New Technologies as a Factor of International Relations [1 ed.] 1443891118, 9781443891110

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New Technologies as a Factor of International Relations

New Technologies as a Factor of International Relations Edited by

Monika Szkarłat and Katarzyna Mojska

New Technologies as a Factor of International Relations Edited by Monika Szkarłat and Katarzyna Mojska This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Monika Szkarłat, Katarzyna Mojska and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9111-8 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9111-0

CONTENTS

List of Figures........................................................................................... viii List of Tables .............................................................................................. ix List of Pictures and Maps ............................................................................ x Introduction ................................................................................................ xi Part I New Technologies, New Reality, New Paradigms of International Relations? Technological Turn and the New Framework of International Relations.... 2 Tomasz StĊpieĔ New Technologies as a Factor of the “Spatial Turn” in International Relations .................................................................................................... 20 Katarzyna Mojska Technology and a New International Distribution of Power ..................... 35 Lech Zacher Anarchy Is What Technology Makes Of It: How to Assess the Role of New Technologies in the Social Construction of War and Peace ......... 53 Ariel Kabiri Part II New Technologies as a Factor of Diplomacy New Technologies in Diplomacy .............................................................. 72 Beata Surmacz Foreign Ministries in the Perspective of Information Revolution ............. 91 Justyna Arendarska New Public Diplomacy as a Consequence of the Information Age ......... 106 Agata ZiĊtek

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Contents

E-voting: Leading Us towards Democratic Global Governance? ............ 123 Maágorzata Kwiatkowska Part III New Technologies as a Factor of International Security and Law Scientific Uncertainty in the Political Process of the Problem of Climate Change ................................................................................... 142 Marek PietraĞ Academic Research in the U.S. Protection and Technology Transfer ..... 167 Robert I. Bolla Political and Military Consequences of the Revolution in Military Affairs...................................................................................................... 212 Konrad Pawáowski Impenetrable Permeable Borders: New Technologies of Control at the Border of the State ......................................................................... 226 Anna Moraczewska Cyberspace: A New ‘Battlefield’, Weapon or Just a Tool? ..................... 257 Magdalena Michno Developments in the Global Legal Acknowledgment of Cybercrimes and Cyberterrorism: Uncertainties of a Modern Society ......................... 278 Tatiana De A. F. R. Cardoso and Rafaela Steffen Gonçalves Da Rosa Part IV New Technologies and the Social Dimension of International Relations Technological Change and Human Rights: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities in the 21st Century ..................................................... 298 Julita RybczyĔska The Consumers’ Right to Information: Genetically Modified Food Case ......................................................................................................... 311 Monika Szkaráat On Anti-Acta: Soft (Media) Power and Pleasures of Symbolic Protest ..... 332 Jakub Nowak

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Part V Energy Technologies and Infrastructure as a Factor of International Relations Revolution in Renewable Energy Technologies and International Relations .................................................................................................. 352 Kamila ProniĔska and Krzysztof KsiĊĪopolski The European Union as a Leader in New Technologies for Energy Security and Climate Change .................................................................. 372 Beata Piskorska Oil and Gas Pipeline Infrastructure and its Significance for the International Relations in Eastern Europe .................................... 399 Justyna Misiągiewicz Prospects of Nuclear Energy in the Context of Poland's Energy Security .................................................................................................... 427 Bartosz Bojarczyk and Jakub Olchowski Notes on Editors and Contributors .......................................................... 456 Index ........................................................................................................ 461

LIST OF FIGURES

3. 1 Conceptual model of power in society – types and dimensions 3. 2 Technology and spheres of human activity in the context of ongoing processes 10. 1 Numbers of institutions with research agreements with Research Corporation for management of technology transfer before enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act 10. 2 Success of the Bayh-Dole Act between 1991 and 2006 as determined from investment in research and outcome in number of start-up companies spun-out of academic institutions and licensing of technology out of from academic institutions (Modified from Fraser, J. 2010) 10. 3 Average number of disclosures per academic institution in the U.S. (19) showing a continual increase through 2009 the most recent year for which data is available 10. 4 Number of patents issued to academic institutions from 1988 to 2008. Source of data is from the Association of University Technology Managers annual reports 10. 5 Influence of patenting on the ability to do research in fields within the sciences, social sciences and humanities. Results of survey of members representing fields covered within the AAAS as to those who felt that patenting of university research had a negative impact on their ability to do research in their chosen field (modified from Hansen et al 2006) 10. 6 Growth in university life science R&D seen in comparing the growth of patents since enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 with the number of articles published over the same period. (modified from Hansen et al. 2006) 12. 1 Graphic biometric identification system 18. 1 Share of RES in World Primary Energy Supply in 2010 18. 2 World Renewable Energy Supply in 2010 18. 3 World renewable electricity generation [TWh] – IEA prognosis 21. 1 Support for construction of a nuclear power plant in Poland 21. 2 Support for localization of a nuclear power plant in the neighborhood

LIST OF TABLES

4. 1 Technological environment theory 12. 1 Effects of utilisation of new technologies in border control for the state 12. 2 U.S. federal spending on technologies at borders and related categories in the fiscal years 2012 and 2013, and projected spending for 2014, in millions of $ 12. 3 Effects of utilisation of new technologies in border control for international relations 12.4. Selected EU security research projects supporting EUROSUR 20. 1 Oil and gas potential of Turkey’s neighbours 21. 1 Primary energy consumption 2000-2010 (in mtoe) 21. 2 Energy consumption in comparison (in mtoe) 21. 3 Energy supply sources by type, Poland 2009-2010 (in mtoe) 21. 4 Coal production and consumption in Poland 2000-2010 (in mtoe) 21. 5 Electricity consumption and domestic supply in Poland 21. 6 Poland’s key oil statistics 21. 7 Statistics of natural gas sector in Poland

LIST OF PICTURES AND MAPS

Pictures 12. 1 An automated kiosk for border control within the Global Entry system in the USA 12. 2 SmartGate at Australian international airports with a guide on how to use it 13. 1 Worms Against Nuclear Killers message

Maps 20. 1 Nord Stream pipeline 20. 2 Blue Stream pipeline and the South Stream pipeline project 20. 3 BPS, Friendship, Odessa-Brody pipelines 20. 4 Turkey’s position in the context of global energy circulation 20. 5 BTC pipeline 20. 6 TGI Pipeline 20. 7 Nabucco pipeline project 21. 1 The Druzhba and North oil pipelines 21. 2 Transit gas system map (Yamal Line), Poland

INTRODUCTION

The development of new technologies significantly facilitates the process of dynamic transformation within the international system. The subject of international relations, as well as their objectives and operational scopes, are affected by the multidimensional impact of the technological factor. Technological progress leads to the redistribution of power in the international environment, promotes change in its structure, shapes the connections amongst the key participants of international relations, and is a source of the increased range, intensity and effectiveness of transborder actions. The influence of the technological factor on contemporary international relations is manifested in various areas of social life, as well as in the operational mechanisms of international relations, including: the processes of institutionalization and management of the international environment, communication, cooperation and conflicts between nations. The contemporary technological transformation is focused on accelerating the development of communication means and the technologies of collecting, processing and storing information. The information revolution is the basis of the “globalization infrastructure”, thus influencing the dynamics of the processes which lead to modifications in the basic parameters of the international environment. Information technologies represent this unique type of technology which, unlike traditional industrial technologies, not only provides new methods of goods manufacturing, but also entails important system changes in the social, economic and political spheres, including those on the international scale. This special type of technology also includes modern biotechnology and genetic engineering (Braman 2002). With regard to the geostrategic dimension of international relations and position building by particular states, and from the perspective of sustainable development, technological solutions designed to exploit, efficiently manage and search for new energy sources are highly significant in international relations, as well. The subject of the book is the character of functioning of the abovementioned technologies as factors for shaping international relations, as well as taking into account technological innovations in military science and in border surveillance. It is also worth emphasizing that along with transformation of the international realities, triggered by technological

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development, the ontology of international relations as an academic discipline undergoes change, as well. One of the key notions here as the focus of international policy research, is power. Selecting the category of power as the perspective around which the analysis is organized, makes it possible to capture the essence and principles of international relations development. What is important is that technological progress affects the transformation of power in the international system, including its character, distribution, sources and manifestations. Scientific and technological potential, resources of knowledge and information constituting the intellectual capital whose quality is reflected in the innovation level, become the key attributes of power. Increasingly, these resources are owned by institutions other than states; this is why non-state players acquire the status of power holders in the international environment, breaking the monopoly of states in this sphere. In his article, Lech W. Zacher refers to the link between new technologies and the dynamics of power in international relations. He presents the cumulative development of knowledge and technological innovations in such areas as: communication, biotechnology, nanotechnology, military science and the exploration of outer space as the arena for international competition for power and its new distribution on the one hand; and as a sophisticated tool for reinforcing the power of particular players on the other. Technological power, based on the capacity to generate progress, and on application, transfer and the control of technology, is a specific type of power in the international environment. It is not only an independent vehicle of potential, but at the same time a catalyst for building other spheres of power, including its economic, political, ideological, cultural and social dimensions. According to Tomasz StĊpieĔ, technological development plays a crucial role in the formation of the new framework of international relations, characterized by networking, interconnectedness and reciprocal interdependence. These changes may by conceptualized as a sequence of “turns” that express the transformation of social life, system of science and research, and what is important – the existing geopolitical configurations from local to global scales. In this context, an area which is intensely affected by the technological factor, influencing both international reality and the processes of building knowledge about it, is the spatial dimension of international relations. Consequently, “technological turn” correlates with so called “spatial turn”. Analysing the technology-mediated “spatial turn” in international relations, Katarzyna Mojska refers to the changing configurations of space, defined in geographical and social terms. She emphasizes the significance of various forms of social and spatial

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organization, especially transborder networks, as units of international relations analysis. The author also notices that modification to the meaning of space in the international system is not a one-way process towards the radical weakening of its territorial basis. Technological progress which leads to the separation of social life from the territorially defined space, limited by the rules of the Westphalian international order, offers at the same time certain sophisticated means of territorial supervision. Anna Moraczewska elaborates on the theme of continuation and change in the context of territorial control as a fundamental rule organizing the structure of international order. Referring to the problem of the evolving significance of state borders towards their increasing permeability, she points to technologically advanced systems of border protection as tools for upholding their supervisory function. Furthermore, Ariel Kabiri explores the problem of the opposing tendencies occurring simultaneously in international relations that are influenced by the technological factor. While critically evaluating technological determinism, he suggests the concept of a social construction of technology, rooted in the constructivist theory of international relations, as a valuable analysis formula. Technological progress generates new conditions in which states exercise their sovereign rights and pursue their interests, both in domestic and foreign policy. Technological advancement forces states to adjust to the logic of functioning in the international environment as characterized by a growing network of interconnections, increasing intensity and dynamics in international political relations, and their considerable complexity. The adjustment processes include official operation of the state in order to fulfil its external functions in one of the oldest spheres of international relations, diplomacy. The influence of information and communication technologies on the evolution of diplomatic functions performed by the state, is discussed by Beata Surmacz. The author notices that the information revolution poses a challenge to traditional diplomatic practice, as it increases the complexity of the environment in which diplomacy is pursued. One of the symptoms is the emergence of the socalled “new diplomacy” phenomenon, identified on the basis of the assumption that the international negotiation processes are increasingly affected by the activity of institutions other than states, especially transnational corporations and transnational civil society organizations. As a result, the negotiation environment emerges as more multidimensional and less clear, no longer resulting from convergence and divergence of interests and the bargaining position of particular states only. The development of the means of communication also modifies the space-time dimension of diplomatic activity. Decision-making processes are speeding

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up at an unprecedented rate and are becoming centralized. Beata Surmacz emphasizes that new technologies provide states with the tools for performing the basic functions of diplomacy, namely representation, negotiation and communication. The issue of the transformation of the diplomatic sphere, as caused by the development of information technologies, is also examined by Justyna Arendarska. She focuses on the “e-diplomacy” phenomenon and indicates that the information revolution affects the organizational basis of diplomacy, leading to changes in the structures of foreign affairs ministries and diplomatic posts. Another text dedicated to new technologies as a factor of diplomacy refers to the state’s activity being aimed at the fulfilment of its interests in the international environment, through building a favourable image among the public opinion abroad. Agata ZiĊtek points to the fact that the adjustment of states’ activity in the public diplomacy sphere to the realities of the information age results in the so-called “new public diplomacy,” as analysed by the author in a case study on Poland. Both the abovementioned “new diplomacy” and “new public diplomacy” become a part of the change logic of contemporary international policy which, though still dominated by states, ceases to be their sole domain. What is important is that information technologies are a factor for empowering individuals in international relations. While discussing the possible application of tools for enabling so-called e-voting at the supranational level, Maágorzata Kwiatkowska presents new technologies as a chance for eliminating the deficit of democracy on the global scale and strengthening global management structures through raising the level of their social legitimization. Unquestionably, progress in science and technology has been conditioned by the significance of the military dimension of international relations. Even though the development of military potential is no longer the most important determinant in shaping the international order emerging after the Cold War period, its significance – from the perspective of position building and the construction of the international roles of states – has not been denied. States continue their work on new kinds of weapons able to deal with contemporary threats to domestic and international security. A noticeable tendency is the more widespread application of advanced information technologies, enabling precise military action intended to achieve a given goal with minimal casualties. A contemporary war may be won due to the power of knowledge which becomes a “rival” to the weapons and tactics used in military action by the enemy. Modern weapons, based on information instead of firearms, enabled a reduction in the amount of explosives, miniaturization of arms and limitation of

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damage, as a direct result of its extraordinary precision. The issue of profound changes in military action, referred to as a Revolution in Military Affairs – RMA, is discussed by Konrad Pawáowski. He analyses the reasons, essence, as well as the military and political effects of ongoing RMA, connected with the dynamic use of computer technologies on the contemporary battlefield, and refers to examples of military operation from the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Future wars will not be fought only on land, sea, in air or outer space, but also in the so-called cyberspace as a theatre of cyber-warfare, i.e. planned and concentrated attacks of hackers against the enemy’s computers. Asymmetric warfare, including cyberterrorism, assumes various forms whose list is constantly growing. Magdalena Michno concentrates on this issue in her chapter. Her aim is to analyse the characteristic features of activity in virtual space, drafting a user’s profile and presenting the current list of activities, not always of criminal character. Jakub Nowak writes that an advantage of cyberspace is the mobilization of individuals who were not willing to get involved in social and political life before. The virtual space, devoid of physical borders, is a multidimensional platform of dialogue and meetings, where the globalized spheres of politics, economics, culture, etc. are intermingled. With diverse content and participants, cyberspace becomes a highly effective tool, and a new medium for contemporary civic society. An example can be seen in the mobilization or rather e-mobilization of the virtual community against ACTA. Cyberspace as a source of threats to the internal security of a state and an individual is discussed by Tatiana de Almeida F. R. Cardoso and Rafaela Steffen G. da Rosa who study the evolution and adjustment of international legal norms and domestic law (on the example of Brazil) to this new phenomena. According to the authors, the factor of uncertainty accompanying the new threat and the dynamic character of change are the basic reasons for the poor adaptation of normative standards to challenges posed by new technologies. Another area influenced by the technological factor is the economy – both national and global. The impact of the technological factor on the global economy stimulates the emergence of a knowledge-based economy in which success or power is determined by information. On the one hand, it is desirable to have access to valuable information such as patent secrets, but on the other hand the surrounding reality is affected by the information oversupply, as manifested by the omnipresent information noise. Due to the growing number of innovative technological solutions, there is a need to prepare regulations pertaining to the legal access and use of

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innovations. It is a fact that the normative process has a retroactive – and rarely anticipatory – character in relation to the scientific and technological progress. Nevertheless, dynamic changes in the domestic and international legal norms can be observed, aimed at establishing rules of introduction, management and control over new technological solutions. An important feature distinguishing the contemporary technological progress is the involvement of private bodies, operating in the transborder sphere, whose potential and financial resources are a favourable factor in the implementation of research and development tasks. Privatization of scientific research and its results leads to the evolution of the intellectual property protection system, for instance through the constant introduction of new protected objects. These issues are examined in the work of Robert Bolla who presents the origin of the system of scientific research financing and commercialization in the United States, on the example of the pharmaceutical sector. The author presents the characteristic features of the mixed system of support for research and development activities, based on the cooperation of public and private bodies, such as: higher education institutions, research institutions, government agencies and enterprises of national and international range. Due to the costs of the research process and later commercialization of effects, participation of private bodies seems inevitable. Therefore, it is very important to determine transparent rules for their involvement. Predominantly, the scientific and technological progress has not been compatible with the need for natural environmental protection. Consecutive technological achievements increased man’s domination over the natural environment and enabled exploitation of natural resources as much as possible. This situation began to change in the second half of the 20th century, when some organizations started protesting against the uncritical attitude to the scientific and technological progress and its impact on man and nature. Negative consequences of the human impact on the natural environment include: the greenhouse effect and related global warming, thinning of the ozone layer, pollution of soil, water and air, deficit of resources, lands turning into desert, progressing restriction of forest areas or extinction of species. These phenomena are widely considered as anthropogenic, with the technological factor accelerating many negative processes. In this context, the focus of the debate is on the significance of the scientific uncertainty factor. As Marek PietraĞ emphasizes, the problem of scientific uncertainty represents one of the key factors influencing the process of climate change negotiations. Depending on particular preferences and

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interests, it may justify contradictory decisions and actions undertaken by states within the international regime of climate change. During the several recent decades, the processes of creating and implementing environmentally friendly technologies became a priority, mostly in highly developed states. The European Union aspires to be the leader in this area, because its economic development strategy, based on the sustainable development idea, aims at the coordinated implementation of energy policy goals, environmental protection and counteracting climate change. The strategy guidelines and implementation status have been analysed by Beata Piskorska who argues that despite numerous political and economic obstacles, the European Union has a chance to become the regional or perhaps even the world leader in the fight with consequences of global warming and in implementation of sustainable methods of energy security management. Nevertheless, accomplishment of this ambitious project may pose a serious problem for some EU member states, including Poland. This is emphasized by Bartosz Bojarczyk and Jakub Olchowski who, analysing the typical features of the Polish energy sector, point to its maladjustment and considerable technological backwardness, which may be an obstacle to the implementation of the EU strategic plans. According to the authors, the nuclear power industry and implementation of the plan for building a new generation of nuclear power stations may be an alternative solution, owing to which obligations can be fulfilled. The authors critically analyse the government project of nuclear power industry development, enumerating its advantages and potential threats. The challenge of balancing energy security requirements with ecological issues is an impulse for the development of technologies enabling more widespread use of renewable energy sources. According to Kamila ProniĔska and Krzysztof KsiĊĪpolski, it will be an important factor shaping international relations, both on the regional and global level, with effects visible in the global structure of power and wealth. Changes in the economic sphere will manifest through the emergence of new energy markets, new important branches of international trade and conditions for operation of transnational businesses from the energy industry. Moreover, renewable energy sources will offer a unique chance for the development of low-income countries, devoid of access to traditional energy sources and energy infrastructure. In the geostrategic dimension, transformation of methods of production and trade in energy will bring about change in the conditions of functioning and political bargaining position of the main exporters and importers of conventional energy. The ongoing “energy game”, whose participants are producers, transit states and consumers of

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fossil fuels in Eastern Europe, is analysed by Justyna Misiągiewicz who presents technological infrastructure of oil and gas transfer in terms of an instrument of political pressure in international relations. Technology understood as a conglomerate of ideas combined with specific methods of developing or implementing a creative conception in the form of a materialized product, is regarded by many as an ethically neutral category. What can be evaluated is the way in which a product of technological progress is used by its owner. It can also be assumed that a creative idea, which is a necessary precondition of scientific and technological progress, is generally not negatively marked, i.e. the intention of technological change is not destruction but growth. It is also confirmed by the semantic analysis, because the word “progress” is synonymous with “development”. However, technological progress, not always, and not for everyone, signifies development understood as the improvement in standard of living. While studying the influence of the technological factor on international reality, we should not disregard the human dimension of international relations. This issue is discussed by Julita RybczyĔska who analyses the relationship between technological progress and human rights, pointing to the current chances and challenges. The impact of technological change on the exercise of human rights is examined also by Monika Szkaráat who concentrates on the relationship between the introduction of genetically modified food on the market and the status of the right to information. Focusing on the EU member states, the author analyses the adequacy of binding EU regulations and the individual perception among European consumers of the exercise of their right to be informed, on the basis of public opinion surveys.

