Nigerian Politics 3030505081, 9783030505080

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Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development

Rotimi Ajayi Joseph Yinka Fashagba   Editors

Nigerian Politics

Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development Series Editors Diery Seck, CREPOL - Center for Research on Political Economy, Dakar, Senegal Juliet U. Elu, Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, USA Yaw Nyarko, New York University, New York, NY, USA

Africa is emerging as a rapidly growing region, still facing major challenges, but with a potential for significant progress – a transformation that necessitates vigorous efforts in research and policy thinking. This book series focuses on three intricately related key aspects of modern-day Africa: economic, social and political development. Making use of recent theoretical and empirical advances, the series aims to provide fresh answers to Africa’s development challenges. All the socio-­ political dimensions of today’s Africa are incorporated as they unfold and new policy options are presented. The series aims to provide a broad and interactive forum of science at work for policymaking and to bring together African and international researchers and experts. The series welcomes monographs and contributed volumes for an academic and professional audience, as well as tightly edited conference proceedings. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, economic policy and trade, regional integration, labor market policies, demographic development, social issues, political economy and political systems, and environmental and energy issues.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11885

Rotimi Ajayi • Joseph Yinka Fashagba Editors

Nigerian Politics

Editors Rotimi Ajayi Political Science Federal University Lokoja Ido - Ekiti, Nigeria

Joseph Yinka Fashagba Department of Political Science Federal University Lokoja Lokoja, Nigeria

ISSN 2198-7262     ISSN 2198-7270 (electronic) Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development ISBN 978-3-030-50508-0    ISBN 978-3-030-50509-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

In recent years, most of the literature on Nigerian politics have become inadequate in illuminating our understanding of the whole gamut of the politics and politicking in Nigeria. The inadequacy did not arise due to the low quality of the literature; in fact, most of the writers did excellently in compiling those brilliant pieces. Most of them have shed light on specific areas or focused on a period in the history of the nation in such a way that readers in other climes, not familiar with Nigeria, may readily find it accessible, educating, informative and illuminating. However, the coverage and subject specificity of most of the books meant that a few different books must be purchased to truly understand and have broad knowledge of the processes of government and the ways politics has been played in Nigeria from the pre-colonial period to the modern time. Thus, this edited piece, containing twenty five chapters, has been carefully prepared to cover broad areas of Nigerian politics from the pre-colonial era to the modern time. The subject areas covered include: history, politics, policy, economics, government, institutions, foreign policy and the challenges of the Nigerian state. In some instances, we dedicate a number of chapters to some of the subject listed above to cover as much areas as possible. The contributors to this edited volume developed their respective chapters to produce a master piece that we present to you. We achieved this by carefully selecting some seasoned academics from different universities in Nigeria. Efforts to get this project started in 2013. The effort was partially successful but that was not what we desired. Consequently, we had to return to the drawing board because full success is when this project is read all over the world, especially wherever those interested in Nigerian politics as well as the Africanists, the world over, may be able to access the book. The new efforts received fresh live and oil in 2019 with vigorous drive and many days of sleepless night to produce this piece. In chapter one of this book, under the subsection titled, ‘The lay-out of this book’, the lead editor, Dr Joseph Yinka Fashagba, carefully highlights the subject matter covered by each chapter in the order in which the chapters appeared in the book. At different times, this project received professional and moral supports from different scholars and people. Specifically, the idea that gave rise to this project was initially discussed with Dr. Oluwashakin Ajinde, currently with the Department of v

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Political Science, Afe Babalola University, Ado Ekiti and also the late Professor Arthur E. Davies of the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, by Dr. Joseph Yinka Fashagba. Regretfully, Professor Davies passed on in 2018, eight months after his retirement from University of Ilorin. He was a great scholar and a great mentor to the two editors of this volume. He also supervised the Phd of Dr. Joseph Yinka Fashagba. May his soul rest in peace. Therefore, we sincerely express our profound gratitude to Dr. Ajinde and late Davies for their input into this project. Similarly, we are grateful to the late Professor Sunday Otokiti for giving us his moral support through persistent encouragement. Also, all thanks to Professor Ogundiya of the Department of Political Science, Utman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto for the thorough review and editorial work he did on eighteen of the twenty five chapter of this book. Similarly, we appreciate Lorraine Klimowich of the Springer Nature publisher for his encouragement that made this publication a reality. Also many thanks to Shobha Karuppiah, Faith Su and Susan Westendorf and other members of the Springer Nature team as well for their contribution to the production of this book. We also appreciate all our contributors for their hard work, time and for always responding to queries promptly. Many thanks to our families, Mrs. Taiwo Fashagba and Helen Ajayi for their understanding and patience with us while the project lasted. Lastly, all glory to God for his mercies over us and the publication of this book. Lokoja, Nigeria  Joseph Yinka Fashagba

Contents

1 Nigeria: Understanding the Contour of the Political Terrain��������������    1 Joseph Yinka Fashagba 2 Nigeria up to 1914: Some Emerging Political and Economic Issues��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25 Mohammed Audu and Roseline Oshewolo 3 Nigeria Between 1914 and 1960: Political-­Constitutional Changes and Crises in an Era of Colonialism������������������������������������������������������   37 Olajide O. Akanji 4 Postcolonial Nigeria: Power and Politics in the First Republic, 1960–1966�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   55 Daniel Eseme Gberevbie and Samuel Oni 5 The Executive Arm of Government��������������������������������������������������������   77 Stephen Akinyemi Lafenwa and Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon 6 The National Assembly����������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 Joseph Yinka Fashagba and Chiedo Nwankwor 7 The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations: Assessing the Many Phases and Challenges of Nigeria’s Judicial System ����������  125 Agaptus Nwozor 8 Nigeria (Con)Federal Structure?������������������������������������������������������������  165 Emmanuel O. Ojo 9 Local Government/Governance System in Nigeria������������������������������  185 Toyin Abe and Femi Omotoso 10 Bureaucracy, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Policy Establishment����  217 Fatai Ayinde Aremu and Solomon Adebayo Adedire

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11 Party Politics and Political Parties Under Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy in Nigeria��������������������������������������������  233 Margaret Apine and Sophia Balogun 12 Nigerian Economy During Colonial Era: An Overview ����������������������  245 Sunday Olabisi Adewara 13 Debt Crisis, Structural Reforms and Debt Relief ��������������������������������  259 Roseline Oshewolo and Segun Oshewolo 14 Terrorism in Nigeria��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  273 Segun Joshua and Felix Chidozie 15 Postcolonial Party Politics and Some Aspects of Intergroup Relation in Nigeria up to 2019����������������������������������������������������������������  289 Fidelis Achoba and Borok Andrew Maren 16 Nationalism and National Integration in Nigeria ��������������������������������  305 Abubakar Abdulahi and Yahaya T. Baba 17 The Niger Delta, Oil Politics and the Nigerian State����������������������������  321 Luqman Saka, Moh’d Azizuddin Moh’d Sani, and Adedoyin J. Omede 18 Money Politics in the Nigerian Electoral Process ��������������������������������  341 Arthur E. Davies 19 Population Census Administration in Nigeria��������������������������������������  353 J. F. Olorunfemi and Irewolede Fashagba 20 Politics of Pension Administration in Nigeria����������������������������������������  369 Mathew Olasehinde Fashagba 21 Corruption, Politics and Governance in Nigeria����������������������������������  377 Sheriff Folarin 22 Military Intervention in Nigerian Politics ��������������������������������������������  395 Solomon A. Adedire and John. S. Olanrewaju 23 Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Continuity, Change and Contradictions����  407 Segun Oshewolo and Femi Fayomi Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  427

Notes on Contributors

Toyin Abe  is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Ekiti State University. He obtained his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan. He is with the Department of Political Science, Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti. His papers have appeared in both local and international outlets. His key areas of expertise include Governance, Political Economy, Public Policy, International Relations and Development Studies. Abubakar  Abdulallahi  is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Uthman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto. Solomon Adedire  holds a PhD degree and he is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Landmark University, Kwara State. He is holder of a doctoral degree in Political Science. Sunday Olabisi Adewara  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics, Landmark University, Nigeria. He is a holds a PhD degree in Economics. Rotimi Ajayi  is Professor of Political Science and the pioneer Vice Chancellor of Landmark University, Omuaran, Kwara State, Nigeria. He is currently with the Department of Political Science, Federal University Lokoja. He is a holder of a PhD degree from the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. His areas of research interests span comparative politics, political economy and public administration. Professor Ajayi has won a number of local and international awards at different times. He was with the University of Texas on Fellowship between 1993 and 1994. He has published extensively in both local and foreign outlets. He was Acting Head of Department of Political Science, Delta State University, Abraka; Head, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State; and Dean, College of Development Stusies, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun state.

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Olajide O. Akanji  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan. He holds a PhD degree in Political Science from the same university. He was with the King’s College, London, as a research fellow for 18 month between 2011 and 2013. He has participated in several local and international workshops and conferences. He is an alumnus of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Africa Workshop. His publications have appeared in both local and international journals. Margaret  Apine  is Lecturer I in the Department of Political Science, Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria. Fatai A. Aremu  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Asia Pacific Studies from the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Japan) where he was awarded a ‘Certificate of Merit for Outstanding Quality of Dissertation’. His research focus covers Comparative Institutions, International Political Economy, Asia-Pacific and Development Studies. He is the author of Asymmetrical Foreign Policy Behaviour of Japan and China (2011). He is co-editor (with H. A. Saliu) of Introduction to International Relations (2012) and Introduction to Political Science (forthcoming). His works have appeared in several reputable journals including African and Asian Studies, Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies and Asia Pacific World among others. He is an alumnus of several methodology training programmes including the prestigious APSA Africa Methodology Workshop and Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) as well as the American Political Science Association (APSA) Africa Workshop among others. Mohammed  S.  Audu  is Professor of History at Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria. He holds a doctorate degree in History and is currently Head of the Department of History at the Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria. Moh’d  Azizuddin  Moh’d Sani is Professor of Political Science, School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia. Yahaya  T.  Baba  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Uthman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto. He holds a PhD degree in Political Science from the same university. He has published widely on democratic governance, especially legislative studies. He has participated in several local and international workshops and conferences. He is an alumnus of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Africa Workshop. Sophia Osebi Balogun  is Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria. Felix Chidozie  is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Covenant University, Ogun State. He is doctoral candidate in the same university.

Notes on Contributors

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Arthur  E.  Davies  is late Professor of Political Science and former Head of Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He obtained his PhD from the University of Lagos, Nigeria, after which he joined the University of Ilorin. He focuses on comparative politics and political theory. His papers have appeared in several reputable local and international journals. Moses  M.  Duruji  is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ogun State. He obtained his doctorate degree from the same university. He is a specialist in conflict studies. Joseph Yinka Fashagba  is an Associate Professor and the Head of Department of Political Science, Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria. Fashagba holds a PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. Fashagba specialises in African politics and democratic institutions with particular interest in legislative studies. His papers have appeared in both local and international journals. He has presented papers in different countries and institutions. He coedited the African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power with Professors Carl LeVan of the School of International Service, American University, Washington DC, and Edward MacMahon of University of Vermont. His newly co-edited book published by Springer Nature in 2019 was titled The Nigerian National Assembly. Irewole Fashagba  is a Lecturer in Kwara State PolyTechnic. He holds a doctoral degree from the Department of Geography, University of Ilorin. His papers have appeared in a number of local outlets. His research interest is population studies. Matthew Olasehinde Fashagba  is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Business Administration at Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria. He is a holder of the PhD degree in Business Administration with special interest in actuarial studies. Femi Fayomi  is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Nigeria. Sheriff  Folarin  is Professor and Head of Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ogun State, Nigeria. He is a holder of the PhD in Political Science Degree at Covenant University. Daniel Eseme Gberevbie  is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ogun State. He holds BSc, MSc and PhD degrees in Political Science and Public Administration. Currently, he is the Deputy Dean, School of Social Sciences. He is a member of Nigerian Institute of Management, Nigerian Association of Political Science and Chartered Institute of Personnel Management of Nigeria (CIPMN).

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Segun Joshua  is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Kola Daisi University, Ibadan, Oyo State. He obtained his doctorate degree from the same university. His areas of interest include: Comparative Politics, Governance, Violence, Conflict and Peace Studies. Steven Lafenwa  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He holds a PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan. Dr Lafenwa writes on democratic institutions/governance. He has participated in several local and international conferences. Chiedo Nwankwor  is a Lecturer and Research Associate in the African Studies Program, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Stusies, Washington DC. Agaptus Nwozor  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu-Aran. He obtained his PhD degree in Political Science from University Nigeria, Nzuka. His research interest is in comparative studies, international relations and conflict studies. Shola John Olarewaju  holds a PhD in Political Science and he is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Landmark University, Nigeria J. F. Olorunfemi  is Professor of Geography and specialist in Population Studies. He has consulted for different organisations at local, national and international levels. His papers have appeared in reputable local and foreign outlets. He is with the Department of Geography, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. He has been visiting professor to different universities. He is currently with the Obahemi Awolowo University as a visiting Professor. Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon  is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Redeemer’s University, Ogun State. He is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. Adedoyin J. Omede  is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. She was acting Head of Department. She obtained her PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Lagos. Femi Omotoso  is Professor of Political Science. He obtained his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He is the Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ekiti State University, and former Director of the Part Time Programme of the institution. He has published articles in reputable journals both locally and internationally and has contributed chapters in books. Professor Omotoso has edited several books including Readings in Political Behaviour.

Notes on Contributors

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Samuel  Oni  is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ogun State. He obtained his doctorate from the same university. He is a specialist in legislative studies. Segun  Oshewolo  is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Landmark University, Omu-Aran. He obtained his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Ilorin. He has appeared in several local and international journals. His area of specialization is International Relations Roseline M. Oshewolo  is a Lecturer in the Department of History of the Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria. Luqman  Saka  is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He obtained his doctorate degree from the Universiti Utara Malaysia.

Chapter 1

Nigeria: Understanding the Contour of the Political Terrain Joseph Yinka Fashagba Abstract  This chapter examines Nigerian politics from historical perspective. It provides the necessary background information about politics and government in Nigeria. It looks at politics in the pre-colonial, colonial and the post-colonial periods. It examines the characters of the Nigerian state, looking at the economic, political and social characters of the state, especially in the periods after independence. It provides information about how each has evolved over the years and what shaped each over time. This chapter also provides detailed information about the chapterization of the book. The book has three major components. The first one presents the history of Nigeria, focusing on both the political and economic spheres. The second one looks at the institutions of government and governance. Another section also focuses on the Nigerian administrative structure. We also have a section that focuses on themes that help us to understand the contemporary Nigerian politics from every necessary angle. Keywords  Nigeria · Nigerian state · Colonialism · Federal government · Independence · State, Ethnicity

Introduction Nigeria is one of the most complex states in the modern world and perhaps one of the most complicated countries to govern. The complexity is evident in the heterogeneous nature of the state. Indeed, there is a significant and obvious diversity among the various tribal or ethnic groups in the various regions of the country. Most writers believe that while Nigeria has essentially three major ethnic groups and two major religions, the total number of ethnic groups in Nigeria has remained a subject of speculation. Many have put the number of ethnic groups in the region of around 250. The number of local dialects in Nigeria is well over 1000. The diversity is evident in the various cultural, linguistic and religious practices among the diverse

J. Y. Fashagba (*) Department of Political Science, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_1

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groups. The diversity among the peoples was so obvious that the British colonial administration had to carefully embrace and introduce the federal system in the 1950s to minimize inter-group conflict and encourage the independence of groups within their respective states while working for unity in diversity. The creation of three regions along the dominant ethnic group lines under colonial administration between 1914 and 1960 was a deliberate step to enable each group to be self- governed and protect its cherished traditions and customs through laws, policies and administrative processes that address the peculiarities of the group. Perhaps, it was also considered necessary to allow each group to develop at its own pace, especially considering that the Northern region was behind the two Southern regions, politically and economically. Although at the early stage of statehood the colonial administration administered the various groups or regions separately, in 1914, the British colonial administration took a bold step to unite the various groups that were essentially divided into three by Rivers Niger and Benue (Williams 1967: 1074). We should point out at this stage that the amalgamation of the three distinct major sections, housing different groups, namely, the three major ethnic groups and hundreds of minorities, was executed by British administrative fiat as the people being brought together never had a say in the forced merger. The interest of the British rather than that of the colony superceded any other consideration in the amalgamation of the disparate groups. The failure of the British government to seek the consent of the various groups before welding them into a political unit has continued to have adverse consequences on the state and inter-group relations after several decades of existence. Under the arrangement, the Northern Protectorate was carved out for the north, and the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Protectorate became one political entity in the South. The latter was called the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The two distinct protectorates were thus brought under one umbrella to create Nigeria. By this, Nigeria was officially birthed as a nation in 1914. Prior to the forced amalgamation of the disparate groups in 1914, most groups had existed as distinct autonomous political community or unit. The independence that the various traditional societies and political systems had enjoyed was either further weakened or aborted on January 1, 1914, by Lord Lugard through the amalgamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Osaghae 1998). It suffices to point out that the advent of colonial administration put an end to an era in the Nigerian political history. To be sure, prior to colonialism, especially up to the nineteenth century, the peoples of Nigeria had developed and operated some indigenous, formal political and administrative systems with varying degrees of sophistication and success. Some had well-­organized administrative and bureaucratic structure that though were traditional but with clear roles and job specification and specialization. The old Oyo Empire and the Sultanate system of the old Sokoto caliphates are clear examples of such well-­developed, centralized and sophisticated pre-colonial states. Thus, before the colonial period created the large state christened Nigeria, the different peoples had lived in their different ancestry lands and under independent political systems. Despite this, evidence of inter-group relations abound, especially in the areas of commerce, diplo-

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macy and wars, in the pre-colonial period. Each group had adopted a political arrangement it considered suitable to the group. This perhaps explains why the Igbo people of the Eastern Nigeria opted for a system that did not encourage a centralized authority yet had a well-organized social and administrative structure that made policies and carried out all administrative, religious and social activities (Davies 1998). However, while the colonial administration settled for the federal arrangement as a device to achieve unity in diversity in Nigeria, and as if to justify the reason for the adoption of the system, the Nigerian federal system has demonstrated a measure of resilience in the face of the consistent threat of dissolution that it often face. To be sure, inter-group relations has remained suspect from colonial era till date, acrimonious, volatile and fragile relations among groups are the hallmark of the day to day realities of the modern Nigerian state. Therefore, developing a state out of the many nations has been futile and remained a dream. The result of this is the governance chaos and persistent inter-group conflicts that have produced some adverse ­multiplier effects on the sociopolitical economy of Nigeria (Fashagba 2019a). The complication in the union is currently evidenced by widespread political, ethnicreligion polarization and violence; regional or sectional rather than national loyalty; adversarial political competition; and bitter struggle for power and resources among the various ethnic groups (Fashagba 2009, 2010). In other words, the destabilizing effects of the inter-group struggles, competition and acrimonies had resulted in avoidable political tension and instability from time to time; military intervention in political; sectionalism; ethno-religious violence and tension; economic tension and crisis; lack of and inconsistent economic plans and policy focus; economic deprivation and mass poverty; religious polarization and violence; and the absence of a true Nigerian in the real sense of the word. In recent years, terrorism, banditry and commercial kidnapping have emerged to further demonstrate the pathetic and near hopelessness of the state. Furthermore, loyalty to the Nigerian state is a rarity in Nigeria, not even among the rulers of Nigeria is loyalty to the state considered salient. This is evidenced by the actions of those who rule the state from one time to the other. Most often, sectional interest is equated with national interest, and the appointments made by some of the rulers are clear indicators of where their loyalty lies. This is most obvious in recent years under President Muhammadu Buhari. Indeed, his approach to governance is such that apart from exhibiting outright disdain for the rule of law and the court, his sectional and ethnic loyalty is an open secret. Although the government had at various times adopted policies aimed at uniting the various groups, the actions of most administrations have deepened and exacerbated the differences among groups rather than uniting them. Often, national integrative policies have been observed in breach than in observance by those in the government. Therefore, the ordinary citizens have no examples to emulate in terms of determining where their loyalty should lie. Nurturing the state to political independence lasted 46 years from 1914. Indeed, it was a period characterized by gradual but significant transformation and re-­ ordering of the political, economic and social orders of the emerging state. However,

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the development and transformation that the nation went through during this period, coupled with the evident differences in the pre-colonial political and socioeconomics as well as religious orientation and practices among groups, have largely defined the current character and nature of the state. For instance, while the British Colonial Administration introduced the modern political administrative and governance systems, tribalism as a political phenomenon, according to Ekeh, found its way into the Nigerian political landscape under colonial administration. Similarly, prior to the colonial intrusion, the different ethnic groups in the geographical space now known as Nigeria had established some forms of different administrative and political systems in the various areas (Davies 1998). Nevertheless, the British colonial administration was responsible for the introduction of modern constitution to Nigeria. In 1922, the first constitution was crafted and promulgated in Britain for Nigeria. This was under the Clifford-led colonial administration in Nigeria. By this, the political fate of the people of Nigeria was determined and firmly held by the British without any form of consultation with the people (Oyediran 1988). Essentially, as earlier noted, this step was motivated first and foremost by the economic interest of Britain. To maximize its economic opportunities, for instance, the British colonial administration had to introduce two administrative systems, viz. the direct and indirect rule for the northern and southern protectorates, respectively (Davies 1998). The British also promulgated the 1946, 1953, 1954 and finally 1960 constitutions for Nigeria. Under the gradual transformation, some modern political institutions and instruments, namely, the elective principle, political parties, modern legislature and executive and judicial arms, were developed. Most significantly, considering the heterogeneous nature of the society, the regionalization of party formation, membership and support and the emerging political struggle and competition for power among the various ethnic groups, the British colonial government had to introduce a federal arrangement in 1954. For about 66  years (1954–2020) that the federal system has been operated in Nigeria, it has often appeared to be on trial. Over these years, despite the overwhelming centrifugal tendencies that weighed upon it, federalism has exhibited a huge measure of resilience. This is evident in its continuous existence after the brutal civil of 1967 to 1970 and the severe ethnic crisis over the annulment of the June 12, 1993, presidential election believed to have been won by a Yoruba man. The brutal, deadly and violence unleashed on several communities, especially Christian-dominated communities by the Muslim Fulanis since the emergence of Buhari, a Fulani and one-time patron of the Fulani in West Africa, as president in 2015, has further raised the question about the future of the Nigerian state. Some referred to the national challenge simply as farmers-herdsmen conflict, while others saw it as ethnic cleansing or war to exterminate Christians. Consequently, while Nigeria became independent in 1960 and a republic in 1963, the myriads of developmental and state building challenges confronting the state have often driven the call for the negotiation of the terms and conditions for the continued existence of the union. In recent years, three national conferences were organized by different administrations to discuss and resolve the challenges of the

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state, but the political will to translate the reports of the conferences into legal and national working documents has been lacking. With its independence in 1960, much hope was placed on Nigeria to emerge as one of the greatest countries in the world. The expectation was certainly not a misplaced one, considering the potential of the nation in human and natural resources. But the realities after about 106 years as a nation and 60 years as a sovereign state suggest that the huge challenges confronting the nation have marred its major aspiration to be a giant in Africa and frustratingly obstructed the realization of the expectations held at independence. This, perhaps, prompted Osaghae (1998) to describe Nigeria as a “crippled giant”. Thus, the time is ripe for an interrogation of most issues surrounding Nigeria as a nation. Consequently, this text examines the structure and institutions of the state, the operation of the system, its politics and economics and the challenges of the nation. However, before going into the details, it is important to briefly undertake an overview of politics in Africa and thereafter examine the character or nature of the Nigerian state.

Post-colonial African States: A Brief Review Colonial rulers from different European countries dominated African politics for over a century until the 1950s when both internal struggles against colonialism and external pressure to dismantle colonialism started to yield some positive results. By the 1950s, a few African states had secured political independence. In the 1960s, more colonial administrations transferred power to the local or indigenous elites. Interestingly, after independence, most African states discarded the various colonial institutions and legacies bequeathed to them. To be sure, many countries replaced the parliamentary system of government with a presidential arrangement. Nigeria is one of the several African countries that introduced and adopted the presidential system in place of the inherited parliamentary system (Fashagba 2019a). Similarly, most multiparty systems collapsed in rapid succession and were replaced by one-­ party regime. Examples of countries where the legacies of colonial administration disappeared, following the transfer of power to the indigenous people, include Ghana under Nkrumah, Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta, among others. Indeed, considering the multidimensional assaults unleashed on the democratic structures and institutions inherited by the local political elites, following the departure of the colonialists, it is not surprising that the seeds of instability were sown which germinated in due course, giving rise to myriads of challenges in all political ramifications. Some of the consequences of the actions of the inheritors of power at independence include acrimonious party politics, military intervention, ethno-religious conflict and political violence as well as bitter competition for powers by different ethnic groups. The economies of almost all the former colonies have been affected directly or indirectly by the post-colonial politics of the local elites.

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Following the dismantling of the democratic structures inherited at independence, most post-independent African states metamorphosed from colonial states to sovereign but politically unstable states. Economically, the gains made at independence in terms of gradual economic growth and development were either retarded or completely reversed. Although the colonialists only took decisions that advanced their narrow interest while they held sway in Africa, the local elites who inherited power at independence did not succeed at putting their respective states on the path of development. Nevertheless, the post-colonial protracted and intractable political challenges and conditions confronting most of the nations have been partly blamed or attributed to the legacy of colonialism (Mafeje 2002). For instance, in a desperate bid to rid the states of colonial legacies, the inherited structures were (in certain instances) subjected to reform, while in others a replacement was instituted in place of the “unsuitable” inherited colonial institutions (Sellasie 1974). The restructuring was most visible in the political arena where the inherited democratic institutions did not only transform from one particular governance model to the other but also in the eroding and dismantling of the democratic principles and structures. Indeed, some states, including Nigeria, which inherited the parliamentary system at independence, hurriedly replaced the system with a presidential system. In other countries like Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia, one-party regime replaced the multiparty structure that the colonialists left behind. The manipulation of the inherited institutions and the mis-governance resulting therefrom led to the invasion of politics by the military (Mafeje 2002). Thus, authoritarian regimes of various shapes, either in the form of one-party rule or military, replaced the independent democratic regimes and structure. The collapse of the democracies left behind by the colonialists could be interpreted differently: from the point of view of the local political elites who were the direct beneficiaries of the new system, it was best to ensure an accelerated development of the continent; it diminished or eliminated economic dependence and ensures a true self-governance. On the other hand, it represented a self-serving agendum to hold on to power as well as banish opposition. Under the one-party regime or military dictatorship, the parliaments either were abrogated or became subordinated to the executive, while corruption thrives with impunity. Weak state institutions emerged— a situation necessitated by the need of the authoritarian regime to reduce the ability of any institution to challenge its growing power. The attendant political instability precipitated by both the military and civilian ruling class pushed Africa into serious political and governance crises. However, like in most other continents of the world, some African states experienced a temporary respite of some sort from the authoritarian regimes, especially in the 1970s, but not for too long before authoritarian regimes resurfaced. Yet, sustained internal and external pressure resulted in a seeming emancipation of the states as fresh air of civilian regimes and multiparty democracies returned in the 1990s (Boadi 1998). According to about 26 African countries were either democratic or committed to serious democratic transition by the end of 1991. While the transition to democracy in Africa faced severe challenges in different countries but went smoothly in the others, the post-transition in some other

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countries has thrown up different challenges all together. As Kayinga et  al. (2010) noted, periodic elections have not necessarily translated into democratic consolidation in Africa. In addition, they argued that democratization has taken place without a concomitant process of change in the institutions of governance; the presidential arrangement grafted on the first-past-the-post has culminated in adversarial politics; election periods become a period when groups compete for power to access values; the rise of new demands and new forms of competing identities; and the rising influence of ethnicity and religious on voting. In what appears to be a worst-case scenario, by 2020, democracy in Nigeria has been reduced to election by bullets instead of ballots. Indeed, Eldozie (2008) summed these up when he noted that economic, social and political factors are very visible in the inability of most democracies to consolidate in Africa. Thus, caught in the web of global call for democratization, Nigeria returned to democratic governance in 1999. However, the restoration of democracy in 1999 appeared to have thrown up some new form of sociopolitical challenges. These challenges and other salient issues in Nigerian politics are discussed in detail in a number of chapters in this text. Although democracy returned to Africa, most states in the North of Africa remained under authoritarian regimes. In North Africa, democracy appeared ­non-­feasible until 2011, when the Arab Spring, a mass revolt of the citizenry of countries like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, led to the collapse of the authoritarian regimes. However, the emerging trend in Egypt, where in 2013 a democratically elected government was disposed by the military less than 1 year in office, partly due to its authocratic approach to governance, points to the fact that a change of regime may not necessarily translate to the arrival of democracy (Masoud 2011). Yet the successful election of a new president in Algeria in 2019 and Tunisia in the same year suggests that there is hope for democracy in North Africa.

Understanding the Context of Nigerian Politics Essentially, the modern state of Nigeria was created by the British colonial government in the early twentieth century. The colonialists nurtured the state for another 46 years before transferring political powers to an indigenous government in 1960. By virtue of its colonial origin, its earlier political, administrative and judicial arrangement benefited from tutelage of the colonial administration. Apart from the parliamentary system which was eventually discarded, some of the legacies of the colonial administration are still very evident in some areas of the national life, especially in the federal system (Fashagba 2019a). Consequently, the colonial origin of the state has continued to shape its post-colonial politics, politicking and institutions. Indeed, the structures of the politics, society and economy in Nigeria often exhibit strong colonial influences. Nigeria is a complex state, and its politics is most often complicated and unpredictable. The level of volatility of the state is such that violence and ten-

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sion of both ethnic, tribal and religious shapes co-habit with a very fragile and unstable peace. As earlier noted, the country is heterogeneous consisting of over 250 ethnic groups (Osuntokun 2013), scores of distinct languages and cultural and religious groups. When the complexity and heterogeneity of the state with their attendant complications are taken into account in any analysis of the Nigerian politics, it will become easy to understand the political, economic and social characteristics of the state and the political realities that have played out over the years. It suffices to note that prior to this study, many works addressing the issue of colonial administration and legacies in Nigeria have been written; hence there is no need repeating what others have already sufficiently documented. However, in a book on Nigerian Politics, it is important to lay emphasis on the context within which politics is played in all its ramifications and its implications on the country. For a start, a brief discussion of the political, economic and social contexts will suffice.

The Political Context of Nigerian Politics Nigeria’s journey to the current fourth republic (starting from 1999) was politically turbulent and interesting. Looking at both the colonial and the postcolonial periods, for instance, the emergence of the modern democratic institutions like political parties, legislature, executive and judiciary, the federal arrangement; the independence in 1960; the collapse of the first republic and the scrapping of the parliamentary democracy by the military and consequent military regimes; the coup and the counter-­coups of the 1960s to the 1990s; the civil war of 1967–1970; the June 12, 1993, presidential election crisis; the reign of terror under General Abacha; the introduction of religion into politics couched in Sharia law in some Northern states such as Zamfara state under Ahmed Sani Yerima as state government; the series of ethno-religious conflicts resulting in thousands of deaths; the constitutional crisis over the prolonged absence of the late President Yar’Adua from office due to illness and attendant politicking; the emergence and politicization of terrorism, especially the Boko Haram terrorist group; the agitation for resource control by the resource bearing states of the Niger Delta; the emergence of militia of various shapes (Fashagba 2019); and the recent creation of Amotekun (the six southwestern states regional security initiative) by the six Yoruba-speaking states in 2020 and the electoral frauds and violence are significant political events that have defined politics in Nigeria over the past decades or century. As we have already mentioned, Nigeria was created and nurtured by Britain. The implication is that the modern political institutions such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as well as political parties entered the political space called Nigeria either through the conscious actions of the colonialists or as a response to the political imperative of that period. For instance, political movement and parties emerged following the introduction of the legislative institution and the granting of

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three legislative seats to Lagos and one to Calabar in 1922. Similarly, a federal administrative system was adopted in 1954, with a view to ensuring unity in diversity, considering the heterogeneous character of the emerging state. Consequently, the colonial legacies bequeathed the nation have in different ways affected and continued to shape the political temperament of Nigeria. However, in other instances, the colonial legacies have been replaced through the conscious efforts of the local elites to further their sectional, ethnic or personal agenda. This has been visible in the behaviours of the elites in the formal and informal governmental institutions as well as in private life. One of the institutions in which this has been evident is the legislature. In order to understand the context of legislative behaviour in Nigeria, a retrospective evaluation of its origin is inevitable. Unlike in Britain where the parliament was the product of intense elites’ clamour for representation and participation in various socioeconomic and political decisions (Smith 1980; Posner and Park 2007), the legislative institution in Nigeria is not only a product of imperialism but was certainly not created for law-making. Indeed, at inception, it was a symbolic institution established to deliberate and advise the then Governor General (Jimoh 1999). Until the early 1950s when some measures of institutional relevance and roles were granted to the assemblies, they remained largely subordinated to the Governor General, a Britain appointed as a colonial representative/administrator (Omoweh 2006). The legislative institution was unable to overcome this historical institutional sterility even after independence. Consequently, the first and second republic legislatures were so weak that they were incapable of protecting democratic rule. According to Fish (2006), a weak legislature is a liability to democracy because the weaker an assembly is, the weaker the democracy will be and vice versa. Although the post-independence legislatures were institutionally weak, they nevertheless became the arena to pursue personal, ethnic and party agenda rather than serving as platform for national integration and development. However, the fourth republic central legislature has been adjudged as strong and assertive (Lewis 2009). Fashagba (2019b) noted that although it has its shortcomings, unlike the previous republics, the fourth republic legislature at the national level has demonstrated strength in the face of executive bullying and intimidation and has thus been assertive. Despite the remarks about the fourth republic legislatures, the frequent scandals in the central legislature, bordering on financial impropriety, which is partly a function of the self-­ serving orientation of the legislature, have eroded its ability to effectively fulfil its oversight and representational responsibilities (Fashagba 2009, 2011a). Perhaps due to this development, it appears there is a disconnect between the legislature and the people. It suffices to note that the legislature has been disbanded on three occasions due to military intervention at different times (Fashagba 2011a, 2019b). Successive military coup meant that the legislature remained in abeyance as long as the military held sway. Consequently, the legislature was shut out of governance between 1966 and 1979 and from 1983 to 1999. However, the legislature made a short return from 1979 to 1983 under the second republic, before it was dissolved once again follow-

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ing a military intervention in 1983. In a similar vein, the legislature made a brief appearance on the political space between 1991 and 1993, under what is commonly called the aborted third republic. The incessant abrogation of the institution has undermined its institutional development and capacity vis-a-vis the executive and the judiciary. The low institutional capacity and development of the assembly was very evident in its performance at the inception of the fourth republic between 1999 and 2003 (Fashagba 2009; Olson 2002). Although legislature returned in 1999 under the fourth republic and appears assertive and strong (Lewis 2009), it suffers from serious integrity, credibility and trust deficit. Tragically, a corrupt legislature is as dangerous to democratic sustainability as a weak assembly. Corruption in the legislature will starve off the political capacity of the institution to fight corruption in the other organs (Kpundeh and Dininio 2006). While the legislature has remained the least developed among the three arms of government and remains the weak point in successive democratic regimes, it is definitely not only the institution that has suffered in the hands of the various post military regimes. Political parties have also often been victims of military intervention at various times. Historically, the Nigerian political parties have been incapable of providing the platform for national integration, a major function the political party performs in modern democracies. In Nigeria, parties of the first and second republics were largely ethnic-based with their membership and voting support drawn from their ethnic groups (Agbese and Anim 1996). Indeed, the parties formed during colonial rule, which eventually inherited power at independence in 1960, wielded enormous influence only in their respective regions (Osaghae 1998). While this was largely a reflection of the diversity in the federation, it was a dis-incentive for unity and national integration. Not even the occasional fragile coalition among parties (Northern People’s Congress (NPC)/National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) 1960–1966 and National Party of Nigeria (NPN)/Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) 1979–1981) could mitigate the negative effect of the dis-integrative party practice. Instead of unity in diversity, the ethnicization of party formation and membership have often further the fragmentation, sectionalization and polarization among groups. As Omoweh (2006:13) observed in his comments on the political parties of the first republic, “political competition was so ethnic based that none of the major parties could win a majority in the 1960 general elections”. Although a coalition government was formed by the NPC and NCNC, while the Action Group (AG) formed the opposition, the arrangement did not translate into national integration. No point demonstrates this better than the military assault led by a crop of southeastern soldiers against the northern elite dominated federal/coalition government. Thus, the three major parties of the republic failed in providing the necessary platform for national integration. Indeed, their actions or inaction not only prompted military intervention in politics but also almost led to the disintegration of the country following the coup and counter-coup and the civil war lasting for 30 months that the unfettered ethnicization of politics and governance precipitated (Okpu 1985; Olumide 2010).

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The second republic came on board in 1979 and collapsed in 1983, but the various transitions to democratic rule embarked upon by the military were bereft of official sincerely. No point proves this than the crisis that Babangida administration unleashed on Nigeria, due to his annulment of the 1993 presidential election. Although the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida had to create two political parties and made it mandatory for all politicians to join and actualize their ambition on the platform of any of the two parties, namely, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), with the aim of checking ethnicization of party politics and largely succeeded in achieving the objective, the transition was abruptly terminated. In the next round of transition that followed, General Sani Abacha was to all intent and purpose aimed at succeeding himself. The aborted third republic (1991–1993) and the current republic (1999 to date) appear to fair better as ethnic-based political parties have become unfashionable. Although some ethnic parties have emerged and vanished, an example is AD, while one, especially APGA, is still around under the fourth republic, the political parties have become increasingly national in outlook, membership and operation in the fourth republic than the first and the second republics. It appears that there is an increasing realization of the disadvantages and limitation imposed on political competition by regional or ethnic party. As Obiyan (1999:43) argued, “the existence of ‘national political parties,’ particularly in a pluralist society holds great promise for promoting a cohesive, stable democratic party”. However, the extent to which this development could be sustained is another issue in Nigeria. In addition, a major issue in the political discourse is the question relating to what type of constitution is appropriate and how should the federal arrangement be operated in Nigeria for the benefit of all. There are those who argued that the unsuitability of the parliamentary constitution of the first republic to a multiethnic society like Nigeria led to the collapse of the republic (Fashagba 2011b). The collapse of the second republic despite the switch to the presidential arrangement, however, appears to vitiate those who hinged the collapse of the first republic on the parliamentary constitution. This perhaps explains why Nwosu (1998) contended that the adversarial behaviour of the operators of the constitutions and republics was responsible for their collapse rather the content of the constitutions. Furthermore, the federal system has oscillated between strong and weak federalism as well as between federal and unitary from time to time and regime to regime, depending on whether the state is under a democratic or military regime. The mode of creation of the federal arrangement has continued to haunt its operation. Indeed, the colonial origin of the federation evident in a forced merger of formerly autonomous and distinct and sometimes incompatible peoples, the geographical lopsidedness and the failure of the colonial administration to address the alleged marginalization of the agitated minorities are major issues that constantly expose the state to political threat and inter-group tension. This is captured by Fatile and Adejuwon (2002) in reference to the situation of Nigeria at independence, “its artificial origin, coupled with other factors, had bequeathed it a number of fundamental problems, one of which is the challenge of integrating into a cohesive socio-­political

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whole, the various entities and strange bedfellows that were largely lumped together by the colonialists”. This, according to them, resulted in mal-integration of the diverse ethnic groups within the new state. The implication is that virtually all groups have distrust for one another (Ojo 2002). According to Ojo, because the federal arrangement is an unbalanced one, evident in both population size and land mass, all segments of the federation including the majority and minority groups have often accused and insinuated against one another allegation of marginalization. The imbalance in the federal arrangement has resulted in the monopolization of power by a section of the country for about 44 out of 60 years as a nation. Between 1960 and 1999, the north controlled the central government for 30 years leaving only 5 years for the south. From 1999 to 2020 the South has ruled for 13 years also under the current fourth republic. The implication of dominating government at the centre was the disproportionate allocation of resources. Indeed, some of the states that produce the wealth of the nation appeared to grow lean, while states which contribute little or nothing to the national purse receive substantial government funding. This has made some states to be parasitic, as they depend on fund transfer from the revenue generated by the Federal government from oil (extracted from some southern states) to fund their annual budgets. However, the evident or perceived injustice in the resource distributive policy of successive regimes, which started under successive military regimes, has given rise to several problems that are now redefining politics in Nigeria. For instance, the agitation for resource control by the oil-bearing states and the militia activities in the Niger Delta region are some of the consequences of the prolonged neglect of the region by the northern-elites controlled Federal government. Indeed, the Ogoni people had once contemplated secession, to follow the like of the Ibo that attempted to secede to form the Biafra republic between 1967 and 1970. The lopsidedness in the federal arrangement; the complaint against marginalization by groups out of power at any given time; the intractable corrupt practices among elected public office holders and the public/civil service or servants; the acrimonious and sometimes violent intra-ethnic, inter-tribal and inter-religion relations; ineffective and weak state institutions; as well as absence of fair and just distributive principle of national wealth, especially under the military regimes, have often given rise to what some writers call the national questions. The issues around which the national questions revolve have consequently often exposed Nigeria to political instability and threat of democratic reversal. Although democracy has replaced military rule, the circle of political tension remains an issue. Thus, while democracy appeared to have been relatively stable and resilient since 1999, despite some challenges like flawed elections, high level of corruption, militia and terrorism, among others, Nigeria has transformed from politically unstable to a politically and democratically fragile state. This perhaps prompted the United States to predict that Nigeria could break up in 2015 (Carson 2010). What accounts for this? This question and salient issues raised in this section have been given necessary and adequate attention in subsequent chapters.

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Economic Context of the State The Nigerian economy emerged with a great promise from the colonial administration in 1960. The hope was based on the strong agricultural-based export-oriented economy coupled with the increasing oil revenue accruing to Nigeria from the abundant hydrocarbon in the Niger Delta. This was a period when the three and later four (1963) regions wielded very significant political power and were financially viable. To be sure, “At independence, the western region was the richest, as a result of the presence of the capital and port of Lagos, cocoa production and the industrial development as well as early access to education”. Although the eastern region economically depended on palm oil production, it was still viable despite depending on food importation as a result of substantial population pressure. However, the northern region which was the largest in both population and land mass was the poorest (Human Rights Watch 1999), despite its huge potential in farming. In 2019, the Federal government announced that the long search for petroleum in the North had yielded fruit with the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the Gombe basin. This is a new development that will in the nearest future shape inter-group relations and agitation for a change in revenue allocation. With time, the increasing oil wealth resulted in a declining desire or outright loss of interest to expand the economy on the basis of diversification of the revenue base of the nation. The implication was the diminishing interest in developing the agricultural sector, which was the major backbone of the Nigerian economy prior to the advent of oil revenue. Thus, while Nigeria with its huge population and natural resource endowment has a great potential to compete successfully on the global stage, it had failed to harness its potential largely due to over-dependence on the oil sector (Nnamani 2007). Steadily but avoidably, Nigeria descended into the narrow path of a mono-economy. Indeed, “the Nigerian economy is almost completely dependent on revenue derived from oil. The contribution of oil to the total annual foreign exchange earnings of the country stands at about 90 percent” (Aghalino 2002). The increasing oil revenue from oil not only did lead to the neglect of the agricultural sector but also increasingly altered the federal practice thereby making the constituent states weaker and financially dependent on the centre. Indeed, the oil-based economy appears to have engendered a macro-economic distortion evident in the volatility of the Nigerian economy. In a commentary in the March 4, 2013, issue of The Punch newspaper, it was pointed out that, “we maintain that oil price volatility remains a threat to the long run sustainability of the Nigerian income profile” (FSDH Merchant Bank’s report, March 4, 2013:31). Not only does the international oil price movement affect Nigerian revenue profile from time to time, due to the regime of price instability, it also exposes the Nigerian local currency, the Naira, to fluctuation. As observed, “in Nigeria, oil price increase leads to depreciation of the naira”. On the macro-level, the nation’s dependence on mass consumption has expanded, while its exportation of manufactured goods has contracted over the years. For instance, while the total value of non-oil export of Nigeria stood at $103,417,649 in

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2002, Kenya, a non-oil exporting but inward looking economy, recorded non-oil export revenue of $188,766,880, in the same year. Thus, the expanding oil revenue of the state has adversely eroded the need to diversify the economy. The tragic consequences include the growing unemployment rate, high level of poverty and conflict in the oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta. More striking is the way the wealth of the nation is being appropriated by the ruling, bureaucratic and military elites either through over bloated emoluments, over invoicing of contracts or other means. This has resulted in a contradiction as the majority of the citizenry live in abject poverty, while the few rich are enjoying the common wealth. Similarly, not only is the Nigerian economy oil dependent, but also it always responds to global oil price movement and is largely susceptible to global oil shock. This often threatens Nigeria’s macro-economic stability and fiscal policy. The failure to diversify has eroded the shock-absorbing capacity of the economy. Indeed, one major way that Nigeria’s sovereignty is yearly assaulted is that the national annual budget is often tied to the international oil price. The implication is that setting the appropriate benchmark in dollars term becomes not only an economic issue but also a political challenge. Indeed, from 1999 to 2019, several executive-­ legislature conflicts have been precipitated by the argument over the appropriate benchmark to adopt in the successive annual budgets (Eminue 2006; Fashagba 2009, 2010). The agitation of the oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta over the need for a fair compensation for the resources extracted from their lands as well as the need to compensate them for the attendant negative environmental impacts of oil exploration including environmental devastation and degradation was at a point undermining the ability of Nigeria to meets its supply obligation to the international market based on the quantity allocated to it by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Kew and Lewis 2010). The over-dependence on oil coupled with the fact that the central government keeps and allocates oil revenue has not only resulted in frequent intense struggle for control of power at the centre by the various ethnic groups, but it has also turned the nation into a rentier state. A rentier state is a term applied in politics to classify those states which derive all or a substantial portion of their national revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients. One of the major effects of over-dependence on oil appears to be its encouragement of patronage politics and ultimately corrupt practice among public office holders, including the elected and unelected. Salvaging the state from the self-inflicted economic predicament has led to the adoption of different economic reform policies by successive administrations. For instance, after ascending power in 1984, General Buhari announced his ten-point programme designed to revamp the Nigerian ailing economy (Osaghae 1998). Also, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (1985–1993) introduced various reform measures aimed at arresting the aggravating debt crisis that the country was plunged into prior to his administration. General Sani Abacha (1993–1998) anchored his economic transformation policy on vision 2010. After many years of debt crisis, the Obasanjo administration was able to negotiate Nigeria out of debt, after certain percentage of the debt. However,

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14 years after exiting debt, Nigeria has return into another debt with the excessive borrowing from China. Thus, despite all efforts to re-position the economy, only marginal positive progress was achieved. For instance, while the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) kept telling the public that the Nigeria economy has been recording about 7 per cent growth rate per annum since 2011, such “unprecedented” growth rate has not translated into a diversified economy, reduction of dependence on oil, increased employment and drastic reduction in poverty level (Diop 2013; Onuba 2013; Osuntokun 2013). The cumulative effect of these is economic volatility, and this perhaps feeds into the politics with the end product being political and democratic fragility. To be sure, the Nigerian economy experienced a recession that was unprecedented in 2016 and 2017. The recession was evidently the result of the inability of the new All Progressive Congress (APC) government to manage the economy after its unexpected victory in the 2015 presidential election.

Social Context of the Nigerian State One of the most visible legacies of colonialism in Nigeria is the bringing together of distinct and divergent peoples into the political unit called Nigeria in 1914. As Fatile and Adejuwon (2002) noted, “Nigeria is one of the states that owe their existence to the imperialistic activities of the colonialists, which by virtue of a superior technology and economy subjugated people from diverse nationalities and organized them to construct Nigeria in 1914”. Thus, Nigeria is a multicultural and multiethnic state made up of many ethnic and numerous sub-ethnic groups. However, three of these ethnic groups, namely, the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba, are the dominant ones. Having a people with divergent backgrounds is not an issue. However, managing the differences among the groups and harnessing them in such a way as to advance the common goods to realize the latent and visible developmental potentials of the groups have always been a major issue in most multiethnic societies, and Nigeria has not demonstrated that it is an exception. As Nagel and Olzak (1982:127) wrote: Countries as culturally, geographically, and developmentally diverse as Nigeria, India, and the United Kingdom, France, Zaire [currently Democratic Republic of Congo], and Guyana, Angola, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Malaysia, Canada, Pakistan, Spain, and the Philippines, have all faced a variety of subnational challenges ranging from inter-group conflict to pogroms and genocide, from protest demonstrations to terrorism and civil war.

Indeed, the diversity among the groups identified by Nagel and Olzak has produced different results for the various groups. The result has been a function of how the diversity among the multiethnic groups and societies has been managed and whether its management responded to the manipulation or handling by the governing elites. For instance, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union have broken into several states, with distinct groups separating and forming separate political units. The break-up

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was consequent upon the declining ability and ultimate loss of steam of the political devise contrived to hold the incompatible groups together. In other words, the political devise that kept the groups under false unity for several decades caved in when it lost its ability to withstand the pressure of the centrifugal forces among the divergent groups. Indeed, 15 and 5 states emerged from the implosion of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, respectively (Rich 1993). On the African continent, the three states mentioned by Nagel and Olzak had at different times experienced bitter and deadly inter-groups wars or still engaging in severe internal inter-ethnic conflicts. This was the case in Nigeria in the late 1960s when the attempt of the Ibo, the third largest ethnic groups, attempted to secede, although not successful. Nigeria shared a feature with Yugoslavia in that it was created by external power for its own purpose (The rise and fall of Yugoslavia n.d.). However, while the name of Zaire was changed to Democratic Republic of Congo following the triumph of the rebel groups which ousted the despotic reign of the then President and subsequently formed a new government in the early 1990, the inter-groups conflict plaguing the state has neither waned nor vanished. The situation in Angola is also similar. In other climes, the diversity among groups has been managed well enough to ensure unity that has translated into development. This is evident in Canada and France, two states also mentioned by Nagel and Olzak. In Nigeria, the two of the most important factors in the social context of politics are religion and ethnicity. However, Lewis believes that in Nigeria the influence of ethnicity varies from region to region and from issue to issue. According to Lewis (2007): Although ethnicity is clearly important to Nigerians, identities vary significantly among groups and regions, and they fluctuate over time. Ethnic feeling is strongest in the embattled Niger Delta, the traditionally restive southeastern (Igbo) states, and Yoruba speakers in the southwest. Elsewhere, ethnicity may be offset by economic or religious identities. In addition, ethnic sentiments have waxed at election time and waned between elections.

Despite this observation by Lewis, it is important to note that intra- and interethnic conflicts have been a major issue in Nigeria. Very frequently, either intraand inter ethnic conflict is reported daily. Indeed, both inter ethnic and intra ethnic groups relations in the country are replete with a history of one form of conflict or another. In the opinion of, intra-ethnic conflict is most often deeper than inter-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. The bitter intra-ethnic struggle between IfeModakeke in the South and the Offa and Erin-Ile in the North Central is a clear example of intra-­ethnic conflicts that have resulted to loss of life at different times. Indeed, between 2001 and 2012, about 4000 deaths have been recorded in Plateau state resulting from inter-communal conflicts (Africa Report no 196, International Crisis Group 2012). The conflict in Plateau state was due to the inability to manage the unique ethnic, linguistic and religious pluralism of the diverse groups. Indeed, the failure of the Nigerian state to have policies that discourage ethnic identity appears to be a major issue in inter- and intra-ethnic conflict in Nigeria.

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Apart from the disunity and acrimony often precipitated by ethnic-based disaffection, religious has been another issue that sets groups apart and at logger head in Nigeria. Although Lewis observed that religion sometimes offset ethnic differences thereby reducing the possibility of conflict, inter-religious conflict has consistently been a major destabilizing factor in Nigeria, particularly in the North. Evident religious bigotry and intolerance have been demonstrated over and over again in the north, and this has resulted in death of thousands of innocent people, mostly Christians. Osuntokun (2013) identified three major types of religious in Nigeria, namely, Christianity, Islam and Traditional Religion. Ironically, the first two, which profess godliness and in fact condemn the traditional religion practitioners, are the most prone to violence. Indeed, inter-religious acrimony appears to have taken a new dimension since 2010 following the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as President, a Christian from a minority ethnic group in the south-south geo-­ political zone. The emergence of Boko Haram appeared to have exacerbated the volatile inter-­ religious relations as evidenced by increased inter-faith acrimony, intolerance and violence in Nigeria, particularly in the North. The ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria appear to have reached a dimension that places Nigeria as a state and the democratic government at a precipice. In short, there seems to be a growing sense of disillusionment among most Nigerians about the future of the country. In other words, social cum ethno-religious dis-aggregation and dis-integration are the hallmark of the state, after 100 years of nationhood. Indeed, while democracy appears to be taking roots and stabilizing in Africa, religion and ethnicity as a new form of identities have tended to constitute serious threats to democracy (Kayinga et  al. 2010). This evinces an evidence of “dis”-unity in diversity in a multiethnic society like Nigeria. Why then has Nigeria remained a fragile state despite moving to democratic governance that appears to have fared better than the previous ones? Is the political reality the result of the economic volatility and dis-integrated social and ethnic groups? Are there factors or issues that require attention that have not been properly attended to? What is the relationship between the states and the citizenry as well as other institutions? These questions find answers in the subsequent chapters.

Why This Edited Volume? A good number of writers have produced scholarly works on Nigerian government and politics over the years. For instance, Billy Dudley published his work on the subject in 1982. Similarly, Osaghae, E. E. published a piece titled Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence in 1998, while Akinsanya, A. A. and Ijang, G. J. (Eds.) published their own volume in 2002. A lot other writers have dealt with the subject. However, while some of the extant literature captured only politics in post-­ independence Nigeria and approached the study descriptively, others adopted the thematic approach but covered only very little. Yet, a lot has happened in the last

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12 years after the last volume on the subject was published, although the volume focused on the second republic. The implication is that there is an evident lacuna in the literature on Nigerian government and politics. Indeed, the need for a book that captures the development in Nigeria from 1900 to 2014 becomes inevitable at this period when the country is marking its centenary anniversary of nationhood. Beyond the descriptive approach of the extant literature on Nigerian government and politics, not only is this book capturing the historical origin and development of the state, but it also contains some salient and topical themes, using empirical data. The multidisciplinary approach adopted through the contributions of scholars from divers academic backgrounds and disciplines further enrich this text. The combination of historical, descriptive analysis and thematic explanation is aimed at giving the readers of this literature an analytical piece that is all encompassing and enriching in content and scope. This is indeed a departure from the known trend, evidenced by the content and narrow scope of the extant literature on the subject.

The Layout of This Book To start with, the book is divided into seven parts, with each part focusing on specific but related issues. The first Part of this book, “Nigeria in Historical Perspective”, focuses on Nigeria from historical perspectives. Essentially, there are three chapters in it. Thus, setting the ball rolling is Chap. 2 entitled “Nigeria up to 1914: Some Emerging Political and Economic Issues”. This chapter traces the origin of Nigeria from the nineteenth century to 1914. In doing so, the authors carefully embarked on an historical explanation of both the economics and the political/administrative structures and systems in operation, especially from the end of slave trade to the introduction of the indirect rule in 1914. Also discussed in the chapter are the systems of government in the various pre-colonial political communities in Nigeria. Chap. 3 titled “Nigeria between 1914 and 1960: Political Constitutional Changes and Crisis in an Era of Colonialism” focuses on a critical review of Nigeria’s political transformation from 1914 when the Northern and the Southern parts were amalgamated to 1960 when Nigeria became a sovereign state. In the chapter, the author dwells on the birth of the country and its nurturing to statehood through constitutional engineering and establishment of modern political structures and institutions and the agitational politics of the nationalists. Also highlighted in the chapter are the nature of the pre-independence constitutions, the major provisions of the constitutions and the origin of party and ethnic politics. Chap. 4 focuses on the first republic. Working on a subject titled “Post-Colonial Nigeria: Power and Politics in the First Republic, 1960–1966”, the authors take off with a discussion on the fear of the minorities and the necessity for the state to allay the fear of domination prior to the independence of 1960. The chapter equally highlights the provisions of the 1960 and 1963 constitutions as well as the operation of the parliamentary system. The

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power play, political competition, rivalry and crises that characterized politics in the period received deserved attention. The chapter also mentions, in brief, the situation of the Nigerian economy in the first republic and wrapped up with a section on the collapse of the first republic. Following the three chapters focusing on Nigerian political history from pre-­ independence to 1966 is the Part on “Institutions of Governance” of the book that addresses the institutions of governance in Nigeria. There are essentially three chapters. Each of the three chapters focuses on each organ of government in Nigeria. By this, Chap. 5 which is the first in that part of the book focuses on the executive organ as an institution of government in Nigeria. Also in focus are the origin of the presidential constitution and some important features of the presidential system. Apart from the federal executive, the chapter equally discusses the state executive organ. The authors further capture power politics in the second, aborted third and the fourth republics and inter-organ relations and explain the reasons for the collapsed of the previous republics. In Chap. 6, the authors discuss the “Nigerian National Assembly”. The historical evolution of the legislative institution, its functions, the committee system and the operation of the legislature as well as the constraints against effective performance of the assigned responsibilities of the national ­assembly received sufficient attention in this chapter. The focus of Chap. 7 is on the third organ of government, namely, “the Judiciary in Nigeria”. The chapter takes off with a focus on theoretical insights on the judiciary and proceeds to address the judiciary in historical perspective. Also attracting attention in the chapter are the structure of the Nigerian Judiciary and the powers of the courts, focusing on the judicial hierarchy in Nigeria and the judiciary under military administration as well as under democratic rule. After examining the institutions of governance, in the following part, attention shifted to the Nigerian Administrative System/Structure. Precisely, in Chap. 8, the authors address the subject of Federalism in Nigeria. They looked at the various challenges that lead ones to ask if Nigeria truly operates a federal system. This chapter assesses some of the major issues that shaped the federal arrangement in Nigeria and the major challenges that the operation of the federal system has faced over the years. Chap. 9 follows with the title “Local Government/Governance System in Nigeria”. While this chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning, character and functions of local government in general and in Nigeria in particular, it delves into the salient arguments on centralization and decentralization. The authors further take their discussion forward by looking at the local government from historical perspectives, discussing the sources of local government finance and the various reforms at the local level. In the concluding section of the chapter, issues related to the challenges of local government in Nigeria are discussed. Next is the chapter focusing on bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics and the policy establishment. By this, Chap. 10 starts with the conceptual framework and moved on to discuss the origin of public bureaucracy in Nigeria. The authors also examine the reforms of the civil service by various administrations in Nigeria, as well as pointing out the challenges of bureaucracy in Nigeria.

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The next Part addresses the “instrumentalities of political participation” in Nigeria. These include political party, elections and electoral administration. Starting with Chap. 11, looking at political parties, the first attention was on their historical development. In the chapter, the nature of Nigerian political parties, party theory and political parties, determinants of party formation and membership, the relationships between interest groups and political parties and the influence of political parties on policy making in Nigeria are in focus. Elections as well as electoral administration have often been of great concern to Nigerians. From the first republic to the current fourth republic, allegation of different kinds of malpractices has often trailed successive elections in Nigeria. In Chap. 12 of this book, the authors examine issues relating to elections and electoral administration in Nigeria. The discussion commences with brief comments on the origin of elections in Nigeria. Similarly, the authors assess the structure of electoral administration and composition and structure of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and thereafter discuss elections from historical perspectives. In the next part, attention shifted to the Nigerian economy. Some issues in Nigerian economy constitute the thrust of discourse. In Chap. 13, the author examines “Nigerian Economy during Colonial Era: An overview”. Agriculture was until the 1960s the most important and major pillar on which Nigerian economy leaned. In all development plannings during and the first decade after colonial rule, agriculture was still given a prominent place in the national reckoning. But the story changed with the discovery of oil and its subsequent export in commercial quantity. The author of this chapter focuses on this by starting from the extent of agricultural contribution at the inception of colonial rule and went ahead to discuss development plans under colonial rule, discriminating economic policies of colonial authority in Nigeria, economic reforms during colonial era and economic benefits of colonial rule. It is no longer news that the Nigerian economy transformed from a prosperous one into a debt-ridden economy in post-colonial periods. The authors of Chap. 14, writing on “Debt Crisis, Structural Reforms and Debt Relief”, traced the origin of the debt crisis that Nigeria experienced until 2005 when President Obasanjo negotiated Nigeria’s debt relief. Furthermore, with the relegation of agriculture in Nigeria, food production and security became major policy and economic issues both locally and internationally. Gradually, self-sufficiency gave way to over reliance on food importation. In recent years, many issues ranging from ethnic militias, terrorism, religions, Niger Delta conflict, moneybag politics to corruption among others have become major issues in Nigeria. Different arguments have been made about each and every issue listed here. Many arm-chair analysts have expressed divergent views on the various subjects. In the nine chapters in the part titled “Some Selected Themes in Nigerian Politics”, all these issues are addressed by specialists. Thus, in Chap. 15 titled “Militia movement in Nigeria”, the author examines some very germane issues in militia activities in Nigeria. In Chap. 16, terrorism in Nigeria attracted attention. The chapter takes off with theories of terrorism with a view to providing the right anchor for the subject matter of this chapter. In the chapter are sections on theoretical explanation on terrorism, cases of terrorism as well as state response to

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terrorism activities and the effects of terrorism on the polity. Chap. 17 that follows, titled “Religion and Nationhood”, examines the types of religion in Nigeria as well as how religion shapes inter-group relations. The author tries to locate religious crisis within their different historical phases and brings to the fore efforts made by the government to ensure religious harmony as well as the challenges that the efforts have faced. Chap. 18 focuses on “Nationalism and National Integration in Nigeria”. The authors start the chapter by examining the factors responsible for nationalism movement in Nigeria and seek to gauge the extent of their success. Also in the chapter are discussions on the quest for national integration, theories of national integration and instrument of national integration. Oil has been a major issue in Nigerian political economy. It has transformed Nigeria from agricultural-based to oil-dollar-based economy. However, oil production and exportation has been characterized by different challenges. In Chap. 19, the authors address several issues relating to oil and the Niger Delta area where oil is produced. This chapter gives a background discussion on oil, agitational politics and the Nigerian state. It assesses the contribution of the oil industry to the Nigerian economy and analyses the place of oil and revenue from it on the political economy of Nigeria from the humble beginning of the nation’s oil production history in 1958 till date. It looks at the nature of oil-induced protests, agitations and conflicts in the Niger Delta and assesses the responses of the Nigerian state and oil multinational companies to mounting grievances in the region In Chap. 20 titled “Money Politics in the Nigerian Electoral Process”, the author examines the impact of money on Nigerian politics. As he notes, money has become a dominant factor in Nigerian electoral process. Political parties and candidates have, by their conduct during campaigns, come to believe that good party manifestoes and integrity of candidates seeking public office are no longer sufficient to guarantee electoral success, hence their resort to vote-purchase. Many of the electorates too have been exhibiting cynical electoral behaviour by the eagerness to sell their votes to the highest bidder. This unwholesome practice constitutes a blemish on public policy and the electoral process. It portends dangers to the democratic process of electing public officers and also prevents good governance. Although it may be difficult to eliminate the phenomenon of money politics, its negative consequences could be minimized. This requires putting in place mechanism for implementing the legislation setting legal limits on campaign contributions and spending, drawing a code of conduct for political parties and their candidates and instituting appropriate political education of the electorate. Chap. 21 aims at defining population census, its administration in Nigeria, politics of census and possible way out of the challenges to successful census administration, especially the role an individual citizenry could play. Chap. 22 addresses the critical and controversial subject of pension administration in Nigeria. Chap. 23 of this book titled “Corruption, Politics and Governance in Nigeria” examines the implication of corruption for governance in Nigeria since independence. It examines the dimensions of corruption, corruption’s profile, causes of corruption and the challenges of the fight against corruption. Although the military withdrew from

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politics in 1999, the intervention of the body in politics still deserves some attention; consequently, we devote Chap. 24 to military intervention in politics. The last Part of this book on International Politics focuses on “Nigeria’s foreign policy”. The writers undertake an historical and contemporary examination of why successive Nigerian governments, both civilian and military, failed in this endeavour. It also spotlights “the contours of the complex dynamics of Nigerian politics” and ferrets the specific factors which determine the country’s foreign policy interests and, eventually, helps to illuminate the problems and prospects ahead for the Nigerian state as well as its relations not only with its neighbours within the West African sub-region and Africa but across the international political system.

References Adejumobi, S. 2002. The relevance of the presidential system of government to Nigeria’s quest for democracy. The Constitution: Journal of Constitutional Development, 3(2), 38–57. Adebayo, A. 1986. Power in politics. Abuja: Spectrum Books Ltd. Africa Report no 196, 2012. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (1): The Jos Crisis. International Crisis Group, 12 December. Aghalino, S. O. 2002. Oil Mineral Exploitation, Environmental Deterioration and Public Policy in Nigeria. Political Science Review, 2(1),12-22 Agbese D. and Anim, E. 1996.The State Elections of 1991. In: Diamond, L, Greene, A.K and Oyediran, O (Eds.), Transition without End. Ibadan, Vantage publisher, pp. 229-252. Boadi, E. G. 1998. The birth of African liberalism. Journal of Democracy, 9(2), 18–33. Carson, J. 2010. US: Nigeria’s Democracy is Fragile, Lagos, THIS DAY, 3rd March 2010. Carson was the Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs. Davies, A. E. 1998. The Search for a Stable Local Government System in Nigeria. Ilorin Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 5(1), 71-88. Diop, M. 2013. Nigeria’s poverty level falls by 2% -World Bank’s VP, Lagos, Channels TV, Tuesday, January 15th, 2013 Eminue, O. 2006. Executive-Legislative Relations: Some preliminary observation on the budget process. In: Ojo, E. O. (Ed.), Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archer, pp. 155-183 Fashagba, J. Y. 2009. Legislative Oversight under the Nigerian Presidential System. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 15(4), 439-459 Fashagba, J.  Y. 2010. De-constitutionalising? Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Assessing executive-­Legislative handling of executive-power vacuum in the fourth republic. Africana, 4(1), 6-43 Fashagba, J. Y. 2011a. The Legislature and Democratisation process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Lapai. International Journal of Management and Social Science, 4(1), 1-19. Fashagba, J.  Y. 2011b. Presidentialism and Democratisation in Nigeria, 1999-2011, PULA Botswana Journal of African Studies, 25(2), 183-203 Fashagba, J. Y. 2019a. Nigeria: A Land of Opportunities and Disappointment. In Paulette Kurzer (ed), Comparative Government, McGraw-Hill, USA Fashagba, J. Y. 2019b. Exploring the Nigerian Central Legislative Institution. In; Fashagba, J.Y., Rotimi Ajayi and Chiedo Nwankwor (eds), The Nigerian National Assembly, Springer Nature, Switzerland. Fish, M. S. 2006. Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies. Journal of Democracy, 17(1), 5-20 Jimoh, A. A. 1994. Law practice and procedure of legislature. Lagos: Learned Publishments Ltd

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Kayinga, K, Okello, D, and Akech, A. 2010. Contradictions of Transition to Democracy in Fragmented Societies: The Kenya 2007 General Elections in Perspectives. In: Kayinga, K, and Okello D. (Eds.), Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. Nairobi, Society for International Development (SID)/Institute for Development Studies (IDS) Kew, D. and Lewis, P. 2010. Nigeria. In: Kesselman, M, Krieger, J, Joseph, W. A. (Eds), Introduction to Comparative Politics (pp.363-410). Boston, Wadsworth Cengage Learning. Kpundeh, S. and Dininio, P. 2006. Political Will. In: Stanpenhurst, R, Johnston, N, Pelizzo, R. (Ed.), The role of Parliament in curbing Corruption. Washington, The World Bank. Human Right Watch, 1999. The price of oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria’s oil Producing Communities. Human Right Watch New York, Lewis, P. 2007, Identity, Institution and Democracy in Nigeria. Afrobarometer Working Paper, no. 68. Lewis, P.  M. 2009. Rules and Rent in Nigeria’s National Assembly. In: Barkan, J.  D. (Ed.), Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies Mafeje, A, 2002. Democratic Governance and New Democracies in Africa: Agenda for the future. A paper prepared for presentation at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa in Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April. Masoud, T. 2011. The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia: The Road to (and from) Liberation Square. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 20-35 Nagel, J. and Olzak, S. 1982. Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An extension of the Competition Model. Social Problem, 30(2), 127Nnamani, K. 2007. The valedictory speech of the Nigerian Senate President. Abuja: National assembly. June. Nwosu, N.  I. 1998. The Military and Constitutional Engineering in Nigeria. Ilorin Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 5(1), 31-49 Obiyan, A.  S. 1999. Political Parties under the Abubakar Transition Program and Democratic Stability in Nigeria. A Journal of Opinion, 27(1), 41-43 Ojo, E.  O. 2002. An Appraisal of the Principle and Practice of Federalism. Political Science Review, 2(1), 37-52 Okpu, U, 1985. Inter-party Political Relations in Nigeria 1979-1983. African Spectrum, 20(2), 191-200 Olson, D. 2002. Presidential systems in Nigeria and the United States. In: Akinsanya, A. A. G. J. Ijang (Ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics, Calabar, Wusen Publishers Omoweh, D. A. 2006. The Parliament and the Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria, Being lecture delivered at the CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute, Dakar, Senegal Onuba, I, 2013, Nigerian economy not in Danger, Abuja, February 28, 2013 Osaghae, E. E. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence, London: C. Hurst & co (publisher) ltd. Osuntokun, A. 2013, A hegemony in a peripheral region of the World: The future of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Annual Lecture, Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA), The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Monday, 25th February, 2013 Oyediran, O. 1988.A new constitution for the second republic. In: Oyediran, O. (Ed.), Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1978-1979, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs/Macmillan Nigeria, pp. 3-24. Posner, P. and Park, C-K, 2007. Role of the Legislature in the Budgeting Process: Recent Trends and Innovations. OECD Journal of Budgeting, 7(3),1-26 Rich, R. 1993. Recognition of states: the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 European Journal on International Law, 36-61. Sellasie, B. H. 1974. The executive in African government. London: Heinemann. The rise and fall of Yugoslavia (n.d.). www.palgrave.com.politics/global/students/casestudies William, F. R. A. 1967. Fundamental Rights and the Prospect for Democracy in Nigeria. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 115(10):1073-1090

Chapter 2

Nigeria up to 1914: Some Emerging Political and Economic Issues Mohammed Audu and Roseline Oshewolo Abstract  This chapter examines the economic system as well as the political and administrative structure of pre-colonial Nigeria from 1800 to 1914. Prior to the introduction of legitimate trade, Nigerians were active in subsistence economic activities. They were self-sufficient in the production of food crops such as yam, cassava, beans and cocoyam, among others. Hunting was also a great profession among the people. In addition, the people also engaged in crafts such as cloth weaving, basket weaving, pottery and wood-carving. Trading through barter was another major element of the Nigerian pre-colonial economy. In the political and administrative sphere, each organized unit had a unique system of administration. The system in the north was an absolute monarchy with a centralized structure under the Emir. The system in the Western part of the country was constitutional monarchy. Although a centralized structure was also in place under the Oba (i.e. king), the power of Oba was not absolute due to the existence of institutional checks. The system in the East was republican and decentralized in structure. The village was also the centre of governmental activities. However, the unique economic structure and political arrangements of these groups were dislocated by colonial imperialism. Keywords  Pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria · Hausaland · Benin · Yorubaland · Igboland · Political and economic system

Introduction A major event in the history of Nigeria in the nineteenth century was the abolition of slave trade; it was remarkable because the country also bore a major burden of slave trade. With the abolition of slave trade, a new system of trade emerged which was known as the legitimate trade. The period of legitimate trade marked the emergence of unprecedented expansion of agricultural output. The indigenous farmers focused mainly on the production of cash crops such as palm oil and cocoa, among M. Audu · R. Oshewolo (*) Department of History and International Studies, Federal University, Lokoja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_2

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others. Prior to the introduction of legitimate trade, Nigerians were active in subsistence economic activities. They were self-sufficient in the production of food crops such as yam, cassava, beans and cocoyam, among others. Hunting was also a great profession among the people. In addition, the people also engaged in crafts such as cloth weaving, basket weaving, pottery and wood-carving. Trading through barter was another major element of the Nigerian pre-colonial economy. In the political and administrative sphere, each organized unit had a unique system of administration. The system in the north was an absolute monarchy with a centralized structure under the Emir. Due to the jihad of 1804 with an extended Islamic influence, the people in the north were predominantly Muslims. The system in the Western part of the country was constitutional monarchy. Although a centralized structure was also in place under the Oba (i.e. king), the power of Oba was not absolute due to the existence of institutional checks. The system in the East was republican and decentralized in structure. The village was also the centre of governmental activities. However, the unique economic structure and political arrangements of these groups were dislocated by colonial imperialism. The chapter, therefore, critically examines the political and administrative structure as well as the economic system of pre-­ colonial Nigeria from 1800 to 1914.

Political and Administrative Systems of Pre-colonial Nigeria Before the advent of colonialism, each of the different groups in Nigeria had a stable political and administrative arrangement that was rooted in the people’s culture. Although there were a number of wars between and within groups during the pre-­ colonial era, howbeit, the structural volatility inherent in the colonial and post-­ colonial political arrangements was alien during the pre-colonial era. Prior to colonial rule, most of the groups that today make up the country were often distinguished by differences in history, culture, political development and religion. The major differences among these pre-colonial groups pertained to their socio-political organization which was either centralized (state) or non-centralized (stateless). The former applied to the Sokoto Caliphate and the emirates of the north that were advanced Islamic theocracies. Also included in this category were the Benin, Oyo and other western kingdoms, as well as the Igala Kingdom in the middle belt. Institutions of a distinctly political nature, as well as taxation systems, were already established. Of all the centralized systems, the Sokoto Caliphate with its vassal emirates had the most advanced form of state organization. Not surprisingly, it provided the model for the British colonial policy of indirect rule, i.e. the governance of indigenous peoples through their own institutions and rulers. The latter applied to systems such as those of the Igbo and other eastern and middle-belt groups. There was a diffusion of political, economic and religious institutions and practices. Also to be found was a large measure of egalitarianism, democracy and decentralized authority. Under the colonial policy of indirect rule, “traditional”

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rulers (known as warrant chiefs) were imposed on these stateless societies (Mongabay 1991). In Hausaland, the political and administrative system was a complex one. The king otherwise known as Sarki had a couple of officials through which the daily administration of the land was carried out, for instance, the town administrator, Mago Jin Gari, Gate Keeper Sarkin Kofa, Ward Head Mai Ungwa and Community Head Sarkin Turawa. The king was vested with the sole responsibility of protecting the people (Crowder 1962). Before the Sokoto Jihad of 1804, although Fulani Muslims served the Hausa rulers as scribes, judges and advisers, the Fulanis were denied direct participation in the administration of the land. The Jihad led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, the largest political unit in nineteenth-­ century West Africa. The Caliphate united the Hausa states politically for the first time under a single authority (Falola et al. 1991). With the new system of administration in Hausaland, the appointment of a Caliph was done by the entire Muslim community. The caliph was then responsible for the appointment of the governing council of the provinces according to the dictate of Islam. In the early stage of the Sokoto Caliphate, the sole authority of the caliphate was derived from Uthman dan Fodio, the founder of the caliphate. However, in 1812, the administration of the caliphate was vested on Mohammad Bello and Abdullahi, dan Fodio’s son and brother, respectively. Bello administered the eastern emirates with Sokoto as the headquarters, while Abdullahi administered the western emirate with Gwandu as the headquarters. Uthman dan Fodio’s commanders who received flags from him earlier became the emirs of their respective emirates. During the period under study, each of the emirs of the caliphate was visited on a regular basis by a high-ranking officer from either Sokoto or Gwandu depending on the capital of the Emir. The official acted as an intermediary between the Caliph and the emir. The appointment of emir was done by the Caliph, but the nomination was the sole responsibility of the emirate council of King Makers. The Caliph was vested with the power of appointing and deposing an emir. It was the responsibility of the emir to visit Sokoto on the appointment of a new Caliph. The emirs were mandated to send annual tributes to the Caliph as well as providing the Caliphate with the necessary soldiers to aid Sokoto in its annual dry season raids against enemies. The Caliph was responsible for safeguarding the people. In administering the emirate, each emir was assisted by a number of council officials. These were Sarkin Fada, the spokesman of the Emir and organizer of palace workers; Waziri, the Prime Minister of the Emirate; Galadima, the Administrator of the capital city; Madawaki, the commander and Head of the Emirate Army; Magaji, Government Treasurer in-charge of the government treasury; Sarkin Dan Doka, Inspector General of Police Force Called Dan Doka; Sarkin Ruwa, Minister in-charge of Water Resources; Sarkin Pawa, Head of Butchers at the Abattoirs; Yari, Chief Superintendent of Prisons in the Emirate; and Sarkin Dogari the head of the king’s bodyguard (Buah 1974). In Benin, the Oba was the most important man. He was the sole administrator of the empire. He controlled all the affairs of the empire. The king was bestowed with

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legislative, executive and judicial powers. He had the sole right to impose capital verdict when the need arose (Eluwa et al. 1988). The Prime Minister Iyase was the leader of the senior titled chiefs of the empire. The Iyase was the second most important man in the empire. The council was responsible for the enactment of new laws and the declaration of war and tranquility. Unwague and Eribo palace chiefs were responsible for the handling of foreign affairs and taking delivery of firearms. (Aigbokhai 1971). However, the daily administration of the empire was carried out by the Oba with proper consultation with important titled chiefs of the empire. To ensure effective administration of the empire, it was divided into units and was controlled by an absentee resident who resided at the royal centre. He acted as an intermediary between the Oba and the residents; he was also in charge of tribute collection. In order to prevent the residents of the unit from revolting against the Oba, a multifarious structure of check was put in place. For instance, the “absentee” resident was restricted from making frequent visits to his area of jurisdiction. This was how the Oba and his council of chiefs administered the empire until the British occupation of Benin in 1897 (Eluwa et al. 1988) In Yorubaland, Oyo was regarded as the political headquarters. The king known as Alafin was the leader, and he was the sole ruler of the Yoruba (Ekundare 1973). He was the head and the leader of all the province kings in the empire. The Onikoyi of Ikoyi was said to be the most powerful of all the province kings. The Alafin was the supreme monarch and ruled over all other monarchs whose power and independence varied according to his calibre and their own proximity to his capital. The kingdom was divided into provinces for easy and smooth administration of the kingdom. Egbado was located southwest, Ijebu south and Ekiti located in the eastern part of the kingdom (Crowder 1962). Oyo developed a complex political structure of titled grades and palace societies through which government was exercised. About seven principal councillors of state emerged; the councillors were also the ward heads which were presided over by the Basorun, the prime minister. The eldest son of the Alafin was the Aremo, crown prince, but during the period under study, the Aremo upon the death of his father, the king, was forced to commit suicide (Crowder 1962). The Alafin was considered Ekeji Orisa, who was the owner of the land. The Alafin was the sole administrator of the kingdom; the kingdom was administered through the assistance of three Eunuchs: the Otun Efa was vested with the sole responsibility of performing the king’s religious rites and duties, Ona Efa performed all judicial tasks and Osi Efa performed all political functions. Yoruba kingdom was administered through checks and balances; the Oyomesi was responsible for checking the excesses of the Alafin. In cases of excesses, the king was forced to commit suicide by offering the Alafin an empty calabash, or a parrot egg could also be given to the king. The Oyomesi performs legislative, executive and judicial functions (Onwubiko 1995). Checks were also made on the Oyomesi to avoid abuse of power by the fact that one of the Oyomesis had to die with the king. Another control on the excesses of the Oyomesi was the Ogboni Society, which comprised members of Oyomesi and heads of important families and religious cults. The political affair of the kingdom was discussed by the Ogboni, and its decisions were binding on all members. The Ajeles were responsible for the

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supervision of the kingdom, who resided in the vassal kingdoms. They were also responsible for the payment of tribute by vassal states. Oyo Kingdom had a standing army, which was headed by the Aare Onakakanfo, and he was directly responsible to the alafin. In battle, Osi Efa also represented the Alafin; in cases of defeat, the Aare Onakakanfo was forced to commit suicide. Oyo, however, developed its own complex administration titleholders and palace officials (Stride and Ifeka 1971). The system in Igboland was different from the political arrangements in the other groups. Although the eastern part of the country was viewed as the provinces of the Igbo and the Ibibio, it contained a variety of other groups such as the Efik, the Ijaw and others. Unlike the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba groups, Ibos operated a decentralized system. They were “chiefless” people. The village was the centre of government activities. The kindred (a group of families held together mainly in their descent from a common ancestor) was the all-important social units. Although each small village had its own myths and beliefs, all the Igbo groups had a sense of cultural unity. Generally, the Ibos had no kings. The age-grade and titled societies were the major instruments of government. The executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the council of elders; the Ofo titleholders; the family; the Ozo titleholders; the Age-Grades; and the “Ala” or the Earth’s goddess. The government in Igboland was also democratic because it involved participation by all the male adults. Leadership was provided by men and women who had risen in the social ladder in their communities and who were influential. The village assembly was the supreme body, and at regular assembly meetings, matters of public interest were thrown open for discussion. Decisions were reached by the elders through a system of gerontocracy. As a result, the Igbo traditional system was regarded as republican, decentralized and egalitarian. Colonialism brought a lot of transformations. The conquest and colonization of the coastal area of Lagos and its hinterlands took place between 1861 and 1897. The conquest of the eastern region and the declaration of the Niger Coast Protectorate occurred in 1894. A third wave of penetration led to the declaration of a protectorate over the northern areas in 1900. In 1906, the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (which included the former Niger Coast Protectorate) were joined together to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914, the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, although both parts continued to be administered separately (Mongabay 1991).

Economic System of Pre-colonial Nigeria During the period under study, the economic system practised in Nigeria was largely agrarian. The vast majority of the population engaged in agriculture because it was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, and it depended on availability of land (Aghalino 2006).

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During the pre-colonial era, Nigeria was self-sufficient as far as food production was concerned. This was because the bulk of the population engaged in farming. Land, usually owned by men, was the most valuable factor of production upon which existence depended (Aghalino 2006). In most Nigerian societies, women had access to land through their husbands or fathers. Farming during the first half of the nineteenth century consisted of simple but primitive operations, and shifting cultivation and bush fallowing were the dominant system of farming that was adopted in many parts of the Nigerian society. The reason for bush fallowing was to retain the fertility of the land depending on the period of fallowing. The principal crops cultivated included groundnut, yam, cassava, beans, cocoa yam and palm kernel, among others (Oniemola 2011). Agricultural activities were carried out by men and women in most Nigerian societies, but their roles differed. There was division of labour between the sexes. While men were engaged in cultivation, tilling and planting, in most cases, women helped in carrying the agricultural produce from the farm to the house (Oniemola 2011). In most Nigerian communities, intercropping was also very common. Indeed, intercropping was a feature of the Nigerian agricultural system. This involved planting of different species and varieties on the same farm in which crop sequences in an agricultural year did not overlap (Sahlins 1974). In addition, during the period under study, polygamy was an asset to successful farming; a man could marry as many as ten wives with a large number of children all supporting him in farming. This was because agricultural production was largely on the subsistence level, and so it was customary for the entire family to provide labour especially during the planting and harvesting period (Oyemakinde 1996). Domestication of animals such as duck, pig, cattle, goat, chicken, sheep and cats was done to provide meat for consumption or used as sacrifices: dogs are used mainly by men for hunting mostly in the Northern part of Nigeria (Bradbury 1967). Because of the terrain, Northern Nigeria was conducive for horse keeping. Horses were used as means of transport or in warfare (Oniemola 2011). Northern Nigeria provided Yorubaland with the needed horses for Calvary. Samuel Johnson opined that every woman whatever her trade may be is expected to keep a few chickens and a goat or two from which she derives small income for housekeeping. The rearing of poultry must be reckoned among female occupation (Johnson 1921:78). Given the importance of agriculture to the economy of Nigeria, both sexes were actively engaged during the period under study. The prominent role of women in agriculture was recognized by their male counterparts who were in most cases their husbands. In view of this, coupled with the fact that agriculture was the mainstay of Nigerian economy as stated before, the women just like their male counterparts were seen as undisputed agents of economic development. Hunting was also a component of the pre-colonial Nigerian economy. It was a highly respectable profession (Bradbury 1967). It was also an important supplement to agriculture and was dominated by the men. Women did not hunt but rather looked after the home while the hunters would spend days in the bush hunting for games. Through accounts of oral tradition, an insight can be gained into some hunting

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practices during the period under study. For instance, bushes were set on fire in the dry season and games were flushed out; the already dried shrubs and grasses which were set on fire provided dry fire wood which was usually collected by children and women for domestic use. Other methods used for hunting were as follows: cudgels or clubs were used to kill animals, traps of various kinds were set and dogs were also used to sniff them out of the bush and chase and kill them. Communal hunting was also practised. Such animals hunted included lion, deers, bush pigs, antelopes, buffaloes, kangaroo and leopards among others. A killed lion, antelope or leopard, to mention just a few, was celebrated by all in the community. Women complimented the efforts of the men in hunting by preserving the game through smoking or drying for future use. Hunting was for many reasons a highly respectable profession. Hunters went after the animals into the remote forest and gained profound knowledge of characteristic behaviour of plants and animals. As a result of their long stay in the forest and their knowledge of medicinal trees, a long list of medicines, preventive and curative, suitable for treating illnesses and diseases known to the people was compiled by the hunters (Oniemola 2011). Furthermore, the people were actively engaged in crafts. During the pre-colonial period, the people made cloth from the fibrous bark of certain trees (Olaoye 2003). By the nineteenth century, weaving had already emerged. Samuel Johnson describes the processes of cotton seeding and threads spinning: It is especially the province of women advanced in age to seed cotton and spin thread. The former is done by rolling out the seeds from the wool between a smooth log of hard and polished iron rod the later by weighing a thin layer of rod about 12 inches long with a small ball of clay 1 inch distant from one end, attaching the cotton to the other end and setting the ball spinning like a top, the wool being rapidly drawn out to the required fineness. Seeded cotton is rendered fluffy for spinning by being attached to the string of a bend and the string constantly pulled as if shooting an arrow. (Johnson 1921:57)

In most Nigerian communities, cotton had been grown and manufactured into cloth for many centuries past (Olaoye 2009). In Yorubaland, for instance, the first duty of a newly married lady was to spin enough cotton to make her husband a robe. Although both sexes engaged in weaving, the bulk of the work done rested on women. The cloth woven by the people included Kitipa, Aso Oke, Eleboto and Asopo among others in Yorubaland and rigar tsamiya and rigar gwado in Hausaland. The woven cloths were both used for ritual and ceremonial purposes. Weaving showed an attachment to the local environment. All the materials employed were homemade and were obtained from the immediate surroundings (Sambo 2006). Apart from the importance which was attached to the woven materials during ceremonies, they were also of high quality. Basket weaving was also done during this period. Both genders were involved in the process of basket weaving. It was exclusively the duty of the male gender to cut down palm fronds for the basket, while the extraction of the materials and the weaving was done by both genders. The fronds were sliced into thin strips and twisted together. They were woven into different shapes and sizes depending on the taste of the weaver. During the pre-­colonial period, baskets were for multipurpose uses; for instance, baskets were used for carrying agricultural produce from the farm as well as drying the produce. Besides, the

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basket was used for housing livestocks and domestic animals such as chickens, dogs and cats. It was also used for packing the belongings of a newly wedded bride to her husband’s house in some parts of Nigeria such as Okunland now in Kogi state (Oniemola 2011). Pottery was another craft that was visible during the period under study. The digging of the clay used for pottery was done by the men, while the pot moulding and firing was done by the women. The potters were able to produce a wide variety of pot wares in response to the needs of the people. The Itsekiris supplied their neighbours the needed earthen vessels during the period under study (Adams, 1823 cited by Aghalino 2006). The pottery products locally produced included the water vessel, cooking pot, stewing pot and banking device known as ojo oto in Yorubaland and asusu in Hausaland, among others (Oniemola 2011). Other activities engaged in by men during the pre-colonial period included wood carving. Such rigid craft limited the roles women could play in the economy. Women were not involved in this vocation due to the strenuous effort demanded by it. Trading was another identifiable element of the pre-colonial economy of Nigeria. Initially markets were not developed as most people grew what they needed. Scarcities were usually rectified by exchange with others. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century and the introduction of legitimate trade, a well-defined market system had already been established. Hence, markets were established gradually, and internal trade eventually became dominant, reasons being that it was less cumbersome and not far from home. Trade went on throughout the day. Women were the major participants. The women shuttled from one settlement to another with goods varying from arts and crafts, agricultural produce and woven clothes. There were daily and periodic markets, which made the trade livelier. Among the popular periodic markets were the Ilorin markets, Araromi market in Old Kabba division, Shintaku market along the Niger River, Aro market in iboland, Ibon market in Nupeland and Aboh market among others (Oniemola 2011). Articles were carried by porterage and journeys made on foot to markets. External trade, which was also important in this period, covered a wide part of the Nigerian societies and her neighbours. The people had trade contact with other regions. This is because the external trade brought them in contact with different people from different countries and ethnic groups. Natron, for example, was supplied from Kano to other African societies (Fika 1978). The journey to these trade centres was done mostly in caravans (Oniemola 2011). There emerged inter-regional markets, and these markets were unique because of the large number of people and the wide varieties of people that were involved. Important commercial centres of trade were Lokoja, Shintaku, Agenebode, Patigi, Obudu and Jatu among others (Oniemola 2011). The most important articles of trade were woven clothes of varying types: cotton, tobacco, beads, Shea butter and palm oil. Although the major participants of the long distance trade were the men, because of the distance involved and the weight of the loads carried along the trade route, the women still participated in one way or the other; they complemented their husbands by assisting in carrying the less bulky goods to the place of exchange. The poorly developed means of transport greatly impeded the expansion of the trade.

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Poor means of transportation did not only limit the amount of goods carried but also restricted traders to few numbers of markets they could attend and few numbers of trips, and this led to the emergence of strong trading networks. Okunland now in Kogi State was a major supplier of yam to Ikare, Akure, Ibadan and Lagos. Goods from the far north got to the middle belt through the Ijesha and Nupe middlemen. Goods were also obtained from Kano and sold to Yorubaland and mid-western parts of Nigeria (Sambo 2006). The frequency of the market depended on the season whether dry or raining season and the articles of trade in stock. The Lokoja, Shintaku and the Ibon market in Nupeland were mostly patronized by the elderly women who could afford to be away from home for a long period. Borno served as an entry port between North Africa and the forest regions. Goods brought from North Africa were exchanged in Borno for those from the forest region and vice versa. The main articles of trade were variety of cloths, gold, salt and cola nuts among others (Oniemola 2011). However, the abolition of slave trade culminated into legitimate trade. It should be noted that the expanding European empires in the new world lacked one major resource: an adequate workforce. In most cases the indigenous peoples had proved unreliable because most of the slaves were dying from disease brought over from Europe and Europeans were unsuited to the climate and suffered under tropical diseases. Africans as well as Nigerians, on the other hand, were excellent workers. In 1807, however, the importation of slaves into the United States was outlawed. In the same year, Britain used its naval power and its diplomatic muscle to outlaw trade in slaves by citizens and to begin a campaign to stop the international trade in slave (Fage 1962). These efforts, however, were not successful until the 1860s because of the continued demand for plantation labour in the new world (Rodney 1982). According to Rodney (1982), Europe abolished the transatlantic slave trade only because human labour was gradually been replaced by machines. The need to produce goods in mass quantities which could only be made possible by machines and European competition for markets for finished goods were the real factors that brought an end to the trade in human cargo and the beginning of competition for colonial territories in Africa. Although, the attitude of the coastal rulers towards the abolition was hostile, the abolitionists had to resort to treaties including promises of some compensation to the chiefs and the encouragement of alternative trade, hence, the birth of “legitimate trade”. The development of legitimate trade was the final phase of private and official British effort to find a positive alternative to the traffic in slave. The expansion of legitimate trade in Nigeria was to take place, not in the European enclaves, but within the existing Nigerian agricultural system, and without unduly disturbing the  existing patterns either of production or of political authorities (Ofonagoro 1979). The principal commodities of legitimate trade were palm oil and palm kernels, which were used in Europe to make soap and as lubricants for machinery before petroleum products were developed for that purpose. The production of cash crops for export spearheaded the incorporation of the majority of the West Africans into the colonial economy. Initially most palm oil and latter palm kernels came from many places in Nigeria including Igboland. In Nigeria, palm trees grew wild, and

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Nigeria supplied Europe with palm oil (Ekundare 1973). It was a relatively simple adjustment for many Igbo families to transport the oil to rivers and streams that led to the Niger Delta for sale to the European merchants. According to Hopkins (1973), the transition from slave trade to legitimate trade, rather than the colonial era, was the beginning of the modern economic history of West Africa. The legitimate trade period marked the end of economic isolation of the hinterland. The imported goods as a result of the legitimate trade were readily available for exchange for local agricultural produce. The new economic situation helped to stimulate production.

Conclusion As submitted above, prior to colonial imperialism, the entity called Nigeria was a rich mosaic of economic and political diversities. Aside from the diverse economic activities engaged in by the people and the resultant developmental returns, each of the pre-colonial groups also had a stable political system rooted in the people’s culture. However, European invasion distorted the economic and political structure. Nigerian societies, like the other societies in Africa, were strategically denied their traditional history, and their economic structures were dislocated for capitalistic gains (Tangie 2005). Due to the imposition of money tax on peasants, which was paid in European currencies, Africans were made to work for the Europeans to be able to meet this tax condition. This marked the end of self-sufficiency in food production. Colonial political and economic structures also promoted public corruption. As explained by Tangie (2005:5), colonialism promoted corruption in three ways: monetization of the economy, introduction of taxation and divide and rule. Through these avenues, corruption infiltrated the indigenous African people and was nurtured into the post-colonial era. If political and economic stability must be achieved, the important lessons from the past must be imbibed.

References Aghalino, S. O. 2006. Economic foundations of pre-colonial Isokoland. Ilorin Journal of History 1(2), 25-39 Aigbokhai, S.  O. 1971. West African history for the certificate year. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd Bradbury, R. E. 1967. The Benin kingdom and Edo speaking people of southern Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press. Buah, F. K. 1974. West Africa since A. D 1000. Macmillan Crowder, M. 1962. The story of Nigeria. London: Faber & Faber ltd Ekundare, R. O. 1973. An economic history of Nigeria 1860-196. London: Methuen & Co ltd Eluwa, G. I. C., Ukagwu, M. O., Nwachukwu, J. U. N., & Nwaubani A. C. N. 1988. A history of Nigeria. Africana First Publishers plc Fage, J. D. 1962. Introduction to the history of West Africa (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press

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Falola, T., Mahadi, A., Uhomoibhi, M., & Anyanwu, U. 1991. History of Nigeria 2, Nigeria in the 19th Century. Nigeria: Longman Nigeria Plc Fika, A.  M. 1978. The Kano civil war and British over-rule 1882-1940. Oxford: Oxford University Press Hopkins, A.G. 1973. An economic history of West Africa. London: Longman Group Ltd. Johnson, Samuel. 1921. History of the Yorubas. Lagos: C.M.S Books Mongabay. 1991. Nigeria – government and politics. Retrieved from http://www.mongabay.com/ history/nigeria/nigeria-government_and_politics.html on 14 March, 2013 Ofonagoro, W. I. 1979. Trade and imperialism in southern Nigeria, 1881-1929. New York: Nok publishers Olaoye, R.  A. 2009. The concept of science and technology. In R.A.  Olaoye (Ed.), History of indigenous science and technology in Nigeria. Cresthill Publishers ltd Olaoye, R. A. 2003. Promotion of creation and creativity in Nigeria: A study of indigenous technology. Ilorin Journal of History 1(1), 1–7 Oniemola, R. 2011. Gender relations in the economy of Okunland 1900-1960, unpublished M. A thesis, University of Lagos, Nigeria. Onwubiko, K. B. C. 1995. History of West Africa. Onitsha: African Publishers Ltd Oyemakinde, W. 1996. The structure of the West African economy. In G.O.  Ogunremi & E.K.  Faluyi (Eds.), An economic history of West Africa since 1750 (pp.  1–13). Lagos: Rex Charles Publication Rodney, W. 1982. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Abuja, Nigeria: Panaf Publishing Inc Sahlins, M. 1974. Stone age economics. London: Tavistock Sambo, Z.S. 2006. An historical analysis of the economic activities of Ilorin people in Kano 1819–1960. Ilorin Journal of History 1(2), 110–123 Stride, G. T. & Ifeka, C. 1971. Peoples and empires of West Africa. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd Tangie, F. 2005. The state and development in Africa. Paper prepared for the 11th general assembly of CODESRIA on ‘rethinking African development: beyond impasse, towards alternatives’, Maputo, Mozambique, December 6–10

Chapter 3

Nigeria Between 1914 and 1960: Political-­ Constitutional Changes and Crises in an Era of Colonialism Olajide O. Akanji Abstract  The colonial era in Nigeria was a period of constitutional changes and crises which shaped politics and governance at the time and laid the foundation of the contemporary Nigerian state. No doubt, contemporary and future political history of Nigeria is linked to the country's colonial era. Keywords  Constitutional engineering · Political crisis · National instability · Ethnic politics · Colonialism · Nigeria

Introduction The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria by Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard in 1914 was a significant event in the annals of world history. Firstly, it ushered in the birth of a state called “Nigerian” as a new addition to the conglomeration of states on world political map. Secondly, it signified the commencement of formal British occupation, colonization, and administration of Nigeria, which lasted till 1960. Thirdly, it introduced western, albeit British, political system, structures, and culture in Nigeria. Lastly, it was the starting point for a number of issues, including political and constitutional changes and crises that shaped Nigeria’s sociopolitical history, with reactions of Southern Nigerians to the amalgamation being the first signpost of the crises to plague the country. Southerners’ reactions, which reflected in comments in some Lagos newspapers, were those of rejection and suspicion of the underlying reasons for the amalgamation. For example, while the Nigerian Chronicle of 23 January 1914 noted that the amalgamation was “Union of name [which] does not mean or involve a union of customs and manners,” the Times of Nigeria of 5 May 1914 considered the amalgamation as “the

O. O. Akanji (*) Department of Political Science, Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_3

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conquest and subjugation of Southern Nigeria by Northern Nigeria” (Ngou 1989:81). These comments clearly point to ethnic suspicion, which has persisted throughout country’s political life from the era of colonialism till date.

Conceptual Note Colonialism and crisis are two terms whose conceptualizations are diffused and fragmented, because the terms can be interpreted in a number of ways. But while discourses on crisis seem to agree that it refers to a condition of instability, threat, chaos, emergency, or tension, the discussions of colonialism have often revolved around some aspect of European activities, beginning from the sixteenth century, in Africa, Asia, and the Americas (Iliffe 1999). Simply put, colonialism represents the sociocultural, political, and economic conquest, subjugation, and exploitation of a weak community (state) or people by a foreign or external power. In Africa, like other colonized regions of the world, colonialism was marked by a formal, but brutal, imposition of European (Western) cultures, values, and politico-economic systems on the African people, which resulted in the disruption of traditional African mores and institutions, and essentially Africa’s process of growth, development, and civilization. This engendered numerous crises, as Africans reacted angrily to some colonial policies, actions, and inactions. Opposition and crises notwithstanding, Western colonialism lasted until the twentieth century in Africa. The fact, however, that colonialism lasted for as long as it did was due to the political structure it imposed on its victims, the colonized people.

Political Structure of Colonialism in Nigeria After the amalgamation of 1914, the British government introduced a political system and structure in which the day-to-day administration of Nigeria was the responsibility of a number of officials. These were the Governor (at a point known as Governor General), assisted members of the Executive and Legislative Council(s), the Chief Commissioners/Lieutenant Governors (in charge of the regions), Residents, and Divisional/District officers, assistant district officers and lastly the traditional rulers and chiefs (see Adamolekun 1986: 34–35). Given the role that the traditional rulers and chiefs, and essentially the traditional institutions played in the colonial political system of governance, as intermediaries between the people and the colonial officials, the system has been widely described as the “indirect rule system” (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004; Iliffe 1999; Olusanya 1980; Ezera 1960). The operationalization of this system, and the challenges it engendered, necessitated the formulation and introduction of series of constitutions by the British government. In all, the British government formulated, with the involvement of some Nigerians at some points, five Westernstyled constitutions for the administration of Nigeria between 1922 and 1960. Each had far-reaching implications for Nigeria’s sociopolitical development.

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 onstitutional Engineering and Political Developments C in Colonial Nigeria Formulation and introduction of constitutions was one issue that shaped Nigeria’s sociopolitical development during colonialism (1914–1960). This was due to the important role that constitution(s), described by K. C. Wheare, as “a collection of norms or standards according to which a country is governed” (cited in Anifowose 1999:157) and a “blend of strict law or legal concepts or principles and political conclusions” (Yakubu 2003:1), play in the administration of political entities worldwide. As a result, constitutions were introduced by the colonial authorities in Nigeria, both as instruments of administering the country and as means, at least on paper, of accommodating the demands of Nigerians for, among other things, inclusive government. But, given the way and manner the constitutions were introduced and the purpose they served, as would be demonstrated in this chapter, they could be described as the British government’s instruments of manipulating Nigerian demands in the interest of colonial rule.

The 1922 Constitution In 1922, the British colonial administration in Nigeria headed by Sir Hugh Clifford introduced the first Western-type constitution into the country. The constitution sometimes referred to as the Clifford constitution or the 1922 constitution was introduced on the backdrop of the anomalies in the Nigerian Council, an ad hoc legislative council that was created in 1914 by the Lord Lugard administration, but which was bedeviled by a series of operational difficulties. Part of the problems with the Nigerian Council was its lack of both legislative and executive power and the lack of jurisdiction over the Lagos colony, which had a separate legislative council of its own (Olusanya 1980). These problems stemmed from the provision of the Nigerian Order-in-Council of 1913, the official legal instrument of the British government that created the Nigerian Council. According to the instrument, “No resolution passed by the Council shall have any legislative or executive authority, and the Governor shall not be required to give effect to any such resolution unless he thinks fit and is authorized to do so” (Olusanya 1980:520). This shows that the Nigerian Council was designed as an institution devoid of the basic powers to function. It was against this backdrop that the 1922 constitution was formulated and introduced. But rather than addressing the shortcomings of the 1913 Nigerian Order-in-­ Council, the 1922 constitution sustained them and created new ones, although it also laid a formal structure for the political administration of the country. First and foremost, the constitution brought the administration of the Lagos colony under the Governor, and created a new legislative council with jurisdiction limited to Southern Nigeria except on issue of budget estimate, and allowed the Governor to administer Northern Nigeria by proclamation (Akinboye and Anifowose 1999:238; Olusanya

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1980:518). The rationale for the limitation of the jurisdiction of the legislative council was predicated on the territorial vastness, ethnic diversity, and poor communication facilities in Nigeria, as well as the theoretical difficulty in distinguishing between a colony and a protectorate (Olusanya 1980). Due to the limited jurisdiction of the legislative council, the constitution failed to foster national unity. It is important to note that the 1922 constitution made some positive contributions to Nigeria’s political development. First, it introduced an elective principle for the appointment of three representatives from Lagos and one from Calabar into the legislative council (Akinboye and Anifowose 1999; Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004; Keay and Thomas 1986; Ezera 1960; Dudley 1982; Olusanya 1980). Second, it created a formal structure of governance consisting of the Governor, assisted by an executive council and a legislative council. But while the legislative council had some measure of power to legislate for the whole country on some issues such as budget estimates, the executive council was purely advisory in nature (Keay and Thomas 1986; Olusanya 1980). The executive council consisted of the Governor and nominated European members. On the other hand, the legislative council comprised the Governor, as the chair/president of the council, 26 appointed officials who were Europeans, 15 nominated unofficial members, and 4 elected unofficial members elected from Lagos and Calabar (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004:53). The composition of the two councils points to another defect in the 1922 constitution: it was undemocratic because the Governor was conferred with enormous power and authority. The Governor was a presiding member of both the executive and legislative councils and also possessed the power to appoint a sizeable number of the members of the two councils. Furthermore, the election of the four members from Lagos and Calabar was attached to franchise qualification of adult male suffrage with residential qualification of 1 year and a gross income of $100 per annum (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004:4). This was clearly restrictive and discriminatory, because it was based on male suffrage instead of universal adult suffrage. The shortcomings of the constitution informed the introduction of another constitution.

Richards’ Constitution and Politico-territorial Restructuring A second constitution, otherwise called Richards’ constitution, was published by the colonial administration of Sir Arthur Richards in 1946. The Richards’ constitution refined the political structure of governance that was introduced by the 1922 constitution. Firstly, it introduced the concept of regionalism by dividing Nigeria into three regions: Northern, Western, and Eastern regions (Olusanya 1980:520; Oyediran 1979:3). Each region was placed under a chief commissioner, as the head of the regional government. Secondly, it provided for central executive council and central legislative councils, alongside regional executive and legislative councils. Unlike the legislative council under the 1922 constitution, the central legislative council of the Richards’ constitution had jurisdiction over the whole country.

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Membership of the central legislative council was equally larger than that of the legislative council under the 1922 constitution (for complete breakdown, see Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004:53; Awa 1964: 20). In addition, the constitution provided for a bicameral legislature in the form of a House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs in the Northern region, while each of the Eastern and Western regions had a unicameral legislature in the form of a House of Assembly (Awa 1964: 20). This was, however, a defect in the constitution, as it points to government discrimination against the traditional institutions in Southern Nigeria. Also, the 1946 constitution enlarged the central legislative council, although it left the central executive council as it was under the 1922 constitution. According to Oyediran (1979), the central legislative council comprised 28 unofficial members and 16 official members. The 28 unofficial members in turn comprised of 20 members appointed by the regional assemblies in the ratio of 9:6:5 for the North, West, and East, respectively, and four members elected in the ratio 3:1 from Lagos and Calabar on a franchise of £100 and £20, respectively. The remaining four unofficial members were appointed by the colonial Governor to represent special interests (Oyediran 1979: 4). Members of the regional House of Assembly consisted of official and unofficial members selected by the Native Authorities and a number of unofficial members (numbers not static) nominated by the Governor (see Oyediran 1979; Awa 1964). The fact, however, that the Governor nominated some members of the central and regional legislatures shows that the constitution failed to promote representative democracy, further buttressed by its failure to increase the number of elected representative from the four that had been in place since the 1922 constitution. In the same token, rather than granting full legislative power to the central and regional parliaments, the 1946 constitution restricted and limited them to subsidiary functions, because it granted the Governor deciding/reserved powers on all matters. The regional parliaments, for example, were restricted to certain functions, including selection of regional representatives for the central legislative council and consideration of issues referred to them by the Governor such as debating regional budget estimates and passing law on how to spend the budgets (Oyediran 1979: 3). Given this, and the fact that the Governor had reserved powers, which could be used to overrule any decision of the central and regional parliaments, the constitution deprived the regions and the central legislature of real legislative power. These and other shortcomings, including the failure of the government to consult with the people before it introduced the constitution, engendered opposition that undermined its implementation (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004:54; Awolowo 1966:6; Ezera 1960:95). Failure to engage in wide consultations before enactment made the constitution to repeat the weaknesses of the previous (1922) constitution and gave opportunities to nationalists such as Nnamdi Azikiwe to criticize it as undemocratic. Besides, nationalists condemned the 1946 constitution for the disproportionate sizes of the regional councils it created and the use of nomination instead of election in the appointment of members of the legislative councils (Oyediran 1979:4). For example, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), a major political party at the time, opposed the introduction of the constitution and organized a

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nationwide campaign tour to that effect (Olusanya 1980). The objectives of the nationwide campaign tour were to raise public awareness about the defects in the constitution and also to raise funds for the party to be able to send a delegation to London to protest against the introduction of the constitution (Olusanya 1980). Although the party succeeded in arousing public interest and in sending a delegation to London over the nature of the constitution, it failed to impress the British authorities to immediately withdraw it. Despite the unpopularity of the 1946 constitution, it still contributed to Nigeria’s political developments, albeit inadvertently. Firstly, the fact that the constitution was fraught with defects enabled nationalists, using the print media and the campaign tour of the NCNC, to express their feelings of marginalization and exclusion from the colonial administration and in so doing raised public consciousness about the ills of colonialism. Secondly, regionalism as introduced by the constitution, in which regions became administrative units, brought the central government closer to the people. Though the three regions lacked full executive and legislative powers, the policy laid the foundation for future participation of Nigerians in the administration of their country. Thirdly, the fact that more Nigerians had the opportunity to participate in politics through their regions, albeit as unofficial members, was better than the practice in the pre-1946 years when there were no regions and few nominated Nigerians were in government. Nonetheless, the defects inherent in the constitution and widespread opposition to it underpinned it replacement in 1951, earlier than would have been.

1951 Constitution and the Structure of Government In 1951, another constitution was introduced by the administration of Sir John Macpherson. The constitution, often called Macpherson constitution, was a departure from the 1922 and 1946 constitutions. This is because it provided clear details of the administrative and political structures of the various tiers of government that were in existence. First and foremost, the 1951 constitution provided for a quasi-­federal system (Ezera 1960:95), comprising central government and three regional governments, each with executive and legislative councils (Dudley 1982:45). The constitution enlarged membership of the central legislative council, the House of Representatives, and vested the regional executive and legislative councils with some powers, as opposed to the practice under the 1946 constitution where the regions only existed for administrative conveniences. The 1951 constitution also retained unicameralism at the central level and in the Eastern region, while it provided for the bicameral legislature in the form of House of Assembly and House of Chiefs in the Western and Northern regions (Oyediran 2007: 17; Oyediran 1979: 5; Awa 1964: 36–37). Under the constitution, the central executive council, otherwise called the central council of ministers, consisted of the Governor (as the Chairman), 6 officials, and 12 Nigerian ministers (Oyediran 1979: 5). The Nigerian ministers in the council of ministers were nominated by the Regional Lt. Governors from the members of the

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regions in the House of Representatives (4 from each of the three regions) (Oyediran 1979: 5), but subject to the Governor’s approval (Keay and Thomas 1986:180). To a large extent, however, the council was advisory in nature, because the Governor had the right to follow the advice of the council only on matters in which he/she had no discretion (Oyediran 1979:5). In the same token, the central council of ministers was itself a mockery of the principles underlying good governance. This is in view of the way ministerial portfolios and responsibilities were distributed among members. The Governor and the 6 official members of the council had responsibilities over external relations, defense, and civil, legal, and financial matters, but the 12 Nigerian ministers were saddled with little or no responsibility at all. Three of the Nigerian ministers had no ministerial portfolio (Keay and Thomas 1986). The remaining nine had portfolios but lacked executive power, because they, like other ministers, only had to liaise with Heads of Departments in carrying out government decisions (Keay and Thomas 1986:181). Thus, the ministers only assisted in proposing government business in parliament and direct executive actions. This shows that the duties of the ministers were without executive powers. Also, the 1951 constitution provided for regional executive council (regional council of ministers), comprising the Lt. Governor, as the Chairman, assisted by regional ministers drawn from the regional parliaments whose roles were similar to those of the central ministers (Keay and Thomas 1986). On the legislature, the 1951 constitution created legislative council for both the central and regional governments. The regional parliaments acted as electoral colleges for the election of members of the central legislative council. Under the 1946 constitution, membership of the central legislature was increased from 44 to 148 members. However, 136 of these numbers were unofficial members elected indirectly from and by the regional assemblies. Also, 68 of the 136 members were from the Northern region and 34 from each of the Eastern and Western regions (Oyediran 1979, 2007). The Governor appointed six official members to represent interests that he considered not adequately represented and another six as ex officio members (Oyediran 1979, 2007). The central legislature had power to legislate for the whole country. The regional parliaments were directly responsible for legislating for the regions on certain matters stipulated by the constitution. For example, the regional parliaments legislated on forestry, fisheries, agriculture, animal health, cooperative societies, social welfare, regional public work, native courts, local government, health, education, town and community planning, land, and other allied matters (Awa 1964:38). Governor’s reserved power, however, undermines regions full exercise of their functions. For example, the Governor had the right to use its reserved power to disallow any regional legislation that conflicted with legislations of the central legislative council (Keay and Thomas 1986). This was intended to preserve the supremacy of the central government over the regions. However, the constitution granted the region a measure of fiscal autonomy, as the Governor was constitutionally mandated to allocate resources to the regions’ principles of derivation (export duties), consumption (excise and import duties), and sharing of the distributable pool (Keay and Thomas 1986:45). This promoted individual regional economic strengths.

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Similarly, the Governor had the power to scrutinize all regional legislations and had the right to object to the passage of any regional bills if such concerned matters outside the legislative purview of regional parliaments or if such were deemed to be inconsistence with the general interests of the country (Olusanya 1980). This is buttressed by Section 121 (i) of the Order-in-Council, which reads: The Governor may from time to time give to the Lt. Governor such directions with respect to the exercise of the executive authority of the Region as he may decide are desirable and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, may give such directions for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provision of section 120 of this Order. (Olusanya 1980:533).

This provision and the powers that the Governor had over the regions show clearly that the 1951 constitution granted the regions very little autonomy. In the same token, the constitution failed to grant the central legislative council full legislative powers, because the Governor’s right to reserved power limited the jurisdiction of the council over a number of sensitive issues. For example, the central legislative council had no power over bills relating to public revenue and public service (Oyediran 1979:5). Both issues were handled by the Governor under the reserved powers (Keay and Thomas 1986). The use of reserved power by the Governor, contained in Section 186 of the Order-in-Council, conferred on the Governor the power to pass into law any bill he/she considers to be in the interest of public order and good government even if the central legislative council failed to pass such a bill (Keay and Thomas 1986). Consequent upon the nature and shortcomings of the constitution, which resulted in increasing display of ethnic politics at the regions, leading to constitutional crisis in 1953 in the central council of ministers, the colonial authorities introduced another constitution in 1954 (Ezera 1960:96).

1954 Constitution and Party System of Government The British government introduced the forth constitution in Nigeria in 1954. The constitution is often referred to as Lyttelton constitution, named after Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the colonial secretary. The Lyttelton constitution retained some of the features of the 1951 constitution, including regionalism, unicameral legislature in both Eastern region and the central/federal level of government, and bicameral legislature in the Western and Northern regions. Among its major attributes were the “strengthening of the power of the regional governments and legislatures in relations to central government” (Ezera 1960:96) and recognition of Nigeria as a federation of three regions, with Southern Cameroon and Lagos designated as federal territories (Olusanya 1980). It equally changed the title of the head of the central and regional governments to Governor General and Governor, respectively.

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Other features of the Lyttelton constitution included the Nigerianization of the public service, regionalization of the judiciary and the public service (Ngou 1989:86), and provision for the review of the constitution within 3 years with effect from 31 August 1953 (Keay and Thomas 1986; Oyediran 1979). Unlike the 1951 constitution, Lyttelton constitution stipulated the use of direct elections for the election of members of the central legislature, the House of Representatives, and the House of Assembly in the Eastern and Western regions, but retained electoral college system for the Northern region, except for 18 urban areas in the region (Oyediran 2007: 28). Similarly, cabinet system was introduced into the executive arm of the governments, as the federal and regional ministers became executive ministers, having control of their ministries (Keay and Thomas 1986:190). This introduced the principle of collective responsibility of cabinet ministers. Furthermore, unlike the 1951 constitution, the executive council of the Lyttelton constitution consisted of the Governor General and three ministers appointed from each of the regions by the Governor General from members of the House of Representatives on the recommendation of the majority leader of the House (Oyeneye et  al. 2005). Also, the Governor General appointed a minister representing the federal territory and a number of official members. Similarly, the membership of the House of Representatives was enlarged to 184 directly elected members with 92 from the Northern region, 42 each from the Western and Eastern regions, 2 from Lagos, and 6 to represent Southern Cameroon (Oyeneye et al. 2005: 146; Keay and Thomas 1986: 189). At the regional level, the executive council comprised the regional Governor, the Premier, and a number of ministers. The Governor then appointed the Premier from the regional House of Assembly. Also, ministers were appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier (Oyeneye et al. 2005; Keay and Thomas 1986). On the other hand, the legislative arm of government in the Eastern and Western regions was headed by a Speaker, who was an elected member of the House of Assembly but chosen by his colleagues to occupy the post. In the Northern region, however, the Governor of the region continued to preside over the affairs of the House of Assembly, as well as the House of Chiefs (Oyediran 2007). Given its innovations, the Lyttelton constitution was no doubt unique, but its major uniqueness was the provision for the review of the constitution within 3 years. This stymied agitations for the constitution’s review, which had characterized the previous constitutions. In line with the provision, constitutional review conferences were held in London in May 1957 and from September to October 1958 in Lagos to review the Lyttelton constitution (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004:54; Ezera 1960:97). During the review sittings, a number of issues were presented by various groups including ethnic minorities. The problem of minorities revolved around their marginalization and domination by majority of ethnic groups. This led to peaceful and, on few occasions, violent agitations for local autonomy (Osaghae 2002). Issues presented included regional self-government, fiscal/revenue allocation, structure of government, state creation, and constituency delimitation. The recommendations of the two sittings of the CRC altered Nigeria’s political topography, because they included ratification of 1960 for Nigeria’s independence, introduction

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of full parliamentary system of government, and a number of other features. Also, the CRC granted the request for immediate self-government made by the Eastern and Western regions and 1959 for self-government in the Northern region (Oyediran 2007: 34; Keay and Thomas 1986:190). This led to the restructuring of the political institutions of the regions. The Governors, for example, ceased to preside over the regional executive councils, although they retained the power to disallow regional activities that violated or conflicted with federal interest (Oyediran 2007). The Governors of the two regions were, however, mandated to act, in all other matters, on the advice of their ministers (the Premier and other regional ministers). Furthermore, at the federal level, the political arrangement was restructured. There was the creation of the office of the Prime Minister, the abrogation of nominated membership of the Federal Executive Council (FEC), and the appointment of the Prime Minister by the Governor General from elected members of the House of Representatives. In addition, bicameralism was recommended and introduced at the federal level, leading to the creation of the Senate (Awa 1964). Membership of the Senate consisted of two members from each of the regions and Southern Cameroons, four from Lagos, and four other members appointed by the Governor General to represent special interests (Awa 1964). The legislative power of the Senate covered all bills relating to any issue, except appropriation bills (Oyediran 2007). In addition, as part of the political restructuring, elected members of the House of Representatives were increased to 320, effective from 1959 (Oyediran 2007: 34). The CRC, however, retained the use of universal adult suffrage for elections in the Eastern and Western regions and Lagos and male adult suffrage in the Northern region (Keay and Thomas 1986). In addition, the CRC recommendations led to the introduction of self-government in Southern Cameroon, leading to the creation of the office of the Premier and a two-chamber parliament comprising the Senate and House of Representatives (Oyediran 2007). On the issue of police, the CRC placed the Nigeria Police Force under the federal government, but recommended the establishment of the Police Service Commission to insulate the force from political interference (Keay and Thomas 1986:190). On the request by ethnic minorities, regarding their fears of marginalization by the dominant ethnic groups of Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, the CRC at its 1958 sitting adopted recommendations made by the Henry Willink Commission, set up in 1957. The commission recommended the inclusion of specific fundamental human rights in the constitution (Oyediran 2007; Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004; Akinboye and Anifowose 1999; Ezera 1960).

1960 Constitution and Independence In line with the recommendations of the CRC meetings of 1957 and 1958, which had ratified 1960 for Nigeria’s independence, a new constitution, containing all the agreements reached at the CRC meetings, was introduced in the country in 1960.

