Nietzsche contra Democracy 9781501733239

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Nietzsche

contra Democracy

FREDRICK

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Ithaca

and London

Nietzsche

contra Democracy

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Nietzsche contra democracy

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Fredrick Appel, p.

ences and index.

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Democracy.

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versity Press

and materials to the

(alk.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm,

political science. 2.

First published

/

—dc2I

1998

98-27125

memoiy of iny father^ LARRY MORRIS APPEL To the

[V

M i

ifi

I

ri.

contents Acknowledgments,

ix

Notes on the Use of Primary Sources, Introduction,

xiii

i

1

Science, Nature, and Nietzschean Ethics,

2

Nietzschean Consciousness-Raising,

3

Negation and

4

Overcoming

5

The Higher Breeding

6

The

Its

Overcoming, 6^

Solitude, 8 i

of Humanity, 705

Art of Politics, 777 based on woi'k with Ruth Abbey

i

6

7

The

Evil of the Strong,

Conclusion; Index, 771

Vlll

CONTENTS

The

Perils of Agonistic Politics,

acknowledgments Many last

of the ideas in this book have been presented over the

few years

at

Association, the

annual meetings of the American Political Science

Midwest

Political Science Association, the

North-

eastern Political Science Association, the Amierican Philosophical

Association (Eastern and Pacific Divisions), the

North American

Nietzsche Society, and the Canadian Political Science Association.

thank

all

of

my

respondents, especially

toph Cox, and Leon Craig. scholars

who commented on

My

Maudemarie

I

Clark, Chris-

gratitude also extends to the fine

or challenged the arguments

various parts of this book: Peter Berkowitz,

made

Monique Deveaux,

in

Je-

remy Goldman, David Kahane, Brian Leiter, Pratap Mehta, Louis Miller, David Owen, Mark T. Reinhardt, Alan Ryan, James Tully, Brian Walker, and Bernard Yack. Wdiile

from them

as

I

I

have not learned as

should have, their advice has

made

this a better

much book.

IX

I

also

acknowledge the inspiration (both professional and personal)

my

received during

postgraduate years from Charles Taylor. His

strong encouragement of this project came at an especially crucial

A

word of appreciation is due to my friend, colleague, and sometime collaborator Ruth Abbey, who has been uncommonly generous with her time and comments and who grajuncture.

special

ciously allowed

Chapter portant

6.

me

The

to include a revised version of our joint essay as

reader will note the pervasive influence of her im-

work on Nietzsche

acknowledge the

I

in

what

follows.

financial assistance of the Social Sciences

Humanities Research Council of Canada during the years this

book was

first

toral fellowship

chercheurs et

conceived and researched. Because of

a

in

and

which

postdoc-

awarded by the Quebec government’s Fonds pour

I’aide a la recherche, I

les

had the privilege of revising the

manuscript in the congenial and stimulating atmosphere of Harvard University.

I

am

grateful to

Kenneth A. Shepsle,

chair of the Depart-

ment of Government, and Charles S. Maier, director of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, for their kind hospitality. Without the strong support of Roger M. Haydon at Cornell University Press, this book might never have been published. As a young author I could not have wished for a more patient, thoughtful, engaged

—and engaging—

editor.

I

am

also grateful to Priscilla Hurdle,

Nancy J. Winemiller, manuscript editor, and to Liz Holmes and John LeRoy for their fine copyediting. Finally, a word of heartfelt thanks to my immediate family. More than anyone else, my wife, Marilyn Besner, made this book possible with her magnanimous understanding, love, and support. The birth managing

editor,

of our older daughter, Lottie, coincided with the

and Martine joined our complement

as

it

have no doubt that the great joy they have

touched

this

book

—indeed,

all

of

my

start

entered all

of this project,

its final

brought to

endeavors

—

in

phase.

my life ways

I

I

has

can

scarcely imagine.

•

•

•

Portions of Chapter tive

Viewpoint:

i

have appeared in

A Nietzschean

ACKNOWl.EDGMENTS

my

articles

“The Objec-

Account,” History of Philosophy Qiiar-

1

4 (October 1996): 483-502, and “Nietzsche’s Natural Hierarchy,” hitemational Studies in Philosophy 29, 3 (1997): 49-62. Chapterly 13,

4 contains material published in “The Uhennensch''s Consort: Nietzsche and the ‘Eternal Feminine,”’ History of Political Thought ter

18, 3 (1997),

Much sche’s

512-530, copyright

of Chapter 6 appeared in

Will to Politics,” an

Review of Politics, 60,

i

article

© Imprint Academic, Exeter, U.K. a slightly different

me

as

“Nietz-

coauthored with Ruth Abbey

(Winter 1998): 83-1 14

of these journals for giving

form

.

in the

thank the publishers

permission to reproduce this work

here.

F.

A.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SV

notes on the use of p

r

i

ni

ary sources

References to Nietzsche’s writings are documented parenthetically in the text, with the exception of references to Nietzsche’s per-

sonal correspondence, which are cited in standard note style. Translations are

by Walter Kaufinann and/or R.

J.

Hollingdale, with the

exception of The Binh of Tragedy, translated by Shaun Whiteside, and the Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Christopher

Middleton.

I

use the following abbreviations of translated works:

A

“The

AOM

Assorted Opinions and Maxhns, in

BGE

Beyond Good and

Antichrist,” published with

TI

Evil, trans. R. J.

(see below).

HAH,

vol. 2 (see below).

Hollingdale (Harmonds-

worth: Penguin, 1990).

NOTES ON THE USE OF PRIMARY SOURCES

XIII

BT

The Bhth of Tragedy, trans. Shaun Whiteside (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993). (The 1886 preface to this 1872 text, the seven-part “Attempt at Self-Criticism,”

“BT

D

is

referred to as

Preface.”)

Daybreak: Thoughts on the Frejudices of Alorality, trans. R.

J.

Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

EH

Homo,

Ecce

trans. R. J.

Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Pen-

guin, 1992).

GM

The Genealogy of Morals, Hollingdale

(New

trans.

Walter Kaufmann and R.

J.

York: Vintage, 1969). Also referred to in

the text as The Genealogy.

GS

The Gay

Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vin-

Science, trans.

tage, 1974).

HAH

Human, All

Too

Hollingdale

Human:

A

Book for Free

Spirits, trans.

Cambridge

(Cambridge:

University

R. J.

Press,

1986). (All references with this abbreviation concern vol.

except for references to the Preface of vol.

HC

“Homer’s Contest,” ed.

in

The Portable

i,

2).

Nietzsche,

trans.

and

Walter Kaufmann (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982),

PP- 32-39-

SE

“Schopenhauer

as

timely Meditations,

Educator,” the third of Nietzsche’s Untrans.

Cambridge University

TI

Hollingdale (Cambridge:

Press, 1983), pp.

“Twilight of the Idols,” published with light

UD

R. J.

1

27-194.

A (see

of the Idols and The Antichrist, trans. R.

J.

Hollingdale

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” the of Nietzsche’s Untimely Mediatmis, trans. R.

WP

above) in Twi-

J.

third

Hollingdale

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 59-123. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale

(New York:

Vintage, 1968).

WS

The Wanderer

Z

Thus Spoke Zarathustra,

arid

His Shadow, in

HAH,

vol. 2 (see above).

trans. R. J. Hollingdale

(Harmonds-

worth: Penguin, 1969). Also referred to in the text as Zarathustra.

When

referring to the

German

original,

I

Werk: Kiitische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli nari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967-1978).

XIV

NOTES ON THE USE OF PRIMARY SOURCES

on the standard and Mazzino Monti-

rely

1

Roman

numerals refer to major divisions or parts in Nietzsche’s

books; Arabic numerals refer to sections and subsections, not pages. So, for example,

(WP

and (Z

refers to

III, 1 1, i)

300) refers to The Will

Spirit of Gravity”), subsection

cated,

emphases are Nietzsche’s own.

A

brief explanation

is

Power, section 300,

Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part

(“Of the all

to

warranted for

i.

my

III,

section

1

Unless otherwise indi-

routine departure in this

book from the accepted practice of gender-neutral language. A book on Nietzsche that scrupulously avoids the use of sexual stereotypes and sexist language would obscure, rather than highlight, Nietzsche’s

own

sexism.

Hence my repeated use of phrases such

rather than “higher

human

beings.” As

I

hope

is

of

that

wish to highlight, rather than endorse,

I

it

will

4,

men”

Nietz-

capable of the highest

be clear in what follows

levels

I

“higher

argue in Chapter

sche believes that only a certain type of man

human achievement.

as

this

Nietzschean view.

NOTES ON THE USE OF PRIMARY SOURCES

XV

Introduction

F

riedrich Nietzsche’s great concern

those few

He

whom

believes that

is

for the flourishing of

he considers exemplary of the

we can

—and should—make

tinctions betv^een higher, admirable

human

qualitative dis-

modes of human

existence and

lower, contemptible ones, and that these distinctions should his target readership to foster higher

cost to the

many who cannot

Such

he

a project,

fears,

modern world because thrust of modernity

is

forms of human

species.

life at

compel

whatever

aspire thereto.

has

become

increasingly difficult in the

the dominant social, political, and ethical

undermining the very

possibility of

human

greatness. Christian and post-Christian ethical and spiritual ideals

have attained hegemonic status

in the

Western world and are

effec-

human beings into a leveling, egalitarif unchecked, may eradicate human excellence. Nietz-

tively indoctrinating superior

ian ethos that,

I

sche sees his project as nothing

from

and he

this degradation,

instincts of those superior

less

than the rescue of the species

initiates

it

by appealing to the deepest

specimens of humanity

now in

the grips of

“herd morality.” By attempting to help them wean themselves from values that are manifestly bad for them, Nietzsche sees himself as laying the foundation for a new, aristocratic political order in in

which the herdlike majority and

whose only concern would be

sche’s project

its

own

understatement to say that

letters. Political theorists

excellence.

of Nietz-

this picture

and moral philosophers

consider themselves radical democrats have grown accustomed to

viewing Nietzsche as interests ized.

for the cultivation of

not often encountered in the contemporary Anglo-

American world of

who

is

a gross is

preferred values are put in

under the control of a self-absorbed master caste

their proper place:

It

its

Europe

As

a useful

resource in their efforts to champion the

and concerns of those who are disadvantaged and marginalefforts to draft Nietzsche’s

democracy have multiplied,

his

thought into the service of radical

popular association with emancipation

and “progressivism” has become ever more entrenched and patendy inegalitarian

political project

This book challenges Nietzsche.

More

this

specifically,

it

his

ignored or summarily dismissed.

popular,

“progressive” reading of

takes issue with a claim being

made

with increasing confidence and frequency, namely that an embrace of Nietzsche’s emancipatory message

is

easily reconcilable with a stead-

commitment to egalitarian ideals. Although Nietzsche claims in a late work to develop his own, superior brand of “philanthropy” [Menschenliebe] (A 2), this book argues that his work is best underfast

stood as an uncompromising repudiation of both the ethic of benevolence and the notion of the equality of persons in the ically aristocratic

commitment

to

human

critique of modern democratic sensibilities I

.

The

first

Georg Brandes.

and practices

I

have read about myself

till

was

a

is

it is

as central

contemporary of

In a letter to Brandes dated

1887, Nietzsche endorses this characterization, saying that that

rad-

excellence.^ Nietzsche’s

to refer to Nietzsche as an aristocratic radical

Nietzsche’s, the Danish critic

name of a

2

December

“the shrewdest remark

now.” Selected Letters of Friediich Nietzsche, ed. and

Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), p. 279. Although my approach differs from that of Bruce Detwiler in some important respects, I find the tide trans.

of his book apt: Nietzsche and the of Chicago Press, 1990).

INTRODUCTION

Politics

ofAris'tocratic Radicalism (Chicago: University

commitment

to his

to excellence as his seemingly less objectionable

evocations of self-overcoming.

The

objections and dismissals that will greet this

ready been rehearsed a

many

times.

Many will

book have

al-

claim that Nietzsche

is

“protean” thinker whose writings can be (and have been) twisted in

innumerable ways.^

It

readiness or reluctance

may be conceded

—that

—with varying degrees of found in the

textual evidence can be

Nietzschean corpus for the reading proposed here. But, so the argu-

ment

goes, any suggestion that

rious; indeed, ile

and

the “right” interpretation

is

spu-

any project attempting to “get Nietzsche right”

is

ster-

a colossal

it is

waste of time.

Partisans of this view tend to be enthusiastic followers of Foucault’s cavalier

approach to the interpretation of texts. His suggestion

that “the only valid tribute to [Nietzsche’s] thought ...

use

it,

to

deform

it,

to

make

it

is

precisely to

groan and protest” provides conve-

nient cover for those wishing hastily to proclaim the irrelevance of Nietzsche’s illiberalism and antiegalitarianism. ^

Thus William Con-

nolly cautions democrats against responding too single-mindedly to

Nietzsche’s antidemocratic remarks, for such a reaction “represses

dimensions in those same formulations that speak

democrat

2.

tions

critically to the

as a democrat.”'^

See, for example, William E. Connolly, ldentity\Dijference: Demoa'atic Negotia-

of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),

p. 185. Cf. his

more

recent The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 26, 206.

Michel Foucault,

3.

Powe?'/Kjto'wledge:

Selected Intervieovs

and Other

Writings,

7972-/977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 53-54. Connolly, for one, does not always adhere consistently to this “protean Nietzsche” line. For example, he criticizes Charles Taylor’s “selective reading” of “the Nietzschean stance” things, “underplay[ing] the role of ization, p. 15). In this

Honig

passage

it

in Nietzsche’s

other

thought” {Ethos of Plural-

seems that getting Nietzsche right

matters.

Bonnie

similarly suggests that a democratic appropriation of Nietzsche produces a

truer reading.

WTien Honig speaks of “radicalizing” Nietzsche’s thought

gested by Nietzsche’s

own

texts,” the implication

better than rival accounts because sition

amor fati

among

for,

more rigorously or

fully

it

than

“in

ways sug-

seems to be that her interpretation

is

follows or highlights the logic of Nietzsche’s poa less radical rival.

Honig,

Political

Theory and the

Displace7nent of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 65. 4.

Connolly, Identity\Dijference,

p.

19 1.

INTRODUCTION

With assumed

the infinite malleability of Nietzsche’s writings conveniently as a point

of departure, postmodern theorists of democracy

approach Nietzsche with the following question in mind: to what purpose can and should we use (or abuse) his work in the pursuit of

our ends? Since we happen to be interested theory and making

tic

a

more

pluralistic

ceivable (so their reasoning goes),

in radicalizing

democra-

democratic practice con-

we should

focus

on those elements

of his opus that seem especially conducive to radical democracy and jettison the rest as retrograde

and

unusable.*’

Just which element to begin with

is

a

matter of some disagree-

ment among those determined

to fashion a Nietzschean pedigree for

and

pluralist visions of liberal (or social)

their radically egalitarian

Romand

democracy.

Coles’s point of departure

of Zarathustra’s “gift-giving

virtue,”*^

which

reading

Mark Warren

whereas

leges Nietzsche’s conception of agency,

a particular

is

is

privi-

said to undergird a

“positive political vision” that “include [s] the values of individuation,

communal

intersubjectivity, egalitarianism,

Honig, for her

part, joins

and pluralism.”^ Bonnie

with Connolly in lauding Nietzsche’s cele-

bration of agonistic conflict and contest, which she claims

is

exem-

plary of a virtu politics that fosters the contestability of concepts and identities

Owen similarly prizes Nietzsche’s

David that

5.

and valorizes dissonance, resistance, and disruption.^ agonistic politics and claims

one of the most useful elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy In this spirit,

Mark Warren

latter in

the former. Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge:

See also David Owen, Nietzsche,

p. 2

1 1.

p.

71. Richard Rorty, a

1

his

speaks of a postmodern “gentle Nietzsche” along-

and of the need to dispose of the

side a “bloody Nietzsche”

is

order to recover

MIT

Press, 1988),

and Modernity (London: Sage, 1995), self-declared postmodern liberal, is not as interested in radiPolitics,

calizing democratic theory, but he remains similarly confident that

we can

safely dis-

miss Nietzsche’s darker musings as “mad” while profiting from Nietzschean notions

of self-overcoming. See “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Relativmn, and Truth (Cambridge:

more 6.

to say about Rorty’s

Romand

flections 2

Cambridge University

argument

in the

Press, 1991), p. 187.

I

have

concluding chapter.

Coles, “Liberty, Equality, Receptive Generosity: Neo-Nietzschean Re-

on the Ethics and

Politics of Coalition ,”

Political Science

Review go,

(June 1996): 375-388. 7.

8.

Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, Honig,

Political Theory.

p.

INTRODUCTION

247;

cf. p.

157.

Both Honig and Connolly attempt to democratize

Nietzsche by seeing the Ubennensch as part of

4

Objectivity,

all

selves rather than a particular elite.

— development of potential that elitist

a “perspectivist”

detached from Nietzsche’s embarrassingly

easily

is

epistemology with emancipatory

may not have meant seriously,

rantings (which he

Indeed, to draw attention to the latter also

(we are told)

politically suspect.

is

in

any

case).^

not only wrong-headed but

As Tracy Strong seems

to sug-

only “Straussians” and others with right-wing political agendas

gest,

would be interested tions of rank

in treating seriously Nietzsche’s attraction to

no-

and hierarchy.^®

One obvious

objection to this “progressive” reading readily comes

to mind. Let us put aside the considerable textual evidence against for the

moment and assume

thinker whose work, with

some

appropriated in limitless ways. radical

in

amount of

that Nietzsche creative

WTy,

protean

bending and twisting, can be

then,

would anyone interested

creative energy required to adapt Nietzschean thought

WTy

bother making Nietzsche’s work

“groan” and “protest” when there are so

and present with

less

dubious credentials

inspiration? If all of this

is

a

democratic theory want to expend the considerable

for democratic purposes?

“Nietzsche”

call it

indeed

is

it

many other thinkers past who could provide ready

bending and twisting turns the end-product

—into

a

mirror image of one’s

own

hard to imagine the point of such an endeavor.

A

convictions,

it

Nietzsche thus

sanitized or domesticated can teach nothing that could not be

learned directly from dozens of contemporary writers.

There is another, deeper objection tion which I develop in the course of claims

is

to the progressive appropriathis

book.

that Nietzsche’s radically aristocratic

One

of

my

central

commitments pervade

every aspect of his project, making any egalitarian appropriation of his

work exceedingly problematic. Thus my

to point out

how

advocate for

illiberal

Owen,

9.

ments

1990); and Daniel 10.

to

ideals. (If this

not simply

W. Conway,

Nietzsche, ed.

were the extent

and Modernity. For other recent book-length

Alan WTiite, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth

Cambridge University 1 1.

and inegalitarian

Nietzsche

Tracy B. Strong, “Nietzsche’s

Companion

is

fervently Nietzsche wished to be understood as an

Nietzsche, Politics,

in this vein, see

intention

and the

Political

(New York:

(New York:

treat-

Routledge,

Routledge, 1996).

Political Misappropriation,” in

The Catnbridge

Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins (Cambridge:

Press, 1996), pp. 128-129.

This point was suggested to

me by

Bernard Yack.

INTRODUCTION

of

my

argument, the Foucaultian

critic

could readily concede

my

point and blithely reply that evidence of Nietzsche’s authorial inten-

need not

tions

freedom.

restrict oiir interpretive

ignore his intentions, the

Why shouldn’t we

and mine

critic will suggest,

work

his

for

nuggets that would prove useful to a project that he himself shunned?) Instead,

intend to argue for the all-encompassing nature of Nietz-

I

sche’s elitist predilections. I

show

coming

in the

rank order

how assumptions

chapters, for example,

among human

of

beings undergird not simply his political

stance but also his epistemology and his understanding of concepts

such as nature. Nietzsche claims to perceive the existence of different types of human nature that represent higher and lower orders of

human self)

existence.

Only higher-order human beings (such

can sense the truth of

geously, joyfully

of a contingent ity that

as

him-

normative ranking and coura-

this

embrace the “hard truths” that science provides us

life

without God. Only members of the tiny minor-

embodies truly noble

instincts are, in Nietzsche’s view, “nat-

ural” in the fullest, finest sense, that

ing and order on chaos and

who

who impose mean-

creators

is,

thus serve as paradigms for the

species as a whole.

Nietzsche aims

at

persuading these noble types

books are written

his

to reorient their views

own visceral

spect for their

tempt

—

instincts

a nostalgic return to the

and

drives.

—those

toward

The

for

whom

a greater re-

idea

is

not to

at-

“blond beast” of antiquity but rather

to learn the lessons of this distant ancestor’s downfall in order to pro-

modern nobility into political and cultural ascendancy in Europe. By revealing his own trials and tribulations at the hands of pel a new,

mediocre

sensibilities

places his

own

suffering in context

historical struggle

hopes to

and by weaving

—that

between master and

jar his readers

genealogical narrative that

a

is,

in the context of a

slave moralities

out of their lethargy into

pan-

—Nietzsche

a healthier, greater

form of existence. I

also

examine

bound up with of those tion of

fit

his celebration of contestation (agonism)

compete and an easy contempt

for

—and dehumaniza-

Nietzsche’s version of

tio-

who would

re-

or magnanimity, highly touted by those

INTRODUCTION

is

warrior ethos that legitimates both a quasi-deification

— those unworthy of the contest.

hlesse oblige

6

to

a

how

claim him for egalitarian thought, will be revealed as a highly uncertain safeguard against the

beings.

Dionysian excesses of his highest human

argue that Nietzschean magnanimity refers ultimately to

I

nothing more than

a sense of

good

taste

and to the higher man’s

we

obligation to himself (rather than to others). Nietzsche, as

no duty

see, recognizes

to (inferior) others based

able right to personal security, respect, or dignity.

upon any

The

may

fashion, but

it is

from innocent

over his inferiors in

it

inalien-

studied indif-

ference that passes for merciful forbearance in his thought

suade the noble type from lording

shall

a

dis-

vulgar

not meant to halt any unintended harm that results

acts of creative self-assertion. In Nietzsche’s view, the

benefits of such self-assertion far outweigh any accidental, destructive

by-products of the creative process.

Posmiodern

racy would do well to examine

more deeply what

to unlimited agonistic struggle this task, in it

up

might

entail.

a politics

The

best

given over

way

or otherwise) with our liberal democratic scruples.

what may well be the

lies

those of us

who

real

importance of Nietzsche for

subscribe to the broad egalitarian consensus.

may

de-

antiegalitarianism.

An

Nietzsche’s usefulness to contemporary democratic theory

from

rive, paradoxically,

engagement with

his

uncompromising

“untimely meditations” about rank, domina-

his

and nobility can enliven the

tion,

stripes

by forcing them to account

he holds

12.

in

to begin

my view, is to revisit Nietzsche’s politics without dressing

(tacitly

Herein

democ-

theorists attracted to the notion of agonistic

sensibilities

for

of egalitarians of

all

and defend those convictions

contempt: concern for the weak, belief in the equal moral

Following Will Kymlicka,

I

assume that

all

contemporary

political

and moral

philosophy, whether of a liberal, libertarian, utilitarian, socialist, feminist, or other

on an

bent, works

are of equal moral

“egalitarian plateau”

where

How these

rights are conceived

but the conviction that licka,

agreed

(a) that all

human

worth and are equal bearers of certain basic rights and

of the main tasks of the political community rights.

it is

Contanporary

we

all

share

Press, 1990), pp. 4-5, 49.

The

An

notion of

is

one

of course highly contested;

(or should share them)

Introduction a

(b) that

the defense and promotion of these

and adjudicated

them

Political Philosophy:

is

beings

(New

is

not. See

Kym-

York; Oxford University

broad consensus on equality

is

also dis-

cussed by Ronald Dworkin in Law's E?npire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); and

Amartya Sen,

Inequality

Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1992).

INTRODUCTION

worth of

human

all

beings and the desire to preserve and promote

liberal institutions^^

The view

that alien ideas have these salutary antidotal benefits

one Nietzsche himself occasionally

professes,

and

is

underlies his fa-

it

mous

claim that “what does not destroy us makes us stronger” as well

as his

repeated insistence upon the value of enemiesd"^ This view, inci-

dentally,

no stranger

is

Mill’s defenses

and

of free speech

who oppose

those

livelier

Ironically,

to the liberal tradition:

that

is

impression of truth produced by

its

by drawing attention away from the

democracy from the

theorists

a

view

is

silenced, even

suffer because they lose “the clearer perception

it

ian elements of Nietzsche’s project

rary

when

one of John Stuart

full

may be doing their

collision with error.”^^ illiberal

and

inegalitar-

and thereby sheltering contempo-

force of his critique, radical democratic

fellow democrats a disservice.

Nietzsche’s Anglo-American Reception

The

construction of an essentially benign, emancipatory Nietzsche

in the collective

imagination of the Anglo-American academy can be

traced back to Walter

Kaufmann, whose

role as Nietzsche’s foremost

English-language translator and as author of an oft-cited study can scarcely be

1950 book and

overestimated.^^ In his now-classic

throughout the lengthy and ubiquitous editorial comments

13.

As Laurence Lampert puts

it,

“Nietzsche’s politics broadens the political per-

spective instead of shrinking itself into

Thnes:

A

in his

some modern option.”

Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche

(New Haven:

Nietzsche

and

Modem

Yale University Press,

1993), p. 431. 14.

The

claim can be found in

of enemies, see 15.

erty

AOM

This citation

and Other

is

191;

GAl

I,

\\T 934 and TI ii;

from chapter

Essays, ed.

Z

2

I,

22, 3;

I,

EH

8; cf. I,

7;

D 507, GS 19. On the value EH II, 6; and TI V, 3.

of “On Liberty.” See John Stuart Mill,

John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University

On

Lib-

Press, 1991), p. 21.

Nietzsche’s faith in the antidotal value of opposing ideas and forces can be added to the convergences between in their “Mill, tics

I

16.

him and Mill

identified

Nietzsche, and the Identity of Postmodern lAherAism," Journal of Poli-

(Eebruary 1995): 1-23.

Walter Kauftnann, Nietzsche:

Philosopher,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

8

by Gerald Mara and Suzanne Dovi

INTRODUCTION

Psychologist,

AntiChi'ist,

4th ed.

translations, Kauftnann’s

main concern was

postwar view of Nietzsche

to counter the prevailing

proto-Nazi, a view that had been en-

as a

couraged by Elisabeth Foster-Nietzsche’s selective editing of her

work and by

brother’s unpublished

the Nazis’

own embrace

of this

doctored product. By highlighting Nietzsche’s contempt for conventional anti-Semitism, for nineteenth-century racism,

man

chauvinism,

Kaufmann provided

and for Ger-

us with a valuable corrective.

In trying to bring his subject into line with prevailing liberal sensibil-

however, his gesture ironically mirrored that of Nietzsche’s

ities,

sister.

Kaufmann’s Nietzsche,

heroic figure aligned with other lu-

a

minaries of the Western canon such as Socrates, Christ, and the En-

lightenment

philosophes,

turned out to be scarcely more accurate

depiction than the Nazis’ Aryan version (albeit from a

a

much more

palatable perspective).

A

decided shift in Nietzsche scholarship began in the 1970s and

when an important part of Kaufmann’s question. Under the influence of Jacques Der-

accelerated in the 1980s,

legacy was called into

Michel Foucault, and other representatives of French post-

rida,

modern or

poststructuralist thought, a

on the Anglo-American

“new Nietzsche” appeared

intellectual scene,

one who turned from

torch-bearer to gravedigger of the Western philosophical tradition.^' In this enthusiastic nouvelle

fluence, Nietzsche

normative

was pictured

vague of French postmodern in-

as a playful

and conceptions of

language

debunker of all truth.

ethical-

Ironically,

this

repudiation of one part of Kauftnann’s reading served to solidify an-

other part of the Kaufmannian legacy: namely, his picture of Nietzsche as an essentially benign, admirable figure. For the postmod-

17.

The

New

Nietzsche

is

the

title

of an influential collection of articles on Nietz-

sche in English translation, ed. David B. Allison (1977; Cambridge:

The French-language work

MIT Press,

1985).

that inspired this collection included book-length studies

by Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and

Philosophy, trans.

Hugh Tomlinson

(1962;

New York:

Columbia University Press, 1983); Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, trans. Duncan Lange (1972; London: Athlone Press, 1993); and a few short pieces by Michel Foucault ’trans.

(in, e.g.,

Power/Knowledge). See also Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's

Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); and, more re-

cently, Eric Blondel, Nietzsche, the Body, trans.

Styles,

Sean

Hand

and Culture: Philosophy as

Philological Genealogy,

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

INTRODUCTION

Nietzschean thought

ernists held that

is

emancipatory

bare of the oppressive, stultifying dogmatism of

all

in its laying

philosophical

categories or grand narratives, especially those dealing with “morality”

and “truth.”i8

Seen through the lens of a Derrida or cized version, an Alexander

spectivism”

from

all

came

Nehamas

a

Foucault

the angli-

(or, in

or Rorty), Nietzschean “per-

to represent a dizzying, radical type of

thought and practice. As Peter Ber-

traditional forms of

kowitz has recently noted,

it

freedom

became standard

practice to follow

Fou-

concern with “regimes of truth” into the assumption that

cault’s

Nietzsche’s main significance tory potential

—

epistemology.^^

ernism, such as

—indeed the source of

his

emancipa-

lay in his critical treatment (or deconstruction) of

Even philosophers out of sympathy with postmodAllan Bloom, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Alain Renaut,

routinely associate Nietzsche with the epistemic and value relativism

of his postmodern champions.^®

Among

more prominent works in this line are Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (Ntvc York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Bernd Magnus et al., Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature (New York: Routledge, 1993); Alexander Ne1

8.

the

hamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); and

Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and

the Politics of Transfguration,

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

known

as

Among

expanded ed.

philosophers not generally

Nietzsche scholars, Rorty has been particularly influential in promoting this

view. See the reference in note 5 along with his Contingency, Irony, Solidarity

bridge: 19.

Cambridge University

(Cam-

Press, 1989).

Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an hntnoralist (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1995). attention

It is

from Nietzsche’s

indeed strange that Foucault, after resolutely deflecting

and

ethical

political concerns, revealed his

own normative

concerns more clearly near the end of his career, in the context of his work on Hellenistic

conceptions of “care of the

as a Practice

self.”

See Foucault, “The Ethic of Care for the Self

of Freedom,” interview with Paul Fornet-Betancourt et

Gautier, in The Final Foucault, ed. Press, 1988). It

J.

trans. J.

Bernauer and D. Rasmussen (Cambridge:

seems that Foucault did not come to

cient philosophy through Nietzsche, nor (to

Nietzsche shared in

al.,

my

his interest in this aspect

D.

MIT

of an-

knowledge) did he acknowledge that

this interest.

Bloom, The Closing of the Atnerican Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Detnocracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (New York: Simon and 20. See Allan

Schuster, 1988); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue:

Dame: University of Notre Dame naut, The Era of the Individual:

10

INTRODUCTION

A

A

Study in Moral Theoty (Notre

Press, 1984), especially chapter 9;

Contribution

to

and Alain Re-

a History of Subjectivity, trans.

M.

B.

Fortunately, the vogue of forcing Nietzsche into a triad with Fou-

and Derrida has diminished markedly

cault

in

more recent

years,

thanks to the appearance of fine studies that have effectively chal-

lenged

many aspects

of the postmodernist reading.

logical front, recent studies have

On the epistemo-

argued convincingly that the Nietz-

schean critique of conventional morality

is

undergirded by serious

appeals to a notion of truth. According to these scholars, Nietzsche

understood that the implausibility of positivism and Platonic realism

need not impel us into an embrace of

relativism. Nietzsche

is

de-

scribed as carving out a position for himself in that vast middle

ground between these

tv^o extremes.^'

Recent authors have also begun to unearth the strong ethicalnormative component in Nietzsche’s project.

comes

easier

tinction

once we employ something

like

Its identification

be-

Bernard Williams’s

dis-

between “ethics” and “morality.”’^ Nietzsche’s repeated

self-description as an amoralist

—indeed, an w/moralist—and

pudiation of “morality” are best understood in light of his native conception of

standpoint.^ ^

And

human

his re-

own

alter-

flourishing: his (Nietzschean) ethical

alongside this salutary shift toward the normative

dimension of Nietzsche’s thought,

it is

now

increasingly accepted

DeBevoise and Franklin Philip (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), chapter 5. See my review of Renaut in the Bosto 7 Book Review 4, 10 (December 1997): 14. i

21. See, for example,

Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1983); Alaudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth

and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1990); and Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche and Aestheticism,” Jo/zrnal of the Histoiy of Philosophy 30,

2

(April 1992): 275-290. Cf. Leiter, “Perspectivism in

Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's "'On the

Genealogy of Morals," ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of Cali-

fornia Press, 1994), pp. 334-357; and his “Nietzsche and the Critique of Morality:

Philosophical Naturalism in Nietzsche’s

Theory of Value” (Ph.D.

diss..

University of

Michigan, 1995). 2 2 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Lhnits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard Uni.

versity Press, 1985), pp. 6-7. 23.

For some recent attempts

at

exploring Nietzsche’s normative dimension, see

Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Oi'igin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991); Ophelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilisin: Nietzsche without Masks (Chicago: University of Chicago

and Berkowitz, whose 1995 hoo\i Nietzsche canny subtitle. The Ethics of an Inmioi'alist.

Press, 1984); in its

reflects Williams’s distinction

INTRODUCTION

that Nietzsche

saw himself

an educator of sorts and wished to

as

share his ethical-normative vision with others.

work represents an undeniable advance. Yet with very few exceptions, the Kaufmann legacy of tidying up Nietzsche All of this recent

for

contemporary

(liberal-

or social-democratic) sensibilities remains

the rule in the Anglo-American academy.^^

The

consensus around

the picture of Nietzsche as an essentially benign figure

many of

lenged and underlies Nietzsche’s

name and

is

rarely chal-

the scholarly skirmishes that invoke

spirit. It is

shared even by those

who

disagree

over the political significance of his writings.

Nietzsche and

Politics

For some, Nietzsche tuous of for

politics.

he was the

is

a thinker

wholly uninterested

in or

contemp-

Kaufmann’s shadow looms particularly large here,

first

to adopt the now-familiar strategy of exonerating

Nietzsche from the charge of proto-Nazism by dismissing or downplaying the political content of his writings. Kaufmann’s claim that “the leitmotif of Nietzsche’s antipolitical individual

who

life

and thought [was] the theme of the

seeks self-perfection far from the

ern world” has resonated through

24. See, for example,

Nietzsche:

A

Critical

many approaches

ed.

Peter R.

Sedgw'ick (Oxford:

pp. 222-249; and Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching:

Spoke Zarathnstra"

to Nietzsche’s

Richard Schacht, “Zarathustra/Zarathustra

Reader',

(New Haven:

An

mod-

as

Educator,” in

Blackw'ell,

1995),

Interpretation of ‘‘'Thus

Yale University Press, 1987).

25. Exceptions include Berkowitz, Nietzsche:

The Ethics of an

bnnroralist; Schutte,

Beyond Nihilis?n; Stanley Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathnstra

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); andj. P. Stern, H Study of Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Charles Taylor also evokes a less than comforting Nietzsche in his Sources of the

Self:

The Making of Modein

Identity

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 444-455, 516-520. In Erance, meanwhile, a younger cohort of moral and political philosophers has for the last decade been engaged

in a serious ree.xamination

of the Nietzsche

who had been trum-

peted by the generation of Deleuze, Derrida, and Eoucault. See, for e.xample, the essays in

Why We Are Not Nietzscheans,

ed.

Luc

Eerr\^

and Alain Renaut,

Loaiza (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), and the Boston Book Review 4, 9 (November 1997): 26-27.

12

INTRODUCTION

my

trans.

Robert de

re\dew of this book in

thought, even those rejecting other aspects of Kauftnann’s interpreNietzsche’s focus

tation.^*^

on

stress

individuality, his

on himself and contempt

his

own

experiences, his

for egalitarian collectivism, his

disdain for the “petty politics” of his day, and his abhorrence at the idea of providing others with blueprints and prescriptions

all

seem

to ^

obviate (in this view) any substantive political vision for the future.

For others, tics

this

equation of Nietzsche’s criticism of modern poli-

with an opposition to politics in general

is

tendentious. Along-

side his castigation of petty politics, Nietzsche

toward what he considers

what follows

I

endorse

a different,

this position

is

said to gesture

grander uq^e of

—although,

as

politics.^^ In

noted above,

I

think there are grave difficulties with the widespread “left-wing” variant

—and attempt

to

show how

Nietzsche’s politics emerge out of

concern for the flourishing of the “higher,” “stronger” type of

his

human

being.

explore

and the

power

To

I

take

up

his aesthetic

approach to

political action

and

some of the qualities he believes future rulers would need mechanisms they could use to exercise and legitimate their

in a revitalized

call for political

European

political

and cultural order.

and cultural revitalization

is,

of course, to em|

some vision of sociability, for politics cannot be a solitary affair. / Here we encounter one of the deepest tensions in Nietzsche. I argue/

brace

that he

is

genuinely torn between two competing

tion of autarchy and an Aristotelian sense of our

ideals: a stoic

dependence on the

right sort of company for the fullest cultivation of our virtue.

26.

Kaufmann,

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, AutiChrist, p. 418.

antipolitical readings that

come

no-

Both

More

in

recent

mind include the aforementioned works well as Ted Sadler, Nietzsche: Truth and Re-

readily to

of Magnus, Nehamas, and Schacht, as

(London: Athlone, 1995); and Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism (Princeton: Princeton Univer-

dejnption the sity

Press,

1990). Although he acknowledges passages that suggest otherw'ise,

Berkowitz similarly concludes that Nietzsche “radically denigrates” See his Nietzsche: The Ethics of an hmnoralist, pp.

2, 19,

political life.

91, 102, 123, 148, 151, 161,

166, 238, and 246-247. 27.

Among

wiler, Nietzsche

those alive to the political dimension of Nietzsche’s thought are Det-

and

the Politics of Aristoa-atic Radicalis?n;

and Modeniity (New York: Columbia University

An

Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker

Press, 1994);

Nancy Love, Marx,

Nietzsche,

Press, 1986); Keith Ansell-Pearson,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University

and Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times.

INTRODUCTION

own

his

voice and in that of his literary creation, Zarathustra, Nietz-

sche urges his readers to take on a higher, noble “selfishness” by es-

caping their

proximity to the majority and fleeing into

stifling

As

itually cleansing solitude.

argue below, however, he

I

concerned that the indefinite maintenance of healing isolation might eventually

My examination gender

harm

also

is

this initially salutary,

rather than foster nobility.

of his agonistic type of friendship and his views on

relations, family,

embrace of an

a spir-

and “breeding” strongly suggests that

aristocratic

form of sociability mitigates (but does not

completely subsume) his more extreme position on individual

The

sufficency.

his

latter retains its

most

self-

telling expression in the so-

we

called eternal return of the same, which, as

shall see, functions in

Nietzsche’s thought as both a daunting thought experiment and a

healing epiphany. often noted, rightly, that Nietzsche abhors strict blueprints

It is

and does not provide us with

a draft constitution for a

new

society

ruled by Ubermenschen. If one believes that the appellation “political

philosopher” ought to be reserved exclusively for those with such blueprints in hand, he clearly

view

is

to opt for an exceedingly

losophy.

Under such

The

Zarathustra text.

bill.

But to hold

from

many elements

even Plato would find his creden-

how

settled. It

seriously to take the

would be

foolish to

title

character of Thus Spoke

deny the ironic elements

in the

of “wicked and malicious” parody in Za 7 'athustra (GS Pref.

i). I

unconvinced, however, by Robert Pippin’s argument that the redemptive message

of this work

is

entirely

undermined by

irony.

See Pippin, “Irony and Affirmation in

Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra," in Nietzsche's Aesthetics,

a 7id

versity of

Chicago

Politics, ed.

New

Seas: Explo 7 -atio 7is in Philosophy,

Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: Uni-

Press, 1988), pp. 45-71. Nietzsche e.\plains in his personal corre-

spondence that “behind deepest seriousness and

all

the plain and strange words” of

my whole

philosophy.

It is

Za 7 -athustra “stand

Nietzsche,

p.

213.

EH

suggests that free-spirited types

INTRODUCTION

my disclosure of Letters of F -iedrich 7

Other professions of the profound seriousness undergirding

Zarathust7 -a can be found in

grave and serious

my

the beginning of

myself.” Letter to Carl von Gersdorff, 28 June 1883, in Selected

14

this

Indeed, in an 1886 preface to The Gay Science Nietzsche himself alerts his readers

to the

am

far

the

narrow conception of political phi-

rigid criteria

question of just is

fit

philosopher called into question, for his Republic

tials as a political

28.

would not

human

beings”

Foreword 4 and

EH XL

More

who engage

in all sorts of

(GS

BCE 94,

107;

cf.

232).

generally, Nietzsche

mockery “are

at

bottom

contains no such nuts-and-bolts analysis.^^ Nietzsche deserves his place in the canon of political philosophy not because he provides a detailed institutional account of the optimal type of polity, but rather

because his sweeping denunciation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, feminism, and other offshoots of modernity leads late (albeit in a

I

am

to

formu-

sketchy and unsystematic manner) an alternative, rad-

ically aristocratic

29.

him

model of

politics that bears serious examination.

indebted to Leon Craig for this point. (Admittedly, in his Laws Plato did

get around to the

more

detailed policy prescriptions lacking in The Republic.)

INTRODUCTION

one

Science, Nature,

and Nietzschean Ethics

The Hardest Service t is

I

sometimes argued that Nietzsche’s embrace of the language

of scientific rigor and method extends no further than his sup-

posedly uncritical, science-worshipping “positivist” period of the

late

1870s. After this time he

skeptical view of artistic creativity I.

modern

said to have

adopted

a resolutely

science and to have prized

unbounded

is

over scientific discovery.^ WTiile this view seems to

See, for example, Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher

(New

York:

Columbia

University Press, 1980); and Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature

16

(Cam-

be suggested in appears to

mere

is

few passages of Nietzsche’s

many commentators

where he

later writings,

to be offering a picture of science as

subjective projection of the desires of the scientist onto the

world, tific

a

I

think

it is

pedigree of Nietzsche’s view of the

much

that

is

may think of the scienhuman condition and there

mistaken. Whatever one

—

tendentious and disputable in his “scientific” account

of reality in general and humankind in particular tral role

finest

upon

human

—he bestows

a

cen-

science in his politico-philosophic enterprise.

The

beings, claims Nietzsche, celebrate science as “the wis-

of the world” (A 47; cf. GS 335; \\T 442, 443). He speaks in glowing terms of a new type of philosopher who would be “hardened

dom

by the

discipline of science”

and decries traditional

beliefs

and prac-

tices for their

ignorance of and/or contempt for scientific method

(BGE 2 3 o).2 The acerbic

treatment of positivist notions of science in the later

works

is all

too often mistaken for

generalized skepticism toward

a

the very possibility of science. In his criticisms of positivism,

Nietzsche professes support for an empiricist principle charac-

ever,

teristic

of modern science: namely, the importance of sense experi-

ence to the generation of Beyojid

Good and

all

genuine knowledge.^ As he proffers in

Evil, “all credibility, all

good conscience,

(BGE

dence of truth comes only from the senses [ 5'/>7 wew]”

TI

how-

III, 3).

all

134;

cf.

Rightly exercised by those with the proper instincts (see

below) and correct “breeding,” sense perception allows for the

tainment of real tivity.

evi-

—

as

opposed to bogus,

The Nietzschean

positivistic

—

at-

scientific objec-

free spirit has the capacity for “delineat[ing]

more recent

bridge; Harv’ard University Press, 1985). For a

articulation of this view,

see Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul:

A

Study of Heroic

Individualism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 103-118. 2. tific

See, for example, the derision directed at priests

knowledge (A

8, 12)

against science” (A 47; 3.

cf.

who

claim to be “above” scien-

and Nietzsche’s condemnation of religious

A 48,

faith for its “veto

49).

Brian Leiter, “Perspectivism in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals,” in Nietzsche,

Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's

“On

the Genealogy of Moj-a Is," ed.

Richard

Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 336-337. Laurence Lampert also notes that Nietzsche rejects the nineteenth century’s reigning scientific

paradigm Descaites,

name of science. Nietzsche and Modem and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, in the

SCIENCE, NATURE,

Thnes:

A

Study of Bacon,

1993), p. 301.

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

I

7

a

reality as

art “of

it is''

(EH

XIV,

5) and, like the

being able to read off a

good

philologist, learns the

fact without falsifying

it

by interpreta-

tion” (A 52).

Nietzsche castigates positivism not for

—

true nature of reality

this

a goal

is

count of scientific objectivity that with

goal of uncovering the

its

—but rather

he shares

is

for an ac-

both naive and cowardly.

(I

deal

supposed naivete here and take up Nietzsche’s charge of

its

cowardice below.)

It is

naive because of

accurate account of the facts

is

implausible view that an

its

possible only after the observer be-

comes “impartial” by purging himself of

all

“bias,” that

is, all

affec-

normative, and/or theoretical orientation to the object in ques-

tive,

In

tion.

a

passage

echoed

often

in

contemporary philosophy,

Nietzsche claims that the positivist conception presupposes “an eye that

is

completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direc-

which the

tion, in

active

and interpreting

forces,

through which

alone seeing becomes seeing somethings are supposed to be lacking

(GM III,

”

12).

In proposing a completely unmediated, neutral grasp of reality,

presume that the attainment of knowledge and truth de-

positivists

pends on privileged access to an unearthly, disembodied realm

world which then serves

“real”

as the

Archimedean point

ment

in the imperfect, “apparent”

world of embodied

ions,

and other corrupting

Thus

biases.

—

for judg-

feelings, opin-

positivists unwittingly repli-

cate the metaphysical realism of Plato and Platonic Christianity.'^

Whereas

pher’s eternal

One

4.

Forms, the Judeo-Christian God, and Kant’s Ding-an-

should keep Nietzsche’s repudiation of allegedly “higher,” more real realms

of existence in mind there

is

when reading

passages such as the following: “In the ‘in-itself

nothing of ‘causal connection,’ of

‘follow the cause,’ there

(BGE

have banished the Platonic philoso-

positivists claim to

21).

sation that

The is

no

‘law’ rules. It

target of this critique

is

‘necessity’. is

;

there ‘the effect’ does not

not causation as such but rather the bogus cau-

part of the equally bogus realm of the “in-itself.”

make use of that “sound conception of cause and

Once we

this (the

effect”

refrain

only) world,

from

we can

he associates with science (A

and the Critique of Morality: Philosophical Natu-

49). See Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche

Theory of Value,” (Ph.D. diss.. University of Michigan, 1995), p. and Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-

ralism in Nietzsche’s

bridge University Press, 1990),

18

.

we alone who have fabricated causes”

speaking of higher realms and focus our attention on

177;

.

p.