Reference Braman, S. 2002. “Information Meta-Technologies, International Relations, and Genetic Power: The Case of Biotechnologies.” In Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance, edited by J. Rosenau and J. P. Singh, Information Technologies and Global Politics, 91-114. New York: SUNY Press.

PART I NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW REALITY, NEW PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

TECHNOLOGICAL TURN AND THE NEW FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TOMASZ STĉPIEē

Introduction. New “actors” of international relations? Nowadays, international relations are shaped by the model of a knowledge-based society understood and interpreted as a network (Castells 2001), and founded on various forms of mobility with the immeasurable flow of ideas, people and goods (Urry 2000). This model expresses also the dominant process of globalisation along with the radical changes and transformation of the social and international order. The background of all these changes in the last decades has been the process of life-technicality, i.e. the progressively increased technological penetration of social and individual life (“invasive Technisierung”, G. Böhme 2008, 11). In this manner, technological development is one of the most important “carriers” and “mediums” of social changes, and at the same time the key element of the new framework of international relations. Consequently, international relations as a discipline of the humanities and social sciences, needs a renewed theoretical design, which would adequately respond to the technologically intermediated changes of societies and social practice. From a theoretical point of view, the (post)modern society is analysed as a result of a sequence of “turns” which have transformed social life, but also the system of science and research, e.g. the dissemination of interdisciplinary orientation in basic research, and finally the hitherto existing geopolitical configurations on different levels, reaching from local to global scales. Above all, the technological development demarcates the new framework of social and international life as characterized by networking, interconnectedness and reciprocal interdependence. As a consequence, the new technologies of communication or the converging technologies such as nano- and biotechnology become new “actors” of international relations. Therefore, science and research, along with technological development and political initiatives in the field of higher education and research, for instance the European Research Area (COM (2000) 6; COM (2000) 612 final) or the NBIC-initiative in the US since

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2001 (Roco and Bainbridge 2003), play a strategic role in politics and are increasingly regarded as the essentials of the international relations. Therewith, the framework of international relations is constituted among others by new technologies. The following reflections and analysis attempts to shape theoretically founded characteristics of the new factors, motives and “actors” of international relations, which at the same time constitute and moderate international life.

The sequence of turns and social transformation The accumulation of knowledge and social changes in the postmodern (post-industrial) society has been one of the major research subjects in the humanities and social sciences in the last two decades (Sztompka 1991; Bauman 2011). These changes are expressed by the metaphor of turns understood as a framework of social life and process of globalisation. The sequence of turns includes the linguistic and cultural, then technological and spatial, and finally the iconic or pictorial in the last few years. By the way, the metaphor of a turn is not only theoretical, but expresses also the real social processes and practices. The turn metaphor itself refers to the beginning of the comparative studies of civilisations after the Second World War and the linguistic turn in philosophy. The origin of the new philosophical concept of language can be found in F. de Saussure, and afterwards in the dispute between E. Cassirer and M. Heidegger in Davos 1929 (Heidegger 1973, 263). The notion “linguistic turn” was introduced by R. Rorty in his essay The Linguistic Turn from 1967 with the concept of language as a means and medium of knowledge, but also as the framework of reality, which is rooted in subject. This new interpretation of language has constituted the following narrative and reflexive turns. Based on this concept of language and the development of the mass media and new communication technologies, in more recent times, the symbol has been recognized as a means and medium of thought and knowledge in the iconic / pictorial turn. The cultural turn in the form of the comparative science of civilisations and history, based on the classical theory of culture, was initiated by Anton Hilckman and his work Die Wissenschaft von den Kulturen (1967) and Arnold J. Toynbee’s Study of history (1934-1961), and continued in postmodern way by M. Foucault and A. Giddens with the debate between the modernists and postmodernists. In the 1990s the explanation of culture, civilisations and history, understood also as the new framework of international relations and the anticipation of the changes of international order after the end of Cold War, was presented by F. Fukuyama and his

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Technological Turn and the New Framework of International Relations

essay The End of History (1991), Z. BrzeziĔski The Grand Chessboard (1997) and S.P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1997). Above all, the conception of a dynamic new world order by Huntington rejected the static and bipolar point of view concerning international relations. The cultural turn as a summative approach in the humanities and social sciences introduced new research subjects adequately to the ongoing process of globalisation, such as: 1) the internationalisation of the “stranger” and the post Marxist problem of alienation in the society, 2) the introduction of an intercultural dimension, 3) the interdisciplinary enlargement of ethnology, and finally 4) all the questions concerning social trust and the possibilities of conflict management in a multicultural society. In this manner, the humanities and social sciences in the second half of the 20th century are characterised by synthesis between the linguistic and cultural turn with particular derivations as those which impact upon the theory and practice of international relations: 1) the interpretative turn with the semiotic concept of culture as text and interpretation, 2) the performative turn with understanding of culture as performance based on symbols as the real and true language of culture. As a result of these assumptions, in the 1980s the postcolonial and then translational turns have opened up the transcultural dimension as a consequence of the first wave of globalisation. In this time of social and geopolitical changes and with technological development and mass dissemination of the new ICT gadgetry, the practice of social and cultural localisation has also changed. The emerging new global networking system of civilisations and societies also needed a new conception of technologically intermediated spatiality. The expressions hereby are the technological and spatial turns. Finally, the sequence of turns is finalised by the iconic or pictorial turn supported by new ICT and the mass media with the understanding of culture as an exhibition of pictures and expressions of thought, mediated by icons. Today the theory of culture is characterised by interdisciplinary orientation including the paradigms of the “travelling theories”, “blurred genres” (Bachmann-Medick 2012) and the hybrid conception of culture (Spielmann 2010). The introduced turn metaphor in the humanities defines the new code of modernization, which also encompasses a new cartography of science and research. In this manner, culture becomes the major subject of research which crosses the disciplinary limits according to the definition of interdisciplinarity as “creating a new object that belongs to no one” (Bachmann-Medic 2012, 17). The result of this interdisciplinary orientation inside the humanities and social sciences was the rejection of the homogenous conception of the world in favour of a play with different ideas expressed by the term “travelling theories”, i.e.

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interdisciplinary opening towards other disciplines on the one hand, and an intercultural opening of the occidental theoretical schemata on the other. The metaphors of turn and the “travelling theories” are completed by the third phenomenon of ‘blurred genres’ with new configuration of the system of science and the creation of the new patterns of discourse. Therefore, a new concept of culture is developed as a hybrid form of social and international life, integrating different motifs, practices and cultural patterns (Spielmann 2010).

Technological and spatial impacts on international relations The typology of turns expresses also the paradigms’ change of international relations resulting, above all, from new information and communication technologies. The technological turn integrates the concept of “space” and its new dynamic understanding as the process of spatiality and the “spatial” (Soja 2009, 11-35). Therefore, the new mode of spatialisation became the decisive factor by development of geopolitical strategies based on variable operation with the different scales from the local to global level, and with the phenomenon of scale-jumping. The technological turn and the new spatiality are connected with the question concerning their technological impact upon: 1) the new geography of innovations, and 2) the social communication on the global level. In the case of social communication and data transfer there is a privacy dilemma because of technologically intermediated communication, and then communities and socio-political movements as the new form of participation in social and political life. In both cases the dissemination and use of the information, and the subsequent communication technologies, are a condition for the successful mobilising of society. Moreover, the field of international relations is increasingly moderated by the use of these technologies. As a result, technological and spatial turns extrapolate new “actors” in geopolitics with a new understanding and distinction between useful, military and joyful technologies (Böhme 2008) on the one hand, and the concept of technoscience in the (post)constructivism and its “turn to the things” with underlined significance of the “non-human” elements in the process of development (Latour 2005, 63-86) on the other hand. The distinction between useful, military and joyful technologies results above all from the accumulated technological development in the last decades. From the classical and historical point of view, technology is understood in relationship to its usefulness, and in the case of the military it is interpreted as the incubator of all scientific and technological

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innovations. But in recent times the new meaning and importance of the “joyful technology” (Böhme 2008, 39) has been formed, understood as a new dimension of innovation in the form of technological gadgetry and the mass media, and as a new form of technological consumption. Nowadays these three basic types of technology are often mixed together; for instance, the combination of military and joyful technology by the aesthetic medial and visual stimulations of warfare (Sassower 2007, 351361). The above-mentioned paradigms are present in the humanities and social sciences (“travelling theories” and “blurred genres”), and we also find them in technological development, i.e. “the borders between technology types tend to blur anyway, or better put: almost every technological development contains features of entertainment technology, precisely because it no longer serves the satisfaction of basic needs” (Böhme 2007, 34). In this manner, society reached the time of technical gadgetry with technologies and innovations as goods of mass consumption, which outline and determine the possibilities and styles of societal and international life. Besides the distinction between the main types of technology, one of the principal tasks is elaboration of the theoretical framework of technology development. One of the most important, besides the concept of technology assessment and the model of converging technologies, is the theory of technoscience. The main subject of technoscience is the analysis of the political and social impacts of scientific discoveries and technological innovations, and the role of science and technology in modern society as a whole. In this way, the concept of technoscience is focused on the theoretical framework of science, technology, and the risks connected with them, because the development of science and technology can be identified with the analysis of risks (BiĔczyk 2012, 9-10). The conception of technoscience, also as a part of the sociology of knowledge and philosophy of technology, is characterised by the ‘turn to the things’ with the underlined significance of the non-human elements in society and scientific development, then by the “participative” turn concerning the possibilities of social monitoring and the moderation of science and technological development. Hereby, the background of the (post)constructivist conception of technoscience is the actor-network-theory (ANT) presented by B. Latour (2005). The notion “technoscience” focuses on science as it is understood in the form of experimental and laboratory research works and practices, which include the material infrastructures of laboratories, also as a condition of research works themselves. Therewith, the significance of the non-human (B. Latour) elements in the research process is emphasized, such as artefacts and the intrinsic complexity of the technological system

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and research infrastructure. The artefacts, research system and infrastructure (laboratories) outline directly research works, but also demarcate and design the structure of the modern society. In consequence, these elements appear as the strategic and key factors of international relations. And with the global mapping of research infrastructure and innovation centres they reflect international life on the global scale. At the same time, one of the most important paradigms of modern society, resulting from the science and technology development as a whole and their impacts on the environment, is the analysis of risks and the unforeseeable consequences of technology use and science development. The model of risk society (Beck 1986) based on the intrinsic systemic risks resulting from technoscience needs, at the same time, a new political and normative framework concerning technoscience itself. Therefore, the model of risk in society is completed by a new culture of participation with the process of science and technology democratisation and the possibilities of monitoring technoscience in the form of public debates concerning technological innovations and their impacts on social life. In this sense B. Latour underlines the enlarged meaning of “collective” in the actor-network-theory including the human and non-human elements constituting the system of technoscience. Instead of technological instrumentalism, autonomy and determinism characterised by dispersed responsibility, the model of technoscience postulates the creation of a political and normative framework at the global level understood as a risk-management strategy confronted with the negative effects and impacts of science and technological development, and then as a condition for the possibility of anticipating and foreseeing the future implementation of strategies in science and technology, so that technoscience appears as a framework of risk in society and international relations. In this perspective, technological determinism is replaced by interactionism, i.e. reciprocal connection and interdependence between scientific, technological, societal and political processes. Therewith science and technology make out social norms and practices, “that the non-human elements are co-defining humanity, funding fundaments of civilisation, and include political and moral components by building of society (…), that technological things and structures co-create global macro-ethics, which is needed in the risk society” (BiĔczyk 2012, 32).

The “turn to the things” that is noted in the concept of technoscience, we find for instance in the new model of the “Internet of things” or in the new laser-based technology that is emerging and enabling key and cross-

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sections technology (Additive Manufacturing Technologies, AMT). Hereby, the question is how far it is possible to explain the occurring geopolitical processes in terms of the concepts and methods employed by technoscience. On the basis of the conception of technoscience, science and technology, artefacts, laboratories and research infrastructures as the non-human elements integrated in the “collective”, society can therefore also be metaphorically interpreted as the main actor in international relations. Besides new emerging and enabling technologies being considered as an expression of the technological turn, the second new “actor” of international relations appears to be: “spatial” understanding as completion and the result of the technological turn. The questions concerning “space” and “spatiality” belong to the most important topics in the humanities, social and engineering sciences, but are also a condition and expression of changes on a global scale in social and international life: “Across the disciplines, the study of space has undergone a profound and sustained resurgence. Space, place, mapping, and geographical imaginations have become commonplace topics in a variety of analytical fields in part because globalization has accentuated the significance of location. While this transformation has led to renaissance in human geography, it also has manifested itself in the humanities and other social sciences” (Warf and Arias 2009, Preface).

The spatial turn relates to the societal conception of space as presented by Henri Lefebvre in his work La production de l’espace from 1974. The notion of a “spatial turn” was introduced for the first time by Ed.W. Soja in Postmodern Geographies (1989), and was then interpreted by him as a kind of a master turn and a paradigm of the contemporary social science with “the potential to be one of the most significant intellectual and political developments of the twenty-first century” (Soja 2009, 12). In the same way F. Jameson in his work Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) recognized the spatial turn as the main phenomenon of the (post)modern society. As a consequence of these statements, the analysis of space and spatiality has been focused on examining the role and significance of space’s transformation, and the perception of it, inside different disciplines in the field of science, reaching from the humanities to engineering, but also concerning social communication and the new culture of interactions, with the aim being to extrapolate the reciprocal interconnectedness and interdependence between the process of spatialisation and technological development. Especially in the social and political sciences there is both

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reintroduction and rediscovery of the spatial dimension, i.e. “that space is a social construction relevant to the understanding of the different histories of human subjects and to the production of cultural phenomena” (Warf and Arias 2009, 1). Therefore, the dynamic acts of spacing, placing and mapping denote the essential elements and aspects in the process of culture’s production and development, but also constitute the new framework of international relations with the supposition “that everything happens in space, but because where things happen is critical to knowing how and why they happen” (Warf and Arias 2009, 1). By the way, the forerunner of this new dynamic conception of space in the societal dimension is the first theory of “mobilities” presented by Pitrim Sorokin and his Social Mobility from 1927. This widening meaning and understanding of space present the space as a social construct which is ideological and symbolic, lived and subjective at once. And above all this understanding expresses the plasticity of space and its function in the process of reproduction of social structures and life in national and international dimensions. In this way, for instance global economy and markets have created new spatiality by deconstruction of the old static and historically determinate geographies. Edward W. Soja in his Postmodern Geographies (1989) indicates that besides the time and social structures there is the third fundamental and constitutive element of social theory: the space or the spatial. Therefore, the spatial turn “has involved the end of historicism, which privileged time over space, and the reassertion of space into social theory”, and the paradigm of ‘turns’ gives the answer and also interpretation “how society is organized and reorganized, knowledge constructed, and the possibilities and perils of change” (Warf and Arias 2009, 6). Finally, besides technology and space, the third “actor” of international relations appears: the icon, i.e. messages and symbols at once intermediated on the global level by the convergence of the mass media and ICT. The iconic turn focuses on the significance of the mass media and their impacts on international relations. To sum up, the characteristics of technological and spatial turns expose a kind of synergy between technology and space that is expressed, for example, with the “death of distance” or the phenomenon of “time-spacecompression” as well as by their direct impacts on social life and international relations. Above all, the metaphor for spatial turn underlines the new geography of the world based on the spatial practices which permanently change the coordinates of the geopolitical order. One of the best examples of this reassertion of space in social science and international relations is that global cities are understood as the nodes of

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global flows, with strategic importance in economic and technological, geopolitical and cultural interconnectivity. With the process of globalisation including the creation of a worldwide market and the dissemination of information and communication technologies, the global cities have an increased bearing on international exchanges in all fields of human activities, expressed above all by the interdependence between cities, economy and technologies. The global cities appear as an example of synergy between the technological and spatial turn. One of the most important reasons for this was the change of the structure of global economy in the 1990s with spatial, dispersal and intrinsic integration. For example, Saskia Sassen in her book The Global City (1991) underlines these two different processes: “The geography and composition of the global economy changed so as to produce a complex duality: a spatially dispersed, yet globally integrated organization of economic activity” (Sassen 1991, 3). This spatial dispersal and differentiation, along with inner integration, outlined the new strategic significance of the global cities as centres of global economy with four main characteristics: 1) “as highly concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy”, 2) “as key locations for finance and for specialized service firms” with the replacement and marginalisation of industry in the urban area, 3) as centres of innovations’ production, and 4) as market for these innovations (Sassen 1991, 3). On the basis of the comparative analysis, Sassen points out that all global cities have been transformed in the same way concerning the spatial organisation and social structure in spite of all cultural, historic or political differences between them: “To understand the puzzle of parallel change in diverse cities requires not simply a point-by-point comparison of New York, London, and Tokyo, but a situating of these cities in a set of global processes. In order to understand why major cities with different histories and cultures have undergone parallel economic and social changes, we need to examine transformations in the world economy” (Sassen 1991, 4).

The arising importance of the global cities is also an expression of the changes occurring in the international order after the Cold War, and Sassen ascertains that “we may be able to understand the global order only by analysing why key structures of the world economy are necessarily situated in cities” (Sassen 1991, 4). This new global order is characterised by the reciprocal interdependence, i.e. the spatial dispersion by integration into a chain of dependence, “that the territorial dispersal of current economic activity creates a need for

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expanded central control and management” (Sassen 1991, 4). These are also the two main mechanisms of globalisation: spatial dispersal by centralisation of monitoring and management. These are the elements of the new logic of concentration and the new system of coordination in spite of ICT development. Therefore, the decisive factor of the significance of global cities in international order is “their capability for producing global control” (Sassen 1991, 6). And this means also radical changes in the global geopolitical geography of international relations: “While a few major cities are the sites of production for the new global control capability, a large number of other major cities have lost their role as leading export centres for industrial manufacturing, as a result of the decentralisation of this form of production” (Sassen 1991, 7).

On the other hand, the specificity of global cities poses a question concerning their disembedding from the national dimension of geopolitics, what is expressed by the process of deindustrialisation in Europe, Japan, and the US. In this way the global cities represent the process of the reconfiguration of the inner structure of international relations, and their relations to the national background pose the question of how far the global cities are integrated or aliened from their cultural, societal and political backgrounds, and the “new international forms of economic activity raise a problem about the relationship between nation-states and global cities” (Sassen 1991, 8). Consequently, the development and economic growth of the global city cannot be identified with the nationstate as a whole, and what “contributes to growth in the network of global cities may well not contribute to growth in nations” (Sassen 1991, 9). In this manner, the global cities, being in tension with their national context, are partially autonomous actors of international relations.

Science and research and their impacts on international relations The framework of international relations with technologies, spaces and icons as its integrated elements is also the result of the present higher education and research policy that is based on the principle of networking on a global scale. Besides the global cities, the other example of change in international order is the process of policy making in the field of higher education and research. By analogy to the global cities and their significance in the global economy, in global flow of people and ideas, goods and capital, the higher education and research centres play a

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strategic role in the present international relations. Moreover, the global system of higher education and research undergoes nowadays the same processes of transformation in spite of cultural and historical differences. The best examples here are those of higher education and research policy in the US, and the concept of the European Research Area (ERA) as an integral part of the European integration. The changes in the field of higher education and research result from the appreciation of knowledge as the driving force of societal development, technological innovations, and economic sustainable growth. The model of knowledge-based society and economy emphasizes human and intellectual capital and the potential to create and to produce scientific knowledge as strategic forces, which result from organisational competences and managerial culture. In this context, higher education and research are recognized as a condition for the attainment of a knowledge-based society, but are also understood as being producers and transmitters of knowledge at the regional, national and global levels. The emergence of the knowledge-based society has enforced the reforms and the transformation of higher education and research system, which is shaped by the processes of internationalisation, globalisation and the marketization of knowledge, along with innovation, on the one hand, while on the other hand the question arises concerning compatibility issues between different systems of higher education and research. In this way, effective knowledge management is crucial on two different scales: 1) on the microscale of an organisation with optimal use of the organisational capacity and potential as a condition of innovations, and 2) on the macroscale with the possibility of integration into the network of public institutions and business involved in research and development programmes and projects. In the knowledge-based society, as a result of globalisation, even the new internationalised area of higher education and research is the major transmitter of changes: “In global knowledge economies, higher education institutions are more important than ever as mediums for a wide range of cross-border relationships and continuous global flows of people, information, knowledge, technologies, products and financial capital” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 3).