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The 1960 constitution, also called independence constitution, recognized Nigeria as a federation of three regions and a federal government, each operating a parliamentary system of government (Ojo 1989). It provided for three regional constitutions, alongside a federal constitution. The four constitutions were similar in every respect, except that the regional constitutions addressed matters related to the regions, while the federal constitution addressed the working of the federal government and its relationship with the regions. The 1960 constitution, however, represented a shift from the 1954 constitution, exemplified by the introduction of full parliamentary system of government at both the federal and regional levels; creation of separate legislative lists for the federal and regional parliaments; increase in membership of the federal legislature, the Senate, and the House of Representatives; and the inclusion of the bill of rights, among others. The major contribution of the 1960 constitution to Nigeria’s political development was the attempts to prevent or reduce abuse of power by elected governments. The constitution thus provided some safeguards. These included provisions on the fundamental human rights of Nigerians, although some of the rights were not justiciable. Also, to ensure accountability and transparency in government, the constitution tied the removal/dismissal of the Director of Audit of the federation to a resolution of both Houses of the federal legislature, and made him/her directly responsible to the parliament through the minister of finance (Keay and Thomas 1986). Moreover, in order to prevent political interference in the judiciary, appointment of Judges of the Federal Supreme Court and High Court were to be made on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, consisting mainly of judges. Removal of judges was equally subject to an investigative tribunal of judges, whose findings must be confirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Ojo 1989:39). Despite the remarkable features of the 1960 constitution as the instrument of Nigeria’s political independence from Britain, there were still some drawbacks. The retention of the Queen of England as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as the apex Court of law for Nigeria (Ojo 1989; Awa 1964) casts aspersion on the country’s independence or, better put, rendered it an independence on paper.

 arty Politics, Ethnicity, and Political Crises P in Colonial Nigeria Nigeria’s colonial history was characterized by political activism from 1922 to 1960. The period also revealed the interface between ethnicity, party formation, and party politics, which resulted in a series of political crises, some of which are discussed in the next subsection.

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Onset of Political Parties and Party Politics The introduction of elective principle by the 1922 constitution was the beginning of party politics in Nigeria, because it awakened political consciousness and stimulated the formation of political parties. In response to the constitution, political parties such as the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led by Herbert Macaulay were formed. By mid-1940s also, a number of other parties had been established, including the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) and the National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). These political parties were formed in response to the elective principle and debilitating effects of colonialism on Nigerians. A number of newspapers also emerged and contributed to sociopolitical activism in the country. These included the Lagos Daily News, The Daily Times, The Nigerian Pioneer, and West African Pilot. The emergence of these organizations (political parties and the media) provided robust channels for Nigerians to express their grievances against the colonial system. Like the 1922 constitution, the introduction of the 1951 constitution engendered political activism across Nigeria, with far-reaching implications for political development. First and foremost, the process of formulating the 1951 constitution involved the active participation of some Nigerians. This gave Nigerians the opportunity to understudy the art of constitution making. Similarly, the opportunities that the constitution created for political participation through the enlargement of the membership of the House of Representatives and the creation of regional parliaments stimulated the formation of more political parties. For example, in response to the constitution, two sociopolitical associations, namely, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (lit. Association of the Children of Oduduwa, the mythical ancestor of the Yoruba people), established in 1945 by some Yoruba political elites, and the Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa (lit. the Association of Peoples of the North), established in 1948 by some Hausa-Fulani political aristocrats, transformed into political parties in 1951 (Dudley 1982:47–49). While Egbe Omo Oduduwa became the Action Group (AG), the Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa became the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) (Dudley 1982:47–49). These political parties, alongside the NCNC, were the dominant political parties in Nigeria at the time. However, a number of smaller political parties were also formed. These include Mabolaje Party in the Western region, United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Alvan Ikoku in the Eastern region, and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), formed by a group of northern radicals led by Mallam Aminu Kano, and United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), formed in 1955 by northern ethnic minority groups under the leadership of David Lot, Patrick Dokotri, and Joseph Sarwuan Tarka, among others (see Ngou 1989). These and other smaller parties served as opposition to the powers and influence of the dominant parties in their regions. The smaller parties still had to form alliances with the dominant parties and with one another to achieve their objectives, the failure of which led to the collapse of some alliances such as the breakdown of NPC-UMBC alliance of 1955–1956 over UMBC’s allegation that the alliance was not helpful to its cause. This led to the

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formation of AG-UMBC alliance in 1957 (Osaghae 2002; Ngou 1989), because AG was more disposed, than NPC was, to minorities’ agitations for local autonomy. This array of political parties and political activities in the country signified the onset of multiparty democracy, which was a result of the nature of the 1951 constitution. However, the operationalization of the 1951 constitution undermined the nation’s unity and collective political activism of the nationalists, as evidences of ethnic nationalism and ethnic politics emerged. Some of the events that followed the enactment of the constitution buttressed this. The events that followed the regional elections in 1951 clearly illustrated the problems that the introduction and operationalization of the 1951 constitution engendered.

Ethnic Politics and Political Crisis in Colonial Nigeria Between August and December 1951, there were elections to the regional parliaments. The elections were contested by more than one political party in each of the regions. The results, however, showed that the AG, NCNC, and NPC won overwhelmingly in the region of their origins. While the NPC won in the Northern region, the AG dominated the Western region, and NCNC, the Eastern region (Bamidele and Ikubaje 2004; Dudley 1982). The results clearly revealed ethnic and regional connotations, because the NPC was formed by some Northern elites and the AG by some Yoruba intelligentsia. The NCNC, on the other hand, although had the semblance of a national party due to large membership that cut across the country, was more under the influence of Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Ibo man from the Eastern region. This underscores NCNC overwhelming victory in the Eastern region. Furthermore, the operationalization of the 1951 constitution weakened national unity and promoted ethnic and exclusionary politics in the Western region during and after the July 1952 elections into the central legislative council. This was because the selection of the Western region’s representatives for the central legislative council by the Western regional House of Assembly was marred by consideration for ethnic identity by legislators and AG leadership. Available records show that although the AG won majority seats in the Western House of Assembly during the 1951 regional elections, the NCNC won all the five seats allocated to Lagos in the Assembly (Oyediran 1979). Thus, the Western region House of Assembly consisted of majority of AG parliamentarians and five NCNC members, one of whom was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the NCNC national leader. While the regional parliaments served as electoral college for election of members of the central legislative council under the 1951 constitution, the Yoruba-­ dominated AG-controlled Western regional House of Assembly deeply influenced the selection process among the opposition members (i.e., the five NCNC members, two of whom were to be nominated) (Oyediran 1979:8). In the end, two Yoruba NCNC members of the Western regional House of Assembly were nominated by the leadership of the House to represent Lagos at the central legislative council. The two, however, did not include the NCNC leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had

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signified interest. The two NCNC nominees were Prince Adeleke Adedoyin and Dr. Ibiyinka Olorun-Nimbe (Oyediran 2007: 22–23). The failure of Nnamdi Azikiwe to secure nomination from the Western region points to a number of things, including the fact that it was a deliberate attempt by the AG to frustrate Azikiwe’s political ambitions as well as a sheer display of ethnic chauvinism and tribal politics by the AG to the detriment of national unity and peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence. It also revealed the absence party discipline among members of the NCNC in the Western region.

The Eastern Regional and Federal Constitutional Crises The fallout of ethnic politics in the Western regional House of Assembly reverberated beyond the region. Its immediate effect was the desperation of NCNC leadership to have its national leader, Dr. Azikiwe, nominated to the central legislative council. To achieve this, records showed that the NCNC ordered its members in the central legislative council representing the Eastern region to boycott parliamentary sittings (Oyediran 2007; Keay and Thomas 1986). This was intended to create a constitutional impasse, since all the regions must be represented in the council before it could constitutionally function. The ploy however failed. Following this, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe resigned from the Western regional House of Assembly and sought election to the Eastern regional House of Assembly (Oyediran 2007: 23), hoping to use it as a platform to gain nomination to the central legislative council. However, given that elections to regional parliaments had taken place in 1951, the NCNC attempted to force the Eastern regional government to conduct fresh election. Firstly, the NCNC leadership requested the ministers in the regional executive council, whom were NCNC members, to resign, so that the party could present a proposal for cabinet reshuffle (Oyediran 2007: 24), which would have necessitated another parliamentary election in the region. Secondly, NCNC leadership ordered ministers representing the Eastern region in the central executive council to boycott government activities (Oyediran 2007: 24). This was intended to create a constitutional crisis that would force the colonial Governor to call for fresh nomination from the Eastern region. However, both strategies of the NCNC leadership failed, because the concerned ministers and legislators in the central executive council and central legislative council respectively disregarded the party directives and were as a result expelled from the party (Keay and Thomas 1986). Consequently, the NCNC-controlled Eastern regional House of Assembly moved a vote of no confidence motion on 2 February 1953 at the floor of the House to recall the nine Eastern regional ministers in the central executive council that had disregarded the party’s directives to boycott government business (Keay and Thomas 1986). This was aimed at forcing the regional government to call for fresh nomination from the region. Although the motion was supported by 60 to 13 votes by show of hands, it fell short of the constitutional requirements that the revocation of the appointment of any minister by any region could only be decided by two-third

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majority of votes cast in secret ballot (Keay and Thomas 1986). As a result, the concerned ministers refused to resign and the government refused to call for fresh nomination. In response, the Eastern regional House of Assembly defeated government’s appropriation bill brought to the floor of the House (Assembly) (Ostheimer 1973: 25), forcing the Lt. Governor (the head of the regional government) to resort to the use of the reserved powers to pass the region’s appropriation bill (Keay and Thomas 1986). In view of this and the fact that the House failed to consider and pass bills for over 3 months, the Lt. Governor dissolved the House of Assembly on 6 May 1953 (Keay and Thomas 1986).

Self-Government Motion Another event that highlighted the interface between ethnicity and politics in colonial Nigeria was the political crisis that attended the motion for self-government in 1953. Available records revealed that in March 1953, Anthony Enahoro, an AG member of the House of Representatives, moved a motion that the House should accept as its primary objective the attainment of self-government in 1956 (Osadolor 1998; Olusanya 1980; Oyediran 1979:8). The northern delegates, however, objected to the motion on the ground of the region’s non-readiness (Ezera 1960). The northern objection was due to a number of reasons, including the fact that the motion came without prior consultation with Nigerians of other political party affiliations, which would have allowed for robust discussions of its pros and cons for each region and the country. This explains why the NPC leader and the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, moved a counter-motion, substituting the phrase, “as soon as practicable” for “in 1956” (Osadolor 1998:42; Olusanya 1980:535; Oyediran 1979:9). Also, the northern objection stemmed from its northernization policy, which underpinned discriminatory employment policy for southerners seeking employment or working in the Northern region, many of whom were recruited on contract basis and many of whom lost their jobs, as opposed to full-time permanent employment that northerners and expatriates enjoyed (Albert 1998; Ngou 1989). The policy was a pointer to age-old bitter north-south dichotomy and lack of understanding or better put ethnic rivalry, mistrust, and suspicions in the country. The northernization policy, and the attendant crisis, was inadvertently caused by the 1953 constitution, which made regional governments freer to run theirs affairs as they deemed fit. The controversy around the self-government motion had serious implications for ethnic relations in the country. First, it polarized members of the central legislative council along regional lines, as there was sharp division between northern delegates, who were mainly NPC members, and southern delegates comprising AG and NCNC representatives. Given the northern objection to the self-government motion, the southern delegates threatened a walkout if the northern delegates used their majority number to defeat the motion and which they eventually did (Oyediran 1979:9). As a result, northern delegates were ridiculed by some of the southern delegates and southern-controlled print media (Albert 1998; Olusanya 1980; Ostheimer

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1973:26). For instance, because of the northern opposition to the motion, Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the AG described the north as “unfortunate victim of British imperialism” (Olusanya 1980:535). The attacks on northern delegates heightened ethnic tension, which almost resulted in the disintegration of the country because northern political elites decided on an eight-point program or the policy of non-­ fraternization with the South (Osadolor 1998:42; Ngou 1989:89; Schwarz and Frederick 1965: 79), which was a subtle declaration of secession. The northern threat was later withdrawn at the instance of the colonial administration (Osadolor 1998:42). Furthermore, in protest against the failure of the self-government motion, Western regional ministers in the central executive council resigned their cabinet membership (Oyediran 1979:9). This created constitutional crisis at the central government (Ezera 1960:96), because the cabinet was no longer reflecting the statutory geopolitical composition. This hampered government business. Similarly, the self-­ government sparked violence in Northern Nigeria. This occurred as the AG leadership embarked on a tour to the North, which was intended to enlighten the northern public on the self-government issue (Olusanya 1980; Oyediran 1979). The tour was misconstrued by northerners as another assault from the South. The AG delegation on the tour was thus greeted with violent riots in Kano, which lasted for almost 4  days and resulted in the death of 36 people and over 240 wounded (Oyediran 1979:9; Schwarz and Frederick 1965:79). These crises forced the British government to introduce a new constitution in 1954, which set the stage for British withdrawal from Nigeria.

Conclusion As it has been demonstrated, political and constitutional changes as well as crises were features of Nigeria’s colonial history. The changes and crises were direct responses to critical issues of the period in which they occurred. Their occurrences were partly due to the nature of British colonialism in Nigeria, which, among other things, excluded the people from the governance of the country. Also the colonially skewed territorial division of Nigeria between the North and South contributed to the crises and tensions. This was because the division gave the Northern region “a disproportionately vast share of the [country’s] land area, 74 percent and of the people, 54 percent” (Ngou 1989:80). This allowed NPC to have an undue advantage over AG and NCNC, because the Northern region which it controlled was always allocated, on the basis of size and population, more than half of the seats in the central legislative council (later House of Representatives). This underscores why ethnic politics was rife during the period. In the same context, failure of nationalists to put national unity above ethnic and sectional interest underpinned the political and constitutional crises that occurred. The changes and crises during the colonial period, however, laid the foundation of the country’s postindependence politics and ethnic relations, both of which have since been checkered.

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References Adamolekun, L. 1986. Politics and administration in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. Akinboye, S.O. and Anifowose, R. 1999. “Nigerian government and politics,” in Anifowose, R. and Francis Enemuo (Eds.), Elements of Politics, Surulere: Sam Iroanusi Publications, pp. 238–260. Albert, Olawale 1998, “Federalism, inter-ethnic conflicts and the northernisation policy of the 1950s and 1960s,” in Amuwo, K., Adigun Agbaje, Rotimi Suberu and Georges Herault (Eds.) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum/IFRA, pp. 50–63. Anifowose, R. 1999. Constitutions and constitutionalism. in Anifowose, R. and Francis Enemuo (Eds.), Elements of politics, Surulere: Sam Iroanusi Publications, pp. 157–170. Awa, E.  O. 1964. Federal Government in Nigeria, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Awolowo, O. 1966. Thoughts on Nigerian Constitutions. Ibadan: Oxford University Press. Bamidele, O. and Ikubaje, J. (Eds.) 2004. Position of Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform on the 1999 Constitution. Lagos: Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform. Dudley, Billy J. 1982. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Ibadan: Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Ezera, Kalu 1960. Constitutional Developments in Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Iliffe, John 1999. Africans: The History of a Continent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keay, E.A, Thomas, H. 1986. West African Government for Nigerian Students, 3rd Edition, London: Hutchinson. Ngou, C.M. 1989. The 1959 elections and formation of the independence government, in Ekeh, Peter P., Patrick Dele-Cole and Gabriel O.  Olusanya (Eds.) Nigeria since Independence: the first 25 years, vol. V, Politics and Constitutions, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd., pp. 80–105. Ojo, A. 1989. The Republican Constitution of 1963, in Ekeh, Peter P., Patrick Dele-Cole and Gabriel O. Olusanya (Eds.), Nigeria since Independence: the first 25 years, vol. V, Politics and Constitutions, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd., pp. 38–48. Olusanya, G.  O. 1980 Constitutional Development in Nigeria, 1861-1960. In Ikime, O. (Ed.) Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan: Heinemann Books Ltd. Osadolor, Osarhieme B. 1998. The development of the federal idea and the federal framework, 1914-1960. In Amuwo, K., Adigun Agbaje, Rotimi Suberu and Georges Herault (eds.) Federalism and political restructuring in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum/IFRA, pp. 34–49. Osaghae, Eghosa E. 2002. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence, Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Ltd. Ostheimer, John O. 1973. Nigerian Politics. New York and London: Harper & Row. Oyediran, O. 2007. Nigerian Constitutional Development. Ibadan: Oyediran Consult International. Oyediran, O. 1979. Background to military rule. In Oyeleye Oyediran (Ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966-1979. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, pp. 1–24. Oyeneye, I., Onyenwenu, M. and Olosunde, E. B. 2005. Government: a complete guide. Ikeja: Longman Nigeria Plc. Schwarz, Jr., Frederick A.O., 1965. .Nigeria: the tribes, the nations, or the race-the politics of independence. Cambridge and London: The M.I.T. Press. Yakubu, John A. 2003. Constitutional Law in Nigeria. Ibadan: Demyaxs Law Books.

Chapter 4

Postcolonial Nigeria: Power and Politics in the First Republic, 1960–1966 Daniel Eseme Gberevbie and Samuel Oni Abstract  The Nigerian politics in the postcolonial period has largely reflected the colonial origin of the system. The ethno-religion, the sectional and adversarial politics all have their roots in the legacy of the colonial era politics. Due to the fragile structure on which the foundation of the new state was laid, barely 5 years after independence, the first republic collapsed. Similarly, the second republic collapsed within 5 years of restoration of democracy, while the third republic was aborted before its birth. The current fourth republic has survived for 22 years. This is unprecedented. This chapter examines the nature, the actors, and the behavior of the operators and the system in postcolonial Nigeria. Keywords Politics · Postcolonial · First Republic · Instability · Nigeria

Introduction Nigeria as it is today came into existence in 1914, when Lord Frederick Lugard amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates into a single entity. In fact, the name was suggested by Flora Shaw that “the several British Protectorates on the Niger be known collectively as Nigeria” (Crowder 1980:11). This singular act of amalgamation brought together people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, which to a greater extent has continued to affect the political landscape of the country. As a matter of fact, most people from different protectorates did not support the idea and have continued to voice out their disapproval and frustration in various forms such as religious and ethnic violent disturbances in different parts of the country. As far back as 1947, the founder and leader of Egbe Omo Oduduwa and Action Group, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, expressed his view about Nigeria as a corporate entity thus:

D. E. Gberevbie (*) · S. Oni Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_4

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D. E. Gberevbie and S. Oni Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the sense as there are “English”, “Welsh”, or “French.” The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. (cited in Coleman 1986:320)

In the same vein, while contributing to a debate on the floor of the Nigerian Legislative Council in March 1948, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who later became Nigeria’s first Prime Minister stated the Northern position thus: Many Nigerians deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria is one…particularly some of the press people…this is wrong. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is artificial and it ends outside this Chamber…The southern tribes who are now pouring into the north in ever increasing numbers, and are more or less domiciled here do not mix with the northern people…and we in the north look upon them as invaders. (cited in Coleman 1986:361)

The view expressed by great nationalists goes to support the fact that the amalgamation of 1914 was a British creation that did not receive the popular support of the people. However, between 1914 and 1960, the country was under the British colonial rule. And at independence in 1960, the country adopted the federal parliamentary democracy with the British Monarch as the Head of State as represented by the Governor-General in the person of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (McCormick 2004). No doubt colonial rule influenced Nigeria in the area of constitutional development, structure of the country, political party system and party formation, elections, and governance. This chapter examines the country at independence, background information on granting of independence in 1960, the provisions of the 1960 and 1963 constitutions, the parliamentary regime – features, elections, composition, and constitutional powers – power politics, Nigerian economy, and the collapse of the First Republic on 15 January 1966.

 ackground Information on Granting B of Independence in 1960 The issue of Nigeria’s independence became heightened toward the end of the 1950s and was the dominant issue at the 1957 Constitutional Conference held in London and the 1958 Conference held in Lagos. Most of the political figures in Nigerian politics and delegates from the regional governments attended the Conferences. The issue of regional government was deliberated upon at the 1957 conference, and it was resolved that the Western and the Eastern Regions should be granted the status of self-government on 8 August 1957 while the Northern Region was to attain that status of self-government in 1959. Very importantly however, the Nigerian political leaders unanimously for the first time agreed that Nigeria’s independence should be October 1960 (Ikelegbe 2004). The conference set up Sir Henry Willink Commission to look into the fears of the minority ethnic groups dominated by the majority ethnic groups in the regions. Although the British government was initially opposed to the idea, they later came out with a declaration that “even if additional states were to be created, not more

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than one state would be created in each region” (cited in Elaigwu 2005:37). The commission, which arrived in Nigeria on 23 November 1957, began public sittings in each region till 12 April 1958 when it submitted its reports. The terms of reference of the Sir Henry Willink Commission to address the fears of minorities in Nigeria were: 1. to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill founded; 2. to advise what safeguards should be included for this purpose in the constitution of Nigeria; 3. if, but only if, no other solution seems to the commission to meet the case, then as a last resort, to make detailed recommendations for the creation of one or more new states, and in that case: (a) to specify the precise area to be included in such state or states; (b) to recommend the governmental and administrative structure most appropriate for it; (c) to assess whether any state recommended would be viable from an economic and administrative point of view and what the effect of its creation would be on the region or regions from which it would be created and on the federation. (cited in Elaigwu 2005:37). In order to consider the reports of the Willink Commission to clear some gray areas in the 1957 Conference, the 1958 Conference was held in Lagos. It was resolved in the conference that the north should attain internal self-government on 15 March 1959 and that Nigeria should be granted independence in October 1960 within the British Commonwealth (King 1988; Ikelegbe 1988). The reports of the Sir Henry Willink Commission showed that the fears of the minority ethnic groups in Nigeria were real. The findings of the commission revealed that: Each regional minority expressed the fear that independence would make it difficult for autocratic regional governments to be changed because of their dependence on the votes of majority ethnic groups. In the West, minorities feared Action Group (AG) dependence on a Yoruba majority; in the North, minorities expressed anxiety about Hausa-Fulani domination through the Northern People’s Congress (NPC); while minority groups in the East feared Ibo domination through the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). (cited in Elaigwu 2005:38)

Furthermore, fears that bothered on discrimination in economic field, religion, public posts, provision of public services, changes in the legal system in the regions, maintenance of public order, individual rights in the regions, intimidation, victimization, role of traditional rulers, and the relationship between Native Authorities and the regional governments were expressed by the minority ethnic groups. Even though the commission saw the real need for state creation to assuage the fears of domination of minority ethnic groups by the majority ethnic groups in Nigeria, yet there was no single state created from the then three regional structure of the Nigerian federation before independence in 1960. This was because all the then regional governments denied many of the fears expressed by the minority ethnic groups as baseless (Elaigwu 2005).

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Table 4.1  The 1959 Federal Election Results Regions Northern Region Eastern Region Western Region Federal Territory Total no. of seats (312)

Action Group UMBC 25 14 33 1 73

NCNC NEPU 8 56 21 2 89

NPC 134 – – – 134

Others Independents 7 1 8 – 16

Source: Ikelegbe (1988:316)

The minority ethnic groups that appeared before the commission included the people of Mid-West, made up of present-day Edo and Delta States from the then Western Region; the people of Ogoja, Calabar, and Rivers of the present-day Cross-­ River, Rivers, and Bayelsa States, respectively, from the then Eastern Region; and the people of the Middle-Belt of present-day Benue, Kogi, Kwara, and Plateau States; also included are people from southern Zaria, southern Bauchi, Niger, and Adamawa in the present-day Kaduna, Bauchi, Niger, and Adamawa States, respectively (Elaigwu 2005). No doubt, the creation of more states from the then three regions would have gone a long way to properly redefine the Nigerian federation in terms of structure and ethnic balancing for development and which would have prevented the adoption and application of the federal character principle currently seen by different scholars as obstacle to merit for development in manpower procurement and promotion in the Nigerian public service (Gboyega 1989; Onyeoziri 2002; Nzeshi 2012). In preparation for independence, a general election into the House of Representatives was held on 12 December 1959. The results of the election showed that NPC secured 134 seats while NCNC had a total of 89 seats. AG, however, gained 73 seats (Ikelegbe 1988; Osaghae 2002; Gberevbie 2009). Since no party emerged with a clear majority of 156 seats out of the 312 members in the House of Representatives, a coalition government comprising NPC and NCNC was formed with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC Deputy Leader) appointed as Prime Minister, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC Leader) appointed President of the newly created Upper Chamber of the Federal Parliament – the Senate – and subsequently became the Governor-General of the Nigerian federation at independence (Akinsanya 2005). Table 4.1 shows the 1959 Federal Election Results of the different political parties that took part prior to independence in 1960. Table 4.1 shows that NPC won majority of seats in the 1959 election but could not form the government alone because to form a government, a political party must win at least half of the total seats contested for in the election; and in this case, a party needed 156 seats in the house of 312 members to form the government all alone (Ikelegbe 1988; Adigwe 1985). Early in January 1960, a motion for the independence of Nigeria was moved in the House of Representatives by the Fani-Kayode. Consequent upon this, the Nigeria Independence Act 1960 was passed by the British Parliament on 26 January 1960. Nigerian government at independence therefore derived authorities,

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in part, from the British Parliament since the legislative powers of the independent State of Nigeria were defined in an Act of the British Parliament (Elias 1967).

Nigeria at Independence Nigeria became an independent nation on 1 October 1960 by an act of the British Parliament. The 1960 Independence Constitution of Nigeria conferred full independence on the entire federation and remained in force until 1 October 1963 when the country became a republic. It had a federal constitution with a parliamentary democratic system modeled after the British Westminster system that emphasized majority rule. Nigeria, unlike most other African states, adopted the multiparty system at independence, although it was regionally based (Metz 1991). The independence constitution of the federation and its regions were established by Section 2 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960, made by the British government in the following order: the Constitution of the Federation Republic of Nigeria, the Constitution of the Northern Region, the Constitution of the Western Region, and the Constitution of the Eastern Region. In case of conflict between the regional constitutions and the Federal constitution however, Section 1 of the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria 1960 provided that the Federal Constitution shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency and the other law shall be void (Nnamdi 1995; McCormick 2004).

The Provisions of the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions The 1960 independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions essentially had the same features with minor differences (Osaghae 2002). Some of the main features of these constitutions will now be discussed. First, the two constitutions maintained the characteristic features of a Westminster model type of parliamentary government both at the central and regional levels. A dual executive existed with the head of state as a titular head while the head of government exercised executive powers. Section 79 of the Constitutions stipulated that the Head of State was a constitutional monarch; the Queen of Great Britain was represented by a Governor-General. Section 81(4) of the Constitutions empowered the Governor-General to appoint as Prime Minister any member of the House of Representatives who appeared to him to command the support of the majority of the members of the House. Also, other Federal Ministers were appointed by the Governor-General but on the advice of the Prime Minister (Adigwe 1985). At the regional level, the head of state was the Governor, and the head of government was the Premier. By the 1963 Republican Constitution, however, the Head of State became a constitutional President in the person of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Ikelegbe 1988; Osaghae 2002). The appointment of the President under the 1963 Republican constitution was clearly stated:

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D. E. Gberevbie and S. Oni Under Section 37 of the 1963 Federal Constitution, a person elected as the President was required to take and subscribe to the oath of allegiance and such an oath for the due performance of those functions as may be prescribed by Parliament before he could start to ­perform the functions of the President. These oaths were to be administered by the Chief Justice of the Federal Republic or by any person for the time being appointed to exercise the functions of the Chief Justice. (Adigwe 1985:235)

Furthermore, Section 37 of the 1963 Republican Constitution stipulated that the President was to hold office for a 5-year period beginning on the day of his election or on the next day following the date on which the office next became vacant where the elected person or another person held office as President on the day of his election. And once the President assumed office, any other public office held by him was to become vacant, and during the tenure of his office, he was disqualified from holding any other public office. Also, the office of the President was to become vacant either upon the expiration of 5 years after his appointment, or if the incumbent died or resigned from his office or was removed from office (Adigwe 1985). In addition, Section 37 of the 1963 Constitution mandated the President of the Senate to perform the functions of the President of the federation during any of the following periods: (a) any period when the office of the President was vacant; (b) any period when the President was absent from Nigeria; the President could not be absent from Nigeria except with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers; (c) any period when the President was in the opinion of the Prime Minister, unable to perform the functions of his office by reason of illness; and (d) any period when the President was prohibited by Section 38(8) of the Constitution from exercising the functions of his office. But if during any other period the President of the Senate was, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, unable to perform the functions of the office of the President so conferred on him, those functions were to be performed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Further, if during any period the Speaker was, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, unable to perform the functions so conferred upon him; those functions were to be performed by a person appointed by the Federal Council of Ministers by an order published in the gazette of the federation (Adigwe 1985). Second, Section 81 of the Constitutions stipulated that the Federal Executive Council was to be headed by the Prime Minister who should advise the Governor-­ General in matters of appointment or dismissal of Cabinet Ministers. The Federal Executive was responsible for the exercise of such powers like the prerogative of mercy, signing of international treaties, and even termination of the life of the parliament. Members of the Federal Executive Council were also members of the national parliament. No Minister of Cabinet rank could criticize the government in public due to the principle of collective responsibility. Once a vote of no confidence is passed by the parliament on the Prime Minister, the government stands dissolved. Similarly, the Regional Executive Council consisted of the Premier and some other Ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The ministers were collectively responsible to the regional Legislature. These same provisions

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also applied under the 1963 Republican Constitution (Adigwe 1985; Ikelegbe 1988; Osaghae 2002). Third, the federal parliament was bicameral and consisted of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate, the upper house, was made up of 44 members chosen by the regional legislatures, while the House of Representatives, the lower house, was made up of 312 elected members. The Senate was composed on the basis of equal representation from the regions. As observed by Osaghae (2002), the Senate had a balancing function to counterbalance the gross inequalities in representation of the House of Representatives. Each regional legislature consisted of a House of Assembly, the lower house, and a House of Chiefs, which was the upper house. While members of the House of Assembly were elected directly by the electorate, the House of Chiefs was made up of traditional rulers (Ikelegbe 1988; Osaghae 2002). Fourth, the 1960 and 1963 constitutions were federal constitutions which divided powers between the Central and the autonomous Regional Governments. Each of the governments had its own constitution, public service, judiciary, and marketing boards. Thus, there existed the Constitution of the Federation, the Constitution of the Northern Region, the Constitution of the Western Region, and the Constitution of the Eastern Region. Section 105 of the Constitution empowered the Parliament to make provision for Police forces forming part of the armed forces of the federation or for the protection of harbors, waterways, railways, and airfields (Adigwe 1985). The Federal Government had power over matters on the exclusive legislative lists, while it jointly exercised power with the regional governments over matters contained in the concurrent legislative lists. Residual powers were reserved for the regional governments, which in essence made the regional governments very powerful. Section 64(4) of the Constitution stipulated that in the case of conflict between the regional constitutions and the Federal constitution, however, the Federal constitution prevailed to the extent of the inconsistency and the other law would be void. In general, the regional constitutions followed the federal model, both structurally and functionally. The most striking departure was, however, in the Northern Region where special provisions brought the regional constitution into consonance with Islamic law and custom. The similarities between the federal and regional constitutions were deceptive in the sense that differences in religious and cultural practices pervaded the conduct of public affairs at the regional levels of the Nigerian federation (Adigwe 1985; Otoghile 1995; Ikelegbe 2004). Fifth, the establishment of a Judicial Service Commission was provided for. The commission was to be responsible for the appointment, discipline, and promotion of judges so as to guarantee the independence of the judiciary from political interference. The salaries and allowances of the judicial officers were charged on the Consolidated Fund. The Federal Supreme Court was vested with the power of judicial review to declare the action of either the Federal or Regional Governments illegal, null, and void if such violated the constitution. Under the 1960 Constitution, the Privy Council in Great Britain was the highest court for Nigeria. The Supreme Court in Nigeria was still not the final Court of Appeal, and as such, cases that required appeal went to the Privy Council in London for final decision. However,

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with the emergence of the 1963 Republican constitution, the Supreme Court became the highest court in Nigeria (Otoghile 1995; McCormick 2004). Sixth, the procedures for the amendment of the constitutions were made cumbersome in order to protect the federal union as stipulated in Sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Constitution (Adigwe 1985). By this provision, motion for amendment of the constitution was to receive a two-third majority votes in the federal parliament in concurrence with two-thirds of the regions. The difficult process of amending the constitution was perhaps hinged on the federal framework of the constitution. The two-thirds support of the national parliament and that of the regions required for any amendment in the constitution meant that no part of the country whether in terms of ethnic, religion, individual, or interest groups would be able to alter any part of the constitution for parochial or selfish motive (Ikelegbe 1988; Otoghile 1995). Seventh, provisions were made for the definition of the citizenship of Nigeria as stipulated in Section 7 (Adigwe 1985). By these provisions, Nigerian citizenship was defined by birth and naturalization. Following this, the fundamental rights of Nigerian citizens were explicitly entrenched as a measure to allay the fears of the minority groups and also to guarantee the liberties of the Nigerian citizens. In the administration of justice, particularly in times of dispute among the component units of the federation and in order to ensure fair play and equity, the Supreme Court acting as the highest court of the land had power to settle disputes. Thus the Supreme Court became the final court where appeals could be heard and justice executed for series of criminal and civil matters. Provisions were made for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Federation and other judges with their tenure of office entrenched in the constitution (Adigwe 1985; Ikelegbe 2004). Eighth, Section 65 of the Federal Constitution gave the Prime Minister emergency powers. By this provision, the Prime Minister could declare a state of emergency, with the approval of the Federal Parliament, on any part of the country for the purpose of maintaining peace, order, and good government. The emergency powers could be exercised when the federation was at war, or where there was a total breakdown of law and order in any part of the country (Otoghile 1995; Ikelegbe 2004). In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted to determine the disposition of the Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, which were administered by Britain as United Nations Trust Territories. By an overwhelming majority, voters in the Southern Cameroons opted to join formerly French-administered Cameroon over integration with Nigeria as a separate federated region. In the Northern Cameroon, however, the largely Muslim electorates chose to merge with Nigeria’s Northern Region (Adigwe 1985). The 1963 Republican Constitution replaced the 1960 Independence Constitution owing to the desire to erase the last traces of colonialism in Nigeria. Consequential upon this therefore, the Federal Parliament enacted the Constitution of the Federation Act 1963, which repealed and replaced the Nigeria Independence Act 1960 and the Order in Council and delegated the same authority to the legislatures of each region to enact its own constitution law to repeal and replace the Independence Act and the Order in Council (Eteng 1997). The result of this was that while the 1960 Constitution was contained in a single document under the same legislative authority – the British Parliament  – the 1963 Constitution was contained in different documents enacted

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under different legislative authorities (the federal constitution being enacted by the federal parliament, and the various regional constitutions were enacted by their respective regional legislatures except the Constitution of Mid-Western Region of Nigeria that was enacted by the Federal Parliament in 1964) (Eteng 1997; Ikelegbe 2004). It was unfortunate that the 1963 Constitution did not last long as various turbulent crises and political maneuvering that characterized the period led to the incursion of the military into politics in Nigeria, which eventually brought about the failure and the collapse of the First Republic on 15 January 1966.

 he Parliamentary Regime: Features, Elections, Composition, T and Constitutional Powers In the First Republic, the system of government was the parliamentary type modeled after the British Westminster. By this system, there existed a dual executive – the head of state whose position was ceremonial without executive powers and the Prime Minister who possessed the real executive powers and responsible for the day-to-day administration of the government. At independence, the Head of State was the Queen of Great Britain represented by the Governor-General, who also acted as the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The Prime Minister was primus inter pares (first among equals). At the regional level, the head of state was the Governor, while the head of government was the Premier (Asia 2001; Gberevbie 2012). As earlier mentioned, the general election into the House of Representatives that was held in 1959 preparatory to independence did not give a clear victory to any political party in terms of winning majority seats in parliament to form the government. So, a coalition government comprising NPC and NCNC was therefore formed. A fundamental principle of the parliamentary system is that the Leader of the party or coalition of parties, who in the opinion of Her Majesty the Queen had majority members in the Parliament, was invited to form the government. On the basis of this, Sir James Robertson, the then Governor-General, invited Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC Deputy Leader) to form a new government as Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC Leader) appointed President of the newly created Upper Chamber of the Federal Parliament – the Senate – and subsequently, the Governor-­ General of the Federation (Asia 2001; Akinsanya 2005). By the 1963 Republican Constitution, the Head of State was named President. The functions of the President under Sections 37 and 65 of the 1963 Republican Constitution of the Nigerian parliamentary system included the following: (i) To invite the leader of the majority party in the parliament to be appointed as the Prime Minister and form the government. (ii) To prorogue the parliamentary session after fresh elections. (iii) To receive letter of credence from foreign ambassadors. (iv) To dissolve the Parliament if a vote of no confidence was passed on the government.

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(v) To give assent to bills passed on the floor of the parliament before they become laws. (vi) To declare a state of emergency on any part of the country in accordance with the provisions of the constitution (Adigwe 1985; Asia 2001; Akinsanya 2005). Fusion of powers is another essential feature of the parliamentary system of the First Republic. By this practice, members of the Executive were also members of the Parliament. The executive derived its existence from being part of and included in the parliament. Members of the Executive were collectively responsible to the Parliament in which case, no Minister of Cabinet rank could criticize the government, once a collective decision was agreed upon by the cabinet. In a cabinet, it is important that members are able to work together as a team. Furthermore, a vote of no confidence passed on the Prime Minister by the Parliament dissolved the government. The Prime Minister therefore depended on the support and confidence of the legislature to survive and remain in office (Asia 2001; Ikelegbe 2004). In the First Republic, the Parliament constituted the legislature of the Federal Government. At the lower level, each region had a House of Assembly and a House of Chiefs. The Northern House of Assembly consisted of 170 elected members. The Northern House of Chiefs was composed of all first class Chiefs in the region, 95 other Chiefs with prescribed qualifications, and an adviser on Muslim Law. On the other hand, the Western House of Assembly consisted of 124 members, while the Western House of Chiefs consisted of 115 members and a maximum of 4 Chiefs selected by the Governor acting in accordance with the advice of the Premier. The Eastern House of Assembly was composed of 146 members, while the House of Chiefs consisted of all traditional rulers in the region, first class Chiefs selected to represent the various provinces in the region, 55 other Chiefs, and 5 special representative members (Adigwe 1985). The Executive of each region consisted of the Premier and some other Ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The Executive was collectively responsible to the Regional Legislature. The executive authority of the region extended to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution of the region in question and to all matters over which the legislative power of the region extended. In order to safeguard the unity of the country, Section 79 of the Federal Constitution stipulated that the executive authority of the region should not be exercised in such a way that it would impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the federation or endanger the continuance of the Federal Government in the country (Adigwe 1985).

Power Politics in the First Republic The politics and power play in Nigeria’s First Republic can be better understood by putting the political events of the period in various perspectives as stated below:

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Formation of Regional and Ethnically Based Political Parties The period between 1960 when Nigeria became independent and 1966 when the military took over the government is often referred to as the First Republic. During this period, Nigeria operated a parliamentary democracy as earlier stated modeled along British system, although regionally based, multiparty system. While Nigeria as a country operated a multiparty structure at this point in time, all the regions operated mainly ethnically based one-party system that could not control power beyond their various regions (Osaghae 2002). The Northern Region, for instance, was dominated by the NPC; the NCNC controlled the Eastern Region; and the AG controlled the Western Region. This development encouraged regionalism and had detrimental consequences of political instability on the Nigerian State (Asia 2001; Gberevbie 2009).

NPC/NCNC Political Marriage of Convenience At the federal level, the government that emerged was a coalition of the NPC and NCNC despite their conflicting differences. According to Akinsanya (2005:22), “in many respects, an NPC/NCNC federal coalition government was an anomaly. It involved the cooperation of two political parties whose public image could not be more distinct or diametrically opposed.” This was particularly so because “while the NPC was traditionalist, aristocratic, gradualist and regionalist, the NCNC was nationalist, radical, egalitarian and populist.” Furthermore, “while the NPC was proWestern and anti-Israeli in orientation, the NCNC was Pan-Africanist and it espoused neutrality and nonalignment in the ‘East-West’ struggle (Cold War)” (Akinsanya 2005:22). Asia (2001:15) pointed that “the uneasy coalition not withstanding, the NPC/NCNC coalition firmly established itself as the ruling coalition party.” The differences in the parties notwithstanding the coalition between NPC and NCNC were made possible due to the fact that some NPC and NCNC leaders had been closely associated in earlier governments at the center between 1951 and 1959. Also, the goodwill that accrued to the coalition, largely, because of the qualities of Dr. Azikiwe and Sir Tafawa Balewa, which endeared them to their colleagues in the administration, made the coalition to become a possibility (Akinsanya 2005). Asia (2001) argued that as a party in opposition, the AG had a difficult time experiencing constant harassment such as intimidation of its members by the ruling party and its supporters. Furthermore, the attitudes of these parties toward accommodating minority aspirations varied widely. While the NCNC espoused self-determination for ethnic minorities but only in accordance with its advocacy of a unitary state, the Action Group, however, supported such movements, including the restoration of the northern Yoruba area (Ilorin, Igbomina, and Kabba) to the Western Region, but as part of a multistate, federal Nigeria. The NPC, on the other hand, persistently opposed the

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balkanization of the Northern Region and was able to win over some disaffected minorities in the Middle Belt (Metz 1991). Several proposals were introduced for the creation of more states as a means of restructuring the regions along ethnic lines to satisfy the clamor of the minorities, especially those from the Northern Region. Only the Mid-Western Region achieved formal approval in 1963 because it served to further the hegemonic interests of the NPC/NCNC coalition government to the detriment of the AG despite its opposition to its creation from the Western Region (Osaghae 2002).

Political Intolerance The early political life of the Nigerian federation began to exhibit a culture of political intolerance both at the regional and at the federal level. For instance, there were trumped-up charges against Chief Obafemi Awolowo and some of his supporters including Chief Anthony Enahoro of smuggling arms into the country with the intent to topple the government of the day and for giving military training to 200 activists in Ghana. They were put on trial for treasonable felony, convicted, and jailed for 10 years (Asia 2001). In addition, Chief Awolowo was accused of criminal misuse of public funds that ran into several million pounds from public development corporations to the AG through a private investment corporation when he was the Premier of the Western Region in the 1950s (Asia 2001). In the same vein, Dr. Chike Obi of the Dynamic Party (DP) and Joseph Tarka of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) who were opposed to the ruling coalition government were also put on trial and convicted of sedition and treason respectively. Following these trials and convictions, the opposition party members from the West, Mid-West, and the Middle Belt regarded these actions as political vendetta and expressed doubt about the credibility of political and judicial systems of the country (Asia 2001).

 G, the Western Region Crises, and Collapse A of the First Republic It is on record that between 1962 and 1966, the Western Nigeria remained the cockpit of Nigerian politics. The leadership of AG could not agree on common issues regarding the administration of the Western Region as well as the national government. Chief Awolowo favored the adoption of social democracy as party policy, following the lead of Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in Ghana, and wanted to enlarge the sphere of influence of the party to make it interregional by drawing support across the country. Chief Samuel Akintola, the regional Premier on the other hand, supported an all-party federal coalition and wanted AG to align itself closely to the ruling party instead of being an opposition party to the government so that the party

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leaders could have access to power as well as benefit from the national spoils usually reserved for ruling parties (Osaghae 2002). Furthermore, while Chief Awolowo as the AG leader felt he should be consulted on policy changes and major appointments in the region, and indeed exercised general supervision over all the activities of the AG, Chief Akintola, however, did not like these limitations. All the mechanisms employed by the elders of the party to reconcile the two personalities did not yield any fruitful results, which eventually contributed to the crises in the Western Region and subsequent collapse of the Nigerian First Republic (Akinsanya 2005; Ojo 2012).

Minority Problems and Creation of New States Although the British colonial government recognized the need for federalism for Nigeria, it did not properly work out the power struggle between the contenders for federal power since one region was in a position to lord it over the other two regions combined in terms of size and population. At independence, the preponderant size of the Northern Region made it possible for the north to dominate the federation. Having more than half of the country’s population, the region through the NPC controlled majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. With this structure, the Northern Region could hold the Nigerian federation to ransom in the sense that any bill that was opposed by the NPC in parliament faced the possibility of rejection. Furthermore, the arbitrary ethnic grouping engendered much bitterness due to actual domination of the minority by the majority ethnic groups in the various regions. This led to the demands for creation of more states and/or regional boundary adjustments (Osaghae 2002; Olawole 2018). Several minority political movements such as the Mid-West State Movement, Middle-Belt Zone League, and the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers Movement were thus formed to press for separate states (Elaigwu 2005). Contrarily, the three major political parties seemed not to sincerely support the carving out of the minority ethnic groups in their various regions. NPC with a policy of “one North, one people, one destiny” wanted the Northern Region to be left intact so as to maintain its hegemony over the other two regions of the East and West combined together. The NCNC in the Eastern Region, on the other hand, supported the creation of additional states as long as states were to be created in other regions and based on four principles of self-determination (majority support for separate state); relative ethnic homogeneity; geographical contiguity of such new state; and viability  – that each state, as nearly as possible, should be a self-sustained economic and administrative unit (Elaigwu 2005). On its part, the AG in the Western Region supported the creation of minority states but with an adjustment that brought to question the viability of the proposed Mid-West State. For instance, the AG suggested that the Ibo-speaking peoples of Asaba and Agbor should be added to the Eastern Region; the Ijaw west of the Niger should join their kinsmen in the East and the two minorities with Yoruba dialect

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(Akoko-Edo of Afemmai and the Itsekiri of Warri) should remain in the Western Region, the Ilorin and Kabba Yoruba of the North should be merged with Yoruba West, and Ishan and Afemmai divisions should be excluded from the proposed Mid-­ West State because of their opposition to the Mid-Western State idea. If these suggestions were to be accepted, the implication was that the creation of Mid-West State would not have taken place due to the problem of viability in terms of population and economic strength (Elaigwu 2005; Olawole 2018). Section 3 of the Federal Constitution mandated the creation of states in the Nigerian Federation (Adigwe 1985). Consequent upon the minorities’ agitation, a bill for the creation of three more states (Middle Belt, Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers, and Mid-West) was introduced in the Federal Parliament. Only the Mid-Western Region received the support of both the Northern and Eastern Regional legislatures. The Western legislature, however, objected to it when Chief Awolowo was in charge of AG, but the creation of the region was formally approved in 1963, when he was already serving a 10-year jail term and because the NPC/NCNC coalition government considered its creation to be favorable to their hegemonic interests. Thus, the creation of the Mid-Western Region out of the former Western Region in 1963 finally completed the devastating blow on the Action Group as a dominant party in the Western Region (Adigwe 1985; Osaghae 2002).

The 1962 Census Crises The issues of size and distribution of population remained volatile in the politics of Nigeria’s First Republic. This was because population distribution served as a barometer to measure the political strength of the regions and as a major factor for allocating revenue, for distributing social amenities, resources, scholarships, and quotas in recruitment into the armed forces among the regions. Furthermore, seats in the House of Representatives were allocated to the regions on the basis of population. For instance, the 312 seats in the House of Representatives were allocated to the regions according to the size of their population based on the 1952–3 census figure. The Northern Region had 174 seats, and the Eastern Region had 73, while the Western Region had 62 and Lagos, 3 seats (Oyediran 1979). Thus, the Parliamentary democratic system in Nigeria simply assured the domination of the Federal Government by the region with the most population. Since party politics ran along ethnic/regional lines, the North with more than half of the country’s population was bound to win all the elections conducted on the basis of one man one vote. The 1962 census presented the best opportunity for the NCNC and the Southern political leaders to redress the lopsided Nigeria’s federal structure and the defective Northern domination. The competing regional governments, therefore, approached the exercise from this perspective (Oyediran 1979; King 1988). The results of the census showed a high count for both the East and the West. The North on the other hand felt undercounted and perhaps cheated in the game and therefore protested. As a result, “the census figures were never published and the

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whole census had to be cancelled on account of harsh criticism” (Adigwe 1985:260). The Prime Minister ordered a fresh count in 1963. The 1963 census figures released on 25 February 1964 put the country’s population at 55,653,821 made-up of Northern Region 29,777,986; Eastern Region 12,388,646; Western Region 10,278,500; Mid-Western Region 2,533,337; and Lagos 675,352 (Adigwe 1985; Osaghae 2002). The results apparently dashed the hopes of most southern politicians that a new census would end the age-long North’s numerical predominance, and indirectly, the Northern political control of the Nigerian Federation (Dudley 1982). The NCNC’s Eastern Regional government rejected the results of the census, while the Western Regional government accepted it due to Chief Akintola’s political romance with the NPC.  The cacophony wreaked havoc on the alliance between the NPC and the NCNC. The NCNC leaders accused the Northern Region’s government of fraud and contested the result in the law court. Tafawa Balewa, the country’s Prime Minister, and Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Regional Premier and leader of the party respectively, denied the claim. However, the Prime Minister declared the census results valid and final. This crisis paved the way for new political alignment and realignment to the detriment of AG and NCNC (Asia 2001; Ikelegbe 2004).

Political Parties Realignments and Alliances The federal parliamentary election of December 1964 was to be the first general elections in Nigeria after independence. The ominous events leading up to the elections revealed an impending volatile political scene. With the elections drawing close, the AG was literally fading from the national political map as a result of Awolowo’s imprisonment, and by early 1964 there was no strong opposition at the federal level, which fundamentally altered political alignments. The Akintola-led Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), while dominating the political activities of the Western Region, sought to maintain an alliance with the ruling party at the federal level. The NCNC saw NNDP as a tool of the NPC. It also felt that the Eastern Region was underrepresented in the government as a result of the previous census results. The NPC became nervous of the moves by NCNC for possible alliances with other political parties. It also became apprehensive of the increasing Igbos’ presence in the Northern civil service. As a result of this distrust between the NCNC and the NPC about each other’s policies and intentions, the two parties parted ways and looked for new alliances (Asia 2001; Ikelegbe 2004). This volatile political situation led to realignment of parties and produced two alliances in preparation for the 1964 elections. First was the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) which comprised of the NPC, Akintola’s NNDP, and the minority parties in both the East and West, namely, the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), the Mid-West Democratic Front (MDF), and the Dynamic Party (DP). The second alliance was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This was made up of the NCNC, what was left of AG, and the Northern Progressive Front (NPF) – a party

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that came from the merger of Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). As rightly observed by Osaghae (2002), in spite of the national and cross-regional appearance of these two camps, the character of these alliances showed a North versus South group. At the center of the NNA was the NPC whose aim was to consolidate the Northern hegemony and the control the Federal Government. To extend its influence to the South as well as frustrate the NCNC, NPC would need to form alliance with the parties in opposition in the South. The UPGA, on the other hand, comprised majorly of NCNC, a southern party whose major aim was to halt Northern hegemony which would only be realized by teaming up with NPC opposition parties in the North (Osaghae 2002; Ikelegbe 2004).

The 1964 Federal Election The 1964 federal parliamentary election was contested by the two major political parties that formed alliances with smaller parties  – NNA and UPGA.  These two broad coalitions polarized the country’s politics into a zero-sum competition between two opposing alliances. The electoral process witnessed great violence, harassment, kidnappings, intimidation and killing of political opponents by the ruling regional parties, allegations, and counter allegations by one alliance on the other of plots to rig the election (Metz 1991). The elections had to be suspended for several weeks, and when the elections finally held, each of the regional parties openly harassed and intimidated its opponents in the campaigns. The army had to be engaged to supervise the elections when it became clear that the neutrality of the Federal Electoral Commission could not be guaranteed. There were accusations and counter-accusations of political harassment in the North during the electioneering campaigns (Dudley 1982). The electoral procedure was so flagrantly abused that at the close of nominations, some 88 out of a total of 178 NNA candidates in the North had their candidature unopposed. The UPGA therefore resolved to boycott the election to protest the unlawful arrest, persecution, kidnapping, and in some cases, killing of its members. Its members in the Federal Electoral Commission resigned. Nevertheless, the elections were still held under a very tense and violent atmosphere. The results of the election showed the NNA sweeping the polls with most of the party’s candidates declared unopposed. Under the conditions that were not free and fair to opponents of the regional parties, the NCNC was returned to power in the East and Mid-West, while the NPC had firm control of the North. NPC was also in a position to form the government at the federal level on its own, so Tafawa Balewa then called on President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe to be reappointed as the Prime Minister of the new government. Dr. Nnamdi then refused, thereby creating a constitutional stalemate that set the country on the brink of collapse. After negotiations, President Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe invited Tafawa Balewa to reconstitute a new government to the detriment of UPGA members (Dudley 1982; Metz 1991; Ikelegbe 2004).

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The 1965 Western Election Crisis The UPGA, after the devastating defeat it suffered in the 1964 federal parliamentary election, looked forward to the Western Region legislative election of 1965 as a hope of victory over the NNA.  The region therefore became the “theater of war” between UPGA and NNA. The irregularities and manipulations that marred the 1964 election were only repeated in the election. Thuggery, violence, victimization of political opponents, and widespread electoral fraud were alleged, and NNA won the elections. Following the announcement of the results, riots, arson, and killings erupted as heartlands of the AG discovered that the election had only returned NNDP in the alliance of NNA to power. Not even the deployment of the army could placate the breakdown of law and order as burning, looting, and killing went on unabated in the Western Region, the home base of AG/UPGA. When it was so clear that the government could not curtail the political upheavals, the army struck on 15 January 1966. The Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and Premier of the Northern and Western Regions Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola, respectively, were killed and that marked the collapse of the First Republic (King 1988; Osaghae 2002; Ikelegbe 2004).

Nigerian Economy in the First Republic The Nigerian government in the First Republic had as its main economic objective the growth and development of the country. The economic policy of the government was geared toward this purpose. Since the economy of the country was dominated by foreign multinationals and trading companies, government efforts were geared toward import substitution and industrialization. The economy of the country, nevertheless, continued to witness foreign, particularly British, dominance (Osaghae 2002; McCormick 2004). Despite foreign control of the economy through extractive role, the state played substantial role in the economic growth and development of the country. The regional governments were for the economic development of their regions. The agricultural potentials of these regions such as the production of cash crops were explored, and through the Produce Marketing Boards established under colonial government, the surplus from agrarian production were exported for huge profits channeled for developmental purpose. The period was characterized by the emergence of leaders who were known and respected by their people like Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the West, Sir Ahmadu Bello of the North, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the East who tenaciously and prudently managed the available internally generated revenue to develop their regions (Ikelegbe 1988; Asia 2001).

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The regional leaders also went into industrial development from the proceeds of their internally generated revenue by setting up regional development agencies. The North had Nigerian Development Corporations that floated Banks of the North and Northern Flour Mills, while the West had Oodua Investment Corporation. Money generated by each region was used for education, provision of health facilities, water, and other infrastructures, although a significant portion of the earnings disappeared to private pockets. In 1962, the allegation of corruption against Chief Obafemi Awolowo and the Action Group necessitated the setting up of a commission of inquiry by the Federal Government with Justice Coker as the Chairman to ascertain the true position of things as it affected corruption in the government of the Western Region. The Commission found that: Action Group received NGN 4.4 million in cash for National Investment and Properties Corporation in addition to payment of its NGN 1.3 million overdraft with the National bank and that the party benefited from NIPC investment in corporations that published pro-­ Action Group newspapers. On Awolowo, the commission reported: ‘His scheme was to build around him with money, an empire financially formidable both in Nigeria and abroad, an empire in which dominance would be maintained by him, by the power of the money which he had given out.’ (Oyediran 1979:15)

In the same vein, it was discovered that the main source of funds for the NCNC was loans from the African Continental Bank (ACB), “a bank whose principal shareholder was Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (and Zik Enterprises Ltd, accompany largely owned by Nnamdi Azikiwe) but whose assets were later taken over by the Eastern Regional Government when the ACB was almost on the point of liquidation” (Dudley, 82:46). Despite the foregoing, political power in the First Republic, thus, created economic opportunity and played a role in developing patterns of social stratification making politicians sole beneficiaries of the economic wealth of their regions (Jackson 1972). Although the bulk of regional governments’ revenue came from cash crops such as cocoa for the Western Region, rubber and palm oil for the Eastern Region, and groundnut for the Northern Region, a substantial amount of revenue also were accrued to the regions from the federation account. The revenue sharing formula of the Federal Government between 1958 and 1966, when the military took over political power, was based on Raisman Commission of 1958 and Binns Commission of 1964. The Raisman Commission of 1958 revenue sharing formula was as follows: North 40 percent, West 31 percent, East 24 percent, and Southern Cameroon 5 percent, while the Binns Commission of 1964 revenue sharing formula was as follows: North 42 percent, East 30 percent, West 20 percent, and Mid-West 8 percent. This was in addition to the already existed principle of derivation, needs, and national interests (Ejimofor 1987; Offiong 1995:346). Undoubtedly at the time, the Western Region was the nation’s most affluent and well-developed region. The revenue generated from cocoa allowed the Western Region and its political elites to continue the substantial development in the areas of roads, education, health, and general infrastructure. The emergence of military leadership, however, truncated federalism and led to the imposition of unitary system of government. Agriculture that used to be the main revenue source of the regions was

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consistently neglected, while it had full control over exploration and exploitation of crude oil for its revenue (Asia 2001; Osaghae 2002; Ikelegbe 2004).

The Collapse of the First Republic At independence, Nigeria was indeed regarded as a beacon of hope for a liberal democratic nation-state. This democratic hope, however, could not guarantee the survival of the republic. Several explanations have been made with regard to the collapse of the First Republic. First, the deficient fundamental socio-political and economic institutional foundation bequeathed by the British colonial government. This wobbly foundation included, among others, a lopsided federal structure, ethnic consciousness and rivalries, regionally based political parties, and a subverted indigenous ethos of government and culture (Akinboye and Anifowose 1999). Following this argument, the fractionalizations, confrontations between political actors that led to the collapse of the republic, are viewed as inevitable factors of the Westminster-style parliamentary democracy bequeathed to Nigeria but which the inexperienced leadership could not handle. This led to large social cleavages and made it difficult to create a unified government. The colonialists had the opportunity between 1914 and 1960 to change all that for good, but failed to utilize it to build a strong structure that would have guaranteed enduring nationhood and democratic governance for the country (Akinboye and Anifowose 1999; Osaghae 2002). Second was the lack of common political culture among Nigerians that could have facilitated the enhancement and sustainability of democratic governance in the country. The new elites, who took over power from the colonialists, lacked political tolerance, and failed to play the political game according to established rules, instead saw the independence as opportunity to further their selfish and parochial interests through the politics of ethnic identity as laid down by the colonial imperialist (Akinsanya 2005). Third was the uneven rate of development among the various groups and regions. The disparities in economic and educational development between the south and the north magnified Nigeria’s ethnic and religious tensions and resulted to struggle for state power by the various regions that insinuated group, ethnic, and regional conflicts in Nigeria even up till now (Metz 1991). Furthermore, regionalization of politics and, in particular, of party formation made the stability of the republic dependent on a fragile balance whereby each party controlled its regional base. This stability and the fragile balance on which the federation rested were altered when the Federal Government invoked its emergency powers in 1962 and removed the AG from power in the Western Region. These underpinning factors were the mutually reinforcing cause of all the political crises, regional conflicts, and instability of the First Republic and which eventually contributed to its collapse on 15 January 1966 through a military coup (Osaghae 2002; Ikelegbe 2004; Akinsanya 2005).

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Conclusion This paper examined power and politics in the postcolonial Nigeria’s First Republic. It observed that since independence in 1960, Nigeria as a country has been at many crossroads. At every point throughout its 53 years of existence, it was always either coming out of one crisis or going into another. These crises have been political, economic, social, ethnic, or religions which have frequently threatened its corporate existence as a united entity and have been the cause of the country’s underdevelopment. This situation may not be unconnected with the fact that the very act of amalgamation on 1914 brought together a people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, which to a greater extent has continued to affect the political landscape of the country. As a matter of fact, most people from different ethnic groups in the country did not support the idea and have continued to voice out their disapproval and frustration in various forms that manifest in religious and ethnic violent disturbances in different parts of the country. From the foregoing, it is clear It is therefore obvious that for the country to experience advancement, there is the need for the Federal Government to re-adjust and/ or modify some of the earlier policies and programs put in place with a view to de-­ emphasize ethnic and religious coloration as basis for participation and recognition. These policies and programs include Federal Quota System and Federal Character Principle, which emphasize equal representation of people from different segments of the Nigerian society as basis for manpower procurement and rewards in the public sector without regard to merit. There are also issues of unequal allocation of resources and infrastructures. For instance, the is lack of Federal Government’s presence in some states with respect to establishment of tertiary institutions, particularly universities and other important industrial concerns. Addressing these issues will help to facilitate peaceful co-existence of Nigerians from different parts of the country. This, the paper observed, as more likely to allay the fears of perceived marginalization of people from the different ethnic groups in the country and bring about a sense of unity and trust required for enhanced national development.

References Adigwe, F. 1985. Essentials of Government for West Africa. Ibadan: University Press Limited. Akinboye, S. and Anifowose, R. 1999. Nigerian Government and Politics. In R. Anifowose and F. Enemuo (Eds.), Elements of Politics (pp. 238-260). Revised Edition, Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publication.. Akinsanya, A. 2005. The Inevitability of Instability in Nigeria. In A. A. Akinsanya, and Ayoade, John A. (Eds.), Readings in Nigerian Government and Politics (pp. 20-85). Ijebu-Ode: Gratia Associates International.. Asia, G. 2001. Nigeria: In Search of Balance. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers. Coleman, J. S. 1986. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Benin City: Ilupeju Press Crowder, M. 1980. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber.

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Dudley, B.  J. 1982. Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press. Ejimofor, C.  O. 1987. British Colonial Objectives and Policies in Nigeria: The Roots of the Conflict. Onitsha: Africana-FEP Publishers Ltd. Elaigwu, J. I. 2005. The Politics of Federalism in Nigeria. Jos: Aha Publishing House. Elias, T.O. 1967. Nigeria: the Development of its Laws and Constitution. London: Oxford. Eteng, F.  O. 1997. Constitutional Development and the Military Experiment in Nigeria. In G. O. Ozumba (ed) Nigeria Government and Politics. Abia: AAU Industries. Gberevbie, D.E. 2012. Forms of Political Administrative System. In R.  Ajayi and Fashagba, Y. (Eds.), Introductory Text in Political Science (pp.  187-210). Omu-Aran: Landmark University. Gberevbie, D.E. 2009. Democracy and the Future of the Nigerian State. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 24(1), 165-191. Gboyega, A. 1989. The Public Service and Federal Character. In P.P.  Ekeh & Osaghae, E.E. (Eds.), Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria (pp. 164-185). Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.. Ikelegbe, A. 2004. Issues and Problems of Nigerian Politics. Lagos: Imprint Services. Ikelegbe, A 1988. Nationalism and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. In A. G. Onokerhoraye (Ed.), An Introduction to Integrated Social Science for Africa and Social Studies for Advanced Students (pp 306-316). Benin City: Geography and Planning Series, University of Benin.. Jackson, L. R. 1972. Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic. Journal of Black Studies, 2(3), 277-302. King, M. 1988. Localism and Nation Building. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. McCormick, J. (2004). Comparative Politics in Transition. 4th edition. Australia: Thomson Wadsworth. Metz, H. C. 1991. Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO Library of Congress. Nnamdi, H.S. 1995. Constitutional Strides to Full Nationhood. In R. F. Ola (Ed.), Nigerian Political System: Inputs, Outputs and the Environment. Benin City: Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City. pp. 80-102. Nzeshi, O. 2012, March 11) “The Quest to Amend Federal Character Commission Act”.ThisDay Newspaper (Lagos). pp. 97-98. Offiong, O. J. 1995. “The National Question and Minorities: Controversies over the Allocation of Financial Resources to Oil Producing Areas.” In R.F. Ola (Ed.), Nigerian Political System: Inputs, Outputs and the Environment pp. 337-362. Benin City: Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City.. Ojo, E.O. 2012. Leadership Crisis and Political Instability in Nigeria, 1964-1966: The Personalities, the Parties and the Policies. Global Advanced Research Journal of History, Political Science and International Relation, 1,1. (6-17). Olawole, O. C. 2018. National Question, The Niger Delta and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria. Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science. 6(7), (pp. 19-33). Onyeoziri, F. 2002. Alternative Policy Options for Managing the National Question in Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers. Otoghile, A. 1995. The Road to Republican Status and Why? In R. F. Ola (Ed.), Nigerian Political System: Inputs, Outputs and the Environment (pp.  103-127). Benin City: Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City.. Osaghae, E. 2002. Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Limited. Oyediran, O. 1979. Background to Military Rule. In O. Oyediran (Ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966-1979 (pp. 1-24). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Chapter 5

The Executive Arm of Government Stephen Akinyemi Lafenwa and Leke Abraham Oluwalogbon

Abstract  Government is the sum total of legislative, executive and judicial activities, irrespective of the existing political system and ideological persuasion. The executive in many political systems is the most obvious and developed arm of government. This chapter explains the significance of the executive arm of government in Nigeria’s democratic governance. It focuses specifically on the President and the presidency under the 1979, 1989 and 1999 federal constitutions. This chapter identifies challenges facing this arm of government and democratic governance in general that must be addressed to avert the collapse of the Fourth Republic. Keywords Executive · President · Presidential system · Second republic · Democracy

Introduction Meaning, Features and Types of Executive Government is the sum total of legislative, executive and judicial activities, irrespective of the existing political system and ideological persuasion. The executive in many political systems is the most obvious and developed arm of government. In Africa, it is the most persistent and enduring organ. This is partly because it is the arm of government that gives effect to the will of the state by enforcing or executing or implementing the laws and policies of government, respectively (Anifowoshe 1999).

S. A. Lafenwa (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] L. A. Oluwalogbon Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Redeemer’s University, Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_5

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The significance of the executive in the operation of government was pointed out by Heywood (2007: 357) when he described it as the irreducible core of government. It has been argued that “political systems can operate without constitutions, assemblies, judiciaries and even parties, but they cannot survive without an executive branch to formulate government policies and ensure that they are implemented” (Oshewolo 2012:149). It has also been observed that the importance of the executive lies in its source of political leadership, a responsibility which has been greatly enhanced by the widening responsibilities of the state in both national and international politics. Historically speaking, Roskin et al. (2008:277) noted, ‘there have been executives a lot longer than there have been legislatures’. They further stated that tribal chiefs, kings and emperors appeared with the dawn of civilization, and most of the time they had no legislatures to worry about. Over the years, many citizens accord prominence to the executive as in many countries, the organ have built-in psychological advantage over legislature. Specifically, the executive is the totality of governmental functionaries, charged with the responsibilities of implementing government’s decisions and policies (Appadorai 1975). It is also defined as that part of government which is responsible for the day-to-day administration of a state. It is pertinent to state at this point that this arm of government is not limited to the chief executives, such as Presidents or Prime Ministers who exercise state power. Rather, the arm is a very large one which includes but is not limited to; the armed forces, police, even clerks and the generality of officials who carry out orders on behalf of the state. The conglomeration of all officials of the executive arm is usually described as the civil service. The executive arm is usually headed by a chief executive, who is either a President, Prime Minister or any other title ascribed to the position and is assisted by a retinue of officials usually called ministers. In modern times, as Anifowoshe (1999) has rightly pointed out, there are two principal roles performed by chief executives vis-àvis; the head of state and the head of government. While the former is a ceremonial role, the latter carries with it a lot of responsibilities being the real holder of the office. Both roles are combined in a single person in a presidential system of government, while they are carried out by different persons or group of persons in a parliamentary system. At this point, it is imperative to explain that those who occupy political executive positions can be categorized into two, namely, permanent executive and temporary executive. The permanent executives include the core of civil servants, public servants and those military and paramilitary officers. The temporary executive members consist of elected and appointed politicians including the President and Vice President and cabinet ministers. In federal systems like Nigeria, the list includes both categories of executives at the federal, state and local government levels. All executive arms do not perform the same functions, as these functions are wide and vary from one political system to another. The variations according to Appadorai (1975) are based on the type of executive in a state, whether parliamentary or non-parliamentary, and on the prevailing ideology in the state, vis-à-vis totalitarianism or liberalism. However, powers of the executive arm as stipulated in various constitutions vary from the formulation of policies, to the assenting of bills, maintenance of law and order as well as external relations, preparation of budgets

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and so on. It can thus be said that this arm of government is responsible for the general administration of the state. The aforestated functions have been categorized into three, namely, the legislative, administrative and judicial functions (Appadorai 1975; Anifowoshe 1999; Oyediran 2003). Legislative functions  It is a known fact that the legislative arm is the primary organ for lawmaking, yet it is interesting to know that the executive arm also performs certain legislative functions, such as the initiation of bills for the consideration of the legislature, the exercise of suspensive veto, delegated legislation, such as the issuing of statutory orders and rules under the powers vested in it by the ­legislature, and the power of summoning, proroguing and the dissolution of the legislature, under the parliamentary system. Since most bills become laws with the assent of the chief executive, and most of these bills are executive bills, it has been conceived that the traditional lawmaking function of the legislature had long been passed to the executive. It is not surprising that some legislatures in developing countries are referred to as appendages of the executive or executive rubber stamps. Administrative functions  These include the general coordination and controlling of the administration of the state, as well as the direction and supervision of the execution of law. This function also include the appointment and removal of higher administrative officers such as ministers, directing their work as well as exercising disciplinary control over them, the control of the armed forces and the conduct of foreign relations. Judicial function  This mainly relates to the pardoning power vested in the executive. By this, the executive can pardon a person who has been legally convicted of committing a crime against the state. This is often called the presidential pardon or prerogative of mercy, and it is exercised by entirely squashing the charges against such a person, or reducing the sentence passed on him or her. The executive has been categorized into three (Anifowoshe 1999; Oyediran 2003). The first type is referred to as titular and real executive. The titular executive performs symbolic and ceremonial roles, as the head of state. It has the rights to be informed and consulted about public issues by the heads of government. On the other hand, the real executive is the head of government, who performs the day-to-­ day business of government. In a presidential system, the President performs both roles, while in a parliamentary one, the real executive is the cabinet headed by the Prime Minister, while the monarch or President is the titular executive. The second type is single and collegial executives. In a single executive, all executive powers are vested in a single individual called the chief executive, who has the full control over all government’s businesses. Other executives (ministers) are subordinate to him. He appoints the ministers who are thus responsible to him. This is advantageous in certain regards, particularly during periods of emergencies when unity of control is of prime importance. Examples of countries with single executive include Nigeria, in the second and fourth republics, and the United States of America. However, in a collegial executive system (e.g. Federal Council of Switzerland and Great Britain), executive power is vested not in an individual but in a council or cabinet. The

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structure of the council, however, differs from state to state. The last category is known as parliamentary and non-parliamentary executives. This categorization differentiates an executive chosen from within the parliament and holding office only so long as it commands a majority in that parliament, from one that is independently chosen of the legislature and holding office for a fixed term. The British cabinet system is an example of the former, while the Nigerian and American presidential systems are examples of the latter.

Origin of Presidential Constitution in Nigeria Nigeria, like most of the other former British Colonies, which the British bequeathed the Westminster model to at independence, has since dumped it for a single executive model (Nwabueze 2004). At independence, the Queen of England was the head of state, but was represented in Nigeria by an indigenous Governor-General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, while the Prime Minister was Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. By 1963, when Nigeria became a republican state, the Queen ceased to be the head of state. In her stead, erstwhile Governor-General, Nnamdi Azikiwe, became the President, and Tafawa Balewa remained as Prime Minister. The Westminster model is characterized by the fusion of a part of the executive into the legislature, as seen in the membership of ministers in the latter, in other words, in a strict sense, it lacks the separation of power. Also, governmental powers are shared between two persons, the head of state (ceremonial head) and the head of government (real head), thus making it a plural executive system. It has also been noted that the legislative power is jointly vested in the head of state and the legislative assembly. More so, the legislature is controlled by the executive members. However, this principles became impracticable, particularly the division of power between the head of state and head of government. Nwabueze (2004) has pointed out certain factors that accounted for the frosty relationship between the two leaders in the early years of Nigeria’s independence and which eventually led to the collapse of the Westminster model and First Republic. Firstly was what he called the personality factor, which implied an imbalance in the relationship between the personalities of the head of state and head of government. Whereas the office of the head of state, ought to be above all other, and the holder of the office be seen as first citizen and be accorded such honour given to the Queen of England, though it is a non-executive office. However, Dr. Azikiwe who occupied the office as President between 1963 and 1966, could not come to terms with serving as a ‘ceremonial head’, while Tafawa Balewa, who did not wield as much influence as him exercised the real authority. With the benefit of hindsight, Azikiwe was a frontline nationalist, and at a time was referred to as the ‘Zik of Africa’. He enjoyed national prominence across the land and had a great followership, until his leadership of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was renounced in many parts of the country, most especially in the Northern Nigeria. He thus crumbled in popularity and influence, so much so that at independence, he

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could not lead the government because his party only had support from the South, particularly from his tribal group (Igbo) (Nwabueze 2004:51). On the other hand, government ministers did not see themselves as the president’s ministers. Much more, the President was described as lacking the attributes of kingly majesty in the eyes of the people as well as in the eyes of the ministers, who saw him as a colleague or worse still, as a political opponent (Nwabueze 2004). The personality of the President was not as grandiose as that of the British Queen who naturally attracts respect from the Prime Minister and the public at large. The inability of the Prime Minister to acknowledge the President as a true state symbol and as such accord respect to him, gradually depleted the system. There was also the clash of interest. As practiced in Britain, from where the system was adapted, the head of state (President) ought to be non-partisan and as much as possible, subordinate his personal interest to that of the state. However, Dr. Azikiwe was unable to distant himself from partisan politics as was expected of him, as demonstrated in the manner he intervened in brokering peace after the 1964 federal election degenerated into a major crisis (Nwabueze 2004). This pitched the two leaders against each other, not only on party lines, but also on ethnic plains. The third factor pointed out was that of the conflict of authority. Although, conflict is not unexpected in human relationships, it takes a higher dimension when as Nwabueze (2004:60) noted, ‘executive authority is vested in one person, but exercised by another, especially where the two represent different interests’. The head of state was expected by law to act only on the advice of the government, though most public acts are done in his name, and some even require his authentication, and all these are predicated on the assumption that there exists a cordial relationship between the two persons. Two areas of conflict of authority in Nigeria’s First Republic were, the conflict of authority of who to maintain and preserve the constitution and the second on whether the President was the Commander-in-Chief or not. The conflict of authority in the first case manifested in the federal elections of 1964 which was marred by irregularities, such as violence, refusal of electoral officers to accept nomination papers from the supporters of opposition parties, use of illegal ballot papers and boycott of the election by the opposition parties. The election eventually held, despite the suggestion of the President to the Prime Minister that the election be postponed. The election result returned the government’s party. Thus the President on the ground of preserving the integrity of the constitution and the attendant irregularities that witnessed the election, refused to reappoint the Prime Minister to form a new government as the constitution prescribes. This initial refusal, however, shook the nation to its foundation and threatened the corporate existence of the state. This imbroglio also saw both President and Prime Minister seeking the assistance of the armed forces at ensuring order in the country. Although the constitution designated the President as Commander-in-Chief, subject to the functions as may be prescribed by the parliament, the statutes governing the armed forces had no such reference to Commander-in-Chief. The final authority over the armed forces was vested in the council of ministers, as well as in Prime Minister who was empowered to direct the commanders of various units for operational use in the maintenance of law and order. Thus the President was just the Commander-­in-­Chief in name.

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These series of conflicts and the ideological difference between Azikiwe’s NCNC and Balewa’s NPC contributed to a military incursion in politics. Thus the decision of the framers of the 1979 constitution not to adopt the 1963 parliamentary constitution was a strategic mechanism to address the specificity of the pluralistic social system of Nigeria. The multi-ethnic configuration of the Nigerian state had, in the past, generated tensions, crises and problems that shook its foundation, resulting in the rise of mutual suspicion and unhealthy rivalries and has also generated intergroup frictions and so hastened the disintegration rather than promote the unity of Nigeria (Agbodike 1998). In a society like Nigeria, the fusion of the executive and the legislature in a parliamentary system poses a serious problem for constitutional practice. This political arrangement could be and has been exploited by the opposition to either extort unpopular concessions or topple hapless regimes (Bassey 2006). Since the executive (cabinet) in the parliamentary system also commands the majority in the legislature, the system could, as in Nigeria’s first republic, create constitutional despotism. This is largely because an executive in control of the legislature and the legislative process is in the position of a near-absolute ruler (Bassey 2006). A ready alternative was soon found in the American model of presidentialism. This system provides for a single executive, by which is implied that the executive powers (both ceremonial and the real executive power) are vested in one person, the president. Also, the executive is wholly outside and independent of the legislature. There is also a clear separation of powers: the legislative power is vested in an independent legislative body, free from executive control by reason of total exclusion of the President and his ministers from membership. Furthermore, the system guarantees the proper application of the doctrine of checks and balances as well as a judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative as well as executive acts). Drawing from these features, the presidential system provides for a complete separation of power between the executive and the legislature and guarantees an independent judiciary. The independence of the executive from the legislative arm ensures that the chief executive, that is the President, is popularly elected. Unlike in the parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister is elected from the parliament together with his cabinet members, the President derives his power from the people, and so he is responsible to the people. He has the power to hire and fire, as such he appoints and dismisses the ministers at will and all ministers are responsible to him, being the chief executive. On the other hand, the legislature is separate and independent of the executive. Its members are also popularly elected, thus having the people as the source of its power just like the President.

 he President and the Presidency Under the 1979, 1989 T and 1999 Constitutions Following the adoption of the presidential system of government first under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 1979, subsequent constitutions

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(1989; 1999) have also retained the presidential system. This section examines the provisions of these constitutions as they relate to the office, structure, election, power and the composition of both the Office of the President at the federal level and that of Governors in all the states of the Federation. It is important to note at this juncture that the provisions of these constitutions on these identified issues are similar. Only on few instances are certain provisions modified as would be seen in this section. All the constitutions under consideration establish the Office of the President and the presidency through their provisions for the executive powers in their Section 5. Section 122 of the 1979 constitution provided for the office of a President for the Federation, who shall be the head of state, the chief executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation. Sections 128 and 130 of the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, respectively, are provided for such also. On the qualification for election into the office of President, Sections 123 and 129 of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions, respectively, stated that a person vying for the office of President must be a Nigerian citizen by birth, in addition to attaining the age of 35 years. The 1999 Constitution was slightly modified, in that in Section 131, the minimum age of a person vying for the office of President was reviewed upward to 40 years. Two other criteria were included, vis, that such a person be a member of a political party and should also be sponsored by the party, in addition to attaining a minimum educational qualification of school certificate or its equivalent. On election into the office of President, Sections 125 and 126 of the 1979 Constitution stated the basis of winning in a presidential election. In a single candidate election, a person must have a majority of the YES over the NO vote cast, as well as have such in not less than one-quarter of the vote cast in each of at least two-thirds of all the states of the Federation, to be returned as the duly elected president. And in a case of an election involving more than one candidate, the winner must satisfy some certain conditions such as stated in Section 126, he must have a majority of votes cast which must not be less than one-quarter of the votes cast, in at least two-thirds of all states in the Federation. And in the case where there is no clear winner, the constitution provided for a second round of election, in which a candidate who secured the highest number of votes at the election vies against one among the remaining candidates who has a majority of votes in the highest number of states. Failure to produce a duly elected President at the second round of election, the 1979 Constitution provided for elections to be held within 7 days of the result, in each House of the National Assembly, and in House of Assembly of every state of the Federation. A candidate with a simple majority of all the votes cast at such an election shall be deemed to have been duly elected as President. This third round of elections shall be conducted on the same day and time throughout the Federation. The 1989 Constitution also made similar provisions in Sections 131 and 132, but included a slight modification. In the event that there still was no duly elected President after the third round of elections, another election shall be conducted in the legislative houses (National Assembly and Houses of Assembly in all the states of the Federation) until a clear winner emerges. Also Section 133, provided for a proper computation of the two-thirds of all states of the Federation or one-third of the votes cast in a state, in the case that the results are in fractions. The figures obtained were to be rounded up to the next higher whole number.

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The 1999 Constitution also has similar provisions concerning elections into the Office of the President, but differed in the facts that, it included the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, alongside the states of the Federation where elections will be held. Also, the third round of elections is still to be held as direct elections, not by an Electoral College, as the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provided for. It also includes that if a duly elected President does not emerge at the third round of elections, the Electoral Commission shall arrange for another election in which the candidate with the majority of votes cast, shall be the duly elected president. On the composition of the presidency, Sections 130 and 131 of the 1979 Constitution, provided for the office and election of the Vice President, who was to be nominated by a candidate for the office of President as his associate for running for the Office of the President. That nominated candidate is deemed to be elected, if the principal, who nominated the person, is duly elected as President. Sections 138 and 139, as well as, 141 and 142 of the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, respectively, also provided for the office and election of the Vice President. Section 136 (1) of the 1979 Constitution provides for the duties of the Vice President as whatever the President assigns to the person. It was similarly provided for in Sections 145(1) and 148 (1) of the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, respectively. The office of Ministers of the Government of the Federation was also provided for under Section 135 of the 1979 Constitution, as may be established by the President. The appointment of ministers is, however, subject to the approval of the Senate. The President, according to Section 136 (1) and (2), assigned roles to the ministers. The President, together with the Vice President and Ministers at regular meetings, was to determine the general direction of the domestic and foreign policies of the Government of the Federation among other things. Sections 138 and 139 of the 1979 Constitution also provided for the Office of the Attorney General and Special Advisers. The number of such Advisers, their remunerations and allowances were to be prescribed by law or by a resolution of the National Assembly. Sections 144 and 145 of the 1989 Constitution had similar provisions, as well as, Sections 147 and 148 of the 1999 Constitution, on the establishment of the office of Ministers and their duties, while Sections 147 and 150 of the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, respectively, had similar provisions on the Office of the Attorney General. Section 148 (2) of the 1989 Constitution, which provided for the Offices of Special Advisers, was modified in that the number of advisers was fixed at three and their remunerations and allowances as prescribed by law or by the resolution of the National Assembly, but must not exceed the amount prescribed by the National Revenue Mobilization Commission. However, Section 151 (2) of the 1999 Constitution reverted to the provisions on the Office of Special Adviser as enshrined in the 1979 Constitution. Sections 5 of the three constitutions under review vested executive powers of the Federation on the President and may either be exercised directly through him, or indirectly through the Vice President or Ministers of the Government of the Federation or other officers in the Public Service of the Federation. These powers cover the execution and maintenance of the constitution, all laws made by the National Assembly and all matters with respect to which the National Assembly has

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the power to make laws. Also under Section 161 of the 1979 Constitution, the President was vested with power to pardon an offender; however, such should be in consultation with the Council of State. Sections 173 and 175 of the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions, respectively, made similar provision.

 ffice of the Governor: Elections, Powers and Composition O of the State Executive As it relates to the state, Sections 162, 174 and 176 of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions established the Office of the Governor of a state of the Federation as the chief executive of that state. As such, Section 5 of the three constitutions vested executive powers of a state in the Governor, which can either be directly exercised by him or indirectly by the Deputy Governor or Commissioner of the Government. This power extends to the execution and maintenance of the constitution, all laws made by the House of Assembly of that state, and all matters with respect to which the House of Assembly has power to make laws. On the qualification for the Office of Governor, the 1979 Constitution, prescribed a person of Nigerian citizenship by birth and not less than 35 years of age. The 1989 Constitution, in section 175 reviewed the age downwards to 30  years, while the Nigerian citizenship criterion remained. The 1999 Constitution, however, in Section 177, reverted the age qualification to 35 years, while it retained the citizenship qualification. In addition, it prescribes that such a person vying for the Office of Governor be a member of a political party and be sponsored by the party. It also included the required minimum educational qualification as the school certificate or its equivalent. Suffice to say that all other provisions as it relates to the office, structure, composition and election of the President of the Federation are applicable to those of the Offices of the Governor of the states of the Federation.

Power Politics in the Second, Third and Fourth Republics The power dynamics among the three organs of government in Nigeria depends on the constitutional provisions and practice as reflected in the three Republics under consideration. In the exercise of governmental powers, particularly under presidential democracy that featured prominently in these Republics, there is no absolute separation of powers. The relationship that exists among legislative, executive and judicial branches of government in the discharge of their constitutional duties reflects the power politics predominant in each epoch of Nigeria’s political history. The 1979 Constitution, which established the Second Republic, was unique in various ways. The constitution, unlike the Independence and 1963 Republican Constitutions combined the real and formal authorities in the office of an executive president or governor at the state level. Thus the conflict which could ensue from the

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division of powers under the cabinet system was taken care of. The provision of the constitution that the President and the Governors be directly elected for a fixed period paved way for the most popular candidate among several contestants to emerge as the winner. It was also a major step in the promotion of responsible democratic governance. Under this presidential constitution, there was a clear definition of functions, powers and interrelationships of the three arms of government. This was meant to promote harmonious relationship with legal basis for efficient administration of the country among the branches of government. In addition, members of the cabinet were to be individually responsible for their actions to the President or Governor as the case may be. There was no absolute power for the President or Governor as there was provision for the application of federal character in the composition of the government and any of its agencies. Also the Senate or House of Assembly must approve the appointments of other unelected political office holders. The power of the President is also limited over the declaration of state of emergency and could not dissolve a state house of assembly. To address corruption problem in Nigeria, the constitution established some corrective institutions, for example, Code of Conduct Bureau, Public Complaints Commission and Corrupt Practices Tribunal. The constitution forbade a state religion and encouraged secularism due to the heterogeneous nature of the country. The constitution made provision for the formation of national political parties to correct the mistake of the past; whereby, parties were organized and operated on ethnic or regional basis. The principle of separation of powers provided the opportunities for each organ to discharge its constitutional duties without undue interference. To forestall undue harassment and intimidation suffered by people in the hands of local/regional policemen in the First Republic, the constitution unified the country’s police force. The last but not the least unique change brought about by the 1979 Constitution is the provision for a pensionable appointment for a person who has held office as President and was not removed from office as a result of impeachment. According to the 1979 Constitution, the President in his wisdom could, if he wished, assign to the Vice President or any Minister of the Federal Government responsibility for any business, including the administration of any department (Adamolekun 2004). In exercising the executive power vested in him, then, the President was expected to rely to a fairly significant extent, on the cabinet, which had to meet regularly to perform specified functions. This idea of a presidential government functioning as a quasi-cabinet government is one of the major differences between the Nigerian presidential system and American model to which it is commonly compared. A second distinguishing feature of the Nigerian presidency was the fact that the constitution formally required the President to obtain advice from, or consult with, certain ‘executive bodies’ before making decisions on certain issues. The executive bodies were the Council of State; the Federal Civil Service Commission; the Federal Electoral Commission; the Federal Judicial Service Commission; National Defence Council; the National Economic Council; the National Population Commission; the National Security Council; and the Police Service Commission.

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Suffice to say that the constitution was not specific enough on the expectations concerning the character and ability for aspirants to leadership positions. It failed to assign any role to the offices of the Vice President and Deputy Governor as the President and Governor were authorized to assign responsibilities to them at their own discretion. In the Second Republic, some Deputy Governors fell out with their Governors shortly after swearing-in and taking oath of allegiance and oath of office. This accounted for their redundancy throughout the remaining period of their tenure of office. In Ondo State, Chief Akin Omoboriowo, the then, Deputy Governor to Governor Michael Adekunle Ajasin left Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) to join National Party of Nigeria (NPN) partly as a result of conflict between him and the Governor. Chief Omoboriowo later contested the 1983 gubernatorial election in the state and won. The electoral victory was challenged in the court by his former boss, Chief Ajasin. In Kano State, the Deputy Governor was reportedly impeached for what is termed as ‘political misconduct’ in the Report of the Political Bureau (1987: 95). Likewise in the present political dispensation, several Deputy Governors had suffered the same fate. Such trends had been observed in the Fourth Republic. For example, in Lagos state, Mrs. Bucknor Kofoworola Akerele, the then Deputy Governor to Chief Ahmed Tinubu, was removed and in Osun state, Chief Iyiola Omisore, the then Deputy Governor to Chief Bisi Akande, was also removed. The executive was given wide range of powers vis-à-vis other organs; thus, making the executive the most obvious organ with powers that could quite easily be abused. It is not surprising that in spite of the checks and balances, the chief executive still had enough room for dictatorial actions. Likewise, the impeachment clause was abused by the legislature in situations where different parties controlled the legislature and the executive. A good example was the removal via impeachment of former Governor of Kaduna State, Alhaji Balarabe Musa on June 23, 1981. The results of the gubernatorial elections held on July 28, 1979, showed Alhaji Musa; who contested on the platform of the People Redemption Party (PRP), defeating Alhaji Lawal Kaita, representing the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The results of the House of Assembly elections created a serious dilemma in that the NPN won almost two-thirds of the seats (64 out of 99 seats) in the Kaduna Assembly. With ideological differences of the PRP and NPN, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the chief executive was destined to become embroiled in a bitter conflict with the legislative house dominated by another party. It was observed that ‘the House of Assembly, on four occasions, rejected the lists of Commissioners sent to it for approval by Governor Musa while he, in turn, refused to bargain and negotiate with the legislature’ (Akinsanya 2005: 176). Although, the executive was not provided with the atmosphere conducive to function effectively, the chief executive could abuse his veto power particularly whenever he was not in good terms with the legislators. Granting the National Assembly the power to fix the salaries and allowances of the President and their own without any restraint left the executive at the mercy of the legislators. The federal character principle which featured prominently in the constitution had little or no respect for merit, thus, leaving the country’s public service in the hands of those who might not be competent enough to promote

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efficiency and effectiveness in their various offices. More fundamental is the encouragement of a winner-takes-all situation provided by the constitution, as there was little room for consensus. This led to some bitter rivalries among political actors and was responsible partly for the demise of the Second Republic. Although several factors could be attributed to the fall of the Second Republic in Nigeria, Adamolekun (2004) points out: …the strong leadership expected from the presidency was not forthcoming because the kind of competitive politics that emerged was different from what the constitution makers had expected.

The Third Republic rested mostly on the 1989 Constitution. Significantly, there were no fundamental changes to the 1979 Republican Constitution as earlier mentioned except for certain provisions included in the 1989 Constitution. In fact, the constitution retained the executive presidential system of government as in the 1979 Constitution. Likewise, it included provisions concerning fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, bicameral legislature at the federal level and unicameral at the state and local levels, a separate judiciary that was generally vested with judicial power and similar court structure. The few changes introduced by the constitution include the following: • A two-party system was entrenched in the constitution as against the multi-party system adopted in the Second Republic. In view of this, the government formed two major political parties, namely, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) to contest in elections that supposed to usher in the Third Republic in 1993. • For the first time in the history of constitution making in Nigeria, the 1989 Constitution stipulates that a person shall not be qualified to be elected as legislators in the National Assembly and House Assembly of each state ‘if he has not been educated up to at least school certificate level or its equivalent’ (Sections 63(2) and 104). This applies mutatis mutandis to the posts of President, Vice President, Governor and Deputy Governor. Thus the secondary school certificate became the minimum educational requirement to qualify anybody aspiring to occupy state and national political positions. • The number of senate members from each state was reduced from five to three and one to be elected from the FCT, Abuja. The constitution recognizes 21 states including Akwa Ibom and Katsina states that were created in 1991 and the 19 existing states. The House of Representatives was to have a total membership of 453 including three representatives from the FCT. Twice the number of representatives for each state in the House of Representatives constituted the total membership of each state House of Assembly. It should be pointed out that the constitution provides that the FCT, Abuja would not be regarded as the state. • Legislators were to be regarded as part-time workers who were all to receive only sitting allowances. Also, there was provision for recall of any legislator who no longer enjoyed the confidence of the electorate. • The constitution accorded greater prominence to the autonomy and democratization of the local government. For instance, there was an increase in the number

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of local governments (additional 140 local governments were created), direct election of the Chairman as the chief executive its deputy and councillors and direct allocation of revenue to local government from the federal consolidated funds as well as from the state government. • To forestall the crisis arising from the ‘two-thirds’ controversy of the 1979 presidential election, the constitution made provision for fractions arising from the computation of votes to be rounded up to the next whole number. • Existing local government areas were enshrined in the 1989 Constitution for the first time. States lost their power granted by the 1979 Constitution to adjust the number and boundaries of local government areas as such action according to section 9(3) of the 1989 Constitution require constitutional amendment. The constitution also established traditional councils. The 1989 Constitution, it has to be noted was merely promulgated and operated in piecemeal. It did not come into operation at all levels of government due to absence of full democratic governance in the country. In the constitution there were provisions for the coming into force of some sections from time to time and the whole constitution to come into operation as from October 1, 1992. It was observed that while civilians operated as governors at the state level, and the elected national and state legislatures existed in a vacuum (due to lack of real legislative powers), the military held on to power at the federal. The interest of the then military president – General Ibrahim Babangida (now rtd.) – affects the electoral outcomes that would have established the Third Republic. The creation of two political parties was seen as a grand strategy for the perpetuation of Babangida’s military rule. After the presidential election was held on June 12, 1993, he nullified the results midway through various calculated steps. Prior to the election, there was an attempt to stop the elections through a state-sponsored, albeit illegal organization, called Association for Better Nigeria’ (ABN) led by Senator Arthur Nzeribe. The Association on June 10, 1993, got a 9:30 pm-­injunction of an Abuja High Court stopping the election from holding as scheduled (Adedokun 2005: 457). In short, the absence of political will on the part of the military class to relinquish power to their civilian counterparts was responsible for the non-­ implementation of the 1989 Constitution and the truncation of the transition programmes that supposed to usher in the Third Republic. Although, as mentioned earlier, the 1989 constitution was not allowed to operate, there was an attempt by the Abacha military regime to draft another constitution that would usher in another republic. The regime took the first step at constitution drafting by instituting National Constitutional Conference Commission in January 1994, which organized election into the Constitutional Conference. By June 27, 1994, General Sani Abacha inaugurated the conference in spite of the wide criticisms from the Nigerian populace. The conference produced a draft constitution in 1995, which was not debated nor ratified by the representatives of the people. Nevertheless, the constitution provided bedrock for the political transition programme adopted by the Abacha military regime. Some of the far reaching changes recommended in the 1995 draft constitution that are still point of reference

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in the contemporary Nigeria’s constitutional history include the division of the country into six geopolitical zones for the purpose of power sharing, particularly, at the federal level. The six zones include North Central (NC) with the zonal headquarters at Jos (Plateau state), North East (NE) with zonal headquarters at Maiduguri (Borno state), North West (NW) with zonal headquarters at Kaduna (Kaduna State), South East (SE) Zone with the zonal headquarters at Enugu (Enugu State), SouthSouth (SS) Zone with the zonal headquarters at Port-Harcourt (Rivers State) and South West (SW) Zone with the zonal headquarters at Ibadan (Oyo state). Also, the introduction of ‘rotational power sharing formula’ for the offices of the President, Vice President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Senate President, Deputy Speaker and Deputy Senate Leader. In other words these offices are to be shared and rotated among the six geographical zones. It is significant to point out that this formula, upon its adoption, was domesticated at both state and local government levels. The establishment of Federal Character Commission and the composition of the federal cabinet in proportion to the votes won by each political party at the polls was part of the recommendations. The constitutional conference that made the above suggestions attempted to evolve a true federalism. Besides, the conference called for the termination of military rule by 1996. This call garnered much impetus from the people. Thus, on the basis of the draft constitution of 1995, Abacha announced a transition programme for the restoration of democratic governance by October 1998. To implement this transition programme, the Abacha military regime put in place two agencies under its supervision. These agencies are (i) the Transition Implementation Commission and (ii) National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON). Although elections were conducted into local government councils nationwide and the same happened in respect of state houses of assembly as well as the National Assembly, none of these bodies was allowed to operate. The wanton desire of General Sani Abacha to succeed himself and the war declared against the opposition groups led to grave violation of human rights and the consequent international sanctions. Nigeria was almost turned into a pariah state as a result of this. For instance, Nigeria was suspended from the British Commonwealth of Nations, and there were series of economic sanctions from different countries of the world. Before the sudden death of General Abacha on June 8, 1998, his regime created six additional states, namely, Bayelsa (SS), Ebonyi (SE), Ekiti (SW), Zamfara (NW), Gombe (NE) and Nasarawa (NC) in 1996. It was also under his regime that five political parties on whose platforms elections were conducted. These parties include: United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and Congress of National Consensus (CNC). This is a deviation from the two-party system instituted by the 1989 Constitution. These parties were dissolved as soon as the head of state (the only presidential candidate endorsed by all the parties) died. As soon as General Abdulsalami Abubakar was sworn in to take over from late General Abacha, he announced a new transitional programme drawn to terminate on

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May, 29, 1999. As part of the transition programme, new military administration decided to draw and launch a new constitution, organize free and fair elections, redeem the battered international image of the country and bring out national reconciliation. The Abubakar led administration scrapped the existing political parties referred to as ‘five fingers on a leprous hand’, cancelled the controversial local government, state and national assembly elections and released many political detainees. The regime also established a new electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) headed by Ephraim Akpata. A 23-member Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC) headed by Justice Niki Tobi was inaugurated to debate on the 1995 draft constitution. The report of this committee formed the basis on which the 1999 Constitution was made in 1998 to usher in the Fourth Republic. The powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria according to 1999 Constitution are shared among the three organs of government. These organs are established to exercise these constitutional powers at the federal and state levels and implicitly at the local government level. The legislative powers at the federal level are vested in a National Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Unlike the bicameral legislature at the centre, each state has a House of Assembly vested with the legislative powers at the state level. Mainly, these legislatures are empowered by the constitution among other things to make laws for the peace, order and good government both at the federal and state levels. The executive powers at the federal and state levels are vested in the elected President and Governor, respectively. Meanwhile, according to Section 6, the judicial powers are vested in those courts recognized by the constitution. The 1999 Constitution, notwithstanding the observed flaws and criticisms levelled against it and its drafters, provides a legal and constitutional framework in this new political dispensation dubbed ‘the Fourth Republic’. With the adoption of the presidential system of government, there is a room for individual and not collective responsibility for good or bad deeds done while in office especially by the elected President or Governor. The constitution as indicated earlier makes provision for amendment which makes it possible for people to demand for constitutional reform. The constitution is criticized on the ground that it promotes unitarism in a federal system. For example, the Federal government appoints both federal and state judicial officers. In addition, issues of revenue generation and sharing, as well as secularity are not adequately addressed. The constitution is very weak on the issue of human rights and the guarantee of socio-economic rights; it does not properly address how to put the army under civilian control and the autonomy of the local governments are not constitutionally guaranteed. Furthermore, observed that: The structures set out by the ( 1999) Constitution are strongly criticized. The institution is said to provide the shortest cut to dictatorship. It does not give room for a decentralized state.

Since then, several attempts had been and are recently being made to review the constitution by the former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, by the late President Musa Yar’Adua and by the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan.

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Evaluation of Executive Power Vis-À-Vis the Legislature Executive-legislative relations in terms of exercise of political authority in most democracies are often characterized with conflict, cooperation, hostility and complicity. In Nigeria, cases of executive-legislative clash of powers and interests are numerous in Second and Third Republics as well the present Fourth Republic. Although the constitution provides for clear separation of powers between the legislature and the executive in particular, it also endows the National Assembly with adequate powers to control the executive. In fact, one of the strongest weapons provided for in all the presidential constitutions to the legislature to check the excesses of the executive is that of impeachment, the raison d’etre was to serve as a last resort for gross misconduct unbecoming of the holder of such high office. The 1979 Constitution in its provisions in Sections 132 and 170 spelt out in detail the procedure necessary for impeachment. This weapon was successfully used to remove former Governor of Kaduna and Deputy Governor of Kano state in the Second Republic as earlier mentioned. Even, recently, 2 days after resigning from office, Mr. Chris Alozie Akomas the Deputy Governor of Abia state was impeached by Abia state House of Assembly on August 2, 2010. As Aiyede (2005:75) noted, ‘the military regimes did not only fuse legislative and executive functions; they also institutionalized a system and culture of government that was extremely executive-centered’. The executive presidential system in Nigeria, since its adoption in 1979 and up till now, has become an interplay of the executive and the legislature, with the judiciary holding the balance of power. This presidential model is designed to prevent executive dominance and emergence of one party state, which characterized most parliamentary regimes. Regarding the legal frameworks for the executive-legislative relations, the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions are very instructive; both at the federal and state levels. The legislation, execution and adjudication are vested in separate but interdependent organs. Under the presidential constitution of 1999, legislative powers and functions are vested at the federal level in a bicameral legislature – the Senate and House of Representatives – while the execution of laws so made and of the constitution is vested in the President and other executive functionaries and bodies. The rule – adjudication role is left for the judiciary. At the state level, there is a unicameral legislature – the House of Assembly – for the exercise of legislative powers while the executive comprises of the Governor and other functionaries. It needs to be pointed out that the exercise of the state executive powers is subject to the provision of any law made by the National Assembly. The same, mutatis mutandis applies to the present 36 states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) under the 1999 Constitution. While it is obvious that the legislative and executive bodies are kept separate, none can operate effectively without the cooperation of the other. To forestall the tyranny of any organ, a system of checks and balances is provided for. By implication, both the legislative and executive arms have specific but restricted legal authorities. On one hand, some of the areas in which the executive depends on the

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legislature or the check of the former by the latter covered by the three constitutions include lawmaking and execution, budget approval, oversight, appointment of executive nominees and tenure security of the chief of executive  – President and the Governor. On the other hand, since executive-legislative relations are not unidirectional, the executive also has various ways of putting the legislature in check, thus balancing the control of the legislature over it. Some of these include policy formulation, initiation of bills and proposals, power of veto, and control of legislative staff. It is significant to point out that the main essence of separation of powers doctrine and the principle of checks and balances in the context of executive-­ legislative relations is not aimed to promote conflict between the two arms of government but to egg on the running of government on the basis of wide consensus and fair concern for all interests involved. In practice, when the presidential system was introduced in Nigeria in the Second Republic, there was an expectation that it would ensure a stable polity and reduce legislative-executive acrimony. This Republic witnessed a lot of squabbles between the executive and legislature. These were not unrelated to anxiousness on the part of the two bodies to assert and guard their autonomy. Immediately after the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari was sworn in, one of the earliest tests of executive-legislative relationship was the issue of ministerial appointment (Awotokun 1988). Prior to the accord between NPN, which as a dominant party could not enjoy simple majority in the National Assembly (having won 36 out of 95 legislative seats and 168 out of 499 House of Representatives seats) and NPP broke down, the appointment of some Ministers was relatively easy, except that of Chief Richard Akinjide of NPN (Awotokun 1988). The nomination of Chief Akinjide by Shagari’s administration was rejected by the Senate, whose confirmation was needed before the executive could make any appointment. The resubmission of his name for consideration generated the uproar between NPN/NPP coalition government and other three political parties in the Senate. The furor that greeted the nomination of Chief Akinjide as a Minister was described by Awotokun (1988: 98) as ‘a clear manifestation of extreme and dogged partisan politics in the Senate at its inception in 1979’. Other issues that generated conflicts between the legislature and the executive in the Second Republic include, the Supplementary Appropriation Bill of 1979/1980, which the executive submitted to the National Assembly for approval after it had spent the money, fixing of legislators’ salaries by the legislature before the intervention of National Economic Council (NEC) and the Electoral Bill of 1981 introduced by the executive but put aside by the Senate unapproved (Awotokun 1988, Madunagwu and Oche 1992). It should be mentioned that at the State level, the experience was the same especially where the party that produced the Governor was not in control of the legislature. As pointed out earlier in this paper, the rivalry between the legislature and the executive led to the impeachment of Governor Balarabe Musa of PRP by the NPN dominated House of Assembly in Kaduna State. In other States, the executive dominance of governmental affairs was firmly established owing to one party nature of most state legislatures.

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In the aborted Third Republic, the military executives in place under General Ibrahim Babangida (Rtd.) did not allow the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly to enjoy the autonomy they deserved. The annulment of June 12, 2003, presidential election results and the subsequent weak executive put in place under Chief Ernest Shonekan as well as the seizure of power by General Sani Abacha (late) were major factors that truncated democratization attempt in this Republic. In the present political dispensation, which begun in 1999, cases of executive-­legislative antagonisms are not very different from those experienced in the Second Republic. Regarding the executive and legislative relations in the Fourth Republic, Aiyede (2005:75) identified three major forms of conflicts at the national level. According to him: The first is underlined by a struggle for prestige and influence by each arm of government. The second relates to the conflicts arising from opposition perception of powers and roles by each arm in the functioning of separation of powers under the presidential system. The third arise from disagreement over issues of policy and the effort by each arm to enforce its preference.

While subscribing to this assertion, it is necessary to add that the centrist nature of the Nigerian political economy that allows the federal executive to take charge in virtually every sensitive political and economic issue is another explanation for the executive-legislative squabbles. Since 1999, most legislative bodies had sought one way or the other to free themselves from the financial string of the executives, and various attempts to achieve this have put legislators at all levels at crossroad with the chief executives. For example, in 2003, the controversial furniture allowance did not only generate conflict between the National Assembly and the then President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, but also pitched the legislative houses against the media and the public at large. The President accused the legislators of seeking to self- enriched themselves by asking for allowance between 3m and 5m to furnish their official quarters. Although the furniture allowance was later disbursed to each legislator (the exact amount given was not officially disclosed), the indictment laid the foundation for other disagreements that ensued between the two branches of government (Lafenwa 2006). One of the major issues that often generated controversy between the legislators and the executive Governors is the issue of Appropriation Bill and supplementary Appropriation Bill in terms of delay in passage and inclusion of certain conditions by the legislature, which always infuriate the executive arm. For instance, the three conditions attached to 2001 Appropriation Bill by Oyo State House of Assembly made Governor Lam Adesina (late) to withhold his assent of the Bill for several days. The House apart from increasing the budget from N20.1bn to N20.4bn added a clause that its Appropriation House committees would be ‘inspecting, monitoring, evaluating, supervising and certifying the proper completion of all contracts before final payment is made’ (Lafenwa 2006: 266). Also the House further directed that ‘the total overhead cost and quarterly capital expenditure of the House shall be released to it at once’ (ibid.). The Governor later signed the Bill into law after private negotiation that led the House to drop the last two conditions. More importantly, the federal legislature was at loggerhead with the executive on the issues relating to budgetary allocation for the development of legislative infrastructures, constituency allowance for each legislator to make direct impact in his/ her constituency, the passage of Niger-Delta Development Commission Bill (which

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was initially vetoed by the executive but later passed by the National Assembly with two-third joint majority votes), and anticorruption programme of former President Obasanjo among others (Aiyede 2005, and Omotola 2006). The executive-­legislative squabbles reached its climax at the federal level when impeachment threats were made against former President Obasanjo by the National Assembly on August 13, 2002. In 2006, the National Assembly thwarted the attempt made by Chief Obasanjo and his supporters to amend Nigeria’s constitution so that Obasanjo could prolong his term in office. At the state level, the incessant executive-legislative conflicts led to the impeachment of the following Governors between 2003 and 2007: Chris Ngige of Anambra State (impeachment was nullified by the Court), Chief Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo state (later reinstated to spend 11 months in office), Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa state, Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti state and Joshua Dariye of Plateau state (he was suspended and later reinstated) in controversial manners. In the case of Ekiti and Plateau States, the federal executive with the approval of the National Assembly imposed 6  months emergency rule due to attendant civil disturbances. Although there were remote causes for the removal of these executive Governors including allegations of corruption and abuse of office, members of Houses of Assembly in these states were actively involved. The sarcasm of this scenario is that except in Anambra state, both the legislative houses and executives were one party dominated. The corollary of the above foregoing is that under the presidential model adopted in the Republics under consideration, the relationship between the legislature and the executive has been frosty and acrimonious, contrary to the expectations of the drafters of 1979, 1989 and 1999 Constitutions. Bassey (2006:133) argues that the ‘debacle of the two previous experiments in constitutional practice in Nigeria (the First and Second Republics) and the current seething developments in executive– legislative relations suggest a deep and ubiquitous problem rooted in our political culture’. It has to be pointed out that this is dangerous for democratic governance in Nigeria. However, it is not proper to advocate for a cooperative democracy in which any of the organs would dominate or be subservient to others at the expense of public interests. It is in order if the principles of separation of powers, checks and balances and rule of law are fully operated to the benefits of all concerned. Although, the executive-legislative friction has reduced, particularly at the federal level since President Goodluck Jonathan Administration took off. It not a surprise considering also the important role played by the legislature in the emergence of the President following the period of uncertainty the country faced all through the period of illness of late President Yar’Adua and after his untimely death.

The Collapse of the Republics The demise of the Second Republic was accelerated by the tension generated by the 1983 general elections which were similar to those of 1964–1965. In several places, violence erupted, and every election was contested in court. A number of the

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electoral verdicts were rescinded in view of evidence that results were falsified. Under these circumstances the military intervened on the last day of December 1983. The insincerity and lack of political will obviously demonstrated by the Babangida’s military regime, with the annulment of June 12, 1993, presidential election resulted into the collapse of the Third Republic. The long years of democratic transition that would have culminated in the Third Republic was eventually truncated in November, 1993, when General Sani Abacha (late) seized power via a palace coup. In Nigeria, prior to 1999, there were myriad problems facing democratization process, some of which were identified by her past leaders as reasons for the collapse of the past Republics. When the first civilian regime was toppled in 1966, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu said: Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent… those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deed. (Onaolapo 2005:10)

The maiden speech of General Muhammad Buhari after the sack of Alhaji Shehu Shagari led civilian administration reads in part: It is true that there is a worldwide economic recession. However, in the case of Nigeria, its impact was aggravated by mismanagement… The situation could have been avoided if the legislators were alive to their constitutional responsibilities. Instead, the legislators were preoccupied with determining their salary scales, fringe benefits and unnecessary foreign travels, et al, which took no account of the state of economy and the welfare of the people represented. (Onaolapo 2005:11)

In another speech delivered by the head of the military government that assumed power on December 31, 1983, Nigerians were informed that “an inept, purposeless and insensitive leadership was responsible for the gross mismanagement of the nation’s resources” (Adamolekun 2004:154). These challenges were identified by late General Murtala and General Ibrahim Babangida (rtd.) after the overthrow of General Gowon and General Buhari’s military governments, respectively. In the inaugural speech of the Political Bureau delivered by the then military president General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida on the January 13, 1986, some of these challenges were considered as the justifying factors for military intervention. Babangida affirmed Invariably military administrations have come about as a result of bad government; indeed our present economic predicament can be attributed to the nature and practice of partisan politics. It has contributed, in part, to the increasing cynicism and apathy of individuals, economic mismanagement as well as apparent social chaos and disorder in our society. (Report of Political Bureau 1987:229)

Bad governance, poor leadership, foreign and local debts, infrastructural decay, loss of societal values, bad foreign image, corruption, legitimacy crisis, protests and strikes were some of the credits of 29 years of military interregnum in Nigeria. It was pointed out in the USAID Report on Nigeria for 2007 that Nigeria has not yet overcome the legacy of military rule. The challenges now, according to the report, are “to struggle to consolidate democratic institutions and the rule of law, reduce rampant corruption and boost public confidence in the democratic transition”

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(International Republican Institute Report 2007). However, it has to be pointed out that the military is no better immune to the pressures and motivations which adversely affect the behaviour of civilian politicians. The restoration of constitutional rule in May 1999 heralded the new democratic order in which the numerous challenges of democratic governance and development facing Nigeria were expected to be effectively addressed. These challenges, peculiar to developing African countries, Nigeria not exempted, include, according to Ibeanu and Egwu (2007:4): Strengthening the basic institutions of democracy and governance such as the legislature; the sanctity of separation of powers and the rule of law; reducing corruption in the public and political spheres; transparency in the electoral system and the conduct of free and credible elections.

Even President Umaru Yar’Adua (now late) confirmed the challenges of Nigeria’s nascent democracy thus: As a nation, one of our greatest challenges has been the evolvement of a culture of disrespect for the rule of law… unbridled corruption, endemic crime, violence, infrastructural deficit and a general malaise in the polity. All these constituted a direct manifestation of disrespect for law and order. (Aondoakaa 2007:143)

Without mincing words, it is glaring from the above testimonies that corruption is a huge recurring challenge in the management of the public space in Nigeria. Today, it has become a defining characteristic of both military and civilian regimes and described as the core of the crisis of governance, the establishment of a stable democratic order, rule of law, development and the welfare of citizens. Indeed, it is the bane of democratic governance. Diamond (1993:158) pointed out in his work on Nigeria’s perennial struggle: No problem, however, is more intractable and more threatening to the future of Nigerian democracy than political corruption. The oil boom has given dramatic boosts to corruption, ostentatious display, and sheer waste.

It is expected that most of these challenges be adequately attended to, in order to forestall the possibly collapse of the Fourth Republic. Political actors occupying executive, legislative and judicial offices are expected to play by the existing provisions in the constitution. The civil society is also expected to be an active player in the smooth conduct of democratic governance.

References Adamolekun, L. (2004). Politics and Administration in Nigeria Ibadan: Spectrum, (rep.). Adedokun, S. (2005) “The Military and the General Elections of 1993 and 1999” in Adeoye A.  Akinsanya and John A.  Ayoade (Eds.), Readings in Nigerian Government and Politics, Nigeria: Gratia Associates International. pp 446–469. Agbodike, C. (1998). Federal Character Principle and National Integration. In Amuwo, K., Agbaje, A., Suberu, R., Herault, G. (Ed.), Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria (pp. 180–188). Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

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Aiyede E.  R. (2005). Executive- Legislative Relations in Nigeria’s Emerging Presidential Democracy. UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2(1): 65–87. Akinsanya, A.  A. (2005). The judiciary and Interpretation of Aspects of the 1979 Constitution 1979-1983. In Adeoye A.  Akinsanya and John A.  Ayoade (Eds.), Readings in Nigerian Government and Politics (pp 163–189), Nigeria: Gratia Associates International. Anifowoshe, R. (1999). The Structure and Organization of Government. In Anifowoshe Remi and Enemuo Francis (Eds.), Elements of Politics. Lagos: Malthouse Press. Aondoakaa, M. K. (2007). Understanding the Concept and Application of the Rule of law in the Fight against Corruption. Paper presented at the 2007 Senate Retreat, Presidential Hotel, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 28th October–2nd November, 2007. Appadorai, A. (1975). The Substance of Politics (Eleventh Ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Awotokun K. (1988). Legislative – Executive Relations: Case Studies. In Victor Ayeni and Kayode Soremekun (Ed.), Nigeria’s Second Republic: Presidentialism, Politics and Administration in a Developing State, Apapa: A Daily Times Publication. Bassey, C. O., (2006). Legislative-Executive Relation And The Future Of Democracy in Nigeria. In Ojo, E. E. (Ed.), Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria (pp 127–139). Ibadan: John Archers Publishers. Diamond, L. (1993). Nigeria’s Perennial Struggle. In Larry Diamond and Marc F.  Plattner (Eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Heywood Andrew. (2007). Politics(3rd ed.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ibeanu Okechukwu and Samuel Egwu. (2007). Popular Perceptions of Democracy and Political Governance in Nigeria. Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development. International Republican Institute. 2007 Election Observation in Nigeria. April 2007 Lafenwa, S.  A. (2006). The Legislature and Democratic Governance in Southwestern Nigeria, 1999-2003. A PhD thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan. Madunagwu M. O. and O. O. Oche (1992). The Legislature. In T. A. Imobighe (Ed.), The Politics of Second Republic. Kuru: National Institute of Strategic Studies. Nwabueze, B. (2004). Constitutional Democracy in Africa, Volume 4, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Omotola J.  S. (2006). Impeachment threats and Nigeria’s Democracy. In Ojo E.  O. (Ed.), Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archers Publications. Onaolapo Soleye (2005). Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria and the Challenges of Retired Generals. A commemorative lecture delivered on 5th February, 2005 at LAUTECH Ogbomoso. Oshewolo S. (2012). Structure and Organization of Government. In Rotimi Ajayi and Yinka Fashagba (Eds.), Introductory Text in Political Science (pp  133–158). Nigeria: Landmark University, OmuAran. Oyediran, O. (2003). Introduction to Political Science. Ibadan: Oyediran Consults International Report of the Political Bureau (March 1987). Abuja Directorate for Social Mobilization. Roskin Michael G, Robert L. Cord, James A. Medeiros and Walter S. J. (2008). Political Science: An Introduction. US: PrenticeHall Pearson Education International The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.

Chapter 6

The National Assembly Joseph Yinka Fashagba and Chiedo Nwankwor

Abstract  This chapter examines the legislative institution in Nigeria, focusing on the National Assembly. We proceeded by looking at the constitutional and institutional development of the legislature in Nigeria. This chapter also discusses the three most important functions of the legislature. It identifies the constitutional powers of the legislature. In this chapter, we discuss the internal structure of the legislature. The relationship between the legislature and the constituency was also highlighted. The importance and role of the committee of the national assembly received its deserved attention in the chapter. Considering the infrequent nature of the legislature in Nigeria, it has been facing some challenges and these challenges were captured in this chapter. Keywords  Nigerian National Assembly · Nigerian legislature · Executive · President · Oversight · House of Representatives · Senate

Introduction The name that the institution responsible for law-making is identified with and called varies from country to country. In Britain it is Parliament, in the United States it is Congress and Senate, in Germany it is Bundestag, in Switzerland it is Federal Assembly (comprising the council of states and National Council), and in France it is National Assembly. This accounts for why Krepel (nd) avers that variety of terms such as assembly, congress or parliament are used interchangeably. The structure, organization, composition and power of the legislature are also characterized by minimal to considerable variation from one country to the other (Smith 1980). As Weinbaum (1975:32) observed, “legislative powers vary widely from constitutional prescripJ. Y. Fashagba (*) Department of Political Science, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria C. Nwankwor African Studies Program, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_6

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tion.” Notwithstanding the differences in the names given to the institution, and the degree of power wielded by the body, the legislatures are essentially political institutions whose members are formally equal to one another, whose authority derives from a claim that the members are representatives of the political community and whose decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures (Bogdanor 1991). In the opinion of Jimoh (1994:12), “constitutional governments all over the world recognise three basic departments of government, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.” Hence, the legislature is one of the legitimate and formal institutions that is indispensable to the existence and operation of a democratic system. It is the custodian of the nation’s sovereignty with the constitutional responsibility to make and amend laws through which the state is administered. Indeed, the difference between a state that is self-governed with a democratic institution in place to make laws reflecting the prevailing popular will of the governed and another political community whose laws are made by foreign power, either domiciled within the territory for which the laws are made or residing outside the geographical space for which it makes laws, is the existence of an independent assembly whose members are elected as representatives to make law and policy by the people for the political entity. It is impossible to imagine or build a democratic government without an institutionalized legislature. As Davies (2004: 199) averred, “representative democracy has been recognized as the best form of government without which the sovereignty of the people will be meaningless.” By this, not only are legislators representatives of the people as well as the institutional mechanism for achieving both horizontal and vertical accountability but also the defining attribute of all established democracies which is more relevant in deepening democratization (Barkan 2009). According to Weinbaum (1975), parliaments were erected wherever governments found it necessary to institutionalize their consultations with elites or sought the consent of the masses to legitimize their rule. However, the fate of the legislatures has not been the same across systems. For instance, while the legislatures in some political systems have been disappearing and re-appearing, as a result of the infrequent appearance of democratic governance, especially in most African countries and other third world states, in other systems with stable democracies, they have consistently remained a major institution without a break. The legislatures in different systems have taken different shapes. For instance, some states have one chamber assembly, essentially, because of economic and political consideration. In a country like Ghana, only one legislative chamber handles all activities relating to the law-making of the state. In some countries, perhaps because of political consideration, bordering on the necessity for the representation of minority groups and interests, as well as the need to balance political weight in policy- and decision-making, the dual-chamber model is embraced. Countries where the two-chamber model is in operation include South Africa, Britain, United States and Germany, among others. Nigeria is one of the countries where the dual-­ chamber model, with the two chambers wielding almost equal power, save in respect of approving power of the Senate of political nominees, and impeaching the president and vice president, is in operation. In some countries, while each of the two chambers wields more or less equal legislative power—Nigeria and the United

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States—in the others the upper chamber may exercise only a marginal power. For instance, in a country like Finland, the second or upper chamber is more or less a committee drawn from the main assembly (Smith 1980). With specific reference to Nigeria, the current national assembly is the fourth sovereign assembly from independence in 1960. The first one was the national assembly that operated under the parliamentary constitution of the first republic (1960–1966). However, when the first republic collapsed in 1966, the military abrogated the legislative institution. The second national assembly emerged in 1979 under the presidential constitution that was in operation between 1979 and 1983. The third national assembly was inaugurated in 1992, and it existed simultaneously with a military head of state. However, in November 1993 the assembly was dissolved, following the truncation of the transition to civil rule programme. The national assembly of Nigeria has always been a bicameral assembly from independence in 1960. Although members of Senate were not elected under the first republic, however, beginning from the second republic, all members of the two chambers have emerged through elections. The Nigerian legislature derives its power from the amended 1999 Constitution (Fashagba 2019). In fact, when the on-­going constitution amendment is completed, the national assembly would have amended the military-imposed constitution twice. The national assembly was one of the three arms of government created by the amended 1999 Constitution. Before we progress in our discussion on the national assembly in this chapter, it is absolutely necessary to attempt a brief historical overview of the legislative institution in Nigeria.

 ackground Information on Nigerian Legislative Institution B 1922–1960 The emergence of the legislative institution in Nigeria dated back to 1922. Ever since the institution emerged on the political scene, it has undergone series of transformation. Historically, the Nigerian legislature can be classified into two: the colonial legislature and the post-colonial legislatures. Sure, the colonial legislature refers to the legislative institution in place under the colonial administration in Nigeria between 1922 and 1960. The post-colonial legislatures refer to the country’s legislative institution after its political independence in 1960. The post-colonial legislatures can yet be divided into the first republic assembly under a parliamentary system (1960–1966); the second republic legislature under a presidential arrangement (1979–1983); the legislatures under the military regime in the aborted third republic (1992–1993); and the fourth republic legislature under the current new presidential democracy. To begin with, a semblance of modern legislature emerged in Nigeria in 1922 when the then Governor of Nigeria, Sir Clifford, introduced the 1922 Constitution into the Nigerian political space. However, the legislature only had four Nigerians as members. The colonially dominated legislative institution had three Nigerian representatives elected from Lagos and one elected from Calabar. In all, the Legislative Council established under the 1922 Constitution was composed of 46 members, of which 4 constituting 4.7 per cent were official and 19 constituting 41.3

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per cent were non-official members. Among the non-official members were the four elected Nigerian representatives from Lagos and Calabar. Apparently, the assembly was not really meant to represent Nigerians. The legislature was merely symbolic and created for ordinary formality; it was bereft of legislative power in actual sense. Indeed, the colonial legislature performed only an advisory role; it did not perform expected modern functions of the legislature. The introduction of Richard Constitution in 1946 led to little changes in the political system—changes which included the emergence of three regional structures, with each region having at least one legislative chamber. In each region, the regional legislature had a semblance of a representative institution. But the regional legislature was a political creation to appease and ensure increased participation but without the influence of the agitated emerging Nigerian economic, political and educated elites (Ojo 1997). Also a legislative council was provided for in the 1946 Constitution. Thus, while the legislature under the 1946 Constitution gave Nigeria a sort of representative democracy, it was instituted to serve colonial agenda. To be sure, the provisions of the Richard Constitution made the Governor the President of the Legislative Council for the country. The Legislative Council comprised 16 officials (of whom 13 were ex officio and 3 were nominated by the Governor) and 28 unofficials (of whom 24 were nominated and 4 were elected) (Omoweh 2006). This second central legislative council was made to legitimize the increasingly unpopular colonial administration. Notwithstanding, the legislature lacked the power to deliberate on the welfare of the people it was meant to represent. Apart from the central legislative council, the Eastern and Western regions had a chamber each, while the Northern region had a House of Chiefs in addition to the Regional Assembly. The 1951 Constitution took the country a step further. The 1951 Constitution provided for the ratio of 90 elected members to 14 non-elected for the Northern Region; 80 elected to 7 non-elected in the Western Region; and 80 elected to 8 non-­ elected in the Eastern Region. Thus, while the number of members increased in the central legislature, later called House of Representatives, the Governor acting as President dominated policy-making, and the legislature was rendered ineffective (Omoweh 2006). Between 1954 and 1960, further progress was made as majority of the legislative members at both the centre and the regions were elected members. Nevertheless, a few officials and special members were still included in the Northern regional House of assembly. The House of Representatives did not only have Speaker for the first time, but it was also largely composed of elected members. Nonetheless, until 1959 the House of Representatives could still not exercise power over budgetary appropriation and imposition of tax, under the 1954 Constitution.

