Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence 3031068815, 9783031068812

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Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence Edited by

usm a n a . ta r sh a r k da m wa pm u k

Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence “This book is a timely contribution and also responds to the concerns of a renowned political scientist, Joseph Nye, who expressed deep concern about the widening gap between academic theory and foreign policy practice. This book makes far reaching suggestions on how to enhance Nigeria’s foreign policy to serve the national interest in a globalized world.” —Professor Eghosa Osaghae, Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) “The book is a welcome addition and deserves a distinct place among the many academic works on Nigeria’s foreign policy. The rich insights by authors carefully selected to contribute to this book will be useful for both academics and policy makers with deep interest in the area of Nigeria’s foreign policy architecture.” —Otunba (Ambassador) Olusegun Akinsanya mni, Former Ambassador Plenipotentiary Extra-Ordinary of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to Ethiopia with concurrent accreditation to Djibouti, and Permanent Representative to AU and UNECA “A timely work of scholarship devoid of propaganda offering a rich mix of optimism and criticism of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the past 60 years. The scholars that contributed to the volume did not hesitate to highlight the numerous challenges that have constituted a drag in Nigeria foreign policy while also underscoring the future prospects. Readers will undoubtedly find this book both educative and critical.” —Ambassador Zango Abdu, mni, Retired Diplomat “In this book, Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk, carefully assembled distinguished scholars to provide in-depth and authoritative analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy sixty years after. The unique attempt to connect the past to the present and project into the future by underscoring pressing challenges that need to be urgently addressed in Nigerian foreign policy, makes this book a must-read.” —Ambassador Audu-Rafiu Olusola ENIKANOLAIYE, former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Nigeria’s Acting High Commissioner to India

Usman A. Tar  •  Sharkdam Wapmuk Editors

Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence

Editors Usman A. Tar Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, Nigeria

Sharkdam Wapmuk Department of Defence and Security Studies Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, Nigeria

ISBN 978-3-031-06881-2    ISBN 978-3-031-06882-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Nigeria’s foreign policy has been aptly described by scholars and practitioners as characterized by continuity and change. Nigeria’s foreign policy which consists of four basic principles, namely non-alignment, equality among all states, non-interference in domestic affairs, and commitment to multilateral diplomacy, has guided the country’s external relations under previous administrations from independence in the past 60  years. What this means is that while administrations may change, these basic principles remain the same. However, the government in power at a particular period may choose to improve on the styles, methods, and strategies to drive or achieve the foreign policy objectives and goals. Sometimes external forces beyond the control of the government may compel it to make involuntary adjustments. Nigerian foreign policy priority has been largely shaped by a dynamic process involving the interaction between the country’s internal and external environments. Indeed, Hubert H. Humphrey has argued that foreign policy is really domestic policy with its hat on. The security challenges posed by the Boko Haram terrorism, armed banditry, cattle rustling, militancy, ethnic agitations, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, trans-­ border smuggling and trafficking, and so many other criminal activities have been major sources of concern for successive governments since Nigeria’s return to civilian democratic rule in 1999. No doubt, these have serious implications for the country’s efforts at securing and welfare provisioning for its more than 200 million citizens. It also affects government’s efforts at attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), maintaining good international image, and dampens its aspirations for power positions v

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at the international level. The bad international image brought about by the abduction of the Chibok girls is a case in point of how seemingly domestic issues could galvanize international response and external involvement. Another major challenge that continues to confront the Nigerian state is the dependence on crude oil as a major source of national revenue. Since independence in 1960, every administration in Nigeria had to contend with the fluctuations in oil prices within the international market, which exposes Nigeria’s vulnerability to the global market. Over the years, there has been realization by the Nigerian government and deep resentment among the Nigerian public that a large share of Nigeria’s oil wealth was being stolen by a kleptocratic class that uses its position in power to amass huge unfathomable wealth and/or corruptly steal the common wealth for private accumulation. Billions of naira which could have been channelled for national economic development, including funds meant for the fight against terrorism in the northeast, were syphoned and most of them hidden in foreign banks. A major testimony to the fact of corruption in Nigeria is that a body like Transparency International— Corruption Perception Index (CPI) had consistently ranked Nigeria low. It is not only in this area that Nigeria has ranked low. Other indicators such as the Annual UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), the Global Peace Index (GPI), the Fragile States Index (FSI), and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) developed by Yale University and Columbia University, in collaboration with the World Economic Forum, have ranked Nigeria low. The connection between the domestic environment and foreign policy cannot be over emphasized. It was William E.  Gladstone who asserted that, “Here is my first principle of foreign policy: good government at home”. Having a stable and supporting domestic environment ensures that the country’s foreign policy serves the national interests. It is in this light that we can understand Nigeria’s engagement with Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in matters of mutual interest such as security. President Buhari demonstrated this commitment by ensuring that his first external engagement on assumption of office was to reach out to Nigeria’s neighbours. He undertook visits beyond the continent to further project the good image of the country and seek foreign direct investment (FDI) with a view to diversifying Nigeria’s revenue sources and create jobs for the unemployed in the country. For too long Nigeria had focused on sustaining the influx of FDI in favour of oil and gas at the detriment of critical sectors such as manufacturing, solid minerals, and agriculture, which was,

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until its neglect, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, providing food and employment for the populace, supplying raw materials for the nascent industrial sector, and generating the bulk of government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. This was done against the backdrop of the understanding that attainment of these objectives will facilitate the emergence of a secure, stable, viable, resilient, and prosperous Nigerian State. These priorities were reflected in Nigeria’s engagements with African and non-African countries, including traditional and emerging powers from the South. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has ensured that Nigeria’s traditional foreign policy preoccupations have received added traction in its external pursuits leveraging on diplomatic policies and soft negotiations. Within the African continent, Nigeria has remained a key player and Africa has remained the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Accordingly, Nigeria has remained committed to the promotion of cooperation, unity, democratic values, rule of law, and good governance in the continent. The promotion and defence of human rights also featured in Nigeria’s diplomatic engagements. Nigeria has also remained an active player in international organizations, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, the Developing Eight (D8), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, amongst others. Under the Buhari administration, Nigeria has sought to elevate and enrich her bilateral relations with African and non-African countries. The MFA has actively provided necessary support for Nigeria to sustain and deepen her relationships and partnerships with other countries of the world. It is heart-warming to note that it is the recognition of Nigeria’s role in promoting global peace, democracy, sustainable development, and human rights that led the global community under the platform of the UN to support and elect Tijjani Muhammad-Bande of Nigeria as the president of the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The MFA, which has overall responsibility for the formulation, development, and implementation of Nigerian foreign policy, on its own part, has actively served as the machinery for coordinating the country’s foreign affairs in line with the government’s priorities. Under my leadership, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) has been re-energized to play its role as a think-tank in foreign policy. NIIA is responsible for remaining committed to serving as “a nursery of ideas on what direction in international affairs Nigeria should take” and carrying out in-depth theoretical and practical researches that produce wide range of publications on topical issues in Africa and the world.

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Recent changes as well as global dynamics dictate that countries examine their national priorities and position their foreign policies to respond to these changes. The recent outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected not only the domestic environment of countries but also the international environment at large. While, on the one hand, it caused diplomatic tensions between some countries such as the USA and China, on the other hand, it steered countries of the world towards the recognition of the inevitability of multilateralism, global governance, and international cooperation. It was also an opportunity to know “friends” and “foes”, “strong” and “weak” countries. The pandemic also brought to the fore “the new normal” in the area of foreign policy and diplomacy. Nigeria like other countries of the world explored greater use of ICTs instruments for bilateral and multilateral meetings, public diplomacy, and the adjustment to hybrid diplomatic etiquette and protocol. Furthermore, diplomacy and its practice have been facing some adjustments in Nigeria, as is the case with other countries since the pandemic. This book is a timely contribution because it presents a detailed and scholarly assessment of the performance of the Nigerian foreign policy in the past 60 years and beyond. It reflects on the perspectives of scholars on the foreign policy engagements and performance within the period under review. A book of this nature also responds to the concerns of a renowned political scientist, Joseph Nye, who expressed deep concern about the widening gap between academic theory and foreign policy practice. This book makes far-reaching suggestions on how to enhance Nigerian foreign policy to serve the national interest in a globalized and changing world. I am proud to be associated with this project that documents Nigeria’s foreign policy beyond 60 years. I commend the editors, Professor Usman A Tar and Associate Professor Sharkdam Wapmuk, for bringing together refined and very sound scholars and practitioners in the area of Nigerian foreign policy to contribute to this milestone project. The book is strongly recommended as a veritable source of material for not only scholars but also practitioners and students of foreign policy, diplomacy, and government. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Nigeria

Eghosa Osaghae

Preface

This book is a product of an idea that came up two years ago on the need for a milestone project that should bring together scholars and practitioners of international relations and diplomacy to critically examine Nigeria’s foreign policy in 60 years and make projections for the future. The aim, therefore, was to undertake a critical assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence in 1960. Consequently, the book takes a retrospective, prospective, and comprehensive assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy in 60 years (1960–2020) of the country’s sovereign statehood as well as examination of Nigeria’s foreign policy challenges of the twenty-first century. One of the main features of independent states is the ability to conduct an independent foreign policy and to establish the paraphernalia that go with it. Foreign policy also provides the means by which a state is able to identify its friends, cultivate friendship with other nations of the world, project and promote its interest abroad, and become member of international organizations. The chapters analyse Nigeria’s foreign policy against the backdrop of the historical and contemporary challenges. It draws on the perspectives of Nigerian foreign policy and diplomatic experts, scholars, and practitioners who have critically engaged the subject over the years. As Nigerians clocked 60  years of independence, scholars and policy practitioners, who contributed chapters to this book, took a second look at the “giant of Africa” in terms of what the country is able to—or not able to—achieve since independence. In the past few years, the old clichés that were used to brand Nigeria—such as the “giant of Africa”—appear to be increasingly challenged by emerging powers on the Africa regional scene ix

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(such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, and South Africa). In the same vein, the various foreign policies posturing tenuously built by the country in 60 years— such as the principle of decolonization, Afro-centrism, pan-Africanism, “good neighbourliness”, concentric circle doctrine, economic diplomacy, and citizen diplomacy—appear to be based on an old assessment of the Cold War era. These policy doctrines have hardly been subject to modern assessment and consideration of emerging realities. At the same time, Nigeria’s domestic environment has changed exponentially and taken a turn for the worse in terms of macro- and micro-economic indicators; the near collapse of national infrastructure; the precipitous decline of industrial sector and rise of industrial unrest; the blind struggle for, and access to, power by the ruling elites who ride the crest on nepotism, religion, and ethnicity; mushrooming demands for restructuring the nation’s federal system (which has been innocuously in operation since 1979); and the rise of insurgency, militancy, and criminality throughout the country. With this domestic profile, Nigeria’s foreign relations within Africa and beyond have been characterized by challenges with mishaps in bilateral and multilateral engagements—ranging from rising (and falling) debt profile; challenges of building a pan-African base and maintaining a regional hegemony in Western African and Lake Chad Basin; the rise of international terrorism with Nigeria playing host to the Boko Haram—which has transformed into a transnational terror and assumed a new name, Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP); the continued exacerbation and internationalization of environmental pollution in the Niger Delta, leading to litigation of major oil companies operating in the Delta—especially Shell Oil Company—in European courts and the court of global public opinion; and challenges of human trafficking and narcotics in which Nigeria serves as a conveyor belt between Africa, Europe, and the rest of the world. Crucially, Nigeria’s outing in major global events—such as G8—and its uneasy relations with countries of North America, Europe, and South East Asia have meant that the country does not command the respect that it used to take for granted in 1960s and 1970s. While coming to terms with its declining status, Nigeria is striking new deals with emerging powers—especially BRICS and countries of South East Asia—causing tension in its long-term relations with countries of North America and Western Europe. What are the domestic and external dynamics defining Nigeria’s foreign relations? What are the key factors and events that drive the precipitous decline of Nigeria’s national prestige and foreign policy? What is the state of domestic development and with what implications for

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the country’s foreign engagement? How is Nigeria working towards redeeming its prestige and building a robust foreign policy that will propel it for the next 60 years? At independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria’s perception of the international system in which it will operate was conditioned and shaped by its domestic circumstances as well as the dynamics of world politics in the midst of the Cold War. It was not surprising that the newly independent country set its objectives and principles of foreign policy objectives to reflect the realities of the times. These covered areas of African unity and independence, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-alignment and non-­ intentional interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and regional economic cooperation and development. Accordingly, while foreign policy can be seen as a continuous process, occasional changes and adjustments do come along depending on the priorities of the government in power. The government in power may choose to improve on the styles, methods, and strategies to drive or achieve the foreign policy objectives and goals. Sometimes external forces beyond the control of the government may compel it to make involuntary adjustments. Nigeria has remained an active player in regional, continental, and global environments. Nigeria has contributed significantly to decolonization and fought for the rights of black people, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. It has also been involved in the promotion of democracy, protection of human rights, fight against global terrorism, and protection of the environment and climate change. Nigeria has utilized international organizations and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and South-South Cooperation (SSC) as veritable platforms for the pursuit of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Given the myriad of economic challenges within the continent of Africa, Nigeria has worked with other member countries in designing the development initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as paradigms for the continent’s economic development. Despite its own domestic challenges, Nigeria has intervened in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and, recently, the Gambia towards restoring peace, promoting democratic governance, and ensuring peaceful transfer of power. Its relationship with neighbouring countries, which predate independence, has been kept active, especially in the context of recent domestic security challenges. This has necessitated

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Nigeria to work closely with neighbours, especially members of ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, amongst others. It is against this backdrop that the editors thought that Nigeria’s 60th anniversary is a timely period to review and assess Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s size, resource endowment, and vast potential have enabled Nigeria to play a leading role in Africa’s anti-colonial struggle, peacekeeping, democratization, and regional integration in West Africa and Africa. These are also the notable achievements of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Despite its contributions and achievements, Nigeria’s contemporary role in global affairs leaves much to be desired. Many factors have prevented Nigeria from maximizing its vast potentials in foreign policy and have affected the scope of her power and influence in the global arena. These include the nature and character of Nigeria’s colonial and post-colonial legacies, lack of coherence and consensus due to fears and suspicion in relationship between the multi-ethnic and religious groups, confusion and ambiguity of what constitutes the national interests, leadership and behaviour of decision-makers, and the challenges in the domestic context. Thus, this raises several questions: to what extent has Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuits in Africa and the world been conditioned by the national interests? What has been the nature of Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral engagement in the past 60  years? What are the major issues defining Nigeria’s contemporary foreign policy? The contributing authors have provided insightful answers to these questions and even more. We must thank all those who have contributed in one way or the other towards ensuring that this project became a success. Kaduna, Nigeria Kaduna, Nigeria 

Usman A. Tar Sharkdam Wapmuk

Acknowledgements

We owe a great deal of appreciation to a number of people and organizations who helped us while we were working on this book project. First, our employers, the Nigerian Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Nigerian Defense Academy (NDA), for granting us exceptional institutional support and providing an enabling environment for research and publication. In particular, the Commandant, Major General IM Yusuf, and Academy Provost, Professor Isa Garba, granted us generous work concessions to concentrate on our research projects. The editors would like to thank all the authors of the two-year project. They have not only shown credible patience and dedication in the project, but most importantly impressive commitment to academic quality as reflected in their chapter contributions. We wish to heartily thank Professors Hassan Saliu, Nanven Audu Gambo, Okolie Aloysius-Michaels, Osita Agbu, and Michael O. Maduagwu, for their immense contribution to this project in the forms of papers, advice, and patience. We owe a debt of gratitude to Efem N.  Ubi, Chris Kwaja, Joseph Ochogwu, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani, Casmir Chukwu Mbaegbu and Samson Nzeribe, Emmanuel Ukhami and Solomon Babatunde Kumapayi, Olawari D.  J. Egbe and Cyril O.  Oleh, Napoleon Enayaba, Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde, Olalekan A.  Babatunde, Vincent Ibonye, Chinasa Ugwuanyi and Olayinka Sodik Kazeem, and Jamal Mohd Ali who provided insightful papers for the book project. We are equally grateful to the following senior colleagues in the Academy for their invaluable advice, support, and encouragement while working on this project: Prof O. E. Tangban, Prof A. O. Ahmed, Prof S. C. Osuala, Prof I. O. Mbachu mni, Prof D. O. Alabi, xiii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Prof Usman Mohd, Prof I. A. Imam, Prof Ayuba Kwasau, Prof Joel Ajibua, Prof Y. A. Umar, Prof M. S. Abdulsalam, Prof J. K. Aremu, Prof Terzungwe Nyor, Prof Joshua Okpanachi, Prof Taiye Adewuyi, and Prof Suleiman Saad. We are equally grateful to the following outstanding scholars outside the Academy, some of who read portions of this volume and made valuable suggestions: Prof Alfred Zack-Williams (University of Central Lancashire, UK); Prof Kenneth Omeje (University of Bradford, UK); Prof Ebenezer Obadare (University of Kansas, USA); Prof Pamela Machakanja (Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe); Prof Cyril Obi (Social Science Research Council, USA); Prof Dauda Abubakar (University of Michigan Flint, USA); Prof Rita Abrahamsen (University of Ottawa, Canada); Prof Ebenezer Obadare (University of Kansas, USA); Prof Cyril Obi (Social Science Research Council, USA); Dr Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] Paris); Prof Celestine Oyom Bassey (University of Calabar, Nigeria); Prof Rauf Ayo Dunmoye (Ahmadu Bello University [ABU[, Zaria, Nigeria); Prof Habu Mohammed and Prof Umar Pateh (Bayero University of Kano, Nigeria); Prof Isaac Olawale Albert (University of Ibadan, Nigeria); Prof Yusuf Zoaka, Prof Kabiru Mato, and Prof Abdulhamid Suleiman-Ozohu (all from the University of Abuja, Nigeria); Prof Alaba Ogunwanwo (Lead City University, Ibadan); Prof Aja Akpuru-Aja (Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria); Prof Warisu Oyesina Alli and Prof Nanven Audu Gambo (University of Jos, Nigeria); Prof Habu Mohammed (Bayero University of Kano, Nigeria); Prof Albert Isaac Olawale (University of Ibadan, Nigeria); Prof Yusuf Zoaka and Prof Kabiru Mato (both from University of Abuja, Nigeria); Prof Abdullahi Ashafa and Dr Tukur Abdulkadir (Kaduna State University); and Zainab Usman (World Bank). We are grateful to Dr Bello Gusau, the Executive Secretary, Petroleum Technology Development Fund (ES PTDF) for his support and encouragement. We are equally grateful to Ambassador Abdu Zango, Country Director of United State Institute for Peace (USIP), Nigeria; and Dr Usman Bugaje of the Arewa Research and Development Programme, Kaduna. We want to also thank our colleagues in the Department of Defence and Security Studies (DSS) for sharing in this vision of celebrating our outstanding scholars, mentors, and region builders. To the pioneer staff of DSS, your names will always be written in Gold and Bold: Professor I.  O. Mbachu, Dr Sunday Adejoh, Samuel Ayegba, Olutayo Ajibade, Nufaisa Garba, Ahmed, Suleiman Danladi Ali, and Jamaludden Muhammed Ali. We acknowledge the contributions of the graphic artists, copy editor,

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and the publisher, Palgrave Macmillan, for graciously designing and printing this publication. We are immensely indebted to our spouses—Mrs Fatima Usman and Dr (Mrs) Agatha E.  Wapmuk and our children—for their patience and support while we worked on this project. We cherish their companionship and familial bond which eased the tension often associated with research and scholarship. To all those whose names are inadvertently omitted, we tender our sincere apology.

Contents

Part I Introduction   1 1 Introduction:  Reflections on 60 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy  3 Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk Part II The Domestic Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Relations  17 2 Bureaucratic  Model: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Foreign Policy 19 Aloysius-Michaels Okolie, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani, and Casmir Chukwuka Mbaegbu 3 Nigerian  Foreign Policy and Challenges of Economic Development 43 Osita Agbu and Samson Akpati Nzeribe

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Part III Afrocentricity and the Regional Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy  61 4 A  Critical Review of Nigeria’s Afrocentric Policy: Rationale, Gains and Consequences 63 Emmanuel I. Ukhami and Solomon Babatunde Kumapayi 5 Natural  Resource Endowment and Regional Integration in West Africa: The Setbacks and Implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy 91 Olawari D. J. Egbe Part IV Nigeria and the Big Global Powers 115 6 The  Dynamics and Strategic Interests in NigeriaUS Relations117 Michael O. Maduagwu and Cyril O. Oleh 7 Nigeria-UK  Relations in the Twenty-First Century161 Napoleon Enayaba 8 The  Foreign Policy of Emerging Big Powers: Nigeria in China’s Belt and Road Initiative185 Efem N. Ubi 9 Nigeria-South  Africa Relations: Prospects and Challenges of a Strategic Partnership209 Usman A. Tar and Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde 10 Nigeria-Brazil  Relations: Ties that Bind and Binds that Tie239 Godwin Ichimi, Chinyere Rita Agu, and Chinonye Frances Dike

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Part V Contemporary Issues and Challenges in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Environment 261 11 Nigeria’s  Foreign Policy Since Independence: Problems, Challenges and Opportunities263 Hassan A. Saliu 12 Nigeria’s  Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalisation: Issues and Challenges287 Audu Nanven Gambo 13 “Gulliver’s  Odyssey”: Assessing Nigeria’s Role in ECOWAS311 Chris M. A. Kwaja 14 Migration  and Nigeria’s External Relations: A Trend Analysis of Its Nature and Dynamics in the Last 60 Years327 Joseph P. Ochogwu and Olalekan A. Babatunde 15 Nigeria’s  Foreign Policy and Diaspora Engagements: The Unharnessed Strategic Asset355 Sharkdam Wapmuk and Vincent Ibonye 16 Climate  Change and Nigeria’s Foreign Relations383 Chinasa Agatha Ugwuanyi and Olayinka Sodik Kazeem 17 Nigeria’s  Relation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation405 Usman A. Tar and Jamaludden Muhammed Ali

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Part VI Conclusion 419 18 Conclusion:  Future Prospects of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Beyond 60 Years of Independence—Emerging Trends and Tasks Ahead421 Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk Index433

Notes on Contributors

Chinyere Rita Agu  is a research fellow with the International Law and Organizations Division in the Research and Studies Department at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. Her research interests include international trade and investment law, human rights law, diplomatic law, maritime law, family law, and international development law. She is a member of the Nigerian Bar Association and other scholarly bodies which include but not limited to the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. She has academic publications in reputable international and national journals and books. Osita  Agbu is Professor of International Relations and dean at the Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria. He obtained his First Degree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan, and his Master’s and Doctorate Degrees in International Relations from the University of Nigeria in 1988 and 1993, respectively. He has specializations in governance and democratization, post-conflict peacebuilding, Africa-China relations, technology and development, and Nigeria’s foreign policy. He was formerly Head of the Division of International Politics at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. He was the editor of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (NJIA) for several years. Agbu has to his credit over 100 publications that include several single-authored, edited, and coedited books; chapter contributions; and journal articles on various areas of political science and international relations. He is the co-editor of The xxi

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Politics and Selection of UN Secretary General (2018); Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta: The Internal and External Dimensions (2018); and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Under the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari (2020). He had lectured at The University of Nigeria, Nsukka; Caleb University, Lagos; and the University of Lagos, before joining Baze University in 2017. He has consulted for several regional and international organizations. Agbu was a visiting research fellow at The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South Africa; and Institute of Developing Economies, Chiba, Japan. Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde  is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Osun State University, Nigeria, where he lectures and undertakes research in international relations, defence, security and strategic studies. Olawale holds an outstanding Master’s Degree in International Relations from the University of Ibadan, Ibadan Nigeria, and a First-Class Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science and International Relations from Osun State University, Nigeria. Presently at the final stages of his Doctorate Degree in Defence and Strategic Studies from Nigeria Defence Academy Kaduna, Nigeria, Olawale’s works have appeared in Annals of Spiru Haret University Economic Series, Young African Leaders Journal of Development, Annals of the Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu Letters and Social Science Series, Carnelian Journal of Law and Politics, and The Journal of International Relations, Peace Studies and Development. Jamaludden  Muhammed  Ali  is a graduate of International Relations from Cyprus International University, Cyprus, after which he obtained a Master’s Degree in Peace and Conflict Management from Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. He is a graduate assistant in the Department of Defence and Security Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna. Prior to his appointment at NDA in 2019, he was also a graduate assistant in the Department of History and International Studies at Federal University Gusau from June 2018 to September 2018. Olalekan A. Babatunde  is a research fellow and peacebuilding and evidence practitioner with the Nigeria’s Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (Directorate of Research & Policy Analysis). He attended the Universities of Ilorin and Ibadan, and holds a PhD in History from the University of Zululand, South Africa. His main research interests include youth and violent extremism, migration, impact evaluation, and research

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ethics. He has consulted for the UNDP, IOM, and Federal Ministry of Education. He was the lead coordinator for the UNDP’s capacity development programme for the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), who are the community youth supporting the Nigerian counterterrorism campaigns in the northeast zone. Over 4000 members have been trained between 2017 and 2019. He supervises peace and conflict research students of the National Open University of Nigeria. Some of his writings have appeared in Peace Review, Journal of Transdisciplinary Peace Praxis, Nova Science Publishers, and International Journal of Development Research. He is a member of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and African Evidence Network. Babatunde is a dedicated, enthusiastic, and consummate peacebuilder who loves reading, writing, and travelling. Chinonye Frances Dike  is an ecologist and a post-graduate student at University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Her research interests are in climate change, pollution management, sustainable development, and foreign policy. She has written in international and national books and journals. Olawari  D.  J.  Egbe  is Scholar in International Relations with bias in environment and Aboriginal peoples, military & strategic studies, international organizations, international political economy (IPE), and transnational organizations. He is a member of several academic associations in Nigeria and beyond. He has participated in numerous conferences, including the controversial conference on “Witchcraft: Meanings, Factors & Practices” at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, 2019. His most recent publications include “National Policies as Impediment to the Paris Climate Change Agreement: The United States of America in Focus” and “Contestations over Natural Resources in Africa and Beyond: Channels of Causation”, amongst others, that have recorded enormous mentions in www.researchgate.net, www.academia.edu, and www.googlescholar.com. He teaches political science at the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Napoleon Enayaba  is a researcher with the Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation at Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). He has over 12 years’ experience in funds/programme management, technical political advisory, and analysis, including working with Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and leading CSO think-tank orgs, coordinating and engaging Civil Society Organisation (CSOs)/ government+institutions towards a common goal. He has managed programme as a donor representative and projects as grantee across conflict,

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stability, security, and justice; P/CVE; transitional justice; Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR); governance, civilian and military security, and justice reform advocacy (including civil military relations—CMR) dialogues; elections security management; monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL); and COVID-19 awareness/ impact mitigation. Audu  Nanven  Gambo is Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies. He holds a PhD in International Relations and Strategic Studies. He was the Director of Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at the University of Jos, Nigeria, between 2010 and 2015. He was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of South Carolina on the study of U.S. foreign policy in 2006 and a visiting scholar at the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands, in 2011. He is the author of Conflict in the Niger Delta and National Security in Nigeria (2008) and he edited Architecture of Peace in Jos city of Plateau State (2013). His recent publications include “Theorising Military Families and National Defence”, in Best S.  G, Mijah E.B. & Lord-Mallam, N.C. (Eds (2019)). Nigeria’s Defence and Security: The Role of Military Families, Ibadan; “Nigeria’s Era of Diplomatic Diversification: Reflections on General Sani Abacha’s Foreign Policy, 1993–1998”, in Tar, U.A. (Ed.) (2020). Perspectives on Peacebuilding and Security and Development in Africa: Essays in Honour of Professor Rauf Ayoade Dunmoye, Kaduna; and “Egypt: Transnational Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, in Tar, U.A. (2021) (Ed.) Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa. London. Gambo has written articles in peer-reviewed journals and contributed numerous chapters in books nationally and internationally. He has been teaching political science in the Department of Political Science for the past 30 years. His field of scholarship includes comparative politics, foreign policy analysis, peace and conflict studies, defence and security studies, international relations, and so on. He got appointed as a directing staff in the Directorate of Studies of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2020 and disengaged from the prestigious National Institute in 2021 to take up appointment as the pioneer vicechancellor at Karl Kumm University Vom, Jos South LGA, Plateau State. He was a member of the 12th Governing Council of University of Jos, representing Senate interest between 2013 and 2017. Gambo was also a member of the presidential committee on the review of the 2006 National Defence Policy between November 2014 and May 2015.

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Vincent Ibonye  is a research fellow in the Division of African Politics and Integration at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Nigeria. Ibonye holds an MA in International Relations from Jilin University, China, and a BS in Political Science from the University of Benin, Nigeria. His main interests include, but are not limited to, the geopolitics of old and rising powers, China-Africa relations, cost-benefit discourses on resource governance/politics, and addressing discordant development. Previously a political aide with the Office of the Secretary to the Government of Lagos state, Ibonye’s experience includes policyrelated research, public policy, and project management. He has worked on a few projects funded by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), with particular focus on the socioeconomics of returnee emigration. Reputable international journals he has written in include, among others, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, International Area Studies Review, and Kritika Kultura. Godwin  Ichimi is a senior research fellow with the International Economic Relations and Organizations Division in the Research and Studies Department at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. His areas of interest include but not limited to international economic relations, food security, sustainable development, and diplomacy. She has academic publications in reputable international and national journals and books. Olayinka  Sodik  Kazeem  is with the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. He holds a BSc in International Relations from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun state, Nigeria, and an MA in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos. He has also participated in research works for international organizations and thinktanks including AU-NEPAD Peer Review on “Corporate Governance” in Nigeria. His research interests are in the areas of climate change, media, migration and displacement, foreign policy, security, strategy, governance, and developmental studies. He has attended several conferences, seminars, and workshops. He has written and also contributed to journals and book chapters in these areas. Solomon Babatunde Kumapayi  works at the Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja, and holds a PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies from the Nigerian Defence Academy, Nigeria. He had also acquired several defence-

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related skills in Nigeria and beyond to include Diploma in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Sweden, 2006), Advanced Diploma in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Norway, 2009), and Diploma in Gender Field Adviser (Sweden, 2011). He has held many important responsibilities in the Nigerian Army. He has a legion of medals and awards to his credit. He has written several books and has contributed in book chapters. He is also a member of many professional bodies. Chris M. A. Kwaja  is a senior lecturer and researcher at the Centre for Peace and Security, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola, Adamawa State, Nigeria. He is also the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on Mercenaries. He is also an international fellow at the Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, Watson Institute of International Affairs, Brown United States, as well as a visiting researcher at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), a West African democracy, peace, and security think-tank based in Abuja, Nigeria. He was formerly the Director General, Research and Planning, Governor’s Office, as well as Honourable Commissioner for Local Governments and Chieftaincy Affairs, Plateau State, Nigeria. His research has focused on the security sector reform in transition societies; the privatization of security; the politics of identity in Africa; civil society, elections, and democratization; as well as conflict, peace, and security analysis. Michael  O.  Maduagwu  holds a PhD in Philosophy-Political Science from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Until his retirement in 2017, he was a senior fellow/directing staff, 1985–2017, at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru-Jos. He has several publications to his credit. His latest book is Federal Character and Affirmative Action: History and Peculiarities of Diversity Policies in the United States and Nigeria (2019). A Fulbright scholar, Maduagwu is widely travelled. He is presently on contract as a directing staff with the National Institute for Security Studies, Abuja. Casmir  Chukwuka  Mbaegbu holds a PhD in International Relations from the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. He teaches in the Social Science Unit of School of General Studies and Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He has written in many reputable and peer-reviewed journals. His teaching and research interests straddle peace and conflict studies, migration governance, foreign policy analysis, international political economy, security, and trans-border studies.

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Kelechi  Elijah  Nnamani  is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nigeria. He consults for United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) on public procurement and has provided technical support to the UNICEF/DFID/EU WASH intervention programmes in Nigeria. He has written in many reputable and peerreviewed journals, including Territory, Politics & Governance, African Identities, and Cogent Journal of Social Sciences. His teaching and research interests include international political economy, foreign policy, security, elections, WASH, and public procurement. Kelechi is a member of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA). Samson Akpati Nzeribe  studied at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, Russia, between 1987 and 1993. In 1993 he obtained an MA in International Journalism and a Diploma in Russian Language. In 1996 he was offered admission into the Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, to pursue a doctoral degree programme. In the year 1999 he defended his dissertation “Nigeria’s Role and that of the International Community in Bringing the Liberian Crisis to an End”. He joined Baze University, Abuja, as a lecturer in the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy in 2016. He has numerous publications in international journals and a published book on crises resolution arising from his doctoral dissertation. The book serves as a handbook for foreign and Russian students interested in African studies. He is a senior lecturer at Gregory University, Uturu, Abia State, Nigeria. Joseph P. Ochogwu  is the Director of Research and Policy Analysis at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria, and a Visiting Associate Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies in the Department of Political Science at Nile University of Nigeria. He has an innovative approach to facilitating and supporting interactions and engagements in emerging areas of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and countering and preventing violent extremism. He is vastly experienced in research and programme design, training, resultbased management, and programme monitoring and evaluation. He served as a member and technical expert to the Presidential Committee on Community Policing and Internal Security. Ochogwu’s research interests include peace and security in the globalizing world, small arms and light weapons, violent extremism and global terrorism, youth and peacebuilding, national security, and international relations.

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Aloysius-Michaels Okolie  is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. He is the immediate past president of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) and current dean at the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Okolie is also the current 2nd vice-president at the Social Science Academy of Nigeria. He is well published, a Fulbright Scholar, and belongs to several national and international professional associations. He is an accomplished scholar and expert on foreign policy analysis, and conflict, security, and development studies. Cyril O. Oleh  holds a PhD in Media Arts from the University of Abuja, Nigeria. He teaches in the Department of Mass Communication at Veritas University, Bwari, Abuja. His core area of specialization is in social media and national security, an area he has written extensively on. Oleh has over 30 years of practical media engagement experiences, having worked variously with the United States Information Agency (USIA), US Embassy Nigeria, as well as US-based Voice of America (VOA). Before then, he had worked with some local regional newspapers in Nigeria, namely Sunray Newspaper, Satellite Newspaper, and New Outlook Newspaper. He is widely travelled, locally and internationally. Hassan A. Saliu  is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He had served as the vice-­ president of both the Nigerian Society for International Affairs and the Nigerian Political Science Association. He is the current president of the latter. Usman A. Tar  is Endowed Professor of Defence and Security Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Nigeria. Tar serve(d) as the dean of the Faculty of Art and Social Sciences, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, and pioneer head of the Department of Defence and Security Studies in the Academy. He is a member of the Board of Social Science Research Council’s African Peacebuilding Network (SSRC/APN), New  York, USA.  He was formerly an associate research fellow at John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for Africa Studies (JEFCAS), University of Bradford, UK.  He was also an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations and director of Postgraduate Studies at the University of Kurdistan-Hewlêr, Northern Iraq. Tar is the author of The Politics of Neoliberal Democracy in Africa (London/New York, 2009); and editor of The Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa (London, 2021), The

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Palgrave Handbook of Small Arms and Conflicts in Africa (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), Globalization in Africa: Perspectives on Development, Security, and the Environment (Lanham MD, USA, 2016), and Defence Transformation and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria (Kaduna, 2018). Tar has consulted or consults for several organizations including the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD, Nigeria), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, Nigeria), and Konrad Adaneur Stiftung (German Development Fund). He has also served as a visiting professor and an external examiner to several institutions of higher learning in Nigeria and overseas. Efem  N.  Ubi is an associate professor in the Research and Studies Department at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria, where he is also the Acting Director of Research and Studies and Head of the Division of International Economic Relations. He is a Graduate in International Relations from Jilin University, China, where he obtained his PhD.  He is also a visiting scholar and adjunct research fellow with the Center for Nigerian Studies (CNS) and the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, China. His research interests include development studies, international economic relations, Chinese-Africa, and territorial conflict. He has written several book chapters as well as articles with Sage, Routledge, and other reputable journals. His recent works include a co-authored book Nigeria in Global Governance, Peace and Security (2017) (Ed) and co-authored book chapter “The Involvement of China in the Reconstruction of Nigeria’s Transport Infrastructures” (2018) (Ed). Chinasa  Agatha  Ugwuanyi is a research fellow in the Division of International Economic Relations, Research and Studies Department at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. She is a graduate from the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Zaria, Kaduna State, Nigeria, where she obtained her degrees in Agricultural Economics and also a Master’s in International Affairs and Diplomacy. She has over ten years of research experience. Her research interests are in the areas of climate change, food security, and foreign policy. She has attended several national and international conferences, seminars, and workshops, and was among the five Nigerian scholars who visited China in 2019 in order to deepen the cultural and educational exchanges between Nigeria and China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework. She also participated in research works for international organizations including AU-NEPAD

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Peer Review on Corporate Governance in Nigeria. She is the desk officer of climate change and other related environmental issues in the NIIA. She has written in reputable journals and book chapters, and co-edited African Perspectives on ACP-EU Relations with Professor Amadu Sesay and Associate Professor Sharkdam Wapmuk. She is a member of Nigerian Association of Agricultural Economics (NAAE) and the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA). Emmanuel  I.  Ukhami  is a doctoral student in Defence and Strategic Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria. He works at the University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria, and has authored and co-authored books, several journal articles, and book chapters in Nigeria and overseas. His major areas of research interest include international politics, security, defence, and strategic studies. Sharkdam  Wapmuk is an associate professor in the Department of Defence and Security Studies at Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria. Formerly, he was the senior research fellow and Ag. Director of Research and Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) and Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA). Wapmuk is the editor of African Perspectives on ACP-EU Relations (with Sesay, A and Ugwuanyi, C.A.), Lagos, 2020; Civil Society and National Security in Nigeria: A Strategic Analysis (with Kalu, E. N.), Lagos and Dallas, 2020; Culture and Nigeria’s Foreign Relations in a Globalizing World (edited with Louis Eriomala), Abuja, 2020; Perspectives on Contemporary Nigerian Politics and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Professor Warisu Oyesina Alli (edited with Usman A. Tar and Efem Nkam Ubi). Lagos and Kaduna, 2020; Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta: The Internal and External Dimensions (edited with Bukar Bukarambe and Osita Agbu). Lagos, 2020. He was the former editor of Nigerian Forum: A Journal of Opinion on World Affairs, published by the NIIA. Wapmuk has attended several conferences on Nigeria and India, India and Africa, including the “Pre-IAFSIII Conference on India-Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Scale and Scope of Comprehensive Partnership”, 2015. He has served as a consultant for various research projects on Asia and Africa, published many articles in journals, and contributed book chapters on Nigerian foreign policy, security, cooperation and integration, Africa-India relations, and roles of think-tanks.

Abbreviations

AFRICOM AfDB AGOA AIDS AIT AMCEN APC AU BBC BRICS CAHOSCC CNN CO2 COVID-19 ECOMOG ECOWAS EFCC ERGP FAO FDI FEC FIESP FOCAC GDP

African Command African Development Bank African Growth and Opportunity Act Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome African Independent Television African Ministerial Conference on the Environment All Progressives Congress African Union British Broadcasting Corporation Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Convention of African Heads of State on Climate Change Cable News Network Carbon Dioxide Coronavirus Disease of 2019 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Economic Recovery and Growth Plan Food and Agriculture Organization Foreign Direct Investment Federal Executive Council Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo Forum for China-Africa Cooperation Gross Domestic Product xxxi

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Abbreviations

GFP GHGs GTI GTA HIV HST ICPC ICT ILO IOM IPCC IPPA IRA ISIS IT KAS MASSOB MFA MNCs MPFA MPLA N2O NADECO NAFDAC NAPTIP NBC NCFRMI NDLEA NEDI NEEDS NEPAD NIDCOM NIEO

The Global Firepower Green House Gases Global Terrorism Index Green Tree Agreement Human Immunodeficiency Virus Hegemonic Stability Theory Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission Information and Communications Technology International Labour Organization International Organization for Migration Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Institute for Public Policy Analysis Irish Republican Army Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Information Technology Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra Ministry of Foreign Affairs Multinational Corporations AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola Nitrous Oxide National Democratic Coalition National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons National Boundary Commission National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons National Drug Law Enforcement Agency New Economic Diplomacy Initiative National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy New Partnership for Africa’s Development Nigerians in Diaspora Commission New International Economic Order

 Abbreviations 

NIIA NIIO NIPSS NIS NNPC NPC NPM NTA NVP OAU OIC ONUC PDP PPP PZ SAP SDGs SLOC TACS UN UNCTAD UNIFIL UNGA UNHCR UNO UNPD UNSC VAT VNSA

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Nigerian Institute of International Affairs New International Information Order National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies Nigeria Immigration Service Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation National Population Commission National Policy on Migration Nigeria Television Authority New Visa Policy Organisation of African Unity Organization of Islamic Cooperation United Nations Operation in the Congo People’s Democratic Party Purchasing Power Parity Paterson Zochonis Structural Adjustment Programme Sustainable Development Goals Sea Lines of Communication Technical Aid Corps Scheme United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Organisation United Nations Population Division United Nations Security Council Value Added Tax Violent Non-State Actors

List of Figures

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5 Fig. 13.1

The top five goods: Exports and imports from the UK. Source: Department for International Trade, Trade and Investment Factsheet, Nigeria (UK DIT, 2022) 176 Share of BRI investments in different regions. Source: Nedopil (2021)193 African nations with a Belt and Road Initiative MoU 194 Map of Nigeria. Source: Wikipedia (2021) 240 Map of Brazil. Source: Wikipedia (2021) 241 Transatlantic trade route. Source: Wikipedia (2021) 243 Nominal GDP and PPP adjusted GDP for Nigeria and Brazil. Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020) 248 Electricity generation in Brazil. Source: Adapted from Statista (2021)249 Political Map of West Africa, showing members of ECOWAS, with the exception of Mauritania that has an associate membership. Source: https://www.istockphoto.com/vector/ west-africa-region-political-map-gm917211566-252345606313

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 14.1 Table 14.2 Table 14.3 Table 14.4 Table 14.5

The Top 25 Economies in the World 49 Some projects in Nigeria that have a direct or indirect relation to the Belt and Road projects 201 The trade transactions between Nigeria and South Africa from 1999 to 2014 217 The Brazil-Nigeria diplomatic relations 245 Number of international travellers’ movement across all Nigeria borders 342 Nigeria immigration statistics, 2017 344 Cases of irregular migrants (2017) 345 Migration control and compliance, 2017 346 Nigeria migration profiles: global legal instruments related to international migrationi347

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PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Reflections on 60 Years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk

The plethora of overlapping yet conflicting definitions of foreign policy often presents many challenges for scholars. This is simply no consensus and a universally accepted definition. According to Sesay et al. (2011), foreign policy is regarded as an array of activities that states engage in to change the behaviour of other international actors and for advertising and promoting their national goals and objectives in the international community. The importance of foreign policy to a nation cannot therefore be overemphasised. It has been argued that through foreign policy, “a nation is able to announce to other independent states, its appearance on the global stage as an independent actor, and to also establish its identity and promote national symbols such as flag and national anthem” (Sesay et  al., 2011). Thus, U. A. Tar (*) Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] S. Wapmuk Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_1

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foreign policy is not only a unique symbol of political independence and sovereignty, but also one of the main instruments for advancing a state’s national interest broadly defined, in the community of nations. Also foreign policy provides a country or nation the means to identify and develop close ties with friends and if possible, neutralise the policies of enemies, perceived or real. A country’s foreign policy statement or declaration, especially its principles and objectives, provides other nations insights into its world views and aspirations and enables other nations to relate with it effectively to achieve its goals through either bilateral or multilateral cooperation, which could be at the regional, continental and global levels.

Historical Emergence on the World Stage and Foundation of Nigerian Foreign Policy There is a deep understanding that from its inception in 1960, Nigerian foreign policy under both military and civilian governments has been characterised by elements of continuity and change. Accordingly, while foreign policy can be seen as a continuous process, occasional changes and adjustments do come along depending on the priorities of government in power. The government in power may choose to improve on the styles, methods and strategies to drive or achieve the foreign policy objectives and goals. With the attainment of Nigeria as an independent country in 1960 and its reception as the 99th member of the United Nations and as a key player in the international system, the pioneers and architects of Nigeria’s foreign relations clearly and vividly enunciated the principles and objectives to the country’s foreign policy. From the period of Nigeria’s independence, under the civilian government of the Late Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa government, the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy were defined in clear terms as aimed at achieving the national interest. Though what constitutes the national interest is subject to debate, there is some consensus that it covers the political, social, cultural, economic, military and security interests of the country. In the pursuit of the national interests, the priorities have not been the same. Each government has had distinctive priorities and style (Bamali, 2007). The consistency of Nigeria’s foreign policy and its continuity by various regimes has been aptly described by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former External Affairs Minister and Nigeria’s Representative to UN as ‘Three Concentric Circles’. The three concentric circles put ‘Nigeria’s interest first, West Africa sub-region second, and the rest of Africa third’ and global fourth. To achieve this goal, Nigeria has devoted both human and material resources to the

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pursuit of liberation, continental and global peace, and security in Africa and at international levels (Gambari, 2008). Within the Africa continent, Nigeria’s commitment has been unparalleled because Nigeria has always seen itself as a leader in Africa, given her size and population. Beginning with the Tafawa Balewa government, the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy was spelt out in the following terms: (a) The sovereign equality of all African states; (b) The respect for independence, sovereign and territorial integrity of all African states; (c) Non-interference in internal affairs of other African states; (d) Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity; (e) Total eradication of racism and colonialism from Africa. The Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979 and 1999 did not depart from the objectives outlined earlier. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria outlines the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy as follows: (a) Promotion and protection of national interests; (b) Promotion of African Integration and support for African unity; (c) Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and (e) Promotion of a just world order. The provision for the promotion of African integration and support for African unity clearly indicates a strengthening of policy on African integration, while the provision on the promotion of a just world order indicates a willingness to cooperate with other countries of the South in challenging global structures of inequality. A review here will help to shed light on the direction of the country’s foreign policy under various administrations. During the Tafawa Balewa administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy was said to be characterised by devotion to African issues. But the regime was accused of being pro-western. The immediate post-colonial character of the state created that impression, and the national elite viewed the West,

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Britain in particular, as a dependable ally. It took the events of the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) for Nigeria to have a better understanding of international politics when it comes to friends and allies. For instance, Nigeria played an indecisive role in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Again, Nigeria was the dissenting voice in 1965 when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Ministerial Council took the unanimous decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain if it failed to suppress the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.

From Post-civil War Pan-African Engagements to Foreign Policy Activism Even after the end of the Balewa government following a military coup d’état in 1966, Nigeria remained committed to liberation of Africa. The Yakubu Gowon administration was committed to liberation struggles in Africa through shuttle diplomacy. Following the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria’s influence in Africa increased greatly, earning it a place in the OAU’s Committee on Mediation, especially on border issues (Moyosore, 1990, p.  35). Nigeria played a leading role in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975 and has remained the pivot of this organisation. The Murtala Muhammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo regime gave African affairs pride of place in foreign policy and foreign relations (Uhomooibhi, 2012). Though Nigeria had always asserted that Africa is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, it was only during the Murtala/Obasanjo regime that the country maintained a militant-oriented foreign policy which sought to dictate the pace and direction of progress on the continent. It was the resolute support of this regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that led to Angola’s independence in 1975. Demonstrating the same assertive Pan-African disposition, the Obasanjo regime opposed British arrogance over Zimbabwe’s independence. This subsequently led to the unanticipated nationalisation of Shell BP on the eve of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1977. Nigeria’s tough stance at the conference under Obasanjo hastened the Lancaster House negotiation which led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1970. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria launched the South African Relief Fund (SARF) in December 1976 and donated N2.5 million to this fund. Nigeria also co-sponsored the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid

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(WCAAA) in Lagos between 22 and 27 August 1977 (Aluko, 1971, 1978, 1980). In fact, between 1975 and 1976 Nigeria did much for needy African states. For example, it extended aid to the Sahelian states through Sudan and Egypt; gave N20 million to Angola in late 1975; gave N2.5 million to Mozambique in late 1976; was the second target contributor to the OAU budget after Libya with a 7.6 per cent contribution; contributed 13 per cent of the equity shares of the African Development Bank (ADB) and gave a loan of N50 million to the Bank in 1975 to supplement its financial resources to assist the less fortunate countries of Africa (Aluko, 1978). On the whole, the Murtala/Obasanjo interregnum was characterised by positive African foreign policy. In fact, this period has been described by observers as a “Watershed” in the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

Strengthening African Solidarity, Promotion of Peace and Stability in Africa Under the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari, Nigeria still professed its commitment to Africa which it articulated as the strengthening of African solidarity, promotion of peace and stability in Africa, support of the rights of peoples to self-determination and unwavering support for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. The short but dynamic Buhari/ Idiagbon interregnum, like the others, continued with the policy of prioritising African affairs and could be credited with dynamism in its foreign policy. There was some element of realism to the government’s approach to foreign affairs. This was clearly evident in its quest at strengthening the domestic economy. The Babangida administration which took over from Buhari after a successful coup d’état in 1985 continued with the objective of strengthening the economy with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986 (Ogwu & Olukoshi, 1991). It also instituted a programme of social and political transition. Elected officials were successfully installed at the local and state levels, and representatives were subsequently elected to the parliament; a largely successful presidential elections were also held only to be annulled at the very last stage of declaring the winner by the military government of Ibrahim Babangida. Chief Moshood Abiola purportedly won the presidential elections. However, the comparatively long administration (1985–1993) of this government by Nigerian standards could be credited with having

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played a very crucial and novel role in regional peacekeeping conflict resolution through its efforts in West Africa. Nigeria spear-headed the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in the Liberian crisis after unending blood-letting by the opposing forces. Nigeria’s mediatory role in conflict situations involving Sierra Leone-­ Liberia, Togo-Ghana, Burkina Faso-Mali and the Liberian crisis in many ways succeeded in averting damaging wars in the continent. It also introduced the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Scheme to assist African and black nations lacking in personnel with capacity building, and the programme has been sustained and been successful. Since then, TAC has remained one of the arrowheads of Nigeria’s foreign relations and a major instrument for the promotion of south-south cooperation.

A Pariah Nation and Shift to Asia It was not surprising when Sani Abacha sacked the Interim National Government (ING) in 1985 after ‘a palace coup’ and assumed the reins of power. The Abacha government was largely preoccupied with maintaining power or regime survival and therefore did little on the foreign scene apart from continuing with some of the foreign policy objectives pursued by the previous governments. Notable, however, was that the government by its actions or inactions turned Nigeria into a pariah nation amongst the comity of nations as a result of its poor human rights records. However, the regime made a policy shift away from the West to Asia courting countries like China, North Korea and Libya.

Shuttle Diplomacy and the Return to Pragmatic Engagement in African and World Affairs This situation did not last for long, as a policy somersault occurred after the sudden demise of Sani Abacha and the emergence of General Abdulsalami Abubakar. He quickly tried to stabilise the Nigerian polity by addressing and redressing where possible the human rights abuses that occurred under the previous government and succeeded in getting their support and assistance for a political transition programme between 1998 and 1999. The outcome of this was the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as president of Nigeria. Olusegun Obasanjo was to take Nigeria’s foreign policy to dimensions never seen before through a combination of shuttle

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diplomacy and pragmatic engagement with the advanced developed countries. Nonetheless, it is right to assume that while the underlying principles governing Nigeria’s foreign policy subsisted, the character of Nigeria’s foreign policy and engagements changed radically under Obasanjo. Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule on 29 May 1999 after a long period of governance by the military opened a new chapter in the history of the country. The implication of this development for Nigeria’s foreign relations is important, especially when juxtaposed with the foreign policy style of the previous military administrations. Again, the economic scenario substantially changed with the deepening of economic globalisation, and economic reforms in various sectors of the economy. Since Nigeria’s return to civil governance, one of the most crucial dimensions of its national interest has been the consolidation of its hard-won democracy. Perhaps, it is the realisation of the above imperatives that caused President Obasanjo to embark on numerous trips abroad that were described by scholars as ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Though many observers of Nigeria’s international relations were critical of this shuttle diplomacy, the government succeeded in improving the country’s national image, attracting foreign direct investments (FDI), and recovering a significant portion of the looted monies lodged in foreign bank accounts. Furthermore, the country succeeded in preventing the emergence or escalation of conflicts in Africa. Examples abound from Nigeria’s interventions in Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola, Cameroun, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, GuineaBissau, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sudan. President Obasanjo also represented the face of the new set of governance by African leaders with a sense of history, a better view of the constraints and challenges facing Africa, and the political will to implement sustainable development programmes in the continent (Tyoden, 2011). This was eventually articulated in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. Under Obasanjo Nigeria once again became a respected leader in Africa, a strong voice in the Commonwealth and a credible advocate for the United Nations. It has continued to play vital roles in the realisation of the objectives of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD (Tyoden, 2011). Specific instances in which Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo was instrumental in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts around Africa include Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan (Tyoden, 2011). The Obasanjo regime also launched a campaign for debt relief, which was globally acclaimed and

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yielded for Nigeria the cancellation of over US$18 billion of its debt to the Paris Club and later exit of Nigeria from its indebtedness to the London Club of Creditors (Ogwu & Alli, 2007). Though this achievement was roundly acknowledged and applauded, it also had its critics, who felt that no matter how rich or capable a country is, it should not pay so much (US$17 billion) in order to get out of debt all at once. Obasanjo’s government generally introduced measures to re-vitalise the economy in order to create an enabling environment that encourages investment by fighting anti-corruption. This campaign that saw government ministers, state governors and top government officials punished for corrupt enrichment also led to the abolition of decrees and regulations which had constrained the inflow of foreign investment as well as the generation of opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investment (Ogwu & Alli, 2007).

From Citizens’ Diplomacy to Domestic Concerns The foreign policy thrust of the Yar’ Adua/Jonathan government was a logical continuation of the foreign policy under the previous government. Whereas foreign policy under the Obasanjo government was aimed at rehabilitating Nigeria and getting the country back into the committee of nations, under Yar’ Adua it is focused on the protection of citizens’ interests (Agbu, 2008, p. 12; Eze, 2010). There is no doubt that this presented a great challenge. The Jonathan administration focused on attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) with a view to creating jobs and wealth. With respect to Nigeria’s foreign policy at the terminal phase of the Jonathan administration, it was clear that the government had to confront many domestic challenges, among which insecurity especially in the northeast stood out. The security challenges posed by the Boko Haram terrorism in the northeastern part of the country were major source of concern for the government; no doubt with serious implications on the country’s quest for foreign direct investment (FDI); international image crises brought about by the missing Chibok girls (Agbu, 2008). Nigeria faced a situation where it had to fight against insurgency and yet strong reluctance of Western countries, notably the United States to provide foreign military support and to sell military equipment to Nigeria to wage war on Boko Haram. Another notable feature of the terminal phase of the Jonathan administration was the abrupt crash in international oil prices, which drastically reduced the national revenue and depleted foreign reserves. These

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developments undermined the country’s capacity to pursue its foreign policy. Closely linked to the country’s economic challenges is the problem of endemic and institutionalised corruption, a phenomenon which undermined national development, fostered negative image abroad and reduced its ability to successfully wage the war against Boko Haram (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016).

Strengthen Cooperation and Partnerships in the Fight Against Corruption, Insecurity and Economic Rejuvenation Nigeria’s foreign policy under Buhari is reflective of the domestic concerns including insecurity, corruption, economic dependency, power and energy crisis, high rate of unemployment, poor infrastructure and health issues, amongst others. These stem from the fact that a dynamic foreign policy requires a solid and functional domestic base. However, in the context of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the domestic agendas that inevitably impinge on Nigeria’s foreign policy are the need to combat terrorism and other sources of national insecurity, a sustained and dispassionate fight against corruption and a purposeful economic action plan that will prioritise economic diversification with a specific focus on agriculture and solid minerals, infrastructural development. In the economic sphere, there is need for a foreign policy approach that is geared towards achieving the country’s national interest. It is pertinent to utilise the goodwill that the country is currently enjoying under President Buhari to attract favourable economic relationships, including foreign direct investment (FDIs) and sustained capital inflows, especially with the volatility of oil prices and staggering budget deficits. So far, engagements with emerging powers such as China are beginning to yield positive dividends. In addition, greater opportunities abound for intra-African trade which could be tapped through increased engagements with African countries. So far, significant achievements have been recorded by the government of President Buhari in the area of security, specifically in the fight against Boko Haram in the last one year. The president focused on strengthening relations with Nigeria’s neighbours and jointly fighting Boko Haram. This was done by relocating the Nigerian military command to Borno state, strengthening the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and placing the same under the leadership of Nigeria. Furthermore, on combating insecurity, Buhari’s

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foreign policy seeks to further strengthen cooperation and partnerships at the regional, continental and global levels. The security summit, organised by the office of the National Security Adviser, which was attended by France, the United States, Britain, neighbouring countries and other major stakeholders attended speak to this point. From the above, it is clear that the character of leadership, as well as personality of the leader in power, could attract goodwill and may also impact the foreign policy drive of the administration. The perception of President Muhammadu Buhari as a disciplined, astute and courageous leader has so far garnered goodwill for the country, leading to engagements with the international community in the areas of security, trade and investment, anti-corruption and energy, amongst others (Bukarambe et  al., 2020). Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari, even though devoid of the usual official sloganeering, can be said to be anchored on the three pillars that constitute the domestic priority programmes of the administration. These priority areas include combating insecurity, the fight against corruption, the rejuvenation of the ailing domestic economy, and job creation. A careful reading of these issue areas reveals the administration’s understanding of and sensitivity to the nature and dynamics of the domestic and foreign policy challenges that it inherited from the previous administration, and its determination to employ the instrument of foreign policy and diplomacy in tackling these challenges (Bukarambe et al., 2020). Recently the rise of new powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil amongst others necessitated Nigeria to re-consider its strategic engagements with the West. Nigeria has engaged these new powers at various levels.

Scope of the Book The essays contained in this book examine Nigeria’s foreign policy 60 years after independence. As the title of the book suggests, the chapters have been carefully selected to give room for critical reflections on pressing issues that are pertinent to Nigeria’s foreign policy in the past, which enable us to understand the present and project into the future. Part 1, ‘Introduction’, contains one chapter. The chapter, which is written by Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk, introduces the entire book by reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign policy in the past 60 years. ‘The Domestic Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Relations’ is the title of Part 2 of this book. The chapters in this part focused on

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domestic context of Nigeria’s foreign policy. While Okolie Aloysius-­ Michaels, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani, and Casmir Chukwu Mbaegbu examined the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Foreign Policy, in Chap. 2, Osita Agbu and Samson Nzeribe focused on Nigerian foreign policy and challenges of economic development, in Chap. 3. The chapters in Part 3 of the book examined the Afrocentricity and the Regional Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. Emmanuel Ukhami and Solomon Babatunde Kumapayi’s review of Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy is an attempt to highlight the rationale, gains and consequences of the policy. In Chap. 5, Olawari D. J. Egbe examined natural resource endowment and regional integration in West Africa, the setbacks and implications for Nigerian foreign policy. Part 4 of this book x-rays Nigeria’s relations with the global and emerging powers. While Chap. 6 authored by Michael O. Maduagwu and Cyril O. Oleh examined the dynamics and strategic interests in Nigeria-US relations, in Chap. 7, Napoleon Enayaba examines Nigeria-UK relations in the twenty-first century. In Chap. 8, Efem N. Ubi explains Nigeria and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In Chap. 9, Usman A. Tar and Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde focus on Nigeria-South Africa relations, prospects and challenges of a strategic partnership. Chapter 10, by Godwin Ichimi, Chinyere Rita Agu and Chinonye Frances Dike, is titled ‘Nigeria-Brazil Relations: Ties That Bind and Binds That Tie’. These authors argued that the relationship between Nigeria and Brazil began long before Nigeria became independent in 1960. Common history of slavery laid the foundation for cultural connection between the two countries. However, contemporary relations are premise on economic, political and technological exchanges between the two South-South partners. The chapters contained in Part 5 basically x-ray contemporary issues and challenges in Nigeria’s foreign policy environment. In Chap. 11, Hassan Saliu provides a brilliant review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy since Independence. He also identified the problems and challenges affecting Nigeria’s foreign policy in the past and opportunities in the future. While Chap. 12, ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalisation: Issues and Challenges’, was written by Nanven Audu Gambo, Chap. 13, ‘“Gulliver’s Odyssey”: Assessing Nigeria’s Role in ECOWAS’ was written by Chris Kwaja. In Chap. 14, Joseph Ochogwu and Olalekan A. Babatunde focused on the issue of migration and Nigeria’s external relations: a trend analysis of its nature and dynamics in the last 60 years. This chapter is followed by an examination of Nigeria’s foreign policy and diaspora engagements by

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Sharkdam Wapmuk and Vincent Ibonye in Chap. 15. According to these authors, the diaspora remains an unharnessed strategic asset in Nigeria’s foreign policy. While the issue of climate change and Nigeria’s foreign relations was addressed in Chap. 16, written by Chinasa Ugwuanyi and Olayinka Sodik Kazeem, in Chap. 17, Usman A. Tar and Jamal Mohd Ali focused on Nigeria’s relations with the organisation of Islamic cooperation. The last part of the book, Part 5, which contains Chap. 18, is a reflection on future prospects of Africa’s international relations beyond 60 years of independence. The chapter is written by Usman A.  Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk. The book containing 18 chapters written by distinguished scholars is a timely examination and reflections on Nigeria’s foreign policy beyond 60 years of political independence. The authors made far-reaching recommendations on the directions Nigeria should take if it must occupy a place of reckoning, power and prestige among the comity of nations. Collectively, the authors in this book underscore the imperative of addressing domestic challenges that affect the well-being of citizens at home and impinge on Nigeria’s foreign relations. The authors in this book have underscored the point that Nigeria is performing below its weight in international affairs. In an era characterised by globalisation and complex interdependence, foreign policy should serve as an instrument for Nigeria’s economic growth and national development. However, the central responsibility for ensuring the actualisation of this goal lies with the government, which has the primary responsibility of providing security and welfare to the citizens. Considering the topics and issues examined in this book, we believe that the compendium will serve as an important reference document for scholars, diplomats, students, as well as public officials interested in understanding Nigerian foreign policy.

References Agbu, O. (2008). Nigeria’s foreign policy under president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua: Challenges and prospects. Nigerian Forum, 29, 1–2. Aluko, O. (1971). The civil war and Nigerian foreign policy. Political Quarterly, XLII(April-June), 179–180. Aluko, O. (1978). Options in Nigerian foreign policy. NIIA, Lecture Series No. 22. Aluko, O. (1980). Nigerian foreign policy. In O. Aluko (Ed.), The foreign policies of African states. Hodder and Stoughton.

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Bamali, N. (2007). Redefining Nigeria’s interest and commitments in peace support operations. In B. A. Akinterinwa (Ed.), Nigeria’s national interests in a globalising world: Further reflections on constructive and beneficial concentricism-­ volume three - Nigeria’s national interests beyond Nigeria (pp. 68–109). Bolytag International Publishers. Bukarambe, B., Agbu, O. A., Wapmuk, S., & Ilesanmi, O. A. (2020). Introduction: Understanding the context of Nigeria’s foreign policy under president Muhammadu Buhari, 2015–2019. In B. Bukarambe, O. A. Agbu, S. Wapmuk, & O.  A. Ilesanmi (Eds.), Nigeria’s foreign policy under the administration of president Muhammadu Buhari: 2015–2019 (pp.  1–18). Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Enuka, C., & Ojukwu, E.  C. (2016). Challenges of Nigeria’s foreign policy. International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 5(2), 52–66. Eze, O. (Ed.). (2010). Beyond 50 years of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Issues, challenges and prospects. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Gambari, I.  A. (2008). From Balewa to Obasanjo. The theory and practice of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In A.  Adebajo & A.  R. Mustapha (Eds.), Gulliver’s troubles. Nigeria’s foreign policy after the cold war (pp.  58–80). University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Moyosore, T. (1990, January/February). Nigeria’s historic mission in Africa: Is she still relevant in African affairs? Nigerian Forum, pp. 33–40. Ogwu, U. J., & Alli, W. O. (Eds.). (2007). Years of reconstruction: Selected foreign policy speeches of Olusegun Obasanjo. NIIA. Ogwu, U.  J., & Olukoshi, A.  O. (Eds.). (1991). The economic diplomacy of the Nigerian state. NIIA. Sesay, A., et al. (2011). Reflections on fifty years of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Vol. I: Foundations and challenges. Society for International Relations Awareness and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Tyoden, S.  G. (2011). Nigeria’s leadership role in the African Union (AU): Challenges and prospects. In T. A. Imobighe & W. O. Alli (Eds.), Perspectives on Nigeria’s national and external relations: Essays in honour of professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi. University Press. Uhomooibhi, M. (2012). An overview of Nigeria’s foreign relations: A practitioner’s perspective. In E. Anyaoku (Ed.), Review of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Issues and challenges. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

PART II

The Domestic Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Relations

CHAPTER 2

Bureaucratic Model: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nigerian Foreign Policy Aloysius-Michaels Okolie, Kelechi Elijah Nnamani, and Casmir Chukwuka Mbaegbu

Introduction The modern state system is an upshot of the Westphalian treaty signed in 1648. Until the emergence of social forces, the state by the reason of this treaty operated as a unitary and dominant actor in the international system which thrives by forging interstate partnership and alliance in the pursuit of its national interest across international boundaries and geographical territories. The concept of national interest is riddled in ambiguity and often fraught with plethora of meanings, interpretations, usages and abuses (Okolie, 2015). Meanwhile, Padelford et al. (1976) remarked that national interests are centred on core values of the society, which include the welfare of the nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial integrity and self-preservation. Again Morgenthau (1952) noted that national interests aim at promoting national image,

A.-M. Okolie • K. E. Nnamani (*) • C. C. Mbaegbu University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_2

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prestige and respect both at home and abroad. According to him, national interests are determined by the political traditions and the total cultural contexts within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. In furtherance of the argument, Okolie (2015, p.  13) summed the meaning of national interest as follows: National interest refers to national security concerns. It entails not only national survival but basically state survival for the protection of internal values from external threats and devaluation. Security here should not be conceived outside the confine of self-preservation, production and reproduction of the material needs of the citizens; pursuits and realization of the basic and prestige needs of the citizens.

Meanwhile, the traditional understanding of national interest was limited to self-preservation, economic wellbeing of the citizens and territorial integrity (Kateb, 2001). In recent times, the idea and scope of national interest has been broadened and transcends its initial state-centric boundary (Villanueva & Tadeo Hernández, 2019). Scholars and policymakers are currently paying a great deal of attention to how emerging issues such as human security (Hoag, 2011; Trobbiani, 2013), identity (Nye, 1999; Henderson et  al., 2015), gender (Campbell & Winters, 2008; Swiss, 2016) and communication (Curtin, 2015; Hartig, 2016) are redefining national interests of states. Meanwhile, the broad and organizational framework for the articulation and pursuit of these national objectives is foreign policy. Like national interest, the concept of foreign policy is enmeshed in very elastic applications. However, given that the preoccupation of this chapter is not to join in the endless debates or search for a suitable and universally acceptable definition of foreign policy, it is our intention to glance through the extant literature with a view to providing the insightful knowledge on the understanding of the concept. Gibson (1944) defined foreign policy as a well-­ rounded comprehensive plan based on knowledge and experience for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. From an institutional perspective, it is seen as the way in which policymaking institutions and official actors define their positions and that of their states vis-à-vis outside world over a period of time (Thompson & Macridis, 1976, p.  21). At all times, foreign policy reflects strategies, goals and objectives which a given state sets to achieve in its interactions with other states. In other words, it is a compendium of national interest of a given

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state and the framework or strategies adopted for realizing them. The central goal of external interaction is to promote and protect the interests of a state. From the foregoing clarifications, certain underlying assumptions are evident. Firstly, foreign policy is fundamentally a state-centric enterprise, involving different nation-states, aggregating and projecting their demands at the international arena. As Okolie and Nnamani (2018) noted, it is an exclusive activity of the state, meaning that although non-state actor can influence the content and outcome of foreign policy, it cannot engage directly in its formulation and implementation. Secondly, foreign policy at all times is interest-driven and goal-directed; it is purposeful action of the state in which clearly stated goals are identified and effective institutional mechanisms structured to ensure their realization. Thirdly, it is remarkably different from other kinds of domestic or national policies in the sense that it is patterned, highly organized and strategic. Hence, we argue that foreign policy is innately about decision-making which is largely defined within the ambit of the state, directed at outlining policies to guide relations with other states at the global level (Okolie & Nnamani, 2018). It is axiomatic to contend that foreign policy emerges from political processes that take into cognisance of several factors. These include: • The ecological variables and geographical factors • Idiosyncratic variables and personalities of political leaders directly involved in the foreign policymaking and implementation • The nature and structure of the foreign policy decision-making • Public opinion/pressure groups • The character and complexion of the political system • National symbols and attributes • The nature of the international system It conduces specific political decision-making aimed at protecting, maximizing and promoting the prescribed national interest of a given state. This perception suggests that decisions about what constitutes national interest are reflection of clashes of vested and divergent interests of individuals, small groups or coalitions which ultimately come to a conclusion about the relevance of a specific issue (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 247). Nevertheless, how these policies or decisions are conceived, made and implemented, as well as factors influencing their choices and outcomes, are usually riddled with competition, complexity and obscurity, thereby

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necessitating a lens or prismatic compass (decision-making models) through which they can be navigated, seen and understood. Decision-­ making models “typically specify processing characteristics by how individuals acquire and assess information, as well as how a final choice is selected among alternatives under consideration” (Brule et  al., 2014, p. 9). Within the context of foreign policy, decision-making model is an analytical tool to illuminate the dynamics in the field and further helps describe how states conduct their foreign policy, diplomatic endeavours and international relations. According to Blankshain (2019), it seeks to explain how states develop and enact foreign policy. It provides insight into the underlying motivation and behaviour of state in its external relations and conceptualizes foreign policy as chains of decisions made by particular actors using specific decision-making processes. Foreign policy decision model further offers a way of organizing the determinants of action around those government officials who acted for the state (Smith et al., 2008). Bureaucratic model is one of the decision-making tools in the analysis of foreign policy. This model substantially deviates from the contending rational actor model which focuses on the behaviour of an individual as well as the organizational process model which places emphasis on powerful organizations of government. Rather, the bureaucratic model sees decision-making as a product of interactions of bureaucrats and elites competing and bargaining to project and protect their interests. It looks at how the behaviour of individuals working in various institutions saddled with the responsibility of initiating and implementing foreign policy influences policy outcomes. As a corollary of the above, Leira (2019) noted that foreign policy as a twenty-first-century practice concept is associated, for instance, with institutions such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Embassies, as well as ideas such as national interests, rational utility-­ maximization and bureaucratic politics. In Nigeria, foreign policy decision-making is mostly coordinated by top government officials of the MFA. Since independence, many scholars have been preoccupied with how the behaviour of bureaucrats in the coordination of the country’s external relations impacts on the foreign policy decision-­ making of the Nigerian state (Aluko, 1983; Nwosu, 1994; Mimiko & Mbada, 2014). After 60 years of Nigeria’s independence, it is germane to explore and unbundle the theoretical postulations of the bureaucratic model of foreign policy decision-making in order to apply them in the analysis of the operations and behaviour of the Ministry of

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Foreign Affairs from 1960 till date. We shall further identify the challenges and policy action plans for stimulating effective foreign policymaking in Nigeria.

Unbundling the Bureaucratic Model of Decision-­Making in Foreign Policy The foundation of the bureaucratic approach to politics is believed to have been laid in Max Weber’s submission that the modern state is influenced by “routines of administration” (Kremer-Asaf, 2015). Its further development for public policy analysis owes to the seminal works of scholars that rejected the political neutrality of civil servants and further drew attention to the political role of bureaucrats. Bureaucratic model of decision-making emerged specifically as response to the contending rational and organizational approaches which were gaining prominence in social science analysis and was designed to explore new areas of thinking on how bureaucratic influences inform policy formulation and implementation. Unlike the rational model which presumes that decision-makers are rational entities who select the rational alternatives that serve their ends or the organizational tool, which analyses every action as organizational output, the bureaucratic decision model sees policymaking process as a game involving many players (bureaucrats). Hudson (2007) conceptualizes the players as those personalities whose expertise, roles or sheer political power coupled with strong interest allow them to determine bureaucratic outcome. Proponents such as Herring (1936), Appleby (1939), March and Simon (1958), Lindblom (1959), Huntington (1961), Neustadt (1960) and Down (1966) established how policy outcomes arising from a game of bargaining among a small, high-ranking government official who select strategies and policy goals impact on their personal and organizational interests. What then is the bureaucratic politics model? Bureaucratic politics model does support the existence of a unitary actor like the rational policy model of Allison; rather it considers many actors to be players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra as well as international problems (Shaw & Aluko, 1983). Usually, foreign policy decisions, according to the bureaucratic politics model, are that which result from the interplay among executive and legislative organizations, public and private interests, and personalities who all play political games to advance

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particular interests (Hudson, 2007). As a decision-making model of the behavioural paradigm, bureaucratic politics model essentially reflects images of decision-making structures and processes in the advanced industrialized economies, or developed countries, especially the advanced capitalist states (Asobie, 1980a, 1980b). It only marginally defines the foreign policy process in developing countries. Meanwhile, the application of the bureaucratic decision-making model in the analysis of foreign policy is attributed to the influential work of Allison (1969), further expanded in Allison and Halperin (1971), and Allison and Zelikow (1999). Allison’s (1969) seminal thesis on bureaucratic approach to foreign policy analysis was influenced by a careful investigation of the standoff between the United States and the former Soviet Union in 1962, otherwise known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. He began the analysis of how foreign policy decisions are made and executed by comparing and critiquing the rational model of decision-making. Using the Cuban Missile Crisis as point of departure, Allison (1969) established the inadequacies inherent in the rational actor model which analyses decision-­making in terms of bargaining and calculations of state actors. The state, according to this model, functions as a rational entity that selects alternative or makes decisions on the basis of self-interested behaviour. Nevertheless, this explanation failed to account for what Krylova (2019) described as the strategic miscalculations of the United States and Soviet Union decision-makers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It noted that variables such as cultural constraints and values could limit the rationality of the actors. The understanding that bureaucratic model of decision-­making incorporated these indices as well as other issues including bargaining seems to have given it an edge over other models. Bureaucratic model of decision-making in foreign policy is the analytical lens which focuses on the policymaking role of bureaucrats and public administrators rather than on the unitary state actors or constellation of loosely allied organizations presided over by political leaders (Krylova 2019). According to Allison (1971), foreign policy decisions are made exclusively by a collective executive with each member of the group possessing his or her own bureaucratic interests. This model suggests that bureaucrats who occupy various sensitive positions are always competing with each other to present their own interest and optimize their organizational goal. These sets of people are key advisers and powerful individuals who assist the political leaders in the formulation of external policies and thereafter use their influence to modify these to align with their

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self-­interests. In many countries like Nigeria, hundreds of bureaucrats working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exert significant degree of influence on external foreign policymaking and implementation. In other words, government remains largely a representation of network of organizations whose choices are impacted only by personal values, motives and intentions of individual actors in the leading positions. Allison and Halperin (1972) noted that the choices selected by this group are likely to mirror the preferences of the group member(s) who possesses bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players’ perceptions of the first two ingredients. This explains why Krylova (2019) defined foreign policy as a by-product of bargaining games between principal decision-makers in the international arena. Meanwhile, in the area of policy implementation, Allison and Halperin (1972) observe that actions on specific governmental issues are taken through action-channels. In furtherance of this, Blankshain (2019) notes that action-channels represent standardized sets of procedures that offer bargaining advantages and create rules for political interface. Action-­ channels organize bargaining games through formal processes for generating government action or through informal means structured on an ad-hoc basis. Thus, the achievement of any player in the negotiation process solely relies on his advantages, his skills in employing these advantages and other actors’ perceptions about his ability to influence the decision-­ making process (Krylova, 2019). Allison and Halperin (1972) highlighted a vital role of action-channels in bureaucratic politics in determining a set of players, their advantages and rules governing the decision-making process. The ensuing governmental decisions and actions reflect collective choices made through bargaining games between key players. From the foregoing illuminations, key propositions of the bureaucratic model approach could be established. First, bureaucratic foreign policy model presupposes that players select policy options that satisfy their bureaucratic role and boost their influence—this is akin to the aphorism which states that “where you stand depends on where you sit”. The preoccupation of the decision-makers is, therefore, to seek and advance the interests of their organization. Secondly, the model assumes that actors in the decision-making process will not only hold different policy choices but also support different proposals, negotiate over outcomes and generate conflict (Blomdahl, 2016). The major issue under contention is basically not whether the players will hold divergent views and bargain thereafter, but to what extent. Indeed, bargaining influence and action-channels are

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key components of the bureaucratic models. Bargaining influence in this analytical framework denotes that some players exert more influence than others. This suggests that these players have unwavering support of the chief executive and as such, assume key responsibilities in the decisionmaking process. Thirdly and finally, the model insists that the decisionmaking process will produce alternatives that mirror a political outcome or concession: typically, a blend of inputs representing the perspectives and positions of different actors (Blomdahl, 2016). Since political outcomes signify several, competing and sometimes ad-hoc inputs that originate from bargaining and compromise, no one player can expect to control them or be able to forecast the result. Instead, the outcome is a function of loose, bureaucratic politics and not a product of objective cost-benefit analyses.

Bureaucratizing Foreign Policymaking in Nigeria: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1960–2020 The Nigerian foreign policy has gone through many phases of policymaking over the years. It has continued to change under different governments, the ideological orientations and personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders. Historically, foreign relations and defence of the territorial integrity were the last functions handed over to the Nigerian government led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa after Nigeria’s independence on October 1, 1960. Subsequently, she established a separate ministry known as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (Jibril, 2004) to deal with external affairs of the government. This inevitably marked the formal establishment of the structure and processes for foreign policymaking in Nigeria. Historically, MFA has come a long way from what it was at the time of independence in 1960. There are different nomenclatures of this institution from one country to another. What is currently known as the MFA in Nigeria began in 1957 as a Department in the Cabinet Office (Ashiru, 2011). It was only formally established in 1960 and afterwards renamed a number of times. Between 1960 and 1963, it was known as the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations; between 1963 and 1991, as Ministry of External Affairs; and in 1992, assumed its current name, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The current name was proclaimed by President Ibrahim Babangida in a budget speech of 1992. In creating

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the ministry, its responsibilities were defined as the implementation and pursuit of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives and the promotion of Nigeria’s interests in different parts of the world (Ofoegbu, 1999). MFA is complemented by its external arms called Missions, Embassies or High Commissions. The MFA has primary responsibility in the implementation of Nigeria’s external relations. However, it is not the only institution involved with foreign affairs. Inputs from the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industry, Economic Development and Defence, amongst others, are equally important as they have areas of interface with foreign affairs and responsibilities affecting foreign policy formulation and implementation (Fawole, 2004). Even though an administrative agency, the MFA is involved in the formulation of the country’s foreign policy. Constitutionally, the responsibility for making Nigeria’s external policy lies with both the legislature and the executive arms of government. Nevertheless, during the immediate post-independence years, especially in the First Republic (1960–1966), though the legislature played its role in the formulation of foreign policy particularly through the debates on foreign policy matters in the Federal House of Representatives and Regional Parliaments, even so, the core responsibility and domain role was played by the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat. Aluko noted that for the first ten months of independence, Prime Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa remained the Foreign Affairs Minister and in conjunction with the Cabinet Office maintained a close control on Nigeria’s foreign policy (Aluko, 1981; Mimiko & Mbada, 2014). According to Olusanya and Akindele (1986), the Nigerian constitution outlines the essential foreign policy concerns. Section 19 of the Nigerian Constitution: Foreign Policy Objectives states that the foreign policy objectives shall be (a) Promotion and protection of the national interest; (b) Promotion of African integration and support for African unity; (c) Promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) Respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and (e) Promotion of a just world economic order.

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Extrapolating from the enunciated major principles influencing and guiding the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy above, it is given that Nigeria’s foreign policy, right from independence, has been designed to meet the requirement for political stability and development in Africa, and this perhaps explains why Africa remains the centrepiece or cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust. The above fundamental principles are related to Nigeria’s Afro-centric drive, particularly its commitment to peace building and conflict resolution in Africa (Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). Similarly, Ezirim (2011) opined that Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence in 1960 has been consistent and characteristically pro-­ Africa. However, he questions the consistency in “Citizens’ Diplomacy” thrust of the Yar’Adua administration, with respect to avowed Nigeria’s foreign policy principles and objectives. The original proponents of the bureaucratic politics model, Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, thought that while their model was the most satisfactory way of explaining foreign policy outcomes for industrialized countries, it was inapplicable to the study of non-industrialized countries or developing countries (Shaw & Aluko, 1983). This is erroneous and defective, given the contemporary situation in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. These views are culture-bound and based on inadequate facts about decision-making processes in many developing countries. The bureaucratic politics model also accounts for the gap between policy decisions and policy implementation. It shows the ability of the MFA to use a number of techniques to influence the nature and content of decisions in the course of their implementation which could involve evading or disregarding instructions, intentionally taking precise instructions; delaying action; and obeying the letter but not the spirit of the instruction, taking actions in the absence of specific instructions (Asobie, 1990). In examining the role of the bureaucracy in the making of Nigerian foreign policy, the bureaucratic politics model is useful in the light of the fact that foreign policy decision-making and implementation in Nigeria go beyond the theory of a strong-leader approach (where a political leader takes ultimate decisions that could in fact result in a zero-sum game for other stakeholders) to demonstrate that developing nations like Nigeria do have organizational structures that deal with foreign policies (Smith, 2003). In foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria, the bureaucrats have played a more critical role than any other individual or organization in the country since independence (Shaw & Aluko, 1983).

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The bureaucratic machinery or organization of Nigeria’s MFA has since October 1, 1960, formulated its foreign political policy and foreign economic policy (Idang, 1973; Adefuye, 1992). According to Ogwu and Olukoshi (1991), Nigeria’s foreign policy was later redirected from a predominantly political focus to an economic one in which foreign policy instruments were used to advance domestic economic development objectives. For scholars, there is a linkage between domestic and global economies. There is an acceptance of a direct linkage between foreign policy and the domestic economy. Both contexts of domestic economic crisis and structural adjustment, as well as a rapidly changing international political and economic environment, affected Nigeria’s decision to adopt economic diplomacy as an object of foreign policy action, expecting that it would be an effective external supplement to the international economic reforms (Ogwu & Olukoshi, 2002). With respect to foreign policymaking in Nigeria, the Nigerian foreign services have been the linchpin of foreign policy decision-making in the country. Dudley (1982) posited that foreign policymaking is the responsibility of the “professionals”, the body of civil servants and/or political appointees, with the former playing the larger role. This is because the management of external relations requires a kind of “professionalism”, expert knowledge and a negotiating skill different from those required for the management of domestic affairs. Specifically, the executive political head responsible for overseeing the external relations of the state may therefore do no more than stipulate the parameters which govern or determine policy outcomes. Ultimately, then the “national interest” may be defined as whatever the professionals who manage the state’s external relations may say it is (Dudley, 1982, p. 276). According to Asobie (1980a, 1980b), Nigeria’s foreign policy may be seen, not simply as what the Foreign Ministry does, or merely “the declarations” of the head of government. Rather, it should be viewed as the sum total of decisions made and actions taken on the basis of suggestions and recommendations emanating from various sources within the Federal bureaucracy. Furthermore, Asobie (1980a, 1980b) noted that the nature of distribution of powers and functions among institutions and structures concerned with the management of external relations coupled with the lack of a regular coordinating policymaking machinery laid a foundation for jurisdictional disputes and rivalry among different bureaucratic units which had serious consequences for the nature of the foreign policy. It should be stressed, therefore, that the foreign policy process in Nigeria, between

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1960 and 2020, involved several ministers, ministries, civil servants and extra-bureaucratic advisers. In practice, although ultimately, the views of the chief executive are usually decisive, that is, when they are definite and distinct from views of other policymakers, the views and interplay of views and attitudes of several ministers, civil servants and unofficial advisers are sometimes as important as those of the prime minister or the president. According to Nwosu (1994), the management of Nigeria’s foreign relations is not restricted to members of the bureaucracy. Others such as holders of public office, interest groups and mass media practitioners participate in decision-making process. Thus, these groups, for us, represent the non-­ bureaucratic groups in Nigeria’s foreign relations. The Balewa and Babangida administrations accorded importance to these groups in foreign policy discourse and set up the All-Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy in 1961 and 1986, respectively. We then make bold to state that what determines the role of the group is the relevance of a particular issue to its survival. The role of the bureaucracy in the policy process and, in particular, the impact of the struggle for power and functions among different bureaucratic units on both the policy process and policy output in Nigeria’s MFA is established. Thus, the MFA is a complex bureaucratic organization with many interests and many wills which often distort both the policy process and the policy output. There is bureaucratic pre-eminence and an inextricable connection between the bureaucratic role of MFA with Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuits, formulation, its engagement with the international community and implementation. What is found here is a situation in which bureaucrats and government functionaries mobilize the support of those with special interest in the subject of a particular policy area to legitimize their position or resolve conflicts resulting from bureaucratic politics. The immediate consequence of this invitation is that foreign policy decision ceases to be an exclusive preserve of the government. It then involves the need to accommodate the idiosyncrasy of informal groups whose primary objective is the achievement of the groups’ goal prior to that of the state. Inevitably, foreign policy decisions become a matter of convenience rather than a well-calculated attempt at assessing the costs and benefits of a particular action. This leads to weaknesses in the administrative procedure or bureaucracy (Nwosu, 1994). In view of the foregoing, it is evident that over the years MFA has— within the confines of its mandate, which is to play a major role in mutually reinforcing foreign policy decision-making and implementation

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processes, inform, and educate the people on Nigeria’s foreign policy and world affairs in general—paid due attention to issues of foreign policymaking and implementation. That is not to state that the working of the Institute is not without challenges and to these we now turn our attention.

Challenges and Policy Action Plans for Stimulating Effective Foreign Policymaking The institutional framework for foreign policy formulation and execution, particularly with regard to the MFA, faces daunting challenges. As a bureaucratic organization, one of the challenges facing MFA is that of autonomy. This was mostly noticeable under the leadership of Olugbenga Ashiru. This period witnessed inadequate information dissemination and lack of democratic principles in managing the country’s foreign policy (Saliu, 2014). This period also witnessed personality conflicts and rivalries among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with those of Home Ministry where external relations are concerned. The resultant effects were lack of any focal point of coordination for the activities of the institutions and structures of foreign policymaking and implementation. There is the perennial bureaucratic infighting for primacy of influence between the major institutions and structures concerned with Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and implementation—MFA, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) and recently the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations. Instances abound in decisions such as the recognition of the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the sole authentic government of Angola in 1975. Here two strong positions were discernible. The first was proffered by those who called for a government of national unity made up of the three liberation movements existing then. The then Ministry of External Affairs was the leader of this group. The second position was that of those who called for the recognition of MPLA only. Here, one finds the NIIA and many university lecturers. These two groups were so convinced about the gains of their positions that none wanted to yield ground to the other. This led to an acrimonious situation which forced Bolaji Akinyemi (1982), the then Director-General of the NIIA, to state that whether the decision was taken or not was less important than the bureaucratic infighting for the power to take decisions and the protection of such power (Nwosu, 1994).

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The second challenge facing MFA and foreign policymaking arises from poor coordination of the activities of the various agencies responsible for foreign policy. Examples abound where external decisions were made without the knowledge and input of the MFA. The expulsion of illegal aliens by the Shehu Shagari government in January 1983 provides an insight. The decision to expel the aliens was taken primarily by the president, his chief security adviser and the Minister for Internal Affairs without the involvement of the MFA which was then referred to as the Ministry of External Affairs. The confusion which resulted in the poor handling of this decision stemmed from the haphazard and slipshod manner of implementing the policy. This led to the condemnation of the policy by the international community as well as some Nigerian groups. It also led to the embarrassment of Dr Oladapo Olusola Fafowora who was Nigeria’s Ambassador/Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York from 1981 to 1984. Fafowora learnt of the decision from the Secretary-General who summoned him to ask for permission from the Federal Government to dispatch the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to Nigeria (Fafowora, 1984). Following the slipshod implementation of the policy and the international embarrassment caused by it, other government agencies became involved in the implementation stage. These included the Ministries of External Affairs now MFA, of Industries, of National Planning and of Justice. Another example is the debate on Nigeria’s membership of Organization of Islamic Conference now Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The debate perhaps more than any other foreign policy matter illustrates the lack of coordination in the administration of Nigeria’s external relations. This was due to the confusion noticed at the highest level of government during that time (Nwosu, 1994). The import of this assertion is that Nigeria’s OIC full membership is a foreign policy issue. Thus, despite the potency of public opinion in foreign policymaking, ultimately, decision-making on foreign policy in Nigeria remained in the hands of the MFA and the president (the Commander-in-Chief) to a great extent. The third challenge can be traced to the overlapping nature of the responsibility of various government departments in foreign policymaking. Over the years, there have been conflicting statements by government functionaries over external policy matters. For instance, while Professor Akinyemi, the former Minister for External Affairs, was calling for the development of black bomb by Nigeria, the then Minister for Science and

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Technology, Professor Emmanuel Emovon, was saying that the country had not matured to go nuclear. Secondly, when the Central Bank of Nigeria refused to remit money to Nigerian students in Israel because Nigeria had no diplomatic relations with the country, the Federal Ministry of Education said that no such policy stopping the payment of school fees to Nigerian students in Israel existed. Again, when the American plane landed in Lagos in 1986, former Chief of General Staff Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe said that nobody expected it but then Minister for Information Colonel Anthony Ukpo countered that the plane was granted a landing right (Akinrinade et  al., 1986). Another instance was the contradictory signals that emanated from the Minister for External Affairs and the Chief of General Staff when General Obasanjo was nominated to be a member of the Commonwealth’s Eminent Persons Group. Whereas the former said that Obasanjo would not participate, the latter said that he would (Akinrinade et al., 1986). What the above analysis suggests is that several agencies, and groups from both the formal and informal sectors, participate in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. This leads to the frequent disagreements noticeable in the decision-making process. It also manifests the weak administrative structure of many government agencies that have the duty to execute the policy adopted. The fourth challenge deals with lack of professionalism. Staffing and training combine as formidable challenges that glare at the professional practices of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is debilitating to the overall output of foreign policy in Nigeria. Nigeria’s foreign policy practice is challenged by professional deficiency, effectiveness and creativity. There is inadequate requisite training and retraining of Nigerian diplomats and foreign policy practitioners to meet up with the diplomatic realities and challenges. Ibrahim Gambari, an erstwhile Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted with regret that for a long time in Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since their entry into it in the 1950s and early 1960s, no further training was undertaken by officials who later attained very senior positions in the ministry. Moreover, the Foreign Service Academy which was established in the early 1980s only served the training needs of staff newly recruited into the service. There was no systematic programme for follow­up training for this or indeed any other category of foreign affairs officers (Gambari, 1989). Even so, there was a programme of massive training at post-graduate levels in major Nigerian Universities in the 1980s, which regrettably was not sustained beyond 1995. Thus, only 25% of Foreign Ministry personnel speak a second international language apart from

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English (Fafowora, 2008). Hence, Gambari (2008) had argued for a move away from a foreign service based on generalists to one based more heavily on specialists. The fifth challenge deals with poor budgetary allocations to the MFA. The budgets have always been inadequate to address the expected service delivery. Funding of Nigerian expansive structures and diplomatic services and obligations both face serious constraints and financial setbacks. The MFA receives just about one percent of the federal government budget for recurrent expenditure. In the last five years, Nigeria budgeted less than ₦200 billion for its foreign missions, representing a paltry 0.5% of all its budgetary proposals of ₦43.98 trillion in that period. MFA proposed a budget of ₦46.5 billion in 2016, 66.7% was allocated to the 115 foreign missions abroad to cater for diplomatic services. That amounted to ₦31.2 billion. While its allocation to foreign missions increased slightly to ₦48.9 billion in its 2017 budgetary proposal of ₦7.2 trillion, it was 73.3% of the ministry’s ₦66.6 billion budget. In 2018, the foreign missions’ allocation was downsized marginally to ₦11.3 billion as the ministry proposed ₦83.3 billion, a 13% cut. Again in 2019, the foreign missions’ allocation fell to ₦4.1 billion to ₦73.6 billion. In 2020, the ministry’s total allocation stood at ₦60.2 billion. By 2021, the proposed budget earmarked ₦65.1 billion for foreign missions, 78% of the ministry’s ₦83.4 billion budget (Babatunde & Akinpelu, 2020). It was a far cry in comparison to the 2020 budget of ministries of defence (₦975,770,634,390.00) and interior (₦253,493,565,095.00) (BudgIT, 2020). Some other ministries receive far more budgetary allocations. The downward exchange rate adjustment of the naira since the early 1980s has made the matter worse. There were some disturbing reports of the country’s Mission abroad owing rents, and Nigerian diplomats not being paid their allowances regularly (Fafowora, 2008). Because of the issue of under-funding, some Nigerian foreign policy analysts and political stakeholders have called for the closure of Nigerian missions abroad. Specifically, in the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a committee was set up which suggested the closure of some missions deemed to be expensive for the country’s economy to run. Such missions were those in Venezuela, Kuwait, Lebanon, Congo, Pakistan, Bangladesh, North Korea and the Philippines (BBC 2013 cited in Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016). The disturbing problem posed by this closure is that “when we close Mission, we damage relations that have taken years to build” (Ashiru, 2013).