Therefore, the two last decades are characterised by the process of the reinvention of global higher education and research areas: “Even as they share in the reinvention of the world around them, higher education institutions, and the policies that produce and support them, are also being reinvented. For the first time in history, every research university is part of

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a single world-wide network and the world leaders in the field have an unprecedented global visibility and power” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 3). The global network of higher education and research signifies the world-wide interconnectedness and competitiveness with knowledge immersion, exchange and accumulation. The process of globalisation makes academic circles and research centres objects but also agents and forerunners of inter-culturalisation. Accordingly, globalisation is a “geospatial process of growing interdependence and convergence, in which worldwide or pan-regional (for example European) spheres of action are enhanced” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 8). The strategic role is played here by new public management with the transmission of reform templates, which are global in scale but have to be nationally implemented. The background of higher education and research policy on the global level includes two kinds of differentiation: 1) between internationalisation and globalisation, and then 2) between intergovernmental and supranational, bilateral and multilateral point of view. Consequently, in the global comparison there are three major strategies concerning higher education and research development: 1) the traditional intergovernmental and bilateral point of view, 2) the intergovernmental and international with the phenomenon of Americanisation, and 3) the supranational with the process of Europeanisation of higher education and research. In this context the major task is mapping or geography of the global higher education and research landscape. Concerning international relations, the relationship between internationalisation and globalisation includes both interdependence and completion, it is also a kind of a dialectic tension between intergovernmental and supranational point of views, which remain interactive and mutually generative, because: “Much of what begins as internationalisation has implications for globalisation, and adds to the accumulation of challenges to national policy and autarky. One difference between globalisation and internationalisation is whether national systems become more integrated as suggested by globalisation, or more interconnected as with internationalisation” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 12).

Therefore both Americanisation and Europeanisation are two processes, which on a global scale divide higher education and research system into centres and peripheries, and at the same time both are confronted with the Asiatic “challenges”, i.e. the new emerging geography in the field of higher education and research with China and India as the

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new centres in the global landscape of knowledge and innovation, and prospects besides the EU and US as the major producers of basic research. But one of the major dilemmas is the disembedding of higher education and research institutions from their national and societal context by permanent global interconnectedness: “In a networked global environment in which every university is visible to every other, and the weight of the global dimension is increasing, it is no longer possible for nations or for individual higher education institutions to completely seal themselves off from global effects. (…) Typically they are more internationally networked than the bulk of the societies in which they sit” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 5).

In consequence, the policy of higher education and research is confronted with a dilemma between disembedding or alignment with national priorities, legislation and territory: “The concentration of research, resources and prestige in major universities constitutes institutions of key importance in their nations and powerful engines of globalisation on the world scale. (…) Every nation wants strong research universities. Every research university wants to lift its reputation. All are focused on policies to lift capacity and performance” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 34).

And one of the most important and powerful instruments of higher education and research policy are the global rankings of universities as “a powerful impetus to intranational and international competitive pressures and have the potential to change policy objectives and institutional behaviours” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 55). Unlike Americanisation, Europeanisation of higher education and research is “an explicitly political process” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 23). For instance the establishment of the European Research Area (ERA) results from transformation of the EU itself from “agriculture” to “knowledge” community in general. Particularly in field of higher education and research it is the process of transmission from international and bilateral to supranational and multilateral level as a part of the European integration. But it is also the European conviction that science “is after all and always has been one of the biggest and most exciting adventures of the human spirit. It is the product of creativity which must not disappear” (COM (2000) 6, 6), and that “investing in research and technological development offers the most promise for the future” (COM (2000) 6, 4). After the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, higher education and research appear as the most dynamic factor of the European integration,

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and with the ERA project initiated in January 2000 a “new horizon for scientific and technological activity and for research policy in Europe” has been created, with the aim “to lay the foundations for a new contract between European citizens and science and technology by putting research back at the heart of society and subjecting its applications to informed political debate, as befits their social implications” (COM (2001) 612 final, 3). Besides the establishment of the ERA, two main instruments are introduced as patterns of convergence in higher education and research with the Bologna Process and Lisbon Strategy as “the main vehicles or frameworks guiding the European response to globalisation in higher education” (Marginson and Wende 2007, 46). Both initiatives are characterised by a tension between bottom-up versus top-down strategy of implementation and between the intergovernmental (Bologna-Process) and supranational (Lisbon-Strategy) point of view. The European approach in policy making in higher education and research with the Lisbon strategy of 2000 is an example of the supranational orientation, i.e. the multilateralism among the EU member states shapes the position of the EU as a political entity in the global geography of science and innovations, and at the same time determines the strategic role of the EU in the framework of international relations. Therewith the process of European integration in the fields of higher education and research has changed from an intergovernmental and bilateral practice to a supranational one and from internationalisation to globalisation. At the same time the European system of higher education and research reflects the tendency on a global scale, e.g. concentration and division into centres and peripheries by the need of divergence and searching for more diversity and competition inside the system itself. The aim is to strengthen the cohesion of knowledge transfer between the European, national and regional levels based on the principles of subsidiarity and regionalisation, that higher education and research projects shall be “as close as possible to the citizens” (COM (2001) 549 final, 4), because the regional dimension of higher education and research is a factor of the European research capacity as a whole. Moreover, there is a double synergy effect between different sectors, for instance, such as cooperation between research centres and industry, and then between disciplines with the intensification of transdisciplinary knowledge “movement” and exchange. At the same time we have reciprocal interdependence between local/regional, national, international and global (supranational) dimensions as expression of the process of regionalisation of the European higher education and research system.

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An example of this geo-spatial reorientation and subsequent reconfiguration of higher education and research systems is Poland, and its process of transformation after the social, political and economic changes since 1989. Moreover, the conditions for higher education and research development in Poland are paradigmatic for all other countries in Central and Eastern Europe according to the Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard presented by OECD 2011. The system of higher education and research in these countries is recognized above all as an integral part and condition of social cohesion and political democratic development. The negative effects of transformation in Poland are: 1) the rapidly increased number of students and intrinsic manifold division into public and private sectors of higher education with the highest indicator in the OECD countries, with the dominant process of marketization and concentration on didactics; 2) low mobility of students and researchers, and in consequence limitation of possibilities for cooperation at the international level, as well as low effectiveness and intensity of the research output in international comparison; 3) finally it is dissemination of the brain drain practice instead of brain circulation. The reform templates are focusing hereby on five principles: diversity, openness, mobility, competition and transparency with the aim to increase the effectiveness of the whole higher education and research system. These three phenomena (massification, marketization, and privatization) express the negative consequences of the “laissez-faire” principle in the field of higher education and research and its “long-term impact on academic norms and codes of behaviour leading to the gradual devalorization of the research mission of public universities” (Kwiek 2013, 12).

Conclusions and prognosis The presented analyses emphasize the fact that the technologies of globalisation (ICT, converging technologies, and the media) increasingly influence the framework of international relations. The major technologies are hereby expressions of the occurring processes of change such as: 1) the various forms of mobilities’ globalisation with the strategic role of transport and mass communication development, 2) the attitude towards environment, and 3) the new technologically intermediated culture of teaching and learning. All of these examples underline the significance of technologies as the decisive factors of international relations. This point of view is one that we find in the social, scientific and economic interdependence at the international and global level as a dynamic process of changes and interactions. For instance, the prognosis

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in the field of higher education and research underlines the growing importance of India and China as the main players, besides US and EU, in the future geography of research and innovations. On the other hand, technological development in the US and EU, for example with laserbased technologies (additive manufacturing technologies, AMT) with the principle of production or manufacturing on individual demand, appears as an alternative to the mass production in the Asiatic system of industry and trade. In this manner, the new generation of the additive manufacturing technologies can be conducive to the marginalisation and exclusion of the Asiatic economies in the future. In this way, technologies, research and science as the essentials of international relations also underline the significance of competences and innovations, which supplement each other with regard to the improvement of creative potentiality in research and science development. Therefore, the policy of higher education, research infrastructure and scientific potentiality become pivotal factors of international relations. This is manifested in the process of globalisation of higher education and research systems as an integral part of social development and democratisation. One of the key issues here is the specificity of engineering science in the system of higher education and research, and the role of the humanities in the engineers’ formation with the envisaged forming of transdisciplinary competences. The used metaphor of turn presents these new “actors” of international relations, such as technologies, spaces, and icons, but also the global cities and research centres with accumulation of various flows of ideas, people and information. The background of this revalorisation of global players in the process of internationalisation and globalisation of science and research institutions is the ongoing disembedding of their national dimension. In consequence, there is a partial replacement of the traditional categories and actors of international relations. In this context, technology assessment and foresight appear as one of the most important subjects. In conclusion, the new technologies, the spatial and the icons, then global cities and research centres metaphorically understood as the new actors of international relations are technologically founded, meaning that technology determines the framework of international relations nowadays. Thus, the questions concerning the future framework of international relations are focused on: 1) the dilemma and new understanding of privacy, freedom and personal autonomy, 2) the creation of a new culture of trust as a constitutive element of social life and system of international relations, 3) the possibilities of risk assessment, management and foresight by analogy to technology assessment (Grunwald 2002). Therefore, the

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metaphor of new actors in international relations expresses the process of replacement, i.e. the traditional actors of international relations such as the nation-state or statesman are replaced or marginalised by technologically intermediated communities, icons, research units and urban spaces.

Reference list Bachmann-Medick, D. 2012. Cultural Turns. Nowe kierunki w naukach o kulturze. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza. Bauman, Z. 2011. Kultura w páynnej nowoczesnoĞci. Warszawa: Narodowy Instytut Audiowizualny-Agora SA. Beck, U. 1986. Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. BiĔczyk, E. 2012. Technonauka w spoáeczeĔstwie ryzyka. ToruĔ: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikoáaja Kopernika. Böhme, G. 2008. Invasive Technisierung. Technikphilosophie und Technikkritik. Kusterdingen: Die Graue Edition. —. 2007. “Technical Gadgetry. Technological Development in the Aesthetic Economy.” In Tensions and Convergences. Technological and Aesthetic Transformations of Society, edited by R. Heil, A. Kaminski, M. Stippak, A. Unger, and Marc Ziegler, 23-35. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. Castells, M. 2001. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. COM (2000) 6. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Towards a European research area. Commission of the European Communities. Brussels, 18.01. 2000. —. (2000) 612 final. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Making a reality of the European Research Area: Guidelines for EU research activities (20022006). Commission of the European Communities. Brussels, 4.10.2000. —. (2001) 549 final. Communication from the |Commission. The Regional Dimension of the European Research Area. Commission of the European Communities. Brussels, 03.10.2001. Grunwald, A. 2002. Technikfolgenabschätzung – eine Einführung. Berlin: Edition Sigma. Kwiek, M. 2013. “Marketization, Privatization, and Declining Demographics: Their Impact on Polish Higher Education.” International Studies in Education 13: 12-20.

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Latour, B. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. —. 2005. Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marginson, S., and M. van der Wende. 2007. Globalisation and Higher Education. Paris: Education Working Papers No. 8, OECD Publishing. Roco, M. C., and W. S. Bainbridge. 2003. Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Press. Sassen, S. 1991. The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sassower, R. 2007. “Postmodern Aesthetics: Manipulating War Images.” In Tensions and Convergences. Technological and Aesthetic Transformations of Society, edited by R. Heil, A. Kaminski, M. Stippak, A. Unger, and M. Ziegler, 351-361. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. Soja, E. W. 2009. “Taking space personally.” In The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by B. Warf and S. Arias, 11-35. London: Routledge Studies in Human Geography. Spielmann, Y. 2010. Hybridkultur. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Sztompka, P. 1991. Society in Action: The Theory of Social Becoming, Cambridge: Polity Press Cambridge. Warf, B., and S. Arias. 2009. The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. London: Routledge Studies in Human Geography. Urry, J. 2000. Sociology beyond Societies. Mobilities for the twenty-first century. London: Routledge.

NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS A FACTOR OF THE “SPATIAL TURN” IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS KATARZYNA MOJSKA

Specificity of the technology-mediated “spatial turn” in international relations As a social science, international relations is a field of study marked by a constant interplay between the “real world” and the world of knowledge (Brown and Ainley 2005, 1). The dynamic changes in the subjective and operational dimensions, as well as the extent and intensity of transboundary activities, coincide with the redefinition of the scope of the discipline. Among the various phenomena of international relations, this transformation, stimulated, inter alia, by technological progress, includes space – both as an element of social reality and an object of conceptual reflections. The process of constructing and changing configurations of geographic and social spaces, including the spatial expansion of social relations, has been an inherent aspect of the history of international relations. Simultaneously, technological development in communication, transportation and military affairs, has had a significant impact in altering the importance of specific socio-spatial relations or geographic locations, and in bringing new dimensions into the spatial construction of the international system. In the words of Robert Pfaltzgraff “as the seas became the dominant medium for the movement of trade and commerce, port cities developed. As land transportation evolved, junctions and highway intersections shaped land values” (2011, 43). “The advent of the airplane, and subsequently the means to penetrate outer space, provided a whole new dimension to geopolitics“ (ibid., 44).

Similar transforming effects can be classified as representing a “spatial turn”, both empirically and theoretically. During the last 30 years the study of space has undergone a significant reconceptualization within various

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disciplines (Thrift 2006, 139). The “spatial turn” unfolding across humanities and social sciences, including international relations, on the one hand manifests itself in introducing space as an important dimension of scholarly interests. On the other hand, it encompasses reworking the notion and significance of space (Warf and Arias 2009, 1). An act of defining a research tendency as a “turn” conveys an impression of reorientation and dynamics in the development of a particular discipline. Although changing perception of the socio-spatial dimension of international relations is obviously not new, due to the rapid development of information and communication technologies in the several last decades, modification of the broadly understood spatiality has gained a particular attention of international relations scholars. In order to indicate the essential aspects characterizing the “spatial turn” in international relations, it is useful to refer to the very nature of the concept of “space”. Approached and written about in a number of ways, “space” is a highly ambiguous term. The fundamental debate concerning space revolved in the 17th century between Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, representing “substantial” or “absolutist”, and the “relational” perspective respectively. In the Newtonian view, space is an empty, absolute entity, ontically prior to and independent from the existence and relations between the objects it contains. “Relational” vision invented by Leibniz predicts that “space is the order of coexisting phenomena” (Leibniz [1712] 1989, 604). This approach does not depict space as a preexisting “container” within which objects and their relations are located, but theorises it as being continuously produced and reproduced by them since they are “not really ingredients but merely requisites of matter” (ibid.). Moreover, defined in “relational” terms, space is, to some extent, a matter of perception – a derivative of the way it is interpreted and measured. Such a view of space, meant as dynamic construction rather than a given entity, seems to provide a proper framework for the analysis of the transformation of spatiality in international relations as it reflects complex character of the spatial phenomena. In the context of this paper, space, being modified under the influence of the technological factor, may be understood at least in two intertwined ways. The first approaches space as the “real kind” and refers both to its material, geographical and locational dimensions, and to the social construction of space. The second understanding views space in discursive terms as an object of scholarly interest within the academic field of international relations and as an analytical unit of the discipline. The technology-mediated spatial turn thereby signifies a simultaneous reconstruction and reconceptualization of space in international relations.

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What is characteristic of international relations analysis is that important categories constituting the ontology of the discipline are conceptualized through metaphors. As Michael P. Marks (2011, 29) points out, one of the compelling reflections in this metaphorical narration concerns the framework, site or location in which international relations occurs. It comes down to the inherently spatial question on “where” international relations take place? Here, “where” does not necessarily mean their physical surroundings or their purely empirical settings. It refers likewise to abstract realms of transborder interactions that might be classified as “levels of analysis”. For Marks (ibid., 58), the “level of analysis” approach represents a spatial metaphor which basically delineates the scholarly field of international relations. It places relations between international actors on distinct planes by using imagery of vertical spatial separation, usually labelled as “systemic” and “subsystemic”, “micro” and “macro” levels. It is an analytical tool organizing investigation by setting a certain perspective on a complex structure of international relations. As such, it is an “open” and useful research formula, even though some authors criticise it for confusing the “levels of analysis” with the “units of analysis” (Wight 2006, 103). The key aspect of this argument is that “the level of analysis” exemplifies the epistemological problem about how to explain objects under consideration, how to assess the significance of various causative forces at different “levels of aggregation” in explaining the logics of international relations and the behaviour of actors involved (Wendt 1991, 387). “The unit of analysis”, by contrast, is an ontological issue concerned with questions pertaining to the investigated entities. Nicholas Onuf (1995, 44) rejects such a rigid distinction when he claims that, despite the practice of announcing the “levels of analysis” as being simply about modes of explanation, it is also an ontological problem. He maintains (ibid.) that there is an important correlation between the “levels of being” and “levels of analysis”. Onuf’s point corresponds with one of the key premises of this article, according to which technological development triggers progressive complexity in the spatial arrangements of international relations. Transborder relations unfold with growing intensity within spatial planes other than the space defined solely by the territorial principle. These spheres, with a primary example of the so-called transnational space, become “units of analysis” – the “levels of being” in the new ontology of international relations and the “levels of analysis” at the same time. As an aspect of the technology-mediated “spatial turn”, the process of extending spatial frameworks beyond and across national territories challenges and de-reifies another metaphorical claim deeply rooted in the

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international relations discourse, namely the “inside-outside” dichotomy. Crucial in the acknowledgment of the academic interest areas (Marks 2011, 62), this spatially oriented division rests on the assumption that the border of a sovereign state is a line demarcating domestic and international domains. Since transnational spaces emanate at the intersection inside of the state and the international realm, clear separation of discernible internal and external blurs. Ash Amin (2004, 33) states that under conditions of continuous “spatial stretching and territorial perforation”, a new world order, built on heterogonous spatial arrangements, appears. Its “social, economic, political and cultural inside and outside are constituted through the topologies of actor networks which are becoming increasingly dynamic and varied in spatial constitution” (ibid.). To avoid possible “traps” associated with the interpretation of the technology-mediated “spatial turn”, two important remarks should be formulated. Firstly, different units and levels of international relations’ spatiality are presented in this paper in “structural” terms, albeit with cognisance that they are not static, pregiven platforms, but dynamic social constructions (Brenner 2004, 28). According to Jayne Rodgers (2003, 12), “relations between actors are as significant as the structures within which they operate”, for spatial structures are continuously created, sustained and modified by interactions between actors. Secondly, despite the profound potential of technological innovations to reorganize and alter importance of the particular established spatial arrangements, and to co-constitute new ones, technology should be perceived neither as single causality nor the only explanatory variable. It by no means functions as an independent force of change, separated from agency and social contexts. Technologies propose and foster spatial change, they do not determine it (Singh 2002, 3). An overall transformative outcome for the international system’s spatiality transcends technologically deterministic logic (ibid.) since “the technological”, “the social” and “the spatial” are continuously produced together.

Manifestations of the technology-mediated “spatial turn” in international relations For the purpose of grasping the most significant manifestations of the technology-mediated “spatial turn” embracing the reconfiguration of the international relations’ spatiality, the concept offered by Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones (2008) may serve as a proper starting point. They build their theory on the four sociospatial lexicons: territory, place, scale and network. The notion of territory is inherently associated with the

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demarcation of an area of state sovereignty, which entails the enclosure, bordering and parcelization of social relations (Brenner 2009, 30). The category of place refers to a portion of geographical space, a particular location within which social processes are embedded (ibid., 31), for instance regions and cities. Scale denotes vertical differentiation of social spheres among global, supranational, national, regional and local levels in particular (ibid, 41). Eventually, networks are structures representing the increasingly significant dimension of contemporary socio-spatiality underpinned by transversal connections among and across geographically scattered actors, loci or organizational units (ibid., 32) According to the authors, the above-mentioned categories, which should be perceived as mutually constitutive and relationally intertwined, are representative for the several “spatial turns” that have occurred in various disciplines (Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008, 389-390). With regard to international relations, the dominant narrative of change, inspired by the transformative impact of new technologies, is the change to the notion of territory. Over twenty years ago, John Agnew (1994) announced the conventional theoretical discourse of international relations as “trapped in territory”. Pointing to the fundamental unit of the discipline’s spatial ontology, he identified three geographical assumptions epitomizing the “territorial trap” and being challenged, inter alia, by the proliferation of information technologies, expanding information economy and innovations in military technology. First, that states act as fixed units of sovereign space. Second, that there exists a polarity between domestic and foreign domains. Third, that the territorial state is pictured as a container of society, where the contours of the social order are perceived to fit in its borders (ibid., 53). The extensive body of international relations research concerning the modification of territoriality produced within last decades can be interpreted as more or less successful routes of escape from the “territorial trap” (Brenner and Elden 2009, 355), albeit not always referred to explicitly. Territory has been reconceived both as an articulation of state authority and the physical terrain within the multifaced deterritorialization discourse pervading globalization studies. It connotes such seminal concepts like “the time-space compression” (Harvey 1990), “the end of geography” (O’Brien 1992), “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990), “space of flows” (Castells 1996), “post-sovereign space” (Rosenau 1996) or “supraterritoriality” (Scholte 2000). Taken literally, similar abstractions may erroneously, and sometimes counter to the author’s intent, suggest that the importance of territory is simply diminishing under the influence of technological factor, thereby leading to

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another intellectual “trap” (Shah 2012), associated with the unreflective “spatial turning”. In the context of the debate pertaining to the modification of territory and territoriality as the central principle for organizing space in international relations, networks analysis has gained particular importance. The turn toward networks, viewed in terms of topological structures in the new spatial morphology of the international system and relational processes through which power is exercised (Dicken et al. 2001, 92), arises as the physical distance between territorially dispersed entities poses less of a barrier to spatial interaction, due to technological change (Agnew 2009, 32). The quintessence of this mechanism has been grasped in the Mauel Castells’s theory of the “space of flows”, defined as: “material organization of simultaneous social interaction at a distance by networking communication with the technological support of telecommunication, interactive communication systems and transportation technologies” (Castells 2009 et al., 171).