217.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

sich

from legitimate

scientific discourse, their talk

mediated access to “the cal gesture (cf.

facts”

of an unbiased, un-

simply replicates this same metaphysi-

WP 481).^

Nietzsche claims that one of the “hardest” truths to embrace the existence of only one world.

There

is

no

escape,

is

no transcendent

appeal from our embodied, natural world of sense, instinct, and

thought to erned by

more

a

“real” world.

Although the universe may be gov-

scientifically discernible natural laws,

supra-human

ethical law; apart

nothing

is

good or bad,

nounces

in

The Gay

from

it is

(or before)

not governed by

human

intervention,

right or wrong. “Let us beware,” he an-

Science,

of attributing to [nature] heartlessness and unreason or their opposites: it is

to

become any of

imitate it.

neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does

.

.

.

these things;

it

it

wish

does not by any means strive to

man. None of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to

Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There

nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. (GS 109; cf. \\T 708, 711)^ are only necessities: there

The supposed

is

truth of this proposition, which essentially relegates

traditional religious fairy-tale status,

and philosophical notions of transcendence to

deemed “hard” or

is

“terrible” because very

few

people are said to be constitutionally equipped to willingly and joyfully

embrace what

hardest service,”

Z

cf.

it

it

implies. Because “the service of truth

remains within the purview of

a

is

the

minority (A 50;

III, 12, 7).

Repudiating the tenets of metaphysical realism and limiting oneself to earthly

—to what Zarathustra

refers to

humanly-conceivable, the humanly-evident, the humanly-

as “the

5.

forms of transcendence

Nietzsche does credit positivism, however, for making an

initial

attempt to

break with traditional metaphysical frameworks. See, for example, his reference to the

dawning of a new age of know ledge 6.

As

I

as “the

cock crow of positivasm”

in

TI

IV, 4.

read this passage, the “laws in nature” against which Nietzsche warns are

those of explicitly normative content, for example, the supposed “natural laws” (of self-preservation, duty to others, etc.)

forming the

basis of seventeenth-century social

contract theories, or Romanticism’s claim to be in tune with Nature’s “voice” 16).

His further claim that “there are only necessities”

modern

scientific

notion that

all

natural

is

(cf.

Z II,

perfectly compatible with the

phenomena obey

SCIENCE, NATURE,

the “laws” of physics.

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

palpable”

—

order (Z

a tall

is

II,

2).

Historically,

obsessions onto the natural

its

jection, to see “life” scientifically, as neither

rather “essentially amoral,” as Zarathustra says

This

is

why Nietzsche

(BT

fearsome prospect

a

is

moral nor immoral but

of himself and those

exception with us” (Z IV,

are told, hu-

own normative preoccupations and world (D 1 7). To come to see this as pro-

mankind has always projected

But

we

like

him,

Preface

^‘‘fear

—

5).

the

is

15).

charges those

who

subscribe to any form of

metaphysical realism not merely with error and naivete but with

who

cowardice. In his view, the majority (including most of those

themselves scientists) cling to the metaphysical

To

of fear.^

face

up

to the reality of what

scribe as a disenchanted universe

realist

framework out

Max Weber would

would drive

call

later de-

lesser sorts of

men

“to

nausea and suicide” (GS 107). This truth would produce profound disillusionment in such individuals,

who would

the weight of contempt” for a

that

meaning (BT Preface

value or religious

5).

would be seen

Hence

as bereft

by providing

pretation for

(GM

human

III,

28).

a

of

the recourse to mendacious

and philosophical worldviews that closed the door to

dal nihilism”

tion

life

be “crushed beneath

“suici-

supposedly externally grounded inter-

existence and suffering and the

This embrace of error

is

hope of redemp-

said to be

due to

cowardice rather than to mistaken but easily correctable reasoning:

“Error

(

—belief

in the ideal

[IrrtJim ist Feigheit]

knowledge

is

.

.

.

—

)

is

not blindness, error

ity”

in

EH XIV,

3).

the result of courage ”

(EH Eoreword in

such

3; cf.

lies,

while others do

Whence the cowardice of those “who take flight in face of real(EH XIV, 3) and the intellectual integrity and courage of those

who

can face

it

unblinkingly? Nietzsche’s characteristic response

to trace the intellectual

what he sees

as their

Even

as

fundamental character or disposition

Nietzsche trumpets the

scientific nature

i;

day

EH

who 20

as the

X,

2;

embodiment of a

EH

III, i;

BGE

—back,

in

And human

own approach, he derides “average man of science” of

of his

the positivist “scientificality” [Wissenschaftlichkeit] and the his

is

and normative stances of individuals back to

other words, to the “type” of person they really are.

7.

cowardice

Every acquisition, every step forward

Why do some people need to believe not?

is

fearful flight

from

truth. See, for example,

204, 206, 211;

GM

III,

25;

BT Preface

and VVP 120, 420. Scholars

consider Nietzsche a debunker of science tend to refer to passages such as these.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

“types,” as they are presented in Nietzsche’s brand of science, are

ranked according to different sorts of instinct.

The Primacy Nietzsche’s

of Instinct

many and

human comportment

varied accounts of

are

punctuated with affirmations of our inescapably embodied condition as animals. Zarathustra claims, for

man”

man

example, that “the enlightened

refuses to repudiate his animality and instead refers to the hu-

being as “the animal with red cheeks” (Z

II, 3).

Nietzsche has no

patience for the belief he associates (perhaps unfairly) with the Platonic and Christian traditions,

human

“We

species

to help

is

it

namely that the only way

transcend

its

bodily, animalistic instincts.

philosophers,” he declares, “are not free to divide body from

“we” have grasped the

soul as the people do,” presumably because scientific truth that

Preface

3).

word

for

ganz

something

willing as he [Seele]^

our entire being

is

tind gar]^

in the

inescapably corporeal

is

man

Zarathustra ’s enlightened

tirely [Leib bin ich a

insists that

body” (Z

4; cf.

I,

Z I,

Nietzsche

II,

is

no more prepared

“body en-

3;

WP

2 29).

is

only

As un-

to

make concessions is

to the

prepared to talk

know

the

body bet-

i7).8

As human animals, our conduct mal

is

(GS

to attribute an independent existence to the soul

of spirit only in a figurative sense after coming to

(Z

he

and nothing beside; and soul

idea of a disembodied “spirit” [Gmt]. Zarathustra

ter

to exalt the

is

said to

instincts or drives [Tidebe] rooted in

aware of this or not. Casting aside

all

be shaped by certain pri-

our bodies, whether we are

notions of a disembodied form

of transcendence, Nietzsche claims that “we can

rise

or sink to no

(BGE

36).

He

other

8.

much

‘reality’

And

than the reality of our drives”

yet Nietzsche also claims that the value of a

truth a “spirit” can bear

(EH Foreword

sche’s propensity for appropriating

also

seem

terms

3).

—such

human

life is

maintains

measured by how

Peter Berkowitz rightly notes Nietzas “spirit,” “soul,”

and “virtue”

—that

to be attacked and discarded in other passages. Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 5-6. In attempting to describe his notion of embodied agency, Nietzsche repeatedly makes use

Ethics of an bmftoralist

of traditional terms with unmistakably metaphysical connotations.

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

into his late period the view formulated earlier in his career that our intellect “is drive'"

(D

only the blind instrument

Reason should be seen not

109).

Werkzeu^ of another

[das blinde

as

an independent faculty

but as “a system of relations between various passions and desires”

(VVP 387). The philosophers’ claim that reasoning is independent of instincts is merely a “misunderstanding of the body,” and any attempt to repudiate one’s bodily only

result, paradoxically, in a

clearly

(Z

name of Reason can

affects in the

deformation of one’s

ability to think

I, 3).

In a crucial passage early in the Zarathustra narrative, Nietzsche

underscores

this

tween “the Self’ as

primacy of instinct

[das Selbst] as creative

a distinction be-

body and “the Ego”

The

conscious thought and feeling.

through

thesis

latter,

[das Ich]

though proud of

imaginative leapings and prone to vainglorious celebration of legedly independent power,

“Your Self laughs

at

is

its

its al-

portrayed as the former’s handmaid:

your Ego and

its

proud leapings. ‘What are these

leapings and flights of thought to me?’

it

says to

itself.

‘A by-way to

my goal. I am the Ego’s leading-string and I prompt its conceptions’” (Z

I,

4).

Ego

In this section the

[kleine Veiniimft] that

is,

is

described as a

in fact, “an

“little

intelligence”

instrument of your body,

instrument and toy of your great intelligence

[grofien

a little

Vemunft]."

Nietzsche suggests elsewhere that to think of oneself as exercising free will over

and against

this

embodied

self

temerity characteristic of the “half-educated”

proponents of metaphysical realism,

who

is

a

form of hubristic

(BGE

2 1).^

Against the

insist in various

ways on

the possibility of rising above instincts, desires, and interests into a

higher realm of knowledge and Truth, Nietzsche claims that the pursuit

of knowledge

instincts, desires,

But what

is

is

both intertwined with and driven by these same

and

interests.

the status of his primacy of instinct thesis? Is

to be a value-neutral, scientific account of the

9.

Thirty years

later

“human megalomania”

Sigmund Freud would echo

this

it

meant

way

the natural world

view

in his criticism of the

that clings to “a deeply rooted faith in

undetermined psychical

events and in free will.” Freud, Introductory Lectu?'es on Pyscho-Analysis, trans. and ed.

James Strachey (New York: W.

Norton, 1966), pp. 353, 130. tween Nietzsche and Freud, see Paul Laurent Assoun, Freud VV.

Presses Universitaires de France, 1980).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

On

the relation be-

et Nietzsche

(Paris:

works from

a perspective

textual passages

seem

wholly outside the realm of ethics? Certain

When,

to support this reading.

for example,

Nietzsche declares that “every table of values, every ‘thou

known

to history or ethnology”

ought to be subject to the

shalt’

critical as-

sessment of “medical science,” he seems to be looking upon

all

forms

of ethical discourse with the same detached, scientific manner; sets

all

of values are determined by the same natural laws and processes

and are to be distinguished (rather than ranked) according to various types of physiology

(GM I,

distances himself from

all

7).

According to

this reading,

forms of ethical valuation and

how and why

causal story about

tific

1

Nietzsche

tells a

values (including his

scien-

own)

are

held and asserted.*® This reading has the merit of logical coherence,

but

is it

a sufficient

account of Nietzsche’s view?

Bodily Knowledge, Bodily Ignorance

I

do not think

this interpretation

can withstand the weighty textual

evidence suggesting something quite the contrary: namely, that a

normative vision of

human

flourishing

ence” and that the rhetoric of science

is

is

driving Nietzsche’s “sci-

invoked primarily to infuse

that vision with added respectability. Nietzsche

story about the causal impact of instinct tion,

but the story does not end there.

is

indeed proposing

on human thought and

He

goes

much

a

ac-

further in ad-

vancing an ambitious truth-claim for his ranking of different types of

human

instincts and, concomitantly, for the superiority of certain

types of human being over others.

Nietzsche slides effortlessly and almost imperceptably from an ostensibly value-neutral, “scientific” account of instincts to a normative prise de position in favor

of certain types of instinct over others. Ac-

cording to the laws of what he refers to as rank order [Rangoi'dimng], each living species

and more

divided generally into “different kinds of

specifically into “ascending”

species in question as

is

he suggests by

10. This, as

I

(WP

592, 857).

his repeated

understand

it, is

life”

and “decaying” forms of the

Human

beings are no different,

mention of an “unalterable innate or-

Leiter’s position (see notes 3

SCIENCE, NATURE,

and 4 above).

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

man and man” (BGE 263; cf. BGE every human being as first and foremost a

228).^^

der of rank between

Nietzsche regards

ological representative” or “carrier” [Triiger] of

of existence ing

“physi-

one of the two types

—strong/healthy/ascending and weak/unhealthy/declin-

—and therefore “may be regarded

as representing the

ascending

WP

(TI IX, 33; cf. TI VI, 2; 287). This rank order, he insists, is not merely his own way of looking at

or descending line of

life”

human world (although of course he does not deny, and indeed goes out of his way to confirm, that it is his view); on the contrary, the

Nietzsche claims that his proposed account would be apparent to any healthy, well-bred individual capable of grasping the “hard” truths of

Our

the natural world. K/isten] ... is

the

place in the “order of castes [Die

only the sanctioning of

Ordnung der

a natural order, a natural

law of

rank over which no arbitrary caprice, no ‘modern idea’ has

first

any power” (A

57).

Anyone capable of examining reality without

illu-

sion can grasp the truth that the representatives of “a higher, brighter

humanity” are “very small

by

number

nature rare),” while those

its

weakness are many: there

in

is

a surplus

(for everything outstanding

who

“Among men,

represent degeneration and

among

as

every other species,

of failures [Mifiratenen], of the sick [Kranken], the

degenerate [Efitartenden], the fragile [Gebrechlichen], of those

bound

to suffer; the successful cases are,

(WP 993; BGE 62; cf. BGE

exception”

among men

29, 126;

Given Nietzsche’s repeated insistence that “animal” instinct,

visceral,

it is

scend animality. Whereas both is

EH III,

all

lie in

human

who

are

too, always the i;

WP 420).

of us are driven by

clear that the key difference

strong and weak persons cannot

the issue

is

between

the former’s ability to tran-

types evince an animal nature,

the type of animality, or (what

is

for Nietzsche the

same

thing) the quality of the instincts and drives in the individual in question.

Nietzsche never

hominem

fails

to underline the

ability to discriminate

and people; indeed, he thinks II.

part of

Passages such as

human

24

ad

different types of instinct

takes priority over any independent

where Nietzsche

identifies

Ra 77gordnung

of any “necessary and pennanent characteristics of

condition.” Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the

expanded

this

as an intrinsic

existence, create difficulty for Strong’s suggestion that Nietzsche re-

jects the existence

man

this,

it

among

importance of

Politics

ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 26;

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

a so-called

hu-

of Transfiguration, cf. p.

37.

— assessment of action as such: “An action

depends on who performs

it all

tion, feeling, or

it”

perfectly devoid of value:

is

(WP

292).^^

The

value of an ac-

sentiment can be assessed only with reference to the

value of the actor

—that

the value of that person’s character and

is,

A backward inference must always be made “from the deed doer, from the ideal to those who need />” (GS 370; cf. BGE

instincts.

to the

221;

WP 675).

So, for example,

someone who can grasp the

true nature of the

universe and reject any notion of a “higher,” “real” world of Being

embodies strong, healthy weariness” leads weaker

“other [higher] world”

instincts,

human

(WP

whereas an “instinct of

types to mendacious beliefs in the

586c).

Those who claim

chant for metaphysical transcendence nitely higher than instinct

—

faith, for instance,

or reason

but “a cloak,

is

behind which the instincts played their game

ness to the

dominance of certain

instincts

that their pen-

driven by something

is

ply deluding themselves. Religious faith sa'een^

life-

.

.

.

—

a

infi-

—are sim-

a pretext, a

shrewd

blind-

[Ojne has always spoken

of faith, one has always acted from instinct” (A 39). Whereas religious ascetics

may

sincerely believe themselves to have transcended their

bodily instincts, close observation reveals that these same (morbid) instincts are at play in their efforts to flee earthly reality.

For

their

all

transcendental longing, the “afterworldsmen” gain an almost sensual pleasure from their flights of fantasy, thereby exposing the

core of

all

metaphysical

realist

is

Z

15;

categorical:

“To

the

frameworks: “To what do they owe

the convulsion and joy of their transport?” asks Zarathustra.

swer

lie at

their bodies

and to

this earth”

(Z

I,

The

3; cf.

an-

Z II,

III, 12, 17).

Whether one can come

and affirm these truths

to recognize

—of

the primacy of bodily instinct and the rank order of human beings

depends very much on where one

WTereas and

(as

we

is

situated in the rank order.

shall see in the next chapter) the prudential interests

instincts of lower-order

human

beings lead them to deny the

very existence of the Rangordnung and to affirm instead the menda12. in

Robert Solomon has recently drawn attention to Nietzsche’s ad hominem

“Nietzsche ad hoin'mem: Perspectivism, Personality, and Ressentiment,”

Ca?fih-idge Cofnpavion to Nietzsche, ed.

bridge:

Cambridge University

in

style

The

Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cam-

Press), pp. 180-222.

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

— human

cious notion of

equality,

at least potentially within the

it is

reach of all “higher” or “stronger” persons to understand and rejoice in their superiority to the

“weak.”

Nietzsche claims to possess sort.^^ In

him

a superior,

discriminating sense of this

speaking of his innate “psychological antennae” that allow

who

to identify the essential servility of those

wash” the

“dirt” at the

bottom of

attempt to “white-

book

their natures with

learning,

Nietzsche describes a type of discriminating knowledge that

is

less

self-consciously rational than instinctive and visceral. In this context

(EH

he sings the praises of his senses of

human being

I, 8).

The

described as an organ of which “no philosopher

is

has ever spoken with due respect” yet which entific [physikalisch]

in

is

my

nose of a higher type

instrument in existence”

he declares

nostrils,”

“perceive physiologically parts, the ‘entrails’

is

“the most delicate sci-

(WP

Homo, lauding

in Ecce

—the proximity or

smell

of every soul”

(EH

XIV,

i;

EH

“My

461).

.

.

.

genius

his ability to

the innermost Similarly, in

I, 8).

The Genealogy Nietzsche confesses that he finds “utterly unendurable” the smell of “the entrails of some ill-constituted soul”

TI

12; cf.

I,

IX, 20).

“Where

(GM

we are inOne should

the people eat and drink,”

formed, “even where

it

worships, there

not go into churches

if

one wants

is

usually a stink.

to breathe pure air”

(BGE

30).

Nietzsche makes use of the metaphor of taste just as often as that of smell

when

discussing the

human rank

order and his lofty place in

The finest human beings, Zarathustra teaches us, are not those who know how to “taste” everything. On the contrary, they have the it.

most “obstinate,

fastidious tongues

Wanting

to be in

agreement with the many

taste, for

the simple fact of the matter

and stomachs” (Z

is

is

III,

ii, 2).

taken as a sign of bad

that the “average

man”

is

uninterested in that which most stimulates every “higher nature and

more

refined and fastidious taste”

13. It

(BGE 43,

might be objected that Nietzsche claims to be “experienced”

decadence” and thus denies holding any superior view

decadent tendencies ^'sinmna is

220).

mminarinu

.

crucially mitigated

is .

.

healthy”

(EH

by

II, 2).

(EH

i).

I,

But

his assertion in the

To have

a

in “questions

of

this confession

of

same work

that he

is

decadent streak, for Nietzsche,

not the same thing as being part of the mediocre majority.

I

argue below that he sees

the “master” or “strong” types of his era as both decadent (in the sense of misguided as to their true interests

26

and deepest inclinations) and

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEiMOCRACY

(at least potentially)

redeemable.

Thus, to and persons sensibility.

is

discernible only to those of higher rank and superior

Only good

good and bad

taste.

This

and aesthetics”

that Nietzsche

ation might

can recognize the distinction betvv^een

taste

why the

is

basic question of whether to pre-

men

of lower or higher

fer the cultivation taste

Nietzsche claims that the rank order in things

reiterate,

(WP

makes

seem

353;

cf.

is

“at

a

question of

WP 878). But here my suggestion

entry into the domain of ethical valu-

a partisan

compromised. Does

to be

bottom

this

emphasis on

taste

not suggest that his perceptions and valuations are matters of mere subjective preference? It

would seem so only

Nietzsche’s use of the notion of taste cor-

if

responds to our typical usage. In everyday language the qualifier

“mere”

is

often placed in front of “taste” to highlight the

posedly idiosyncratic nature

like

“merely”

a

—or

if

he subscribes to

Weber’s view that aesthetics has become an au-

tonomous value sphere ethics

is

Nietzsche shares our habitual associ-

taste. If

ation of taste with idiosyncratic preference

something

sup-

someone claims

for example,

Hollywood movies over opera

that her preference for

matter of her personal

—when,

latter’s

and science

in the

modern world, wholly

from

distinct

—the aforementioned passages could be read sim-

ply as assertions of his

own

subjective preference for certain types of

people over others. But Nietzsche does not in fact subscribe to the

common,

subjectivist

view of taste. By insisting on the normative and

cognitive significance of judgments rooted in taste, he rejects the

Weberian notion

that the aesthetic, the moral,

and the

scientific

op-

erate according to separate, mutually exclusive logics.

Of course, Nietzsche’s

incessant highlighting of the intensely per-

sonal nature of his predilections can easily be mistaken for a deliberate attempt to

undercut their objective truth-value. In Ecce Homo, for

example, he refers twice to “his” morality, and in Beyond Good and Evil he “grants” that his will to

“only interpretation”

(EH

in these constructions his

of truth from the

I

5;

BGE

22).

is

Rather than see

think they are most profitably looked

aimed

lies

EH III,

thesis (discussed below)

an attempt to relativize or otherwise mitigate

own views, however,

as rhetorical devices

II, i;

power

at distinguishing his (accurate)

that historically have

guage of truth. Against those

who

insist

upon

evocation

monopolized the

lan-

upon the impersonal nature

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

who

of truth,

claim that objectivity involves attaining an Archi-

medean point denuded of all perspective, Nietzsche insists that there is no contradiction between the deeply personal, embodied perspective

of

human being and objective truth. and objectivity can be made only from an inperspicacious

a superior,

Claims to truth

escapably personal point of view

HAH

BT Preface

12;

5;

GS

374;

Preface 6 ).^^

I

When

Zarathustra describes the body as a “great intelligence”

Venmnft] and declares that to the “discerning

[gfvfien detj\

(GM III,

instincts are holy,”

all

credited with something

erences (Z

I,

4;

Z

I,

22,

it

man

[Erkennen-

appears that bodily instinct

is

being

more than simply reflecting subjective pref2). “Of all forms of intelligence [alien Arten

von Intelligenz] discovered hitherto,” Nietzsche proffers elsewhere, “‘instinct’

a cognitive

(BGE

the most intelligent”

is

element

quantum of reason”

in

(WP

wisdom ence.^^ tra’s is

human

We

learn that there

our passions, that every passion contains 387;

cf.

Z IV,

to be suggesting in these passages

of exceptional

218).

is

is

“its

What Nietzsche seems

13, 9).

that the

embodied

inclinations

beings can result in a form of knowledge or

rather than simply a manifestation of subjective prefer-

This

is

the reasoning that forms the background to Zarathus-

coupling of subjective perception and knowledge claim: “There

wisdom

in the fact that

Nietzsche repeatedly

much in insists

the world smells

(Z

ill”

III, 12, 14).

on the incommunicability of

this

The “goodness” [Gut] that his embodies can never become a “common good”

“bodily knowledge” to most people.

imagined higher caste 14.

This, in

my view, is how Nietzsche’s celebrated “perspectivism” should be read.

A fuller discussion of Nietzsche’s attempt to reconcile the ubiquity of perspective with the possibility of objective truth is found in my “The Objective Viewpoint: A Nietzschean Account,” History of Philosophy Quaitej-ly 13, 4 (October 1996): 483-502. The popular association of Nietzschean perspectivism with pure subjectivism owes a great deal to

Nehamas’s

Nietzsche: Life as Literature.

For an

effective critique of

reading, see Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche and Aestheticism,” losophy 30, 2 (April 1992): 15.

as

that Nietzsche “enthrones” taste

an “organ of knowledge,” he ignores Nietzsche’s insistence on

when he

Habermas thereby a subjectivistic

refers to

joins those

it

who

as

“beyond true and

Pan pour Pan. Habermas, The

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

false,

its

cognitive and nor-

beyond good and

see Nietzsche as a purveyor of nothing

evil.”

more than

Philosophical Discourse of Modernity:

Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge:

28

of the History of Phi-

275-290.

Even though Jurgen Habemias acknowledges

mative import

Nehamas’s

MIT Press,

1987), p. 96.

1

the very notion of which

what can be

common

has ever but

little

sheer folly to attempt to teach the

overcoming, II

and

of

III

“a self-contradiction: [for]

is

(BGE 43).

value”

many about rank

is

as Zarathustra discovers early in his odysseyd*^ this

work, Nietzsche’s

alter

By

parts

ego has concluded that one III, 12, 17).

among them because they represent a fundamenhuman type and possess instincts foreign to the supe-

man, whose teachings cannot possibly

ing response (Z

III, 9; cf.

Thus Nietzsche select”

self-

in vain

tally different

rior

would be

order and

should not attempt to be physician to the “incurable” (Z All speech

It

Z IV,

4).

sympathetic, know-

Z III, 8, i; WS 131). those whom he considers

13, 9;

writes only for

(EH Eoreword

elicit a

“most

Like Christ, both Nietzsche and his

liter-

ary creation describe themselves as “fishers of men,” but with one crucial difference: in rejecting Christianity’s universalizing message,

Nietzsche/Zarathustra claim to be

much more

(EH

and catch

their choice of fishing hole

X,

i).

cast their fishing rods into

swamps “where

Zarathustra seeks “the fairest

human

stinctive

(Z

fish”

discriminating in

Unlike those

who

there are no fish,”

III, 8, 2;

Z

IV,

i).

In-

knowledge can be shared only with those who are “predis-

—those who,

posed and predestined” for

it

instincts similar to Nietzsche’s

(BGE

in other words, possess

30).

Once again, the language of embodiment is invoked to home this point. Alongside the references to taste and touch,

drive

audi-

tory metaphors are also prominent. His teachings are only for the

most

sensitive ears

(EH II,

7;

Z I,

12).

They are

certainly inaccessible

whom

Zarathustra long ago

to those with donkeylike “long ears” for

“unlearned consideration” (Z FV,

3, i).

Moving from

the auditory to

the gastrointestinal, Nietzsche further delimits his readership by referring to Zarathustra’s teaching variously as “man’s fare” [Meiiie

Manns- Kost], “warriors’ food” [Ef’oberer-Kost]

(Z IV,

17,

predestined” for his insights

.

am

not the

speaking, of course, of the story of Zarathustra’s repudiation and ridicule

hands of the people

in the

marketplace (Z Prologue). By part IV Zarathustra

considers his early attempt to share his folly”

is

thing, however, as having a guaranteed grasp of them. Despite

same

at the

and “conquerers’ food”

i).

To be “predisposed and

16

[Knieger-Kost],

(ZrV,

13,

i;cf.ZrV,

wisdom with

the

many

to have been a “great

12).

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

their strong stomachs, sharp ears,

him

share membership with

pened their

I

higher

in the caste of stronger,

modern

beings have fallen into grave difficulty in the

chapter

examine Nietzsche’s account of

how

era. In the

next

could have hap-

this

“awakening”

as well as his various rhetorical strategies for

dormant noble

who human

and sensitive noses, those

Before these strategies can be ex-

sensibilities.

amined, however, Nietzsche’s characterization of “strong” and “weak”

human beings must be fleshed out. One crucial element of this hierarchy

human life is measured by how much truth can a spirit dare'"’ 1041). One is stronger and thus of

Nietzsche believes that the value of

“how much

truth can a spirit bear^

(EH Foreword

BGE 39; WP

3; cf.

greater value than

most

if

one

is

has already been discussed.

a

constitutionally equipped not sim-

ply to recognize the hard truths of reality but “to be

cheerful” in their presence

(EH III,

3).

This

hy Jasagen: “Recognition, affirmation of Jasagen ziir Realitdt]

as

is

much

happy and

what Nietzsche means

is

reality” [Die Erkenntnis^ das

a necessity for the

man

as its

for the

weak

strong

of reality”)

opposite (“cowardice

flight in the face

(EH

not the only way in which the strength-

IV, 2).

But

this is

weakness distinction

is

distinguishes the strong

framed. Below

from the weak

we

shall see

(a) in

is

how

Nietzsche

terms of “will to power”

and, in a related way, (b) using a normative standard of nature.

Power Thesis

Strength, Weakness, and the Will to

Many commentators from Heidegger and

Jaspers to the present

have assumed the will to power to be Nietzsche’s cosmological theory of the innate workings of the universe, and admittedly there are textual passages that appear to vindicate this reading. Zarathustra’s

teaching “about

life

and about the nature of

encapsulated in the observation that “where

found

there

I

voice

we

strength

will to

power” (Z

30

cf.

living creatures”

found

Moreover,

—

life as

such

in Nietzsche’s

GM

II,

12;

.

power” and that “the

is

will to

.

aims at the expansion

.

GM

III, 7;

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

WP

is

a living creature,

are told that “a living thing desires above

mental instinct of life 349;

II, 12).

I

all

ofpower’’^

all

own

to vent

its

really funda-

(BGE

13;

GS

1067). Occasionally Nietzsche

frames the will to power thesis

as

an ostensibly value-neutral, scien-

tific

observation rather than a form of approbation; that a “body

will

want

to grow, expand,

draw

to

itself,

gain ascendancy”

.

.

.

.

power”

[that] life fr will to

(BGE

.

due

is

not to “any morality or immorality” but simply to the fact that lives

.

“it

259).

In light of the obvious weakness of any reductionist account of life that purportedly “explains”

Kaufmann and

several

sentient behavior in terms of “power,”

all

more recent commentators have argued

against the cosmological interpretation in order to save Nietzsche’s

reputation as a serious philosopher. After noting that the bulk of Nietzsche’s references to the will to

power stem from

his observa-

human psychology, they conclude that the will to power speaks to the human world (rather than to “life” in general) and emerges from Nietzsche’s own preference for power-seeking, agtions of

grandizing individuals. Nietzsche, as Maudemarie Clark suggests, believes that “every

enhancement of the human type depends on

strengthening of the will to power.”

Wdiile

a

do not share these

I

commentators’ goal of “saving” Nietzsche from an indefensible cosmological thesis,

vance of the

I

will to

think they are right to highlight the primary relethesis for Nietzsche’s assessment of human

power

relations.

Strong, ascendant forms of human

power

in a joyous

life

are said to

embody a

will to

and unflinching manner. In Beyond Good and

for example, Nietzsche speaks of an “unconditional will to

Evil,

power”

that revels in the “art of experiment and devilry of every kind,” a

view also reflected in the notebooks unpublished in Nietzsche’s time

where we learn

(the so-called Nachlass),

that

it is

“the supreme will to

power” to “impose upon becoming the character of being”

(BGE 44;

WP 617). Turning to those whom he identifies as weak, Nietzsche of two minds.

On

possess the will to

is

the one hand, he claims that those “in decline”

power only

in pitiably small quantities, as in this

passage from The AntiChrist: “I consider

life

itself instinct

for

growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for power:

where the is

will to

decline” (A 6;

power cf.

A

lacking [wo der Wille zur Macht fehlt] there

is

17;

17. Clark, Nietzsche on Tiiith

WP

and

98, 855).

If,

in this vein, the will to

Philosophy, p. 226.

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

— power

associated with everything “that heightens the feeling of

is

power”

in

man, then those who cannot

through their

They might

On

creative agency cannot “be” will

embody an urge

instead

the other hand

—and,

I

\

able

amount of will

nies

its

own

to

power

in a

for the

most part

of mustering

as capable

—but

power in and to power (A 2).

to survive in relative comfort.

would suggest,

Nietzsche also depicts the weak

\

I

own

feel their

a

consider-

form so misguided that

it

de-

Consider, for example, his derisive treatment of

reality.

modern democracies who delude themselves into thinking that they are not really commanding but rather “obeying” or “serving” the people, God, or something else (Z III, 5, 2; cf. BGE 199; A 38). Such hypocrisy is the outcome of an essentially dishonest worldview that denies the fact that will to power those political “leaders” of

1

\l

M

drives everything. will

of the servant

As Zarathustra observes I

found the

will to

Nature and ArtificeiThe Highest

in this spirit,

be master” (Z

“even in the

II, 12).

Human Type

Although Nietzsche describes both higher and lower human beings as “natural” in the sense described

mals with

instincts),

human being

is

he also

above (both

insists that the higher,

tive

stronger type of

term that

“The Ethics,

recalls a classi-

moral philosophy. As we examine Nietzsche’s norma-

view of reality should come out even more

“neither by nature nor against nature” first

(i

io3a2 5).^^

it

does not develop spontaneously, without edu-

cation or upbringing. In this sense hardly anything in “natural,” including the use of language.

18. Aristode,

The mean-

part of this cryptic phrase seems straightforward: virtue

“unnatural” in that

19.

clearly.

virtues arise in us,” declares Aristode in the Nico?nachean

ing of the

Nicmnachean

As Bernard Williams notes

in his

p. 47.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

The second

human

beings

is

part, that virtue

Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge:

Ethics, trans.

Harvard University Press, 1985),

32

—nat-

use of nature, the ethical vision that undergirds his ostensibly

scientific

is

types are ani-

much more natural than the lower and weaker

ural in a specifically normative sense of that cal tradition in

human

is

not “against nature,” suggests that an ethical disposition

is

part of

human development, where “natural” certain essential human attributes in the

the natural culmination of refers to the cultivation of

context of an

artificial

Virtuous action that in that

it

is

(human-constructed) culture or community.

part of the creative artifice of culture

represents the

of the correct development of

telos

human

kind of animal: the

is

being.

From

natural

a certain

this Aristotelian perspective,

the standard nature-culture dichotomy popularized both by

Romanticism and Kantian philosophy simply does not make

modern

sense.

Without ever acknowledging an intellectual debt to Aristotle, Nietzsche was drawn to this Aristotelian perspective on nature.^^ In opening remarks to the early essay “Homer’s Contest” (1872), Nietzsche stakes out a recognizably Aristotelian position from his

which,

I

would argue, he never

When tal

departs:

one speaks of hiiinanity

that this

idea

reality,

however, there

together.

Man,

in his highest

[gaiiz Natia‘]

who

and noblest

and embodies

ter \iinheimlichen Doppelcharakter].

20. Scholars

no such separation: “nat“human” are inseparably

is

ural” qualities and those called truly

wholly nature

fundamen-

something which separates and distinguishes man

is

from nature. In

grown

is

capacities,

is

uncanny dual charac-

its

(HC)^^

have recognized Nietzsche’s rejection of the nature-culture di-

chotomy include Bruce Detudler,

Nietzsche

and

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), tal Revolution: Philosophic Sources

the Politics of Ai'istoa'atic Radicalism

p. 80;

Bernard Yack, The Longing for To-

of Social Discontent fivm Rousseau

to

Marx and Nietzsche

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 317-318; and Eric Blondel, Nietzsche,

The Body, and Culture: Philosophy as

Philological Genealogy, trans.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 43. Blondel, however, classical

antecedent and appears to assume that Nietzsche was the

have thought 21.

first

to note any

philosopher to

this way.

Kaufmann, whose rendition of “Homer’s Contest”

the entire piece for his Portable Nietzsche volume. translations have recently appeared:

Competition,” Pearson and

fails

Sean Hand

as a

trans.

pp. 187-194), and a

Schacht (Urbana,

I

use here, did not translate

Two new

and complete English

one by Carole Diethe (with the

supplement to On

title

the Genealogy of Morality, ed.

“Homer on

Keith Ansell-

Carole Diethe [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], second by Christa Davis Acampora in Nietzscheana #5, ed. Richard

111 .:

North American Nietzsche

Society, 1996).

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

a

Nietzsche maintains the view that fulfillment of the highest being’s true nature

—that

is,

the attainment of

human

excellence

to be found in “artificial” realms of creativity rather than

any rediscovery of

by

a

human

—

is

through

purportedly authentic, “natural” self unsullied

(BGE i88). A fragment from 1887 succinctly states his po“Man reaches nature only after a long struggle he never ‘re-

artifice

—

sition:

turns’”

(WP

120).

Nietzsche’s critique of Romanticism can be understood in light of this insistence

on

“artificiality.”

His profound objection to the view

one could “return to nature” (and thus to

that

by sloughing

virtue)

off the artifice of culture and recovering a pristine, “natural” self

well illustrated in part

IV of Zarathiistra^ where Nietzsche burlesques making one of his two kings

the nostalgia for the noble savage by so-called “higher

day

man”

—declare that the

a healthy peasant,

is

rV, 3,

The

i).

is

“finest

and dearest

—

man

to-

uncouth, cunning, obstinate, enduring” (Z

fact that the

lowly peasant

is

thoroughly “natural”

is

no

reason to show him the respect due to higher orders of humanity.

Nietzsche despises the intellectual and

fashion of his

artistic

Natu—associated both with Romanticism and with the ralism of Zola — that on the inherent worth of everything nattime

literary

insists

He

ural.

Romantic

asserts that the fashionable

manners and the indiscriminate

idealization of rustic

curiosity of the literary Naturalists

toward everything “natural” embody an assault against that true nobility

sider

and decency he sees himself it

as

championing: “Today we con-

matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to

a

be present at everything, or to understand and ‘know’ everything”

(GS Preface

4).^^

Nietzsche’s highest

human

type, to recapitulate,

high degree of naturalness in virtue of being tifice”

and discrimination.

He

is

a

man

embodies

a

of cultural “ar-

the type described in the third es-

say of The Genealogy as a “great experimenter with himself, discon-

tented and insatiable, wrestling with animals, nature, and gods for ultimate dominion,” a being things, braved

22.

ace 4;

34

who

more and challenged

For some examples of Nietzsche’s

GS

347;

TI

“has dared more, done

IX,

7;

and \\T 821.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

fate

more than

all

more new

the other an-

distaste for literary Naturalism, see

GS

Pref-

(GM

imals put together”

III, 13).

listen to nature’s “voice” a la

Such

a

man

does not attempt to

Rousseau. As noted above, Nietzsche

considers the amoral natural world to be an inappropriate model

human beings. In aspiring “to be other than this nasuperior man becomes one of a very few “genuine artists

for superior ture,” the

of

life”

(BGE

Nature That

9, 32).

Is

Also against Nature

Although Nietzsche privileges the sort of in the creation of

normative values, he

will to

insists that

power

resulting

not

forms of

all

value creation are equally praiseworthy. Debased forms originate

with those at

all

who would

—those

who,

prefer to think of themselves as not creating

like

the aforementioned democratic political

something “higher”

“leader,” consider themselves to be obeying

than themselves. This, he claims, flight

is

a

monumental

self-delusion, a

from truth that diminishes the value of the creation.

Consider

as well the character

of the ascetic

sche treats as a higher, stronger type of

priest,

whom

Nietz-

human being gone bad

(or

“decadent”). Nietzsche often evinces a grudging admiration for

those “ingenious” [Geistirich] individuals

who

have founded and per-

petuated those religions with mass following and universalistic pretensions as

(GM

I, 7).

He

he acknowledges

recognizes their inherent

own extended

his

he identifies himself as their kin

(GM

flirtations

warm

its

Such

qualified praise

ascetic priests

tity

is

also illustrated in his

The a

ascetic project of service to

God and

kind of disciplined self-overcoming in

way.^^

sche’s identification of a

.

2).

he concedes, evinces

own

23

with “decadence,”

treatment of the solitary hermit character in the Prologue of

Zarathustra (Z Prologue truth,

and insofar

Nietzsche’s qualified

II, 24).

respect for creativity in the service of religion

ability,

show

is

crucially mitigated, however,

paradox

at the center

of such

a life.

by Nietz-

Although

great creativity in producing highly sophisti-

As Charles Taylor observes

in his Sources of the Self:

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989),

p.

The Making of Modern Iden-

453.

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

human

cated

that calumniate

and attempt to

capacity to

so “new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory” as to

6).

And

(GM II,

worthy of “divine spectators”

constitute a “sublime” spectacle 1

core values

products

This bizarre spectacle of creativity-that-calumniates-creativity

create. is

embody stamp out the human

artifacts, their resulting

while Nietzsche concedes that this turning of the

human

chamber” may have made humankind more

soul into a “torture

“in-

teresting” (in the sense that the inner turmoil thereby generated has

added depth to the human psyche),

one could

call it that

—

is

his praise of this spectacle

balanced by the claim that

it

i6;GMII,

II,

The

of animals (A

world, ours is,

those

is

Out of

a

“gruesome hybrid of sickness and

against something that rally creative will to

4; is

WP

179).

A truly noble and

power

He

that denies

its

(WP

will to

is

whose expression

an example of “nature

own

He who

way of life openly and

who

the universe and

24.

informed by

this

and bases

on the honesty and

who

can do

honesty

[Redlichkeit]"

(Z

refuses to fudge or run

YV, 13, 8; cf.

D

and

contrast, itself

on

integrity

—who cre-

honestly^*^

a realistic grasp

more Preface 4; WTP

declares, “I count nothing

natu-

can scarcely be exaggerated.

of the workings of

away from “hard”

—performs the task that Nietzsche claims he As Zarathustra

a

228).

of the sort of individual

ates a table of values

embodies

creative nature

in external sources

the truths of science. Nietzsche’s stress

this

The aspower” who

form of value creation, by

fully natural

from seeking meaning

embodies

innova-

creativity,

also nature” because he

discourages this creativity in others

truths

the

order to extirpate these same drives.

(EH Foreword

refrains

is

the species in the animal

all

continually “[denies] and condemn[s] the drive [he] is”

man

proof positive that

marshal healthy species drives (for

tion, originality, etc.). in

cetic priest

14).

is

the only one that produces decadent individuals, that

is

who

man”

22).

case of the ascetic priest

“sickliest”

if

has been re-

sponsible for “the most terrible sickness that has ever raged in

(GM

—

first set

for

him-

valuable and rare today than 404). Berkowitz perceptively

highlights Nietzsche’s identification of honesty as a cardinal virtue for the superior

man. See

36

his Nietzsche:

The Ethics of an hmnoralist, pp. 40, 102, 128, 250.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

self in artist,

The Birth of Tragedy: “to see science under the lens of the but art under the lens of life” (BT Preface 2).

But what of those unable to

attain this

represent, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the vast majority

the dual character of

human

distinction in the first

good

life,

How do those who

summit? fit

into this account of

beings? In an echo of Aristotle’s famous

book of The

between mere

Politics

and the

life

Nietzsche refers disparagingly to the so-called virtue that

put into play merely “in order to bdi'inlicheti

BehagenY (Z

noblest part of human

I,

6;

life,

cf

live

long and in

Z Prologue

3).

a

miserable ease

is, its

[er-

Turning away from the

the majority pursues what Nietzsche refers

to as “the happiness of serfs” [Gliick der Kjiechte] in

tence,” that

is

pursuit of the base ideal of

physical health, and comfort (Z

II, 8;

Z

mere

12; cf.

II,

its

“will to exis-

self-preservation,

WP 944). Having

neither the capacity nor the desire for greatness, the majority

cused of “depriv[ing] existence of

its

g/rat character”

(EH

is

ac-

XIV,

4).

Again and again the many are revealingly described with animal imagery; they

move

together as a “herd” or “swarm,” succumbing to the

temptations of a merely animal-like existence focused on the

From

fulfill-

ment of immediate,

basic needs.

man, they are

the ape and treated as “a laughing-stock or a

like

painful embarrassment”^^ (Z Prologue

While

this

language

is

the standpoint of the creative

3; cf.

GS

reminiscent of the

351).

more

familiar nature-

culture dualism and seems at times to suggest that superior ings

somehow

human

be-

transcend animality altogether,^*^ Nietzsche subverts the

standard dualist picture by insisting on the “unnaturalness” of the table

of values that undergirds the majority’s bovine existence

Targeting “slave morality,” as he terms the

predominant

in

Western

mode

civilization since the

(WP

204).

of ethical valuation

dawn of

rabbinical Ju-

daism and the early days of its Christian offspring, Nietzsche speaks of his '^attentat

(EH

IV, 4). It

25. is

on two millennia of anti-nature and the is

not,

he confesses,

Bovine imagery takes over

violation of

just slave morality’s epistemic errors

in the fourth part

of Zarathiistra

when

portrayed as cows whose cud-chewing masquerades as reflection (Z IV, 26.

man”

Bernard Yack argues that Nietzsche

falls

the majority 8).

into the familiar Kantian dualism of

nature and culture in early works such as “Schopenhauer as Educator.” Yack, The

Lo 7igmgfor

Total Revolution, pp.

318-319.

SCIENCE, NATURE,

AND NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

— that horrify

courage in

ghasdy

and offend him, not

spiritual affairs

.

.

.

—

lack “of discipline, of decency, of

its

the lack of nature,

it is

it is

the utterly

honors

fact that anti-natiire itself has received the highest

morality,

and has hung over mankind

(Higher) Nature

as law”

(EH XIV,

is

man”

at the

height

confidently accurate in actions taken and judgments

made; he considers

and Evil echoes

EH III, 5).

in Peril

Zarathustra suggests that the superior, “discerning

of his powers

7; cf.

as

all

this

of his instincts “holy” (Z

view in

Beyond Good

22, 2).

suggestion that such a

its

“fundamental certainty which

I,

man

evinces a

noble soul possesses in regard to

a

it-

something which may not be sought or found and perhaps may

self,

not be plete

lost either”

(BGE

“com-

287). Elsewhere Nietzsche speaks of a

automatism of instinct”

as “the

precondition for any kind of

mastery, any kind of perfection in the art of living,” and suggests that

noble and maganimous types should “follow

end”

if

they

know what

is

good

for

them (A

[their]

57;

GS

own

senses to the

3).

Eor Nietzsche, however, the great calamity of the modern age that higher

human

beings

—with the exception of himself and

a

is

few

modern figures such as Goethe and Napoleon no longer know what is good for them. The picture of the superior man who listens to his bodily instincts is drawn as a normative ideal perhaps as wishful thinking rather than treated as a common occurrence. All too often, superior types have been led away other extraordinary

—

—

from

their instincts into beliefs

for them. in its

Having been

and practices that are objectively bad

raised in

modern herd

society and inculcated

erroneous post-Christian democratic values, superior

men no

longer experience and revel in their authentic corporeal instincts.