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The sixth challenge is executive-legislative relations. Even though budgets and confirmation of ambassadorial nominees go through the National Assembly for approval, there are challenges in getting approved appropriations released on time and in full for the execution of Nigeria’s foreign policy. After all, it is recalled that the envelope system of budgeting is an executive decision, ostensibly to reflect government’s budget revenue profile. The legislative organ of the government often times injects itself directly in the foreign policy implementation process. In many instances, the legislative organ of the government reacts or deals with aspects of Nigeria’s foreign relations without the benefit of institutional knowledge and information about best practices and processes. The net effect of this policy of incoherence is that this organ of state then works at cross purposes, making Nigeria’s foreign policy goals and objectives unclear and ambiguous (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016). The seventh challenge concerns the fragile economy confronting Nigeria’s foreign policymaking. The weak state and dependent nature of Nigeria’s economy has vitiated the ability of Nigeria’s foreign policy to protect the national interest, in the global political economy. It is a truism that a state’s foreign rating and influence is a reflection of the health, quality and size of the country’s economy. While Nigeria has a large economy, it equally has serious economic crisis that makes it difficult to realize its full potential. The structure of Nigeria’s economy exhibits largely a neo-­ colonial orientation, depending largely on the export of primary goods and importation of finished commodities. Hence, external development strategies and associated distortions reverberate negatively in the economic fortunes of the country. This, unarguably, disallows it to play the critical roles it craves in the international system. Connected to the issue of economy in Nigeria’s foreign policy is the challenge of globalization. Presently, there is no country in the world that is totally independent of others. Finance, capital, labour and goods are highly mobile, as the world has rapidly shrunk as a result of the information age. However, this interdependence poses a threat to developing countries like Nigeria, as it is not equally beneficial to all states because the developed countries enjoy favourable balance of trade and more economic power than the developing countries like Nigeria. This situation makes Nigeria and other developing countries vulnerable to manipulation by industrialized countries (Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016). Finally, there is the challenge of security and terrorism. In international relations, states have a monopoly on the use of coercive force. In a

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situation whereby there are non-state actors contending with the state in the use of coercive force, a situation of order and counter-order ensues; hence, disorderliness assumes the defining characteristic of the state in question. With respect to Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorist groups and the nature of their attacks, killings and destruction of lives and properties have undermined the territorial integrity and questioned her leadership roles in Africa. The insecurity in Nigeria has created an impression of a weak government that lacks the capacity to maintain internal security. This, again, sends negative signals to foreign tourists and investors, especially where the economic diplomacy of the government is anchored on attraction of foreign direct investments, deepening of trade and enhancing domestic productivity. With respect to those mentioned earlier, the following action plans are necessary for a new normal in stimulating effective foreign policymaking and implementation. The Nigerian MFA needs to be reformed and reinvigorated. The Nigerian MFA, though large with multiple structures for policy formulation and implementation, does not lack a clear organizational hierarchy. Occasional frictions and conflicts of interests between the political heads (Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Hon. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs), Permanent Secretary and other agencies under the ministry may happen. Apart from an approved organogram that continues to be adapted as the need arises, the roles and responsibilities of the principal officers and political heads of the ministry (Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Minister of State and the Permanent Secretary) are clearly delineated in a manner that obviates any conflict or clash of roles. In this connection, the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations has long ceased to function as nothing has been heard of it since the second term of President Goodluck Jonathan. Thus, there is the need to strengthen structures and institutions such as NIIA, NIPSS, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Directorate of Technical Aid Corps and Directorate of Technical Cooperation in Africa, and recently the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations for policymaking and implementation. Furthermore, the roles of these institutions must be properly defined to avoid overlapping of roles by these institutions. The MFA should be allowed to take charge of the formulation and execution of Nigeria’s foreign policy and to take credit or blame for its failures and successes. The point being made is not so much that the MFA should be the sole agency for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. However, the NIIA, NIPSS and the Presidential Advisory

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Council on International Relations should remain the ministry’s think tanks to avoid overlapping of functions and roles in foreign policymaking. The NIIA and the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations should consult with the MFA for coherent and effective foreign policymaking and implementation. In addition, there is the need to strengthen the relationship between the MFA and Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) which came into being in 2018 and has since been playing an active role in not just seeking to harness the immense resources of the Nigerian diaspora community, but also connecting them with the homeland. This will go a long way in further complementing the efforts of the ministry in extending consular assistance to Nigerians in distress. There is a need to have career diplomats and bureaucrats drive the cardinal objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is necessary for a foreign policy that is issue-driven, goal-oriented and continuities rather than discontinuities in international diplomacy. The need to bureaucratize and de-personalize Nigeria’s foreign policy is very expedient. Expectedly the leaders’ ideas should not be eschewed, but these should be made to pass through distilling process of the bureaucratic and decision-making machinery of the MFA. This calls for the bureaucratization and democratization of the foreign policymaking process, allowing experienced and trained career diplomats and citizens’ participation and inputs in the foreign policy process and ensuring that the institutions that are constitutionally empowered to take part in decision-­ making are free to play their statutory roles. For the fact that diplomacy is a game of elaborate rules requiring sound professional acumen, the federal government must ensure that recruitment into the MFA should henceforth be based essentially on merit. Specialized trainings in international relations at the master’s level and in other related areas should be encouraged as this will further improve the capacities of the officers in the onerous task of engaging other actors and international persons in the course of advancing Nigeria’s core and middle-­ range interests.

Conclusion The conclusion derivable from the analysis above is that several agencies and both formal and informal actors participate in Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making. The administration of Nigeria’s foreign policies through

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the MFA, NIIA and other ministries/agencies over these years lacks synergy, proper planning and coordination. This is principally because of the MFA’s perception of itself as the sole authority in foreign affairs. However, this is a misconception of what foreign relations is, especially in an ever-­ dynamic global society. There have been attempts to run and make policies with non-career civil servants’ ambassadors in Nigeria’s foreign policy practice. It manifests the weak administrative structure of many government agencies that have the duty to execute the policy adopted. These non-careers civil servants’ ambassadors handle most critical issues haphazardly and based on the spurs of the moment with little regard to their implications on domestic environment and the demands as well as the expectations of the global political economy.

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Nwosu, N. I. (1994). The administration of Nigeria's foreign policy. Trans African Journal of History, 23, 105–116. Nye, J. S. (1999). Redefining the national interest. Foreign affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-­s tates/1999-­0 7-­0 1/ redefining-­national-­interest, on July 12, 2020. Ofoegbu, R. (1999). The structure and process of foreign policy formulation and implementation: A study of the ministry of external affairs. In G. O. Olusanya & R. A. Akindele (Eds.), The structure and processes of foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria, 1960–1990 (pp.  72–105). Vantage Publishers International Ltd.. Okolie, A.  M. (2015). Fundamental issues in foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria. In A.  M. Okolie (Ed.), Contemporary readings on Nigeria’s external relations: Issues, perspectives and challenges. WillyRose & Appleseed Publisher. Okolie, A. M., & Nnamani, K. E. (2018, December). Foreign policy and fungibility of development in Nigeria. Studies in Politics and Society, 6. Olusanya, G. O., & Akindele, R. A. (1986). Nigeria’s external relations: The first twenty-five years. Ibadan University Press. Padelford, L., & Oglivy. (1986). The dynamics of international politics. Macmillan. Saliu, H.  A. (2014). Contending views on Nigeria’s diplomatic missions. India Quarterly, 70(4), 313–325. Shaw, T., & Aluko, O. (1983). Nigerian foreign policy: Alternative perceptions and projections. Macmillan, St. Martin. Smith, B. L. (2003). Public policy and public participation engaging citizens and community in the development of public policy. Health Canada. Smith, S., Hadfield, A., & Dunne, T. (2008). Foreign policy: Theories, actors, cases. Oxford University Press. Swiss, L. (2016). Space for gender equality in the security and development agenda? Insights from three donors. In S. Brown & J. Grävingholt (Eds.), The securitization of foreign aid (Rethinking International Development Series). Palgrave Macmillan. Trobbiani, R. (2013). How should national security and human security relate to each other? Retrieved from https://www.e-­ir.info/2013/04/26/how-­should-­ national-­security-­and-­human-­security-­relate-­to-­each-­other/, July 30, 2020. Villanueva, C. & Tadeo Hernández, E.  L. (2019). Mexican foreign policy and diplomacy: From defensive tradition to incomplete modernity.. Politics & Policy.

CHAPTER 3

Nigerian Foreign Policy and Challenges of Economic Development Osita Agbu and Samson Akpati Nzeribe

Introduction Over the past 60 years beginning from 1960 when Nigeria became politically independent, it is safe to say that the broad goals and objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have remained fairly consistent, only changing slightly, in terms of its expansion to include emergent global issues. Indeed, although the style and conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy may have changed, there have been little profound changes in the content or substance of foreign policy. The trends developed since the 1960s to the present arose from the basic formulations of the principles, aims, and objectives of the Tafawa Balewa post-independence era. Overall, the basic objectives of each successive administration have been tempered and guided by overall national interest. The only exception in terms of possible drastic change in pattern of foreign policy execution was during the

O. Agbu (*) • S. A. Nzeribe Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria Gregory’s University, Uturu, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_3

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Murtala Muhammad military interregnum between 1975 and 1976, when Nigeria’s foreign policy was said to be assertive and radical. It is against this background that we wish to examine Nigeria’s foreign policy and the challenges of economic development. With respect to domestic imperatives or determinants of foreign policy, we are able to identify three major issues that will influence the relevance and future of Nigeria’s foreign policy and attainment of its economic objectives. These include, firstly, the imperative for consolidation of democracy and ensuring political stability; secondly, reducing corruption and enhancing the ease of doing business; and thirdly, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) with the accompanying relevant technologies. In short, Nigeria’s most pressing domestic challenge is the consolidation of the democracy it achieved in 1999 and addressing the myriad of insecurities bedeviling the country in very recent times such as the Boko Haram insurgency, largely in the North East of the country, kidnappings around the country, Herdsmen-Farmer conflicts, and outright demands for independence by segments of the South Eastern States that are ready to defend their territory through self-help due to the incapacity of the Nigerian state to rein in killer terrorist groups and bandits terrorizing rural communities and travelers. Although the country has now gone through five successive elections after the 1999 presidential elections that saw the country transit from several years of military rule to civil governance, there is a general consensus that the country’s democracy is still very fragile. Indeed, the fragility of Nigeria’s democracy is the most worrisome dimension of its many problems, because of the implications for stability of the country and the ECOWAS sub-region. While the general elections of 2003 and 2007 were largely condemned by both domestic observers and international monitors as not having met international standards, that of 2011 was acknowledged by both observers as largely free and fair with only minor lapses. The expectation was that the country will be able to build on the goodwill from this particular election to consolidate its democracy. However, the recent activities of Boko Haram, a domestic terror group supposedly professing a Muslim fundamentalist philosophy of opposition to western values and attacking symbols of government and innocent citizens, call into question the sustainability of the present democratization and potentials for the Nigerian state overcoming this particular challenge to its existence. It is widely believed by many that effective leadership and a stronger economy could serve to counter this type of

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challenge to the authority of the state (Akinbi, 2015; Agbu, 2020 and Oche, 2020). Secondly, corruption is a serious cankerworm eating deep into the underbelly of the Nigerian state. The seeming lack of progress in addressing this by the Federal Government and other components of the federal state has been detrimental to achieving a developmental state and for the country to attain its immense potentials. Corruption and human rights violations have combined at various times in undermining Nigeria’s credibility, at times making it a pariah state (Sani Abacha’s military junta) amongst the comity of nations. Indeed, there is the observation that Nigeria’s image problem and lack of acceptability among the international community have been self-inflicted, in the sense that the country stopped investing in its diplomacy and goodwill garnered after its immense support toward the demise of Apartheid and liberation of Southern Africa. Thirdly, against the backdrop of increasing economic dire-straits, increasing population—now officially determined to be 211,506,909 million (National Population Commission (NPC), 2020)—increasing low-­ capacity utilization (due mainly to power problems), insecurity and increasing poverty among ordinary Nigerians, Nigeria requires to do all that is possible to improve the economic conditions of its teeming populace, especially the youth. Nigeria is host to 2.64% of the humankind, with an annual population growth rate of 2.58% (NDC, 2020, p. xiv). In fact, there are 90 million Nigerians under the age of 30 who require education, jobs, healthcare, and social infrastructure. If this population were imagined as a country of its own, it would be Africa’s second most populous nation (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 99). Although still an important player in the global oil industry, the revenue generated from this industry has dwindled, and the proceeds have not been properly deployed in improving the lot of Nigerians. With a maximum crude oil production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, it is ranked as the sixth largest oil producer in the world (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 2012). Nigeria is blessed with a variety of solid minerals like gold, iron ore, coal, and tin and 37.33 Sq. km of arable land out of a total land size of 923,768 Sq. Km. This indeed is a country with immense potentials. Notwithstanding, the country at a point in time was experiencing classic ‘economic paradox’, in which it was de-industrializing with poverty rising, while earning more oil rents. The problem was that the country was not industrializing based on productive activities, rather it was and is still a consuming nation that tended more toward the service

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sector. This is not surprising as the basis for its industrialization, conceived in the 1970s (Ajaokuta Integrated Steel Complex), has remained comatose. It is common knowledge that ‘technology is power’ and that it is this that drives industrialization, creates jobs, and builds infrastructure. Nigeria’s inability to do this has undermined its economic potentials, image, and the reach of its foreign policy. The economy is therefore an imperative domestic issue for Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-makers.

A Conceptual Overview of Economic Development The term ‘economic development’ can be understood in different ways. Economic development can be defined as growth in material wealth (money and property). Improvements in material wealth can be measured by growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). But human experience is more complex, and national economies often do not have the same impact on people. Although it can reflect these complex circumstances, economic development can be defined more broadly to include improvements in living standards, such as in health, housing, and education. Only through improvements in these aspects of human life can individuals and communities make real choices about their lives and achieve meaningful and sustainable ‘economic development’ and contribute to the social, economic, and cultural wealth of their communities (Economic Development Discussion Paper, VII, 1983). In short, development is both a process and an outcome. Economic growth is simply the beginning of a series of interrelated processes toward economic development. To domesticate these processes and outcomes, national development is treated in terms of the specific experience of the development process of a country. From this broad sense, the goal of economic development is freedom (self-determination): improving the capacity of individuals and communities to own and control the resources that allow them to make choices about their lives and to chart their own course for the future. Encapsulated in the development discourse include the role of institutions, decision making, partnerships, and capacity building—the foundations for economic development; factors that contribute directly to economic development, such as education, skills, health, land, and financial resources. Others include the inputs to economic development; methods to achieve enhanced employment, enterprise, and ownership of income-generating assets, as well as the activities of economic development; the benefits and outcomes.

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Economic development as a concept, however, has been in existence in the West for centuries. Whereas economic development is a policy intervention aiming to improve the well-being of people, economic growth is a phenomenon of market productivity and increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Economic growth can be seen as one aspect of the process of economic development. Economists primarily focus on the growth aspect of the economy at large, whereas researchers of community economic development concern themselves with socioeconomic development as well. Development according to Rodney (1973) is a phenomenon which is inherent in all societies. Economic development of a nation can be pursued externally, but the relevant laws that will drive it must be home-made and domesticated. Thus in 1987–1989, the Minister of Foreign Affairs General Ike Nwachukwu introduced what was called ‘economic diplomacy’ which in actual sense had been in existence in most developed nations then. In this scenario, the minister decided to use the instrument of international relations through the foreign affairs ministry to pursue and bring foreign direct investment into Nigeria to facilitate economic development. Therefore, economic development can be defined as the outcome of a nation’s use of its institutions, organs, agencies, and resources to attract investments that will ultimately develop the nation economically.

State of Economic Development in Nigeria The level of economic development of nations is easily and conspicuously visible and reflects on the standard of living of the populace. It determines the position or respect accorded to the nation in the international arena, and it is among the indices that determine where a nation is placed, that is, to say if the nation is developed or developing. It then does follow that after 60  years of independence from Great Britain and despite its enormous resources and potentials, Nigeria is still ranked amongst the developing nations. No wonder then that at a recent event in Nigeria, the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair after expressing disappointment that Nigeria still finds itself among developing nations advised the country in his own words: If you ask, what does a nation have to do to be successful today? I think there are three prerequisites: First of all, you have to have rules-based economy which involves a predictable environment for investment, a climate for

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enterprise and business that rewards hard-work that enables companies to grow and where the infrastructure that is built in the country goes to support electricity, roads, rail, etc. (Blair, 2020).

Nigeria is a paradox in that, since independence, instead of growing progressively forward, the country is moving retrogressively backward. Economic development usually involves improvements in a variety of indicators such as literacy rates, life expectancy, and poverty rates. Due to the fact that GDP alone does not take into account other aspects such as leisure time, environmental quality, freedom, or social justice, alternative measures of economic well-being have been proposed. Essentially, a country’s economic development is related to its human development, which encompasses, among other things, health and education. These factors are, however, closely related to economic growth so that development and growth often go together. Different governments in Nigeria have, since independence in 1960, failed in pursuit of structural changes. The growth dynamics have been propelled by the existence and exploitation of natural resources and primary products. Initially, the agricultural sector, driven by the demand for food and cash crops production, was at the forefront of the growth process, contributing about 54.7% to the GDP during the 1960s (Blair, 2020). The second decade of independence saw the emergence of the oil industry as the main driver of growth. Since then, the economy had remained healthy with the oil boom. Government expenditure outlays that are dependent on oil revenues have more or less dictated the pace of growth of the economy. Looking back, it is clear that the economy has not performed to its full potential, particularly in the face of its rising population. The railway that was functional at independence was allowed to collapse completely; it was only from 2014, under the Presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, that efforts were made to resuscitate the moribund railway. All the major commercial and industrial cities in Nigeria are not covered by rail lines, but Nigeria under the Buhari government felt comfortable constructing a rail line up to Niger Republic, justifying this by claiming that it will enhance business relations with Niger. Almost every other African country has steady power supply, even those that get it from Nigeria, but power supply is one of the hindrances to doing business in Nigeria because there is no steady power supply in Nigeria. Businesses resort to the use of generator sets and diesel thereby making the cost of doing business in Nigeria exorbitant. This has accounted for many

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international companies that used to do business in Nigeria relocating or partially relocating to neighboring countries like Ghana and the Republic of Benin. Examples include Dunlop Nigeria, Michelin, Paterson Zochonis (PZ), and Unilever Plc (Proshare, 2021). Of recent Nigeria’s monetary policy has been questionable as People now find it hard to deposit their money in banks due to increase in sundry charges and Value Added Tax (VAT). Further, the manipulation of monitory policy exacerbated the problem of economic growth, resulting in high unemployment rate, low investment, high rate of inflation, and unstable foreign exchange rate with the Naira exchanging for about N500 to a US Dollar in 2021. Nigeria has therefore grossly underperformed in the area of economic development. With the tag ‘Giant of Africa’ and the most populous black nation on earth, Nigeria has underperformed relative to its enormous resource endowments. Endowed in commercial quantities with about 37 solid mineral types, in addition to oil and large gas reserves, one would have expected that economic development will be the least of its problems. Yet economic performance has been rather weak and does not reflect these endowments. When put on same scale with the enterprising Asian countries beginning from the 1970s like Malaysia, China, India, and Indonesia, Nigeria is far behind in terms of GDP per capita. These countries have transformed their economies and are respected globally for their economic development strides. See Table 3.1. Table 3.1  The Top 25 Economies in the World Country

Nominal GDP (in trillions)

PPP Adjusted GDP (in trillions)

Annual Growth (%)

GDP Per Capita (in thousands)

United States China Japan Germany India United Kingdom France Italy Brazil Canada

$21.43

$21.43

2.2%

$65,298

$14.34 $5.08 $3.86 $2.87 $2.83

$23.52 $5.46 $4.68 $9.56 $3.25

6.1% 0.7% 0.6% 4.2% 1.5%

$10,262 $40,247 $46,445 $2,100 $42,330

$2.72 $2.00 $1.84 $1.74

$3.32 $2.67 $3.23 $1.93

1.5% 0.3% 1.1% 1.7%

$40,493.9 $33,228.2 $8,717 $46,195

Source: Investopia.com, 2020

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Noting the GDP per capita for China, Japan, and India; Nigeria’s economic contemporaries in the 1960s, we can see that China had a GDP per capita of $10,262 in 2019. Japan is the third largest economy in the world. Its GDP crossed the $40,247 per capita mark in 2019. Strong cooperation between government and industry and advanced technological know-how have built Japan’s manufacturing and export-oriented economy. India is the fifth largest economy in the world, with a GDP per capita of $2100 in 2019, more than 4% higher than in 2018. In 2020, its GDP was put at $6118 by the World Bank. Because of its large population, India has the lowest per capita GDP on our list. However, liberalization of India’s economy since the 1990s has boosted economic growth (Silver, 2020). On the other hand, Nigeria according to the World Bank (2020) had a GDP per capita of US$4917  in 2020 compared to China ($16,411), Japan ($41,380), Indonesia ($11,445), Korea Republic ($42,251), Malaysia ($26,435), and Singapore ($93,397). The difference is quite clear about their performances since the 1960s. Still, Nigeria is the third host economy for FDI in Africa, behind Egypt and Ethiopia according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2019). FDI flows to Nigeria totaled US$1.9 billion in 2018 and showed a decrease compared to the previous year (US$3.5 billion in 2017) because of the austerity measures. Estimated at US$99.6 billion in 2018, the total stock of FDI represents 25.1% of the country’s GDP. Some of the main investing countries in Nigeria include the United States, China, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France (UNCTAD, 2019). The point here is that the country still has the potentials to improve its economic performance were the domestic challenges and appropriate measures put in place at home and abroad.

Nigeria’s Economic Development Objectives Nigeria’s economic development objectives can be said to be largely wrapped around its undue dependence on proceeds from the oil and gas industry and the desire to free itself from this by diversifying its sources of revenue. Over the last 50 years, Nigeria earned about $800 billion as revenue from oil. And still has great potentials for gas with proven reserves of 180 trillion cubic feet of natural gas—the largest on the continent (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 99). In order to cope with the incessant disruptions in oil and gas production and export and to insulate the economy from associated vulnerabilities, the country began to lay more emphasis on

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economic diversification. Beginning with the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDs) between 2003 and 2007, through the perspective development plan of Vision 20:2020 under the Obasanjo administration, to the Transformation Agenda of the Jonathan administration and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) between 2017 and 2020 under the Muhammad Buhari administration, the ambitious goal has always been to achieve economic diversification. At the core of ERGP is the commitment to agriculture value addition, food security, and industrialization through small- and medium-­ scale enterprises, social investment, and promotion of the service sector (Enikanolaiye & Dipeolu, 2020). For Osinbajo (2020, p. 101), one of the core values of the ERGP is ‘Investing in our people’, and this means creating jobs and driving capacity building and skills acquisition interventions in the services sector. The government therefore sought to support the development of high value skills in ICT, Healthcare, and other professional services while increasing investment in tertiary education. As the ERGP completes its life cycle at the end of the year 2020, the Nigerian government has commenced the process of crafting a ten-year economic blueprint to replace ERGP (NDC, 2020, p. xv). Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and its debilitating impact on many economies in the world, the Nigerian government announced that the country has again exited economic recession in the last quarter of 2020 with a positive GDP growth rate of 0.11% (MoneyCentral, 2021). The good news is that other sectors like information technology and agriculture contributed much more than the oil and gas sector to this development. The government, therefore, called on the business community to increase the export of commodities to consolidate this achievement.

Foreign Policy and Economic Development Nigeria was able to use the instrumentality of its foreign policy and shuttle diplomacy to embark on a successful campaign for debt relief which became a reality for the nation and a number of African countries. Indeed, so pleased was Cameroon with the debt relief granted to it by the creditor nations and agencies that a national holiday was declared to celebrate the feat. Nigeria was short of declaring a national holiday, but the Obasanjo government held the view that it was a major achievement for it to have succeeded in getting a relief of US$18 billion (Omotola & Saliu, 2009). This later become known as Nigeria’s debt diplomacy popularized by the

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Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Prior to achieving this feat, Nigeria was not given any chance of reducing or exiting its debt peonage as the nation was considered wealthy by creditor nations and agencies that included the Paris and London Club of Creditors. This was, indeed, a fine diplomatic outing for Nigeria. Further, with the re-establishment of democracy in 1999, the country under President Obasanjo utilized face-to-face diplomacy in disabusing the minds of the international community about Nigeria. This obviously worked and allowed Nigeria to play a leading role in the reform of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as it transitioned from the OAU to the African Union (AU) in 2002. Together with Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Obasanjo was able to raise a partnership that led to the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) on 23 October 2001, a comprehensive economic development framework designed to attract financial assistance from the wealthy countries of the world to fund economic development in Africa. Cognizant of the fact that the domestic environment is linked to the external, the Obasanjo government took measures to address the cankerworm of systemic corruption that had eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian state with implications for the economy and foreign investment. To address this, two important agencies were established by the Obasanjo government as a response to international concern about the level of corruption in the country. These were the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) established in September 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) established in 2003. It suffices to note that since their establishment both have achieved only modest results, while corruption subsists with some semblance of caution on the part of Nigerians. On bilateral economic relations, three very important countries for Nigeria include the United States, India, and China. At the meeting of the US-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC) held on 3 February 2020, the focus was on good governance and anti-corruption, trade and investment, development and food security, and security and counter-terrorism efforts. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Nigeria, with FDI concentrated largely in the petroleum/mining and wholesale trade sectors. At $3.2 billion in 2019, Nigeria is the second largest export destination of the United States in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bureau of African Affairs, 2021). In 2019, bilateral trade in goods totaled $10 billion. US exports to Nigeria include wheat, vehicles, machinery, kerosene, lubricating oil, Jet fuel,

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civilian aircraft, and plastics (Bureau of African Affairs, 2021). Before now, especially before the discovery of shale oil in the United States, Nigeria’s exports to the United States included crude oil; Nigeria was a major supplier of crude oil to the United States. Other items include cocoa, cashew nuts, and animal feed. Nigeria is eligible for preferential trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Nigeria’s relationship with the United States is very important to it, and the nation will do well to further cultivate this relationship by adhering to the basic expectations of the free world. Indeed, the United States continues to support Nigerian institutions and Nigerian people in their efforts to conduct free, fair, transparent, and peaceful elections. India is the largest trading partner of Nigeria, and Nigeria is India’s largest trading partner in Africa. The total bilateral trade between India and Nigeria during the year 2019–20 registered at US$13.82 billion, as against US$13.89 billion recorded during the year 2018–19. Indian exports to Nigeria during the period 2019–20 were US$3.61 billion, as against US$3.0 billion in 2018–19 (High Commission of India, 2020). India’s imports during the period 2020–19 recorded US$10.21 billion as against US$10.88 billion in 2018–19. More importantly, India is the largest importer of Nigeria petroleum products. Out of the total India’s imports of $10.21 billion from Nigeria, crude oil accounted for $10.03 billion. Nigeria has emerged as the fourth largest supplier of crude oil and LNG to India in 2020 (High Commission of India, 2020). FDI inflows from Nigeria to India from June 2019 to April 2020 were US$14.50 million. Over 135 companies are owned or operated by Indians or Persons-­ of-­Indian origin in Nigeria. The investment by Nigeria has been made in construction, textiles, hotel and tourism, and drugs and pharmaceuticals (High Commission of India, 2020). India is a very important trade partner of Nigeria and came on the scene to buy Nigerian crude at a time the country needed new outlets. Indeed, both countries have related very well economically in the spirit of South-South cooperation. And it is to Nigeria’s advantage to further cultivate good relations with India using its foreign policy. Nigerian Government took steps to diversify the Nigerian economy with focus on the agriculture and mining sector. Nigeria recently signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) Agreement on 7 July 2019, during the 12th extraordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union, which was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the constraints on trade relations in the country due to the coronavirus,

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the overall India-Nigeria trade and commercial relations remain buoyant and steady. Nigeria’s bilateral relations with China are where the country has used its diplomacy to sustain economic relations between both countries. The Chinese have been involved in Nigeria since the 1990s in the development of massive infrastructure projects like seaports, railway, roads, and Stadia. Looking back, under President Musa Yar’Adua, massive ‘oil for infrastructure’ agreement of the Olusegun Obasanjo administration with China was replaced with ‘oil for cash’. Obasanjo had used his influence as his own minister of petroleum to secure major oil blocs for Chinese firms (Kabir, 2019, p.  4). The ‘oil for cash’ approach rebounded with the Goodluck Jonathan administration between 2010 and 2015. Nigeria became the second largest Chinese export destination in Africa (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). Chinese exports to Nigeria included industrial, mechanical, and electrical products, while Nigeria exported cocoa beans, rubber, cashew nuts, and hides and skin. President Buhari also embarked on a six-day official visit to China in September 2018. While in China, he attended the seventh The Forum on China-Africa Corporation (FOCAC) summit. Nigeria signed two important agreements with China. An MOU for the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative (OBOR) and a US$328  m financing agreement for the National Information and Communication Technology Infrastructure Backbone. Nigeria also had the support of President XI Jinping for the construction of the Mambilla Project, Nigeria’s largest hydroelectric plant. The Nigerian delegation signed a total of 13 agreements at this meeting valued at more than US$10 billion. We note that the government of President Muhammad Buhari has shown some consistency, not very common in Nigeria in developing the Agricultural sector through improved policy and investments. To the extent that Nigeria within a space of five years is self-sufficient in rice production and has drastically reduced its net import of the food item is impressive. While some collaboration with China had been undertaken in the past in his sector, there is a need to re-focus attention in exploring opportunities in the sector for both countries. The contribution of agriculture to the recent growth in GDP is noteworthy against the desire of the country to diversify its revenue profile. Indeed, the oil sector contributed only 5.87% to total real GDP in Fourth Quarter of 2020, while the non-oil sector that includes agriculture contributed 91.84% to real GDP, higher than 91.22% recorded in 2019 (The Cable, 2021).

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There appear to also be a positive outlook for the manufacturing sector in Nigeria. The Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index stood at 60.8 index points in December 2019, which was the highest level since November 2018 (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 103). This positive outlook can be seen from the Leventis Group which made substantial investments in Nigeria through its subsidiaries—the Nigerian Bottling Company and Beta Glass. The Nigerian Bottling Company commissioned its Asejire Plant in 1983, which took a substantial part of the $500 million investment in Nigeria, while Beta Glass which makes bottles for the pharmaceutical sector and for beverages like Coca-Cola and Star Beer invested another $30 million to expand its furnace capacity (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 103). Still another interesting dimension to Nigeria’s economic development is the role of the Diaspora and of the Foreign Ministry. For Nigeria, the Diaspora is a strategic asset, just as it is in India. In 2018, remittances to Nigeria by Nigerians abroad equaled $25 billion, a sum amounting to 6.1% of the GDP and 8.3% of the federal budget (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 108). This was 11 times the flow of FDI recorded in the same period as well as 7.4 times the quantum of foreign aid in 2017. This figure is projected to rise to $34 billion by 2023 (Osinbajo, 2020, p. 108). Remittances clearly represent a critical social investment and present the Foreign Ministry with the task of protecting Nigerians abroad because they are big stakeholders and investors in the country. For the Foreign Ministry, therefore, there is also the added task of resisting any impediments to the flow of remittances in the international financial system.

Challenges to Nigeria’s Economic Development: A Discourse Management of Democracy and Insecurity A major constraint to economic development in Nigeria is the country’s inability to manage its hard-won democracy, resulting in insecurities of various shades and dimensions. Nigeria successfully transited to representative democracy in 1999 and has since then had five General Elections, the last being in 2019 that brought Muhammad Buhari and the All-­ Progressives Congress (APC) to power. However, the country has not known much peace since then, troubled by terrorism, kidnappings, cattle

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rustling, banditry, and separatism. The government was partly voted into power on the basis that it will be able to address insecurity, address corruption, and improve the economy. Many years down the line, insecurity actually worsened and the institutions of democracy that include the National Assembly and Judiciary appear comatose and unable to intervene positively. This in a way led to the mass protests (END SARS Protests) against the government by the youth, as a result of police brutality on the citizenry across the country in October 2020. Nigeria’s democracy and indeed, polity could be said to have been undermined by ethnic and selfish considerations by politicians and their civilian collaborators in the face of state incapacity to live up to its promises. The security of lives and property of citizens of any nation is the primary responsibility of the government. It is the unsigned social contract between the government and the governed. Once a leader takes that oath of office, it becomes his primary duty to secure lives and property in that geographical enclave. In the same manner, no country can attract foreign direct capital investment if there is insecurity of life and property. Thus, terrorism and insecurity have been major challenges to the Nigerian state. The emergence of the terrorist sect Boko Haram in the northern part of the country has led to mindless bombings and killings of innocent citizens. Recently, another terrorist group referred to as Killer herdsmen has joined from the northern part of Nigeria in killing, maiming, raping, and kidnapping Nigerians across the country, even foreigners are not exempted. It is believed but yet to be proven that many members of this group were individuals hired from across West Africa and armed for purposes of the 2015 general elections but subsequently abandoned by politicians or refused to leave due to mitigating circumstances. Victims often attest that the marauders do not speak English and their accents are not Nigerian. This situation has no doubt affected economic activities in the country and by implication economic development. Corruption Amongst the many challenges and hindrances to economic development in Nigeria, corruption stands intractable. Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office for private benefits. In Nigeria, corruption is one of the many unresolved problems that have critically undermined and skewed development (Madichie, 2005). It remains a long-term major political and economic challenge for Nigeria (Maduagwe, 1996). It is a cankerworm

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that has eaten deep into the fabric of the nation. And ranges from petty corruption to political/bureaucratic corruption or Systemic corruption (Abimbola, 2007). In Nigeria, different forms of corruption have existed since the first republic through the military regimes up to the 2020s. The most horrifying is when monies that should accrue to the nation’s purse are diverted to that of an individual. This is actually the form that impedes the provision of infrastructure and basic amenities for the teeming masses across the nation. It suffices to state that with the quantum and variety of corruption in Nigeria, it has become increasingly difficult to attract FDIs or retain those already invested in the country. This in itself makes the work of the Foreign Ministry most difficult but, at the same time, imperative. Leadership Leadership can be defined as a social influence process in which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of subordinates in an effort to accomplish organizational targets or goals (Graig, 2005). Robert (2004) posits that leadership involves a complex interaction among the leader, the followers, and the situation. Exemplary leadership is visionary, imaginative, innovative, and transformational in outlook and by nature. It is motivational and inspires the populace into following his lead. A dependable and reliable leader assumes and accepts responsibility for everything that happens under his watch. Leadership makes the difference between success and failure in a country. It involves giving direction to citizens who are the critical assets of the nation. Amongst the negatives associated with leadership in Nigeria include disrespect for rule of law, absence of development-­ oriented leadership, absence of accountability and transparency, corruption, electoral malpractice, lack of political will, inexperience before ascending leadership position, ethnicity and nepotism, and undue pressure on public servants to do their bidding. Indeed, Nigeria has been most unlucky with the quality of leadership it has produced, especially from the 1980s. Infrastructure Deficit Infrastructure deficit is one of the challenges affecting economic development in Nigeria. As well known, economic infrastructure generates services that are vital for development. Lack of adequate and functional infrastructure has made Nigeria cost-ineffective as a destination country

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for investment. Often domestic companies are compelled to expend more resources in the provision of basic infrastructure that facilitates business. This renders domestic products uncompetitive. The state of electricity, roads, rail, fuel, and water are all costs that affect the performance of companies in Nigeria and impede efforts by relevant government agencies and ministries to attract FDIs.

Conclusion Foreign Policy plays a catalytic role in the promotion of national development in a manner that important aspects of the domestic environment is projected, defended, and promoted as the main constituents of the country’s national interest. To this extent, Nigeria’s efforts at economic development must therefore be one of the top priorities of the foreign policy as articulated and managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this chapter, we have examined the issues involved from the conceptualization of economic development to determining Nigeria’s economic development objectives and interrogating with examples the role of foreign policy in economic development. This is, however, not without also examining the major challenges to economic development in Nigeria. What is left is to attempt some recommendations on how foreign policy can be used to promote economic development in the country. The Buhari Government from 2015 identified three key priorities: the Nigerian economy, security, and anti-corruption. The task before Nigeria’s diplomacy is to deploy foreign policy strategies and components. The New Economic Diplomacy Initiative (NEDI) which arose from this thinking requires funding and institutional support by the Foreign Ministry to energize facilitation of market access, FDIs, cross-border trade, and the mobilization of skilled Nigerians in Diaspora for national development. The quest for FDIs as a major plank of Nigeria’s foreign policy is important. Attracting FDIs is a competitive issue, and FDIs in the right sectors promote domestic production and value chain. This should be one of the main goals of the missions abroad. Economic development, not just growth, necessarily implies that the basic infrastructure necessary for industrialization is available. With the failure of the country’s road network, railways, and the iron and steel master-plan, it does appear that attracting FDIs at the level we want may depend on other factors. There is a need, for example, for the country to address the unsettled political issues and insecurities bedeviling it in an enduring manner, as well as the infrastructure deficit before it can hope to attract significant FDIs in the required sectors.

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be involved in the organization and sponsorship of trade fairs at home and abroad to promote exports and increase demand for them. Aid to foreign countries should contain a significant percent of made-in-Nigeria goods to promote and expose Nigerian exports. Nigerian Missions abroad should market Nigeria and promote old and new markets for Nigerian products. This requires being abreast with accurate and timely information on Government’s domestic economic policies that include export promotion initiatives and policies. The institutional machinery for foreign policy making, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, needs to be re-positioned and re-tooled to embrace the use of modern technology and ICT in the performance of the task of contributing to the country’s economic development. The Foreign Minister should ideally be an individual with the requisite personality and training to propel the protection and projection of the country’s national interest. Overall, the imperative to fine-tune foreign policy toward the goal of economic development cannot be overemphasized.

References Abimbola, A. (2007, June 19). Nigeria: Cesspits of corruption. This Day Newspaper (Lagos). Agbu, A. O. (2020, 11 March). The complex phenomenon of terrorism and Nigerian foreign policy. Paper delivered at the 1st memorial lecture in honour of professor Ogaba Oche, at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. Akinbi, O. J. (2015). Examining the Boko haram insurgency in Nigeria and the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis. Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(8), 32–45. Blair, T (2020, August 31). The Nation Newspaper. Bureau of African Affairs. (2021, April 29). US relations with Nigeria. https:// www.state.gov/u-­s-­relations-­with-­nigeria/. Egbula, M., & Zheng, Q. (2011). China and Nigeria: A powerful Alliance, west African challenges (WAC). Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC/OECD). Enikanolaiye, & Dipeolu, A. (2020). Economic diversification and Nigeria’s foreign policy, strategic lenses, series 4. NDC. Graig, E. J. (2005). Meeting the ethical challenges of leadership. Sage Publications. High Commission of India. (2020). Brief on India-Nigeria bilateral economic and commercial relations. https://www.hciabuja.gov.in/India-­Nigeria-­Bilateral-­ Trade-­and-­Economic-­Relations.php. Kabir, M.  S. (2019). Sino-Nigeria Trade and Economic Relations and Nigeria’s Quest for Economic Advancement: An Assessment, [M.Sc. Project, Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Baze University Abuja – Nigeria].

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Madichie, N. O. (2005). Corruption in Nigeria: How effective is the corruption perception index in highlighting the economic malaise? World Review of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development, 2(3/4), 320–335. Maduagwe, M. O. (1996). Nigeria in search of political culture, the political class, corruption and democratization. In A. Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption and democratization Nigeria (Vol. 13, pp. 18–19). Friedrich Ebert Foundation. MoneyCentral. (2021). Nigeria returns to positive growth in Q4 as GDP rises 0.11%. https://www.central.org.ng. National Population Commission (NPC). (2020, July 23). https://www. Worldometers-­Info/world-­population/Nigeria-­population. Nigerian Defence College. (2020). Strategic lenses, series 4. NDC. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. (2012, July 23). Oil production. https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-­Business/upstream-­ventures/Pages/ oil-­production.aspx, Oche, O. (2020). The Boko Haram Insurgency, Violent Extremism and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. In B. Bukarambe et al. (Eds.), Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari 2015–2019. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Omotola, J. S., & Saliu, H. A. (2009, April). Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa’s development: Problems and prospects. South African Journal of International Affairs, 16(1), 87–102. Osinbajo, Y. (2020). Economic dimension of National Security: The Nigerian experience, strategic lenses, series 4. NDC. Proshare. (2021). Full Report: 2021 in the Rearview, 2022 in the Headlamp; Opportunities and Threats in Nigeria’s Pre-Election Year. Retrieved on 21 December, 2021 from https://proshare.co/articles/full-report-2021-intherearview-2022-in-the-headlamp-opportunities-and-threats-in-nigerias-preelection-year?menu=Reports&classification=Read&category=Proshare%20 Confidential. Robert, J. (2004). Culture, leadership and organization: The globe study of 62 societies. Sage Publications. Rodney, W. (1973). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London: BogleL’Ouverture Publications. Silver Caleb. (2020, July 23). The top 25 economies in the world. https://www. Investopia.com/Insights/worlds-­top–economies. The Cable. (2021). Nigeria exits recession with 0.11% growth. Economic Development Discussion Paper, 1983, Volume II. The World Bank. (2020, July 23). GDP Per Capita 2020. https://www.data. worldbank.org/Indicator/NY.GDP,PCAP,PP.KD?locations-­NG. UNCTAD. (2019). World investment report. United Nations.

PART III

Afrocentricity and the Regional Dimensions of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

CHAPTER 4

A Critical Review of Nigeria’s Afrocentric Policy: Rationale, Gains and Consequences Emmanuel I. Ukhami and Solomon Babatunde Kumapayi

Introduction Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy was adopted in Nigeria’s foreign policy lexicon, as soon as the country got its independence on October 1, 1960. One can rightly say that Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy is as old as the country itself. The foreign policy objectives and principles of Nigeria were articulated and elaborated to capture Africa, as the centre-piece of its foreign policy. The adoption of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy was initiated by Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa at the admission of Nigeria to the United Nations on October 7, 1960. In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, he said, “Nigeria hopes to work with other African states for the progress of Africa and to

E. I. Ukhami (*) University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria S. B. Kumapayi Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_4

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assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence” (Balewa, 1960). To further reassure the world on Nigeria’s proposed intention to lead and shoulder the burden of Africa, Jaja Anucha Wachukwu, the External Affairs Minister, at the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, on October 10, 1961, said that: Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country… We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa. The moment Africa is affected, we are involved. We want to make this absolutely clear. (Wachukwu, 1961)

Nigeria has not only made Afrocentric posture a policy statement but has practically been involved in the affairs that pertain to Africa. This was shown in Nigeria’s first outing at the multilateral level, when Nigeria immediately contributed its troops for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Congo, under the auspice of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), from 1960 to 1964. From that period, Nigeria has been strategically involved in the liberation of other African nations under the grip of colonialism, racism and apartheid regimes until the end of the struggle in 1994. The country has also not relented in the peacekeeping missions in Africa at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Some of the countries that have enjoyed Nigeria’s benevolent gestures include Congo, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Cote d’Ivoire, among others. According to Amao and Okeke-Uzodike (2015), the decision by Nigeria to make Africa the core of its foreign policy focus is attributable to a number of factors which include geo-political consideration that sees Nigeria strategically located within the West African Subregion, demographic explanations that credit the country as the most populous black nation in the world (with a present estimate of over 200 million people) and economically viable nation among other African nations. According to Yorom (2010), among other contentions on Nigeria-Afrocentric policy, the decision also stems from the need to protect Nigeria’s security, given its cultural, geographical and historical experiences with other African states and also because of transnational security concerns defined by the way Nigeria’s security is affected by what happens around its contiguous states.

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The “manifest destiny” bequeathed on Nigeria puts the country in a vantage position to lead Africa and ensure stability in the continent. According to Ibori (2019), the description of Nigeria as “the giant of Africa” is both symbolic and salutary. The symbolic nature has to do with its strategic location in the African continent, while the salutary aspect is how its natural endowments have enhanced its leadership roles in Africa since independence in 1960. Nigeria was and is still the most populous country in Africa and one of the fastest growing countries globally in terms of population. The involvement of Nigeria in the promotion of peace and security and the championing of Africa’s socio-economic and political development are further justified by Ebohon and Obakhedo, who observed that: Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her dominant position in the region as a matter of prestige; analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do so, other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) and South Africa would take on such responsibility. (Ebohon & Obakhedo, 2012: 163)

Since 1960 till date, subsequent governments in Nigeria, irrespective of their foreign policy caption, have never shied away from shouldering the burdens of other African countries. Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy, for the past 60 years, has been consistently and passionately pursued to suit either personal, national or collective interest of other African states. The point is that the willingness of a particular leader to give attention to African affairs can go a long way to determining the extent of the country’s Afrocentric posture. While in some cases, it might be for the interest of the nation or the collective will of other African countries through the various African organizations Nigeria belong to. Generally, this principle is succinctly captured in section 19 of the 1979 and section 20 of the 1989 Nigeria constitution. The present 1999 constitution (as amended) also captured Nigeria-Afrocentric policy in section 19. The desire to be involved in African affairs is simply the epicentre of Nigeria’s national interest, but the big questions remain: what have been the benefits of Nigeria-Afrocentric policy for the past 60 years? How has Afrocentrism impacted Nigerians and the country’s national interest? Nigeria has had to interface with some African nations as a result of molestation, maiming and killing of its citizens in those countries. For instance,

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South Africans had on several occasions carried out xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa, yet, this is a country that Nigeria was concerned about and contributed to its independence in 1994. The chapter, therefore, examines Nigeria-Afrocentric policy, with an objective of evaluating the rationale, gains and consequences of its actions. The chapter is divided into five subtitles which include introduction; conceptual and theoretical framing; Nigeria’s involvement in Africa’s affairs; rationale, gains and consequences; conclusion and the way forward.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framing on National Interest, Foreign Policy, Afrocentrism and the Politics of Hegemony What Is National Interest? National interest is the premise on which a country carries out its domestic and external policies. It forms the basis for any action and inaction of governments’ policies, all over the world. Though, national interest is cumbersome to define, as it expresses a different operational framework of states in the conduct of their affairs (whether domestic or external). More worrisome is the inability of some states to define what forms their national interest, which is why Agaba and Ukhami (2019) point out that a nation with no adequately defined national interest is a nation with no viable agenda for both domestic and foreign policies. According to Asobie (2007), the question of what constitutes the “interest” of a nation and the problem of how to identify it have commanded the attention and tasked the energies of policy makers and theorists for several decades and, in some cases, centuries. The concept is not amenable to precise definition, yet, it can neither be ignored nor easily jettisoned as a basis for political analysis and action. National interest, therefore, can be said to be the broad goals that all states share—political independence, economic growth, cultural preservation and peace—and the distinct goals each state pursues on specific goals (Nester, 2001). National interests are evoked to justify virtually every action of state, from generosity to genocide. The most obvious national interest is self-preservation, and the greatest threat to that basic interest is an enemy of invasion. Thus, the use of national interest as a cornerstone of foreign policy is a key element of the road more travelled by in world

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politics. Realists contend that it is a wise basis for foreign policy (Rouke & Boyer, 2004). The concept of national interest has continued to play a significant role in the foreign policies of sovereign states. Since a state’s foreign policy is not operated in vacuum, there are always goals which a state wishes to accomplish in its interaction with other states (Ebegbulem, 2019). Nation-states all over the world design and implement foreign policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and defend their vital national interests in areas such as defence of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by its national interest, which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in the international relations (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). In Nigeria, what constitutes national interest has been constantly debated. This is so because, at some point, national interest varies due to idiosyncrasies or personality of a leader at the helm of affairs. This makes it difficult to suggest that Nigeria has a defined, codified and institutionalized national interest framework. National interest in Nigeria, at some point, is more personified than institutionalized. President Obasanjo, for instance, carried out foreign policy through his shuttle diplomacy, making it look like he was both the president of Nigeria and the foreign affairs Minister at the same time. The ceding of Bakassi Peninsular to Cameroon after the signing of the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) in New  York, against public opinion and the National Assembly approval, is a pointer that Obasanjo unilaterally took that decision, probably to curry the favour of the international community. Sani Abacha, for instance, was a symbol that contradicted national interest with the violation of human rights of the citizens, which eventually led to the isolation of Nigeria from some countries in the international community. The return of President Buhari in 2015 was a watershed that initially put corrupt individuals in the country on their toes because of his “incorruptible” personality. Buhari also got the support of most powerful nations of the world in his fight against corruption, revamping the economy and tackling insecurity just because of his personality, even though personality of leaders can help in achieving national interest. At the domestic level, the fight against corruption seems not to be yielding any positive result, as corrupt practices have so much been established within the circle of his

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government, and Buhari has not seem to take a firm stand to purge some of his appointees of corrupt practices. Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy has been relatively dynamic, depending on the circumstances that emanate, but has constantly retained the Afrocentric policy that has not significantly favoured the country, which is why it is also difficult to suggest that Nigeria has an “internal oriented national interest”. National interest, at times, is what the leaders say it is; even though it is contrary to public opinion, leaders have the instrumentality of state power to achieve personal interest in form of “national interest”. The point is that there is no strong institution that ensures that actions and inactions of government are in line with national interest. National interest ought to be a collective will of the people enshrined in the policy document of states and implemented by state actors. Conceptualizing Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Foreign policy is a very important concept in the study and practice of international politics. As it is true that no nation of the world can live in isolation, there is a need for nation-states to relate with one another in the international system. Thus, these relations could be bilateral or multilateral. The relationship could be positive or negative; it depends on the country’s national interest. Foreign policy cannot be achieved in isolation of national interest (Agaba & Ukhami, 2019). It is a tool to achieving national interest across national boundaries. Ota and Ecoma (2015) defined foreign policy as a strategy that is properly articulated and designed in a coordinated manner by institutionally designated decision-makers in a bid to manipulate the international environment to achieve identified national objectives. This conception presents foreign policy as an instrument of power via which states can react to events in the international environment by their actions or inactions for the purpose of advancing national goals. However, foreign policy is guided and influenced by domestic and external factors. The domestic factors include personality of the leader, economic strength of a nation, military capability, diplomatic sense, public opinion and population, among others. The external factors include international law, treaty obligations, responsibilities in the international organization, the influence of international terrorism and multinational corporation (MNCs). Surprisingly and unfortunately though, the outbreak of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in 2019 is a global pandemic

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which changed the dynamics of global politics. The outbreak of the virus started in China and spread to other countries of the world, which made it difficult for states (at that point) to physically carry out their foreign policy as a result of social distancing within and across national boundaries. Nation-states simply had to close their borders to avoid the increase in the spread of the virus. This is a pointer that unexpected events and circumstances, whether good or bad, can determine the direction of a country’s foreign policy. On the foreign policy goals of Nigeria, Mbachu (2008) stated that it was not until 1976 that Nigeria had what could be seen as stated goals. This was “the review of Nigeria’s foreign policy” under Adedeji Adebayo which was accepted in May 1976. The six proposals of Nigeria’s foreign policy as reviewed in 1976 included: (a) the defence of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; (b) creation of the necessary political conditions in Africa and the rest of the world as would facilitate the promotion and defence of territorial sovereignty and independence; (c) the creation of necessary economic, and socio-political conditions in Africa and the world, so as to facilitate the promotion of self-­ reliance of Nigeria and rapid development; (d) the achievement of collective self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the world; (e) the promotion and defence of social justice and respect for human dignity and (f) the promotion and defence of world peace. The above proposal was articulated by the Obasanjo administration when it confined itself to the following primary objectives: (a) to maintain the stability and unity of Nigeria’s territorial sovereignty and independence; (b) to promote socio-economic development through modern technology and (c) to promote world peace and security. The 1979 federal constitution section 19 provided inter lia:

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(a) the promotion of African unity; (b) the promotion of the total political, socio-economic and cultural interaction—liberation of Africa; (c) the promotion of all forms of international cooperation conducive for a consolidation for a universal peace, friendship and respect among all states and people and (d) to combat racism and quicken the process of decolonisation and racism in all its ramifications. The above-mentioned goals did not capture how Nigeria will ensure that its national interest is put over and above other interests. Neither did it point out how the country’s development, prosperity and security can be achieved. This is why Nigeria has not been able to liberate itself from the siege of neo-colonialism and dependency. Nigeria’s “charity has always begun abroad” and not at home since its political independence. The 1989 constitution of section 20 and section 19 of the 1999 constitution spelt out the same foreign policy goals of the nation; thus, the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria section 19 outlines the country’s foreign policy objectives as follows: (a) promotion and protection of the national interest; (b) promotion of African integration and support for African unity; (c) promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) respect for international law and treaty obligation as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication and (e) promotion of a just world economic order. Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives have been adjusted to align changed environment, particularly against the backdrop of globalization as well as prevailing circumstances with the global scene. The present 1999 constitution only captured one significant domestic national objective in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. This domestic objective is the “promotion and protection of the national interest”. The big question is, what is Nigeria’s national interest? The vigour to pursue Afrocentric foreign policy of the country has never been in doubt as Africa has always been the

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centre of Nigeria’s foreign policy, since independence, but that vigour to achieve domestic national interest cannot be said to be viable. Afrocentrism and the Politics of Hegemony The concept of Afrocentrism became a buzzword before the independence of most African states, including Nigeria. It symbolizes the “spirit of Africanism” (African togetherness) and the struggle to liberate Africa. Afrocentrism according to Conyers (2004) is a discourse originally developed in African American studies in the early 1930s with the primary aim to “create a substantive knowledge about the African world experience”. Afrocentrism was first traced to the African–American historian W.E.B. Du Bois, who employed it in some of his key works to project black experience and practices. Notable amongst these are The Study of the Negro Problem (1898), The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Black Reconstruction in America (1935), The World and Africa (1946), and Africa in Battle Against Colonialism, Racism, Imperialism (1960). Afrocentrism, according to Stikkers (2008), is intended as an answer to the intellectual colonialism that undergirds and serves to validate political and economic colonialization. In regard to theory, it places African people at the centre of any analysis of African phenomena in terms of action and behaviour. It is described as a devolution to the idea that what is in the best interest of African consciousness is at the heart of ethical behaviour and seeks to cherish the idea that “Africanness” itself is an ensemble of ethics. For Chukwuokolo (2009), Afrocentricity is simply “African centeredness” that gives Africans their intellectual pride as the originators of civilization. In the spirit of Afrocentrism, linked to the Pan-Africanism struggles initiated from the time of Sylvester Williams, W.E.B.  Du Bois, Nigeria from 1960 has been in the struggle to liberate other African colonies from the tight grip of colonialism, racism and apartheid oppression. Nigeria was at the forefront in the liberation struggle of Angola, Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia), Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. Even after the independence of these African countries, Nigeria has continued to project the spirit of Afrocentrism in its foreign policy pursuit in the area of regional integration and stability, peacekeeping and economic prosperity of the continent. These have presented Nigeria as a regional hegemon in Africa. One of the very first attempts to define regional hegemony was made by Østerud, who referred to the notion of a “regional great power” being

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a state which is geographically part of a delineated region; able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; highly influential in regional affairs; and, contrary to a middle power, might also be a great power on the world scale in addition to its regional standing (Østerud, 1992; Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Regional hegemons can be identified by the assumption of a stabilizing and leading role and the acceptance of this role by neighbouring states (Nolte, 2010). Regional hegemons can also be considered as role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that are generally accepted by neighbouring states (Schirm, 2005). The early founding fathers of Nigeria—Tafawa Balewa, Ahmadu Bello, Nnamdi Azikwe, Obafemi Awolowo, among others, like Ayo Rosiji, Jaja Wachuku, and Chief Fani-Kayode—had expressed the opinion that Nigeria was pre-destined to play an important and leading role in African affairs. For instance, Honourable Jaja Wachuku, while contributing to a January 1960 Parliamentary motion requesting Britain to grant independence to Nigeria, argued that the country’s independence was essential because: “The whole black continent is looking up to this country (Nigeria) to liberate it from thralldom; the whole Negroid race is looking up to Nigeria to be free from slavery” (Wachukwu, 1960). This has explained why Nigeria over the decades has carried out unreserved Afrocentric policy and has claimed to be the “hegemon” of Africa. The politics of hegemony in Africa is based on the premise that Nigeria, by “manifest destiny”, has the population, economic well withal, military capability and natural resources, among other endowments that put the country in a vantage position to lead Africa. The question is who is a hegemon? And what constitutes a regional hegemon? According to Schirm (2005) in Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2016), regional hegemons can be considered as role models and leaders within a particular region by carrying out leading activities that are generally accepted by neighbouring states. Flemes distinguishes regional hegemons by using four vital gauges: “claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership” (Flemes, 2007, p.  11). Accepting the role of regional leadership means that the state in question has taken upon itself the responsibility of entrenching peace and stability and crafting policies for economic initiatives. The constructivist paradigm for global or (in this case) regional power entails that fellow nations in the international system accept one of their own as a fitting leading power (Flemes, 2007; Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

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From a more theoretical perspective, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) propounded by Charles P. Kindleberger argues that states can only cooperate economically with one another when a hegemonic power holds the ring, economically or militarily (Kindleberger, 1973). According to the theory of hegemonic stability, the role played by a hegemonic power is very important in creating stability in international politics and economy. Without strong hegemonic power, the creation of international stability is impossible. In his book published in 1973 entitled The World in Depression, Kindleberger, as an economic historian, explained the outcome of the great depression at the beginning of the twentieth century with the weakness of Great Britain to stabilize the international system and the unwillingness of the United States (US) to do so, although it was strong enough. Eventually, Kindleberger comes to the conclusion that for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer (Kindleberger, 1973). Some more general statements on the central propositions of the HST were made by Robert Keohane who argues that order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power and that this order is constituted by the formation of regimes and the provision of public goods. Another assumption is that the maintenance of this order requires a continued hegemony which implies cooperation between the participating states within the system (Keohane, 1984). The point to note is that Nigeria has in a way projected itself, based on its political leadership, economic and military contributions, to lead the African continent. But judging by other attributes such as regional acceptance of Nigeria as a hegemon and employment of foreign policy instruments, can Nigeria really claim to be a hegemonic power? According to Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2016), Nigeria is bigger than Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (UK) combined, but it has had to grapple with several conflicts within its borders. Factors such as contestations over the control of crude-oil resources, an unwieldy population size and diverse ethnic identities have combined to produce polarizing effects that have been the bane of its prospects for continental hegemony. While these kinds of challenges may not have stopped countries such as the US, Russia, India, China and many other states from exercising regional or global influence, their poor management in Nigeria—due particularly to endemic corruption and poor leadership—appears to stifle Nigeria’s hegemonic prospects. By implication, although Nigeria’s regional hegemonic capability may suffer from apparent ambiguities, it may be inappropriate (in the absence of compelling logic) to tag it as a secondary power relative to its

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South African counterpart. Subsequent subheadings will point out if Nigeria is really a hegemon or only claim to be.

Nigeria’s Involvement in Africa’s Affairs The origin of Nigeria’s involvement in Africa’s affairs could be traced to early period when Nigeria had its independence in 1960. Nigeria’s Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa in his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on October 7, 1960, said: So far, I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think we are not interested in the problems of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organisation, but being human, we are naturally concerned with what affects our immediate neighbourhood. (Balewa, 1960)

The determination of Nigeria’s Afrocentric relations was experimented in 1960, when the newly independent country sent its troops to Congo under the auspice of the UN for peacekeeping mission. As part of the Afrocentric foreign policy principle that guides the Balewa administration, Nigeria became actively involved in African affairs. According to Saliu (1999), a major incident that put Nigeria’s Afrocentric posture to a test was when France detonated atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert of Algeria in 1961. This tested the political will of Nigeria to implement its pan-­ African foreign policy. Balewa’s government therefore severed diplomatic relations with France that year. His government also championed the expulsion of racist South Africa with the Commonwealth in 1961. Nigeria successfully convened a conference on Nigeria’s African policy in 1961. Nigeria has had to interfere in the political matter of Africa, not to subjugate, but to ensure political stability and sovereignty of other African countries. On gaining independence, Nigeria did not hide its stance in protecting the political sovereignty of its fellow African countries. According to Lord-Mallam (2016), shortly after its independence, Nigeria vigorously supported liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, and in Rhodesia, South Africa and West Africa. Fawole (2003) pointed out that it was perhaps a combination of all these efforts to liberate African states from colonialism and apartheid rule in Africa that led to Nigeria being regarded as the most

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prominent African state and the foremost defender of the interests of Africans at the close of the 1970s. In order to have formidable ground to champion the cause of “political” freedom in Africa, Nigeria was a key actor in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 that was later transformed to the African Union (AU) in 2002, redefining the organization’s objectives to suit current realities—seeing that all African countries have gained “political independence”. At sub-regional level, Nigeria also spearheaded the establishment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on May 28, 1975. Nigeria was at the forefront of championing the cause of other Africans’ liberation through advocacies and agitations. Nigeria did not mind to incur the wrath of many European nations and America for daring to be so audacious in their quest for Africans emancipation. For instance, after France tested its nuclear weapons in the Sahara Desert of Algeria on December 27, 1960, Nigeria did not hesitate to sever its relationship with France. The country’s support of Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) against the interest of America in Angola under Murtala Mohammed was another daring act to protect the interest of Angola rather than the wishes of the US. Liberating Africa was seen as confrontational to the exploitative tendencies of the European powers. The “Africa has come of age” by the then Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, was a milestone; hence, he was martyred on the altar of Afrocentrism. More so, his predecessor, General Obasanjo, while addressing the Khartoum summit of the OAU in July 1978, said: In the context of foreign intervention in Africa, there are three parties involved. These are the Soviets and other socialist countries, the Western powers and we Africans… To the Soviets and their friends, I should like to say that having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the struggle and consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome. Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another. (Obasanjo, 1978)

Nigeria often had to forfeit the goodwill of the Western world in choosing to antagonize their interests by supporting the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and a host of other African states (Osuntokun, 2005). Nigeria marched its words with actions in ensuring that some of these countries in Africa gained their political independence.

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Some of these African countries, after independence, became ridden with intractable conflicts (including Nigeria), yet, Nigeria did not look away. Rather, it was unequivocally involved in peacekeeping missions in the affected areas. According to Njoh, African conflicts occur in many circumstances which make them most times intractable. One major cause of conflict is the deep ethnic basis of most African societies. Colonialism and its aftermath have not transformed the continent to the extent that one would see a little attachment to ethnic roots (Njoh, 2007). The inability and failure of governments in Africa to provide basic needs of life to the citizens (such as shelter, good infrastructure and affordable food), ensuring security and equitable distribution of public resources, has led to high level of poverty, unemployment and suffering. This is responsible for the explosion of conflicts in the region (Ukhami & Doumbia 2021). The struggle for resource control and power, sit-tight syndrome of African leaders and corruption of political leaders that has led to poor living condition of the people, all metamorphosed into intractable conflicts in Africa. Countries like Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, Sudan and Mali, among others, have had, and some still having, their share of violent intractable conflicts. According to Ola (2019), Nigeria has excelled in promoting the peaceful settlement of dispute regionally and continentally. As early as 1960, when it attained independence, Nigeria sent peacekeeping forces to Congo. Nigeria was instrumental in containing conflict through peaceful mediation and conciliation measures in Angola, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Nigeria participated in the activities of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. President Obasanjo was engaged in the mediation of the peace process in Darfur in his capacity as chairperson of the AU and as president of Nigeria. Nigeria hosted various peace talks between warring factions. Nigeria embarked on peacekeeping Liberia and intervention in Sierra Leone. The Babangida regime was particularly noted for its “zero tolerance” for conflict in West Africa. The establishment of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is an evidence in Nigeria’s commanding role in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008; Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). On Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberian crisis, Babangida pointed out that: The whole ideology rests on the fact that if we allowed a force from outside to come in and cause instability in Liberia, chances are that such instability

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would spread into other neighbouring countries in the West African Region. (Babangida, 1990)

This also suggests the involvement of Nigeria in the Mali crisis as pointed out by then President Goodluck Jonathan. He said: If we do not contain the problem of Mali, definitely, it will affect other African countries and that is why Nigeria had to move fast. (Jonathan, 2013)

The emergence of General Sani Abacha in 1993 as Nigerian leader marked a very low point in Nigeria’s foreign policy relations, especially with the world powers like Britain, the US, France, Germany, Canada and South Africa due to Abacha’s abuse of fundamental human rights and his inability to restore democracy after the annulment of June 12, 1993, presidential election by the Babangida administration. Yet, Nigeria was still able to assert its leadership status in Africa when it sent troops to dislodge military junta that forcefully took over power in Sierra Leone and restored democratically elected government of President Tijani Kabbah (Ibori, 2019). According to Akinterinwa (2005), Nigeria’s record in peacekeeping operations worldwide, and particularly Africa, is impressive and second to none in Africa. The record is a reflection of unwavering commitment to peace as instrument of national and African development. Fawole (2003) notes that the resources in human and material terms, which Nigeria has committed in African states since independence, are incalculable. Nigeria spent more than $60 million in cash and tangible gifts while playing support to MPLA movement. It lost many of its citizens in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in addition to huge expenditure. The goal of developing Africa is a great concern to Nigeria. It has involved itself in joint economic ventures with some African countries and granted numerous financial assistance and loans to others (Saliu, 2016). For instance, Gowon in 1971 demonstrated the readiness of Nigeria to lead in Africa’s decolonization by volunteering logistics support in form of trucks, military hardware, medical supplies, food and clothing to Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Saleh, 2006). The support that the neighbouring countries lent to a unified Nigeria promoted by Gowon also attracted reciprocal gestures after the civil war towards them in form of various types of assistance and joint projects; various highways linking Idi-­ Iroko in Nigeria to Port-Novo in the Republic of Benin, interests-free loans, joint cement project and joint sugar project; various forms of

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donations in cash and materials that were provided to Republic of Benin (Saleh, 2006). The establishment of the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS) by the Babangida regime in 1986 was to ensure that African countries do not just enjoy financial benefits from Nigeria, but also enjoy benefit from the pool of knowledge of Nigerian professionals like doctors, lawyers, surveyors, pharmacists, architects, among others. According to Ogunsanwo (2012), this made Nigerian professionals to litter the African countries providing services in the areas of military, police, medical, teaching, soccer and others much to the benefit of the host nations. At the organizational level, Shagaya (2003) put it that the Babangida regime gave ECOWAS institutional relevance by not only donating land for the building of the secretariat but contributing $4.5 million towards its construction. Nigeria under the President Obasanjo administration also utilized economic diplomacy to deepen its commitments to regional cooperation and integration through a plan to undertake a gas pipeline project linking the Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, on the one hand, and a West African pipeline project linking Benin, Ghana, Niger and Togo, on the other (Ota & Ecoma, 2016). The administration also showed commitment towards the success of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (Nwanolue & Iwuoha, 2012). Worthy of mention is the trust fund created by Nigeria at the African Development Bank (AfDB) where it placed over #100 million as a soft lending window to least developing African countries (Ola, 2019). No doubt, the Afrocentric efforts of Nigeria towards other African countries are so numerous to mention, as virtually all the administrations in Nigeria have impacted immensely and positively on other African countries.

Rationale, Gains and Consequences The rationale behind Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy is the ability for Nigeria to discover itself early in the 1960s, immediately after independence. Nigeria from inception is blessed with both human and material resources. As the most populous black nation, with numerous natural resources, it was easy for Nigeria to assert itself in a position of hegemon and influence in the sphere of African continent. According to Ibori (2019), with these favourable elements of state power, Nigeria assumed the status of primus inter pares in the comity of nations in Africa. This position has largely

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contributed to defining its foreign policy objectives after independence in 1960. Another fundamental rationale for Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy can be situated within the context of Nigeria’s geopolitics, political history and juxtaposition of its national interest. The political history of Nigeria like most other African countries reflects the experimentation of colonialism and its negative consequences. Hence, as an erstwhile colonial in Africa, it became Nigeria’s interest to assist other countries to decolonize. Hence, Africa became the centre-piece of its foreign policy. The Nigeria-Biafra civil war (1967–1970) experience is a strong reason why African neighbouring countries, especially, should not be taken for granted. The assistance of Nigeria’s neighbours in preventing the infiltration of weapons into Nigeria by the Biafran soldiers and supporters of Biafrans which eventually led to the surrendering of Biafrans to Nigeria’s government was a reason why Nigeria must take its neighbours seriously. Nigeria extended its hands of fellowship and increased good neighbourliness to these countries by providing financial and technical support for them. Some of these countries include Niger, Cameroon, Benin Republic, Togo and Chad. Security factor is another reason for the frequent intervention of Nigeria to ensure peace reigns in the African continent. As stipulated in the Nigerian foreign policy’s principles in which its national interest could be achieved through the notion of four concentric circles propounded by Ibrahim Gambari, the country should be conscious security-wise about the happenings around it (Innocent & Onyishi, 2014; Badiora, 2015; Dauda et  al., 2019). This means that the earlier Nigeria addresses the security challenges within its environment the better for the country and vice versa. As a result of this Nigeria is directly or indirectly protecting itself by assisting other neighbouring countries to ensure stability and normalcy in their countries (Dauda et al. 2019). Nigeria’s significant role in the decolonisation of Africa, dismantling of apartheid regimes, peacekeeping within the continent and beyond, and its consistent representation of Africa’s interest at any given fora projected and positioned it to enjoy some international leverage, among the comity of Western and other developed nations. Nigeria’s Afrocentric gestures in all ramifications have projected the nation as a promoter of peace and stability. As at the period when UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations report published in May 2010 showed that Nigeria had approximately 6000 men and women participating in peacekeeping missions, Alao (2011) noted that no other African country comes near this figure. In fact,

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worldwide, only three countries—Pakistan, Bangladesh and India—surpassed the figure. For this reason, the UN accredited the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre as one of the four facilities in the world where UN peacekeepers are trained ahead of the deployment. Nigeria has continued in her peacekeeping and contribution of troops in any conflict-­ridden area till date. For instance, President Jonathan sent about 1200 soldiers to Mali to ensure peace in the state in 2012. Obayuwana (1999) also affirmed that Nigeria’s role in the maintenance of global peace and security in addition to its earlier enumerated roles in the international politics, indeed, enhanced its image and influence in global politics. According to Saliu, upon the recognition and the cash donation of 20 million pounds to the Neto administration in Luanda in 1976, Angola, instead of reciprocating the Nigerian gesture, showed its gratitude to Cuba and other countries perhaps due to the ideological commitment of its leaders to communism. Literature is also replete with cases of ingratitude on the part of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea and other countries towards Nigeria. Nigerian citizens have been constantly persecuted in Zimbabwe, Gabon, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa (Saliu, 2016). The incessant diplomatic row between Nigeria and South Africa, mostly as a result of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa, could be characterized as an act of ingratitude to Nigeria’s efforts in eradicating apartheid regime in South Africa. According to Amao and Okeke-­ Uzodike (2015), with Nigeria’s commitment to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa, it remains to be seen how well this Afrocentric policy has helped in the protection of the interests of Nigerians both at home and abroad, particularly when located within the purview of the hate and disdain with which Nigerians are being confronted with in most of the countries that have benefited from the policy. There was about US$90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace keeping force that was deployed to Chad in the 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of US$800 million Nigeria Trust Fund established under AfDB to assist African countries to obtain soft loan to execute vital projects. Surprisingly, it is with connivance of some of these African states that Nigeria was denied the presidency of AfDB.  What a backstab (Okoye, 1997 cited in Wogu et al., 2015). The crush of Nigeria on the AfDB presidency in the 1990s was facilitated by South Africa which refused to identify with Nigeria’s aspiration for the presidency (Saliu, 2016). Though, the unanimous support for the Nigerian AfDB President, Dr Adesina Akinwumi, despite the US pranks to knock him out of office in 2020, is a right step in the right direction, not only for Adesina good

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works, but probably in recognition of Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa over the years. Nigeria has been actively involved in helping to resolve both intra-­ African and extra-African problems, lending credence to the fact that Nigeria is indeed Africa’s regional power. Becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is both necessary and desirable since that will put it in a better position to champion the cause of Africa both within Africa and in the international community (Osunyinkanmi & Osunyikanmi, 2019). Yet, some African countries still campaign against Nigeria, while smaller countries that still struggle to survive economically drag the position with Nigeria. To date, Nigeria has not been able to reap any economic benefit or carve for itself any major economic niche in these post-conflict countries. Yet, the Afrocentric framework has continued to maintain a stronghold on foreign policy thinking in Nigeria. Nigeria continued to exhibit generosity all over in order to create a wrong impression that the political economy is healthy. Paradoxically, Nigeria became too protective, too tolerant and too conciliatory in its relations with African countries (Iganga, 2013). With the extent Nigeria has involved itelf in peace and conflict resolution in the African continent, and its contributions in the UN, one expected that, at the return of democracy since 1999, Nigeria would get the right place in the UN Security Council (UNSC), but all efforts proved abortive. One begins to ask, what is the rationale behind these benevolent services to Africa and the world at large, and how has Nigeria gained from the ceaseless contribution rendered for international relations and harmony when till now, it has not been recognized among the “who is who” powerful countries in the United Nations? Obasanjo administration indicated spirited effort to plead the course of Nigeria in clinching the UNSC Permanent seat that matters most in the UNO structure when high-­ powered committee was set up by the government in October 2000, to lobby the UN member states (Tar & Ukhami, 2018). More so, some African nations have always posed as a stumbling block on the wheel of Nigeria’s interest for the UNSC seat. The debt burden hanging on most African states is an evidence of the danger of enslavement of Africans (including Nigeria) in the hands of the Western creditor nations. Unfortunately, China today through their Sinocentric posture has joined the league of creditor nations to Africa, furthering compounding the risk of Africa’s liberation. With the consistent involvement of Nigeria in African affairs, the European powers have

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not completely lost their grip on Africa. The impact of Eurocentrism in Africa is felt more than the Afrocentric policies of Nigeria in Africa. Ironically, the wave of Eurocentrism is also felt in Nigeria which claims to be a “big brother”. This has led to the constant rape and bleeding of the continent’s economy and political stability. China today has dominated and almost claimed the entire Africa market without any recourse for resistance, and Nigeria cannot claim to be on a rescue mission, because it also needs to be rescued from the powers that have continued to raid the country of its economic resources, development and true freedom. Nigeria is constantly borrowing to run the economy in the midst of abundant human and natural resources, making the country a dependent nation that produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce. According to Chukwuokolo (2009), this Eurocentric (and, also, the recent Sinocentrism) notion pervades all aspects of life in Africa. Even the consumer behaviour tilts more towards European goods and services. This has engendered the alternative for African development to come from Europe (and also China). Expatriates are invited to design technologies, politics, economy, etc. the Bretton Wood institutions have taken over subtly. Its latest is globalization which has resulted in the absence of medium economy as the West is draining the rest of the world. Judging from the “rationale”, “gains” and “praises” that justified Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy, how has it yielded to domestic realities and conditions of Nigerians? The inability of Nigeria to reciprocate the Afrocentric gesture on itself and its citizens is worrisome. Then Foreign Affairs Minister Ojo Maduekwe in 2007 asked the hard questions, “To what extent has our foreign policy benefitted Nigerians? To what extent has our foreign policy put food on our table? In other words, where is the citizen in our foreign policy?” Even though the citizen-centred diplomacy was introduced by Ojo Maduekwe under the President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration, the lives of Nigerian citizens have not in any way improved by the policy. The citizen-centred diplomacy eventually became a mere statement and foreign policy assumption. Nigerians in diaspora still suffer rejection and maltreatment from some of their host countries, while Nigerians in Nigeria suffer maltreatment due to poverty, inability of government to deliver on their promises to the people and human rights abuses, as a result of bad leadership that has been bestowed on Nigeria since inception. According to Warner (2016), one of the most devastating challenges Nigeria is currently facing is terrorism. The Boko Haram terrorists wreak havoc in northeast Nigeria and attack defenceless Nigerians,

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religious bodies and even the nation’s security forces. As also pointed out by Ayitogo (2018), the Fulani herdsmen in the middle belt region have attacked farming communities repeatedly, leading to wanton killings. Benue state alone has suffered about 20 different attacks in 2017 and many others in 2018, leading to scores of deaths and colossal destruction of properties. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2017) records that “the Fulani herdsmen launched more attacks and were responsible for more deaths than the Boko Haram in 2016. The total number of people the herdsmen have killed exceed 2,500 people between 2012 and 2016”. And more maim have been unleashed on farmers/communities from 2017 to 2020. Also, the activities of bandits and kidnappers are worrisome. Nigeria’s inability to combat security challenges limits its position as the “powerhouse” of Africa. According to Gambari (2011), “Nigeria will always be limited when the domestic environment is not attuned to carry the burden of African leadership. Too many Nigerians are being pushed out of the country and those within the country are being devalued by mis-governance anchored on corruption. The country has not missed the front row in world corruption index over the decades. The Boko Haram menace, kidnapping and other ethnic and sectarian conflicts are not projecting the image of Nigeria as a peaceful nation”. Worst of it is the inability of Nigeria’s government to curtail the proliferation and circulation of Small and Light Weapons in the country, which has become a threat to the Nigerian state and vulnerable citizens. Nigeria is significantly charitable to African countries, while that same affection is not shown to its citizens. This is why the nation is characterized by high rate of poverty, unemployment, lack of infrastructure and very low industrialization. Nigeria’s altruistic contributions to Africa have made the country too blind to see the economic and political realities of its actions domestically and in its ability to weigh its authority and interest on the continent. Nigeria is often and secretly mocked by other African countries as “a giant with clay feet”. According to Ukaeje (1999), “our false generosity abroad and penury at home are proof that we are pretending to be what we are not in reality”. Akinboye (2013) simply captured that Nigeria’s Afrocentric behaviour is likened to “beautiful abroad but ugly at home”.

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Conclusion and the Way Forward No doubt, and faithfully, Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy has come a long way. The foreign policy principle of the country has been felt positively in most African states from 1960, when the country ventured in the realm of the decolonization process of other African states suffering from the tight grip of colonialism, racism and apartheid regimes. The peacekeeping missions of Nigeria in the bid to keep Africa together in one piece is second to none, as it has sacrificed its fine soldier and other personnel on the altar of African security. The implication of these sacrifices in peacekeeping has rendered some Nigerian women, widows and children, orphans due to the deaths of their husbands and fathers at the peacekeeping missions. To add to that is the financial sacrifices the country has made in assisting other African countries in their difficult times. Unfortunately, since the last 60  years, Nigeria has not reaped the benefits of its benevolence and “Father Christmas” generosity to Africa. It has most times had confrontations with some other African countries over attacks on its citizens in those countries, and other disagreements, in which Nigeria would have ordinarily been allowed to have its rightful place as a mark of respect. The internal crisis and other domestic challenges within the country already discussed in the above subtitle have further declined the audacity of Nigeria to declare itself as the giant of Africa in the true sense of it. Therefore, finding the way out of some of these challenges will be the best thing to do in this chapter, if Nigeria must advance in its foreign policy beyond the last 60 years. Nigeria must as a matter of priority place its national interest over and above any other sentiments. If the “big brother” approach is not yielding results, it should be kept aside for a more meaningful result-oriented foreign policy that suits national interest and domestic development. Nigeria must not continue with the regular zero-sum Afrocentric policy, a policy of “give alone”. The outcome of its gestures to other African countries should now be seen as an Afrocentric reciprocity (a give and take Afrocentric policy), as previously suggested by Akinyemi (1987) that: If when we say that Africa is the centre-piece of our foreign policy, we mean that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimate interests of Africa, collectively, and each African state, individually, then I submit, that “Africa and African states also identify with and defend Nigeria’s interest…”

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Therefore, if Nigeria must continue to embark on its Afrocentric mission, it must not be shy in attaching conditions to its philanthropic gestures to other African countries, and in adequately putting its national interest first on the negotiating table of Afrocentric policy. This can only be possible if Nigeria can redefine its national interest and incorporate in it a foreign policy document. A country should not give what it does not have because charity ought to begin at home. Nigeria should adopt an “inside-out” policy in the conduct of its Afrocentric policy and any other external relations for that matter. Nigeria’s Afrocentric gestures must be a reflection of the domestic conditions of the country. It does not make logical sense for a country to show altruistic charity to other countries while its citizens are in despicable poverty and misery. Nigeria should channel its resources into the development of infrastructure in the country; alleviating the poverty of the vast majority of its citizens; asserting the same political will it has in ensuring peace and security in Africa, to solving the security challenges inherent in the country; and ensuring that the fundamental rights of citizens in the country is not trampled at in a democracy. With the debt burden and incessant external borrowing that characterized the country, the Nigerian leadership must learn to look inward, by utilizing the God’s given human and natural resources available in the country. The country should concentrate on mechanized agriculture, developing new industries, resuscitating its dead industries and improving its technology, in order for the country to be a hub for foreign and local investors in the nearest future. More so, to become a huge market for Africa, rather than borrowing these monies to fund African problems. More so, for a state to claim to be a hegemonic power, in the twenty-first century characterized by technological proliferations and increased global interconnectedness, it must be known to have highest technological advancement, strongest military, very strong and most times stable economy, wide range of political allies and friendly relations.

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Gambari, I.  A. (2011). How Nigeria can win UN’s permanent secretary seat. Vanguard 20 June. Online. Ibori, M. S. (2019). Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa: The dimensions and policy options. In Y. A. Zoaka, S. Abdulhamid, & S. A. Adeniji (Eds.), Public policy and National Development in Nigeria: Essays in honour of professor Sam Amdii. Joyce Graphic Printers and Publishers. Iganga, I. O. (2013). Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy: An assessment of the principle of Africa as the Centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy. Being a conference paper presented at the 7th Annual National Conference of the School of Arts and Social Science, College of Education Oju, held between 14th-16th August. Innocent, E. O., & Onyishi, T. O. (2014). Boko Haram and security challenges in Nigeria. Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 3(11), 1–18. Jonathan, G. E. (2013, January 23). Jonathan says Africa is a High Risk Investment Region because of Prevalent Political Instability. Premium Times, 23. Keohane R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kindleberger, C. (1973). The world in depression, 1929–39. In An explanation of the 1929 depression. University of California Press. Lord-Mallam, N. (2016). Nigeria and United Nations security council. American International Journal of Social Science, 5(2), 93–100. Maduekwe, O. (2007). Time for a citizen-Centred diplomacy. Retrieved February 25, 2009 from http://www.nigerian villagesquare.org. Mbachu, O. (2008). Foreign policy analysis: The Nigerian perspective. Joyce Graphic Printers and Publishers. Reprinted. Nester, W.  R. (2001). International relations: Politics and economics in the 21st century. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning. Njoh, J. (2007). Liberia: The path to war. Spectrum Books Limited. Nolte, D. (2010). How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics. Review of International Studies, 36, 883. Nwanolue, B., & Iwuoha, V. (2012). A reflection on Nigeria’s past: Africa as the Centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy revisited. Developing Country Studies, 2(4), 76–84. Obasanjo, O. A. (1978). Address at the OAU summit. Online. Obayuwana, O. (1999, September). United States senator seeks better treatment of Nigerian affairs. The Guardian Newspapers, 30, 40. Ogunsanwo, A. (2012). Challenges and prospects of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 21st century. In T.  Imobighe & W.  Alli (Eds.), Perspectives on Nigeria’s National Politics and external relations: Essays in honour of professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi. University Press.

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Ogunnubi, O. & Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2016). Can Nigeria be Africa’s Hegemon? African Security Review, 25(2), 110–128. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10246029.2016.1147473. Ola, T. P. (2019). Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy in the twenty-first century. The IUP Journal of International Relations, XIII(4), 41–50. Østerud, Ø. (1992). Regional Great Powers. In Neumann, I. (ed.). Regional Great Powers in International Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Osuntokun, A. (2005, June 8). Nigeria and the United Nations reforms: Service deserves its rewards. Paper presented at the National Conference on inter-group relations in Nigeria, Nassarawa State University. Osunyikanmi, F. A., & Osunyikanmi, P. O. (2019). Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy: An overview. International Journal of Development Strategies in Humanities, Management and Social Sciences, 9(2), 20–27. Ota, E. N., & Ecoma, C. S. (2015). Nigerian foreign policy in a globalizing world: The imperative of a paradigm shift. Journal of Asian Development, 1(1), 55–65. Ota, E. N., & Ecoma, C. S. (2016). Nigerian foreign policy and the democratic experiment: The lessons of history and options for the 21st century. International Journal of Applied and Advanced Scientific Research (IJAASR), Impact Factor, 1(1), 9–18. Rouke, J., & Boyer, M. (Eds.). (2004). International politics on the world stage. McGraw Hill Higher Education. Saleh, D. (2006). Nigeria’s foreign policy. Daily Graphics Nig. Ltd. Saliu, H. A. (1999). Selected themes in Nigeria’s foreign policy and international relations. Sally and Associates. Saliu, H. A. (2016). Nigerian foreign policy under the fourth republic. College Press. Schirm, S. A. (2005). Führungsindikatoren und erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale politik Brasiliens, Lateinamerika Analysen, 11. Shagaya, J.  N. (2003). Governance in Nigeria-the IBB era: An Insider’s view. Viewpoint Communications Ltd. Stikkers, K. W. (2008). An outline of methodological Afrocentrism, with particular application to the thought of W.E.B.  DuBois. Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 22(1), 40–49. Tar, U., & Ukhami, E. (2018). Nigeria’s foreign policy in the fourth republic: Perspectives on Obasanjo and Yar’Adua administration. Pyla-mak Publisher. Ukaeje, I. (1999). Nigeria’s foreign policy and great power politics. Chinedum Publishers Ltd. Ukhami, E., & Doumbia, L. (2021). Multinational corporations, trafficking of small arms and intractable conflicts in Africa. In U. A. Tar & P. C. Onwurah (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook on small arms and conflicts in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan.

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CHAPTER 5

Natural Resource Endowment and Regional Integration in West Africa: The Setbacks and Implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy Olawari D. J. Egbe

Introduction This is an age of unions. Not merely in the economic sphere, in the working world of unworthy ends and few ideals do we find great practical organisations; but law, medicine, science, art, trade, commerce, polities and political economy we might add philanthropy. … The talisman is, perhaps, self-­ interest, but, none the less, the spirit of union is there. (Kant, 1927, p. 1)

The foreign policy of any state is dependent on its national interests (Frankel, 1964, 1970; Philips, 1964). However, as Kant’s (1927) epigraph above indicates, the Westphalian state is definitely incapable of solving the myriad of challenges confronting humanity today (de Melo & Panagariya, 1993; Booker & North, 2005). Thus, the need for regional integration remains a strong and unavoidable necessity (Ewing, 1967;

O. D. J. Egbe (*) Niger Delta University, Amassoma, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_5

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Plessz, 1968; Kuhnhardt, 2010). However, regional integration is beset by enduring setbacks. One of such setbacks is unequal natural resource endowment or skewed shared resources (Buthelezi, 2006; Bach, 2016). Thus, this chapter seeks to answer this central question: Does resource inequality or shared resources an impediment to regional integration in West Africa? This question became pertinent because while the benefits accruing from regional integration are never contested, a reason for the plethora of regional groupings to solve the myriad of challenges bedevilling the continent (Robinson, 1996; Mistry, 1996). However, regional integration is beset by nature-induced setbacks—resource abundance/scarcity, shared resources in border regions, and state topography (coastal/landlocked) (Mistry, 2000; Collier & Venables, 2009/2010; Ayuk & Kabore, 2013). This trend is particularly conspicuous in West Africa: Nigeria’s dominance in oil and gas, coal, and steel; the enormous deposit of gold in Ghana; and huge diamond deposits in Sierra Leone. These disparities have caused limited intra-West African trade (Foroutan & Pritchett, 1993; Coe & Hoffmaister, 1999; Subramanian & Tamarisa, 2001) and which explains the ingenuine efforts at regional integration in West Africa. This disparity has further been strengthened by mutual suspicions promoted by exogenous explanations, principally their colonial linkages (Williams, 1991; Robinson, 1996; Bach, 2007). In recognition of these daunting challenges, the Economic Community of West African States (hereafter ECOWAS) at its 62nd meeting of the Council of Ministers held on March 26–27, 2009, in Abuja adopted the Directive C/DIR 3/O5/O9 on the Harmonisation of Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector. This act was followed by the endorsement of Act A/SA.16/02/12 by ECOWAS Heads of State which adopted the ECOWAS Minerals Development Policy (hereinafter EMDP) which was further strengthened by an Action Plan. The Economic Commission for Africa (hereinafter ECA, 2015, p. 66) noted that: the overall vision of the ECOWAS Minerals Development Policy is to promote the exploitation of the mineral resource potential, to contribute to sustainable economic growth and to integrate socio-economic development in the region. … Member States must thus ensure that national policies on mineral resources are in harmony with the EMDP.

It is noticed that the EMDP was solely to revamp African economies through stimulating intra-African and external trade. This is an achievable

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feat because the extractive sector remains a major source of exports and tax revenues for Africa, capable of financing infrastructural development in the continent (Besada & Martin, 2013). However, in spite of such potentials, regional integration still eludes the sub-region, which justifies the main position of this chapter: that resource inequality portends regional disintegration in West Africa. This chapter continues in the following sequence: Section II deals with a conceptualisation of regional integration. Section III explains the resource-induced setbacks to regional integration in West Africa. Section IV in concluding the chapter notes the implications of Nigeria’s foreign policy reliant on natural resource endowment.

Regional Integration: A Clarification This section defines a number of concepts in the regional integration literature: region, integration, and regional integration. First, what is a region? A region is a set of states which “created a legal framework of cooperation, covers an extensive economic relationship, has the intention that it will be of indefinite duration, and has the possibility of foreseen that the region will evolve or change” (Page, 2001, p. 5). Second, what is integration? The usage of integration eludes a consensus definition as attempts always lead to confusion (Nye, 1968). However, it is an established fact that integration refers to both states and process-led development (Balassa, 1961; de Lombaerde & van Langenhove, 2005). In the state-led context, the strength of any regional integration depends on the integrating states or precisely how the integrating states want it to be. In the process-led context, Haas (1958, p. 16) defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the preexisting national states”. According to Galtung (1968, pp. 376–77): Integration is integration of something; we assume that the units to be integrated can all be referred to as actors, and that actors can be divided until we reach the social atom, the individual. … Integration is the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated. Conversely, disintegration is the process whereby one actor splits into two or more actors. When the process is com-

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pleted, the actor is said to be disintegrated. Integration does not yield a set of actors, but a set that can act-a new actor.