Having risen to prominence, networks were sometimes viewed as an alternative to the territorial space (Agnew 2009, 33) as if the growing significance of the space of flows was directly proportional to the decline of the territorial spatialities (Brenner 2004, 56). However, territories and networks function relationally, rather than in mutual exclusion (Agnew 2009, 33). Although the functional nature of networks transcends the territorial logic of the organization of international system, the space of flows is not devoid of a territorial configuration related to the nodes and hubs constituting networks. As Castells (2010, 433) argues, “it is not a placeless space”. Specific places do not disappear in the space of flows. New technologies do not just make them irrelevant. Despite having shown their unquestionable capacities for limiting the role of territorial barriers and absolute physical distances, electronic networks have by no means erased the significance of places and geographical locations. For instance, analyzing the impact of the new information and communication technologies on the spatial organization of contemporary economy, Peter Dicken et. al. (2004, 391) suggest that the core argument supporting continuing relevance of geography and places in the increasingly networked world is the persisting creation of localized clusters or agglomerations of economic activity, which remain a dominant characteristic of the economic landscape of the 21st century. The network approach, used to conceptualize, for example, transnational commodity chains, transboundary, interregional and interurban connections, transnational governance structures and social movements, delivers a

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particularly convenient toolkit with which to investigate manifestations of the “spatial turn” in international relations, for the logic of networks permeates three interdependent tendencies that are characteristic of the international system’s spatial reconstruction. Firstly, networks produce an external orientation of the spatial units nested within national territories. Secondly, the rising importance of networks complements the so-called “scalar turn” (Jessop, Brenner and Jones 2008). Thirdly, networks are essential to the formation of transnational space. Contrary to the idea that new technologies, while bolstering spacespanning network connections, are merely reducing the significance of places, there is ample support for a claim that they are gaining currency in international relations exactly through networks. The notion of place, concerning sub-state spatial entities, like cities, regions and local sites, has not been widely recognized as an object of inquiry within the international relations discourse. But via networks ties, places are given specific transborder dynamics, hereby challenging a binary division between domestic and international domains. This process of contributing to the overall reorganization of the spatial architecture of international relations may be illustrated with the concept of the “global city”. Introducing this notion, Saskia Sassen (2001, 2005) highlights the strategic role that the cities such as London, New York and Tokyo play in the global economy as they tend to host key sectors characterized by crossborder networks, for instance finance and advanced services, information management, research and development. Sassen (2005, 37) argues that, through telematics and intense economic transaction, these “global cities,” bound together at the inter-metropolitan level, form the transnational center of the global economic system. “Global cities” and networks among them constitute a specific space that is both embedded in particular places and transterritorial, since it links up geographically distant sites (ibid., 39). The proliferation of networks with their structural and operational properties correlates with another important aspect of the spatial change and its theoretical representation in international relations studies: the shift in the scale of transborder interactions. The very notion of scale may indeed help to find an answer to the problem of “where” international relations takes place (Sjoberg 2008). But the metaphorical “placing” of boundary-crossing interactions simply on different, vertically stratified planes, and the “levels of analysis” situated outside the state demarcation, do not reflect the complex multiscalar reality. Neil Brenner (2001, 605) acknowledges that: “scalar hierarchies constitute mosaics not pyramids. Processes of scalar structuration do not produce a single nested scalar hierarchy, an absolute

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pyramid of neatly interlocking scales, but are better understood as a mosaic of unevenly superimposed and densely interlayered scalar geometries”.

Following Sallie A. Marston et al. (2005, 418), it is worth emphasizing that these shifting scalar configurations are often neither entirely domestic nor international, supraterritiorial or global. They function in accordance with the logic of transterritorial networks that are always “deeply localized” and extensive in reach at the same time. The emblematical example of the spatial reconstruction of international relations, occurring through technologically-underpinned networks and manifesting in the processes of “scale jumping”, is represented by the socalled “transnational space”. By transnational spaces Thomas Faist (2004, 3) means “relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of ties reaching across the borders of sovereign states”. Ludger Pries (2001, 18) understands transnational spaces as “configurations of social practices, artifacts and symbol systems that span different geographic spaces in at least two nation-states”. Although the subjective dimension of transnational space does not totally exclude state agents or intergovernmental bodies, what provides it with the unique characteristics is the proliferation of non-state actors’ transboundary activity. For the purpose of scholarly investigation, transnational space is also distinguished as both a level and unit of analysis, mainly to highlight the role of intensifying interactions between non-state entities across borders in the processes of spatial reframing. The most prominent examples of actors that give rise to the emergence of transnational spaces include transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations. Essential to the nature thereof, technology-mediated transterritorial spanning of social and economic activity is certainly not a recent phenomenon. Introducing the printing press, radio communication and the telephone considerably augmented the capabilities for spreading ideas or coordinating business projects across and, to some extent, independently of national borders in earlier eras (Rosenau 2006, 116-117). What differentiates the present times is the unprecedented intensity and associated dynamics with which specific spaces, functioning simultaneously within and above national frames, expand. Such domains are partly constituted by the structures of interactions spread largely in electronic spaces. Robert Latham and Saskia Sassen (2005) use a construct of “digital formations” to label these transnational spatial arrangements that illustrate the intersection of technological and social conditions. The notion of digital formations may be applied to the specific dimension of the aforementioned transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations’ activities associated with utilization of computer-centered technologies. Although driven by

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distinct criteria, inasmuch as they represent market and civil society rationales respectively, these actors, reinforced structurally through their use of interactive technologies, contribute to the progressive density of transnational space and, consequently, to the further reconstitution of international relations’ spatiality. In this context, new technologies are viewed not solely as tools for processing information which facilitates networking, increasing communication, streamlining operations and lowering transaction costs (Bach and Stark 2005, 39). As a “nervous tissue” of digital formations, they facilitate processes of knowledge creation and exchange that sustain and transform interactions and organizational patterns within networks, producing uneven dynamics of transnational spaces accordingly. With regard to non-governmental organizations, Jonathan Bach and David Stark (2005) assert that interactive technologies may enhance their potential to modify social and political spaces, since their exploitation eases the formation of “knowledge communities” around NGOs’ activities. These, in turn, play a major role in what the authors name “associative space” within and around which meanings are being negotiated and discourses established in the fields such as human rights, development, security and environmental protection. It symbolizes NGOs’ function as deliberative associations (ibid., 46) that influence institutions located at global, regional and national levels. Moreover, “associative space” is particularly important from the perspective of changes to the spatial model of political power enclosed in state territorial units (ibid., 50). In this regard, the liminal role of transnational NGOs between local, national, international and global scales situates them in the centre of technology-mediated reorganization of the traditional spatial order in international relations (ibid.). According to Dieter Ernst (2005), in the corporate sector, digital formations take the form of global flagship networks. These networks include both intrafirm (parent enterprises, foreign affiliates) and interfirm ties (joint ventures with suppliers, subcontractors, service providers or strategic alliances) (ibid., 91). Knowledge production and sharing serve as a “glue layer” necessary to keep these complex transnational systems growing. Due to support of digital information systems used to manage corporate flagship networks, knowledge diffusion is continuously extended across firm boundaries and national borders, among various network participants in remote geographical locations (ibid., 92). It is worth emphasizing that the evolution of the cross-border forms of corporate structures towards global flagship networks, combined with

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utilization of digital technologies, strengthens the function of transnational corporations both as key inhabitants and producers of transnational spaces. Transnational space itself instantiates qualitative changes to the international relations’ spatiality and the following reworking of its conceptual representations within the discipline: constituted through crossborder relations and transactions, it typifies the environment of specific, nonlinear spatial logic. This space is not established somewhere between intrastate and international domains. It is produced simultaneously in and overlaps with both environments (PietraĞ 2013). The concept of transnational spaces does not picture the globe as a single place in the way that some globalization studies tend to do (O'Byrne and Hensby 2011, 151). Transnational space articulates uneven multiscalar geometry within which supranational and global processes take place at the subnational level. Subnational entities, in turn, are provided with external orientation, remaining “deeply local yet intensely connected digitally” (Sassen 2012, 14). Thus, transnational space may be termed as “pluri-local” (Pries 2001) and “microglobal” (Sassen 2012, 456). Despite the indubitable significance of multi- and transscalar shifts, the narration of the technology-mediated spatial turn in international relations, marked essentially by the discourse of change, should not overlook the elements of continuity. The meaning of state territory, borders and distance changes through the mechanism of technological innovation as it permits social activity to overcome physical territorial barriers and operate beyond state sovereign jurisdictions (Starr 2013, 435). But states by no means should be perceived as passive, helpless objects of these transformations. Suffice it to mention that under the increasing permeability of their borders, states extensively use, among others, satellite imagery, biometric technologies, telephone- and Internet-tapping technologies, social network analysis programs, Global Positioning System and Geographic Information System for the territorial surveillance and control. Consequently, technological change stimulates both continuous deterritorialization and reterritiorialization. Technological development contributes to the transformation of space, wherein cross-boundary relations take place, into an increasingly complex and polymorphous system. Nevertheless, it in no way makes for a “Westphalian” spatial structuration, organized along territorially defined state boundaries, irrelevant or dissolving. It still matters both in reality and study of international relations. From the perspective of the latter, the border of a sovereign state, despite its changing meaning in the increasingly interdependent world, remains a major point of reference, even for analyses aiming at deconstruction of the traditional conceptual

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frameworks of the discipline. Further, it would make no sense to theorize, for instance, transnational spaces without taking state context into account. It is important to highlight that the logic of interstate system, which is composed of national demarcations, may, to some extent, transfer to nonterritorial spaces. As previously mentioned, new technologies provide the material basis for the spatial extension of international relations into new virtual or physical environments that may be produced by, or accessed through, technological innovations. Epitomized by cyberspace and outer space, these novel spaces become arenas of interactions between states. International relations scholars have already begun to transfer their claims concerning the behavior of states in “real” and Earth-bound spaces into thinking about their conduct in the aforementioned spheres (Pfaltzgraff 2011, Manjikian 2010). And the stories about interstate relations taking, or predicted to take place in these novel “terrains,” differ in basic assumptions not because of distinct views on the nature of cyberspace or outer-space and its possible impact on behavior, but mainly due to different theoretical perspectives on international relations being applied. Consequently, realism tends to approach cyberspace as the extension of the battlefield, to reproduce security dilemma into the virtual world (Manjikian 2010, 386), and predict outer space to be a new field of the inevitable enduring struggle for power (Pfaltzgraff 2011, 47). Liberalism emphasizes the role of the formal and informal regimes created to facilitate cooperation and benefit from activities in outer-space (ibid., 52) as well as highlights the potential for alliance building with regard to cyberspace (Manjikian 2010, 398).

Conclusions The technology-mediated transformation of space poses significant conceptual challenge to the international relations analysis. This dynamic process manifests itself in a set of phenomena, which represent uneven geometry, and transcend one-directional and mono-casual explanations. Following Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008, 391), it may be convincingly argued, that reasonable interpretation of the “spatial turn”, stimulated by the mechanism of technological innovation, should be “immune to intellectual fashion cycles”. While focusing on a particular spatial plane or scale of transboundary interactions is a natural analytical procedure, associated, for instance, with “the level of analysis” approach, it is important to view spatial constructs, such as territories, places, scales and networks as interrelated and mutually constitutive. The technology factor notably contributes to the modification of the spatial architecture of

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international relations into an increasingly multidimensional and polymorphous structure. However, as Latham and Sassen assert (2005, 8), the new transnational spatial structures, underpinned by electronic networks are “neither subsumed by, nor reducible” to technologies that provide immense infrastructural support for their creation and growth. For their meaning is provided by social logic (ibid., 6). Moreover, the transformative impact of new technologies is far from making territorial spatialities irrelevant. It triggers both discontinuity – deterritorialisation, and continuity - retteritorialization (surveillance and control) in the ongoing process.

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TECHNOLOGY AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER LECH ZACHER

Technology has played both driving and transformative roles throughout history. Technology accelerated its development (and impacts) twice in the modern era, in the form of the industrial revolution (18th century) and the scientific and technological revolution (20th century). The previous revolution formed a new social system (internally) and a new international order by creating industrial powers who were in turn producing new technologies and goods, capitalizing on competitive advantage, controlling technology transfer (by patents, embargos, and policies). The technological gap became a reality, as well as political and strategic ones. The industrial revolution was mostly practically oriented – to production. The scientific and technological revolution (the term coined by J. D. Bernal in 1939) was based more on research and scientific knowledge. This overall revolution can be, not only analytically, decomposed into its several components called electronic revolution, telecommunications revolution, information revolution, digital revolution, and also biotechnological and recently nanotechnological revolutions. The production of knowledge depends on the available research potential, scientific personnel, financing, institutional solutions, supportive policies of governments, and business organizations. Unequal potential worldwide makes some countries technological leaders (even hegemons), while others are just imitators and the rest are simply excluded. Thus, a new map of international power emerges. In spite of globalization and networking (due to ICTs), technological domination/subordination is a political fact. Technology (called new, high, edge tech) is an area and at the same time a means of playing a power game. Needless to add, military build-up, space exploration, the arms trade, and wars contributed to this game. It is also conducted in cyberspace.

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Types of power nowadays In the present complex world, different types of forces clash and generate various changes and reconfigurations. Power is no longer onedimensional (i.e. military and political), but may be exercised virtually in all fields of people’s life and activities. There are new factors and mechanisms of power. x Technological power: Depends on the scientific and technological potential of a country (or an organization, e.g. a transnational corporation) and on the ability to use it effectively. Dynamic, large R & D sector, government and private business labs, skilled personnel, talented leaders, decent financing, and instrumental bureaucracy produce inventions and innovations that can be patented, exported or not, embargoed, or controlled. This means performing of power. As a result, there are technological leaders and dominators and these which are dependent and marginalized. Technology generates possibilities for the performing of power on an international scale (Zacher 1994). Leadership in military, space, industrial technology, and techno services makes others dependent and subordinated. Newly advanced (high tech, cutting edge) technologies are protected by patent policies, intellectual rights regulations and by governments’ policies (e.g. financing research, developing education). In spite of the free market and international free trade, flows of technologies are controlled (not only of the cutting-edge technologies). Thus, technology transfer, technology trade (legal and illegal), technological cooperation and aid, technological espionage, migrations of technological personnel, technological policies of governments, international organizations (such as UNIDO, former COCOM, ITU), and technological business strategies – all of these constitute a kind of order that is mostly the result of various processes, activities, and policies, only to some extent it is normative and legally regulated (by international law, multilateral treaties and agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the like). There are also efforts to control cyberspace, which is a technologically generated social space (the recent anti-ACTA movement was opposing such control). So technology means power. International distribution of power is connected with technology creation, distribution, and use. Technology assures intellectual (knowledge), military, and economic competitive advantage. It is also a major drive for broadly understood modernization. However, it produces technological gaps (the latest is called a digital divide). In the technology market, there are also such factors as patented goods, technical standards, embargos, and monopolized tendencies (e.g.

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the case of Microsoft), illegal trade and fake commodities, and stealing technical designs and solutions (e.g. mutual claims of Apple and Samsung). The relationship of technology to power is complicated and multifaceted; it is far from being one-way (Adas 1989, 2006; Rycroft & Kash 1999; Vanderburg 2005, 2007; Zacher 2011, 2012). There are many reasons for that. Technology is semi-autonomous and difficult to control. It can be stimulated by financing research and promoting innovation by co-sharing risks and costs, such as the Advanced Technology Program in the U.S. or the European Union Research Frameworks, as well as by controlling standards and norms (of safety, of emissions, etc.). Cooperation, trade, and networking on the one hand enlarge power (or power nods in the networks), but on the other hand to decentralize power. Moreover, new technologies (ICT and transportation) enable more transparency, influence and participation, and also easier mobility (important for various refugees and opponents, such as J. Assange and E. Snowden recently), and activities of the counter-power type. Many international non-governmental organizations (INGOs e.g. Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch) take some power from governments and corporations. More democracy means less centralized power. Globally accessed information and online communications enable big international actions (e.g. anti- or alter-globalization) which can also be regional, as with the Arab Spring or Outraged Movement, or national such as the Occupy Wall Street movement. Such actions have cultural character or an anti-system or political liberation dimension. Nevertheless, they can influence the distribution of power nationally, regionally, or worldwide. To sum up, technological power is manifested in technological potential and production of technological knowledge, equipment, and procedures, not rarely monopolized and legally protected by patents, and exported according to strategies of governments, international organizations (e.g. technical, military blocs) and corporations (market supply seems more important in action than market demand, which is often technology-driven and shaped by demand-creating industries, by marketing and ads, and by the management of needs and desires). Governments are still quite powerful in the domain of technology since they co-finance R & D, they help in risky projects, they order technologies (mainly military), they initiate big technological programs (as for example Apollo or Mars exploration), and they construct international research and cooperation networks and institutions (e.g. R & D frameworks in the EU, CERN). Militarization as a technological trend is still ongoing in many countries. In wars, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and piracy, technical devices

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and means are used (from machetes, Kalashnikov guns to drones). Emergence of cyberspace enables cyber war. Technological power is used widely and effectively on an individual, local, national, international, and global scale by various actors. Government policies and business strategies are effective given that in the present technological civilization, the existing societies, in leading countries in particular, become socio-technical systems (Johnson & Wetmore 2009). The logical dimension is shaped by technology and the technological power of various actors. Thus, the whole world can be treated as a socio-technical system with its leaders and peripheries. Lessdeveloped countries and regions demand technological aid and assistance and privileged technology transfer. In the ’70s, there were even demands concerning the so-called new international technological order. Criticisms of technological colonialism and post-colonial practices are often formulated and expressed during international debates. Military technology gives power to governments and anti-government partisans, to narco-business and mafia armies, to international terrorists, to criminals and to armed individuals. Moreover, info-communication technologies give to all these subjects additional technology-driven power. A new situation of individuals – caused by these technologies, ICT in particular – is connected now not with a gun possession, but with a computer and access to global network. It is an evident emancipation of individuals, their empowerment and globalization never achieved before. Of course, ICTs contribute greatly to other aforementioned actors, their users to good or bad ends. Anyway, power relations are changing somehow and technological race results in a better power position. Technological power, as it is broadly understood, can be ascribed not only to governments and nation states, but also to computerized and networked individuals (who may enjoy more freedom than before and who may ignore, in their virtual setting, the traditional power structures, and who can build new forms of network power). Moreover, technological power can be attributed to societies, which is illustrated by the term hightech societies. Their power dimension is expressed by their high international position, which gives them a comparative advantage (in competencies and skills, level of salaries, paths of international careers, bargaining position in the labour market, capabilities to use effective new technologies, better understanding of their possible impacts – which are important for effective protests and negotiations with government agencies and business). High-tech societies have more technology around but they also have – at least potentially – more knowledge about its use and impacts, as well as about its possible detrimental side effects. So they are