Their rational part lies

—

—claims Zarathustra, often

“spirit” [Gc/yf]

about the soul” [Seek] (Z

of the sorry state of higher

III, 1 1, 2). It is

human

38

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

to Nietzsche’s diagnosis

beings in the

his projected rescue operation, that

“tells

modern

we must now

turn.

age,

and to

two I

Nietzschean Consciousness-Raising see

them already coming,

slowly, slowly;

something to speed their coming vicissitudes,

upon what

paths,

I

if I

see

A tion

is

s

we have

of the

I

shall

do

describe in advance what

them coming?

—Human, All The Ressentiment

and perhaps

Too

Human

I Preface 2

Herd

seen, Nietzsche traces “slave morality” back to the

cowardly inability of an essentially weak, declining type of

human being

to joyfully

“artifice,” a construct

embrace the

fact that ethical valua-

of human agency. But this

is

not his only

genealogical account of “herd” values. In a second, complementary

genealogy, slave morality

is

explained as a defensive and vengeful

39

outgrowth of the majority’s resentment of the superior individuals its

in

midst.

The

root of slave morality, ressenthnent,

essential lack of self-sufficiency,

mote

on vanity

The

attributed to the herd’s

understand and pro-

inability to

an autonomous, noncomparative way. Nietzsche’s ob-

itself in

servations

its

is

[Eitelkeit] as a servile trait are instructive in this

whose entire spirit is consumed with ensuring that others watch them because their sense of self-worth is wholly dependent upon the validation of others (Z II, 22). Zarathustra refers to them derisively as self-conscious singers “whose voices are softened, whose hands are eloquent, whose regard.^

vain are “good actors” [Schauspieler]

eyes are expressive, is

(Z

full”

who

III,

II,

whose i; cf.

hearts are awakened, only

Z

II,

15).

When

when

the house

Nietzsche ridicules those

ostentatiously display “the heaving bosom,”

who

are quick to

invoke “the big moral words ... of justice, wisdom, holiness, virtue”

and

in

whom

moral seriousness

and gestures,” he

is

[Ernst]

becomes “imprinted on

criticizing a particularly

form of this dependency (TI

I,

19;

GS

tawdry and

faces

distasteful

359).

Nietzsche considers the need for applause to be a sure sign that real

human

excellence

is

absent. “Subtle fabricators and actors,”

claims Zarathustra, can evince only “pretended virtues” [Aushange-

Tugenden] and “glittering, false deeds” (Z IV, 13, virtue

is

manifest away from an audience

is

dependency and evince the courage of

“which not even

a

Only when

a

move beyond such hermit or an eagle,

god observes any more,” rather than the so-called

courage manifested only “in the presence of wimesses” (Z IV,

The

in his

and praise

destined to

fail.

shift in Nietzsche’s

—

as

“human,

all

too

many” and

Abbey, “So Polyphonous

a

human”

—

period discussions ofvanity include

D

of

as part

works

of the

it

human con-

becomes

a servile table

a

weak-

of values. See

Being: Friedrich Nietzsche in His Middle Period” (manu-

University of Western Australia, 1997).

and

in the late

a central attribute

In his heart of hearts

treatment of vanity: whereas

middle period he was more inclined to identify vanity

ness of the “many, too

50;

is

Ruth Abbey notes an important

dition in general

script,

13, 4).

vain man’s attempt to develop a positive self-image by at-

tracting attention

I.

a

a truly virtuous disposition

present. Zarathustra challenges his “brothers” to servile

8).

385, 558.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

HAH 89,

Some

of the more important middle-

137, 158, 170, 527, 545;

AOM 234; WS

he can never praises

feel in

confident possession of the virtues he so loudly

and to which he

equipment

lays claim

—the proper

instincts

because he simply lacks the natural

—

for

human

excellence. His public

exertions are like those of a flat-footed dancer;

world

will

the effort in the

all

not bring about what Zarathustra describes

“dancing virtue” [Tanzers Tugend] (Z

III, i6, 6).

own

as his

awkward pos-

In his

mere pretender remains one of those “beasts” whom Zarathustra describes as “clumsy-footed from birth,” who can only turing the

“exert themselves strangely, like an elephant trying to stand

head” (Z IV,

13, 19). In general,

“poor, sick type” of

know how

on

he observes, representatives of the

human being have “heavy

and “do not

feet”

to dance” (Z IV, 13, 16).

Unaided by

^dight feet,” that

is,

those healthy bodily instincts and

human

elevated passions that are the sme qua non of

studied effort goes for naught, and

may even be

an objection,”

a

view echoed

excellence,

a late

work,

in the Nachlass: “All perfect acts are

conscious and no longer subject to

will;

consciousness

WP 430; EH

“is

un-

the expres-

is

sion of an imperfect and often morbid state in a person” (TI VI, cf.

all

taken as evidence of

an inner deficiency. “Effort,” as Nietzsche suggests in

WT 289;

its

2;

II, 9)."

Nietzsche claims that the

of

futility

search for validation

this

through self-conscious, awkward performance tenders to virtue themselves. Although they

is

not

may

on the pre-

lost

flee

from the hard

truth about themselves and find temporary solace in each other’s

com-

pany, they remain tormented by inchoate, scarcely conscious feelings

of inadequacy. Nietzsche speaks of the pervasiveness of “that inwardturned glance of the born failure which betrays to himself

—that glance which

sighs this glance: ‘but there at the

outcome of a

ity gives

2

.

The

way

is

is

a sigh! ‘If

how such a man speaks

only

no hope of that’”

I

were someone

(GM III,

natural lottery that has relegated

14).

them

else,’

Sadness

to inferior-

to outrage; Zarathustra notes that because the “despisers

notion that fine action emerges out of visceral, inner compulsion rather

than self-conscious effort also appears in the third essay of The Genealogy, sche explains that the

maxim “he who

possesses

is

possessed”

is

when Nietz-

held by his imagined,

higher philosophers not because of a self-conscious “will to contentment and simplicity”

aimed

mands

this

at attracting

popular approval but rather because “tbeir supreme lord de-

of them, prudently and inexorably”

(GM

III, 8).

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

of the body” are unable “to create beyond [them] selves” they become

“angry with

life

and with the earth” (Z

This frustration

in the face

I,

4).

of inadequacy

is

twinned with resent-

ment and seething envy toward those who seem and sure-footed tra

naturally graceful

in their dealings. In the passage just cited Zarathus-

speaks in this context of “unconscious envy” [imgewiifiter Neid]^

comments on the spectacle of those disheaving bosom” who “at the same time look with envy

while elsewhere Nietzsche playing “the

on the advantages enjoyed by those who

live for

the day” (TI

In such passages the herd appears to have an accurate scarcely articulate

—understanding of

its

own

inferiority.

I,

—

19).

albeit

In the same

vein Zarathustra warns one of his select, youthful interlocutors to be

on guard against those who one

finds the noble

man

“still feel

you are noble” (Z

I,

8).

“Every-

an obstruction,” he observes, because the

presence of innate grace in the midst of awkwardness serves to re-

mind most people of

their

own inadequacy

(ibid.).

As Zarathustra

cautions another of his interlocutors, “Before you they feel themselves small.”

Gewissen] to

Thus

[his]

the higher type

neighbors” (Z

I,

becomes

“a bad conscience [bose

12).

Superior types unintentionally antagonize and exasperate the

mediocre simply by being

who

(or what) they are.

By

refusing, for

example, to resort to the pretentious moral phraseology that serves others as a crutch, they evince a “silent pride” that “offends [the] taste” of the

mediocre

calm, polite

way

in

(ibid.).

Moreover, the crowd cannot abide the

which they

refrain

from

flattery, envy,

and other

obvious signs of dependency on the opinion of others. Zarathustra notes, for example, that the people in the marketplace cannot forgive

him for not being envious of their “virtues” (Z III, 5,2). Most unforgivable in the eyes of the majority, however, is the superior man’s innate, instinctive contempt of those who do not share his lofty sensibility. Despite the higher type’s magnanimous displays of polite, reserved gentleness, his disdain unquestionably shines through. “Even

when you

are gentle towards them,” Zarathustra in-

forms his youthful comrades, “they

still

feel

you despise them; and

they return your kindness with secret unkindness” (Z 17). In

an apparent allusion to Nietzsche’s

among

his university colleagues, Zarathustra

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

own

I,

12; cf.

Z

I,

early experiences

remarks that when he

among

lived

me

scholars,

for that. /

They

he “lived above them. They grew angry with

want

did not

over their heads” (Z

II,

i6).

know

to

The

that

someone was walking

idea that the herd’s ressentiment

is

fueled by an inchoate perception of the condescension directed to-

ward

revisited in Nietzsche’s late autobiographical reflections:

is

it

“He whom tence

I

I

despise divines that

I

despise him: through

enrage everything that has bad blood in

its

my mere exis-

veins”

(EH

II, lo).

Nietzsche’s use of the term “tarantulas” to refer to those experi-

encing “repressed envy” reveals the link between herd ressentiment

and the vengeful desire to “sting” everyone

As suggested by Zarathustra’s

6).

who is

unleashed indirectly,

its

will to

power openly and unapologetically (Z

In their “tyrant-madness of impotence,” the

project of revenge III,

14).

II,

because of the majority’s innate weakness and cowardly

inability to evince 12).

not herdlike (Z

allusions to the herd’s “secret un-

kindness” and “hidden vengeance,” the sting in large part

is

upon “everything

Nietzsche identifies

that has

this project

many launch

power” (Z

with

a

I,

their

II, 6; cf.

GM

“slave revolt in

morals” in which noble values are calumniated and herd values proclaimed the only true, respectable form of normative valuation.

The Moral Imperialism

of the

Herd from nobler

In his Gejiealog)! Nietzsche distinguishes slave morality

forms of valuation by highlighting what he sees tially reactive

nobility

thy and

is

nature

(GM

I,

10;

GM

as

an afterthought

one’s level as bad [schlecht]

Whereas the essence of oneself as good and praisewor-

II, 1 1).^

to be self-regarding, to take

—almost

as the former’s essen-

—to dismiss what cannot

attain

and undesirable, those incapable of such

psychological autarchy can only trumpet themselves as good by stig-

matizing the dispositions of others

Although Nietzsche occasionally describes

3.

ishing as a higher (master or noble) morality II, i;

—the

V\T

268, 404),

to associate the

I

—

noble sort

as evil [bose].

his alternative vision of

(e.g.,

BGE

202, 260;

GM

I,

human 10;

24;

EH

prefer to speak of Nietzsche’s “ethics” or “normative vision” and

term “morality” with

a large,

extended family of religious and secular

discourses that Nietzsche regards as questionable because of their emphasis tarian

A

flour-

and benevolent values

(BGE

on

egali-

228).

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

The

herd sees

itself as

“good” only

in the

wholly negative sense of be-

ing not-evil, of not evincing the capacities of stigmatized others.

That Nietzsche finds this a spiritually inferior form of valuation is no surprise. That he does not call for its utter eradication is less apparent, but nonetheless true. Nietzsche believes that the world will

always be

with unselfsufficient types needing some form of

filled

consolation and meaning. for people leading

gious belief

thus “understandable and forgivable”

It is

“empty and monotonous”

(HAH

lives to slide into reli-

same middle-period passage, Nietz-

115). In this

sche lauds Christianity’s usefulness in this regard: “Within Chris-

assumes the appearance of

tianity servility

astonishingly beautiful” see the majority

and

quite

is

WP 216). Hence his desire not to

(ibid.; cf.

wrenched from

a virtue

dogmatic convictions. As he pro-

its

claims in his notebooks, “the ideas of the herd should rule the herd”

(WP

287).

God may be

have exposed him as an

dead, “murdered” by those in the artifact

know who

of human ingenuity, but the fact that

the majority continues to believe in his existence

is

by no means un-

desirable, so long as those capable of perceiving “the greatness of this

deed” are allowed to do so and to

live

This crucial proviso, however, of hand.

The

“secret desire” of

everyman,” to

(BGE 43;

cf.

insist that

BGE 202,

is

accordingly

what

its

125).

“slave morality” rejects out

purveyors

is

“to be a truth for

only their values are true and universal

221, 228;

GS

345;

An; WP

175, 185).

What

really enrages

Nietzsche about a so-called “herd religion” such as

Christianity

this “revolting”

186). It

is

is

of

human

claim to unique conceivability

one thing for the majority to

illusions alongside life;

“virtues that

it

“teaches obedience” and fosters in the mass

make [them]

and convert everyone to and monotonous

bition

useful

a

and submissive”

lives, asserts

apparent in his

5; cf.

BGE

216). It

is

competing modes of valuation

Those with empty Nietzsche, “have no right to demand

mind when he speaks of this hegemonic am1886 preface to The Binh of Tragedy, when he speaks of in

“Christian, unconditional morality” [christlichen, das

Preface

(WP

herdish belief system."^

That Nietzsche has Christianity is

according to comforting

future rulers might even “patronize and applaud” a

quite another to attempt to banish

4.

live

(WP

and under the domination of other, higher forms

herd religion because

44

(GS

203).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

heifit

unbedingten Moral]

(BT

religiosity of those

(HAH

1

1

whose

By asserting

5).

daily

its

not empty and monotonous”

life is

own system

system, the majority overreaches

itself

of valuation as the one, true

by proclaiming

ceral experiences of suffering, jealousy, resentment,

normative framework for ization

(BGE

Nietzsche takes

all.

this

and

own

fear as the

form of general-

is

impermissible” as a sign of baseness

“What

is

right for one,” he insists,

198, 221, 272).

One form ticularly galls

(BGE

'"'‘cannot

Nietzsche

tend to love

228).^

is

the ascetic slander of worldly (especially

unimpeded

life as

they love themselves, seeing in

life

sensibili-

“a fountain

of delight” and adopting a life-affirming stance, they tend to the hands of “consumptives of the soul”

tence by projecting their self-loathing

Z

III, 10, 2;

(Z

I,

part III their

III, II, 16).

The

latter

who

calumniate

oumards (Z

I,

9;

all

Their base

—

own

filter

out

instincts all

of

into

fall

of exis-

Z II,

6; cf.

Z

can see “only one aspect of exis-

namely the misery, meanness, and ugliness of their own

9).

by

of herd imperiousness in the realm of values that par-

bodily) pleasure. Although those with fine and

tence,”

vis-

“where generalization

any means therefore be right for another”

ties

its

—referred to

as

lives

“aching stomachs” in

beauty and goodness, allowing only

life’s

ugly projections to pass through (Z

III, 1 1, 16).

Those who calumniate worldly pleasure and vitality are also predisposed to promote “moderation” as a universal virtue. In the hands of the hoi polloi and

its

priestly representatives, this notion

confused with mediocrity and associated with tion for comfort and ease satirical portrait

in part

man”

I

(WP

870;

Z

a

is

contemptible aspira-

III, 5, 2;

Z

Prologue

3).

The

of the self-proclaimed preacher of “opium virtues”

of Zarathustra illustrates the same sentiment. This “wise

counsels against sinning

—indeed,

against

all

innovative

life

experiments because they would be inconsistent “with good sleep.”

He

claims that accruing a great deal of honor for oneself, in the

manner of

man, would

Aristotle’s great-souled

much, while possessing no honor the solution, he concludes,

is

at all

would make one sleep badly;

to seek out a

mediocre) form of honor: “a good name”

(Z

“excite spleen” too

“moderate”

(read:

in the eyes

of the majority

Roudedge and Kegan

Paul, 1983), p. 455.

I, 2).

5.

Cf. Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London:

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

Following the jaundiced view of the French moralist tradition typified

by writers such

as

this risk-averse “virtue” as

La Rochefoucauld, Nietzsche unmasks an inadequacy or deficiency. “In truth,”

who

confides Zarathustra, “I have often laughed at the weaklings

think themselves good because their claws are blunt!” (Z

WP

355).^

“virtue that

Herd “moderation” makes small” (Z

III, 5,

not that such a “virtue” exists virtues” are

is

truly a verkleinemde Tiigend, a

Nietzsche’s grave concern

i).

—he

needed for “small people”

thinks, after

—but that

universalization,

its

stunting the

is

growth of finer human beings and thus leading to

ing of the horizon of

The moral

human achievement and

a

potential (Z

narrow-

III, 5, 2).

injunction that one ought not overreach oneself

be fine for those whose reach

upon those with the

is

When

short to begin with.

much

potential for reaching

farther,

may

imposed however,

the consequences can be disastrous. Indeed, Nietzsche considers

matter of principle that “the demand for one morality for

mental to precisely the higher man” detriment in the

lies

(BGE

228;

precisely in the key role this

herd project of revenge.

When

normative game in town, noble types

cf.

is

that “small

all,

along with the universalization of other “herd values,” spiritual

13; cf.

II,

all is

BGE 62,

it

a

detri-

82).

hegemonic demand

The plays

herd values represent the only

who

internalize

them

experi-

ence great spiritual torment because of the disjuncture between these alien values and their innate instincts.

The

spectacle of their

torment, however, provides perverse satisfaction to the herd, compensating 6.

it

for

own

its

feelings of inadequacy.

Compare La Rochefoucauld, Maxhnes pour borner I’ambition des grands

tion,

de leur peu de fortune

et

“On

308:

hommes

et

a fait

une vertu de

pour consoler

les

la

modera-

gens mediocres

de leur peu de merite” [Moderation has been elevated into

virtue in order to curb the ambitions of the great

a

and to console the second-rate for A

their lack of

good fortune and the mediocrity of

their talents] {\iaximes [Paris: Edi-

Gamier, 1961], p. 87; The Maxhns of the Due de la Rochefoucauld, trans. ConstanFitzGibbon [London: Millington, 1974], p. 92). On the influence of La Roche-

tions tine

foucauld on Nietzsche, see Ruth Abbey, “Dissent and Descent: Nietzsche’s Reading of

Two French

Moralists” (Ph.D.

eration” as a plot of the

weak

McGill University, 1994). The notion of “moddiffuse the threat from the strong can be traced back

diss.,

to

to the ancient sophists. See especially Callicles’ speeches in Plato’s Gorgias. Brian

Leiter notes the affinity between Nietzsche and at least

some elements of

cleanism in “Nietzsche and the Critique of Morality” (Ph.D.

Michigan, 1995), pp. 125-128.

46

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

diss..

Calli-

University of

Consciousness and “Free Will”

False

Having been

modern herd

raised in

society and steeped in Christian

men no

values (or in secular, Christian-influenced values), superior

longer seem capable of experiencing and reveling in their corporeal

Their

instincts.

“spirit” [Geist] often “tells lies

and not simply because lations

(Z

it

When

III, II, 2).

made some

has

to

its

deepest instincts

easily correctable miscalcu-

—

made “mankind it

and

“Illusion”

will” in Nietzsche’s

.

.

.

false

prosperity,” he does

not presume that the instincts of the finest have been 2).

itself

to the point of worshipping the inverse

values to those which alone could guarantee

(EH Foreword

[Seele]^^^

Nietzsche suggests that the deep inter-

nalization of otherworldly ideals has

down

about the soul

left

untouched

and “blundering” have “become body

imagined readers (Z

I,

22, 2).

Through

the

propagation of sophisticated but misanthropic transcendental notions of self-perfection, “everything has

down

to

its

very bottom” (Z

been distorted and twisted

III, 12, 28).

Nietzsche identifies two complementary weapons used in the

on noble bodily knowledge: the Christian view of free and the dualistic form of philosophy introduced into Western

herd’s assault will

civilization

by Socrates.

I

discuss Nietzsche’s assessment of Socrates’

we should examine

significance later in this chapter. First, however,

account of

his

stition

the defenders of slave morality used “the super-

of free will” as

men (GS

rior

how

a club

Duping

345).

with which to beat

because

it

healthy, supe-

these latter into an embrace of the free

will doctrine represents a crucial victory

sensibilities

down

over noble inclinations and

leads strong individuals to believe that they

can (and should) “freely choose” not to manifest their strength against others. Their

weak and the

to be

embrace of the

bird of prey to be a lamb”

dential interests of “lambs”

(GM

I,

13).^

Once caught

the instincts” 7.

cal

belief “that the strong

who want

in the

is,

is fi-ee

of course, in the pru-

to avoid being preyed

web of herd

becomes “second nature”

man

upon

valuation, “mistrust of

in the strong; indeed, these

In The Genealogy Nietzsche also presents the free will doctrine as a psychologi-

device that bolsters the herd’s fragile self-esteem. In embracing free will the multi-

comforted by the

tude

is

truth

— that

their

illusion that

weakness

is

innate

it

has “chosen” to be weak.

—would be unbearable (G.M

To confront I,

the hard

13).

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

47

very instincts become “confused” aggressive

(EH

XIV,

8).

Being true to one’s

and exerting strength against weakness are

instincts

henceforth stigmatized as “sin.”^ Infused with a Christian notion of free will and sin and thus pre-

vented from joyfully and spontaneously embracing stincts, the

noble psyche turns into

a

own

its

lofty in-

scene of self-torture as an alien

“conscience” seeks to extirpate the body’s intelligence.

The

guileless,

open savagery evinced by the pre-Christian nobles of antiquity and praised in The Genealogy

turned inward in the strong but

is

human

lascerating” and “ill-constituted”

“self-

beings of modernity (A 22).

Obliged to deny powerful instincts that refuse to ebb, the superior

man

in the grip of plebeian false consciousness seeks

out “new

.

.

.

subterranean gratifications,” developing a secretive, guilt-ridden personality that

combines public self-abnegation with covert enjoyment

of stigmatized and shameful inclinations

(GM II,

counts this

psychological

“And now your

ashamed

it

that

pathology:

must do the

and lying-ways to avoid

its

will

16).

Zarathustra respirit

is

of your entrails and follows by-ways

own shame” (Z

II, 15).

This sad spectacle comes to pass without any overt coercion on the part of the majority. “Morality,” observes Nietzsche in one of his

Prefaces of 1886,

does not merely have at

its

command

every kind of means of

frightening off critical hands and torture-instruments:

reposes far

it

in a certain art

—

it

has at

its

disposal

lyzing the critical will against drives

The ity to

security

of enchantment [Kunst der Beza-

knows how to ‘inspire’. With this succeeds, often with no more than a single glance, in para-

ubemn^ art

more

its

its

sting into

finest

its

own

it

itself,

body.

so that, like the scorpion,

(D Preface

3; cf.

Z

I,

it

8)

have been “enchanted” by the hegemonic slave moral-

such an extent that herd sensibility becomes their “good con-

8. Interestingly,

will in his

Nietzsche

flirted briefly

with

a

very different genealogy of free

middle period. In “The Wanderer and His Shadow” the origins of the free

will doctrine are traced

back to the strong rather than the weak; the

latter,

reasoned

Nietzsche in 1880, could never have conjured up such an idea because they had no experience of strength or freedom (see pletely in the later works.

48

I

owe

this

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

WS 9). This alternative account disappears compoint to Ruth Abbey.

science” and drives

“As long

viduality:

away any expression of independent, proud as the

good conscience

[giite

Gewissen]

herd, only the bad conscience [schlechte Gewisse??] says: I” (Z

called

is I,

indi-

To

15).

make matters worse, the “heavy words and values” of the herd are hammered into noble types at an impressionable age, taught and preached to them “almost in the cradle” (Z III, ii, 2). All nonconformity is stamped out early on by “old idol-priests” whose “palates” are “excited” by the prospect of taking on impressionable young people as charges (Z

Although

a

12,6).

III,

may

superior type raised in herd society

into thinking that the struggle for equal rights for

all is

be tricked

synonymous

with “justice,” Nietzsche aims to show his readers that such ostensibly high-minded rights talk masks the herd effort at exacting re-

venge. “To hunt

him

[the free spirit]

from

his hiding place

ple always called that ‘having a sense of right’” (Z

Nietzsche refuses to take the preting

it

call for

as a vehicle for the herd’s

—the peo-

II, 8; cf.

Z

II, 6).

equal rights at face value, inter-

attempted domination of the

tal-

ented few. In an invective launched at the “preachers of equality,” Zarathustra claims that the appetite” (Z will,”

II, 6).

The

demand

mystification, another

crafty strategy for convincing the strong to refrain their will to

power on the weak. “One speaks

Nietzsche,

when “one wants

growing

power”

The

in

(WP

strong, talented

a “tyrant-

rhetoric of equal rights, like that of “free

deemed another form of herdish

is

masks

for equality

equal

from exerting rights’,^'

claims

to prevent one’s competitors

86).

man who embraces

such ideas and

who

takenly comes to think the multitude worthy of his guidance Nietzsche’s eyes, a tragic spectacle. In flock,

he

lets

He

becoming

a

misis,

in

shepherd to the

go of the discriminating sense of Rangordnung that pro-

common

or-

what Nietzsche describes metaphorically

in

tects finer sensibilities

ders.

from

imitates

by keeping them apart from the

Zarathustra as that “weight-bearing spirit,” the camel, in his willingness to kneel

(Z

I, i).

down

before the herd and take

its

cares

This camel wades into “dirty water,” ignoring

upon

his

back

his innate, dis-

criminating sense by refusing to disdain anyone: not even “cold frogs

and hot toads.” bases itself” by

The

camel-like creature, argues Zarathustra, “de-

“making friends with the

deaf,”

by loving “those who

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

despise” those of noble sensibilities turns to the image of the camel,

who

“bears too

many

(ibid.).

In part III Zarathustra re-

bemoaning the on

foreign things

misguided weight-bearing,

who

who

Here

(Z

III,

man 2).

1 1,

takes advantage of

drains the life-energy of the tal-

ented few, as “the most offensive beast of parasite (ibid.).

of the higher

his shoulders”

Zarathustra denounces the type of person this

lot

man

a

I

ever found”; the

again, Nietzsche’s tendency to associate the

many with lower forms of animal life comes to the human beings, unable to create but profiting from

the creations of

warmth from

light-givers” (Z

others, spend their lives “extract[ing] II, 9; cf.

Z

IV,

1 1).

willed conspiracy; their

own

innocent of praise,”

This shameless exploitation need not be part of a

on the

contrary, parasites

may be

parasitism, “want[ing] blood ... in

Neither should

fore. Parasitical

quite

unaware of

innocence” (Z

all

I, 8).

be imagined that their often obsequious flattery

it

this parasitism.

“They buzz around you even with

their

remarks Zarathustra to an interlocutor, “and their praise

They want may seem

importunity.

Although

it

to be near

that “he

your skin and your blood”

who

is

(ibid.).

praises” the talented wishes

thereby to “give back,” the truth of the matter given more!” (Z

is

that “he wants to be

is

III, 5, 2).

Given the routine association these days of Nietzsche with the debunking of

all

normative categories,

Nietzsche speaks of injustice

it

may seem

when denouncing

surprising that

of

this exploitation

the strong by the weak. Just as Aristotle argues in The Politics that

would be unjust Nietzsche tial

to treat the better sort of

insists that “justice itself’

man

like

everyone

it

else,

supports his belief that deferen-

treatment and privilege, rather than expectations of service to the

“common good,” are the due of those like him (BGE 265).^ “For men are not equal,” intones Zarathustra, “thus speaks justice” (Z II, 16; cf.

Z

II,

7).

Conversely, injustice

“lies in the

claim to ^equaP

rights,” in a social order that has the temerity to “call into question

9. “Justice is

thought by [men] to be, and

only for equals.” Aristotle, The

Politics, ed.

is,

—

equality

not, however, for

Stephen Everson,

trans.

all,

but

Benjamin Jowett

with revisions by Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1988),

i28oaio-i3. Leiter notes that “while Nietzsche might not dispute the general moral imperative that

‘like cases

should be treated

are, in fact, all like cases." Leiter,

50

alike’

he clearly rejects the idea that we

“Nietzsche and the Critique of Alorality,”

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

p. 15.

HAH

the higher, greater, richer” (A 57; I Preface 6).^® Nietzsche claims that his approach to political and social life is premised on a

—and better—notion of

different

justice. Nietzsche’s

“new philoso-

phers” claim as their motto the words of Charlemagne’s Anglo-

Saxon advisor, Alcuin: “prava corrigere, sancta sublimare” [Correct what

what

raise

Stepping

is

holy]

(WP

Out from

et recta corroborate, et

wrong, strengthen the

is

right,

and

977).

the Domination of Chance

and the Priesthood

While hopeful (most of the time) that a small number of individuals like himself do in fact exist,'* Nietzsche is far from certain that his “slow search for those related to [him]”

human

higher

will

be successful and that

beings will emerge to claim their rightful place in a re-

and cultural order

vitalized political

(EH

X,

i).

In Beyond Good and

Evil he anxiously contemplates “the terrible danger that they might

not appear or might

types have always been

much

(BGE

224;

GM

.

.

.

man, he

BGE

explains,

276,

\\T

684). Indeed, “the higher

due not “to any special

is

on the notion of equal

rights

is

fatality

given further attention in

We

should note, however, Nietzsche’s occasional suggestion that he

come

into being. See, for example,

is

writing

WP 958: “I write

for a species of man that does not yet exist: for ‘the masters of the earth.’” Cf. the in Ecce

Ho?no that his Zarathustra,

ought to communicate oneself 12. at the

or

6.

for a readership that has yet to

ment

that

a

10. Nietzsche’s attack

11.

good luck

flashing up” and as “lucky hits” [GliicksfdlkY^

III, 14; cf.

man

tion of a higher

Chapter

history than mediocre

pieces of

little

Higher

203).'^

man represents, the greater the improbability he out weir (BGE 62; cf. Z IV, 13, 15). The premature destruc-

the type of will turn

come

human

rarer in

ones; they are described as “brief

here and there

(BGE

or might degenerate”

fail

.

.

.

will

Laurence Lampert understates

who

“is still

looking” for those “to

have to look for this fear

when he

a

long time yet!”

com-

whom

(EH

one

III, 4).

writes that “Nietzsche stood

head of an army not yet mustered and outfitted, an army formed for public bat-

tles still a

long way off and

Tmies:

A

1993X

P- 389-

won

in the

mind of their

Study of Bacon, Descaites, arid Nietzsche

instigator.” Nietzsche ajid Modeivi

(New Haven:

Yale University Press,

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

— a

malevolence of nature, but simply to the concept ‘higher type’:

—

the higher type represents an incomparably greater complexity

sum of co-ordinated elements: so its disintegration is also incomparably more likely. The ‘genius’ is the sublimest machine

greater

there

is

—consequently the most

In the

modern

(WP

fragile”

684).

by those with “the

age, moreover, the danger faced

become extraordinary” (BGE 282). At a time when sickliness has taken on hegemonic ambition, “the corruption, the ruination of higher human beings, of more desires of an elevated, fastidious soul

strangely constituted souls,

.

the rule;

is

rule always before one’s eyes”

.

(BGE

.

has

dreadful to have such a

it is

269;

BGE 62,

cf.

268;

EH II, 8).

Alongside that traditional obstacle to the higher type’s flourishing capricious Fortima

— the

priestly leadership

have been added to the mix.

petty vindictiveness of the herd and

its

Nietzsche’s dread at the prospect of the extinction of higher types like

himself becomes even more understandable in light of his belief

that the fate of the species as a

whole depends on the condition of

these talented few. If the exemplars of the species are slave morality

to ensure “a

largement”

and be

lost

succeed in securing

will

current spiritual torpor, the struggle

left in their

new greatness of man, will

(BGE

abandoned to

a

new untrodden path

to his en-

212). Left unchecked, herd morality

itself as

the only viable table of values, thus

ensuring what Nietzsche considers “worst of species-wide “degeneration” [Entartun^ (Z

22,

I,

an irreversible

all”: i).

Instead of se-

curing the preservation and enhancement of the higher type of hu-

man (EH

being,

we

\n[I, 2).*^

will witness “the physiological ruination

The somber pronouncement

in his

of mankind”

notebooks that

“man as a species is not progressing” suggests that in his moods Nietzsche believed that this feared degeneration was 13. Nietzsche’s talk

belies

of the need to preserve and protect

a

blacker already

higher form of human

life

William Connolly’s suggestion that Nietzsche rejected the notion of preserva-

tion in favor of self-overcoming. Ide7itity\Dijference: Democratic Negotiations of Political

Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),

fragment from 1884, although

“rarer, subtler,

and

p.

less

186.

As Nietzsche argues

men”

average

in a

(himself, for ex-

ample) are “enraged” by the instincts of self-preservation of that “profoundly average creature, the species

men

man”

[das tiefe Durchschnittswesen, der Gattnngsmensch], superior

are themselves eager to declare,

se 7 -er Ei-haltnng] is

‘“We

more important than

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

are nobler {Edleren]

that of those cattle!”’

\

Our

preservation [un-

(WHP 873;

cf.

EH

II, 8).

under way

(W^

684). His picture of

memorable Prologue

to Zarathustra^

besetting higher

threat this poses to

human

evoked

in the

mob becomes

master

terminus

where the

is

“last

man” emerges triumphant.

human

beings and the imminent

and the comfortable nihilism of the

The danger

its

excellence adds urgency to Nietzsche’s

proselytizing. Despite his occasional signs of despairing pessimism,

Nietzsche refuses in the end to adopt deed, he takes to task those

noble instincts with

who

time to act

enough”

a “fatality that lies

is

now: whereas the

ideas’”

(BGE

humanity may

“soil” of

for such a task

203).

still

be “rich

soon

(Z Prologue

The

it

will

Those

5).

share his views are said to “have no other choice” but to direct

hopes “toward new philosophers

enough

original 203).

concealed in the idiotic guile-

for the cultivation of a noble ethos, “one day”

become too “poor and weak” their

continue to face the onslaught on

and blind confidence of ‘modern

lessness

who

posture of resignation. In-

a

One must

to

make

a start

on

.

.

.

toward

spirits

strong and

antithetical evaluations”

begin, he claims, by calling

(BGE

upon “tremendous

counter-forces” to combat the contemporary “progress” toward uni-

(BGE

formity

Genealogy

Among

268).

as Edification

the “tremendous counter-forces” posited by Nietzsche, his

genealogical account of the battle between “slave” and “master” tables of value in antiquity plays a central role.

say

“On

As early

as his

1874 the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” he urged

those like

him

to take the examination of ancient societies (“classical

studies”) seriously, “for the benefit of a time to

come,”

as part

of

a

broader struggle against the dominant, servile ethos of the modern age (UD, Eoreword).

backwards

as

When

he suggests that the noble type “goes

everyone goes backwards

who wants

jump,” Nietzsche’s intention might be to entice vate themselves by learning from the mistakes

the past

The feat

(BGE

to take a big

his readers to culti-

made by

fine

men

in

280).

account in The Genealogy of the origins of injustice

—the de-

of the original, pre-Christian nobility at the hands of the NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

herd

—

edify.

an example of an unhappy, cautionary

is

Whereas the tormented,

consider his

own

tale that

meant

is

may

guilt-ridden noble type

well

inner turmoil and struggles to be aberrant, Nietz-

sche aims at drawing him out of his isolation and convincing that he

is

The

not alone in his anguish.

meant to serve recognition from a reader who “blond beast”

is

this is

purpose by eliciting

encouraged to see

No longer an idiosyncratic,

beast’s downfall.

him

sad story of the infamous

shock of

a

his

own

mis-

began with the

takes and suffering as part of a long, sad history that

blond

to

isolated case, the

noble-spirited reader can thus take heart in viewing his struggle in

terms of a millennial meta-struggle between master and slave forms of

By recounting

life.^“^

the genesis of a form of valuation that has

caused sensitive, creative individuals throughout the ages such

Nietzsche wants his readers to understand an heir to

How

how dangerous

grief,

to be

it is

this struggle.

did the noble types of antiquity allow themselves to be

tricked by the clever, vengeful machinations of the herd? Nietzsche

points to three factors, the

being identified in both The Geneal-

first

ogy and Zarathustra as the superior man’s “indifference to and con-

tempt for

security, body, life,

comfort”

(GM

I, 1 1).

The high-minded

“imprudence” [Unklugheit] of the strong, their “bold recklessness

whether

in the face of

danger or of the enemy,”

is

contrasted favor-

who

evince

Z III,

lo, 2).

ably with the “timid mistrustfulness” of “cowardly souls” a

cautious self-concern in their every gesture

Given

their

tendency to channel

all

(GM

I,

lo;

resources into creative activity,

the strong and resourceful have neither the time nor the energy for self-defensive prudence.

“everything small”

is

Their resulting “helplessness”

caused by the suspension of

sive capabilities” in the face

supposed by every

They

creative

all

in the face of

“minor defen-

of the “tremendous expenditure

deed”

(EH

IX,

.

.

.

pre-

5).

tend, moreover, to shun the prospect of constant vigilance

against the attacks of resentful inferiors. “I ?mist be without caution,” insists

14. In

54

my fate

Zarathustra, “so

“So Polyphonous

sume

all

slaves

emerges only

a

Being,”

will

have

Abbey notes

it”

(Z IV,

5, 2).

Refusing to

that Nietzsche’s tendency to sub-

of his psychological observations into a meta-narrative of masters versus in his later period.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

— defend oneself against the thousand pinpricks or stings of the com-

mon

folk

prove

fatal. “I will

light of you,” Zarathustra says to the insect-

folk surrounding him, “since I have heavy things to

bundle!” (Z

sicht]

make

and what do

carry;

care

I

II,

if

beetles and dragonflies

sit

themselves on

Better to be “without foresight” [ohne Vor-

14).

than “to be prickly towards small things,” which Zarathustra

dismisses as “the

wisdom of a hedgehog” (Z

III, 5, 2; cf.

Such freedom from suspicion, claims Nietzsche, sword; although he portrays that

may

honorable, even though their gradual accumulation

common

like

my

is

it

renders the

magnanimous

8).*^

double-edged

a

of nobility he also concedes

as a sign

it

is

EH II,

soul highly vulnerable to the

machinations of lower types.

A

premodern noble psyche, and one

third vulnerable area of the

that Nietzsche treats as (at least in principle) excisable in his targeted

contemporary audience,

Even the

finest

“were rather

is

its

lack of critical self-understanding.

of ancient men, he concedes, held concepts that

uncouth, coarse, external, narrow,

at first incredibly

meaning to a degree Possessing what to our

straightforward, and altogether wisy?nbolical in

we can scarcely conceive” (GM I, 6). modern sensibilities must appear as an impoverished that

one stretched thinly II,

16)

— and relying

“as

it

solely

were

on

.

.

.

between two membranes”

development: the emergence of

and

(GM

their admirable “unconscious drives,”

noble types were highly vulnerable to

tellectual

inner world

a

a

completely unprecedented

morally charged and vengeful in-

spiritual revolt erupting

from the masses and

led

by the

standard-bearer of self-conscious reflection, Socrates.

15.

As Martha Nussbaum points out, the view that chronic suspicion and mistrust-

fulness are signs of a base character can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. “Euripides, Aristotle,

and Thucydides concur

in the

view that

which can come to an agent through no moral the bad things in

life,

can be

a

failing,

poison that corrodes

all

... a mistrustful suspiciousness,

but only through e.xperience of of the excellences, turning them

to forms of vindictive defensiveness.” The Fragility of Goodness: Luck

and Ethics

Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 16. “Socrates

Greek

418.

belonged, in his origins, to the lowest orders: Socrates was rabble

[H]e contained within him every kind of foul vice and lust” (TI that the essential morbidity of Socratic philosophy “sick” multitude

p.

in

—

is

II, 3).

—and hence

its

II, i,

.

.

Nietzsche claims affinity

proven by Socrates’ apparent denigration of mortal

ing embrace of death, as recounted by Plato in the Phaedo (TI

.

12;

life

GS

with the

and

will-

340).

NIETZSCHEAN CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

Socrates’ public dialogues were

embraced by Athenian

aristocrats,

new and appealing way the Athenian desire for agonistic competition: “He introduced a variation into the wrestling-matches among the youths and young men” (TI II, 8; cf. TI IX, 23). In the end, however, Socratic diin Nietzsche’s view,

alectics

because they seemed to satisfy in a

proved to be the undoing of noble types with “small

and spacious souls” (Z

II, 4).

More

at ease issuing

intellects

commands than

giving reasons, habituated to act spontaneously on instinct, these naive aristocrats were reduced to shadows of their former selves, “to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect” II,

16).

Henceforth they were

at their

“weakest and most

(GM

fallible,”

highly vulnerable to the noxious influence of morbid and vengeful types

who were

well schooled in logic and metaphysics

Critical self-consciousness thus

the weaker

(ibid.).

became the Trojan horse allowing

—though more “clever”—majority

and minds of the strong (TI IX,

to capture the hearts

Nietzsche believes that

14).^^

philosophers since the time of Plato have been, with only ceptions, learned vulgarians

who

proselytize

a

on behalf of the

few exsort of

Platonic and Christian metaphysics that teaches higher types to ig-

nore or extirpate their bodily knowledge. Since the time of Socrates, “the weaker dominate the strong again and again,” largely through the propagation of a conceptual and normative package that calumniates the

body and the earth and

instills

self-misunderstanding,

doubt, bad conscience, and self-loathing in the souls of the healthy (ibid.; cf.

TI X,

2).

Zarathustra illustrates this view of the unsavory

normative role of philosophy since Socrates when he bemoans the fact that “hitherto all knowledge [Wissen] has

conscience [bdsen Gewisse 7i\V^ (Z

grown up

beside the

bad

III, ii, 7).

However, Nietzsche does not

call

upon

his readers to

emancipate

themselves by repudiating rational self-consciousness altogether and returning to the

One

noble.

blissful,

naively confident state of the pre-Socratic

simply cannot “take mankind back, force

it

back, to an

standard of virtue” (TI IX, 43; cf. GS 377). The Pandora’s box of reflexive self-consciousness opened by Socrates and his followers earlier

17.

Nietzsche often associates cleverness [Klugheit] with

prudence. See, for example,

56

Z

I,

12;

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Z

II,

16;

Z

III, 5, 2;

GS

3.

a cowardly, calculating

— can never be shut again. evitability

Zarathustra expresses this sense of in-

when he reminds

the incomprehensible

can you be

veniiinftige]

Nostalgia

is

imagined comrades that “neither

his

[Unbegreifliche]

home” (Z

at

nor

II, 2; cf.

the irrational

in

Z I,

10;

Z III,

in

[U?i-

15, 2).

—we

ruled out of court not only because of its futility

can never recapture the prerational innocence of the “blond beast” but also because of

would

its

entail a servile

ignominy. To pine for

sche’s great

manner reminiscent of

man

feels viscerally

tems that equate

long-lost antiquity

conformity with received tradition that would

be antithetical to Nietzsche’s idea of tion.^^ In a

a

fine action

something outside of the

self.

a truly

noble form of valua-

Aristotle’s jfiegalopsiichos^

Nietz-

compelled to rebel against moral sys-

and motivation with obedience to

This

refusal of

all

mimicry forms the

background to Nietzsche’s famous declaration that “we must over-

come even the Greeks” (GS 340). Yet we should be cautious about assuming

that Nietzsche’s rejec-

on

his part to take a stand

tion of romantic nostalgia entails a refusal

between “master” and “slave” modes of valuation.-^ As Nehamas has

Bernard Williams rightly notes that the complexity of Nietzsche’s attitude to-

18.

ward modernity stems,

“from

in part,

his ever-present sense that his

ness

would not be possible w ithout the developments

view^

of things

wardness

that,

.

.

.

depended on

he thought,

it

a

own

conscious-

that he disliked. In particular his

heightened reflectiveness, self-consciousness, and in-

w^as precisely

one of the charms, and indeed the

powder, of

the Greeks to have done without.” Williams, Sha?fie and Necessity (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1993), p- 9- Nietzsche’s genealogy of heightened inw'ardness and self-consciousness can be profitably compared with Charles Taylor’s discussion of the “radical reflexivity” of the Identity 19.

UD

2

modern

identity in Sources of the Self The

Making ofMode?!?

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 1 30-1 31, 176-178. Cf. Nietzsche’s early assessment of the limitations of “antiquarian history”

and

3.

Peter Berkowitz’s discussion of these passages in his Nietzsche: The Ethics

of an bnjnoralist (Cambridge: Harv^ard University Press, 1995), pp. 32-36, ful.

in

is

very' use-

Nietzsche’s criticism of nostalgic longing recalls Machiavelli’s polemic against the

fashionable cult of things ancient in his prefaces to The Piince and The Discourses. 20.

Such caution

is

notably absent in

many

Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s emphasis on creation trality

between the “masters” and the

Nietz. Living in close proximity to the herd

loss

may

moreover, to the

lead,

of the essentially optimistic, affirmative embrace of

sine qua

non of

all

healthy, higher types.

oneself only with good things and good one’s

optimism (Z

IV, 13, 15).

company if one

Such optimism

ing fool” character encountered in part cizes for having

likened to a

One ought

III,

is

III, 7).

whom

By remaining near

that

is

a

to surround is

to preserve

absent in the “frothZarathustra

remained within shouting distance of

swamp (Z

life

the

criti-

a city that

city,

is

the fool has

been overwhelmed by the vulgarity of its inhabitants and reduced to a caricatural

upon

prophet of doom, spewing overwrought damnations

passers-by.

He would

have done better to have fled “into the

forest” or to have explored “the sea” for

lands”

The

some of its many “green

is-

(ibid.).

figure of the frothing fool

is

meant

to

warn those whose

re-

peated exposure to plebeian vulgarity threatens to overwhelm their 3.

\Tjlgar

Brian Leiter similarly discerns Nietzsche’s link between the “overcoming” of

elements within the self and the importance of maintaining distance from the

herd in his “Morality

in the Pejorative Sense:

On

the Logic of Nietzsche’s Critique of

Morality,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy

68

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

3

(1995): 113-145.

optimism. Nietzsche claims that the best way to protect one’s capacity to affirm

life is

where one

to seek out environments

The

constant contact with that which should be negated.

No

say

which

as

little

To

as possible.

no longer

is

idea

is

in

“to

separate oneself, to depart from that to

No would be required again and again” (EH II, 8). When one is

forced repeatedly to negate, one’s defensive posture becomes “a rule, a habit” that leads to “an extraordinary and perfecdy superfluous impov-

erishment,” a siphoning off of valuable energies ation, the temptations of nihilism can

contempt

In such a situ-

(ibid.).

become overwhelming:

a

noble

for vulgarity could easily be perverted into an indiscriminate

“contempt for men”

in general.

When

this

coming the vulgar and creating new values

happens,

all

hope of over-

abandoned."^

is

Zarathustra’s treatment of the “frothing fool” reveals yet another

reason for effecting what Nietzsche refers to as solitude”

(GS Preface

nunciatory rhetoric praise.

