Nigeria-India Relations in a Changing World 1793644535, 9781793644534

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Nigeria–India Relations in a Changing World

Nigeria–India Relations in a Changing World Sharkdam Wapmuk

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE Copyright © 2021 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available Names: Wapmuk, Sharkdam, 1976– author. Title: Nigeria-India relations in a changing world / Sharkdam Wapmuk. Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2021] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “This book examines the contextual, theoretical, and historical foundations of Nigeria-India relations. The author also analyzes Nigerian and Indian economic relations and contemporary dynamics in strategic engagement between the two countries”— Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2021028538 (print) | LCCN 2021028539 (ebook) | ISBN 9781793644534 (hardback) | ISBN 9781793644541 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Nigeria—Foreign relations—India. | India—Foreign relations— Nigeria. | Nigeria—Foreign relations—1960– | India—Foreign relations— 20th century. Classification: LCC DT515.63.I4 2021 (print) | LCC DT515.63.I4 2021 (ebook) | DDC 327.669054—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021028538 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021028539 ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To my wife Agatha Eileen, and the children—Shinna’an, Hoomna’an, Nijin, Rangna’an, Na’anbuet, and Buetna’an

Contents

List of Tables

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Foreword xi Preface xv Acknowledgments xix List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Introduction: Nigeria and India as Strategic Partners in Africa PART I: CONTEXTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS 1 The Contexts of Nigeria–India Relations: Domestic Imperatives, Foreign Policy, and Role Perceptions

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1 3

2 Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Nigeria–India Relations

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3 The Eagle and Elephant: Evolution of Nigeria–India Relations

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PART II: LEVERAGING ON NIGERIA–INDIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

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4 Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations

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5 Investment Relations between Nigeria and India

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6 Perspectives on Technical and Consultancy Cooperation, Joint Ventures, and Indian Companies in Nigeria vii

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Contents

7 Nigeria–India Cooperation in the Agricultural Sector PART III: CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS IN NIGERIA– INDIA RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENTS

139 153

8 Nigeria–India People-to-People Relations

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9 Medical Tourism and Indian Investments in the Nigerian Health Sector

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10 Military Cooperation and the Contributions of Nigeria and India to International Peacekeeping Operations

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11 Nigeria–India Relations and the Fight against Terrorism and Insurgency 221 12 Nigeria–India Relations in the Context of COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond

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Conclusion: Continuity and Change in Nigeria–India Bilateral Relations 261 Appendix 269 References 279 Index 313 About the Author

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Major Diplomatic Visits by Nigerian Leaders/Officials to India, 1999 to 2018 Table 3.2 Major Diplomatic Visits by Indian Leaders/Officials to Nigeria, 1999 to 2018 Table 4.1 Nigeria’s Crude Exports to India Compared with Other Asian Countries (Quantity of Barrels) Table 4.2 Statistics of Nigeria–India Bilateral Trade in Millions of US$ (2003–2010) Table 4.3 Statistics of Nigeria–India Bilateral Trade in Millions of US$ (2010–2018) Table 4.4 India’s Exports to Nigeria by Principal Commodities (2013–2014) (in USD) Table 4.5 Top Ten Items in India’s Export Basket to Nigeria (in USD Thousands) Table 4.6 Fastest-Moving Fifteen Items in India’s Export Basket to Nigeria, 2008–2014 (in USD) Table 4.7 India’s Imports from Nigeria by Principal Commodities 2013–2014 (in USD) Table 4.8 Top Seven Items in India’s Import Basket from Nigeria, 2013–2014 (in USD) Table 4.9 Top Seven Items in India’s Import Basket from Nigeria, 2008–2014 (in USD) Table 5.1 List of Joint Ventures of Indian Banks Abroad as at March 31, 2013 Table 9.1 Cost Comparison between India, the United States, Thailand, and Singapore (Approximate Figures in USD)

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65 70 83 85 85 87 89 90 91 92 92 111 183

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List of Tables

Table 10.1 Nigeria and India’s Participation in International Peacekeeping 215 Table 12.1 Repatriation/Airlifts of Indians and Nigerians during the COVID-19 Pandemic Period 258

Foreword Zachariah Mampilly

I am pleased to write the foreword to this important new work on India–Nigeria relations. Nigeria–India Relations in a Changing World by Professor Sharkdam Wapmuk is a valuable addition to the growing literature on India– Africa relations and to scholarship on the Global South more generally. I first met Sharkdam in 2013 at a conference I organized with the Economic and Social Research Foundation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on “India in Africa: New Frontiers in South-South Relations.” At the time, the literature on India in Africa was fairly limited with most taking a broad perspective that shoehorned all of India–Africa ties into a single theoretical framework, most commonly one heavily influenced by the burgeoning field of China– Africa studies. While an essential first step, this literature was limited by its attempt to sketch Indo-African ties with broad strokes. Compared to China, India’s ties to the continent are defined by a lack of top-down coordination, a more historical and sustained presence, and riven by internal contradictions between the diverse Indian diaspora in Africa and the ambitions of the Indian government. The conference, which brought together scholars from throughout Africa, India, and beyond, tried to go deeper to explore the nuances involved with India’s distinct relationships with Africa’s fifty-four countries. What emerged from the various papers was a mosaic of Indo-African relations, some based on deep historical and social ties and others driven by contemporary geopolitical rivalries. Wapmuk’s contribution to this emerging literature goes deep instead of wide. By focusing on Indo-Nigerian relations across multiple dimensions and different time periods, he provides the most comprehensive look at the subject available. This is an essential task, one that fleshes out the picture of Indo-African relations without reverting to stereotypes or tropes of unambiguous Global South solidarity. xi

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Foreword

The reader may ask why focus on India–Nigeria relations at all? India, while a growing power globally, lags China on almost every important political and economic metric as it does the United States, still the global hegemon. Nor does it possess the deep historical ties to Nigeria as it does with other African countries. To this, I would respond that in a world of shifting geopolitical alignments, we still do not know nearly enough about relations between emerging powers, especially those located in the Global South. As such, India’s rise globally, as well as Nigeria’s dominance in West Africa and increasingly beyond, warrants deeper analysis. But even beyond the undeniable rising significance of both countries, there is a more essential reason why such a study is necessary. Despite some important initiatives, African Studies in India remains a marginal field and Indian Studies in Africa is basically nonexistent outside of South Africa. As has been well documented, scholarship on international relations remains bounded by colonial logics. As such, while it is common to find numerous studies on India or Nigeria’s relations with the United Kingdom, a declining power with arguably less influence on the global stage than either of its former colonies, we know very little about their relations with each other. This pattern is not unique. There is far more attention paid to relations between countries in the Global South and their former or neocolonial masters in the Global North in comparison to relations within and between the Global South itself. Colonial boundaries for knowledge production limit our understanding of both India and Africa and their positions within the global order. While the reasons for this state of affairs are well known, it is still a shame that too many scholars from the Global South rigidly retain adherence to colonial modes of knowledge production. To be clear, this is not simply a historical practice, but the result of ongoing exclusionary practices. Scholars from the Global South are still siloed into studying only their own countries. If they seek to examine issues beyond their borders, they are told to confine themselves to the larger region they are from or to limit their analysis to relations with the “great powers” or international agencies. Those that seek to break out of this box are often disciplined by having their work shunned by the major journals and presses that are still overwhelmingly under the control of scholars from the Global North. What is the solution? As Wapmuk’s book demonstrates, a few intrepid individuals are already challenging the colonial mode of knowledge production by focusing on connections within and between states and societies in the Global South. Yet while essential, individual initiative is unlikely to overcome historical modes of promotion and exclusion that render such scholarship marginal to disciplines of political science and international relations. What is necessary is a system-wide transformation that can begin to dismantle the barriers to intra-South knowledge exchanges.

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Toward this end, let’s applaud and elevate Wapmuk’s work and those similarly engaged in a process of decolonizing knowledge production. As Wapmuk’s book makes clear, Indo-Nigerian relations are worthy of study along multiple dimensions—economic, political, cultural, and epistemic. Centering the historic and contemporary interconnections between Africa and South Asia—the two fastest growing regions in the world—is necessary as we try and make sense of our rapidly evolving global order. Whether climate change, migration, economic development, or international institutions, no credible study of the “global” is complete without understanding where these regions stand. This volume is an important addition to these efforts. Zachariah Mampilly Austin Marxe Endowed Chair of International Affairs Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, The City University of New York The Bronx, New York

Preface

In his famous work Just So Stories written in 1902, Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem that accompanied the tale of The Elephant's Child. It opens with “I keep six honest serving men (They taught me all that I knew) Their names are: What and Why and When and How and Where and Who” (Kipling, 1902). Throughout human history, these are questions whose answers are considered basic in research, information gathering, and problem solving. The reality that we learn well and faster, when we learn from others who are ahead of us, was lucidly captured by Isaac Newton who wrote that “if I have been able to see further, it was only because I stood on the shoulders of giants” (Newton, 1675). The book, Nigeria–India Relations in a Changing World, is no doubt a product my befriending the six honest-serving men and standing on the shoulder of giants. I have had the privilege of being taught by teachers and erudite scholars with great expectations of me and who took more than personal interest in my academic work and progress through the years. My interest in India began with early exposure to Bollywood movies which were popular in Nigeria especially in the 1980s and 1990s. I was fascinated with the Indians working in Nigeria during this period. My first direct contact with the Indians in Nigeria was with the doctors in hospitals, teachers in schools, and traders that owned large stores. I was to later discover that the Indians were engaged in many other sectors of the Nigerian economy. However, my interest in Nigeria–India relations was deepened in 2008. I was a member of the delegation from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) that undertook an academic visit to the Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) from Saturday, August 16, to Wednesday, August 20, 2008. During the academic visit, the NIIA delegation participated in a conference titled “Nigeria-India Track II Dialogue on International Affairs,” jointly organized by ICWA and NIIA. It was my first visit to New Delhi, India, and I was fascinated by its progress. xv

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The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) jointly organized the Second India–Africa Academic Conference at Lagos from March 14 to March 15, 2012. The event was attended by approximately eighty academicians, including an eight-member ICWA delegation led by its director general Shri S. T. Devare. I later returned to India to attend the Pre-IAFS-III Conference on India–Africa in the 21st Century: Scale and Scope of Comprehensive Partnership, held on September 15–16, 2015, at the ICWA, Sapru House, in New Delhi. The Indians spoke of their achievements, plans, and projections toward engaging a changing world. Despite the huge population in India, the largest democracy in the world was determined to lift most of her population out of poverty and become an economic and technological giant in a world that was adjusting to the changes occasioned by the fourth industrial revolution. I made up my mind to pay more attention to India. The idea to write a volume on Nigeria–India relations was prodded by Professor Warisu Oyesina Alli and later by Professor W. Alade Fawole. Both noted that this will be a major contribution to knowledge since there are few well-researched publications on Nigeria–India relations and Afro-Asian relations. For some time, the work did not progress as quickly as envisaged because of volume of work that keeps streaming in and increasing by the day. The book project was further spurred by Professor Usman A. Tar when I mentioned to him that I was working on a book for publication. Since then, he has kept tap on the progress of the work. He insisted that that my perfectionist tendency was keeping the work from getting to publishers for consideration. I listened to the advice of my teacher, mentor, and friend whom himself is an accomplished author of many outstanding publications and here we are. This book is important in broadening our understanding of the relationship between Africa and Asia in general, and Nigeria and India in particular. The basis of Afro-Asian relations was borne out of the need for mutually beneficial cooperation among countries of the South, such as Nigeria and India. The dynamic nature of the global environment requires frequent evaluation of such cooperation targeted at improving the socioeconomic and political conditions of the South countries with a view to making necessary adjustments to achieve the intended optimal result of mutual benefits. Against the background of the changes that have taken place in the global system especially since the 1990s, and with the redistribution of power, especially economic power among countries of the South, it is even more significant to investigate the elements of continuity and change in Afro-Asian relations. The dearth of research on the subject especially as from the 1990s provided a wide gap for this modest contribution to the understanding of the historical heritage, dynamics, and dimensions of Nigeria–India relations. This was done with the hope that it will stimulate others to either add to the existing

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body of literature on Nigeria–India relations or perhaps examine other South Asian states and undertake a similar study. There is little doubt that the field of study is fairly open and lots of work needs to be done to adequately fill the gaps in international relations. This book is significant and important not only for Nigeria but also for African and Afro-Asian scholarship. While it has benefited from the comparative research contributions and significant articles penned by some of the earlier Nigerian, African, and Indian scholars, it builds on and expands upon some of their inputs by exploring and covering the historical, diplomatic, economic, military, agricultural, sociocultural, and people-to-people dimensions. Against this backdrop, the book hopes to stimulate further research on Nigeria’s ties with India in particular, and on India and other African states in general. The book will therefore be of interest to scholars and foreign policy makers, international relations specialists, political scientists, economists as well as those who are concerned with the role of both state and non-state actors in the ever-changing international system. In specific terms, this study contributes to our understanding of the dynamism in the political economy of Nigeria–India relations. A book of this nature has immense academic, economic, political, social, and policy implications. It will contribute to the ongoing debate on the character and dynamics of economic relations between developing countries of the South. It will add to the growing number of available works on the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. The book is of significance not only to the government of Nigeria but also to the government of India, which have been exploring ways of deepening the relations between them. Sharkdam Wapmuk Department of Defence and Security Studies Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna

Acknowledgments

I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals and institutions that supported me while I was working on this book project. The Nigerian Defence Academy has provided an enabling environment for academic work and research. Professor Warisu Oyesina Alli has been more than a teacher. He has been mentor, a father, and dear friend over the years. He is one person that has made a mark in my life. From him, I learned that the virtues of hard work, honesty, and integrity pay especially in the academic business. It was Professor Alli who first stimulated my interest in Afro-Asian studies and Nigeria–India relations in particular, while I was a young scholar at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria. Indeed, NIIA provided the platform for my early research on Nigeria–India relations and facilitated regular contact with the Indian High Commission in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria. NIIA also facilitated my academic visits to India, especially to the Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) in 2008 and 2015. My former colleagues at the NIIA will always be remembered for the teamwork at the Research and Studies Department. I am really grateful to Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa, Professor Osita Agbu, Professor Charles Dokubo, Late Professor Osita C. Eze, Late Professor Ogaba Oche, Professor Bukar Bukarambe, Dr. Efem Ubi, Dr. Joshua Bolarinwa, Dr. Chinasa Ugwuanyi, Dr. Godwin Ichimi, Dr. Tola Ilesanmi, Dr. Rita Agu, Vincent Ibonye, Oluwatooni Akinkuotu, Kelechi Nwogu, Adeola Akindoju, and Sunday Olubejide. Professor Usman A. Tar has also been more than a teacher. He monitored my progress from undergraduate days at the Department of Political Science and Administration, University of Maiduguri, and kept in touch with me throughout the years. Professor Tar remains a solid mentor and friend, and a strong academic pillar. I owe Professor Tar a debt of appreciation for not only inviting me to join the NDA but also providing me the opportunity of meeting xix

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Acknowledgments

very vibrant and energetic academic team within the Department of Defence and Security Studies (DSS). To my colleagues at NDA and pioneer staff of DSS, Dr. Sunday Adejoh, Samuel Ayegba, Olutayo Ajibade, Nufaisa Garba Ahmed, Suleiman Dan Ali, and Jamaludden Muhammed Ali, I am learning a lot and it is always exciting working with you all. Several persons in the academia, too numerous to mention, played motivational roles in the course of this work. Professor Cyril Obi (United States); Professor Dauda Abubakar (University of Michigan-Flint, United States); Professor Amadu Sesay (NISS); Professor W. Alade Fawole (OAU); Professor Haruna Bonaventure (Unijos); Professor Victor Adetula (Unijos); Professor Pam Dung Sha (Unijos); Professor Shedrack Gaya Best (Unijos); Late Professor Habu Galadima (Unijos); Associate Professor Adakai F. Amayah; Professor Haruna Dlakwa (BSU); and Professor Zakariah Mampilly (United States). My appreciation also goes to the High Commission of India, Abuja, Nigeria. H.E. Mr. Abhay Thakur, High Commissioner of India to Nigeria, concurrently accredited to Benin, Chad, and ECOWAS, has been a dear friend to Nigeria. Writing a book of this nature requires diligence, patience, and commitment and immense contributions of many people. I am grateful to the reviewers, whose comments, suggestions, and commendations assisted me in reviewing aspects of the work. Lastly, my special gratitude goes to my lovely wife, Dr. Agatha Eileen Wapmuk, and my children—Shinna’an, Hoomnaan, Nijin, Rangnaan, Na’anbuet, and Buetna’an—for their understanding, prayers, support, and putting up with me constantly not being available for them as I should including at weekends to do a little more work on the book. I shall remain forever grateful to Professor and Mrs. Longmas Sambo Wapmuk, great parents, who all these years have been a real source of strength and inspiration, and most especially for believing in me and giving me wings to fly.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AALCO AARDO ACCI ACDC AEC AfCFTA AFRICA AI AICA AIDS AINSCA ANC ANOC AoA APC APEC APRM ARVs ASEAN ATC AU BAL BASA BAY BEL BHEL

Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization Abuja Chambers of Commerce and Industry African Centre for Disease Control African Economic Community African Continental Free Trade Area Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid Artificial Intelligence All Indian Cultural Association Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome All India Nigerian Students and Community Association African National Congress Asian National Oil Companies Agreement on Agriculture Arewa People’s Congress Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation African Peer Review Mechanism Anti-Retroviral Drugs Association of South-East Asian Nations Agreement on Textiles and Clothing African Union Bronchoalveolar Lavage Bilateral Air Services Agreement Borno, Adamawa and Yobe Bharat Electronics Ltd Bharat Heavy Electricals

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BIM-STEC B  ay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BIPPA Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement BISTA Bilateral Inter-Governmental Science and Technology Agreement BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CA Country Agreement CJTF Civilian Joint Task Force CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease CSC Command and Staff College CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee CVE Countering Violent Extremism D8 Developing Eight DIA Defence Intelligence Agencies DPR Department of Petroleum Resources DSS Department of State Security DTAA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement EAS East Asian Summit ECDC Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EEPC Engineering Export Promotion ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FERA Foreign Exchange Regulation Act FIEO Federation of Indian Export Organisations FIRS Federal Internal Revenue Service FRELIMO Liberation Front of Mozambique FRRO Foreign Regional Registration Office FTO Foreign Terrorist Organizations G-15 Group of Fifteen (15) G-20 Group of Twenty (20) G-77 Group of Seventy Seven (77) GDP Gross Domestic Product GIHL Global Infrastructure Holdings Ltd GSL GOA Shipyard Ltd GSMC Global System for Mobile Communication GSP Generalized System of Preferences HAL Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

HCQ HIPC HIV HMO HMT HUJI HuM IASC IBTC ICA ICCR ICT ICWA IDP IDSA IEEMA IHCF ILS IMF INC INJC IONS IOR-ARC IPF IR IRCON ITEC IWA JDZ KNOC LCBC LeT LNG LOC LWE MAD MAN MASSOB MCI MCT MD MDGs

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Hydroxychloroquine Highly Indebted Poor Countries Human Immuno Deficiency Virus Health Maintenance Organization Hindustan Machine Tools Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami Harakat ul-Mujahadeen Integrated Ajaokuta Steel Company Investment Banking and Trust Company Indian Cultural Association Indian Council of Cultural Relations Information and Communications Technology Indian Council of World Affairs Internally Displaced Persons Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis Indian Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers Association Indian Health Care Federation Indian Language School International Monetary Fund Indian National Congress India–Nigeria Joint Commission Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation Indian Professionals Forum International Relations Indian Railway Construction Company Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Indian Women’s Association Joint Development Zone Korea National Oil Company Lake Chad Basin Commission Lashkar-e-Taiba Liquefied Natural Gas Line of Credit The Left-Wing Extremism Movement for the Advancement of Democracy Manufacturers Association of Nigeria Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry of Culture and Tourism Ministry of Defense Millennium Development Goals

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MECON MEND MFA MFA MI MJ MNJTF MoHFW MONUA MONUC MOSOP MOU MPLA MRTP MST NACTEST NAFDAC NAM NAMA NARC NATO NCDC NDA NDPVF NEEDS NEPAD NEPC NEW NEXIM NGOs NIA NICCI NIEO NIFA NIIA NIPC NIPP NIS NIS NITDA NJIA

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta Ministry of Foreign Affairs Multi Fibre Agreement Ministry of Interior Ministry of Justice Multinational Joint Task Force Ministry of Health and Family Welfare United Nations Observer Mission in Angola UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People Memoranda of Understanding Movement Popular de Liberatacco de Angola Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Ministry of Science and Technology National Counter-Terrorism Strategy National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control Non-Aligned Movement Non-Agricultural Market Access Nigerian Army Resource Centre North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nigeria Center for Disease Control Nigerian Defense Academy Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy New Partnership for Africa’s Development Nigerian Export Promotion Council Nigerian Engineering Works Limited Nigerian Export-Import Bank Non-governmental organizations National Investigation Agency Nigerian-Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry New International Economic Order Nigeria–India Friendship Association Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Nigerian Investment Promotion Council National Independent Power Project Nigerian Immigration Service Nigerian Immigration Services National Information Technology Development Agency Nigerian Journal of International Affairs

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

NMA NMTL NNPC NOTAP NPC NPC NPF NRC NRDC NSAs NTPC OAU ODA OECD OFB OMEL ONGC ONUC ONUCI ONUMOZ OPC OPL OPVs OVL P5 PCR PHCN PIO PTF RAW RENAMO RFR RIS RITES Rs. SAARC SADC SAIIA SAIL SAJIA SAP SARS

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Nigerian Medical Association Nigerian Machine Tools Ltd Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion National Planning Commission National Populations Commission Nigeria Police Force Nigerian Railway Corporation National Research Development Corporation Non-state actors National Thermal Power Corporation Organization of African Unity Overseas Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Ordinance Factory Board ONGC-Mittal Energy Ltd Oil and Gas Corporation UN Mission to the Congo United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire United Nations Operation in Mozambique Odua People’s Congress Oil Prospecting Licence Offshore Patrol Vessels ONGC Videsh Limited Permanent Five Polymerase Chain Reaction Power Holding Company of Nigeria People of Indian Origin Presidential Task Force Research and Analysis Wing Mozambican National Resistance Rights of First Refusal Research and Information System for Developing Countries Rail India Technical and Economic Services Rupees South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation South African Development Community South African Institute of International Affairs Steel Authority of India South African Journal of International Affairs Structural Adjustment Programme Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

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SCAAP SDG SIMI SME SMJTF SSC SWAPO TAC TAN TCIL TCN TELCON TI TNC TOT TPA TRIPS UBHAS ULFA ULFA UNAMID UNAMR UNAVEM UNCTAD UNDP UNESCO

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan/Programme Sustainable Development Goals Student Islamic Movement in India Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Special Military Joint Task Force South–South Cooperation South-West Africa People’s Organization Technical Aid Corps Tamil Sagam, Telegus of Nigeria Telecommunications Consultant India Limited Transmission Company of Nigeria Telecommunication Consultants (Nig) Ltd Transparency International Transnational Corporations Transfer of Technology Terrorism Prevention Act Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Uttar Bharat Seva Samaj The United Liberation Front of Assam United Liberation Front of Assam United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda UN Angola Verification Mission United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNGCT United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy UNIDO United Nationals Industrial Development Organization UNIFIL UN’s Interim Force in Lebanon UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan UNO United Nations Organization UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UNOMSIL United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia UNSC United Nations Security Council UNTAG UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia UNTPLC United Nigeria Textile Plc USI United Service Institute of India VBIED Vehicle Bone Improvised Explosive Device

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

VVIP WAPCO WB WHO WTO

Very Very Important Persons Water and Power Consultancy Services World Bank World Health Organization World Trade Organization

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Introduction Nigeria and India as Strategic Partners in Africa

In the state-centric international system, cooperation between states is inevitable. Relations could be at bilateral or multilateral levels. Geographic propinquity, historical, economic considerations, linguistic or cultural ties may determine, dictate, or influence the dynamics of such relations. The needs or interests in multidimensional ways of one or two countries may also affect the initiation, existence, shape, form, nature, and depth of such relations (Ogunsanwo, 2007). The implication of this is that deliberate steps must be taken to determine the direction, at various levels, of the relations between two countries. This is more so, given the fact that they must recognize that there are other participants within the international system that are competitors or potential partners. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of India play active roles in their respective regions. Both countries have diversities of religions, cultures, languages, and practice democratic and federal systems of government. Over the past decades, both countries played active roles in the Commonwealth of Nations, as well as Group of 77 (G-77), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and Group of 15 (G-15). They are also members of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) and Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization (AARDO). Both countries have demonstrated support for anticolonial and antiapartheid struggles and have been visible at multilateral platforms such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have actively supported the reform of the world body and the demand of a new global economic order. Both countries have demanded greater participation of developing countries concerning critical issues on the global agenda such as climate change, the Doha Rounds of the WTO, and the need to curb the spread of terrorism (The Guardian, October 15, 2007). xxix

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Nigeria stands out not only in West Africa but also in Africa. Historically, Nigeria has played prominent roles at subregional, continental, and global levels, through the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Asobie, 2010). Even though the official national census conducted in 2006 by the National Populations Commission (NPC) of Nigeria had declared the country’s population to be 140,431,790 million, the National Bureau of Statistics estimated Nigeria’s population as at 2016 to have reached 193,392,517 million.1 Nigeria is not only the most populous nation in Africa and ranking seventh in the world but also has the largest population of black people in the world.2 Nigeria’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the year ending December 2013 was estimated at ₦80.3 trillion (US$509.9 billion), the highest in Africa, and the twenty-sixth largest economy in the world (Kale, 2014). This later drop to US$493,841 in 2015, US$405,442 in 2016, US$405,442 in 2017, and stood at US$398,186 million in 2018 (Country Economy, 2019). Nigeria’s exports were worth US$98.364 (₦4.693.34 trillion) in the first quarter of 2018, which was far higher than most countries on the African continent (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The country produces an average of 2.5 million bpd of oil, a major commodity which accounts for 95 percent of Nigerian export earnings and 65 percent of total government revenue (NNPC, 2019; Aribisala, 2013). Nigeria ranks as Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixth-largest oil-producing country in the world. Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 36,972 billion barrels, and in addition the country is among the most richly endowed in the world in terms of natural gas, with a proven reserve of 5,675 billion cubic feet of reserves (OPEC, 2019). Nigeria is rich in solid minerals (tin, columbite, coal, iron ore, limestone, among others), and its land is suitable for agricultural production of a variety of food and cash crops (maize, yams, sorghum, cassava, rice, millet, oil palm, cotton, cocoa, rubber, and groundnuts). Nigeria has the largest, best-equipped, and trained armed forces in West Africa (Galadima, 2011). India stands out in Asia apparently because of the size of its population, military, economic growth, and its growing interest to play a leading role in international affairs. For instance, India accounts for 75 percent of the population of South Asia, 65 percent of its total land area, and 78 percent of its GDP (Singh, 2007). India with a population of approximately 1.2 billion people is the second-most populous country in the world next only to China (Government of India-Census of India, 2011).3 Economically, India has a dynamic and highly competitive private sector which accounts for over 75 percent of its GDP. Its GDP was estimated at US$2.1 trillion in 2014–2015 and its average annual GDP growth rate stood at 6.1 percent between 2011 and 2012 (IMF, 2014). India has also emerged as a destination country for medical tourism. Indian hospitals receive international patients from different

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countries including Nigeria that are seeking better healthcare, better-equipped hospitals, and/or at rates comparatively cheaper than obtained in Nigeria. Historical exigencies, particularly British colonialism, brought the two countries into contact, with India becoming independent much earlier than Nigeria in 1947, while Nigeria became independent in 1960. The presence of a sizable number of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India, which stood at about 35,000 and 5,000 respectively in 2010 (Sachdev, 2011), is an attestation of this historical link. The Indian community has a strong presence in the area of trade and manufacturing, especially large departmental stores, textiles, pharmaceuticals, paints, chemicals, engineering, banking, manufacturing, brewing, consumer goods, and electronics. There are over 100 Indian companies that have established profitable technical and business ventures in Nigeria. These include Kishinchand Chellarams, Bhojsons, Ranbaxy pharmaceutical company, Tata Automobiles, Reliance Communications, Airtel Barti Telecommunications, Bajaj, NIIT, Aptech, Indorama, Godrej, Primus hospital, Dana Group, Stallion Group, among others, which employ thousands of Indians and Nigerians. Their penetration of the Nigerian market has been facilitated by Nigeria’s free economy as opposed to India’s semi-closed economy. The two countries have interacted at the political, economic, military, and sociocultural levels. At the political level, there have been visits by government officials from both countries. A high point of such visits was by the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, from October 14 to October 17, 2007. It also marked the second official visit by an Indian prime minister after Nehru’s visit to Nigeria in 1962. Several Nigerian heads of state and state officials, including ministers and governors, among others, have also visited India since 1960. Among the Nigerian leaders that have visited India are President Shehu Shagari who was guest of honor at India’s Republic Day Celebrations in January 1983; Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon and Commodore Augustus Aikhomu, on November 2, 1984, who attended the burial of the former prime minister of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi (Daily Times, January 23, 1983); and President Olusegun Obasanjo who was a guest of honor at India’s Republic Day Celebrations in January 2000. During Obasanjo’s historic visit, he assured the Indians that Nigeria would soon be Africa’s “most lucrative market,” enabling India to access other West African markets as well (The Hindu, 27 January 2000). At the economic level, trade between the two countries has increased in recent years, and its value was reported to have grown from US$14.628 billion in 2011 (Ashiru, 2012) to US$16.67 billion in 2013 (₦2.7 trillion) reaching US$11.76 billion in 2017–2018. (Punch Newspaper, January 18, 2014). It was also reported that India, with an investment of US$5 billion, was the largest investor in Nigeria in 2010 (The Punch News (Nigeria), August 12,

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2011). Furthermore, Indian-owned and/or operated companies are said to be the second-largest employer in Nigeria after the Nigerian government. Nigeria is currently India’s largest supplier of crude oil in Africa, which constitutes 96 percent of Indian imports from Nigeria and 20–25 percent of India’s domestic oil demand (Singh, 2007). Militarily, the Indian government helped in establishing some of Nigeria’s military institutions, including the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in Kaduna and the Command and Staff College (CSC) Jaji in Kaduna (Kura, 2009). In addition to selling of military equipment to Nigeria, the Indian government has also trained officers through scholarships provided under the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP) (Pham, 2007a). Notwithstanding the large presence of Indians in Nigeria, the relations between the two countries became lukewarm at the political level, especially from the late 1970s to 1990s. The weak relations at the political level during this period were partly due to the challenges confronting the two countries. While India was preoccupied with her own domestic challenges including the restructuring of her economy, which until 1991 followed protectionist policies, Nigeria also had challenges that fall into the broad areas of political instability, including challenges of prolonged military rule and infrastructural decay. Over the years, certain aspects of the bilateral relations have experienced ups and downs. For instance, the proposed Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed on September 28, 1972, which later metamorphosed into the Nigeria–India Joint Commission (NIJC) with the signing of the MOU on December 26, 1977, has not progressed as expected. The commission has as its objectives the transfer of technology and the training of Nigerians by Indians. The sessions of the commission are supposed to be held alternately and biennially in the capitals of both countries. By 2012, only six sessions had held in 1981, 1989, 1991, 2000, 2003, and 2011 (Offor, 2010). In 1984, there were sixteen Indian joint ventures in Nigeria. These were in the fields of light engineering goods, transmission lines, drug and pharmaceuticals, polyester and nylon, glass and glass products, machine tools, cables and conductors, banking, insurance, and consultancy. Due to lame commitment by both countries, as well as economic and political constraints faced by the companies, by 1990s, some of these joint ventures had either collapsed or were struggling to survive, and some of them, which were yet to be established never took off. From the 1960s to 1990s, India’s relations with Nigeria, as with the rest of Africa were initially built upon historical and political connections with issues such as decolonization, non-alignment, South–South Cooperation, and the need for a new international economic order dominating discussion at various fora. The end of the Cold War brought about changes in the international environment, with issues of economics taking the center stage

Introduction

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in Indo-Nigeria relations. With the end of apartheid rule in South Africa and decolonization in Africa, the main political and ideological agenda that brought India and African countries such as Nigeria close together in the international arena had ceased to be. The shared ideologies of nonalignment and disarmament even though still advocated were no longer the core rallying points of interaction. Moreover, after the start of India’s economic liberalization reforms in 1991, India’s foreign policy moved from being preoccupied with ideological principles to become increasingly pragmatic. India has since then used economic diplomacy as a strategy of engaging African countries, including Nigeria. In 1993, the Indian government stated that “in the future, new relationships based on concrete economic, technological, educational cooperation will assume significance” (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1993). Indian officials also emphasized that the orientation of India’s foreign policy is designed to promote “enlightened national interest” (Singh, 2007, p.3). At the same time, Indian policy makers pointed out clearly that energy security is an important element of India’s foreign policy, particularly in the context of the developing world. According to Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, “our concern for energy security has become an important element of our diplomacy and is shaping our relations with a range of countries across the world, Africa, West Asia, and Latin America” (Singh, 2007, p.3). Accordingly, India has made several efforts to engage Nigeria and other African countries, with an interest motivated by geo-economics, especially in terms of access to energy supply. THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA: BEYOND THE SIGNING OF AGREEMENTS In international relations, the notion of partnerships is not always clear. According to Holslag (2011, p. 295) it is largely “what states make of it.” A partnership can be used to describe alliance, common economic cooperation, or sometimes even the interactions between rivals. In the nomenclature of other countries, however, partnership has specific meaning and is applied to only a certain type of relations. Strategic partnership has been explained also in the depth and intensity of cooperation in reaching common objective. Strategic partnership allows for the identification of a specific cooperation as strategic by distinguishing its variables; such as compatible interests of national security, formulated common objectives, formalization of implementation and institutionalization process (Gajauskaite, 2014). The depth of the strategic partnership can be determined by the qualitative indicators of functional areas, an element of cooperation, an international institutional

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structure, mutual expectations and strategic objectives, and such quantitative indicators as bilateral agreements in the areas of strategic importance, the number of common projects, the number of diplomatic corps in the country of the partner (Gajauskaite, 2014). A key factor in strategic partnership is its long-term nature. According to Michalski (2019), strategic partnerships, a privileged bilateral relation, has surged in recent decades as a result of the fallout from the weakening of the international order, as key nations United States, China, India, and Russia prioritize power politics over multilateral solutions. Both Nigeria and India agreed to elevate their relationship to the level of strategic partnership in 2007. This followed the visit of the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh from October 14 to 17, 2007, during which the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Nigeria and India and other Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed. The signing of agreements under the framework of strategic partnership has been subjected to varied interpretations. Some have argued that it was in furtherance of India’s engagement of African countries of which Nigeria is strategic, particularly because of her oil resources and market (Vines, Wong, Weimer, & Campos, 2009). While some have interpreted the phenomenon of India’s increased engagement of Nigeria in the light of a new scramble for Africa’s resources and markets, others see it as a continuity of a relationship in the light of old ties such as in the days of the NAM, anticolonial struggle, and in the spirit of South–South cooperation. The first India–Africa Summit held in New Delhi in April 2008, the second India–Africa Forum held in Addis Ababa in 2011, and the third India–Africa Summit held in New Delhi in 2015 witnessed a serious strategic push from the Indian government to strengthen its ties with African nations. Although several issues were highlighted during these summits, the desire to ensure energy security is seen as the dominant interest in India’s policy toward Africa today (Biswas, 2013a; Haté, 2008). India has moved up the development ladder and has made achievements in the areas of industrialization, scientific, and technological capabilities, as well as advances in information and communications technology (ICT), from which Nigeria could benefit immensely. India is today a nuclear power country (Mampilly, 2013). At the same time, the changing dynamics of national and global politics have made India, a once underdeveloped country, to become a member of the emerging economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Nigeria belongs to the group of developing countries known as the D8 (with Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, and Pakistan). Strengthening relations between the two countries becomes even more imperative since both nations are looking for avenues to promote their interests in an increasingly changing and interdependent global environment.

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Several concerns have been expressed as to why the Indian government is increasing its engagement of key African countries such as Nigeria. Even though Indians have been resident and taking part in the Nigerian economy for a long time, the Indian government has not been actively involved in Nigeria—considering the span of forty-five years of visits by the Indian leaders from 1962 to 2007. Concerns have also been expressed as to why the Indian government is back now and how the Indians perceive Nigeria in a changing world; the platforms for engagement; the nature of trade, investment, and other engagements. A book of this nature is therefore very important so as to critically examine the nature and dynamics of relations between the two countries at this time. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE QUEST TO REPOSITION NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA The engagements between Nigeria and India are defined by certain strategic interests. Obi (2010) believes that at the forefront of India’s foreign policy priorities as from the 1990s is energy security. The Indian economy has grown rapidly from the 1990s, and securing cheap energy and other strategic raw materials as well as markets on a long-term basis has become an economic and political imperative. It is projected that by 2030, India will be the world’s third-largest consumer of energy (Madan, 2006). Retrospectively, 75 percent of India’s oil imports came from the politically volatile Middle East. Notably, because India possesses few proven oil reserves, diversifying the sources of its energy supply by developing stronger economic ties with the African continent tops the political agenda (Sharma & Mahajan, 2007). With projections suggesting that India will depend on oil for almost 90 percent of its energy needs by the end of this decade, it is little wonder that energy security through the diversification of supplies is a key priority. Given Africa’s position as the last oil frontier, and Nigeria as Africa’s largest producer of oil, it is only strategic that India engages the continent, and Nigeria, in particular, in the pursuit of her energy security interests. This urgency is further elevated by the increasing scramble for African resources and markets by India, China, and the industrialized countries of Europe and America. Nigeria has also become a major attraction to Indian oil companies in recent years because its oil is of high quality, being low in sulfur, and because new discoveries were made offshore, extending to the Gulf of Guinea, away from potential conflict areas onshore such as the Niger Delta (Beri, 2005; Mishra, 2019). Second, Nigeria, given its huge population and the size of its economy in West Africa, has emerged as an important market for Indian goods and services,

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as well as a vital element in India’s quest for strategic minerals and other natural resources needed to feed its burgeoning economy. In this regard, the Indian private sector, with sufficient government support, has been active in expanding trade and investment in Nigeria to capture its market potential. India emerged as Nigeria’s biggest export destination for its crude oil since 2013 after the United States, the previous highest buyer, made a shift in crude oil demand by turning its attention to shale production. India, as the world’s third-largest oil importer is therefore an important market for Nigeria oil, which the country depends on as a major source of revenue to finance its national budget. Similarly, as a developing country, Nigeria is also interested in drawing lessons from the Indian experience, having moved up from an industrially underdeveloped state. It is also interested in drawing lessons from India’s experience in the areas of ICT, agriculture, pharmaceutical, as well as small- and medium-scale enterprises, with its huge potential for employment generation in Nigeria (Ashiru, 2012). The relationship between the two countries, though often described as cordial by officials of both countries (Eze, 2008), is not devoid of the national interests—economic, political, and strategic—that do converge and diverge at some point in time, and, also the competition that characterize the relations between states. Recent developments within the global environment and emerging challenges have necessitated Nigeria and India to work toward repositioning their bilateral relations with a view to responding to these critical challenges. Among these challenges are the increasing spate of the scourge of terrorism and insurgency, which have continued to undermine the stability, peace, and security of the two countries; and, the novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). These challenges have increasingly drawn the attention of these countries on the need to strengthen their cooperation at various levels. It is against this background that the book examines the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India in a changing world. What are the dynamics of bilateral relations between Nigeria and India? To what extent does contemporary engagements between Nigeria and India demonstrate elements of continuity or change and what are the implications for both countries? The focus of this book is not only to undertake a holistic and in-depth evaluation of Nigeria’s relations with India, but more so, it examines the dynamics of Nigeria’s relations with India, against the background of many changes that have taken place in the international environment, especially since the 1990s. SCOPE OF THE BOOK The book provides an incisive coverage of a number of issues in the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. It is divided into three parts and twelve chapters. The introduction provides a detailed background of Nigeria and India

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as strategic partners in Africa and also provided insights into the issues discussed in the book. Part I, “Contextual, Theoretical, and Historical Foundations of Nigeria–India Relations,” contains three chapters. Chapter 1 is an examination of the contexts of Nigeria and India relations, with a major focus on the domestic imperatives, foreign policy, and roles perceptions. While chapter 2 focuses on the conceptual and theoretical issues in Indo-Nigeria relations, chapter 3, The Eagle and Elephant: Evolution of Nigeria–India Relations,” examines the historical development of direct and indirect contacts between Nigeria and India, in the preindependence and postindependence era. Part II, which makes a strong case for leveraging on the economic relations between Nigeria and India, has four chapters. In chapter 4, the book examines trade as the fulcrum in Nigeria–India relations. This is followed by an examination of the investment relations between Nigeria and India in chapter 5. The major focus of this book in chapter 6 is to analyze the technical and consultancy cooperation, joint ventures, and role of Indian companies in Nigeria. Chapter 7 examines Nigeria– India cooperation in the agricultural sector. Part III, “Contemporary Dynamics in Nigeria–India Relations and Strategic Engagements,” contains five chapters. While chapter 8 dwells on Nigeria–India people-to-people relations, chapter 9 focuses on medical tourism and Indian investments in the Nigerian health sector. Chapter 10 focuses on the military cooperation and the contributions of Nigeria and India to international peacekeeping operations. While chapter 11 discusses Nigeria–India and the fight against terrorism and insurgency, chapter 12 is a reflection on Nigeria–India relations in the context of COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. The concluding section of the book examines elements of continuity and change in Nigeria–India bilateral relations. NOTES 1. National Population Estimates based on population census conducted in 2006 by the National Population Commission retrieved from https​:/​/ni​​geria​​nstat​​.gov.​​ng​/do​​ wnloa​​​d​/775​. 2. Nigeria’s population was estimated at 200,963,599 people in 2019 according to UN data. In a UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs report titled “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision” Nigeria was projected to be the world’s third most-populous country by the year 2050. Nigeria’s population is projected to overtake the United States before 2050, at which point it would become the third-largest country in the world next to only China and India. Retrieved from https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/d​​evelo​​pment​​/desa​​/publ​​ icati​​ons​/w​​orld-​​popul​​ation​​-pros​​pects​​-the-​​2​017-​​revis​​ion​.h​​tml 3. The population of India, which currently ranks as the second most populous country with 1.3 billion inhabitants, is expected to surpass China’s 1.4 billion citizens, by 2024. Retrieved from https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/d​​evelo​​pment​​/desa​​/publ​​icati​​ons​/w​​orld-​​ popul​​ation​​-pros​​pects​​-the-​​20​17-​​revis​​ion​.h​​tml.

Part I

CONTEXTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS

Chapter 1

The Contexts of Nigeria– India Relations Domestic Imperatives, Foreign Policy, and Role Perceptions

Strengthening the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India for mutual benefits requires deeper understanding of their domestic features, which inform the pattern of relations as well as the nature and structures of both the countries. Such domestic features discussed include the economy, politics, military, geo-demographic structure, and foreign policy of the two countries. These features, which to a large extent form the bedrock for the development of the countries’ capabilities, to a very large extent also, condition each country’s foreign relations. NIGERIA Geo-Demographic Structure One permanent factor that affects Nigeria’s foreign policy is its geography (Adetula, 2014). Geographically, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, consisting of 36 states, 774 local government areas, 6 geopolitical zones, and the federal capital territory in Abuja, has a total land of approximately 923,768 square kilometers or 356,667 square meters. It is the world’s twenty-ninth-largest sovereign state in terms of size (Adalemo & Baba, 1993, p.13). Nigeria is bounded in the West by the Benin Republic, in the East by Cameroun and Chad, in the North by the Republic of Niger, and its coast in the South lies on the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria lies roughly between longitude 3° and 15° east of the prime meridian and between latitudes 4° and 14° north of the equator. Its location 4° and 14° north of the equator puts it south of the part of the westerly winds in the 3

4

Chapter 1

north and almost out of the true equatorial doldrums, which lie to the south of Nigeria. Thus, this places the country in the heart of the trade winds belt with summer rains and winter drought. However, the country’s position in relation to the land and sea makes it face two directions—toward the land in the north and sea in the south. This geographical factor has a great influence upon Nigeria’s climate and vegetation terrain. Because of the rich vegetation and climate, there is virtually no part of the country that is uninhabitable (Mohammad, 1999, p.59). A situation, which not only made it impossible for a variety of agricultural activities but equally promoted economic activities, especially agriculture, which provides a means of livelihood for over 70 percent of the populace. Nigeria is endowed with abundant water resources, both underground and surface. The major rivers are the Niger and Benue rivers. The Niger drainage system is indeed among the top five largest in the tropics and has been the source of a major hydroelectric power generating system (Adalemo & Baba, 1993, p.70). It provides the country’s electricity requirement and that of some of her neighbors, such as Niger Republic. Demographically, population is one of the important determinants of power potential of a nation. Nigeria incontrovertibly is endowed with enormous human resources. It is the most populous Black country in the world, the most populous in West African subregion, the most populous in Africa, and the five most populous countries in the tropics. This rectangular position of Nigeria’s population has equally demonstrated that Nigeria is naturally endowed with huge human resources. With a population estimated at 193,392,517 million people in 2019 (National Populations Commission, 2019), Nigeria is not only the most populous nation in Africa and ranking eighth in the world but also has the largest population of black people in the world. Nigeria’s population is made up of more than 200 ethnic groups, 500 indigenous languages, and 3 major religions—Christianity, Islam, and traditional religion. The largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the Southeast, and the Yoruba in the Southwest. Nigeria’s geographical, ethnic, and cultural identity diversity is balanced by the country’s federalism which places emphasis on the federal system government and representation anchored on the six geopolitical zones, states, and different ethnic and cultural identities (KPMG & CII, 2015). Population has helped in projecting Nigeria’s image in international politics, particularly within the context of Africa. Nigeria’s population is one of the factors that have helped her to assume leadership role in Africa and in a way in becoming a spokesman for the latter among the comity of nations (Mohammad, 1999, p.60). Incontestably, the most important aspect of population is manpower provision, and manpower development is an aspect of economic capability which is an instrument of power and foreign policy.

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5

Domestic Economy Economic development, that is, the transformation of society from relatively underdeveloped structures to more productive ones that are able to meet the basic needs of the populace, remains a basic challenge to Nigeria. Unlike other domestic factors that influence foreign policy, economic factor is unarguably the most important (Ogwu & Olukoshi, 1991, p.16), because it is the strongest pillar that holds all the edifice of nations’ foreign policy activities. This is why since independence, economic development has remained the principal priority of successive Nigerian administrations. Nigeria is no doubt endowed with the human and natural resources to achieve economic development. Some of these natural resources have remained untapped and underdeveloped. The geographical location and size of the country coupled with relatively large population gave it greater development potentials relative to not only African states but even other countries of the south. Nigeria has a wealth of agricultural resources. Agriculture at independence was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, accounting for nearly 70 percent of the country’s GDP, with distribution and manufacturing at only 12.5 and 4.6 percent, respectively. Mining activities then contributed only 1 percent to the GDP. Oil at independence accounted for just 2.6 percent of Nigeria’s foreign earnings, but with its development had by 1974 provided 92.6 percent, rising further in 1985 to 97 percent (Okolo, 1988, p.3). More so, agriculture being the mainstay of the economy from 1960 to 1973 provided 80 percent of the export earnings and employment. With the development of the oil, agriculture suffered a chronic neglect and its contribution to national economy dropped significantly. As stated earlier, petroleum resources became the dominant source of government revenue. It is consequently a major source of strength for Nigeria economically. Oil is presently the dominant economic resource of Nigeria. Nigeria owes this to the large reserves and production of crude oil in relative terms is a member of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Since the discovery of oil in the 1970s, oil revenue contributes about 80 percent of revenue and 95 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings thereby entrenching a monoculture economy due to the neglect of other vital sectors of the economy by successive governments such as agriculture and manufacturing. The manufacturing sector’s contributions to the GDP are under 4 percent with over 80 percent of manufactured goods in Nigeria imported (Onuoha, Ichite & George, 2019). Disruptions and fluctuations in international oil prices drastically reduced the national revenue and depleted foreign reserves. Crude oil prices began to decline since June 2014, when it was US$115 a barrel (The Economist Magazine, December 8, 2014). The price fell from US$42.90 a barrel to as low as US$30 in 2015. These developments undermined the

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country’s capacity to pursue its foreign policy. According to Amuwo (2016), oil became a veritable foreign policy tool during the 1970s, as seen in the active foreign policy thrusts of the Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo military government (1975–1979) and, to a lesser extent, that of Yakubu Gowon, notably post-Civil War and Mohammed/Obasanjo’s immediate predecessor (1966–1975). Oil boom of the 1970s not only accelerated economic growth in Nigeria but also served as a key instrument of foreign policy. It was this oil wealth that relatively put Nigeria into a position of “Giant” of Africa. It was the relative oil wealth that informed Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Chad republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and also the donations to disaster-stricken countries like Niger Republic, Somalia, and others. Oil wealth also made Nigeria to champion the course of African emancipation, liberation, and democratization in African countries like South Africa under apartheid regime, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe. More than a decade now despite Nigeria’s endowment with both oil and gas, fuel scarcity has continued to threaten the economy of the country owing to bad management of the production, refining, and distribution of the products. Worse still the country is importing fuel for domestic use. Oil which is a source of revenue, and a strong foreign policy variable, has now become a burden for the country. Despite the enormous oil revenue, the country was caught in a huge dilemma of economic crisis due to poor management of the national economy and corruption. Since 1999, there have been significant efforts toward attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Nigerian economy. However, the World Bank (WB) Ease of Doing Business 2020 Report ranked Nigeria 131 out of 190 countries on the World Bank Doing Business Index (CNN, 2021). Even so, the Nigerian government has continued to review, update, and/or introduce new policies to create an enabling environment. The government amended the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) in 2020 to replace CAMA 1990. In the banking sector, Nigeria adopted Basel I, II, and III, Guidelines for Whistle Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry (2014); Code of Corporate Governance for Other Financial Institutions (2020); Financial Act 2019; and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011. Towards creating resilient public companies in Nigeria, the Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria of 2011 was introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Even though the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) was established since 2003, NEITI continued to achieve milestones, including publishing its oil and gas report for 2018 in March 2020. The telecommunication industry in Nigeria is one sector that has recorded significant growth and development through effective implementation of laws and regulations. The most recent being the Code of

The Contexts of Nigeria–India Relations

7

Corporate Governance for the Telecommunication Industry 2016 issued by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC). Other policies initiated by the Nigerian government to promote an enabling business environment include the Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council (PEBEC) 2016; the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) as a Medium-Term Plan for 2017–2020; Nigeria Open Data Policy 2018; the new Immigration Regulations 2017; adoption of the African Passport and Visa on Arrival (VOA) Scheme for Nigeria; and Nigeria’s signing of the ACFTA in July 2019. The informal sector/small- and medium-scale enterprises that remain dominant in the Nigerian economy, however, continue to face critical challenges of start-up. Toward supporting funding of small business, Nigeria introduced Funding Small Businesses through the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEEP) which includes MarketMonie, TraderMonie, and FarmerMoni. Political History and Governance Nigeria has a very long political history that spans the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial era. It is worthy to note that though several empires, kingdoms, and other political arrangements had existed within her geographical area even before the arrival of colonialist, Nigeria as a country was created by the British colonial power. Like India, Nigeria achieved her independence after a prolonged struggle by the nationalists, which led to series of constitutional amendments. Nigeria achieved independence from the British colonial power on October 1, 1960. After independence, the federal state was headed by military and civilian administrations. Its former heads of state include Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, General Yakubu Gowon, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, General Murtala Ramat Mohammed/General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Muhammadu Buhari, General Ibrahim Babangida, Chief Ernest Shonekan (Interim National Government), General Sani Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President Umaru Yar Adua (died on May 5, 2010) succeeded by his deputy, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and President Muhammadu Buhari, whose tenure in office is constitutionally to end by 2023. Nigeria operates a federal constitution, and like India, the country is also a republic. In the first republic, a parliamentary system of government modeled after Britain was practiced. It had a president who assumed essentially ceremonial and symbolic powers. He appointed the prime minister and other key officers of the state on the advice of the prime minister. Executive powers were invested in the prime minster and his cabinet (ministers). There were also two legislative houses: the House of Representatives, that is the lower house, and the Senate, which is the upper house. Constitutionally, the two

8

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houses exercised the lawmaking powers of the country at the national level. There was also the judiciary. Logically, from the preceding discussion, it is clear that there were three arms of government: the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Although the functions of each of these were clearly spelled out, yet there was considerable fusion or overlap among the three. The 1979 Constitution gave birth to the second republic and provided for a presidential system of government. The presidential system of government has remained the system of government enshrined under the 1999 Constitution. Under this system, the president holds executive powers. The governors, at the state level, exercised similar executive powers. The judiciary has the traditional functions of law application and interpretation. While the State Houses of Assembly make the laws at the state level, the National Assembly makes the laws at the national level. The constitution equally granted independence to the judiciary, which is a normal procedure under a presidential system of government. Domestic Security Challenges The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in section 217 (1) states that there shall be an armed force for the federation which shall consist of an army, a navy, an air force, and such other branches of the armed forces of the federation as may be established by an act of the National Assembly for the purpose of: 1. defending Nigeria from external aggression; 2. maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, and air; 3. suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly; and 4. performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. The previous section of the Constitution clearly underscores the traditional functions of the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military is comprised of the army as the land branch, the navy forming the sea branch, and the air force as the air branch. Since independence in 1960s, the basic provisions of national security, defense, and self-preservation have been the priorities of successive Nigerian governments. Following the civil war, Nigeria realized the need to reorder and adequately equip the military. The size of the Nigerian armed forces was increased from its pre-war level and defense expenditures have also increased. The point is

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that the Nigerian military has undergone transformation over the years. From a small, modestly equipped and compliant military inherited at independence, the Nigerian military has in the past five decades into a relatively more professional security body going by its modest contributions to internal, regional, and global security. To some extent, it was because of this development that the military establishment has performed peacekeeping roles (Agwai, 2007, p.146). The Nigerian military like many institutions in Nigeria has its share of challenges that affected its professionalism (Agwai, 2010). The successive coup d’état in the country, beginning with January 1966 to 1998, have claimed many experienced and inexperienced personnel from the Nigerian military. This had implications in terms of reducing their size and efficiency. Equally, the extent of politicization of the Nigerian military demonstrates the extent of its diversion from their traditional and constitutional functions. Thus, there are many variables that determine the capability of the military such as quality of their training, equipment, morale, ability to mobilize at short notice, the capability of intelligence service, technical skills, and industrial capacity. There is no doubt that the military needs to be properly funded, equipped, and trained. That withstanding, Akinyemi (1987) has argued that the total resources that should be channeled to the military are gauged in terms of some basic variables such as the country’s Gross National Product (GNP), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the National Budget; comparison with other sectors like education, health, and so on as an indication of the relative priorities in the allocation of scarce resources; and expenditure on arms imports as a percentage of the country’s total imports. Since military capability is incontestably a sine qua non to successful execution of foreign policy objectives, Nigeria must as a matter of importance modernize all her military programs, education, training and equipment, and hardware development. Nigeria should develop a national military-industrial complex with a critical role of locating a viable, productive capacity and military capability. Therefore, the economy must be developed in order to meet the demands of modern military capability and requirements. Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the country has been confronted with numerous, political, economic, and security challenges. The situation which Nigeria found herself necessitated a reexamination of its domestic and external environments and to prioritize its international engagements. Within the domestic environment, since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed ethno-religious violence, and communal and political conflicts of varying intensity and magnitude. Added to these are the farmers-herders clashes, cybercrimes, armed robberies, armed banditry, kidnappings for ransom (K4R), and cattle rustling, ethnic militias, militant and religious-fundamentalist groups, which posed serious threats to national security and a major challenge to public policy (Campbell, 2018). The

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most worrisome was the outbreak of the Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria in 2009. Boko Haram (Western Education is Sin), officially known as Jama atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda a Waati Wal Jihad, in Arabic (meaning— ‘people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad’) has perpetrated numerous human rights abuses and shows contempt for life (Abubakar & Wapmuk, 2020). These security threats within the domestic environment have necessitated the deployment of military troops to the trouble spots within the country. Within the external environment, particularly in Africa and West Africa, Nigeria also needed to rethink and prioritize its engagements. The insecurity unleashed by the Boko Haram in the Northeast necessitated the reactivation of the Multinational Joint Tax Force (MNJTF) in collaboration with neighboring countries of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Following the operationalization of the MNJTF with troops from these countries, tremendous gains have been recorded in the fight against the Boko Haram as most territories previously controlled by the terrorists have been recaptured and many people rescued. Apart from the Northeast, Nigerian troops are also deployed to the oil-rich Niger Delta region in the South–South which continues to experience threat of militancy and oil theft. The problem of militancy had subsided following the introduction of the Amnesty Programme in 2009 by the administration of late president Musa Yar’Adua. However, the return of such militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) has necessitated troop deployment to protect oil facilities and innocent citizens from violent attacks. Foreign Policy There is a deep understanding that from inception in 1960, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by elements of continuity and change. Accordingly, while foreign policy can be seen as a continuous process, occasional changes and adjustments do come along depending on the priorities of government in power. The government in power may choose to improve on the styles, methods, and strategies to drive or achieve the foreign policy objectives and goals. With the absorption of Nigeria as the ninety-ninth member of the United Nations and as a key player in the international system after achieving independence in 1960, the pioneers and architects of Nigeria’s foreign relations clearly and vividly enunciated the principles and objectives to the country’s foreign policy. From the period of Nigeria’s independence, under the government of the late prime minister Tafawa Balewa, the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy were defined in clear terms as aimed at achieving the national interest. Though what is the national interest is subject to debate, there is some consensus that it covers the political, social, cultural, economic, military, and security interests of the country. Africa is often

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defined as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Accordingly, Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy has been upheld by various regimes. That is not to say that the priorities have been the same. Each government has had distinctive priorities and style. The consistency of Nigeria’s Africa policy and its continuity by various regimes has been aptly described by Professor Gambari, former external affairs minister and Nigeria’s former representative to the United Nations as “Three Concentric Circles.” The three concentric circles put “Nigeria’s interest first, the West African subregion second, and the rest of Africa third.” To achieve this goal, Nigeria has devoted both human and material resources towards the pursuit of liberation, continental peace and enduring unity in Africa. By virtue of her size and population, Nigeria has always seen herself as a leader in Africa. Beginning with the Tafawa Balewa government, the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy was spelled out in the following terms: 1) the sovereign equality of all African states; 2) the respect for independence, sovereign and territorial integrity of all African states; 3) non-interference in internal affairs of other African states; 4) commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African Unity; 5) total eradication of racism and colonialism from Africa. The Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979 and 1999 did not depart from the objectives outlined previously. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria outlines the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy as follows: (a) promotion and protection of national interests; (b) promotion of African Integration and support for African unity; (c) promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication; and (e) promotion of a just world order. The provision for the promotion of African integration and support for African unity clearly indicates a strengthening of policy on African integration, while the provision on the promotion of a just world order indicates a willingness to cooperate with other countries of the South in challenging

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global structures of inequality. A review here will help to shed light on the direction of the country’s foreign policy under various administrations. During the Tafawa Balewa administration the type of foreign policy pursued by Nigeria was said to characterize by devotion to African issues. But the regime was accused of being pro-Western. The immediate postcolonial character of the state created that impression, and the national elite viewed the West, Britain in particular, as a dependable ally. It took the events of the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) to debunk this misplaced perception. For instance, Nigeria played an indecisive role in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Again, Nigeria was the dissenting voice in 1965 when the Organization of African Unity Ministerial Council took the unanimous decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain if she failed to suppress the rebellion in southern Rhodesia. Even after the end of the Balewa government following a military coup d’état in 1966, Nigeria remained committed to liberation of Africa. The Yakubu Gowon’s administration was committed to liberation struggles in Africa through shuttle diplomacy. Following the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria’s influence in Africa increased greatly, earning her a place in the Organization of African Unity (OAU)’s Committee on Mediation, especially on border issues (Moyosore, 1990, p.35). In the area of economic relations, Nigeria’s efforts culminated in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975. Since then, Nigeria has acted as the pivot of this organization. The Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo regime gave African affairs its pride of place in foreign policy and foreign relations. Though Nigeria had always asserted that Africa is the cornerstone of its foreign policy, it was only during the Murtala/Obasanjo regime that the country maintained a militant-oriented foreign policy, which sought to dictate the pace and direction of progress on the continent. It was the resolute support of this regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that led to Angola’s independence in 1975. Demonstrating the same assertive Pan-African disposition, the Obasanjo regime opposed British arrogance over Zimbabwe’s independence. This subsequently led to the unanticipated nationalization of the Shell BP on the eve of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1977. Nigeria’s tough stance at the conference under Obasanjo hastened the Lancaster House negotiation which led to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1970. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria launched the South African Relief Fund (SARF) in December 1976 and donated ₦2.5 million to this fund. Nigeria also cosponsored the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid (WCAAA) in Lagos between August 22 and 27, 1977 (Aluko, 1978). In fact, between 1975 and 1976 Nigeria did much for the needy African states (Akinboye, 2005). For example, she extended aid to the Sahelian states

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through Sudan and Egypt; gave ₦20 million to Angola in late 1975; gave ₦2.5 million to Mozambique in late 1976; was the second target contributor to the OAU budget after Libya with 7.6 percent contribution; and contributed 13 percent of the equity shares of the African Development Bank (ADB) and gave a loan of ₦50 million to the bank in 1975 to supplement its financial resources to assist the less fortunate countries of Africa (Aluko, 1978). On the whole, the Murtala/Obasanjo interregnum was characterized by positive African foreign policy. In fact, this period has been described by observers as a “Watershed” in the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Under the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari, Nigeria still professed its commitment to Africa which she articulated as the strengthening of African solidarity, promotion of peace and stability in Africa, support of the rights of peoples to self-determination, and unwavering support for the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. The short but dynamic Buhari/Idiagbon interregnum, like the others, continued with the policy of prioritizing African affairs and could be credited with dynamism in its foreign policy. There was some element of realism to the government’s approach on foreign affairs. This was clearly evident in its quest at strengthening the domestic economy. The Babangida administration, which took over from Buhari after a successful coup d’état in 1985, continued with the objective of strengthening the economy with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986 (Ogwu & Olukoshi, 1991). It also instituted a program of social and political transition. Elected officials were successfully installed at the local and state levels, and representatives were subsequently elected to the parliament, a largely successful presidential elections were also held only to be annulled at the very last stage of declaring the winner by the military government of Ibrahim Babangida. Chief Moshood Abiola purportedly won the presidential elections, but was denied his mandate. However, the comparatively long administration (1985–1993) of this government by Nigerian standards could be credited with having played a very crucial and novel role in regional peacekeeping and conflict resolution through its efforts in West Africa. Nigeria spearheaded the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in the Liberian crisis after unending bloodletting by the opposing forces. Nigeria’s mediatory role in conflict situations involving Sierra Leone–Liberia, Togo–Ghana, Burkina Faso–Mali, and the Liberian crisis in many ways succeeded in averting damaging wars in the continent (Babangida, 1992). It also introduced the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Scheme to assist African and black nations lacking in personnel with capacity building, and the program has been sustained and been successful. Since then, TAC has remained as one of the arrowheads of Nigeria’s foreign relations and a major instrument for the promotion of South–South Cooperation (SSC).

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It was, not surprising when Sani Abacha sacked the Interim National Government (ING) in 1985 after “a palace coup” and assumed the reins of power. The Abacha government was largely preoccupied with maintaining power or regime survival, and therefore did little on the foreign scene apart from continuing with some of the foreign policy objectives pursued by the previous governments (Agbu, 2001). Notable, however, was that the government by its actions or inactions turned Nigeria into a pariah nation among the comity of nations as a result of its poor human rights records. However, the regime made a policy shift away from the West to Asia-courting countries like China, North Korea, and Libya (Agbu, 2001). This situation did not last for long, as a policy somersault occurred after the sudden demise of Sani Abacha, and the emergence of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (Agbu, 2001). He quickly tried to stabilize the Nigerian polity by addressing and redressing, where possible, the human rights abuses that occurred under the previous government and succeeded in getting their support and assistance for a political transition program between 1998 and 1999. The outcome of this was the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as president of Nigeria under controversial circumstances. Olusegun Obasanjo was to take Nigeria’s foreign to dimensions never seen before through a combination of shuttle diplomacy and pragmatic engagement with the advanced developed countries (Agbu, 2001). Nonetheless, it is right to assume that while the underlying principles governing Nigeria’s foreign policy subsisted, the character of Nigeria’s foreign policy and engagements changed radically under Obasanjo (Agbu, 2001). Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule on May 29, 1999, after a long period of governance by the military opened a new chapter in the history of the country. The implication of this development for Nigeria’s foreign relations is important, especially when juxtaposed with the foreign policy style of the previous military administrations. Again, the economic scenario substantially changed with the deepening of economic globalization, and economic reforms in various sectors of the economy. Since Nigeria’s return to civil governance, one of the most crucial dimensions of its national interest has been the consolidation of its hard-won democracy. Perhaps, it is the realization of the above imperatives that caused President Obasanjo to embark on numerous trips abroad that was described by scholars as “shuttle diplomacy” (Agbu, 2001). Though many observers of Nigeria’s international relations were critical of this shuttle diplomacy, the government succeeded in improving the country’s national image, attracting FDI, and in recovering a significant portion of the looted monies lodged in foreign bank accounts. Furthermore, the country succeeded in preventing the emergence or escalation of conflicts in Africa. Examples abound from Nigeria’s interventions in Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola, Cameroun, Ethiopia–Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo,

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Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sudan (Agbu, 2001). President Obasanjo also represented the face of the new set of African leaders with a sense of history, a better view of the constraints and challenges facing Africa, and leaders with the political will to implement sustainable development programs in the continent (Tyoden, 2011). This was eventually articulated in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria once again became a respected leader in Africa, a strong voice in the Commonwealth, and a credible advocate for the United Nations. She has continued to play vital roles toward the realization of the objectives of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD (Tyoden, 2011). Specific instances in which Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo was instrumental in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts around Africa include Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan (Tyoden, 2011). The Obasanjo regime also launched a campaign for debt relief, which was been globally acclaimed and yielded for Nigeria the cancellation of over US$18 billion of her debt to the Paris Club and later exit of Nigeria from its indebtedness to the London Club of Creditors (Ogwu & Alli, 2007). Though this achievement was roundly acknowledged and applauded, it also had its critics, who felt that no matter how rich or capable a country is, it should not pay so much ($17 billion) in order to get out of debt all at once. Obasanjo’s government generally introduced measures to revitalize the economy in order to create an enabling environment that encourages investment by fighting anti-corruption. This campaign that saw government ministers, state governors, and top government officials punished for corrupt enrichment also led to the abolition of decrees and regulation which had constrained the inflow of foreign investment as well as the generation of opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investment (Ogwu & Alli, 2007). On the issue of attracting FDIs, for example, though significant investments had come into the country under this administration, it was observed that these were mainly in the oil and gas sector, rather than, say, agriculture and solid minerals sectors. This notwithstanding, Nigeria remained among the top recipients of FDI between 1999 and 2003. In 2003, for instance, she received a total of US$1,200 million in FDI generating profit remittances worth US$1,316, with a cumulative total of US$12.387 billion worth of FDI (Agbu, 2007). The Nigerian economy benefited a whopping US$3.2 billion in 2005 as remittances from Nigeria living abroad. This was a 100 percent increase over the 1998 figure of US$1.15 billion (Global Economic Prospects, 2006). Also, the country’s foreign reserves grew to an all-time high of US$34 billion, the highest in Africa over the review period (Obieri, 2006, p.19). This prompted Goldman Sachs, a leading investment bank, to

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forecast the possibility of Nigeria becoming the eleventh-largest economy in the world by 2050. The foreign policy thrust of the Yar’ Adua/Jonathan administration is a logical continuation of the foreign policy under the previous government. Whereas, foreign policy under the Obasanjo government was aimed at rehabilitating Nigeria, and getting the country back into the committee of nations, under Yar’ Adua it is focused on the protection of citizens interest (Agbu, 2008, p.12). There is no doubt that this presents a great challenge. The Jonathan administration focused on attraction of FDI with a view to creating jobs and wealth creation. With respect to Nigeria’s foreign policy at the terminal phase of the Jonathan administration, it is clear that the government had to confront many domestic challenges, among which insecurity especially in the Northeast stood out. The challenges of insecurity posed by the Boko Haram terrorism in the northeastern part of the country was a major source of concern for the Nigerian government. This no doubt had serious implications for the country’s quest for FDI and international image, especially following the kidnapping of the Chibok girls (Agbu, 2008). Nigeria faced a situation where it had to fight against insurgency and yet strong reluctance of Western countries, notably the United States, to provide foreign military support and to sell military equipment to Nigeria to wage war on the Boko Haram. Another notable feature of the terminal phase of the Jonathan administration was the abrupt crash in international oil prices, which drastically reduced the national revenue and depleted foreign reserves. These developments undermined the country’s capacity to pursue its foreign policy. Closely linked to the country’s economic challenges is the problem of endemic and institutionalized corruption, a phenomenon which undermined national development, fostered negative image abroad, and reduced its ability to successfully wage the war against the Boko Haram. Nigeria’s foreign policy under Buhari is reflective of the domestic concerns including insecurity, corruption, economic dependency, power and energy crisis, high rate of unemployment, poor infrastructure, and health issues, among others. These stem from the fact a dynamic foreign policy requires a solid and functional domestic base. However, in the context of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the domestic agenda that inevitably impinge on Nigeria’s foreign policy are the need to combat terrorism and other sources of national insecurity, a sustained and dispassionate fight against corruption, and a purposeful economic action plan that will prioritize economic diversification with a specific focus on agriculture and solid minerals, infrastructural development. In the economic sphere, there is need for a foreign policy approach that is geared toward achieving the country’s national interest. It is pertinent to utilize the goodwill that the country is currently enjoying under President Buhari to attract favorable economic relationships, including

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FDIs and sustained capital inflows, especially with the volatility of oil prices and staggering budget deficits. So far, engagements with emerging powers such as India and China are beginning to yield positive dividends. In addition, greater opportunities abound for intra-African trade, which could be tapped through increased engagements with African countries, especially following the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA). While significant achievements were recorded by the government of President Buhari in the area of security, specifically in the fight against the Boko Haram in his first one year, Nigeria’s internal security witnessed serious decline in subsequent years as kidnappings, armed banditry, and terrorism became pervasive. The president focused on strengthening relations with Nigeria’s neighbors and to jointly fight the Boko Haram. This was done by relocating the Nigerian military command to Borno state, strengthening the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and placing the same under the leadership of Nigeria. Furthermore, on combating insecurity, Buhari’s foreign policy sought to further strengthen cooperation and partnerships at the regional, continental, and global levels. The security summit, organized by the office of the National Security Adviser, which was attended by France, United States, Britain, neighboring countries, and other major stakeholders, speaks to this point (Strategic Comments, 2016). As discussed, it is clear that the character of leadership as well as personality of the leader in power could attract goodwill and may also impact on the foreign policy drive of the administration. The perception of President Muhammadu Buhari as a disciplined, astute, and courageous leader garnered goodwill for the country leading to engagements with the international community in the areas of security, trade and investment, anti-corruption, and energy, among others (Bukarambe, Agbu, Wapmuk & Ilesanmi, 2020). Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari, even though devoid of the usual official sloganeering, anchored on the three pillars that constitute the domestic priority programs of the administration. These priority areas include combating insecurity, the fight against corruption, the rejuvenation of the ailing domestic economy, and job creation. A careful reading of these issue areas reveals the administration’s understanding of, and sensitivity to, the nature and dynamics of the domestic and foreign policy challenges that it inherited from the previous administration, and its determination to employ the instrument of foreign policy and diplomacy in tackling these challenges (Bukarambe, Agbu, Wapmuk & Ilesanmi, 2020). Recently the rise of new powers such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil among others necessitated Nigeria to reconsider its strategic engagements with the West. Nigeria has engaged these new powers at various levels. For instance, Nigeria–India relations that is often described as warm and friendly has received great attention, leading to more visits on both sides since Nigeria

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returned to democracy as well as economic, military, and cultural exchanges. Some have maintained that Nigeria ought to be more concerned with her domestic well-being. Nigeria’s Roles in West Africa and Africa As previously stated, Nigeria is a major player in West Africa and African continent. In the past, two critical issues dominated Nigeria’s foreign policy discourse and engagement. These are decolonization and the struggle against apartheid and racism in South Africa. These two political problems have been resolved and Nigeria played a major role in ending these ills through direct and indirect support, especially funding of liberation committee of the OAU and direct grants to the Liberation movements in southern Africa and Guinea-Bissau. Post-decolonization and apartheid foreign policy of Nigeria now revolves around the issues of rapid economic development at home and using foreign policy to achieve this (Tyoden, 2011). Other critical issues are economic integration in West Africa, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping in West Africa’s trouble spots. Other areas of foreign policy include the transformation of OAU to AU; democratization in West Africa as foreign policy goal; setting up continental institutions for political and economic integration; the issue of attraction of FDI; rapid economic development in Africa; the institutionalizing of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under the NEPAD and the politics of the UN reforms and Nigeria’s desire for a permanent membership of the Security Council (Tyoden, 2011). Apart from these, there are other issues that are important to Nigeria’s foreign policy; particularly, Nigeria has maintained her commitment of south issues through her membership of South–South groups such as the Group of 77 (G-77), NAM, and Group of 15 (G-15). Nigeria continues to play meaningful roles in the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations and its agencies, and seeking a just world order and African interest at the Conferences of Parties on the UN Convention on Climate Change (COP UNCCC). The Nigerian military has over the years made outstanding contributions to the promotion of regional and global peace through its active role in peacekeeping and peace support operations. This started with the United Nations Operations in the Congo in 1960. That was before the country became a republic in 1963. The Nigerian Army was part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 1978 to 1982 and also led the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1983. In 1990, Nigeria provided leadership for the ECOWAS subregional force named ECOMOG that undertook the restoration of peace in Liberia. The mission which was essentially for peacekeeping was later transformed to peace enforcement. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG operated in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2000.

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Some of the other operations undertaken by the Nigerian military include United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), Liberia again in 2003 as ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and now the ongoing as United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and United Nation-African Union Mission in Sudan (UNAMID), and African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) (Adesoji, 2015; Agwai, 2007). The conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), assisted by diplomatic missions abroad, and supervised by the country’s president as the chief executive. The MFA operates at different levels of engagement and volume of transactions, which include, but not limited to, the headquarters, an extensive network of diplomatic and Consular Missions overseas, the Home Service, Regional Institutions, and a myriad of multinational and international organizations. In addition, because of the nature of its national and international assignment as well as engagements, the MFA works closely with other MDAs, foreign countries, international organizations, and institutions. In the MFA, the Department of International Organization (DIO), operating complementarily with both the African Multilateral Affairs Department (AMAD) and the country’s diplomatic missions located in the headquarters of prominent international organizations to which Nigeria belongs, is the core network responsible for the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy (Akindele, 2013, p.4). The MFA, which was established in 1957 as a Department in the Cabinet Office, under the direct supervision of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was charged with the responsibility of articulating, formulating, and conducting Nigeria’s foreign policy. The MFA as it is presently called was known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations (1960–1963) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) (1963–1992) (Akindele, 2005, p.51). Since its establishment more than sixty years ago, the MFA has undergone various reforms in response to the growing demands of Nigeria’s national interest as well as the changing domestic and international environment.