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in a power position toward political or business technological decisionmakers, moreover their consciousness and pressure can exert influence on the behaviour of governments, international organizations, and corporations on all scales, from local to global. It is evident that the technological power connected with technology development, promotion, trade, transfer, application, and control has to include such issues as technological risk creation and decrease, technological safety and technological negative side effects, not to mention misuses of technology and technological accidents and catastrophes (their symbols can be Chernobyl, Deep Horizon oil platform, Fukushima nuclear power plant, making mistakes in aircrafts or drones, attacks on civilians, etc.). The impacted people blame usually governments for their unsafe living and weak protection. Under democratic conditions, it means more responsibility and less power for decision-makers. Technology in international politics has always played a crucial role – either in armed conflicts and wars – which are an “extension of policy” (according to Clausewitz) – or in the case of maintaining military equilibrium (e.g. during the Cold War), or to deter potential aggressors. So-called peace technologies (such as satellites) can serve to control either armament or disarmament, and either for spying or for protecting against terrorism and crimes. Technological power and force were often used in history as “gunboat politics” or as military manoeuvres or aircraft carrier fleets approaching turbulent locations. Nowadays in the Age of Information, there are also global technological possibilities for controlling (bugging, censoring, jamming, distorting) of information and communication (e.g., Project Echelon and PRISM). In democratic countries, with active civil societies, technological power is questioned and sometimes – thanks to citizens’ actions – limited. “Surveillance society” means more power to governments and special services, police, army, etc. Needless to add, there are other sorts of power besides technological power. However, they are, as a rule, somewhat more connected with technological development and are used or driven by technology and its advances. x Economic power is basically an effect of technology applications (innovations, devices, objects, infrastructure, procedures, design, and research). This is technology that imposes re-engineering of structures, functions, networks, organization, workforce use, and the like at the national and global level (to states, international organizations, regional groupings such as the EU, and also to transnational corporations). Until recently, economic power was based on industrial technology (such terms

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as industrial economies or industrial democracies were in use, as well as industrialized countries). Nowadays, there are new labels that reflect technological change: e-economy, new economy, information economy, digital economy, and virtual economy. They are often attributed to a more comprehensive socio-economic framework, which is modern capitalism or a capitalist system, called technological, but also flexible, regulatory, global, informational, digital, electronic, and cognitive system. Technological megatrends (ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotization) are based on “new economy”, as well as globalization. They build global power networks, not only national power structures and webs. Calls for appropriate technology (Schumacher in the 1970s), alternative technology (at present by environmental movements) or for glocalization, break the coherent concept of technological power. However, flexibility in technology design and technology decentralization have some inconvenient limitations. International competitive advantage is a result mainly of technology, innovations, technological export commodities, technoservice, and a highly competent technical workforce. In technological societies, there is a big demand for technological goods, very often for refined technological gadgets which are commonly used. In high-tech economies, technological innovations are often stimulated by government funds, tax reductions, and orders by a public-private partnership; in strategically important areas (e.g. in telecommunications and armaments) the role of the state is significant. Moreover, governments are promoting national production and export of technological goods. This means technological and economic power connection and positive feedback. Hence, new technologies are driving forces of economic development, productivity and modernization, and they change the structure of economies and make them networked. Transnational technological corporations are the main source of innovations and a vehicle of their worldwide diffusion. So-called dot.com companies are of great importance for the economy. However, they generated a “bubble” around the year 2000, which shook international economic relations. Nevertheless, computerization and informatization of the economy determine nowadays their competitive position in the world market. For the purposes of techno-economic success, new institutional or organizational solutions are introduced in government and in business. Technical staff in corporations (which can be called – after Galbraith – technostructure) are vital for success. Big laboratories employ highly qualified inventors (even Nobel Prize winners, e.g. at Bell Labs). Various

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innovative models of cooperation among government, industry, and universities are structured and practical (e.g. the Triple Helix model). Hence, the political power of the government is closely associated with the military power of the state and both are based on technological power shared by public and private spheres. x Market power can be separated – not only theoretically - from the domain of economic power. While the economic power was discussed above as connected with deliberate policies, strategies, and activities of both government and business, the market power refers to possibilities of influencing or controlling the market in spite of various forces present there – not only supply and demand, but also strategies and policies, behaviours of consumers, conjuncture and crisis cycles. In the market game, its participants are diverse – from government agencies and public sector companies to private firms of varied size (from family companies to global giants), and from traditional industries to dot.coms and virtual finance institutions (often transnational, hard to control, speculative, conducting electronic transactions in seconds). In many countries, there are so-called flagship industries or companies, important for their role and power (e.g. Siemens, Nokia). They often play a strategic role in innovation and export, as well as in transborder expansion (i.e. in globalization). The information revolution offers an unusual possibility for the economic activity of individuals in the net (which can be called micro-globalization). It means that the individualization of economic power besides its transborder character, thanks to technology. Market actors are thus diverse and their market power is differentiated. Some (such as governments) may have an influence on prices, while others can expand their market penetration. Technological companies are competing by creating new products and services. There is no perfect competition in real markets. There are monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies – de facto product of competition awarding the strongest actors. There are cartels, alliances, hidden agreements, unfair composition, dumping practices, and corruption. The market situation and market game depend much on the type of market, be it financial or insurance, food and raw materials, armaments and technology, media and pop culture, not to mention the black market connected with “shadow economy” and organized crime. Thanks to technology, the market is not a place any more, but a multidimensional space (cyberspace included) with new characteristics of e-economy. Technology modifies markets and redistributes market power nationally and internationally, but is not able to eliminate market turbulences and market failures.

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x Political power is traditionally perceived as a real “pure” power that is attributed to political systems and institutions, political parties and leaders, also to various pressure groups, sometimes hidden. Political power is connected above all with political decision-making and can be performed on all levels – from local to international and global. Political power is nowadays an emanation of the nation-state, its authority and institutions. Sovereignty was traditionally a fundamental principle of politics. Growing cooperation, networking, exchange, integration, and globalization processes change the traditional meanings and functioning of governments. At present, national authorities are limited by democracy (institutions, procedures, citizen activity, deliberations, participation), by the strategies and decisions of transnational corporations (native and foreign), by international organizations and institutions (as IMF, World Bank, UN, NATO, OPEC), and last but not least, by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and various movements and activism (often called hactivism) in the global net. Moreover, there are also limitations originating from international law, treatises, agreements, and recommendations (e.g. of World Summits, G5 or G20 guidelines). Hence, political choices and performance are bound in many ways on virtually all levels in all domains. Of course, dominating states have more power and choice, but still they are in the global network. Technological power and political power are de facto intertwined; they are constitutive components of the network – national and international. Strength and effectiveness of political power – internally or internationally – depends greatly on technology utilization in politics. This is not an easy task. Nevertheless, many governments promote overwhelming technology use in political communication, information, and propaganda, in conflict resolution and in foreign policy. That is why they introduce methods, infrastructure, and devices of e-politics, e-government, e-governance, and e-democracy (Zacher 2007, 2009b). Thus, technology is yet again a challenge – expensive, difficult to control, and possible to be used against the existing powers. Technology also ensures great possibilities for achieving important socio-political goals, such as growth, competitiveness, stability, security, good international position (military, economic, political, and cultural), and better e-future. Thus, political power is technologized more and more. Political power engineering is, as a rule, connected with a technocratic approach and netocracy (with help of the mass media). Thus, technology makes it possible to control societies, to shape advantageous international standing and position, to develop political cooperation worldwide, to undertake joint actions globally, and to increase military build-up. ICTs are instrumental in performing both soft

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power and power politics. International distribution of political – and not solely – power is shaped by the abilities to effectively use modern technologies in domestic and world power play. Technologically leading countries have more to say; they may even dominate and make others dependent. The less technologically advanced ones try to imitate this path by technology transfer and similar institutional patterns. The most important thing is to combine the power of technological innovations and applications with political innovations, which should be provided by the political and knowledge elite. x Ideological power – In spite of the announcement of its end (by Aron and Bell), it still plays an important role in explaining, interpreting, and justifying all kinds of power (Latham 2000). Moreover, it has in itself some power potential and it helps in power performance. Mass access to information, widespread education, and increasing knowledge contribute to rationality but only to some limited extent and in some areas (e.g. research or creation of technology). People’s mentality and consciousness, their mind-set and Weltanschauung are significantly shaped by ideology (or ideologies). Ideologies’ diffusion is today greatly supported by technology (electronic devices, media, Internet, and so forth). Not a small flow of information can be ascribed to ideology, which is always persuasive and instructive. Often ideologies represent interests which are not necessarily material ones. Ideologies motivate and shape the convictions of people with no exceptions. Ideologies are practically effective, influencing people’s thinking and behaviour. ICTs give them a boost. Charismatic politicians, religious leaders, social critics, Internet gurus, intellectuals, and artists produce, diffuse, or support their own or others’ ideologies. Thus, ideology is a power per se because it can motivate, persuade and encourage or even compel people to certain decisions and behaviours, and has always been widely used. Political ideologies often reflect old ideas, convictions, and values. Ideologies are connected – and de facto created by – great civilizational transformation as for example the industrial revolution (industrialism) and the presently ongoing scientific/technological revolution (called also information, electronic, digital revolution) proposing technologism, informationalism, and globalism. Ideologies are often embedded in the future visions and utopias (Zacher 2008, 2009a). Futurists, various leaders, and gurus have a real power using ideologies in which they believe or treat them instrumentally. Decision, policies, activities – even national and knowledge-based – can have an ideological dimension or bias. And they are hard to separate.

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Almost everything can be ideologized, for example, the idea of progress, modernization theory, neoliberal globalization, information revolution, civilization or cultural missions of the leading countries, power politics, technology development, future studies, human thinking, democracy, cyberspace, etc. In the human minds, behaviours, and policies, there are often some “mixtures” of ideologies that are used to pursue more or less specific goals. The international distribution of power is supported by various ideologies, whereas their “set” may change because situations, contexts, and the potential of actors are changing, and require new supportive approaches in order to create change, to adapt to change, or to stop it. Of course, there are not only ideologies that justify the existing status quo or ongoing change, there are ideologies which are counter-cultural, revolutionary, and “paradigmatic”. More of these are the ideologies connected with technological change and with new technologies. x Cultural power should not be neglected in analysis of different power types in technological civilization and society. Performative force of technology and concerns about culture change are supporting and stimulating each other. A certain cultural potential or ability is necessary to produce (or possibly import) new technologies and apply them effectively, looking for their systemic and synergetic dimensions. Broadly understood culture makes it possible, because cultural values present in social life and in individual daily life are favourable to undertakings that may be promising and advantageous although risky and costly. Prospectiveness and visions, boldness and courage, striving for perfection and progress, curiosity, respect for individual talents, openness to new solutions and, of course, appropriate organizational and managerial abilities – all these enable technological change and the connection of technological power with cultural power. Cultural power is reflected in assimilation of new technologies and possibilities created by them, and in their application in daily life culture and in so-called high culture connected with art, music, literature, architecture, and various performances also in the Internet. Technological culture means people’s understanding of new technologies and the ability to use them smoothly. Historically, culture happened to be stronger than technology. Since the 19th century, which was a time of great transformation due to the industrial revolution, technology seems to dominate cultural change. Increasingly, technologized culture is called a technopole (Postman’s term). This may harm traditional culture, although new technological possibilities create a new culture or cultural expressions, forms, and events (Aronovitz et al. 1996, Batteau 2010;

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Hughes 2004; Taylor & Harris 2005). There are many examples: video art, electronic music, cyber art (Silver & Massanari 2006, Spiller 2002), not to mention unprecedented quality, high fidelity, use of lasers, computer simulations, and so on. The cultural capital of a country and society manifests itself in the influence on others. This influence can be expressed by creating various models – of organization, of media and advertisement, of consumption, and of patterns of behaviour and lifestyles. Trend setting in culture, pop culture in particular, in entertainment and news broadcasting, is always connected with the professionalization and globalization of the media (e.g., BBC World, CNN). Cultural power – with the help of technology – can impose models and patterns on others by innovativeness, leadership, attractiveness, and monopolistic positions. The creative use of new technologies is vital for success. The international position of a country – in the network of power, influence, pattern setting, and behaviour shaping – depends on its cultural potential, capital, and power. x Social power is a feature of people, of citizens and their national and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs). In the Information Era, the new terms were coined: netizens and global netizens. They refer to cyberspace, which is a new additional societal space, a space for living and acting. This space is produced by technology. It provides a new framework for human activities. It creates unprecedented possibilities for people’s communication, self-expression, information and knowledge accessing, and political acting, also on an international scale. ICTs enable an immediate reaction, online exchange of information, transborder communication, and possibility of active participation in e-government and in e-democracy procedures (Lengwiler 2008, Philbrick & Barandiaran 2009, Callon et al. 2009). Information revolution, the mass application of ICT’s influence through many societal and individual domains: education (there is an ongoing transition from an information society to a knowledge – based society), social activism and hactivism (movements, protests, actions on an international scale), social capital building (at workplace, locally, in the public sphere, internationally, in politics), and cyberspatial activities (symbolized by Wiki, Wikileaks, free culture, open source, Creative Commons, social networks, anti-ACTA movement etc.). However, transnationalization and cosmopolitanism together with multiculturalism change traditional social cohesion. Moreover, network individualism contributes to the disintegration of traditional bonds and structures. Will unlimited and immediate interactions of individuals (informed and knowledgeable) replace them?

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Anyway, social power – greatly supported by new, powerful technologies – is manifested in empowerment of informed and free individuals in the net and in the general information infrastructure, which allows us to call advanced societies – information-rich, informed, digital, virtual, cyber-societies, and e-societies (Zacher 2007). Needless to add, technologies other than ICT are also important and transformative. They can reshape societies or societal aggregates (crowds, collectivities). New structures and mechanisms of functioning are illustrated by new labels being created for societies: e-herd, e-swarm, intelligent crowds, manmachine aggregated, and the like. Biotechnology, nanotechnology, and robotization already make people, their bodies, and brains more artificial (using genetic engineering, biomedicine, regenerative medicine, and various prostheses). Artificial intelligence may one day outdo man’s intelligence. Such a perspective is called singularity (Kurzweil’s term – Kurzweil 2005). This process of the denaturalization of man, as well as the environment, will probably lead to a Post-human Era. However, for the time being, it should be stated in the context discussed here that technologically leading societies have more influence and power on an international scale.

Modelling technology-driven power In the technological civilization we live in, technology plays a performative role. It is a driving force of change in virtually all spaces of human life and activities. Technology is fundamental for power potential building and performance (and this concerns not only highly advanced countries). Many types and dimensions of power are co-shaped and maintained by technology – new technologies in particular. Such a prevailing role of technology nowadays results not only from the immense development of technology (mostly in the 20th and 21st centuries) and its overwhelming applications, but also from a radical change in the relationship between society and technology. Societies have transformed and created with ubiquitous technology a socio-technological system (Harbers 2005, Johnson & Wetmore 2009). Thus, technology is not only a factor, a means, a context, but a dynamic part of the system. Mutual dependence, interactions, and feedback are not always symmetrical. Such a system is very complex and of course highly differentiated geographically. The whole world can be treated as a kind of a super-system. In any research on technology-driven change in the system, it is helpful to analyse various types, dimensions, and spaces of power performance (See Fig. 3.1).

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Fig. 3.1. A Conceptual model of power in society – types and dimensions.

All types of power are intertwined and can be easily separated, mostly analytically. However, in real life these types are somehow institutionalized – nationally and internationally as well. Nation-states are still important and they perform power multidimensionally. On an international scale, it can be manifested in higher effectiveness of policies, achieving competitive advantage, influential decision-making, pattern-making and widespreading, exerting pressure, and gaining leadership or a monopolistic position. It goes without saying that proportions, constellations, and the strength of types of power used in states, international organizations and institutions, big corporations, transnational in particular, are very diverse because their goals, strategies, and abilities to fulfil them are divergent. Moreover, there are, as a rule, many actors and stakeholders and many contexts. For the purpose of integrating all types of power, it is useful to examine their potential and reach, their relations, gaps and inconsistencies, and possibilities of synergy. It is difficult to bring them into alignment. Analyzing power derived from technology, or technology-driven power, or technology-applying power requires in-depth understanding of modern technology, especially new or so-called cutting-edge technologies. This type of knowledge is not popular in political circles and in societies in general. Discourse on the relationship between technology and society

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should be promoted and popularized. Therefore, it is mostly a subject of research of STS (science, technology, society studies) communities in Western democracies. Such discourse should take place in non-technical sciences, in politics, business, and in civil society. The body of knowledge on technology, society, and politics grows and is useful for understanding and acting. The potential and dynamics of technology, be it ICT or biotech, make it a drive, amplifier, multiplier, and transformative power. The evolution from agricultural civilization to the present technological one (and its informational or info-bio stage) is its visible result. Mass and multiple applications of technologies, transforming societies and environment, have created a technological civilization, technological societies, and a technological man (Nye 2006, Fox et al. 2006, Friedel 2007, Wajcman 2004). So technology and its applications, effects, and impacts should be the subject of investigation and policy in all domains, and in all spheres of human activities (See Fig. 3.2). These spheres are developed in countries and societies variously with what is determined by history, heritage, economic potential, strategies, and policies. Thus, it is better to elaborate, for example, with regional models or models for selected classes of countries (i.e. similar cases). The role and effects of technology – in spite of the general pattern of its development – will be diverse for many reasons (already discussed earlier). They will depend also on a response to challenges generated by the present ongoing processes worldwide, cyberspace included. Technology-driven power originates from the society’s ability to produce technology (or possibly to import it) and to use it effectively. In other words, it originates from creativity – R & D, innovations, intellectual capital, technological culture of people, and often brain drain. It is obvious that countries have differentiated their technology-driven power potential. Abilities to activate and utilize effectively such potential are not very common in the world. But having a good global position in the technological race means more power – political, economic, cultural, etc. On the international scene, it may lead to a monopolistic position (for example, in military and space technology, supercomputers), to profit from technology export, to the possibility of controlling technology trade and dissemination (through embargos and political pressure), to the possibility of brain drain from other countries (because of better work conditions for talented people), to competitive advantage due to effective strategies in producing breakthrough innovations and using them in many industries and human activities. Harnessing talented people, institutions and funds;

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taking risks, and having the ability to commercialize, result in the leadership position. Fig. 3.2. Technology and spheres of human activity in the context of ongoing processes. Military Economy Environment TECHNOLOGY Culture (plus SCIENCE)

Present processes internationalization integration globalization cooperation competition disintegration networking individualization virtualization

postnational transhuman eras posthuman

Education Social life

Consumption

Modelling technology-driven power change on an international and global scale requires consideration of each country’s potential, measured by such indicators as R & D funding, innovations (their numbers, patents, exports, level of education, scientific and technical infrastructure, e.g., science and technology parks, research labs, personnel), size and skills, strategies and policies (their right choices of goals and means). This potential can be classified and analysed on the basis of their models of existence and change. Hence, the potential can be characterized as emerging (new powers), dominating (old powers), cooperating (the EU), merging (TNCs), conflicting (in international trade), diverging (changing direction and division of innovation), obsoleting (less-developed countries), being excluded (the least developed countries and localities). Such modes of potential existence and change can be assigned to countries, societies, or regions to be examined. Additionally, models can be decomposed into spheres of human activities (cyberspace activities included).

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Conclusions Technological civilization makes technology, new technologies in particular, probably the most important and effective factor of international distribution and the redistribution of power. Thus, technology-driven and technology-supported politics – local, national, international, global, cyberspace, and even outer space – should be considered and investigated. “Pure” politics or technology policy is no longer sufficient in order to understand the present national and global transformation. Real influence and impact of nation-state societies, international organizations, businesses, integrated groupings, and coalitions depend to a great extent on technology production and applications. The main actors in the techno-political competition can have technologically leading positions, may make others dependent, have dynamic (although with bubbles and turbulences) economies, have the ability to pattern fix (in consumption, media), and can be culturally influential (at least in mass pop culture, fashion, and lifestyles).