As Zarathustra sees

at

them,

might have cause

revenge” (Z

III, 7).

the fool’s violent, de-

for

The

much

down

revenge\

fool’s great

beside this

For

filth ...

all [his]

disappointment

—and

many

acknowledge

he

flatter the fool to his satisfaction,

“[sitting]

ognized and valued by the for their failure to

it,

driven by a desire for the herd’s flattery and

Because the herd did not

began “grunting” [he]

is

i).

a “radical retreat into

at

frothing ...

is

not being rec-

vengeance

his desire to seek

his “greatness”

so that

—reveal

misguided

a

dependency on the opinion of those who ought to be despised. In presenting the episode of the fool as one of his

many

caution-

ary tales, Nietzsche demonstrates his concern that his readers’ close

proximity to mainstream European culture and society might tempt

them to take the same embittered, vengeful turn. Life in or near a big, modern city, he suggests in an almost Rousseauian spirit, is pervaded with the obsessive pursuit of honor, fame, and tra

glory. Zarathus-

speaks disparagingly in this context of the “lusting for eminence”

4. In

the Nachlass Nietzsche asserts that the nihilist tables of value are

is

guilty of a pathological “gen-

empty and

eralization”: the

assumption that

one

of values has been exposed as empty and

(servile) set

all

false

false

simply because

(\\T

3).

1

transcend the level of negation, the nihilist deems himself and the w'orld as

be “valueless”

(WP

12a). Cf. Zarathustra’s allusion to the nihilistic error

whose wrong-headed from the “rabble” (Z

rejection of

life

began with an

initially sensible

Unable a

to

whole to

of “hermits,” turning away

II, 6).

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

characteristic of “the ambitious” (Z

17).

I,

As we have already seen,

Nietzsche believes that high-minded and high-spirited people in

full

possession of themselves reject this sort of other-dependency. But in

order to achieve and retain self-possession, a flight away from the

crowd

advisable.

is

Although solitude

should be dissuaded from

[it]”

son” for unselfsufficient types

is

not for everyone

because solitude

—

it

is

—“many

invariably a “poi-

seems the best medicine for those

wishing to wean themselves from beliefs contrary to the highest

form of human flourishing (Z

The

IV, 13, 13;

GS

359).^

Discipline of Suffering

Nietzsche talks of solitude in terms of a therapeutic “recovery” \Gene-

which one “returns” to oneself (EH

j7/wg], a state in

II, 8).

Something

“voiceless” counsels Zarathustra to “go back into solitude,” for only in this state will

he “grow mellow” (Z

even personified as

a

woman who,

II,

in a

22). Solitude [Einsamkeit] is

memorable dialogue with

Zarathustra, contrasts herself favorably with the loneliness [Verlassen-

how much better she is for him than his previous life among the many (Z III, 9). Nietzsche understands that such words may seem like cold com-

heit\

experienced in crowds and reminds him

fort to those

who, because of their upbringing

in a

herd community,

can contemplate the prospect of abandoning their past loyalties and affections only with great reluctance.

Given the deeply internalized

nature of the false consciousness of his imagined readers, he readily

concedes that

a definitive

break with the communities that breed

slave morality will cause spiritual torment. Zarathustra forewarns his

youthful interlocutors that “the voice of the herd will

panions (Z

one of his

17).

I,

disciples, a

munity of origin, 5.

Nietzsche

healthy type

still

insists

(e.g.,

discover they

as their herdlike

former com-

prophesies in particular the inner torment of

young man who, upon breaking with finds

its

his

“conscience” ringing in his ears.

com-

“No

on distinguishing between the solitude sought by the un-

the religious ascetic

strong and healthy (Z

70

He

ring within

when they

[them]” and that they will “lament” the day

no longer have “the same conscience”

still

III, 6; cf.

EH II,

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

who 10).

flees to

the desert) and that chosen by the

one speaks to me,” the youthful rebel laments, “the

me

tude makes

made him

frost of

my soli-

tremble.” His wish to “rise into the heights” has

a pariah

among

former comrades, and

his

his resulting

misery makes him doubt the wisdom of ostracizing himself:

do

I

want

Someone

Z I,

8; cf.

12).

may succumb once

mistresses of seduction,” slave morality,

back into the familiar warmth and comfort of

slink

community (D Preface midst of

all

I,

concedes Nietzsche,

in this position,

again to “the greatest of

and

(Z

in the heights?”

a

A beleaguered,

3).

“What

self-imposed desert exile

may

his

former

suffering noble type in the

“blink thirstily at the islands

with springs where living creatures rest beneath shady trees” (Z

filled

While aware of the temptation, Nietzsche has only contempt for those who succumb to it. These are the backsliders who abandon their II, 8).

higher vocation,

who succumb

with hindsight slander

“common, comfortable” life and “their morning boldness” (Z III, 8, i). Wdiereas

they once “lifted their legs

to the

now

like a dancer,”

they return to the

abnegating beliefs of their childhood, “creep[ing] to the Cross” In the end, speculates Zarathustra, they true nobility after

all,

few, fine exemplars of

for they

fail

may

(ibid.).

not have had the stuff of

to demonstrate that

humanity have

self-

which only the long-enduring

in their hearts: “a

courage and wantonness” (ibid.).Their cowardice in retreating to the herd for comfort reveals their

Hoping

with the many-too-many.

affinity

and comfort to like-minded

to bring aid

Nietzsche

souls,

exhorts his readers to take pride in their internal turmoil and anguish.

The

suffering that results

normal but ethical

it

One

spiritual self-remaking.*^

prematurely and seek

affliction”

(Z

I,

1

7).

to radical

should not, he

relief in the “pitiable

stresses,

comfort” of

herd existence. “The way to yourself,” claims Zarathustra,

way of your

not only

is

commitment

also desirable as a sign of serious

and

abandon

from ostracism and loneliness

is

also “the

Throughout Nietzsche’s account of

Zarathustra ’s odyssey, suffering consistently appears as a reliable indicator of the authenticity of one’s efforts at self-improvement:

^ —that

uine [Wahrhafti

is

what

I call

him who goes

deserts and has broken his venerating heart” (Z

6.

honor

That Nietzsche considers is

suggested in

BGE

a pariah status

30, 43,

and 220;

Z

among

II, 8;

into god-forsaken

II, 8).

Zarathustra ’s chastisement of the so-called higher

“Gen-

In the midst of

men

of part IV,

we

the majority to be a badge of

Z II,

6;

and

A 46.

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

learn that

one of the

their not having “suffered

In his

own

impoverishment

clearest signs of their spiritual

enough” (Z

is

IV, 13, 6).

voice Nietzsche makes a clear distinction between the

—the suffering

many

suffering of the

we noted

that, as

chapter, leads to ressentiment toward the talented few

experienced by those few

who

in the last

—and the pain For the

are of concern to him.

latter,

he considers “suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignibe formative. “I wish them the only thing that can prove to-

ties” to

day whether one 910). It fied

is

is

worth anything or not

revealing that one of the features of slave morality identi-

by Nietzsche

as

most contemptible

glish happiness,” a life

denuded of

all

sche,

aspiration for an

is its

(BGE

228).

measure of the depth of our examination of is

the depth of our suffering \das Leiden] (Z

gestion that suffering

a

claims Nietz-

life,

III,

2,1).

precondition for the cultivation

The sugof human

made powerfully in Beyond Good and Evil: “The disof suffering, of great suffering do you not know that it is this

excellence cipline

is

'‘'‘En-

suffering and dedicated solely

to the pursuit of “comfort and fashion”

A

—that one endures” (WP

is

also

—

discipline alone

(BGE

which has created every elevation of mankind hith-

BGE

There is “much bitter dying” in the life of the creative individual; one must be prepared to countenance repeated reexaminations and even rejection of one’s most chererto?”

225;

cf.

270).

—

—

ished beliefs and closest relationships in order to reemerge as a “child

new-born” (Z

II, 2).

In drawing out this metaphor of child-

birth, Zarathustra claims that

one who aspires to be

knowledge and insight “must

also be willing to be the

endure the mother’s pain”

(ibid.).

Gay

Science,

made once

is

when Nietzsche

give birth to our thoughts out of our pain.

ultimate liberator of the spirit”

“newborn”

.

(GS Preface

insists that .

.

in

mother and

This association of creative

ing with maternal pain in childbearing preface to The

a

striv-

again in the

“we have

Only great pain

is

to

the

3).

absence to

comtempt them

into “hecom[ing] like these comfortable creatures: for

where there

Nietzsche exhorts his readers not to allow their panionship and their fear and anguish in

are oases there are also idols” (Z

II, 8).

its

thirst for

Courageous are those who,

while having an intimate knowledge of the fear and pain of social disapprobation, refuse to

let

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

these emotions dominate

them (Z

TV,

An important step in this

13, 4)-^

overcoming of the

self-mastery, this

suffering associated with the overthrow of slave or herd morality,

is

—many would say

successful passage through a particularly difficult

dreadful

The

—thought experiment.

Eternal Return as Psychological Problem

Nietzschean higher types,

as

we have

seen,

must pass through

ods of tremendous personal upheaval and anguish in order to

The

their lofty potential.

a

daunting hypothetical

they had the opportunity to relive their

if

fulfill

crucial phase of their suffering arrives,

however, only after they decide to confront choice:

peri-

would they do so unhesitatingly and

joyfully,

thing in their past would recur unaltered?

lives in perpetuity,

knowing

Would

that every-

they have the

forti-

tude, in other words, to relish the prospect of a continual repetition

of the sorrows, humiliations, and defeats of the past along with past

moments of joy and victory? become true lovers of fate

If they

—

attain “the highest

and boundless declaration of Yes and

Ethics,

1 1

A

8.

1

(EH IX,

—and

They thereby

i).

man

Amen” (Z

w'ell-known alternative interpretation of eternal return

it.

—

Nkoinachean

eternal return as

Nietzsche’s cosmological theory of the actual workings of the universe criticized

as a

III, 4).^

of virtue knows fear but masters

5 a I o-b 2 o.

they

amor fati

few capable of what Zarathustra refers to

Cf. Aristotle’s view that the

7.

this prospect,

in Nietzsche’s sense of

formula of affirmation”

join the ranks of those

“vast

can stomach

—

is

effectively

by Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Tnith and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1990), pp. 245-270, and Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 141-169. As they indithe texts that Nietzsche himself published provide little support for this interpre-

as Literature cate,

tation.

One

possible exception

animals appear to formulate thing ad infinitum (Z

III,

a

is a

passage in TMrathustra where the

cosmological doctrine of the

13, 2).

Clark and

Nehamas

literal

title

character’s

recurrence of every-

rightly obser\^e, however, that

Zarathustra himself treats his animals’ cosmological musings with condescension and chastizes

though low),

how

I

them

my

for turning his idea into a tiresome “hurdy-gurdy song” (ibid.). Al-

reading of Nietzsche’s thought experiment differs from Clark’s (see be-

think she

is

right to interpret

it

“as a practical doctrine, a directive concerning

to live, rather than a theory^ concerning the nature of the universe.” Clark, Nietz-

sche on Ti'uth

and Philosophy,

p. 247.

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

— Nietzsche presents amor fati as an inescapable precondition for noble self-love.

One must

affirm everything that has directly or indi-

rectly contributed to one’s personal

“The

errors:

turnings

.

.

blunders of

have their

.

life,

the temporary sidepaths and

own meaning and

this austere

wrong

They are an expressupreme sagacity” (EH II, 9). Ulti-

sion of a great sagacity, even the

mately

development, even the so-called

value.

and uncompromising formula for affirmation re-

quires an embrace of everything. Since “in the actual world

everything

bound

is

to

and conditioned by everything

think away anything means to

(WP

else,

.

.

.

... to

condemn and think away everything”

584). All things in the universe are causally interconnected

—and should

“chained and entwined together,” as Zarathustra puts

it

thus be affirmed as having contributed to what one

(Z IV,

Not one

is

19, 10).^

shred of regret for the past can be tolerated; the pain and

suffering caused by physical illness, the death of close friends or family

members, public humiliation and ostracism

at the

hands of the herd,

and even the most horrific of human-made or natural catastrophes all

have played a role in making one what one

interlocutors that

(ibid.). If, in

After inquiring of his

they had ever said “Yes to one joy,” Zarathustra

if

they have done

if

is.

other words,

woe as well” what we have become, we should be

“then [they] said Yes to

so,

we

love

insists

all

prepared to say yes to ijasagen) the eternal return of all past things unchanged, in order to ensure the reappearance of our noble selves.

easy to understand

It is

to such a prospect as

(GS

341).

For

his

why Nietzsche

one of horror,

presents his

initial

as the suggestion

reaction

of a “demon”

thought experiment requires higher types to posit

and affirm “without reservation” the unending recurrence “even of suffering, even of guilt, even of all that

existence”

(EH

IV, 2).

One

is

strange and questionable in

prescient interpreter of the eternal recur-

Maudemarie Clark, shares Nietzsche’s initial resistance to the uncompromising nature of this idea. “Why,” she asks, “cannot I afrence,

firm

life

precisely

by preferring

the exact recurrence of life

to

all

Why isn’t

it

its

horrors to

a greater affirmation

of

TI \1

,

8;

I

of the horrors do too does not seem like a

For some other references to

III, 16, 4;

74

life?

of

want the repetition of the past without the bad things? That

cannot recur unless 9.

my

a history stripped

this

notion of interconnectivity, see

and \\T 293, 331, 333, 634, and 1032.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Z

III, 2, 2;

Z

very good or a very Nietzschean answer.”^® Writing near the end of the bloodiest century of

human

Clark takes

history,

a stance that is

readily understandable; she, like

most of us, would prefer

eternal return of “a world that

just like ours except for the

of Hitler.”^

And

^

Nietzsche, she

is

is

to will the

absence

sunny view of

since she maintains an unreservedly

inclined to assume that he cannot maintain a posi-

tion that seems so horrific.

But

this

benign view

distorts.

Nietzsche openly derides as “farcical”

the expression “that should not have been”

(WP 584). To will the eter-

—

nal recurrence of only a selective version of the past alized past

denuded of

its

horrors, suffering, and ugliness

view, to remain in a brooding state of ressentiment

away

for “another”

“Strong,

to recuperate,

“So rich

10).

—

by

contrast, have “the

power

is

joy,” explains Zarathustra, “that

it

of graveside tears” that

is

will be.

to form, to mold,

thirsts for

(ibid.).

it

(GM

I,

woe, for

(Z IV,

world’"'

This type of joy wants both the “honey” and the “dregs”; just the “gilded sunsets”

in his

where one pines

and to forget” even the “misdeeds” of the past

Hell, for hatred, for shame, for the lame, for the

not

is,

world that never has been and never

natures,”

full

a prettified, ide-

19,

1 1).

demands

but also the “graves” and “the consolation

As Nietzsche

can be subtracted, nothing

is

insists in Ecce

dispensable”

(EH

Homo, “nothing IV, 2).

Nietzsche’s version of an affirmative Jasageji-'m^ stance toward life insists

on an unconditional affirmation not only of

and suffering but also of inferior forms of human

all

life.

past evil

“He who

climbs upon the highest mountains,” claims Zarathustra, “laughs all

tragedies, real or imaginary” (Z

I,

7).

at

Nietzsche understands, of

course, that such a prospect cannot be faced lightly; he concedes that

the “hardest test of character” and makes

it is

initial

reactions to

it

highly unfavorable

(WP

some of Zarathustra 934).

WTen

’s

positing

the notion of an “eternal recurrence even for the smallest” and most

contemptible, Zarathustra, like Maudemarie Clark, in “disgust”

(Z

baseness strikes

hard

him

as

1.

very idea of

a ceaseless

recurrence of

an “abysmal thought,” and he confesses

And

in Ecce

Homo Nietzsche

10. Clark, Nietzsche on Titith 1

The

“to understand that small people are necessai’y" (Z

it is

III, 5, 2).

III, 13, 2).

initially recoils

and

how

III, 3;

Z

gives voice to these sentiments

Philosophy, p. 281.

Ibid.

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

in a strikingly personal

way when he

jection to the ‘Eternal Recurrence’,

my mother and my sister” (EH

confides that “the deepest ob-

my idea

generate

—even

—without losing

(b) faith in the possibility

own

to his

(a)

abyss,

intestinal fortitude

the existence of the

always

can learn

weak and de-

healthy contempt for these latter and

He

points

“who

to an

of a higher form of human lifed^

human

Zarathustra as an example of a

unheard-of degree says No,

is

3).^^

I,

But Nietzsche claims that those with to Jasagen everything

from the

does

No

type

to everything to

hitherto said Yes,” and yet remains “nonetheless

.

.

.

which one has

the opposite of a

(EH IX, 6). Nietzsche hopes that his readers will feel disdain toward the many while, like Zarathustra, affirming their existence as “bridges” or “steps” [Stufen] upon which higher men must

spirit

of denial”

tread in their journey to greamess^"^ (Z IV,

The

1 1).

Eternal Return and the Battle against “Lord Chance’’

Once we would

and joyfully that we

are prepared to declare unreservedly

of the past

will the ceaseless repetition

whole idea of “misfortune”

claims, the

cious force loses

12.

See Chapter

13.

Thus

I

its

5,

hold over our

lives.

as

if

we

could, Nietzsche

an independent, menda-

Through sheer

force of will,

note 16.

disagree with Robert Pippin’s suggestion that the eternal recurrence

image “suggests to Zarathustra

a radical deflating

“Irony and Affirmation in Nietzsche’s

of the Ubetynensch ideal.” Pippin,

Thus Spoke

Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics,

and

Zarathustra,” in Nietzsche's

Politics,

New

Michael Allen Gillespie and

ed.

Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 54. Pippin’s claim that the eternal recurrence is a “profoundly antiredemptive thought” appears to turn

on the assumption

that Nietzsche/Zarathustra believes

nally (ibid., pp. 55-57, 64). If Pippin

able any

hope

were

all

redemptive

ideals.

Nietzsche’s declared opposition to “the

II, 12).

Once

now

14. In

Chapter 6

I

literal

engender

would indeed a

dis-

thoroughgoing

interpretation

is

at

odds with

prevalent instinct and taste” in democra-

upon “the mechanistic senselessness of all

eternal recurrence

demptive ambition becomes

is

seen as

a

thought experiment,

its

re-

clearer.

suggest that this need for lower

occasional claim that higher types can

76

But the

countries for fatalistic theories that insist

events” (GAI

things do in fact recur eter-

right, eternal recurrence

for cultural renewal and, as he suggests,

ironic stance toward

tic

all

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

become

human

beings subverts Nietzsche’s

(in principle)

completely

self-sufficient.

that

which had once been seen

One

choice.

misfortune becomes

as

product of

thereby graduates from “milk[ing]” the cow of

tion” to “drink[ing] the sweet milk of her udder” (Z cise

a

of willpower over fate

Once

vulnerability.^^

fills

the superior

man

I, 5).

with

“afflic-

This exer-

a feeling

of in-

the gauntlet of the eternal return has been run,

tragic misfortune can never break one’s spirit again.

At times Nietzsche seems to believe

empowering

thought experiment so

his

banish the very notion of accidental occurrence in

as to

the lives of superior men. Zarathustra gloats that “the time has

passed

come

when

me

to

accidents [Znfalle] could befall me, and what could

was not already

that

“Chance”

struggle with

am

over his victory: “I in

my

my

pot.

will

.

.

And

.

spoke to

on

ploringly

its

my own?”

(Z

III, i).

predominantly featured,

is

Zarathustra the Godless:

truly,

many a chance came

I

knees” (Z

Zarathustra’s

is

his boasting

cook every chance

imperiously to me: but

even more imperiously, then

it

as

it

went down im-

III, 5, 3).

Zarathustra’s declaration in part III that he has freed chance

“servitude under purpose” might

sche wished higher 4). If

we

still

seem

from

its

to refute the view that Nietz-

men to subdue contingency to their purposes (Z III,

read this passage in context, however,

it

becomes

clear that

Zarathustra means to liberate contingency only from metaphysical notions of purpose

than from a god;

it

for example, the “eternal reason-spider”

purposes

(ibid.).

rivals

WTiether

(Z

IV,

this talk

tion of “free will”

is

6).'*^

of willing

—

as

whom

of the higher man’s will

One

an important question.

is

is

there

consistent with Nietzsche’s rejec-

obvious answer, w'hich w'ould require

no contradiction because Nietzsche’s

opposed to the metaphysical notions of will he

criticizes

—

refers to

an embodied sense of agency emerging out of (rather than against) healthy, affirming instinct. Ruth

Abbey argues

here in “So Polyphonous script,

16.

a

as

In this vein Zarathustra urges like-minded

an argument absent here, would be that there talk

—rather

Fortune cannot, must not, be honored

must serve the ends of the superior man, before

can be no 15.

all

—

that Nietzsche

falls

life-

into serious inconsistency

Being: Friedrich Nietzsche in His Middle Period” (manu-

University of Western Australia, 1997).

Peter Berkowitz rightly highlights the ethic of self-deification developed in

The Ethics of an hmnoralist (Cambridge: Harv'ard University Press, 1995), pp-4, 15-20, 150, 207-210. lam not as convinced by of Zarathustra and the y)Osx.-Zarathustra wTitings exemplify a his claim that part

works such

as Tjirathustra in his Nietzsche:

W

prudent retreat from

this hubristic goal.

TI

I,

3

serves as

one example of the continued

importance of self-deification.

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

own

souls to consider themselves their fates [Schicksale], if

with me?” (Z

you

will

men

“And

if

you

not be

will

—

how can you conquer who counsels prospective

not be inexorable:

Like Machiavelli,

III, 12, 29).

political leaders to forcibly

superior

“fate”:

subdue the female Fortuna^ Nietzsche urges

to subordinate

all

of life to their dictates.

Zarathustra readily admits that becoming a “redeemer of chance” in this sense requires a breathtaking

arrogance beyond the reach of

those destined to remain Fortune’s “prisoner” (Z 3).

The mob,

forces

from “will

its

control,

he

is

the sport of every wave,” a fact that

“God” or

cards that

weak man

III, 12, 16; cf.

how the weak,

unable “to go backwards,” its

itself:

its

it

own impotence

the

Invulnerable

Z IV,

1 1).

III, 12,

stemming

fills

man

him with

will’s

only

regret

Ziifall]

has dealt him,

(Z

II, 20).

servile will turns ill-tempered

awareness of its

takes revenge (ibid.).

“is

Bitterly resentful of the

“dreadful chance” \gimiser

takes to “teeth-gnashing” in

venge

as

finds his predilection for revenge intensified

Zarathustra observes

suffer for

Z

or as completely independent and capricious. Unable to

and recrimination (Z

the

whether these are understood

backwards” in the sense described above, the herd

‘willed’,

cf.

claims Nietzsche, tends to think itself at the behest of

beyond

God

20;

II,

and

own impotence. Being

on others and makes them

“This alone,” he explains,

antipathy towards time and time’s

‘It

was’”

“is re(ibid.).

Men?

In positing invulnerability to fortune as a normative ideal, Nietzsche

evinces an indebtedness to a long-standing tradition in Western

moral and

political

philosophy associated primarily with Stoicism

and ultimately traceable back to Socrates. In

its

many guises,

this tra-

dition gives expression to the pervasive desire to believe that acting

and living only on

well, as

human

Martha Nussbaum

effort, things that

no matter what happens

17.

and

Martha Nussbaum, “Tragedy and

ton University Press, 1992),

p.

263.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

human

depend

beings can always control,

world around them.”^^ Nussbaum

in the

Pity,” Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed.

writes, “are things that

Self-Sufficiency: Plato

and Arisotle on Fear

Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Princeton: Prince-

identifies the first philosophical expression of this desire in Plato’s

Apology^

The

where Socrates claims

that a

good man cannot be harmed.

Stoics later radicalized this thought, insisting that the

good man

ought to disengage himself psychologically from that which fortune controls or influences: the “external goods” of wealth, political free-

dom,

friendship,

and community. In the Stoic view, one could be

bereft of all these goods and

With

still

lead an upstanding, admirable

his doctrine of the eternal return

Nietzsche aims

life.^^

at radical-

izing the Socratic-Stoic ideal of invulnerability. For the Stoics, as

well as for later thinkers such as Machiavelli, fortune remains a for-

midable force in the

What

of even the most admirable men.

lives

separates the virtuous from the majority

is

the former’s ability to

erect barricades of a psychological and/or political nature to stem fortune’s tide.

The

adoption of compensatory strategies, such

psychological disengagement from

all

as the

external goods and Machiavel-

acknowledges fortune’s great power.

lian political vinii, implicitly

Nietzsche, by contrast, urges upon his ideal readers a mindset that ostensibly

would

banish the role of contingency in their lives. Al-

though pure contingency always plays of the weak, the same, he

can cry out “once more!”

insists,

when

determinant role in the

lives

cannot be said for those few

who

a

faced with the prospect of the eternal

recurrence of all that has been. In light of this sometimes delusional stress invulnerability,

it

man

importance of “external goods” such

of superior men.

How

tain inherently contingent I

While drawn

invulnerability, Nietzsche

an alternative view of the

is

as friendship

could he hold that the superior insist that cer-

goods are necessary for

his full flour-

intend to argue that he

successfully.

and

same time

can master contingency while

ishing?

self-sufficiency

might seem incongruous to suggest that Nietzsche

also argues for the in the lives

on

at the

tries to retain

both views

—un-

to the Stoic-Socratic ideal of personal also pulled in another direction,

human

toward

condition whose roots in the West-

ern tradition are just as deep. Associated with the great tragedians of ancient Greece and given

1

8.

its first

philosophical expression in Aristo-

See Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness

(New York: Oxford

University Press,

1993), pp. 262-290, 385-411.

NEGATION AND

ITS

OVERCOMING

tie,

this tradition recognizes, as

ously powerful,” that

“it is

Nussbaum

possible for a

says, that luck

good person

is

“seri-

to suffer seri-

ous and undeserved harm.”*^

The

next chapter shows that Nietzsche feels the force of this dis-

course even as he clings tenaciously to Stoic ideals of personal autarchy.

The

result

is

problematized body of thought.

a seriously

Perhaps the most significant problems emerge in Nietzsche’s treat-

ment of friendship and community.

19.

Martha Nussbaum, The

Philosophy (Cambridge:

Fragility of Goodness:

Cambridge University

Williams also gives voice to reality [acting] to crush a

this perspective

Luck and Ethics

Press,

when he

1986), pp.

in

Greek Tragedy and

384-385. Bernard

speaks of the possibility of “social

worthwhile, significant, character or project without display-

ing either the lively individual purposes of a pagan god or the world-historical signifi-

cance of

a Judaic, a Christian,

or a Marxist teleology.” Williams, Shame ayid Necessity

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 165.

80

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Overcoming Solitude

foil r All

company is bad company except the company of one’s

equals.

—Beyond Good and Evil 26 The

Limitations of Solitude

G

iven Nietzsche’s repeated praise of the therapeutic effects

of solitude and his insistence on intensely personal, inimitable paths to ethical-spiritual

to read into his

work an unremitting

development,

hostility

form of sociability and community.’ His

I.

broad

The field,

consensus view of Nietzsche

in

tempting

toward any and every

radical individualism

as a radical individualist

encompassing scholars who disagree

it is

many

seems

extends over a v^ery

other respects.

Some

of the

81

apparent

when he

“stand [s] out”

teaches that the exceptionally creative individual

abzuheben] and should value himself as one to

[sich

whom preferences,

Montesquieu’s sense, are owed (TI IX,

in

great man,” observes Nietzsche, “finds

(WP

tasteless to

it

37).

“A

be familiar”

962).

Nietzsche, moreover, finds that noble self-sufficiency

is

woefully

absent in the “gregarious” [heerdenhaft] lower orders, where an ethic

of “love thy neighbor” reigns out of necessity rather than virtue 886).

He

(WP

detects a spiritual void and even self-loathing in the sort of

sociability that feeds

upon the glances of others and

eats praise out of

the hands of flatterers. In Beyond Good and Evil he speaks of a “sub-

is

a “lover of his

Such

a

who

and un-self-sufficient species of man”

servient, unauthoritative

neighbor” out of weakness rather than strength.

man performs

“good works” (including

his

scientific research)

with an eye for “honor and recognition” because a “constant affirma-

and

tion of his value

of self-worth

(BGE

his utility”

206).

is

needed to shore up

The dependent

the thought of existence without the

proximity to other herd animals

(ibid.;

his

shaky sense

type of person cannot bear

warmth generated by

Z Prologue

5).

close

As Zarathustra

observes, such a person can hardly endure to be alone with himself

and

flees to the

company of his neighbor (Z

better-known studies making

this

Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist,

16).

assumption include Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1974), p. 162; Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: p.

I,

407; Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the

Roudedge and Kegan

Politics

of Transfiguration, expanded ed.

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 112; and

and

Political

Thought (Cambridge:

theorists not

known

as

MIT Press,

Nietzsche scholars

Paul, 1983),

Mark Warren,

Nietzsche

1988), p. 61. Philosophers and political

who

also

view Nietzsche as

a strictly

“no-

madic” thinker include William Connolly, Ide7itity\Dijference: Detnocratic Negotiations of Political Pa?-adox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),

p. 187;

Bonnie Honig, Po-

Theoiy and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 230; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: Uni-

litical

p.

versity of Notre

Dame

Press, 1984), p. 258;

and Martha Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy:

Nietzsche’s Stoicism,” in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's ''On the

Genealogy of Morals," ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 158.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Yet

it

would be hasty

to infer that passages such as these reflect an

uncompromising repudiation of all forms of sociability. Although the radical individualist reading

seem

is

vindicated in textual passages that

to posit an austere vision of personal autarchy,

sche’s praise of solitude

and self-sufficiency emphasizes

of Nietz-

a selective

company of the mass of ordinary human beings and

distaste for the

open the prospect of

leaves

much

“a refined conception of friendship” in

(BGE

the lives of stronger, healthier individuals

Repudiating the “pitiable comforts” of herd

260). life

and successfully

passing through a psychologically trying thought experiment

necessary as preconditions for suffice.

full

human

may be

flourishing, but they

do not

Beyond the imperative of breaking with mediocre communities

and joyfully willing the gestures (at least

infinite repetition

it

tasteless to

be familiar

try suggesting that these

great communities”

Nietzsche

felt

Nietzsche

life,

most of the time) toward another, higher type of so-

ciability required for self-overcoming.

consider

of one’s past

is

The

suggestion that great

men

balanced by another notebook en-

same great ones “want to embed themselves

in

(WP 964). Even at his most isolated and friendless,

that his “cure

very least to dream of

and self-restoration” required him

a “relatedness

and identity

in eye

and

at the

desires, a

reposing in a trust of friendship, a blindness in concert with another

without suspicion or question-marks” nealogy^

(HAH

Preface

I

moreover, unending solitude appears as

than the most desired

Or solitude,

if it

state:

essein miiss]V''

In The Ge-

a fail-back plan rather

“Let us have good company,

must be [warn

i).

(GM III,

oiir

company!

14).

In his later writings, the perceived need for a higher form of solidarity pervades Zarathustra in particular, relief at

gives

having escaped the

way

to a

stifling

where the

deep yearning, often couched

Ruth Abbey argues that Nietzsche’s treatment of

pales in

character’s

atmosphere of herd society soon in

metaphor, for new,

meaningful connections with like-minded others.^

2.

title

The

pursuit of

sociability in his later

comparison with the rich evocations of friendship and solidarity

in the

work

middle

period and speculates that this change can be traced back to the aggravation of Nietzsche’s personal isolation in the

mid- to

late 1880s.

Abbey, “Nietzsche and the Ex-

cluded Middle,” presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1997.

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

I

wisdom,

as

we have

seen, requires a period of “voluntary living in ice

and high mountains”

(EH Foreword

3).

But once solitude has been

“My hand

attained, Zarathustra cannot help but cry out,

with

ice!

.

.

.

[N]ow

long for speech panions

my longing breaks (Z

[Rede]'''

II, 9). It

from

me

burned

is

—

like a well-spring

seems that the “speech” of com-

needed to counteract the “threatening, suffocating, heart-

is

tightening” effects of a solitude that encircles and embraces the isolated,

ostracized seeker of truth. This view of the

emptiness of unending solitude

from 1886, when

samun^ on

morbid

“this

the icy peaks

is

reiterated in

of spirit”

spiritual

one of the prefaces

isolation” [dieser krankhaften Verein-

described as but “a long road to that

is

tremendous overflowing certainty and health

dom

now-

... to that

mature free-

(HAH I Preface 4).

Zarathustra clearly does not wish to end up like the hermit he

meets in the Prologue. While he does

by

ascetic loner (suggested later

comments suggest

feel a kinship

warm

their

parting from each other), his

if

unchecked by

able companions. In the

company might lead an ate the many-too-many

a

more mature,

first place,

initially

may

turned away from ble” (Z

lead to certain

selective search for suit-

the absence of the right sort of

sound and healthy desire to repudi-

into a nihilistic repudiation of humankind in

In this vein Zarathustra notes sadly that

toto.

life” initially

“many

a

one who

had “turned away only from the rab-

II, 6).

Second, too long

a

period of self-imposed isolation

the ostracized superior type so “needy,” so starved for tact, that fall

how-

that the radical retreat into solitude,

ever laudable as a self-protective measure,

pathologies

of sorts with this

he

may

may render human con-

ignore the warning of his discriminating taste and

back into the mediocre companionship from which he escaped

in the first place.

“The

hand too quickly

to

solitary,”

observes Zarathustra, “extends his

anyone he meets” (Z

I,

1

7).

This message

is

re-

iterated in his declaration that the greatest danger for the solitary

man (Z

is

an indiscriminate love,

a

84

is

folly to

when,

of any thing if only

it is

aliveV

Farther along in the text this lapse of the instinct for Ran-

III, i).

gordnung

a “love

criticized as “the folly of hermits” [die Einsiedler-Torheit]

which Zarathustra himself succumbs

after a

long period of solitude, he

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

sets

in the Prologue,

out to speak to every-

one

in the marketplace. In retrospect, Zarathustra claims to

under-

stand that by attempting to speak to everyone, he “spoke to no one”

(ZIV,i3,

i).3

Alternatively, a

bereft of all friendship

life

mit’s folly: excessively

between

allel

too

many

his

own,

depths” (Z

versation that

may lead

morose introspection. Zarathustra solitary self and the hermit, for

I,

14).

Without

2,

spirits

whom “there are

would draw him out of himself, Zarathustra

Nietzsche ruthlessly mocks as

may

is

that, as

in a in

II, 13).

life:

A sociable

of self-loathing and

a sign

19; cf.

world where conversation among kindred

spirits

there

that

is,

Zarathustra ’s

3.

I,

more

is

“Where

How sweet it

in

repeatedly go over past slights and personal failures,

remains possible

ward

danger

we saw

turning bitterly resentful and lusting secredy after revenge (Z

Z

con-

unending solitude even the most optimistic

ressentiment. In prolonged,

of

offers a par-

engage him

a friend to

of falling into the same humorless moral pedantry

Chapter

to another her-

own

an affirmative stance to-

likely to preserve is

talking, the

world

is

like a

garden to me.

exist”

(Z

words and sounds of music

company

acceptance of some highly suspect

odyssey seems to cast doubt on the depth of his

III, 13, 2).^

in part

own understanding

IV of his

of this lesson.

Robert Pippin notes that the quality of Zarathustra ’s interlocutors scarcely improves

from the Prologue

IV and

to part

interprets this clear lack of progress as evidence of

Nietzsche’s ironic undercutting of Zarathustra’s redemptive project. “Irony and Affir-

mation

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

in Nietzsche’s

Philosophy, Aesthetics,

and

Politics,

ed.

rV of Zarathustra

moralist (Cambridge:

as a “retreat

Averse to

from the extremes.”

Nietzsche:

Harvard University Press, 1995), pp.

facile,

2

The Ethics of an Im-

11-227. There

of his sort

may have

pollyannaish happy endings, Nietzsche

lous characters near the end of the

who

to Today, neither

men

is,

how-

of part FV.

placed these ridicu-

book to underline the great difficulty facing anyone

attempts to find (or create) suitable companions. As noted above,

Zarathustra declares at the beginning of part

do we speak

to the

IV

Never” (Z

an indication that the redemptive hope

cally

Peter Berkowitz similarly sees

p. 62.

another way of interpreting the presence of the so-called higher

ever,

as

Seas: Explorations in

Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), part

New

in Nietzsche's

named “higher men,” moreover,

is

that he and his destiny “do not speak

IV,

i). I

retained,

take the last part of this phrase

however chastened. (The

ironi-

serve as important vehicles for Nietzsche’s ped-

agogy, as further negative examples to his imagined readers.) 4.

The image

of a dialogical commimity of superior

lowing Nachlass passage: “What dawns on philosophers longer accept concepts as a create

gift,

men

last

is

also

of all

[is

evoked that]

nor merely purify and polish them, but

them, present them and make them convincing”

in the fol-

they must no first

make and

(WP 409). OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

85

Yet Nietzsche’s preferred

life

of rarefied sociability would not be

one of constant bavardage. Paradoxically, the herd in order to

of kindred

comes

overcome

loneliness, so

one needs

from

to flee

one requires the company This insight

spirits to attain a healthy, peaceful silence.

to Zarathustra after years of self-imposed isolation: “I have be-

longed to solitude too long: thus II, i).

just as

I

have forgotten

how to

be silent” (Z

This same idea of a healthy, mature silence that paradoxically re-

companions reappears

quires the presence of worthy

Zarathustra speaks of having attained a “silence to betray itself

by silence” (Z

III, 6).

not to destroy the satisfying silence

He

in part III,

when

has learned not

[that]

has learned, in other words,

among

friends

by retreating once

again into the forced introspection of solitude. Elsewhere in part III

Zarathustra similarly observes that the “lonely height” of isolation

may not always be That

solitude

“sufficient to itself’ [selbst begniige]

is

meant

his

his “childen

upon

and companions” to

trees,

learn solitude and defiance and foresight” (Z

he explains,

my kind and my race”

is

meant

to determine

is

sug-

his admirers in part III.

duty to “uproot” them and “set each one up by

isolation,

III, lo, 2).

to be a temporary, transitional state

gested by the test Zarathustra springs

Comparing

(Z

he

insists that it is

itself,

III, 3).

that

(ibid.).

may

This enforced

whether each

[meinerArt imd Abkunft]

it

At

tree “is of

this

point in

the narrative, Zarathustra ’s devotees have not yet proved their mettle to his satisfaction.

Although they have taken the important

first

negating their communities of origin, he believes them to be

step of still

in

new, servile cult of devotion and worship, with

danger of forming

a

Zarathustra as

godhead. Unless they are pushed onto solitary

its

may come to resemble the pathetic “higher men” burlesqued in part IV, who hang onto Zarathustra’s every word and find meaning and value only in his person (Z IV, 1 1). To those who pass the paths, they

test,

him on an

Zarathustra crucially extends an invitation to rejoin

equal footing, to

become

his

“companion

[Gefdhrte]

and

a fellow-

creator and fellow-rejoicer [Mitschajfender und MitfeiemderY (Z

With terms such

as “fellow-creator”

Nietzsche evokes

III, 3).

a rarefied

notion of companionship that recalls the Aristotelian model of a friendship of

he makes

magnanimous men grounded

a hierarchical distinction

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Like Aristotle,

between lower-order

and the comradeship of kindred, noble 86

in virtue.

spirits

solidarities

bound together

in

equality and virtue.^ Lower-order

man loves most about his friend:

Zarathustra claims the virtuous

eye and the glance of eternity” (Z

I,

fine instincts, they

recognize themselves in the reflection of each other’s face, claims Zarathustra, “is

imperfect mirror”

(ibid.).

upon

Nietzsche’s noble soul bestows

reference as

it

own

his

(BGE

applies to itself’

an expression of self-love.

is

your own

Recognizing

And

is

Thus

not

another

same

.

.

.

tender

one of

friends Nietzsche also suggests that healthy self-love

pendent upon maintaining

when one

oneself aright

a love for friends.

ceases to give

self,

love for one’s friend in a letter to

all;

eye.

rough and

face, in a

his equal “the

this

undimmed

in the friend

265).

“the

14).

Because true friends are equally endowed with

A friend’s

become

beings cannot

they simply do not possess what

friends in the highest sense;

undimmed

human

“One

is

de-

ceases to love

oneself exercise in loving oth-

ers.”6

Like Aristode, moreover, Nietzsche sees

form of

in the highest

friendship an essential vehicle for self-discovery. In light of the culty

we

experience in seeing our

own

lives clearly

and without

particularly useful to study ourselves secondhand, as

is

ied in another fact

good

end up being

ourselves.

from

his

life.

Blinded as

a greater

are

by our

bias,

it

embodwe may in

were,

it

partiality,

source of insight for our friends than for

As Zarathustra puts

own

we

diffi-

it,

chains and yet he

is

“many

a

one cannot deliver himself

his friend’s deliverer”

(Z

I,

14).^

The Bestowing Virtue “I

want to go

to

man once more,” announces Zarathustra.

under among them 5.

Ethics

Of the

\iinter

ihnen will ich imtefgehen],

want

want to go

to give them,

three grounds for friendship identified by Aristotle in the Nicomachean

—pleasure, advantage or

utility,

and good character

best by far (i I57a30-b2 2). Friendship rooted in virtue it

I

“I

involves a “sharing of conversation and thought”

herdlike “sharing

[of]

the same pasture”

(i

i

is

—the

third

is

said to be the

considered superior because

among virtuous men,

yob 1 2-14). In The

Politics

rather than a

he notes that the

highest type of friendship presupposes “likeness and equality” (i287b32). 6.

and

Letter to Peter Cast, 18 July 1880, in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed.

trans. 7.

Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996),

Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

i

p. 173.

i69b2 8-i i7oa4.

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

dying,

my

(Z

richest gift!”

the desire to “go under”

—

That Zarathustra should express

III, 12, 3).

that

is,

to

undergo

process of radical self-transformation

—

a figurative “death” in the

in the

midst of others reveals

the great importance of companionship to Nietzsche’s whole project. also reveals the

importance of the act o{ giving to fellow higher humans.

Just as the brilliance of the sun and every other star depends

shining on objects external to themselves, so

is

on

a

the happiness and

man dependent on

virtue of Nietzsche’s superior others.

It

his “shining

on”

At the very beginning of his adventures and again near their

end, Zarathustra gives voice to his feelings of kinship with the sun

when he

cries,

“Great

had not those for

star!

What would your

whom you shine!”

(Z Prologue

Zarathustra and his animals bless the sun for fliifi]

and draw strength from

from each

other’s overflow.

abundant”

it,

happiness be,

its

so do lofty

Z IV,

i;

if

you

20). Just as

“superfluity” [Uber-

men draw

sustenance

Both Zarathustra and the sun are “super-

requiring others to take in their energy.

[iiberreiches]^

Switching metaphors but in a similar

spirit,

Zarathustra compares

himself at the start of his journey to a bee gathering too

much honey

that needs “hands outstretched to take it” (Z Prologue

Until others

have experienced his overflow, he cannot claim to be a the highest sense of the word; “This cup wants to be

Zarathustra wants to be

man again

The

more worthy

and

comes

as

to see his

misguided and

recipients of his beneficent overflow.

idea of the necessity of giving, however, of the “bestowing virtue”

[der schenkenden Tiigend\,

remains the same. Hence the highest man’s

sense of thankfulness for the presence of others to give the giver cessity?” a

again,

[wieder Mensch werden]’^ (ibid.). After

toward the mass of ordinary people

begins to search for

human being in

empty

the debacle in the marketplace, of course, Zarathustra earlier generosity

i).

owe thanks (Z

bestowal

III, 14).

to:

“Does not

to the receiver for receiving? Is giving not a ne-

The

idea that the

upon others

is

given

full

expression of virtue requires

metaphorical

expression

when

Zarathustra compares his compulsion to share with that of a stream that flows inexorably into the sea. Further

on

in the

same section he

speaks of needing to release a storm of cloudlike “tension” (Z 8.

11 , i).^

Invoking yet another metaphor from nature, Nietzsche has Zarathustra com-

pare the exceptional man’s need to share his “superabundance” with others with the

mother’s physical need to nurse her child (Z

88

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

III, 14).

— As suggested

earlier,

however, these evocations of mutual depen-

dency coexist uneasily with Nietzsche’s occasional insistence that any such arrangement

metaphors are

tantamount to

is

servility.

also pressed into service to

evoke

The this

star

and sun

opposing vision

of the creative individual as a completely self-contained source of

When

light.

light, I

know

Zarathustra

insists, for

example, that “I

my own

live in

drink back into myself the flames that break from me. /

1

do not

the joy of the receiver,” he seems to repudiate the dimension of

reciprocity so crucial to the sustenance of any long-term, satisfying

human relationship (Z 11, 9 ). Creative beings, in this section, appear doomed to remain isolated from other sources of meaning and value: “Many suns circle in empty space: to all that is dark they speak with their light

that the

—

to

me

human

they are silent”

(ibid.).

This passage

also suggests

contact experienced by the emitters of light tends to be

asymmetrical and exploitative, as uncreative, “obscure, dark ones” scramble to “extract warmth” and “comfort” from them while giving

nothing of worth in return

(ibid.).

The same

Nietzsche

who

insists

on

the necessity of giving as a precondition for virtue here faces a Nietz-

sche the

who

belies these insights

most talented and

and refuses to acknowledge that even

self-sufficient

needs to receive as well as to give.

Agonistic Friendship

Early on in his personal journey Zarathustra becomes aware of the temptations of a

facile, lazy

type of happiness that must be rejected in

favor of more difficult paths that precipitate ethical-spiritual growth.

He

has this sort of “desire for love” in

desire [Begeh7^en ]

—that now means

to

mind when he

me: to have

Nietzsche exhorts his readers to cultivate

3 ).

sort because of

from the ace

3 ).

its

sets

The

(Z

III,

human

of perpetual self-improvement

beings away

(HAH

I

Pref-

out to convince those predisposed to understand that

the best form of love

each other

lost myself’

“To

“hatred of love” of this

potential for steering higher

difficult task

He

a

declares:

—shuns

—the love of noble types

for themselves

and for

this ersatz variety.

finest sort of love

both in oneself and

should actually precipitate suffering

in others

—

in order to facilitate constant self-

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

betterment. As Zarathustra claims, “there

of even the best love: thus thus

it

is

a bitterness in the

arouses longing for the Superman,

it

arouses thirst in you, the creator!” (Z

loved in man,” after

is

all,

cup

I,

20).