INDIA Geo-Demographic Structure The Country, India, is officially known as Republic of India, but it is also called in Hindi “Bharat Ganarajya.” India, described as a subcontinent in the region of Southern Asia with the capital in New Delhi, is formed as a union

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of states and territories. It is the seventh largest and the second most populous country in the world after China (Pankar, 1960, p. 351). It covers an area of 1,261,810 square miles or 3,268.90 square kilometers, with a land frontier of 9,425 miles and a coastline of 3,535 miles (New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.6, p. 283). India shares borders with Pakistan to the West; Bhutan, the People’s Republic of China, and Nepal in the vicinity of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, while India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands share maritime border with Thailand and the Indonesian Island of Sumatra in the Andaman Sea. Mainland India is bounded by the Indian Ocean on the South, the Arabian Sea on the West, and the Bay of Bengal on the East (Kumar, Pathak, Pednekar, Raju, & Gowthaman, 2006, p.530). This location places India into a direct contact with other countries of the world. With Indian Ocean in the South and Atlantic Ocean bounding Nigeria also in the South, the two countries have great advantage of developing trade relations among themselves. India’s climate is governed by the tropical monsoon; consequently, it has four seasons: winter or cold weather, the pre-monsoon season, the rainy (monsoon) season, and the season of post-monsoon or the retreating southwest monsoon (Chang, 1967). Rainfall varies from an annual average of 450 inches (11,430 mm) to less than 4 inches (100 mm) annually. Temperature also varies primarily with elevation; at hill stations in the Himalayan region, annual average temperatures range between 54°F and 57°F (12° and 14°) and in the rest of the country between 79°F and 83°F (26°C and 29°C). The implication of this is that almost three-fifths of the India’s total land is arable and a fourth of the cultivated land is irrigated. And one-fourth of the country is forested, supporting wild life (New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.6: 283). Like Nigeria, India has great rivers that rise in the mountains and which play an important role in the lives of the people of India. Examples are Indus, Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Irrawaddy. This made the development of agriculture, especially irrigation, remarkably possible. Except in the mountainous areas of the Himalaya and desert, all parts of India are habitable. The geographical location of the country made some observers to call it a subcontinent. India is not only recognized because of its large territory, it is also the second most populous country in the world after China. The 1971 census gave the population of India at approximately 550 million. In 1983, the population had risen to 730.5 million. More so, India’s population as at 1990 was 853,373,000, which is about one-sixth of the world’s population and it rose to about 1.2 billion people, which was second most populous country in the world next to China (Government of India—Census of India, 2011). In terms of demography, India’s population has been beneficial in the provision of enough workforce and military personnel for the country. A key feature of the vast Indian population in the mid-1960s was that about two-fifths of the populace was under fifteen (Agarwala, 1967, p. 53). Analysis of India’s

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population, in the 1980s, was that of pessimism. The Indian p­ opulation was seen as a liability by burdening the working population with the provision of adequate health services, food, and education. Large population was also seen as burden because then rapid population was seen as reducing the cultivable land area per person. For example, in 1961, with a total arable land of 175 million hectares, and a population of 361,100,000, this was half a hectare (one-and-a-quarter area) per individual reduced to less than one-fifth of a hectare (half an acre) per individual (Brian, 1981, p. 107). It was argued that by 1999, the picture would be terrible if nothing was done. The thinking was that perhaps children born after 1990 would not get any cultivable area in India. That was why the Indian government with international assistance had been vigorously promoting family planning known as Family Welfare, since 1977. The government increased funding of programs involving family planning education and birth control methods and information. But in spite of all these measures, India’s birth rate remained higher than the world average. Its death rate was equal to the world’s average, which was equally high for India’s expanding economy to provide marked gains in per capita measures of economic well-being for the majority of the population (Brian, 1981, p.109). India in the last sixty years has witnessed rapid population increase due to several factors which include the massive increase in food production following the green revolution, the medical advances, and the growth of the economy. The population distribution, according to the 2001 Census, had about 285 million Indians living in the urban areas, while more than 70 percent of Indians living in the rural areas. It also notes that India’s literacy rate was 64.8 percent, with about 75.3 percent for males and 53.7 percent for females. Government and Politics India like Nigeria was colonized by Britain. While India achieved her independence much earlier in August 1947, Nigeria became independent much later in October 1960. India’s nonviolence strategy adopted by its great nationalists such as Mahatma Gandhi in the struggle for independence not only influenced but equally inspired Nigerian nationalist to adopt constitutional and peaceful strategies in the course of struggle for Nigeria’s independence. This provided a bedrock for the development of the future political relations between Nigeria and India. Constitutionally, India is a Union of States and like Nigeria, it is also a federation. Structurally, the two countries have certain things in common. Although a Union, India is a federation in practical structures; the federation/union of India consists of twenty-eight states and eight union territories (Bhambhri, 1992, p.122). According to the Indian Constitution which came

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into force on January 26, 1950, the Union Executive, or what in Nigeria called the federal or central government, consists of the prime minister, the president, and the council of ministers. India operates a parliamentary system of government, with prime minister having the executive powers and the president with ceremonial and symbolic powers. The president is elected indirectly by an electoral college consisting of elected members of both houses of parliament and the legislative assemblies of the states. He appoints the prime minister as the head of government. The prime minister exercises most of the executive powers. In the Indian parliamentary system, the executive is subordinate to the legislature, with the prime minister and his council being directly responsible to the lower house of the parliament. The legislature or parliament of India is bicameral. The Upper House called Rajya Sabha is also known as the Council of States and the Lower House called Lok Sabha is also known as the House of People. The Rajya Sabha is a permanent body consisting of 245 members serving staggering six-year term. Most of its members are indirectly elected by the state and territorial legislatures in proportion to the state’s population (Bhambhri, 1992). The Lok Sabha on the other hand consists of 545 members out of which 543 are directly elected by popular vote to represent individual constituencies for five-year term, while the remaining two are nominated by the president from the Anglo-Indian community. India has three arms of government: the executive, the legislative (parliament), and the judiciary (Appadorai, 1974, p.409). Constitutionally, the powers of these three are diffused. This is due to the parliamentary system of government being practiced by the state. Although the powers/ functions of each arm are clearly defined in the constitution, in practice the powers are interwoven and interconnected. Consequently, there is an inherent checks and balances in the working of the democratic government (Appadorai, 1974). Politically, since independence in 1947, India has never experienced military intervention. That is why India is described as the largest democracy in the world. Though in Indian politics, the two largest political parties have been the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), for most of the years since independence, the federal government has been guided by the INC (Bhambhri, 1992, p.118). India has over 600 million voters, 650 political parties, and more than 6,000 candidates at any elections. Over the years, the INC enjoyed a parliamentary majority. The INC was out of power between 1977 and 1980. During this period, the Janata Party won the election owing to public discontent because of accusation of corruption leveled against the then-prime minister Indira Gandhi. In 1989, the Janata Dal–led National Front coalition in alliance with the Left Front coalition won the elections but only stayed in power for only two years. As the 1991 elections gave no political party a majority, “the Indian National Congress (INC)

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formed a minority government under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and was able to complete its five-year term” (Bhambhri, 1992, p.120). The government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao was credited with the introduction of major reforms in the early 1990s that further saw to the liberalization of the economy of India (Jha, 2002). The periods from 1996 to 1998 were not quite stable for Indian politics and democracy as the federal government was characterized by several short-lived alliances. The BJP government that was formed in 1996 was brief as it was followed by the United Front coalition that excluded the BJP and the INC. Again in 1998, the BJP, together with several other political parties, formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In the 2004 Indian election, the INC won the majority number of Lok Sabha seats and formed a government with a coalition called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), supported by various parties that were opposed to the BJP. In the 2009 general elections, the UPA again won the election and Manmohan Singh became the second prime minister since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962 to be elected twice after completing a full five-year term. In fact, these two democratic leaders have been instrumental in strategically position the foreign policy of India in such a way that due and special consideration is always being given to countries of the South. In the 2014 general election, the BJP was elected and Narendra Modi, former chief minister of Gujarat, became the prime minister. The BJP thus became the first political party since 1984 to win a majority and govern without the support of other parties. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was reelected in the 2019 general elections. National Economy The size of India’s population made some observers to posit that the state would be saddled with problems in the area of food shortage, leading to malnutrition and diseases. But on the contrary, the Indian agriculture has done the country proud by rising to the occasion to feed its population (Indian Perspective, 1993, p.24). This is, therefore, to say that agricultural development in the union had seen it casting off the shackles of dependence on food imports as well as transforming the country into a potential exporter. In spite of the growth of its population, the Union of India has become agriculturally a big international player in world economy. This is as a result of consequent of the various agricultural development programs initiated by successive governments in India. Significantly, although as at 1970s, India experienced relatively slow economic progress with her “per capita net domestic product at 1971 prices approximately 552 Rupees (US$75), one of the lowest per capita incomes of the world” (Indian Perspective, 1993, p.22), yet because of its sophisticated

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administrative and political, a well-equipped bureaucracy, large supply of educated workforce, relatively good transport, and communication system, India was able to surmount the challenge of feeding her rapidly growing population. To India and any other densely populated country, agriculture remains an important aspect of the economy. For India, this is not because of her good vegetation terrain and climatic conditions, but because development of her agriculture means adequately meeting the nutritional needs of the population in order to balance the population with other sectors’ need for manpower. A population that sinks in squalor is bound to naturally exterminate itself. This was why India introduced the Green Revolution and other economic programs in the mid-1960s. Following the success of the green revolution, India did not only achieve the goal of self-sufficiency in terms of food production but by the middle of the 1980s, “India virtually had mountains of food grains and was exploring the international market for exporting her surplus grains” (Indian Perspective, 1993, p. 23). Despite the rapid increase in population, the country has achieved selfsufficiency in food production. The significance of “a buffer stock of 23 million tonnes” was not realized till the worst drought that hit India in 1987. The irrigated areas have gone up from 22.6 million hectares to 57.8 million hectares. In 1968, Indian farmers produced about 6.6 million tons of wheat, while previous records show about 12.3 million tons. In 1993, the wheat output was around 58 million tons. It was this quantum jump in wheat and rice production that made Western farm experts to remark that it was nothing but a revolution taking place in the farmers’ fields in India (India Perspective, 1993, p.25). Paradoxically, the Operation Feed the Nation introduced by General Olusegun Obasanjo in the 1970s in Nigeria which aimed at achieving similar objectives with the Indian Green Revolution, did not change much about the agricultural production in the country. Instead, some years later, the country was importing more food items. Nigeria has lessons to draw from India’s experience in the agricultural sector. Another important feature of the Indian agricultural growth in the 1980s and 1990s was that it focused on the improvement of productivity rather than increase in the size of land area under cultivation. Logically, if increase in population could lead to scarcity of cultivable land, then productivity improvement in the scarce arable land could produce enough food to sustain the population adequately. India is a case in point. The production of oil seeds for instance witnesses an increase as an example of how agricultural production generally witnessed rapid development. The improvement of wheat and rice production was accompanied by spectacular rise in the output of edible oils after the establishment of technology mission on oil seeds. The production of oilseeds which stood in 1985–1986 at only 10.8 million tons rose

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up to 18.35 million tons in 1991–1992 and 20 million tons in 1992–1993. This led to the decline in the imports of edible oil from 0.16 million tons in 1991–1992. India even moved from importing edible oil to exporting the commodity as India’s export of oilseed products went up from Rs. 2,570 million in 1985–1986 to Rs. 11,900 in 1991–1992. Thus, this sector which had a foreign exchange outgo of Rs. 5,110 in 1985–1986 had become a net foreign exchange earner of Rs. 10.30 million in 1991–1992 (India Perspective, 1993, p. 25). The huge funds invested in the development of the sector further demonstrate the importance attached to agriculture by the Indian government. For example, the outlay for agriculture in the eighth plan had been fixed at Rs. 111,050 million. This marked an increase of Rs. 5,810 million over the seventh plan outlay. And the allocation for agricultural research and education was Rs. 13,000 million representing an increase of over 300 percent over the seventh outlay. More so, the 1993 India’s budget had given several other concessions to the agricultural sector. Import duty on various items of machinery use for agriculture, horticulture, forestry, poultry, and so on was drastically reduced (India Perspective, 1993, p. 25). It is pertinent to note that due to India’s geographical location, the country has rich natural endowments like good soil, sufficient water, plentiful sunshine, and diverse climate. Coupled with this is the potential of the available technology “which has not been fully exploited even as new technologies are being evolved to provide the necessary impetus to growth in production” (India Perspective, 1993:25). This was why the agricultural sector was in 1993 challenged to meet the projected requirements of 225 million tons of food grains by the end of 2000. India is well endowed with mineral resources. The country has vast reserves of coal and one-seventh of the total iron ore reserves of the world. India also has large reserves of manganese ore. This is why mineral production and export earnings have over the years been moving upward (ICSIR, 1970, p.2). Enormous mineral reserves did not favor India in terms of petroleum (Wadia, 1957, p.85). India, because of her low oil output, imports more than 60 percent of her crude oil requirement. So, of the 18 million barrels of crude oil refined by Indian refineries in the 1970s, 11 million barrels had to be imported. India has been partnered with Nigeria in this regard to ensure adequate supply of her energy needs. Manufacturing, which is another vital sector of her national economy, has equally succeeded in the 1950s and 1960s to acquire a sizeable and diversified industrial base. By the 1970s, it accounted for approximately one-sixth of the GNP and employed one-tenth of the workforce. In 1969, the industrial structures were dominated by consumer goods industries. In this sector, the most important industries were cotton weaving, tea, sugar,

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automobiles, iron and steel, ship building, textiles, electrical appliances, chisel engines, and pharmaceutical. Capital goods industries accounted for just over one-tenth of the production by weight and the rail road equipment and motor vehicles were the most imported. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, India had a relatively sophisticated industrial structure, with major investment in steel, machine tools, fertilizers, cement, aluminum manufacturing, industrial machinery and components, and electrical and transport equipment. By 2000, India had witnessed a turn-around. According to the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), the primary sector witnessed a 2.8 percent growth rate during April–June 2000, compared to corresponding period of 1999, and high growth rates in construction (6.7 percent), manufacturing (6.2 percent), and other services (7.8 percent). All these have helped increased the overall GDP from 3.6 percent during the first quarter of 1998–1999 to 5.5 percent during the last quarter of 1999–2000. More so, as a consequence of economic reforms initiated in July 1990, Indian economy has undergone transformation, a shift from a mixed economy to a free, competitive, and market-oriented one, with increasing thrust toward globalization. Accordingly, India’s domestic savings was as high as 22.24 percent of its GDP (Indian News, 2000, p.7). With this, India could mobilize her own resources to meet the infrastructure investment needs. This was because steel (industries) has grown 11.5 percent in 1999 and cement by 18 percent. Automobiles, another sector that impacts large sections of the economy, had raced to 44 percent growth in production; motorcycles remained strong at 25 percent. And there was about 68 percent growth in medium and heavy commercial vehicles; exports presented a mixed picture. While some sections like steel, medium, and heavy vehicles had shown impressive growth and software (computer technology) remained strong. Software production grew at 60 percent in April to November 1999 alone (Indian News, 2000, p.4). The launch of the “Make in India” initiative by the Narendra Modi government would further boost India’s manufacturing capacity. The initiative seeks to give global recognition to the Indian economy and also place India on the world map as a manufacturing hub. With the initiative, India also set for itself an ambitious target of increasing the contribution of manufacturing output to 25 per cent of GDP by 2025, from 16 per cent (KPMG & CII, 2015). Another important sector of the Indian economy, which occupies a reasonable percentage, is film industries. India ranks with Japan and United States among the largest producers of films in the world. This underscores the importance of the film industry and the unimaginable percentage being invested into it. Accordingly, the film industry occupies eighth position among Indian industries and provides employment for more than 100,000 persons. On an average, 70 million people visit cinema every day in India.

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Through cinema, a large proportion of revenue is internally generated (New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.6, p. 276). In his inaugural speech delivered at the Global Indian Entrepreneurs Conference held in New Delhi, the former prime minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee summed up the development of the Indian economy in the following words: In the last 50 years, India developed certain competitive advantages, these include a large technical and scientific manpower base, fairly well-developed infrastructures, a large network of banks, a well-established capital market and a good educational system. India has a substantial private sector; active in all areas of the economy . . . the Indian corporate sector is large and diversified, with a mix of ownership in public, private and corporate sectors, and small, medium and large-scale enterprises. The recent crisis, which has, affected the economies of South East Asia and Russia and even Japan, spared our economy, which remained by and large unaffected by the economic disturbances. This speaks well of the resilience our economy has developed over the years. Despite being part of the globalisation process, our fundamentals remain strong and helped us to stay on course and prevented any major macro-economic imbalances. (Vajpayee, 1998, p.3)

Given the progress recorded by India since the 1990s, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) reported in 2011 that India’s GDP at purchasing power parity could overtake that of the United States by 2045 (Hawksworth & Tiwari, 2011). This is to be achieved only if India’s GDP continued to grow at an annualized average of 8 percent, making it potentially the world’s fastest-growing major economy until 2050. The report highlighted key growth factors: a young and rapidly growing working-age population; growth in the manufacturing sector because of rising education and engineering skill levels; and sustained growth of the consumer market driven by a rapidly growing middle class. However, the World Bank (2010) had cautioned that for India to achieve its economic potential, it must continue to focus on public sector reform, transport infrastructure, agricultural and rural development, removal of labor regulations, education, energy security, and public health and nutrition. Military In India, the military has since independence in August 1947 stuck to their traditional functions of providing security and safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Union. The military has never interfered by taking over the power from democratically elected public officials. Although the prime minister holds executive powers, the supreme command of all armed forces

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in India constitutionally is vested in the president. Similar to Nigeria, the responsibility for the administration and operational control of the armed forces lies with the Ministry of Defense in India. Yet, besides the three common categories of the armed forces, that is the Army, Air force and Navy, there are supplementary semi-military bodies called the National Cadet Corps (NCC), which has the strength of about 1,300,000–1,500,000, including about 189,386 women. The functions of the NCC are similar to the regular forces. The NCC was divided into Army, Air force and Navy (Ganguly, 2015). According to Ganguly (2015), at the time of independence, India inherited a military that had been created, equipped, trained, and used to mainly protect and consolidate British power in India. After independence, the Indian military began a process of modernization, a development which was also born out of necessity of India’s war experiences such as the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971, and Indo-Chinese war of 1962. To achieve India’s military modernization quest, the Indian military’s annual spending increased steadily from US$9 billion in 1970 to US$12 billion in 1980 to US$17.5 billion in 1990. By 2019, it was reported that India’s military spending grew by 6.8 percent to US$71.1 billion (SIPRO Report on “Trends in World Military Expenditure,” 2019). Comparatively, China, the world’s second-largest military spender, is estimated to have allocated US$261 billion to the military in 2019, which was equivalent to 14 percent of the global military expenditure. Its military spending in 2019 was 5.1 percent higher than in 2018 and 85 percent higher than in 2010. This was the highest military spending in South Asia. All three services, namely army, navy, and air force, benefited from modernization. While the army invested in “new tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, modern artillery, ground-attack missiles, air defence systems and the country’s first attack helicopters,” the navy, with Soviet support, purchased Soviet-made anti-submarine frigates, naval patrol boats, and diesel/electric submarines to build up its capacity to patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and to protect India’s coastlines (Ganguly, 2015). The navy also invested in building indigenous capacity to manufacture and service naval warships and submarines. The air force initiated a major upgrade of its inventory of fighter jets, the MiG-21 and the Sukhoi Su-7, which had proved effective during the 1971 Bangladesh war (Ganguly, 2015). It also placed large orders for the twin-engine Jaguar fighters from British Aerospace, the Dassault Mirage 2000 multirole fighter jets from France, and the MiG-27 and MiG-29 multirole fighters from the Soviet Union (Ganguly, 2015; Cohen & Dasgupta, 2013, pp. 75–78). Strategically, to counter the threats that India was confronted with in the postindependence era, she needed not only to expand and modernize the military, particularly the army and the air force, but also to develop a nuclear power. This was to achieve in 1974. On the morning of May 18, 1974, in the Pokhran desert, the

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ground shook violently as India conducted its first atomic bomb test, cloaking it as a peaceful nuclear explosion. In doing so, India became the world’s sixth nuclear power after the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China (Ganguly, 2015). India with a strength of over 1.4 million active personnel became the world’s second-largest military force, the world’s largest volunteer army, and the third-largest defense budget in the world (Pike, 2016; Ganguly, 2015; Tian, Fleurant, Kuimova, Wezeman, Wezeman, 2020). India like Nigeria has committed her resources and military personnel to the promotion of global peace. Some of the peacekeeping operations that the country’s military has served in Africa include the UN mission to the Congo (1960–1964); Namibia (1989–1991); Angola (1989–1991); Liberia (1993–1997); the Congo (1999 onward); Ethiopia–Eritrea (2000 onward); Mozambique (1992– 1994); Somalia (1993–94); Rwanda (1993–1996); Angola (1995–1999); and Sierra Leone (1999–end of 2000) (van Rooyen, 2010, p. 8). Both Nigeria and India served in some of these peacekeeping operations especially in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, where Nigeria provided the leadership for the ECOMOG and also contributed huge human and material resources toward the restoration of peace in these countries. One other significant aspect of the Indian military is her well-established and reputable military training institutions that provide training for her forces similar to that of other developing countries. India has more than twenty-eight military training institutions that offer training in all the three wings of defense services—the army, navy, and air force (Ministry of Defense, India). These institutions include among others: National Defence College, New Delhi and National Defence Services Staff College, Wellington in Tamil Nadu. The training covers a number of fields such as Security and Strategic Studies, Defence Management, Artillery, Electronics, Mechanical Engineering, Marine and Aeronautical Engineering, Anti-Marine Warfare, Hydrography, Logistics and Management and Qualitative Assurance Services. Some of the trainings are covered under different programs such as the ITEC-I Scheme that covers the entire cost of air travel, tuition fees, living allowance, medical, and study tours borne by the Government of India. Under ITEC-II, only the cost of international travel is met by the beneficiary country and all other costs are paid by the Indian government. Another important aspect of India’s military capability is the development of nuclear weapons. Today, India is a nuclear power state that has conducted several nuclear bomb tests both underground and under water. The number of resources being expended in the development of nuclear weapon is contingent on her geographical location close to China, which is already a nuclear power and Pakistan which is also a nuclear possessing state. The location of India has warranted her to develop nuclear capability as a form of deterrence.

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Thus, India is not only economically developed but has also developed her military power. Foreign Policy Foreign policy, which involves national interests and the modus operandi of realizing the national interests of countries in a world of dynamism and crosscutting complexities, brought about by globalization, has not been an easy task. The guiding principles of India’s foreign policy are the pursuit of her national interest and the promotion of peace, stability, and cooperation in the changing world (Khilnani, Kumar, Mehta, Menon, Nilekani, Raghavan, Saran & Varadarajan, 2012). India’s foreign policy was fashioned out of the following principles and goals as clearly enunciated by the Indian minister of external affairs: i. To promote harmony, trust, and a cooperative spirit among nations in order to strengthen peace, eliminate tensions, and reduce the danger of conflict; ii. To create an environment of peace, trust and stability which would permit optimum utilisation of natural and manpower resources for economic, social and cultural advancement. (Vajpayee & Dass. 2004, p.4) Thus, India has been conducting an open foreign policy of friendship, mutually advantageous cooperation, and equal and beneficial bilateralism with her neighbors. Except Pakistan, which has been in constant conflict with India over Kashmir region, India has good relations with Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, and Afghanistan. India is a member of the NAM and therefore opted to avoid any aligned relationship with either the West or the East during the cold war (Khilnani et al. 2012). But whether India strictly adhered to this foreign principle or not is subject to debate. This can be gauged against India’s nuclear policy, which is an important aspect of India’s foreign policy. This is a policy that since 1960s has continued to dominate the theme and tune of India’s relations, and has kept India close to the great powers especially the United States. India is militarily and strategically a nuclear power. And because of that India has been lukewarm toward the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty and weapons of mass destruction. India’s foreign economic policy is compartmentalized into (1) trade, (2) aid, (3) investment, (4) relations with international economic institutions, and (5) relations with the developing countries. It is within the last compartment that India and Nigeria as members of the South have sought to strengthen their economic, political, cultural, and military relations. Generally speaking, the inauguration of a new government does not always translate to change

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long-term national interests and external factors influencing a country’s foreign policy (IDSA, 2014). In the same vein, it does not always lead to a change in a nation’s fundamental self-perceptions, ideas, and values be altered in a short period of time. Even under the regime of Prime Minister Modi, as with other regimes before him, India’s foreign policy priorities begin with the Indian neighbors first, followed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the BRICS countries, Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, Australia, and the Arab states—with Africa last in the list (MEA, 2014, p.6). There is no doubt that the administration of Prime Minister Modi has rekindled India–Africa relations; however, like other nations, this is largely driven by national interests. India’s foreign policy has been developing over the years. Today, the country stands on the threshold of playing significant roles in world affairs and in the promotion of peace and understanding among nations, a role consistent with her history and mature democratic tradition, size, population, and cultural and economic strength. Subregional Context: India and West Africa India and West African countries cultivated close relations at meetings such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, the NAM, the Commonwealth, and the Group of 77. India’s engagements with West Africa were heavily predisposed toward Ghana and Nigeria, both colonized by Britain and English-speaking countries. Over the years, there have been exchange of diplomatic visits by officials from India and West African countries, training of West African students in Indian universities with quite a number benefiting from the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and Special Commonwealth African Assisted Plan (SCAAP), and provision of Indian technical support in various fields such as agriculture, railway, education, and health. In the field of defense cooperation, several former top strata of the Ghanaian and Nigerian defense forces had attended at least one defense training course in India. India helped set up the Nigerian Defence Academy and other training institutes for the Nigerian defense forces. At the level of people-to-people relations, popular Indian culture has long been exported to the whole of West Africa. Apart from the popular Bollywood films, Indian mode of dressing, herbs, tea, cosmetic products, and jewelries are found in West Africa. These constitute part of the diaspora connections with mother India on the one hand, and on the other, with the people of West Africa. Since the 1990s, India has expanded her trade and investment relations with West Africa. In its Annual Report 2004–2005, the MEA stated that “India enjoys cordial links with the countries of West Africa” (MEA India, 2005, p.71). The interests and engagement of India can be seen in the creation of a new division within the

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ministry to deal with West African countries. The reason for the engagement is frankly stated by the MEA that “the region holds great promise for India’s energy security and the Ministry took the initiative in exploring possibilities to access the oil and petroleum sector in this region, particularly in Angola, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania and Equatorial Guinea” (MEA India, 2005, p. 71). India, however, not only views West Africa as a source of resources to cover their own needs but also as an interesting market for Indian products. While India had an old tradition of exchange with East Africa, West Africa up to a few years ago played a relatively negligible role as a market for Indian products. The current trend of enhanced exchange should be retained, and cooperation between the trading partners should be increased significantly: “Trade and economic exchanges, which were limited, grew rapidly and Indian companies were encouraged to establish their presence in West Africa” (MEA India, 2005, p.71). The Indian strategy toward West Africa encompasses two major interests: resources and access to the market. This policy is accompanied by assisting the EBID to finance India’s exports to West African countries (Mishra, 2019). The expanding economic relations between India and West Africa is reflected in the bilateral trade relations wherein India’s total trade with West African countries which rose from US$13.5 billion to US$21.6 billion during the decade 2008–2009 to 2017–2018. India’s exports to the region amounted to US$6.4 billion, and imports from the region amounted to US$15.3 billion during period 2017–2018 (Mishra, 2019). This increase is also reflected in West Africa’s share of the total trade between India and Africa. Africa’s bilateral trade with India witnessed an increase from a mere US$1 billion in 1990 to US$3 billion in 2000, reaching up to the level of US$36 billion in 2007–2008 and climbing up high to the current level of US$70 billion in 2012–2013 (Nayyar & Aggarwal, 2014). In the area of investments, West Africa has long been a home to some investments. Indian investments in West Africa are in many sectors such as ICT, pharmaceuticals, airlines, textiles, plastics production, electronics, automobiles, hydrocarbons, and many others. Even so, Mishra (2019) argues that despite efforts to boost bilateral relations, West Africa’s participation as an investment partner to India remains relatively limited compared to other parts of Africa. Apart from rising up to the challenge posed by China’s soft power diplomacy in West Africa, India also seeks huge market which West Africa offers. This is in addition to seeking energy resources, and destinations for Indian companies that are keen to invest using their low-cost modern technologies. India’s export drive compels it to pay attention to the West African market as alternative destination for manufactures from India whose exports to traditional destinations in Europe and North America are on the decline. West Africa also expects from India FDI to create employment; capacity-building

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programs; appropriate technology transfer; and access to soft credit for infrastructure development. While noting India’s historical connection and contribution, West Africa is increasingly engaging India as a South–South partner in an interdependent relationship. Continental Contexts: India and Africa In the wider context, the relationship between India and Africa dates back to centuries and has been based primarily on trade, movement of peoples, and cultural exchanges. Further, during the second half of the twentieth century, this relationship was one largely based on political, ideological ties, and some trade. However, over the past decade India’s relationship with countries in Africa has undergone a huge transformation to a one focused on building mutually beneficial economic and political relationships. In 2013, India became Africa’s fourth-largest trading partner with India–Africa trade amounting to US$64.1 billion in that year. Gieg (2016) noted that at the beginning of the new millennium, the figure had only stood at US$5 billion. The changing and reinvigorated Indo-African relationship is characterized by a greater focus on capacity building, development cooperation, and economic and technological initiatives. As a South country, African countries find India attractive given its historical experiences, some of which are similar to that of Africa. India’s reinvigorated relation with the African continent today takes place at three different levels: Pan-African, regional, and bilateral. Furthermore, India’s relation with Africa has also been fostered by a comprehensive set of diplomatic mechanisms and summits such as the India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), India Regional Economic Communities (RECs) meetings, annual India–Africa trade ministers meeting, regular meetings of joint working groups, inter-governmental joint commissions, foreign office consultations, and business enclaves. These also include the crucial “Pan-African e-Network” project and interactions at various multilateral forums such as the “Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC).” While analyzing India–Africa ties, it is important to understand that both India and Africa have much to gain from cooperative initiatives especially considering their common interest in crucial global issues such as reforming of the Bretton Woods institutions and the UNSC. Moreover, India’s growing economic and global position, along with the fact that Africa carries significant weight in multilateral fora such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by virtue of the large number of countries in Africa, many of which are doing well economically, makes the India–African relationship a significant and mutually beneficial partnership. Furthermore, given the commonalities in development challenges confronting

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the two regions, strong partnerships in the form of greater South–South development cooperation, economic as well as bilateral agreements in areas of comparative advantage are mutually beneficial. There is no doubt that it has significantly increased its relations with African states as a whole since the 1990s. The most visible expression of this was the three India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) held in 2008, 2011, and 2015. Overall, the cooperative measures undertaken during the India–Africa summits provide further impetus to African countries to resurrect struggling sectors such as agriculture and health care through greater Indian technological inputs and capacity development initiatives (Mullen & Arora, 2016). India, on the other hand, relies heavily on the African continent for fulfilling its ever-expanding energy demands, for African backing in the UNGA for India’s aspiration of global power position (Mullen & Arora, 2016). These summits have also provided a structured platform for political and economic interaction between Indian and African leaders. By examining the different but important attributes of power of both Nigeria and India, readers are better positioned to understand the roots of the relations between the two countries and to also better comprehend the basis for continuity and change in the relations.

Chapter 2

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Nigeria–India Relations

This chapter explores diverse conceptual and theoretical opinions presented by different scholars on issues related to bilateral relations and broad spectrum of cooperative relationship between countries in the South. In other words, the chapter reviews key concepts and theories, and empirically reviews thematic areas in the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. The major concerns of the chapter are twofold. First is to define the concepts of bilateral relations and dynamics, and second, to review international relations (IR) theories with a view to locating an appropriate theoretical framework for book on Nigeria–India relations. Bilateral relations and economic cooperation are concepts that have attracted a lot of scholarly attention, especially in the area of Afro-Asian studies in recent times. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS The term “bilateral relations” refers to the political, economic, cultural, and historic ties between two countries. By bilateral cooperation between two countries, it is understood that relations established between the authorities of each state revolve around common interest, aspirations, and goals. The reasoning behind entering agreements is to tackle common issues and to achieve interest issues through exchanges of knowledge and experience, exchanges of information, technical consultation, exchanges of experts, and organization of meetings. Bilateral relations are the most common used type of cooperation by developing countries. According to Ogunsanwo (2013), bilateral relations or bilateralism is very much in vogue and has not been supplanted by multilateral relations or multilateralism which is defined as “the 35

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practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states” (Keohane, 1990: p. 731). He further argues that bilateral relations refer to the relationship between two independent countries in areas which include, but not limited to, political, economic, sociocultural, and military spheres. Ofoegbu (1980) observed that a country has many reasons for seeking positive bilateral relationships with other countries. These reasons could be geographical proximity, cultural affinity, trade and investment considerations, and search for scarce mineral resources. For example, the two countries may be physical neighbors, and thus a harmonious coexistence is both convenient and beneficial for each country. Cultural similarities can further strengthen the relationship between them. However, that is not always the case in the modern world, where countries seek to meet needs other than geographical proximity and cultural affinity. Countries that are separated by long distance have developed bilateral economic relationships in trade and commerce for the benefit of their national economies. Therefore, bilateral relationship is the conduct of political, economic, cultural, and even military relations between two sovereign states. It is in contrast to unilateralism or multilateralism, which is an activity by a single state or jointly by multiple states, respectively. When states recognize one another as sovereign states and agree to develop diplomatic relations, they exchange diplomatic agents such as ambassadors to facilitate mutual dialogue and cooperation. It is an agreement that is affecting or undertaken by two parties, a mutual agreement. Bore (1994) observed that despite the phenomenal growth of the concept of multilateral relations in the modern world, bilateral relations or bilateralism still occupies a prominent place in interstate relations. Multilateralism refers to “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states” (Keohane, 1990, p. 731). Accordingly, bilateral cooperation is not a substitute for regional and multilateral cooperation among nations; rather, it supplements and reinforces them. One of the conditions for the growth of bilateral relations between two countries is that there should be some historical basis which should serve as a foundation for the further development of relations between them. It is in this perspective that Vasudevan (2010) argues that British colonialism in Nigeria and India as well as anti-colonial struggle, nonalignment, and South–South Cooperation (SSC) provided the historical basis for the interaction between Nigeria and India. Bilateral relations can grow even when such roots do not exist, but if they exist, they go a long way in facilitating their growth. The second condition for the growth of bilateral relations is that the two countries should be willing to forge such relations, and they would be willing to do so if they find it mutually beneficial to do so (Bore, 1994). The third condition for the growth of bilateral relations is that there should not be any major political problem or unresolved misunderstanding of bilateral nature

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between them which should hinder the growth of relations in other fields such as economic, social, or cultural. It is seen that whenever there has existed any major political problem between two countries, it has been difficult, if not impossible for them to forge economic, cultural, and even military ties on an extensive scale. Fourth, the countries which desire to develop bilateral relations should have similar outlook or common understanding in international affairs. The similarity in outlook implies absence of unnecessary irritants between them, which makes the task of forging bilateral relationship easier (Bore, 1994). Nigeria and India meet these conditions for bilateral relations. Their relations are not of recent origin, but are rooted in the past. Trade between Nigeria and India has existed in the colonial times and expanded into other commercial areas and investments, political, cultural, and military areas in the postcolonial era. These links were strengthened by the attainment of political independence in both countries, and the subsequent arrival of Indian teachers, doctors, businessmen, and consultants in the steel and rail sectors in Nigeria. Second, there are no problems of political nature between India and Nigeria at the level of government to government. However, that is not to rule out the irritants that sometimes arise at the level of people-to-people relations. Third, there is an intense desire on the part of the leaders of both countries to develop mutual beneficial relations between their countries. Nigeria and India have had more or less identical approach to global problems such as colonialism, racism, world peace, disarmament, the proposal for a new international economic order, and terrorism (Badejo, 1989). Both countries have spoken almost with one voice on these issues in various regional and international fora (Eze, 2008). Both countries are non-aligned and believe in the concept of SSC because they believe that they can accelerate their economic and social development through mutual help. THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The term dynamics as used in the context of the study refers to a process or system that is characterized by constant change, activity, or progress. It also refers to the system capable of changing or being changed. According to Haas and Whiting (1956), the word dynamics in the context of IR refers the causative or motivating agent or force, underlying an event or phenomenon that is characterized or distinguished by continuous change or vigorous activity within the international system. The international system within which states and non-state actors (NSAs) alike conduct their relations is not static, but constantly changing. Accordingly, interstate relations are not

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static, but rather characterized by continuity and change. In the contemporary ­globalized world, political, economic, military, and sociocultural relations of states are different from the pre– and post–World War I, post–World War II, and Cold War era. Since 1990s, the dynamics of IR took an entirely new shape. The globalized world has witnessed the emergence of new powers, structures, and issue areas. The end of Cold War also marked the beginning of an international paradigm shift. The impact of this transition in international political power relationships has drastically resulted in shaping up the new realities, modalities, and trajectories of relationship of states and NSAs. Consequently, changes and transitions began to unfold not only in the geopolitical and strategic relationships and alliances among the states but also within the domestic institutions of governance of the states. It is within the context of dynamics (constant change, activity, or progress) of IR that the chapter examined and sought better understanding of the contemporary relationships between the South countries such as Nigeria and India. REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES Theory plays a central role in the analysis of relations between states. Theory also forms an important aspect of research work and scholars choose relevant theories and suitable paradigms that help them in their studies and which assist to yield meaningful and reasonable interpretations and understandings. Burchill (1996, p.13) clarifies the rationale for making use of theories when he says that “one aim of studying a wide variety of international relations theories is to make international relations more intelligible and better understood.” He goes on stating that it is to make better sense of institutions, events and processes which exist in the contemporary world. And as far as he was concerned at times the theories will involve testing hypotheses, proposing causal explanations, describing events and explaining general trends and phenomena, with the aim of constructing a plausible image of the world (p.13).

Cox (1992, p.133) also adds his views on the relevant status of theory when he makes the point that “theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality.” IR, which became an academic discipline in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I, has been a discipline that has been in a constant state of theoretical flux. From the very inception of IR and for much of the twentieth century, Neuman (1998, p.13) points out that mainstream IR theories

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such as “Idealism, Realism, Neo-Realism, and Liberalism were, and are still ­essentially Eurocentric theories.” Most of these had, however, been manufactured in, and exported from, the United States (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1996; Paolini, 1997) and because of these developments, Tickner (2003, p.297) prefers to describe the US theorists as the gatekeepers of IR and which has ultimately resulted in an “Americocentric representation of international politics.” When it was developed, in the early 1900s, it was moulded and shaped along the notion that the state was, and remained, the sole actor in the world of politics and IR. The sovereignty of the state was paramount and as such all sociopolitical and economic affairs are connected to the state and in the hands of its leadership who represents the state and its citizens. In other words, actors such as the president or prime minister of a state were the secondary actors while the state was viewed as the primary actor. As time moved on toward the 1960s and beyond there were many critical IR scholars who began to question the dogmatic view of the classical IR scholars who considered the state as sacrosanct and a non-negotiable political entity. These scholars also argued that while the nation-state might have been identified by earlier IR classical scholars as the only actor, there are new actors such as Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and NSAs that play a greater role in international affairs. And because of this, they will have to forfeit that special position and allow space for the other actors to take their rightful place next to the state as key players in the IR arena. Examples of TNCs and NGOs abound: Coca Cola and McDonalds belong to those TNCs that have spread their tentacles to almost all corners of the world, and the NGOs that have made their mark in the IR arena and have thus become significant players in global affairs. And as a consequence of the interventions of many of these transnational institutions, their concrete contributions have in some cases overshadowed the position of the nation-state and forced the governments of these nation-states to accept them as important international political players. Strange (1996) undertakes a survey of world affairs and argues that the state’s position as a political actor has weakened as a result of the integration of national economies into the global market economy. She thus concludes that “we come across a ramshackle assembly of conflicting sources of authority” because when business dealings are executed or commercial ties forged then these are either with the government of a state, a TNC such as Barclays, or with a social movement such as Jubilee 2000; from this random selection of institutions, the work deal with a variety of persons who represent their specific institution. The impact of the TNCs and NGOs gave rise to the eventual emergence of IR scholars who proposed alternative theories such as Liberalism and Structuralism (George, 1994; Jackson & Sorenson, 1999; Burchill, 1996; Steans & Pettiford, 2001) that interpreted world events and developments

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very differently from their colleagues who still held on to the idealist and realist notions of the sovereignty of the state as espoused by the classical theorists. A synopsis of the theoretical developments over the many decades during the twentieth century will provide an insight into the types of theories that have been proposed, debated, discussed, and applied. IR scholars have however classified them into three broad “debates.” The one group is referred to as the First Debate theories, namely “Idealism” and “Realism” during the 1940s and 1950s (Swatuk, 1991; Quirk & Darshan, 2005). This was naturally succeeded by the Second Debate theories which centered around the confrontations and conflicts between “history” and “science” and that took place during the 1960s and into the 1970s (Knorr & Rosenau, 1969). And since the 1980s, the Third Debate came to life; this debate has been characterized as the “discipline defining” debate because of the variety of concerns raised by theorists such as Holsti, Kauppi, Little, Cox, and an array of others (Lapidus & Friedrich, 1997; Neufeld, 1995). According to Neufeld (1995), three contending paradigms that describe the present state of IR have been proposed: “realism,” “pluralism,” and “structuralism.” According to this proposition, Realists appropriate the “billiard-ball” model, which reflect the view how states intermittently collide. Pluralists deal with the “cob-web” relationships where there is constant crisscrossing of activities, and Structuralists face a “multi-legged octopus” sucking up the wealth from the peripheries “to feed” the center. While these may be viewed as complementary paradigms, there are however contradictory categories that are accommodated by these theoretical schools. Among these are (1) actors (states), (2) dynamics (primary force, complex social movements, economics), (3) dependent variables (IR explaining what states do and identifying the major events), (4) subject boundaries (state centric and world society), and (5) specific concepts (deterrence and alliance, ethnicity and interdependence, dependence, and exploitation) (Neufeld, 1995). On the one hand, the Third Debate brought to close all the traditionally mainstream theories within the IR discipline, and on the other, it sparked off a string of new and vibrant debates that fired up the discussions from various dimensions. These debates were, in fact, affected and influenced by theoretical models that have been devised, advocated, and applied in fields such as literature and linguistics. In fact, many contemporary IR scholars have responded critically toward the mainstream theories arguing that most of these theories ignore cultural varieties and are “suspect” (Neuman, 1998). Another shortcoming, according to Ayoob (1998), was that they “do not concern themselves with the (changing) behaviour of the large majority of members of the international system.” Beyond the Third Debate, which Jackson and Sorenson (2002) described as the Fourth Debate, there emerged a number of very vibrant and challenging

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theories. All of these theories have opened up new debates and discussions that critically questioned the ontological and epistemological foundations of the mainstream theories. The advocates of these theories have interrogated the philosophical foundations of the earlier theories to demonstrate how inadequate they were to comprehend the nature of the contemporary society and state. And since the classical theories failed to provide any satisfactory answers to the developments in the international system, the newly coined and proposed theories could provide some positive responses. In mapping out a theoretical framework for this book, the study is mindful of Holsti’s (1992, p.12) admonition that the researcher/scholar should be “employing concepts, categories and typologies that foster rather than hinder comparative analysis”. It also takes into consideration Halliday (1995, p.745) submission that “the philosophy of the social sciences” should always be kept in mind for theory to avoid the pitfalls. More importantly the work takes heed of Burchill’s (1996) remarks when he discusses the constitutive international theory, which is different from the explanatory international theory. He notes that generally every scholar comes to IR with preconceptions, experiences, and beliefs which affect the way the person understands the subject. These remarks are crucial when reflecting upon the relationship between Nigeria and India. Based upon these observations, the work is thus a deep reflection on the dynamics of cooperation between Nigeria and India—countries that are often referred to as “South countries,” “developing countries,” or “third-world countries.” Several changes have taken place in the South over the years thus necessitating a rethinking of these categorization and the relations between countries. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY The complex interdependence theory was developed by Keohane and Nye in 1977. The main tenet of the complex interdependence theory is that the international system is becoming “increasingly multi-layered and interconnected” and, therefore, states cannot fulfill certain tasks on their own and need to cooperate with other states (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Complex interdependence is based on the idea that economics, specifically trade, investments, technology issues, and other forms of cooperation between nations, will make war too costly and that cooperation will cause states to depend on one another for their own prosperity. Complex interdependence is a structural theory of international political economy building on political bargaining in cases of asymmetrical power distribution in different issue areas. Complex interdependence, whether viewed in terms of bilateral or systemic interdependence, places more

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emphasis on economic and other forms of cooperation than on military c­ onflict. Interdependence is better understood when viewed from the perspective of relations between country A and B: independence (signifies no relationship between the two countries), dependence (depicts a relationship where country A depends on country B, but not vice versa), and interdependence (depicts a relationship whereby country A depends on B; B depends on country A). The theory of complex interdependence, developed by these scholars as a synthesis of the realist and liberal theories, considers that world politics is seen from two opposite perspectives (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The first is the modernists’ approach that focuses on the importance of increasing economic and social interactions and claims the decline of military force. The second is realists’ approach with the assumption that first, states considered as coherent units are the main actors on the international level; second, force is the most effective instrument of foreign policy; and third, high politics dominates IR (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Keohane and Nye recognized the modernist underestimation of the importance of power, particularly military power, and realists’ undervaluation of the changes that take place in world politics, thus connecting the values of the two approaches and bridging the gap between them. Complex interdependence theory posits that units, within the international system, consist of state and NSAs such as IGOs, NGOs, second that goals pursued by these actors are not limited to security alone, but are rather in the form of multiple goals which include economic, political, military, and so on. Third, that rather than using military force, economic cooperation is a more useful instrument in achieving set goals. Fourth, the theory emphasizes linking issue areas and agenda setting and that power remains important in the relations between states. Though the origin of the theory of complex interdependence goes back to Keohane and Nye’s book Power and Interdependence written in 1977, they have repeatedly revisited the concept of interdependence and scrutinized its validity in explaining IR in the contemporary times. In their essay entitled Globalization; What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?), Keohane and Nye (2000, p.104) argued that we did argue . . . that some bilateral relationships—French-German and US-Canada, for example—approximated all three conditions of complex interdependence. In a world of complex interdependence, we argued, politics would be different. The goals and instruments of state policy—and the processes of agenda setting and issue linkages—would all be different, as would the significance of international organizations.

India’s relations with Nigeria, as with the rest of Africa which were initially built upon historical and political connections, have gradually

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come to be based more upon economic links. Issue areas initially included ­nonalignment, colonialism, racism, and imperialism, issues of third-world debt, and so on (Vasudevan, 2010). With increasing globalization, especially as from 1991, the scenario in India changed, as needs and preferences of India have taken a drastic change. Several changes have also taken place within the Nigerian political and economic environment. Nigeria’s return to democratic rule also bought about significant changes to the country’s political economy and serves as an attraction for countries to deepen relations with her. The evolving issues areas like trade and investments, and access to scarce resources, particularly energy resources, have become dominant issue areas in the relations between the two states. India is looking beyond its borders to meet future demands (energy resources and markets for finished goods) of the country. Nigeria also looks beyond its borders for foreign direct investments (FDI), technological access, and capacity building, with the possibility of a complementary effect on the development of the country. With the changes in the context of their bilateral and international engagement witnessed since the 1990s, it can be argued that the relations between the two countries have developed around issues areas that fit important aspects of the concept of complex interdependence. Therefore, the choice of the theory of complex interdependence helps us in understanding the current dynamics of Nigeria’s relations with India. IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of changes in the international system and drew a link between changing nature of foreign policy and political processes on three separate grounds. First, the increased complexity of the international events needs continuous process of adaptation of the traditional foreign policy institutions; second, complexity increased the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy, especially the link of economic issues with foreign policy; and third, the formulation of foreign policy is influenced by the actors from within as well as outside domestic political structures. According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence exists when there is mutual dependence between the actors within the international system, or when the actors are mutually exposed to costly effects. Namely, in relations between two actors in the international system, any change provoked by one of the actors or a third actor, may have a costly effect on both actors. According to these authors, conflict of interests still exists in complex interdependence relationships and power continues to play an important role in the relations between states. In addition, James Rosenau (1984) contributed to the debate over complex interdependence by examining different perceptions of states as powers. He argues that the power of states can be viewed differently—through military, economic, technological, or resources such as energy. However, in his view, the most important issue is not the source

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of power itself, but the way it is directed and responded to by other actors. Rosenau argues that nations influence each other, they exercise control over each other, and they alter, maintain, subvert, enhance, deter, or otherwise affect each other. In accordance of this view, economic, political interdependence between Nigeria and India is significant not only for their prosperity and power projection but also for their survival within the international system. Not surprisingly, power remains the central resource for political and economic bargaining under complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye’s understanding of power derived from Weber’s (1947) definition of power as probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests. It is defined as “control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes” (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p.10). Baldwin (1980, p.484) points out that interdependence can be traced back to Machiavelli’s dichotomy of “self-reliance” and “dependence” and has received a considerable attention by scholars of international political economy ever since. He defines interdependence as “international relationships that would be costly to break.” McMillan (1997, p.34) explains that “even though economic interdependence enlarges a country’s economic possibilities, it creates a matrix of constrains that most countries can influence only slightly, if at all.” He further argues that though liberal scholars often interpret interdependence as an incentive for increased cooperation, the effect of interdependence must not naturally be positive. The same case had been made by Keohane and Nye (1977, p.8) that “we must therefore be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad world of conflicts.” Keohane and Nye stress the aspects of costs rising out of interdependence in various different areas and understand dependence in terms of the two analytical concepts, which are sensitivity and vulnerability. While sensitivity is the extent to which one country understands the needs and requirements of another, vulnerability is the extent to which a country is affected by the actions of another. Sensitivity means that one country is sensitive to the other and is able to make adjustments to the bilateral relationship. It is also the extent to which a country can, by adopting its policies, insulate itself from the costly effects of events that occur elsewhere. The country that is vulnerable on the other hand cannot make adjustment to the shocks in the bilateral relationship. What this translates to in Nigeria–India relations is that while India is sensitive to the relationship and is only affected by sensitivity interdependence, Nigeria is vulnerable and is affected by vulnerability interdependence. Sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence therefore draw our attention to the extent to which actors in the international system

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can make adjustments or changes in their relations without incurring high costs. The problem before individual governments is how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining much autonomy as possible. From the perspective of international system, the problem is how to generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation. Cooperation requires that the actions of states which were not in harmony, be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation and policy coordinations. Moreover, Keohane (1984, p.51) further argues that “cooperation is in a dialectical relationship with discord and they must be understood together. Thus, to understand cooperation, one must also understand the frequent absence of, or failure of, cooperation.” Complex interdependence theory as developed by Keohane and Nye (2001) has three main characteristics: first, the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies expands the range of policy instruments, thus limiting government’s control over foreign relations. Formal and informal diplomacy remain very important, but it is no longer the only channel in which political renewal international interaction takes place. Keohane and Nye name informal ties among nongovernment elites and transnational organizations as two additional channels connecting societies. Second, state policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies, but are subject to trade-offs. Military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. On the contrary, “Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degree of conflicts” (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p.21). Third, that when complex interdependence prevails, military force is not used by governments on other governments within the region, or on the issues. The proponents of this theory do not mean to deny the importance of military force in general terms, but rather emphasized that in the context of interdependent relationships the use of military force to achieve goals is less feasible. Except perhaps for the issues of military assistance, peacekeeping, or peace support operations, where both countries serve together, there has been less emphasis on security issues in influencing relations between India and Nigeria. At least when it comes to conventional military powerplay, force has played almost no role in defining the relations between the two countries either in the past or present. As argued by Keohane and Nye (1989, p.24), trade and investment, resource security, climate change and environment, and other international diplomatic issues have become more salient “issueareas” in interdependence relations between countries of the South in recent times. However, if one looks closer at the tangible interaction between India and Nigeria within the international system, one can acknowledge some important trend. India’s relations with Nigeria, as with the rest of Africa, had centered on issues linkage such as decolonization, nonalignment, SSC,

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and the need for a new international economic order, however, the end of the Cold War brought about changes in the international environment, with issues of economics, particularly energy security, taking the center stage in Indo-Nigeria relations. India’s emergence as an economic power has seen her playing significant roles in global institutions. India is growing while making active use of international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), to promote the country’s development of global power status. Given what is discussed, a number of political processes have to be understood differently than what traditional analysis of politics and economics would suggest. These processes include the goals of the actors, instruments of state policy, agenda formation, linkages of issues, and roles in international organizations. The first purpose here is for the theory to guide us in understanding the goals of the actors in the emerging issue areas; second is to understand how change in power distribution between the two states affect the pattern of their bilateral and multilateral engagements; and third, more specifically, to understand how India’s growing energy hunger and access for market impact on its recent engagement with Nigeria. In examining the goals of actors, special attention is paid to not only the domestic but also the influence of the international structure on the actors’ goals under complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye argue that complex interdependence allows for differences in power structures and actors in different areas. One result of these differences is that actors might pursue different interests and coalitions depending on the issue area. For instance, in addition to its bilateral dealings, changing dynamics of national and global politics have made India to be today a member of “medium power” group known as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) to which has just been added South Africa, necessitating the change of the acronym to BRICS. Regarding the roles of Nigeria and India in the international system, it has been argued that change in the international system in terms of distribution of power may lead states to change and reassessments of interests (Keohane, 1989). On instruments of state policy, it has been argued that under complex interdependence, military power is not the foremost instrument of state policy anymore. Rather, different aspects such as economic power, technological knowledge distribution, or diplomatic resources might be relevant in different issue areas. India’s recent efforts to strengthen its involvement in the African Indian Ocean Rim (2004); the launch of the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa–India Movement (Team-9) with eight energy- and resource-rich collaborative partners; the hosting of India–Africa Partnership summits (2008 & 2011) where “a model of friendship of equals”; and were presented are indeed India’s diplomatic overtures to Africa to strategically aligned to India’s resource security and to develop closer ties with energy-rich countries (Alvarenga, Jansson & Naidu, 2009). On agenda formation, complex

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interdependence argues that different issue areas are structured differently in terms of hierarchies of goals and power distribution. Factors affecting the agenda formation include national interest, international regimes and linkages from other issue areas. It will be especially interesting to examine the Indian foreign policy especially after the Cold War toward Africa and try to elaborate on the question regarding New Delhi’s ability to control the agenda formation in Indo-Africa relations. On linkage of issues, Keohane and Nye (2001) argue that less vulnerable states will try to use asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups of issues as a source of power, and they will try to use international organizations and transnational actors and flows to their advantage. They also note that this will probably give strategy and bargaining a much more important position when it comes to linkage issues. Aggarwal (1998) shares similar views on this with Keohane and Nye. In his view, states are likely to have varying interests in the issue area within which bargaining takes place. While several factors might affect a state/actor’s interests, the most significant influence narrow down to states/actors’ international position (referring to both capabilities in the overall international system as well as to the relative capabilities in the issue areas); its domestic coalitional stability; and elites beliefs and ideologies about causal connections among issues and the need to handle problems on a multilateral basis. The complex interdependence theory has been used by other scholars to study relations between countries. For instance, Daniel Alvarenga, Johanna Jansson, and Sanusha Naidu (2009) applied the complex interdependence theory to analyze the unfolding relationship between India, China, and Africa. They argued that in the current conditions of the global political economy, interdependence is the central phenomenon that brings about a diffusion of power in IR (Alvarenga, Jansson & Naidu, 2009; Simmons & Elkins, 2004). In this view, the global political economy might create a more suitable environment for multilateralism, the emergence of international institutions and cooperation by means of a socialization process of states through evolving norms, rules, and communication. Relating this to India’s engagement with Nigeria, and given the recent nature and pace of this wave of engagement, both countries are just now starting to define what these norms, rules, and forms of communication are. The globalization concept sheds light on the power exchanges and on how relations of causality have been changing at the international level. However, what “globalization” does hold is the ability to describe the pace, scope, and visibility of the accelerated products of these power exchanges, offering a useful term for describing the marvels of time and space compression. Instead, the work opted for the idea of complex interdependence as a preferable theory in this context. It addresses what the current conditions bring

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about: multiple channels of access between the two countries being studied. Except perhaps for the issues of arms trade, military training and support and peacekeeping, there has been less emphasis on security issues in influencing relations between India and Nigeria. At least when it comes to conventional military power play, force has played a less significant role in defining the current relations. Complex interdependence is, therefore, better at explaining why there has been a clear fluidity and variance when it comes to the matters of a hierarchy of issues in the relationship being analyzed. Although issues of SSC, nonalignment, and others are still being rhetorically amplified in the diplomatic engagement between India and African countries, these issues have started to lose importance as interest rises in other economic issues. Trade, investments, resource security, or other international diplomatic issues have become more salient and any “issue-area” can now be at the top of the international agenda at any given time (Keohane & Nye, 1989). Concerning the explanatory power of their theory, Keohane and Nye explain that “we do not argue that . . . complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality.” Quite contrary, both it and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations in the relations between states “fall somewhere between these two extremes” (Keohane & Nye, 2001, p.24). It is in this light that this study uses the framework of complex interdependence to analyze the dynamics of Nigeria–India relations. As can be seen as the work proceeds, India–Nigeria relations might sometimes fit the portrait of complex interdependence quite well and sometimes less, nevertheless, thinking in a theoretical way it is important as it can help us in asking the right questions. Another importance of the complex interdependence theory is also its focus on the interactions between the international and the domestic levels of analysis. As this book attempts to increase the understanding of Indo-Nigeria relations, one needs to understand the implications of combining research on different levels of analysis on the validity of the theory applied. NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND BILATERAL COOPERATION According to Ofoegbu (1980), the connection between IR and bilateral cooperation is a clear one. He argues that relationship between the two is intertwined and that it is better understood in the context of international economic relations. Bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries involves international trade and commerce, investments, the transfer of capital and technology, commodity and payments arrangements, and the entire relationship between the poor and the rich in the international system. IR, which cover all interactions among international actors irrespective of whether

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these interactions are political, economic, cultural, or scientific, embody the spirit of cooperation. Without economic cooperation, nation-states would struggle with much more difficulty to adequately promote trade and foreign investment, achieve international economic diplomacy, and enhance national security (Ogunsanwo, 2013). Based on the number of countries, economic cooperation can be divided into bilateral cooperation and multilateral cooperation. While bilateral cooperation is between the two countries, multilateral cooperation involves many countries or cooperation by a country with some other countries. This study concerns itself primarily with bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. The perspective of IR identifies different representations of bilateral cooperation. From the perspective of the realistic approach, in an international system characterized by “anarchical hierarchy,” economic cooperation is facilitated by the existence of a “hegemonic leadership.” From the perspective of liberals, the role of the state is to protect the market and economic freedom by the provision of services which are not available in the private sector (Bakut, 2006). Within international economy where there is no such formal framework of protection, states should cooperate to form such a framework. States therefore seek to promote positive relationship under bilateral or multilateral frameworks to ensure their mutual benefits. The complex interdependence theory provided by Keohane and Nye (1977) and adopted for this study on cooperation among countries is understood from the angle of interdependence. In the contemporary globalized world, the term “interdependence” is frequently used. The globalization concept sheds light on the power exchanges and on how relations of causality have been changing at the international level. Interdependence is a situation in the international system where all the actors including states are dependent upon one another. Interdependence in international economic relations refers to “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane & Nye, 1977). However, IR and bilateral cooperation are not simple processes; they incur costs and sometimes returns may not be as profitable as the resources involved (Bakut, 2006). In IR, trade and interchange of materials and services are as significant as communications, the transmission and receipt of messages. While these transactions are highly politicized within the international system, it would be difficult to ignore the influence of international trade and investment, international labor, and its mobility as well as cultural exchanges in analyzing the relationships of countries such as Nigeria and India as members of the international system. In essence, all states, including Nigeria and India, depend on each other in one way or the other. According to Rosenau (1984, p.255), the international system since the beginning of the twentieth century has entered an era of economic interdependence based

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primarily on the rapidly changing nature of IR in terms of “resource scarcity, sub groupism, the effectiveness of governments, transnational issues, and the aptitudes of politics.” It is in the light of the nature of the international system that Bukarambe (1989) presented the pattern of relations between Nigeria and India within the international system. He argues that in the international setting, IndoNigeria relations are pursued along two fronts—bilateral and multilateral. At the bilateral level the two countries have interacted at the political, economic, military, and sociocultural levels. At the multilateral level, India and Nigeria collectively utilize the international organizations as instruments for regulating the issues that shape interstate relations within the global system as a whole—such as terms of trade, third-world debts, arms race and conflicts. As former colonies, some of the rules currently governing international behavior appear to them as unfair impositions that would be removed or, at least, significantly altered to reflect their own realities. India and Nigeria utilized the structures of the organizations in a bilateral context to assist or support each other directly. Beyond the two major fronts mentioned previously, however, there is a third front which is a derivative of the specific national outlooks. While Nigeria is inclined to see different international organizations in terms of its scope relative to its national objectives, India sees, in addition to that, an instrument for projecting itself as a power-house to be reckoned with. That is to say that unlike Nigeria, India sees international organizations against the backdrop of its self-perception as a country destined to play a leading role in world affairs. In the context of Indo-Nigeria relations, the above considerations are more in evidence in the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the United Nations. However, the presence of cooperation should be an aim to be reached in an environment in which economic interdependencies are stronger than ever, the isolation and failure of cooperation jeopardizing the development and even survival in this environment. Forms of economic cooperation between countries cover areas such as interstate commerce which includes the export and import of goods; implementation and acceptance of services or investments referred to as exports and imports of services; export of services is the provision of services to a person or a foreign country; and imports of services are receiving services from a person or a foreign country by paying services. Scholars identified several goals of cooperation between countries. First is the need to mutually fill the resource gap between countries, particularly in the economic field. The point here is that no country can produce all it needs for its survival, hence the need to cooperate with other countries to meet its economic needs. The second reason is to increase economies of these countries in finance or monetary, trade, investment, industry, banking, agriculture, food, service, and development in general. The third reason is to improve

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the living conditions of the citizenry. Finally to fostering friendship between nations and maintain order and world peace. This clarification of underpinning concepts and exploration of theoretical insights undertaken in this chapter provides a necessary foundation for subsequent chapters in this book.

Chapter 3

The Eagle and Elephant Evolution of Nigeria–India Relations

This chapter examines the evolution of Nigeria–India relations. It explores the historical roots of the bilateral relations, and examines the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Nigeria is depicted as the eagle based on the fact that the red eagle sitting on the country’s coat of arms represents its strength and pride. This ideology was also cascaded down in the naming of the national soccer teams (Green Eagles, Super Eagles, Flying Eagles, Golden Eaglets), national centers (Eagle Square in Abuja, Nigeria), among others. India is depicted with the elephant, which is a symbol of intellectual strength, earthiness, power, and responsibility. Indian Hindus have worshiped elephants for centuries. The elephant is regarded as national heritage animal in India. Elephants enjoy tremendous popularity and a charismatic status in other parts of South Asia. Hindus regard the elephant as a sacred animal. In the Indian society, elephants are believed to bring good luck and prosperity. In the context of the discourse on new scramble for Africa, Mawdsley and McCann (2010) questioned if India is The Elephant in the Corner. Answers to this question have been varied, especially when presented from the prism of comparison with Sino-African relations. An examination of the evolution between Nigeria and India will reveal that the relations between the two countries are not only historically rooted, but that India is not a newcomer to the African continent. NIGERIA AND INDIA: THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS Most writers on Nigeria–India relations easily assume that contact between the two countries started with the advent of British colonial rule in the two 53

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territories. However, contact between countries can be divided into the direct and indirect contacts. Indirect contact could be traced to a much earlier period when the Mughal rulers of India maintained extensive links with the Muslim empires of the Middle East, North and West Africa (Schoff, 1912). The latter, in turn, later interacted closely with the people in territories that became Nigeria and other parts of West Africa through the Trans-Saharan trade (Times of India, October 1, 1985). Some historical records suggest that some people from the area that later became the northern part of Nigeria had contact with the Indians even before colonialism in both India and Nigeria (Lodhi, 1992; Patel, 1990). One of such historical records dated relations between the people to have begun in the fifteenth century ad (Sachdev, 2014). According to Sachdev, the history of Nigeria–India relations can be understood in historical phases. The two strands that weave recorded history of ties between Nigeria and India are people-to-people contacts and entrepreneurial interactions. These contacts have over the years developed threads that take dynamic forms of political, economic, defense, and sociocultural ties. The first phase of contact between Nigeria and India locates the early form of people-to-people contact. There are many legends about the origins of the Afro-Indian (known as Sidi/Siddhi/Sindhi or Habshi/Habsi) settlements in India, particularly in the state of Gujarat bordering Pakistan and, in the states of Andhra Pradesh in South-Central India (former Kingdom of Hyderabad), Maharashtra (formerly Bombay State), Kerala and Karnataka in the South, and the former Portuguese territories of Daman, Diu, and Goa. In Gujarat, they are found in the districts of Ahmedabad, Amerili, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Broach/ Bharuch near Ratanpur, and the former Kingdom of Cutch/Katchch (Census of India, 1961). By 2014, about 250,000 Siddhis were living along the western coastline of India facing Africa. Historical records found strongly suggest that the Sidis of Jambur originally came from Kano in Nigeria via Sudan and Mecca after their hajj pilgrimage (Burton, 1850; Lodhi, 1992). Such evidence is provided by early reports written by European officials and travelers. One of such short language studies is titled Sindh, and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of the Indus by the explorer Richard F. Burton in 1850. Their leader from Kano in Nigeria was a wealthy merchant by the name of Baba Ghor who first settled in the Rajpipla Hills near Broach and Cambay (Khambat) where he developed mining and trade of agate, the precious stone known as Akik in India. Duarte Barbossa, a sixteenth-century Portuguese traveler to India, recorded the popularity of Baba Ghor’s brand of jewelry in India and abroad. Indian stakeholders in agate stone industry still worship Baba Ghor as their patron saint (Sachdev, 2014). A certain variety of agate beads are known as Baba Ghori; another maroon cornelian stone is named after his sister and successor Mai Mariyam. It is also claimed by the Shemali Sidis that one of Baba Ghor’s younger brothers was a Nagarsha in the former Kingdom

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of Madhapur and is worshiped as one of the several pirs in Jambur (Lodhi, 1992; Patel, 1990). These early and indirect contacts were concretized when both Nigeria and India came under the domination of British colonial rule. The second phase of contact between Nigeria and India was therefore facilitated through British colonial rule in both countries. By the time British colonized Nigeria in the first decade of twentieth century, India was already the “Jewel in the Crown.” Some administrative, legal, and welfare structures as well as personnel were transposed from India to Nigeria. Some British colonial officers, such as Lord Fredrick Lugard, served the British Crown in both territories and the influence of the experiences of such officers could be discerned, for example, by the introduction of indirect rule based on the Indian example in some parts of Nigeria. Early contacts were also made between the peoples of India and Nigeria with the employment of Indian and Nigerian people in the British military units where they fought together during World War I and World War II. Furthermore, being subjects of the British Crown, at that time, there were interactions between Nigerians and Indians in London (Times of India, 1 October, 1985). Direct contact started when the Sindhi traders took advantage of sea transportation in the nineteenth century to explore trading opportunities in Nigeria. This period also ushered in the second phase in Nigeria–India people-to-people ties. Members of the Indian Sindhi community from Gujarat where Baba Ghor had settled half a century ago were the first to arrive in Nigeria in the early part of the twentieth century to explore business opportunities (Gopalkrishna, 2008; Sachdev, 2014). During this period, British ships sailed from London to Nigeria. They had stopovers at Freetown, Sierra Leone and Accra, Ghana, and finally at Lagos, Nigeria, as the final stop. This community was said to have primarily engaged in trading and commercial activities, dealing in commodities and consumer goods in the western part of Nigeria, particularly Lagos, but later spread into other parts of the country, and gradually ventured into other fields like assembling, agro-processing, manufacturing, and professional services. The Sindhi traders who reached Lagos in 1919 opened shops for retail business in Lagos (Gopalkrishna, 2008). A representative of the J.T. Chanrai Group, named after the brothers Jhamatmal and Thakurdas Chanrai, the founders of the group, was said to have reached Lagos from Sierra Leone. He opened the first shop in Lagos and later opened outlets in other parts of the country such as Ibadan, Onitsha, and Port Harcourt. The Chellarams group opened their first shop in 1923. Most of the early Indian settler-traders in Nigeria were said to have marketed textiles and handloom products imported from Madras through Liverpool in England. By mid-1930s, a small group of Indian entrepreneurs were active in other parts of Nigeria such as Kano and Kaduna. While leaving Indian

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subcontinent in August 1947, Britain created Pakistan, which included Sindh province. This forced many non-Muslim Sindhi to migrate either to India, or other destinations such as Nigeria, where their cohorts were already living. Thus, by the time Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the people-to-people and entrepreneurial ties with India were already in their third generation and thriving. The success recorded by the early entrants encouraged and paved the way for other businessmen, and professionals, such as teachers, doctors, engineers, and others of Indian origin to do business, render services, and establish residency in Nigeria. The third phase of Nigeria–India ties began in mid-1970s when dramatic increase in oil revenues enabled the Nigerian government to launch ambitious development programs. A large number of Indian professionals were deputed to various projects in sectors such as railways, academia, medicine, engineering, management, consultancies, and agriculture. The next decade (1975–1985) was described by the Indian High Commission in Nigeria as the “golden era” of bilateral contacts with extensive people-to-people contacts supplementing the growth in Indian entrepreneurship in Nigeria. For Indian professionals, during this period, Nigeria offered better salaries, harmonious living conditions, greater freedom of religion and association, English language, and responsibility than otherwise in an overseas assignment. However, in the second half of 1980s, a variety of factors, such as the decline of oil revenue, devaluation of the naira making expatriate salaries unattractive, indigenization policy replaced expatriates with Nigerians, military authoritarian rule, and changes in government policies, led to progressive reduction in Indian presence and extant activities. These remained at low ebb for next to fifteen years of military rule. At the same time, the Indian presence in Nigeria was affected by the terminal decline of the Nigerian textile industry, by then the mainstay of Indian entrepreneurship. The fourth and ongoing phase of Nigeria–India ties began with the restoration of civilian-democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999. During President Olusegun Obasanjo’s eight-year rule (1999–2007), he made determined efforts to revive the ties between Nigeria and India. By this time, Indian multinationals were visible in Nigeria. By 2010, official figures put the number of Indians in Nigeria at about 35,000, although some estimates put the number at more than 40,000 (Sachdev, 2011). The Nigerian High Commission in India on the other hand argues that the number of unregistered Indians in Nigeria is higher (High Commission of Nigeria, New Delhi, 2008). India achieved her political independence on August 15, 1947, earlier than Nigeria, and the modus operandi adopted influenced Nigerian nationalists in their struggle to achieve independence. The Indian struggle for independence was particularly significant for Nigeria because India was a colored nation. India was the oldest of all the tropical dependencies of Britain that led the

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way in the struggle for independence and acted as one of the catalysts in the growth of the consciousness of nationalism in Nigeria (Olusanya, 1985). That perhaps was the reason why Nigerian nationalists pursued the method of nonviolence through peaceful constitutional path in the struggle to achieve independence. The belief was that the international balance of forces would exert pressure on the colonial power to wind up her colonial domination of the empire(s). To a very large extent, this marked the beginning of political interaction between Nigeria and India even though there were earlier contacts between their peoples. The significance of the inspirations derived from Indian nationalism was categorically stressed by the popular newspaper, the West African Pilot, when it maintained that India has a special significance for the coloured members of the British Commonwealth as such; her fate in imperial politics means a lot to the coloured world undergoing British tutelage. The significance to Nigeria cannot be underestimated because this dependence comes next to the Indian empire in size and population. If the deadlock in India can be successfully resolved by the British government after many years, then a new era has downed in British colonial policy. (The West Africa Pilot, 1942, p.189 cited in Kura, 2009)

This was also confirmed by Chief Anthony Enahoro who observed that “there is a sustained inspiration from India and her leaders in Nigeria dating back to the nationalist days when Nigerian nationalists derived great inspiration from Indian leaders and the Indian home rule” (Morning Post, January 10, 1972, p.4 cited in Olusanya, 1985). The thinking, passion, and philosophy of the Indian nationalists, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and Subash Chandra Bose, have influenced the thinking, passion, and philosophy of the pioneer Nigerian nationalists and politicians. The admiration by Chief Obafemi Awolowo of India’s great leaders’ personalities is well documented in his autobiography (Awolowo, 1960). It was thus not surprising that when Awolowo became the premier of the Western Region in 1952, it was India that he first visited. Emphatically, Olusanya (1985) observed that the “language of the Nigerian nationalists in the early year of the movement was reminiscent of the language employed by the nationalist leaders in India” (p.189). The Nigerian nationalists also borrowed the tactics of the Indian National Congress (INC), a political party under the platform by which India struggled and achieved independence. India’s success in achieving independence in August 1947 had a significant influence on not only Nigeria but other countries still under the colonial yoke. Following her independence, India became a sovereign state, henceforth a member of the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Having suffered the pains and hardships of colonial domination, she decided to champion

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the course of decolonization and the eradication of racial domination under the platform of these organizations. Prime Minister Nehru demonstrated the commitment of India toward supporting decolonization process, when he stressed that “we are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and people, and in the recognition of the theory and practice of equal opportunities of all races” (Indian Council for World Affairs, 1964, p.2). Following the attainment of political independence, Nigeria also pursued foreign policy objectives that anchored on the restoration of human dignity to black men and women all over the world and the eradication of colonialism and racial rule from Africa (Kura, 2009; Olusanya & Akindele, 1989). After independence, Nigeria became a member of the United Nations, Commonwealth of Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in 1963 it became a Republic. It was under the auspices of these international organizations and through individual efforts that both Nigeria and India fought colonialism and racial discriminations in Africa and other countries of the South. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA The establishment of diplomatic missions is usually seen as significant landmarks in the founding of formal, diplomatic, and political relations between two countries. India established her diplomatic mission on November 20, 1958, in Lagos, two years before Nigeria became an independent state. To further cement the relationship between the two countries, the Indian mission was eventually upgraded to the status of a High Commission after Nigeria became a political sovereign state. The visit to Nigeria by the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in September 1962 was in recognition of Nigeria as a gateway to Africa given its size, population, resources, and other endowments (Vasudevan, 2009). The visit was therefore expected to open an important chapter in the friendship between the two countries. However, the visit appeared not to have been a great success given disconnect between Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the prime minister of Nigeria, and Indian prime minister. This was not unconnected to Nehru’s preoccupation at that time with the Chinese aggressive postures toward India (Vasudevan, 2009). Charles Heimsath and Surjsit Mansingh (1971) have also suggested that it was possible that Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was also preoccupied with domestic developments with implications for the unity of Nigeria. Yet the issue of Sino–India border conflict of 1962 although a completely Indian affair was a litmus test to the

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bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. India expected that Nigeria and other African countries would offer political support to her by declaring China as the aggressor (Badejo, 1989). Ajay Dubey (2013) argues that by the end of the 1950s (and early 1960s), Indo-African relations were not in areas of priority in Indian foreign policy. Due to a combination of various factors, India’s global concerns seemed to extend beyond the limited Afro-Asian horizon. The business of cultivating close relations with Africa states was left to the Indian diplomatic staff. By implication, the cultivation of Indo–Nigeria relations was therefore left in the hands of the diplomatic staff in Lagos. India had also taken a “softer” approach on colonial issues in Africa. For India’s enlargement of area of peace amid the superpower rivalry was its main concern at that time. On the process of decolonization in Africa, India gave diplomatic and moral support to Africans, but it was a qualified support (Dubey, 2010a). For India, peaceful and constitutional path was the legitimate way. It believed that international balance of forces would force the colonial powers to wind up their empires in Africa. At the same time the leadership of Afro-Asian Movement had shifted to Africans by early 1960s. The increasing numbers of independent African countries, with a feeling of African solidarity, were becoming an important factor in Afro-Asian Movement (Dubey, 1990). China, on the other hand, was providing a contrasting and radical posture as against India on many of the African issues. Chou-En-Lai had gone on an African Safari, which enabled him to develop closer rapport with African leaders and to convince them of Chinese viewpoints. Chinese stand on armed struggle as integral part of freedom struggle and assertion that no ruling power ever left its power voluntarily, along with Chinese material support, contrasted against the Indian qualified diplomatic support. Even India’s limited support seemed to be hollow and Indian image as staunch anticolonial country was compromised. Nehru (1961) held the view that Goa’s liberation was an exclusive Indian problem—similarly liberation of Mozambique and Angola were exclusive African problems. At such a juncture, when China attacked India in 1962, there were not many friends in Africa to sympathize with India’s position. India got diplomatic support from four countries in Africa: Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, and Congo (Leopoldville). Six others expressed sympathy and concern. Ghana, Tanzania, and Guinea took an openly unhelpful stand toward India. India viewed the stand of most African countries at that time as unfavorable and embarrassing. India was isolated not only on the issue of Chinese attack but even in Afro-Asian and third-world meets. Contrary to the moral support maintained by some African states over Sino-Indian conflict, Nigeria under Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa openly supported the Indian position and henceforth called for total condemnation

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of China’s action against India. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in his response to a message sent to Nigeria by the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared that “I agree entirely with your assessment that the issue involved is not merely that of territorial adjustment but of principles and standards of behaviour to be followed in international intercourse if world peace and civilisations are to endure” (Varma, 1963, p.186). Similarly, there was positive response to India’s border conflict with China from the Nigerian press. For example, the Daily Telegraph in an editorial stressed that India which believes solidly in non-violence has been forced into violence by communist China, which needs extra territory for her teeming millions, and to do this, she has embarked on an aggression on Indian territories. The eyes of the world are watching this assault and those who keep an open mind agree that China is committing an aggression on India. (Daily Telegraph, October 23, 1962, p. 90 cited in Kura 2009, p.5)

The West African Pilot opined that aggression against India offers an opportunity for concerted action to cage the dragon, which is China (West African Pilot, October 30, 1962, cited in Olusanya, 1985). This clearly demonstrates the moral and political support that India enjoyed from Nigeria during her conflict with China in 1962. That notwithstanding, India did not enjoy similar support during her war with Pakistan. Nigeria decided to remain neutral probably because Pakistan was also a member of the Commonwealth. Both the Nigerian government and the press were quite silent on the issue. The most controversial was Nigeria’s reaction toward the creation of Bangladesh. Ogunsanwo opined that the Nigerian reaction toward the creation of Bangladesh represents a break from the normal neutrality that Nigeria had maintained on the Indo-Pakistani conflict before 1971 that Nigeria’s view was that it could not support the Indian balkanization of Pakistan (Ogunsanwo, 1974). Be it as it may, Nigeria had passively and politically supported India. The attendance of the Commonwealth summit of 1971, which Pakistan boycotted and which India and the newly created state of Bangladesh attended, demonstrates Nigeria’s diplomatic support to India. If, on the other hand, Nigeria had quit the Commonwealth meeting in 1971 as Pakistan did, then there would be solid ground suggesting Nigeria’s dissatisfaction with Indian complicity in the successful separation of Pakistan and the consequent creation of Bangladesh. Even though Nigeria stood up in support of India when it needed the support of African countries most against “The China factor,” this did not endear Nigeria as a country to be seriously engaged by India at that time. During the administration of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who took personal interest in meeting and interacting with African leaders as well as Rajiv Gandhi’s government,

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there were no qualitative efforts toward strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries. Mrs. Indira Gandhi went with a high-powered delegation for an African Safari in 1963–1964. The main task of this safari was to assess China’s influence in Africa; explaining the factors behind India’s reverse in the border war; assessing the future of 420,000 People of Indian Origin (PIO) settled in Africa; and effecting technical and economic collaboration with African countries (Dubey, 2013). Indian move was to engage the large number of PIO as part of India’s foreign policy (Dubey, 2010b). During the 1963 African Safari, Mrs. Gandhi called on Heads of State of several African states, but missed an important opportunity to visit Nigeria and cement the efforts which Nehru began in 1962 toward engaging Nigeria as the gateway to Africa (Dubey, 2013). The fact that Nigeria has been maintaining a cordial diplomatic relation with India is indisputable. At the international level, the two countries have been caught in the same network of supporting the rights of people to selfdetermination and freedom from colonial and foreign subjugation; supporting all liberation movements in the legitimate struggle for national independence; and unrelented support for all efforts to dismantle the system of apartheid in South Africa and all forms of racial bigotry and prejudice (Anirudha, 1979). This is an important issue at African or generally international levels that brings the two countries into mutual diplomatic contact. This is not to say that the mere fact of claiming similar policy toward an international issue shows the concrete nature of the two countries relations. The implication of this is clear that having similar policy toward an international issue more often than not, oils and strengthens the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. Among all the third-world countries, India was the first to bring up the issue of apartheid at the international fora. India was forced to take up these issues more seriously probably because of the feedback it got from African countries during its conflict with China in 1962. India decided to revive its image as an anticolonial and anti-racist power by sending troops as Nigeria did, to Congo, during the Congo crisis of 1960–1963, for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (van Rooyen, 2010). India also became materially concerned in the goal of dismantling racist South African regime and struggle for Namibian independence. In addition, India recognized and provided offices in New Delhi for the African National Congress (ANC), a political party that struggled for freedom of blacks in South Africa and the eventual dismantling of apartheid regime, and the South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia. India was the first country to take its complaint against South African racist regime to the UN. For example, in 1946, the Government of India raised at the UN, the problem of racial discrimination under Articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter. It singled out the Union of South Africa as a violator of international law and the Charter

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because of its many disabling ordinances aimed against residents of Indian origin and the blacks. Consequently, India recalled its high commissioner and discontinued its trade with South Africa (Anirudha, 1979). Although India was highly concerned of the ill-treatment of her people in South Africa, it recognized that opposition to racial discrimination could not remain limited to the issue of PIO alone. For in the ultimate analysis, the whole issue rested on the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. India, therefore, extended her support to all groups and communities subjected to racial discrimination in South Africa. This change of attitude and extension of policy was well underscored in President Rajendra Prasad’s address to Parliament on May 16, 1952, where he observed that “the question is no longer merely of Indians in South Africa; it has already assumed a greater and wider significance; it is a question of the future of Africans more than that of Indians in South Africa” (Varita, 1979, p.75). During the Angolan Civil War, which divided the OAU into rival camps, India recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which Nigeria also supported openly. India gave assistance to the liberation movements through the OAU liberation committee. Such contributions had passed Rs. 5 million mark by 1977. And in the same year, India was reported to have budgeted Rs. 31 million for assistance to African liberation movements. India was equally a regular donor to some of the multilateral aids that were set up for the liberation of southern Africa by the UN. Apart from the tangible donations, India also kept up its propaganda attacks on South Africa. For instance, during the 1978/79 anti-apartheid years, India set up a National Committee for the observance of anti-apartheid year under the Chairmanship of Mr. Asoka Mehta. The committee throughout the year organized seminars, rallies, exhibitions, film shows, and meetings, all of which were geared toward bringing the realities of apartheid to the Indian people and the world (Ramchandani, 1997). These attitudes and material commitments of India were significant to what Nigeria equally considered her top foreign policy objectives in Africa. In addition, the Indian government in order to succeed regularly held diplomatic consultations with Nigeria on strategies to be adopted at international conferences and fora aimed at providing the moral, political, and material resources toward Africa in all spares of development. Because of the unity of purpose and cooperation between India and Nigeria on South African liberation, President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria and the Indian prime minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in January 1983 in a Joint Communiqué declared that both leaders strongly condemn the Pretoria regime for its recalcitrant attitude to the Namibian question and endorsed the stand of SWAPO and the frontline states. They affirmed their opposition to any linkage between the achievement

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of Namibian independence and the withdrawal of urban troops from Angola. They expressed their hope that Namibia would soon achieve independence in terms of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. The two leaders condemned the Pretoria regime’s policy of apartheid, repression and denial of political and human rights to the majority population. They called for the immediate release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners languishing in South African jails. Both sides agreed that peace could only be established with the abolition of apartheid. They reiterated their firm commitment of moral, material and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of South Africa. (Indo-Nigerian Joint Communiqué, 1983, p.3).