Accepting Galtung’s (1968) characterisation, integration has two implications. Firstly, that integration fundamentally requires “a deepening or widening of activity, trade, peoples, ideas, or conflict at the regional level” (Fawcett, 2005, p. 25). Secondly, the term integration implies “the replacement of the existing ties with the metropolitan centres by a new pattern of economic and political integration within the region” (Asante, 1980, p. 72). This means that where a regional integration effort is put in place, the integrating states are expected to withdraw economic and political relations with any existing ties except the newly formed union (Obiozor, et al, 1994). It is in this context that Olukoshi and Obi (1994) assert that a successful integration theory must be dependent on the liberalisation of the movement of capital goods, services, and labour within the region and selective closure to areas outside of the region. Integration is a process in which: units move from a condition of total or partial isolation towards a complete or partial unification … integration refers to a process of large-scale territorial differentiation characterised by the progressive lowering of internal boundaries and the possible rising of new external boundaries. … Although integration at the level of states can refer to many different aspects of cooperation, it is mostly used in a context of economy and international trade. Integration then becomes economic integration and can be defined as the voluntary linking in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level. (Mattli, 1999, p. 41)

Third, what then is regional integration? According to Schmitter (1970, p. 836), regional integration is the study “of how national units come to share part or all of their decisional authority with an emerging international organisation”. The term regional integration is often used interchangeably with political integration to mean a deliberate attempt at harmonising states’ domestic and foreign policies and instead transferring those functions to neutral central organs. It also involves a new centre taking political responsibilities (Linberg, 1963). According to van Niekerk (2005), regional integration can be defined along three dimensions. The first is the ‘geographic scope’ dimension

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which illustrates a set of states involved in an integration effort based on economic, political, social, geographic considerations; the second is the ‘substantive coverage’ dimension which indicates the domains or activities involved such as labour, trade, labour mobility, macro-policies, sector policies; and the third is the ‘depth of integration’ or ‘deep integration’ dimension to mean the amount of sovereignty a state is willing to surrender to the regional integration. Deep integration in van Niekerk’s (2005) analogy can as well be subdivided into three levels of interactions. The first level is cooperation. This level of state interaction is the weakest form because cooperating members can easily withdraw from the cooperation effort. Cooperation is also issue-­ based (say exchange of information, border issues, clearance of goods, etc.) because often there is no subsisting supranational body to make far-­ reaching key decisions. Examples of cooperation among others include River Basin Agreements/Commissions. The second level is harmonisation/coordination which demands of integrating states to a more committed level of cooperation. Whereas harmonisation addresses issues of inconsistencies in policy content (such as differentials in trade policies, tax policies, quality control, business law, etc.), coordination addresses time-consistency issues. The third level is integration. In this context, integration demands of the integrating states to a deeper lock-in in the integration process which may lead to loss of sovereignty in certain respects (Asante, 1980; Tuluy, 2016), such as those that may occur from the adoption of a united market for goods (e.g., Free Trade Area, Customs Union), common markets (factors), common currency (e.g., the European Union’s adoption of the Euro as its common currency). According to van Niekerk (2005), a federated union as it is in the case of the United States of America represents the deepest form of integration that combines political and economic integrations which demand abrogating their sovereignties to supranational agency, especially a federal government typology (van Niekerk, 2005). For regional integration initiatives to be effective, it must perform the following eight functions:

(i) The strengthening of trade integration in the region; (ii) the creation of an appropriate enabling environment for private sector development, (iii) the development of infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and regional integration,

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(iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)

the development of strong public-sector institutions and good governance; the reduction of social exclusion and the development of an inclusive civil society; contribution to peace and security in the region; the building of environment programmes at the regional level; the strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions of the world. (De Lombaerde & van Langenhove, 2007, p. 381)

While these functions are worthy for a functional regional integration, West African states are challenged by a special kind of dilemma—the challenge of the Transnational Corporations (hereafter TNCs) such that if African states need to develop by means of self-reliance, they definitely need capital and technology, which of course is not available. Conversely, if West African states welcome the TNC, then the pro-profit nature of the TNC naturally conflicts with their developmental interests (Onwuka, 1985). Regional integration in the context of West Africa must then be seen “as a collective response to this dilemma: how to acquire, organise and utilise needed external resources whilst seeking to minimise external intervention in the development process” (Onwuka, 1985, p.  149). Thus, regional integration, contrary to Mitrany’s (1946) orthodox conceptualisation, “is an approach to collective development which simultaneously seeks to minimise foreign involvement” (Onwuka, 1985, p. 149). Onwuka (1985) further argued that the essence of integration in the first instance is to checkmate the exploitation of natural resources by TNCs in a given area. This, in effect, implies that regional integration creates room for self-generating development. This peculiar brand of development can only prevail where integration is targeted towards a total delinking with the metropolitan centres and being structured around a form of economic and political integration (Asante, 1980). To achieve this feat external dependence on the metropolitan centres through the power of the TNC must be terminated because the metropolitan centres are not oblivious that a strong united regional integration in Africa is a threat to their areas of influence and as sources of raw materials (Curry & Rothchild, 1974)—for it is obvious that “to continue to maintain the dependency relationships, these powers may apply several adaptive measures … by aiding, advising, cajoling, or flattering regional and national actors” (Asante, 1980, p. 72).

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However, while this line of action is most desirable, Kwame Nkrumah (Onwuka, 1985) cautioned that such actions at delinking with the metropolitan West must be time and circumstance conscious because collaboration with TNCs was better than economic blockade of the West, especially when assistance from the Socialist bloc was not procured and operational.

Resource Endowment as Impediment to Regional Integration in West Africa The salience of regional integration is unquestionable, incontestable and incontrovertible globally and in West Africa in particular (Ewing, 1967; Gibb, 2009; Dirar, 2014; GEA-ASG, 2014). Resource endowment even necessitates regionalism (Fouquin et al., 2006); however, it is not hitch-­ free (Bourrier, 1993; Foroutan, 1993). One of such enduring setbacks is the heterogeneity in resource endowments (Carrere et  al., 2012). This resource differential in Africa (see Appendix) compels regional integration  (UNCTD, 2009). In recognition of this diversity, the ECOWAS Treaty in Article 31 detailing natural resources asserts that: Member States shall harmonise and coordinate their policies and programmes in the field of natural resources, and to this end, they shall seek better knowledge and undertake an assessment of their natural resources potential; improve methods of pricing and marketing of raw materials through a concerted policy; exchange information on the prospection, mapping, production and processing of mineral resources, as well as on the prospection, exploitation and distribution of water resources; coordinate their programmes for development and utilisation of mineral and water resources; promote vertical and horizontal inter-industrial relationships which may be established among Member States in the course of developing such resources; promote the continuous training of skilled manpower and prepare and implement joint training and further training programmes for cadres in order to develop the human resources and the appropriate technological capabilities required for the exploration, exploitation and processing of mineral and water resources; coordinate their positions in all international negotiations on raw materials; and develop a system of transfer of expertise and exchange of scientific, technical and economic remote sensing data among Member States.

It is unfortunate that such aspirations have not come to fruition on account of the enduring setbacks highlighted below:

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(a) The Challenge of Oil and Gas Endowment The strategic value of crude petroleum to inter-state relations is well articulated in the international economic relations of states (Maathai, 2009). The fortunes of states or entire regions are suddenly affected on account of oil and gas discovery in commercial quantities. Nigeria’s impressive external life, especially in the 1970s, has recourse to oil and gas discovery in parts of Nigeria (Adeniji, 2005). Ghana’s recent discovery of crude petroleum in commercial quantities has also impacted on that state’s foreign relations. However, while oil and gas assume this enormous weight in states’ strategic economic relations, there are mounting security concerns and worries where crude petroleum is discovered along international boundaries since nature’s wealth distribution is blind to national and international boundaries. Nationally, states in Nigeria such as Rivers and Bayelsa States, Cross River, and Akwa Ibom States are embroiled in continuous litigations arising from equal claims to territories rich in oil and gas resources. Internationally, where crude petroleum is discovered along the border of two countries, skirmishes are a frequent sight to behold, as it is in the case with Nigeria and its neighbours, mostly Cameroun and Chad to a lesser extent. Nigeria’s relations with the state of Cameroun over oil and gas resources until the resolution of the Bakassi Peninsula by the judgement of the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) at The Hague was most critical which makes Cameroun the most belligerent of all Nigeria’s neighbours (Akinyemi, 2014). Aside Nigeria-Cameroun oil-induced skirmishes, (Kimengsi, et  al, 2018), it is not entirely rosy between Nigeria and Benin, and Chad and Niger republics put together as prospecting for off-shore oil and gas continues in the Lake Chad Basin. It is even anticipated that the conflicting relations between Nigeria and its immediate five neighbouring states would grow worse when and where Equatorial Guinea continue into off-­ shore oil exploration towards Nigeria and Cameroun (Obiukwu, 1996). This fear is imminent as the Byogo Nguema Island of Equatorial Guinea is barely 30 kilometres distance from the closest Nigeria oil location (Akinyemi, 2014). Regional integration as in ECOWAS sub-region and continental integration as in the African Union between Nigeria and its neighbours in the midst of the above unpleasant scenarios is a far cry ambition. The idea of

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regional integration, therefore, is dependent on the state of security and economic well-being of the integrating states. (b) The Paradox in More Producers Less Cooperation Closely related to the foregoing is the paradox in more producers less cooperation. The gain expected from more state oil and gas producers is in no doubt—that is more oil producers expectedly bringing the prices of oil down and by extension increasing consumer options. However, these expected gains are rather not forthcoming as continental and sub-regional oil producers of oil and gas in Africa demonstrate intense unwillingness to cooperate among themselves. Instead, African oil producer states are more interested in doing business with state buyers from the Northern hemisphere for huge profits and for securing and maintaining existing strategic military alliances. Under such intense suspicions and distrusts, it is no surprise that West African oil producers are best of friends and customers to world capitals in London, Washington D.C., and Paris, among others, and not among themselves (Linberg, 1963). These developments are never of any good to regional integration and cooperation in West Africa, especially that the entry of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire into the league of oil-producing states in sub-region is interpreted by Nigeria as a challenge to its leadership position in the oil and gas industry, a strategic position it has traditionally held in the sub-region. Consequently, Nigeria would be most reluctant to support initiatives that undermine its status in the sub-region (Tedom, 2014). (c) The Challenge of Water as a Shared Resource Water is essential for human existence, but it is unevenly distributed, sometimes located along state boundaries, and so it remains an instigator to conflict. For example, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River has already caused strained relations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan (Dessu et  al., 2020). Little wonder, ECA (2004, p.  167) observes that: water is essential to development. But because Africa is one of the world’s driest continents, the diminishing availability of usable water in the face of rising demand creates the potential for disputes and conflicts over water resources, both within and between countries. Moreover, the uneven distri-

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bution of water resources—the result of erratic rainfall and varying ­climate— has stratified the continent into areas of abundant water resources and areas of extreme water scarcity and stress.

These concerns indeed are germane to the worrying water situation in West Africa. In West Africa, the common bodies of water are the River Niger and Lake Chad. The use of these water bodies has compelled the different benefiting states to establish different water regulatory bodies, including the Lake Chad Basin Commission (hereafter LCBC) which comprises Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroun; and the Niger River Basin Commission (NRBC) which consists of Nigeria, Burkina-Faso, Benin, Niger, Cameroun, Mali, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. The exploitation of the resources of Lake Chad and the Niger River waters is restrained from unauthorised usage by member states (Omede, 2006). While the regulatory commissions or basins exist, however, there are functional disputes—disagreements over the way member states use and manage their sections of the waters that flow into their territories present enormous danger (Getis et al., 1991). And the requisite regulatory bodies seem docile in handling unsanctioned usage of the land and water around the Lake Chad Basin. More so, the activities of these regulatory bodies are further frustrated by the insatiable desires of member states to have undue exploitation at the detriment of other member states. By the provisions of the LCBC, for example, member states are prevented from tapping and developing the water and land under the authority of the commission. However, while this provision was enshrined to protect common interest, it has become a source of frustration to member states with the capacity to transform the water for national advantages. Moreover, it has now become the common practice among states to carry out one form of construction work or the other such as barrages, and dams, which affects the flow of the entire water systems of both River Niger and Lake Chad (Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992). A number of instances may substantiate this challenge further. First, Niger has constructed various barrages, and dams, along its territorial course. Second, Cameroun without due diligence and consultation with other states such as Nigeria has constructed the Ladgo Dam on the upstream of the Benue River which hitherto simultaneously serves fishermen in Cameroun and Nigeria, thereby affecting fishing and agricultural activities (Akindele & Akinterinwa, 1992). The point in emphasis here is that the rivers in question have come to cause strained relations among member states of the Lake Chad and River

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Niger Commissions. For example, at the peak of Cameroun’s unilateral construction of the Ladgo Dam and its attendant challenges, Nigeria considered to seek redress at the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ). This option was considered to make Cameroun to see reasons in decoupling the Ladgo Dam project in order to reduce the dam’s adverse impacts on irrigation purposes and available areas of Fadama (i.e., a marshy area capable of sustaining the growth of crops even during the dry season). It is then obvious that the use and exploitation of shared natural resources as water and its resources portends danger to regional integration in West Africa (Konings, 2005; Njikam & Tchouassi, 2011; Familugba & Ojo, 2013). However, in an attempt to avert such seeming crises, the First Pan-­ African Implementation and Partnership Conference on Water under the aegis of African Ministers Council on Water, UNWater/Africa, and so on was held at Addis Abba, Ethiopia, in December 2003, which in fact marked the International Year for Freshwater. The communiqué of the conference was emphatic in stating that “water resources shared by communities and countries must be jointly managed on an equitable and sustainable basis” (ECA, 2004, p. 171). (d) The Issue of WAEMU Membership In January 1994, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (hereafter WAEMU) was formed which comprised of eight countries in the sub-region, namely Niger, Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo and Senegal, however, with a copious non-­membership of Nigeria and the Gambia (Golub, 2015). It is crucial to notice that all members are Francophones except for Guinea-Bissau. The WAEMU treaty declared that its objectives are (i) to strengthen the competitiveness of economic and financial activities; (ii) to ensure a convergence of performance and economic policies; (iii) to create between Member States a common market based on the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and so on; (iv) to institute the coordination of national sectoral policies by means of joint action and, eventually, common policies, especially in areas including mining; and (v) to harmonise, to the extent necessary for the smooth operation of the common market, legislation and particularly the taxation systems. In addition, the WAEMU Common Mining Code was adopted through Act No. 01/2000, which was purely to strengthen extractive mining

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sector of member states in as much as it remains a major contributor to the economy of member states. The primary aims of the code were, among others, the creation of an environment favourable to mining investments, the diversification of mining outputs, the transformation of minerals where they are produced, the co-existence of industrial mines and small-scale and artisanal mining, the improvement of infrastructures, the growth of financial resources for the states and job creation, and the preservation of the environment. To bolster the broad objectives of WAEMU, the Community Mining Code was adopted by passing Regulation No. 18/2003/CM/ UEMOA, which explicitly was designed to overcome the existing regulatory disparities among member states in exploiting mineral resources (Kabore, 2014). However, while the formation of the WAEMU was a lofty idea, it was dead on arrival on account of Nigeria’s copious absence from the union. The dynamics of the WAEMU without Nigeria, which remains a major harbour for mineral resources, spelt doom for regional integration in West Africa. (e) The Lack of Sovereignty over Natural Resources Regional integration can occur when the integrating states have meaningful and permanent sovereignty over the resources in question. In the case of West Africa, though the resources in question are within their territorial boundaries, they have no control over these resources because the technological know-how in transforming or refining the resources to a final state is lacking. Pitiably, African states are constrained by: Lack of  information on natural resource endowment of large and unexplored areas; the activities of transnational corporations dealing with natural resource assessments; lack of adequate capacity (capital, skills and technology) for the development of these resources; a considerable dependence on foreign transnational corporations for the development of a narrow range of African natural resources selected by these corporations to supply new material needs of the developed countries; the inadequate share in the value added generated by the exploitation of natural resources of Member States due to imperfect pricing and marketing practices; non-integration of the raw materials exporting industries into the national economics of the Member States thus impeding backward and forward linkages; extremely low level of development and utilisation of those natural resources

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of no interest to foreign transnational corporations; and; disappointingly low general contribution of natural resources endowment to socio-economic development. (ECA, 2011, p. 21)

Certainly, these constraints definitely hinder regional integration and cooperation in West Africa. (f) Resource-Rich States and Their World Market Orientation Resource-rich states are strange bedfellows to regional integration efforts, but instead are more world market-oriented (Fouquin et  al., 2006). This orientation is known to have undermined regional integration, especially when the integration effort is structured around resource-­ rich economies. It is also noticed that how resource-rich states interpret the use of natural resources further inhibits regional integration among resource-rich states. Natural resources “are often viewed as a natural and strategic capital stock which should be at the exclusive disposal of national purposes and not be opened to access for member countries in an integration scheme” (Carrere et al., 2012, p. 2). Economic explanations also buttress the reluctance among resource-­ rich states in entering into regional integration schemes. It is observed that where resource-rich and resource-poor states accord preferences to each other, the former are likely to suffer from trade diversions (Carrere et  al., 2012, p.  190). Therefore, to avoid such diseconomies of scale, resource-rich states often prefer to trade with extra-regional trade. Conversely, resource-poor states earnestly desire regional cooperation with their resource-rich neighbours in order to profit from the wealth of the resource-rich states (Venables, 2009, 2011). This trend is suggestive that regional integration can either be trade creating or trade diverting (Viner, 1950). The foregoing points in discourse affirm that effective regional integration efforts in West Africa remain a tall dream—the West African landscape remains a complex admixture of the very resource-rich states and the extremely resource-poor states. Their mutual suspicions are further bolstered by external interests in resources and colonial lineages would definitely not allow genuine integration in West Africa.

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Conclusion and Implications for Nigerian Foreign Policy The chapter addressed a pertinent question: Are variations in natural resource endowments among ECOWAS member states a tendency towards regional disintegration in West Africa? The chapter concludes that regionalism in West Africa is greatly challenged by nature’s blind endowment of wealth. While some West African states are fabulously endowed with natural resources, others are scarcely endowed. This differential has impeded integration in the ECOWAS sub-region. However, rather than disintegration, resource disparities should be the reason for regional integration in the first instance. Any attempt at strengthening regional integration in West Africa must engage a careful consideration of the afore-discussed setbacks so that the sub-region can better contain the realities of globalisation in the twenty-­ first century.

Implications for Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Several prevalent factors have bolstered Nigeria’s leadership claims in West Africa: among others, Nigeria’s cash crops in the 1970s, its large population which influences the size of the domestic market, and majorly, oil and gas (Ihonvbere, 1991). But has crude petroleum strengthened or weakened Nigeria’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century? Has it, particularly, strengthened Nigeria’s continental or regional leadership aspirations in the past 60 years? Has it been more of regrets—a big brother without reciprocal gains? It is a mixture of both as the following underlisted suffices: First, Nigeria is blessed with a huge human and natural resource base which automatically made it the largest economy in Africa—a strategic economic position that enables it to make contributions to the ECOWAS and even the African Union has lost its pride of place in both sub-region and continent-wide. Often, requisite recognitions and support elude Nigeria (Oni & Taiwo, 2016). For example, Nigeria lost the privilege of housing the headquarters of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Africa Airlines hub, however, with both headquartered in Ghana—a country with a population and an economy not comparable to Lagos State. Nigeria continues to play Santa Claus and did not compensate for the huge regional expenses it incurs. What is lacking in Nigeria is

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focused and visionary continental leadership. For example, why has Nigeria, having signed the AfCFTA Agreement, not submitted the instruments of ratification? Sadly, while Nigeria is so bugged with domestic matters—ethnicity, religion and zoning of leadership positions—smaller sister states covet lucrative regional institutions to themselves. Perhaps, in the twenty-first century, Nigeria is still committed to what Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said: “Nigeria would never impose itself upon any other country and shall treat every African country, big or small, as our equal” (Epelle, 1968, p. 67). Second, in a global village where sustainability is the watchword in economic relations, Nigeria’s foreign policy is still dependent on its endowment of natural resources to satisfy its energy and raw material needs. However, while there are concerted efforts at sustainable energy extraction, the Nigerian landscape is littered with altered contaminated soil and water resources and an endangered flora and fauna, often with transboundary consequences (HRW & NRDC, 1992; Bidoglio, 2004). By these actions, Nigeria has contravened Article 29 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty which states that: Member States undertake to protect, preserve and enhance the natural environment of the region and co-operate in the event of natural disasters. To this end, they shall adopt policies, strategies and programmes at national and regional levels and establish appropriate institutions to protect, preserve and enhance the environment, control erosion, deforestation, desertification, locusts and other pests. (ECOWAS Commission, 2010, p. 21)

Nigeria’s reliance on crude petroleum has already made it a candidate for resource curse (Cust & Manley, 2018). Third, the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula issue remains an ‘unresolved issue’ requiring vibrant foreign policy measures from Nigeria. The irony is that the Bakassi people claim citizenship and pledge allegiance to Nigeria, whereas oil in their territory belongs to Cameroon. Nigeria needs to repeal the ICJ judgement; moreover, the entirety of the said judgement was reliant on the interpretation of historical documents (Uchehara, 2004). Fourth, the environmental impacts of oil and gas exploration and the handling of the accruing rents rather than being a shining example, it is a warning reminder to emerging oil-rich economies in Africa. Questions are raised whether emerging economies will repeat the environmental mistakes of their oil-rich cousins (Shaw, 2012). Whereas Nigeria’s foreign

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policy is anchored and sponsored by means of oil wealth, this wealth has been a source of corruption and insurgencies. What message is it sending out to newly emerging oil economies in the sub-region? Fifth, oil rents instigated Nigeria’s ‘big brother’ in African foreign policy—seeing every African state as a brother to extend possible assistance (Philips, 1964; Sinclair, 1983). However, reciprocity is yet to come from the sub-regional states, especially the Francophone states, who in the often time unite against Nigeria (Oche, 2005). A meticulous re-assessment would have helped in redirecting Nigeria’s resource-energies to more profitable ventures. Sixth, Nigeria’s democracy is a crude democracy—that is, democracy fostered on oil wealth, which made it dominant and authoritarian in approach, which makes regional efforts pretty difficult in the ECOWAS sub-region (Dunning, 2008). Seventh, Nigeria is widely acknowledged as the key financier of the ECOWAS. Oil rent is the backbone of such sub-regional financial endeavours. However, this reliance is dangerous for Nigeria, especially in shaping its foreign policy in the sub-region. This is because oil prices are prone to enormous volatility in the international market (Kitous et al., 2016; Koh, 2017). Can Nigeria meet its financial obligations to the ECOWAS when oil prices are at all time low as the cases of U.S. refusal to buy Nigeria’s oil in 2015 and the COVID-19 portend? Eighth, the water ways of the Gulf of Guinea have gained notoriety in illicit trade, where informal trade networks abound and which easily permeates borders in carrying on informal businesses across the sub-region (Boas et al., 1999). Oil is the major merchandise easily traded by agents of international traffickers. Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust anchored on oil is indeed dangerous in these circumstances. Ninth, Nigeria’s regional agenda premised on an oil economy has a bleak future without a deliberate diversification from monocultural economy towards industrialisation (Oche, 2005). Oil dominance in the global economic configurations is fast fading. Nigeria must watch and listen to the ensuing world energy calculations. Finally, the chapter is not oblivious of the following—however, for space handicap, it is only mentioned in passing and opened for future research. First, the role and potential of the West African gas pipeline and any other similar projects for regional economic cooperation and market integration in West Africa. Second, the role of foreign powers—including the great powers and emerging powers from the global South in the struggle for access and control of African natural resources with major implications for regional integration in West Africa.

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Appendix “First Nature” Geography in Sub-Saharan Africa: Natural Resource Exports and Country Classification Value of exports of fuels, ores, and metals Country (Year) Equatorial Guinea (2005) Angola (2005) Congo, Rep. (2005) Gabon (2006) Chad (2005) Nigeria (2004) Botswana (2005) Guinea (2006) Congo, Dem. Rep. (2006) Mauritania (2005) Mozambique (2005) Zambia (2005) Sudan (2005) Cote d’Ivoire (2005) Mali (2004) Cameroon (2005) Sierra Leone (2005) South Africa Zimbabwe (2005) Niger (2005) Kenya (2004) Senegal (2005) Togo (2004) Namibia (2006) Ghana (2005) Madagascar (2006) Cen. African Rep. (2005) Tanzania (2005) Cape Verde (2006) Swaziland (2002) Uganda (2005) Ethiopia (2004)

As percent of GDP

Per capita (U.S. dollars)

Collier (2007) Classification

93.92

14,591

Resource rich

72.16 71.46 55.90 44.47 40.94 34.74 24.40 24.34

1471 1182 4071 258 214 1977 88 34

Resource rich Resource rich Resource rich Landlocked Resource rich Resource rich Resource rich Resource rich

19.79 18.71 18.32 13.50 12.52 10.65 9.40

123 62 116 102 108 46 89

9.40 6.81 5.75 4.55 4.52 4.30 3.90 3.11 2.50 1.70 1.62

20 351 15 12 21 30 13 97 12 5 5

1.58 0.87 0.81 0.66 0.54

5 19 9 2 0.7

Newly resource rich Newly resource rich Resource rich Newly resource rich Coastal Landlocked Coastal, formerly resource rich Coastal Coastal Landlocked Landlocked Coastal Coastal Coastal Coastal Coastal Coastal Landlocked Coastal Coastal Landlocked Landlocked Landlocked (continued)

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(continued) Country (Year) Burundi (2005) Rwanda (2005) Burkina Faso (2004) Mauritius (2005) Benin (2005) Malawi (2005) Guinea-Bissau (1995) Gambia, The (2003) Comoros (1997) Djibouti (1990)

As percent of GDP

Per capita (U.S. dollars)

0.34 0.33 0.31 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.03 0.01

0.3 0.8 1.2 9 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1

Collier (2007) Classification Landlocked Landlocked Landlocked Coastal Coastal Landlocked Coastal Coastal Coastal Coastal

Source: Collier and Venables (2009/2010, p. 55)

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PART IV

Nigeria and the Big Global Powers

CHAPTER 6

The Dynamics and Strategic Interests in Nigeria-US Relations Michael O. Maduagwu and Cyril O. Oleh

Introduction This chapter examines the undercurrents of Nigeria’s long and close relationship with the United States (US) since Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960, taking into account all the deliberate strategies by both countries to sustain and enhance their bilateral relationship. Although Nigeria was a British colony until 1960, both Nigeria and the US have been strategic partners in sub-Saharan Africa since Nigeria’s attainment of independence. This was not a coincidence but a deliberate policy by two governments whose economic and strategic interests loom large in their areas of influence. It would be recalled that the 1960s were the height of the Cold War era during which the West under the leadership of the US were very concerned about Soviet expansionism around the

M. O. Maduagwu (*) National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria C. O. Oleh Veritas University, Abuja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_6

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world. Thus, one key strategic interest of the US at the beginning of its relations with Nigeria was to leverage on that relationship in containing communist expansion in Africa (Ayam, 2008, p. 118). The US had indeed indicated how highly it recognized Nigeria’s strategic importance in Africa when President Dwight Eisenhower sent Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York to represent the US government at Nigeria’s independence ceremonies on 1 October 1960 (Ayam, 2008, p. 118). During the Cold War the US was determined through its overtures to Nigeria that the latter did not fall into the sphere of the influence of the then Soviet Union. Right from independence, however, Nigeria did not overtly want to be caught into the web of East-West rivalry. Thus, in his speech on the admission of Nigeria into the United Nations on 7 October 1960, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa stated that Nigeria, as a matter of policy, would not be a member of any power bloc (Ate, 1987; Shepard, 1991). Upon assuming office in 1961, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy of the US invited the leadership of the newly independent Nigeria for a bilateral meeting in Washington. Nigeria’s Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa led Nigeria’s delegation to Washington and was granted audience by President Kennedy in the Oval Office of the White House (JFK Library, 1961). Thus, the stage for a longer relationship between the two continental strategic partners was set. While the US is a world power and has enormous influence on the pace of economic and political trends in the world, Nigeria’s regional influence in Africa, particularly at a time when South Africa was being ravaged by Apartheid, situated it for political and economic leadership on the continent. It, therefore, became imperative for the two nations to cooperate even if only for their national interests. Of course, every nation exists to protect its own interests above and over other nations. These national interests have played out the bilateral relationship between the two countries in the last 60 years. But even where the countries have been known to maintain generally cordial relationship over the years, it has not been a bed of roses either. Many times, the relationship has run into troubled waters on either the political, diplomatic or economic front. The US has been a strong ally of Nigeria in spite of the latter’s chequered political developments dominated by intermittent military interregnums. Following this introduction, the remaining chapter is divided into the following sections: “Theoretical Perspectives on Nigeria-US Relations”; “Overview of Nigeria-US Relations Since 1960”; “Nigeria-US Trade and Investment Relations”; “Democracy and Security as Strategic Interests in Nigeria-US

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Relations”; “Cracks on the Wall of Nigeria-US Relations”; “The Future of Nigeria-US Relations”; and “Conclusion”.

Theoretical Perspectives on Nigeria-US Relations Relations among nations are generally and predominantly determined by the abrasive power they exercise and how advantageous the benefits they enjoy from other nations, which are often couched in diplomatic lingos as national interests. National interest is a defining factor in determining the nature and strategy adopted by individual nations in their relationship with other nations. The national interest of a nation helps it to maintain its prestige and clout in the comity of nations. The concept of national interest is the key factor which determines the diplomatic and foreign relations of every nation. It is at the core of how a nation acts or behaves or fails to act in the world circle. Because of its nature and politics of power play, the term “national interest” has come to mean so many things to so many nations. However, in spite of the variations in definition, national interest is the totality of the politics, culture, safety, economy, prestige, survival and welfare of a nation (Akinterinwa, 2007). In a world controlled by centrifugal forces where nations are drawn close and apart by divergent national self-centred considerations, each nation does everything it can to either protect or enhance its national interest. Morgenthau (1952) captures it succinctly thus: “Thus, all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations”. National interests are used by state actors to articulate, defend and pursue the interests and welfare of their nations and citizens. Adeniran (1983, p. 191) substantiates this claim when he posits that “[w]hen statesmen and bureaucrats act in their national interest, they take actions on issues that would improve the political situations, the economic wellbeing, the health and culture of the people, as well as their political survival”. The position of both Morgenthau and Adeniran clearly establishes a clear connection between national interest and foreign relationships among nations in general. This, then, provides the theoretical underpinning for the discussion in specific terms, Nigeria-US Foreign Policy relations in the last six decades.

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Overview of Nigeria-US Relations Since 1960 As we stated in the introduction to this chapter, Nigeria’s diplomatic relationship with the US started on a strong footing immediately following Nigeria’s independence on 1 October 1960. On the same date, both countries opened Embassies and Consulates in the host countries (United States Office of the Historian, n.d.), obviously to drive home their desires for a partnership that is tactical in approach and strategic in outlook. The US wanted a strong foothold in Africa which Nigeria was strategically placed to provide because of its human population, land mass and economic potentials, particularly in oil and gas, as well as in agriculture and cultural diversity. Nigeria, on the other hand, felt that a strong tie with a superpower, like the US, would guarantee it international clout and image (Ate, 1987). Also, conscious of some of its neighbouring countries that seemed obviously to be scheming to assume leadership of Africa, Nigeria needed an ally of a country like the US which could readily be available to help it counter any perceived domineering influences that might come from Socialist Ethiopia or gregarious Gold Coast (Ghana), which attained its independence three years earlier, in March 1957. Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah, did not help matters either. His proposal for a United States of Africa (Olaosebikan, 2011) conveyed wrong impressions of a neighbour in a hurry to dominate its political environment. The Nkrumah pronouncement must have rattled both the US whose pre-eminent position in the world could easily be threatened by a United States of Africa and Nigeria whose acclaimed leadership role on the continent could be whittled down and submerged within a greater regional umbrella. Therefore, both Nigeria and the US felt they needed each other’s clout and prowess to teleguide the direction of major events in their regions. Amoa (2011) agrees with this submission that there was a sublime consciousness between the two countries in their ability to play strategic leadership roles in their respective regions and continents. The early start of the relationship between the two countries, however, suffered a setback in less than six years following the military interruption of the democratic process in Nigeria on 15 January 1966, which led to the overthrow of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s civilian government and subsequent coups and counter-coups that eventually plunged Nigeria into a 30-month Civil War or the so-called Biafran War. The period of the Nigerian Civil War (30 May 1967–15 January 1970) witnessed a hiatus in Nigeria-US relations. The US, preaching against dictatorship as

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represented in the military leadership that sprang up out of the Coup d’états of 1966 and 1967, did not want to officially endorse a military dictatorship which runs counter to its teachings on democratic ethos all over the world. On the other hand, Nigeria felt abandoned by a strategic ally and turned to other countries including its former Colonial Master Great Britain and the Soviet Union, a known rival of the US in the raging international Cold War between Capitalist blocs led by the US and Socialist countries spearheaded by the Soviet Union. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were willing to offer Technical Assistance to what was left of Nigeria after a section seceded under the umbrella of the Republic of Biafra. At that time, the Soviet Union had established satellite towns in Africa in Ethiopia and Tanzania, which had embraced Socialist ideologies, albeit, the African style. However, that second optional relationship with other countries rather than the US was only a matter of time to collapse in keeping with what Ahmadu Bello, Premier of defunct Northern region, once said when he was asked if Nigeria was willing to expand its friendship to the Soviet Union, “We have to [continue] to work with those we are accustomed to” (Ajayi, 1972). However, not wanting to lose out of the strategic importance of Nigeria, the US made a tactical retreat soon after the Nigerian Civil War, offering assistance in many kinds, ostensibly to help rebuild the war battered country. Sanderson (1974, p.  26) writes that in 1974, the Nixon administration offered Nigeria an aid in the sum of US$25 million to help the nation find its feet after the war. But as we shall see later, this was not the only time that the relations between the two countries witnessed a nosedive in the last six decades. Economic interest is at the centre of the many factors that have helped to shape the relations between Nigeria and the US. Other important factors include democracy and security.

Nigeria-US Trade and Investment Relations Nigeria is one of the significant trading partners of the US although many have argued that the trading benefits are tilted one way, with the US benefiting more from Nigeria in Oil and Gas importation. Nigeria is also a trading partner in goods and services including machinery, vehicles, wheat, textiles, agricultural products and cocoa, among others. The trading volume between the two countries has remained high, qualifying Nigeria to benefit from the United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides trading assistance to countries in Africa whose

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trading prospects are strategically important to the interest of the US. As a way of sustaining the trade relationship, in the year 2000, Nigeria and the US signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The eight Nigeria-US TIFA council meeting was hosted in Nigeria in March 2014 to discuss further ways of enhancing the bilateral trade relationship between the two countries. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2018), US goods and services trade with Nigeria totalled an estimated US$11.3 billion in 2018. Exports were US$5.1 billion; imports were US$6.1 billion. The US goods and services trade deficit with Nigeria was US$1.0 billion in 2018. It also reports that Nigeria is currently the US’ 49th largest goods trading partner with US$8.3 billion in total (two-way) goods trade during 2018, with exports in goods totalling US$2.7 billion; imports totalling $5.6 billion. The US goods trade deficit with Nigeria was US$2.9 billion in the same year, 2018. Trade in services with Nigeria (exports and imports) totalled an estimated US$3.0 billion in 2018 (USTR, 2018). Exports in services were US$2.4 billion, while imports were $531 million. The US services trade surplus with Nigeria was $1.9 billion in 2018. Similarly, according to the US Department of Commerce, US exports of goods and services to Nigeria supported an estimated 35,000 jobs in 2015, 17,000 supported by goods exports and 18,000 supported by services exports (USTR, 2018). In specific terms, Nigeria was the US’ 56th largest goods export market in 2018, where US goods exports to Nigeria in that year were US$2.7 billion, up 23.6% (US$513 million) from 2017 but down 34.5% from 2008. The top export categories in 2018 were as follows: vehicles (US$854 million), machinery (US$374 million), mineral fuels (US$326 million), cereals (wheat) (US$227 million) and aircraft (US$185 million). The department also reports that the US total exports of agricultural products to Nigeria were US$328 million in 2018. Leading domestic export categories include wheat (US$193 million), prepared food (US$20 million), soybeans (US$15 million), wine and beer (US$15 million) and corn (US$13 million). Conversely, on the import curve, Nigeria was the US’ 44th largest supplier of goods imports in 2018 (USTR, 2018). US goods imports from Nigeria totalled US$5.6 billion in that year, down 20.3% (US$1.4 billion) from 2017, and down 85.2% from 2008. The top import categories for Nigeria were mineral fuels (US$5.4 billion), special other (returns) (US$44 million), fertilizers (US$43 million), cocoa (US$16 million) and artificial flowers, feather or down articles (US$12 million). The US total

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imports of agricultural products from Nigeria totalled US$49 million in the same year, 2018. Leading categories in the Nigeria import trade include cocoa beans (US$15 million), tea, including herbs (US$8 million), tree nuts (US$6 million), feeds and fodders (US$6 million) and spices (US$4 million). As we stated earlier, there has been concern among Nigerian government officials who have continued to urge the US government to close the gap between the two trading partners. In 2018, the US Department of Commerce announced that the US goods trade deficit with Nigeria was US$2.9 billion, a 39.9% decrease (US$1.9 billion) from what it was in 2017 (USTR, 2018). The Foreign Direct Investment between the two countries is not any better either. US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria (stock) was US$5.6 billion in 2018, a 2.5% decrease from 2017. On the other hand, Nigeria’s FDI in the US (stock) was US$75 million in 2018, up 23.0% from 2017. In general, there is a noticeable attempt by the US government to maintain its volume of trade with Nigeria in spite of the global economic problems associated with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic across the world. Within the first five months of the year 2020, the volume of US trade with Nigeria stood at US$1.43 billion, indicating a noticeable 25.43% decline in both export and import trading activities. While the US exports to Nigeria decreased by 4.35%, its import from Nigeria fell by 47.14% (World City, 2020). There is no doubt that both Nigeria and the US recognize the strategic importance of their trade and investment relations. Nigeria is the largest economy and most populous country in Africa with present estimated population of over 200 million, which is expected to grow to 400 million by 2050. It is expected to become the third most populous country in the world after China and India. Nigeria’s gross domestic product in 2020 was US$429.42 billion, but it is estimated to rise to US$514.05 billion in 2021 (O’Neill, 2021). In May 2000, the US administration under President Barack Obama introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an Act aimed at assisting the economies of sub-Saharan Africa to improve the economic relations between African countries and the US, and, as already noted, Nigeria has been taking good advantage of AGOA. The Joe Biden administration has, since assuming power in November 2020, made efforts to continue along the line of strengthening bilateral trade and investment ties between Nigeria and the US. To this end, in April 2021,

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the new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken conducted a virtual meeting with the Nigerian authorities. The virtual meeting had President Buhari and Foreign Minister Onyeama of Nigeria participating in an opportunity both countries used to highlight the commitment of the US to assisting Nigeria to combat infectious diseases (U.S.  Department of State, 2021). Oil remains the single most strategic trading product from Nigeria to the US. Until recently when it was overtaken by Canada, Nigeria used to be among the largest supplier of petroleum to the US. Even so, it is estimated that since 2020, the US imports on average about 75,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Nigeria (Sonnichsen, 2021). In 2019, the two-­ way trade in goods between the US and Nigeria totalled over $10 billion. US exports to Nigeria include wheat, vehicles, machinery, kerosene, lubricating oils, jet fuel, civilian aircraft and plastics. Nigerian exports to the US included crude oil, cocoa, cashew nuts and animal feed. For Nigeria-US trade relations in the last 20 years, see the Table in the Appendix to this chapter.

Democracy and Security as Strategic Interests in Nigeria-US Relations Perhaps, the next most important role that has drawn Nigeria and the US closer apart from economic gains is the strategic importance of Nigeria in the West African sub-region. Nigeria’s sheer land size, population, power status and military capability in the West African sub-region have ensured and enhanced its political hegemony in the sub-region. Every region has a “Superpower” who calls the shots or dictates tone of events in that region. Theoretically, Nigeria fits into that all-powerful nation whose opinion should matter in the continent in general and definitely in the sub-region. As we noted in the theoretical perspectives of this chapter, international politics is a struggle for power and influence. To achieve these, nations depend largely on the force of their military. Nigeria is no exemption. It is therefore not surprising that the US finds Nigeria a strategic ally in the area of regional security and democratic stability. At independence in 1960, the Nigerian military was just a little above five battalions, rising to 110,000 personnel at the dawn of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. Garuba (1996) records that at the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, the strength of the Nigerian military was 250,000. In 2018, Nigeria was ranked 43rd in the world in military strength by the

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military ranking institution, Global Fire Power (GFP). The country was credited with 181,000 total military personnel, out of which 124,000 were active while 57,000 were reserved (This Day, 2018). These numbers do not include the police and personnel of other para-military agencies. Right from independence, Nigeria has put to good use its military capabilities which also underscore its leadership potentials on the African continent. The country has been involved in several regional and sub-­ regional Peace Keeping Operations very much like what the US does in parts of the world, including some troubled parts of Africa. Nigeria made its first mark in International Peace Keeping Operations as an independent country in 1962 when Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi Ironsi led its contingent to participate in the United Nation’s efforts to restore peace in the troubled Democratic Republic of Congo. Nigeria’s outstanding performance in the exercise stood the nation out and became one of the yardsticks for measuring its military capability. Nigeria’s participation in several International Peace Keeping Operations has earned it the admiration of other nations including its long-time strategic ally, the US. The United Nations has continued to rely largely on Nigeria’s military capability for peace Missions in Africa. One remarkable International Peace Keeping mission which Nigeria and the US co-operated so well was the West African sub-regional effort to bring peace to war-torn Liberia. Nigeria’s leadership role in that effort through the Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) became legendary between 1989 and 1997. Leading the rest of the sub-region under the auspices of ECOMOG, Nigeria went into the fray in August 1990 with the first batch of its military. Although the crisis in Liberia was projected to last only 12 months, it blossomed into a full-­ scale war with many political and tactical complexities. The war eventually lasted for six years leaving behind its trail, destructions, war and death of humongous proportions. Within this period, regardless of the fact that Nigeria was under a military regime, the US unobtrusively lined up behind Nigeria, supporting it in military wares, financial aid and military intelligence in the course of the Liberian war. It should be recalled here that Liberia was an American colony. Freed slaves from parts of America were shipped into and re-settled in Monrovia among the native inhabitants. Since then there has been uneasiness between the two groups in their quest for political and cultural supremacy. Even with the marriage of convenience between the two groups, the schism had continued. According to Davies (1953, p.  29), the Commonwealth of Liberia issued a

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declaration of Independence on 26 July 1847. In spite of the declaration of Independence, various tribal groups that make up Liberia maintained their distinct identities. There were occasional skirmishes among the tribal groups. It was, therefore, only a matter of time before the simmering conflicts would burst out into full-blown warfare as we witnessed between 1989 and 1997 following military coups and counter-coups that eventually metamorphosed into civil war. However, what is important here is that the US used the involvement of Nigeria in the Liberian peacekeeping mission to exert some political influence on its former colony, albeit, indirectly, thus scoring a major strategic goal on the continent (Ayam, 2008). Nigeria-US strategic interests entered a new phase when Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999 after 16  years of military interregnum. This phase was anchored on strengthening of Nigeria’s nascent democracy. Thus, on assumption of office, former President Obasanjo was said to have requested the then US President Bill Clinton for some military assistance, including the re-professionalization of the Nigerian military (Maduagwu, 2006). As a result of that request and following the visits of US Defense Secretary to Nigeria in April 2000 and later President Clinton in August 2000, speculation became rife that Nigeria might have entered into a secret military pact with the US (Maduagwu, 2006). However, in a press conference during the visit to Nigeria by the US Defense Secretary William Cohen, the US Ambassador to Nigeria in response to a direct question on the issue of Nigeria-US Military pact stated that there was no discussion on that at all between the US and Nigeria (Embassy of the United States in Nigeria, 2000). Instead, the Defense Secretary stated that “Nigeria and the United States have launched a joint programme to re-professionalize the Nigerian military”. He announced the donation by the US of US$10 million to finance specific projects “in the military’s reform and rebuilding effort”. In addition to the US$10 million, the US was to provide a grant of US$600,000 to bring Nigerian military officers to the US military institutions to take courses in command and general staff topics, such as law, medical management, civil-military relations, among others, under the programme of International Military Education and Training (IMET). Nigeria was also contributed a counter-part funding of US$3.5 million. In March 2001, the US Embassy issued a statement clarifying the extent of the Nigeria-US Military Cooperation (Embassy of the United States in Nigeria, 2001). According to the statement by the Embassy of the United States in Nigeria, (2001), the “primary goal in the U.S.

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military’s re-engagement with the Nigerian military since May 1999 has been to help solidify the democratic transition by strengthening civilian control and oversight of its military.” The statement named the following items as included in the package of military assistance that Nigeria would receive from the US under the cooperation arrangement: i. Refurbishing the Nigerian Air Force fleet of C-13-0 s, as requested by the Government of Nigeria; ii. Providing requested assistance to military training institutions; iii. International Military Exchange Training (IMET) programmes through which Nigerian soldiers, airmen and sailors would study at the foremost US Military Training Institutions; iv. The Nigerian Navy’s acquisition of some former United States Coast Guard boats; v. Providing a requested computer war-gaming facility for the National War College; and vi. Assistance for the Nigerian Armed Forces Oshodi Resettlement Center. In concluding the statement referred to above, the US Embassy made this remark: What the United States is doing to assist Nigeria military is an open book. As is appropriate in a democracy, we strive to keep the U.S. Congress as well as the U.S. and international media informed of our activities. The Embassy and U.S. military trainers issued press releases, briefed the media and members of the National Assembly. … We will continue this practice of transparency in the future. (Embassy of the United States of Nigeria, 2001)

Cracks on the Wall of Nigeria-US Relations Barely six years after Independence under democratic system modelled from the British parliamentary system, Nigeria, like many other African countries, fell under military rule. The first bloody military coup of 15 January 1966 was followed by even more bloody counter-coup of 29 July 1966. Subsequent events led to secession of Eastern Region of Nigeria populated mostly by the Igbo ethnic group. Then ensued the Biafra war, 1967–1970. During the war, the US tried not to get involved, preferring to leave matters for Britain since Nigeria was under its sphere of authority. However, both the US and Britain refused to sell arms either to Nigeria or

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to Biafra, a policy that compelled Nigeria to turn to the Soviet Union for the sale of weapons, including warplanes. The US criticism of the Soviet Union for sale of arms to Nigeria as an act of self-aggrandizement was met with condemnation by Nigeria, which accused the US of “disguised support for the Ibo” (Stremlau, 1977, p. 29). Another major issue that strained Nigeria-US relations was Nigeria’s slow pace towards democratization. The climax was Babangida’s abortion of his long-drawn transition to civilian rule in 1993. As expected, the US government openly rejected the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election that would have returned Nigeria to democracy since the military sacked the last democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 31 December 1983. Like the rest of the world, the US was scandalized about the truncation of the democratic process. A Press Release from the US Embassy in Lagos signed by its Information Officer, Mike O’Brien, condemned the annulment of the 12 June 1993 election and called on the Nigerian military to rescind its decision or risk sanctions by the international community. Mike O’Brien was declared Persona Non Grata by the Nigerian government and ordered to depart from Nigeria within 72 hours of issuing his Press Statement. The general uneasiness in Nigeria forced General Babangida to vacate office on 23 August 1993, leaving behind a contraption he called Interim National Government under Chief Ernest Shonekan, a business magnet from Chief Abiola’s home state of Ogun, apparently to assuage the feelings of the Yoruba ethnic group who had mobilized press attacks and social unrest against the Babangida regime. Chief Shonekan’s lame-­ duck administration was placed under General Sani Abacha, Babangida’s Chief of Defence Staff, who in 1983 had announced the overthrow of Shehu Shagari in a military coup. Not surprisingly, three months later, specifically in November 1993, General Abacha shoved away Chief Shonekan in a palace coup and installed himself military Head of state, a move that further infuriated both Nigerians and the international community, including the US. Rather than try to assuage the feelings of Nigerians and the international community, General Abacha became more brutal and confrontational in his dealings with both Nigerians and the international community. He could not tolerate the agitations in the oil-rich Ogoni land in Rivers state for a cleaner environment which had been going on for years under the auspices of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by the acclaimed environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Against all

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protestations by prominent Nigerians and the international community, the Abacha regime, after a hasty trial, executed the prominent members of MOSOP, known as “the Ogoni 9”, including the leader Ken Saro-Wiwa on 10 November 1995 (Maduagwu, 2018). Very insensitively, this took place while the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, of which Nigeria is a member, was holding in Auckland, New Zealand, 10–13 November 1995. Ironically, the Secretary-General then was Emeka Anyaoku, a Nigerian. The Commonwealth Meeting naturally condemned the Nigerian action and Nigeria was suspended (The Commonwealth, 1995). Following that action, Nigeria became a pariah state in the comity of nations until the return of the country to democracy in 1999. The spate of administrative highhandedness on the part of the Abacha regime earned Nigeria the ire of the international community, particularly the US, which could not stand Abacha’s riotous regime. On their part, the Abacha regime often citing national interest went overboard in their reactions to comments and actions of the US government. As the days went by, General Abacha became more tyrannical. He went after civil society groups, the press, opposition groups and the academia driving them underground. In reaction, the international community, led by the US, imposed political and economic sanctions on Nigeria. International Financial Institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the Paris Club either refused outrightly to grant financial assistance to Nigeria or declined to review existing ones. In a similar vein, the US cancelled all military assistance to Nigeria including stoppage of supply of certain categories of military hardware to the Nigerian army. All direct flights from Nigeria to the US were suspended. The US also decertified Nigeria’s Narcotic status and labelled Nigeria a nation of interest in the drug warfare. This in turn affected not only Nigeria’s prestige but Nigeria’s ability to benefit from certain categories of foreign assistance. One of the major effects of the sanctions was the inability of Nigeria to vie for the membership of the prestigious Security Council of the United Nations which Nigeria had earlier indicated interest in. Abacha carried out some retaliatory symbolic measures against the US and its allies. He renamed the street in Lagos housing major Embassies and Consulates including the Embassy of the US from Walter Carrington to Louis Farrakhan street to spite the US government and the international community. Louis Farrakhan was the leader of the Nation of Islam

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in the US who was an opposition figure against the administration of US President Bill Clinton. The pariah status of Nigeria in general and the lifting of sanctions by the US ended only with the country’s return to democracy in 1999. We noted earlier how the Clinton administration supported Nigeria’s nascent democracy through, among other things, the re-professionalization of its military at the request of the newly elected President Olusegun Obasanjo. The restored cordial relationship between Nigeria and the US was still getting stronger when an incident happened that put another strain between the two countries. On 25 December 2009 the 25-year-old Nigerian-born Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound Delta Airline mid-air. This incident took the world by surprise. Before then, Nigeria had never been associated with that magnitude of international violence. The President Obama administration was so infuriated that he included Nigeria on a watchlist of terror nations (Osaretin & Ajebon, 2012). That meant that, indirectly, the US had labelled Nigeria a “country of interest” alongside 13 other countries that were labelled sponsors of terrorism at the time. Furthermore, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) imposed more stringent measures against travellers coming to the US from some countries, including Nigeria. What that meant was that travellers from such countries received extra attention and technology-enhanced screening at entry points into the US air and land territories (Ijediogo, 2010). Many Nigerian travellers including government functionaries were at the receiving end of this reprehensible treatment as they travelled to the US. About that time, several Nigerians, particularly senior-level functionaries and politicians, were constantly denied visa at the US embassy. The foregoing strains in Nigeria-US relations notwithstanding, it is pertinent to note that scholars have long identified three key areas of priorities that have dominated the bilateral relations between the two countries over the years. These are economic cooperation, security and democratic governance (Mikell, 2008). As we have seen, these three areas have also featured prominently in this chapter. To what extent these three dimensions of Nigeria-US relations will continue to receive priority attention in future, especially on the part of the US, remains to be seen, as further explored in the next section.

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The Future of Nigeria-US Relations It should also be in the strategic interest of the US, and indeed the West, that Nigeria remains secured and stable. For over a decade now, since 2009, Nigeria has been fighting a war against terrorism led by Boko Haram and its allies that are said to include Al Qaeda and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (United Nations, 2020). With a strong foothold in the northeastern part of Nigeria, Boko Haram whose ideology is against Western or modern education has continued to terrorize the entire northern part of Nigeria, especially the Northeast. Boko Haram emerged at the time that the international terrorist group, Al Qaeda, was waxing strong in the Middle East and the Arabian peninsula, causing palpable apprehension in the international community, particularly the US, which had suffered terror in the hands of Al Qaeda in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Yet the US chose to treat Boko Haram as Nigerian domestic insurgency for a long time even when the terrorist group had carried out suicide bombing attacks on the Nigerian Police Headquarters and the United Nations Building in Abuja on 16 June 2011 and 27 August 2011, respectively (Mantzikos, 2014). It was not until 14 November 2013 that the US designated Boko Haram as an international terrorist organization (U.S.  Department of State, n.d.) and placed a bounty of US$7 million on the current leader Abubakar Shekau who succeeded the founder Mohammed Yusuf after the latter was killed in 2010. The bounty of US$7  million on Shekau was renewed on 26 February 2020 (Odoh, 2020). As if to spite the US for designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, the group began to carry out an unprecedented terrorist act of abducting school girls and either using them for sexual abuse or selling them into slavery. The first occurred on 14 April 2014  in a suburb of Maiduguri, where Boko Haram abducted 276 female students, predominantly Christians, from Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok. Not a few Nigerians expected and hoped that the US would come to the aid of Nigeria and assist to rescue the girls. Later there were allegations that the US and the UK had offered to assist but that the Jonathan Government rebuffed the offer, an allegation that the Jonathan Government denied (Faul, 2014). The second major abduction of school girls took place at Government Girls’ Science and Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe State, on 19 February 2018, where 110 were abducted.

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The Nigerian Government efforts to rescue these girls only yielded limited results. After negotiations between the terrorist group and Federal Government, some of the abducted Chibok school girls were released at different times. While 21 of them were freed on 13 October 2016, 82 were released on 6 May 2017. A total of 103 of the kidnapped 276 Chibok school girls have united with their families (Adegun, 2017). In the same manner, out of the 110 kidnapped Dapchi school girls, 104 of them regained their freedom on 21 March 2018 after negotiations and an agreement of ceasefire were reached between the group and the Federal Government (Ehikioya, 2018). Unfortunately, five of them were said to have died during their captivity while Boko Haram refused to release the only Christian girl among them, Leah Sharibu, on the grounds that she refused to convert to Islam. All things considered, it is really inconceivable that the Nigerian Western allies, especially the US, seem to have abandoned Nigeria to its fate in the fight against Boko Haram, more than ten years since the terrorist group has been waging war on Nigeria and attempting to establish a Caliphate in Northeast Nigeria. The major challenge of the Nigerian military in the fight against Boko Haram is obviously inadequate weapons. Between 2016 and 2017, the Nigerian military was able to regain all but about three Local Government Areas under the occupation of Boko Haram, prompting the Federal Government to begin to propagate that Boko Haram has been technically defeated. However, by 2018, it has regained ground and occupied as many as 8 out of 20 Local Government Areas of Borno State, according to Ahmadu Jaha, a local legislator. Due to lack of adequate or required military equipment, sometimes Nigerian soldiers had to desert their positions in the face of superior firepower of the insurgent group. Nigeria has lost several soldiers to Boko Haram in the Northeast. Among military equipment desperately needed by Nigeria are warplanes. The US under the Obama administration was said to have refused to sell arms, including warplanes, to Nigeria on allegation of corruption and human rights abuses of the Nigerian military (Siollun, 2015; Erunke, 2016). The President Trump administration has reversed President Obama’s decision. In 2017 the Buhari Government ordered for 12 attack aircraft, known as Super Tucano, at the cost of US$496 million with the delivery date initially set for 2020. The delivery date has now been shifted to 2021. With this development, it is to be hoped that in the next couple of years Nigeria will be able to put behind it the menace of Boko Haram terrorism.

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It must be noted that Nigeria has been receiving enormous humanitarian assistance from international nongovernmental organizations as well as some government agencies of Nigeria’s development partners to alleviate the suffering of the people from Boko Haram terror activities which have rendered life for the people of some States in the Northeast, especially Borno, Yobe and Adamawa unbearable. Around two million people have been displaced in the Northeast, and the humanitarian situation is worsened by the adverse impact of climate change. In 2018, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that “about US$1.6 billion would be required to ease hunger, provide shelter and healthcare and help communities rebuild their livelihoods” (Olojo, 2019). Meanwhile, it is estimated that by 2018, at least 150 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in humanitarian work in the Northeast (Olojo, 2019). In addition, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) are also actively involved in providing relief materials to the internally displaced persons in the Northeast (U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, 2017; House of Commons, 2016). Presently Nigeria is also facing the challenges of Coronavirus, also known as COVID-19. The virus originated from Wuhan, China, in late 2019. It has infected millions of people, and it is now a serious concern to all countries and authorities across the world. Thousands of people have also died from the disease, which was declared a global pandemic on 11 March 2020 by the World Health Organization (WHO). The pandemic has serious health and security implications for Nigeria. As Nigeria, like the rest of other countries, battles to contain the spread of the disease, it will definitely be looking up to its development partners, especially the US, for massive support. The assistance of the US for eventual eradication and prevention of this disease in Nigeria would become very critical in the months ahead when the vaccine against COVID-19 would have finally been discovered.

Conclusion The last 60 years have witnessed, on the whole, very close relationship between Nigeria and the US. The relationship like all others among nation-states is propelled by national interests subsumed in the economic and strategic interests of each country. While it is understood that for the US, interest in Nigeria’s oil and gas resources remains paramount, other strategic reasons that are residual to the relation include Nigeria’s military

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and political clout, promoting a stable and democratic Nigeria as well as its human and natural resources in the West African sub-region. However, in the last 20 years, there have been noticeable shifts in Nigeria’s approach to its bilateral relations with other nations. While still holding on to the traditional relationship with the US, it has also opened its diplomatic doors to China, a move that is occasioned by the end to the cold war between the West and East as well as the evolution of new technology which has enhanced globalization. There is no doubt that Nigeria and the US need each other as strategic partners considering the clout and power each country enjoys within their geographical areas of influence. As a result, the bilateral relations will continue even if on a mutual suspicious level. As the years go by, successive Nigerian governments will continue to try to improve on their administrative lapses including trying to reduce the level of impunity in governance and high-level corrupt practices that have continued to be areas of concern for the US. The two countries can also improve their relations in many other spheres such as intelligence gathering; empowering strategic institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Defence and Security, the Aviation sector and the civil society; and encouraging free press, fight against terrorism, cyber security and cyber-crime, with particular attention to cyber fraud, among other areas of strategic importance to the two countries. In particular, Nigeria should be seen to be showing enough political will to deal decisively with identified disruptive elements in the country rather than fighting perceived political elements. Both Nigeria and the US need to restructure their foreign policy goals towards each other for a more strategic relationship that would be mutually beneficial to each other; one that is also devoid of obvious economic and diplomatic imbalances. In specific terms, Nigeria needs a credible political culture that is capable of dictating the right path not only in the West African sub-region but on the African continent. A credible political culture will drive both internal and foreign policy initiatives capable of transforming Nigeria into a country that determines the tune for the rest of Africa’s foreign policy mandates. That way, Nigeria will get back to that era where the rest of the world would ask for Nigeria’s stand on any continental issue before taking a decision. We also advocate for Nigeria to prioritize its foreign policies, spending resources only on strategic bilateral relations that would help it to achieve its core national interests. The US definitely qualifies as one of the priority countries that Nigeria should continually engage as a strategic partner.

‘89

‘12

‘78

‘31 ‘08

‘18

‘Total ‘27

All products Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral … Cocoa and cocoa preparations Fertilisers Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons Lead and articles thereof Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal … Ships, boats and floating structures

Product Product label code

Value in 2010

Value in 2011

Value in 2012

Value in 2013

Value in 2014

Value in 2015

Value in 2016

Value in 2017

Value in 2018

Value in 2019

Value in 2020

514

979

0

0 2804

16,479

135,779

13,061

6

0 4674

50,066

136,267

3394

601

0 5171

45,474

130,620

12,439

4057

29 6444

461,082

17,610

2956

7218

42,927

552

0 1397

84,439

778

0 17,339

52,623

279,412

1648

637

0 1238

4215

0

1621

0

0 1427

2920

11,918

3352

1228

7235 7285

10,403

671

2408

76

7907 4707

2110

37,956

3956

3275

0 4741

5171

(continued)

3952

5633

5655

7963 5799

13,217

13,618,240 29,755,938 28,327,506 24,139,338 7,576,364 3,796,955 1,742,769 4,203,686 5,231,307 3,216,707 2,822,364 1,033,843 13,467,584 28,512,792 26,995,524 22,305,554 7,020,296 3,465,270 1,039,001 4,177,802 5,167,487 3,175,832 2,730,077 976,104

Value in 2009

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

Bilateral trade between Nigeria and United States of America

Appendix

‘03

‘06

‘88

‘23

‘67

Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles … Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates

Product Product label code

(continued)

39

14,020

6

6016

0

Value in 2009

70,984

1437

1240

3930

0

Value in 2010

1617

514

54,581

1739

0

Value in 2011

4866

1100

2418

392,036

0

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

8747

10,367

215

7806

645

Value in 2013

5381

1020

8040

5226

326

Value in 2014

4646

497

356,203

3455

4269

Value in 2015

3673

401

0

3464

7617

Value in 2016

3392

339

0

5248

7804

Value in 2017

3776

1662

0

3480

8629

Value in 2018

2322

1620

15,286

4919

6673

Value in 2019

1448

1636

1712

2522

3057

Value in 2020

‘20

‘91

‘19

‘41

‘38

‘21

‘07

‘76

‘39

‘09

‘25

Salt; Sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement Coffee, tea, maté and spices Plastics and articles thereof Aluminium and articles thereof Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers Miscellaneous edible preparations Miscellaneous chemical products Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks’ products Clocks and watches and parts thereof Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants

12

0

0

1530

628

0

141,327

458

655

538

116,839

230,851

2964

8

453

343

11

0

132

633

291

0

0

0

74

5397

572

918

28

3429

19,574

2576

0

2422

0

4984

51,579

3786

734

70

8893

30,367

1344

120

1071

0

1498

4196

1507

2547

882

2051

1039

9701

0

12

0

42

1353

3

225

4

949

798

1352

0

0

0

503

1223

0

263

8

80

2896

882

0

6

0

100

324

0

395

62

0

2270

914

0

0

0

55

156

0

210

162

0

3363

818

0

5

0

525

272

0

73

271

317

1138

1135

0

13

23

130

164

0

187

86

915

774

1365

0

(continued)

111

121

160

191

225

246

281

399

805

959

1227

‘52 ‘11

‘72 ‘70

‘15

‘63

‘22

‘24

Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes Beverages, spirits and vinegar Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal … Iron and steel Glass and glassware Cotton Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten

Product Product label code

(continued)

271 1052

0 381

0

0

643

6032

Value in 2009

1785 2944

643 1370

504

3914

4310

14,336

Value in 2010

0 220

7 135

536

295

476

82

Value in 2011

26,357 330

5815 3545

59

523

4242

7730

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

154 4230

1460 1774

438

258

383

0

Value in 2013

228 1154

0 0

0

25,890

49

0

Value in 2014

0 565

0 0

53

292

104

0

Value in 2015

0 141

0 0

174

0

97

0

Value in 2016

20 61

0 7

37

0

74

0

Value in 2017

0 271

0 16

228

0

76

0

Value in 2018

0 364

0 12

0

111

51

0

Value in 2019

28 14

37 29

53

65

65

109

Value in 2020

‘94

‘93

‘92

‘75

‘74

‘73

‘71

‘35

Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad … Articles of iron or steel Copper and articles thereof Nickel and articles thereof Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; …

0

0

1

0

0

1993

0

0

2541

0

0

0

181

6046

0

939

2462

0

0

0

4784

1123

0

0

458

0

0

0

2147

1414

0

55

3

0

0

0

6998

434

311

129

5

0

0

264

7469

33,676

0

0

0

0

55

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

664

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

32

0

0

0

0

0

276

0

0

0

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

11

‘36

‘90

‘99

‘97

‘96

‘95

Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof Miscellaneous manufactured articles Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques Commodities not elsewhere specified Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical … Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations

Product Product label code

(continued)

0

35

0

0

0

0

Value in 2009

0

305

0

72

126

39

Value in 2010

0

1488

0

0

82

1

Value in 2011

0

567

0

0

3

0

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

0

830

0

0

22,486

6

Value in 2013

102,462

454

0

4

2926

0

Value in 2014

4629

1677

0

3

3602

1

Value in 2015

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2016

0

88

0

0

0

0

Value in 2017

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2018

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2019

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2020

‘29

‘28

‘26

‘34

‘33

‘32

‘37

Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, … Organic chemicals

Photographic or cinematographic goods Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring … Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial … Ores, slag and ash

10

21,612

0

17

6

1019

0

89,956

234

240

3

185

29

0

28,365

946

429

651

507

0

0

26,343

1510

2584

326

1778

1142

1

9665

6

0

0

321

3

112

0

0

3184

4

0

0

0

0

6

980

6

3

0

0

0

0

0

174

10

0

0

0

0

0

33

0

0

0

0

0

0

683

0

0

0

0

0

0

222

0

0

0

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

‘10 ‘04

‘14

‘13

‘17

‘16

‘30

Pharmaceutical products Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates Sugars and sugar confectionery Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included Cereals Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere …

Product Product label code

(continued)

0 0

0

561

101

0

0

Value in 2009

9 2786

0

906

0

0

0

Value in 2010

455 12

0

510

0

0

3

Value in 2011

1 343,199

0

4735

1991

0

185

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

417 2216

0

1364

0

8

0

Value in 2013

0 4

0

0

0

61

0

Value in 2014

0 399

0

0

0

1774

0

Value in 2015

3 0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2016

5 35

0

0

10

0

0

Value in 2017

0 0

0

0

0

79

0

Value in 2018

3 0

0

22

4

66

329

Value in 2019

0 0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2020

‘58

‘57

‘56

‘55

‘54

‘53

‘01 ‘02

‘05

Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included Live animals Meat and edible meat offal Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials Man-made staple fibres Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof Carpets and other textile floor coverings Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery

0

0

0

230

0

0

7 0

0

0

0

453

1261

0

0

2 0

0

0

0

0

188

1

0

0 0

0

0

0

1

1248

8

0

42,990 1980

11

31

0

25

0

0

0

1 9

10

0

0

0

233

0

0

0 0

62

0

0

0

0

0

0

2 0

82

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0

27

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0

13

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 0

0

‘43

‘42

‘62

‘61

‘60

‘59

Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable … Knitted or crocheted fabrics Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles … Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof

Product Product label code

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2009

8

160

0

3

0

0

Value in 2010

0

0

718

0

0

0

Value in 2011

0

0

798

12,452

0

0

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

0

0

0

0

4

0

Value in 2013

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2014

0

0

9

0

0

0

Value in 2015

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2016

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2017

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2018

0

0

0

0

325

0

Value in 2019

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2020

‘50

‘49

‘48

‘47

‘46

‘45

‘44

Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal Cork and articles of cork Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or … Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, … Silk

0

17

0

0

0

0

284

0

4161

0

165

0

0

22,378

0

203

7

2

0

0

2879

0

1042

35

99

0

0

690

0

76,281

1

0

0

0

12,432

0

222

9

0

0

0

2069

0

277

0

0

0

0

29

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

77

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

‘80

‘79

‘69

‘68

‘40

‘66

‘65

‘64

‘51

Value in 2009

0 0

13

18

0

973,881

0

0

1512

0

Value in 2011

0

287

0

44,209

0

0

169,724

0

Value in 2010

0

0

0

258

168,666

0

0

5910

0

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

Wool, fine or 0 coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric Footwear, gaiters 97 and the like; parts of such articles Headgear and 0 parts thereof Umbrellas, sun 0 umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof Rubber and 7429 articles thereof Articles of stone, 0 plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials Ceramic 0 products Zinc and articles 34 thereof 0 Tin and articles thereof

Product Product label code

(continued)

0

0

4

0

163,091

0

0

0

0

Value in 2013

0

0

0

0

6634

0

0

0

0

Value in 2014

0

0

21

14

479

0

0

0

0

Value in 2015

0

0

0

0

56

0

0

0

0

Value in 2016

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2017

0

0

0

0

224

0

0

0

0

Value in 2018

767

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2019

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Value in 2020

‘85

‘84

‘83

‘82

‘81

Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal Miscellaneous articles of base metal Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television …

3589

61,552

0

4

0

2332

86,386

5

47

0

981

20,372

0

1895

0

3248

31,964

224

68

2

2486

72,910

0

13

0

328

11,355

262

254

0

6390

16,777

0

699

0

0

0

0

0

0

50

426

0

0

0

0

22

0

0

0

140

0

0

0

0

(continued)

0

0

0

0

0

Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures … Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof

316

5

Value in 2009

532

270

Value in 2010

3787

41

Value in 2011

5478

183

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s exports to United States of America

Note: Units are in Thousand Dollars

‘87

‘86

Product Product label code

(continued)

1460

145

Value in 2013

662

72

Value in 2014

1841

258

Value in 2015

0

0

Value in 2016

0

0

Value in 2017

0

0

Value in 2018

0

0

Value in 2019

0

0

Value in 2020

‘73 ‘85

‘22

‘49

‘27

‘10 ‘39

‘84

‘Total ‘87

All products Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof Cereals Plastics and articles thereof Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral … Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, … Beverages, spirits and vinegar Articles of iron or steel Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television …

Product Product label code

109,575 81,468

1842

4430

2592

109,891 84,814

530,943

2,041,594 595,778

Value in 2009

Value in 2011

Value in 2012

Value in 2013

Value in 2014

Value in 2015

Value in 2016

Value in 2017

Value in 2018

Value in 2019

Value in 2020

254,650 634,093

26,966

55,367

114,224

727,874 264,435

246,198 292,378

46,419

122,426

3,524,502

2,917,066 270,144

2,091,721 839,158

541,796

165,067 241,900

69,001

20,826

144,569

197,536 147,140

19,517

10,435

468,023

1,111,130 791,828 254,803 170,767

760,327

184,094 165,258

74,337

11,780

415,881

865,978 202,887

660,812

150,921 100,578

133,902 118,236

34,774

9788

8435

48,575

315,426

433,698 157,937

509,807

181,500

625,041 185,963

413,744

47,835 72,861

81,375

6704

328,095

478,816 114,700

310,458

71,232 85,009

76,466

8275

624,584

232,683 121,525

371,076

131,938 129,252

160,973

182,143

253,889

509,586 289,828

684,665

(continued)

42,801 179,462

136,659

8026

274,799

505,020 192,934

694,415

7,936,544 11,517,283 4,886,971 3,852,503 4,549,027 2,958,504 2,878,904 2,292,320 2,679,911 4,679,670 4,802,911 1,478,024 1,899,984 1,277,108 686,659 1,217,595 597,367 493,599 535,867 715,395 1,803,707 1,956,887

Value in 2010

Nigeria’s imports from United States of America

Bilateral trade between Nigeria and United States of America

‘33

‘29 ‘89

‘03

‘47

‘21

‘48

‘88

‘90

‘38

Value in 2009

21,599

28,376 51,688

58,015

9059

39,329

50,947

21,005

243,375

120,766

Value in 2010

10,352

31,361 73,604

37,213

11,423

10,021

101,496

7992

41,028

72,795

Value in 2011

11,272

56,691 58,046

68,880

11,550

23,966

52,811

19,942

43,234

102,666

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s imports from United States of America

Miscellaneous chemical 103,137 products Optical, photographic, 32,099 cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical … Aircraft, spacecraft, and 6392 parts thereof Paper and paperboard; 25,787 articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard Miscellaneous edible 1382 preparations Pulp of wood or of other 153 fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or … Fish and crustaceans, 12,278 molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates Organic chemicals 39,917 Ships, boats and floating 16,290 structures Essential oils and 1682 resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations

Product Product label code

(continued)

7248

13,397 72,781

15,894

9740

195,846

46,038

15,873

43,476

110,955

Value in 2013

6170

29,397 129,527

4665

6333

25,937

51,732

18,103

60,666

84,738

Value in 2014

6119

19,790 43,481

16,788

5395

26,619

25,494

10,869

40,301

79,560

Value in 2015

6525

9896 163,143

1005

9362

25,710

16,374

153,488

38,349

67,336

Value in 2016

4042

10,031 19,939

8970

8748

18,873

16,205

38,322

33,375

35,507

Value in 2017

1606

8510 14,217

7339

16,857

24,402

17,933

51,324

37,211

37,282

Value in 2018

2772

11,311 409,222

12,560

12,209

36,032

13,949

61,132

69,426

59,543

Value in 2019

15,147

16,762 15,921

23,315

25,461

29,311

31,508

40,906

62,294

77,565

Value in 2020

‘82

‘15

‘94

‘11

‘30 ‘40

‘19

‘28

‘54

Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, … Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks’ products Pharmaceutical products Rubber and articles thereof Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; … Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal … Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal 47,271

29,602

46,803

29,906

3366

135,900 228,756

13,933

20,476

2345

262

2903

113

3081 45,121

4190

2681

95

32,124

143,546

22,660

37,705

92,718 279,959

7062

8828

921

15,032

32,390

34,311

2423

24,066 22,656

7450

11,668

587

19,372

24,110

8955

1069

3252 34,929

1528

10,346

296

17,341

33,848

5418

2275

3461 17,195

2358

10,404

3952

12,668

59,024

27,588

1885

4822 13,415

2241

9593

10,892

7358

23,372

17,673

2100

3742 11,257

1679

9517

10,982

3161

16,089

1604

2002

956 6707

1500

11,001

12,213

4645

10,404

1868

1534

3833 10,180

1719

13,657

10,417

6626

2826

3047

1284

11,270 10,367

8243

11,871

12,697

(continued)

6332

6609

6825

8081

10,990 9334

11,432

14,167

14,589

‘59

‘86

‘63

‘35

‘83

‘24

‘32

‘34

Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial … Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring … Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes Miscellaneous articles of base metal Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures … Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable …

Product Product label code

(continued)

39,373

608

4107

1200

4461

23,729

7066

4297

Value in 2009

177,591

6259

5128

6984

17,718

35,066

53,857

29,238

Value in 2010

23,984

774

21,545

10,877

57,700

6349

21,977

37,034

Value in 2011

8020

5872

5609

6693

16,456

11,380

10,380

11,089

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s imports from United States of America

6105

5251

1571

6119

12,217

7959

8598

4382

Value in 2013

4735

6306

1817

5658

9101

11,127

8149

4601

Value in 2014

2150

932

1131

2559

9468

8263

7890

4182

Value in 2015

1165

720

605

4091

12,040

3995

4979

4347

Value in 2016

571

123

342

2153

1845

6658

2525

7822

Value in 2017

919

135

6963

2748

17,722

7378

6794

3749

Value in 2018

3500

3272

1401

3691

3818

4186

4624

5419

5639

Value in 2020

884

3951

2148

12,699

5351

2352

5201

Value in 2019

‘69

‘72 ‘62

‘41

‘61

‘17

‘64

‘76

‘95

‘55 ‘44

‘23

‘68

‘56

‘74

Copper and articles thereof Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder Man-made staple fibres Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof Aluminium and articles thereof Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles Sugars and sugar confectionery Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather Iron and steel Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted Ceramic products

9158

33,716 475

1632

0

477

523

1248

1137

97 539

179

2338

10,337

350

143,830

92,490 1509

84,705

674

36,770

21,944

20,302

26,612

2258 15,235

6849

6778

12,414

5752

3119

21,669 5085

529

5999

13,218

1065

10,074

2084

390 6822

4181

1801

2751

821

4780

10,974 957

234

272

36,379

1946

16,736

2390

1557 4253

8913

3893

4699

1794

3490

7252 743

59

306

31,495

376

15,873

2899

181 1279

9286

1436

1413

943

3036

12,569 993

50

1169

40,740

905

21,290

2732

793 515

13,332

1994

2619

2416

3789

4263 913

177

450

1418

1447 726

86

648

1448

559

547 20,794

1955

2021

4803 301

4422

853

1212

581

4569

2180

1869 477

7264

2628

1844

6062

851

678 661

130

620

1656

393

2907

1274

2041 547

1726

656

1361

1423

1602

2907 533

73

1066

1540

795

5775

1410

607 315

1839

434

1711

991

1970

2493 1691

695

1178

1672

1315

1777

1646

1489 1401

2465

1166

1100

1268

(continued)

1358

1467 1363

1479

1591

1650

1755

1829

1967

2344 2155

2619

2909

2931

3202

‘42

‘09

‘81

‘91

‘96

‘58

‘04

‘13

‘70 ‘75

‘25

Salt; Sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement Glass and glassware Nickel and articles thereof Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere … Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery Miscellaneous manufactured articles Clocks and watches and parts thereof Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof Coffee, tea, maté and spices Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles …

Product Product label code

(continued)

163

95

0

30

5387

103

4451

58

1943 13

4689

Value in 2009

850

10,276

259

1265

14,157

467

59,114

2184

38,166 1

11,793

Value in 2010

91

885

6

91

832

717

4847

4854

2134 106

10,436

Value in 2011

338

735

101

389

1185

1094

7237

3627

3514 24

29,743

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s imports from United States of America

297

436

151

430

660

186

5026

1783

993 206

6359

Value in 2013

115

108

231

107

716 348

98

1008

1556

26,850

383

545 836

3526

Value in 2015

153

934

699

8468

1833

1034 796

9972

Value in 2014

96

763

170

253

654

786

13,528

896

971 3747

1100

Value in 2016

171

164

53

377

425

361

4467

1146

320 1433

587

Value in 2017

1234

113

14

471

365

111

2562

973

404 37

2692

Value in 2018

804

284

42

1348

1002

268

338

245

964 314

353

Value in 2019

513

593

597

640

651

740

795

799

1112 1029

1245

Value in 2020

‘50

‘05

‘52 ‘08

‘20

‘65

‘71

‘18

‘53

‘07

‘36

‘12

Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal … Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn Cocoa and cocoa preparations Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad … Headgear and parts thereof Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants Cotton Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included Silk

12

12

0 0

3033

4883

53

7

59

7

844

21

13

398

537 890

53,460

675

745

214

530

2457

2155

43,426

0

233

166

313 531

212 190

491

3437

300

16

401

17

161

2538

1134

5042

694

22

37,877

0

126

2823

291

54

284

103 4655

12,771

197

93

797

3

543

479

453

0

172

188 4273

32,159

642

83

196

0

651

2181

823

0

238

371 188

18,534

1063

238

47

1

277

2004

31,864

16

38

79 146

5573

1200

82

241

4

368

468

210

12

40

224 237

2596

1236

107

109

337

99

1925

74

5

11

123 352

140

265

192

444

1878

415

951

15,788

89

46

109 240

730

1432

274

529

3841

140

1739

11,227

(continued)

121

128

151 135

164

177

293

352

369

405

443

506

‘37

‘79 ‘45 ‘31 ‘02

‘97

‘06

‘93

‘92

‘67

‘66

Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles … Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques Zinc and articles thereof Cork and articles of cork Fertilisers Meat and edible meat offal Photographic or cinematographic goods

Product Product label code

(continued)

462

46 2 76 2

2

0

192

501

896

499

Value in 2009

4561

617 112 58,316 0

11

9

95

632

10,164

551

Value in 2010

412

109 2 1185 0

13

117

120

545

44

8

Value in 2011

592

736 9 4972 0

18

7

2

881

321

278

Value in 2012

Nigeria’s imports from United States of America

112

368 4 15,276 0

53

0

8

161

442

11

Value in 2013

427

189 46 7195 0

4

5

62

239

447

43

Value in 2014

175

93 7 41,429 29

7

3

36

409

226

80

Value in 2015

488

7 53 6142 2

30

3

16

61

53

17

Value in 2016

419

9225 20 13 392

12

1

5

71

26

17

Value in 2017

423

22 21 202 0

22

21

10

177

86

16

Value in 2018

15

17 99 4 7

53

0

946

381

72

85

Value in 2019

14

27 20 18 15

30

33

41

60

64

115

Value in 2020

‘99

‘14

‘80 ‘26 ‘60

‘01 ‘16

‘51

‘78 ‘43

‘46

‘57

Carpets and other textile floor coverings Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork Lead and articles thereof Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric Live animals Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates Tin and articles thereof Ores, slag and ash Knitted or crocheted fabrics Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included Commodities not elsewhere specified

0

0

0 274 0

0 1

19

10 0

0

0

0

0

0 1218 27

2239 243

3

367 6

307

2

0

0

0 863 30

3 110

4

17 0

0

3

0

1

1 784 573

120 457

231

37 60

1

4

0

0

0 989 0

9 10

0

5 12

0

44

0

10

0 4941 19

6 19

21

68 3

5

51

0

74

0 2567 15

0 6

16

71 0

80

41

0

0

60 1 0

6 47

10

49 0

0

11

0

0

10 0 33

4 17

620

0 0

1

14

0

23

0 2 3

15 16

96

0 0

2

24

0

35

4 0 3

3 0

3

0 2

0

61

0

0

2 1 1

3 2

3

4 3

11

12

158 

M. O. MADUAGWU AND C. O. OLEH

References Adegun, A. (2017). Updated: Why 82 kidnapped Chibok girls were released by Boko Haram. Retrieved July 24, 2018, from www.naija.ng Adeniran, T. (1983). Introduction to international relations. Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Ajayi, E.  A. (1972). Nigeria-soviet relations. Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 1, 3. Akinterinwa, B. A. (Ed.). (2007). Nigeria’s national interest in a globalising world: Foreign policy interests in the innermost circle (Vol. 2). Bolytag International Publishers, (2018). Amoa, B. O. (2011). Overview of the key security issues and infrastructural challenges facing West Africa. Retrieved January 24, 2020, from www.waansa. org/indexphp Ate, B. E. (1987). Decolonization and dependence: The development of Nigeria-US relations, 1960–84. Westview Press. Ayam, J. A. (2008). The development of Nigeria-U.S. relations. Journal of Third World Studies, XXV(2): 117–132. Retrieved January 24, 2020, from http:// media.web.britannica.com.pdf. Davies. (1953). This is Liberia. The William Fredrick Press Ltd. Ehikioya, A. (2018). How we secured Dapchi schoolgirls’ release – DSS. Retrieved January 4, 2020, from www.thenationonlineng.net Embassy of the United States in Nigeria. (2000). “Defense Secretary Cohen holds Press Conference in Nigeria”, Crossroads (April 2000). Embassy of the United States in Nigeria. (2001). “No Defense Pact, No Base, No Invasion” in Crossroads (March 2001). Erunke, J. (2016, January 28). Boko Haram: Why US refused to sell arms to Jonathan – Activist. Vanguard. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://www. vanguardngr.com Faul, M. (2014, May 11). Nigeria refused help to search for kidnapped girls. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 30, 2014, from www.washingtonpost.com Garuba, C. (ed). (1996). Principles, culture and values: Influences on Nigeria’s role in international peace and security. House of Commons. (2016). DFID’s Programme in Nigeria – Parliament (publications). Retrieved, April 21, 2020, from https://publications.parliament.uk.pdf Ijediogo, G. (2010, January 9). Controversial terror list: America’s unrighteous anger. The Guardian, 10, 40. JFK Library. (1961). America welcomes Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Belawa of Nigeria. Retrieved March 2019 from https://www.jfklibrary.org Maduagwu, M.  O. (2006). The United States military policy on sub-Saharan Africa: A case study of Nigeria. In C. Ikonne & S. I. Radda (Eds.), Nigeria-US

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relations: The challenges of international understanding in the new millennium (pp. 13–34). University of Port Harcourt Press. Maduagwu, M.  O. (2018). Leadership and challenges of ethnic nationalism in contemporary Nigeria: A sober reflection. In A.  Muhammad-Wali, M.  O. Maduagwu, S.  Dauda, & A.  A. Karim (Eds.), Cultural values, ethnic nationalism and contemporary governance in Nigeria: Issues, challenges and perspectives (pp. 115–114). Institute for Security Studies. Mantzikos, I. (2014). Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria and neighbouring countries: A chronology of attacks. Retrieved May 31, 2020, from www.terrorismanalysts.com Morgenthau, H. J. (1952, December). Another great debate: The national interest of the United States. The American Political Science Review, XLVI, 961–962. Mikell, G. (2008). Players, policies and prospects: Nigeria-US relations. In A. Adebajo & A. R. Mustapha (Eds.), Gulliver’s troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy after the cold war. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Odoh, I. (2020, March 4). Boko Haram: US declares war on Shakau, places $7m bounty on him. Business day. Retrieved May 31, 2020, from https:// businessday.ng Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2018. U.S.-Nigeria trade facts. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://ustr.gov Olaosebikan, A. J. (2011). Kwame Nkrumah and the proposed African common government. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 5(4), 218–228. Retrieved April 27, 2020, from http://www.academicjournals. org/ajpsir. Olojo, A. (2019, July 31). Humanitarian aid in Nigeria’s north-east: Helping or hurting, ReliefWeb. Retrieved June 20, 2020, from https://reliefweb.int/ report/nigeria/humanitarian-­aid-. O’Neill, A. (2021). Nigeria: Gross domestic product (GDP) in current prices from 1996 to 2026. Statista Retrieved July 23, 2021, from https://www.statista.com. Osaretin, I., & Ajebon, H. C. (2012). The United States and Nigeria relations: Diplomatic row over official terrorist label. Global Journal of Social Sciences, 11(1), 53–61. Retrieved, June 20, 2020, from www.globaljournalseries.com. Sanderson, G.  N. (1974). The European partition of Africa. The Journal of Imperial Commonwealth History, 3(1), 26. Retrieved April 6, 2020, from www. ustr.gov/countries-­regions/africa/nigeria Shepard, R. R. (1991). Nigeria, Africa and the United States; From Kennedy to Reagan. Indiana University Press. Siollun, M. (2015, February 3). No helicopters for you. Retrieved May 31, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/03/nigeria-­boko-­haram-­obama-­ goodluck-­jonathan/ Sonnichsen, N. (2021). U.S. petroleum imports from Nigeria 2000-2020 Statista. Retrieved July 23, 2021, from https://www.statista.com Statista.

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Stremlau, J. (1977). The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967–70. Princeton University Press. This Day. (2018, September 3). Global military strength: Nigeria ranked 43rd. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from thisdaylive.com The Commonwealth. (1995). Nigeria suspended from the Commonwealth. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from https://thecommonwealth.org. United Nations. (2020). Islamic State West Africa province. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from https://www.un.org. United States Department of State. (n.d.). Foreign terrorist organizations. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from https://www.state.gov/. United States Office of the Historian. (n.d.). A guide to the United States’ history of recognition, diplomatic, and consular relations by country, since 1776: Nigeria. Retrieved July 26, 2021, from https://history.state.gov/countries/nigeria U.S.  Department of State. (2021). Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the virtual U.S.Nigeria health partnership event. Retrieved July 22, from https://www.state.gov/ secretary-­antony-­j-­blinken-­at-­the-­virtual-­u-­s-­nigeria-­health-­partnership-­event/ U.S.  Embassy in Nigeria. (2017). USAID’s role in providing humanitarian assistance to the Boko Haram ravaged zone. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://ng.usembassy.gov/usaids-­r ole-­providing-­humanitarian-­assistance-­ boko-­haram-­ravaged-­zone/ World City. (2020). U.S. trade numbers. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from www. ustradenumbers.com.

CHAPTER 7

Nigeria-UK Relations in the Twenty-First Century Napoleon Enayaba

Introduction Nigeria is a former colony of the UK. Historical ties between Nigeria and the UK date back to before colonisation. The experience of the relationship between the UK and Nigeria during the global slave trade and colonialism was one that raises strong emotions and concerns. This relationship has evolved, but the complexity of this relationship has continued to define the relationship between the UK and the government of Nigeria, on the one hand, and the relationship between the UK and Nigerians, on the other hand. For many of the peoples of Nigeria, evading slavery was their first experience of meeting the UK. Some Nigerians are unhappy that the UK was instrumental in bringing together present-day Nigeria under one country, Nigeria. At the same time, the UK was the first country to abolish the slave trade with the introduction of the 1807 Abolition of the Slave Trade Act (UK.GOV. (2016, March)). The Royal Navy Squadron was instrumental in enforcing an end to the slave trade global. The UK is

N. Enayaba (*) Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation (CDSD), Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_7

161

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number one of Nigeria’s closest allies. The UK, after colonising Nigeria for about 50 years after the 1914 Amalgamation, left behind a legacy that has continued to influence most aspects of Nigerian national life (Vincent et al., 2017; Lucas, 2020). Since independence in 1960, the UK and Nigeria have established mutual diplomatic relations across different areas of endeavours, including political, social and economic but few to mention. Besides the Dikko covert operation that led to breakdown of diplomatic relations in 1984, the UK and Nigeria have enjoyed a mutually cordial and beneficial relationship since 1960. During Nigeria’s civil war from 1967 to 1970, the UK did not hide its preference for continuous one, indivisible and united Nigeria where people are equal irrespective of tribal, religious and ethnic affiliations. Although there are marked areas at multilateral levels where Nigeria has maintained its political ideology of non-­alignment, this has not strained the relationship between Nigeria and the UK. The views of non-alignment have been a major driving factor in Nigeria’s engagement at the United Nations, but some schools of thought have argued that Nigeria has always aligned but in its interest. Notwithstanding, Nigeria and the UK have always found a way around their relationship being members of the Commonwealth (founded on 11 December 1931 with over 54 member nations). Nigeria is the UK’s second-largest trading partner in Africa after South Africa with EURO 6 billion (about N2.4 trillion) in bilateral trade volume by 2016 and EURO 10 billion (about N4.3 trillion) in 2019. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Nigeria-UK relationship has seen even more growth. On both sides, the rate of change in world politics has been of huge influence on this relationship but, more significantly, the traditional ties. Owing to this traditional bilateral tie, the relationship has evolved from Abuja to London into people-to-people (Nuamah, 2003) ties. The population of Nigerians in the UK, the worth of Nigeria business and diaspora Nigerian transaction between Nigeria and the UK have become one of the many dimensions that UK and Nigeria relationship has taken over time. The increasing importance of people-to-people links is seen in the demographics, with some estimates putting the number of Nigerians in the UK at around one million. Although according to D. Clark, “there were approximately 178 thousand Nigerian nationals residing in the UK in 2021, a large increase from the 90 thousand Nigerian nationals residing in the UK in 2008.” (quoted in Statista, 2021). The significance of the

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163

relationship is particularly evident in the impact that the new generation of British-Nigerians is having on British society, and members of this group are increasingly represented in many sectors of British life including business, the arts and culture. A number of common aspirations and points of connectedness have and will continue to shape UK-Nigeria relationship. On the one hand, Nigeria’s foreign policy is deeply rooted in Africa with strategic emphasis on political and economic cooperation, democratisation of Africa and dispute resolution. Nigeria and the UK relate across these themes. In recent years, owing to insurgency and other crimes, Nigerian leaders also have their attention fixed on defence and security bilateral relationship with other countries besides an age-long colonial relationship with the UK. In some instances, both the UK and Nigeria have risen to the occasion to stand by each other in difficult times. Then UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to Nigeria on 8 August 2018 was an important step up in UK-Nigeria effort against terrorism. The UK government has shown incremental commitment at improving its footprint in Nigeria. The signing of the first ever UK-Nigeria security and defence partnership in 2018 which tackles shared threats with increased military training and the supply of vital equipment is one of those many commitments. On the other hand, the UK is one of Nigeria’s strongest allies. Nigeria and the UK are strong partners bilaterally and in the Commonwealth with mutual security and prosperity strengthened by close cooperation (UK. GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). The bilateral strategic partnership cuts across common opportunities and mutual threats. An estimated 190,000 people (with a confidence interval (CI) of 21,000) were born in Nigeria live in the UK (UK Office for National Statics, 2020, May 18). Of this figure, 102,000 (CI 15,000) people with Nigerian citizenship live in the UK. Just as Nigeria, the UK supports the interests of British nationals working and living in Nigeria. There are also growing commercial ties, including through a new Economic Development Forum, to help identify and overcome barriers to trade and investment. Nigeria is the largest economy and most populous country in Africa. The current population of Nigeria is 206,990,089, based on projections of the latest United Nations data (WPR, 2020). Nigeria will be the third most populous country in the world after China and India (World Meter, 2020) with an estimated Population growth of 400 million by 2050 (World Bank, 2019). It has the world’s tenth largest proven oil reserves and the ninth largest natural gas reserves (NS Energy,

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2019). The UK-Nigeria trade relationship was worth £4 billion in 2015 and has grown significantly over the years. Nigeria is therefore a significant trade and investment partner for the UK in Africa. However, Nigeria faces a number of challenges to its future growth and development. Conflict continues to affect its oil-rich delta region, bandits have displaced many out of their homes in the north-west and there is a violent Islamist insurgency in its north-east and spreading into the north-­ west which has caused a humanitarian crisis. Despite significant natural resources, more than one in four (57 million) out of Nigeria’s over 206 million population do not have access to safe water and two-thirds (over 130 million) lack adequate sanitation. Ten million children are out of school and more than half of the population (112 million) live in extreme poverty. Many Nigerians, especially girls, are highly vulnerable and at risk of being trafficked to Europe including the UK. To lift these 112 million Nigerians out of extreme poverty, not less than US$24 billion is needed, an amount that is smaller than the combined wealth of the five richest Nigerians (estimated at US$29.9 billion). The richest Nigerian man would take 42 years to spend all his wealth, even at a rate of US$1 million a day (Hallum & Obeng, 2019). The government of Nigeria is taking the lead to tackle these issues but struggles with corruption, as well as the necessary capacity and resources required. The UK is focused on helping Nigeria overcome these challenges. The UK support shared goals with Nigeria on prosperity, security, migration, education, development and cooperation in the international field. The Department for International Development (DFID) leads the UK’s global efforts to end extreme poverty, deliver the Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDGs) and tackle a wide range of global development challenges. The UK’s focus and international leadership on economic development is a vital part of Global UK. The UK is supporting the effort to harness the potential of new trade relationships, creating jobs and channelling investment to the world’s poorest countries, including Nigeria. The UK believes that sustained job-creating growth has played the greatest role in lifting many people out of poverty. The plan is to replicate this belief by supporting systems that create jobs and, by so doing, bring about growth in Nigeria. Whilst there is an urgent need for traditional aid in many parts of the world, ultimately economic development is how the UK hopes to achieve the Global Goals and help countries move beyond the need for aid.