1960–1966 From 1960 when Nigeria became independent to 1966 when democratic institutions of the first republic were abrogated due to the military intervention of 1966, the parliamentary system of government was practised. The Northern People’s Congress

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(NPC) which controlled the largest number of seats could not form government because it lacked the simple majority required to do so. Consequently, it formed a coalition with the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). Under the coalition, the NPC was the senior partner and it produced the prime minister. The NCNC produced the president, as the junior partner in the coalition. However, while the prime minister was the executive head of government, the office of the president under the arrangement was a symbolic one vested with ceremonial functions. The president wielded just some marginal power, particularly the power to assent to bills passed by parliament. The disparity in the power vested in the office of the prime minister and the president led to some avoidable personality clash between the holders of the two offices (Adebayo 1986). Perhaps because the legislature was fused with the executive organ of government under the parliamentary arrangement, the assembly was weak (Fashagba 2009; Adebayo 1986; Lafenwa 2006). The legislature was more or less a rubberstamp of the executive. Considering the weakness of the legislature, it was incapable of serving as a bulwark against the wind of democratic reversal in the early post-independent era. Consequently, the parliamentary democracy of the first republic collapsed barely after about 6 years. This appears to justify the assumption of Fish (2006) that a weak legislature will lead to a fragile democracy.

1979–1983 With the adoption of the presidential system in 1979, Nigeria returned to democratic rule. The presidential system was characterized by separation of power. This can be considered to be largely due to the reasoning among the military rulers and in the academic circle, as well as among the political elites, that a separate and independent legislature would secure true democracy, by checking executive excesses. Contrary to expectation, however, the legislature was weak, especially in the first 2 years while the alliance of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the National People’s Party (NPP) lasted (Akinsanya 2002). The legislature was pliant and failed to check abuse of executive power. Ultimately, the failure of the legislative institution to perform its roles in the first 2 years of the second republic (1979–1981) and the adversarial or confrontational politics that resulted following the collapse of the NPN/NPP alliance contributed in part to the sudden collapse of the second republic in 1983. For instance, the fundamental legislative oversight role that would have ensured accountability and transparency in executive governance was neglected. Consequently, the second republic gave way to the military incursion in Nigerian politics. The military justified its intervention on the pretext of prevalent corruption and adversarial politics in the country. Although with the military intervention in 1983 the Nigerian central legislature called National Assembly disappeared as the dispensation of democracy ended, the Assembly re-emerged in 1992, but under a condition that made it a mere lame duck. The National Assembly was made to work with a military-controlled executive or government as a presidential election was still pending. Considering the aversion of the military for the legislative institution, the junta put in place so many decrees with

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ouster clauses that incapacitated the legislature of the aborted third republic (Davies 1996). The incapacitated legislature disappeared in 1993 when the d­ emocratic transition was aborted by the military (Ojo 1997). The legislative institution did not reemerge again until 1999, when a new presidential constitution was introduced. What are the shape, composition, as well as the electoral systems adopted in organizing the National Assembly? What functions do the legislatures perform in a democratic setting? In the next sections, we provide answers to these questions.

Functions of the National Assembly The role of the legislatures in modern system cannot be over-emphasized. A virile legislature does not only promote political stability (Fish 2006); it also guarantees good governance and democratic sustainability. Indeed, the legislatures perform three distinct roles deriving from the nature of their constitutional powers and composition. The legislatures perform law-making, oversight and representational functions. In some literature, a fourth role, constituency service function of the parliaments, is sometimes mentioned. Law-making  The first primary and major function of a legislative assembly is law-­ making. Although the extent of legislative involvement in law-making vary from weak under parliamentary democracy to strong under the presidential system, the executive in both systems submit its proposal to the assembly for deliberation (Davies 2004). Some scholars, especially in the United States, are of the view that the American legislature is the strongest assembly in the world. With reference to Nigeria, while some have challenged the members of the Nigerian national assembly as not productive enough to justify their rating as the highest paid legislators in the world, they have nevertheless been involved in law-­making since democracy returned in 1999. For instance, between June 1999 and June 2009, the national assembly passed 146 bills. By this, on the average 14.6 bills were passed per annum between the periods. This also translates to average of 1.2 bills per month. This low yearly and monthly average perhaps accounted for why many commentators hold the view that the Nigerian legislators have been less impressive in the performance of their lawmaking role. Similarly, the members of the national assembly have been competing with the executive organ in initiating bills. A bill is a legislative proposal submitted either by the executive or the legislature for legislative consideration and action. The bill may be passed after a minor or major amendment but will only become an act of the national assembly on being assented to by the president or through the two-thirds majority vote of members when a bill is vetoed by the president. Between 1999 and April 2014, a number of bills were vetoed by the assembly. The latest one was the State of the Nation Address bill 2013. The bill which sought to compel the president to address the national assembly every July was vetoed by the president in June 2013. Specifically, while several bills, most of which were members’ bills, have been vetoed by various presidents from 1999 to date, only four have been ­successfully

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counter-vetoed by the assembly. This was despite the fact that the chambers were controlled by the same People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Despite the efforts of the members in initiating bills, it has become evident that executive bills have greater chances of not only being passed but also assented to by the president. To be sure, while the Senate received 487 bills between June 2003 and May 2007, 129 (26.49%) were executive bills, 237 (48.67%) originated with the Senate, and 26 (5.34%) were sponsored by members of House of Representatives. However, out of the 487 bills, 132 were passed by the Senate out of which 83 (62 per cent) of the passed bills were executive bills and 49 (37.12) were members’ bills. However, not all bills passed by one chamber get passed by the other, hence the low average per annum. Oversight or scrutiny of administration  The second function that the legislatures perform is the oversight or scrutiny of administration. In the opinion of Saffell (1989), with the diminished influence of the modern legislatures in law and policy-­ making, the legislatures have sought to make up for the loss of significant law-­ making role with increasing oversight responsibility. In fact, the legislature, especially in the modern states, is not simply contented watching from the sideline the implementation of bills passed by them but oversees the implementation of policy and budget to ensure compliance by the executive. The national assembly of Nigeria performs the role by overseeing the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government. They conduct investigation on executive activities and have been able to reveal several abuses of executive power and financial misappropriation of government agencies (Fashagba 2009). Although the national assembly has frequently found itself in one financial scandal or the other, it has nevertheless been able to expose corruption in the departments and agencies of government. It has through public hearings and investigation exposed corruption in the executive organ from time to time. For instance, the Senate investigated the executive organ over an alleged unlawful withdrawal of public funds for personal use in 2006. The then President and his Vice had engaged each other in accusation and counter-accusations on unconstitutional withdrawal of public funds from the account of the Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF). The then Vice President was indicted by the Senate ad hoc committee that investigated the allegation. The Senate also scrutinizes executive appointment. One of the oversight functions of the national assembly and the Senate in particular is to ensure that appointment of people into public offices by the executive is made in a way that not only reflects the federal character principle enshrined in the constitution but also that credible individuals who are capable of delivering the responsibilities of the office are appointed. The Senate has been discharging this responsibility since 1999. Indeed, while many executive nominees have been cleared, on different occasions the Senate had turned down the request to confirm some nominees (Fashagba 2009). For instance, a candidate nominated for ministerial appointment from Taraba state was rejected in 2011 during screening because the three senators from his state opposed his nomination. The three senators were members of the ruling PDP and so

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enjoyed the support of the principal officers of the chamber. According to the three senators, their state governor did not consult them before the nomination. However, candidate nominated from states governed by opposition parties have been confirmed even when the legislators from such states objected the nomination. However, while the members of the national assembly have appeared to be more active in their oversight role, most often they have seen the performance of their oversight function as an avenue to further enrich themselves. This has resulted in several financial scandals among members of the legislature. In fact, a Senate President was forced to resign in 2005 because he was alleged to have compromised his office by conniving with the committee on education to solicit bribe from the ministry of education with a view to inflating the budget of the ministry in the 2005 Appropriation Bill. In 2012, the ad hoc committee set up by the lower House to investigate the fuel subsidy abuse between 2009 and 2011 ended up in another bribery scandal. The leader of the ad hoc committee, who had claimed to be the chairman of the “integrity group” of the lower chamber, was alleged to have solicited and collected the sum of $650,000 from one of the oil importers under investigation. Most other members take advantage of the ministry or agency they oversee by taking contracts. As Lewis (2009) noted, most Nigerian legislators are contractors. They run after contract in different government establishments. This behaviour depicts a high tendency towards corruption. Representational function  The legislature also performs representational role. Indeed, the 360 constituencies in Nigeria have 360 representations in the lower chamber. Representation in the lower chamber is based on population, but some have asserted that there is no fairness in the delimitation of constituency. Nevertheless, population plays a very significant role. For instance, Lagos and Kano states have comparable population size and have 24 members each in the House of Representatives. However, each state is represented by three elected senators, which implies “equal” representation irrespective of the size of states. Consequently, both the Senate and the House of Representatives are representing their constituencies and are expected to reflect their concerns, views and interests in the policy-making arena. Balancing the roles of representation and national interests has always been an issue for representatives. Although some have advocated the Burkean approach to representation, which emphasizes national interest, others have advocated the Wilsonian principle that stresses the necessity to place interest of constituency ahead and above national interest. Indeed, while the latter is the delegate theory of representation, others have suggested the need to balance between trustee and delegate roles. This is called the politico approach to representation (Saffell 1989). In Nigeria most legislators always claimed to work in the national interest rather than the constituency or narrow interest. This means most members see themselves as trustees and not mere delegates of their constituencies. Most members of the national assembly perform their representational role through financial supports, distribution of food, clothing materials and others to members of their constituencies. This suggests that the legislators also perform ­constituency service. Some members have provided facilities for small-scale business for members of their constituency. This is not surprising because the legislators

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earn very huge constituency allowance every quarter. Similarly, members use their political connection to secure government jobs for members of their constituencies. It is important to mention that perhaps in line with the thinking of the need to have one House checking and balancing the power of the other, the two legislative chambers have often disagreed on issues and toed different lines of actions on most national issues. Very often, they have had to negotiate to resolve their differences. However, disagreement over clauses of any bills is resolved by the conference of the national assembly. Conference committee is a committee comprising members drawn from both chambers to reconcile the differences in any bills or measures passed by the legislature. Having examined the functions of the national assembly, we now focus on the organization of the national assembly.

The Organization of the National Assembly The ways members are drawn from the society or public to the legislature vary from state to state. The composition of the body may also vary with the preference of the ruling elites and the constitution of a state. Similarly, the internal organization and operation of a legislature may reflect the dynamics of the polity and the groups operating the system as well as the mood of the legal framework creating the assembly. We will discuss these in brief under three headings focusing on the Nigerian National Assembly.

Composition of the National Assembly The legislatures are known to have several distinguishing characteristics. These features may be classified into the general and specific. This section shall discuss both the general and specific features. One of the major features of the legislatures is the classification based on the number of chambers. By this, three essential types are identifiable. There is the single-chamber or unicameral system taking the shape of a single House to which all elected legislators belong. The second form that the legislatures take is the dual-­ chamber or bicameral model where there are two separate Houses, constituted either through separate elections or other arrangement by which some members of an elected parliament are selected to form a committee and regarded it as a distinct House. This is found in the Nordic countries of Europe. Apart from unicameral and bicameral legislature, there is the multi-chamber legislature. This is sometimes established to take care of the representational imperative of diverse groups within a political system (Krepel nd). The lower House in a bicameral legislature often consists of a larger number of representatives. Representation in the lower chamber of a bicameral assembly reflects as much as possible the population spread or distribution of the state. By

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this, the whole political community is divided or delimited into electoral constituencies for the purpose of election of representatives. The basic criterion for the distribution is usually population. Population has remained the sole criterion for delimiting constituency for elections into the 360 member House of Representatives in Nigeria. A legislator is expected to represent at least 100,000 people based on the 1999 Constitution. Consequently, there is disparity in representation as population is the major criterion used in the delimitation of constituency in the states. By this, states like Lagos and Kano with high population have higher number of representatives in the lower chamber than a state like Bayelsa with a low population. Conversely, in the upper chamber, equality of states is emphasized. Consequently, rather than the division based on population, such factors as equality of sub-national units (e.g. United States, Germany and South Africa during apartheid), minority protection, and ethnic balancing determined the composition of the chamber. This explains why equal representation of states was adopted in Nigerian Senate. For instance, while each state is represented by three senators in Nigeria, in the United States, each state is represented by two. In Nigeria, a senator is elected to represent the federal capital territory (FCT). This is perhaps to ensure the representation of the indigenes of the FCT. Thus, there are 108 senators from 36 states and 1 from FCT, making a total of 109 senators in the upper chamber. According to irrespective of whether a system is unicameral or bicameral, its membership must not be too large or small. If the number of members is too large, decision-making might become unwieldy. Similarly, the number of members who will be able to contribute to debate on any bill may be few, and this may ultimately affect the quality of policy output. Some members who may not enjoy the patronage of the House leadership can easily be sidelined, or those who have relevant and salient contribution to make are overlooked. While all legislative powers are concentrated in the only chamber in a unicameral system, power sharing between the upper and the lower chamber is the hallmark of the bicameral arrangement. Indeed, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides for concurrence power of both Houses in making decisions on most issues on which the national assembly exercises valid power (Fashagba 2019). This is with the exception of the confirmatory power over executive nominees vested exclusively in the Senate. Considering the fact that the legislatures have many responsibilities, most times both the unicameral and bicameral assembly have to put in place special and standing committees. These committees are assigned legislative responsibilities to ease the burden on the two chambers. In Nigeria, for instance, the number of committees in both chambers has expanded between 1999 and 2013, as committee leadership appointment has become a viable patronage to reward those loyal to the leaders of the legislature. This has led to proliferation of committees (Fashagba 2009). It is important to point out that the nature or character of a legislature usually reflects the preference of the people in a democracy and of the governing military class in a post authoritarian state. In Nigeria, the military has often played a very significant role. This was evident in 1975 when the Nigerian Military Head of State, Late General Mohammed Muritala, openly canvassed and suggested to the constitu-

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tion drafting committee (CDC) that he set up the need to consider a constitution in line with the American model. It suffices to note that a single-chamber model has been associated with a unitary state with largely homogeneous people. However, despite the heterogeneous character of all the 36 constituent states in Nigeria, none of them has a bicameral assembly. Equally important is the argument that a single chamber reduces cost of running a legislature. The single-chamber model has the advantage of reducing the gestation period between policy proposal (bill) and approval by the assembly (bill). This is essentially so because there is no second chamber whose concurrence would be required. The necessity of the concurrent action on proposal, either originating from the executive or the legislature, could delay the passage of bill and elongate the gestation period of bills in a bicameral system. In Nigeria, the presidential constitution in operation under the fourth republic makes it imperative for the two chambers to concur on any legislative matter before such issue can have the force of law. However, those who disagree with having just a single chamber suggested that while unicameral may be cost-effective, it denied policy decision making the benefit of closer scrutiny that the second chamber often facilitates. Operating a bicameral model appears repulsive to some because of the thinking that it drains the funds that the state would have channelled towards development. This has been the major argument many have put forth in Nigeria to demand for the abrogation of the second chamber. Indeed, the argument seems plausible because in 2010 the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) raised the alarm that the 469 members of the National Assembly alone consumed about 24 per cent of the annual budget made for about 160 million Nigerians. Nevertheless, many writers believe that bicameral legislature is preferable in a federal system. Irrespective of whether a system is unicameral or bicameral, legislatures in presidential democracies are believed to play more significant role in policy formulation and budgeting than their counterparts in the parliamentary system. The reason for the variation in power and influence under the two models is partly due to the fact that the presidential constituency is the entire nation and most popularly elected, while the legislators are representing different constituencies in the nation as well as emerging through separate elections. In addition, the executive and the legislature belong to separate institutions and so draw their respective powers from the constitution. On the contrary, the executive leadership in a parliament owns its existence to the legislature because it is drawn from it and remains a part of it. Perhaps, because of the different constituencies from which the legislature and the executive emerge, the non-dependence of the executive on the legislature for continuous existence and the different elections through which each emerges, party discipline is often weak in the legislature in a presidential system than those under the parliamentary system. This has been very evident in Nigeria since 1999. For instance, although the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has been ruling since 1999, the lower chamber controlled by it has often challenged the executive in a confrontational manner. This was the case between 1999 and 2003 as well as from 2011 to 2014. The PDP-controlled lower chamber has thus been playing opposition politics against PDP-led federal government.

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Apart from this general overview of the features of the legislatures, in a more specific sense, the institution possesses certain specific attributes that deserve to be mentioned.

Legislative Elections The 1999 Constitution contains the relevant provisions on the qualification, the procedures and other necessary conditions that any person seeking election to the National Assembly must meet. For instance, section 65 spells out the age requirement for those contesting the Senatorial elections as well as those vying for the House of Representatives (HoRs). For any candidate to qualify to contest the Senatorial elections, the constitution provides that such a person should have attained the age of 35 years, while those seeking elections into the lower chamber or the House of Representatives (HoRs) must have attained the age of 30 years. In different nations of the world, the legislatures are elected into the assembly using different means. In some legislatures, proportional representation is adopted to elect legislators from various constituencies to which a state has been delimited. In some other states, legislators are elected using the first past the post or the single member constituency. Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the first past the post system was adopted. This provision for single member constituency is very clear in section 77 of the constitution. Furthermore, members of the two chambers of the Nigerian National Assembly are elected from the numerous constituencies and senatorial districts to which each state has been delimited. This makes all members of each chamber to be equal in the eye of the law. The president, on the other hand, is popularly elected and therefore represents the entire nation. For instance, there are 360 federal constituencies and 109 senatorial districts in Nigeria under the fourth republic. Given the size of the Nigerian population of about 160 million, a national assembly having two chambers and a total number of 469 legislators cannot be said to be too large. Each member is equal to the other because they are individually elected by each constituency to which the entire country is delimited. Nevertheless, the speaker of the House or president of the Senate is more powerful than any other members. This is more so in a presidential system where the executive is separate from the legislature. While the legislative leader is powerful, he/she must nevertheless be responsive and listen to the members as well as guard against any action that could precipitate confrontation between him and his or her colleagues. Attempt to disregard members’ views and concerns has proved to be counter-productive in the national assembly. This is evidenced by the removal of a number of Speakers and Senate Presidents between 1999 and 2007 (Fashagba 2009). The legislature is a microcosm of the country. Its members mirror the composition and groups’ interests in the state; the legislature is the custodian of the national sovereignty. It is important to note that unlike the practice in the United States where midterm elections are held to elect 50 per cent of members of both chambers, elections of

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members into the two chambers of the national assembly in Nigeria are held the same time during the general elections. The president is equally elected during the general elections. This limits the extent to which coattail as well as surge and decline theories are applicable or relevant in Nigeria. On a small scale, however, bye-­ elections are often held in-between general elections to fill legislative seats whose occupants had died, resigned or removed by any of the electoral tribunals adjudicating on disputed election results. Electorally, the Nigerian National Assembly has been characterized by high turnover rate. In the successive elections of 2003, 2007 and 2011, 2015 and 2019, most incumbents were not re-elected. This suggests that incumbency did and still not often translate to electoral advantage for the incumbents. A number of reasons account for this. For instance, the heterogeneous and complex nature of most legislative constituencies in both the House and senatorial districts makes re-election a challenging task for most incumbents. In most legislative constituencies, different ethnic groups often clamour for rotation of the legislative slot among the ethnic groups in the district. Except where there is a dominant ethnic group that declines the request to have a minority representative filling the slot, rotation among ethnic groups often limits the number of terms a member could serve. Furthermore, in a number of times or cases, disagreement between an incumbent senator and the governor of his/her state had resulted in the governor manipulating the party machinery to prevent the re-election of some legislators (Fashagba 2019). This situation had on different occasions forced some incumbents to seek re-election in another party. Similarly, perhaps due to the high remuneration and other perquisites of office that members often translate into, competition for ticket is usually very fierce. This, in part, accounts for the high rate of defections among incumbent legislators (Fashagba 2014). However, the rate of re-election among members who switch parties has been less than impressive. Indeed, in no legislative elections were re-elected party switchers more than 5 per cent of those who switched to contest under another political platform. By implication, the number of freshmen or elected new members was higher than the re-elected members in all the three assemblies constituted in 2003, 2007 and 2011. For instance, only about four senators, including Senate President David Mark (2007–date), have been elected four times and have been in the Senate since 1999. In the House of Representatives, the number of greenhorns remained consistently high when a new legislative session took off in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Greenhorn refers to those elected into the assembly for the very first time and who may be devoid of any legislative experience. Indeed, 271 members were freshmen when a new legislative session was inaugurated in 2011—only 89 out of 360 members were re-elected in 2011 legislative elections. Considering the myriads of extraneous re-elections threatening forces that incumbent legislators often contend with, it has been difficult to accurately determine the degree of influence of performance of members on their re-election aspiration. However, unlike in the United States, no elections have for once produced a divided government at the national level in Nigeria. The ruling party has consistently received the number of legislative seats required to control the assembly and

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have its measure passed, although, as already pointed out, the lower chamber has often constituted itself into opposition despite the fact that the ruling PDP has consistently won majority seats to control the chamber. Similarly, no elections have ever produced a truncated majority in Nigeria—both chambers of the national assembly have always been under the control of the PDP since the restoration of democracy in 1999 (Fashagba 2010). Although the opposition parties have not been able to take control of any of the two chambers since inception in 1999, the members of the majority party had on few occasions to vacate their seats. This often results from court ruling over disputed election results. The 2003 and 2007 general elections were characterized by electoral flaws. Consequently, a number of aggrieved individuals pursued their cases in the courts. Thus, a number of elections were nullified, with the courts ordering a re-run. For instance, 139 petitions were filed in the various electoral tribunals over the 2007 senatorial elections, while 322 petitions were filed over the lower chamber elections at the same period. Despite the number of litigations over legislative elections and the number of elections result overturned, no significant change has taken place in the numerical representation of the parties, as the incumbents often won most of the bye-elections. There appears to be no coattail effect of presidential influence on legislative elections at the federal level. At the state level, the party of an incumbent governor often stands a better chance of winning a bye-­election than any opposition party. This suggests that coattail effect is more relevant and significant in the state than at the federal level. Elections into both Houses take place every 4 years. However, as observed elsewhere, there is no limit to the number of times that a member can run or serve in the legislature. Despite this leverage, the rate of turnover of members remains high. Apart from David Mark and Ike Ekweremadu (2007 to date), other leaders in both the House of Representatives and the Senate did not return to the national assembly after completing the term they were serving when they became the presiding officers. Apart from the members who are serving their fourth term in the Senate, few members of the House of Representatives including Lawal Farouk have been elected four times. The members are elected through popular election, using the single member district or constituency. This is a departure from the practice under the first republic democratic practice where some members of the upper chamber were selected. It suffices to point out that although the president is vested with the constitutional power to issue a proclamation for the holding of the first session of the National Assembly, immediately after his being sworn in, a ritual that occurs every 4 years, the president lacks the power to dissolve the assembly. The amended 1999 Constitution of Nigeria separates the legislature from the executive and gave the legislative members 4-year term, which is renewable from time to time. The assembly is automatically dissolved at the expiration of a period of 4 years commencing from the date of the first sitting of the House. Indeed, the power and tenure of the legislatures are constitutionally defined. In this modern time, while there are different versions of constitution, namely, nominal, normative and semantic, the fact remains that most legislatures have their roots in the extant constitution of their respective states. Consequently, whether the executive has power to dissolve the assembly or not is a constitutional issue. Beyond this however, the executive may

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attend a joint legislative sitting to lay his budget before the House or do address the body on any national issue, but not to be part of its debate. Looking at legislative elections from gender representation, only a very few women have been elected into either of the chambers since 1999. Between 2003 and 2007, while there were 104 male members, only 4 were females. These represented 96.3 per cent male against 3.7 per cent female. In a similar vein, the number of women who emerged at elections to the lower chamber has also not been too impressive. Between 2003 and 2007, while 338 men were elected, only 22 women won the legislative elections to become members of the legislature. There was no significant difference between 2007 and 2011. During this period, while 100 men were elected into the Senate, only 9 women were elected as Senators. Similarly, while only 27 women were elected into the House of Representatives, 333 men won at the polls. Various reasons militated against effective women participation. One major reason is cultural or religion-­related constraint. In the Northern part of the country, most men would not encourage the participation of their wives in contesting any elective office. Furthermore, the level of violence characterizing electioneering campaign in Nigeria constitutes a good reason discouraging effective women participation. Also a challenge is the huge financial requirement, which often makes it difficult for both men and women who lack the financial strength required for effective participation to venture into politics in Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria is highly monetized. Most Nigerian politicians see politics as an investment. Consequently, only few women can afford the cost of electioneering activities. Considering the enormous bump to effective participation, only very few women were elected into the National Assembly in the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. Also an emerging feature in the National Assembly and the Senate, in particular, is the fact that some state governors often take up career in the legislature after completing their two terms in office. The Senate is becoming attractive to members of the executive organ. For instance, under the current republic, the former governors of Anambra, Bornu, Taraba, Kwara, Kebbi, Jigawa, Zamfara, Gombe and Kaduna states have been elected into the Senate. Similarly, a number of former deputy governors have been elected into the Senate under the current democratic dispensation. In all cases, the incumbent senators had to yield the seat to the governor after completing his second term as governor or forced out of the contest through primary elections that were pre-determined to favour the governor. Incumbent senators who yielded without challenging the governors were those from states where the governors had a very firm grip on the political structure and machinery. Some examples of this were seen in Kaduna and Taraba states in 2007. In state where the governor depended on a number of different groups and so did not have a strong control of the various sections and groups, the incumbent senator often challenged the governor, although the governor usually succeeded in securing the nomination ticket by manipulating the party machinery to his advantage. This was evident in Benue State in 2007. In some instances, the spouses of some state governors became the candidate of the party for the senatorial elections in states that experienced that the governors or former governors with their strong hold on the party machinery got their spouses elected. This was evident in Niger and Lagos states in 2003 and 2011, respectively.

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Internal Organization of the Legislature The internal organization of a legislature can make or mar, enhance or slow down the operation of the body. The leadership structure, the committee system and the rules of procedure play a very significant role in determining the level of efficiency of an assembly. In Nigeria, most members of the National Assembly were naïve when the assembly was inaugurated in 1999. The high level of naivety could be attributed to the prolonged absence of democracy. With the exception of the brief periods of civil rule between 1979 and 1983, the military ruled between 1966 and 1999. The operating mechanism of the military was quite different from a democratic system. Against this background, the legislative institution returned with high expectation placed on them. Hence, the legislature requires the appropriate operational mechanism and institutional capacity to translate popular support into deliverable public goods in a democratic environment. Consequently, the Nigerian National Assembly, like any other assembly, has put in place an internal organization considered necessary for the realization of the overall objectives of the body. Legislative Leadership  The 1999 Constitution, as amended, made provisions for leaders for the two chambers of the legislature. Each chamber is presided over by a set of leaders elected by members of the House. In the Senate, there is a provision for a substantive Senate President who presides over the day-to-day business of the House, especially at plenary. Although the president of the Senate is elected to represent just one senatorial district like his/her colleagues in the assembly, once given the mandate as president of the upper chamber, he/she becomes unequal with the others in terms of power, influence and authority. The President of Senate presides at plenary over the Senate and calls for vote on division on any issue upon which the chamber has deliberated. The Senate President controls and has firm grip on the agenda of the House. Members must be recognized by the chair in plenary before any contribution could be made. To reduce friction, the members of the various parties hold caucus meetings to harmonize their positions on issues. While the Senate President is presumably strong vis-a-vis other members, his ascendance to the position is at the instance of those he presides over and so accountable to them. Evidence abounds under the current fourth republic that any Senate President who disregards the concerns and views of his/her colleagues would not maintain the senate presidency seat for too long. This was clearly demonstrated when Senate Presidents Chuba Okadigbo and Adolphus Wabara were removed from office in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The two leaders were given the option to resign, following the discontentment occasioned by allegation of corruption. However, while Okadigbo was removed by his colleagues, Wabara resigned in response to the pressure. The three leaders who appeared to have had less trouble dealing with other members in the Senate were those who seemed to be responsive to the members and were able to strike a balance between executive-legislature relations/interests and leader-members relations/interests in order not to match or fall victim of what Senate President Ken Nnamani (2005–2007) called banana peel. Between 1999 and 2007, there was leadership instability in the Senate. Indeed, a

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president occupied the seat for an average of 1 year and 6 months. Five Senate presidents presided during the period. On individual basis, the longest serving Senate President served for about 2 1/2 years during the period. This has reversed since 2007 when David Mark became the Senate President. To be sure, he has occupied the office for about 7 years. The Senate President is assisted by a Deputy Senate President. The Deputy, according to the constitution, shall be elected by the members of the Senate from among themselves. In the absence of the Senate President, the Deputy Senate President presides either at plenary or other important meetings. The Deputy Senate President is also very strong and influential but often lives under the shadow of the President. Any important responsibility that requires setting up a committee, the Deputy President of Senate handles that. This was evident when the Deputy Senate President Ibrahim Mantu was made the chair of committee on the review of 1999 Constitution in 2005. Similarly, Ike Ekweremadu was appointed in 2012 to chair the committee on the review of the 1999 Constitution. Perhaps, because the Deputy Senate President occupies the rear seat, none has been pressured to resign or impeached since 1999. Apart from the Deputy Senate President, The Majority Leader, chosen from the party controlling majority seats in the Senate, is equally very strong and wields significant influence on legislative agenda. Other important positions in the Senate include Majority Party Whip, Minority Leader and Minority Whips. In the Senate inaugurated in 2011, there were three minority whips. The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) had one each. Similar leadership structure is in place in the House of Representatives. However, the major difference lies in the nomenclatures of the first two presiding officers. The man at the apex of the House leadership is referred to as the Speaker. The Speaker, like the Senate President, presides over the House, particularly at plenary. He/she wields substantial power and influence as well as has a firm grip of the agenda of the House. Some speakers have used this in a confrontational manner against the president, although they belong to the same ruling PDP. This was the case between 1999 and 2003 and from 2011 to date. However, it appears that the speakers involved in this were those who felt threatened by the executive. Indeed, during the tenure of Ghali Umar Na’abba, it was always alleged that the executive was making moves to get him impeached. Consequently, he was not only confrontational but also in constant conflict with the executive. Similarly, considering the manner in which Tambuwal emerged as Speaker in 2011, it appears he constantly feels psychologically threatened by the party and the presidency. The implication of this is the aggressive approach to executive-House of Representatives relations. Nevertheless, and perhaps due to the aforementioned reason, the House seemed to be more independent and assertive on issues than the Senate, most times. However, the assertiveness often smacks of youthful exuberance, unlike the Senate. This is evident by the many un-actionable or impracticable motions passed by the House from 1999 to 2014. A good example was the House resolution in January 2012, calling on the federal government to reverse the increased fuel pump price to the old price. While the presidency simply disregarded the resolution of the House, it heeded the call for

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dialogue made by the Senate. It was the dialogue that eventually led to the reduction of the pump price of gasoline by 50 per cent of the new increase. Similarly, a motion of the House requesting the House of Representatives to take over the Rivers State House of Assembly over the internal conflict in the House in June 2013 was driven by emotion. However, the leadership of the House of Representatives has been more stable than that of the Senate. For instance, while the Senate had five presidents between 1999 and 2007, the House was presided over by three people, giving an average of 2  years and 7  months per speaker. On individual basis, Bello Masari (2003–2007) successfully completed 4-year term in 2007. The Speaker is assisted by a Deputy Speaker. The 1999 Constitution also stipulates that the Deputy Speaker shall be elected by the members of the House from among themselves. The Deputy Speaker presides over the House in the absence of the Speaker. The leadership of the National Assembly frequently makes use of what they refer to as executive session to discuss major issues that, in their estimation, should not be discussed in public. At such sessions, major decisions and compromises are reached. Such decisions are then reflected in the public actions and decisions taken by the House. Each chamber of the assembly also makes use of party caucus where issues requiring party line decision are discussed and a position taken. Although this is done at an informal level, whatever decisions taken either at the executive session or party caucus of either the Senate or the House often shaped the opinions of members in their contribution to any subject or matter before the House. The Committee System  There is rarely any legislature where the committee system is not an integral part of its operative mechanism. A committee is a microcosm of the assembly. By this, most responsibilities of the assembly are assigned to the appropriate committees for thorough scrutiny and detailed attention with a view to helping the House to make informed and appropriate (policy) decision. Indeed, after the second reading of a bill, the bill moves to the committee stage. However, once in a while a situation may arise that would require the committee of the whole House to take a bill at the committee stage. Committees are constituted to oversee government agencies, departments and ministries. Committee helps members to develop expertise, especially where members stay long enough on the same committee overseeing the activities of an agency or department over which members exercise oversight power. In Nigeria, the two chambers of the national assembly make use of both standing and special committees. Among the committees of the two chambers that appear to be most indispensable include: (i) Rules and Business Committee (ii) Selection and Ranking Committee (iii) Public Account Committee (iv) Committee on National Security and Intelligence (v) Service Committee (vi) Committee on Ethics, Privileges and Public Petitions (vii) Committee on Media and Public Affairs

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The committee system is relatively new and developing in Nigeria. This is largely so because of the prolonged rule of the military. Furthermore, the committee system in the National Assembly may not be able to develop the necessary expertise like in some other countries: one, due to the high turnover of members and, two, because the leadership of the legislature sometimes utilizes placement of members in committees, especially those considered as “juicy” as a compensatory instrument or patronage to reward loyal supporters instead of being merit driven. When new members are elected, they will have to learn the job afresh, and this robs those who have acquired some experience but failed to secure re-election the benefit of using the experience to facilitate effectiveness in the House. Seniority has not been an issue in placing legislators in committees in both chambers of the national assembly. However, in recent times members have enjoyed the opportunity of being requested by the leadership of the House, especially the lower chamber, to write out the names of committees they would like to serve. While the lists submitted by members are taken into cognizance, the selection committee of the House, in consultation with the leadership, has the final say on committee placement. Indeed, committee making in the national assembly is a very sensitive issue that any leader who fails to handle it well in both chambers will live with crisis after constituting the committees. Until 2007, the committee system in both chambers was very unstable. This was very common when frequent change of leadership always resulted in the reconstitution of the committees in the Nigerian National Assembly between 1999 and 2007. At different times and in both chambers of the National Assembly, constituting the committees of the House became a major source of intra-chamber rancour and the cause of the fall of some legislative leaders. The reconstitution of the Senate committee under Okadigbo leadership in the Senate in 1999 and House committees under Patricia Etteh in the House in 2007 is a few examples (Fashagba 2009). This was in part responsible for the intra-chamber acrimonies witnessed between 1999 and 2007 in the two chambers of the National Assembly. Indeed, for the purpose of efficiency, the National Assembly makes use of the committee system just like most other legislatures. The Nigerian legislature had a relatively fewer number committees at inception in 1999. However, due to political consideration and the need to expand the patronage base of the National Assembly leadership, especially considering its importance to the survival of the leadership of the two chambers, the number has proliferated since 1999. Although the Senate had 44 committees while the House had 42 between 1999 and 2003, the number of committees in the Senate was 52, while the House committees increased to 72 between 2003 and 2007 (Fashagba 2009). Between 2007 and 2011, the Senate had 57 committees, while there were 73 committees in the lower chamber. After the 2011 legislative elections, the number of House committees rose to 85, and in the Senate 57 committees were in place. According to a former Clerk of the national assembly, placing members in committees in both chambers was largely influenced by political consideration rather than merit. Consequently, members struggle to belong to certain committees which they considered lucrative (Fashabga 2009). This often resulted in a situation in which many legislators found themselves belonging to eight different committees. Perhaps due to the high number of committees to which

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most legislators belonged, it became difficult for committees to meet regularly. Most committees in both Senate and House of Representatives did not meet up to ten times a year. In fact, some committees could go a whole year without meeting. Indeed, as noted that in 2009/2010 legislative session, only the House committee on appropriation met 27 times. In the Senate, seven committees did not meet at all in the 2005/2006 session, while only one did not meet during the 2007/2008 session. Also, low attendance of committee meetings is an issue in the assembly (Hamalai 2010).

Functions of Standing Committees The standing rules and order of each chamber of the National Assembly clearly identifies the functions of the standing committees of each chamber. Thus, the functions are largely those of the legislature but delegated to the committees because of the detailed attention they require. Consequently, most legislative committees perform as many functions as are assigned to them by the main assembly. The specific functions given to the standing committees of the Nigerian National Assembly include: –– Conduct oversight on executive agencies under their jurisdiction: The oversight function of the national assembly is made possible through committees created to oversee specific government departments, ministries and agencies. For every department or agency of government, a parallel committee exists to oversee its activities in Nigeria. –– Conduct hearings on bills and other matters referred to them: This they do by enabling member of the public to express their opinions on any matter before them. This is done very often with stakeholders and interested members of the public given the opportunity to express their views on any bill being scrutinized by the committee. –– Examine measures and bills assigned to them in a detailed manner: One of the tasks of the committees is the detailed clause-to-clause examination of the ­content of a bill referred to them. This happens very frequently in both chambers of the National Assembly. However, most times many committees often failed to report back to the House on the bill or measure referred to them long after the due date. In 2010, for instance, Speaker Bankole Oladimeji complained publicly on the lackadaisical attitude of members of the lower House towards their committees’ assignment. The failure to turn in bills or report on matters referred to them, according to the Speaker, often undermined the effectiveness of the assembly. –– Consider annual budget estimates of the executive agencies under their jurisdiction: The 1999 Constitution confers the power to authorize spending on the assembly. Although the executive prepares the national budget annually, it is the responsibility of the National Assembly to scrutinize and appropriate funds. Consequently, after second reading of the annual appropriation bill, each committee takes over the relevant sections of the budget of the ministries or agencies over which it has oversight responsibility. The committees often invite the offi-

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cers of the ministries and agencies whose budget they are scrutinizing to defend their budget proposals. This is very important, as it enables the legislators to identify where certain actions are needed to correct some observable lapses. For instance, a Senate committee that scrutinized the proposed estimates of a government agency on works exposed a corrupt tendency when it observed that the amount proposed in the 2013 budget for monitoring a road project was five times the cost of the road. Occasionally too, members of committees have sought to enrich themselves by making financial demand from the ministries whose budget they are scrutinizing with a view to jerking up the amount due to the ministries or agencies. This was evident in 2005 when the Minister of Education was sacked for paying bribe to some legislators who solicited bribe from him. The Senate President was also forced to abdicate office for conniving with the chairmen of the committees on education in both the Senate and House. –– Simplify the complexity and technical details of legislative proposal referred to them, in order to make the work of the plenary House less cumbersome during the final stage of decision-making on legislative proposals. Most often, this is achieved by both chambers through public hearings through which relevant and informed opinions of stakeholders and experts are harvested to help in simplifying the technicality of any bill or policy measure under consideration, as well as shedding light on any grey areas before such bill or policy measure is further dealt with at plenary. The views articulated by interested members of the public during public hearings help in shaping the content of a proposal to reflect the mood of the target group but more importantly illuminate the proposal for a better understanding by members of the assembly. While the foregoing are the functions of the committees performed by the National Assembly, the committees are able to achieve this because they enjoy extensive power given to them by the legislature. In the next section, focus shall be on the powers of committees.

Powers of Committees The powers of the committees of the national assembly as contained in an edited piece by Hamalai (2010) include: (i) Examine matters within their specified mandate or issues referred to them by the House (ii) Report to the House from time to time (iii) Send for papers, persons and reports (iv) Sit while the House is sitting or stands adjourned (v) Print necessary papers and evidence (vi) Delegate to sub-committees any of their powers except power to report to the House (vii) Hire experts and consultants (viii) (viii)Undertake investigatory tour

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(ix) Organize workshops and seminars on subject matters under their jurisdiction (x) Organize hearing on matters referred to them

The Legislators and Their Constituencies in Nigeria It is often said that national legislators hold two allegiances, one to their constituency and the other to the nation or collective will. By this, they have to cope with constituency interest and balance this with national pressure. The members are committed to their constituencies as their representatives and at the same time carry the responsibility to pass laws addressing national issues in cooperation with other members in a consensual manner. By this, the delegate (in which the legislators mirrors or transmits constituency attitudes) and trustee (where the legislator uses his personal judgement to determine what is in the constituent’s best interests) roles of the assembly must be blended in a way that conflict of interest between constituency and national interests is minimized (Johnson and Nakamura 1999). While some argued that legislators the world over often find themselves in perpetual struggle on how to resolve this functional conflict, to Saffell (1989), this conflict may be resolved if members adopt a politico approach. By adopting a politico approach, a member will take cognizance of the view of his or her constituency and reconcile it with the national demand or interest before taking a position on any national issue or decision-making. In Nigeria, perhaps because of the level of monetization of electioneering activities, there is a disconnect between constituents and legislators (Fashagba 2011). This is perhaps so because most legislators were not resident in their consistencies before they were elected. Their elections most often were facilitated either by the huge investment they made before and during the elections or the existence of a political godfather or gladiator who sold the ticket to the highest bidders (­ candidates). Nevertheless, due to the increasing level of political awareness in the current fourth republic, which indeed appears unprecedented, public opinions and media pressure have in recent years forced the legislature to reflect public concerns in its decisionmaking. This was evident in the killing of the constitution amendment bill of 2006. The bill that would have removed the constitutional limit of two terms thereby making it possible for the incumbent president to seek re-election for the third consecutive times was killed by the Senate in 2006 in response to the call by the public. In a similar vein, a senator facing severe scrutiny from members of his constituency in Akure in Ondo State in July 2013 had to weep openly while apologizing and expressing regret over his support for a clause in the constitution amendment bill 2013 seeking to legalize underage marriage. Thus, what appears to be the current trend in the national assembly is that while the legislative behaviour and comments of most senators suggest that they tend more towards trusteeship approach to their legislative responsibilities, most members of the lower chamber see themselves as the delegates of their constituents who must yield to the concerns and opinions of

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their constituencies rather than that the nation’s (Adisa 2013). This is perhaps so because unlike the senatorial districts, the constituency represented by every House member is far smaller in size and less heterogeneous than each senatorial district. Senatorial districts are most often drawn along ethnic boundaries within each state. This is evident in Ogun, Oyo, Kogi and Kwara States among others where Senatorial districts were drawn along ethnic boundaries of the major ethnic groups.

The Challenges of the National Assembly Nigeria is one of the new democracies on the global scene. Although a seemingly legislative institution first debuted in Nigeria under the colonial constitution of 1922, the existence and operation of the body have been inconsistent and infrequent, especially in the post-colonial periods. For instance, although Nigeria became an independent state in 1960, that is, about 44 years ago, the legislature has only operated in the country for only about 26 years. In fact, the legislature operated only for about 6 years in the first republic (October 1960–January 1967) before it was terminated by the military. Similarly, in the second republic (October 1979– December 1983), the legislature functioned for about 4 years and 3 months only to be dissolved again by the military (Fashagba 2011). The legislature was again inaugurated in 1992 but subsequently abrogated in November 1993. The national assembly in the current dispensation has had the longest period of continuous existence on the political scene. The legislature was inaugurated in 1999 and has been very resilient in the face of the evident threat of democratic reversal confronting the new democracy. The frequent abrogation of the legislative institution in Nigeria has had some very significant implications for the development and efficiency of the institution. For instance, when the fourth republic legislature took off in 1999, less than 5 per cent of members had any previous legislative experience. The two chambers of the national assembly were therefore presided over by people bereft of any form of previous legislative experience. Consequently, the first major result of the poor legislative knowledge among members was low efficiency. In fact, most members have often had to go through a phase of learning period each time the legislative institution returns under a democratic rule. Indeed, while the legislature has been on and off the political stage, the executive organ has consistently remained on the stage, although the arm was occupied by military personnel under the various military regimes. The alternation of power between the military and civilian therefore helped the executive organ to grow to the detriment of the legislature. Therefore, the relative dominance of the executive over the legislature, especially between 1999 and 2007, can partly be situated within the disparity in their level of institutional development. The frequent disappearance of democracy and the resultant incessant scrapping of the national assembly have robbed the country the ability to develop democratic culture, especially legislative culture (Fashagba 2011). The fact that a large number

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of members of the national assembly have always been greenhorns or freshmen each time democracy returns after a prolonged military interlude meant that most members lack any knowledge of the legislative tradition. According to the former Clerk of the National Assembly, Ogundiya, it often took 2 or more years for the freshmen of the House to learn and understand the procedures and workings of the House. The continuity required for legislative culture to develop has been lacking. With the exception of the current dispensation, the legislature has never existed beyond 6 years before. This problem would appear to have been overcome with the relative continuity of the body in the fourth republic, having taken off since 1999. However, the fact that the Nigerian legislature has constantly experienced high turnover rate in the successive elections since 1999 diminishes any advantage that legislative continuity in the current dispensation should have translated into for the country. In 2003, only 36 out of the 109 senators in the Senate between 1999 and 2003 were re-elected. In the HoRs, 312 out of the 360 members did not returned. The number of re-elected senators dropped to 26 in 2007, while in the HoRs, 89 were re-elected, while the remaining 271 failed in the re-election attempt (Fashagba 2009). This is not helped by the lackadaisical attitude of members to legislative business. What this suggests is that some members sought elections primarily because of the lucrativeness of the legislative position rather than the commitment to good policy-making, governance and national advancement. Nigerian legislators are the highest paid in the world. This is without a concomitant commitment to their responsibility. For instance, while the House received a total of 489 bills between June 2007 and May 2011, only 165 were passed (Ohai 2011). Indeed, most often each time any chamber sets up a probe panel to investigate any matter of public importance, rather than submitting a report for debate, members have often got involved in one scandal or the other while carrying out their investigating role. On several occasions probes have been used to highlight rather than sanitized the system and sanction violators/offenders. This is evidenced by the probe panel set up by the HoRs to investigate the power sector in 2007. The report of the probe could not be considered at plenary because it was discredited over an alleged involvement of the members of the probe committee in shady financial deal with the agency being probed. Indeed, members were alleged to have taken contracts from the agency they were probing and were subsequently charged to court by the state anti-graft agency. Similarly, the probe panel set up to investigate the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2012 was disbanded over an alleged demand for gratification by members of the panel. To be sure, the Director General of SEC openly accused the chairman of the ad hoc committee investigating the commission of demanding for 30 million naira from SEC officers. Her failure to provide the money, according to her, led to the harsh manner in which she was addressed by members of the panel. Similarly, the chairman of the “integrity group” failed the integrity test when he needed to demonstrate that he was a man of integrity. Following the removal of fuel subsidy on January 1, 2012, and the mass protest that the policy precipitated, the House intervened by calling on government to revert to the old price and equally set

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up an ad hoc committee to investigate how the amount budgeted for subsidy in the previous years was utilized. Before the report of the probe was submitted, it was revealed that the chairman of the ad hoc committee probing the subsidy funds, who equally chaired the “integrity group”, in the House had taken about 650,000 dollars graft from one of the companies being probed. He was subsequently arrested and arraigned in court (The Punch 2012). Considering the inability of some members to rise above board, especially in performing their administrative scrutiny or oversight role, the public has had a very dim view of the members. The misplacement of priority therefore affected the effectiveness of the assembly and the efficient delivery of quality public policy. The evident realities in performance and attitude to work of members of the national assembly may not be unconnected with the weak party discipline system. This is perhaps so because the legislators and the executive are elected through separate elections. Indeed, the cost of elections, in electioneering campaign and other sundry expenses, is very high, considering the entrenched patronage orientation of the politics. The political parties rarely sponsor national legislative elections. The burden to finance political rallies and campaign therefore rests on the candidates. The only exception is where the incumbent governor in a particular state wants to prevent a candidate that does not enjoy his support to emerge. This was very evident in Kogi West senatorial district of Kogi State during the December 2010 primary elections. The governor supported, mobilized and funded the campaign of his preferred candidate against the incumbent senator but still failed to stop the re-election of the incumbent. Thus, the desperation to recoup the huge expenses incurred in pre-election period and during elections appears, in part, responsible for the manner in which the legislators look for money by any means. This also partly explains why members often challenge their respective parties, when the parties appear to encumber members from behaving either too independently or take advantage of any slightest opportunity to make money outside their legitimate income.

References Adebayo, A. (1986). Power in politics. Abuja: Spectrum Books Ltd. Adisa, T. (2013). LG autonomy: how Reps defied lobbying top politicians. Nigerian Tribune, July 29. P.6, Lagos, Nigeria Akinsanya, A. A. (2002). Four years of presidential democracy in Nigeria. In: A. A. Akinsanya and G. J. Ijang (eds). Nigerian government and politics (1979-1983), pp. 203–239. Calabar: Wusen Publisher

Barkan, J. 2009. Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies. London, Lynne Rienner Publisher Bogdanor, V. (1991). The blackwell encyclopaedia. Oxford, Blackwell Publisher Davies, A. E. (1996). Executive – legislature relations and democratization during the transition programme. In: Gboyega, A. (ed) Corruption and democratization in Nigeria, pp. 36–41. Ibadan: Agbo Areo publishers.

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Davies, A. E. (2004). The role of the legislature in fostering an efficient system of public finance. In Taiwo, I. O. and Fajengbesi (Ed.), Fiscal federalism and democratic governance in Nigeria, Ibadan, NCEMA/ACBF Fashagba, J. Y. (2009). Legislative oversight under the Nigerian presidential system. The Journal of Legislative studies, 15(4), 439–459 Fashagba, J. Y. (2010). Executive-Legislature relations in Oyo State. Covenant Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 4(1&2), 120–141 Fashagba, J. Y. (2011). Presidentialism and Democratisation in Nigeria. PULA Botswana Journal of African Studies, 25(2), 183–203. Fashagba, J. Y. (2011a). Executive-Legislature Relations in Policy-Making and Governance in Kwara State. Ife Journal of Politics, 1(2), 137–149 Fashagba, J. Y. (2011b). The legislature and democratization process in Nigeria’s Fourth republic. Lapai International Journal of Management and Social Sciences, 3(1), 137–149 Fashagba, J. Y. (2014). Party Switching in The Nigeria’s Fourth Republic Senate, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 20(4), 516–541 Fashagba, J. Y. (2019). Exploring the Nigerian Central Legislative Institution. In: The Nigerian National Assembly (ed), Joseph Y. Fashagba, Romiti Ajayi and Chiedo Nwankwor, Springer Nature, Switzerland Fish, M. S. (2006). Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies. British Journal of Politics, 17(1), 5–20. Hamalai, L. (2010). Committees in the Nigerian national assembly: a study of the performance of legislative functions, 2003-2010. Policy Analysis and Research Policy, National Assembly, Abuja Jimoh, A. A. (1994). Law practice and procedure of legislature. Lagos: Learned Publishments Ltd. Johnson, J. K. and Nakamura, R. T. (1999). A concept paper on legislatures and good governance. Based on a paper prepared for UNDP, July Lewis, P. M. (2009). Rules and rents in Nigeria’s National Assembly. In J. D. Barkan (Ed.), Legislative power in emerging African democracies (pp. 177–204). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. Lafenwa, S.  A. (2006). The legislature and democratic Governance in southwestern Nigeria, 1960-2003. Ph.D thesis, University of Ibadan. Ohai, C. (2011). NASS: Jumbo pay versus hanging bills, Lagos, The Punch. Omoweh. D. A. (2006). The parliament and the crisis of democratisation in Nigeria. Being lecture delivered at the CODESRIA Democratic Institute, Dakar, Senegal, Aug - September. Saffell, C.  S. (1989). Essentials of American government: change and continuity. California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. Smith, G. (1980). Politics in Western Europe: a comparative analysis (3rd ed), London, Heinemann Educational Books. The Punch, (2012). June 12. I took Otedola’s N96m bribe to expose him –Lawan, Lagos Weinbaum, M. G. (1975). Classification and change in legislative systems: with particular application to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. In: Boynton G. R. and Kim, C. L. (Eds.), Legislative systems in development countries (pp. 31–67). North Carolina, Duke University Press.

Chapter 7

The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations: Assessing the Many Phases and Challenges of Nigeria’s Judicial System Agaptus Nwozor Abstract  The judiciary is an important organ of government as it functions as a counterbalancing institution in states. Notwithstanding the nature of the political system in place, either democratic or nondemocratic, the judiciary plays the essential role of interpreting the extant laws and adjudicating between competing interests whether domiciled in individuals, groups, institutions of government or the various arms of government. The stabilising role of the judiciary in modern governance is exemplified by its ingrained function of checking the excesses of individuals, groups and government institutions through the application of state laws. Since Nigeria’s independence, its judiciary has been discharging its constitutional responsibilities. The journey of the Nigerian judiciary has been quite explosive, considering that it traversed both the jackboot of military authoritarianism and democratic governance in diverse forms, with each presenting its own peculiar bouquet of challenges. This chapter examines the various phases and attendant challenges that the Nigerian judiciary has passed through. It chronicles its many challenges and triumphs as well as low points. In sum, the Nigerian judiciary has acquitted itself admirably in dealing with such challenges as judicial independence, judicial accountability and crisis of condence occasioned by judicial recklessness and corruption. However, Nigeria’s judicial system still has room for further improvement in order to continue to command the respect of the citizens and thus, deserve such epithets as “the last hope of the common man”, “the bulwark of the people’s liberty”, “the defender of the rights of the people” and “the bastion of constitutional democracy,” among others, which demonstrate public acceptance and confidence. Keywords  Judiciary · Intergovernmental relations · Judicial independence · Judicial accountability · Nigeria

A. Nwozor (*) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_7

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Introduction The judiciary is the branch of government saddled with the core responsibility of interpreting the codified laws of a state and applying such interpretations to the resolution of conflicts between and among citizens, groups, organisations and institutions of government within a state. The centrality of the judiciary in modern governance especially in checking the excesses of government institutions in the course of exercising state power has earned it various epithets such as “the last hope of the common man”, “the bulwark of the people’s liberty”, “the defender of the rights of the people” and the bastion of constitutional democracy”, among others (Egbewole 2008; Musdapher 2011). The Nigerian judiciary has had an eventful existence since the introduction of rudimentary court system known as Courts of Equity in the Niger Delta areas of Brass, Benin, Okrika and Opobo in 1854. This earlier experiment with court system was under the auspices of trading companies that operated individually until 1879 when they were merged and subsequently granted a charter in 1887 as the Royal Niger Company Limited (Azikiwe 1929). But the consolidation of the court system came with the revocation of the charter and the enthronement of formal British rule in 1900. An important point to note is that Nigeria’s judicial system preceded the formalisation of British rule. Ali (n.d.) identified four phases, through which the Nigerian judiciary evolved, with the earliest phase being before 1842. The other phases were 1845–1912, 1914–1953 and 1954–date. Ali’s categorisation is not only faulty but arbitrary and, thus, is analytically unhelpful in understanding the various developmental changes in Nigeria’s judicial system. The Nigerian judiciary, factoring the various developments in the polity, has undergone nine distinct phases, namely, before the period of 1861, 1863–1913, 1914–1953, 1954–1962, 1963–1965, 1966–1979, 1979–1983, 1984–1998 and 1999–date. The import of this categorisation is that the Nigerian judiciary was not enamoured of the consequences of the tumultuous political evolution of the country. Each political epoch provided its own challenges that the judiciary grappled with for its corporate survival. Ideally, the judiciary thrives best under constitutional democracy where the rule of law and principles of separation of powers guarantee its independence (Gye-­ Wado 2003; Oko 2009). Thus, the long period of military rule in Nigeria tended to undermine and emasculate the judiciary. Its creativity, however, anchored on what has been termed judicial activism enabled it to maintain its corporate respectability (Okere 1987; Imam 2010). The Nigerian judiciary is the only branch of government that has enjoyed continuity as a result of its singular “good fortune” of not being sacked alongside the executive and legislative arms in the wake of coups d’état. Egbewole (2008) explains this “good fortune” within the context of the judiciary’s innate legitimising attributes which military regimes required to consolidate their regimes. A contrary reason on why the judiciary was accommodated as a “necessary evil” in the political arena during military regimes was the paucity of legal personnel within the military institution to carry out judicial functions. A major practical

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strategy which the military autocrats deployed to checkmate the judiciary and thus create a balance between the incongruity of rule of force and rule of law was the introduction of ouster clauses (decrees) as well as special tribunals. The history of the Nigerian judiciary is characterised by a mixed fortune of activism and passivity and courage and hesitancy in the discharge of its functions. Generally, the challenges facing the judiciary are the self-same extant challenges that confront the Nigerian state. But beyond the institutional and systemic challenge of building a virile and respectable judiciary is the greater challenge of moving the judiciary from the pedestal of conservatism to dynamism. This chapter takes a panoramic view of the Nigerian judiciary from its colonial origins to the contemporary period, examining its strength and weaknesses through the alternate governmental typologies of civil democracy and military authoritarianism.

 he Judiciary in Nigeria’s Political Development: T Theoretical Insights The judiciary exists as a counterbalancing institution in states. Whether the political system is democratic or nondemocratic, the judiciary essentially plays the role of interpreting the extant laws and adjudicating between competing interests whether domiciled in individuals, groups, institutions of government or the various arms of government. The activeness of the judiciary as well as the extent of the role which it performs in a political system is determined by the type of government in operation. Guiora and Page (2005, p. 51) have also added that the role of the judiciary in political systems is further determined by its willingness “to actively review and if need be, criticise and intervene in the decisions and actions of the executive”. In other words, where the judiciary lacks the willingness to chart its own course, no matter the type of government in operation in a political system, it might be severely constrained. There appears to be no unanimity among scholars about which political system conduces more to unfettered expression of judicial independence. While some scholars believe that democratic political systems conduce to, and provide the necessary environment for, the smooth operations of the judiciary (Toharia 1975; Tate 1995; Oko 2009), some others contend that there is judicial empowerment in authoritarian regimes (Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008). However, since even authoritarian regimes need some rudiments of judicial intervention to administer effectively, it has been suggested that the mere manifestation of some form of rudimentary judicial empowerment could not be said to confer independence on the judiciary as such empowerment are often “too contingent on the desires of the authoritarian leadership for real judicial independence to exist” (Alexander 2010, p. 2). Until Nigeria’s new democratic dispensation that started in 1999, the judiciary had traversed the political continuum from colonialism to the alternations between democratic and nondemocratic administrations. Each type of administration had its

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own peculiarities which the judiciary contended with. Essentially, the credentials of democratic administrations are the constitution, the rule of law and guaranteed independence of the judiciary, which make the theory of separation of power and rule of law applicable. Considering the unaccountable nature of military regimes in Nigeria and their overall legitimacy question, the restrictive operational environment of the judiciary during the era of military rule accorded with the concept of hegemonic preservation. The quest for hegemonic preservation led successive military regimes to reduce legal latitude that could confer destabilising powers on the judiciary. The most effective strategy often adopted by military regimes to rein in the judiciary, in addition to suspending the constitution, was the incorporation of ouster clauses in their decrees. Ouster clauses resulted in the restriction of jurisdiction and reduction of judicial powers of courts. Of course, the suspension of the constitution also meant the suspension of the theories of separation of power and rule of law. Even under various democratic administrations, with all the constitutional provisions and legal safeguards, the judiciary struggled to maintain its independence. Judicial independence essentially consists of statutory recognition by all organs of government and compliance with judicial decisions as well as systemic insulation of judges from negative consequences as a result of their judicial rulings. In other words, judicial independence exists when there is reasonable expectation that the judicial decisions of judges will be fully implemented by the relevant branches of government irrespective of whether or not such decisions are in their interest. It also exists when judges discharge their judicial responsibilities without being afraid of professional diminution or personal harm (Feld and Voigt 2004). The decisions of judges upon which they reasonably expect compliance and implementation must necessarily flow from the exercise of judicial powers bestowed upon the courts presided over by them. The major challenge, which the Nigerian judiciary contended with, both in military regimes and democratic administrations, was how to safeguard its judicial power or improvise a way to circumnavigate the restrictions imposed by ouster clauses that characterised major decrees. Thus, judicial activism represents the theoretical underpinning that motorised judicial activities. As Okere (1987, p. 88) avers: Judicial activism is constitutive in theory, liberal in conception and teleological in essence. It assumes that every legislation has a purpose; that a constitution is a social charter of a dynamic society based on certain ideological or philosophical presuppositions. In interpreting the constitution, it seeks to ascertain these underlying principles and give effect to them. Giving effect to the ultimate goal of the constitution is the essence of its interpretative effort.

The theory of judicial activism offers insight into how the judiciary was able to protect itself from the restrictions imposed by the military regimes and democratic administrations alike. Judicial activism enabled the courts to navigate the legal landmines of restrictions imposed by such strategies as ouster clauses and erosion of the jurisdiction of the courts through the creation of alternative courts like special tribunals and commissions. It also enables the judiciary to overcome the various novel ways the politicians have deployed to undermine the judiciary, even in democratic settings.

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The Nigerian Judiciary in Historical Perspective The judiciary is part of the tripodal components of presidential system of government, the others being the legislature and the executive. Whether in democratic or authoritarian regimes, the core tasks of the judiciary are embedded in the judicial powers bestowed upon it by the relevant enabling laws. These judicial powers empower the courts to interpret and decide cases in accordance with the tenets of the laws. Igwe (2002) has outlined the two core responsibilities of the judiciary to include the interpretation of the constitution or body of recognisable laws and adjudication on the basis of these laws for the purpose of protecting the interests of the citizens, resolving disputes arising from conflicts of interests and prescribing punishment for culprits. In Okitipupa Oil Palm Co. Ltd v. Jegede 1982,1 Justice Afonja added another task by contending that it also falls within the purview of the courts to exercise supervisory role over all the branches of government to ensure that they keep within their respective spheres of powers, privileges and competence under the constitution. The cornerstone of judicial operations is the rule of law. It is the rule of law that confers relevance on the judiciary. Otherwise, judicial pronouncements will be hollow rituals without any correlation with the perception of justice. The rule of law is a constitutional safeguard that is anchored on the twin doctrines of supremacy of the constitution and equality of every citizen before that law (Igwe 2002). Thus, the complete components of rule of law include the primacy of the law; governance of the law; subjection of the entire society including democratic institutions, organs of government and the civil society under legal rules; and impartial and fearless judicial officers dedicated to establishing the spirit and letters of the constitution (Okere 1987; Kahn 2002; Gye-Wado 2003; Garner 2010;  Akanbi and Shehu 2012; Piana 2016). The rule of law is antithetical to the exercise of arbitrary powers or the adoption of self-help strategies. In other words, the whole essence of the rule of law is that every citizen is subject to the dictates of the law, including its observance and protection. The Supreme Court emphasised this much in Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu2 when the Lagos State Military Government ejected Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu from his residence at No. 29 Queen’s Drive, Ikoyi, while the case was still pending at the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Nigeria declared that “the essence of rule of law is that it should never operate under the rule of force or fear. To use force to effect an act and while under the marshal of that force, seek the court’s equity, is an attempt to infuse timidity into court and operate a sabotage of the cherished rule of law”.

 Okitipupa Oil Palm Co. Ltd. v Jegede 1982, 3 NCLR 494  cvThe Military Governor of Lagos State & Ors v. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu & Anor (1986) LPELR-SC241/198. Available at: http://www.lawpavilionpersonal.com/judgmentdetails. jsp?suite=olabisi@9thfloor&pk=SC.241/1985 1 2

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The evolutionary phases of the Nigerian judiciary as identified by Ali (n.d.) are misleading as they are patently arbitrary and unrepresentative of landmark events in the judicial system especially in the post-1954 period. Thus, by our observation and analysis of trends and developments in Nigeria’s political arena and the judiciary itself, we have identified nine phases in the evolution of Nigerian judiciary. The first phase covered the period before 1861. This period encapsulated all the rudimentary judicial systems set up by various British trading firms to organise their operations. The second phase spanned 1863–1913 and covered the ceding of Lagos to the British Crown by Prince Docemo, the enactment of the Supreme Court Ordinance and Northern Nigeria Order-in-Council, both of which provided the legal bases for the establishment of Supreme Courts for the Colony of Lagos in 1863 and Northern Protectorate in 1900. It also covered the various courts that were established in the pre-amalgamation period (Azikiwe 1929; Egbewole 2008). The third phase was 1914–1953 when the Colony of Lagos and the Northern and Southern Protectorates were administered as one. This phase was characterised by the deference of Nigerian judiciary to the West African Court of Appeal (WACA) (Aghalino 2006; Egbewole 2008; Ibhawoh 2013). The fourth phase coincided with 1954–1962 when the federal system was institutionalised. In this period, appeals from Nigerian courts ceased to go to WACA but directly to the Privy Council. This era was also characterised by the regionalisation of the judiciary and the divestment of first instance jurisdiction from federal courts (Elaigwu 1988; Mwalimu 2007). The fifth phase was the period from 1963 to 1965. This period established the judicial independence and sovereignty of the Nigerian judiciary through the republican constitution. Within this period, Nigeria’s Supreme Court became the highest court in the country and its judicial decisions became final (Okere 1987; Okpanachi and Garba 2010; Edeko 2011). The sixth phase was 1966–1979. This period was characterised by the overthrow of the democratic government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the suspension of the Nigerian Constitution and its substitution with decrees. It also started the process of re-federalising the judiciary from 1973. The judiciary fought for survival and independence in the face of restrictive policies of successive military regimes (Phillips 1980; Babawale 2007). The seventh phase was 1979–1983 with the introduction of presidential system of government and emphasis on rule of law, separation of powers and independence of the judiciary (Nwabueze 1985). The eighth phase was 1984–1998. This period approximated to the earlier military eras and was a replay of the restrictive and authoritarian excesses of the military against judicial independence (Edeko 2011; Ikhariale 1990; Davies 1990; Ogbondah 2000). The ninth phase is 1999–date with efforts geared towards the repair of damages wreaked on the judiciary by prolonged military rule. While the judicial system in the period before 1842 consisted of the indigenous means of arbitrating disputes based on prevailing customary norms, the period between 1845 and 1912 marked early efforts at the modernisation of the judicial system in accordance with British jurisprudence. It was during this era that the Sharia law, which had been in force in most parts of Northern Nigeria before 1892, was displaced as the grundnorm of the area (Ali n.d.; Elaigwu and Galadima 2003).

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In Southern Nigeria, during this era, new systems of adjudication were in the process of being evolved. The earliest courts established by the British were called the Courts of Equity and operated in the Niger Delta areas of Brass, Benin, Okrika and Opobo in 1854 (Ali n.d.; Adewoye 1977). These courts were the creation of the trading firms that operated in those areas. As Azikiwe (1929, p. 329) observed, “in 1879 the various British trading firms formed a merger, and in 1887 Queen Victoria granted them a charter for ‘The Royal Niger Company, Limited.’ By this charter the company was made responsible ‘for the government of the river basins and the whole of Hausaland’”. The Nigerian judicial system, which came into effect through the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 11 of 1863, was a replica and extension of the British legal system (Egbewole 2008; Mwalimu 2007). This ordinance established the first Supreme Court for the Lagos Colony whose jurisdiction covered the administration of common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in England as of 24 July 1874. For the Northern Region, the Northern Nigerian Order in Council of 1899 signalled the beginning of attempts to erect a judicial system. This order-in-­ council empowered the high commissioner to create a framework for the administration of justice in the protectorate. The outcome was the issuance of the Protectorate Courts Proclamation Order of 1900 and the Native Courts Proclamation Order of 1900, which established a Supreme Court, Provincial Court and Cantonment or Magistrate Courts on the one hand and a new system of Native Courts on the other hand for the protectorate (Ali n.d.; Mwalimu 2007). The Nigerian judicial system developed gradually and by piecemeal. Between 1863 and 1914 when the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated, a court of record vested with constituent powers comparable to a High Court of Justice of England and a Supreme Court were established in Lagos Colony and Northern Protectorate, respectively. By 1914, the judicial system had been relatively entrenched with three classes of courts in operation, namely, the Supreme Court, Provincial Courts and Native Courts (Mwalimu 2007; Egbewole 2008). In actual judicial sense, the Supreme Court was not supreme in dealing with cases as the final appellate powers resided in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council until 1963. In other words, cases decided by the Supreme Court still had to go through other courts on appeal. But the Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts. Between 1934 and 1954, appeals from the Supreme Court went to the West African Court of Appeal (WACA), and appeals from the WACA went to the Privy Council. However, from 1954, appeals from the Supreme Court of Nigeria went directly to the Privy Council (Mwalimu 2007; Ibhawoh 2013). As has been noted, the initial body of laws and the courts to interpret and adjudicate on them were products of colonial rule. But with constitutional development that provided for the election and appointment of Nigerians into the legislative bodies, the corpus of law began to include legislations made by Nigerians in addition to British common law, law of equity and statutes of general application in England as of 1 January 1900. The diversity in Nigerian cultures and differences in religious affiliations created serious difficulties in fashioning a harmonised Nigerian common law. So, the norms and mores that could have constituted the basis of Nigerian common law have been pigeonholed into customary law with constraints to wide applicability (Awa 1964; Mwalimu 2007).

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Apart from the British legal system, there were other external influences on the formulation of the corpus of Nigerian laws. In 1904, Northern Nigeria adopted the Criminal Code of Queensland, Australia, and with the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, this code became applicable all over the country. However, in 1959, the Northern Region repealed and replaced the Criminal Code with the Penal Code, which was modelled after the Maliki law and the Penal Code of Sudan and India. This Penal Code was preserved at independence and has continued to apply in the 19 states of Northern Nigeria. On the other hand, Southern Nigeria retained the Criminal Code, and today, it applies in the 17 states that comprise it (Mwalimu 2007; Anyebe 2011). Nigeria’s political independence in 1960 did not include judicial independence (Okpanachi and Garba 2010). Cases that originated in Nigeria still went on appeal to the Privy Council. It was not until 1963 when Nigeria adopted the republican constitution that it obtained judicial independence. The Nigerian Supreme Court, therefore, assumed the status of apex court with final judicial power. The structure of the courts was altered by the 1954 constitution to reflect the federal principle which it promoted. The effect of the 1954 constitution was the regionalisation of the judiciary. Until 1954, the Nigerian judiciary was centralised although inferior courts like the magistrate, district and native courts dispensed justice at local levels. With the federal constitution of 1954, the judiciary became regionalised which meant, in effect, that federal courts were divested of first instance jurisdiction and bestowed only with appellate jurisdiction (Awa 1964; Nwabueze 1982; Mwalimu 2007). The metamorphosis of Nigeria’s contemporary court system started in 1973 with the promulgation of Decree No.13 of 1973, which established the federal revenue court as a court of first instance. The court system was further expanded in 1976 through Decree No.2 which established a Federal Court of Appeal for the first time in Nigeria’s constitutional history. These two courts, with the Supreme Court; the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, form the courts under the authority of the federal government (Mwalimu 2007). The Nigerian courts have, under both military and democratic administrations, played very important role in upholding the independence of the judiciary. Its strategy consisted in playing activist role in circumventing legal landmines placed by ouster clauses and in reinventing its independence. The Nigerian judiciary has been particularly alive to upholding the country’s federal principles and stopping the federal government and the presidency from using their enormous constitutional powers to overrun the states. There are several Supreme Court judgements to this end. These include the following: 1. Attorney General of Ogun State and others v. Attorney General of the Federation 19823 (where the Supreme Court declared that neither the National Assembly nor the President had the constitutional power to impose any new duty or confer powers on the states)

 Attorney General of Ogun State and others v Attorney General of the Federation (1982), NSCC 1.

3

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2. Attorney General of Bendel State v. Attorney General of the Federation and others 19834 (where the main issue was whether the federal government could make a law purporting to administer on behalf of the states the funds allocated to them from the Federation Account based on the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account, etc.) Act, No. 1 of 1982. The Supreme Court declared the Act to the extent that it made provision for the administration of funds made for the states unconstitutional and void) 3. Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation 20035 (where the Lagos State Government challenged the federal government over a dispute arising from physical planning. The Supreme Court declared that the federal government could not impose any obligation on a state government outside the stipulations of the constitution) 4. Attorney General of Abia State v. Attorney General of the Federation 20026 (where the competence of the federal government to cover areas within the exclusive competence of the states in relation to the tenure of local government functionaries was challenged on account of the Electoral Act 2001. The Supreme Court held that the National Assembly had no power to make laws for the conduct of elections into the offices of local government councils except for the area councils of the Federal Capital Territory)

 he Structure of the Nigerian Judiciary and the Powers T of the Courts The judiciary is the branch of government that exercises judicial powers of the state. In the chequered political history of Nigeria, the judiciary was the only organ of government that survived military coups d’état, albeit with constant threat to its corporate independence. It perennially contended with the myriad of underhand policies of successive military regimes intended to undermine its authority and independence. It was during the era of military rule that the culture of eroding the independence of the judiciary was spawned as demonstrated by the importation of ouster clauses into legislations, seizure of the power to hire and fire judicial officers by the military oligarchy, disobedience of court orders and judgements and use of tribunals to carry out judicial functions (Okere 1987; Ikhariale 1990; Davies 1990; Gye-Wado 2003; Akanbi and Shehu 2012). Notwithstanding its chequered history, the judiciary is the only branch of government that has a record of institutional continuity. And for this reason, the judiciary is a critical player in governance

4  Attorney General of Bendel State v. Attorney General of the Federation and others 1983, All NLR 208. 5  Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation 2003, 6 SCNJ 1. 6  Attorney General of Abia State and others v. Attorney General of the Federation 2002, 3 SCNJ 15.

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as it builds on its privilege of institutional continuity to function as a mediator in the political system (Yusuf 2010). As has been noted, the judiciary exercises judicial powers through the courts. According to Section 6(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended, “the judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation”. In recognition of the federal status of Nigeria, Section 6(2) provides, “the judicial powers of a State shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established, subject as provided by this Constitution, for a State”. What this implies is that judicial powers are vested in, and exercisable by, courts set up by both the federal and state governments in accordance with the constitution. The courts in Nigeria are arranged in pyramidal order of judicial competence and authority. Section 6(5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended outlines the hierarchy of courts in Nigeria. At the apex of the judicial pyramid in order of superiority is the Supreme Court followed by the Court of Appeal. Others are: (i) The Federal High Court (ii) The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (iii) A High Court of a State (iv) The Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (v) A Sharia Court of Appeal of a State (vi) The Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (vii) A Customary Court of Appeal of a State (viii) Such other courts as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction on matters with respect to which the National Assembly may make laws (ix) Such other courts as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or on appeal on matters with respect to which a House of Assembly may make laws Before 1963, the Nigerian Supreme Court was subservient to the Privy Council of the House of Lords in England as its judicial decisions were subjected to judicial review by the Privy Council. One of the major factors that underpinned the shift in opinion about the need to address the lack of judicial sovereignty of Nigerian Courts was the Akintola v. Adegbenro case in which the Privy Council’s decision conflicted with the position of Nigeria’s Federal Supreme Court (Yakubu 2003). Shortly after this case, Nigeria became a republic with the resultant effect that Nigeria’s Supreme Court became independent of the British Privy Council. Thus, since 1963, the Supreme Court has been exercising judicial independence as the apex court in Nigeria. Section 230 of the Nigerian Constitution establishes the Supreme Court and provides that it is to be made up of not more than 21 Justices who will be under the headship of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN). The appointment of the CJN and Justices of the Supreme Court is made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and subject to confirmation by the Senate (see Section 231(1) and (2), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The Supreme Court exercises original and appellate jurisdiction. Section 232(1) of the Nigerian Constitution identifies the exclusive and

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Table 7.1  Roll call of Nigeria’s Chief Justices Name of Chief Justice The Hon. Justice (Sir) Adetokunbo Ademola The Hon. Justice (Dr) Taslim Olawale Elias The Hon. Justice (Sir) Darnley Arthur Alexander The Hon. Justice Atanda Fatai Williams The Hon. Justice George Sodeinde Sowemimo The Hon. Justice Ayo Gabriel Irikefe The Hon. Justice Mohammed Bello The Hon. Justice Muhammad Lawal Uwais The Hon. Justice Salihu Modibbo Alfa Belgore The Hon. Justice Idris Legbo Kutigi The Hon. Justice Aloysius Iyorgyer Katsina-Alu The Hon. Justice Dahiru Musdapher The Hon. Justice Aloma Mariam Mukhtar The Hon. Justice Mahmud Mohammed The Hon. Justice Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen The Hon. Justice Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad

Term of office 1958–1972 1972–1975 1975–1979 1979–1983 1983–1985 1983–1985 1987–1995 1995–2006 2006–2007 2007–2009 2009–2011 2011–2012 2012–2014 2014–2016 2017–2019 2019–

original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as including “any dispute between the Federation and a State or between States if and in so far as that dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends”. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court lies in its exclusive right to hear and determine appeals from the Court of Appeal. Apart from appeals as of right to which the Supreme Court is entitled from the Court of Appeal, there is also appeal by leave of the Supreme Court (see Section 233(1–6), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). For the purposes of hearing appeals or performing responsibilities conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Supreme Court is deemed to be duly constituted with not less than five Justices of the Supreme Court. The Constitution specifies that the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are final (see Section 235, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). Table 7.1 below shows the various Chief Justices of Nigeria and their terms of office. Next in line in the hierarchical structure of Nigerian courts is the Court of Appeal. The establishment and composition of the Court of Appeal are outlined in Section 237(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. The Constitution provides that the Court of Appeal should have not less than 49 Justices “of which not less than three shall be learned in Islamic personal law, and not less than three shall be learned in Customary law. The President of the Court of Appeal and the Justices are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the NJC subject to confirmation by the Senate”. The Court of Appeal is conferred with original and appellate jurisdiction. Its original jurisdiction consists of the right to hear and determine whether any person

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has been validly elected to the office of President or Vice President under the Constitution, or the term of office of the President or Vice President, or the position of the President or Vice President has become vacant (Section 239, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal consists of hearing and determining appeals from the Federal High Court; the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; High Court of a state; Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; Sharia Court of Appeal of a State; Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; Customary Court of Appeal of a State; and from decisions of a court martial or other tribunals as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly (Section 240). Like the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal exercises its jurisdiction of appeal as of right and with leave. Its appellate jurisdiction as of right is set out in Sections 241 and 243–246 and also includes decisions of the Code of Conduct Tribunal, the National Assembly Election Tribunals and the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunals. In respect of election petitions on various elective offices other than the offices of the President and Vice President, the decision of the Court of Appeal is final (Section 246(3), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The Court of Appeal is considered to be duly constituted if it consists of not less than three Justices of the Court of Appeal. If the appeal requiring the decision of the Court of Appeal is from Sharia Court of Appeal, it shall consist of not less than three Justices of the Appeal Court learned in Islamic personal law, and if from the Customary Court of Appeal, it shall consist of not less than three Justices of the Court of Appeal learned in customary law (Section 247, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). In addition to its Abuja headquarters, the Court of Appeal has 16 divisions spread across Nigeria.7 The Federal High Court is a creation of the federal government and recognised in Sections 249–254 of the Nigerian Constitution. Thus, the federal government exercises appointive powers over the Chief Judge and Judges of the Federal High Court on the recommendation of the NJC, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The Federal High Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction and powers on issues contained in the exclusive list; offences of treason, treasonable felony and allied offences; and criminal causes and matters on the above preceding areas. The Federal High Court is duly constituted if it consists of at least one judge of that Court. The High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and State High Courts are empowered by the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended to exercise jurisdiction in civil and criminal proceedings. According to Sections 257 and 272, these courts are empowered to “have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal 7  These divisions include Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu, Benin, Jos, Port-Harcourt, Abuja, Calabar, Ilorin, Owerri, Sokoto, Yola, Ekiti, Akure and Makurdi (http://www.courtofappeal.com. ng/index.php).

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proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person”. While the President appoints the Chief Judge and Judges of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, on the recommendation of the NJC, the Governor does so for a State High Court. Like the Federal High Court, these courts are duly constituted with one Judge. It should be noted that the Federal High Court; the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; and the High Court of a State have co-ordinate jurisdiction, that is, they are equal in status and authority. The Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, are respectively established by Sections 260 and 265 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, as amended. The appointment of the Grand Kadi and the Kadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal and the President and Judges of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, are made by the President. While the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, exercises appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law, the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, exercises appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of customary law. The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State and the Customary Court of Appeal of a State exercise the same appellate and supervisory jurisdictions as their counterparts in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and the appointment of the judicial officers are made by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the NJC (See Sections 276, 277, 281 and 282, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The Constitution institutionalised, for the first time, the Election Tribunals. While Section 285(1) provides for the establishment of the National Assembly Election Tribunals vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions relating to elections into the National Assembly, Section 285(2) establishes the Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal with exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor or Deputy Governor or as a member of any legislative house. The qualifications for membership and composition of the Election Tribunals are set out in the Sixth Schedule to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended. The Constitution provides that each of the Election Tribunals should consist of a Chairman and four other members who must be members of the judiciary not below the rank of a Chief Magistrate. Apart from these courts set out in the 1999 Constitution, other categories of courts exist. Their existence derives its essence from Section 5(j) and (k), which authorises the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly to set up courts to exercise jurisdiction on matters they have competence to make laws. There is no uniformity in the categories of courts operational in all the States as each State sets up its own courts to suit its needs. Thus, there are various grades of Magistrates ranging from Magistrate III to Chief Magistrate with grading variations in the system of magistracy. There are also provisions for such courts as National Industrial Court and Industrial Arbitration Panel.

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The nature of court system reflects the flawed federal system in operation in Nigeria. The erosion of the federalist principle started in 1973 and was consolidated in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, as amended. As Babawale (2007, p.  66) has argued, “the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, further assaulted the federalist inclination of the Nigerian Judiciary by the enormous powers it assigned to the National Judicial Council (NJC) on the appointment and removal of judges”. The argument of “de-federalising” the judiciary is strengthened by the absence of an equivalence of the NJC at the State level and the advisory powers vested in the State Judicial Service Commission (Section 5, Part II, Third Schedule, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended).

 he Phases of Nigerian Judiciary: Alternations Between T the Jackboot of Military Authoritarianism and Multiparty Democracy Nigeria’s current fourth republic (which commenced in 1999) has recorded the longest period of democratic governance since the country’s independence in 1960. Thus, Nigeria has now enjoyed 20 unbroken years of democracy with greater prospects of entrenching and consolidating it. Before 1999, Nigeria had a chequered democratic history as a result of routine military incursions into politics and seizure of power, which truncated the prospects of democratic consolidation. The country’s first republic (1960–1966) was anchored on parliamentary system and lasted for less than 6 years. It was overthrown in 1966 through a military coup d’état, which unfortunately resulted in the death of some key government officials at both the regional and federal levels. The coup dismantled Nigeria’s democracy and ushered in military authoritarianism that remained in place for 13 years before the country was returned to democratic rule in 1979. It must be pointed out that the poor management of the political crisis that emanated from the 1966 counter-coup led to a 30-month civil war (Ademoyega 1981; Nwabueze 1982; Falola 1999; Siollun 2009). Although the change of government did not result in the outright sacking of the judiciary like other branches of government, the suspension of the constitution and the promulgation of new decrees (with no democratic pretensions) eroded the independence of the judiciary. The second republic (1979–1983) was short-lived and even more so if it is compared with the first republic. It lasted for 4 years and 3 months. The second republic was based on presidential system with its major attraction being the principles of separation of powers. The seizure of power by the military on 31 December 1983 and the subsequent suspension of the 1979 Constitution abridged the operational environment of the judiciary. The military remained in power until 1999. The third republic was a stillborn following the annulment of the presidential election of 12 June 1993, which would have brought the transition programme to full circle. Thus, the 1989 Constitution which would have undergirded it was not fully given the force of law (Ikhariale 1990).

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Even though successive military regimes did not dismantle the judiciary, the abuse it was subjected to on account of the irreconcilability of the rule of law with autocracy was more than unnerving (Olowofoyeku 1989; Ogbondah 2000). The combined effect was that the judiciary appeared to be perennially preoccupied with the twin concerns of fighting for its independence and survival. This section examines the judiciary in the alternating periods of military authoritarianism and multiparty democracy.

 rom Parliamentarianism to Military Authoritarianism, F 1966–1979 The military incursion into politics in 1966 brought parliamentary constitutionalism to an end. Between 1966 and 1979, four military regimes administered Nigeria. These included the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime (January 1966–July 1966), the Gowon regime (1966–1975), the Mohammed regime (1975–1976) and the Obasanjo regime (1976–1979). The initial decrees, which the Aguiyi-Ironsi regime enacted to secure his regime, provided the legal basis that sustained subsequent military regimes. In the place of the pre-1966 parliamentary system, the military set up its own form of government which was anchored on the ethos of authoritarianism. Apart from the sacking and replacement of the parliamentary government, which was then in place, both at the federal and regional levels, the grundnorm of Nigeria’s sovereignty, that is, its constitution, was also dispensed with (Nwabueze 1982). As at the time of the first coup, the Nigerian state was experimenting with its seventh constitution since the formalisation of its statehood through the Lugardian amalgamation policy of 1914. Nigeria’s constitutional development prior to 1966 consisted of Sir Frederick Lugard’s Amalgamation Report of the 1914, Sir Hugh Clifford Constitution (1922), Sir Arthur Richards Constitution (1946), Sir John Macpherson Constitution (1951), Oliver Littleton’s Constitution (1954), the Independence Constitution (1960) and the Republican Constitution (1963) (Coleman 1986; Ekeh 2010). The reason for the suspension of the 1963 Republican Constitution through the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1966 and the 1979 Constitution vide the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1984 was to address the irreconcilability of constitutionalism and authoritarianism (Falola 1999; Siollun 2009). Thus, these decrees afforded the successive military regimes the latitude for arbitrariness. From Nigeria’s experience with military coups d’état, a standardised sequence of events could be reconstructed: the first was the securement of the reins of power through the deployment of force, which might result in a bloody or bloodless change of government; the second was the suspension of the constitution and the promulgation of decrees; and, lastly the incorporation of non-military elite into the government to legitimise and consolidate it (Siollun 2009). The last point was of added significance if the regime ousted was a democratically elected one.

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The circumstances of the first military coup d’état were such that the set of military officers who took over power were not the same set that planned and executed the coup (Ademoyega 1981). With the assassination of the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and other key government officials as well as the pervading insecurity in the country, the military, under General J.T.U. Aguiyi-­Ironsi, was invited by the remnants of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) cabinet and the political elite to take over the government. The NPC issued a statement through Hashim Adaji extending their “unqualified support” to Aguiyi-Ironsi. In a similar vein, Dauda Adegbenro, Kolawole Balogun and Richard Akinjide of the Action Group (AG), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), respectively, issued statements in support of the military government (Siollun 2009). The popular support for the military regime was not restricted to mainstream politicians and opposition parties, but it also extended to the masses who pledged their unalloyed loyalty to General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi (Siollun 2009). The 1963 Republican Constitution, which was in force then, recognised election as the only legitimate means of changing governments. Coup d’état, rebellion, revolt and other violent means of ousting legally constituted governments were strange to the Constitution and, therefore, constituted unlawful means of changing administrations. The response to this seeming challenge was the suspension of the constitution and the promulgation of decrees in its stead. Thus, through decrees, the military government dismantled government institutions, abbreviated the powers of others and, in some instances, emasculated their capacity for the optimal performance of their hitherto constitutional responsibilities. The abrogation of the 1963 Republican Constitution by the military had two interrelated effects: it bestowed unlimited powers on the military oligarchy and undermined the basis for the operations of the Nigerian judiciary (Uko 2004). The seizure of power by the military and its eventual control of Nigeria’s political sphere severely eroded both the independence and interpretative authority of the judiciary. Ekeh (2010) has argued to the contrary that despite the suspension of the constitution by decree, the military respected the spirit of the constitution. As he put it, “throughout the era of the civil war and while General Yakubu Gowon presided over the Central Government, Nigeria’s political affairs were ruled by a healthy respect for the central tenets of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution”. However, Ekeh’s position could not be completely valid considering the innate disconnect between military rule and constitutionalism. The anti-constitutional disposition of the military was exemplified by the import of its anchor decree, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1966. This decree made explicit provisions which circumscribed the jurisdiction of the courts in the dispensation of justice. For instance, Section 6 of that Decree stated, “no question as to the validity of this or any other Decree or Edict shall be entertained by any Court of Law in Nigeria”. The Federal Military Government, through the instrumentality of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), bridged and eroded the concept of separation of powers as it became the embodiment of law-making, law implementation and, in some cases, law adjudication. The members of the SMC doubled

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as members of the Federal Executive Council (FEC), a corresponding body to the defunct Council of Ministers under the Westminster model, and were tasked with law-making and implementation functions (Falola 1999; Siollun 2009). There is a seemingly unresolved argument among scholars about the legality of military regimes. The central element of the argument is whether it is the constitution or the decree that should act as the legitimising source of regimes. Of course, the emergence of military regimes on the political turf has been rationalised on certain grounds. Falola (1999) identifies the factors that facilitate the emergence of military regimes as including the defence of a particular ideology or instigation of a revolution; protection of the interests of the ruling class against opposition forces; prevention of an imminent collapse of society; protection of the interests of the army itself, especially if its officers want power and wealth; and identification with a popular movement to bring about changes. But military regime is unknown to the constitutions. The emphasis of military regimes on decrees with the penchant for incorporating ouster clauses created what we might call interpretative dependency. The interpretative powers of the courts were conditioned by what the decrees stipulated and what they did not stipulate. Since the judiciary is a creation of the law, it follows that its continued existence is dependent on the law which recognises it and on the basis of which it carries out its interpretative role. In Ugwu v. Ararume 2007,8 Tobi, JSC, avers, “… the only constitutional function of the Judge is, [to] put in the conservative latinism, judiciumest quasi juris dictum, meaning judgment, as it were, is a declaration of law. In other words, a law must be in existence before a Judge interprets it”. In other words, whatever law that recognises the expediency of the judiciary and, thus, makes allowance for its operation constitutes the source of its powers. As Edeko (2011) affirms, it is the duty of the judiciary in the process of statutory interpretation to ascertain the will of the people who made the laws being applied in the polity. Thus, the seeming benevolence of the military by not suspending the judiciary as it had done to the other organs of government (namely, the offices of President, Prime Minister and Federal Ministers at the federal level and those of Regional Governors, Premiers and Regional Ministers, at the regional level, as well as the Federal Parliament and all the Regional Legislatures) shifted its allegiance from the Constitution to the enabling Decree, that is, Decree 1 of 1966 (Ojo 1971). As military regimes are inconsistent with the ethos of democratic principles, their decrees are not the product of collective input anchored on the will of the people, but simply the codification of the preferences of the ruling military oligarchy. In contrast, the constitution is the product of the people, a codification of the wishes of the people through the agency of their representatives (Ojo 1971; Aghalino 2006; Obiozor 2010). The area of convergence between decrees and constitutions is that both are the codification and collection of rules and principles according to 8  Engineer Charles Ugwu & anor v. Senator Ifeanyi Ararume & anor (2007), SC.63/2007. Available at: http://www.nigeria-law.org/Engineer%20Charles%20Ugwu%20&%20Anr%20v%20 Senator%20Ifeanyi%20Ararume%20&%20Anr.htm

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which a state is governed. The bases for their  divergence are contained in three questions relating to firstly, the question of legitimacy and where the source of the grundnorm lies; secondly, the distribution of governmental powers within the state formation; and finally, the issue of the guarantee of fundamental rights and duties of citizens, including the rights to participate in the government (Ojo 1971; Aghalino 2006). The immediate consequence of suspending and abrogating the  constitutional legal order and substituting it with decrees and edicts was the erosion of the powers of the judiciary. As has been noted, the judiciary is a creation of the constitution and is driven by constitutionalism. Thus, with the dismantling of the constitution as the grundnorm of the Nigerian state, and its replacement with decrees, the judiciary’s source of legitimacy was undermined. Two decrees, namely, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1 of 1966 and the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970 served as the foundational decrees from which the subsequent powers of the military regime flowed (Siollun 2009). Not only did the decrees limit the powers of the courts to challenge their provisions, they also set limitations and boundaries which the courts must not overstep. The general implication of the new grundnorm embodied in decrees was twofold: (1) the constitution became subordinated to the Federal Military Government and (2) decrees symbolised the legal manifestation of the absolute authority of the military. As Nwabueze (1982, 205) observed, “in so far as the 1963 Constitution formed part of the Constitution of the Military government, it derived validity both from the old civilian legislatures that enacted it and from the F.M.G [Federal Military Government], which permitted it to continue in force, but it owed its continued application solely and entirely to the FMG”. The Nigerian courts, especially the Supreme Court, did not play a strictly docile role in the face of the abridgement of the powers of the courts by various decrees promulgated by the military. The courts played activist role in the course of interpreting even the decrees. There were several cases where the courts attempted to carve an independent niche for itself. The response of the military was to forcefully stamp its authority through the enactment of more decrees. Several cases gave the judiciary the opportunity to scrutinise military decrees and offer its opinion about the legality of such decrees. One of such cases was Lakanmi v. Attorney General of Western State, 1970.9 As part of the overall anti-corruption efforts of the then military regime, the Western Region promulgated a law known as the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and Other Persons) Edict No. 5 of 1967. Under this Edict, a Tribunal of Inquiry into the assets of public officers of the Western State was set up with Mr. Justice Somolu as Chairman. In the case of Mr. E. O. Lakanmi, the Tribunal ordered under the provisions of Section 13(1) of Edict No. 5 of 1967 that Mr. E. O. Lakanmi, Kikelomo Ola (his daughter) and other persons holding properties on behalf of or in trust for any 9  E. O. Lakanmi & Ors v The Attorney General (West) & Ors, 1970, LPELR-SC.58/69. Available at: http://www.lawpavilionpersonal.com/newfulllawreport.jsp?suite=olabisi@9thfloor&pk=SC.5 8/69&apk=16450#16450

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of them should not dispose of them until directed by the Military Governor of the Western State of Nigeria.10 Mr. Lakanmi brought an application before the High Court for an order of certiorari in furtherance of his intention to have the order made by Mr. Justice Somolu dated 31 August 1967 quashed. The High Court dismissed the application on 21 December 1967 on two major grounds: (1) that Edict No. 5 of 1967 was validly made and was not in conflict with the Federal Military Government Decree No. 51 of 1966, which was not in operation in the Western State of Nigeria at the time the Edict was made, and (2) that the validity of the order was reinforced by the ouster clause barring its challenge (Ojo 1971; Nwabueze 1982; Yakubu 2003). While the case was pending in the Western State Court of Appeal, the Federal Military Government took legal steps to entrench its powers. It promulgated three decrees, viz. the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and other Persons) Decree No. 37 of 1968, the Investigation of Assets (Public Officers and other Persons) (Amendment) Decree No. 43 and the Forfeiture of Assets, etc. (Validation) Decree No. 45 of 1968. Section 14 (1) of Decree No. 37 repealed both Decree No. 51 of 1966 and Western Region Edict No. 5 of 1967, with effect from 29 July 1968. The combined effect of all these decrees was that the Court of Appeal struck out the appeal (Ojo 1971). However, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by declaring Decree No. 45 invalid. The cardinal ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court hinged on the argument that the Federal Military Government was not a product of revolution but a constitutional interim government that must be subservient to the constitution.11 The response of the Federal Military Government was the promulgation of the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Power) Decrees No. 28 of 1970, which conferred sweeping powers on the Federal Military Government to enact decrees whose legality was unassailable and beyond question even when certain of their provisions conflicted with the unsuspended portions of the Constitution (Ojo 1971; Siollun 2009). From Presidentialism Back to Military Authoritarianism, 1983–1999 The period spanning from 1983 to 1999 witnessed four military regimes (Buhari/ Idiagbon regime, 1983–1985; Babangida regime, 1985–1993; Abacha regime, 1993–1998 and Abubakar regime, 1998–1999) and one military-instituted regime (Interim National Government headed by Ernest Shonekan). The judiciary, like the legislative and executive organs of government, suffered the negative consequences of military seizure of governmental powers during this period. The military coup masterminded by Major Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon came into being after 4  years and 3  months of democratic

10 11

 Ibid.  Ibid.

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governance that started in 1979. The coup sacked the democratically elected government of President Shehu Shagari, precisely on 31 December 1983. The sack affected all the institutions of democratic governance that derived their legitimacy from the electoral mandate of the people. The coup also affected the division and locus of governmental powers. All governmental powers were usurped and made to reside in the Federal Military Government. The judiciary, which could question or undermine the unfettered exercise and deployment of state power by the then military oligarchy, was debarred from meddling or speculating about their legality through decrees. The first legislative duty performed by the military regime of Buhari/Idiagbon was the suspension of the 1979 Constitution through the resuscitation and repackaging of the hitherto moribund Decree 1 of 1966. Thus, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1 of 1983 suspended the 1979 presidential constitution as well as conferred supremacy on the Federal Military Government in terms of enacting laws for the good governance of Nigeria. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime laid the foundation for the authoritarianism that characterised successive military regimes. The autocratic disposition of their regime was exemplified by several repressive decrees it promulgated which restricted fundamental human rights, the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of speech, especially of the press (Abubakar 2001; Yakubu 2003; Alimi 2011). Ouster clauses were the essential feature of the decrees enacted by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime. The effect of these ouster clauses was twofold: (1) they constrained the jurisdictional capacity of the judiciary to act and (2) they provided cover for the repressiveness of the Federal Military Government. Representative repressive decrees depicting the despotism of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime included Decree Nos. 2 and 4. Abubakar (2001) and Alimi (2011) consider the bulk of the decrees enacted by this regime as cruel and repressive due to their anti-people orientation, penchant to suppress fundamental human rights and denial of access to credible legal justice through ouster clauses that abridged the jurisdiction of the judiciary. For example, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984 conferred enormous powers on the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, to arrest and detain anybody indefinitely without trial on the grounds of threat to state security (Yakubu 2003). Section 4 of this Decree not only suspended Chapter 1V of the 1979 Constitution, which was concerned with fundamental human rights, but also Sections 219 and 259 which dealt with the jurisdiction of the courts. The unaccountable nature of military regimes and their perennial preoccupation with regime survival made even those regimes that initially started with people-oriented policies to relapse into authoritarianism. Yakubu (2003) observes that this decree resurfaced afterwards in every military regime and mutated severally in terms of who could detain and for how long, till the end of military rule in Nigeria in 1999. Another decree promulgated by the Buhari regime which the Nigerian media considered as draconian was the Public Officers (Protection against False Accusation) Decree No. 4 of 1984. Not only did this decree abridge the rights of a

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free media, it also denied people prosecuted under it the right of appeal. Alimi (2011) has pointed out that this decree was a replication of an earlier version enacted by the Obasanjo military junta in 1976. The variations in the two versions were located in two factors: (1) institution of enforcement, while the Obasanjo regime allowed the courts to enforce the provisions of the decree, the Buhari regime vested the power of enforcement in the hands of a Special Tribunal established under Section 1, Sub-section 4 of the Decree, (2) the locus of culpability: Decree No. 4 expanded the circle of culpable persons as well as provided for the confiscation of all or any equipment of the media organisation that violated the Decree (Abubakar 2001; Alimi 2011). Despite the epithet of “benevolent dictatorship” used in the Nigerian press to describe the Babangida regime, it never stopped to roll out decrees. Most of these decrees inexorably led to the abridgement of people’s rights and the undermining of the jurisdictional competence of the judiciary. Part of the legitimacy stunt pulled by General Babangida to secure public confidence included the repeal of the obnoxious Decree No. 4 and the release of those held under it, the curtailment of the powers of the Nigeria Security Organisation (NSO) and its replacement with the State Security Service (SSS) and his promise to return the country to democratic governance by 1990 (which was later changed to 1992 and then 1993) (Uko 2004; Babawale 2007). The late General Sani Abacha’s regime emerged out of the political uncertainty that characterised Nigeria following the annulment of 12 June 1993 presidential election by General Babangida. The election was presumed to have been won by the late Moshood Abiola, but the military oligarchy decided not to hand over power to him (Ogbondah 2000). The mass agitation that greeted the decision spawned three scenarios: firstly, it swept away Babangida from power; secondly, as a face-saving measure, Babangida formed an Interim National Government (ING) and appointed Ernest Shonekan to head it; and lastly, the annulment created an intractable political crisis with consequences on national security. The crisis led to the emergence of Abacha in a palace coup in 1993. The Abacha regime was described by Nigeria’s former High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Abubakar Alhaji, in a BBC Hausa interview as the saddest chapter in Nigeria’s history (as cited in Ogbondah 2000). The Abacha regime resurrected all the repressive decrees of the past to sustain his authoritarian regime. He dismantled the Interim National Government (ING), the National and State Assemblies and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) as well as outlawed all political activities. While Decrees No. 1 of 1993 established the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) as the junta’s highest policy and law-making body, Decree No. 17 suspended and modified some sections of the 1989 Constitution and prevented the courts from adjudicating on  the decree’s validity (Ogbondah 2000). As in the previous military regimes, Abacha embarked on a large-scale abbreviation of people’s rights through the enactment of the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 11 of 1994, which empowered the Chief of General Staff of the Army and the Inspector-General of Police to arrest and detain any citizen for up to 3 months in the interest of state security (Ogbondah 2000).

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Battling for Survival: The Judiciary Under Military Dictatorships The dilemma which generally faced military dictatorships in the course of Nigeria’s political development was the place of the judiciary in the polity. This dilemma was reinforced by the question of whether these military regimes should adopt the rule of law or the rule of force. Under the circumstance, the choice of the rule of force would entail the sacking and replacement of the judiciary with a new institution, a situation that might pitch the people against the regime. On the other hand, the rule of law would require the retention of the judiciary, a seeming leash on the arbitrary and dictatorial tendencies of military regimes. But the ambivalence is tempered by the recognition that even though military regimes fit into the schema of unaccountable governments, they still derive, and sustain, their legitimacy from the people. This recognition led military regimes to adopt a middle-way approach, which was why the judiciary was tolerated but with serious restrictions on its capacity to operate fully (Egbewole 2008). The indispensability of the judiciary, whether in democratic or authoritarian regimes, is underpinned by the necessity of a functional institution to arbitrate, or seem to arbitrate, over disputes among the citizens and between the state and the citizens. Beyond adjudicating over conflicting interests in the polity, the underlying rationale for the retention of the judiciary by military dictatorships is located in two factors: the necessity of judicial affirmation with its legitimising and stabilising effect on the survival of the regime and the indispensability of the judiciary in preserving law and order, which are necessary ingredients for creating the environment for stable governance (Ogowewo 2005). Even though military regimes are extra-constitutional entities, they have striven to codify and entrench their existence within the ambit of laws. The source of conflict between military regimes and the judiciary in Nigeria was the multiplier effect of suspending and modifying the constitution, which in the main, eroded the power base of the latter. The containment of the judiciary through ouster clauses was a subterfuge designed to entrench the unquestioning supremacy of the Federal Military Government (Nwabueze 1982). This, of course, was achieved within the boundaries of legality as recognised by the grundnorm of military decrees. As there cannot be “a question of splitting the grundnorm”, the overthrow of the constitution and its replacement with decrees automatically transfers supreme authority to it (Ojo 1971). Legality, therefore, depends on whether entities are operating within the ambit of the ascendant national law. In Attorney General (Anambra State) v. Attorney General of the Federation 1993,12 the Supreme Court established the supremacy of decrees in military regimes; thus, “... under the present condition, decrees are the supreme laws in Nigeria and all other laws including the current constitution are inferior to the decrees as provided for by the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree 1984”.

12

 Attorney General (Anambra State) v. Attorney General of the Federation (1993) 7 S. C. N. J. 245.

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Justice Ayoola in an interview asserted that military regimes dealt a dangerous blow to law through lawlessness and subordination of the law to individual whims (as cited in Ogowewo 2005, p.  39). While this might be true, it should be seen within the context of personal rather than institutional failure. A body of recognisable laws existed in every regime since military intervention in Nigerian politics. In Labiyi v. Moberuagba, Mr. Justice Karibi-Whyte set out this body of laws which cut across all regimes as: (i) Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (ii) Decrees of the Federal Military Government (iii) Unsuspended provisions of the Constitution (iv) Laws made by the National Assembly before the coup d’état (or having effect as if so made) (v) Edicts of the Military Governor or Administrator of a State (vi) Laws enacted before the coup d’état by the House of Assembly of a State (or having effect as if so enacted) (as cited in Yakubu 2003) Another characterising experience of the judiciary in the era of military despotism was the predilection of the military regimes to embrace judicial ad hocism. Judicial ad hocism denotes the circumvention of established line of judicial authority through the setting up of parallel bodies to address judicial questions which fall within the purview of traditional courts. Thus, judicial ad hocism was the strategy adopted by the military to pull the rugs off the feet of the judiciary, and it achieved it through the establishment of special and military tribunals. These tribunals encroached upon the powers of the judiciary since no appeal was possible against their decisions (Nwabueze 1982; Olowofoyeku 1989). Constitutionally, judicial officers are assured of security of tenure. But during the military era, this security was compromised. The standard requirements for the removal of judges were misconduct and evidence of inability to discharge regular duties (Nwabueze 1985). But the invocation of any of these grounds required adherence to due process. As Ikhariale (1990, p. 154) observes: Before the … judges are removed from office, both the alleged misconduct and its gravity have to be established before the Judicial Service Commission which is an independent impartial body. The Governor is not bound to remove a Chief Judge or a judge so recommended by the House of Assembly or the Judicial Service Commission. In both cases, he is entitled to exercise his discretion.

But in military regimes, the procedure was less rigorous to be actually regarded as arbitrary. In the period following the collapse of the second republic, the Judicial Service Commission, established to guarantee the independence of the judiciary, was swept away with other Sections of the Constitution considered incompatible with authoritarianism. In its place, Section 14 of Decree No. 1 of 1984 provided for an Advisory Judicial Committee with responsibility to undertake the appointment and discipline of judicial officers. Thus, the Federal Military Government took complete control of all appointments to the Superior Courts of record. The implication was that the Federal Military Government assumed complete control over the

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appointment and dismissal of judges without recourse to the least requirements of fair hearing (Ikhariale 1990). Indeed, both in 1975 and 1985, there was a massive sack of judges. According to Olowofoyeku (1989, p. 62), “it is evident that with the exception of those few judges whose removal is required to be on the recommendation of the Advisory Judicial Committee, the A.F.R.C. [Armed Forces Ruling Council] may remove summarily, without consultation and without giving any reasons, any judge who the government does not wish to continue in office”. Another challenge of the judiciary during the military era was the flagrant disobedience of court orders and the circumvention of court judgements through the enactment of new decrees that would render them redundant. The effect of disobedience of competent orders of the court was the institutionalisation of lawlessness as in Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (supra) where the Military Governor of Lagos State ejected the respondent without due regard to subsisting court order restraining such self-help approach. Also, following the Supreme Court judgement on the Lakanmi case, the Federal Military Government promptly enacted the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970 which had the effect of nullifying the judgement and reasserting its right to unlimited legislative competence (Ojo 1971; Falola 1999). Similarly, the military used the strategy of legal ambush to achieve judicial victories. For instance, in an attempt to pre-empt decisions in the various suits challenging the validity of, or claiming damages for, the dismissal of some public officers by the military government in 1984, the Federal Military Government retroactively enacted several decrees. These decrees which included the Civil Service and Other Statutory Bodies (Removal of Certain Persons from Office) Decree (No. 16) of 1984 and the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree (No. 17) of 1984 had interesting features, namely, they were passed in June 1984 but were made retroactively effective from 31 December 1983; they specifically barred judicial intervention; and discontinuation of judicial action already instituted (Olowofoyeku 1989). The funding of the judiciary also acted as part of its Achilles heel. Financial constraints adversely affected the effectiveness of the judiciary. These constraints created acute dependency syndrome as the judiciary directly depended on the Federal Military Government for their budgetary and staff needs (Olowofoyeku 1989; Ogowewo 2005).

 ultiparty Democratic System: The Nigerian Judiciary Under M Parliamentarianism, 1960–1966 Democracy creates a conducive environment for the judiciary to thrive. This is understandable because democratic governance is anchored on the tenets of constitution and constitutionalism (Shehu and Akanbi 2012). It is the constitution as the fundamental law of the state that confers authority on every organ of the government, including the judiciary. The 1960 Constitution also known as the Independence

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Constitution became operational on 1 October 1960. Despite the appellation of “independence” attached to the Constitution, Yakubu (2003, p. 5) describes it as “a British legacy to Nigeria”. The 1960 Constitution incorporated the Constitutions of the three Regions in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Schedules. The 1960 Constitution tied the Nigerian judiciary to the apron strings of the British Privy Council. Chapter VIII of the Constitution contained the powers of the judiciary. This chapter covered the establishment of the courts, appointment, jurisdiction and tenure of office of the Justices and Judges. The highest appellate body in the hierarchical ranking of the courts was the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. What this meant was that anybody who was dissatisfied with the judicial pronouncements of the Federal Supreme Court could appeal to the Privy Council. But the Constitution, in Section 114, outlined the category of cases that could proceed to the Privy Council for judicial review, and this comprised appeals as of right and appeals by the leave of the Federal Supreme Court. Appeals as of right included matters whose value was 500 pounds and upwards, final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to the interpretation of the Constitution of a Region and final decisions in proceedings for the dissolution or nullity of marriage. Appeals with the leave of the Federal Supreme Court consisted of matters involving questions of great general or public importance and such other cases as may be prescribed by the Parliament (Nigerian Independence Constitution 1960). The judiciary was active under the 1960 Independence Constitution and resisted any attempt to undermine its constitutional role. An example was when the Federal Government, pursuant to Section 1(d) of Part III of the Schedule to the Constitution, set up the Commissions and Tribunals of Enquiry Act, 1961, with ouster clauses. The Supreme Court promptly declared Section 3(4) containing the ouster clause unconstitutional as it had the effect to limit the jurisdiction of the courts (Edeko 2011). The judiciary played significant role in handling the political crisis that engulfed the Western Region following the controversial removal of Samuel Ladoke Akintola and his replacement by D. S. Adegbenro as the Premier of Western Region by the Governor, Adesoji Aderemi (Yakubu 2003). Even though the case originated at the High Court, it was at the Privy Council that it was conclusively determined. The 1963 Republican Constitution was an improvement on the 1960 Independence Constitution. Apart from being the first solely indigenous effort at constitution-­ making, it consolidated Nigeria’s independence by excising its political umbilical link to Britain (Okpanachi and Garba 2010) The 1963 Republican Constitution retained many features of the 1960 Constitution such as parliamentary system of government, bicameralism, federalism, fundamental human rights and regional  governmental structures. Yakubu (2003) has argued that the major achievement of the 1963 Constitution lay in its satisfaction of the nationalistic yearnings of the people. The major inclusions in the constitution were political and judicial. In the political realm, it created, in Section 34, the office of the president of the republic who also doubled as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the federation. With regard to the judiciary, the constitution laid the foundation for its independence. Section 120 of the Constitution formally stopped the appellate powers of the Privy Council by making Nigeria’s Supreme Court the highest court in the country.

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 he Judiciary Under Presidentialism: The Second, Third T and Fourth Republics The 1979 Constitution was a radical departure from the two previous post-­ independence constitutions in several ways. The first was that the constitution dispensed with regional constitutions that were the hallmark of the previous two post-independence constitutions. This could be explained within the context of three factors, namely, the centralising tendency of the Nigerian state, the conversion of the states into the appendages of the federal government and the unwieldiness of state system (Babawale 2007; Okpanachi and Garba 2010; Bolarinwa 2015). Another area of departure from the previous constitutions was that the drafting of the constitution followed a robust and rigorous process that involved the setting up of two institutions  – the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and the Constituent Assembly (CA). While the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which was set up in 1975, produced the draft constitution, the Constituent Assembly (CA) inaugurated in 1977 deliberated on the draft constitution with a view to fine-­ tuning it. As Phillips (1980, p. 10) observes: The Constituent Assembly made no fundamental alterations to the document presented by the C.D.C. It agreed upon some relatively small changes, ‘tidied up’ some of the language, and debated anew - but did not resolve to everybody's satisfaction - such issues as the Sharia courts and the creation of new States. But the draft prepared by the Constitution Drafting Committee was basically the ‘clean’ copy submitted in June 1978 to the Federal Military Government, which there-after only made 17 minor amendments.

The third was the broad-based participation in the processes leading to the production and consideration of the draft constitution. Although the membership of the CDC was small and chosen through appointment, it was, more or less, representative as each of the then 19 states had 2 members apiece with the rest representing the civil society. It also received cooperation from Nigerians. According to Phillips (1980, p. 5), it received “346 memoranda from various groups and individuals” on a wide range of issues. On the other hand, the Constituent Assembly had majority of its membership elected. Its 223 membership consisted of 203 elected members based on local government areas and 20 appointed members representing diverse interests with the Chairman of CDC and his seven Sub-Committee Chairmen as ex officio members (Phillips 1980). The fourth feature of the new constitution was that it introduced presidentialism, which was modelled after the United States. The presidential system adopted by Nigeria was a hybrid that incorporated the peculiarities of the Nigerian state, including the lessons from the diverse problems the country had encountered in the past (Phillips 1980; Nwabueze 1982; Yakubu 2003; Shehu and Akanbi 2012). The fifth feature was that it introduced new sections in the constitution ranging from the creation of a chapter tagged fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, where all organs of government exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers were charged to conform to, observe and apply the provisions of the chapter (Chapter II, Section 3, 1979, Nigerian Constitution). An important point to note is that this section of the constitution was held by the Court of Appeal

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in both Okogie v. Attorney General of Lagos State13 and Adamu v. Attorney General of Borno State14as non-justiciable. What this means is that there is no legal course of action or remedy for anyone who feels aggrieved about the non-­performance of the duties contained in this chapter if such a person approaches the court (Durojaye 2010; Duru 2012). Lastly, while the 1979 Constitution retained the bouquet of rights in the previous constitutions, its unique contribution was the attribute of pre-emption it imported into the rights of people. According to Section 42(1), “any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress”. Yakubu (2003) avers that the import of this provision was that the judiciary had become the first hope of the common man as he didn’t have to wait for all administrative remedies to be exhausted before approaching the court for redress. The military putsch of 31 December 1983 and subsequent promulgation of decrees suspending and modifying the 1979 Constitution terminated it as the grundnorm of the Nigerian state. Although the 1999 Constitution is essentially the same with the defunct 1979 Constitution, there are significant modifications, especially in the judicature. For instance, in furtherance of the independence of the judiciary, the 1999 Constitution created and conferred on the National Judicial Council (NJC) the responsibility of recommending rather than advising the President and the Governors, as the case may be, about the appointment of judicial officers of superior courts. Thus, in Section 231(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the appointment of a person to the Office of Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) is to be made by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation of such appointment by the Senate. This is contrary to what obtained under the 1979 Constitution where, according to Section 211(1) and (2), the President was empowered to appoint the Chief Justice of Nigeria and Justices of the Supreme Court acting in his discretion subject to confirmation by simple majority of the Senate. The same kind of foregoing differences characterise the appointment of the President and Justices of the Appeal Court and the Chief Judge and Judges of Federal High Courts as well as those of the State under the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions (see Sections 218(1, 2 and 4); 229(1 and 3); 235(1, 2 and 4) of 1979 Constitution and Sections 238(1, 2 and 4); 250(1, 2 and 4); 271(1, 2 and 4) of 1999 Nigerian Constitution as amended). Another example is Section 231(4) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which constrains the President to appoint the most senior Justice of the Supreme Court as acting Chief Justice of Nigeria. In the 1979 Constitution, Section 211(4) empowers the President to choose the acting Chief Justice of Nigeria from among the Supreme Court Justices acting in his discretion. The innovativeness of this lies in its advancement of the notion of the independence of the judiciary and exclusion or reduction

13 14

 Okogie v. Attorney General of Lagos State 1981, NCLR 218.  Adamu v. Attorney General of Borno State (Nigeria) 1996, 8 NWLR 203.