Furthermore, in a similar diplomatic reaction, the Indian government through the high commissioner in Nigeria expressed sympathy over the civil war fought between 1967 and 1970 and also noted that India too has had to contend since her independence in 1947 with an attempt at destroying her integrity and was at that time having a problem of a vast flood of refugees pouring across her borders. The Indian high commissioner further added that the problem of the refugees has assumed vast dimensions not only for India but also for the international community, requiring the urgent and active support of all nations constituting the United Nations. He finally solicited Nigerian understanding and support in giving succour to the refugees and helping in their early return to their homes. In reply, the then head of state General Yakubu Gowon stated that Nigeria was sympathetic to the events in Indian subcontinent, affecting two sister member countries of the Commonwealth of Nations. The head of state further stressed that we share with you the anxiety by the dimension of the human problems involved. I am glad to note that the world is not indifferent to the problem in your area. We acknowledge the outstanding contributions being made by the United Nations Organisation and other international efforts at trying to bring succour to the needy in the area. (Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 1972, p.14)

The sympathy offered by the Nigerian government further cemented the relationship between the two countries. In 1990, Nigeria and India, in another bilateral dialogue had signed the Bale Convention controlling the export of dangerous industrial waste and its movement across borders (New Nigerian, March 23, 1990, cited in Kura, 2009). Both countries having bordered by the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean, respectively, have signed the convention in order to environmentally protect their waters. Nigeria was the first African country to sign the convention, which bans the export of industrial waste without the consent of importing countries. What posed a challenge in relationship between Nigeria and India, especially in the

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1980s and 1990s, was the issue of Nigerian nationals languishing in Indian prisons for allegedly being involved in drug trade and trafficking. But the resumption of discussions between the two countries in April 2000 on the exchange of prisoners opened a window opportunity in addressing this critical problem in Nigeria–India relations. It was reported that not less than 500 Nigerians were languishing in Indian jails on drug-related offenses. This situation has grave implication on the image of Nigeria in India and in the international community, and it has affected the diplomatic relations between the two countries. With accusations and counteraccusations on lopsided judicial process, poor condition of Indian prisons, and responsibilities for extradition of ex-convicts, the Nigerian High Commission in New Delhi and Indian Ministry of External Affairs have been at loggerheads over the matter (The Punch, April 14, 2000). Accordingly, the exchange of prisoners would be in line with the Nigerian government’s efforts to clear her image abroad. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was therefore seen as a welcome development to resolve the differences posed by the prisoners’ dilemma. Nigeria–India relations entered a new era with the return to democracy in Nigeria. The period from 1999 to 2014, witnessed increase of visits of officials from both countries as shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2. Former president Olusegun Obasanjo’s visit of India in January 2000 to attend the Fiftieth Republic Day Celebration was seen as significant in the relations between the two countries. This was followed by the visit of the External Affairs Minister of India Shri Jaswant Singh to Nigeria in March 2000 to cochair the Session of India–Nigeria Joint Commission. Before its reactivation in 2000, the Nigerian–Indian Joint Commission had been inactive since 1991. The implication of the lapse on the operation of Joint Commission is that several joint projects of economic and social importance suffered setback. Several agreements were reached including the revitalization of Nigeria Machine Tools Industry in Osogbo (Guardian, October 15, 2007). Though the aid to rehabilitate the Machine Tools Industry had been provided earlier by India before the visit of the external affairs minister, there had been disagreement on the point of principle. Indian authorities wanted to provide the company with materials and expertise from the Indian Hindustan Tools Company to cover the US$5 million grant and Nigeria on the other hand requested that the grant be provided and Nigeria will utilize the funds in accordance with the needs of the factory in Oshogbo. India’s position was that since the aim of the aid was for technological development in Nigeria, New Delhi should monitor its implementation through the involvement of its tools company. The Machine Tools Company in Oshogbo was established to produce various machine tools and various tools for automobiles and industries in Nigeria.

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Table 3.1  Major Diplomatic Visits by Nigerian Leaders/Officials to India, 1999 to 2018 Date

Leader/Official

January 2000

President Olusegun Obasanjo

October 2003

Foreign Affairs Minister Ambassador Olu Adeniji

November 2004 2006 May 2006

President Olusegun Obasanjo Senate President Ken Nnamani Former foreign affairs minister Ambassador Olu Adeniji Vice President Goodluck Jonathan High-level diplomatic delegation Vice President Goodluck Jonathan Minister of Commerce and Industry Chief Achike Udenwa

November 2007 November 2007 April 2008 August 2009 January 2010 February 2010 August 2010 March 2011 September 8–10, 2011 October 2011

October 31– November 3, 2011 January 6, 2012

Focus of Visit/Discussion Chief guest at the Fiftieth Republic Day celebrations Cochaired the Fourth Session of India–Nigeria Joint Commission Working visit Conference on satyagraha Meeting with Honorable (AS) Shri Anand Sharma To attend the Federalism Conference To attend the Africa Hydrocarbon Conference To attend the India–Africa Forum Summit To participate in the Doha Round Informal Conference Bilateral visit

Labor and Productivity Minister Prince A. Kayode Defense Minister Major Led Nigerian delegation to General (retired) Godwin Abe DefExpo Minister of Science and Led Nigerian delegation Technology Prof. M.K. Abubakar to participate in the Bengaluru Space Expo25 Foreign Affairs Minister Odein To attend the Fifth Session of Ajumogobia the Joint Commission and sign bilateral agreements Minister of Education Prof. (Mrs.) To attend E-9 Countries Ruqayyatu Rufai Conference In connection with proposed Governor of Delta State, Dr. mega-fertilizer project in Emmanuel Uduaghan, led a Koko free trade zone, delta delegation state in collaboration with Nagarjuna Group of India To inspect Indian Institutions Minister of State for Niger Delta training ex-militants from Affairs H.E. Ms. Hajia Zainab Nigeria under the Federal Ibrahim Kuchi Government amnesty program To observe the Eleventh Chairperson, House of Pravasiya Bharatiya Divas in Representative Committee on Jaipur Diaspora Matters, Mrs. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, led A ten-member delegation (Continued )

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Table 3.1  (Continued) Date February 27 to March 2, 2012 March 1–2, 2012 March 1–3, 2012 March 2012 April 2012 March 28, 2012

September 12– 15, 2012 September 24– 26, 2012 September 2012 November 8–10, 2012 October, 2012 November 8–10, 2012 September 7–11, 2013 December 9–13, 2013

Leader/Official An eleven-member delegation led by Minister of Works Arc. Mike Onolememen Honorable Minister of Science and Technology, Prof. Ita Okon Bassey Ewa, led a four-member delegation Minister of Labor & Productivity led a three-member delegation Former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo Minister of State of Defense of Nigeria Honorable Mrs. Erelu Olusola Obada led a delegation Nigerian Finance Minister Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Honorable Minister of Science and Technology, Prof. Ita Okon Bassey Ewa, led a six-member Nigerian delegation Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources A delegation led by Governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, visited India Minister of Education, Prof (Mrs.) Ruqayyatu A. Rufai, led an eleven-member delegation Minister of Land and Housing H.E. Ms. Ama Pepple Minister of Communication Technology Mrs. Omabola Johnson Minister of Justice & Attorney General Mr. Mohammed Bello Adoke Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral Dele Joseph Ezeoba. He led a six-member delegation

Focus of Visit/Discussion To study the business model of National Highways Authority of India To attend India–Africa Science and Technology Conference For IBSA International Workshop To encourage economic ties between Nigeria and India To participate in the DefExpo India 2012 To lobby for her candidature for the President of World Bank with the leaders of BRICS To participate at third Bengaluru Space Expo To attend Fortieth Year Celebration of ICRISAT at Hyderabad To seek Indian investors in renewable energy, among others To attend Ninth E-9 Ministerial Review Meeting in New Delhi To take part in Commonwealth Conference March 19–21, 2013, visited New Delhi/ Kolkata to attend India Soft-2013 To participate in AALCO, Annual Conference in New Delhi On an official visit

(Continued )

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The Eagle and Elephant Table 3.1  (Continued) Date March 9–11, 2014

March 20–22, 2014 June 21–26, 2014

September 10– 13, 2014 October 26–30, 2015

March 14–15, 2016

Leader/Official Twenty-member delegation comprising five House of Representative members and Chairman House Committee on Banking and Currency Mrs. Sarah Reng Ochekpe, Minister of Water Resources Fourteen-Member Senate Committee of Senators & Members of House of Representatives of Parliament at the invitation of CEC Minister of Industry, Trade & Investment Olusegun Aganga accompanied by a high-level business delegation President Muhammadu Buhari. Accompanied by a 121-member delegation consisting of Governors of Kano State, Mr. Abdullahi Umar Ganduje and Delta State, Mr. Ifeanyi Okowa; National Security Adviser (NSA), Maj.-Gen. Babagana Monguno (Rtd); besides Permanent Secretaries in the Ministries of Defense, Power, Communications Technology, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and Industry, Trade & Investment Minister of Industry, Trade & Investment Dr. Enelamah Okechukwu

September 1–3, 2016

Minister of State for Health Dr. Osagie Ehanire

October 16–18, 2016

Minister of State for Petroleum Resources, Dr. Ibe Kachikwu. He led a three-member delegation to India. During his visit, he met his Indian counterpart Shri Dharmendra Pradhan

Focus of Visit/Discussion Tenth CII-EXIM Bank Conclave on India–Africa Project Partnership held in New Delhi To participate at the Reinvent the Toilet Fair: India 2014 in New Delhi Visit hosted by Election Commission of India

On official visit

To attend India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-III)

The minister led a large Nigerian delegation to participate in 11th CIIEXIM Bank Conclave as a partner country in New Delhi He led a five-member delegation to participate in India–Africa Health Science Meeting To discuss cooperation in hydrocarbon sector

(Continued )

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Table 3.1  (Continued) Date March 9–10, 2017 May 22–26, 2017

September 2017

December 11– 15, 2017

January 15–16, 2018

February 22, 2018

Leader/Official Governor of Ebonyi State, Engr. (Chief) David Nweze Umahi accompanied by several senior state officials Minister of Finance Ms. Kemi Adeosun

Focus of Visit/Discussion To participate in CIIConclave being held in New Delhi The minister led a Nigerian delegation to India to attend Annual Meeting of African Development Meeting held at Ahmedabad, Gujarat Visited India in connection with setting up of Industrial Park by the Mahindra Group in Benin city, capital of Edo state

Governor of Edo State Godwin Obaseki, accompanied by Emmanuel Usoh, Commissioner for Wealth Creation, Cooperatives and Employment; Kadiri Bashiru, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources Nigerian Minister of Agriculture & Held a meeting with Minister for Agriculture & Farmer’s Rural Development Chief Audu Welfare, Radha Mohan Ogbeh Singh. He also visited Anand (Gujarat) to study India’s experience in white revolution To attend an international Mr. Suleiman Hassan Zarma, workshop on Disaster Nigerian Minister of State for Resilient Infrastructure Power, Works and Housing (DRI) at the invitation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). Met the Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh and MoS (IC) R.K. Singh for Power and New and Renewable Energy on January 16, 2018 Met India’s minister of Nigerian Minister of communications Mr. Communications Barr AbdurManoj Sinha in New Raheem Adebayo Shittu Delhi on the sidelines of International Expo of Telecom Equipment and Services Export Promotion Council (TEPC) (Continued )

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The Eagle and Elephant Table 3.1  (Continued) Date

Leader/Official

Focus of Visit/Discussion

March 25–27, 2018

Mr. Chibuike Amaechi, Minister of Transportation

Participated in the thirteenth edition of CII-EXIM Bank Conclave on “India–Africa Project Partnership” To participate in the End-TB Summit. Met India’s Minister of Health and Family Welfare J.P. Nadda in New Delhi on March 13, 2018, on the sidelines of the End-TB Summit To participate in the fourth India–Africa Health Forum, which was organized as part of the Global Exhibition on Services (GES) held from May 15 to May 18, 2018

March 13, 2018

Health Minister Prof. Isaac Adewole

May 15–18, 2018

Health Minister Prof. Isaac Adewole

March 10–14, 2018

To participate in the Minister of State of Power, Works Founding Conference of and Housing of Nigeria, a the International Solar Nigerian delegation led by Alliance (ISA) and the Solar Mustapha Baba Shehuri and Mr. Summit in New Delhi on Ibrahim Usman Jibril, Minister of March 11, 2018 State for Environment

Source: Bilateral Visits, High Commission of India, Nigeria. Retrieved on November 15, 2018, from https​:/​ /hc​​iabuj​​a​.gov​​.in​/b​​ilate​​ral​-v​​​isit.​​php

The state visit by the Indian prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh from October 13 to 17, 2007, was the second visit by an Indian prime minister to Nigeria since Nehru’s visit in 1962. The visit was seen as significant in spurring the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The visit also resulted in the signing of the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Nigeria and India and other MOUs (Eze, 2008). Specifically, the MOU signed on October 15, 2007, included MOU on Mutual Cooperation between the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA); MOU on Mutual Cooperation between Nigerian Foreign Service Academy and the Indian Foreign Service Institute; MOU on Defense Cooperation, Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA); and Protocol on Consultation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and the Ministry of External Affairs of India (Eze, 2008). The Abuja Declaration enunciates an all-embracing vision of India–Nigeria strategic partnership with emphasis on closer energy partnership. Both countries noted that a

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Table 3.2  Major Diplomatic Visits by Indian Leaders/Officials to Nigeria, 1999 to 2018 Date

Leader/Official

March 2000

External Affairs Minister Satya Mey Vijayte

December 2003

Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee

September 2006

Speaker of Lok Sabha Shri Somnath Chatterjee (accompanied by a large delegation) Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh

October 13– 17, 2007

July 27–28, Special Envoy to the Prime Minister 2008 Shri Anand Sharma January 15–17, Honorable Minister for 2010 Commerce and Industry Shri Anand Sharma January 25–26, Minister for Petroleum and 2010 Natural Gas Shri Murli Deora September 30– Minister of State (IC) for Corporate Affairs and Minority Affairs Shri October 2, Salman Khurshid 2010 May 6–7, Shri R.P.N. Singh, Minister of State 2011 for Petroleum and Natural Gas May 29, 2011

Minister for Water Resources and Minority Affairs Shri Salman Khurshid

May 28–29, 2015

Shri Dharmendra Pradhan, Hon’ble MoS (IC) for Petroleum and Natural Gas

September 26– 29, 2016

Vice President Shri M. Hamid Ansari. Accompanied by his spouse Smt. Salma and a thirteen-member official delegation comprising of MoS for Finance and Corporate Affairs, Shri Arjun Ram Meghwal, three members of the parliament, Shri Bhubaneswar Kalita, Shri Dilip Kumar Tirkey, Shri Mohammad Salim, Secretary (ER) Shri Amar Sinha, and other senior officials

Focus of Visit/Discussion Cochairing the Third Session of India–Nigeria Joint Commission Participation in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting To attend the Fifty-Second Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference Bilateral discussions; signing of the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership Bilateral trade discussions To attend the “Namaskar Africa” event Bilateral visit Represented India at the fiftiethanniversary celebrations of Nigeria’s independence Visited Abuja as Special Envoy of PM to extend invitation for IAFS-II to President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Represented India at swearing-in ceremony of Dr. Ebele Goodluck Jonathan as President Visited Abuja to attend inauguration ceremony of President Muhammadu Buhari Bilateral visit

Source: Bilateral Visits, High Commission of India, Nigeria. Retrieved on November 15, 2018, from https​:/​ /hc​​iabuj​​a​.gov​​.in​/b​​ilate​​ral​-v​​​isit.​​php

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strategic partnership agreement should take into account the commonalities and complementarities between the two countries. They also agreed that the strategic partnership should cover bilateral economic, political, trade, security, cultural, educational, science and technology, and international dimensions. It was therefore agreed that to enhance and broaden the cooperation between them, the following agreements would be formalized and signed within the next six months (i.e., by April 2008): ( 1) Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTA) (2) Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (3) Bilateral Inter-Governmental Science and Technology Agreement (4) Bilateral Air Service Agreement (BASA) (Renewal of 1976 Agreement) (5) Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (6) Extradition Treaty (7) Trade Agreement (8) Agreement on Cooperation Against Trafficking of Drugs, and so on (9) Cultural Exchange Program 2008–2010. Evidence suggests that both countries have not only failed in meeting the deadline set by them to sign these agreements but also the agreements have suffered from neglect. As at 2014, the following MOUs were still outstanding: ( 1) Agreement on the transfer of prisoners. (2) MOU on the field of information and communications technology. (3) MOU on BASA. (4) MOU on Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). (5) Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA). (6) Extradition Treaty. (7) MOU on Cultural Exchange Program. (8) MOU on Cooperation against Trafficking in Drugs. The MOU on Cooperation in the pharmaceutical sector was only signed during the sixth India–Nigeria Joint Commission held in New Delhi on March 16, 2011. The failure of the two countries to conclude the outstanding MOUs has implications for certain aspects of the bilateral relations between them. A case in point is the nonconclusion of the BASA, which was first signed in 1976. In the initial stage, both countries fully utilized the provision of the agreement, with Air India flying to Kano and Lagos and later Belview Airlines was designated as the Nigerian carrier, with its hub in Mumbai. However, in 1989 following the drug saga involving India Air, the airline suspended its operations in Nigeria. Despite this development, the agreement

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was renegotiated in 1994 in order to keep it operative. However, this did not achieve much success. Subsequently, Belview had to also suspend its operation in 2005 due to lack of passengers. The MOU on BASA would go a long way in assuring the Nigerian and Indian airline operators as well as passengers from both countries of government support, protection and investor confidence, and good services for the passengers. Direct air travels between the two countries will also enhance the economic cooperation in the areas of trade and investments. The Indian government granted a concessional line of credit (LOC) of US$100 million to Nigeria in the power sector (Government of India, 2019). This also included renewable sources of energy. The major projects earmarked for utilization of the LOC, included US$30 million for Kaduna and US$30 million for Cross Rivers. Both projects are in advance stages of implementation (Government of India, 2019). The third project for implementation at Enugu state was estimated at US$40 million. In addition, another US$75 million LOC was offered by India for solar-related projects in Bauchi State of Nigeria (50 MW Solar Power Plant) estimated at US$66.60 million (Government of India, 2019). Another US$8.36 million was to be injected for Solar PV Renewable Micro-Utility (REMU) in six political zones of Nigeria (Government of India, 2019). Agreements for these were reached during the International Solar Alliance (ISA) Founding Conference and Solar Summit held on March 11, 2018, in New Delhi. While providing LOCs through EXIM Bank to African countries, India expects that the selection of projects and the implementation is done through a consultative process. There were some concerns regarding Nigeria’s participation in the Pan-African e-Network project, which is being executed by Telecommunications Consultant India Limited (TCIL). The program, which is grant-aided, is designed to link all the fifty-four member states of the African Union (AU), through satellite and optic fiber, to bridge digital divide between the continent and the rest of the world. The services to be provided by the project included tele-education, tele-medicines, Very Very Important Persons (VVIP) connectivity linking state houses and foreign offices of participating countries. Individual African countries were expected to sign separate Country Agreement (CA) to facilitate execution. The Indians were to offer technical assistance, installation, training of personnel as well as servicing of the project for the period of five years, while the participating country would provide a center to house the project, operating personnel, free V-Sat facilities, free custom clearance, establish a Project Implementation Task Force, and set up a Steering Committee to liaise with the AU Commission. Ordinarily, the offer attracted many African countries. However, Nigeria’s reservations were that the way the contract agreement was designed could undermine

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Nigeria’s long-term strategic interests in space venture. Nigeria’s reservations are not unfounded as the operation of the VVIP connectivity being routed through India has serious national security implications. The chances are that all official business, engagements, and discussions of African leaders can be monitored by New Delhi. Besides, before it went out of orbit, the NigComSat launched in 2007 was already providing the services indicated in offer by India in the CA. It was also envisaged that the quick completion of NigComSat II and III would have ruled out the need for the Indian version. However, the failure of the Nigerian satellite in orbit gave room for a consideration of the benefits of the Pan-African e-Network. In view of the failure, an Inter-Ministerial Technical Sub-Committee was set up to engage the technical team from TCIL with a view to sorting out all technical, administrative, funding, and security issues to ensure a smooth take-off of the program.

Part II

LEVERAGING ON NIGERIA– INDIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Chapter 4

Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations

Foreign trade plays an important role in the economic development of a country. It enlarges the market for a country’s output and may become an engine of growth. Expansion of a country’s trade may energize otherwise stagnated economy and may lead to the path of economic growth and prosperity (UNCTAD, 2014). Economic expansion and foreign trade are linked and there is a causal relationship between the two. The trade relationship is one of interdependence rather than one of unilateral causation. The crucial role of trade in the relations of Nigeria and India is widely and repeatedly acknowledged by the authorities of both countries. The Indian high commissioner to Nigeria, for instance, makes it a point to always highlight the trade balance between two countries on various occasions (234Next, January 27, 2011). The dynamics of trade relations between Nigeria and India is better appreciated by examining their exchanges not only from the 1990s but from a much earlier period. This will enable us to also understand the trend of imports and exports, as well as character of trade between the two countries. NIGERIA’S EXPORTS TO INDIA BEFORE 1990 At the time of independence, India’s trade with Nigeria was quite small. Moreover, there were wide fluctuations in the total amount of India’s imports from Nigeria. For example, in 1961–1962, Nigeria’s exports to India were worth Rs. 17.8 million, which decreased to Rs. 1.2 million in 1962–1963, in just one year. The total imports from Nigeria even fell further to Rs. 2.1 million in 1966 (Chishti, 1966). During the period of the Nigerian Civil War, however, total import from Nigeria by India increased to Rs. 6.6 million from 1967 to 1968. During the period 1962–1969, Nigeria’s major commodity, 77

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which India bought from Nigeria, was palm oil, which also registered decline from Rs. 10.8 million in 1961–1962 to Rs. 7.5 million in 1963–1964 (Singh, 1992). The position regarding India’s imports from Nigeria, during the period from 1969–1970 to 1973–1974 further deteriorated. The total value of India’s imports from Nigeria, which was Rs. 6.6 million in 1967–1968 decreased to Rs. 3.2 million in 1969–1970, and practically to nil in 1971–1972 and 1972–1973 (Singh, 1992). This was largely due to the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Thereafter, there was some return to exports again to the tune of Rs. 0.3 million in 1973–1974 (Singh, 1992). An evaluation of India’s imports from Nigeria during the period reveals that the commodities bought by India from Nigeria included oil palm, groundnut and groundnut cake, cocoa beans, cocoa butter, and other related products, rubber, raw cotton, cotton seeds, tin, hides and skin, coffee, timber, and plywood. During the period 1974–1975 to 1975–1980, a further fall was observed in value of Nigerian goods imported by India. But again, in 1975–1976, it rose to a record level of Rs. 18.4 million and the upward trend was maintained, except in the year 1976–1977, when total exports were only Rs. 0.5 million. India’s main import from Nigeria during this period was again palm oil. Crude oil to supplement India’s domestic production, which was quite low, was at that time being sourced from Iran and Saudi Arabia. By late 1970, however, against the backdrop of the international oil crisis, India needed to expand its sources of oil. From 1979, the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) began importing Nigeria crude oil to the tune of about 10,000 barrels a day (Nigerian Enterprise, 1983). In terms of money value, it was worth about US$100 million annually. From this period, crude oil became the major commodity in the bilateral trade between Nigeria and India. For instance, in 1980–1982, among all the commodities imported from Nigeria, including cocoa, palm kernel, rubber, and groundnut, it was crude oil that accounted for about Rs. 50 million in that year (Report of the First Meeting of Indo-Nigeria Joint Business Council, March 1982). NIGERIA’S IMPORTS FROM INDIA BEFORE 1990 The utility of the Indian gunnies in West African countries stimulated the export of Indian goods, notably the real Madras Hanker-chief popularly called “George” in the southern part of Nigeria. These commodities were initially handled by large European traders in India until the Indian businessmen, chiefly the enterprising Sindhi traders, arrive the scene. Slowly, they built up the retail trade in Indian textile, including silk, gaining a firm foothold in the whole of English-speaking West Africa. As some Indian merchants traveled to other Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, it was not

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difficult for the Indian traders to source for goods from their kinsmen from Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan. Ultimately, the Indian merchants became a nucleus for marketing products of not only these countries, in addition to that of India, but also European and American products (Export Promotion Council, April, 1981). When Nigeria became independent, most of the Indian business outfits started diversifying their retail trade by offering other goods besides gunnies and textile. Today, there are well over 100 Indian businesses spread across the country (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2011). In 1961–1962, the total value of India’s exports to Nigeria was worth only Rs. 70.3 million which further decreased to only Rs. 30.7 million in 1968–1989. The major exports from India to Nigeria during this period were cotton twist and yarn, cotton piece goods, jute bags and jute cloth, shoes, utensils, electrical appliances, fans, iron and steel products, bicycles and parts, sewing machines, steel furniture’s, razor blades, builders, hardware, locks and padlocks, dry battery, and so on. The decline in India’s exports to Nigeria during this period was mainly due to the fall in the export of cotton piece goods and jute goods. This decline was noticed notwithstanding the marginal increase registered in the export of engineering goods (Eton, 2006). The share decline of India’s exports to Nigeria during the period 1961– 1969. The causes for the decline in Indian exports to Nigeria are due to the diversification of its exports trade and tilt toward the markets of Europe and North America. In view of the exchange and import control and the indifference of the Indian manufacturers to take note of the changing consumer preferences in the Nigerian market, local buyers also shifted their purchase needs from India to its competitors such as Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan, which were also gaining foothold in the Nigerian market (Singh, 1992, p.143). Above all, Indian goods were unable to retain competitiveness of price and packaging had been criticized as utterly poor (Report of Indian Industrial Delegation to Some African Countries, 1977). Another reason for the decline was the ignorance on the part of Indian shippers with regard to commercial and market opportunities in Nigeria (Singh, 1992). Most Indian traders at that time established their economic ventures in major Nigerian cities such as Lagos, Ibadan, Port Harcourt, and Kano. Being of Indian origin and lacking deep knowledge of other parts of the country, they failed to take advantage of the huge market opportunities in other parts of the country. India’s exports to Nigeria rose from Rs. 79 million in 1970–1971 to Rs. 111.9 million in 1973–1974. The major commodities that India exported to Nigeria from 1970 to 1974 consisted of engineering goods, machinery, coaches, and so on. The fastest growing sectors of the Nigerian economy in the post–Civil War era were construction, manufacturing, transport, and

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communications. Following the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, a period, which coincided with the oil boom of the early 1970s, the Nigerian government embarked on reconstruction work focusing on infrastructure such as roads, bridges, housing and major industries in the country. Thus, the Indians took advantage of domestic demand for goods related to the development of these sectors of the Nigerian economy. There was substantial increase in the value of engineering goods exported by India to the Nigerian market which rose from Rs. 17 million in 1969–1970 to Rs. 58 million in 1973–1974. This was the highest value of Indian exports to Nigeria realized in the 1970s (Mathew, 1988). The other major category of items exported by India was chemical and allied products, including pharmaceuticals and cosmetics products. Apart from these, commodities such as cereals and cereal preparations, fish and fish preparations, cotton manufactures, readymade garments, and some other miscellaneous manufactures were exported to Nigeria (Mathew, 1988). India’s exports rose significantly to a level of Rs. 374 million during 1975–1976 as compared to Rs. 18 million in 1974–1975, registering an increase of 58 percent (Report of Study, 1977). This growth was not sustained and exports to Nigeria came down to Rs. 296 million in 1979–1980. India’s exports moved to Rs. 530 million in 1980–1981 and to Rs. 719.1 million in 1981–1982. The increase recorded was not sustained as India’s exports to Nigeria declined to Rs. 570.1 million in 1982–1983, declining further in 1983–1984 and 1984–1985. The major reasons for the decline according to the Indian High Commission in Nigeria were due to the external payment problems of Nigeria following worldwide slump in oil demand and fall in oil price. Another reason advanced for the decline was the restrictions on imports during the period (Economic & Commercial News, June 1984). The major export items from India comprised of jute, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, textile fabrics, cotton and jute fabrics, pearls, worked and un-worked precious stones, iron and steel, metal manufactures, machinery, electrical wares, footwear, developed cinematographic film, articles of artificial plastics materials, bicycle and bicycle parts, auto parts and fans, and so on. What the previous analysis reveals is that trade between Nigeria and India from 1960 to 1980s had been in India’s favor. Before crude oil became the dominant commodity in the trade between the two countries, palm oil was the dominant commodity imported by India from Nigeria (Eton, 2006). India, on the other hand, had exported to Nigeria a wide range of manufactured industrial goods, consumer goods, and pharmaceutical products. Though both countries conduct their trade under the aegis of South–South Cooperation (SSC), the structure and pattern of trade between the two countries could easily be mistaken for that between a country of the North and that of the South.

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The concern for the future implication of this one-sided pattern of trade relations led Kuruvilla-Matthews Kuran (1967) to argue that the fact that India is buying from Nigeria only one commodity is inhibiting the future prospects of India’s export to Nigeria. It will be a folly on our part to believe that any country will be interested in continuing to buy from us while we are not inclined to buy from it. (p.17)

Whether the Indian government paid any serious attention to this warning remains unclear as the importation of Nigerian crude oil introduced a new phase in relations between the two countries from 1985 onward. When the data obtained from the Indian side is compared with data obtained from the Nigerian side, within the same period, the picture becomes even clearer that balance of trade during the 1970s and 1980s was not in Nigeria’s favor. The trade between Nigeria and India from 1969 to 1984 was not in Nigeria’s favor. While total import within this period from India stood at ₦411,903, Nigeria’s total exports to India stood at ₦9,441 and balance of trade within this period was −40,2462. Convinced that cooperation in trade is essential to achieving maximum development in their respective countries, the governments of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Republic of India signed a trade agreement in 1983. The agreement, which was done on January 27, 1983, was signed by Shri Shivraj V. Patil, then minister of commerce, for the Indian Government and Alhaji Bello Maitama Yusuf, then minister of commerce, for the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. According to Article 1 (1.1) of the Agreement: Contracting Parties shall accord each other most favoured treatment with respect to imports and exports, customs, duties and other charges and taxes applicable to importation exportation or transit of goods and commodities and also with respect to rules and formalities in connection with such importation and exportation.

In addition, the Trade Agreement in Article 2 (2.1) stated that the contracting parties “shall make every effort to increase the volume and diversify the content of trade between their two countries and shall endeavour to achieve them a balance of trade.” In order to ensure that the trade cooperation between them was mutually beneficial, the Trade Agreement in Article 3 (3.1) stipulated that goods and commodities to be exchanged shall only be those originating in countries of contracting parties. What this means is that such goods or products must be wholly produced or manufactured in either country. In the case of agricultural products, they must have been grown in either country. A Committee was therefore set up to monitor the implementation of the

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agreement. The Committee was expected to meet at least every two years, alternating between Nigeria and India, to review the effective implementation of the agreement. However, the meetings were not held as expected. On the whole, there was a failure on the part of both countries to ensure successful implementation of the agreement and its review by the Committee that was set up for this purpose. The implications are that trade between Nigeria and India was one-sided. From 1981 to 1990, the balance of trade was not only in India’s favor, but diversified on the Indian side and lack of diversity on the Nigerian side. The total visible exports of India to Nigeria exceeded the total visible imports. NIGERIA–INDIA TRADE, 1990–2018 In the post–Cold War era, India’s foreign policy moved away from ideological principles to become increasingly pragmatic (Beri, 2011). From this time, India used economic diplomacy as a method of gaining greater access into the economy of African countries, including Nigeria. After the economic liberalization reforms of 1991, the Indian economy began to witness significant growth, thus necessitating India to step up her engagement with African countries considered as strategic such as Nigeria to expand trade and investment, as well as increased its access to energy resources, particularly oil, whose demand was increasing in India (Dadwal, 2011). By 1990, India was importing 50 percent of its oil requirements, the bulk of which was being imported from Iran and Saudi Arabia as importing oil from Nigeria at that time implied additional uneconomic freight and costs (Singh, 1992). However, in 1991, following the rise of global oil prices due to the Iraq–Kuwait war, India found itself in a worse situation than many countries. From this time, crude oil had assumed greater significance as the dominant commodity in the trade relations between the two countries (Chellaney, 1999). From 1991 to 1995, the balance of trade became increasingly in favor of Nigeria, mainly because of increased importation of Nigeria’s oil by India. Despite the distance between the two countries, India’s demand for Nigeria’s crude oil, which was handled by the IOC rose by over 186.64 percent within five years from 1994 to 1998. India’s imports of Nigerian crude oil have continued to rise, reaching 67,142 million barrels in 1998. It is also important to note that at this time the above quantity of crude oil was bought by India either in the domestic or international market. There was a decline in the quantity of oil bought by India between 1999 and 2003. While the quantity of oil bought by India in 1998 was 67.142 million barrels, the quantity stood at 11.578 barrels in 2002–2003.

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Table 4.1  Nigeria’s Crude Exports to India Compared with Other Asian Countries (Quantity of Barrels) S/N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Month/Year January–December 1999 January 2000 February 2000 March 2000 May 2000 June 2000 July 2000 August 2000 September 2000 October 2000 November 2000 December 2000 January 2001 February 2001 March 2001

Total Exports to Asia and Far East

Total Export to India Only

(%)

155,859,603 7,863,896 10,417,275 5,679,252 10,278,584 11,657,282 8,939,121 9,553,447 10,691,194 10,913,172 16,005,216 13,067,540 13,127,239 6,537,478 5,804,326

104,777,707 6,005,118 7,619,781 3,910,748 6,679,810 6,871,733 5,082,325 6,759,172 5,854,560 7,089,975 9,697,846 10,249,291 10,309,986 5,648,968 4,884,596

67.2 76.4 73.1 68.9 65.0 58.9 56.8 70.7 54.8 64.9 60.6 78.4 78.5 86.4 84.2

Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC (1999): Monthly Petroleum Information Corporation Planning and Development Division (CPD) and NNPC Annual Petroleum Bulletin, 1999.

Notwithstanding the fluctuations in the quantity of oil purchased by India within this period, it was still higher than most Asian countries. Table 4.1 shows that of all Asian countries that import crude oil from Nigeria, India imports the largest percentage, with the highest percentages reached in February and March 2001 of 86 percent and 84 percent, respectively. Bilateral trade between Nigeria and India has witnessed a significant increase in the last few years growing from US$14.628 billion in 2011 (The Punch, August 12, 2011) to US$16.67 billion in 2013 (₦2.7 trillion) (Punch Newspaper, January 18, 2014). By 2010, Indo-Nigeria trade had also surpassed the level of Nigeria’s trade with other countries in southern, central, and western Africa. India is the fourth-largest non-oil export destination for Nigeria (Vasudevan, 2010). Aside from oil, it exports cashew nuts, wood, cotton, pearls, rubber, and gum Arabic to India. India’s exports to Nigeria from 1990 to 2014 comprised of paper and wood products, textiles, plastics, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and drugs and pharmaceuticals. The trade relations between the two countries were reinvigorated after series of visits at the governmental and commercial levels following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule as from 1999. In October 2007, the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh visited Nigeria and he announced among others, a US$5 million line of credit (LOC) to promote trade between Nigerian companies and India. The EXIM bank of India had also extended a US$30

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million LOC to the African Export-Import bank to finance India’s exports to its members (Naidu, 2010). Nigeria is a member of the African Export-Import bank. However, no information could be obtained on how much of these funds have been accessed by Nigeria. Even so, it can be argued that these visits and the extension of LOC have spurred more bilateral trade relations between the two countries. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show significant growth in trade between the two countries especially between 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 before declining again by 2009–2010 and later picked up from 2010–2011 to 2013–2014. Even so, there were declines in Indian imports from Nigeria in 2012–2013 and Indian exports to Nigeria in 2013–2014. According to Eze (2008), the main reason for the expansion of trade between the two countries is the expansion of the business environment following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999. Other reasons include India’s demand for more energy resources against the backdrop of the unrest in the Middle East, and the desire for expansion of overseas markets for Indian-manufactured products. As a result of the centrality of crude oil in the bilateral trade between the two countries, balance of trade has been in Nigeria’s favor. However, when oil and some gas which constitutes more than 99 percent of the Nigerian exports to India are isolated, the picture is different. Figures obtained from the Indian High Commission in Nigeria shows that Nigeria’s exports to India excluding crude oil valued in US million dollars stood at US$48.40 between 2004 and 2005, and US$72.46 from 2005 to 2006, while exports from 2008 to 2009, which included oil, stood at US$8,900.35. From table 4.3, it can also be observed that there were periods of growth and decline. Given the fact that crude oil is the dominant item in the trade between the two countries, the years of growth and decline implies demand for more or less oil and/or rise and decline in crude oil prices in the international market. When oil exports are compared with the non-oil exports, the picture of the one-sidedness in the trade relations between Nigeria and India becomes clearer (Agbu, 2008). It is clear that crude oil is the dominant commodity in the bilateral trade between Nigeria and India. Haté (2008) concurs that the need to secure energy supplies is at the forefront of India’s strategy in African countries. Though in terms of trade, oil dominates as a commodity thus necessitating the attention of Nigerian and Indian government to move away from a one-sided and oil-centered trade relationship, the Indian investments in Nigeria span into other areas. The explanation for the expansion of trade within this period is not farfetched. Supplies of Nigerian crude and some natural gas constitute 99 percent of total Indian imports from Nigeria. India argues that when compared with supplies from Gulf, Nigeria’s crude is actually uneconomical for India. However, Nigeria’s oil is attractive to India because it is sweet (low in sulfur) and is normally sold for a premium. Nigerian crude involves long supply

Table 4.2  Statistics of Nigeria India Bilateral Trade in Millions of US$ (2003 2010) 2004–2005

2005–2006

2006–2007

2007–2008

2008–2009

2009–2010

Indian Exports to Nigeria

565.49

544.68

874.03

903.48

75,64

48.40

72.46

7026.93

1529.26 (41% y-o-y Growth) 8900.35 (14.1% y-o-y Growth)

1408.25 (−8%)

Indian Imports from Nigeria

1083.34 (20% Growth) 7616.09 (8.47% Growth)

7287.91 (−18% decline)

Source: Indian High Commission, Abuja, 2014. Excludes oil import figures.

Table 4.3  Statistics of Nigeria India Bilateral Trade in Millions of US$ (2010 2018)

Indian Exports to Nigeria Indian Imports from Nigeria

2010–2011

2011–2012

2012–2013

2013–2014

2014–2015

2015–2016

2016–2017

2017–2018

2,259.09 (+60%)

2,700.23 (+29% growth) 14,622.57 (+36% growth)

737.940 (+1.33% growth) 13,826.017 (5.92% decline)

2,666.198 (−2.62% decline) 14,315.08 (+3.54% growth)

2,681.37

2,221.90

1,764.11

2,254.93

13,682.97

9,949.17

7,659.48

9,501.33

10,787.72 (+36% growth)

Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations

2003–2004

Source: Indian High Commission, Abuja, 2018.

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lines making freight much more expensive. Even so, the Indian government currently buys Nigeria’s crude and in large quantity because older generation Indian public sector refineries are less sophisticated and tailored to refine only sweeter crudes, such as Nigerian blends. Because of the vitality of crude oil as a commodity for the Indian national economy, India does not want to depend solely on the supplies from the Gulf. At the same time, the preference for Nigerian crude is as a result of the political and other risks involved in the Middle East. Supplies of crude oil from Nigeria are therefore to diversify India’s crude import basket. A further examination of the trade between Nigeria and India reveals some interesting trends. The trade data obtained from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics and the Indian Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, suggest that trade between the two countries is large. However, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that the official statistics significantly underestimate it (Sachdev, 2014). The evidence draws from the fact that many Indian exports to Nigeria come through third countries, such as UAE, South Africa, Benin, and Cameroon. This has been attested to by the former Indian high commissioner to Nigeria Ambassador Mahesh Sachdev that some Indians actually bring in their goods through these countries (Sachdev, 2014). The understanding between the two countries is that goods and commodities to be exchanged shall only be those originating in countries of contracting parties. Such goods or products must be wholly produced or manufactured in either country and agricultural products must have been grown in either country. India’s exports through third countries happen mainly for two reasons, namely, logistical convenience and circumvention of high Nigerian tariffs and outright import ban on certain items. Moreover, high tariffs and import bans also lead to under-invoicing and missinvoicing. Indians have argued that it is cheaper to import goods through neighboring Benin Republic ports than through Lagos ports. Such goods including some that are officially banned by the Nigerian government are smuggled into the country. On the other hand, India buys 90 percent of its Nigerian crude directly or indirectly through international spot market. This practice introduces uncertainties of the price and rule of origin. These factors distort the accuracy of bilateral trade data. For instance, sudden doubling of Nigerian import tariff on rice to 110 percent from January 1, 2013, resulted in (−) 77 percent plunge of supplies of non-basmati rice from India from US$338 million in 2012–2013 to US$77 million in 2013–2014. An evaluation of the principal commodities of exchange between the two countries is also very revealing. As shown in table 4.4, although India’s exports to Nigeria are large (US$2.666 billion) and varied (83), they are dominated by finished products. Table 4.5 shows the top ten items in India’s export basket to Nigeria and their performance over the years.

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Table 4.4  India’s Exports to Nigeria by Principal Commodities (2013 2014) (in USD) S/No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Commodity Tea Coffee Pulses Rice–basmati Rice (other than basmati) Wheat Other cereals Dairy products Floriculture products Tobacco unmanufactured Tobacco manufactured Spices Sugar Cashew Sesame seeds Spirit and beverages Guar gum meal Oil meals Castor oil Shellac Fruits/vegetables Fresh fruits Fresh vegetables Processed vegetables Processed fruits & juices Misc processed items Marine products Sports goods Poultry products Iron ore Mica Processed minerals Other ores and minerals Finished leather Leather goods Leather garments Footwear of leather Leather footwear component Saddlery & harness Drugs, pharmaceuticals, and fine chemicals Dyes/intermediates and coal tar chemicals Inorganic/organic/agro chemicals

Unit

Quantity

April 2013 to March 2014 (US$)

Kilograms Kilograms Ton Ton Ton Ton Ton – – Kilograms – Kilograms Ton Ton Kilograms – Ton Ton Kilograms Kilograms Kgs – – – – – Kilograms – – Ton Kilograms – – Kilograms – – – Kilograms

152,458 223,233 2 1,154 192,302 338 68 – – 4,543,790 – 6,532,119 315 8 615 – 166 15 300,523 550 4,128 – – – – – 519,530 – – 3,000 413 – – 48,000 – – – 380

8,018,36 1,767,096 1,970 1,431,031 77,152,391 1,157,60 28,377 13,385,775 25,618 19,074,649 10,789 24,528,403 231,644 40,208 1,173 28,429,963 738,495 5,476 496,824 8,687 237,655 165,960 96 2,250,792 825,071 17,047,832. 633,179 926,640 321,239 1,296 1,284 12,196,606 2,835,595 528,628 120,546 91 1,549,255 24,132

– –

– –

9,327 38,197,810

Kilograms

3,177,064

15,973,843

Kilograms

32,091,881

57,031,567 (Continued )

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Table 4.4 (Continued ) S/No. 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Commodity Cosmetics/toiletries, etc. Jute yarn Jute hessian Other jute manufactures Rubber mfd. products except footwear Footwear of rubber/ canvas, etc. Paints/enamels/varnishes, etc. Gems & jewelry Glass/glassware/ ceramics/Reftrs/Cmnt/ Paper/wood products Plastics and linoleum products Residl chemical and allied products Ferro alloys Aluminum other than products Nonferrous metals Manufactures of metals Machine tools Machinery and instruments Transport equipment Residual engineering items Iron & Stl Bar/Rod Etc & Frro-Aloy Primary & semi-finished iron and steel Electronic goods Computer software in physical form Manmade staple fiber Cotton yarn, fabrics, makeups, and so on Antral silk yarn, fabrics, makeups Manmade yarn, fabrics, makeups Woollen yarn, fabrics, made-ups, and so on Rmg Cotton Incl Accessories

Unit

Quantity

April 2013 to March 2014 (US$)

– Ton – – –

– 171 – – –

26,602,123 164,902 103,746 449,466 51,221,784

–

–

8,013,314

Kilograms

18,353,163

37,329,354

– –

– –

6,124,414 15,611,282

– –

– –

63,876,515 186,136,056

–

–

19,002,156

Ton Kilograms

13,939 304,090

12,835,542 1,065,285

– – – –

– – – –

26,382,551 152,038,780 10,131,744 391,544924

– – Ton

– – 745

455,179,756 2,854,379 1,102,810

Ton

112,682

93,771,320

– –

– –

157,980,831 378,957

– –

– –

1,196,747 29,449,781

–

–

1,094,967

–

–

65,360,480

–

–

2,581

–

–

75,572,871 (Continued )

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Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations Table 4.4 (Continued ) S/No. 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83

Commodity Rmg silk Rmg manmade fibers Rmg wool Rmg of other textile material Coir & coir manufactures Handloom products Carpet (exclusively silk) handmade Handcrafts (exclusively handmade carpets) Petroleum: crude and products Project goods Other commodities No of records = 83

April 2013 to March 2014 (US$) 4,822,586 11,762,781 910,238 13,788,819

Unit – – – –

Quantity – – – –

– – –

– – –

178,906 2,702,543 242,663

–

–

233,356

Ton

88,516

37,827,590

– –

– – Total value = 2,666,198,229

537615 37,682,105

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

Table 4.5  Top Ten Items in India’s Export Basket to Nigeria (in USD Thousands) S/No. 1 2 3 4

Item

10

Total exports Transport equipment Machinery and instruments Drugs, pharmaceuticals, and fine chemicals Cotton and textile products Plastic and linoleum products Electronic goods Manufactures of metals Primary and semi-finished iron and steel Non-basmati rice

11

Paper and wood products

5 6 7 8 9

2013–2014

2012–2013

Change (%)

2,666,198 455,180 391,545 381,973

2,787,940 372,483 357,544 341,065

−2.62 +22.2% +09.5% +12.0%

207,085 186,136

154,623 123,070

+33.9% +51.2%

157,981 152,039 93,771

265,321 154,453 80,024

−40.5% −01.6% +17.2%

77,152 (192,302 Ton) 63,877

338,393 (813,199 Ton) 82,584

−77.2% (−76.4%) −22.7%

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

With the exceptions of sharp decline in figures of non-basmati rice and electronic goods, Indian exports to Nigeria did reasonably well. Also, the relaxation of imports of textile and garments, which was banned until 2012, benefited India, a traditional supplier to Nigeria. Though the Nigerian market for imported goods from India is large, it is subject to pulls and pressures

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Table 4.6  Fastest-Moving Fifteen Items in India’s Export Basket to Nigeria, 2008 2014 (in USD) S/No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Item Footwear of rubber/ canvas, and so on Gems and jewelry Processed vegetables Coffee Spirit and beverages Dairy products Basmati rice Footwear of leather Non-basmati rice Tobacco unmanufactured Marine products Spices Transport equipment Textile and garments Electronic goods

2007–2008

2013–2014

Change in Six Years

$4,762

$8,013,314

1,683 times

$5,734 $37,594 $33,134 $564,347 $676,380 $76,719 $94,884 $59,689,072 $1,997,512

$6,124,414 $2,250,792 $1,767,096 $28,429,963 $13,385,775 $1,431,031 $1,549,255 $600 mn (est) $19,074,649

1,068 times 60 times 53 times 50 times 20 times 19 times 16.3 times 10 times 9.5 times

$76,931 $3,558,942 $66,198,553 $32 mn (est) $30,833,899

$633,179 $24,528,403 $455,179,756 $207 mn (est) $157,980,831

8.2 times 6.9 times 6.9 times 6.5 times 5 times

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

resulting from change in trade policy concerning a particular item or commodity. Even so, Indian exports to Nigeria have performed well over the years. Table 4.6 indicates the fifteen fastest moving items in India’s export basket to Nigeria from 2008 to 2014. Taken over past six-year period, official Indian exports to Nigeria have grown by 146 percent (from US$1,085,410,496 in 2007–2008 to US$2,666,198,229 in 2013–2014). Considering the individual items with export of above US$1 million in 2013–2014, the fifteen items listed in table 4.6 have grown fastest in the past six years. Table 4.7 indicates India’s imports from Nigeria by principal commodities in 2013–2014. Even as India’s imports from Nigeria in 2013–2014 are nearly 5.3 times bigger than Indian exports to the country (US$14.315 billion vs. US$2.666 billion), they are less diversified. In fact, over 99 percent of Nigerian supplies to India are comprised by “petroleum, crude, and products.” Remaining US$138 million are mostly primary products, such as metal scrap, agricultural products, leather, and a few others. Table 4.8 captures the top seven India’s import basket from Nigeria in 2013–2014. With the inclusion of petroleum, crude, and products, Indian imports from Nigeria did reasonably well. However, when petroleum, crude, and products are removed, the picture presented is different. The evaluation of commodities of trade reveals the asymmetrical trade relation between Nigeria

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Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations Table 4.7  India’s Imports from Nigeria by Principal Commodities 2013 2014 (in USD) PC Code 04 12 14 18 19 20 23 29 31 34 38 41 44 46 49 52 54 57 58 63 64 67 69 72 75 77 79 80 82 90 99

Commodity Cereal preparation Raw cashew nuts Spices Oil seeds Vegetable oils fixed (edible) Natural rubber Wood and wood products Raw hides and skins Leather Cotton raw: comb./uncomb/ waste Metalifers ores and products Petroleum, crude, and products Essential oil and cosmetic preparation Inorganic chemicals Medicinal and pharmaceutical products Artificial Resins, plastic materials, and so on Chemical materials and products Paper board and manufactures Printed books, newspapers, journals, and so on Pearls precious, semiprecious stones Non-metallic Minerals Manufactures Excluding Pearls Iron and steel Nonferrous metals Manufactures of metals Machine tools Machinery except Electrical machinery Except Electronic Electric goods Transport equipment Professional instruments etc except electronics Other commodities No of records = 33

April 2013 to March 2014 (US$)

Unit

Quantity

Ton Ton Kilograms Ton Ton – – – Ton

– 133,48 6,739,383 – – 1,212 – – – 503

156 11,664,512 8,628,448 22,877,378 409 3,028,311 12,026,230 624,604 15,268,597 945,511

– – –

– 16,752,271 –

28,616,782 14,176,992,234 333

– –

– –

10,727 54

–

–

161,956

– Ton –

– – –

32 758 52,730

–

–

1,710,705

–

–

87

Ton – – – – –

– – – – –

242,749 23,377,640 2,002 6,952 83,463 230,102

– – –

– – –

840,950 4,051 17,260

–

– Total value = US$14, 315,083,078

421

7,667,355

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

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Table 4.8  Top Seven Items in India’s Import Basket from Nigeria, 2013 2014 (in USD) S/No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item Petroleum, crude, and products Metalifers ores and metal scrap Nonferrous metals Oil seeds Leather Wood and wood products Raw cashew nuts

2013–2014

2012–2013

Change (%)

$14,176,992,234 16,752,271 mn tons (335,000 bpd) $28,616,782

$11,916,508,122 $14,111,132 mn tons (2.822 mbpd) $33,561,861

19.0 18.7 −14.7

$23,377,640

$40,969,557

−42.9

$22,877,378 $15,268,597 $12,026,230

$10,881,065 $6,500,514 $21,159,133

110.4 134.9 −43.2

$11,664,512 13,348 Tons

$24,099,812 26,827

−51.6

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

Table 4.9  Top Seven Items in India’s Import Basket from Nigeria, 2008 2014 (in USD) S/No. 1 2 3 4

Item Leather Metalifers ores and metal scrap Oil seeds Petroleum, crude, and products

5

Raw cashew nuts

6 7

Nonferrous metals Wood and wood products

2013–2014

2007–2008

Change

$15,268,597 $28,616782

$232,519 $5,432,894

65.53 times 5.27 times

$22,877,378 $14,176,992,234 16,752,271 Tons (335,000 bpd) $11,664,512 13,348 Tons $23,377,640 $12,026,230

$810,440 $7,504,512,944 12,732,306 Tons (254,640 bpd) $10,013,918 18,289 Tons $31,235,718 $21,229,780

2.82 times +89% +32% +16.5% −27.0% −25.2% −43.3%

Source: Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Government of India, 2014.

and India, where Nigeria imports from India mainly manufactured goods and India buys mainly crude oil from Nigeria. Thus, the picture of the trade relations tends to suggest the relationship between North and South countries. The items listed in table 4.9 also feature the fastest moving seven items in India’s import basket from Nigeria from 2008 to 2014. The Indian imports from Nigeria in the year 2013–2014 are compared with the corresponding data for 2007–2008. Limiting the comparison to items, which have attained a minimum value of US$10 million in 2013–2014, the performance of the major items is evaluated. Considering that during the six-year

Trade as the Fulcrum in Nigeria–India Relations

93

period, India’s imports from Nigeria increased by 88 percent (from US$7,612, 015,018 to US$14,315,083,078), and only three major items (leather, metalifers ores and metal scrap, and oil seeds) have showed some growth. Of these, leather has performed better. It is important to note that even though agricultural items did not perform well, this may be explained as resulting from logistical bottlenecks and lack of diversification of the Nigerian exports. According to official Nigerian trade data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2014), India is the largest trading partner of Nigeria. India is the first destination of Nigerian exports and fifth source of Nigeria’s imports. That notwithstanding, the examination of Nigeria–India trade relations up to 2014 reveal that on the side of traditional Nigerian exports to India, oil and gas is huge and obviously a very lucrative sector. The focus on oil and gas places Nigeria in a vulnerable position in the trade relations. Following the shale discovery, the US import of Nigerian crude has declined by nearly 74 percent over last six years. As the United States was the largest buyer of Nigerian crude, this development made Nigerian crude a buyers’ market. India is currently not only the largest buyer of Nigerian crude; its demand is also growing. India does also require large quantities of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). NLNG is currently Nigeria’s only LNG exporter and trades on long-term basis. For now, it has no arrangements for long-term purchase with Indian buyers. However, following the United States turning into an LNG exporter, reversal of Japan’s surge in gas demand after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 2011, sputtering Ukraine crisis, threatening Europe’s gas supplies from Russia, and India raising price of the natural gas, the international market is in a state of flux. This may be a significant opportunity for Nigeria to diversify its exports to India to include more natural gas. Nigeria does present considerable opportunities for exporting some nonoil products, which are either yet to reach their full potential or require some groundwork before arriving at sustainable trade. Among the products for bigger market in India are metal scrap, wood, raw leather, raw cashew nuts, spices, shea butter, herbal products, and several agricultural commodities. India currently imports nearly 9 billion dollars’ worth of palm oil annually, mostly from Malaysia and Indonesia (Sachdev, 2014). Until mid-1960s, Nigeria was the world’s top producer of palm oil and seedlings were taken from Nigeria to Malaysia and Indonesia, both countries, which today, have thriving palm plantations. Meanwhile, largely due to concentration and dependency on crude oil, Nigeria witnessed a decline in agriculture, in general, and oil palm production in particular. Until the late 1970s, palm oil was a major commodity in Nigeria–India trade, which ceased to be after Nigerian oil palm plantations plummeted making the country a net importer. However, with government support for the farmers, the palm plantations in the coastal areas can be revived. To further diversify Nigeria’s exports, other

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agro-products such as groundnuts, cotton, and minerals such as coal, iron ore, gold, and others, could be added to the Nigerian export basket to India. Thus, the evaluation of Nigeria–India trade relations reveals a trend of complex interdependence where both countries cannot just walk away from the relationship. Despite the asymmetrical nature of the trade relationship, both countries have no choice but to trade with one another to meet their domestic needs. Therefore, the challenge is to enhance their trade relations for mutual benefits of both countries.

Chapter 5

Investment Relations between Nigeria and India

Having assessed the trade relations between Nigeria and India, this chapter evaluates the areas of investments that have attracted the interest of Indians and also their impact in the various sectors of the Nigerian economy. In recent times, India has diversified its investments in Africa. One reason for this is that India has substantial foreign currency reserves, and the government has lifted regulations and controls to allow more firms to go abroad. It also removed the US$100 million cap on foreign investment by Indian firms. Both state-owned enterprises and Indian private sector operators draw a great deal of support from the Export-Import Bank of India through its Lines of Credit (LOC) program. The credit lines are seen as strengthening and expanding export trade between the respective regions and India through deferred payment terms. Despite Nigeria’s low ranking on East of doing business, the returns on investment have remained an attraction to Indian companies (KPMG & CII, 2015). For example, the World Bank (WB) recently released its Ease of Doing Business 2020 Report in which Nigeria ranks 131 out of 190 countries on the World Bank Doing Business Index (CNN, October 24, 2019). Even though this is poor compared to more high-ranking countries, the report showed a slight improvement of moving up fifteen places from 146th position in the 2019 report (CNN, October 24, 2019). The report attested that Nigeria is one of the top ten countries with the most notable improvements in Africa during the review period. It has been pointed out by the Indian High Commission in Nigeria that there are over 100 Indian companies present in Nigeria mainly in telecommunications, hydrocarbons, textiles, chemicals, electrical equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics, information and communications technology (ICT), and automobile sectors. Indian automobile companies have significant presence in Nigeria. Indian investment in Nigeria was estimated to be over US$10 billion (Sachdev, 2014). It was also reported 95

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that India was the largest investor in Nigeria in 2010 (The Punch, August 12, 2011). Indian entrepreneurs’ presence in the Nigerian economy is well diversified and does not easily subject itself to stratification. However, Indian investment in Nigeria can be compartmentalized into three broad categories on the basis of the source of investments. These include India-based (Tata and Airtel), Nigeria-based Indians (Dana Group, Chanrais, and Chellerams), and third country–based Indians (Indorama). The current Indian entrepreneurial presence in Nigeria touches virtually all aspects of the Nigerian economy, even as its relative strengths are uneven. Although many of the Indian ventures are concentrated around Lagos, Indian enterprises are present in many Nigerian states as well. In terms of numbers, the pharmaceutical sector dominates with over thirty establishments, followed by healthcare, steel smelting (from scrap), and consumer products. In terms of size of investments, Airtel Nigeria brought in high investments estimated at about US$4.5 billion investment into the telecommunication sector. The major Indian investments in Nigeria comprise of Airtel, Indorama, various groups of Channai family, Sterling Energy, Dana Group, Stallion group, Mehtanis, Chellarams group, Bajaj, Tata, Godrej, NIIT, Ashok Leyland, Skipper, Simba, and Primus among others. Following Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, the Nigerian government sought to attract more investments into the country including those from India. It is in this light that the Nigerian and Indian governments signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) and Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) as part of the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Nigeria and India, during the state visit by the Indian prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh from October 13–17, 2007 (Eze, 2008). Ogunsanwo (2012) argued that it was clear to Nigeria at that time that it was not in a position to actually invest in India and therefore, the MOU on BIPPA and BTA was welcome by Nigeria to serve the purpose of attracting Indian investments and to sell more oil and non-oil commodities to India. The strategic agreement signed between Nigeria and India in 2007 was expected to be followed by other agreements, including the BIPPA; however, after eight years of signing the strategic agreement, the BIPPA, which both governments agreed has the potential of increasing and improving trade and investment between the two countries, the agreement was yet to be concluded. The Indian government, through its union minister of commerce and industry, Shri Anand Sharma, expressed dissatisfaction over the delay in concluding the agreement during the bilateral meeting with Mr. Henry Odein Ajumogobia, then minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, held in March 2011. Shri Sharma also noted along this line that “the

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complementarities of Nigerian and Indian economies need to be harnessed for more extensive bilateral engagement.” There is no doubt that the conclusion of this agreement will go a long way in enhancing the investment relations between the two countries. The long presence of Indian entrepreneurship in Nigeria is attested by the fact that India is the second-largest employer of labor next to the Nigeria’s Federal Government (Sachdev, 2014). This is largely as a result of the deep penetration of the Indians entrepreneurs into the major sectors of the Nigerian economy. IMPACT OF INDIA’S MANUFACTURING IN NIGERIA Manufacturing sectors in which the Indians have large-scale investments include textiles, plastics technology, pharmaceuticals, food processing, iron and steel industry, and many others. Some of the Indian companies that make vital products and have famous household names are Ranbaxy, Unique, and Dana in pharmaceuticals; a large number in the plastic manufacturing outfits and the ONGC–Mittal in iron and steel smelting. Some of the Indian companies such as Simba Technology, Wandel Technology, and Bhojraj Group have ventured into technology including ICT assemblage. One of the key manufacturing sectors in Nigerian economy where the Indian have been visible is the textile sector. It is undeniable that despite the strenuous hardship owing to certain policy changes and smuggling activities, some Indian nationals who own companies in this sector are doing well. Among Indian companies standing to this credit includes Globespinning Nigeria Ltd, which has a substantial interest in production of yarn; Reliance Textiles Ltd has been involved in textile manufacture. The role of the textile sector in Nigeria–India relations needs to be examined in greater detail as an industry that was the largest employer in the manufacturing sector of the country. The first modern textile mill in Nigeria Kaduna Textile Mill was established in 1956 in Kaduna, northern Nigeria. The primary reason for setting up the mill was to process the cotton that was being produced in the northern part of the country. By the 1970s and the 1980s, the Nigerian textile industry had grown to become the second largest in Africa. A report by the United Nations University (UNU) stated that in 1987, there were thirty-seven textile firms in the country, operating 716,000 spindles and 17,541 looms. This was the golden period of Nigeria’s textile industry. Between 1985 and 1991, it recorded an annual growth of 67 percent, and as at 1991, it employed about 25 percent of workers in the manufacturing sector. During this period the structure of the global textile trade was governed by the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA). The MFA was a system of quota that could be imposed

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by developed countries on the amount of textile products that developing countries could export (Gieg, 2016). The MFA was replaced by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in 1995. Under these agreements, the textile industry was brought into full compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, and all quota restrictions were rolled back by January 1, 2005. The quota restrictions were not applicable to some countries, one of which was Nigeria. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria’s textile industry received a lot of foreign investment (Daily Independent Newspaper, June 13, 2011). By 1991, some of the Indian-owned textile companies included Aflon Nigeria PLC owned by Afprint Nigeria Plc, which was in turn part of the Indian Kewalram/Chenrai group and Spintex Mills (Nigeria) Limited was also an Indian company. During the same period, United Nigeria Textile Plc (UNTPLC), a Kaduna-based company that was established in Nigeria in 1964, was bought by CHA Textiles, a Chinese company. It has been argued that the reason why the number of textile companies in Nigeria grew during this period was because Nigeria was not under the MFA quota restrictions. According to Mr. Victor Eburajolo, who is the first Nigerian Group managing director of Kewalram/Chanrai, the decline of the textile industry was as a result of the hasty accession of Nigeria to the WTO in 1995 (Field Work, 2014). Prior to the decline in 1990s, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN, 2010) asserts that the textile sector provided employment to an estimated 600,000 Nigerians with well over 650 functional factories and small-scale production units scattered all over the country. Another group of 160,000 Nigerians are indirectly employed by the industry. This group includes the producers of raw materials for the textile industries who are generally referred to as cotton farmers. The industry raised millions of middlemen, marketers of finished product, tailors, garment makers, wholesalers, retailers, and traditional producers of local fabric. According to MAN in Amachree (2010), the industry then generated an annual turnover of US$8.85 billion; an average of 25 percent of the sector’s gross domestic product (GDP) which accounted for not less than 10 percent of corporate income taxes. Nigeria presented 65 percent of the textile capacity in the West African region before the decline of the sector. In accordance with WTO rules, Nigeria had to remove any protection of the local textile industry, among others. It would have been better for the country to secure special arrangements with the WTO, such that the local textile industry would be protected until it was stronger and more competitive. While this is so, some other factors also contributed to the decline of the industry, one of which was the entry of the cheap Chinese textile. Traders in the popular Dantokpa Market in Cotonou have pointed out that before the decline of the textile sector in Nigeria, the country used to supply them with good quality

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wax-resist textile, popularly called ankara in Nigeria. Apart from the WTO factor, which significantly account for the decline of the textile sector in Nigeria–India relations, another problem was the difficulty of access to finance. Many of the companies could not afford to take loans at the very high lending rates (sometimes more than 45 percent) in the country. It was also difficult to get foreign exchange and deal with inflation problems, in a situation where a lot of cotton and other raw materials used were imported. There was also poor state of transportation, power, and other infrastructure that were needed by the industry. All these factors contributed to the collapse of the industry. The Nigerian textile industry has seriously declined in production. Between 1992 and 2006, 543,000 textile workers have lost their jobs. Most of these job losses were in northern states such as Kaduna and Kano. More than 150 textile companies have shut down in the past twenty years (Amachree, 2010). This also implies loss of job opportunities down the value chain, including, millions of middlemen, marketers of finished product, tailors, garment makers, wholesalers, retailers, and traditional producers of local fabric. Comparatively the Indian textile industry generates huge employment for both skilled and unskilled labor in India. It has continued to be the secondlargest employment generating sector in that country offering employment to over 35 million people. According to the Indian Textile Ministry, the sector contributes about 14 percent to overall Index of Industrial Production (IIP), 5 percent to the country’s GDP and 17 percent to the country’s export earnings (Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, 2016). Resuscitative measures have been experimented upon by the Nigerian government over the years. Shortly before the end of the second term of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, there was an initiative by the Federal Government to raise ₦70 billion through bonds of five-year duration. The money was named the Textile Development Fund, and it was to be lent to cotton growers and textile manufacturers through the Nigerian Export Import Bank (NEXIM). However, in July 2010, it was reported that the United Bank of Africa (UBA), which was to help the Federal Government to market the bonds, was unable to do so. Notwithstanding the challenges in the textile industry in Nigeria, both the Indian and Nigerian governments have continued to seek ways of addressing the challenges of doing business in this sector. The possibility of revitalizing the textile industry with the support of the Indians was thoroughly discussed when an Indian trade mission, led by Mr. Ravi Bangar, the deputy permanent representative of India to the WTO, visited Mr. Jubril MartinsKuye, Nigeria’s minister for commerce and industry, in May 2011. One of the major issues they discussed was the possibility of India helping Nigeria to revitalize its textile industry. Following this visit, the minister directed

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both the National Cotton Association of Nigeria and the Nigeria Textile Manufacturers’ Association to put a paper together, giving specific details on how the government could help the textile industry. INDIANS IN NIGERIA’S RETAIL BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL VENTURES Among all the sectors in Nigeria where the Indians have invested in, the most prominent of them is commerce. The focal point of Indian investment in the Nigerian economy can be readily observed in the area of commerce as most Indian companies started off by trading in one commodity or the other before venturing into setting up factories. A lot of Indian investments in commerce are in such commodities as rice, sugar, cars, electronics, batteries, and many others. Notable Indian companies in this area include Chellarams, Kewalrams, Bhojsons, Dana, Somotex, and several others. These companies also export commodities out of Nigeria such as cocoa, ginger, cashew nuts, palm kernel, tent, wood, and other agricultural products. Indians are involved deeply in Nigeria’s retail business and own a number of big shops in Nigeria. These include “Park and Shop,” one of the Nigeria’s biggest retail shops, as well as Sumal Foods, and Dana Juice and Dana Pharmaceuticals (whose products include juice and pharmaceuticals). Two Indian companies are at the forefront of India’s involvement in vehicle importation into Nigeria. These are the Dana Group and the Stallion Group. The Dana Group has been responsible for the importation of Kia vehicles into Nigeria, while the Stallion Group has been responsible for the importation of vehicles such as Hyundai, Honda, and Audi Volkswagen. The Dana Group is also involved in airlines, operating flights across key cities in Nigeria, especially profitable routes linking Lagos, the commercial capital, with Abuja, the national capital and the oil-rich city of Port Harcourt. Indian tricycles Bajaj, popularly called “keke or marwa” in Nigeria, are now common in several parts of the country. The Dana Group has entered into an agreement with a Nigerian company, Affordable Cars Limited, to provide sales, after-sale services, and technical services to Kia customers in Ikeja, Lagos, and the environs. While the Nigerian business environment has offered lots of opportunities for Indians to invest in the retail and commercial sector, the Indian retail sector remains an exclusive business area for the Indians. Recent attempts by the Indian government to introduce reforms including allowing foreign supermarket giants to buy stakes in the India retail sector was fiercely opposed by trade unions in India and prompted coalition ally, Trinamool Congress Party (TCP), to resign from government (This Day, Monday, September 4, 2012).