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UK: Development Aid to Nigeria The UK’s development assistance to Nigeria is predominantly delivered through DFID.  There are also a number of efforts led through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). UK aid is tackling human trafficking and crime that directly affects the UK, supporting economic opportunities for Nigerians within Nigeria. Other areas are political, military, intelligence and trade engagement and contribution towards a more peaceful, democratic and prosperous Nigeria. These in turn prevent migration, foster stability and reduce the risk of violent extremism. DFID’s development programme covers a range of areas, particularly capacity development and empowerment to strengthen Nigeria’s agricultural sector and domestic manufacturing base, employment opportunities and tax collection; systems transparency and removal of constraints on the ease of doing business; quality investment and improved competitiveness. According to the DFID Nigeria report of 2018, the planned budget for the 2018/2019 financial year was £235  million, and for 2019/2020, £220  million. The contribution to the Global Goals and other government commitments including Nigeria (achieved as of March 2018) include: • 242,000 children supported to gain a decent education, • 3.5 million people with sustainable access to clean water and/or sanitation, • 10.3 million children under 5, women and adolescent girls reached through nutrition-related interventions; • 347,000 additional women and girls using modern methods of family planning between 2015 and 2017. In recent years, deliverable for DFID Nigeria focused on humanitarian (particularly in north-east Nigeria) and building resilience to crises, economic development and basic services and building stability and institutions. In 2017, then Foreign Secretary and now Prime Minister Boris Johnson and then International Development Secretary and now Secretary of State for the Home Department Priti Patel visited Nigeria to see how the UK is leading the international response to the humanitarian crisis, helping to avert famine and building stability and security in the northeast (Daka, 2019).

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The UK increased and extended DFID’s humanitarian programme in Nigeria over five years (2017–2022) following the visit of Boris Johnson and Priti Patel to deliver: 1. lifesaving food for more than 1.5 million people on the brink of famine; 2. treatment for up to 120,000 children at risk of dying from severe acute malnutrition; 3. ongoing support to help keep 100,000 girls and boys in school to get a decent education, providing a brighter future for the next generation; 4. safe humanitarian access to transport brave aid workers and deliver aid to the hardest to reach areas, for example using helicopters where roads are blocked or dangerous to use. (UK.GOV, 2017a) Through DFID, the UK government spent £2,490,271,610.1 on international development assistance to Nigeria and covering health care, governance reforms, Justice Reforms and anti-corruption programmes amongst many other thematic areas between 2006 and 2013 (Development tracker Nigeria, year). The UK as one of the biggest donors in Nigeria has helped to ameliorate the worsen state of hunger and education, especially among children. In northern Nigeria, more than 50% of girls have no experience of formal education and 80% of women and young girls can neither read nor write. This number of girls who are excluded from the education sector is staggering and further incentivises the inability of women to compete favourably with their male folks. Consequently, women and girls are often unable to make their own contributions towards the development of their society, some of which only they can make. In 2017, UK aid provided life-saving support to more than 1 million people facing famine-like conditions in north-east Nigeria. As of 2019, UK aid helped to improve the lives of some most vulnerable societies in Nigeria through creating jobs, better health and education. At least, 11.9 million people have received support enabling better nutrition and 500,000 children supported to have access to decent education. UK aid also supported the government of Nigeria to deliver a long-term response to cope with crisis, gradually supporting effort towards dependency on international humanitarian assistance.

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To improve government and its institutions’ effectiveness, transparency and accountability to citizens, UK aid supported federal and state-level governments through a number of locally led initiatives by Nigeria civil society organisations including elections process. A number of institutions across anti-corruption, human trafficking, migration and so on have been and are still receiving support to help improve effectiveness and efficiency in accordance with laws establishing them. UK yearly development assistance in Nigeria is below half a billion UK pounds. The UK has been among the leaders of the international response to the humanitarian and stability crisis in the north-east of Nigeria. Other areas are rehabilitation of girls and women affected by insurgency, security infrastructural support and reform. The UK scaled up humanitarian funding from £1 million in 2014 to 2015 to £74 million in 2016 and £100 million in 2017. In 2016, the UK delivered food assistance to more than 1 million people and treated 34,000 children at risk of death from severe under-nourishment in Nigeria. The UK provided essential household items to more than 225,000 people who have fled from their homes and provided more than 135,000 people access to clean water and sanitation (UK.GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). As provided in UK law, aid assistance yearly is up to 0.7% of Gross National Income. The UK has been steadfast in its resolve to collaborate with Nigeria to support social and economic development. There is however the need for Nigeria to move away from reliance on development assistance. This would in turn allow Nigeria to better prioritise its development partnership to be more an exchange of ideas, a transfer of technologies and a genuinely balanced trade relationship. The position of the UK as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, G7, and of course, the Commonwealth could be some of the very enticing advantages that Nigeria can harness to support peace and security with Nigeria.

UK Assistance to Nigeria: Security and Defence Partnership Nigeria and the UK signed their first ever UK-Nigeria security and defence partnership in August 2018 (UK.GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). Of particular significance was the visit of UK Prime Minister Theresa May to Abuja and Lagos in August 2018. Nigeria was one of three African countries (including Kenya and South Africa) visited by May as part of a

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mission to reset the UK’s relations with former colonies in Africa (Tayo, 2019). The UK’s Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson also visited Nigeria in November of the same year. He reiterated the UK’s commitment to the agreement stressing that it was in his country’s interest to help keep Nigeria secure to avoid insurgents establishing a caliphate and plotting attacks against the West (Daily Mail, 2018). The partnership is transforming the way the UK and Nigeria worked together to tackle shared threats and helping to make both countries safe and free from terrorist threats. The partnership laid the foundation for a series of initiatives geared towards helping Nigeria defeat Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. Under the new partnership, the UK is expanding its provision of equipment and training for the Nigerian military to help them protect themselves from the threat of improvised explosive devices used by terrorists. This is ensuring the safety of soldiers’ lives on the frontline and equipping them to combat insurgency-style tactics. The UK had also offered to help Nigeria—for the first time within the frame of this defence and security partnership—train full army units before they deploy to the north-east. Before the partnership, the UK has trained more than 30,000 Nigerian troops since 2015 of whom a significant number have been deployed on counter-insurgency operations in north-east Nigeria (UK.GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). This includes counter-­ terrorism cooperation, providing training on response to terrorist attacks, bomb scene management and improving aviation security. By tackling the threat posed by insurgents and bandits in Nigeria, the UK government has helped to ensure long-term security in the area, so that people who have lost everything are kept safe and can rebuild their lives. Through the new partnership, the UK and Nigeria governments will work together to: 1. deliver a new £13 million programme to educate 100,000 children living in the conflict zone whose teachers have fled and schools been destroyed, by providing equipment, teacher training and safe places to learn; 2. implement a new Nigerian crisis response mechanism, similar to the UK’s COBR system, to help the government respond to incidents like terror attacks so it can protect its citizens and British nationals and businesses in the country;

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3. Cut the number of new recruits joining Boko Haram by tackling the lies and false information spread by the group to attract new members—including by working with communities to push out counter-­ narratives and drawing on the UK’s experience of countering terrorist propaganda at home and as part of the global campaign against Daesh (UK.GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). Beyond terrorism, Theresa May said the agreement set out how Nigeria and the UK would work together to strengthen policing, reduce piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, tackle organised crime—including kidnapping and trafficking—and stamp out corruption. A new civil asset recovery task force is also in place as part of this task force meant to help Nigeria recover stolen assets held in the UK and stop criminals from using the UK as a safe haven for the proceeds of corruption (UK.GOV, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). This agreement has since then set the foundation for increasing security and military relationship between the UK and the Nigerian government.

Bilateral Economic Relations In May 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo inherited a nation with a battered image and without credibility externally. The country was more or less a pariah nation with negative and offensive international media attention (Abdul & Ibrahim, 2013). To shift the tide, Nigeria made a concerted effort to boost foreign investment. President Olusegun Obasanjo introduced a number of anti-corruption institutions between 1999 and 2003 to encourage influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by reassuring the international community of safety of their investment. In 2017 post Nigeria’s recession between 2015 and 2016, the Nigerian government announced plans to and commitment to diversifying its economy, particularly its external revenue, and announced a series of reforms, including on the ease of doing business, revitalising key sectors (especially agriculture) and investing in much-needed power and transport infrastructure. By this, Nigeria sent a clear message that Nigeria is open for business, which increased the confidence of potential investors and fostered new opportunities for trade. The UK has reciprocated Nigeria’s gesture for external investors. The UK Department for International Trade (DIT) provides trade and investment services and practical support to UK companies to succeed in

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Nigeria. They offer expertise and contacts, extensive network of specialists in the UK, and Nigeria. There is significant potential for further UK deals beyond oil and gas, in agriculture, infrastructure development, education and technology in particular (UK.GOV, 2017b). DIT has a strong team in the country to support this working with the High Commission in Abuja and the deputy high commission in Lagos. Already, leaders of the UK mission in Nigeria chair a series of investment roundtables with bilateral partners in Nigeria. Contrary to views held by some Nigerians, the UK and Nigeria are strong trade partners. In 2015 UK bilateral trade with Nigeria was worth £4 billion. The UK was Nigeria’s top trade partner in 2000. Despite the fall to the fifth position in 2014, the UK’s bilateral trade relationship with Nigeria is still worth £3.8 billion per annum as of 2018. Initial shock was largely a function of lower oil prices reducing the value of Nigerian exports to the UK. Surging trade relations with newer partners such as China and India have also affected the UK’s ranking in Nigeria’s trade partnership. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) analysis carried out for the FCO assessed that non-oil UK exports to Nigeria could reach £7 billion by 2030 (from £1.9 billion in 2014), and non-oil FDI could grow from £1 billion to £4.5 billion. Many transnational corporations from the UK have operated successfully in Nigeria for a long time. British Airways’ (BA) first flight from the UK to Nigeria was 83 years ago; Diageo (Guinness), Shell, Unilever, PZ Cussons and Reckitt Benckiser (among others) have strong and longestablished operations in Nigeria (Oyewobi, 2016). The UK’s bilateral trade relationship with Nigeria is still worth £3.8 billion per annum. Shell, a British-Dutch company, has invested billions of pounds into Nigeria and has around 60 onshore or shallow water oilfields and 700 wells (UK.GOV, 2017b). Nigeria remains the largest oil-producing country in Africa, in spite of the depressed price of oil at this time (UK.GOV, 2017a). Consequently, trade volume between Nigeria and the UK has risen over the succeeding years. In the year up to June 2019, the total trade in goods and services between the UK and Nigeria was worth £5.1 billion, an increase of 14.4% on the previous year bilateral trade valued at £4.2 billion (Famuyiwa, 2018). Total exports from the UK to Nigeria amounted to £2.7 billion in the year to June 2019, up 15.9% on the previous year. Sectors offering

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particular opportunities to UK companies include energy, infrastructure and agro-technology. As of 2018, Africa generally represents 2% of British trade, with Nigeria accounting for a tenth of that, according to UK Trade Ministry. As of 2019, the UK accounted for 2.7% of total goods exported from Nigeria and 3.8% of total imports into Nigeria. These exports have historically remained undiversified with oil and gas representing 95% of Nigeria’s export to the UK. In January 2017, the Nigerian Finance Minister launched the Eurobond issue in London. No doubt, huge potential abounds in Nigeria as a market for British businesses, and huge potential in the UK for entrepreneurial Nigerians willing to trade and invest. Just as the UK, Nigerian companies are equally investing in the UK. Nigeria’s vice president speaking at the first meeting of the Nigeria-UK Economic Development Forum (EDF) hinted that “already, there are 4 Nigerian companies listed on the main board of The London Stock Exchange, although only one Nigerian company, Seplat Petroleum Development Company Plc is listed in both Nigeria and the UK. It is also fascinating that about half of the companies on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index (FTSE 100) have exposure to Nigeria. By leveraging the EDF, I hope that we will continue to build on the existing foundation and work together on recording increased trade and investment flows, particularly in the areas where we have comparative advantages”. Aside from the work of the EDF, the current UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson organised a UK-Africa summit in January 2020 to leverage and improve on bilateral economic relationship between the UK and the African Continent. The summit was designed to create lasting new partnerships that deliver more investment, jobs and growth, benefitting people and businesses across Africa/Nigeria and the UK. The summit had a strong focus on sustainable energy and on female participation in the economy. During the summit, more than US$6.5 billion worth of commercial deals in sectors including infrastructure, energy, retail and technology were signed. Among the top winners was Nigeria as it secured business deals with over four British companies. Following from the summit, Nigeria and the UK agreed to be partners in a range of initiatives announced during the summit including: 1. Commercial deals worth £324 million (over ₦153.4 billion) and new UK government assistance to grow the UK-Nigeria trade and investment partnership,

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2. Significant UK commitments to support Nigeria develop an enabling environment to turbo-charge economic growth, including helping address land issues for investment, strengthening and improving the finance sector; helping entrepreneurs secure access to finance; preparing the ground for the launch in the UK of naira-denominated bonds—“Jollof Bonds”; and developing the tech sector; 3. substantial initiatives to accelerate the clean energy transformation in Nigeria, through enhanced technical and financial support and 4. strong commitments to harness private sector support for social development, particularly supporting women and young people in business. 5. The UK Department for International Trade (DIT) launched three major programmes that will benefit African countries, including Nigeria, during the summit: (a) £28 million (₦13.1billion), Investment Promotion Programme for Nigeria and South Africa to stimulate Foreign Direct Investment and facilitate technology and knowledge transfer (b) £37 million (₦17.5 billion) Growth Gateway programme, offering trade and investment business support services across Africa (joint programme with DFID) (c) £20  million; (₦9.5 billion) Trade Connect programme to increase exports from Africa to the rest of the world through the provision of direct support and advice (joint programme with DFID). 1. DIT and Asoko Insight launched a new digital DealRoom app matching UK investors to African firms during the summit. 2. DFID funded a new Nigeria Investment Guide, and nine sector guides for the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) which will be used to promote investment opportunities at the summit. • DFID announced its Manufacturing Africa programme will expand into Nigeria in 2020, working through investment promotion agencies (both NIPC and state level agencies) to help find more foreign investors for Nigeria and supporting those already in country. • The newly launched £55  million (₦26 billion), Land Transformation Facility will help tackle a key barrier to responsible investors, ensuring land access and markets are lawful and fair.

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• Ahead of the summit, the Department for International Development (DFID) launched the £320 million (₦152 billion) UK Financial Sector Deepening Platform working in 45 countries in Africa, including Nigeria. The programme will improve financial systems and regulation, boost green finance products and improve access to banking and loans for poorer consumers and entrepreneurs. • DFID and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) announced an IFC Cross-Border Risk Facility, set up using £30 million (₦14.2 billion) in UK funding. This facility is designed to help countries across Africa access local currency finance and will be used to inform discussions on naira-denominated bonds (Jollof Bonds)—which were a feature of a meeting between the Nigerian government and investors at the London Stock Exchange on 21 January. • The UK government announced a Digital Access Programme, investing up to £45 million in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa to support inclusive connectivity and digital literacy, build cybersecurity capacity and establish Tech Hubs to grow the digital economy. As part of this programme, the “Go Global Africa 2020” training project will empower start-ups with the digital and business skills needed to expand globally. • DFID launched the £10  million (₦4.8billion) Catalyst Fund, which will support 30 start-up fintech companies from Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, India and Mexico with pre-seed capital, bespoke venture capital building support and connections with investors to help them establish and scale up their businesses. • DFID also announced a £800  k (₦379 million), programme working with the UK Financial Conduct Authority to improve the regulation of fintech companies in Nigeria and Kenya. • DFID announced a £79 million (₦37.4 billion), package of support designed to help African governments create development impact bonds to channel private investment towards development projects. • DFID announced a £3.5 million (₦1.7 billion), extension to the SheTrades programme to support women-owned businesses in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. • The Department for Culture, Media and Sport announced a Female Tech Founders Programme 2020, aimed to overcome the

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digital gender gap by providing 15 Female Tech Founders from Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa with world-class mentoring, access to UK investors and expert training. • DFID announced £9  million (₦4.3 billion), in support for the African Development Bank Africa Centre for Youth Employment, a centre designed to give advice on youth employment policies and initiatives and enable them to be implemented at scale. According to the UK Government, the UK-Africa Investment Summit on 20 January 2020 laid the foundations for new partnerships between the UK and African nations based on trade, investment, shared values and mutual interest. Billions of pounds of new commercial deals were announced highlighting the strength of the UK’s offer and existing relationship with Africa. The UK also announced new initiatives and funding which will strengthen the joint trading relationship, support African countries in their ambition to transform their economies, launch a major new partnership with the city of London, turbo-charge infrastructure financing and enable Africa’s clean energy potential. Taken together, this will help to realise the UK’s ambition to be the investment partner of choice for Africa, create hundreds of thousands of jobs and ensure the mutual prosperity of all our nations. There are obvious results coming out of the incremental effort for the UK and Nigeria wanting to do more business together. According to UK Department for International Trade factsheets on Nigeria released on 18 February 2022, total trade in goods and services (exports plus imports) between the UK and Nigeria was £3.5 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2021, an increase of 1.9% or £65 million from the four quarters to the end of Q3 2020. Of this £3.5 billion: • Total UK exports to Nigeria amounted to £2.2 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2021 (an increase of 7.7% or £157 million compared to the four quarters to the end of Q3 2020); and • Total UK imports from Nigeria amounted to £1.4 billion in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2021 (a decrease of 6.4% or £92 million compared to the four quarters to the end of Q3 2020).

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Trade in Goods by Commodity (ONS) Please note that these data are presented on a non-seasonally adjusted basis and are not directly comparable to seasonally adjusted data, including the headline trade statistics presented before. The top five goods exported from the UK to Nigeria in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2021 were: • 33R—Refined oil (£614.8 million or 46.5% of all UK goods exported to Nigeria) • 65—Textile fabrics (£56.2 million or 4.2%) • 55—Toilet and cleansing preparations (£51.8 million or 3.9%) • 05—Vegetables and fruits (£40.4 million or 3.1%) • 71EK—Electric motors (capital) (£35.4 million or 2.7%) • The top five goods imported to the UK from Nigeria in the four quarters to the end of Q3 2021 were: • 33O—Crude oil (£610.2 million or 81.9% of all UK goods imported from Nigeria) • 33R—Refined oil (£70.1 million or 9.4%) • 28—Metal ores and scrap (£14.8 million or 2.0%) • 34—Gas (£10.3 million or 1.4%) • 792—Aircraft (£8.9 million or 1.2%) There is a rise in the number of Nigeria-owned businesses investing in the UK and individuals exporting from Nigeria to the UK. There is also a reciprocal rise in the number of UK-owned businesses that are doing business in Nigeria and with Nigerians back across different sectors like power (including solar), infrastructure, agriculture, education, the digital economy, fintech. Smaller and medium-sized British companies are already franchising in Nigeria as Hamleys has famously taken forward. In May 2017, the UK launched a report on Franchising in Lagos. The UK is also supporting the manufacturing of electric motor cycle and investing in marine transportation in Lagos among others. With the UK completely out of the European Union (EU), there is no doubt that the volume of investment between British and Nigeria-owned businesses will continue to rise and will continue to form part of the factors that will shape future relations between both countries. The UK has been, and always will be, a trading nation, keen on entrepreneurship and innovation, sustaining old ties and forging new ones (Fig. 7.1).

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Fig. 7.1  The top five goods: Exports and imports from the UK. Source: Department for International Trade, Trade and Investment Factsheet, Nigeria (UK DIT, 2022)

Cultural Ties Nigeria and the UK have a long history with strong cultural and logistics ties dating about the fifteenth century. This cultural relationship has outlived the many phases of Nigeria-UK relationship. The UK remains a popular destination for Nigerians wishing to study abroad. Many Nigerians who later became heroes and heroines of Nigerian decolonisation schooled in the UK, and Nigerians are still schooling in the UK in their number till date. This list does not exclude recent past and present political leaders including well-established technocrats. As of 2019, there were 16,072 Nigerian students studying in the UK making Nigeria the top five suppliers of international students to the UK. Nigeria’s demand for the UK’s expertise in education, language, skills and technological innovations will remain a major reason to maintain ties with the UK. Already, lots of UK-Nigeria citizens now hold political elective and major political appointments in the UK. As of 2017, there were seven parliamentarians of Nigeria origin in the UK parliament: 1. Chi Onwurah, Member of Parliament for Newcastle Central—Labour 2. Fiona Onasanya, Member of Parliament for Peterborough—Labour 3. Chuka Umunna, Member of Parliament for Streatham—Labour 4. Helen Grant, Member of Parliament for Maidstone—Conservative

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5. Abimbola Afolami, MP Hitchin and Harpenden constituents— Conservative 6. Kemi Badenoch, Member of Parliament for Saffron Walden— Conservative 7. Kate Osamor, Member of Parliament for Edmonton—Labour Through UK Council’s (BC) many programmes in arts, education and society, the UK and Nigeria systems have become more connected, enriched, integrated and fostered international trust and understanding. The platform of dialogue that BC creates has helped to enhance international partnerships between higher education institutions and organisations and students who want to study abroad. At an event heard in Abuja in March 2020 to commemorate 75 years of BC in Nigeria promoting joint UK-Nigeria cultural relationship, Vice President, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, commended the culture mission in Nigeria for strengthening ties between Nigeria and the UK. The BC as a cultural mission has made recognisable contributions to the development of the English language as well as the support of mother tongue–based, multi-­ lingual education. Besides the BC platform, many UK institutions, philanthropists and programmes offer scholarship opportunities to Nigerians willing to study in the UK including the UK government’s Chevening Scholarship programme. The Chevening is a global fully funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and partner organisations scholarship programme offered by the UK government to outstanding professionals from all over the world to pursue a one-year master’s degree in any subject at any UK university (Chevening, 2020). Since 1983, Chevening Awards have enabled over 50,000 international scholars and fellows to study in the UK. In Nigeria, these people are leading and making impact in their various fields of endeavour. These people and their skills if harnessed can contribute hugely to development in Nigeria.

Diaspora Remittance Another goldmine in the UK relationship is diaspora population. In 2016, estimated 140,000 Nigerians applied for visas to the UK. Of those that applied for student visas, 90% were successful. For those that applied for other visas, around 70% were successful. The UK has rejigged its visa system introducing a same-day visa service—at a cost. And a service that can mean you get a visa within 5  days, at a lower cost than the same day

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process while retaining all other visas for 15  days (UK.GOV, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). It is now easier for Nigerians to travel to the UK for business and to study, see family and invest in the UK economy. Consequently, there are more than 250,000 Nigerian nationals or dual Nigerian British nationals living in the UK now. Some texts claimed the total Nigerian diaspora in the UK is well over a million. There are perhaps 20,000 British nationals here in Nigeria. These numbers mean a lot investment-­wise. Many Nigerians in the UK continue to crave for local and indigenous commodities including fabrics and agricultural produce to name but a few. This itself is a big market couple with general demand for Nigerian local commodities in Nigeria. Opportunity for two-way export and important investment is widening by the day and the Nigeria population in the UK and UK citizens in Nigeria will continue to be a significant aspect of the investment. The Nigerian diaspora constitutes a viable resource for the mobilisation of development interventions. The Nigerian diaspora gained more relevance in 1999, when President Olusegun Obasanjo identified the need to tap into the growing resource base of the Nigerian diaspora, based on the assessment of their growing remittance contributions and the international trend of diaspora contributions to the development of third-world and developing countries. Official records indicate that there are 1.24 million migrants from Nigeria in the diaspora. This figure is likely to be higher in 2018 and 2019 with the recent trend in migration from the country. Almost half of the Nigerian adults have indicated their willingness to leave the country in the next five years, according to a 2018 survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre. Consequently, Nigeria accounts for over a third of migrant remittance flows to Sub-­Saharan Africa. PwC estimated that these flows amounted to US$23.63 billion (2017: US$22 billion) in 2018 and represented 6.1% of Nigeria’s GDP. The 2018 migrant remittances translate to 83% of the Federal Government budget in 2018 and 11 times the FDI flows in the same period. Nigeria’s remittance inflow was also 7.4 times larger than the net official development assistance (foreign aid) received in 2017 of US$3.4 billion. PwC estimates that migrant remittances to Nigeria could grow to US$25.5 billion, US$29.8 billion and US$34.8 billion in 2019, 2021 and 2023 respectively. Over a 15-year period, PwC expects total remittance flows to Nigeria to grow by almost double in size from US$18.37 billion in 2009 to US$34.89 billion in 2023. The growth in remittances is subject to global economic forces, which could spur or hinder growth of remittance flows. Other factors that

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will drive remittance flows include growth in emigration rate, economic conditions of the resident countries and the economic fundamentals in the Nigerian economy (Ojo, 2020). “The World Bank forecasts global growth to slow to 2.6% in 2019”. The UK with an estimated 250,000 Nigerians is the second country behind the US with the highest number of Nigerian migrants. As of 2017, Nigeria diaspora remittance from the UK alone stood at US$4119 million. “The 1990s witnessed the UK-based Nigerian diaspora foundation of the pro-democracy organisation, the United Democratic Front for Nigeria Abroad (UDFN) and also the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) abroad, coordinated the activities of pro-democracy movements in Nigeria and abroad and in recent times campaigned for constitutional reforms”. They continue to act as watchdogs of democracy diasporas engage indirectly in politics and sponsor political parties and elective offices. More groups have since emerged with interest in Nigeria’s development and politics. To demonstrate the increasing influence of Nigerians in diaspora and particularly in the UK, major political parties in Nigeria now have chapters in the UK. Nigeria’s anticipation of diaspora vote will see this increasing population vote in the near future. Considering voter apathy in Nigeria’s election history, Nigerians in diaspora could become more influential in Nigeria’s politics in the foreseeable future.

Entertainment In November 2021, Nigerian singer Ayodeji Balogun popularly known as Wizkid reportedly made N5.2 billion in gross earnings at the O2 Arena in London when he performed his ‘Made in Lagos’ concert in front of a sold-out crowd of 20,000 capacity. Equally both Burna and Davido have sold out in their O2 Arena performances. UK-Nigeria ties have also deepened along entertainment lines, including music, fashion and movies. Expectedly, media channels for showcasing these talents have become increasingly accessible. For instance, TV and radio channels of Nigerian origin have emerged in the UK just as many Nigerians rely on UK channels for entertainment, information, news and education. It is important not to leave out football. Nigerians are big fans of UK clubs (Udugba, 2021). The role of social media in globalisation means many Nigerian and UK businesses are increasingly connecting and doing business (Kazeem, 2016). In terms of food and restaurants, the UK has continued to witness

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an increase in demand for Nigerian food within its shores. The proliferation of Nigerian online food suppliers in the UK as well as restaurants such as Olumo foods, John and Biola foods and Abi global foods lends credence to this aspect of solidifying cultural ties.

Conclusion In conclusion, governments, companies and citizens of Nigeria and UK origins have thus far shaped the UK-Nigeria relationship in the twenty-­ first century and would remain the major actors in the years to come. The global world will continue to shrink because of technological advancement, unforeseen global dynamics and politics. These factors will shape interactions between companies and individuals. The UK and Nigerian governments have a responsibility to ensure mutual development and trust in their relationship while encouraging the same to apply to a relationship at all levels. Companies, individuals and governments of the UK and Nigeria need to be alive to some issues that can undermine trust in their relationship. Money laundry by corrupt government officials in Nigeria, online fraudsters and the recent court judgements by UK courts over US$9 billion court judgement (Process & Industrial Developments versus Nigeria) (Strohecker & George, 2019) and Eurafic Power Limited versus Nigeria are some errors that need proper mitigation. The UK and Nigeria have a strong partnership that builds on longstanding historical, political, economic and social relations that predates colonial rule. This traditional tie means both countries have many things in common which has seen many Nigerians schooling in the UK way before independence and some in cases, remaining there. In as much as the relationship has been continuously gotten stronger and incremental since the end of colonial rule, dual UK-Nigeria citizens, historical ties, education, culture and the commonwealth union among others mean the relationship of both countries is mutually beneficial. Also, individuals have also emerged as critical stakeholders, in people-to-people engagement between the UK and Nigeria. This is why what is happening in the UK will continue to matter to Nigeria just as what is happening in Nigeria will continue to matter to the UK. A clear instance is the 2020 EndSARS protest in Nigeria. Nigerians in the UK parliament called for a hearing on the matter with the aim of sanctioning government officials. Good thing that the UK and Nigeria are both keen on remaining partners of choice for

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trade and investment. Being a more developed country with better infrastructures and systems, the UK could help Nigeria reduce its dependency on oil and gas and provide greater commercial opportunities for UK investment in sectors such as financial services, agricultural technology and education in Nigeria.

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Kazeem, Y. (2016, March 26). The sound of young urban Africa is set to take over the world’s pop charts. News report. Quartz Africa. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://bit.ly/3MsneeM. Lucas, O. N. (2020). Nigeria and the United Kingdom, diplomatic relations: The emerging issues in the post-Brexit era. International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation (IJRSI), VII(VII), 2020. NS Energy. (2019). Top ten countries with world’s largest oil reserves, from Venezuela to Iraq. Retrieved August 30, 2020, from https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/ features/newstop-­ten-­countries-­with-­worlds-­largest-­oil-­reserves-­5793487/ Nuamah, R. (2003). Nigeria’s foreign policy after the Cold War: Domestic, regional and external influences. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.ipinst. org/wp-­content/uploads/2015/06/nigerias_foreign_policy.pdf Ojo, A.  S. (2020, August 31). Firm secures judgement against FG, set to sell off 33 Nigeria’s property in UK. News report. Viewed August 31, 2020, via Newspeak, https://newspeakonline.com/firm-­secures-­judgement-­against-­fg­set-­to-­sell-­off-­33-­nigerias-­property-­in-­uk/ Oyewobi, A. (2016, November 7). British Airways celebrates 80 years of Nigeria flight operations. News report. Premium Times. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-­news/214677-­ british-­airways-­celebrates-­80-­years-­nigeria-­flight-­operations.html Strohecker, K. & George, L. (2019). UK judge to allow Nigeria to appeal ruling on US$9 billion P&ID case. News report, 26 September 2019. Retrieved August 31, 2020, from Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­nigeria-­ arbitration/uk-­judge-­to-­allow-­nigeria-­to-­appeal-­r uling-­on-­9-­billion-­pid-­case-­ idUSKBN1WB1VZ Tayo, S. (2019, January 17). An assessment of UK’s relations with Nigeria in 2018. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://divergentoptions.org/2019/01/17/ an-­assessment-­of-­UKs-­relations-­with-­nigeria-­in-­2018/ The World Bank in Nigeria, Overview. (2019). Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview Udugba, A. (2021). Wizkid rakes in over N5.2bn from O2 Arena concert. Business Day. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://businessday.ng/news/article/ wizkid-­rakes-­in-­over-­n5-­2bn-­from-­o2-­arena-­concert/ UK Office for National Statics. (2020, May 18). Number of Nigerians living in the UK. Retrieved August 29, 2020, from https://www.ons.gov. uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/ numberofnigerianslivingintheuk UK.GOV. (2016, March). Seizing the opportunity; an economic assessment of the key sectors of opportunity for UK businesses in Nigeria. PWC report. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/544604/PWC_REPORT_ TRADE_AND_INVESTMENT_IN_NIGERIA.pdf

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UK.GOV. (2017a, August 30). UK increasing support to save lives and rebuild north east Nigeria as famine looms after Boko Haram destruction. Press release. Retrieved August 31, 2020, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ uk-­increasing-­support-­to-­save-­lives-­and-­rebuild-­north-­east-­nigeria-­as-­famine-­ looms-­after-­boko-­haram-­destruction UK.GOV. (2017b, April 21). Nigeria-UK relations to grow stronger in the next century speech. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nigeria-­british-­relations-­the-­next-­100-­years UK.GOV. (2017c, April 21). Nigeria-UK relations to grow stronger in the next century; Ties that bind the UK and Nigeria will grow stronger and not weaker in the next century. Speech. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.gov. uk/government/speeches/nigeria-­british-­relations-­the-­next-­100-­years UK.GOV (2018a, July). DFID Nigeria country profile. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/723246/DFID-­Nigeria-­Profile-­July-­2018.pdf UK.GOV. (2018b, August 29). PM meets President Buhari. Press release. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-­meets-­ president-­buhari-­29-­august-­2018 UK.GOV. (2018c, August 29). UK and Nigeria step up cooperation to end Boko Haram threat. Press release. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.gov. uk/government/news/uk-­and-­nigeria-­step-­up-­cooperation-­to-­end-­boko­haram-­threat UK.GOV. (2018d, August 29). UK and Nigeria step up cooperation to end Boko Haram threat. Press release. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.gov. uk/government/news/uk-­and-­nigeria-­step-­up-­cooperation-­to-­end-­boko­haram-­threat Vincent, E., et al. (2017). Nigeria-British relations: Implications for Nigeria in the post-Brexit ERA. Palarch’s Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 17(7), 8811–8822. ISSN 1567-214x. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://bit. ly/3IMnl2r World Meter. (2020). Nigeria Population (LIVE). Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.worldometers.info/world-­population/nigeria-­population/ World Population Review. (2020). Nigeria Population 2020. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-­population

CHAPTER 8

The Foreign Policy of Emerging Big Powers: Nigeria in China’s Belt and Road Initiative Efem N. Ubi

Introduction The international system is undergoing great transcendental changes as a result of conflagrations of events, some of which are redefining and reconfiguring international politics as well as international economic relations. In fact, one of such changes is the emergence of powers such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia. Indeed, while these powers are beginning to occupy and play increasingly prominent roles in the international system, their foreign policies at the same time include a mix of soft power, public diplomacy, direct investment, and private sector partnerships to deepen relations (Shaw et al., 2009) and sometimes even smart power. Two important factors are discernible with the emergence of these powers. First, they are restructuring international economics, reordering global economy, and driving global growth by playing an increasingly imperative role. Second, these emerging powers, as a result of their relatively huge supply of development finance, are playing unprecedented

E. N. Ubi (*) Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_8

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roles in laying the foundation for the development of the countries of the global South, thus challenging the existing international development architecture (Ubi, 2014). Kitchen (2013) observed this when he opined that in many respects this is an expression of wider global trends characterized by the shifting balance of wealth and power away from the US and Europe to the rapidly growing economies. According to him, the impact of these emerging—or in some cases, re-emerging—powers is becoming more substantial and more complex almost by the day (Kitchen, 2013). Indeed, emerging powers’ engagement with the rest of the world, especially countries of the global South, takes a number of different forms, both in terms of the goals pursued and in terms of the means used. Importantly, foreign direct investment (FDI), aid, trade agreements, and infrastructural development are the more familiar forms of strategies by which emerging powers interact and engage with the continent of Africa (Kitchen, 2013). With the advent of these powers, Africa has to a considerable extent leverage on making new friends as well as diversify its economic partners, portraying a slight shift away from its traditional partners—the advanced countries of the West, which used to represent close to 90% of the destination of exports—towards new partners represented by the emerging economies (iMFdirect, 2015) like China, India, Brazil, Russia, and so on. In fact, recent statistics provide the most illustrative indicator of the rapidly expanding role in Africa of the emerging powers. These emerging powers are witnessing an increasing share of Africa’s foreign trade, while the traditional economies of Western Europe and North America are seeing their trade dominance being scaled down considerably. These changes are noticeable not only in terms of the size and volume, but also the sheer speed of these shifts (Tjønneland, 2015). For instance, trade between US and Africa fell from a high of US $100 billion in 2008 to about US $41 billion in 2018. More so, US foreign direct investment in Africa which totalled US $50.4 billion in 2017 also decreased to US $43.2 billion in 2019 (Ubi, 2021). Among these emerging powers, China is by far the dominant destination for African exports and source of imports. Thus, it is undeniable how important Africa is to China. China has shown itself to be “first among equals” as an emerging power that is increasingly playing an imperative role in the global economy by engendering the restructuring of international economics and driving the global economic growth. This enormous economic outburst of China is today being seen by numerous development initiatives that China has created, like the recently established Belt

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and Road Initiatives (BRI). Recent developments have shown that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China’s massive centrepiece development programme aimed at connecting maritime and overland trade, and strengthening economic, political, and cultural interactions with participating countries across the globe (Leslie, 2020). And as Dollar noted, despite the name, the programme is global, and not confined to the specific corridors; however, it is a multi-billion undertaking consisting of a massive infrastructure for connectivity routes that stretch from Beijing to Western Europe and to Africa. The initiative is in consonance with Africa’s development needs, especially its quest for infrastructural development. China has continually seen itself as the harbinger of Africa’s development and vow to lay the foundation for the take-off of the continent’s development, and one way China is doing this is through the supply of development finance, for infrastructural development, which to a considerable extent is beginning to challenge the existing international development architecture. Over the last two decades (2001–2020) China has delivered huge amount of aid packages to be tapped by African countries. And much recently, these aid packages are coming through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, the questions are: irrespective of what China’s Belt and Road Initiative signifies, can it be a harbinger of Africa’s economic growth and development? Is Nigeria truly positioned to tap from the BRI? What does Nigeria stand to benefit from being a part of China’s BRI? Or put differently, is the BRI a sine-qua-non for Nigeria’s development? These and other questions not posed here will direct the discourse in this chapter.

Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Notwithstanding, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was birthed in 2013; however, the initiative is not a new idea, but rather the rebirth by the current Chinese government of the old and highly successful Silk Route dating back to the second century BC, during the Han Dynasty era of China, around 130 BC when Zhang Qian, a Chinese imperial official and diplomat, was sent westward by the Han Emperor Wudi to form alliances against the nomadic Xiongnu tribes. This journey to the West was seen as the first step of Chinese contact with the Western world, and over the subsequent years the Silk Road became an important trade route and

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took significance as the beginnings of commercial relations between China and the Western world (PwC, 2017). However, contemporary Silk Road was the result of a speech in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013 by China’s President Xi Jinping, where he proposed the initiative of building a Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road. This was later renamed in 2016 as the “One Belt and One Road Initiative”, otherwise known today as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that would stretch from East Asia to Europe and Africa along six corridors. Today, while the BRI has become one of China’s most important foreign policy goals (Kulaksız, 2019), the initiative emphasizes cooperation in five priority areas: (a) policy coordination, (b) infrastructure connectivity, (c) unimpeded trade, (d) financial integration, and (e) connecting people. The BRI on the one hand is China’s current global development initiative that seeks to construct an elaborate web of trade routes and necessitated infrastructural support, all to be integrated within a China-­ centred trading network (Taylor, 2020). On the other hand, BRI has come to signify a platform for inducing new thinking on China’s open economic development and outbound investments. The expansion and acceptability of the BRI today can be seen from two dimensions. First, it has shown that the initiative is not just the business of China alone. President Xi Jinping alluded to this, when, in April 2016, he stated that while the initiative is focusing on China’s own development, “it should also welcome other countries on board China’s express train of development, and help them realise their own development objectives” (Jinping, 2017). Xi’s statement above gives credence to the fact that BRI is mutually reinforcing; while promoting China’s ongoing development, it nevertheless would engender development opportunities for other countries. Second, the manifestation in the number of countries that have become part of the initiative has given credence to the importance of BRI. Thus, by the end of August 2019, the Chinese government had signed 195 Belt and Road cooperation documents with 136 countries and 30 international organizations. The extensive participation of these countries and international organizations that signed the BRI portrays the importance of the initiative. Since its formation of BRI, China has cooperated with member countries in many sectors, including but not limited to infrastructural development, financial integration, trade, and so on.

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Thus, China’s trade with countries along the BRI has remained unimpeded. China’s total trade (import and export) with BRI members between 2013 and 2017 grew faster than China’s overall international trade. Other data speculates that China’s total trade with BRI members in 2013–2018 totalled nearly US $6.5 trillion. By the end of June 2019, a total of 16,760 China-Europe freight trains had carried almost 1.5 million Twenty-foot Equipment Units (TEUs) of goods, reaching 16 countries and 53 cities abroad. More so, China has set up 18 pilot free trade zones and 56 economic and trade cooperation zones (China White Paper, 2019). Again, since 2017, China and other countries along the routes have signed more than 100 customs inspection and quarantine cooperation documents and established more than 40 customs inspection and quarantine cooperation mechanisms. Thus, under the BRI, Chinese enterprises had invested more than US $90 billion in Belt and Road countries, and the turnover of contracted projects had exceeded US $400 billion (China White Paper, 2019). Infrastructure wise, great progress has been made in the construction of key interregional and intercontinental railway networks such as the China-Laos Railway, China-Thailand Railway, Hungary-­ Serbia Railway, and Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway. Importantly also, the BRI has given impetus to people-to-people ties, with China signing mutual visa exemption agreements with 71 participating countries covering different types of passports and visa facilitation agreements or arrangements.

Who Finances the BRI? From inception in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the initiative with an initial budget of US $900 billion for its development (Leslie, 2020). Notwithstanding, China uses multiple financial vehicles and goes through multiple channels to advance its infrastructure diplomacy (Chan, 2018). Following that, on 29 December 2014, within the first year of the BRI announcement, with a strong commitment to the programme, the Chinese government established the Silk Road Fund (SRF) with a total investment of US $40 billion, whose capital was further increased by 100 billion Yuan in May 2018. Prior to that, the fund in 2017 signed agreement to be involved with 19 projects and further promised to invest another US $7 billion (PwC, 2017). However, the funding of the BRI comes from four distinct channels: policy banks, state-owned banks, sovereign wealth funds, and

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international financing institutions. China’s policy banks here will include Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), whose main focus is in implementing Chinese state policies relating to industry, foreign trade, diplomacy, investment, and international economic cooperation. Hence, financial integration under the BRI has continuously improved, as could be seen by the open, pluralistic, and market-oriented investment and financing system that saw the People’s Bank of China, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the African Development Bank jointly financed nearly 200 projects covering more than 70 countries and regions at the end of the first quarter of 2019 (China White Paper, 2019). However, as of 2020 total project’s funding is estimated at US $1.3 trillion (Leslie, 2020). More so, given its important role, the Exim Bank of China is a major player in the financing of BRI. For instance in 2018, Exim Bank lent more than US $80 billion in total, almost three times as much as the Asian Development Bank. Most of its loans were in 49 countries considered to be part of the Belt and Road Initiative (Week in China, 2020). Another policy bank, the China Development Bank (CDB), specifically finances infrastructure, energy, and transportation. CDB is often portrayed as the engine that powers China’s economic development policies. In 2018 alone the CDB was involved in more than 900 cross-border projects, most of which were infrastructure-related, with a total estimated investment value at US $890 billion (Belt and Road News, 2019). During the first Belt and Road Forum in 2017, China pledged to provide around US $55 billion in loans from the above two policy banks (Belt and Road News, 2019). These two main institutions—Export-Import Bank of China (Exim) and China Development Bank (CDB)—are the largest sources of finance for Silk Road loans. More than a thousand of its loans were in 49 countries considered targets of the Belt and Road Initiative. Although, there are no comparable figures from CDB, but it is suspected that it has been involved in more than 900 cross-border projects, most of them are infrastructure-related, with total investment value estimated at US $890 billion. It is important to also note here that China’s three stated-owned commercial banks (the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, and China Construction Bank) had extended US $250 billion in total. With this amount of funding, if BRI is fully consolidated, it is most likely to cost some trillions of US dollars over the next decade. With lack

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of publicly available data, popular estimates for Chinese investments under BRI range from US $1 trillion to US $8 trillion. This in fact puts China on a precarious situation, because, even if we based funding for BRI on the lowest estimate of US $1 trillion, China is unlikely to be able to finance the capital costs of BRI projects on its own. The more reason why Chinese government has put in place financing opportunities for the Belt and Road Initiatives for member states including countries in Africa. Thus, China’s other funding comes from Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which has over US $4 billion in total assets; China Construction Bank (CCB), with more than US $3.4 billion (Tini, 2019); and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), which is China’s third-largest lender with over US $3.2 billion. ABC has assigned funds for BRI projects such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei cluster, Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area, and the Yangtze Economic Belt. In 2018, the ABC increased its loans by almost US $63 billion. The Bank of China (BOC) is another policy bank. The BOC is the second-largest lender in China and the fourth-largest bank in the world by market capitalization value with more than US $2.9 billion (Ubi, 2019). Apart from the above financial institutions in China, BRI have also seen a multitiered integration that involves various existing financial institutions including the World Bank that also pledged to invest about US $80 billion in infrastructure for BRI participants. China is right now encouraging financial institutions to conduct overseas Renminbi fund business with an estimated amount of RMB 300 billion (US $46.1 billion) (Tini, 2019). As for Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB), it is the most dramatic example of Chinese plan to underwrite the economic development along the new Silk Road; notwithstanding, it has the remit to lend outside Belt and Road countries as well. The bank’s creators say it has been designed to finance badly needed transportation, telecommunications, and energy projects, and it joins the Silk Road Fund, backed by US $40 billion of Chinese capital, and some of it provided by China Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign wealth fund. However, the AIIB has been working in collaboration with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Meanwhile, as of 2016, the AIIB provided US $1.7 billion in loans for projects in participating countries and approved its first four loans. The first of the four loans, which is US $500 million, went to four projects in the Belt and Road countries—an electricity grid in Bangladesh, a slum redevelopment initiative in Indonesia, and highways in Pakistan and Tajikistan (Week in China, 2020).

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The New Development Bank (NDB) is another lender with a focus on infrastructure. The NDB was created by Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa (BRICS countries). The NDB aims to facilitate investment between and among the partners. The AIIB and NDB were established between 2015 and 2016. Although, their establishments are not entirely for providing financial support to the Belt and Road construction; however, a considerable proportion of their funds are earmarked for this purpose. In summation, China’s big four state banks have contributed US $150, while for the Silk Road Fund (SRF), the AIIB and the NDB have contributed only US $4 billion and US $2 billion, respectively. Nevertheless, the whole essence of creating a wealth of finance for BRI is to enable countries to be able to tap from it for their BRI projects.

Africa and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Although it is often assumed by China that Africa is part of the historical and natural extension of the Belt and Road. The truth is that, at the initial stage of its establishment, Africa was never mentioned. For President Xi Jinping, BRI was for Asia only, as noted in his speech on 8 November 2014, when he stated, “[F]irst, we should focus on Asian countries and realize connectivity in Asia first. The Belt and Road both trace their origins to Asia. … It is natural that we focus our attention on connectivity between Asian countries and strive to expand our common interest.” That is why Asia remains the region that received the most BRI investments between 2013 and 2020 than any other regions (see Fig. 8.1). Howbeit, China has opened the BRI to all countries of the world and its membership has been expanded to also include countries in Africa—the second region with the most BRI investment (Nedopil 2021). Indeed, BRI can now be seen to be a major contemporary element in a wider expansion of Chinese involvement in Africa (Calabrese, 2019). Hence, Taylor (2020) observed that the BRI—which was initially very much focused on East Africa—has now extended to include countries in Central and West Africa. More so, Venkateswaran (2020) observed that China has made significant inroads into Africa under the BRI. At a bilateral level, it has invested in 52 out of the 54 African countries and is poised to enter the 53rd market in São Tomé and Príncipe. Also, China’s official statistics noted that 49 of the 54 countries (i.e. over 90%) have already signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). Geographically, 22 of the 49 countries (nearly 50%) are located in West Africa, with East Africa (12

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Fig. 8.1  Share of BRI investments in different regions. Source: Nedopil (2021)

countries), North Africa (9), and Southern Africa (6) comprising the other 50%. The African Union has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI cooperation with China. However, while MoUs are not legally binding, they formalize Chinese investments in the host country (Venkateswaran, 2020). Figure 8.2 shows the African map with countries that have signed the Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Just like many other countries in Africa, Nigeria is not left out; it has also signed to be a part of the BRI in September 2018. But the pertinent questions are, will Nigeria and Africa as a whole be able to maximize this opportunity to build their infrastructure and industrial capacity? Is BRI a guarantor of Nigeria and Africa’s development? A very important question also asked by Venkateswaran (2020) is: is the BRI a purely economic construct to enhance international cooperation as China claims, or a geopolitical tool to enhance global strategic influence as its strategic competitors suspect? More so, does the BRI genuinely benefit participating local countries or only serve to enhance China’s economic benefits? These are some of the questions that this chapter will try to give answers to. Evidentially, whether we like it or not, it is no gainsaying that China has since opening up attached great importance to Africa’s development and in fact Africa occupies a key position in Chinese foreign policy. This is more discernible in the FOCAC, 2018 Beijing declaration and Action Plan (2019–2021), which states that Africa is an important partner in the Belt and Road cooperation and as a result,

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Fig. 8.2  African nations with a Belt and Road Initiative MoU China will extend loans of concessional nature, export credit line and export credit insurance to African countries, make the loans reasonably more concessional, create new financing models and improve the terms and conditions of the credit to support China-Africa Belt and Road cooperation and industrial capacity cooperation, and the infrastructure construction, development of energy and resources, agriculture, manufacturing and the comprehensive development of the whole industrial chain of Africa.

As a completely open and inclusive international cooperation platform, the Belt and Road provides a conducive environment for China to open its door to the rest of the world. In the five years since the initiative was taken, China has strengthened its relations with many countries along the

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Belt and Road. After the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-­ Africa Cooperation, links with Africa have also been strengthened under the Belt and Road cooperation (Hu, 2019). Although, documents capturing individual countries with Chinese BRI infrastructure projects in Africa are negligible. It is important to note here that most of the projects that are recently subsumed within the BRI projects in Africa have been there even before the establishment of the Initiative; although, these projects are now a part of BRI. Instances of such BRI projects include but are not limited to the Northern Corridor Trade Route in Africa linking the maritime port of Mombasa to countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa and Trans-­ Africa Highway, North-South Passage, Cairo-Cape Town Passway, the Port of Piraeus, Port Sudan-Ethiopia Railway connectivity, and the Suez Canal Economic Zone (Belt and Road Forum, 2019). Cumulatively, the total length of railway lines laid down by Chinese in Africa exceeds 6000 kilometres and the total length of highways under construction exceeds 5000 kilometres. In addition, a number of ports and airports are also under construction (such as Djibouti Port). Out of the 49 countries in Africa that China has signed MoUs or officially expressed support for the BRI, 34 (nearly 70%) are located along the coast of Africa: 16  in West Africa, 8 each in the North and the East of Africa, and 2 in the South of Africa (Venkateswaran 2020). More so, some of these infrastructure projects in Africa have already been completed and are currently operational. Examples are the Mombasa-­ Nairobi Railway in Kenya, operational in May 2017; the Abuja-Kaduna Railway in Nigeria, operational in July 2017; and the Addis Ababa-­ Djibouti Railway from Ethiopia to Djibouti, which opened to traffic in 2017 (Hu, 2019). As China infrastructural footprint in Africa has shown, China remains the single largest financier of Africa’s infrastructure. Financing one in five projects and constructing one in three. Although, there are conflicting data, statistically, in 2018, the gross annual revenues of Chinese companies’ engineering and construction projects in Africa totalled US $48.84 billion, a 0.5% decrease from 2017 (Further Africa, 2020). However, it is speculated that the first half of 2020 saw newly contracted projects undertaken by Chinese businesses in Africa increase to the tune of US $29.1 billion in value, a year-on-year increase of 33% (Zefei, 2021). The top five countries in Africa accounting for gross annual revenues of Chinese companies’ engineering and construction projects are Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya,

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Egypt, and Angola. These five countries account for 46% of all Chinese companies’ 2019 construction project gross annual revenues in Africa. Thus, Algeria alone accounts for 14%. Notwithstanding, the last four years according to CARI have seen gross annual revenues of Chinese companies’ construction projects in Africa decline (Ubi, 2020).

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and China’s BRI In his briefing to the Diplomatic Corps on Thursday, 16 January 2020, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Geoffrey Onyeama, outlined nine new mandates as government priorities to direct policy directions under President Buhari’s second term in office over the next four years: (1) build a thriving and sustainable economy; (2) enlarge agricultural output for food security and export; (3) attain energy sufficiency in power and petroleum products; (4) expand transport and other infrastructure development; (5) expand business growth, entrepreneurship, and industrialization; (6) expand access to quality education, affordable healthcare, and productivity of Nigerians; (7) enhance social inclusion and reduce poverty; (8) build systems to fight corruption, improve governance, and create social cohesion; and (9) improve security for all. The disposition of President Muhammadu Buhari’s economic direction for Nigeria gave impetus for the country’s membership of the BRI. Notwithstanding, Nigeria signed the BRI agreement in September 2018 at a bilateral meeting between Presidents Muhammadu Buhari and Xi Jinping held on the side-line of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing (Ships and Ports, 2019). And since then, Nigerian government’s foreign policy has been towards maximizing the BRI for its development, especially with regards to productive infrastructure, like building and upgrading Nigeria’s railway, roads, and air connectivity. Nonetheless, a critical analysis of BRI’s priority areas, while it can also be assumed within the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDG) and the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, are also areas that can engender Nigeria’s economic growth and development. In that stead, it is undisputable to opine that BRI can be a harbinger to build Nigeria’s critical infrastructure, improve Nigeria’s economic diversification, as well as expand other areas of the economy. Irrespective of the advantages BRI present, the problem is whether Nigeria, including many African countries, is truly positioned to maximize the benefits of this initiative, because there have been alleged fears for

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Africa with regards to leadership and governance, continuity, and commitments, however, not negating Africa’s excessive debt. For instance, Calabrese (2019) observed that the BRI focuses on the development of large-scale infrastructure projects. However, while many African countries hope to use this opportunity to fill their own infrastructure gap, it nevertheless comes with challenges, like abandoned projects, even before the inception of the BRI. Most have become “white elephants” projects—too large, too expensive, not viable or simply not well planned, and out of proportion with their value or usefulness. To understand why Nigeria should be a part of BRI, one needs to know the state of Nigeria’s infrastructural decay. Nigeria is in dire need of infrastructure and industrialization and these are the pristine promises of the BRI.  It therefore behoves Nigeria to harness its foreign policy towards maximizing the BRI for Nigeria’s economic growth and development. Two important elements stand out as to why Nigeria should not miss out on the largesse offered by China’s BRI. The first is that, Nigeria’s economy is weak, and this weak economy has further hindered the Nigerian government’s inability for social provisioning, amongst other things like being able to build and upgrade its infrastructure. Infrastructure development is critical for Nigeria’s economic growth and development. Thus, the amount needed to upgrade and build Nigeria’s infrastructure is undisputedly enormous and Nigeria is incapacitated financially. To revamp Nigeria’s infrastructure, it is estimated that US $100 billion is needed annually. This is about 189.77% above the 2021 federal budget, projected at US $34.51 billion. Accordingly, with such a gap, the Nigerian government is incapable of addressing the country’s infrastructure needs on its own (Proshare, 2020). It is therefore imperative that Nigeria will not only need public-private partnership (PPP) and foreign investment in the sector, but also aid from the international donor community. Right now, Nigeria’s public and private sectors are investing minimally, only a paltry sum of US $5–6 billion on infrastructure (Ubi & Hongwu, 2018). In other words, Nigeria needs to ramp up its spending on infrastructure from the current 3–5% of GDP to an average of 9% to close the gap. In fact, it has been speculated that Nigeria needs about US $2 trillion in the next 30 years to bring its infrastructural needs up to date in consonance with the overall growth of the economy (Ubi, 2020). Second, there is no debating the fact that China is the only country in recent times that is willing to invest in Nigeria and Africa in areas like

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infrastructure, and generally where Nigeria’s traditional partners from the West have refused to, as China’s infrastructural footprint has shown. Today, in comparable terms with other advanced and industrialized countries, China is the world’s largest country-to-country development lender as well as the biggest investor in infrastructure and the world’s largest provider of financing for developing countries, with China Development Bank offering more loans than the World Bank (Solana, 2015). For instance, between 2008 and 2019, China’s two major policy banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), financed a total of 615 development finance projects with known and validated physical locations, as well as 243 other development finance projects without specific geographic footprints (Ray & Simmons, 2020). Again, between 2005 and 2017, China’s global construction projects (mainly infrastructure) in millions of dollars amounted to a total of US $480.3 billion for the BRI participating economies, some 59% of the global total of US $814.3 billion (OECD 2018). In its relationship with the developing world China is Africa’s biggest investor in infrastructure, thus providing African states with a broader range of options that were formerly limited to a small group of Western countries to which the African countries had access. The advent of China into Africa has helped to reshape the debate around Africa by giving African countries the option and opportunities to choose, thereby creating a good bargaining strategy for many countries in Africa. Today, China is among the few countries that have shown interest and willingness to support Africa’s economic growth through the building and upgrading of productive infrastructure under the BRI framework. Thus, Chinese construction in sub-Saharan Africa amounts to US $170.7 billion, in Latin America it is US $63.4 billion, and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries not in the BRI at US $34.0 billion (OECD 2018). Aside China’s unparalleled trade relations with Nigeria compared to other African countries, which is the biggest in terms of volume and size, amounting to US $19.27 billion in 2019 and US $13.66 billion in 2020, makes Nigeria a major destination for Chinese out-bound capital. Thus, over the last 20  years since the establishment of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC), China has consistently and committedly been providing Africa with pledges of loan to tap from and these pledges have seen geometrical increment every three years. However, again, at the 7th FOCAC, China delivered US $60 billion aid package in the form of concessional loans, grants, and so on to be tapped by African countries

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between 2019 and 2021. It must be known that interest rate for Chinese loans varies between 3 and 6%, while grace period varies between 3 and 6 years and maturities are between 8 and 12 years. Thus today, China is the only country giving out loans with a low interest rate of 2.8% (Ubi, 2020); in fact, no other international donor country or multilateral agency does that. More so, aside the BRI, China has created a lot of other initiatives like the joint implementation of a 10-point cooperative plan, which covers industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial aid, poverty reduction, and so on: there is also the eight major initiatives of 2018, which takes into consideration industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity initiative, trade facilitation initiative, a green development initiative, a capacity building initiative, a healthcare initiative, a people-to-­ people exchange initiative, and a peace and security initiative, and the most recent, the Belt and Road Initiative. Thus, the whole essence of these initiatives is to encourage and give impetus to Africa’s development. In this regard, the BRI thus present an astute framework that predisposes Nigeria to tap from in order to develop its infrastructural master plans that have been put forward by the various Nigerian administrations since 1999. The paucity of finance has been a hindrance to Nigeria’s capacity to build and upgrade its infrastructure. Thus, BRI financing provides Nigeria a more appropriate solution to promote practical cooperation on roads, railways, ports, maritime and inland water transport, aviation, energy pipelines, electricity, fibre optic, telecommunications, information and communication technology, and so on. And in keeping with the Chinese government’s policy to step up China-­ Africa cooperation in transportation, telecommunications, water conservancy, electricity, and other types of infrastructure, major projects in Nigeria are being financed by Chinese enterprises as the country looks for ways to escape its infrastructure problems. As has been noted earlier, many of the projects subsumed under BRI today in Nigeria were started prior to the establishment of the Initiative, but however have been brought under the auspices of the BRI. Nonetheless, some projects have been completed and some are ongoing. The number of infrastructural projects ongoing in Nigeria makes it China’s third-largest investment destination in Africa with about 40 officially identified Chinese development projects since 2015. As of 2017, Chinese involvement in the Nigerian economy totalled about US $45 billion (Ubi, 2019). This total comprises completed projects valued at US

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$22 billion, and projects valued at US $23 billion are still ongoing. It is pertinent to note that in recent times, Nigeria’s share of Chinese investment in Africa has increased by over 30% (Ubi, 2019). Although, the sectorial spread of Chinese infrastructure finance in Nigeria is a little different from the entire Africa, with transport projects amounting to 65.0% of all commitments, followed by power with 24.0%. Notwithstanding, irrespective of the gains of China’s infrastructure footprint in Nigeria, the looming fear is that speculatively Nigeria has obtained 17 Chinese loans to fund different categories of capital projects, that Nigeria will still be servicing till around 2038, which is the maturity date for the last loans obtained in 2018 (Odutola, 2020). More so, these fears are predicated within the future of debt sustainability (Table 8.1). It is important to state here for clarity that the Lagos-Kano Railway is being built in segments. The segment between Abuja and Kaduna officially opened in July 2016. The segment between Lagos and Ibadan began limited passenger operations on 7 December 2020. And on 15 May 2018, the Nigerian Minister of Transportation signed another US $6.68 billion contract with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation for the remaining segments of the Lagos-Kano which include Ibadan-Osogbo-­ Ilorin (200 km), Osogbo-Ado Ekiti, Ilorin-Minna (270 km), and Minna-­ Abuja, Kaduna-Kano (305 km). Further there has been a recent boost to the Lekki Export Processing Zone in June 2020. The Lekki Deep Sea Port Project in Nigeria was launched, receiving over US $1 billion investment from Chinese business through public-private partnership (PPP). It is hoped that the project will significantly boost the transportation capacity and competitiveness of West Africa, and create a large number of jobs for the citizens. While the above projects and some others listed in the entire Africa are laudable initiatives, a major problem for Nigeria and countries in Africa is being able to hold China on its promises. Although indisputable is the fact that Chinese assistance to Africa had not only added to Africa’s capacity for self-development, but has also produced practical results, like increase in demand for Africa’s products, a raise in the bargaining position of African countries, built infrastructure in Africa, and so on, but the truth is that, irrespective of the number of infrastructure built, it will be difficult for Nigeria to sustain the self-development or the practical result gained without either technology transfer or acquisition. In that stead, it is important for Nigeria to use its economic diplomacy to ask China for technology transfer as has been promised by China in nearly all the FOCAC plan of action documents.

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Table 8.1  Some projects in Nigeria that have a direct or indirect relation to the Belt and Road projects No Infrastructure Sector 1

Lagos-­ Calabar Railway

2

Lagos-Kano Railway

3

Abuja Rail Mass Transit Phase II

Route length

Amount

The construction costs are between US $12 and US $13 billion. Rail 1343 Construction transport kilometres of the (835 Abuja-Kaduna miles) segment costs US $876 million, consisting of US $500 million in loans from the Exim Bank of China and the balance coming from the Nigerian government. Lagos–Ibadan segment was awarded at US $1.53 billion. Rail 42.5 km US $824 transport (26.4 mi) million.

Contractor

Rail 1402 km transport

Status Yet to begin.

China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC)

Abuja-­ Kaduna, Lagos-Ibadan operational. Other segments in planning.

CCECC

Number of lines 2 (1 operational). (continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) No Infrastructure Sector

Route length

Amount

4

Nigcomsat Satellites

Space

Expected to cost US $550 million.

5

Abuja International Airport terminal

Aviation

6

Port Harcourt International Airport

Aviation

7

Kano International Airport

Aviation

US $600 million–US $500 million loan from China and a counterpart funding of US $100 million from Nigeria. US $500 million from the Export-­ Import Bank of China and $100 million in counterpart funding from the Nigerian government. 106 billion Naira.

Contractor

Status

CCECC

The satellites were expected to be ready two years after the deal was sealed. As of today, it is not clear if the production is still ongoing or if the deal was, in fact, wrapped up. In progress.

CCECC

(continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) No Infrastructure Sector 8

Lekki Deep Sea Port Project

Route length

Amount

Contractor

US $629 million from China Development Bank.

Status In progress

Source: Ubi (2017) and https://www.beltroad-­initiative.com/projects

Conclusion From the above discourse, one thing is sure that, as it is right now, no developing country, not even Nigeria, can rebuff China’s advances when considering and placing side by side China’s diplomacy with other superpowers. For Nigeria and many countries of Africa, China is more amenable to relate with. China’s soft power in the international system has come to overshadow the advanced economies, however, not without scepticism. These scepticisms revolved around China as a new colonizer, China as propping up rogue regimes, and much recently the debt-trap narratives which China is plunging African countries into. The debt-trap narratives shouldn’t dissuade Nigeria in maximizing its foreign policy with China towards fulfilling the nine priorities of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration discussed earlier in the chapter. The “debt trap” narrative does not hold merit and it is based on spurious premises. It is important to note here that China is inclined to renegotiate or write off debts incurred by other countries for its Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) infrastructure projects, and rarely seizes assets. The Chinese government has continued to maintain even before the formation of BRI that it has no political motives and China is not pushing any developing country into a “debt trap”. In this stead therefore, instead of spending time on criticism, what is important is that Nigeria should be strategizing and putting in place astute policies for debt repayment and debt servicing that will not be a burden to the populace or mortgage the future generation. And importantly, the loans collected should be properly channelled into what it is meant for, especially on productive infrastructures, while Nigeria endeavours to avoid a repetition of the aid fatigue that embroiled the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s.

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Whether we like or not, one thing is static, with the posture of China today, that it will be an anathema for Nigeria or any country in Africa not to use its foreign policy to translate its relationship with China for economic growth and development. It is important to adduce here that while it is difficult to divorce economics from politics, in the same vein, it is somewhat difficult to disassociate a nation’s foreign policy from its economic development. Therefore, a significant focus on any Nigeria’s foreign policy should be geared towards gaining access to strategic material resources that it does not have enough of, or having adequate resources to cater for the populations at home (Ubi & Akinkuotu, 2014). Thus, cooperation between Nigeria and China under the BRI will help Nigeria generate more resources and means, and expand the market and space for the needed economic growth and development. And if well managed, the BRI will further provide Nigeria with great opportunities to build its infrastructure as well as to develop its industrial and healthcare capacity. In fact, it is no gainsaying that, aside being the only one willing to invest in hard infrastructure, China loans are easily accessible by developing countries, especially by the African continent. However, while we agree that it is one thing to pledge, it is also another thing to fulfil the promises. So, therefore, it is suggestive that the Nigerian government as a member of the BRI and in line with its foreign policy of economic development to hold the Chinese government on their pledges, so as to reap the benefits of the BRI. And also make sure that the Chinese government is committed in encouraging and supporting Chinese companies to invest in Nigeria not just in trade, but to also outsource and offshore their manufacturing to Nigeria.

References Calabrese, L. (2019, October 15). Making the Belt and Road Initiative work for Africa. Insight. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from https://www.odi.org/ blogs/10797-­making-­belt-­and-­road-­initiative-­work-­africa Chan, G. (2018). Understanding China’s new diplomacy: Silk roads and bullet trains. Edward Elgar Publishing. (Google Books). FOCAC. (2018). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021). The 2018 Beijing Summit and the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

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Hu, B. (2019). Belt and road initiative: Five years on implementation and reflection. Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 11(1–2), 1–10., © 2019 Emerging Markets Institute, Beijing Normal University. https://doi. org/10.1177/0974910119871377 iMFdirect. (2015). China and Africa: Will the honeymoon continue? Retrieved February 22, 2017, from https://blog-­imfdirect.imf.org/2015/12/21/ china-­and-­africa-­will-­the-­honeymoon-­continue/ Jinping, X. (2017). The governance of China II (p. 543). Foreign Language Press. Kitchen, N. (2013). Emerging powers in Africa (Executive Summary). LSE Ideas Special Report, SR016 June 2013. Kulaksız, S. (2019). Financial integration via belt and road initiative: China– Turkey cooperation. Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 11(1–2), 48–64. Leslie, A. N. (2020). China-Africa relations: The belt and road initiative and its impact on Africa. African Studies Quarterly, 19(3–4), 1–7. Nedopil, C. (2021). Investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. IIGF Green BRI Center. www.green-­bri.org Odutola, A. (2020). Nigeria is falling into China’s debt trap. Retrieved March 20, 2021, from https://nairametrics.com/2020/05/21/china-nigerialoan-nigeria-is-falling-into-chinas-debt-trap/ OECD. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape. OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018. Proshare. (2020, December). Infrastructure development in Nigeria: The PPP approach. Proshare. Retrieved March 19, 2021, from https://www.proshareng. com/news/Nigeria%20Economy/Infrastr ucture-Development-inNigeria%2D%2DThe-PPP-Approach/54712# PwC. (2017, June). Repaving the ancient silk routes. PwC Growth Markets Centre. Retrieve from PwC. https://www.pwc.comassets.pdf.pwc-­gmc-­re Ray, R. & Simmons, B. A. (2020). Tracking China’s overseas development finance. Global Development Policy Centre. Retrieved February 10, 2021, from https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2020/12/07/tracking-chinas-overseas-developmentfinance/ Shaw, T. M., Cooper, A. F., & Chin, G. T. (2009). Emerging powers and Africa: Implications for/from global governance? Politikon, 36(1), 27–44. https:// doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155385 Ships and Ports. (2019). Nigeria joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved March 19 2021, from https://shipsandports.com.ng/nigeria-joins-chinasbelt-and-road-initiative/ Solana, J. (2015). China and global governance. Retrieved March 31, 2018, from http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-multilateral-institutionsthreaten-us-by-javier-solana-2015-03

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Taylor, I. (2020). Kenya’s new lunatic express: The standard gauge railway. African Studies Quarterly, 19(3–4), 29–52. The Belt and Road Forum. (2019, April 27). Joint Communiqué of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Retrieved August 2, 2020, from http://www.beltandroadforum.org/english/ n100/2019/0427/c36-­1311.html Tini, T. (2019). Financing and funding for the Belt and Road Initiative. OttawaLife Magazine. Retrieved May 5, 2020, from https://www.ottawalife.com/article/ financing-­and-­funding-­for-­the-­belt-­and-­road-­initiative?c=1 Tjønneland, E. N. (2015, January). African development: What role do the rising powers play? Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) Report. Ubi, E. N. (2014). Foreign aid and development in Sino-African relations. Journal of Developing Societies, 30(3), 243–272. https://doi.org/10.117 7/0169796X14536971 Ubi, E. N. (2019). China and Africa’s peace and security: Examining China’s role in Nigeria’s insecurity. In C. Hartmann & N. Noesselt (Eds.), China’s new role in African politics: From non-intervention towards stabilization? (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429422393 Ubi, E. N. (2020). Chinese loans and Nigeria’s infrastructural development: Will the Future of Nigeria’s Sovereignty be Guaranteed? Being a Paper presented at the Inaugural Roundtable on Nigeria-China Relations: Reflections on Equal Partners and Prosperity in Solidarity. Held at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Abuja, Friday 29th January, 2021. Ubi, E. N., & Akinkuotu, O. O. (2014). Nigerian foreign policy and economic development, 1999–2013. International Area Studies Review, 17, 414. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865914557099 Ubi, E. N., & Hongwu, L. (2018). The involvement of China in the reconstruction of Nigeria’s transport infrastructure. In W. O. Alli (Ed.), Nigeria’s diplomacy of economic development and China (p.  88). Centre for Inter-African Human Development Studies (CIDES). Ubi, E. N. (2021). US and China in Africa: Why the Competition instead of Cooperation? Being a Discussion paper presented at A Webinar in Partnership with the African Centre for the Study of the US (Wits University)/Wits School of Governance (Johannesburg), Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Lagos) and Africa Policy Institute (Nairobi), August, 2021. Venkateswaran, L. (2020, August). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications in Africa. ORF Issue Brief No. 395. Observer Research Foundation.

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Week in China. (2020). How is Belt and Road being funded? Retrieved August 16, 2020, https://www.weekinchina.com/chapter/belt-and-road/how-is-beltand-road-­being-­funded/ White Paper. (2019, September). China and the World in the New Era. Issued by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Zefei, W. (2021). China-Africa cooperation prospers against Covid-19. Retrieved from Xinhua New. September 24, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2021-­0 1/03/c_139638729.htm#:~:text=TikTok%20has%20 become%20the%20fastest,%2Dyear%20increase%20of%2033%25

CHAPTER 9

Nigeria-South Africa Relations: Prospects and Challenges of a Strategic Partnership Usman A. Tar and Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde

Introduction Nigeria-South Africa (SA) relations have thus become a product of the two broad modes of diplomatic relations (Ebegbulem, 2013). It has been a product of peace, on the one hand, and circumstantial rivalry, on the other hand. Needless here to say that the relations between post-­ independence Nigeria and apartheid South Africa were, unarguably, confrontational, while it was friendly between Nigeria and the Liberation Movements in South Africa, especially with the African National Congress (ANC) (Adams, 2006). It was more so because Nigeria adopted Africa as the centerpiece of her foreign policy and committed itself to the total liberation struggle of the African continent from the shackles of colonialism

U. A. Tar (*) Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] O. O. Akinrinde Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_9

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and racism. In this pursuit, Nigeria further staged a formidable oppositional force against colonialism on the African continent as well as apartheid system that existed in South Africa before 1999 by extending funds and other strategic supports to the Liberation Movements in South Africa during her anti-apartheid struggles. The hope and optimism for a much more cordial relation between the two countries following the termination of apartheid system in South Africa in 1994 was dashed due to the dictatorial regime that was in place in Nigeria at that time. However, the re-installation of a civilian government in Nigeria in 1999 redefined the relations between Nigeria and South Africa. While still in power, Nigeria under former President Olusegun Obasanjo maintained an unprecedented cordial relation with South Africa under Thabo Mbeki. This high level of cordiality between the two countries during the reigns of former President Olusegun Obasanjo and former President Thabo Mbeki in Nigeria and South Africa, respectively, eventually led to the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Adams, 2006). Dr. Bobby Moroc, the Deputy Commissioner of South African High Commission, Abuja, attested to this diplomatic cordiality during this phase in Nigeria-South Africa relations when he opined the politics of personalities played out in Nigeria-South Africa relations during the reigns of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki in Nigeria and South Africa, respectively. The level of cordiality and its attendant diplomatic advantages were unprecedented. In short, this era can confidently be referred to as the golden era of Nigeria-South Africa relations (Akinrinde, 2020). They have also worked closely on conflict prevention and resolution and also facilitated the establishment of the African Union with a view to putting forward a detailed blueprint toward the actualization of sustainable development for Africa. Similarly, the cooperation of both countries through the South Africa-­ Nigeria Bi-national Commission (BNC), that was created in 1999 to facilitate strategic bilateral relations between the two countries, seeks to create an environment conducive for the creation of a better quality of life for the citizens of both countries. The Commission is also seen as a platform in which both countries can, collectively as partners, impact positively on, in conjunction with other African countries, regional peace and security, socioeconomic development, poverty alleviation and the prevention of crime and corruption (Chidozie, 2014). Nigeria and South Africa have in recent times sought to advance their mutual interests by intensifying their

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bilateral relationship through cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, infrastructure development, science and technology, agriculture, minerals and energy, transport and communication and so on. Both countries have been on regular consultations to find ways of establishing common positions on efforts to bring the continent into the mainstream of global economic development. The Commission has facilitated cooperation between the two countries in areas such as defense and security, science and technology, education and culture. The benefit of this Commission to both countries can be seen from the fact that between 1999 and 2002, there was an increment of 540% in the amount of South Africa’s export to Nigeria (Onuoha, 2008). South Africa and Nigeria have also collaborated and contributed immensely to peace-keeping missions in Africa. While Nigeria provided more troops in numbers, South Africa was taking a larger role in mediation and other technical assistance for troops. Although, through these individual and collective endeavors, Nigeria and South Africa have asserted that they have so much to gain in having a more united and friendly relation especially if the goal of a united Africa must be achieved, yet through their incapability to contain and extinguish the anger of their respective citizens against foreigners that is usually exhibited as xenophobia, they have shown the rest of the world that the road to a full ‘strategic partnership’ is still far-fetched. Furthermore, the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development project that could have further concretized the strategic relationship and partnership between the two states and inspired the spirit of one Africa as well as good neighborliness among Africans had failed to achieve the intended results (Sidiropoulos, 2008). In fact, despite the presence of a relationship between the purported giants of Africa Nigeria and South Africa, the continent is still exposed to a high level of vulnerabilities occasioned by numerous human security challenges such as poverty, HIV/ AIDS, corruption, unemployment, child mortality, maternal mortality and environmental degradation. Reputed as one of the underdeveloped continents, Africa is vulnerable and prone to human-based challenges (Onimode, 2000: 69). Buttressing this point, the United Nations Development Programme (2009) informs that Africa is categorized as the most underdeveloped continent in the world. It has an average life expectancy of fortyseven years, with eighteen of African countries having the lowest human development indexes across the world as of 2009 (UNDP, 2009: 197). Consequently, Africa has been bedeviled by cases of fragile states, porous borders, ethno-communal crisis, intra-state conflicts, piracy, small arms and

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light weapons proliferation, insurgencies, weak judicial and law enforcement institutions and poorly managed economies (Chidozie, 2014). Thus, one fundamental development in this regard is the increasing realization that there are some countries that have to play a key or lead role to help other countries in the continent out of the woods. Unsurprisingly, many observers such as Tieku (2004), Chidozie (2014) and Ebegbulem (2013) have rightly argued that the quality and direction of Nigeria-South Africa relations hold the key to Africa’s future and development. By implication, therefore, any act or action capable of puncturing the bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa would consequently portend threat to the quest for African development. Hence, there is therefore the need for a concerted and holistic approach in quelling the raging evils of xenophobia in South Africa that now poses monumental threat to the strategic relations between Abuja and Pretoria.

Historicizing the Making of Nigeria-South Africa Strategic Partnership As earlier upheld, two things have always characterized the history of Nigeria-South Africa relations and strategic partnership, namely the preponderance of the common and national interests of the two states. These two variables can be identified as the basic underpinnings of the historical emergence of Nigeria-South Africa relations. As sovereign states, both Nigeria and South Africa are permitted within the framework of international regimes to pursue their respective national interests and/or common interests when necessary. While what constitutes a nation’s national interest may either be core or be peripheral, both are still needed in inter-­ states relations. This explains why both Nigeria and South Africa have always considered their sovereignties and survivals core and immutable. The core national interest of a state can hardly contradict that of other states except in situations of physical confrontations or wars. Hence, the relative peace and tranquility Nigeria-South Africa relations have witnessed in the post-apartheid era. The other strand of a state’s national interest cum common or peripheral interests has largely determined both the nature and the history of Nigeria-South Africa relations in post-apartheid South Africa era. Peripheral interests such as the quests for continental leadership, and/or United Nations Permanent seat for Africa, international recognition and others, coupled with common interests such as

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collective security, regional and/or continent security, democratization of Africa, have determined and defined the peaceful and at the same time confrontational nature of Nigeria-SA relations. Common interests in regional security, stability, decolonization and democratization have however dictated and informed the peaceful nature of Nigeria-South Africa relations. The hostile and unpleasant nature of Nigeria-South Africa relations, on the other hand, has been a product of clashes of peripheral or secondary national interests of the two states. The quests for continental hegemonic power and leadership as well as the subtle motive by both states to secure the proposed much-talk about United Nations Security Council slot have contributed and informed the hostile relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. For instance, the quest by Nigeria to assert its sub-regional influence during the Côte d’Ivoire presidential elections in 2011 was punctured by South Africa’s call for a military action against the defeated sit-tight Laurent Gbagbo’s regime insistence to remain in power following its defeat at the poll. This was however against Nigeria’s strategic call for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the political schisms in Côte d’Ivoire. South Africa’s claim of asserting continental leadership in Laurent Gbagbo’s Côte d’Ivoire’s electoral wrangling colluded with Nigeria’s strategic but peripheral interest in stamping its sub-regional hegemony in the West African sub-region. This therefore demonstrates how the pursuits of secondary national interests by both states cum Nigeria and SA had pitted the two states against each other, thereby defining the confrontational or unfriendly nature and history of Nigeria-South Africa relations. The issue of xenophobia in South Africa has also contributed to the reoccurrence, or simply put, the reawakening, of another unpleasant nature and chapter in the historical archive of Nigeria-South Africa relations. Although, it can be argued that the issue of xenophobia in South Africa can best be seen within the prism of track two or citizens diplomacy because it intersects with relations among South African citizens and those of other nationalities, its emergence, notwithstanding, has added to the unfriendly nature and rivalry inherent in Nigeria-South Africa relations. The manifestation of xenophobia and its inherent politics has however gone beyond the level of citizens relations as both Nigeria and South Africa have had diplomatic altercations. From the killing of the three Africans in a moving train by South Africans, the cankerworm of xenophobia had grown to become a large-scale violent manifestation with staggering degrees of human, economic, political and social, touristic consequences. As expected,

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the occurrence of xenophobia instigated a frosty-­like relationship between Abuja and Pretoria, with the former questioning the incessant untamed manifestation of the xenophobic attacks on its citizenry, as well as the latter’s commitment to putting a stop to the menace. This informed the recalling of Nigeria’s Ambassador to South Africa by the Nigerian government in 2015. These gestures by the Nigerian government did not go unaddressed by its South African counterpart, as the latter began to question Nigeria’s intent for the recalling of her Ambassador while also reminding the Nigerian government of the deaths of South African nationals who were trapped in the collapsed Synagogue Church of all Nations in Ikotun area of Lagos, Nigeria. Furthermore, the conflicting positions of Nigeria and South Africa on whom to be appointed the Chairman of the African Union Commission in 2012 demonstrated how the pursuant of secondary or peripheral national interests of both states pitted the duo against each other. While the Nigeria government was averse to the nomination of South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma, as the Chairman, SA supported their nomination against the incumbent chairperson, Jean Ping (Agbu et al., 2013). Eventually, the emergence of Dhlamini-Zuma created the perceptions that South Africa’s leading role had been reinforced in the face of Nigeria’s declining continental leadership capacity. Without sounding mechanistic, the pursuits of national interests by states, especially the secondary interests, could equally inform a friendlier and more harmonious relation and strategic partnership when a common interest can be seen by the actors. Common interests like collective security, democratization, commercialization, adequate guarantees for human rights, decolonization and others continue to inform the peaceful and friendly nature of Nigeria-South Africa strategic relations. For instance, Nigeria and South Africa had cooperated and pursued common interests in the area of Africa’s development, security and democratization. In 2002, Obasanjo and Mbeki were nominated to work hand in hand as part of the Commonwealth troika with the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, to monitor the post-electoral events in Zimbabwe after it was suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations in 2002 due to alleged rigged elections won by its President Robert Mugabe. Bilaterally, Nigeria and SA relations is considered one of the most viable and successful in Africa, given the level of economic, political and social interactions between the two states. The bilateral relations with Nigeria and SA alone contributed a total of ZAR 66.2 billion in trade to the African economy. Within the framework

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of Nigeria-South Africa bilateral strategic relations, a fruitful strategic partnership through the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission was birthed in order to foster more relations between the two states. The Nigeria-South Africa’s Bi-national Commission and Nigeria-South Africa’s Chambers of Commerce are glimpses of institutions set up by both Nigeria and South Africa for further deepening of their bilateral relations. The logic here therefore is to again reaffirm the fact that the historical nature of Nigeria-South Africa relations has been a mixed one—spanning across the ambivalence of peace and hostility, as well as cooperation and competition. The is equally tied to the fact that the nature of Nigeria-­ South Africa relations, at any point in time, is a product of the national interests of both states, as well as how these interests are pursued. This explains why the issue of South Africa’s xenophobia touches the very heart of any state’s national interest when it is directed toward a state’s citizens living in foreign land. The preservation of not just the territorial integrity of a state but also that of its citizens lies at the core of any state’s core or primary interest. When this is threatened, as in the case of xenophobia in South Africa, a state is bound to act and defend the sanctity of its national and human lives.

The Quest for Strategic Bilateral Trade and Investment Partnership The Nigerian state has a population of 160 million people and its Gross Domestic Product(GDP) is $509.9 billion since the rebasing exercise in April 2014, thereby making it the largest economy in Africa. South Africa has a population of 51.19 million people and a GDP of $384.3 billion, thereby making it the second-largest economy in Africa (Adetula, 2014). Meanwhile, the BNC constituted the context for strategic partnerships to enhance bilateral relations and redeem Africa’s economy. It is noteworthy that between October 1999 and April 2000 on the avoidance of taxation on income and capital gains, reciprocal promotion and protection of investments, cooperation in the fields of mining, geology, exploration and energy were done (Banjo, 2010: 9). Nigeria and South Africa signed agreements that attracted hundreds of South African companies into the Nigerian economy (Bello & Hengari, 2013). The South African firms operating in Nigeria include the Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN), with 55.4 million subscribers in 2014 (MTN Group limited, 30 September, 2014). Shoprite, Stanbic Bank and Digital Satellite Television

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(DSTV) are equally strategic South African businesses in the Nigerian economy. Similarly, the Dangote Group of Companies with headquarters in Nigeria have investment portfolio of nearly $400 million in cement production in South Africa, and Nigeria’s Oando Oil Company is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Oil represents over 95% of Nigeria’s exports to South Africa (Nagar & Peterson, 2012: 4). The South African government in October 2000 raised the volume of crude oil import from Nigeria, thereby suggesting increase in economic relations (Ogoegbulem, 2000). The bilateral volume of trade increased from ZAR 174 million in 1998 to ZAR 22.8 billion in 2008, thereby accounting for nearly a quarter of South Africa’s total African trade in 2008 (Otto, 2012). South Africa’s exports to Nigeria increased from ZAR 505 million to ZAR 7.1 billion and Nigeria’s exports to South Africa increased from ZAR 15.7 billion to ZAR 123.6 billion in the same period (Otto, Ibid.). South Africa’s exports to Nigeria in 2010 stood at ZAR 4.38 billion and Nigeria’s exports to South Africa stood at ZAR 16.08 billion, with the total trade amounting to ZAR 20.46 billion. The aggregate trade figures experienced a leap in 2014 with a cumulative of ZAR 66.2 billion (Otto, Ibid.). The post-apartheid period recorded exports to Nigeria from South Africa at the rate of ZAR 10.5 billion, while Nigeria’s exports to South Africa skied up to ZAR 55.7 billion (see Table  9.1 showing the trade transactions and the items of trade between Nigeria and South Africa from 1999 to 2014). While there are constraints in gathering data on the items of trade, the available data are as captured. Hence, the foregoing data suggests trade surplus in favor of Nigeria, but the state has failed to diversify its economy and expand production base. Nigeria heavily relies on export of oil and human resources to South Africa and South Africa’s exports to Nigeria include electrical equipment, machinery, wood, paper, foodstuff, beverages, spirit, tobacco, rubber and plastics. The diversified nature of South Africa’s investment portfolio has raised question on the country’s interest in Nigeria. More so, it has been difficult for Nigerian firms to penetrate the South African economy, thereby raising fear of South Africa’s likely dominance in Nigeria. Ironically, the South African firms record significant contribution to Nigeria’s GDP; the end users rarely benefit as Nigeria’s GDP per capita is $2688 in relation to South Africa’s GDP per capita of $7336 (Langalanga, 2014). These asymmetric relations raise question on the strategic partnership and expected role of Nigeria within the sphere of her relations with South Africa notwithstanding.

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Table 9.1  The trade transactions between Nigeria and South Africa from 1999 to 2014 Year

Nigeria’s imports from SA

Nigeria’s exports to SA

Total trade

1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

ZAR 514m ZAR 709m ZAR 1.6bn ZAR 2.7bn ZAR 2.9bn ZAR 3.4bn ZAR 3.85bn ZAR 4.62bn ZAR 7.12bn ZAR 5.41bn ZAR 4.38bn ZAR 5.7bn ZAR 6.4bn ZAR 7.8bn ZAR 10.5bn

ZAR 1.23bn ZAR 1.26bn ZAR 1.66bn ZAR 3.6bn ZAR 5.1bn ZAR 4.2bn ZAR 9.28bn ZAR 12.48bn ZAR 15.74bn ZAR 15.60bn ZAR 16.08bn ZAR 12.27bn ZAR 30.5bn ZAR 34.9bn ZAR 55.7bn

ZAR 1.74bn ZAR 1.97bn ZAR 3.2bn ZAR 6.3bn ZAR 8bn ZAR 7.6bn ZAR 13.13bn ZAR 17.10bn ZAR 22.86bn ZAR 20.01bn ZAR 20.46bn ZAR 28.4bn ZAR 36.9bn ZAR 42.7bn ZAR 66.2bn

Source: High Commission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in South Africa, 2015. http://www.nigeriapretoria.org.za/nido.htm, and Trade and Industry Department, South African High Commission, Nigeria, http://www.dirco.gov.za/abuja/tradeandindustry.html

Strategic Partnership Through Multilateralism Nigeria and South Africa have maintained somewhat viable multilateral relations since the Obasanjo and Mbeki administrations. The commitment of these countries to international organizations such as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) enhanced their relations. Both countries facilitated effective cooperation through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Commission (SADC). The multilateral relations began to wane when Russian President Vladimir Putin invited South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki to the G-8 summit in Moscow in 2006. The invitation of Mbeki raised suspicion of former President Obasanjo and other African leaders that the region’s leadership position may have been implicitly conferred on South Africa. Meanwhile, the struggle for Africa’s permanent representation on the UN Security Council, which started in 2005, placed the African triumvirate—Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt—on competitive relations. The Ezulwini Consensus that called for at least two permanent

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positions (with veto power) and five rotating positions for Africa in the UN Security Council inadvertently led to diplomatic strife between Abuja and Pretoria. Nigeria claimed it was qualified for the seat in the light of its historic role in maintaining international peace and security amid its status as the most populous black nation in Africa. South Africa equally claims it is qualified for the seat citing its economic strength. The political quagmire in Ivory Coast in 2011 created diplomatic tension between Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria was opposed to the government of former President Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to abdicate power on his defeat at election. Nigeria mobilized the West African forces to displace Gbagbo from power, which contradicted the preference of South Africa for a political negotiation. The position of South Africa on the crisis in Ivory Coast was perceived as interference in a sub-regional issue, and attempt to foster its African leadership agendum. The Nigerian government preferred military action to displace the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in sharp contrast to the positions of South Africa. The AU, however, excluded Nigeria from the ad hoc committee on Libya and appointed Zuma as the chairman. Nigeria’s preference for a National Transition Council (NTC), to replace the Gaddafi leadership, was perceived by South Africa as a unilateral recognition of the NTC in Libya (Agbu et al., 2013: 9). The contest for the AU chair position in 2012 reopened another vista of rivalry when the Nigeria government opposed the nomination of South Africa Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma, and supported the incumbent chairperson, Jean Ping. The South African quest for the position was conceived as violation of an unwritten understanding reached among the Africa’s main financial contributors to the AU—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa—to avoid contest for the chair position in the AU Commission (Agbu et al., 2013, 8). The ECOWAS states supported the former Foreign Minister of Gabon, Jean Ping, and the SADC supported Dhlamini-Zuma who later emerged as the chair. The emergence of Dhlamini-Zuma created the perceptions that South Africa’s leading role had been reinforced and the capacity of Nigeria declined. The Nigerian government, however, argued that it supported a joint decision of ECOWAS and did not contest for the position of AU chairperson. The Nigerian government had contested for the seat of Commissioner for Political Affairs, which it won. The South Africa’s membership of BRICS and G-20 raised anxiety in Abuja on

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Nigeria’s leadership in the region. South Africa was likely perceived as a relatively strong economy with a large industrial base in Africa; and on the contrary, Nigeria’s economy has been predicated on low industrial and weak economic base. South Africa’s improved relations with Angola in 2008 created anxiety that Pretoria was de-emphasizing relations with Nigeria. Angola is a major crude oil producer in the Gulf of Guinea and likely source of crude oil supply to South Africa. The multilateral relations are characterized by intense rivalries and competitiveness that are not healthy for the growth of intra-Africa trade, economic and political relations.