“What can be

not his ability to serve as

a

source of

commiseration and sympathetic ear for our complaints but rather his

being “a going-across [Ubergan^ and

(Z Prologue

4; cf.

Z

IV, 13, 3).

The

a

down-going [Untergan^'’’’

self-loving noble type rejects

self-indulgence, cultivates “harshness” [Hdrte] as one of his habits

who takes own indulgence” (EH III,

and never “spares” himself because he knows that he the easy path “sickens at last through his

3;ZIII,

I).

Nietzsche’s suspicion of complacency and comfort explains his insistence that his “refined conception of friendship” has

no room

for the “soft” sort of love that excuses

and even encourages expres-

sions of weakness and vulnerability.

Echoing Goethe’s

“the world will other’s

humane

become

a large hospital

and each

will

fear that

become

the

nurse,” Nietzsche counsels a stoic “hardness” as an

Only when life becomes “harder and harder,” claims Zarathustra, will “man grow to the height where the lightning can strike and shatter him” (Z IV, 13, 6). “Creators,” we learn elsewhere, “are hard” (Z III, 12, 29; cf. Z III, antidote to overindulgent commiseration.^

i).

Their virtue has

easy I,

life,

22,

origin and beginning” in a rejection of the

of “the soft bed and what

is

pleasant [das AngenehmeY^ (Z

i).

The first

“its

we

hardness with which

and foremost

a reflection

treat

our loved ones, he argues,

our loved ones, those tra

who

and

self-love,

are a mirror

proposes that the finest sort of love

9.

The

quoted

in

citation

from Goethe

is

a

we man-

we

spare

of the stringent standards to which

hold ourselves accountable. If our refusal to spare ourselves ifestation of self-concern

is

from

why, then, should

image of ourselves? Zarathusis

that

his letter to

Kauftnann, Nietzsche: Philosopher,

is

which spurs our friends

Frau von Stein, 8 June 1787,

Psychologist, AntiChrist, p. 369.

evokes the hated hospital model of society in

GM

III,

14.

Nietzsche

Martha Nussbaum notes

Nietzsche’s debt to the ancient Stoics in this regard; the Stoics were also fond of using

images of softness and hardness “to contrast vulnerability to external conditions with dignified absence of such v^ulnerability.” icism,” p. 146.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Sto-

to achieve their highest potential (Z

and

we ought

longing for the Superman,”

a

Representing “an arrow

lo).

I,

to provide

them not an

oasis of easy respite but rather “a resting-place like a hard bed, a

camp-bed: thus you

ward our difficult

will serve

him

friends, in other words,

may be

it

best” (Z

is

II, 3).

A hard

stance to-

in their best interests,

however

to maintain in practice.

Zarathustra acknowledges that resisting the temptations to mollycoddle

is

one might

no easy initially

“Where have (Z

II, 9).

In the act of “being hard” toward friends

feat.

think oneself insensitive and cry out plaintively,

the tears of my eye and the

bloom of my heart gone?”

But our hearts’ tendency to melt

at the sight

of

a

loved

we remind ourselves of the probable consequences of soft-heartedness. The indulgence of the softhearted [We ich lichen] toward their comrades is more likely to contribute to the dissipation of their creative potential. Through our harsh treatment we cultivate in our friends the same qualities of one’s suffering can be resisted

if

harshness so necessary for ethical-spiritual epanouissement: “In or-

der to ffrow

hiv. a tree

wants to strike hard roots into hard rocks!”

(zni.;,). Nietzsche

particularly derisive toward the notion that higher-

is

order companions ought to pity one another and counts the over-

coming of

pity [die Uberwindung des Mitleids]

(EH

virtues”

4; cf.

I,

Z

II, 3).

Why

is

this so?

among

Why

the

^'"nohle

does he think

that “the hands of pity can under certain circumstances intrude

downright destructively into sions of pity, in his view,

own

(EH

a great destiny”?

disempower the

pitied

sense of powerlessness and victimhood.

I,

4).

Expres-

by reinforcing their

To

pity

someone

is

presuppose his or her vulnerability to the vagaries of fortune.

who

pity the person

tained ter,

a

to

We

has fallen victim to bad luck and has thus sus-

serious loss of

however, Nietzsche

some is

sort.^^

As noted

convinced that

a

in the previous

mature noble type

chapis

ca-

pable of taking charge of his destiny and mastering fortune through

10.

ethical

I

have profited from Martha Nussbaum’s reflections on the psychological and

dynamic underlying

Apeiron 20,

2

pity.

See “The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,”

(1987): 129-158, and “Therapeutic

sire,” Differences 2,

i

Arguments and Structures of De-

(1990): 46-66.

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

91

an imaginative form of “willing backwards.” Thus to treat such

man

as requiring pity

condescend to him, to consider him

to

is

a

as

an inferior because of his apparent inability to take charge of his life.ii

This,

would argue,

I

why Nietzsche

is

middle period that “to offer pity

He

135).^^

considers

it

is

as

work from

claims in a

good

as to offer

especially insidious because

its

nign, nurturing face masks a noxious leveling effect,

his

contempt” (D ostensibly be-

whereby noble

types are gently but assuredly discouraged from continuing their up-

—and

ward trek Pity

is

worse) even rewarded for abandoning

numbered alongside

thus

is

(what

“friendliness” [Freimdlichkeit] as

cried as “the

tion”

(BGE

most

sinister

260;

GM

one’s

sympathy” and

impose one’s ingly,

on

ideal

and thus exert

one of the

5).

one’s friends in commiseration,

on

patience, humility, and insipid slavish virtues

and

symptom of our sinister European

Preface

it.

is

de-

civiliza-

Instead of indulging oneself and

one should “keep

“persist in one’s

own

one’s fellow beings

reign

a nice tight

ideal of man;

one should

and on oneself overpower-

a creative influence!”^^

Nietzsche introduces an explicitly martial dimension to his austere, edifying

notion of friendship, suggesting that

late

works

in particular, a conflict-ridden socia-

One might suppose that Nietzsche would ward weaker individuals who (in his view) must 11.

chance. This, however,

is

be prepared to countenance pity toinvariably remain the playthings of

not the case. Alongside his disapproval of expressions of pity

toward higher men, Nietzsche also considers “active sympathy ill-constituted

spirits

becomes almost indistinguishable from

the hardness of friendship

pure enmity. In the

among free

[das Mitleiden] for the

and weak” to be “more harmful than any vice” (A

2).

Chapter

7

exam-

ines why. 12.

Abbey argues

Daybreak also evoke

a

that middle-period

works such

more benign notion of pity,

form worthy of higher,

as

Human, All

Too

a discreet, sensitive

free-spirited individuals. Abbey,

Human and

and respectful

“So Polyphonous

a Being:

Friedrich Nietzsche in His Middle Period” (manuscript. University of Western Australia,

1997).

As the

this alternative

The his

idea of a

work by

citation

from

D

135 suggests, however, even in the middle period

view coexisted uneasily with Nietzsche’s more

fonn of pity suitable

for higher

human

GS

345;

view of

pity.

beings completely drops out of

the early 1880s.

Malwida von Meysenbug, August 1883, Selected Letters of F?-iedrich 216. For some other examples of Nietzsche’s disparagement of pity, see

13. Letter to

Nietzsche, p.

common

BGE

199, 202, 222, 225;

TI

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

IX, 37; and

A

7.

bility is

contrasted repeatedly and favorably with a contemptible de-

sire for

peace and tranquility. Given his self-characterization in Ecce

Homo

as “warlike”

by nature,

unsurprising that he imagines his

it is

ideal friends as “brothers in war,” at

against a

common

adversary

(EH

his youthful admirers that they

enemy” and that their “when you oppose him” (Z I, best

war with each other

I, 7;

Z

I,

10).

as

Zarathustra reminds

should consider their friend “[their]

hearts should feel closest to a friend 14).

The friend/enemy is valued

role in providing the free spirit with the “resistances”

(EH

maintain the sharpness of his heightened instincts over, as Zarathustra parts

much

as

from

his

for his

needed to

I, 7).

More-

admirers into another long period

of therapeutic, self-imposed isolation, he suggests that the heartfelt intimacy experienced by his type of friend can quite appropriately

encompass

der Erkenntnis]

must be able not only

hate his friends” (Z

Friendship across

Is this

“man of knowledge [Der Mensch

feelings of hatred: the

I,

22,

enemies but also to

to love his

3).^“^

Gender

Lines?

“refined conception of friendship” applicable to male-female

relationships?^^

To

struggle and

salutary effect remains

its

a limited extent

it is,

theme of agonistic

for the

prominent

in Nietzsche’s de-

piction of the ideal sort of relationship between a free spirit and his

female consort. Even in his relations with the opposite sex the Nietz-

schean warrior male

is

expected to shun the

safe, pitiable

Mann] he consorts with “woman, as the

sought by the herd male. Because “the true man”

wants “danger and play” out of life,

most dangerous plaything

means of

14.

—

as

opposed to contempt

—

is

amorous

treated

love.

— For he

a

15. In this section I

10:

draw

freely

upon

512-530, copyright

first

my

article

“The

As

a

he seeks

as a sign

of respect

“How much

—

Nietzsche and the ‘Eternal Feminine,”’ 18, 3 (1997):

I,

18).

I,

man for his enemies! and such reverence is enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction.”

noble

desires his

GM

(Z

relations,

by Nietzsche

for one’s equals, be they friend or foe. See, for example,

ence [Ehifurcht] has

[der dchte

[das gefdhrlichste Sp/V/zfz/g]”

testing his mettle even in his

Hatred

comforts

a

rever-

bridge to

Ubermensch's Consort:

published in History of Political Thought

© Imprint Academic, Exeter, U.K. OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

93

out not the submissive shrinking violet of a lesser man’s fantasies but rather a “strangely wild” creature, a “dangerous, creeping, subter-

ranean

little

beast of prey”

(BGE

she poses

239;

whose

EH III,

attractiveness lies in the challenge

5).

man

neither possible nor desirable for the free-spirited higher

It is

to subdue this “wild” creature completely. Nietzsche imagines that

such

a

woman,

and “fear” her

indeed of her society, just as

cf.

239;

BGE

text of “the world’s

1

31).

Nietzsche speaks approvingly in

most powerful and

men

women

influential

their

(BGE

women

While

with their warrior mates.

con-

this

(most re-

power and ascen-

precisely to the force of their will”

Nevertheless, he balks at the idea of such

women

239).

attaining agonis-

believing that “healthy”

can attain certain specifically female forms of excellence

which he

of

life

many strong-willed women

mother of Napoleon),” who “owed

dancy over

tic equality

presence in the

a forceful

have exercised considerable power behind the scenes

in the past

cently the

would remain

[Furcht],

man and

(BGE

possessing an “inner savagery” that inspires “respect”

attributes greater value than “herd virtues”

form of human flourishing

that the ultimate

male exemplars of the

species.

is

—

to

—he maintains

reserved only for a few

As we have already seen, Zarathustra’s

teachings are characterized as “man’s fare” or “warriors’ food” that

would be

indigestible to children

young.” Thus he concludes:

16.

Here, once again,

writings.

I

am

“I

am

and “fond

little

women,

old or

not their teacher and physician” (Z

speaking primarily of Nietzsche’s better-known later

Ruth Abbey suggests that the works of Nietzsche’s middle period counte-

nance the prospect of

middle period,

it is

a truly equal relationship

between the

sexes.

But even

easy to find evidence of the masculinist views that later

dominant. See Abbey, “Beyond Misogyny and Metaphor:

in the

became

Women in Nietzsche’s Mid-

dle ^tv'xody Journal of the History of Philosophy 34, 2 (April 1996): 244-256. 17.

Sarah Koftnan recognizes Nietzsche’s view that “some

mative than

.

.

.

women

are

more

affir-

some men.” Koftnan, “Baubo: Theological Perversions and

Fetishism,” in Nietzsche's

New

Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics,

and Politics,

ed.

Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 193. Berkowitz hmnoralist, p. 170. as a misogynist.

makes

Thus my

See

The Ethics of an disagreement with Bruce Detwiler’s labeling of Nietzsche a similar observation in his Nietzsche:

his Nietzsche

and

the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 15, 193.

and practice of gender equality without being sition

94

is

both unfamiliar and objectionable in

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

It is

a hater

possible to be against the idea

of women (although such

a feminist era).

a

po-

.

IV, 17,

woman

also of note that Ecce

i). It is

Ho?no compares the healthy sort of

who were the female followers rather than equals of Dionysus (EH III, 5). However much of a challenge they may pose to their male partners, healthy women are said to find their deepest fulfillment in service to dewith the Maenads of ancient Greek mythology,

—

—

“The man’s happiness [Gb'ick] is: I He will” (Z I, 18). At some deep level,

serving men. As Zarathustra puts

The woman’s

will.

happiness

claims Nietzsche, the finest

is:

it:

women

admire only strong and audacious

men and crave to be dominated by them. This point is made in a passage wisdom metaphorically

that identifies

as a

woman, when Zarathustra

claims that she “never loves anyone but a warrior” (Z

Beyond Good and Evil

in the preface to

supposes truth to be a

woman,

certain type of virtuoso,

when

I,

7).^^ It

Nietzsche,

who

reappears this

time

suggests that she reveals herself only to a

one without the “gruesome eamesmess” and

“clumsy importunity” that have characterized dogmatic philosophers heretofore sisted the

(BGE

Preface;

cf.

GS

Only those men who have

345).

re-

emasculating efforts of centuries of servile moral teaching are

deemed worthy of a fine woman’s attentions. To those whose constitutions predispose them to servility, respect is neither owed nor given. “In

women [die Weihlein] play the deuce with selfless, with merely objective men [ans selbstlosen, aiis blofi objektiven ManneimY (EH III, 5). This same idea is apparent in part I of ZarathustJ^a when the title character asks, “Whom does woman hate most?” and immediately provides his own answer: “Thus spoke the iron the long run,” as Nietzsche suggests, “the

to the magnet:

‘I

little

.

.

hate you most, because you attract me, but are not

me towards you’” (Z I, 18). superior man and his consort could form

strong enough to draw

The

idea that a

ship of equals ideal

woman

is is

further belied by Nietzsche’s view that even the

inherently “shallow” and thus unable to

the depths of the superior man’s nature 18.

Compare

a friend-

(ibid.).*^

most

comprehend

As evidence of

Machiavelli’s infamous suggestion at the end of chapter 25 in The

woman,” she will be “well disposed” to young men “because they are less cautious and more aggressive, and treat her more boldly.” The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pj ince that “since fortune

is

a

Press, 1988), p. 87. rp.

man

See also Nietzsche’s comparison of woman’s shallowness with that of the Ger-

in Ecce

Homo: “With the German, almost

the bottom, he has none: that

is all”

(EH

XIII,

as

with the woman, one never gets to

3).

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

"

woman’s

Nietzsche points to her ostensibly inferior

superficiality

manner of

whereas the woman’s love for

loving:

a

characterized by “total devotion

.

.

.

man

a

typically

is

with soul and body without any

consideration or reserve,” presupposing an “unconditional renuncia-

man such a desire for total devotion would be “alien” (GS 363). “A man who loves like a woman,” he concludes, “becomes a slave; while a woman who loves like a woman becomes a more perfect woman'' (ibid.). Passages and

tion of rights”

a “will to renunciation,” for a healthy

such as these highlight the resemblance of Nietzsche’s picture of malefemale friendship to Aristotle’s. Aristotle also posits a hierarchy of philoi in the polis,

with the friendship between virtuous males deemed

most perfect and

the

that

—although hardly

children an inferior

The

man

between the

of virtue and his wife and

—

insignificant

variety.^^

paragraph from The Gay Science quoted above highlights an

important aspect of Nietzsche’s view of women and gender relations that has been either studiously avoided or dismissed outright

commentators who invoke Nietzsche antiessentialism.^^

As

in the

name of

by

feminist

a

have argued at greater length elsewhere,

I

Nietzsche’s attack on nineteenth-century feminists for their attempt “to enlighten

men

about ‘woman as such’

[das

Weih an

and for

sich\

‘woman in herself’” should broader combat against an essen-

their hubristic “elevation of themselves as

be seen not tialist

as

an illustration of

a

view of the feminine but rather

on one

particular

—

liberal

as

feminist

an attempt to cast aspersions

—interpretation

of women’s

name of another (ostensibly more accurate) BGE 232).^^ That Nietzsche considers himself a

essence in the

version

(EH

connois-

III, 5;

seur of

woman’s nature

20. Cf.

Nicomachean

is

suggested in the obvious pride with which

Ethics, bk. 8, chaps.

7-12; The

21. See, for example, the collection Nietzsche

and

Politics,

bk.

chaps.

i,

2, 5, 12, 13.

the Fetninine, ed. Peter J.

(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994),

Burgard

and especially Burgard ’s intro-

duction, pp. 1-32. See also the contributions to Nietzsche, Feminism, and Political Theory, ed.

Paul Patton (London: Routledge, 1993).

22. Fredrick Appel,

“The

Ubermensch's Consort: Nietzsche and the ‘Eternal Femi-

nine.’” Nietzsche does not take a consistent line with the ever.

While

at times criticizing its

women’s movement, how-

proponents for putting forward

a faulty

conception

of feminine essence, he accuses them in other passages of commiting a great error “stupidity”

—by attempting

nally, necessarily

96

to talk

men

out of the idea “that there

feminine [Ewig- and Notwendig-Weibliches]”

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

is

(BGE

something 239).

—

eter-

Notwith-

— he reports to

him

his friend Peter

Cast that August Strindberg regards

“as the greatest psychologist of women.

The

“dangerous plaything” role discussed above

form of service to men that Nietzsche assigns to

The second is directly related mentarity of these two roles are

many things

the

same time

III, 12, 17).

his superior

encapsulated by Zarathustra: “There

is

and pleasant

women’s

[niitzlich zugleich

breasts: at

und angenehmY (Z

Another remark relating more direcdy to the division of

labor between the sexes makes the same point: “This

man and woman:

have

women.

His view of the comple-

to procreation.

so well devised that they are like

useful

not the only

is

the one

fit

for

war

III, 12,

23; cf.

Z I,

18;

BGE

how

[kriegstiichti^, the

for bearing children [gebdiTtiichtig]^ but both

and heels” (Z

is

fit

I

would

other

for dancing with

fit

head

239).

Greatly respectful of women’s procreative capacity, Nietzsche believes that

lance

(Z

—

woman’s

virtue

—her “highest hope”

consists in part in bearing the next Ubetynenschlich generation

Zarathustra includes the following

18). Earlier in this section,

I,

in Zarathustra ’s par-

homily: “Everything about

woman

is

a riddle,

and everything about

woman has one solution: it is called pregnancy. / Eor the woman, the man is a means: the end is always the child” (ibid.).^”^ The great importance he attributes to this role

is

further demonstrated in his crit-

icism of Christianity’s “abysmal vulgarity” with respect to “procre-

standing this inconsistency, the

throughout tialist

tion

his

commitment

to gender essentialism remains constant

mature period. In an attempt to recuperate Nietzsche for an antiessen-

feminism, Maudemarie Clark suggests that Nietzsche’s decision to place quota-

marks around the phrase “woman

as

such” (das IVeib an

sich) in

paragraph

231

of

Beyond Good and Evil reveals an ironic stance toward essentialist categories as such. See Clark, “Nietzsche’s Misogyny,” International Studies in Philosophy 26,

While she

is

does not entail

a

23. Letter to

331

7.

an

sich, I

argue in “The Ubermensch's Consort” that this

manner of talking about woman’s essence. Peter Cast, 9 December 1888, in Selected Letters of Friedrich break with

all

Nietzsche,

-

24. Cf. Ecce

‘redeems’ the

(1994):

surely right that Nietzsche wishes to dissociate himself from the Kantian

flavor of a phrase such as Weib

P-

3

man

—

is

a

Homo: “Has

my

answer been heard to the question

woman? One makes

always only the means: thus spoke

Beyond Good and EviPs declaration that strong children”

(BGE

The woman Zarathustra” (EH

a child for her.

a

woman’s

“first

and

last

how one

cures

has need of children, III, 5).

Also of note

profession

is

is

to bear

239).

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

ation

[die

Zeugiin^

.

.

.

women,

[and] marriage” (A 56).

of Christianity’s ascetic strain to “slander” the body

is

The tendency said to involve

an unwarranted and disrespectful vilification of female procreative functions.

By

contrast, he contends, the Indian

Law

of Manu treats

these matters “seriously, with reverence [Ehrfiircht], with love and trust.”

The

Indian caste society, he believes, “have a

women which

as

elitism pervading

women

to

embody

[arti^ to

(ibid.).

Source of Corruption

all

leave his treatment of

the laws of

way of being polite

has perhaps never been surpassed”

The Feminist Woman

The

who composed

“old greybeards and saints”

aspects of Nietzsche’s thought does not

women

unaffected. Far from believing

all

certain “essential” characteristics simply in vir-

tue of their gender, he presents certain “feminine” roles and dispositions as paradigmatic virtues that

exemplify. ity

Those who

reject

only superior (“healthy”)

women

gender stereotypes and fight for equal-

of the sexes, such as the suffragettes and salon

women

of Nietz-

bottom run of the Rangordnung of

sche’s day, are relegated to the

femininity.

Given Nietzsche’s predilection

for tracing

all

normative claims

and psychological orientations back to physiology and

instinct,

it is

not surprising that he attributes feminist demands for the vote and other legal rights to physiological pathology. rights,”

he diagnoses,

(EH

knows

that”

idea of

woman’s

“is

III, 5).

even

a

“The

struggle for equal

symptom of sickness: every physician

A woman who

tries to talk

inferiority clearly evinces “a

nine instinct [weiblichen InstinkteY'

(BGE

men

crumbling of the femi-

239). Specifically, she

women

are said to

vices: biological reproduction.

‘emancipated’

who

just

perform one of their greatest

ser-

women,

the

Feminists are ^^abonive

lack the stuff for children”

(EH

III, 5).

In this portrait the feminist’s alleged infertility linked to a morbid set of instincts that produces a

envious of and bitterly resentful toward the healthy,

98

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

is al-

we have

leged to be physiologically deficient in an area where, as seen, healthy

out of the

is

inextricably

woman secretly fertile woman of

Nietzsche’s imagination. His account of a feminist activism driven by

envy and ressentiment mirrors

his

more

familiar account of the moti-

who

vations of the feminist’s degenerative male counterpart,

also

is

preoccupied with the secret plotting of revenge upon superior types:

‘“Emancipation of woman’

who who

has nmted out

that

ill,

—

is

is

the instinctive hatred of the

to say

woman

incapable of bearing, for her

is

has turned out well. ... At bottom the emancipated are the an-

world of the ‘eternal-womanly’, the underprivileged

archists in the

whose deepest sentful

woman

instinct

revenge”

is

(ibid.).^^

Nietzsche’s sterile, re-

thus shares with the herd male the mantle of the ple-

beian or lower sort of human being.

Although the feminist

working

woman

remains convinced that she

for the true interests of her sex, Nietzsche claims that she

ensures a contrary result.

A “real woman”

[ein

wohlgeratenes Weib] in

touch with her “most womanly instincts” understands

more

a

is

woman is a woman

[Das Weih,je mehr Weib

es /Jt]

“The more she

this:

the

(BGE

defends herself tooth and nail against rights in general”

239;

EH III, 5). It would be in women’s best interests to submit to the natural order of unequal

gender

relations, for they

would thereby

retain

the advantages of their abilities in one crucial area where, as

we

noted above, he thinks they can exert great power: that of personal relations with

men. “The

war between the

state of nature, the eternal

sexes puts her in a superior position by far”

vate realm of gender relations,

men

(EH

In this pri-

III, 5).

of honor provide

a “tribute

of re-

spect” [Achtungszoll] to their consorts, something that modern, de-

generate

women

have perversely come to see as “almost offensive,”

preferring as they do the “competition for rights”

But when they

insist

on “equal

“grammar school education,

rights,” that

(BGE is,

equal access to

trousers and the political rights of vot-

ing cattle [Stimmvieh-Rechte],^'

women

actually

abandon

natural advantages in exchange for the opportunity to

men in woman”

a

239).

their great

compete

witli

man’s game, thereby “lower[ing] the general rank of

[das allgemeine

25. Nietzsche considers

Rang-Niveau

anarchism to be no

des Weibes ^'heninter'^ bringen] less

an exemplification of modern herd

morality than socialism, liberalism, democracy, or feminism. For tigation of anarchists

and anarchism, see

D

Preface

3;

GS

370;

a

sampling of his cas-

GM

I,

5;

and

A

58.

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

(EH

III, 5).^^

“Since the French Revolution,” he concludes, “the in-

fluence of woman in

Europe has grown

less

her rights and claims have grown greater”

We

have already seen

Chapter

(in

doctrine of equal rights as a rhetorical

2)

in the

(BGE 239). how Nietzsche

weapon used by

against their natural superiors. This, he argues,

healthy

women

use rights

dominate

talk: to

and domestic spheres. Zarathustra female who, as

behind

a veil

a

“dressed-up

same proportion

men

treats the

the mediocre

exactly

is

how un-

in

both the public

raises the specter

of the ambitious

lie,”

conceals her domineering streak

of submissiveness during courtship, only to unleash

upon an unsuspecting,

gullible

as

groom

after

marriage (Z

20).

I,

it

Hav-

ing sought after a bride and believing himself to have found “a hand-

maiden with the finds himself “the

The

virtues of an angel,” the naive

handmaiden of a woman”

husband suddenly

(ibid.).

unhealthy woman’s success in dominating her

man

in this

—

—

manner is attributed to the basic servility unmanliness of the modern herd male. “If one tests your virility,” Zarathustra declares mockingly to the “men of the present,” “one finds only sterility!” (Z II, 14). Echoing the civic humanist discourse of Aristotle, Machiavelli,

as

and Rousseau, Nietzsche points out instances of what he sees

female domination in his age and interprets them as unmistakable

signs of widespread cultural degradation and decline.^^ In a corrupt

The

26.

parallel

passage from Emile:

makes use of her

with Rousseau

“Woman

is

is

striking.

worth more

as

rights, she has the advantage.

remains beneath us.” Emile, or

On

Education,

Compare,

woman and

for example, the following less as

man. Wherever she

Wherever she wants to usurp ours, she trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic

Books, 1979), pp. 363-364. Cf. Penelope Deutscher, ‘“Is it not remarkable that Nietzsche should have hated Rousseau?’ Woman, Femininity: Distancing Nietzsche .

.

.

from Rousseau,”

in Nietzsche, Eeminism,

and

Political Theory, ed.

Paul Patton (London:

Routledge, 1993), pp. 162-188. 27. Nietzsche also adopts the classical civic humanist association of public virtue

with tight male control over women: the ancient Greeks “from Pericles,”

“more

he believes, understood “how necessary [notwendi^”

strict

with

women”

it

to the age of

was

to

become

[strenger gegen das Weib\ “with the increase of their culture

and the amplitude of their powers”

100

Homer

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

(BGE

238;

cf.

HAH 259).

— society,

where men’s

religious-ascetic

power

will to

is

weak or channeled

into either

or lazy self-indulgence,

self-renunciation

many

women seize the opportunity to step outside the domestic sphere and assert themselves publicly.

Decadent European

culture, bereft of the

“manliest drives and virtues” [mannlichsten Tugenden und Ttieben]^ has

women

allowed unhealthy, resentful

(A

17;

TI

I,

28).

“There

is little

to begin aping the

male virtues

manliness here” [Des Marines

wenigj, observes Zarathustra of the ambient, “herd” society.

ist

hier

“There-

women make themselves manly. For only he who is suffiman will redeem the woman in woman” (Z III, 5, 2).^^

fore their ciently a

Nietzsche’s concern for the cultivation of a disposition of “hard-

ness” should be understood in light of this fear of the “castrating” influence of a degenerate, emasculated culture that prefers a tranquilizing, self-indulgent

benevolence over robust acts of creative

Zarathustra issues an ominous warning that “what [IVeibsart],

what stems from

slavishness [Knechtsart]

become master of mankind’s

.

.

.

womanish

now wants

to

no ac“the whole of European

entire destiny” (Z IV, 13,

cident that Nietzsche refers disparagingly to

is

will.^^

3). It is

on everything that annoys him about modern European civilization (D Preface 4).

feminism'''' in

the course of a polemical harangue

“Woman,” he opines

28.

in the Nachlass, “has always conspired

See also Nietzsche’s disparaging comments about the “literary

Litleratur- IVeib] of eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century Europe

and Beyond Good and Evil (TI IX, scribed as a “masculinized

BGE

27;

woman”

233).

Madame

with the

woman”

[das

in Twilight of the Idols

de Stael, for one,

is

de-

of “unbridled presumption,” apparently because

she engaged in scholarship, an inherently masculine pursuit

(BGE

209;

cf.

BGE

144).

Malwida von

Only Meysenbug and complimenting her on her books, another indication that his views on women underwent a marked shift by the early i88os. See, for example, the letter of ten years earlier Nietzsche was corresponding with the writer

14 April 1876 in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 142. 29. “To demand that everything should become ‘good man’, herd animal, blueeyed, benevolent, ‘beautiful soul’, character,

would mean

(EH

4).

his

XIV,

day

is

to castrate

.

.

.

would mean

mankind and

to deprive existence of

to reduce

it

to a paltry

Nietzsche’s critique of the “emasculation of social

noted by Keith Ansell-Pearson

in

An

Introduction

life” in

to

its

great

Chinadom”

the Europe of

Nietzsche as Political

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 180-199.

OVERCOMING SOLITUDE

lOI

types of decadence, the priests, against the ‘powerful,’ the ‘strong,’

the

men

love”

—

.

(WP

Woman

brings the children to the cult of piety, pity,

864 ).^o

In calling for the cultural regeneration of Europe, Nietzsche

hopes to see the reappearance of warrior figures

emerged out of

a

a soupgon

Napoleon, who

make Europe “virile” example gave modern Euro-

plebeian political culture to

[Vermdnnlich] again. Napoleon’s virile

peans

like

of what

it

would be

like for

“over the businessman and the philistine

man

—and

to regain control

perhaps even over

‘woman’ who has been pampered by Christianity and the enthusiastic

spirit

(GS

ideas’”

30.

of the eighteenth century, and even more by ‘modern 362).

Sarah Kofrnan notes that for Nietzsche, “the weak act

like

women: they

try to

seduce, they charm, by misrepresenting and disguising nihilistic values under gilded trim.” Kofrnan, “Baubo; Theological Perversions and Fetishism,” p. 179. that slave morality evinces seductive feminine qualities

Good and duction leged”

102

Evil,

also

expounded

where Nietzsche speaks of “every unegoistic morality”

[Vei-filhriin^

(BGE

is

221;

cf.

as

and injury [Schddigun^ for precisely the higher,

D Preface

3).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

The view in

Beyond

both “a serarer, privi-

2

five You

The Higher Breeding of Humanity shall

your

make ajnends to your children

fathers: thus

you

shall

redeem

all

for being the children of

that

is

past!

—Thus Spoke Zarathustra

///,

12, 1

Breeding Companions

W

hen the prospect of finding those worthy of pany seems remote, Nietzsche

38).

stratagems.

“haunted by

ing blacker than the blackest melancholy” and

tempted to throw off all hope and embrace

man” (A

feels

a nihilistic

To combat such pessimism he

The

his

is

coma feel-

sorely

“contempt of

resorts to

numerous

eternal return thought experiment, for one, permits

103

— him

to believe

—

some of

at least

the time

—

in his

own immunity

to

By “willing backwards” Nietzsche convinces himself that “lack of adequate company” is both necessary and salutary, hence insistence that friendlessness has never prevented him “from be-

misfortune. his his

(EH

ing brave and cheerful”

Another strategy to

II, 2).^

fulfill

the psychic need for comradeship in-

volves the creation of a fantasy world populated by idealized friends.

At an early stage of the Zarathustra narrative the sels his interlocutors to

title

character coun-

follow this route, deeming

it

preferable to

“create your friend and his overflowing heart out of yourselves” than to

“endure

.

any kind of neighbor” (Z

.

.

16).

I,

In an 1887 preface to

an earlier work, Nietzsche admits to having recourse to “companions” of this sort:

Thus when spirits’ to

needed to

I

whom

need of them

rounded by

at that

ills

as

1.

ing

time

if I

did not exist in

good

See Chapter

when one

3. It is difficult,

“Where may

himself, at the least for

Devil

I

I

lacked.

(ELAH

[meinew

BediirfniJI]

a letter

“constantly being

wounded” by “not hearing any answer,

Preface

2)-

my kind

of philosopher

last

(WP 464).

years of sanity

from 1888,

after

is

having

profoundest book” (presumably Zarathiistra), he confesses to

own

(why

tedious

of new philosophers?”

its

share, to shed

one can

however, to detect any cheerfulness in the follow-

look with any kind of hope for

my need

I

of companionship clearly disturbed Nietzsche in his

one’s

had

I

while sur-

whom

when they become

“given humanity

on

—but ...

laughing and chattering,

feels like

even more evident in his personal correspondence. In

terribly,

dedicated:

is

spirits

brave companions and familiars with

compensation for the friends

a lack

exist,

was to keep

whom one can send to the

cri de coeur:

That

melancholy-valiant book ...

‘free

(sickness, solitude, unfamiliar places, acedia, inac-

laugh and chatter

and

once also invented for myself the

of this kind do not

‘free spirits’

tivity): as

this

I

[by]

shoulders, alone, the burden which one

else

having to bear, most

would have

liked to

should one write?).” Letter to Malwida von Aleysenbug, end

of July 1888, in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Christopher Aiiddleton (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 2.

about

p.

In 1885 Nietzsche confessed to his

302.

mother and

sister that “there is

nobody

living

whom I care much; the people I like have been dead for a long long time — for ex-

ample, the Abbe Galiani, or Henri Beyle, or Montaigne.” Letter to Franziska and Elisabeth Nietzsche, 31

104

March

1885, in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 238.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Given Nietzsche’s avowed commitments bodiment, however, vices for creating his arsenal

(Z

would be odd

it

if

to worldliness

these purely imaginative de-

“companions and children of

III, 3).

There

is

and em-

his

hope” exhausted

clear evidence that Nietzsche envisions

other ways of seeking out suitable companions that involve action in the real world. As

we noted

in

Chapter

2,

he never abandoned hope

of finding the “raw material” for worthy friends and companions. flesh-and-blood

Real,

friends, are

That will

companions,

as

distinct

in the offing:

still

free spirits of this kind could

one day

exist, that

have such active and audacious fellows

morrow and as in

my

from imaginary

among

our Europe

its

sons of to-

the next day, physically present and palpable and not,

merely phantoms and hermit’s phantasmagoria: /

case,

should wish to be the slowly, slowly

.

.

.

last to

doubt

(HAH I Preface

it.

I

see

them already

comings

2)

This reference to the slowness of their appearance

—and to the —appears

patience required by those wishing to hasten their arrival

elsewhere in Nietzsche’s later writings. As

knows

that patience

III, 8, 2; cf. .

.

EH X,

do not speak

.

is

i).

a cardinal virtue for

of men,” he

those with his vocation (Z

Zarathustra informs us that he and his “destiny

to Today, neither

patience and time and

a “fisher

do we speak to the Never: we have

more than time” (Z

IV,

i).

He reassures his in-

may be unable to produce a An] overnight, they “could

terlocutors that although they

“beautiful

new

transform

race” \neuen schonen

[themselves] into forefathers and ancestors [Vdtem und Voifahren] of

Superman” (Z II, 2; cf. Z III, 12, 12). I argue below that Nietzsche’s “slow search

the

for those related to

[him]” includes a serious consideration of questions of lineage and inheritance and even a desire to instigate forms of selective breeding that

(EH

would ensure the continued propagation of higher human types X,

i). I

argue further that the notion of breeding

service not only his

need for companionship but

is

invoked to

also his politics

one of the “tremendous counter-forces” required to stem the

—

as

tide of

mediocrity that, in Nietzsche’s view, threatens to engulf Europe

(BGE

268).

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

Literal

and Figurative Breeding

Recent studies have tended to follow Kaufmann

in either dismissing

outright or underplaying the idea that Nietzsche seriously coun-

tenanced the notion of breeding in the

sense of eugenics.^

literal

Although the pervasiveness of procreative imagery readily acknowledged, pretation.

The

it is

work

in his

often given a strictly metaphorical inter-

apparent strength of this reading

lies in

Nietzsche’s

undeniably frequent use of procreative imagery to metaphoric

When

he refers to the “continually creative person”

type in the grand sense” [eine erly

human

ativity

with

type”

is

'‘'Mutter^'

[die miitterliche

(GS

fertility is clear

effect.

as “a ‘mother’

von Mensch] or as “the moth-

Art Mensch] the association of cre-

369;

GS

376).“^

As early

as Daybreak^

no more in conscious control of the ideas or deeds gestating within him than the mother is in control of her offspring’s rate of growth or time of birth (D 552). The

Nietzsche declares that the creative type

“birthing” of ideas and deeds

is

is

equated with that of infants

when he

exhorts his readers to “give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like

mothers,

endow them with

all

we have of blood,

sure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, cf.

Z

II, 2).

ness” of the

and catastrophe” (GS Preface

philosopher

is

creator as the child

is

to

“Nietzsche looked to

man above Christ,

its

art,

mother

learn that the “fruitful-

work

(GM III,

[Werk],

8; cf.

religion and philosophy

which

BGE

— and not to race—to elevate

4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),

to breed, raise, rear,

a literal

p- 285; cf. p. 303.

dimension to Nietzsche’s

grow or cultivate,

a

word normally used

animals or plants.” But despite his claim to have taken the value,” Strong shies

away from seriously examining

transfigured world.” This vision, he claims,

tempts”

panded

its

206).

breeding in his book, noting that Nietzsche “repeatedly uses the word

“new

to

is

the beasts.” Walter Kaufrnann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-

Strong briefly takes up the possibility of

means

3;

to be found not in the sphere of

biological reproduction but rather in his

3.

we

In The Genealogy, moreover,

new (male)

heart, fire, plea-

at description.

is

its

in

call for

ziichten,

Tracy

talk

of

which

connection with

breeding “at face

role in Nietzsche’s vision of a

“so complex as to defy ...

Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the

Politics

all at-

of Transfiguration, ex-

ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 274,

viii,

292.

And as we noted in the previous chapter’s discussion of “infertile” (feminist) women, mediocrity is analogously described as a type of barrenness. Zarathustra considers uncreative, herd men to be “unfruitful” [Unfnichtbare] and “sterile” (Z II, 14; cf. 4.

Z 106

IV, 13, 9).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

These and

rhetorical tropes have, of course, a long history in moral

political philosophy,^

Nietzsche’s writings

and the importance of that tradition in

beyond

is

rhetoric of procreation

is

dispute.

I

maintain, however, that his

most profitably seen on

a

continuum, with

the metaphorical treatment at one end, the evocation of “breeding”

form of education and/or upbringing

as a

in the

middle range, and

a

frank consideration of experimentation in eugenics at the other ex-

treme.

The

uum

a delicate one,

is

task of placing various textual passages along the contin-

complicated by the fact that the

for breeding, Ziichtung, has (like tural

its

English counterpart) both cul-

and biological connotations. In English

“well-bred”

is

German term

German

as in

the term

used typically as a synonym for “well-trained.”*^ Nietz-

German term

sche’s use of the

for discipline, Zucht^ alongside

its

ety-

mological cousin Ziichtun^ further highlights the importance of the cultural

dimension

in Nietzsche’s treatment of

breeding and reminds

namely

his desire to cultivate

us of what was discussed in Chapter a

“new

own

nobility” {neuen Adel\

children (Z

2,

whose members

are not literally his

III, 12, 12).

When Nietzsche speaks of breeding in this nonliteral, pedagogicaltherapeutic sense, his preference for the term Zilchtimg

by

his suspicion

of the standard

culture. In his eyes Bildung

is

of

is

for education

by

irretrievably tainted

with slave morality,^ and in Ecce education, Erziehimg^

German terms

Homo

reinforced

is

the other

its

and

association

common term

for

treated with equal suspicion: “All questions

ordering of society, education \der Erziehun^ have

politics, the

down

been

falsified

men

have been taken for great

to their foundations because the

inclined, however, to invoke

men” (EH

EiHehung for

II,

his

Nietzsche

10).

own

most injurious is

also

purposes. His de-

scription in his notebooks of the new, higher sort of philosopher as a example, claims in the Nicornachean Ethics that “a

5. Aristotle, for

originates and fathers his 6.

own

actions as he fathers his children”

As Bruce Detwiler reminds us

in his Nietzsche

and

(i

i

human being

I3bi8).

the Politics ofAnstocratic Radi-

Chicago Press, 1990), p. 1 1 1. Nietzsche envisages “great enterprises and collective experiments

calism (Chicago: University of 7.

and breeding [Zucht und Zuchtun^' 8.

14;

For

a

BGE

203.

sampling of some caustic remarks on European Bildung, see

and TI VIII,

dung

in

5.

Mark Warren

in his Nietzsche

in discipline

GS

86;

Z

II,

notes Nietzsche’s preference for Ziichtung over Bil-

and Political Thought (Cambridge:

MIT Press,

1988), p. 262.

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

comes

“great educator” [Erzieher]

to mind, as does a middle-period

passage which evokes an expansive notion of breeding that has both biological

and cultural components: “Education [Die Erziehimg]

is

a

continuation of procreation [der Zeugiing], and often a kind of sup-

(WP 980; D

plementary beautification of it”

As

this latter passage suggests, a serious

397).

^

concern for breeding

as

education need not imply a lack of interest in questions of propagation. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s

fectual

view the former ultimately becomes inef-

without serious attention to the

Sound pedagogical

latter.

practices and institutions ultimately are ineffectual in the absence of

means of ensuring the appearance of future generations of freethinking, high-spirited individuals predisposed by instinct to live and

a

learn in a healthy manner. His aim

which people

stitutions ... in

and teaching”

(EH

that of marriage^®

panions in mind.

III,

i).^

live

Such

is

to help

fulfill

and teach

as

institutions

I

understand living

—including,

—are of course discussed with

More

the need for “in-

his

imagined com-

important, however, Nietzsche wants his in-

stitutions to flourish over the longiie diiree, in

what Zarathustra gran-

diosely envisages as a “thousand-year empire” (Z IV,

need for measures to ensure the breeding of [regierenden Kaste] for

notably,

Europe,”

a truly

a

i).

“new

Hence

ruling caste

“master race” [Herren-Rasse]

that could avail itself of these institutions over the long haul

251;

WP 960;

It is

cf.

BGE in

(BGE

208).

Nietzsche’s view that the children born of superior

women and raised

the

men and

an environment that encourages self-expression

and self-esteem (rather than conformity and self-abnegation) would stand a better chance at becoming exemplars of excellence than those

whose

birth

ing, as

we noted

and upbringing are in

Chapter

2,

left

to the vagaries of chance. Believ-

that the appearance of higher

human

beings has always been irregular and infrequent heretofore, he an-

nounces

a

grandiose aim of bringing about a society in which these

“brief little pieces of good luck” are “willed” into being

9.

Chapter 6 provides

a

more

(BGE

224;

A

extensive discussion of Nietzsche’s interest in insti-

tution building. 10.

Nietzsche

is

especially desirous of fostering marriage because of

its

status as

“the most enduring form of organization” that provides “security” for society “to the

most

108

distant generations” (TI IX, 39).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

3;

cf.WP

979).

The key question, he

declares,

being one ought to

breeds

thy of life” (A

EH IV, 4; WP 957).

One

3; cf.

ought to

as

TDill^

is

more

“what type of human

more wor-

valuable,

of the best-kept secrets of recent scholarly commentary on

Nietzsche

toward childbearing and child rear-

his positive stance

is

ing. In the course of his critique of ascetic “preachers of death,” for

example, Nietzsche identifies as particularly noxious their deprecation of a

of child raising. These ascetic “consumptives of the

life

soul,” observes Zarathustra,

cause of their view that “lust

renounce the begetting of children besin,” that “giving birth

is

laborious,”

and that “one gives birth only to unhappy children” (Z

I,

9).

is

In light of the aforementioned “fruitfulness” of the

new

comment

in

The Genealogy that the

philosophers will manifest

thing other than children,

we might be

thustra ’s repeated talk of children

itself in

some-

disinclined to interpret Zara-

literally.

WTen, however, one con-

siders his repeated suggestion that the “garden of marriage” can assist

one

in

propagating oneself “not only forward but upward,” and

that marriage can best be described as “the will of

one who

more than those who

is

created

it,” it

two

to create the

seems plausible that

Nietzsche countenances the propagation of future generations as an

human beings can manifest their 12, 24). The propagation and nurture

important way in which higher

(Z

fruitfulness

I,

20;

cf.

Z

III,

of children as potential creators the only

—

way

for the healthy

is

—although of course not

one way

body

to “create

beyond

(Z

itself’

I,

4).

Breeding and Inheritance Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for marriage and reproduction

tended to

all

is

hardly ex-

marital and reproductive arrangements. In Zarathustra to those prospective parents

who

have gone through an intense period of self-examination and

self-

propagation

is

recommended only

development: “You should build beyond yourself [Uberdich bauen\.

But

first

you must be

.

.

.

hinaus-

built yourself [selber gebaut sein]^ square-

body and soul” (Z I, 20). One should take steps, in other words, to “become what one is” and throw off all false consciousness built in

before taking on the responsibility of raising the next generation.

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

However, no amount of preparation the appearance of children

for

parenthood

“more worthy of

will

guarantee

the prospective

life” if

upon the offspring of

parents are “decadent.” Nietzsche looks askance

those whose desire to reproduce has been driven by “the animal and necessity,” or “isolation,” or

“disharmony with yourself’ (ibid.).When

Zarathustra asks rhetorically, “Are you a

man who

ought to desire a

child?” (ibid.), the implication seems to be that only certain reproductive

arrangements are especially praiseworthy.

A child born from spir-

weak parents can hardly be considered a potential creator of values. As we learn in Beyond Good and Evil^ “it is quite impossible that a man should not have in his body the qualities and preferences of his itually

may

parents and forefathers: whatever appearances

(BGE

trary”

Thus

264).

say to the con-

the sterile, conformist propensities of

ern scholars are traced back to deficiencies in their lineage,

more

creative, free-spirited types are

free-spirited parents desirous of

their “victory

The made

link

and

.

.