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Even though multinational retailers have outlets in India, they can only sell to Indian smaller retailers. The proposed reform sought to allow participation of more foreigners who will sell directly to Indian consumers. The then prime minister of India Manmohan Singh and the National Congress Party (NCP) had argued that the reforms were necessary to revive investor confidence and to assure other countries who complained of a closed Indian economy. The exclusion of foreigners from participating directly in the retail sector of the Indian economy therefore leaves little or no room at all for the Nigerians residing in India to set up profitable businesses in the retail sector. According to KPMG and CII (2015), the Government of India is undertaking reforms toward improving the regulatory environment and Ease of Doing Business in India. The Indian government seeks to bring the country to top fifty rank of Doing Business. In this regard, an Investor Facilitation Cell was created to guide, assist, and handhold investors during the entire life cycle of the business. Furthermore, the Indian government took steps to simplify application processes, make the approval processes online, promote self-compliance and self-certification, and so on. The national government also recommended that state governments should prescribe timelines for each service delivery including time lines for seeking clarification/rejection along with reasons. An important step toward enhancing the Ease of Doing Business in India was the passage of the Companies Amendment Act 2015 to remove requirements of minimum paid-up capital and common seal for companies. This important law also simplifies a number of other regulatory requirements. INDIA’S OIL COMPANIES AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY Central to India’s involvement in Nigeria, and perhaps the most controversial, appears to be Nigeria’s oil sector. Given Nigeria’s position in the global oil market, and India’s move to diversify its sources of oil supply, it is not so difficult to comprehend the increasing presence of Indian oil companies into the Nigerian economy. As argued by Singh (2007), Indian companies are not blindly entering into business relationships in Nigeria, West Africa, and Africa. India faces fierce competition from the West and other Asian countries to secure African resources, particularly oil. The resource-rich countries of Africa, such as Nigeria, have become increasingly attractive from the point of India’s rapidly growing economy. In order to sustain its high growth rates, India needs vast quantities of resources like crude oil (Biswas, 2013b). For its energy supply, India had depended on the countries of the Persian Gulf. Nigeria has been an oil producer for more than fifty years, and a producer of

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gas, exported as liquefied natural gas (LNG) since 1999. Statistics show that in 2006, Nigeria produced 3 percent of the world’s crude oil at an average of 2.4 mbpd, making it the twelfth-largest oil producer and the seventh-largest oil exporter. Within Africa, it has long been the top producer. Its known reserves, standing at 36.2 billion barrels in 2006, place it in the ninth position worldwide. The high quality of Nigerian crude—light, sweet with low sulfur content—makes it a prized commodity for refineries in the Atlantic Basin and Asia. When compared with the West, Indian oil companies are late comers to the oil sector in Nigeria; it has long had significant commercial presence in Nigeria. In which case, in the wider economic context, Nigeria is not a virgin territory for Indian companies. Indian investors have pointed out that their initial reluctance to invest in Nigerian oil sector especially in the 1990s stem from concerns that the military government in power did not honor contract agreements. They also perceived the Nigerian oil sector as the exclusive domain of the international oil companies such as Shell, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and others. There was also perception of Nigeria as a corrupt, fraudulent, and politically unstable country that was too risky for business. The perception of Nigeria as a risky place for business in Nigeria’s oil sector was particularly because of the increasing volatile environment of the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta, before the introduction of the amnesty program by the late president Umaru Yar Adua. The reasons for heightened demand and increased quest for oil by India are different from other Asian players. Demand for oil in India has increased in the last decade. Its economy has high growth rates of 9 percent, and rated the fourthlargest economy in the world in 2009. India will need to import about 90 percent of its oil requirements by 2020 (Vines et al., 2009). India emerged the third-largest economy in the world in 2014 in terms of GDP purchasing power parity, thus overtaking the UK to become the largest economy in the Commonwealth. President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) sought Asian players from India, China, South Korea, and so on to acquire oil blocks in Nigeria in return for their commitment to invest in downstream and infrastructure project, overall projects valued at US$20 billion were promised. India did not show any interest in the 2000 licensing round. However, Indian oil companies were among the competitors for oil licenses in the 2005 licensing round, which was Nigeria’s first open auction. Nigeria, under the Obasanjo government abandoned the long-standing tradition of discretionary approach to the award of oil blocks licensing which former military rulers had favored to reward friends, associates, and cronies, who in turn sell them at huge profits to the international oil companies. A huge amount of acreage was on offer—but only forty-four of the seventy-seven blocks were awarded. The

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Asian companies including those from India were offered preferential terms. These included Rights of First Refusal (RFR) and discounted signatures bonuses on a number of oil blocks. Despite the fact that international oil companies, that were Nigeria’s traditional partners, expressed their concern about the scheme, arguing that it tilted the playing field against them, and the complaints of indigenous players and local oil companies, the Obasanjo government went ahead with the deal. The Obasanjo government had argued that the initiative would bring a “development divided.” Most Asian governments were quick to see the value of this novel arrangement. Not only would they acquire oil blocks to enhance their energy security, but their companies would win large contracts into the bargain. The Indian government was particularly delighted by the offers by the Nigerian government. This was noted by the India’s former minister of petroleum who said that “we salivated in anticipation of what could be off the shores of Nigeria” (Aiyar, 2008, p.28). Accordingly, in pursuance of her strategic interest in this sector, the Indian government threw its weight behind her oil and natural gas corporation, Oil and Gas Corporation Limited–Videsh Limited (ONGC–VL), when it bided for some of the sixty-three new oil blocks announced by Nigeria in August, 2005 (Singh, 2007). Nigeria’s offer of both oil blocks and big contracts proved to be very attractive to the Indian oil companies. India’s ONGC–VL was quite confident that it will acquire the two best deep offshore oil blocks on offer. Its confidence was based on six months discussion with Nigerian officials (Singh, 2007). Contrary to the expectations of the Indian oil companies, the two blocks in question (OPLs 321 and 323) went to Korea National Oil Company (KNOC), in partnership with Equator Explorer. The main reason for the loss of the oil block, despite the ONGC’s preparedness to pay the same signature bonus as KNOC, was Indian cabinet’s delay in agreeing to the bid price. The Indian government tends to be cautious in spending public money in foreign acquisitions compared to its Asian counterparts such as China, whose formal bilateral relations with Nigeria started much later than India but has strongly established its presence in the Nigerian society (Ogunsanwo, 2012). In addition, the Indian government believed that having had prior discussions with the Nigerian government, the two oil blocks would be awarded to the Indian oil companies. The Indian government was quite displeased with the outcome and complained to the Nigerian government about what it described as unfair treatment meted out to the oil major (Singh, 2007). Given the failure of the 2005 round to seal the oil-for-infrastructure transactions, with most of the Asian oil companies except KNOC, the Nigerian government decided to hold a mini-round in 2006, specifically to fulfill its promises to India, China, and Taiwan. India, China, and Taiwan were all given RFR on preassigned blocks in return for promises of infrastructure

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investment. The first was India’s national oil company, ONGC, by then teamed up with Mittal Steel in a new company known as ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL). An MOU was signed in July 2005 between the overseas arm of India’s national oil company, ONGC–VL, and privately owned Mittal Steel to synergize their respective strengths in order to promote energy security for India. This resulted in an innovative public–private partnership (PPP) with the establishment of a joint venture company, ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd (OMEL for short), in October 2005. OMEL’s first overseas success was in Nigeria in 2006, but its aim was to also replicate this success elsewhere. This new PPP proved to be a more successful vehicle for India’s entry (Harshe, 2010). It strengthened India’s bid as an infrastructure provider, allowing it to compete more successfully with the Koreans and Chinese. OMEL was preassigned three blocks (OPL 279, 285, and 216). In return it committed to an investment of some US$6 billion to include the construction of an 180,000 bpd refinery, a 2000 MW power plant, and a feasibility study for a new East–West railway line from Lagos across the Delta to Port Harcourt. ONGC in its own right was offered two blocks, 217 and 218, as compensation for losing out to KNOC in the 2005 round (DPR, April 2008). It was not only through the bidding rounds that the Indian oil companies acquired oil assets in Nigeria. Apart from the two oil blocs won by the Indian national oil company, OMEL, Obasanjo privately awarded an additional oil block OPL 297, on discretional basis to OMEL. Though President Olusegun Obasanjo had denounced discretionary awards when he came into office in 1999, he later used the device to further strategic interest in relations with Asian countries such as India. In addition, following the 2004 licensing round on the Nigeria–São Tomé Joint Development Zone (JDZ), India’s ONGC was awarded a 9 percent share in a consortium for Block 2 in May 2005. The JDZ was established by Treaty in 2001 in an attempt to resolve a long-standing maritime boundary dispute between the two countries. The JDZ lies 200 km off the Nigerian coast. It is subdivided into six blocks for oil exploration. Under the terms of the treaty, the revenues are to be shared 60:40 between Nigeria and São Tomé. Indian companies were among the Asian oil companies offered RFR terms from 2005 to 2007. No doubt, the involvement of Indian oil companies in the Nigerian economy increased within the period from 2000 to 2008. Until 2005/06, India preferred to access Nigerian crude either through oil-lifting contracts or through buying it on the international spot market rather than through direct investment. India still imports 12 percent of its oil from Nigeria on a long-term supply contract. After signing a major oil contract with India in 2000, Nigeria began to export oil to India on a sustained basis. The amount of export rose from 44,000 bpd to 60,000 bpd in a new oil supply contract signed during the visit of Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh in 2007. In

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fact, since 2010, one out of every five barrels of oil imported by India came from Nigeria (Vasudevan, 2010). The main client is the state-owned Indian oil corporation which owns and operates ten of India’s nineteen refineries and, until recently, was the monopoly importer of crude. Through the oil-for-infrastructure transaction, the Nigerian government under the Obasanjo administration had hoped that India’s expertise in this area will benefit Nigeria. By early 2008, President Obasanjo was reportedly “fed up with the Shells and Exxons” (Africa Confidential, February 1, 2008). Despite the support of the Nigerian government, the international oil companies had repeatedly declined to build new refineries and invest in gas production so as to cut gas flaring on grounds of cost. They also refused to invest in job-creating projects outside their core business that was primarily targeted at harnessing huge profits from crude oil production. It was evident to Nigeria that the Multinational Oil Companies from the West were only exploiting Nigeria’s oil resources and giving next to nothing in return. The country’s infrastructure was in a very bad shape and in dire need of modernization. During his visit to New Delhi in 2000, Obasanjo had opined that India could support Nigeria to achieve a “development dividend” which Nigeria had failed to get from the MNCs from the West. Records from the DPR show that OMEL paid signature bonus of US$25 million for OPL 297 in September 2006; given the high prospects of the block, the very low price suggest that a discount was given to the Indian company. Despite the oil blocks awarded to the Indian companies, by 2014, there was nothing to show by the Indian companies for the oil-for-infrastructure transactions. Reasons for the failure are not farfetched as the Nigerian government, on its own part, right from the start failed to put in place formal mechanisms to enforce the transactions. The Indian oil companies, who evidently were much more interested in oil than infrastructural development, did not fail to take advantage of the rather loose agreement that was more of promises in principle. For instance, when OMEL signed an MOU with the Nigerian government in November 2005 for infrastructure investments in exchange for drilling rights, which it later acquired in the 2006 mini-rounds, the MOU was valid for twenty-five years. At the time of signing, the chairman of ONGC made it clear that the investment would be proportional to the scale of oil discoveries, suggesting that no action would be taken on the downstream promises for many years: “The investment in infrastructure will depend on the joint venture’s returns from the blocks” (International Business Times, July 15, 2006, quoted in Vines et al., 2009). Moreover, Mittal had made it clear that it wanted two billion barrels of reserves before signing up to the implementation of any downstream investment (Menas, 2007 quoted in Vines et al., 2009). This largely explains why no progress has been made on the ground on any of the commitments.

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The railway projects were tied to the oil blocks allocation to Indian oil companies in exchange for feasibility study for a new East–West railway from Lagos to Delta. The Obasanjo government had planned to upgrade the railway system, but the rail projects tied to the oil block allocation were put on hold by the Yar Adua administration following a number of complaints about the conduct of the 2007 bidding round for oil blocks. Though the preliminary MOU was signed with India’s OMEL in November 2005, the infrastructure project was not executed. One of India’s OMEL’s commitments in return for oil blocks was to build a green field with 180,000 bpd capacity refinery. While negotiations continued in 2009, the site for the proposed refinery was yet to be decided. Both Lagos and the Niger Delta are suggested as possible options (Business day, January 5, 2008; The Guardian, April 24, 2008). Records obtained from the Indian High Commission and the DPR reveal that Indian oil companies presently have six oil blocks; ONGC Mittal (OMEL) with three licenses (OPL279, OPL285, and OPL297); Sterling with two licenses (OPL 2005 and OPL 2006); and Essar with one license (OPL 226). While the Indian High Commission in Nigeria attests to the fact that oil started flowing since 2011, the promise to build new green refinery by the Indian OMEL was yet to translate to reality. Evidently dissatisfied with the transaction with the Indian and other Asian oil companies, and their failure to fulfill their commitments in the oil-forinfrastructure transaction, in 2008, the House of Representatives decided to set up an Ad-Hoc Committee to enquire into the activities of the NNPC and its subsidiaries for the period 1999–2007. The true nature of the OMEL transaction was exposed when Mittal’s representative admitted in a session to the Ad-Hoc Committee that former President Olusegun Obasanjo had agreed that Mittal would not have to fulfill any of the promised downstream obligations until the two blocks awarded in 2006 yielded 650,000 bpd. That is not only a doubtful target but practically impossible to achieve short of a major oil field discovery on OMEL’s concessions. Obasanjo later made a discretionary award of a third block to help OMEL reach its production target. Mittal also claimed that the original agreement to invest in three projects had been later changed by mutual agreement, so that Mittal would invest in only one. The shifts in position by the company clearly confirm the lack of commitment to the infrastructure agreement with the Nigerian government. Accordingly, following its findings, the ad hoc committee recommended the cancelation of the oil blocks awarded to OMEL, among some other Asian companies, in the 2005 and 2006 transactions. It is evident from the reports from the Indian High Commission in Nigeria that the oil transactions were never really canceled; instead, more Indian oil companies such as Sterling with oil licenses OPL 2005 and OPL2006 and Essar with oil license OPL 226 have gained entry into the oil business in Nigeria.

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INDIA’S INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA’S TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR The telecommunication sector is an important sector in Nigeria. As at March 2015, the sector had contributed about 8.5 percent to Nigeria’s GDP. With a tele density of 106.27, Nigeria is among the highest in Africa. Nigeria had over 148 million GSM subscribers as of June 2015 (KPMG & CII, 2015). Telecommunications has grown to be a major sector of the Nigerian economy and the country provides the largest telecommunication market in Africa. The percentage share of GDP from the sector rose from 0.06 in 1999 to 3.66 by the end of 2009. By 2010, the annual revenue from mobile services represents between 2 percent and 7 percent of African countries’ nominal GDP; in Nigeria this ratio is close to 4 percent (NCC, December 18, 2020). The share of Nigeria’s telecoms sector in total GDP has stabilized in the last six quarters as released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report. In the First Quarter (Q1) of 2017, the telecoms sector contributed ₦1.452 trillion to the GDP, that is 9.16 percent. This is an increase of 0.2 percent compared to the First Quarter of 2016, indicating stable growth in the sector. Nigeria’s Active Mobile-Broadband Penetration has increased from less than 10 percent in 2015 to 20.95 percent in 2016 (NCC, December 18, 2020). Furthermore, Nigeria’s Internet penetration has reached a milestone of 47.44 percent. And, Nigeria is Africa’s highest active Internet user (over 90 million subscribers) and ranks tenth globally (NCC, December 18, 2020). Over the past five years, NCC has remitted over ₦362.34 billion as revenue for the Federal Government’s consolidated revenue account. The revenue has been ploughed into the provision of, and development of, infrastructure at the various levels of the government (NCC, December 18, 2020). The impact of this on the economic growth has become impressive. Indians have entered Nigeria’s telecommunications business with Bharti Airtel investing US$600 million in Nigeria’s mobile market after it purchased Zain Telecom’s African business for US$10.7 billion in February 2010. The country’s involvement in Zain Telecom has made it possible for India to infiltrate other aspects of business in the Information Technology (IT) sector. For example, the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT), an Indian company, trains about 15,000 Nigerians annually in IT, which according to the firm is to enable them to be self-employed. In March 2011, Zen Mobile, one of India’s fast-growing handset manufacturing companies, made its debut in Nigeria, promising to provide best quality mobile phones at affordable prices. In total six Zen mobile phones were launched, namely the X381, X410, X430, M20, Z66, and X82 (This Day, Lagos, April 15, 2011). According to the Indian high commissioner, during 2010, India invested around US$5 billion in Nigeria largely through such prominent acquisitions

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by Airtel and Godrej. Even before the entry of large Indian telecommunication companies such as Bharti Airtel, other telecommunications, such as South Africa’s MTN, Nigeria-owned Globacom, Airtel, and Etisalat, had been in the Nigerian market. THE ROLE OF INDIANS IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING AND INSURANCE SECTORS Indian nationals were well represented in Nigeria’s banking sector until recently, when the banking consolidation exercise eased most of them out as major players. As far back as May 1979, the State Bank of India, the biggest public sector Indian Bank at that time, opened a representative office in Nigeria. The attraction of the Indians to the Nigerian economy at that time was the perception of Nigeria as a wealthy country in West Africa, evidently because of the huge earnings from oil in the mid-1970s. The Indians also realized that there was a need to establish full-fledged banking to cater to trade and commerce, which was tilted in their favor at that time. Since the Nigerian FDI regulation at that time permitted 60 percent local participation and 40 percent foreign capital, the State Bank of India decided to contribute 40 percent capital to the joint collaboration. Thus, the Indo-Nigerian Merchant Bank was set up, incorporated precisely on November 26, 1982, and started operation from December 15, 1982. By early 1990s, two joint ventures, namely, the Indo-Nigerian Merchant Bank Limited in collaboration with the State Bank of India, and the Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd, were in operation in the field of banking in Nigeria. The past record of the banks stated that they introduced new concepts in lending to the small-scale farmers, an approach which had yielded good results in India. They also claimed to have provided lending to industrialists in support of Nigeria’s economic growth. The past records of the Indo-Nigerian Merchant Bank Limited show an approved profit after tax of ₦4,715,321.00 in 1985 compared to ₦1, 906,049.00 approved in 1984. In the case of the Allied Bank, its profit after tax and provisions in the account stood at ₦8.3 million in 1985, a rise of 8.98 percent over 1984 (Economic Times, June 4, 1984). The bank argued that the loans it gave out were as a result of their sizable increase in earnings and statutory reserves, which also led to the expansion of their branches and the employment of a number of Indians as well as Nigerians in different states in the country. Investigations by the Nigerian government as to why the banks reached the point of near total collapse before their merger reveal that some Indian nationals in Nigeria had obtained loans and failed to repay the bank loans. A case in point was the defunct Société Bank, where some Indian nationals took bank facilities without sufficient collaterals and

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failed to meet the terms of payment. The situation did not speak well of some of the Indians living in Nigeria. This prompted the then inspector general of police Ibrahim Coomasie to issue a directive for the arrest of Indians involved in the banking scam (Nkiru, 2008). Another major issue with the role of the Indians in the Nigerian banking sector in the past was their being arrested by the Nigerian authorities for financial fraud against the government. The Nigeria’s banking sector became distorted in the mid-1990s when the late military president General Sani Abacha liberalized the sector. The development saw the rise of “wonder banks” and various finance houses that defrauded their customers. The situation, which was investigated by the Presidential Commission set up by the Federal Government, indicted some Indians of siphoning of foreign exchange especially during the military regime. Following the discovery, some Indian nationals were arrested for one form of financial crime or the other involving capital flight (Nkiru, 2008). Fertilizer and books were mostly targeted because they were supposed to attract the lowest duty rate at that time. It was an offense that was easily committed as it only involved application for foreign exchange at the official rate for the importation of either fertilizer or books, only for the Indians and other Nigerian culprits to take the foreign exchange out of the country and either import far lesser quantity of fertilizers than they bided for or import books that were worthless. Some Indian businessmen were also accused of check kitting and roundtripping. One of the mind-boggling cases was that of Patrick Fernandez, an Indian businessman, who was arrested by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and charged to the Federal High Court in Lagos in 2014 (Soyele, 2014). He was charged alongside three of his companies for perpetrating ₦32 billion bank fraud against Nigerian banks—Zenith, Afribank, Intercontinental, Union, and Wema. The method he used in defrauding the banks involves a “business model known as Lazy Susan.” Lazy Susan involves members of a business group transferring money from one sister company to another without selling any commodity, using money obtained from other banks. If the person brings a check, credit will be given to him immediately without going through clearance since it involves the same group of companies. If a person has a check discounting facility, for example, for ₦1 billion check they will give him up to ₦800 million. Records submitted by the affected banks to the EFCC showed that Patrick Fernandez had less than ₦2 million in his account as by September 2007. The volume of transaction at the onset was minimal, starting with ₦20 million, within the same month, it rose to ₦600 million (EFCC, 2013). The volume of transactions skyrocketed to billions of naira within just three months through transactions that involved the use of suspended check, which did not go through the clearing house initially. By the time checks were verified

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at the clearing house as fraud, Wema Bank had allegedly loss ₦23 billion to Fernandez and his companies (The Nation, April 22, 2015). Fernandez convinced the banks that he was involved in oil and gas business which was “cash-intensive” and therefore needed to move money from one bank to the other. The bubble busted when Zenith, Afribank, Intercontinental, Union, and Wema banks, at the clearing house, discovered that they were clearing the same check, and had to report the matter to the EFCC operatives for investigation. Patrick Fernandez, the Indian businessman, argued that his companies were duly incorporated and that his accounts were opened through traditional means and insists that he is a businessman. He however did not deny the fact that he involved a business model known as Lazy Susan, instead he insists that he is a businessman and that his companies were duly incorporated and that his accounts were opened through traditional means (The Nation Newspaper, April 22, 2015). No doubt, some Indians doing business in Nigeria give India a negative image for taking advantage of the loose Nigerian banking and financial system. However, the banking consolidation did not end Indian investment in the banking sector, but rather diluted the volume of control they had in the banks. Some of the banks, which the Indians had investments included Chartered Bank, Reliance Bank, and NBM Bank. A noticeable exception, however, was the Mahtani family from India. They held considerable stakes in Chartered Bank, established in 1988, and later Regent Bank, established in 2005. In November 2005, both banks merged with others to form the Investment Banking and Trust Company (IBTC), in which the Mahtani family has retained a significant stake (Alao, 2011). The Indians also own 11.81 percent of the joint venture with Sterling Bank of Nigeria PLC. Following the consolidation of Nigeria’s banking industry; NAL Bank completed a merger with four other banks namely Indo-Nigeria Merchant Bank (INMB), Magnum Trust Bank, NBM Bank, and Trust Bank of Africa in January 2006. The merged entities were integrated and operated as a consolidated group with the name Sterling Bank. Data obtained show that the bank, which operates as a commercial bank in Nigeria has an asset base of US$4 billion (₦600 billion) and over 2,600 professional employees in various parts of Nigeria. The evaluation of Indians in the Nigerian banking sector shows that they have been involved in the Nigerian banking sector for a very long time.  Nigeria consolidated its banking system in 2005 from eighty-nine banks to twenty-four. By 2014, Nigeria had the second-largest banking sector in the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region. The total assets of the banking sector stood at about US$156 billion (KPMG & CII, 2015). In comparison, India has more robust banking and insurance sectors. India was projected to become the fifthlargest banking sector globally by 2020 (KPMG & CII, 2015). Compared to the long involvement of the Indians in the Nigerian banking sector, there is

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Investment Relations between Nigeria and India Table 5.1  List of Joint Ventures of Indian Banks Abroad as at March 31, 2013 S/No.

Name of the Bank

Name of the Center

1 2

Bank of Bhutan Indo Zambia Bank Ltd.

Bhutan Zambia

3 4 5

Nepal SBI Bank Ltd. Everest Bank Ltd. Nepal Commercial Bank of India LLC

Kathmandu (Nepal) Nepal Moscow, Russia

6 7

Sterling Bank PLC India International Bank (Malaysia) Bhd.

Nigeria (Lagos) Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur)

Remarks SBI 20% BOB 20% BOI 20% CBI 20% SBI 55.28% PNB 20% SBI 60% Canara Bank 40% SBI 11.81% BOB 40% IOB 35% Andhra Bank 25%

Source: List of Joint Ventures of Indian Banks Abroad as on March 31, 2013. Retrieved from http:​/​/rbi​​docs.​​ rbi​.o​​rg​.in​​/rdoc​​s​/Con​​tent/​​pdfs/​​​71206​​.pdf.​

no record of Nigerian banks that have been established or even extend their operations to India. Even with the banking consolidation carried out in the past, the Indians have always found a way of sustaining their strong presence in the Nigerian banking sector. The banking consolidations in the country have not in any way ended the participation of the Indians in the banking business in Nigeria but only diluted their ownership. The insurance business is another financial sector where the Indians have been actively involved. A notable joint venture company that has remained active in the insurance sector is the Prestige Assurance Company Ltd. The Prestige Assurance Company Ltd was established in Lagos on August 16, 1959, as a branch office of the New India Assurance Company Ltd, India. The company was incorporated in Nigeria on January 6, 1970, as a public company. The company later changed its name to Prestige Assurance Plc on September 24, 1992. Its services have also increased since then, into providing insurance policies ranging from personal to general property to highly complex risks of oil and gas and aviation industry in Nigeria. In compliance with the Central Bank of Nigeria’s policy on recapitalization of the insurance sector in 2007, Prestige Assurance sought to strengthen its financial base by aligning more strongly with its parent body in India. Currently the company operates as a subsidiary company of the New India Assurance Company Limited, Mumbai, which holds 51 percent share of the company. In the financial year December 31, 2011, Prestige Assurance Plc., posted a profit after tax of ₦255.990 million. Records also showed that the company’s net assets stood at ₦4.743 billion, while gross premium income stood at ₦4.173 billion in contrast to ₦3.860 billion realized in 2010 (Vanguard News, May 16, 2012). Even though its level of employment generation within the country

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over the years could not be ascertained, it has been observed from the profile of management staff and directors that more Indians occupy the top management positions in the company. That notwithstanding, the company remains the only joint venture with India in the field of insurance, covering several states in Nigeria. Even though more insurance companies have emerged as competitive players within the Nigerian market, the company has remained active in the Nigerian economy. The Nigerian insurance market as a whole has remained fairly underdeveloped and fragmented. According to KPMG and CII (2015), there were thirty-two nonlife insurers, seventeen life insurers, and ten mixed companies catering for a total market of US$1.6 billion as of 2013. INDIANS IN NIGERIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR India is one of Nigeria’s biggest suppliers of pharmaceuticals. The Indians have paid significant attention to this sector in the relations with Nigeria because of the huge returns on investment. Ranbaxy Meatari (Nig) Limited is one of the India’s pharmaceutical companies that have had a long-standing presence in Nigeria. The company was established in collaboration with Ranbaxy laboratories Ltd, India. Ranbaxy Laboratories is India’s largest pharmaceutical, which was established in 1961. The company first went public in 1973 and began the very first of its several strategic alliances through a joint venture in Nigeria in 1977. Due to the Indigenization policy in Nigeria in the late 1970s, the company’s equity contribution had to be deployed in the form of exports of Indian-made capital goods and know-how. Ranbaxy therefore supplied equipment against its shareholding in the joint venture unit as from 1978. However, the situation changed with the introduction of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act No.16 of 1995 and the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No.17 of 1995 (http://www​.nipc​.gov​.ng/). Ranbaxy retained 10 percent holding in the Nigerian joint venture (Kale, 2007). By 2014, Ranbaxy had world-class manufacturing facilities in eight countries namely China, Ireland, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Romania, the United States, and Vietnam. The company was also ranked ninth worldwide as a generics drug manufacturer (Humad, 2006). The huge profits made by Indian pharmaceutical companies exporting products to Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s encourage other pharmaceutical companies from India to venture into Nigeria and to explore possibility of manufacturing drugs locally. For example, among drugs and pharmaceutical exports, streptomycin and related preparations were in high demand in the 1970s and 1980s, thus increased from Rs. 55,000 to Rs. 125,000 and other antibiotics from Rs. 1.12 million to Rs. 3.0 million between 1974–1975 and

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1979–1980. Other medicaments increased from Rs. 5.1 million to Rs. 7.8 million during the same period (Mathew, 1988). India also exported pharmaceutical and cosmetic products worth Rs. 83.18 million and Rs. 77.97 million in 1983–1984 and 1984–1985, respectively, to Nigeria according to the Annual Report of Basic Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Exports Promotion Council of Bombay. Indian pharmaceutical companies have recorded huge profits from exports to Nigeria. In the period ending December 2003, total export of pharmaceutical products to Nigeria was US$72.21 million, while formulating export within the same period stood at US$69.59 million; by December 2004, the total export increased to US$82.78 million, while formulation export also increased to US$77.93 million. By December 2005, the figure for total exports had risen to US$103.01 million, while formulation export rose at US$107.65 million; the period ending December 2006 saw total export again increasing to US$118.7 million, while formulation export witnessed a rise to US$121.84 million. Similarly, increases were witnessed in the periods ending December 2007 and 2008, with total exports peaking at US$139.08 million and US$166.48 million and formulating exports peaking at US$121.84 million and US$115.01 million, respectively (CMIE India Trade Data, 2011). Indian pharmaceutical products have been found attractive not only in Nigeria but in various parts of the world because they are said to be cheaper compared to drugs from United States and Europe. India’s pharmaceutical industry developed out of India’s patent system, which allowed for the reverse engineering of branded drugs. Since joining the WTO, the industry has concentrated on producing generic drugs. This has been of particular benefit in combating HIV/AIDS. The emergence of cheap anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) has helped to increase access to medicine in poorer countries. In the 1990s, treatment cost between US$10,000 and US$15,000 per person, per year (Price, 2011, p.17). By 2001, the same treatment was available from Indian pharmaceutical companies for under US$300. Now it costs just US$88.27 (Price, 2011). The Clinton Foundation has been instrumental in linking demand in Africa with producers in India. India exports around twothirds of the generic ARVs it produces, dramatically increasing access to medicine. With pharmaceutical firms using India for research and development, the industry seems set to continue to grow. Indian pharmaceutical companies based in Nigeria have imported medical drugs at relatively cheap prices. Pharmexcil, the Indian Pharmaceutical Exports Promotion Council, opened its first office outside India in Nigeria in March 2011. There was a two-day exhibition featuring over forty Indian pharmaceutical companies in Nigeria and the two governments signed an MOU on pharmaceutical co-operation in March 2011 in New Delhi. The then Indian high commissioner in Nigeria Mahesh Sachdev used the opportunity

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to assure Nigerians that India would cooperate with the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) to combat fake drugs (Indian High Commission, Nigeria, 2011). As of the time of the visit, it had been established by the Nigerian government that most of the fake medicines entering the country originated from India. The MOU stipulates that Indians caught importing fake drugs into Nigeria will be jailed for life and will have their property confiscated. It also confirms India’s agreement to pay for the prosecution of anyone suspected of counterfeiting drugs. Compensation of N28, 300,000 (about US$2,000) will be paid to any informant who provides NAFDAC with information to uncover the source and producer of counterfeited products. Furthermore, India will collaborate with NAFDAC in capacity building, training programs and assist in providing funding to train medical engineers (Indian High Commission, Nigeria, 2011). The issue of importation of fake and substandard drugs, involving not only Indians but also some other countries particularly from Asia, has been a major challenge in Nigeria which NAFDAC has struggled to overcome. In some cases, NAFDAC had insisted that these drugs should be manufactured locally. NAFDAC made it clear that certain drugs, which have been prohibited by the Nigerian Federal Government from being imported into Nigeria are not accepted for registration or renewal of registration. These drugs include paracetamol tablets and syrups; cotrimoxazole tablets and syrups; metronidazole tablets and syrups; chloroquine tablets and syrups Haematinic formulations: ferrous sulfate and ferrous gluconate tablets; folic acid; and vitamin B complex tablets (except modified release formulations) (NAFDAC, 2014). Other drugs prohibited also included multivitamin tablets, capsules, and syrups (except special formulations); aspirin tablets (except modified formulations and soluble aspirin); magnesium trisilicate tablets and suspensions; piperazine tablets and syrups; levamisole tablets and syrups; clotrimazole cream; ampicillin/cloxacillin combination capsules; ointments–penicillin/gentamycin; pyrantel palmoate tablets and syrups; intravenous fluids (dextose, normal saline, etc); and disinfectants and germicides (NAFDAC, 2014). The reason behind the ban is to encourage the production of these drugs locally. Despite repeated warnings against importation of these drugs, to encourage local manufacture as well as discourage importation of fake and substandard versions, some Indian firms with their local collaborators have been involved in sharp practices that have propensity to undermine Nigeria’s relations with India. Even more worrisome was the request by Pharmexcil (set up by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India) in 2011, that Nigerian officials should abolish NAFDAC’s inspections of Indian pharmaceutical facilities in Nigeria. Instead, it insisted that Nigeria should accept the WHO GMP certificate issued by Indian regulatory authorities

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(Pharmexcil, 2011). NAFDAC has insisted on inspecting pharmaceutical facilities within the country and drugs coming into the country to prevent fake drugs in the country. Accordingly, NAFDAC from time to time publishes on its website and through print and electronic media the list of firms that it has officially banned. On October 9, 2020, NAFDAC also banned all products manufactured by Mars Remedies Pvt Limited, India, over falsification of Ciprofloxacin tablets BP 500 mg with NAFDAC registration number NO C4-0498 for Pinnacle Health Pharmaceutical Ltd. NAFDAC alleged that the company illegally manufactured different formulations of Ciprofloxacin tablets instead of the approved formulation for export to Nigeria (Vanguard News, October 27, 2020). The importance of the pharmaceutical sector in Nigeria–India relations is such that issues in this area have featured in diplomatic discussions between the two countries. Particularly, the issue of importation of fake and substandard drugs into the country has engaged the attention of diplomats of both countries, as both countries seek to improve their bilateral relations. This issue was a point of focus during the meeting between visiting Nigerian foreign minister, Odein Ajumogobia, and India’s external affairs minister, S. M. Krishna, in New Delhi on March 17, 2011. During this visit, a bilateral agreement was signed in the field of pharmaceuticals between India’s Department of Pharmaceuticals and Nigeria’s NAFDAC (IANS News, March 17, 2011). The agreement focuses on the promotion of mutual trade in good quality drugs, drug testing and analysis, and detection and prevention of supply of adulterated and fake drugs. That notwithstanding, India’s share of the pharmaceutical market in Nigeria has remained large. By the year 2020, India was the fifth-largest exporter to Nigeria for pharma machinery sector, covering 10 percent of the import market of the country (Yadav, 2020). As noted by the Pharmexcil, in 2018–2019, top importers of India’s pharmaceutical products were United States (US$119.18 million), Russia (US$10.33 million), United Kingdom (US$9.83 million), South Africa (US$3.63 million), and Nigeria (US$1.71 million) (Indian Trade Portal, 2020). As part of Nigeria’s efforts to strengthen health infrastructure in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Nigeria waived off import duty on supplies of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals with effect from May 1, 2020. While Nigeria stands to benefit from this waiver especially under the COVID-19 realities, Indian pharmaceuticals will no doubt benefit more from exemption of import duty for pharmaceutical supplies to Nigeria.

Chapter 6

Perspectives on Technical and Consultancy Cooperation, Joint Ventures, and Indian Companies in Nigeria

India had executed a number of turn-key and consultancy projects in Nigeria even before the 1990s. The consultancy services rendered by Indian firms can be divided into two areas: one relating to macro-level feasibility studies and the other relating to project engineering and allied work. For instance, the Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (MECON), which is an Indian joint venture in Nigeria, has been involved in the development of the Nigerian steel industry. MECON has also been involved in training personnel from the Delta Steel Complex. As a consultant to the Delta Steel Complex, MECON had supervised the completion of the design bureau and operation of the complex. MECON was responsible for total consultancy services covering evaluation and project supervision up to the commission of the plants in 1980. The steel plant including the infrastructural facilities involved an overall investment of about US$1 billion and was viewed with high prospects to act as a catalyst for growth for a number of ancillary industries (Singh, 1992). Another Indian company that has been involved in consultancy in Nigeria is the Pan African Consultancy Services (Nig) Ltd. The company, which was incorporated in 1974, is a member of the consultancy division of the Birla Group of India. The company currently provides these services to various projects for manufacturing of steel, cement, asbestos sheets, pipes, and paper, among others. The company rendered services to the steel project at Ajaokuta. The Ajaokuta steel project was designed to produce about 1.3 million tons of steel per annum at the initial stage; however, the company never went into full production as expected and later collapsed completely. Following the decline of consulting jobs for the Birla group in the Ajaokuta steel, the company as from the mid-1990s, ventured into rendering services 117

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in the area of agricultural sector in Nigeria. This the company does not only to government agencies but also to private entrepreneurs. The Telecommunication Consultants (Nig) Ltd. (TELCON) in association with M/s. Telecommunication Consultants India Limited (TELCO) is another Indian company that has provided consultancy services in the field of telecommunications. The TELCON had done some jobs for the federal government of Nigeria by executing a contract for technical assistance for extending telecommunication network; supply of Indian experts for instruction in Nigerian training centers; training of Nigerian technologists in Indian telecommunication training centers; provision of assistance to Nigerian Postal and Telecommunication personal in civil works; and installation of microware systems in Nigeria in association with Bell Telephone Manufacturing Company of Belgium. The most famous consultancy service is the three-year management of the Nigerian Railways by Rail India Technical and Economical Services Ltd. (RITES) (Badejo, 1989). The award of this contract in 1978 opened the door for the future involvement of RITES in the management and operation of the Nigerian Railway Corporation. The contract stipulated specific targets for the improvements in wagons loading, locomotive utilization, goods traffic, passenger traffic, and so on with the active cooperation of the officers and staff of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), the RITES executed these contracts. Over the years, RITES has been engaged by the Nigerian government in the training of personnel of NRC. Records show that more than 500 were trained on the Indian Railways and over 5,000 of the staff of the NRC received on-the-job trainings. Another Indian public company under the Ministry of Railways of India, which has benefited from contracts from the Nigerian government, has been the Indian Railway Construction Company (IRCON). The company received its first contract as early as 1981 to supply and install mechanically lifting barriers to NRC (Singh, 1992). Indian experts have also been sent to Nigeria under the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation (ITEC) agreement since 1971. Under this program and with the help of India, Nigeria has enjoyed provisions for training facilities; financial assistance for conducting feasibility studies and economic surveys; and undertaking of specific projects due to economic agreements (Dewan, 1980). Nevertheless, in 1975, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between India and Nigeria to provide services for 500 teacher trainees. In a visit by the Nigerian oil corporation delegation in 1974, requests were forwarded to India regarding training facilities for Nigerian engineers, geologists, and technicians in the oil and fertilizer industries. During the visit, arrangements for a special training program at the Institute of Petroleum Exploration at Dehradun were completed. Nigerians also requested training facilities for their technicians in the steel industry. Thus, a batch of

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twenty-two trainees underwent training in oil exploration at Dehradun in 1974. More personnel have also undergone training in hydrographical surveying at the Hoogly River Development Board in India (Dewan, 1980). This is a clear indication that the technical cooperation between the two countries is another strong aspect of their bilateral economic interactions. The return of Nigeria to democratic governance in May 1999 opened a new chapter in its bilateral relations with India and offered opportunities for enhanced Technical and Consultancy Cooperation. During the visit to India in January 2000, President Obasanjo as the Chief Guest at the Fiftieth Republic Day celebrations disclosed that far-reaching agreements had been concluded that would boost economic interactions between the two countries. The agreement included: ( 1) A pact with India’s electricity supply giant, BHBEL; (2) An agreement for the state-owned Indian Oil Company to buy about 10 million tonnes of natural gas from the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant; (3) An agreement for the Indian Oil Company to explore the possibility of a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); (4) An agreement for India to cooperate with Nigeria on the latter’s programme to promote small and medium-sized enterprises. (5) A renovation of about 25 Jaguar jet fighters owned by the Nigerian Air Force, which had been purchased at the cost of about US$1 billion from India; (6) The reactivation of the Nigeria-India Joint Commission in order to facilitate the harmonisation of various areas of economic interest between both countries; and (7) A high-powered delegation to visit Nigeria. (Kura, 2009) Four months after President Obasanjo’s visit to India, a high-powered Indian delegation headed by the Indian foreign affairs minister Jaswant Singh visited Nigeria in April 2000, perhaps in fulfillment of the last clause of the above agreements. During the visit, the following agreements were made: (1) The Indo-Nigerian Joint Commission was reactivated. It had been kept in limbo since 1991, thereby resulting in the mismanagement of several joint projects of economic and social importance over the past 10 years; (2) The revival of US$5 million in aid that Indian authorities had voted to offer Nigeria to enhance the revitalization of the Nigerian machine tools industry at Osogbo; (3) India’s provision of technical assistance to Nigeria to cover installation, upgrading and rehabilitation of small and medium-sized enterprises in

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the areas of engineering, tool manufacturing, leather technology, weaving and textiles, medicine, woodwork, bio-gas and metal work. (The Punch, 2000); (4) Nigeria’s supply of crude oil to India on a long-term basis, as these exports would go a long way to ensure an effective balance of trade between the two countries; (5) Nigeria's supply of about 25 per cent of crude oil to India. This supply rate, which has amounted to over 3.66 million barrels per month and 43.98 million annually, has made India's direct government-to-government crude oil contract with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NNPC the fourth largest of such contracts; (6) The agreement of both countries to boost their relations regarding power, steel, railway telecommunication and medium-sized enterprises. (The Guardian, 2000) Other initiatives included the signing of a technical service agreement between Nigerian Chemical Industries Limited, Notore, and an Indian company, Tata Chemicals Limited, in April 2011. Tata Chemicals Limited is an integrated chemical company and part of the Tata Group of Companies. The aim of the agreement was to assist the Nigerian company in further optimizing and achieving breakthrough performance in its fertilizer plant in Onne, Rivers State. India also expressed interest in establishing a coal and gas power project in Nigeria. India’s largest power producer, the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), came up with this initiative, but later abandoned it following delays in finalizing a partnership for the venture. In February 2011, the NTPC restated its commitment. The arrangement involved Nigeria ensuring the yearly supply of 3 million tons of gas for NTPC projects in India. In return for the gas, the NTPC was to build a 700-megawatt gas-fired power plant and a 500-megawatt coal-based plant, and renovate a 200-megawatt unit at a 1,300-megawatt plant. The NTPC also offered to train thirty Nigerian engineers and set up a training institute in the country. The proposal was called off because the Nigerian partners wanted an equity stake in the power projects to be set up by the NTPC in lieu of using their influence to ensure the signing of the gas agreement. The evidence on ground does not suggest that some Indian investors are working to promote mutual beneficial relations between both countries. A case in point was accusations of assets stripping perpetrated by Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) of the Ispat Group, which was given operational rights to manage the Ajaokuta Steel Company in 2004. The agreement with GIHL was to manage Ajaokuta Steel Company (worth about US$3 billion) for a period of ten years, renewable for another ten years with GIHL holding a first right of acquiring the company as and when the Nigerian

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government decides to divest. Instead of an expected turnaround, the GIHL engaged in massive asset striping in Ajaokuta, leading the federal government of Nigeria under President Umaru Musa Yar Adua to revoke the license granted to Global Infrastructure in 2008. JOINT VENTURES IN NIGERIA– INDIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS Foreign participation in joint ventures in Nigeria is presently regulated by the laws regulating foreign investments in Nigeria. The principal laws include the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act No. 16 of 1995 and the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 17 of 1995. Before the introduction of these laws in 1995, foreign participation was regulated by the indigenization regulations. The indigenization laws outlined three schedules of businesses. Schedule I reserved all the enterprises mentioned therein for only Nigerians; Schedule II requires equity participation of Nigerians and foreigners in the ratio of 60:40; and Schedule III, which included all the remaining industries not covered in Schedules I and II, lays down equity participation of Nigerians and foreigners in the ratio of 40:60 (Singh, 1992). The NIPC Act No. 16 of 1995 abolished any restrictions in respect of the limits of foreign shareholding in Nigeria on registered/domiciled enterprises. However, certain business/enterprises are exempted from free and unrestrained participation by any person or group of persons irrespective of their nationality. These are mainly the production and dealing in arms and ammunition, narcotic drugs, and psychotropic substances; military/paramilitary wears and accoutrements; and participation in coastal and inland shipping. Under the 1995 investment laws, foreigners are allowed to invest and participate in the operation of any enterprise in Nigeria. Foreign investors of approved enterprises are also guaranteed unconditional transferability of funds through an authorized dealer, in freely convertible currency, irrespective of whether they are dividends or profit (net of taxes) attributable to the investment; payments in respect of loan servicing where a foreign loan has been obtained and the remittance of proceeds (net of all taxes); and other obligations in the event of sale or liquidation of the enterprise or any interest attributable to the investment. The law also gives investment protection and assures that no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any government of the federation. Indian participation in joint ventures in Africa had since the 1960s concentrated in two countries, namely, Nigeria and Kenya. During the 1960s, Nigeria offered good prospects to the Indian manufacturers for exporting

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their products as well as starting small-, medium-, and large-scale industries in collaboration with Nigerians. Six units for the manufacture of textile goods, engineering goods, pencils, razor blades, expansion of an existing oil mill, and palm kernel crushing plant were approved by the Indian government during this period to be set up with Indian collaboration in Nigeria. One joint venture producing engineering goods and the other razor blades were in operation in Nigeria between 1966 and 1970. The establishment of joint ventures in Nigeria was seen as a welcome development by the Nigerian government, especially for industries where technical know-how had not been developed in the country. This maximized the net value added for the newly established industries, especially for those which were mainly export oriented. These mainly included agro-allied industries, petrochemical complexes, salt refining, iron and steel, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and rubber manufactures (Singh, 1992). In 1977, Nigeria signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement with India. The areas of cooperation outlined included development of industries, including small-scale industries, through joint ventures and other forms of cooperation; promotion of trade and commerce; and deputation of experts and training facilities in academic, technical, and technological institutions. Other areas of cooperation outlined in the economic agreement of 1977 were in mining and geological survey, civil constructions, transportation, development of iron and steel and other mineral-based industries, and provision of consultancy services. Subsequently, a Protocol was signed with India on August 2, 1979, which formalized the MOU on Technical and Economic Cooperation between the two countries. The agreement identified areas of technical cooperation in agriculture, commerce, industry, petroleum, mining, education, and consultancy services, and provides ideas for the setting up of a joint commission to supervise the projects in agreed areas. By 1979, three new joint venture companies were established—Thapar Group of India, Best and Crompton of India, and Modi of India—collaborating in some cases with persons of Indian origin and Nigerians to register companies in Nigeria. With the signing of the economic agreement, the first Nigeria–India Joint Commission (NIJC) met in New Delhi from July 28 to July 30, 1981. Following the meeting, India pledge to provide some forms of technical assistance to Nigeria. In the field of agriculture, India agreed to provide technical cooperation in the form of exchange of information in sciences and Indian experts and to train Nigerians in areas such as rice production, food processing plants, fertilizers, and postharvest technology. A trade agreement was also concluded between the two countries in February 1983, with the provision of extension for a similar period. These agreements gave some assurances to Indian businessmen, leading to the establishment of more joint ventures in Nigeria. By 1984, there were sixteen joint ventures with India.

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The joint ventures in the field of collaboration included light engineering goods, transmission lines, drug and pharmaceuticals, polyester and nylon, filament, yarn, asbestos, cement products, glass and glass products, machine tools, cables and conductors, banking, insurance, and consultancy. Some were later established in the field of soft drinks and paper industry in the late 1970s and 1980s (Gupte, 1992) India started partial opening up its economy since 1990 to integrate into, and tap from, the global economy. Several economic reforms have been undertaken in this regard since 1991, with the aim of making India a global economic player. Globalization has emerged as a dynamic that no country could just wish away. On the one hand, it offers benefits for those economies that are prepared to take advantage of the opportunities it offers, and on the other hand, it offers no such gains to weak economies, especially those that lacked technological know-how. India recognized that the internationalization of businesses by domestic players is an important parameter for measuring the level of globalization of the country’s business. Indian companies are also recognizing the need for physical presence in other countries for India to have a closer connection with the market that could be served and the products that could be developed with unique natural resource endowments of those countries. This, to a large extent, explains the increasing presence of Indian companies, and more seeking to establish joint venture businesses in Nigeria. The examination of Indian businesses abroad shows that they were much fewer in the pre-liberalization era—that is before 1991. The number of joint ventures approved up to 1991 stood at 244. The joint ventures were concentrated in Malaysia (22), Thailand (17), Sri Lanka (15), Nigeria (14), Singapore (14), Indonesia (13), Russia (13), Nepal (13), UAE (11), and Kenya (10). The scenario with joint ventures changed dramatically in the post-liberalization era—that is, after 1991. The number of joint ventures approved per year in the post-liberalized economy is almost half of the total number of joint ventures before in the entire pre-liberalization period. Between 1992 and 1999, the number of joint ventures increased and the concentration also spread from twelve to nineteen countries with Mauritius (24), Germany (22), Hongkong (21), Saudi Arabia (15), Bahrain (15), the Netherlands (13), Australia (12) also getting more than ten joint ventures , United States (119), United Kingdom (89), UAE (79), Sri Lanka (69), Singapore (55), Malaysia (54), Nepal (53), Russia (36), Thailand (34), Indonesia (21), Nigeria (19), and Kenya (14). The number of Nigeria–India joint ventures therefore increased from fourteen in 1991 to nineteen in 1999, which represents an increase of about 0.13 percent total share of India’s joint ventures in the world. The significance of this analysis is that from the 1960s to 1980s, Kenya and Nigeria had the

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largest concentration of joint ventures, with Kenya having more than Nigeria in Africa; the situation has changed since 1991. Since 1999, Nigeria has emerged as the preferred country for Indian investments, particularly through joint venture collaborations.

EVALUATION OF SOME JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA AND WHOLLY OWNED INDIAN COMPANIES IN NIGERIA Nigerian Engineering Works Limited (NEW) The Nigerian Engineering Works Limited (NEW) is one of the long-surviving joint ventures between Nigeria and India. NEW was conceived as a joint venture between the Birla Group of India, the Rivers State Government (now including Bayelsa state government), and the Nigerian Industrial Bank Ltd (NIDB). The company, which began operation as early as 1964, had to close down in 1967 following the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War and started functioning again in 1971. The Birla group, which provided the management and technical support, is a large industrial group in India with diversified interests in automobiles, heavy engineering, paper, cement, asbestos, chemicals, textiles, and many more. The group is said to provide employment to more than 500,000 people as at 1990 (Singh, 1992). The headquarters of the NEW is based in Port Harcourt, where the main factory is located. Other factories and branches are found in Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Enugu, Ilorin, Ibadan, and Lagos. The branches serve as the marketing, distribution, and servicing outlets of the company. The company produces a wide range of engineering products including NEWCLIME and PRESTIGE range of air conditioners, split systems, NEWCLIME fans, and water coolers. It also produces NEWPLAN range of office equipment including filing cabinets, cupboards, desks, chairs, library book shelves and accessories, storage shelving, lockers, post office boxes and NEWSTRUCT steel structures, pipelines, and tanks. By 1990s, the company had diversified further into automobile components and electric distribution. Under its NORSTEEL Products Division, NEW manufactures a number of components for supply to the Peugeot automobile plant in Kaduna. These include spare parts wheel cradles and car airconditioner components. NEW Electricals Division manufactures a number of electrical distribution equipment such as switchgears. While its facilities are dominantly in Port Harcourt and Lagos, the company divided the country into three zones (East Zone, West Zone, and North Zone) for effective marketing. In addition, the company, after it was granted the ECOWAS certification, started exporting its products to Nigeria’s neighboring countries.

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Best and Crompton Engineering (NIG) Ltd The Best and Crompton Engineering (NIG) Limited was incorporated in 1978 and works in association with the Best and Crompton Engineering Group of India, which provides additional backing in terms of technical, personnel, equipment supply, and finance. The company has executed projects associated with high voltage transmission lines and substations and rural electrification in Nigeria between 1980 and 2000. From documented sources, some of the transition line projects it carried out include Berin-Ughelli (100 km) double circuit 133 KV transmission line, in addition to over 600 kms of 132 KV lines in Borno, Bauchi, and Gongola (now Adamawa and Taraba states) as subcontractors to Sumtomno Corporation of Japan. The group has also carried out a total of 576 kms of 330 KV transmission lines (single circuit) between Kainji and Oshogbo, through Jebba and between Jebba and Kaduna. In addition, records also show that the company completed the construction of a 156 km of 136 KV single circuit line between Kano and Katsina in October 1985 (Gupte, 1992). In the late 1980s, the company had challenges arising from failure of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and the Bauchi State Integrated Rural Development Authority (BASIRDA) to meet their contractual agreements with respect to import of materials required for completion of contracts signed with the company. Even so, the company claimed to have provided employment to about 330,000 unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled workers, and 217,000 supervisory and managerial persons per annum in Nigeria. Since the 1990s, the company embarked on a diversification strategy with foray into new businesses such as manufacture of apparels, precast building slabs, precast building accessories, implementing precast buildings, multipurpose machinery, machine tools, drivers, and motors. The company also made foray into construction business. Its Nigerian joint venture posted a total turnover and profit after tax for the period from January 2005 to December 2005 of Rs. 8.30 crores and Rs. 0.32 crores, respectively (Best and Crompton Eng. Ltd, 94th Annual Report 2005–2006). The company points out that it continues to face problems with regard to procurement of materials from abroad for its work due to fluctuating policies of the Nigerian government. Nigerian Machine Tools Ltd (NMTL) The largest Indian joint venture initiated by 1979 was the Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) collaboration with the Federal Government of Nigeria to set up the Nigeria Machine Tools Ltd. The NMTL factory founded in 1980 is located in Osogbo, Osun state. It consists of four assembly and heavy machine shops, three light machine shops, and a foundry with independent pattern and casting shops and a training school. The company commenced

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operations in January 1983 with the primary objective of machine tools production and assembly. The underlying plan was for the NMTL to play a leading role in Nigeria’s quest for industrialization. A comprehensive agreement covering designing, supply of equipment, erection, commissioning, and management of the plant was signed. Alongside the agreement, HMT had the task of also training Nigerian manpower. For its services, the HMT was paid the sum of ₦8.63 million. In addition, the agreement also gave the HMT royalty of 2 percent of value added, net taxes, for a period of seven years for each product manufactured by the Nigerian company. The entire project cost stood at ₦45 million and HMT’s share in the equity was 15 percent, which was supplied, not in cash, but in form of plant and machinery. The plant was expected to be fully operational within a period of five years. From the seventh year onward, it was expected that the plant would be able to completely manufacture several lathes, power hacksaws, shaping machines, and so on (Singh, 1992). Another noteworthy development is that the HMT prepared a feasibility study report for setting up a machine tool and metal working complex for Nigeria. The report, which was sponsored by UNIDO, was accepted. This provided further scope for not only direct sale of machine tools and setting up tool room facilities but opened up opportunities for setting up agricultural mechanization centers, manufacture of agricultural implements, lamps, industrial fasteners, and assistance in setting up of industrial estates. Even though the company has been operating with difficulty and struggling over the years to stay afloat, it has been manufacturing some simple machine tools, machine accessories, mechanical spares and providing after-sales support within Nigeria and West Africa. NMTL also engages in the manufacture and production of industrial spare parts and fittings for energy and power, defense, and iron and steel industries; manpower training in various engineering and technological fields; and provision of after-sales and consultancy services. The company also manufactures and assembles agricultural tractors and implements under its proprietary BULL trademark. The NMTL has provided services to a wide range of clientele in different sectors such as food, tobacco and beverages, textile, packaging and steel, cement, quarry and agro-allied, paper, oil and gas, building, automobiles, brewery glass, and educational sectors. Despite the huge opportunities offered by this project for Nigeria’s technological breakthrough, it has not worked as expected. The project has not only performed below capacity but also remains one of the critical issues of concern in Indo-Nigeria joint ventures. A case in point that buttresses the challenges experienced in the management of this joint venture between Nigeria and India was when the offer of US$5 million in aid was made by the Indian authorities for the revitalization of the Nigerian Machine Tools Industry at

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Oshogbo. Although the aid package had been available since 1997, the implementation of the deal was delayed due to “disagreement on the point of principles” (The Punch, 2000). While the Indian authorities insisted on providing the company with materials and expertise from the Indian Hindustan Tools Company to cover the US$5 million grant, officials at the Nigerian National Planning Commission (NPC) had requested that the grant be provided in cash to Nigeria. The point of the NPC was that Abuja should be in the position to decide how the funds would be utilized in accordance with the needs of the factory at Oshogbo. India on the other hand argued that since the object of the aid was to help revitalize the technological development of Nigeria, then New Delhi should monitor its implementation through the involvement of its own machine tools company. This proved to be a thorny issue that was only resolved during the visit of the External Affairs Minister of India Shri Jaswant Singh to Nigeria in March 2000 to cochair the Session of India–Nigeria Joint Commission (Guardian, October 15, 2007). In 2006, a private group acquired 70 percent of the Federal Government of Nigeria’s shares in the NMTL under the Federal Government of Nigeria’s privatization program thus bringing the company under private ownership and control. The reason for the privatization of the company, according to the Nigerian authorities, was to reposition it for better performance and productivity, and thus enabling the company to play a major role in Nigeria’s quest for industrialization. Chellarams PLC The company, Chellarams PLC, popularly known as K-Chellarams (Kishinchand-Chellarams), in Nigeria began operations in 1923 as a trading company in wholesale textile. The company was set up by a management team appointed by Shri Kishinchand Chellarams to set up the group’s first African branch in Nigeria. It was incorporated as a private limited liability company on August 13, 1947. The company became a public limited liability company and was admitted to the Nigerian stock exchange on November 29, 1978. Owing to its success in Nigeria, K-Chellarams shifted its focus from retail to wholesale business in 1982 and by 1990, the company, K-Chellarams was renamed “Chellarams PLC.” From its take-off point in Lagos, the company has opened branches in Aba, Kano, Onitsha, Abuja, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, and Maiduguri. The company’s trading operations are divided into two separate divisions: industrial raw materials and consumer products. The products traded by the two divisions include industrial chemicals, machinery, ingredients for food manufacture, frozen foods, bicycles, and electronics. A close examination of the history of the company reveals that it has evolved over the years. It began

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with textile trading in 1923 to the establishment of dynamic industries limited in 1967, establishment of Chellco industries limited in 1978 and also became a public quoted company on the Nigerian stock market in the same year. The company also established United Technical and Allied Services (UTASL) in 1986. By 1998, the company became a conglomerate with diversification in manufacturing, marketing and services. By 2009, it established a joint venture with Dynamic Industries Ltd (DIL), Devyani International (Nig) Ltd, and also established Isolo Power Gen Ltd (IPGL). Over the years, the company adopted a strategy for further expansion and diversification through joint venture contracts. In 2010, it entered into a joint venture with American Express Travel Nigeria (Tourvest Plc) and in 2011; it established a joint venture with Woolworths Retail Stores Ltd of South Africa. Presently, the company has three subsidiary companies (Chelltek industries Ltd, DIL, and UTASL) and joint venture partnerships with American Express Travel Services, Devyani International (Nig) Ltd, IPGL, and Woolworths Retail stores Ltd. The annual report and financial statement of the company for the year ended on March 31, 2012, posted a turnover growth of over 7 percent from ₦23.35 billion to ₦25 billion and a profit after tax of ₦231.6 million as against ₦220.3 million in 2011. The success recorded was as a result of improved performance of the subsidiaries. The company decided in 2012 to discontinue the business of assembling and selling bicycles in Chelltek Industries because of its low turnover. The activities of Chellarams PLC in Nigeria are not limited to business and profits alone. In the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the company established the Murli T. Chellaram Foundation (MTC Foundation) in honor and memory of the immediate past-chairman, with a view to giving back to host communities in Nigeria (Chellarams PLC, 2021a). Specific areas covered in the company’s CSR include education, primary health, and aid to the physically challenged. The foundation also entered into a Strategic Partnership with the University of Lagos with the aim of fostering an Entrepreneurial Mind-set and Culture through Learning and Development Interventions targeted at members and nonmembers of the University of Lagos Community. This is being undertaken by the Nirmala Chellarams Centre for Entrepreneurship Skills (NCCES), which is an On-Campus Enterprise Development Centre created with the sole purpose of advocating for and promoting entrepreneurship through learning and development interventions for both members and nonmembers of the University Community (Chellarams PLC, 2021a). The interventions are achieved through learning, development, and vibrant community initiatives. The initiatives include the Chellarams Professionals and Entrepreneurs Network (CPEN) as a community component of the NCCES, University of Lagos, is a set of five categories of programs, strategically designed for several cadres of individuals that seek

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to broaden their entrepreneurship knowledge (Chellarams PLC, 2021c). The programs include Executive Education Courses (EEC); Short-term Business Courses (STBC); Professional Masterclasses (PMC); Customized Enterprise Education Courses (CEEC); and Global Graduate and Undergraduate Programs (GGUP) (Chellarams PLC, 2021c). Other areas through which Chellarams PLC actualizes its CSR in Nigeria is through initiatives targeted at Special Persons Association of Nigeria and sponsorship of social events. To illustrate, Chellarams donated over 250 customized handicapped tricycles to the Special Persons Association of Nigeria (SPAN) to create and promote the culture of cycling in Nigeria. The company also reported that it supported the association with yearly financial donations and provided scholarships to outstanding students who are members of the association. Also, the company sponsored the bodybuilding championship competition (Mr. Flex Nigeria) which is a platform through which Nigerian bodybuilders are prepared for participation in the international bodybuilding championships. It also supported “the annual Ymedia Park n Ride project, a two-hours 10km bicycle roundtrip ride within Lagos State metropolitan estates”. The company also supports the development young talents in music and arts. It partnered with the Society for the Performing Arts in Nigeria (SPAN) and donates about ₦2 million, yearly to the organization’s program. The support for SPAN is to expand the opportunity for talented and gifted persons in the society by organizing formal and informal classes to talented children and youths in the community and through its performing arts centers. Dana Group of Companies The Dana Group began operations in Nigeria with pharmaceuticals manufacturing in the mid-1980s. An examination of the historical development of the group reveals that since the 1990s, it has diversified into bulk importation of industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals and surgical equipment, commodities, polyethylene, automobiles, electronics, airline, and a wide range of goods and services. There is no doubt that the group has provided employment to Nigerians as well as Indians, both directly and indirectly. The group also commissioned a plastics plant for household products in the year 2000. It also expanded into setting up of pharmaceutical formulation plant and table water bottling plant in 2003. The group also ventured into the manufacturing of food products with an instant milk plant under the name Danaco Milk and an instant noodle plant under the name Dana Sun Yum Noodles in 2007. The company also established a rice milling plant. Dana Group also acquired a Steel Rolling Mill in Katsina to produce debars and wire rods in 2006. Its venture into the air transport industry with the launch of Dana Air on November 10, 2008, was often cited as the most successful venture of the

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group. However, the events of June 3, 2012, involving the crash of Dana Air flight 0992 from Abuja to Lagos, which killed all the 146 passengers, 7 crew members, and about 10 others on ground, was said to be the second deadliest air crash in Nigeria after the Kano disaster (Accident Investigation Bureau, Updated Report on Dana Air Crash, 2012). Two Indian nationals were among the victims who lost their lives in the Dana Air crash. Following this crash, the Federal Government of Nigeria seized the license of Dana Air and banned the MD-83 aircraft type used by Dana air from being used by all airlines operating in Nigeria. The Nigerian government also set up a nineman technical and administrative panel that audited all airlines operating in the country (Agbobu, June 4, 2012). Preliminary investigations had revealed that Dana Air McDonnell Doughlas-MD-83-jet may have been purchased with preexisting safety issues and a troubling past record of safety (Agbobu, June 4, 2012). The aircraft was sold off by Alaskan airlines in 2008 on the grounds that it wanted to upgrade its aircrafts for fuel-efficient ones. Before the deal, Alaskan airline had its own incidents with MD-83 aircraft, one of which resulted in a fatal air crash on January 31, 2000 (Agbobu, June 4, 2012). The Alaskan flight, which crashed into the pacific, claimed the lives of eighty-three passengers, two pilots, and three crew members. The events surrounding the Dana air crash, delay in the release of remains of victims to family members, and the issues compensation for family members, put Dana Air on the spotlight as victims’ families and sympathetic Nigerians criticized the airline for not carrying out adequate maintenance of its aircraft before flying (This Day News, July 15, 2012). It was on this account that the news that the Nigerian Federal Government had lifted the suspension of Dana Air’s operating license in September, 2012, was not well received by members of the public (This Day, September 18, 2012). Even though most of the victims’ families were still mourning their loss, the airline resumed its travel services on domestic routes (Abuja, Lagos, Port Harcourt, Uyo), international routes (Ghana), and charter operations. The activities of Dana Group in Nigeria go beyond just business. The company also undertakes corporate social responsibilities (CSR) in Nigeria through the sponsorship of Sri Sai Vandana Foundation (SSVF), which operates in Nigeria as a registered charity. Since the foundation was registered in 1995, it provides humanitarian service activities and participates in programs committed to alleviating the underprivileged in Nigeria. Specific areas of intervention by the foundation include healthcare services, clean water, education, vocational training, and other social infrastructures to the community. To illustrate, Dana Drugs Limited donated drugs to the victims of Kano bomb blast (Dana Group, 2021a). Items donated to Murtala Muhammed Specialist Hospital, Kano, and Muhammad Abdullahi Wase Specialist Hospital, Kano, which were beneficiaries from the donations included infusions, formulations,

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and surgical devices necessary for injured people (Dana Group, 2021b). On December 10, 2012, Dana Drugs Limited also donated items comprising pharmaceutical products to victims of flood disaster in Nigeria. The donations which were in support of the relief efforts of the Federal Government in the affected states were made to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Abuja office (Dana Group, 2021b). On November 20, 2012, Dana Drugs Limited donated a brand new fourteen-seater bus to the management of the Lagos Teaching Hospital (LUTH) to support its mission of caring for the sick (Dana Group, 2021c). The donation was made in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the hospital. The Stallion Group The Stallion Group is a family business that is currently managed by the Vaswani brothers—Sunil, Haresh, and Mahesh Vaswani, all of whom were born and grew up in Ilupeju, Lagos. Their father Sunderdas Vaswani settled in Lagos in 1954 and engaged in trading. Over the years, the Stallion Group expanded and currently operates in eighteen countries. Stallion has expanded into a business conglomerate with well-consolidated business lines in diverse sectors including trading, industrial production, automotive, and the services sectors. The Stallion advantage, according to the Vaswani brothers, remains its business model which is premised on high volumes and small profit margins, which help to keep prices of their goods low. Nigeria remains the group’s biggest market in West Africa, with subsidiary firms specializing in sourcing, importation, warehousing, and distribution of products of mass consumption in the country. Stallion’s product lines in trading include rice, sugar, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, food items, vehicles and accessories, and a whole host of products of mass consumption (Yemi, 2010). In the area of automobile, Stallion is the sole exclusive representatives and distributors for Audi, Porsche, Honda, Hyundai, Mahindra, and Skoda cars in Nigeria and other West African countries. Stallion’s manufacturing activities in Nigeria include textiles, plastics, motorcycle assembly, and rice milling. The group is also actively exploring other industries like motor car assembly and fertilizers. Stallion’s Insurance division provides a whole range of insurance services. Stallion’s Shipping division is an international freight forwarder and customs broker operating out of Lagos, Nigeria, and Accra, Ghana offering premium logistics services to local businesses. Stallion Aircraft Chartering and Leasing provides aircraft chartering and leasing services. The Stallion Group also founded a commercial bank known Reliance Bank in Nigeria. In 2005, pursuant to the Central Bank’s stipulations on recapitalization of Nigerian banks, Reliance Bank merged with EIB International

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Bank Plc, Bond Bank Ltd., and Cooperative Bank Plc. to form the Skye Bank. In addition, Stallion Group is also involved in other key manufacturing plants in Nigeria including Stallion Textile and Stallion Plastics. The company has also collaborated with manufacturers in the motorcycle industry Suzuki of Japan and Qingqi of China to ensure that it controls the importation of cheap, stylish, and affordable motorcycles into Nigeria. In all, Stallion alone runs thirty companies in Nigeria, employing about 10,000 people, directly and indirectly (Yemi, 2010). In addition to Nigeria, the group does businesses in seventeen other countries spread across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, and has its sights on expanding into thirty other countries. On the face value, the vast presence of the Stallion Group in the Nigerian economy seems to be a model success story of Nigeria–India relations. Unfortunately, the Vaswani brothers, the Indian owners of the Stallion Group, for the past three decades have been involved in unending scandals (The Daily Times, November 18, 2011). These brothers have been subject of petitions, accusations of having unfair advantage, arrests by the EFCC, and subsequent court trials bordering on criminal conspiracy, tax evasion, economic sabotage, financial crimes, and money laundering (Sowunmi et al., 2010; The Guardian, November 21, 2011). The brothers have been arrested by the EFCC, tried by Nigerian courts, and deported twice between 2002 and 2010 only to return to the country by the same Nigerian courts to continue their business unhindered. Following the EFCC investigations, recommendations were made to the President Obasanjo administration to deport the Vaswani brothers in 2002. In 2007, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua invited the brothers back to Nigeria. Among other arguments, the court upheld that constitutionally, the Vaswani brothers having been born in Nigeria are citizens of the country (Adeniyi, 2012). Yar’Adua had to deport the Vaswani brothers yet again for unethical business practices including tax evasion and money laundering. A follow up to this was that a Federal High Court in Lagos in 2009 quashed the deportation of the Vaswani brothers and some of their foreign workers (Ikhilae, 2009). The Indian Vaswani brothers have become a force to reckon with among even the Asians in Nigeria that control about 30 percent of Nigeria’s economy. EVALUATION OF INDIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY While Indian investments abound in Nigeria in sectors such as retail and commercial sector, manufacturing, the iron and steel industry, textiles, and pharmaceuticals, the same cannot be said about Nigerian investments in India—no real investments exist. While there are over 100 Indian companies in Nigeria, there

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is no single Nigerian company in India (Choubury, 2013). The implication of this is that Nigerian entrepreneurs need to develop more capacity for competition, invest in domestic economy and abroad, and for the Nigerian government to support the efforts of investors by creating an enabling environment. There is no doubt that the establishment of Indian businesses either as joint ventures or wholly owned ventures in Nigeria has created employment for the nationals of both countries. However, it has been observed, too, that generally, there are no comparable job opportunities for Nigerians in India (Magaji & Muh’d, 2008). Even so, the quality of employment offered by the Indian companies in Nigeria leaves much to be desired. The issue of underemployment by some Indian companies is also of grave concern to the Nigerian government. Contrary to the stance of Nigerian trade unions on casualization of labor, some Indian-owned companies still engage staff as casual laborers and hide behind agreements on contract-staffing in order to evade the law. Middle- and lower-level staff of various Indian companies in Lagos have complained of long hours of work and poor remuneration from the Indian companies. There have also been complains of staff being laid off for complaining about the working conditions and failure to compensate the staff when they get injured or encounter accidents at work. Instead, they are summarily replaced by other persons who are waiting for employment. With this kind of arrangement, technological know-how is not being transferred to Nigerians. According to Nigerian immigration rules, all trained expatriate personnel employed by any business in Nigeria must have suitably qualified Nigerians working in tandem in order to be mentored and for actual skills transfer to take place. However, Nigeria is yet to fully tap the benefits from such arrangements. The activities and unsavory practices of some Nigerian and Indian businessmen adversely affect bilateral trade and investment relations, and these pose enormous challenges. These people take advantage of porous borders to smuggle substandard and contraband products into Nigeria, a situation which has affected the pharmaceutical industry, textile industry, and rice production and other sectors of the Nigerian economy. The Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), for example, blacklisted about twenty-two Indian-owned pharmaceutical companies due to the importation of fake and substandard products (NAFDAC, 2012). The negative business practices of some Indians have serious negative impacts on the Nigerian economy. Apart from tax evasion, which was put at not less than ₦44 billion annually, they are also involved in abuse of import waivers, dumping of commodities such as rice, asset stripping, and money laundering (Abdallah, 2011; Ikhilae, 2009). The EFCC under Mallam Nuhu Ribadu as Chairman, in 2002, had noted clearly that institutionalized corruption and patronage was exacerbating these practices.