Citizens Relations and the Quest for Strategic Partnership The liberalization policy of Obasanjo administration encouraged South Africans into Nigeria for trade and investment opportunities. Similarly, the Nigerian experts and business class increasingly sought and explored opportunities in South Africa. There are numerous thriving businesses owned by Nigerians in South Africa, and its intellectuals are quite visible in the academia (Olupohunda, 2013: 24). Since 2008, there has been increasingly hostility and suspicion of foreigners in South Africa. The foreigners including Nigerians are linked to drug trafficking, prostitution and armed robbery. The deficit dimension in bilateral citizens’ relations has shown in the series of coordinated xenophobic attacks on Nigerians and other Africans. There is the perception that foreign workers largely occupy jobs meant for South Africans. The mining and retail sectors are somewhat populated by foreign migrants from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria. Meanwhile, the racist and apartheid policies created social divisions between the white minority and black majority populations. The land dispossession of majority black population and its transfer to white farmers created the land question, while the Bantustan education and segregated residences are major sign posts of expropriation policy of the apartheid regime. The post-apartheid phase, however, held promise of social change in the socioeconomic conditions of the black populace. The perception of receding expectations occasioned by the preponderance of slum residences, continuous land dispossession and high level of unemployment among the black population, and the increasing entry of foreign

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migrants who compete with South Africans for jobs underscore the xenophobic attacks. There were incidences of xenophobic-related attacks in 2015, which led to the death of eight foreigners. The Nigerian media reported physical attacks and looting of retail businesses of Nigerians, especially in the province of Johannesburg. This development led to the withdrawal of Nigeria’s Ambassador in South Africa and the plan to relocate its nationals. The recall of Nigeria’s Ambassador provoked responses in the Nigerian media on its appropriateness; the media considered the decisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as ill-thought and clumsy. It argued that the recall of its Ambassador further exposed Nigerians to xenophobic attacks. The media insisted that the crises demanded the presence of a high-level diplomat to respond to the travails of Nigerians in South Africa, and relate to Pretoria on the mechanisms to deal with the fallouts. More so, the South African government condemned the xenophobic attacks and promised tough measures against its perpetrators. Pretoria, however, responded to the withdrawal of Nigerian envoy citing the death of 38 South African nationals in a collapsed building at the Synagogue Church in Ikotun, Lagos. The South African government recalled that the deaths did not elicit harsh reactions by state officials and the populace. The killing of popular South African music icon, Lucky Dube, in 2009 increased hostility at bilateral citizens’ level. The assassination of the reggae icon was influenced by the perception of his nationality amid the stereotyping of Nigerians in South Africa as rich, living in opulence and owning flashy cars through crime-related activities (Games, 2013: 23). The issuance of visa raised issues on Nigeria-South Africa relations. Nigerians on initial visit to South Africa were required to deposit monies to offset the cost of a possible repatriation from South Africa. The South African government denied visa to several Nigerians who applied for it during the 2010 FIFA World Cup without official reasons (Olanrewaju, 2013: 51). The delay in issuance of visa to Nigerian businessmen had resulted in cancelation of contracts due to their inability to meet business schedules. The South Africa declined to sign a non-visa regime pact with Nigeria which it earlier agreed (Agbu, 2010: 444). The Nigerian Nobel Prize winner Professor Wole Soyinka was delayed at the airport in 2005, despite his invitation to deliver a lecture at Nelson Mandela’s birthday. He was allowed entry at the intervention of Mandela’s wife, Gracia Mandela (Olanrewaju, 2013: 51). The experience of Soyinka

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heightened the perception among Nigerians that South Africa has least respect for the country’s intellectual class and business class, and other citizens.

Contents and Contexts of Nigeria-South Africa Strategic Partnership The structure of Nigeria-SA relations has always been hinged on two forms of diplomatic relations—bilateralism and multilateralism. Aside the post-apartheid Nigeria-SA relations that have been heavily structured into these two categories, the pre-apartheid Nigeria-SA relations had also conformed structurally to these two forms of diplomatic relations. While no form of bilateral or multilateral relation was established with the apartheid South African government, the Nigerian government maintained strong diplomatic relations with several South African indigenous anti-apartheid movements. All diplomatic—bilateral or multilateral—relations were cut by the Nigerian government with the apartheid South African government due to the reigns of apartheid system in South Africa during the period. The triumph of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa in 1994 marked the beginning of official diplomatic bilateral and multilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa. Very dishearteningly, this period (1994–1999) coincided with the military dispensation in Nigeria. Hence, no fruitful bilateral or multilateral relations were witnessed between successive democratically elected regimes in South Africa and successive military regimes in Nigeria from 1994 to 1999. The return to democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 which saw former President Olusegun Obasanjo at the helms of affairs marked the beginning of fruitful and highly productive bilateral and multilateral relations between the Nigerian state and the South African state. With Thabo Mbeki at helms of affairs in South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, the bilateral and multilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa witnessed an unprecedented level of cordiality and productivity. From 1999 up to the present (2019) alone, the bilateral and multilateral relations between these two states had produced commendable diplomatic outputs that include but not limited to the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in 1999, the creation of Nigeria-South Africa’s Bi-national Commission, the creation of Nigeria-South Africa’s Chambers of Commerce as well as various joint

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peace-keeping and election-monitoring missions in Africa. Multilaterally, Nigeria and SA remain in the class of highest financiers of the African Union. While relations between Nigeria and South Africa had always been structured on bilateral and multilateral arrangements, the contexts of these revolve around economic, political, social and consular/citizens relations. Politically, Nigeria-South Africa witnessed the most productive and cordial relations during the reigns of former Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. Scholars like Amuwo (2014) and Akinboye (2005) have attributed the level of political relations between Nigeria and South Africa to the personal friendship and relations between Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo. Without the political relationship between the two states, especially the personal relationship between South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, the economic, social and other contexts of Nigeria-­ South Africa relations would not have materialized nor yielded the recorded level of fruitfulness. Both former presidents were committed to consolidating democratic ideals in not only the South African region but the entire African continent. They were highly respected international statesmen with track records of undoubted commitment to the goal of African unity and integration. For instance, between 1999 and 2007, former President Olusegun Obasanjo embarked on several diplomatic visits to SA, just as much as former President Thabo Mbeki’s visits to Nigeria. Following the glorious triumph of the anti-apartheid movements and the subsequent installation of a democratic system in South Africa, the Nigeria-­ South Africa relations that were, hither to, defined by high-stake hostilities and confrontations became not just a friendly relation but one that promised a great deal of benefits for both countries. The apartheid system that was, hither to, the source of discordant relations between Abuja and Pretoria before the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president in South Africa paved way for a more cordial diplomatic relation between the two countries. This cordiality did not however fully materialize until 1999 following the termination of the military regime in Nigeria. South Africa could not really extend its appreciatory gestures to the Nigerian state for the role it played in her apartheid struggle because of the dictatorial regime that was still in place in Nigeria. Logically speaking, having tasted the inglorious apartheid system, South Africa was then practically constrained to establish any friendly relations with the military government in place in Nigeria at that point in time. The military government in Nigeria with its human

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rights abuses incurred the wrath of the international community. South Africa that was, hither to, a subject of criticism for its apartheid system in the eyes of the international community and Nigeria before 1994, began using her position as an emerging African Superpower to campaign for the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth and the United Nations due to Nigeria’s human rights abuses under the military cum Abacha’s regime (Fawole, 2003). This brief confrontation reached the ceiling in 1995 when the then-South African President Nelson Mandela vigorously campaigned for the expulsion of Nigeria from Commonwealth during the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland (Fawole, 2003). However, with the re-installation of a democratic government in place in Nigeria in 1999, Nigeria-South Africa relations became less confrontational, more friendly and cordial than ever before. From this period onward, South Africa started building strong ties with the Nigerian government under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki. This relationship was also facilitated by the fact that Thabo Mbeki had developed a strong friendship with Obasanjo and Yar’Adua when he was in exile in Nigeria from 1976 to 1979. There is no gainsaying the fact that this period witnessed unprecedented bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries. Politically, the leaders of both countries have traversed the globe spreading the idea of African renaissance—focusing largely on democracy, development and security and seeking foreign investments to revive Africa’s ailing economies. They have called for greater international burden-sharing in peace-keeping missions, campaigns for the annulment of Africa’s external debt, championed better access for African goods entering Western markets and called for Africa’s integration into the global economy on fairer terms (Fawole, 2002). It will be recalled that the former Heads of State of Nigeria and South Africa, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, worked relentlessly to lobby the rich nations of the world to focus greater attention on African problems. At the G-8 meeting of the world’s richest states in 2000, both leaders argued strongly that the rich nations should forgive Africa’s debt. Both had called for technology and resource transfer from the West to Africa, criticizing the gap between promise and delivery on the part of most Western states. NEPAD, championed by Mbeki and Obasanjo, proposed a simple bargain that the West should provide debt relief, open its markets, invest in Africa and support peace-keeping missions in exchange for democratic accountability and financial probity by African leaders through a self-monitored peer-review mechanism in Africa.

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Both leaders have common aspirations for a united and prosperous democratic Africa. Thabo Mbeki’s dream to play a leading role in Africa’s socioeconomic development merged with Obasanjo’s dream of economic diplomacy which led to a series of consultations and meetings by the leaders of both countries. The meetings of both countries since the past decade underscore the need for greater coordination of regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution within the African Union mechanism and the United Nations Security Council (Chidozie, 2014). Both countries have continually stressed the need for ensuring peace and stability becomes a reality in Africa. In one of their meetings in Abuja, the Heads of State Summit emphasized a need for an effective peer-review mechanism, which would be designed, owned and managed by Africans. This mechanism, the Heads of State emphasized, must be credible, transparent and all-encompassing to demonstrate that African leaders are fully aware of their responsibilities and obligations to their peoples. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the institution of peer-review mechanism was championed by Nigeria and South Africa. This then underscores the emergence of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development as a product of both Nigeria and South Africa’s committed resolve to facilitate the quest for true Africa’s development. In fact, the recent visit of the South African president to Nigeria and his subsequent visit to the Nigerian National Assembly early in 2016 show the renewed commitment of both countries to a more cordial diplomatic relation. Within the economic context, Nigeria-South Africa relations are arguably considered as one of the most productive and successful in Africa. For the records, South Africa’s exports to Nigeria by 2005 were valued at ZAR 3.4 billion, with importation worth ZAR 4.2 billion of commodities from with over hundred South African companies doing business in Nigeria, according to Nigerian-South African Chambers of Commerce, and hundreds operating in different parts of Africa. Coupled with this, it is equally on record that more than half of the MTN Group’s total turnover last year in Africa was generated outside of South Africa and that the majority of that money was realized in Nigeria. From its operations in 2014 alone, MTN’s revenue amounted to almost ZAR 54 billion, more than the ZAR 39 billion it made in its parent country, South Africa (South African Broadcasting Corporation, 2015). Similarly, South Africa’s financial institutions such as Standard Chartered, Stanbic IBTC and others continue to operate and expand their tentacles within the Nigerian financial sector. With several other South African companies operating in Nigeria as well as

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the present reality about the enormous profits being realized in Nigeria, it follows that the potential effects of any cause of hostile behavior in relations between the two states may be dire for both countries especially South Africa, given the level of its investments in Nigeria. According to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, South Africa has Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $342 billion, which is about 13% of Africa’s total Gross Domestic Product of $2.5 trillion. Added to this, the exportation of goods is the primary trade relations between South Africa and the rest of the continent (Nigeria inclusive) (South African Broadcasting Corporation, 2015). Despite the rhetoric about possible reprisal from different quarters, no official or documented retaliatory move has been instituted against South Africans or their businesses in Nigeria in light of the various manifestations of xenophobia in South Africa. These investments and other economic empires built by multinationals of South African descent face possible economic suffocation in Nigeria perhaps in an event of further manifestation of the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Similarly, in terms of commercialization and branding of South Africans’ products at the international market, xenophobia is systematically damaging the prospects of South Africans’ products at the international market. International buyers may be tempted to shun South Africans’ businesses because of fear of being hated or persecuted on the basis of working or living in South Africa. This is because foreigners’ stereotypical views and images about a place or group of people or a product are in most cases hard to dislodge (Akinrinde, 2020; Mkhondo, 1993). It may be difficult to evaluate in monetary terms how xenophobia has damaged the chances of South Africans’ products in other countries; it is however certain that South Africans’ products will not be exempted from the consequences of xenophobia. Further, since it is evident that these xenophobic attacks occur between the economically disadvantaged domestic poor and the materially privileged foreign nationals as pointed out by Tewari, it is then crystal clear that the xenophobic violence could only further impoverish the perpetrators and the victims (Tewari, 2015). Socio-culturally, Nigeria-South Africa relations have, in recent times, witnessed a slump in the bilateral relations as touching tourism. For Omitola Adetola, tourism had contributed immensely to the balance of payment of all nations and has equally be an earner of foreign exchange, but the recurring theme of xenophobia in the parlance of tourism has affected the development of tourism in Africa. According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, travel and tours alone contributed ZAR 102

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billion to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product in 2012, and by implication provided 10.3% of jobs in South Africa (World Economic Forum, 2013). With thousands of Nigerians visiting South Africa for tourist purposes, and South Africans visiting Nigeria for the same purposes, the xenophobic attacks now pose a great deal of danger to the development of tourism in both Nigeria and South Africa. The implication of this on Nigeria-South Africa is the fact that the inter-personal relationship among the citizens of both countries is needed to solidify and foster the bilateral exchanges and relations between the two countries. Similarly, the national imageries and role conception of the South African state have suffered some setbacks due to the xenophobic outburst. The national role conception being a vital part of state power calculus is one of the soft powers that can be deployed by any state at the International System. It simply refers to how a country is perceived by other countries at the International System. Against this background, the recent xenophobic outburst in South Africa now portrays South Africans as being xenophobic and intolerant. This perception transcends the shores of the African continent. This perception determines to a very large extent the choice of destination for foreign tourists, investors and professionals or skilled migrants. Needless to say here, that the xenophobic onslaughts in South Africa would further prevent not only Nigerian tourists but also skilled migrants and labors from visiting South Africa. This is definitely not in the strategic interest of neither South Africa nor Nigeria or the African continent, given the strategic importance of the leadership status of South Africa in Africa. Coupled with the above, with thousands of Nigerians undergoing various educational trainings in South Africa, the recent manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa could discourage prospective Nigerian students and other African students intending to go to South Africa for further academic pursuits, thus, negatively affecting the educational developmental goals of the African continent.

Theoretical Positions on Nigeria-South Africa Strategic Relations and Partnership Avalanche of theoretical premises and orientations abound as touching the concept and practice of strategic inter-state relations and partnerships. While relations among states had existed long before the signing of the 1648 Westphalia treaty, it was however the birth of this landmark treaty

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that marked the official commencement of inter-state relations. While appreciating the eventual signing of this treaty and its attendant diplomatic benefits since 1648, it was not until recently that states like Nigeria and South Africa began to demonstrate and invoke the very essence of the treaty following their attainments of statehood and self-rule in 1960 and 1994, respectively. Despite the disparity in their years of attainments of statehood and self-rule as the case may be, Nigeria and South Africa have achieved an unrivaled level of strategic partnerships and relations as far as diplomatic relations are concerned within the African continent. Both countries have succeeded in achieving considerable amount of strategic economic, political, educational and social relations through either bilateral or multilateral arrangements. While the field of inter-state relations has never been short of credible theories and paradigms, getting a ready-made theory that is specific to the theme under study accounts for the lack of theoretical depth in this field. Realism, Idealism, Constructivism, Marxism, Critical Theory and others have sought to provide credible and spot-on empirical explanations as to why states behave the way they do in inter-state relations and strategic diplomatic partnerships. Notwithstanding, none of the aforementioned explanations and insights as to their respective theorizations fully capture the real dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa relations. Liberalism therefore offers us a more convincing insight as to how Nigeria-South Africa relations had epitomized both cooperation and competition. Liberalism, as an International Relations and Strategic Studies theory, arose as it were originally from the foundational Idealist theoretical orientation. As a Latin word dubbed liber (i.e. to be free), Liberalism originally refers to the principle and philosophy of Freedom. It is a theory that grew from the Idealist theoretical teachings that perpetual peace and cooperation is quite achievable in the International System. The views of classical Idealists like Woodrow Wilson, Mahatma Gandhi and others informed the general conceptions of the Liberalist theory in the field of International Relations and Strategic Studies (Kleingeld, 2013). Liberalism however started playing a very vital role in the theoretical discourses of International Relations from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries till date. It has substantially grown to become a potent theoretical tool, also, in the modern analysis of international events, phenomena and relations. Liberalism, as influenced by the Thirty Years’ War and the Era of Enlightenment, rides on the notion of adequate guarantee for liberties, freedom, cooperation, peace and democratic orientations (Doyle, 2011).

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As a theoretical school of thought, Liberalism rejects the idea of power play and politics among state actors as being the sole determinant of states’ behaviors and actions at the International System. It questions the realist quest for supreme military dominance and hegemonic displays by states at the International System. Liberalism believes that shared economic affiliations and cooperation through bilateral and institutional arrangements would water down the propensity for constant schisms and frictions in inter-state relations at the International System (Fukuyama, 1992). Again, Liberalism argues that state actors are not the sole drivers or players at the International System. It argues that non-state actors and networks such as international religious organizations, terrorist networks, international private individuals, non-governmental organizations and others continue to affect the International System (Kleingeld, 2013). Liberalism equally believes that International Institutions, especially International Economic Institutions, play a vital role in facilitating cooperation and peaceful coexistence among states. This is hinged on the belief that common economic grounds and affiliations with commitment could serve as restraints on the excesses and possible aggression of states (Woolf, 1916). And that since states normally relate with one another on economic, financial and socio-cultural grounds, hegemonic security and military capability may not necessarily tend to be the primary goal in their relations and interactions. Against the backdrop of the realist conception of anarchic International System, Liberalism believes International laws and regimes can serve as regulatory mechanisms in inter-state relations. The Liberalist scholars have argued that International laws and regimes such as the United Nations Charter and the Magna Carta continue to regulate the behaviors of states at the International System. Liberal scholars such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have scholarly extolled the ideals of this theory. John Locke in his ‘Treatise of Government’, for instance, outlined the imports of natural rights and liberties. Locke argued that man is born free and empty of preordained ideas (Weart, 1998). But, however, the state of nature, as Locke has rightly said, reveals people in their barbaric form. This barbarism would be replaced with a more civil approach when civil governments intervene by helping the people to regain their consciousness of being humans with basic rights to health, freedom and properties. The strategic relations between Nigeria and South Africa can thus be seen within the prism of the Liberalist orientation. Firstly, the relationship

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between the two countries has been more cooperative and collaborative than the usual high competitive tendencies in relations among countries. Than any other, Nigeria and South Africa have been able to demonstrate how two sovereign countries with differing foreign policies and national objective should relate in Africa. The collaborative relations between the two states have led to the creation of South Africa-Nigeria Bi-national Commission as well as the Lagos-South Africa chambers. They have also worked closely on conflict prevention and resolution, while also facilitating the establishment of the African Union with a view to putting forward a detailed blueprint toward the actualization of sustainable development for Africa. Similarly, the cooperation of both countries through the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-national Commission, that was created to facilitate bilateral relations between the two countries, seeks to create an environment conducive for a better quality of life for the citizens of both countries. The Commission is also seen as a platform in which both countries can, collectively as partners, impact positively on, in conjunction with other African countries, regional peace and security, socioeconomic development, poverty alleviation and the prevention of crime and corruption (Chidozie, 2014). Nigeria and South Africa have in recent times sought to advance their mutual interests by intensifying their strategic bilateral relationship through cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, infrastructure development, science and technology, agriculture, minerals and energy, transport and communication and so on. Both countries have been on regular consultations to find ways of establishing common positions on efforts to bring the continent into the mainstream of global economic development. The Commission has facilitated cooperation between the two countries in areas such as defense and security, science and technology, education and culture. The benefit of this Commission to both countries can be seen from the fact that, between 1999 and 2002, there was an increment of 540% in the amount of South Africa’s export to Nigeria (Onuoha, 2008). South Africa and Nigeria have also collaborated and contributed immensely to peace-keeping missions in Africa. While Nigeria was providing more troops in numbers, South Africa was taking a larger role in mediation and other technical assistance for troops. While there had been reasons for rivalry and competitions in both states’ pursuits of their respective national interests, Nigeria and South Africa have found more reasons to cooperate and continue to find a way of synchronizing their respective national interests for the greater good of

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collective African and global security. The cooperation between Abuja and Pretoria has resulted into loads of economic benefits and achievements. In the post-apartheid epoch alone, Nigeria and SA had jointly created a Bi-national Commission, a Bi-national Chamber of Commerce, and facilitated the creation of a development framework for Africa cum the New Partnership for Africa’s development, and a host of other collaborative peace missions within the continent. For instance, there continues to be several South African firms operating in Nigeria and several Nigerian companies and nationals operating in South Africa (Nagar & Peterson, 2012: 4). The resulting outcome of this economic cooperation is the aggregate trade figures that experienced a leap in 2014 and stood at ZAR 66.2 billion. The diplomatic friendliness was aptly captured and self-­evident in the personal friendship between the former leaders of the two states, that is Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki (Obi, 2015; Otto, 2012). Despite the propensity and presence of cooperation and collaboration among states as theorized by the Liberalist, frictions and infractions are bound to set in in inter-states relations. But, states, for Liberalism, would continue to find a way under the auspices of shared and common economic interests to suppress them. Nigeria-SA relations have not been exempted from this. Both states have had reasons to pursue their respective national interests without any recourse to their age-long diplomatic and historical ties. The turn of a new anti-apartheid cum democratically elected system in SA in 1994 pitted the Nelson Mandela-led government against its Nigerian counterpart because of the inglorious reign of Sani Abacha’s dictatorial government in Nigeria during this period. In fact, SA championed very vocally the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1996. Coupled with this, the Nigerian and South African states had also been on diplomatic loggerheads since the race for a permanent African slot in the UN began in 2005. While the former was laying claim to its population size by being the most populous back country in the world and other leadership engagements across the sub-regional and regional levels, SA was canvassing its reasons to be afforded the slot from its unrivaled economic power on the African continent. Overtly and covertly, both states continue to disagree on this and many more areas, especially in the areas of continent leadership and electioneering processes in other African states. However, Nigeria-South Africa relations may currently not be as rosy as it is used to be under Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki’s regimes in Nigeria and SA, respectively, but the relations remain unbroken as Liberalism had theorized.

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Maximizing Nigeria-South Africa Strategic Partnership: Any Challenge? Most discourses on Nigeria-South Africa relations have continued to be centered on what Landsberg (2012: 2) describes as volatility and tension in asserting their leadership roles. The literatures written prior to 1999 emphasized Nigeria’s indispensable roles in dismantling the apartheid system in South Africa, and how the post-apartheid state would recompense what Nigeria had done. Literatures from 1999 till date had been preoccupied with the analyses of how to reach a détente, revive the sickening economies and unveil the love-hate relationship that has become a recurring decimal in Nigeria-South Africa relations. Games (2013) identified the prevalent features of Nigeria and South Africa relations as cooperation and competition. He posits that the type and level of bilateral relations and strategic partnership have been defined by leadership issues and the differences in the countries’ strategies in approaching continental problems. He cited the democratic attitude of Nelson Mandela and the despotic disposition of General Sani Abacha as the reason for the unfriendly engagement between 1995 and 1999, while the efforts and established friendship of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo as the factors responsible for cordial relations post 1999. To Games, bilateral relations in the Jonathan and Zuma administrations almost crumbled due to the domestic policy emphasis of Nigeria and South Africa’s preoccupation with international issues beyond Africa (Games, 2013). Games posits that despite the often conflict nature of Nigeria and South Africa relations, there is a certain degree of cooperation on African issues. He perceives Nigeria and South Africa as powerful and emerging markets whose active participation at the levels of G-20 and BRICS would engender development. He advocates for cooperation of the powers and discourages the promotion of self-seeking ambitions on the probable greatest power in the region. Games attributes Nigeria’s inability to measure to South Africa in the economic realm to the local issues such as lack of institutions, poor infrastructure and heavy dependence on crude oil as the major import into South Africa. Games’ submissions are laden with subjective assertions that appear to be in defense of the impenetrable nature of the South African economy. He justifies the rigid nature of South Africa’s economy as a function of the naivety of Nigerians to understand and compete favorably in the business and market domains in South Africa. Games further placed little emphasis on the

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attitude of white-dominated South African bureaucracy that has been reluctant to promote relations with black Nigerians (Agbu, 2010: 44), namely a factor that hinders a level playing ground for Nigerian business players. He did not demonstrate in substantial terms the implications of xenophobic attacks in South Africa on the capacity of Nigerians to effectively penetrate the South African market. Ngwenya (2010) and Obi (2015) agree that the relations between Nigeria and South Africa improved dramatically with the creation of the BNC as a mechanism for reinvigorating the inactive engagement. Obi reiterates South Africa’s position in the global economic governance, and how the development of Africa is predicated on South Africa’s strategic partnership with Nigeria, which is the single continental economic power without BRICS. He insists that Nigeria and South Africa should cooperate and avoid competing with a view to attaining regional development aspirations. More so, Obi avers that the Nigerian state is a significant partner of South Africa in projecting a meaningful African agenda for engaging with global powers. He attributes the diplomatic setbacks in Nigeria-­ South Africa relations to the failure of leaderships to build relations that would endure. Obi (2015), agreeing with Otto (2012), argued that the relations maintained by Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo were built on personalities rather than independent foreign policy structures and institutions. To Otto, the relations have been cordial in trade and investment, but it has suffered at the political level. Obi and Otto cohere that the unstable political relation explains the inability of Nigeria and South Africa to sustain cordial relations beyond a few years of Obasanjo and Mbeki’s tenure. Otto reasons that despite the problems in the bilateral engagements of the continental giants, the development of the region can be achieved when the states go beyond contest and rise above petty rivalry and unhealthy competition. He canvasses for the implementation of developmental policies and prioritization of mutual interests for their citizens and region. Amuwo (2014) illustrates the dwindling influence of Nigeria in continental affairs amid South Africa’s strides in the economic realm, governance and infrastructure. He argues that the Nigerian governing elite are preoccupied with domestic issues at the expense of African policy. Amuwo (2014) avers that bilateral relations between Nigeria and SA have been marred by conflicts, citing the struggle for the chair of African Union and the seizure of Nigeria’s $15 million (ZAR 164.6 million) meant for arms purchase by the South African government. Agbu (2010) examines

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the prospect of future relations and interrogates domestic obstacles to healthy bilateral relations. He asserts that the South African bureaucracy is largely occupied by whites who are less willing to forge relations with the most populous black country in the region. Conversely, the Nigerian infrastructural base problem, inadequate power supply and poor road networks are major impediments to its growth. The Nigeria-South Africa relations have also been described by Agbu (2010) as bumpy albeit cordial political relations. He argues, however, that the rivalry and competition between Nigeria and South Africa should not justify the fragile relations, and prescribes a strategic partnership in different aspects of relations. Banjo (2010) relies on the collision between Nigeria’s former Head of State, Abacha, and South African’s icon, Mandela, to discuss the contradictions inherent in Nigeria and South Africa relations. He observes, however, that the Bi-national Commission (BNC) aided diplomatic rapprochement in Obasanjo and Mbeki’s tenure. He insists on the actualization of African potentials and the need to give credence to the probable impact of foreign relations on ordinary citizens. He avers that the strengthening of BNC is critical to improving bilateral economic relations and achieving synergy through the convergence of resources. Sega and Lekaba (2014) appraise Nigeria-South Africa relations amid the rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP in April 2014. Examining the competitive and cooperative pattern of existing bilateral relations and the likely future gains at bilateral and regional levels, they argued that economic growth recorded by Nigeria as shown in the rebasing of its GDP signpost the likely gains of flourishing intra-African trade. Sega and Lekaba (2014) contend that the economic growth in Nigeria cannot be disconnected from the huge investment of South African companies in the Nigerian economy. South Africa is, therefore, rated by these scholars as a major player in the expanded and liberalized Nigerian economy. To Sega and Lekaba (2014), the economic growth in Nigeria has been achieved through the cooperation of Nigeria and South Africa, albeit the domestic challenges and contradictions that confront the two states’ respective national economies. The scholars argue that these problems, particularly the Boko Haram challenge, could be contained through a collaborative effort relying on South Africa’s strong military base rather than solicit external intelligence that derides Africa’s intelligence. The authors insist that the Nigerian state cannot be a regional leader as a result of its internal challenges, specifically the inability to recover the abducted Chibok girls

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from the Boko Haram Sect. This argument is faulty and ignores the global nature of terrorism, which makes counter-terrorism measures difficult. Sega and Lekaba (2014) further concedes that Nigeria’s security architecture was not at its best when the school girls were abducted, but it is not sufficient to undermine the country’s regional status and influence. Adekeye and Landsberg (2003: 171–204) appraise the rivalry in Nigeria-­ South Africa relations to fill the hegemonic lacuna in the region. These scholars contend that the role of Nigeria and South Africa as hegemons would likely induce anti-hegemonic alliances and deepen regional rivalries. Olaitan (Olaitan, 2003) shares the view of Adekeye and Landsberg (2003) when he compared leadership roles of Nigeria and South Africa. He describes Nigeria’s leadership role as mirage and predicates his submission on the predatory nature of power politics of the political class in Nigeria as against the engagement of young generations in the governance of South Africa. Olaitan (Olaitan, 2003) insists there is no competition in a real sense and argues that the most populous country is chasing the shadow of leadership without popular recognition.

Conclusion: Overcoming the Challenges for Maximum Maximization of the Strategic Partnership Across known and recorded human histories, human relations had never been devoid of imperfections, challenges and occasional conflicts of interests. Relations among state actors and non-state actors are no exceptions. This explains why despite the strategic importance and embedded prospects of Nigeria-South Africa relations, the partnership has been far from being a utopia. It is a partnership, as well-proven and explicated in the preceding sections, that has yielded unimaginable individual and collective benefits for the advancement of both states’ national interests, on the one hand, and the quest for a more united and developed African continent, on the other hand. Amid its potentials and prospects to deliver a win-win diplomatic outcome and benefit for both Nigeria and South Africa and the African continent as a whole, given the strategic importance and leadership positions both states occupy, a number of expected and unexpected but spontaneous challenges have cropped up and began to threaten the strategic prospects and potentials of Nigeria-South Africa partnership. Issues such as overt continental leadership rivalry, overt but tensed rivalry

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over the proposed African slot in the United Nations Security Council, declining bilateral economic relations, worsening citizens’ relations and the challenge of the politics of xenophobia and its concomitant violence now threaten the strategic partnership between Abuja and Pretoria. The golden era in the relations and partnership between the two states in post-apartheid South Africa was particularly notable for personality-­ informed friendliness between Nigeria’s Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki as well as the cordial relations among the citizens. The Obasanjo-Mbeki’s golden era witnessed an unprecedented level of cordiality between Nigeria and South Africa and further recorded several collaborations bilaterally and multilaterally leading to the creation of supranational organizations such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and Nigeria-South Africa Bi-national Commission, among many other increased bilateral economic, investment and trade partnerships. The personality mechanism and means must be explored by current and subsequent leaders of the two states in facilitating more friendly relations and partnerships for both states. Since the foreign policy position is, among other considerations, as good as the personality of the Head of State or government, the leaders of the two respective states must exhibit personality and character capable of unifying and accommodating each other’s interests and needs. This would go a long way in building more strategic partnerships between both the states. Finally, the recurring manifestation of the politics of xenophobia in South Africa that now portends grave consequences for the strategic partnership and relations between Nigeria and South Africa further mirrors the symptom of a strategic partnership that is not yet where it should be. It further reflects the current deficiencies in citizens’ relations between the two states. Holistic and concerted efforts that involve massive economic empowerment of many of the black South Africans whom are ready-made tools for the perpetration of the xenophobic politics and attacks must be done without further delay. The widening gulf in the socioeconomic opportunities and privileges between the white South African community and its black counterpart must be bridged going forward. The lesser the poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, the lesser the poor black South African population and the lesser the perpetrators of the xenophobic politics and violence, as many overwhelming evidences have shown that xenophobic attacks are mostly perpetrated in the black predominant provinces in South Africa by black South Africans.

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References Adams, A.  J. (2006). Rethinking Africa’s Development through the New Africa. Paper presented at Sapes Trust Fifth Anniversary Annual Colloquium. Adekeye, A., & Landsberg, C. (2003). South Africa and Nigeria’s regional hegemons. In M.  Baregu & C.  Landsberg (Eds.), From cape to Congo: Southern evolving security challenges. Lynne Rienner. Adetula, V.O. (2014, October). Nigeria’s rebased economy and its role in regional and global politics. E-International Relations. Agbu, O. (2010). Nigeria and South Africa: The future of a strategic partnership. In O. Eze (Ed.), Beyond fifty years of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Issues, challenges and prospects. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Agbu, O., Okereke, E., Wapmuk, S., & Adeniyi, B. (2013). The foreign policy environment in Nigeria and implications for Nigeria-South Africa relations: Baseline study. (SAFPI Policy Brief 54). South Africa Institute of International Affairs. http://www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/SAFPI_ Policy_Brief_54.pdf Akinboye, S.  O. (2005). From confrontation to strategic partnership: Nigeria’s relations with South Africa, 1960-2000. In U. Joy Ogwu (Ed.), New horizons for Nigeria in world affairs (p. 211). N.I.I.A. Akinrinde, O. (2020). Africanity and the politics of African xenophobia: A study of two parallels. Annals of Spiru Haret University Economic Series, 20(4), 133–151. https://doi.org/10.26458/2047 Amuwo, K. (2014). Nigeria’s continental diplomatic thrusts: The limit of Africa’s nominally biggest economy (Policy Briefing 111). South African Institute of International Affairs. Banjo, A. (2010). South Africa-Nigeria diplomatic and economic relations, 1994-2004. Africa Review, 2(1), 83. Bello, O., & Hengari, A.  J. (2013). Revamping Nigeria-South Africa relations: Key to continental progress. South Africa Institute of International Affairs. Chidozie, F.  C. (2014). Dependency or Cooperation? Nigeria-South Africa Relations (1960–2007). A PhD Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State. Doyle, M. W. (2011). Liberal peace: Selected essays. Routledge. Ebegbulem, C. A. (2013). An evaluation of Nigeria – South Africa bilateral relations. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, 1(1), 32–40. Fawole, A. (2002). Obasanjo’s foreign policy: Nigeria’s return to global reckoning? Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 26(2), 20–40. Fawole, A. (2003). Nigeria’s external relations and foreign policy under military rule, 1966–1999. Obafemi Awolowo University Press. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Free Press.

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CHAPTER 10

Nigeria-Brazil Relations: Ties that Bind and Binds that Tie Godwin Ichimi, Chinyere Rita Agu, and Chinonye Frances Dike

Introduction Globally humans are social beings, which invariably means that relations are inevitable and have been in existence since creation. According to the Greek philosopher Aristotle, “[M]an is a political animal by nature.” Nigeria’s foreign policy can be traced back to the times beyond independence, during the times of the empires of old Nigeria: Hausa emirates, the Igbo kingdoms, the Benin kingdom and the Oyo Empire (Idahosa & Adebayo, 2017). Nigeria, the giant of Africa, is an important country not only in the region but also in the world. It is endowed with both human and natural resources and is the most populous country in the African continent. The resources include but are not limited to oil and natural gas, solid minerals, fertile land for agriculture and aquatic resources. Figure 10.1 shows the map of Nigeria and borders.

G. Ichimi • C. R. Agu (*) • C. F. Dike Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_10

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Fig. 10.1  Map of Nigeria. Source: Wikipedia (2021)

It is the world’s seventh-largest oil producer and largely depends on oil which provides more than 95% of the country’s earnings (International Monetary Fund, 2018). Since independence, the external affairs policy of Nigeria has been centered on unity and independence, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intentional interference in the internal affairs of other African countries and economic cooperation and development. Thus, Nigeria has developed and nurtured regional ties and has extended its arms beyond Africa in a bid to build and promote economic, security and socio-cultural cooperation with various countries of the world. Among the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Nigeria and Brazil have the oldest relations, which are buttressed on history and culture. Figure 10.2 shows the map of Brazil and the borders. Brazil is the largest in the whole South America continent in terms of population and economic size (International Monetary Fund, 2018). It is one of only five countries that ranks among the top ten globally in terms of physical size, population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP); the

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Fig. 10.2  Map of Brazil. Source: Wikipedia (2021)

others being India, together with China, Russia and the United States. Independently, Nigeria is among the fiddle players in the world as far as the African continent is concerned, but the BRICS are more advanced than Nigeria on virtually all power-determining or relations-defining fronts. This stirs the thought to the actual nature of the relations between

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Nigeria and the BRICS, with focus on the Nigeria-Brazil relations. Nigeria and Brazil share the status as the largest countries in terms of population and economic size in the African and South American continent, respectively; both countries share a strong historical and cultural link which dates back during the transatlantic slave trade era, yet the two countries remain far apart in technology, defense, economy and even terms of depth of the socio-cultural relations. Although their bilateral relations may not have enjoyed intense interest from the media, it exists in a progressive trajectory. These questions arise: What is the nature of Nigeria-Brazil relations? Is Brazil just another emerging power interested in exploiting Nigeria’s natural resources? What is the core of Brazil’s foreign policy and how does it align with the national interest of Nigeria? What are the benefits of the bilateral relations between the two countries? What are the challenges in the bilateral relations between the two countries? What can be done to further strengthen the relations between Nigeria and Brazil? Therefore, this chapter examines the historic development of the relations between Nigeria and Brazil and views the Nigeria-Brazil relations in the aspects of socio-cultural connections, economic relations, diplomatic contacts, military collaborations as well as technological relationship in a bid to highlight its benefits and challenges so as to forge a sustainable way forward.

Historical Development and Nigeria-Brazil Socio-cultural Relations The Nigeria-Brazil history and cultural ties cannot be overemphasized as it lays the foundation of what may be the longest relation Nigeria has with any BRICS country. This relation dates back to the fifteenth century when the Portuguese arrived in Benin, Nigeria, to trade on the coast of Benin (The British Museum, 2020). During the infamous slave trade between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, many people were captured and enslaved in Brazilian plantations as cheap labor (Boakya, 2018; Klein & Luna, 2010). Majority of the slaves have their ancestral homes in the south-western parts of Nigeria, a claim corroborated by the influence on language, culture and cuisine popularity of the Brazilians (Black, 1983). Figure 10.3 shows the transatlantic trade route. After the slaves regained their freedom, some embarked on a journey back to Nigeria and settled in a part of Lagos and by the end of the nineteenth century the Brazilians in Lagos had become the commercial

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Fig. 10.3  Transatlantic trade route. Source: Wikipedia (2021)

intermediaries between the native producers and the European colonial firms (Amosu, 1987). Conversely, some scholars opine that in spite of the historical and cultural ties between both countries dating back to the slave trade period, the Nigeria-Brazil bilateral relations were non-existent till 1960 when the diplomatic relations between the two countries were established; this stagnancy in bilateral relations is attributed to the domestic turmoil that plagued the political scene and leadership in Brazil and their propagation of isolationist policy (Freitas, 2016). According to the Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (2020), the visit of President Obasanjo to Brazil in September 2005 focused on collaboration to promote African history education to strengthen the bilateral relations and maintain the cultural ties between both countries. Nigeria-Brazil relations diversified and became intense in the political domain in 1960.

Nigeria-Brazil Diplomatic and Political Relations Nigeria’s independence in 1960 ushered in a new era of freedom and partnership. Nigeria and Brazil established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial levels as both countries shared similar leadership and development patterns as regards initial military rule and adoption of the US constitution template (Abiodun, 2011). Brazil opened a resident embassy in Lagos in 1961 which was transferred to Abuja in 2005. The governments of Jânio Quadros (January 1961–August 1961) and João Goulart (September

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16–April 1964) adopted a more independent foreign policy which was marked with the creation of the African Division (Itamaraty) within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Rudolph, 1983) and Brazil forged and strengthened bilateral and multilateral relationships with Nigeria and other African countries. This progress in the bilateral relationships was interrupted after the 1964 military coup in Brazil, although in 1966 Nigeria established an embassy in Brasilia (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2020). By the early 1980s, Brazil had placed Nigeria and Africa second after Latin America on the foreign policy priorities and high-level diplomatic contacts were made. Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro visited Nigeria for the first meeting of Nigeria-Brazil Joint Commission in 1981; Brazilian President João Figueiredo visited Nigeria in 1983, while in 1986 Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodré visited Nigeria (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2020; Wikipedia, 2020). However, the Nigeria-Brazil relations remained seemingly passive following the return of democratic rule to Nigeria in May 1999 as Brazil was the last BRICS to be visited by the then-Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo during his second term in office (Abiodun, 2011). In January 2005, the then-Brazilian Minister of External Relations (Foreign affairs), Celso Amorim, led a 14-man delegation on a visit to Nigeria. This was regarded as the first major diplomatic connection between both countries. The cooperation of Nigeria and Brazil on the UN reforms was discussed and was followed in June 2006 by a high-level visit of Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji to Brazil (Brasilia, 2008). In October 2017, Foreign Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira visited Nigeria during his second official tour in Africa, and in 2018 Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama embarked on a high-level diplomatic visit to Brazil. Table 10.1 shows the Brazil-Nigeria relations from 1961 to 2020. Currently, Bolsonaro government’s foreign policy promotes cooperation between Brazil and Africa; it articulates the following objectives: increase trade, participate in the development of infrastructure and food production (Brasilia, 2019). President Jair Messias Bolsonaro has reaffirmed his commitment to strengthen the bilateral relations between Nigeria and Brazil. Hence, Brazilian External Relations Minister Ernesto Araújo visited Nigeria in December 2019 (Office of the Vice President, 2019) for bilateral talks on defense, legal cooperation on trade and investment as well as talks about the High-Level Strategic Dialogue Mechanism

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Table 10.1  The Brazil-Nigeria diplomatic relations Date

Brazil-Nigeria relations

1961 1961–1964

Brazil opened a resident embassy in Lagos. The governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart adopted a more independent foreign policy. Created the African Division (Itamaraty) in the foreign ministry. Nigeria established an embassy in Brazil. Brazilian Foreign Minister Mário Gibson Barboza visited Nigeria to discuss oil supplies and trade partnership. Diplomatic contacts were made by Nigeria Foreign Minister Okoi Arikpo. Diplomatic contacts made by Foreign Minister Joseph Nanven Garba. Diplomatic contacts made by Vice President Shehu Musa Yar'Adua and the Minister of Energy, Justin Tseayo. Brazil Foreign Affairs Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro visited Nigeria for the first meeting of Nigeria-Brazil. Brazilian President João Figueiredo visited Nigeria. Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Roberto Costa de Abreu Sodré visited Nigeria. President Olusegun Obasanjo visits Brazil during his visit to the BRICS. Vice President Atiku Abubakar visits Brazil for the signing of the Cultural and Educational Cooperation Agreement. Adoption of a Pro-African Foreign Trade Policy by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Visit to Nigeria by a 14-man delegation led by Brazilian Minister of Foreign affairs Celso Amorim. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visited Nigeria and later President Obasanjo visited Brazil to discuss the bilateral agreement. Agreement on Trade and Investment, Agreement on Technical Cooperation and Agreement on Regular Political Consultations were signed in 2005. Visit to Brazil by Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji. Garba Bichi, the Nigerian Minister of State for Commerce, visited Brazil for the VI meeting of the Mixed Nigeria-Brazil Commission in Brasília. Conference hosted by Pan African Strategic and Policy Research Group in Janeiro. President Umaru Yar’Adua visited Brazil for discussions that focused on the bilateral agreement. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that highlights the broad areas of cross-national cooperation and a relationship that emphasizes the history, art and culture of Nigeria and Brazil in Abuja. Nigeria-Brazil collaborated on combating drug trafficking which led to the placement of the Nigeria-Brazil route on red alert.

1966 1972 1974 1977 1979 1981 1983 1986 1999 2000 2002 2005

2006 2008 2009

2010

(continued)

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Table 10.1 (continued) Date

Brazil-Nigeria relations

2011

Vice President Namadi Sambo and President Goodluck Jonathan-led government visited Brazil to continue and cement the bilateral discussions. Olusegun Aganga, the Minister of Trade and Investment of Nigeria, visited Brazil. President Goodluck Jonathan and his Brazilian counterpart Dilma Rousseff met at the Rio +20 Conference and called for urgent reform of the United Nations Security Council. Minister Olugbenga Ashiru and Vice President Namadi Sambo visited Brazil for the First Session of the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism. Brazil-Nigeria Business Forum, in Lagos, was organized by APEX (Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency) and Itamaraty. Foreign Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira visited Nigeria during his second official tour in Africa. Nigerian Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama visited Brazil, Brazilian External Relations Minister Ernesto Araújo visited Nigeria in December for bilateral talks on defense, legal cooperation on trade and investment. Nigeria-Brazil High-Level Strategic Dialogue Mechanism meeting.

2012

2013 2017

2018 2019

2020

Source: Compiled by Authors

meeting scheduled for March 2020 in Abuja, Nigeria, aimed at solidifying the partnership between both countries in areas of defense and legal cooperation and economy (Onochie, 2019).

Nigeria-Brazil Economic Relations Africa only became a region of primary concern to Brazil in the 1970s because of oil as Brazil was the largest oil importer in the Third World (Rudolph, 1983). In 1972, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mário Gibson Barboza visited Nigeria and other African countries to discuss oil supplies and Nigeria went ahead to become an important trading partner of Brazil. Apparently, this partnership leveraged on the cultural ties and the similarity in climatic condition of both countries (Kluck, 1983). In 2002, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva adopted a Pro-African Foreign Trade Policy after he assumed office (Ibrahim & Sari, 2019), which activated the trade flow between both countries from 2003 to 2005. Nigeria’s merchandise exports to Brazil were recorded to have increased from nearly $1.5 billion to $5 billion, making Nigeria the

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fifth-­ highest exporter of goods to Brazil, behind the United States, Germany, Argentina and China. In contrast, Brazil’s exports to Nigeria rose only marginally, reaching $643,000 in 2005 (Ibrahim & Sari, 2019). In April 2005, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva visited Nigeria and by September 2005, the visit was reciprocated by President Obasanjo and the bilateral agreement was the focus of the discussion between both leaders. Importantly, the bilateral agreement focused on four major areas of trade and investment, technical cooperation, cultural revival and regular political consultations. In 2008, the trade relations between the countries rose and were estimated at $8.2 billion (Ibrahim & Sari, 2019), Garba Bichi, the Nigerian Minister of State for Commerce, visited Brazil for the VI meeting of the Mixed Nigeria-Brazil Commission in Brasilia (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2020). The importance of the Nigeria-Brazil bilateral agreement was corroborated by President Obasanjo’s affirmation that both countries were in the process of “re-igniting the golden years of Nigerian-­ Brazil relations of the 1980s” (Lohor, 2005). Other bilateral agreements signed in 2005 are Agreement on Trade and Investment, Agreement on Technical Cooperation and Agreement on Regular Political Consultations. After the visit of Olusegun Aganga, the Minister of Trade and Investment of Nigeria, in 2012, a new height was attained in the Nigeria-­ Brazil economic relations when Minister Olugbenga Ashiru and Vice President Namadi Sambo visited Brazil in 2013 for the First Session of the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism in Brasilia (Portal do Governo Brasileiro, 2017). To show their commitment to the intensification of bilateral relations and their dedication to cooperating with Nigeria for economic growth, APEX-Brazil (Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency) and Itamaraty organized the Brazil-Nigeria Business Forum in Lagos in August 2017. To highlight the business opportunities involving the two countries and create a platform for Brazilian and Nigerian public and private sectors to exchange experiences and review the current bilateral economic situation, an international trade mission titled “Expanding Nigeria-Brazil Trade and Business Relations” was created as a joint initiative of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment of Nigeria, in partnership with the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Brazil and Nigeria embassy. This trade mission to Brazil was led by Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment, Aisha Abubakar, with meetings focused on agricultural and agro-allied business, banking & finance, information communication technology, manufacturing & processing, automotive

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industry and small & medium enterprises as well as visits to the Brazilian Investment Promotion Agency (APEX), Brazilian Confederation of Industry (CNI), Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP) and Brazil National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) in 2019 (Macedo, 2019). According to the World Bank (2020), Brazil is the ninth-largest economy in the world as a result of the diversified economy from aircraft and automotive production, mineral and energy resource extraction, investment in alternative energy infrastructure, a huge agricultural and agro-­ allied sector as well as economic reforms to curb debt and public spending. Although Nigeria’s economy relies mostly on crude oil, solid minerals, agriculture and tourism are also important to the economy and have huge potential. In comparison, the GDP per capita is US $2097.1 and US $6796.8 for Nigeria and Brazil, respectively. Nominal GDP is US $448.12 billion and US $1.84 trillion for Nigeria and Brazil, respectively, while the PPP Adjusted GDP in international currency is $1.07 trillion and $3.153 trillion for Nigeria and Brazil, respectively. Figure 10.4 shows the nominal GDP in US dollars and PPP Adjusted GDP in international dollars for Nigeria and Brazil.

3.5 3 2.5 2 Brazil

1.5

Nigeria

1 0.5 0

2020 Nominal GDP in US Dollars

2020 PPP Adjusted GDP in International Dollars

Fig. 10.4  Nominal GDP and PPP adjusted GDP for Nigeria and Brazil. Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)

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Nigeria-Brazil Technological Relations Focus on innovation and application of technology in aspects of the economy accounts for the rapid expansion and significant growth of a nation. The Nigeria-Brazil technological relations are broadly reflected in the energy sector, agricultural sector and security sector. The energy sector in Brazil is diversified into sustainable sources such that hydropower accounts for almost 63.5% of electricity generation, natural gas (9.60%), wind (8.90%), biomass (8.30%), nuclear (2.60%), coal (2.40%), petroleum products (1.30%), solar (1.10%) and others (2.20%). Figure 10.5 shows electricity generation in Brazil. Power production in Nigeria is not as diversified and sustainable as compared to Brazil. Natural gas is the most common source for electricity production and accounts for 81% of the total electricity generation in 2020 while hydropower accounts for only 19% (Statista, 2021); yet Nigeria is endowed with aquatic resources and has the capacity to harness wind and solar energy as well as biomass as sources of electricity generation to solve the power problems in the nation. However, a joint agreement between Nigeria and Brazil on energy cooperation was signed following the visit of late President Umaru Yar’Adua in August 2009 to Brazil. The Energy Commission was established with the objective to assist in revolutionizing the Nigerian energy sector and exploring the vast hydropower potential. Brazil showed interest in collaborating with Nigeria in

1.30% 2.40% 2.60% 8.30%

1.10%

2.20%

Hydropower Natural Gas Wind

8.90%

Biomass Nuclear Coal

9.60%

Petroleum Products Solar 63.50%

Others

Fig. 10.5  Electricity generation in Brazil. Source: Adapted from Statista (2021)

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completing the development of the 700 MW Zungeru hydropower plant expected to be completed in 2020 and financing Mambila hydropower project which will give about 3000 MW (ESI Africa, 2020). However, in return for Brazil’s participation in two hydropower projects, Brazil was granted access to Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Brazil’s agricultural productivity is on course to outgrow the global average over the next ten years as Brazil continues to develop and apply technological innovation in its agricultural sector through Embrapa—Brazil’s agricultural research agency and a functional network of agricultural cooperatives that increases access of small-scale farmers to the high technology (Marcos, 2021). According to the Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural Development, Alhaji Bukar Tijani, Nigeria is set to leverage on the historic relationship with Brazil to learn strategic ways of improving food production and exporting. The trade mission led by the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, Luiz Fernando Mainardi, focused on rice and poultry farming, with a lot of interest in cooperatives and soya bean production in the country and the need for transfer of ideas and technology (Ikpefan, 2013). In line with Brazil’s commitment to development in Nigeria, the Green Imperative which is a bilateral agricultural development program has been established. This program is expected to last 10 years and is budgeted at $1 billion, with focus on sustainable expansion of Nigeria’s agro-industry in addition to training of farmers and modernization in agriculture (Brasilia, 2019). Furthermore, the High-Level Strategic Dialogue Mechanism meeting initiated by the Brazilian government in collaboration with the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Brazil-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce (NAN, 2020) also discusses agriculture and food security among other agendas. Nigeria’s agricultural sector experiences numerous challenges; however, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Mohammed Nanono, at the 44th meeting of the National Council on Agriculture and Rural Development announced that the partnership between the Federal Government and Government of Brazil has yielded €995 million mechanization loan to improve the ongoing agro-­ digitalization efforts by the Federal Government (Ewepu, 2021). Nigeria-­ Brazil technological relations are also highlighted in the security sector. Ernesto Araújo presented documents to show the expectations from the technology elements in the proposed defense cooperation between both

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countries and asserted that the guide will be a force booster in Nigeria’s counterterrorism and anti-banditry operations (Odunsi, 2021). Furthermore, the Brazil More Digital (Brasil Mais Digital) Information Technology (IT) education program targeted young people aged 16–25 for capacity building and to drive innovations in various sectors to match the skills in demand (OECD, 2017).

Nigeria-Brazil Security Relations The Global Firepower (GFP) ranking utilizes geography, military might, financial and logistical capability to ascribe annual Power Index (PwrIndx*) score to nations (a perfect PwrIndx*score is 0.0000). Brazil holds a PwrIndx* score of 0.2026 and ranks 9 out of the 140 countries considered while Nigeria holds a score of 0.6241 and ranks 35 (GFP, 2021). The disparity in military strength comes into focus in the relations between both countries. In 2010, Political Consultations Meeting was held and the Defense Section of the Nigerian Embassy in Brazil was commissioned by the former Nigerian Vice President, Namadi Sambo, and discussions to further the military relations of both nations through a collaborative commitment to the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (Abiodun, 2011) were marked by signing the Defense Cooperation Agreement. In addition, the military relations between both countries were further strengthened through defense projects such as training of military personnel from African countries such as Namibia, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea Bissau, Angola and Nigeria (Marcos, 2020). The military relations of Brazil and Nigeria are supported by the Brazil’s National Defense Policy (PND) and the National Defense Strategy (END) (Brazil, 2016) which state that the area of priority defense interest is the South Atlantic and West African countries. Furthermore, the defined strategic defense actions in Brazil’s highest-level document on defense issues include increase participation in military exercises with other countries; preserve at-risk nationals and safeguard Brazilian assets, resources and interests abroad, including the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC); increase the relationship with the defense sector of other countries; increase naval presence actions in support of diplomacy actions; intensify measures to foster mutual trust and international security; and intensify defense exchanges and agreements with other countries (Abdenur & Danilo, 2014).

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In 2011, Vice President Namadi Sambo and President Goodluck Jonathan-led government visited Brazil to continue and cement the bilateral discussions between the two countries. Prior to that, Nigeria and Brazil collaborated on combating drug trafficking which led to the placement of the Nigeria-Brazil route on red alert by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) with the aim of intercepting drug traffickers and dismantling drug-trafficking syndicates in April 2010. In 2012, Nigeria’s President, Goodluck Jonathan, and his Brazilian counterpart, Dilma Rousseff, met at the Rio +20 Conference during which they called for urgent reform of the United Nations Security Council (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, 2020; Premium Times, Nigeria, 2013). The strengthening of the bilateral defense cooperation between both countries to reflect the current realities of Nigeria in the defense sector has begun with the meeting of the Nigerian Defense Minister, Bashir Magashi; Nigerian Ambassador-designate to Brazil, Ahmed Makarfi and his Brazilian counterpart Ricardo Guerra De Araujo; the Deputy Ambassador, Ronaldo Lima Vieira; and the Defense Attaché, Col Claudia Mandine, at the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Nigeria. The outcome of the meeting includes a review of a Memorandum of Understanding, implementation and ratification to reflect the present peculiarities of the defense sector and improve cooperation and operations of the military arms of Nigeria and Brazil. Furthermore, the Nigerian Defense Minister enumerated the creation of counterterrorism special forces brigade, joint training, instruction courses in flight safety, airborne operations and operations in jungle environment for the Nigerian Army (Pallestra, 2019). Also, he reiterated that research, development and strategic intelligence management are essential in improving the defense cooperation (Odunsi, 2021). In addition, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) collaborates with Brazil to tackle cybercrimes and fraud which have become more audacious in recent times as well as trans-national organized crimes that impact on the economies of Brazil and Nigeria. The visit of EFCC Chairman, Abdulrasheed Bawa, to the Brazilian Embassy in Abuja on May 19, 2021, resulted in a law enforcement interaction agreement to delegate desk officers to increase the exchange of information (EFCC, 2021).

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Nigeria-Brazil Relations: The Way Forward The relationship between Nigeria and Brazil may have begun with the cultural connection but it is presently based on the premises of Nigeria’s appreciation of Brazil’s doggedness in rising to global importance as a major economic power and what it could adopt from Brazil in its quest for socioeconomic development and Brazil’s dependency on Nigeria’s natural resource endowments. For instance, as the leading power in tropical agriculture and third-largest food exporter in the world (WTO, 2011), Brazil has positioned itself as an important partner in Nigeria’s quest for food security. Brazil has much to offer in terms of expertise in agriculture as agriculture has been the most important driver of the Brazilian economy in the last 10 years; mining, and other areas where it can help Nigeria harness her potential for sustainable development and set the stage for more mutually beneficial economic engagement with other countries in the future. Also, having attained energy independence itself in 2006, Brazil has shown unwavering commitment in power-generation projects through Petrobras a Brazil-owned oil company and has invested in projects such as alternative energy (Mthuli et al., 2011). This is particularly important to Nigeria, as the issue of epileptic power supply has plagued us for years and the government is committed to providing constant power supply to boost economic growth and development. Despite trade agreement between Nigeria and Brazil in 2013, trends analysis of Nigeria-Brazil trade showed a decline in the years 2015–2017 which was attributed to a reduction in export to Brazil within the same period Nigeria’s crude oil export was directed toward India, United States, Spain, Netherlands and South Africa, leaving Brazil behind the topmost export destination (Vincent, 2013). According to Uncomtrade (2018) reports, Nigeria has more variety of imports from Brazil compared to exports which is mostly crude oil and primary products (Garrick, 2013; Ibrahim & Sayuti, 2017; Uncomtrade, 2018). Ibrahim and Sari (2019) examined Nigeria’s bilateral trade relations with Brazil using trends analysis and trade intensity index in order to measure the strength of their bilateral trade relations; the result showed that Nigeria can only competitively export few commodities compared to Brazil and evidence from trade analysis revealed the existence of a partial match between Nigeria’s exports supply and Brazil’s imports demand; yet the balance of trade between the two countries has been in favor of Nigeria due to the crude oil in Nigeria’s export (Garrick, 2013).

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Nevertheless, relations with Africa generally oscillate with each new Brazilian government as well as with the Brazilian economic conjuncture. Hence, the common point among the policies for Africa including Nigeria of the last four Brazilian governments was the search for trade relations that preferably generate a surplus trade balance (Marcos, 2020). Furthermore, the trade patterns of Brazil on the African continent raise suspicion of a typical resource-hungry country (Stolte, 2012), whose major interest is to exploit the natural resources of unsuspecting developing countries with their intentions shrouded in seemingly robust partnership agreements. Contrary to this school of thought, Brazil is a resource-rich country itself; hence, it is not dependent on Africa’s resources. In addition, natural resources account for a significant portion of Brazil’s total exports, and some scholars assert that Brazil is overly dependent on natural resources export. Furthermore, Brazilian government maintains that Africa is perceived as an expanding ground for their operations rather than an exploitation ground to secure resources (Alves, 2013). Moreover, Brazilian resource companies (such as Petrobras) unlike their Chinese counterparts are not fully state-owned enterprises as they were partially privatized in the 1990s thus must reconcile national interest with corporate considerations which calls for more accountability and transparency (Alves, 2013). In global governance, Brazil has insisted on the need to adjust and strengthen the world’s institutional framework—particularly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—to reflect a post-Cold War period and the emergence of new players (Global Policy Forum, 2020). Thus, strong Nigeria-Brazil relations guarantee an ally for Brazil as Nigeria is a stakeholder and of critical importance for Brazil’s pursuit of its international political agenda that includes a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Alves, 2013; Brazil, 2019). The country has a policy that aligned the increased relationship with African countries in order to boost its international image and better project its demographic and economic prowess. Nevertheless, Brazil and the African countries including Nigeria could collaborate to exert transformative influence in the governance of the aforementioned international institutions. In general, Nigeria-Brazil relations have been beneficial for both countries and Nigeria has tapped from Brazil’s experience in the field of infrastructural development and technological advancement in energy and agriculture sectors and Brazil from Nigeria’s natural resource

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endowments. However, to ensure advancement, increase relevance and enhance competitive appeal in relations with Brazil and other countries, Nigeria should: • invest in Nigerian researchers in areas of technological innovations to solve some of the issues peculiar in various sectors. • invest in focused education in digital skills and problem-solving skills from the elementary levels to drive innovation in all sectors. • develop the non-oil aspects of our economy so as to significantly reduce our dependence on crude oil. • restructure Nigeria’s exports through the diversification of economy will inadvertently lead to the identification of new export opportunities in Brazilian markets and other markets thereby strengthening the trade relations between the countries. • diversify power production through the application of innovative processes to curb the power problems and improve the economy.

Conclusion The Brazil-Nigeria relations have come a long way in spite of the alternating moments of inactivity and action due to majorly political reasons. However, Nigeria has emerged as Brazil’s main partner in Africa. Hence, during the last decade, Brazil has actively forged closer relations with Nigeria and indeed Africa, in addition to the shared great African heritage which dates back centuries ago when Africans crossed the Atlantic in appalling circumstances to help build Brazil. Nigeria and Brazil are key players in their continents and the world in terms of size, trade and population which is an indication that high trade opportunities and a large market for the export in both countries exist and when harnessed will further strengthen the diplomatic ties between both countries and increase their relevance in the world. Clearly, Brazil has a great interest in Africa and has strategically presented itself as an ally for development especially in the areas of agriculture having recently become an economic power and in propagating the needed reforms in the United Nations Security Council. Therefore, visionary leadership, diversification of the economy and dignifying of each Nigerian by the Nigerian government are imperative for this nation to position itself strategically in relation with other countries in order to exert significant influence in discussions spanning from

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economics, politics, military prowess to development across sectors regardless of the intent of the other party in this bilateral relationship. However, the potential influence of other BRICS, especially China, in the relationship between the two countries or lack of it remains a question that begs to be explored. Moreover, the ability of Brazil to uphold its South-South solidarity principles while expanding its economic footprint in Nigeria leaves one in wonder.

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EFCC. (2021). Cybercrime: EFCC, Brazil to strengthen collaboration. Accessed August 25, 2021, from https://www.efccnigeria.org/efcc/news/6785-­ cybercrime-­e fcc-­b razil-­t o-­s trengthencollaboration?__cf_chl_jschl_ tk__=pmd_8kZ2o_yUXPfYQi57nWkKb4VhNrJv94X6 s SCubQo02o-­1629462729-­0-­gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQd9 ESI Africa. (2020). Nigeria Mambila power project back on the cards, says Minister. Africa’s Power Journal. Accessed July 3, 2020, from http://www.esi-­africa. com/newws/nigeria-­mambilla-­hydropower-­project-­back-­cards-­says-­minister Ewepu, G. (2021). FG, Brazil partnership yields €995m Agric mechanization loan. Vanguard Newspaper. Accessed August 26, 2021, from https://www. vanguardngr.com/2021/06/fg-­b razil-­p artnership-­y ields-­e 995m-­a gric­mechanization-­loan/ Freitas M. V. (2016). Brazil and Africa: Historic relations and future opportunities (pp.  1–9). Policy Brief; German Marshall Fund of the United States/OCP Policy Center. Garrick, K. (2013). Bilateral Business between Nigeria and Brazil: The Way Forward. Accessed July 2, 2020, from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/nigeria-­ brazil-­trade-­below-­volumepotential/ GFP (Global Firepower). (2021). 2021 Military strength ranking. Accessed August 24, 2021, from https://globalfirepower.com/countries-­listing.php Global Policy Forum. (2020). Membership including expansion and representation in the UN. Accessed July 1, 2020, from https://www.globalpolicy.org/ security-­council/security-­council-­reform/membership-­including-­expansion-­ and-­representation.html Ibrahim, K. H., & Sari, D. W. (2019). An examination of recent trends, composition and trade intensity of Nigeria-Brazil bilateral relations. International Journal of Advanced Economics, 1(1), 31–43. Ibrahim, K.  H., & Sayuti, A.  S. (2017). Nigeria’s export supply versus Brazil’s import demand: 2000–2016. Ife Social Sciences Review, 25(2), 48–58. Idahosa, S. O., & Adebayo, K. (2017). An analysis of the Nigerian foreign policy: A narrative. World Wide Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 3(10), 215–221. Ikpefan, F. (2013). Nigeria, Brazil Begin Technology Transfer. The Nation Newspaper. Accessed August 24, 2021, from https://thenationonlineng.net/ nigeria-­brazil-­begin-­technology-­transfer/ International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2018, March). Nigeria. IMF Country Report No. 18/63. Klein, H.  S., & Luna, F.  V. (2010). Slavery in Brazil (pp.  1–353). Cambridge University Press. Kluck, P. A. (1983). The society and its environment. In R. D. James & F. Nyrop Richard (Eds.), Government and Politics Brazil: A country study (pp. 81–156). U.S. Government Printing Office.

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Lohor, J. (2005, September 6). Nigeria, Brazil Sign Bilateral Agreements. This Day Online, Nigeria. Accessed July 2, 2020. Macedo, E. (2019). Nigeria aims to strengthen trade ties with Brazil. Accessed August 23, 2021, from https://www.google.com/amp/s/diplomaticvista. com/nigeria-­brazil-­trade-­mission.nbtm-­expanding-­nigeria-­brazil-­trade-­business­relations/%3famp Marcos, V. M. S. (2020). Brazil and China interests in Atlantic Africa: Convergences, divergences and opportunities for cooperation inside the BRICS forum framework. JCIR: BRICS Special Edition, 2020, 98–132. Marcos, F. N. (2021). Brazil’s biodiversity and technology focus will drive trade with the UK New Food Magazine. Accessed August 11, 2021, from https://www. newfoodmagazine.com/article/135751/brazil-­trade/ Ministério das RelaçõesExteriores Brazil. (2019). Republica Federal Da. Accessed from http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=5602 &Itemid=478&cod_pais=NGA&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=pt-­BR Mthuli, N., Charles, L. L., & Desire, V. (2011). Brazil’s economic engagement with Africa. African Development Bank Group Chief Economist Complex. Accessed July 2, 2020. News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). (2020). Nigeria, Brazil to hold high level talks in Abuja next month-consul general. Accessed July 3, 2020, from http://www. google.com/amp/s/www.pulse.ng/news/local/nigeria-­brazil-­to-­hold-­high-­ level-­talks-­in-­Abuja-­next-­month%2D%2Dconsul-­general/vick9vn.amp Odunsi, W. (2021). Nigeria, Brazil meet to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation. Accessed August 23, 2021, https://dailypost.ng/2021/04/02/ nigeria-­brazilmeet-­to-­strengthenbilateral-­defence-­cooperation/ OECD. (2017). Education at a glance 2017: OECD indicators. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/eag-­2017-­en Office of the Vice President. (2019). Vice President Osinbajo meets with Mr Ernesto Araujo, Brazil’s Minister of External Resources on 10/12/2019. Accessed July 3, 2020, from http://www.yemiosinbajo.ng/vp-­osinbajo-­meets-­with-­mr-­ ernesto-­araujo-­brazils-­ministry-­of-­external-­resources-­on-­10-­12-­2019 Onochie, B. C. (2019). Brazilian Minister visits Nigeria for Bi-lateral trade talks. The Guardian News. Accessed July 2, 2020, from http://m.guardian.ng/ news/brazilian-­minister-­visits-­nigeria-­for-­bilateral-­trade-­talk/ Palestra. (2019). PalestraIISS Reviews. Multilateral system and Brazil’s engagement with international security and stability. https://www.funag.gov.br/ images/albuns/Dialogo-­IISS-­FUNAG-­Pos/Palestra-­IISS-­Rev-­NATO.pdf Portal do Governo Brasileiro. (2017). Visit of Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira to Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Benin. Ministry Foreign Affairs. Accessed July 2, 2020, from http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-­re Premium Times, Nigeria. (2013). Nigeria, Brazil call for ‘urgent’ UN Security Council reform. Accessed July 2, 2020, from https://www.premiumtimesng.

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com/news/121667-­n igeria-­b razil-­c all-­f or-­u rgent-­u n-­s ecurity-­c ouncil-­ reform.html Rudolph, D.  J. (1983). Government and politics. In F.  Nyrop Richard (Ed.), Brazil a country study (pp. 233–288). U.S. Government Printing Office. Statista. (2021). Accessed August 26, 2021, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/985665/brazil-­electricity-­generation-­source/ Stolte, C. (2012). Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources? Africa Programme and Americas Programme. The British Museum. (2020). The Kingdom of Benin. Accessed July 2, 2020, from https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/ar t-­a frica/west-­a frica/ nigeria/a/the-­kingdom-­of-­benin Uncomtrade. (2018). World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). Accessed July 3, 2020, from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). https://comtrade.un. org/dbBasicQuery.spx Vincent, A. O. (2013). Nigeria-Brazil business relations: The journey so far speech delivered by the Nigerian Ambassador to Brazil. Accessed July 1, 2016, from http://www.nigerianembassybrazil.org/ingles/News/noticia_01.html Wikipedia. (2020). Nigeria-Brazil relations. Accessed July 2, 2020, from https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil%E2%80%93Nigeria_relations Wikipedia. (2021). Brasil-Nigeria Locator. Accessed August 22, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil%E2%80%93Nigeria_relations#/media/ File:Brazil_Nigeria_Locator.png World Bank. (2020). World Bank Indicator. Accessed August 25, 2021, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicatoNY.GDP.PCAPKD.ZG?end= 2020&most_recent_value_desc=false WTO (World Trade Organization). (2011). World Trade Report 2011. World Trade Report 2011: The world and preferential trade agreements, from co-­ existence to coherence. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf

PART V

Contemporary Issues and Challenges in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Environment

CHAPTER 11

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Since Independence: Problems, Challenges and Opportunities Hassan A. Saliu

Introduction Nigeria’s foreign policy began in 1960 with a lot of promise. Nigerians and their foreign friends held a strong belief that with her attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria would be a beacon of hope for all blacks in the world (Akinyemi, 2007). Although Ghana was earlier on the stage as a new bloc that was out to project the African continent on the world arena, the feeling was still strong that the trophy belongs to Nigeria. Indeed, Accra under President Kwame Nkrumah made some attempts to galvanize African support and solidarity. Her immense contributions to African unity have been well documented (Gambari, 1980). The only snag was the weight of Ghana in carrying out the African burden. Her population and resource profile were adjudged as too light for the task of leading Africa. Reservations were therefore expressed on Ghana to lead the continent. Despite Ghana’s commendable efforts at championing the cause of Africa including on the platform of the

H. A. Saliu (*) University of Ilorin, Kwara, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_11

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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), upon which Nigeria was put on the spot and sometimes berated for her thorough pro-western stance during the hysteria period of NAM.  Notwithstanding, many watchers of African affairs believed that Nigeria was capable of carrying the burden of Africa (Aluko, 1981; Osuntokun, 2020). Nigeria, in popular opinion, was the ideal nation to lead the continent. After some trepidation, the country under Balewa came out of her shell to assume her rightful role in African affairs (Fawole, 2014). As reported by Gambari (1980), Nigeria showed her influence when she rallied African support for an African Summit scheduled to hold in Accra and her considerable influence contributed to the success of the conference. On account of African leadership, there were instances of frosty relations between Nigeria and Ghana eloquently demonstrated at the level of forming an African organization that pitched the country against Ghana on the platforms of Monrovia and Casablanca groups of countries. The triumph of the Monrovia group translated into its views dominating the mode of operations for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was birthed in May 1963 in Addis Ababa (Alli, 2011; Alli & Wapmuk, 2014). The victory of the Monrovia group under the leadership of Nigeria was to raise the diplomatic profile of the country and that marked the crucial evidence that Nigeria was no longer hesitant in leading Africa. Subsequent events especially the experience of the Civil War that Nigeria waged against the secessionist Biafra in which African solidarity had enhanced the capacity of the Federal side in overcoming the Biafran side during the war was to further drive home the point (Aluko, 1981). Consequently, Nigeria emerged from the war as an unquestionable leading nation in Africa. Her newfound wealth derived from oil exports was an enabler that convinced the world that a new power bloc had arrived on the world scene (Ihonvbere, 1982). The country did not disappoint the world by leading popular causes on the African continent. Her commitment towards Africa on occasions made her to clash with vital global actors and interests as she conveniently expanded her African concern to include fighting for all blacks wherever they may be in the world (Akinyemi, 2007; Osuntokun, 2019a, 2019b). Brazil, Jamaica, Haiti and other nations were made to experience Nigeria’s concern for blacks across the world (Babawale, 2014). Most significant was the commitment that Nigeria showed towards liberation movements that were fighting for decolonization and eradication of the obnoxious policy of racial discrimination in South Africa. So impervious

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was Nigeria’s support to anti-apartheid struggles that she did not mind to engage notable western countries that were aiding or out to prolong the apartheid regime in South Africa (Ajala, 1986; Osuntokun, 2019a). Everything conceivable was staked by Nigeria in seeking a multiracial government in South Africa. Her admission as a member of the Frontline States despite her long distance to the theatre of apartheid regime was an incidence that fired Nigeria’s resolve in seeking an end to the apartheid regime. Her record of performance across the world, especially in Africa, cannot escape an analysis on the rampant security functions she has played across the world. Nigeria has been a constant factor in all major peacekeeping posts that have been established across the world, most notably in Africa (Galadima, 2011; Saliu, 2016). For any African issue to gain the attention of the world, Nigeria must be identified with it. Her role in seeking debt relief for African countries can hardly be discountenanced when discussions on the celebrated debt overhang led to debt relief regime granted to African countries in 2005 and 2006 by the London and the Paris Clubs. Many more accomplishments were recorded by Nigerian foreign policy in the years past (Garba, 1987; Obasanjo, 1990; Saliu, 2004). However, beginning with the Second Republic in 1979, a dark cloud descended on Nigeria’s foreign relations as all the major planks of the foreign policy began to experience some stress. A reversal was thus observed with a consequence of decline in Nigeria’s push in the international system. Except for some tokenism that dotted the foreign policy turf of Nigeria under Babangida and Obasanjo regimes, the decline has been steady and thorough. The centre can no longer hold as events have shown clearly that Nigeria’s foreign policy has been gripped by lethargy which is making some people to erroneously conclude that the foreign policy has collapsed (Ayobolu, 2016; Lakemfa, 2018). Nigeria does have a foreign policy. All the compliments of foreign policy are no doubt in existence. The problem has always been with locating the correct place of the country in the global system and poor reading of events that are happening in the system. These were magnified under Babangida and Abacha administrations. At a time when the world was democratizing, these Nigerian governments were pushing ahead with their anti-democratic credentials and in the process earned a pariah status for the country (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008). Actions such as annulment of a presidential election and transmuting into civilian regimes through odious manipulation of the winding

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democratization process were eloquent demonstrations of a country that was at odds with the new values in the international system. At a point, the Abacha’s Minister of Foreign Affairs even tactlessly took on the western world when he put them down by insinuating that as inheritors of democracy, they did not fully understand the hazards involved in the efforts of Nigeria to establish democracy in the country (Ikimi, 1997). Little surprise, the two odd administrations in the country left the stage with sanctions imposed on Nigeria and that translated into little relevance for the country in the global affairs (Okon, 1999). Poor reading and obsession with power were the limiting factors experienced under the second Obasanjo government. Although the climate of the global system was largely favourable under the government, the gamble with tenure elongation rubbished all the goodwill it had generated in the international system (Saliu, 2007; Saliu & Mohammad, 2020). The government was succeeded by governments that were disinterested in foreign relations with poor domestic choices which alarmed the global system that eventually made the Buhari government to upstage the Jonathan government with a ray of hope of turning things around in the country, especially with regard to external relations. Five years after, there are concerns that Nigerian foreign relations have lapsed into the era of inertia (Osuntokun, 2019b). The country is no longer in a position to lead in global developments. Instead, she is reacting in a rather unfortunate manner. The foregoing paints a picture of uneasiness in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. This background, no doubt, compelled this effort. Its mission is to identify the longstanding issues in Nigerian foreign policy. Despite the availability of most elements of power such as population and resource profile, among others, Nigeria is still digging below her weight in the international system. Why is this, the case for the largest economy in Africa? Finding an answer to this question is the preoccupation of this chapter.

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Dominant Issues at the Inception of Nigerian Foreign Policy As a young nation, Nigeria was confronted with a number of issues in 1960 when she attained her independence. Knowing a few of these issues is extremely important in appreciating the stressful foreign policy that the country currently parades. One of these issues had to do with what should be the role of Nigeria in global affairs (Osuntokun, 2005). The Balewa government made no pretentions about its relative exposure to international affairs. This, perhaps, informed its choice of first External Affairs Minister, Chief Jaja Wachuku, of the National Council for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). Unfortunately, while his choice was applauded based on the regime of coalition in place after independence, it nevertheless created its own problems. Balewa was a member of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), with its conservative outlook. Wachukwu, on the other hand, belonged to a party with its somewhat radical outlook more so on African issues (Gambari, 1980). The implication is that Nigerian foreign policy, at its inception, was a compromise worked out by the coalition partners. It endured until the inherent contradictions in the political arrangement could no longer co-­ exist. On some occasions such as expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth though belated was achieved by the government. Subsequent events relating to other African issues showed clearly the incompatibility of interests between the coalition partners. This led to the unceremonial exit of the first substantive Minister of External and Commonwealth Relations from the government. He was replaced by his deputy, Nuhu Bamalli, a member of the senior party in the coalition (Nwankwo, 2013). Left to the NCNC, Nigeria should have been vigorous in her pursuit of African interests such as decolonization. But the NPC was not in a hurry to catch the bug. Another foundational issue that cannot be ignored was the issue of country’s relationship with the West. Although the two parties in coalition were generally pro-West, there was a qualitative difference in their outlooks. For the NPC, the country should not have any choice than being attached to western countries even if doing so would harm African interests. In the words of Prime Minister Sir Tafawa Balewa who, until five years after independence, still retained the services of a Briton as his adviser, the

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western countries were masters and later friends of Nigeria whose standards including external relations must be what the country should aim to attain (Gambari, 1980). It really took protests and demonstrations by students and intense agitations by the main opposition party, Action Group (AG), before the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact was abrogated. In the literature, it was clear the British inserted the Defence Agreement in the resolutions that encapsulated Nigeria’s process of attaining independence which virtually all the parties subscribed to (Gambari, 1980). Upon independence, the AG went public with the agreement probably as a way of scoring some political points against the immediate post-­ independence government. Deep down, the NPC did not see anything wrong in the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Agreement, but had no choice than to cave in. All successive governments have maintained the close attachment to the West though with occasional tendencies to query the attachment (Bach, 1983). If one’s gaze is at the objectives and strategies of implementing Nigerian foreign policy, it would be seen that the Balewa tradition is still quite evident. The objectives were no doubt moralistic and they gave an indication of the worldview of the inaugural government in 1960. For instance, the old objectives of the country’s foreign policy had emphasis on eradication of all forms of racism and colonialism from the African continent. There was also a commitment to peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts. On the whole, the objectives were idealistic and heavily reflected the orientation of the governing elites in Nigeria in 1960 (Fawole, 2014). On the side of strategies or instruments, the Balewa government established the two types of ambassadors for Nigeria, namely political and career ambassadors, a dichotomized regime that the country is still battling to do away with. The shortage of the required number of career ambassadors had encouraged the invitation extended to other professionals to be appointed as ambassadors. Reflective of the environment of the country at independence, the pioneer professional ambassadors were all British-trained in the diplomatic act and that explains why the orientation of the country’s Foreign Service personnel has always been towards the western power bloc. As once argued by Aluko (1981) when appraising the principle of non-­ aligned in Nigeria, the country under Balewa was everything but non-­ aligned in her external relations. For instance, borne out of the British prejudice against the defunct Soviet Union, Nigeria not only limited the

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privileges extended to the former Soviet Union Republic, but the Balewa government was on record to have rejected some scholarships that were extended to the country. The foundation for a pro-western attitude of Nigeria’s foreign policy was therefore laid by the government (Aluko, 1981; Ate, 1988; Okolo, 1986). Perhaps informed by the dearth of experts on Nigerian foreign policy, there was little institutionalization of the foreign policy process. The only exception was the penchant for the opposition parties and the parliament to be active in foreign policy. The Action Group (AG), for instance, was a thorn in the flesh of the government as it occupied a centre stage on foreign policy of the country (Gambari, 1980). In the literature, it is strongly believed that the Balewa government did its best in preparing the contours of Nigerian foreign policy. Most authors have no hesitation in dismissing the government in its foreign policy pursuits. This author, while agreeing substantially with their conclusions, posits that the environmental context of the government was not paid serious attention to. We cannot surely use the contemporary realities of the country to judge a government that was headed by a moderately exposed personality. The prime minister did not fail to admit his limited knowledge of intricacies of inter-state relations. This has, informed by Gambari (1980), almost made the leader of government to try to woo Anthony Enahoro of the AG to be the first Minister of External Relations. Significantly, the precarious coalition arrangement that propelled the government was also not taken proper note of in appraising the government in its foreign relations. Additionally, the economic climate was another limiting dimension. The oil wealth that visited the subsequent governments was not available to the government. This, perhaps, underscored the tremendous belief that the Balewa government had in western countries for the economic breakthrough of the country. Unequivocally, the government tried its best in designing a foreign policy for the country. One only hopes that future authors will be more lenient with the government in foreign relations especially as the foundation laid by it for the nation’s foreign relations has largely remained the same with occasional flashes here and there (Uhmoibhi, 2016). A cursory look at the re-worked objectives of Nigerian foreign policy courtesy of the 1999 Constitution as amended would show that they do not differ markedly from what the Balewa government had outlined for the foreign policy (Saliu, 2015). Also, the appointment of career and political ambassadors that is still a reality in the country was started by the government.

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An Analysis of Selected Themes in Contemporary Nigerian Foreign Policy Over the years, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by notable strands. These include good neighbourliness policy, African centrepiece, relationship with major powers, international organizations and so on. In this effort, only a synopsis of the issues is attempted to drive home the point that the country’s foreign policy is a quagmire. Nigeria at independence embraced the good neighbourliness policy that entails showing more concern for her neighbours in West Africa informed by her enlightened self-interest. Security was a major consideration behind the policy. It was reasoned, quite correctly, that for Nigeria’s security to be secured in an era of Cold War, conscious efforts must be made by her to be at peace with her neighbours. These neighbours were smaller in size relative to her population. Also, they were not as resource endowed as Nigeria. As a matter of cause, she must be ready to look after their affairs to avoid a situation in which they could be used as a pawn in the hands of extra African countries that may want to use them against Nigeria’s vital interests. All successive governments in the country have tried to make this to reflect in their foreign policy pursuits (Obi, 1993). For instance, virtually all Nigerian presidents/Heads of State have served as chairmen of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that was established in 1975. However, this strand of Nigeria’s foreign policy is facing some stress as her ability to control the affairs within her sub-region has been declining, leading Bach (2007) to claim that Nigeria is only dominant without the commensurate influence in ECOWAS. Nothing has shown this more than the ongoing boko haram menace in which the country is facing considerable obstacle in containing the insurgency. Both Cameroon and Chad have had cause to disagree with Nigeria on the matter (Albert, 2015). The resort to the Lake Chad Commission as a platform to overcome the boko haram menace has not totally been the salvation path for the country on the insurgency (Saliu & Saka, 2019; Tar & Mustapha, 2017).

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Three factors would appear to have conspired against Nigeria in sustaining her wide-range investments in her sub-region. One of these has to do with her giddy economy at home that has warranted some anti-good neighbourliness policies. As the economy began to fumble starting with the Shagari government, some anti-ECOWAS actions have been taken by the Nigerian State. Two of these are as follows: (i) expulsion of illegal aliens by both the Shagari and the Buhari governments and (ii) the recent closure of country’s borders in West Africa. The two policies were compelled by economic realities facing the nation (Daily Independent, 2020; Obi, 1993). The second important factor has to do with the reality that while ECOWAS loves Nigeria’s funding, the organization is not perceived to be ready to transmit a thoroughbred Nigerian platform. This has led to withholding of funds to the organization, including her regular contributions to fund the sub-regional organization (Onyeama, 2018). The third factor has to do with the assumption that Nigeria as a giant in West Africa must be worshipped and adored even if her goals are unclear to her neighbours. As reported by Aluko (1981), Nigeria was a late entrant into the race for a non-permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council against a Nigerian citizen who had long been campaigning for the seat but was able to secure the seat at the expense of what looked like an African consensus favouring a Nigerien citizen. This repeated itself under the Jonathan presidency in 2010 and the same hostility followed Nigeria’s decision from Sierra Leone and Benin Republic that had indicated their interest long before Nigeria threw her hat into the ring over non-­ permanent Security Council seat in that year. Cumulatively and arising from the discovery of oil with its fortune on a downward trend in the world, Nigeria’s influence is not what it used to be in the past. The 2019 announcement of the adoption of a common currency for ECOWAS by the Ivorian President only proved the point about the decline of Nigeria’s power in West Africa. The committee of the organization that was later set up was a face-saving measure as the rug had been pulled out of Nigeria’s control: a diplomatic defeat for the country. Relations with the larger Africa have followed the tradition of declining power for Nigeria. The country that used to galvanize African opinion on the global scene has receded to the extent that other smaller countries are now being called upon to speak for Africa (Gambari, 2012). One can illustrate this with the continued xenophobic attacks against other black nationals especially Nigerians in South Africa. Basking in her anti-­apartheid

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struggles, Nigeria and her citizens believed that they are supposed to be a favoured country and the preferred citizens in South Africa. This perception, however, conflicts with the perception of black South Africans who are seeing the Nigerians as intruders who are denying them their rights and privileges as South Africans (THISDAY, 2019). Nigerians are being held for all manner of fouling behaviour in the country. The 2019 edition of xenophobic attack angered Nigerians who called for drastic measures against South African interests in Nigeria (Saliu, 2020). One reality that has emerged from the incessant attacks against Nigerian interests in the country is that citizens of South Africans are not seeing Nigeria and her citizens in the light they are seeing themselves, which translates into low esteem in which they are held. This pattern of hostility towards Nigerians is spreading to other African countries, including Angola, Congo, and, surprisingly, Ghana, Mali and so on in West Africa. One may want to ask: why is this, the fate of Nigeria in Africa? All the factors adduced under the good neighbourliness policy are also relevant. One additional factor is the unresolved internal contradictions in Nigeria. As Nigerians flock to other African countries, their activities in these countries have further created the image problem for the country. Nigeria that was always at the forefront of championing African causes has now been crippled by her own internal problems that are making her voice to be muffled on African affairs (Kolawole, 2018; Osaghae, 1998). As a poverty capital of the world, so many global efforts are being pressed on without any recognition being accorded to the giant nation and biggest economy in Africa (May, 2018). At her expense, South Africa is a member of G20 and BRICS, which include Brazil, Russia, India and China, while Nigeria is not. This in itself is a statement on Nigeria’s place in Africa (Bolarinwa, 2014). Quite surprisingly, Madagascar has hit the airwaves with her anti-­ coronavirus drugs that are being imported by Tanzania and other countries, while Nigeria is looking in the direction of the West to release its drugs for fighting the scourge (Iwu, 2020; Ogunwusi, 2020). Despite several claims that have been made by some Nigerians on the cure for the virus, one key official has even argued that COVID-19 being a foreign disease, the country must seek a cure for it from the international community, notwithstanding the decoration of President Buhari as a leading light in the fight against the pandemic in the West African sub-region (Ehanire, 2020).

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The point being made is that some crucial events are happening in Africa upon which people expect the country to take her pride of place but which unfortunately is not the case. I put the blame for this on the simplistic policy environment that prevails in the country. An active research culture on foreign relations that could lead to scenario-building is virtually absent. The country, therefore, has not been showing enough reflexes in engaging with the international system that translates into being ill-­ prepared for the games that nations play (Olisemeka, 2019). Nigeria’s relations with the larger international system constitute another plank on which one can appraise the country’s foreign policy. The country has a longstanding relation with Britain as her colonial master. Major socio-economic structures in Nigeria were as designed by Britain, most notably her external relations. Her foreign policy as alluded to in the earlier part of this chapter was constructed by Britain. The pioneer Foreign Service personnel were recruited by British colonial masters and the major focus of her external conduct was shaped out for the country. Little surprise, the prejudices of Britain were sketched for her foreign policy. Economic ties were established and have been sustained by Nigeria’s leaders. The direction of her loans and economic assistance was primarily from Britain. The warm relations with Britain were later extended to embrace the larger western world. The USA has thus emerged as another major force in Nigeria’s external relations. Over the years, the USA has been a major source of economic assistance to the country. It is inconceivable for Nigeria to plan and execute projects and programme without counting on the western world (Saliu, 2017; Saliu & Mohammad, 2020). Some notable developments have characterized the country’s relationship with the West that has tended to puncture the otherwise warm relations. One of these is the displeasure of the West with the high level of public corruption, which has been making the assistance received from western countries not to make the desired impact in the country. Year in, year out, the country has maintained a frontline place in western sources on corruption to the displeasure of Nigeria’s leaders. Another is the low level of electoral integrity that has dogged Nigeria’s elections. Indeed, the level of interference in the country’s elections was very high with the 2019 round of elections conducted in the country, leading to the body-bag statement made by Nasir El-Rufai, the Kaduna State governor (El-Rufai, 2019). Nigeria’s relations with the West have also shown in the level of economic management. This shows clearly in the

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debt management. Nigeria, as today, is indebted to the West and their agencies, the true sources of which are difficult to determine. Some Nigerians are not well pleased with the position that the West has taken on Nigeria’s relationship. These Nigerians do not feel at ease especially given their country’s attachment to the West. In their judgement, Nigeria has little to benefit from the West because of their imperialist considerations that have harmed the country’s interest. A case has been made of the role played by the West in frustrating the anti-apartheid struggles where their considerations had delayed the attainment of a multiracial government in South Africa until 1994. The reality confronting Nigeria in her relations with the West is that there are too many issues in contention. Based on this, Nigeria does not enjoy the kind of warm relations it used to enjoy among the countries. The case of China has been mentioned as a crucial variable that has made their relationship not to be as warm as it used to be. These days, these countries do not see Nigeria as a crucial partner in Africa (Campbell, 2018). A careful review of Nigerian foreign policy in the last two decades would show the stress that has gripped their relationship. The West is looking in the direction of some less-endowed countries as the leading nations on the continent at the expense of Nigeria (Gambari, 2012). The aborted issues of bond for Nigerian travellers to the UK and the visa restrictions on Nigerian migrants to the USA on some grounds that are not convincing enough give an indication of unhealthy relations between Nigeria and the West. Regular deportations of Nigerians from the UK, USA and Russia are additional facts that depict the character of their relationships. China has, no doubt, emerged as a giant nation which her relationship with Nigeria is waxing strong especially in the field of economy. Major contracts and projects especially in the infrastructural sub-sector are being executed in Nigeria by the Chinese. Reflective of the warm relations that have developed between China and Nigeria, the Chinese currency has been adopted by the country in her international economic transactions. Much as Nigeria’s leaders are happy about the shift to China and viewing her as a promising alternative to the West, there are some Nigerians who are wary of the rise of China in their country’s affairs (Ezekwesili, 2018, 2020). It is quite evident that the USA has turned her anger on Nigeria on the grounds that she is losing the country to China. However, the new bride of Nigeria is not without her complaints about the country. To be sure, she, too, is not happy with the pervasive

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corruptive influence in the country. This is the dilemma as Beijing has capital punishment for corruption, but in Nigeria there is a huge level of tolerance for it. A sizeable number of Nigerians have been imprisoned in China for sundry offences that include fraudulent acts. In the face of coronavirus, the Chinese have not stopped their discrimination against Nigerians in Ghouzou, some of whom were rounded up as carriers of the virus, forgetting that she exported the coronavirus to other parts of the world. While some Nigerians are angered by the attitude of the Chinese authorities against Nigerians, the Abuja authorities have been nursing the hope that China is a good partner in the fight against the virus and in bringing economic succour to the country. Either way, Nigeria does have issues with the larger international system. The elbow given to Nigeria by France when she colluded with a few West African countries in announcing a currency for ECOWAS without proper discussion indicates the state of Nigeria’s contemporary relations with France. Based on current developments, the country does not seem to be in the good book of most notable countries in the world. Although she is always in the mood of counting on the various tasks she has carried out for the dominant power states especially on peacekeeping activities, the global system seems to have moved on, using a new set of criteria in assessing Nigeria’s place in the international system (Campbell, 2018). All the foregoing has created the basis and ground for this chapter to conclude that Nigerian foreign policy is in a state of a flux. Its conduct does not seem to excite many people on the global scene. The logical question to ask at this point is: why should Nigeria, though considered as a non leading nation in the world, be consulted on major international issues especially those that related to Africa? The answer to this question can be found in the ensuing analysis.