.

liberation”

likely to issue

(GS

348, 349;

Z I,

more

creative,

20).

instinct

and birth

is

Beyond Good and Evil:

For every elevated world one has to be born pressed

while

producing “living memorials” to

between superiority/inferiority of

explicitly in

from

mod-

clearly, bred \geziichtei\ for

—taking the word

losophy

in the

it:

[geboren] or, ex-

one has

grand sense

a right to phi-

—only by

virtue of

one’s origin [Abkiinft\\ one’s ancestors [Vorfahren], one’s ‘blood’ [Gebliit] are

the decisive thing here too.

Many

generations must

have worked to prepare for the philosopher; each of his virtues

must have been individually acquired, tended, rated.

(BGE

213)

A similar conclusion is “there

1 1

.

is

inherited, incorpo-

found

in the Nachlass,

only nobility of birth

The tendenq^

[Gebiirtsade[\^

where we discover that only nobility of blood

to attribute normative-spiritual inferiority to low birth

is

also

evident in Nietzsche’s criticism of Socrates. Socrates’ valorization of reason over instinct

is

possible to grasp the lofty notion of trust in one’s instincts (TI ilarly,

the plebeian nature of the Protestant Reformation

II, 3; cf.

is

peasant origins and allegedly consequent vindictiveness (A 61;

GMIII,

made it imTI X, 3). Sim-

explained by pointing to his plebeian origins, which supposedly

22). t

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

attributed to Luther’s cf.

GS

358;

BGE

50;

[Gebliitsadel],

.

.

When

.

one speaks of

of the

‘aristocrats

sons are usually not lacking for concealing something. alone does not

make noble

(WP

quired? Blood [Des Gebliits]”

spirit.

is

typical nineteenthrity”

For

spirit

is

re-

942). is

convention-

understanding of who should be consid-

from conventional

in

its

rejection of the

more

and twentieth-century obsession with the “pu-

Declaring that he has taken the concept of “gentle-

of blood.

men” more

far

.

—What then

Although the emphasis on inheritance and blood ered an aristocrat

.

rea-

[Geist allein ndmlich adelt nicht]; rather,

there must be something to ennoble the

ally aristocratic, Nietzsche’s

.

spirit,’

“radically” than

it

has ever been taken heretofore, Nietz-

sche finds the blood of Europe’s nineteenth-century aristocracy

wanting

(EH

X,

2).

The

so-called aristocrats of the

claims Zarathustra, far from being well-bred in his strate their

accuses

a

He

decadence by serving plebeian, mercantile values.

them of selling

their supposedly high birth to “shopkeepers

with shopkeepers’ gold” (Z

come

modern world, sense, demon-

III,

12, 12).

Moreover, they have “be-

bulwark to that which stands,” knee-jerk defenders of a woe-

ful political status

quo

in

which

the hands of herd politicians

real political

(ibid.).

power has

Having abdicated

all

fallen into real

power

and reponsibility, they are accused of debasing the very notion of nobility

by subsuming

it

into servile Hoflichkeit, that

and gestures. These aristocrats at courts,”

name

courdy manners

only, having

“grown courtly

have “learned to stand for long hours in shallow pools,

motley-coloured

like a

with courtiers; and

12.

in

is,

all

flamingo: / for being able to stand

a

merit

courtiers believe that part of the bliss after

Benedict Anderson argues that modern

Comte de Gobineau,

is

racist doctrine,

developed by the

flowed easily from earlier aristocratic preoccupations with

blood. In the age of nationalism, the notion of superior races characterized by pure

blood was “democratized” to include whole nations or peoples See Anderson, Imagmed Communities:

Reflections on the Origin

(London: Verso, 1991), pp. 149-150. Strong rightly notes that in Nietzsche’s view “there

in the privileged elite.

and Spread of National-

ism, rev. ed. 13.

who

is

no reason why someone

occupies the status of a president or king might not be slavely moral.

One

does

not have slave morality in the same manner as one has social-economic status.” Fnedrich Nietzsche and the

Politics

of Transfiguration, p. 239. Peter Berkowitz makes a

similar point in his Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge: sity Press, 1995), p.

1

Harvard Univer-

19.

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

I I I

— death

— being allowed to

is

sit!” (ibid.).

the whole of virtue with being able to

less servility that associates

wait endlessly in courts (Z IV,

Thus even

as

Zarathustra decries the mind-

3, 2).

he attributes the possession of fine instincts to the

right sort of blood, Nietzsche associates the latter neither with

any

conventional European aristocracy nor with a particular race or eth-

Aryan or otherwise.

nic group,

made

that the

raw material

In Zarathustra the suggestion

who

societies,

from individuals

have broken with the mainstream. Zarathustra issues his

them: “You

solitaries

[ihr Ausscheidenden],

who

you,

of today, you

you

come

for a noble order of the future will

from the margins of contemporary herd

shall

who

is

call to

have seceded from society

one day be

a people [ein Volk\\

from

have chosen out yourselves, shall a chosen people spring

and from

this

chosen people, the Superman” (Z

I,

22, 2).

Nietzsche

imagines these marginals and deviants coming together to form a

new “master race” that character (GS 377).

is

multiracial (rather than “pure-blooded”) in

In The Genealogy he claims that noble types have arisen in areas of the world and spring

from many peoples

Japanese, and Arabic, for example

many

—Scandinavian,

—and never suggests that the

ori-

gins of the future ruling caste will be anything other than cosmopoli-

tan

(GM

emerge out of racial

Hence

ii).

I,

—and

his

view that the new ruling caste would

—“international

be continually replenished by

unions” [intemationalen Geschlechts-Verbdndeji]

comments on how

(WP

960).

His

the “slave revolt” led to an unfortunate, promis-

cuous mingling of the races might appear to suggest something quite

—

different

a

concern for the purity of the ruling

and

14. Cf. Detwiler, Nietzsche

ception must be

made

caste’s

blood

the Politics of Ariston'atic Radicalis?n, p.

Germanocentrism of an

work such

(GM I,

1 1 1.

An

ex-

The Birth of Tragedy. After throwing off the early influence of Wagner, Nietzsche invariably imag-

ines his readership as ity

for the

early

as

“good Europeans” rather than members of a particular national-

or ethnic group. Carl Pletsch notes that the shift tow^ard cosmopolitanism began

with the appearance of Human, All Too Hutnan in 1879. Pletsch, Young Nietzsche: Be-

coming a Genius sche’s 6;

1

12

GS

(New

York: Free Press, 1991),

understanding of higher 377;

BGE

Preface;

BGE

human

202. For

some examples of Nietz-

beings as good Europeans, see

241, 256; and

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

p.

\\T

132.

HAH II Preface

BGE

9; cf.

difficulty

is

200).^^ In the offending passages, however, Nietzsche’s

not with interracial breeding

in principle;

he

is

well dis-

posed toward an interbreeding of disparate individuals deemed (by

him) superior.

What

he frowns upon

is

the genetic mixture of “bad

—belonging to those he deems of “the lower

blood”

[schlechtes Bltit]

orders”

—with the blood of

EH II,

10).

Nowhere

essentially noble types

in Nietzsche’s

work

(EH

are “lower

EH

I, 3;

human

I,

8;

beings”

associated with a particular racial or ethnic group.

Ascription

vs.

Achievement

Notwithstanding

this

unusual insistence on the multiracial character

of nobility, the emphasis on inheritance remains

not exclusive) concern of Nietzsche’s

later

(although

a central

works. In scoffing at the

expression “aristocracy of the spirit” in the Nachlass passage quoted

above, he aims to expose what he sees as the wishful thinking implied

Enlightenment

in the

in favor of merit.

to just

call for

an overthrow of inheritance and birth

Ascension to the real aristocracy simply

any educated individual. The idea that genealogy

prescribes one’s potential and determines one’s fate

is

is

not open

essentially

strongly sug-

gested in Zarathustra’s advice to his interlocutors; “Eollow in the footsteps of your fathers’ virtue,” he counsels, for “it

would be

a

piece of folly” to “pretend to be saints in those matters in which your fathers

were vicious” (Z

Science speaks of

from generation

is

II, 7).

Moreover, The Gay

governed by certain “capacities”

to generation, becom[ing] domineering, unreason-

and intractable” (GS 361).

This because

stress it

on lineage

forces

him

strong, higher type

15.

character

Z

transmitted through the bloodline and “accumulated

[Veiynbgen]

able,

how

IV, 13, 13; cf.

This

is

is

rather

awkward

to reconcile his

^^sn 7n?na

for Nietzsche personally

own

sinmnanmT with

self-understanding as his

a

view of his immedi-

the conclusion of Hubert Cancik in his ‘“Mongols, Semites, and the

Pure-Bred Greeks’; Nietzsche’s Handling of the Racial Doctrines of His Time,” Nietzsche aiid Jewish Culture, ed. Jacob

Golomb (London:

Routledge, 1997),

in

p. 61.

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

common

ate family as

view

is

his father,

I, i;

Homo. The Protestant

mother and

EH

Nietzsche

I, 3).

be a blasphemy against

is

mother and

sister],”

my divinity” (EH

which involves clinging

German”

“To be

re-

he declares, “would

I, 3).

redeem

his “divinity.”

The

steadfastly to the aristocracy of birth

a scarcely lucid

and rather pathetic vaunting of

wholly reinvented personal lineage: bleman,” he

and “morbid” and

[zart]

well aware of the problem:

separate strategies are invoked to

model, involves

all

minister’s son reveals that

sister for their “incalculably petty” instincts

lated to such canaille [as his

first,

his

That he held this latter comments on his imme-

although “lovable,” was “delicate”

derides his

Two

[canaille].

borne out by an examination of

diate family in Ecce

(EH

and vulgar

am

“I

a

pure-blooded Polish no-

a

whom there is no drop of bad blood, least of On a charitable reading of this move, Nietz-

insists, “in

(ibid.).^^

sche thereby stakes a claim to a hybrid genealogy, a “two-fold origin .

.

from the highest and the lowest rung of the ladder of life,” with

.

the dominant “Polish” side of his constitution allowing

come decadence (EH

A

him

to over-

I, i).

second, less fanciful track has Nietzsche returning to a

strictly meritocratic

In a

riod.

more

view of nobility characteristic of his middle pe-

work such

as

Human, All

aristocracy “of the spirit” that

rather than ridiculed

(HAH

is

Human

Too

the notion of an

independent of birth

210, 261).

The

criteria

is

embraced

of free spirited-

ness include the ability to break not only with established customs

and

beliefs

(HAH

but also with one’s “origin, environment

225). In this

acquiring abilities

work Nietzsche

—rather than

.

.

.

[and] class”

gestures toward the possibility of

simply inheriting them

—when

he

balances a discussion of “inborn talent” with an emphasis on “ac-

quired toughness, endurance and energy” this

summed up

approach,

16.

(HAH

was suppressed by Nietzsche’s

sister,

edition used by Hollingdale for his translation,

trumpeting

Georg Brandes, 10

14

later reinserted into the

make use of here. Another efbackground is made in a letter to

which

a fictitious Polish aristocratic

sis-

Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, in her

I

April 1888, in Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, p. 293.

See Ruth Abbey, “Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche’s Reading of

Moralists” (Ph.D.

I

thrust of

admirably by the declaration that free

posthumous edition of his works. The suppressed passage was

17.

The

This passage, which also includes the reference to Nietzsche’s mother and

ter as canaille,

fort at

263).

diss.,

McGill University, 1994), pp. 213-224.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Two French

spiritedness represents a “victory of education over the arrogance of ancestry,” jostles uneasily with an aristocracy of birth

tures a side to Nietzsche that

ment

(HAH

embraced the

model and cap-

ideals of the Enlighten-

237).^^

Although the aristocracy of birth model becomes more prominent in the late works, its meritocratic rival

still

makes

forceful appear-

ances and competes for attention, notably in Zarathustra’s exhortation to his interlocutors to “let

where you are going, not where you

come from, henceforth be your honor” (Z III, may stem “from the race of the hot-tempered

12, 12).

Although one

or of the lustful or of

the fanatical or of the vindictive,” with the proper encouragement

one might ils

[into]

The

find the resources within oneself to turn

angels” (Z

all

of one’s “dev-

I, 5).

meritocratic view also seems to

fit

well with the sort of un-

conditional affirmation of the past and present implied in the eternal

return thought experiment. Nietzsche speaks in this context of how, after a

long period of shame and despair

reason to weep over

its

parents?”

—“What child has not had

—he learned

to affirm even his fa-

him early on toward an ethereal transcendentalism, Nietzsche came to appreciate how its project of service to God and truth instilled in him a “heroic” discipline and suspicion of laissez-aller that became important in his own, worldly project of self-overcoming (Z II, 4). Thus he learned to ther’s priestly asceticism

embrace the to it

its

title

(Z

I,

20).

Although

it

tilted

of “heir” [Eben] to this self-discipline and to accede

(hypothetical) eternal recurrence even as he pledges to redirect

(D Preface

in ostensibly healthier directions

4).

After acknowledging and even affirming his tainted ancestry in this

manner, Nietzsche finds himself

immediate parentage and embrace

“One

genealogy:

is

in a position to transcend his

a loftier, fanciful (that

least related to one’s parents.

.

.

.

we should understand 18.

(EH

I, 3). It is

willed)

Higher natures

have their origins infinitely farther back, and with them

be assembled, saved and hoarded”

is,

much had

to

in this context that

Nietzsche’s claims to be “related” to political

Middle-period passages that perpetuate the aristocracy of birth model include

HAH 442

and

of the spirit”

tendency

D

205, 272. Nietzsche’s use of the perplexing phrase “born aristocrats

[die geborejien

in these

Aristokraten des Geistes] in

works to

slide

between the

HAH 2 10 highlights his frequent

tw'o models.

THE HIGHER BREEDING OF HUMANITY

figures such as the thirteenth-century antipapist

the Second

(EH

IX,

ble type can find a

4).

new

Having made

emperor Friedrich

his peace with his past, the

sort of kinship “through loftiness of will”

no-

(EH

III, 3).

This reference to

a kinship resting

ogy should caution us against remarks on breeding tion.

As

ing”

is

on the

will rather

hastily interpreting

as a call for controlled

all

than physiol-

of Nietzsche’s

eugenic experimenta-

have argued above, however, the instances where “breed-

I

discussed as a nurturing form of pedagogy are not inconsis-

tent with calls for procreation in the literal sense. Indeed, Nietzsche’s literary surrogate

evokes their compatibility

interlocutors that talents developed in

aspects of one’s lineage can be used to shall

make amends

thers: thus

you

to

shall

redeem

ation, pedagogy, or both) its

eminently

institutional

Now we

all

that

I

16

is

often

to ensure

is

his left

political nature

framework

must turn

suggests to his

overcoming the unfortunate

become

a better parent:

“You

your children for being the children of your

Although the exact nature of about

when he

past!”

(Z

III, 12, 12).

breeding project

procreis

clear

a political-

establishment and sustenance.

to the matter of Nietzsche’s politics.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

(as

ambiguous, Nietzsche

— about the need for

its

fa-

I

The Art of

X

The first part of this

chapter^

thored by Ruth Abbey

Politics up

to '‘'Plato

V Peifect State, ”

and Fredrick Appel and has been

is

coau-

revised by

Fredrick Appel.

Beyond Petty

G

iven Nietzsche’s ical

many deprecatory remarks about the

realm and his self-description

tics, it is

as a thinker

I.

Politics?

understandable that

as a thinker

many have

unconcerned with or despairing of

polit-

above poli-

characterized

politics in

him

general^

See the Introduction, note 26 for some examples of influential antipolitical in-

terpretations of Nietzsche.

He

undeniably derides the “long-drawn-out comedy of [Europe’s]

petty states and the divided will of its dynasties and democracies” and

condemns Germany’s

German

imperialist pretensions

(BGE

208).

He

scorns

movements in general as examwith which Europe is sick, [an] eternaliz-

nationalism and nationalist

ples of a “nevrose nationale

ing of the petty-state situation of Europe, of petty politics [kleinen PolitikY’

(EH XIII,

GS

2; cf.

377;

tiness clearly has a great deal to

interests

WP Preface WP 748). Such pet2;

do with democratic catering

and needs of the majority. Zarathustra “turned

to the

back

[his]

upon the rulers” after finding their political activity to be nothing more than “bartering and haggling for power with the rabble!” (Z II, 6) Only small-minded people, in his view, entertain ambitions for strive power in herd society: only the “superfluous [Ubeijiiissigen]

—

.

towards the throne” (Z

Does

this

I

mean, however, that Nietzsche reduces

all

beneath the dignity of his higher

politics to

human

be-

argue that equating his criticisms of the modern state and his

condescending treatment of democratic to politics in general

sage from Ecce

Homo

is

a

way out of

politics

with an opposition

premature.^ Indeed, the aforementioned pas-

castigating petty politics gestures toward a dif-

ferent and higher type of politics

know

.

I, 1 1).

petty, herdlike behavior,

ings?

.

by asking, “Does anyone except

this blind alley?

again to unite the peoples?”

...

(EH XIII,

2).

A

enough once

task great

Some

me

alternative

is

evoked

again in Nietzsche’s prediction that “the compulsion to grand politics”

supersede “petty politics”

will

(BGE

the declaration that “political and

208). In Daybreak^ moreover,

economic

affairs are

being the enforced concern of society’s most gifted diately followed cal

by

a critique

not worthy of

spirits”

is

imme-

of contemporary economic and politi-

arrangements and attitudes, in particular the idea that the

state

should provide universal security (D 179). Even in the earlier

man, All Too Human, the requirement that “a few must

first

of

Hu-

all

be

flowed, now more than ever, to refrain from politics and to step a little aside” is followed by the anticipation of a time wJigjjj^e^e few 2.

Gerald Mara and Suzanne Dovi similarly caution against the

antipolitical read-

ing in their “Mill, Nietzsche, and the Identity of Postmodern Liberalism,”

57 (February 1995): 5. See also Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the tocratic Radicalis?n (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 59. Politics

I 1

8

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Jownal of

Politics

ofAris-

Thus while

“permission to speak”

will take

those

who

read Nietzsche as nonpoliti^ or antipolitical are correct in claiming that he denounces “petty politics,” they ity that this

might be

in the

name of a

to consider the possibil-

fail

higher, grander conception of

the political, one that includes cultural-cum-ethical concerns.

The

reading of Nietzsche as a thinker uninterested in or

mately scornful of politics can be buttressed by

on

tion of his aestheticism.^ His accent

an

artist

of the self

for social

valry

exist.

art in the conventional, limited sense

types of

engaged

human

in the

existence.

ethical

does

“What does it

all

art

not select? does

it

That

do? does

it

is

not praise? does

not highlight?

among

encompass any form of bold,

3.

fied

.

.

.

[this is] cf.

aesthetics, ethics,

original creativity.

artist to

he

Artists,

TI

it

not glorify?

the prerequisite III, 6;

and

WP 821).

will to

power

is

often taken to

He

repeatedly in-

convey an action-oriented, produc-

As Martha Nussbaum observes, Nietzsche’s remarks about existence being justi-

only as an aesthetic phenomenon

(e.g.,

BT Preface

imply some sort of moral aestheticizing of existence,

and

iso-

suggested in Twilight of the

runs deeper, for the aesthetic in Nietzsche’s work

vokes the image of the

not

art inspires discriminating, practical

for the artist’s being an artist at all” (TI IX, 24;

Yet the relationship

judgment.

is

eminently ethical endeavor of ranking

judgments about human flourishing Idols:

ri-

ethical or the political does not

from questions of power and

claims, are

cultivating the individual as

For Nietzsche, however, such

political projects."^

Even

narrow interpreta-

often taken to be incompatible with a concern

is

between the aesthetic and the

always lated

and

a

ulti-

political categories in the

name of detached

GS

107) are often “taken to

a playful

overturning of all moral

5;

aesthetic values.”

Nussbaum, “Trans-

figurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus,” Avion

i,

2

(Spring 1991): loi. 4. See, for

the

artist,

example, Walter Kauftnann’s claim that Nietzsche “was concerned with

the philosopher, and those

who

achieve self-perfection.

.

.

.

[Those who]

af-

firm their

own being and

morrow.”

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1974),

p.

all

eternity,

backward and forward, have no thought of to-

322. Echoes of this reading can be found in Alexander

Ne-

hamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 136-137; Leslie Paul Thiele, “The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault’s

Thought,” American

and Bonnie Honig,

Political

(September 1990): 913; Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

Political Science

Theory and the

Review 84,

3

versity Press, 1993), p. 231.

THE ART OF POLITICS

“productive” species-type “to the extent that

tive life. Artists are a

(WP

they actually alter and transform”

impulse

(WP

mighty want to form” His “ardent, creative .

.

will” drives

drives the

[I]t

.

941).

(EH IX,

8).

him “again and again ...

to

an ugly stone which requires the sculptor”

ness, material,

mankind

human beings, for “the strong, the To Zarathustra, “man is formless-

characteristic of higher

is

585a). This broad aesthetic

hammer

to the stone” (ibid.;

cf.

As the capacity to create and transform includes the

work

human

on, shape, order, and organize

beings,

Z

II, 2).

ability to

unsurprising

it is

that Nietzsche construes politics as aesthetic activity. Barbarians

“who come from

the heights: [are] a species of conquering and ruling

natures in search of material to mould”

(WP

We

900).

the violent beginnings of the polity were forged by

command, act

.

.

.

who

and bearing.

.

.

[are] .

by nature

Their work

1

7).

.

.

.

.

who

[are]

violent in

egoism”

artists’

artists

(GM II,

violence” and to “those artists

“artists’

of violence and organizers [Gewalt-Kimstlem und Organisatoren] build states” (ibid.;

over

feels

a

GM

II, 18).^

can

an instinctive creation and impo-

[T]hey exemplify that terrible

Nietzsche refers to their

.

.

men “who

most involuntary, unconscious

sition of forms; they are the

there are.

is

‘master,’

are told that

Discussing the power the great

who man

people, he speaks of the desire “to give a single form to

(WP 964).

the multifarious and distorted”

Nietzsche’s general claim that the great

man

is

“always intent on

making something out of’ the people he comes into contact with

who work “on

by Caesar and Napoleon,

illustrated

whatever the cost in men”

(WP

WP

962;

(WP

of government so far”

129). Christians,

gated as “not high or hard enough for the

mankind"

5.

(BGE

62).

As Julian Young

for talking about artists rapists

(TI LX,

8)

—

—he

refers to

is

them

continually emphasizes

.

.

.

action.

the ranks of

‘artists.’” Nietzsche's

versity Press, 1993), P-

this.

-

casti-

refashioning of

artistic .

.

.

some

divine

Nietzsche’s activist vocabulary

And

it is

this perspective

and

on the

as

artist

and builders of states and empires

Philosophy ofArt

(New

York:

Cambridge Uni-

Cf. Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995),

120

by contrast, are

as creators, makers, doers, violators

that provides the basis for inclusion of conquerors

among

Napo-

as the “great artists

Nietzsche envisages one “with

writes, “art, in short,

their marble,

975). Confucius,

and the Imperium Romanum are numbered

leon,

is

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

p. 88.

hammer

in his

hand” reacting to the sight of the distorted humanity

wrought by Christianity by

wailing,

“Was

this

work

for

your hands!

How you bungled and botched my beautiful stone!” (ibid.). These remarks abundantly

illustrate Nietzsche’s

broad notion of

the aesthetic and his thinking about grand politics as aesthetic activity.

human

Indeed, he imagines the goal of redeeming the

from

its

current decline as the ultimate

artistic project.

species

His “higher

concept of art” encompasses the “artist-philosopher,” and he wonders

how

men

that he can

such

politics will

a

have

man

“can place himself so far distant from other

form them” a different

(WP

The time is coming “when meaning” [wo man iiber Politik unlemen master race of the future working “as

wird\,

and Nietzsche sees

a

artists

upon ‘man’ himself’

(WP

Politics as

795).

960).

Architecture

In light of passages such as paragraph 287 of Beyond Good and Evil,

which underline the importance of the quality of motivation determination of nobility,

many

in the

recent commentators follow Kauf-

mann’s conclusion that Nietzsche “does not write to endorse course of action” and that his “primary concern

tions.

a

Many

stress

passages illustrate Nietzsche’s view that an individual’s

worth depends on the quality of derives partly certain

when

not with particu-

on the importance of motive need neutral stance toward the content and outcome of ac-

lar actions.”^

not entail

However, the

is

a

from

way cannot

his deeds.

his

life’s

work and

that his identity

Simply thinking about oneself

in a

create self-transformation; this can occur only

actual behavior

is

attended to and

life

projects altered. Nietz-

sche dismisses the belief that “mere evaluation should produce

6.

Kaufmann,

Nietzsche: Philosopher,

Psychologist,

AntiChjist, p.

248. Cf. Tracy

Strong’s assertion that Nietzsche does not concern himself with “actual behavior” in his Friedrich Nietzsche af7 d the Politics of Trafisjiguration,

versity of California Press, 1988), p. 13;

cf. p.

expanded

ed. (Berkeley:

91. Similar claims are

in Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 203. Berkowitz’s

Uni-

made by Nehamas

Nietzsche locates nobility not in ac-

tions but in “the self-knowledge of the noble soul.” Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Intmoi-alist, p.

252;

cf. p.

255.

THE ART OF POLITICS

12

I

‘works’” as “unnatural.” Instead, “one must practice deeds, not

strengthening of one’s value-feelings”

of the definition of nobility

is

(WP

192;

cf.

WP

one constantly contradicts the

“that

great majority not through words but through deeds”

Becoming what one

210). Part

(WP

944).

requires the discharge of talents and tough-

is

ness “in works and actions”

(HAH

263).

The power of actions

to de-

condemnation of Chris-

fine identity also appears in Nietzsche’s tians, for

they do not engage “the works which Jesus demanded”

(WP

cf.

191;

A 38).

Nietzsche thus parallels his Rangordnung of higher and lower hu-

mans with worthy ity.

the

a hierarchy

actions, the

“How And

mediocre and contemptible engage

why his

This explains

human

of deeds: superior individuals perform praise-

species are

complaints about the decrepit condition of

accompanied by claims such

few ‘works’ for the sake of which

alas

no more

in base activ-

‘deeds’ whatever!”

life

(WP

as the following:

on earth

is

worth while!

395).

What, for Nietzsche, characterizes a great deed? This same passage from the Nachlass refers to great works that have remained and not been washed away by the waters of time,” which illustrates his focus on formal properties of fine action such as its ambition and long-term scope

(ibid.).

The doer of great

create things of lasting value. “It

deeds possesses the will to

must seem

bliss to

you,” remarks

Zarathustra to an imagined comrade, “to press your hand upon the millennia as

upon wax,

upon metal”(Z

upon the will of millennia as comes to politics, Nietzsche en-

/ bliss to write

III, 12, 29).

When it

dorses Machiavelli’s claim that “the great goal of statecraft should be duration^

which outweighs everything

Nietzsche’s

model

works that endure ways inspired

is

else”

(HAH

for those farsighted artists

the architect:

224).

who

strive to create

“The most powerful men have

architects; the architect has always

al-

been influenced by

power. Pride, victory over weight and gravity, the will to power, seek to render themselves visible in a building; architecture

rhetoric of power,

now

a

kind of

persuasive, even cajoling in form,

bluntly imperious” (TI IX, ii). In the

human

is

now

modern world, however,

the

type based on the architect [der Baiimeister\ has been super-

seded by that based on the actor [der Schauspeiler], with baneful consequences:

122

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

— The

make

strength to build becomes paralyzed; the courage to

plans that encompass the distant future

is

discouraged; those with

undertake projects that

become scarce: who would still dare to would require thousands of years for their

completion? For what

is

a genius for organization

would enable us

namely, the faith that is

a stone in a

is

the fundamental faith that

to calculate, to promise, to anticipate the future

in plans of such scope,

he

dying out

and to

man

sacrifice the future to

them

has value and meaning only insofar as

gt'eat edifice.

(GS 356)

Nietzsche follows Machiavelli and Aristotle by likening the work of the master legislator to that of the architect.

The

task of the great-

resembles that of founders of constitutions

est architects

“[eternalizing] a grand organization of society, the

who aim

at

supreme condi-

tion for the prosperity of life” (A 58). This approach

is

most evident

immense admiration for the political and constitutional achievements of ancient Rome. “Nobody stronger and nobler has yet existed on earth” in large part because of the Romans’ audacity to his

in

enact plans for social and political engineering that were millennial in

scope

(GM

I,

16; cf.

A 38). They established institutions so sturdy

as to survive “the accident of persons”

(A

Nietzsche marvels

58).

at

the development of a “most grandiose form of organization ... in

comparison with which everything before and everything since patchwork, bungling, dilettantism” “this

most admirable of all works of art

ginning, this

its

The

in the

hnperiinn Roinamnn,

grand

D

style,

was

a

structure was calculated to pi'ove itself by millennia

day there has never been such building, to build

ner snb cf.

(ibid.).

specie

aetemi has never been so

much

as

is

in such a

dreamed

be-

—

to

man-

of!” (ibid.;

71).

Nietzsche bemoans the subversion of the impressive structure by the Christian table of values and political.

Faced with the

Roman

Christians could only ask,

its

hostility

edifice of institutions

“What

is

the point of public

Roman

toward the

and practices, spirit,

what

is

the point of gratitude for one’s descent and one’s forefathers, what is

the point of co-operation, trust, of furthering and keeping in view

the general welfare? ...

from the

‘right road’”

So many ‘temptations,’ so many diversions

(A 43).

The

political

quietism of Paul

is

also

THE ART OF POLITICS

I

23

condemned: “There

is

nothing more

false

declares Zarathustra, than to say, ‘“Let

and

or deceitful in the world,”

him who wants

and harass and swindle the people; do not

kill

to slaughter

raise a finger

Thus they will yet learn to renounce the world’” (Z III, 12, 15).^ Paul, we are informed, drew his followers from an “absolutely unpolitical and withdrawn species of little people^^ (WP 175). Once it against

it!

gained popularity, the Christian ideal proved destructive of the political

and

because

social

it

detaches the individual from people, risdiction;

it

—

lets

it

the usefulness and value of man.

ther aggressive nor defensive

.

.

.

Unpolitical, anti-national, nei-

life,

asites to proliferate at public expense.

who

ju-

everything go that comprises

—possible

firmly ordered political and social

Christians are “parasites”

community,

knowledge, cultivation of good

rejects education,

manners, gain, commerce

state, cultural

only within the most

which allows these holy par-

(WP

221;

cf.

WP 204,

21 1)

focus on otherworldly goals while

achievements of lofty-minded,

living off the political-architectural

worldly others, even as they denigrate the achievements of the latter as “vainglory.”

lution

is

A modern

political

movement

like the

French Revo-

“the daughter and continuation of Christianity,” for one of

the things

it

inherits

is

the Christian devaluation of politics, which

“destroy[s] the instinct for a grand organization of society” 90).

The

pervasive influence of Christianity

on

political

(WP

184,

thought and

why Nietzsche finds so much to condemn in modernity: “No one any longer possesses today the

action helps to explain

the politics of

courage to claim special privileges or the right to courage for

a pathos

of distance.

lack of courage!” (A 43;

In

what he

cf.

.

.

.

Our

politics

is

rule,

moi'bid

.

the

from

this

.

.

WP 212).

sees as a vital

first

step in the establishment of the

“thousand year empire” envisioned by Zarathustra, Nietzsche exhorts his imagined readers to overthrow this antipolitical Christian

7.

Nietzsche echoes the criticism of Christian quietism advanced by Machiavelli in

The Discourses

II. 2

and Rousseau

in

The

Social Contract. IV. 8.

As we

shall see below,

however, Nietzsche follows Machiavelli (but not Rousseau) in deeming Christian quietism wholly appropriate for the mass of ordinary people.

124

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

and post-Christian mindset and to recapture the sort of political that gripped the ancient

Romans. The

latter

owed

their

to the fact that their political vision and ambition

and Nietzsche hopes that

their will,

one day manifest

again in

itself

will

achievement

were matched by

same quality of will could Europe. “Europe would have to this

.

.

.

new caste dominating all Europe, a protracted terrible will of its own which could set its objectives thousands of years ahead” (BGE 208; cf. BGE 212, 213). Thus acquire a single will by means of a

Nietzsche’s insistence that “strength of the will” be listed as part of

becoming the

the “preparation for

legislators of the future, the

mas-

of the earth” (\VP 132).

ters

The Most Comprehensive

Responsibility

Nietzsche’s occasional talk of a healthy form of “selfishness” would

seem

at first glance to

suggest that his nobles have obligations only

However, obligation toward

to themselves and their self-perfection.

the self and obligation to others need not be mutually exclusive; rather, his preferred index of value

and rank concerns “howy^r one

could extend one’s responsibility”

(BGE

instinctively seek

nobility not to

(WP

want

BGE

944;

heavy

responsibilities,

212). Nietzschean nobles

and

cf.

BGE

213).^

The

(WP

in

.

.

a sign

of

responsibilities”

majority of

by contrast, “weak and growing weaker

are,

own

to “relinquish or share our

272;

considered

it is

.

human

beings

responsibility”

898).

Nietzsche’s political vision cannot be understood apart from this

notion of the highest types’ responsibility.

and concerns of free

spirits is

Among

the proper cares

whether leaders who can sustain the

weight of responsibility for transvaluing modern democratic

Bernard Williams notes that

8.

thought

one

is

.

.

.

that

one can be under

and of one’s

a

has been in every society a recognizable ethical

(moral) requirement

social situation.” Ethics

Harvard University Press, 1985), philosophy in

“it

this regard.

(This

p. 7.

is

political

and

.

.

.

the Limits of Philosophy

Nietzsche resurrects the

no way means

simply because of who

spirit

(Cambridge:

of ancient moral

that Nietzsche thinks higher

human

beings ought to be responsible for the security and well-being of their ostensible inferiors.

Chapter

7 explains why.)

THE ART OF POLITICS

emerge and endure (BGE

values will

men

highest

entails a

compares the

of the future to Caesar or Napoleon, for they too must

“bear the greatest

As we noted

203). Nietzsche

in

responsibility

Chapter

and not collapse under

2, this

it”

(WP

“most comprehensive responsibility”

concern not simply with the

spiritual self-perfection of su-

perior individuals but with the fate of the species as a whole 61). Nietzsche’s politics

is

therefore driven by the conscience his

philosophers will share for collective evolution of

new

Nietzsche’s fare

of the great

Whereas under

a particular

mankind”

new

kind of creative activity: “the

(ibid.).

dispensation reverses the

is

(BCE

way

in

which the wel-

currently interwoven with that of the many.

the democratic status

quo those with the

potential for

bound up with (and held down by) the many, Nietzsche’s new politics would require that the majority of orgreatness are beholden to and

human

dinary

order. It

beings be restored to their proper place in the social

must be

realized that society

tion and scaffolding

upon which

raise itself to its highest task

258;

cf.

BCE

126;

“mankind

in the

species of

man

It is,

and

is

justified

a select species

“only as a founda-

of being

is

able to

in general higher existence”

(BCE

WP 679, 681, 898, 997). As The Genealogy decrees,

mass

sacrificed to the prosperity of a single stronger

—that would be an advance” (CM

II, 1 2).

therefore, the responsibility of the few to restore this proper

balance to social and political organization and to appreciate that the

mass

them in their quest for heightened nobility. They must grasp and act upon the fact that “this homogenizing is

there to serve

species requires a justification:

it lies

in serving a higher sovereign

species that stands

upon the former and can

only by doing this”

(WP

raise itself to its task

898).

Robert Solomon, by contrast, suggests that Nietzsche’s philosophy “does not about ‘responsibility’ or ‘authenticity.’” Introduction to Reading Nietzsche, ed.

9.

talk

Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen 1988), p. 10. Laurence

and Evil

“is a

book

Lampert

is

M. Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, closer to the mark when he argues that Beyond Good

that assigns the greatest responsibility to the philosopher as

one

who knows what religions are good for, who knows how to order the politics of fatherlands, who commands and legislates how the world ought to be, and who has the whole future of mankind on 'Thus Spoke Zarathiistra"

126

his conscience.” Nietzsche's Teaching:

(New Haven:

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

An

Interpretation of

Yale University Press, 1987), p. 247.

Commanding and Obeying Nietzsche’s catalogue of complaints about contemporary politics in-

cludes the almost complete ignorance of “the art of commanding”

(BGE

Kunst des Befehlens] art

is

BGE 203). Worse still is the way this

2 1 3; cf.

by those who exercise power;

discredited and disavowed, even

The herd

instinct of

obedience has been inherited best and

expense of the art of commanding. If taken to

its

from

a

we

men

at

command would

order to be able to

in

commanders

they existed, they would suffer

all; or, if

bad conscience and

at the

think of this instinct

ultimate extravagance there would be no

or independent

[des

have to practise a deceit upon themselves: the deceit, that

is,

that

they too were only obeying. This state of things actually exists in

Europe

(BGE

today.

199)

Nietzsche thus imputes to the noble personality ical

capacity

ability to

—the

ability to rule.

Sometimes

a traditionally polit-

this

coupled with the

is

be ruled, echoing Aristode’s belief that citizens of the polis

only the capacity

command and obey.^® At other times, however, to command is seen as vital to higher types and the

of obeying

relegated to inferiors. In a fragment from 1887, for

should be able to

art

is

example, Nietzsche

lists

command” along

the “will and capacity to

with the will to power and to enjoyment as features of “the relatively strong and well-turned-out type of

were

effects

still

unbroken

Following the

.

)”

.

.

classical view,

man

(WP

(those in

whom

the grand

98).^^

Nietzsche requires the capacity to

new aristocracy The truly sover-

rule others to be coupled with that for self-rule: the is

“based on the severest self-legislation” 10. Aristotle,

totelian

The

1261322;

Politics, II, 2,

dictum “to rule and be ruled

(WP 960).

III, 4.

in turn” are

Nietzschean echoes of the Aris-

found

in

GS

283;

BGE 251; WT 912

and 918. 11.

Nehamas

by rendering

it

characteristically depoliticizes the Nietzschean capacity to

self-reflexive

question whether one

is

or

is

one can indeed command and

“Who Are

and confining not

a

it

to the personal realm.

genuine philosopher

legislate,

is

just the

whether one can fashion

‘The Philosophers of the Future’?:

Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins,

A

command

For him, “the

question whether

a life

of one’s own.”

Reading of Beyond Good and Evil”

eds.,

Reading Nietzsche

in

(New York: Ox-

ford University Press, 1988), p. 65.

THE ART OF POLITICS

I

2

7

eign individual

is

necessarily gives

able creatures” ual

acutely aware of how his “mastery over himself also

him mastery over

(GM II,

And

12).

of the herd: “Small

greatness’’'

(WP

984).

command

human

—shouts

is

less reli-

— hence a

is

character-

cannot possess

“herd instinct of

crude appetite for direction that “accepts

a

whatever any commander Nietzsche

obey

Such types can only evince

obedience” and show

public opinion

must

spirits

and

just as the great individ-

capable of command, so the inability to

is

istic

Z II,

2; cf.

... all weaker-willed

—parent,

in its ears”

teacher, law, class, prejudice,

(BGE

199;

cf.

WP 279).

even audacious enough to contend that lower-order

beings would be better off submitting to the domination of

their betters.

Once

again echoing Aristotle, Nietzsche claims that

the natural slave-type “needs

someone who

liberal-democratic society this need leads to the majority’s perversion.

will use

frustrated

is

him” (A

54). In a

and regrettably

Encouraged by an ambient demo-

cratic culture to forswear a natural, healthy instinct of deference to

one’s betters, the herd develops distasteful character traits, notably

“untoward intemperance,” “narrow enviousness,” and “a clumsy obstinate self-assertiveness”

has

become so much

(BGE

a part

264;

cf.

A 57).

of mainstream

Democratic ideology

common sense

that

all

im-

knowledge of rank order and of the “need” of the weak-willed for “a master, a commander,” is lost (BGE 242). “The mob,” obplicit

serves Zarathustra, “does not straight

and honest” (Z

know what

IV, 13, 8).^^

is

great or small, what

Encouraged

to think of

is

them-

no worse than anyone else and as capable of anything, the lower orders succumb to what he refers to as the “evil falsity” of willing beyond one’s powers (ibid.). Democratic reformers think they are working in the best interests of the majority, but in fact they accomselves as

“He who makes the lame man walk,” intones “does him the greatest harm: for no sooner can he walk

plish the opposite:

Zarathustra,

than his vices run away with him” (Z

1

2

.

Nietzsche sees his

own

II,

20).^^

compatriots as particularly damaged in this regard: “In

Germans have no idea whatever how common [gemein] they are; but that is the superlative of commonness [der Gemeinheit they are not even ashamed of being mere Germans” (EH XIII, 4). 13. Mark Warren rightly observes that Nietzsche “registers occasional sympathy the end the

]

for the

128

working

classes.” Nietzsche

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

and

—

Political

Thought (Cambridge:

MIT

Press,

Nietzsche’s proposed hierarchical political order redeems the ple-

beian in the plebeian, allowing the mass to evince the “herd virtues” [Heerdentiigenden] of which they are capable:

That which

natures and makes their existence possible

even dissipation

disbelief,

—would,

if it

where industriousness

is

moderation giing''] cf.

The

—

fruitful

leisure, adventure,

—and

to

me-

actually does.

[Arbeitsamkeit], rule

firm “conviction”

[die Mdfiigkeit],

have their place

—

were available

them

diocre natures, necessarily destroy

This

and most

available only to the strongest

is

[die Regel],

[die fest ^^Ube?‘zeu-

in short, the “herd virtues.”

(WP

901;

WP 356)

inferior,

untalented individual would be liberated of all unrealis-

hopes (along with their attendant disappointments and resent-

tic

ments) and would

at last follow the

path that Zarathustra associates

with (lower-order) virtue: “Thus speaks virtue: vant, then seek

Thus

—

ner

in

him

whom you

the natural slave

can serve best’” (Z

would

and through service to

your

thrive with

lord’s spirit

flourish

—

his master:

and

must be

‘If you

in his

a ser-

II, 8).

own

limited

man-

‘“Thus you yourself will

virtue!”’ (ibid.). In a properly or-

dered society the natural slave finds an intrinsic satisfaction in the fulfillment of his or her limited capacities:

cog, a function,” claims Nietzsche,

is

“To be

a public utility, a

a “natural vocation” or a “kind

of happiness of which the great majority are alone capable, which

makes

intelligent

machines of them. For the mediocre,

happi-

it is

ness to be mediocre” (A 57).

Modernity’s Self-Overcoming

Despite his very real concern that higher his call

and

1988), p. 224.

1

solidarity with

will

remain in the grips of

would argue, however,

them but

that his

beings will not heed

a servile false

consciousness.

sympathy stems not from any

rather from his reading of

movements have perverted

human

how

egalitarian ideas

feeling of

and

political

their originally docile psyches.

THE ART OF POLITICS

I

29

Nietzsche believes that the seeds for their ascendancy are being sown within the liberal-democratic order itself. One of democracy’s unin-

tended consequences

a

is

general weakening of the people’s will,

which increases the opportunities for strong-willed individuals to

command. The

majority’s descent into nihilism “brings to light the

weaker and

secure

less

among them and

thus produces an order of

rank according to strength, from the point of view of health: those

who command are recognized as those who command, those who obey as those who obey” (WP 55). What is required for realizing the potential inherent in this situation is that the new elite hearken to Nietzsche’s urgings and “employ democratic Europe

as their

most

pliant

and supple instrument for

getting hold of the destinies of the earth”

Without subscribing

(WP

any doctrine of historical

to

mains hopeful that they

will

do

960;

cf.

WP

inevitability,

898).

he re-

so:

have as yet found no reason for discouragement.

Whoever

has

preserved, and bred in himself, a strong will, together with an

am-

I

ple spirit, has

more

favorable opportunities than ever. For the

men has become very great in this democratic Eumen who learn easily and adapt themselves easily are the

trainability of

rope;

herd animal, even highly intelligent, has been prepared. Whoever can command finds those who must obey; I am thinking, rule: the

e.g.,

of Napoleon and Bismarck.

intelligent wills,

which

is

rivalry with strong

the greatest obstacle,

is

small.

and un-

(WP

128;

WP 898, 956)

cf.

Thus Nietzsche

discerns a double

while weakening the majority,

—

“the breeding of tyrants

most

The

spiritual”

(BGE

it

movement

in democratization:

creates circumstances propitious for

in every sense

of that word, including the

242).

Along with democratization, Nietzsche identifies the burgeoning industrial and commercial culture as creating enabling conditions for a

new 14.

elitist

This

order.

issue

is

works, although as passages include

Far from oblivious to economic change and

more thoroughly

we

shall see

it

30

discussed in the middle period than in the later

does not vanish altogether. Pertinent middle-period

HAH 585; WS 218, 220, 278-280, 283, 288; D

31, 42, 188.

I

its

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEiVIOCRACY

175, 186, 308;

GS

21,

some contend, Nietzsche applauds industritransformation of “mankind into a machine” (WP

salience for politics, as alization for

866). His

its

endorsement stems not from an enthusiastic embrace of

the ethos of capitalism for the

—Nietzsche never

lost his aristocratic disdain

rampant materialism and “indecent and perspiring haste” of

his era^^

—but rather from

a belief that industrialism

generates the

large caste of “weak-willed and highly employable” types required to facilitate the leisure

Modern

of a higher-order

elite

(BGE

242;

cf.

“new

industrialism, in other words, provides the

required for Nietzsche’s

“new order” (GS

human

ing and enhancement of the

new kind of enslavement”

377).

HAH 439). slavery”

“Every strengthen-

type,” he insists, “also involves a

BGE

(ibid.; cf.

257). Nietzsche speaks not

simply of enslaving manual laborers, but also of exploiting the expertise

“The

ideal scholar”

deemed “one of

the most pre-

of the specialized technician and

possessing “the scientific instinct” cious instruments there are”

powerful”

(BGE

who

is

scientist.

“belongs in the hand of one more

207).

The problem with capitalist industrialism,

for Nietzsche, has

been

the “lack of noble manners” of the employers, whose sudden accu-

mulation and ostentatious, vulgar display of wealth seem to

call into

question the very idea of a natural rank order, thereby lending cre-

dence to egalitarian ideologies. alist

leads the factory

The

spectacle of the vulgar industri-

worker to think “that

it is

only accident and

luck that have elevated one person above another. Well then, he reasons: let us try accident

cialism

is

and

throw the

luck! let us

born” (GS 40). But while casting

a

dice!