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Apart from these, Indian investments in Nigeria face challenges which also affect other businesses in the country. Two typical examples are power generation and infrastructural development. Due to poor and unreliable power supply from the national electricity grid, most businesses resort to private power generation which, naturally, increases the cost of doing business. Another problem faced by the Indian community doing business in Nigeria is security. Recently, the problem of terrorism in Nigeria has affected many citizens and foreigners alike particularly those that reside in the northern part of the country. This problem seriously undermines the business activities of not only Indians and other foreigners but also Nigerians as well. For instance, two Indians were killed and one seriously injured in an attack by the Boko Haram terrorist group on an Indian-owned Gum Arabic factory in Maiduguri, Borno state on July 25, 2012 (Sachdev, 2014). Since the foreign nationals also become the targets of terrorists in the area, most Indians are repeatedly warned of the security situation through the Indian High Commission offices in Abuja and Lagos. Clearly, this is a security problem that needs to be addressed urgently and an area in which collaboration can be to the mutual benefit of both countries. The Indian businesses have also complained of difficulties faced in establishing and running business ventures in Nigeria, especially in the past. While some of these concerns have been addressed by the authorities of the two countries, some of the problems have persisted, thus affecting the economic relations of the two countries. Some of the common problems pointed out in the course of interviews and discussions are analyzed in the following subsections. Insecurity From the perspective of Indians living in Nigeria, insecurity was identified as the most pernicious physical threat to economic cooperation in recent times. Insecurity arising from civil strife, terrorism, kidnappings, armed robberies, and cybercrimes are major deterrents to the realization of Nigeria’s economic potential. Among these security threats, terrorism has emerged as the deadliest. According to the UN Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (UNIDMC), not less than 3.3 million Nigerians were Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) due to the unrest and terrorism, making Nigeria the third most-affected country in the world with 10 percent of global burden or 2 percent of Nigerian population. During 2013, the number of Nigerian IDP grew by 470,000. Nigeria suffered 13,477 deaths in 146 terrorist attacks by the Boko Haram. These attacks were described as world’s deadliest with each causing many deaths. According to the past Indian high commissioner Ambassador Mahesh Sachdev, Indians have

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been affected by the spate of insecurity in the country in during the past seven years. He also noted that over 100 Indians have been kidnapped, most of them in the Niger Delta. Although they were eventually released on payment of ransom, the negotiation processes were difficult. During the period, some Indians resident in Maiduguri and Kano were either direct or collateral victims of the terrorism in the country. Inflation Nigeria at some point faces problems of running inflation, resulting in increased cost of living in the country. This has resulted in not only negative growth rate in real value sense in many sectors, but had also hampered the purchasing power of the Nigerian people. Unless inflation was controlled through effective increase in domestic production and good governance, the economy does not improve and thereby affects foreign business as well as local businesses adversely. With continued demand for increase of salaries by workers due to rising inflation, this has made domestic payment of wages and salaries difficult for joint venture between Nigeria and India, and wholly owned Indian companies, who are struggling to survive in business and also make profits. Raw Materials Availability Most of the Indian manufacturers in Nigeria point out that they had to import their raw materials from other countries. This had been the trend for quite a long period, particularly in the case of iron ore, paper pulp, cotton, yarn, ICT, electrical goods, and so on. It was only in recent years that local exploration of these raw materials was initiated and encouraged by the Nigerian government. Foreign exchange crisis was often also responsible for not getting adequate raw materials in time from abroad for some of the companies operating in Nigeria. Electricity Shortage Poor electricity supply has been underscored as a major constraint on economic activity in the country. Discussion with some Indian manufacturers reveal that due to crippling shortage of electricity, most businesses have to rely on generators which significantly adds to the cost of production and prices of goods produced by Indian companies in Nigeria. Nigeria has an installed capacity of 6,000 megawatts of electricity and manages to produce between 3,000 and 4,000 megawatts of grid power. The country spends around US$455 million annually on diesel-run generator sets of varying

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capacity to generate power for residents, offices, and industrial production. On March 17, 2014, the power minister stated that less than 40 percent of Nigerians had access to electricity, which means more than 25 million households and businesses across the country are without power. Even the fortunate 40 percent receive power supply only intermittently. Almost all commercial and industrial concerns have backup arrangements for power generation. The reality of the situation is that Nigeria’s electricity shortage is inconsistent with available resources to generate power. Huge amount of natural gas is still being flared, despite various plans to curb this waste over the past decades. Nigeria has huge untapped power potential in hydro, solar, wind, and biomass sectors. The power shortage is cumulative result of lack of investment, surging demand due to rapid population growth and urbanization, public sector mismanagement, generator mafia thriving on importation of generating sets and subsidized diesel, and the disconnect between lofty targets and tardy implementation. The Nigerian government recently took decisive steps to address the situation in a comprehensive manner. In August 2013, the government published a “Road Map for Power Sector Reforms.” The government has so far implemented a three-year long, US$2.5 billion program for privatization of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) comprising of seven generation and twelve distribution companies with assets being handed over to the successful bidders. In the second phase, the government announced privatization program for assets created under the National Independent Power Project (NIPP). Although Indian players in the electricity sector such as Powergrid Corporation, Tata, Adani, Reliance, Essar, and Skipper had participated in the bid round, none of them were successful. Although the new owners have taken some of the Indian companies as technical partners and shareholders, they are not dominantly in control. Work Culture There have been complaints also about the work culture of Nigerians which was such that management and continuous supervision became necessary. Even though Nigerians are hardworking and always ready to work, they are said to require additional motivation to work. As such, managerial and supervisory roles are often emphasized to monitor performance. Some of those interviewed point out that whenever the role of the Indian entrepreneurs was taken away, it had adversely affected economic functioning of those businesses especially in joint venture enterprises. Sometimes, this had forced the Nigerian counterparts to bring back management from outside Nigeria.

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Delay in Remittances Apart from the continuous fluctuation of foreign exchange value of the naira, there was willful or otherwise delay in remittance of fees, royalty to overseas investors, as well as delay in remittances of savings of the expatriates. There were such instances cited where practically every overseas investor or expatriate had to try hard to get their money back from Nigeria in the form of foreign exchange. In some of the cases, remittances on these counts due for payment prior to five to seven years were either delayed or not paid. Examples include that of Campa Beverages Private Ltd and Hilltop Bottling Company Ltd., Jos, which were originally contracted as joint ventures but had to be abandoned due to failure to declare dividend as per original stipulated dates. The implication is that these investments in Jos could not stand the test of time. Changes of Government Policies Frequent changes in sectoral economic policies particularly in the field of industrial sector, fiscal and monetary policies, and political stability have been pointed out as being largely responsible for slow growth of joint ventures and wholly owned business enterprises not only from India but from the developed countries as well. The Indian businesses have also complained of facing challenges from India in terms of inadequate efforts by the Indian government to promote business ventures abroad. Some of these challenges pointed out in the course of interviews and discussions are analyzed in the following subsections. Inadequate Promoting Policies Investing in Nigeria had been viewed in the past as a high risk for private entrepreneurs, particularly from the point of view of distance between Nigeria and India. The Nigerian environment was also perceived as politically unstable, especially during the military era. The only way India could compete was to offer a package of services at competitive rates along with loan-cum-investment incentives. Indian policy from 1991, following the reforms, has emphasized outward drive specially to encourage imports and exports. India needs the Nigerian markets for its goods and services and raw materials and natural resources, particularly oil resources, to fuel its growing economy. Before the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, it was circuitous and time consuming in getting approval to set up investment abroad from the Indian authorities. Equity Participation The Indian government has had rigidities on export of Indian equipment/technology as equity contribution. This was the Indian government’s approach

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of safeguarding its indigenous technology. At the international level, the major problems the entrepreneurs faced included uncompetitive Indian prices, and Indian quality and models often lack finished presentation and updated technology. As such, it was in the interest of entrepreneurs to have some cash equity participation in foreign exchange which should have been freely available. The various businesses, including joint ventures, especially the new companies, had faced limited capital and lack of reserve problems. The Indian companies therefore depended on the Indian promoters for counter guarantees for bid/performance bonds and credit facilities from banks in Nigeria and abroad. This to some extent explains why some of the Indian businesses were found culprits in the banking scams that led to near-total collapse of the banking sector in Nigeria in the 1990s. Approval Procedures by the Indian Government Some investment opportunities had been lost by Indian businesses due to delay in government approval from New Delhi. While the government sometimes argued that it had to protect public investment through careful study of every case and situation, it sometime takes too long. A case in point was lost in the first bid in 2005 by India’s ONGC–VL which had bided for two oil blocks (OPLs 321 and 323). Despite the ONGC’s preparedness to pay the same signature bonus as South Korea’s KNOC, the Indian cabinet delay in agreeing the bid price. As a result of the delay, the two oil blocks went to South Korea’s KNOC, in partnership with Equator Explorer. Agreements by Indian companies for rendering mechanical or technical services, and so on to foreign enterprises require Indian government’s approval which was time consuming and caused delay. Keeping in view the vast potential for expanding Nigeria–India relations, the two governments should continue to strengthen their bilateral relations for mutual benefits. The challenges identified and obstacles faced by business ventures in Nigeria and India should be addressed by both countries. This will go a long way to create a conducive environment for enhancing further collaboration especially in the economic sphere for the two countries.

Chapter 7

Nigeria–India Cooperation in the Agricultural Sector

The chapter examines Nigeria–India cooperation in the agricultural sector, with a view to enhancing mutual benefits in food security with South–South Cooperation as the fertile ground. It argues that enhancing Nigeria–India cooperation in the areas of agriculture and food security is not only critical in the transformation of their national economies but also holds the key to achieving mutual benefits and sustaining the strategic partnership established between the two countries of the South. Both countries have huge population of over 190 million and 1,210,193,422 billion (2011 Census), of which 70 percent and 65 percent, respectively, still rely on agriculture (Kumar, 2012). Nigeria and India stand to gain from solving the problem of food insecurity, which varies among them. Even though the two countries have long recognized the importance of agriculture and food security, the path taken to achieve the goal of increased production of agricultural commodities and food security has differed between the countries of South. India’s Green Revolution transformed its economy from a food deficient stage to self-sufficiency in terms of production and a surplus food market for export. Even so, food distribution remains a challenge in India. Nigeria, on the other hand, depends on food imports to supplement its agricultural production. India with a higher population than Nigeria has made investments in human and capital resources, thus achieving giant strides in economic growth and advances in agricultural technology. It has emerged as one of the biggest international agricultural producers. Nigeria has vast uncultivated arable land. However, most of its farmers still practice subsistent rain-fed agriculture with its attendant challenges such as limited irrigation, small-sized farms, poor fertilizer distribution, and lack of modern agro-technology. The relationship between Nigeria and India, which is historically rooted, spans various dimensions and sectors, diplomatic, economic, sociocultural, and 139

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military. In the economic sphere, Indians, numbering more than 30,000 residents in Nigeria, have established profitable ventures with over 160 Indian companies. Before the discovery of crude oil, now a dominant commodity in Indo-Nigeria trade, agriculture which was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy has since declined. Compared to other economic sectors, few Indian companies in Nigeria have invested into direct agricultural production despite its huge prospects for returns on investments. Contrary to the spirit of South–South Cooperation (SSC), issues of technology transfer and capacity development in agriculture, and drawing lessons from India’s agricultural model “Green Revolution” have received less attention. Recently, domestic concerns over decline in food production, and increased desire by the Nigerian government to diversify the economy away from oil dependency, have led to greater policy focus on agriculture and food security. In addition to seeking private sector investments in the agricultural sector, the government has initiated various schemes for promoting importation of technology and machinery for development of the agricultural sector. No doubt in the area of food security, there is potential to explore the adaptation of Indian agricultural technologies and capacity building to both the small- and large-scale farming sector in Nigeria. Specifically, the chapter examines dimensions of Nigeria–India cooperation in the agricultural sector, specifically trade, Indian Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and capacity building. Finally, recommendations are made on how Nigeria–India relations could be enhanced for mutual benefits in the agricultural sector, and achievement of food security. The core questions that the chapter sought to answer are: What lessons can Nigeria learn from India’s agricultural model? What are the dimensions of Nigeria–India cooperation in the agricultural sector? To what extent can SSC be utilized as a platform to transfer agricultural technology and capacity building using Nigeria–India relations as a case study? THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, FOOD INSECURITY, AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS IN NIGERIA Agriculture can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Nigerian economy. Nigeria is well endowed with fertile land and favorable climate for agricultural production. Estimates indicate that 82 million hectares out of available land in Nigeria are regarded as arable; however, only about 34 million hectares are being cultivated. At independence in 1960 up to the mid-1970s, Nigeria was self-sufficient in terms of food production. Then, Nigeria produced all its food needs and surpluses for its promising agro-industries and for exports. The agricultural sector also provided raw materials for some

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industries such as textile, shoe making, and beverage, which employed a large number of workers and artisans. Its agricultural imports were very small. Despite its endowment, Nigeria is currently among the world’s largest importer of agricultural products such as rice, wheat, sugar, milk powder, palm oil, fish, tobacco, and oil palm. From less than ₦1billion in the early 1970s, Nigeria’s total import of food reached about ₦2.3 trillion (US$15 billion) per annum as at 2014 (Sachdev, 2014). The poor state of agricultural production in Nigeria produced negative multiplier effects such as high food prices, import dependence, widespread malnutrition, rural unemployment, and uncontrolled urbanization. A number of factors account for the decline of the agricultural sector in the past three decades and its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These include, among others, overdependence on crude oil, lower official priority to agriculture, and rural–urban migration. Up to the 1970s, agriculture contributed 60 percent of Nigeria’s GDP and foreign exchange earnings (Abdullahi, 2008). In the oil boom era (1966 to 1977) the oil sector emerged as an important source of the national revenue. The oil sector, which contributed a meager 2.6 percent of the GDP in 1960, rose up to 57.6 percent to the GDP in 1970 and up to 99.7 percent in 1972. Agriculture, on the other hand, witnessed serious decline contributing only 12 percent to the GDP in 1970 (Ugwu & Kanu, 2012). This culminated in rising food import bill leading to the persistent huge deficit in the balance of payments over the years. In an attempt to revive the ailing agricultural sector, the Nigerian government introduced and implemented several programs and policies. Among the programs initiated, Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and Green Revolution generated much interest. However, like many others, they faced lots of challenges and were short-lived. As noted by Cheru and Modi (2013, p.2), “no country in the world ever made the transition to industrialization successfully without first developing its agricultural sector.” This informed President Goodluck E. Jonathan’s redirection of the economy through transformation of Nigeria’s agricultural sector by launching an Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) in 2011. The ATA builds on the foundation established through the African Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Major initiatives of the ATA included rationalization of fertilizer subsidy, increase in extension services, and mechanization, all of which were geared toward reviving Nigeria’s lost glory in the production of rice, wheat, cotton, oil palm, cassava, and groundnuts. The ATA aimed to boost agricultural output, encourage private-sector engagement, and to create 3.5 million new jobs in the farming sector. In 2014, the government reported that there was a 403 percent reduction in Nigeria’s food import bill between 2011 and 2013, and the number of jobs in the agriculture sector increased by 3.56 million between

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2012 and 2014. President Jonathan noted in 2014 that the launch of ATA in 2011 attracted private investment of US$11 billion into the Nigerian agricultural sector. The then minister of agriculture and rural development Dr. Akinwumi Adesina had reported that by 2014 agricultural import declined by ₦906 billion due to higher domestic production (Grow Africa, 2017). President Muhammadu Buhari who took over in May 2015 pledged to move the economy away from oil, in part by reviving the agricultural sector. This was to be achieved by building on the foundations of the ATA laid by the Jonathan administration. On June 21, 2016, the Buhari government launched a new policy—“The Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016-2020): Building on the Successes of the ATA, Closing Key Gaps”—also known as the “The Green Alternative.” As a departure from previous agricultural policy documents introduced in 1988 and 2001, the government argued that the green alternative will provide a disciplined approach to building an agribusiness ecosystem. It will also help in curbing the twin problems of inability to meet domestic food requirements, and inability to export at quality levels required for market success. One objective common to successive policy documents is the achievement of self-sufficiency in basic food supply and the attainment of food security (FMARD, 2016). New elements added to the “green alternative” document reflect the lessons from the ATA as well as priorities emerging from the aspirations of the Buhari administration. The new policy which seeks to promote agriculture in Nigeria was crafted based on some understandings. These are agriculture as a business, agriculture as key to long-term economic growth and security, food as a human right, value chain approach, prioritizing crops, market orientation, factoring climate change and environmental sustainability, participation and inclusiveness, policy integrity, nutrition-sensitive agriculture, and agriculture’s linkages with other sectors (FMARD, 2016). Furthermore, the Buhari administration also initiated the idea of establishing Staple Crops Processing Zones (SCPZ). Specifically, the SCPZ seeks to attract private sector agribusinesses to set up processing plants in zones of high food production, to process commodities into food products. The government supports the private sector by putting in place appropriate fiscal, investment and infrastructure policies for SCPZ. INDIA’S GREEN REVOLUTION AND LESSONS FOR NIGERIA India’s Green Revolution offers beneficial lessons for Nigeria. In the mid1960s and early 1970s, India faced challenges of food shortages which reached a crisis point, particularly with severe famines in the eastern part. This spurred India to explore alternative approaches to agricultural development

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through the Green Revolution that combined state-led initiatives, technology, and participatory policy approach. One important lesson in this regard is that India increased its budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector, while at the same time investing in research and development, and capacity building. As part of the Third Five Year Plan, India set out to increase agricultural productivity, even with limited land, by introducing innovations. The innovations focused on modernizing the agricultural sector by introducing high yield varieties of seeds; making fertilizers and insecticides more widely available; manufacturing farm equipment; upgrading irrigation practices; and providing institutional support to farmers (Modi, 2017, p.2). The country made considerable progress between 1970s and 1980s, after the introduction of the Green Revolution—new seed–fertilizer technology in the mid-sixties, increasing production of food grains, particularly wheat and rice. Food grain production in the country increased from 108 million tons in 1970–1971 to 234 million tons in 2008–2009 (Sharma & Gulati, 2012). Based on an innovative cooperative model in the 1970s, India recorded remarkable success in milk production, ranking high globally. The private sector–led biotechnology revolution has boosted production of cotton in the country. The initiation of wide-ranging economic reforms in the country in 1991 led to an improvement in agricultural terms of trade and private investments in agriculture. India’s Green Revolution is not without challenges. The country faces a number of challenges to agricultural growth including technological fatigue, policy deficits, infrastructural, credit and marketing constraints, and water and soil health–related ecological and environmental problems. In addition, the Green Revolution did not remove challenges faced by rural farmers, most of whom could not afford expensive inputs and capital investments. Some farmers could not access rural credits in the same way as large farmers who are land owners leading to displacement of some of the small farmers and increase in rural impoverishments (Modi, 2010). Generally, India’s investments in agriculture have increased over the years. Nigeria also experimented with the idea of a Green Revolution, which was introduced by General Olusegun Obasanjo regime in 1979. The Green Revolution Scheme promoted massive involvement of the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA) in direct agricultural production and establishment of the state-owned agricultural production and marketing companies, and played a key role of government in input distributions and marketing. Unlike India’s Green Revolution, Nigeria’s experience has shown that its approaches through government subsidies did not produce desired results, but were counterproductive, as they diminished the incentives for private sector participation. The effect of public sector involvement in direct agricultural production discouraged the private sector, distorted incentives

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and discouraged potential entrepreneurs and investors from the agricultural sector. Nigeria needs serious agricultural entrepreneurs, agricultural labor force, and private investors to transform the agricultural sector into a modern and developed economic system. This is because private sector involvement in agriculture has been shown to play an important role in the economic development of many countries. Public–private partnership in agriculture in Nigeria can bring about employment, infrastructural development, proliferation of agro-allied industries, and income for the farmers. Emphasis should be on an efficient and sustainable public–private partnership that can catalyze the rapid agricultural development of the country. Major lessons that Nigeria can draw from India’s Green Revolution include a well-thought-out plan for agricultural transformation, including adequate budgetary allocation, agricultural investment, R&D, technology (appropriate, adaptable, and affordable), and participatory policy approach. India developed technological equipment and irrigation that suites local/rural conditions of small farmers whose major source of income is agriculture. Lessons could be drawn also from credit accessibility and financing of small farmers, excessive use of chemical fertilizers, and balancing between agriculture as business and protection of small farmers. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE CONTEXT OF NIGERIA–INDIA COOPERATION Cooperation in agriculture has been an integral part of Nigeria–India relations since inception in 1960. India opened its diplomatic outpost in 1958, in recognition of Nigeria as the gateway to Africa, given its size, population, resources, and other endowments. India’s first prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated this position during his visit to Nigeria in 1962. This was also a period when agriculture was the dominant sector in the Nigerian economy and a major contributor to the country’s GDP. From that time, Indo-Nigeria trade and investment relations centered on exchange of agricultural commodities from the Nigerian side and manufactured goods from the Indian side. Oil palm was the major commodity of trade between the two countries. Other items which India bought from Nigeria in the 1960s–1970s include groundnut and groundnut cake, cocoa beans, cocoa butter, and other related products, rubber, raw cotton, cotton seeds, tin, hides and skin, coffee, timber, and plywood. By late 1970s, however, against the backdrop of the international oil crisis, India needed to expand its sources of oil. From 1979, the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) began importing Nigerian crude oil to the tune of about 10,000 BPD (Vasudevan, 2010). In terms of money value, it was worth about US$100 million

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annually. When Nigeria’s agricultural produce began to decline, focus of exports shifted to crude oil. That notwithstanding, agricultural commodities have remained components of items that India buys from Nigeria, though earning less compared to crude oil. Agriculture was one of the key issues of discussion during the first Nigeria–India Joint Commission (NIJC) in New Delhi from July 28 to July 30, 1981. In agriculture, India agreed to provide technical cooperation in the form of exchange of information in sciences and Indian experts, training of Nigerians in areas such as rice production, food processing plants, fertilizers, and postharvest technology. With frequent changes of government and policies in Nigeria, mostly under military regimes, not much was achieved under these arrangements. That notwithstanding, the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria, which official figures put at over 35,000, are mostly engaged in trading and manufacturing in a wide range of economic sectors in Nigeria. These include telecommunications, hydrocarbons, textiles, chemicals, electrical equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics, information and communications technology (ICT), and airline and automobile sectors. Indians have emerged as major dealers in agricultural machinery and tractors in Nigeria. Records show that agricultural machinery export to Nigeria was worth US$2.8 million (1999–2000), rising to US$3.5 million (2000–2001) (Sachdev, 2014). It accounted for 11 percent of Nigeria’s total market in 2002–2003. The attraction of Indian agricultural machinery and tractors has been attributed to the quality of the products, price competitiveness, and suitability to the local environment. Over the past six decades, the Indian government offered scholarships to Nigerian students to study in India under the Special Commonwealth African Assisted Plan (SCAAP) and Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. From five Nigerian students visiting India for undergraduate and postgraduate research in 1984 the number of slots increased to 190 in 2012–2013, for trainings in different fields. The changing dynamics of national and global politics have made India to emerge as an economic power within the South, well endowed with know-how and willing to share its experience with African countries. India has moved up the development ladder and has made achievements in the areas of industrialization, scientific and technological capabilities, as well as advances in ICT, from which Nigeria could benefit immensely. Today, India is a nuclear power country. India is a member of the emerging economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Accordingly, the Indian government has worked closely with not only the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities but also individual countries to create a new agenda for transforming agriculture and achieving food security. A testimony to this is that the First India–Africa Summit held in New Delhi in April 2008, the Second India–Africa Forum

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held in Addis Ababa in 2011, and the Third India–Africa Forum held in New Delhi in 2015 witnessed efforts to enhance relations between Africa and India. In all the documents emanating from these meetings, agriculture was a top priority for collaboration between India and African countries such as Nigeria. EVALUATING NIGERIA–INDIA COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY As captured in the Africa–India Framework of Cooperation adopted in 2008, the two parties agreed that agricultural development is an effective approach to ensure food security, eradicating poverty, and improve peoples’ livelihood. They also emphasized sustainable development of agricultural and animal resources with effective support for scientific research for conservation of land and environment. The document indicated that cooperation will focus on broad areas such as capacity building, sharing of experience, transfer of applied agricultural technology, sharing of expertise, market access, supporting agro-processing industries, and enhancing cooperation between agricultural training centers and relevant research institutes. Flowing from the Second India–Africa Forum held in Addis Ababa in 2011, India made offers to African countries. Nigeria indicated interest for the establishment of an India–Africa Food Processing Cluster in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. Despite several follow-up and notes raised on the issue to the Indian authority through the Indian High Commission in Abuja and the AU through the Nigerian Mission in Addis Ababa, the idea never took form. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of India for Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture and Allied Sector was initiated in 2010 and discussed by both countries on the platform of the NIJC. Areas of cooperation highlighted by the MOU included postharvest management; mechanization; training in dairy development; water management; seeds quality enforcement; transfer of technology in food processing and agricultural products preservation and storage; capacity building for officials and farmers; and collaborative program in the promotion of high-value crops such as shea nuts, sesame, castor seeds, and Jatropha curcas. The MOU was to be in force for a period of five years, and to be implemented by competent authorities, namely, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, on behalf of the Government of Nigeria, and the Ministry of Agriculture, on behalf of the Government of India. Broadly, the cooperation between Nigeria and India in the agricultural sector covers areas such as trade dimension, direct investment dimension, and

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capacity-building dimension. It is against this background that the chapter evaluates Nigeria–India cooperation in agriculture and food security. TRADE DIMENSION OF NIGERIA–INDIA COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE The growth of Indo-Nigeria trade has been due to mainly import of crude oil. The bilateral trade during the year 2015–2016 stood at US$12.17 billion as against US$16.36 billion for the year 2014–2015. This was mainly due to sharp decline in oil prices. India’s imports from Nigeria by principal commodities in 2013–2014 (in USD) are nearly 5.3 times bigger than Indian exports to the country (US$14.315 bn vs. US$2.666 bn). However, over 99 percent of Nigerian supplies to India comprised by “Petroleum, Crude and Products.” Remaining US$138 million is mostly primary products, such as metal scrap, agricultural products, leather, and a few others. An assessment of growth of trade between the two countries shows that agricultural goods feature in the trade between them. Among the top agricultural commodities India imports from Nigeria are oil seeds and raw cashew nuts. While oil seeds increased from US$810,440 in 2007–2008 to US$22,877,378 in 2013–2014, cashew nuts increased from 18,289 tons (US$10,013,918) in 2007–2008 to 13,348 tons (US$11,664,512) in 2013–2014. India also exports agricultural commodities to Nigeria. Among the fastest moving fifteen items in India’s export basket to Nigeria, 2008–2014 (in USD), coffee, dairy products, basmati rice, non-basmati rice, and unmanufactured tobacco top the list. Out of these, coffee increased from US$33,134 to US$1,767,096, basmati rice from US$76,719 to US$1,431,03, non-basmati rice from US$59,689,072 to US$600 million, and unmanufactured tobacco from US$1,997,512 to US$19,074,649. What this reveals is that there has been significant increase in trade in agriculture between Nigeria and India. Recently, India approached Nigeria to supply US$1 billion (about ₦367 billion) worth of pulse beans, which is in demand in the country. During a meeting with the then Nigerian minister of agriculture and rural development Chief Audu Ogbeh, the Indian Ambassador to Nigeria Nagabushana Reddy noted that pulse beans is consumed four to five times daily by Indians. DIRECT INVESTMENT DIMENSION OF NIGERIA– INDIA COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE As a result of focus on the trade dimension and Indian investment in other sectors of the Nigerian economy, its direct investments in the agricultural

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sector appears to receive less attention. Even though Indian wholly owned and Indian-linked companies in Nigeria are more than 160 in total, only few are engaged in the agricultural sector. Some of the Indian companies are engaged in agric-business and in supplying modern farm technology, among others, the sale of tractors and harvesters, sale of irrigation pumps, manufacture of fertilizers and other agro-chemicals, sale of improved yielding varieties of seeds, and many others. These include Nagarjuna Fertilizers (fertilizers), Olam (Nig.) Ltd (agro-business), Sonailika (tractors), Sterling Agro (agric inputs), Virgin Enterprises Ltd (agriculture), Indorama (petrochemicals/fertilizers), and Mahindra and Mahindra (tractors) (Sachdev, 2004; Modi, 2010, p. 120). As part of Nigeria’s Gas Master Plan, which was developed in 2008, and reinforced by the Gas Revolution Agenda of 2011, the government provides incentives for private sector investors to meet the potential to produce 30 million tons of urea per year. This is aimed at reducing the domestic price of fertilizers, particularly urea, for farmers and to enable Nigeria to become a manufacturing export hub for urea within the next five years. Despite the considerable fiscal burden to the government, actual use of fertilizer by farmers was very low. Hence, under the Growth Enhancement Support (GES) program launched by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 2012, the government sought to reform fertilizer distribution across the country, combined with the availability of natural gas in Nigeria to attract investors into domestic fertilizer production. Some Indian investors have responded to the invitation for private sector investors by investing in the production of fertilizers. Out of over US$5 billion of investment commitments that have recently been made in Nigeria for fertilizer production two Indian companies are involved. Indorama Eleme Petrochemicals Limited signed agreements with sixteen global development finance institutions, including the African Development Bank (AfDB) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) and invested US$1.2 billion in urea plant to start operation in 2016. Nagarjuna Fertilizer and Chemical Limited (India) signed an MOU with Xenel Corporation of Saudi Arabia to build an ammonia and urea facility (Grow Africa, 2017). Even though companies such as Mahindra and Mahindra have long been involved in selling tractors, parts and inputs in the Nigerian markets, new Indian companies are investing in Nigeria’s agricultural sector. Research evidence and official records reveal that Indorama Eleme Fertilizer/Chemicals Limited has gone into production following the completion of a giant world-class fertilizer plant in Port Harcourt at the cost of US$1.5 billion. The plant is expected to supply about 360,000 tons of urea to fertilizer blenders, which, in turn, will produce NPK fertilizer for the benefit of farmers across the country. With the commencement of production by Indorama, the price of fertilizer seems to be declining. As of October 2017,

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Indorama Granular urea price was ₦6,000 (US$16.71) per 50 kg based on factory price at Port Harcourt. Olam (Nig.) Ltd began its operations in Nigeria in 1989, with an initial focus on the procurement of primary commodities like cashews, cocoa, and shea nut (Indorama, 2017). The company gradually refined its operational scope and expanded operations into three major business streams, namely exports, imports, and branded packaged food products. As at October 2017, its staff strength was approximately 3,500. Olam works directly with network of farmers, suppliers, wholesalers, Local Buying Agents (LBAs), customers, and service providers. In 2013, Olam invested over 19 billion Naira in a 10,000 hectare farm with integrated mill which directly employs 950 people from the surrounding communities, producing 36,000 metric tons of rice for the Nigerian markets—Mama’s Pride and Mama’s Choice brands (Olam, 2017). Olam farm also supports an “out-grower programme” whereby surrounding rice-growing communities are supported by the Olam farm with training, pre-finance, fertilizer, and seeds in order to improve their paddy yields. Not less than 3,000 farmers were engaged in the program, with a target of 16,000 by 2018. This investment was specifically in line with the Nigerian government’s ATA to produce rice for the domestic market thereby boosting self-sufficiency. According to the company, it pioneered Nigeria’s sesame hulling and sesame exports and has invested in state-of-the-art processing facilities in Lagos and Ogun states, which employ close to 1,000 workers. Olam has also invested in the development of cocoa processing facility in Akure, which employs 500 workers. In the north, it has developed a cotton ginnery in Zaria Kaduna state with an annual capacity for 30,000 metric tons of lint (Olam, 2017). In 2011, Sonalika, an Indian agriculture equipment manufacturer which specializes in making a wide range of tractors from 20 to 90 HP, farm equipment, and implements established a new assembly line in Nigeria. Before then, in 2009 it worked with Parco Gateway Integrated Tractor Assembly Plant to assemble the first set of fifty Sonalika Agricultural tractors in Abeokuta, Ogun state. The Sonalika brand is increasingly being sought by farmers in Ogun state. In addition to tractors, its range of equipment includes harvesters, threshers, harrows and other configuration that makes farming more rewarding for the farmers. The success being recorded by the assembly plant affirms the possible gains from public–private partnership approach to agriculture and food security. CAPACITY BUILDING DIMENSION OF NIGERIA– INDIA COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE India’s contributions to capacity building in Nigeria’s agriculture are facilitated through scholarships, education/trainings, research and development

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in agriculture of which some Nigerians have benefited. The ITEC instituted in September 1964 as well as the SCAAP programs seek to develop capacity through training, study tours, project assistance, and expertise to Nigeria. Under the ITEC/SCAAP, 130 ITEC slots for Nigeria for the year 2010–2011 were fully utilized. Following the second IAFS, Nigeria’s ITEC quota for 2011–2012 was increased to 190 and an overwhelming 177 slots were utilized. According to the Indian High Commission in Nigeria, about 500 Nigerians from various sectors participated in the ITEC program in 2016. During the visit by Indian vice president Hamid Ansari to Nigeria in September 2017, the Indian government announced fifty extra slots to Nigeria over a five-year period. As part of the program to celebrate 2017 ITEC day, the Indian high commissioner to Nigeria Nagabhushana Reddy announced that India has extended its ITEC program to include agricultural courses. Both the Indian and Nigerian governments—through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria—are working together to create programs based on Nigeria’s needs in agriculture and allied sectors. There is no doubt that the extension of ITEC program to include training in agriculture will go a long way in enhancing the capacity of Nigerians in agriculture and agro-allied sectors. Some Nigerians have benefited from India’s agricultural capacity development program. In order to ensure full implementation of first IAFS and second IAFS, specifically the agricultural component, the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Government of India, was saddled with responsibilities of agricultural education and establishment of some centers in Africa. They include Soil, Water, and Tissue Testing Laboratories; Farm Science Centres; Agricultural Seed Production; and Demonstration Centers. Accordingly, to support the agricultural human resource development in Africa, the India–Africa Fellowship Programme (IAFP) was initiated by the Indian government. This entailed the placement of 300 fellowships (75 per year: 50 Masters and 25 PhDs) to be provided for four years (2010-2014). According to Ayyappan (2015), DARE is the authority entrusted with capacity building of African students, which include Nigerians, in different agricultural universities and research institutions in India. Nigerian students are among African students that were admitted yearly in Indian agricultural universities for MSc and PhD under the IAFP. According to official records, as at October 12, 2015, total number of Nigerian candidates enrolled in Indian agricultural institutions under the IAFP was nineteen PhDs and sixteen master’s students—a total of thirty-five. The number of Nigerians that had completed their studies under IAFP included four PhDs and ten master’s, bringing the number to fourteen. While this evidence clearly attests that Nigerians have benefited from capacity building in agriculture under the

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IAFP, a broader intervention is required to have wider impact on Nigeria’s huge population of more than180 million, which is the largest in Africa. PROSPECTS OF SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION AS FERTILE GROUND FOR ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY SSC refers to a broad framework for association among countries of the Global South in their political, economic, sociocultural, technical, agricultural, and environmental areas. It involves different kinds of cooperation, including the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, technology transfer as well as financial, monetary, and development cooperation. There have been significant changes in recent years in the structure of the development cooperation and partnerships in the South. With the emergence of countries such as India and China as economic powers, SSC is increasingly playing an important role in global trade, finance, investment, governance, and development assistance. These changes have opened up opportunities for further partnerships between Africa and India. Our examination of Nigeria– India cooperation in agriculture sector reveals that the trade, investment, and capacity building dimensions have been given significant attention by both governments. However, not the same can be said about issues of technology transfer to Nigeria in the area of agriculture. The understanding of SSC is that it should serve as a platform for enhancing mutual benefits for cooperating members. Drawing from this perspective, India is regarded as a country that can share the technological experiences of its Green Revolution with Nigeria. Elements that Nigeria could benefit from include design and manufacture of specific agricultural equipment, development of irrigation methods, climate-smart agriculture, production of high yielding and disease-resistant seed varieties, transfer of agricultural techniques, the dairy and livestock sectors and value addition to agro products, among others. There is no doubt that Nigeria regards India as a forerunner in cutting-edge initiatives and low-cost solutions in the agricultural sector. Its technology is regarded as more appropriate, adaptable and affordable to the conditions of Nigerian local farmers who depend on income from agriculture. As countries of the South, strengthening the partnership between Nigeria and India, particularly in the agricultural sector, will not only benefit the two countries in addressing problem of food insecurity but also accelerate Nigeria’s quest for economic diversification from dependence on crude oil exports for budget financing. The chapter concludes by noting that beyond oil, agriculture, and food security are important areas with huge prospects for collaboration between Nigeria and India. These include, but not limited to, supplying agricultural inputs, processed food, machinery; direct

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investments in growing cashew, oil palm and refining, bio-fuel, and alcohol from cassava, tomato paste, cotton textile; and supply chain management such as cold storages, transportation, and distribution of food across the vast territory of Nigeria. It recommends that the Indian government work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Nigeria as well as the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) to ensure that Nigeria taps from its “Triple A” technology transfer (appropriate, adaptable, and affordable). The Nigerian government should encourage more agricultural and agro-allied FDI from India to Nigeria. It should also collaborate with the Indian government to strengthen existing agricultural institutions in the country.

Part III

CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS IN NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENTS

Chapter 8

Nigeria–India People-toPeople Relations

Engagements between Nigeria and India have been anchored on three pillars: Government-to-Government (G-to-G), Business-to-Business (B-to-B), and People-to-People (P-to-P) ties (Bhatia, 2015). The third pillar, which focuses on P-to-P, is unique because the people have played important roles in the establishment and deepening of bilateral relations between Nigeria and India. Notably, the peoples of Africa and India do not only represent a third of humankind but have had historical contacts as well as shared experiences of colonialism, domination, and discrimination. In Africa, Nigeria has the largest population of black people, hence the gateway to Africa as recognized by India’s first prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In this context, the Nigerian and Indian Diaspora, sociocultural interactions, educational exchanges, and the civil society have played instrumental roles in promoting understanding and friendship at the people’s level, thereby strengthening the other pillars, G-to-G and B-to-B. While this may be the case, while relations between the two countries blossom, misunderstandings and unresolved conflicts at the level of P-to-P also have implications for the relations at the level of G-to-G and B-to-B. This chapter focuses on the Diaspora and sociocultural relations as means to bring not only the peoples of Nigeria and India closer together but also businesses and governments. THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN NIGERIA: ROLE AND IMPORTANCE IN INDIAN POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA The Indian Diaspora in Nigeria, today, constitute an important, and in some respects unique, force in promoting Nigeria–India relations, especially in the 155

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areas of trade and investment. They certainly have better understanding of Nigeria better than the newcomers. This is more so, given the recent diplomatic drive by the Indian government for increased access to critical energy resources from Nigeria and markets for her goods and services. The Sindhi community, that were first to arrive in Nigeria in the early part of the nineteenth century to explore business opportunities, with time, were joined by other Indians, including the professionals. The strong presence of the Indians in Nigeria has remained in the areas of trade and investment, especially in large departmental stores, textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, engineering, banking, manufacturing, brewing, consumer goods, and electronics. The activities of the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria have been facilitated through important associations and cultural organizations. These associations have the unique functions of uniting not only the Indians in Nigeria, but have huge potential of serving as desideratum through which the present friendship and understanding between Nigeria and India could be further strengthened for mutual benefits of the two countries. Nigeria and India have had a long historical relationship that predates the independence of both countries. Anirudha (1979) noted that during the period of British rule, some 5 million Indians migrated to different colonies of the British Empire, including Nigeria, mostly under the system of indentured labor. The Sindhi traders that had ventured out to explore business opportunities were on record to arrive Nigeria in the early part of the nineteenth century and settled down in various parts of the country (Gopalkrishna, 2008). According to Badejo (1989) factors such as English language, governmental procedures, anticolonial struggles as well as contemporary interests necessarily attracted the Indians into contact, interaction, and cooperation with Nigeria. The presence of a sizable population of People of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident Indians (NRI) in Nigeria, which stood at about 35,000 in 2010 (Sachdev, 2011, p.1), is an attestation to this fact. The number of Indians in Nigeria could have been more but for many of them, who had formed the crop of science teachers in secondary and tertiary institutions in some of the states of Nigeria left the country because the earnings in government paid jobs became unattractive. That notwithstanding, the strong presence of the Indian community has remained in the area of trade and investments, especially large departmental stores, textiles, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, information and communications technology (ICT), chemicals, engineering, banking, manufacturing, brewing, consumer goods, and electronics. Indians have no doubt established profitable technical and business ventures in Nigeria. These include Kishinchand-Chellarams, Bhojsons, Ranbaxy, Tata, Reliance Communications, Airtel Barti telecommunications, and Dana Group,

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among others (Wapmuk, 2012). Their penetration of the Nigerian market has been facilitated by its free economy policy. However, when compared to the Western powers whose presence dates back to the preindependence era, the entry of the Indians into the Nigerian oil sector is a relatively new phenomenon. Following its economic liberalization reforms in 1991, the desire to ensure energy security became one of the dominant interests in India’s policy toward Africa, and by extension, Nigeria. This is another major sector of the Nigerian economy where the Indian Diaspora could play an active role in the enhancing entry and participation of Indian investors. Despite the long presence of the Indians in Nigeria, the relationship between the two countries has developed rather hesitantly. In the first fortyfive years of Nigeria’s independence, there were only two official visits and one unofficial visit from an Indian prime minister to Nigeria (Vasudevan, 2010, p.11). Even though Nigeria stood up in support of India when it was in dire need of the support of African countries against the “The China factor,” this did not endear Nigeria as a country to be seriously engaged by India at that time. During the administration of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who took personal interest in meeting and interacting with the Indian Diaspora in various African counties, and, with African leaders, as well as Rajiv Gandhi’s government, there was no qualitative effort toward engagement of the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria and to strengthen the bilateral relations between the two countries. During the 1963 African Safari, Mrs. Gandhi held discussions with the Indian Diaspora of several African countries and also called on heads of state of these countries, but missed an opportunity to visit Nigeria and cement the efforts which Nehru began in 1962 toward engaging Nigeria as the gateway to Africa. This is not surprising as population size of the Indian Diaspora in each African country seems to suggest the yardstick that defined which country the Indian leaders should visit. This seems to still pervade the thinking of policy makers in India today. According to the 2001 Report of the High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (Chapter 8, p.94), the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria put at 25,000 (8,000 PIOs and 17,000 NRIs) out of Nigeria’s estimated population of 125,000,000 is an insignificant percentage of the population. Nigeria was among the countries examined under the broad heading “Other African Countries.” There is no doubt that in terms of population size, the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria is far smaller compared with those in South Africa and East Africa; however, the chapters argues that beyond the issue of number, the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria, that have established a strong presence in the Nigerian economy, given Nigeria’s size in West Africa, have huge potential of serving as desideratum through which the present cooperation between Nigeria

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and India could be further strengthened for mutual benefits of the two countries. Does the Indian government see the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria as an asset? Is India leveraging this asset effectively? It has been documented that the Government of India’s interaction with the Diaspora in the United States in the last decade has led to many positive outcomes. Why can’t this be replicated in Nigeria, in a modified way, to build additional bridges of friendship and cooperation? UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA AND THE INDIAN DIASPORA It is quite difficult to confine the word “Diaspora” to an agreeable definition because of the form and character of the subject. In a world in which identity politics and recourse to ethnicity are regularly invoked, Diaspora as a term is seriously contested. Around the world, many different ethnicities, nationalities, races, and religions claim Diaspora identity for themselves, while scholars who study them often use the term without much analytical precision. What this bears witness to is that defining Diaspora and deciding who gets to be regarded as belonging to a diasporic community is not a little problematic. Accordingly, anyone who seeks to write about the Indian Diaspora is almost certain to get caught in the exercise of definition. On the face value, the phrase “Indian Diaspora” may appear to be a straightforward description. This may not necessarily be so. Methodologically speaking, defining the Indian Diaspora also requires clear understanding of the sociological character of India, including its ethnic and class composition. That notwithstanding, Diaspora may refer broadly to communities of individuals residing and working outside their countries of origins. These individuals often maintain social, financial, and cultural connections to their country of origin, usually mediated through family and friends in their homeland. The ancient Greek derivation of the word (διασπορά—diaspeirein “disperse,” from dia “across” + speirein “scatter”) connotes spreading or scattering of seeds. Historic Diaspora was often forcefully expelled, although the modern Diaspora is formed by those who search for better opportunities and livelihood abroad. Diaspora communities are of different origins. In recent times, the subject has emerged as an area of study generating much interest. The Indian Diaspora consists of NRIs, Indian citizens who live abroad, and PIOs, individuals with no Indian passport but of Indian descent (Dubey, 2007, pp.189–265). While the NRIs are Indian citizens who have emigrated, the PIOs are Indians that have assumed the citizenship

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of their new home country. The PIO in Nigeria can therefore be regarded as Nigerians but of Indian ancestry. The total size of the Indian Diaspora is estimated at between 25 and 30 million people globally (Bhattacharya, 2014, p. 153). In the 1950s, Nehru advocated the integration of the Indian Diaspora into their respective states. One of the reasons for this was China’s positive experience. Chinese ethnic groups abroad made a significant contribution to China’s economic upswing by their investments in their home country. Mrs. Indira Gandhi went with a high-power delegation for an African Safari in 1963–1964. The main task of this safari was to assess China’s influence in Africa, assessing the future of PIO settled in Africa, and enhancing cooperation with African countries. India’s move was to engage the large number of PIO as part of India’s foreign policy (Dubey, 2007, p.193). The role of the Diaspora within Indian foreign policy was to be fundamentally reassessed in the 1990s. The Government of India set up a new department in the mid-1990s to better support various groups of Indian people abroad. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which came into power in 1999 decided to pay more attention to the Diaspora. Action was taken in September 2000, when the government set up a highlevel commission. This commission was tasked by the government to recommend proposals and strategies for enhancing engagements with the Indian Diaspora. Following the completion of the commission assignment, it submitted a report, which was published in January 2002. Among others, the report proposed the possibility of dual citizenship for NRIs and PIOs (Wagner, 2019). Since taking office in 2014, Prime Minister Modi has been intensively involved with the Diaspora during his trips abroad. As part of his first visit to America in September of the same year, he gave a speech aimed at the Indian Diaspora at Madison Square Garden in New York. Modi made similar appearances during his travels to Great Britain and Australia. On an official visit to Uganda in the summer of 2018, Modi also addressed the Indian community (Wagner, 2019). HISTORICIZING THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN NIGERIA Most writers on Nigeria–India relations easily assume that contact between the two countries only started with the advent of British colonial rule in the two territories. However, contact between countries can be divided into direct and indirect contacts. Indirect contact could be traced to a much earlier period when the Mughal rulers of India maintained extensive links with the Muslim empires of the Middle East, North, and West Africa; the latter, in turn, later interacted closely with the peoples of Nigeria and other parts of West Africa through the Trans-Saharan trade (“Indo-Nigeria Relations: An

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Overview,” October 1985). Some historical records suggest that some people from the area that later became the northern part of Nigeria had contact with the Indians even before colonialism in both India and Nigeria (Lodhi, 1992, 84; Patel, 1990, p.367). There are many legends about the origins of the Afro-Indian (known as Sidi/Siddhi/Sidhi or Habshi/Habsi) settlements in India, particularly in the state of Gujarat bordering Pakistan and, in the states of Andhra Pradesh in South-Central India (former Kingdom of Hyderabad), Maharashtra (formerly Bombay State), Kerala and Karnataka in the South, and the former Portuguese territories of Daman, Diu, and Goa. In Gujarat, they are found in the districts of Ahmedabad, Amerili, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Broach/Bharuch near Ratanpur, and the former Kingdom of Cutch/Katchch (Census of India, 1961). Historical records strongly suggest that the Sidis of Jambur originally came from Kano in Nigeria via Sudan and Mecca after their hajj pilgrimage (Lodhi, 1992, 84). Such evidence is provided by early reports by European officials and travelers and one short language study titled Sindh, and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of the Indus by the explorer Richard F. Burton in 1850. Their leader from Kano in Nigeria was a wealthy merchant by the name of Baba Ghor who first settled in the Rajpipla Hills near Broach and Cambay (Khambat) where he developed mining and trade of agate, the precious stone known as Akik in India. A certain variety of agate beads are known as Baba Ghori; another maroon cornelian stone is named after his sister and successor Mai Mariyam. It is also claimed by the Shemali Sidis that one of Baba Ghor’s younger brothers was a nagarsha in the former Kingdom of Madhapur and is worshiped as one of the several pirs in Jambur (Lodhi, 1992, p.84; Patel, 1990, p.367). Members of the Indian Sindhi community were said to be the first to arrive in Nigeria in the early part of the nineteenth century to explore business opportunities (Gopalkrishna, 2008, 15). During this period, British ships sailed from London to Nigeria. They had stopovers at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Accra, Ghana, and finally at Lagos, Nigeria. This community was said to have primarily engaged in trading in the western part of Nigeria, particularly Lagos, but later spread into other parts of the country, and gradually ventured into other fields like manufacturing and professional services. A representative of the J.T. Chanrai Group, named after the brothers Jhamatmal and Thakurdas, the founders of the group, was said to have reached Lagos from Sierra Leone. He opened the first shop in Lagos and later opened outlets in other parts of the country such as Ibadan, Onitsha, and Port Harcourt. K-Chellarams group opened their first shop in 1923. Most of the early Indian settler-traders in Nigeria were said to have marketed textiles and handloom

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products imported from Madras through Liverpool in England. The success recorded by the early entrants encouraged and paved the way for other businessmen, and professionals, such as teachers, doctors, engineers, and others of Indian origin, to do business, render services, and establish their presence in Nigeria. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN PROMOTING INDIAN POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA The Indian policy toward Nigeria cannot be divorced from the Indian policy toward Africa as a whole. Even though New Delhi’s policy toward Africa, today, is seen to be largely driven by demand for energy and markets due to its rapid growth and development, such analyses are at best too simplistic. It is a well-known fact that historical experiences have shaped the contours and continue to shape the development of relations between them. In the fight against colonialism in Africa, India was at the forefront and contributed huge resources, partly because of the presence of a large number of PIOs that had migrated to various African countries, particularly the southern and eastern parts. Indian leaders, especially Mahatma Gandhi and later India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, took up the issue of discrimination against non-whites and gave it political foundations. It is within the context of these political foundations that India worked closely with some African countries such as Nigeria. However, it took the issue of Indian war with China in 1962 to bring the importance of the Indian Diaspora in Africa to occupy a place of importance in Indian foreign policy toward Africa. The Indian Diaspora in Nigeria has had a long presence in the area of trade and investment long before Nigeria’s independence in 1960. Though Indians have traded and partnered with Nigerians for many years, not all business sectors have attracted the same interest. The Indian Diaspora understands which sector of the Nigerian economy to focus more to meet customers’ needs and achieve maximum profits and expansion. Danjuma (2008, p.106) has observed that most Indian investments in the Nigerian economy have been concentrated in the area of commerce, as the majority of Indian companies started off by trading in one or more commodities, before setting up factories for the manufacture of certain products. Among Indian businesses that started off as trading companies are notable ones such as K-Chellarams, Kewalrams, Bhojsons, Dana, and Somotex. Indian investments in Nigeria have branched out into other areas, creating

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employment and adding value to the Nigerian economy. In the manufacturing sector, Indian investments include those pharmaceuticals, iron and steel, food processing, and plastics. Some of the popular brand names in Nigeria are Ranbaxy, Unique, and Dana Group in pharmaceuticals, airlines, and so on; Rail India Technical and Economical Services Ltd. (RITES), and Nigerian Machine Tools Ltd (NMTL) in rail and steel technology; Sterling Bank in the banking sector; and Prestige Assurance Plc in the insurance sector. Though the textile industry in Nigeria is presently not doing well, Indian-owned companies in this sector are among those making significant contributions to the Nigerian economy, popular names include Reliance Textile Nigeria Ltd and Globe Spinning Mills Nigeria. Indians are also visible in the telecommunications sector with Bharti Airtel investing US$600 million in Nigeria. Major ICT companies include Infosys, Satyam, NIIT, and Aptech (Guardian News Nigeria, October 2008). Several Nigerian banks are using ICT software developed by Indian companies. Thus, Indian investments are recognized as making significant contributions to the Nigerian economy, also in the area of employment creation. It has been observed that apart from government institutions, Indian businesses are the largest employers of labor in Nigeria (Danjuma, 2008, p.108). In recent times, the Indians have expressed much interest in the Nigerian oil sector. Thus, along with other Asian oil companies, India’s major oil companies, such as the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd (OMEL), and the Gas Authority of India Ltd (Gail), showed keen interest in the Nigerian oil industry by competing for various oil blocks as from the year 2005. The Obasanjo administration openly supported Asian oil companies including those from India by offering them oil blocks on preferential terms such as the Rights of First Refusal (RFR) and discounted signatures bonuses on a number of oil blocks. The Obasanjo government had argued that the initiative of oil-for-infrastructure deal would bring a “development divided” to Nigeria. In this context, some Indian companies were offered prospective oil blocks in exchange for the construction of a Greenfield refinery 180,000 bpd capacity; feasibility study for a new East–West railway from Lagos to Delta. Indian oil companies such as OMEL, Sterling, and Essar acquired oil licenses between 2005 and 2007, yet the oil-for-infrastructure deal proved to be a failure in Nigeria, partly on account of the review of the sales by the government and policy changes. No doubt, the Indian Diaspora that has long been in Nigeria and understands the business environment has a key role to play in enhancing the participation of Indian investors in the Nigerian oil sector. The role of the Diaspora in this regard will be beneficial not only to India that needs oil to drive its economy but also to Nigeria that depends on oil proceeds as major source of national revenue.

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SOCIOCULTURAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE INDIAN DIASPORA IN NIGERIA AND THE NIGERIAN COMMUNITY Nigeria, like India, has diverse cultures. These include the peoples values, beliefs, learning, languages, communication, religions, cuisine, social habits, music and rich arts. It plays host to citizens of different countries, some of whom are permanent residents. It is very common for new migrants, in the process of settling down or setting up new businesses, to locate their own countrymen and women, who obviously should have better understanding of the political, economic, and sociocultural environment. It is within this context that the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria becomes even more critical for the present phase of engagement between two countries. Equally, there is a growing number of Nigerian Diaspora in India. The exchange of culture is therefore inevitable. It has been argued that a broad range of motivations and expectations can lead to the constitution of Diaspora organizations, initiative networks, and associations. Different reasons to migrate create different types of diasporic linkages with home countries and lead to the formation of different types of Diaspora networks (Barré et al., 2003). In Nigeria, the activities of the Indian Diaspora have been facilitated through a number of associations and organizations such as the Nigeria–India Friendship Association (NIFA), Indian Professionals Forum (IPF), Indian Women’s Association (IWA), the All Indian Cultural Association (AICA), the Nigerian-Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NICCI), and the Uttar Bharat Seva Samaj (UBHAS). Some of the other groups in Nigeria are Indian regional organizations, such as Tamil Sagam, Telegus of Nigeria (TAN), Oriya Samaj, Kerala Samaj, and Bengali Samaj, among others. Some of these associations, whose membership are not strictly Indian, not only have the unique function of uniting the Indians in Nigeria but also posed or served as a forum through which cordial friendship and mutual understanding could be built between Nigerians and Indians. The roles and contributions of the Indian community associations have been examined in this book.

LESSONS FROM INDIA’S ENGAGEMENT OF ITS DIASPORA Nigeria can draw some lessons from India’s engagement of the Diaspora and the huge contributions the Indian Diaspora is, in turn, making to the

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development of India. India’s first strategy in engaging its Diaspora was the introduction of legal and tax incentives to attract financial resources of NRIs and to create a PIO card. The PIO card is a long-term twenty-year visa that allowed PIOs to own property or have access to the educational system in India. In addition, the government created a high-level committee on the Indian Diaspora, charged by the Ministry of External Affairs, to issue a report on the roles NRIs and PIOs can play in India’s development. The committee made far-reaching recommendations, including the granting of a dual citizenship to some PIOs (Dubey, 2007, p.255). Within the last decade, the Indian government has shown significant interest in the Diaspora and established a number of Diaspora policies. India’s increasing interest in its Diaspora can be attributed to three major factors (Dubey, 2007, p. 255). First, India once had a closed economy that did not encourage foreign contributions, businesses, or investment. When the government liberalized the economy in the early 1990s, Diaspora Indians became more useful as agents of trade, investment, and technology. Second, India’s foreign policy began to recognize the value of the Diaspora in the industrialized countries, especially in the United States, United Kingdom, and other countries for public diplomacy. In this regard the Indian Diaspora has also been a useful instrument in furthering India’s engagement with other countries including African states. And third, only from the mid-1990s, ethnic Indians started surfacing as high-level executives of multinational corporations. The general success of the community, especially in the United States and Canada, and the community’s positive influence on the overall idea of Indian qualities led successive Indian governments to take a more proactive approach. Since 2003, the Indian government has been hosting an annual Diaspora conference that is designed to serve as a platform for interaction between overseas Indians, the Indian government, and interested segments of the Indian society, such as businessmen, cultural, and charity organizations. High-level political leaders, including the prime minister, the president, and union ministers, address 1,000–1,500 overseas Indians on topics such as investment and philanthropic activities in India, as well as concerns of the communities the world over. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, established in 2004, coordinates activities aimed at reaching out to the Diaspora. These include the “Know India Program” for Diaspora youth and annual awards for eminent Diaspora personalities. The government also set up a Global Advisory Council to the prime minister in 2009, consisting of Diaspora scholars, scientists, politicians, and businessmen. With the financial resources of the Diaspora in mind, the government amended investment laws and established the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre in 2007 to

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make it easier for Indians abroad to invest. Additionally, the Reserve Bank of India has procedures in place so that NRIs and PIOs can invest in Indian companies. Although there are no reliable statistics, anecdotally, there has been an increase in the number of Indians that have returned in recent years. Returnee Indians can benefit their home countries by contributing enhanced skills, which can be used in the country of origin (human capital); access to business networks abroad (social capital); and financial capital and investment. The Indian information technology (IT) industry is widely regarded as a showcase for this triple-benefit formula. Figures from India’s national software association National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) show that North America, particularly the United States, accounted for two-thirds of India’s IT exports from 2004 to 2007. While the industry’s success is attributable to other factors, the impact of the Diaspora and returnees from the United States particularly is believed to be important for three reasons. First, several studies have shown that Indians who returned from the United States have founded and managed successful IT companies in India. Second, some Indians who founded companies in Silicon Valley have subcontracted work to companies in India. These entrepreneurs often serve as intermediaries between the markets. Third, the success of Indian IT professionals in the United States has created trust in the country’s intellectual abilities abroad. It has been a major factor in branding India as a source of well-educated and hard-working professionals (Dubey, 2007, p. 265). The Indian government’s increasing recognition of its Diaspora, in part, explains several countries’ increased interest in recruiting Indian graduates and professionals. It also explains the willingness of companies in other countries to collaborate with and outsource to Indian companies and experts. In addition, India recognizes the importance of the US Congressional Caucus on India and the Indian-Americans. This body consists of more than a third of all US lawmakers, as well as the US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC). Indian-American advocacy efforts reportedly played a significant role in the signing of the US–India Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation in 2008, in lobbying for the removal of US sanctions in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, as well as other occasions. The role and importance of the Indian Diaspora in Indian policy toward Nigeria cannot be overemphasized as it also depends on the depth of the linkages they have with their country of origin. The role of the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria in promoting India’s policy toward Nigeria can therefore be enhanced

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by deepening their linkages with their country of origin. So far, the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria is seen as insignificant largely on account of their percentage vis-à-vis the Nigerian population which stood at 140,003,542 million people (National Populations Commission, 2006) and has not received sufficient attention from their homeland government; hence, the need for Indian government to pay attention to it. The Indian Diaspora in Nigeria therefore needs to be seen as a strong asset. Even though an estimated number of about 35,000 PIO and NRIs in Nigeria may seem insignificant, they are still a unique force capable of driving the process of Indo-Nigeria relations for mutual benefits of both countries. This is even more critical considering the increasing competition for access to markets and recourses in Nigeria by other emerging powers such as China. Though China’s foray into the Nigerian economy has attracted more attention both within and outside the country, many argue that India has an edge in Nigeria and Africa because of its deep-rooted Diaspora. The fact that the Indian Diaspora is deeply entrenched and spread across various parts of Nigeria, including a significant number in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Onitsha, and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and knows its way around is a big advantage. In view of the historic ties between India and Nigeria and the bridges that have been built by the Diaspora over the years, India ought to have an edge in competing with about China’s plans in the country. According to N.K. Somani, a CEO of the Dangote Group, which is one of Nigeria’s most diversified business conglomerates, argues that even though there have been initiatives on both the sides to forge a strong business relationship, a lot needs to be done in terms of government measures. A lot needs to be done on the promotional and incentives level by the Indian government, as Nigeria has a very high potential for trade and investment with India. (Chandaria, 2010)

The point remains that the big businesses from India that entered Nigeria had in many cases engaged with the Indian Diaspora, including talented professionals of Indian origin. The Diaspora can also help in deepening the relations between the two nations. The advantage can be retained only if they are well-organized. Indian government is sitting on a goldmine in terms of place of Indian Diaspora in its foreign relations. In order to gain its rightful place in the world, India should focus on its Diaspora across the African continent not only in economics but also in terms of culture. Nigeria, given its vast population, resource endowment, and vast market potentials not only in West Africa but Africa as a whole, remains indisputably the economic gateway to Africa.

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SOCIOCULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA The development of Nigeria–India relations can also be examined from the patterns of their cultural and social interactions. The Indian government in 1955 started a scholarship scheme for African students. This, as argued by the Indian government, is her commitment toward strengthening the relations with Nigeria and other African countries. Although, as argued by Ogunsanwo (1974), the scheme initially did not fully justify the hope of its founder and funder because many Nigerian students preferred going to Europe, United States, Canada, and Russia to study. Some questioned the standard of education in India compared to Europe and the United States. Apart from the preference for Europe and the United States, there was also the issue of distance. Nigerians at that time found it easier to travel to Europe and United States than going to the Indian subcontinent. But today, the story has changed; by 2008, there were approximately 5,000 Nigerians or more studying in India (Agbu, 2008). This development came up because in spite of the perception of India as a developing country, it has achieved technological and scientific breakthrough. Most of the students today are even self-sponsored as Indian scholarships are available only to a few. Nevertheless, under the Special Commonwealth African Assisted Plan (SCAAP), India provided eight to ten scholarships to Nigerians for various training programs. More so, since 1984, under an Indo-Nigerian cultural exchange program sponsored by the Indian government, five Nigerian students visit India for undergraduate and postgraduate research. Again, two junior and senior research fellowships are granted annually since 1984 to Nigerians by the Indian government. These facilities for training have been extended to telecommunications, where technical training has been provided to about 150 Nigerian telecommunications personnel from Telecommunications India Ltd (TCIL) (Badejo, 1989). Confirming this, India’s external affairs minister Shri Jaswant Singh stressed that several Nigerians have been trained in specialized institutions in India under the Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program (The Guardian, April 3, 2000, p.2). The implication of this is that India has created avenues for Nigeria to benefit from her technical know-how through the ITEC program (Beri, 2003). The Indians in Nigeria argue that they have been rendering technical assistance to Nigeria’s development in the fields of education, agriculture, health, construction, paper, cement, engineering, telecommunications, small- and medium-scale industries, and more importantly in the development of railways and steel industry where India has earned praise by the Nigerian government (Indian Bulletin Lagos, June 30, 1998). Equally, there is a significant number of Nigerians living

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in India. The exchange of culture is therefore inevitable. In the 1970s and 1980s, to a lesser extent in present day, the Indian community in Nigeria formed the corps of science teachers in secondary and tertiary institutions especially in the northern Nigeria. The Indians are also found in the medical field. Although the Indian educational credentials had been questioned and the standard of their universities criticized, yet India has recorded technological and industrial achievements (Ndayako, 1980). Another landmark in the relations between Nigeria and India is the establishment of the NIFA formed and inaugurated on November 11, 1978, at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos (Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 1981). The premise, which led to the formation of the association, was the consideration that the position of the countries of the South vis-à-vis that of the industrialized nations of the North with regard to trade and science and technology leaves much to be desired. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was concerned with how to achieve a New International Economic Order (NIEO), by encouraging educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation between countries of the South. Developing countries wanted the prevailing order where less than 18 percent of the world’s population controlled more than 60 percent of the world’s income to change. Efforts directed at achieving a more rational and equitable economic order would not achieve much unless there is cooperation among countries of the South in such areas of trade and science and technology. Accordingly, the association NIFA was formed with a view to promote cooperation and mutual benefits between Nigeria and India in the areas of culture, sports, science and technology, exchange of information and tourism; to boost the understanding of each other’s culture; to strengthen understanding and goodwill between the people of Nigeria and India; and to strengthen the industrial and technological ties among the two countries. The NIFA also stressed that the cooperation between Nigeria and India would be more stable as the disparities in resources, development, and standard of living were not much. They argued further that the transfer of technology and its consequent absorption would be easy because these countries have technology that takes cognizance of their shared values of “inefficiency.” The association, further observed, that it was only when developing countries reduce their dependence on the superpowers that they could meaningfully talk about an NIEO. Several other organizations and institutions were formed in Nigeria and India by the Indian and Nigerian communities with a view to promoting the sociocultural relations between the two countries. These include IPF, IWA, the AICA, the NICCI, the UBHAS, and the All-Indian Nigerian Students and Community Association (AINSCA). Some of the other groups in Nigeria are Indian regional organizations, such as Tamil Sagam, TAN, Oriya Samaj, Kerala Samaj, and Bengali Samaj, among others. These associations, whose

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memberships are either Indian, Nigerian, and Nigerian-Indian, not only have the unique function of uniting the Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India but also served as a forum through which cordial friendship and mutual understanding could be built between Nigerians and the Indians. An evaluation of some of these associations would further shed light on their objectives, missions, and roles in Nigeria and India. The Indian Cultural Association The ICA was established many years ago and is thus the pioneer Indian association in Nigeria. The association exists in almost all the Nigerian cities with significant Indian population such as Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, Benin City, and Abuja. Lagos has the largest number of Indians; hence the location of its headquarters in Illupeju in Lagos (Gopalkrishna, 2008). The association organizes programs and showcases the Indian culture and also engages in “charitable projects in the host country and thereby further strengthening the ties between the two countries.” All the major festivals from all the regions of India are celebrated or marked by the association. Among the charitable causes of the association in Nigeria are the donation of boreholes to the Lagos University Teaching Hospital Medical School, fixing of artificial limbs for the needy people free of charge; donations of food items for the destitute centers; and initiatives such as “Vision for All” under which surgeons from New Delhi were invited to conduct 1,500 eye surgeries free of charge for the needy. The Nigerian-Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry The NICCI was incorporated in 1994. The NICCI serves as a bilateral chamber of commerce and industry and a permanent forum to promote synergy between the private sectors of the two countries and to facilitate and promote trade and investment between the federal government of Nigeria and the Government of India. It also provides a platform for Indian business stakeholders in Nigeria to discuss and identify common issues and opportunities regarding their economic and commercial interests. It undertakes advocacy on policies and procedures affecting NICCI members’ operation in specific sectors. While the Indian high commissioner to Nigeria is the chief patron of the NICCI, its operation is managed by a board of directors, which includes eminent Nigerians, Nigerian and Indian businessmen, and business executives. The board functions through several sectoral committees and each of these committees is chaired by a member of the board. This helps to ensure that the board works more effectively. In the two decades of NICCI existence, it has played a proactive role in building synergy and promoting trade and investment relations between Nigeria and India.

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Indian Professionals Forum The IPF was established in 1994 in Lagos as a non-profit association of Indian professionals working and operating in Nigeria. The Indian high commissioner serves as the grand patron and equally supports the activities of the association. The association has about sixteen other patrons, made up of chief managing directors of large Indian companies in Nigeria and an eighteenmember executive committee that oversees the affairs of the association. The IPF as at 2014 had 55 Category A Corporate Members, 35 Category B Corporate Members, and 110 individual members. The IPF is engaged in various activities aimed at meeting the welfare needs of the Indian professionals in Nigeria and to facilitate their interaction with various Nigerian stakeholders. It organizes receptions-cum-lectures by various Nigerian professionals and officials such as the ministers of trade and industry, finance, economic planning, director generals of Nigerian parastatals such as NAFDAC, NOTAP, and many others. This is done with a view to bridging the gap between the professionals and Nigerian government. The association also facilitates engagements of visiting Indian professionals. The Indian Language School The Indian Language School (ILS) that was established in April 1982 has since its establishment functioned as a private school run by a board of trustees, under the umbrella of the Indian High Commission (Gopalkrishna, 2008). The school was established essentially to cater for the Indian community, so that Indian children living in Lagos would not lose touch with their culture. The school exposes the Indians to the national and regional languages and the educational system in India. For instance, it runs a coeducational program, with classes from LKG to grade XII. The school had an enrolment of about 1,600 students in 2008 (Gopalkrishna, 2008). By 2014, the number of students enrolled in the school had risen to 3,000 (Sachdev, 2014). The language school is strongly affiliated to the central board of secondary education in New Delhi. The Uttar Bharat Seva Samaj The UBHAS was established on August 29, 1999, as an association to promote Indian culture with a socially committed disposition. The association was basically created to represent the North Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar. According to Sri Ravitosh Shukla and Sri Somesh Rastogi, who are the leading founders of the association, UBHAS was founded to bring together the North Indians of these states and to interact with them through their unique culture and

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languages. Accordingly, the association promotes the use of Hindi language as much as possible, promotes welfare programs in the Nigerian society, and helps members in emergency situations (Gopalkrishna, 2008). Primarily, it recognizes Indians that have excelled and made contributions by conferring awards. This association pioneered the “Indian of the Year Award,” which is conferred to Indians that have made significant contributions to Nigeria, in terms of social services (Gopalkrishna, 2008). The All-India Nigerian Students and Community Association (AINSCA) The AINSCA which was incorporated on November 11, 2013, is an organisztion that has under its umbrella both Nigerian students and workers living in India. The organization is classified as Indian Non-Governmental Company and is registered at Registrar of Companies in New Delhi (Choudbury, 2013). It also serves as a nonofficial body supporting the work of the Nigerian High Commission in India. The aim of the organization is to help Nigerian community members resident in India. It also acts as a liaison between the Nigerian community and the Indian authorities. The organization has helped the Delhi police to identify and investigate dishonest Nigerian elements in the community. By doing so, it seeks to reduce the harassment of innocent Nigerians resident in India. The Indian associations in Nigeria have also been organizing symposia, seminars, and social gatherings where Indian cultural heritage is displayed (Choudbury, 2013). The existence and activities of these associations perhaps demonstrate the significant role that culture plays in the relations of the two countries. For instance, on December 4, 1998, the IWA and IPF had organized a “Talk on Fulani-Hausa Tradition,” where Alhaji Suleiman Baffa and others presented papers. Similarly, the AICA on November 15, 1998, displayed Indian cultures where the Indian cultural troupe displayed Indian classical dancing and singing. To mark the Indian Independence Day, the Telugu Association of Nigeria (TAN) and ICA organized a cultural event titled “Dance Nigeria Dance” on Saturday August 15, 2015, at Bellus Court Ilupeju. The Indian culture to some extent has filtered into the Nigerian society through the Indian films (Bollywood). The Bollywood which is a fundamental part of the Indian diasporic experience is characterized by a style of acting, spiced with songs and dance. Gopalkrishna (2008) has observed that the Bollywood has altered the style of the Hausa fashion, their songs, and the writing of novelists in the northern Nigeria, where the film culture is popular. She also notes that there is a dialectic similarity and dissimilarity between the Hausa culture and the Indian culture. For instance, the Bandiri music in northern Nigeria and the Sufi Music in India have the same tones. Stickers of Indian films and stars are sometimes used to decorate cars and

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commercial buses in northern Nigeria. In fact, it is because of this cultural dialogue and understanding that an executive member of NIFA, Chief G.L. Kesawani, once observed that “the Indians have a lot to learn in Nigeria, just as they also have something to offer Nigerians . . . the best asset of this country (Nigeria) is not the oil boom, but the friendly attitude of the people towards strangers” (Nigerian Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, 1981). It is evident that the associations are established to increase the understanding between Nigerians and Indians. CHALLENGES OF NIGERIA AND INDIA PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS Despite the attempts to promote sociocultural ties between the two countries, there have been tensions at the level of people-to-people relations. Nigerians in India do not receive the same treatment given to Indians in Nigeria. Nigerians in India constitute one of the largest African communities in India. According to the Indian High Commission in Nigeria, as at January 2013, there were about 20,000 Nigerians living and working in India. The Indian High Commission in Nigeria estimates that there are more than 2,500 Nigerians living in New Delhi, about 3,000 living in Bengaluru, and about 4,000 in other parts of the country. On the other hand, the Nigerian High Commission in India notes that there are only about 5,000 registered Nigerians living and working in cities such as New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Bengaluru, and Jaipur (Vanguard, January 11, 2012). Others are found in areas such as Munirka, Mukherjee Nagar, Uttam Nagar, and areas such as Malviya Naga, Hauz Tani, Arjun Naga, Dwarka, and Kingsway Camps (Mukherjee, 2010). While the Nigerian society with some government encouragement has offered Indians opportunities for profitable technical and business ventures in so many areas such as ICT, pharmaceuticals, airlines, hydrocarbons, textiles, plastics production, electronics, automobiles, and many others; however, Nigeria on the other hand has no real investment in India. Most Nigerians, who migrate to India on their own, find it very difficult to establish business ventures because of the stringent Indian laws or even to get jobs. The main challenge faced by Nigerians resident in India is the perception of Nigerian community by their Indian host. Nigerians in India generally have a negative public image arising from the activities of some criminal elements that have at one time or the other been involved in illegal activities. These include drug trafficking, Internet scam, cybercrime, advance fee fraud, credit card fraud, job and lottery scams, phishing, and forgery of travel documents, including international passports and visas, trafficking of stolen

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documents; marriage of convenience to enable them secure their stay in India; and forgery of academic certificates for admissions and jobs. Records indicate that there are over 500 Nigerians serving various jail terms across India (Vanguard, January 11, 2012). These issues have posed serious consular problems in the relations between the two countries (High Commission of Nigeria- New Delhi, 2008). The negative perception of Nigerians often results in the maltreatment of some Nigerians in India. The killing of a Nigerian national Obodo Uzoma Simeon in Panaji, Goa’s state capital, on October 31, 2013, on accusation of being a member of a drug gang, led to protests and a breakdown of law and order. Even before the killing of the Nigerian youth, there had been reports of frequent illegal arrests, detention, and maltreatment of Nigerians in India. Such xenophobia against Nigerians was fueled by incitements and encouragements from politicians. The Goa arts and culture minister Dayanand Mandrekar described Nigerians in India as a “cancer” and their presence in India as detrimental to tourism, and the Goa chief minister Manohar Parrikar ordered the police in the region to find and expel any Nigerians living illegally in the state. Findings by the Indian authorities later revealed that Obodo Uzoma was innocent. Even though both ministers later apologized for their comments, the damage to Nigeria’s image in the country remains a critical issue. Some advertisement signs and billboards in the country clearly display in bold—“Say no to Nigerians, Say no to Drugs” (Aljazeera, November 13, 2013)—and some Indians have resolved not to give out houses for rent to Nigerians. The Nigerian High Commission in India has argued that Nigerians in India are being discriminated (Aljazeera, November 13, 2013). Even though some Nigerians are living in India illegally and some involved in illegal activities, there are laws in place which are not been implemented and diplomatic platforms exist between Nigeria and India to deal with that, which are not been utilized by the Indian authorities. Rather than reporting such matters to the Nigerian High Commission in India, the Nigerian community are constantly threatened with deportation. They are constantly subjected to extortion and harassment by the Indian immigration and law enforcement authorities. Nigerians who overstay their visa pay huge penalty ranging from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 50,000 and those who cannot afford such penalties languish in Indian jails and detention camps. Those who want to regularize their stay in India are refused by the Foreign Regional Registration Office (FRRO), thereby exposing them to frequent arrests and undue harassment. Following the killing of the Nigerian youth, the Nigerian High Commission in New Delhi threatened to reciprocate if the ill-treatment of Nigerians were not stopped. The commission also argues that there are fewer Nigerians in India compared to Indians resident in Nigeria (Aljazeera, November 13, 2013).

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The issue of racism and Afro-phobia in India is not only directed at Nigerians. Other African nationals, including students, are targeted for racist attacks by some Indians. The murder of Masunda Kitada Oliver, a Congolese student in India on May 20, 2016, was widely condemned by the Association of African Students of India (Govindarajan, 2016). The victim was beaten to death after a verbal altercation over the hiring of an auto-rickshaw near Kishangarh village in Vasant Kunj area in South Delhi. A similar attack in September 2015 on three African students at the Rajiv Chowk metro station in New Delhi brought to light India’s racist undertones. This came to limelight when the video later went viral on the social media. The attack was triggered off when the African students asked copassengers why they were clicking pictures of them. Even when the matter was taken to the police, some racist remarks were made by Indians and a fight broke out. The three students were beaten up by a mob shouting “Bharat Mata Ki Jai” (Glory to mother India) and “Vande Mataram” (National Song of India) (Raj, 2016). The death of Oliver led to a boycott of the May 2016 Africa Day Celebrations by the African Group Heads of Mission, which was organized by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations in New Delhi. The African diplomats in New Delhi justified the boycott citing the pervading climate of fear and insecurity in New Delhi. They also demanded that unless security of African students in India is guaranteed by the Indian government, they would consider recommending to their governments not to send new students to India. In addition, a strong letter demanding improved safety measures was sent to the Indian government by envoys. The Indian authorities reacted to the situation by arresting five Indians who were involved in the murder of Oliver. The External Affairs Minister of India Sushma Swaraj also promised a speedy trial and harsh punishment to the perpetrators of the crime, and a sensitization program to be launched to address larger concerns regarding violent outbreaks (The Wire, May 25, 2016). The reports of maltreatment of Nigerians and other Africans in India must be seriously addressed in order not to affect negatively the relations between the two countries, especially in the economic sphere. A MODEL OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES AS THE CORNERSTONE OF INDO-NIGERIA RELATIONS: NIGERIA AS INDIAN KISHINCHAND CHELLARAM’S NEW HOME AND PEDHI The Chellaram family that set foot in Nigeria since the early 1920s and grew from refugees to successful entrepreneurs in Nigeria represent a model

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of people-to-people relations between Nigeria and India. Kishinchand Chellaram, who was born to Gianchand Chellaram, a family of Sindhi textile merchant of Madras, attended primary school in Hyderabad. He was also trained to join the family business and became involved at the early age of fifteen. The significance of basic education and entrepreneurial training before joining the family business was captured in the biography of Kishinchand Chellaram: Like most Sindhi bhaiband families, Chellaram started to prepare his four sons to eventually work with him in the business . . . The boys were sent to the Vidyalaya School in Hyderabad, but none progressed further than the modernday equivalent of primary four . . . In 1895, Kishinchand, then 15, was taken to Madras by his father to work in the chain of stores. His English was poor, but he had the opportunity to converse with his father’s British customers. As was the custom of the day, Kishinchand was put to work in every area of the business, including sourcing, retail and wholesale and making deliveries . . . Over the next couple of years, Kishinchand was given the more significant tasks of liaising with suppliers, negotiating prices and purchasing for his father’s shops. (Cited in Falzon, 2004, pp.221-222)

By 1915, Chellaram established his own business known as K. Chellaram and Sons in Madras. Daswani (1998, p. 51) who described Kishinchand Chellaram as a Sindhi pathfinder also described his business practice as an entire global network of close to 100 main branches, warehouses, offices and tiny outlets under the Kishinchand Chellaram umbrella was being guided by one quiet and withdrawn man who treasured the simplicity and sameness of his life in a pedhi (business office) in Hyderabad.