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of the possibility of arbitrary and nepotistic manipulation of the judiciary by the executive. The beauty of democracy generally is its reliance on the constitution as well as emphasis on constitutionalism. In other words, democracy provides every organ of government a constitutional checklist of their operational competence that renders actions outside it ultra vires and void. For the judiciary, the beauty of democracy is manifest in such factors as the absence of ouster clauses or placement of limitations on the competence of the courts to interpret the laws, certainty of what constitutes the grundnorm and procedural orderliness in law-making. The reinvention of the judiciary as a result of democracy has rekindled confidence in it as a veritable platform to protect the citizens from arbitrary laws. But the greatest challenge of the judiciary is the subsisting military mentality arising from the creation of strong men rather than strong institutions who perceive themselves as being above the law. The resultant effect has been the  disobedience of court orders and judgements (Adejumobi 2010; Falana 2010; Adegbami and Uche 2016).

 he Multidimensional Challenges of the Judiciary Since 1999: T Executive Lawlessness and Judicial Rascality in Nigeria The judiciary is generally regarded as the bastion of constitutional democracy due to its constitutional responsibilities to entrench the rule of law and  the societal expectations that it would enhance the protection of democratic values (Musdapher 2011). However, it will be naive to assume that democracy automatically bestows independence on the judiciary or that the independence of the judiciary is always deployed exclusively to noble ends. Thus, despite constitutionalism as the guiding principle and core distinguishing feature of democratic governance, there have been myriad of anti-constitutional behaviours by various organs of government, including the judiciary. This disconnect has led to a distinction between civil rule and democracy by scholars. Jega (2003) opines that civil rule is not synonymous to democracy but constitutes part of its ensembles. What this implies, therefore, is that civil rule metamorphoses to democracy when the culture of democracy, exemplified by the ascendancy of rule of law, existence of multiparty electoral system and respect for fundamental human rights and so on, has been imbibed and entrenched (Osaghae 1999; Agaba 2010). Whether civil rule or democracy, the judiciary is well-positioned to exercise its authority without interference from the other branches of government as constitutionally provided. Thus, judicial independence must be conceived within the framework of the doctrine of separation of powers. This doctrine is premised on a number of pedestals, namely, the recognition of multiple branches of government, differentials in the functions they perform and the imperative of ensuring that the exercise of governmental authority is done within the boundaries recognised by the constitution. The key objective is to avoid an excessive concentration of power on any

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branch of government and thus eliminate the prospects of arbitrary exercise of powers which could be converted to potentially abusive or tyrannical ends (Michaels 2015; Gailmard 2017). Thus, within the context of the doctrine of separation of powers, judicial independence is not to be conceptualised in isolation but in relation to other actors or branches of government. Within this context, judicial independence means the insulation of judicial officers from all kinds of external constraints that could impede or influence their judicial functions. Such constraints could range from external interference aimed at derailing the course of justice, threats of personal harm, pecuniary worries and apprehensions in relation to career advancement and job security (Yusuf 2010). Judicial independence is intricately related to judicial accountability. The whole idea of accountability is anchored on the demand for an entity saddled with responsibilities, power and funding to report on how these resources under its care have been utilised in the furtherance of such responsibilities. As Yusuf (2010) has pointed out, accountability involves an obligation on the part of an entity to render accounts within the context of the power legally delegated to it. Thus, judicial accountability imposes a demand on the judiciary and its officers to behave in a manner that will accord the courts the capacity to achieve the roles envisioned for the judicial system in the polity. The judiciary is accountable to the political system as whole as a result of the impacts of its decisions. Thus, judicial accountability imposes two interrelated duties on the judiciary. The first is  the duty to ensure that public laws are functioning as intended and that there is public access to judicial decisions and court proceedings. And the second is the duty owed to other branches of government who appropriated the funds for its operations and who therefore have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the judiciary is operating within the ambit of the constitution (Burbank 2007; Yusuf 2008). The imperial disposition of government officials which was characteristic of military regimes reared its head in democratic governance (Akanbi and Shehu 2012). But the resistance from the judiciary and the civil society has helped to stabilise the Nigerian state. There have been many instances of disobedience of court rulings by government officials under democratic administrations. In military regimes, the disobedience of court rulings was the rule rather than the exception (Onagoruwa 2004). But despite the undemocratic nature of military regimes and their predilection to the “rule of force” rather than the “rule of law”, the Nigerian judiciary used every opportunity to resist the military government. Apart from the resistance of the courts to the seeming lawlessness of the military oligarchy, civil society organisations especially the Nigerian Bar Association had often lent a hand in resisting government arbitrariness. Under the auspices of the Nigerian Bar Association in 1988 and 1992, lawyers boycotted the courts to protest the wanton disobedience of court orders by military authorities. What led to the 1992 boycott was the high-handedness of the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida in arresting pro-democracy activists and subsequent refusal to obey court orders relating to their release. Onagoruwa (2004) paints the picture of what led to the 1992 boycott; thus, “22 court orders were made by various courts, 19 were expressly disobeyed by government, [and] three were overtaken by events”.

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Several factors appear to explain and motorise the disobedience of court orders in Nigeria’s democratic system. These include executive lawlessness, the character of the Nigerian state as a result of its being privatised and personalised by the elite, imperial presidency, political indebtedness arising from flawed electoral system, sacred cow syndrome and persisting circle of untouchables, and the dependence of the judiciary on the executive to enforce its decisions (Fabunmi and Akai 1988; Agaba 2010). The disobedience of court orders and judgement has been dubbed “executive lawlessness” considering that every person occupying any position in the three organs of government swore to abide by the constitution and to protect it (see Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended; Oaths Act 2003; John 2011). Interestingly, there is no documented evidence of mass action against the worrying norm of executive disobedience of court orders and judgements since 1999. The only concerted action in terms of protesting the flouting of court orders and judgements came from the Nigerian Bar Association which boycotted all court activities for 2 days in March 2006. The anomaly of using the instrumentality of strike and boycott actions to compel the government at all levels to obey court orders and judgement led Acholonu (2006) to regretfully assert, “if we have reached a stage in this country where the Bar would ask the courts to close shop for 2 days to demonstrate its grievance against disobedience to Court Orders, then we are in for a high jump”. Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, there have been lackadaisical attitude and in some cases outright refusal by the agencies of the government to obey court orders and judgements. The major example was Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation 2004.15 The Lagos State Government created additional 57 Local Government Councils pursuant to Section 8(3) of the 1999 Constitution and its own state law, the  Creation of New Local Government Areas Law No. 5 of 2002. Through a letter referenced PRES/87 of 8 April 2004 and sent to the Honourable Minister of Finance, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo called the attention of the Minister to the election which Ebonyi, Katsina, Lagos, Nasarawa and Niger states conducted into newly created Local Government Areas by their respective State Assemblies. He directed the stoppage of financial allocations to these states since the National Assembly had not fulfilled the constitutional requirements embedded in Section 8(5) and by virtue of Section 162(6) and (7). Acting on this directive, the Ministry of Finance withheld the statutory monthly allocations from the Federation Account due to Lagos State Local Government Councils, an action that appeared to contradict Section 162(3) and (5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. It was on this basis that Lagos State Government approached the Supreme Court for the interpretation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the President had no power (by executive or administrative action) to suspend or withhold for any period whatsoever the statutory allocation

15

 Attorney General of Lagos State v. Attorney General of the Federation 2004, 12 SCNJ 1.

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due and payable to Lagos State Government pursuant to the provision of Section 162(5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and issued a consequential order compelling the federal government to pay all outstanding statutory allocations due and payable to the Lagos State Government immediately. However, the federal government under former President Obasanjo refused to do so (Agaba 2010). Apart from the federal government, other tiers of government as well as ministries, agencies and parastatals of government got deeply involved in disobeying court orders. This state of affairs led the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mohammed Uwais, to lament at the opening ceremony of All Nigeria Judges Conference; thus: The greatest constraints and hindrance to effective legal action is disobedience to a court order. You cannot pick and choose which order to obey. In a well-oiled democratic society, there are guarantees set out in the organic law as to how a person could pursue and agitate his rights through the courts leading ultimately to the Apex Court. … It therefore becomes difficult to understand why there should be rebuffs and irritating acts of disobedience to court orders (Acholonu 2006, np).

Although there are many instances of disobedience of court orders, sometimes, the cause of disobedience emanated, not from the unwillingness of these entities to obey the orders of the court, but as a result of the unprofessional conduct of judicial officers. A case in point is the issue of the abuse of ex parte and interlocutory injunctions by courts. The former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Dahiru Musdapher, during the 2012 induction course for newly appointed Judges and Kadis at the National Judicial Institute (NJI) in Abuja, decried the abuse and anomalous granting of ex parte injunction by judges. He was quoted as lamenting that ex parte injunction which was designed with good and laudable intentions as a vehicle for instant justice in proper cases had been turned to “a bulldozer for the demolition of substantial justice” (Nnochiri 2012). Ex parte is a Latin word which means “on the part of one side only”. In law, it indicates that an order has been made on the strength of the party that made the order (Encarta 2008; Garner 2010). Although ex parte appears to be in conflict with Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, Egbewole (2008, p. 221–2) argues that it is “not anathema to proper intervention by the judiciary in determining contentious issues as brought by parties”. Stretching its legal value further, Dahiru Musdapher asserts that an ex parte was designed for the carriage of instant justice in appropriate cases and this normally required the judicial and judicious discretion of the judge (Nnochiri 2012). In Nathaniel Adedamola Kotoye v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Ors 1989,16 Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC (as he then was), set the parameters of ex parte order; thus: An applicant for a nonpermanent injunction may bring the application ex parte that is without notice to the other side or with notice to the other side, as is appropriate. By their very nature injunctions granted on ex parte applications can only be properly interim in nature. They are made, without notice to the other side, to keep matters in statu quo to a named  Nathaniel Adedamola Kotoye v. Central Bank of Nigeria & Ors, 1989, SC.118/1988. Available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Nathaniel%20Adedamola%20Kotoye%20V%20Central%20 Bank%20of%20Nigeria%20&%20Ors.htm

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date, usually not more than a few days, or until the Respondent can be put on notice. The rationale of an order made on such an application is that delay to be caused by proceeding in the ordinary way by putting the other side on notice would or might cause such an irretrievable or serious mischief. Such injunctions are for cases of real urgency. The emphasis is on ‘real.’

Many judges have neither exercised their power of ex parte judicially nor judiciously. And many politicians have hidden behind ex parte injunctions to frustrate the wheel of justice. For instance, in 2007, the former Governor of Rivers State, Peter Odili, secured a perpetual injunction from Justice Ibrahim Buba of the Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt restraining the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) from investigating, arresting and/or prosecuting him (Ekeinde 2008). Another instance of recklessness in issuing ex parte orders was its deployment to jeopardise public good. In February 2012, the former CJN, Dahiru Musdapher, overrode an ex parte injunction issued by Abdul Kafarati of the Federal High Court, Abuja, which purported to have stopped the Cross River State Governorship Election scheduled for 25 February 2012 through an administrative order. In what appeared to be a justification of his administrative order, Musdapher, in an opening address during the induction ceremony of newly appointed Judges in June 2012, asked rhetorically, “my Lords, how do we explain a court of law restraining a university by an order of ex parte injunction from holding convocation to award degrees to over a thousand graduating students just because two students who failed their examinations had applied to the court for a declaration that they too were entitled to be awarded degrees?” (as cited in Nnochiri 2012). Executive lawlessness of disobeying court orders has persisted despite 20 years of democratic governance. The Nigerian government under Buhari has not been forthright in obeying court orders. For instance, despite court orders from three Nigerian Federal High Courts and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice granting bail to Sambo Dasuki, former National Security Adviser to former President Jonathan Goodluck, the Nigerian government refused to release him. Dasuki was arrested on allegations of illegal possession of firearms and diversion of US$2.5 billion arms fund (Azu 2019). Another example was the refusal of the federal government to release Ibraheem El-Zakzaky, the leader of a Shiite Muslim group formally known as the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), and his wife, Malama Zeenat, who were granted bail by a Federal High Court since 2 December 2016. The refusal of the government to release El-Zakzaky had the effect of further complicating Nigeria’s security situation. Since 2018, the security agencies had been contending with regular violent protests staged by the supporters of EL-Zakzaky in their bid to force the discontinuance of his incarceration and subsequent release. In October 2018, there were hundreds of casualties with at least 21 deaths when members of IMN clashed with security agencies at the outskirts of Abuja (Human Rights Watch 2018; Campbell 2019). And in July 2019, several days of violent protests in Abuja by the group led to the death of over 20 people including a serving youth corps member and senior police officer (Reuters 2019; Punch 2019; Jazeera 2019).

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Another issue is the questionable integrity of judicial officers and judicial recklessness. Generally, the danger of judicial corruption is quite grim. Not only does it provide the ground for the efflorescence of tyranny and injustice, it also undermines the moral fabric of the country and erodes public confidence in the judicial system. The allegations of corruption levelled against high-ranking judicial officers such as the former Chief Justices of Nigeria, Justices Mohammed Uwais and Aloysius Katsina-Alu and the former President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Ayo Salami, had negative impact on people’s perception of the judiciary (Nnochiri 2011). Even before these afore-mentioned allegations against high-ranking judicial officers, there had been attempts to exorcise the judiciary of the demon of corruption. The Kayode Eso Panel set up during the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida to investigate corruption in the judiciary passed a damning verdict. Not only did the panel confirm a prevalence of monumental judicial impropriety among Judges, it also indicted more than two dozens of serving judicial officers on the grounds of acute deficiency in personal integrity (Nnochiri 2010). On the basis of the indictment, the panel recommended compulsory retirement and outright dismissal depending on the nature of the offences established against each judicial officer. The National Judicial Council (NJC), which is a creation of Section 153(i) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, is empowered to oversee the appointment, discipline, dismissal and general condition of service of judges from the High Court up to the Supreme Court. The NJC has done a lot to reposition the judiciary especially in blacklisting compromised judicial officers (Oko 2009). For instance, following the less-than-noble role played by the judiciary in the political crises in Anambra State that pitched its then governor, Chris Ngige, against his political godfather, Chris Uba, the NJC descended heavily on Justices Egbo-Egbo and Stanley Nnaji for granting frivolous ex parte and controversial injunctions and delivering questionable rulings (Yagboyaju 2011; Ezea 2013). There were other judicial officers that fell under the sledgehammer of sanctions spanning State and Federal High Courts and the Court of Appeal including the former Chief Judges of the Anambra and Plateau states, Justices Chuka Okoli and Lazarus Dakyen, respectively; two Justices of Appeal Court, Enugu Division, Justices Okwuchukwu Opene and Adeniji; and a host of others (Ezea 2013; Vanguard 2013a; Salihu and Gholami 2018). The roll call of judicial officers who have been punished for graft and professional misconduct is a pointer that the NJC is alive to its responsibilities (Vanguard 2013b). The proactive strategy adopted by the NJC in weeding out corrupt judges is a good move (This Day 2011). Not only will it reposition the judiciary and place it at the apex of people’s confidence, it will also ultimately anathematise disobedience of court orders and judgements and make it reprehensibly repugnant. Notwithstanding the earlier efforts of the NJC to weed out corrupt judicial officers, it was still generally believed that the judiciary was steeped in corruption (UNODC and NBS 2017). At a seminar organised by the Nigerian Bar Association’s Anti-corruption Committee in 2015, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Mahmud Mohammed, said that between 2009 and 2014, about 64 judges were disciplined by the NJC for corruption-related offences. This number of indicted

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judicial officers was considered unrepresentative of the rot in Nigeria’s judicial system considering the picture of rampant corruption involving all cadres of judicial officers and judiciary employees (ranging from secretaries, court registrars, process clerks to bailiffs), which the former CJN, Maryam Aloma Mukhtar, had earlier painted when she took office in 2012 (Bamgboye 2015). The general perception of deep-rooted corruption in the judiciary prompted the overnight gestapo-like raid of the residential homes of some judges by the Department of State Services (DSS) in October 2016. These senior Justices included Sylvester Ngwuta and John Inyang Okoro of Nigeria’s Supreme Court; Adeniyi Ademola and Nnamdi Dimgba of the Federal High Court in Abuja; Kabiru Auta of Kano State High Court; A. I. Umezulike, the Chief Judge of Enugu State; Muazu Pindiga of Gombe State High Court; and Justice Samia of Sokoto State High Court (Okakwu 2016). In a press release by the DSS, it alleged that it took the action based on petitions it received against the judges and the concurrence of the NJC.  The action of the DSS pitched various stakeholders in a war of condemnation and justification. However, the amount of cash, in various currencies, found in the possession of the judges could not have been justifiably and legitimately earned by them. Table 7.2 below has the breakdown of the cash found in the residences of three of the judges. Despite the arraignment of some of these judges, none was convicted. Although some analysts condemned the invasion of the residences of the judges, the bottom line is that the DSS did not break any law as judges are not covered by immunity clauses in the Nigerian Constitution. The non-conviction of any of the judges by the courts led Itse Sagay, the chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC), to accuse the judiciary of “not being on board in the fight against corruption” (Azu 2017). A most recent face-off between the executive and the judiciary was the unilateral removal of the CJN, Walter Onnoghen, by President Buhari and the appointment of Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad as the acting CJN. The presidency claimed it predicated this action on the order issued by the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) directing the suspension of the CJN. Paradoxically, there were several unfavourable court orders Table 7.2  Breakdown of money found in the residences of the judges Currency type Naira (N) Dollars ($) Euro (€) Pound (£) UAE Rupees Gambian dalais Argentine peso Ghanaian cedis

Sylvester Ngwuta 35,208 million 319,475 280 25,890 380 – 420 4 20

John Inyang Okoro 4,350 million 38,833 1000 – – – – – –

Source: Adapted from Sahara Reporters 2016

Adeniyi Ademola 54 million 171,779 4400 80 – 1010 – – –

Total 93,558 million 530,087 5680 25,970 380 1010 420 4 20

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that the federal government either ignored or refused to implement. Following public outcry, the federal government claimed that the president did not remove the CJN but only suspended him (Adesomoju 2019). Onnoghen’s crime was that he did not fully disclose his assets as required by law. The Nigerian Constitution does not empower the president to exercise this kind of power. Section 292 is unambiguous about the modalities for the removal of judges, including the CJN. According to the section, judges can only be removed in the face of their inability to discharge the functions of their offices or misconduct or the contravention of the Code of Conduct through two-thirds majority of the Senate (Section 292, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). This procedure was never applied in the removal of Onnoghen as the CJN. This illegality was consolidated when Onnoghen formally resigned his position on 4 April 2019, thus paving the way for the swearing in of Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad as the substantive CJN on 24 July 2019 (Punch 2019).

Conclusion If the Nigerian judiciary were to be placed on a performance-measuring scale, the verdict on its overall performance might not be overly critical considering the environment in which it had to operate. In spite of the restrictions placed upon the judiciary by successive military regimes through ouster clauses and other encroachment on its independence, it acquitted itself respectably. The most trying and difficult epoch in the evolution of Nigerian judiciary was the military era. The military regimes were caught in the web of dilemmas: they were confronted by the unpleasant choices of balancing between regime survival and pretension to adhering to the doctrine of rule of law. Regime survival entailed taming the judiciary (the only remaining institution of democratic governance) to conform to authoritarianism. This dilemma was deepened by the traditional perception of the judiciary as the conscience of the society and last bastion of hope for the common man. The successive military regimes weakened the judiciary through the erosion of the bases of its independence. The ensembles of judicial independence such as appointment procedure for judges, judicial tenure and funding of the judiciary were routinely distorted. The crisis of judicial independence did not disappear with the emergence of democratic governance. Indeed, the judiciary has continued to fight for its independence. The main threat consists in selective obedience and disobedience of court judgements considered either favourable or detrimental to the political interest of the ruling elite. Apart from external threats to judicial independence from the executive organ of government, there is absence of internal cohesion in driving the rebranding of the judiciary. The various cases of corruption against judicial officers, especially the cases involving the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Aloysius Katsina-­ Alu, the former President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Isa Ayo Salami, and more recently Walter Onnoghen have dented the image of the judiciary.

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Although the challenge of corruption among judicial officers in the course of dispensing justice is being tackled by the National Judicial Council, there is a need to institutionalise a systemic mechanism to check the festering of corrupt practices in the judiciary. It is only through this approach that the judiciary can be repositioned to fulfil its constitutional mandate. But beyond the institutional challenge of building a virile and respectable judiciary is the greater challenge of moving the judiciary from the pedestal of conservatism to dynamism. The judiciary must liaise with other arms of government to push for the passage of relevant bills that could create the right operational environment for its entrenchment.

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Chapter 8

Nigeria (Con)Federal Structure? Emmanuel O. Ojo

Abstract  Nigeria, like several other plural and deeply divided societies, is a federation. The choice of federalism for Nigeria is a function of both historical antecedents combined with her peculiar existential realities. The ultimate aim of the founding fathers was definitely to weld together the disparate ethnic groups that constitute the federation. It is against this background that Nigeria’s federalism is regarded as a ‘catch-­all management strategy’. However, contemporary developments in Nigeria’s convoluting federalism are indeed a pointer to serious problem of achieving national integration thereby truncating the aspirations of the founding fathers. More so, that the travails of federalism in Nigeria are getting exacerbated as a result of the mismanagement of the system. Hence, Nigerians and non-Nigerians are calling for alternative system(s). The most popular one brandished in public discourses is confederacy. Thus, this paper critically discussed con(federal) option for Nigeria. The paper however posits that a reorganized and balanced fiscal federalism with imbued democratic ethos such as, fair play, justice and equity is more pragmatic than the present warped federal arrangement that may eventually go the way of disintegrated Soviet federation. Keywords  Federalism · Confederacy · Pluralism · Travails · Restructure

Introduction You cannot continue to tie people together by force. One day, people are bound to successfully resist it, be it 50 years or in a 100 years time. And when that time comes, Nigeria will destabilize. (Aguda 1998:1&2)

The above quotation by Akinola Aguda (of blessed memory), an eminent international jurist, represents the height of frustration with the travails of federal solution in Nigeria. The concomitant effect of the heightened disappointment with the performance of Nigeria’s convoluting federalism vis-à-vis the challenge of national integration and political development of the polity has resulted into E. O. Ojo (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_8

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strident calls in some quarters for con(federal) option or at best political restructuring of the country in anticipation of true federalism which Nigerians are clamouring for. No doubt, going by public perception of Nigerians, coupled with a number of ­concerned members of the global village, the polity is at a crossroad (see Kinnan et al. 2011). The snag, however, is the palpable inability of the federal system to sufficiently respond to the three classic challenges of the postcolonial state, namely, national unity, democratic stability and socio-economic development (Suberu 2009:67–68). By several accounts, however, the record of Nigerian federalism in managing this triple challenge is largely disastrous. Various analysis have portrayed the Nigerian federation as violently divided, democratically unstable, economically dysfunctional and ultimately, headed for collapse or disintegration (see, Herbst 2005; Ottaway et al. 2004; International Crisis Group 2006). At the heart of such pessimistic appraisals is the recognition of the rampant political corruption associated with the organization of the Nigerian federal system around the intergovernmental sharing of centrally collected oil revenues, much of which is then embezzled by ethno political actors at the federal, constituent state and local levels (Suberu 2009:68). It is not surprising therefore that Richard Joseph (cited in Soremekun 2009:11) described Nigeria as a ‘flawed pluralist democracy that must be helped to emerge from the labyrinth of corruption, fraudulent elections, sclerotic public services and pervasive poverty’. Not only that the political reality of Nigeria as a Third World country, which Africanists have described as ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’, ‘criminalized’, ‘rhizome’, ‘invisible’, ‘shadow’ (Amuwo 2004:316–17, also cited in Ojo 2009a:689)) and ‘the crippled giant’ (Osaghae 1998), all contributed to the findings of a team of American researchers which recently projected 2030 for Nigeria’s possible disintegration having failed as a state (see Kinnan et al. 2011). The fear, though not misplaced is that if former Soviet Union could disintegrate as a result of Russian hegemony between 1917 and 1991. Between 1954 when the foundation of Nigeria’s classical federal structure was laid till date, it has not been a bed of roses, more so with manifestations of stress suffered by the beleaguered federal polity. Following from the above introductory discussion, this paper is divided into five major sections. The first section is a description of Nigeria’s plural character. This provides a good background to the necessity of federalism cum the imperatives of balancing act. The next section dwells on the concepts of federalism and confederacy to avoid any misconception. The third section, however, bothers on the travails of federalism in Nigeria which necessitated the polemic on the viability of confederacy as a possible option for the stability of the polity. Section four considers the pros and cons of confederacy as an alternative political choice for Nigeria. The final part of the paper is on the dimension of possible reforms of the federal arrangement having noted the fact that confederacy’s feasibility is questionable.

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Nigeria’s Plural Character: A Comparative Analysis Nigeria like several other new states and segmented societies must contend with the problem of integrating her numerous and diverse ethnic groups that constitute the federation (Ojo 2009b:11). According to A.H.M Kirk-Green, Nigeria has well over 400 ethnic groups (1969:4). For Suberu (1998:277), Nigeria is one of the most ­ethnically diverse countries in all regions and climes of the world, and some of the ethnic groups are higher in number than many states of contemporary Africa. At the beginning of the 1960s, there were over 3000 ethnic groups in the whole world, about 1000 were represented in the continent of Africa and 445 of these in Nigeria alone (see, Mabogunje 1998:797–98). In that wise, ‘Nigeria has a relatively unique problem of achieving solidarity in action and purpose in the midst of hundreds of ethnic nationalities where justice reigns’ (Ojo 2005a, b:49). This uniqueness, in the words of Onwujeogwu (1995:60–79), creates ‘unique problems unknown to the experience of other peoples in the world … no Western or Eastern civilization has ever evolved a political system that can cope with this gigantic problem of hyper-ethnic instability syndrome’. As Crawford Young (cited in Joseph 2006:15) points out, ‘among federal democracies, India matches Nigeria in its degree of cultural complex’. Like the Indian federal state, which has been described as the land of a ‘million mutinies’ Nigeria is no doubt a divided and plural society (see Roy 2002:2, Anderson 2008). It is not a surprise, therefore that these ethnic groups are always in conflict and competition over resources. This is not unexpected especially between ethnically defined constituencies (Williams 1975: 131–157, 1980:69). The reason is that almost by definition, ethnic groups compete for the strategic resources of their respective society. This occurs because ethnic groups are sociocultural entities which, while inhabiting the same state, country or economic area, consider themselves biologically, culturally, linguistically or socially distinct from each other and most often view their relations in actual or potentially antagonistic terms (Cox 1976:371). The nature of ethnic groupings in each society and the competitive short-term tactics and long-term strategies they employ are functions of history and of the resources they seek to control (Fried 1967:71–72). Groups with more effective tactics and strategies normally gain competitive advantages over other groups within their societies. Yet this success is not without its concomitant problems. One of the problems is the challenge of national cohesion or integration, which is more of a mirage in plural and divided societies than in homogenous ones. It is in this regard that Weiner argues that ‘developing nations’ central problem that is often more pressing than economic development is the achievement of integration’ (Ojo 2002:3). From the foregoing, one can juxtapose Nigeria’s pluralism with several other countries, both new and old states. Such comparative analysis empirically shows that Nigeria is not the only multi-ethnic state in the world but rather that her pluralism is indeed deep. For instance, Germany’s numerous ethnic groups were forced

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into a Northern German Confederacy by Otto von Bismarck in 1867; when he united both Northern and Southern Germany’s 260 ethnic groups into the German Empire in 1871. Germany has since been one of the most powerful countries in the world. Italy’s independent city-states of Lombardy, Sardinia, Parma, Modena, Romagna, Tuscany, Sicily, Naples, Marches, Umbria, Mantua and Venetia were united into the Italian Empire by Garibaldi and King Victor Immanuel in 1869 and 1871, respectively. Apart from the minor separatist movement in Northern Italy and the Independent status granted within Rome to the Vatican Catholics, no realistic Italians are calling for the dissolution or weakening of Italy (Aluko 2005:33). Also Malaysia was created by the British which colonized it in 1867 and granted it independence in September 1963. Malaysia consists of former nine independent Malay Monarchies, each of which is an agglomeration of many ethnic groups. Malaysia is a federal parliamentary democracy with a Prime Minister and a Head of State, elected every 5 years by a council of hereditary rulers of the Malaysian 13 states and the 2 federal territories. Malaysia today has a population of 24.4 million (see also Aluko 2005). Switzerland is an agglomeration of Germans (65%), French (18%), Italians (10%) and Romanian (1%), with about 5–10 other ethnic groups making the remaining 6%, including Africans and Europeans. Yet, Switzerland is one of the most united, most peaceful and one of the happiest countries in the world. It has a population of only 7.2 million. It is a Federal Republic with a President elected by the Federal Assembly (Council of the Republic) for 1 year only, to ensure that the other ethnic groups have their respective terms in rotation as annual Heads of State. Switzerland has 20 full Cantons (states) and six half-Cantons, making in effect 26 states. Switzerland today has the third highest per capita income in the world, after Norway and Luxemburg. Switzerland is a federal parliamentary democracy (Aluko 2005). The United States with a population of 294 million is a federation of 50 states and a federal capital territory. It is a country of many ethnic groups from all over the world. The federal government is getting stronger vis-à-vis the component 50 states. It is the most expensive presidential system, which Nigeria has aped. The fact from these cases is that there is hardly any other country in the world today, federal or unitary, that has only a single ethnic group. Each country including even those that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union is a multiplicity of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, which is trying to accommodate many other ethnic groups by finding the highest common consensus of living together in peace, harmony and progress within the same polity (Aluko 2005). Nevertheless, the dynamics of pluralism in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society extends beyond ethnicity, making her plural character perhaps a bit more complex than the picture of the countries painted above. While it may be easy to acknowledge the ethnological visibilities and boundaries of the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo, it is certainly not easy to demarcate the boundaries of the so-called minority ethnic nationalities. The use of sociological, anthropological, cultural and linguistic classifications could assign as few as 375 minority ethnic nationalities or as many as 1450 such groups in the country. Geopolitically, Nigeria used to be seen on the basis

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of a North-South division, then a North-West-East division. In 1963, the now defunct Midwest region was created, and in 1967 the first wave of state creation was experienced, contemporary Nigeria has 36 internally complex and plural states, 774 local government areas and the federal capital territory (FCT) which operates as a quasi-state in terms of autonomy. Recently Nigeria’s pluralism acquired the additional vocabulary of a geopolitical structure of south-south, south-east, south-west, north-central, north-west and north-east (Oyovbaire 2001:29–30). There are also the complexities and pluralism of religion, religious’ sensibilities and organizations. It is generally acknowledged that the two important religions of Christianity and Islam, together with their denominational and intradenominational divisions, dominate the human landscape thus, exacerbating dynamics of cleavages. They compete with a variety of traditional or indigenous religions, so that certain individuals and families can and do transcend this religious terrain (Osaghae 2006:5). The rationale for drawing attention to these categories of Nigeria’s pluralism is to relate them to the problematic nature of integrating the disparate and diverse groups and interests in the multi-­ ethnic society.

Federalism and Confederacy: A Conceptual Classification Federalism According to Dudley (1963:95-103) concepts can be defined in various ways. But it needs be emphasized that one can obtain a useful definition of a concept only when the boundaries of the concept are reasonably clear. This is hardly the case with a concept like ‘federalism’. Though, Venter (1990) argues that federalism is not ‘an essentially contested concept’, but there are different and important emphases regarding its meaning. It should be noted ab initio that the aim of this section is to state as explicitly as possible what is meant by saying or classifying a government as being ‘federal’. If we admit that federalism has not achieved its founders’ mission in Nigeria, we need to ask whether Nigeria has been operating a federal system of government properly so-called or not. In essence, which system of government is federal or, put differently, what are the features of a federal state? This should be made clearer when we discuss the typology of federalism later in this section. We shall begin our analysis from Wheare (1963) who is generally regarded as the doyen of contemporary federal theories. In his famous book, Federal Government, he conceptualizes federalism or federal government as ‘…the method of dividing power so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere coordinate and independent’. In another of his work, he defines federalism further as ‘the delimited and coordinate division of government functions, and I have implied that to the extent to which any system of government does not conform to this criterion, it has no claim to call itself federal’ (Wheare 1943:34).

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It is not a surprise, therefore, that students of political constitutionalism and federalism in particular have viewed this definition as being very rigid, while commentators too have been displeased with the rigidity of the definition which when strictly applied, is likely to exclude all known federations. Wheare’s assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, it should be noted further that his definition is indeed legalistic and inflexible. The reason for this is not farfetched. Wheare used the United States as a paradigm of federal government. No doubt his model is static and Eurocentric. It may be the case that the definition of federalism must include the United States but it is simply not true that any federal system which is unlike America’s political life is thereby condemned as not federal. More so, when American federalism evolved and transformed in obedience to the dynamics of that country’s politics as observed by Oyovbaire (1979:78–91). He therefore defines federalism as the interaction between conflicts, consensus and resources, which normally takes place in an arena – a value system which underpins the perception of these phenomena by actors. Once societal forces had called federalism into existence, the arena of interaction itself becomes a factor in the political process. It therefore tends to acquire a legitimacy of its own. If the legitimacy is rooted, society can be said to possess a ‘federal attitude’, or lack it in a case of ‘converse experience’ (see Oyovbaire 1979). To avert the shortcomings of Wheare’s postulations about federalism, Carl Fredrick (1964:1) says that ‘federalism is a process rather than a design. Any particular design or pattern of competencies or jurisdiction is merely a phase, a short-­ run view of a continually evolving political reality’. He claims further that ‘if this is understood as the process of federalizing, it will become apparent that federalism may be operating in both the directions of integration and differentiation’. This definition is quite different from Wheare’s because it implies that federalism is a general principle of social organization and that the degree of federalism in a political system is a function of sociological and legal criteria. His definition can also be extended to nongovernmental associations. Nevertheless, Fredrick’s reformulation is less restrictive than Wheare’s. He went to the other extreme to argue that ‘federalism seems the most suitable term by which to designate the process of federalizing a political community, that is to say the process by which a number of separate political organizations  – be they states or any kind of association  – enter into arrangements for working out solution…’ (Fredrick 1965:9). He thus extends the concept of federalism to the international level. An avid reader may like to ask: How can we identify a federal system of government if we see one? Carl Fredrick sets out the following requisite conditions that any political entity is expected to possess before it can be so regarded: (a) An assembly of representatives of the component communities, which after instituting the league usually by way of a charter or treaty, amends it when necessary. (b) An executive establishment of sorts to carry out the decisions of the assembly. (c) An arbiter or judicial body interpreting the treaty in its bearing upon the relations between them and the league as a whole, thus seeking to eliminate the recourse to arms.

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Another notable scholar of federalism is William Livingston, (cited in Dare 1979: 32) who also looked beyond the legal formulation of the general systemic view. He asserts that ‘the essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shaping of legal force – economic, social, political, cultural – they have made the outward forms of federalism necessary …’. He avers further that ‘the essence of federation is not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected’. Livingston classified federal political systems into two. There is the formal constitutional dimension which is the unwritten constitution, which has to do with the existence of a charismatic leader, national political party, existence of external military or diplomatic threat, real or assumed national disaster and military intervention. Although, Livingston’s (see Dare 1979) definition took the sociological dimension, William Riker has picked holes in his juristic element entirely. He says that there are two prerequisites to federalism which are necessary and sufficient. The first is expansion condition, and the second is military condition. Ricker believes that these two predispositions are essential in a federal system. On the former he claims that leaders are likely to agree to unite if they expect to participate in a foreign adventure, and if leaders expect an aggression from outside to attack them, they unite. A consideration of these two conditions would reveal that Riker is preoccupied with unification and sees federations evolving through unification rather than disintegration (see, Riker 1964). Meanwhile, Daniel Elazar (1973–1974:80) seems to have helped matters a bit. He defines federalism as a System of political organisation uniting separate states or other units in such a way as to allow each to remain a political entity. A federal system which differs from other methods of organizing states in being based on a contractual agreement by separate governments to share power among themselves.

Admittedly, no two existing or moribund federal systems of government are identical. Each one differs from the other according to the circumstances of its formation and history. The well-known federations of the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, India and recently the defunct federations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have their commonalities. Elazar has a good summary of what these commonalities may be, which he calls principles and characteristics. He considers some of these basics while he regards as supplementary a constellation of the others. The three basic principles are: (a) A written constitution (b) Non-centralization (c) A real division of power The supplementary characteristics are: (d) Elements maintaining union (e) Elements maintaining non-centralization (f) Elements maintaining federal principles (g) Written constitution (cited in Ogban-Iyam 1998:80)

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In his own contribution, Ayoade (1988:6) also a notable student of federalism conceptualizes federalism as ‘a conditional alliance characterized by considerable tolerance of competing centres of power’. Recently, a national newspaper attempted a definition of federalism in its classical formulation as ‘a political and ­constitutional system of government with a de-concentration of power upon the constituent states or nationalities’ (see, The Guardian, June 16, 1997:14). A federal system is not only decentralized, it is also deconcentrated and democratic. In this way meaningful freedom and autonomy are exercised by the states in the internal governance of their people, while the federal government acts as the constitutional and political scaffold for the guarantee of defence and security and the regulation of international relations, among the common functions, (Dudley 1963). For the purpose of this paper therefore, we like to admit with Livingston that federalism is a function, not of constitution, but of societies. As Birch (Cited in Dudley 1963) puts it, ‘its essence lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself’. Livingston (cited in Dare 1979) expressed much the same opinion when he wrote that ‘federalism arrives out of and expresses in a daily plebiscite, the desire of the constituent communities to place themselves under a single government and the freedom to experiment and to protect their individually’. But it is important to remember that ‘independence’ and ‘self-government’ are not absolute terms. What is important is not the legalistic constructions but the response of such constructions to the wishes of the people and the dictate of the times (Elazar 1972:26). The problem of conceptualization becomes compounded by the fact that ‘there are several varieties of political arrangements to which the term has properly been applied’ (cited in Ayoade 1988). It is, therefore, not a surprise that Max Frankel has identified a total of 460 types of federations (see Ayoade 1988). In view of the foregoing, it will not serve any useful purpose to extend our definitions further. Little wonder then, that Ayoade (1982:13–14) argues that the ‘concept of federalism has died’. That it suffered death by qualification. The history of the concept of federalism is a tangled mass of definitions. This is why it is now accompanied by an endless parade of hyphenations or adjectives. These include dual federalism, cooperative federalism, centralized federalism, mature federalism, national federalism, new federalism, creative federalism, dynamic federalism, true federalism and permissive federalism, to name just a few. According to Elazar (1968:353), part of the definitional problem of federalism arises from the difficulty of relating theoretical formulations in federalism with the actual operation of federal systems. Confusion has also been generated by difficulties in distinguishing between the federal principle as a broad social concept and federalism to a narrower political device and by the problem of differentiating authentically federal systems from political systems, which merely utilize elements of the federal principle. But the crux of the matter still remains unresolved. Finally, the question comes to the mind once again: How does one discern and classify a federal system of government? To this we can now allude to a typology by Dudley (1963), which is still valid for recognition and identification of a federal system of government with these four possible combinations:

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Type 1 – A federal constitution with federal practice Type 2 – A non-federal constitution but federal practice Type 3 – A federal constitution but non-federal practice Type 4 – A non-federal constitution and non-federal practice From the foregoing, Nigeria represents a polity with a federal constitution to some extent but non-federal practice and that is perhaps the major absurdity of the system. In view of the above polemic vis-à-vis identification of federal state, a typology of federal variation as collated by Suberu (2009:71) in an insightful work recently readily comes to our aid which I now adopt extensively. He noted that Alfred Stepan (1999) has famously distinguished among three modes of federation building ‘coming together’ unions that emerge from the political integration of previously sovereign entities (the United States, Australia, Switzerland); ‘holding together’ federations that develop from the constitutional implementation of devolutionary arrangements as a conflict-management strategy in erstwhile unitary states (India, Spain, Nigeria); and ‘putting together’ systems involving, as in the former USSR, ‘a heavily coercive effort by a non-democratic centralizing power to put together a multinational state’ (Stepan 1999:23). A different but related, classification (see McGarry 2005; O’Leary 2005) distinguishes between national or mono-national federations that are established to promote nation-building rather than to empower distinct ethnic-territorial communities (the United States, Germany, Australia, Malaysia, South Africa and the Latin American federations of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela), on the one hand, and multination or plural-national federations that are designed specifically to accommodate territorially based identity communities (Switzerland, Canada in relation to Quebec, India, Russia Belgium and Ethiopia), on the other. Among other design choices, national federations tend to enshrine the constitutional primacy of the central government, to assign the same constitutional powers to the federal subunits and to use the subunit boundaries to intersect or cross-cut cultural identity boundaries. Multinational federations, on the other hand, tend to be constitutionally decentralized and asymmetrical (with different unit enjoying distinct, culturally specific competencies), and to endow and empower identity communities with their own constituent governments. A final taxonomy locates federations along a continuum from coordinate through cooperative to organic federalism according to whether the power relationship between constituent and central governments is characterized by relative independence, interdependence or dependence. In this regard, Nigeria’s transition from a coordinate or centrifugal federation into a more organic or centripetal system, with a constitutionally and fiscally hegemonic central government, has been one of the most remarkable features of the country’s post-independence political development. Indeed, the birth and design of many federations, including the Canadian and Indian federal experiments, has often entailed a hybrid of federal processes. Thus, while Nigeria, like India, would appear to be a classic case of ‘holding together’ federalism, elements of Stepan’s two other modes of federal system creation have shaped the country’s political evolution.

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The different components of what eventually became Nigeria, for instance, were forced together by British colonialism from 1860 to 1914. British colonial policy, however, failed to integrate the diverse Nigerian peoples. Instead, the country came into independence in 1960 as a centrifugal union of the large ethnic regions in what ‘appeared to be a coming together’ multinational federation (Keller 2002:24). This colonially bequeathed tripartite ethno-regional federal system promoted the hegemony of the three major ethnic groups in general – and the oversized northern region (the base of the Hausa/Fulani) in particular. The system fuelled ethnic majority chauvinism, minority insecurity and interregional polarization, thereby destabilizing Nigeria’s first Republic (1960–1966). This set the stage for the intervention of the soldiers, ethno-military infighting, the attempted succession of the Ibo-­ dominated Eastern Region and the subsequent Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) (see, Suberu 2009). From the above typology, one can glaringly discern why Nigeria’s federal arrangement is convoluting. But the real reason why it is so shall be brought to the limelight later in this paper.

Confederation This term is descriptive of an association of autonomous states coming together for achievement of certain common purposes. Confederation is not a state but an association of sovereign states. Early example of confederation is the Achaean League formed by Alexander in Greece. In modern times Switzerland was a confederation in the technical sense in 1621. In practical reality there exists no confederation in the world. The following are the features of a confederation: (i) Confederation is formed by a mutual treaty or agreement signed by sovereign states. (ii) Confederation has a central organ through which the member states express their opinions on a variety of subjects. (iii) Confederation’s central organization does not make statues. (iv) Confederation has no citizens (Chaturvedi 2006:64). Confederation is usually designed for the purpose of promoting or accomplishing certain common objectives without necessarily sacrificing the sovereignty or governmental autonomy of member states. The powers of the central government are extremely limited in number and scope, and they deal chiefly with problems of external security. The central government does not have dual authority over the individual, but must act through the agency of the member states. The organizational features of this system generally include participation in some kind of judicial or arbitral machinery to reduce or solve problems of internal dissension. Voting in the central legislature is usually by states which are represented according to the principle of equality. A confederation is a more loose form of association than an alliance, since the former has come out of established central agencies of government having authority

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over a greater degree of permanence. In comparison, confederation and federation should not be used interchangeably. The Swiss federation is entitled ‘Swiss Confederation’, but this may be misleading as the two cannot and should not be used interchangeably. Unfortunately, some writers have also not cared to distinguish them. Federation and confederation do resemble each other in three respects: (i) Both are derived from the same root, ‘foedus’ (ii) Both constitute an alliance between independent and sovereign states (iii) Both create a common centre (see, Chaturvedi 2006) But their similarities end here. There are vast differences between the two. In a federation, two states are not envisaged. It makes only one state and, therefore, one sovereignty. The units of a federation are not really states. It is a misnomer if they are so named. They are subordinate lawmaking bodies with guaranteed powers. They are not sovereign, but autonomous within their sphere of powers as the national government is within its own sphere of jurisdiction. What is divided in a federation between the centre and units are the powers of government, and not sovereignty (Kapur 2006:214 see also, Ojo 2009b). There were a number of confederations in the ancient world and among the early Italian city-states. Later examples include the Rheims confederation (1254–1250), the Hanseatic League (1367–1669), the Holy Roman Empire (1526–1806), the Swiss Confederation (1291–1789 and 1803–1848) and the United Netherlands (1576–1746). The best known examples were the American Confederation (1781–1789) and the German Confederation (1885–1867). Both were supplanted by the federal system of government. The confederal states of America (1861–1865) operated only under emergency wartime conditions and were never really in a position to demonstrate the efficacy of their constitution, which was based on that of the United States (a federal form) but proposed to allow considerably greater sovereignty to the component states (Feilman 1997:149). Similarly, a confederation is, in the words of Forsyth, (see Feilman 1997) essentially a permanent treaty-based wins between several states to enable them to exercise certain key policies in common. But unlike in most federations, in a confederation the right of secession is always an integral part, written or implied, of the confederal contract or treaty. As Forsyth puts it, in a confederation ‘sovereignty has not passed unequivocally to the centre’ (cited in Feilman 1997).

Travails of Federalism in Nigeria Since 1954 when the foundation of classical federalism was laid by the colonial masters, Nigeria has been reeling from one problem to the other, making national integration and cohesion unattainable. A number of reasons are responsible for the travails of federalism, which have made the polity convoluting since then (Ojo 2009b). It will be recalled that Nigeria was one of a number of federations that the British created in their retreat from empire. India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the West

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Indies, Central Africa, East Africa, Canada and Australia are earlier examples. In any case, the postcolonial federations of the 1950s and 1960s had a very mixed history: three failed entirely, while Malaysia and Pakistan split. Only Nigeria and India endured totally intact, but Nigeria’s history was much more troubled than India’s. While both countries had tremendous diverse populations, Nigeria was dealt a much poorer hand than India for a stable federation (Anderson 2008:2). Unlike India there was little sense of Nigerian identity. Nigeria in 1960 when the country got flag independence was reminiscent of Italy in 1867, when Garibaldi famously said ‘we’ve made Italy, now we need to make Italians’ (cited in Anderson 2008:2). Till date, Nigeria has not been able to resolve at once her citizenship problem (see, Ojo 2009a). The degree of loyalty to the constitution, particularly the sections relating to the formal division of powers between and among levels of government is important to federal stability. Though, the idea that constitutions can be used to manage ethnicity and ethnic conflicts is a fairly recent one (Osaghae 2009:1), but it represents one of the major paradigmatic gains of the shift in constitutional discourses and development from the formalistic philosophical and rather static formulations of the legal-­ constitutional perspectives that dominated the field for a long time to the more inclusive, adaptive, dynamic and problem-solving perspectives that emphasize the political, social, economic and global aspects of constitution making and operation (Osaghae 2009:1). The development of these latter perspectives owes a lot to the search for appropriate political and constitutional ‘solution’ and ‘settlements’ for Third World countries caught in the throes of decolonization, chronic and protracted conflicts, civil war, crises and instabilities. Divided multi-ethnic states, which have a notorious tendency to be unstable and to defy conventional political solutions, constitute the most problematic category of states in this regard (Osaghae 2009). Perhaps the most direct bearing between federal constitution and the management of ethnicity is not unconnected with the fact that federalism is basically a juristic concept, much of its success or failure would depend on the extent to which the central and constituent governments define their powers, territories and other provisions in the constitution. It is not a surprise that since 1954, constitutions were drafted in quick successions with not satisfying the yearnings and aspirations of Nigerians as if the only panacea for federal stability is the constitution, whereas in the words of Alfa Belgore – a former Chief Justice: The elite are making terrible encroachments into the constitution; our elite are very selfish people. The constitution is a very sacred document but our people don’t have respect for it. Everything in the constitution is like a gentleman’s agreement between the state and the people which must so respect. (see, The Nation, January 2, 2007:pp. 1 & 2)

Thus, any federal arrangement like Nigeria’s where the constitution is not taken as an upright and sacred document, which must be respected by all no matter how highly placed, coupled with rare obedience to court verdicts, federalism definitely runs into troubled waters. In essence, operators of the system at all levels need to evolve a completely different attitude to the organic document of the state. Ivor Jenning (1940:10–11) has also said that apart from the loyalty of the politicians to the constitution, much also depends on the constitutional loyalty of professional soldiers to the success of a federal arrangement.

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Until the last 18 years, the Nigerian military has little or no regard for the constitution (see, Ojo 2006, 2009b); whereas, authors like Wheare (1967:47) and Maddox (1941:125) held the view that federalism is most likely to succeed under democratic, not totalitarian conditions. As Maddox (1941), puts it, ‘there can be no such thing as a federation which includes totalitarian regimes denying free, political action …’. On this ground, the former USSR with its one-party totalitarian system was not regarded as a true federation. In other words, federalism never worked successfully whether in military dictatorship or civilian absolutism. Nonetheless, unlike Switzerland which, in spite of being a very small country but is one of the most decentralized countries in the world as noted by Arnold Koller (2002:27), Nigeria’s federal system is highly centralized. This is not unconnected with enduring military rule in Nigeria coupled with the fact that the military is commandist in nature (Ojo 2009b:52). The absurdity of protracted military rule on the federal arrangement is no doubt over-centralization which eventually turned the polity to a military arrangement rather than a federal one (Eliagwu 1998:6–7). Another observable travail of federalism in Nigeria is structural imbalance. According to Mill’s law of federal stability, ‘a federation is morbid if one part of the federation is bigger than the sum of the other parts’ (see, Ayoade 1987, 1988). The Nigerian system is, indeed, far from being balanced. The problem is not unconnected with the awkward and lopsided origins of the Nigerian federal structure, which has created problems of permanent dimensions. The division of the country into three units turned the federation into an asymmetric territorial association in which the North was equal to the sum of the other two parts that is the West and East. It is true that there is no federal system in the world in which the constituent states or regions are even or merely equal in size, population, political power, administrative skills, economic development or relative geographical location (Frenkel 1986:65) but wherever the disparity is as great as to make one constituent state permanently dominant in collective decisions, it results into military centralism rather than federalism. Indeed, from empirical indications, this structural imbalance generated fear of domination among the other groups in the country, especially the so-called minorities. More recent developments in terms of states’ and local governments’ creation exercises as well as recruitment into public office have resurfaced the lopsided nature of the structure of the Nigerian federation (Ojo and Adebayo 2008:334–367). The feeling that the federation is tilted to the advantage of one of its component units tends to transform the federation into an imperial structure (Duchacek 1970:195). It is the foregoing that breeds the problem of hegemonic domination by the major ethnic groups in the country. It is also for these reasons that the minorities are restless (see, Ojo 2000:44–53). If anything, the greatest travail of Nigerian federalism is the problem of asymmetric power relationships between and among the disparate component units of the federation. The federation is rife with mutual accusations and counter-accusations of domination and marginalization. The South is aggrieved by what it calls political domination by the North (Ojo 2005a, b). On the other hand, the North too is less comfortable with Southern domination of strategic sectors of the economy, most

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especially the bureaucracy. In the same vein, Ayoade (1987:184) observes that religious bias has proved to be another form of poor power distribution in Nigerian federalism. For instance, in the second republic (1979–1983), ‘countrywide, Moslems obtained about 70 per cent of all executive and board positions’. Furthermore, the problematic nature of Nigeria’s citizenship is another travail of Nigeria’s federalism, which has in no small measure undermined the efficacy of the federal structure, unlike in India where there is no dual citizenship, in which case there is only one Indian citizenship, and where the concept of a state citizen does not exist (Sangma 2002:35). To be employed outside one’s ethnic base at state level in Nigeria is really a big risk in the sense that such a person would bear the burden of a ‘non-indigene’. Indeed, there is a conscious notion of ‘my state’, or ‘my home’ which afflicts every Nigerian who lives outside his state of origin and makes him go ‘home’ to marry a wife, to build a house or to vote. Even the dead are rarely buried outside their states of origin. The implication of this is that citizens’ allegiance to the federation is truncated because of the state’s preferential treatment of its citizens. Yet, the citizens that are discriminated against pay taxes and perform other civic duties in their states of residence. A system whereby the state cannot effectively tackle the problem of citizenship negates the tenets of federalism. Laski’s view is apt: ‘a state must give to men their dues as men before it can demand, at least with justice, their loyalty’ (Laski 1982:89). As a result of the mismanagement of the system, in recent times, there has been a dramatic surge in xenophobic expressions, the hardening of ethno-religious positions and the proliferation of ethnic militias that have unleashed varying degrees of violence and terror on the polity (Egwu 2001:1). In a perceptive work, Ikengah-­ Metuh (1994) identified three broad types of religious violence in Nigeria, viz, (i) interreligious disturbances which occur between different denominations or sects; (ii) interreligious conflicts prevalent between adherents of different religious beliefs but capable of assuming socio-economic dimensions; and (iii) interreligious conflicts, which though have socio-economic origins, end up in the form of religious conflicts. A survey of ethno-religious conflicts between 1999 when democracy was inaugurated till date shows that they are worrisome developments which threaten harmonious coexistence and jeopardize the unity of the Nigerian nation-state with its fledging democratic experiment far more than any other challenge of democratic sustenance and consolidation (Ojo 2008:368–378). The absurdities of federalism discussed in this section are far from being exhaustive. Few other salient ones that space constraints do not permit includes the need for constitutional reforms, fiscal federalism, weak state of intergovernmental relations and perennial minority rights problem among others (see, Aiyede 2009:249–269).

Confederal Structure: How Feasible? In the Nigerian case, there has been very little consensus or clarity regarding the composition of the ethnic federations that would make up the proposed Nigerian confederacy (Suberu 1995:23). However, the Movement for National Reformation

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(MNR) way back in 1993 had published a position paper advocating the restructuring of Nigeria into a union of the following eight federations: (a) Western Federation – comprising the present Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states (b) South Central Federation – comprising the present Edo and Delta states (c) East Central Federation – comprising the present Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Imo states (d) South-Eastern Federation  – comprising the present Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Rivers states (e) Central Federation  – comprising the present Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna and Plateau states (f) North-Eastern Federation – comprising the present Adamawa, Borno, Taraba and Yobe states (g) Northern Federation  – comprising Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto states (h) West Central Federation – comprising Niger, Kogi and Kwara states (see, The Guardian, January 28, 1993) Despite the MNR’s elaborate proposals and others, the feasibility or viability of a Nigerian confederation is bogus indeed. According to Chuba Okadigbo, a former Senate President: … Nigerian confederation, though perhaps desirable will be very difficult to negotiate and even harder to create … who will implement confederal plan? – the soldiers from Northern Nigeria with cards placed face down or those from the Middle Belt … who may become very vulnerable to domination by their brethren of the far Northern sector? Or do the advocates of confederacy think that Nigerians will gladly gather round on table and gleefully dispense off the federation and its resources by sheer appeal to simple and often fraudulent geographical stratification? (see, African Concord, August 7, 1986:11–12)

Moreover, given the volatility and complexity of Nigeria’s cultural divisions, it should be obvious that the country’s ethnic problems would not disappear in a looser confederation (Diamond 1987:209–226). But the most compelling argument against confederation is that it is actually ‘a polite strategy for the dissolution of Nigeria’ (African Concord, August 7, 1986). As West Africa (August 5, 1985) opines, ‘a debate about confederation can hardly be described as a discussion about Nigeria’s political future, it is more about how to end the existence of Nigeria as one entity in the future’. A final perspective on Nigeria’s political future, while it does not explicitly advocate the dissolution of Nigeria nevertheless, sees the country’s dissolution as a real possibility. Akinola Aguda, for instance, laments that he is no longer ‘sure that Nigeria will continue to exist … (as) we are today faced with the imminent danger of disintegration’ (see, Nigerian Tribune, 5 April, 1995:5). This view was also echoed by S.G. Ikoku who spoke of ‘a real threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria’ (Newswatch, 1 May, 1995:8). In October 1992, Bolaji Akinyemi warned against the convening of a sovereign national conference (SNC). This was because such a convention would vote for the dissolution of the Nigerian entity (Newswatch, 26 October, 1992:14). Adebayo Williams contends that the ‘question is no longer whether Nigeria will break-up but when’ (The News, 21 February 1994), while Tanko Yakasai proposed the organization of referendum that

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would enable ‘Nigerians to decide, once and for all, whether they want to continue as a single political entity or not’ (New Nigerian, July 6, 1992:25). Suggestions regarding Nigeria’s possible dismemberment reflect deep concern, frustration and alarm at the tragic failures and flaws of the Nigerian federalism. Yet, as historian J.F. Ade Ajayi argues ‘just as there are problems in trying to unscramble it and the problems of putting it asunder’ (The Guardian, 10 June, 1992:29); it may, in fact, be more onerous than the challenges of nurturing and sustaining Nigeria’s national integration.

Concluding Remarks From the foregoing, we have established the fact that confederacy may not be appropriate after all for Nigeria in view of her peculiar existential realities noted in this paper. With her characteristic plural nature, federalism is most suitable. However, the future of the country can only be secured with a federal arrangement that is imbued with democratic virtues of equality cum equitable distribution of resources. Above all, the contentious fiscal federalism and perhaps a redress of the aforementioned travails and absurdities of the federal arrangement is of great importance to eth stability and growth of Nigeria’s current convoluting federal system. No doubt, Nigeria will do better with a well-restructured federal system.

References Aguda, A. (1998), “Why Sovereign Conference is Imperative”, The Guardian, Lagos, (September 25). Aiyede, E.R. (2009), “The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism and the Dilemma of Constructing a Developmental State in Nigeria”. International Political Science Review, Vol. 30, No. 3. Aluko, S. (2005), “The National Political Reform Dialogue and Nigeria’s Future”, Nigerian Tribune, Ibadan (11 March). Amuwo, K. (2004). “State Repair and Democratic Development in Africa”, in Africa at the Cross-­ roads (eds). John Mukum Mbaku and Soresh Chandra Saxenus, London, Praeger. Anderson, G. (2008), Notes for an Address to the Nigerian Bar Association Annual Conference, held on 25th August, Abuja. Nigeria by President and Chief Executive Officer of the Forum of Federations, Canada. Ayoade, J.A.A. (1982), Federalism in Nigeria: The Worship of an Unknown God”, paper presented at a Special Seminar held at the Institute of African Studies on Wednesday, (10 February). Ayoade, J.A.A., (1987), ‘Ethnic Managment in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution’, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. xiv no 1 Ayoade, J.A.A. (1988), Federalism in Nigeria: The Problem with the Solution”, Being a Faculty Lecture delivered on (13th July), Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Chaturvedi, A.K. (2006), Dictionary of Political Science, Academic (India) Publishers, New Delhi. Cox, O.C. (1976), Caste, Class and Race: A Study of Social Dynamics. New  York, Modern Paperbacks.

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Dare, L. (1979), “Perspectives in Federalism”, in A.B.  Akinyemi et  al. (eds.). Readings in Federalism, NIIA Publication, Lagos. Diamond, L. (1987), Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic, African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 343. Duchacek, I. (1970), Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimensions of Politics. New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston. Dudley, B.J. (1963), “The Concept of Federalism”, Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1. Egwu, S. (2001), Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria, African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV), Abuja, Nigeria. Elazar, D.A., (1968), ‘Federalism’, in International Encylopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vols 5 & 6 (London Collier-Macmillan). Elazar, D.J. (1972), “The Ends of Federalism: Notes Towards a Theory of Federal Political Arrangement”, in Max Frankel (ed), Partnership in Federalism, Berns, Pater Lang. Elazar, D.J. (1973–1974), ‘Federalism’ in Encyclopedia Britannica (Macrophedia) Vol. 4, Chicago, Helen Hemmingway, Benton Publishers. Eliagwu, I. (1998), “Federal Structure for Sustainable National Development, The Herald, Ilorin (30 September-October 6). Feilman, D. (1997), “Confederation”, in Collier’s Encyclopedia, Vol. 7, New York. Fredrick, C. (1964), “New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice”, paper presented to the 6th World Conference of the International Political Science Association. Fredrick, C. (1965), Federalism: National and International, Oxford University Press. Frenkel, M. (1986), “Federal Theory”, Camberry Centre for Research in Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University. Fried, M.H. (1967), The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology. Random House, New York. Herbst, J. (2005), ‘The ticking time bomb that’s Nigeria’, The Wall Street Journal, (March 1). Ikengah-Metuh, E. (1994), Two Decades of Religious Conflict in Nigeria: A Recipe for Peace, Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology. Vol. 6, No. 1. International Crisis Group. (2006). ‘Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment’, Africa Report No. 119, (25 October). Jenning, I. (1940), A Federation for Western Europe. London, Macmillan. Joseph, R. (2006), “Mis-governance and the African Predicament: Can the Code Be Broken?”, Faculty Distinguished Lecture Series No.1 delivered on Thursday 30 November), Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Kapur, A.C. (2006), Principles of Political Science, S.  Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, India. Keller, E. (2002), Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No. 1. Kirk-Green, A.H.M. (1969), “The Peoples of Nigeria”, Journal of African Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 262 (Jan.). Kinnan, C.J., Gordon, D.B., DeLong, M.D., Jaquish, D.W. and McAllum, R.S. (2011), Failed State 2030: Nigeria-A case study, Occasional Paper No. 67, Centre for Strategy and Technology, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, US. Koller, A. (2002), “Swiss Federations” in Roundtable on Mechanism of Inter-governmental Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, India. Laski, H. (1982), A Grammar of Politics, (7th Impression), London, Allen and Unwin. Mabogunje, A.L. (1998), ‘NIGERIA’, in Regional Survey of the World: Africa South of the Sahara, 28th Edition, Europe Publications Limited, London. McGarry, J. (2005), ‘Guardian Lessons for Iraq’, in B. O’Leary, J. McGarry & K. Saliu (eds), The Future Kurdistan in Iraq, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania press. Maddox, W.P. (1941), “The Political Basis of Federation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 6.

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O’Leary, B. (2005), ‘Power-sharing, Pluralist Federation and Federacy’ in B. O’Leary, J. McGarry & K. Salito (eds). The Future Kurdistan in Iraq, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Ogban-Iyam, O. (1998), “Federalism in Nigeria: Past, Present and Future” in Tunde Babawale, et  al. (eds.), Re-Inventing Federalism in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives, Fredrick Ebert Foundation, Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos. Ojo, O.E. (2000), “Nigeria’s New Modes of Power Sharing: A Prognosis”, African Notes, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1&2. Ojo, O.E. (2002), “Integrative Mechanism in a Federal State: The Case of Nigeria”, being a Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Ojo, O.E. (2005a), “Federal Character Principle and National Integration in Nigeria”. International Review of Politics and Development. Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan.). Ojo, O.E. (2005b), “Federalism and National Cohesion”, in Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi T. Suberu (eds.), Nigerian Federalism in Crisis: Critical Perspectives and Political Options, John Archers (Publishers) Ltd., Ibadan. Ojo, O.E. (2006), “Taming the Monster: Demilitarization and Democratization in Nigeria”. Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Winter Issue). Ojo, O.E. (2008), “A Survey of Ethno-Religious Crisis in Nigeria and its Implications for Democracy”, in Ojo, O.E. (ed), Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria, John Archers Publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria. Ojo, O.E. and Adebayo, P.F. (2008), “The Politics of States and Local Governments’ Creation and Nigeria’s Search for Geo-Political Balancing”, African Research Review, Vol. 2, No. 3. Ojo, O.E. (2009a), “Guarding the Guardians: A Prognosis of Panacea for Evolving Stable Civil-­ Military Relations in Nigeria”, Armed Forces and Society Vol. 35, No. 4, (July). Ojo, O.E. (2009b), Mechanisms of National Integration in a Multi-Ethnic Federal State: The Nigerian Experience. John Archers (Publishers) Ltd., Ibadan, Nigeria. Onwujeogwu, M.A. (1995), “Indigenous Socio-Economic and Political Organisations and their Relevance to Development in Contemporary Nigeria”, Ilorin Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1, No. 2 (February). Osaghae, E.E., (1998), Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant, Hurst and Co., London. Osaghae, E.E. (2006), Federalism and Political Accommodation: The Nigeria Experience in Comparative Perspective, NISER Distinguished Lecture Series, No. 1. Osaghae, E.E. (2009), “Federal Constitution and the Management of Ethnicity in Nigeria, being text of a speech delivered on the occasion of public presentation of Mechanisms of National Integration in a multi-ethnic Federal State: The Nigerian Experience”, authored by Emmanuel O. Ojo, at the University of Ibadan Conference Centre, U.I., Nigeria on June 18th 2009. Ottaway, M., Herbst, J. & Mills, G., (2004), Africa’s big States: Toward a New Realism, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnagie Endowment for International Peace, (February). Oyovbaire, S. (2001), “The Media and Democratic Process in Nigeria”, Text of a lecture delivered at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos, in Guardian The, Lagos, August 29–30. Oyovbaire, E.E., (1979), ‘The Theory of Federalism: A Critical Appraisal’, Nigerian Journal of Political Scinecde, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June). Riker, W.H. (1964), Federalism: Origin Operation, Significance, Boston, Little Brown. Roy, A.N. (2002), ‘Introduction’ in Roundtable on Mechanisms of Inter-Governmental Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, India. Sangma, P.A. (2002), “Understanding Federalism in India” in Roundtable on Mechanism of Intergovernmental Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, India. Soremekun, K. (2009), “What Will it Take?” Nigerian Compass (Jan. 14), Isheri, Ogun State, Nigeria. Stepan, A. (1999), Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the … Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 4.

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Suberu, R.T. (1995), “Federalism Ethnicity and regionalism in Nigeria”, being a revised draft paper presented to the Conference in “The Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria”, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA, November 10-14. Suberu, R.T. (1998), “States Creation and the Political Economy of Nigerian Federalism”, in Kunle Amuwo et al. (eds.). Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria. Spectrum Books Ltd. and IFRA, Ibadan. Suberu, R.T. (2009), “Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective”, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March). Venter, A.J. (1990), South Africa: (Con)Federal Structures?, Plural Societies, Vol. XIX, Nos. 2&3 (March). Wheare, K.C. (1943), “What Federal Government Is”, in Patrick Ransome (ed), Studies in Federal Planning, Macmillan, London. Wheare, K.C. (1963), Federal Government (4th Edition), Oxford University press. Wheare, K.C., (1967), ‘Federal Government, (Fourth Edition), London, Oxford University Press. Williams, G. (1975), “Competition Within Ethnic Systems in Africa” in Leo A.  Despress (ed). Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies. The Hague, Morton Publishers. Williams, G. (1980), “State and Society in Nigeria”, Idanre, Afrografika.

Newspapers and Newsmagazines African Concord (Lagos). Business Times (Lagos). Daily Times (Lagos). New Nigerian (Kaduna). Newswatch (Lagos). Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan). Sunday Punch (Lagos). The Guardian (Lagos). The Nation (Lagos). The News (Lagos). The Punch (Lagos). The Source (Lagos).

Chapter 9

Local Government/Governance System in Nigeria Toyin Abe and Femi Omotoso Abstract  Nigeria is federal system with three layers or tiers of government. The local government councils occupy the lowest place in the structure. The local government has gone through series of transformations to make its operations modern, efficient and productive. However, despite all efforts at making local governance efficient, the system has been incapable of achieving the goals of establishing it. The blame is partly attributed to the under interference of the state government which very often turn local government to a more or less `another ministry’ that must be controlled for it’s own good to the detriment of local administration and the people at the grassroots. Keywords  Local government · Local administration · Local governance · Grassroots · Financial autonomy

Introduction The system of local government is believed to exist in every nation of the world, albeit, with variations in its essential features such as constitutional status, historical structure and level of autonomy (Ezeani 2006:253). In Nigeria, local government exists as the lowest and third tier of administration within the country’s federal structure. The federal constitution being operated in the country recognizes the existence of three administrative levels of governance, namely, the federal government, state government and local government. Each of these tiers of government has its spheres of functions and responsibilities. The federal government, for example, has jurisdiction and control over exclusive constitutional responsibility on issues contained in the ‘Exclusive Legislative List’, while the state government exercises control over the ‘Concurrent Legislative List’ and the local government over ‘Residual List’. This implies the existence of legal and administrative decentralization of

T. Abe (*) · F. Omotoso Department of Political Science, Ekiti State University, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_9

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authority and power by a higher level of government to a local community with a will of its own, performing specific functions within the wider national framework. Local government as an institution of governance is thus created for meeting the peculiar needs of the people at the grassroots as it relates to the provision and sustainability of infrastructural development (Agagu 1997; Khalil and Adelabu 2012). Beyond the need to decentralize power, the resilience, relevance and continued existence of local government as an institution is predicated among others on the need to engender and promote local autonomy; enhance participatory democracy at the grassroots; promote the efficient utilization of local resources; provide local services; and serve as vehicle for rural socio-economic development (Adamolekun 1983; Ola 1984; Bello-Imam 1996; Olowu 2000; Ekpe 2012). Furthermore, the idea of local government involves a philosophical commitment to the ideals of democratic participation in the governing process at the grassroots level. This commitment is anchored on the assumption that ‘citizens have special knowledge that is indispensable for the development of practice-oriented, effective, and meaningful solutions to problems’ (Fischer 2000). It thus, involves a search for new, more direct ways through which citizens may influence government and hold them accountable (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999: 2), through the 'utilization of local peoples’ knowledge about local conditions in solving local problems more efficiently’ (Osamani 2001:6). This way, it is expected that citizens themselves get to play a role in the process of policymaking, by proposing policy options (Gramberger 2001:16).

Local Government: Meaning, Character and Functions Local government, which can be simply described as government at the grassroots level has been defined by various scholars in different ways (Orewa and Adewumi 1981 (please delete 1991) 1991:22). According to the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA), local government is defined as ‘that level of government with constitutionally defined rights and duties to regulate and manage public affairs which are also constitutionally defined for the exclusive interest of the local population. These rights and duties shall be exercised by individuals that are freely elected on periodical basis by equal, universal suffrage while its chief executive shall be so elected or appointed with the full participation of the elected body’ (Bamidele 2011). The United Nations Office for Public Administration defines local government as ‘a political subdivision of a nation or (in a federal system) State, which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs including the powers to impose taxes or to exact labour for prescribed purposes. The governing body of such an entity is elected…’ (Ola 1984). In the words of Appadorai (1975:287), a local government is a ‘government by popularly elected bodies charged with administration and executive duties in matters concerning the inhabitants of a particular district or place.’ The official handbook on the reformed system on local government in Nigeria m 1976 defined local government as:

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Government at local level exercised through representative councils established by law to exercise specific powers with defined area. These powers should give the substantial control over local affairs as well as the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of services and determine and implement projects so as to complement the activities of the state and Federal Governments in their areas, and to ensure through devolution of functions to these councils and through the active participation of the people and their traditional1nstitutions, that local initiation and response to local needs and conditions are maximized. (FRN 1976:1)

Ugwu (2002) defines local government as ‘the lowest unit of administration to whose laws and regulations communities who live in a defined geographical area and with a common social and political ties are subject’. The definitions bring out at least ten key characteristics of local government: (i) Local government is government at the grassroots or local level. (ii) Local government lacks full sovereignty since it is a creation of a central or intermediate legislature. (iii) It comprises elected members, such as chairmen and councillors. (iv) It has a legal personality distinct from the State and Federal Governments. (v) It has jurisdiction over people inhabiting its geographical terrain. (vi) It possesses the authority and the institutional structure necessary for achieving the purpose for which it has been created. (vii) The inhabitant of the local territory directly or indirectly participates in its government through their elected, nominated, or appointed representatives. (viii) It can impose taxes and incur expenses. (ix) It must provide avenues for the promotion of the welfare of the members of the community. (x) It must enjoy substantial autonomy (Agagu 1997; Igbuzor 2003; Essien 2010).

Functions of Local Government Councils in Nigeria The federal government determines and assigns the specific functions of local governments. In the exercise of such powers, however, the functions of local government bodies should centre on: (a) Those activities which require detailed local knowledge for effective and efficient performance. (b) Those activities in which success depends on the responsiveness and full participation of the local communities. (c) Those activities which are of a personal nature requiring provisions close to where the individuals affected lives, and in which significant use of discretion or understanding of individuals is needed. According to the Fourth Schedule, section 7 of 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the following functions are allocated to local government councils in Nigeria:

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(a) The consideration and the making of recommendations to a state commission on economic planning or any similar body on. (i) The economic development of the state, particularly in so far as the areas of authority of the council and of the state are affected. (ii) Proposals made by the said commission or body. ( b) Collection of rates, radio and television licences. (c) Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds and homes for the destitute or infirm. (d) Licencing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks) canoes, wheel barrows and carts. (e) Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, markets and motor parks. (f) Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lightings, drains and other public highways, parks, gardens, open spaces or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the House of Assembly of a state. (g) Naming of roads, streets and numbering of houses. (h) Provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal. (i) Registration of all births, deaths and marriages. (j) Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a state. (k) Control and regulation of. (i) Outdoor advertising and hoarding. (ii) Movement and keeping of pets of all description. (iii) Shops and kiosks. (iv) Restaurants, bakeries and other places for sale of food to the public. (v) Laundries and licencing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor. (2) The functions of a local government council shall include participation of such council in the Government of a state as respects the following matters: (a) The provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education. (b) The development of agriculture and natural resources, other than the exploitation of minerals. (c) The provision and maintenance of health services. (d) Such other functions as may be conferred on a local government council by the House of Assembly of the State (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999:150–151).

Centralization or Decentralization Centralization and decentralization represent degrees of inter-organizational differentiation and the dispersal of authority for governance within a political system. The two concepts are not direct opposite of one another, since no country ever completely centralizes nor decentralizes its administration. It therefore, goes to say that

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countries are only classified according to their degree of centralization or decentralization. Centralization connotes a high ‘concentration of power (measured by the criteria of weight, scope and domain) by a few within an organized social group’ (Bello-Imam 1996:3). It denotes a process of increasing governmental powers, especially over local political systems. As a concept it also connotes absolute concentration of governmental powers and authority in one central government of a country. Decentralization on the other hand, represents a shift from top-down governance towards bottom-up governance (Ferguson and Chandrasekharan 2004:3). It entails the transplantation of power and responsibility from the centre to subnational units of government or agencies (Enemuo 1999:34). Decentralization denotes ‘the organization of government activity outside the headquarters of the central government either as an administrative measure involving the transfer of resources and responsibilities to agents of the central government located outside the headquarters or as a political arrangement involving devolution of specific powers, functions and resources by the central government to subnational level government units’ (Adamolekun 1990). Decentralization is a process of transferring power to popularly elected local governments. It brings about change in the operation of instructions and almost invariably occurs gradually (Centre for Democracy and Governance 1998:6). To Dennis Rondinelli (1981: 137), decentralization is: The delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the central government and its agencies to field organization of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area-wide or regional development authorities, functional authorities, autonomous local governments and non-governmental organizations.

Decentralization refers to administrative changes, which give lower levels of government greater administrative authority in the delivery of services (Suwondo 2002; Khan 2002). Further, it is generally agreed that decentralization comprises of four broad aspects or forms (Klugman 1994; Enemuo 2000; Blair 1995, 1998; Rondinelli and Nellis 1986; Rondinelli et al. 1987; Adamolekun 2000). These are (i) deconcentration, (ii) delegation, (iii) devolution and (iv) privatization/partnership. Deconcentration  The transfer of administrative responsibility for specified functions to lower levels within the central government bureaucracy. Essentially, it refers to ‘the redistribution of central resources to localities on the sufferance of those central authorities’ (Cohen and Peterson 1996). Another form of decentralization is local administration under which subordinate levels of government such as provincial and local governments are agents of the central government (Rondinelli 1981:43). Delegation  The transfer of managerial responsibility for a specifically defined function outside the usual central government structure. This is the responsibility for decision-making and service delivery passed by the central government to semi-­ autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by it, but which remain answerable to it for functions delegated to them (Scot-Herridge 2003:5). These agencies are granted broad powers to plan and implement programmes over specific activities under the indirect control of central government ministries.

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Devolution  Refers to the distribution (or redistribution) of authority to make decisions and to take action by local governments (Wunsch 2001:1). It requires the creation of independent subnational levels of government that are outside the control of the central government. They are not directly accountable to the central ­government, although they have to work within the statutes and rules set by it. According to the report of the United Nations Global Forum, devolution is particularly important to local authorities which must have sufficient power and freedom to formulate policies and raise revenue to deliver services, being answerable in the first instance to the local electorate for their actions (United Nations Global Forum 1996:29–32). Privatization/Partnership  Under this form of decentralization, permission is granted to community groups, cooperatives, voluntary associations, business and other non-governmental organizations to provide services either alone or in partnership with public agencies. The objective is to mobilize the capacity and initiatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working for social and economic development (Osamani 2001:7). The foregoing exposition clearly brings to the fore the general consensus among scholars that decentralization has become an important theme of governance, especially in developing countries, where there has been much dissatisfaction with the results of centralized economic planning (Crook and Manor 1998;  Agagu,1998; Manor 1999; Shah 1998; Fukasaku and de Mello 1999; World Bank 1999). Decentralization thus becomes necessary to break the grip of central governance and induce broader participation in democratic government (Smoke 1994; Olowu 2000). A decentralized system is also more accessible to new political movements and minority groups in their attempt to influence politics. This is particularly important in ethnically divided societies, where political exclusion can have serious polarizing effects (Lijphart 1997; Grindle 2000; Hadenius 2001). Decentralization, therefore, provides valid justifications for the existence and relevance of local government.

Local Government in Historical Perspective The history of local government administration in Nigeria can be better explained in relation to three important historical periods in Nigeria. The first is the pre-colonial era, the second is the colonial period and, lastly, the post-colonial or independence period.

Local Government in Pre-colonial Era Before the entrenchment of British colonial enterprise on the inhabitants of the present construct that is now Nigeria, traditional political leaders had established

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forms of local administration conducive and suitable to the peculiarities of their societies. The form of local administration adopted by each society was often influenced by the prevalent social forces, conditioned by the sociocultural values and belief system of the people. However, two administrative structures became prominent and synonymous with these societies, namely, the centralized and decentralized forms. Thus the Yoruba in the West had different gradations of chiefs who owed allegiance to the Alaafin, i.e. ruler of the old Oyo Empire, operated a centralized form of administration. In like manner, the Hausa-Fulani in the North, predominated by Islam, entrench a centralized leadership characterized by rigid class hierarchy and attitudes of political deference and subordination  (  Keay and thomas 1977; Coleman 1986:39). The Ibo in the East on the other hand, had no paramount rulers but rather a collection of autonomous communities. As such the decentralized system of administration was more appropriate owing to the attitude of individualism that did not allow for large groupings of people for the purpose of administration. The administration, of these different styles ensures that in each locality traditional political leaders rule over their domain on the basis of prevalent traditional norms and values. For instance, in the North, where the emirate structure was well organized, the Sharia law held sway with Emir as the supreme judge of the state. Similarly in the West, the Oba was in principle the supreme ruler, though subjected to a system of consultation and checks in practice. In the Ibo speaking area of the East, the system political organization was highly decentralized without a central government. As such, decision-making powers were invested in a number of bodies, which included council of elders, village council, and age grades among others.

Local Government in Colonial Era During the period of colonial rule in Nigeria, local government was known as Native Administration system. This system came into being as a result of the adoption of indirect rule by Lord Lugard. The reason for the adoption of indirect rule according to Lugard, stemmed from the fact that: There was no desire to impose on the (Nigerian) people any theoretically suitable form of government but rather to evolve from their old institutions, based on their habits of thoughts, prestige and customs, the form of rule best suited to them and adapted to meet the new conditions. (cited in Omotoso 2000:17)

In order to effectively pursue this policy, the Native Authority Ordinance of 1910 was enacted for the establishment of native authority first in Northern Nigeria, and then later in Southern Nigeria. The Native Administration system comprised four main interdependent parts: (i) The residents who provided direction and control. (ii) The native authority, usually headed by a chief who enjoyed legitimacy under the indigenous political system, often supported by a council of elders.

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( iii) The native treasury. (iv) The native court composed of representatives of the native administration (Gboyega 1987). The native authority system was usually headed by a traditional chief, who in some cases might be the sole native authority while in others it could be chief-in-­ council. During this time, the traditional chief was assisted by lesser chiefs or council of elders. Lord Lugard emphasized this point when he argued that: The first step was to endeavour to find a man of influence as chief, and to group under him as many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers and to take an interest in his native treasury, to support his authority and to inculcate a sense of responsibility. (Sandra et al, in Omotoso 2000:18)

The indirect rule system introduced in the Northern region blended with the traditional organization of political power that existed there. The mission of indirect rule was to restructure the Emirate system, such that emirs were transmitted into paid civil servants and the village organization became native authorities which were charged with the function of maintenance of law and order. In the Western Region because of the absence of absolute political powers of Obas over their subjects, the native authority system did not enjoy much success. In Yorubaland, Obas were to rule through the system of consultation and checks and balances. The monarchical system in operation in Yorubaland coupled with the system of representation by council of elders made it extremely difficult for Obas to rule as their counterparts in the Northern Region. The Eastern Region had neither Emirs nor Obas like the other two regions. In other words, there was no organized government beyond the village level in which village elders exercise authority. The inability of the colonialists to locate the centre of power occasioned the appointment of ‘warrant chiefs’. The people detested the warrant chiefs. From the foregoing, while it was obvious that variation existed in the practice of local administration during colonial era, one general feature was respect for traditional rulers and the willingness of the colonial authorities to incorporate them in the administration. This is evident in the cases of the Hausa-Fulani in the North and Yoruba in the West. In the case of the East where traditional rulers never existed, their posts were created by colonial warrant.

Local Government in Post-colonial Era During the early post-independence era, the heterogeneous nature of Nigeria led to the emergence of various types of local governments, which were practised by different regimes in Nigeria. According to Okoli (1998:34), the federal system of government adopted after independence further confirmed these differences, when it provided that each of the then four regions was responsible for the structure, legislation and operation of its local government councils. This perhaps, explains why during this period, the names given to local governments were different in all regions

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or states. In the north, the local government was then called local authority, while it was called local government in the west, and in the east, it was known as district council. Drastic innovations in the system was flagged off by the Eastern Region through its Local Government Ordinance of 1950 (Agagu 1999:152), which formally abolished the native administrative system and substituted it with a more democratic type of local government which gave cognizance to local representation through the introduction of elected councils with a three-tier structure based on the British pattern. Reforms in the Western Region commenced in 1952 with the promulgation of the Local Government Law. It adopted the British-type of three-tier structure, where representation was based on 25% for traditional chiefs and 75% for elected officials (Ajayi 2003:117). The region in 1957, introduced further reforms, which provided for the inclusion of a specified number of women in each of the councils. In the Northern Region, reform did not start until 1954, when the Native Authority Law came into effect. It provided for democratic representation by broadening the base of native administration. Although Yahaya (1980:78) observed that ‘the changes embodied in the Local Government Law of 1954 seem to have fallen short of full participatory local government which the educated group was demanding…’, it began the process of reorganization that was gradually built upon. Consequently, emirs and other chiefs started to wither away as sole native authorities, and by the mid-1960, 41% percent of the native authorities included a majority of elected members (Campbell 1963:66–68). On the whole, the observable trend across the regions from the 1950s to the period before independence witnessed an era of pupillage for councils in modern local government practice. The native authorities were democratized for enhanced participation, but not without some attendant problems, which include friction and role conflict between the pioneering elected councillors and the conservative traditional rulers, particularly the emirs in the north. However, the pattern of democratic participation and representation was sustained all through the year of independence and the First Republic until it was eventually terminated in January 1966.

 ocal Government Under Military L and Democratic Governments The incursion of the military into the Nigerian political space, in the early years of self-rule to a great extent reversed the hitherto democratic achievement recorded at the local government level. The army was set up to defend the country from external aggression and internal subversion. But the army went beyond its mandate to intervene in the Nigerian political scene. The first military coup took place in Nigeria in 1966, culminating in the dissolution of the existing elected council representatives and the appointing of civil servants as sole administrators in their place. The concept of sole administratorship, apart from being autocratic, is undemocratic, as it

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does not allow for meaningful participation by the people. The subsequent outcome on the various regions was retrogression. In the Western Region, ‘this had the effect of completely undermining any sense of popular participation in local government administration’ (Goyega 2003:65–68). In the East, although the various local government laws provided for local representatives to participate in the process of local administration, their role was advisory to the resident or divisional officers, as the case might be and could ignore their advice (Ibid). This limited participation by the citizens in  local governance, prevented it from attracting widespread support from easterners (Goyega 1989:178). Although the Northern Regional government saw ‘participation as one of the principal means of fostering a sense of self-efficacy’ (Gboyega 1987:98), however, the ban on party politics could only ensure that local government councils were constituted through government-appointed members (Gboyega 1989:178). The 1976 Local Government Reform embarked upon by the Mohammed\ Obasanjo administration attempted to restore participation and the representational rights of the people through the setting in motion of a process of extensive consultation at all levels of government, among public servants, traditional rulers, staff unions and experts on local government administration (Gboyega 1989:70). The government also facilitated conferences and seminars on local government matters in universities and institutes where proposals collected from the field and other fora were appraised (Tukur 1999:463). However, the 1976 reform was not without its own undemocratic character. For instance, according to the guidelines of the reform, 25% of members of the council were nominated by executive State Military Governors. In addition, the election of the chairman of the council was subject to ratification by the state governor. This laid the basis of the interference in the conduct of the affairs of local government by military. This formed the basis for the council election of late 1976 and early 1977. However, at the expiration of the tenure of the elected officials in late 1979 to early 1980, the councils were filled by management committees appointed by the democratic state governors. The obvious consequence, according to Gboyega 1989), was that local government ceased to be representative as from 1980, although democracy had already been restored. The return of the military in December 1983 led to the dissolution of all democratic structures at all levels including local governments. It replaced the elected council officials with sole administrators, who were top civil servants. The sole administrators were not in any way responsible to the citizens of the local areas but to the military government that appointed them. The regime also strove to compress the number of local governments that had been overblown by the politicians back to its original 1979 status. Similarly, a 21-member committee headed by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki was constituted to look into the problems of local governments. However, this committee did not see anything wrong with the 1976 Local Government Reform aside from operational problems. But the coup of Ibrahim Babangida on August 1985 scuttled the implementation of the Dasuki Report. With the overthrow of the Buhari administration in 1985, the new military regime under general Babangida, in line with the Dasuki Report, rejected the appointment

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of political appointees as members of the local councils; instead, it composed the council with non-partisan members from the council area. The political bureau, which Babangida administration appointed in January 1986 ‘to search for a viable political future’ for Nigeria, among other things, endorsed many of the recommendations of the Dasuki Report, including retaining the 301 local government one-tier system of 1976–1979. While government accepted to retain the 301 local government areas and to establish within each a maximum of five development area councils in 1987, by May 1989, 149 new local government areas were created, thereby increasing the number of local government to 453(FRN, 1988a). Two years later, 140 additional local government areas were added, bringing the total to 589(FRN, 1988b). Another outstanding feature of the Babangida regime was the introduction of the presidential model into local government system. By this model, the chairman of each local government became the chief executive and accounting officer of the local government. The chairman’s role as accounting officer, however, excludes the signing vouchers and cheques. This innovation began with the introduction of the 1988 civil service reform under the Chairmanship of Professor Adedotun Phillip. According to the reform civil service guidelines was to be applied to all ministries/extra-ministerial departments, state civil services and local government (The 1988 Reform: 3). By virtue of the 1988 civil service reform local government administration was brought to the same line of operation with the federal and state government. This made the secretary to local government a political appointment. The regime of General Sani Abacha almost reversed all that were done to local government during the Babangida era. He began by abolishing the presidential system, replacing local government secretary with career officers and appointing caretaker committees into local councils instead of elected officials. The regime went on to create additional local governments based on Decree No. 7 of 1997 which reversed the power of creating new local government to the federal government. The regime finally conducted election into local government on party basis. The Abubakar regime that took over after the demise of General Abacha sacked the elected council officials and replaced them with career civil servants as sole administrators. He later imposed caretaker committees on all local governments throughout the country, with sole administrators serving as chairmen. Members of the caretaker committee were appointed among indigenes of the local government. The regime concluded by conducting election on party basis, into all local governments in the country. The 1976 Local Government Reform provided the basis for local government operations in the Second Republic. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria came into force on October 1, 1979. Section 7(1) of the constitution provided that: The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed; and accordingly the Government of every state shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils. (FRN 1979:13)

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For the first time in Nigeria, there was constitutional unification of local government system. The constitution also made provision for local governments share in the Federation Account just as the other two levels of government. The operations of local government were, however, hampered by the dissolution of elected local government councils and their replacement by the nominees of the governors in the various states. The December 31, 1983, coup cut short the life of the Second Republic. The country’s return to democratic civil rule on May 29, 1999, once again, provided for the people the opportunity of active participation in selecting their representatives at the local level, as provided for by the 1999 constitution that the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed (FRN 1999). However, the replacement of elected council officials with transition committees at the expiration of the former’s tenure by state governors, as witnessed in Jigawa, Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ekiti and Edo states, once more, had the negative effect of unrepresentativeness witnessed in the Second Republic.

Local/State Relations in Nigeria The notion of local/state relations would naturally fall within the confines of intergovernmental relations. The term ‘intergovernmental relations’ (IGR) is ‘commonly used to refer to relations between central, regional and local governments, as well as governments between any one level, that facilitate the attainment of common goals through co-operation’ (Opeskin 2001:1). In the words of Adesanya (2005), it involves the relationships, both vertical and horizontal, that exists between the various organs and departments within the sovereign government of a particular country. To Adamolekun, it is a term ‘commonly used to describe the interactions between the different levels of government within the state’ (Adamolekun 2002: 60). The 1976 Local Government Reforms as enshrined in the 1979 constitution which provided the basis for local government operations in the Second Republic set the tone for local/state relations in Nigeria. The constitution delineated a three-­ tier federal structure in which each tier enjoys considerable measure of autonomy in terms of jurisdiction, composition, functions and finance. Section 7(1) of the constitution states that: The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed; and accordingly the Government of every state shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils. (FRN 1979:13)

Explicit as the constitution appears concerning the existence, jurisdiction, finance and functions of local government; its operation in the second republic was undoubtedly skewed against the local governments. State governors were quick to capitalize on their power under the constitution to dissolve elected local government councils,

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replacing them with either sole administrators or caretaker committees. But when it comes to the disbursement of the statutory 10 percent of state revenues to local government councils, many of the Governors were reluctant. For instance, in the area of election, it is on record that ‘throughout the duration of the Second Republic no local government elections were conducted to constitute local government council’ (Gboyega 1988:186). Commenting further on the utter disregard for the constitution and the right of local government officials to exist, Gboyega noted that: It is slightly more difficult to explain why over a period of four years Nigerian politicians so blatantly flouted the constitution which they were sworn to uphold. In 1979 when the military handed over political power to civilians, the tenure of the council elected in 1976 was running to a close. Thus, the question was not that the governors dissolved the Councils, as indeed all of them did, but that the action of the governors’ consequent upon dissolution of the elected councils, the appointment of Management Committees, was a contravention of the constitution. (Gboyega 1988:187)

Concerning the statutory disbursement of a portion of the federation account among the states for the benefits of local governments in their area of jurisdiction, all the governors of the 19 states found one justification or the other to flout this rule. This was in spite of the fact that it was a constitutional requirement under Sect. 149 (4) and (5) of the 1979 constitution and also enshrined in the Revenue Allocation Act of 1982. It was not surprising therefore that all the governors of the 19 states were found wanting in this regard, with the 12 non-NPN controlled states, namely, Anambra, Bendal, Borno, Gongola, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo and Plateau found particularly culpable (Ayeni and Olowu 1988:197–218). As such, in his review of local/state relations in the Second Republic, Adesanya has this to say: Local Government Councils are autonomous entities, and therefore, should be treated as such. However, the much touted autonomy of LGCs, if that was the intention or intendment of the “authors” of the “1976 Local Government Reforms”, flies in the face of facts and constitutional provisions. (Adesanya 2005:28)

The situation under the present democratic dispensation does not seem to be any better. The 1999 Constitution under Section 7(3) requires the local governments as partners in progress, to collaborate with the states in the economic planning and development of their respective areas (Yakubu 2003). The constitution also empowers the states to conduct elections into local government councils. The Supreme Court in its ruling on the 2002 Electoral Act emphasized this point, when it declared that no law by the National Assembly could validly increase or alter the tenure of elected officers of the local governments (Aiyede 2004:35). However, instances of state governors dissolving elected local government councils and replacing them with sole administrators or caretaker committees are common place as witnessed in states like Jigawa, Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ekiti and Edo states. Beyond withholding the disbursement of the statutory 10 percent of state revenues to local government councils, many state Governors have even gone ahead to force local government councils to make contributions from the ‘Federation Account’ into State Joint Local Government Account. These monies are often diverted by state governors without any justifiable explanation to the local government councils. The case of illegal

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diversion of local government fund that took place in Ekiti state between 2004 and 2006 under the Fayose administration is a glaring example. The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) alleged the Ekiti State Government of illegally diverting the sun of N11.8 billion out of the N17.9 billion paid into the State Joint Local Government Account without any justifiable explanation (Abe 2010:189).

Local Governance Financing in Nigeria The centrality of finance to the maintenance and sustainability of any organization cannot be overemphasized. As the third tier of government in Nigeria, local governments require finance for the successful implementation of their programmes. Also, by virtue of its constitutional recognition, local governments receive certain transfers from the federal and state governments to enable them to meet part of their recurrent and capital expenditures. The 1999 Constitution stipulates an arrangement that allows for statutory allocation of public revenue from the federation account held at the centre to states and local governments (Section 7(6)); 162(l)–(8)). The federation may also give grants to a state to supplement the revenue of that state with the prescription of the National Assembly; this is called the Federal grants-in-­ aid (Section 164(1)). However, in relation to state/local government financial relations, Section 162(5)–(8) is worth enumerating for the purpose of emphasis. Section 162(5) – The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in a Federation Account shall also be allocated to the States for the benefit of their local government councils on such on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Section 162(6) – Each State shall maintain a special account to be called ‘State Joint Local Government Account’ into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of the State from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State. Section 162(7) – Each State shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of its total revenue on such on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Section 162(8) – The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a State shall be distributed among the local government councils of that State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the State. These transfers range from statutory allocations to grants, loans and funds for certain projects. There are, however, certain peculiarities exhibited by local government financing in Nigeria (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999:961). This is not unconnected with the fact that in spite of its wide-ranging power to internally generate revenue; local government still extensively depend on the funds allocated by the federal government since the 1976 Local Government Reforms (Agagu 1999:27). More so, when it had become obvious, since 1976, that local governments are veritable instruments for rapid development of the rural communities, as the closest government to the people. Interestingly, the sources of funds for this tier of

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administrative authority have continued to dwindle over the years with the ascendancy of both the central and state as the key actors in the Nigerian political economy. This is in spite of prime importance of finance to local government if it must carry out its functions effectively. This centrality is emphasized by Aborisade (1987) who observed that ‘in local government like any other business institution, finance takes priority in planning for expansion and in increasing the level of innovation for effective management’. It needs to be pointed out that the sources of local government finance have passed through different phases, from relatively scarcity during the colonial era when native authorities were mere instruments of tax collection for the colonial government to a period of solvency occasioned by the reforms of 1976 where the sources of finance for local government councils were constitutionally enshrined and recognized; the era of benevolent handouts by state Governors who for their selfish agenda unjustifiably divert local government funds. This situation has significantly contributed to the dwindling relevance of local government in Nigeria’s federal arrangement. Adedokun (2012) observed that ‘the federal structure of Nigeria constraints local government’s ability to mobilize and use revenue to meet their obligation in a sustainable manner’. He notes further that: One of the recurrent problems of the three-tier system in the country is the dwindling revenue generation as characterised by annual deficits and insufficient funds for meaningful growth and viable project development. Local governments are the nearest government to the people at the grassroots in Nigeria; they are strategically located to play a pivotal role in national development. (2012:2)

According to Ojo (2009), local governments have performed below expectations as a result of poor management. Undoubtedly, finance and its prudent management are the bedrock of effective functioning of local government. It is against this backdrop that Tonwe (1995, cited in Ojo 2009: 37) argues that local governments require finance to perform their statutory functions. The ability of the local government to do this is largely dependent on availability of fund, coupled with efficient management which constitutes the required catalyst necessary for timely execution and completion of their development projects. Tonwe (1995), however, expresses some reservations. For instance, he notes: In recent time, lack of funds has often been attributed as the major problem which had hindered effective and successful execution and completion of many projects at the local government level. However, experience has shown the contrary that poor finance management, rather than inadequate finance is the bane of local governments’ inability to achieve substantial development in their domain. (1995, Cited in Ojo 2009: 37)

Local government financial predicament is further exacerbated by the nature of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism characterized by the overwhelming concentration of tax jurisdiction and collection in the hands the federal government. All the major sources of government revenue, such as petroleum profits tax, import duties, excise duties, mining rents and royalties, and companies’ income tax, are solely controlled by the federal government. State and local governments on the other hand have jurisdiction only over minor revenue sources with low yield (  Gboyega, et.al 1988; Khemani 2001).

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Local Government Reforms in Nigeria Pre-Independence Era In order to achieve administrative effectiveness and efficiency, a native administrative system made up of four main interdependent parts was introduced. Viz, (i) the resident who provided direction and control; (ii) the native authority, usually headed by a chief who had indigenous political legitimacy and supported by a council of elders; (iii) the native treasury; and (iv) the native court composed of representatives of the native administration (Gboyega 1987:2). The native authority was usually headed by a traditional chief, who in some cases might be the sole native authority while it could be chief-and-council in some others. In the former, the chief has the capacity to act against the decisions of the council, if he felt that in doing so he was protecting the welfare and good government of his council. The former represents traditional rulers, while the latter was usually only associated with an ‘artificial chieftaincy', though sometimes, where a chief had misgoverned his people, he was reduced to a chief and council to curb his authority (Keay and Thomas 1986:75). In both, the chief had to consult with his council on matters, but where the matter for decision was either of lesser importance or too urgent to wait for a council meeting, he might consult with two members act and report later to the council. The effectiveness of the native administrative system varies in degrees of success in the regions. It would be expecting the impossible in the light of the tribal diversity in the country to assume that the system would be greeted with the same degree of enthusiasm. The system achieved tremendous success in the Northern Region because of the favourable and conducive emirship system that hitherto existed. In the west, because of the absence of absolute political powers of Obas over their subjects, the native authority system was a partial success. In Yorubaland, for instance, Obas ruled through the system of consultation and checks and balances. The monarchical system in Yorubaland, coupled with the system of representation by council of elders, made it extremely difficult for Obas to rule as their counterparts in the Northern Region. In the Eastern Region, the system failed to achieve any measure of success. One of the reasons for this was the total absence of the traditional infrastructure needed by the system to succeed. There was nothing in Ibo-land that resembled the elevated position of the emir in the north. The failure of the colonialist to locate the centre of power led to the appointment of ‘warrant chiefs’ who were grossly resented by the people. Coupled with the gross misconduct of the warrant chiefs and their abuse of power, native authorities in the Eastern Region were anything but successful. As Akpan (1967:27–30) aptly observed, ‘in its entirety, the system of indirect rule was not meant to benefit the natives, instead, it was a device for mere administrative convenience for the British colonialist’. The period of transition was therefore characterized by progressive and deliberate attempts at ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the modern local government system that replaced the native authorities.

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In the east, the three-tier local government system (i.e. county, district and local councils) established by ordinance were to work independently of each other, with the upper tier having the power to issue financial ‘precept’ or requisitions on the ones below. The county council was the top tier with jurisdiction over education, motor roads, hospitals and agriculture, among others. The district councils, on the other hand, were to perform functions not assigned to the county councils. The local councils were merely attempts to accord recognition to the traditional unit of the Igbo political organization, as such it had no separate administrative machinery for the discharge of its responsibilities. The three-tier local government system in the east was, however, fraught with certain defects that adversely affected its effective performance. First, it was a replica of the English system of local government both in structure and nomenclature but lacked the cultural foundations on which it could flourish. Second, it was applied without adequate preparation throughout the region. It also gave the councils excessive independence for which they were unprepared. According to Ronald Wraith (1972:180): ‘It gave to these councils for greater powers, including the power of taxation, than had ever been accorded to the native authorities but simultaneously removed the restraining hand of the district officer of government’. The resultant effect was that ‘the operations of the councils gave rise to many cases of immaturity, inexperience, irresponsibility and dishonesty’ (Bello–Imam 1983:26). The regional government was forced to exercise stricter control over the councils in the interest of efficiency and probity through the form of the Eastern Region Local Government Law of 1955. However, the law lacked both inspectorate division and local government service board for the recruitment and welfare of staff” (Ajayi 2003:117). In the 1960s, the district councils were re-designated county councils by a new local government ordinance. The system was still not dynamic enough to mobilize resources and generate development, as local councils became mere debating chambers. The councils remained ineffective for the same old reasons that they had no staff of their own and had only meagre resources (Gboyega 1989:162). In the Western Region, the Local Government Law of 1952 established a three-­ tier structure of local government similar to that of Eastern Region. The law provided for divisional councils with jurisdiction over major services and precedence over the district councils for funds. The district councils, the intermediate authority, were established for township areas. While some of these councils were all-purpose, others had a limited range of functions. The local councils were designed for a group of villages or towns and performed minor functions such as maintenance of small markets, cemeteries and motor parks. The reorganization led to an increase in the number of local authorities, with 22 divisional councils, 104 district councils and 100 local councils established to ‘promote effective local self-government’ (Western Region of Nigeria 1955). The region went further to introduce the establishment of local government inspectorate division and local government service commission on staff matters. The entire region was therefore divided into three ‘circles’, each of which was under the charge of a local government Inspector, who toured his circle to inspect the books and records

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of the local government councils, reported on them to the minister and advised the minister on the exercise of the latter’s control powers as appropriate (Gboyega 1989:162). On close examination, it was evident that this system provided a low calibre of leadership at the councils, and this together with the rapacious behaviour of the councillors and council officials as well as the limited role assigned to the district officer, led to government rethinking the arrangement. In 1957, the Local Government Law of 1952 was replaced and superseded by a new Local Government Law, which consolidated all previous amendments to the local government system. Pertinently, the 1957 Local Government Law brought numerous structural and functional changes, but, like its predecessors, the structural charges were incongruent with the purposes and financial arrangements, and no satisfactory performance could be induced from the local government councils. Consequently, many vices plagued these councils.

1960–1975 Era By 1962, the structure had been reduced to two tiers with divisional councils at the top supported by local councils. But this effort came to nought because of disillusionment with the performance in the area of delivery of social services. Consequently, the mobilization of resources was becoming increasingly difficult and required the employment of coercive instruments. By 1965, many vices such as corruption and embezzlement in the councils had reached unmanageable dimensions. Consequently, all of them were suspended while ‘sole administrators’ or ‘committees of management’ were introduced in their place. The appointment of sole administrators to take charge of all the affairs of local government councils plunged the councils into a greater depth of inertia and insensitivity to the yearnings of the people for efficiency and effectiveness in services. The experiment with the English model system of local government had failed to succeed as expected (Gboyega 1989: 165). In the Northern Region, the 1954 Local Government Law provided for five different native authorities, viz., the chief-in-council native authority, the chief-and-­ council native authority, the council native authority, ‘a group of persons’, ‘a sole chief’ or other category. This was nothing more than a reinforcement of the native authority administrative system that had already been in existence in the regions. As a result, many anomalies became manifested in the efficient management of the system. For instance, the huge disparities in the size and resources of the native authorities resulted in corresponding inequalities in the service they could provide for the entire citizenry (Bello-Imam 1983). These experiments continued until the military coup of 1966. Various systems of local government administration in terms of structure and management were experimented by different states in Nigeria between 1966 and 1976. For instance, in the east, three states (the East Central, Cross River and Rivers)

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that were created out of the Eastern Region in 1967, together with the Mid-West, adopted the same structural pattern of local administration, involving, among others, (i) the designation of an administrative officer as the local authority; (ii) the establishment of representative councils with deliberative and advisory functions; and (iii) the abolition of the local government service and its absorption into the state civil service (Gboyega 1989:176). The focus quite clearly was to establish a system which would enable the government to more effectively control the mobilization and utilization of scarce human and material resources. However, the sole authority, as the agent of the government at the local level, responded more to the government’s purpose than to local preference. Following the division of the north into six states – North Central, North Western, North Eastern, Benue-Plateau, Kano and Kwara – the desire to do away with redundant staff and use public funds correctly and efficiently in  local administration necessitated the merger of native authority courts with the judiciary, while the native authority police and prisons were to be absorbed by relevant federal institutions. These reforms saw to the decline of the relevance of local administration in the north, as the powers of the councils waned as a result of the taking over of some of their major functions by the stales and federal government. In the west, the colony area of the Western Region was excised out of the region and merged with the federal territory to form Lagos State. The remainder of the region was named the Western Region. The Western Region introduced the Local Government Reform Edict No. 18 in 1972, which reduced the number of local government councils from 114 to 39. A management committee was appointed for each council. This approach did not benefit the councils as the close restrictions placed upon their initiative and extent of policy autonomy led to frustration and loss of interest. The reason why the council manager system failed to function effectively as expected was that the reduction in the number of councils did not result in any substantial savings in overhead costs since the surviving councils inherited the entire staff and other liabilities of the defunct councils. Also, the revenue effort of the council did not improve and the new source of revenue could not be effectively collected. Furthermore, the control exercised by the council through the divisional officer from the Ministry of Local Government directly frustrated many highly qualified people over selection into the management committee (Gboyega 1989:176).

1976–1988 Era The inefficiency and lack of effective local administration in Nigeria before the 1976 Local Government Reform was aptly captured by Brigadier Shehu Yar’Adua, the then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, thus: … Lack of adequate funds and appropriate institutions had continued to make local government ineffective and ineffectual. Moreover, the staffing arrangement system had been inad-

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equate… Consequently, there has been a divorce between the people and government institutions at their most basic level. (Guideline 1976: 1)

Confronted with these challenges at the grassroots level, the Murtala regime embarked on a radical transformation of governance at the local level. The aim was to stabilize and rationalize government at the local level. The vision of the regime is captured in its perception of local government as enunciated in the Guidelines for Local Government Reforms Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976 as follows: Government of local level exercised through representative council established within defined areas. These powers should give the council substantial control over local affairs as well as the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to complement the activities of the state and federal government in their areas.

The year 1976 thus, marked a watershed in the history of Local Government Reforms in Nigeria. It became a point of departure for an examination of the transformation of the local government system in Nigeria (Ayo 1995:16–19). Ayo commented further that the year 1976 was significant because: one, a uniform, single-tier system of local government was introduced for the first time in Nigeria. Two, local government became recognized as a third tier of governmental activity in Nigeria in that year. Three, local governments began to receive a fixed portion of federal revenues. Lastly, the Local Government Reform of 1976 has continued to serve as a point of reference for subsequent reforms of local government in Nigeria. The principal aims of local government as highlighted by the reform include:

(a) To make appropriate services and development activities responsive to local wishes and initiatives by devolving or delegating them to local representative bodies. (b) To facilitate the exercise of democratic self-government close to the local levels of our society, and to encourage initiative and leadership potential. (c) To mobilize human and material resources through the involvement of members of the public in their development. (d) To provide a two-way channel of communication between local communities and government (both state and federal). Essentially, the 1976 Local Government Reform provided for a multipurpose, single-­tier structure of local government is introduced nationally. This led to the establishment of 299 local government councils all over the country. The preference for a single-tier structure was based on the desire of the government to have local governments with complete and self-contained budgets, so that the whole system of local government within any area can be identified, costed and coordinated (Ayo 1995:18). Special provisions were also made to prevent the establishment of local councils which would be so small as to be ineffective or too large and unwieldy. Each local government was to have a population of between 150,000 and 800,000, provided these limits may be varied in exceptional circumstances, and provided further that there should be no upper limit to the size of local governments covering major towns so as to ensure that each town is within a single unit.

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The internal organization of the local government councils was equally designed to combine the best features of previous organizational structures. The council of the local government was vested with policy and execution powers of the local authority. Also, in order to augment the resources of the local government councils so that they may effectively perform their functions, provision was made for the federal and state governments to make annual grants to the councils in addition to their traditional sources of revenue. Also, the reform stipulates that Local Government should have two main Standing Committees: the finance and purposes committee and the education committee. The reform also tried to strengthen the managerial capacity of the councils. This was to be achieved through the establishment of training schemes in three universities, Ife, Nnsuka and Ahamadu Bello. Efforts were also made to confine councillors to a purely political role and to abolish interference from the field administrative officer of the state government by abolishing provincial administration and divisional administration (Gboyega 1989:184). The reform also recognizes the need for the establishment of the Ministry for Local Government at the state level. Other essential aspects of the reform included the empowerment of state governments to establish Local Government Service Board, charged with personnel management functions relating to recruitment, posting, promotion and discipline of councils’ members of staff. Also, the Board was responsible for the harmonization of salaries, pension, gratuities and other benefits of local government staff, in line with those of civil servants. The functions of the Board were basically similar to those performed by the state civil service commission. The need to attract competent and professional manpower for sound development of local government as a third tier of government was a major spur for the harmonization of these conditions of service with that of the state and federal civil servants. Similarly, statutory recognition was accorded traditional institutions, through the setting up traditional council in each local government of the federation. The composition of the council was made up of traditional rulers and representative of the council. The council responsibilities included advisory body to the local government; coordinate development plans of the local government by joint discussion and advice; community tax assessment and collection in the area; and control of chieftaincy matters. In spite of the comprehensive nature of the 1976 Local Government Reform in terms of policy and structure, its implementation witnessed certain inadequacies that greatly undermined the effectiveness of local administration in the country. The first was the unwillingness, on the part of many states, to allow the conduct of elections into local government councils, as well as fulfil their financial obligations to local government authorities in their areas. Similarly, the habit of issuing circulars and instructions on matters of day-to-day administration, administrative procedure, budgetary allocations, etc., by the Ministries of Local Government adversely affected their ability for initiating and implementing programmes. The 4 years of civilian rule from 1979 to 1983 further exacerbated the problems of the local authorities through the creation of additional local governments, which, in many states, did not accord with constitutional procedures, so much so that by the end of 1983 when the civilian administration was overthrown, the number of local

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government councils in Nigeria was estimated to have increased to over 800 (Gboyega 1989:188–189). This excessive fragmentation/proliferation meant that overhead costs multiplied and the quality of management staff declined as inadequately experienced people were promoted rapidly to charge of new local government councils. The financial squeeze and the loss of quality in management occasioned by the excessive fragmentation were worsened by the fact that, although the federal statutory grants were sent regularly to the state, the state did not always pass the grants on nor did they make their own statutory grants available to the local government council as and when due. In many cases, too, deductions were made from local government revenue to pay for state government programmes (Gboyega 1989:189). The return of the military to power in December 1983 brought the dissolution of all management committees. Sole administrators were appointed to take charge of the local government council which had been reverted to their 1979 boundaries, thereby doing away with the 500 or so new ones created after 1979 (Gboyega 1989:189). The federal government went ahead to abolish the Ministries of Local Government, and local governments revenue was reviewed upward from 10%–15% in 1989, in addition to assisting them in paying the cost of running primary schools through a national primary education commission (Gboyega 2003:76). The disbursement of the funds, however, proved problematic as the State Primary Education Boards, through which the funds were to be disbursed, soon became more interested in contract awards than in transferring funds to local governments (Gboyega et al. 1988). The return of the military in December 1983 led to the dissolution of all democratic structures at all levels including local governments. On May 29, 1984, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Major-General Tunde Idiagbon inaugurated the 21-man committee headed by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki to look into the problems of local governments’ administration in Nigeria. The committee’s terms of reference include: (i) To evolve the most suitable mode of managing the local government within the context of the present military administration. (ii) To examine the existing structures, functions and financial resources available to local governments for the performance of those functions. (iii) To look into the account/management (staff) problems of local governments, including the standardization of the various departments of the councils. (iv) To evolve approver place for traditional authorities in local government. (v) To propose how best to manage intergovernmental relations between federal, state and local governments and also between local governments and Ministries for Local Government, Local Government Service Boards/Commissions, etc. (vi) To work out manpower schemes for all cadres of local government staff. (vii) To deliberate and recommend on other matters the committee considers relevant for the improvement of Local Government Administration in the country. The committee deliberated on all the points stated in the terms of reference, and came to the realization that the problem was not with the 1976 Guidelines, but with its operator.

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The 1988 civil service reforms introduced by the Babangida regime were made applicable to the local government. The II-man Technical Committee had a single term of reference: to study the new civil service reforms and make recommendations on how they would apply in the local government service bearing in mind the peculiarities of the service and the need to preserve the gains made in building the service in the recent past. The highlights of the reform include: (a) The Chairman of the local government is the chief executive and accounting officer, but he is precluded from signing cheque. His duties could be delegated to the Deputy Chairman, Supervisory Councillors and the Secretary. (b) Professionalized Local Government Service in which the local government is structured vertically and horizontally to ensure overall management efficiency and effectiveness, high degree of specialization, job satisfaction, optimum span of control and clear lines of authority and responsibility. (c) Organizational structure of the local government in which the local government should consist of the Departments of Personnel Management; Finance, Supplies, Planning, Research and Statistics; and four (4) Operations Department of Education; Agriculture and Natural Resources; Works, Housing, Land and Survey; and Medical and Health. (d) Personnel Management in which there is a Junior Staff Management Committee (JSMC). There should also be an Internal Audit Unit in every local government. (e) Creation of the Office of the Director of Local Government Audit in the state. This becomes imperative in view of the increase in the financial allocation from the Federation Account; and the 10% internally generated revenue from the state governments. (f) Establishment of Audit Alarm Committee in each state. (g) Retention of unified Local Government Service. (h) Direct payment of the statutory allocations from the Federation Account (20%) to the local governments. (i) Abolition of the Ministry of Local Government and establishment in its place, a Department of Local Government in the office of the Deputy Governor. The assessment of the guideline for implementing the local government (Basic Constitutional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree 1991 reveals an extension of the presidential system of government to the local government level. The adequacy, workability and relevance of the reform cannot be underestimated because of the fact that the presidential system had been in operation at the federal and state levels. Introduction of a similar system at the local government level would undoubtedly strengthen the presidential system and facilitate its internalization. One significant feature of this reform is the politicization of the office of the Secretary to the local government. It is to be noted that the reform stipulates that the Chairman of the local government should appoint the Secretary to the local government. Many career officers of the local government service are not favourably disposed towards this provision. They see the politicization of the topmost echelon of their cadre as a usurpation of their right. Although, this was in line with what obtains at the federal and state levels, carrying this to the local government level met with

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some opposition. As obtains in the federal and state 1evels, the appointed DirectorGeneral lives and dies (i.e. retires) with the government that appointed him. This provision lends itself to one major criticism of the 1991 local government reform. Because of the agitation of local government chairmen that they are allowed to take over full responsibility, in regard to funding and management of primary education, the national primary education fund was scrapped in 1991, and revenue allocation to local governments increased to 20%. The local government chairmen were, however, soon to discover that the extra 5% revenue increase was inadequate to cater for the payment of primary school staff salaries. As a result, many local governments fell into arrears in the payment of primary school staff salaries, and teachers strike became rampant. Similarly, the eagerness of local government chairmen to engage in grandiose and white elephant projects, rather than focus on the basic necessities of life that their citizens lacked, further eroded the capacity of the local governments to function effectively. It was, therefore, not so surprising when the regime of General Sani Abacha on assumption of office in November 1993, dissolved all democratic structures, including local governments and appointed caretaker committees to run their affairs throughout the country. The regime went ahead to increase the number of local governments from 589 to 774 on October 1, 1996. Following the 1995 Draft Constitution, the exclusive power to create new local government was granted to the states. The 1997 Local Government Guidelines issued by the Federal Military Government also shows that government is interested in strengthening the local government as a level of government activity. There is no doubt, the fact that local government executives and the official functionaries alike will become better informed, more effective and highly efficient in the performance of their respective duties and responsibilities if they adhere strictly to the provisions contained in the guidelines. These changes notwithstanding, the consensus among scholars was that the local governments under the Abacha regime suffered a reversal from the path of progressiveness that could have facilitated efficiency and the effective functioning of the councils, for they become instruments of patronage and regime legitimization. The regime of General Abdulsalam Abubakar that succeeded General Abacha did not achieve much in the area of effective functioning of local governments, as it had no definitive policy thrust for that tier of government. Rather, it dissolved the elected local government councils and replaced them with career civil servants as sole administrators, who were later replaced by caretaker committees with non-­ partisan members from each council area and with the former sole administrators as chairmen and secretary.

The Era of 1999 till Date The system of local governance in the fourth republic was heralded by the conduct of local government election held on December 5, 1998. Elected officials did not,

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however, assume office until 6 months later in May 1999. The electoral law under which the official of the local government were elected (the Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions Decree No. 36 of 1998) provided for tenure of 3 years (Igbuzor 2003). In the same vein, the 1999 Constitution, like the 1995 Draft Constitution, restored the competence of the states over local governments. Section 7 (a and b) of the constitution also guarantees statutory financial allocation to the local government councils from both Federation Account and state governments. It also mandated the federal government to send to the local government allocations from the Federation Account to the State Local Government Joint Account established for the purpose. The obvious implication of these regulations has been the revival of the undermining factors that rendered local governments impotent and ineffective in the Second Republic. The undermining of local government capacity in the fourth republic began with state governors’ dissolution of elected council officials in accordance with the Provisions Decree No. 36 of 1998. Elected officials were replaced with members of ruling political party in the state, as caretaker committees. Even after four consecutive general elections this trend has not abated, as state governors continue to supplant democratically elected council officials with caretaker committees. On several occasions, the governors of Anambra, Edo, Ekiti, Imo, Ondo, Rivers states, etc. terminated the tenure of the democratically elected councils and replace them with members of ruling political party in the state, as caretaker committees. In most cases, the state government even resolves not to conduct elections into the councils, as in the case of Anambra state for over 6 years and Ekiti for over 3 years (Apata and Yemi, 2011;Wilson 2013). Similarly, various state governments capitalizing on the provisions of the 1999 constitution have conveniently laid siege and total control on local government funds through the establishment of Joint Account and Allocation Committee (JAAC) headed by a state government representative. The consequence of this arrangement is that as a result of JAAC, appointed council officials are only aware of the existence of their councils’ allocations without any power of control over the funds.

Challenges of Local Government in Nigeria The challenges facing local government system in Nigeria are no doubt enormous. The chief challenge has to do with the shortage of fund. The problem of inadequate funding has remained biggest problem facing local government in Nigeria. Local government authority in Nigeria lacks the requisite financial autonomy desirable and necessary for effective management of their financial resources. The shortage of funds quite naturally, has undermined the capacity of local governments to deliver on the statutory and shared responsibilities between it and the other tiers of government (Lawson 2011). Aside the fact that allocations and grants accruing from the federal and state governments are grossly inadequate, they have on several occasions been used as instrument of controlling the local governments

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in an attempt to make them succumb to the wimps and caprices of these other tiers of government. As such, the much touted local government autonomy envisaged by the theory and practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has remained more or less a political gimmick. Related to the shortage of fund is also the issue of abuse of local government funds by state governments. The issue of who controls the local government funds has been a great concern to the local government autonomy and democracy. Various state governments take advantage of the provisions of the 1999 constitution to abuse local government funds through the establishment of Joint Account and Allocation Committee (JAAC) headed by a state government representative. The JAAC deprives the local government the powers to control their funds. In most cases, through the instrument of the JAAC, the local governments are starved of fund for exercise of their democratic responsibilities to the people. The effect is that the local governments are now dependent on the state governments for their survival and continued existence and relevance. The situation is made worse by the constitutional rights granted to states to conduct election into local councils. Most state governors have capitalized on this provision to reduce local governments to mere extension of their political and administrative domain. In fact, since the governors and other top party leaders, in most cases ‘put them in office’, the governors believe that Chairmen of local government councils owe them a duty to ‘deliver’ whatever their monthly subvention are to them to partake in how they are appropriated. Cases abound where deductions are mandatorily made from local government accounts in the name of taking their own share of ‘counterpart-­ funding’ by the state governments to ‘fund’ their own projects. In some cases, such deductions end up in either the ruling party purse or groups or individual private pockets (Abdullahi and Mahuta 2012). Furthermore, insecurity of the tenure of local government officials equally constitutes a challenge to effective local government administration in Nigeria. The determination of the tenure of the office of political actors of local government councils has become an issue of dispute between the state and local governments. Local government as a tier of government has been hampered by the instrument of the state in determination of the tenure of their political officers. In several occasions, the state governments of Edo, Ekiti, Ondo and Rivers states, terminated the tenure of the democratically elected councils and replace them with members of ruling political party in the state, as caretaker committees. In most cases, the state government even resolves not to conduct elections into the councils, as in the case of Ekiti state where the state government have continually made use of caretaker committee since the inception of the administration in 2010. The dearth of qualified personnel at the local government level is also another obstacle to its effective administration. Qualified personnel are lacking in local governments due to poor remuneration and motivation. Local government staff are continually leaving the system in search of greener pastures. Recruitments into local government council’s employment are most often carried out, not on the possession of requisite knowledge and experience, but rather on political considerations and patronage (Oviasuyi et al. 2010).

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Lastly, the incidence of corruption, misappropriation and misapplication of funds that has become rampant and endemic at local level is also another critical challenge that the local government is confronted with. The local government staff have been alleged to generally exploit every opportunity in the name of official functions to embezzle government funds (Lawson 2011). Although it may be argued that corruption in Nigeria is not peculiar to local governments alone, as vertically all aspects of our national seems to have been infested with this malaise, the widespread nature of corruption at the local government level is considered more devastating and damaging because of its closeness to the grassroots. Nasir (2012) put this situation in perspective when he stated that: In the year 2011, the 774 local governments and the area councils in Nigeria received almost N1 trillion from the federation account, which is equivalent to the entire annual budget of Burkina faso, Rwanda, Burundi and Togo combined. These transformations were to enable them carry out their functions…nothing to show for this huge transfer of cash to the LGAs.