And

thus so-

disapproving glance at

“the notorious vulgarity of manufacturers with their ruddy, fat

hands” 15.

(ibid.),

Nietzsche applauds their relegation of the majority to

Keith Ansell-Pearson claims that Nietzsche “ignored the changed conditions

of work through

modern

industrialized production.”

An bitroduction

to

Nietzsche as Po-

Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 214. Karl Lowith writes similarly of Nietzsche’s “lack of concern for social and economic questions.” litical

Fro?n Hegel 16.

to Nietzsche, trans.

D Preface 5. Cf. HAH

sche’s criticisms of the ideal

of a leisured

David E. Green (London: Constable, 1965), 285;

D

elite is

It is

GS

21, 40;

BGE

189;

\VP

943. Nietz-

worship of money cast doubt on Nancy Love’s claim that

more

his

bourgeois and thus an ideological support for capitalism.

Love, Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity pp. 18, 189, 200.

203, 204;

p. 176.

(New

likely that his

York:

model

is

Columbia University

Press, 1986),

the ancient slave economy.

THE ART OF POLITICS

.

.

.

who

machines”

“intelligent

and general

“exist for service

utility

and

only for that purpose” (A 57; BGE 6i)d^ However, this evocation of the need for a new, industrial form of

may

exist

own occasional endorsement of a stoic noself-sufficiency. The autarchic ideal, already problema-

slavery subverts Nietzsche’s tion of noble

by Nietzsche’s

tized

when he

even further

on the importance of

stress

speaks of

willed and unreliable creatures”

self-mastery

(GM

II,

how

friendship, recedes

mastery over

a

“all

more

short-

part and parcel of the noble type’s

is

Nietzschean self-sufficiency ultimately suc-

2).

cumbs to the superior type’s need for lower individuals as “steps” to tread upon in the ascent toward the summit of human development (Z II, 7; cf.

that

BGE

which

is

heavy dwarfs

259). In the

danced

—

iipon^

words of Zarathustra, “must there not

exist

danced across? Must there not be moles and

for the sake of the

nimble

.

.

.?”

(Z

III, 12, 2).^^

Mastering Christianity

When

Nietzsche declares that

“it is

the intrinsic right of masters to

create values,” a nonpolitical reader such as to

mean

interprets this

that Nietzschean philosophers of the future could only be

concerned with themselves “and perhaps

(BGE

Nehamas

261).^^

To subdue

a

few others

like

them”

the herd politically, he reasons, would entail

subsuming both the herd and the

under the same

elite

set of values.

Nietzsche, given his concern for maintaining a “pathos of distance”

between

castes,

could look upon such a prospect only with distaste.

Hence, concludes Nehamas, those preoccupied with value creation must remain completely uninterested in politics. 17.

Apart from

its

infrastructural role of

making

leisure possible for the elite,

man-

ual labor also has the salutary effect of dulling the pain that necessarily attends the inferiority

of the majority (GAl

manual) labor

III,

1

8).

Of course, any kind

of specialized (and especially

with noble sensibilities (A 57, VVP 943). 18. Keeping this in mind helps us interpret comments such as the following: “We is

totally unsuited for those

must think of the masses species”

(WP

760).

as

unsentimentally as

Such passages

call

19.

and

think of nature: they preserve the

into question Tracy Strong’s insistence that

Nietzsche’s masters and slaves do not depend Nietzsche

we

on each other

in

any way. Friedrich

the Politics of Transfiguration, p. 353.

Nehamas,

“Who Are

‘The Philosophers of the Future ’?”

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

p. 57.

We need not follow Nehamas and other Nietzsche scholars in adhering to

this familiar “either-or” scenario

as value creators are

—either the Ubeiynenschen

completely disengaged from the herd or they

must mix higher and lower together by creating one overarching set of values for all. It would be more fruitful to pursue another possibility:

that a key aspect of the Nietzschean

power

hegemony

elite’s

the

is

to prescribe different values for different sections of society.

upon those like him to move “beyond good and evil,” Nietzsche “demand [s] that herd morality ... be held sacred unconditionally” (WP 132). His elite would not only create new values but would also respect Zarathustra’s observation that “small people” need “small virtues” (Z III, 5, 2). Nietzsche’s new rulers would endorse some existing values including Christian ones insofar as Even

as

he

calls

—

—

they serve to legitimate the

Thus

in a

Nietzschean

new

elite’s

rule in the eyes of the many.

polity, Christianity

would not become com-

pletely obsolescent.^^

There

is

no shortage of passages

in the

Nietzschean opus where

Christianity joins nihilism, democracy, and industrialization as a

way

force inadvertently preparing the

for the rise of a

new

elite.

Consider, for example, the admission in Nietzsche’s notebooks that

although “we good Europeans the present

we support

stinct: for these

hands” ruler,

(WP

prepare

.

.

.

are atheists and immoralists, for

the religions and moralities of the herd in-

type of man that must one day

a

fall

into our

132). Anticipating the future tasks of the philosopher-

Beyond Good arid Evil acknowledges the need to “make use of

work of education and breeding, just as he make use of existing political and economic conditions” (BGE the religions for his

The

strategic value of religion

defines

it

20. Pace

as

is

further underlined

61).

when Nietzsche

“one more means of overcoming resistance so

Nehamas’s claim that “the view that Christianity and

will

its

as to

be

morality have out-

runs through the whole of Nietzsche’s later work.”

lived

their usefulness

p. 60.

Karl Lowith shares this view of Christianity’s utter obsolescence in a Nietzschean

polity

when he

suggests that “the

unbelieving masses.”

Fi'ojn

Hegel

that Nietzsche’s political vision

is

new

I-

Ibid.,

masters of the earth shall ‘replace God’ for the

to Nietzsche, p.

262.

WTien Ansell-Pearson complains

bereft of any account of

how

his

new

political organi-

zation will be justified to the ruled, he similarly assumes that Nietzsche’s pronounce-

ment of the death of God prevents See

An

his

new

elite

from using religion to legitimate

itself.

Intfvduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, pp. 42-43, 51, 153-158.

THE ART OF POLITICS

I

33

able to rule: a

bond

that unites together ruler

and ruled and betrays

and hands over to the former consciences of the latter” (ibid.). Nietzsche thus considers a central question in the history of political

thought

erful

(HAH 472). This

be-

especially apparent in a fragment noting that “moralities

and

and

comes

—how religion can be used to the advantage of the pow-

in the service

of the best social order

means by which one can make whatever one wishes out of man, provided one possesses a superfluity of crereligions are the principal

and can assert one’s

ative forces

will

over long periods of time

the form of legislation, religion and customs” virtues Christianity

promotes

As

for future rulers.

a

in the

(WP

144).

—

in

Some of the

mass of people could be useful

“herd religion,”

“teaches obedience.

it

Christians are easier to rule than non-Christians”

(WP

.

.

.

216). Future

might “patronize and applaud” this faith because it fosters in the mass “virtues that make their subjects useful and submissive” rulers

(ibid.).

Nietzsche

a doctrine

is

highly cognizant of the fact that

and religion of “love,” oi suppression of self-affirmation,

of patience, endurance, helpfulness, of cooperation in word and deed, can be of the highest value within such classes [of decaying

and atrophying people] even from the point of view of the for

it

—the

all

deifies a life

of

suppresses feelings of rivalry, of ressentbnent^ of envy

too natural feelings of the underprivileged

—

slavery, subjection, poverty, sickness,

inferiority for

and

der the ideal of humility and obedience.

As noted

in

Chapter

(WP

even

them un-

373)

moreover, Nietzsche believes that the mass

2,

of ordinary people need religion a solace for suffering

it

rulers:

and

—

specifically, Christianity

—both

as

obedience (GS 347). It can give meaning to their mediocrity by providing servility with “the appearance of a virtue” that is “quite astonishingly beautiful” (HAH 1

1

5; cf.

WP

216).

From

as a rationale for

Nietzsche’s political vantage point, then,

Christianity has redeeming features. His call to superior types to ac-

knowledge God’s death and to overcome Christian values does not, therefore, preclude Christianity from fulfilling a civic function by inculcating obedience in the masses. Nietzsche outlines the proper role of religion in Beyond

that

134

it is

strictly for the

Good and

Evil, arguing, as

use of the rulers

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Hobbes

does,

— they are not to be ruled by

— dear and terribly

“It costs

it:

when

means of education and breeding

own

but in their

right as soverei^^

religions hold sway, not as a

hands of the philosopher,

in the

when they themselves want

(BGE

ends and not means beside other means”

final

The

62).^^

obvious objection to Christianity playing even an instrumen-

role in a Nietzschean politics of the future

tal

to be

obedience,

that while

is

also preaches the “equality of souls”

it

—an

Christian faith Nietzsche repudiates incessantly.^^ Given

of fundamental Christianity stratified

human

article

of

premise

its

equality because of equal worth before

would seem an unsuitable ideology

and unequal

teaches

it

God,

for the sort of highly

Nietzsche promotes.

political organization

This emphasis on equality destroys the pathos of distance so essential

for the resurgence of nobility.

However, the idea that equality lated into secular equality

rights

—

is

a particular,

—into

modem

of

in the eyes

God must

be trans-

equality before the law and equal

reading of Christianity. While liberal

philosophers such as John Locke,

Mary

Wollstonecraft, and Alexis de

Tbcqueville grounded their arguments for secular equality in such Christian ideas, not

all

adherents of Christianity have inferred an im-

perative to secular equality. In the history of Christian-influenced political all

thought,

it

has been argued to the contrary that precisely because

individuals are, as God’s creatures, essentially equal, their worldly

status

is

of little or no importance.^^

A form of Christianity could serve

as a doctrine legitimating hierarchical

provided that

it

did not

mle

in a transvalued future

demand some form of secular

Ronald Beiner argues cogently that “Nietzsche

21.

ern tradition of Beiner,

civil

religion as set forth

is

equality.

entirely faithful to the

mod-

by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau.”

“George Grant, Nietzsche, and the Problem of a Post-Christian Theism,”

in

George Grant and the Subversion of Modernity, ed. Arthur Davis (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1996), p. 126. 2 2 Passages where Nietzsche associates Christianity with the doctrine of human .

equality include

BGE 62,

202,

2 19;

GM

III, 14;

TI

IX, 37;

A 43,

46, 57; and

WT 684

and 898. 23. See St. Augustine’s City of God, ity” in

litical

12, 15

Press, 1991).

The

writings of Sir Robert Filmer

another example of the marriage of Christian hierarchy. See Filmer, Patriarcha

“On Secular AuthorHarro Hopf (Cambridge:

and Luther’s

Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority, ed. and trans.

Cambridge University stitute

XIX,

and Other

faith

and belief in

Writings, ed.

Johann

(d.

1653) con-

social

P.

and po-

Sommerville

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

THE ART OF POLITICS

Thus

many

despite his

on Christianity and

virulent attacks

modern Europe, Nietzsche does not

legacies for

insist that it

be

its

jet-

tisoned. Christianity could have a place in a transvalued future, but a

much more “The

pies:

chastened and circumscribed one than

it

ideas of the herd should rule in the herd

out beyond

it;

currently occu-

—but not reach

the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally differ-

ent valuation for their

own

lieve in the truth-claims

(WP

actions”

287). Rulers

need not be-

of a lying religion that they grant to the

all-

too-human.

Plato’s Perfect State

The

structure of Nietzsche’s envisioned political order can be de-

scribed as

man

two concentric

circles,

beings surrounded by

jority population that

instrumental for that Nietzsche’s

a

with an inner circle of higher hu-

much

larger circle representing a

both subordinate to the ruling minority and continued flourishing.^*^ It is important to note

its

main

is

interest

is

in fact in the inner circle.

important the subjugation of the majority of elite

the “main consideration”

activity,

higher species in leading the lower

which it

[the]

merely

own

a

(WP

.

.

,

its

is

may

be to the sustenance

“not to see the task of the

but the lower as

own

However

tasks

a

base

upon

—upon which alone

901). Nietzsche envisages and tries to inspire “not

master race whose sole task

is

to rule, but a race with

its

sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, cul-

manners

ture,

may grant

to the highest peak of the spirit, an affirming race that

itself

sphere of

over inferiors?

(WP

every great luxury”

however, Nietzsche’s vision

If,

own

.

higher species performs

can stand”

ma-

life,”

how

is

898).

that of a “master race” with “its

could he also countenance

The answer becomes

tween Nietzsche and Plato on clared in The Republic that

if

this

clearer

question

the finest

is

human

when

its

political rule

the parallel be-

considered. Plato de-

beings refused to rule

This section takes issue with Bernard Williams’s suggestion that Nietzsche has “no coherent set of opinions” about how politics ought to be organized in the modern 24.

world.

I

36

Shame and Necessity

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. lo-i

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

i.

their inferiors they

when he

evinces

would be ruled by them,

sentiment Nietzsche

observes “with anguish and contempt the politics of

present-day Europe, which

web of the

at the

a

is,

under

circumstances, also working

all

men” (WP 367). Since the politics of effect on human excellence, oppressing

future of all

herd society has a corrosive

those of potentially great talent and stature, the latter should create a

more

politics

keeping with their needs.

in

In light of Nietzsche’s vilification of Socrates and his identification of Platonic metaphysics with the “slave revolt” in morals

seem strange

may

to argue for the resemblance of Nietzsche’s imagined

order to Plato’s ideal

political

it

As others have noted, however,

polls.

Nietzsche’s view of Socrates/Plato

is

not entirely negative.^^ His

greatest difficulty with Plato relates to the latter’s notion of the

Forms, which

we

is

rooted in

noted in Chapter

first

a i,

metaphysical realist framework that, as

Nietzsche resolutely

rejects.

As

far as

Plato’s politics are concerned, however, their unapologetic elitism

and authoritarianism are heartily embraced.^^

One element drawn is

is

of The Republic to which Nietzsche

the notion of a martial class of “guardians”

to insulate the inner circle of nobles

class.^^

This

is

particularly

whose function

from the majority plebeian

especially apparent in The AntiChrist,

the prospect of a “predominantly spiritual type” Geistigen] directing a

is

where he evokes [die

vofiviegend

“predominantly muscular and temperamental

type” that in turn would relieve the former of “everything coarse in the

work of ruling”

[alles ^^Grobe^^ in

Nietzsche’s suggestion that the

der Arbeit des Herj'schaft] (A 57).

management of “mediocre

types” be

delegated to an intermediary buffer class can be explained by his belief that

the close proximity of the higher to the lower would be nox-

ious for the former.

25.

See, for example,

Nehamas,

Nietzsche: Life as Literature,

Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Iminoralist, 26.

As early

ments about

as the

24-34, and

p. 45.

1872 essay “The Greek State,” Nietzsche makes admiring com-

“Der griechische and Mazzino Montinari,

“Plato’s perfect state” [Der vollkommne Staat Platos]. See

Staat,” Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed.

30

pp.

vols. (Berlin:

de Gruyter, 1967-197"''

III,

Georgio Colli

2:258-271, and his discussion of Plato in

the essay “Schopenhauer as Educator" in the collection Unthnely Meditations (SE 27.

The Republic

III,

41 2C-42

8).

ic.

THE ART OF POLITICS

— A higher human in

Chapter

3, is

majority.

sitical

type in close quarters with the herd, as

we noted

always in danger of being “sucked dry” by the para-

Hence

the imperative of maintaining a form of

A

apartheid between master and slave types.

“master race”

at its

highest level of development simply cannot remain preoccupied with the

mundane

tasks involved in ruling over inferiors. In this context

Nietzsche refers approvingly to the Indian caste system, singling out the Brahmins as an admirably disciplined order that “have themselves the

power of nominating

their kings for the people, while

keeping and feeling themselves aside and outside

and more than kingly tasks”

(BGE

61;

cf.

TI

VII,

ors

—

self-rule of higher-order peers

free,

political rule

and the rule over

inferi-

we reconducted among

also recalls Aristotelian political philosophy. Aristotle,

associates the best type of rule with a politics

call,

of higher

3).

This division of labor between different types of

between the

men

as

self-governing

men and

slaves or slavelike persons,

contrasts

who,

economic deprivation,

ciencies,

it

with the despotic rule over

for whatever reason (innate defi-

cannot govern themselves.^^

etc.),

Nietzsche similarly deems the kind of rule “over select disciples or brothers” to be best and “most refined,” whereas the direction of the larger

community of unequals

“the necessary dirt of Politik-Machens]

all

(BGE

is

said to require a cruder

form of rule,

politics” \dem ''notwendigen'' Schmiitz alles

61).

Nietzsche believes that

this “dirty” type

of rule over inferiors

should be structured by “the entire administration of law [RechtY'

which would serve

as a crucial tool in the efforts

of the rulers to sub-

due the mob’s “reactive feelings”

(GM II,

cratic societies of antiquity, so

should be in the future: rulers must

use “the institution of law”

it

[die

1 1).

As

it

was

in the aristo-

Aufrichtimg des Gesetzes] “to impose

measures and bounds upon the excesses of the reactive pathos and to

compel

it

to

come

to terms” (ibid.). This,

sistent with the claims of justice, for

wherever

28. “All the different kinds of rule are not, as

For there jects

who

is

some

are

by nature

slaves.” Aristotle,

The

affirm, the

Politics,

i295bi8-22; i324b3i-35.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

I,

is

it “is

one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature

a2C>-24; ii6oaio-b32;

138

he proffers,

7,

entirely con-

practiced and

same

free,

as

each other.

another over sub-

I255bi6-i7. Cf. 1253

maintained one sees

a

stronger power seeking a means of putting an

end to the senseless raging of ressentiment among the weaker powers that stand

under

it” (ibid.).

The just political is

order

is

therefore one in which the vast majority

regulated by stringent legal codes. This

is

as

among

an instrument in the power struggle

it

should be, for law

social forces

and

is

is

one

of the most valuable tools in the hands of the artist-tyrant: “Lawgiving moralities are the principal

means of fashioning man accord-

ing to the pleasure of a creative and profound

such an

make

of the

artist’s will

its

first

rank has the power in

Political

(WP

the majority, Nietzsche

is

rights

is ^^hostile to life,

man” because

bidly weak, those

who

BGE

ii;

historically

“One

The

by the

Especially galling to

universal application of

an agent of the dissolution and

works to the advantage of the mor-

safety,

comfort and an easier

44). In Nietzsche’s view, the

tions of “equal rights”

and constrain

have conspired together to secure rights in

order to enjoy “security, II,

it

vital.

to

a bearer of natural, inalienable

is

and thus deserving of respect.^^

destruction of

(GM

must apply

—even the strongest and most

such egalitarianism

purpose of disciplining

highly critical of liberal democracies for

the notion that everyone

is

957).

for the

their insistence that systems of law

him

hands and can

Agon

While countenancing the use of law

everyone

its

provided that

creative will prevail through long periods of time, in the

form of laws, religions and customs”

The

will,

life

for all”

complementary no-

and “the rule of law” have been employed

inferior as devices for controlling the strong:

speaks of “equal rights”

—

.

.

.

as

long as one has not yet gained

superiority one wants to prevent one’s competitors from growing in

power”

(WP

86;

cf.

29. In arguing thus,

I

WP 80). The weak have always had an interest draw upon Ruth Abbey’s paper, “In

a

Similar Voice: Nietz-

sche on Rights,” presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 1995.

THE ART OF POLITICS

— in

perpetuating the idea that rights are fixed

state

of affairs”

(WS

39)

—rather than

—“a sacred, immutable contingent manifesta-

fluid,

tions of power.^^

In light of his view, expressed in Beyond Good and Evil, The Geneal-

and Zarathustra, that struggle, domination,

ogy,

injury, violence,

why

appropriation are inescapable features of existence, one can see

Nietzsche prefers to look upon of the strong

man

(WP

120).^^ In his

and

rights as provisional “conquests”

all

imagined

political order,

higher hu-

beings are “beyond the law” \Jenseits des Rechts] in the sense that

their negotiations

and struggles with others are not

artificially

con-

strained by an independent juridical system of rights and entitle-

ments

(GM

II,

10).^^

On

the contrary, everything

is

based on merit

and remains perpetually open to negotiation, contestation, and struggle. Instead of equal rights for

Nietzsche proposes a vision

all,

who are “equal-inof sheer ability (BGE 265). This is

of a minority inner circle composed of those rights” [Gleichberechtigen] in virtue

the

meaning of the Nietzschean

The

agon.

agon thus plays as central a role in Nietzschean politics as

it

does in his understanding of friendship. In an early essay entitled

“Homer’s Contest” (1872), he argues that the institutionalized competitions of the Greek agon provided a constructive outlet for the potentially destructive wills of competitors,

Greek community

life

and fostering

its

thereby preserving

high culture. Casting his

eyes to the future, Nietzsche wishes to foster a space of contest and rivalry with a similar function.

obey

that

is

“Who

experimented hereV’ (Z

III,

must be constant and never-ending, tics

“The

12.25).

is

The

who

can

experimentation

one of the basic characteris-

for

of Nietzsche’s higher individuals

can command,

their

burning desire to

rule.

best shall rule,” proclaims Zarathustra, “the best wants to rule!

And where

it is

taught differently, there

—the best

is

lacking'’

(Z

III,

12, 21).

30.

This view,

also

on

offer in

D

1

12

and

HAH 93, casts

tention that in his middle period Nietzsche looked favorably

doubt on Warren’s con-

on

“political cultures that

include equal rights.” Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought, p. 72.

BGE

GM

See

32.

Detwiler notes Nietzsche’s “repudiation of all

259;

II,

ii;

thought” in his Nietzsche and the

140

Z III,

31.

and

Politics

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

12, 10. legalistic

approaches to

ofAristocratic Radicalism, p. 192.

political

Whereas

variants of slave morality hypocritically discourage

all

and disparage the desire for aside

crisy

When

power”

for

“lust

hypo-

evinced by the loftiest of men,

desire scarcely warrants the appellation “lust”: “Lust for

a

power: but

who shall

call it lust,

power! Truly, there

after

open and honest

favor of an

in

[HeiTschsucht\ (Z III, lo, 2).

such

rule, Nietzsche’s ago 7i tosses all

descent!”

(ibid.).

The open

aristocratic inner circle

Whatever inner circle

no

is

is,

when

sickness and lust in such a longing and

clash of

competing

wills to

power

in the

for Nietzsche, a thing of beauty.

tentative, provisional stability there

is

down

the height longs to stoop

in this agonistic

is

the result not of any notion of “social contract” but

rather of the relative equality or equilibrium of strength and virtue that leads to a guarded sense of mutual respect and recognition.^^

Like the nobles of antiquity, Nietzsche imagines his higher types constraining themselves through “custom, respect, usage, gratitude,

and even more by mutual suspicion and jealousy”

with

as well as

“consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship”

(GM

GM

ii; cf.

I,

equality,

II,

In a sociopolitical context of relative

2).

noble types would quite naturally “exchange

and rights” and consider

“from mutual

BGE

injury,

it

“good manners”

.

.

.

honors

[guten Sitteij] to refrain

mutual violence, mutual exploitation”

(BGE

Given the agonistic nature of this community of rivals, however, any social peace would be tentative and temporary, repeatedly giving way to challenges and contests of an unspecified 265;

259).

nature.

With

respect to this inner circle, then, Nietzsche proposes replac-

ing the juridical state and

allegedly small-minded rules and regu-

its

lations with a self-policing

community of outstanding

individuals.

Impartial legal codes would be replaced by the self-governing instincts

who

of those

design their

own punishments this

Rousseauian

when he

claims that

promises and other infractions. Zarathustra evokes scenario of a self-policing citizen-legislator

“when he 33.

ciety

is

See a

[the living creature]

GM

II,

17.

contract (Z

elsewhere that the

for breaking

commands himself

.

.

.

also

must he

Zarathustra similarly decries as “soft-hearted” the view that so-

III, 12, 25).

demand

Contractarianism

is

the likely target

for “oaths instead of looks

temptibly “timid mistrustfulness” (Z

when he

and hands” reveals

claims a

con-

III, 10, 2).

THE ART OF POLITICS

make amends

for his

avenger and victim of his

This cle.

state

of affairs,

What of the mass

elite that itself is

own

enough

34. In his “calls

himself he

is

cir-

Would

we

rule of law in the conventional

turn to the lot of the majority in a

the noble sensibility of their betters be

them from oppression?

middle period Nietzsche advances

is

only to the inner

of ordinary people, subjected to the laws of an

a similar picture

himself to account and publicly dictates his

ing that he

judge and

II,

recall, applies

exempt from the

polity.

to save

law” (Z

we should

sense? In the final chapter

Nietzschean

He must become

commanding.

of a transgressor

own punishment,

in the

proud

who feel-

thus honoring the law which he himself has made, that by punishing exercising his power, the

power of the lawgiver” (D

187;

cf.

D

437).

Ansell-Pearson perceives the Rousseauian nature of this passage in his Nietzsche contra Rousseau:

A

Study of Nietzsche's Moral and

University Press, 1991),

p. 215.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Political

Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge

seven

The

Evil of

the Strong

Noblesse Oblige

A

s

we have

just seen,

Nietzsche rejects the view that the mass

human

beings have inalienable rights and legal

of ordinary

recourse against their betters. In his ideal polity there

right “that

is

not supported by the power of enforcement”

Whereas noble

types

may

at all to the majority

complete license to act toward them

“injustice”

is

i

no

id).

well have obligations toward themselves

and their peers, they owe nothing

WP 943). There

(WP

is

no such thing

as

as

they think best

committing

toward the many-too-many, for

and have

(GM

II, 2;

acts of “justice” or

“justice

can be hoped for

143

.

.

.

only inter pares [among equals]”

926). Against this in

which

background

GM

943;

I,

ii; cf.

WP

hard to avoid imaging a scenario

it is

trampled on by their superiors.

lesser types are

Those

(WP

inclined to dismiss such a scenario often try to deflect con-

cern by pointing to Nietzsche’s repudiation of overt, malicious cru-

Their case seems strong

elty.*

Nietzsche does

at first glance, for

evince an undeniable repugnance for the idea of lording inferior.

weak”

As

early as Daybreak^ he writes that

it is

[das Bose der Schwdche] that ''wants to

the signs of the suffering

it

has caused”

(D

over an

only the “evil of the

harm

371).

it

others and to see

From

the standpoint

of nobility, the idea of gratuitous cruelty toward those clearly infe-

“An easy prey is something contemptible for proud natures” (GS 13). Only vulgar pretenders to virtue take advantage of their positions of power to “scratch out the rior in strength

is

abhorrent:

eyes of their enemies with their virtue”; in Zarathustra’s words, they

lower others” (Z

“raise themselves only in order to

Zarathustra teaches us to “mistrust strong” (Z

II, 7).

He

is

in

whom

it

a

the antithesis of nobility (Z

III, 12,

torment of the abjectly vulnerable would be

We

ment with view,

is

ness

is

1

1).

through malicious

in the

it.

from vulgarity than

Being “prickly toward small things,”

but “the wisdom of a hedgehog” (Z

When

and suffering

worst possible

have already seen, moreover, that Nietzsche

clined to counsel disengagement

contact with inferiors

is

is

more

active

in-

engage-

in Zarathustra’s

III, 5, 2).

unavoidable, a measured polite-

sometimes recommended. Zarathustra claims to exemplify

such politeness “towards every small vexation,” and Nietzsche I.

is

form of “despotism” [Gewalt-

Clearly, the flaunting of one’s superior position

taste.

Elsewhere

the urge to punish

identifies the effort to inflict pain

with bitter resentment and deems HeiTischen\ that

all

II, 5).

insists

Alexander Nehamas, for example, argues that “Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’

the crude praise of selfishness and cruelty with which

it is

is

not

often confused.” Nietzsche:

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 167; cf. p. 2 16. In a passage that wonderfully encapsulates a core assumption of the popular “progressive”

Life as Literature

reading of Nietzsche, Alan WTiite invites us to be “as charitable to Nietzsche as to Aristotle: let us grant that those

who

are

most noble, admirable and self-affirming

not attempt to exploit others.” Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth 1990), p. 130.

nism,”

Political

Bonnie Honig

cites this passage

Theory 21,3 (August 1993): 533.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

(New

approvingly in

will

York: Routledge,

“The

Politics

of Ago-

in his

own voice

him

that his “nature” directs

to be “mild

and benev-

olent towards everyone” and “full of consideration for the basest

EH

II,

magnanimity by restraining

all

people” his

(ibid.;

EH

and maintaining

XIII, 4;

10).

The

noble type also reveals

signs of annoyance at the canaille

a lofty forbearance.

“There

is

often

more bravery

in

containing oneself and passing by,” suggests Zarathustra, “/w order to spare oneself for a worthier enemy!” (Z

There

is

a distinct

GS

III, 12, 21; cf.

echo of ancient moral philosophy

on moderation and forbearance

in one’s interactions

276).

in this stress

with inferiors.

how the niegalopsuchos believes that “an atbe impressive among inferiors is as vulgar as a display of against the weak.”- And when Nietzsche praises mercy

Aristotle also speaks of

tempt to strength

\Gnade\ as the “privilege of the most powerful man,” he seems to

memory of Seneca’s Nero, “On Mercy” (GM

evoke the

influential tract for the

peror

II,

lieves that the gentleness

10).

Like Seneca, Nietzsche be-

with which an exceptional

handles those under his power

is

duty (A

a

young em-

57).

human being

But whereas Seneca

(and Aristotle) crucially speak of the duty of princes towards their charges,^ the

more

radically elitist Nietzsche insists that higher types

any way. They are bound only

cannot be accountable to inferiors

in

by duties to themselves, to

own

those equal in power and

their

sense of good taste, and to

stature."^

Nietzsche assures us that in

a

new order under the

control of well-

bred, high-spirited types with natures that “are the antithesis of the vicious and unbridled,” complete confidence can be invested in their tact,

judgment, and good

taste

(WP

871).

They can be

abuse their absolute freedom, for they possess

a

trusted not to

“dominating

spiritu-

ality” that “put[s] a

check on an unrestrained and

irritable pride

wanton

(GM III,

selves evince a ha-

sensuality”

tred of laisser

aller,

Their disciplined

of “blind indulgence of an affect,” which

2.

Aristotle, Nico 7nachean Ethics,

3.

In

“On Mercy,”

8).

14.1,

i

is

or a

con-

i24b22-23.

Seneca likens the duties of the prince to those of “good

which evokes the notion of strong emotional and ethical bonds. Seneca: Moral and Political Essays, ed. and trans. John M. Cooper and J. F. Procope (Camparents,”

bridge: 4.

Cambridge University

Press, 1995), p- 146.

Peter Berkowitz similarly contends that the Nietzschean nobleman’s politeness

toward inferiors

is

rooted in “considerations of enlightened self-interest.” Nietzsche:

The Ethics of an Inmioralist (Cambridge: Har\'ard University Press, 1995),

THE

EVIL OF

p. 120.

THE STRONG

demned

as “the cause

of the greatest evils”

(BGE

Nietzsche explains that although the noble self

manner (EH

plined

II, 9).

“a

WP

928).

tremendous

and creative impulse,

multiplicity,” full of passionate intensity

“nonetheless the opposite of chaos” and

is

i88;

is

tightly

bound

it is

in a disci-

Bhth

In the language of his early essay The

of Tragedy, the exceptional man’s protean substratum of Dionysian

energy

is

given form and order by an Apollonian discipline.

Yet despite this stress on self-discipline and aristocratic disdain for malicious cruelty, the mass of ordinary people in a Nietzschean polity

might

safety.

The violence

still

have reason for grave concern about their personal

them would have

less to

do

with malicious cruelty than with thoughtless, destructive behavior

is-

that could well befall

suing from the self-absorbed higher type’s creative experimentation.

Violence and the Second Innocence

As noted tially

in the previous chapter,

Nietzsche suggests that the poten-

violent drives of the exceptional

are, for the

most

men

part, tightly controlled in

in his aristocratic

agon

order to maintain a sense

of mutual respect and tenuous order. The Genealogy reveals, however, that the “constraints and conventions” of an agonistic society of

equals create a great psychological tension which cries out for sporadic release.

This

is

illustrated in

The Genealogfs

first essay,

which

depicts the ancient warriors’ need for brief periods of respite

the

agon'’s

from

self-imposed rigor, periods in which their “hidden core”

\verborgenen G?imd\

porarily liberated

would be allowed

to “erupt”

(GM

I,

ii).

Tem-

from the constraining

discipline of their peers,

men found

themselves in a state of

these innocent, high-spirited

nature-like “wilderness” and set about purging their inner tension

by metamorphosing into “triumphant monsters” \frohlockende Ungehener] bent

on

torture” (ibid.).

a

“disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and

Thus purged, they rejoined

undisturbed of soul,” as a students’

A

prank”

if

the agon “exhilarated and

their violent savagery

“were no more than

(ibid.).

sympathetic account of this unleashing of murderous destruc-

tion during periods of respite also appears in Ecce Homo's brief, idio-

146

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

syncratic

comments on

evil in

the serpent in the garden of perat[ing]

There it is suggested that none other than God “recu-

the Bible.

Eden

is

from being God” (EH X,

The

2).

formed, “had made everything too beautiful. the idleness of

God on

perfect world that

its

.

.

seemed

to require

Raiibtiei-Gewisseiis]

is

gone

Having created

a

forever, Nietzsche

modern analogue

“innocent conscience”

(GM

merely

toward destruction and mischief-making.-'*

instincts

of prey-like

is

strength in further cre-

its

appears intent on encouraging something like a beast

Devil

are in-

no further improvement, the

Although the era of the “blond beast”

his

The

that seventh day” (ibid.).

divine creative will, unable to discharge ation, turned

.

we

Almighty,

I,

1 1).

Such an analogue

[die is

to

Unschuld des

suggested in The

where Nietzsche evokes the prospect of

Genealogy^s second essay,

postreligious, noble “second innocence” [zweiter Unschidd]

(GM

a

II,

Only when the Christian legacy of guilt and self-abnegation is purged will the modern type be free, as Nietzsche claims elsewhere, to innocently, joyfully “do things that would convict a lesser man of 20).

and immoderation”

vice

(WT

In Nietzsche’s view, there sort of instinctive

a malicious,

weak and

defenseless.

former

—described

simply no comparison between this

is

need to purge creative tension and the violence

unleashed by the

871).

vulgar character

While the

in a felicitous

his view) the higher type

it

is

enjoys lording

clearly in

bad

it

—

over

taste,

middle-period passage as the

the

“evil

positively life-affirming

(D

an innocent form of cruelty because

(in

of the strong” [das Bose der Starke] 371). Nietzsche considers

latter

who

is

simply cannot do otherwise. As

a

concate-

nation of drives and instincts, a product of forces beyond his conscious control, the exceptional

TI

man

is

“a piece of fate” (TI VI, 8;

cf.

V, 6).

In light of this strong streak of fatalism one must qualify the pre-

vious chapter’s claim that Nietzsche associates nobility with responsibility.

Whereas he hopes

to galvanize his higher

men

into feeling

responsible for raising the species as a whole, he also wishes to dis-

suade them from feeling responsible in any way to ostensibly inferior

5.

Cf. Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche

University of Chicago Press, 1990),

and

the Politics of Aristoa'atic Radicalism (Chicago:

p. 167.

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

human

beings. Indeed, in his account the path to species improve-

ment entails a willful disregard of any accountability to the majority. To berate innocent nobles for their lack of consideration or remorse would betray an adherence

same

to the

slave morality that at-

tempts to engender shame and bad conscience in noble types for

and inclinations. As Nietzsche

their essentially healthy instincts

claims in The Gay Science, the feeling of remorse

“something goes wrong” only for servdle types

reckon with

(GS

sult”

a

beating

of one’s actions

as a result

who “have received when his lordship is

41). In place of

shame,

Zarathustra prefers his sort of

and mendacious systems of

.

have to

.

with the re-

to be “shameless” [Schanilosen]

and impervious to attacks of conscience (Z guilt

.

and vacillating self-doubt,

guilt,

men

satisfied

when

appropriate

is

orders and

not

Rene]

[die

belief,

II, 4).^

Once purged of all

noble souls are expected to

affirm unconditionally their every instinct; they implicitly under-

stand that

the end” (Z

[ShiJie] to

holy” and “follow

“all instincts are

instinct,” after

all, is

I,

22, 2;

Z

II, 2).

A

[their]

own

senses

“complete automatism of

“the precondition for any kind of mastery, any

kind of perfection in the art of living” (A 57; cf. BGE 287). Apart from the destructive venting of built-up tension, Nietzsche

evokes a complementary scenario just as likely to perturb the safety of the many: the prospect of “collateral damage” caused by the creative activity of those obsessively self-absorbed

thing but the task at hand. As

I

argued in the previous chapter, one of

Nietzsche’s favorite images of his the creative sculptor is

if,

in the

new

hammering away

modern humankind. Absorbed

care

sort of political actor

in his

midst of his creative rage, stone fragments are sent

“WTat

me?”

directions:

ments

fly

from the blows of his “raging hammer” (Z

if

is

that to

be in their path? Nietzsche’s likely answer

6.

learn to sacrifice

“From what one hears of it,

anything respectable. 7.

sche’s

I

a

should not

many and

is

—

e.g.,

the

hammers

who happen

does not seem to

an act in the lurch afterwards''

hammer

that “sound out idols” and reveal

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

EH IX, to

found in the Nachlass:

[Geu'issaisbifi]

Eric Blondel interestingly discusses other forms of

work

II, 2; cf.

to take one’s cause seriously

pang of conscience like to leave

fly-

asks Zarathustra, as frag-

the fragments strike unfortunate innocents

“One must

that of

work, the sculptor does not

all

And

is

at the “formless” material that

ing in

8).^

148

and oblivious to any-

(EH

me

11 , i).

imagery^ in Nietz-

them

as

hollow

in

enough not

men” (WP

to spare

by-product of creative activity the grandeur of the

The cendy

also

of

Any

little

suffering produced as a

consequence compared to

artist’s oeuvre.^

possibility of

is

is

982).

evoked

widespread havoc that could be wreaked inno-

in the course of Zarathustra’s descriptions of the

“overflowing” namre of the highest sort and of the need for sudden releases

of the flow. Virtue has

ing” of a heart “broad and a

danger to those

who

origin and beginning” in the “surg-

full like a river”

live

metaphor of the surging

“its

nearby” (Z

river

is

that I,

22,

storm” that

may

we

we

that of a raging

are told,

be mistaken by his “enemies” for

In part IV, moreover,

i).

Further on, the

i).

complemented by

storm: Zarathustra’s “happiness and freedom,” a

both “a blessing and

is

come

“like

(Z

a great evil

II,

learn that the “laughing storm” that

is

Zarathustra’s free-spirited nature has a tendency to “blow dust” in the

eyes of “the dim-sighted and ulcerated” (Z IV, 13, 20).

Once

gression toward an inconsequential plebeian element

is

again, ag-

shrugged off

product of the inner workings of creativity.

as the inevitable, ancillary

Sublimation of Cruelty?

That Nietzsche even countenances such innocent valued future

is

resisted

the foreword to Twilight of the

by those who argue that Nietzschean Idols.

by Nietzsche to the hammer

is

and Culture: Philosophy

as

that of the destruction of mass.” Blondel, Nietzsche, the Body,

p. 106.

lent

For

a similar

hammer

Sean

attempt

self-

Holding an unreser\'edly benign vdew of Nietz-

sche, he insists that “the least important use assigned

Philological Genealogy, trans.

cruelty in a trans-

Hand

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991),

at deflecting attention

away from Nietzsche’s more

imagery, see Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche and

Modem

Times:

A

\do-

Study of

and Nietzsche (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 401-402. Nietzsche’s exceptional men bear a striking resemblance to Hegel’s “world-

Bacon, Descaites, 8.

historical individuals” in this respect. In his lectures a figure”

that gets in his way.” Introduction anapolis: Hackett, 1988), p. 35. sche’s higher

human

to the

This

Philosophy of Histoiy, trans.

parallel,

of course, has

its

Leo Rauch

limits: unlike

(Indi-

Nietz-

beings, Hegel’s world-historical individuals are unwitting ser-

vants of the unfolding Geist.

my attention

history,

who “commits himself unreservedly to one must “necessarily trample on many an innocent flower, crushing much

Hegel describes how “so great purpose alone”

on the philosophy of

My

thanks to Brian Walker and Ruth Abbey for calling

to the parallel.

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

overcoming involves the sublimation of the primitive humanity.

Kaufmann,

cruel, savage impulses of

for example, suggests that Nietzsche

approves of the transformation of overt violence toward others into a “spiritualized” cruelty toward oneself.^ Nietzsche’s

comments

yond Good and Evil and elsewhere on the sublimation and ization” [Vergeistigiin^ of cruelty as preconditions for

in Be-

“spiritual-

modern “high

culture” are said to illustrate his abhorrence of anything like the

oppression found in ancient warrior societies. Nietzsche’s brand of

concludes Kaufmann,

cruelty,

individual’s attitude

is

concerned exclusively with “the

toward himself’ and involves “man’s conquest

of his impulses, the triumph of reason and

—

one word

in

—

self-

overcoming.”^®

would be

It

however, to assume that a description of a

a mistake,

historical process implies

an endorsement of

it.

When we

recall

Nietzsche’s assertion that a “sweetening and spiritualization” [Versiifiimg

und Veigeistigun^

is

“virtually inseparable”

poverty of blood and muscle,”

author of Ecce

mations

it

would seem

from an “extreme

at least possible that the

Homo is not nearly as enamored

with modernity’s subli-

commentators would have us believe

as recent

(EH

I,

i).

Nietzsche does indeed associate the sublimation and interiorization of cruelty with the

mean

of “high culture” in Europe,

rise

by “culture” we

the development and increasing sophistication of the arts and

letters,

and science and technology. But he never considered

culture to be “high” in the sense of noble or lofty; is

if

on the

often referred to depreciatingly as Zivilisation and

vorably with an idealized realm of Kidtur, that

is,

this

high

contrary,

it

compared unfa-

a truly

noble sphere

of human achievement. Nietzsche imagines himself to be clearing the path for a true cultural revitalization in this second sense of the term:

“Only

after

me

are there again hopes, tasks, prescribable paths of cul-

ture \uorziischreihende

9.

Wege der KulturY^

Walter Kaufinann, Nietzsche:

(EH XII,

2).^^

Philosopher, Psychologist, AntiChrist,

4th ed. (Prince-

ton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 228. 10. Ibid., p. 246. Similar

don: Routledge and Literature, pp. 2 11.

1

7-2

Kegan 1

views are expressed in Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (Lon-

Paul, 1983), pp. 276, 331, and

Nehamas,

Nietzsche: Life as

8.

Blondel notes that for Nietzsche, ^Kultur and Zivilisation are opposites from

the point of view of values: the former implies the ‘noble’ values of an intellectual or

I

50

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

While

certainly true that Nietzsche dismissed as nostalgic

it is

nonsense the prospect of

a

return to the unreconstructed “blond

beast” of antiquity, part of his pedagogical-therapeutic project in-

unmanly “tam-

volves urging his imagined readers to throw off the

ing” of their instincts perpetrated by those civilized purveyors of “intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual natures” In The Genealogy

we

inizing spiritualization and sublimation

openly and honestly took pleasure

“Without cruelty there

is

(GM

by contrast, our pleasure

that

is

chical

to say

it

no

festival:

In

(ibid.)-

modern

in cruelty perversely requires “a cer-

and subtilization [Sublmtiemng und Subtilism’im^,

has to appear translated into the imaginative and psy-

and adorned with

II, 6;

one

thus the longest and

.

.

.

innocent names”

(GM II,

Hence the animal “man” in

modern culture that has tamed the by convincing him to repudiate his still intense

(GM

it

upon

in seeing cruelty inflicted

tartuffery of a

part

Previously,

II, 6).

most ancient part of human history teaches” tain sublimation

moderns,

form under the weight of centuries of fem-

lingers only in a debased

times,

12 i)d^

are told that although the “thirst for cruelty”

[Lust an der Grausamkeit] of yesteryear remains with us

others:

(WP

GM

7).

love of cruelty

II,

The Inhuman and the Superhuman Nietzsche believes that the

when

human

species as a

whole

will

advance

most perfect exemplars conduct themselves in accordance with “Dionysian pessimism” and unconditionally embrace an

only

its

spiritual end, while the latter

is

linked to the pejorative appreciation of realizations

considered ‘simply’ material.” Nietzsche, the Body, and Culture, 12.

The

p. 42.

association of Zivilisation with the domestication of higher natures

ther highlighted in

\\T

is

fur-

871: “Struggling ‘civilization’ (taming) needs every kind of

irons and torture to maintain itself against terribleness and beast-of-prey natures.” 13.

Schacht seems to acknowledge Nietzsche’s view of the deleterious effects of

“sublimation” on the will to power

when he

notes that Nietzsche deems

‘sickness’ in relation to the ‘healthy animality’ of a kind

of

life

it

“a

fonn of

governed by an un-

disrupted, smoothly functioning and comprehensive instinct-structure.” Nietzsche, p.

277;

cf.

pp. 389, 434. But he hastens to add that Nietzsche “is far from supposing

that the latter

is

inherently preferable to

it” (p.

277).

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

eternal, “terrible” truth: the inescapably violent, cruel nature of life

(GS

370).

Speaking admiringly of the ancient Greek tragedians for

their recognition of “everything terrible, evil, cryptic, destructive

and deadly underlying existence,” Nietzsche lauds their tragedies for

(BT

laying bare the fearfulness of reality

Philosophers in

Preface

EH XIV,

4; cf.

4).

Hellenistic Greece are taken to task for having

later,

turned away from this important lesson and thus for precipitating their culture’s decline this

.

Preface

A society that turns its back on

i).

hard truth, that sublimates and spiritualizes the cruelty implicit

in existence .

(BT

and embraces an “optimistic, world”

logical interpretation of the

.

doomed

to

go under

hands of

at the

superficial [obafldchlkher], is

already in decline and

courageous enough to embrace the truth (BT Preface

want

257). Nietzsche, for his part, does not

make

honest and

rival cultures still

4; cf.

kindred

his

the mistake of the Hellenistic Greeks. “Terribleness

BGE

spirits to is

part of

greatness” [Zur Grdjse gehdi~t die Furchtharkeit], he intones in his

notebooks, “let us not deceive ourselves”

Once

(WP

1028).

touch with their deepest inclinations and

in

men

sche’s higher

will

come

olence within themselves.

face to face with primordial evil

It is

no accident

exploration of his inner “depths”

in part III,

man

is

este]

in

where Zarathustra declares

is

his best strength

Z

III, 13, 2; cf.