The business outfit, which sold mainly silk textiles and other wares, later expanded westward and established an office in Lagos in 1923 (Forbes Africa, 2012). Kishinchand Chellaram was among the Sindhis that first ventured into Nigeria’s growing economy and began by trading in silk clothing, textiles, brassware, silver figurines, and even French perfumes (Daswani, 1998). Following the formation of East and West Pakistan as a Muslim state, in the late 1940s, the Chellarams, who are Hindu, were forced to leave their home and set up shop permanently in Lagos, Nigeria. Since then, the name Chellaram became popular in Nigeria for retail business. As noted by Markovits (2004, p.210) “total imports of cotton piece goods and artificial silk goods into Nigeria in 1933 reached 100 million yards, and the 700,000 yards imported by Chellaram represented almost 1 per cent of the market.” He further argued that the Sindhi firms also controlled the bulk of textile

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imports from India, which were the main beneficiaries of the anti-Japanese quotas. The strong position that Chellaram and other Sindi merchants occupied on the Nigerian textile market was due to their good knowledge of the specific needs of the market for goods that were manufactured specially in Japan and to their good connections with Japanese mills (Markovits, 2004). They smartly took advantage of opportunities created by shifts in demand and prices within the Nigerian market. It was clear to the Sindi merchants such as Chellaram at that time that Nigeria was the largest market not only in West Africa but in Africa as a whole (Markovits, 2004). The enterprise operated seventeen department stores across the country selling groceries, cosmetics, textiles, luxury items, and electronics from the early 1950s up until 1992. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Nigerian economy was under a regime of structural adjustment program and military rule. The economic and political conditions therefore affected business operations. It was therefore not surprising that the Chellarams PLC was affected, but survived, thus emerging as one of the largest conglomerates in Nigeria in the twenty-first century (Forbes Africa, 2012). Aditya (cited in Forbes Africa, 2012, p.1) underscored the challenges faced by Indian businesses in the 1980s and 1990s as follows: A difficult period was the early to mid-’90s with the major devaluation and the ’94 election saga. International credit lines were given to Nigerian banks and they were crawling on repaying these loans. They began to aggressively try and cease advantage and take over our house. Real estate really saved us then and we have had to sell some iconic real estate that we owned, including warehouses, retail stores and an office tower. Remarkably, the family was not derailed by the oil boom of the ’60s when many companies were rushing to get a piece of Nigeria’s black gold. We are not running after a rainbow. It is a high investment business and we were small boys. It’s a game that is not for Indians or foreigners but a game for the indigenes. Our aim is to supply products that benefit these businesses which, Chellarams believes, is a better business model anyway.

The Chellarams business portfolio focused on fast-moving consumer goods, chemicals distribution, a bicycle manufacturing division, a food packaging unit contracted to Nestlé Nigeria, an industrial goods sales and service subsidiary, a textiles manufacturing unit, a plastic film manufacturing unit, quick service restaurants, a travel agency and a retail operations business. (Forbes Africa, 2012, p.1)

Being a family business, entrepreneurial knowledge and business skills have been transferred to younger generations of the Kishinchand family that currently manage the diverse companies under the name Chellarams PLC.

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To illustrate, Kishinchand’s great-grandson, Suresh, his wife Kavita and his two children, Aditya and Amisha, now manage the business. Even though the company was listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1978, the family still held seventy-five of the business, while shareholders own 20 percent and the remaining 5 percent is in the name of a Nigerian charity. In the view of Kishinchand great-grandson, Aditya, “My great-grandfather was the first Indian member in Nigeria’s prestigious Ikoyi Club and the first Indian to live in Ikoyi” (Forbes Africa, 2012, p.1). Chellaram’s Amisha partnered with South African retail giant Woolworths to open shop in Nigeria. Woolworths, which operated as a franchise in 2002, was quite successful until its operations was halted in 2005 following the official ban on importation of garments and footwear by the Nigerian government. However, the business was reactivated in November 2011 as a joint venture business. The Chellaram’s family business has also entered into a joint venture with RJCorp of India and Yum! Restaurants International as the sole operator of the KFC brand in Nigeria. Today, fifteen stores operate in Nigeria, with plans to open another fifteen stores this year. Chellarams has also partnered with international businesses such as American Express travel services, Oldenburger, and Real (dairy products), as well as chemical companies like Shell and Bayer, and other international consumer durables and electronics companies (Forbes Africa, 2012). Chellaram’s biggest trading line is chemicals for the foam mattress industry. According to Aditya (cited in Forbes Africa, 2012, p.1) Nigerians are very savvy and well-travelled, so they are exposed to international brands. They are looking for brands and these brands are looking for Nigeria now. With the recession in Europe and America, everyone is looking to Nigeria now and Chellarams is positioning itself to be a partner for these guys—not just an investment partner but a strategic partner that can provide services and that has the local knowledge. We will keep finding ways to leverage these partnerships to grow our other businesses.

The Chellarams family is a model of success in people-to-people relations which has had major impact on business-to-business relations between Nigeria and India. Despite the challenges of the business environment, the family business has survived the tough business climate in Nigeria by leveraging on people-to-people relations in Nigeria and continuing Kishinchand’s Nigerian dream in the twenty-first century. Kishinchand Chellaram family sum up their relationship with the Nigerian people as thus: “We are Sindhi refugees but Nigeria has been a warm welcome.”

Chapter 9

Medical Tourism and Indian Investments in the Nigerian Health Sector

“Medical tourism” is a phrase that is commonly used to describe the phenomenon of foreign patients seeking health care in another country at betterequipped hospitals and at medical fees comparatively cheaper than in their home countries. In other words, medical tourism refers to “visit by overseas patients for medical treatment and relaxation” (Shanmugam, 2013, p.1). The phrase “medical tourism” is an amalgamation of two distinct services—health care and tourism. The reality, however, is that it is difficult to associate the word “tourism” with chemotherapy, heart surgery, kidney transplant, and other related treatment of chronic diseases. The World Tourism Organization (1999) defines tourists as people who “travel to and stay in places outside their usual environment for more than twenty-four (24) hours and not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited”. From the previous discussion, it can be deduced that tourism involves particular activities selected by choice and undertaken outside the home. Accordingly, medical tourism has emerged as a form of travel activity undertaken for medical purposes and rest. Compared to other forms of tourisms, namely leisure tourism, winter tourism, summer tourism, and mass tourism, medical tourism, which is a form of adjectival tourism, is a recent phenomenon. “Adjectival tourism” refers to the numerous specialty travel forms of tourism that have emerged over the years, each with its own adjective. Many of these terms have come into common use by the tourism industry and academics. Apart from medical tourism, other examples of the more commonly emerging adjectival tourism markets include agritourism, culinary tourism, cultural tourism, ecotourism, geotourism, extreme tourism, heritage tourism, medical tourism, nautical tourism, 179

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pop-culture tourism, religious tourism, slum tourism, war tourism, sex tourism, and wildlife tourism (Gbadebo & Adedeji, 2013, p.13). Apart from these, other emerging forms of tourisms include sustainable tourism and space tourism, among others. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into these mentioned aspects of tourism in detail. That notwithstanding, it is pertinent to note that the medical tourism sector continues to grow at an increasingly fast rate and has emerged as a major force for the growth of export services not only in India but worldwide. Apart from India, countries like the United Kingdom, Middle East, Japan, United States, Canada, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dubai, Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and several others have emerged as active players in the medical tourism business. India has emerged as a major player in global medical tourism and has become the destination of choice for afflicted Nigerians who can afford to, or are compelled by, the fate of ill-health, to seek medical attention in that country. According to the Indian High Commission in Nigeria, 47 percent of Nigerians that visited India in the year 2012 did so to seek medical attention, while the remaining 53 percent did so for business, training, tourism, and as students (Daily Independent Newspaper, June 6, 2014, p.3). The 47 percent of Nigerians that visited India for medical purposes amounted to 18,000 persons out of a total of 38,000 visas issued to Nigerians visiting India in 2012. The Nigerian medical tourists to India expended ₦41.6 billion (US$260 million) in foreign exchange in the process (Daily Independent Newspaper, June 6, 2014, p.3). The trend resulted from the inequality in access to health care and dearth of specialized medical facilities, which have remained a critical challenge to Nigeria’s health-care provision. The chapter focuses on the growing phenomenon of medical tourism in Nigeria–India relations. It also discusses the evolving relationship between Nigeria and India in the medical sector and the growing presence of Indian investments in the Nigerian medical sector. It is evident that the attraction of Nigerians to Indian hospitals hinges on the desire to seek quality and cost-effective health-care services. According to Modi (2011, p.125), India is emerging as a global health-care provider because of its ability to offer world-class expertise at developing world costs. In addition to the public health-care facilities maintained by the Indian government and long-standing, well-equipped private health-care centers, recently, there has been a proliferation of new private health-care facilities in India. Government support and increased investment in medical infrastructure facilities are some of the factors that have contributed to the growth of the industry in India. Other underlying issues that define the growth of medical tourism in India are air connections and access to visa facilities.

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THE CONCEPT OF MEDICAL TOURISM Many scholars working on the subject have attempted to define medical tourism. Generally speaking, the phrase “medical tourism” is the act of traveling to other countries to obtain medical, dental, and surgical care. According to Goodrich and Goodrich (1987), medical tourism is the attempt to attract tourists by deliberately promoting its health-care services and facilities, in addition to its regular tourist amenities. Laws (1996) defined medical tourism as a travel from home to other destination to improve one’s health condition as one type of leisure. This includes getting indigenous and alternative medical services, and any other form of tourism undertaken with the purpose of addressing a health concern. Connell (2006) describes medical tourism as a popular mass culture where people travel to overseas countries to obtain health-care services and facilities such as medical, dental, and surgical care while having the opportunity to visit the tourist spots of that country. Carrera and Bridges (2006) have defined medical tourism as travel which is systematically planned to maintain one’s physical and mental health condition. According to the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), medical tourism is the second mode of trade in health services. In this mode, customers (patients) leave their home country to obtain health-care services with high-quality and affordable prices. Blouin et al. (2006) and Monica (2007) argue that medical tourism occurs when international patients travel across boundaries for their health-care and medical needs. It can be understood as a provision of cost-effective private medical care in collaboration with the tourism industry for patients needing surgical and other forms of specialized treatment. Bookman and Bookman (2007) have defined medical tourism as travel with the aim of improving one’s health, and also an economic activity that entails trade in services and represents two sectors: medicine and tourism. Dawn and Pal (2011) introduced an interesting dimension to the discourse on medical tourism. According to these authors, medical tourism is looking for available quality combined with cost-effective and low-price health services while offering a similar level of safety to the patient. In the past, the majority of medical tourists visited the industrialized countries of the world especially Europe, the United Kingdom, Middle East, Japan, the United States, and Canada, where the cost of medical treatment has become very expensive and there are often long waiting times for treatments. Over the years, an increasing number of medical tourists, including government officials, elites, and citizens, who can afford the cost of travel, treatment, and accommodation, have been traveling to emerging economies to receive medical care. Medical tourists from the less-developed countries, such as Nigeria, travel to other

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countries to receive medical care, for reasons other than just cost. In most cases, the quality of medical care is poor or lacking due to the collapse of medical sector in their countries. For most ordinary citizens, tourism is hardly the attraction, but their main aim is usually to seek medical attention in well-equipped hospitals in foreign countries (Olukotun, 2013, p.1). Other than India, emerging countries that are currently promoting medical tourism are Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Bolivia, Brazil, Belgium, Cuba, Costa Rica, Hungary, Israel, South Africa, and Jordan. Also, in context, private sector development in emerging economies, such as India, Thailand, Singapore, and certain Latin American nations, attracts foreign patients for relatively cheaper care: the uninsured, the underinsured, or those who prefer not to wait for treatment under a national health insurance system. The dynamics of globalization has had its impact on the medical tourism industry. This construct of globalization in relation to medical tourism highlights the importance of the reduction of fees that time and space impose, and should warrant particular attention to the extensive role of the Internet. Over 1 billion individuals have access to the Internet, and this number is growing daily. The Internet is a truly global forum for information dissemination, advertisement, as well as a medical information transport device which has virtually no boundaries. Patients and doctors are able to converse and share information instantaneously; the Internet provides a practically free avenue to deliver medical history, X-rays, and other complex tests via email, in addition to videoconferencing and free online chatting. The patients’ primary care doctor at home can converse with their surgeons abroad at little more cost than the doctors’ time. MEDICAL TOURISM AND NIGERIA– INDIA COOPERATION The reasons for the increase of Nigerians going for medical tourism in India are many. First, years of systemic decay by a lack of political commitment, corruption, and mismanagement of the national economy have also affected the health sector. The political leaders lack confidence in health-care facilities established by them and prefer to go abroad for treatment. Aside from the lack of confidence in the health sector, the then president of NMA Dr. Osahon Enabulele argued that the major reason for the medical pilgrimage includes persistent negligence and underdevelopment of the health sector, especially under the military era; poor funding and out-of-pocket financing of the sector; and declining quality of medical personnel occasioned by dwindling standards of education. Second, with the Nigerians’ preference for anything foreign, it is not surprising that over 5,000 citizens fly out on a monthly basis,

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seeking medical treatment in India and other countries. According to the Nigeria Medical Association (NMA), while Nigeria loses over US$500 million annually, India gains about US$260 million of the resultant cash flight. Buoyed by the boom of its medical tourism due ostensibly to Nigerians’ patronage, India’s projection for the year 2014 was to realize a huge sum of between US$1 billion and US$2 billion from a medical tourism market worth over US$20 billion (Shanmugam, 2013). At all levels of government, local, state, and federal, there are many contributing factors. These factors make subjecting patients to treatment in any Nigerian hospital a difficult choice to make. The late activist Gani Fawehinmi was diagnosed with malaria in Nigeria and was treated for the same several times, only to discover that it was cancer, when he traveled for treatment abroad (The Punch, June 26, 2014). Unfortunately, the right diagnosis was made too late to save him. The same fates that befall several Nigerians go unreported in the country. The irony is that most of those Nigerians who can afford to spend between US$20,000 and US$50,000 on an average trip abroad for medical treatment may end up being treated by fellow Nigerians, who back home would not have been as efficient and prominent as they have become in a foreign land. The main reasons for the growing popularity of medical tourism in India include the long waiting lists in the developed countries and low cost of medical treatments in India as compared to other developed countries. Table 9.1 provides cost comparison between India, the United States, Thailand, and Singapore in US dollars. From table 9.1, there is no doubt that India provides relatively cheaper fees compared to the United States, Thailand, and Singapore. Apart from cheaper cost, the attraction to India has been facilitated by increased use of the Internet to communicate with prospective hospitals and increase in air travels. With the development of information and communications technologies Table 9.1  Cost Comparison between India, the United States, Thailand, and Singapore (Approximate Figures in USD) Procedure Heart Bypass Heart Valve Replacement Angioplasty Hip Replacement Hysterectomy Knee Replacement Spinal Fusion

United States

India

Thailand

Singapore

130,000 160,000

10,000 9,000

11,000 10,000

18,500 12,500

57,000 43,000 20,000 40,000 62,000

11,000 9,000 2,000 8,500 5,500

13,000 12,000 4,000 10,000 7,000

13,000 12,000 6,000 13,000 9,000

Note: International Figures Based on Hospital Quotes in Named Countries. Source: http:​/​/www​​.docs​​toc​.c​​om​/do​​cs​/12​​16363​​1​/MED​​ICAL-​​​TOURI​​SM​/P/​​36

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(ICT), new tourism companies have emerged that act as middlemen between international patients and hospital networks, giving patients easy access to information, prices, and options. Other reasons for the increased popularity of medical tourism in India are the state-of-art technology, specialist doctors, nurses, and paramedical staffs that have been adopted by the big hospitals and diagnostics centers in India. In India, the medical education system also caters to the ever-increasing demand for the delivery of the quality healthcare services all over the country (Suthin, Assenov & Tirasatayapitak, 2007). With the growth of medical tourism in India, the tourism industry in the country as a whole which has witnessed significant growth since the 1990s has also emerged as a major income earner for India. Foreign tourist arrivals to India increased from 1.68 million people in 1991 to 6.29 million people in 2011. India’s earning from tourism also increased from US$1.9 million to US$16.6 million within the same period, with India also ranking as the seventeenth highest earner in the world in tourism in 2010. According to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the industry’s earning potential of medical tourism sector was estimated at Rs. 5,000–10,000 crores by 2012 (CII-Mckinsey, 2002, p.2). The major service providers in Indian medical tourism include the Apollo Hospitals, Escorts Hospital, Fortis Hospitals, Breach Candy, Hinduja, Mumbai’s Asian Heart Institute, Aravind Eye Hospitals, Manipal Hospitals, Mallya Hospital, Shankara Nethralaya, and AIIMs, a public sector hospital. In terms of locations, New Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore, and Mumbai cater to the maximum number of health tourists and are fast emerging as medical tourism hubs. It also visualizes high-end healthcare services through Indian BPO firms like Hinduja TMT, Apollo Heart Street, Comat Technologies, Datamatics, and Lapiz that work in the areas of claim adjudication, billing and coding, transcriptions, and form processing. One-stop centers in key international markets to facilitate patient flow and streamlining immigration for health care are envisaged. The CII, along with Indian Health Care Federation (IHCF), wants to establish an Indian healthcare brand synonymous with safety, trust, and excellence. Therefore, it is clear that the opportunities and challenges for growth in the health sector are seen primarily within the private/corporate sector, not in the public sector. Nowadays medical tourism in India includes advanced and life-saving healthcare services like open transplants, cardiovascular surgery, eye treatment, knee/hip different cosmetic surgeries, and alternate systems of medicine. Also, leisure aspect medical traveling/wellness tourism may be included on such medical travel trips. India provides a variety of medical services to overseas patients. The reality, however, is that “medical tourisms” are hardly tourisms in the true sense. For instance, there is nothing tourism about chemotherapy, heart surgery, kidney transplant, and other related treatment of chronic diseases. Medical tourism in India is not without challenges.

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THE CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL TOURISM IN INDIA There are several challenges involved in medical tourism in India. Like many developing countries, though better off than many, some parts of India suffer from lack of adequate infrastructural facilities including poor power supply, poor water supply, lack of connectivity, and lack of coordinating system (Dawn & Pal, 2011, p.193). Major challenges that impact on medical tourism sector in India include poor accessibility, lack of, or insufficient capital, lack of community participation and awareness, lack of concern for sustainability, complex visa procedures, lack of good language translators, accommodation challenges, and poor airport facilities to carter for patients who arrive with critical conditions. Most Indian hospitals also face problems such as lack of trust from the foreign patients. Some Nigerians, whose patients or family members have either suffered complications after being treated or died in Indian hospitals, have complained of the medical treatment in India and observed that the medical treatment in India falls below their expectations (The Punch Newspaper, April 21, 2014). The Indians on the other hand have blamed Nigerians of bringing patients to India only when they are in critical conditions and often too late to save them. The Indians have also pointed out that some Nigerians visiting the country for medical treatment lack medical insurance to cover medical bills and some lack adequate resources to cater for their stay including payment of accommodation or hotels (The Punch Newspaper, April 21, 2014). Some Indian hospitals have been criticized for observing poor hygiene, especially among the medical attendants, unhygienic food handling, lack of proper hospitality services, heterogeneous pricing of services, and lack of industry standards (Dawn & Pal, 2011, p.193). A strong case has also been made on the need for the Indian government to be more involved in regulating medical tourism in India, rather than leaving it in the hands of the private sector that are currently more involved in the medical tourism business. Problems facing medical tourism industry in India, which are perceived as caused by the government, include poor regulations, taxation anomalies, bureaucratic bottlenecks, lack of land reforms, lack of long-term investor-friendly policies, and instability with respect to terrorism and communal tensions (Dawn & Pal, 2011, p.193). On the part of insurance and allied services, the medical tourism industry in India is also facing some serious bottlenecks. These include inadequate insurance cover, underdeveloped insurance market in India, insurance frauds, and overseas companies refusing reimbursement to customers (patients). Apart from these, there are some specific issues that have to do with quality of personnel. They include quality accreditations to the Indian hospitals and service providers, training and development to the doctors, nurses, and paramedical staffs, and lack of customer-oriented approach.

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There is no doubt that medical tourism to India involves high costs and many other challenges encountered on the part of afflicted Nigerians traveling to access medical care in India. These issues are further exacerbated by the lack of direct air travels between Nigeria and India. Travelers to India have to connect flights in Addis Ababa, South Africa, Dubai, Nairobi, Cairo, Doha, Frankfurt, or London. Movements of patients during emergencies have proved to be very uncomfortable and also difficult on account of lack of direct flights between the two countries. Processing visa for medical purposes to India involves complex procedures of uploading personal data through an online system, printing and submission, and in most cases, appearing in person for interview, documents and medical report citing, and biometric capturing. These procedures no doubt are cumbersome for patients seeking medical attention in India. As part of the new National Tourism Policy (Government of India, 2002), the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (Planning Commission, 2008), the Indian government took various steps to promote tourism in India. One of the major steps was the introduction of Visa-on-Arrival scheme for tourists from Singapore, Finland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, and Japan on a pilot basis from January 2010 and was extended to many other nations in 2011 (Shanmugam, 2013, p.10). So far, the Visa-on-Arrival scheme has not been extended to medical tourists from Nigeria. Given the large number of Nigerians visiting India for medical tourism, the Government of India should consider extending the Visa-on-Arrival scheme to Nigerians visiting India for medical purpose. This should be done in addition to reducing the difficulties faced by patients and accompanying relatives in processing visa from Nigeria for medical purposes in India. The Indian government, in turn, stands to benefit as indicated in the Draft Approach to the Twelfth Five Year (Planning Commission, 2011) reports which highlighted the importance of the tourism sector in terms of its contribution to GDP and employment generation. Against this backdrop, medical tourism has provided a new platform for partnership between Nigeria and India in the provision of state-of-the-art medical care by Indian professionals locally through the establishment of Indian-managed hospitals in Nigeria. MEDICAL TOURISM AND INFLOW OF INDIAN INVESTMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN MEDICAL SECTOR Recently, Nigeria witnessed the entry of Indian hospitals, a development which the Nigerian government under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan had argued will curb medical tourism and reduce capital flight to India. The Chennai-based Apollo Group of Hospitals, with an extensive network of hospitals in India and abroad, was the first private hospital group to offer

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its consultancy services to hospitals in West Africa, in Ghana and Nigeria in 2003/2004. In 2004, Apollo partnered with Hygeia Nigeria, which owns the largest Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), with over 200 hospitals and clinics in the country (Modi, 2010, p.128). Since 2000, Apollo has been the largest provider of telemedicine in India. In Nigeria, Apollo, which is located at Wuse II in Abuja, has assisted in capacity-building through upgrading the skills of medical personnel and has introduced state-of-the-art techniques that are used by the Apollo chain of hospitals in India (www​.apollohospitals​.com). It has also worked to improve the clinical and administrative process and also train doctors in super-specialty disciplines and provide telemedicine support. Another leading Indian hospital in Nigeria is Primus Hospital located at Karu in Abuja. The hospital, which began with capacity of 120 beds, before expanding to 250 beds in 2012, conducts major surgeries in Nigeria. The hospital also has state-of-the-art advanced technology. One of the prominent Indian-owned health centers in Nigeria is Me Cure Healthcare Limited (MHL) owned by Anil Grover (Me Cure, 2015). MHL, according to its owners, is leading in the medical diagnostic and health-care sector in Nigeria and the West African region with an established pharmaceutical manufacturing company. Their first fully comprehensive state-ofthe-art Imaging and Diagnostic Centre was commissioned by His Excellency Babatunde Fashola on May 20, 2009 (LGT, 2015). MHL offers services in plain radiography, ultrasound, 4 slice CT scanner, a 0.3 Tesla MR magnet, and diagnostics in both laboratory and ophthalmologic arenas (Soroosh, 2015). MHL has more than 2,300 tests listed under one roof which are done at a high standard; despite this, their pricing policy is considered as reasonable, yet beyond the reach of many Nigerian patients. Strengthened by good return on investment, MHL has established about nine additional branches to its parent health center located at Debo Compound, Oshodi, Lagos, Nigeria. The emergence of this center has created competition among the radiologistowned centers. MHL offers rebates to referring physicians; this also plays a major role in their market dominance (Soroosh, 2015). MHL was honored with two highly prestigious awards during its first year of operations, in 2009; Me Cure was honored as the Best Healthcare Company in West Africa for excellence in Diagnostic services by the Institute of Direct Marketing of Nigeria (IDMN). MHL has been involved in various research works in Nigeria involving medical physicians in various parts of the country. It also has its innovative medical tourism with a network of over sixty specialized doctors abroad and is affiliated to numerous hospital groups in India (Me Cure, 2015). Evidently buoyed by the huge returns on investments, the Indian high commissioner to Nigeria noted that Indian investors have expressed readiness to establish Indian hospitals across the six geopolitical zones of the

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country. This was followed by the entry of Vedic Lifecare Clinic in 2013. The hospital, which was established at a cost of ₦20 billion is supported by clinical, technological, and management support from Manipal Hospitals based in India. Manipal Hospitals is one of the most patronized hospitals by Nigerians on medical tourism to India and is part of the Manipal Educational and Medical Group (MEMG), which pioneers in the field of education and health-care delivery in India. The setting up of the Indian hospital in Nigeria is therefore to be accessible to more Nigerians that would have hitherto traveled to India for treatment. The hospital, located at Lekki, Lagos, offers multi-specialty tertiary health care and seeks to expand the concept to Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Warri. There is no doubt that particularly the public health infrastructure in Nigeria is in a poor state owing mainly to low funding, shortage of medical facilities and personnel, and poor medical service delivery. These inadequacies have created immense opportunities for the Indian medical sector’s marketing line of “first-class treatment at Third World prices”. Having the medical facilities closer to home is undoubtedly advantageous, particularly, in terms of immediate access to medical facilities and regular follow-ups. To overcome the shortage of health-care facilities, the Nigerian government explored the possibility of Indian investments in hospitals and export of medical skills in the form of public–private partnerships (PPP) in the country. There is no doubt that this arrangement, whether in form of medical tourism or the incursion of Indian hospitals, gives India an edge and offers huge gains from the Nigerian economy. So far, the entry of a few Indian investments in the medical sector has not curbed the outflow of medical tourists to India. The complex interdependent nature of Nigeria’s relations with India in the medical sector is such that both countries cannot just walk away from the relations. While India depends on the Nigerian market for medical tourists or customers (patients) for the Indian hospitals, Nigeria on the other hand depends on Indian expertise in the health sector and has to pay the huge cost of health services offered by the Indian hospitals. Promoted by the Indian government, the medical sector and tourism industries in India are increasingly seen as the favored destination of “medical tourists” from developing countries such as Nigeria, who seek better treatment at relatively cheaper cost than is obtained in the developed countries. Thus, both the public and private hospitals in India are experiencing an influx of patients from Nigeria, who can afford to pay the bills or are compelled by the fate of ill-health to travel to India for treatment. The key selling points of the Indian medical tourism industry to Nigerians and other patients from developing countries are the combination of high-quality facilities, competent, English-speaking medical professionals, cost-effectiveness, and the attractions of tourism. As noted earlier, the term “medical tourism” has been

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subjected to various interpretations. For some, there is nothing to suggest leisure or tourism about chemotherapy, heart surgery, kidney transplant, and other related treatment of chronic diseases. Rather, it is the long wait and poor attention often given, lack of professionals/specialists in these areas, and also lack of specialized medical facilities in Nigerian hospitals that have compelled some people to travel to India to seek medical care. There is a need to improve the quality of health-care delivery in the country; restore the confidence of citizens in the health sector; and, more importantly, create the enabling environment for the Nigerian medical practitioners in the Diaspora to return home and also boost Nigeria’s medical tourism. An improved health sector will, no doubt, reduce the huge cash flight which the current exodus to India for medical treatment represents and go a long way to boost the ailing economy. There is no doubt that medical tourism provides a basis for partnership between Nigeria and India. In this regard, the chapter recommends that the Indian example could be replicated in Nigeria by encouraging Nigerian and Indian entrepreneurs to partner and invest massively in the provision of quality, affordable, and accessible health-care services in Nigeria.

Chapter 10

Military Cooperation and the Contributions of Nigeria and India to International Peacekeeping Operations

Military interaction between India and Nigeria also dates back to the period immediately after Nigeria’s independence in 1961. The historic visit to India by Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu in 1961, the then Nigeria’s defense minister, marked the beginning of postindependence formal military interaction between India and Nigeria. During the visit, the minister solicited assistance from the Indians in building up the Nigerian Armed Forces. India is militarily a big power compared to other developing countries. The fact that India currently possesses nuclear power underscores the extent of her military capability. India herself confirms that India is a nuclear weapons state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression. These are weapons of selfdefence . . . to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats. (Singh, 2016; The Vanguard, May 29, 1998)

India has a lot to offer Nigeria in terms of military technological support in critical areas of Nigeria’s needs. The military relations between Nigeria and India have taken different forms. TRAININGS India has been involved in the training of Nigerian military officials since the 1960s. To date the exact number, names, and ranks of Nigerian officers that have received part of their training in India remain classified. However, it is public knowledge that some of the high-ranking officers in the army, navy, and air force have received military training in India, including the late 191

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General Murtala Mohammed, General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier General Mohammed Daku, Rear-Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, Air Vice Marshal Ibrahim Alfa, and many others. In 1997, ten out of the thirty-six military administrators had received military training in India (Isa, 2008). India is quickly transforming from a regional military power to a global one. This is being driven by a number of factors among which is India’s emergence as a global economic player and China’s largescale military buildup in the region. John Chipman had noted that in 2011, “Asian defence spending increased overall by 3.15 percent in real terms . . . India, China, Japan, South Korea and Australia accounted for more than 80 percent of total Asian defence spending. India already has a large military force” (Chipman, 2012, p.2). A group of Nigerian military officers and soldiers also received training in India in fighting terrorism and urban guerrillas. Similarly, the Government of India donated military hardware worth US$1 million to Nigeria (Zabadi, 2012). India has also installed IT equipment at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) and the National War College (NWC), Abuja. Recently, National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi, increased vacancies allotted to Nigeria for its fifty-second course from one to four officers. Also, the National Cadet Corps (NCC) of India expressed interest to initiate Youth Exchange Programme with Nigeria where one officer and six cadets are sent to India. Notable cooperation in the area of military training between the two countries includes assisting Nigeria in building various military institutions. For example, India played instrumental role in the establishment of the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA), Kaduna, which was set up in February 1964 as a reformation of the British-run Royal Military Forces Training College (RMFTC), and later renamed the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at independence, before being named as NDA. Taking off with only sixty-two cadets, the first set of trainers at the academy were mostly officers in the Indian army. The NDA also adopted the pattern similar to NDA in Khadakwasla, Pune, India. In fact, the first commandant of NDA was an Indian army brigadier M. R. Verma (1964–1969), who was succeeded by Major General David Ejoor (1969–1971) as the second commandant and first Nigerian commandant in the history of the academy. The academy stands out today as a military institution that trains the officer corps of the Nigerian army, navy, and air force. India was also instrumental in the establishment of the Command and Staff College (CSC), Jaji, in Kaduna state, and the Nigerian Naval College, Onne, established by a team of seven officers in 1980 (Isa, 2008; Kura, 2009). India assisted Nigeria in building physical structures in the aforesaid institutions, sending Indian officers to the above military institutions to train Nigerian officers. The first commandant of the NDA was an Indian (Zabadi, 2012). India provided scholarship for many

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Nigerian officers to be trained in Indian military institutions (The Guardian, 2000). India offered military consultancy services for Nigeria’s military institutions and sales of defense equipment. In addition, India and Nigeria defense missions established decades ago allow mutual sharing of defense-related intelligence between their defense advisers and also military technological collaborations (The Guardian, 2000). MILITARY INTERACTIONS A nine-member delegation from the Nigerian House Committee on Defense including its then chairman Honorable Oluwole Oke visited India’s defense industries from December 15 to 18, 2008. The visit was aimed at learning from India’s technological advancement for the benefits of Nigeria’s own defense-related industries such as DICON and Naval Shipyard. The Nigerian delegation visited the Goa naval shipyard, which is engaged in the production of varying classes of vessels ranging from 12-meter patrol boats to 150-meter offshore patrol vessels. They also visited Bharat Electronics, which produces various types of surveillance and fire control radars, electronic support measure/electronic countermeasures equipment, and sonar. There has also been exchange of visits of faculty members between Nigerian Defence College (NDC) and NDC India. They include NDC Nigeria visit to NDC India between April 27 and May 12, 2007, and NDC India visit to NDC Nigeria from June 18 to June 26, 2007. So far, since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule as from 1999, emerging signs indicate that the two countries are increasing their engagements in military matters. On January 20, 2009, during a meet by then Indian high commissioner to Nigeria Mr. Mahesh Sachdev with the Nigerian defence minister Shettima Mustafa, India pledged to assist Nigeria to raise its defense capabilities, while also seeking an accelerated implementation of the three MOU signed between the two countries in 2007. The MOU on defense cooperation, in addition to other items, points that the Indian government will establish two IT LABs in the NDA (Nigeria) and enhance cooperation between Nigeria and India in respect of UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Also, following the Indian Defexpo, 2010, the Ordinance Factory Board (OFB), GOA Shipyard Ltd (GSL), Bharat Electronics (BEL), BEML, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers were among the Indian companies that indicated strong interest in cooperating with Nigeria. The Nigerian navy and other maritime organizations were invited by PIPAVAV Defence and Offshore Engineering Company Ltd, Mumbai, India, to their shipyard. This is in view of the Nigerian navy ship-building program. In addition, in November 2011, a meeting was held with Lt. General

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Ramdas, director general of Medical Services (Army) along with two medical officers from India, on the setting up and managing level of IV Hospital in Kaduna, Nigeria. Furthermore, as affirmed by the Indian High Commission in Nigeria, the armed forces of Nigeria and India have attended military training together, exchanged programs, and served in UNPKO. Other areas of cooperation include counterterrorism and counterintelligence (CT-CI) and sea piracy. There have been series of Joint Defense Coordination Committee (JDCC) meetings between the two countries, aimed at exploring avenues to enhance the bilateral defense cooperation. While the first meeting held in New Delhi in April 2013 and the fifth JDCC was held in New Delhi from January 17 to 18, 2019. It is clear from the foregoing that India is a militarily strong nation, therefore, Nigeria has a lot of lessons to draw from military relations with India provided they are made mutually beneficial. There is already a long history of cooperation in this area between the two countries. However, a closer look will reveal that Nigeria has not gained much from India the same way India has done in her military cooperation with the former Soviet Union. This is a major challenge to address in the current phase of relations between the two countries. ENHANCING NIGERIA–INDIA MILITARY RELATIONS A major issue of interest here is that of transfer of capacity in the area of military technology from India to Nigeria. This includes the transfer of technology (TOT), knowledge, institutional development, and other skills to assist Nigeria in her dealings with other countries from where Nigeria might want to acquire arms and technology. India has a long history of dealings with the major powers and has mastered how to maximize her interests beyond what is usually on offer. The question, however, is whether India in the spirit of South–South solidarity be willing to assist Nigeria in this regard. At the third session of the Nigeria–India Joint Commission held in Abuja in 2000, the Indian side indicated that it will assist the Nigerian military in the following areas: refurbishment of the NAF MIG-21 and Jaguar Aircraft; repair of Dornier 228 aircraft and the supply of spare parts; provision of fasttrack patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), and technical assistance in refurbishment of Nigeria’s Naval Dockyards; computerization of military equipment; defense production including the manufacture of small arms and ammunition, radio communication equipment, uniforms, accoutrements, and so on (Field work, 2014). By the time the fourth session of the Nigeria–India Joint Commission was held in New Delhi in 2003, these pledges were yet to materialize. The fourth session of the Joint Commission also discussed

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issues of military cooperation and agreed to accommodate the training needs of each other’s armed forces within the limits of their resources; have a more stable and institutionalized bilateral training arrangement; increase the number of defense-related visits including high-level military delegations and professional exchanges; step up efforts to explore procurement, production, maintenance, and upgrading of defense equipment; cooperate in joint military exercises and defense research; and institutionalize exchange of Directing Staff (DS) and students. Regrettably, very little progress has been made in concretizing the above areas of envisaged military cooperation between the two countries. While the problem of lack of funds is often singled out as the most important reason for lack of implementation, the inability to realize these goals also stem from sheer inertia on the part of both countries. Another area is that of institutional capacity building, particularly how the Ministry of Defense of Nigeria can be assisted to handle procurement the way India has done it such that local production of the platforms is made possible. For instance, the Indian navy is the fifth largest in the world, yet there are plans to increase this capacity with acquisition of submarine and aircraft carriers. The indication of this was given in the year 2000, when George Fernandes, then India’s defense minister, defined India’s maritime sphere of interest as extending from the North of the Arabian Sea to the South of China Sea. As part of the modernization of Indian air forces, the country procured 126 Eurofighter jets for the Indian air force. What should interest Nigeria from the Indian experience is how the country can maximize its benefits from the deal it secured from the Eurofighter Consortium. According to Avmish Patel, “Out of the 36 jets that will be purchased” the first eighteen will be bought in a flyaway condition, while the remaining eighteen will be manufactured in India under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (Patel, 2012). The lesson here is that India negotiates technology transfer alongside deals for her military procurement. This can also be extended to collaboration in the area of research and development between Nigerian institutions and companies and their Indian counterparts. The range of activities to be covered is wide enough to make for mutual beneficial cooperation between the two countries. What is obvious and has been fairly demonstrated in this chapter is that the two countries have had historical relations which date back to many decades ago. The relationship between them, which have evolved in various aspects such as political, economic, sociocultural, and military, has progressed rather hesitantly, despite the huge presence of Indian residents and businesses in Nigeria. This can also be observed from only two official visits by the Indian prime minister to Nigeria in 1962 and 2007. Issues such as colonialism, racism, and the desire for a new international economic order, which brought the two countries into close contact at the international and bilateral levels

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from 1960s to 1980s, had ceased to be by the 1990s leading the transformation of an erstwhile relations built upon historical and political connections to assume new pragmatism. However, since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule, there have been increased engagements between both countries, leading to the signing of a strategic agreement in 2007 covering diplomatic, economic, cultural, technological, and military areas. Even so, it is evident that India has continued to deepen its presence in Nigeria more than Nigeria does in India. NIGERIA AND INDIA IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Nigeria and India have contributed significantly to global peace and security by playing active roles in UNPKO. Acting as “global good citizens” the two countries have been contributing troops and resources to international peacekeeping. As at December 2012, 116 countries were contributing troops to peacekeeping operations, and 14 countries each provide more than 2,000 soldiers for peacekeeping operations (Rej, 2019). Among them, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria were the four leading contributors. Although Nigeria and India have both played active roles in UNPKO since joining the United Nations in 1960 and 1947, respectively, they have been more active particularly since the end of the Cold War (Rej, 2019). When the Cold War ended, it was believed that the world will become a safer place, at least with the celebrated “triumph of liberalism,” waning of the ideological confrontations between the United States and Soviet Union (Fukuyama, 1989). However, this was not the case. It was not long before new forms of threats emerged, even became more deadly as intra-state conflicts became more pervasive and state sovereignty threatened by the increased activities of violent non-state actors (NSAs). The post–Cold War period has also been characterized by the rise of ethnic tensions, terrorism, and emergence of NSAs assumed deadly dimensions, necessitating increased focus on peace and security issues at national, regional, and global levels. Accordingly, with the increase of conflicts in the post–Cold War era, the demands on UN peacekeeping to contribute to international peace and security continue to grow. The UNPKO has also changed considerably in recent years in terms of their scale (Choedon, 2014). Out of fifty-four peacekeeping operations set up by the United Nations since 1948, two-third (36) were established from 1991. As at December 2012, there were fifteen peacekeeping operations and one special political mission—the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNMA) and a total number of 113,057 personnel serving peace operations at the cost of about US$7.8 billion with complex mandates (UNDPKO, 2012). The Department of Peacekeeping

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Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) manage sixteen peacekeeping operations and one special political mission (Afghanistan). There are a further eleven political and peace-building operations managed by the Department of Political Affairs, including a mission in Iraq. DFS was created in 2007 by General Assembly Resolution 61/279, following proposals by the secretary general to restructure DPKO and establish a separate department to strengthen the organizational capacity of the United Nations to manage the growing number of peacekeeping operations. Regarding its operational manpower, as at December 2012 more than 82,700 military personnel were deployed, as well as 14,300 police officers and around 2,000 military observers. In all, about 99,000 peacekeepers are now deployed compared with 12,000 in 1996 and 20,000 in 2000. The largest missions are the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Missions in Darfur (UNAMID) with 23,000 personnel in uniform and MONUSCO in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with about 19,000; UNFIL in Lebanon and MINUSTAH both with about 12,000; UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire with 11,000 personnel; UNMIL in Liberia with about 9,200; and UNMISS in southern Sudan with more than 5,400 personnel (UNDPKO, 2012). This part of the chapter discusses the contributions of Nigeria and India to international peacekeeping operations. THE CREDENTIALS AND COMMITMENTS OF NIGERIA AND INDIA IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS The credentials of both Nigeria and India in peacekeeping operations have made both of them as reputable countries in international peacekeeping operations. Nigeria is a highly respected and experienced actor in international peacekeeping operations across the globe. Since joining the United Nations in 1960, Nigeria has consistently committed troops to the cause of peacekeeping in various parts of the world. By 2010, the country had “participated in about 25 UN peacekeeping operations across the globe and has produced not less than eleven force commanders” (Galadima, 2011, p.302). It has also participated in two peace operations organized by the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) and three by ECOWAS. Today, Nigeria stands out in the world in the area of international peacekeeping. It occupied the chair of the UN special peacekeeping since 1989. Nigeria also expended enormous human and material resources in support of peacekeeping operations. Nigeria spent more than US$10 billion on peacekeeping between 1990 and 2000 alone and has lost dozens of its personnel. The impact of peacekeeping on Nigeria, especially under the subregional mechanism, has been substantial.

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Among the developing countries peacekeepers, India has one of the longest and consistent records of participation in UNPKO. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India, 2008), India had participated in forty-three out of the sixty-three UN peacekeeping missions established between 1945 and 2008. The Government of India also noted that more than 100,000 Indian soldiers, military observers, and civilian police officers have participated in UN peace operations in various parts of the world. India’s participation in external peace operations began in the late 1940s, when it became part of the first UN observer mission in Palestine (Krishnasamy, 2010). India’s level of participation increased significantly in line with the overall growth in number of UN peace operations. In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, India participated in twenty-three peace missions in about fifteen different locations around the world. NIGERIA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS At independence, Nigeria committed herself to the principle of nonalignment and tactfully avoided being dragged into Cold War politics that characterized the post–World War II system and refused to pitch tent with either of the ideological camps competing for global domination. This actually enhanced Nigeria’s credibility and respect as an impartial peacemaker in numerous conflict areas around the world. This further underscores the prominent roles played by Nigerian Armed Forces and the police force in various conflict areas around the globe. The Nigerian forces have been actively involved in international peacekeeping under the auspices of United Nations, the OAU/ AU, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and under some bilateral arrangements. During the Cold War era, Nigeria participated in the operations in Congo (ONUC) 1960–1964; military observer missions in New Guinea (UNSF) 1962–1963; battalion operations in Tanzania, 1964; military observer in India–Pakistan (UNPOM) 1965–1966; battalions operations and Staff Officers in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978–1983; Battalions operations and staff officers in Chad (HARMONY I) 1982–1983; brigade operations in Chad (Harmony II, OAU) 1982–1983; and military observers in Iraq–Iran (UNIIMOG) 1988–1991. In the post–Cold War era, Nigeria participated in a number of peacekeeping operations. These included the Division Operation in Liberia (ECOMOG) 1990; military observer mission in Iraq–Kuwait (UNIKOM),1991; military observers mission in Angola (UNAVEM II) 1991–1992; Sierra Leone (NATAG) 1991; detachment mission in Angola (UNAVEM III) 1992–1995; military observers mission in Namibia (UNTAG)

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1989–1990; military observers mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 1991; military observers mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992–1993; battalion operations and Staff Officers in Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992–1994; battalion operations and Staff Officers in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), 1992; military observer mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992; battalion operations in Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1993; Gambia (NATAG), 1993; military observer mission in Aouzo Strip (UNASOG) 1994; military observers mission in Israel (UNTSO), 1995; and United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), from 2005 (Galadima, 2011). While some of Nigeria’s peacekeeping deployments were at bilateral levels, others were at subregional, continental, and global/international levels. Nigeria’s Bilateral Deployments The first bilateral deployment happened in 1964 with the battalion operations in Tanzania and was meant to quell mutiny by Tanzanian soldiers. The second bilateral deployment by Nigeria was to Chad in 1979 for peacekeeping under operations HARMONY I (Ogwu, 1998). One battalion of the Nigerian army was deployed to the country on bilateral basis. The other bilateral arrangements were for training purposes and they took place in the Gambia in 1993 and Sierra Leone in 1994. In the case of Sierra Leone, the bilateral deployment paved the way for UN peacekeeping at a later stage. Nigeria’s Deployments under the ECOWAS/ECOMOG The ECOWAS formed in 1975 was founded by a treaty which was aimed at spurring economic integration and development in West Africa. Since integration and development cannot take place in the absence of peace, regional security was also underscored. In 1989, ECOWAS capacity for conflict management was tested with the eruption of the Liberian Civil War, 1989–1997. Owing to international inaction, and to avoid a repetition of the Rwandan tragedy that became a scar on the conscience of humanity, ECOWAS was compelled to intervene unilaterally. That it did without the authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to halt the crisis. The attention of the international community at that time was focused mainly on the former Soviet Union, the unfolding developments in Eastern Europe and the crisis in defunct Yugoslavia. The ECOWAS led by Nigeria had to take the initiative to intervene. The deployment was to Liberia was the first by ECOWAS. In November 1992, two years after ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, the UNSC adopted Resolution 788, which placed an arms and petroleum embargo on the country and empowered ECOWAS to enforce its terms. In September 1993, the

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UNSC adopted Resolution 866, which established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). This, for the first in UN history, co-deployed forces with another mission, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was already underway. However, ECOMOG continued to serve as primary keeper of the peace with Nigeria providing the bulk of the troops and 80 percent of the resources and virtually all the commanders. Between January 1991 and November 1996, the UNSC adopted fifteen resolutions relating to the situation in Liberia, and the president of the Security Council issued nine presidential statements in this connection. Almost all resolutions and statements noted Nigeria’s role and commended ECOWAS for its efforts, asked the UN member states to support it financially, requested African countries to contribute troops to the mission, and condemned attacks by the rebels. Nigeria contributed a whole division in Liberia. The deployment to Sierra Leone was the second by the ECOWAS. In May and August 1997, ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone in order to reverse the coup d’état against the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and forestalled intense civil conflict. The ECOWAS relied on Article 58 and a request by Kabbah to justify its intervention. In October 1997, the UNSC supported ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone by adopting Resolution 1132, which imposed arms and petroleum embargo and travel restrictions against the military junta. It also empowered ECOWAS to enforce the resolution and supported the case of pro-democracy intervention. In October 1998, about fourteen months after the intervention in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS adopted a “binding mechanism to allow for interstate collaboration in the collective management of regional security; the Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” (Musa, 2010, p. 299). The framework sets out an elaborate scheme for ECOWAS–ECOMOG enforcement operations, including a coherent command and control structure. It calls for the creation of an ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to authorize all forms of intervention, including military. The intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was also undertaken by the ECOWAS in October 2000. President Laurent Gbagbo was declared the winner of a bitterly contested national election that was decided in his favor by the country’s Supreme Court. The crisis in the country dates back to the colonial times and has taken many forms in the postcolonial era, especially with military involvement in the nation’s politics. In September 2002, approximately 800 discontented soldiers attacked a military installation in the commercial, administrative, and diplomatic center in Abidjan, and the second-largest city, Bouake, launching a rebellion that divided the country between rebelled controlled north and the loyalist south, and President Gbagbo lost control of the country. In October 2002, at the request of President Gbagbo, ECOWAS

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acting under the authority of its protocol instituted a peacekeeping force to monitor the cease-fire agreement in Côte d’Ivoire. Efforts by the ECOWAS, the United Nations, France, and the AU culminated in the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement of January 2003. In early February 2004, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1527, fully supporting efforts of the ECOWAS and France to promote a peace in Côte d’Ivoire. Nigeria contributed some military observers in Côte d’Ivoire (Musa, 2010). History was to repeat itself again following the refusal of President Laurent Gbagbo to step down after losing elections to another candidate in the country’s election. It took the intervention of France to oust him out of power. Nigeria’s Deployments under the OAU/AU Under the auspices of the OAU, before its transformation to AU, there were two deployments by Nigeria. These were in Chad in 1981/82 and Rwanda in 1994. Under the AU, there had been deployments of Nigeria troops to Sudan as a result of the Darfur crisis in western Sudan since 2004 for peacekeeping mission, before the operation became a hybrid one, the UNAMID, which was first commanded by a Nigerian general Martin Luther Agwai. Nigeria was the first to deploy a peacekeeping force in Chad in 1979 and was later drawn under the auspices of the OAU, at the July 1979 OAU summit meeting in Monrovia. The conflict in Chad had been on since 1965. Following accusations brought by Malloum regime of Chad against Libya over the latter’s support of FROLINAT, the OAU set up an Ad Hoc Committee to mediate the conflict between Chad and Libya. The Chad situation was transformed in February 1979 with the defeat of the Malloum regime by the FROLINAT faction led by Hissene Habre. The conflict was transformed from an issue of domination of the southern part over the North into a fierce struggle for power. Hissene Habre was challenged by his long-standing northern rival Goukouni Weddeye. Nigeria played active roles in mediating in the conflict, thus propelling the OAU to follow Nigeria’s mediatory initiatives because they were pursued in the framework of the OAU mediation. Nigeria also convened national reconciliation conferences in Kano (Kano I and Kano II) and Lagos. The frustration that Nigerian troops encountered in Chad was a foretaste of what was in store for the OAU subsequent efforts at peacekeeping. Several problems were encountered including lack of finance, lack of cooperation from some member states of the OAU, lack of clear mandate for the Nigerian peacekeepers, and the perception by the Chadian factions that the neutral forces were either with them or against them. The Chadian conflict was to change dramatically toward the end of 1980, following the large-scale intervention of Libyan troops in support of President Weddeye. In a concerted anti-Habre campaign, Libya and its supporters

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expelled Habre’s troops out of N’Djamena by the end of December 190. On January 6, 1981, Libya and the government of Chad announced their decision to work toward achieving the merger of the two countries. Nigeria and a number of African countries opposed this merger and insisted that Libya withdrew its troops. The withdrawal of Libyan troops paved the way for finalizing the modalities and protocols for dispatch of the African peacekeeping mission. Nigeria contributed 2,000 officers and men by December 17, 1981, and a Nigerian commander general Geoffrey Ejiga superintended over the operations. Unfortunately, the challenges of funding impaired command and control and undermined the morale of some of the troops. According to Ogwu (1998), “the first OAU Peacekeeping force was plagued from the beginning by organizational, logistics and financial problems”. By the time, it became operational, the cease-fire had broken down and there was no peace to keep. That notwithstanding, Nigeria’s role in keeping Chad as a single country is noteworthy, and represents its bold attempt to ensure peace and security of the continent. NIGERIA’S PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION Nigeria actively participated in the UN Operations in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo-UNUC), which took place in the Republic of Congo from July 1960 until June 1964 (Ibrahim, 1993). This marked a milestone in the history of Nigeria’s involvement in international peacekeeping in terms of responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved. ONUC was established by UNSC Resolution 143 of July 1960. The mission was further empowered by Resolution 161 of February 21, 1961, and Resolution 169 of November 24, 1961 (Galadima, 2011). The Republic of Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent on June 30, 1960. Shortly after, a disorder broke out, and Belgium sent troops to the Congo, without the consent of the Congolese government, for the restoration of order. On July 12, the Congolese government requested for UN military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against external aggression. The United Nations asked Belgium to withdraw its forces and in less than forty-eight hours, contingents of a UN force, provided by a number of countries, including Nigeria and India, arrived in Congo. UN civilian experts were also sent to help ensure the continuity of operations of essential public services. To meet the vast and complex task before it, the United Nations had assembled a very large team totally about 20,000 officers and men. About 5,000 men of the Nigerian army rotated over four years. Major General J.T.U. Aguyi Ironsi was the force commander from January

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1964 to June 1964, when the operation ended (Galadima, 2011; Ibrahim, 1993). By February 1963, Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of Congo. However, at the request of the Congolese Government, the UNGA authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further period of six months. The force was completely withdrawn by June 30, 1964. Nigeria also participated in the UN’s Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL (Ogumudia, 1997). This is one of the United Nations’ oldest peacekeeping operations. UNIFIL was established in 1978 by the UNSC Resolution 425. The UN authorized the establishment of the interim force for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area among others. This action of the UNSC followed years of tension along the Israel–Lebanon border: the March 1978 attack in Israel by Palestine Liberation Organization fighters coming from Lebanon and a subsequent Israel invasion of south Lebanon. Cross-border fighting continued; Israel did not completely withdraw; the authority of the government of Lebanon was not restored in the south. Under these circumstances, UNIFIL could not fulfill its responsibilities under Resolution 425. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and subsequently established its own security zone inside the country, which remained until they withdrew in June 2000. Nigeria contributed 643 officers and men to UNIFIL, manning of checkpoints, manning of observer posts and patrols. In all, “Nine Nigerian battalions totaling 7000 men were rotated through UNIFIL from 19781982” (Galadima, 2011, p. 311). Nigeria withdrew from UNIFIL in 1983 (Ogomudia, 1997). INDIA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS As a key stakeholder in the international system, India has put its military at the service of global order, participating in several UNPKO. India participated in only one peacekeeping operation in Africa during the Cold War, when it served in the UN mission to the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1964). Since the end of the Cold War, India has been engaged in a number of UN’s missions (Mukherjee, 2015). It provided military observers in the Iran–Iraq (UNIIMOG, 1988–1991) and Iraq–Kuwait border disputes (UNIKOM, 1991), Namibia (UNITAG, 1989–1991), Angola (UNAVEM, 1989–1991), Central America (1988–1992), El Salvador (1991–1995), Liberia (UNMIL, 1993–1997), the Congo (MONUC, 1999 onward), and Ethiopia–Eritrea (2000 onward). Additionally, sizeable military contingents from India participated in PKOs in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993), Mozambique (ONUMOZ,

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1992–1994), Somalia (UNOSOM, 1993–1994), Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993– 1996), Haiti (1994–2000), Angola (UNAVEM I, II, and III 1995–1999), Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1998 onward), and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999– 2000). Although India has participated in UNPKOs in other conflict zones, our attention here is focused on India’s peacekeeping participation in Africa (Mukherjee, 2015). India and the United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUC was also notable for being the first UN mission in Africa in which Indian peacekeepers took part. The UN invited military contributions from ten countries including India and Nigeria, which both countries contributed. According to Kumar (2007, p.30) “an infantry brigade group (comprising two to five battalions) represented the Indian armed forces that formed part of the UN force.” In one of the most difficult and violent of peacekeeping operations the United Nations had faced, ONUC was mandated to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in maintaining law and order, and to provide technical assistance. This operation marked the first occasion in which the United Nations authorized the use of force by a peacekeeping operation to prevent Civil War (UNSC Resolution 161 (1961) of February 21, 1961 [S/4741]) (Mukherjee, 2015). It was also the first time the United Nations undertook an intervention in an intrastate, rather than an interstate, conflict. Although India had participated in UNPKOs in other conflict zones, ONUC was also notable for being the first UN mission in Africa in which Indian peacekeepers took part (Rej, 2019). The casualties suffered by the “Indian brigade over the period of its involvement amounted to 147” (Rooyen, 2010, p. 8). These included peacekeepers killed in action. Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria, who served as a UN peacekeeper, was awarded with India’s highest military award for courage—Param Vir Chakra. Although India was involved in peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world, Indian peacekeepers returned to the African continent only in 1989 (Krishnasamy, 2010). The Role of India in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) This UNPKO spanned the period when the Cold War era was coming to an end, ushering in a time of unipolarity and uncertainty. The UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) was faced with the task of implementing UN Resolution 435 of 1978 within a time frame scheduled to begin on April 1, 1989, and to be completed within twelve months. It had taken ten years for the parties to the dispute to give formal assent to UNTAG’s

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undertaking. The high point of the transition operation was to be the organization of an election to be held in November 1989. The military component of the task force was trimmed down to 4,500 soldiers contributed from 21 states. India, Nigeria, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sudan, and Kenya provided military observers into the area (Rooyen, 2010). The task force commanded by an Indian General, Lieutenant General Prem Chand, was deployed in 200 locations to monitor the fragile cease-fire and to attempt to demobilize armed men. According to Rooyen (2010, p.9), the soldiers and civilian personnel were responsible for the smooth withdrawal of foreign troops, elections, and the subsequent handing over of authority to the government. Other tasks undertaken by the UNTAG forces were curbing the infiltration of armed men from across the country’s borders, and overseeing the phased withdrawal of 30,000 South African Defence Force personnel. The cost of the whole exercise was $383 million. UNTAG disbanded, having achieved its objectives from May 1989 to May 1991. India’s Involvement in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) The UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) intervention lasted from June 1989 to May 1991. This came at a time when Cold War rivalries were declining but still affected ideologies and loyalties in these countries. They continued to exert an influence on political arrangements throughout the region. This was an important aspect of the intricate international negotiations required in Angola. The first of two missions, UNAVEM I, was established by UNSC Resolution 626 (1988) of December 20, 1988, at the request of the governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the redeployment of Cuban troops northward, and their phased and total withdrawal from the territory of Angola, in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two governments. India supplied eight of the seventy military observers for UNAVEM I. The withdrawal was completed by May 25, 1991, more than one month before the scheduled date. The UN Secretary-General reported to the UNSC on June 6 that UNAVEM I had fulfilled its mandate (Rej, 2019). India’s Role in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) UNAVEM II lasted from May 1991 to February 1995. The force that replaced the first mission, UNAVEM II, was the second of a total of four UN missions deployed to Angola during the course of that country’s Civil War. The mission’s original mandate, which was outlined in UNSC Resolution 696 (1991), passed on May 30, 1991, was to verify the arrangements agreed by

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the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the cease-fire, and to oversee reprofessionalization of the Angolan police during the cease-fire period. A subsequent UNSC Resolution, 747 (1992), passed on March 24, 1992, altered the mandate to include electoral monitoring duties. The candidates for election included members of both of the rival factions in the Civil War, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the de facto government’s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which had controlled Luanda and most of the country since Angola’s independence in 1975 (Mukherjee, 2015). India contributed a Chief of Staff and eight military observers to UNAVEM II. During the country’s preelection period, 400 UN electoral observers were deployed, along with the rest of the UNAVEM II personnel, to carry out the mandate of “observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections in Angola.” The mandate was again altered by a series of UNSC Resolutions passed in 1993, which were intended to encourage more stringent adherence to the cease-fire by both the government of Angola and UNITA, after the resumption of hostilities. Finally, in late 1994, with the sanction of UNSC Resolutions 952 (1994) and 966 (1994), UNAVEM II began observation and verification of the Lusaka Protocol of November 20, 1994, and prepared to make way for the new mission. India and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) UNAVEM III lasted from February 1995 to June 1997. After the signing of the new peace accord, the Lusaka protocol, which both the government and UNITA committed themselves to respecting and implementing, the UN launched UNAVEM III in February 1995. Its mandate covered four broad areas: political, military, humanitarian, and electoral. Politically it had to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol; militarily it was to supervise, control, and verify the disengagement of forces and monitor the cease-fire; to help establish quartering areas and the demobilization of UNITA forces, and supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; to monitor the amalgamation of MPLA and UNITA soldiers into a single joint national defense force; and to verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan national police; to coordinate, facilitate, and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process; and, electorally, its mandate was to ensure that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of the presidential election were fulfilled, and then monitor and verify the election process. India supported the UNAVEM III mission by providing guards, field and mechanized companies, and staff officers and military observers. The Indian government also notes that the Indian army was active in clearing road intersections and ensuring logistic security, and also

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became involved for the first time in the detection and removal of landmines. However, UNAVEM III was scaled down when the peace process, with the agreement it was founded upon, collapsed. India’s Contribution to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) The MONUA was occasion by the disappointingly slow pace of the peace process in Angola and the slow pace in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Entrenched mistrust and lack of political will to take decisive measures had prevented the parties from honoring their commitments. However, both the MPLA government and UNITA had agreed on a new timetable to move the peace process forward. Accordingly, and in order to provide some continuity of effort, the UN authorized MONUA, which was a small observer mission to assist the parties to make progress toward peace. India seconded a Chief of Staff and two force commanders (Kumar, 2007). In the successive phases of the UN missions in Angola, India was involved. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs also pointed out that the Indian military’s construction and Engineer Company was deployed in the construction of camps for refugees. It repaired and undertook the reconstruction of war-damaged bridges on the Conga, Quisaju, Mugige, and Nhia rivers, and built an airfield at Londuimbali. India and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) The United Nations established ONUMOZ in December 1992 to restore peace at the end of a long Civil War. ONUMOZ was also mandated to ensure the full withdrawal of all foreign forces, including private armed groups, and to separate the two factions geographically. India provided a companystrength contingent of staff officers, military observers, engineering, and logistics personnel; and also provided independent headquarters. According to Rooyen (2010, p.12), the Indian peacekeepers assisted in the monitoring and verification of the cease-fire between the two main protagonists: Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Indian peacekeepers also carried out the collection, storage, and destruction of arms and ammunition after overseeing the disarmament of the two warring factions. They established and maintained security along a transport route that had been constructed, and also secured other critical infrastructure sites. They rendered humanitarian aid, and assisted in the conduct of elections (Kumar, 2007).

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India’s Role in the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) Krishnasamy (2010) argues that the “UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is considered one of the most difficult and challenging operations that the UN has ever attempted” (p.229). The mission’s activities in Somalia started in April 1992 with efforts to provide humanitarian and food aid to those most affected by the Civil War and famine. From this initial mandate, the mission was widened to stop the conflict and rebuild the basic institutions of a functional state. In December 1992, the United Nations established a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which consisted of three ships carrying forces mandated to create a safe environment in which humanitarian aid and food relief could be supplied to the people of Somalia. Although UNITAF was under US command, India contributed a naval task force under Commodore Sampat Pillai. This was the “first-ever Indian naval participation in a UN mission” (Kumar, 2007, p.34). Indian ships and navy personnel were involved in patrol duties off the Somali coast, in humanitarian assistance on shore, and also in the transportation of men and material for the United Nations. India initially declined to contribute deploy ground troops to the US-led UNITAF for two reasons. First, India was critical of the initial deployment of the UNITAF because it argued that it had not met the condition of “request and consent” by the host government (Sharma, 1995, p.41). Second, India did not subscribe to the “Lead Nation” concept, and preferred to steer a middle path as part of its nonaligned policy (Indian Centre for UN Peacekeeping, 2013). India’s decision to contribute troops in 1993, following the takeover of UNITAF by the United Nations, also marked the second phase of the operation— UNITAF II. In fact, the decision to deploy Indian ground troops came after much deliberation and debate at the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian parliament), and was also based on a ground survey and study by two Indian delegates who visited Somalia early in 1993 (Krishnasamy, 2010, p. 229). In May 1993, India contributed a contingent to UNOSOM II, comprising an infantry brigade group; a mechanized infantry battalion; a light battery; air support to carry out reconnaissance and observation flights; armed helicopters from the Indian Air Force (IAF); a veterinary corps; and a logistics unit. The UNOSOM II operation involved peace enforcement, as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the Indian objective was humanitarian relief, the Indian contingent successfully combined the often-conflicting roles of coercive disarmament and humanitarian relief to the civilian population. The Indian brigade had operational responsibilities for one-third of Somalia, an area of 1,730,000 square kilometers, the largest ever controlled

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by any contingent (Kumar, 2007). In spite of the huge geographical extent covered by the Indian area of responsibility, there were civilian casualties. The Indian contingent dug a large number of wells to provide an adequate level of water security, and constructed schools and mosques. It operated mobile dispensaries and relief camps that also provided veterinary care. The peacekeepers, therefore, gave medical and humanitarian assistance to the Somalis and their livestock. They also managed the rehabilitation and resettlement of thousands of refugees, and helped to repatriate them to their homes. The last remaining units of the Indian contingent departed on Indian navy ships at Kismayo port in southern Somalia in December 1994. India’s experiences in Somalia, like those of the United States, led to a serious reappraisal of the future of UN peacekeeping within the former’s political and military circles. On August 23, 1994, several opposition members of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian parliament) tabled “a motion demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops following the news that seven Indian lives had been lost in Somalia the previous day” (Rooyen, 2010, p. 13). India’s Contribution to the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) India was the first country to deploy an all-female police unit in Liberia in 2009. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) under Commander Seema Dhundia enjoys the distinction of being the first all-female UN peacekeeping unit ever deployed in the history of international peacekeeping. The Indian police unit was part of the law enforcement team within the UNMIL. The Indian unit of 103 women played a critical role in “mentoring unarmed local Liberian police officers who were tasked to deal with the lingering suspicions of citizens who resented the police participation after the civil war” (Krishnasamy, 2010, p.232). The then-special representative of the UN Secretary-General commended the deployment of the unit from India’s Central Reserve Police Force as “a new beginning for gender equality in peacekeeping” and expressed the hope that its presence would be “an encouragement for Liberian women to come forward and help rebuild their country by participating in the forces of law and order” (Pham, 2008, p.11). India and the United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL) The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established by the UNSC to help consolidate peace in the country, enhance development, and ensure human rights. The conflict in Sierra Leone commenced in March 1991, when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched

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attacks to overthrow the government. In spite of joint peace efforts by a UN Special Envoy, the OAU, and ECOWAS, armed hostilities continued unabated. Out of 13,000-member force of UNOMSIL, India contributed 3,059 military observers and medical personnel under Brigadier S. C. Joshi, in July 1998. The mission was commanded by Major General V. K. Jetley of India. The peace process broke down again soon afterward. Rebel forces entered the capital, Freetown, on January 6, 1999, and attacked the UNOMSIL premises. The Indian military observers stationed there volunteered to stay behind until all the others in the headquarters had escaped or been evacuated, with Joshi supervising the evacuation of civilian staff while the building was under attack (Rooyen, 2010). In October 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1270 creating its peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). It was charged with the general mandate of cooperating with the government and the other protagonists in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement; but it also had a range of specific tasks: helping to carry out the government’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan; monitoring adherence to the ceasefire agreement; and protecting UN personnel and establishing “a presence at key locations.” On February 7, 2000, the UNSC revised UNAMSIL’s mandate. It also expanded its size, which it did again on May 19, 2000, and once more, a year later, on March 30, 2001. Even before the Indian army sent a battalion, which included armored personnel carriers and attack helicopters, to Sierra Leone in December 1999, “Indian doctors and military observers had been operating a hospital there for almost a year” (Kumar, 2007, p.34). In addition, India also contributed police officials. Between May 1 and 6, 2000, about 500 peacekeeping troops and military observers from India and another 13 countries were captured and held hostage by the rebel RUF, which renounced the cease-fire. The situation attracted severe criticism of UNAMSIL in the Indian parliament, media, and civil society (Times of India, 1994). In the views of Rooyen (2010, p.15), many Indians back home queried the very presence of the Indian contingent in Sierra Leone, and raised doubts about its military integrity (Times of India, 2000). The last of the captured Indian personnel were released only on June 29, 2000 (Times of India, 2010). Differences between the Indian Commander of the UN force and ECOWAS commanders, particularly Nigerian commanders, came to a head when 222 India peacekeepers were taken hostage by the RUF. The Indian commander argued that his situation was made more difficult by the noncooperative attitude of Nigeria, British, and United States in the matter of resolving the hostage crisis. The stand of the then UN secretary-general Kofi Anan was clear that India’s General Jetley should restrict himself to performing only peacekeeping duties. The general was not comfortable with this directive because it was

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Indian troops that were been held hostage and there was increasing pressure from the Indian government and parliament (Kumar, 2007, p.34). The situation led India to phase out its troops from Sierra Leone. Following the release of its captured peacekeepers in June 2000 India had become involved in more robust activities in Sierra Leone. The UNAMSIL mandate came to an end in December 2005. Although the mission had been tested severely, the United Nations helped the Sierra Leonean government to stop the illicit trading in “blood” diamonds and regulate the industry. In December 2005, UNAMSIL was succeeded by a new mission—the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone. India and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR, UNAMIR II) The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a mission instituted by the United Nations to aid the implementation of the Arusha Accords, which was signed in August 1993. The Accords had been designed to end the Rwandan Civil War fought largely between the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). India provided a contingent comprising one infantry battalion and support elements to UNAMIR, to help ensure the security of the refugees, and to create conditions in which free and fair elections could be held (Kumar, 2007, p. 35). The Indian battalion was assigned the responsibility of safeguarding UN installations, manning security posts, and denying “marauding irregulars and armed bandits” (Rooyen, 2010, p.16) access to Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. A second mission, UNAMIR II, largely dedicated to stabilizing the situation in the country in the aftermath of the genocide, was formed in November 1994. India supplied medical, engineering, and communications specialists to this mission. The role of UNAMIR has attracted much adverse attention, most of which relates to the limitations on its rules of engagement, which prevented it from intervening during the Rwandan genocide. The United Nations as well as a number of Western nations came under fire for their lack of positive action, for their failure to use their knowledge of the atrocities being committed to prevent them, and for their unilateral withdrawal of UN forces. Gerald Caplan, the author of Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, calls this “shameful” period a “multitude of betrayals” (Caplan, 2009). The mandate of UNAMIR II extended into the period after the RPF had overthrown the government, and continued into the Great Lakes refugee crisis. It is therefore not surprising that this mission is viewed as one of the UN’s peacekeeping failures. India was one of the countries that maintained peacekeeping troops in Rwanda during the period of the crisis.

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India and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) Following the signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional states, the UNSC passed Resolution 1279 (1999), which established the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). Its initial mandate was to observe the cease-fire; ensure the disengagement of all forces; and maintain close liaison with all parties to the Cease-fire Agreement. Through a series of subsequent resolutions, the UNSC expanded MONUC’s area of responsibility to include supervising the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement, and to performing multiple additional tasks. India committed about 4,421 personnel comprising of both police officials and military to MONUC. By December 2009, “the number of personnel in the Indian contingent represented the highest proportion contributed by any member state” (Rooyen, 2010, p.17). This mission has become the United Nation’s largest PKO, with the time frame of the most recent resolution setting a terminus on May 31, 2010, but with an option to extend the deadline by another year. Reports in late 2009 indicated that the government of the DRC wished for an earlier withdrawal of UN forces, largely to counter perceptions that it was relying on the UN to bolster its authority. Mampilly (2013, p.4) argued that India’s participation in MONUC became very controversial, to the extent that it is likely to have a deleterious effect on the reputation of UN peacekeepers. A report in the Africa Research Bulletin notes that confidential reports by the UN contained forty-four allegations against the Indian battalion based in North Kivu province. The main report described issues that range from ivory, arms, and gold smuggling, to drug dealing, to fraternizing with the rebel forces. Indian troops have also been at the center of a number of sexual scandals in peacekeeping operations in different African countries, a fact often attributed to the difficult and isolating working conditions (Mutumayi, Sen & Datta, 2011). The UN’s Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (ID/OIOS) investigated these charges, but because the allegations “may have the potential to damage the reputation of the Indian military and the United Nations, . . . other avenues which fall outside the purview of the ID/OIOS investigations” were pursued. India’s defense minister ordered an inquiry, although this did not cover the allegations that force members had been involved in illegal arms dealing. The UN’s OIOS states, under the heading “Access to OIOS Reports” that according to General Assembly Resolution 59/272, the reports may be requested by member states (only), and that “for reasons of confidentiality or the risk of violating . . . rights of individuals involved . . . the report may be modified, or withheld” (Mampilly, 2013, p.4). Obtaining full access to these reports remains a challenge (Lynch, 2011). MONUC has repatriated more

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than seventy peacekeepers for sexual abuse and exploitation, but UN officials acknowledge that they rarely find out whether an offending peacekeeper has been punished by his government (Mampilly, 2013). India’s Contribution to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) In June 2000, after two years of fighting concerning a border dispute, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a cessation of hostilities agreement following proximity talks led by Algeria and the OAU. In July, the UNSC set up the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to maintain liaison between the parties and establish a mechanism for verifying the cease-fire. In September 2000, the council authorized UNMEE to monitor the cessation of hostilities and to help ensure the observance of security commitments. Out of the UMEE 4,200 military personnel, in June 2001, India sent an infantry battalion of 879 personnel, a construction engineering company of 153 personnel, and a force reserve company of 165 (Kumar, 2007). India provided UNMEE’s force commander, who served from July 2004 to March 2006. In addition, the Indian contingent included doctors and dentists who gave free access to their clinics to the people of their host nations. According to Kumar (2007, p.35), “During the period of the mission, the Indian medical battalion attended to well over 7,000 medical and 1,100 dental cases,” Working with Kenyan peacekeepers, the Indians ran field hospitals in Barentu and Assab, ensuring that local inhabitants received free consultations and treatment. Especially during the dry season communities rely heavily on dam-fed water, and the Indian Construction Engineer Company embarked on a number of water conservation projects, constructing five water dams between May 2004 and the last quarter of 2006 in villages that depended on this system. In addition, they dug wells and laid water pipes to schools and orphanages. The engineers also built roads and carried out essential maintenance work, especially on rebuilding roads that link distant farms to the main regional town of Barentu. These projects were instrumental in improving the lives of communities in both countries. The humanitarian crisis in both countries presented UNMEE with additional duties. Kumar (2007) further argues that the humanitarian situation in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by a severe drought that led to a major food crisis, which affected almost 8 million people. On July 30, 2008, the UNSC abruptly terminated the mandate of UNMEE, with effect from the following day. This decision came in response to harsh conditions and restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE, which included the cutting off of fuel supplies. These constraints had made it impossible for the operation to continue carrying out its mandated tasks, and set the safety and security of UN personnel at risk.