This perhaps explains the inefficiency and ineffectiveness in local government administration in Nigeria. The system has been rendered superfluous and redundant. Areas where corruption seems to thrive in the local government include the following: (a) Inflation of prices of bought items. (b) Overestimation of cost of projects. (c) The ghost workers syndrome. (d) Award of contracts and subsequent abandonment. (e) Outright payment of huge sums of money to political godfathers, etc. (Aghayere 1997). The prevalence and pervasiveness of corruption at the local government level remain a source of concern for the survival and continued relevance of the local government system. It has thrived, progressed and flourished unabated at the local government level such that it has become accepted as part of the system. Government business is, therefore, riddled with ineptitude, mismanagement and misappropriation of valuable resources. Commenting further on the situation of corruption in Nigeria, Aluko (2006) noted that: In every state of the Federation, Council Chairmen, other top local government officials have been accused of embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, extra-budgetary spending, purchase of official vehicles and plants (sometime unnecessarily) at unreasonably exorbitant prices and outrageous expenditure on security.

This situation is becoming more worrisome, more so when these officials find difficult to demarcate public fund from private resources. Account books are falsified, and funds embezzled with reckless abandon. Nobody is held accountable and audit reports have become politicized and are of less utility to enforce transparency and accountability in the local council areas in the country. This situation has left a sour taste in the mouths of the local populace, engulfed by the feelings of distrust, cynicism and despondence.

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Conclusion The Nigerian federal structure constitutionally recognizes and guarantees the existence of local government as the third tier of government. The history of local governance in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial era, where traditional ruler exerted enormous influence and control over the institutions of local administration in their domain. The advent of colonialism, however, occasioned the gradual but constituent erosion of the influence of traditional rulers, as a result of the participatory culture that became synonymous with governance at the local level. However, the incursion of the military into the Nigerian political space, shortly after independency contributed significantly to the reversal of the hitherto democratic achievement recorded at the local government level. Attempts at repositioning the local government for popular participation and effective performance necessitated the introduction of several reform efforts. Despite these reforms and the gains recorded in local governance over the years, the problems of funding, overbearing influence of the federal and state governments, insecurity of tenure, corruption, among others, still continue to plague the local government system in the country. These challenges have in no small measures contributed to democratic setback of local government administration in Nigeria. In most cases, the local governments were reduced to local administrative centres, thereby encouraging the autocratic intensions of the state actors and depriving the local people the access to choice of credible and viable leadership in the governance of their communities. Overcoming these challenges would require first and foremost that local government councils evolve a strategy of self-sufficiency in resources generation. Also, exploring and exploiting justifiable ways of judiciously utilizing what is presently accruing to the local councils will go a long way in stemming the present trend of poor performance and misappropriation, commonly associated with local government administration in Nigeria. Similarly, there is need for restructuring of the local government and assigning it with specific functions that is sufficiently local, reflecting the specificities and peculiarities of the country. Furthermore, local government councils as a matter of urgent necessity need to put in place mechanisms capable of promoting transparency and accountability in governance. In this regard, strengthening institutions of horizontal accountability and anti-corruption bodies becomes paramount. In addition, civil society organizations at the local level should be reoriented and empowered to demand accountability from elected officials. Finally, allowing the people at the grassroots a voice in policies and situation that impact on their lives is very germane. Government should that the people at the local level are afforded the opportunity of effectively participating in electing their representatives.

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Crook, R.C. and Monor, J. (1998) Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Danjuma A. (2012). Good governance as panacea to socio-economic crises in Nigeria. IOSR journal of Business and Management (IOSR JBM), volume 2, issue 3. www.ISORjournals.org. Ekpe, A.  N. (2012). Transparency and Accountability in Local Government Administration in Nigeria. African Education Indices, 1(1), 180-190. Enemuo, F. C. (1999). Decentralization and Local Government: Models, Principled and Purpose. In Anifowose, R. and Enemuo, F. C. (Eds.), Elements of Politics. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd. Enemuo, F. C. (2000). Problems and Prospects of Local Governance. In Hyden, G., Olowu, D. and Ogendo, H. (Eds.), African Perspective of Governance. Trenton/Asmara: African World Press. Essien, E. (2010), Nigeria under Structural Adjustment. Ibadan: Fountain Publication. Ezeani, E. O. (2006). Fundamentals of Public Administration. Enugu: Snaap Press Ltd. Ferguson, I. and Chandrasekharan, C. (2004). Paths and Pitfalls for Decentralization for Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences of the Asia-Pacific Region. In Colfer, C. and Capistrano, D. (Eds.), A New Vision for the State (and how it is working out in forests). CIFOR, Bogor. Fischer, F. (2000). Citizens, Experts and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge. Duke University Press:Durham. FRN. (1976). Guidelines for Local Government Reforms. Kaduna: Government Printer. FRN (1979) The 1979 Constitution. Daily Times Press Ltd. FRN. (1988a). Implementation Guidelines on the Civil Service Reforms. Lagos: Government Printer. FRN. (1988b). Supplementary Implementation Guidelines on the Civil Service Reforms. Lagos: Government Printer. FRN. (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos Government Printer. Fukasaku, K. and De Mello, L. (1999) Fiscal Decentralization in emerging Economic, governance Issues, Paris: OECD, Development Centre. Gaventa, J. and Valderrama, C. (1999). Participation, Citizenship and Local Governance. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. Gboyega, A. (1987). Political Values and Local Government in Nigeria. Lagos: Malthouse Press. Gboyega, A. (1988). Local Government and the Democratic Process. In Ayeni, V. and Soremekun, K. (Eds) Nigeria’s Second Republic: Presidentialism, Politics and Administration in a Developing State. Lagos: Daily Times. Gboyega, A. (2003). Democracy and Development: The Imperative of Local Governance, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers Ltd. Gboyega, A. (2003a). Local Autonomy in Federal Polities: The Nigerian Local Government System in Historical Perspective. In Gana, A.T. and Egwu, S. G. (Eds) Federalism in Africa. Vol. Two: The Imperative of Democratic Development, Eritrea, Africa World Press Inc. Trenton Gboyega, A. (2003b) Democracy and Development: The Imperative of Local Governance, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers Ltd. Gboyega, A.  Ogunsanya, M. and Okunade, B. (1988). An Evolution of the Liberalization of Funding and Administration of Primary Education in Nigeria as a result of SAP, Ibadan: NISER/SSCN National Research Network on Liberalization Policy in Nigeria. Gramberger, M. (2001). Citizens as Partners: DECD Handbook on Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-making, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Grindle, M. (2000) Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press. Hadenuis, A. (2001) Institutions and Democratic Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Igbuzor, O. (2003). Local Government Reform and Constitutional Review in Nigeria. http://nigeria-local-government.blogspot.com/2009/01/local-government-reform-and.html. Assessed on 29/5/2013. Keay, E.A. and Thomas, H. (1977). West African Government for Nigerian Students. London: Hutchinson and Co. Publishers Limited.

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Khalil, S. & Adelabu, S.A. (2012). Fiscal Planning and Local Government Administration in Nigeria: The Quest for Sustainable Rural Development. African Journal of Business Management, 6(9), 3482-3489. Khan, M.H. (2002). Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank Strategies and their Limitations. In Pincus, J. & Winters, J. (Eds) Reinventing the world Bank. Cornell University Press. Khemani, S. (2001). Fiscal Federalism and Service Delivery in Nigeria: The Role of States and Local Governments. Paper prepared for the Nigerian PER Steering Committee. Klugman, J. (1994). Decentralization: A Survey Literature from a Human Development Perspective, UNDP Occasional paper 13. hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/ocational_papers/oc13g.htm Lawson, P.S. (2011). Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution and Intergovernmental Relations (IGR): The Need for Improvement. Ozean Journal of Social Sciences 4(3). Pp. 199-205. Lijphart, A. (1997) Democracy in Plural Societies, Yale University Press. Manor, J. (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, Washington DC. World Bank. Nasir, A. (2012). Local governments: The missing tire of government, Nigeria village square. http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com. Assessed on 11/6/2013. Ola RF (1984). Local administration in Nigeria. London: Kegan Paul International. Olowu, D. (2000). Stalled Decentralization Reforms: The Nigerian Case and Lessons for Other African Countries. In Adedeji, A. & Ayo, B. (Eds.), People-Centred Democracy in Nigeria? The Search for Alternative Systems of Governance at the Grassroots. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc. Omotoso, F. (2000) ‘The changing phases of Local Government in Nigeria,’ in Ajayi, K. (ed), Theory and Practice of Local Government, Ado-Ekiti: Department of Political Science, University of Ado-Ekiti. Opeskin, BR (2001). Mechanisms for Intergovernmental Relations.  https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2451.00301 Orewa, G. O. and Adewunmi, J.B. (1981) Local Government Finance in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects, Benin City: Ethiope Publishing. Osamani, S. R. (2001). Participatory Governance, People’s empowerment and Poverty Reduction, http://www.undp.org/seped/publications/cont/pub.htm Oviasuyi, P. O., Idada, W. and Isiraojie, L. (2010). Constraints of Local Government Administration in Nigeria. Journal of Social Sciences, 24(2). .81-86 Rondinelli, D. (1981). Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries. International Review of Administrative Sciences, XLVII(2). Pp. 137-148. Rondinelli, D. and Nellis, J.  R. (1986). Assessing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: The Case For Cautious Optimism. Development Policy Review 4. Pp. 41-56. Rondinelli, D. et  al. (1987). Decentralization of Public Service in Develop0ing Countries: A Framework for Policy Analysis and Implementation. Working paper in Decentralization in Developing Country Series. Research Triangle Institute: Research Triangle Park, N.C. Scott-Herridge, R. (2003) Decentralization – Does it Deliver Good Governance and Improved Services? The Experience of Uganda, African Studies Centre: Occasional paper series, No. 10. Shah, A. (1998). “Fostering Fiscally Responsive and Accountable Governance: Lessons from Decentralization”, in Picciotto, R. and Wiesner, E. (eds) Evaluation and Development. The Institutional dimension. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Smoke, P. (1994). Local Government finance in Developing countries: The Case of Kenya, Nairobi: Oxford University Press. Suwondo, K. (2002.) Decentralization in Indonesia: paper prepared for international Non-­ government Organization forum on Indonesia Development Annual Advocacy. www.infid.be/ infid%20background%202002%decentralization.pdf Tukur, M. (1999) Leadership and Governance in Nigeria. The Relevance of Values. London: Holder and Stoughton.

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Ugwu, S. C. (2002). Issues in Local Government and Urban Administration in Nigeria. Enugu: Echrisi and Company. United Nations Global Forum (1996) Local Governance: Report of the United Nations Global forum on Innovative Practices in Local Governance. Western Region of Nigeria (1955). Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1955, Ibadan. World Bank (1999) World Development Report 1999/2000: entering the 21st Century: The changing Development Landscape, London/New York: Oxford University Press. Wilson, G. (2013). The Politics of Local Government Reforms and Democratic Governance in Nigerian Local Governments. Developing Country Studies, 3 (1). Pp. 136-143. Wraith, R. (1972). Local Administration in West Africa. London: George Allen and Unwin Limited. Wunsch, J. (2001) Decentralization, Local Governance and the Democratic Transition in Southern Africa: A comparative Analysis, African Studies Quarterly. http://web.africa.ufl. edu/asq/v2i192.htm Yahaya, A.D. (1980), The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press.

Chapter 10

Bureaucracy, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Policy Establishment Fatai Ayinde Aremu and Solomon Adebayo Adedire Abstract  Bureaucracy is the machinery through which the aspirations of the state and of its operators are articulated, formulated, and executed. The study presents an overview of the bureaucracy, reviews its evolution, its reforms and transformations as well as engages the salient issues that dominate the discourses on the bureaucracy. Relying on secondary sources of data such as textbooks, journals, official documents, reports, and a discourse analysis, this chapter argues that impartiality, anonymity, and political neutrality are hallmark of bureaucracy, which allows it to function effectively without being encumbered by the vicissitudes of the kaleidoscopic political environment. The finding was that the Nigerian bureaucratic establishment exerts tremendous strain on public overhead expenditure to the detriment of investment in capital project and infrastructure. Rather than draw down the size of the bureaucracy, successive administrations have continued to grow the service as a result of desire to grant political patronage to supporters and acolytes. Considering the endemic corruption that permeates civil service and the entrenched culture of nepotism, this chapter proposes that Nigerian bureaucratic establishment requires much deeper restructuring and a change of mentality and attitude to work than the periodic peripheral reforms seem to offer. Keywords Bureaucracy · Politics · Policy · Reforms · Hallmark · Kaleidoscopic

Introduction Bureaucracy is the live wire of the state. It is the machinery through which the aspirations of the state and of its operators are articulated, formulated, and executed. The effectiveness of the state is intricately connected to the effectiveness of its bureaucratic establishment. It is widely noted in the literature that the idea of F. A. Aremu (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria S. A. Adedire Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_10

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“developmental state” revolves around the centrality of the bureaucracy in marshalling the human and material resources of the state to achieve developmental objectives (Muramatsu, Naschold and de Gruyter, 1997). Comprising of people that are specially trained in the routine official business of the state, the bureaucracy deals with the daily management of policies. Defined by unique attributes such as hierarchy, clearly stipulated schedule of activities, actions based on written and documented rules which are implemented by neutral officials, and the careers of such officials as well as their advancement defined by organizational principles rather than individual whims, these attributes make the bureaucracy a cardinal custodian of the Weberian legalrational authority. Interestingly, it is the attributes that open the bureaucracy to criticism as being excessively steeped in adherence to rules to the detriment of progress thereby creating unwieldy complex and cumbersome administrative procedure. The Nigerian bureaucratic establishment could be seen as a manifestation of the general orientation of the common attributes of bureaucracy. Indeed, the various pre-colonial administrative entities that eventually metamorphosed into the Nigerian bureaucracy could be said to have exhibited the attributes of bureaucracy. Common to the Northern Caliphate/Emirate systems, the Oyo Kingdom in Western region and the traditional governance institutions in Eastern and Central Nigeria are a body of people that discharge what would qualify as the functions of modern bureaucracy. Upon amalgamation in 1914, the subsequent integration and harmonization of the various administrative and bureaucratic entities comprising of the colonial state evolved into the Nigerian bureaucracy which was handed down to post-­colonial Nigerian leadership at independence in 1960. Series of reforms have characterized the operation of the bureaucratic establishment with the aim of making the service more efficient and result-oriented. This chapter presents an overview of the bureaucracy; reviews its evolution, its reforms, and its transformations; as well as engages the salient issues that dominate the discourses on the bureaucracy.

Bureaucracy and Public Policy: A Conceptual Framework Policy in the government sphere refers to the relationship of a government unit to its environment (Eyestone, 1987). What makes policies distinctively “public” is that they are developed by governmental bodies and officials. As an activity, policy-­ making is located squarely within the vortex of government. Institutions of government such as legislature, executive, and judiciary are assigned specific functions in furtherance of the purpose of government. There are also agencies of government such as the civil bureaucracy, the police, prisons, etc. which perform sundry functions that are contingent on the goals of government (Adesina, 1999). The main reason for the establishment of government is to provide effective and efficient service delivery to the citizens on an equitable basis in order to ensure even development in the country. The performance of this role depends on a dynamic and accountable public service system. Ayodele (2004) observed that the challenges of

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development and stability of the polity depend on a great deal on the efficient, effective, mobile, accountable public service system. The civil service is normally the thinking arm of the sovereign nations and often draws from a country’s most unique talent pool, from its established centers of knowledge production – the universities, the research centers, and the entire schools system. It generates ideas to create and continuously renew the charter and mission of nationhood (Nwakanma, 2014). The civil service plays a vital role in formulation, implementation, evaluation, and review of government policies and programs. Civil service reforms provide an enabling environment for civil servants to perform their duties in an unfettered manner, fair treatment of personnel and establishment of a demographically representative apparatus (Sekwat, 2002). Ejifor (2003) argued that civil service in developing societies like Nigeria is everything and that the most important catalyst of development is an efficient service while at the same time its inefficient constitutes the heaviest millstones of any nation. This is similar to the view of Agagu (1997: 233) who contends that civil service is the continuously active business part of government concerned with carrying out the law, as made by the legislative bodies in the process of organization and management. The civil service has emerged as an organ of the executive arm that is responsible for advising it on policy formulation and implementation. Thus, Warren Fisher (quoted in AL- Gazali 2002: 2) in his report of the Royal Commission of the civil service stated as follows: Determination of policy is the function of ministers, and once a policy is determined, it is the unquestionable and unquestioned business of the civil servant to strive to carry out that policy with precisely the same goodwill, whether he agrees with it or not.

Bureaucracy is one way to organize the public administration. The word bureaucracy is often used in common language to mean the public administration, usually with a connotation of distance. However, social scientists have a precise meaning for it: a particular mode of administrative organization that was developed as a reform in the nineteenth century and spread widely to be the most generally used mode today (Shively, 1942). Gerth and Mills (1958) consider the following as features of bureaucracy: Members of the public administration are appointed and promoted on the basis of their qualifications for the job they are to do. Special requirements of training or experience are set for the position. Administrative procedures are standardized, so that relatively little is left to individual officials’ biases or passions. Clear lines of command are established, in which an order from a high official goes to a lower official, who then passes the order on to the next level and so on until it reaches the point of operation. This arrangement is called a hierarchical command structure. Finally, public administrators are shielded from day-to-day political pressure, usually with a system of tenure.

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Evolution and the Nigerian Bureaucracy The Nigerian bureaucracy (essentially the civil service) is not a creation of modern times. It has its roots in history and dates back to the times of the ancient civilizations. Civil service can be traced to colonial era as an institution that was modeled on the British civil service as part of the “migrated social structures” (Ekeh,1980). With the emergence of modern states and the development of the parliamentary system of government, the civil service evolved as the bedrock of the executive arm of government. Its main task is the implementation of policies decided on by the legislature (Adebayo, 1989). The civil service is normally the thinking arm of the sovereign nations and often draws from a country’s most unique talent pool, from its established centers of knowledge production – the universities, the research centers, and the entire schools system. It generates ideas to create and continuously renew the charter and mission of nationhood (Nwakanma, 2014). The Nigerian civil service system has been subjected to three political influences: the colonial, the civilian, and the military. The British colonial rulers of Nigeria decided to transplant a British-inspired civil service system into the country in the 1950s. This transplantation exercise was accompanied by the establishment of distinct institutions for managing the entrepreneurial activities undertaken by the state. The civil service system was conceived as a career service whose members would serve successive terms of temporary political executives on a permanent basis. The assumption was that the justifications for the emergence of a career civil service system in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century following the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1855) were equally applicable to Nigeria (Adamolekun, 1986: 51–77). From 1957 when the first set of Nigeria were carefully recruited directly to the colonial administrative service under the leadership of the English chief secretary, Sir Ralph Gray, it was assumed that Nigeria would build upon the best tradition and values of its inherited service (Nwakanma, 2014). The British-inspired conception of the civil service was maintained at independence in 1960. It was more or less openly acknowledged in the 1950s that the civil service system was closely connected to the parliamentary system of government. After the independence, the basic norms of the civil service such as anonymity, political neutrality, and impartiality were respected by the civil servants. With the intervention of the military in Nigerian politics, the influence and supremacy that the civil service wielded was eroded by the military. The principles of anonymity, political neutrality, permanency, and impartiality enjoyed by the civil service prior to the military era were completely removed. During the first phase of military experimentation, two patterns emerged with regard to the role of the higher civil servants. Between 1967 and 1975, the higher civil servants dominated the policy-­making process leading to the virtual loss of the attributes of political neutrality, anonymity, and impartiality. On the contrary, between 1975 and 1979, the role of the civil servants in the policy process became less pronounced. The trend, which has continued since then, is attributable to three factors (Adebayo, 1981):

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First, the mass dismissals or “purges” of the civil service in 1975/1976 in which it was estimated that about 10,000 public officers were dismissed. The reasons given for the exercise were alleged inefficiency, old age, declining productivity, and doubtful probity. Commenting on this Osaghae (1997) stressed that such surgical operation was needed to cure an endemic problem. However, the exercise was hijacked by reactionary forces who manipulated the exercise to witch hunt and victimize real and perceived enemies. Second, the appointment of advisers to government with strong technical skills in various disciplines has reduced government reliance on civil servants. Third, economic reforms, especially privatization and commercialization of public enterprises, have also reduced the opportunity for the appointment of higher civil servants to the board of directors, thus curbing their influence.

Civil Service Reforms in Nigeria: An Overview There is no gainsaying the fact that the future growth and development of a nation depend on the strength and ability of the civil service to develop a science and philosophy of administration to discharge social goods in the developing societies (Stone, 1986:2). The civil servants have played an indispensable role in the development of the country. However, over time, the public have held the civil service with a lot of suspicion, with some people believing that the services operate for the benefit of a handful civil servant and their political counterparts or collaborator (Gupta, 2003). In other words, the civil service has not been versatile enough to initiate or embrace change but rather often merely responds to changes initiated from outside of the institution. As society developed therefore, there arose a correlating demand on the state for effective and accountable civil service and effective and accountable public sector institutions. These demands became more evident in the late twentieth century when greater education, awareness, and liberty led to rising public expectation for better governance and accountability (Faseluka, 2010). The Nigerian civil service has undergone several major reforms that dated back to the pre-independence era. The reforms can be divided into colonial (pre-Udoji reform) and post-colonial civil service reforms; the post-colonial reform can be further divided into Udoji and post-Udoji reforms.

Colonial or Pre-Udoji Civil Service Reforms Under the 1954 constitution, the Nigerian civil service was regionalized into four distinct civil services in the country. By 1965, the number of civil services had increased to five: the federal public service and one public service for each of the

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four regions. With the creation of 12 states in 1967, 13 distinct civil services became operational until the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. Prior to the Udoji reform of 1972, the following commissions were set up to review the civil service structure (Civil Service Handbook, 1997: 21–22).

Tudor Davis (1945) This was primarily concerned with the review of wages and general conditions of service.

Harragin Commission (1946) This made some structural changes by introducing “senior service” and “junior service,” thus dividing the service into two rigid compartments.

Gorsuch Commission (1954) The commission reviewed the senior and junior service categories. It recommended that the service be structured into five main grades, from the lowest established posts upwards, with parallel classes for both the administrative and professional cadres. It recommended that the public service, which had been unitary, be split into four separate services, comprising the federal and three regional services. This was in line with the emerging federal structure of the 1950s.

L.N. Mbanefo Commission (1959) This was set up to review the basic rates of salary and wages payable to holders of posts in the federal public service as well as the public service of the Northern and Eastern regions and Southern Cameroons. While the four reforms above were executed under the colonial era, starting from the Morgan commission of 1963, reforms in the civil service became a purely domestic affairs articulated, initiated, coordinated, and implemented by indigenous rulers. Although the post-colonial reforms dated back to 1963, Udoji Commission only came on board in 1974 a report for a comprehensive civil service report was submitted.

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Adeyinka Morgan Commission (1963) This was set up to review the wages, salaries, and conditions of service of junior federal civil servants and workers in private establishments. It introduced, for the first time, a minimum wage in the country on a geographical basis.

Adebo Salaries and Wages Commission (1971) This commission was set up under the chairmanship of Chief Simeon Adebo, who was appointed on July 29, 1970, with the following terms of reference: (a) To review the existing wages and salaries at all levels in the public services and in the statutory public corporations and state-owned companies (b) To examine areas in which rationalization and harmonization of wages, salaries, and other remuneration and conditions of employment are desirable and feasible as between the public and private sectors of the national economy (c) To consider the need to establish a system for ensuring that remunerations in the public services, the statutory corporations, and the state-owned companies are periodically reviewed and kept to proper national balance (d) To make recommendations to the Federal Military Government, including, if necessary, the need for any appropriate interim measures pending final recommendations

The Udoji Reforms The commission which was named after its chairman was a milestone in the annals of Nigerian civil service because of the wide-ranging nature of its review and recommendations, which extended beyond the civil service and encompassed the parastatals and local governments as well. The terms of reference of the Udoji Commission were to: (a) Examine the organization, structure, and management of the public service and recommend reforms where desirable (b) Investigate and evaluate the method of employment and the staff development programs of the public service (c) Examine the legislation relating to pensions as well as the various superannuation schemes in the public services and in the private sector and suggest such changes as may be appropriate (d) Undertake, with the aid of appropriate grading terms, a grading of all posts in the public service, establish scales of salaries corresponding to such grades, and carry out a job evaluation for each post in the service

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(e) Enquire into and make recommendations on any other matter which, in the opinion of the commission, appear to be relevant to the forgoing and, therefore, ought to be inquired in the public interest In his report, Udoji (1974) made the following recommendations: 1 . Introduction of open reporting system for performance evaluation 2. The Unified Grading and Salary Structure, covering all posts in the civil service 3. The opening of the post of chief executive of a ministry, referred to as permanent secretary 4. The introduction of the merit system as a basis of reward 5. The replacement of the confidential reporting system by the open reporting system 6. The introduction of a new code of conduct to the Nigerian civil servant

Post-Udoji Reforms The Civil Service Reorganization Decree No. 43 of 1988 was enacted following the Udoji Commission recommendations. Subsequently, two major reforms were initiated – the 1988 Civil Service Reform and the 1994 Ayida Review Panel, respectively.

The Civil Service Reforms of 1988 This reform was headed by Dotun Phillips. Some of the important provisions of the reforms (Civil Service Handbook, 1997 22–3) were: 1. There was the politicization of the service, especially its upper echelon. For instance, the office of the head of civil service was abolished; the Minister, in addition to being the chief executive, also became the accounting officer in place of the permanent secretary. The post of permanent secretary was abolished. 2. Each ministry was empowered to undertake the appointment, promotion, and discipline of its staff under the general and uniform guidelines provided by the Federal Civil Service Commission. 3. Each ministry or extra-ministerial department was allowed to have three common service departments, Department of Personnel Management, Department of Finance and Supplies, and Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics, and not more than five operations departments.

Civil Service Reforms of 1994 (Ayida Panel) The 1988 Civil Service Reform had such disastrous consequences on the service that the Abacha administration had to constitute the Ayida Panel in 1994 to examine the civil service afresh, with a view to discovering factors inhibiting its effectiveness

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and efficiency and the various factors that had led to low morale in the service. Government decision on the recommendations was published in a white paper in June 1997 (Bhagwan and Bhushan, 2006). The decisions of the Federal Military Government were as follows: 1. Ministries and extra-ministerial departments should be structured according to their objective, functions, and sizes, and not according to a uniform pattern. 2. The minister should no longer be the accounting officer of the ministry. This function now becomes the responsibility of the director general. 3. In a similar vein, government accepted the recommendation that the title of director general should revert to permanent secretary. This will remove the confusion between the director general of ministries and those of parastatals and myriad of government agencies. 4. Government accepted the recommendation that the post of permanent secretary should be a career post. Appointment will be made from among serving senior officers in the civil service on the advice of the Head of the Civil Service and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. 5. Government accepted that the recommendation that the post of Head of the Civil Service should be restored and that he should be appointed from among permanent secretaries. 6. The panel recommended and government accepted the scrapping of parastatals like National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, National Committee against Apartheid, and Centre for Democratic Studies. 7. Government accepted the recommendation that the “Guideline of Administrative Procedure of the Federal Government” should be updated and applied in the conduct of government business. 8. Recruitment into the Civil Service at the entry grades should be based on accountability of merit and federal character. 9. Retirement age in the civil services should be 60 years irrespective of the length of service. 10. In order to improve morale and reduce corruption, the panel recommended that the salaries and allowances of civil servants should be substantially reviewed upwards.

Public Policy Reforms of 2003 A policy analysis unit was established in the legislative arm, with a view to building capacity for policy formulation, implementation, and review. In the executive arm of government, policy implementation and monitoring units were also set up to monitor all programs or projects on the agenda.

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Monetization as a Public Policy Reform (2003) The Presidential Committee on Monetization in the Public Service was set up on November 11, 2002, under the chairmanship of Chief U.J. Ekaette, Secretary to the Federal Government. The monetization policy aimed at reducing government recurrent expenditure, waste, and abuse of public facilities. This was aimed at enhancing efficiency in resource allocation as well as moving the economy forward. The list of benefits currently being monetized is as follows (Ekaette, 2003: 16): (a) Residential Accommodation—monetized at 100 percent of annual basic salary which is to be paid in advance to enable an officer pay for the accommodation of his choice. (b) Furniture Allowance—paid as 300 percent of annual basic salary in line with the provisions of employment of certain political, public, and judicial office holders. (c) Utility Allowance and Domestic Servants’ Allowance. (d) Motor Vehicle Loan and Transport—monetized with provision of vehicle loan of 35 percent annual basic salary and recoverable over 6 years with 4 percent interest rate. (e) Fueling/Maintenance and Transport Allowance—10 percent of annual basic salary will be paid to public servants while political office holders will be paid 30 percent annual basic salary. (f) Leave Grant—monetized at the rate of 10 percent of annual basic salary. (g) Meal Subsidy—monetized. (h) Entertainment Allowance—already monetized for public servants, while 10 percent of annual basic salary was stipulated for political office holders. (i) Personal Assistant Allowance—monetized.

The Pension Reform Act, 2004 The Federal Government set up a committee called Adeola Committee to look into pension administration in Nigeria. The committee came up with a recommendation for the reform of pension administration and management in Nigeria. This recommendation was subsequently introduced as a bill to the National Assembly and passed into law on Friday, June 25, 2004. The passage of the bill into law resulted in the abrogation of the Pension Act of 1979. The 2004 Pension Act established a uniform contributory pension scheme for workers in both private and public sectors of the economy. Eneanya (2009) highlighted the major features of the Act as follows: (a) Contributions of funds by both the employer and the employee to fund retirement benefits. (b) Amounts deducted from the employee’s emoluments together with the employer’s contributions are to be credited to the employee’s retirement savings account with pension fund administrators.

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(c) Pension fund assets are to be privately managed and invested by professional Pension Fund Administrators licensed by the National Pension Commission. (d) Strict regulation of the activities of Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) and Pension Fund Custodians assets under uniform laws and regulations for both public and private sectors. (e) The establishment of the National Pension Commission (Pen Com) charged with responsibility for matters relating to the regulation, supervision, and effective administration of the scheme.

Servicom Policy (Initiative) It was established within the Presidency to manage and effect government commitments to the people in the area of service delivery. It is a social contract between the Federal Government of Nigeria and its people. According to Eneanya (2009), Servicom was empowered to: (i) Coordinate the formulation and operation of Servicom charter (ii) Monitor and report to the President on the progress made by ministries and agencies in performing their obligations under Servicom (iii) Carry out independent surveys of the services provided to citizens by the ministries and government departments, their adequacy, timeliness, and customer satisfaction (iv) Conduct Servicom compliance evaluation services provided by government departments (v) Award Servicom index (vi) View Servicom books and relevant documents

Limitations of Administrative Reforms (a) Inadequate knowledge of provisions of the reforms on the part of some civil servants and top government functionaries (b) Absence of strong commitment on the part of top government functionaries to the implementation of the reforms, partly as a result of misconception that full implementation would erode their powers (c) Inadequate fund for the introduction and entrenchment of the provisions of the reforms (d) Lack of a formal program of implementation incorporating deadlines and lack of sanctions for infringing the provisions of the reforms

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 ivil Service Reforms During Obasanjo Administration C (1999–2007) Although in the foregoing discussion some mention was made of some of the reforms executed since 1999 when the fourth republic took off, we want to examine, in brief, some specific reforms implemented under Obasanjo administration between 1999 and 2007. In his effort to re-orientate the value system and improve the standard of living of Nigerians, Obasanjo regime provided well-remunerated packages to enhance democratic governance. Since 1999, the government has increased the salaries of workers twice, while several official hitherto deprived of promotion have been promoted (The Guardian, May 30 2004: 15). The thrusts of the civil service reforms included: (a) Professionalizing the service with skilled and knowledgeable technocrats with appropriate motivation to assist in upgrading the operations of government (b) Reducing waste and inefficiency by monetizing fringe benefits within an incentive structure that supports private sector development by outsourcing services which are considered to be unnecessary and only tangential to effective government and operation of the service (c) Improving morale by instituting a more transparently managed contributory pension system that guarantees pension payment as and when due and under direct control of the retiree (d) Rightsizing the workforce of the service by weeding outsourced cadres and those that do not have the qualifications, which required discipline or the proper state of physical and mental health to serve effectively (e) Instituting fiscal and budgetary reforms within the context of a Medium-Term Public Expenditure framework in order to sanitize budgeting and funding of government programs (f) Harmonizing organizational structures and objectives to reduce duplication and promote systematic reporting and evaluation of performance and program implementation (g) Refocusing government agencies on their core functions and withdrawing from commercial activities and making them more effective through restructuring and re-skilling (h) Re-engineering administrative rules, procedures, and work processes by making them faster and adapting them to existing operational and technological realities (ICT) (i) Changing the mind-set of officers so that they are disciplined, courteous, and guided by a professional code of ethical conduct, etc. (Yayale, 2007)

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 ureaucracy and the Nigerian State: Issues, Challenges, B and Possibilities Some issues dominate the discourse on bureaucracy in Nigeria. The issues could be seen as constituting the challenges to the effective operation of the bureaucratic establishment. At the same time, the issues also constitute the future possible trajectories that the Nigerian bureaucracy could chart and navigate. Subject to debate is the variation in the degree of influence and control that the bureaucracy has over the policy process. The common assumption is that the bureaucracy exercised greater influence under the military administrations than under civilian regimes. The end of the First Republic and the advent of military rule gave rise to the emergence of highly influential bureaucrats. The era of the Simeon Adebos, Philip Asiodus, Udojis, and their peers who were then described as “super-Permanent Secretaries” marked the height of influence that was wielded by the bureaucrats. Their influence waned with the onset of democratic administration in the second republic (1979–1983) only to return with the arrival of the military in political arena in the 1980s and 1990s. The boom-bust cycle in the influence of the bureaucracy which coincided with military-civilian regimes is an interesting phenomenon that requires further explanation. The military leadership that ventured out of the barracks into the political arena has an endemic deficit ab initio: lack of legitimacy. Unlike their civilian counterparts that were known to and elected by the people, the military leadership at the federal and state levels suddenly emerged from their various barracks to occupy positions of leadership across the country. An obvious legitimacy gap was thus created, and this was made up for with the dependence on the bureaucrats who have been in the public domain prior to the coming of the military administrators. This gave greater visibility to the bureaucracy/bureaucrats under the military than civilian regimes. In addition to the legitimacy deficit, there was also the knowledge deficit which compelled the military leadership to depend more on the bureaucracy than their civilian counterparts. The wealth of knowledge at the disposal of bureaucrats often proved invaluable to the military leadership in terms of policy formulation and delivery. Conversely, perhaps because of the diverse backgrounds of people in government during civil rule, and the fact that recruitment from the civil populace often further boost the legitimacy of the government, political leadership under democratic regime is believed to be better equipped with the requisite background knowledge and experience that could easily translate to efficiency in office. Parties compete for power, and the winning party comes to power with either a well-­articulated manifesto or programs of action as is always the case in Nigeria. The programs of action serve as a directional map for a party that captures power for the purpose of policy-making and execution. This is not so with the military. Despite the thinking in some circle that the military personnel often acquire experience that is transferable considering their years of training and service, in as much as the training remains basically military oriented, it will remain

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difficult for the military to match or exhibit the level of knowledge and experience often brought into governance by their political counterparts. On the whole, it is clearly discernible that the visibility that the bureaucracy enjoys under military regimes pales out under democratic administrations. Directly connected to the debate on the influence of the bureaucracy is the issues of whether the variations in the level of dependence and involvement of the bureaucracy in the policy process affect the quality and effectiveness of public policy. This is an issue that is likely to endure in the discourse on the bureaucracy and its role in Nigeria’s politic into the foreseeable future. Although the degree of influence that is exercised by the bureaucracy could vary according to regime-type (and this calls empirical inquiry), there is no gainsaying that bureaucracy represents an influential constituency in the policy arena irrespective of the type of regime. As the harbinger of institutional memory and custodian of tremendous pool of information and knowledge, the bureaucracy enjoys overriding dominance in the policy establishment. Compared to the political elite who ordinarily is expected to exercise effective control over public policy as the custodian of people’s mandate, the unelected club of bureaucratic elite takes advantage of its institutional memory and permanence (at least much longer than politicians) in policy cycles. In terms of accountability to the public, the fact that the bureaucracy is not elected by the people, they are not directly accountable to the public as much as the politicians. The issue of control, accountability, and responsibility breeds suspicion and acrimony between the political leadership and entrenched bureaucratic elite in policy establishment. The possibility is that this phenomenon in the bureaucratic landscape is unlikely to change in the future. Another thorny issue that may continue to characterize the Nigerian bureaucratic establishment is its internal mechanisms and processes. Generally speaking, recruitment into the bureaucracy ought to be driven by competitive and transparent procedures which would guarantee that the most highly qualified in the employable pool makes it into the service. In other climes, recruitment examinations into the bureaucracy are some of the toughest. The performance of potential recruits in the examinations which reveals their areas of competencies invariably determines the posting of successful candidates. For instance, in recruitment exercises into the Japanese bureaucracy, the candidates that score highest in Mathematics, Finance, and Economics get posted to the powerful Ministry of Finance (Zaimusho) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Keizansangyusho formerly MITI). Similarly, candidates that score highest in politics and law get posted to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho) and Ministry of Justice. The open and transparent recruitment procedure allows the bureaucracy to attract the most highly qualified and suitable for the service. Consequently, in Nigeria with regular intensive training and merit-driven recruitment and promotion exercise, the bureaucracy could be made more productive and efficient in discharging its responsibilities in the policy establishment. The practice of bureaucracy in Nigeria is hardly close to the description of an ideal-type. Recruitment into the service is driven more by patronage rather than

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by open, competitive, and transparent procedures. In recent years, government ministries, parastatals, and officers and sometimes too those fronting for them have often extorted applicants for jobs. Indeed, employment racketeering has become a culture in the Nigerian public/civil service. This malaise has infected the recruitment exercise into paramilitary services as well. This has been spreading like a wide harmattan fire with the state appearing incapable of checking abuse of officer power and protecting the mass unemployment youths in the country. By the same token, posting, promotion, and discipline are guided more by ethno-religious balancing, geopolitical considerations, and nepotism than by formal rule-based procedures that bureaucracies are known for worldwide. These have had negative impact on the productivity and effectiveness of the bureaucracy in Nigeria. Indeed, they are contentious issues that may continue to define the Nigerian bureaucracy into the future. Impartiality, anonymity and political neutrality are hallmark of the bureaucracy which allows it to function effectively without being encumbered by the vicissitudes of the kaleidoscopic political environment. Insulation from the vagaries of political maneuverings and mudslinging enables the bureaucrats to concentrate on policy formulation, advice, and policy implementation to the various leaderships devoid of ideological and political colorations. The time-tested attributes have dissipated with expression of open political preference of serving bureaucrats. Unbridled political interference in the operation, procedure, and internal processes of the bureaucracy has opened the service to frontal assault by the political elite such that the boundary between career bureaucrats and politicians is hardly distinguishable. The phenomenon has had devastating effect on morale, discipline, and order in the bureaucracy thereby giving rise to grossly inept and appallingly inefficient bureaucratic machine at various levels of government in Nigeria. The relationship (and level of involvement) between bureaucrats, politics, and politicians is one of the thorny issues that will continue to mark the discourses on Nigerian bureaucracy. The question of size, corruption, and nepotism in the bureaucracy would almost certainly constitute a dominant agenda in the debate on Nigeria’s bureaucratic establishment along the future. Multilateral financial institutions and development agencies have perpetually drawn attention to the awesome and unsustainable size of Nigeria’s bureaucracy. This exerts tremendous strain on public overhead expenditure to the detriment of investment in capital project and infrastructure. Rather than draw down the size of the bureaucracy, successive administrations have continue to grow the service as a result of desire to grant political patronage to supporters and acolytes. The large size of the Nigerian bureaucratic establishment without commensurate productivity, efficiency, and quality of service may constitute a recurring decimal in the analysis of Nigeria’s political system. With the endemic corruption in the civil/public service and the entrenched culture of nepotism, the Nigerian bureaucratic establishment faces daunting challenges that require much deeper restructuring and a change of mentality and attitude to work than the periodic peripheral reforms seem to offer.

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References Adamolekun, L. (1986). Politics and administration in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books and London, Hutchinson. Adebayo, A. (1981). Principles and practice of public administration in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Adebayo, A. (1989). Principles and practice of public administration in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Adesina, K. S. 1999 Public Administration: An Introduction, Lagos, Mozee Publications Agagu, A. (1997). “Public Administration,” In D. Kolawole (ed.) Readings in Political Science. Ibadan: Dekaal. AL-Gazali, A. (2002). Understanding the basic civil service rules and regulations in Nigeria’s technical aid corps: Issues and perspectives. Ibadan: Dokun Publishing House. Ayodele, B. (2004). “Ethno-Nationalistic Militarism and the Quest for Democratic Security in Post-Military Nigeria.” In K.  Ajayi and B.  Ayodele (eds.), Perspectives on democracy and development in post-military Nigeria. Ibadan: Julius and Julius Associates. Bhagwan, V. and Bhushan, V. (2006). Public Administration. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd. Civil Service Handbook 1997. Federal Government Press, December. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division. Ejifor, P. 2003. “Welcome Address by Chairman Conference Local Organising Committee,” In O.  Godwin (ed.), Corruption and Sustainable Development: The Third World Perspectives. Onitsha, Anambra State: Bookpoint Ltd. Ekeh, P. P. (1980). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. Comparative Studies in Society and History 17(1): 91–112. Ekaette, U.J. 2003. “Monetization as a public policy reform.” social science lecture. Lagos: University of Lagos. Eneanya, A.N. 2009. Public administration in Nigeria: principles, techniques and applications. Lagos: Concept Publications. Eyestone, D. J. 1987, The Politics of Administrative Process: Washington DC, CQ Press Faseluka, G. 2010, “Civil service administration and effective service delivery for development” In F. Omotosho, A. Agagu and O. Abegunde (eds.), Governance, Politics and Policies in Nigeria. Gupta, S. 2003. “India and the Crisis of Good Governance.” In C.P. Barthwal Good Governance in India, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. 1958. From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press 196-244. Muramatsu, M., Naschold, F. & de Gruyter, W. 1997, State and Administration in Japan and Germany, New York: M. E. Sharpe Nwakanma, O. 2014. The reforms in the civil service. Vanguard, Thursday March 6. Osaghae, E. E. (1997). Structural adjustment and ethnicity in Nigeria (Research Report No. 98). Uppsala, Sweden: Motala Grafiska, Motala. Sekwat, A. 2002. Civil service reform in Post-Independence Nigeria: Issues and challenges. Public Administration Quarterly 25 (4), 498–517. Shively, W.P. 1942. Power and choice: an introduction to political science. New York: McGraw Hill. Stone, D. 1986, Planning and Administration in America. New York: Alfred Knopf Udoji, J. 1974. Public Service Review Commission, Main Report. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lagos: Government Printing Press. Yayale, A. 2007, “Extending the Frontiers of the Civil Service Reforms” presentation at the 37th Annual Conference of Civil Service Commission in Nigeria held at Uyo.

Chapter 11

Party Politics and Political Parties Under Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy in Nigeria Margaret Apine and Sophia Balogun Abstract  This chapter examines party politics and political parties in Nigeria. From independence to date, the frequent dissolution of democracy has affected the growth of political parties in Nigeria. This also has affected the experience and ability of the politicians to develop and imbibe some basic democratic culture. This has made democratic sustainability a difficult task. Thus, both under the parliamentary and the presidential systems, democracy was largely unstable. The multi-party democracy of the first and second republics collapsed under an adversarial party politics. This chapter discusses how party politics shaped the character of government under the two systems. Keywords  Democracy · Party politics · Parliamentary · Presidential system · Multi-party

Introduction In the modern time, and particularly in democracies, political parties provide the platform through which individuals seek public office and acquire elective government offices. Political party is usually made up of people who share the same view and ideology or at least have certain political goals which they consider realizable within the ambit of the party. By this, individuals who are committed to a particular approach to governance and who pursue common goals based on a common ideology may or sometimes come together to form a party with the ultimate goal of capturing political power or public office to implement those social, economic, and political values that the captures the interests of its members and party as a whole. Although political parties perform similar functions with some non-political institutions like pressure groups, what distinguishes a political party from the other social organizations is that political parties are instruments that connect citizens to the M. Apine (*) · S. Balogun Department of Political Science, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_11

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policy makers. Parties articulate and aggregate demands and interest, recruit and remove leaders, make or unmake government policies, and carry out or obstruct the implementation of a policy decision as well as of disciplinary measures for members (Johari 2011). Historically, political parties have emerged and evolved through various political eras. This ranges from the normative/pre-behavioral era to that of the behavioral and post-behavioral eras (Reiter 2006). The normative period was characterized by groups which were necessary in supporting the existing political order and as a medium which could serve as suggestive forum to the polity to carry out necessary reforms in the system. Individuals in the behavioral period, on the other hand, viewed political party as “a group of people who are joined together for the main reason of influencing and controlling of a political system” (Johari 2011). This, they achieved by making their political ideologies in a detailed manifesto as well as influencing voting process directly or indirectly. Political party can be defined as therefore regarded as requisite in any democracy because they form the structure of the political system and the behavioral school of thought’s pattern of political party suits this dispensation. They channel the minds of voters toward choosing preferred candidates in any election (Magleby 2015). Their existence is believed to strengthen and ensure the sustainability of democratization process, be it in parliamentary or presidential systems. What then is a political party? A political party is a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power (Duverger Maurice, Britanica, britanica.com). However, political parties seem to be more institutionalized in some systems of government than others. It is believed that political parties, particularly in the developed and established democracies, have grown in organization, structure, and ideology and consequently are well advanced and operating with well-articulated principles and ideologies that differentiate or separate one from the others from one state to the other. Political parties are therefore institutionalized and provide the platform to achieve the central goals they are established to perform. In most developing democracies, the level of institutionalization may vary from weak to strong. One form of authoritarianism or the other, taking power from one time to the other, has implications for the institutionalization of political parties. To be sure, political parties are often dissolved or streamlined into one under military or civilian dictator, respectively, to eliminate opposition and dissent under authoritarian regimes. Although this action often imperil democracy as the right of the citizens become abridged in a civilian regime but under a military regime, it is taken for granted. In any case, the competition that political parties facilitate in a democracy is unacceptable in an authoritarian state and thus must be eliminated. Conversely, in both the established presidential and parliamentary democracies of the modern time, the rule of law prevails as against the rule of fist and brute force. Therefore, political parties are recognized standard medium for changing of government or consolidated power within the provisions of the laws under a competition and well-coordinated political contest. With reference to Nigeria, both the presidential and the parliamentary systems have been experimented with. For instance, although the post-independent political

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parties in Nigeria operated on the basis of some regional beliefs, those foundations were too weak to sustain democracy. In fact, it was a little surprising that the political parties dug the pit that eventually swallowed the First Republic democracy. Indeed, before the parties mature to become institutionalized, the military sacked the civilian administration and established a military dictatorship, therefore making political parties to vanish from the political space for 13 years. Since then, political parties have been on and off on the political stage. This has been a major issue not only in Nigeria but also in most developing democracies where political parties have been very inconsistent as different anti-democratic forces attack the institution. In the next section, we shall be looking at the features of political parties.

Features of a Political Party Political parties have their distinct traits that distinguish them from other groups that exist in a democratic system. They include among others: 1. Appropriate political power: the main aim of underlying the formation of a political party is to acquire political power in accordance with the constitution or the laws of the land as the case may be (Johari 2011). 2. Organized structure: One salient trait of a political party is that it is a well-­ structured group. It carries out its activities through campaigns, proposals, acclaimed policies, and manifesto. It has laid down rules and possesses party constitution to guide the conducts of its members (Joseph 2012). 3. Unique to democratic setting: Another characteristic of a political party is that it thrives and flourishes in democracy but strangulates in systems that are non-­ democratic. This is irrespective of the number of political parties in a system, but in most cases, at least two parties create the environment for political competition. 4. One more feature of a political party is that it can be formed as a result of varying factors. It could be ethnic inclined, religious, political, social, and even economic in nature. 5. Ideological base: most parties are organized along the shared principles of its members.

Types of Party System Across the world, and in democracies, the party system adopted varies from one state to the other. This doesn’t place importance on a party system over and above others but that societies have used those that best suit their respective political system. Irrespective of the type of party system adopted by any state, it has played a vital role in the structuring of its polity. Duverger helped us to shed light on this. By

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this, he categorized party system into three, namely, one-party system, two-party system, and multiparty system. Although it has been considered to be outdated by some scholars (Bondel 1969) and Coleman 1964), especially when compared to Sartori’s groupings, it still forms the basis of our discussion: (a) One-/Single-Party System This is a scenario whereby just one party exists and controls political power of a state. Usually other groups that influence policy-making and decision-making are present in a society; however, it is the only one that wields political power. This form of a party system as argued by social science scholars cannot be democratic but totalitarian in nature. As such, it is seen from two perspectives: it is said to be democratic when it allows other groups in the society to exist as well as influence policy- and decision-making, and it holds and control political power which cannot be wrest from it by the existing groups. It is considered to be totalitarian when it doesn’t allow any other group that could influence the decisions made by the dominant part to exist (Curtis 1968). However, this party system is not common in most democracies. It is import to note that in a one-party system, other parties exist as stated in two different perspectives above. Only that one particular one enjoys higher level of popularity as compared to others within the state. Similarly, there is one party de jure which means only one party exists in line with the constitution of the state. The government or state has made laws that make the existence of any other party illegal. There is also the one party de facto. By this, other parties withered out of existence or have grown too weak to compete or make any impact in election. Under this, the government did not deliberately eliminate other parties, but they either died naturally or lack the strength to compete over time. (b) Two-Party System/Bi-party System Here, there exist two dominant political parties that struggle and compete for political power in a society. Most often, power alternates between the two parties from time to time. The power outside of power at any given point is government in waiting because it could win next election and form government. Like in the single-party system, other parties exist but have little or no influence on issues in the polity as compared with the two major ones. The bi-party system can be categorized into two as posited by Dahl (1967). It can be distinct or indistinct. The latter is such that political power interchanges between the two major parties with the other existing parties having little or any political positions or influence to seize any opportunity to take over power. In this case, these two parties possess high level of popularity across the state at the expense of other political parties. The distinct bi-party system is a situation which is also made up of two major parties, but other smaller parties within the political system could acquire and share political power now and then. (c) Multiparty System This is a scenario where many parties exist within a political system without any being able to hold and maintain a significant majority of legislative seats.

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Other instances may arise when legislative seats are shared by more than two parties in such a way that formation of coalition government may become inevitable. Usually, when a state has a number of registered political parties, usually more than two, it is said to be multiparty in nature. However, this is not enough to categorize a state with only this feature as multiparty. This is because a country may have ten registered political parties, but only one or two may be competitive and regularly receive seats during election. Therefore, as stated above earlier, multiparty is a situation where there is a regular interchange of the possession of political power among numerous political parties. In most democracies in the contemporary time, the two party and multiparty systems are the most commonly practiced. Nigeria, the main focus of this chapter, is one of the countries that adopted the multiparty system following advent of the third of democratization. Although since 1999, when Nigeria adopted the multiparty system, only 3 parties play significant role in the polity, the number of parties has grown in number from 3 in 1999 to over 90 in 2020. These include the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), All (Nigerian) People’s Party (APP), and Alliance for Democracy (AD) and currently the All Progressives Congress (APC). While at least three major parties shared legislative seats in the National Assembly between 1999 and 2003, the PDP took control of the legislature from 2003 to 2015, when the newly formed APC did not only defeat the ruling PDP in the presidential election but also won majority seats in the two chambers of the legislature. In other words, while the number of parties has proliferated in Nigeria within the first 20 years of the Fourth Republic, only a few has been able to win either governorship seat at the state level as well as the national assembly.

Etymology of Political Parties in Nigeria Political parties in Nigeria predate its independence in 1960. During colonial era, political parties were created as a means through which the dissatisfied indigenous people could make their grievances known to the then colonial administration with the hope of getting some attention from them. The first political party that was created after the amalgamation of Nigeria was the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). This was in 1923 when Herbert Macaulay, one of the Western-educated Nigerians and an emerging elite under colonial administration, founded the NNDP. The party was created after the introduction of Sir Clifford’s constitution of 1922 which the people hoped would give better opportunities to indigenous people in the colonial government (Ajayi & Fashagba 2014). Unfortunately, that was not the case. The party comprised of most interest groups that were opposed to the harsh colonial treatment meted out on the local populace. The emergence of the party was beneficial then because it continued to win seats in the legislative council for a number of years. This assisted in enlightening the people on the tenets of governance apart from the main goal of an inclusive indigenous participation in the colonial government.

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The political party that followed the NNDP was the Nigerian Youth Movement of 1938. It came with a force so much that it overtook the pioneer political party that year. Others that followed were National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1944 and Action Group (AG) and Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) of 1950 and 1951, respectively. The abovementioned three political parties played active roles in the 1950s and in fact became the major parties that competed and ruled in the First Republic. However, the NCNC transformed to the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. Each of the three parties had gained popularity in each of the three major political regions of the country. Indeed, the East recognized the NCNC and embraced as a regional party. Ditto for the West and the Northern regions where the AG and the NPC, respectively, maintained firm grip on the polity. These parties had internal crisis prior to the independence, but this worsened after independence. The crisis led to the splitting of most of the parties. New parties were formed by most breakaway members. It is on this note that one may argue that ethnic- or regional-based parties were very common and prominent in Nigeria and at different democratic dispensation until very recently. To be sure, not until 2007 under, the current Fourth Republic did one start to notice the gradual disappearance of ethnic or regional parties and the growing acceptance of national parties (Lewis & Kew 2015). Indeed, the political realities since 1999 suggest that there has been a growing shift in paradigm in the formation and membership of political parties in Nigeria. Parties are increasingly dropping off the label of ethnic coloration. Instead, some level of elitism has filled the void left by the ethnic groups.

 arliamentary System of Government and Party Politics P in Nigeria Parliamentarism as a model can be described mainly from two angles: continental or Westminster (Fashagba 2012). The latter is synonymous to the one the nation inherited after it gained its independence. This type of system has a Prime Minister who is the leader and legally responsible to the parliament with the presence of a titular Head of State. The continental type, just to mention in passing, is one that the titular Head of State or President as the case may be selects his Prime Minister on the recommendation of the leading party or coalition parties. The parliamentary system of government was practiced in Nigeria immediately after independence. Although the parliamentary democracy lasted for 5  years (1960–1966), despite the shortcomings of that political dispensation, that period should have served as the stage of nurturing and consolidating party politics and political parties, following the formative stage of party politics and political parties of the previous decade. This parliamentary model of government was transferred to and bequeathed to Nigeria by the British who were and still practicing the parliamentary system.

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Under the First Republic, the first Prime Minister in Nigeria’s parliamentary system was the late Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, who was elected by the upper chamber of the then legislative council. While the ceremonial Head of State was Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe. Unlike Britain that operates a model based on constitutional monarchy, where the Queen is the Head of State while the Prime Minister is the Head of Government, in Nigeria, the absence of a centrally recognized monarchy made the constitutional monarchy model impracticable. In a homogenous society or a society with less diverse groups possibly a two tribal setting, the parliamentary system of government provides high level of inclusiveness. However, in Nigeria, due to the regionalization, where there exists three regions with the Head of State and the Prime Minister emerging from two different regions under a coalition between the NPC and the NCNC, the third region (Western Region) controlled by the AG formed the opposition and was left out of power and sidelined in the decision-making sphere. This led to a major agitation from that region for a change of the governing process in the “new state.” This goes to mean that although some may consider the parliamentary model of government the ideal system for a multilingual and multi-ethnic political system, the extraneous factors like ethnic and religious sentiments attached to political offices in Nigeria undermined the system in the First Republic and triggered its collapse. For instance, the then leader of the Western Region accused the pioneer independence government of mismanagement of the nation’s resources and sectionalism and discriminatory in the area of development. Rather than taking necessary and positive measures to correct the alleged wrongs, the government created a new region out of the Western Region to weaken the opposition and the agitation from that region. This was done under the excuse of maintaining peace and unity in the country. Indeed, both intra- and interparty relations were simply characterized by acrimonies in the First Republic. The collective action that is the hallmark of parliamentary democracy meant that the First Republic political parties wielded enormous influence on their members until an internal crisis erupted in the AG in the southwest. The crisis threatened the foundation of the newly independent state and in part responsible for the eventual collapse of democracy in Nigeria in 1966.

 he Relationship Between Political Parties T and Presidentialism Several political scientists have adopted neo-Madisonian principles to underscore the relationship between political parties and systems of government. Such perspective focuses on how parties, first of all, structure political ambition from individual political actors to resolve collective action, by enabling politicians join efforts that will enable them to benefit from economies of scale, and secondly, the way parties solve problems of uniting legislators around policy issues thus helping them attain majorities in parliament’’ (Cox 1987; Strom 1990).

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From this standpoint, political actors are self-interested, and the most successful way to bring together the different individual ambition with collective goals of the party depends on the organizational structures of political parties (Samuels & Shugart 2006). Parties therefore design their policies in such a way that when it wins or loses, the benefits go to all its members as a result of their collective actions. However, like all public goods, individual politicians have little desire to invest in the costs of running their parties. For example, politicians that seek to be reelected are most likely to support bills that will enhance their career than those that provide collective benefits for all. This sort of activity may benefit such individual politicians, but in the long run, it may sacrifice the party’s image and can lead to c­ ollective electoral losses. None collective actions by individual politicians may either benefit or harm the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Consequently, political parties seek to solve such challenges by creating institutional framework that compels individual politician to act in the collective interest. To achieve this, party leaders are granted authority to impose discipline or sanctions on members or followers whose behavior threatens the party’s image and can reward those whose behavior advances the interest of the party, group, or members (Samuels & Shugart 2006). While several tools of punishment are available, the most important ones at the disposal of party leaders, according to Aldrich (1995), are their control over candidate selection and over distribution of resources such as campaign finance used for voter mobilization. Worthy of note is that such powers and coordination are difficult to implement within the separation of powers that characterize presidential systems of government. Presidential electoral systems are candidate-centered, and each party must seek to bridge the separation of power which empowers the executives and the legislators independently. As such, parties in presidential system focus their attention on the issue of how to win the presidency, on which all other electoral strategy will be based. This begins with the nomination of presidential candidate and how to campaign and align both legislative and presidential race and to set the party’s agenda and ideology to meet the demand of the electorates. This separation of powers, therefore, makes party campaign organizations particularly different under presidentialism (Samuels, 2002). Furthermore, presidentialism affects how parties plan and distribute campaign finance and media campaigns. The fact that personalities of the candidates are in most occasions, a decisive factor in presidential campaign suggests that the winner of a presidential election may not necessarily come from a majority party. In this system, candidates from small parties may contest and capture the executive position, despite having little support in parliament. Presidential campaigns may even have antiparty tone, and political outsiders with little experience in handling congress can get elected. As a result, in some South American countries, such as Brazil and Ecuador, presidents often do not enjoy support in or of their own party (Mainwaring (1989), suggesting that presidential system lacks the means of ensuring that the president will enjoy the support of a majority in congress. By implication, party discipline is far weaker in a presidential democracy than in a parliament democracy due largely to the level of independence of action and decision that members have in presidential democracy vis-à-vis parliamentary democracy.

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One of the presidential democracies where the foregoing has often played out is Nigeria, where members of the legislature at the national level have consistently demonstrated the level of independence that was rarely found in the First Republic parliamentary democracy. Since 1979 when Nigeria adopted the presidential system to the current Fourth Republic, the multiparty arrangement has operated alongside the presidential system. Precisely, the 1979 constitution provided for a multiparty system, which enabled the politicians to form five political parties in the Second Republic. These parties basically were more of recantations of those of the First Republic under different labels as the Hausa-Fulani’s Northern People’s Congress (NPC) simply resurfaced as the NPN. The Yoruba AD (Action Group) in the West on the other hand reincarnated as UPN, while the Ibo’s National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) was replaced with NPP. The smaller parties were United Middle Belt Congress, the UMBC, metamorphosed into the GNPP, while the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) was renamed the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) (Fashagba 2019). Under the presidential system, the parties that emerged were not substantially different from those in the first republic. It was business as usual, as parties were formed along ethnic and regional lines despite the fact that military government had sought to check the emergence of ethnic or regional parties. The NPN emerged victorious in the 1979 presidential election but did not win absolute majority in the legislature. Under the arrangement, a coalition was formed in 1979 by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP). Although coalition is rare under a presidential system, the desperation of the NPN to avoid running a divided government compelled it to go into a coalition that collapsed after 2 years. In 1979, three major ethnic parties shared majority seats in the National Assembly (Fashagba 2019). The NPN captured less than 40 percent of seats in both chambers of the national assembly and therefore feared that its bills may not pass easily or get stalled in the national assembly. However, because of the different values and principles upon which the two parties stood, the union survived only for 2 years and collapsed in 1981. From that moment onward, it dawned on the NPN that sustaining coalition in a presidential democracy is not the same as sustaining it under a parliamentary democracy. However, the collapse was also a proof that while the southeast and north often like to go into political alliance, deeply rooted irreconcilable differences remained unresolved. This explains the collapse of the coalition both in the first and the second republics. This is because the coalition entered into by the two regions in the republic was crisis ridden, volatile, and unsustainable. Furthermore, in the Fourth Republic, individualism rather than collective action has been very prominent. Members of the national assembly have consistently demonstrated their independence in decision-making and in their critique of the executive. This was evident when the PDP controlled both the executive and national assembly between 1999 and 2015. Three major parties, namely, the PDP, the All People’s Party, and the Alliance for Democracy, shared the legislative seats between 1999 and 2003 but with the PDP capturing majority seats. Controlling the two chambers and the presidency did not translate to crisis free executive-legislative relations as the legisla-

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ture sought to assert itself and refused to be a spectator in the civilian administration. This trend continued until 2015, when PDP was defeated and the APC took the presidency. The fact that the chambers were both under the APC did not translate to blind legislative support for the executive from 2015 to 2019. However, with the emergence of new leadership in the national assembly in 2019, it appears the national assembly is becoming increasingly pliant. The APC has been in control of the two chambers since 2015. It suffices to mention that party discipline has been very weak and most times appears nonexistent. This account for the frequent party switching that has characterized democracy in Nigeria since 1999 (Fashagba 2014). Only a few members have shown some level of loyalty to their parties.

Conclusion Given the underdeveloped political culture and the absurd elite behavior as demonstrated above, political parties in Nigeria are weak and ineffective, while politics is reduced to opportunism, serving interest of individual politicians. The elites will stop at nothing to have their way; they derail internal party democracy and use arbitrary control of internal party structure and mechanism to influence elections and party functioning. In fact, political parties in Nigeria were never institutionalized under the country’s parliamentary experience neither are they now under presidentialism. The president controls the ruling parties, while party bosses or godfathers are unwilling to allow internal party democracy to operate, a circumstance that leads to frequent conflicts and constrains the development of parties as popular organizations. All these suggest that political elites have not learned much from the mistakes of the past. The various crises plaguing the major parties and emerging ones and the various interparty crises of the defections in the National Assembly, cross carpeting of governors among others, are vivid instances of this tendency. Lack of party discipline and ideology continues to feature prominently in the two major political parties. Leaders of political parties since independence to date do not exhibit an understanding or deliberately ignore the fact that there are some issues which can’t be tolerated in a parliamentary system and are incompatible with presidentialism given that it is predicated on separation of powers. But this is no surprise; several studies have shown that presidentialism generates loose political party systems.

References Ajayi R. & Fashagba J. O. (2014). Nigeria: A Century of Rough Journey. In Ajayi R. & Fashagba, J. O. (eds), Understanding Government and Politics in Nigeria (pp.2-19). Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Kwara State Nigeria. Aldrich, J. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bondel J. (1969). Comparative Government, London, Macmillan

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Coleman, J.S. & Rosberg, C.R. (1964). Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. University of Califonia Press. Cox, G. W. (1987). The efficient secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Cox, K, & McCubbins. (1993), Party power or preferences? Quasi-experimental evidence from American state legislatures. The Journal of Politics 72, no.3, 799–811. Curtis, M. (1968). Comparative Government and Politics, New York, Harper and Row Dahl, R. A. (1967). Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Fashagba, J. Y. (2012). Models of Government in Modern States. In Ajayi R. & Fashagba J. O. (eds), Introductory Text in Political Science (161-186). Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria. Fashagba, J. Y. (2014). Party Switching in Nigeria Presidential Democracy. The Journal of legislative Study, 14(4) Fashagba, J.O. (2019) The legislatures in the First and Second Republic: In Levan & Utaka (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics; UK Oxford University Press (pp215) Joseph. I. (2012). Political Parties and Pressure Groups. In: Ajayi R. & Fashagba J.  O (eds), Introductory Text in Political Science (283-302). Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria. Johari, J. C. (2011). Comparative Politics. New Dehli India, Sterling Publishers Pvt Ltd Lewis P.M & Kew D. (2015). Nigeria's Hopeful Election. Journal of Democracy, 26(3), pp. 94–109. Mainwaring, S. & Scully, T, eds. (1989). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Magleby, D. (2015). The Necessity of Political Parties the Importance of Compromise. BYU Studies Quarterly, 54 (4),23. Retrieved online from www.jstor.org/stable. Reiter, H. (2006). The Study of Political Parties, 1906-2005: The View from the Journals. The American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 613-618. Retrieved online from www.jstor.org/ stable. Samuels, J.D. (2002) Presidentialised Parties The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior. Comparative Political Studies 35 (4): 461-483. Samuels, D.& Shugart, M.(2006)Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behavior Prepared for presentation at the 2006 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Sartori, G.(1994) ‘Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism’, in Arturo Valenzuela.(eds.) The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 1: Comparative Perspectives, Juan J.  Linz and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Strom K. (1990). A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties American Journal of Political Science Vol. 34, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 565–598.

Chapter 12

Nigerian Economy During Colonial Era: An Overview Sunday Olabisi Adewara Abstract  This chapter considers British incursion into what is presently referred to as Nigeria. This chapter shows that the colonial government was mainly motivated by the search for cheap human and material resources necessary for the sustenance of British Empire. The colonial rule in Nigeria altered not only the traditional political institution in the name of civilization but also transformed the entire economy of the country. The present Nigeria economy was affected via expanded commercial institution, promotion of inland trade with the sole objective of enriching existing British commercial interest than to develop Nigeria industry. British colonial economy in Nigeria aimed at achieving three primary goals. The first goal is expansion of Nigeria’s commerce via exporting of raw materials and importation of finished goods. Therefore, building of roads and railways, provision of telegraph and expansion of waterways and ports are to facilitate this first objective. The second goal is closely linked with the first which is to bring the country into a cash economy based on Britain currency (Pounds sterling), while the last is to force Nigerians both directly and indirectly to work for the cash. Finally, this chapter draws useful lessons from the colonial experience and provides useful suggestions for the future growth of the country. Keywords  British · Colonial · Nigerian · Economy · Government · Agriculture · Nigeria

Introduction The British incursion into what is presently referred to as Nigeria was mainly motivated by the search for cheap human and material resources necessary for the sustenance of the British Empire (Akpan 2003). Slave trade was declared as illegal in the Dr Adewara Sunday Olabisi is a lecturer in the Department of Economics, Faculty of B.S.S; University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He is also an associate researcher in EPRU research unit, School of Economics, University of Cape Town. S. O. Adewara (*) Department of Economics, University of Ilorin, Omu-Aran, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_12

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1890s, while trading in goods was declared ‘legitimate’ following the industrial revolution in Europe. The industrial revolution in Europe further generates two needs which are scarcity of raw materials and insufficient markets for the multinational industrial outputs. West Africa coast was therefore regarded by the colonial masters as a potential source of raw materials for the industries in Europe and as a ready market for the industrial outputs from the advanced countries. These two realisations led to the scrambling for absolute political power over territories in West Africa Coast by the British, France and Germany in the late 1890s (Akpan 2003; Ekundare 1973). Prior to this period, Britain interest in Nigeria was limited to the activities of few private companies (such as the Royal Niger Company) operating then in the various parts of the country. Furthermore, the search for cheap supplies of resources, human and material to contribute to the sustenance of the British Empire particularly informed British presence in the territory that later became Nigeria and eventually British colonial rule. In addition, it was in the mind of British Empire to ensure that the exploitation of Nigeria’s resources for the benefit of the empire was undertaken in a more efficient manner. In order to accomplish efficient exploitation objective, the colonial authorities in Nigeria were concerned with the provision of basic infrastructure and services in the country to the extent that they were required to enhance the sourcing and shipment of raw materials to Britain. The colonial rule in Nigeria altered not only the traditional political institution in the name of civilisation but also transformed the entire economy of the country. The present Nigeria economy was affected via expanded commercial institution and promotion of inland trade with the sole objective of enriching existing British commercial interest than to develop Nigeria industry. British colonial economy in Nigeria aimed at achieving three primary goals. These are expansion of Nigeria commerce via exporting of raw materials and importation of finished goods. Therefore, building of roads and railways, provision of telegraph and expansion of waterways and ports are to facilitate this first objective. The second goal is closely linked with the first which is to bring the country into a cash economy based on Britain currency (Pounds sterling), while the last is to force Nigerian both directly and indirectly to work for the cash. This paper seeks to draw lessons from the Nigerian economy during colonial rule with the aim of providing useful suggestions for the future growth of the country.

 gricultural Productivities at the Inception A of the Colonial Rule The colonial authority employed various strategies and policies to stimulate local production of industrial raw materials such as palm oil and kernels, cocoa, cotton, groundnut and rubber. The strategies were adopted in order to satisfy the dominant motives of colonialism which includes the search for cheap raw materials and expansion of markets for the products of the colonialists. Therefore, the economy

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Table 12.1  Average cash crop ton export in Nigeria between 1900–1904 and 1925–1929 Cash crops export Groundnut Cotton Cocoa Palm oil Palm kernel

1900–1904 475 132 305 53,729 120,778

1925–1929 109,068 6038 45,483 124,716 255,469

Actual change 108,593 5906 45,178 70,987 134,691

% Change 22861.68 4474.242 14812.46 132.1205 111.5195

Source: Eicher and Lieldholms (1970:11)

was targeted mainly on agriculture and trade. Locals were encouraged to produce the needed raw materials, while the colonial investors were encouraged to export these raw materials into Britain and at the same time import finished products into Nigeria for local consumptions. However, most of the raw materials are bought at a relatively cheaper price, while the finished products are bought at a relatively higher price (Charle 1967; Eicher and Lieldholms 1970; Forde 1941; Igbafe 1979). As a result of the encouragement given by the colonial authority to local provision of cash crops, exportation of these crops rose rapidly within a very short time, however to the detriment of local provision of food crops. For instance, from Table 12.1, while a yearly average of 475 tons of groundnut was exported in Nigeria between 1900 and 1904, it rose to a yearly average of 109,068 tons between 1925 and 1928 which was about 22861.68 percent increase. Within the same period, average export of cotton rose by about 4474 percent from 132 tons in 1900 to an average of 6038 tons in 1925. The table also indicates that average export of cocoa rose from about 305 tons between 1900 and 1904 to about 45,483 tons between 1925 and 1929 which was about 14,812 percent increase. In the case of palm oil export, it rose by about 132 percent from 53,729 tons between 1900 and 1904 to about 124,716 tons per annum between 1925 and 1929. In addition, palm kernel export from Nigeria to Europe also rose by about 112 percent from 120,778 tons between 1900 and 1904 to around 255,469 tons average per  annum between 1925 and 1929  (Tamuno 1980; Usoro 1974).

Development Plans Under the Colonial Rule There were colonial economic plans in Nigeria prior to the country’s political independent in 1960. The colonial government’s idea of development and how to pursue it were summarised in two documents which the administration described as ‘development plans’. These were the popular Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria from 1946 to 1956, which was terminated in 1954, and the plan of 1955–1960 (Ayo 1988). For the first 10 years development plan of 1946–1956, the colonial administration planned to allocate national resources mainly to activities that would bring about improvements in the general health and mental condition of the people and to

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the provision of those physical facilities (infrastructures) which has been regarded as the minimum necessary for the general improvement of the country and its population (Helleiner 1966:332; Usoro E. J 1977). In terms of specific sectors, the colonial administration development policy meant concentrating public resources on the provision of social services, as well as transport and communications. The colonial government belief, then, was that these facilities would induce private entrepreneurs to invest in industry and agriculture that would bring about the jobs, the goods and services and the modern skills and production techniques (i.e. technological capability) necessary for the growth of the economy and the improvement of people’s material well-being (Helleiner 1966:332). Thus, the private sector was entrusted with the task of establishing and running directly productive activities (DPAs), while the colonial government concentrated on the provision of physical and social infrastructure (Olaloku et al. 1979:139). The 1955–1960 development plans showed a slight modification of the colonial government’s approach to development. In the second development plan, the colonial authorities began to participate in directly productive activities by setting up and running industrial and agricultural enterprises. The modification was brought about by the realisation from the first development plan that indigenous business had not yet developed the necessary productive capacity. This realisation was in response to the prompting of eager indigenes in government, who then constituted a significant force in policy making, following the 1954 constitutional changes. In monetary value, for the first 10 years (1946–1956), the colonial government planned to make a total capital expenditure of £55million. A substantial proportion of this was allocated to social services (water and health) and transport and communication in accordance with the development orientation of the authorities. A closer look at the plan shows that the improvement of water supply and health services was allocated as much as 25 percent, whereas industry and agriculture, the directly productive sectors, were allocated only 6.4 percent of the budget. However, in the second development plan for the 1955–1960 periods, though the total planned capital investment, £330 million was much larger than that of the previous period, but the allocation for industrial and agricultural development, although higher than in the first plan, was still small, being only about 9.0 percent of the total sum. In the same plan, the transport sector alone was to take 38.7 percent (Olaloku et al. 1979:139). As part of the effort to change the structure of the economy, the governments (both federal and regional) decided to specifically encourage and induce foreign investments in the country, especially for industrial production. In order to achieve the objective of attracting foreign investors, both the federal and the regional authorities mounted a campaign in Europe by which they sought to make known to European industrialists, in particular, the opportunities that were available for investment in Nigeria. To further encourage foreign investors, both governments further announced a number of generous incentives to attract them. These incentives included the Aid to Pioneer Industries (1952) and the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief Ordinance) (1958). Other incentives included guarantees on the security of foreign investments and freedom to repatriate their capital at any time they wanted to do so.

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Thus, to achieve moderate development in Nigeria, the colonial administration used the above incentives to nurture private entrepreneurs and rely on them to take the necessary decisions, such as the choice of projects in which to invest and, therefore, the types of goods to be produced in the economy; the materials to use in producing the goods and the sources from which to procure them; the techniques to employ in production and their sources; the locations of such activities in the local economy; and who to collaborate with on the projects and the terms of such collaboration. Because these are the crucial decisions in the development process, the colonial administration’s approach amounted to leaving the task of developing the economy and society to private business men and women. No wonder, the post-independent economy of the country followed the colonial legacy of emphasis on private ownership of resources to the detriment of the general public interests  (Ezera 1964; Onimode 1981, 1983; Todaro 1979).

 iscriminating Economic Policies of Colonial Authority D in Nigeria The age long adage that ‘He who pays the pipers dictates the tune’ was clearly demonstrated by the discriminating policies of the colonial authority in Nigeria. Prior to the outbreak of the World War I, there were considerable commercial interests of the Germans in Nigeria. However, Germans were deported, and their trade passed to the hands of British merchants following the complete taking over of the country and the aftermath of the World War I. British colonial authority in Nigeria took advantage of the World War I to expand its strongholds in the country and at the same time eliminates the influence of other competitors from the country. For instance, in 1916, British parliament devised a scheme to permanently divert all shipments to England by imposing 2 pounds duty per ton on all palm kernels shipped from West Africa to other destinations. Between 1919 and 1922, the restriction led to increase in production in other countries outside British control as well as decline in Nigerian production. For instance, Sumatra productions at 8500 tons as at 1918 rose to 28,000 tons in 1922. This policy of the British authority was a clear subordination of Nigeria interests to those of the British merchants (Aghalino 2000;19; Ahazuem & Falola 1987:250; Aghahowa & Ukpebor 1999:157). In 1934, Britain demonstrated her discriminating economy policy in the country by using her tariff power to help her manufacturers but at the same time took certain steps to curtail Japan cheaper textiles import to Nigeria which was about 11 million square yards in 1933. In order to restrict fair market competition, British government in Nigeria set quotas on Japanese textile imports by fixing a maximum of 1.5 million square yards in 1934. The economic implication of the policy led to increase in the local price of textiles in the country. However, the restriction was retained despite protests by Nigerians. Due to the restriction, Japan import to the county

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Table 12.2  Prices of exported products from Nigeria to Britain in 1940 and 1944 Products Palm oil Palm kernels Groundnut

Price in 1940 16 11 15

Price in 1944 23 18 23

Actual change in price 7 7 8

% change in price 44 63 53

Source: Edwin G. Charle (1967) Table 12.3  Prices of exported products from non-empire to Britain in 1940 and 1944 Products Palm oil Palm kernels Groundnut

Price in 1940 13 10 16

Price in 1944 35 20 36

Actual change in price 22 10 20

% change in price 170 100 125

Source: Edwin G. Charle (1967)

remained at 3.5 million even in 1938 just less than one-third of their 1933 volume (Njoku 1987; Shokpeka and Nwaokocha 2009). During the World War II, England set up marketing board with the sole authority to buy and export major crops in Nigeria. The marketing board assigned quotas to agents at a priced far below market rate with the sole purpose of benefiting the British Empire and in suppression of Nigerian interest. They also preclude entry of other competitors into the market. The marketing board was sold at ridiculous low prices to British Ministry of food in England (Akinjobi and Ososba 1980). Tables 12.2 and 12.3 clearly revealed deliberate suppression policy of the Nigerian economy by the colonial masters in favour of the colonial authority home economy in Britain. While we present change in the exported prices of three products from Nigeria to Britain in Table  12.2, that of the non-Britain empire was presented in Table 12.3. The tables show that between year 1940 and 1944, price of a ton of palm oil imported into Britain from non-empire source rose by 170 percent, while that of Nigeria rose only by 44 percent from £13 to £35 and £16 to £23, respectively. Palm kernels rose by 100 percent for non-empire from 10 to 20 pounds per ton, but it rose in Nigeria to 63 percent from £11 to £18. While groundnut price rose in Nigeria by 53 percent, from £15 to £23 per ton, the price rose in British India by 125 percent from £16 to £36 and others countries by 63 percent or from £16 to £26. Nigerian economy was greatly disadvantaged during the colonial era as clearly indicated by the lower actual and percentage change in the prices of these three exported products from the country to Britain compared to other countries in the two tables (Yunusa 2009). The pound sterling currency was introduced in1922, backed up by Nigeria reserves held in Britain and other commonwealth countries outside Nigeria. The reserves expanded rapidly after 1940. Importation from dollar countries was discouraged by British government. Nigeria was forced to shift import from United States to other countries. By 1953 Nigeria’s total foreign investment exceeded all expatriate companies and Nigeria’s national debts. The currency control limited Nigeria’s choice of suppliers and diverted numerous investment potentials from the country (Helleiner 1981; Inyang 1981).

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British government gave unlimited power to Royal Niger Company including military and police powers throughout a vast section of inland Nigeria for the purpose of protecting Britain political and economic interests. The charter was revoked in 1900 after payment of 150,000 pounds as compensation to the company. It was also given 99 years right to 50 percent of all royalties and rent which the government might collect on minerals mined in its former area of operation. As in 1939, UAC alone controlled about 39 percent of Nigeria export. Within the same period, Unilever the parent body of UAC also controlled about 80 percent of Nigeria’s external trade. The monopoly power given to the expatriates’ merchants helped them to keep the buying prices of Nigerian products very low, while they sell the finished products at very high prices. The arrangement then further enriched foreign shareholders at the expense of impoverished Nigerian workers (Rodney 2005). Between 1913 and 1915, import prices from Britain rose sharply, but in Nigeria, export prices fell within the same period. For instance, the price of salt rose by 128 percent, bread by 86 percent, flour by 43 percent and soap by 36 percent, while Nigeria products such as palm kernels and palm oil fell from 18 to 11 pounds and £22 to £20, respectively. Lever brothers and Royal Niger Company later merged in 1920 at a cost of 8 m pounds. With the strength of John Holts, they both dominated every aspect of Nigeria economy (Fieldhouse 1978).

Economic Reforms During Colonial Era There were several reforms in the country following the complete taking over of Nigeria by the British government. The main reasons for these reforms were to make the administration of the country both easier and beneficial to the British Empire. We briefly explained some of these economic reforms in this section.

Taxation During Colonial Era In order to ensure smooth running of the colonial government in Nigeria, a uniform taxation was introduced in the entire country unlike the situation in the pre-colonial era. There was an urgent need by the colonial authority to generate revenue internally to cover her recurrent expenditure for the payment of African soldiers, policemen, native authority officers, etc., engaged by the colonial government in their day-to-day administration of the country. The Land Ordinance of 1904 empowered the colonial government to abolish the previously existing tax systems in the country. In addition, the introduction of a uniform tax necessitated commoditisation of the country since taxes were paid in British pound sterling. In order to fulfil their tax obligation, most peasants therefore resulted into an involuntary selling of their labour power, livestock, or grain to get money and pay taxes.

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Table 12.4  Customs revenue of Nigeria 1916–1920 Year Export duties (A) Import duties (B) (B)–(A)

1916 57,624 1,086,625

1917 333,639 861,692

1918 490,917 896,415

1919 612,124 1,221,150

1920 837,853 2,278,863

Source: Nigeria handbook, 1919, 150. Annual report customs department, 1923,3 Table 12.5  Tonnage and duties collected on palm kernels produce 1930–1934 Year Tonnage Duties

1930 26,002 278,201

1931 254,454 229,111

1932 309,061 278,231

1933 259,945 233,950

1934 142,291 128,063

Source NAL CSO 26/219270 VOL 1 EXPORT DUTIES ON PALM PRODUCTS, 83 Table 12.6  Tonnage and duties collected on palm oil produce 1930–1934 Year Tonnage Duties

1930 135,801 194,106

1931 118,179 141,817

1932 116,060 139,285

1933 128,696 154,433

1934; 6 months 55,992 67,191

Source NAL CSO 26/219270 VOL 1 EXPORT DUTIES ON PALM PRODUCTS, 83

The colonial authority also generates revenue from duties on exported raw materials from Nigeria to Europe. Tables 12.4, 12.5, and 12.6 show pattern of government revenue from palm oil and palm kernels. Table  12.4 also indicates wide disparity between government revenue from import and export. The disparity may be connected with the differences in the low prices of exported raw materials and the high prices of the imported finished goods.

Currency and Banking During Colonial Era There was no generally acceptable currency as a legal tender in Nigeria prior to 1900. Multiple types of money were used by different parts of the country in the pre-colonial era. Some of the money includes iron bar, cowries, copper, Maria Theresa, etc. (Olarewaju 1996:74–76). Uniform legal tender was introduced during the colonial era as a generally acceptable currency for the country in order to facilitate transaction of goods and services. However, the currency was strongly tied to the British sterling, while the country foreign reserves and her foreign exchange were directly controlled in London. Tying of Nigeria currency to British sterling indicates that the country economy was directly affected by the economy of England. It was also susceptible to international fluctuations in prices and goods and services. The currency policy during the colonial era makes Nigeria economy to be an extension of Britain domestic economy as noted by Olarewaju (1996:74–76). With the growth of foreign trade came the need of modern financial institutions, especially banks, mainly from Britain. Among the early banks were the Bank of

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British West Africa (now First Bank of Nigeria PLC) and Barclays Bank (now Union Bank of Nigeria PLC). These banks brought with them British payment instruments, especially silver coins, and the modern practice of banking. Soon, several new banks emerged. But because most of the new banks were ill equipped, they soon failed (Nwankwo 1980). The above experience and several other factors led to the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1958 to, among other things, regulate developments in the financial sector (Olukoju 1995).

Land Policy During Colonial Era In order to facilitate British interests in Nigeria, the British Empire took over the control of the country land. Previous land under the control of Royal Niger Company became the property of the Queen according to a declaration by Lord Lugard on the first of January 1900. The British authority also made several laws that facilitated their taking over of the land in Nigeria. In the first place, Lord Lugard in 1901 ordered for the registration of the land previously under the control of Royal Niger Company. Lugard order was followed by Crown Lands Proclamation No. 16 of 1902 whereby the land of the country was divided into two categories (Buchanan and Pugh 1955). (i) Public lands: These are all lands administered by the local chiefs under the customary laws across the country. The British authority preserved these lands for the natives for the main purpose of encouraging agricultural production. At this time, no European firms were allowed to invest in agricultural production. (ii) Crown lands: Crown lands include all lands and minerals that were formerly so-called property of the Royal Niger Company as well as lands that were allegedly granted to the British authority as far back as 1890. However, there was series of land laws subsequent to that of 1902 especially the nationalisation of all lands in the country in 1907 by the colonial authority. The new land proclamation removed all restriction on land whereby permitting private individual alienation of as much land as they could irrespective of the individual nationalities. Due to the land policy of 1907 and many others, many natives lost their source of livelihood as they became landless. Many peasants therefore migrated into the cities in search of wage labour in place of their traditional engagement in farming activities. The multiplier effect of the 1907 land policy was serious food shortage in the country due to a sharp reduction in average food production (Brown 2009).

Labour Policy During Colonial Era Labour is an essential part of every successful economy. During the colonial era, the objective of natural resources exploitation depends largely on the availability of adequate quality and quantity of labour force. There was a limit to the number of British that can come into the country to execute British Empire agenda in the

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protectorate presently called Nigeria. Assuming it was easier for the British to come to Nigeria to execute the colonial authority agenda, it may not be efficient to do so considering the economic interest of the colonial empire. Local labour was therefore needed to work in road constructions, as police men, as military men, in railways construction, buildings construction, as interpreters, etc. Labour policy under the colonial era can be divided into forced and wage labour. (i) Forced labour: The proclamation of No. 15 of 1903 gave legal power to the colonial authority to execute forced labour. The law specified that ‘all able-­ bodied men and women are compelled to work without pay under the chiefs for a specific period of time’ (Ohadike 1987). Refusal to abide by this law attracts a penalty of 24 strokes.1 (ii) Wage labour: The British colonial economy was paradoxical in nature. Forced labour and wage labour were simultaneously practiced in the country. The aim of wage labour was to entrench capitalism in the country for easy exploitation. Wage labour however contributed to shortages in the agricultural sector due to commoditisation of the sector. In addition, the need to pay taxes and levies imposed by the colonial master also necessitated that wages should be paid to workers. However wages to local workers were so ridiculously lower. As in 1933 in Nupe land, a minimum daily wage was 2–3 pence, meaning that a peasant must work up to 90 days in order to be able to meet tax demand of 9.6d to 15 shillings per adult male (Shenton and Freud 1978).

Economic Benefits of Colonial Rule Most of the benefits Nigerians derived from colonial rule are simply not deliberate but mainly due to multiplier effects of the economy policies of the colonial authority. Long before, and during the colonial period, Nigerians operated considerable market-oriented economies. These were especially in respect of agriculture, including hording and fishing, mining and industries (smelting iron works, bronze works, etc.) and crafts, using leather, wood, raffia, clay and the like. Various articles of trade thereby went into various networks and rings of daily and periodic markets, as well as short- and long-distance ones. Apart from several such local market rings, there were interregional trading centres and linkages in different directions, East West and North South, in the territory now known as Nigeria (Charle 1967; Ekundare 1973; Ihovbere and Falola 1987; Falola and Heaton 2008; Falola 2007). There were also international and intercontinental markets, trading routes and commercial transactions involving Nigerians.

1  See Ohadike (1987: 149) for more information on this law. For instance, in 1905, about 200 men were forced to work on road construction in Agbor. They were to provide their own food and were compelled to travelled up to about 20 kilometres and worked for 5 days without pay (Goshit).

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Thus, there were trans-Saharan, to countries of North Africa and Southern Europe; trans-Atlantic, to countries of South and Latin America; and transnational, to countries surrounding Nigeria (including Cameroun, Niger, Togo and Chad).2 The economies of the Nigerian people during both the pre-colonial and colonial periods were able to sustain these trading links; also substantial population increases, and settlement spread into frontier areas or regions as well as urbanisation at that time. Products and art pieces dating even far beyond the colonial period are well-­ known today in the world of art. During the colonial period, the authorities also tried to encourage this indigenous economic sector, consciously and unconsciously. They recognised and encouraged a dual economy with internal and external (export) components (Mapuva and Chari 2010). Unconsciously, the relative peace and security which colonial rule eventually ushered in meant, for instance, that the areas (spheres) for the people’s economic activities were widened, as they could have access to farm land, fishing grounds, or pasture land even beyond their ethnic or kindred areas (Charle 1967). The roads and railways constructed in the export crop-producing area and the mineral mining zones also helped in evacuating agricultural surpluses, including the local food crops, to distant markets and consuming populations particularly in the cities. The country’s was connected by rail in the following order: Lagos to Ibadan in 1900; Ibadan to Osogbo in 1907; Osogbo to Jebba in 1909 and Jebba to Kano in 1912 (Charle 1967). Through the initiative of the colonial authorities and individual (including expatriate) philanthropists, some innovations were introduced into the local economy. They included nylon fishing nets, new crops (cassava and maize) and new breeds of cattle. They provided water from earth dams and reservoirs for, and encouraged, irrigation farming in many parts of Northern Nigeria. Some of the industrial and commercial businesses owned by the government or operated during the colonial era helped to organise the local farmers and/or to provide them with funds (capital) for their farming inputs or activities. Examples include cotton farmers (helped by the then British Cotton Growing Association) and tobacco growers (by the Nigerian Tobacco Company). Perhaps the most significant conscious encouragement from the colonial administration was in research and scientific backup. Many research institutes in Nigeria today started at that time. They include Ibadan (Moor Plantation); Benin (Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research); Umudike near Umuahia (National Root Crops Research Institute); Badeggi near Bida (National Cereals [then Rice] Research Station); Vom near Jos (National Veterinary Research Institute); and Kaduna (Nigerian Institute for Trypanosomiasis Research). There were, indeed, several others. Based on the findings and pilot trials by the research institutes, agricultural extension services were offered to the farmers through government-paid extension workers. With these and several other measures, the colonial era witnessed some boost in the internal economy and well-being of the local people, as well (Ajayi 1999).

 See Charle (1967), Ekundare (1973) and Ihovbere and Falola (1987) for further details.

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Conclusion and Recommendation In this chapter, we considered the Nigerian economy during colonial era. Our discussion shows that the primary motive of British incursion into the country was their economic interest. To this end, the economic interest of Nigeria and her citizens was supressed and subordinated to the interests of colonial authority. Most of the benefits derived by the country may be regarded as the crumbs falling from the master table of the colonial authority. Though opinions differ concerning the performance of the colonial economy, however, it has to be admitted that the economic policies and measures adopted at the time have affected the nature and character of the development problems Nigeria faces today. Nigerian economy under colonial rule was tailored to nurture the European economy in general and British economy in particular. Therefore, the economy has been foreign oriented till today. Nurture capitalism has continued, even though it has been largely unsuccessful. Also, the country’s industrialisation efforts and, indeed, the entire development process have become dependent on external factors as a result of the initial policy measures. These features of the Nigerian economy will have to be changed in the struggle to improve living conditions in the society. However, the rapid improvements in the productivities of agricultural products at the early years of colonial rule in the country due to colonial policies are an indication that the sector can regain its lost glory with appropriate public policies. It is therefore expedient for the policy makers to look within in order to formulate necessary appropriate policies and restructuring of the country if the current effort to overcome our increasing economic problems in the country is to be successful. The following recommendations will definitely fast-track an inclusive economic growth in the country. In the first place, agricultural sector should be encouraged through massive investment in mechanised farming in order to regain the lost glory of the country as the world’s largest producer of some agricultural products such as palm oil, groundnuts and cocoa. Secondly, governments at all levels should provide conducive environment for the local private investors in order to enhance an improvement in the contributions of the private sector to employment generation and the overall development of the country. In addition, there should be massive infrastructural development in the country in order to aid transportation of goods and services especially agricultural produce from the rural to urban areas. Finally, the present railways in the country inherited from the colonial authority should be extended to every parts of the country in order to reduce the cost of transportation of goods and services and hence the market prices of these products.

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References Aghahowa, J.O and Ukpebor E.E.M (1999). The British Colonial Economic Policies and Nigeria Underdevelopment, The Nigerian Journal of Politics and Public Policy, Vol 3, N0 1&2, December. Aghalino, S.O (2000). British Colonial Policies and the Oil Palm Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 1900-1960, African Study Monographs, Vol. 21, No 1, January. Ahazuem J.O and Falola, T (1987). Production for the Metropolis: Agriculture and Forest Products, in Falola, T (ed.), Britain and Nigeria. Exploitation or Development? London: Zed Books. Ajayi G (1999).Internal Politics of Decolonization and the Emergence of Neo-Colonialism in PostIndependence Nigeria. In: G Ajayi (Ed.): Critical Perspectives on Nigeria’s Socio-Political Development in the 20th Century. Lagos: Stebak Books, pp.21-28. Akinjobi I.A and Ososba G.O (1980). Topics on Nigerian Economics and Social History. Ile- Ife: University of Ife Press Ltd. Akpan, N.E (2003). “Colonial Administration in Nigeria” in Osuntokun, A et al (eds) Issues in Nigeria Government and Politics, Ibadan: Rex Charles Publications. Ayo, E.J (1988). Development Planning in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press Plc. Brown, G (2009). Crisis, Colonial Failure, and Subaltern Suffering, speech to joint session of U.S. Congress, March 4, Buchanan, K.M. and J.C. Pugh (1955). Land and Peoples in Nigeria. London. Edwin G. Charle (1967). English colonial policy and the economy of Nigeria. American journal of economics and sociology. Vol 26 no 1 p79-92, 1967 Eicher C, and C.  Lieldholms (1970). Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy. Michigan. Michigan State University. Ekundare, R.D. (1973). An Economic History of Nigeria. 1860-1960. Methuen and Co., London. Ezera, K. (1964). Constitutional Development in Nigeria. Cambridge University Press, London. Falola, T (2007). History of Nigeria 3: Nigeria in the Twentieth Century, Lagos: Longman. Falola, T and M.  Heaton (2008). A History of Nigeria, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-68157-5 Fieldhouse, D.K. (1978). The anatomy of Multinational, 1895-1965. Unilevel Overseas, London. Forde, D. (1941). The Native Economics of Nigeria. In (M.  Perman, ed.) The Economics of a Tropical Dependency. Faber and Feber, London. Igbafe, P.  A (1979). Benin Under British Administration. The Impact of Colonial Rule on an African Kingdom 1897 – 1938. London: Longman. Helleiner G. K (1981). Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria. In: Nnoli Okwudiba (Ed.): Path to Nigerian Development. Dakar: Codesria, pp. 76-93. Ihovbere J. and T.  Falola (1987). ‘Introduction: Colonialism and exploitation’ in Falola (eds) Nigeria and Britain: Exploitation or Development?. London Zed Books Ltd. Inyang E. (1981). Myths and Fallacies in Nigerian Development. In: Nnoli Okwudiba (Ed.): Path to Nigerian Development. Dakar: Codesria, pp. 48-75. Mapuva, J and Chari, F (2010), Colonialism no longer an excuse for Africa’s Failure, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 12, No.5. Njoku O. N (1987). Trading with the Metropolis: An Unequal Exchange: In: T Falola (Ed.): Britain and Nigeria. Exploitation or development? London: Zed Books, pp. 137-138. Onimode, B. (1981). Imperialism and Nigerian Development. In: Nnoli Okwudiba (Ed.): Path to Nigerian Development. Dakar: Codesria, pp. 80-81. Onimode, B. (1983). Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria Lagos: Macmillan. Olarewaju, S.A. (1996). The infrastructure of Exploitation: Transport, Monetary Changes, Banking, etc. in Falola, T. (ed) Britain an Nigeria: Exploitation or Development. London: Zed Books Ltd. Olukoju, A. (1995). Anatomy of Business-Government Relations: Fiscal Policy And Mercantile Pressure Group Activity In Nig. 1916-33. African Studies Review; April 1995, Vol. 38 Issue 1 Rodney, W. (2005). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Abuja: Panaf Publishing Inc.

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Shokpeka, S. A and Nwaokocha, O. A (2009). British Colonial Economic Policy in Nigeria, the Example of Benin Province 1914 – 1954”, Journal of Human Ecology, Vol.28, No. 1: 56-66. Tamuno T.N (1980). British Colonial Administration in Nigeria in the Twentieth Century in Ikime Obaro (ed.) Groundwork of Nigerian History, Ibadan: Heinemann. Todaro, M.P (1979). Economics for Developing World, London: Longman. Usoro E.J (1997). Colonial Economic Development Planning in Nigeria, 1919-1939: An Appraisal, The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol.19. No 1, March. Usoro E. J (1977). Colonial Economic Development Planning in Nigeria, 1919-1939: An Appraisal. Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 19: 121-136. Usoro, E. J (1974). The Nigerian Oil Palm Industry. Ibadan: University Press. Yunusa, K.S (2009). The Political Economy of Nigeria and the Continuing Agenda of Recolonizaton: A Challenge for Critical Knowledge Production”, The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol.3, No.3 September

Chapter 13

Debt Crisis, Structural Reforms and Debt Relief Roseline Oshewolo and Segun Oshewolo Abstract  Using the civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo as the point of departure, this chapter explains the Nigerian debt crisis. In a thematic manner, this chapter presents Nigeria’s economic profile, accounts for its debt crisis and the predisposing factors, links the eventual debt relief to structural reforms, and recommends clear policy choices for promoting debt sustainability and development in Nigeria. Keywords  Debt crisis · Structural reforms · Debt sustainability · Development · President olusegun obasanjo · Nigeria

Introduction In the early period of statehood in Nigeria, hopes and expectations were high that the country would transpose into a major industrial destination in the world. These hopes were hinged on the abundant natural and economic resources that dot the length and breadth of Nigeria (Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013). In what appeared to be a seeming posture of self-sustenance in the 1960s and the early 1970s, Nigeria, just like many other states in Africa, was not indebted (AFRODAD 2007). The huge economic cost of war notwithstanding the government of General Yakubu Gowon successfully prosecuted the Nigerian civil war without recourse to foreign loan. Perhaps, this explains why Gowon stated in the early 1970s that the problem of Nigeria was not cash but rather what to use the available money for (Ikejiaku 2008:4). No doubt, afterwards, the descent of Nigeria into the abyss of indebtedness represents a monumental betrayal of the country’s huge resource base. Because of the critical nature of the situation in the entire African region, Enweze (2003:75) R. Oshewolo (*) Department of History and International Studies, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] S. Oshewolo Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu-Aran, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_13

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submits that it is something of an irony that, looking back, we might regard the 1960s as Africa’s Golden Years, at least in the light of the optimism that greeted the emergence of many African countries into independence. The situation in Nigeria, before the achievement of debt relief, was particularly horrendous. Endowed with large quantities of oil, from which the country has generated nearly $300billion in oil exports between 1973 and 2000 (Okonjo-Iweala et  al. 2003:1; Omotola and Saliu 2009:92), sarcastically, Nigeria had to contend with a devastating debt profile. From a position in which Nigeria was ‘under-­ borrowed’ in the late 1970s, Nigeria became one of the heavily indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with total external debt peaking at over $30.0 billion in 1999. In 1993, Nigeria’s per capita external debt amounted to $300, which was roughly equal to its income per capita (AFRODAD 2005:6). As of August 31, 2001, Nigeria’s debt stock, excluding penalty interests, amounted to $28.42 billion. This was made up of obligations to Paris Club creditors at $22.04 billion, non-Paris Club bilateral creditors at $111.6 million, multilateral creditors at $2.89 billion and commercial creditors at $3.37 billion (Okonjo-Iweala et  al. 2003:7). By the end of 2004, Nigeria’s total external debt stock stood at $35.94 billion, roughly half of gross domestic product and a significant drain on public resources (Alsop and Rogger 2008:7). The country had to reschedule its debt payments to external lenders like the Paris Club on four occasions – 1986, 1989, 1991 and 2000 – in order to make the debt service burden bearable and avoid default (AFRODAD 2005:6; Federal Ministry of Finance 2014). Accompanying the escalating external debt has been a crushing debt service burden. Nigeria’s domestic debt has equally been rising, fuelled primarily by escalating fiscal deficits. At the end of 2002, the total federal government domestic debt outstanding amounted to N1, 166.0 billion. This compares with a total domestic debt of a mere N404.1 billion in 1998 (see AFRODAD 2005:9). How do we explain Nigeria’s swift descent into the abyss of indebtedness? The contraction of the fiscal space including the need to plug daunting shortfalls in budget has catalysed governments’ resolve to borrow. As argued by Soludo (2003:29), poverty and underdevelopment were the primary reasons why Nigeria, ditto other countries in Africa, resorted to external borrowing. These reasons appear justifiable given the potential of external borrowing to promote high investment in social infrastructure such as education and health or to circumvent hard budget constraints. Regrettably, however, development finance has compounded the financing gap in Nigeria. Monumental squandering of resources by opportunistic leaders constitutes an obvious analytical barometer. The huge gap between projected infrastructure requirements and public funding capabilities has aggravated pervasive poverty in Nigeria (Oshewolo and Oniemola 2011). As reported by AFRODAD (2005:1), at the dawn of the third millennium, approximately 70 percent of the population still lived on less than $1 a day. This indication of extreme poverty has made Nigeria home to the highest number of poor people in sub-Saharan Africa. It also explains why, using selected world development indicators, Nigeria is poorly ranked on the continent of Africa (Oshewolo 2010a).

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But, in what appears to be a ray of hope, FONDAD (1992:12) submits that all creditors, even the reluctant and occasionally obstructive private banks, agree that Africa’s debt problem, and particularly that of the low-income countries south of the Sahara, needs special attention. Perhaps, this is as a result of the global publicity that Africa’s galloping poverty has generated. But the failure of this to translate into a concrete solution by way of debt forgiveness has heightened African struggle for debt cancellation from creditors, particularly from the Paris Club. A major turning point came in 1986 when the organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to bring Africa’s debt problem to the UN, asking Western countries to help solve it (Federici 2010:8; Omotola and Saliu 2009). Again, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and IMF, which involved 38 countries out of which 32 were in Africa, represented a major international plank in the struggle for debt relief (Omotola and Saliu 2009; Morrissey 2001). In Nigeria, as part of government’s efforts aimed at achieving sustainability and reducing the burden of foreign debt, the Debt Management Office was established in 2000 (Alsop and Rogger 2008:7). To complement the above effort, Alsop and Rogger (2008:7) noted that a major way to achieve sustainability was to target the Paris Club debt, which constituted 86 percent of the foreign debt portfolio. Good enough, given the pace of structural reforms in Nigeria, the debt relief deal was eventually struck in 2005. As submitted by Obasanjo (2005), 100 percent debt relief was granted to 18 low-income and heavily indebted countries in the developing world, which included 14 African nations. Nigeria equally celebrated with the success of negotiations for a comprehensive treatment of the country’s debt with the Paris Club. At the end of the negotiation, a total of $30 billion debt owed the Paris Club was wiped off our books (Federal Ministry of Finance 2014).

Deciphering the Debt Crisis in Nigeria The Nigerian debt crisis including the predisposing factors would be better understood if placed within an appropriate framework of analysis. Unless the causes of this predicament are properly understood, appropriate solutions may be difficult to design. Therefore, scholars and writers have adopted different explanatory variables to analyse the complexities surrounding the protracted debt crisis in Nigeria and other nations of Africa. While Ikejiaku (2008) identifies economic liberalization as a major cause, Enweze (2003) identifies the problems of governance that lead to misallocation of resources. Other major explanations include the perverse consequences of capital flight (Ajayi 2003) and corruption and rent seeking (Soludo 2003; AFRODAD 2005). Although these arguments have their merits, the paper howbeit employs the concept of ‘global interdependence’ to effectively distil the problem. The rationale for this is that virtually all the arguments have their roots in ‘interdependence’. The politico-economic intrigues characterizing the asymmetrical global system offer precise and concise explanatory notes on the Nigerian debt phenomenon.

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Interdependence is seen as the appropriate mechanism for exchange of goods, services, ideas and technical skill between states in the international system which constitutes the basis for the contemporary practice of international relations and foreign policy (Akinbade 2004:90). Goldstein (2003:317) notes that ‘when the well-being of a state depends on the cooperation of a second state, the first state is dependent on the second. When two or more states are simultaneously dependent on each other, they are interdependent’. Linkages in the world economy are therefore a product of global interdependence. Rweyemamu (1992:5) states that ‘linkages in the world economy have increased, not only through rapid growth in international trade but also because developing countries have become significant borrowers…’ In this context, judging from the practice of development assistance, Nigeria’s debt crisis cannot be separated from the regime of global interdependence. While remarking on the structure of an interdependent global system, Goldstein (2003:317) avers that the mutual dependence of two or more states does not mean that their degree of dependence is equal or symmetrical. Often one is more dependent on the other. Perhaps, technological advancement coupled with economic prosperity has placed the Global North in an advantage position. As a consequence, the region has become the centre of gravity that attracts the technologically and economically disadvantaged regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Given this scenario, the resulting asymmetrical structure has made ‘dependency’ a dominant concept. Although global interdependence has its benefits, owing to the fact that it is a preferable option to autarky which the principle of internationalism has relegated to the background, but it appears to have lost its significance. The reason being that through political instrumentalities, the North tends to strengthen the existing structure for regional gains. The gains of global interdependence have been generously distributed to favour the developed world to the detriment of the third world. Because of the condemnation of interdependence to political manoeuvring, Goldstein (2003:317) contends that it is a political and not just an economic phenomenon. In the light of this, a politically manipulated global economic strategy is development assistance. It is within the framework of official development assistance that development finance to Nigeria may be perceived. The financing gap crisis in Nigeria and other parts of Africa has attracted the attention of the ‘development partners’. In the face of economic crisis and in the context of global interdependence, African leaders, like their colleagues in Latin America and Asia, embraced development finance as a way of kick-starting economic recovery in their respective regions (Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013: 11). Ikejiaku (2008:3) remarks that events in Africa provide us with some reasons why attempts made in redressing the situation through increased foreign borrowing have contributed to the current debt crisis by increasing the resource gap even further. No doubt, development finance, which today constitutes a banana skin/peel to African leaders, has become a key instrumentality for fostering the peripheral position of the South. Federici (2010:5) observed that the African crisis, in particular, has unfolded through two different phases, each differentiated by the more or less direct intervention of foreign governments and the role played by international agencies. The two phases, perhaps, capture a division of labour between the IMF and the World Bank.

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Phase I, roughly lasting from 1980 to 1984, was dominated by the IMF monetarist policies. This was the phase when as country after country defaulted on interest payments, arrangements were made with the IMF for standby loans in exchange for the infamous IMF conditionalities such as cut in subsidies to products, wage freeze, retrenchment in public sector and massive devaluations, which in many countries virtually demonetarized the economy (see also Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013:11). Given the hatred for the IMF, the phase II began in 1984 with the takeover by the World Bank. This second phase was characterized by economic recovery and development plans. According to Federici (2010:5), the World Bank announced in 1984 that it would raise $1billion to provide 50 ‘soft loans’ to sub-Saharan nations prepared to accept its recipe for economic recovery and embark on the path of economic reforms. This special facility came under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). It is in this context that economic liberalization developed as an outward policy of the World Bank in the already asymmetrically structured global system (Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013:12). SAP means that in exchange for the generous financial assistance from the Bretton Woods Institutions, a country must accept a package of reforms that include the liberalization of imports, the privatization of state industries, the abolition of restrictions on currency exchange and commodity prices and the demise of subsidies to health care, education and constant devaluation (Obianyo 2009:21; Akinbade 2004:195; Federici 2010:6). As remarked by Obianyo (2009:21), SAP requires governments to redirect their spending from public services and publicly owned enterprises into debt servicing. It was at this point that poverty became endemic in Africa. The rationales for the imposition of these conditionalities have not gone unchallenged. Akpuru-Aja (1998:173) noted that IMF and the World Bank have the same package of conditionalities and prescriptions for every needy state without regard to the peculiarities of the country’s economic problems and goals. What this implies is that these institutions have failed to make a distinction between the differing levels of economic conditions of states. Although SAP draws from the democratic logic of popular participation and freedom of choice, the states that adopted it were not allowed to choose. In Nigeria, through a national debate, Nigerians rejected the IMF loan and its conditionalities, yet the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (rtd) went ahead and implemented it (Obianyo 2009:21). Also, the liberalization of trade option in a monocultural economy like Nigeria where oil constitutes the commanding height of the economy is to expose the domestic market to foreign domination and exploitation (Akpuru-Aja 1998:174). Virtually all the emerging ‘dependent’ nations have tales of woes for implementing SAP (Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013:12). It is against this background that the potential of SAP to enhance development in Nigeria has been questioned. Nigeria’s debt escalated dramatically since the acceptance of the IMF/World Bank economic recovery measures. The Nigerian debt rose from $20 billion to $30 billion after the introduction of SAP, while Africa’s total external debt has tripled since 1980 and is now as large as the continent’s GNP (see Federici 2010:8; UNDP 1992:40).

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Another observable trend closely linked to the processes above has been the corruption and embezzlement of funds by the governing and bureaucratic elite. The funds are often placed in foreign banks and are furnished back as loans (Shah 2010). This situation, coupled with the obligations relating to debt servicing and other forms of payments, constitutes capital flight, which produce massive resource flow implications from the world’s poor to the rich (Ajayi 2003). Although corrupt national governments have been described as an accomplice, the bulk of the blame however goes to the creditors. Loans received were not expended on viable projects, and the creditors seemed unconcerned. At this point, the debt profile ballooned, and the funding gap became enormously wide. Also, the privatization and commercialization of public enterprises have made corrupt and provocatively rich public officers in Nigeria to dominate the economic sphere (Akpuru-Aja 1998:175). Ikejiaku (2008:3) therefore noted that the Bretton Woods Institutions have created an easy means through which corrupt leaders siphon the nation’s wealth thereby worsening the debt crisis and deepening the level of poverty. Given the asymmetrical structure of the global system, coupled with the inherent politico-economic intrigues, the well-being of Nigeria and other states in Africa has been tied to policies and conditions in other states, outside their control. As a result, Nigeria lost its economic sovereignty (Ajayi and Oshewolo 2013:13). Federici (2010):7) reiterated that leaders have learned that they cannot rule without the help of Washington, London and Paris. Thus, they have willingly complied with the conditionalities of international agencies, often implementing austerity measures stiffer than those demanded, while pretending in front of the people to be helpless before the IMF and World Bank. The policies of the International Financial Institutions have produced harsh effects. So for Nigeria, it is not hypothetical whether or not debt overhang hurts. There is evidence that it hurts very much (Soludo 2003:36). The debt burden has inevitably imposed a number of constraints on economic growth prospects. The burden of principal, interest repayment and other payments has drained the nation’s resources and curtailed the possible expenditure of resources on other productive ventures (Ajayi 2003:113). Against this background, debt relief offers massive prospects for development in that debt relief fund becomes virtual poverty fund. According to Alsop and Rogger (2008:14 &15), a virtual poverty fund is a coding system within an existing budget classification structure that enables the ‘tagging’ and ‘tracking’ of poverty-reducing spending funded by debt relief. However, beyond debt relief, efforts should be made to address the distortions in the structure of global interdependence which largely precipitated the problem.

Linking Debt Relief to Structural Reforms Given the distortion of the global system and the harrowing debt crisis, the economies of Nigeria and other African countries have become deplorable with poverty and general deprivation having a toll on the people. To address these and other current

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challenges, many governments have embarked on wide-ranging social and economic reforms with the hope of strengthening institutions and creating a favourable environment for empowering the private sector and enhancing national productivity and economic growth (Nwokoma 2005). Many African countries have undertaken these reforms, on their own or with the assistance of multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, to achieve economic stabilization and improve macroeconomic management and governance on the continent (Elhiraika 2003:192). The repositioning of the African Union (AU) including the laudable programmes of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the progress of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has helped to deepen these reforms which eventually facilitated the debt relief deal (see Obasanjo 2005). A major precursor to these reform-based efforts was the unwillingness of the International Financial Institutions to arrogate the economic woes in Nigeria and other countries of Africa to the inherent contradictions in SAP.  Due to bad governance, occasional government interventions and corruption, Africa has been blamed for its predicament (Obianyo 2009:24). While these arguments may be correct, to a large extent, it is a diversion from the realities. As the politico-economic intrigues of the asymmetrical global system suggest, this worrisome state was arrived at with the connivance of the Bretton Woods Institutions. However, as the Western orchestrated logic above goes, the only remedy is for Africa to democratize and enthrone good governance. Quite frankly, apart from external complicity, African countries have poor governance indices. This explains why Obasanjo (2005) identifies political rascality, abuse of office and power, corruption, mismanagement and waste, misplaced priorities, fiscal indiscipline and weak control, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as the springboard for Africa’s debt crisis. In line with this thinking, the emerging market reform was predicated on the World Bank’s philosophies of good governance and state effectiveness. This appears to be a ploy to rebrand the hazardous SAP reform provisions by adding a new component code named ‘good governance’. In response to Africa’s deepening debt crisis, the HIPC initiative was conceived in 1996 (Omotola and Saliu 2009:93). The original version of the initiative was to be anchored on such principles as targeting overall debt sustainability and providing a true exit from debt; track record of performance to address moral hazards; building on existing mechanisms such as the London and Paris clubs; ensuring a broad and equitable integrity of multilateral creditors; and pressuring the financing of concessional terms in order not to compound the problem it is trying to solve (Obadan 2004:190). The failure of this initiative to translate into debt relief in Africa has led to its revision. Hence, in 1999, the enhanced HIPC (HIPC II) initiative was adopted. The HIPC II scheme was based on conditionalities linking debt relief to poverty reduction and social polices (Morrissey 2001:17). In essence, poor eligible countries must be ready to embrace poverty reduction policies, which the earlier SAP conditionalities ignored. It was on the back of impressive economic and political reforms that Nigeria’s debt relief deal was eventually negotiated. Armed with the philosophy of good governance and the effective state, the government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo embarked on massive socioeconomic reforms (Obianyo 2009:25). Before the

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expiration of his tenure in 2007, no aspect of the nation’s public sector in particular was left untouched by the reforms, from the civil service to the judiciary to health, education, electricity and power generation, postal, telecommunication, oil and gas, banking and finance and the transport sector (Olajide 2006:229). The necessary starting point should be the return to civilian rule in May 1999 after three decades of military autocracy, interrupted only by the 1979–1983  Second Republic (Adetula et  al. 2010:1) and the Interim National Government of Ernest Shonekan in 1993. At this point, the World Bank reinstated interest in the economic plight of Nigeria. This interest was further fuelled by Obasanjo’s resolve and readiness to implement the World Bank-/IMF-approved economic reform programmes (Onuoha 2009:53). The government’s initial focus was on political stability, strengthening democratic practices and tackling corruption. After winning a second term in 2003, and with the appointment of a formidable finance minister, Ngozi OkonjoIweala, the Obasanjo administration, pursued a wide-reaching macroeconomic agenda embodied within the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). The key areas of focus were improving the macroeconomic environment, pursing structural reforms, strengthening public expenditure management and implementing institutional and governance reforms (Alsop and Rogger 2008:5). The Economic Management Team (EMT) saddled with the task of implementation was home grown but globally recognized and endorsed (Obasanjo 2005). Obasanjo demonstrated an aggressive political will to implement NEEDS to forestall the inherent factors that made SAP fail. NEEDS was built on four lofty goals, namely, poverty reduction, wealth creation, employment generation and value reorientation. The Obasanjo regime perceived the reform as inevitable and was determined to implement the programme no matter how painful economic adjustment may be (Oshewolo 2010b: Obianyo 2009: Onuoha 2009). It should be stated that the implementation of NEEDS was expected to involve all the three tiers of government and other stakeholders including the private sector, non-­governmental organizations and the general public (Onuoha 2009:53). Efforts to improve macroeconomic stability were centred upon the introduction of an oil price-based fiscal rule to de-link public expenditure from oil revenue earning. All oil revenues above a predetermined benchmark price would be saved for leaner times. The immediate impact was to increase the gross domestic product and accumulate significant excess crude savings as well as foreign reserve. The Fiscal Responsibility Bill was consequently introduced to formalize this rule and bind all three tiers of government to a medium-term expenditure framework in an effort to improve budgetary planning and execution (Alsop and Rogger 2008:5). Improved macroeconomic stability saw the oil-dominated GDP grows 6 percent per year on average and the non-oil sector grows by more than 8 percent from 2006 to 2008 (Adetula et al. 2010:1). Major institutional and governance reforms focused on public procurement, public expenditure management, transparency in the oil and gas sector and fighting corruption (Alsop and Rogger 2008:6). Onuoha (2009:54) observed that good governance can be facilitated through transparency, due process and zero tolerance for corruption. In this wise, the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit was set up to commence a process of contract award review, oversight and certification of

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public spending. Similarly, the government initiated a Public Procurement Commission Bill. Others include the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct Bureau and the establishment of anticorruption units within all federal ministries, departments and agencies (Ahmed-Ahmed 2006:179). These bodies successfully help to secure a string of high-level suspensions, dismissals, impeachments and convictions across judges, ministers, state governors and even a former Inspector General of Police, as well as the seizure of assets worth over $5 billon (Alsop and Rogger 2008:6). The private sector equally benefited from the reforms. The government embarked on the recapitalization of the banking and insurance sector. This pruned down the number of banks and insurance companies by more than half (Obianyo 2009:31). This reform exposed weak banks to merger and acquisition. The impact of this was the improved ranking of Nigerian banks continentally and globally. The military, civil service, power and telecommunication sector were also affected. The liberalization of the telecommunication sector was particularly successful resulting in a preponderant increase in the number of telephone lines across the country. This background of economic reform is an important context within which to place the debt deal. Without these impressive reform efforts, Nigeria would have failed to convince the Paris Club to consider a debt deal (Alsop and Rogger 2008:6). These reforms were bountifully rewarded. In 2004, shortly after implementing NEEDS, the World Bank under the IDA soft loan window granted the federal government a total credit of $140 million to support and encourage economic reforms and good governance programme in Nigeria. In 2005, the World Bank also granted the federal government another IDA credit of $18.1 million for state governance and capacity building project (see Onuoha 2009:56). However, the most developmentally justified reward was the eventual debt relief deal. Following the spate of reforms in Nigeria, in 2005, the creditors wiped off about 60 percent ($18 billion) from our national debt, and the country utilized $6 billion savings from the ECA to buy back the rest of the debt at 25 cents on a dollar, after paying off the accumulated interest arrears (Federal Ministry of Finance 2014). Nigeria’s deal was Africa’s largest debt relief deal. However, beyond the debt relief, what must be done to promote Nigeria’s economic sovereignty and ensure that the country does not slide into the abyss of indebtedness once again? This constitutes the modest effort in the next section.