Why the Foreign Policy Is Passing Through a Stressful Era? It is inevitable to conclude that overall Nigerian foreign policy is passing through a stressful time. The clout of the country in the international system is not as strong as it used to be. These days when Nigeria sneezes, no country even in Africa is catching cold. Both the Libyan and Côte d’Ivoire crises were managed with the country’s influence not showing its contours, contrary to the expectation. Not too long ago, the Malian

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episode of flashpoint showed up, but with France elbowing Nigeria from the circles of relevance. So also was the situation with The Gambia debacle that greeted the world scene with Nigeria’s role barely noticeable, given the historical ties between the countries that led some professionals being dispatched to the country before the electoral debacle in The Gambia. Both Guinea and Senegal appeared to have enjoyed more confidence with the recalcitrant Yahya Jammeh, who, on an occasion, berated Nigeria for deploying her troops to his country (THISDAY, 2017). Quite unfortunately, the country comes within negative occurrences in most parts of the world, especially in Europe where citizens of other countries with criminal records have found it more convenient to claim to be Nigerians with the country’s passports that have become easily accessible to them. This further reflects on the influx of illegal migrants to Europe where Nigerians were caught in the web of illegal migration which has created a negative image for the country. More worrisome is the flat-footed approach of Nigeria to the issue of migrants to Europe. It is either Abuja is denying the development or leaving the affected Nigerians to their fate. Also signifying the distressful foreign policy being paraded by Nigeria is the maltreatment of Nigerians in other lands. Of course, this cannot be totally avoided in inter-state relations. However, what is troubling is the response level of the foreign policy machinery in Nigeria. Although there have been reactions by the state, the various efforts have not invoked the feeling of satisfaction from either the targeted countries or the citizens who are involved. Most times, the desired interventions come pretty late with the citizens feeling unhappy about the sloppy reaction level. No doubt, the regime of stress has its causes that are both internal and external (Saliu, 2020). The causes within the internal environment have so many dimensions. A few of the key ones are raised and discussed in this section. One of these has to do with the place of foreign policy in the governance environment. This has two dimensions. The first has to do with the relative disinterest of successive political leaderships in foreign relations. With the exception of Murtala, Obasanjo and, to some extent, Babangida, after the civil war, all other leaders have not shown enough interest beyond the tendency of always being in the sky or embarking on shuttle diplomacy that can hardly be linked concretely to the real national interests of Nigeria that include her sovereignty not being subservient to other nations or economic dependent on other nations. As long as their interest on foreign relations is not warm, there is no way the platform of foreign policy can be free from

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stress. Issues of interest are regularly coming up but derived from their state of mind; Nigeria has been reacting, instead of seizing the initiatives. The second dimension has to do with the choices of foreign ministers for the country. As I remarked elsewhere, the choice of Aminu Wali as Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister in 2013 by the Jonathan presidency was informed more by the need for President Jonathan to win Kano State in 2015. He, therefore, spent much time in Aso Rock plotting unsuccessfully to defeat Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso, not the substance of Nigerian foreign policy (Saliu, 2018). Also, it is feared that Geoffrey Onyeama’s appointment as Foreign Affairs Minister under President Buhari was influenced by his closeness to the late Chief of Staff to the President, Abba Kyari, not the health of the country’s foreign policy. Not surprisingly, his impact on Nigerian foreign policy since his first appointment in 2015 is still being expected, despite his re-appointment after the 2019 presidential election. Beyond the issue of choice of foreign ministers, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister is one among the ministers without any consequential presence and recognition in the hierarchy of government. While one agrees with Sanu (2016) that Nigerian presidents are the effective Foreign Affairs Ministers of the country, not raising the profile of successive Foreign Affairs Ministers in government’s circles has created an environment of watching above their shoulders, while manning the Balewa House in Abuja. That has eclipsed the tradition of sustainable and desirable thrusts of Nigerian foreign policy as each of them upon being appointed tries to come up with his thrust, not minding the grounds already covered with earlier thrusts of Nigerian foreign policy. Related to the low level of foreign relations in government’s circles, the funding for the country’s foreign policy has been poor. For example, the level of funding for the foreign policy in 2021 is less than 1% of the national budget. Nigeria, from all accounts, aspires to be an active player in the world but she is not prepared to spend big on her foreign policy. In the last two decades, the country has not spent more than 2% of her national budgets on foreign relations. Payment of salaries, allowances and municipal bills in Nigeria’s diplomatic missions has not been as seamless as one would ordinarily expect. In 2013 and 2016, both Presidents Jonathan and Buhari had cause to blame the dwindling national resources for the country’s decisions to withdraw from Mali and her indebtedness to ECOWAS (Saliu, 2018).

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On the too many complaints of Nigerians for the failure of the country’s diplomatic missions to always be at the service of Nigerians who live abroad, the line of defence often given by Nigeria’s missions is the paucity of funds that has constrained them from providing legal services to distressed Nigerians who regularly undergo judicial processes in their countries of abode (Uhmoibhi, 2012). The manner of releasing appropriated funds to the missions is another constraining reality. Poor funding was surely a factor in withdrawing Nigeria from many international organizations in 2017 (Adeosun, 2017). In modern times, resources and research are important for a foreign policy to excel in inter-state relations. The point on poor funding has been noted. The other angle is the poor research environment that propels the country’s foreign policy. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) created in 1961 is a foremost research arm of the country’s foreign policy. However, stories coming out of the institute of late have indicated a low level of research activities borne out of poor funding and unhealthy governance practices that have dogged the institute (Saliu, 2018). One sad reminder of the neglect of the Institute is the disappearance of the culture of the Patrons’ Dinner that used to provide a platform for the country’s political leaders to show the direction of Nigerian foreign policy, which the foreign policy elites used to look forward to. In recent years, the premier institute has lost some of its finest staff due to its reduced level of importance that reflects in the level of neglect it has suffered. The assumptions and parameters that guide Nigeria’s foreign policy have been faulty. While the country considers herself a champion in the world based on her possession of unharnessed elements of power (Saliu, 2009), the world does not seem to share the feeling of being important that the country has built around herself. Nigeria erroneously believes that, judging by her position in Africa as a leading nation, all other countries especially in the continent should defer to her even if her mission or stand on major international issues is unknown. Unfortunately, as Mustapha (1992) once remarked, no nation is born great in the international system. Every one of them has been striving to cope with changing times in the system. It is less surprising that the country’s push in global affairs is not as impactful as anticipated borne out of her feeling of self-importance. A look at the reformulated objectives of Nigerian foreign policy would reveal that her mission through the objectives of her foreign policy remains ambiguous and unclear to other actors in the international system. At

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present, the country parades five objectives of her foreign policy. A scrutiny of the objectives shows that they are too idealistic to serve as a major navigator in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. At another level, they are not a good measure for impact assessment. For instance, how can one measure the impact of the country if ‘a just international economic order is birthed in global affairs’? This is the dilemma. Two major points are involved on this issue of objectives. At one level, the officials who conduct Nigerian foreign policy are at a loss in operationalizing what Uhmoibhi (2016) has described the Articles of Faith in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy, because they are too general instead of being specific. At another level, the other actors that Nigeria relates with are also at a loss about what the country seeks to achieve on the international arena through her utopia foreign policy objectives. Most times, her fellow African countries have often raised this issue with the Nigerian public officials without anything redemptive being seen (Kayode, 2016; Saliu, 2004). The constitutional provision makes the practice of reviewing the objectives that was last carried out in 1976 a daunting task as tampering with them would require amending the constitution which has proven an uneasy enterprise (Adedeji, 2008). Nigerian foreign policy has a longstanding issue of coordination to contend with. Officials on foreign missions are always not coordinating their activities. If they are not disagreeing among themselves, they are at times absenting themselves from important meetings that they are paid to attend. Shopping and attending some inconsequential issues seem to be more important than defending or pressing for Nigeria’s interests at the international fora (Ogunjobi, 2007). Domestically, foreign policy, being a multi-sectoral issue, is not seen to be a coordinated issue in Nigeria. For instance, the country has an experience of widespread participation in peacekeeping operations, but this is not reflecting in her policy approach. The Defence Ministry, an important arm on the external sector of the country, is not seen as being harmonized with foreign policy machinery. At times, troops are sent on foreign missions without adequate consultations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The end result, as was shown in the Malian operation, was the little impact that the country has made on that score (Adebajo, 2013). Beyond the issue of coordination at an institutional level, there is a contending issue of improper regime pre-intervention that one can raise with the whole matter of peacekeeping operations. Often times, Nigerian peacekeepers only get to know why they are sent on peacekeeping at the

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centres of their enactment. The celebrated Mano River experiment also suffered from pre-intervention tardiness. What the peacekeepers do at the theatres of peacekeeping in terms of negative occurrences can only be blamed on the manner of sending them to crisis spots in the first instance (Galadima, 2011). Only a ray of hope exists with the establishment of the Jaji Centre on Peacekeeping training. Externally, the Nigerian State is either in a hurry to intervene or too late in reacting to international events. In 2013 and 2015 when Presidents Jonathan and Buhari were showing pleasure for being invited to America, this author had cautioned that they need not be too enthusiastic about the invitations, as their host being an imperialist state was only interested in her own interests, and not in Nigeria’s interests. The two Presidents did not pay attention to the words of caution expressed only for them to run into the troubled waters of American global agenda when they failed to win American support for their second-term bids in 2015 and 2019, respectively (Osaghae, 1998; CRS Report, 2019). Contrary to the thinking of the Nigerian State, the global system operates on the basis of certain dynamics: values and orientations keep changing, reflecting the changing mood of the powerful States. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s leaders assume the system is static and her mood or unpreparedness should also be fancied by the rest of the members of the international system, which is not the case. The West in particular with their far-flung interests are not in such a mood of tolerating Nigeria and her inconsistencies or her failure to read correctly the new motors that are now driving the international system. While the country is somewhat resisting western pressures, ostensibly from the point of her national interest, no matter how vaguely defined, the generality of the people are not being mobilized to be in sync with the preferred choices of the State. This gap often promotes infiltration by ambassadors of other countries that translates into meddling in Nigerian affairs (Saliu, 2019). Essentially, due to a multitude of factors and issues, Nigerian foreign policy is in a state of stress that translates into unfulfillment, but her tendency to make easy assumptions about the international system and her wrong perception of her place in it have been the obstacles that she has to get around before the grandiose role that Nigeria has carved out for herself can be made more manifest. The task before her in the conduct of her foreign policy is to show understanding to the limiting factors that are

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inherent in the international system and move to resolve the too many contradictions that surround her current existence. In making the review or overhaul of her foreign policy that is in a state of flux, it must be noted and recognized that the internal environment has a big role to play and therefore concerted efforts need to be made to prepare it for a more robust engagement with the international system. For now, her foreign policy has a bagful of disappointments.

Conclusion I have tried in this chapter to argue that the current state of Nigerian foreign policy is unnerving for the citizens and foreign friends of the country. There are many instances to prove that the foreign policy is undergoing some troubling moments. Relations with the country’s neighbours, larger African countries, and indeed with larger international systems have been unsung with considerable loss of power and influence by Nigeria. On the path of why the foreign policy is in a flux during these momentous changes in the global system, the chapter identified lack of coordination, poor funding, failure of constant reviews of the foreign policy and poor reading of the extant international system as some of the notable causes of irritations with the conduct of contemporary Nigerian foreign policy. While the author admits that the country has the potential to be a major actor on the international scene, there is an urgent need to develop the necessary compass to separate the foreign policy from the current stress that has gripped it. Doing so should command the urgent attention of the Nigerian state in order to make its past investments on the global scene not to be a waste.

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CHAPTER 12

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalisation: Issues and Challenges Audu Nanven Gambo

Introduction Interaction among sovereign State actors is an inevitability of their existence and this takes place within the international system. The key underlying factor behind the inevitability of interaction among sovereign States is the question of self-sufficiency and the globalisation trends. The phenomenon of globalisation in particular has widened and deepened the frontiers of interdependence among States and has thrown up new non-­ state actors, especially “Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA)” (Williams, 2008, p. 1), on board. No sovereign State, no matter how resourcefully endowed and technologically advanced, can exist in isolation from others. The question of self-sufficiency is determined in part by the place of geography, technological know-how, natural resource endowment and human capital. The confluence of all these factors determines to a considerable extent the scale of dependence of any country. Keohane and Nye (2001)

A. N. Gambo (*) Karl Kumm University, Vom, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_12

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describe the international system as an interdependent one essentially characterised by mutual sensitivity and vulnerability. There is hardly any country in the world that is sufficiently blessed with all these aforementioned factors as to exist in isolation. Countries produce what they can, using resources available to them, and depend on others for the consumption of goods and services they cannot produce locally. For instance, many Third World countries are known to depend on the industrialised Western countries for the consumption of goods they cannot produce using their local resources, while the Western countries depend on the Third World countries for primary agricultural produce to meet the raw material needs of their economies. Similarly, some countries, especially those in Africa, are generously endowed with mineral resources while others are not. Countries also differ from one another technologically. While some are technologically advanced, others are backward. Fundamentally speaking, although states are said to enjoy legal equality on account of their sovereign status, they differ significantly in their socioeconomic, political and military attributes. The chapter interrogates Nigeria’s foreign policy in the age of globalisation with a view to bringing out salient issues that can chart a new direction for the enterprise of foreign policy. The underlying concern of the chapter is to examine the implications of globalisation for Nigeria’s foreign policy and what appropriate responses should be articulated to make Nigeria’s foreign policy more vibrant, assertive and dynamic than what it is in the age of globalisation. It is structured into five sections. Section 1 is the introductory remark. Section 2 focuses on conceptual and theoretical issues such as foreign policy and globalisation for clear comprehension and appreciation. Section 3 presents an overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the age of globalisation. Section 4 brings out the issues and challenges in Nigeria’s foreign policy in the age of globalisation and strategies for harvesting the benefits of globalisation through effective and dynamic foreign policy. Section 5 is the conclusion.

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues In their interaction with one another, sovereign States are guided by what is referred to in the literature as foreign policy which is the correlate of domestic policy. The domestic condition of a state shapes its foreign policy carefully constructed in response to issues of interest within the international environment. Such a policy is intended to elicit favourable outcome

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from the international system. In the formulation of foreign policy, states take into consideration some prescribed ideals such as peace, development, security, prestige and a host of others generally described as “national interest”. There is, therefore, considerable sense in which one can contend that the foreign policy behaviour of any state is influenced by what it considers as its national interest. Foreign policy broadly refers to “the scope of involvement abroad and the collection of goals, strategies and instruments that are selected by governmental policymakers” (Rosati, 2006, p. 4). The goals here may be socioeconomic development, generation of employment opportunities through mobilising foreign direct investment, provision of security, building a democratic society, boosting welfare of citizenry and so many others, just to mention a few. Once the goals of foreign policy are clearly expressed, the strategies and instruments for achieving them are then identified and deployed appropriately. Common strategies often adopted by sovereign States in the pursuit of foreign policy goals include nonalignment, building alliances, isolation and so on. Any of these or a combination of some of these strategies can be employed towards driving the foreign policy objectives of a given country. The instruments for driving the foreign policy of any sovereign State are diplomacy, economic, military and propaganda (Holsti, 1995). Foreign policy could also be viewed as the pattern of behaviour cultivated over some time by the governing elite towards shaping and influencing the behaviour of other sovereign actors within the international environment. In other words, the foreign policy of any sovereign State seeks to positively influence the actions of others within the system in a way that ensures the optimisation of national interest. Galadima and Dallaji (2017) view foreign policy in broad terms as the pattern of behaviour that one State adopts while pursuing its interests in relation with other States. Sovereign States have always been guided by an articulated framework that keeps them focused and goal oriented in their relationships with others in the international system. In their external engagements with other sovereign actors, States are guided by the principle of national interest. National interest of sovereign States varies and is as dynamic as the international environment itself. The national interest of a State, according to Nwoke (2013, p. 77), is “the expected value it has to protect and garner in its international transactions, through the instruments of its foreign policy”. It should be noted, however, that national interest can be broadly classified into three categories: primary, secondary and peripheral interests. A confluence of these three makes up the national

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interest of a given State. Primary component of national interest of a State refers to those elements which are considered very critical that the State in question would go to war when threatened, to protect and defend them. Such elements include the territorial integrity, independence, security, economic and socio-cultural heritage of a State. These are interests that cannot be easily negotiated away no matter how intense and pronounced the threats may be. Secondary interests involve those elements that fall outside the scope of primary interests but are supportive of the latter. Examples of secondary interests of a State include the welfare of citizens abroad, diplomatic immunity of accredited representatives of the State overseas, the image of the State and host of others. The fact that these elements are classified secondary does not by any stretch of imagination suggest that they can be compromised in any given circumstance. Peripheral interests of a State are those elements that are not so critical to its survival. Such interests include respect for international law, the beliefs, religious, partisan and other interests of the State (Galadima & Dallaji, 2017). National interest in a sense could be used to refer to the aggregate of all the ideals of a given state. While some are achievable in the immediate, others are aspirational in nature meant to serve as guide in terms of the foreign policy behaviour of a state (Gambo, 2020). In the context of this discourse, Nigeria’s national interest over the years has remained a subject of intense contestations and controversies. This standpoint is supported by the assertion that decades after the attainment of independence, students and practitioners of Nigeria’s foreign policy still encounter difficulties in determining what counts as Nigeria’s national interest (Saliu, 2008). There is in a sense lack of broad consensus on Nigeria’s national interest and this accounts for the challenge in determining successes and failures of the country’s foreign policy as a tool for driving the enterprise of national development. The most critical expectation of any country’s foreign policy is to generate massive prosperity and good will for the benefit of the citizenry (Rosati, 2006). It is instructive to note that Nigeria’s National Defence Policy (NDP) (2017) has clearly deconstructed Nigeria’s national interest into three: vital, strategic and peripheral. The vital interests include the inviolability of Nigeria’s territorial integrity; the defence of her sovereignty; protection of her democracy, economic resources and citizenry, wherever they may be domiciled; as well as the preservation of her rich cultural heritage. Nigeria’s strategic interests as articulated by the National Defence Policy (2017) document are those that are important, but less than the vital ones as

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aforementioned. These include the desire to conduct economic, political and diplomatic relations with other nations in consonance with national goals, and regional security by way of combating terrorism and other transnational crimes. The third component of Nigeria’s national interest is the peripheral one. Peripheral interests are Nigeria’s obligations to the international community. This underscores the imperative of Nigeria’s involvement in support of peace and security across the globe. Nigeria is arguably one of the leading participants in peace support operations (PSO) at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. The country has been faithful in the pursuit of this aspect of its national interest. Be this as it may, it is controvertible the mode of articulation of these three aspects of Nigeria’s national interest as captured in the country’s National Defence Policy (2017). Can this be said to be a product of consensus? How participatory was the process of coming up with these broad categorisations? Is it a projection of government’s preferences or societal interests? The notion of national interest especially within the context of Nigeria is an intensely contested one (Gambo, 2020). The national interest of Nigeria is better pursued when it enjoys the blessings of the citizens rather than the articulation of some official preferences. Democratically articulated national interest generates greater good will than one simply imposed on citizens by the government. The foreign policies of States are determined by a range of factors such as the economic strength, geography, military prowess, technological status, domestic condition and several other factors. These are factors that make the foreign policy of a State either vibrant, assertive and dynamic or subservient, weak and ineffective. Foreign policy is a critical instrument through which sovereign States grow prosperity at the domestic front. For example, a State that pursues vibrant and effective foreign policy can easily grow its socioeconomic condition that makes life more meaningful and fulfilling for citizens. Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be attracted to the country through the instrumentality of foreign policy. Foreign policy is therefore a veritable driver of national development especially for developing countries if carefully, strategically and prudently pursued. Over the years, some credible instruments of foreign policy have been identified and these are economic, military, diplomatic and propaganda instruments (Galadima & Dallaji, 2017; Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2011; Holsti, 1995 and Opadiran, 2005). Any State that is adequately armed with these instruments can successfully drive its foreign policy towards achieving the prescribed goals. It is instructive to note that the domestic condition of a

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State is a critical factor in determining the effectiveness or otherwise of its foreign policy. Eze (2009, p. 6) articulates this point very pungently when he notes that “a sound domestic policy that will meet the welfare needs and security of the people is a necessary condition for a successful foreign policy”. It is a fundamental truth that the foreign policy of any given State is but a reflection of its domestic environment. An environment characterised by robust stability, peace and harmony, progressive, disciplined, patriotic and contented citizenry is no doubt a critical driver of a successful foreign policy. The ability of any state to influence events within the international environment depends significantly on its domestic economic, strength and political stability (Briggs, 2005). The domestic environment or context is a critical factor in determining the effectiveness of a nation’s foreign policy. There is therefore a sense in which it can be contended that foreign policy is a projection of a country’s domestic policy. The concept of globalisation has received considerable scholarly attention and is, therefore, not anything new to generate intense controversy over what it is all about. Scholars such as Elaigwu (2005), Ogbonnaya (2012), Scholte (2000), Scholte (2005), Babangida (1998), Botombele (1996), Tar et al. (2018), Tope (2010), Oche (2014), Hakeem (2015), Mbachu (2016) and several others have articulated their various perspectives on the concept of globalisation. Globalisation in the context of this chapter is viewed as the deepening interconnectedness among the diverse actors in the global environment fuelled by unprecedented revolution in information and communication technology (ICT). At no time in the history of the world has there been virtual erosion of interstate borders than now. Physical distance between States has been eroded by revolution in information and communication technology. The world has contracted into a global village where happenings in the remotest part of the globe are received and felt by other parts. Imobighe (2016, p. viii) captures this vividly when he notes, “[T]he truth is that no country can claim immunity to happenings outside its shores”. This suggests that happenings in faraway places have far-reaching (positive or negative) implications for other States. The Arab Spring which started in Algeria but quickly spread to some countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is quite instructive here. The international system provides a platform for sovereign States to seek to promote what is widely but loosely referred to as national interest. This often ill-defined concept of national interest is what is expected to shape the behaviour of sovereign States within the international system.

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The international system is characterised by the existence of a multitude of both sovereign state and non-state actors in regular interaction towards promoting some articulated interests. The factor of sovereignty of states does not recognise any overarching political authority within the international system. The system is generally described as anarchical due to the absence of a centralised and effective political authority that can govern the behaviour and conduct of both state and non-state actors. As Brown (2001, p.  127) has contended, “[A]narchy is basic to state-centric International Relations because sovereignty is basic to state-centric International Relations”. However, despite this obvious structural limitation of the international system, the factor of order is not habitually and critically weakened. The description of the system as anarchical does not in any significant sense suggest that it is utterly devoid of some prescribed norms of behaviour that could establish enduring order. Anarchy here is not more than the expression of the factor of sovereignty which states possess and which makes them to recognise no higher political authority above them. The absence of government within the international system fuels the belief among state actors, particularly, that unless they are sufficiently equipped in terms of power in its composite form, they become easy preys to some more powerful ones. In spite of the reality and potency of the legal principle of sovereignty which negates effort at establishing a world government to promote global peace and security, the international system is not perpetually in a state of instability and disorder. The reluctance of states to capitulate their sovereignty to a supranational entity has robbed the international system of an effective government to prescribe and enforce fundamental rules of behaviour for both state and non-state actors. However, the inevitability of interaction among sovereign state actors arising from the fact of lack of self-sufficiency has provided an alternative structure of governance often described as “global governance” (Brown, 2001, p. 127). In the absence of an effective world government, states have had to cooperate with one another towards meeting the basic needs of their citizens. The platforms that are constructed to sustain the cooperative efforts of states in tackling common developmental challenges serve as structures for global governance. The United Nations Organisation (UNO) and all its specialised agencies, World Trade Organisation and so on, are some of these structures that drive global governance in contemporary time. The twenty-first-century world is generally characterised as a global village because of the advancement in information and communication

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technology. The breakdown of traditional barriers between States has left sovereign entities virtually borderless. The world as it exists today is without traditional borders as it was in the recent past. The exercise of jurisdiction over the air, land and water spaces of sovereign States has been considerably undermined with the advent of globalisation and especially the revolution in information and communication technology. Deepening interconnectedness and interdependency between State and non-state actors are the critical manifestations of the phenomenon. The traditional notion of interdependence according to the liberal school of thought has further been strengthened by globalisation (Baylis et al., 2011). Globalisation has thrown up some challenges such as terrorism, climate change, identity-based conflicts and a host of others that require State actors in particular to mobilise collective responses to them. These are critical challenges that cannot be tackled by any individual State alone. The growing numerical strength of international institutions is a reflection of the rising new challenges that continue to threaten the common survival and prosperity of mankind. The absence of a centralised political authority at the international level is remedied by the proliferation of international institutions that are as much as effective as government in the domestic sense. The liberal school has cultivated deep faith in the capacity of international institutions to drive global peace and order through cultivating a vast network of cooperative behaviour among state and non-state actors. The post-Cold War World order is significantly characterised by the emergence of non-state actors on the global scene with comparable capacity and capability as State actors to destabilise the global system. This is, however, not to suggest that before the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s, non-state actors were not active on the global scene. What made them gain recognition in the post-Cold War World order is their immense capacity to inflict unspeakable scale of destruction on State actors who are widely recognised as the legitimate custodians of instruments of violence. The harrowing experience of 9/11 events in the United States is still verdant in the memory of humanity. Not only was the foundation of national stability of the United States, globally and arguably recognised as the leading world power, fundamentally threatened but also the world was awakened to the grim reality of the capacity and capability of non-state actors such as Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terrorist organisation to wreak such havoc of unprecedented scope and intensity on the United States. Similarly, on 11 March 2004, there was the bombing of commuter train system of

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Madrid which killed almost 200 people and wounded over 2000. On 7 July 2005, a “series of suicide bombing attacks on London’s public transport system undertaken by four British nationals of Pakistani descent, cost over 50 lives along with about 700 injuries” (Jeong, 2011, p.  63). In effect, one can assert that there has been an upsurge in both the tempo and the range of global terrorism and insurgencies (Fafowora, 2013). Terrorism and insurgencies which used to be isolated cases have become widespread and are viewed as global challenges that require building robust strategic partnerships to successfully tackle them. Third World countries, in particular, have become helplessly vulnerable to the subversive penetration of these violent non-state actors operating either as terrorists or as insurgents. Terrorism and insurgency are extreme forms of conflicts that are becoming widespread. The Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, militancy in the Niger Delta, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Taliban in Afghanistan, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Great Britain, Al Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and a host of others are familiar terrorist and insurgent groups that have dotted the global landscape. There is hardly any continent in the world that is utterly immune to terrorism and insurgency due to globalisation which has made movement easy and pleasurable. Although it may be inaccurate to suggest that globalisation is responsible for terrorism, it is a fundamental truth that technologies associated with globalisation have been exploited by terrorists (Baylis et al., 2011) to advance their sinister agenda against humanity. Technologies have assisted terrorists to quickly reach out to each other and build vast networks around the globe. This is the sense in which globalisation and terrorism can be said to be closely linked and implicated in the contemporary global disorder. One can therefore contend with considerable vehemence that every country is at risk. This hard reality about terrorism and insurgency demands building strategic partnership not only to check the spread of these twin evils but also to effectively counter them when and where they rear their ugly heads.

Overview of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy The enterprise of foreign policy is the exclusive preserve of sovereign States. As noted by Sesay and Eyinla (2012, p. 91), foreign policy is one of “the most visible and prestigious symbols of political independence and sovereignty in the comity of nations and is the exclusive activity which

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only independent and fully sovereign States can embark upon”. Nigeria became a sovereign State with the attainment of independence on 1 October 1960. Between 1914 and September 1960, the British colonialists conducted and managed international relations on behalf of the colonised society. The British colonialists therefore incorporated Nigeria into the contemporary international system. It is, therefore, a fundamental truth that Nigeria like most other countries of the global South did not make input in the articulation of the principles that drive the extant international system which serves as an arena for interstate relations. This exclusion from the process of constructing the international system is reflected in the agitations for New International Economic Order (NIEO), New International Information Order (NIIO) and a host of other critical demands of Third World countries. The foundation for the conduct and management of Nigeria’s foreign policy was laid with the articulation of the fundamental objectives and principles driving the country’s foreign policy as enunciated in Chapter Two, Section 19, of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). These objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy were articulated by the then-Nigeria’s only Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on 7 October 1960 during the 15th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New  York when the country became the 99th member of the global multilateral body (Agbu, 2020; Chika, 2006). These objectives and principles are outlined as follows: 1. promotion and protection of national interest (Nigeria’s sover eignty, territorial integrity and national independence); 2. promotion of African integration and support for African Unity; 3. promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of all discrimination in all its manifestations; 4. respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and 5. promotion of a just world economic order (Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution 2011. (As Amended, p. 23) Successive governments in Nigeria since 1960 have remained faithful to the aforementioned foreign policy objectives and principles. Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy has remained an enduring principle.

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Nigeria has demonstrated incredible faithfulness to this principle in her foreign policy pursuit since 1960 when she gained independence from the British. Nigeria played a frontline role in the decolonisation of some African countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and host of others. Also, Nigeria was in the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa until the morally reprehensible and repugnant apartheid structure was dismantled in South Africa in the early 1990s to allow for democratic governance. One can, therefore, argue with utmost strength of conviction that the enterprise of foreign policy in Nigeria has been characterised more by continuities than discontinuities. However, the style of individual leaders has been variable in the sense that the approach to the conduct and management of Nigeria’s foreign policy differs significantly from one leader to the other. This accounts for the successes and failures of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In the First Republic, foreign policy under Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was characterised by cautious optimism and subservient posturing. This was understandably so because of the tight bipolar structure of the international political system within which Nigeria gained independence and became a notable and influential actor in global affairs. Since then, Nigeria’s multilateral and bilateral diplomatic engagements have witnessed successes and failures. The most vibrant, assertive and bold foreign policy has been under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. For the first time in Africa, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime painstakingly mobilised independent African States to stand up against Western interest in Angola. The Western world had made spirited effort to constitute a lackey government in Angola but the Murtala/Obasanjo opposed the imperialist interest by supporting the MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) Party to establish a government. This was a humbling defeat for the Western world. This marked a turning point in Nigeria’s foreign policy which before this time had remained largely subservient, conservative and pro-Western interest. It is quite worthy to note that between 1960 and 1985, Nigeria’s foreign policy had been fundamentally oriented towards political and diplomatic interests rather than economic interest. In a sense, emphasis was more on gaining political and diplomatic influence than on economic concerns. One could understand why Nigeria’s foreign policy was more heavily tilted towards pursuing political and diplomatic goals. The principle of Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy has imposed on Nigeria the burden of driving the anti-colonial project to its logical conclusion. This process continued from the 1960s when Nigeria gained her

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independence to the early 1990s when the African continent completely shrugged off colonial or minority rule yoke. It was a great relief for the continent in general and Nigeria in particular to witness the historic collapse of the obnoxious and inhumane apartheid structure in South Africa in 1994. However, this longstanding tradition was changed when General Ibrahim Babangida, through a bloodless counter coup, took over power on 27 August 1985. The administration of General Ibrahim Babangida introduced a bold and courageous policy of structural adjustment of the monocultural economy as a response to the deepening economic crisis in Nigeria. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in 1986 was to promote the diversification of the economy away from oil as its mainstay and to correct some structural distortions. The external correlate of this domestic economic policy was the economic diplomacy vigorously pursued to support domestic effort. The economic diplomacy was carefully articulated to drive Nigeria’s foreign policy towards attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to strengthen the economy that was gasping for oxygen. Nigeria’s foreign policy has, therefore, over the years been deployed as veritable instrument for growing domestic prosperity, stability and progress. It was with this consciousness in focus that the economic agenda received fair attention of the foreign policy establishment. Since this strategic turn in the foreign policy direction of Nigeria in favour of the economy in 1986, successive administrations have remained focused on the need to frontally attack domestic socioeconomic challenges as a strategic move to enhance Nigeria’s influence in regional and global affairs. The only exceptions were the General Sani Abacha and General Abubakar Abdulsalami administrations which downplayed the economic agenda in favour of political consideration owing to the peculiar challenges that confronted the two administrations. General Sani Abacha’s administration was faced with robust and sustained political opposition particularly by the defunct National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) as the frontline opposition group to the military government which infamously annulled the June 12 presidential election widely adjudged as the freest and fairest ever conducted in the political history of Nigeria. This development adversely affected the effectiveness of foreign policy as there was massive clamp down on opposition elements forcing some to flee the country for safety to foreign countries sympathetic to the democratic struggle of members of NADECO.  This accordingly elicited hostile response from

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some Western countries leading to isolation of Nigeria from the comity of nations. In the case of General Abdulsalami who succeeded General Sani Abacha following his death in June 1998, had to undertake extensive tour of Western countries to rebuild the badly injured bilateral and multilateral relations. General Abubakar had to embark on image laundering abroad especially as Nigeria started her steady march to the marketplace of democracy. There was little or no consideration for the economic agenda in the country’s foreign policy pursuit. The administration of General Abubakar Abdulsalami had the shortest history of transition to democratic governance in Nigeria since 1960. The administration enjoyed popular support from both local pro-democracy groups and foreign interests. General Abdulsalami’s political transition programme ended on 29 May 1999, with the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on the same date. The administration was unable to finish the image-laundering agenda before the inauguration of the Fourth Republic with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the driver of Nigeria project. President Obasanjo continued with the image-laundering project from where General Abdulsalami stopped. It is noteworthy to articulate the point that Chief Obasanjo like his immediate predecessor, General Abdulsalami, enjoyed considerable support and good will of most Nigerians and Nigeria’s traditional Western friends as he set out to reconcile the country to her friends. President Olusegun Obasanjo worked assiduously to restore Nigeria’s battered image abroad and once more Nigeria became the beautiful bride of the international community. The enterprise of foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo centred on the issues of debt relief and cancellation, poverty, unemployment, climate change, threats to health security of Nigerians generated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and malaria, widespread corruption, economic crisis, insecurity engendered by widespread ethno-religious and communal conflicts and a host of others. These were the critical issues that dominated the foreign policy agenda of President Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007. Within this time frame, Nigeria, once a pariah State, played host to presidents of notable countries such as France, United States, India, China and so on. The significance of these visits cannot be overemphasised in diplomatic circles as they were concrete evidence of Nigeria’s acceptance within the comity of nations. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s successor, Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua, continued along this path as part of efforts towards economic recovery, prosperity, stability and security. President Yar’Adua took over the government

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from Chief Olusegun Obasanjo amidst growing asymmetric security threats of insurgency in the Northeast part of Nigeria, violent militancy in the Niger Delta, separatist agitations in the Southeast part of Nigeria and numerous other security threats. The most serious security threat in Nigeria at the time Yar’Adua came on board was the sustained militancy in the Niger Delta with grave implications for the economy of the country. He evolved a strategic response to the threat of militancy by granting Amnesty to the militants. The Amnesty Programme was introduced in 2009 as one of his Seven Point Agenda towards stabilising Nigeria. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was also established to effectively coordinate the developmental aspirations of the boiling oil producing part of the country. President Yar’adua’s methodical approach to governance was truncated following his death in 2010 after he took ill. He was succeeded by his vice president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who completed the tenure of the administration in 2011. President Goodluck Jonathan contested the 2011 presidential election and won for another four-year term. Under President Goodluck Jonathan, insecurity grew to a disturbing height. The Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism became unprecedentedly deadly as bombings of religious worship centres, public infrastructure, United Nations building in Abuja, ThisDay Dome and Nyanya Park bombing, and abduction of over 200 Chibok school girls and other associated crimes became very common. All these combined to portray President Jonathan’s administration as weak, inept, clueless and grossly incompetent in the management of the security environment. This popular perception of the Jonathan government turned out to be the source of his defeat in the 2015 presidential election by General Muhammadu Buhari who was the candidate of the All Progressives Party (APC). The APC in its sustained determination to wrest political power from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which had been in power for over a decade of Nigeria’s democratic project, carefully and strategically scanned the domestic environment and came up with three critical issues driving its electioneering campaigns. These were security, economy and corruption. These three core campaign issues of the APC appealed to the majority of Nigerian voters who felt the PDP had failed in instituting the culture of good governance in the country. President Muhammadu Buhari’s key foreign policy agenda was to generate the good will and support of the international community to help in tackling the challenges of insecurity, corruption and the ailing economy he inherited from his predecessor, former President Goodluck Jonathan, in

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2015. President Buhari’s foreign policy since 2015 to date is targeted at addressing widespread insecurity in Nigeria. The multitude of asymmetric security threats range from insurgency, terrorism, banditry, killer herdsmen, armed robbery to kidnapping. The government of President Muhammadu Buhari is strategically engaging with the international community to combat terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. The APC government has invested considerable effort in the search for durable and sustainable peace through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. For instance, on 22 July 2021, A-29 Super Tucano Fighter Planes arrived Nigeria from the United States (ThisDay Newspaper, Friday, 22 July 2021). The arrival of these military hardware was greeted with widespread joy and sense of relief. These fighter Jets, six in number with the remaining expected to arrive Nigeria in December 2021, would no doubt boost the fight against insurgency, terrorism and banditry in particular. Security consideration has remained top on the foreign policy agenda of Muhammadu Buhari’s presidency since 2021. Another critical foreign policy agenda of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration is the zero tolerance for the monster of corruption in Nigeria. Corruption grows luxuriantly like colony of trees along riverbank in Nigeria and this has catastrophic consequences for national development. He made solemn promise to Nigerians that he was going to engage corruption frontally if voted into power in 2015. Concerned about the crippling effects of corruption, majority of Nigerian voters voted for him. Muhammadu Buhari’s presidency has set out since 2015 to weed out corruption in public life in Nigeria, but the monster is defying all prescriptive measures. Widely believed to be a man of impeccable character with strong sense of probity, Nigerians trusted his capacity to liquidate corruption within a short time of his presidency. The president in his determination to stamp out corruption in Nigeria has preached the anti-corruption message both within and outside the country to elicit the necessary support. However, corruption, like the climate of insecurity in Nigeria, has defied all prescriptions. This is largely attributable to the weak justice system which has fuelled corruption in the country. The country’s political system, especially the electoral process, is believed to offer strong incentive for corruption to flourish in Nigeria. President Muhammadu Buhari took over an economy that was critically traumatised in 2015. Addressing the economic challenge was one of his campaign promises to the Nigerian voters in 2015. Having identified the near comatose economy as one of the critical challenges threatening

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the future of the country, he had to embark on both bilateral and multilateral engagements to mobilise support towards economic recovery. He enunciated the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) (2017–2020) to stimulate positive growth of the economy. One of the critical components of the ERGP was the need to revive agriculture, which was once the mainstay of the economy, to support the dwindling oil sector. The ERGP was purposely designed to restore economic growth by exploiting the productive capacities of Nigerians. Incentives were generously offered by the Federal Government of Nigeria to stimulate interest in the agricultural sector of the country. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) Anchor Borrowers’ Programme (ABP) is a good example of some of these incentives targeted at boosting agrarian activities. The CBN had provided 40 billion naira free-interest loans to farmers as incentive for boosting rice production in the country. Other social intervention programmes include TraderMoni, home-grown school-feeding programme, N-Power and a host of others all targeted at refuelling the traumatised economy bequeathed to President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration in 2015. The Buhari administration had also gone into bilateral arrangements with China to access loan facilities to address the huge infrastructural deficit in Nigeria. Remodelling of major international airports in different locations, construction of rail lines linking different parts of the country, reconstruction and construction of new roads were all aimed at rebuilding the economy which had practically collapsed under the immediate past administration. One can contend with strong conviction that President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration has made sustained effort to meet his electoral promises to Nigerians but the domestic environment—characterised by widespread insecurity, growing unemployment, corruption, agitations by different interests for either secession or restructuring and many others— has conspired to render almost ineffective some of the measures employed to address some of the critical developmental challenges.

Globalisation and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Challenges Globalisation as the key defining characteristic of the twenty-first century has significantly influenced the operational environment of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The twenty-first-century strategic environment is generally

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characterised by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and this has very far-reaching implications for Nigeria’s foreign policy. The most obvious implication of this is that Nigeria’s foreign policy is on a slippery slope which requires utmost care to maintain balance. What this means is that due diligence must be applied in dealing with critical foreign policy issues. Nigeria’s foreign policy makers must dig deep to uncover hidden motivations behind certain actions and inactions of other actors within the international environment. The complexity of the global environment suggests that foreign policy issues should be painstakingly analysed to generate critical insights that could help in articulating appropriate and effective responses to them. Globalisation, as viewed by Khor (2001), has led to the breakdown of national economic barriers and is threatening the integrity of the Nigerian economy expected to be the strong pillar and critical driver of a vibrant, assertive and independent foreign policy. The closure of border by the Nigerian government between August 2019 and December 2020 is practical evidence of the appreciation of the negative impact of free trade in the age of globalisation. The land border closure with neighbouring Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in August 2019 was primarily motivated by the desire of the Federal Government of Nigeria to stem the smuggling of contraband goods, especially rice, into Nigeria considered as inimical to the healthy growth and development of the economy. Until the border closure policy of the Federal Government of Nigeria in August 2019, foreign rice and other foreign goods had inundated Nigerian markets, thereby killing local productive efforts, especially agricultural production. Influx of foreign goods threatens the health and development of the Nigerian economy. The border closure policy became compelling against the backdrop of President Muhammadu Buhari’s passionate determination to boost local production of rice to not only meet the domestic consumption needs but also export to other countries. However, as noted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2021), the border closure policy was not effective enough in stemming the smuggling of goods into Nigeria using unmanned routes. The border closure policy had generated immense pressures on the economies of neighbouring countries and consequent rising hostility towards Nigeria. The 2020 Ghanaian hostility towards Nigeria is interpreted by the Institute of Security Studies (2021) as a strategic response to the harrowing effects of the policy on the Ghanaian economy. Furthermore, globalisation has brought with it the culture of violence in Nigeria as noted by Hakeem (2015). The Boko Haram insurgency may

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have local roots but is being supported and sustained by some violent non-­ state actors spread all over the African continent. The African continent is at grave risk with the growing culture of bad governance. The danger of this for the continent, Nigeria inclusive, is well captured by Imobighe (2006, p. viii) when he notes that “with many African governments increasingly breeding discontented, alienated and frustrated groups through misrule, the continent could become a fertile source of new recruits into the various terrorist gangs”. This is the grim reality of the negative aspects of globalisation such as the free trade as driven by the neoliberal ideas. In the name of free trade, the economic border of Nigeria like many other African countries has killed local industries that would have provided employment opportunities for the teeming youth (Gambo, 2014). Globalisation has unleashed similar catastrophic consequences on some African economies. The proliferation of terrorist groups in Africa is the inevitable consequence of allowing the youth to drift due to growing lack of employment opportunities. This domestic condition cannot support a vibrant and dynamic foreign policy of any country. Nigeria should, of urgency and necessity, invest more resources for the production of high-­ quality human capital to drive the economy for equitable, inclusive and sustainable growth and development. A domestic environment characterised by numerous asymmetric security threats such as insurgency, terrorism, banditry and kidnapping cannot but compromise a credible foundation for a vibrant and dynamic foreign policy. Tar’s (2019, p. 17) contention that “globalisation has transformed the character of war from inter-state to intra-state and from conventional or symmetric to unconventional or asymmetric” is exemplified by the happenings in Nigeria where insurgency and terrorism have undermined national cohesion and stability. It is against this background that the Nigerian government is leaving no stone unturned in restoring sanity to the convoluted security environment. In the age of globalisation, Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-making process should no longer be limited to some few officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the presidency and some relevant ministries. The scope of participation in foreign policy decision-making process should be widened to include scholars of International Relations, the Manufacturing Association of Nigeria and other organised interest groups to enrich the quality of foreign policy decisions. Nigeria needs to aggregate opinions from diverse sources in the articulation of foreign policy decisions to ensure credible and informed national responses to international issues of

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strategic relevance to the country. The longstanding tradition of a few public officials deciding on foreign policy issues on behalf of the country should not be the case anymore. There is the need to open up the foreign policy space so as to benefit from the considered opinions of other critical stakeholders across the country. The multiplicity of domestic challenges which have significantly constrained the country’s foreign policy choices should be carefully and painstakingly tackled so as to strengthen the domestic foundation for an effective, credible, assertive, vibrant and dynamic foreign policy. For instance, improving on the country’s socioeconomic and physical infrastructure can boost industrial production and also generate gainful employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed youth. This will in turn respond favourably to the numerous asymmetric security threats, given that youth unemployment is one of the critical drivers of insecurity in Nigeria. In fact, sanitising the country’s convoluted security environment is a fundamental precondition for creating a desirable domestic condition for driving Nigeria’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century. The domestic environment should be stable, orderly, sensitive and responsive to both local and external dynamics to check against the country drifting towards catastrophe. Another challenge posed to Nigeria’s foreign policy is the conduct and management of multilateral relations. Nigeria currently maintains membership of 310 multilateral organisations and is indebted to the tune of $120 million in terms of annual dues (FEC, 2017). This was disclosed in a Memo presented to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) by the then-­ Minister of Finance, Mrs Kemi Adeosun, on 27 September 2017. Nigeria’s membership of 310 multilateral organisations was not only considered as unwieldy but also a huge burden on a fragile economy. FEC on the basis of views expressed by members directed that the Nigeria’s membership of multilateral organisations be scaled down to 220 for effective and efficient management. However, the prescribed number of 220 organisations is still unwieldy, given the state of health of Nigeria’s economy. Nigeria needs only to subscribe to membership of not more than 100 critical international organisations covering a range of salient common issues requiring global efforts to respond to. Essentially, bilateralism appears more expedient in articulating responses to technical and socioeconomic challenges in the twenty-first century. Multilateralism slows down the decision-making process of a country. Reducing Nigeria’s membership of multilateral organisations will not only free immense resources to be deployed to other critical sectors of the economy but also contribute to sharpening the instruments of Nigeria’s foreign policy.

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The challenge of growing youth unemployment in Nigeria poses significant and credible threat to national stability in the age of globalisation. Unemployment has threatened decent means of livelihood for youth who are largely educated but idling away. Unemployment robs the country of the emotional attachment of the youth to the Nigerian State as most of them view unemployment from the perspective of deliberate denial of the opportunity to work for their fatherland. This belief is reinforced by the fact that some of their schoolmates whom they graduated with are surreptitiously enlisted into federal and state public services while they are asked to be patient. This perceived preferential treatment can drain them of the spirit of patriotism and may resort to subversive behaviour that can compromise the foundation of national stability. Some of the youth may become easy recruits for insurgents and terrorists’ groups for carrying out sinister agenda against the state. It is instructive to appreciate the fact that while Nigeria’s foreign policy between 1960 and 1990 was focused on political, diplomatic and economic concerns, there is a compelling need to shift from this posture to issues of security, corruption and economy. The security concern is particularly more compelling given the strategic importance of a secure domestic environment to grow the economy and launch Nigeria on the path to national greatness and immense prosperity for citizens. The foreign policy of Nigeria in the age of globalisation should focus on boosting science, technology and innovation as a response to security challenges. This is particularly expedient in the context of the fact that the total number of personnel of security and law enforcement agencies is not up to 1 million. The following statistics by Daily Trust Newspaper of 20 December 2019 corroborate the claim: Security manpower in Nigeria i. Nigeria Custom Service ii. Federal Road Safety Corps iii. National Drug Law Enforcement Agency iv. Nigeria Prison Service v. Nigeria Immigration Service vi. Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corp vii. Nigeria Police Force viii. Nigerian Navy ix. Nigeria Air Force x. Nigeria Army xi. DSS, DIA & NIA Total: Source: Daily Trust, 20/12/2019

17,277 20,000 5300 27,992 21,357 40,000 370,000 20,000 15,000 162,000 5500 698,926

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This number of security personnel is inadequate given the huge population of Nigeria which is put at 201,000,000. It is expected that technology would be used to complement this lean figure for adequate provision of security. For instance, the use of remote sensing technology, unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, communication infrastructures and geographic information system would have been deployed to help in tracking the movement of the bandits, terrorists and insurgents. These technologies would also have been used to locate their sanctuaries in order to dislodge them. One would expect that Nigeria’s foreign policy in the age of globalisation is targeted at fast tracking the process of technological development for robust national transformation.

Conclusion Nigeria’s foreign policy in the age of globalisation cannot follow the same old pattern; it requires critical and strategic thinking to be able to gain deep insights into issues of common interest desiring appropriate responses. Nigeria’s foreign policy decision-makers must be sensitive and responsive to both local and external challenges for speedy consideration and determination of possible courses of action. The strategic environment in particular should be carefully and regularly scanned and analysed with a view to keeping pace with the fast-changing international environment. Scanning and analysing the strategic environment would help to anticipate possible challenges and begin to articulate relevant and effective responses before they fully express themselves. It is contended here that for a credible, vibrant and assertive foreign policy in the age of globalisation, the economy should be significantly grown as a critical instrument and the domestic environment should be made stable. The volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity nature of the global strategic environment requires close, regular and critical scrutiny to avoid any happenstance, not even within the domestic environment. Asymmetric security challenges such as insurgency, terrorism, banditry and kidnapping should be strategically tackled to make the domestic environment supportive of the enterprise of foreign policy in the age of globalisation. The domestic

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environment should be significantly sanitised to make it possible for Nigeria to reclaim her lost glory. Nigeria should assume an influential role in the sub-regional, regional and global contexts through conscious effort at building a stable and enduring social order at the domestic level.

References Agbu, O. (2020). Nigeria’s foreign policy from Balewa to Buhari: A discourse. In U.  A. Tar, S.  Wapmuk, & E.  N. Ubi (Eds.), Perspectives on contemporary Nigerian politics and international relations: Essays in honour of professor WarisuOyesina Alli. Nigerian Defence Academy Press and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Press. Babangida, I. B. (1998). Africa and globalisation: The challenges of cooperation and linkages in the twenty-first century. Institute for Governance and Social Research. Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). The globalisation of world politics: An introduction to international relations (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. Botombele, C. B. E. (1996). Globalisation in action faced with the international challenges of the global society and the future of individual at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Law and State, 53/54, 10. Briggs, D. A. (2005). Foundations and development of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Some theoretical considerations. In D. A. Briggs (Ed.), Nigeria in world politics: Trends and challenges, essays in honour of major general Joseph Nanven Garba. National Institute Press. Brown, C. (2001). Understanding international relations (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Chika, N. N. (2006). Nigeria and the United Nations reforms. African Renaissance, 3(3), 104–109. Daily Trust (Nigeria). (2019, December 20). Elaigwu, J. I. (2005). Globalisation and Nigeria’s foreign policy. In D. A. Briggs (Ed.), Nigeria in world politics: Trends and challenges, essays in honour of major general Joseph Nanven Garba. National Institute Press. Eze, O. C. (2009). Opening Address. In O. C. Eze & E. A. Peter (Eds.), Foreign policy and Nigeria’s economic development. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Press. Fafowora, O. (2013). Understanding insurgencies in Nigeria: Nature, types, dynamics and the way out. In O. Obafemi & H. S. Galadima (Eds.), Complex insurgencies in Nigeria. National Institute Press. Federal Executive Council. (2017, September 27). Memo by the Honourable Minister of Finance, Mrs. Kemi Adeosun on the need to reduce Nigeria’s membership of International Organisations from 310 to 220.

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Galadima, H. S., & Dallaji, I. A. (2017). Understanding Nigerian Foreign Policy. In H. S. Galadima & I. A. Dallaji (Eds.), Nigerian foreign policy and strategy: Responses to the dynamics of domestic & global environment in the twenty-first century. National Institute Press. Gambo, A. N. (2014). Conflicts and Africa in global strategic calculations in the 21st century. In M. Amutabi (Ed.), Africa and the challenges of globalisation. Research, Catholic University of Eastern Africa. Gambo, A. N. (2020). Nigeria’s era of diplomatic diversification: Reflections on General Sani Abacha’s foreign policy, 1993–1998. In U.  A. Tar (Ed.), Perspectives on peacebuilding, security and development in Africa: Essays in honour of Professor Rauf Ayo Dunmoye. Nigerian Defence Academy Press. Goldstein, J.  S., & Pevehouse, J.  C. (2011). International relations (7th ed.). Pearson/Longman. Hakeem, O. T. (2015). Foreign policy in the era of globalisation: The need for Nigeria to refocus its priority. International Affairs and Global Strategy, 38, 34–41. Holsti, K.  J. (1995). International politics: A framework of analysis (7th ed.). Prentice-Hall International. Imobighe, T. A. (2006). Preface. In T. A. Imobighe & A. N. T. Eguavoen (Eds.), Terrorism and counter terrorism: An African perspective. Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc. Imobighe, T. A. (2016). Pax Nigeriana: The Quest for a Peaceful World. Lagos: AFSTRAG. Institute for Security Studies. (2021). Nigeria’s border closures have not served their purpose. ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Jeong, H. (2011). Understanding conflict and conflict analysis. Sage. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. (2001). Power and Interdependence (3rd ed.). Longman Publishers. Khor, M. (2001). Globalisation in the south: Some critical issues. Spectrum Books Limited. Mbachu, O. (2016). Globalisation and foreign policy: An evaluation of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 21st century. In U. A. Tar, M. E. U. Tedheke, & E. B. Mijah (Eds.), Readings on globalisation and development in Africa. Nigerian Defence Academy Press. Nwoke, C.  N. (2013). Nigeria’s National Interest in a globalised world: Completing the Independence project. Nigerian Journal of International Studies, 38(1 & 2), 77–111. Oche, O. (2014). The African Union and the challenges of globalization in the twenty-first century. In N. Nwoke & O. Oche (Eds.), Contemporary challenges in Nigeria, Africa and the world. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Press.

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Ogbonnaya, I. D. (2012). Nigeria in the age of globalisation. In B. A. Akinterinwa (Ed.), Nigeria and the world: A Bolaji Akinyemi revisited. Nigeria Institute of International Affairs Press. Opadiran, J. K. (2005). The base of Nigeria’s foreign policy and its role in the life of a nation. In D. A. Briggs (Ed.), Nigeria in world politics: Trends and challenges. Essays in honour of major general Joseph Nanven Garba. The National Institute Press. Rosati, J. (2006). The politics of United States foreign policy. Thomson Learning. Saliu, A. H. (2008). An agenda for Nigeria’s foreign policy. In A. H. Saliu et al. (Eds.), Nigeria beyond 2007: Issues, perspectives and challenges. Faculty of Business and Social Sciences. Scholte, J.  A. (2000). Globalisation: A critical essay (1st ed.). McGraw Hill Publishers. Scholte, J. A. (2005). Globalization: A critical introduction. Palgrave Macmillan. Sesay, A., & Eyinla, B. (2012). The place of National Interest in Nigeria’s foreign policy. In T. A. Imobighe & W. O. Alli (Eds.), Perspectives on Nigeria’s National Politics and external relations: Essays in honour of Professor Bola Akinyemi. University Press PLC. Tar, U. A. (2019). Combating insurgency and violent extremism in the 21st century: Towards a paradigm shift in Nigeria’s national defence and security architecture. 11th Professorial inaugural lecture of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna. Tar, U. A., Mijah, E. B., & Tedheke, M. E. U. (Eds.). (2018). Globalisation in Africa: Perspectives on development, security and the environment. Lexington Books. ThisDay Newspaper. (2021). A-super Tucano fighter planes arrive Nigeria. ThisDay Publishers. Tope, O. (2010). Globalisation and Nigeria foreign policy. Ego Booster Books. Williams, P. (2008). Violent non-state actors and national and international security. Swiss Institute of Technology.

CHAPTER 13

“Gulliver’s Odyssey”: Assessing Nigeria’s Role in ECOWAS Chris M. A. Kwaja

While there will always be a place for charity in the affairs of nations, generosity without an eye for the promotion of the national interest amounts to a pursuit of illusions. (Mailafia, 2010: 201)

Introduction In the aftermath of independence in 1960, Nigeria emerged as a major player in international affairs. At the continental level, Nigeria played a key role in the emergence of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OUA) in 1963, its support towards the decolonization of the continent as well as its membership of the frontline states that fought against apartheid respectively. These credentials positioned the country as a hegemon, coupled with its elements of national power in terms of demography, human, financial and natural resources. Within these periods, Nigeria effectively deployed these resources towards the realization of its foreign policy

C. M. A. Kwaja (*) Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_13

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thrust that was framed on the principle of afro-centricism, which places Africa as the centrepiece of its foreign policy. Within the West African region, the drive by General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria towards regional integration as a key catalyst for economic growth and development in West Africa led to the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975. Within this period and beyond, the foreign policy agenda of Nigeria was defined along the contours of its well-recognized power as a member of the frontline states in the fight against apartheid in Africa, taking the lead in peacekeeping, peacemaking and broader stabilization, and Technical Aid Corps (TAC), among others. In undertaking these tasks, the successive administrations in Nigeria committed huge human and financial resources, which attracted national, regional, continental and global commendations. At the initial stage of its operations, the ECOWAS secretariat was located in Lomé, the capital of Togo. After the overthrow of General Yakubu Gowon as Head of State in July 1975, the regime of General Murtala Muhammed moved for the relocation of the ECOWAS secretariat to Lagos, the capital of Nigeria. The justification for such a drastic, yet, strategic decision was hinged on the fact that Nigeria was the principal financier of the organization and deserved to host the secretariat, which can be viewed as part of its nationalistic drive in the pursuance of its national interest with tangible gains (Ojo, 1980; Bobboyi, 2010). By virtue of its sheer size in its demography, human and economic resources as well as economy, Nigeria typifies the story of Gulliver in Jonathan Swift’s 1726 satire titled Gulliver’s Travels. Gulliver’s Travels captures both the adventure and misadventure of Gulliver during his voyage that ended up in shipwreck in a tiny country of the Lilliput, a race of tiny people that were less than six inches (15 cm) tall (Bloom, 1990). Though the Lilliputians were receptive to Gulliver, they were weary of the threat that his size posed to them, despite the assistance he provided for them to subdue their enemies. The coinage of the word Gulliver’s odyssey in this chapter represents the reality of the Nigerian story with its involvement in the emergence of ECOWAS, as well as some of the under-currents associated with its role in the organization since its emergence.

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ECOWAS: Origin and Mandate The desire to forge regional integration as a catalyst for economic growth and development for West Africa laid the foundation for the establishment of the ECOWAS in May 1975. The initiative was spearheaded by General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, widely recognized as the founding fathers of the organization. The period leading to the establishment of the organization witnessed series of strategic engagements between the two West African leaders and leaders of other countries within the region, with the aim of garnering support for what gave rise to the Treaty of Lagos, which in turn led to the birth of ECOWAS (Bossuyt, 2016). At the initial stage of its emergence, the primary goal of ECOWAS was the pursuit of economic cooperation among member states of the region, which was envisaged will lead to economic growth and development for the region, targeting the then sixteen members states, which included Mauritania that left leaving the current fifteen members—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (Fig. 13.1).

MAURITANIA

MALI

CAPE VERDE

NIGER SENEGAL

GAMBIA GUINEA-BISSAU

BURKINA FASO

GUINEA

BENIN

SIERRA LEONE

IVORY COAST

NIGERIA GHANA

LIBERIA

TOGO

Fig. 13.1  Political Map of West Africa, showing members of ECOWAS, with the exception of Mauritania that has an associate membership. Source: https://www. istockphoto.com/vector/west-africa-region-political-map-gm917211566252345606

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In the early 1990s, the spate of violent conflicts witnessed in the West African region, notably within the Mano River Area of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Adebajo & Mustapha, 2008), led to the expansion of the mandate of ECOWAS from the pursuit of economic growth and development to peace and security. The pursuit of peace and security later dominated the efforts of ECOWAS based on the logic that in the absence of regional peace, security and stability, the realization of the goal of economic growth and development was unrealizable. Within this period, peacekeeping, peacemaking and mediation dominated the agenda of ECOWAS, with Nigeria taking the lead in the implementation of several initiatives that were geared towards the restoration of peace and security in the region. For instance, Nigeria committed huge financial and human resources towards the creation of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which became the first peacekeeping force to be established by a regional group and single-handedly financed by a country—Nigeria. Though some commentators viewed Nigeria’s role in the establishment of ECOMOG as one that was done in the pursuit of its unilateral objectives (Okolie, 2010: 113). Nigeria’s role in the protection of human lives and the restoration of democracy in Liberia (1995) and Sierra Leone (1998) (Adebajo, 2002) happened at a time when the international community was said to have abandoned the West African region to its fate (Adetula, 2006).

Nigeria and ECOWAS: The Many Sides of Support As a driving force for the establishment of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s support for the ECOWAS came in many ways. While some were direct to ECOWAS as an institution, some of the support came in the form of bilateral or multilateral assistance to member states of ECOWAS.  Other supports came through the pursuit of specific foreign policy agenda that were either ECOWAS targeted or continental in nature, covering economics, security and wider governance issues. Economic Diplomacy Through its bilateral and multilateral economic assistance programmes, Nigeria pursued an economic diplomacy agenda that provided direct financial assistance to some member states of ECOWAS. It was reported that member states of ECOWAS such as Benin Republic, Cape Verde,

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Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Liberia and Mali benefited from an estimated US $60 billion that Nigeria spent for Africa and Caribbean countries (Mailafia, 2010: 192). The strength of Nigeria’s participation and contribution to the ECOWAS Fund for Compensation and Development, which later became the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, is evident against the backdrop of its position as a dominant or major financial contributor (Mailafia, 2010). Within the ECOWAS, Nigeria was also reported to have taken advantage of its oil wealth in the pursuit of oil-diplomacy in the provision of economic assistance to its poorer neighbours (Adebajo, 2008).

Technical Aid Corps (TAC) TAC was created in 1986 by the Ibrahim Babangida administration as part of Nigeria’s foreign policy agenda for the promotion of goodwill and fostering economic and social development in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACPs), within the framework of a south-south cooperation. One of the biggest successes of the TAC, which deploys over 1000 experts annually (Adebanwi, 2005: 60), has been in the area of human capital development, where skilled personnel from Nigeria were able to provide technical support to countries abroad. In the context of The Gambia as a member of ECOWAS, it was reported that one of the volunteers sent by Nigeria to the country, Professor Donald Ekong, became the first vice chancellor of its pioneer university, known as the University of The Gambia (Mailafia, 2010). In an opinion piece of The Guardian newspaper, Aina (2020) rightly observed: “The TAC is the only volunteer service of its kind (academic and knowledge-based) currently operated by an African country on the continent. That (knowledge-based impartation) in itself is the main ingredient of soft power.”

Peacekeeping and Nigeria’s Leadership Role in ECOWAS Mediation The spate of armed conflicts that dominated the West African region in the early 1990s laid the foundation for a strategic shift in focus from economic integration to peace, security and stability. For Nigeria under the regime of President Ibrahim Babangida, the prevailing security environment was one in which ECOWAS needed to take proactive steps towards

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the restoration of peace and security in affected countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. Beyond the boardroom deliberations at the ECOWAS secretariat and other fora, the demonstration of commitment with boots on the ground became a defining feature of Nigeria’s leadership role in the maintenance of regional peace and security. Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping within the West African region represents its commitment to regional peace, security and stability. This is one area that Nigeria has been able to prove its commitment as a hegemon within ECOWAS. Through participation in series of ECOWAS-led peacekeeping missions, Nigeria was able to restore peace, security and stability in several countries across the West African countries. Also, Nigeria is reported to have provided strategic military training for members of the armed forces of member states of ECOWAS at its military academies such as the National Defence College (NDC) and the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) (Alli, 2012). It was estimated that Nigeria’s contribution to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) within ECOWAS was to the tune of $8 billion, coupled with having the highest number of military and civilian personnel in many of the missions the country has been involved (Adeniyi, 2016). Former leaders of Nigeria such as Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and Dr Goodluck Jonathan remain key figures, whose expertise has been utilized by ECOWAS in the pursuit of regional peace. In 2011, ECOWAS appointed Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as its special envoy to Côte d’Ivoire, due to the political crisis that engulfed the country in the aftermath of an election in which the incumbent leader of the country Laurent Gbagbo refused to accept the outcome of the election, which was widely considered credible and in favour of opposition leader Alassane Ouattara (Cook, 2011). In 2015, General Abubakar was appointed by ECOWAS to lead a special delegation of experts on high-­ level solidarity and pre-election fact finding to Niger, in recognition of his role in the pursuit of peace and democracy in Africa (ECOWAS, 2015). In concert with President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and the ECOWAS, Dr Jonathan was appointed special envoy to Mali in 2020 as head of the ECOWAS mediation mission. The mission was expected to facilitate dialogue between the Malian government and opposition leaders, towards addressing the socio-political crisis in the country (ECOWAS, 2020). From the domestic front, the credibility demonstrated by General Abdulsalami Abubakar as head of several mediation missions within the ECOWAS region has been quite helpful internally in terms of his pursuit of

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national harmony and cohesion. The establishment of the National Peace Committee (NPC), which Abdulsalami currently leads, has been central to the current state of peace in Nigeria, due to his role in engaging presidential and gubernatorial aspirants to avoid violence and peacefully accept the outcome of elections, as witnessed in 2015 and 2019 respectively. Such effort has attracted commendations from Nigerian citizens, the international community and development partners, among others. In fact, the NPC has become one of the key infrastructures for peace in Nigeria, which can be utilized by the ECOWAS in advancing its goal of peaceful elections in the West African region. In this context, member states of ECOWAS can be supported to establish their own NPCs based on the uniqueness and local specificities of their systems and environments.

Key Challenges to Nigeria’s Leadership in ECOWAS Though Nigeria regards itself as West African regional hegemon, domestic challenges that are linked to prolonged military rule, corruption as well as violent conflicts and insurgency constitute key obstacles to its personae at the regional front. In the last three decades, Osaghae’s crippled giant (Osaghae, 1998), Adebajo and Mustapha’s Gulliver’s troubles (2010) as well as Mailafia’s analogy of Nigeria as Prometheus (Mailafia, 2010), all provide key insights into the contradictions of Nigeria’s claim as a strategic hegemon within ECOWAS and beyond, against the backdrop of its pursuit of a foreign policy agenda that has not been beneficial both internally and externally due to the domestic challenges it has to confront. The recent decision by the Federal Republic of Nigeria to close its land borders was viewed as a clear violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of People and Goods from one member country to another within the region. The closure of the land borders, which was imposed in 2019, was meant to checkmate the smuggling of rice into Nigeria through the Benin and Niger borders (Nexia International, 2020). The position of the Nigerian government on the border closure was to the effect that it was the most viable way to address the issue of smuggling and the activities of criminal groups (Premium Times, 2019). Prior to the border closure, Nigeria has been accused of not addressing some hitches that hinder cross-border movement and trade, which has to do with administrative harassments and extortions at cross-border posts, in the form of seven checkpoints on every 100-kilometre stretch of the road between Lagos and Abidjan (Adebajo, 2004: 36). Notwithstanding the expansion

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of its influence in the region as an economic super-power, Nigeria has not fully utilized such powers in facilitating the creation of a common market that it can optimally benefit from. This is an issue that has been raised for over a decade now (Adebajo, 2008). The lack of political will towards the comprehensive and effective control of the spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) within the West African region constitutes one key area that ECOWAS has not addressed. The 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons called on member states of ECOWAS to establish national commissions on SALWs as well as the establishment of a database and regional arms register (Uwa et al., 2020). Concerned by the devastating impact of the circulation of SALWs in the country, the Nigerian government commenced the process of establishing a national commission since 2000 (Ero & Ndinga-Muvumba, 2010: 235), which culminated in the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW) in May 2021. The influence of France continues to serve as a counter-force to Nigeria’s power within West Africa and ECOWAS in particular. The close ties between France and its former colonies that currently dominate ECOWAS in terms of numbers and voting strength weaken the bargaining power of Nigeria, with specific reference to decision-making. For instance, the emergence of the Group of Five for the Sahel countries—known as G5 Sahel, which is made up Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger of ECOWAS, Chad of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) as well as Mauritania of the Arab Maghreb Union—continues to weaken the cohesiveness of members states of ECOWAS. For instance, it took the intervention of France after a series of discussions between Nigeria and some of its French-speaking neighbours to support the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight against the Boko Haram insurgency, which they initially viewed as primarily as Nigeria’s domestic issue. The recent declaration by President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire and Emmanuel Macron of France that the “Eco” will replace the CFA franc as a legal tender was viewed as an attempt to undermine the ongoing process of a single currency in West Africa (Manboah-Rockson, 2020). The fact that out of the fifteen member states of ECOWAS, ten speak French, coupled with the reality that Nigeria is bordered by French-­ speaking neighbours, makes French language of strategic value. Over the years, the Nigerian government sought to adopt French as a second official language, as pronounced in 1996 by the Late Head of State, General

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Sani Abacha (Faniran, 2017). Unfortunately, the policy was abandoned by the successive administration. The strong organic connection and principle of good neighbourliness that exists between and among the nine francophone countries make it easy for them to pursue common interests, unlike the very few English-speaking countries—The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Though the English-speaking countries are few in ECOWAS, they are still not able to forge a common cohesive force like their French-speaking counterpart. As the country with almost half the population of the other ECOWAS countries put together, Nigeria has not been able to effectively address this protracted challenge of language barrier in the pursuit of its national interest within ECOWAS. This is an issue that the Nigerian state must accord serious priority as it seeks to expand or consolidate its influence as a hegemon within the West African region and ECOWAS in particular. The vision of a common market for West Africa remains one of Nigeria’s unactualized dream as a founding member of the ECOWAS, despite its huge oil-wealth. The dominant influence of France over majority of the member states that are French-speaking accounts for their reliance on economic trade and financial support from their former colonial ruler. In fact, relations between Nigeria and France have been one in which the French policy of containment of Nigeria’s interests and influence within ECOWAS is framed along the logic of preventing Nigeria from serving as a major obstacle to the politico-economic interest of France (Akinterinwa, 2017: 90). In the same vein, Nigeria has also been critical of the influence of France in West Africa, which in many ways represents a direct threat to its hegemonic power.

Transnational crimes in the context of insurgency, drugs and arms constitute one of the key security challenges that Nigeria has not been able to effectively address (Adetula, 2015). The unilateral decision of the Nigerian government to close its borders against the backdrop of worsening security threats was viewed by several commentators as a clear violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of People and Goods within the West African region (Omale et al., 2020). Though, 2020 was not the first time Nigeria was closing its borders. Such decisions were taken in 1984 and 2003 in order to checkmate smuggling into the country (Ani et al., 2020). In a report that was released by the INTERPOL (2018: 15), it was revealed that “criminal syndicates take advantages from the freedom of movement of goods within the ECOWAS region which enables them to

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move stolen vehicles (complete or in parts) across borders easily using forged or altered documents”. From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, states are driven by their national interests, which they pursue and protect. For instance, it was reported that Benin Republic as a member of ECOWAS adopted a strategy of an entrepôt state, in the sense that it serves as a trading hub for both legal and illegal goods into Nigeria in ways that enable it to profit from the distortions of the Nigerian economy (Ani et al., 2020: 29). Where regional interests clash with national interest, the national interest takes precedence. At the core of Nigeria’s concentric circle of its foreign policy lie the national interests, which the closure of its borders underscores. While economic agendas are often used as the main basis for regional integration, it is increasingly clear that geopolitical and security considerations have gained currencies, against the backdrop of the fact that countries seek multiple benefits as members of supra-national entities such as ECOWAS. Notwithstanding its hegemonic position in ECOWAS, Nigeria had to take drastic measures to close its borders thrice—1984, 2003 and 2020— under what other member states of ECOWAS viewed as unilateral action, which contradicts the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of People and Goods within the West African region. The Nigerian government imposed the border closure regimes as a basis for addressing smuggling of goods and arms by criminal groups, which was a way of dealing with external threats to its economy and national security, which are enabled through the borders of its West African neighbours. The Nigerian decision with respect to the closure of its border attests to this reality of placing security considerations at the core of its membership of ECOWAS, which has done more with the advancement and protection of its national interest. Aluko (1981: 265) argued quite unambiguously to the effect that since independence in 1960, Nigeria’s national interests have been predicated on the core principles of self-preservation, defence and maintenance of the country’s independence and economic and social well-being of the people, among others. Constitutionally, there are also clear provisions regarding the pursuit of Nigeria’s national interest under what is framed as the objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy, which have the first principle as the promotion and protection of the national interest (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999).

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Recommendations: Towards a Constructive and Beneficial Nigeria-ECOWAS Engagement Central to Nigeria’s vision for ECOWAS has been the desire to have a regional entity that can serve as the key catalysts for peace, security, stability and economic development. Though there has been some appreciable success, which has been linked to Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS as highlighted in this chapter, there is a lot more that needs to be done, in order to consolidate on its strategic position and influence in the organization. For a country to either confer on itself or be recognized as a hegemon within a supra-national entity such as ECOWAS, it should be able to provide the much-needed leadership at all times, in line with its strategic national interest, which must not conflict or undermine the overarching vision of the organization. The return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 represents a major leap in its drive towards political stability, which by extension has made the country a key defender of democracy in West Africa. The declining cases of election-related conflicts in the region constitute a major pointer to the democratic gains recorded in the region (Bolaji, 2015), which has been linked to the role of ECOWAS and the involvement of eminent personalities of Nigerian descent. For instance, the activities of eminent personalities such as Olusegun Obasanjo, Abdulsalami Abubakar and Goodluck Jonathan as special envoys further positioned Nigeria as a major voice in the region, which led to the restoration of democratic order in Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia respectively. The role of Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in supporting other Election Management Bodies (EMBs) across the region has been a major booster of Nigeria’s democratic credentials and image in the continent. There is a strong sense in which the pursuit of political stability in Nigeria will have a multiplier effect on other member states of ECOWAS, which underscores why there has been huge attention given to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria, particularly as it relates to the conduct of credible and peaceful elections, which should be pursued vigorously and consolidated. The signing of the African Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) represents a major opportunity for Africa to deepen its commitment on regional economic cooperation and integration, which Nigeria is a signatory. Unfortunately, the operationalization of the AFTA constitutes a major problem against the backdrop of the difficulties associated with the

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infrastructure in the continent—power, communication and transportation. So far, the African continent has the most complex and difficult connectivity in terms of transportation. Though, at the regional levels, such difficulties are near absent as movements of people and goods within the five regions of the continent occur with fewer hitches. Nigeria should spearhead the review of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and Goods, in order to facilitate the emergence of a West African Free Trade Agreement (WAFTA), with the other regions of the continent doing same, while the AFTA is made to provide guidance and oversight in the first instance. The success of these regional free trade agreements should help inform the start-up of the AFTA, bearing in mind the existing challenges associated with prevailing weakness in intra- and inter-industrial structures and non-convertibility of currencies, which need to be vigorously pursued. One of the costs associated with Nigeria’s membership of the ECOWAS was the partial loss of its sovereignty, which places huge limitations on its ability to take unilateral decisions as evidenced with the closure of its borders in 1984, 2003 and 2020 respectively. There is no doubt that the imposition of border-closure regimes by Nigeria has attracted mixed reactions from member states of ECOWAS, which is viewed as a violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and Goods, notwithstanding the economic and national security implications that the activities of smugglers and criminal groups pose. There is a sense in which the episodic closure of the borders cannot effectively address the concerns of Nigeria. So far, there is no clearly defined policy framework for addressing such a challenge within ECOWAS. Against the backdrop of the foregoing, Nigeria should work with other member states of ECOWAS towards improving border governance and security in ways that address the challenges posed by the activities of smugglers and other criminal groups. In an ideal situation, burden-sharing or cost-sharing as the case may be constitutes one of the key ways that supra-national organizations are sustained. In most cases, statutory dues by member states are paid on the basis of equality of states in view of the fact that they have equal stake in the operations of such an entity. In the context of ECOWAS, Nigeria had to take on huge responsibilities by investing human and financial resources in the pursuit of the ECOWAS vision of regional peace, security and stability, as demonstrated with the emergence of ECOMOG. Nigeria’s demonstration of such goodwill to ECOWAS is premised on its desire to fulfil its

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obligation as a big brother and good neighbour, coupled with the fact that though the principle of equality of states applies, the reality is that the member states of ECOWAS are not at the same level of development and resource endowment. Going forward, Nigeria’s strategic influence in ECOWAS will continue to be assessed and appreciated on the basis of its support to the organization, outside the statutory contribution that each member state is expected to make. The fact remains that for a state to confer on itself the status of a hegemon, or be conferred such status by other member states, comes with huge responsibilities, regardless of the tangible benefits that accrue to such a state. That is the kind of price that the United States, China, France and Russia pay in North America, Asia, Europe and Eastern Europe respectively. In the past few years, conflicts between farmers and herders have taken both a national and a transnational dimension, with Nigeria serving as the epicentre for such conflict. Though the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance was designed to address the movement of transhumance across the region, majority of the member states of ECOWAS have failed to implement the certification policy associated with the protocol, which provides for the proper documentation and profiling of herds and herders as they move from one country to another. As a primary victim of the security challenge that the undocumented movement of transhumance poses for the region, Nigeria should take the lead in the enforcement of the transhumance protocol. This is one critical area that its hegemonic influence should be felt in the region, rather than the back-seat role it is perceived to be playing on such a matter of national and regional security concern.

Conclusion The ultimate goal of every country is the design of a foreign policy agenda and pursuit of national interests that gives it an edge over others. In crafting such policy agendas, countries are often guided by the principle of self-interest, which has to do with the fact that as each country works towards advancing the interest of others—bilaterally or multilaterally— such a country ultimately advances its own self-interest. From an international relations standpoint, the national interests of countries are largely embedded in its foreign policy thrust, which comprehensively captures the security, economic, ideological, cultural and social interests, in relation to its dealings with other countries. If the guiding principle of Nigeria’s

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foreign policy lies in advancing its national interest both at bilateral and at multilateral levels, it means the pursuit of such national interest becomes very central to its survival, which cannot be compromised or negotiated. In line with this principle, its role in furthering the ideals of ECOWAS should be one that places the interest of its citizens at the centre of its foreign policy thrust as a hegemon in West Africa and ECOWAS in particular. As a strategic hegemon in West Africa, Nigeria remains a big brother to member states of ECOWAS due to its sheer size, demography and resource endowment. In fact, this conviction was the basis for its role in the emergence of ECOWAS as a catalyst for forging regional integration and economic development in the West African sub-region. Outside the realm of the pursuit of economic development in the sub-region, Nigeria became a major pillar for regional peace and security in the region, defined largely by the huge human and financial resources it provided in support of ECOWAS. Going forward, Nigeria’s strategic membership of ECOWAS and other supra-national entities must be anchored on the much-­advocated logic of constructive and beneficial foreign policy agenda, which places the interest of the country and its people first.

References Adebajo, A. (2002). Building peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Adebajo, A. (2004). ECOWAS: A retrospective journey. In A. Adebajo & I. Rashid (Eds.), West Africa’s security challenges: Building peace in a troubled region. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Adebajo, A. (2008). Hegemony on a shoestring: Nigeria’s post-cold war foreign policy. In A. Adebajo & A. R. Mustapha (Eds.), Gulliver’s troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy after the cold war. University of Kwazulu-Natal Press. Adebajo, A., & Mustapha, A. R. (Eds.). (2008). Gulliver’s troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy after the cold war. University of Kwazulu-Natal Press. Adebanwi, W. (2005). Government-led service: The example of the Nigerian technical aid corps. Voluntary Action, 7(2), 57–68. Adetula, O. A. V. (2006). Development, conflict and peacebuilding in Africa. In S. G. Best (Ed.), Introduction to peace and conflict in West Africa. Spectrum Books Limited. Adetula, O. A. V. (2015). Nigeria’s response to transnational organised crimes and Jihadist activities in West Africa. Discussion Paper, No. X, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

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Adeniyi, A. (2016). Peacekeeping contributor profile: Nigeria. Accessed July 25, 2021, from https://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/04/24/ peacekeeping-­contributor-­profile-­nigeria/ Aina, D. (2020). Technical aid corps: Nigeria’s soft diplomacy since 1987. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://guardian.ng/opinion/technical-­aid-­corps­nigerias-­soft-­diplomacy-­since-­1987/ Akinterinwa, A.  B. (2017). Nigeria-France and European Union Relations. In S.  H. Galadima & A.  I. Dallaji (Eds.), Nigerian foreign policy and strategy: Responses to the dynamics of domestic and global environment in the twenty-first century. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). Alli, O. W. (2012). The role of Nigeria in regional security policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). Abuja: Peace and Security Series. Aluko, O. (1981). Essays on Nigerian foreign policy. George Allen and Unwin. Ani, C. E., Baajon, A. M., & Samuila, A. A. (2020). Border closure: Implications on Nigerian economy. Journal of Economics and Finance, 11(3), 21–32. Bloom, A. (1990). Giants and Dwarfs: An outline of Gulliver’s travel. Simon and Schuster. Bobboyi, H. (2010). Nigeria, ECOWAS and the promotion of regional integration in West Africa. In M.  A. Jega & W.  J. Farris (Eds.), Nigeria at fifty: Contributions to peace, democracy and development. Shehu Musa Yar’adua Foundation. Bolaji, K. (2015). Democratic cooperation and electoral integrity in West Africa: Issues and prospects. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://www.idea.int/sites/ default/files/publications/development-­cooperation-­and-­electoral-­integrity-­ in-­west-­africa.pdf Bossuyt, J. (2016). Political economy of regional integration in Africa: The economic community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Study. Accessed July 20, 2021, from http://www.ecdpm.org/peria/ecowas Cook, N. (2011). Cote d’Ivoire post-Gbagbo: Crisis recovery. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Report for Congress. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21989.pdf ECOWAS. (2015). ECOWAS appoints Abdulsalami Abubakar as Leader of Solidarity Mission to Niger. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://www.ecowas. int/ecowas-­appoints-­abdulsalami-­abu-­bakr-­as-­leader-­of-­solidarity-­mission-­to-­ niger/#:~:text=ECOWAS%20appoints%20Abdulsalami%20Abubakar%20 as%20leader%20of%20solidarity%20mission%20to%20 Niger,-­10%2F12%2F2015&text=The%20Economic%20Community%20of%20 West,of%20State%20of%20Nigeria%2C%20Gen.&text=Abubakar%20for%20 accepting%20to%20lead%20the%20delegation ECOWAS. (2020). Communique: ECOWAS mediation mission in Mali. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://www.ecowas.int/wp-­content/uploads/2020/09/ Eng-­Communique-­Final-­Mediation-­Mali-­25-­sept-­2020-­Ok.pdf

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Ero, C., & Ndinga-Muvumba, A. (2010). Small arms, light weapons. In A. Adebajo & I. Rashid (Eds.), West Africa’s security challenges: Building peace in a troubled region. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Faniran, O. A. (2017). French as a second official language in Nigeria: Problems, prospects and implications for the future of the English language in Nigeria. European Journal of English Language, Linguistic and Literature, 4(1), 7–15. Federal Government of Nigeria. (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Federal Government Printer. INTERPOL. (2018). Overview of serious and organised crimes in West Africa, analytical report. France: INTERPOL. Mailafia, O. (2010). Prometheus as Good Samaritan: Nigeria’s bilateral and multilateral assistance since independence. In M.  A. Jega & W.  J. Farris (Eds.), Nigeria at fifty: Contributions to peace, democracy and development. Abuja. Manboah-Rockson, K. J. (2020). ECOWAS’ monetary conundrum: How France wants to “Kidnap” the ‘Eco’, in an attempt to short-circuit the monetary integration in West Africa. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.22962.56004. Nexia International. (2020). Nigeria’s unilateral border closure needs to be rethought. Accessed July 20, 2021, from https://nexia.com/insights/global-­ insight/nigeria-­s-­unilateral-­border-­closure-­needs-­to-­be-­rethought/ Ojo, B.  J. O. (1980). Nigeria and the formation of ECOWAS. International Organisation, 34(4), 571–604. Okolie, A. (2010). Nigeria’s role in peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG, Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In M. A. Jega & W. J. Farris (Eds.), Nigeria at fifty: Contributions to peace, democracy and development. Shehu Musa Yar’adua Foundation. Omale, M., Olorunfemi, F. J., & Aiyegbaje, O. A. (2020). Legal viable option to incessant closure of Nigeria’s international borders. African Identities. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2020.1828037. Osaghae, E.  E. (1998). Crippled Giant: Nigeria since independence. Indiana University Press. Premium Times. (2019). Why we closed Nigeria-Benin Border – Buhari. Accessed July 25, 2021, from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/ 349226-­why-­we-­closed-­nigeria-­benin-­border-­buhari.html Uwa, G.  O., John, E.  A., & Adi, I. (2020). The role of ECOWAS in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa sub-­ region. International Journal of Political Science, 6(4), 1–11.

CHAPTER 14

Migration and Nigeria’s External Relations: A Trend Analysis of Its Nature and Dynamics in the Last 60 Years Joseph P. Ochogwu and Olalekan A. Babatunde

Introduction Migration has been one of the most significant features of Nigeria’s external relations since its independence in 1960. In this chapter, the term is referred to as the movement of a person or a group of people across political borders with the intentions of settling permanently, or temporarily, and it may be voluntary or forced (regular or irregular). Likewise, migration has also been adopted to encompass movement of goods and services in some international conventions and practice as well as matters relating to border management, labour, trafficking, refugees, asylum seekers and many more. Because of its sensitivity, migration is closely regulated and restricted. An individual country cannot unilaterally manage it; hence while Nigeria has promoted migration relations through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, it has also undermined migration agreements as

J. P. Ochogwu • O. A. Babatunde (*) Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_14

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demonstrated in the 1980s. But to a large extent, Nigeria’s 60-year external relations on migration have reflected its deep history, heritage and regime policies that in turn have shaped its management and the related development programmes of the government. That is, the causes and dynamics of Nigeria’s migration have largely been defined by its socio-economic and political conditions, rapprochement with the international community, global politics and the efficiency and effectiveness of its relevant institutions. For instance, the Nigerian nationals who suffered from xenophobia, trafficked across difficult terrains, contravened host countries’ laws, sold as slaves or lured into prostitution in foreign land have received support and assistance through the cooperation and partnership Nigeria evolved with other countries and international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM, n.d.), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Labour Organization (ILO). Though it took it decades to develop a coherent and sustainable policy on migration after it was realized as a development agenda that could benefit both the state and the individual wellbeing. Accordingly, Nigeria has generated considerable interest in migration since the publication of its first migration profile in 2009 and its consequential comprehensive migration policy called National Policy on Migration (NPM) (Isiugo-­ Abanihe, 2016). The migration policy in this context was part of the overall Nigeria’s foreign policy interests. Therefore, the 60  years of its nationhood offers a fresh opportunity to examine the elements or structure of the Nigeria’s diplomacy on migration’s relations with the outside world. Remarkably, the study was carried out amidst the introduction of New Visa Policy (NVP 2020) by Nigeria. Understanding the part migration played in its external relations will help shed light on the causes and dynamics of Nigerian migration management with the outside world. Recognizing the politics behind Nigerian migration policies and decisions would help to recalibrate and refocus its priorities and actions for the twenty-first century. A lot has changed in world affairs. Nations have become more protective of their borders and trade is threatened more than at any time in history. Globalization has given rise to migration, terrorism and violent extremism, climate change, human rights abuses, diseases, populism, far-right movements, Brexit and other socio-economic and political phenomena. How Nigeria had managed these phenomena is important to comprehend the social cause and effect of its external relations. Also, it would throw light on the various efforts of governments at

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using migration as a veritable tool for international politics and to support Nigerians as well as African migrants’ desires to seek social and economic opportunities across the borders. Relying on reams of historical documents and a wide spectrum of personal and professional experiences in foreign, political and migration affairs, the study charts a new path forward for the Nigeria’s foreign policy to meet up with the emerging trends in migration management. On the whole, the following questions are considered in this chapter: what underpins the nature of Nigeria’s migration policies and practices? How have migration trends and dynamics influenced Nigeria’s relations with Africa? What were the basic manifestations of Nigeria’s migration engagements with the international community? And, what emerging trends on migration could determine Nigeria’s future relations? Until recently (2009) that the Nigerian policymakers, like most of their foreign counterparts, began to acknowledge the importance of migration to development, there were no available data on migration to inform policymakers let alone guide their external relations. The existing ones are patchy. Also, the quality of data on its migration issues is poor mainly due to the lack of capacity as well as the weak coordination among the agencies responsible for collecting the data. The porosity of borders and the rapacity of irregular or illegal migration complicated the data issues. This posed some limitation to the study, but given the scattered migration data, rigorous but careful attempts were made to present detailed and coherent analytical account on migration and Nigeria’s external relations within regional, interregional and the wider world frameworks. This study will contribute to a stronger evidence base to inform policy development and practice on Nigeria’s relationship within the international migration system. The authors have no conflict of interests while carrying out and reporting the research study.

Historical Underpinnings of Nigeria’s Migration Trend Any attempt to understand Nigeria’s diplomatic engagement with the international community on migration in the last 60 years must first take into account the socio-economic relations between peoples that made up the country and the relations they had built with other communities of the West and Central African regions prior to the advent of the Europeans.