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India’s Role in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) The UNSC, through Resolution 1590 of March 24, 2005, decided to send a UN mission (UNMIS) to Sudan. The main objective was, and remains, to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) on January 9, 2005. The mission was also mandated to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance and the protection and promotion of human rights. Although the protection of civilians is the responsibility of the sovereign government of Sudan, the UNMIS military has been mobilized to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence as far as the capability of the force allows. The mission also provided assistance to the “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and supported the activities of other UN programmes” (Kumar, 2007, p.32). On August 31, 2006, the UNSC, by its Resolution 1706, expanded the mandate of UNMIS to include its deployment to Darfur to support an early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Indian army official, General Lidder served as force commander in UNMIS. Out of totaled sanctioned strength of 10,000 military personnel, India contributed about 2,385 soldiers who belong to two infantry battalions and a helicopter squadron. According to (Rooyen, 2010), India’s veterinary contingent also made a significant contribution, in collaboration with the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), by initiating a campaign to eradicate a debilitating fever that was threatening to wipe out Sudan’s indigenous cattle. The Indian engineers also carried out road rehabilitation and maintenance. ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA AND INDIA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING The first UNPKO, where both Nigeria and India served together, was in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1964). As indicated in table 10.1, since the end of the Cold War both countries have been among the top contributing countries to the UN peacekeeping missions. Table 10.1 also reveals that both Nigeria and India have served together in a number of UNPKO in the post–Cold War era. As indicated in table 10.1, within Africa, India and Nigeria have both served in MONUC with Nigeria contributing 23 personnel while India contributed 4,600 personnel. In the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Nigeria contributed higher number of personnel (1,718) than India (248). India’s contingent in UNMIL included a unit that enjoys the distinction of being the first and, for now, the only all-female UN peacekeeping unit ever deployed in international peacekeeping mission. In the United Nations Operation in Côte

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Table 10.1  Nigeria and India’s Participation in International Peacekeeping UN Mission

Pakistan

Bangladesh

India

Nigeria

Egypt

MINURSO MONUC MONUSCO UNMIL ONUCI UNMIS UNAMID MINURCAT Total

11 3,646 2,938

9 2,819 1,471

0 4,600 248

7 23 1,718

24 1,025 15

1,275 1,522 788 6

2,346 1,656 1,349 151

8 2,701 0 0

5 48 3,705 4

180 1,539 2,616 10

10,186

9,801

7,549

5,510

5,409

Source: Pham, P. J (2007). India’s expanding relations with Africa and their implications for US interests. American Foreign Policy Interests, 29(5), 24; United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Missions Summary Detailed by Country, June 30, 2010; Retrieved on May 22, 2019 from www​.un​.org​/en/ peace​keepi​ng/co​ ntrib​utors​/2010​/june​​103​.p​​​d.

d’Ivoire (ONUCI), Nigeria contributed 5, while India contributed 8; under the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), India contributed 2,701, while Nigeria contributed 48. Under UNAMID, Nigeria contributed the highest number of personnel which stood at 3,705, while India did not contribute any personnel. What this reveals is that though Nigeria and India at different times contribute more troops than the other, they still remain among the highest troop contributors to the UN peacekeeping missions and peace and security in the international arena. An understanding of the reasons why the two countries are engaged in peacekeeping operations is not only imperative but instructive. This will help to explain the continued commitments of the two countries as well as the successes and challenges recorded by them in international peacekeeping operations. Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations is shaped by a number of considerations. Galadima (2010, p.319) has argued that the variables that help to explain Nigeria’s willingness to participate in multilateral interventions are geographic proximity, domestic political culture, national interests as well as economic considerations. In terms of geographical proximity, what happens in nearby countries may have security, economic, political, and domestic implications for Nigeria and these considerations have played a major role in Nigeria’s participations in peacekeeping operations. Nigeria’s involvement most times stem from considerations that what happens nearby is likely to endanger nationals, raise significant security concerns, and result in creation of refugees, economic disruptions, and unwanted political spillovers. These reasons explain Nigeria’s involvement in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and recently, Mali.

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Nigeria’s participations in international peacekeeping operations appear to relate to its political culture, which is shaped by both history and elite views about Nigeria’s place in the contemporary international system. Nigeria feels strongly that it has the capacity to represent Africa as permanent member of the UNSC. Thus, to demonstrate this capability, a political culture has evolved over the years that permit modest participation and contribution in international peacekeeping and even humanitarian interventions. Linked to this political culture is consistency on the part of Nigeria to contribution of troops to the UNPKO since its independence in 1960. This culture has also been sustained by organizational culture in foreign ministry bureaucracies that sometimes pressure home governments to get involved. Nigeria’s population, economic power, and military strength make Nigeria not only a subregional power but also an African leader. This leadership position compels Nigeria, by sheer force of circumstances to contribute troops for peacekeeping and even peace enforcement operations. Again, such leadership attributes on the part of Nigeria enabled it to intervene in both Liberia and Sierra Leone and deal with several other conflicts in the continent. Nigeria shouldered the heavy cost of its participation in Sierra Leone. This amount, which has been estimated at US$12 billion, is more than the approved UN peacekeeping budget for the year 2004–2005, which was US$2.80 billion (UNDPKO, 2012). A number of reasons also account for India’s commitment to UNPKO, “the primary reason being India’s ‘Great Power’ aspiration as a primary source of motivation” (Krishnasamy, 2010, p.238). There is a tendency among most observers and writers that India is inspired by an idealism rooted in the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and the vision of a peaceful world. Another version to this argument is that India’s idealism has been outweighted by its aspiration for “great power” aspiration and the needs to increase its presence within the United Nations with a long-term aim of being considered favorable as a candidate for a permanent seat in the UNSC. One of the fundamental shifts in Indian foreign policy in recent years has been India’s transition from aspired leadership of the “third world” to achieving “great power” status (Mohan, 2006). Indian leaders right from the onset have always sought to “corner a leading role for India in the international arena” (Krishnasamy, 2010, p.238). While seeking to curve a niche for India and even in the search for resources for India’s growing economy, its leaders often drummed the rhetoric of “common colonial history,” “south–south cooperation,” “interdependence,” and “mutual benefits,” Traditionally, great powers are recognized because they are economically and militarily strong and powerful, and have capacity to exert influence across the world. According to Nossal (1989), a number of variables bear a profound influence on a country’s foreign policy behavior. These are geographical location

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(that is relating to the size of land and natural resources), capability (the size of the country’s population, its level of urbanization, development, and wealth), and alignment in international politics and power (having capacity to make decisions for itself to achieve its own political goals). India considers itself as possessing these attributes. India not only covers 72 percent of the subcontinent but also has a large population and abundant resources. These features have shaped India’s vision of emerging as one of the dominant regional powers. It is also argued that, as part of its evolving foreign policy orientations, “India’s actions and aspirations on the global stage have changed dramatically towards greater activism and leveraging of its new found economic strength” (Sinha & Dorschner, 2010, p.76). Unsurprisingly, as part of its economic transformation since the early 1990s, India’s inward-oriented economy became more integrated in the world economy and has ventured outside its extended neigborhood to search for more natural resources for its industries and markets for its goods. Thus, India’s participation in international peacekeeping operations not only helps shape India’s positive image as a “good international citizen” that is committed to global responsibilities but also provides an opportunity for India to increase its presence within the United Nations. Another argument that has been advanced why India is committed to UN international peacekeeping operations is the need to find an “employment outlet for its huge population.” Because of India’s large population size which is estimated at 1.1 billion, employment in the military and by extension peacekeeping postings are competitive. Indian soldiers look forward to participating in peacekeeping operations because of the gains involved and for the purposes of gaining experience. Positions abroad are highly sought after by Indian officers and troops. According to officers interviewed by Mampilly in Goma (Mampilly, 2013, p.4), “Positions in peacekeeping missions provide an opportunity to gain field experience that is valued highly upon their return to India.” Every year, 15,000 troops are selected for a first interview with 5,000 eventually deployed to various missions following a “pre-induction training” at the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in New Delhi (Mampilly, 2013, p.4). Most troops have little awareness about Africa, but receive a series of briefings prior to departure where they learn the background of the specific mission, the activities of Indian troops, and a general history of the country. Once in country, life is often difficult for the troops who work six days a week and are prohibited from socializing with locals due to DPKO restrictions. Another reason why India participated actively in international peacekeeping operations is to avert competition and the challenges to its “leadership” reputation in peacekeeping (Akbar, 2007). India has been operating in an international environment where new peacekeepers have

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been gaining significant attention and appreciation. This is a growing reality that the Indian government has well taken note of, especially from China that has been projecting itself as a “responsible great power” by participating in UN peace operations since 1990 (Krishnasamy, 2010, p.240). Ling (2007, p.48) argues that based on the month average of peacekeepers deployed in 2006, China’s personnel contributions surpassed that of the four other members of the Permanent Five of the UNSC. In 2008, about 2,000 Chinese peacekeepers were serving on UN peace missions in countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Lebanon, and Sudan. Similarly, India faces competition from Pakistan that has been participating in external peace operations since the 1960s. Pakistan too has been a major participant in international peacekeeping in the post–Cold War era. It has participated in more than twenty-five UN peace missions abroad and contributed about 30,000 military and other ground personnel in total (Krishnasamy, 2002). In 2008, 10,705 Pakistani military personnel were deployed in eight peacekeeping missions and nine observer missions spread over fourteen countries, making Pakistan the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Another competitor close home to India is Bangladesh. Bangladesh has not been deterred by its weak political structures and economic pressures, as it continues to contribute large peacekeepers since the late 1980s (Krishnasamy, 2003). Bangladesh has made a sizeable troop commitment in more than thirty UN peacekeeping missions. This is significant when compared to India, which has contributed only slightly more missions of forty-three and has been participating in UN peace operations for about sixty years. Although India may view Nigeria as a less competitor, in terms of regional hegemony, when compared to China, Pakistan and perhaps Bangladesh, it has been documented that Nigeria and India had at one time or the other found themselves in competition over who should “command UN operations as was the case in Sierra Leone” (Rooyen, 2010, p.16; Kumar, 2007, p. 34). CHALLENGES AND COMPETITION BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING The involvements of Nigeria and India in UNPKO have not been without challenges, as disagreements have arisen between the two countries over roles, command, and other issues, bordering on perceptions (Bullion, 2004; Srivastava, 1994). A case in point involved disagreements which arose in the UNOMSIL between Nigeria-led ECOMOG force and the UN force headed by an Indian commander (Rooyen, 2010). The Force Commander and Chief

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Military Observer Vijay Kumar Jetley from India had argued that his experience in dealing with army officials and diplomats from Nigeria was increasingly becoming difficult. It was not only “Nigeria that was accused by India of non-cooperation, Britain and US was also accused of non-cooperation in the matter of resolving hostage crisis” (Kumar, 2007, p.34). He also accused the Nigerian generals of insubordination. This troubled relationship came into the open after the international press published several official documents, he had submitted to UN Headquarters in New York, which the Indian commander had allegedly been removed without permission from his computer in Freetown. The Nigerian authorities strongly denied all the charges Vijay Kumar Jetley had made against their officers, and claimed that they had found Jetley remote and unapproachable. Following the failure to resolve the misunderstanding, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee personally took the decision to pull out the Indian contingent. India officially announced that India’s presence in Sierra Leone had been part of a “routine rotation so as to give other member states a chance to participate in the mission,” and removed its troops (Kumar, 2007, p.34). While the Nigerians had perceived the Indian force commander of being dictatorial, the Indians on the other hand had argued that Nigeria’s move was to unseat Jetley (Rooyen, 2010). Another major reason for India’s pullout from Sierra Leone at that time was because the prime minister was facing increasing criticism from members of parliament and some leading members of the armed forces over India’s continuing participation in the mission. THE IMPERATIVE OF STRENGTHENING RELATIONS BETWEEN NIGERIA AND INDIA IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING Given the credentials of both Nigeria and India in peacekeeping operations, the two countries have gained reputations of being “good global citizens” by contributing to global peace and security. Accordingly, the chapter focused on major contributions of Nigeria and India to international peacekeeping operations at bilateral, regional, and global levels. An important lesson to be learned is that despite the cordial relations between the two countries at the bilateral level, their involvement in international peacekeeping is not without challenges, arising from misunderstandings that were quickly resolved in the course of their involvement in the UNOMSIL. Against this backdrop, the chapter recommended increased collaboration between Nigeria and India by strengthening of Nigeria–India defense cooperation, capacity building, and the exchange of military officials and sharing of best practices not only in

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international peacekeeping but also other critical areas of peace and security including terrorism and violent extremism at domestic and global levels (Sharma & Kumar, 2020). This will no doubt go a long way in enhancing mutual understanding between the two countries, including in peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 11

Nigeria–India Relations and the Fight against Terrorism and Insurgency

Terrorism and insurgency are major challenges confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Although terrorism has haunted the world for a long time, it was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack directed at the United States that brought significant global attention to the phenomenon. This was as a result of the extent of the damage and human losses which accompanied the attack on the world’s superpower that was hitherto thought to be invincible. Following the events of September 11, 2001, many nations that did not consider terrorism as a serious social, political, and security issue within their territory felt obliged to support the global movement to eliminate the menace. Nigeria and India have emerged among the world’s most consistent targets of terrorists, insurgents, and militants. While Nigeria ranked third in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index, India ranked eighth (IEP, 2020). Since 2009, the Boko Haram intensified its attack on Nigeria’s Northeast. The group, officially known as Jama atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda a Waati Wal Jihad in Arabic (people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad), is popularly referred to as Boko Haram (Western Education is Sin) because of its stance on Western value system including education. The Boko Haram group attracted more global attention on Nigeria. In the case of India, the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 attracted the most global attention. As a result of their multiethnic and pluralistic societies, both countries have had their experiences with domestic contestations and competition and through history witnessed diverse forms of terrorism, insurgency, and militancy as far back as the colonial era. Though terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria and India, past attempts to brand certain individuals or groups as terrorists and their activities as terrorism have been controversial and problematic. There has been a confusion as to whether certain non-state actors (NSAs) in Nigeria that 221

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employed violence in their agitation for the actualization of various forms of interests—ethnic, religious, and ideological—should be branded as terrorist groups. These include groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Egbesu Boys and Niger Delta Vigilante, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Bakassi boys, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Odua People’s Congress (OPC), and the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) (Ifeka, 2010). Owing to the fact that none of the groups in Nigeria had featured on global terrorist list at that time, Nigerian government had refrained itself from branding these groups as terrorist groups (Ifeka, 2010). That notwithstanding, several incidences of terrorism abound in Nigeria’s historical past. The Maitasine uprising was a classic case of domestic terrorism from 1980 to 1985 (Adesoji, 2010). The havoc unleashed by the group on Kano city in December 1980; Bullunkutu area of Borno state on October 16, 1982; Rigasa village in Kaduna state on October 20; and Jimeta-Yola attack in former Gongola state in 1984 were quite shocking to both citizens and security agencies. The group engaged in the destruction of lives and property as they took on not only civilians but also the army and police with little or no concern for their own lives (Adeoye, 2005). In India, several violent extremist groups have emerged and assumed terrorist coloration over the years. According to Kamath (2002, p. 135), “In the 1960s China actively encouraged insurgent groups in Nagaland and other north-eastern states.” He also stated that several insurgent groups in Nagaland and elsewhere in northeastern states were funded, armed, and trained by China. This continued until Rajiv Gandhi’s state visit to China in 1988. The Punjab separatist movement of the 1980s assumed terrorist color from that period as a result of its religious and ideological orientation. With the aim of promoting Sikh sub-nationalism and violent extremism, violence soon became a norm for this group. The Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) became widespread in India at one time, attracting membership of almost one-third of its population. The LWE did not have religious coloration, but deeply steeped in the communist ideology of the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung. Though the LWE is largely under control today, it is largely based in India’s rural areas and has waged a revolt against the state “for the lack of development and insufficiency of compensation for the extraction of minerals from the rural resource rich areas which coincide with the boundaries of the Red Corridor” (Hasnain, 2020, p. 4). Separatist movements have since 1989 emerged in Jammu and Kashmir. These have been termed as proxy wars largely because it is a border state with territorial issues involving India’s neighboring state of Pakistan. However, India has since labeled this as a terrorist movement since the group employs extreme violence and India believes that attacks in Jammu

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and Kashmir have strong support of forces in Pakistan. Among the scores of insurgent and terrorist groups operating in India, the US State Department recognizes the following as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) or other “groups of concern”: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakatul-Mujahadeen (HuM), The Communist Party of India (Maoist), Harakat-ulJihad al-Islami (HUJI), Jamiat-ul-Mujahadeen, and The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) (Kaplan & Bajoria, 2008, p.1).  Terrorism and insurgency have remained essentially contested concepts. With lack of consensus on definition, the tendency is thus to describe acts of terrorism and insurgency. In order to avoid the conceptual landmines, this chapter adopts the definition accepted by African leaders under the auspices of the Organization of African Union (OAU), now African Union (AU), at its Algiers meeting in 1999 (AU, 2002a, AU, 2002b). According to OAU/AU, terrorism is any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity, or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any member, or group of persons, or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental, or cultural heritage (AU, 2002a, AU, 2002b). To counterterrorism is to act against or in opposition to terrorism. Hence, counterterrorism has also been referred to as antiterrorism or prevention of terrorism. Keen and Attree (2015) opined that counterterrorism consists of military efforts to defeat particular actors who have been designated as “terrorists” and/or their sponsors. The term broadly captures broad efforts at national, regional, and global levels to combat or prevent terrorism. Counterterrorism may also include efforts to apply law enforcement approaches to disrupt, prevent, or punish terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies include attempts to counter financing of terrorism. The United States Department of the Army (2014) defined insurgencies as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” It also refers to a rebellion against a recognized and accepted authority. Insurgent warfare is marked by the absence of fixed lines, by the use of secrecy and ambush, and by the competition for the support of the population between the insurgents and their opponents. Insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political communities. Insurgencies are often characterized by an organized, non-state paramilitary force attempting to subvert the legitimate government of a region, and implementing its own informal regime in its place. It must be noted that insurgencies, while outwardly militaristic, are often rooted in an ideal or ideology. This may be a political system, independent movement, religious motivation, or any other unifying cause. The defeat of an insurgency cannot be achieved solely through military might, hence the need to win the hearts and minds of the people through political, economic, psychological, and civic actions.

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Counterinsurgency, as used in this chapter, means going beyond the military approach to designed solutions as well as comprehensive civilian efforts to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. No doubt, both Nigeria and India have recognized that the phenomenon of terrorism poses serious challenges to their domestic stabilities, securities of lives and properties, and both recognize the imperative of domestic and cooperative efforts in countering terrorism. It is against this background that this chapter examines the threats posed by terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria and India and efforts by these countries at countering terrorism and insurgency. TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA Given that terrorism is not a new phenomenon, there is no country of the world where it is absolutely absent. Nigeria has had its own share of domestic terrorism even though such acts were hardly described as terrorism. The attempts in the past in Nigeria to brand certain groups as terrorists and their activities as terrorism have been problematic. There has also been a confusion as to whether groups agitating for various forms of interests—ethnic, religious, and social groups—are, or should be, branded as terrorist groups. These include groups such as the IYC, MOSOP, MEND, Bakassi boys, MASSOB, OPC, and APC, among others. At the same time, these groups hardly met the classification as set by the United Nations and the US government, neither were they included in the list of global terrorists, which included individuals such as Osama bin Laden, and entities linked to the Al Qaeda and Taliban. Owing to the fact that none of the groups in Nigeria had featured on global list at that time, although there were instances of linkages between groups in northern Nigeria and the Taliban, Nigerian government had refrained from branding these groups as terrorist groups (Ifeka, 2010). That notwithstanding, several incidences of terrorism abound, especially during the civilian and military era. The emergence of the Maitasine was seen as the epitome of religious fanaticism (Adesoji, 2010, p.96). The fact remains that the Maitasine uprising was a classic case of domestic terrorism. From 1980 to 1985, the Maitasine became a veritable force that threatened the sociopolitical and religious stability of Nigeria. The havoc unleashed by the group on Kano city in December 1980 was quite shocking to both citizens and security agencies. The group as they took on caused grievous damages to lives and property of not only civilians but also the army and police with little or no concern for their own lives (Adeoye, 2005, p.2). Apart from the Maitasine phenomenon in the 1980s, the sporadic bombings and political assassinations were the most terrifying forms of domestic terrorism that gripped some parts

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of Nigeria. Between 1986 and 1996, a large number of terrorist activities carried out were labeled assassinations. For instance, during the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, the assassination of Dele Giwa, the founding chief executive and editor-in-chief of the Newswatch magazine, through a letter bomb on Sunday, October 19, 1986, was hardly tagged as an act of terrorism. There were also political assassinations of persons such as the late chief Alfred Rewane, on October 6, 1995, and late Kudirat Abiola on June 4, 1996. These were often described by the government and security forces as assassinations by criminal elements. Apart from assassinations, several bomb explosions also occurred during the regime of General Sani Abacha in cities such as Ilorin and Lagos (Saliu, 2010). Terrorism in Nigeria had also targeted the aviation sector. The first incident of terrorist violence on the civil aviation was experienced on October 25, 1993, the Airbus 310, Flight WT, which took off from the domestic wing of Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos, heading to Abuja, was highjacked by four Nigerian youths and diverted to Niamey, Niger Republic. The hijackers, acting under the umbrella of the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD), had declared that they were protesting against the dictatorship of the late General Sani Abacha (Adeoye, 2005). Since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, after many years of military authoritarian rule, the country has been faced with complex security challenges that continue to threaten democratic consolidation in the country. The tendency of resorting to terrorist violence to resolve conflicts rather than dialogue and negotiation also became a recurring decimal. The opening of the democratic space in the country as from 1999 was followed by the emergence and the intensification in activities of certain ethnic, political, religious, and social groups that have seriously threatened Nigeria’s national security. While these groups were prevalent in different parts of the country, North, South, East, and West, the activities of the groups in oil-rich Niger Delta, South–South Nigeria, posed a serious concern because the area also accounts for about 90 percent of the government’s revenue (Ibaba, 2011). The activities of groups agitating for development of the region of Niger Delta against the backdrop of environmental degradation and pollution occasioned by oil exploration activities initially were not linked with terrorism in anyway. For about a decade now, however, these agitations assumed a violent dimension, with heavy casualties recorded. The region became the highest flash-point of conflict between groups, and militants and federal troops posted to secure facilities in that part of the country. Such militant groups deviated to terrorist acts including kidnappings and the demands of ransom and vandalism (Ibaba, 2011). Even though several groups were involved in the agitations in the Niger Delta region, the activities of groups such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC),

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Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the NDPVF, and the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), and several others took a different dimension when they began to kidnap oil workers and demanding ransoms, attacking of police stations, shutting down oil platforms, and many other similar activities, to draw attention to their cause. In the area of kidnapping, initially only expatriates or foreigners working in oil companies were the main targets, but subsequently, Nigerians including women and children and the aged also became targets, because of the huge ransom payment that accompanied their release. The situation was particularly worrisome in the years 1991–2000, when Nigeria was ranked ninth behind nations such as Columbia, Mexico, Russia, the Philippines, and Venezuela in the annual rankings of kidnapping. For instance, in 2008, the rate of kidnapping in Nigeria was 353 and in 2009, it had risen to 512 (Ojukwu, 2011, p. 21). In an effort to bring peace to the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s federal government created the amnesty program which required militants to surrender their weapons and in return receive a presidential pardon, education, training, and access to a rehabilitation program. The amnesty program though ongoing has reduced tension and militancy in the region. The government budgeted about US$63 million for rehabilitation and reintegration programs, and for allowances for thousands of militants. No doubt, some progress has been made. However, it is questionable whether peace can be sustained in the region long after the amnesty program. Although Nigeria has a history of violent acts that could have been branded as terrorism, a new dimension emerged with the infamous attempt by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while onboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253, carrying 279 passengers and 11 crew members, en route to Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport in the United States on December 25, 2009. Before then, the United States and its allies had expressed worry over the likelihood of Nigeria being used as a spot in the terrorist networks. Following the failed attempt by Abdulmutallab, Nigeria was put in the spotlight. The concern over Nigeria’s vulnerability to terrorism assumed a more worrisome dimension when it was confirmed that Abdulmutallab had been trained in Yemen. The response of the United States following the failed bombing attempt was swift and twofold: first, actions which included thorough checking of passengers traveling to the United States was taken to further enhance aviation security; second, Nigeria was blacklisted by her inclusion in US terrorist watch lists. By classifying Nigeria as a “country of interest” in the US terrorist watch list, it found itself among countries considered by the United States as state sponsors of terrorism (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011). These included Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria, and others simply described as “countries of interest”: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and

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Yemen. The implication of blacklisting a country is that citizens of the designated and affected countries will be subjected to enhanced screening techniques, such as body scans, pat down, and a thorough search of carry-on luggage for traces of explosives—no matter where they are traveling from. Despite the often-acclaimed cordial relations that have existed between the two countries, the blacklisting of Nigeria sparked a diplomatic row with the United States when the Nigerian government strongly criticized the decision to include it in the US terrorist watch list. Scholars, government officials, and the National Assembly condemned the measures taken by the United States against Nigeria. Following the blacklisting of Nigeria, the government stepped up its diplomatic engagement with the US government, with a view to reversing the negative trend. Given Nigeria’s strategic and economic importance, it was not long before the crisis was resolved, of course not completely washing out the stain created. The United States considers Nigeria important for certain reasons. Nigeria accounts for about 12 percent of crude that comes to the United States and is also seen by the United States as a strategic country within West Africa and Africa, given her huge population size of about 140 million and large number of Muslims, especially in the northern part of the country (Mikell, 2008). Notwithstanding there was a demand from the United States that Nigeria should improve the security in the nation’s airports. At the same time understanding was reached for passing legislation geared toward combating terrorism in the country and deployment of air marshals on board of aircraft (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011). Another event which brought terrorism in Nigeria to international spotlight was the twin bomb blast that disrupted the October 2010 celebration of Nigeria’s fiftieth independence anniversary in Abuja, and killed about twelve people and injured several others. MEND claimed responsibility for the blasts. This attack took place after a similar type of vehicle bombing took place in March 2010 in Warri, Delta state, Niger Delta. Unlike the previous attacks by the militant group, both attacks were not aimed at oil installations but rather targeted a public gathering where a large number of Nigerians had turned out to celebrate Nigeria’s fiftieth independence anniversary. Investigations by security forces led to the arrest of Henry Okah, who was based in South Africa and who coordinated the attack with the support of other allies based in Nigeria. The outbreak of the Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria in July 2009 marked yet another phase of terrorism in Nigeria. Boko Haram has perpetrated numerous human rights abuses and acts of violence. In July 2009, for instance, members of the sect staged spectacular attacks on government institutions. In response, a state-sanctioned aggressive crackdown led to the killing of over 700 members of the group including their leader Muhammed Yusuf. About a year later, in September 2010, Boko Haram carried out another attack that

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involved a prison break in Bauchi which set free over 700 inmates, including members that had been detained since the July 2009 revolt. In addition, over five people including a soldier, a policeman, two prison wardens, and a civilian were killed during the attack. The attacks by this extremist sect have increased in tempo in recent times. Even though the Boko Haram intensified its domestic terrorist activities from 2009, two events in 2011 announced the ascension of the Boko Haram on the international terror scene. These were the bombing of the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja, on June 16, 2011, and the attack on the UN headquarters building in Abuja on August 26, 2011. These events provided a source for serious worry both nationally and internationally, because of the change in the group’s tactics and targets. The bombing of the Nigerian police headquarters, for instance, marked the first time that a Vehicle Bone Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) manned by a suicide bomber was used in Nigeria. Since then, the vehicle-borne improvised explosive, which is commonly used by international terrorists such as the Al Qaeda and Hamas, has been used in several bomb attacks within the country. It was reported that between September 2010 and December 2011, Boko Haram carried out about forty-five major operations (Cook, 2012). The economic structure of Nigeria is gradually being influenced by Boko Haram’s activity, particularly in northern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (the BAY states). Critical resources needed for development are being diverted toward fighting insurgency. The changing economic condition of northern Nigeria is evident in increasing migration across the states. The repatriation of huge sums of money among others as a result of the migrations has all contributed to the distortion of economic structures in the North. The activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria have also affected neighboring countries like Cameroun, Chad, and Niger. In fact, the whole of Lake Chad Basin has been grabbling with a complex humanitarian emergency as a result of the crisis. According to a report by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2019), over 3.3 million people have been displaced since the inception of the insurgency, including over 2.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in northeastern Nigeria, over 550,000 IDPs in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, and about 240,000 refugees in the four countries (UNHCR, 2020). TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN INDIA On its part, India was confronted with violence and insurgency movements from the moment of its inception in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan (Asthana, 2010). Since then, terrorists and insurgents have continued to

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threaten peace and stability of the people of India. India faces the threat of terrorism and insurgency from several domestic and transnational groups. According to Hoffman (2006), terrorism found in India can be termed “Islamic,” “separatist,” and “left wing.” The regions with long history of terrorist activities have been Jammu and Kashmir, East–central, South–central India, and the seven sister states (Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland). It was reported in 2008 that there were as many as 800 terrorist cells operating in India. The South Asia Terrorism Portal noted that a total of 180 terrorist groups have operated within India over the last twenty years. Many of the terrorist groups have alliances with international terror networks operating in or from neighboring South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. As at 2013, it was reported that not less than 205 of the country’s 608 districts were affected by the activities of terrorists. Among the domestic terrorist groups are the Naxalites, Maoists that operate in the states of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, and others; Hindu extremists; and various separatist groups. While the Naxalbari movement of militant peasants is against rich landowners, Maoist insurgency violence is spread in more than fourteen states (Asthana, 2010). The northeastern states in India have experienced insurgency movements since 1956, when states like Nagaland and Mizoram demanded independence (Roy, 2020). The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) sought to create an independent state of Assam in the Northeast. This group is one of the indigenous insurgent movement that has threatened the stability and security of India. Religious insurgency has also been a major problem in India. The beginnings of the recurring religious insurgency have been linked to the rise of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in Indian-controlled Kashmir (Asthana, 2010). However, over the years, this group was dominated by other more radical groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen that later became more violent and adopted terrorist tactics with the support of Pakistan to perpetuate a low-intensity conflict with India (Asthana, 2010). India has also been a victim of transnational terrorism. Since independence in 1947, India has had an uneasy relationship with Pakistan, a country which India notes for using NSAs as proxies to fight its war (Hooda, 2020). The two countries have not only been to war but occasionally have clashes at the border areas. Pakistan’s support for the mujahideen is seen as a payback to India for its humiliating defeat of the 1971 war and dismemberment of East Pakistan into Bangladesh. The competitive relationship between the two countries have led them to pursue massive acquisition of military power including nuclear power and continuous expansion of the size and equipment of their military, which are also deployed to the border areas.

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Since the 1980s, Punjab experienced insurgent movements seeking a separate state called “Khalistan” that turned violent, necessitating Indira Gandhi, India’s then prime minister, to order military action on the Golden Temple as well as the Akal Takht, the Sikh Reference Library. That same year, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh bodyguards believed to be driven by the Golden Temple affair and widespread anti-Sikh riots ensured, especially in New Delhi. Several parts of India including Uttar Pradesh, the seven sisters (Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland), Bangalore, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and New Delhi, among others have experienced several terrorist and insurgent attacks over the years (Kozak, 2011; Mishra, 2014; South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2014). India has also been seriously affected by the consequences of foreign intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, particularly as a result of the cross-border movement of Afghan veterans and illegal arms (Asthana, 2010). The insurgency by Kashmiris has been linked to issues concerning the 1986 election in Kashmir, and the breakdown of law. India’s neighbor was accused of taking advantage of the situation to arm and train Kashmiri youths who in turn waged insurgency operations against India. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a militant separatist movement, was initially responsible for all political violence and insurgency in Kashmir. The terrorist and insurgent groups in India have laid claim to be fighting for liberation hinged on ideology or religion or a combination of both. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are known for the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, the February 2007 blast of a train between India and Pakistan, and the orchestration of November 26, 2008, Mumbai attacks (Asthana, 2010). Some of the other groups that operate in the region and have been alleged to have carried out attacks against India are Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI), Jamat-ul-Mujahideen, and Hizbul Mujahideen. Apart from Pakistan, India also faces terrorist threats from its eastern border with Bangladesh. Attacks by HUJI have been attributed to Bangladeshi soil. There has also been emergence of newer groups like the Deccan Mujahideen and Indian Mujahideen. Mumbai appears to be one of the hottest spots and targeted area for most terrorists in India. It is alleged that many of the terrorists attacking Mumbai have their operational base in Pakistan (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2014). Though several terrorist attacks targeted Mumbai, before and after 2008, the attack of November 26–29, 2008, was unprecedented and attracted condemnation worldwide. In this terrorist attack, two major hotels, a landmark train station, and a Jewish Chabad house, in South Mumbai, were attacked and many people were killed. By the time the security forces in India ended the siege, not less than 172 people had been killed. Beyond the Mumbai attacks,

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bombs exploded in Bihar during an election rally on October 27, 2013; bombs exploded in a terror attack at the Bodh Gaya temple complex in July 2013. New Delhi, the capital, has also been targeted for attacks by terrorists. For instance, the 2011 Delhi bombing took place on Wednesday, September 7, 2011, happened outside the gate of the Delhi High Court (Katoch, 2020). It has been revealed that there has been high level of involvement of local elements in the actual local-level planning, execution of these terrorist, and insurgency acts with the help and support of external groups (Asthana, 2010). It has also been revealed that the increasing use of technology and communications have enabled them to successfully avoid detection in the processes of planning and executions of operations. Using these strategies, the Indian Mujahideen joined the terror of forces claiming responsibility for the series of blasts in November 2007 in the state of Uttar Pradesh and the 2008 attacks in the Indian cities of New Delhi, Jaipur, India’s software capital Bangalore, the industrial city of Ahmedabad, and the high-tech hub Hyderabad. The Indian Mujahideen, a homegrown group, has been linked to the Bangladeshi HUJI and another organization that has recently been in controversy for its radicalism, the Student Islamic Movement in India (SIMI). According to Hasnain (2020), the terrorists and insurgent groups in India have some basic differences which may set them apart from each other. These include, but not limited to the historical reasons for the movement, the terrain of operation, level of foreign support, ideological disposition, and the ultimate objective and goal. Hasnain (2020) also argued that there are some commonalities between all of them. These include charismatic leadership to mobilize supporters; building an environment of hate against the mother country; resources (human and finance which is the livewire of terrorism); and supply of arms and ideology. Terrorism also depends on networks, technology, and communication including the wide usage of the social media to broadcast its activities. Knowledge of why and who terrorist and insurgents are able to sustain their activities becomes imperative in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts of states. COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS IN NIGERIA In the fight against international terrorism, Nigeria has been both a contributor and a victim. Since the intensification of Boko Haram terrorism as from 2009, Nigeria’s national security has been deeply affected (Abubakar, 2017). The devastating impact in terms of killings, population displacements, and humanitarian complexes engendered necessitated the adoption of several counterterrorism measures in Nigeria. From the foreign policy

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angle, it also encouraged Nigeria to leverage on bilateral and multilateral partnerships with a view to strengthening its capacity for counterterrorism. According to Dasuki (2013), the initial efforts at countering terrorism by the Nigerian state included the declaration of state of emergency and imposition of curfew; the establishment of the Seventh Division of the Nigerian Army in Maiduguri; establishment of Almajiri schools; relocation of military command center to Maiduguri; banning and restoration of Global System for Mobile Communication (GSMC) services; and establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Further efforts are setting up a committee on the proliferation of small and light weapons and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program. More assertive efforts in countering terrorism included the making of laws and a strategy on counterterrorism. The laws are the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (Amended in 2013), (TPA 2013); Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act (Amended 2012), (MLPA 2012); and the establishment of the National Counter-terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) (Dasuki, 2013). Barkindo and Byranss (2016) submitted that the NACTEST, a presidential directive signed on April 30, 2014, serves as a framework that guides all the counterterrorism measures of the Nigerian government and seeks to strengthen the synergy of all the agencies saddled with counterterrorism. According to Dasuki (2013), a counterterrorism center domiciled in the ONSA is saddled with the implementation of the NACTEST, whose objectives are to “forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement” (NACTEST, 2014). Barkindo and Byranss (2016) noted that the NACTEST seeks to embrace nonviolent strategies to combat terrorism by adopting a comprehensive approach that addresses both the root causes and the most effective response to terrorist attacks. In addition, Dasuki (2013, p.9) argues that the NACTEST is designed to provide a comprehensive and holistic approach to counterterrorism. Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts also involved strengthening partnership with its neighbors and global powers. Under the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with military strength of about 10,000 forces were reactivated. The MNJTF comprises troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon, and the Benin Republic to forestall the cross-border activities of the group within the Lake Chad region (Amnesty International, 2015). Several developed countries proscribed the terrorist organization. The United States designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) in 2014; UK listed Boko Haram as a proscribed terrorist organization in 2013; and the United Nations and the EU designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization by 2014. The United States Department of Defence (US DOD) undertook training of 650 Nigerian soldiers in combat operations, provision of aid by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and proscription of Boko Haram

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leaders with placement of US$7 million bounty on Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader (Dasuki, 2013; Faluyi, 2017). While several concerted efforts have been made by the Nigerian government to end the scourge of Boko Haram, “it is not yet Uhuru” for Nigeria’s fight against terror. Despite claims of Boko Haram and its affiliates being disseminated, the violent NSA has continued to attack soft spots in the Northeast (Bappah, 2016). For example, the Nigerian military and other security forces were preoccupied with enforcing the lockdown order, together with the closure of schools, ban on social gatherings, closure of borders, and ban on international flights, which were the measures instituted by the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19, to curtail the spread of the disease, and violent non-state armed groups such as the BH and the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) exploited the void to further their terrorist activities in the Northeast. Under the COVID-19 lockdown, the insurgents ambushed and killed military officers on March 21, 2020, and also attacked communities in Gubio, Nganzai, and Monguno local government areas of Borno state. The attacks on communities already under the economic pangs of lockdowns due to COVID-19, no doubt have aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the region. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), noted that as a result of COVID-19, the number of people in need of urgent assistance in Northeast Nigeria rose from 7.9 million at the beginning of 2020 to 10.6 million by early July 2020. COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS IN INDIA India’s initial response to terrorism and insurgency was through the use of force to quell disturbances in the affected regions. Over the years, it has moved into coordinated counterinsurgency operations, economic development, and psychological initiatives. In 2002, India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) (Kaplan & Bajoria, 2008). This act expanded the government’s powers in combating terrorism. It included measures such as the ability to keep terror suspects in custody without bringing them to trial. However, the law was repealed in 2004, just two years after its introduction. This was as a result of allegations that government officials and even security forces were abusing their powers. Following its repeal, and following spate of bombings, there were demands for introduction of a strong law against terrorism. In December 2007, India released a doctrine for sub-conventional operations dealing specifically with counterinsurgency (Asthana, 2010). This doctrine, released by the Indian Army, advocates respect for human rights and minimum use of force to create security. The doctrine advocates the use

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of force against foreign and “hardcore” terrorists while giving a fair opportunity to others to surrender. The doctrine also placed importance on civic projects that emphasize and target youths, creation of jobs, and improvement of education and health care. The doctrine attempts to formalize conduct of counterinsurgency operations with a strategy of civic and military measures, oscillating between a mix of political accommodation, economic development, and the use of force. As stated in India’s quasi-federal constitution, the responsibility for maintaining law and order is a part of the state list (Asthana, 2010). While the responsibility for immediate action and follow-up for any law-and-order incident rests with the state police, the central government in New Delhi provides the states with financial support, training, professional help, and shares collected intelligence (Subramanian, 2007). India’s counterterrorism structure is large and characterized by complex bureaucracy. An important set of agencies responsible for fighting terrorism in India are the intelligence organizations. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the external intelligence agency utilized in gathering cross-border information (Kaplan & Bajoria, 2008). The Intelligence Bureau (IB), a division of Home Affairs Ministry, is responsible for collecting intelligence information inside India (Asthana, 2010). A joint committee analyzes intelligence information collected from RAW, IB, and military intelligence agencies that provide tactical information in general and during counterinsurgency operations. There also exists the Intelligence Director General of the Armed Forces, whose purpose is to gather and collect tactical intelligence during counterterrorism operations that may be carried out in Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast, and elsewhere (Asthana, 2010). India also established the Defense Intelligence Agency which coordinates intelligence inputs from the Army, Navy and the Air Force. The agency interacts with all important ministries dealing with national security, the IB, and the RAW (Kaplan & Bajoria, 2008). Other agencies include special security forces to guard high-profile targets and the specially trained National Security Guards for terrorist situations like hostage crises and kidnappings. The central government has a large number of paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force, and the Border Security Force (Asthana, 2010). These paramilitary forces can assist the police during counterterrorism operations. During a terrorist attack, the local administration and the police try to take control of the situation at first. The army’s role in counterterrorism operations comes in only as a last resort, except in Kashmir under the Armed forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990. The Indian army has special privileges and is at the forefront in counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir and the Northeast. In the case of Kashmir, a unified headquarters has been established under the chief minister to coordinate all activities of

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the army, police, and the intelligence agencies. The armed forces are under the control of the central government and are by far the most disciplined, efficient, and organized force in the country. The Ministry of Home Affairs oversees all the above agencies except army, which falls under the Ministry of Defense (Asthana, 2010). There has also emerged a Counter Terrorism division in the Ministry of External Affairs whose task is to brief countries diplomatically about terrorism and Pakistan’s role in terrorism. This division also deals with issues of extradition and other legal assistance. After the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, the Central Government also established a National Investigation Agency (NIA) empowered to deal with terror across states without special permission from the states (Times of India, 2008). It will investigate terrorist crimes and offensives. CHALLENGES OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT The Nigerian government has responded to terrorism by the Boko Haram by initiating various counterterrorism measures. However, it would appear that the measures have been counterproductive and, in some cases, exacerbated existing tensions. According to Solomon (2012), the response of the Nigerian government to Boko Haram since 2009 has been largely militaristic by meeting “violence with violence.” For example, the killing of Mohammed Yusuf in custody on July 31, 2009, revealed that despite violent security responses and decapitation of Boko Haram’s leader, the group could rebound with more force unleashing more violence and mayhem. Following attacks by the Boko Haram in 2011, the government set up a Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in 2011. It consists of personnel from the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), and the Defence Intelligence Agencies (DIA). The creation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) was to block leakage of intelligence and allow for better coordination among the security services. In addition, various checkpoints were mounted, more security deployed, and curfew imposed in places such as Adamawa. The government also closed its borders with northern neighboring countries (Solomon, 2012, p.7). However, given the length of Nigerian borders, the terrain and capacity of security, the borders largely remained porous. A consequence of the 9/11 attacks is that it impelled the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pass Resolution 1373 by which all the member states were required to make terrorism a serious crime in domestic legislation along with terrorist funding and other ancillary offenses. UNSC also set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to follow up progress in the implementation of the resolution by member

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states. Accordingly, member states were urged to comply with the resolution without delay by amending their existing counterterrorism laws or enacting new ones. Prompted by increased terrorism by the Boko Haram in Nigeria, the government also adopted an anti-terrorism bill to provide legal backing in the fight against terrorism. It was later passed by the National Assembly and signed into law as the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and later amended in 2013. However, the effectiveness of the legislation in curbing terrorism in Nigeria is at best questionable. According to Sampson (2015), terrorism by Boko Haram and counterterrorism by the Nigerian state have impacted on human rights with devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the rights to life and liberty, and the physical integrity of victims. Largely, the security and enforcement agencies have imposed curfews, engaged in mass arrests, house-to-house searches, destruction of people’s homes, and unwarranted detentions and interrogations of anyone suspected to be associated with Boko Haram. According to Serrano and Pieri, (2014) the security and enforcement agencies have not been proactive but rather reactionary in their actions. This has been attributed to poor intelligence gathering and interagency mistrust. The need to differentiate between terrorists and innocent civilians and also bridge the gap in intelligence gathering led to the partnership between the military and civilians known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Supported by the government, the CJTF engages in intelligence gathering, effecting arrests of identified Boko Haram members, and physical battles with the Boko Haram. On the one hand, efforts by the CJTF have been fruitful. They have appreciable knowledge of the Boko Haram tactics and have provided strong support for the military in the fight against the Boko Haram. However, the CJTF have also been accused of human rights abuses including torture, rape, and dismemberment of their victims (Sampson, 2015). This no doubt reveals a stark weakness of Nigeria’s counterterrorism. The challenges confronting Nigeria’s conception of terrorism and counterterrorism require further elucidation. First, it is difficult to fight an organization that is largely diffused in nature and lacking a clear chain of command. Second, not much is known about the sources of finance of the Boko Haram. Terrorism financing is no doubt the lifeblood of any terrorist organization and blocking same drains the group of such lifeblood. Third, the upsurge of Boko Haram activities points to the spread of radical ideologies, and in particular aligned to Al Qaeda in the Magreb and the Islamic State. Accordingly, the Boko Haram views the Nigerian state as evil and unworthy of allegiance. This thinking provides the group justification to target everyone that aligns with the state. Fourth, Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts are crippled by the incapacity of the Nigerian security, particularly weakness of the intelligence services such as the DSS and NIA. Fifth, Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts

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have proved to be counterproductive on account of the brutality unleashed by the security forces on Nigerian citizens. The JTF in Borno state was accused by Amnesty International of resorting to unlawful killings, discriminate arrest of civilians in areas of attack, extortion, and intimidation. Even though these allegations were denied, most Nigerians do not trust the security themselves to volunteer information to them. The issues of professionalism and corruption have also crippled Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts. According to Bappa (2016), until the involvement of troops from Chad and Niger in January 2015, and later the establishment of the MNJTF under the LCBC, the Boko Haram insurgents were succeeding in their effort to establish an extreme version of the “Islamic state” in parts of Northeast Nigeria. The initial failure recorded by the military was as a result of deep-rooted factors such as the erosion of military professionalism under civilian administrations since 1999; the poor handling of the war by the top military officers; and a lack of decisiveness in the leadership to end the insurgency. In the case of Nigeria, corruption has undermined the effectiveness of counterterrorism. According to Transparency International (TI), former military chiefs have stolen as much as US$15 billion of money meant for defense. The former national security adviser Sambo Dasuki was arrested and on trial for allegedly diverting funds meant for the counterterrorism war (Vanguard News, 2017). Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that the approach of counterterrorism through military efforts to defeat terrorists and existence of national anti-terrorism laws is not a sufficient attestation of success of counterterrorism. CHALLENGES OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN INDIA India’s counterterrorism approach has been political and never the exclusive domain of the military. India tries to avoid the use of hard approach to domestic counterterrorism. India’s strategy is therefore considered soft. As a democracy and given its multiethnic and multireligious diversity, India tends to adopt measures that are favored by some other states. India’s own soft response to terrorism has emboldened international terrorists and their sponsors over the years. Pakistan has employed homegrown terrorists and Afghan veterans to threaten India. It has been stated that India lacks the sophisticated intelligence and law enforcement capacities that United States and European countries like England, France, and Spain employ to protect its citizens and uncover terrorist plots before they are actually executed. India’s intelligence agencies and state police are mostly structured as agencies to protect law and order and spy on rivals, rather than act as investigative and intelligence units

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(Chidambaran, 2009). These structural issues lead to reluctance of sharing information among the agencies (Chidambaran, 2009). India’s police and internal security system remains highly fragmented and poorly coordinated (Rabasa et al., 2009). The government’s responses to the November 26, 2008, Mumbai attacks have been criticized as failure of coordination (Kaplan & Bajoria, 2008; Oberoi, 2008). On coordination, there are a combination of state and central authorities, and a lot of joint committees and task forces. However, the process is highly cumbersome and slow (Gupta, 2008). State and central agencies compete over resources. Apart from these challenges, it has been stated that most security institutions are understaffed, undertrained, and technologically backward. LESSONS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NIGERIA AND INDIA AND EFFORTS TOWARD STRENGTHENING BILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION India has since its independence in 1947 has been battling terrorism. Compared to India, Nigeria has had fewer years of experience in battling terrorism. Despite the fact that terrorism is not so new in Nigeria, the emergence of Boko Haram necessitated the redefinition of Nigeria’s stance on the fight against terrorism. Given the relatively new brand of terrorism that Nigeria had to confront, its response was initially hesitant, cautious, and slow particularly on aspects of its response to radicalization and violent extremism (Akilu & Jaji, 2020). India has confronted multiple variants of terrorism and engaged in many campaigns against distinct terrorists and insurgents. Despite these challenges confront India, it has been able to achieve high level of industrialization and growth in agriculture, medical care, and push the embers of socioeconomic and political development. It is also interesting to note that India has remained the world’s largest democracy. According to Sharma and Kumar (2020) even though India still faces several challenges in her counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, there are key lessons to be drawn from India’s experience. These lessons apply to Nigeria as well. First, the necessity of keeping the institutions of government functional. Insurgents and terrorist assumed victory when they are able to disrupt administration and paralyzes the institutions of governance. This is instructive. Drawing from the Nigerian experience, it was reported that by March 2015, the Boko Haram controlled around twenty local government areas in Nigeria’s Northeast. Having dislodged the administrative and governance structures in these local governments, they foisted their flag. However, Nigeria’s military has recovered these local governments,

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leading the Boko Haram to retreat to the Sambisa forest. From the Indian and Nigerian experience, it is evident that the people remain unbroken if institutions of government remain functional and this is important in reinitiating development and addressing aggrieved population (Sharma & Kumar, 2020). Second, the dedication of counterinsurgency and counterterrorist forces is very crucial. India’s experience in the past seven decades reveals that a dedicated counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces is critical in harnessing intelligence, knowledge of terrains of operation, culture, and demography. Also, from the Indian experience, the military operations use minimum force so as to prevent collateral damages. Forces are trained to operation in specific terrains and over the years have acquired experience and ensures commitment to operations. Examples from India include the Assam Rifles which is synonymous with the acronym of Sentinels of the East and Rashtriya Rifles, a force which specializes in counterterrorism operation in Jammu and Kashmir and has thorough knowledge of the terrain and culture, sentiments, and vulnerabilities of the people. It also creates trust and bond between the people and the forces. Third important lesson to be taken from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism from the Indian experience is the cultivation of close relations with neighboring countries. It is important to work closely with neighbors when dealing with instability especially when they have similar challenges. While India’s neighbors including Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar have cooperated with India in its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, not all have been sincerely supportive of these efforts. In the case of Nigeria, her immediate neighbors are Chad to the Northeast; Niger to the North; Republic of Benin to the West; Cameroun to the East; and Equatorial Guinea to the South on the Atlantic Coast. Nigeria has collaborated with her neighbors in the fight against terror and together forming the MNJTF under the LCBC. The MNJTF comprises troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroon, and the Benin Republic and they have been in the forefront of the counterterrorism activities in the Lake Chad region. The fourth lesson is the involvement of the civil society and promoting community meditation. There is no doubt that the civil society organizations play a vital role in providing a platform for the engagement with the insurgents and terrorists. Such channels should not be closed by government officials and security forces. Rather they should be maximized for the benefit of peace and security in the country. Another lesson from the Indian experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is the need for political integration of dissatisfied and agitative members within the state. According to Sharma and Kumar (2020, p. 168), “The political incorporation of insurgents has enabled India to keep watch and control over insurgent separatist movements in the seven states of India’s Northeast since 1956.” The issue of

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integration of repentant Boko Haram members has remained very controversial in Nigeria. Beyond nonacceptance of repentant Boko Haram members community members (Bukarti & Bryson, 2019), for now Nigeria is far from politically incorporating Boko Haram leaders and members. India learned two lessons from its experience. One, that if the conflicts are not resolved, institutions of governance cannot function effectively. Hence, engaging politically with insurgents can allow institutions of governance to function. Two, India learned that rehabilitation and reintegration, skilling and retooling of insurgents should be done in a structured manner for the political process to be functional. These lessons are no doubt instructive. Even so, while dealing with insurgent and terrorist groups already in existence, there is the need to prevent terrorism and insurgency through inclusive growth, public participation, and deliverance of good governance. Primarily, the state’s failure to provide basic rights, services, equitable distribution of resources and political power, employment generation for the huge and growing youthful population and security contributes to growing inequality. It also creates a vacuum that allows violent NSAs to exploit and take control over state sovereignty and territory (Sharma. & Kumar, 2020). Terrorism has since assumed a transnational nature and thus requires bilateral and multilateral cooperation and efforts. In this regard, Nigeria and India have agreed to work together to address the challenges posed by global terrorism. This was reflected in the Joint Communique of the Virtual Bilateral Meeting held on September 1, 2020, between H.E. Dr. S. Jaishankar, minister of external affairs, and H.E. Mr. Geoffrey Onyeama, minister of foreign affairs, Federal Republic of Nigeria (High Commission of India, AbujaNigeria, 2020). During the interaction, the two ministers recognized and acknowledged the cooperation in the field of defense training and capacity building, and noted that it was expanding to newer areas such as defense equipment support, medical and maintenance services, sharing of research and development expertise for counterterrorism and counter-insurgency, and regular exchange of information (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The ministers urged the armed forces of both countries to continue to work together in the ongoing efforts to counter terrorism, insurgency and piracy. Apart from the diplomatic interactions aimed at strengthening cooperation toward counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, there have been institutional collaborations in this regard. The United Service Institute of India (USI) and the Nigerian Army Resource Centre (NARC) have taken “an initiative to collaborate to carry out studies, document experiences and methodology of dealing with terrorism and insurgencies from their respective perspective nations” (Sharma & Kumar, 2020, p. xiv). The overall objective of the collaboration is to derive lessons from the Indian and Nigerian experiences of dealing with militancy, violent extremism, insurgency, and

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terrorism. This collaboration has started yielding positive results. The landmark joint study involving academicians, military officers, and practitioners led to the publication of a book on India–Nigeria experience in combating terrorism. In line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCT), which identified four pillars to deal with terrorism, Nigeria and India should continue to collaborate toward addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, adopting measures to prevent and combat terrorism and measures to build their capacities to prevent and combat terrorism. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS Both Nigeria and India have been confronted with diverse groups of insurgents and terrorists that threaten the stability, peace, and security of both countries. Efforts by both countries to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have produced varied experiences. No doubt, India, which has been fighting terrorism and insurgency since its independence in 1947 has acquired more experience. Even so, it continues to face serious challenges in its vast regions. The chapter argues that India’s experiences provide viable lessons for Nigeria’s fight against the Boko Haram and its splitter groups operating in the Northeast. Lessons from Nigeria and India have shown that in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, there is the need for a strong government, dedication of security forces, harnessing intelligence, good governance, respect for human rights, collaboration with civil society, and cultivation of good relationship with neighboring countries. More so, terrorism and insurgency have acquired new dimensions with modern technology including the Internet, communication, ideology, and availability of small arms and light weapons. The nature, targets, and impact of terrorism and insurgency have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Against the backdrop of the reality that terrorism is no longer a domestic phenomenon, having assumed complex transnational dimension, shared experiences, collaboration, and cooperation between countries such as Nigeria and India become inevitable.

Chapter 12

Nigeria–India Relations in the Context of COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond

The world faces a universal health emergency as public attention and resources turned toward containing the scale, scope, velocity, and lethality of COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2) of the novel Coronavirus family. The disease affected not less than 213 countries worldwide and 23,511,251 cases globally had been confirmed as at August 23, 2020 (Worldometer, 2020a). Hence, considering the scope and intensity of the menace, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the situation a “Pandemic” on March 11, 2020 (WHO, 2020a). As the virus spreads globally, health-care systems, economies, security, livelihoods, among other important fractions are being overwhelmed and affected even in developed countries of the world. As a protective measure against COVID-19 transmission, WHO instructed certain practices like thorough and regular washing of hands using an alcohol-based hand sanitizer or soap and water, while outside avoid touching eyes, nose, and mouth, circumvent distance traveling or crowd gathering, and encouraged breastfeeding babies to enhance immunity. Nigeria and India as a part of the global system have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic which caused massive disruptions and socioeconomic challenges for both countries. Since the outbreak of the disease, virtually everything in these countries have been affected, hence, both countries focused attention on how to prevent the spread and manage those that had been infected. COVID-19 is a novel disease caused by a coronavirus which was first discovered in Wuhan, China. Since its discovery in China, it has spread to almost all countries in the world. It has ravaged the world like wildfire and the WHO regarded it as a pandemic which means that it requires multilateral interventions among countries to find solutions to it. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and Republic of India both have large sizes of populations estimated at 200 million and 1.2 billion, respectively. It is not surprising 243

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that a portion of the population and businesses are affected. Notwithstanding, the governments of the two countries did not leave anything to chance in coming to terms with the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic did not prevent Nigeria and India from pushing forward their cooperation and partnership in various spheres. Major engagements between Nigeria and India during the COVID-19 pandemic were mainly in the areas of diplomatic interactions between the two governments; repatriation of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India during the pandemic; business interactions; capacity building; and cultural and community outreach during the pandemic. This chapter focuses on the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications for Nigeria and India. It also examines the cooperation between the two countries and support offered in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. AN OVERVIEW OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND TAXONOMY OF THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS Delicate epidemics of infectious diseases have battered the human populace throughout history, immersing huge humanitarian and economic toll that altered historical narratives. Waves of infectious diseases such as the Bubonic Plague and the Black Death attacked and killed over 50 percent of Europeans during the Middle Ages amid others like smallpox that caused the death of many native populations (DiMaio, Enquist & Dermody, 2020). However, infectious diseases that affect humans, plants, and animals that spread beyond geographical boundaries are termed “pandemics” (WHO, 2020b). Notable among these pandemics that occurred in the last century were the 1918 Influenza and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) which brought forth huge devastative penalties all around the world. The Influenza pandemic of 1918 occurred shortly after World War I, causing the death of tens of millions of people and displaced many others due to nonavailability of effective antibiotics and sustainable health facilities that will remedy the effects and spread of these bacterial infections (Brown, 2020). The coronavirus is an age-old virus that has its historical antecedent in the Great Flu pandemic documented in 1918 to have lasted for 102 years since its discovery, killing an estimated 50–100 million people globally (Brown, 2020). A microscopic view of the virus when it was first observed gave a crown-like morphology that earned it the name “coronavirus” in 1968, thus a Coronaviridae family was classified from this by the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses in 1975. Subsequently the Coronaviridae family was divided into two subcategories: the coronaviruses and the toroviruses (prone to attack animals and sometimes humans) by the International

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Nidovirus Symposium in Colorado Springs (Weiss & Martin, 2005). The coronavirus has three genres, I–III, that include the animal and human typology. COVID-19 belongs to the SARS-CoV prototype that is believed to cause serious illnesses in people and as such, it is coined to denote a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) based on its molecular composition and origin. It is the same SARS coronavirus, presently known as COVID19, that led to the outbreak of the first major pandemic in humans in 1918; 1930 in animals; 1960 in humans; 2003, 1997, and now in the year 2020 (Cheng, Lau, Woo & Yuen, 2017). The continued consumption of animals as sources of protein traced to Huanan Seafood Market of Wuhan city in the Hubei Province of China without proper biosecurity screening led to the reemergence of the disease 100 years after its first outbreak. The virus infects birds, mammals, and humans by causing primary cold which metamorphoses to severe respiratory infection that can be transmitted from one person to another (DiMaio, Enquist & Dermody, 2020). THE EMERGENCE, ESCALATION, AND CONTROL MECHANISM OF COVID-19 IN NIGERIA AND INDIA The end of 2019 characterized the emergence of a new novel pandemic termed the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) which presents in the form of a respiratory infection that could cause severe complications and death (Africa Centre for Disease Control, 2020a). The pandemic meteorically rose in China and spread across 210 countries and 2 international conveyances with the United States, Germany, Italy, among other countries recording new waves of outbreak (Worldometers, 2020b). The WHO declared it a global pandemic amid its imminent risk to public health and well-being and urged the general public and world governments to adopt stringent preventive measures to contain the plaque (McKibbin & Fernando, 2020). Consequently, Nigeria with an estimated population of over 200 million people had experienced outbreaks of diseases in past years such as Lassa Fever, Meningitis, Ebola, and currently the COVID-19 pandemic which has spread across different regions infecting different fractions of people in the country (NCDC, 2020a). Therefore, it is pertinent to understand the demographic profile of risk groups and transmission processes, trends, and dynamics of recorded cases in Nigeria and India, Nigeria and India’s testing capacity, and mechanism put in place for prevention and control of further spread of the virus in Nigeria and India. No doubt, this will provide helpful insights in understanding the cooperation between the two countries within the context of COVID-19 pandemic. It has been observed that in Nigeria and India, the virus has the potential of infecting all age groups that are either healthy or with a weak immune system

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although data seems to be changing as events unfold. The COVID-19 virus is conceived to transmit from human to human although historical backgrounds from past pandemics of the virus family has shown that it started off from animal and later transmitted to humans. SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) has a unique transmissibility capacity to travel from respiratory droplets of an infected person either from sneezing or coughing or by touching delicate organs of the body like the nose and mouth after having contact with an infected surface. Therefore, any close contact with an infected person can compel a crossinfection process to occur from one person to another in the absence or use of protective tools such as masks, boots, gloves, gown, and so on (Akinmayowa & Amzat, 2020). In addition, 3–9 days with a range between 0 and 24 days have been identified as the mean incubation period after which symptoms begin to showcase which can be fever, cough, and fatigue, in addition to other symptoms such as headache, diarrhea, dyspnea, and sore throat. Regardless, chest abnormalities have been identified in some patients before symptoms prevail (Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020). TRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF RECORDED CASES IN NIGERIA AND INDIA The first country to experience the plague of the COVID-19 pandemic in West Africa is Nigeria after it recorded and confirmed its first imported case from Italy on February 27, 2020, who was an Italian that arrived Nigeria via the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos, at 10 p.m. aboard Turkish airline from Milan, Italy (Adepoju, 2020). In the same regard, the second case was recorded on March 9, 2020, which happened to be a contact of the index case and gradually, there was an explosive rise in the number of confirmed cases arising as a result of importation from infected countries and local transmission (Ebenso & Otu, 2020). Alas, Nigeria recorded its first death on March 23, 2020, having hit ninety-seven confirmed cases (Adebayo, 2020). As at August 22, 2020, 601 new confirmed cases and 1 death were recorded in Nigeria totaling 51,905 confirmed cases, among which 38767 have been discharged and 997 deaths have been recorded in 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (NCDC, 2020b). Since Nigeria recorded its first case, the aftermath of that imported case saw the meteoritic rise in the number of cases who got infected. The Presidential Task Force (PTF) inaugurated on March 9, 2020, was saddled with the responsibility of controlling the spread of the virus buttressed that travelers coming from COVID-19 high-risk areas have the potential to infect and spread the virus, hence were banned from entering the country (Ihekweazu, 2020). Unfortunately, the enforcement of the ban proved

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unfruitful as the nation had recorded more imported cases as most travelers that arrived Nigeria didn’t adhere to the fourteen days quarantine protocols as suggested by the NCDC. Although the transmission mode of COVID19 virus is still being investigated, community transmission in Nigeria has proven to have risen due to refusal or noncompliance to safety measures such as social or physical distancing, regular hand washing, or staying at home as these are social realities that need to be adhered to control the menace (Sobowale, 2020). In India, the first three infection cases reported in Kerala on January 30 and February 3, 2020, were directly imported from Wuhan, China, as they returnees (Patrikar et. al., 2020). By March 3, 2020, two more cases were reported. This time around, one of the patients had a travel history from Italy, while the other in Hyderabad had visited Dubai. By this time, the disease was beginning to spread to other parts of India. To curb the spread, the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) swiftly issued travel advisory restrictions. Also, the government imposed self-quarantine rules for fourteen days to all international travelers entering the country, travel visas restricted until April 15, for other countries and on March 16, 2020, the Health Ministry proposed various interventions such as social distancing of 1 meter to reduce the rate of disease transmission (Patrikar et al., 2020). This exponential rise in Nigeria can be attributed to a number of factors. The first explanation is that despite movement restrictions imposed by federal and state governments and closure of borders, schools and places of worships, there were still reported incidents of movement by people who chose to go against the stay-at-home orders in search of food (Vanguard Newspaper, 2020). Second, at the initial outbreak of the pandemic in Nigeria, very little believed they could be susceptible to the virus due to the detection of the virus in top government officials. Many held close to their hearts, their belief in their faith and black man’s resistance to diseases which adversely led to little or no regards for safety precautions (NOI Poll, 2020). Lastly, the expansion in molecular testing capacity and house–house case search strategy adopted has been able to aid in detecting pressing cases of the virus that needs urgent isolation (Buhari, 2020). Consequently, Nigeria is still grappling with these increasing number of cases have exerted several efforts at both federal and state level to contain the spread of the virus. At the federal level, Lagos, Ogun and the FCT were placed on lockdown being the hotspots of confirmed cases in the country on March 30, 2020 (Campbell, 2020a). Also, the two principal international airports in Lagos and Abuja were closed amid the imposition of travel restrictions into the country for travelers coming in from China, Italy, Japan, Spain, United States among other high-risk places. The suspension of railway services

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as a measure to aid the decrease in spread of the virus also followed effect from March 23, 2020, as local transmission continued to escalate nationwide (Adedeji, 2020). Other preventive measures adopted include social distancing, discouraging mass gatherings, use of nose masks, proper handwashing, use of alcohol-based hand sanitizer, ban on interstate movements, and closure of schools and markets among others as advised by the Nigeria Center for Disease Control (NCDC, 2020b). It is pertinent to note that some of these restrictions are being eased in some parts of the country as citizens are being affected by the socioeconomic implications of these measures. To stem the tide of rising cases of COVID-19 pandemic in India, the government imposed the first phase of twenty-one days lockdown started in India on March 24, 2020, an extended second-phase lockdown on April 14 (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). These were later extended beyond the periods envisaged due to the escalating number of cases of infections. To make the lockdown and social distancing effective, India also levied the quarantine law under the Epidemic Disease Act, 1897. This 123-year-old legislation allows a state/ country to inspect people traveling by railways, ships (air travel was not an option at that time when this law was created), and segregate suspects in hospitals, under temporary accommodations, or otherwise to prevent the spread of dangerous pandemic disease. In spite of the measure put in place by the Indian government to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, cases in India COVID-19 reached 1,01,139 by May 18, 2020 (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). Given the advanced health-care system in India, particularly in the urban center as compared to the rural communities, initially, it was considered that India was dealing well with the COVID-19. This was so adjudged given the low number of positive cases from COVID-19 because of the constricted transmission during a lockdown and social distancing. However, at the end of all lockdown phases, India experienced a total of 1,90,648 confirmed cases including 5,407 deaths due to this disease (Ghosh et al 2020). Major cities that were most affected included Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Bhopal, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Indore, Jaipur, and Kolkata. These cities were identified as the COVID-19 hotspots in India. By July 11, 2020, India became the third-most COVID-19-infected country globally with 2,922,58 active cases, along with 5,34,620 patients being cured and discharged (recovery rate of 60.86 percent) followed by the demise of 22,674 COVID-19 infected patients (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). COVID-19: Nigeria and India’s Testing Capacity In some African countries like Nigeria with a crippled health-care system, universal testing for dictating cases may virtually be impossible due to inadequate resources and facilities. To mitigate the aforementioned challenge,

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the African Centre for Disease Control (ACDC) organized a professional training from February 6 to 8, 2020, for experts in fifteen African countries with Nigeria as a participatory member on the diagnosis of COVID-19 using Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) (Africa CDC, 2020a). The PCR was recognized and recommended by WHO as the most preferred testing methodology for COVID-19 at geographical centers that will enable people to access the best while other cheaper methodologies could be adopted at lower government public health laboratories (WHO, 2020c). In this regard, with effect from June 7, 2020, Nigeria made use of the PCR to conduct most tests in molecular laboratories as it initially was able to test only 76,802 people from the first index case on from February 27, 2020, to June 7, 2020. Many considered this effort as trivial as the number fell short in capacity to 200 million population at stake (Akor, Jimoh, John-Mensah & Ramoni, 2020). The criteria to be met to be qualified for medical laboratory testing for COVID-19 in Nigeria according to Amzat et al., (2020, p.3) include: • Returnees from overseas trips who are symptomatic within 14 days of their arrival (the returnees were advised to self-isolate for 14 days upon return to Nigeria). • Persons who had contact with confirmed cases and developed symptoms within 14 days of contact. • Those having COVID-19-related symptoms of unknown cause, 4 and persons residing in areas with a moderate or high prevalence of COVID-19. In order to ascertain the viability of the virus and therein form diagnosis, samples in the form of nasal secretions, blood, sputum, and bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) are subjected to specific serological and molecular tests specific for COVID-19 laboratory investigations that helps detect the presence of specific COVID-19 proteins (WHO, 2020c). An average of six to seven hours is required to run a COVID-19 test and it takes about 20 to 48 hours to ascertain results. There is still no scientifically proven cure for COVID-19 worldwide but Nigeria is making efforts through its government agencies like the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness Innovation (CEPI) to research and find sustainable cure to the virus although the National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) has approved the use of certain local herbs to test their efficacy in curing the virus (Ifijeh, 2020). Also, Nigeria faced the challenge of insufficient testing centers and PCR testing kits and thus, new developments in medical laboratory technology need to be realized and adopted to conform with world standards. So also, the job roles of laboratory scientist, public health professionals and other related medical service providers need to be specified and described in line with international

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practices that will aid in guaranteeing credible test results (Bamidele & Daniel, 2020). The Indian government mobilized all stakeholders to combat the challenges and threat posed by the growing COVID-19 pandemic. These include involving the public, medical association, nurses, NGOs, police forces, including paramilitary. In the case of India, the rising cases prompted the government to direct that every person should be scanned for COVID-19. The testing facilities in India included Real-time PCR test, Point-of-Care molecular diagnostic assays, rapid antibody test (suitable for surveillance as the results come after seven to ten days of the pandemic infection), and pointof-care rapid antigen detection test for early detection of COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic test in India starting from less than 100 tests per day and reached 2,00,000 test per day on May 18, 2020 (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). The increase of about 2,000-fold COVID-19 tests has been attributed to the cooperation from airlines, railways, medical colleges, ministries, postal services, research institutions, and testing laboratories. As at January 2020, India had only one laboratory testing for COVID-19, at the Indian Council of Medical Research’s National Institute of Virology, Pune. However, by May 20, 2020, India had set up 555 laboratories across the country. By July 2020, there are 1,105 operational labs (788 government labs and 317 private labs) to deal with COVID-19 cases and cumulatively 1,15,87,153 samples were tested and 2,80,151 as on July 11, 2020 (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). Additionally, over 2.02 crore N95 masks and 1.18 crore PPE kits are distributed in Indian states and UTs for free since April 1. India launched “ArogyaSetu” mobile application for tracking the movements (Ghosh et​.​al 2020). Prevention and Control Mechanisms in Nigeria and India The primary prevention and control measures adopted by Nigeria and India principles against the COVID-19 remains the adoption of public health measures such as physical distancing, environmental protective measures, travel restrictions among others. This is paramount to adhere to because there were no specific vaccines or treatments against the virus (WHO, 2020d). Before the development of vaccines or antiviral drug against SARS-CoV-2, hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) was being advised as chemoprophylaxis drug. Equally important is the need to acquire more testing facilities for early detection of the virus and the effective implementation of control measures like isolation and quarantining of infected persons (Ikponmwosa & Isaiah, 2020). Another required preventive control that needs to be embraced is the need for health practitioners to limit the potential of COVID-19 patients in encountering acute complications which are common to the ailment such as respiratory diseases, and cardiovascular failures, among others. At the advent

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of such occurrences, there should be effective medical or nonmedical precautions that should be put in place to contain the effects of such complications (Osibogun, 2020). NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS AND BILATERAL SUPPORT TOWARDS CURBING COVID-19 PANDEMIC In his address to Ugandan Parliament on July 25, 2018, as he propounded the “Ten guiding principles” of India’s engagement with Africa, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi stated that the “ten guiding principles” underscore India’s commitment to its relationship with Africa and also shares an alternative vision of engagement based on equal partnership and mutual gains. In his words, “Our development partnership will be guided by your priorities. It will be on terms that will be comfortable for you, that will liberate your potential and not constrain your future.” There is no doubt that COVID-19 pandemic presented a new priority and a test case for India–Africa relations and India– Nigeria friendship in particular. While the pandemic presented huge challenges to Nigeria and India, it also presented opportunities to solidify existing friendship and to plan for a post-COVID-19 era. In September of 2020, India had plans to host the fourth summit of the India–Africa Forum. Nevertheless, it had to be delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Times of Africa, 2020). Following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi reached out to Africa through telephone conversations with the Chairman of the African Union (AU). India extended medical assistance to twenty-five African countries, including Nigeria. Several engagements and interactions took place during the COVID-19 pandemic period. These were mainly in the areas of diplomatic interactions between the two governments during the pandemic, repatriation of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India during the pandemic, business interactions, capacity building, and cultural and community outreach during the pandemic. These are examined in detail. Diplomatic Interactions between Nigeria and India and Visits during the COVID-19 Pandemic Several high-level diplomatic interactions took place between Nigerian and Indian officials during the COVID-19 period. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic which caused disruptions in international travels and face-to-face meetings, virtual meetings became part of the new normal. Under the new normal mode of meetings, Dr. S. Jaishankar, minister of external affairs of India, held a virtual bilateral meeting with Mr. Geoffrey Onyeama, minister

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of foreign affairs of Nigeria on September 1, 2020 (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). Among others, the two ministers discussed the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commonwealth, challenges of multilateralism and bilateral relations, and ways of strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries. On October 2, 2020, the virtual platform also provided another opportunity for the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs Mr. Geoffrey Onyeama to grace the Gandhi Jayanti celebrations. The event also had in attendance diplomats and the Indian community in Nigeria (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). Even before these high-level ministerial meeting, a virtual meeting was held on August 13, 2020, during which Nigeria and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on “Cooperation in Exploration and use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes” (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The signing of the MOU was witnessed virtually by Nigeria’s minister of science and technology Dr. Ogbonnaya Onu, and India’s minister of state for external affairs Shri V. Muraleedharan. Another virtual meeting was also held between India’s minister of commerce, industry and railways Shri Piyush Goyal and Nigeria’s minister of industry, trade, and investment Otumba Niyi Adebayo on October 11, 2020 (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The discussion between the two ministers centered on bilateral trade, economic cooperation, the African Continental Free Trade Area is a free trade area (AfCFTA), and other matters of mutual interest to Nigeria and India. The Nigerian minister used the opportunity to solicit India’s support for Nigeria’s candidate Dr. Okonjo Iweala for appointment as the director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). During the pandemic period, specifically on September 22, 2020, Nigeria’s minister of industry, trade, and investment Otumba Niyi Adebayo also participated in the inaugural session of the 15th Confederation of India Industry (CII)-EXIM Bank Digital Conclave on “India-Africa Project Partnership” which was inaugurated by Dr. S Jaishankar, minister of external affairs, Government of India (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). During the meeting, the Indian minister of external affairs stated that India has remained a steady partner for Africa by keeping her supply lines open during the peak of the COVID pandemic and ensuring that critical supplies such as medicines and medical equipment reached countries in need in the Africa continent. Another ministerial-level virtual meeting which took place during the pandemic period had in attendance the minister of communications and digital technology Dr. Isa Pantami. The minister led other Nigerian participants including Dr. Amina Sambo Magazi, National Coordinator, National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), to attend artificial intelligence (AI) summit (RAISE, 2020), which took place on October 6–9, 2020 (High

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Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). Globally, artificial intelligence (AI) is considered to be the next giant technological breakthrough similar to electricity and the Internet. The Responsible AI for Social Empowerment (RAISE, 2020) a virtual global AI summit was organized by the Government of India in partnership with Industry and Academia. The summit served as a global meeting of minds to exchange ideas and charter a course to use AI for social empowerment, inclusion, and transformation in key areas like healthcare, agriculture, education, and smart mobility among other sectors (RAISE, 2020). Several other visits took place during the pandemic period. For instance, the Indian high commissioner Mr. Abhay Thakur visited several eminent personalities in Nigeria during the pandemic period. These include Professor Babagana Umara Zulum on March 9, 2020; Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Zubairu Dada on May 28, 2020; Minister of State for Petroleum Chief Timipre Sylva on August 11, 2020; Senate President of National Assembly Ahmad Lawal on October 19, 2020; Governor of Kano State Abdullahi Umar Ganduje on October 23, 2020; the Emir of Kano Aminu Ado Bayero on October 23, 2020; and visit to Governor of Bayelsa State Mr. Douye Diri on September 21, 2020 (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). Business Interactions in the Period of COVID-19 Pandemic Several Nigeria–India business interactions took place during the pandemic period. On July 4, 2020, the Indian high commissioner held a business interaction webinar session with the Chairman, Economic Advisory Council (EAC) Dr. Doyin Salami and other Indian businessmen. On September 25, 2020, discussions were held between Indian Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers Association (IEEMA), Abuja Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), and Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) led by S.A. Abdulaziz (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The discussion centered on strengthening the power sector in Nigeria. Another business interaction that took place during the pandemic period was held on August 13, 2020. The business interaction which was titled “Doing Business with Nigeria” was between Engineering Export Promotion (EEPC) of India and Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). The first International Virtual Business to Business (B2B) meeting between Nigeria and India was held on July 8, 2020. The event had in attendance over 200 participants and 38 sectors in attendance. The participants exchange views on how to transact business during COVID-19 era. Also, during the pandemic period, the ACCI organized a trade event titled “HALAL 2020.” The event, which was held on August 22, 2020, was attended by Indian and Nigerian participants including India’s deputy high commissioner in Nigeria D. L. Surendra (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020).