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Hughes, T. P. 2004. Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture. Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press. Johnson, D. G., Wetmore J. M. eds. 2008. Technology and Society – Building Our Sociotechnical Future. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Kurzweil, R. 2005. The Singularity Is Near. New York: Viking. Latham, M. E. 2000. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation Building’ in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Lengwiler, M. 2008. “Participation Approaches in Science and Technology – Historical Origins and Current Practices in Critical Perspective.” Science, Technology & Human Values 33(2): 186-200. Nye, D. E. 2006. Technology Matters – Questions to Live With. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Philbrick, M., Barandiaran, J. 2009. “The National Citizens’ Technology Forum: lessons for the future.” Science and Public Policy, June: 335347. Rycroft, R. W., Kash, D. 1999. The Complexity Challenge – Technological Innovation for the 21st century. London – New York: Pinter. Silver, D. and Massaneri, A. eds. 2006. Critical Cyberculture studies. Cambridge, MA: New York University Press. Spiller, N. ed. 2001. Cyber reader: Critical writings for the digital era. London: Phaidon. Taylor, P. A. and Harris, J. L. 2005. Digital Matters – Theory and culture of the matrix. London – New York: Routledge. Vanderburg, W. H. 2005. Living in the labyrinth of technology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. —. 2007. ”Technology and the Law: Who Rules?” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 27(4): 322-332. Wajcman, J. 2004. Technofeminism. London: Polity/Blackwell . Zacher, L. W. 1994. ”Technology as a Source of International Tensions and Conflict.” In Understanding the Contemporary World – Inquiries into the Global, Technological and Ecological Issues, edited by Lech W. Zacher. Vol. 1: 201-222. Warsaw: Fund. Edukacyjna Transformacje. —. 2007a. “E-Transformations of Societies.” In Electronic Government: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications, edited by AriVeikko Anttiroiko. Vol. 6, Chapt. 8.5: 3754-3763. Hershey - New York: Information Science Reference (IGI Global). —. 2007b. “E-Government in the Information Society.” In Electronic Government: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications, edited

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by Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko, 23-31. Hershey - New York: Information Science Reference (IGI Global). —. 2008. ‘Some Repetitive Reflections on Visioning the Future.’ In Transformative Pathways: Attainable Utopias, edited by Sangeeta and Pramod K. Sharma: 83-106. Jaipur: Prateekasha Publications. —. 2009a. “Information Society Discourse.” In Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology: 1985-1993. Hershey, PA:IGI Global, 2nd edition. —. 2009b. “Socio-Cultural Context of E-Government Readiness.”, International Journal of Information-Communication Technologies and Human Development 1(2), April-June: 228-247. —. 2010. “The Future As a Space Where Knowledge, Imagination and Interests Clash.” In Limits of Knowing the Future, edited by D. Zalewska: 47-74. Wroclaw: OPSIS. —. 2011. “Technological vs. Political Modernization – Interactions and Feedbacks.” In Modernization, Globalization and Social Transformation, edited by Istvar Modi: 90-101. Jaipur: Rawat Publications. —. 2012. “Society, Market and Technology Nexus as Contexts of ICT Policies and Applications: Some Issues and Reflexions.” International Journal of Information – Communication Technologies and Human Development. July – September . Vol. 4, No. 3.: 32-42.

ANARCHY IS WHAT TECHNOLOGY MAKES OF IT: HOW TO ASSESS THE ROLE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WAR AND PEACE ARIEL KABIRI

How can we assess the future implications of new technologies on the social construction of war and peace? The conceptual framework of the technological environment, whereby the interaction between technology and territory functions as a systemic selector in the ongoing competition between the territorial cultures of status quo and revisionism, can answer this question in a consistent and parsimonious fashion. Technology, whose sustained development relies on the acquisition of territorial resources, achievable through the use of that same technology, selects shared revisionist understandings in relation to the territorial order as legitimate. These understandings then constitute a systemic culture of change and war. In contrast, technology, whose ongoing development does not rely on territorial resources, and whose use makes acquiring these resources either difficult or impossible, selects shared understandings of the territorial status quo as legitimate. Understandings of this nature accordingly constitute a culture of stability and peace in great power relations.

Introduction How can we assess the future implications of the new technologies on the social construction of war and peace? Why was the pre-world war dynamic among the great powers replaced with the long peace? How can we explain transitions from long periods of war to long periods of peace and vice versa, in general? And what kind of great power dynamics can we expect in the future? To respond to these questions I propose a new conceptual framework called the technological environment, where the

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interaction between technology and territory functions as a systemic selector in the ongoing competition between the territorial cultures of status quo and revisionism. More specifically, I argue that a technology whose sustained development relies on the acquisition of territorial resources, achievable through the use of that same technology—selects from shared revisionist understandings in relation to the territorial order as legitimate; and understandings achieved thusly will constitute a systemic culture of change and war. In contrast, a technology whose ongoing development does not rely on territorial resources, and whose use makes acquiring these resources either difficult or impossible, will select shared understandings of the territorial status quo as legitimate, resulting in understandings that will constitute a culture of stability and peace. Thus, the concept of technological environment—which I define as the territorial culture selected by the influences of technology upon territory— enables us to explain the various effects of different technologies on the social constructs of war and peace among the great powers and to estimate the possible effects of new and emerging technologies on these processes. To analyze how technology affects international politics, I hypothesize that if the prevailing technology is relatively conducive to conquest, meaning that it is both easy and beneficial—a revisionist culture will dominate the great powers relations and constitute tendencies for strategies of expansion and war. Conversely, if the studied technology is not conducive—the dominant culture will be status quo, resulting in stability and peace as the strategic imperative. I develop this reasoning below in two main stages. In the first stage I propose a new mechanism, material selection in ideational competitions, which I will argue is a valid material-ideational synthesis that successfully responds to IR criticism of materialism and technological determinism. In the second stage I will use the synthesis to identify ideal types of technological environments in the international system and the great power tendencies supported by each.

Rethinking materialism in international relations theory The unique functions and explanatory weight of shared ideas, which constitute the social meaning of materialistic forces from the outset, significantly challenge the validity of materialistic views in the social sciences1. For instance, power and interest, which were perceived as material forces, are in fact socially constructed (Wendt 1999, 113-130). So by posing evolutionary selective relations between brute material conditions and shared understandings, we will be able to efficiently,

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parsimoniously, and consistently synthesize material explanatory variables and ideational constitutive mechanisms. Furthermore, we will be able to determine the relative weight and specific functions of each variable (Wendt 1999, 92-93; Dueck 2006, see esp. 174n21). Since even the social forces of production and destruction in classical Marxism and neoclassical geopolitics depend upon ideational constructions, they are valid only in a specific ideational structure2. In different social contexts they become invalid, and as a result, many in the social sciences in general, and in theoretical IR in particular, have shifted the explanatory power attributed to material causes to ideational ones3. The strictly materialistic argument, on the other hand, devoid of any ideational component, can only limit the possible range of possible outcomes; thus, its explanatory value is low (Wendt 1999, 94-96). Can we establish valid brute material causation in a social dynamic? In neoclassical realism we find a general latent logic in which the social dynamic might be perceived as ideational competition, whereby under certain material conditions, the more attractive ideas dominate and manifest as social practices that constitute the political reality4. The social act—in this case, foreign policy—is nothing but the collective manifestation of the legitimate intersubjective ideas of a particular society. The political act is an expression of an idea that has won, for the moment, in the ongoing ideational competition in the free market of ideas5. By joining the material and external conditions that limit the scope of behavior, on the one hand, with ideational and domestic constitutive mechanisms, on the other hand—neoclassical realism can merge material explanations and ideational constitutive mechanisms into one economical framework (Hollis and Smith 1990). This cannot be achieved simply by adding ideational variables to a materialistic framework, but rather by establishing a selection relationship between the two. The interface between numerous brute material conditions creates distinct strategic environments, each of which assigns a specific costbenefit value to a given idea. In different material environments, certain ideas will be more compelling, less expensive, or more beneficial than their alternatives. The compelling ideas in a certain material environment will then be selected as legitimate and over time, will be the ones to constitute the political reality. Such a material-ideational synthesis, in which brute material conditions select the legitimate shared ideas, which then constitute interests and identities, can serve as a valid material causation in IR theory.

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Theoretical syntheses are neither simple nor self-evident, and there is no consensus that they are even possible, but in certain conditions they can be very advantageous (Hellman 2003; Fearon and Wendt 2001). Several different material-ideational syntheses have been suggested in the literature (Bially 2004; Barkin 2003; Lebow 2001; Checkel 1997). For example, the concept of the sociotechnical system, which links together actors, machines, institutions, and social relations, is an important step in the attempt at such a synthesis (Hughes 1980; 1987, 51-82; 1994, 101-113; Misa 1994, 115-141). Herrera (2006) used this concept to operate the interaction capacity in the international system. Herrera shows that the railway is actually composed of wooden strips, steel rails, a steam engine, wagons, iron wheels, schedules, stations, tickets and drivers, transportation standards, coordination between civil authorities, finance and insurance companies, production companies, and safety regulations. Similarly, nuclear weapons are composed of detonating devices, launching apparatus, control systems, early warning systems, and a means of arms control (2006, 34-37). Two key and legitimate objections to Herrera’s synthesis have been pointed out. First, by stretching the concept to include both technology and society, Herrera has decreased its efficiency (Sartori 1970); furthermore, the boundary separating the sociotechnical system from society is obscured (Marx 2010). Second, blurring the interface that separates or links the material and ideational components in the sociotechnical system, also blurs the link between technology and politics. As a result, we remain unable to answer any of the following questions: (a) Do the ideational components cease to influence once the sociotechnical system has matured and proliferated? (b) Do the materialistic components really have no independent influence in the system’s development and maturation? (c) In light of both the above questions, what is the relative explanatory weight of the materialistic and ideational components? The evolutionary approach, on the other hand, does provide a materialistic-ideational synthesis of the relationship between technology and politics. It offers selection mechanisms of interests and behaviors that derive from the possibilities and limitations that a given technology presents to society. Besides consistently and parsimoniously combining both materialistic and ideational causes like the sociotechnical system, the evolutionary approach is also capable of identifying the relative weight and unique role of each variable (Basalla 1988). Headrick (1981), for instance, argues that a technological influence on political dynamics makes expansion easier and more efficient, but not obligatory. Similarly, Heilbroner (1967, 1994) concludes that technology should be perceived as

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a “force field” that organizes and regulates movement but does not determine whether it will occur. In the same vein, Winner (1980) argues that no technological path is inevitable. Gunpowder, the compass and printing were invented in China, but only the Europeans adopted and developed these technologies, thereby selecting to pursue this technological path, which changed the world and led to modernism. Once a technology emerges, Winner (1980) concludes, it acquires independent value. In an approach such as Winner’s and others’, technology does not require specific political arrangements, though some or more compatible with it than others. This compatibility has a cumulative effect over time. Hence, it can help generate a new materialistic approach in international relations, which is neither deterministic nor formulated in terms of production/destruction relations. I propose a mechanism of material selection in ideational competition that dovetails with modernist constructivism of “ideas—not all the way down”, and at the same time, shifts the explanatory weight from ideational to materialistic causes that have ontological precedence (Searl 1955, 55-56). What follows shows that technological environment theory can overcome the flaws that constructivists have legitimately criticized in materialist theories. Materialistic-ideational synthesis of material selection in ideational competitions can ease the tension that has risen between material and ideational approaches in IR theory over the past two decades. I argue that in different material environments, certain ideas will be more compelling or less expensive and more beneficial than other ideational options. Thus the strengths of this approach are twofold: We can incorporate a valid constructivist position which attributes the explanatory power of social phenomena to ideas, however, we identify material conditions as independent variables and claim that the latter predicts which explanatory shared ideas will emerge. We identify shared ideas as intervening variables, which as such, can account for suboptimal outcomes, as well as delay between material changes and outcome variations. In the next section I elaborate the two components of technological environment—the material technology-territory balance and the ideational territorial culture—their relationship, and the variety of possible technological environments and their effect on international politics.

Technological environments in the international system Other types of environments have already been discussed in the literature6. Sprout and Sprout (1965, 26) contend that the environment

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includes materialistic conditions that are external to the state—namely, climate, geography, or technology7. They also characterize the environment as an array of opportunities and limitations regarding choices and preferences (Sprout and Sprout 1965, 83)8. External materialistic factors are not dependent on human perceptions, and their influences set limits, which moderate behavior, performance, and outcomes, regardless of whether humans are aware of them (see Sprout and Sprout 1965, 10-11 on “environmental possibilism”)9. To demonstrate that technological environments indeed exist in the international system and that they are both influential and variable, I address two pairs of questions: What are the components of the technological environment and what is the relationship between them? How does the technological environment work and how does it change? In the introduction, I identified the technological environment’s two components: technology-territory balance, and territorial culture. I now argue that the technology-territory balance selects the culture and that different balance values select different territorial cultures, which in turn, constitute the identities, determine the interests, and are repeatedly expressed in practices. Territorial culture begins to change when a technological family bearing a different relationship with the territory than that of the existing one emerges. Then, as the new technology matures, the technology-territory balance changes and selects a different systemic culture. Conversely, if a new technological family with a similar relationship to the territory to that of the existing technology begins to emerge, the technology-territory balance will remain the same, and hence, so will the territorial culture. The technology-territory balance is the material component of the technological environment and expresses the degree to which technology can be used to obtain the territorial resources necessary for its sustained development. Two variables can affect the balance: The first is the technological incentive to expand, or in other words, whether and to what extent expansion is worthwhile. For example, although the production and ongoing operation of some technologies rely on large amounts and a wide 10 variety of territorial resources, other technologies do not . The second variable affecting the balance is the technological opportunity for expansion, referring to whether expansion is possible, or how easy it is. Whereas some technologies support absolute weapons, other technologies do not 11. The second component in the technological environment, which I identified as the territorial culture, is ideational. Of the two possible systemic cultures the revisionist culture expresses the general tendency

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toward change and the other, the general tendency toward preservation, or a status-quo culture. Just as shared ideas that express some kind of relationship to the territorial order (either supporting change or not) are a unit contribution, a culture based on the territorial order is a systemic contribution. The more great powers in a single system that perpetuate territorial revisionist ideas over the long term, the sooner the scales will reach the tipping point. And once the shift has occurred, the new territorial order will then begin to dominate the logic of the system and the system’s contribution will become revisionist12. Anarchy of revisionist states is different from anarchy of status-quo states13. Technology, territory, gravity, and the very existence of oceans and continents—as brute data—do nothing in themselves. Political activity is performed by people who are operating for the sake of and based on their shared ideas. Nevertheless, no social activity can escape the brute data (Wendt 1999, chap. 3). Just as it would be unlikely for an idea such as unaided flight to win adherents—since the moment it were to be put to the test, it would clash with the constraints of gravity—so over time, an idea that is incompatible with the technology-territory balance is unlikely to be accepted as legitimate. On the other hand, an option for conforming to the technology-territory balance values would naturally be easier and more effective for the great powers to actualize. The view of territorial culture as the great constituter of international processes and outcomes is now the prevalent systemic constructivist approach. The question to be asked, therefore, is how, or under which conditions, specific shared ideas can be internalized to the point of legitimacy, or how territorial culture is selected. I suggest looking at the brute data component of the technology-territory balance, which, as we saw in the previous section, affects the conduciveness and benefit of realizing specific shared ideas. Change in the technological environment depends on change in the relative values of the technology-territory balance which, as we discussed above, is affected by two variables. Therefore, if a new technological family emerges and affects the relative values of the cost and benefit of expansion, the technology-territory balance values change as well, and as a result, new tools, methods, and skills affecting the material environment 14 will constitute new social, political, and economic processes . We might anticipate that territorial culture as a constitutive mechanism would construct the development of a new mirror technology, which would not result in change. Nonetheless, just as a systemic culture based on social roles and reconstructed as a self-fulfilling prophecy can change, so can a systemic culture based on the territorial order (Wendt 1999,

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chap.7). The reason for this latter change is that a culture defined as shared knowledge cannot escape the influences of the relationship between technology and territory, which as brute data, cannot be socially constructed. Any further scientific knowledge that opens up new possibilities and continues to stretch the limits that the laws of nature impose on humans, represents a certain kind of relationship to territorial resources. Social processes linked to the development of tools, methods, and skills that change the materialistic environment cannot alter the physical relationship between technology and territory. It is society that determines whether to continue to develop knowledge and dictates which of the tools and methods to employ (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999, 3-27). However, once society makes its choice to advance in a certain technological direction, the more the technology will mature and proliferate and the stronger will become the link to the territory it is associated with. The more technological systems that bear the same relationship to territorial resources, the stronger this relationship will become. If the new relationship is parallel, similar, or identical to the existing relationship between the technology and territorial resources, the culture and political dynamics will remain the same. On the other hand, if the relationship between the new technology and territory is different from the existing one, eventually a new culture will be selected that in turn will constitute a new dynamic. The table below demonstrates the proposed theoretical construction of the technological environment and how it can be used to assess the impact of new technologies on international political dynamics. The top left rubric of the table shows that a strong relationship between technology and territory selects a revisionist culture. Empirical cases such as manual manufacturing, industrial technology, and the revolution in military affairs (RMA), as well as the future case of nanotechnology, which in its mature form is expected to culminate in a method for molecular manufacturing, are all examples. Developing and utilizing these technologies requires a wide variety and large amount of territorial resources. That is to say that expanding territorial control will enable greater change to materialistic reality with the help of that same technology. At the same time, not one of the above-mentioned technologies supports absolute weapons. In other words, using them enables the expansion of territorial control through implementing offensive and defensive military operations, which are both required for

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territorial expansion. Hence, adopting such a technology will make expansion easier and advantageous. History shows that during the years that the industrial technology matured, between the last third of the 19th century and 1945, revisionist ideas such as field of resources (Japan), living space (Germany), place in the sun (Germany and the UK), fascism (Italy and Germany), world dominion/empire (Germany and Japan) and imperial culture (all the great powers) became more compelling and legitimate than their status-quo counterparts of collective security, balance of power, and pacifism. The table shows that the revisionist territorial culture that was selected was also responsible for constituting the political dynamic of the territorial expansions of the late imperialism, World War I, the crisis during the 1930s, and World War II. On the other hand, the bottom right rubric shows that a weak relationship between technology and territory selects a status-quo culture. To date, only one case that matches these conditions can be found: the nuclear technology that developed after 1945, which does not require great diversity or extensive territorial resources, apart from a plentiful uranium supply. In other words, expanding territorial control does not support either larger and cheaper nuclear weapons or nuclear electricity production. At the same time, the technology does support absolute weapons, meaning that the use of this technology alone would not enable the expansion of the territorial control because of the military advantage of deterrence operations (see Brodie et al. 1946; Jervis 1989; Paul, Harknett, and Wirtz 1998; Adams 2003-4). Hence, adopting a technology that would make expansion difficult and non-advantageous explains why there was a drastic change from previous revisionist tendencies toward territorial status quo. The growth of nuclear technology made it easier and more worthwhile to adopt and realize statusquo ideas, such as containment, arms control, and nuclear taboo, as opposed to the revisionist alternatives of the conventionalization of nuclear weapons, full disarmament, rollback, and missile defense. The more nuclear technology matured and proliferated, the more central actors in the system adopted territorial status-quo strategies, which eventually dominated the logic of the system and constituted the international processes and outcomes. These included bipolar stability, the peaceful dismantling of the Soviet empire, and the continuance of unipolarity since then. The top right rubric illustrates the conditions in which the technology motivates the demand for territorial resources but does not enable their use to achieve them; an empirical case of this type has not occurred to date. In

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the bottom left rubric, one case is identified—that of information technology—whose development did not rely on resources, but it has been possible to apply the technology to obtain them. In other words, in this instance, status-quo understandings had a certain advantage over the revisionist alternatives. Table 4. 1. Technological environment theory Technological environments in the international system Technological incentives for High expansions (how much territorial resources are Low needed)

Technological opportunities for expansion High (Offense and Low (Absolute Weapons Defense) Deterrence) Revisionist culture of More revisionism than war, e.g., status quo (no technological nanotechnology, case of record) industrial technology More status quo than Status-quo culture of revisionism, e.g., stability, e.g., nuclear cyberspace technology

Three final remarks Information technology is uniquely composed of two different technological subfamilies: cyberspace and RMA. While both subfamilies contribute to offensive, as well as defensive military operations, which are both necessary for expansion practices—their relative requirement for territorial resources differs. Whereas sustained cyberspace development does not rely on such resources, RMA, owing to its hybrid technological components (the fusion between information devices and capabilities in industrial military technology)—does indeed. Thus, the theory clearly predicts that RMA must select a revisionist culture, even though cyberspace weighs in favor of status-quo ideas. Second, the benefit of expansion factors more significantly than its cost. That is, a high demand for territorial resources, even if not coupled with the technological capability to achieve them, would drive a constant search for other expansion opportunities, whereas a low demand for territorial resources would cancel out the materialistic incentive for expansion, even if its cost is low. Nonetheless, even lacking the material incentive, either religious wars or wars for the sake of humanitarian intervention, could indeed break out. Third, Duedney’s neoclassical geopolitical model uses classical Marxist reasoning to refashion the classical geopolitics in a new, genuinely non-deterministic manner in order to show that the selection of

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certain political arrangements and not others is linked to the degree they are compatible with the constraints and opportunities of the materialistic context. In other words, each type of technology and territory combination selects fixed possibilities and constraints (Duedney 1995; 2000, esp. 8488)15. In effect, therefore, technological environment theory and neoclassical geopolitics share key insights, explanatory factors, and the logic of selection. The essential difference between the two lies in the manner that each addresses materialistic-ideational tension. While the selection mechanism in neoclassical geopolitics is composed of the forces of destruction, which involves an ideational mechanism, the selective mechanism in the technological environment is stripped of any ideational component. Hence, the latter is not subordinate to a specific social context16.