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Like any other bases of its foreign policies, the Nigerian historical and political leadership antecedents have considerably influenced its migration trends and patterns over time. Like Ezirim (2010, 1) has posited on foreign policy, “[A] range of actions, as well as a set of principle influencing these actions, taken with reference to external situations and factors.” This means that foreign policy is a reflection of the country’s past and immediate political, economic, social and cultural circumstances at the domestic level. Migration is all about people and thus putting people at the centre of its foreign relations, Nigeria has demonstrated optimal relevance and importance on its citizens. Nigerians are popularly known to be highly mobile and skilled. Due to its largest population of about 200 million people and widespread mobility, it is often said that one out of five Africans is a Nigerian. Also, it is a catchword outside the country that wherever you go and do not find a Nigerian, it is better to take a leave. There is enough evidence that since time immemorial, peoples of the territory that is now Nigeria have been traversing the West and Central African regions even up to the Middle East for social and economic opportunities. Their involvement in the trans-Saharan trade was popular. Some were forced into slavery. The slave trade in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries had taken about 2 million people across the Atlantic, Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Mberu & Pongou, 2010). Equally, most of the over 250 ethnic nationalities that were amalgamated into one political structure by the British Colonial Administration had a rich history of long distance trade that had influenced inter-group relations across their immediate boundaries and the West African region. For example, the Hausa traders who were famous for their crisscrossed trade had their presence across the peoples of the region and up to North Africa (Sundstrom, 1974). Likewise for other groups like the Yoruba, Igbo and Nupe. The Fulani cattle herders also migrated in search of better pastures while warrior groups left one polity and moved to establish their rule and dominance over neighbouring populations (Skinner, 1965). The human movements flourished to the extent that it led to the formation of settlements that transformed into nations and kingdoms such as Oyo, Kano and Songhai (Gasiokwu, 1998, 4). These were periods of unrestricted movements among various ethnic groups of the West African region. Restrictions such as payment of tolls, marauder or wild animal attacks, unfriendly people, linguistic differences and period of war did not deter the people from crisscrossing boundaries. Instead, bonds of

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marriage, religion and friendship enabled migrants to move freely on the routes since they are passing through friendly states. During the pre-colonial time, relations among distant groups were mostly cordial as they exchanged articles of trade like salt, textile, livestock, ironware, ivory and agricultural produce. Some pre-colonial West African states gave protection to traders. Empires such as Mali and Ashanti rendered traders protection, supplied means of transport, maintained roads and canoes, policed markets and settled disputes (Gann & Duignan, 1975, 39). Pre-colonial Nigeria’s migration with other West African peoples promoted cross-border cooperation. Evidence of hospitality was extended to travellers in the region. Once the travellers had been accepted as guest, customs demanded that his host assist such in a number of ways like providing hospitality and safety. Through these alliances, marriages or bonds of friendship were formed. For example, fraternity and secret societies of the Efik and Ekoi people of Nigeria developed to a large extent into a trading society. Intermarriages and other social interactions developed. But with the partition and imposition of colonial rule in West Africa, the pattern of the Nigerian group relations did not but increase across the region’s borders that functioned less as barriers than as conduits between the states on either side (Asiwaju, 1985, 11). So migrants moved across the borders as if the partition had not been created. It is important to note here that the West African contact with the outside world stimulated a great movement of people in the region (Little, 1996, 9). The improved method of transportation and communication facilitated this movement. Roads, railways, bridges and waterways enhanced the access of not only Nigerian migrants but others as well to new areas of the colonies. For example, some Yoruba traders moved into the markets of Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso, and the spread of the Igbo to the north as traders and clerks (Fage, 1955, 182). Similarly are the instances of cross-border movement of Hausa kinsmen between Nigeria and Niger border that created new border settlements such as Jibiya and Zandam and increased the size of existing communities such as Katsina, Daura and Kebbi (Collins, 1985, 198–199). The migratory movement built up relationships and common interests among the peoples. Some people who had settled permanently in other lands that today are now claiming it to be their place of origin. In short, as far as the Nigerians were concerned, colonial migration relations increased due to

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the new social and economic opportunities that were created. The development impacted on the inter-state relations. But at the early post-independence, Nigerian relations with other countries of the region began to contrast compared to the pre-colonial and colonial eras. Independence reinforced national consciousness as West African migrants became aware of their nationalities (Wallerstein, 1965, 157) and confronted the physical reality of what it meant to be a Nigerian, Senegalese or Ghanaian. The frontiers were seen as very important by the national governments. While immigration and customs papers gave reality to the new order through crossing the borders officially, illegal trade and unauthorized movement of persons and goods developed across the porous borders. For example, smuggling of cocoa and groundnuts from Nigeria into Republic of Benin and Niger respectively by farmers in search of higher prices (Wallerstein). Meanwhile, for effective migration management, the British Colonial Administration had in 1958 extracted the Nigeria Immigration Service from the Nigeria Police Force. But it was formally established in 1963 by an Act of Parliament, Cap 171, Laws of the Federation Nigeria (Nigeria Immigration Service [NIS], n.d.). With this position, it was expected that the NIS would attain the desired goals and objectives of the government on migration issues such as regular and irregular migration, border management, visa and residency, passport and other travel documents as well as investigation and compliance. Consequently, to reduce the obstacles of movement and ease disputes and smuggling at the borders, Nigerian joined other West African countries to initiate and ratify the Treaty on the Protocol on Free Movement of Community Citizens.

Nigeria’s Relations in African Migration Nigeria is a regional power with regional interests. It is an important destination country for migrants in the West African region. Scaling its economic and demographic power to the region and to some extent Africa requires careful decisions and deliberate diplomatic manoeuvres with regard to the importance and priority of those interests. As demonstrated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and introduction of the Treaty on Free Movement in 1979, migration was one of the most appropriate and effective ways it regarded to achieve those interests. For instance, its huge population needed to move freely in search of opportunities, its burgeoning

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manufacturing companies required expanded market to sell their products and flourish and leadership was important to be provided for keeping the age-long migration tradition of the regional peoples. That is why Nigeria has played a central role in the development of the regional migration policies, conventions and regulations. The cooperation promoted African unity, brotherliness, prosperity and people-to-people connection in West Africa and African Union (AU). However, Nigeria’s relations with the rest of the region were sometimes strained due to threats to national security, local economy as well as mass influx of illegal immigrants, xenophobic violence against its nationals and imposition of excessive trade taxes on Nigerian traders by host countries, among others. It was usual for Nigeria to respond arbitrarily to these threats and challenges through diplomatic moves, retaliation, deportation or expulsion and a few other measures. Therefore, it is important to examine a few of these developments. As Bojang (2018, 5) noted in his work on foreign policy in international relations, large countries with large population and resources such as the United States, China, India and Russia tend to be ready and willing to assume special and larger responsibilities in global affairs than the smaller ones like the Gambia, Benin and Brunei. With its strategic position, Nigeria has also taken advantage of its geography, size and population to influence its relations with West African states to initiate, manage and strengthen migration issues. Nigeria has been a destination for African migrants during the golden decade of the 1970s and early 1980s. During the oil boom, its currency (Naira) had more foreign exchange value than both the British pounds and the American dollars. The influx of African labour migrants that such financial and employment attractions engendered caused a lot of social, political and diplomatic problems for the country. The Ghanaians (largest group), Togolese, Nigeriens, Cameroonians and others took up jobs in cobbling, teaching, housework and so on, while some engaged in illicit trades such as prostitution and smuggling. Nigeria has also been a destination for other African nationals especially during the 1960s when it signed bilateral agreements with Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast (now Côte d’Ivoire), Benin, Guinea, Morocco, Niger and Togo. It exempted their citizens from visa requirements (Meyers, 2002, 46). Today, Nigeria has also become a destination for refugees from neighbouring Cameroon especially from its English-speaking region that is ravaged by secessionist violence. It is important to understand the key

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diplomatic processes Nigeria adopted to realize the regional migration objectives. Following the European Union-EU model, General Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration used ECOWAS, the regional bloc on economic cooperation and integration, to rally other West African leaders (Authority of Heads of State and Government) to adopt and sign the Treaty on Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment in Dakar, Senegal, on 29 May 1979. By this, the protocol became part of the ECOWAS Treaty and was registered with the African Union and the EU. It provided for removal of all bottlenecks and barriers placed on the peoples of the region (Community Citizens) by colonialism and national immigration bureaucracy. Such barriers as visa and documents requirements had impeded the movement of Community Citizens and thus its removal “make ECOWAS more meaningful to our people” (ECOWAS Annual Meeting, 1979). Only valid travel document and a health certificate are the main requirements to tender at the official entry points of member states. Though since the policy’s introduction, some supplementary protocols and improvement have been added, the freedom to move across the regional borders have gone to unleash the energy of the peoples to exploit socio-economic opportunities in the region. Today, Nigerians are ubiquitous across the region engaging in one activity or the other. Besides there are other African countries outside ECOWAS that can visit Nigeria without visa. These are Seychelles and Cameroon. From the above diplomacy, it could be thought through that as the main country of destination in the region, the Obasanjo administration had used the migration treaty to further realize its national goal to become the regional hegemony and achieve greater integration. Indeed, Nigeria had wanted to develop closer ties with the francophone West Africa, especially after Côte d’Ivoire and Benin sided with the rebels during the Nigeria Civil War (Daily Times, 1979, May 6). The country was willing to accept free labour migration in order to gain benefits in other issues (regional hegemony and trade). According to Eytan Meyers (2002), at the time ECOWAS was created, Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire were the wealthiest countries in the region with per capital GDP of $1000–1250 in comparison to $185–536 for others in 1980 and the main countries of destination for migration (Meyers, 45). The large economic gap would have contributed to the mass influx of both legal and illegal migrants to Nigeria and its violations of the Treaty in the 1980s. Thus adopting the free movement,

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one can opine that Nigeria had asserted its regional leadership and used the community as an expanded market for its industrial products. Likewise, Nigeria had demonstrated shrewd but controversial diplomacy through executive orders when it expelled over 2 million West African illegal migrants (mostly Ghanaians) in January 1983 and May 1985 (Meyers, 4), closed its borders and called for a postponement of the protocol’s second phase in 1985 (Babatunde, 2005), thereby placing unilateral conditions on the protocol’s implementation. That action contravened the spirit of ECOWAS Treaty. The way the government handled the deportations was criticized by the affected member states. The migrants were dumped on the border and pilgrim camps under shoddy conditions in Lagos. Benin closed its borders because the Nigerian government had not provided escorts as agreed to. Those who could not leave at the expiration of the (10 May 1985) deadline had to be delayed. They were eventually repatriated by ships after the migrants, mostly Ghanaians, protested at the immigration department’s offices at Alagbon in Lagos. Though one could assert that Nigeria violated the principles of the free movement, but about 35 years after, one could not completely blame the action of the federal government that was confronted with the declining oil prices and political crises at that period. Therefore, multilateral agreements can be sacrificed in the name of mass influx of migrants regardless their status and conditions. That was what both the Shehu Shagari and Muhammadu administrations did by the expulsion, border closure and indigenization policies. Also the expulsion and other related issues by Nigeria was a blatant example of a policy decision contravening the spirit of the regional economic community initiative. Many heads of state of ECOWAS member states denounced the Nigerian move as “contrary to the spirit of African hospitality and various international agreements” (Babatunde, 123). But the government’s actions could not have raised questions if its migration management, politics and internal security had not attracted criticisms and condemnation particularly from politicians. Such has been the nature and dynamics of migration issues in most parts of the world. The migrants were accused for engaging in criminal activities, prostitution, cross-border banditry, smuggling, trafficking and taking jobs from the locals. In addition, the way Nigeria implemented the protocol has raised sharp reactions from other Community Citizens. For example, the Nigerian immigration officials, the customs, police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, State Security Service, anti-trafficking agency, the quarantine and

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other law enforcement agencies have been reported to collect illegal fees without receipts at the borders and set up ubiquitous checkpoints. Community Citizens were sometimes harassed and maltreated. From the investigation carried out, it was found out that increased transport fares between Nigeria and other member states could be attributed to it. Free movement is a key part of economic integration. By the adoption of the regional multilateral cooperation on migration, Nigeria reinforced the historical ways of lives of its citizens and created an economic and political environment conducive to the growth and integration of African economies as a single regional market and customs union. The diplomatic relations suggest that real integration is all about people. People want to move freely and engage in legitimate business and seek opportunities in the contiguous countries. It was their belief that ECOWAS was established precisely for that purpose (IRIN News, 2005). In short, Nigeria has used migration to strengthen integration in Africa. Having cooperation on migration like Nigeria promoted helped to breakdown the boundaries of colonial separation and suspicions that had hindered free movement in the early post-independence West Africa. The ECOWAS model became an example for others in Africa. Salim Ahmed Salim, the one-time Secretary General of the Organization of Africa (now African Union), urged other regions in the continent “to emulate the ECOWAS given that in the final analysis, integration was about the people and not only goods and services” (PanaAfrican News Agency, 2000). He specifically praised the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of persons. Generalizing the above achievement, it is fair to comment that Nigeria was regarded as the regional mega state in terms of population, economy and gross domestic product (GDP). Therefore, pursuing free movement of persons, goods and services would only benefit its national interests at the expense of other member states. But migration could be inherently flawed and damage multilateralism if not effectively managed. One can posit that best relations can be soured or strained if large numbers of migrants flood into a particular place, like it was witnessed in Germany. There were streams of immigrants into Europe in 2016 fleeing violence in Africa and the Middle East. The tendency is that opposition politicians use it to campaign for election. In the Nigerian case, critics condemned the poor handling of the expulsion. Besides that the migrants suffered several days of waiting at the borders, there were reports of death. Many took to the streets in protest. The

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popular name Ghana Must Go for a bag which they packed their belongings has become a symbol of exclusion and intolerance. Recently, other African governments also adopted deportation to deal with Nigeria. There has been regular occurrence of Nigerian citizens being forcibly sent home from Ghana. In 2019 alone, more than 2000 Nigerians were deported for alleged prostitution and cybercrime. For instance, according to the government source, 994 Nigerians were deported and repatriated from Ghana in 2018 (The Guardian, 2019, July 19). As a result of this, the Chairman of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, Mrs Abike Dabiri-Erewa, cautioned that the continent would suffer should Nigeria treat other nationals in the same manner. According to her: It will not go down well on the continent if Nigeria decides to do what they do to Nigerians over there. We demand respect. If a Nigerian commits a crime, you should deal with that particular person rather than generalize issues by punishing those who are innocent of the crime. (Ibid.)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs often reacted to such treatments whenever they occurred to Nigerian nationals outside the country. It equally did on the deportation in Ghana through its spokesman, Mr George Edokpa, when he was quoted as saying: Although, it is the policy of the government not to condone any form of criminality on the part of Nigerians in any part of the World, such inhuman treatment and alleged torture of some of these Nigerians in Ghana is unacceptable. (MSN, 2019, February 23)

No country will condone threat to its security in the name of migration. In West Africa, as contained in the ECOWAS Protocol, free movement can be surrendered in the name of security. That is, for reason of internal security, public or morality, a member state could deem it necessary to close its borders to Community Citizens (ECOWAS Protocol, 34). As a member state with the strongest economy, Nigeria has witnessed a high rate of crimes, violent conflict and extremism as a result of mismanagement of borders and unwholesome relationship with neighbouring countries: smuggling, human trafficking, cross-border terrorism and banditry have threatened national security. Equally, Nigeria has also coped with the failure of some member states to fully cooperate with the spirit of the protocol, corruption and other forms of abuse by police and immigration

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officials as well as the limited powers of ECOWAS to assert itself. In 2002, the former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, had lamented over the challenges in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, saying, “[Y]es, in spite of the efforts of political leaders, in spite of agreements and protocols on free movement, we have these problems on the ground” (IRIN News, 2022). Accordingly, as evidenced by Nigeria’s implementation of the free movement and cross-border management, it can be argued that migration could be said to add new turn to challenges of nation building in the country. NIS and other border security agencies have been contending with these formidable challenges since its ratification of the protocol. The foreign ministry has also been involved in negotiation and mediation at the regional and continental levels to promote national security amidst migration. As the big brother in the region, it was not expected to fail or disappoint in accommodating fellow Africans and promoting brotherliness through free movement. Security has proved to be an albatross of Nigeria’s migration relations since independence. The Maitatsine’s riots of December 1985, led by a Cameroonian, Mallam Mohammed Marwa, and the 20% of the fanatics that participated in the riots were aliens from Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso (Aluko, 1985, 539). There have been constant expulsions undertaken by NIS due to the Boko Haram insurgency and widespread kidnapping. According to the army source, foreigners are among the terrorist folds. The discovered illegal aliens from Niger, Ghana, Cameroon and Mali have been sent back to their countries on the ground of insecurity. Xenophobia, molestation, harassment and torture have also defined the Nigerian relationship with fellow African countries, particularly in the contemporary times. For example, during the xenophobic attacks against Nigerians in South Africa, the government condemned the action, quizzed the South African High Commissioner in Nigeria and sent a plane to evacuate over 600 Nigerians in the country while taking some diplomatic initiatives to restore relations. Decisions and actions were taken to guide against future occurrence. In Ghana too, Nigeria has reacted to the way Nigerian traders have been having their shops locked since 2007 due to the traders’ inability to pay the imposed exorbitant taxes. A fresh tax of $1 million was introduced in December 2019 (AIT News, 2020, February 23). According to a former chairman of sub-section of Nigerian Union of Traders in Ghana, Ugwoke Ernest, while calling on the Nigerian government to intervene, said some of the traders were sometimes arrested and

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beaten. The Nigerian media outfit, African Independent Television (AIT), suggested the Ghanaian new move as retaliation to the border closure by Nigeria. Closure of borders as exemplified by Nigeria in the past (1983–1985, 2005) and in August 2019 till the time of reporting this study is evidence that the government was ready to discard or undermine multilateral agreements for the protection of its economy and national security. In what President Buhari termed “massive smuggling activities, especially of rice, taking place on that corridor,” which threatened the “self-sufficiency already attained due to his administration’s agricultural policies” (Punch, 2019, August 28). These kinds of actions might be termed as against Africa unity. The Nigerian authorities have heeded to the calls made by leaders of Benin, Ghana and Niger to reopen the borders. A committee was set up by ECOWAS to look into the issue of border closure. Trafficking and smuggling are also part of the migration issues that have influenced diplomatic relations of Nigeria with other countries. Trafficking in persons especially Nigerian girls to Europe and other places like Libya and Lebanon through the Saharan Desert have harmed relationships. Arms proliferation in the country as commonly been found by the customs and security agencies has been attributed to the unmanned borders. The Minister of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, in an interview with the press foreclosed the re-opening of the borders saying, “95 percent of arms and ammunition inflow to Boko Haram, kidnappers, killer herdsmen and bandits has gone down considerably” (Vanguard, 2019, November 26). He also said 296 illegal immigrants have been arrested. Economic and security challenges have been consistently challenging Nigeria’s relations with its neighbours. Through diplomatic channels, Nigeria engages with them to comply with the ECOWAS Protocol on Transit. But while at the continental level, the African Union (AU) did not evolve a free movement of Africans across the continent similar to ECOWAS; Nigeria had supported the multilateral initiatives in developing policies and frameworks including the promotion of migration governance in Africa. For example, as a critical member, Nigeria actively participated in the formulation and adoption of the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) in Banjul, the Gambia, in 2006. Ten years later, in 2016, the AU Commission revised the document based on the changing dynamics, trends and patterns of migration in the continent. Nigeria supported in the formulation of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa

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and Plan of Action (2018–2030) to guide member states in the management of migration in Africa (African Union). Its eight key pillars are migration governance, labour migration and education, diaspora engagement, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration and migration and trade. It is important to note that through its advocacy and facilitation of the coherent management of migration within the framework MPFA, AU requested member states to forge synergies with institutions that are working on the identified pillars. Though Nigeria and its other counterparts in the African Union have been unable to forge free movement of Africans in the continent, but with the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the introduction of the Nigeria Visa Policy 2020 by President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria is promoting African integration by introducing visas on arrival for short visits to Nigeria for holders of passports of AU countries. In addition, Nigeria cannot shut its wall against its neighbours for too long. It is hoped that the country would forge better relations with other African countries and work towards unity and development of the continent.

Nigeria’s Relations in International Migration For the most periods of its 60-year history, Nigeria’s external relations were based on reactive policy than proactive. Reactive policy emerges in response to a concern, problem or emergency that must be addressed (Torjman, 2005, 3). In other word, responding to events after they have happened. Thus, as earlier indicated in this chapter, the Nigerian migration dynamics have been fostered mainly by the different agencies saddled with migration responsibilities vis-à-vis the foreign ministry. It is worth to note that the dynamics of relations were not as coherent as witnessed in the multilateral approach of West African migration. As demonstrated, the military’s migration approach to relate with the rest of the world on migration was somehow different from the democratic government. For example, while the establishment of ECOWAS’s free movement protocol was under the military regime, the expulsion of migrants was made during the civilian administration. The above suggests that migration relations were advanced in accordance with the vision and goal of each political system. This could also explain why, to a large extent, the generality of the people was left with laissez-faire migration. That is, there was not much interference or follow

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up on what, how, why and where Nigerians moved or faring outside the country. Putting it succinctly, there were no systematic relations with Nigerians abroad and no credible data on migration. The study found out that the lack of data on Nigerian migration has been a handicap for its handling agencies to effectively and efficiently manage migration relations with the international community. For example, information that is needed on the number of its nationals abroad and where they are, the rate of inflow and outflow of migrants into the country, security status and a lot more are not only unavailable for the international community to use but also not existing for national policy and decision purposes. But the establishments of agencies like the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM) and National Boundary Commission at the advent of the democratic government in 1999 ushered in some level of active migration governance with the outside world. But understanding how the past wider trends and patterns have undergone is invaluable. Nigeria’s engagement in the global migration is a mixed experience. It is a source, transit and destination country for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. As a source, that is sending country, there has been a wide range of push factors that made its citizens to move outside the country, mostly for social and economic reasons. Poverty, ethno-religious and political violence have made many Nigerians emigrate outside the country. At the early post-independence to the late 1970s, Nigeria witnessed some of its citizens going overseas for more education and acquisition of expertise. While some returned, others stayed behind after the completion of their studies. Fortunately, there was the economic boom then in the 1970s and it ushered in labour migrants mostly from Asian countries of India and Pakistan while some British and other Europeans came to teach or work in the Nigerian hospitals and companies. At the same time, Nigeria was a transit nation for some travellers, migrants, traffickers and other categories of travellers who moved across the land, sea and air borders. One would have imagined the rate of the movement especially when its defunct national airline, Nigeria Airways, was in operation. West and Central Africans moved to different parts of the world in search of better opportunities and security. Nigeria has also provided camps at Oru in Ogun State for war refugees from Liberian and Sierra Leone. While majority had returned home, some are still around the

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camp and have integrated into local communities. It invoked the historical migration patterns of the regional groups crisscrossing the country even up to Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The table illustrates movements across Nigerian borders (Table 14.1). But from the mid-1980s, Nigeria began to witness mass exodus of its citizens to other countries of the world in search of greener pastures. Medical practitioners, educational professionals, engineers, sports men and women, students and a host of others were mostly emigrating in droves. Many reports viewed the main push to the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the inequitable trading policies pursued by the world’s most prosperous countries and Bretton Woods institutions that made life more difficult and shrank employment opportunities for the younger populations. Prospects in white-collar jobs, companies and other professional categories became very competitive and most times non-­ existent. The popular media campaign refrain, “No light, no water, men, I’m checking out”, by one Andrew (late actor Enebeli Elebuwa) on the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) during the Buhari military administration in 1984 that was designed to discourage willing youth from moving out did not reduce the pace of the emigration. Instead the exodus of people that left afterwards now has become the referral point for national development (Babatunde, 2009, 20). The countries of destination are Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Saudi

Table 14.1  Number of international travellers’ movement across all Nigeria borders Year

Nationality

Arrival

Departure

Total

2013

Nigerians Foreigners Nigerians Foreigners Nigerians Foreigners Nigerians Foreigners Nigerians Foreigners

1,578,715 956,081 1,247,424 505,704 2,401,383 874,546 1,209,897 612,604 1,245,595 556,500

1,760,530 861,240 1,361,580 372,712 2,640,508 960,426 1,181,211 478,413 1,344,318 568,855

3,339,245 1,817,321 2,609,004 878,416 5,041,891 1,834,972 2,391,108 1,091,017 2,589,913 1,125,355

2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (Immigration Statistics 2017) [National Bureau of Statistics April 2018, https://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/net_ migration_rate.html (accessed 19 February, 2020)]

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Arabia, United Arab Emirates and so on. Both regular and irregular means were sought to these destinations. Interestingly, it is the likes of Andrew that national agencies such as NIS, NCFRMI and NIDCOM are managing. In reflection, those who decided to emigrate are now the pride of Nigeria in the diaspora by seeking to tap their experiences, skills and knowledge. A good number of these Nigerians have become successful notable figures and professionals in their chosen fields. Besides sending billions of dollars as remittances home, they are sometimes part of the audiences of the Nigerian presidents and government officials each time they visit Nigerian communities abroad for investment campaign drives. As the media reported recently, among who was the CNN’s Global Public Square anchor, Fareed Zakaria, Nigerians in the diaspora remitted $28 billion that supported the informal sector (CNN, 2020, February 16). Since the Obasanjo democratic administration, some efforts have been demonstrated to connect more with these groups. As part of its mandate, the NIDCOM is to leverage national image as well as support and harness the diaspora’s potential for national development. Similarly, as a destination, labour migrants came to Nigeria from all over the world for work while some have since settled down in the country through naturalization. Most of these migrants were from the United States, Britain, Germany, India, Pakistan, Lebanon, China and Philippines. For example, some Lebanese migrants have lived in the country for as far back as the colonial era (some have naturalized). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the available figures indicate that the number of immigrants residing in Nigeria has more than doubled in recent decades, from 477,135  in 1991 to 971,450  in 2005 (NPC, 1991). The number of immigrants was expected to increase to 1.1 million in 2010 as given by the UNPD, 2009 (IOM). In absence of the current data, one would have assumed that the number of immigrants in the country would have increased hugely in view of the globalization effect. NIS has been saddled with the issuance of different categories of permit to these immigrants. Meanwhile, NIS is saddled with the responsibility of issuing forms to new arrivals to determine their place of origin, length of stay and so on. The study found out that there have been no reliable analyses on this kind of data to make an informed decision. The way and approach of immigration management particularly the NIS has also defined the international image of the country. For instance, both at the arrival and at the departure wings of the nation’s

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airport, immigrants formed their perspectives about the way Nigeria handled migration. While doing their legitimate work, it was not uncommon to hear the border officials requesting for “anything for the boys?” at the counters. Such practice does not augur well for a nation (Table 14.2). Furthermore, to promote good governance of labour migration, protect and promote migrant workers’ welfare and optimize the benefits of labour migration on development, while mitigating its adverse impact, Nigeria developed the Labour Migration Policy (2014). IOM and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Nigeria jointly supported its formulation. In the policy implementation, Nigeria was expected to facilitate reintegration of returning migrants, negotiate bilateral agreements with labour-sending countries, resolve Expatriate Quota abuses and violations of immigration laws of the country and link with the pool of expertise in Nigerian transnational communities. Unfortunately, the study was unable to gather data on the policy compliance. But expectedly, the labour migration has served as an engine of growth and development for both Nigeria and the source countries. In short, it rejuvenated the national workforce by adding capacity and resources.

Table 14.2  Nigeria immigration statistics, 2017 Visa on arrival issued Month

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total

Year

Year-on-year change (%)

2016

2017

521 558 598 695 693 769 873 974 1906 1023 1523 2304 12,437

608 896 730 968 848 794 1604 3732 1897 3841 2594 4108 22,620

16.70 60.57 22.07 39.28 22.37 3.25 83.73 283.16 (0.47) 275.46 70.32 78.30 81.88

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (Immigration Statistics 2017)

Month

2017

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total

1716 1121 1316 513 989 797 1474 1379 1539 1479 1799 1590 15,712

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The Nigerian government has also encouraged the return of victims of trafficking through the technical assistance of IOM and ILO (IOM). Thousands have been assisted to return. Libya was and is still the destination and transit for many Nigerians, most of whom were victims of traffickers and smugglers who subject them to inhuman treatment and modern-day slavery. Similar was the illegal and criminal activities of Nigerian migrants in host communities and which have added to the concern of government. Prostitution mainly in Italy, drug trafficking in Saudi Arabia and Asian countries and the Internet financial scam syndicates in the United States are a few examples of nefarious activities Nigerians perpetrate in host countries. Attending to or checking the negative image or embarrassment that some Nigerian migrants have caused the country and also the human rights violations committed against the migrants were another task for the national authorities like the foreign ministry, NIS, NIDCOM and so on in collaboration with some international organizations such as IOM to resolve, prevent or manage with the host countries. There have been periods in the Nigerian history that seemed most countries did not want to receive Nigerian migrants as a result of the crimes committed by a few individuals. Some of the fallouts are visa denial to genuine applicants or excessive security frisk at entry points. The tensions or disagreements such incidences generated were doused and the dynamics are constantly changing due to the global trends on migration, globalization and the activities of international criminal network (Tables 14.3 and 14.4). The changing pattern of migration up till this day suggests interesting and varied approaches to Nigeria’s external relations. Whether foreigners migrate to the country or transit, or Nigerian citizens emigrate to others, such movements unleash enormous challenges for the national migration management. The inability of the requisite agencies (NIS is already Table 14.3  Cases of irregular migrants (2017)

Types of irregular migration Number of Nigerians refused departure Number of Nigerians refused entry abroad Number of foreigners refused entry into Nigeria Number of foreigners repatriated Number of stowaways Total

31,672 2267 18,543 2646 66 55,194

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (Immigration Statistics 2017)

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Table 14.4  Migration control and compliance, 2017 Number of refugees received

284,400

Number of Nigerians refused departure Number of foreigners refused entry in Nigeria Number of Nigerians deported from different countries across the globe Number of Nigerian returnees profiled from across the globe Number of foreigners repatriated Number of Nigerians refused admission abroad Number of foreigners sought asylum in Nigeria Number of asylums granted Number of victims of human trafficking, child labour and smuggling of migrants (SOM) intercepted Number of cases of stowaways recorded Number of human traffickers arrested

31,672 18,543 16,387 4735 2646 2267 152 113 110 66 4

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (Immigration Statistics 2017)

overwhelmed) saddled with the responsibilities to mitigate these challenges was often behind the problems of information sharing and lack of coordination with Nigeria’s international partners. For example, the 2020 United States’ visa ban on certain immigrants was primarily as a result of the lack of information sharing. Nigeria is still negotiating with the United States to resolve the crisis. The past 60 years of Nigerian migration management with the international community has likewise witnessed a wide range of policy and capacity development on migration, reversing the brain drain, setting up of the NIDCOM as earlier mentioned, capacity building for the immigration and other migration-related agencies such as the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP), National Boundary Commission, National Population Commission, National Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and so on. IOM and other foreign agencies have been active in this regard. External assistance and support from international organizations have also come for Nigerians displaced as a result of terrorism and climate change-induced migration. For instance, the drying up of Lake Chad Basin has triggered migratory movement. According to the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Hajia Sadiya Umar Farouq, over 2 million people are displaced (TVC News, 2020, 21 February). This came through humanitarian assistance by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM and others. A few of the released Chibok girls

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Table 14.5 Nigeria migration profiles: global legal instruments related to international migrationi

347

Year ratified United Nations legal instruments 1960 1967 1968 1991 2009 2001 2001

1949 ILO Migration for Employment Convention 1951 Refugee Convention 1967 Refugee Protocol 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection

abducted by Boko Haram insurgents have been supported to migrate to the United States and Canada, while some are undergoing further studies (Table 14.5).

The Future of Nigeria’s Migration Relations Given the nature, dynamics and manifestations of the past 60  years of Nigerian migration policies and strategies with the outside world as well as the emerging trends in global migration, one can foretell a future of challenging outcomes for the country’s migration regime. The challenges that could manifest in a variety of ways would go a long way in defining its relations with the outside world. First, the rising anti-immigrant sentiment across the world does not portend well for the Nigerian prolific migrants. The United States’ visa ban on certain categories of Nigerian immigrants, the growth of right-wing nationalism in Europe, terrorism and others are some of the threats to international migration that would need more than what the migrants themselves can cope with. Therefore, it demands the Nigerian government’s unprecedented attention especially in immigration, security and development matters. The agony of Nigerians in Libya and Lebanon was an example. As earlier mentioned, the newly established NIDCOM is already engaging with foreign authorities to address the human rights violations of Nigerians abroad. The government should support the initiative of the commission to develop a database of Nigerians in the diaspora. The immigration authorities as well as the foreign ministry must be ready more than ever before to manage the diplomatic and political issues that might arise from

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the maltreatment of Nigerians. The success from this strategy will project Nigeria’s image in the world and the way its nationals are looked upon while travelling. Second, the newly introduced visa-free policy of the federal government would go a long way in defining its migration relations particularly with other African countries. Due to poor economy performance and internal security challenges, Nigeria is not likely to receive influx of economic migrants as witnessed in the 1980s; but with the new Nigeria Visa Policy (NVP 2020), launched by President Buhari, he said it was expected the country would attract “innovation, specialized skills and knowledge from abroad to complement locally available ones” (Pulse Nigeria, 2020, February 5). It would improve Foreign Direct Investment and tourism. The visa categories of the policy include Visa Free/Exemption, Short Stay, Temporary Residence and Permanent Resident, totalling 79 visa classes as compared to the previous one which had 6. All African travellers will be granted visas on arrival. In addition, the NVP is a global visa system with biometrics linked to each application online. Its features will reduce the chances of criminals beating the system. Also, according to the Minister of Interior, Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola, “[T]he new visa policy will be helpful to diaspora Nigerians by birth who can now use other to visit the country because some countries do not allow dual citizenship” (IOM, 2009). Third, on the push-and-pull factors of migration, Nigeria requires a higher degree of cooperation among the international community. This is because Nigerians would continue to migrate unless the government addresses the socio-economic, security and environment challenges that have pushed people to emigrate. The growing insecurity, arms proliferation, unemployment, climate change and poverty as the nation clocks 60 years of independence would likely increase the desperation of vulnerable youth and predatory smugglers to foment irregular migration. This may not augur well for the West African regional cooperation on free movement and international migration. The constant uncooperative attitude as a result of the political differences between the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries in the region must be effectively managed by Nigeria as its puts its house in order. Similarly, the government should through the various multilateral agreements with international governments and organizations protect the rights, freedom and social protection of Nigerians in their quest to integrate more with their host countries. Likewise other migrant workers in Nigeria should be entitled to the same treatment under the immigration

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laws. Also in the region, Nigeria and other ECOWAS member states should pursue the realization of the body’s goal to improve the social, economic and political conditions of their peoples. Their positive outcomes would check the mass movement of Community Citizens into the more prosperous states. Fourth is the current border closure and the seemingly reluctant attitude of the authorities to reopen it does not portend good omen for deeper and more successful multilateral cooperation with the rest of ECOWAS member states and the AfCFTA. Nigerian migrants have already been facing hatred, suspicions and threats in some African countries. The unfriendly trade tax ($1 m) imposed on Nigerian traders in Ghana allegedly in reaction to the Nigerian border closure is agitating feelings in Nigeria. The public is waiting to see how the government would adequately respond to the situation. Also the Nigerian government can cooperate with global technological companies for modern equipment to monitor the porous and lengthy borders. State and human security have been breached through the weak border management. Nigeria should through the AU reverse the brain drain from Africa to brain gain and support the continental integration to improve transport linkages among African countries. With the emerged trend on xenophobia in South Africa, one could not think the anti-Nigerian feelings would be overcome, but can be essentially managed. Therefore, Nigeria should seriously consider and follow up on the diplomatic effort of President Cyril Ramaphosa to restore relations in the aftermath of September 2019 violence. President Muhammadu Buhari’s visit to South Africa is a welcome one. Both governments would establish common ground by holding regular meetings to share common views and challenges. Fifth, from the global migration trend, the future belongs to technology. Nigeria should obtain modern technology to monitor the spread of contagious diseases such as coronavirus, since Nigerians are high travellers and the country receives large numbers of Chinese visitors. Traders, investors, tourists and other category of travellers should be carefully examined according to the global standards before they enter into the country. On migration governance, it would be a serious challenge for Nigeria to monitor and evaluate the progress it is making in the management of international migration except it deepens its collaboration with the IOM and other supporting organizations which have the expertise and reach to support. Being a multifaceted issue, migration needs concerted effort of all

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stakeholders and Nigeria must not be left out in managing emerging migration practices. Sixth, what could torment Nigeria’s relations with the international community on migration is when it failed to address the underlying causes of emigration such as corruption, marginalization, unemployment and violence. Similarly, if it does not cooperate to receive repatriated immigrants, share information on immigration as the United States has listed as one of the reasons for imposing visa ban as well as utilize modern technology to drive its migration management effectively and competently to engage with its counterparts outside the country. Lastly is the disruption that the COVID-19 pandemic has unleashed on travels and migration management around the world. Most nations especially in the advanced world are closing their borders and imposing drastic regulations on foreigners. Nigeria has to be strategic diplomatically in relating with the international community. The protection of its citizens’ welfare and security is important. Since Nigeria has in the last 60 years demonstrated propensity to sign international instruments relating to development issues, it should be fully aware of the obligations it assumed as well as the commitments that come with their implementation and assessment. Therefore, Nigeria should take full opportunities that migration offers in the development of economy.

Conclusion The chapter has attempted to analyse why and how migration was an ineluctable fact of Nigerian history and its external relations. Its peoples have demonstrated the trait over the ages and different governments, both military and civilian, have buttressed that way of life through their policies, decisions and actions within the international community. Since independence, Nigeria has promoted free movement in West Africa and supported relevant migration protocols and conventions within the frameworks of AU and other countries of the world as well as the international organization. From these diplomatic engagements, Nigeria has developed a comprehensive migration policy, supported its citizens who were trafficked or had their rights violated outside the country and currently trying to harness the potential of its nationals in the diaspora. But the migration world is rapidly changing especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. Hence the study shows that unless the Nigerian government strengthened its migration engagement and

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diplomacy with the world and scaled up internal mechanisms, harnessed diaspora role, tackled brain drain as well as reduced the risks associated with weak borders, it would be difficult to realize the nation’s vital interests and goals on migration. While it is hoped that the newly introduced Nigeria Visa Policy would ameliorate the socio-economic conditions of the people and improve the national security, achieving just that would depend on the pragmatism and commitment of the relevant bodies to update their migration management and reform their practices. As a source, transit and destination, Nigeria has a lot to benefit from effectively and efficiently managing migration policies and practices. It cannot afford to fail amidst the emerging trends in global migration and its aspiration to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. Consequently, Nigeria needs to deepen its external relations and understandings in order to maximize benefits that come with migration.

References African Union The Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action. (2018–2030). https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35956-­doc-­au-­ mpfa-­executive-­summary-­eng.pdf AIT News, 23 February 2020. Aluko, O. (1985). The expulsion of illegal aliens from Nigeria: A study in Nigeria’s decision-making. African Affairs, 84(337), 539–560. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/722327?seq=1 Asiwaju, A. I. (1985). Partitioned Africans: Ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries (1884–1984). C. Hurst & Company. Babatunde, O. A. (2005). An Appraisal of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons, 1979–2005. MA Dissertation, University of Ibadan. Babatunde, O. A. (2009). National security and migration: Towards an effective cross-border management in Nigeria. International Organization for Migration, Retrieved February 20, 2020, from https://publications.iom.int/ system/files/pdf/national_policy_labour_migration.pdf Bojang, A. S. (2018). The study of foreign policy in international relations. Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs, 6, 4. https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/330476527_The_Study_of_Foreign_Policy_in_International_ Relations Collins, J. O. (1985). Partitioned culture area and smuggling: The Hausa and the Groundnut trade across the Nigeria-Niger border from the mid-1930s to the mid-1970s. In A. I. Asiwaju (Ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic relations across Africa’s international boundaries (1884–1984) (pp.  198–199). C.  Hurst and Company.

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ECOWAS. (1979). An ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons. Ezirim, G.  E. (2010). Fifty years of Nigeria’s foreign policy: A critical review. ResearchGate, pp.  1–16. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/26857 5383_Fifty_Years_of_Nigeria%27s_Foreign_Policy_A_Critical_Review Fage, J.  D. (1955). Introduction to the history of West Africa. Cambridge University Press. Fareed, Z. (Presenter). (2020, February 16). Global public square. CNN [TV series episode]. Federal. (2019, November 26). Nigeria: Why land borders will remain closed-Govt. Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/11/why-­land-­bordersll-­ remain-­closed-­fg/ Gann, L. H., & Duignan, P. (1975). The pre-colonial economics of sub-Saharan Africa. In H. Gann & P. Duignan (Eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960: The economics of colonialism (Vol. 4). Cambridge University Press. Gasiokwu, M. O. U. (1998). ECOWAS: Problems of citizenship and free movement. Jos: Mono Expression Ltd. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 268575383_Fifty_Years_of_Nigeria%27s_Foreign_Policy_A_Critical_Review International Organization for Migration. https://iom.org IRIN News of 5th March 2005. www.irinnews.org Isiugo-Abanihe, U.  C. (2016). Migration in Nigeria: A country profile 2014. International Organization for Migration. Little, K. (1996). West African urbanization: A study of voluntary associations in social change. Cambridge Press. Mberu, B. U., & Pongou, R. (2010). Nigeria: Multiple forms of mobility in Africa’s demographic giant. Migration Policy Institute. Meyers, E. (1979, May 6). What does Nigeria Gain from ECOWAS? Daily Times, 2002. Meyers, E. (2002). Multilateral cooperation, integration and regimes: The case of international labour mobility. www.ccis.uscd.org/pubilcation MSN. (2019, February 23). Govt condemns deportation of 723 Nigerians from Ghana. https://www.msn.com/en-­xl/africa/top-­stories/govt-­condemns-­ deportation-­of-­723-­nigerians-­from-­ghana/ar-­BBTZ1Dp National Bureau of Statistics. (2018, April). https://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/net_migration_rate.html Nigeria Immigration Service. https://immigration.gov.ng/nis-­structure/ Nigeria National Policy on Labour Migration. (2014). https://publications.iom. int/system/files/pdf/national_policy_labour_migration.pdf. PanaAfrican News Agency. (2000, October 24). Paris, France. Pulse Nigeria. (2020, February 5). Nigeria’s new visa policy: Here is everything you need to know by Inemesit, U. https://www.pulse.ng/bi/lifestyle/nigerias-­new-­ visa-­policy-­heres-­everything-­you-­need-­to-­know/v20dtms

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Punch. (2019, August 28). Nigeria-Benin border closed to curb smuggling. https:// punchng.com/nigeria-­benin-­border-­closed-­to-­curb-­smuggling-­buhari/ Skinner, E. P. (1965). Labour migration among the Mossi of the Upper Volta. In H.  Kuper (Ed.), Urbanization and migration in West Africa. Cambridge University Press. Sundstrom, L. (1974). The exchange of pre-colonial tropical Africa. C.  Hurst and Company. The Guardian. (2019, July 19). 994 Nigerians deported from Ghana in 18 months – Abike Dabiri-Erewa. https://guardian.ng/news/994-­nigerians-­deported-­ from-­ghana-­in-­18-­months-­says-­dabiri-­erewa/ Torjman, S. (2005). What is policy? The Caledon Institute of social policy. Canada. https://maytree.com/wp-­content/uploads/544ENG.pdf Wallerstein, I. (1965). Migration in West Africa: The political perspective. In H.  Kuper (Ed.), Urbanization and migration in West Africa. Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 15

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and Diaspora Engagements: The Unharnessed Strategic Asset Sharkdam Wapmuk and Vincent Ibonye

Introduction International migration has played an important role in shaping various aspects of Nigeria’s political economy. Hence, most studies on the Nigerian diaspora have focused on the contributions of the diaspora to national development through remittances, attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI), and knowledge transfer. In this chapter, we examined the implications of the diaspora for Nigerian foreign policy. Emigrants are sometimes seen as potential actors or channels for the foreign policy goals of home country governments. In this regard, they are ‘bridges and antennae’ that could be harnessed for goals including foreign policy objectives of their

S. Wapmuk (*) Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] V. Ibonye Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_15

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home country states (Kuznetsov & Sabel, 2006). For instance, through meetings with MPs of Italian origin from around the world among other activities, Italy has constantly reached out to her expatriates and their descendants as a means of foreign policy. Technological advances open up new political opportunities, a type of simultaneity or ‘time-space compact’, in which actors can participate in politics that are symbolically rooted and referenced in a state, often an idealized homeland, while actually based in another. International cities like London, for example, act as important policy centers in places as diverse as Nigeria and many other places associated with immigrant or diaspora communities. From a group of Americans holding a fundraiser in London toward Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, to Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs or Diyanet’s financing the construction of a US $100 million mosque in Maryland, United States, even Ukrainian Canadian Congress’s lobby in Ottawa for increased official aid to Ukraine, the common thread is diaspora politics: transnational forms of political engagement that connect constituencies in one country with a real or imagined homeland elsewhere (Adamson, 2015). They affect how states govern their citizens and each other by creating transnational constituencies and political interests, as well as ambiguity between domestic and foreign policy by extension. The demise of Cold War was trailed by the concern of some analysts about the ability of states to create coherent national strategies in an increasingly interconnected world. As Samuel Huntington observed, national foreign policy could be affected by very narrow but sound diaspora interests. And in more recent times, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt illustrated in their book The Israeli Lobby just how interest groups in diaspora shape the formation of foreign policy. Pessimists of this idea expressed in the language of fears about ‘dual loyalties’ argue that diaspora politics distort national interests and intensify the likelihood of violent conflict, whereas optimists point to possible improvements in foreign policymaking through providing specialized knowledge to policymakers, strengthening public diplomacy and enhancing the ‘soft power’ of states. During the 1990s, for example, numerous Nigerian dissident groups operating in exile as agents of democratization in the West provided new foreign policy challenges for the military regimes. Since the 2000s, the Nigerian diaspora has continued to exert influence on Nigerian domestic policy, although its actual impact on democratization varies substantially, based on conditions in the country. In the era of globalization and the

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concomitant demands of both micro and macro integration and transnationalism, migrants are now regarded as international actors and how states respond to their transnational activities contribute to the ‘redefinition of the state’ (Levitt & Dehesa, 2003). The challenge posed for the foreign policy of various Albanian governments by large Albanian minorities in the Albanian near abroad helps to make this point tangible. In the last decade, diaspora mobilization has become of increasing interest to scholars and policymakers in the arena of transnational social movements, particularly demonstrable parallels between the mobilization of diasporas and transnational networks. In any case, from policymakers and global institutions looking to draw on the specialized knowledge and global networks of diaspora groups, to national government and politicians seeking the support of diaspora populations abroad in promoting policies and running for office, including armed insurgent groups seeking diaspora support as a means of securing external funding and legitimacy, a range of different actors invoke the ‘diaspora’ for its political usefulness. Indeed, invocation of the term diaspora can be a political act solely intended to exploit the political support of constituency to the extent that diasporas are ‘contested constituencies’, open to engagement and mobilization by many kinds of actors for different purposes and agendas. And political entrepreneurs in home states explicitly need major states and international organizations to endorse their potential foreign policy goals. In this regard, they have the incentive to heavily engage their diasporas. The point at issue is that the competition among different actors and organizations for the political loyalties of a certain diaspora group or seeking to represent them for particular purposes transforms diasporas already empowered by advanced globalization, new communication technologies, and increased travel and global economic integration into globalized constituencies capable of exerting transnational foreign policy pressures of their own—a point not lost on current diaspora populations of which 1.24 million hailed from Nigeria as at 2017 (United Nations, 2017). And judging from a 2018 survey by the Pew Research Centre showcasing willingness on the part of almost half of Nigerian adults to migrate abroad within five years, this figure has likely grown exponentially (Pew Research Center, 2018). What relevance does this large and growing diaspora have for Nigeria’s foreign policy? Can the diaspora be a strategic asset for the country, or might it actually become a constraint? While discussion of Nigerian government-diaspora relations and engagement initiatives is beyond the scope of this study, consistent with the thesis ‘The Method of Presentation

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Must Differ in Form from that of Enquiry’ (Marx, 1970), it reports a modest dialectical analysis of the independent mobilizations of the Nigerian diaspora in foreign policymaking in order to help provide hypotheses for subsequent studies.

Diaspora and the Transnationalism of Foreign Policy Even though Weiner (1993) had long submitted that international migration had expanded beyond the realms of concerns for humanitarian, labor market and social integration concerns, according to Hollifield (2000), it was in the late 1990s that international relations study began to acknowledge the dramatic effect that international migration can have on the foreign policy of states. The notion that a nation’s foreign policy goals are bound to be influenced by migration has been come to be fully realized by both home and origin countries in terms of their potential for great importance in their bilateral relations (Mitchell, 1989). As a result, migration debates relate to socioeconomic and political dimensions of migration bearing implications for intrastate relations in the international society. In recent years it has assumed prominence on the agenda of leaders and of many intergovernmental organizations, indeed becoming a significant issue of high politics. Given the importance of foreign policy to a country’s agenda, Gebe (2008) prescribes taking into account all the important actors on the international scene that affect the policymaking and implementation processes of countries. In this regard, the public narrative about the role of emigrants in building or sustaining foreign policy relations with emigrants’ host states, including political support among domestic constituencies that are ideologically committed to ethnic nationhood or socially linked to emigrant communities, has seen a range of different actors invoke the term ‘diaspora’ as a soft power asset. For example, states such as India, Nigeria, Turkey, and Morocco are increasingly setting up formal diaspora engagement programs to encourage remittances and investment to promote public diplomacy or even to help keep an eye on opposition movements in exile. Although definitions vary, diaspora is mostly associated with formations within the host country which contribute to consolidating the ease with which their communities can be politically mobilized, including the potential to influence political actors both at home and in their host state. While analysis of debates about the concept of the ‘diaspora’ is beyond the scope of this research, we adopt Adamson and Demetriou’s (2007) definition,

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which contextualizes the ‘diaspora’ in the era of globalization ‘as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to: (a) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (b) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links’ (Ragazzi, 2009). Yet we limit its interpretation to Anderson’s (1998) ‘long-distance nationalists’: ethnonational collectivities outside territories close to the homeland. Since diasporas often comprise diverse competing groups, ‘diaspora’ speaks to social collectivities and ‘diaspora entrepreneur’ refers to individual and institutional activists who make claims on behalf of their original homelands. That acknowledged, the intensification of diaspora communities’ activities increasingly adds a political component to the continual general expectation of diaspora members’ economic contributions to their home country. Regarding this, ‘diaspora diplomacy’ surmised as varied foreign policy strategies which primary aim to generate loyalty toward the home country and ultimately maximize it as political influence by propagating particular nationalistic narratives, including by means of specific practices such as organized cultural festivities or holding elections abroad. Helpful in grasping the soft power attributes of the diaspora, Joseph Nye proposed that the multilateral ways of cooperation among States, political actors and diaspora communities are more viable means to manage politics in an interdependent world. According to him, the foreign policy formulations of the countries in such an arrangement should emphasize more on the notion of soft power, rather than hard military force. The diaspora is one of several instruments of soft power like culture, education, and economy, and constitutes an economic, cultural, political, emotional, and social investment. Its significance is reflected in three areas—political lobbying, economic development, and knowledge transfer (Mohan, 2003). Its role as a credibility enhancing agent for economic actors back home and its economic contribution to the host country give enough space for political maneuvering to influence the policy decisions relating to their country of origin. The soft power credentials of diaspora are clearly visible in today’s world. Several countries like China and India are trying to lure their overseas population to contribute to the economy of the country of their origin (Stanzel, 2015). Although the role of the diaspora as a foreign policy

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instrument is relatively new and only gained momentum in the post-war era, diasporas have emerged as powerful entities that are acknowledged as a ‘soft power’ in the realm of foreign policy strategy. For instance, in the political sphere, the Jewish Diaspora has a strong grip over the United States and European Union in terms of shaping their strategic relationship with Israel. Hence, diasporas being transnational communities have become important non-state actors as well as deciding factors in international political and economic relations. Countries cannot afford to neglect the interest of diasporas which can contribute massively to economies through financial flows, in the form of remittances and foreign direct investment. In view of the above, it is worth noting that diaspora diplomacy has grown to the extent that government engagement with diasporas is associated with strengthening credibility of foreign policies when they are collaborated with, since deliberate collaboration with diasporan publics promotes informed policy and stronger ties with governments and publics abroad. Collaborative, deliberative, and inclusive engagement with diasporas is particularly relevant as governmental diplomatic actors grapple with increasingly diffuse, decentralized networks across government and the non-governmental and for-profit sectors. In order to bestride the networks of international diplomacy and diaspora, state departments and agencies employ global communication tools and cross-cultural communication processes. Establishing mutual trust and interests between government and diasporan actors through this collaborative framework of engagement, foreign policy practitioners have greater capacity to network transnationally with diasporas and shape policies and programs that are perceivably constructive for the home and host countries. Shared interests in the intrastate relations between the home and host countries are the primary sites for these engagements between these actors. These interests include immigration and transportation, among others. In the mutual trust-building experiences of collaborative engagement with diverse diasporas, dispute over unshared interests can also be mediated by jointly arriving at outcomes in advance. It goes without saying that modern diasporic publics, with extra-­ national life experiences, have unique perspectives on policy of the homeland and host state. Politically active diasporas can be employed to counter ‘marginalization of immigrant, minority, and ethnic communities, in terms of both societal inclusion and inclusion in the foreign policy process’ (Berns-McGowan, 2008). Political experiences and viewpoints among

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diasporas inform government efforts to articulate foreign policy in ways that resound favorably domestically and abroad. Recent times have seen increasing attention paid to the utility of diaspora diplomacy (Leonard et al., 2005; de Gouveia & Plumridge, 2005; Gilboa, 2008) in international relations because diasporas’ political perspectives provide context for shaping policy at home and negotiating it abroad. Moral co-­ responsibility among diasporas (i.e., the transnationally constitutive responsibility embodied in material performance) makes them change agents and critical stakeholders in foreign relations of governments, committed both to their host and to the origin countries. For example, governmental engagement with diasporas in the politics and programs of foreign policy can contribute to democratic pluralism and reduction of domestic ethnic-based tension, including overall socioeconomic progress in countries of origin (Shain, 1999; de Haas, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diasporic Transmobilization and Foreign Politics Political entrepreneurs in home states explicitly need major states and international organizations to endorse their potential foreign policy goals. It is expected they would have incentives to engage their diasporas heavily with peaceful lobbying states. In this context, diaspora foreign politics can be likened to that of transnational activists in some aspects. Scholars have highlighted that this broader form of transnational politics involves participation in meetings and discussions about politics of the homeland without actual travel (Lien, 2006). Research in these areas addresses transnational political exchanges and how much diasporas are territorialized, asserting that transnational diaspora politics can be reterritorialized in some aspects yet territorialized in others. Diaspora activists act as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ nested in social contexts (Tarrow, 2005). In this regard, the transnational nature of diaspora might be negatively related to political participation in origin countries (Barreto & Mun˜oz, 2003; Jones-Correa, 1998) because the conception of dual nationality often presents a dilemma when conflicts on foreign policy issues arise between their host states and home states. That is to say, they may form a global political movement around shared goals, but resort to ‘division of labour’ in segments of their network (Lyons & Mandaville, 2010). An example is Arab Americans and British Arabs who contend with long-term tensions between their host states and Middle Eastern countries of origin. They articulate their claims within a broader transnational context, but often organize their outreach

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work in individual localities (Nagel & Staeheli, 2010). Here, the concept of ‘positionality’ helps to contextualize diaspora embeddedness. Diaspora positionality describes diaspora entrepreneurs’ perceptions about the strength of their social positions derived from linkages to the host-land and homeland. The literature notes that transnational diaspora networks can be nested in both host-lands and homelands, but does not discuss how this occurs. Positionality addresses the fact that some diaspora entrepreneurs are more embedded in the context of the host-land than others. Also, some positions are more influential than others (Sheppard, 2002). Power is derived not only from material resources, but from the social position entrepreneurs perceive themselves as occupying in a transnational space linking host-land and homeland. Social positions can be in host-state networks, institutions of the original homeland and transnational migrant and other networks interlinked with it. More specifically, ‘social position’ captures objective measurements of education, income, occupational prestige, and race (Goldman et al., 2002); indicates an absolute position on strength between homeland vis-à-vis a host-land; and a ‘position’ in network analysis wherein positions of power are highly central or densely interconnected with other parts of the network, and measurements are objective in the capture of existing ties and relationships among nodes. It then becomes noteworthy to explain why and how diaspora entrepreneurs mobilize through different channels. Accordingly, diaspora mobilization can be conceptualized as claims and practices of diaspora entrepreneurs pursued primarily through state-based or transnational channels or both, that is a dual-pronged approach. Channeling claims through host-state institutions take place alongside what McAdam et al. (2001) call ‘contained contention’: using ‘well established means of claim making’ in occasional, public, and collective interactions with other claim-makers, often governments. Adapting these ideas to diaspora foreign politics, we consider that diaspora entrepreneurs use state-based channels when they engage with non-violent rhetoric, petitions, demonstrations, media and internet publications, and lobbying for policies and legislation to advance their claims. Pursuing claims through transnational channels is close to ‘transgressive contention’: sporadic, public and collective interactions in which at least some of the parties are newly identified political actors and employ innovative collective action, adopting means that are ‘either unprecedented or forbidden’ (McAdam et  al., 2001). Through this method, diaspora entrepreneurs use some moderate practices where they can engage with transnationally organized

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migrant and other networks, as well as international NGOs, and so on. Under the dual-pronged approach, diaspora entrepreneurs focus on both channels. They can use state-based channels to amend minor aspects of the host-state’s foreign policy and transnational channels to challenge the state peacefully or directly influence policy process in the homeland. Of importance to this study are traditional foreign policy narratives which claim that diaspora entrepreneurs mobilize foreign policy lobbying through state institutions, party systems, and trade unions. An old, politically unified, organizationally strong, partly assimilated diaspora, active in foreign policy issues and eager for alliances with other interest groups, is likely to lobby successfully (Rubenzer, 2008; Shain, 1999, 2002; Sheffer, 2003; Tololyan, 2000). Diaspora entrepreneurs can act on transnational opportunity structures (Adamson, 2013; Smith & Stares, 2007; Wayland, 2004), restructure issues during foreign policy lobbying (Adamson, 2013; Shain, 2002), and employ ‘transnational brokerage’ to connect smaller and larger networks (Adamson, 2013), including the internet to advance their political goals (Bernal, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Nagel & Staeheli, 2010). However, their ethnonational-based character displays distinctive tendencies and stronger ties to other kin and original homelands even when advocating for liberal values (Koinova, 2009; Kozlowski, 2005; Lyons & Mandaville, 2010; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Countries of origin can appeal to diasporas motivations for rousing national campaigns in foreign lands (Haegel & Peretz, 2005; Ragazzi, 2009; Varadarjan, 2010; Waterbury, 2010). European-based Muslim groups advocating political claims on behalf of a global Ummah and Sharia law exemplify this point (Adamson, 2013; Mandaville, 2007). These bonds are greatly facilitated by social exchanges in a ‘transnational social field’, wherein diasporas function beyond the nation-state (Appadurai, 1996; Basch et al., 1994; Faist, 2000; Glick-Schiller, 2001; Levitt, 2001; Vertovec, 2009). Hence, foreign policy and diaspora social position together explain why diaspora entrepreneurs engage with state-based and transnational channels of mobilization or both. Also, while foreign policymakers usually do not engage with radical diaspora elements, one should bear in mind that a diaspora is not monolithic and is constituted also of moderates. Hence, moderate diaspora entrepreneurs are likely to engage with lobbying. In recapitulation, studies on diasporic political influence have historically been sparse, with an upsurge in new research only noticeable in recent decades just as diasporas have become extremely more involved in the policy process contemporarily. Lahneman (2005) rightly observes that

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since the demise of the Cold War to the common trend toward multiculturalism and globalization, organized diasporas have grown exponentially into prominent players in the policy process. And while characteristics of diaspora mobilization vary extensively, they nevertheless have displayed the capacity to exert sufficiently focused, organized, and strong influence to constitute significant actors in international affairs (Lahneman, 2005). As Lahneman (2005) further submits, some politically active diasporas consist mostly of first- and second-generation migrants, while more durable diasporas transcend several generations to the extent that dynamics of assimilation by host countries hugely shape a diaspora’s durability. In another dimension, advances in ICT are a major facilitating factor for the increasing importance of diasporas as actors in international politics, especially its role in the transmission of ideas and ideologies and understanding the ideological motivations for diaspora behavior (Lahneman, 2005). Indeed, ICT advances deserve further examination in their importance to diaspora mobilization. On the whole, diaspora groups form lobbies to influence, for instance, US foreign policy in various ways which include, among others, framing issues for government attention, serving as a source of information on specific issues, and providing oversight for the policy process in addressing their concerns. Evidently, foreign policy is a dynamic process which is linked to transnational, non-state actors in the international system. And this requires the constant flow of socioeconomic, political, and institutional, among other forms of information associational to the contributions of the diasporas in both origin and host countries. In other words, immigration and emigration systems relative to the larger international system can influence the stability of states. All things considered, the foregoing discussion provides a framework for examining Nigeria’s external relations as it relates to diasporas’ activities, taking into consideration the historical, geopolitical, strategic, and the systemic dynamics that impact on the policy process.

Historicizing Contemporary Nigerian Diaspora Although a significant percentage of African migrants who have fled their countries of origin because of conflict or fear of political persecution since the 1960s could rightly be described as ‘refugees’, many Nigerians could hardly be and would better be called ‘economic migrants’ and politically induced migrants. Former Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe noted that more than 15 million Nigerians live in neighboring countries and across

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Africa, the United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and North America. The population of Nigerians in the United States alone is estimated at around 2 million (Campbell, 2013), while the United Kingdom has 2–3 million Nigerians (Maduekwe, 2010). As at 2017, they were 1.24 million migrants from Nigeria in the diaspora (United Nations, 2017). Added to a 2018 survey by the Pew Research Centre showcasing willingness on the part of almost half of Nigerian adults to migrate abroad within five years, this figure has likely grown exponentially (Pew Research Center, 2018). Several push-and-pull factors influenced Nigerian exodus after independence in 1960: severe economic crisis, accompanied by the collapse in crude oil prices in the 1980s; the sporadic emergence of autocratic and oppressive regimes and the associated political repression between 1966 and 1998; the economic difficulties caused by the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1980s; brain drain syndrome; the search for economic and social mobility by skilled workers from different areas; and the search for education and training opportunities by many young people after the destruction of the education systems are just some of the many factors that are forcing Nigerians to migrate. Historically, the introduction of the IMF/World Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which wiped out the middle class, led to widespread poverty and a massive outflux of professionals and eligible Nigerians in search of better opportunities. Thereafter, the cancelation of the 1993 presidential election plunged the country into a political crisis. The next administration of General Sanni Abacha saw more political turmoil. The killings of political opponents, extrajudicial arrests, the alleged destruction of opponents’ homes, and the extrajudicial killings led many Nigerians, especially several prominent democrats, to flee. According to Ajibewa and Akinrinade (2013), between 1993 and 1995, roughly 400 and 500 Nigerians applied for political asylum on a monthly basis. This is in contrast to the number 50 between 1990 and 1992 (Ajibewa & Akinrinade, 2013). While most of the people who moved in search of employment found themselves within the African continent, especially in Gabon, Botswana, and South Africa. Most of those looking for a better life have been found in countries outside the subcontinent, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. From a sample of Nigerians a survey was conducted from 2008 to 2010 to determine whether Nigerians would agree to leave the country permanently if they had the possibility: results showed that 44 percent would do so; 14 percent of which were planning

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on doing so in the next 12 months, and 40 percent said they would choose to relocate to the United States, 20 percent to the United Kingdom, and 8 percent to Saudi Arabia (OECD, 2012). Komolafe’s (2013) argument is confirmed by the fact that Nigerian immigrants move mainly to countries where they are more adaptable in understanding the language of the host country, getting a paid job and returning quickly, and reuniting with friends or acquaintances from their home country. For these reasons, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada are among the most popular destinations for Nigerian immigrants. The United States was the most popular destination for a percentage of 47.1 Nigerians overall, followed by the United Kingdom (33 percent), Italy (6.1 percent), Canada (3.9 percent), Ireland (3.1 percent), Netherlands (1.1 percent), Austria (1.0 percent), France (1.0 percent), and Australia (0.6 percent) (OECD, 2012).

Nigerian Diaspora and Foreign Policy Cuko and Traore (2011) argue that globalization has helped diaspora communities to flourish through increased ease of communications facilitated by the new technologies and efficient channeling of diaspora resources by transnational financial flows, as well as the emergence of heterogeneous social fabrics in most countries following the cultural reconfiguration of geopolitics. It is against this global context it is expected that actors outside national frontiers would increasingly act upon home issues, impacting on aspects of states’ decision-making and development (Cuko & Traore, 2011). So, what does all this transnational activity mean for the future of foreign politics? Observers of diaspora politics can be divided loosely into diaspora optimists and diaspora pessimists. Optimists view diaspora politics as ushering in an era of radical multiculturalism and acting as a cosmopolitan force for increased global understanding and integration. Pessimists see diasporas as contributing to a world characterized by growing fractionalization, conflict and violence, with rogue non-state actors claiming to represent groups while lacking political accountability. The answer may lie somewhere in the middle, with national governments around the world having to learn to accommodate the fact of permanent transnational constituencies that connect the domestic politics of different states. Bass and Riggio (2006) consider transformational diplomacy as an expansion of transactional diplomacy premised more on the ability of

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leaders to discuss among them what is required of them, specifying the conditions and benefits that accrue upon fulfilling this conditionality. To Burn (1978), transformational diplomacy refers to a style of leadership in which leaders and followers uplift one another through motivation and morality. Extrapolating, for this study, transformational diplomacy would refer policy programs that seek the involvement of Nigerians in the diaspora for the country’s development. This adaptation is informed by changes in international affairs wherein threats to national interest have grown beyond the competition among governments to encompass activities of newly empowered sub- and transnational actors, requiring a realignment of states’ departments overseas in protection of their varied interests (Grundleger, 2012). It is against this background that the statist parochialism of the traditional school has birthed the nascent school that takes into the psycho-­ cultural element of an individual’s citizenship which imposes on him or her certain responsibilities (Chandler, 2011). In the realm of international diplomacy, these responsibilities may be taken for the active participation of citizens in shaping foreign policy outcomes through mass opinion, that is how the public outlook stands with respect to foreign policy (Baum & Potter, 2008). As a participant in the process of external engagement, the individual is linked to both diplomacy and its consequence. Not only is this individual expected to engage in the making of foreign policy and its related diplomatic instruments, he/she is also the symbol of diplomacy. What arose from these theoretical orientations is the concept of ‘citizen diplomacy’, also referred to as new, unofficial, or unconventional diplomacy (Murray, 2008) that confers on the individual both the right and the responsibility to participate in the conduct of foreign relations (and also expect concrete returns/dividends). Arising from these practical delineations is the idea of citizen diplomats characterized by better access to diplomatic documents through the more transparent internet; involvement in foreign affairs through lobbying, contracting, and investing; including acting as ambassadors during foreign trips by communicating with high-­ ranking corporate and government leaders (Eastwood, 2007; Agbu, 2009; Shemesh, n.d.). In the practice of diplomacy, citizen diplomacy has now gone mainstream, although not as an alternative to the existing diplomatic machineries of the state but as complementary to them (Ogunsanwo, 2009). Noting Liu and Ren’s (2017) ‘dual embeddedness’: the involvement of immigrants in both the societies of origin and settlement where related activities are embedded in social relations and institutions, this

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chapter expands the interpretation of ‘citizen diplomacy’ because, beyond the solitary nation-state domain, present-day diasporas navigate transnationalism and integration in dual-embedded contexts. Today, perhaps more than ever before, diasporans are uniquely positioned to exert pressure on both host state and homeland governments for policy change. Placing diaspora as a component of Nigerian foreign policy, Akinterinwa (2017) argues that diaspora affairs fall under international relations, specifically private international law, and is considered important to the government’s foreign relations. In the last few years, Nigeria has joined the ranks of countries that developed administrative and diplomatic capacities to systematically establish their influence on, and communication channels with, their diaspora communities through its Diaspora Commission which was set up in 2019. Such institutionalization of ‘diaspora diplomacy’ highlights a wider trend and orientation of diaspora communities as important subjects of interest for foreign policy and related activities. Prior to that time, the government opened its doors to the increasingly economically significant Nigerian diaspora by helping to facilitate the establishment of the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) and the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS): both aimed at creating institutional frameworks for attracting Nigerians in the Diaspora to contribute to the nation’s development efforts. The relationship between Nigeria and its diaspora should not strictly be regarded as a one-way street in which the diaspora is encouraged to engage with the homeland and government, because they can also be leveraged to filter perceptions and influence pro-Nigerian policies from within their respective countries. The Nigerian diaspora buoyed by technological connectivity is to influence policymaking and advance external relations of the homeland. The negotiating power of the Nigerian diaspora can be maximized to counter the negative perceptions arising from geopolitical impacts on Nigeria, including acquiring strategic intelligence that will better serve the country in making policy decisions. Effective ‘diaspora diplomacy’ can contribute substantially to the discourse of how Nigeria shapes its foreign policy agenda. At this juncture, the need arises to address the question of whether this re-emergence translates into the diaspora having an effect on Nigeria’s foreign policy agenda. Considering the government’s position that the country’s foreign policy would be guided by the thrust of citizen diplomacy (Ogunsanwo, 2009; Oshewolo & Fayomi, 2020), there is a sense in which various segments of the Nigerian diaspora who were previously

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neglected by the country’s diplomacy contributed in realizing the policy thrust in question. As Dickson (2010) rightly points out, citizen diplomacy is a foreign policy thrust under which the Federal Government of Nigeria seeks to incorporate the participation of Nigerians abroad into its effort to develop the country. To help make this point more tangible, one of the philosophies Maduekwe (2009) identified as causal to Nigeria’s citizen diplomacy was how the voice of the average Nigerian citizen could be integrated in the articulation of foreign policy initiatives. These are prescient reflections because they not only depict what should be the ambit of citizen diplomacy in the Nigerian context but also are consistent with the rationale in the relevant literature. They drive home the point that citizens’ participation in (and supposed benefits from) diplomacy is fundamental. With the consistent failure of Nigerian diplomacy to provide adequate representation for citizens in the diaspora, the thinking stresses on how diplomacy would guarantee the participation of the average Nigerian in diaspora and, therefore, demands the deployment of the country’s diplomatic machinery to enhance the active involvement of its citizens in diplomacy. Whereas citizen diplomacy in foreign policy is conducted with the various lines of citizens’ affiliation in mind, Saliu (2010) argues that interpretations of citizen diplomacy by Nigerian promoters imparted the idea ‘the status of an enigma or an all in all kind of concept’ in foreign policy theorizing. The point at issue is that regarding how the diaspora would be practically involved, the failure of government to mobilize the needed resources and effectively capture the constituents identified particularly in terms of participation, contradicts the philosophy in the literature: citizens’ participation is as important as the returns accruing to them. In fact, greater emphasis was placed on how Nigeria’s foreign policy would improve the wellbeing of citizens at home and in the diaspora, at the expense of their active participation in formulating and implementing foreign policy. In short, this thrust of Nigeria’s international diplomacy suffered from amorphousness and poor clarification in outlining how the citizens would be practically engaged. Foreign Policy and Engagement with the Nigerian Diaspora Since the 1970s, the Nigerian government has made efforts to link up and engage with the Nigerian diaspora. For example, under the rule of General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976–1979), the government of Nigeria recognized

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the value of expatriates, particularly the Nigerian-American community, not only in promoting Nigeria’s bilateral relations with the United States, but also in promoting Nigeria’s foreign policy, particularly in support of Nigeria’s role in the anti-colonial struggle and the struggle against apartheid in Southern Africa. This is evidenced by the close working relationship with Andrew Young, the then-US Ambassador to Nigeria. The question of Nigeria maximizing its diverse skilled migrants for its development was not very successful under the administration of President Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983, neither during the military rule of General Muhammad Buhari from 1984 to 1985, nor the military rule of General Sani Abacha from 1993 to 1998. Nonetheless, the Nigerian diaspora was quite active in the struggle to return Nigeria to democratic rule. This was especially true during the military administration of General Sani Abacha when Nigerians abroad, under the aegis of the Nigerian Migrant Association of Nigerian Abroad (ANA), fought to bring the country back to democratic governance. Their labors contributed to the isolation of Nigeria from the international community. By 1985, under General Ibrahim Babangida, the issue of instrumentalizing the country’s diaspora was expanded from mere concerns to business and, in fact, to a goal and purpose with the articulation of numerous policy statements and policy initiatives. As observed by General Babangida, the Nigerian diaspora are regarded as ‘an extension of our own resources and as one people with us we have remained ever committed to developing stronger fraternal relations with them’ (Babangida, 1992). In this regard, a body of eminent Africans having some Nigerians based abroad in its membership was established to address the issue of reparation of Nigerian diaspora (Babangida, 1992). From May 1999 to 2007, the period of Nigeria’s return to civilian democratic rule under President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigerians were officially recognized as valuable stakeholders and partners in the development of the country, particularly in the manner Nigerians living abroad were engaged in this regard. This made room for the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) to be founded in 2001 as a global umbrella organization for all Nigerian diaspora, with branches in the United States, Europe, Russia, and Asia. Among the concrete results from the government-­diaspora interaction seen shortly during this period, a striking case was the 2002 decision that allowed Nigerians to obtain foreign citizenship without depriving them of Nigerian citizenship. Simply put, Nigerians living abroad availed the opportunity to obtain dual citizenship.

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In 2007, despite the disenchantment of Nigerian immigrants with the controversial 2007 presidential election and subsequent inauguration of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as president and the disreputable removal of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (a highly respected member of the Nigerian diaspora) as finance minister, among other disappointing outcomes, Nigerian-Canadian Professor Isa Odidi, who ran for president in the 2007 election and lost, managed to secure the right of immigrants to stand for election in Nigeria at the Supreme Court (Akwani, 2012). On February 27, 2013, Chatham House convened a joint meeting of the Nigerian National Assembly Committees on the 1999 Constitutional Review and the UK-based Nigerians, giving them the opportunity to contribute to the debate surrounding the process as well as the amendment (Chatham House, 2013). According to Rt. Hon. Emeka Ihedioha, then Deputy Speaker and Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on the Review of the Constitution, what greeted the announcement of People’s Public Sessions was memoranda from many interest groups such as the Central Association of Nigerians in United Kingdom (CANUK), the All Nigerian Nationals in Diaspora (ANNID), the Nigerian Diaspora Alumni Network (NIDAN), and the Students Association of Nigerians in Diaspora (SAND), among other NIDO-related and non-NIDO-related organizations (Ihedioha, 2013). In particular, the Nigerian diaspora has advocated the recognition of their voting rights. In the run-up to the 2015 General Elections, the diaspora asked the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Nigerian government to approve their participation as voters. At present, in spite of the best efforts of diaspora groups such as the Nigeria Diaspora Voting Council and the All-­ Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Nigeria (chaired by British MP of Nigerian descent, Kate Osamor), the issue of embracing the diaspora as voters continues to remain unaddressed coupled with the challenges of conducting elections and counting voters. The Nigerian diaspora has been engaging in skills and knowledge transfer as well as direct interventions through projects, advocacy, and the organization of programs in tertiary institutions as a result of collaborations between the National Universities Commission (NUC) and the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) (Wapmuk, 2021). Experts and academics of Nigerian descent have returned home to transfer knowledge in universities, as well as facilitated academic linkages and collaborations with academics and institutions in other parts of the world, through the Linkages with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora Scheme (LEADS),

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the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), and the African University of Science and Technology (AUST), among other Nigerian alumni associations in the diaspora (Wapmuk, 2021). With the signing of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission Establishment Bill in 2017, and the subsequent founding of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NIDCOM), greater input came into working with Nigerians in and out of the country to contribute human capital and material resources, as well as knowledge, to the country’s development. Then again, the Nigerian diaspora has increasingly been involved in facilitating diplomacy and resolving violent conflicts. For example, the efforts of British Nigerian relatives of victims of systemic violence by Fulani militias and Boko Haram led to the June 28, 2018, UK House of Lords debate titled ‘Escalating Systematic Violence in Nigeria—Fulani Militias and Boko Haram Threaten the Future of One of Africa’s Great Countries’, which focused on violent killings by militant Fulani herdsmen in parts of the Central and Middle Belt regions, and increasingly in the more southern regions of Nigeria, including abuses by Nigerian security forces alleged to have been involved in human rights violations (Hansard Parliament, 2018). This struggle has been taken to the international community by some diasporan Nigerians and members of the British House of Lords that jointly petitioned the President Buhari-led Federal Government at the International Criminal Court (ICC). In the petition titled ‘ICC Is Failing Nigeria: Act Against Genocide Now’, Lord David Alton MP and Baroness Caroline Cox MP, alongside some concerned diasporan Nigerians, accused the Buhari administration of, at the very least, docility over genocidal killings by Fulani herdsmen, terrorists, and bandits and, on the other hand, the ICC’s Madame Prosecutor of dragging her feet by conducting an endless ‘preliminary examination’ while genocide is perpetrated daily in Nigeria (Gabriel et al., 2020). As an early outcome of these events, the British government is reviewing the support and assistance it provides Nigeria. Presently, NIDCOM is the major platform for mobilizing the Nigerian diaspora and concomitant remittances for national development, while also ensuring that the government is accountable and responsible to its nationals living abroad. As a go-between for the government and the diaspora whose rights it strives to protect abroad, the Commission responded positively to xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa, welcoming 501 Nigerians back home in two separate batches on September 11, 2019, and September 18, 2019, in Lagos (Wapmuk & Akintola, 2021). They

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were profiled in order to receive the appropriate help and reintegration, including a soft loan from the Bank of Industry. In the middle of the COVID-19 confusion, NIDCOM vehemently criticized the treatment of Nigerians in China, particularly in Guangzhou. At the height of pandemic and related lockdowns, the Commission remained active online as a critical tool for connecting with Nigerians living overseas (Wapmuk & Akintola, 2021). In collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations, the Commission developed a platform where it coordinated the collection of data on Nigerians stranded overseas and facilitated the evacuation of nearly 9000 stranded Nigerians back home (Wapmuk & Akintola, 2021).

Select Constraints and Problems The belief has existed that newer generations of Nigerian immigrants headed for the United States, for instance, will turn out to be less politically involved in Nigeria and more fixated on wealth acquisition at the expense of catalyzing policy change. To elucidate, though the populations who migrate are largely uneducated they are not pedagogical. Acquiring an education is not on the front-burner for them; rather the aim is to secure employment, regardless of what of type of job might be available, for example driving a taxi. This picture starkly differs from what held among Nigerian migrants in the past. Acquiring an education was the particular reason why Nigerians left for abroad. And because they were educationally inclined, many of them graduated from high school and some proceeded to college. Most of the people who migrated did so to study, taking care to prearrange or sort out the institutions they wished to study at, including the duration of programs in question. While the plan in days of old was to graduate and return, most of the contemporary travelers abroad, in all frankness, are just people seeking to earn a livelihood. This is a completely different viewpoint, to the extent that present-day Nigerian diasporas have little care for gaining an education. Noted is the fact that many of the immigrants who returned to Nigeria after studying abroad in the 1960s and 1970s ultimately re-migrated to the United States on account of frustrations by the political turmoil in Nigeria at that time. The point of the foregoing discussion is that an original zeal to build the Nigerian state drove the earlier immigrants to become politically active or inclined in Nigeria and abroad. On the contrary, newer generations of

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Nigerian diaspora tend to be more interested in making a living for themselves. In this regard, Nneka Achapu—founder of AfriPAC, a non-partisan political group advocating for policies of empowerment for the Black diaspora and a former immigrant rights strategist at the Texas chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union—observes that an apathetic mindset is prevalent among the diaspora. According to her, ‘If you have come from a place where politicians are corrupt and don’t fulfill promises, you’re going to be apathetic to politics. Black immigrants come with the mindset of: I have to stack as much money as I can’ (Nwoye, 2020). Adding the point that US-based Nigerians are not politically strategic, Achapu states: We’re not politically inclined and we do not follow politics the way we’re supposed to like other cultures … in order for us to have an impact we have to have a seat at the table. Power is not given; it’s taken. Other groups have some kind of status, they’re able to get things fixed because they lobby. But [Nigerians] just say that is the law. Just the same way we fight for our money, the same hunger that makes us strive for success, should make us want to strive for political clout. (Nwoye, 2020)

For Achapu, compared to their Liberian counterparts, Nigerian diaspora groups in the United States are unskilled and inexperienced in political organizing and political advocacy. Regarding this, Nigeria got placed on the Trump administration’s travel/visa ban list, whereas Liberian diaspora groups instituted a class action lawsuit against Trump’s plan to cancel the ‘Deferred Enforced Departure’ status held by about 4000 US-based Liberians and, with the support of members of Congress of Liberian descent, succeeded in incorporating the provision in a $738 billion defense appropriation bill under ‘Other Matters’ that got signed into law on December 20, 2019 (Nwoye, 2020). Invariably, this granted the said Liberians a path to US citizenship via the green card process. However, putting forward a more nuanced position based on the politico-­situational realities in Nigeria which impede transnational participation of Nigerian diasporans in foreign policy processes, Bola Akinterinwa, former Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), argues that politicking by the country’s diasporic populations mirrors the political outlook of the Nigerian homeland. In his views: Nigerians in the Diaspora have not done enough because they have not been enabled to do enough, for no fault of theirs. They have not done

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enough because of the inclement political environment of Nigeria. Nigeria cannot be rightly said to be developing. It is more of under-developing than developing. Consequently, Nigerians in the Diaspora will still need to do more. (Oyebola & Salau, 2020)

Indeed, regarding the ‘need to do more’, there is opportunity for better political organizing by Nigerian diasporas for increased influence in the foreign policy arena, although it remains unclear whether, as a community, they are (actually) aware of their potential political power. For example, despite relative fallouts of instability in their homeland, Nigerian diasporas have failed to harness the array of resources available within their ranks to counter terrorism and compensate for capital flight owing to perceived vulnerability. In this regard, a study investigating correlations between terror incidents and remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa found that terrorism may precipitate increased financial inflows, alongside matching remittances that sometimes exceed FDI and foreign aid as a source of foreign income for many developing countries and, by extension, cutback on the root causes of terrorism (Ndzendze, 2020). As Nigeria struggles with transnational terrorism, its socioeconomic causes are increasingly looking resolvable by its diaspora—the subject of AU 2019, even considerable for institutionalization. Terrorism is a destructive force for Nigeria’s significant but uncertain benefits and gains in accelerated inter-continental mobility of (goods and) persons; hence the decommissioning of arms depends on policy decisions and confidence building as well as new social contracts between governments and their people even in the diaspora.

Concluding Reflections In the globalized world, all sorts of actors are rapidly embracing the role of the diaspora. Diaspora politics is nothing new, although it has gained a new level of influence. In the realm of foreign policy, the new era of international diaspora politics has been defined by the emergence of permanent transnational constituencies linking states and diasporas as contested constituencies possessing, in an inverse sense, potential power and influence from being courted by a wide range of actors, including governments around the world. This changes the diplomatic landscape in which states operate by creating more complex policy environments and political exchanges, thus challenging the traditional distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. The emergence of immigration politics creates

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challenges, but also opportunities. Most importantly, it is a structural feature of international diplomacy in the twenty-first century that policymakers must accept and adapt to. Against this backdrop, scholarship on foreign policy lobbying, migration integration regimes, and transnationalism is to come to terms with diaspora mobilization on the basis of foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality. Regarding this, the relatively weak position of the diaspora favors engagement with transnational channels, but does not predict engagement strictly through such channels. In fact, transnational engagement is not driven solely by lack of institutional access since a diaspora that draws support predominantly from the host state may still prioritize state-based channels, to the extent that transnational channeling can occur simultaneously. Basically, foreign policy stance and diaspora positionality are critical in a broader episode of diaspora mobilization toward developing countries, for example, in how they could be operationalized in the narratives of political entrepreneurs in varied contexts and, essentially, depict diaspora networks as both deterritorialized and embedded. This linkage or dual embeddedness of diaspora entrepreneurs not only redraws the boundaries of the state and nation, but bears different social weights and hence affects the capacities of diasporas to affect politics between/of host state and homeland. Taken together, the question of when diasporas act under state direction or independently arises. State-led actions are pursued through state-based and transnational channels. However, transnational channels offer a fertile ground for more independent acts and ‘grey area’ activism, where diaspora entrepreneurs overtly engage with civil society and other non-state actors to advocate particularistic claims and even radical agendas. In response to the challenges posed by globalization through official diplomatic channels, multiple actors including governments expanded the tracks by which they seek to influence other actors to incorporate diasporic activity also known as diaspora diplomacy—a trend of globalization largely defined by citizen diplomacy. Given the imperativeness of a diplomacy that is citizen-centered in the affairs of any nation, Nigeria refocused on citizen diplomacy in a bid to identify with the interests of its citizens both at home and abroad. Nigeria’s quest to follow the trend of globalization in Nigeria was constrained by problems of implementation. Not only is the thrust of citizen diplomacy to be better articulated, how the diaspora will be engaged in international diplomacy also needs to be clearly mapped out to be more programmatic in responding to the needs of Nigerians whether at home or abroad. Indeed, there is the need to address the hitherto

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abysmal clarification of our diplomacy to keep the diaspora adequately informed about the operational techniques, the potentialities, as well as the limitations. That said, the fact that Nigerian diaspora groups are growing in visibility in foreign politics is incontestable. However, their roles have tended to be more facilitative than causal, as depicted in instances of successful lobbying involving powerful interests abroad that were pushing for particular plans of action. Thus, while organized groups of Nigeria diaspora have helped push through certain policy agendas, they have not helped shape the agenda itself. So what does the somewhat unsettled, mostly facilitative role attributable to the most visible and perhaps most influential groups of the Nigerian diaspora suggest about the impact of the diaspora as a whole on Nigeria’s foreign policy? In short, though the continued presence of older diaspora communities and ongoing emigration to areas like North America and Europe, even East Asia, makes the Nigeria diaspora a growing presence in international politics, and potentially a political resource for the Nigerian state, their effect on shaping Nigeria’s foreign policy remains negligible. In the light of the above, perhaps the following responses and processes forming our conclusion could be incorporated by the both the Nigerian state and the Nigerian diaspora groups and so enhance their interventions in foreign policy. Nigeria’s foreign policy should be reviewed to capture the protection of the rights and the welfare of Nigerians at home and abroad, as a means to counteract diaspora apathy to the country’s external affairs. Once diasporan Nigerians are satisfied, they would begin to better serve as citizen diplomats and ambassadors of the country. Regarding this, there is a need to amend Section 19, Chapter 2, of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution to make it enforceable and justiciable. Nigeria’s foreign missions should be better funded to cater to the needs of Nigerian diasporas who contribute significantly to the Nigeria’s development; hence their voice should be accorded a pride of place in the country’s diplomacy. On the other hand, Nigerians in the diaspora will have to increase political or diplomatic pressure on host and home governments when necessary over issues concerning their homeland. Their success at lobbying, and so on would depend on (1) discreetly sourcing and working closely with influential Nigerian figures in the diaspora who are relevant to the achievement of the mapped-­ out goals; (2) establishing a think tank of Nigerians in the diaspora, with committees to work on specific areas of need such as terrorism, immigration, and so on; and (3) taking measures that will enable Nigerians in the diaspora to lay the foundation for the acquisition of economic power,

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translatable as political influence and hence become recognized political stakeholders in their respective host states. Of importance to Nigerians in the diaspora is to immediately secure training and educational opportunities, so that more of them gain the strategic knowledge for civic participation and acquiring political prestige. In sum, a consensus on foreign policy and the diaspora will continue to elude Nigeria because of the asymmetry between the pursuit of essentially conservative political orientation at home and the articulation of radical rhetoric for policies abroad. We can, therefore, conclude that one important foreign policy challenge for Nigeria is how to ensure that foreign policy truly serves the ends of its transnational populations.

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CHAPTER 16

Climate Change and Nigeria’s Foreign Relations Chinasa Agatha Ugwuanyi and Olayinka Sodik Kazeem

Introduction The basic understanding in the relations among states is that every country’s foreign policy should be in the service of its national interest. While foreign policy could be the guidelines on which state engages one another, the thrust of what we know as Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence in 1960 is linked to the vision of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first prime minister and Head of Government from October 1960 to January 1966 (Fawole, 2003). However, as a matter of historical analysis, Nigeria’s national interest, within the framework of its foreign policy, has gone through, what could be described as significant and basic alteration from the immediate post-colonial period to date, even when the core elements have remained largely the same—from a period of timid foreign policy approach in the first republic to a relatively influential and big brother role in Africa.

C. A. Ugwuanyi (*) • O. S. Kazeem Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_16

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Nigeria had made it clear through its leadership that Africa would occupy a central place in Nigeria’s worldview and policies, thus taken for itself the right to lead Africa before the African states had themselves given it the leadership it deserves. At its own expense, it must therefore prove itself. Nigeria could thus be said to have placed itself in an unenviable position, and it is its immediate neighbors who are the beneficiaries of this make-belief predicament. Nigeria is a “big brother”—sometimes regarded, but most times disregarded.The big brother mindset which Nigerian leaders arrogated to themselves is ascribed to Nigeria by accident of history more than of its own functional reality. It was Nigeria’s sheer size and weight in population that bestowed it this self-acclaimed status as leader in Africa. There is no doubt Nigeria had striven to earn the name, first by directly reaching out to its immediate neighbors, and then forging a union of all states of Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union, of which it sought to be the leader (Osita, 2010). Following its role as a regional leader, Nigeria was one of the founders of the African Union and has been the lynchpin of the Economic Community of West African States. It is also active in the United Nations system. In the past, Nigerian government contributed large numbers of troops to United Nations and other peacekeeping operations. Generally, Nigeria has long been a key player on issues of mutual concern in Africa, ranging from peacemaking to responding to epidemics. But Nigeria is currently under siege. Its security challenges include the issue of climate change, insurgency in the northeastern part of the country called Boko Haram, restiveness in the Niger Delta, and the heartland of Nigeria’s petroleum-based wealth, ethnic, and religious conflict. Taken together, these are some serious challenges to the continuation of Nigeria as a big brother in Africa. Already Nigeria plays a smaller role on the international stage than it did, so productively, in the past. Moreover, with its continent-wide influence in a host of areas, Nigeria’s success as a democracy is in the fundamental interest of its African neighbors and the international community. Nigeria’s present security challenges are related, directly or indirectly, to the consequences of climate change. Climate change is increasingly becoming a serious challenge to Nigeria’s socio-economic development. Various manifestations of its impact are evident in Nigeria, which include increased drought and food scarcity instigated by irregularities in rainfall, flooding, and desertification. Desertification is promoting economic and social instability in northern

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Nigeria. It already results in higher levels of impoverishment among herders and farmers, thereby providing an opening for radical movements. Since 1990, the Sahara has moved north and south by a total of about 150 miles, and now covers an additional 3750 square miles (Olayide et al., 2016). Each year, Nigeria loses thousands of acres of agricultural and grazing land to the advancing desert and periodic drought. According to the World Bank, average rainfall in Nigeria has decreased by 21 percent over the past five years. The implications of these challenges range from hunger and ill-health to migration (Olayide et al., 2016). However, the fundamental issues that confront Nigeria in the twenty-­ first century, with the deepening of securitization, globalization, and socio-economic landscape in the emergence of new powerful actors, are how to reconceptualize her national interest and provide the mechanism and strategy that will facilitate the pursuit of foreign policy to achieve its national objectives, especially given the pressing desire to transit from an underdeveloped economy to one of the most developed in the years to come and at the same time provide the means to ensure the security and way of life of its people. This effort requires that Nigeria employs its foreign policy to eliminate the serious deficits that impede the actualization of the status of a stable polity anchored on good governance, whose primary responsibility is the welfare and security of its citizens, both at home and abroad, that not only commands respect but whose citizens are respected and not denigrated everywhere (Osita, 2010). It has become imperative for scholars of international relations especially experts on foreign policy to ponder on how to tone down the impacts of these challenges. This is because the impacts of globalization in the daily lives of the states, as evident in long drawn-out state interconnectedness through increased global connectivity (Baylis, 2020), especially in communication, readily expose states to the myriad of these happenings at the international arena. Much as globalization has helped in bridging the gap between the developed countries and the less developed ones in such areas as removal of barriers in trades, information, and human mobility, with a view to mitigate the effect of climate change on the developing countries including Nigeria, it has failed in making these countries grasp development (Tooze, 1997).