I,

.

.

.

is

that “the wickedest in

[A] 11 that

Part of what

19).

hard

truth:

“man

is

[Untnensch] and III, 13, 2;

growing “better”

that

all

it

is

is

most wicked

means

superhuman

\VP

1027;

cf.

to discover an espe-

also

means growing

[Ubeiynensch]: these

GM

16).

I,

first

cautionary example of someone

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

man

is

in-

belong to-

The Genealogy speaks

between ‘animal and angel’”

“well constituted, joyful mortals”

“pale criminal” of the

[Bbs-

to attain the

beast and superbeast; the higher

similarly of the “unstable equilibrium

a

is

and the hardest stone for the highest

gether” (Z

The

5).

The most evil The same point .

him

“wickeder,” that

within

.

“Evil [das Bose],''

him

heights of normative-spiritual development

human

vi-

necessary for the best in

creator” (Z

cially

evil. .

necessary for the Superman’s best” (Z IV, 13,

made

and

described repeatedly as an en-

is

man’s best strength.

“is a

Nietz-

that the exceptional man’s

counter with an inner core of dreadfulness and claims Zarathustra,

instincts,

(GM III,

part of Zay^athustra

who had

initially

2). is

presented as

made

this discov-

ery

—who took the

initially

courageous step of exploring and revel-

ing in his noble, beastly side morality led

him

in the

erating, all-too-fleeting

committed an

end to

—but whose recoil

indoctrination in slave

and take

moment of mad

flight

from

blood-lust, the pale criminal

thirsted for the joy of the knife [Glilck des Messe 7 's]V^ (Z act,

In a lib-

“wanted blood, not booty: he

act of violence; his soul

immediate wake of the liberating

it.

I,

6).

In the

however, the criminal’s “simple

mind,” slavishly caught up in the dictates of plebeian morality and not wanting “to be ashamed of his madness,” drew him back from his joyous reveling. “‘What

denly taking

not

at least

own,

as a

the good of blood?’” he asks himself, sud-

small-minded, utilitarian view of his action. ‘“Will you

commit

how

imagine its

a

is

a theft too?

Take

a

(ibid.).

Unable

the joyously performed act of violence could stand

monument

to

on

of passionate, innocent self-expression, the

criminal then performs a base action

tempt to

revenge?”’

—he

steals

—

in a pathetic at-

“justify” his violence.

Nietzsche’s point seems to be that only one of refined sensibility

and good breeding, the

initial

fully in

murderous attack

touch with his dark self-justifying.

is

fected by) the herd, this deed could only ried to a vulgar act that ensures

pale criminal

is

some

side,

could see that

But for those of (or

make

in-

sense by being mar-

sort of material “payoff.”

The

thus a “heap of diseases” not because of his terrible,

violent crime but because of a “simple-mindedness” unequal to his

deed

(ibid.).

Nietzsche longs for

a society in

which creative

their actions in the lurch like the pale criminal.

joyfully

hind

it

embraces

(Z

I, 7).

his

destructive consequences.

Only

this

man

beast of prey and serpent in

Rnubtier- iind Schlangeiihafte

man

am

[alles Bose,

Menschen]

Erhbhwig der Spezies

Further on in Beyond Good and

all

free rein,

vestiges of

whatever the

type of society, moreover, would

benefit the species as a whole, for “everyiTing

specific,

His free-spirited

Affirming one’s dark side frees one from

species ‘man’ [zur

longer leave

“madness” and understands the “method” be-

bad conscience and allows the healthy impulses

cal,

men no

Fz;//

dreadful, tyranni-

evil,

Fwchthai'e, Tyraimische, serv^es

to

"'''Meiisch'''’ dieiitY’’

enhance the

(BGE 44).

Nietzsche becomes even more

noting that “certain strong and dangerous drives, such as

enterprisingness, foolhardiness, revengefidness, craft, rapacity, [and]

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

ambition,” while today calumniated and stigmatized by mainstream

must be allowed

morality,

full

expression

(BGE

201). In particular

circumstances, as Zarathustra readily suggests, life-affirming

may

require killing and stealing: “Is there not in

ing and killing?” [ 1st in alle?n Lebeii selber nicht gen] (ZIII, 12, 10).

any universalistic highest sort,

opposes

is

To

all life

itself—steal-

—Raiiben

iind Totschla-

claim the contrary, warns Zarathustra, to place

moral constraints on the actions of the

legal or

to preach “a

all life (ibid.; cf..

sermon of death”

GS

that contradicts

In “the general

and

economy of the

whole,” the unleashing of such potential destructiveness would be a far better

thing than the maintenance of a safe and prudent humani-

tarianism:

“The

fearfulness of reality (in the affects, in the desires, in

the will to power) are to an incalculable degree

more necessary than

any form of petty happiness, so-called ‘goodness’; since the conditioned by granting

it

falsity

latter

is

of instinct one must even be cautious about

a place at all”

(EH XIV,

4).

Nietzsche could not help but profess

a

grudging admiration for

the audacity of an ascetic moral project that sublimates healthy drives and turns the psychic inner

ber”

(GM

II,

16).

As

I

life

of

man

argued in Chapter

i,

into a “torture

however,

this

cham-

grudging

profession of respect for otherworldly asceticism hardly amounts to

strong support. Nietzsche gestures toward the possibility of

a cul-

order that both permits and endorses outward forms of aggression with an openness and innocence of conscience that would outtural

rage

modern

liberal

sign that he was

democrats.

on the

And he would

see their outrage as a

right track.

Against Pity

Although Nietzsche wants

his

higher

men to maintain

connection with their kindred

spirits,

he

slide

from empathy toward

a softening,

calls

an empathetic

upon them

to resist the

feminizing commiseration.

Passages such as these create difficulties for those who, like William Connolly, assume only “fools” think that the Nietzschean conception of nobility could sanction 14.

murder. Connolly, review of Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth by Alan WTiite, ory 29,

154

4 (November

1992): 705.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Political

The-

His disparaging treatment of pity can be explained partly by

his

view

of the deleterious consequences that expressions of pity have for

development

friend’s spiritual

(see

Chapter

4).

To

pity a friend

a

to

is

both insult and mollycoddle him: mollycoddle, because the comforting gestures of the pitier invariably encourage the pitied to

become

reconciled to his weakness rather than overcome

because

insult,

it;

the very act of pitying presumes that the object of pity to misfortune,

when

in fact a truly

mounting and mastering But eration is

a

this is

is

all

noble type

is

is

vulnerable

capable of sur-

fortune.

only one side of Nietzsche’s critique of pity. If commis-

an inappropriate expression of empathy for one’s equals,

also seen as ill-advised

toward

inferiors.

Wherein

lies

it

the danger of

human being showing pity for an inferior? Nussbaum has reminded us how pity can serve to reconfirm and

higher

reinforce the view that both pitier and pitied are tied together by the

bonds of

their

common

for misfortunes befalling

knowledge the just as easily

humanity.*^ In pitying other

them through no

of our

fact

own

vulnerability

have fallen prey to

words, “contains

a

fault

a similar

thought experiment

in

human

beings

we acwe could

of their own,

—the

fact that

misfortune. Pity, in other

which one puts oneself

in

the other person’s place, and indeed reasons that this place might in fact be, or

become, one’s own.”^*^

Nietzsche

and

is

is all

too aware of these cognitive and affective linkages

deeply concerned that any pity for the weak and inferior would

generate bonds of solidarity and commonality that would undermine the psychological distance and feeling of superiority he wishes to foster.

In Ecce Ho?f70 he candidly reveals that his “reproach against those ,

who

practice pity

is

that shame, reverence [die Ehifiircht]^ a delicate

feeling for distance [das Zangefiihl vor Distanzen] easily elude

(EH

I,

4).

To

forming an

down

pity the sufferings of the herd

affective

would be tantamount

a slippery slope

toward

a disastrous identification

of his voca-

As we have seen,

Martha Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism,”

nealogy, Morality, ed.

to

bond with them, leading the exceptional man

tion with the servicing of their needs and interests.

15.

them”

in Nietzsche,

Ge-

Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994),

pp. 139-167. 16. Ibid., p. 157.

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

Nietzsche sees the free of self-indulgence that as a

spirit’s

vocation as lying elsewhere, in

a

form

said to lead to the flourishing of the species

is

whole. Hence the need to combat anything that would tear the

noble type away from himself and those of his kind.

By relegating

the vast majority of the

human

species to an inferior

plane of existence, Nietzsche constructs a lofty imaginative space that remains impervious to the suffering of the many. Zarathustra’s

“mind and longing” “go the remote things” (Z IV,

[only] out to the few,” to “the protracted, 13, 6).

As

for the petty travails of the weak,

haughty and dismissive: “What are your many, little, brief miseries to me!” (ibid.). In light of his inability or unwillingness his attitude

is

to recognize the

common humanity

he shares with these sufferers,

Zarathustra reacts predictably. Indeed, the psychology that undergirds his arrogant imperviousness

was outlined over

a

century earlier

by Rousseau:

Why are kings without pity for their subjects? Because they count on never being mere men. Why are the rich so hard towards the poor? It is because they have no fear of becoming poor. Why does the nobility have so great a contempt for the people? a

noble will never be

Because the talented in their difference

a

It is

because

commoner.'^

men of Nietzsche’s new order are

taught to revel

and superiority and to understand the eternal na-

ture of the rank order, the likelihood of their ever feeling compassion for the majority

is

remote indeed.

nated as canaille must

It

would appear

that those desig-

make do with nothing more than

Nietzsche’s

condescending promise of “gentleness” toward them. {Bien entendu, this is a promise the nobleman makes only to himself; it can always be overridden

The

when

pledge of

the need for venting creative tension a

gentle stance toward the majority

is felt.)

becomes even

more tenuous in light of the naked contempt that Nietzsche’s exceptional humans are expected to hold toward their inferiors. In and of themselves, “the great majority of [ohiie

Recht zu?n DaseinY’

17.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

Basic Books, 1979), p. 224.

872).

Einile, or

Nussbaum

Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism,”

156

(WP

p. 144.

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

On

men

have no right to existence

Their right to

exist

Education, trans. Allan

puts this passage to

is

“a thou-

Bloom (New

good use

York:

in “Pity

and

sand times” smaller than that of their noble betters,

hope

for the future perfectibility of

humankind

who embody the

(GM III,

14).^^

This

unbridled and shameless contempt undergirds Nietzsche’s conviction that the

mass of ordinary humans should be spared the rigors of

Under

the agon.

schajfenen] duel

the presumption that there

[recht-

between unequals, he declares that “where one de-

spises [verachtet]

one cannot wage war” (EH

marked contrast

In

no “honest”

is

I, 7).

mid- to

to his occasional tendency in the

1870s to speak of “the human,

too human,” the foibles of

all

late

human

beings as such, the mature Nietzsche deems the less-than-human majority to be unworthy opponents. In a particularly graphic refer-

ence to those

whom

he

calls

declares that “wherever there

there they crawl like

lice;

from cracking them” (Z

who

morality

“teachers of submission,” Zarathustra is

anything small and sick and scabby,

and only

my

disgust \niein Ekel\ stops

In his eyes, the champions of slave

III, 5, 3).

have been honored hitherto do not count “as belong-

ing to mankind at

all

—to me they are the refuse of mankind

chnfi der Menschheit]^ abortive offspring of sickness

stincts”

(EH

[Anss-

and vengeful

Man

Nietzsche claims that an open expression of fear and trembling

omnipotent

caste of self-aggrandizers

aging sign of social progress

human

—

18. Cf. the third

on

a

wide

and respect for the

scale.

A passage from the

of Nietzsche’s early (1874) “untimely meditations,” “Schopen-

hauer as Educator”: “The question

is this:

how

the highest value, the deepest significance?

can your

How can

it

life,

be

the individual

least

19.

Kxmiplai'e],

squandered? Certainly

and not for the good of the majority, that

individually, are the least valuable [wettlosesteij] exemplars”

Like

many

is

(SE

[selteristen

to say those 6).

recent Nietzsche scholars, Schacht chooses to “pass over Nietzsche’s

rhetorical excesses” because he believes that “dwelling

coming

upon them

my

view'

is

way of

gets in die

to terms with the substance of his philosophical thought.” Nietzsche, p.

Schacht,

receive

life,

only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars

who, taken

at the

would be an encour-

a sign that reverence

species had been reinstated

und weitvolL^en

in-

9 II, io).i

Retrieving the Fear of

sight of his

me

xv Pace

that Nietzsche’s “rhetorical excesses” shed important light

basic politico-ethical stance

and thus should be subjected to

on

his

critical scrutiny.

THE

EVIL OF

THE STRONG

157

middle period suggests that fear “has promoted knowledge of

more than

(D

love has”

Whereas

309).

love often leads us to erect

images of our beloved, visceral terror concentrates the mind and

false

obliges us, for prudential reasons, “to divine

can do, what he wants”

(ibid.).

When

who

the other

is,

likely to

remain foremost

ments on the

is

in their minds. Zarathustra similarly

more com-

desirability of plebeian fear: because the souls of the in-

—the “good and

ferior

a very

what he

the majority are in abject terror

of the strong, in other words, the eternal truth of rank order

is

men

just”

good sign indeed

bar] in their eyes

(Z

—

the higher

if

21).

II,

are “so unfamiliar with

If,

on the

man

what

is

great,”

appears “fearful”

it

\fiircht-

contrary, the majority felt per-

fecdy safe in his presence, something would be terribly wrong. Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view something has gone terribly wrong in

modern Europe, where fear has been replaced with comfort, security, and the maxim “love thy neighbor.” Lamentably, many “naive peoples and men” have succumbed to “the pleasing effect produced by the ‘good man’

[^‘‘giite

keine Fiircht\, he permits

take)”

(WP

386).

The

Mensch’’’^

one

(

—he arouses no

to relax,

fear [er erweckt

he gives what one

cultivation of the

“good man”

is

is

able to

but the

side of the active persecution of the fearful, predator-type

flip

man,

whose near extinction has resulted in a “diminution and leveling of European man” that Nietzsche claims is “owr greatest danger” (GM “Together with the fear of man,” he insists, “we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the I,

12).

will to

him”

(ibid.; cf.

D

551;

BGE

201).

Nietzsche believes that a social order dedicated to human greatness must involve a recovery of the healthy fear of one’s betters. Eor him, the choice fear

is

where one can

clear:

“Who

would not

a

hundred times sooner

admire than not fear but be permanently condemned to the repellent sight of the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atroalso

phied, and poisoned?”

echoes

this

(GM

I,

ii; cf.

WP

91, 386). Zarathustra

sentiment, declaring that he “would rather have noise

and thunder and storm-curses than this cautious, uncertain feline repose and uncertain, hesitating passing clouds” (Z III, 4). Elsewhere he insists that “petty thoughts” are far worse than cruelty: .

.

.

“Truly, better even to have tily!”

158

(Z

II, 3).

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

done wickedly than

to have thought pet-

Conclusion:

The

C

Perils of Agonistic Politics

ompared with political,

his often detailed critique

and cultural institutions and practices and

nealogical explanations of

qualities

how

would take are

him open

to the

left

same

like is just that: a sketch.

would

high-spirited warriors

fight over

might respond that his

new

I.

is

politics

Exactly what his

this

may seem

criticism of emptiness leveled at a

his task

his ge-

and what form their strug-

undetermined. While

philosophical champion of the agon^

social,

they came to exemplify the

he despises, Nietzsche’s sketch of what an agonistic

of the future would look

gles

of modern

Hannah

to leave

more recent

Arendt,^ Nietzsche

not to prescribe in precise detail

how

philosopher-rulers should exercise power. Providing a de-

Hanna

Pitkin, “Justice:

On

Relating Private and Public,”

Political

Theory 9

(1981): 327-352.

159

tailed blueprint for political action

to

showing disrespect

for the

would, in his view, be tantamount

agency of his free

However, even considering

spirits.

this steadfast refusal to

provide firm,

prescriptive rules for future conduct, the broad outlines of a Nietz-

schean agonistic politics are nevertheless

clear.

that a castelike society, offering unparalleled

competitive challenges to the finest of men,

Nietzsche believes

freedom and unending is

essential for revivify-

ing the creative capacities of the species. Political action aimed at instituting the new order would put a stop to the centuries-old effort of “public opinion” to condition the finest specimens of humanity to serve the interests of the mediocre majority. Living in a sphere un-

by the close proximity of ordinary human beings, Nietzsche’s high-spirited aristocrats would devote themselves to artistic-political achievement in an intensely competitive ag07i. Constrained only by a tainted

sense of respect for and gratitude toward their peers and focused on the contests and challenges at hand, they think nothing of using the

mass

as

fodder for their creative enterprises.

They

also accept with

equanimity the prospect of widespread destruction and loss of that occur as a by-product of their innocent experimentation.

This model

how

example,

is

pervaded with unresolved tensions.

It is

life

unclear, for

the long-term institutional stability so prized by

Nietzsche could become

a reality in light

of his refusal to counte-

nance any brake on the experimentation of his highest men beyond the restraints imposed by powerful rivals. In his unwillingness to consider the idea that a stable social and political order requires even the finest specimens of humanity to submit to a more systematic

regime of

discipline,

Nietzsche compares unfavorably to

ber, his great successor in

German

social

and

Max We-

political thought. Al-

though Weber expressed some rather Nietzschean reservations about bureaucratic routinization the process whereby the achieve-

—

ments of charismatic, innovative leaders are transformed into stable institutional forms he at least took this phenomenon seriously and

—

accepted (albeit unenthusiastically) the prospect of a tradeoff. Nietzsche cannot bring himself to do this; his aristocratic radicalism runs too deep. As

order

is

avowed

interest in a durable sociopolitical

compromised. Another source of tension

writing, as

i6o

a result, his

we have

seen,

is

the lack of fit

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

bemeen

in Nietzsche’s

his insistence

upon

the dependency of higher types inferiors) for full

human

on others (both friends/enemies and

flourishing and his occasional evocation of a

form of self-sufficiency incompatible with any form of sociability or dependency.^ Despite these

many contemporary

difficulties,

political theorists

philosophers and

have been quick to reclaim the Nietzschean agon

for egalitarian political purposes. Despite Nietzsche’s repeated insis-

tence that a natural hierarchy of

human

types

is

one of the unalter-

able “hard truths” of existence, they assure us that his aristocratic

radicalism

is

but

detachable module in

a readily

a

broader, subversive

philosophical project that could be pressed into service for radically

democratic ends. His unmasking of the dishonesty, hypocrisy, and

and

ressentiment of ruling classes political,

his insistence

on the primacy of the

of struggle and contestation, are seen as useful tropes for

those interested in celebrating the fact of pluralism, diversity, and difference and

—more

—championing the

specifically

interests of the

marginalized and disadvantaged.^ Nietzsche’s transfer into the

of radical democracy, as already noted,

is

often expedited by collaps-

ing his work into that of Foucault, whose well-known

conformism and resistance of the agon I

much more

remain

skeptical,

camp

call for

non-

to oppressive “normalization” render talk

palatable for democratic sensibilities.

however, about recent theoretical efforts to

reconcile a radical Nietzschean agon with egalitarian political aspira-

2.

Those who

take Nietzsche to be a forerunner of

postmodern philosophy may

well be tempted to dismiss such concerns for consistency by pointing to his alleged de-

construction of such “logocentric” categories. This view Nietzsche’s belief that the

impels him to “demand.

. .

mand

3.

difficult to reconcile

Preface

greater and greater precision.” Philosophers of his sort de-

and buts

.

.

.

[are]

evidence of one

all

of their “values,”

will, one health, one soil, one

sun”

2).

Nietzsche

has been

“ifs

with

of knowledge” of his ideal philosopher

consistency: they have “no right to isolated acts of any kind”;

“yeas and nays,”

(GM

will

is

is

deemed

not the only radically antidemocratic modern thinker whose work helpfully subversive by radical democrats.

Mark

Lilia has recently

written of a similar attraction of opposites in the curious left-wing admiration for the

Nazi-sympathizing constitutionalist Carl Schmidt. “In the view of some European leftists,

Schmitt was

a radical (if

right-wing) democrat whose brutal realism can help

us today to rediscover ‘the political’ distinction

is

said to

remind us that

emy of Liberalism,” New

.

.

.

[H]is unabashed defense of the friend-enemy

politics

is,

York Review of Books,

above

May

all,

struggle.” See Lilia,

“The En-

15, 1997, p. 42; cf. p. 39.

THE

PERILS OF AGONISTIC POLITICS

tions.

The

notion of unending struggle or competition has an unde-

niable appeal, of course, in particular, circumscribed fields of en-

Open-ended

deavor.

many

fields,

from

struggle does indeed have a salutary effect in

ual contestability of one’s

will

political struggle

perpet-

achievements and victories guards against

complacency and keeps one on one’s tumble

The

philosophy to figure skating.

political

Moreover, rough-and-

toes.

among and between

individuals and groups

always remain an integral component of any democratic politics

worthy of the name. one thing to acknowledge the necessity of these circum-

It is

scribed forms of struggle;

it

quite another, however, to follow

is

Nietzsche in celebrating a universalization of struggle, to posit per-

Those who do so in theory would have us believe that its actualization in practice would improve our democracy. The unending, unbounded nature of agonistic struggle, in this view, would guard against any imposition of a petual contestation as a normative goal in

stultifying,

permanent hierarchy. But

consistently

Could

it

worked

is

such

out, truly inimical to

not conceivably lead to

a

itself.

a vision,

all

once

debunking of key liberal-democratic suffrage,

as

rights

as

it

and

forms of domination?

equal —such our notions of universal human the establishment of —even

verities

fully

resists

respect, a

and

permanent

structure of hierarchy?

Postmodern

theorists, as

good democrats,

rightly (and thankfully)

shrink from such imaginings. But their adherence to the contemporary democratic consensus reveals a crucial disjuncture between their

bold rhetoric of unbounded struggle and their more constrained substantive politics.

The

theoretical call for a politics constituted

an “endless subversion of codes”

is

routinely belied by a

in the face of the

wants and needs of

of previous ages were

less reluctant to

others."^ Political

make

The

phrase in quotation marks comes from

Dana

sense of this willingness

R. Villa,

the Public Sphere,” American Political Science Revieu' 83,

should note that in this

upon Nietzsche,

article Villa

in his depiction

moral su-

“Postmodernism and

(September 1992): 719. I draws upon Foucault and Arendt, rather than

of a postmodern

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

will

philosophers

theoretically; John Stuart Mill, for example, claims that the

4.

humane,

demands of one’s

liberal-democratic willingness to attenuate the

by

politics.

3

— periority of

modern

civilization lies in

—what he

disciplined restraint

successful inculcation of

its

the “social principle”

calls

—

in those

of “strong bodies or minds.”^

Postmodern

political thinkers balk at this language, preferring a

politics that resists all

forms of discipline and “normalization.” Mil-

lian talk of social discipline, in this view,

carries within

And

sion.

it

a subtle, insidious

is

but

a

Trojan horse that

form of domination and repres-

the fact that Mill evokes the need for discipline and civi-

lization in order to justify the British imperialism of his time

seems

to strengthen the argument.

am

I

concerned, however, that

dismiss Mill’s views in

toto

a

key insight

Postmodern democra-

are,

modern

civilization.^ Fragile

they remain achievements; although

it

has

unfashionable to say so in contemporary political theory, that

a

because they take for granted the (admittedly ten-

uous) moral and legal achievements of

me

when we

can make blithe assumptions about the benignity of

politics of struggle

though they

lost

because of his ideological implication in

the nineteenth-century imperialist enterprise. tic theorists

being

is

one of liberal democracy’s great

historical

it

become

seems to

achievements has

been the establishment of institutional barriers that prevent the into the type of radically politicized competitive space for

slide

which

“On Liberty,” chapter 3, in John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 67. Mill, of course, was con5.

See

cerned that modern democratic societies were succeeding straint

all

too well in their con-

of individuality and spontaneity, and struggled to oudine a vision of the

politi-

would combine the necessity of disciplined restraint with the encouragement of forms of human excellence that would not endanger the public safety. Nietzsche, who in \VP 30 dismisses Mill as a “flathead,” was disdainful of any endorsement cal that

however 6.

which

qualified

—of modern

civilization’s

“taming” of strong individuality.

See, for example, William Connolly’s picture of a “politics of disturbance” in “friends, lovers,

tual appreciation

and adversaries” restrain themselves

in the

end “through mu-

of the problematical bases from which they proceed.” Connolly, The

Ethos of Plia-alization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 29. If this picture of self-restraint through radical self-doubt

mind, to

a preexistent, taken-for-granted

of something

at the

at all attractive,

achievement of

like Mill’s social principle.) I

and Modernity” (paper presented

is

it is

civilization. (I

due, to

am

my

thinking

argue this at greater length in “Agonism

annual meeting of the American Political Sci-

ence Association, Boston, September 1998).

THE

PERILS OF AGONISTIC POLITICS

Nietzsche yearns. At their very best dition

—

liberal

—

sadly,

an all-too-rare con-

democracies provide protection and means of

self-

betterment for society’s most vulnerable members.^ Nietzsche

is

certainly correct in pointing out that the entrench-

ment of notions of universal and equal

rights in liberal democracies

serves to inhibit the strong and aggressive. But

some

version of the egalitarian ideal, ^ should

if

we

subscribe to

we not embrace what

Nietzsche decried about modern liberal democracies, namely that they treat rights as something very different from the booty of victors?

Competing Conceptions of the Agon As

suggested above,

I

it

would be

a grave

mistake to denigrate the

of contestation in liberal-democratic politics altogether.

role

A

regime that takes individual and group rights seriously must include an agon of sorts

—although not of the Nietzschean

variety.

Once we

turn to the Western philosophical tradition in search of an ideal of political contestation

more

in line with liberal-democratic sensibili-

Aristotle appears to be of

ties,

Seeing the former

much

greater help than Nietzsche.

an agonistic thinker of any sort has until re-

as

cently been difficult in light of the popular “communitarian” association of Aristotle with

communal harmony and shared understand-

ings. Fortunately, Aristotle has

role in the “liberal vs.

Among

been wrenched out of

his confining

communitarian” debates of the 1980s by those

many contemporary political theorists who criticize the inability or unwillingness of our governments to make good on these commitments are those who argue that a truly just political order must make room for forms of political expression 7.

the

not readily suited for agonistic competition

— for example, the more

tentative, concil-

and consensual forms that are often associated with the feminine. See, for example, Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative iatory,

Democracy,”

in Deynocracy

and

Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed.

Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 8. Just why we

subscribe to

it is

no

idle question.

As

I

why we adhere

to views about the equal

beings.

164

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

20-1 35.

argue below,

with Nietzsche can provoke us into usefully articulating what ered self-evident:

1

a

confrontation

too often

is

consid-

moral worth of

all

human

all

who

rightly highlight his clear-eyed

cal conflict in

even the most stable regimes.^ But what

democratic eyes than the

a suspicion

The

assumptions

elitist

of democracy into his political models?

aristocratic tastes

chos are undeniable, as

is

and gestures of the Aristotelian inegalopsu-

Aristotle’s

tendency to

as a yardstick^®

However, the

from the Nietzschean Ubemtensch

Nietzsche,

of virtue should be

inegalopsuchos

one key

in

insist, like

man

that the perceptions and intuitions of the

looked upon

about

it

possess an aristocratic sensibility and build heavy

and

is it

politi-

more promising to liberalNietzschean variety? Did not Aristotle also

agonism that makes

Aristotelian

countenance of perpetual

respect: the

is

distinct

former

is

not granted the absolute discretionary power that Nietzsche’s excep-

man demands

tional

Even the

as his right.

best of us, argues Aristo-

can have our judgment distorted by personal interest and pas-

tle,

sion: “Desire

is

a wild beast,

when they

even

and passion perverts the minds of rulers,

are the best of men.”^^

Hence

the need for law,

which, as a mechanism denuded of passion and particular attachments, ensures the constancy and stability required for the mainte-

nance of public order. By declaring the rule of law to be “preferable to that of any individual,”^^ Aristotle tempers the agon in a

unacceptable to the self-policing hubristic

man

manner

of Nietzsche’s fan-

tasies.

At one point Aristotle does seem to toy with the prospect of spiriand moral

tual

individual

who

perfectibility as far

is

above mortals. Such

from

all

when he imagines

the discovery of an

above other citizens in virtue

as the

gods are

he concedes, should be exempt

a divine being,

law and given absolute power.

Aristotle’s skepticism

dent, however, in his conclusion that “since this

is

is

evi-

unattainable, and

kings have no marked superiority over their subjects,”

all

should sub-

own

are

more upon

mit to the 9. tice,

law.^"^

“In our

day,” he observes,

See especially Bernard Yack, The

and

P -oble fis of a

Conflict in Aristotelian Political

7

7

“men

Political

Annual: Coftwtunity, Jus-

Thought (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1993). 10. See, for

example, Aristotle, Nico?nachean

11. Aristotle,

The

Ethics,

i

i66ai2-i3;

i

lydaiy-ip.

Politics,

12. Ibid.,

i287a2o.

13. Ibid.,

I284a3-i5;

14. Ibid.,

i332b22-30.

cf.

i332bi5-2o.

THE

PERILS OF AGONISTIC POLITICS

an equality, and no one

is

so immeasurably superior to others” as to

warrant blanket exemption from the lawsd** Aristotle’s refusal to seriously

countenance the prospect of human

him to suggest that the best polls would allow less talented citizens some share of political power. Whereas an allpowerful individual “is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion” and have his judgment perverted, the demos is “less perfectibility also leads

easily corrupted”

Although

and can thus serve

as individuals “they

have special knowledge, as

a

as a safeguard to

may be worse

body they

good

order.

judges than those

are as

good or

who

better,” pro-

vided, of course, they have not been “utterly degraded” by poverty, disease, and/or oppression.

Nietzsche, by contrast,

contempt

is

much more

inclined to maintain a lofty

for the less resourceful, insisting

on

self-evident fact and scornfully dismissing the

their degradation as a

poor

taste

of Aristo-

suggestion that the artist-legislator might have something to

tle’s

from those subject

learn

unlike Aristotle’s,

is

to his laws.^^ Nietzsche’s artist-legislator,

an artist-tyrant

who

can accept challenges to his

authority only from a select circle of peers. sists

that respect for the dignity

found

disrespect for the

needs and wishes of the vast majority,

maintains that there

totle

Whereas Nietzsche inof humankind requires showing pro-

is

Aris-

something worthy of respect and

admiration even in the lowliest.

The

can sustain

of shared interest in the Aristotelian

polls,

a political friendship

talented and the less able,

who

can experience only contempt and fear for each other in the

community envisioned by Nietzsche. 15. Ibid.,

131336-9.

16. Ibid.,

1286332-35.

17. Ibid.,

1282315-17.

“There 3re some

18. 3 rtists

3rts

whose products

3re not judged of solely, or best,

by the

themselves, n 3 mely those arts whose products are recognized even by those

who do

not possess the

art; for

example, the knowledge of the house

is

not limited to

the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house will actually

be

a

better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than

the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.” Ibid.,

1282317-25. 19.

“The weak and

ill-constituted shall perish [zu

o«r philanthropy ['nnsrer' Menschenliebe]" (A

166

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

2).

Griwde gehn]:

first

principle of

Democracy

Nietzsche’s Importance for Liberal

If,

as partisans

in favor of the Aristotelian variety,

sche’s legacy?

we

of liberal democracy,

reject

Nietzschean agonism

what are we

make of Nietzpre-Walter Kaufmann era,

Are we to return to the

to

when Nietzsche was banished from all respectable academic discourse? Some have suggested this might be for the best; Alasdair MacIntyre, for example, considers the Nietzschean Uben?iensch better suited for a bestiary

than for serious philosophical scrutiny.^®

Friends of democratic equality might be better advised, however, to

The

attend seriously to his message.

point

is

not to “discredit”

Nietzsche but rather to invite democracy’s friends to face the depth of his challenge head-on with

mocratic

a

reasoned and effective defense of de-

ideals.

Like other keen nineteenth-century European observers of modern Western civilization, Nietzsche feared that the post-Christian, liberal,

and democratic emphasis on equality and rights was eroding

the sociopolitical conditions for the flourishing of

He, no

less

than J.

S.

human

greatness.

Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, uncovered the

penchant of “democratic man” for the “pitiable comforts” associated with a terial

life

dominated by the narrow pursuit and accumulation of ma-

goods.^^ All of these thinkers

warned of the “leveling” of mod-

ern culture as democratic majorities lose their traditional deference and, through prurient, suffocating attention and envy, chase those still

capable of grand achievement to the margins.

In

many ways

thinker such as Tocqueville

a

is

more

palatable for

the egalitarian-minded, largely because his worries are balanced by a

genuine admiration for democratic virtues and the hope that countervailing factors (especially religious belief)

would check

its

narrow

some element of transcendent

striving in the

democratic populace. Perhaps Nietzsche’s continuing

ability to dis-

materialism and sustain

concert

lies in his

calls for

21.

rejection of

countervailing measures.

We

A

Study

20. Alasdair

versity of

uncompromising

Notre

Macintyre, After Virtue:

Dame

Tocquevillian

must choose, he in

insists,

be-

Moral Theory (Notre Dame: Uni-

Press, 1984), p. 22.

See Alexis de Tocqueville, Dernoa'acy

vol. 2, part 2, chaps, i,

all

14 and part

4,

chaps. 6,

in

America, vol.

i.

Part

i,

chaps.

3, 5;

7.

THE

PERILS OF AGONISTIC POLITICS

— tween democratic equality and cultural entropy on the one hand and inequality and heightened levels of

Contemporary

political

human

flourishing

philosophy has “responded” to

schean claim with either silence or obfuscation.

minded philosophers and cially

on the

political theorists

—

I

this

Nietz-

Many egalitarianam thinking espe-

of partisans of liberalism in the Anglo-American academy

consider talk of such a choice both distasteful and dangerous. the insistence that is,

other.

all

Hence

such “perfectionist” talk be marginalized, that

barred from political debate and relegated to

a private

sphere of

aesthetic self-expression. In order to join in respectable political dis-

we

cussion,

are told,

we must

already be part of the “overlapping

consensus” that accepts certain beliefs

moral worth of for the

weak

—

—

for example, in the equal

human beings, and in the importance of concern givens. To try to articulate and defend publicly the

all

as

assumptions behind these beliefs would be divisive and

futile,

be-

cause (they claim) such efforts invariably introduce metaphysical

may not be to everyone’s liking in a modern pluralistic society. To ensure maximum inclusiveness, they conclude, public debate must simply accept equality as a given and move and/or religious values that

on

to matters of procedural justice

and rights adjudication.^^

Citi-

zens whose lives exemplify particular conceptions of human flourishing and

who complain

that the public

commitment

to equal treat-

ment undermines these conceptions must not expect order to accommodate their concerns in any way.

One

self-declared

this view,

“postmodern

liberal,”

the political

Richard Rorty, echoes

claiming that the optimal arrangement for those

who

share

the “moral intuitions” of Western liberal democracies involves a politics

that excludes public debate over basic values and a private

given over to expressivist and perfectionist urges.

life

Although Rorty

invokes Nietzsche as an inspiration for the “private,” expressivist

component of

convenient arrangement, he ignores Nietzsche’s

2 2.

Both John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas

23.

Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in

ativism,

and

ty^pify this attitude.

Objectivity, Rel-

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also his Conand Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Ti'iith

tingency, Irony,

168

this

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

own profound skepticism about such easy compartmentalization. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Nietzsche casts doubt on the very possiof

bility

and admirable form of “private” expression

a satisfying

in

the face of an ambient political culture that discourages innovation.

Much

modern

like

feminists, he wants to

unmask

conventional lines between the personal and the

as spurious the

political, insisting

that self-overcoming at the individual level can succeed only with a radical

revitalization

of culture.

(Unlike

modern

feminists,

of

course, he insists that such revitalization entails a forceful public reassertion of antiegalitarian and masculinist values.)

We

would do well

sion to ignore Nietzsche’s charges.

simply as

wisdom of the popular deciBy taking the belief in equality

to question the

given in debates about justice, by encouraging inarticu-

a

paramount questions as “why equality?” and “equalof what?,” political philosophy abandons rigorous argument in

lacy over such ity

good faith. It is sometimes asserted that democracies have no need of a reasoned defense because an-

favor of pious wishes and liberal

tidemocratic visions of a Nietzschean sort are increasingly marginalized in the West.

But even

if

we

grant the accuracy of this socio-

logical claim, the

assumption that democratization eliminates the

need for reasoned

justification

to Rorty,

tendentious. In a recent response

is

Adam

Stephen Mulhall and

Swift put the matter co-

gently:

may well be

It

that the ethical and political vocabularies of Nietz-

sche and Loyola are losing their grip on Western culture as a

whole; but any individual

who

thing and wants to speed

it

regards this development as a good up,

must do so by revealing the

poverty, ugliness and irrelevance of these vocabularies in argu-

ment^ not by declaring that development to have been completed

24.

Daniel

“‘healthy’

W. Conway

self-creation

is

rightly notes Nietzsche’s unequivocal

never

strictly

private”

because

it

insistence that

always involves “a

Dionysian element of excess or superfluity” that could not abide being stricted to a private sphere. Nietzsche p. 129. litical

Keith Ansell-Pearson makes

and

a similar

the Political

point in

(London: Routledge, 1997),

An Introduction to Nietzsche as Po-

Thinker (Camhndge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.

THE

artificially re-

1

70-1 72.

PERILS OF AGONISTIC POLITICS

already. be,

it

However devoutly

will

So long

to be wished this

not be brought about by wishing alone.^^

as political theorists

and philosophers dismiss Nietzsche’s

radical aristocratism as uninteresting

against

25.

consummation may

democracy

will

Stephen Mulhall and

and

trivial, his

serious charges

remain unanswered.

Adam

Swift, Liberals

and Com?n Unitarians (Oxford: Black-

247 (emphasis added). 26. In arguing thus I draw upon Ruth Abbey and Fredrick Appel, “Domesticating

well, 1992), p.

Nietzsche:

170

A Response

to

Mark Warren,”

NIETZSCHE CONTRA DEMOCRACY

Political

Theory 27:1 (February 1999).

1

Index Beiner, Ronald, 135

Abbey, Ruth, 40, 46, 48, 54, 77, 83, 92, 94,

1

14, 139, 149,

Berkowitz, Peter, 10-13, 21, 36, 57, 77,

170

85, 94, III, i2C^2i, 145

Acampora, Christa Davis, 33 Anderson, Benedict,

“Blond beast,”

1 1

Blondel, Eric,

Annas, Julia, 79

Aristode, 37, 50, 73, too, 107, 127-28, on 138, 164; on friendship, 86-87, 96;

164-66; on

Augustine, Saint, 135

114

inheritance, 109-16; religion as a tool

133-35

and

otherworldly transcendence, 25, 61,

Assoun, Paul Laurent, 22

2,

Burgard, Peter J., 96

Ascetism, 35,45,98, loi, 109, 115, 154; ascetic priest, 35-36, 70;

Brandes, Georg,

for,

and nature, 32-33

and the

Booth, Wayme, 58 Breeding, 61, 106-9, 130; and

the great-souled man, 45, 57, 145,

virtue

also

Instinct

Arendt, Hannah, 159

political agon,

148-50

Body, 21-22, 28, 47, 62-63.

133, 142, 169

on the

9, 33,

Bloom, Allan, 10

Ansell-Pearson, Keith, 13, loi, 131,

165;

6, 54, 57, 60, 147, 151

1

15

Cancik, Hubert, 113 Christianity,

i,

18, 29, 37, 64, loi,

147; ascetic strain in, 97-98;

171

5

2

1

C'hristianity, (cont.) antipolitical nature

123-25; and free

of,

1

1

will,

47-48;

political usefulness of, 44,

133-36

Clark, Maudemarie, 18, 31, 73-75, 97

Romand, 4 Commanding. See Ruling C.oles,

Fortuna. See

1

Luck

Foucault, Michel,

9-1

3,

161

1,

Freud, Sigmund, 22 Friendship, 14, 79, 83, 155; agonistic,

86-93, 141? male-female, 93-96

Connolly, W^illiam E., 3-4, 52, 82,

Gobineau, Joseph-Arthur de,

1 1

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von,

154, 163

Contempt:

of nobility, 42-43,

as sign

65-66, 76, 157 Conway, Daniel VV.,

5,

38,

90

Habermas, Jurgen,

169

28, 168

Courage, 40, 60, 62, 71-72, 145; to embrace hard truths, 6, 20, 38

Health, 24, 26, 37, 60 Hegel, Georg Wlhelm Friedrich, 149

Craig, Leon,

Herd

1

Cruelty: innocent, 147-49; sublimation of,

150-52

Danto, Arthur,

10, 16

prelude to grand

130-31, 133. See

Honig, Bonnie, 3-4, 82, 119, 144 Hunt, Lester, 1

Instinct, 21-25, 28-32, 38, 41,

Decadence, 24, 26, 35, 52 Democracy: characteristic vices 128-29;

morality. See iMorality: slave

47-48,

55-56, 62, no, 148, 153-54. See of,

also

Body

politics,

also Equality;

Justice, 50-51,

143-44

Modernity Derrida, Jacques, 9-1 Detwiler, Bruce, 1

18, 140,

2, 13, 33,

Kaufmann, Walter, 8-10, 94, 107, 112,

147

Deutscher, Penelope, too

82, 90, 106,

1

19, 12

Kofrnan, Sarah,

9,

Kymlicka, Will,

7

1,

13, 33, 57,

150, 167

94, 102

Diethe, Carole, 33

Domination, 128, 140 Dovi, Suzanne, 8, 1 18

Lampert, Laurence,

Drives. See Instinct

La Rochefoucauld,

Duty,

Law, 138-42, 165-66; ofManu, 98;

7,

143-44, 147-48

Dworkin, Ronald,

7

8, 12, 17, 51,

126, 149

natural, 19, Leiter, Brian

,

le

Due

de,

46

23-24 17-18, 23, 28, 46,

50, 68 Lilia,

Mark, i6i

Love, Nancy,

13, 13

Lowith, Karl, 131, 133 Luck, 51-52, 76-80, 108 Eternal return, 73-76, 103-4; ^”^1

Luther, Martin,

no, 135

unconditional affirmation, 64

Feminism, 96, 98-102, 169

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 57, 78-79, 95, too, 122, 124

Ferry, Luc,

MacIntyre, Alasdair,

1

Filmer, Sir Robert, 135

INDEX

Magnus, Bernd,

ro, 82,

10, 13

167

3

Mara, Gerald, Mill,

8,

1

Ressenthnent, 40, 139;

Romanticism,

19,

150-51, 163-64; and industrialism,

Rorty, Richard, 4,

130-32

Rosen, Stanley, 1

1;

master, 6, 43; slave,

2, 6,

37-52, 129

38, 102, 120,

Sadler, Ted,

126

10, 13, 16, 28,

57-58, 73, 119, 121, 127, 132-33,

150-51, 157

Schmidt, Carl, 161 1

,

9, 76,

1

14 Nietzsche, Friedrich: antipolitical

17-19; against nostalgia,

of, 3-5,

9-10,

17-18, 20

Selfishness, 14, 64-65, 125

Socrates, 47, 55-56, 78-79,

1

55, 78, 80, 82,

25, 126

Solomon, Robert, Stern, J. R, 12

155-56

19,

and suffering,

70-73

Nihilism, 20, 53, 69, 130

Nussbaum, Martha,

no

Solitude, 13-14, 81-83; pernicious effects of, 84-85;

161-63

9(^91,

of,

Seneca, 145

6,

56-58; as pedagogue, 12, 59-61;

postmodern readings

Science, 16, 22-23, 36; positivist notions

Sen, Amarty'a, 7

interpretations of, 12-13, 1

1

Schutte, Ophelia,

44 150

Nietzsche, Elisabeth Foster-, 104,

156

Schacht, Richard, 12-13, 45, 57, 82,

Nehamas, Alexander,

^

1

Ruling, 32, 127-32, 140

Nature, 19, 32-38

137,

33-34 10, 168-69

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 100, 124; on pity,

Mulhall, Stephen, 169-70

Napoleon,

and revenge,

43,69

Moderation, 45-47 Modernity, i, 38, loi, 122-25,

Morality,

1

Renaut, Alain, 10, 12

18

Stuart, 8, 162-63, 167

John

2

Stoicism, 13, 66-67, 78-80

Strong, Tracy B.,

Owen, David, 4-5

5, 10, 24, 57,

82, 106,

III, 121, 132

Perspectivism,

Swift,

28

5,

Adam, 169-70

Pippin, Robert, 14, 76, 85 Pitkin, Pity,

Taste, 26-27, 59, 144-47; ethical

Hanna, 159

significance of, 27-28

91-93, 154-57

Plato, 14-15, 46, 56, 136;

ofFonns,

18,

1

140-41, 146,

119-23, 148-49

art,

3, 12,

35, 57

Thus Spoke Zarathustra: irony

12

Politics: agonistic, 4, 6-7,

Taylor, Charles,

Thiele, Leslie Paul, 13, 17, 119

137

Pletsch, Carl, 61,

159-62; as

and the theory

in, 14;

Nietzsche’s assessment of, 104; the “pale criminal”

in,

152-53

Tocqueville, Alexis de, 135, 167

Racism,

9,

1 1

i-i

2

Rangordnung. See Rank order

Rank

order, 6, 23-30, 49, 65, 122,1 26,

Transcendence: earthly,

19, 62

Truth, II, 18-19, 22, 24-28, 30, 36, 152

128, 156, 158

Rawls, John, 168

Vanity, 40-41

Reason, 22, 25, 55-56

Villa,

Dana

R.,

162

INDEX

173

Virtue, 13, 21, 32, 34, 39-41, loi, 105, 149; of the herd, 64, 82, 92, 94, 129;

and nature, 32-35; woman’s, 97-98. See also Courage; Duty; Moderation

Williams, Bernard, ii, 32, 57, 80, 125, 136

Will to power, 27, 30-32, 35-36, 43, 49, loi, 119, 127, 154

Women, 93-102 Walker, Brian, 149

Warren, Mark,

174

4, 82, 107, 128,

Weber, Max,

20,

WTiite, Alan,

5,

INDEX

160

144, 154

140

Yack, Bernard,

Young,

Iris

5, 33, 37,

Marion, 164

Young, Julian, 120

165

I

i:

V