Conclusions Two political implications from the theory arise. First, decision-makers must first consider their technological environment and the possible constraints associated with it when weighing their strategic situation. By doing so, they will be able to identify the type of political ideas that are easier and more beneficial to actualize by all the actors sharing the same technological environment. If their environment is characterized by a strong relationship between technology and territory, it will be easier and more worthwhile to adopt revisionist ideas; and conversely, if the environment’s relationship between technology and territory is weak, it will be easier and more worthwhile to adopt status-quo ideas. Second, the theory directs attention to the implications of the advances made in nanotechnology and so serves as a wake-up call to international relations researchers and those who influence national science and national security policy issues17. As nanotechnology matures, the benefit from expansion will increase, its cost will decrease, and it will become easier and more worthwhile to realize revisionist ideas of gradually increasing scope. Technological environment theory shows that status-quo strategies will fail to constitute international processes and outcomes (Altman 2004, 2006; Drexler 1986, 1992; Drexler, Peterson, and Pergamit 1991; Drexler and Smalley 2003; Roco and Tomellini 2002; Wendt 2003). Therefore, decision-makers in states seeking either to strengthen their strategic position or guarantee their great power superiority will be well-advised to concentrate their efforts on attaining molecular production methods and adopting the corresponding territorial revisionist ideas.

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I would encourage further research of complex technological environments in which states simultaneously share different technological environments. Such environments are most likely to include great powers and small or peripheral states. In contrast to great power relations, political outcomes in such cases will tend to be determined by the relative distribution of capabilities; nevertheless, technological environment theory can help us understand the pre-outcome dynamics of such unique cases, as well.

Notes For useful comments and encouragement, I wish to thank the dedicated editors of this volume, as well as Ariel Gruzman, Korina Kagan, Nadav Kedem, Yael Krishpin, Oded Lowenheim, Carmela Lutmar, Galia Press-Barnathan, Ziv Rubinovitz, Ilai Saltzman, and above all—to my mentor Benjamin Miller. Any errors or omissions that nonetheless remain are all my own. 1 Pure materialistic forces cannot establish causality between the explanatory and dependent variables; they establish only correlation (material objects cannot act by themselves). But a theory, by definition, must be able to identify causation and since social causation is contingent upon the active agency of people, institutions, and norms—which are all ideational causes—any causal mechanism one proposes must be able to take account of them. Lieber’s use of technological offensedefense balance (ODB) theory, which in its pure material version cannot support causality, led him to falsely conclude that the ideational hypothesis is stronger than the material one (2005). 2 The destructive force in neoclassical geopolitics, like the productive force in classical Marxism, is actually based on social relationships; both materialistic theorizations, therefore, are subordinate to processes of social construction. In other words, the validity of their arguments is subject to a specific social context (Wendt 1999, 109-113). 3 If Marxism were a purely materialistic theory, we could accurately refer to it as an example of technological determinism—but this is obviously not the case. See MacKenzie (1984, 474-502) and Bimber (1994, 79-100). 4 Neoclassical realism includes a main systemic variable and an array of intervening domestic variables. See Rose (1998); Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (2008); and Rathbun (2008). 5 On the functions and meaning of intersubjective ideas in IR, see Adler (2002, 95118); Hopf (1998); and Onuf (1989). 6 Rosencrance (1963, 221, 291-292.), for example, coined the term environmental capacity to describe constraints that are rooted in the international system and which limit international actors. 7 Sprout and Sprout called a materialistic environment that includes social relations a “milieu”, but the milieu, like the powers of production and destruction in Marxist theory and neoclassical geopolitics is subordinate to ideational ontology and to

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processes of social construction because it contains ideational components. See also Wendt (1999, chap. 3). 8 According to Sprout and Sprout (1965, 86-89), technological advancement changes the constraints of the environmental opportunity and therefore the limitations become cultural, ethical, and normative over time. 9 In their discussion of “environmental possibilism” Sprout and Sprout note that (a) the range of strategies of cultural adaptation that are possible under specific environmental conditions are limited by the spectrum of operational possibilities and (b) that while the environment offers both possibilities and limitations, it does not determine behavior. 10 The kind of technology that relies on large amounts and a wide variety of territorial resources increases the value of the territory, because the more of it there is, the greater the possibility of changing the material reality by means of that technology. On the other hand, the second type of technology—which does not rely on large amounts and a wide variety of territorial resources—reduces the value of the territory, because more territory, in this case, will not enable that same technology to further cause material changes. On the benefits of conquest and the extent of accumulation of resources, see Lieberman (1993); Choucri and North (1975); and Van Evera (1999, chap. 5). 11 Technologies that support absolute weapons favor the implementation of military deterrence operations, and as such, make expansion difficult or impossible. In contrast, technologies that do not support absolute weapons offer the advantages of offensive and defensive operations, which when applied in conjunction, enable expansion: offensive operations to conquer territory and defensive operations to maintain them. On the uniqueness and implications of absolute weapons, see Brodie et al. (1946); Jervis (1989); Paul, Harknett, and Wirtz (2003); and Adams (2003-4). For an additional discussion of the technological dimension of the cost of conquest issue, see Van Evera (1999, chap. 6); Levy (1984). 12 See the Wendtian discussion of the systemic dimension of culture (1999, chap. 6), as well as T. Schelling’s (1978). 13 The main differences relate to the state-death rate, the degree of preservation of territorial rights, and the tendency to war and conquest (Wendt 1999, 104-105). On revisionist anarchy, see Mearsheimer (2001); on status-quo anarchy, see Waltz (1979). Furthermore, status-quo great powers cannot sustain themselves over the long term in revisionist anarchy, just as revisionist great powers will not remain so in status-quo anarchy. In the first case, great powers will respond to an enemy— who, in the revisionist anarchy, will strike at the first opportunity—with power politics. By contrast, revisionist great powers in status-quo anarchy—in which enemies strike only under limited conditions and which affords a variety of alternative practices—will not remain revisionist. 14 It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe how new technologies evolve. Suffice to note that regardless of which processes society chooses to promote, the decisive factor to the question of whether to expand is the relationship between the technology and the needed territorial resources, which is brute data and, therefore, cannot be socially constructed.

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15 Duedney (2000) further argues that a principal and significant part of the environment is the technology-territory interaction, which constitutes “forces of destruction,” which in turn moderate political structures, institutions, and security practices. The change in the technological-territorial interaction that occurred during the transition from industrial to nuclear technology also altered the set of constraints and opportunities that were operable. Competing security approaches, such as realism and liberalism, as well as international outcomes, are selected by the forces of destruction of technology-territory interactions. 16 See the first part of this paper, as well as Wendt’s (1999, 109-113) discussion of “ideas[,] not all the way down.” 17 The validity of all the physical, biological, and chemical principles that we have come to know does not rule out the possibility of a transition to a revolutionary down-top production method of performing complex operations by programmable robotic machines and self-replication as a result of their nanometric size (a “selfreplicating assembler”). The significance of nanotechnology is that it makes it possible to construct and destroy objects of any size by chemical, electric, and mechanical manipulation of the material’s molecules. In its mature form, this new mode of production technology known as “molecular manufacturing”, relies on a large and wide variety of territorial resources, to a greater degree than any technology thus far and guarantees both to render existing absolute weapons obsolete and to prevent new absolute weapons from emerging.

Reference list Adams, K. 2003-4. “Attack and Conquer: International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance.” International Security 28 (3): 45-83. Adler, E. 2002. “Constructivism and International Relations.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B. A. Simmons, 95-118. Sage. Altman, J. 2004. “Military Uses of Nanotechnology: Perspective and Concerns.” Security Dialogue 35 (1): 61-79. —. 2006. Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive Arms Control. Routledge. Barkin, S. 2003. “Realist Constructivism.” International Studies Review 5 (Sept.): 325-342. Basalla, G. 1988. The Evolution of Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bially, J. 2004. “Power in the Realist-Constructivist Research.” International Studies Review 6 (Oct.): 337-352. Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. and Pinch, T. eds. 1987. The Social Construction of Technological System: New Direction in the Sociology and History of Technology. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

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Hopf, T. 1998. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security 23 (Summer): 171-200. Hughes, T. 1980. “The Order of the Technological Order.” History of Technology 5:1-16. —. 1987. “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems.” In The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by W. E. Bijker, T. Hughes, and T. Pinch, 51-82. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Hughes, T. 1994. “The Technological Momentum.” In Smith and Marx 1994, 101-113. Jervis, R. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Cornell University Press.Lebow, R. N. 2001. “Thucydides the Constructivist.” American Political Science Review 95 (Sept.): 547-560. Levy, J. S. 1984. “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis.” International Studies Quarterly 28(2): 219-238 Lieber, K. 2005. War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology. NY: Cornell University Press. Lieberman, P. 1993. “The Spoils of Conquest.” International Security 18 (2): 125-153. Lobell, S., Ripsman, N. and Taliaferro, J. eds. 2008. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacKenzie, D. 1984. “Marx and the Machine.” Technology and Culture 25 (June): 474-502. MacKenzie, D. and Wajcman, J. 1999. “The Social Shaping of Technology.” In The Social Shaping of Technology, edited by D. MacKenzie and J. Wajcman, 3-27. Buckingham: Open University Press. Marx, L. 2010. “Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept.” Technology and Culture 51 (3): 561-577. Mearsheimer, J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton. Misa, T. 1994. “Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from Technological Determinism.” In Smith and Marx 1994: 115-141. Onuf, N. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. SC: University of South Carolina Press. Paul, T. V., Harknett, R. J. and Wirtz, J. J. eds. 1998. The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order. Michigan: Michigan University Press.

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Rathbun, B. 2008. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.” Security Studies 17 (2): 294-321. Roco, M., and Tomellini, R. eds. 2002. Nanotechnology—Revolutionary Opportunities and Social Implications. Third Joint EC-NSF Workshop on Nanotechnology, 31 January to 1 Febuary. Leece, Italy. Schelling, T. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton, Smith, M. R., and Marx, L. eds. 1994. Does Technology Drive History? Massachusetts: MIT Press. Rose, G. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51 (1): 144-172. Rosecrance, R. 1963. Action and Reaction in World Politics. Little, Brown and Company. Sartori, G. 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” American Political Science Review 64 (4): 1033-1053. Searl, J. 1955. The Construction of Social Reality. NY: Free Press. Sprout, H., and M. Sprout. 1965. The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Van Evera, S. 1999. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. NY: Cornell University Press. Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. Wendt. A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. —. 2003. “Why a World State Is Inevitable.” European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491-542. Winner, L. 1980. “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109 (1): 121136.

PART II NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS A FACTOR OF DIPLOMACY

NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN DIPLOMACY BEATA SURMACZ

“My God, this is the end of diplomacy.” This is reported to have been the reaction of Lord Palmerston when he received the first telegraph message in the 1860’s (Nickles 2003)1. Fortunately, “diplomacy has survived the telegraph as well as subsequent technological innovations, such as the radio, telephone, television, and faxes” (Kurbalija 2012). Every new technological development has caused similar reactions. Today, new information and communication technology (ICT) poses new challenges to diplomacy. The world is changing fundamentally. Images and information respect neither time nor borders. Hierarchy is giving way to networking. Openness is crowding out secrecy and exclusivity. Ideas and capital move swiftly and in an unimpeded fashion across a global network of governments, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations. In this world of instantaneous information, traditional diplomacy struggles to sustain its relevance. The prime mover of change is information technology2 (Report CSIS 1998, 8). Moreover, the ICT revolution brought completely new forms of diplomatic relations. It was a gradual shift from letters and telegrams to mobile phones, e-mails and Skype, from short messages (SMS) to twitter posts, hard-copy invitations to Facebook events, TV announcements to Youtube channels, face to face meetings to web-conferences and even from physical embassies to virtual missions. There are a lot of voices arguing that modern communication technology has obviated the need for diplomacy and diplomats3 (Schmitz 2001). Others argue that a “revolution in diplomatic affairs” is inevitable (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 1999; Metzl 2001; Moses and Knutsen 2001; Dizzard 2001). There are also more moderate voices arguing that although the diplomatic corps have traditionally been slow to incorporate new technologies, diplomacy has a long history of adaptation (Berridge 1995; Hocking 1999; Hocking 2002; Melissen 1999) and the current ITrevolution meets resilient institutional structures (Batora 2008). Jozef Batora, analyzing the ICT influence on the organizing principles of modern diplomacy – hierarchy, secrecy and one-way communication with the public, identifies three different scenarios. According to the first

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scenario, “transformation,” the effects of ICT bring about a profound transformation of diplomacy. It may include IT-driven changes from hierarchical arrangements towards horizontal networks; from secrecy towards openness and risk export; and from one-way communication towards multi-channel public communication. The second scenario, “status quo,” implies that effects of ICT do not bring about any profound change of diplomacy. This scenario presupposes that ICT does not challenge established notions of what diplomacy is and what role it plays. The third scenario’s assumption is that ICT-effects do not lead to a replacement of the existing set of norms, rules, routines and procedures of diplomacy, but to a reinvigoration of the existing norm-set using the potential of ICT (Batora 2008). In addition to traditional intergovernmental diplomacy, ICTs seem to generate three new types of diplomacy, which may be labeled: public, people, and virtual diplomacy (Tehranian 1997). Although both public and people diplomacy have assumed an increasing importance in the conduct of foreign policy, they are not aimed to be discussed here. The main question is: will ICT change the nature of diplomacy or will diplomacy resist change? The objective of this article is to examine the impact of ICT on diplomatic practice. The ICTs are promoting change in the international scene. This change is inevitable but does not mean or signal the end of diplomacy (Smith and Sutherland 2002). The management of a growing number of issues in a more interdependent world demands more diplomacy than ever. What is clear is that the way diplomacy is conducted is changing.

What is diplomacy? The word “diplomacy” has several different meanings. According to Peter Marshall at least six related meanings can be distinguished (Marshall 1990): 1. as a synonymous of foreign policy; 2. the conduct of foreign policy (synonym of statecraft): the best example is the book “Diplomacy” by Henry Kissinger; 3. management of international relations by negotiation – this is the understanding of the concept by Harold Nicolson: "the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys" (Nicolson 1988) or Geoffrey Berridge who has defined diplomacy as a conduct of international relations by negotiations

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rather than by force, propaganda or recourse of law, and by other peaceful means (Berridge 2005, 1); 4. as a synonymous of foreign service; 5. the manner in which relations are conducted – the definition by Ernest Satow “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations” (Satow 1979, 3) is a case in point; 6. the art or skills of professional diplomats. Generally, there are two fundamentally different ways to understand the concept of diplomacy. From the “macro” perspective, diplomacy refers to a process of communication that is central to the workings of the international system, more clearly defined as “resolution of conflict by dialogue and negotiation”. From the “micro” perspective, diplomacy is understood as an instrument of foreign policy or a mechanism of representation, communication and negotiation through which states and other international actors conduct their business (Melissen 1999, xvii).

What are new technologies? The introduction and spread of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs), such as the World Wide Web, e-mail, telephones, fibre optics and satellites has been revolutionising the way in which societies interact. ICT refers to the integration of telecommunications (telephone lines and wireless signals), computers, middleware and the data systems which enable users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate information. What do ICTs offer that will shape the conduct of diplomacy? These technologies enable: x Direct communications (e-mail, voice and video communication, especially videoconferences) x Access to information (world wide web, GPS, Geographic Information System) x Sharing Information and Online Communities (websites, blogs, social networks, mainly Facebook and Twitter) x Collaborative work (specialized intranets, language translation software, web-based seminars). ICTs, and particularly the Internet, have enabled intensive low-cost collaborative work without much need for physical contact. For example J. Kurbalija argues that ICT development means that the work of diplomacy no longer needs to be organized geographically, but rather functionally in task-

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oriented structures, consisting of diplomatic missions and headquarters (Kurbalija 1999, 188-189). x Mobility and widespread presence of lap-tops, smart phones, palmtops and digital pads, wireless Internet has led to increased mobility in work and nearly ubiquitous access to information (Radunovic 2010, 8-20).

Interplay between ICTs and Diplomacy There are two main aspects of an interplay between ICTs and diplomacy: ICT-driven-changes of the environment in which diplomacy is conducted and the use of new tools in the practice of diplomacy (Kurbalija 1999, 172-187), which has changed the way the main diplomatic functions are fulfilled. There is also third aspect of this interplay: the development of ICTs has accelerated the growth of new ITrelated issues as new topics on the diplomatic agenda, for example, the Internet regulations or the protection of intellectual property rights.

Changes of environment At a broad level ICTs have changed the environment in which diplomacy operates. According to Richard Grant three factors have driven this transformation: speed of application, increasing capacity and shrinking costs (Grant 2004, 8). New technologies have permitted new types of actors to become diplomats: multilateral institutions, global firms, non-governmental organizations, special interest groups, social movements and even private citizens (celebrity diplomacy). ICTs have helped these groups to increase their spheres of control and their ability to function across national borders. Although states remain the main actors with regard to diplomacy, non-state actors will continue to grow in power and influence in this new communications environment. They serve as sources of ethical impulses, as kick-starters, and as agents for disseminating ideas and information (Martin 2001). The development of ICT is dramatically magnifying the role of civil society and non governmental organizations in international affairs. They mobilize public opinion, play a leadership role and thanks to ICT are able to network around the world. NGOs are becoming more politically aggressive and resorting to their own diplomatic outreach to achieve their objectives (Leguey-Feilleux 2009, 93). The most impressive example of network power was provided by the International Campaign to Ban

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Landmines, a network of more than 1200 organizations around the world that influenced governments and their diplomatic processes to the point that NGO representatives participated in the negotiations over the landmine treaty (Cameron 2002). The availability of communications technology greatly enhances their ability to reach more people, irrespective of borders. This has made it more difficult for diplomats to manage and control foreign affairs. Nonstate actors must be considered and diplomats should negotiate as frequently as possible with international and non-governmental organizations in the same way that they do with the diplomats of other nations. ICT has practically turned information into a source of national power and influence. The new information technologies are catalyzing important shifts in hard and soft power. Traditional military and financial powers are being replaced by soft power, which means “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, x). Soft power recognizes that relying on the traditional state to state diplomacy is less effective. The information technologies have been altering the nature of diplomatic time and space. ICT has created a new fundamental challenge to diplomacy: speed at which diplomatic process and functions are carried out. The ICT powered instant access to nearly anyone and any information at any point in time asks for the instant reaction and puts additional stress on real-time diplomacy, often allowing little time for thinking. Sometimes diplomatic reactions and decisions must be taken in a matter of seconds. The ICT has greatly shortened the time horizons of diplomatic decision making. “All these large numbers of information systems make diplomacy much harder to carry on,” said Madeleine Albright, “because the information comes in very fast and you have to make decisions much faster than you might under previous circumstances. Everybody wants an answer right away” (Bolier 2003, 5). Shortening the amount of time increases the risk of ill-chosen or immoderate responses. There is much “greater tension between velocity of information and judgment” (Bolier 2003, 17). Moreover, constant emphasis on speed often forces decisionmakers to react instantaneously to international events, bypassing traditional diplomatic channels (Jönsson and Hall 2003, 207). It may be argued that the challenges posed to diplomacy by the compression of time are not new. For example, if one compares the response of diplomacy to the advent of the telegram and the advent of the internet over a century later, there are obvious parallels. In both cases, the changes were driven by the military and by merchants, and resisted by

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diplomats, who were reluctant to use this technology when it was introduced – although it soon became an indispensable tool for them (Neumann 2007, 6). The density of flows of everything –from persons (tourism, migration) to information (TV programmes, internet home pages) to goods – is higher than ever. For diplomacy, one obvious consequence is that consular work has been intensified. ICT has also made the diplomatic environment and the process of diplomacy more transparent. The general public can take part in the conduct of diplomacy and diplomacy has to listen to and interact with the public in order to get its support. With the emergence of ICT, the impact of public on shaping policies and applying foreign policy has multiplied. Diplomacy is forced to become more transparent and inclusive. Transparency however does not mean the lack of discretion. Discretion is important in diplomacy for reaching agreements. Many such agreements require compromises, especially where the substance of the matter discussed involves high security risks. The supporters of Wikileaks argued that the releasing of diplomatic cables was motivated by values such as transparency and accountability to citizens. Although Wikileaks did not release any information that was not known to the public through open intelligence sources, the leaks demystified diplomacy to ordinary citizens (The Heptagon Post 2011).