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Climate Change Since the peak of public awareness in the early 1990s, the global environmental problem known as climate change has been developing and transforming rapidly in recent years. There is no gain saying the fact that man depends on his environment for existence and sustenance such that man’s life is shaped by his environment and this underscores the need for the protection of the environment from all forms of degradation, especially those brought about by the activities of man. Realizing the significance of the environment for survival of man, environmental experts have been arguing vociferously that without the environment man cannot exist since human activities are made possible by the existence of his environment. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined climate change as the change due to natural variability alongside human activity (Morgan & Dowlatabadi, 1996). The issue of survival of millions of people whose livelihood depends on the climate makes the issue of climate change one of the biggest threats facing humanity today. According to IPCC, the world must cut its carbon dioxide emissions to net zero by 2050 in order to prevent global warming of 1.5 °C, or likely more, above pre-industrial levels, and Nigeria in reassessing the focus of her foreign policy must play her role in the achievement of this goal (Ebhuoma & Simatele, 2019). In its 2019 seasonal rainfall prediction, the Nigeria Meteorological Agency noted that 2019 will be another hot year. It is important to note that 2018 was hotter than the preceding year; the trend is clear for all to see. The mean annual variability and trend of rainfall over Nigeria in the last six decades depicts several inter-annual fluctuations that have been responsible for dry and wet years or extreme climate events such as droughts and floods in many parts of the country (Igwe et al., 2019). Considering Nigeria’s dependency on oil and agriculture, desertification in the north and rising sea levels in the south, for example, have the potential to generate conflict. But also cautions that the political implications of climate change are still poorly understood (Al Jazeera, 2012). So far, successive administrations have responded weakly. Hence, we need solutions; we don’t have time. It’s now time for action and especially for those peoples who are getting impacted and who did not contribute to the climate change phenomenon. Nowadays, environmental issues are receiving attention at global levels and the global communities are continuously making efforts toward ensuring that the world is a better place for human

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habitation. Of note in this regard is the CNN Television News Report (CNN, 2016) showcasing the signing of Paris Climate Change Agreement by both the United States and China which sought to cut carbon emissions by half within the next fifteen years. This endorsement is significant because the United States and China are said to account for about 40 percent global carbon emissions (Mulligan, 2017). Undoubtedly, the world continues to be under the threat of climate change problems like global warming, greenhouse gas effects, flooding, rising sea levels, rising sea temperatures resulting in depletion of marine organisms, earthquakes, wind storms, land and mud slides, desertification, tsunami, erosion, volcanic activities, hurricanes, pollution, and deforestation, among several others. Climate change is principally a major problem caused by the increase of human activities leading to several direct and indirect impacts on health. These climatic changes have a wide range of harmful effects including increase in heat-related mortality, dehydration, spread of infectious diseases, malnutrition, damage to public health infrastructure, and migration of both man and animals, among others. Nigeria like other countries of the world has its own experience of climate change disasters like the one that struck 25 years ago in the northeastern region presently comprising Borno, Yobe states and the southern part of Lake Chad—the section of it that lies inside Nigerian territory dried up. Some four decades ago, the Lake covered an area of over 40,000 square kilometers, whereas it now encompasses a mere 1300 square kilometers (Al Jazeera, 2012). While the negative trend continues unabated and land is laid to waste by the rising temperature leading to the rapid southward expansion of the Sahara Desert, farmlands and surrounding villages become barren and are swallowed up by the advancing desertification, leading to massive migration of people in search of more fertile terrain from the north east toward the greener plateau and middle belt regions. Growing desertification forced thousands of Fulani herdsmen to move to the south and middle belt, leading to clashes with crop farmers and culminating in death of hundreds (Al Jazeera, 2012). Nigeria’s Guinea Savannah region is not spared either. Logging and over dependence on firewood for cooking have stripped a greater part of this area of its vegetative cover. This situation is similarly replicated in the south, where the forest around Oyo has long been reduced to grassland. The south-eastern part of the country has been struck by a different ill. There, gully erosion has devastated many settlement areas and farmlands, leading to poverty among the local populace. And, it doesn’t stop there.

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Just as desertification is devastating vast areas of the north, rising sea levels are threatening Nigeria’s coastal regions. Although a source of Nigeria’s oil wealth, the Niger Delta’s low-lying terrain and crisscross of waterways makes it extremely vulnerable to flooding; apart from being at the risk of rising sea level, it has fallen victim of extreme oil pollution. In southern Nigeria, climate change is also reflected in the massive flood experienced in 2012 (Al Jazeera, 2012), where houses, farms, farm products, properties, and even human beings were swept away. Negligence and failure to tackle the issue of climate change by successive governments have also contributed to the rise of insurgency groups across the country. Against this backdrop, if appropriate, preventive action is not taken and adaptation measures are not implemented on time, the results could be catastrophic. No doubt, the need to preserve, protect, and promote the environment constitutes a headache to many nations and dominates discussions and activities of governments and non-governmental organizations across the globe. This is because the nature and prospects of the future are determined by the safety of the environment and this fact has increased the need for a healthy and functional plan to preserve and protect the environment (BBC, 2016).

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization: Unilateralism and Multilateralism Foreign policy is a set of political goals, which explains when, what, and how interactions between a country and other actors such as national governments, multinational corporations, and international organizations should be. The making of foreign policy is the business of the government; hence, the primary responsibility of a country is to cater for its citizens. Therefore, foreign policy is designed to cater for national interests that include provision of buoyant economy, protection of ideological goals, and security. So, foreign policy in an era of globalization should understand these challenges. The processes of social relations acquire relatively less distance and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place. It can be argued that social relations among countries and other actors such as international and supra-national organizations should become a sort of multilateral diplomacy for the reason that countries have to come together to address common problems such as climate change. Ironically, multilateralism in an era

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of globalization has led to the states becoming more individualistic. This is because multilateral actions are informed by the peculiarities of individual countries’ national interests. It is this that explains what foreign policy is. Haas (2002) hinges the successfulness of foreign policy on the understanding of the particular challenges of the day. Globalization, which should make multilateralism possible, has, in its stead, replaced it with unilateralism, in which national governments pursue policies/actions on purely selfish considerations. For example, multilateralism could have prevented the seemingly crisis between America and Iran, if only the United Nations could exert its influence as a supra-national organization in persuading the United States from taking a unilateral decision of killing its military leader over a protest on its embassy. The implication of this is that multilateralism has been downplayed while unilateralism has been uplifted in addressing the challenges posed by the impacts of globalization. It is in responding to these phenomena that Nigeria should pursue its external relations within the purview of its domestic challenges. The less emphasis on territory denotes the borderless intrinsic value of globalization. Globalization has made countries of the world relate in a way that makes territorial sovereignty to be attracted with little or no importance. The establishment of military base in Nigeria dubbed African Command (AFRICOM) is an elongation of domestic policy of the United States in protecting its national interests. This dynamism of events therefore makes it imperative for a developing country such as Nigeria to refocus its foreign policy in such a way that it is capable of meeting these challenges posed by globalization. This is because happenings at the international arena such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and climate change phenomenon have wider implications for Nigeria. So, Nigerian foreign policy is as good or bad as its capability to meet these challenges. Formulating a good counteractive foreign policy is therefore contingent upon how those experts, bureaucrats, ministries, and agencies that are statutorily responsible for the formulation of foreign policy are able to articulate the issues before them adequately and consequently put up a comprehensive foreign policy, taking into consideration the multifarious nature of the events that shape them. However, the anarchic nature of international politics, that is, lack of government to oversee its administration, has meant that states have to seek for protection by themselves. Abati (1999) concurs with the necessity for Nigeria’s foreign policy to reflect the global dynamism as exhibited by globalization. He puts it markedly that we must abandon this tunnel vision

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about Africa being Nigeria’s main concern and define relations in terms of gains and interests. We must seek a connection between domestic policy and foreign policy. This becomes imperative as the states in an era of globalization have to come to terms with the reality that the national interest of the countries within the present context of globalization should be determined not only by the domestic problems of the individual countries, but also in relation to the happenings in the international arena. Again, the importance of foreign policy of any state is anchored on its national interest; this means that the citizens should benefit from the foreign policy formulation. It is on this premise that Nigeria should approach its relations with others—national actors, transnational actors, international organizations, and so on. Consequently, Nigeria should begin to approach its foreign policy with the dictates of globalization. In a globalized world, denationalization has taken over nationalization. This means that power hitherto held by states has been transferred to supra-national bodies/ international organization. Jessop (2017) talks about the spectacular change in the power of the state at the national scale as brought about by the impact of globalization. So, individual states have to fend for themselves. Jessop talks about denationalization of statehood thus: [T]his involves the transfer of power previously located at the national territorial level upwards to supra-regional or international bodies, down-wards to regional or local states, or outwards to relatively autonomous cross-­ national alliances among local, metropolitan or regional states with potentially complementary interests. In addition, new state powers have been allocated to states other than the nations. This re-allocation of specific state powers weakens national states qua mutually exclusive, formally sovereign, spatially segmented instantiations of the modern inter-state system. (Jessop, 2017)

There is need for Nigeria to recognize the political configuration of international system. Arguably, the unipolarity of the international system in favor of the hegemonic power of the United States has made the domination of the system by the United States very possible by the aid of globalization. In the current dispensation, there has been a quite controversial stand of the United States on climate change, particularly with the Donald Trump Presidency. Donald J. Trump became the president of the United States on January 20, 2017, and all through his campaign till his election and eventual inauguration as president of America, Donald Trump has not

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hidden his disapproval of various environmental/climate change agreements of past U.S. administrations. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump campaigned on a pledge to roll back government regulations and within days of assuming the presidency, he started by implementing what he called the “America First Energy Plan” (Konisky & Woods, 2018), which was meant to loosen regulations that stifle U.S. businesses and energy outputs. He also signed executive orders and called for more drilling and opening of land for energy development. A 2018 analysis reported that the Trump administration’s excessive rollbacks and proposed reversals of environmental laws would cost the United States as much as 80,000 lives and can lead to respiratory problems for about 1 million people. In flagrant disregard to this and many other warnings, Trump had pulled the United States out of the Paris Climate Change Accord (Konisky & Woods, 2018). Indeed, Trump and many of his cabinet appointees are oblivious of the fact that carbon dioxide is a primary contributor to global warming. In fact, Trump acknowledges that he has read articles, studies, and numerous write-ups about climate change and its impacts but he does not believe them. During his campaign, Trump was of the view that global warming and cooling is a natural process and as such he often described global warming as a hoax designed by the Chinese government as a plot to sabotage American manufacturing businesses (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). He even promised to roll back Obama’s Climate Action Plan, and stop all U.S. payments toward United Nations Warming Programme (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). In April 2017, a group of 20 members of the European Parliament from the right-wing Alternative for Germany, UK Independence Party, and other parties sent a letter to Trump urging him to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (BBC, 2012). On May 25, 2017, 22 Republican senators, including Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, sent a two-page letter to Trump urging him to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement. The letter was drafted by Senator John Barrasso, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, and Senator Jim Inhofe, known for his longtime climate change denial. Most of the signatories to the letter were elected from states reliant on the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas); the group of 22 senators had collectively received more than $10 million (Geri & McNabb, 2017) in campaign contributions from fossil fuels companies in the previous three election cycles. Earlier the same week, a group of 40 Democratic senators sent Trump a letter urging him to keep America in the Paris Agreement,

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writing that “a withdrawal would hurt America’s credibility and influence on the world stage” (Geri & McNabb, 2017). Within this context, countries have to recognize the fact that the United States has become the basic reference or source of international actions. The dwindling nature of the regional organizations, international organizations, and supra-national organizations in military, economic, and political roles has assisted the hegemonic ascendance of the United States. For example, the dwindling nature of the United Nations has strengthened the unipolarity of the international system in favor of the United States, even though such unipolarity has not translated into securing the international order. The present configuration of the international arena has been a tailback to Nigeria in getting assistance. For example, when composition of the international system was bi-polar, sources of assistance were many with each source trying to make essence of its aid and ironically controlling the minds and resources of the recipients, since politics, according to Tijani (2018) seeks to control the minds and resources of men and nations. This is the reality that globalization has ironically brought to us. The foreign policy of any country in an era of globalization should be the one that sees globalization as an indispensable determining variable in its formulation. This is imperative more so that globalization spreads inequalities and creates unequal relationships. Thus, it is necessary for states to relate within the context of globalization when formulating policy solution that has wider implications on issues such as climate change.

Globalization and Climate Change The attainment of the period of globalization affects climate negatively by promoting global production and international trade. A predominant factor in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is its direct relation to world gross domestic product not only in manufacturing but also in industrial agriculture and transportation. The role of global production if quantifies and its linkages to technology in generating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions that are mainly responsible for climate change has made it clear that there is an urgent need to restrain the level of economic activity and the resulting generation of pollution and other waste products (Energy, 2014). Although, industrialization has always seemed to be the key to wealth and better living, but in reality it has been shown that, although it leads to better conditions of living, it affects our environment and ultimately

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contributes to climate change. Industrialization not only involves technological innovations but also involves economic and social transformation of the human society. With industrialization come opportunities as well as challenges. The challenges include coping with higher temperatures, more extreme weather conditions, changing human lifestyles, and changing philosophies. Due to these challenges, industrialization must take into account climate change and its consequences; for example, changing human lifestyles and philosophies have major impact on our environment and this has to be considered. The concept of industrialization has been described as the process of transformational change of the human society socially and economically from an agrarian society into an industrial one (O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003). It generally involves technological innovations and is part of a wider modernization process, where social change and economic development are closely related with these technological innovations. According to O’Sullivan and Sheffrin (2003), industrialization is the extensive organization of an economy for the purpose of manufacturing. Manufacturing has always involved large-scale usage of energy and alteration of natural systems from their pristine states. It has further been stated that industrialization introduces a form of philosophical change where people obtain a different attitude toward their perception of nature, and a sociological process of ubiquitous rationalization (Chigbo, 2011). From the above statements, it could be said that industrialization involves mainly technological innovations, economic and social transformation. It is thus necessary that climate change can be described as the persistent change in the weather pattern engendered by anthropogenic activities. One of the major drivers of climate change is the global warming. According to Shah et al. (2005) put simply, global warming and climate change refer to an increase in average global temperatures. The causes of climate change have been a serious subject of international debates. There is a consensus that the climate is changing but there has not been an agreement as to the causes. Both natural events and human activities are believed to be contributing to an increase in average global temperature. There has not been an agreement as to whether humans are the chief culprits or not but one thing has been shown to be certain—human have some effect on the global climate and heightened human action has contributed to the alteration of the face of the earth. Global warming has been generally agreed to be caused primarily by the emission of GHGs (such as carbon dioxide [CO2], methane (CH4),

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and nitrous oxide [N2O]), chlorofluorocarbons, and other chemicals into the atmosphere (Morofsky, 2007). The accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere results in heightened “greenhouse effect” (Morofsky, 2007), which leads to global warming with local temperature, humidity, wind speed, precipitation, soil moisture, and sea level anomalies; it has also been recorded to have led to global cooling in some previous era (Baldasano & Soriano, 2000). On the other hand, an increase in aerosols in the atmosphere, also due to industrial emissions, cools the earth through a reflection of solar radiation back into space (Nordell, 2007). The greenhouse effect is a natural effect which helps prevent excessive loss of heat from the earth’s surface. Without that effect, the earth would have been a lot colder and might have been less habitable for humans, animals, and plants. It has been postulated that the earth’s surface would have been about 33 °C colder than it currently is (Evliya, 2007). However, if the greenhouse effect becomes stronger, then more heat gets trapped than needed, and the earth might again become less habitable. This is where the effects of industrialization key into the climate change equation. Increase in the greenhouse effect and the devastation of the earth surface have been shown to be as a result of human activities. The human activities mentioned here are linked to human efforts toward industrialization. Since keeping of records began, it has been observed that global temperatures actually fluctuate from year to year, but then a trend has been observed in it. The trend is clearly upward. A global rise in temperature has been recorded since then. An estimated increase in temperature during the past century was between 0.4 °C and 0.8 °C (Chigbo, 2011), with the ten warmest years occurring within the last fifteen years (Energy, 2014). In historic terms, this is a large increase in global mean temperature. Although it is uncertain how much of this warming can be attributed to greenhouse gases, there is evidence that human activities are causing an enhanced greenhouse effect or global warming. According to Press et al. (2008), “An international panel of scientists appointed by the United Nations reported in 1995 that part of the global warming of 0.5 °C that occurred in the twentieth century was due to human activity”. Following this, heightened human activities have been shown to have led to an increase in global temperatures causing climate change. The human activities in question have been the human’s bid to improve its lot by making use of the available and abundant natural resources and processing them into products which will improve the quality of life and standard of living. Incidentally, in doing this, humans have altered the balance

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of nature and triggered off a near calamitous situation on earth. In the past two centuries, human activities took a different turn toward the use of machines and the mechanization of processes which were erstwhile performed by hand. The result was technological innovations, rapid transformation of economies, territorial expansions, unprecedented population growth, emergence of urban areas, transformation of the global social system, and so on. That was the beginning of the industrial revolution. The accumulation of capital allowed investments to be made in the conception and application of new technologies, enabling the industrialization process to continue to evolve (Nordell, 2007). Systems which burned carbon-based fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—proliferated, leading to further need to prospect for such fuels to power those systems. However, since the industrial revolution, humans have tremendously increased the rate of alteration of the climate and the environment through changing agricultural and industrial practices. The population growth which accompanied the industrial revolution worsened the matter because more agricultural lands and development of new cities (urbanization) were needed leading to massive deforestation and changing of the environment. This population explosion also meant more people burning fossil fuels to satisfy their energy requirements. About 98 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, 24 percent of methane gas emissions, and 18 percent of nitrous oxide emissions (Nordell, 2007) are due to fossil fuels burned to run cars and trucks, heat homes and businesses, and power factories. But quite a significant share of emissions is due to increased agriculture, deforestation, landfills, industrial productions, and mining. The effects of the emissions are not restricted to only those nations which emit them, but are extended to even the unindustrialized nations like Nigeria. So, the effects of industrialization of the western world are felt as far as in the developing world of Africa and Asia. These effects could be described in terms of opportunities and challenges. The opportunities that arise from industrialization are well known, for example economic transformation which results to better amenities, improved standard of living, accumulation of capital, and so on. The challenges include coping with higher temperatures, more extreme weather conditions, ecosystem impacts, rising sea levels, increasing ocean acidification, changing human lifestyles, and changing philosophies. Economic transformation involves the exploitation of natural resources. This exploitation affects the environment; for example, mining has been linked to instability of the earth surface as well as emission of the

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obnoxious gases, leading to climate change and environmental changes. With industrialization obviously comes urbanization. This is the rising of settlements which evolve into large towns to serve and house factory workers. With such developments, businesses grow and thrive in such places leading to population growth. This results in large movement of human beings and resources. People living in the surrounding areas have to leave their family in order to come to work in the towns and cities where the industries are found. The nature of that economic environment eventually introduces changes in the behaviors of the residents of that urban area. Changing human lifestyles and philosophies have major impact on our environment. Industrialization widens the gaps in different classes of people in the society and leads to changes in lifestyles; for example, in the United Kingdom, with mechanization, productivity was boosted and incomes increased. This formed a class of industrial workers who had more money to spend than their “agricultural cousins” (Hecht, 2007). They spent this on items such as tobacco and sugar and, in effect, they changed their lifestyles. In the developing world where regulations are lax and level of ignorance high, industrialization spells higher level of pollution, uncontrolled exploitation, and inability to link up between non-performances of social responsibilities and non-functionality of systems. For example, in Nigeria, with the introduction of the plastic packaging, indiscriminate dumping of such wastes has led to blockage of drainage channels, flooding in some of the areas, rapid growth of malaria cases, and other water-borne diseases. This is purely due to poor social behavior. Oil exploration and exploitation have spelt doom to those living in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria (Jakob & Steckel, 2014). The change in people’s philosophies has accounted for a lot of irresponsibility where accumulation of wealth becomes the only goal of people, particularly in the developing nations. No care is given to the consequences on the environment. This is largely due to ignorance and the inability to establish a link between our lifestyles and the impact they have on our human environment. For instance, since the democratization of Nigeria, the general idea has been that of freedom of the people to do as they like. The attitude to established laws guiding disposal of wastes has been anything but right. Established agencies for the protection of the environments in most parts of the country have not been as up and doing as they should be. This is leading to a near health and environmental disaster in the nation. For example, in Lagos State (Oloke et al., 2013) which

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is the most industrialized part of Nigeria, although the established agencies are working very hard, the attitude of the populace to waste disposal, both industrial and domestic, is not yet right. Pollution level of the environment is still very high and the canals serve as refuse disposal channels. The result is the constant annual flooding of the state with a very disastrous one occurring in July 2011 (Akiyode, 2010). Again, with very low power supply from the national electricity grids, industries and the massive population had to rely on electric power generators which burn fossil fuels. This has resulted in very high level of air and water pollution with the effect that the average temperature of the area, longer periods of rainfall, and flooding are on the rise. These are certainly the effects of longer period of spewing the greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Unless the people’s philosophy and industrial attitude to the environment, waste disposal, and lifestyles change, the detrimental effects on the climate will continue to be experienced (Akiyode, 2010).

Issues in Climate Change for Nigerian Foreign Relations Arguably, Nigeria is the African state of greatest strategic importance to the United States. It is home to about 20 percent of the people living in Africa, south of the Sahara. It has a population of more than 200 million, and it is already considerably larger than the Russian Federation (Romaine, 2013). Nigeria in fulfilling the basic principle of the “social contract” is duty bound to address all areas of human concern as it relates to climate change and other core issues and challenges. This is primarily why the governance system of any country determines the degree of comfort or otherwise of her nationals. So, climate change and its impact on the lives of those affected ought to be a primary concern of Nigerian government both at home and in her external relations. This is because human actions and/or inactions have direct impact on the environment and the integrity of the physical environment has direct bearing on the condition of the climate. The way the Nigerian government responds to crucial issues of national concern and, in particular, climate change is underlain by its traditional approach to making decisions and implementing the same. However, it can also be observed that the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy as at independence did not deal directly with matters pertaining to climate

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change or environmental preservation, perhaps because this was not a pressing issue at the time both locally and globally. Issues affecting the environment that were taken into consideration were directly physical/ human imposed threats to the security of both the nation and the continent at large, including Africans in diaspora. In the modern day, however, this is changing, as threats to national and continental security have become climatic and impossible to control with physical force or peace-­ keeping operations. There is also at present a scientific consensus that the increase in carbon dioxide levels is due to the human activities in the following sectors of the economy: transportation, industrialization, urbanization, irrigation, burning of fossil fuel, agriculture, water pollution changes in land cover, and deforestation (in search of industrial wood and timber). These sectors emit GHGs into the atmosphere, while others such as deforestation and water pollution reduce the rate of carbon sink, thereby enhancing GHGs’ concentration in the atmosphere. The impact of the change will be difficult to handle and it will be potentially long-lasting. “It is very serious.” The scientific evidence on global warming is strengthening daily, and there are risks over and above those that are usually considered. The disproportionate impact on Nigeria will be for a combination of reasons. Global warming will be greater over land than over sea because land retains heat more than water. There is also increasing evidence that it will be particularly hit by the effect of vertical rises and falls in air currents. Climate change often appears very esoteric but in Nigeria, it’s real. We already have an increasing incidence of disease, declining agricultural productivity, and a rising number of heat waves. Declining rainfall in already desert-prone areas in northern Nigeria is causing increasing desertification, the former food basket in central Nigeria is now empty, and people in the coastal areas who used to depend on fishing have seen their livelihoods destroyed by the rising waters. Thus, there is glaring evidence that climate change is not only happening but it’s changing our lives. Adapting to climate variability and mitigating its impacts is something that we do in our everyday lives, but we have to understand what climate change is, what we contribute to it, and how we can adapt and reduce our vulnerabilities. An urgent attention needs to be taken about the negative impacts of climate change, as the impacts of climate change that results from natural and anthropogenic sources would certainly be for worse. How does this trend affect Nigeria? Climate change impacts will be differently impactful among different regions, generations, age, classes, income

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groups, occupation, and gender (Qin et al., 2007). Just like the incipient stage of the current global financial crisis, there had also been a tendency in Nigeria, nay Africa, to wish away the impact of global climate change with a tinge of rather unfounded optimism, that “God so loves Nigeria, He did not encumber her population with highly sinister climate events particularly with ones commonly associated with most countries in Europe, America, the Pacific and Asia”. The ripple effects of these general environmental degradations would rub off negatively on other sub-sectors which we have earlier listed. But our major concern in this chapter is the integrity of Nigeria’s foreign policy response to climate change. There is ample evidence to show that Nigeria has become part of the international, regional, and sub-regional strategies and protocols aimed at responding efficaciously to climate change. According to a KAS document (2007), Nigeria signed the Kyoto Protocol on climate change (Nigeria is part of the non-Annex I economies, so it is not committed to take measures) and the Paris Agreement, but according to IPPA (Institute for Public Policy Analysis), the co-founder of the “Global Coalition on Climate Change”, which consists of 25 NGOs from 23 countries, Nigeria would be better off with her own initiative to handle the issue of climate change (unilateralism). To be part of a shared agenda on climate change adaptation and mitigation, Nigeria is already committed to the following regional networks: the Nairobi Declaration adopted by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) in May 2009 and the Convention of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) created in July 2009. In 2010, Nigeria hosted a study group among African legislatures that produced recommendations on concrete steps parliaments can take to use their legislative functions to address the effects of climate change. Also, in 2010, the Economic Community of West African States adopted the framework of strategic guidelines on the Reduction of Vulnerability and Adaptability to Climate Change in West Africa. This agreement seeks to build scientific and technical capacity to reduce climate change vulnerability in member states, integrate climate change issues in national and regional development policies, and implement climate change adaptation programs (Amobi & Onyishi, 2015). The incremental approach to public policy has allowed business-as-usual attitude to dominate considerations of the looming catastrophe portended by climate change; yet the weather events since the recent past across the wide spectrum of the territory suggest desperate urgency in adopting a

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relatively synoptic approach to making policies which will respond much more decisively to climate change (Ayoade, 2003).

Conclusion This chapter concludes by submitting that the changes in the international system in the last sixty years have been momentous. There should be a refocus on Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation with a view to keeping pace with globalization. While Britain and America controlled the global economy sixty years ago, the world has since witnessed the emergence of new powerful players: China, India, Japan, and the European Union. Nigeria should recognize the tenets of globalization, which has downplayed the importance of regional groupings. So, such not-so-good objective of the Nigeria’s foreign policy of having Africa as centerpiece of its foreign policy should give way to accommodate happenings that define her national interest which is a reflection of the foreign policy to include climate change, economy, agriculture, protection of human rights, food security, and expansion of transport and infrastructure. Nigeria should have a refocus of its foreign policy, which can meet the challenges of climate change and other issues bedeviling the nation more so that globalization has become imperative. Nigeria should learn to live with this reality. This is because globalization drives development. Sources of domestic problems such as corruption, banditry, kidnapping, insecurity, political crises, economic upheaval, and insurgency should, as matter of urgency, be identified and solutions should be adequately provided. It is this that can guarantee the propensity of Nigeria to herald in a new foreign policy that can meet the challenges posed by globalization and immediate needs to inculcate mechanisms to address climate change as a pressing phenomenon in the twenty-first century. Climate change issues are not isolated from other developments on the global agenda generally and Nigeria in particular, and actions in other areas of the Nigerian foreign policy will have impacts on the climate change sphere. Thus, collective efforts should be aimed at ensuring the ostensible goal of Nigeria’s foreign policy, which is to provide stability through a transparent framework that allows for measurable commitments on climate change as stated in the Paris Agreement.

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CHAPTER 17

Nigeria’s Relation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Usman A. Tar and Jamaludden Muhammed Ali

Introduction Nigeria is a heterogeneous state with several religions and ethnic nationalities. There are over 250 ethnic groups across Nigeria. Apart from Islam and Christianity, African traditional  religion  (ATR) is also practiced in Nigeria. Islam and Christianity have an almost equal demographic spread divided regionally, the north being mainly Muslims and the south predominantly Christians. Diversity is not necessarily a source of weakness; however, it presents strong unquestionable challenges in the decision-­ making process for the country’s leadership. The foreign policies of states are determined by both her internal dynamics and the external environment. Religion is one major internal

U. A. Tar (*) Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] J. M. Ali Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_17

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factor that determines and shapes Nigeria’s foreign policy since the attainment of independence in 1960. The internal contradictions within Nigeria, specifically the major religious divides, constitute a serious determinant in Nigeria’s external relations. This was highly made manifest in Nigeria’s attempt to join the OIC. The phases and struggles of Nigeria’s relation with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) cannot be discussed in isolation from existing historical realities of the pre-colonial and post-­ colonial Africa; Islam has been one of the main political and social determinant factors in many parts of North as well as South of the Sahara (Kukah & Falola, 1995). The Jihad of Usman-Dan-Fodio in 1804 was an emphatic consolidation of Islam, particularly in the area that is regarded as northern Nigeria today—from where it spread less effectively southward. The Islamic empire that Dan-Fodio had established had hardly survived half a century before colonial intrusion. The colonial period of course birthed secularism. However, after political independence was achieved, African Muslims became more clearly aware of what the colonial hiccup had cost them, notably, the disruption of long nurtured institutions during the colonial period and the relative isolation of African Muslims from wider Islamic currents, as well as the injection into their intellectual horizons of larger or smaller doses of western secular thought (Hunwick, 1996, p. 232). Despite the complex nature of the Nigerian state, the country still moved to become a full member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986, where it previously held an observer status. However, the decision for Nigeria to have affiliation with faith bases international organization spurred heavy debates among the religious groups in the country. This chapter, therefore, examines Nigeria’s relationship with the OIC from 1986 when it attained full and active membership. This chapter anchored the debate that surrounded Nigeria’s full membership in the OIC and legal framework, as well as the recurring tensions. The chapter further identified the benefits of the country’s membership as well as the prospects of existing relationships with the OIC. This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section 1 is the introduction, Sect. 2 offers an understanding of Nigeria’s membership of the OIC, and Sect. 3 gives the background for the evolution of Nigeria’s relation with the OIC. Section 4 focuses on the imperatives and dynamics of Nigeria’s relation with the OIC, Sect. 5 articulates the challenges of Nigeria’s relations with OIC, and Sect. 6 is the conclusion.

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Understanding Nigeria’s Membership of the OIC Nigeria’s membership of the OIC is one that was greeted with a series of contradictions as there were different arguments for and against this move. The internal contradictions in Nigeria in terms of her pluralities, particularly the religious divide, played a major role in the postulations and positions of Nigerians as far as her membership of the OIC was concerned. The sharp divide was that the Christians saw it as an attempt to Islamize Nigeria while basing their argument on the secularity of the Nigerian state and Islamic coloration of the OIC.  Nevertheless, on 9 January 1986, Nigeria moved to become a full member of the OIC during Babangida’s administration. Most Nigerians had hitherto been unaware of the organization and the news of Nigeria’s membership almost went unnoticed had it not been the persistence of certain prominent clerics, notably Archbishop Okogie of Lagos, as well as the news media (Faseke, 2019). The importunate blowback of Nigeria’s membership of the OIC was the fact that the country got divided deeply along religious lines where both religious groups anchored their positions on the matter. The Christians called for immediate withdrawal, arguing persuasively on the secular status of the country as enshrined in section 10 of the 1999 Constitution (amended), “The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion”. The above-mentioned section has been the backbone of every critic and condemnation of Nigeria’s decision to assume full membership of the OIC in January 1986, being quoted with several claims by Christians that the decision was to Islamize Nigeria and that the Constitution clearly prohibits such actions. However, the Muslim group represented by Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) held their ground in responding to the claims of Islamizing the country, claiming that the said section did not prohibit Nigeria’s membership to an Islamic or any religious organization as proclaimed by the critics. They claimed that the section clearly prohibits the adoption of a State religion; without causing ambiguity to the interpretation of the aforementioned section, taking Nigeria into the OIC by General Babangida’s administration did not in any way declare Islam as the State religion, but rather, his reasons for admittance were anchored on both economic and political considerations (Jama’atu Nasril Islam, 1986). Furthermore, Babangida’s administration sought to salvage the economy of the nation by accessing interest-free loans of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), a

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subsidiary institution of the OIC.  In the realm of politics, General Babangida considered the organization as one that will allow Nigeria to rally against racism and colonialism, a powerful key point of Nigeria’s foreign policy; adding that all OIC members also belonged to the Non-­ Aligned Movement with the exception of Turkish Republic (Faseke, 2019). He also added that many of the nation’s neighboring countries that were members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were also members of the OIC. Therefore, the organization was seen as a platform for members of the Third World countries to seek cooperation among themselves, and that also persuaded him to push for Nigeria’s membership in the OIC (Faseke, 2019). Nigeria guarantees the right to freedom of religion as one of the fundamental rights in the 1999 Constitution. Section 38 of the Constitution (as amended) provides that: 1. Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. 2. No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony, or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or a religion not approved by his parent or guardian. 3. No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination. 4. Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity, or be a member of a secret society. The only prohibition in the above-mentioned section is that of adherence to a secret society as claimed by JNI; the OIC is just like any other international organization that was founded in 1969; its motto is to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony (OIC, 2020). Just like other international organizations, each has a requisite for joining its membership—some are regional/political basis: European Union (EU) and

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African Union (AU); some are economical/regional: Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Labor Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and others are belief based: Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Furthermore, Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution (amended) guarantees: “Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union, or any other association for the protection of his interests”. Given that Section 38 guarantees freedom of Religion and Section 40 provides for freedom of Association, and also, Durkheim (1915) concluded: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”. Religion therefore has to do with the coming together of those who adhere to certain beliefs and practices so as to form a single moral community. To restrict the Muslims of the Nigerian Federation from joining or associating with some international Islamic organizations is to violate or infringe on their fundamental right, in as much as they do so without endangering the rights of their fellow countrymen (Christians).

Background: Evolutions of Nigeria’s Relation with the OIC It is evident and undisputable fact that most parts of northern region of Nigeria were under the control and influence of Islamic system/structure prior to the presence of colonial administration in the country at large, though it was not a federation then. The amalgamation of 1914 gave birth to the unification of these regions into a single country, and after the attainment of independence in 1960, the Islamic group of the country sought to revive their fraternity with the Islamic world and coreligionists; hence, it was disrupted by the colonial era. The government of the northern region had already created connections with Islamic regimes mainly in North Africa and Middle East (Oded, 1987). Sequel to these connections, Late Sir Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna of Sokoto), a great-great grandson of Usman Dan-Fodio (founder of the largest Islamic empire in Africa

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[1808–1815]), was among those charged with the responsibility of looking into the possibility of creating a permanent forum through which Islamic governments could interact frequently (Olukoshi, 1990). Sir Ahmadu Bello quoted in his letter to the secretary of the Islamic World Congress on 16 May 1962: “[A]s you have known, my family have been associated with the spread of Islam for 200 years, and I only want to assure you of my fullest cooperation for continued effort to strengthen Islam day by day”; but Bello could not live long enough to fulfill his promise as he was assassinated four years later in January 1966 coup d’état (Paden, 1986). On 25 September 1969, Nigerian delegations, led by Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, attended the Assembly of Muslims Leaders in Rabat, Capital of Morocco, after the burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque; Gumi pledged the support of Muslims of the country toward the cause of solidarity, which gave birth to the Organization of Islamic Conference  (now Organization of Islamic Cooperation) as the charter was later signed in that summit (Olukoshi, 1990). Yakubu Gowon, the then head of state, acted swiftly amid rumors that there was a plan to Islamize the nation and that the ongoing Biafran Civil War was in fact a religious conflict. He made it categorically clear that the presence of the Gumi delegation in Rabat was not a declaration of Nigeria’s intention to become a member of an association of Islamic states, since the polity is a secular state. Gowon went on to write an urgent note to King Hassan of Morocco, host of the 1969 summit, clearly stating that the Gumi delegation was strictly a private affair and did not represent the views of the Nigerian government in any way (Faseke, 2019). Consequently, when the OIC was fully constituted in 1971, Nigeria could not enroll as a member but remained relevant in the sense that delegates kept attending OIC meetings as mere observers (Faseke, 2019). Nigeria was recognized by OIC countries as having an “observer-status” within the organization and maintained that status for fifteen years (1971–1986).

Imperatives and Dynamics of Nigeria’s Relations with OIC Nigeria’s full membership with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation came under General Babangida’s administration in 1986, though the pro-­ OIC groups lobbied Nigeria way back, arguing persuasively in the face of unceasing economic problems and the harsh conditions of western

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financial institutions (IMF) in issuing assistance, which justifies Nigeria’s stance to seek other alternatives to these western financial institutions in order to start the country’s economic recovery. For instance, Piscatori (2000) documented that the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), a subsidiary institution of the OIC, approved 114 projects in 30 member countries of the OIC that were worth $943.32 million in interest-free loans in 1979. Nigeria could not benefit from this project as it was just a mere observer; thus, General Babangida sought the advice of the Ministry of External Affairs on the implications of Nigeria’s full membership which the ministry counseled against such a move (Faseke, 2019). However, the Babangida administration was not contended with the ministry’s advice and proceeded to set plans in motion for enrolling Nigeria into the OIC on a full-term basis. On December 1985, Nigeria received an invitation from the OIC secretariat in Jeddah, asking Nigeria to attend the organization’s ministerial meeting that was scheduled for four days (6–10 January 1986) in Fez, Morocco. Traditionally, the Ministry of External Affairs asked the Nigerian Ambassador in Morocco to make arrangements to observe the proceedings. On January 1 1986, General Babangida appointed some prominent officers from his cabinet mostly Muslims to attend the ministerial meeting in Fez. The delegation was led by Rilwanu Lukman (Minister of Mines, Power, and Steel); other personalities included Abubakar Alhaji (who was Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Planning), Abdulkadir Ahmed (who was Governor of the Central Bank), Ibrahim Dasuki (the then-Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs), and Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (the former Grand Khadi of northern Nigeria). The delegation arrived in Fez on 8 January and participated in the meeting for the first time the next day, after the Nigerian Ambassador to Morocco, who was clueless about the impending arrival of the delegates, had registered his presence as a mere observer (Olukoshi, 1990). Nigeria’s formal application for full membership into the OIC was made on 9 January 1986 during the delegates’ participation at their first ministerial summit (Faseke, 2019). The governing body of the organization was so gratified with this submission that they decided to waive some statutorily required procedures for admittance into the OIC. Instead of waiting for a full probation year, Nigeria’s admission was communicated at that meeting; the board members only requested that its application should be sponsored by existing members, which countries like Syria, Sierra Leone, Pakistan, and Senegal gladly fulfilled the task. During the

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remarks of the chairperson of the conference (Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada— Secretary General of the OIC—1986), he spoke in blooming terms of Nigeria and applauded her decision to become a full member of the organization. He further stated, “[Y]our seat has always been reserved and we hope you will apply your zeal for the achievement of the aims and objectives of the OIC” (Faseke, 2019). The leader of the Nigerian delegates thanked the chairperson and other members and pledged the country’s support to the cause of the organization. With the demise of Babangida from power in 1993, Nigeria maintained a neutral ground with respect to its membership status in the OIC. Nigeria’s position in the OIC became blurry, as the nation stopped playing active roles and minimized its participation in the organization in order to appease Christians from 1993 to 1998. The OIC saga resurfaced again under Abacha’s administration on 8 June 1998, when the Sultan of Sokoto, having attended the OIC meeting some months back, called for the support of the members of Jama’atu Nasril Islam for the resurgence of Nigeria’s full membership in the OIC (Dickson, 1998). He also tried to enlighten the opposing groups that the membership was for economic advantages and not for any impending motives; but the agitation he was trying to avoid was inevitable as Christians (Christian elites in Nigeria) started agitation and protests against the move, warning that such move or development can engineer a religious conflict and that no nation has survived a religious conflict without being shattered and torn apart. “We warned in clear terms that all Nigerian Christians within and outside Nigeria shall be mobilized by Congress on Christian Ethics in Nigeria (COCEN) to resist at any cost, Nigeria’s membership of OIC in any coloration” (Christian Ethics in Nigeria, 1998). The material and economic benefits that Nigeria was supposed to gain from joining the OIC were eclipsed due to the tightrope of neutrality the nation faced in trying to appease the divers groups of the country’s population between 1986 and 2000. However, with the coming of President Olusegun Obasanjo as the new democratically elected president in 1999, Nigeria’s membership in the OIC was fully endorsed. Thus, in 2005, Nigeria purchased 0.03% of the overall capital of the IDB (Ezeanokwasa, 2007), which was later increased to 7.69% in 2010 (Faseke, 2019). This subscription put Nigeria among the nine permanent members of the board of executive directors and also the fourth-largest equity subscriber of the IDB. To honor Nigeria’s commitment, the IDB and Nigerian government implemented a three-year

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strategic transformation agenda programming framework (2012–2015), under which the bank and its affiliates provided $2 billion for projects implementation in major areas of concern: agriculture, transportation, power, water supply and sanitation, education, and health sector. The IDB also established a Group Gateway Office in Nigeria in order to foster cooperation and enhance bank’s country presence and client’s responsiveness (Faseke, 2019). Another development was the Bilingual Education Scheme that was initiated in January 2016—its aim was to educate the idle youths of the northern region in both western and Islamic education, arguing persuasively that these idle youths constitute the recruiting pool for terrorism (Boko Haram) in the region (Faseke, 2013); this arrangement was made when the Northern Governors’ Forum visited the president of the IDB, Ahmad Ali, on 31 January 2016, where he pledged his commitment and that of the IDB into working together to find a comprehensive and constructive plan to support northern Nigeria. According to him, “We will start with education, particularly bilingual education, and other areas such as job creation” (Tukur, 2016). IDB provided $98 million for the Bilingual Education Program in Adamawa, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Osun, and Yobe, and also promised to support similar projects in other states of the country few weeks after the Northern Governors’ arrangement with the IDB president (Adetayo, 2016). President Muhammadu Buhari welcomed the arrangement warm heartedly; thus, a few weeks later, the president also welcomed an offer by the IDB to organize a financing roundtable in Abuja to mobilize more funds for investment and development of infrastructure in Nigeria (Faseke, 2019).

Challenges of Nigeria’s Relation with OIC The immediate impact of Nigeria’s full membership with the OIC was that it divided the country based on religious lines; Christians demanded for total exit from OIC on the ground that Nigeria is a secular state as provided by the constitution. On the other hand, the Muslims claimed that Nigeria still remains a secular state as its secular posture has not in any way been violated, as the country did not adopt Islam as a State religion. Commenting on the issue, Arch Bishop Okogie (leader of the Christian Association of Nigeria—CAN), noted: “[I]f it was a section of the Islamic community that joined, there is no problem, but for Nigeria as a Country, we hold the President responsible for this; the President alone does not

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make up Nigeria” (Faseke, 2019). The Muslims, on the other hand, championed by Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) argued that “the call for withdrawal was part of the insensitivity of the Christians toward matters that concern Muslims; if Nigeria withdraws from OIC, it will have to withdraw diplomatic relations with the Vatican” (Jama’atu Nasril Islam [JNI], 1986). These divergent views explain why all previous governments had worked out that compromise of our being an observer rather than a full member. And it was the full membership that made religion became a tendentious issue in Nigerian politics (Faseke, 2019). The OIC saga resulted into an uprising, largely due to the lack of public awareness or transparency by the government about the issue. It was the national French news agency (Agence France-Presse [AFP]) that broke the news of the saga to Nigerians—that Nigeria had somewhat clandestinely been admitted as the forty-sixth member of the OIC (Falola, 1998). Clerics and Christians within the government were shocked and so desperate to confirm if the news was true and if so, why? Christians became more restive when it was discovered that top government officials (mainly Christians) were equally bedeviled and just as the public, ignorant of the decision. The second-in-command to the then head of state, Ebitu Ukiwe, declared to the public of his ignorance of such a big policy decision. Many Christians believed it was his public declaration that led to his removal from office by General Babangida (Falola, 1998). The entire saga of enrolling Nigeria on full membership in a secretive manner despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs having advised against it played directly into the hands of those Christians that had all long held the view that there was a secret plan for the Islamization of Nigeria. Bolaji Akinyemi, who was then Minister of External Affairs, strongly opposed Nigeria’s relations with OIC, stating, “[T]here were definitely economic gains from the organization, but one has to keep in mind that sometimes economic gains may not be sufficient enough to counter some strategic problems that you get yourself into by capitalizing on certain decisions” (Akinyemi, 2018). He added, “[W]hile there are Christian countries in the OIC, these countries do not experience the kind of religious tensions that we experienced in Nigeria” (Akinyemi, 2018). Other debaters who were not as extreme in their views as the CAN and JNI tried to defend their claim in more concrete terms by stating that “the Christians had exaggerated the negative implications of Nigeria’s association with the OIC, pointing out some non-Islamic nations like Uganda, Rwanda, Gabon, Kenya, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Benin Republic were members of the OIC” (Lawal, 2018). Therefore, the organization

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was not essentially a religious one, but something in the mold of the United Nations. This group of Liberal thinkers capitalized on the political and economic advantages of the OIC, such as the monetary and technical assistance, projects/development funds, scholarships, and also the low/ interest-free loans of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The complexity of the Nigerian state made it difficult at the initial stage for the country to fully declare its membership and participate in the activities of the organization as we have seen above; this challenge faced made it impossible to benefit from the organization as earlier than 1999; the country was enrolled as a member in 1986 but critics and domestic policies hindered the activation of its membership. It was not until 2005, when President Obasanjo purchased the capital of 0.03% from the IDB, which was considered as the subscription fee for the country’s full commitment and participation.

Conclusion This chapter examined Nigeria’s relations with OIC. This was done against the backdrop of its demographic and faith-based settings, the statutory frameworks of both Nigeria and the OIC; furthermore, the chapter also explored the legality of Nigeria’s participation in the OIC despite its secular posture, the dynamics, evolutions, and imperatives of Nigeria’s relation with the OIC. Being a plural state, the Christians kicked against joining the organization, arguing persuasively on grounds that the OIC is a faith-­ based organization and that Nigeria, as a plural state, should not join such organizations and that the Constitution prohibits the adoption of state religion. Furthermore, there were compelling issues that made it cogent for Nigeria to join the OIC, mainly economic incentives of interest-free loans and other developmental projects enjoined by its members.

Bibliography Adetayo, O. (2016). Islamic bank’s offer to Nigeria excites Buhari; Punch. February 25. Accessed July 25, 2021, from http://www.punchng.com/ islamic-­bank-­offer-­to-­nigeria-­excites-­buhari/ Akinyemi, B. (2018). Nigerian minister of external affairs, 1985–1987; Interview with Babajimi Faseke. Lagos, Nigeria, August 17. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Third alteration: Act 2010; Federal Government Printer, Lagos  – Nigeria. FGP 027/32011/ 2,200(OL 13).

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Christian Ethics in Nigeria. (1998). Withdraw Nigeria from OIC to avert Religious War. Vanguard, May 8, p. 4. Dickson, A. (1998). Nigeria to Join Islamic Bank. The Guardian, 1–2, Lagos, Nigeria. Durkheim, E. (1915). The elementary forms of the religious life. Dover Publications. Ezeanokwasa, O. J. (2007). The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) loan and secularity of Nigeria: Nigeria World. October 9. Retrieved June 15, 2020. http:// nigeriaworld.com/articles/2007/oct/091.html Falola, T. (1998). Violence in Nigeria: The crisis of religious politics and secular ideologies. University of Rochester Press. Faseke, B. O. (2013). The battle for hearts and minds: Religious peacebuilding as an alternative solution to Boko Haram terrorist threat. IUP Journal of International Relations, 7(4), 41–58. 18p. Faseke, B. O. (2019). Nigeria and the organization of Islamic cooperation: A discourse in identity, faith and development, 1969–2016: Religions, 10(3), 156. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030156. https://appgfreedomofreligionorbelief.org/nigerian-­churches-­unite-­to-­address-­violence-­in-­north/ retrieved on 25/07/2021. Hunwick, J. (1996). Sub-Saharan Africa and the Wider World of Islam: Historical and contemporary perspectives. Journal of Religion in Africa, 26(3), 230–257. Jama’atu Nasir Islam. (1986). The Position of Muslims with regard to OIC. Press Statement. New Nigerian, March 20. Kukah, M., & Falola, T. (1995). Religious militancy and self-assertion: Islam and politics in Nigeria. Ashgate. Lawal, Y. (2018). Director of African affairs in the political department of the OIC, 2005–2018. Interview with Babajimi Faseke: Abuja, Nigeria, July 20. In Faseke, B. O. (2019). Nigeria and the organization of Islamic cooperation: A discourse in identity, faith and development, 1969–2016: Religions 2019, 10(3), 156. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030156. Oded, A. (1987). The promotion of Islamic activities by Arab countries in Africa-­ contemporary trends. Asian and African Studies, 21(3), 281–304. Olukoshi, A. (1990). The long road to fez: An examination of Nigeria’s decision to become a full member of the organization of Islamic conference. In G. Olusanya & R. A. Akindele (Eds.), The structure and processes of foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria (pp. 1960–1990). NIIA and Vantage Publishers International Limited. Organization Islamic Corporation. (2020). www.oic-­oci.org: retrieved on 19th-­Feb, 2020. Paden, J. (1986). Ahmadu Bello  – Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and leadership in Nigeria. Hudahuda.

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Piscatori, J. (2000). Religious transnationalism and Global Order, with particular consideration of Islam. In J. Esposito & M. Watson (Eds.), Religion and global order (pp. 66–99). University of Wales Press. Tukur, S. (2016). Islamic development bank agrees to help develop Northern Nigeria; Premium Times Magazine. January 31. Accessed July 25, 2021, from http:// www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-­news/197768-­islamic-­development-­ bankagrees-­help-­develop-­northern-­nigeria.html

PART VI

Conclusion

CHAPTER 18

Conclusion: Future Prospects of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Beyond 60 Years of Independence—Emerging Trends and Tasks Ahead Usman A. Tar and Sharkdam Wapmuk

Projecting into any country’s future is a herculean task. What is however certain is that the world is continuously changing and Nigeria must be prepared to engage a changing world characterized by rapid globalization and complex interdependence. However, scholars have argued that Nigeria has continued to perform below her capacity majorly due to complex challenges which must be addressed if Nigeria must occupy its rightful place in the comity of nations (Adebajo, 2008; Obiozor, 2004; Osaghae, 1998).

U. A. Tar (*) Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] S. Wapmuk Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9_18

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Historically, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been guided by the commitment to the principles of respect for sovereignty and independence of nations, decolonization and respect for universally accepted human rights, nonalignment, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and multilateral diplomacy. It is evident that while some of these principles are no longer as relevant as they were in the 1960s, others are as relevant as they were back then. Considering the fact that Nigeria is a member of the international community and that it must preserve its sovereignty and independence, it must continue to be guided by some of the principles of self-preservation, prestige, peace and security, and sustainable development. These are considered vital to Nigeria’s national interests. It is with a profound understanding of these that we undertake the exercise of examining the emerging trends in international relations and challenges that continue to confront her foreign policy that point to the task ahead for Nigeria.

Emerging Trends in International Relations and Specific Tasks for Nigerian Foreign Policy Emerging trends suggest that international relations would continue to be dominated by the industrially and technologically advanced countries. While the United States has led since the end of the Cold War, it is evident that the superpower is being challenged by emerging powers. The unipolar world that characterized the post-Cold War era is fast giving way to a fluid system oscillating between bipolarity and multipolarity. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s no doubt ushered a paradigm shift in international relations and global diplomacy. The change altered political, economic, diplomatic, and geostrategic balances and equilibrium. Generally, countries of the world adjusted to these changes and Nigeria is no exception. The world is again witnessing a change in the power equation at the international level with the rise of economic powers and the emerging political, military, and geostrategic contestations. The contestations for power in the international system are emerging between the United States and its allies with China and Russia, respectively (Ziegler, 2020). While the relationship between the United States and Russia is deteriorating, as was the case during the Cold War, it is the smaller member allies that are receiving the heat. For instance, the developing relationship under Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999) began to decline following NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, and has since deteriorated significantly (Ziegler, 2020). Under President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, relations between United States and Russia greatly

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deteriorated further due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Deterioration continued with the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, and from the end of 2016 over Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. elections and alleged interference in the 2020 elections. The United States views Russia as a hostile actor, and this view is likely to prevail for the foreseeable future. Washington seems to resent Russia’s global activism and is increasingly concerned about its partnership with China. Likewise, Moscow views the United States as an aggressive actor and a threat to Russia’s domestic stability and claim to a prominent position on the world stage. There is no doubt that response to the emerging world by various nations within the international system would take different forms, of course based on each country’s interests. Consequently, for Nigeria, the response to the emerging global trend should be weighed in consideration of the basic national and African interests, which also constitute the basic foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. It should not be the case of any blind support for any superpower or emerging power. Rather, the response should be in tandem with all the major inherent and crucial issues of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Another trend that characterizes international relations which Nigeria would have to cope with is the technological dominance by the Western industrially advanced countries and their desire to maintain the long-term exclusive control over sophisticated technologies. This is clearly illustrated in the race for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). Facing resistance from Russia and China, among others, the competition between United States and emerging powers has shifted to other domains including control of the international economy and technology such as the fifth-­generation telecommunications networking (5G network). Against this backdrop, the stage was set for the new era of competition between the great powers and emerging contenders. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have risen to challenge the positions of the United States including in the UN Security Council (UNSC). For instance, while both the United States and China recognize the imperative of technological advancement as a means to achieving “wealth and power”, the emerging results from China appear to be giving the United States serious concerns about the possibility of China take-over. However, in terms of technological gaps, the United States is still in the lead. In terms of R&D expenditure of GDP, the gap between the two powers narrowed from 1.32% in 2008 to 0.64% in 2017 (Wu, 2020). If Hong Kong is included in China’s figures, Beijing already exceeded U.S. GDP spending on R&D in 2012 (Wu, 2020).

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The unfolding scenario in global politics suggests that the development of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is becoming even more competitive and characterized by power contestations. The great powers including United States and European countries have been at the forefront of the industrial revolutions over the last two-and-a-half centuries. The emerging powers in the south were latecomers to these revolutions. Nevertheless, many of them, including China, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, made significant progress by the end of the Third Industrial Revolution. The new powers who are set to compete with the dominant Western powers in the 4IR are witnessing stiff resistances as is the case of trade wars between the United States and China. Unlike what happened in previous industrial revolutions, sectors like renewable energies, aerospace, FinTech, ICT, biotechnology, and nanotechnology are already deepening the complexity of dynamics in the political, economic, commercial, financial, environmental, social, and military spheres. While countries such as Russia, Japan, and China are able to challenge the US technological dominance, developing countries such as Nigeria are better off negotiating through multilateral and intergovernmental platforms. Nigeria must also focus attention on the emerging trend in global governance, which is another characteristic of international relations that Nigeria must cope with. Global governance, “the collective management of common problems at the international level, is at a critical juncture” (Mishra, 2013, p.  622). Although global governance institutions have recorded some successes since they were developed after World War II (WWII), the growing number of challenges on the international agenda, and their complexity, is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope. The nature of the world today requires cooperation and interdependence rather than the complex powerplay, contestations, and competition that have characterized global governance since the end of WWII. The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance (Mishra, 2013). The emergence of economic powers from the south and their increasing demand for inclusion also pose a challenge to the present structure of global governance. Power is shifting not only from traditional powers to emerging powers, but also toward non-state actors (NSAs). At the beginning of the twenty-­ first century, threats such as pervasive poverty, violent conflicts, infectious diseases, and terrorism, as well as a new generation of global challenges including climate change, energy security, food and water scarcity,

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international migration flows and new technologies, are increasingly taking center stage (Buzan, 1981, 1991). Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. In addition, diverse perspectives on and suspicions about global governance and related institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, among others, which are seen as Western concepts and instruments, have added to the difficulties of effectively addressing the growing number of challenges. The World Bank, IMF, and WTO often promote free-market fundamentalism and economic reforms by the often required as conditions for their lending. The so-­ called Washington Consensus of fiscal austerity, high interest rates, trade liberalization, privatization, and open capital markets have often been counterproductive for target economies and devastating for their populations (Masters & Chatzky, 2019). Masters and Chatzky (2019) linked indiscriminate lending conditionality to the onset of financial crises in East Asia in 1997, Argentina in 1999, and Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s. For Chang (2010) the World Bank and the IMF present themselves as “good Samaritans” whose only motives are to assist the developing world, but they are actually “bad Samaritans” because their motives are essentially selfish. More so, these institutions, which have continued to toe the Western line, are instruments for promoting Western values particularly liberal democracy. Yet, these institutions lag behind in terms of democratization and opening up of space for representation of developing countries in the decision-making arena. One of the most expected reforms is the UN reforms, especially of the UN Security Council, to expand with the addition of more permanent members. Nigeria, working with other African countries and partners within the international system, should continue to demand for reform of the prestigious UN security council. It is evident that the existing five members will retain their veto powers and continue to block initiatives aimed at diluting their powers in global affairs. Another important trend in international relations which Nigeria would have to cope with is the COVID-19 pandemic which has broad implications far beyond health dimension, which is often the focus of attention of many states. The pandemic which emerged in late 2019 in Wuhan, China, has since spread to different parts of the world including Nigeria. The pandemic has long-term consequences for international relations and poses serious challenges for Nigerian foreign policy. Nigeria, like other countries of the world, adjusted her priorities and policy, including foreign policy, in line with the changing geopolitical situation in the world and the global fight against COVID-19. The actions of most governments in this

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regard entailed closure of land and sea borders, restrictions of international and internal travels, the use of face masks, social distancing, frequent handwashing, the use of hand-sanitizers, and the initial closure of educational institutions. In terms of implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on Nigerian foreign policy, several perspectives, which have implications for Nigeria’s foreign policy in the future, can be considered. For example, the pandemic has revealed the extent to which the rest of the world holds Nigeria and Nigerians. It revealed Nigeria’s real friends and seasonal friends. While the breakthrough in production of the COVID-19 vaccine was welcomed as hope for overcoming the pandemic globally, it has become the new form of political power and competition between old and emerging powers (Matambo, 2021). Nigeria, like most African countries, still lags behind European, American, and to some extent Asian actors that have politicized the vaccine as they try to show their benevolence toward Africa while reaping soft power diplomatic benefit in return. It is imperative to state that the COVID-19 has brought new dimensions in Nigeria’s foreign policy with future implications. There is no doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic has considerably distorted and impacted variously on human security, human mobility, migration, economy, and socio-cultural dimensions that underpin population diversity. While some of the distortions are viewed as short term, others have long-­ term implications. The emergence of new COVID-19 variants such as delta and omicron and her continued spread, even among people that have taken the vaccines, shows that COVID-19 pandemic would continue to feature in Nigeria’s foreign policy in the future. Hence, Nigeria’s foreign policy must adjust to the vagaries of the new normal in international relations and diplomacy. While these are broad trends in the international arena that Nigeria’s foreign policy post-60  years would have to deal with, the capacity of Nigeria’s foreign policy to cope with the complexities is inextricably linked to the current political and socioeconomic dilemma at the domestic level. Commendably, Nigerian governments have remained committed to keeping the country united. Barring ethno-religious agitations and contestations for power sharing, Nigerians of different ethnic and religious backgrounds are found in different parts of the country and outside the country. Despite the challenges confronting Nigeria’s foreign policy, particularly at the domestic level, Nigeria has continued to maintain the principle of good neighborliness and has remained a “good global citizen”,

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contributing to international peace and security through “blue helmets” in peacekeeping operations beyond Africa. However, while these positive notes are rooted in great expectations of a country performing below its weight in the international system, we must also acknowledge that domestic contestations undermine national consensus which in turn could support a robust foreign policy at the external level. To this we turn our attention.

Major Challenges Confronting Nigeria’s Foreign Policy A major challenge to Nigeria’s foreign policy is the weak state of the Nigerian economy. There is no doubt that for a country to have a vibrant foreign policy and good image abroad, it needs a strong economic foundation that is self-sustaining and self-sufficient. Nigeria’s neo-colonial economic structure has continued to be dependent on dominantly oil exports and importation of finished commodities. In the era of globalization, characterized by information and communications technological revolutions, Nigeria remains technologically backward. Against the backdrop of the increasing liberalization and homogenization of global economy, Nigeria’s economy is susceptible to dumping from more advanced economies of the world. Another major foreign policy challenge that has confronted Nigeria is the articulation of the national interest (Sesay et al., 2011). Eze (2010) argued that in the final analysis, the foreign policy of a country is essentially about the protection and advancement of the national interest. The debate about what constitutes the national interest of Nigeria has been ongoing since the country’s independence, yet as noted by Eze (2010), “It is difficult to identify Nigeria’s conception of national interest since independence to date” (Eze, 2010, p. 81). The All-Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy 1986, organized during the Babangida regime, conceived of national interest as simply national security. Beginning from the administration of Tafawa Balewa, national interests and foreign policy goals pursued by the Nigerian government include decolonization and anti-colonialism, pan-African solidarity, national economic development, and pursuit of world peace and security. It has been observed that the national interests tend to lack the outlook of “nationalness” and “nationalistic” quality since public opinion is either not sought or not considered

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(Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016, p.  60). Rather, it tends to be personalistic, reflecting the interest of the regime in power and that of the ruling class. There is simply no national voice in the national interest. Nigeria continues to witness deep divide in national politics as well as witnessing a rising curve of ethno-linguistic and religious fissiparous and secessionist tendencies. Some scholars have questioned the extent to which Afrocentrism, which is lacking in terms of reciprocity from African countries, remains an enduring national interest in Nigeria’s foreign policy in the era of globalization (Agbu, 2008; Enuka & Ojukwu, 2016). While Nigeria has maintained a tremendous normal relationship with neighboring countries, they remained suspicious, reluctant, and even subvert Nigeria’s interests in some cases. The question of reciprocity in the context of Nigeria’s Afrocentric policy has received greater attention in the context of Nigeria’s role in peacekeeping and peace operations, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Uhomoibhi (2010) reported that Nigeria contributed 12,000 out of the 13,000 ECOMOG troops deployed to Sierra Leone between 1998 and 1999 and its treasury released nearly US $400 million annually for the mission. Adebajo (2008) noted that Nigeria provided at least 80% of the ECOMOG’s troops that kept peace in the embattled Liberia and 90% of its funding. However, contrary to the expectations of reciprocity in international politics, both Liberia and Sierra Leone voted against Nigeria’s interest and candidature of non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. Nigeria did not benefit from these countries either in terms of access of foreign direct investments from Nigeria nor award of reconstruction to Nigerian construction companies. Furthermore, insecurity, particularly terrorism, has emerged as a major foreign policy challenge for Nigeria. In international relations, states have a monopoly of the use of coercive force. The emergence of violent non-­ state actors, such as the Boko Haram challenging state sovereignty and contending with the state in the use of coercive force, poses huge challenges for the foreign policy of the country. Beyond the issue of human rights questions, national image, refugees from Nigeria in neighboring countries, humanitarian crisis, scaring foreign tourists, and investors also dent the image of the military that has been acclaimed globally for contributing international peace and security, but showing less results at home. That notwithstanding, another dimension on the challenges posed by terrorism to Nigerian foreign policy is the lessons of power play in international politics. While Nigeria has invested human and material

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resources in furthering the course of international security in trouble spots beyond the African continent, it would appear that the world has not accorded Nigeria the much-needed support in her times of need. While the lessons of the Civil War (1967–1970) remain deep, the emergence of Boko Haram has yet brought to the fore Nigeria’s vulnerability in the context of international politics. Repeatedly, the United States refused to grant Nigeria’s request to purchase lethal equipment that would have brought down the Boko Haram terrorists on the excuse that Nigerian soldiers were involved in human rights abuses. These accusations were based on “half-truths”, rumors, and exaggerated accounts. Under the Barack Obama administration, the United States blocked the sale of American-made attack helicopters—Super Tucano attack warplanes—to Nigeria from Israel on accusation of human rights concerns (Cooper & Searcey, 2016). Even when Donald Trump’s administration eventually agreed to sell the fighter jets, he demanded that Nigeria should make full payment of US$ 496 million to the US before delivery of the fighter jets (BBC News, November 11, 2014). As noted by then Nigeria’s Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Adebowale Ibidapo Adefuye: “Boko Haram is Nigeria’s equivalent of the Islamic State group, and threatened the nation’s territorial integrity. There is no use giving us the type of support that enables us to deliver light jabs to the terrorists when what we need to give them is the killer punch. A friend in need is a friend indeed. The true test of friendship is in times of adversity” (quoted in BBC News, November 11, 2014).

Beyond 60 Years: The Task for Nigerian Foreign Policy Having examined the emerging trends in international relations and challenges to Nigerian foreign policy, what then are the specific tasks for Nigeria beyond 60 years after independence. First, ensuring the continuity, unity, and territorial integrity of Nigeria should be given highest priorities. Ethno-centric, linguistic, and religious centrifugal tendencies have challenged Nigerian unity, peace, and progress. The foreign policy dimension of the problem stems from the involvement of foreign elements as well as lack of monitoring of the borders of neighboring countries leading to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, transnational crimes,

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and trafficking of all kinds. In essence, Nigeria can and should afford cooperation and not conflict with her neighbors. Second, the task before Nigerian foreign policy would be to ensure an atmosphere of peace and stability in which Nigeria can focus on economic development and problems affecting the wellbeing of the people at home and abroad. This would be further strengthened by enhancing investment in education, science, and technological dimensions. Of course, Nigeria’s foreign policy has a role to play in creating peace and stability in the West African region and African continent. This requires strengthening national capabilities to defend Nigeria’s unity and territorial integrity. This capability should rely on Nigeria’s resource and development of indigenous technology with the support of partners. The third task would be to strengthen regional cooperation and integration in West Africa and Africa. The idea is to ensure that regional cooperation becomes an instrument for peace and stability for long-term security and economic wellbeing of citizens. The fourth task for Nigerian foreign policy is to continue supporting multilateralism and multilateral solutions to global problems. This would require strengthening the UN and its organs and its specialized agencies bearing in mind Nigeria’s interest. Nigeria should continue to advocate the democratization of the UN by advocating the collective interests of the developing countries in the UN. The fifth task for Nigeria is to recalibrate her foreign policy and external engagements to attune with the new normal in international relations in the context of the COVID-19 and beyond. The new normal at the domestic level in Nigeria will entail modifying the diplomatic, administrative, economic, labor, social, and cultural functioning of all societies, and mental and behavioral of all people, exposing the diversity of the fragility of populations and imposing communication technologies as a resource and solution to the demands of physical distancing. At the external level, the new normal includes greater focus on multilateralism, transparency in global governance, internationalization and securitization of health issues, using virtual platforms for diplomatic and business meetings, and reorganization of the country’s foreign missions to adjust to the realities of the pandemic. The sixth task for Nigerian foreign policy would be to undertake the required organizational and institutional reform in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Nigerian Foreign Service as the core foreign policy machinery and training of foreign officers. This would involve improvements by modernizing recruitment, specialization, training and retraining, posting,

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and the creation of special mechanisms for inter-departmental, inter-­ agency, and inter-ministerial coordination and consultation within the Nigerian government. This would also require meeting the required funding needs for a robust foreign service capable of functioning in a globalized world that is fast changing. On the whole, beyond 60 years of political independence, there is the need to chart a new direction for the country’s foreign policy by prioritizing the Nigerian people as the beneficiaries of Nigeria’s international engagements. Putting the people first entails making the domestic environment conducive for national development, addressing human security concerns, and developing national capacity for Nigeria to respond to the complex challenges of a globalized world.

References Adebajo, A. (2008). Hegemony on a shoestring: Nigeria’s post-cold war foreign policy. In A. Adebajo & A. R. Mustapha (Eds.), Gulliver’s troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy after the cold war (pp. 1–37). University of KwaZulu Natal Press. Agbu, O. (2008). Nigeria’s foreign policy under president Umaru Musa Yar’Adua: Challenges and prospects. Nigerian Forum, 29, 1–2. BBC News. (2014, November 11). Boko Haram crisis: Nigeria fury over US arms refusal. Retrieved November 9, 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-­africa-­30006066 Buzan, B. (1981). People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Harvester Wheatsheaf. Buzan, B. (1991). New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century. International Affairs. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 67(3), 431–451. Chang, H. (2010). Bad Samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism. Bloomsbury Press. Cooper, H., & Searcey, D. (2016, May 15). After Years of Distrust, U.S. Military Reconciles with Nigeria to Fight Boko Haram. The New York Times. Retrieved November 9, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/ africa/boko-­haram-­nigeria-­us-­arms-­sales-­warplanes.html Enuka, C., & Ojukwu, E.  C. (2016). Challenges of Nigeria’s foreign policy. International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH), 5(2), 52–66. Eze, O. (2010). Beyond 50 years of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Issues, challenges and prospects. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Masters, J., & Chatzky, A. (2019, April 9). The World Bank group’s role in global development. Retrieved December 15, 2021, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/world-­bank-­groups-­role-­global-­development

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Matambo, R. (2021, July 23). Global vaccine politics and its impact on Africa – the case of Zimbabwe. Retrieved December 20, 2021, from https://www.accord. org.za/analysis/global-­vaccine-­politics-­and-­its-­impact-­on-­africa-­the-­case-­of­zimbabwe/ Mishra, P. (2013). Emerging challenges to global governance in 21st century. Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2(8), 622–626. Obiozor, G. A. (2004). Nigeria’s foreign policy and the challenge of unipolarity. In B. A. Akinterinwa (Ed.), Nigeria’s new foreign policy thrust: Essays in honour of ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, at 70 (pp. 237–245). Vantage Publishers. Osaghae, E.  E. (1998). The crippled giant: Nigeria since independence. Indiana University Press. Sesay, A., et al. (2011). Reflections on fifty years of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Vol. I: Foundations and challenges. Society for International Relations Awareness and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Uhomoibhi, M. (2012). An overview of Nigeria’s foreign relations: A practitioner’s perspective. In: Anyaoku, E. (2010). Review of Nigeria’s foreign policy: Issues and challenges. : Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Wu, X. (2020). Technology, power, and uncontrolled great power strategic competition between China and the United States. China International Strategy Review, 2, 99–119. Ziegler, C. E. (2020). A crisis of diverging perspectives: U.S.-Russian relations and the security dilemma. Texas National Security Review, 4(1), 11–33. Retrieved from https://tnsr.org/2020/11/a-­crisis-­of-­diverging-­perspectives-­u-­s-­russian­relations-­and-­the-­security-­dilemma/

Index

A Action plans, 11, 23, 31–37, 92, 193 Activism, 6–7, 376, 423 Africa, vii, ix, 4, 7–8, 28, 45, 63, 74–78, 93, 118, 162, 186, 192–196, 209, 239, 263, 288, 312, 329, 365, 383, 406, 425 Africa(n) continent, vii, 65, 73, 78, 79, 81, 125, 134, 171, 204, 209, 210, 222, 226, 227, 230, 234, 239, 241, 254, 263, 264, 268, 298, 304, 322, 365, 429, 430 nation, 64, 65, 81, 174, 194 solidarity, 7–8, 264 Union (AU), vii, xi, 9, 52, 53, 75, 76, 98, 104, 193, 196, 210, 214, 217, 218, 222, 224, 229, 232, 333, 334, 336, 339, 340, 349, 350, 375, 384, 409 and world affairs, 8–10 Afrocentric gestures, 79, 82, 85 policy, 13, 63–85, 428

Afrocentrism, 65–75, 428 Agriculture, vi, 11, 51, 53, 54, 85, 120, 169, 170, 175, 194, 211, 229, 239, 248, 250, 253–255, 302, 386, 392, 395, 398, 400, 413 Al Qaeda, 131, 294, 295 Apartheid, 7, 45, 64, 71, 74, 79, 80, 84, 118, 209, 210, 219, 221–223, 231, 265, 297, 298, 311, 312, 370 Asia, 8, 192, 323, 365, 370, 395, 399 B Bakassi Peninsula, 67, 98, 105 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 13, 185–204 agreement, 196 Biafran, 79, 264 War, 120 Bilateral relations, vii, 54, 130, 134, 210, 212, 214, 215, 225, 229, 231–233, 242–244, 247, 358, 370

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 U. A. Tar, S. Wapmuk (eds.), Nigerian Foreign Policy 60 Years After Independence, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06882-9

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INDEX

Bilateral trade, 52, 53, 122, 123, 162, 170, 215–216, 253 Boko Haram, v, x, 10, 11, 36, 44, 56, 82, 83, 131–133, 168, 169, 233, 270, 295, 300, 303, 318, 338, 339, 347, 372, 384, 413, 428, 429 Borders, 6, 69, 73, 92, 95, 98, 106, 211, 239, 240, 271, 292, 294, 303, 304, 317, 319, 320, 322, 327–329, 331, 332, 334–342, 344, 349–351, 359, 426, 429 Brazil, 12, 13, 185, 186, 192, 240–244, 246–256, 264, 272 BRI, see Belt and Road Initiative Bureaucracy, 28–30, 232, 233, 334 Bureaucratic model, 19–38 politics, 22–26, 28, 30 Bureaucratizing, 26–31 foreign policymaking, 26–31 C Chibok, vi, 10, 131, 132, 233, 300, 346 China, viii, 8, 11–13, 49, 50, 52, 54, 69, 73, 81, 82, 123, 133, 134, 163, 170, 185–204, 241, 247, 256, 272, 274, 275, 299, 302, 323, 333, 343, 359, 373, 387, 400, 422–425 Chinese foreign policy, 193 Cities, 48, 174, 189, 356, 395, 396 Citizens, v, 10, 14, 20, 37, 44, 56, 57, 65, 67, 76, 77, 80, 82–85, 119, 167, 168, 176, 180, 200, 210, 211, 213, 215, 219–222, 226, 229, 232, 233, 235, 271, 272, 276, 281, 290, 291, 293, 306, 317, 324, 330, 333, 336, 337, 341, 342, 345, 350, 356, 367, 369, 376, 377, 385, 388, 390, 430

diplomacy, x, 10–11, 28, 213, 367–369, 376 Civil War, 6, 76, 77, 79, 120, 126, 162, 264, 276, 429 Climate change, xi, 14, 133, 294, 299, 328, 348, 383–400, 424 Cold War, x, xi, 117, 118, 121, 134, 270, 294, 356, 364, 422, 423 Colonialism, 5, 64, 71, 74, 76, 79, 84, 161, 209, 210, 268, 334, 408 Colonisation, 161 Commonwealth, vii, xi, 9, 74, 162, 163, 167, 180, 214, 217, 223, 230, 267 Communication technology, 357, 430 Constitution, 5, 27, 65, 69, 70, 243, 269, 279, 296, 407–409, 413, 415 Cooperation, vii, viii, xi, 4, 5, 8, 11–12, 14, 50, 53, 70, 73, 78, 93–95, 99, 103, 106, 127, 130, 163, 164, 168, 188–190, 193–195, 199, 204, 210, 211, 215, 217, 227–231, 233, 240, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 296, 313, 315, 321, 327, 328, 331, 333, 334, 336, 348, 349, 359, 408, 410, 413, 424, 430 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), viii, 51, 53, 68, 106, 123, 133, 272, 275, 349, 350, 373, 425, 426, 430 Corruption, vi, 11–12, 44, 45, 52, 56–57, 67, 73, 76, 83, 106, 132, 164, 169, 196, 210, 211, 229, 273, 275, 299–302, 306, 317, 337, 350, 400 Cultural, 4, 13, 20, 24, 46, 64, 66, 70, 119, 120, 125, 176–177, 180, 187, 242, 243, 246, 247, 253, 290, 323, 330, 359, 366, 430 Currency, 95, 173, 248, 271, 274, 275, 318, 320, 322, 333

 INDEX 

D Dam, 100, 101 Dapchi, 131, 132 Debt, x, 9, 10, 51, 52, 81, 85, 197, 200, 203, 223, 248, 265, 274, 299 Decolonisation, x, xi, 70, 77, 79, 84, 176, 213, 214, 264, 267, 297, 311, 421, 427 Defence, vii, 26, 34, 67, 69, 163, 167–169, 278, 290, 320 Democracy, vii, xi, 9, 44, 52, 55–56, 77, 81, 85, 106, 118, 121, 124–130, 179, 223, 266, 290, 299, 314, 316, 321, 384, 425 Desertification, 105, 384, 386–388, 398 Diaspora diplomacy, 359–361, 368, 376 entrepreneurs, 359, 362, 363, 376 interests, 356 mobilization, 357, 362, 364, 376 Diasporic, 360–364, 374, 376 Diplomacy, v, viii–x, 6, 8–12, 29, 36, 37, 45, 51, 52, 54, 58, 67, 78, 82, 185, 189, 190, 200, 203, 213, 224, 251, 276, 289, 298, 314–315, 328, 334, 335, 351, 356, 358, 360, 366–369, 372, 376, 377, 388, 421, 422, 426 Domestic concerns, 10–11 Domestic policy, v, 231, 288, 292, 356, 389, 390, 415 E Eastern Region, 127 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), vii, xi, xii, 6, 13, 44, 75, 78, 92, 98, 104, 106, 217, 218, 270, 271, 275, 277, 311–324, 332, 334–336, 338–340, 349, 384, 399, 409

435

Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 8, 76, 125, 314, 428 development, vi, xi, 13, 29, 43–59, 164, 165, 167, 188, 190, 191, 204, 211, 229, 321, 324, 359, 393, 427, 430 development in Nigeria, 47–50, 55–58 diplomacy, x, 29, 36, 47, 78, 200, 224, 298, 314–315 and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 52, 134, 252 growth, 14, 46–50, 66, 92, 95, 172, 186, 187, 196–198, 204, 233, 247, 253, 302, 312–314 integration, 94, 95, 315, 336, 357 interest, 121, 230, 297 rejuvenation, 11–12 relations, 52, 54, 98, 105, 123, 169–174, 185, 216, 223, 233, 235, 242, 246–248, 360 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), vii, xi, xii, 6, 13, 44, 75, 78, 92, 98, 104, 106, 217, 218, 332, 334–336, 338–340, 349, 384, 399, 409 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 8, 76, 125, 314, 322, 428 Egypt, 7, 50, 65, 99, 196, 217, 218 Election, 7, 8, 44, 53, 56, 77, 128, 167, 179, 213, 214, 217, 218, 265, 273, 277, 298, 300, 316, 317, 321, 336, 359, 365, 371, 390, 391, 423 Electoral integrity, 273 Entertainment, 179–180 Ethiopia, x, 50, 99, 101, 121, 195, 338

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INDEX

Eurocentrism, 82 Exploitation, 48, 92, 96, 97, 100–102, 254, 395, 396 Exports, 35, 50–54, 59, 93, 107, 122–124, 170–172, 174, 176, 178, 186, 189, 194, 196, 211, 216, 224, 229, 246, 247, 253–255, 264, 303, 427 External relations, v, 12, 13, 22, 27, 29, 31, 32, 67, 85, 266, 268, 273, 327–351, 364, 368, 389, 397, 406 F Finance, 35, 126, 172, 173, 185, 187, 189–192, 198–200, 247, 371 Foreign direct investment (FDI), v, vi, 9–11, 36, 44, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 123, 169, 170, 172, 178, 186, 289, 291, 298, 348, 355, 360, 375, 428 Foreign policy objectives, v, xi, 4, 8, 27, 63, 70, 79, 279, 289, 296, 355, 423 politics, 23, 28, 66–74, 204, 361 relations, 77, 119, 358 under Obasanjo, 6, 9 under Yar’ Adua, 10 France, 12, 74, 75, 77, 275, 276, 299, 318, 319, 323, 366 Fund, vi, 6, 52, 78, 85, 189, 191, 192, 200, 210, 271, 278, 413, 415 G Gas, vi, 49–51, 78, 92, 98–99, 104–106, 120, 121, 133, 163, 170, 171, 181, 239, 249, 250, 387, 391, 394–396 Geography, 107, 251, 287, 291, 333

Giant of Africa, ix, 49, 65, 84, 239 Global cooling, 394 migration, 341, 347, 349, 351 pandemic, 68, 133 politics, 69, 80, 328, 424 power, 232 warming, 386, 387, 391, 393, 394, 398 Globalisation, 9, 13, 14, 35, 70, 82, 104, 134, 179, 287–308, 328, 343, 345, 356, 357, 359, 364, 366, 376, 385, 388–397, 400, 421, 427, 428 Goals, v, xi, 3, 4, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, 30, 35, 43, 46, 51, 57–59, 66–70, 77, 126, 134, 164, 186, 188, 211, 222, 226, 228, 271, 289, 291, 297, 313, 314, 317, 323, 332, 334, 340, 349, 351, 355, 357, 358, 361, 363, 370, 377, 386, 388, 396, 400, 427 Greenhouse effect, 394 gases, 392–394, 397, 398 Green Tree Agreement (GTA), 67 Gulf of Guinea, 106, 169, 219 H Harmonisation, 95 Hegemonic, 73, 85, 213, 228, 234, 319, 320, 323, 390, 392 Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), 73 Herdsmen, 56, 83, 301, 339, 372, 387 Human activities, 386, 387, 393–395, 398 Humanitarian assistance, 133, 166, 346

 INDEX 

I Igbo, 127, 239, 330, 331 India, 12, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 73, 80, 123, 163, 170, 173, 185, 186, 192, 240, 241, 253, 272, 299, 333, 341, 343, 358, 359, 400, 424 Industrialization, 46, 51, 58, 83, 106, 196, 197, 199, 392–396, 398 Infrastructure, x, 11, 45, 46, 48, 54, 57, 58, 76, 83, 85, 95, 102, 169–171, 174, 175, 181, 187–200, 203, 204, 211, 229, 231, 232, 244, 248, 300, 305, 307, 317, 322, 387, 400, 413 deficit, 57–58 Insecurity, 10–12, 36, 44, 45, 55–56, 58, 67, 299–302, 305, 338, 348, 400, 428 Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), vii, 31, 36–38, 52, 278, 374 Integration, xii, 5, 13, 27, 70, 71, 78, 91–106, 188, 190, 191, 222, 223, 296, 312, 313, 315, 320, 321, 324, 334, 336, 340, 349, 357, 358, 366, 368, 376, 430 International boundaries, 19, 98 community, 3, 12, 30, 32, 45, 52, 67, 81, 128, 129, 131, 169, 223, 272, 291, 299–301, 314, 317, 328, 329, 341, 346, 348, 350, 370, 372, 384, 422 laws and regimes, 228 migration, 329, 340–349, 355, 358, 425 partnership, 177 relations, ix, 9, 14, 22, 35, 37, 47, 67, 81, 227, 293, 296, 304, 323, 333, 358, 361, 368, 385, 422–430 Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), x, 131

437

L Lake Chad, 100, 387 Lake Chad Basin Commission, xii, 100 Leadership, vii, xii, 11, 12, 31, 36, 44, 57, 65, 72, 73, 77, 81–83, 85, 99, 104, 105, 117, 118, 120, 121, 125, 164, 197, 212–214, 217–219, 223, 226, 230–232, 234, 243, 255, 264, 276, 315–321, 330, 333, 335, 367, 384, 405 Liberalism, 227, 228, 230 Logistics, 77, 176 M Migration, 13, 164, 165, 167, 178, 276, 327–351, 358, 376, 385, 387, 426 Military, 4, 6, 7, 9–11, 44, 45, 57, 67, 68, 72, 73, 77, 78, 85, 99, 118, 120, 121, 124–130, 132, 133, 163, 165, 168, 169, 213, 218, 221–223, 228, 233, 242–244, 251, 252, 256, 288, 289, 291, 298, 301, 316, 317, 340, 342, 350, 356, 359, 370, 389, 392, 422–424, 428 relations, 251 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), vii, 13, 19–38, 58, 59, 220, 247, 279, 304, 337, 373, 414, 430 Multilateral agreements, 335, 339, 348 relations, 217, 219, 221, 299, 305 Multilateralism, viii, 217–219, 221, 305, 336, 388–392, 430 N National interest, vi, viii, xii, 3–5, 9, 11, 19–22, 27, 29, 35, 43, 58, 59, 65–74, 79, 84, 85, 91, 118, 119,

438 

INDEX

129, 133, 134, 212–215, 229, 230, 234, 242, 254, 276, 280, 289–292, 296, 311, 312, 319–321, 323, 324, 336, 356, 367, 383, 385, 388–390, 400, 422, 427, 428 Nation-states, 21, 67–69, 133, 363, 368 Natural resource, 13, 48, 72, 78, 82, 85, 91–106, 134, 164, 239, 242, 253, 254, 287, 311, 394, 395 exports, 107, 254 Neighbourliness, x, 79, 270–272, 319 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), xi, 9, 52, 78, 210, 211, 221, 223, 224, 230, 235 Nigeria afrocentric policy, 13, 63–85, 428 diaspora engagements, 13, 355–378 economic development, 13, 29, 43–59, 165, 167, 253, 321, 324, 430 economy, vii, 53, 58, 179, 199, 215, 216, 233, 303, 320, 427 external relations, v, 13, 27, 32, 85, 266, 268, 273, 327–351, 389, 397, 406 foreign policy, v, vii–ix, xi, xii, 3–14, 19–38, 43–59, 63, 67–71, 77, 91–106, 163, 196–204, 239, 263–281, 287–308, 315, 320, 324, 329, 355–378, 383, 388–392, 397, 399, 400, 405, 408, 421–431 leadership, vii, 11, 57, 73, 82, 85, 99, 104, 105, 118, 120, 125, 213, 214, 219, 223, 234, 243, 255, 264, 315–320, 330, 335, 384 migration, 13, 164, 327–351, 355

migration relations, 327, 331, 338, 347–350 relations in African migration, 332–340 relations in international migration, 340–347 Nigeria-Brazil diplomatic and political relations, 243–246 economic relations, 242, 246–248 relations, 239–256 socio-cultural relations, 242–243 technological relations, 249–251 Nigeria-ECOWAS Engagement, 321–323 Nigerian army, 129, 252 civil war, 6, 76, 77, 120, 121, 124, 264, 334 diaspora, 14, 37, 55, 58, 82, 162, 178, 179, 343, 347, 348, 355–378 foreign policy, v, vii–ix, 4–6, 13, 14, 19–38, 43–59, 91–106, 265–275, 277–281, 355, 368, 389, 400, 422–431 military, 4, 6, 9–11, 45, 118, 120, 124–130, 132, 133, 165, 168, 169, 218, 221–223, 243, 252, 316, 317, 389, 428 Nigeria-South Africa relations, 13, 209–235 strategic partnership, 13, 209–235 strategic relations and partnership, 226–230 Nigeria-United Kingdom Relations, 13, 161–181 Nigeria-US relations, 13, 117–134, 161–181 trade and investment relations, 118, 121–124

 INDEX 

O Objectives, v, vii, xi, 3–5, 7–9, 20, 26–30, 35, 37, 43, 44, 50–51, 58, 63, 66, 68–70, 75, 79, 101, 102, 188, 229, 244, 249, 268, 269, 278, 279, 289, 296, 314, 320, 332, 334, 355, 362, 385, 400, 412, 423 Oil boom, 6, 48, 333 diplomacy, 315 and gas exploration, 105 Organization of African Unity (OAU), xi, 6, 7, 52, 75, 80, 264, 311, 384, 408 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 14, 32, 405–415 P Pan-African, x, 6–7, 74, 427 Partnership, vii, 11–12, 19, 46, 52, 120, 163, 167–171, 174, 177, 180, 185, 211–227, 231–235, 243, 246, 247, 250, 254, 295, 328, 423 Peace and stability, 7–8, 72, 79, 224, 430 Peacekeeping, xi, xii, 8, 64, 71, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 84, 265, 275, 279, 280, 312, 314–317, 384, 427, 428 Petroleum, 52–54, 98, 104, 105, 124, 196, 249, 384 Policy, v, 3, 20, 43, 63, 91, 117, 185–204, 209, 240, 263, 288, 311, 328, 355, 383, 414, 421 Political influence, 126, 359, 363, 378 Politics of hegemony, 66–74

439

Population, 5, 45, 48, 50, 68, 72, 73, 104, 120, 123, 124, 162–164, 177–179, 204, 215, 219, 230, 235, 240, 242, 255, 263, 266, 270, 307, 319, 330, 332, 333, 336, 342, 357, 359, 365, 373, 374, 378, 384, 395–397, 399, 412, 425, 426, 430 Power, v–vii, ix–xii, 4, 8, 11–14, 23, 29–31, 35, 45, 48, 55, 56, 68, 72, 73, 75–78, 81, 82, 85, 96, 106, 118, 119, 123, 124, 134, 169, 175, 185–204, 210, 213, 218, 226, 228, 230–234, 241, 242, 249, 253, 255, 264, 266, 268, 270, 271, 275, 278, 281, 293, 294, 298, 300, 301, 312, 315, 318, 319, 322, 332, 338, 358, 359, 362, 368, 374, 375, 377, 390, 395, 397, 412, 413, 422–426, 428 Producers, 45, 99, 219, 240, 243 Public private partnership (PPP), 197, 200, 248 R Racist, 74, 219 Region, 65, 72, 76, 83, 92–96, 98, 105, 120, 121, 124, 164, 190, 192, 193, 195, 219, 222, 231–234, 239, 246, 312–324, 329–334, 336, 338, 348, 349, 372, 387, 388, 396, 398, 409, 413, 430 Regional great power, 71 hegemony, x, 71, 334 initiatives, 95 integration, xii, 13, 71, 91–106, 312, 313, 320, 324

440 

INDEX

Religion, x, 105, 331, 405, 407–409, 413–415 Resource, xii, 4, 7, 13, 37, 46–49, 58, 72, 73, 76–78, 82, 85, 91–106, 133, 134, 164, 178, 194, 204, 216, 223, 233, 239, 242, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 263, 266, 270, 277, 278, 287, 288, 290, 304, 305, 311, 312, 314, 322–324, 333, 344, 362, 366, 369, 370, 372, 375, 377, 392, 394–396, 429, 430 endowment, xii, 13, 49, 91–106, 253, 255, 287, 323, 324 Royal Navy Squadron, 161 S Scepticisms, 203 Security defence partnership, 163, 167–169 relations, 251–252 Slave trade, 161, 242, 243, 330 South Africa, x, 7, 64–66, 71, 74, 77, 80, 118, 162, 167, 172–174, 209–235, 253, 264, 265, 267, 271, 272, 274, 297, 298, 338, 349, 365, 372 Sovereign States, 67, 212, 287–289, 291–296 Sovereignty, 3, 69, 74, 95, 102–103, 212, 276, 290, 293, 295, 296, 322, 389, 421, 422, 428 Soviet Union, 24, 118, 121, 128, 268, 422 Sub-Saharan Africa, 52, 107, 117, 123, 178, 198, 375 T Technical Aid Corps (TAC), 8, 36, 312, 315

Technological, 13, 50, 85, 97, 102, 176, 180, 242, 249–251, 254, 255, 287, 291, 307, 349, 356, 368, 393, 395, 423, 424, 427, 430 Technology, 44, 51, 59, 69, 82, 85, 96, 102, 134, 167, 170–172, 181, 199, 200, 211, 223, 229, 242, 247, 249, 250, 295, 306, 307, 349, 350, 357, 366, 392, 395, 423, 425, 430 Terrorism, v, vi, x, xi, 10, 11, 35, 55, 56, 68, 82, 130–132, 134, 163, 169, 234, 291, 294, 295, 300, 301, 304, 307, 328, 337, 346, 347, 375, 377, 389, 413, 424, 428 Third World countries, 288, 295, 296, 408 Tourism, 53, 225, 226, 248, 348 Trade, 11, 12, 35, 36, 52–54, 58, 59, 91, 92, 94, 95, 103, 106, 121–124, 161–165, 167, 169–172, 174, 175, 181, 186–190, 198, 199, 204, 211, 214–217, 219, 225, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 242–244, 246, 247, 250, 253–255, 303, 304, 317, 319, 322, 328, 330–334, 340, 349, 363, 385, 392, 409, 424, 425 Trafficking, v, x, 165, 167, 169, 219, 252, 327, 335, 337, 339, 345, 430 Trans-Saharan trade, 330 Treaty of Lagos, 313 U UK, see United Kingdom Unemployment, 11, 49, 76, 83, 211, 219, 235, 299, 302, 305, 306, 348, 350

 INDEX 

United Kingdom (UK), 50, 73, 131, 161–181, 274, 342, 365, 366, 396 assistance to Nigeria, 165–169 United States (US), viii, 10, 12, 24, 50, 52, 53, 73, 75, 77, 80, 95, 117, 118, 120–134, 164, 179, 186, 189–192, 195, 197–200, 241, 243, 247, 248, 253, 273, 274, 294, 299, 301, 315, 323, 333, 342, 343, 345–347, 350, 356, 360, 364–366, 370, 373, 374, 387, 389–392, 397, 422–424, 428, 429 V Visa, 130, 177, 178, 189, 220, 274, 332–334, 340, 345–348, 350, 374

441

W WAEMU, see West African Economic and Monetary Union Water, 58, 97, 99–101, 105, 106, 118, 164, 165, 167, 170, 199, 228, 280, 294, 397, 398, 413, 424 West Africa, xii, 4, 8, 13, 56, 74, 76, 91–106, 192, 195, 200, 270–272, 312, 313, 318, 319, 321, 324, 331, 333, 334, 336, 337, 350, 399, 430 West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 101–102 Westphalian, 19, 91 World market, 103 orientation, 103 World Trade Center, 131 X Xenophobia, 211–215, 225, 226, 235, 328, 338, 349