Promoting Debt Sustainability and Development in Nigeria As argued by Ake (1981:143), it is quite hazardous to talk of development strategies in Africa, not because there is anything inherently problematic about the concept in the African context, but because it is not in the least clear that many African countries have a strategy which is identifiable. Stemming from this argument and within

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the current debt relief regime, a debt sustainability strategy becomes very important. According to Ajayi (2003:125), external debt sustainability connotes that the country is expected to be able to meet all its external obligations in full without recourse to debt rescheduling or relief or the accumulation of arrears, over the medium term or long term and without compromising economic growth. To Soludo (2003:24), a debt sustainability strategy is one in which, over a reasonable time horizon, ensures that the country/region escapes from debt and aid dependence as well as the traps of pervasive poverty and inequality. The African debt crisis reveals that virtually all countries in the region lack a clear debt sustainability strategy. In fact, the lack of it was the genesis of the crisis (Debt Management Office 2008a). Thus, a heavily indebted country like Nigeria needs to articulate creative strategies for bringing about debt reduction so that the high debt stock and associated crushing debt service burden would not impact too negatively on economic growth (AFRODAD 2005:8). In this wise, the Debt Management Office (DMO) was established in Nigeria to manage the country’s debt as an asset for growth, development and poverty reduction (Debt Management Office 2008b). By developing and implementing a sustainable borrowing strategy, the DMO plays an important role in reducing the risk of Nigeria returning to an unsustainable foreign debt burden in the future (Alsop and Rogger 2008:4). Although the activities of the DMO cover important aspects of debt management such as administration, accounting and monitoring, it however requires additional institutional energization to function optimally. Its establishment should be seen a matter of fundamental national imperative and therefore should be insulated from the domains of politics  (Debt Management Office 2008a). More so, to achieve development, the current wave of socioeconomic reforms should be strengthened and sustained. As argued earlier, reform-based efforts contributed immensely to the attainment of debt relief in Nigeria. In this wise, Okonjo-­Iweala et al. (2003:15) recommend that the government should vigorously pursue economic policy reforms, not just as an attempt to meet the requirements of donors but as a matter of national importance. According to them, such reforms should address the poor state of infrastructure and minimize the risks and uncertainties associated with the business environment. Obadan (2003:204) emphasizes the importance of sound macroeconomic reforms. He states that the implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies along with debt reduction packages will ensure that debt reduction provides a much needed stimulus to investment recovery and growth. As noted by Alsop and Rogger (2008:6), the debt relief package itself will help to support the success of these reforms. It is however important to put in place temporary relief measures to absorb the short-run adverse effects that usually accompany reforms (Omotola and Saliu 2009). Again, it is imperative to limit external borrowing and mobilize untapped domestic resources. This is necessary to consolidate the debt relief gains and avoid slipping into indebtedness once again. As at the end of December 2012, the external debt of the country was $6.5 billion and domestic debt stood at N6.5 trillion (The Nation 2013). A dramatic reversal of the debt relief gains is

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therefore not impossible if the current profile becomes unsustainable. OkonjoIweala et al. (2003:17) argue quite correctly that in this present regime, any borrowing must be from concessional sources only and that the government would need to strictly monitor and avoid implicit or explicit contingent liabilities arising from borrowings, guarantees or liabilities of any public enterprises or other government entities. According to Obadan (2003:205), fresh loans should be sourced only for projects that meet the criteria of viability and feasibility. They should be for productive and self-financing projects, which are capable of yielding economic and social benefits. Again, as put forward by Omotola and Saliu (2009:97), to make up for investment, saving and consumption gaps, it would be better to intensify domestic production by mobilizing very effectively untapped national resources. In this regard, the diversification of the economy becomes a necessary task. Aside from oil, the development potentials of the other productive sectors of the economy must be adequately tapped. The additional revenue accruing from the productive engagement of these sectors will increase social spending on basic infrastructure and in the long run contribute to poverty reduction. It is also imperative to eschew accumulation of domestic debt in order to prevent the huge problems it can cause for the budget and the entire domestic financial system. Importantly, there is need to deepen governance reforms. According to AFRODAD (2005:21), there is need to reform the institutional, legal and administrative framework for public resource management. This is to ensure effective and efficient utilization of present and future public resources so as to prevent the waste and inefficiencies of the past. Among other things, this institutional re-engineering would ensure due process, transparency, accountability and sanctions. In the submission of Enweze (2003:80), good governance requires robust and public accountability institutions to formulate and implement policies, promote transparency and fight corruption. It also involves fostering a participatory reform process, both in terms of giving civil society a voice in decision-making and the means, through fiscal decentralization, to participate in the development effort. In addressing corruption, which largely inhibits good governance and development, the anticorruption agencies in Nigeria such as the EFCC, no doubt, have recorded modest achievements by the number of high-ranking public officers and business elites they indicted and prosecuted. However, institutional independence and adequate funding would help these anticorruption agencies to fare better. Above all, the distortions in the global economic system would have to be addressed. Fairness and equity should constitute the basis for global interdependence, and the gains arising from that should be mutual. The economic predicament of the African continent where Nigeria belongs should not be construed as a license for domination and exploitation; instead it should propel the true spirit of international development assistance within the interdependent global system. Admittedly, the international donor community has taken a major step to reduce debt through the enhanced HIPC framework, in which the African Development Bank participates. However, the success will depend on sufficient resources made available by the donors. This must be backed by a strong credit policy, which ties debt forgiveness,

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new loans and credits to sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Enweze 2003:83). Performance on the scale of worldwide governance indicators should constitute the yardstick for development assistance to forestall given foreign aid to corrupt and unaccountable governments.

Concluding Remarks The debt relief deal offers the possibilities for another development not just in Nigeria but in the entire African continent. However, the achievement of sustainable development requires serious efforts by both the government of Nigeria and the international community. On the part of Nigeria, efforts must be made to promote debt sustainability agenda for positive impact on economic growth and poverty reduction; strengthen and sustain the current tempo of socioeconomic reforms; institute a sustainable regime of good governance; and address the corrosive scourge of corruption. On the part of the international community, building a truly symmetrical interdependent global system is a necessary political and economic task. Given that all the regions are not equally endowed technologically and economically, advanced and developed regions may benefit more, but a major inequity that needs to be addressed is the exploitation and domination that hitherto characterize the global order. Reforming the current package of international development assistance to propel the true spirit of global interdependence constitutes inevitable and socio-politically expedient measures. It is within this gamut of articulation that Nigeria can lay claim to sustainable socioeconomic development.

References Adetula, V., Kew, D. and Kwaja, C. (2010). Assessing democracy assistance: Nigeria. FRIDE. AFRODAD (2005) The politics of the MDGs and Nigeria: a critical appraisal of the Global Partnership for Development (Goal 8). Harare, Zimbabwe: AFRODAD. AFRODAD (2007). Nigeria: foreign debts, stolen wealth, IFIs and the west: a case study. Harare, Zimbabwe: AFRODAD. Ahmed-Ahmed, A. (2006). ‘Social welfare as an instrument for tackling endemic corruption in Nigeria’. Ilorin Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 11(1&2), 169–213. Ajayi, I.  S (2003). ‘External debt, capital flight, and growth in Nigeria’. In N.  Okonjo-Iweala, C. C. Soludo and M. Muhtar (Eds), The debt trap in Nigeria: towards a sustainable debt strategy (pp. 105–152). Trenton: Africa World Press Inc. Ajayi, R. & Oshewolo, S. (2013). ‘Historicizing the African development crisis’. In A.O. Odukoya (Ed.), Alternative development strategies for Africa: A festschrift for Gabriel Olatunde Babawale. (pp. 1–26). Lagos: CBAAC. Ake, C. (1981) A political economy of Africa. New York: Longman Inc. Akinbade, J. A. (2004). Dictionary of Nigerian government and politics. Lagos: Macak Books Ltd. Akpuru-Aja, A. (1998). Fundamentals of modern political economy and international economic relations. Owerri: Data-Globe.

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Alsop, M., Rogger, D. (2008). ‘Debt relief as a platform for reform: the case of Nigeria’s Virtual Poverty Fund’. Paper Prepared for Birmingham Conference on Debt Relief, Birmingham University, UK, May 16–17th. Debt Management Office (2008a). Report of the annual national debt sustainability analysis (DSA). Abuja: Debt Management Office. Debt Management Office (2008b). Annual report and statement of accounts 2008. Abuja: Debt Management Office. Elhiraika, A. (2003). An integrated approach to Africa’s development constraints. The Hague: FONDAD. Enweze, C. (2003). ‘Sustainable debt and development strategy in Africa’. In N. Okonjo-Iweala, C. C. Soludo and M. Muhtar (Eds.), The debt trap in Nigeria: towards a sustainable debt strategy (pp. 75–90). Trenton: Africa World Press Inc. Federal Ministry of Finance (2014). Responses to the 50 questions on Nigeria’s economy posed by the House of Representatives’ committee on finance. Abuja: Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Finance. Federici, S. (2010). ‘The debt crisis, Africa and the new enclosures. The Commoner’. Retrieved from: http://www.thecommonerorg FONDAD (1992). African debt revisited: procrastination or progress? The Hague: FONDAD. Goldstein, J. S. (2003). International relations. fifth edition. New York: Longman. Ikejiaku, B. (2008). African debt crisis and the IMF with a case of Nigeria: towards theoretical explanations. Journal of Politics and Law, 1(4), 2–7. Morrissey, O. (2001). ‘Pro-poor conditionality for aid and debt relief in East Africa.’ CREDIT Research Paper No. 01/15. Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham. Nwokoma, N.  I. (2005). ‘Public sector reforms and the future development of African economies: an appraisal of the Nigerian situation.’ Paper prepared for an international conference on NEPAD and the future of economic policy in Africa at IDEP, Senegal, November 9–12. Obadan, M. (2003). ‘Toward Nigeria’s sustainable debt strategy’. In N.  Okonjo-Iweala, C. C. Soludo and M. Muhtar (Eds), The debt trap in Nigeria: towards a sustainable debt strategy (pp. 195–213). Trenton: Africa World Press Inc. Obadan, M.  I. (2004). Foreign capital flows and external debt: perspective on Nigeria and the LDCs group. Lagos: Broadway press ltd. Obasanjo, O. (2005). ‘Debt relief for Nigeria: a dividend of democracy’. Being the title of Obasanjo’s address to the nation on debt relief, June 29. Retrieved from: http://www.dawodu. com/obas40.htm Obianyo, N. E. (2009). Reconstructing the state in Africa: good governance, market reform and virtual governance  - the experience of Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 35(1), 9–40. Okonjo-Iweala, N., Soludo, C.  C. and Muhtar, M. (2003). Introduction. In N.  Okonjo-Iweala, C. C. Soludo and M. Muhtar (Eds), The debt trap in Nigeria: towards a sustainable debt strategy (pp. 1–19). Trenton: Africa world press Inc. Olajide, O.  A. (2006). Labour flexibilization and public sector reforms in Nigeria: 1946–2006. Ilorin Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 11(1&2), 219–241. Omotola, J. S. and Saliu, H. (2009). Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s development: problems and prospects. South African Journal of International Affairs, 16(1), 87–102. Oshewolo, S. (2010a). Galloping poverty in Nigeria: an appraisal of government’s interventionist policies. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(6), 264–274. Oshewolo, S. (2010b). ‘State, market and civil society: a triangular partnership for alleviating poverty in Nigeria’. Unpublished M.Sc thesis, department of political science, University of Ilorin, Nigeria, July. Oshewolo, S. & Oniemola, R.M. (2011). The financing gap, civil society and service delivery in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 13(2), 254–268.

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Onuoha, J. (2009). The State and economic reforms in Nigeria: an explanatory note on the capture theory of politics. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 35(1), 41–60. Rweyemamu, J. F. (1992). Third world options: power, security and the hope for another development. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House. Shah, A. (2010). Causes of the debt crisis. Global Issues. Retrieved from: http://www.globalissues. org/article/29/causes-of-the-debt-crisis. Soludo, C.  C. (2003). ‘Debt, poverty, and inequality: toward an exit strategy for Nigeria and Africa’. In N. Okonjo-Iweala, C. C. Soludo and M. Muhtar (Eds), The debt trap in Nigeria: towards a sustainable debt strategy (pp. 23–73). Trenton: Africa World Press Inc. The Nation (2013). Nigeria’s external debt hits $6.5b, domestic N6.5t. Retrieved from http:// thenationonlineng.net/new/business/nigerias-external-debt-hits-6-5b-domestic-n6-5t/ on 04 June 2013. UNDP (1992). Human development report 1992. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 14

Terrorism in Nigeria Segun Joshua and Felix Chidozie

Abstract Terrorism has become one of the most attractive concepts in the field of security studies, especially since the international security architecture was radically transformed in 2001 following the 9/11 incident in the United States. Thus, terrorism has acquired a transnational outlook in the global governance agenda. This chapter is an attempt to explore the issues surrounding terrorism in Nigeria, since the recent upsurge in terrorist activities has drawn immense interest from both local and international stakeholders. This chapter is a desk study which borrows heavily from secondary sources of data to examine meaning and feature(s) of terrorism, types of terrorism, theoretical explanations of terrorism in Nigeria, a historical overview of terrorism in Nigeria, cases of terrorists attack and effects of terrorism on the Nigerian economy, politics and diplomatic relations. It argues that the causes of terrorism in Nigeria are multidimensional in nature and scope, suggesting a multi-stakeholder approach to stemming the tide in the polity. It further establishes an inextricable link between terrorism and religious fundamentalism in the Nigeria experience. It concludes that unless the country cooperates with other international actors, especially her immediate neighbours in combating the menace of domestic terrorism, it will remain vulnerable to terrorist activities which have increasingly become globalized in nature and scope. Keywords  Nigeria · Politics · Religion · Security · Terrorism

Introduction The word “terrorism” is from “terror”, and terror has a Latin origin meaning to frighten; akin to Greek triein to be afraid, flee; tremein to tremble (Rodrigueez 2003:9). Terrorism has a long history in the world. In fact, Abimbola and Adesote (2012) contend that terrorism has existed at least over 2000 years ago. According to S. Joshua (*) · F. Chidozie Department of Political Science and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_14

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Whittaker (2002) in the first century AD, the Roman province of Judea was plagued by the hit-and-run terrorism of the zealots. These Jew zealots resisted Roman Empire rule and Jews whose orthodoxy was tainted with heresy. Abimbola and Adesote (2012) explained further that these zealots carried out their campaign through assassination of their perceived enemies in broad day light, often in the crowd like markets places or on feast days. They killed many Roman soldiers and destroyed properties in Rome. However, what is described in modern language as “religious fundamentalism” played a part in what some thugs brought to the central and northern India that lasted for 1200 years. Thus, the thugs of roving bands carried out thousands of sacrificial strangulations to the goddess Kali and also involved in some criminal acts tantamount to outright banditry. In the eleventh and twelfth century, the Shi’ite Order of the Assassins whose followers considered it a sacred duty to hunt down Christians in Persia, Syria and Palestine came up. They were made to believe that success in their murderous missions would ensure them a place in paradise. This is similar to the doctrine imbibed by modern suicide bombers among the Hezbollah in the Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka (Whittaker 2002). Thus, religion remained the major source of terrorism until the French revolution (1789–1799). The French revolution led to the emergence of nationalism, anarchism, and some secular political movements to challenge divine rule by monarchs. With the passage of time, terrorism became associated with some repressive governments like Lenin and Stalin in former Soviet Union, Nazi, Fascist totalitarian regime in Germany among others that employed repressive style to deal with opponents (state sponsored terrorism). There also exist other non-state terrorists (Abolurin 2011; Abimbola and Adesote 2012). Act of terrorism has become a frequent occurrence in contemporary world, and Nigeria too has joined the clique of terrorist countries. In recent time, there seems to be an increase in terrorist activities associated with religion. That is to say although religion and terrorism share a long history, continuous rise in religious terrorism in recent time is frightening. For instance, in 1980 religious terrorist groups, amount to only 2 out of 64 groups of terrorist were active that year. Twelve years later (1992), religious terrorist groups have increased nearly sixfold, representing a quarter (11 of 48). Instead of the situation getting abated, it was accelerated. In fact, by 1994, a third (16) of the 49 identifiable terrorist groups was religious in character. The number increased yet again in 1995 to nearly half (25 or 45 percent) of the 58 known terrorist groups that were active. The situation seems not to have changed (Hoffman 2000:19). It has been observed that religious terrorism tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism due to the radically different value systems, mechanism of legitimization and justification, concept of morality and world views that directly affect the “holy terrorists” motivation. Religious terrorists see violence as sacramental act or divine duty: executed in response to some theological demands or imperative and justified by scripture. In other words, religion legitimizes wide range violence against and all non-members of the religious terrorist group (Hoffman 2000). Some of the terrorist organizations according to Abolurin (2011:135–139) include the following: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)-Middle East, Palestinian; Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-Philippines; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMS)-Middle East; Al-Shabaab-Somalia; Ansar al-Islam-Iraq; Asbat al-Ansar-Lebanon; Aum

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Shinrikyo (AUM)-Japan; HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)-Middle East; Hezbollah (Party of God)-Lebanon; Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)-Middle East; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-Uzbekistan; Kahane Chai (Kach)-Israel; Kata’ib. Hezbollah (KH)-Iraq; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)-Libya; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-Sri Lanka; Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)-Middle East; al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-Saudi Arabia; al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)-Saudi Arabia; Taliban; and of course the dreaded Boko Haram (BH)-Nigeria among others. Although there have been pocket of terrorist activities by some groups in Nigeria, that of Boko Haram has been more deadly, more organized and more devastating in the history of terrorism in Nigeria. The fact that Boko Haram is a terrorist group is not in doubt. According to Lacy (2012) the sect (1) pursues political goals, (2) is a non-state actor, (3) systematically uses violence against civilians and (4) aims to spread terror in a target audience. Comparison of BH with contemporary terrorist organizations supports this assessment, and as such BH should thus be understood within the context of modern terrorism. Book Haram operates in northern Nigeria especially in Bornu, Bauchi, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and some other states in the north. The sect is known for bombing, using explosives to kill, to maim and to cause massive destruction, hence a threat to national security. The group has been using religion as a facade to unleash terror on innocent citizens (Abolurin 2011).

Meaning and Features There are varying conceptions of terrorism. This is because there is no agreement on what constitutes a terror attack. This implies that the definition of terrorism is eclectic in nature. This lend credence to the philosophical dictum of John Stuart Mill (cited in Bender and Leone (2000:9) that: “The only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this”. From this philosophical premise, some definitions of the concepts are given below. According to Oche and Dokubo (2001), terrorism is traceable to Latin word, terrere similar to what has been said before. It is characterized by the desire to instill fear and disrupt the socio-political lives of its target population. Cline and Alexander (1987:215) define terrorism as a deliberate employment of violence or the use of violence by sovereign states as well as some national groups, assisted by sovereign states in order to attain strategic and political objectives through the violation of law. It is also seen as the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological course of action which involves serious violence against any person or property (British Government, cited in Whittaker 2002:22). A premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (US State Department, cited in Whittaker 2002:22).

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However, there are little consensus as to the root causes of terrorism, whether they bear political, economic or social imprints. In terms of political terrorism, Shultz and Sloan (1980) define it as the threat and/or use of extra normal form of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of achieving certain political goals or objectives. This is to influence the behaviour and attitude of certain groups within a political context. The problem of terrorism has kept people in perpetual fear, robbing people of freedom and security. Thus, the world as a whole is voicing concerns over the menace of terrorism, extremism and radicalism. A huge number of lives and properties worth billions also destroyed. People live in perpetual fear of insecurity, because they do not know the next turn of events, where it would take place and the propensity of the effects. Apart from the fear of insecurity terrorism brings about, it also reflects in economic decline, unemployment and p­ overty as well as a general sense of frustration amongst the victims because with terrorism, people are afraid to walk the streets. As such, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which are inalienable rights are affected negatively.

Types of Terrorism Terrorist groups differ from one another in important ways. They differ in the nature of ideology and the specificity of their political objectives. They differ in their relationship to religion and to the communities from which they derive support. They also differ in the trajectory of their violence. Historically, for example, most terrorist groups were domestic, and other started locally and went global (Richardson 2006). In other words, there are different types of terrorism; however the common ones according to Abolurin, (2011:19–29) include the following:

International Terrorism International terrorism takes place all over the world. It is practiced in a foreign country by terrorists who are not native to that country. International terrorism became American domestic news in 1993. Terrorism has been a concern to the international community since 1937 when the League of Nations elaborated the convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism. The international community since 1963 has, however, elaborated universal legal instruments related to prevention and suppression of international terrorism.

Domestic Terrorism This is the broadest form of terrorism, and it involves car bombing and international hacking. For instance, the bombing of the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters at Abuja on Thursday, June 16, 2011 is domestic terrorism. In fact, domestic terrorism

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can be described as unlawful use of force or violence, by group(s) of two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. During the 1990s, the United States became more concerned about domestic terrorist activities perpetrated by her citizens. A man called Unabomber killed 3 people and injured 23 others with package bombs.

Political Terrorism This type of terrorism is politically motivated as the name implies. Terrorists who embark on this type of terrorism are politically oriented. It is, therefore, a political tactic, which is used by activists when they believe that no other means will affect the kind of change desired. It is indeed a political crime that emphasizes violence as a mechanism for promoting change. Terrorists systematically use murder and destruction or the threat of these to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or government into conceding to their political demands. The terrorists communicate a political message. For instance, in Nigeria, political terrorism tends to be organized around such issues as the Niger Delta development, resource distribution and control and boundary delineation, among others. Government can as well use political terrorism to instill fear on the masses to achieve their aims and eliminate anyone that opposes them or against their political aspiration.

State Terrorism States can use force or threat of force, without declaring war to terrorize citizens and achieve political goals. This occurs when national government aids terrorists to further their own foreign policy and goals. State-sponsored terrorism can be described as a form of secret warfare; it is a means to wage war secretly through the use of terrorist surrogates as hired guns. For instance, the United States has been called terrorist, through its covert sponsorship of Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s. State-­sponsored terrorism has the backing of government of the state who supply arms, money and save haven to terrorists. State sponsorship can placed at terrorist disposal the resources of an established country’s diplomatic, military and intelligence services.

Religious Terrorism Religious terrorism as the name implies is rooted in faith-based tenets. It is performed by groups or individuals. Religious terrorism defines an individual or a group’s view or interpretation of that belief system’s teaching and does not in itself necessarily define a particular religious view. It must be noted that terrorist

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acts throughout the centuries have been carried out on religious grounds with the hope to either spread or enforce a system of belief. Religious terrorism is of two kinds: political religious terrorism and milleniaristic terrorism. While the former aims for political goal, the later strives for a higher abstract sacred goal that is impossible to reach. It is in retaliation of something that somebody or a society has done. For example, if a society has done something, everybody as a matter of fact is a possible target.

Cyber Terrorism Cyber terrorism involves the use of information technology to attack civilians and draw attention to their cause. It can also be described as a computer crime targeting computer networks without necessarily affecting real-world infrastructures, lives or property. Cyber terrorists use information technology such as computer systems or telecommunications to perpetrate their act. For instance, cyber terrorists could disable networked emergency systems, totally disrupting its services, by means of what is referred to as computer virus. A large chunk of information could be lost through that process, and it may be impossible to recover such.

Bioterrorism This form of terrorism refers to the international release of toxic biological agents to harm and terrorise civilians, for political or other cause. The viruses, bacteria and toxins that can be used in an attack as identified by the United States Centre for Disease Control include anthrax (Bacillus anthracis); botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin); The Plague (Yersinia pestis) to mention just a few.

 heoretical Explanations of Terrorism in Nigeria (Boko T Haram Insurgency) Even though violent flare up has been part of Nigerian society since inception, the dawn of the Fourth Republic democratic dispensation has witnessed rise of violent groups, most of them wielding ethnic agenda with clear and specific demands on the Nigerian state. Such irredentists groups include Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) among many others that employed terror tactics in their agitation, but none has been as daring as the Boko Haram, which emerged visibly in 2009. The activities of Boko Haram of recent has posed the greatest security challenge to the country and finally destroyed the myth

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that Nigerians are not terrorists. But what are the specific explanations in scholarship to the emergence of the insurgency waged by Boko Haram. The following points have been espoused so far.

 eeply Divided Society, State Failure and Violent Conflicts D in Nigeria From sociological viewpoint, most African countries are multi-ethnic societies with populations that are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious and similar cleavages. Most are composed of several and some of many different traditional societies, each with distinctive institutions to which members of other traditional societies are not only detached but also disinclined, if not actually opposed. The inherent complexities in the states created by European imperialism made less feasible the prospects of the new states modeled after the Western types. In spite of the long process of nation-building, many of the states still convulse from one shock after another resulting from those sociological and political divergences. In fact, “the African state is hardly ever coextensive with a common society” (Ekeh 1989:5) and “the society in which the African state exits is typically segmented into small rival political communities, often with strong localized identities, competing to capture and exploit state power or at least prevent it from oppressing them” (Ake 1996:42). The arbitrariness of the African state conferred on African political culture, attributes of negativity, so that “African political culture has become characterized by a vast array of negative elements such as corruption, violence and mistrust”. Those negative elements identified by Ekeh and, much more, have all combined to make the African state irrelevant to the citizenry, thus eroding its legitimacy. Additionally, the state becomes prone to economic dislocation and political instability  – all which are indices of state failure (Rotberg 2002: 86 cited in Uzodike and Maiangwa 2012). This theoretical construct which also mirror the Nigerian state points to a deep gulf between state and society, what Ekeh (1989) term “the difficult relations between state and society” and Claude Ake’s “Irrelevant State”. In the realm of theory, such disconnect is not only capable of eroding legitimacy but also inducing state failure and the subsequent repercussions that emanate from it, such as violent conflicts or terrorism. This view is supported by Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012:97) study which highlights the various conditions and features of a failed state as pertaining to Nigeria, ranging from the Failed States index in which the country ranked 14  in 2011; Terrorism and Political Mapping (2010–2011), which ranked her fifth; and the Human Development Index Trend (2011), where Nigeria emerged 156 out of 186 countries. On these bases, they asserted that the chaotic and anarchic situation in the Nigeria of 2012 exemplifies the characteristics of a failing or weak state that is degenerating into full failure conducive for terrorism to fester.

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The Relational/Vengeance Theory Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic, religious and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of negative stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination (Faleti 2006). The differences in value invariably create the “We” and “Others” dichotomy: “The fact that ‘others’ are perceived as different, makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists perceptions that we have about each other” (Faleti 2006). Consequently, terrorists’ sects are attracted to places where this perception of the local population is prevalent.

The Human Needs/Socio-Economic Perspective The socio-economic perspective of the challenge of terrorism in Nigeria essentially attempts to de-emphasizes the interpretation of this wave of terrorism on Muslim or northern crisis. It rather blames social conditions for the violence, anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. The central thesis here is that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfill, and failure caused by other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict (Rosati et  al. 1990 cited in Faleti, p. 51). The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate 1990). According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction, defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally, relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emanating from it (Midlarsky 1975:29). Unlike the relational/vengeance theory, the perspective goes beyond the trigger to focus on the underlying factor(s) that could have bred the emergence of groups like Boko Haram.

The Political Feud Perspective In political terms, domestic terrorism phenomenon is perhaps more interesting because of the specific historical context in which it is occurring. A classic example is the Boko Haram which is an Islamic movement, occurring in a multireligious political setting in which religion is a major factor in determining the

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distribution of political power (Kukah 1993:x). The emergence of Boko Haram was preceded by intense political bickering between some, mainly Muslim political actors in the north and their counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian. In a political environment in which the power of incumbency is a major factor in determining electoral success, the fact that the victor in the contest superintended over the machinery of the state at the time of the election is a critical variable in conveying a sense of fair play or otherwise to the losing side. Importantly, Jonathan’s electoral victory came barely 3 years after power returned to the north, from an 8-year sojourn in the south, where the north grudgingly ceded it to the south in 1999, following the tumult that resulted from the annulled 1993 presidential election, which Moshood Abiola, a southerner, was acclaimed to have won. This is countervailing to the ingenious political engineering by the Nigerian power elite that devised a power-sharing arrangement in which central power rotates between the north and south. After 8  years in the south via Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidency (1999–2007), power had returned to the north in May 2007 via the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s presidency and was supposed to remain there for another 8 years. Despite the constitutional provision that g­ uarantees his succession by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, the north was sour for having “lost” power again to the south by virtue of Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010 barely 3 years into office. The sense of loss, which ensued from Yar’Adua’s death, manifested in the succession tension in Nigeria prior to the 2011 general elections period. The Boko Haram insurgency is, therefore, a reaction against the prevailing situation and a ploy to prevent the Jonathan presidency from taken firm hold beyond the first term.

The Islamic Theocratic State Theory This viewpoint contends that some segments of the northern Muslim population may be unhappy with the compromise of state-level Shari’a coexisting side by side with a secular federal system. Hence, although this segment may arguably be small, “they are increasingly becoming radicalized and more willing to periodically express themselves through violence” (Lengmang 2011:101). Furthermore there is resentment to the coexistence of Shari’a with secular federal system among northerners who also believe that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in the region and so shares the fallacy of western education being incompatible with Islam (Lengmang 2011: 99). However tangential, its link with international terrorist groups, and the fact that insurgents in Nigeria holds the vision of global political Islam, which is the overthrow of all worldly government (Kufur system) and the enthronement of an Islamic theocratic state cannot be brushed aside. Thus, the demand of Boko Haram to islamise Nigeria, stem from this view.

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Conspiracy Theories The conspiracy theory explains the emergence of terrorism on both machinations of internal actors and external actors. Internal actors here include the disgruntled sectional elites who have lost out on power but are bent on bringing down Nigeria under an outside elite leadership. Another angle to this is that this outside elite group that ascended to power by default may be sponsoring the crisis in order to rally base support behind it. The third angle views terrorism as a grand design controlled by some “invisible” hands that seek to destroy the hitherto dominant section of the country ahead of the next election circle so as to forestall or weaken its bid for the presidency at that time (Adibe 2012:58). External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western states like the United States, or neighbouring African states envious of Nigeria’s progress and stability are the ones sponsoring terrorism to halt the rise of the country.

Terrorism in Nigeria: A Historical Overview Terrorism in Nigeria is traceable to the emergence of the Maitatsine sect in the 1980s in Kano State. From 1980 to 1985, Maitatsinism became a veritable force that threatened the socio-political and religious stability of Nigeria. Muhammadu Marwa alias Maitatsine, personally led the uprising, although he was later killed. His disciples that escaped from Kano later were alleged to have caused insurrections which occurred in Bullumkuttu area of Bornu State on October 16, 1982, Rigassa village, Kaduna State on October 20, 1982, and the Jimeta-Yola in Gongola State in 1984 (Adeoye 2005a). The Maitatsine was a religiously motivated terrorist group. The group was anti-authority, as they regarded every authority as an idol, and as such respect for authority is tantamount to idolatry. The belief of the group was that violent destruction was necessary to bring about radical transformation of a society in order to build a new order on the ruins of the old (Adeoye 2005a). On October 25, 1993, Nigeria experienced what can be termed as international terrorism in the aviation industry when the Airbus 310, Flight WT 470 which took off from the domestic wing of Murtala Mohammed Airport Lagos for Abuja was hijacked by four Nigerian youths, under the umbrella of the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD). The drama lasted for 4 days with the Airbus diverted to Niger Republic. At Niamey, in Niger Republic, while strangers, women and children were allowed to disembark, others were detained and used to negotiate with the Nigerian government then. Their demands included the deproscription of some newspapers which government has proscribed at the heat of political impasses in the country, calling the National Assembly into session and handing over government to them, trial of public officers, both serving or retired that have stacked away about US$33 billion of the nation’s money abroad (Adeoye 2005b).

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The Fourth Republic as mentioned before has witnessed a revival in terrorist activities. The period is characterized with the emergence of some groups championing ethnic agenda whose violent activities made them to be described as terrorists. They include: the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) that was involved in hostage taking, sacking of police station, killing of state security officials, kidnapping and ransom seeking of oil companies’ workers (Adeoye 2005a). Another dreaded group is defending the Yoruba race as a result of the June 12, 1993, presidential election which was alleged to have been won by a Yoruba man the late Chief M.K.O Abiola as stated before among others. However the most dreaded terrorist group in Nigeria as stated before is the Boko Haram group. The sect has perpetrated violence in a most unthinkable way and has been a hard nut to crack for the security agencies. The Boko Haram group started as Shahaba group in 1995 under the leadership of Abubakar Lawan who later traveled to the University of Medina to further his study. Yusuf Mohammed took over from him, changed the doctrine and come up with a new name Boko Haram also known as Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Alilus Sunna, Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda awatiwal Jihad. It is believed that the sect emanated from an orthodox teaching similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To this school of thought, anything western is an aberration and unislamic. It sees the influence of the West on Islam as its basic weakness and as such declared all western institutions as infidel and must be avoided by Muslims. Membership of the sect cut across young people many of them left schools especially in states like Bauchi, Bornu and Yobe States. Some lecturers and highly place individuals also joined the sect. Some people sold their property to contribute to the purse of the sect in order to fight the cause of Allah so as to save Islam from the influence and domination of west (Abolurin 2011). The group has clashed with the security agencies on several occasions, killed so many people and had claimed responsibility for most bombings and violent killings in the country.

Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria According to Fafowora (2012), the following are responsible for terrorism in Nigeria: colonial legacy; the pre-independence political process; weak postcolonial political and economic systems; and the progressive breakdown of the old and powerful emirates. Terrorism in Nigeria has its root in the colonial policies in the country. Thus, it has generated uneven economic and social development between the North and the South. Added to this is the fact that northern leaders failed to invest in education of their people. It is this failure and not mere religious differences that account for the deep-seated grievances of the Boko Haram Insurgents in Nigeria. It seems the process and pace of modernization in the north appear much slower than the south; hence the frustration among the northern youths who find themselves unable to compete with their southern counterparts in all respects. The pre-­ independence political process that laid the foundation of ethnic politics equally prepared the ground for the emergence of insurgents in the country as there has not

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been noticeable improvement in curbing ethnic politics in the country. The political organization of power appears to play contributory role in the emergence of terrorism in the country. The terrorist group has been more active since the north loses power to south-south in electoral contest. The progressive reduction of the influence of emirs has equally contributed to the emergence of insurgents in the country. The old emirates no longer have power of coercion as they now rely on the state security forces to maintain law and order in their domain. They now find it difficult to call errant youths to order. Other causes of terrorism according to Nweze (2012) are: Inadequate Community and Youth Development Agenda:- Lack of effective grass-­ root youth development scheme is partly responsible for youth participation in violence act including terrorism. Because of the apparent low level skill, youth are known to flock the capital cities, some of who have no meaningful skills and are largely unemployed and in many cases unemployable. Many of them turned out to be motor park touts and urchins, area boys all ready to give themselves up for any kind of enlistment for various nefarious criminal activities. This is largely the situation in Nigeria. Porous Nature of Nigeria’s External Borders:- Illegal aliens find their way easily into Nigeria. In fact, some criminal records have shown that some illegal aliens who have no legitimate business in the country have been caught to have perpetrated criminal activities. It is on record that some members of the notorious Boko Haram are not Nigerians. Added to this is the fact that large quantities of arms and ammunition found their way to the country through the porous borders with criminal implications. The Globalization Factor:- Terrorists in Nigeria largely draw their orientation, tactics, determination to succeed and the modus operandi from what is currently taken place in the Middle East Afghanistan. The late Osama Bin Laden has become a figure or mentor to terrorist all over the world. Furthermore, Afghanistan has become the training capital for world terrorists. Even Nigerian terrorists are known to have obtained their lessons from Afghanistan. Nature of Nigeria Internal Security Operatives:- Although Nigerian Police seems to be well trained, particularly in the combatant area, there seems to be some gaps in the area of surveillance and information gathering. It appears the terrorists were taken for granted initially before it snowballed to uncontrollable conflagration. The Muslim-Christian Divide:- Religious differences seem to be having effect on the wave of terrorism in the country. Many leaders on either side often fail to speak against terrorist activities because of shared religious sentiment. It took the northern leaders some time to speak out in condemnation of activities of Boko Haram at initial stage until it became clear that the Boko Haram group did not mean well for anybody irrespective of religious, ethnic, social and political affiliation.

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Cases of Terrorists Attack Some of the cases of terrorists attack have been documented by Okpaga et  al. (2012). On July 27, 2009, Boko Haram attacked Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters, three Policemen and one fire service officer died. The sect attacked Bauchi Central prison, set the prison building ablaze and freed members of the sect in prison custody on September 8, 2010. The sect attacked Jos Plateau State which led to the dead of 300 people on March 13, 2010. In January 21, 2011, the sect killed Alhaji Modu Gubio brother to former governor of the state Modu Sheriff along with six others in Maiduguri, Borno State. In March 30, 2011, bomb planted by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe State, exploded and injured a police officer. Bomb by the sect at INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, claimed lives of eight corps members and a suicide bomber on April 9, 2011. Book Haram bombed army Barrack in Bauchi on April 29, 2011. Nigerian Police Headquarters’ Abuja was bombed by suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers, three persons were killed, and many vehicles were damaged. On June 16, 2011, a suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja, killed 25 and injured 60 persons. About 150 people were killed by Boko Haram in Damaturu, Yobe State, on November 4, 2011. On December 24, 2011, about 80 people were killed in bombing in Jos, Plateau State. 50 people were killed on Christmas day bombing in Madalla, Niger State, on December 25, 2011. About 250 people were killed in multiple attacks in Kano by the sect on January 20, 2012. On February 15, 2012, Boko Haram attacked Koton Karufi prisons, in Kogi State, a warder was killed, and 199 prisoners were released. In Maiduguri, Borno State, five persons were killed by the sect on February 17, 2012, to mention just a few.

 ffects on Nigerian Economy, Politics and Diplomatic E Relations Nigeria, until the Boko Haram saga assumed an international dimension in 2011, had no record of international terrorism, but it has experienced variants of municipal terrorism in specific circumstances. As a matter of fact, both state and non-state actors (government and groups) have created terrorism. States or government-­ sponsored terrorism in Nigeria has been geared at stifling domestic opposition, through selective assassination, while sub-national groups and political parties also seem to adopt terrorism as a strategy or policy (a means) of publicizing their grievances, settling scores, gaining and maintaining political power (Adeoye 2005a). In view of the domestic and international dynamics of terrorism, Nigeria has been affected in all facets of its existence – political, economic, social and diplomatic engagements. Indeed, terrorism and other forms of militia a ctivities can impose costs on a targeted country through a number of avenues. Terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct

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i­nvestment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security or limiting trade. If a targeted country loses enough FDI, which is an important source of savings, then it may also experience reduced economic growth. In some instances, terrorism may affect specific industries like tourism and aviation, thus generating industrial disputes. Terrorism also raises the costs of doing business in terms of higher insurance premiums, expensive security precautions and larger salaries to at-risk employees (Sandler and Enders 2008). According to Bamidele (2012), the recent statistics released by the Federal Government on the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria paints a gloomy picture. He argued that the year 2011 showed that Boko Haram catastrophic terrorism has continued to pose a clear threat to the Nigerian economy which is critically dependent on foreign investment and natural resources. He contended that renewable natural resources exploration in agriculture and foreign investment sectors contributes more to the gross domestic products (GDP) of many Northern states’ economies than manufacturing. In addition to the significant contributions to national economies, foreign investments sustain rural livelihoods through the p­ rovisions of a wide range of products and services. All these potential opportunities are not only undermined but crippled by unprecedented incidences of terrorism in that part of the country. Similarly, the consequences of militia activities and domestic terrorism have shown some worrisome signs on the political scene. Given the ethnic configuration of the Nigerian state and its potential for conflicts, it is not surprising that politics in Nigeria have been reduced to “do or die affair” where different political parties fan the embers of ethnicity to dominate certain regional interests to the detriment of the Nigerian state. The immediate consequences of this is witnessed in the highly volatile election contests in the country which has never been without serious structural and logistic challenges, thus undermining the political process and robbing the system of positive democratic credentials. Furthermore, since terrorism has assumed a cross-border dimension in contemporary international relations, it is expected that disturbances by domestic militia groups in Nigeria will attract international attention. This was demonstrated by the face-off between the Federal government and the US Congress in the latter’s attempt to enlist the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria as terrorist group on the world list. Even though the issue was resolved diplomatically, it has left a permanent damage on the Nigeria-US relations in multi-faceted ways. It is all the more so with the increasing cases of harassment, kidnapping and hostage taking of foreign expatriates working in Nigeria. The most dramatic turn-out of the above event played out recently with the abduction and eventual murder of seven foreign hostages by Ansaru, an Islamic terrorist group which is affiliated to Boko Haram. According to ThisDay sources (March 11, 2013), the Ansaru terrorist group claimed responsibility for the murder of seven foreign hostages in its custody who hail from Britain, Greece, Italy and Lebanon. This singular incident has not only damaged Nigeria’s diplomatic relations with the countries affected but has the potential of threatening the former’s national security apparatus. In the main, the overall cost of terrorist-related ­activities on Nigeria’s foreign image is despicably undermining the efforts of innocent citizens, especially in foreign countries and at international airports, who are continually subjected to indecent treatments.

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Conclusion This chapter has so far examined the issue of terrorism in Nigeria. Certain conclusions may be drawn from the analyses above: First, there is a strong correlation between religion and terrorism. This has been amply demonstrated in the study that religion and terrorism share long history. Secondly, high rate of poverty and unemployment in the country especially among the youths provides a convenient platform for terrorism to thrive. This is because hungry youths deprived of legitimate source of income find it difficult to resist temptation of been enlisted into criminal groups that they feel could at least provide them with immediate means of sustenance. Competition for political power and distribution of resources in the country among the various groups have given impetus to the formation and revival in the activities of terrorist groups in the country. The inability of the Nigerian police to curb the activities of terrorist groups at inception by treating them with kid gloves has given room to their activities to degenerate into uncontrollable conflagration, making it a herculean task for the security agencies in the country to manage. Lastly, the porousness of the Nigeria’s borders has made it easy for illegal aliens with criminal tendencies to enter the country with implication for insecurity. Given the above scenario, it is therefore imperative to take remedial actions to eliminate terrorism in the country. In view of this, the following measures are suggested: the government should install digital satellite that can monitor the activities of terrorist groups in the country so that they can be tracked easily. There is need to reorientate the politicians towards shunning divisive politics and do or die politics that have imprints in terrorist activities by placing the unity and security of the country in high premium as against their selfish interests. Government should embark on mass youth employment. The government should solicit for the cooperation of countries sharing borders with Nigeria in tracking down illegal immigrants into Nigeria. They can also assist Nigeria to prevent the escape of terrorist groups into their country.

References Abimbola, J.O. and Adesote, S.A. (2012) Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Issues and Trends: A Historical Discourse, Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society, 4 (September): 11-29. Abolurin, A. (2011) Terrorism Nigerian and Global Dimensions, Ibadan: Golden-Gem Unique Multiventures. Adeoye, M.N. (2005a) “Terrorism: An Appraisal in the Nigerian Context”, in Ayinla Saadu Alanamu (ed), Issues in Political Violence in Nigeria, Hamson Printing Communications, Ilorin, Nigeria, Pp. 200-232. Adeoye, M.N. (2005b) “Aviation Security and Terrorism: An Overview of Nigerian Experience” in Ayinla Saadu Alanamu (ed), Issues in Political Violence in Nigeria, Hamson Printing Communications, Ilorin, Nigeria. Pp. 249-262. Adibe, J. (2012) “Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting Narratives,” African Renaissance, 9(1):47-64 Ake, C. (1996) Democracy and Development in Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.

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Bamidele, O. (2012) “Boko Haram Catastrophic Terrorism- An Albatross to National Peace, Security and Sustainable Development in Nigeria”, in Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 14 (1): 32-44. Bender, D.L. and Leone, B. (2000) “Why Consider Opposing Viewpoints” in Egendorf, L.K. (ed) Terrorism Opposing Viewpoints, San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press. Pp. 9-10. Chine, R. and Alexander, Y. (1987), “Terrorism: Threats And Trends”. Terrorism, Vol 10. Dougherty E.J. and Pfaltzgrate, L.R. Jr, (1990) Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Second edition, New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Ekeh, P. P. (1989) “Nigeria’s Emergent Political Culture,” in Ekeh, P et al (eds). Nigeria Since Independence in the Last 25 years, Vol. V, Politics and Constitution. Heinemann Educational Books Inc. Fafowora, O. (2012) Understanding Insurgencies in Nigeria: Nature, Types, Dynamics and Way Out. Being Keynote Address Presented at the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting on Complex Insurgencies in Nigeria, Kuru: National Institute For Policy and Strategic Studies. Faleti, A.S. (2006) “Theories of Social Conflict,” in Best, G.  S (ed) Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Afric,. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Hoffman, B. (2000) “Terrorism is a Serious Threat” in Egendorf, L.K (ed) Terrorism Opposing Viewpoints, San Diego, California: Greenhaven Press. Pp. 17–25. Kukah, H. M. (1993) Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria, (Reprint Edition). Ibadan: Spectrum Books, Limited, 1993. Kukah, H.M. (1999) Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Lacy, P. L. (2012) The Emergence of Boko Haram: An Analysis of Terrorist Characteristics, 3rd Australian Counter Terrorism Conference Novotel Langley Hotel, Perth, Western Australia. 3rd–5th December. Lengmang, J. (2011) “The Upsurge of Religious Fundamentalism: A Critical Reflection in the Light of the ‘Boko Haram’ Phenomenon in Northern Nigeria,” in Best, G. Shedrack (ed) Religion and Post-Conflict Peace Building in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan: John Archers Publishers Ltd. Maiangwa, B. & Uzodike, U.O. (2012) The Changing Dynamics of Boko Haram Terrorism, retrieved on 13th January, 2013 from http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/07/2012731685998733. htm Midlarsky, I.M. (1975) On war, Political Violence in the International System. New  York: The Free Press, 1975. Nweze, A. (2012) Diagnostic Overview of Insurgent and Group Terrorists Activitisms in Nigeria: Sources, Causes and Remedies: Psychological Dimensions. A Paper Presented at the Eminent and Expert Group Meeting on Security at the Unity Hall of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Jos, Plateau State, August 28th–31st. Oche, O. & C.  Dokubo. (2001) “The Scourge of Globalized Networks of Terror and Nigeria’s Security”, Paper Presented at the Conference on “Nigeria and the World after Forty Years: Policy Perspectives for a New Century”, NIIA, Lagos, December 5–6. Okpaga, A., Ugwu, S.U & Eme, O.I. (2012) “Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria” Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN) 1(9):77–99. Richardson, L. (2006) “The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview” in Richardson, L. (ed) The Roots of Terrorism, London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Pp. 1–13. Rodrigueez, O. (2003) “A Civil Defense Against Terrorism” in Clarke, L. (ed) Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas, U.K: Elsevier Ltd. Pp. 7–17 Sandler, T. & W.  Enders (2008) “Economic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing Countries: An Overview”, in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds) Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness, New York: Cambridge University Press. Shultz, R.H. & Sloan, S.S. (1980) Responding To the Terrorist Threat, New York: Pergamon Press. This-Day Newspapers, Monday 11 March, 2013. Uzodike, U.O. & Mainangwa, B. (2012). Boko Haram Terrorim in Nigeria: Casual Factors and Central Problematics, African Renaissance 9(1):91–118. Whittaker, D. J. (2002) Terrorism Understanding the Global Threat, London: Longman.

Chapter 15

Postcolonial Party Politics and Some Aspects of Intergroup Relation in Nigeria up to 2019 Fidelis Achoba and Borok Andrew Maren Abstract  Party politics started in Nigeria with the lifting of ban on political parties which saw the emergence of the first political party in 1923. This was basically a fulcrum towards achieving independence which was attained in October 1, 1960. However, the beginning of party politics that was devoid of ethnic bigotry later took ethnic and religious dimensions. Thus, this to a large extent has characterized Nigeria politics till day. This work also brings to bare the challenges faced by various political parties at different democratic dispensations. Aside from that, some aspects of intergroup relations especially in the Plateau area of central Nigeria have also reshaped social-political life of the peoples. However, this study is achieved by interrogating evidences from primary and secondary sources in order to bridge the gap in the historiography of Nigeria’s political life. Keywords Nigeria · Evolution of political parties · Party politics · Elections · Intergroup relation

Introduction Nigeria is a country with a rich history of intergroup relations. Right from ancient times, evidence abound that the various ethnic nationalities that made up what is today known as Nigeria had always interacted with one another economically, socially and politically. These interactions stemmed from the fact that no individual is an island and no group is self-sufficient; hence the need to relate with one another becomes inevitable. Interestingly, during the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 in which Africa was shared by the European foreign invaders, the Nigerian area was handed over to Great Britain. At first, Britain showed no serious political interest in most parts of the territory. Thus, the Royal Niger Company was allowed to take charge of the Northern F. Achoba (*) · B. A. Maren Department of History and International Studies, Federal University, Lokoja, Lokoja Kogi State, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_15

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part (Falola 1991). However, on the eve of the twentieth century, the Royal Niger Company’s charter was revoked bringing in full British colonization which began the following day on the opening of the twentieth century, January 1, 1900. After 14 years of governing the territory as two entities, the British government decided to get the Northern and Southern protectorates, amalgamated for effective administration. By and large, Nigeria was created out of the existing polity that existed before the coming of the Europeans. Therefore, the claim that Nigeria is an artificial creation of Britain holds no water as the area had existed before their coming and its people had elaborate intergroup relations in sociopolitical and economic spheres of life (Achoba 2015). It suffices to point out that while there was substantial evidence of precolonial intergroup relations in the territories that became Nigeria, under the coercive control and supervision of the British authority, most of the groups had operated as distinct and autonomous political entities. However, the colonialists only pull the disparate groups together for its own interest. This had tremendous influence on intergroup relations both in the colonial and postcolonial era.

 emocracy, Partisan Politics and Intergroup Relations D in Nigeria: An Introduction Political parties, like other democratic institutions such as the executive, legislature, judiciary and electoral body, are no doubt vital and indispensable agencies of democracy. The relevance of democratic institutions of which political parties are one, in fostering democratic etiquettes, values, norms, practices and procedures, is probably what Schumpeter had in mind when he defined democracy as “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s votes” (Schumpeter 1967: 26). In other words, democracy thrives well within an environment with a framework of established, functional and registered political parties, an electoral body and other political institutions which enforce the standard practices of the system. Party politics in Nigeria since 1960 has been characterized by intrigues, manipulations or manoeuvrings, alignment and realignment of political groups and forces. The basic political objectives of having two or more major parties of equal or relative equal strength are to facilitate competition and avoid a drift towards authoritarianism. Under the condition, the opposition party may unseat the party in power, win election and political power to control the state and make authoritative allocation of resources, as has been witnessed in Nigeria in recent time. The desire by politicians to evolve two mega parties, capture power and be involved in government has led to a trend in Nigerian politics described as politics of merger or coalition of parties whose sole aim is to unseat the dominant political party in power and provide alternative platform to govern Nigeria. From inception in Nigeria, political alliances among political gladiators have always shaped intergroup relations, at least within the formal institution and settings of the state. However, this often trickles down to the society, as the mass public always queue behind public office holders from their respective ethnic groups.

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To place the party politics and postcolonial intergroup relations in a clear perspective, it is imperative that we examine the origin and evolution of political parties and political participation in Nigeria. This is because political parties brought peoples of different ethnic groups and religious beliefs and education background together in pursuit of common interest.

Political Parties and Intergroup Relations: The Colonial Era 1922 was a revolutionary year in Nigerian politics, in that it was the year the Clifford Constitution which provided for political inclusion was enacted. The constitution provided for four elective positions, three for Lagos and one for Calabar. The reasons for restriction to Lagos and Calabar were not far-fetched: firstly, Calabar and Lagos were the first two areas to experience British colonialism in Nigeria, and secondly and similarly, these were the first areas where nationalist government was more pronounced at that time. As a result, the National Congress of British West Africa and the Nigerian National Democratic Party emerged in 1923 (Olusayan 1982). The latter was to dominate Lagos politics until 1934 when the Lagos Youth Movement metamorphosed into a political party and became the Nigerian Youth Movement. Arguably, the first political party with national outlook, having branches in Ibadan, Ijebu Ode, Warri, Benin, Kaduna, Zaria, Jos, Calabar and Kano and embracing all young intellectuals of that period such as Herbert Macaulay, H.O. Davies, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. Vaughan, Dr. Kofo Abayomi, etc., was NNDP (Sklar 1963: 14). Until 1944, the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) dominated the political scene, but due to personality clash that started in 1941, the party’s influence started dwindling and later disintegrated due to internal fracas that led to the resignation of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and all Ibo members of the party in 1941. This showed that the conflict was essentially interethnic conflict within the party. Out of it emerged the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) in 1944 and the Action Group (AG) in 1950 (Fwatshak 2009). Other political organizations that emerged owing to the Clifford Constitution of 1922 were the Reform Club, the Union of Young Nigerians and the People’s Union. However, they could not measure up to the standard of NNDP and NYM. NCNC took the place of NYM as the most popular political party in Nigeria until the introduction of Regional Legislation in 1946. Since then, political parties started taking the form of regional political parties. The resulting tribal sentiment really played out in 1951 when the “big” parties won in their various regions. Though the NCNC also performed incredibly in the West, its national leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was prevented from proceeding to the Federal Legislature as Yoruba members of the NCNC that were nominated from the region were unwilling to step down. As a result, Azikiwe had to move to the East with his Igbo supporters where he was later nominated to the Federal Assembly (Fwatshak 2009).

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Political Parties and Intergroup Relations at Independence The First Republic In the build up to independence, like the pre-independence era, there existed three dominant parties which held sway at the various regions: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the North, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the East and Action Group (AG) in the West. Other minority parties were Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and a crop of others representing one tribal group or the other. The dominant expectation of these minority parties bordered on the minority question and the creation of more regions (Fwatshak 2009). While they were pursuing those issues in order to better their lot during the 1959 elections, some of the minority political parties entered into alliances with the dominant parties. NCNC/NEPU and AG/UMBC were the most prominent. However, in the end, the NPC came out victorious as a single party, despite not having a representation on the ballot in the Eastern region and in the Western region. In the build up to the election, both the AG and the NCNC had toured the whole of the country for campaigns, while the NPC only ensured it held on to her area of influence in the North whose population was more than the whole South put together and that did play out well for the party (Ademoyega 1981). The introduction of politics in Nigeria was sequel to the Clifford Constitution of 1922 which gave franchise to a select Lagos electorates; thus, Herbert Macaulay and his associates succeeded in establishing the first political party in June 24, 1923, known as the Nigerian National Democratic Party. Though the party was mainly founded by Herbert Macaulay, its first president was Egerton Shyngle. The party became the most powerful political organization with a primary focus for an independent Nigeria. The second pressure group, which metamorphosed into a political party, was the Lagos Youth Movement, founded in 1934. The Lagos Youth Movement however changed to the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in the same year. It was inaugurated in that year through the effort of H.O.  Davies, Ernest Ikoli, Dr. J. C. Vaughan and Samuel Ladoke Akintola. In the year 1938, the NYM defeated the NNDP in the Lagos town council election (Sklar 1963: 41). The third political party was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which was established under the leadership of Herbert Macaulay and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1934. Like its predecessors, the principal focus of this party was to facilitate Nigerian self-government (Mackenzie 1960:12–13). It was the addition of three Cameroonian groups in the national affairs of Nigeria by January 1945 that actually sustained the name of the party, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (Sklar 1963:58). At its peak from 1944 to 1947, the NCNC was the leading Nigerian nationalist political party. By and large, the year 1946 was a watershed in the development of political parties in Nigeria. It was the Richards Constitution of 1946 that divided Nigeria into three regions, respectively. This constitution was another source of the unhealthy

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division of the country based on three major ethnic groups: the Northern region mainly for the Hausa, the Western region dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group and the Eastern region dominated by the Igbo. While it is a truism that the 1946 Richards Constitution created an unhealthy division of the country, it is quite pertinent to debunk the popular notion that politics in Nigeria has always been ethnic centred. In spite of the different ethnic groups that existed, there were cases of detribalized politics before independence. A case in point was in the early 1940s during the time of the late Herbert Macaulay when Ernest Ikoli, an Ijaw by origin, was elected into the Legislative Council as an Honourable Member to represent Lagos in preference to Mr. Akinsanya of Yoruba origin. In the same vein, Alhaji Ibrahim-Imam having dropped out of the Northern People’s Congress (a Kanuri Leader) was invited by Joseph Tarka (a Tiv man) to the Middle Belt to serve a Tiv Constituency in the Northern House of Assembly where he became the official leader of the opposition. There are several other instances of detribalized politics that occurred prior to Nigerian independence contrary to the held notion that Nigerian politics has always been tribal (Sklar 1963:73). As time went by, the Action Group headed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo was seen as a Western regional party because it emanated from a pan-Yoruba cultural organization known as Egbe Omo Oduduwa, while the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon was also labelled an Igbo party, since its supporters were the most populous ethnic group in the Eastern region. And the Northern People’s Congress headed by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and Tafawa Balewa was categorized as Hausa/Fulani party, which evolved from Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa. This political development from the defection of 1954 up to first and second republics in Nigeria took ethnic dimensions. Thus, following Nigeria’s independence in 1960, regional thinking took precedence over national identity. The regional parties enhanced separate developments. For instance, the Western region established the first television station in black Africa, when this was the number one nation’s television. Primary education was 6 years in the Eastern and Western regions, while it was 7 years in the Northern region. The activities of the three major political parties brought about the problem of disunity among the three regions especially between 1954 and 1966 which saw the end of the first republic following the aborted coup d’état led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu.

 iddle Belt Politics and Implications for Intergroup Relations M in Nigeria It is important and quite interesting to look at party politics in the Middle Belt region in detail because of its multi-ethnic nature. The Middle Belt region which formed part of the Northern region before the creation of Benue-Plateau state has experienced one of the most conflicting party politics in Nigeria. The reason is that

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it was multi-ethnic and also served as the meeting point of Islam, Paganism and Christianity. These differences affected the nature and pattern of party loyalty and followership took place. It became highly characterized by ethnicity, personality conflict, distrust and regionalism. Trade union and political parties came to be the same thing in the mining camps. This was because by 1954, a new trade union was established, Northern Mine Workers’ Union (NMWU) (comprising basically Hausa, Kanuri and Chadic labourers). Before 1950, NEPU, the Northern political party that was radical just like the NCNC was against the activities of tin companies on the Jos-Plateau tin fields; yet the NEPU was on opposition to any Southern political and economic control of the North. But by 1951, the NPC was formed in response to the already existing NCNC and AG which had Southern origin. The politics in the Middle Belt took on firmly the shape of regional, religious and ethnic antagonism. In reaction to AG and NPC activities, the NCNC which initially had a national outlook now adopted an increasingly regional and Igbo-centric cast. As far as the NPC was concerned, the trade unions in the tin fields were a thing for the Southerners, the owners of NCNC and AG. Though before 1951 NEPU enjoyed large Northern followership of the talakawa, the masses because it was too harsh on the status quo, i.e. Native Authority, were seen as repressive and exploitative (Borok 2011a:121). The development of Northern Miners Union (NMU) was attributed to the appearance of Mallam Audu Danladi, a graduate of Barewa College, Zaria, the training institution par excellence of the Northern elite and had been employed in Zaria by the Gaskiya Corporation, a government-run Hausa publishing company where he was an official of the African Staff Union. Danladi arrived on the Plateau in 1951, and he became the Welfare Officer at the Bisichi Tin Company and soon emerged as the central agitator for a separate Northern union that would back the NPC. Danladi’s closest collaborator was a contractor, Alhaji Isa Haruna. The Northern Mine Workers’ Union (NMWU) moved to develop into the mainstay of NPC political strength on the Plateau. However, the field work research for this academic exercise revealed that NMWU was not formed by Mallam Danladi but Alhaji Isa Haruna. The plan for a Northern union was already in place before the appearance of Danladi. This is so because Haruna was a contractor who claimed to have up to 500 labourers under him at the Bisichi mines. In an interview with him, he said that he, together with one Mallam Mohammed, was called by Amalgamated Tin Miners of Nigeria (ATMN) union for a meeting at Bisichi, his mining area. In the meeting, discussions were dominated by Igbo and others and that only two of them were Northerners. This and other reasons made them to walk out of the meeting hall without asking permission. Another meeting was held in the following week, though he said he had headache and could not attend. Haruna’s behaviour now made the union members to conclude that he had connived with the tin companies. After the meeting, the union members in the meeting came to his house where they booed him and his family and called them names. In defence, his family members came out with sticks and pestles, said his wife. But Haruna stopped them from the violent decision. This singular development, according to the aged Haruna, made him to establish the NMU, after deliberations with Danladi (Borok 2011a:122).

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When Haruna was asked whether he was in support of the proposed strike by ATMN union, he said he never wanted the strike because being a contractor and a tributer, he will lose his labourers and never wanted to go back to the rigours of seeking labour should the strike disperse them. Other informants from Barkin Ladi and Gidan Akwati said the same thing. Also during the 1950 strikes, there was accusation by Nigerian Association of Mines-worker’s Union (NAMU) of mining companies trying to have a separate deal with Northern labourers. At the end of that year, the labour officer in a memorandum fully accepted NAMU’s accusation that the employers were scheming to create a Northern alternative to the union. This happened some months before Danladi appeared on the scene. The colonial government itself was anti-Southern because after the formation of the NMU, the Labour Department reported blatantly that NMU could effectively represent the bulk of the unskilled workers on the mines if only by tribal ties (unskilled labourers being predominantly Hausa). Following the struggle between tin companies and the trade union, the NMU appeared as a god sent to the capital on the mines field. The management now drew a dividing line between the bulk of the labourers, i.e. Northerners, predominantly Hausa and Southerners/Berom labourers (Freund 1980:186–8). Throughout this period, NMU continued to sabotage any industrial action by trade unions as it became very decisive owing to its number of labourers. Danladi taking advantage of Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo continued to write inciting the Northerners against NAMU and its leaders. Amidst the storm, in 1958, the Berom formed a separate union, i.e. Middle Belt Mines Workers (MBMW), and backed the UMBC for a Middle Belt region. This development seemed to be a future check to any possibility of NMU excesses (Borok 2011a: 122). To have a strong hold, Haruna usually called all the labour contractors or tributers of NMU for a weekly meeting and sometimes monthly meeting. They also toured all the mining camps inciting and encouraging the Northern workers to see themselves distinct from the Southerners who never had any respect for authority, something an average Northerner is known for. Also, the Northerners constituted the real labourers who were engaged in rivers, paddocks and open fields in direct tin extraction, so priority should be given to them and that is what NMU opted to offer and represented. This contrast with the NAMU which demands only concentrated on the welfare of skilled workers who are always in office buildings, sitting, standing and giving directives to labourers who got soaked and painted with mud water in the act of direct tin extraction in the paddocks. This development helped in brewing anti-South sentiments and also anti-Hausa sentiments by Southerners and the local people with the creation of Middle Belt Mines Workers Union (Borok 2011a:123). All these divisive policies were caused by the colonizer and their agents. They used NMU in controlling labour demand not minding the future consequences on this people who for long had been brought to stay together with most of them without the hope of going anywhere because the mines camps became a home where some of them were born and bred.

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With the Berom protest movement which started in 1947, the colonizers took a swift move by appointing Rwang Pam as the chief of Jos, an office held by the Hausa since 1915. This development created tension between the Berom and the Hausa who both interpreted this development differently, i.e. as it favoured or disfavoured either group. This recognition unlike before opened opportunities to the Berom who now had an elite class who now dabbled into politics, trade and even labour contracting. The Land Reclamation Scheme by the government and the companies which came to be established did not achieve anything much. Rather, it was just a mere strategy to cope with Berom peasant’s resistance. In a nutshell, the politics of labour control in Jos and its environs led to anti-group or anti-ethnic sentiments in the area (Platnicov 1967a, 41). The politics of labour control now extended or widened to party politics. During this period, two movements took place, the Berom Progressive Union (BPU) and the UMBC, which co-opted the BPU later to form a larger struggle. With the introduction of the NPC in 1951, one Abdulkadir Abubakar Koguna brought it to Barkin Ladi. The group first gathered in First Baptist Church Barkin Ladi. He delivered a long speech that he wanted to bring all the Northern youths, male and female, together, adding that they do not want NEPU politics which was combined with the Igbo who do not have respect for traditional authority. All these activities of the NPC were to be opposed by the BPU. NPC suffered a stiff resistance because Patrick Dakotri, BPU secretary and later UMBC’s came from Kurra Falls village close to Barkin Ladi mining camps (Borok 2011a, :152). In the course of this opposition, the NPC, already enjoying the presence of its leader on the Plateau in the person of Alhaji Isa Haruna, became strong because he was enjoying the support of the Native Authority and the mining companies who devised ways to ensure the strength of the NPC in the neighbouring camps. NPC meetings and rallies were held in a rotational manner, i.e. each mining town hosted meetings and rallies; and Jos town played a more or less central role. This strategy shook the UMBC and it had to start going round in like manner showing to the people that they are made to suffer double suppression, that of the Hausa and the mining companies (Borok 2011a, 152). The NPC hated the NEPU members more than the members from other political parties. They were seen as sell-outs to the Igbos. Thus, the NPC seemed to have its campaigns easier because of the control it had over Northern mines workers and labourers as well. There were even cases of victimization of NEPU and UMBC members. One case was that of Alhaji Daura who was made the district secretary (i.e. comprising all mines around Barkin Ladi and it was the same with the mines in Jos settlement) of NMU and who made sure that any worker who was an NMU and UMBC follower was sacked from the tin industries. This came to be implemented with vigour during the Northernization policy. The mining companies helped in achieving this owing to the low demand for tin in the international market in the 1950s (Borok 2011a). With the booing in 1953 of Sardauna shortly after the House of Representatives session in Lagos, when he rejected the self-government motion by an AG member, the Sardauna Vanguard was formed in the camps to protect the integrity of the

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premier. This group never took it easy with any man who made bad utterances against the premier in the name of politics. The activities of these people were added by Yandoka who worked for the Native Authorities Police. Alhaji Datti, an interviewee who was one of these men, explained how they used to flog or whip any anti-Sardauna element on some occasions. Thus, the peak of the NPC and the UMBC contest came when Patrick Dokotri of UMBC and Isa Haruna of NPC stood for election as member of the Regional House of Assembly. The contest was a hot one because the two of them stood for different ethnic groups and trade unions, i.e. Hausa, NMU, and Berom, BMWU. Amidst this political tussle, the AG at first was not seen as a serious threat until it later formed an alliance with UMBC. The weaknesses of the AG in the mining towns, according to one informant, were that the Yorubas were divided into two, the Northern and Western. The Northern Yoruba in the town, who were predominately Muslims, were in support of NPC, while the Western Yoruba were in support of AG (Borok 2011a). By the end of the 1950s, the Northern Regional Government embarked on Northernization policy. This was to replace all Southern workers in the Northern region’s civil service with the Northerners. This was because the predominance of Southerners in the civil service and the private sector in the North seemed to give the NCNC and the AG an upper hand in the scheme of affairs. At the end of the day, the NPC could not meet the criteria to form a government, so it aligned with the NCNC, and a government was formed with the AG becoming the main opposition party in the first republic.

 artisan Politics and Intergroup Relations in Nigeria P in the Second Republic The journey to the second republic was heralded by the then military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, on July 14, 1978, when he announced in his broadcast to the nation that military Governors in the 19 states would be redeployed to normal military duties from July 24, 1978 (James 1979). The implication of this was that General Olusegun Obasanjo and his Vice, Chief of Staff Supreme, Headquarters, Brigadier Shehu Yar’Adua, would not return to barracks after handing over power to civilian on October 1, 1979, while the affairs of the 19 state structures would be handed over to Brigade and Garrison commanders which included Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. By this, the road map to the second republic was actively drawn. Consequent upon the foregoing, political parties for the second republic evolved. By September 22, 1978, barely 24 hours after the ban on politics was lifted, Chief Obafemi Awolowo officially declared the formation of his party known as Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and its four-point agenda (James 1979). These included free education for all at all levels which took effect on October 1, 1979, integration of rural development which was aimed at boosting food production and feeding 60 million hungry citizens of Nigeria, provision of free health

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facilities for all citizens of Nigeria, and full employment for all. The UPN however enhanced the relationship among the Yoruba-dominated state structures. The Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) was formed on September 22, 1978. It was a fulcrum of three main groups. These include the National Union Council, Club 19 and Council for National Unity, Ojuelegba – Surulere, Lagos. It was Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim that read its written statement to a journalist (James 1979). Other prominent political parties in September 1978 included the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which cut across the length and breadth of Nigeria, and as such the configuration of its leadership and intergroup relations had a better national outlook. The Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) was formed by Barrister Tunji Braithwaite. This party could not succeed because the Yoruba people had already had bloc support for the UPN. So since it had home disadvantage, external support became difficult. In addition, there was the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) led by Mallam Aminu Kano. Waziri Ibrahim later formed another party known as Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP) which dominated Borno and old Gongola state politics in the second republic. The Middle Belt was the domain of the UMBC in the first republic and a rallying point of the Middle Belters. However, it could not form a party that was identified as Middle Belt party in the second republic. Nevertheless, some members of the party became members of the GNPP. The formation of these parties, just like their predecessors in the first republic, had regional allegiance as each of them could not easily penetrate other major ethnic groups because of the perception that each party was serving the different ethnic group’s interest. By July 7, 1979, senatorial elections were held across the country. The NPN had the lead of 36 seats followed by the UPN with 28 seats. The GNPP had 8 seats, while the PRP had 7 seats. This seat distribution pattern was replicated in the House of Representatives which was held on July 21, 1979. The same pattern of results followed in the gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections held in July 28, 1979. August 11, 1979, was the presidential election. A Northern presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN, was declared the winner of the controversial election. The candidate was declared to have met the requirements of receiving at least 1/3 of vote cast in at least two-thirds of the then 19 states. This suggests that he received support across ethnic lines.

 Case of Groups’ Party Loyalty in Jos and its Environs A and Intergroup Relations from 1970s to 2007 To further buttress party politics and intergroup relations in Nigeria from 1990s, a brief discussion of its politics will be useful. This is because the area has the features that make it a miniature of Nigeria because of its intragroup and intergroup relations due to it indigenous multi-ethnic composition. In the Jos area, we saw how the Hausa ethnic group became pro-NPC and NEPU, the Igbo and other South-­ Eastern groups became pro-NCNC, the Southern Yoruba became pro-AG and the

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some Northern Yoruba people pro-NPC and the Plateau people became pro-UMBC and later MBPP (Middle Belt People’s Party). This type of political formation continued up to the 1999 national elections. Before the general election of 1979, the then Obasanjo military administration planned a transition to democracy, and in the process, new political parties were formed. Some of these political parties include NPP, NPN, GNPP, PRP, NAP, etc. The coming of these political parties in the Plateau state was a mere reflection of the earlier politics going on. The NPP took the place of UMBC, NPN of NPC, AG of GNPP and PRP of NEPU. This development produced the kind of political formation that was obtained during the nationalist party politics and post-independent politics before the January 15, 1966, military junta (Abba, n.d.:208). During this period, the “indigenous” Plateau groups gave their loyalty to NPP because it was a party that its followership was predominately Southerners and Christian and Azikiwe was its presidential flag bearer. Chief Solomon Lar was its gubernatorial flag bearer and he with other party stalwarts was able to gather support for the party. On the other hand, the Hausa group embraced NPN which was seen as a continuation of the NPC ideals. From the foregoing discussion, we saw how NPC even wrote a memo asking for the creation of Hausa traditional institution in Jos. This support enjoyed from NPC made the Hausa population to embrace NPN when they saw that most of the NPC members are the ones that formed NPN. After the 1979 elections, a stalemate could be said made in the politics of Jos. NPP won the governorship election in the Plateau state, while at the national level, NPN won the presidential election. This situation now gave Hausa population another advantage for the NPN now using them to make an en route to plateau politics and that could only be achieved by getting them empowered. For some of them that were in PRP, a child of NEPU had to go to Kaduna and Kano for political sustenance because these two states were won by People’s Redemption Party whose leader was Mallam Aminu Kano (Abba, n.d.:208). The NPP Government on the Plateau had to contend with Hausa’s influence in the political arena. This is done by starting to adopt a policy where the Hausa were being denied indigeneship certificate. This action was taken to avoid a situation in which the Hausa will eventually take over and dominate the indigenes and the politics of the Plateau state. It was a politics of exclusion for self-preservation. This tension continued until the military junta of 1983. Though before then, just as it was the case between NCNC and NPC at the independence election in the late 1950s, NCNC and NPC forged a coalition against AG. In the second election, the Shagari and his NPN-led federal government ensured that the NPP and NPN forged a coalition in the senate that made an NPP senator from the Plateau state John Wash Pam to become the Deputy Senate President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Wash P J.2/2013). The coalition was prompted by the fact that the NPN only captured one-­ third of the seats in the senate. By the beginning of the 1990s, Babangida started his transition to democracy. The ban on party politics was lifted. However, when it appeared that the politicians did not meet the conditions for registration in line with the guidelines provided by

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the military, the military created two parties, wrote their manifestoes and built structure for them across the states of the federation and a national headquarter. The National Republican Convention and Social Democratic Party were thus created. Coming to the Plateau, most of the first and second republics politicians went for the SDP, and in that manner, majority of the Plateau populace gave their political support to SDP. In Jos town and other local government areas where the Hausa population was predominant, their loyalty was to NRC. Whether NRC was Northern base or not, since most of its presidential flag bearers are core Hausa, it was seen as a Hausa party, and on the other side of the coin, the Hausa population embraced NRC and pushed it for acceptance among the Hausa population of the Plateau state (Tanko, D.B/Ladi/1/2014). No wonder in the 1991 local government election, Alhaji Inuwa Mato, a Hausa man in Jos, won the chairmanship election under the platform of NRC. This singular victory strengthened the Hausa NRC loyalty for they saw it as an opportunity to carve their political boundary where they will always use to have the political control of the heartbeat of the state. This victory generated tension as the indigenous group saw it as a situation equal to traditional war defeat. By 1993, the democratic government under the military rule of Babangida was over, and by the end of 1993, a new military leadership emerged, under General Sani Abacha. This leadership came up with the appointment of new military administrators to man the states and also the appointment of new chairmen to man the local government areas. In the case of Jos North, a Hausa man was appointed as the caretaker or sole administrator of the council as we have mentioned elsewhere, which led to a big political fracas in the Jos metropolis. The death of Sani Abacha in 1998 ushered in a new political dispensation in the account of the Plateau state and Nigeria at large because Abdulsalam, Abacha’s successor, promised a transition to civil rule. In the process, new political parties came up, namely, the PDP whose pioneer leader was Chief S. D. Lar, a Plateau man; AD, predominantly a Yoruba party; and All People’s Party (APP) with a strong base in core north. In the 1998 local government election, PDP in the Plateau won an overwhelming majority for it was seen as a party controlled by one of their own. This victory continued up to the national election where PDP won almost all the positions in the state. In fact, at this point in time, PDP did not seem to have much opposition in the Plateau state. Even among the Hausa population, the opposition was there but minimal. Consequently, Jos North local government election was won by a PDP candidate, Hon. Frank Taddy, a Christian from the Anaguta tribe. Though after the general election, PDP won some principal Northern states, i.e. Kebbi, Kaduna, Katsina and Kano, that was not able to impact much on the Hausa population of Jos. The reason was a simple one: Kano where they respected as the centre stage of Northern politics was PDP and also a place they visited often for their businesses. Two, Bauchi state neighbouring Plateau state was also a PDP state. These reasons helped in maintaining a balance followership of APP and PDP among the Hausa population (Field Note Report 4/ 2013).

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By the year 2000, there was a massive political change in the entire Northern region. This was due to the ushering in of the Sharia legal code and political system by Governor Alhaji Sani Yerima Bakura of the Zamfara state. This political development promoted the party of the governor in the Northern region. By 2002, all individuals who wanted to vie for political offices started making political formations and planning against the 2003 general election in that trend; General Muhammadu Buhari declared his intention to vie for the presidency under the platform of APP who, on coming on board, changed the nomenclature of the party to ANPP, i.e. All Nigerian People’s Party, and the symbol of the party was a peeled cob of maize. The coming of Sharia and Buhari gave ANPP a boost on the Plateau area. It was seen by the Hausa as a party that has reverence for Islam and its holy book Qur’an, and Buhari was also seen as a no-nonsense leader owing to his War Against Indiscipline (WAI) policy of 1983–1984 and the role he played as PTF boss. These reasons boosted the activities of ANPP. In the Plateau, ANPP became stronger as Mr. Jonah David Jang having felt being denied the PDP flag to contest for Governor decided to move to ANPP; this time around the Berom and the Hausa formed a political marriage, something very unusual: the Hausa for Buhari and Sharia in the North, the Berom for a Berom man to become the next governor of Plateau state, a position a Berom man never held before. In this marriage, the Hausa population supported Jang candidature but he lost the election to Governor Dariye by a gap of only about 6000 votes. The Berom on their part supported the candidature of a Hausa man for Jos-North Bassa Federal Constituency Alhaji Salihu Nakande who won the election. To further strengthen the winning chances of Jang, the Berom conceded the seat of senator of Plateau North District to a minority Amo man Senator John Adudu, a post never before held by a non-Berom man owing to their dense population in the District. At the end of the day, the political alliances turned not in the favour of the Berom because Jang lost the gubernatorial election to the incumbent governor (Field Note 2013). After the 2003 general election, by 2004, a time table was designed for local government polls. This time around, the Hausa group was determined to produce the next chairman of the Jos North L.G.C, while the other groups, i.e. the “indigenes”, were also determined to avert that. The Hausa population now felt that since they won the federal seat of Jos North-Bassa constituency, they can still do the same LGA polls. Aside from that, Jos had already witnessed the September 6, 2001, crisis that claimed many lives and mutual trust was now long gone. These made them to rally around to see that they won the chairmanship seat of the Jos North LGA. The state government under the leadership of Governor Joshua Dariye saw a potential danger as the contending forces are all determined to win the election. On the part of the Berom, they needed compensation because they came out virtually empty in the 2003 political alliances and needed something to fall on. On seeing the desperation on all sides, the government decided to suspend the election in Jos North LGA and selected Mr. Danladi Atu, an Afizere man, to man the council (Field Note December, 2013).

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The year 2007 was another time for general election. This time around, the governor was illegally impeached and a Berom man his deputy became the governor. All governorship aspirants on opposition parties in 2003 election now came back to PDP to vie for governorship. By this time, the Plateau state had witnessed uncountable crisis apart from that of 2001; there were the 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006 crises. The Hausa population in Jos and Bukuru and Barkin Ladi because of their proximity to the Berom ethnic group felt the Berom who were the closest to mines camp and the present towns were their biggest adversary, and therefore they should not support any Berom candidate in the election race. But after the PDP primary election in December 2006, Jang, a Berom man, emerged as its gubernatorial flag bearer. In ACN, another Berom man emerged as its flag bearer and these were the two strong political parties. This left them with no option rather to be apolitical to the governorship election but made sure the seat of Jos North-Bassa Federal Constituency is maintained and that they did under the platform of DPP. After the 2007 election, Jang won the seat of the governorship of the Plateau state (INEC, Jos Plateau 2007, Elections). With this mental prejudice among the Hausa groups, election became a survival matter when the government decided to conduct local government election in Jos North. A Berom man was filled in as chairmanship candidate for PDP, and the Hausa elements who were in PDP felt the process that made him emerged was bias and therefore undemocratic. This time around, they were determined to produce a chairman; perhaps this will help them avert the governor’s policy proposals in respect to Jos. To do this, they filled in a Hausa candidate under the platform of ANPP. So Timothy Buba, a Berom man, stood for PDP, while Aminu Baba, a Hausa man, was for ANPP; thus, a battle line was drawn because the outcome of the result will show the cultural group that has the highest number of electorate. In the situation of the Igbo and Yoruba, they never went for chairmanship post; instead, they filled councillorship candidates in the wards they knew they constitute the majority in terms of electoral power.

2011–2019 Major Parties’ Politics and Intergroup Relations By 2011 presidential election, the South-West disappointed a prominent Northern candidate in alliance bid to remove President Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw man from the South, from power. Although no open alliance was made with the PDP’s candidate, the bulk of the votes from the Southwest went to the PDP which made some people to think that the Southwest leaders sold out. However, this was not the case in 2015 and 2019 presidential elections as party politics and intergroup relations have advanced since that period. For instance, the merging of Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), ANPP and a faction of PDP and APGA in 2015 was unexpected because the latter comprised more of the Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups and the former was made up of the Yoruba cultural group. This alliance designed and packaged by Barack Obama administration in the

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United States and executed to oust Jonathan from power. The objective of the merger was achieved in the long run. Although the alliance succeeded in removing Jonathan from office, the level of intra-party and inter-organ acrimonies that followed became albatross on the Buhari-led government from 2015 to 2019. The members of the People’s Democratic Party that joined the alliance in 2013 were sidelined and also discriminated against in the sharing of patronage. This prompted them to return to the PDP in 2018 but with little success in recapturing power because the APC had consolidated its hold on power. It is quite evident that the nexus between intergroup relations and party politics in Nigeria prior to independence was interestingly complex as the different ethnic compositions on the one hand had their sole interest at attainment of independence, while other groups mobilized for the interest of their ethnic groups. With different cultural backgrounds, religion and the apparent fear of domination, owing to huge population of some groups, political parties in Nigeria have been largely determined by ethnic, regional and religious factors since independence. This brings us to the problem of disunity and lopsided infrastructural development in the nation since independence. In spite of this obvious weakness of political parties and poor harmonious synergy in intergroup relations with respect to national cohesion and national development, conscious efforts are being made by the different ethnic groups for understanding. The problem seems to come from the political actors, not the political parties in themselves. The political parties are themselves necessary if representative government must exist. But to achieve peaceful, harmonious, sustainable and efficient intergroup relations, the political parties after the second republic ought to develop ideologies that must grow above primordial cultural considerations and ethnic and religious prejudices and focus on the interest of the Nigerian state. The political parties’ ideologies were hitherto quite germane for the Nigerian state but most of the times poorly executed. It is quite disappointing that the parties and their players have always taken the interplay of politics and intergroup relations to ethnoreligious dimension instead of the genuine national interest. If not well checked and conscious efforts taken to correct this weak intergroup relations in party politics, the ugly trend may continue in the future with attendant negative implications for Nigerian societies. On the whole parties are imperative at all levels for every representative government. They should, therefore, be taken as panacea for unity, stability and fulcrum for democratic development.

References Abba. A. n.d. Radical politics in Nothern Nigeria. The case of NEPU Zaria Achoba, F. (2015), “Pre-Colonial Inter-Group Relations and the Nigerian Unity: A Case Study of Igala-Igbo Relations.” Nsukka Journal of the Humanities 25 (2). Ademoyega, Adewale (1981), Why We Struck, Ibadan: Evans Brothers. Borok A.M. (2011a), Colonial Tin Mining and Intergroup Relations in South-western Jos Division M.A Thesis Department of History ABU, Zaria.

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Borok, A.M (2017b) Intergroup Relations in Nigeria: Jos and its Environs 1900 to 2013 PhD Thesis Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, University of Port Harcourt. Davies, J.A.,(n.d.) Study of the Nigerian Ethnic Groups 1942-1949. Egwu S.G (2000), Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: The Jos Case 1960-2000. PhD Thesis Department of Political Science University of Jos. Falola, T. (1991), Violence in Nigeria: the crisis of religious politics and Secular Ideologies, Rochester: Rochester University Press. Falola T. (1991), Abdullahi Mahadi, Martin Uhomoibhi and Ukachukwu Ayanwu, A History of Nigeria II, Ikeja: Longman Publishers. Field note interviews administered during research in Jos and its Environs 2013. Persons interviewed are given in the text Freund, B. (1980), Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin mines, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Academic Press,  Fwatshak, S. (2009), Economic and Political Environment of Elections and Expectations of Nigerians from Elections in Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria v. 18, Special Edition. Harold Lasswell, quoted in: Rotimi Ajayi and Yinka Fashagba (ed) (2012), Introductory Text to Political Science. Omu-Aran, Landmark University. James, O.O. (1979), “13 Year of Military Rule,” Daily Times. Lagos. Olusanya, G.O. (1982), “Nationalist Movement in Nigeria” in Obaro Ikime (ed.) Groundwork of Nigerian History. Nigeria: HEBN Publishers. Padden, P., (1986), Ahmadu Bellow: Sardauna of Sokoto Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Britain. Platnicov, L. (1967a), Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria, University of Pittsburgh Press. Schumpeter, J.S. (1967), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy London: Allen and Unwin. 269. Sklar, F.L. (1963), Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 14.

Chapter 16

Nationalism and National Integration in Nigeria Abubakar Abdulahi and Yahaya T. Baba Abstract  This chapter examines the contexts within which nationalism evolved in Nigeria, largely against the backdrop of Africa’s colonial history and the associated crisis of national integration in the postcolonial period. This chapter argues that struggles for independence in Nigeria was influenced largely by developments around the world and happenings within the Nigeria’s colonial entity. Western education among the natives, influences of the First and Second World Wars as well successes of independence struggles in states such as India inspired Nigeria’s Independence struggles. Through different phases of the nationalist struggles, many structural reforms were instituted by the colonial government and bequeathed to the Nigerian state that appears to sow the seed of discord among the various fragments that make up the Nigerian state, which complicates the country’s drive to nationhood and national integration. This chapter is guided by a combination of three theories of self-determination, which advocates ethnic nationalism as the basis of national integration, the melting pot theory that emphasized the elimination of ethnic and other subnational identities and the management theory that advocates for the institutionalization of responsible and representative government as recipe for national integration. Methodologically, this chapter relied on existing secondary data collected and analyzed through desk review. The substance of these materials provided insights on the trends and challenges of different phases of nationalist movement in Nigeria as well as Nigeria’s touted path to nation-building and national integration. This chapter found that many factors undermine Nigeria’s national integration. These include the debate about appropriateness of the political system, resource mobilization and allocation, power sharing, structural arrangements among other contentious issues, which exploded into myriad of political crisis of military coups and counter coups, civil war, north-south dichotomy, ethnic nationalism, regional tension and bad governance. This chapter argues that some remedies such as Federal Character Principle, National Youth Service Corps and Federal Unity Schools, though made some positive impacts but are far from facilitating national integration in Nigeria. This chapter concludes that the Nigerian nationalists have succeeded in the struggle for political independence; however, they failed in their drive to ensure full integration of the state after independence. A. Abdulahi · Y. T. Baba (*) Department of Political Science, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_16

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Keywords Nationalism · Political independence · Nation-building · National integration · Nigeria

Introduction Nigeria and indeed other African countries with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia are ex-colonies of European colonial powers. African countries were colonized by a number of European powers, particularly Britain, France, Portugal, Italy and Belgium. The intrusion of colonial powers in Africa instigated, in the first instance, resistance against colonial occupation by African traditional rulers. Africa’s resistance to colonial conquest was, though, unsuccessful with the exception of Ethiopia (Dekker 2001). Thus, western colonial governments were established across the political landscape of Africa. The political domination and economic exploitation that characterized colonial governments in Africa influenced the emergence of yet another generation of indigenous nationalists that challenged the continued domination, exploitation and occupation of African societies. The emergence and upsurge of nationalist groups and liberation movements across colonial Africa was initially underscored by the need for greater participation of the natives in colonial government and administration. Thereafter, universal values of freedom, human rights, democracy and indeed some developments in other parts of the world such as World  Wars I and II, Indian independence, etc. stimulated the struggles for freedom and political independence (Muhammad 2012). These struggles, which were patterned along armed struggles and constitutional processes, are mostly defined as nationalist struggles for the freedom and emancipation of Africa from the shackles of colonialism. Thus, nationalism especially in the context of Africa represents a desire for inclusion, self-determination and political independence for native Africans to manage their own affairs without any form of control or external interference. However, most postcolonial African states are confronted with a daunting challenge of nation-building. The heterogeneous nature of African societies and the ‘divide and rule tactic’ employed in the governance of colonial Africa as well as the artificial boarders created by the colonialists invokes, at independence, a deep culture of suspicion and distrust among various ethnic, tribal and religious groups within most African states. Accordingly, national integration becomes the major challenge of most postcolonial African states. Thus unhealthy competition for power, political opportunities and scarce resources characterized the nature of politics in postcolonial Africa. This makes the continent conflict riddled and vulnerable to frequent changes of government (military coups and countercoups), dictatorship, rebellion violence, chaos, civil war and genocide of varying magnitudes. The political history of Nigeria clearly depicts some of these scenarios. The collapse of the First Republic through violent military coup, the ethnically motivated countercoup and the civil war that lasted for 30  months from 1967 to 1970 speak volumes of the country’s inability to integrate as a nation after independence.

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It is against this background that this chapter examined nationalism and national integration in Nigeria. It began with a conceptual discourse on nationalism and thereafter identified the factors that contributed to the growth of nationalist movement in Nigeria and discusses some of the major achievements of nationalist movement in Nigeria. Similarly, the paper also interrogates the concept of national integration, some theories of national integration as well as the instruments of national integration in Nigeria. Some of the challenges to national integration in Nigeria are also identified and discussed. The paper is concluded by identifying some of the shortcomings of the integration strategies adopted by the country and how the flaws can be remedied for the smooth integration of the country towards sustainable development.

Conceptual Definition of Nationalism The study of nationalism and national integration is essential in understanding Nigerian government and politics. This is because Nigeria as a nation is a product of nationalist struggles. Secondly, after political independence, the country was and is still being confronted by the crisis of national integration. This is in spite of various efforts aimed at enhancing the unity, cohesion and solidarity of the people as citizens and nationals of a single political entity. Thus, it becomes imperative to conceptualize and interrogate nationalism and national integration in relation to its applicability and survival of Nigeria as a nation. Nationalism has been defined differently and from different perspectives. Thus to explain the term nationalism is not a simple task as its application differs from one state to another, more so that different nations have different priorities and peculiarities. Accordingly, nationalist feelings and concerns vary from one country to another, depending on the priorities and peculiarities of nations. However, in the context of Africa, nationalism can be defined as any effort made by the natives to resist the imposition of colonial rule. It is therefore seen as a direct response of Africans to the process of colonial conquest on one hand and that of the struggles to liberate the conquered territories from the colonial powers on the other hand. This presupposes that the character of colonial oppression and the very process of colonial dehumanization of Africans culminated to the emergence of nationalism. It is in this regard that Muhammad (2012) described nationalism as simply elimination of colonialism from Africa. From this perspective, distinction could be made between African and European nationalism. Unlike European nationalism, African nationalism is associated with opposition to foreign political domination and economic exploitation or simply a desire to do away with colonial domination. On the other hand, European nationalism simply means the struggles against traditional or monarchical system of rule to the institutionalization of representative government established based on the universal principles of freedom, social justice and fraternity in the management of public affairs. For instance, the French revolution set to paved way for the destruction of traditional structures and to the emergence of

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modern nation-state. Similarly, nationalism means consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership of a nation-state either already existing or to which they aspire and of a desire to achieve political and economic independence, overall social and economic development as well as the cultural revival of a nation controlled by another. In view of the above, Smith (1991) opined that the term nationalism can be described in different ways: it is a whole process of forming and maintaining nations, a consciousness of belonging to a nation, a language and symbolism of a nation, an ideology for a nation and a political and social movement to achieve the goals of a nation in order to realize national will. The foregoing shows that nationalism is the basis for nation-building and a doctrine for integration of people that agree to come together to form a national identity. Thus, people with different backgrounds who aspire to become a nation are regarded as nationalists. Nationalism in the words of Penecke cited from Muhammad (2012) comes about when a group of people (nation) consciously asserts their right to control all aspects of their public life and command their own domestic decisions to have discernably separate voice in international affairs and a distinct cultural identity. From the above it can be argued that the basis for nationalism is self-rule or simply a desire to create an independent nation. Nationalism in this context may be defined as the aspiration of people with common backgrounds and/or a dialogue of different sociocultural groupings for the purpose of emancipation and their socio-­ economic development as a single political entity. As is in the case of many African countries and Nigeria in particular, diverse cultural groups of different nationalities may be bounded by common historical experience to strive together for the common good of all. This argument was aptly captured by Amin (1974) and Rodney (1974) that colonialism is not only a form of political subjugation and domination but also an attempt to halt the whole historical development of African societies. Therefore, the desire to have a sovereign nation free from political domination and economic exploitation of foreigners is the basis for nationalist struggles in Africa. It is important to add that the ideals that inspired the nationalist feelings among diverse Nigerians are twofold: the desire for freedom which rejected the moral validity of the subjugation of one people by another and upheld the principle of self-­ determination as the right of all people everywhere and to consolidate pan-Nigerian nationalism which was a product of a common colonial experience (Muhammad 2012). From the foregoing, it can be argued that nationalist movement in Nigeria had dual mandate: that of anticolonialism and that of pan-Nigerian feeling and solidarity. Therefore, political freedom from colonialism and strengthening macro-­ Nigerian nationalism are believed to be the objective realities of the struggle. These objectives are as well believed to be in consistent with human dignity, material and spiritual well-being of all Nigerians. In view of the above, it can be argued that nationalism in Nigeria began as a small resistance movement and later transformed into a united front agitating for political independence. There are factors that accounted for the development of nationalism in Nigeria. These factors are numerous and vary from one classification to another. Therefore, the next section of the chapter identified and discussed some of these factors in detail.

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Factors Responsible for Nationalist Movement in Nigeria Different factors accounted for the rise and growth of nationalist movement in Nigeria. These factors have been classified differently. However, the most common classification is categorizing the factors into political, economic and sociocultural. Nonetheless, scholars and students of Nigerian government and politics have also classified these factors into internal and external factors. In this chapter, however, the first classification above will be discussed. 1. Political Factors: the problem of inadequate representation of the natives in the governance and administration of Nigeria contributed to the growth of nationalist movement in Nigeria. For instance, the composition of legislative and executive councils during the colonial period clearly shows that the natives were not adequately represented. The majority of the members were Europeans, and therefore decisions were often made in favour of the colonial government and the colonizing power (Britain). Thus, matters affecting the natives were neglected, and where decision becomes imperative, the governor general makes proclamations for the country. Although elective principle was introduced in 1922 following series of protests by the nationalists, its provision was limited to Lagos and Calabar alone. Therefore, political activities in terms of formation of political parties and conduct of election were restricted to those areas alone. This restriction influenced nationalist movement to continue to agitate for increased participation and inclusion of Nigerians into the political affairs of their country. The overall effect of this agitation led to series of constitutional changes (1946, 1951, 1953, 1957 and 1960 independence constitution) which later led the foundation for political independence in the country. 2. Economic Factors: economic activities in most pre-colonial African countries were communal and agrarian in nature. The primary objective of such economies was to provide for individuals and their immediate communities with emphasis on food crop production. However, the emergence of colonialism changed the pattern and trend of African economy. First, the colonial system destroys the communal nature of African economy and encouraged natives to be involved in cash crop production as against food production (Mazrui 1993). These changes brought the emergence of market economy and the integration of Nigerian economy into global capitalism. Importantly, the economy became a source of raw materials and also a ready-made market for the European factories and companies. Added to the above was the introduction of taxation and banking system in the Nigerian. While taxation was seen in many communities as alien, the banking system was used to launch Nigeria into the global capitalist development. This creates a vicious circle and tied Nigeria economy to the happenings and development of capitalism. The introduction of the Nigeria economy into the vicious cycle of capitalism coupled with the desire to reduce economic dependence on European companies influences nationalist struggle to among other things eliminate the dependent nature of the Nigerian economy.

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3. Sociocultural Factors: these factors relate to the introduction of western education, social mobility, development of transportation and communication system as well as the activities of the missionaries. It has often been argued that one of the major factors that stimulate nationalist struggle was the nature of educational training provided to the natives by the colonialists. This training according to Rodney (1972) was meant to produce supporting or clerical personnel required for the development of colonialism in Africa. These personnel were employed to serve as interpreters between the colonial masters and the natives in, especially, commercial and political activities. Although the type of education provided was to support the colonial activities, however, the unequal treatment of Nigerian educated class compared to their British counterparts contributed to the rise of native educated elite who fought and struggle against the colonial system. They fought against discrimination over appointment, salaries and other condition of service. The second issue under sociocultural factors relate to the development of transportation and communication system. The nationalist observed that most railway and communication routes are located and developed in areas where the colonial system can have easy access to raw materials. This is evident in cases such as railway lines from Lagos to Kano and Kaura Namoda. These major towns were the melting pot for the procurement of agricultural products and raw materials from the hinterland to the coast. The development of transportation system to potential areas of raw materials brought about urbanization, which contributed to the rise of nationalist and anticolonial feelings among people of diverse backgrounds in Nigeria. Closely connected to the above is the role of the church in the promotion of colonial activities. The missionaries preached in their churches the gospel of equality and brotherhood and preached against torture, wickedness, greediness and other forms of inhuman vices. The refusal of the missionaries to fight against inhuman treatment suffered by the natives from the colonial powers led to rise and growth of nationalist movement in Nigeria. The above factors shaped and influenced nationalist activities in Nigeria. Indeed, these factors and other developments at the international level such as the Atlantic Charter of the United Nations, support from Black in diaspora and the independence of countries like India and Pakistan further stimulate nationalist struggles and the cohesion among the various nationalities that fought for political independence in Nigeria. It is however important to note that the nationalists employed different strategies in their struggle for self-determination and political independence. At the onset, the struggle was largely advocacy in nature. Thereafter, newspaper agitations, petitions and violent verbal threats in political rallies and meetings were employed to put pressure on the colonial government. For instance, it was through newspapers that nationalists in Nigeria waged war against the colonial administration. Indeed, the newspapers were quick to point out the shortcomings of the colonial system and thus mobilize support for the nationalist cause. Similarly, petitions were also used by the nationalist to express their dissatisfaction with the colonial administration.

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For example in April 1947, following an incident of racial discrimination at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, a coalition of nationalist parties was formed specifically to protest against the incident. The United Front Committee presented a petition to the governor demanding inter alia an end to all forms of discrimination in the country (Muhammad 2012). The petition not only succeeded in obtaining a circular from the governor banning all racial discrimination in public places but also led eventually an end to discrimination against Nigerians in appointment to the academic staff of the University College Ibadan. Likewise, in 1947 the NCNC delegation took a petition to the Colonial Secretary in London and sought among other things the revision of the Richard Constitution of 1946. The delegation also submitted another memorandum identifying 33 grievances for which they demanded redress. This eventually led to constitutional reform before its expiration period of 9 years.

Achievements of Nationalist Movement in Nigeria The struggle by the nationalist in Nigeria brought about significant development in Nigerian government and politics. These achievements are: 1. The activities of the nationalist led to the formation of political parties and the establishment of free press. Some of these political parties and the press include the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), the Lagos Pilot, the Lagos Daily News, etc. The formation of political parties and emergence of press provided a fertile ground for articulation of the nationalist ideas for the struggle against colonial rule in Nigeria. 2. It was through the nationalist activities that major constitutional changes were made. All the colonial constitutions were criticized on different grounds including of participation and marginalization of Nigerians in their own affairs. 3. Nationalists agitation led to the development of higher education in Nigeria such as higher schools and colleges. 4. A fair treatment was given to Nigerians both in the civil service and the business sector as a result of the general strike of 1945 engineered by the nationalists. 5. The granting of political independence to Nigeria in 1960 was made possible through the nationalist struggle. In fact, political independence was the primary objective of nationalist movement in Nigeria.

The Quest for National Integration in Nigeria The question of national integration is not a new one as it has been a major area of discourse in Nigerian government and politics. The prominence of the notion of national integration in debate on Nigerian project hinged upon the historical antecedents and diversity of the country as a result of the intrusion of British colonial

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power and the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914. More importantly, the inability of the Nigerian people to manage their diversity in terms of religion, culture and ethnicity has also called to question the capacity of the nations’ integrative measures to bring about the needed unity of the country. Ekanola (2006) argued that Nigerian people were not effectively integrated towards evolving a true sense of national identity and commitment to the survival and development of the nation. This therefore made national integration a national question in Nigeria. Thus, national integration has become a major precondition for the survival of Nigeria. Literally, integration refers to bringing together of different groups through an appropriate framework into a whole. This presupposes that integration is a mechanism used to mediate between contending forces for the promotion of group identity. In other words, it relates to the ability of different groups of people to put in place an appropriate mechanism for mediating and managing their differences for the purpose of unity, solidarity, progress and development. According to Mazrui (1994) national integration is the establishment of a single national identity and the commitment and loyalty of the citizens to a central authority. Embedded in this definition is the desire for a common front to pursue a course for the common good of all citizens regardless of their primordial leanings in relation to culture, religion, ethnicity, etc. This course could be a desire for political independence or a way for the management of diversity among different groups that makes such a nation after independence. Therefore, any effort made towards self-­determination or management of competing demands among people of a nation such as state and local government creation, equal opportunity in employment, conflict resolution and mediation or a simple act of ensuring social cohesion could be regarded as national integration. This suggests that national integration does not mean total disregard or disappearance of subnational or regional differences but a mechanism for the effective management of such differences. In his study Gurung (1980) sees national integration as both a political idea and an ideal. It thus implies a nation-state where citizens have full right without any form of segregation. Essentially, national integration from this viewpoint is aimed at providing equal opportunities and access to state resources in accordance to agreed formula by the nation-state. However, for national integration to be achieved, people ought to agree to surrender their sovereignty and loyalty of their smaller tribes, villages and small communities to the larger central political system. In this regard, the larger political system devised different frameworks within which to accommodate differences and diversities for the development of all people. It could be deduced from the above discussion that national integration is a mechanism for social cohesion and harmony among people of a given nation-state. These mechanisms vary in terms of content and approach and largely depend on a particular nation-state. In view of the need to isolate a particular country for study, scholars have developed theories to explain various ways through which national integration can be achieved in multi-cultural countries. The next section of the chapter examined some of the theories of national integration.

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Theories of National Integration Scholars of different backgrounds in humanities have developed theories explaining how national integration can be achieved in multi-cultural societies. These theories examined national integration from different perspectives. They include: 1. Self-Determination Theory: this theory was popularized by the advocates of ethnic nationalism as the basis for national integration. The theory argued that nation-states should be established on the basis of ethnic and tribal nationalities. Individual subunits have the right to determine what kind of political arrangement they want. According to Ozohu-Suleiman (2005) the solution to the question of national integration lies in the capacity of different groups to accept subnational entities as the basis for a more viable and stable political system. However, primordial units can also achieve national integration through consensus and willingness of the units to live together. This argument shows that a nation-state of different groups can only be formed if the groups desire and ask for it. Thus, the desire to form a union without the subunits necessarily losing their identities is the basis for national integration in plural societies. Secondly, since these subunits desire to live together, they should also surrender their sovereignty to the new national government formed on the basis of an agreed arrangement acceptable to all. This arrangement can be achieved through structural and constitutional provision made for and on behalf of all the subnationalities that makes up the nation. The basis for national integration is the views and demands of various sub-groups, hence the need for the groups to understand their dynamics and differences in order to achieve unity in diversity. However, the theory of self-determination was criticized as weak instruments with low practical relevance in explaining the prospects of national integration, and secondly some nation-states with diversity in terms of culture, religion and other primordial differences have failed to utilize their differences as argued by the theory for the common good of all. For instance, in a plural society like Nigeria, the feeling of ethnic nationalism is intense, and each group faces one another with mutual distrust and suspicion right from the colonial period to date. Ekanola (2006) opined that during the colonial era, ethnic nationalism showed itself in an aggressive regionalism with the formation of political parties along ethnic and regional lines. For instance, there was the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), formed by the Northern educated elites in 1949. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), formed by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, started as a national political party, but it was quickly taken over by Nigerians of the Igbo extraction. In the West, there was the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, which quickly metamorphosed into a political party in 1951, by the name of the Action Group, dominated by the Yoruba nation. These political parties and their struggle for power and influence promote regional and tribal interest at the detriment of national interest. This scenario was however linked to the nature and character of the colonial system which introduced a divide and rule policy not for the benefit of the natives but for the convenience of colonial lords.

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2. The Melting Pot School: this theory is a critique of the self-determination theory. It argued that unity and national integration can best be achieved in plural societies through the gradual elimination of ethnic, cultural and other primordial differences among citizens to their conscious assimilation into a binding national culture and identity (Nkom 1994). This gradual elimination of ethnic differences could be in form of cultural homogenization or acculturation by way of identifying a common national symbol, culture and identity. These national symbols and identity are seen as a mark of patriotism, nationalism and political maturity. Thus, ethnic loyalties and other primordial ties are described as inferior culture and framework that could lead to lack of integration and eventual collapse of a nation-state. This theory was however criticized for ensuring the dominance of one ethnic group over another. For example, Worsley (1978) in his studies associated this approach with national integration process in the USA and UK. He argued that the USA pursued a policy of isolationism and repression towards indigenous in its effort to establish a national culture and identity. This was evident by the imposition of Anglo-Saxon protestant culture on the rest of American society as the only way of life. In the UK the English language and culture was imposed on the Irish, Scottish and Welsh through bloody repression or gradual assimilation into English hegemonic culture through political engineering. In view of the above cases, the melting pot approach could be said to have lack respect for diversity of human societies. 3. The Management School: This school of thought looks at national integration neither from perspective of homogeneity nor from diversity but argued that the achievement of national integration in diverse societies relates to the institutionalization of a responsible and representative government. Therefore, national integration lies in the effective management of the economy, imbibing the culture of democratic good governance and economic fairness and social justice (Ozohu-Suleiman 2005). In view of this, democratic good governance is seen as a mechanism and process through which people articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Arguably, democratic governance provides rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for harmonization of differences among subnational groups. Democratic governance gives equal opportunity to individuals and groups to participate in decision-making through election and other democratic means. Therefore the management approach sees national integration as a process of building democratic institutional framework within which the various ethnic, religious and communal groups can co-exist harmoniously under a just social order. It is important to note that although the management school does not recognize primordial differences as a factor for national integration, the school however believes that ethnic and cultural pluralism could be employed as veritable tools and source of national strength. Ironically, in the words of Ozohu-Suleiman (2005), many plural societies including Nigeria have failed to utilize the inherent strength

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of diversity. This failure can be connected to the inability of the successive governments to adequately address what has been described as national question in Nigeria. This question related to issues such as power sharing, resource allocation and peaceful co-existence among others. It is believed that if national question is managed very well, it will bring about national integration and unity among Nigerians. The next section of the chapter examines some of the instruments of national integration in Nigeria.

Instruments of National Integration in Nigeria It is an undeniable fact that Nigeria has been confronted with the problems and challenges of national integration. These problems range from the adoption of an appropriate form and type of political system, resource mobilization and allocation problem, power sharing, state and local government creation to the relationship between the state and religious institutions. These problems have undoubtedly affected Nigeria’s journey to nationhood. Aside from the struggle for a democratic order in the country, these problems remain at the forefront in the debate of Nigeria’s project. While these problems continue to manifest themselves in different ways, the state is making efforts to put in place effective instruments to contain the problems of national integration. This section examines some of these instruments with the view to discuss their utility in Nigeria’s national integration effort. 1. Federal Character Principle: the idea of federal character is not new in Nigerian government and politics. It was first popularized during Murtala/Obasanjo between 1975 and 1979 and became a constitutional matter during the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) and Constituent Assembly debate. Following the debate, it finally got into the Nigeria’s constitution in 1979 as directive principle of state policy (cited from Osaghae 1988:4–5). The 1979 Constitution, Section 14(3), defined federal character as the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in government or any of its agencies (cited from Nnoli 1996:234). Therefore federal character principle otherwise referred to as quota system or zoning formula is a principle for sharing of appointment and positions between and among various ethnic, tribal, cultural or religious groups that make up the country. The essence of federal character principle is to foster a sense of belonging through equitable distribution of positions and jobs among Nigerians. In order to ensure equitable distribution of jobs and positions, the Federal Character Commission was established to regulate appointments into public service including recruitment by private sector organizations. In spite of the significance of the character principle in managing diversity in appointments into public service, the policy has made limited impact in Nigeria.

316 Table 16.1  Composition of federal civil service by zones and regions as of 2000

A. Abdulahi and Y. T. Baba

Region No. of staff North 35,977 Middle Belt 34,989 Northern Region 70,966 Yoruba 47,349 Igbo 30,490 Niger Delta 39,153 Southern Region 116,982 Total 187,958

% of total staff 19.1 18.6 37.7 25.2 16.2 20.8 62.2 99.9

Source: Adapted from the Federal Character Commission 2000:2

The inability to use the policy as an appropriate framework for job distribution results from the misuse and manipulation of the principle by those responsible for its implementation. Over the years recruitment into federal civil service tends to favour either by omission or commission one region over another. The table below shows the composition of staff by zones and region in Nigeria (Table 16.1). The table revealed that the Northern Region which comprises 19 states of the federation has a total of 70, 966 staff representing 37.7% of the total workforce in the federal civil service, whereas the Southern Region with 17 states accounts for 116,982 representing 62.2% of the federal workers. This clearly shows that the Southern Region has the highest number of workers in the civil service, and this by implication gave the region an edge over the Northern Region. 2 . National Youth Service Corps Scheme: the unfortunate antecedent that accompanied Nigeria’s political development (Nigerian Civil War) culminated to the establishment of National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) scheme. It is a scheme that came into effect in 1973 as instrument employed in Nigeria to ensure national cohesion and integration especially between the youth and their host communities. It was introduced by the government of General Yakubu Gowon after the 1967 Civil War. As a national programme, NYSC members posted to states far from their state of origin are expected to mix with people of other tribes and learn the culture of the indigenes in the place they are posted to. This action is aimed at bringing about unity in the country and to help youths appreciate the diversity of the nation and the cultural attributes of other ethnic groups. Corps members are mostly posted to schools, hospitals and other areas that are in dire need of manpower for a 1 year mandatory service. Impliedly, NYSC scheme is designed to integrate the youth and expose them to work situations as well as acquire necessary experience and skills for employment. Over the years hundreds of thousands of Nigerian graduate have made significant impact to their host communities through the scheme. Some Corps members execute meaningful development programmes in areas such as construction of culvert, classrooms, free medical services and financial assistance to the needy within their areas of primary assignment. They also participate in national programmes such as census exercise, election and polio eradication programmes. This clearly

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attests the fact that the scheme has helped in nurturing unity and national integration in Nigeria. However, there are a lot of challenges that affect the efficiency of the scheme and by extension national integration. Some of these challenges are insecurity, inadequate funding and delays in the release of funds and poor condition of orientation camps within which Corps members find themselves. The killings of some Corp members in Bauchi state during the 2011 election attest to the fact that the problem of insecurity is becoming a serious threat to the NYSC scheme (PLAC 2001 Election Report, 2012). In fact, the problems of insecurity and inadequate funding have led to the closure of NYSC camps in conflict-ridden states such as Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Evidently, many prospective Corp members refused to go to their areas of postings, thereby affecting the very philosophy for which the scheme was initiated. Given the problems affecting the scheme, some Nigerians have advocated for the scrapping of the programme or at least for the posting of Corps members to be localized within their own state of origin. Evidently it was reported that there is now increasing demands for preferential postings across the camps in Nigeria. In spite of these challenges and frequent calls to abolish the scheme, the Nigerian government remains confident that the scheme is a very good tool for national integration and development. 3 . Federal Unity Schools: The Federal Unity Schools comprises Federal Government Colleges (FGCs), King’s College and Queen School, Lagos, etc. Most unity schools especially the FGCs came into existence after the Nigerian Civil War (1967 to 1970) and were, actually, by-products of the war (Ijaiye & Jekayinfa 2009). Fresh from the war, the federal government of Nigeria decided to establish those schools in each state of the Federation as a strategy to forge the muchneeded understanding, patriotism and national unity among the feuding tribes through education. Schools were rightly thought to be the fastest means of promoting understanding, appreciation, tolerance and respect for each other’s culture, and children in their formative years, given the opportunity to live together, are better placed to forge that national unity. There were therefore boarding schools, mostly mixed at first, while a few were single-sex only (female), but eventually, each state got additional female type. These schools in the past are adjudged to be centres of excellence as only outstanding students are admitted into the schools on the basis of quota system from all the states of the federation. Admission into unity schools is through competitive interviews and written examinations. Selected candidates are engaged in serious class activities by their teachers throughout their period of stay in the schools. This led to outstanding performance by the students in both national and international examinations and subsequent preparation of needed manpower for the country. The schools have over the years produced excellent students who have and are still contributing to national development, e.g. past and current head of service at federal level, military personnel, engineers, doctors, professors, governors, notable accountants, bankers, etc. (Ijaiye and Jekayinfa,2009). Apart from being centres of academic excellence, the schools serve as the melting point for national integration because of their national spreads and activities.

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Paradoxically the schools are now living on their past glories suffering from serious decay in infrastructure, poor funding as well as a gradual decline in the quality of students due to inadequate manpower and poor supervision from the inspectorate department of the Federal Ministry of Education. All these have contributed significantly to the collapse of the schools and their inability to achieve the desired goal of national integration for which these schools are established.

Conclusion This chapter examines nationalism and national integration in Nigeria. It identified the various factors responsible for the rise and growth of nationalists’ activities as well as the achievement of nationalist movement in Nigeria. The chapter argues that as against the experiences of other societies of the world (Europe, America, etc.), nationalism in Nigeria is mainly focused on the liberation of the country from British colonial domination. In addition to the liberation of Nigeria, nationalist struggles also contributed immensely to the emergence, growth and development of major political institutions such as political parties, civil society organizations, free press, legislature, etc., which are central in the political and socio-economic transformation of postcolonial Nigeria. Another significant feature of nationalism in Nigeria is the peaceful and constitutional process through which the nationalists actualized their dream of an independent Nigeria. This is in contrast with other parts of Africa where arms struggle was a defining strategy for liberation movements (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, South Africa, Namibia, etc.). The chapter also discussed national integration and the various instruments used by successive Nigerian governments to facilitate national integration in the country. The paper concludes that the Nigerian nationalists have succeeded in the struggle for political independence. It is however noted that they failed in their drive to ensure full integration of the state after independence. Worst still, the succeeding generations of political leadership have failed to utilize effectively national integrative measures to unite the country for national development.

References Amin, S. (1974). Unequal Development, Monthly Review Press, New York and London Dekker, H. (2001). “Nationalism, its conceptualization and operationalization” in Phalet, K & Orkney, A. (eds), Ethnic Minorities and Interethnic Relations in Context: A Dutch-Hungarian Comparison, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Ekanola, A.B. (2006). “National Integration and the Survival of Nigeria in the 21st Century” in Journal of Social and Political Science, Vol. 31(3): pp. 279-293. Gurung, H.B. (1980). “Socio-economic Dimension of National Integration” paper presented at a Seminar on Political Development and Social Change in Nepal: Nepal

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Ijaiya, N.Y. and Jekayinfa, A.A. (2009). “Public-Private Partnership Initiative and the Management of Unity Schools in Nigeria: To be or not to be?” Educational Reforms in Nigeria: Past, Present and Future: accessed from www.unilorin.edu.ng/.../31 on 30/03/2013 Mazrui, Ali A. (1994). “Recolonization or Self-colonization? Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization,” in Debating the African Condition: Governance and Leadership. Africa World Press. Mazrui, A. (1993). “Pluralism and National Integration” in Kuper, L et  al (eds) Pluralism in African Societies, Barkeley University. California Muhammad, G.B. (2012). “The National Ethics and Sustainable National Development: An Essay Concerning the Normative Discourse of Nigeria Project” accepted for publication by Research and Publication Committee: Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto Nkom, S. (1994). “The Social Basis for National Integration in Nigeria” in Abdullahi Mahadi et al (eds) Nigeria: State of the Nation and the Way Forward. Arewa House, Kaduna Nnoli, O. (1996). ” Ethnic and Regional Balancing in Nigeria Federalism” In J.I Elaigwu and R.A.Akindele (eds), Foundations of Nigeria Federalism: 1960-1995, Jos: Institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR) Osaghae, E.E. (1988). “The Complexity of Nigeria’s Federal Character and then Inadequacies of the Federal Character Principle” Journal of Ethnic studies, 16(3). pp 1-25 Ozohu-Suleiman, A. (2005). “Federal Character and the Politics of National Integration in Nigeria: Currents and Perspective” in Dauda, S & Liman, A (eds), Issues in Nigeria’s Political and Economic Development, Abuja: Zumunta Publishers Ltd PLAC (2001). “Analyzing the 2011 Post-Election Violence in Nigeria” Report prepared by Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Abuja: Nigeria Rodney, W. (1974). How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Horward University Press Rodney, W. (1972) ‘How Europe Underdevelop Africa’ London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications (ISBN 0-9501546-4-4) Smith, A.D. (1991). National Identity, London: Penguin. Worsley, P. (1978). The Third World, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London

Chapter 17

The Niger Delta, Oil Politics and the Nigerian State Luqman Saka, Moh’d Azizuddin Moh’d Sani, and Adedoyin J. Omede Abstract  Regardless of the perspectives from which it is looked at, national or international, ecology or geopolitics, Nigeria’s Niger Delta is a unique region. Though an important biodiversity hotspot, the geostrategic significance of the region within Nigeria and at the international stage has much to do with its abundant reserves of proven oil and gas deposit. Hardly could anything be written about the political economy of Nigeria outside of the oil discourse and the way it has impacted the nation’s politics, economic development, governance process, foreign policy and ethnic relations. This chapter gives a background discussion on oil, agitational politics and the Nigerian state oil-impacted governance crisis. It assesses the contribution of the oil industry to the Nigerian economy and analyses the place of oil and revenue from it on the political economy of Nigeria from the humble beginning of the nation’s oil production history in 1958 till date. It looks at the nature of oil-induced protests, agitations and conflicts in the Niger Delta and assesses the responses of the Nigerian state and oil multinational companies to mounting grievances in the region. Keywords  Agitational politics · Dissent · Oil · Resource rents · Nigeria

A substantial part of this essay was reproduced from a chapter in one of the authors’ Doctoral Thesis submitted to the School of International Studies, the Northern University of Malaysia in July, 2011. L. Saka (*) ∙ A. J. Omede Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] M. A. Moh’d Sani School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_17

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Introduction Regardless of the perspectives from which it is looked at, national or international, ecology or geopolitics, Nigeria’s Niger Delta is a unique region. Ecologically it is the world’s third largest wetland after the Mekong and Mississippi deltas. Though the Niger Delta is a fragile ecological region, however, this important mangrove and rainforest ecosystem supports a rich biodiversity on which a large segment of the region’s population depends for their livelihood and sustenance (Agbogidi and Ofuoku 2006). Though an important biodiversity hotspot, the geostrategic significance of the region within Nigeria and at the international stage has much to do with its abundant reserves of proven oil and gas deposit. Hardly could anything be written about the political economy of Nigeria without reference to its history of oil production. Indeed, the political history of post-civil war Nigeria will be incomplete outside of the oil discourse and the way it has impacted the nation’s politics, economic development, foreign policy and ethnic relations. The story of oil is but a contrast; massive oil rents accruable to the coffers of the Nigerian state have for decades kept the three tiers of government across the federation afloat (Etekpe 2007). On the contrary, oil exploration and production-­related activities have impacted negatively on the environment and social structure of communities in the oil-producing region. Studies have shown that environmental degradation that characterized all aspects of oil production has severely impacted the fragile ecology of the Niger Delta. This has in turn contributed to loss of livelihood and worsens the living conditions of people in oil-bearing communities (Aghalino and Eyinla 2009; Omoweh 2005; Roberts 2005, 1999). Thus, the paradox of the Niger Delta is that of a region rich in natural resource but with significant percent of its population living below the poverty line. The contradictions that characterized the history of oil production particularly the crisis of poverty that defines the life of people in the oil-bearing communities amidst the oil wealth have given rise to different forms of group protest and dissent against the state-oil alliance (Akinwumi 2004; Ikelegbe 2006; Obi 2009; Osaghae 2008). While the Nigerian government and major oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta have evolved differing number of responses to manage the crisis in the region, these responses have failed to adequately redress the fundamental grievances driving protest and dissent in Nigeria’s oil-bearing region (Aghalino 2009a, b). On the contrary, the responses have somewhat seem to exacerbate dissent against state-oil majors’ interests that have enveloped the region. Indeed, the radicalization and militarization of dissent and the unprecedented emergence of militant groups/ movements better capture the failure of state crisis management responses in the Niger Delta (Omotola 2006, 2007, 2009 and Frynas 2005, 2001). This chapter gives a background discussion on oil, agitational politics and the Nigerian state. It assesses the contribution of the oil industry to the Nigerian economy and analyses the place of oil and revenue from it on the political economy of Nigeria from the humble beginning of the nation’s oil production history in 1958 till date. It looks at the nature of oil-induced protests, agitations and conflicts in the Niger Delta and assesses the responses of the Nigerian state and oil multinational companies to mounting grievances in the region.