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Before the COVID-19 disruptions, the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) organized physical exhibitions. However, following the disruptions in travels as a result of the COVID, the FIEO also adopted the virtual platform to organize the Indo-Africa Virtual Exhibition which was held on September 1, 2020. It also featured business interactions with Nigerians including B2B of interested member companies of FIEO with ACCI (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). Also taking advantage of the new normal, particularly the virtual platform, the PHD Chambers of Commerce and Industry and FIEO organized the “Enterprising Africa 3D Expo and Conferences 2020” on September 22, 2020. The event provided an opportunity for fruitful business interaction with Nigerian business during the pandemic period. Beyond business-to-business interactions, these meetings also provided opportunities for buyers to meet sellers. This was significant since physical meeting was difficult during the pandemic period due to closure of international borders and temporary stoppage of international flights as part of the preventive measures and to minimize the spread of COVID-19. Interactions on Defense Cooperation between Nigeria and India during the Pandemic During the pandemic, Nigerian and Indian officials also discussed and reviewed the ongoing defense cooperation between the two countries. The discussion on defense cooperation between Nigeria and India took place at the meeting held between Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, General Bashir Magashi (Rtd) and Indian high commissioner Abhay Thakur on June 5, 2020. Before that meeting, the Indian high commissioner had paid a visit to the Nigerian permanent secretary, Ministry of Defence, Sabiu Zakari on July 16, 2020 (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). During the visit, the parties discussed long-standing ties of friendship between Nigeria and India and reviewed ongoing defense cooperation. Capacity Building during the COVID-19 Pandemic The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program celebrated its fifty-sixth year in 2020. The Indian High Commission in Nigeria used the occasion to reaffirm India’s commitment to the promotion of social and economic development and technology transfer through capacity development of Nigerians and other Africans. According to the Indian High Commission in Nigeria, during the year April 2019–March 2020, a total of 295 Nigerians attended various civilian and defense ITEC courses in India (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). During the COVID-19 phase, ITEC course was adapted to the prevailing challenges and held in

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virtual mode. Between April and October 2020, about fifty Nigerians benefited from e-ITEC course and sharing of experiences and expertise in areas such as health, policing, and governance. During the COVID-19 phase, the Union Minister of India Dr. Jitendra Singh inaugurated ITEC NCGG “International Workshop on COVID-19: Good Governance Practices during a Pandemic.” The workshop, which was held from August 16 to August 17, 2020, was attended by 184 participants from 26 countries and 22 participants from Nigeria, including the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The Indian High Commission in Nigeria reported that as at October 2020, a total of nine Nigerian medical practitioners benefited from the first training session of the e-ITEC network “Managing COVID-19 Pandemic: Experiences and Best Practices of India” held from April 27, 2020, to May 1, 2020. The training program which was organized by the Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh, was supported by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Sociocultural Relations and Community Outreach during the Pandemic Sociocultural and community relations remained a vital aspect of Indo-Nigeria relations during the pandemic period. On August 1, 2020, and September 16, 2020, respectively, the Indian high commissioner joined leading members of the Nigerian Strategic and Think-tanks Community for dialogue on matters of common interests. Members of this community include Savannah Centre, Gusau Institute, National Defence College (NDC), and Army Resource Centre (High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria, 2020). The interaction which was led by Ambassador Abdullahi Omaki, included Ambassador Sani Bala, Executive Director, Savannah Centre. As part of its community engagement, the Indian High Commission joined Nigeria’s friends and well-wishers to celebrate Nigeria’s sixtieth independence anniversary. India celebrated her seventy-fourth Independence Day on August 15, 2020, at the High Commission in Abuja and Lagos with community leaders and friends from Nigeria. Also, as part of its community outreach during the pandemic period, the Indian Cultural Association (ICA) Abuja donated food items to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, Nigeria. The donations made on May 5, 2020, were received by the Minister of State, FCT, Dr. Ramatu Aliyu. The Indian Commissioner used the occasion to appreciate the Nigerian government for the support being given to Indians in Nigeria. As part of its community outreach during the pandemic, SABHA (All India Association and Organization) in Nigeria handed over to the Lagos State Ministry of Health the Indo Eye Care Foundation (IECF) isolation-cum-treatment center for

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COVID-19 patients. This gesture by the Indian community led by the IECF is useful to hundreds of COVID-19 patients in Lagos. India’s Donations of Medical and Essential Supplies during the Pandemic As part of her support to combat COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria, India donated essential medicines worth $50 million to Nigeria and other African countries (Odutola, 2020). The medical items presented to the Nigerian government by the high commissioner of India to Nigeria, Mr. Abhay Thakur, on behalf of the Government of India on July 17, 2020, were seven tons of consignment (586 cartoons) of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine and antibiotics (Odutola, 2020). The items were well received by Minister of Health Dr. Osagie Ehanire, on behalf of the Federal Government. India also donated 100,000 AstraZeneca or covishield vaccine doses approved by NAFDAC and produced by the Serum Institute of India. This donation, which was a gift of the Government of India to Nigeria, was delivered by the Indian High Commission in Nigeria to the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA). This was added to the 1.4 million doses of vaccines donated by MTN and produced by Serum Institute of India and shipped to Nigeria from India (High Commission of India, April 2, 2021; Channels News, 27 March 2021; Reuters, 2021). This gesture by the Indian government no doubt demonstrated her deep concern for her Nigerian friends despite the fact that India was grappling with higher number of cases of COVID-19 pandemic as compared to Nigeria. The donation to Nigeria and eighty-two other countries were in line with the commitment made by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020 that “India’s vaccine production and delivery capacity will be used to help humanity in fighting Covid-19.” India has not been guided by the philosophy of collective approach to the fight against COVID-19 and its own Vaccine Maitri Initiative (Maitri means friendship). While struggling to protect its national interest by vaccinating her huge population, India has also kept faith as the pharmacy of the world and a front liner in the battle against COVID-19 pandemic. Repatriation of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India during the Pandemic During the period of the COVID-19, history was made when Air Peace began repatriation of Indian nationals from Nigeria on May 31, 2020, to India. The flight from Lagos to Kochi was the first-ever Nigerian airline with 312 passengers to fly directly to India. Another repatriation saw Air India 1922 traveling from Lagos to Delhi with 231 passengers on June 1, 2020, under the Varde Bharat Mission

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in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second direct flight on Air Peace flight to India from Lagos airport was on June 4, 2020. This enabled the repatriation of 270 needy employees of Dangote Group that wished to return home to India during the period of the COVID-19. To facilitate the return of Indians in Nigeria in distress during the period of the COVID-19 and desirous to return to India, the Indian High Commission in Nigeria held virtual interactions with the heads and members of the Indian Community Organizations to review the repatriation process on June 6, 2020. The High Commission had issued a COVID-19 notice to Indian nationals in Nigeria, Benin, and Chad in distress and desirous of returning to India urgently Government of India has begun the process of formal registration to enable Indian nationals to return to India on genuine, compelling grounds, at their own cost. Priority was being given to compelling cases in distress, including migrant workers/laborers who have been laid off, short-term visa holders faced with expiry of visas, persons with medical emergency, pregnant women, elderly, students, and those required to return to India due to death of a family member. Those who meet the criterion were requested to fill up the registration form. This registration and collection of information enabled the Government of India to plan for return of Indians from abroad in COVID-19 situation. More so, all prospective passengers were requested to adhere to the rules and regulations of host country government on departure and Government of India on arrival especially those related to COVID-19. Before boarding, passengers were expected to carry a COVID-19 negative certificate from an authorized agency/center. All passengers were to undergo mandatory institutional quarantine for a minimum period of fourteen days, on arrival in India or return to Nigeria. Table 12.1 captures more repatriation/airlifts of Indians and Nigerians during the pandemic period. Following the institution of travel guidelines and facilitation of travels by stakeholders in Nigeria and India, including the High Commission of India in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria, and High Commission of Nigeria in New Delhi, airlines such as Air Peace and Air India, the civil aviation of Nigeria, and cooperation of Indian and Nigerian nationals, it was possible to airlift many Indians and Nigerians nationals back home. Later, many returned back following the resumptions of flights. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: THE NEW NORMAL OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS This chapter examined Nigeria–India relations in the context of COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter noted that the novel coronavirus disrupted health-care systems, economies, security, and livelihoods in many countries including Nigeria and India. Even though the chapter examined the nature of the COVID-19

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Table 12.1  Repatriation/Airlifts of Indians and Nigerians during the COVID-19 Pandemic Period S/No.

Airline and Flight

Date

1

Air Peace

May 31, 2020

2 3

Air India Air Peace

June 1, 2020 June 4, 2020

4

Air Peace

5

Air India 1922

June 12, 2020

6

Air India 1906

June13, 2020

7

Air India 1904

June 15, 2020

8

Air India 1906

June 17, 2020

9

Air India

June 18, 2020

10

Air India

June 20, 2020

11

Air Peace

July 3 and 4, 2020

12

Air Peace

13 14 15 16 17

June 11, 2020

July 7 and 8, 2020 Chartered July 10, 11, and Flights 13, 2020 Chartered July 20 and 21, Flights 2020 Maersk Charter July 28, 2020 Air Peace August 5 and 6, 2020 Air Peace August 10 and 11, 2020

Description 312 Indians, Lagos–Kochi, first Nigerian direct flight from Lagos to India in history 231, Lagos–Delhi, Varde Bharat Mission 270 Dangote employees, second direct flight to India 312 Indian nationals from Lagos and Port Harcourt, third direct flight to India. Return flight evacuated Nigerians in India Second flight under Varde Bharat Mission from Nigeria 231 passengers Lagos–Mumbai under Varde Bharat Mission from Nigeria 203 passengers from Lagos to Kolkata under Varde Bharat Mission from Nigeria 235 Indian nationals from Abuja and Lagos, who returned to Mumbai, Ahmedabad, and Trivandrum under Varde Bharat Mission from Nigeria Phase 3 232 passengers from Lagos–Mumbai– Chennai–Bangalore under Varde Bharat Mission from Nigeria Phase 3 Lagos–Delhi–Lucknow and Lagos–Delhi– Hyderabad under Varde Bharat Mission Phase 3 from Nigeria. In all, 2,884 Indian nationals were repatriated in 8 Air India and 4 chartered flights over 3 weeks. 302 Indian Nationals repatriated to Delhi and Over 50 permanent Indian residents returned to Lagos/Abuja alongside Nigerian nationals 204 Indian nationals to India and 152 Nigerian nationals/Indian residents 540 passengers to India and 253 to Nigeria for repatriation, business and projects 571 Indians and 11 Nigerians to Delhi 98 Indian seafarers from Lagos to Mumbai 313 passengers Lagos–Delhi, Delhi–Lagos for business, project, and medical care. 303 passengers Lagos to Delhi, including 26 Seafarers and Army officers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and India at NDC Nigeria, 316 Indian and Nigerian nationals from Delhi to Lagos. (Continued )

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Table 12.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Airline and Flight

18

Air Peace

19

Air Peace

20

Air India

21

Air India 1903/1904 Air India 1903/1904 Air India 1903/1904 Air Peace APK 7810/7811 Air India 1903/1904

22 23 24 25

Date August 12 and 13, 2020 August 15 and 16, 2020 September 12 and 13, 2020 September 24 and 25, 2020 October 6 and 7, 2020 October 13 and 14, 2020 October 15, 2020 October 20 and 21, 2020

Description 223 passengers to India and 270 passengers back to Nigeria. 259 passengers to Delhi and 166 to Nigeria 287 Nigerian and Indian nationals from Delhi and 312 Indian and Nigerian passengers back 236 passengers to Lagos and 191 to Delhi 241 passengers to Lagos and 239 to Delhi 229 passengers to Delhi–Lagos and 231 passengers Lagos–Delhi 262 passengers Lagos to Delhi 231 passengers Delhi to Lagos and 150 passengers Lagos to Delhi

Source: High Commission of India, Abuja-Nigeria (2020, October) India–Nigeria: Partners Against the Pandemic. Retrieved on November 20, 2020, from https://hciabuja​.gov​.in​/pdf​/Publication ​%20on​​%20In​​dia​ %2​​0Nige​​ria​%2​​0duri​​ng​%20​​Panda​​mic​.p​​df

pandemic, its emergence, escalation, and control mechanisms put in place by Nigeria and India, the major focus of the chapter was to examine efforts at strengthening the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India and support toward managing the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, areas examined included the diplomatic interactions between the two governments during the pandemic; repatriation of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India during the pandemic; business interactions; capacity building; and cultural and community outreach during the pandemic. It is evident that while the COVID-19 pandemic posed serious challenges to both Nigeria and India, the two countries also adopted and adapted to the new normal including using virtual platforms for diplomatic and business meetings. It also provided an opportunity for the exploration of direct flights from Nigeria to India by a Nigerian airline. This calls for urgent review of the agreement on air travels between the two countries. The opportunities presented by the COVID-19 pandemic should be maximized for the benefits of both countries, including continuous usage of the virtual platform for diplomatic interactions, to connect B2B, ITEC and some educational trainings, and medical care. The two countries should take advantage of the direct flights introduced during the pandemic period to revisit the Bilateral Air Service Agreement between them with a view to enhancing their diplomatic and economic relations beyond the COVID-19.

Conclusion Continuity and Change in Nigeria– India Bilateral Relations

The world in which Nigeria and India conduct their bilateral relations is a changing one. Given this reality, both countries need to adjust to the important dynamics within their domestic and external environments as their relationship evolves. The chapters in this book underscored the fact that many changes have taken place in the international environment, which has become increasingly globalized and interdependent, especially since the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War brought about changes in the international environment, propelling the issues of economics to take the center stage in Indo-Nigeria relations. Accordingly, the shared ideologies of nonalignment and disarmament even though still advocated were no longer the core rallying points of interaction. Economics, particularly issues of trade and investment, emphasis on access to Nigerian market, and strategic resources such as oil have emerged as the most important dynamic of Nigeria–India relations since 1990. The book has shown that India’s economic liberalization reforms in 1990 and shift in foreign policy from ideological principles to pragmatic issues have emphasized concrete economic cooperation and energy security. It also emphasized expanding the markets for Indian goods and services to profitable areas. It also entails expanding investment opportunities for Indian companies to territories with good returns on investments. Overall, it entailed greater involvement of the Indian government driving the process through the instruments of diplomacy. Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 also bought about significant changes to the country’s political economy and served as an attraction for India to deepen its relations with Nigeria. Before 1990, investing in Nigeria had been viewed as a high risk for private Indian entrepreneurs, particularly from the point of view of distance between the two countries. The situation was compounded by the lack of 261

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direct air flights between Nigeria and India, a situation which affected not only business-to-business relations but also patients traveling to India for medical treatment. The Nigerian environment was also perceived as politically unstable, especially during the military era. Indian policy from 1991, following the reforms, has emphasized outward drive specially to encourage imports and exports. India needs the Nigerian markets for its goods and services and raw materials and natural resources for its growing economy. The Nigerian population, which is the largest in Africa and the size of its economy in Africa, has emerged as an investment hub for Indian entrepreneurs and important market for Indian goods and services. REKINDLING NEHRU’S VISION OF INDO-NIGERIA FRIENDSHIP India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is one outstanding Indian leader whose vision went far beyond his time in power (1947–1964). Adebajo (2010) wrote in his book The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War that “visionaries are dreamers and prophets who see further into the future than lesser mortals” (p.271). Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was a visionary of India– Africa relations, and particularly, Nigeria–India relations. Beyond his idealist internationalism, humanism, and the quest for world peace, Nehru’s vision of Africa anchored on the conviction that the African continent needed India’s support in her struggles for freedom and emancipation from imperial underdevelopment. In his address to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi on March 13, 1947, he said that “we of Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human family.” This vision coincided with the period of struggle for freedom in Africa. Nehru was concerned not only about the national freedom and well-being of the common man in Africa but also close relations with leading African countries in the quest for this freedom (Srivastava 1996, p.24). Jawaharlal Nehru was not only the main architect of Indian National Congress (INC) policy toward Africa but also played major roles in the Afro-Asian Solidarity and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which enabled member states to decide their own course of development during the Cold War era. Indeed, Pandit Nehru who visited Nigeria from September 23 to 27, 1962, just two years after Nigeria’s independence, had recognized Nigeria as a gateway to Africa given her size, population, resources, and other endowments. In his interaction with Nigeria’s first prime minister, Tafawa Balewa, Nehru emphasized the need for the two countries to work together to address common problems affecting Africa and Asia. This was clearly captured in the communique issued by both leaders on September 27, 1962. This vision

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and partnership were instrumental to the success recorded in the struggle against racial discrimination and colonialism, particularly in South Africa. Unfortunately, Indian leaders after Nehru have not pursued this strategic vision with equal vigour. It took the Indian authorities forty-five years before another visit by an Indian prime minister to Nigeria. Indian leaders, as exemplified by Nehru’s daughter, Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi, who was the first and, to date, only female prime minister of India, began to focus more attention on African states with the large numbers of India’s Diaspora. While acknowledging the significance of the Diaspora in Afro-Asian relations, it is evident that high-level visits and interactions go a long way in spurring the expansion of bilateral relations between the two countries. Businessmen/ women and citizens will always move in the direction of the national flag and where the national leaders focus their attention. As the Nigerian former president Chief Olusegun Obasanjo once pointed out, “If you get it right in Nigeria, you are likely to get it right on the rest of the continent” (Aditya, 2020, p.1). The positive historic relations and Nigeria’s potential as a regional and continental power make the country a prominent partner that India cannot afford to ignore. As argued by Aditya (2020, p.1), “India should start shaping an exclusive foreign policy towards Nigeria, rather than merely treating it as a unit of its grand African strategy. One way of engaging Nigeria could be through exclusive international platforms.” PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS AS THE CORNERSTONE FOR STRONGER GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONS The population of the Indian Diaspora may be larger in some African countries compared to Nigeria; however, the presence of the Indian Diaspora in Nigeria and their economic activism in Nigeria predate Nigeria’s independence. While relations at official levels have continued and are cordial, tensions at the level of people-to-people relations could have far-reaching implications for the cooperation between the two countries. It is important for the two countries to pay greater attention to people-to-people relations as the Diaspora community constitute an important resource for each government to tap from. As underscored by the successful stories of Indians in Nigeria such as Kishinchand Chellaram family that set foot in Nigeria as far back as 1923 and came to fully accept Nigeria as their new homes, people-to-people relations remain the bedrock for successful intergovernmental and business relations. The growing Indian Diaspora community in Nigeria and the Nigerian Diaspora community in India, including students, are important resources that

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the Nigerian and Indian government should harness in deepening the bilateral relations between the two countries. EMERGING CHALLENGES AND THE QUEST FOR COMMON SOLUTIONS Insecurity, as exemplified by the growing phenomenon of terrorism and insurgency, has emerged as major challenges confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Nigeria and India have consistently been targeted by terrorists, insurgents, and militants and in recognition of the fact that no country can win the war on terror and insurgency on its own, the two countries have agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in this area. There is no doubt that the challenges posed by terrorism and insurgency present a new frontier in the security cooperation between the two countries. India’s long experience with terrorism and insurgency, yet being able to harness domestic resources and capacities with international support for industrializations and economic development, provides valuable lessons for Nigeria. Hence, the need for shared experiences and collaboration between Nigeria and India. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a new context for Nigeria–India relations. Even though both countries with their huge populations have been affected, it did not prevent Nigeria and India from pushing forward their cooperation and partnership in various spheres. Diplomatic interactions between the two governments during the pandemic; repatriation of Indians in Nigeria and Nigerians in India during the pandemic; business interactions; capacity building; and cultural and community outreach during the pandemic are clear indications that the pandemic also present an opportunity to explore new grounds in the bilateral relations. The new normal has given rise to virtual diplomatic and business-to-business meetings and use of virtual platforms for capacity building including the e-ITEC. The pandemic period also provided an opportunity for exploration of direct flights between Nigeria to India and India to Nigeria. Both countries can take advantage of this opportunity to review the agreement on air travels with a view to strengthening the economic relations as well as medical tourism which has emerged as important aspect of Indo–Nigeria bilateral relations since the 1990s. MODIFYING NIGERIA–INDIA RELATIONS AND THE QUEST OF “DEVELOPING TOGETHER AS EQUALS” Under Shri Narendra Damodardas Modi, the fourteenth prime minister of India and the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s quest to

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modify her relations with African countries including Nigeria was activated. From the perspective of the Indian authorities, India has an enduring interest in helping African countries such as Nigeria to achieve progress and to overcome developmental challenges. Hence, the notion of “developing together as equals” defines India’s bilateral partnership (Viswanathan & Mishra, 2019). It is believed that a resurging Africa and a rising India can give a strong impetus to South-South cooperation, especially when it comes to addressing global challenges. These include issues such as climate change and clean energy, technology especially against the backdrop of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR), maritime security, terrorism and armed militancy, connectivity and cybersecurity, blue economy, and COVID-19 and diseases. In his quest to actualize his vision of developing together as equals, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Ugandan Parliament during his state visit on July 25, 2018, and outlined a vision for not just a bilateral partnership with African countries, but also a partnership in multilateral forums by espousing the “10 guiding principles for India-Africa engagement.” Given that India’s relations with African countries have been characterized by elements of continuity, many aspects of the Ten Guiding Principles (10-GP) are not entirely new. In fact, they actually reflect a continuity in policies that have historically defined India–Africa partnership. Even so, the 10-GP also reflect a change in the nuances and priorities in India’s future engagement with African states. This no doubt provides a prism and projections for continuity of the bilateral relations between Nigeria and India in a changing world. For long, the Indian government has been criticized for not having a clear vision or strategy for engagement with Africa. As succinctly observed by Viswanathan and Mishra (2019, p.3), India does not normally have “white paper” documents detailing bilateral engagement with nations for various reasons. Therefore, enunciating the Guiding Principles for India-Africa engagement has helped address the primary concern of not having a coherent Africa policy. The guiding principles can thus be seen as a vision document for India-Africa partnership.

The 10-GP for India-Africa engagement, as articulated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, include • Africa will be at the top of our priorities. We will continue to intensify and deepen our engagement with Africa. As we have shown, it will be sustained and regular. • Our development partnership will be guided by your priorities. We will build as much local capacity and create local opportunities as possible. It will be on terms that are comfortable to you, that will liberate your potential and not constrain your future.

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• We will keep our markets open and make it easier and more attractive to trade with India. We will support our industry to invest in Africa. • We will harness India’s experience with the digital revolution to support Africa’s development; improve delivery of public services; extend education and health; spread digital literacy; expand financial inclusion; and mainstream the marginalised. • Africa has 60 percent of the world’s arable land, but produces just 10 percent of the global output. We will work with you to improve Africa’s agriculture. • Our partnership will address the challenges of climate change. • We will strengthen our cooperation and mutual capabilities in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace. • We will work with African nations to keep the oceans open and free for the benefit of all nations. The world needs cooperation and competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean. • As global engagement in Africa increases, we must all work together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions, but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth. • Just as India and Africa fought colonialism together, we will work together for a just, representative and democratic global order that has a voice for one-third of humanity that lives in Africa and India. (Modi, 2018) From the priorities outline in the 10-GP, the historical connection, trade and investments, development cooperation, climate change, capacity building including in agriculture, technology, education, medicine, peace and security, and broad issues south–south cooperation will remain important components in Indo-Nigeria relations. India has traditionally exported manufactured products to and imported raw materials from Nigeria. India has a negative trade balance with Nigeria due to its high demand for oil. Therefore, to ensure that India and Nigeria “develop together as equals” India must expand and diversify its import basket to include both primary and manufactured goods from Nigeria. Indian investments no doubt abound in Nigeria, hence India’s quest to increase ease of doing business at the domestic front should be complemented with initiatives to support Nigerians, particularly those residents in India that are willing to invest and grow their businesses in India. It is, therefore, pertinent that Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTA), and Bilateral Trade Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPA) between Nigeria and India should reflect such interests that serve to encourage citizens to expand relations in the areas of trade and investments. In the area of agricultural sector, there are huge benefits to be derived from improved collaboration between Nigeria and India. Given the different stages of development between the two countries, Nigeria stands to benefit from

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the Indian experience in agricultural transformation after the Green Revolution, and its Triple “A” (appropriate, adaptable, and affordable) technology. Given the importance of agriculture and its connection to food security, agriculture represents a key component of continuity and change in the relations between Nigeria and India. While military and defense cooperation enjoy elements of continuity and change, aspects of capacity building and training, and the quest for transfer of state-of-the-art military technology, will remain the cornerstone of defense ties between the two countries. Issues of peace and security will continue to loom large in Nigeria–India relations in a changing world. The reality is that in the post–Cold War era, security challenges have become even more complex and over-stretching the capacity of states to manage. More so, the traditional notions of security connected to military power and protection from external threats have since changed to focus on human security dimension. Hence, nontraditional threats such as environmental security, food security, health security, energy security, and immigration issues are fast taking the center stage. Nigeria and India as with the rest of the world, are no longer denying the fact peace and security are intrinsically linked to development. Both Nigeria and India have contributed to peacekeeping operations as blue helmets in search for global peace. Both Nigeria and India have recognized that terrorism, insurgency, and militancy pose huge threats to human lives, development, and stability of their countries. Both countries stand to benefit from shared experience and knowledge as well as lessons learned in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. India and Nigeria also stand to gain from working together by coordinating their views and efforts in institutions of global governance and multilateral platforms such as the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). While the world is fast changing, these global institutions are far from adapting to the changing world, particularly from the angle of providing adequate representation of the voice of the developing world. In this regard, India and Nigeria should remain active voices in the quest for democratic reforms of global institutions, particularly, expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent membership of the UN Security Council, reform of the WTO, and enhancing the capacity of the World Health Organisation (WHO) to provide more effective global health governance. On the whole, keeping in view the vast potential for expanding Nigeria– India cooperation in the light of the recent efforts by the two governments to strengthen political, economic, sociocultural, and military relations, challenges that could undermine the evolving relationship should be collectively and consistently addressed by the two countries. This will go a long way in enhancing the bilateral relations for mutual benefits of the two important countries of the South, especially in the era of complex, interdependent, and ever-changing world.

Appendix

Table A.1  List of India-Linked Companies in Nigeria (In Alphabetic Order) S/No.

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

Address

1 2 3

Aarti Steel Aprint Nig. Plc Agro Allied Dev. Ent. Ltd

Steel Textiles –

Sohan Baghla D.P. Chanrai Lokesh Kumar

4

Airtel Networks Ltd.

Telecom

5

AKS Steel Nig. Ltd.

Steel

Deepak Srivastava Segun Ogunsanya Sanjay Kumar Sharma

6

–

Shailendra Dange

Healthcare IT Training Textiles

Dr. P. Shenoy M. Srinivas D.L. Wadhwani

10

Allianz Management Ltd. Apollo Clinic Aptech Arcee Textile Ind. Ltd. Artee Enterprises

Haresh Keshwani Lagos

11

Arthouse Nig.

12

Arvee Investments Ltd. Ashok Leyland

Partk’ n Shop Retailing Art Exhibitions & Auctions Finance Transport

Riyaz Nujum

7 8 9

13

– – 4/6, Happy Home Avenue, Kirikiri, Apapa, Lagos Plot 42, Banana Island, Ikoyi, Lagos Plot 27, LSDPC Industrial Estate, Odongunyan, Ikorodu, Lagos. 9A, Awori Rd, Dolphon State, Ikoyi, Lagos. Lagos Lagos

Kavita Chellaram

Lagos

Gunjan Sujnani

298 Murtala Mohammed Way, Yaba, Lagos Lagos (Continued )

269

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Appendix

 Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

Address

14

Atlantic Shrimpers Ltd.

Marine Products

Kamlesh Kabra

15

Avon Crown Cap & Containers Plc. Bajaj (Nig.) Ltd. Banarly (Nig.) Ltd

Packaging

S.R. Ramchandani

Bexo Bike & Agro Ltd Bharat Ventures Ltd BHN Plc

–

P.K. Sood

–

P.P. Shrivastav

–

Porus Doctor

21

Bhojsons & Co Nig. Plc.

Gen sets, etc.

22

Bhojwani Brothers Nig. Ltd Bilafar Health Nig. ltd Century Polyester Ltd.

–

Deepak Dalamal, Rakesh Kanwar Raja Bhojwani

Healthcare

–

–

Textile

S. Deshmukh

25

Chelaram Plc

26 27

Chi Ltd Churchgate Group Coates Brothers (WA) Ltd

Food Products, Textile, etc. Beverages Construction

Suresh Chellaram Ashok Gajwani B. Mahtani

Plot 64, Ikorodu Ind. Estate, Ikorodu, Lagos. V.I Lagos

16 17 18 19 20

23 24

28 29

2 and 3 wheelers Firdous Ahmed – M.S. Rao

K.R. Nair

Kirikiri Lighter Terminal, Phase 1, Apapa, Lagos 22, Musa Yar Adua Street, Victoria Island, Lagos Lagos Plot C, Bridge Road Otto, Ebute-Metta, Lagos Np-13, Sere Close, Ilupeju, Lagos. 12, Waziri Ibrahim Crescent, VI, Lagos Ayorinde Bus-Stop, KM-27, Ibadan Expressway, Ibafo Ogun. 29C Kofo Abayomi St. VI, Marina, Lagos.

Abuja V.I., Lagos Lateef Jakande Road Agindingbi, Ikeja, Lagos Iddo House, Lagos

Beverages

Tapash Ghosh

30

Consolidated Breweries Plc Contac Global

Data Processing

31 32 33

CSA Interior Co. Cumberlands Dabur Nigeria

– Hotel & Catering Herbal Products

Binoy Berry, – Sarla Prasad Murali V – Victoria Island Lagos Shantanu Sharma – (Continued )

271

Appendix Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No. 34

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

Address

Textiles

Nari Dalamal

35

Dalamal Textile Mills Ltd. Dana Group

Airline, Steel, Pharma, etc

Jacky Harthiramani

36

Deekay Group

–

37

Delta Steel Ltd

Steel

Sibansankar Subudh Biju Koshy

38

Dr. Agrawal’s Eye Institute Dr. Hassan’s Clinic Drury Ind. Ltd. Dufil Prima Foods Plc

Ophthalmology

Farooq Siddiqui

Warri (Delta state) & Abuja Kaduna

Healthcare

Dr. S. Hassan

Maitama Abuja

Food Items

S. Jobanputra Deepak Singhal

Educomp Solutions Edusoft Associates Eldorado Nigeria Ltd. Emcure

Education & Skillings Education& Skilling –

SV Hedgekatte

– 44, Jimoh Odutola Street, Off Eric Moore Road, Surulere, Lagos Port Harcourt

B. Prasad

Lagos

Sunil C. Shah

Diagnostics

Bejoy Rajan

46

Emel Enterprises Ltd.

–

Ramesh Touraney

47

Emmyson Nigeria Ltd Engineers India Ltd Enkay IndoNigeria Ltd.

–

Nilesh B. Kacharia –

27, Henry Carr. Street, Ikeja, Lagos 6 Isijola St. Ilupeju, Lagos 10, Ijora Causeway, 2nd Floor, UBA Bank Building, Ijora, Lagos. 200 Awolowo Road, Ikoyi, Lagos Lagos

50

Essar Group

Diversified Group

51

Eureka Metals Ltd

52

Evans Medical Plc

39 40 41

42 43 44 45

48 49

Engineering Consultancy –

Gulati R.K. Ashok Bansal H.K. Ram

Healthcare

Kiran Virat

9th Floor, Wema Towers, 54, Marina, Lagos –

31 Obalodu Str. Off Coker, Ilupeju, Lagos – Gate 5, Ladipo, Oluwole Street, Off Oba Akran, Ikeja. Agbara Ind. Estate, KM 32, Lagos-BadagryRoad; Agbara, Ogun State. (Continued )

272

Appendix

Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

Address

53

Fine Chemicals Nigeria Ltd

Chemicals

Prakesh R. Ramchandani

54

First Spinners Plc. Flying Dove Nig. Ltd Garnet Industries Nig. Ltd. Glenmark

Textiles

Lalit Khanna

–

Ashok Jain

–

Globe Spinning Mills (Nig.) Ltd. Godrej Nigeria Ltd Grand Cereals& Oil Mills Ltd. Hercules Nig. (Euromax) Hoesch Pipe Mills Nigeria Ltd Horwath Dafinone

–

Munshi A. Jabbar 4, Adeleke Adedoyin Str. , VI, Lagos Chandra G. – Moika Saha S. Plot 3, Block A, Amuwo Odofin, Lagos Maswood 11/12, Fatai Atere Ahmed Abbas Way, Matori, Lagos H. Makhijani Jos South LGA, Plateau state Ashok Kumar Lagos

64 65 66

55 56 57 58 59 60 61

–

Toiletries& Cosmetics Food Items Diversified Activities –

122/132 Oshodi Apapa Express, Afprint Compound 2nd Gate, Lagos Plot 67, Ikorodu Ind. Estate, Lagos VI. Lagos

Chief J.C. Dugad

Henry Carr. Street, Ikeja, Lagos

–

P.K. Bhasin

IHS Nig. Plc IL&FS Indigo

– Project JV Misc. Services

Sanjay Srivastava – Manoj Jagtiani

67 68

Indorama Infinity Tyres Ltd

Petrochemicals Tyres

– S.K. Agarwal

69

Inlaks Plc, 2nd Floor NUJ Building International Plastics Nig. Ltd International Textile Interpharma A Division of Cadila Pharmaceutical

Computer

V. Sankar Narayanan

Ceddi Towers, 16, Wharf Road, Apapa, Lagos – Abuja 242B Muri Okunola Street, VI Lagos – 35, Adeola Odeku street, Victoria Island, Lagos. 3/5, Adeyemo Alakiya street, VI, Lagos.

Plastics

N.S. Kedarnath

4C, Ijora Causeway, Ijora, Lagos

Textiles

B.R. Garg

Pharmaceuticals

Hemant Sharma

Plot 10 Block E, Isolo Ind. Estate, Lagos 47, Morison Crescent, Off Oregun Rd. Alausa, Ikeja, Lagos

62 63

70 71 72

(Continued )

273

Appendix Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

73

Irving Sinat Ltd

74

James Wallace & – Co. Ltd

75

JAWA International Ltd JayKay Carpets JMD Pharmalinks Jolly P. Michel JPatel & Sons Kafin Kafi Ltd Kaycee Nigeria Ltd

Pharma

Construction Misc. Trading

Jolly P. Michel Urmil Patel Haresh Manwani S.H. Tahilramani

KEC Kewal Ram Nig. Ltd Kolorkote Nig. Ltd Lagos Free Trade Zone Company

Power Sector Diversified

– –

–

Dinesh Lakhotia

Logistics

Kundan Sainani

86 87

LagosSmart Limca Bottlers Co.

IT Solutions Beverages

Anuj Morarka Chandra S.N.V

88

Litho Packges (Nig.) Ltd. Lucky Fibres Nigeria Ltd Mahindra

Packaging

R. Surendra Nathan Dinesh Rathi

76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84 85

89 90 91 92

Majestic Snacks Nig. Ltd MBH Power Ltd

–

Main Person(s) Vijay Nikte

M. Jacob V. Verghese

Synthetic Carpets Lakhi Manglani Pharma Srinivas Joshi

Address 11E, Obagun Avenue, Off Fatai Atere Way, Matori Mushin, Lagos 250 B, Sapara Williams Street, VI, Lagos Jawa House, 6 Abimbola Way Isolo, Lagos. Kano Lagos

Transport & Tractors Food Items

–

Lagos Abuja Kano c/o Pharco Productions Plc, 9E-Isolo Ind. Estate, Off Ladipo Str. Papa Ajao, Mushin, Lagos. Abuja 8A–Karimu Kotun Str. Lagos Idiroko Road, Ogun state 81A, Younis Bashorun Street, Off Ajose Adeogun Str. VI, Lagos Lagos 1/3 Badejo Kalesanwo Street, Matori Industrial Estate 1, Awosika Ind. Estate, Ikeja-Lagos 44, EricMoore Road, Surulere, Lagos Lagos & Ibadan

Umesh Kalaskar

–

–

Manish Mittal

10, Acme Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos (Continued )

Textiles

274

Appendix

Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

93

mCarbon Tech Innovation

–

–

94

MECON

M.F. Beg

Lagos

95

MeCure Healthcare Ltd Meltech West Africa Ltd.

Mobile Value Added Services (VAS) Engineering Consultancy Healthcare& Diagnostics –

Anil Grover

Oshodi, Lagos

Jivrajani Shailesh

Offshore Oil Services –

Shekhar Ajmani

10, Common wealth Avenue, Palm Groove Estate, Lagos Lagos

96

Main Person(s)

97

Mercator Ltd

98

Merck Millipore

99

Meridian Group Nigeria

–

M. S. Mahadevan Deepak Khullar

100

–

N. G. Patel

101

Metropolitan Industries Ltd. Micro Nova Pharmaceuticals Ind. Ltd.

Pharma

Hemant Sharma

102

MINL Ltd

–

Guha

103

–

Deepak Singhal

Fertilizers

–

106

Multipro Enterprises Ltd. Nagarjuna Fertilizers Nagode Industries Ltd NIIT Nigeria Ltd

107

104 105

Address

– 332, Ikorodu Road, Capital Building, Maryland, Lagos Lagos Plot No 3, Billings Way, Oregun Industrial Estate, Lagos 21/23 Abimbola Street, Isolo, Lagos Plot 44 Jimoh Odutola Str. Eric Moore, Surulere, Lagos

Maneesh Garg

Matori

IT Training

Pankaj Maheshwari

NIPCO Plc.

–

108

Nycil Ltd

Chemicals

109

Marine Products

110

Ocean Fisheries Nig. Ltd Olam (Nig.) Ltd.

Agro-business

Venkataraman Venkatapathy K.R. Sarkar & P. Sridharan P. Ravindra Kumar V. Srivathsan

111

Panar Group

–

Davinder Vacher

70A, Itafaji Road, Off Corp Drive, Dolphin Estate, Ikoyi, Lagos 1&15 Dockyard Road, Apapa, Lagos KM 6, Ota Idiroko Road, Ota 25-Creek Road, Apapa, Lagos. Plot 2, Block K, Ilasamaja, Isolo, Lagos. Lagos (Continued )

275

Appendix Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

112

Panar Ltd.

–

Ravi Daryani

113

Panvij Biotec Nig. Ltd Parco Group

Pharma

Saxena V.K

Steel & Other Industries

P.K Gupta, R.P. Singh

Pardee Foods Nig. Ltd PJS Products Ltd.

Food Items

Ritesh Sachdeva

–

Prakash Sharma

Positive Packaging Industries Nig. Ltd. Precise Saviour Ind. Ltd Prestige Assurance Prima Group

Packaging

N. P. Kriplani

–

Gopal Agarwal

Non-Life Insurance –

Dr. A.P. Mittal

121

Primlaks Galvanising

Metals Processing

Anil R. Hemnani

122

Primlaks Nig. Ltd Diversified Group Primus Hospital Healthcare

H.K. Ram

Q-Oil & Gas Services Ltd. Ranbaxy Satguru Travels Seagle International Ltd Securisk Insurance Broker Seven-Up Bottling Co. Plc

Oil Services, Education Pharmaceuticals Travel Agency –

V. Ram

Insurance Brokerage

Pradeep Pahalwani

Beverages

Sunil Sawhney

114

115 116

117

118 119 120

123 124 125 126 127 128 129

M.N. Vaswani

Jayaraj Pinto

Gussharan Singh Mukund Garud

Address 447, Apapa Oshodi Expressway, Ijeshetedo, Lagos 15A, Biaduo St. Ikoyi, Lagos 1 Commercial Road, Gemini Block, Eleganza Plaza, Apapa, Lagos. – 2, Ilupeju By-Pass, Henry Stephan Compound, Ilupeju, Lagos Lagos

Abigal Oyindamola Close, KM 1, Ijoko. Lisabi Ayorinde Street, VI, Lagos 12 Akinwande Str. Alaba Coker C/O Eureka Metals Ltd. 5, Ladipo Oluwole Str. Oba Akran, Ikeja, Lagos Lagos Karu New Extension, Abuja, FCT. Port Harcourt Lagos Lagos & Abuja 6/8, Obagun Avenue, Off Fatai Atereway Lagos 14 Industrial Street, Ilupeju, Lagos 247, Moshood Abiola Way, Ijora, Apapa, Lagos. (Continued )

276

Appendix

Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No.

Company

Core Business

Main Person(s)

130

Sewell Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceuticals

131

Pharmaceuticals

Construction

Vivek Satyam

Steel Healthcare

Umesh L. Nagda

135

Shalina Healthcare Nig. Ltd. (Socomex) Shapoorji Pallonji Shree Steel Ltd Shrezar Healthcare Nig. Ltd Simba Group

Deepak C. Kothamdi (Raju) –

136

Skipper Group

137 138

Sonailika Stallion Group

139

Stellar Constructions Ltd Stephen Hospital Group Sterling Agro Sterling Bank Plc

132 133 134

140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

Diversified Consumer Group Diversified Electrical &Infra Group Tractors Diversified Group Construction Healthcare Agric Inputs Banking

Hydrocarbons Sterling Global Oil Resources Plc Sun Holdings Ltd Diversified Group Sunflag (Nig.) Textiles Ltd. Swift Freight International Ltd TATA Africa Services (Nig.) Ltd. Tech Mahindra

Logistics Transport, Equipments, etc IT & BPO

Vinay Grover R. Menon

Address Plot 4, Block 4, Otta Industrial Estate, Ogun State 3/4 Adewunmi Industrial Estate, Kudirat Abiola Way, Oregun, Lagos Lagos 27, Olumo Street by Unilag 2nd Gate, Onike, Yaba, Lagos Lagos & Abuja

Jitender Sachdeva

Plot 900, Onisha Crescent, Gimbia Street, Garki, Area 11, Abuja – – Vaswani Brothers Lagos K.V. Ravi Rangaraajan Dr. Philip Mathew Tarun Das Devandra Nath Puri Deepak Barot

Plot 6, Block A, Ogba Industrial Estate, Ikeja, Lagos 46, Burma Road, Apapa, Lagos – Awolowo Road Ikoyi, Lagos Victoria Island, Lagos

Sonu Shewakramani V.K. Kapur, MG Memon, SK Ahuja Mukul Adarkar

17A, Karimu Kotun Street, VI, Lagos Plot 37-39, Iganmu Industrial Estate, Iganmu, Lagos Ikeja, Lagos

Sudeep Ray

Plot C89, Amuwo Odofin Industrial Layout, Lagos Lagos, Ibadan & Abuja (Continued )

277

Appendix Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No. Company 149 Top Steel

Core Business Steel

150

Tower Aluminum Nig. Plc

Diversified Group

151

Trident Marketing Ltd

–

152

Tulsi Chanrai Foundation TVS Unipumps Nig. Ltd United Global Resources Ltd.

Charitable Activities 2 & 3 Wheelers –

K.S. Murthy

–

Sunil Dhanuka

VedicLife Healthcare Veetee Rice Nigeria Ltd.

Healthcare

–

Rice

D.Mata

Viceroy Virgin Enterprises Ltd. Vista International Ltd. Viva Methanol Ltd Wacot Ltd Wakkies Masala Wahala Wandel International Nigeria Ltd. Wapic Insurance Ltd Water Health Nig. Ltd

Indian Restaurant Sudeep Agriculture K. Selvan

153 154 155

156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167

West African Tobacco Co.Ltd.

Main Person(s) Rajendra Bharadia R.D. Chandaria, Ramesh Chandra Biswal Satbir Singh Chhabra

S. Hayagriva Rao

–

Dev Varyani, Dhiraj Kapoor

Chemicals

Mohan K. Vaswani Sibaram Pradhan Elias Titus

– Indian Restaurants –

Vinay Grower

–

Ashish Desai

–

Rasmakrishna

Tobacco

Rakesh K. Rastogi

Address Lagos 9, Oba Okran Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos 23, Ajao Estate, Off Adeniyi Jones, Ikeja, Lagos Abuja Lagos KM 16, Ikorodu Road, Ojota, Lagos. 86A, 1st Floor, Akran House, Allen Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos Lagos Plot 1, Block E, Isolo Industrial Estate, Isolo, Lagos Lagos Kano Block 1, Plot 44, Off Eric Moore, Surulere, Lagos. No. 2 Oremejai Str. Ilupeju, Lagos Lagos Wuse-2, Abuja 77/79, Eric Moore Road, Surulere, Lagos Lagos 1C, Aduke Close, Maryland Crescent, Lagos. Vital House, Plot 22, Block A, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos (Continued )

278

Appendix

Table A.1  (Continued ) S/No. 168

169

Company Wollen & Synthetics Textile Manufacturing Ltd. Zinc Oxide Industrial Ltd

Core Business

Main Person(s)

Address

Textiles

G. Raghu

88, Oba Akran Avenue, Ikeja, Lagos.

Chemicals

K.S. Vijayan

2 Babs Ladipo Street, Agege, Lagos.

Source: Sachdev, M. (2014). Nigeria: A Business Manual. New Delhi: M/S Eco-Diplomacy & Strategy.

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Index

Aba, 127 Abdulsalami Abubakar, 7, 14 Abike Dabiri-Erewa, 65 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 19, 58, 60 Abuja, 127, 255; Declaration, xxxiv, 69, 96 accusations, 64 achievements, in Nigeria, xxxiv Adamawa, 235 Addis Ababa, xxxiv, 146 adjectival tourism, 179 Afribank, 110 Africa, 18, 47, 59; -India Movement, 46; Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 18 African: Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA), 17; Development Bank (ADB), 13; integration, 11; National Congress (ANC), 61; Safari, 59, 61, 157, 159; unity, 11 Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization (AARDO), xxix Afro-phobia, 174 agitations, 225 agreement, xxxiii, 71, 82, 119, 138, 148; on textiles, 98 agricultural, 5; capacity development program, 150; education, 150;

exports, 147; production, 143; products, 147; sector, 139, 140 Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA), 141, 149 agriculture, 24, 25, 139, 140, 145, 147, 149; and food security, 146 aid, 30 air force, 8 airlifts, 258 Air Peace, 257, 258 Airtel, 108 Ajaokuta, 117; Steel Company, 120 Akik, 54 Akure, 149 Alaskan airline, 130 Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd, 108 Almajiri, 232 Al Qaeda, 224 Americocentric, 39 Andhra Pradesh, 54 Anglo-Indian, community, 22 Angola, 6, 13, 32, 62, 205 Anthony Enahoro, 57 anticolonial, 61 anti-corruption, 15 apartheid, 6, 12, 18, 61 Apollo, 187 approval procedures, 138

313

314

Index

Arewa People’s Congress (APC), 222, 224 armed: forces, 28; struggle, 59 arms and ammunition, 121 army, 8 assessment, of Nigeria and India, 214 associations, 163 Atal Behari Vajpayee, 27 Atlantic Ocean, 63 Audu Ogbeh, 147 Augustus Aikhomu, xxxi automobile, 131 aviation, 111 award, 171 Baba Ghor, 54 Bakassi boys, 224 balance, of trade, 81 Bale Convention, 63 Bandung Conference, 31 Bangladesh, 215; war, 28 banking, 108, 110; and insurance, 108 banks, 110, 131 Belview Airlines, 71 benefits, 193 Benin Republic, 3 Best and Crompton Engineering (NIG) Limited. See evaluation Bharat Ganarajya. See India; Republic, of India Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 22 Bhojsons, xxxi bicameral, 22 bilateral: deployments, 199; relations, 35, 36, 37, 119, 261 (condition, 36); relationships, 42, 257; security cooperation, 238; trade, 83 (relations, 32); Trade Agreement (BTA), 96 billboards, 173 billiard-ball model, 40 Boko Haram, 10, 16, 17, 227, 228, 236, 238–40 Bollywood. See film industry border, war, 61 Borno, 17

Brahmaputra, 20 Brazil, 17 BRICS, xxxiv, 46 Britain, 17, 21, 29, 31 British: colonialism, xxxi, 55; empire, 156 Buhari/Idiagbon, foreign policy, 13 Buhari regime, 16 Burma, 30 business-to-business, relations, 263 Cameroun, 3 capacity building, 149 cases, 247. See also COVID-19 casualization, of labor, 133 CDC. See COVID-19 Chad, 3; republic, 6 Chadian conflict, 201 challenges, 63, 99, 134, 143, 172, 264; and competition, 218; in India, 237; of medical tourism, 185 change, 43; of government, 137 character, of leadership, 17 Chellarams: business portfolio, 176; family, 174, 177; group, 55; PLC, 128 (programs, 129). See also evaluation Chibok girls, 16 China, xxxiv, 14, 17, 28, 29, 47, 59, 61, 166, 243 Chinese, 59; company, 98 Christianity, 4 citizens interest, 16 civilian: administration, 13; rule, 9, 14 Civil War, 62, 63, 205 climate, 20 Clinton Foundation, 113 coal, 25 cob-web, relationships, 40 cocoa, 78 coffee. See imports, from Nigeria Cold War, xxxii, 46, 198 collaboration, 151 colonialism, 43 combating insecurity, 17

Index

Command and Staff College (CSC), xxxii commerce, 169 commercial ventures, 100 commitments, 197 commodity, of trade, 80, 88, 89 common solutions, 264 Commonwealth, 31, 50, 63; of Nations, xxix community relations, 255 companies, 98 company, 130 Complex Interdependence Theory, 41, 42, 45, 47–49 condition, 36 conflicts, 30; around Africa, 15; of interest, 43 Congo, 59; Brazzaville, 6; crisis, 12 constitution, 7, 21; 1979 and 1999, 11; 1999, 8 consultancy, 117; companies, 117; services, 118 contacts, 54, 55 continuity and change, 261 contributions, of Nigeria and India, 191 control mechanism, of COVID-19, 245 cooperation, 45, 69, 117; in agriculture, 144, 147, 149 coronavirus. See COVID-19 corruption, 16, 237 cost comparison, 183 Côte d’Ivoire, 15 cotton, 78, 144 counterinsurgency, 231, 234; challenges, 235, 237; in India, 233; in Nigeria, 238 counterterrorism, 223, 231; challenges, 235, 237 coup d’état, 9, 12, 13 COVID-19, 115, 233, 243, 244, 249, 255, 257, 264; bilateral support, 251; business interactions, 253; capacity building, 254; cases, 246; control mechanism, 250; defense cooperation, 253, 254; donations,

315

256; essential supplies, 256; in India, 248; Indians in Nigeria, 256; medical supplies, 256; Nigerians in India, 256; pandemic, 246; prevention, 250; repatriation/Airlifts, 258; sociocultural relations, 255; testing capacity, 248 credentials, 197 cross-border, fighting, 203 crude oil, 81, 82; exports, 83. See also imports, from Nigeriacultural, 166 culture, 170 curbing COVID-19, 251 cybercrimes, 134 D8, xxxiv Daman, 54 Dana: Air, 129; Group, 100, 130. See also evaluation David Ejoor, 192 debt, 15, 43; relief, 15 decline, 79, 80, 98. See also agricultural, sector decolonization, xxxii, 18 defense, 8, 193; cooperation, 193 delay, in remittances, 137 demand, 82 democratization, in West Africa, 18 dental, 181 Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE), 150 dependence, 44 deployments, 199; ECOWAS/ ECOMOG, 199; to Sierra Leone, 200 developing: countries, 41; as equals, 264 development, 18, 58 diagnosis, 249 Diaspora, 31, 158, 159, 163, 165, 166; conference, 164; policies, 164 diplomacy, 12 diplomatic: consultations, 62; interactions, 251; issues, 45; mechanisms, 33; missions, 58; relations, 58, 61; support, 59; visits, 65, 70

316

Index

direct: contact, 55, 159; investment, 147 disagreements, 218 diseases, 184, 243 Doing Business, 101 domestic: economy, 5; imperatives, 3; security challenges, 8 donations, 6, 256 dragon, 60 drugs, 64, 114 dynamics, 37; of COVID-19, 246; of IR, 38; in Nigeria–India relations, 153 Eagle, 53; and Elephant, 53 economic, 43; cooperation, 49 (agreement, 122); development, 5; diplomacy, 82; reforms, 123 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 109, 132 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 13, 197 economy, 3 ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 13, 18, 29, 198, 218 Egypt, 215 elections, 23 electricity, 136; shortage, 135 elephant, 53 emergence, of COVID-19, 245 energy, 72 engagements, xxxv, 17 engineering, 117 entrepreneurial interactions, 54 entrepreneurs, 96 Enugu, 124 equity participation, 137 Ernest Shonekan, 7 escalation, of COVID-19, 245 Ethiopia, 59 ethnic groups, 4 evaluation, 132; of joint ventures, 124 evolution, 53 expansion, 128; of trade, 84 exports, 25, 77, 89, 93, 113, 145; from India, 79; to India, 77; items, 80; to Nigeria, 79, 87

extortion, 173 extremist groups, 222 factories, 100 fake drugs, 114 fall, 80 fans. See exports, from India farm, 149 FarmerMoni, 7 federalism, 4 Federal Republic of Nigeria, x–ix fertilizer, 149; plant, 148; subsidy, 141 fighter jets, 28 film industry, 26 finance, 50 flights, 186 food: insecurity, 140; production, 24; security, 146, 151 foreign: participation, 121; policy, 3, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 30 (issues, 18) foreign direct investment (FDI), 15 forestry, 25 formal diplomacy, 45 forms, of tourisms, 179 France, 17, 29 Freetown, 55, 160 functional factories, 98 Ganges, 20 Gani Fawehinmi, 183 gateway, 58 generator, 135 Geo-Demographic Structure, 3; India, 19 geography, 3 George Fernandes, 195 Ghana, 31, 59 global: challenges, 265; politic, 145 globalization, 47, 49, 123, 182 Goa, 54 goals, 30, 46 Godrej, 108 Godwin Obaseki, 68 golden era, 56 Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, 7, 65, 142, 186; administration, 16

Index

goods, 80 government: policies, 137; and politics, 21 grants, 18 great power, 216 green alternative, 142 Green Revolution, 24, 143 groundnut, 78 Group: of 15, 18; of 15 (G-15), xxix; of 77, 18; of 77 (G-77), xxix growth, 82 G to G relations, 263 Guinea, 3; Bissau, 18 Gujarat, 54, 55, 160 harassment, 173 HARMONY, 198 Hausa: culture, 171; Fulani, 4 heads of state, 7 health, 34, 181, 187, 247; centers, 187; sector, 184 hearts and minds, 223 Henry Odein Ajumogobia, 96 hides and skin, 78 Hindi. See Bharat Ganarajya historical, 54; foundations, 1; relationship, 161 Hong Kong, 78 horticulture, 25 Ibadan, 55, 124 Ibrahim Babangida, 7; administration, 13 Idealism, 40 ideology, 53 Igbo, 4 Ilorin, 124 impact, 97 imperialism, 43 implementation, 82 importation, 114 imports, 25; from India, 78; from Nigeria, 78 independence, 7, 21, 56, 57 independent: India, xxxi; Nigeria, xxxi

317

India/’s, xxx, xxxii, xxxiv, 17, 21, 31, 43, 47, 56, 59, 60, 117, 139, 145, 173, 215, 265; and Africa, 33; arms of government, 22; contributions to UNOMIL, 209; economic liberalization, 261; economic policy, 30; economic relations, 121; engagement, 163; export, 90; foreign policy, 30, 82; Green Revolution, 142, 143; imports, 91; industrial structure, 26; investments, 107; military peacekeeping operations, 29; and MONUA, 207; and MONUC, 212; national oil company (ONGC), 104; neighbors, 20, 30; nuclear policy, 30; and ONUC, 204; and ONUMOZ, 207; in peacekeeping operations, 219; peacekeeping participations, 203; population, xxx; Regional Economic Communities (RECs), 33; relations with Nigeria, xxxii; and UNAMIR, UNAMIR II, 211; and UNAVEM, 205; and UNAVEM III, 206; UNMEE, 213; UNMIS, 214; and UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL, 209; and UNOSOM I, UNITAF, UNOSOM II, 208; and UNTAG, 204; and West Africa, 31. See also Republic, of India India-Africa: engagement, 265; Forum Summit (IAFS), 33, 34; Summit, xxxiv; ties, 33 India–Africa Fellowship Programme (IAFP), 150 India-Nigeria, interaction, xxxi Indian/s, 100, 107, 170; armed forces, 28; associations, 171; in banking sector, 110; banks, 108, 111; businesses, 123, 134; businessmen, 109; community, xxxi; companies, xxxi, xxxii, 95, 97, 100, 148 (in Nigeria, 117, 124); company, 117; constitution, 21; corporate sector, 27; Council on World Affairs (ICWA), 69; Cultural Association,

318

Index

169; culture, 171; democracy, 23; Diaspora, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163(in Nigeria, 155, 159, 161, 166); diplomatic staff, 59; economy, xxxv, 26, 27; experts, 118; exports, 85, 86, 90; film industry, 26; government, 138; gunnies, 78; hospitals, 184, 186; imports, 85, 92; information technology (IT), 165; investments, 96, 100, 110, 179; investors, 120; involvement, 132; joint venture, 125; Language School, 170; manufacturers, 135; military, 27, 28, 29 (strength, 29; training institutions, 29); National Congress (INC), 22, 57; nationals, 108; navy personnel, 208; neighbors, 31; in Nigeria, xxxi, 156, 157, 172; Ocean, 63; oil companies, 102–4; Oil Corporation (IOC), 78; pharmaceutical (companies, 112; Exports Promotion Council, 113; products, 113; sector, 112); policy, 165 (professionals Forum, 170; towards Nigeria, 161); politics, 22; population, 20, 21; prime minister, xxxi; principles, 30; professionals, 170; rivers, 20; scholarships, 167; settler-traders, 55; strategy, 32; Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), 31; telecommunica-tion companies, 108 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), 118 Indigenization, 112 Indira Gandhi, xxxi, 60 indirect contacts, 160 Indo-African: relations, 59; relationship. See Africa; India Indonesia, 93, 123 Indo-Nigerian: friendship, 262; Joint Commission, 119; Merchant Bank Limited, 108; relations, xxxiii, 50, 174; trade, 147 Indus, 20

industrial waste, 63 industries, 25; capital goods, 26; consumer goods, 25 industry, 169; in Nigeria, 99 inequality, 12 infectious diseases, 244 inflation, 135 informal diplomacy, 45 Information Technology (IT), 165 infrastructure, 105 insecurity, 16, 134, 174, 264 inspections, 114 institutions, 168 instrument, of state policy, 46 insurance, 108, 111 insurgency, 16, 221; in India, 228; in Nigeria, 224, 228 insurgent groups, in India, 231 interactions: economic level, xxxi; political level, xxxi. See also contacts Intercontinental Bank, 110 interdependence, 44, 47, 49 international: Monetary Fund (IMF), 267; peacekeeping, 218; peacekeeping operations, 191; relations, xxxiii. See also international relations (IR); system, 37, 46 international relations (IR), 1, 38, 40, 43, 48; and bilateral cooperation, 48, 49; changes, 43; theories, 38 internet, 107 investments, 30, 32, 96, 97, 104, 138; relations, 95 investor, in Nigeria, xxxi Iran, 226 iron, 97 iron ore, 25 Irrawaddy, 20 Islam, 4 Israel, 203 Jaji, xxxii Jama atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda a Waati Wal Jihad. See Boko Haram

Index

Japan, 26 Jawaharlal Nehru, 58, 60 Jhamatmal, 55 Joint: Task Force (JTF), 235; ventures, 108, 111, 117, 123 (in Africa, 121; in Nigeria, 121, 122) J.T.U. Aguyi Ironsi, 202 Jubril Martins-Kuye, 99 judicial process, 64 Kaduna, 98, 127, 192; Textile Mill, 97 Kano, 54, 71, 127 Kashmir region, 30 Katsina, 129 K. Chellaram and Sons, 175 Ken Nnamani, 65 Kenya, 121, 123, 124 kidnapping, 134 killed, 134 Kishinchand Chellarams, xxxi Lagos, 71, 124, 255 Lake Chad, 239 Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), 232 Laurent Gbagbo, 200 Lazy Susan, 109, 110 leader, in power, 17 Lead Nation, 208 Leather, 91 legends, 160 legislative houses, 7 legislature, 22 lessons, 144, 163, 194, 239; of counterinsurgency, 238; of counterterrorism, 238; for Nigeria, 142 Liberalism, 39 Liberia, 6 Liberian, crisis, 13 Libya, 14, 59 line of credit (LOC), 72, 83, 84, 95 linkage, 47 loans, 108 LOC. See line of credit Lok Sabha. See parliament

319

London, 55, 160; Club of Creditors, 15 Lord Fredrick Lugard, 55 Lusaka, 12 Machine Tools Company, 64 Madras Hanker-chief, 78 Mahatma Gandhi, 57 Mahtani family, 110 Maiduguri, 124, 127, 232 Malaysia, 93, 123 maltreatment, 173, 174 manganese ore, 25 Manipal Hospitals, 188 Manmohan Singh, xxxi, xxxiv, 69 manufacturing, 25, 97 Mao Tse Tung, 222 market, xxxv MarketMonie, 7 Marshal Ibrahim Alfa, 192 mechanization, 146 Me Cure, 187 medical, 181; education, 255; insurance, 185; sector in India, 188; tourism, xxx, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185 (and Nigeria-India cooperation, 182; in India, 183); treatment, 181 medium power, 46 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), 64, 69, 71, 96, 104, 146, 193 Metallurgical, 117 Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (MECON), 117 MFA. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Middle East, xxxv, 84 militancy, 10 militant-oriented, foreign policy, 12 military, 3, 27, 121; assistance, 45, 195; capability, 9, 29; cooperation, 191; government, 6; institutions, 192; interactions, 191, 193; Observer, 219; operations, 19; personnel, 29; spending, 28; support, 191; technology, 194; training, 191 military observers mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 199

320

Index

mineral resources, 25 mining, 5 ministerial meeting, 252 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 19, 97, 98 mobile phones, 107 modernists, 42 modernization, of armed forces, 195 Moshood Abiola, 13 motorcycle, 132 Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), 224 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 222, 224, 227 Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 12 Mozambique, 13 Mughal, 54 Muhammadu Buhari, 7, 142; regime, 17 Muhammadu Ribadu, 191 Muhammed Yusuf, 227 Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), 97 Multinational: Joint Tax Force (MNJTF), 10, 17, 232; relations, 36 Mumbai, 71 Murtala Mohammed, 6, 12, 192; International Airport, 225 Murtala/Obasanjo regime, 12 Musa Yar’Adua, 10 Nagabushana Reddy, 147 Nagaland, 222 Namibia, 6, 61 Narendra Modi, 23 National: Cadet Corps (NCC), 28; Democratic Alliance (NDA), 23; Economy, 23; interests, xxxvi, 10; Populations Commission (NPC), xxx; security, 9 National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), 133. See also pharmaceutical companies

National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT), xxxi, 107 nationalists, 57 nation-state, 39 navy, 8 NCC. See telecommunication Nehru’s vision. See Indo-Nigeria, friendship NEPAD. See New Partnership for Africa’s Development NEWCLIME, 124 New Delhi, xxxiv, 19, 61, 145 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 15, 18 NEWPLAN, 124 Niger Delta, 10, 102, 135, 225; Avengers (NDA), 10 Nigeria/’s, xxx, 18, 31, 32, 53, 55, 59, 110, 121, 123, 160, 196, 215; bilateral deployments, 199; counterterrorism, 232; deployments, 199; deployments under the OAU/ AU, 201; domestic economy, 5; donations, 12; foreign policy, 11, 16, 18, 19; geo-demographic structure, 3; and India, xxix, xxxiv, 58; insecurity, 9; mediatory role, 13; and peacekeeping operations, 198; peacekeeping participations, 202; pharmaceutical sector, 112; population, xxx, 4; ranks, xxx; roles in Africa, 18; roles in West Africa, 18; wealth, 6 Nigeria-India, 56; agricultural cooperation, 144; bilateral relations, 37, 261; collaboration, 138; contact, xxxi; cooperation, 139, 146, 147, 182; cooperation in agriculture, 149; COVID-19 Testing Capacity, 248; diversities, xxix; economic relations, 75; in international peacekeeping, 196; Joint Commission (NIJC), xxxii, 122, 194; joint ventures, 123; membership, xxix; military relations, 194; pharmaceutical, 115; P-to-P

Index

relations, 155; relations, xxxv, 1, 3, 35, 44, 53, 64, 77, 115, 159, 180, 251, 264; ties, 56; trade, 82 Nigeria–India Friendship Association (NIFA), 168 Nigerian-Indian: Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 169; Joint Commission, 64 Nigerian/s: administrations, 12; banking sector, 109; banking system, 110; Civil War, 80. See also Civil War; Communications Commission (NCC), 7; community, 163; Defence Academy (NDA), xxxii, 31, 192; in Delhi, 172; economy, 5, 15, 96, 101, 107, 132; Engineering Works Limited (NEW), 124; foreign policy, 10; government, 6; heads of state, xxxi; Health Sector, 179; IDPs, 134; in India, xxxi, 172, 173; Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), 69; Machine Tools Ltd (NMTL). See evaluation; markets, 149; military, 9, 18 (officials, 191; operation, 19); railways, 118; sectors, 132; students, 150; textile industry, 97 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 30, 31 nonalignment, 43 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 39 Northeast, 10, 238 North Korea, 14 novel coronavirus, 244 nuclear: power, 29; weapons, 191 Obafemi Awolowo, 57 Obasanjo regime. See Olusegun Obasanjo Obodo Uzoma Simeon, 173 Odein Ajumogobia, 115 Odua People’s Congress (OPC), 222, 224 offers, 146 oil, xxx, xxxii, xxxv, 5, 32, 103–5; blocks, 9–10, 102, 104, 105, 106;

321

boom, 6, 12; companies, 101, 102, 162; for-infrastructure, 10–19, 105; and gas, 111; palm. See palm oil; prices, 16; revenue, 5; sector, 101, 102; theft, 10 oilseed, 25 Olam, 149 Oliver, 174 Olu Adeniji, 65 Olusegun Obasanjo, xxxi, 6, 7, 15, 24, 56, 64, 99, 102, 104, 106, 192, 263; foreign policy, 14; regime, 12. See also heads of state Onitsha, 55, 127 Operation Feed the Nation, 24 Organization of African Union (OAU), 18, 201, 223; Committee on Mediation, 12 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 5 Osama bin Laden, 224 Osogbo, 64, 125 overstay, 173 pad-locks. See exports, from India Pakistan, 30, 56, 60, 215, 218, 223, 237 Palestine, 203 palm oil, 78. See also imports, from Nigeria Pan-African, 12, 33; e-Network, 33 Panaji, 173 pandemics, 243, 244 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, 57, 144, 155, 262 Paris Club, 15 parliament, of India, 22 participation, 137 partnership, xxxiii, xxxiv, 151 passport, 7 patients, 179, 186 Patrick Fernandez, 109, 110 patronage, 183 pattern, of relations, 50 payment, 80

322

Index

peacekeeping, 6, 13, 215, 217; operations, 18, 191, 197, 203, 215; participations under UN, 202 People of Indian origin (PIO), 61 personnel, 29 perspective, of IR, 49 petroleum, 32. See also crude oil; oil pharmaceutical, 71, 80, 112; companies, 112, 113; manufacturing company, 187; market in Nigeria, 115; products, 113, 115; sector in India, 115; sector in Nigeria, 115 pharmaceuticals, 97 pipes, 117 plywood. See imports, from Nigeria policies, 6, 137 policy, 30, 111, 112; interventions, 140 political: history and governance, 7; parties, 22; problems, 18; processes, 46; reality, 48; relations, xxxii; relationships, 33 politics, 3 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 62 population, 4, 20, 21, 24, 139, 217, 263 Port Harcourt, 55, 104, 124, 127 post-Cold War, xxxv poultry, 25 Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), 136 powers, 17, 43, 44; distribution, 46; generation, 134; sector, 72 precolonial, 7 Prestige Assurance Company Ltd. See insurance Pretoria regime, 62 prevention and control. See COVID-19 prime minister, 22 prisons, 64 private sector, 148 privatiza-tion, 127 problems, 45, 80; relations, 172, 263; ties, 174 products, 79, 93 professionalism, 237

Professor Gambari, 11 profits. See pharmaceutical companies proposition, 40 protection, 49 protocol, 122 P-to-P, 155 P.V. Narasimha Rao, 23 racism, 18, 43, 174 railway, 104, 106 rainfall, 20 Rajya Sabha. See parliament Ravi Bangar, 99 raw materials, 135 realism, 40 realists, 42 records, 108 refinery, 106, 162 reflections, 241, 257 refugees, 63 relations, 95, 195 relationship, 36 religions, 4 remittances, 137 repatriation, 256, 258 Republic; of India. See India; of Niger, 3 resident, in India, 172 resolution, of conflicts, 15 restrictions, 80, 121 retail business, 100 rice, 129 Rights of First Refusal (RFR), 103 risk, 261 rivers, 20 role perceptions, 3 roots, 53; of the bilateral relations, 53 rubber, 78, 144 Russia, xxxiv, 17, 123 Sani Abacha, 7, 109; regime, 14 scholarship, 149, 167 sector: agricultural, 140; agriculture, 139; banking, 108, 110; insurance, 111; in Nigeria, 107; power, 136 security: challenges, 8; Council, 18

Index

self-reliance, 44 sensitivity, 44 separatist, 222 settlements, 54 sewing machines. See exports, from India Shehu Shagari, xxxi, 7; foreign policy, 13 Shell BP, 12 Shri Anand Sharma, 70, 96 Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, 70 Shri Jaswant Singh, 64 Shri M. Hamid Ansari, 70 Shri Narendra Damodardas Modi, 264 Shri Sharma, 96 shuttle diplomacy, 14 Sierra Leone, 6, 55, 160 Sindhi, 54, 159; traders, 55, 160 Singapore, 78, 123 Sino-Indian: border conflict, 58; conflict, 59 S. M. Krishna, 115 social interactions, 166 sociocultural, 255, 267; interactions, 163; relations, 166 solutions, 264 Sonalika, 149 South Africa, 61, 62 South African Relief Fund (SARF), 12 South–South Cooperation (SSC), 61–62, 151 sovereignty, 39 Soviet Union, 29 Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP), xxxii, 31 Sri Lanka, 123 SSC. See South–South Cooperation the Stallion Group, 131 State Bank of India, 108 statistics, 87–93, 102, 107, 155 strategic: engagements, 153; interests, xxxv; partnership, xxxiii, 71; partners in Africa, xxix strengthening: bilateral, 238; relations, 219

323

Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 13 Structuralism, 39 students, 150 Subash Chandra Bose, 57 substandard drugs, 114 Sudan, 54 summits, 33 support, 60 surgeries, 169 surgical, 181 Suzuki, 132 sympathy, 63 Tafawa Balewa, 7, 10, 262; administration, 12; foreign policy, 11; government. See foreign policy Taliban, 224 Tanzania, 59 tax, 164 taxonomy, 244 technical, 117; service agreement, 120 Technical Aid Corps (TAC), 13 Techno-Economic Approach, 46 technological support, 191 technology, 138 telecommunication, 107, 118 terrorism, 16, 134, 192, 221, 233, 240; index, 221; in India, 228; and insurgency, 223, 224, 228; in Nigeria, 224 terrorist, 222; groups, 224; organizations, 223 textiles, 97, 98, 124; companies, 98; development fund, 99; fabrics, 80; industry, 99 Thailand, 123, 183 Thakurdas Chanrai, 55 theoretical: issues, 35; schools, 40 theories, 40, 41 theory, 38, 41, 42, 48 third-world, 61 timber. See imports, from Nigeria tin, 78 TNCs and NGOs, 39

324

Index

tourism, 179; business, 180; countries, 180; to India, 186 tourist, 184 tractors, 149 trade, 30, 33, 77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 147; agreement, 81, 122; balance, 266; data, 93; dimension, 147; and manufacturing, xxxi; relations, 83 TraderMonie, 7 trading companies, 162 trafficking, 64 training, 145, 191 Triple A, 152 triumph of liberalism, 196 Tunde Idiagbon, xxxi turnover, 98 UAE, 123 Umaru Musa Yar Adua, 7, 102, 121 UNASOG, 199 Union Bank, 110 Union Executive, 22 Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 206 United Nations (UN), xxix, 10, 50; Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 18, 198, 203; membership, 18; military assistance, 202; mission in Africa, 204; Missions, 215; Peacekeeping Operations, 193 United Nations-African Union Hybrid Missions in Darfur (UNAMID), 197 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 197, 214 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 199 United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), 208

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 33 United States, xxxiv, 17 US terrorist watch, 226 Uttar Bharat Seva Samaj, 170 Vaswani brothers, 132 vehicle importation, 100 ventures, in Nigeria, 156 Victor Eburajolo, 98 Vijay Kumar Jetley, 219 virus, 244, 249 Visa, 186 visits, 58, 64, 251 voters, 22 vulnerability, 44 war, 61 Wema Bank, 110 West Africa, 18, 31, 32 West African, 78; countries, 32; students, 31 Whistle Blowing, 6 wonder banks, 109 wood, 92 work culture, 136 World: Bank Doing Business Index, 6; politics, 42; Trade Organization (WTO), xxix, 46 Wuhan, 243 Yakubu Gowon, 6, 7, 63; administration, 12 Yar’ Adua/Jonathan, administration. See foreign policy yarn, 97 Yoruba, 4 Zain Telecom, 107 Zenith Bank, 110 Zimbabwe, 6

About the Author

Sharkdam Wapmuk (PhD) is associate professor with the Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna. He was formerly a senior research fellow and acting director of Research and Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. His current publications include African Perspectives on ACP-EU Relations (edited with Sesay, A. and Ugwuanyi, C.A.), 2020; Civil Society and National Security in Nigeria: A Strategic Analysis (edited with Kalu, E.N.), 2020; Culture and Nigeria’s Foreign Relations in a Globalizing World (edited with Louis Eriomala), 2020; Perspectives on Contemporary Nigerian Politics and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Professor Warisu Oyesina Alli (edited with Usman A. Tar and Efem Nkam Ubi), 2020; Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta: The Internal and External Dimensions (edited with Bukar Bukarambe and Osita Agbu), 2020. Wapmuk has attended several conferences, seminars and academic dialogues on Nigeria-India and India-Africa relations. He has served as consultant for various research projects, published numerous articles in journals, and contributed book chapters on Nigerian foreign policy, security, cooperation and integration, Africa-India relations, and roles of think-tanks in foreign policy.

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