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 he Oil Belt of Nigeria, the Niger Delta: Geographical T and Political Definition The literature is replete with different definitions of what constitutes the Niger Delta. In its exclusive geographical characterization, the Niger Delta encompasses those areas covered by the creeks, estuaries, swamps and natural alluvial deposition of the River Niger as it enters the Atlantic Ocean. The Willink Commission Report (1958) defines this mangrove and swamp areas to include the then Rivers Province without Ahoada or Port Harcourt in the former Eastern Region, plus the Western Ijaw Division in the former Western region of Nigeria. This corresponds to the present states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers which Adeyemo (2008) takes to be the core geographical Niger Delta. If expanded the Niger Delta will include areas east and west drained by River Niger and its numerous tributaries, estuaries and creeks. By this, the northern boundaries of the Niger Delta are placed at Aboh, while the western and eastern boundaries are the Benin River and the Imo River estuaries, respectively. This according to Roberts (2005) also corresponds to the definition of the region by the Niger Delta Environmental Survey. Contrary to the two earlier descriptions, the UNDP (2006) human development report gives the broader definition of the Niger Delta to include all oil-producing areas and other contiguous areas considered relevant for political considerations, administrative convenience and development rationality. Following this inclusive definition, as adopted by the Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC in the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan, the Niger Delta region, thus consists of all the nine oil-producing states of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (NDDC 2006). By this definition the Niger Delta now cuts across all the three geopolitical zones of southern Nigeria. As constituted it includes all the six states in the south-south zone, Abia and Imo in the south-east zone and Ondo in the south-west zone. Scholars have termed this expanded definition as the political Niger Delta (Etekpe 2007; Naneen 2007; Omotola 2006). The foregoing discussion on the definition of the region highlights the fact that the discourse of what constitutes the Niger Delta has been subject to definition and redefinition. Much as the Delta is a geographical phenomenon, oil production has introduced politics into the definition of what ordinarily should be informed by geography.

 he Oil Industry and the Emergence of Oil as the Mainstay T of the Nigeria Economy While the dominance of crude oil in the Nigeria economy commenced in the 1970s, the history of oil in Nigeria actually predates the nation’s political independence in 1960. The history of oil prospecting in colonial Nigeria started with the awarding of licence to a German company, Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, in 1909 to prospect

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for crude oil in south-western Nigeria. In 1937 the colonial government granted Shell D’Archy the sole rights to explore for hydrocarbons all over the territory of colonial Nigeria. In 1947, Shell D’Archy teamed up with British Petroleum to form Shell-BP oil corporation in Nigeria, and the newly formed company continued prospecting for crude oil in south-eastern Nigeria around Owerri. By 1955, Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated obtained concession to prospect for oil all over the former Northern region. Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated carried out a geological survey and also drilled three dry deep wells in the former Western region before abandoning its concession in 1961 (Etekpe 2007). Shell-BP later renamed Shell-BP Nigeria drilled series of deep well in its initial prospecting areas around Owerri, but they all failed to yield oil. Though faced with initial disappointment, the company rather than quit decided to extend its search down south to the swamp and mangrove areas of the then Eastern Region. The company’s tenacity yielded result when its crew of engineers struck Nigeria’s first commercial oil well in Oloibiri a sleepy rural farming and fishing community [in Brass Division of the former Eastern Region] present-day Bayelsa state on the June 4, 1956 (Etekpe 2007). Thus the humble beginning of Nigeria’s journey to becoming a major oil-producing nation started with the Oloibiri well 1 which at that time produced a little above 5000 barrels per day of crude oil. Commercial production and export from the Oloibiri field commenced in 1958. Reinvigorated by its first successful well, Shell-BP Nigeria extended its prospecting and drilling activities to other locations within the riverine region. The company recorded streaks of successes as it further discovered crude oil in Afam and Bomu areas (Aigbedion and Iyayi 2007). The granting of political independence to Nigeria by Britain slightly changes the unfettered control of Shell-BP Nigeria. The new government in Lagos decided to limit the pioneering company concession operating area in others to give other companies the chance to prospect for oil. In 1961 the federal government of Nigeria issued ten oil prospecting licences on Nigeria continental shelf to new companies. The granting of new prospecting rights by the Federal government in 1961 brought companies like Mobil, Agip, Gulf Oil (now Chevron), Safrap (now Elf), Amoseas (now Texaco/Chevron), Tenneco and others into the Nigeria oil industry. These companies prospect for oil onshore in the Niger Delta and offshore in the nation’s continental shelf. Nigeria’s first offshore oil well was struck by the former Gulf Oil company (Chevron) at Okam field off the coast of the former Bendel state. The oil majors and pioneers of the oil industry in Nigeria have since been joined by other companies, and together they have drilled more successful onshore and offshore oil wells in Nigeria’s oil sedimentary basins. With successful discoveries of more wells and fields, Nigeria’s oil production history witnessed a steep rise in the level of exploration and production, while the nation’s proved eserves have also risen tremendously (Table 17.1) For nearly four decades, Nigeria’s economic policies, growth and other related activities have been largely influenced by one sector, the oil industry, and one commodity, crude oil production and export. To say that the economy is heavily dependent on the oil industry will amount to an understatement as the oil industry is

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Table 17.1  Operators in the upstream subsector of the Nigerian oil industry Joint venture companies SPDC

Production sharing contract STAR DEEP

Mobil

ADDAX

NPDC

Chevron Total E&P NAOC/Phillips ChevronTexaco

Esso E&P Nig NAE SNEPCO SA PET/Total Upstream Nig

Consolidated Express Pet. AMNI Cavendish Petroleum ATLAS Continental Oil MONI PULO DUBRI

Pan Ocean

Service contract AENR

Independents NPDC/AENR

Marginal fields Niger Delta Pet Res Platform Petroleum Midwestern Oil Walter Smith

Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2008 Annual Statistical Bulletin

nothing short of a lifeblood for the Nigeria economy. Like all energy resource-­ dependent economies, the Nigeria economy remains highly unshielded from the volatility that characterized the world energy price. Thus, circles of boom and bust in the international price of crude oil have seriously affected macroeconomics stability of the economy. Nigeria case is worsened by the failure of the state to diversify the economy away from its overdependence on crude oil production and export (Uwakonye et al. 2006). Although, crude oil production and export commenced in Nigeria in 1958, the oil sector of the economy did not achieve its present pre-eminent position until the mid1970s. While the volume of Nigeria’s oil production and export increased substantially throughout the 1960, the agricultural sector still retains its edge in relations to volume of export, contribution to national GDP and government revenue. The displacement of agriculture as the leading sector of the economy by the oil industry that occurred in 1973 is basically a result of the phenomenal rise in the international price of crude oil arising from supply shortage in the international market consequent on the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Much as the first oil price shock might have been a major decisive factor, Nigeria would not have been able to cash in on the price rise if not for the nation’s increased level of production. Indeed, the growth of Nigeria’s oil production and proved reserves level are nothing but tremendous. From a yearly production of 1.876 million barrels at the inception of production in 1958, the country’s production level had risen astronomically to 395.843 billion barrel in 1970. By 1975 yearly production has further rose to 660.148 billion barrels. By 1980 yearly production has rose to 760.117 billion barrels. The period of 1970 to 1980 represents Nigeria’s oil boom era in terms of production, exports and earning from exports. Peak production in the boom era was achieved in 1979 with a yearly production of 845.463 billion barrels representing an average daily production of 2.3 million bpd (CBN 2008 and CBN 2007).

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Table 17.2  Nigeria’s yearly crude oil production, export and domestic consumption 1960–2008 (‘000 Barrels) Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1979 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008

Production 6374.0 99,355.0 395,689.0 660,148.0 854,463.0 760,117.0 547,088.0 660,559.0 715,400.0 797,880.0 919,285.0 813,950.0 803,000.7 768,745.9

Export 6244.0 96,985.0 383,455.0 627,638.0 807,685.0 656,260.0 486,580.0 548,249.0 616,900.0 688,080.0 846,179.7 656,090.0 791,826.5 724,479.8

Domestic consumption

12,234.0 32,510.0 37,778.0 103,857.0 60,508.0 112,310.0 98,500.0 109,800.0 73,105.9 164,200.0 Not available “

Source: CBN, Annual Statistical Bulletin Volume 18, December, 2007

The high-level production in the industry coupled with record high oil price at the international market throughout the 1970 led to an unprecedented massive inflow of oil revenue to the treasury of the federal government. However, the oil price hike and the boom in the international market of crude oil are not to last contrary to the expectation of Nigeria’s political leaders and the emergent middle class created by the boom. By the beginning of the 1980s, the world crude oil market was plunged into a recession which was followed by a drastic fall in demand. This created a glut which triggered a nose dive in the international market price of oil. The falling price led to the adoption of supply quota by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as a measure to curtail supply surplus and prevent further downward spiral of price. The glut and other attendant issues resulted in a steep decline in Nigeria’s crude oil production throughout the 1980s (Table 17.2). NNPC 2008 Annual Statistaical Bulletin (Summarised) 1st Edition The years of boom of the 1970s and the bust period that followed throughout the 1980 adversely affected the stability and wellbeing of the Nigeria economy no doubt. However, the close correlation of fluctuation in the economy to this cycle of boom and bust shows the importance of the oil industry and the extent of the economy dependence on the industry. Beginning from the 1970 contribution of the oil industry to Nigeria’s GDP, total national export and contribution to government revenue have been on the increase. With this rise, the oil industry has continued to occupy a privilege position in the structure of the nation’s economy. The growth in the oil industry has enhanced Nigeria’s position in the global energy market and in international politics. With a daily production of more than 2 million bpd and a proved reserve of 32.6 billion barrels of crude oil by 2008, Nigeria is not only the largest producer in Africa; the country has the continent’s second largest recoverable reserve of crude oil. Nigeria is today ranked among the top ten largest crude

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Table 17.3  Oil and gas contribution to national GDP at current basic prices, 1960–2008 (million naira) Years 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total GDP 2233.0 3110.0 5281.1 21,475.2 49,632.3 67,908.6 267,550.0 1,933,211.6 4,582,127.3 14,572,239.1 18,564,594.7 20,657,317.7 23,842,170.7

Oil and gas contribution to GDP 7.0 106.8 489.6 4165.5 14,137.4 11,375.2 100,223.4 766,518.0 2,186,682.5 5,664,883.2 6,982,935.4 7,533,042.6 9,299,524.8

% contribution of oil and gas to GDP 0.3 3.4 9.2 19.3 28.4 16.7 37.4 39.6 47.7 38.8 37.6 36.4 39.0

CBN, Statistical Bulletin Golden Jubilee Edition, December 2008.

oil-­producing nations and is the sixth largest exporter of crude oil in the world (BP 2009; NNPC 2008) (Table 17.3). In order to better explain the position of crude oil exploration and production as the driving sector of the Nigeria economy since the boom of the 1970s, there is the need to refer to its total contribution to national gross domestic product over the years. More than any other sector of the economy, the sectoral contribution of crude oil to the Nigeria economy has indeed undergone tremendous change since the inception of exploration and production in the twilight year of colonial rule. The sector contribution to national GDP at current basic prices was as low as 7.0 million naira at independence in 1960. That amounted to a negligible 0.3 percent contribution to national GDP. With increase in exploration- and production-related activities consequent on the boom of the 1970s, the sector’s contribution to national GDP rose to 28.4 percent by 1980. The slump in world price of crude oil and the bust it created dampened growth in the Nigeria oil sector throughout the 1980s. However, the industry rallied from the bust years of the 1980s as investment and growth picked up beginning from 1990. In clear term, the industry’s contribution to Nigeria GDP commenced its impressive recovery from the 1989 fiscal year. By 1990 its contribution to GDP at current basic prices has risen to N100,223.4 million naira out of a total GDP of N267,550.0 million naira. This amounted to a 37.4 percent contribution, and it might be taken as the beginning of the oil sector total dominance of the Nigeria economy. The sector continued its impressive performance throughout the 1990s such that by the year 2000 its percentage contribution stood at 47.7 percent. While successive regimes continued to pay lip service to the diversification of the Nigeria economy, the oil industry continued to maintain its domineering position with a percentage contribution hovering around 35–40 percent for the past 9 years of democratic rule.

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Table 17.4  Contribution of crude oil and gas export to Nigeria’s total export 1960–2008 (million naira) Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total export 339.4 536.8 885.7 4925.5 14,186.7 11,720.8 109,886.1 950,661.4 1,945,723.3 7,246,534.8 7,324,680.5 8,120,147.9 9,774,610.9

Non-oil export 330.6 400.6 376.0 362.4 554.4 497.1 3257.6 23,096.1 24,822.9 105,955.9 133,594.9 169,709.7 94,316.7

Oil and gas export 8.8 136.2 509.6 4563.1 13,632.3 11,223.7 106,626.5 927,565.3 1,920,900.4 7,140,578.9 7,191,085.6 7950438.3 9,680,194.2

Oil and gas export as % of total export 2.3 25.3 57.5 92.6 96.0 95.7 97.0 97.5 98.7 98.5 98.1 97.9 99.0

CBN, Statistical Bulletin Golden Jubilee Edition, December 2008

The dominant position of the oil sector in the Nigeria economy also reflects its dominance of the nation foreign trade, in particular that of export. Starting from 1970, the contribution of oil export to total national export overtakes that of non-oil component of which agriculture is the main contributor, and this has since been the trend. Increasing oil export over the years has helped to increase the volume of Nigeria’s total trade. The sheer volume and monetary value of Nigeria’s oil export have also helped the nation to maintain a positive and healthy balance of trade over the years. In clear statistical term, oil export has maintained a total dominance in Nigeria’s export trade beginning from the 1970s. At independence in 1960, the percentage contribution of oil export to total national export stood at a low 2.3 percent, while non-oil of which agriculture export was the main component contributed the rest 97.7 percent. This was, however, to change in a drastic manner such that by 1970 oil export as percentage of total national export has risen to 57.5 percent. The total routing of agriculture and industrial products in national export by crude oil and gas export was achieved towards the twilight years of the boom period of the 1970s. By 1980 oil export as percentage of total national export had reached a staggering height of 92.6 percent. Much as successive regimes in the present democratic republic shout about their efforts at diversification, the story of Nigeria’s foreign trade remains that of crude oil and gas export as the industry contribution to national export in monetary term stood at N9.680 trillion out of a national annual total of N9.774 trillion representing a staggering and record height 99.0 percent (Table 17.4). The contribution of crude oil and gas to government revenue not only underlies the centrality of revenue from the industry to financial viability of the Nigeria state, it also shows the importance of oil rents in national politics. Revenue from the petroleum industry comprising of crude oil and gas export earning, petroleum profit

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tax, royalties, signature bonus and oil block leasing fees among others has witnessed steady growth over the years. The rise in the contribution of the sector to total federal revenue can be attributed to a number of factors. These include the impressive increase in the country’s crude oil and natural gas production level, the series of rise in the world price of crude oil and the ability of the state to negotiate favourable tax regimes with the multinational oil companies operating in the nation’s oil and gas industry. Throughout the decade of the 1960, the contribution of proceeds from crude oil to total federal government revenue was of limited importance. This was, however, to change in a drastic manner thanks to the hike in the international price of crude oil that started from 1973 and the increase in national production level. The contribution of crude oil to total annual federal revenue that stood at N166.00 million naira in 1970 representing 26.1 percent of the total revenue jumped to 12.353 billion naira out of annual total of N15.233 billion naira in 1980. This represents 81.1 percent of total annual revenue collected by the federal government of Nigeria. The slump in the world price of crude oil and the mild economic recession of the 1980s dampened investment and growth in the industry. Though this resulted in decrease in the actual contribution of proceeds from crude oil to federal government revenue, however, the percentage contribution of the oil sector to federal government revenue still remains high standing at 64.3 percent in 1986 the lowest level since 1974. As the oil sector recover from the slump of the 1980s, contribution of proceeds from crude oil to total federal revenue rises in actual monetary value and in percentage term. By 1990 the contribution of oil earning to total federal government revenue stood at 71.887 billion naira representing 73.2 percent of total revenue. By fiscal year 2000, proceeds from crude oil and gas contributed N1.591 trillion naira out of total of N1.906 trillion naira representing 83.5 percent. The contribution of crude oil and gas earning to total federal government revenue in percentage term continued to hover around 80 percent since the fiscal year 2000, except in 2007 that it fell to 78 percent as a result of fall in production and export resulting from political tension in the oil-producing areas. As at fiscal year 2008, the contribution of crude oil and gas proceeds to federal government revenue stood at N6.530 trillion naira out of a total federally collected revenue of N7.868 trillion naira; the crude oil and gas proceeds represent 82.9 percent of total revenue accruable to the Nigeria state (CBN 2008) (Table 17.5). The increase in the contribution of crude oil and gas proceeds to total federal government revenue has come with a corresponding decrease in the contribution of non-oil sector of which agriculture is the main component. This inverse relationship shows the over-reliance of the Nigeria state on crude oil and gas proceeds. This over-reliance of the state on one source for its revenue and foreign exchange earning has come with its own shortcoming, the most potent of which is the vulnerability of the nation’s fiscal policy to the swing in the world price of crude oil a situation that has been made worse by the tendency of successive regimes to jack up government spending during boom years, thereby failing to set aside excess revenue for lean years.

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Table 17.5  Federal government revenue and the contribution of crude oil and gas 1960–2008 (million naira) Year 1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total federally collected revenue 223.65 654.34 634.00 5514.70 15,223.50 15,050.40 98,102.40 459,987.30 1,906,159.70 5,547,500.00 5,965,101.90 5,715,600.00 7,868,590.10

Non-oil Oil revenue revenue 0.00 223.65 0.00 654.34 166.00 467.40 4271.50 1243.20 12,353.30 2880.20 10,923.70 4126.70 71,887.10 26,215.30 324,547.60 135,439.70 1,591,675.80 314,483.90 4,762,400.00 785,100.00 5,287,566.90 677,535.00 4,462,910.00 1,200,800.00 6,530,630.10 1,335,960.00

% of oil revenue in total revenue 0 0 26.1 77.4 81.1 72.5 73.2 70.5 83.5 85.8 88.6 78.0 82.9

CBN, Statistical Bulletin Golden Jubilee Edition, December 2008

Although the Nigerian oil industry is largely an enclave sector with a few forward and backward linkages with the rest of the economy, it, however, remains a decisive force determining to a large extent the nation’s economic performance. Given the low level of the oil and gas industry linkages particularly to agriculture and manufacturing sectors of the economy and its low level of employment generation, the sector main impact has been largely transmitted through the income effect (Aigbedion and Iyayi 2007). This has been mediated through the oil industry huge contribution to federal distributive pool account share by the tiers of government, a sizeable part of which is transmitted to the economy via public spending whether through government recurrent or capital expenditure.

 il Politics and the Rise of Agitational Groups O in the Niger Delta Protests against one form of domination or another in the Delta dated back to the colonial era. History is replete with the stiff resistance of the oil city states of the Niger Delta to colonial domination and incorporation (Alagoa 1972, 1999). This pattern of resistance to domination was to characterize the relationships of minority groups in the Niger Delta with the dominant groups in the strong regional arrangement prior to political independence. Naneen (2007) recounts that as colonial Nigeria moves towards political independence from Britain, the people of the Niger Delta minority groups were in the forefront of agitations for the creation of more regions from the then existing three regions of federal arrangement. It is also on record that the first armed insurrection against the state in independent Nigeria

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emanates from the region and was led by the late Isaac Adaka Boro, an ex-policeman and an Ijaw from Oloibiri the community that host Nigeria’s first oil well. Boro’s revolution was informed by the desire to end the marginalization of Niger Delta minorities and the determination to assert Ijaw control over oil resources which the logic of majority-minority power dynamics makes impossible. Though “the twelve day revolution” as Boro’s revolt has come to be referred in the literature was short-­lived, it was symbolic as future protests in the region continue to draw inspiration from Boro led insurrection (Omotola, 2009; Obi, 2001; Ovwasa, 1999; Tebekaemi, 1982; Tamuno, 1970). Niger Delta minorities have adopted various approaches in their quest to seek equity and fairness and political emancipation in their relationship with ethnic majorities that have long dominated Nigerian politics. Niger Delta minorities have favoured the civic approach in their dealing with majority groups that dominated regional governments and later the federal government. This involves constitutional and peaceful political steps taken by community leaders, leaders of thought, regional-based political parties, community-based civil society organizations and interest groups. On this the people of the region have taken actions that range from petitions to political authorities, sponsoring of legislative motions on issues of concerns to the Niger Delta minorities in the legislative houses, media publicity and institution of court litigations against oil MNCs among other peaceful civic actions. These civic methods have a long history in the Niger Delta that date back to the early decade of colonial rule. The increasing incidence of oil spill and other environmental pollutions arising from the rise in oil exploration and production starting from the 1970s led to an intensification of civil protests in the Niger Delta (Ibeanu, 2000). The wave of civic actions and protests in the Delta assumed a high momentum by the 1980s, addressing diverse issues as oil-induced environmental degradation, the problem of compensation, the problem of socio-economic development, revenue allocation and state and local government creation among others. The new wave of protests from the 1990s onward was anchored on the mass movement approach and was pioneered by the Ogoni via their pan sociocultural group, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People MOSOP (Frynas, 2001, 2000). MOSOP embarked on mass mobilization, enlightenment and publicity of the Ogoni cause and plights of Niger Delta oil communities. The demands of the Ogoni couched in the language of “rights” were communicated to the Nigerian state and the international community through the public presentation of the Ogoni Bill Rights by MOSOP. The Ogoni through the bill of right demand for local autonomy, the recognition of the economic contributions of Ogoni to the Nigerian state, restitution for poverty and ecological damage by the state and oil MNC’s operating in Ogoniland (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1995; Okonta and Douglas, 2001; Courson, 2009). The demands of the Ogoni in the bill of rights represents the ideal of self-­ determination as conceived by the Ogoni and constitute a radical reformulation of the Niger Delta question (Naneen, 1995; Osaghae, 1995; Welch, 1995). The public campaign of MOSOP internationalizes not only the Ogoni cause but the plights of Niger Delta oil communities. At the height of MOSOP’s non-violence mass base

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campaigns, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), the main operators of the Ogoni oil fields decided to shut down its production-related activities in the whole of Ogoniland. MOSOP campaigns and publicity of the negative impacts of oil production were also instrumental to the emergence of numerous non-­ governmental environmental and social advocacy groups (Ojakorotu, 2008; Omotola, 2009). Largely as a result of the activities of ethno-nationalities groups, advocacy movements and civil society groups, the campaigns for the causes of the Niger Delta oil-bearing communities have intensified beyond imagination. Notwithstanding the repression of the Ogoni by the Nigerian state, other Niger Delta minorities have adopted the mass-based mobilization and campaign of MOSOP in their confrontation with the state-oil alliance (Ikelegbe, 2006; 2001a; 2001b; Isumonah, 2001). Of note is the Ijaw under the aegis of the Ijaw National Congress (INC) and the radical youth movement, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). The Ijaw under the banner of IYC have taken up the campaign for the cause of the Niger Delta oil-bearing minorities since 1997. Like the Ogoni under MOSOP, the Ijaw through the IYC drew up its own bill of rights embodied in the Kaiama Declaration. The declaration stated interalia: “all land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival”. The declaration also demanded for “self government and control of resources for the Ijaw people within a federation of ethnic minorities” (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Like the Ogoni Bill of Rights the Kaiama Declaration of Ijaw Youth was couched in the language of rights, self-determination and resource control. This pattern was repeated in all other minority declarations that emanated from the Niger Delta, and it shows the trend of radicalization of civic protests that is to become the hallmark of group confrontations with the state and oil multinational corporations in later years. Drawing on the experience of MOSOP, the IYC mobilized Ijaw youth and ordinary people behind the cause for which they engage the state and oil MNC’s by drawing upon local Ijaw idioms and culture of resistance (Obi, 2008). Of note is the reincarnation of the spirit of Isaac Adaka Boro through the extensive use of his name and birthplace in the mobilization of the Ijaw people by the IYC (Obi, 2008). The Ijaw campaigns through the IYC are the precursors of the struggle for resource control that has become a thorny issue in the national question discourse. By and large, the radicalization of the Niger Delta struggle that defines the present approach by militant youth movements in the creek of the Niger Delta represents just a phase in the trajectory of resistance by Niger Delta minorities to the management of the Niger Delta question by the Nigerian state and the insensitivity of multinational corporations to the plights of oil producing communities. Since the nations return to democratic rule in 1999, there has been substantial escalation of violent protests and demonstrations across Niger Delta oil fields, accompanied by major attacks on oil facilities. As Ikelegbe (2001a) asserts, the delta has indisputably emerged as “a region of insurrection”. The tactics and repertoires deployed against the companies have been various: demonstrations and blockades against oil facilities; occupations of flow stations and platforms; sabotage of pipelines; oil “bunkering” or theft; litigation against the companies; hostage taking and

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strikes. Watts (2008) argued that the periodicity and character of the militancy in the region have been shaped by the conjuncture of recent forces that include local and national elections, the emergence of ethnic militias, the promotion of armed struggle as a platform for expression of dissent by restive youth and the growing militarization of the oil fields and oil installations that started since the 1990s. In the face of heightened militarized and violent response to their demands by the Nigerian State, armed groups/movements started to emerge in the Niger Delta. The first and prominent of such armed youth groups is the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, NDPVF, led by Asari Dokubo and the more sinister, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, MEND. MEND was formed by remnant of Asari NDPVF and other similar group after the incarceration of Dokubo by the Federal Government (Asuni, 2009; Courson, 2009; Obi, 2009 and Omotola, 2009). The arrest of Dokubo after signing a peace deal with the Federal Government teaches MEND a very good lesson as the group adopts the face-less approach. Without an officially known public figure as the head, it becomes difficult for the Nigerian state and its security outfit to castrate the group through the arrest of its leaders. MEND campaigns of violence directed at crippling the operations of the oil industry were wage through the kidnapping of expatriate and local oil workers, the vandalization of oil installations and spate of violent acts against the interests of the Nigerian State and the oil multinationals (Courson, 2009; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010; Obi, 2009). At the heights of it campaign of violence from 2006 which lasted till late 2009, MEND through its action was able to force the shutdown of vital oil production installation and cut the nation’s daily oil production by at least 25 percent taking conservative estimate (Obi, 2009). Though the implementation of an amnesty package by the federal government has reduced to the barest minimum the state of insecurity in the Niger Delta, the situation still remains that of the peace of the graveyard (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana, 2011; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010). The reason being that for as long as the state failed to address in an wholistic manner, the major factors underlying grievance and protests in the region the likelihood for resumption of violent action against the interest of the state-oil MNC’s alliance will remain high. Resolving the political and socio-economic and development challenges facing the region by all stakeholders is the only recipe for peace (Table 17.6).

 etween Paternalism and Militarism: Discussing State B Response to Agitations in the Niger Delta One major conclusion that can be gleaned from the literature on conflict management in Nigeria is that official handling of governance-related conflicts in Nigeria is problematic, inadequate and questionable (Albert, 2003). The problem associated with conflict management by the Nigerian state was avidly demonstrated by the response to and management of the governance crisis and ensuing conflicts in the Niger Delta. From its handling styles, it can be deduced that the Nigerian state over the years has failed to evolve coherent conflict management modality for resolving

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Table 17.6  Trend of protests and conflicts in the Niger Delta Period 1950– 1965

February to March 1966 1970– 1982

1983– 1990

1990– 1996

1997- till date

Issues informing agitations Civil agitation for special development attention in view of the difficult ecology and terrain and for separate regions because of marginalization by majority groups Call for separation or greater autonomy for the Niger Delta

Modes of agitations Writing of petitions; parliamentary presentations and position papers by Niger Delta elite

Militant insurgency led by Isaac Adaka Boro and his Niger Delta Volunteer Force Peaceful agitation by host Demands for basic social infrastructure, communities against multinational oil greater development attention and compensation payment for damages to land, corporations farmland and property Peaceful demonstrations and Conflict between host communities and multinational oil corporations over payment obstructions of installations and court litigation of fair and just compensation for damages to farmland, water body and property and for the provision of development projects The rise of civil, communal, ethno-national Peaceful mass base demonstrations by civil and ethno-national groups and and regional groups to coordinate protests and demonstration against the state and oil host communities and occupation of production installations multinational corporations for continued insensitivities to the development plight of host communities and for state repression Continue demands for greater development Peaceful and confrontational protests; efforts on the part of the Nigerian state and demonstrations and occupation of oil oil multinational corporations; demands for facilities; proliferation of communal and other forms of militias groups and increase in derivation; call for resource commencement of violent ownership and control; call for the confrontations between militias and abrogation of existing laws and the other armed groups and state security enactment of new laws to regulate all aspects of the operations of the oil industry forces

Compiled from Ikelegbe, 2006: 102–106

the crisis in the Niger Delta. According to Isumonah (2003), response of the Nigerian state to the Delta crisis has entailed a mixture of both peaceful and non-peaceful methods. The peaceful methods have encompassed the setting up of various development commissions, extra-development agencies and bodies by the state, especially the federal government to address the socio-economic and infrastructural problems facing the oil-bearing region. The establishment of commission to address the challenges of development was a core recommendation of the Willink Commission set up to inquire into the fears of minority and means of allaying them by the departing British colonial power in 1958. It was on the basis of the recommendation that the Niger Delta Development Board was established in 1960 to cater for the unique development needs of the region (Akpabio and Akpan, 2010; Willink Commission, 1958). The increase in the incidence of communal protests against the operations of oil companies forced the federal military government to announce a series of policy measures, the most

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important of which was the setup of a twelve-member statutory agency, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) through decree No. 23 of July, 1992. It was this tradition that was maintained under the present democratic dispensation when the Federal Government under the Presidency of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo announced the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC in 2001 (Aghalino, 2009b; Isumonah, 2003). However, more than the peaceful approach, state responses to anti-oil protests have been marked more by coercion and repressions. As Omotola argued (2009) state repression may not be unconnected with the very high stakes of oil in the Nigerian political economy. This has worked to constrict the state to be sluggish on the use of dialogue, negotiation and concessions and expansive, willing and quick to the utilization of repressive tactics (Ikelegbe, 2001a). Even before the massive militarization of the Niger Delta that effectively begins in the 1990s, the Nigerian state violently crushed the first revolt in the Niger Delta led by Isaac Boro in 1966. The policy of repression was later to be perfected under the military junta of General Sani Abacha when the regime created the notorious Rivers State Internal Security Task Force to crush the Ogoni rebellion. The repressions, right abuses and other state-sponsored violence visited on the Ogoni have been subject of much scholarly discourse (Ukeje, 2001; Naneen, 1995; Osaghae, 1995; Welch, 1995). Since the Umuechem killing of 1990 and the repression in Ogoniland, things have moved from bad to worse in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian state with the tactic connivance of the oil companies has devised and implemented repressive military campaigns which have left trails of tears, blood, death and sorrow among inhabitants of the region. The use of force and state repression as conflict management modality that characterized the response of the Nigerian state to the crisis in the Niger Delta under different military regimes continued unabated under democratic rule. The Nigerian state under the present democratic rule has sanctioned deadly military campaigns that have resulted in loss of hundreds of live, maiming, destruction of community and other forms of atrocities in Odi in 1999; Choba in 2002, Odioma in 2005, Gbaramantu in 2009 among other. The crises that led to the destruction of Odi and Odioma and the cold blood murder of the inhabitants of these towns by men of the Nigeria Armed Forces deployed by the civilian regime of President Obasanjo have been well documented (Omeje, 2004; Albert, 2003; Effiong, 2002; ERA, 2002). Though reports regarding the number of deaths recorded as a result of the military invasion of Odi varied, large was its scale that it was asserted to be the third biggest internal military operation to be carried out by the Nigeria Armed Forces (Albert, 2003). Contrary to expectation, the military repression in Odi, Choba and Odioma failed to silence dissent in the Niger Delta. In the face of continued violent actions by militia groups in the region, the federal government deployed a permanent Joint Military Task Force codename “Operation Restore Hope” to maintain peace and order and secure oil installations. This signalled the commencement of effective and total military occupation of the region by the Nigerian state. While relative peace and normalcy have returned to the Niger Delta sequel to the implementation of the amnesty programme, the policy of military occupation of the region continued unabataed.

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Conclusion This chapter gives an introduction into the history of the emergence of the oil industry in Nigeria. It highlights the important position that the oil industry occupies in the context of the political economy of Nigeria since the 1970s. The chapter notes that there are many contradictions that characterized the operations of the oil industry the most important of which is the fact that while the industry generates enormous revenue for the State, the people of the region live in penury. This is as a result of the negative effects that the operation of the oil industry has on people’s lives and livelihoods in the region. This is what informed the emergence of popular peaceful protest and agitation in the region. The failure of the Nigerian state to proactively respond to grievances driving protests and the use of force to quell agitation transformed popular protest in the Niger Delta from peaceful to that characterized by violence. It is on the foundation of this culture of violent dissent that emanated from the years of neglect and state repression sanctioned by oil multinationals that the present dynamics of conflict that emerge within the context of democratic politics and governance since 1999 is premised. The rise of dissent movements in the Niger Delta was without doubt the climax of an expression of dissatisfaction with the excruciating conditions of the region occasioned by the exploitative, coercive and repressive dispositions of the state and oil companies to anti-oil protests. The present level of violence, resistance and confrontation against the state and the industry might be seen as a vindication of the prediction by Saro-Wiwa before he was sentenced to death by the military tribunal that heard his case and that of his eight Ogoni compatriots. Saro-Wiwa before his death was quoted to have stated thus: I predict that a denouncement of the riddle of the Niger Delta will soon come. The agenda is being set for this trial. Whether the peaceful ways favoured will prevail depends on what the oppressor decides, what signals it sends out to the waiting public…I call upon the Ogoni people, the peoples of the Niger Delta, and the oppressed minorities of Nigeria to stand up now and fight fearlessly and peacefully for their rights. (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 209)

While the people of the Niger Delta particularly the youth has heeded Saro-Wiwa calls, they have been forced to take the option of violent protests and armed confrontations as their peaceful methods had been met with state violence and repression. Indeed, there can never be a better understanding of the logic of violent resistance that characterized state-oil alliance relationship with youth militia movements and the people of the Niger Delta without situating the crisis within the context of state repression and militarization of the oil fields and relationship in the region that commenced with the military operations in Umuechem and Ogoniland in the early 1990s.

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Roberts, F.O.N. (1999). The State, Accumulation and Violence: the Politics of Environmental Security in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Areas, NISER Monograph Series, 17. Saro-Wiwa, K. (1995). A Month and A Day: a Detention Diary, London: Penguin. Saro-Wiwa, K. (1992). Genocide in Nigeria: the Ogoni Tragedy, London, Lagos and Port Harcourt: Saros International Publishers. Tamuno, T.N (1970). Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914, Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, (4), 563-584. Tebekaemi, Tony (1982). The Twelve-Day Revolution, Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Company, 1982. Ukeje, C. (2001). Youth Violence and the Collapse of Public Order in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Africa Development, Volume XXVI, No. 1 and 2. UNDP (2006). Niger Delta Human Development Report, Abuja: United Nations Development Programme. Uwakonye, M.N; Osho, G.S and Anucha, H. (2006). The Impact of Oil and Gas Production on the Nigerian Economy: a Rural Sector Econometric Model, International Business & Economics Research Journal, 5, (2), 61-76. Watts, M (2008). Imperial Oil: The Anatomy of a Nigerian Oil Insurgency, ERDKUNDE, 62, (1), 27-39 Welch, C.E, the Ogoni Uprising and Self Determination: Increasing Violence in Nigeria, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1995 Willink Commission (1958). Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them. London: Her Majesty Stationary Office

Chapter 18

Money Politics in the Nigerian Electoral Process Arthur E. Davies Abstract  This chapter examines the issue of money politics in Nigeria. In recent years, politics and elections have been seriously monetized. The political class appears to hold the belief that votes are commodities that could be bought off from the electorates. Once paid for, the electorates are robbed of the power to demand accountability. Money politics is driven by the high level of poverty in the country. The high level of poverty is the consequence of bad governance of policy. Despite the negative consequences of selling votes, it has been growing on an alarming rate. Poverty makes the electorates susceptible and thus exposes them to political manipulation that manifest in vote buying. This chapter examines the reasons for vote buying, the shapes it takes and the implications for the new democracy. Keywords  Vote buying · Money politics · Electorates · Poverty and politicians

Introduction Politics is generally regarded as the struggle for power among actors who pursue conflicting desires on public issues. The principal aim of the victorious in that struggle is to authoritatively allocate values, including setting the economic, social and political agenda for the society. It is also a process that involves the exercise of control, constraint and coercion, typifying the Lasswell’s saying that politics is about who gets what, when and how. Politics is ubiquitous in all social relations, whether within organizations or among individuals (Worsley 1964). It involves the use or attempt by one person to use power to influence others to behave in a manner that they would ordinarily not have to behave. That is why political gladiators strive to secure political power to enable them to influence the direction or the path their society or organizations should go.

A. E. Davies (*) Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_18

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It is a truism that human beings, because they are homo-politicus, have the tendency to want to acquire political power, not only to provide for their material needs, safety and security but also to dominate others. It is not uncommon, therefore, for them to invest some or all their financial and material resources, directly or indirectly, in the struggle for political power. Power then has, to an extent, assumed the quality of a material substance (Friedrich 1974:16). Power is now to politics what money is to economics. Paradoxically, money itself has become a dominant factor not only in all economic affairs but also in deciding issues in the political and social arena. Furthermore, money seems to have taken the centre stage in the political process in most countries; and in Nigerian politics, it is sadly now playing an increasingly critical role. It even appears to be so dominant in the electoral process to such an extent that the word ‘money politics’ with a pejorative connotation has crept into the country’s political lexicon. It is now a critical variable when assessing the level of political corruption in the country. It is not in any way being suggested that the use of money by political parties or any person or group of persons involved in the electoral process is inherently corrupting or that every financial investment made by a political office holder to get elected should be regarded as an evidence of political corruption. On the contrary, it is an incontrovertible fact that money matters in a democracy, because most of the political activities that make democracy to be a preferred system of governance, could not take place without it (Walecki 2008). Money is needed, for example, for sundry services and logistics such as mobilization for political campaigns and rallies; printing of posters and manifestoes; production of party emblems and other symbols; publicity; etc. The funds for all these normally come from the political parties themselves, campaign contributors and, by the electoral laws in many countries including Nigeria, public treasury. Whenever the government makes financial contribution to political activities, the rationale is usually not just to aid the political parties and their candidates; but more importantly, it is to allay the suspicion of the people that special interest groups which make large donations to political parties and candidates in elections, would control elected officials who would be obliged to show gratitude for the campaign money they might have received from these interest groups. On the surface therefore, the sources of funds for electoral contest are quite legitimate. The only worry is the noticeable corrupting influence of money in the electoral system and indeed the democratic process. Given the element of quid pro quo inherent in the contributions from interest groups and rich individuals whose political and economic motives may be incompatible with public interest, the concern that the electoral process has been hijacked by the rich merits an investigation. In addition, critical appraisal of political financing becomes imperatives because legal frameworks or the implementation of extant legal limits regarding election financing is still infancy and also very weak in most developing countries, including Nigeria. It is against this background that this chapter examines the concept of money politics and its perceived negative effects on the Nigerian body politic.

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Money Politics: Its Trends and Predisposing Factors We define money politics here as that phenomenon in the Nigerian electoral process whereby contestants use money or money is used on their behalf, as an inducement to sway the support of the electorate from their opponents to their side, rather than relying on persuading the electorate to vote according to their wish and conviction. Many interest groups, corporate bodies, businessmen and some rich individuals who have developed infinite capacity to invent stratagems to channel large sums of money to campaign coffers of some political parties and their candidates often aid this phenomenon. Their spending pattern during elections sometimes becomes so disgusting that the impression is easily created that candidates are being merchandised for high public office like a breakfast cereal (Sohner 1973:195). This makes a mockery of a simple democratic process of electing rulers and representatives of the people, paving the way for a government with questionable legitimacy to emerge. The use of money to buy votes does not even stop at election time. It is a common practice in Nigeria as it is in many other countries, for numerous private interest groups and political action committees which seek policy goals and legislations to serve their narrow private needs, to continue to use all the means at their disposal, including money and to solidify or expand their influence on the elected officials (Wright 1985:402). The relative ease with which the elected officials show their gratitude by endorsing the legislative and policy proposals of campaign contributors seems to support the hypothesis that there is a correlation between special interest donations to political parties and candidates and legislative votes. Money has, in fact, been made to become ‘the mother’s milk of politics’ (Sohner 1973:190) which the political gladiators must drink to remain in business. Money politics reared its head in post-independent Nigeria, although its influence was quite minimal in the First Republic. Appeals to ethnic and religious sentiments were the most important weapon the political leaders and tribal heroes deployed to win elections since the strength and popularity of the major parties and their allies were enhanced by the primordial ties they had with the people in their regions. In addition, the Westminster model (parliamentary system) that was in place during this period made the political parties to exercise considerable control over the candidates to be fielded for elections. Candidates in the elections were less important as the parties took the centre stage, appealed to ethnicity, played alliance politics and used highly emotive terms which, in most cases, incited people to violence (Dudley 1982:68). Most of the election expenses were borne by the parties from the funds they were able to raise from local commercial establishments and rich individuals that enjoyed party and government patronage (Adeyi 2008:29–33). Although politicians were known to distribute T-shirts, caps and badges with party emblems, as well as some foodstuffs and sundry items to voters at political rallies, there was no huge spending by individual candidates to win elections. Money politics assumed greater dimension during the Second Republic which commenced in 1979. It was encouraged by the oil boom of Gowon era, coupled with the emergence of some immensely rich Nigerians who made their money during the

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Nigerian civil war, supplying arms and ammunition, and those who were government contractors involved in the federal government reconstruction projects. Thus, as soon as the military signalled the commencement of competitive politics, these people ventured into politics or sponsored candidates for elective office. There was so much display of affluence and use of money by the wealthy contractors and the mercantile class that those who emerged victorious in the conventions and the primaries of some of the parties, notably the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian People Party (NPP) and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), belonged to the business managerial group. Campaigns that were conducted in 1993 did not fare any better in terms of excessive use of money during the party primaries and the ­presidential election, despite the fact that the election took place under the watchful eye of the military. The rich had actually hijacked the two political parties established by the military, namely, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) (Ibid: 36). At the party primaries, for example, the use of money to win party nomination was pervasive, while complaints of bribery trailed the results. As one of the contestants who lost out claimed: Money was paid to party functionaries who were demanding and negotiating the amount of money to be given to them for payment to ward officers and others, and for how many votes will be allocated to aspirants. (Cited in Nwosu 1996:76)

Interestingly, the noticeable excessive use of money during the 1993 presidential election was ostensibly adduced by President Babangida to annul the election. He declared: There were authenticated reports of election malpractice against agents, officials of the NEC and voters….there were proofs of manipulation, offers and acceptance of money and other forms of inducements, evidence available to the government put the amount of money spent by the presidential candidates at over 2.1 billion naira. (Cited in Ojo 2000:11–12)

Similarly, money politics reached its zenith in the elections that ushered in the present democratically elected government in 1999 and the civilian to civilian transition elections of 2003 and 2007. If the use of money in the 1999 elections was open and shameless (cited in Suberu 2001), that of 2003 in particular was outrageously indecent. This seemed to have jabbed the conscience of President Obasanjo, incidentally a beneficiary of the sordid act in the act in the 1999 and 2003 elections. At a public forum the president belatedly admitted that: With so much resources being deployed to capture elective offices, it is not difficult to see the correlation between politics and the potential for high level corruption. The greatest losers are the ordinary people, those voters whose faith and investment in the system are hijacked and subverted because money, not their will, is made the determining factor in elections. Can we not move from politics of money and materialism to politics of ideas, issues and development? (INEC 2005:4–5)

In a nutshell, the Nigerian electoral process is now being characterized by unbridled use of money to purchase votes as well as the willingness and readiness of the politicians to channel their financial and material resources to secure electoral victory at the polls.

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But why has the situation degenerated to this level in Nigerian politics? A number of reasons could be advanced for this, among which are: (a) The inability of the political parties and the contestants to put in place comprehensive and comprehensible manifestoes that would enable the electorate to make a rational political choice, meaningless slogans, demagogic and rabble-­ rousing speeches. Such speeches either overestimate or underestimate the political perception of the voters but are rarely educative and convincing. Many voters seem to be impressed by all the tricks the parties and the candidates employ, hence the need to bribe them for their votes. (b) Political cynicism on the part of the voters who believe that political office holders are incurably corrupt, self-seeking and incompetent; that politics is a dirty and dishonourable enterprise and that the whole political process is a fraud and a betrayal of the public trust (Campbell 1962:14). This cynical view of politics is further accentuated by the unfulfilled promises made by the winners of past elections. Thus, asking for money from the candidates canvassing for votes is equivalent to asking for a pay-off, another way by which the people receive their own share of the national cake. On the other hand, the candidates who give money to voters probably believe that they are investing against electoral failure. (c) Focusing on personalities rather than on issues. By the mode of their campaign, most candidates draw the attention of the electorate away from the political parties to themselves. The consequence of this is that the political parties and their message become less important to the electorate. The candidates then take the centre stage and would, therefore, need to spend more money than their parties could afford in order to mobilize support for themselves. This becomes inevitable because in the Nigerian political scene, very rich people largely own the big political parties as well as huge sums of money to defray the running cost of party secretariat. Thus, the wealthy politicians have a firm grip of the party decision-making process and the party machine. It is probably the suffocating grip by the money bags and political godfathers that enable them to control, lock, stock and barrel and determine who gets which office within the political party structure. Given the financial dependence of the political parties on their financiers, the big political parties deliberately charge exceedingly huge nomination fees that shut out the candidature of the poor in party primaries. (d) The people’s perception greatly reinforced by obscene display of opulence by the public office holders and ostentatious living of many politicians that every elected or appointed public officer is amassing wealth from the public treasury. This seems to have strengthened the resolve of many voters to sell their votes to the highest bidder (Obasanjo and Mabogunje 1992:6). (e) The penchant of politicians to strive to win elections, even at the party primary levels, at all cost, makes desperate contestants to engage in all sorts of malpractices including offering financial and material inducements to voters. Working on the poverty of the people, Nigerian politicians have been known to distribute foodstuffs and other consumable materials to voters shortly before the elections

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and sometimes on election day, contrary to the provisions of the extant electoral law that prohibits such practice. Instances abound too, when candidates threw some money into the air during campaign rallies, making people to scramble for it and getting injured in the process (Adejumobi 1997:138). (f) The noticeable weakness in party whip, characteristic of party politics in the presidential system, when elected members exercise considerable degree of freedom when voting on legislative proposals. Such freedom makes the legislators to be more susceptible to receive gratifications from the private interest groups. The interest groups employed what is referred to as ‘legalized bribery’. They make large donations to some spurious private or community programmes in which the target legislators are interested and give expensive gifts to the legislators or sponsor their overseas travels, etc., all in the name of public relations to secure the votes of the legislators in the legislature. (g) The absence of any effective legislation that puts any ceiling on financial contributions to the political parties and candidates by groups or individuals. However, its provisions (Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999) in respect of the finances of political parties relate only to their sources of funds and other assets. For instance, section 225(3) of the constitution merely prohibits any political party to (a) hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria or (b) retain any funds or assets remitted or sent it from outside Nigeria. On the other hand, section 228(c) of the constitution only complements the source of funding the political parties by enjoining the National Assembly to provide annual grants to the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis, to assist them with their functions. But the requirement that political parties prepare and submit audited account to the electoral body is only intended to ensure transparency and accountability (INEC 2005:4–5). Until the passage of the Electoral Act, 2006, no law existed in Nigeria that put any limit to the amount candidates could spend in elections, while the National Assembly is yet to issue guidelines to regulate the activities of lobbyists and other political action groups that operate, formally or informally, buying the votes of legislators for their causes in the legislature.

Myth and Reality of Money Politics The logical question to ask when assessing the influence of money in the electoral process is: To what extent can one say that the electoral victory of a candidate is a function of the quantum of money that has been invested in the election? This may not be easy to establish. Admittedly, money, as it has been said, is required for logistics, etc. However, good party organization, clear manifesto and fielding credible candidates with integrity or record/expectation of good performance while in office are also important determinants of success at the polls. In addition, candidates who are identified with political parties that have good programmes stand a better chance

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to win elections, baring religious and ethnic consideration (Vanguard, Friday, October 14, 2005). But can the politician who ignores these factors and bribes voters directly or indirectly attribute his success to the amount of money he gave the voters? No one can say with any certainty. Even if the politician beats his chest in the euphoria of victory that his money has done the electoral magic, the claim is still presumptuous. The truth is that there is yet no statistical or material evidence of a causal link between the victory at the polls and the monetary or material inducement to the voters because: (i) The Nigerian electoral system is characterized by secret ballot or open-secret ballot. That being the case, there is no way by which the politician who has bribed the electorate would know who did not vote for him. Some politicians, especially those that have little funds to spend during campaigns, share this view. That is why financially hard-pressed politicians and civil society organizations with keen interest in free and fair election usually advise the voters to collect the money and material doled out by the big spenders but still cast their vote secretly according to their conscience. (ii) The monetary inducement would have direct impact if all the voters or majority of them could be identified, as it would have been in an electoral college, in order to facilitate the bribery transaction. What the unscrupulous politicians who are aware of this limitation probably do to overcome this problem is to first identify the most influential persons in the party machine within communities, grease their palms and direct them to use influence to get the required votes from the target electoral wards and areas. How much electoral success can be attributed to this practice is unclear. (iii) Where there are thousands of voters in the constituency, there is the additional problem of how to bribe a large number of voters to change their predetermined electoral preference. How much is the politician going to spend to do this? Certainly the candidates contemplating using money to buy votes would have to mobilize a substantial sum of money to make an impression. Some candidates may succeed in raising funds to cover their election expenses, but since success cannot be guaranteed, many of the politicians who invest their money in this kind of venture later go into penury after failure at the polls. Some even engage in despicable conduct to have a financial lifeline. Just recently, one of the unsuccessful election candidates confessed, when he was arrested by men of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), that he took to drug pushing after losing all his savings from pharmacist’s business, which he spent during the 2007 elections, and that his motive for dealing in hard drugs was to equip himself financially in readiness for the 2011 elections (The Nation, Thursday, May 27, 2010). (iv) The absence of any legitimate sanction which could be imposed on voters that collected money but refused to vote as expected makes the buyers of votes (politician) helpless, while it emboldens the sellers of votes (voter) to take his decision unhindered.

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Despite the absence of empirical evidence of the actual link between success at the polls and the quantum of money spent during campaigns, the way candidates in Nigeria go about spending money to reach their target audience and supporters confirms the view that money not integrity and service has become the dominant influence and variable in the political process. Besides, the high level of corruption and fraud among elected public officers (state governors, legislators, etc.) has lent credence to a grand swell of opinion that most elected public officers are looting the treasury and collecting bribes as much as they can in order to recoup what they spent to get elected.

Consequences of Money Politics There are many negative consequences which money politics brings to the polity. Among them are: (i) Spending money beyond what is ordinarily required to defray legitimate campaign expenses by directly or indirectly bribing voters is definitely an electoral malpractice, and the ‘favourable electoral results’ emanating from that would not represent the true wishes of voters, i.e. their actual political preference minus the intervention of money. (ii) People of integrity and those who genuinely want to serve the people but have no money to buy votes may lose out in the electoral contest, while bad candidates with abundant financial resources or those with corrupt tendencies may get elected. When this happens, the immoral and condemnable use of money to buy votes is then celebrated as a good and effective weapon in electoral battles by successful contestants (Milbrath 1965:24). (iii) The winner of an election characterized by purchase of votes and other corrupt electoral practices would, expectedly, develop investment mentality and try to recover the money he invested in the elections when he occupies a public office that gives him access to public funds; when he finds himself in a position, say that of a legislator, he becomes more prone to receive gratification to promote and support the private interest of his sponsors. To be sure, there is now a popular feeling, indeed thinking, among a coterie of Nigerian politicians, that political contest is a high-risk investment opportunity; the higher the risk, the greater the returns. This type of thinking has been corroborated by a former President of the Nigerian Senate when he affirms in an interview that because votes are not free, politicians considered electoral contest for seats in the National Assembly as an investment and that many of them invested their fortunes; incurred massive debts and even sold their houses to contest and get elected (Saturday Punch, June5, 2004). The unequivocal message that was being sent by the former President of the Senate is that if a huge sum of money has been invested to contest election, then it is inevitable for the investor to strive to recover his money or part of it through different ways. If the investor with the political investment motives wins and is eventually entrusted with power, it is

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quite logical for people to assume that the pay back is likely to come from public funds (The Guardian editorial, Wednesday, July 19, 2006). This view is also being shared by President Obasanjo who lamented the total absence of any control on spending by parties and candidates towards elections. According to him, Nigerians are known to: Prepare for election as if we are going to war,… the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections more than would have been needed to fight a successful war. The will of the people cannot find expression and flourish in the face of so much money directed solely at achieving victory. Elective offices become mere commodities to be purchased by the highest bidder and those who literally invest merely see it as an avenue to recoup and make profits. Politics becomes business and the business of politics becomes merely to divert public funds from the crying needs of people for real development in their lives. (INEC 2005:4–5)

Nigerian legislators seem to be adept in investing strategies to recover the money they invested to contest elections. Some Senators have, for instance, been accused of demanding bribe from those whose nominations for some public offices were to be ratified by the Senate, in accordance with the provisions of the Nigerian constitution. Similarly, Obasanjo then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in a nationwide broadcast dismissed his Minister of Education whom he accused of offering bribe to some Senators, including the former Senate President, who demanded gratification to facilitate the approval of his ministry’s budget proposal in the appropriation bill (Vanguard, Friday, March 23, 2005). The Minister and the Senators have been facing trial for bribery and corruption. However, the Court of Appeal has lately quashed their trial because the criminal charges against them were said to have been badly prepared (The Nation, Wednesday, June 2, 2010). This sordid, corrupt practice is not limited to the Senate because a member of the House of Representatives has also confirmed that legislators often asked ministers and heads of public agencies to give them some money before any budgetary or extra-­budgetary proposals from their agencies could be approved (Sunday Vanguard, September 25, 2005). This kind of unwholesome practice constitutes a serious blemish on public policy and legislative process and consequently brings the highest indignity to the democratic process (Lamb 1978:155). Elected public office holders who spent a huge sum of money to secure victory at the polls would usually have a greater propensity to pursue their private business and financial interest and sometimes those of their corporate sponsors or mentors and financiers, euphemistically referred to in Nigeria as godfathers. In this situation, public interest takes the back seat in their calculation, thus degrading the responsibilities of the elected officials to the people. It is for this reason that Nigeria’s National Orientation Agency, a public enlightenment body, sponsored a radio and television jingle during political campaigns and rallies, by which it warned the electorate to be wary of politicians who want to buy their votes because, according to the jingle, anyone who uses wuruwuru (crooked, illicit means) to get elected would certainly render wuruwuru service to the people.

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What Should be Done? If money politics cannot be totally eradicated, there should be, at least, some mechanism by which its negative consequences could be minimized. One major way to begin with is for the State, by way of appropriate legislation, to set limits on how much political party or candidates seeking elective offices could receive as donations and how much is to be permitted as expenses on election campaigns. Such legal limits did not exist in Nigeria until 2006 when the agency responsible for conducting elections in Nigeria, i.e. the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), mindful of the dangers of money politics, got the National Assembly to pass a new electoral law that contains provisions that set limits to financial contributions to and spending on political campaigns. Specifically, section 93 (sub-section 1–11) of the Electoral Act 2006 not only set limits to the amount to be spent by candidates in presidential, governorship, national and state assemblies, chairmanship and councillorship elections, as well as the maximum amount (N1, 000,000) an individual can donate to any candidate in an election, it also stipulates various fines and terms of imprisonment or both for any contravention of the provisions (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2006). It is conceded that even if such legal limits are fixed on the solicitation, acceptance and disbursement of funds for political campaigns, strict enforcement and compliance may still be problematic. The problem would not be too different from the situation in the United States where, although legal limit has been set, such limit has been honoured more in breach than in observance and American politics has been very much oiled by money from the ‘fat cat’ contributors (Rodee et al. 1976:159, Wright 1985:408). In the Nigerian case, cynics have questioned the capability of INEC to implement the provisions of the electoral law relating to legal limits on funding and spending. Their argument is based on the well-known facts that (i) data on election expenses are hard to come by and (ii) the ingenuity of political parties and politicians to devise methods such as fundraising dinner for would-­be large contributors; sale of party emblems and making of souvenirs for dignitaries; book launch, contributions through dubious foundations and philanthropic agencies established by aspirants for elective public office and secret pay back, all of which are known to fatten campaign purse. The loopholes that could be exploited by the politicians are, admittedly, legion. Nevertheless, the decision to include legal limits on election financing in the electoral law was indisputably sound and represented a landmark effort to tackle the menace of money politics. All that is required is for the INEC to have the political will to enforce the law even-handedly by prosecuting all electoral offences in order to assure the public of its impartiality and independence. There is the need for some ethical codes to be enacted for all elected officials to prohibit them from exhibiting stupendous wealth which gives negative signal to the people that election to public office gives one the rare opportunity to amass wealth. This type of signal will unnecessarily raise the stakes; push the candidates in the elections to see the contest as akin to a do-or-die affair and consequently heat up the polity and the entire electoral process.

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More transparent and effective screening methods must be devised by the political parties and INEC to ensure the exclusion of politicians with overt or covert tendency to corrupt the electoral process. There is also the need for political education of the electorate to be more discerning in their electoral choices and minimize the pressures put on their elected representatives for financial and material rewards for voting. Finally, political parties should refrain from projecting the financial profile of the wealthy candidates and their financial importance to the parties. This is because such candidates have the tendency to want to live up to the image so created, by injecting more money into the campaigns than is morally justified.

Conclusion This paper is restating that money is an important element needed by political parties and their candidates to participate meaningfully in electoral contest for political power. Although money may not guarantee electoral success, it is, however, doubtful if any political party or candidate can effectively and successfully organize any campaign and contest elections to public office in Nigeria without some financial resources. To that extent, political parties, their supporters as well as the candidates are in order when they make their modest financial contributions towards the achievement of their goal. This is normal and legitimate. What is, however, abnormal, immoral and illegitimate is the pervasive corrupting tendency of some aspirants to attempt and, indeed, use of money to influence the outcome of elections in their favour, directly or indirectly bribing the voters or the officials of the electoral body. Once this kind of malfeasance creeps into the electoral process, election becomes synonymous with the ‘gentle art of getting votes from the poor and campaign funds from the rich, by promising to protect one from the other’ (Sohner 1973:186). This undermines the democratic process and encourages competitive corruption because almost all the candidates, particularly those who have the means, would resort to the disgusting tactics of using money to buy votes. If the situation remains like this, then Nigerian electoral process will continue to lose its credibility and the government that emerges thereof will represent anything but the wishes of the generality of the people.

References Adejumobi, S. (1997), ‘The Two Political Parties and the Electoral Process in Nigeria: 1989–1993’ in G. Nzongola-Ntalaja and M.C. Lee (eds.) The State and Democracy in Africa, Harare: AAPS Books, 125-145. Adeyi, E.M. (2008), ‘Funding of Political Parties and Candidates in Nigeria: Analysis of the Past and Present in V.A.O Adetula (ed) Money and Politics in Nigeria, Abuja: IFES-Nigeria Book Project, 29-38.

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Campbell, A., (1962). ‘The Passive Citizen’. Acta Sociologica, VI: 9-21 Dudley, B. (1982). An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics, London and Basing stoke; The McMillan Press. Federal Republic of Nigeria, (1999). The Nigerian Constitution, Lagos, Federal Government Press. Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006). Electoral Act 2006, Lagos: Federal Government Press. Friedrich, C.J., (1974), Limited Government: A Comparison, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. INEC, (2005). Political Party Finance Handbook, Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission. Lamb, K.A., (1978). The People, Maybe. California. Duxbury Press. Milbrath, L.W., (1965). Political Participation, Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company. Nwosu, N.I., (1996). `The Nigerian Presidential Election of 1993’ India Journal of Politics, Vol. XXX, No.1-2, pp.78. Obasanjo, O. and A Mabogunje, (1992). Element of Democracy, Abeokuta: ALF Publication. Ojo, E, (2000). ‘The Military and Democratic Transition in Nigeria’. An In depth Analysis of Gen. Babagida’s Transition Programme (1985–1993), Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol.28, No.1,pp.11-13. Rodee, C.L. et al. (1976). Introduction to Political Science, London: McGraw-Hill. Sohner, C.P., (1973). The People’s Power: American Government and Politics Today. Illinois. Scott, Foresman and Company. Suberu, R.T., (2001). ‘Can Nigeria’s New Democracy Survive?’ Current History May, pp.207–212. Saturday Punch, June 5, 2005. Saturday Vanguard, September 25, 2005. The Guardian (Nigeria), Wednesday, July 19, 2006. The Nation, Thursday, May 27, 2010a. The Nation, Wednesday, June 2, 2010b. Vanguard, Friday, March 23, 2005a. Vanguard, Friday, October 14, 2005b. Walecki, M., (2008). `Political Money and Corruption: Limiting Finance’ in V.A.O Adetula (ed) Money and Politics in Nigeria, Abuja: IFES-Nigeria Book Projects, 99-112. Worsley, P. (1964). ‘The Distribution of Power In Industrial Societies’ in P.  Halmos (ed), The Development of Industrial Societies, Sociological Review Monograph, Vol.8, pp.16-31. Wright, J.R.. (1985). ‘PACs Contributions and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective’, The American Political Science Review 79:2, pp.400-414.

Chapter 19

Population Census Administration in Nigeria J. F. Olorunfemi and Irewolede Fashagba Abstract  The number, size, and dynamics of population together with its spatial distribution are imperative for planning purposes. In Nigeria, and indeed, most developing countries where the number and distribution are essential, censuses, the primary source of population data are infrequently carried out. Hence, this chapter examines population census administration in Nigeria. The objectives are to assess politic of census and the possible way out of the challenges to census administration. Using secondary data and a qualitative analytical technique, it was observed that censuses were not only infrequent, but also faced with several challenges in conducting them. Prominent of these problems are the following: (i) poor organizational and managerial challenges, (ii) weak technological capacity, (iii) inadequate funding, and (iv) political problem. Also, this chapter reveals that some figures of the infrequent censuses were usually manipulated. In fact, a comparative analysis of 2006 census and the voters’ registration data conducted in the study showed that a series of anomalies occurred in the census. This is perhaps because of the political benefits attached population figures. Therefore, this chapter recommends that indirect techniques should be employed to generate population data to argument the available data generated through the census. This can greatly enhance the possibility of achieving some of the developmental goals in Nigeria. Keywords  Population · Census · Head count · Spatial distribution · Census administration

Introduction The number, size, and dynamics of population together with its spatial distribution are imperative for planning purposes. In the developed parts of the world, censuses regularly take place to provide the raw data needed for various governmental planning. However, in most developing countries, where ironically, the matter of numJ. F. Olorunfemi · I. Fashagba (*) Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_19

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ber and distribution of population is equally if not most essential, it has not been possible to have regular and reliable censuses. Against this background, this chapter takes a cursory look at census administration in Nigeria. Essentially, in the chapter, we aim at defining census, its administration in Nigeria, and discussing the politic of census and possible way out of the challenges to census administration, especially the role an individual citizenry could play.

Population Census Census is derived from a Latin word, meaning to value or tax (Ghende and Karitkar 2003). In practical terms, it is the photograph of the population condition of a country at a census moment expressible in number (Policy Analysis and Research Project, PARP 2007). Generally, census can be defined as the total process of collecting, compiling, evaluating, analyzing, and publishing demographic, economic, and social data pertaining, at a specific time, to all persons in a country or in a well-­ delimited part of a country (United Nations 1967; Ekanem 1972, and Ghende and Karitkar 2003). This, in other words, is the enumeration of the entire country or region at a particular time. Summarily, census therefore can be viewed as a periodic activity concerned with the quantitative documentation of the population and its characteristics collected at a specific geographic space for the purpose of social, economic, and political planning. From both developed and developing countries’ point of view, demographers have viewed population as the major source of data on the size, structure, and distribution of a country’s population for planning, research, and other population data users. Demographic data often captured from census are used for numerous purposes. In the beginning, censuses were done in parts to know or have an idea of the potential tax payers as well as to determine, from the quantitative point of view, an area or regional military strength. During this era, census taken was usually limited to counting the adults who were productive economically, socially, and politically. Most often women were not enumerated as they were considered irrelevant. As a matter of fact, demographic data at this point were collected in others to determine what the government could gain from an individual or groups of people rather than for planning what the people could derive from the state. In the modern states, however, apart from census data being used for tax collection and military conscription, data generated in both developed and developing countries have often provided basis for political representation in their various national assemblies or parliaments. Since population started to increase, representative system of government became prominent because the direct democracy where every adult citizen of a state would gather to deliberate and take decision on state’s affair became impracticable. Thus, people were represented on the basis of number of people enumerated from each area or state. Today, as it was in the past, the need for representative system of government has increasingly continued to put more demand on the need for regular head count in many countries, particularly in the

19  Population Census Administration in Nigeria Table 19.1  Censuses in Nigeria

355 Year 1866 1911 1921 1931 1941 1953 1963 1973 1991 2001 2006

Population (in million) N. A 11.100,000 18.700,000 20.000,000 World War II 30,410,000 55,670,055 79, 760,000 (later cancelled) 88,992,220 None 140,431,790

continents of Africa, South America, and Asia where the total population, structure, and composition as well as the spatial distribution are highly dynamic. Today, population census has however gone beyond mere counting of numbers, and data such as age, sex distribution, educational status, employment status, as well as occupational status of the people are derivable from census. These demographic data are indeed critically important in setting up comprehensive objectives in planning which further enhances government efforts in attaining equitable socioeconomic development. Census, being the main source of dependable demographic data of countries of the world both developed and developing, has often made efforts to carry out their individual head count as often as practicable, usually, between the interval of 5 and 10 years. As far back as 1960s, United Nations have encouraged countries of the world to have census in years ending with “0” or near it as much as possible, to allow for international comparability. Despite this admonition, this has not been possible in Nigeria as evidenced by the haphazard way in which censuses are carried out in the country. The early censuses with effect from 1911 were carried out in every 10 years or near it (Table 19.1), and this continued until 1991. The lack of commitment of the Nigerian government and its rather lackadaisical attitude toward determining, in truth, the actual population size of the country made it abandon census until 2006. While this may appear to be a disservice to the state, but it would appear to benefit the ruling elites who derive major political benefits from the situation.

Census Administration in Nigeria Available records have shown that census has a very long history. As a matter of fact, records have revealed that census started as far back as 3000 BC. In the ancient time, census taken was common or readily practiced in many countries, especially in Egypt, Babylon, India, Palestine, and Rome. Countries like Persia, Greece, and Japan among others also have a long history of census (Eniayejuni and Agoyi 2011 and Bamgbose 2009). In Nigeria however, early records of population data dated back to 1866 when the first census was carried out in Lagos area (Olusanya 1989).

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Census covering the whole country indeed began in 1911, when the then two protectorates that made up Nigeria were not yet amalgamated. However, subsequent censuses in the pre-independence period came up in 1921, 1931, and 1953. From Nigeria’s independence in 1960 to date, the country has had only three acceptable censuses. While the first one came up in 1963, others were conducted in 1991 and 2006. Apart from the acceptable ones, Nigeria has equally conducted two other censuses in 1962 and 1973, but the results were rejected on the ground of massive irregularities. Authors’ compilation, 2013. Note, figures for 1953 were taken from the 1953 census of Nigeria, while 1973 was from Geo Studies Forum 2000, and 1991 and 2006 results were from National Population Commission, 1991 and 2006. Efforts at documenting the total population have often been faced with many problems. Evidently, Nigeria’s early censuses appeared not to have been adequately prepared for by the government. For instance, after amalgamation, in the first two censuses conducted in 1921 and 1931, people were actually counted in few areas among Nigerian settlements. Majority of the people from most settlements were estimated from tax records. As a matter of fact PAN (1990) averred that: The two censuses (those of 1921 and 1931) which followed the amalgamation fell far short, for various reasons, of true censuses; they fell far short of the universal coverage and only in a few places were actual enumeration conducted. Census figures were derived from ethnological and historical enquiries and from tax records.

In the decennial series, there was no census in 1941 as a result of the World War II. Consequently, there was no census until during the 1952/1953 staggered census. Even though, the exercise was planned by the government to be conducted simultaneously throughout the country, it was conducted in 3 years – 1950 to 1953. In the government’s effort to have a dependable census result, Lagos area which have always had regular census was used for the trial census between 1950 and 1951 to test the suitability of the new methods intended to be used for the whole country. After the Lagos exercise, other head counts came up in 1952 and 1953 (PAN 1990:22). Despite this effort, the census suffered two major anomalies. First, many people deliberately avoided being enumerated; too many settlements particularly in the southwest (Nigeria) were not captured in the exercise (Ogunlesi 1965). The need for census in the early 1960s became apparent because the penultimate census to Nigeria’s independence was assumed to be an undercount coupled with the fact that the new sovereign state needed a credible population data for planning for her spatial, social, and economic transformation programs. Hence, there was urgent need for fresh head count as soon as was possible. Eventually, in 1962 the first postindependence exercise was conducted. However, the result was annulled due to widespread inflation of the population census results among the regions. The fact that the 1952/1953 census results were used to allocate seats to the three regions prompted each region to doctor its figure and inflate the number counted in the 1962 census. It was not surprising therefore that the result of the massively manipulated census figure was cancelled.

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Although the post censuses have been characterized by a fluvial process, because of its importance, another census was conducted in 1963. In an attempt to prevent the falsification of census results, the government embarked on a series of campaigns to discourage people from presenting themselves for multiple counting as it was the case in 1962. After much efforts, the exercise took place, and a total of 55,670,055 people were enumerated with 53.4% in the north and 46.6% in the south. The results of the 1963 census, for a very long period, remained the main source of demographic data used for Nigerian various planning purposes. In 1973, Nigeria embarked on another census exercise. Despite the huge amount of money committed into it by all the states, the head count was badly abused with extreme regional inflation of figures. According to record, the enumerated result for the north almost doubled her 1963 figure, while the south had less than 10% increase in 10 years. Consequently, the results were cancelled. Due to several reasons, the government could not carry out any credible or acceptable census like that of 1963 until 1999 when another head count was conducted. In fact to institutionalize the census exercise in Nigeria, the government decided in 1988 to put in place a permanent structure, the National Population Commission (NPC), under the leadership of Alh. Shehu Musa, to administer census in Nigeria. The new commission went into action and effectively planned and executed the population census of 1991. Three years before the exercise, an in-house mobilization and awareness drive for management and staff and the directors of the National Population Commission had started. Apart from this, the supervisors and the enumerators were adequately trained. To make the task much easier for the enumerators, a nationwide base map and enumeration areas (EAs) which divided the country to about 300,000 EAs were prepared. Eventually, when the exercise was carried out in 1991, it recorded a huge success with an enumerated total number of 88,992,220 people. Up till today, the 1991 census is adjudged the best census ever conducted in Nigeria. The 1991 census therefore remained the source of population data until 2006 when another census was conducted. There was no census in 2003. In the 2006 census exercise, a total of 140,431,790 people were enumerated. The result would appear too high considering the intercensal period. As a matter of fact, the increase came as a surprise to most of the population specialists in the field. Ever since 1991, Nigeria growth rates, though fluctuating, have been put at between 2.5% and 2.8% per annum toward the 2006 head count. One general feature common to Nigeria census is inaccurate results. Evidently, most, if not all the early censuses, conducted before Nigeria’s independence were all undercounted because people deliberately avoided being enumerated for fear of taxation. Apart from this, some of the settlements particularly in the southwest (Nigeria) were omitted in the list of enumerated settlements. However, from independence upward, the tide completely changed from the usual undercounting to multiple counting, spurred by few anticipated political benefits.

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Challenges of Census Administration in Nigeria Although census data are essential tools used for development planning, in many countries of the world, the exercise is conducted very infrequently. Some administrative, technological, environmental, economic, and sociopolitical challenges and constraints often account for this. The challenges and constraints inhibiting frequent conduct of censuses worldwide vary from country to country and from region to region. Where the challenges and constraints are less or probably unrelated to the availability of resources, it becomes easier to have a more regular exercise. Indeed, just a few developing and developed countries are very comfortable in this regard. Hence, only a few countries of the world are able to conduct census regularly (United Nations Records). Evidence from literature reveals that, up till the first half or a little beyond the middle of the twentieth century, there were still few places where population data had not emerged (Olorunfemi 2005a, b). Similarly, it was noted that more than 30% of the countries in the world did not conduct any census between 1955 and 1964 (United Nations Demographic Year book, 1964:2; and Linder 1959). Even today, many African countries are yet to have acceptable censuses. Perhaps because of the ways and manners in which census administration has carried out in the country over the years, particularly the way the exercise has often been manipulated by some tribal lords, Nigeria has remained one of the countries with disputable census figures. To be sure, in the earlier definition of census, it was noted inter alia that apart from collection and compilation, the results of the census must be published. On the contrary, details of the locality figures of the 2006 Nigerian census are yet to be published and released to the public. This is due to the fact that many states, especially Lagos, contested the outcome of the exercise. If one may ask, what are the major challenges militating against accurate census? The challenges and constraints shall be discussed under: 1. Organizational and managerial skills 2. Weak technological capacity 3. Inadequate funding 4. Unfavorable political environments

Organizational and Managerial Challenge Many of the available results of censuses particularly from the developing countries suggest that censuses were poorly organized or in certain cases conducted by people who lacked adequate requisite skills. For instance, the Nigerian census of 1953 and the first postindependence census conducted in 1963 revealed lack of adequate organizational skills. In the census prior to that, for example, many settlements that were already in existence before 1952 were omitted (Ogunlesi 1965). Besides, in many instances, the purpose of census was often misunderstood. While the program was meant for socioeconomic development, people had the notion that the demographic data generated from them were meant for political purpose. In the head

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count of 1963, there were limited organizational as well as low managerial skills that could curb irregularities, particularly the multiple counting and inflation of figures. In addition to the above, in some of the early exercises, the enumerators were told that they would be paid based on figures enumerated. This, to a large extent, encouraged fraudulent practices because the higher the figure enumerated the higher pay. By this, administrative ineptitude evidenced by the policy of making compensation a function of figure generated grossly undermined the integrity of the exercise. Apart from the above, the skilled manpower needed in many countries for data collection, processing, analyzing, and evaluating was often inadequate. Normally, data collected by the enumerators are usually filtered through adequate processing and thereafter compared with generated data from other sources. On the contrary, in most developing countries, the data are published without adequate processing. Perhaps, this explains why the Nigeria’s 1973 census returned for the northern regional figure was too high and far more than their enumerated figure in 1991 census, 18 years after. In many countries of the world where census is facing organizational problem, enumerators were often employed based on political affiliation. In other words, the appointment of enumerators is not merit driven but essentially motivated either by nepotism or patronage. Merit is here defined in terms of possession of relevant ­academic and professional degrees or qualifications and/or on the job experience. Indeed, possession of a combination of these two qualifications on the other hand would further enhance the quality of the individuals saddled with the responsibility of census administration. Today, despite the availability of a good number of trained personnel in census and demographic administration, they are sometimes not employed; even when engaged, they are told to tailor the results in a certain way. Good organizational skills ordinarily take care of cultural factor. In many countries culture has been noted to hinder the success of the census exercise. For instance, many cultures hold the belief that counting the children or the people generally attracts doom to the people. In an attempt to prevent the doom, censuses are being frowned at. In Nigeria, for example, counting the number of children a couple has is believed to be a taboo among the Yoruba-speaking people (southwest Nigeria). Sometimes, such culture and many more beliefs of the people constitute the major challenges. Thus, overcoming the challenges such as those identified here often requires good managerial and organizational skills.

Weak Technological Capacity In the early censuses up till the 1953, the available cartographical maps were obsolete because they were drawn with the traditional method; in some cases the boundaries overlap. Consequently, several settlements were not covered. As a matter of fact, report on the Nigerian 1953 census reveals that some settlements from the southwest were not captured due to the misleading cartographical map. Besides, it was also reported that the instruments used for data collection in the past censuses were structurally faulty. Scholarly writing of Ekanem (1972) indi-

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cated that the 1953 Nigerian census was defected. According to him, the structure of the questionnaire used was substandard compared to the general standard often used then. Therefore the questionnaire designed and used for the 1953 exercise rendered it a little bit difficult to make necessary adjustment to the final head count result. Apart from this, Nigeria like many other countries did not take into cognizance the environment where the head counts were conducted in the past. Before now, enumerators were usually denied access to the female respondents for various reasons. Literature concerning some of the early censuses conducted in Nigeria and Lebanon shows that enumerators’ functions were restricted. As a matter of fact, they were denied access to married females and the opposite gender in some regions of the countries. Even now the problem of gender and the Pudar system is still an issue. In recent years, this challenge has been tackled with the recruitment of sufficient female enumerators to take care of the situation. With advancement in technology, the development of appropriate technology such as remotely sensed data and the computer the problems associated with maps can no longer be an excuse for a failed census exercise.

Inadequate Funding Census is an expensive exercise. Usually, it requires some huge amount of money from planning to execution and to its final point of dissemination. Consequently, the substantial capital required has often hindered conducting censuses regularly in many countries of the world. Experience from many countries has revealed that the cost of executing head count could be as high as between 40% and 50% of most countries’ annual budgets. Onsembe and Ntozi’s (2006) estimated that the cost of Burundi, CAR, Uganda, and Ghana censuses from 2000 to 2009 was US$ 3.5 million, US$3.5 million, US$ 17 million, and US$ 21 million, respectively. For Nigeria, the giant of Africa, the 2006 census exercise gulped about US$ 300 million (this is about #40 billion as at when the exercise was carried out). This huge amount of money could conveniently finance three of Nigerian key sectors, the health, agriculture, and power sectors for some years as at 2006 when the head count was done. Considering the available resources, the capital required for conducting census is far higher than what most African countries can afford. Hence, many countries of Africa including Nigeria therefore depend on foreign aid in financing several aspects of their censuses (see Table 19.2). Table 19.2  Estimated cost for censuses among selected African countries (2000–2009)

Name of country Burundi CAR Uganda Ghana Nigeria

Cost in US$ 3.5 million 3.5 million 17 million 21 million 300 million

Source: Authors’ Compilation, 2013

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Political Problems This is perhaps the most common and dominant problem of censuses in the developing countries. Most of the census problems started as a result of politics, the level of falsification, or manipulation increases with the number of dominant ethnic groups in an area. In some instances, each ethnic group makes effort to gain the central control at all cost. Even though census data are vital, many times some individuals from some ethnic groups often made efforts to prevent census taken. Where their efforts failed from preventing such national head counts, the census results were often manipulated in pursuit of some narrow interest or objectives. In several countries, deliberate attempts have been made to avoid head count. For example, Clark (1969 cited in Olorunfemi 2005a, b) observed that the Lebanon government declined at taking census because of the delicate religion numerical imbalance. It was believed that embarking on such assignment might reveal the true population distribution. This situation was also true with Nigeria in the last 2006 national census when the inclusion of question on religion affiliation into the census questionnaire (intended to be used for demographic data collection) was hotly debated in the National Assembly. This was so because it was believed by the politicians that the result could lead to power shift if the assumed most populous religion failed to reach the height its adherent had claimed. It is important to note that most of the problems identified here are not limited to one country. They are common among most of the African countries. Additionally, in Nigeria, census taking as well as other sources of demographic data generation is often frowned at by the Nigerian politicians. This essentially aimed at preventing a situation where a new census figure could reveal the truth about the real population strength of each region or group as against the established regional percentages. It is believed that such exercise would unveil the true population distribution and consequently erode their political base. When census is eventually taken, the final regional result is often falsified. Since 1953 when the first true and scientific census exercise started till the last one held in 2006, Nigeria’s regional population distribution has always revealed a constant regional percentage 53% for the north and 46% for the south. Figures were believed to be artificial in nature rather than random. In an attempt to maintain the status quo in the regional population distribution, it was reported that the north increased from 29 million to 50 million people in the 1973 census in the space of only 10 years. On the contrary, the south increased from 26 million to 29 million. In the subsequent head count conducted in 1991, the level of falsification became clear as the area where about 50 million people were enumerated in 1973 reported a smaller regional population of about 46 million people after 18 years. Political problem in Nigeria would appear to have been created in 1954 when the available seats at the central legislative house were shared based on regional numerical strength as expressed in the census of 1953. Ekanem (1972) aptly stated that: After independence, the problem assumed a new dimension. Constitutional controversy and pure struggle for power at the centre between the three ethnic groups, Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas have been the recurrent themes in Nigeria political history. According to the constitution of the country at independence, population became the basis of political representation in the federal legislature.

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Since politics has been linked with demographic data distribution in Nigeria, gathering a reliable, credible, and dependable population data through census has since remained unrealistic.

Some Techniques of Generating Population Data Census is the most reliable and legal source of population data. However, because of the problems associated with the exercise in Nigeria, it has become imperative for Nigerians to find alternative techniques of determining her population. In many countries of the world, the population figures are determined through several techniques. In many countries data from electric meter installation, school enrollment, voters’ registration, and remote sensing inter alia have proved very useful. In the late twentieth century, specifically in the last two decades, a number of indirect techniques were used, while several others suggested. For instance, Ayeni (1980) used births and death records to estimate southwest regional population. Similarly, Olorunfemi (1985) used and also suggested the use of the house counting technique combined with crowding index (ci) in estimating population in Nigeria. Apart from this, several other techniques such as active and passive, error adjusting as well as record matching techniques have been suggested for estimating the population of Nigeria. Recently, it was further suggested that where voters’ registration and school enrollment data are readily available, it is possible to determine the country’s population.

Politics of Census Administration in Nigeria Ideally, demographic data are generated through national census in both developed and developing countries. However, the quality of each result of the exercise is affected by the desire for political allocation of seat to various states in the national assemblies, sustenance, and/or the desire for increase in each state’s federally allocated revenue and creation of new state among others.

Political Allocation of Seat Early censuses before 1960 were usually under-enumerated. In fact many people deliberately avoided enumeration for fear of taxation. However, this idea of avoidance of enumeration suddenly ended in 1954 when the regional representative was based on the figure enumerated from the 1953 census. With the use of census data for seats allocation, census became highly politicized. Ekanem (1972) aptly stated that:

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After independence, the problem assumed a new dimension. Constitutional controversy and pure struggle for power at the centre between the three ethnic groups, Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas have been the recurrent themes in Nigeria political history. According to the constitution of the country at independence, population became the basis of political representation in the federal legislature.

Census results from various regions were manipulated. As a result the first postindependence census of 1962 was rejected on the ground of massive falsification of head count results. Indeed, each region increased its regional population in order to maintain or possibly increase the number of seats due to it in the central legislative house of assembly. From that time till date, Nigeria’s censuses have often witnessed political manipulation. And as long as the yardstick for sharing of governmental benefits is a number game, recording a credible population figure would remain difficult.

Sharing of National Wealth In Nigeria, distribution of the nation’s socioeconomic resources has been based on the available demographic factors. Spatial and manpower, needs for development in areas such as road, power, and water and provision of health, education, housing, and social infrastructures, respectively, have been based or determined by population characteristics that were often enumerated through the national census. Not only that, military recruitment, employment into government parastatals, agencies and commissions, and selection of people into special positions at the federal level are often based on local government of origin, senatorial district, and/or state. Because of these identified factors as well as many others, collecting data reflecting the true population of Nigeria has remained elusive.

Creation of New State Most arguments for state creation in Nigeria have often been based on population and land mass in the last five decades. In 1991, for instance, among the 6 new states that were carved out from the previous 30 states, 4 of them were created from the north (one each from Sokoto, Kano, Gongola, Borno), while 2 states were created from the south (from Edo and Imo states). Even though their creation was based on land mass and population, one would wonder how and why the population of the newly created states rapidly increases as soon as they were created. As far back as 1979, each time a new state was carved out, the population started to increase rapidly. On the contrary, the population of other states that were left untouched would appear growing in a normal way. A case of this can be seen among the states created in the north and few in the south where their population appeared to increase geometrically as soon as they were created. Most of the new states often return very high population figure.

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The population figure presented by most of the states would appear to have been tailored. For instance, in 1991, Lagos’ population was reported to be a little above five million, while Kano was a few thousand higher than Lagos. After another state creation in 1991, Kano state was still reported to have more than Lagos’ population despite the fact that no new state was carved out of Lagos. It appears the total population of some states was deliberately underreported so as to enable regional domination as well as central control by some people since the game is more of a number. The politics of census has been evident in the fluctuating percentages of increase between the west, south, and north.

 omparative Analysis of the 2006 Census and Voters’ C Registration To put this study into proper perspective, therefore, it is necessary to examine the last Nigerian two censuses of 1991 and 2006. This would enhance ones’ understanding of politics of censuses in Nigeria. Evidences from the statistical analysis conducted on the population distribution of the two censuses suggest that the results were controversial. As the data from the direct source (the census) are compared with the indirect data source (data that are totally free from political manipulation), the credibility of the censuses becomes questionable. Even though there is limited space for the discussion of population growth as well as the distribution in Nigeria, some major states are discussed here. According to the 1991 census, Kano state recorded the largest population of 5.8 million, while Lagos had 5.7 million. Also, Kaduna recorded 3.9 million, Katsina 3.7, Rivers 3.1, Oyo 3.4 million, and Jigawa 2.8. In the last census of 2006, Kano state, despite the fact that Jigawa state was carved out of it, recorded 9.4 million, while Lagos state occupied the second position with 9.1 million, Kaduna 6.1 million, Katsina 5.8 million, Rivers 5.1 milloin, and Jigawa 4.6 million. The population distribution recorded in 2006 suggests that Kaduna state population would have been more than Lagos’ if Katsina state had not been carved out of Kaduna state. Indeed a comparative analysis conducted on the distribution revealed that Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, as well as some other major states in the north grew at 21%. This perhaps is the reason why the north and south have been presenting the same percentages in all their censuses since 1953 to date. In many states of the federation including Kano, Lagos, Kaduna, and Oyo, the results enumerated from censuses were contended. In fact some of the results were challenged in the census tribunal. In the 2006 census, for example, the 9.1 million census result released by the National Population Commission for Lagos was seriously contested. In fact, the then Lagos state governor, Senator Bola Tinubu told the world that he was prepared to conduct another head count for his state. Records from various sources present good reason why one would believe that the result given by the NPC was an undercount. Supporting this claim, Bamgbose (2009)

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presented a record of immunized children for Lagos state which showed that about three million children were immunized in 2003, 2004, and 2005. An available estimate on Lagos’ population for 2006 puts the population at over 17 (United Nations). On the contrary, NPC puts Lagos state population at 9.4, while many other Northern states’ figures appeared inflated, perhaps to maintain the status quo socially, economically, and politically. Recently, the Niger state governor reported to the world that the northern states economy had been witnessing serious economic crisis because of the political crisis the region has been going through. Using as his case, Babangida stated that Kano state, which used to have a daily bank saving of 300 million before the Boko Haram sect crisis began, now has a low bank saving of about 11 million per day. Even though he stated that people no longer go to Kano market, this may not be the true picture of the situation. The fact is that many people had left, while several others would still leave the crisis-rocked region. This may not come as a surprise if the usual state population percentage is not affected in the 2016 population census. The basis for this comparison would be based on 2006, the only year Nigeria ever had her census and voters’ registration simultaneously. As the two exercises came up simultaneously, one would expect a similar population for people from 18 years above from various states. On the contrary, the population distribution for most states differed significantly (Table 19.3). For instance, Bayelsa, Kwara, Benue, Nasarawa, and Gombe had more registered population than people enumerated in 2006. Furthermore, the population of Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Katsina, and Yobe Table 19.3  Comparison of the 2006 census and registered voters’ figures for people aged 18 years and above State Lagos Ondo Osun Ekiti C/Rivers Bayelsa Enugu Kwara Benue Niger Nasarawa Kaduna Kano Katsina Sokoto Borno Gombe Yobe Total

Pop from 18 yrs. $ above 5,655,650 1,908,360 1,915,622 1,334,690 1,594,384 941,322 1,878,006 1,181,095 2,026,533 1,853,801 900,488 2,908,477 4,360,547 2,631,384 1,705,461 1,993,637 1,086,793 1,084,089 36,960,339

Registered voters 4,206,000 1,356,779 1,297,279 7,71,228 1,139,735 955,279 1,201,697 1,216,478 2,150,515 1,551,903 1,001,422 2,589,047 4,172,597 2,589,047 1,409,337 2,191,902 1,410,234 996,380 35,162,978

Variance 1,450,650 551,581 617,720 563,462 454,649 −13,957 676,309 −35,383 −123,982 301,898 −100,935 319,530 287,950 42,337 296,124 −198,265 323,441 87,709 1,797,361

% 25.6 28.8 32.3 42.3 28.5 −8.5 36.0 −3.0 6.1 16.3 −11.2 10.9 6.6 1.6 17.4 −9.9 −29.8 8.1 4.9

Source: Authors’ compilation, 2013. Compiled from 2006 census results and Nigerian 2006 voters’ registration list

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slightly exceeded the voter registered figure (see Fig. 3). Indeed only in a very few states of the federation can the figures be considered to be fairly represented. Each of the states manipulated her population because of the perceived political, social, and economic benefits.

Conclusion Population census is an essential ingredient which shows the spatial population distribution as well as the demographic characteristics necessary for social, economic, and political planning. Because of the importance of census, efforts have been made as far back as 3000 BC to document an individual country’s population data. On the contrary, Nigeria which has a short history of census 1866 to 2006 has not been able to conduct the exercise on a regular basis. Within her short period of conducting census, obtaining reliable results has been difficult because of the excessive politicization of the exercise. Emanating from Nigeria’s irregular conduct of censuses, various indirect techniques have been suggested for estimating the country’s population data. Nevertheless, because of the recent technological improvements in various symptomatic data capturing media, there have been great improvements in some of the data. To the end, data from the voter’s registration can therefore be used in estimating Nigeria’s population following the various differences observed in the comparison made in the study.

References Ayeni, O. O. (1980). A Vital Registration Model for Nigeria Population: Data Assessment from Nigeria. Proceeding, No 1, Nigeria Population Association. Bamgbose, J. A. (2009). Falsification of Population Census Data in Heterogeneous Nigerian state: the Fourth Republic Example: African Journal of Political Science and International Relation, 3(8):311-319 Clark , C. (1969). Population Growth and Land use , London, Mcmillan, 339-387 Ekanem, I.  I. (1972). The 1963 Nigerian Census: A Critical, Ethiope Publishing Corporation, Benin City, Nigeria. Eniayejuni, A. T. and Agoyi, M. (2011). A Biometric Approach to Population Census and National Identification in Nigeria: A Prerequisite for Planning and Development: Asian Transaction on Basic and Applied Sciences, 1(5):51-57. Linder, G. (1959). World Demographic Data: P. D. Duncan (eds) the Study of Population, Chicago University Press. Ogunlesi, T. O. (1965). Before and After Census Operation in Nigeria: A physician’s Experience. In Caldwell, J.  C. and Okonjo, C. (eds). The Population of the Tropical Africa, Longman, London. Olorunfemi, J. F. (1985). Land use and Population: A Linking Model, Photogrametric Engineering and Remote Sensing, 50(2):221-227

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Olorunfemi, J. F. (2005a). Establishing Population Levels: Population Society Monograph, Series, Haytee Publishers, Ilorin. Olorunfemi, J. F. (2005b). Enhancing Accurate Population Census for Productivity: Science and Humanities Journal, 1(1):112-129. Olusanya, P.  O. (1989). Population and Development Planning in Nigeria. In Tanimu, T. and Atanda, J. A. (eds) Nigeria Since Independence, the 1st 25 years Government and Public Policy, Nigeria, Ibadan. (5):227-243. Onsembe, J. O. and Ntozi, J. P. M. (2006).The 2000 Round of Censuses in Africa: Achievements and Challenges. The African Statistics Journal, Vol.3. Population Association of Nigeria (1990) Everybody’s Guide to Nigeria Census. The Population Asociation of Nigeria. Policy Analysis Research Project, PARP, (2007). Nigeria’s Social Indicators for Legislative Guide, Abuja.

Chapter 20

Politics of Pension Administration in Nigeria Mathew Olasehinde Fashagba Abstract  This chapter examines the journey of the pension system from defined benefit scheme to defined contribution scheme in Nigeria. Pension was introduced to the public service in Nigeria in 1951 by her formal colonial masters. There were several adjustments in the administration of pension by different regimes to ensure the welfare of her retirees were sustained. It was not until 2004 when it was obvious that the old scheme could not achieve the goal of sustaining the welfare of the old that a major reform was considered and passed into law. With the new act generally referred to as Pension Reform Act, Nigeria effectively migrated her pension system from defined benefit pension scheme to defined contribution pension scheme. International influence, change in population structure, corruptions among political officers and pension administrators are shown to be among the factors responsible for the migration of the scheme. Finally, the work also reveals that the gains of the pension reform include generation of additional funds for economic activities, elimination of corruption in pension administration. Keywords Pension · Pensioner · Retirement benefit · Reform · Politics, Economy

Introduction In modern states, it is incontestable that among the three major components of the population structure, the aged and the retirees constitute a reasonable proportion of the population of any nation. In recent years and with the advent of the modern state and bureaucracy, there is an increasing disconnect between the birth rate and the expected population growth rate. To be sure, in most states, the birth rate and by implication the growth rate have been on a sustained decline, while those transiting to the ages of retirement have remained consistently high or increasing. This can be attributed to increasing improvement in science and technology, especially in terms of healthcare provision and medical facilities. This has been evident in the developed economies of the developed economies. M. O. Fashagba (*) Department of Business Administration, Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_20

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The implication of the growing percentage of the category of people that can be classified as aged or old population is not only felt on the economy of the country concerned but also in the political landscape. While this impact may not be direct on the nondemocratic nations, on the contrary, they have direct impact on the politics of democratic nations. The citizenry often react to government action or inaction on its decisions or policy on pension, retirement benefits, and the aged population through various means. That explains why policies on pension, retirements, and taxes are usually major campaign issues in western democracies because the politicians are aware that certain categories of voters are most likely to base their decisions on such issues. This is rarely the case in developing economies where extraneous factors rather that concrete government policies and plans for the workers and retirees play some roles in the electioneering activities of the politicians and the state. In Nigeria in particular, it is very rare for politicians to engage with the retirees and highlight their plans for them should they secure the support of the aged and the retirees in an election. Despite the foregoing, in recent years, government attitude appears to be changing as was evident in the enactment of the 2004 Pension Act by the Nigerian National Assembly. The enactment of the Act on the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) has itself triggered a new operational system which has also led to a new dimension in terms of politicking in the operating environment and between the operators like the pension custodians and administrators and the government on one hand and between the operators and the society on the other. Therefore politics of pension has received more prominent attention with the advent of the new democratic dispensation in 1999 in Nigeria. This is not to say that pension politics has not existed prior to the recent enactment of the Pension Act; rather the point is that a new twist and dimension were birthed with the introduction of the contributory pension scheme under Obasanjo administration. Indeed, there were not less than ten pension legislations between 1951 and 2004. This shows that the issue of pension has not been relegated by both previous military and civilian governments; however the approach to it and how the public and the media receive it vary from time to time.

Brief History of Pension in Nigeria The origin of pension in Nigeria has been traced to Pension Ordinance passed by the colonial government in 1951 with a retrospective effect backdated to 1946 for colonial government employees (Odia & Okoye 2012). The defined benefit pension scheme in form of “Pay-As-You-Go” was adopted for public service in Nigeria to provide for the retirement benefits for retirees under the colonial adminsistration. According to Fapohunda (2013), there were not less than ten (10) pension acts between 1951 and 2004. All the acts only made little modification on the Pay-As-­ You-Go (PAYG) which was adopted from the inception. All the pension laws with exception to the  2004 Pension Reform Act retained the defined benefit pension scheme as the main pension system for the public service in Nigeria.

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2004 Pension Reform Under his administration between 1999 and 2007, former President Olusegun Obasanjo led administration sign into law the contributory pension Scheme 2004 Pension Reform Act as part of his general economic reform executed by the administration. The reform ushered into the Nigerian pension system a contributory pension scheme, a significant departure from the traditional Pay-As-You-Go PAYG pension system adopted for the country public service in 1951. Different factors can be attributed for the replacement of the defined benefit pension scheme with the contributory pension scheme (CPS) in 2004. These factors can broadly be categorized into three broad classes of factors. The three broad factors are international factors, the local peculiar factors, and the general economic reform undertaken by the administration.

International Factor Nigeria is a member of the global community that witnessed the transition from the defined benefit pension scheme to a defined contribution pension scheme in recent years. This, according to Hinrichs (2003), was referred to as globalization which means a seamless, unfettered, and simultaneous information flow across nations and borders. Countries in Europe in particular were changing from the defined benefit pension scheme to defined contribution pension scheme as a result of the changes in their population structure. Some of the countries that have changed from the defined benefit pension scheme to the defined contribution pension scheme, according Orenstein (2008), Fashagba, and Dunmade (2019), include Chile, Bolivia, and Mexico among others. Orenstein specifically noted that over 30 countries adopted the defined contribution within a short time. The reasons for changing from defined benefit pension scheme to defined contribution pension scheme around the nations of the world include the reduction in fertility rate and expansion in life expectancy and span. According to Orenstein (2008), many countries faced a demographic problem, thereby making private pension desirable. There was a change in the structure of the population which made it difficult to retain the old pension system. The change prompted the new thinking and perhaps made it impossible to keep the defined benefit pension scheme for retirement benefit. The situation that Hinrichs (2003) described as “both below-­ replacement fertility and ever greater life expectancy” shows that fertility has reduced in the European countries leading to fewer younger people entering the labor force and providing for their wages as well as the retirement benefit for the increasing old population. At the same time, the improved Medicare and technology have slowed down the death rate. The implication is that there is more old population needing support while working population was on a decline. Worst still is fewer children are being born which means lesser numbers will grow to enter into the working population in the future.

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The old or aged does not provide for their retirement benefit while in service under defined benefit but rather is made to be dependent on the younger working population at retirement. It was therefore becoming more unsustainable since the old scheme required a growing working population to survive. Another major international factor responsible for the replacement of the defined benefit pension plan is the economic value of the new contributory pension scheme. The defined benefit pension scheme has been shown to play a significant role on the economic growth through mobilization of additional savings to compliment the traditional savings. Hinrichs (2003) rightly identifies that pension reform in the developed nations adds more responsibility to the funded scheme in terms of providing profitable investment for the economic growth. Similarly, other studies have shown that economic growth has a positive relationship with pension fund (Edogbanya 2013; Nwanne 2015; Farayibi 2016; Fashagba 2018). This also plays a strong motivation for rapid change of the pension system from old scheme to the new scheme. This is further justified in Barr and Diamond (2006) that other objectives for government involvement in pension policy include economic development.

Local Factors Notwithstanding that there were sufficient evidence from the international factors that conventional defined benefit pension plan could no longer be sustained for pension system for the retirement benefit for the pensioners, there were more serious local factors probably peculiar to Nigeria. These factors were also partially responsible for the replacement of the old scheme. These factors among others include: The existence of corruption in the pension sector in the country, studies have shown evidence of widespread corrupt practice in pension management in the country. This in fact precipitated the need for reform of the scheme, and this is what Obasanjo administration did to stem or eliminate the corruption in the sector. The consistent inadequate budgetary allocation for pension payment in the public sector which often results in a huge pension liability also prompted the need for reform. Odia and Okoye (2012) revealed that pension outstanding debt as at December 2005 was about 2.56 trillion naira. If the new scheme was not implemented as at the time it was, the situation would have grown worse. Obviously, the pensioners in Nigeria went through difficult times in recent years with arrears of unpaid pension accumulating for years. Indeed, many of them died while waiting for the never-ending state screening conducted on a regular basis to ascertain who is dead and who is still living. This itself is an indictment on the state which lacks the capacity to keep proper records. On the other hand, organizing screening for pensioners may be an avenue for some corrupt government officials to dip their hands into the public tilt by deliberately but unnecessarily inviting people to Abuja for screening just to allocate and share government money using the screening as a smoke screen.

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As noted, inadequate record on pensioners is a major challenge in Nigeria. The consequence is the avoidable but frequent verification and reverification exercises the pensioners are subjected to with its attendant hardship despite their old age. It was obvious that the old scheme was already a time bomb waiting to explode. One of the likely implications for the country is that current employees who are witnessing the suffering of the pensioners may want to avoid a similar fate by doing one of two things. One is to seek to improve the status quo by changing it to a realistic system or two to make desperate attempts to enrich self through action not devoid of corruption.

The General Economic Reform Nigeria having just emerged from military rule has suffered neglect in several sectors of the economy due to the desperate attempt of the military government to hold onto political power. Nigeria in the eye of the world was not in a good shape. It was a really bad situation that needs a desperate solution. The Obasanjo administration, after being sworn in for the second term in 2003, embarked on a general economic reform to revitalize and resuscitate the dying economy as well as to enhance the image of the country on the global scene and create confidence in the international investors with a view to attracting foreign direct investment which the economy was desperately in need of to be back on her feet. Indeed, pension as a tool of national security, economic growth, and capital accumulation for investment also benefited from political will of the administration to turn Nigeria economy around. This was done by adopting what has been working in other countries of the world. The new scheme was found to be working in Chile and some other countries that have adopted it (Babatunde 2012). The result of these three broad categories of factors was the 2004 Pension Reform otherwise referred to as the contributory pension scheme (CPS). The lapses of the 2004 Act were addressed in the 2014 Amendment Act. This has further addressed some of the major lacuna of the 2004 Reform. For instance, the 2014 Amendment Act increased the amount to be contributed by the government while reducing the amount to be contributed by the workers or subscribers.

Major Changes in the Scheme The first major change in the scheme is the transfer of pension management from public sector to private sectors. The scheme introduced uniform pension scheme for both private and public sector employees. The exemption is that all employees of the public sector are compulsory members of the scheme, while a private sector employer with employees with

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less than 4 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004) and less than 15 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2014) may not be included in the scheme. Pension fund is to be provided on a monthly basis for each employee until he or she disengages or retires. The fund remains in the personal account of the beneficiary in the custody of a licensed pension fund administrator and cannot be withdrawn by the employees until he/she retires and/or has attained at least 45 years. Compulsory monthly saving. Under the amended Pension Act 2014, a retirement saving account is required for all employees from the public and private sectors. The employers are expected to remit 10% of the employees emolument, while the employee contributes 8 percent. This rule does not apply to the military whose package is different. The Act provides for a pension fund for individual employees, like a bank account, personalized to each employee. Employees are expected to accumulate retirement pension through compulsory and voluntary monthly saving in the fund. The total amount accumulated in the account at the time of retirement will be used to pay the retirement benefit over the expected life span of the retiree.

Regulation The pension reform considers institutionalized regulation as a matter of urgency to avoid recurrence of the malpractice and corruption that characterized pension administration under the old order. Consequently, the new law established some key institution for the purposes of regulation, administration, and fund control. The provisions in the Act were a device to check possible excesses in the management of the pension funds. The bodies include the Pension Commission (PENCOM), Pension Fund Administrators, and Pension Fund Custodians.

National Pension Commission (PENCOM) This is a body created by the Act to regulate the activities of the employers, PFAs and PFCs in administration of the retirement saving accounts and any other matter related to the pension funds. The body was also empowered to award the penalty to any defaulting body in order to ensure a smooth administration of the funds.

Pension Fund Administrators (PTAs) This is the body allowed by the Act to open a retirement saving personal account for employees where their pension fund is to be remitted. The body is charged to manage, on behalf of the employees, their retirement funds in a safe and profitable investment.

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Pension Fund Custodians (PFCs) This is the body charged by the Pension Act with keeping and management of the investment of the Pension Fund Administrators’ assets. The employers remit pension fund to PFC chosen by the PFA who in return inform the PFA to credit the amount for the employee.

Political Aims of Contributory Pension Scheme in Nigeria The pension landscape in Nigeria has no doubt changed since the adoption of the contributory pension scheme in 2004. Some of the gains from the adoption of the contributing pension scheme include but are not limited to the following: Reduction in corruption practices in the public pension. The percentage of budgetary allocation for pension has reduced from 100% pension to 10% of the employees for public servants and 2.5% for military personnel. Therefore corrupt practices can only be limited to the operation of the old pension system and not likely on fund credited to individual accounts. However, the recent discovery of the huge pension funds diverted by some public officers charged with the responsibility of overseeing the pension operation suggests that the country still has a long way to go to root out corruption in the sector. Recurrent need for a large but unavailable budgetary allocation for pension payment has been overcome. The fund required to pay defined benefit pension is much larger as it is wholly funded by budgetary allocation. Unfortunately, the funds were usually unavailable leading to avoidable suffering by pensioners. With the contributory pension scheme, the budgetary allocation for the employer’s contribution to employee’s retirement saving account is just 7.5 percent saving the government with so much funds to meet other basic needs of the country as well as reduction of the frequent crisis between government and pensioners.

Political Gain of the Pension Reform The political gains of pension reform in Nigeria among others include but are not limited to the following: More funds are made available for infrastructural development of the country: The reduction in budgetary allocation for pension payment from 100 percent to 7.5 percent of the current employee’s emolument (12.5% for military personnel) constitutes a lot of relief on government expenditure. There is no doubt that this can be used for other infrastructural needs of the country. Elimination of political corruption in the pension sector: The privatization of pension management in the country has if not completely eliminated the widely reported corruption pension and has reduced it as less funds are expended for

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pension purposes. The appointment of staff and the management of funds are done on merit to ensure efficiency as they operate in the competitive market. Economic development: Funds created through pension saving with contributory pension scheme in Nigeria have generated a pool of funds for investment into the nation’s economic development. Pension fund is part of the nonbank financial institutions complimenting the traditional saving that enhances the capital market efficiency. Local and cheap source of funds for the government: the government can get secure funds from the pension fund at a cheaper rate with more ease than international funds for their use.

Conclusion The government has shown active interest in the pension system in Nigeria from the inception of pension in 1951. Both colonial and indigenous (military and civilian alike) government have been involved in improving the pension system to provide a framework for better welfare for the old, retired workers through continuous adjustment and modification of the legal frameworks.

References Babatunde, M. A. (2012). Impact of Contributory Pension Scheme on Workers’ Saving in Nigeria, The Social Sciences 7(3).pp 464 – 470 Barr, N. & Diamond, P. (2006). The Economics of Pensions, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (1) pp.15 – 39 Edogbanya, A. (2013). Assessment of the Impact of the Contributory Pension in Nigeria Economic Development, Global Journal of Management and Business Research 13 (2) Farayibi, A. (2016). The Funded Pension Scheme and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Munich Personal RuPEC Archive MPRA Fapohunda, T. M. (2013). The Pension System and retirement Planning in Nigeria,. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4 (2) Fashagba, M. O. (2018). Effect of Funded Pension on the Economic Growth in Nigeria, Lapai Journal of Management Science 8 (1) p 86-91 Fashagba, M. O. & Dunmade E. O. (2019). Evaluating the Benefits of the Old and the New Pension Schemes in Nigeria, Economic Horizons 21(1),3-11 Federal Republic of Nigeria (2004). Pension Reform Act Federal Republic of Nigeria (2014). Pension Reform Act Hinrichs K. (2003). The Politics of Pension Reform in Germany, Paper prepared for the Conference Pension Reform in Europe: Shared Problems, Sharing Solution? London School of Economics, Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, London Nwanne, T. F. I. (2015). Impact of the Contributory Pension scheme on the Economic Growth in Nigeria, Global Advanced Research Journal of Management and Business Studies 4 (8) Odia J. O. & Okoye, A. E. (2012). Pension Reform in Nigeria: A Comparison Between The Old and New Scheme, Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences 3 (3) Orenstein, M.  I. (2008). Out-liberalizing the EU: Pension Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), pp 899-817

Chapter 21

Corruption, Politics and Governance in Nigeria Sheriff Folarin Abstract  Corruption in Nigeria since 1960 has cost the country hundreds of billions of pounds. The immediate impacts of this are economic pains and infrastructural decay, but long-term effects include crawling pace of national development and loss of integrity in the global system. So, how does corruption affect politics and governance in Nigeria? This chapter examines the relationship between them and where it has positioned the country in terms of development and progress. Anchored on the argument that corrupt and other related acts would inevitably discount the gains of democratic governance, pollute the political space, create a spatial economy, and lead to a “massification” of the poor, this chapter posits that corruption has thrown spanners in the wheels of national development. The chapter also argues that the politics and government of Nigeria have suffered for too long in the hands of habitual and unrepentant treasury looters, political jobbers and beneficiaries of interminable orchestrations of scandals and frauds. It recommends that anti-corruption agencies should be answerable only to the judiciary, made up of persons with records of integrity, and led by a judge with a record of accomplishment, forthrightness and fearlessness. Keywords Corruption · Governance · Nigerian politics · Public officials · Corrupt practices · Financial crimes · National development

Introduction A British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) estimation years ago, puts the cost of corruption in Nigeria since 1960 at a staggering 220 billion pounds. The leakages created by corruption probably explain the slow pace of development, as the adverse effect of corruption on national development can be phenomenal. This chapter examines the implication of corruption for governance in Nigeria since independence. It argues that corruption and other related acts would inevitably thwart S. Folarin (*) Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Canaanland, Ota, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_21

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democratic gains, pollute the political space and create a spatial economy that will inexorably culminate in the massification of the poor. The chapter hinges its argument on the fact that corruption throws spanners in the wheels of national progress or development and that governance of Nigeria has suffered lack of accountability, transparency and honesty for too long. It is recommended that anti-corruption agencies should rather be controlled and answerable to the judiciary, be made up of persons with records of integrity and be led by a judge with a track record of forthrightness and fearlessness.

Concept of Corruption Broadly speaking, corruption is a term used to describe acts that are considered immoral, such as fraud, graft, bribery, stealing, perjury, lying, dishonesty, indiscipline and debased act like sexual immorality or perversion. Corrupt acts also include economic and financial crimes, nepotism, favouritism or discrimination and partiality in decision-making or allocation of values. Corruption thus represents degeneration from the normal, that is, an antisocial behaviour (Okojie and Momoh 2005:1). By inference therefore, corruption goes beyond the narrow definition of the World Bank as the use of public office for private gain (Huther and Shah 2000). Our operational definition of corruption will however be flowing from the United Nations guideline in its “Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy III”, which distinguishes two important corruption typologies, namely, grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption represents such antistate acts as looting, 419 scam, money laundering and operation of illegal foreign bank vaults by public officers and private individuals. Such other acts as immorality, dishonesty and perjury, though related to grand corruption, will be considered as petty corruption. Grand corruption is thus another term for public corruption, while petty corruption may refer to private corruption. However, both are not mutually exclusive as aspects of one can be gleaned from the other. In their study, Okojie and Momoh (2005:2) see grand corruption as an act which is widespread and systematic in nature and damaging to the local economy. To commit grand corruption is to commit economic crime, and those who commit it are being regarded as “economic criminals”. However, there is also the phenomenon of political corruption that further explicates the term, grand corruption. Political or grand corruption has brought much social decadence upon the Nigerian State, carrying along with it such rotten baggage as godfatherism, influence-peddling, rigging of elections, manipulation of and buying of votes, manipulative political financing, embezzlement in office and fraud. Aiyede (2006) defines political corruption as the abuse of public or governmental power for illegitimate private advantage. For Lipset and Lenz (2000:112), political corruption is an effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means for private benefit.

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The Nigerian anti-corruption law has identified as corrupt practices the use of pecuniary advantage, insincerity in advice with a view to gaining advantage, less than a full day’s work for a full day’s pay, tardiness and laziness towards public office or tasks and failure to report cases of inducement to the anti-corruption bodies, among others (Akanbi 2004; Aiyede 2006: 39). For our purposes, therefore, in view of the fact that we are examining the Nigerian public life, grand corruption, that is the use of public office for private advantages, will be our framework.

Manifestations of Corruption Private Corruption By private corruption, we mean people outside government, private individuals engaging in unethical acts. These could be individuals outside institutions who commit acts of immorality (perversion, show of dementia and acts of fraud or scamming). The other group of people is persons in the organized private sector who may loot or carry out other acts of fraud in their companies or who collude with those in government to perpetrate sharp financial practices. Private corruption has manifested in Nigeria as everyday bribery to obtain a desired objective, breaking of traffic laws, piracy, plagiarism, alteration of school grades, illegal inflation of petroleum pump prices by dealers, robbery, sexual gratification for higher grades or promotion, etc.

Public Corruption This is the familiar corruption that takes place in government or by government officials and their accomplices in the private sector. Another name for public corruption is official, grand or institutional corruption. This is the kind of corruption involving public office holders. In this case, persons in position of authority exploit the position to loot the commonwealth. Let us briefly look at the manifestations of public corruption. (i) Political corruption: This is the kind of corruption that obtains in the three arms of government in a democratic rule, namely, executive, legislative and judiciary. Corruption at this level is the highest because it involves state fund. The issues of personal and primordial attachments in appointment, award of contracts as well as inflation of contract monies, embezzlement of funds and misappropriation of fund are critical examples of public corruption in the executive. The legislature in Nigeria has in recent times been in the news for high-profile bribery scandals (the Hembe-Oteh bribe scandal and the Farouk Lawan-Femi-­ Otedola bribery allegations are typical examples) in which the chairmen of the

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House of Representatives probe panels were indicted by the persons they were probing for demanding and collecting bribes from the suspects. The judiciary becomes vulnerable when it looks away from an obvious case of crime, tries to downplay the veracity of a crime or commits travesty of justice for a particular political interest. The Federal Court of Appeal has been in a state of crisis for sometime, leading to the suspension of its president on alleged complicity in election cases involving some western states which the president was said to have served the interest of a political party (Ketefe 2012). (ii) Bureaucratic corruption: Corruption here is still at the level of government. It involves the technocrats and civil as well as public servants who implement government policies. These include the leadership and personnel in ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). The corruption at this level is the worst as the allocation, release and use of money is executed by these government offices. The staff are the ones that propose and submit financial needs of the units or projects, and they are the ones that transfer and effect payment. Corruption becomes rife at this point. We have had cases of heads of ministries and parastatals busted and arraigned before competent courts and tribunals on charges of high-profile stealing and fraud. Bureaucratic corruption also manifests in favouritism and nepotism in appointment, promotion and reward systems in public offices. Some persons get rapid promotion and rewards on the basis of family, friendship, ethnic or religious affiliations to the boss, while some never get promotion because of such frivolous considerations. (iii) Military corruption: This was obtainable in Nigeria during military dictatorship. Ironically, the military was an institution that saw itself as a corrective regime in the face of bad leadership and festering corruption. That was the original intention of the army when they struck in January 1966. But we also know that the counter-coup of July 1966 was an ethnic-motivated coup meant to avenge the assassination of some persons of northern extraction in the first coup. With this mentality, professionalism that formed the fulcrum of the “corrective” notion of the institution began to fade out as corruption gradually crept in. By 1971, the military had become debased as all sorts of allegations were raised against General Gown’s military ministers and state governors. It got worse with the Babangida and Abacha regimes which came under the spotlight as the two most corrupt leaderships in the country (TI, 2004). (iv) Other forms of institutional corruption: The other forms of institutional corruption include that in the media and entertainment industries and even in the labour movement. The media is particularly known for the graft or “brown envelope” syndrome in which news reports are only publishable when certain individuals or groups in the story pay their way; or when an image polishing is done for those who can pay the reporter for it; or negative stories are stepped down when money has been paid to destroy such story. In the entertainment industry, persons for musical or movie auditions may have to “sort” or “settle” with money or sexual gratification to be given roles in films even when they are good or very bad. Labour groups are sometimes compromised by government not to embark on industrial action or to betray the cause of the movement by “sorting” labour leaders through the fattening of their accounts.

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Nigeria’s Corruption Profile Corruption has been identified as a major challenge to national development in Nigeria (Seteolu 2004). For the past 50 years or so, corruption has manifested in bribery, graft, treasury looting, subsidy and pension theft, over invoicing of cost of projects or contracts, money laundering, advance fee fraud, general indiscipline, favouritism and nepotism. The deep-seated nature of corruption and its drawbacks have earned Nigeria all manner of rankings by the eagle-eyed and whistle-blowing global corruption monitoring agency, Transparency International (TI), which once placed Nigeria as the fifth most corrupt nation among over 100 countries of the world sampled (T1 2005). Despite the promise to combat corruption on before and after assumption office in 2015, the level of corrupt has remained very high under the current administration of President Buhari. To be sure, in 2019, Nigeria was ranked 148 out of the 180 countries rated by Transparency International. The corruption culture became so etched in the social life that certain catchphrases have entered the social lexicon of the country. These include “sorting” (2005–date), “kleptocracy” (1990s–date), “settlementocracy” (1980s to 1990s) and “contractocracy” (1960s to1980s). The embarrassing rate of corruption has continually brought Nigeria into global spotlight and made it feature in the news for the wrong reasons. This has led to the attempts by successive administrations to fight public and private corruption. Notable among these attempts have been Ethical Revolution by the Shagari administration, War Against Indiscipline (WAI) by the Buhari-Idiagbon regime in the 1980s, War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) by the Abacha regime in the 1990s and the recent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000, which birthed the ICPC (ICPC, 2006), as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission set up in 2002 by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration to tackle economic and financial crimes, including advance fee fraud (419), overt looting of public treasury and money laundering (EFCC 2002).

Precolonial Era Corruption in Nigeria has sometimes been traced to the precolonial era, when the forerunners to colonial masters created Afro-European conversations that were premised on falsetto. It has been argued by some scholars such as Davidson (1960), Ikime (1985) and Anene and Brown (1966) that the colonialists established an empire on the foundation of scam or fraud. Their “carrot and stick” approach was itself manipulative and deceptive. It was not different from offering grafts in exchange for favours, which falls within our conceptual framework of corruption. The acquisition and establishment of colonies were fraudulent and questionable. In some places, they had offered “protection”, sealed in questionable “protectorate treaties” that turned out to be outright scamming of local chiefs to let off their

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kingdoms without knowing it. King Jaja of Opobo had questioned the meaning of “protectorate”, for which he was dethroned and banished (Alagoa 1980). King Shaka of the Zulu kingdom had queried the real intentions of the European offer of military alliance and “protectorate” over the Natal Province, for which his kingdom was subsequently infiltrated with traitors even from Shaka’s royal family, who eventually secured the alliance of the Europeans to tear the great Zulu kingdom apart (Golightly 2011). Historical records show that Africans once lived together and had their traditional conflict and peace times which further bound them. But with the coming of the Europeans shortly after the Berlin settlement of colonial interest in 1885, the approach the Europeans came with were not far from corrupt practices as we have defined it. For instance, the missionaries had brought the message of sublimity and meekness through the teachings of the scriptural beatitudes but which the colonial masters seemed to have manipulated to make “zombies” of the subjects, apparently preparatory to a fraudulent change of land and state ownership. In some cases, Europeans resorted to playing Africans against one another. In the Niger Delta area, the Dappa Pepple Ijaw kingdom was pulled down by a fraudulent siding with Anne Pepple with men and material to prosecute an insurgency that would topple Dappa, a recalcitrant leader who despised European encroachment. The Efiks were played against the Ibibios just for the purpose of winning the Efiks to gain control of the coastal trade (Alagoa 1980).

Colonial Era During colonialism, the divide and rule and carrot and stick systems did not change. It was this pattern of public corruption that the colonial masters directly bequeathed to the political class. While the southwest sought early decolonization and the north preferred a much later date, it was the north that power was eventually handed over to. The northern political class thus began to see power as their birthright and would adopt the strategy of divide and rule like their European protégés at independence. A process of recycling northern elements in power, populating the political system (and government) with northern elements and empowering the younger political class with plum and strategic positions in government, sharing huge contracts among the elite for financial empowerment, using the military to seize power and consolidate the northern hold on to power as well as manipulating census figures to reflect a demographic superiority of the north over the south would follow. The raising of Warrant Chiefs in eastern Nigeria during colonial rule was a probable attempt at deepening divisions in the Igbo society, while the extension of the tax policy to include women paying tax was considered a rip-off. Also, the use of Warrant Chiefs, use of persons from the Osu caste system as chiefs and tax collectors and the taxing of women were alien to traditional Igboland. But the deliberate introduction of this was considered by the people at the time as a means to defraud them and corrupt the system for self-interest (Columbia Encyclopedia 2012).

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Postcolonial Era The corruption profile during military and civilian rule was not different. Characteristics of corruption remain “kleptocracy” (stealing in high government places with or without the connivance of individuals in the private sector); “contractocracy” (a recurring act of distributing or sharing bloated capital projects construction monies among friends and family members; such contracts may remain undone and as such constitute white elephants); “settlementocracy” (a chop-I-chop regime where national wealth goes round the personnel in government and their cronies; they can also buy off people considered potential or real opposition); and of course the regular money laundering, drug peddling and embezzlement of public fund. Indeed, the history of Nigeria from 1960 has been replete with misappropriation of funds, embezzlement or looting of treasury, prebendalism and “settlements” through grafts and contracts (Awonishakin 2006). One of the reasons why the administration of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was overthrown by the military in 1966 was alleged crass materialism among his ministers and “corruption in high places” (Nzeogwu 1966). According to Nzeogwu, the “enemies” were those “corrupt ministers, VIPs… in high places… the ten percenters (from fat contracts)…who have turned development back by several years…and who have made Nigeria big for nothing in international circles” (paraphrased) (cited in Obasanjo 1987). After the civil war in 1970, the three “Rs” (Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Reconstruction) were massively embarked upon by the Gowon regime with the huge oil revenue that had characterized the war years. The oil fortunes soon became a minus as it prompted the arbitrary and careless Udoji Salary Awards that over-­ monetized the economy, discouraged rural farming and constructed spatial inflation. The resultant situation was the over-prizing of money ahead of social values, which caused infidelity of market forces, embezzlement for increased financial capacity and gratifications (Adele 1998). The oil boom and windfall predated the era of jumbo and “white elephant” projects and inflated contract awards. Subsequently, the “Rs” era witnessed declining national morality with Gowon’s Supreme Military Council members accused of unprecedented personal aggrandizement and arbitrary awards of jumbo project contracts to friends, relations and foreign partners (Diamond 1998). The military regime of Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo benefited from a tremendous influx of oil money that increased to 350 per cent between 1973 and 1974, when oil prices skyrocketed, to 1979, when the military stepped down. Increased revenues permitted massive spending that, incidentally, was poorly planned and concentrated in urban areas. The oil boom was marred by a minor recession in 1978–1979, but revenues rebounded until mid-1981.The increase in revenues made possible a rapid rise in income, especially for the urban middle class. There was a corresponding inflation, particularly in the price of food, as rural dwellers, who were the major producers of food, had begun to move to the urban centres in search of white-collar jobs to benefit in the oil money (Eker 1999). The urban centres soon became glutted, and places like Lagos began to produce slums, shabby environs and criminally minded unemployed youth (Folarin 2006).

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The sudden wealth arising from oil, which dominated Nigeria’s exports, encouraged greed and corruption and berthed the new trend among the political and military class to seek power by all means because of the opulence occurring from it. About N2.8 billion of oil revenue was allegedly declared missing from the state affairs in 1978 as reckless spending characterized an unaccountable governance (Nwankwo 1999). This prompted the Obasanjo Declaration at Jaji in 1977 sign-­ posting the commencement of the battle against the creeping culture of corruption, bribery and indiscipline. Shagari’s Ethical Revolution was to transform the society in which corruption and financial indiscipline had become pandemic. The term “revolution” denoted the gravity of the decadence, which could not be handled by Obasanjo’s Jaji Declaration. The period of Ethical Revolution was marked by state officials amassing wealth from public parastatals, boards and ministries to stave off as much as possible in an emergent era of “oil doom” (i.e. a time fortunes on oil revenue had declined considerably) with an interface of inflation and deflation. The Shagari administration responded by introducing austerity measures, a policy that caused severe social and economic hardships that encouraged treasury looting, bribery, fraud and social crimes like robbery. It was this era that witnessed the phenomenon of arson-after-­ looting by officials in a bid to offset all records that could trace culprits. The Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) buildings, among others, were the early examples of this new dimension of corruption. War Against Indiscipline (WAI) was a practical approach to corruption and immorality pursued in 1984 by Generals Buhari and Idiagbon. By creating military task forces, the “war” ranged from forcing market prices down, raiding illegal and informal “black market” sales outlets, arresting and detaining corrupt politicians and sentencing corrupt offenders to life imprisonment or death to compulsory environmental sanitation, maintenance of decorum at public places and queuing to board buses, trains and planes, to buying stamps at post offices, making telephone calls and even fetching water from public pipes. The measures were however considered too high-handed, stifling social life and used as a weapon to eliminate political and military opposition. The task forces were also accused of excesses, such as raiding to loot markets, assaulting “bloody civilians” and intimidating their petty foes or folk alike (Ake 1988). General Babangida overthrew the Buhari administration on charges of “high handedness” among others. Babangida thereafter relaxed the “war” and rather commenced a social and economic reengineering policy, culminating in structural adjustment programme (SAP). The programme, badly implemented, gave Nigeria away to foreign profiteers who collaborated with local capital cliques (including leadership and the economic class) to make fortunes through deregulation (privatization and commercialization). Soon the middle class paled into extinction, the gulf between the rich and the poor widened significantly, naira lost its value remarkably, and the social situation became unbearable for the masses (Osoba 1993). Indiscipline intensified in the polity: crime rate escalated; shortcuts to wealth through drug peddling, money rituals and reckless aggrandizement took dangerous dimensions; and money laundering and advance fee fraud (419) became

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phenomenal in the country. Three of these variants of corruption and indiscipline, namely, drug peddling, money laundering and advance fee fraud or 419, were not only issues that made Nigeria lose its goodwill in the global community but were also the triumvirate that became associated with the country during the Babangida regime of SAP. It was the combination of the Babangida and Abacha mismanagement of the regime of corruption in Nigeria that galvanized the international standing of the nation in 2000 as one of the most corrupt nations. Speculations were made that the two military rulers corruptly enriched themselves and so could not have controlled the malaise because they were beneficiaries of it. The disappearance of the $12.4 billion Gulf War oil windfall from 1991 to date added some credibility to this speculation, while government has confirmed reports in the case of Abacha that most of his loots have been recovered (Okojie and Momoh 2005). This has been the story of Nigeria before the intervention of 2000 and 2002.

Explanations of Corruption in Nigeria While examining the dynamics of corruption in Nigeria, Nwolise, in a lecture in 1992, described “dynamics” of corruption as the systematic causation of corruption to its phenomenal level. Put differently, dynamics have to do with the scientific explanation of the causes of corruption among public office holders. Among the forces, poverty is identified as the most fundamental. In a study of an average Nigerian society, Ogunwezeh (2005) contends that the fear of or the quest to quit poverty has been the driving force behind acts of corruption. Those in high places do not want to return to abjection after service. In a similar vein, people seek public office to initiate a change of financial state or fortunes. The escalating rate of poverty in the country caused by poorly implemented economic policies and misappropriation of funds, among others, culminate in state and mass poverty the fear of which drives people to capitalize on opportunities for enrichment. Other acts such as 419, drug peddling and laundering are “private” manifestations of the poverty mentality syndrome. Second, the enormity of social or societal pressures on public office holders or an affluent individual imposes a burden that could compel acts of corruption. Merton (1957) notes that much pressure is exerted on a public office holder or rich family member by members of his nuclear or extended family to assist them in one way or the other. This is as a result of the fact that a public office such as Local Government Councillor or Senate President or Accounts Manager, or Director-General or Chief Accountant, is considered as a goldmine and proximity to the “national cake” that should be wisely shared among family members, who could either be sent to school, or for whom businesses could be set, or rehabilitated, among other pressures. These encourage tendencies towards official and political corruption, in the same way individuals considered wealthy may be tempted to engage in fraud, money laundering or drug peddling in order not to disappoint his kinsmen (Ekeh 2006).

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Third and yet closely related is the “social responsibility” paradigm in the functionalist model (Chinnoy 1967). Naturally, as status changes or increases, social responsibilities are bound to increase as more expectations, like pressures and demands, are coming from people. An elected House of Assembly member is not only expected to “deliver” at his ward and local government but also to “take care” of a growing number of political associates, friends, political thugs, concubines or wives and retinue of personal staff. A little inflation of contracts and figures here or there may thus be considered not be out of place; or adding “419” to his source of income for the non-public office holder may become desirable not to lose his status. Political instability engenders political corruption. Frequent changes of power threaten security of office and by extension source of income. The political class, like their military counterparts, is tempted to steal as much as possible while they last in office, as they are not sure of tenure of office anymore. Even under democratic rule, the frequent military-like appointment and dropping of ministers, directors-­general and other public office holders tacitly encourage corruption. Other variables explicating corruption in Nigeria include the lingering impact of SAP, economic mismanagement, legacies or examples of past corrupt rulers and individuals, lack of accountability and transparency, lack of empirical outcome or tangible evidence of punishment of past corruption offenders, flaunting of ill-gotten wealth by individuals who seek political power with such means, abundance of sacred cows that walk freely in and out of corridors of power and of course the culture of crass materialism that has no bounds of age gender and experience in the Nigerian value system (Azelama 2002).

Major Corruption Cases in Nigeria Among the old inconclusive cases of corruption were the 1956 Foster-Sutton Inquiry into the Affairs of the African Continental Bank, 1960 Elias Commission of Inquiry into the Administration, Economics and Industrial Relations of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1965 Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Nigerian Ports Authority, 1970 Inquiry into the Apapa Road Project fraud, 1980 Tribunal of Inquiry into fraudulent crude oil sales, 1983 Ayo Irekefe Panel on alleged N2.8 billion from NNPC’s bank account in the UK, 1983 Tribunal of Inquiry into the Republic Building Fire Incident, 1999 Christopher Kolade Commission into the Award of Government Contracts and the Idris Kuta Panel Report on the Award of Contracts by the Senate between June 1999 and July 2000 (Okojie and Momoh 2005:18). There was the high-profile corruption case involving former Vice President Abubakar Atiku which led to hot verbal exchange between Obasanjo and Atiku in August and September 2006. The former President was openly accusing his Vice President, Atiku, of gross acts of corruption, including illegal transactions, bribery, fraud and embezzlement with the view to enrichment (The Sun 2006). This showed the leadership’s culpability. The Obasanjo-Atiku episode opened a new vista in the

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corruption situation, showing the extent to which such governmental thievery and irresponsibility had eaten deeply in the national fabrics. Similarly, Colonel Dasuki, the National Security Adviser under President Goodluck administration (2010–2015), was alleged (and in fact locked up in jail for about 4 years) to have shared about $2 billion meant for the purchase of military equipment to fight insurgency in the Northeast to the members of the former ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) during the 2014 and 2015 presidential electioneering activities. Also, Diezani Madueke, the Minister of Petroleum under President Goodluck Jonathan, was also alleged to have appropriated several million dollars of public funds for personal use under the watch of her principal. There was also the scam of the $214 million national identity card project that involved the Internal Affairs Ministry and SAGEM.  SAGEM had supplied new, fairly used and disused data-capturing machines for the 2002/2003 national identity card project at such a prohibitive cost. Yet the Ministry had declared that the machines were new, which brought the Minister to the spotlight as it was apparent that there was a collusion between SAGEM and the Ministry to defraud the government. The case did not however last long as it soon died out. Similarly, there was an allegation by some ministerial nominees in 2003 that the Senate screening committee demanded N54 million bribes to be given clearance (Fashagba 2009). There were also the Abacha loots that were traced to local and international banks (Jason 2006). Government has continued to make efforts to recover the loot from various foreign countries. Recently too, there was an allegation that the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of the federation under the Buhari administration had connived with the consultants handling the recovery of the Abacha looted funds to inflate the consultancy charges to the tune of several millions of dollars. No effort has been made by any of the government anti-graft agencies to investigate the allegation. This perhaps account for why many people believe that the much mouthed fight against corruption by the Buhari administration is a fight against the main opposition PDP and its members to weaken them. In addition, there was the case of the arrest and trial of a serving Saki East Local Government Chairman, Mr. Ogunmola, for fraudulent contract awards between 2004 and 2006 (Punch 2006a, b). Some government officials in Akwa Ibom, Ekiti, Sokoto, Kano and Ondo states were busted for corrupt-related offences totalling N227 million. Also, by 2006, there were already petitions on stealing, money laundering and fraudulent contract awards against 24 serving state governors in the federation (ICPC 2006). One of the biggest cases of public corruption in Nigeria was that involving a serving Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, who was exposed and arrested on multiple charges, including using his office to embezzle $128 million dollars. There was also the case of a serving Bayelsa State Governor, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was accused of many charges, particularly that of multiple money laundering abroad. He was arrested in London and detained, but he jumped bail and escaped to Nigeria from London, only to be impeached and arrested by the EFCC for prosecution (ThisDay 2006)

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There has been the recovery of N640 billion and arrest of over 500 people in money laundering battle in the last 20 years. Other cases include arrest and prosecution of a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Ricky Tafa, over financial scam and demand for the sum of over 200 million dollars as bribe from the Chairman of Obat Oil Limited between 2005 and April 2006; findings and charges against former Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State over multiple cases of money laundering abroad; investigation of former Ekiti State Governor, Ayo Fayose; former Abia State Governor Orji Uzor Kalu; Otunba Mike Adenuga of Globacom and Conoil; Mohammed Babangida, son of the former military President Ibrahim Babangida; and former Governor George Akume of Benue State (The News 2006); and in recent times, the trial and conviction of Chief Olabode George, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Nigerian Ports Authority for multiple frauds as Board Chairman and the indictment of former governors Gbenga Daniel and Alao-Akala of Ogun and Oyo states, respectively. It was discovered that part of the N1.6 billion ecological fund mismanaged by Plateau State Governor, Joshua Dariye, was donated to the ruling People’s Democratic Party (Aiyede 2006: 50). The EFCC also uncovered the N50 million scandals involving a Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji, in allocation deals with the National Assembly and the National Universities Commission (NUC), which eventually led to his removal and the illegal sales of government’s landed property. This illegal sale and allocation of public estates declared for sale which was investigated found a Minister, Mrs. Osomo, culpable which led to her removal from office (Anwana 2006). On September 27, 2006, the EFCC levelled allegations of varied cases of grave acts of corruption against 31 serving state governors at the floor of the National Assembly. The Commission’s Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, made a case against the governors challenging them to waive their immunity so that his agency could enable to prosecute them (The Guardian 2006). This allegation, although lampooned and described as baseless, constituted the first major confrontation of corruption at the very top in Nigeria. Although many cases of corruption are unnecessarily prolonged in the court, in recent time, a number of convictions have been recorded. For instance, former governors, Dariye of Plateau State, Jolly Nyame of Taraba State and Orji Nzor Kalu of Abia State, have been jailed over corrupt practices they engaged while serving as governors. However, the fact that a former governor of Kano and another of Gombe were let off the hook of prosecution after conceding or jetissioning their political ambition that could negatively affect the ruling APC meant that government is aiding and abetting corruption in the polity. Many other corruption cases against members of the APC have been abandoned or discharged by the court due to “lack of diligent prosecution”. Many former members of the PDP who were formerly under prosecution had their prosecution waived following their defection to the ruling APC as well. This is a clear case of politicization of the fight against corruption and perhaps accounted for why Nigeria continued to be rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the Transparency International.

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Weaknesses in the Anti-Corruption Crusade In more recent times, particularly from 2011 to 2020, there have been practical evidenvce of failures in the Nigerian anti-corruption war. As the counter-corruption measures of government increased from 2015, leading to exposures, arrests and prosecutions of suspects, including those in high places; so have more heinous cases of corruption crimes escalated. There have been allegations of swallowing of over sixty million Naira at once by a snake in a national examinations body in 2018; squandering and alleged divesrion of  N81.5b by the Niger Delta Development Commission between October 2019 and May 2020; the litany of allegations of corrupt practices against Magu, the acting EFCC chairman; and claims by the Federal Government of unsubstantiated spending of tens of billions of Naira for distribution across Nigeria as COVID-19 palliatives, among other obvious brazen corrupt acts (Morphy 2020). Before 2020, the institutional weaknesses of the ICPC, EFCC and the Due Process Commission are the first set of brickwalls in Nigeria’s fight against corruption. The institutions, by their acts of omission and commission, appear to lack complete independence. The ICPC is very slow to act and cannot, strictu sensu, prosecute, while the seemingly effective EFCC can prosecute but appears incapable of penalizing. The close affinities ICPC and EFCC have with the presidency that created them in the first place have made the two to appear like instruments of state coercion and victimization of perceived and real enemies of the civilian administration. The above scenario is made credible by the selective investigations and prosecutions by both commissions, particularly in handling cases of corruption involving politicians and those in the private sector that condemn federal government policies or opposed to the recently aborted third term bid by President Olusegun Obasanjo. Among those who were in the federal government’s white list until they took side in the opposition camp in one way or the other are Tafa Balogun, Fabian Osuji, Alamieyeseigha, Joshua Dariye, Bola Tinubu, Orji Uzor Kalu, Mike Adenuga and more recently Ibrahim Babangida and Abubakar Atiku (The News 2006). The EFCC and the entire anti-corruption machine seem to overlook corrupt cases and corrupt persons and groups until they begin to oppose the president on his policies and personal decisions affecting governance (Jason 2006). This brings us to the issue of certain ignored or “closed” or “forgotten” cases of alleged corruption. For instance, the allegations by Nasir El-Rufai, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), that two senators close to Obasanjo, Deputy Senate President Ibrahim Mantu and Senate Majority Leader, Jonathan Zwingina, asked him for a bribe of N54 million to secure approval for appointment (Dike 2006) appear consigned in the waste bin of history. Again, the whereabouts of recovered Abacha loots declared by the presidency since 1999–2000 are not known nor can what it has been used for be ascertained. Also, the $12.4b Gulf War oil windfall made under General Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, which cannot be traced to date, is an obvious case of embezzlement that neither the EFCC nor ICPC has investigated or shown any willingness to take up. Moreover, there are also the copious cases of jumbo contracts, “white elephant” and abandoned projects between 1976 and 1983 that are no longer mentioned.

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The overt politicization of the anti-corruption crusade has made the fight against corruption a means to witch-hunt people the presidency may not want to succeed it. The Abubakar Atiku case is apposite to locate within this frame of argument. Until Vice President Atiku made it apparent that he would like to succeed Obasanjo and demanded the latter’s exit in 2007, the two of them were trusted political allies. From 2005, however, Atiku vehemently opposed President Obasanjo’s third term bid which he considered as an obstacle to his ambition. Shortly, the relationship between the two collapsed, and soon after, EFCC and President Obasanjo himself laid charges of corruption against Atiku (The News: 20). This development, like many others in which “anti-Obasanjo” politicians (Independent, 2006) are involved, has made observers to call ICPC and EFCC government’s bulldogs against political enemies (Makarfi 2006). The victims of the political witch-hunt are themselves culpable, which explains their successful investigation and removal like Balogun, Osuji, Alamieyeseigha, Osomo, etc.; but these are also many allegations and cases not looked into as earlier mentioned, because such cases involve those supportive of the administration (ThisDay 2006). There are also constitutional constraints. First, the number of the convicted by the courts is quite small in comparison to the allegations. Both the ICPC and EFCC have been tinted that they have prima facie evidence of wrongdoing against a majority of state governors but have been unable to prosecute them because of restraining legal frameworks. The EFCC claims that the state governors, altogether, hold assets worth $175 billion in foreign accounts. Under the current law, serving governors cannot be the subject of criminal action until they cease to hold public office (George 2000; Newsweek 2005). According to the 1999 Federal Constitution, immunity is conferred on 74 public office holders, including the President, Vice President, 36 state governors, and 36 deputy governors, who can neither have criminal proceedings instituted against them nor be arrested nor imprisoned while in office. These provisions have been blamed for hindering anti-corruption crusade because it is mainly top public office holders that commit heinous economic and financial crimes who yet hide under immunity throughout their tenure spanning 4 years or 8 years if they get a second term. For instance, Nigeria’s Former Finance Minister, Okonjo-Iweala, claimed that most governors embark on foreign trips immediately after allocations from the federal government and yet cannot be arrested or prosecuted (Independent 2006). The other problems of anti-corruption in Nigeria include perjury on the part of culprits and distortions in fact-finding by panels of inquiry, manipulation of information and records and destruction of records or traces of corruption and general lack of cooperation with the crusade either for lack of faith in it or because of the overwhelming culture of corruption across the nation.

Impact of Corrupt Practices on Governance Corruption is the altar on which national development is slaughtered. Indeed, this is because the scope and complexity of corruption in Nigeria is immense (Page 2018). The cost of corruption goes beyond the financial implications as revealed by the BBC. It has

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social, cultural and political drawbacks that have overall consequences on the development of the nation. The social, cultural and political backlashes have graver consequences for a nation’s existence (Page 2018). Let us examine some of these effects.

Poverty and the Burden of Governance The immediate impact of stolen wealth is bankruptcy of a state. This creates a major problem of wealth creation and distribution as it also impedes job creation. The ultimate impact is mass unemployment and poverty of the majority. The burden of governance escalates as there are limited resources to carry out developmental projects or run government.

Economic and Structural Underdevelopment The fewer the resources as a result of emptying treasury, the more the yawning gaps in structural development. Resources meant for multitude have been shared among a few. The result is economic backwardness and underdevelopment.

Inability to Control Other Kinds of Crime Another structural problem corruption creates is that a corrupt government, institution or individual would not have the moral and legal justification or the boldness to control others or prosecute them. It thus leads to a situation of multiplication of corrupt practices that cannot be checked.

Indebtedness to Other Nations The drained resources would require replenishment. The state could go a-borrowing again and again, thus increasing indebtedness. This has manifested in the draining of Nigerian domestic and foreign reserves and the borrowing of more money from abroad. Nigeria’s external debt profile on March 31, 2013, is 6.6b USD, combining debts owed the World Bank, African Development Bank, Exim Bank of China and French Development Agency, among other agencies and bonds (DMO 2013).

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Failure of Institutions to Work The fact that institutions and individuals are compromised would mean that the institutions will not be able to work or function and serve their purpose. This will lead to a buffeted system and a perpetual state of disorder. There will surely be erosion of institutional capacity of government because of disregard for procedures and due process. Such lack of capacity owing to mismanagement of office and fund explains the failure of such institutions as the Nigeria Airways, NITEL, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and commercial banks, among other groups.

Poor Service and Productivity Again the compromised system engages personnel based on sentiments and not merits. As such, mediocrities are engaged, which have direct impact on quality of service delivery and output. The important issues here include nepotism and favouritism in public office and appointment and value distribution. The qualified personnel to execute excellent tasks are denied, while incompetent friends, family members or those who have bribed to get the jobs are engaged, thus leading to poor service delivery.

National Security Risks Compromised security personnel can do little or nothing to protect lives and property. Where corruption has affected the health and food sectors, the citizens stand the risk of consumption of fake or adulterated drugs. In terms of national security, it has been reported severally that the Boko Haram security menace and other cases of armed gangs on rampage beating the security system have either been aided by bribed security personnel or have been able to beat a corruption-weakened security network (Abraham 2013). Other serious social and political consequences of corruption include compromising of the rule of law by the judiciary, unfair and inefficient provision of services of public administrators, undermining of the legitimacy of government and democratic values of trust and tolerance and of course a consequent poor external image of the country. These are the situations Nigeria has been suffering for years as a result of festering corruption in the land.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria, the causes, manifestations and implications for national development. The chapter also examined some cases of corrupt practices in high places and how these have affected

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governance and politics of Nigeria since independence. It did a historical search of corruption, establishing the fact that corruption in Nigeria dates back to the precolonial era of western incursions into Africa and that the postcolonial state has degenerated more as a result of certain social factors, including poverty, greed, selfishness and the likes. The strengths and weaknesses of the anti-corruption crusade were identified, with the devastating effects on nation-building highlighted. The dangerous consequences of corruption for the nation make it imperative that the anti-corruption war should be intense and backed by new and systematic strategies. Anti-corruption agencies should no longer be under the control of the executive arm of government. Such agencies should rather be controlled and answerable to the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, which is often independent of the presidency or executive. Also, the anti-corruption agencies should be made up of persons with records of integrity, who have never identified with any political party, and should be headed by a judge of the Supreme Court who has a track record of forthrightness and fearlessness.

References Abraham, J. (2013). “17 Soldiers to Face Court Martial for Murder, Others”, National Mirror, Lagos, July 2, 2013. Adele, B.J. (1998). Fundamentals of Nigerian Politics (Lagos: Ijede). Akanbi, M.M.A. (2004). Corruption and the Challenges of Good Governance in Nigeria (Lagos: Faculty of the Social Sciences Distinguished Lecture Series). Ake, C. (1988). “Government Instability in Nigeria,” Paper presented at the National Conference on “The Political Transition Programme” (Lagos: N.I.I.A, April). Akinseye-George, A. (2000). Legal System, Corruption and Governance in Nigeria (Lagos: New Century Low Publishers Ltd). Alagoa, E.J. (1980). “The Eastern Niger Delta and the Hinterland in the 19th Century”, in Ikime, O. (1980) Groundwork of Nigerian History (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Anene, J.C. and Brown, G.N. (1966). Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Handbook for Teachers and Students, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Anwana, J.U. (2006). “The Anti-Corruption Law and Corruption in Nigeria” http”//www. allafrica.com Awonishakin, T. (2006). Nigerian Democracy and Kleptocracy. Thisday, Lagos, March 2006. Azelama, J.U. (2002). Public Enterprises Management in Nigeria (Ambik Press). Chinnoy, F. (1967). Society: An Introduction to Sociology (New York: Random House). Columbia Encyclopedia (2012). “Aba Women’s Riots of 1929”, Columbia Encyclopedia. Davidson, B. (1960) Old Africa Rediscovered London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. Debt Management Office (2013). “Debt Profile”, Abuja: DMO. Diamond, L. (1998). “Building a Democratic Africa” Hoover Digest No.3. Dike, V.E. (2006) “Anti-Corruption Crusade: Can the Obasanjo Regime sustain the Momemtum?“http://nigerdeltacongress.com/articles/anticorruption_crusade can_the.htm Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Establishment Act 2002. Eker, Y. (1999). “On Origins of Corruption: Irregular Incentives in Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies 19(1). Ekeh, P.P. (2006). A Case for Dialogue on Nigerian Federalism. A Keynote Address delivered at the Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism.

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Fashagba, J. Y. 2009. Legislative Oversight under the Nigerian Presidential System, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 15(4) Folarin, S. (2006). The Anti-Corrutpion War in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Role of EFCC and ICPC. Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Crimes. Golightly, W. (2011). Shaka the Great: The Epic Story of the Zulu Empire (Quercus). Huther, J. and Shah, A. (2000). Anti- Corruption Policies and Programmes: A Framework for Evaluation (Washington: Wall Bank Policy Research Working paper 2501). Ikime, O. (1985). “In Search of Nigerians: Changing Roles of Inter-Group Relations”, Presidential Address at the 1985 Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, HSN. Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, 2006 “About ICPC”. http://www.ICPC.org (accessed 9/8/06). Independent (2006). EFCC vs Politicians: The Passion, The Cries. Lagos, July 29. Jason, P. (2006). “The Making of Olusani Abachanjo” Vanguard (Lagos, November 25). Ketefe, K. (2012). “Hurdles before Salami’s Reinstatement”, National Mirror (Lagos), October 29, 2012, p.1. Lipset, S.M. and Gabriel, S.L. (2000). “Corruption, Culture and Markets” in Lawrence, E.H. and Huntington, S.(eds)(2000) Culture Matters (New York: Basic Books). Makarfi, A. (2006). “Makarfi Chides EFCC, ICPC, over Arrests” ThisDay (Lagos, August 16). Merton, R.K (1957). Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press). Newsweek (2005). “No Longer a way of Life” (June 2, 2005). Morphy, R. (2020). Nigeria’s Failing War against Corruption. Leadership, Abuja, July 2020. Nwankwo, A.A. (1999). The Stolen Billions (Enugu: Forth Dimension). Nzeogwu, C.K. (1966). Interview with British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in Kaduna on January 16, 1966. Obasanjo, O. (1987). Nzeogwu: An Intimate Portrait of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (Ibadan: Spectrum). Ogunwezeh, F. (2005). “Poverty, Development and the Burden of Governance in sub-Saharan Africa”. Okojie, P., Momoh, A. (2005). “Corruption and the Crisis of Development in Nigeria,” paper presented at the conference on “Redesigning the State? Political Corruption in Development Policy and Practice,” held at Manchester Metropolitan University, 25 November, 2005. Osoba, S. (1993). “Crisis of Accumulation and Democratic Misadventure in Nigeria: A Retrospective and Perspective Analysis” Ife Journal of History Vol.1, No.1, Jan-June 1993. Page T.  Matthew 2018. A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Seteolu, D. (2004). “The Challenge of Leadership and Governance in Nigeria” in Odion-Akhaine, S (2004) Governance: Nigeria and World (Lagos: Cencod). The News (2006). “The Case against Atiku” (Lagos, September 18, 2006). The Punch (2006a). “ICPC Investigates LG Boss” (Lagos, 15/08/206). The Punch (2006b). “Anti-Corruption War won’t succeed unless… ICPC” (Lagos, 16/8/2006). The Sun (2006). “Foul: Governors Reply Ribadu over Corruption Allegation-Enough is Enough, I drop My Immunity-Yerima” (Lagos, 29/9/06). This Day (2006). “From Third Term to Anti-Corruption” (Lagos August13). The Guardian (2006). EFCC, ICPC record Average Performance. Lagos, April 7. Transparency International “Corruption Perception Index 2005” http://www.transparency.org/ cpi/1999/cpi1999_infocus.html (accessed 8/8/06). Transparency International (2004) “Introduction to Political Corruption” pg. 13 http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004 (accessed 24/1/13).

Chapter 22

Military Intervention in Nigerian Politics Solomon A. Adedire and John. S. Olanrewaju

Abstract  This chapter interrogates military intervention in Nigerian politics. This chapter historicizes the various military incursion in Nigeria from the post-independence era and gives an analysis of coup d’état that took place in the country. Using a hybrid of socio-economic development theory and organizational formal theory, this chapter observes that the deteriorated economic conditions increase the choice of military intervention. Similarly, the weak political institutions and low political culture have resulted to legitimacy crisis. This chapter argues that the cohesive nature of the military institution and the stronger military resources, either as percent of state resources or relative to the national economy encourage military interregnum. Relying on the secondary source, and the use of discourse analysis, this chapter discusses an historical overview of military intervention in Nigeria and adduces reasons in support of military intervention. This chapter further argues that the kleptomania of the military government has posed security threats and gave rise to economic dislocation, while the judiciary has been subjugated. This chapter therefore concludes that the prolonged stay of the military institution in government has adversely affected the citizens and the Nigerian economy, and has eroded the professionalism of the military institution. It concludes with a recommendation that the military should avoid the temptation of getting involved in government, but rather, concentrate on their traditional role of protecting the territorial integrity of the state. Keywords  Military intervention · Nigerian politics · Legitimacy crisis · Hybrid Political institutions

Background to Military Intervention Nigeria is a country that has the largest political entity in Africa. It has as its neighbours in the West and East by the Republic of Benin and Republic of Cameroon, respectively. In the North of the country, it shares boundaries with Niger and Chad S. A. Adedire (*) · J. S. Olanrewaju Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omu Aran, Kwara State, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_22

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Republics. British colonial government administered the territory of Nigeria for more than six decades before granting independence to the people on a weak foundation. The weak superstructure upon which Nigerian independence and state was laid was enough sign of the imminent troubles that the future holds. At its foundation, the military had perfected its strategies of the subjugation of other groups and dislodging it from governance. Following the crisis of political succession that accompanied political independence in Africa, and particularly the failure of the politicians to agree on an orderly transfer of power, the military, in most cases with ease, took over the reins of power (Olurode 2004). After the first military intervention that took place in Egypt in 1952, other African countries have witnessed continuous military upsurge. For example, military intervention took place in Sudan, Togo, Dahomey and Ghana in 1958, 1963, 1965 and 1966, respectively. Nigeria is not an exception to the military interregnum that took place in Africa. Although the Nigerian military inherited the British tradition of professionalism and neutrality, the post-independence era witnessed the politicization of the military. The cherished military traditions and values of neutrality and professionalism were thus compromised. On January 15, 1966, barely after 6  years of independence, a group of Majors led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu overthrew the civilian administration of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The coup which was bloody led to the killing of the Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa; the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Finance Minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh; Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Premier of the western region; Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari, Commandant, Second Brigade, Lagos; Brigadier S.A. Ademulegun, Commandant, First Brigade, Kaduna; and Col. R.A. Shodeinde, Commandant of Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna (New Nigeria, January 1996a; Schwarz, January 1966; Paden 1986). Rodney (1974), Babawale (1993) and (Gambari 1995) observe that the 6-year mistakes of the first republic politicians triggered the politically ambitious and conscious military to intervene in governance and seize power after more than six decades of colonial rule and barely 5 years of independence. During this period, the military took over the affairs of federal, states and local council (George et al. 2012).The first coup in 1966 was attributed to the inability of the federal government to curtail ethnic crisis and find solution to the ‘political killings that had risen to a dangerous level’ (Ihonvbere 1996). Barely 6 months after the first military intervention, a countercoup was staged by a group of soldiers from the North, and this led to the overthrow and assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the then military Head of State. One of the major reasons for the overthrow of the Aguiyi-Ironsi government was the abolition of the federal structure and the introduction of the Unification Decree. Similarly, the coup was carried out to retaliate against the Igbo, the ethnic group that dominated in January 1966 in which only prominent southerners were killed. Although the coup failed but an Igbo, Aguiyi-Ironsi became the Head of State following the assassination of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, a northerner. The northerners considered this an affront and therefore return the violence in form of countercoup in which prominent Igbo including Aguiyi-Ironsi were killed. General Yakubu Gowon, a northerner, was installed as the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in July 1966, following the success of the counter coup. He ruled until 1975 when he was overthrown in a

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bloodless coup by a group of soldiers that wanted to return civilian rule to Nigeria. On July 29, 1975, Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed and a faction of the army executed a bloodless coup on the ground that General Gowon put off the pledged to return the country to civilian rule (Elaigwu 1986). A year later, precisely in February 1976, Mohammed was assassinated in a violent coup that led to his death. General Olusegun Obasanjo, the second in command to Mohammed, succeeded, due to the failure of the coup. Three years later, in 1979, Obasanjo returned the country to civil rule under Shehu Shagari. The 1979 constitution handed over to the politicians by the military was presidential with two-­chamber national assembly. Contrary to expectation, on December 31, 1983, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a bloodless coup by some politically conscious and non-professional army led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari (Buhari returned to power as a democratically elected president in 2015 and his regime was still largely dictatorial). Early in 1984, Buhari was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by the junta and ruled for 20  months until 1985, when he was overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida. Babangida promised a return to democracy when he seized power. However, on three different occasions, Babangida found reasons to shift the handover date and consequently ruled Nigeria until 1993 when due to both internal and external pressures he abdicated the office hurriedly and transfer power to a man handpicked by the military. Earlier on he had cancelled the election that was meant to produce his successor. The results of the election were already known and the winners waiting to be declared only for the Babangida-led military administration to terminate the exercise. After aborting the election but unable to withstand the resulting backlash and pressure, the military handed over power to Ernest Shonekan under an interim government arrangement. Three months later, Shonekan was overthrown by General Sani Abacha, with former President Babangida appeared to be involved with a visit to Egypt. Abacha appointed himself Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of Nigeria. After Abacha’s death in 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over. The cause of the death of Abacha has remained a subject of speculation, but many believed that his death was the result of conspiration from the toes he had stepped on. General Abdulsalami that succeeded Abacha executed the shortest transition to democracy programme that lasted just 11  months and ruled until May 1999. Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military Head of State and General, became the Head of State once again in 1999 (via an election (Onwumechili 1998)). The above scenario is evidence that Nigeria has passed through several military coups and many years of military rule. The collapse of the constitutional governments could be attributed to factors like ethnic politics, breakdown of law and order, electoral malpractices, economic mismanagement, corruption and intolerance. More importantly, weak institution of accountability, lack of professionalism among the military, the inclination of the ambitious military officers to get into office and dip hands into public tilt and distribute patronage and the uncommon desire to be part of governance are some of the major factors driving the military into intervening in politics. The third republic was more problematic as the political class surreptitiously collaborated with the military to subvert the political process before it took off. This

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account for why it is often referred to as the aborted third republic. The republic had partially taken off with the restoration of democracy in the states, but the process was abruptly terminated when the 1993 presidential election was cancelled and the transition programme terminated. The collapse of the republic was not surprising given the dubious manipulations inherent in the entire process (Akinboye 2001). In view of this, the chapter focuses on civil-military relations or military intervention in Nigerian politics. In discussing this, this paper will generate data from the secondary sources and analyse same using descriptive statistics.

Military Intervention: Some Theoretical Insights The decolonization of Africa has left some questions that needed answers. First is that ‘will the newly independent states develop economically than under the colonial government’? Second is that ‘what forms of government would be adopted in the newly independent states’? Shortly after the independent of the colonized states, answers to these questions began to surface. The reality was that peaceful change of government through elections became a rarity as military coup d’etat became the major means of changing government. Electoral democracy was pushed to the background or into extinction for several years or decades until the third wave of democratization. After the first military intervention in Egypt, the wind of military coup d’etat began to blow and swept most elected civilian leaders in Africa. Each military government that comes to power has adduced different reasons for coming to power. The intervention of the military has often been to the detriment of their central and traditional role of defending the territorial integrity of their countries. African military like their contemporary elsewhere have always advanced justification and rational the rationale behind their intervention. Nevertheless, it suffice to note that the African politicians have often created a fertile ground for military intervention, due to their attitude and conduct in and out of power. Although most military regimes have been guilty of the charges they often advanced for their intervention, such charges sometimes include lack of accountability and transparency among the civilian leaders, corruption, mismanagement of public funds, tribalism and favouritism, ethnic and religious tension and violence, etc. In spite of this, theoretical discourse on military intervention has taken different dimensions. In other words, one theory is not adequate to explain military intervention in politics, but rather a hybrid of theories. In this paper, we have adopted a hybrid of theories to explain military intervention. Scholars have theorized military intervention in politics differently. The proponent of socio-economic development theory like Onder, Finer, Germani and Silvert belief that the density of military intervention is more likely to decrease with increased socio-economic development status (Finer, 1988 cited in Onder 2010). Also, they argue that deteriorated economic conditions increase the choice of military intervention particularly when civilian administration is unable to solve the core economic issues and the chances of intervention increase (Mahmood 2016). The general idea of socio-economic development is on improved standard of

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living, health and economy capable of sustaining the population (WiseGeek 2014). According to Huntington (1969), the military will intervene when civilian groups lack legitimacy due to inadequate economic performance and an ineffective executive. Putnam (1967) states that “nations with high socio-economic situations have higher urbanization, industrialization and literacy level and so have increased mass participation into the social activities” (cited in Onder 2010:3). This theory is linked to explain military intervention in Nigeria’s politics in 1985 when General Babangida removed General Buhari from power due to the latter failure to revamp the nation economy that had declined during his rule (Huntington 1969). Socio-economic development is also attributed to the rise of middle strata in the social structure. Germani and Silvert argued that middle class has the motivation and capacity to create and sustain political institutions (Germani and Silvert, 62–80). This view is supported by Huntington’s (1995) study that posits the military is most likely to intervene in politics especially in states lacking institutionalized political cultures, which suffer from economic hardship and social divisions. Similarly, scholars have used political development indicators like strong civil institutions, strong political institutions and strong democratic values as justification for military incursion in politics (Mahmood 2016). They believe that once these indicators are lacking in any society, the government may face the legitimacy crisis (Mahmood 2016). However, where these indicators are found, there is high degree of fundamental human rights, rule of law, equity and justice (Edeh 2014). In other words, military intervention will be difficult where the variables are prevalent, but where they exist in a breach, the society is prone to military intervention and rule (Edeh 2014). In addition, Huntington (2002) argues that the sources of military intervention in politics have not only the keen interest of the military itself, but it is also the result of weak political institutions and low political culture of the developing countries. Generally, in Africa, institutions of government are so weak that democratic governance has been very difficult to be attained, consolidated and sustained. Other explanation given for military intervention is the cohesive nature of the military institution and the availability of military resources. To the scholars, the stronger the military’s resources, either as a percent of state resources or relative to the national economy and coupled with the “national guard” function, the weaker the institutions of civil society and the greater the probability of military intervention (Edeh 2014). The theory believe that the greater the military resources and cohesion of this institution, the higher the chance of military intervention (Mayer and Burnett 1977). Due to the state of insecurity and terrorist activities in Africa, a large percentage of the national budget is always allocated to defence. For example, the Nigerian military over the years has attracted a larger percentage of the national budget due to the security challenges. An increase in the resources available to the military over those of the civilians enables the military to emerge as a strong institution (Mahmood 2016). Furthermore, the centralized chain of command and military discipline has become an effective weapon for the military to take over power. Jenkins and Kposowa (1992) cited in Onder (2010) argued that the centrality of the military to the state’s claim on legitimate violence makes it prone to use this to dominate politically and especially if the civilian institutions are weak. The centrality of this theory has exacerbated the dominance of the military over the civilian leaders. In Nigeria, past military intervention that was

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successful was due to the command and hierarchical structure of the military where orders must be obeyed to the latter. According to Finer (1962), “the armed forces enjoy three massive political advantages over civilian organisation; a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms (1962: 6). More importantly, scholars have attributed most military intervention to conflict situations (both within and without). Conflict is inevitable in human society and the military is not excluded. Religious, ethnic and cultural differences and indeed the heterogeneous nature of the African societies have become a curse than a blessing because it often precipitates intergroup conflict and/or violence that the military take advantage of to intervene in politics. The second military incursion that brought General Gowon into power was attributed to ethnic conflict. The thrust of this theory is that internally weak and divided societies are more prone to military intervention (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992). According to Jenkins and Kposowa, the various facets of ethnicity may be seen in the resentment of one group against the other. This may be due to perceived or evident cultural diversity among groups, ethnic supremacy, ethnic competition and rivalry. Ultimately, the resentment that these spur becomes a trigger of military intervention in most heterogeneous societies and Nigeria in this case (1992: 271–292). Therefore, the inability of government to rein in and minimize intergroup and intragroup conflict and acrimonies is a major issue to consider when accounting for the rationale for military intervention in Nigeria. The state has often engaged in policies that divide rather than unite the people (Mahmood 2016).

Historical Overview of Military Intervention in Nigeria Military intervention has been a practice in the third world countries, particularly in Africa. Military is the generic name given to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Military intervention in Nigerian politics is traceable to the post-independence era. The first military coup took place on January 15, 1966, when a Major in the Nigerian Army, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, led other Majors to stage a bloody coup that ousted the first Prime Minister of an Independent Nigeria, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The coup led to the killing of some top civilian officials and soldiers who were majorly from the Northern part of the country. The coup plotters attributed the coup to the perceived corruption among the public office holders, oppression and intimidation of the western regional government by the ruling Northern People’s Congress (James, Amujo and Cornelius 2012). The military rule of Ironsi was short lived, partly due to the abolition of federalism and introduction of the unitary system in the country. The 1966 Nigerian countercoup which is referred to as the “July Rematch” took place 6 months after the first military intervention. The coup led to the murder of Aguiyi-Ironsi, while General Gowon became the Head of State. The regime of Gowon witnessed a major civil war in Nigeria which lasted for 30 months where almost two million lives were lost, mostly civilian and conscripted army. Gowon was in power until July 1975 when he was overthrown in a palace coup on July 30, 1975, by a group of soldiers that wanted to return the country to democratic rule. In 1976, Murtala who succeeded Gowon was assassinated in a bloody and aborted coup in 1976.

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With the death of Murtala, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo became the military Head of State in 1976 and later handed over power to a democratic elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. The second phase of military rule in Nigeria took off in January 1984 when Alhaji Shehu Shagari was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Major General Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by the junta and ruled for 20 months before he was kicked out of office in another military coup in 1985. General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who led the 1985 coup took over the power with a promise to return the country to democracy. Although he was smart and had his ways three times by reneging on his promise to hand over power to civilian government, the tension generated by his cancellation of the 1993 presidential election ultimately brought him under both domestic and international pressures that forced him to resign from office in 1993. Thus, he ruled Nigeria until 1993 when he handed over power to the interim Head of State, Ernest Shonekan. Three months later, Shonekan was overthrown by General Sani Abacha; Abacha appointed himself Chairman of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of Nigeria. After Abacha’s death in 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over, and ruled until 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo again become Head of State (via an election), and ended the junta (Onwumechili 1998).

Reasons for Military Intervention in Nigerian Politics Military intervention in politics was a peculiar political occurrence in most of African countries prior to the third wave of democratization. With the attainment of independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria had experienced short period of parliamentary democracy before the first military coup and countercoup which eventually led to the 30-month agonizing civil war. Between 1966 and 1999, the army held power in Nigeria without interruption apart from a short-lived return to democracy between 1979 and 1983. The first military intervention in Nigeria which set the pace for subsequent coups in Nigeria was leveraged on democratic failure. In addition, other factors that were visible prior to the intervention included corruption, misrule, ineptitude and political crisis in the western region. The intraparty conflict in the western region and subsequent violence that followed were largely believed to have been instigated by the NPC-led central government. As observed by Huntington (1996), military quest for political power is most likely especially in states lacking institutionalized political cultures, which suffer from economic hardship and social division. In other words, social division was at the base of the military coup and counter of the 1960s in Nigeria. With regard to corruption, military has often justified its intervention on its prevalence in Nigeria. According to Diamond (1989), the mismanagement of public fund under the administration of President Shehu Shagari provokes the military intervention of 1983. The action was executed, according to the plotters, to correct the anomalies in the system. The regime of Major General Buhari was committed to

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the imprisonment of several top government functionaries at both the federal and state levels throughout his regime as the Head of State. Some government functionaries were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, including life imprisonment, for crimes ranging from unlawful possession of government properties to their contributions to the socio-economic hardships  adversity of the country (Diamond 1987). Furthermore, his regime was discriminatory in handling the corruption cases against the politicians. The southern politicians were treated harshly and jailed for long years, while the northern politicians were not so treated. The military intervenes in politics when there is a breakdown of law and order. The military intervention of 1966 and 1983 occurred following the violence that erupted over elections, especially in the Yoruba-speaking states under the first and the second republics. Similarly, Falola (1999) identifies the factors that facilitate the emergence of military regimes as including the defence of a particular ideology or instigation of a revolution and protection of the interests of the ruling class against opposition forces, among others (Cited in Nwozor 2014). Falola’s position could not be completely valid considering the magnitude of corruption, revolution and other social unrest under the fourth republic without any military coup. The uninterrupted civilian-­to-civilian transitions in Nigeria from 1999 till date has expanded the justifications of military intervention in Nigerian politics beyond the purview of corruption and democratic failure. In Nigerian political history, military appears to be more corrupt than the civilian rule before 1999. Herbert and Ugwueze (2014) observe that it will be difficult for any military rule to perform better than civilian-­ led administration being a body taught to fight and kill than to govern. Nigeria sojourned under the military dictatorship for several years because of some other important factors beyond corruption and democratic failure. Nigerian political system originated in the nondemocratic setting of colonial rule which was neither democratic nor legitimate; after the attainment of independence, the political elites abandoned the goal of national unity and integration, the very goal that gave birth to their political ambitions and fell back on subnational politics. This was demonstrated during the first republic that later culminated into civil war and incessant military coup and countercoup. Conversely, global political wave also played an important role in military interventions in Nigeria. Prior to the Cold War era, the African society was littered with authoritarian regime of different shades as well as one-party system. According to Carrie (2005), prior to 1990, only four countries in sub-Saharan Africa (three of them on the mainland) could be accurately described as competitive electoral democracies (Botswana, Gambia, Senegal and Mauritius). Surprisingly, between 1990 and 1995, 38 out of 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa held legislative elections. This is what Huntington (1996) called the third wave of democratization in Africa. The democratic order was low in pre-Cold War compared to the post-Cold War era because of the triumph of capitalism. This scenario has made some analysts to contend that the incessant military interventions in Nigerian politics were the offshoot of global political wave coupled with the level of unpreparedness of the emerging Nigerian political elites after the decolonization process (Olanrewaju and Letswa 2017). The colonial encumbrances

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and the prevailing international political order had a profound influence on the postcolonial Nigeria.

Implications of Military Intervention in Nigerian Politics The incessant military intervention in Nigerian politics has posed serious danger to the survival of Nigeria since 1960. Within the short period of Nigerian statehood, coup and countercoup had plugged Nigeria into agonizing civil war that culminated in severe political instability in the country. The first military coup that dismantled Nigeria’s parliamentary democracy in 1966 and ushered in military rule remained in place for 13  years before the country returned to democratic rule in 1979. On December 31, 1983, the military struck again and remained in power until 1999. Over the years, military rule has become infamous sequel to its restriction of the fundamental human rights, abrogation of the people’s constitution as well as the promulgation and use of decrees. The denial of people’s inalienable rights to participate in governance and subsequent security threats was the heart of all the military regimes in Nigeria. Nwozor (2014) corroborated further that successive military regimes subjected the judiciary to serious abuse on the account of the irreconcilability of the rule of law with autocracy. Military intervened in Nigerian politics in 1966 and abrogated the parliamentary constitution and introduce military laws into the civil place. By this, the first decrees were enacted by Aguiyi-Ironsi regime to secure his regime and sustain the subsequent military actions and regimes. All the democratic institutions and processed of the first republic were eroded under the atmosphere of political instability as a result of coup and countercoup which eventually culminated into civil war. Despite the obscurity that characterized the statistical data of the civil war causalities, Wiseberg (1975) observes that the civilian deaths ranged from 500,000 to as high as six million with 100,000 overall military causalities. An estimated 1000 people died of hunger per day as a result of blockage and disruption of agriculture and the operation of the food distribution relief agencies operating in the region (Wiseberg 1975). The first coup of 1966 did not only threaten the survival of the Nigerian state, but it also exposed the vulnerability of the Nigerian state and how simple it was to use soldiers to attack the government, rather than protect it. The initial coup of 1966 brought devastating and division into Nigerian political lexicon because of the assassination of the high-profile northerners such Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and Northern Region Premier Ahmadu Bello. Six months later, northerner soldiers staged another bloodier countercoup against their Igbo colleagues. Northern mobs killed 30,000 Igbos which eventually set Nigeria on fire (Wiseberg (1975). Military has always leveraged their intervention in politics on institutional decay and instability in the system, but unfortunately it ended up creating corrupt institutions and more political instability. Apart from internal political instabilities, there was high rate of corruption and nepotism under the military regimes. Prior to 1999, Transparency International ranked Nigeria as

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the second most corrupt nation in the world (cited in Oshewolo and Olanrewaju 2011). That was the period of prolonged military rule. Military intervention gives rise to political and economic dislocation. Economic policy of the previous government was often discontinued by the new regime as it seeks to legitimize itself through the introduction of some populist programme. The judiciary is always subjugated by the military after intervention, while the rights of the citizenry are often abridged. The introduction of ouster clauses is commonly applied to decimate the judiciary and make it subservient to the military. Draconian decrees are promulgated that extremely restrict the rights of the citizens. Freedom of individual is unduly restricted. Some judicial functions are transferred to military courts that rarely operate within the armpit of the constitution or civil law. Lastly, the growing levels of corruption and erosion of professionalism in the military establishment are some of the far-reaching implications of military intervention in politics in Nigeria.

Concluding Reflections In this study, we have provided background information on military incursion in Nigerian politics. Nigeria is a diverse country with heterogeneous society. Nigeria has passed through many years of military rule due to the collapse of constitutional governments. Further to this, military intervention in politics was discussed, and the obvious realities remain that military intervention is caused by both internal and external factors to the military as an institution and internal and external factors to the Nigerian state. Military government has always justified their intervention in politics. To them, they are the “messiah” who has come to salvage the country from economic “mess” and uproot the evils of the society. Thus, their intervention in politics is usually seen from the perspective of patriotic citizens coming forward to “correct” what has gone wrong with the system such as ethnicity, religious bigotry, rampant corruption, election malpractice, etc. (Bingel 2000). The prolonged stay of the institution in government has brought untold hardship on the governed and untold damage on the state. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the state if the military can avoid the temptation of getting involve in military intervention. More so that President Obasanjo succeeded in making provision for remuneration similar to those of the politicians for the top hierarchy of the military.

References Akinboye, S.O. (2001). Nigeria’s transition to democracy: prospects for consolidation. Africa Insights, 31(3) Babawale, T. (1993). Neo-colonial Dependency and Crisi in Nigeria. Nigerian Forum. March/ April, 13(3–4). Carrie, M (2005). Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave. Sage Publications.

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Diamond, L.J. (1987). Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, Blackwell Publisher Edeh, H. (2014). Military and politics: Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of military incursion in third world politics. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(20). Elaigwu, I. (1986). Gowon. Ibadan: West Africa Book Publishers Limited. Finer, S.E. (1962). The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics. London: Pall Mall Press. Finer, S. E. (1988). The Man on Horseback. 2nd ed. Bould Co: Westview Press. Gambari, I. (1995). Nigeria Today and the Year 2000. ECPER Journal. 3(1) First Quarter. George, O., Shadare, S. and Owoyemi, O. (2012). Military interventions in the Nigeria politics: ‘A Timed Bomb’ Waiting to Explode? The Avowal of a new management elites. International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, 2(5) 191-198. Herbert E and Ugwueze M (2014) Military and Politics: Understanding the Theoretical Underpinning of Military Incursion in Third World Politics. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(20) Huntington, S.P. (1969). Praetorianism and political decay. In, Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press Huntington, S.P. (1995). The political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. Huntington, S.P (1996) The Third Wave: Democratizations in the late Twentieth Century: Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Huntington, S. P. (2002). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: The Free Press. Ihonvbere, J.O. (1996). Are things falling apart? The military and the crisis of democratization in Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34(2), pp. 193-225. James, O.G., Amujo, O.C. and Cornelius, N. (2012). Military intervention in the Nigerian politics and its impact on the development of managerial elite: 1966-1979. Canadian Social Science, 8(6), pp. 45–53. Mahmood, R. (2016). Theoretical preliminaries of military intervention in politics and its implications on Pakistan. Journal of Indian Studies, 2(2), July-December 2016, pp. 90-105. Mayer, L. C. and Burnett, J. H. (1977). Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Perspective. New York: John Wile and Sons. Jenkins, J. C. and Kposowa, A. J. (1992). The Political Origins of African Military Coups: Ethnic Competition, Military Centrality, and the Struggle over the Post-Colonial State. International Studies Quarterly 36(3), 271–291. Nwozor, A. (2014). “The Judiciary in Nigeria: Its Many Phases and Challenges” In R. M Rotimi& J.Y Fashagba (eds) Understanding Government and Politics in Nigeria. Department of Political and International Relations, Omu aran, Kwara State. Olanrewaju, John S and Letwsa A. M. (2017). An Assessment of Global Political Wave on Party Politics in Africa. Journal of Administration 1(1) Olurode, L. (2004). Issues in Nigeria’s 1999 general elections. Lagos: Rebonik Publications Ltd. Onder, M. (2010). What Accounts for Military Intervention in Politics: A Cross-National Comparison. Son Giincelleme Tarihi. Onwumechili, C. (1998). African democratization and military coups. Westport: Praeger. Oshewolo, S and Olanrewaju J.S (2011) From Hell: The Surge of Corruption in Nigeria, 1999-2001. Journal of Academic Leadership, USA Vol IX No 1 Paden, J. N. (1986). Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria. London: Hodder and Stronghton. Putnam, D.R. (1967). Toward explaining military intervention in Latin American politics. World Politics, 20(1). Rodney, W. (1974). How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Washington DC: Howard University Press. Wiseberg, L. (1975). The Statistics Jungle: Measuring War, Plague, Fire, and Famine. Society 12(5) WiseGeek, (2014). Socio-economic development” in www.wisegeek.com

Chapter 23

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Continuity, Change and Contradictions Segun Oshewolo and Femi Fayomi Abstract  Foreign policy promotes a state’s interest and its overall survival in the international system. Considering the importance of foreign policy, every sovereign state  – regardless of the size, political ideology, and level of development  – has always embraced it. This chapter historicizes the Nigerian foreign policy. It does not only explain the different foreign policy thrusts adopted by successive administrations and the raisons d’etre, it also clearly maps out the golden moments and periods of decline. Using the qualitative research method, this chapter thematically focuses on the evolution of Nigeria’s foreign policy and the post-independence dynamics and contradictions. Keywords  Nigeria’s foreign policy · Idealism · Non-alignment · Afrocentric policy · Economic diplomacy · Citizen diplomacy

Introduction Nigeria achieved political independence from Britain on October 1, 1960. On account of its huge potentials, the country occupies a prominent position in the region of Africa and globally. Nigeria is not only the largest black nation in the world, but it is one the biggest in terms of resource endowment. The political configuration of the country has oscillated between military autocracy and electoral democracy. After several years of incessant military incursion into politics, the country eventually returned to the democratic path on May 29, 1999, with the inauguration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as the democratically elected president. After more than two decades of uninterrupted electoral democracy, the current democratic experiment is the longest in the nation’s political history. Although the operationalisation of the system is riddled with a lot of disabilities, the consensus among the diverse population is that Nigeria’s overall political interests will be better served by it. S. Oshewolo (*) · F. Fayomi Department of Political Science and International Relations, Landmark University, Omuaran, Nigeria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7_23

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A major defining attribute of Nigeria’s political configuration is the conduct of its foreign policy. In the words of Uhomoibhi (2012, p. 3), ‘the foreign policy of a country occupies that ever-shifting and unpredictable terrain in which countries not only pursue and maximise their national interests, but also collectively promote peace and security, friendship, solidarity and development’. Nigeria’s foreign policy has never been static. It has historically incorporated diverse analytical elements and often pursued in the contexts of West of Africa, the African continent, international organisations, global south-south corporation and the rest of the world. Successive administrations have always given attention to these multiple areas in the pursuit of the nation’s foreign policy. In addition, the general objectives that guide the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy have been etched in Chapter 11, Section 19, of the 1999 constitution, as amended. These general objectives include: (i) Promotion and protection of national interest; (ii) Promotion of African integration and support for African unity; (iii) Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (iv) Respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as seeking settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication; and (v) Promotion of a just world economic order (Uhomoibhi, 2012, pp. 3–4). This chapter gives an overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1960 and explains the high and low points of the policy.

The Evolution of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy While there were traces of foreign policy engagements during the colonial era conducted by Imperial Britain, the consensus in the literature is that the country’s international diplomacy officially began after the attainment of political independence on October 1, 1960. Explaining the origin of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Osuntokun (2005a, p. 29) noted that: The first reference to the area in modern diplomacy goes back to the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-85 when, at the instigation of Prince Otto Edvard Leopold von Bismarck (1815-1895), the German Chancellor, the territories around the Niger and Benue Rivers were recognised as being under British influence. The partition of Africa began in earnest and by the Brussels Act of 1890 the European powers (had) agreed to the rules of the partition…

Osuntokun (2005a) further articulated that the advent of colonialism notwithstanding, Nigeria, like other African countries, was not very active in the world of diplomacy until the outbreak of the First World War. He observed that during the War, Nigerians and other Africans were recruited to fight the colonial armies of Germany by the colonial masters. They were therefore involved in a war they knew

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nothing about the cause and against an enemy that was not of their own making. At the end of the War, and in a tacit move that resembled an expansionist foreign policy agenda, the Shehu of Borno and the Lamido of Adamawa pressed for the annexation of parts of German Cameroon through the colonial administration. This was however not successful. Nigeria also made efforts during the Second World War to ensure Allied victory not only in Ethiopia but also particularly in Burma in the campaigns against Italy and imperial Japan (Osuntokun 2005a). During this period, the country had no real interest of its own, other than the constant push for self-rule by the elite and the occasional expansionist tendencies exhibited by some traditional authorities. In terms of international diplomacy, the interest of the colonial masters was also the interest of Nigeria (The Library of Congress Country Studies 2005). In this context, British colonial authorities played a frontline role in the conduct of Nigerian foreign relations, as Britain was responsible ‘for conducting the foreign policies of all its colonies including Nigeria’ (Saliu 2012, p. 173). As a colonial entity, the visions about Nigeria’s role and status in the world were not just dreams about Nigeria by Nigerians but largely by the colonialists (Akinyemi 2003). Oche (2012, p. 324) aptly captured the situation by noting that ‘Britain as a colonial suzerain acted as a phantom agent for Nigeria in all matters and commitments in respect of which Nigeria, as a cosmetic principal under duress, was bound to accept’. The country ‘remained under these disabilities until the midnight of September 30, 1960’ (Oche 2012, p. 325). As overwhelmingly asserted by authors (Saliu 2013; Tyoden 2012; Asobie 2010), Nigeria officially started playing on the world scene only after the attainment of independence. Obi (2000) added weight to this assertion by suggesting that what opened up the global stage to Nigeria was its independence from Britain in 1960. The position of these authors was premised on the fact that Nigeria’s first notable international (multilateral) diplomacy occurred on October 7, 1960 (6 days after independence), when the country became a member of the United Nations (UN), founded as a global platform for multilateral diplomacy. As a colonial entity, Nigeria was not eligible to sign up for membership of the UN until after independence when it possessed the qualifying credentials (Tyoden 2012). This statement substantiates the notion that foreign policy is essentially the business of sovereign states. The idea of sovereignty has evolved as the organising principle of international relations roughly for the last four centuries (Haass 2005). The attainment of independence opened a new vista in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, in that it made Nigeria the architect of its own destiny and the driver of its own international diplomacy. In the opinion of Okoosi-Simbine (2012, p. 213), Nigeria’s independence ‘heralded a new course of foreign relations for the country’. She explained further that political independence created a new channel for integrating the country into the international community of nations, especially with the emergence of Nigeria as the 99th member of the UN shortly after independence. Following the optimism that greeted the emergence of Nigeria as a global player after independence, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa made it clear during a debate in the Federal House of Representatives on January 14, 1960, that Nigeria’s assumption of the responsibility for the conduct of its foreign policy was a privilege that would be taken with all sense of responsibility and seriousness (Uhomoibhi 2012).

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From an institutional point of view, Nigeria’s diplomatic practice began in 1957 when the pioneer members of staff of the Nigerian Foreign Service were recruited by Britain. These personnel were exposed to the British diplomatic missions across the world after 1 year of training in a British university (Saliu 2012). To aid Nigeria’s foreign policy, the Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was created in the Cabinet Office in 1956, with the Secretary to the Prime Minister serving as the officer in charge (Ashiru 2012; Saliu 2012; Fafowora 2008). This Department became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in 1960 and emerged as the central machinery for managing Nigeria’s foreign ­relations (Akindele 2005). As it happened, the attainment of independence did not lead to the appointment of a substantive Minister of External Affairs as the Prime Minister combined the portfolio with that of his office until 1961 when Jaja Wachuku was appointed a substantive Minister (Saliu 2012, 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it is currently called, is the senior arm of an integrated structure referred to as the Foreign Service, with the country’s foreign missions as the other institutional component. The diplomatic missions abroad implement the country’s foreign policy and serve as its ears and eyes abroad. Both arms of the Foreign Service are functionally interdependent. While the missions abroad receive vital directives from the headquarters which they carry out, the Ministry relies a great deal on the advice of the missions in designing the strategies for the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign affairs (Akindele 2005). With a few foreign missions in 1960, Nigeria has expanded the size of its Foreign Service to embrace all corners of the world including representations/delegations at the level of international organisations (Saliu 2012; Saliu 2014). Since the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria’s foreign policy has evolved and gone through different phases. The next section is intended to capture the administration of the country’s foreign policy in a chronological manner.

 rom Political Independence to General Abdusalam F Abubakar It should be stated that Nigeria’s foreign policy immediately after the attainment of political independence in 1960 was built on idealism. As a matter of fact, this idealist orientation shaped Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives at the time. The major objectives derived from idealism were the promotion of international cooperation and the elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations. Idealism would allow Nigeria to collaborate with other countries particularly through the instrumentalities of international organisations. As a result of this orientation, the country subscribed to the undying philosophies of notable international organisations such as the UN, Commonwealth of Nations and Non-Aligned Movement (Adeniji 2005; Gambari 2008; Uhomoibhi 2012; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). However, under the regime of General Gowon, Nigeria’s idealist foreign policy gradually shifted to a relatively

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more activist foreign policy. The major reasons for this new activism were Nigeria’s experiences during the civil war and the post-civil war oil boom which greatly supported the pursuit of the country’s foreign policy. With the new realities after the war, Nigeria began to see the Soviet Union and its allies as more dependable partners than the countries of the West. With the oil boom, the number of Nigeria’s foreign missions also almost doubled (Saliu 2010; Gambari 2008; Fafowora 2008; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). The Murtala/Obasanjo’s military administration was very active on the international scene. Their government ushered Nigeria into an era of deep diplomatic awakening (Effiong 2012; Olusunle 2006). The regime moved Nigeria’s foreign policy to a more truly non-aligned position (Bukarambe 2010). This was the period when ‘the Western powers and their multinational corporations had come to be regarded as exploitative and viewed with suspicion’ the same way ‘the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies were no longer regarded as reliable friends’ (Asobie 2010:4). From the thinking of Nigeria’s foreign policy elites during this period, ‘only states of the South could be trusted and regarded as Nigeria’s dependable friends. This re-definition of Nigeria’s friends and foes, within the international community, was in line with the new perception of the international system by the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole’ (Asobie 2010, p. 4). Another factor that influenced the regime’s non-aligned foreign policy posture was the revival of the Cold War between the West and East during the mid-1970s. This represented a major external challenge for Nigeria. During this period, ‘the average annual value of arms imported into sub-Saharan Africa rose from $370 million to $2500 million, the chief recipients been Angola and Ethiopia’ (Lliffe 2011, p. 73). This influx of arms could worsen Africa’s security and stability. The foreign policy posture of non-alignment would therefore allow the regime to speak up against the destabilising activities of the superpowers on the continent of Africa, contribute more to the liberation of Africa and give the country a leading position on the continent in particular and the global South in general (Lliffe 2011).Murtala/ Obasanjo’s ‘radical nationalism and openness to innovation came together to transform Nigeria’s external relations’ (Lliffe 2011, p. 45). As a result of the ‘dynamic Africa-centred foreign policy’ that the military regime undertook (Whiteman 2008, p. 263), it was so committed to the continent that it ‘spent apparently 75 percent of its time and resources in solving Africa’s problems’ (Akinterinwa 2014, p.  286). Considering the activist foreign policy orientation of the regime, it was prominently involved in addressing all matters affecting the continent of Africa. A major interesting move by the military regime of Obasanjo towards the implementation of Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy was the nationalisation of the British Petroleum (BP) ‘then worth 2.3 billion naira’ (Whiteman 2008, p. 264). In 1978, the Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), on behalf of Nigeria’s military leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, sent a telegram to the British Petroleum (Nigeria) Ltd., declaring Nigeria’s 100 per cent takeover of select operations belonging to the oil company. The name of the oil company was not only changed to African Petroleum, but also the regime also instituted a ban on contracts for British companies, although the ban was later rescinded by the civilian

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administration of Shagari. The popular narrative is that the assets of the oil company were taken over to register Nigeria’s displeasure at the UK’s proposed change in policy favouring the resumption of oil supplies to apartheid South Africa (Akinterinwa 2014; Whiteman 2008; Olusunle 2006). In 1979, Nigeria also nationalised the assets of the Barclays Bank ‘when Britain violated Nigeria’s policy on non-export of Nigerian oil to apartheid South Africa’ (Akinterinwa 2005, p. 14). Clearly, the decisions were taken to demonstrate the regime’s anti-apartheid stance in Africa. Prior to his emergence, ‘Nigeria had pursued a low-profile, pro-Western foreign policy with little sympathy for African liberation movements’ (Lliffe 2011, p. 45). General Obasanjo – just like Murtala – had a strong emotional commitment to the liberation of Africa, particularly Southern Africa (Lliffe 2011). General Obasanjo’s regime ‘ended Nigeria’s support for Anglo-American peace proposals for Rhodesia-­ Zimbabwe, and increased diplomatic, financial and other support for the country’s Patriotic Front Liberation Movement’. In addition, Nigeria ‘rejected the results of the elections in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe which produced Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the first prime minister’ (Gambari 2008, p. 66). Obasanjo’s actions were intended to convince Britain to change its ‘stated intention to recognise Muzorewa’s regime and to lift economic sanctions on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe’ (Gambari 2008, p. 66). In general, Obasanjo’s position ‘in the long and often frustrating diplomatic dialogue on the topic of Rhodesia was robust and uncompromising’ and often brought Brigadier Joe Garba – Obasanjo’s foreign minister – ‘up against British diplomats’ (Whiteman 2008, p. 263). The military administration of Murtala/Obasanjo provided immense supports to liberation movements across the continent. During this period, the then capital city – Lagos – almost became the rallying point for liberation movements from different parts of Africa, particularly Southern Africa. These movements were allowed to open secretariats and branches in Lagos. Private Nigerian citizens also made financial contributions to these liberation efforts, which were channelled through the National Committee on Apartheid (NACA). For Nigeria’s fearless supports for liberation struggles in Southern Africa, Nigeria became classified as a ‘frontline state’, thus enjoying the same status as the East and Southern African countries that bore the major burdens of the struggles (Yaqub 2005, p. 63). More so, the regime hosted the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in Lagos in February 1977. The plan for the festival was adopted by Gowon, postponed by Murtala and finally implemented by Obasanjo as a display of Nigeria’s cultural leadership. However, General Obasanjo was less committed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Although Gowon had agreed that its headquarters be located in Lome to win Francophone support for ECOWAS, Obasanjo insisted that if Nigeria was going to provide the bulk of the budget, the headquarters must be located in Lagos. The regime did not achieve much in ECOWAS due to the extreme suspicion shown by its Francophone members who saw it as a potential means of Nigerian domination (Lliffe 2011). This situation notwithstanding, Nigeria’s foreign policy, particularly towards Africa, under the military regime of Murtala/Obasanjo was eventful.

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The governments of President Shehu Shagari and General Muhammadu Buhari were largely isolationist due to the country’s overwhelming economic crisis. A major fallout of this crisis was the expulsion of a very large number of the citizens of other West African countries from Nigeria. Under Buhari’s military autocracy, in particular, Nigeria closed its borders to several West African nationals (Adeniran 2008; Adebajo 2008; Effiong 2012; Ajulo 2007; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). The Babangida military government was notable for its economic diplomacy. The government recognised that if Nigeria’s economic crisis was not addressed, it would hamper the country’s external engagements. Babangida’s economic diplomacy would allow his government to deploy all diplomatic resources available to manage the damaged economy, arrest the worsening economic situation and generate external supports for the economic recovery programmes (Saliu 2010; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). The regime was also committed to global south-south cooperation particularly through the Technical Aids Corps Scheme (TACS) that was established in 1987. Again, Babangida’s regime demonstrated commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Apart from his emergence as the Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1991, a Nigerian – Chief Emeka Anyaoku – became the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, and another Nigerian – Joe Garba – presided over the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (Saliu 2010; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). The Abacha military regime represented the dark era in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Abacha’s foreign policy was abrasive and confrontational. The regime committed human rights abuses. Different political figures were sentenced to death and terms of imprisonment. The government also ordered the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others. The regime was equally notorious for disregarding international resolutions. The implication was that Nigeria became a pariah state under his watch. Nigeria’s traditional allies did not only sever diplomatic ties with it, but also major international organisations also openly criticised the country (Akpan 2010; Effiong 2012; Adeniran 2008; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). After the death of General Sani Abacha, General Abdusalam Abubakar took over on June 9, 1998, and began the process of mending Nigeria’s ostracisation by the international community. In order ‘to convince the world that a genuine transition to civil rule was on course, and that a process of national reconciliation at home had commenced’, he embarked on trips to world’s leading democracies such as the United States, Britain and France, among others. In the course of these trips, the international community did not only pledge support for the regime’s transitional agenda but also advised it to resolve outstanding human rights issues in Nigeria and requested that those arrested and detained under Abacha’s watch be released. These were journalists, politicians and democracy activists (Folarin 2013). In response to international and local demands, the regime released some political detainees such as General Olusegun Obasanjo, Beko Ransome-Kuti and others. Those on exile – such as Wole Soyinka and others – also returned home. Abdulsalami stick to the transitional agenda of his regime which eventually led to Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 and the emergence of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the democratically elected president. Although the efforts made by the regime yielded some dividends, there were still some sanctions on Nigeria until an elected government was sworn in (Folarin 2013; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018).

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 he Return to Civil Rule and President Olusegun Obasanjo’s T Foreign Policy Six successful military coups and ‘nearly 30 years of dictatorship’ preceded ‘the 1999 transition’ (LeVan 2014, p. 216). Nigeria’s fourth republic began on May 29, 1999, when Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated as the country’s elected president, making him the first Nigerian – living or dead – to occupy the highest political office twice – first as a military ruler in 1976. However, Nigeria’s democratic transition to the fourth republic was tortuous and convoluted (Ojo 2008). Explaining this tortuous democratic journey, Fawole (2004, p.  1) noted that the democratic idea was: Initially conceived in 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida seized power from his predecessor…, the pregnancy that was to result in the birth of civilian rule, had to be carried by three successive military regimes, namely, the Babangida regime (1985-1993), the Sani Abacha regime (1993-1998), and the Abdulsalami Abubakar regime (1998-1999). The safe delivery of the pregnancy of democracy was, however, twice aborted, first by General Babangida who annulled the June 1993 elections, and later by Abacha who stubbornly insisted on transmuting from military dictator to civilian ruler in 1998. It was the succeeding regime of General Abubakar that eventually rescued the pregnancy from another miscarriage. His regime’s transition to civil rule programme was brought to successful conclusion in May 1999.

The presidential election of February 27, 1999, was contested by three registered political parties. These included the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP) later known as the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). While Chief Olusegun Obasanjo emerged as the flag bearer of the PDP, Chief Olu Falae picked the ticket of the APP/AD alliance. At the end of the presidential election, Obasanjo of the PDP won a total of 18,738,154 votes (62.78 per cent) over Falae’s 11,110,287 votes (32.22 per cent) and was consequently declared the winner and duly elected the president of Nigeria by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (Obasanjo 2014; Omotola 2010). The flaws that characterised the election notwithstanding the military finally handed over power to Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, effectively returning Nigeria to civil rule (Campbell 2011). The inauguration of President Obasanjo’s government was greeted with fanfare and celebration. The event attracted about 40 heads of state and government, thereby heralding Nigeria’s return to the fold of civilised nations. This was the first time in Nigeria’s political history that a national ceremony would attract such an impressive array of world leaders (Fawole 2000). As argued by President Obasanjo, ‘the number and quality of guests’ were even comparable to those at the country’s independence celebration in 1960 (Obasanjo 2014, p.  113). The warm embrace of the second Obasanjo government by the international community was a function of Nigeria’s new democratic experiment and the international community’s perception of the personality and moral stature of President Obasanjo, coupled with the expectation that he would change the fortunes of Nigeria in the world (Fawole 2000).

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The conclusion of the electioneering process and the inauguration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the duly elected president signalled the symbolic retirement of the military from Nigerian politics. General Abdulsalami Abubakar – who midwifed the electioneering process – was escorted in a motorcade by the military’s highest-ranking officers to his hometown, Minna, Niger State, about 75 miles west of the Federal Capital, Abuja (Onishi 1999). In order to prevent the possibility of another military coup, Obasanjo launched his presidency with a whirlwind of activity. ‘Barely two hours after inauguration, he removed the service chiefs whom Abdulsalami had left in post, replacing them by men from minority groups. During the next two months, he retired some 200 officers, including all 93 who had held political positions’ (Lliffe 2011, p.  183). The successful political transition programme offered hopes that the country would return once again to global and continental reckoning (Anyaoku 2013). On President Obasanjo’s way to attaining power the second time, ‘several commitments and compromises were struck which apparently could not be wished away’ (Osuntokun 2005b, p. 211). The emergence of General Olusegun Obasanjo as a major contender in the process leading to the 1999 elections and his eventual electoral victory can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the death of General Sani Abacha in mysterious circumstances led to Obasanjo’s release from prison on June 20, 1998, by General Abdulsalami Abubakar. But for Abacha’s death, it would have been difficult to predict the turn of events considering the maximum ruler’s insistence on succeeding himself. Second, the death of Chief MKO Abiola – the winner of the annulled June 12, 1993, presidential election – also played a role. The exit of Abacha implied that Chief Abiola who was in military detention remained in contention for the highest political office. As a matter of fact, there were popular calls at home and abroad for the establishment of a national government to be headed by Abiola, even though the government of General Abubakar was not kindly disposed to the idea (Ekanade and Odoemene 2012). However, the death of Abiola in detention put the whole plans and debates about his possible emergence in disarray. Also, but closely related to the above, ‘Nigeria’s return to democracy emerged as a trade-off between the elite northern oligarchy and Obasanjo, and was facilitated by the departing military government’ (Ekanade and Odoemene 2012, p. 83). The idea was that General Obasanjo would serve as a tool for bridging the gap between the military establishment and new democratic order. For this reason, General Babangida – in the company of some retired military officers – visited Obasanjo at his Ota farming village to strike a deal on his emergence as president. The ‘pact’ provided that Obasanjo must vacate his earlier support for the ‘June 12’ cause and all it stood for (Opejobi 2018; Ekanade and Odoemene 2012). Because he embraced the agenda presented to him, the northern oligarchy facilitated his emergence as the PDP flag bearer and his consequent electoral victory. It is believed in some quarters that the electoral body – INEC – ‘rigged the 1999 elections in favour of Obasanjo in demonstration of military solidarity’ (Omotola, 2010, p. 544). Finally, Obasanjo’s political pedigree may have played a role in his emergence. General Obasanjo’s voluntary handing over of power to a civilian government in 1979 and his

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i­nternational exposure during the interregnum between his military and civilian presidency made him a widely acclaimed figure with all the leadership attributes to oversee Nigeria’s new democratic project. To put in perspective President Obasanjo’s international engagements, it is important to touch on some critical issues. The Nigerian domestic environment after the 1999 political transition has been described as ‘ugly’ (Akinboye 2013). The domestic environment that President Obasanjo inherited was not in good shape on account of the multifaceted problems that bedevilled the nation at the time. Problems such as public corruption, poor economy and ethnic contestations largely conditioned the character of his administration’s foreign policy. President Obasanjo and the new members of the ruling class were determined to address these problems head-on (Obasanjo 2014). They had the ‘monumental task of re-engineering the society, rebuilding basic infrastructure and institutions, fighting corruption, and most importantly, restructuring the economy for faster economic growth and poverty reduction’ (Okonjo-Iweala, Soludo and Muhtar 2003, p. 1). On the international front, Nigeria’s external image crisis, internecine conflicts across Africa and the continent’s precarious economic position in the global system all shaped President Obasanjo’s foreign policy choices. The modest effort here is to examine these problems and then find out how they shaped President Obasanjo’s foreign policy. First, at the termination of military rule, Nigeria was classified by Transparency International as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world (Fawole 2004). This was due to the ‘evidence of massive looting of public resources by Nigerian leaders, especially during the presidency of General Sani Abacha (1993–1998)’ (Enweremadu 2013, p. 52). These looted assets comprised kickbacks paid by multinational oil companies, contracts awarded at inflated costs to firms linked to Abacha and direct withdrawals from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Abegunrin 2006; Fawole 2004). President Obasanjo realised the danger of public corruption on Nigeria’s image abroad and made conscious efforts to address the problem. The administration embarked on a reform of the public services by establishing new anti-corruption bureaus and a campaign aimed at recovering looted assets held abroad. President Obasanjo exchanged correspondences with countries holding Abacha’s loots and the leaders of the G7 soliciting their support in retrieving Nigeria’s assets held abroad. These correspondences were followed with high-level diplomatic visits to the countries concerned. While President Obasanjo’s efforts brought some improvements in that they created international awareness about his administration’s initiatives and somewhat deprived government officials the use of the international financial networks to pillage resources, his efforts did not produce significant success for Nigeria (Enweremadu 2013; Olusunle 2006). As articulated by Enweremadu (2013, p. 52): first, the theft and international laundering of public funds did not stop. Second, much of Nigeria’s estimated 170 billion USD in stolen public wealth was not repatriated. When Obasanjo left office on May 29 2007, the government’s efforts had only recouped 2 billion USD, including the 825 million USD previously retrieved by General Abubakar. The recovery was hampered by a lack of transparency, an excessive fixation with the Abacha loot, inadequate legal and accounting skills, the uncooperative attitude of accused persons, and, more importantly, limited external support.

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Second, President Olusegun Obasanjo inherited a poor and heavily indebted economy. Commentators agreed that an average Nigerian was poorer than in the previous decades ‘despite the country’s nearly US$300 billion earnings from oil exports between 1973 and 2000’. Poverty was pervasive, ‘with about 70 per cent of the population in absolute poverty’. During the period, the country’s external debt was 65 per cent of gross domestic product, while the annual debt service was nine times the annual health budget. Domestic debt also ballooned to an estimated US$8.6 billion by the end of 2001 (Okonjo-Iweala, Soludo and Muhtar 2003). President Obasanjo embarked on far-reaching reforms that would create conducive environment for the flow of foreign investments (Lamido 2012; Abegunrin 2006). To address Nigeria’s debt crisis and forge a consensus on broad policy issues between the public sector, private sector and international community, the Debt Management Office (DMO) in collaboration with the African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE), and with financial support from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), held a conference in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 17, and 18, 2001. During the conference, President Obasanjo charged the participants to effectively diagnose Nigeria’s debt problem with a view to identifying the causes and proffer appropriate solutions inter alia (Okonjo-Iweala, Soludo and Muhtar 2003). President Obasanjo was more concerned about debt forgiveness because the Nigerian national debt was dragging the country down (Osuntokun 2006; Lamido 2012). This debt crisis forced Obasanjo to look to creditors for succour and support (Osuntokun 2005b). He travelled tirelessly to Western capitals in a bid to secure the annulment of the country’s external debt (Adebajo 2008; Olusunle 2006). Therefore, in 2005, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, President Obasanjo’s Finance Minister, negotiated a settlement of most of the country’s foreign debt with the Paris Club, an informal group of 19 government lenders. ‘This allowed Nigeria in 2006 to become the first African nation to fully pay off her debt to the group. The Paris Club settlement freed Nigeria from debt service of some one billion U.S. dollars per year’ (Campbell 2011, p. 18). The strong political support given to President Obasanjo by London, Washington and Paris was underpinned by the credible and technical arguments of Okonjo-Iweala. After the final negotiated agreement, Paris Club members received about US$12.5 billion from Nigeria and forgave US$18 billion (Campbell 2011). The major factor underpinning Obasanjo’s efforts in this regard was the realisation that one’s foreign rating and influence is a reflection of the health and size of the economy (Lamido 2012). Third, when President Obasanjo came on board as Nigeria’s elected president, the domestic environment was weakened by several centrifugal forces occasioned by Nigeria’s complex federal configuration. There were ethno-religious conflicts across the country and contestations over resource ownership and control. These domestic conflicts weakened the domestic setting and greatly diminished the country’s influence on the continent of Africa and globally (Abegunrin 2006). For instance, there were spiralling religious conflicts in Plateau State, and Obasanjo reacted to the crisis by imposing a state of emergency despite public criticisms against such a move. There was also a lingering crisis in the Niger Delta over

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resource control. To address the issue of militancy in the region, the president invited Dokubo-Asari – a leading militant threatening the peace of the oil-rich Niger Delta – to Abuja for a private discussion against Obasanjo’s military reputation of applying force to combat violent disturbance. Obasanjo’s argument was that ‘if he was helping to secure peace in other lands of Africa, he should be prepared to do the same at home even if it requires negotiating with people with unusual background and reputation’ (Osuntokun 2005b, p. 224). President Obasanjo realised that it would be difficult for Nigeria to be assertive in its international engagements if the conflicts at the home front were not nipped in the bud. As articulated by Osuntokun (2013, p. 7), the reality in international diplomacy is that ‘a country that is strong at home would be influential abroad’. The conflicts Obasanjo inherited at the beginning of his presidential term in 1999 included ‘Ogonis against Andonis, Ijaws against Itsekiris, Tivs against Juukuns, Chambas against Kutebs, Katafs against Hausas, Yorubas against Hausas, Hausas against Igbos, Ife against Modakeke, Omulgri against Agolugri’ (Adebajo 2008, p. 5). Fourth, as of the time President Olusegun returned to power in 1999, ‘the image of the country was at its lowest ebbs. Sanctions of various sorts were imposed by some of the Western countries with Canada in particular going to the extreme of breaking up diplomatic relations over the Ogoni episode’ (Yaqub 2005, p. 70). This was because Nigeria faltered on the scales of democratisation, rule of law and human rights (Saliu and Omotola 2006). Nigeria’s foreign policy suffered tremendously, particularly under the military rulership of Abacha, because of his record level of human rights violation. The miserable human rights record of the Abacha regime ‘led to the suspension of Nigeria from the membership of the Commonwealth of Nations in 1995, and in addition seriously diminished the country’s influence on the continent of Africa, and was ostracised as a pariah state internationally’ (Abegurin 2006, p. 265). His administration needed to rebrand the country’s international image as one where human rights were respected and rule of law was the basis of governance (Lamido 2012). To repair Nigeria’s battered image abroad and facilitate Nigeria’s return to the fold of civilised nations, President Obasanjo needed to embark on diplomatic travels to convince the members of the international system that Nigeria had embraced the culture of democracy and solicit their supports in nurturing the system. As articulated by Fawole (2004, p. 6), ‘one major challenge that the Obasanjo government had to grapple with right from the outset was that of guiding and nurturing the young democracy through its most difficult teething stages’. It was also imperative for the administration to restore Nigeria’s leadership credibility on the continent of Africa. Given the historical significance of Africa to Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuits, the administration had the responsibility of returning Nigeria to its previous position of preeminence in the region. Fifth, during the tenure of President Obasanjo, there were internecine wars across Africa. They occurred in such places as Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau and the hot war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Osuntokun 2005b). The continent ‘even contributed a new phenome-

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non of disappearing states to political lexicon, in the sense that, at a time, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia were no longer states’ (Osuntokun 2005b, p. 212). Nigeria, under President Obasanjo, made the resolutions of these numerous political convulsions across the continent a foreign policy priority. His administration became actively involved in resolving conflicts in several hotspots through unilateral efforts and the multilateral frameworks of ECOWAS and the AU. These efforts cost Nigeria a lot of financial, material and human resources. Sixth, during the tenure of President Obasanjo, the economic position of Africa in the global system was very precarious. While the continent of Africa represented the second largest continent in the world after Asia, and probably the second most endowed, after South America, in terms of natural resources, ‘yet, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Africa attracted less than one percent of global foreign direct investment (FDI), and less than two percent of global trade and export. It enjoyed two percent of global energy consumption and was groaning under the dead-weight of foreign debt’ (Osuntokun 2005b, p.  213). Because of Africa’s unimaginable depth of poverty, vulnerability and marginalisation in the global system, President Obasanjo had the responsibility to mobilise other African leaders into action. This necessitated Obasanjo’s numerous journeys abroad campaigning for Africa’s debt write off and soliciting for the inflow of FDI into Africa. Africa’s precarious economic situation also influenced the prominent role Obasanjo played in fashioning out the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Nigeria’s foreign policy engagements  – under President Obasanjo  – were not limited to Africa. Although the administration’s foreign policy was more tilted towards Africa, there were other important levels of engagement. The civilian government of Obasanjo saw the need to balance its Afrocentric foreign policy pursuits with the formidable relations, especially with global powers that had the capacity to assist Nigeria in its domestic concerns (Nwankwo 2013). Nigeria maintained very important relationship with the West. At the initial stage, the country’s diplomatic relations with the Western world were intended to repair its badly dented image, court new friends, announce itself as a repentant nation and sell Nigeria’s new democratic potentials to the world. Abegunrin (2006) explained that after Obasanjo took the oath of office in 1999, he ‘went on a global goodwill tour to call the attention of the international community, and particularly of the Western industrialised countries to the Nigerian situation’. Later, it became part of efforts aimed at integrating Nigeria into the international power matrix, being the leading nation from the African continent with immense power potentials and resources. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria was also active at the levels of international organisations. President Obasanjo saw the multilateral platforms offered by international organisations as critical instruments for promoting friendly relations with all nations of the world (Saliu and Omotola 2006) and projecting Nigeria’s influence among the committee of nations. Obasanjo also used the instrumentalities of these platforms to advance and project Africa’s interests to the world. These multilateral frameworks included the UN, G77, the Commonwealth of Nations and the Non-­ Aligned Movement, among numerous others. Through these platforms, ‘President Obasanjo delivered widely acclaimed speeches’ (Saliu and Omotola 2006, p. 319).

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In the UN, for instance, Obasanjo pushed for political and administrative reform of the organisation, particularly the Security Council. Nigeria did not hide her strategic quest for a permanent membership of the Council – dominated by a minority of five countries. For this, Obasanjo was very vocal on the need for an expanded UNSC (Akindele 2013; Agwu 2011). In pursuit of this goal, Nigeria used every opportunity and international platform to brandish her credentials and sell her candidacy.

The Post-Obasanjo Era The post-Obasanjo era in Nigeria has produced three different heads of state: Presidents Umar Musa Yar’Adua (2007–2010), Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010–2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015 to date). However, the thinking in the literature is that while President Obasanjo pursued Nigeria’s foreign policy with evident gusto, his successors have not been able to march his level of achievement (Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). President Umar Musa Yar’Adua assumed office as Nigeria’s head of state on May 29, 2007, after succeeding Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. On account of his predecessor’s foreign policy achievements, much was expected from the administration of Yar’Adua, in terms of maintaining the momentum in the conduct of the country’s foreign policy. His shallow background in international diplomacy notwithstanding, the managers of Nigeria’s foreign relations in the ministry of foreign affairs interestingly came up with a new foreign policy thrust for Nigeria – known as citizen diplomacy. Through the instrumentality of the new foreign policy thrust, the expectations were that Nigeria would harness the resources and potentials of its citizens both at home and in the diaspora, mainstream the principle of reciprocity and create an enabling environment for citizens to prosper and engage in broad issues of human importance at both national and international levels (Pine 2011). The need to redirect Nigeria’s diplomacy to benefit the citizens at home and abroad, and enhance their active involvement in the diplomatic environment, led to the conception of the thrust of citizen diplomacy. The administration of late President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, through his foreign affairs minister, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, developed and articulated the concept of citizen diplomacy as Nigeria’s new foreign policy thrust. With this, the protection of the interests of Nigerians at home and in diaspora would constitute the mandate for both arms of the Nigerian Foreign Service – the ministry of foreign affairs and the missions abroad. Prior to its adoption, several Nigerians in different parts of the world had been subjected to unseemly and inappropriate treatments such as unfair deportation, imprisonment and all manners of hostility. The foreign missions, mandated to see to the needs of Nigerians abroad, were usually incapacitated by several issues, most notably finance. At home, the story was not different. The citizens had to endure unreasonable pains to obtain visas to travel abroad. There was also a huge gap between governance and the expectations of the citizens. The fallout of this governance-citizenship gap had been the apparent loss of confidence in the political leadership. As laudable as the foreign

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policy thrust was, there were some contradictions. For instance, the thrust was poorly articulated, and there was the problem of poor budgetary allocation to the ministry of foreign affairs and Nigeria’s foreign missions. Following the death of President Umar Musa Yar’Adua in 2010, his deputy  – Goodluck Jonathan – was sworn in as the president in May 2010 and subsequently won Nigeria’s 2011 presidential election. The circumstances surrounding his emergence were very interesting. He was the deputy to Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and eventually became the governor after the impeachment of his boss. While preparing to run for the same office during the 2007 general elections, he got nominated as Yar’Adua’s vice-president and both went ahead to win the election. Therefore, Jonathan had been deputy-governor, governor, vice-president and acting president before becoming elected president (Ojo 2014). In terms of the administration of Nigeria’s foreign policy under his watch, it is important to emphasise that Jonathan’s moderate foreign policy exposure – like his predecessor in office – had a defining impact on the conduct of his government’s foreign policy. Because of his little foreign policy exposure, he relied largely on his foreign affairs minister  – Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru – who was a retired Foreign Service officer in making key decisions (Saliu 2016). The government of President Jonathan played a commendable role in West Africa where Nigeria has historically been described as the undisputed leader. During his tenure as Nigeria’s president, he served as the chairman of ECOWAS. He performed major mediatory roles in Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea and a number of other countries. His government was also committed to democracy promotion in the region. This was notable in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, among others. Under Jonathan, a Nigerian  – Mrs. Salamatu Hussaini Suleiman  – emerged as ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and another Nigerian – Dr. Aisha Laraba Abdullahi – won election as the chair of the AU’s Commission for Political Affairs. Dr. Bernard O Aliu was President of the Executive Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Nigeria equally got the endorsement of the AU and ECOWAS to represent the West African subregion for the fifth time on the UN Security Council (UNSC). In terms of Nigeria’s relations with the rest of the world, the relations with the West and China stood out. However, there were some black spots. The administration was not very assertive in managing the Ivorian and Libyan crises; there was the rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa on a number of occasions and the increase in the scale of Boko Haram terror attacks, particularly in the Northeast (Saliu 2016; Ojo 2014). In the aftermath of the electoral defeat suffered by incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP in 2015, General Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) was inaugurated as Nigeria’s fourth democratically elected president in the current republic. He therefore became the second person – after Chief Olusegun Obasanjo – to rule Nigeria both under military autocracy and democracy. In the area of foreign policy, a number of issues have defined President Buhari’s administration. First, the government is fond of making – albeit bizarrely – negative statements about Nigeria in international forums. Rather than serve as the country’s chief image maker, the president has consistently used international platforms to advertise Nigeria’s negativities

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(Oshewolo and Nwozor 2019; Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). President Buhari and his foreign policy handlers must understand that Nigeria’s interest would be better served if international forums and platforms are used to project the country in good light and not for disparaging and de-marketing purposes. Again, under the current administration, Nigerians living abroad have been subjected to different kinds of mistreatment. Nigerians have not only continued to be subjected to xenophobic attacks in different parts of the world, but also they have also had to grapple with rising spate of deportation. Furthermore, Nigeria’s global ranking, particularly in international peacekeeping, is declining. Even in Africa where Nigeria has always spearheaded peace operations, the country appears to be taking the back seat now. What is more, the country’s global visibility is under a threat. The Buhari government has always demonstrated its readiness to prune Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad, and this is largely as a result of the domestic challenges confronting the country (Saliu and Oshewolo 2018). The contradictions under the current government notwithstanding, there have been some diplomatic returns. For instance, Nigeria’s Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, Akinwumi Adesina and Mohammed Barkindo currently preside over the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), respectively (Oshewolo 2019a).

Concluding Reflections Nigeria’s foreign policy, without a doubt, has been characterised by twists and turns. In terms of the pursuit of the policy, while there have been periods of docility, some regimes have been marked by activism. With regard to returns, the deliverables have not been the same across regimes. In general, although some have argued that Nigeria’s returns from its foreign policy have not been proportionate to the sacrifices, one can say that there have been notable diplomatic upturns. The pursuit of the policy has conferred on Nigeria major advantages in international diplomacy. It has not only allowed the country to consolidate on its leadership/hegemonic ambition on the continent of Africa, but it has also enhanced its visibility and relevance globally. However, to expand the scope of returns, the domestic environment of foreign policy should be rejigged to enable it to support the policy better, the allocation to the foreign policy sector  – as a proportion of the national budget  – should be expanded, and there should be a more purposive inter-ministerial approach to foreign policy formulation and implementation (Oshewolo 2019b).

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Index

A Abyss of indebtedness, 259, 260 Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), 302 Action Group (AG), 291 Adjudication, 131 Advisory Judicial Committee, 147 Africa’s debt crisis, 265 Africa’s Golden Years, 260 African debt crisis, 268 African Development Bank, 269 African Union (AU), 265 All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), 301, 302 All People’s Party (APP), 300 Amalgamated Tin Miners of Nigeria (ATMN), 294 Amalgamation of north and southern Nigeria, 37 Anti-Sardauna element, 297 Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), 148 Asymmetrical global system, 264, 265 B Berlin Conference, 289 Berom ethnic group, 302 Berom Progressive Union (BPU), 296 Berom protest movement, 296 Bicameral legislature, 41 British authority, 290 British colonial policy, 174 Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit, 266

Bureaucracy Adebo Salaries and Wages Commission (1971), 223 Adeyinka Morgan Commission (1963), 223 civil service reforms (1988), 224 civil service reforms (Ayida Panel 1994), 224–225 civil service reforms (Obasanjo administration 1999–2007), 228 Gorsuch Commission (1954), 222 Harragin Commission (1946), 222 L.N. Mbanefo Commission (1959), 222 Nigerian bureaucracy, 220–221 Nigerian bureaucratic establishment, 218 Nigerian state, 229–231 Pension Reform Act (2004), 226–227 post-Udoji reforms, 224 pre-Udoji reforms, 221 public policy reforms (2003), 218–219, 225, 226 Servicom policy, 227 Tudor Davis (1945), 222 Udoji reforms, 222–224 Bureaucratic corruption, 380 Burkean approach, 106 C Cameroonian groups, 292 Census administration challenges, 358 fluvial process, 357

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 R. Ajayi, J. Y. Fashagba (eds.), Nigerian Politics, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50509-7

427

428 Census administration (cont.) history, census, 355 inadequate funding, 360 managerial skills, 358, 359 national wealth, 363 new state creation, 363, 364 Nigeria, 355–357 organizational skills, 358, 359 political allocation, seat, 362, 363 political problems, 361, 362 politics, 362 techniques, population data, 362 the 2006 census vs. voters’ registration, 364, 365 weak technological capacity, 359, 360 Central council of ministers, 42, 43 Central executive council, 42 Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), 134, 135, 151, 155–159 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, 265 Civil rule Africa, 416–419 Commonwealth of Nations, 419 debt forgiveness, 417 democratisation, 418 domestic environment, 417 electioneering process, 415 ethnic contestations, 416 G77, 419 gross domestic product (GDP), 417 human rights, 418 military establishment and democratic order, 415 military rule, 416 Nigeria’s foreign policy, 419 Nigeria’s fourth republic, 414 Nigeria’s political history, 414 Non-Aligned Movement, 419 poor economy, 416 public corruption, 416 rule of law, 418 UN, 419 Civilian rule, 266 Clifford constitution, 39 Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), 158 Colonial economy agricultural productivities, 246–247 development plans, 247–249 discriminating economic policies, 249–251 economic benefits, 254–255 economic reforms currency and banking, 252–253 labour policy, 253–254

Index land policy, 253 taxation, 251–252 industrial revolution, 246 railways, 246, 254–256 Colonial Nigeria Eastern regional, 50, 51 ethnic politics, 49, 50 federal constitutional crises, 50, 51 government structure, 42–44 1951 constitution, 42–44 1954 constitution, 44–46 party politics, 48, 49 party system, government, 44–46 political crisis, 49, 50 political parties, 48 political structure, 38 political system, 38 politico-territorial restructuring, 40–42 Richards’ constitution, 40–42 self-government, 51, 52 the 1922 constitution, 39, 40 the 1960 constitution, 47 Colonialism, 26, 29, 34, 38 Confederal structure ethnic federations, 178 federations, 179 MNR, 179 Nigeria’s political future, 179 Nigerian federalism, 180 Confederation central government, 174 features, 174 federation, 175 Forsyth, 175 organizational features, 174 Swiss federation, 175 Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), 302 Constituent Assembly (CA), 150 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), 150 Constitutional democracy, 152 Constitutionalism, 152 Contributory pension scheme (CPS), 371 Convoluting federalism, 165, 174, 180 Corruption anti-corruption agencies, 393 anti-corruption crusade, 389–390 colonial era, 382 conception, 378–379 convictions, 388 EFCC, 381, 388–390 explanations, 385–386 governance, 390–392 ICPC, 381, 389, 390 major cases, 386–388

Index national security risk, 392 postcolonial era, 383–385 precolonial era, 381–382 private, 379 public bureaucratic (see Bureaucratic corruption) institutional corruption, 380 military (see Military corruption) political corruption, 379, 380 rate of, 381 Court of Appeal, 129, 135, 136 Courts of Equity, 131 CRC, 46 Crisis, 38 Customary Court of Appeal, 136 D Debt crisis, see Nigerian debt crisis Debt Management Office (DMO), 261, 268 Debt relief achievement, 260 APRM, 265 deals, 267, 270 economic and political reforms, 265 gains and indebtedness, 268 HIPC II, 265 international plank, 261 Nigeria’s economic sovereignty, 267 package, 268 reform-based efforts, 268 regime, 268 structural reforms, 261, 264 virtual poverty fund, 264 Debt reschedule, 260 Debt sustainability agenda, 270 debt and aid dependence, 268 DMO, 268 external, 268 fiscal decentralization, 269 implicit/explicit contingent liabilities monitoring, 269 social spending, 269 strategy, 268 Democracy, 148, 152, 290 Democratic administrations, 128 Democratic institutions, 290 Demographic data, 354, 358, 361, 362 Department of State Services (DSS), 158 Dependent nations, 263 DMO debt management, 268

429 E East and Action Group (AG), 292 Eastern region, 50 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 267 Economic Management Team (EMT), 266 Economic policy reforms, 268 Economic reform, 267 Egbe Omo Oduduwa, 293 Election Tribunals, 137 Elections, 343–351 Electoral fraud, 348 Enhanced HIPC (HIPC II), 265 Ex parte orders, 155, 156 Executive arm administrative functions, 79 chief executive, 78 collapse of republics, 95–97 executive power Vis-À-Vis, 92–95 Governor, 85 judicial function, 79 legislative functions, 79 parliamentary and non-parliamentary executives, 80 power politics Abacha military regime, 90 Babangida’s military rule, 89 Federal Character Commission, 90 Federal Republic of Nigeria, 91 Fourth Republic, 91 National Assembly, 87 national political parties, 86 powers vis-à-vis, 87 Second Republic, 85 Third Republic, 88, 89 two-party system, 90 president and presidency constitutions, 82–85 presidential constitution, 80–82 significance, 78 single and collegial executives, 79 titular and real executive, 79 Executive lawlessness breakdown of money, 158 civil rule vs. democracy, 152 civil society organisations, 153 constitutionalism, 152 democratic rule, 154 disobeying court orders, 154–156 ex parte orders, 155, 156 federal government, 155 government officials, 153 judicial accountability, 153 judicial independence, 153

430 Executive lawlessness (cont.) judiciary, 152 the Lagos State Government, 154 military oligarchy, 153 Ministry of Finance, 154 Nigeria’s democratic system, 154 power, 152 Executive presidential system, 88, 92 External borrowing, 260 F Federal capital territory (FCT), 108, 169 Federal Executive Council (FEC), 46, 141 Federal government, 168, 171, 172 Federal Legislature, 291 Federal Military Government (FMG), 142–144, 146, 147 Federalism, 19 British colonialism, 174 characteristics, 171 conceptualization, 172 confusion, 172 constituent vs. central governments, 173 convoluting, 165, 174, 180 definition, 169–172 design, 170 expansion condition, 171 federal constitution, 173 federal government, 171, 172 federal variation, 173 government, 169 legal formulation, 171 military condition, 171 multination/plural-national federations, 173 national/mono-national federations, 173 political community, 170 political entity, 170 political system, 170 principles, 171 recognition/identification, 172 sociological dimension, 171 theoretical formulations, 172 United States, 170 Financing gap, 262 First Republic British Protectorates, 55 collapse, 73 Constitutions of 1960 and 1963, 59 corruption, 72 crude oil, 73 governance, 56, 73

Index independence in 1960, 56 Niger Delta Congress (NDC), 69 Nigeria at independence, 59 Nigerian economy, 71–73 parliamentary regime, 63–64 power politics AG, Western region crises and collapse, 66 census crises, 1962, 68–69 creation of new states, 67–68 federal election, 1964, 70 minority problems, 67–68 NPC/NCNC political marriage, 65–66 political intolerance, 66 political parties realignments and alliances, 69–70 regional and ethnically based political parties, 65 western election crisis, 1965, 71 Fiscal Responsibility Bill, 266 Fluvial process, 357 Foreign direct investment (FDI), 285–286, 419 Funds, 342 G Gaskiya Corporation, 294 Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, 295 Global economic system, 269 Global interdependence, 261, 262 Government’s initial, 266 Governorship, 302 Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP), 298 Gross domestic products (GDP), 286 Groups’ party loyalty compensation, 301 governorship, 302 Hausa ethnic group, 298 Indigenous group, 300 Indigenous Plateau groups, 299 local government polls, 301 mental prejudice, 302 NPN, 299 Obasanjo military administration, 299 PDP, 300 political dispensation, 300 political formations and planning, 301 PRP, 299 registration conditions, 299 SDP, 300 WAI policy, 301

Index H Hausa NRC loyalty, 300 High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 136 Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), 261, 265 House of Representatives (HoRs), 102, 105, 106, 108, 110–113, 115, 116 IMF/World Bank economic recovery measures, 263 Inadequate funding, 360 Independence Constitution, 148–149 Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), 267 Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), 346, 350, 351 Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 350 Industrial destination, 259 Institutional and governance reforms, 266 Institutional re-engineering, 269 Institutional, legal and administrative framework, 269 Interdependent global system, 262, 269, 270 Interethnic conflict, 291 Intergovernmental relations (IGR), 196 Intergroup relations Middle Belt politics, 292–293 partisan politics, 297–298 party politics, 303 2011-2019 major parties’ politics, 302, 303 Intergroup relations, independence Action Group, 293 AG and NCNC, 292 Clifford Constitution, 292 dominant expectation, 292 dominant parties, 292 ethnic groups, 293 National Council of Nigeria, 292 Northern People’s Congress, 293 NYM, 292 regional parties, 293 Richards Constitution of 1946, 292 Interim National Government (ING), 145 Interim National Government of Ernest Shonekan, 266 International development assistance, 269, 270 International Financial Institutions, 264, 265 International trade, 262 Inter-organ acrimonies, 303 Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), 156

431 J Jamaatu Alhlissunnah Lidda awatiwal Jihad, see Boko Haram (BH) Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hyra Alilus Sunna, see Boko Haram (BH) Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa, 293 Jos North-Bassa constituency, 301 Jos North-Bassa Federal Constituency, 301, 302 Judicial accountability, 153 Judicial activism, 128 Judicial ad hocism, 147 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 149 Judicial corruption, 157 Judicial independence, 128, 152, 153, 159 Judicial officers, 157, 160 Judiciary, 126 L Lagos State Local Government Councils, 154 Lagos Youth Movement, 292 Lagos’ population, 364 Land Reclamation Scheme, 296 Legitimate trade, 25, 32–34 Liberalization, 267 Local government administrative levels of governance, 185 centralization, 188 challenges, 209–211 characteristics, 187 colonial era, 191–192 decentralization, 188, 189 definition, 186, 187 delegation, 189 devolution, 190 Electoral Act, 197 finance, 198–199 functions, 187–188 institution of governance, 186 local/state relations, 196–198 military and democratic governments, 193–196 post-colonial era, 192–193 pre-colonial era, 190–191 privatization/partnership, 190 reforms 1960–1975 era, 202–203 1976–1988 era, 203–208

Index

432 Local government (cont.) era of 1999, 208–209 pre-independence era, 200–202 Revenue Allocation Act, 197 Local Government Law, 193, 201, 202 Lyttleton constitution, 44, 45 M Macpherson constitution, 42 Macroeconomic reforms, 268 Middle Belt Mines Workers (MBMW), 295 Middle Belt politics ATMN, 294 Berom protest movement, 296 BPU, 296 Gaskiya Corporation, 294 House of Representatives, 296 labour contractors/tributers, 295 MBMW, 295 multi-ethnic, 294 NAMU, 295 NCNC, 294 NMU, 294, 295 NMWU, 294 NPC, 294, 296 trade union, 294 UMBC, 297 union members, 294 victimization, 296 Yorubas, 297 Middle Belt region, 293, 295 Military Authoritarianism, 1966–1979 FMG, 142, 143 military regimes, 141 military rule vs. constitutionalism, 140 Nigerian courts, 142 parliamentary constitutionalism, 139 Republican Constitution, 139, 140 Military Authoritarianism, 1983–1999 Abacha regime, 145 Babangida regime, 145 Buhari/Idiagbon regime, 144 FMG, 144 military regimes, 143, 144 Military corruption, 380 Military dictatorships Advisory Judicial Committee, 147 challenge, 148 democratic/authoritarian regimes, 146 financial constraints, 148 FMG, 146, 147 judicial officers, 147 legal strategy, 148

military regimes, 146, 147 Nigeria’s political development, 146 rule of law, 146 Military intervention, 3, 5, 9, 10, 22 bloodless coup, 397 British tradition, 396 civilian rule, 397 civil-military relations, 398 conflicts, 400 countercoup, 396, 400 first coup, 396 insecurity and terrorist activities, 399 military coups, 397, 398, 400, 401 military resources, 399 military rule, 401 political development indicators, 399 political succession, 396 socio-economic development theory, 398, 399 theoretical discourse, 398 Unification Decree, 396 Military regimes, 153, 159 Ministry of Finance, 154 Minority ethnic nationalities, 168 Monetary inducement, 347 Money, 342 Money politics candidates, 345, 350 consequences, 348, 349 definition, 343 election expenses, 343 elections, 344 electoral fraud, 348 electoral process, 346 ethical codes, 350 INEC, 351 legal limits, 350 monetary inducement, 347 Nigerian electoral process, 344 Nigerian electoral system, 347 political cynicism, 345 political parties, 344, 345, 351 politician, 347 post-independent Nigeria, 343 Second Republic, 343 spending money, 348 use of money, 343, 344 vote buying, 344, 346 voters, 347 Westminster model, 343 Monumental squandering, 260 Movement for National Reformation (MNR), 178–179

Index Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD), 282 Multilateral development institutions, 265 Multinational federations, 173 Multiparty democratic system broad-based participation, 150 CA, 150 CDC, 150 constitutionalism, 152 Independence Constitution, 148, 149 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 149 the 1960 Constitution, 149 the 1979 Constitution, 150, 151 the 1999 Constitution, 151 policy, 150 political crisis, 149 political realm, 149 presidentialism, 150 N NAMU’s accusation, 295 National Assembly, 348 bicameral assembly, 101 challenges, 121–123 committee system, 116–118 composition, 107–110 democratization, 100 economic and political consideration, 100 fourth sovereign assembly, 101 independent (1960–1966), 102 judiciary, 100 law-making, 104–105 legislative elections, 110–113 legislative leadership, 114–116 legislators and constituencies, 120–121 Nigerian legislative institution 1922–1960, 101–102 oversight or scrutiny of administration, 105–106 political community, 100 powers of committees, 119 presidential system (1979–1983), 103, 104 representational function, 106–107 standing committees, 118–119 National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), 41, 42, 48–52, 291, 292, 294, 297, 299 National debate, 263 National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), 347

433 National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 266, 267 National federations, 173 National integration achievements, 311 African traditional rulers, 306 economic factors, 309 federal character principle, 316 Federal Unity Schools, 317–318 management school theory, 314–315 melting pot school theory, 314 nationalism (see Nationalism) NYSC scheme (see National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) scheme) political factors, 309 question, 311–312 resource allocation, 315 resource mobilization, 315 self-determination theory, 313 sociocultural factors, 310–311 National Judicial Council (NJC), 134, 138, 151, 157 National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 298 National Population Commission (NPC), 357, 364 National wealth, 363 National Youth Service Corp (NYSC) scheme, 316, 317 Nationalism, 306–308, 313, 314, 318 Native Administration system, 191 Native Authority Law, 193 NEPU politics, 296 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 265 Niger Delta Agitational Groups, 330–333 mangrove and rainforest ecosystem, 322 Nigeria economy (see Oil industry) Nigeria’s oil-bearing region, 322 oil belt of Nigeria, 323 oil production, 322 paternalism and militarism, 333–335 protests and conflicts, 334 Nigeria agriculture, 20 colonial administration, 2 economic, 3–8, 13–15 electoral process, 21 ethnic groups, 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14–17 first republic, 8–11, 18, 20 fourth republic, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19, 20 historical origin and development, 18 legislative institution, 19

434 Nigeria (cont.) major ethnic groups, 2 military intervention (see Military intervention) Oyo Empire and Sultanate system, 2 political transformation, 18 politics, 8–12 post-independence, 17 public policy, 21 second republic, 9, 11, 18 social context, 15–17 sociopolitical economy, 3 terrorism, 21 third republic, 10, 11 Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), 298 Nigeria Security Organisation (NSO), 145 Nigeria’s debt stock, 260 Nigeria’s democratic system, 154 Nigeria’s domestic debt, 260 Nigeria’s foreign policy, 22 Abacha military regime, 413 Africa, 407, 411, 422 evolution, 408–410 Goodluck Jonathan, 421 military autocracy, 407, 413, 421 Musa Yar’Adua, 420, 421 objectives, 408 PDP (see People’s Democratic Party (PDP)) post-Obasanjo era, 420–422 President Olusegun Obasanjo (see Civil rule) Nigeria’s National Orientation Agency, 349 Nigeria’s per capita external debt, 260 Nigeria’s plural character ethnic groups, 167 geopolitical structure, 169 Germany, 167 Malaysia, 168 midwest region, 169 minority ethnic nationalities, 168 national cohesion/integration, 167 religion, 169 solidarity, 167 Soviet Union, 168 Switzerland, 168 United States, 168 Western/Eastern civilization, 167 Nigeria’s political independence, 132 Nigerian Administrative System/Structure, 19 Nigerian Association of Mines-worker’s Union (NAMU), 295 Nigerian civil war, 259 Nigerian Council, 39

Index Nigerian debt crisis corruption and embezzlement, 264 economic liberalization, 261 financing gap, 262 interdependence, 262 loans, 264 mutual dependence, 262 phases, 262 political instrumentalities, 262 predisposing factors, 261 privatization and commercialization, 264 resource gap, 262 SAP, 263 Nigerian electoral process, 344 Nigerian electoral system, 347 Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 267 Nigerian federation, 166 Nigerian judiciary, 100 activism and passivity, 127 adjudication, 131 categorisation, 126 challenges, 127 colonial origins, 127 colonial rule, 131 common law, 131 court system, 132 Courts of Equity, 126 Criminal Code, 132 customary norms, 130 democratic administrations, 128 democratic dispensation, 127 developments, 126 evolutionary phases, 130 executive lawlessness (see Executive lawlessness) first republic (1960–1966), 138 inferior courts, 132 innate legitimising attributes, 126 instance jurisdiction, 130 judgements, 132 judicial activism, 128 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 131 judicial independence, 130 judicial intervention, 127 judicial powers, 129 Military Authoritarianism (see Military Authoritarianism) military autocrats, 127 military dictatorships, 146–148 military regimes, 128 military rule, 130 multiparty democratic system (see Multiparty democratic system)

Index Native Courts Proclamation Order of 1900, 131 Penal Code, 132 political system, 127 presidential system, government, 129 Protectorate Courts Proclamation Order of 1900, 131 republican constitution, 130 rule of law, 129, 130 second republic (1979–1983), 138 self-help strategies, 129 structure (see Structure of the Nigerian Judiciary) survival and independence, 130 type, administration, 127 WACA, 130 Nigerian legislators, 349 Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), 48, 292 Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), 298 Nigerian political system, 402 Nigerian politics, 290 civil-military relations, 398 democratic failure, 401, 402 military coups, 401–403 military incursion, 404 military intervention implication, 403–404 reasons, 401–403 post-Cold War, 402 pre-Cold War, 402 socio-economic adversity, 402 Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), 291, 292 Nigerianization, 45 Non-Paris Club bilateral creditors, 260 Northern and Southern protectorates, 290 Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), 292, 294, 296, 298, 299 Northern Mine Workers’ Union (NMWU), 294 Northern Miners Union (NMU), 294–297 Northern People’s Congress (NPC), 292–294, 296, 297, 299 Northern Protectorate, 2 Northern region, 41–46, 49, 51, 52 Northern Regional Government, 297 Northernization policy, 51, 297 NPN-led federal government, 299 O Oil industry colonial Nigeria, 324 crude-oil production and export, 325, 326 domestic consumption, 326 federal government revenue, 329, 330

435 GDP, 326, 327 high-level production, 326 nation’s economic performance, 330 new prospecting rights, 324 Nigeria oil sector, 327 Nigeria’s economic policies, 324 Nigeria’s export trade, 328 operators, 325 prospecting and drilling, 324 Oil politics, see Niger Delta Oil revenues, 266 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 261 Organizational skills, 358, 359 P Paris Club, 260, 261 Partisan politics GNPP, 298 implication, 297 NAP, 298 NPN, 298 NPP, 298 PRP, 298 second republic, 297 UPN, 297 Party politics, 48, 49 desire, 290 political alliances, 290 political objectives, 290 postcolonial intergroup relations, 291 Patrick Dokotri of UMBC, 297 Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG), 370 Pension Act, 370, 374, 375 Pension administration category of people, 370 healthcare provision and medical facilities, 369 National Pension Commission (PENCOM), 374 Pension Fund Administrators (PTAs), 374 pension management, 373 Pension Ordinance, 370 pension reform (see Pension reform (2014)) political aims of CPS, 375 political gains, 375–376 Provision of Pension Funds (PFCs), 375 Pension reform (2014) CPS (see Contributory pension scheme (CPS)) general economic reform, 373 international factor, 371–372 local factors, 372–373 PAYG pension system, 371

Index

436 People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 300–303, 407, 414, 415, 421 People’s Redemption Party (PRP), 298 Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF), 105 Pluralism, 167–169 Political cynicism, 345 Political institutions, 290 Political manoeuvring, 262 Political parties, 48, 49 and political participation, 291 behavioral and post-behavioral eras, 234 coalition government, 237 democratic institutions, 290 etymology, 237–238 features, 235 functional and registered, 290 funds, 342 ideologies, 303 leading party/coalition parties, 238 Logos Youth Movement, 291 national outlook, 291 NCNC, 291 normative/pre-behavioral era, 234 parliamentary system of government, 238–239 parliamentary systems, 234 party system multiparty system, 236, 237 one-/single-party system, 236 two-party system/bi-party system, 236 political power or public office, 233 presidentialism, 234, 239–242 use of money, 342 Political power, 342 Political realm, 149 Political restructure, 166 Political systems, 127, 153 Politicians, 343–345, 347, 348, 350 Politico approach, 106, 120 Politico-territorial restructuring, 40–42 Politics, 341 Poor governance indices, 265 Population census definition, 354 demographic data, 354, 355 value/tax, 354 Population distribution, 364 Pre-colonial economic legitimate trade (see Legitimate trade) pre-colonial Nigeria (see Pre-colonial Nigeria) Pre-colonial Nigeria economic system, 29–34 political and administrative systems, 26–29

Pre-colonial political institutions, 26 Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC), 158 Presidential system, 346 Presidentialism, 150 Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), 145 Public Accounts Committee (PAC), 267 Public Procurement Commission Bill, 267 R Recapitalization, 267 Regional legislations, 44 Regional parliaments, 41, 43, 49 Regional seats, 363 Regionalism, 42 Religious terrorism, 274, 277, 284 Republican Constitution, 140 Richards Constitution of 1946, 292 Richards’ constitution, 40–42 Royal Niger Company’s charter, 290 Rudimentary court system, 126 Rule of law, 129, 146 S Self-government, 45, 46, 51, 52 Sharia legal code and political system, 301 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 300 Socioeconomic reforms, 265 Spending money, 348 State Security Service (SSS), 145 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), 263 Structure of the Nigerian Judiciary appellate jurisdiction, 135 branch of government, 133 Chief Justices of Nigeria, 135 Court of Appeal, 135, 136 court of inferior tribunal, 133 court system, 138 Election Tribunals, 137 exclusive/original jurisdiction, 135 Federal High Court, 136 High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, 136, 137 judicial powers, 134 military rule, 133 NJC, 134, 138 pyramidal order, 134 Sharia Court of Appeal, 137 Supreme Military Council (SMC), 140, 397, 401 Sustainable socioeconomic development, 270 Swiss Confederation, 175 Swiss federation, 175

Index T Technical Aids Corps Scheme (TACS), 413 Terrorism bioterrorism, 278 Boko Haram (BH), 275, 278, 280, 281, 283–286 causes, 283–284 conceptions, 275 conspiracy theories, 282 cyber terrorism, 278 domestic terrorism, 276, 277 economy, politics and diplomatic relations, 285–286 feature, 275–276 human needs/socio-economic perspective, 280 international terrorism, 276 Islamic theocratic state theory, 281 militia activities, 285, 286 multi-ethnic societies conflicts, 279 political feud perspective, 280, 281 political terrorism, 277 relational/vengeance theory, 280 religious fundamentalism, 274 religious terrorism (see Religious terrorism) state failure conflicts, 279 state terrorism, 277 terrorist organizations, 274 terrorists attack, 285 violent conflicts, 279 Tiv Constituency, 293 Travails of federalism citizens, 178 constitution, 176 disparity, 177 ethno-religious, 178

437 federation, 177 India, 178 Nigeria, 175, 177, 178 Nigerian military, 177 Nigerian system, 177 states/local governments, 177 Switzerland, 177 type, religious violence, 178 Trusteeship approach, 120 U Unicameral legislature, 41 United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 48, 292, 296–299 Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), 297 V Virtual poverty fund, 264 Vote buying, 344, 346 W War Against Indiscipline (WAI), 301 West African Court of Appeal (WACA), 130, 131 Western Region, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48–50, 142 Westminster model, 343 World Bank-/IMF-approved economic reform programmes, 266 Y Yoruba party, 300 Yorubas, 297