New tools for diplomatic practice The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations identifies the main diplomatic functions as: representing and protecting national interests, negotiating, gathering and reporting information and promoting friendly relations between sending and receiving states (Vienna Convention). The development of ICT has changed the nature of most of these functions4. Representation is a traditional and still vital function of diplomacy. In cyberspace most states are represented through the official websites. “If cyberspace is considered a separate entity to ‘space’, then websites of diplomatic services could be considered as a country’s representation in that space” (Kurbalija and Baldi 2000, 100). Although virtual diplomatic missions may be virtual representations of their physical counterparts, statements issued through virtual diplomatic missions are not legally binding to the same effect as the ones issued from traditional diplomatic missions (Nweke 2012, 24). Some virtual diplomatic missions clarify this by posting a warning on their website.

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Internet also offers the option of virtual representation, either in form of an information service merely, or with virtual envoys and even virtual embassies, to replace missions of less priority or complement the work of existing missions with reduced staff and growing tasks. Managing virtual representation can be done from the headquarters. Virtual diplomatic missions are much cheaper to maintain than physical ones. They are also much easier to access for general public and are able to provide information on a 24 hour basis, seven days a week. For example, the United States has developed the Virtual Presence Post Program, which uses IT to establish a virtual U.S. presence directed toward local populations. The online consulates offer many of the same services as the traditional consulates. The Department of State has over 40 VPPs located in Western cultural hubs such as Gothenburg, Sweden, in addition to unstable areas in which the United States has no physical presence, such as Mogadishu, Somalia, and Gaza in the Palestinian territories. VPPs are included in the Foreign Affairs Manual as an official type of U.S. presence abroad. VPPs are usually composed of one or two officers that manage an internet site explaining U.S. policy, providing updates and news on U.S. relations with the host country and are accessible for dialogue (e-Diplomacy Office 2012). In December 2011 the United States opened its Virtual U.S. Embassy Teheran providing information and services to Iranians despite the lack of diplomatic relations. However this website is not a formal diplomatic mission, nor does it represent or describe a real U.S. Embassy accredited to the Iranian Government (Virtual Embassy of the U.S. 2011). These early ventures have been critiqued as being largely about propaganda: links to press releases and pages about constitutional history do not make for lively cross-cultural engagement5. The main weakness of virtual missions is the lack of interpersonal relations. A virtual ambassador could be used to supplement the “non-resident” ambassador. He could also be very useful for small or even medium countries which want to be represented but find the cost of a resident embassy too high. As Kishan Rana predicts, it will take much time before the ritual of physical presentation of credentials and other essentials of diplomatic discourse will change – besides customs, it is rooted in international law (Rana 2007). According to Olesya M. Grech, who has made a SWOT analysis of virtual diplomatic missions, they are cheaper to maintain than physical ones, easier to access, much more informative, have content that can be updated instantaneously and are available 24 hours, seven days a week. The main weaknesses are: lack of interpersonal relations, lack of identity

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verification and accessibility only for Internet users. The possibility of extending representation around the world and creating an international presence, especially for small countries, is the main opportunity for the virtual diplomatic mission. As the main threats, it identifies vulnerability to attacks, the possibility of misinterpretation of information, and reduced credibility (Grech 2006, 24-30). Moreover, some countries – for example Sweden, Estonia and Colombia - established virtual embassies in the Internet-based virtual world named “Second Life” (Copeland 2009). Negotiation. Negotiation is considered to be the main function of diplomacy. The transport revolution combined with the communications revolution has definitely changed the rules of the game of bilateral negotiations. As transportation and communication technologies have developed, direct contacts between political leaders have become more frequent. The increase in the number of high-level summits has decreased the need for diplomats to mediate and represent their head of state. Negotiation has thus become more important to top-level officials. The local diplomatic representative is no longer irreplaceable. The role of a bilateral embassy in the classic domain of negotiations can be described at best as ancillary. Moreover, as a general rule, negotiations in bilateral relationships are conducted by experts or representatives from the capitals. The embassy and its diplomatic personnel are no longer the main instruments of bilateral negotiations, as they were in the past. The embassy may be called upon to perform such minor tasks as the formal signature of an agreed text by the ambassador or to provide the logistics to the negotiators from the capitals. The picture is somewhat different in the field of multilateral negotiations. In the case of the European Union (EU) or UN, the permanent representative of a member state is constantly involved in the negotiation (Cede 2006, 2). The first stage of every negotiation process is preparation and prenegotiation. ICT play a major role in this phase by creating new channels of information. Connected centralised databases of various sectors and ministries, collaborative work on shared documents and constant communications among involved professionals through e-mail, chat, online groups, teleconferencing, and video conferencing are important for this phase. They simplify the synchronization of the negotiation team. The pre-negotiations phase asks for a number of meetings between involved parties in order to agree to negotiate and set up the agenda and procedures. In traditional diplomacy this is mostly done through sets of face-to-face meetings; these communications are facilitated by introducing

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more frequent virtual encounters – e-mail communication, social networking contacts, voice or video calls. When it comes to the negotiations around the table, there is still probably no alternative to sitting around the table in the same room and sharing the atmosphere of negotiations including small-talk and handshaking corridor talks. Technology poses a barrier to building trust, to using tone and body language, and to understanding one another (Radunovic 2010, 58). Virtuality does not seem to replace “real life” presence. The development of wireless technology (Wi-Fi) has introduced many changes to conference diplomacy. J. Kurbalija identifies new developments and innovations in diplomatic practice resultant from the Word Summit on Information Society (WSIS). During the WSIS process numerous ICTbased tools and techniques were introduced. A Wi-Fi connection provided a constant contact for diplomats with their ministries of foreign affairs, enabled the coordinating of national positions in negotiations and facilitated real-time consultations via the internet. A Wi-Fi network of notebooks also enabled the co-ordination of initiatives among representatives who were in the conference room. Computer exchange complemented and sometimes replaced the traditional diplomatic meetings involving short chats or corridor diplomacy (Kurbalija 2008, 201-202). Communication. The types of diplomatic communication range from communication between governments, communication within a ministerial bureaucracy, and communication with foreign populations and entities such as the media and NGOs (Fong 2010). Information technology has changed the way that each of these audiences is reached. In the 19th century the US president wrote a memorandum to his Secretary of State, lamenting the fact that the ambassador in Spain had not been heard from for two years. “If we do not hear from him this year,” he added, “let us write him a letter” (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 91). As technology advances, interstate communication has become faster. Today, e-mail and mobile phone eliminate the communication difficulties between embassies and headquarters. Diplomatic personnel are linked in real-time by e-mail, instant messaging, mobile phones and handheld data communications devices. The revolution in communication technology is changing the relationship between diplomats and their headquarters. Foreign ministries are able to maintain tighter control over their diplomats abroad (micromanagement). On the other side, diplomats in the field can more easily contribute to the decision-making process back home or more easily seek new instructions or documentation from the ministries. Databases are now accessible electronically by diplomatic staff around the

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world. Foreign Ministry staffs are also linked electronically to personnel of other ministries and agencies involved in diplomacy. In a digitalised MFA system a clear track of all the instructions, reports, communications and documents can be managed through the intranet. There has been huge growth of message traffic. In the US Department of State, for instance, by the turn of the century over 140,000 official records and 90,000 data messages were processing each day (Leguey-Feilleux 2009, 86). It must be noted however that this expansion can result in information overload. ICT has increased the capacity of individuals and other entities to communicate both within and between countries. Although diplomacy has never had an exclusive monopoly over communication with foreign entities and individuals, it was considered to be the main channel for official communication. ICT has enabled official and unofficial communication between entities and individuals in order to bypass the diplomatic channels, so that diplomacy has lost its position as the main facilitator of contacts with foreign entities. This trend is evident in the governmental structure, where contacts with foreign entities, especially in technical fields, have been shifted from the MFA to other departments. Another ICT contribution to diplomatic communication is networking. At the level of ministries, this means that all divisions and sections can constantly interact. The same can be achieved with missions and posts abroad. As a result, most administrative work, accounts and consular matters can be automated and handled in a single place at the home. Networking can also be extended to other government departments or even to the private sector and to non-governmental bodies of all kinds having a stake in external relations (Kappeler 1998). Changes in the ways diplomats communicate with others do not refer only to the adoption of new technologies, but also to a paradigm shift resulting from them. Acknowledging citizenry as an actor means maintaining two-way communication and interaction, such as individual emails or personal blogs; active participation in discussions led by non-state actors, such as online discussion forums; becoming accustomed to highly increased frequency of communications and information flow with a diversity of actors. Many politicians and diplomats already use social media to communicate with the public. Social networking technologies such as Twitter and Facebook have become a powerful tool in diplomacy (Yepsen 2012). A “Twiplomacy” study by the U.S. public relations firm Burson-Marsteller shows that Twitter has become a new way to communicate with world leaders and a way for these leaders to communicate with each other. A new study finds that almost two-thirds of world leaders now have a

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Twitter account, but many don't bother to follow each other. Threequarters of European governments are active on Twitter (Twiplomacy 2013). The most influential e-diplomat is President Barack Obama, although he only occasionally writes his own tweets. His audience of nearly 34 million followers dwarfs those of Pope Francis (7.2m), Turkish president (3.4m) and Russia’s Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev (1.5m). Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt is the best connected world leader with eleven mutual follows (Twiplomacy 2013)6. So many tweeting “Talleyrands” there is always the danger of e-diplomatic incidents (Economist 2012). Although most diplomats tweet with caution, they haven’t avoided gaffes entirely7. Twitter has also been used to retaliate for real-life gaffes8 . Expanding use of ICTs in diplomatic affairs raises the issue of communication security. Threats to the security of electronic diplomatic communication occur at two levels: hacking and electronic espionage. Hacking occurs when some individuals or groups attempt to crack the encryption codes that protect diplomatic communication for personal or political reasons. Electronic espionage is most often conducted by governments (Pigman 2010, 115-116). Information management. New communication tools have allowed a free flow of content and information. Information is no longer limited to privileged government officials but is accessed by the general public. This has led to governments losing the monopoly over information that they once enjoyed. Governments’ capacity to control the acquisition, processing and dissemination of information has therefore been eroded. Collecting information. Information gathering is regarded as a basic function of modern diplomacy. Although diplomats have traditionally been in charge of collecting information about events in a country and relaying it back to the ministry, this function is increasingly filled by the global media. Media has benefited greatly from the Internet and communication technologies such as satellite phones. The role of diplomats as the “mouths and ears” of the foreign ministry has lessened. The reversal in the role and power dynamic between media and the diplomatic corps represents one of the major changes in the field of diplomacy. Today journalists and diplomats are mutually dependent on each other (Fong, 2010). ICT has brought about a dramatic increase in the quantity of information. Masses of information are provided by the media to almost every place in the world, but it would be very naive to believe everything the media passes to the public. International relations are indeed influenced by erroneous information, misinterpretation, prejudices, ethnic

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stereotypes, propaganda and conflicting cultural values. There is a need for the proper contextualization of information. It has to be related to the particular operational context exercised by the diplomatic service. There is also still highly relevant information that can only be obtained through the traditional diplomatic procedures, based mainly on human contact (Kurbalija 1999, 183). Processing and analyzing information. ICT has also reinforced the relevance of diplomatic skills. Instead of providing news and general updates to headquarters, the embassy – with its sensitivity to local culture and relations – is best placed to provide analysis of the most important information. Kishan Rana in his book The 21st Century Ambassador confirms that even in the age of 24-hour global news network, ambassador reports are still of great value. They present the analysis catering to the perspectives and interests of the home country, provide prognosis and recommendations as well as necessary judgments and assessments (Rana 2006, 88-90). It is increasingly necessary for diplomats to process and analyze information in response to this growing amount of news. As Gordon Smith notes “Diplomats of the digital age must be able to find the wheat and separate it from the chaff. The skills of analysis have never been more important” (Smith 2011). The amount of time available to diplomats and policy-makers to analyze, and formulate foreign policy options has been proportionally reduced in relation to how much and how fast information is publicly available. Whereas George Kennan had weeks to write the famous Long Telegraph in 1946, reports are now expected in days or even hours. As responses are needed more quickly, diplomats must be trained in using new technologies, to quickly identify the source and legitimacy of information, assess the information’s significance, and efficiently report the most important findings using information technologies (Fong 2010).

Virtual diplomacy The influence of ICTs has been significant to the extent that a new type of diplomacy has been defined: virtual diplomacy (digital diplomacy, e-diplomacy, cyber diplomacy). This term refers to diplomacy carried out in a virtual fashion through the use of technology and the Internet. Richard H. Solomon, president of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) defined virtual diplomacy as “social, economic, and political interactions that are mediated through electronic means rather than face-to-face communication”. He clarifies that although “virtual … implies a lack of

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reality…, Virtual Diplomacy, however, is real diplomacy - in the sense of authoritative interactions between officials of different governments” (Solomon 1997, 1-2). Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister distinguished a broad and a narrow meaning of the term. At its broadest meaning “virtual diplomacy signifies the altered diplomacy associated with the emergence of a networked globe. As its narrowest, virtual diplomacy comprises the decision-making coordination, communication and practice of foreign affairs as they are conducted with the aid of information and communication technologies in the wake of the changes brought about by the computer and telecommunications industries” (Brown and Studemeister 2001, 42). Virtual diplomacy can be said to mean: “the conduct of what in the past has been regarded as classical diplomacy but that is now an activity being practiced in a different way both because of changes in technology and because it is being practiced by a broader range of people, including many who are not professional diplomats”(Smith 1999).

According to Daryl Copeland digital diplomacy means the adoption, within diplomatic institutions and government more generally, of digitallybased systems of data creation, transmission and storage using the Internet, social media platforms, computers, and a variety of wireless electronic device (Copeland 2011). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office defines digital diplomacy as “solving foreign policy problems using the internet”. This definition excludes internal electronic collaboration tools, mobile phone or tabletbased diplomacy. “It's conventional diplomacy through a different medium. Through the web we can listen, publish, engage and evaluate in new and interesting ways. Crucially, we can also widen our reach and communicate directly with civil society as well as governments and influential individuals” (FCO 2012). Cyber-diplomacy, as explained by Jan Melissen in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations “links the impact of innovations in communication and information technology to diplomacy (…) It recognizes that new communication technologies offer new opportunities to interact with a wider public by adopting a network approach and making the most of an increasingly multicentric global, interdependent system” (Melissen 2007, 30).

Some researchers argue that concepts such as virtual diplomacy, cyber embassy or digital diplomat are useful for attracting attention and making

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IT more acceptable to diplomats. In most cases, however, they are only IT adds-ons to traditional diplomatic procedures that are not utilizing IT to the full. Full implementation of IT will require deeper changes in working culture and organizational practices (Kurbalija 1999, 188). The first foreign ministry to establish an e-diplomacy unit was the US State Department, which created the Taskforce on eDiplomacy in 2002. This Taskforce has since been renamed the Office of eDiplomacy. The office has led a culture change in information management from "need to know" to "need to share." eDiplomacy is a leader in innovating and promoting knowledge management and collaboration technologies to serve national foreign affairs goals as part of what Secretary Clinton has characterized as 21st Century Statecraft. Other foreign ministries have also begun to embrace ediplomacy. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office has an Office of Digital Diplomacy that is involved in a range of ediplomacy activities.

Conclusions ICTs have become an integral part of the foreign policy process, and diplomacy. They have changed the environment in which diplomacy operates and the way diplomacy is conducted. But we should notice that new technologies are a double-edged sword for diplomacy9. They bring benefits but they also create dissonances (Grant 2004). They are still complementary tools of diplomacy. “E-Diplomacy remains diplomacy not electronics. The e-diplomacy assumes and emphasizes the ‘electronic’ as a tool that should serve a state’s national interests in diplomatic relations” (DiploFoundation 2005). Information technology is not a substitute for human interaction, but an enabler of it. As John Arquilla cautions, “focusing too closely on technology is a risky, seductive business” (Chandra 2003). Seeking the balance between human and technological resources is the greatest challenge for diplomacy over the next decade.

Notes 1

In this interesting book, Nickles describes the advent of the telegraph and the changes this development wrought upon Victorian diplomacy. It reduced communication times from weeks to less than a day and gave governments the means to issue more frequent instructions and to demand more reports. Nickles, however underlines that no technological advance could make up for uncertain

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governments or incompetent representatives; nor could faster communications compensate for lack of clarity, or hesitancy. 2 According to the Report “the Westphalian world in which modern diplomacy was born is no longer recognizable”. The Report was initiated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies to advance the conduct of American diplomacy in the 21st century. The recommendations constitute minimal requirements for a “revolution in diplomatic affairs”. 3 Ch. A. Schmitz in his vision of American embassy in 2015 forecasts some threats to the traditional roles of embassies. He predicts that Information Technologies will eliminate or considerably decrease the need for setting up embassies: “Embassies provide human, on-the-spot eyes and ears. Remote sensing, imaging, teleconferencing, etc., will have eliminated much of that need. Embassies “show the flag” and otherwise “represent” the sending state. IT has provided better and more immediate means for foreigners to understand the sending state; and homebased, high-ranking officials have been able to do more representation through IT than ever before, as when they had to actually travel abroad to create local impact”. 4 According to the report Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, among today’s main functions of U.S. diplomacy, priorities are: representing and protecting U.S. interests, program management, and promotion of national interest, interpreting information and negotiating agreements. 5 The website was blocked by Iranian authorities almost the same day. 6 Twitter seems heavily underrated by Polish politicians and authorities. The analysis of the Polish President and Prime Minister's Twitter accounts shows that the Polish political leaders prefer one-way communication, using Twitter as a kind of RSS stream to publish news. The only exception is Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, who seems to have mastered the art of tweeting 7 As Barak Ravid noted in a Haaretz article on August 15, 2012 Israel’s Foreign Ministry was prompted to update social media guidelines for Israeli diplomats around the world because of some unusual tweets made by Israeli diplomats. 8 When President Obama said “Polish death camp” rather than “Nazi death camp”at a ceremony for Polish resistance fighter Jan Karski, Polish foreign affairs Minister Radek Sikorski tweeted, “The White House will apologize for this outrageous error”. 9 This was one of the conclusions of a symposium “Diplomacy and the Internet” organised jointly by the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) and the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London on 11 November 2004.

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FOREIGN MINISTRIES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMATION REVOLUTION JUSTYNA ARENDARSKA

New technologies have been widely used in diplomacy today. The popularity of social media makes them a convenient tool of public diplomacy, as they enable effective communication with the audience. However, ICT has been also widely used in bilateral as well as in multilateral diplomacy. In my paper, I claim that the information revolution in diplomacy refers not only to diplomats using social media like Facebook or Twitter. Modern e-diplomacy relies not only on social media but also on instruments which enable planning an online communication strategy or evaluating the effects of a campaign. Under the influence of new media, societies are transforming from mass into information and network societies. In my paper, I consider how new media changes diplomatic practices by analysing them from the perspective of foreign ministries and I present the means by which foreign ministries can adjust to the information revolution. New technologies have reduced the capacity of the state to maintain control over the flow of information within its borders. The improvements in media technology, which have transformed boundaries, political realities and instant crossborder data flows, make the task of controlling information almost impossible or, at least, very costly. In the days when the political media comprised only of print and analogue broadcasting, there were fewer channels to manage and the information flowed more slowly, determined by the level of communication technology employed. As Brian McNair puts it, not only has the internet made more information publicly available than ever before in human history, but it has also accelerated the rate of flow of that information and the speed at which all kinds of knowledge are disseminated. Traditional one-way communication is being replaced by multi-channel, multidirectional communication. As there is constant live

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coverage of anything that is happening in the world, the boundaries of time and space have dissolved (McNair 2009, 222). For those societies in which control of information is critical to maintaining power, steps are taken to deflect the dangers of too many channels and diverse sources of information. The states defend themselves against the information inflows, and try to protect their information space against unwanted incursions. In many cases, as with the incident with the secret wires published by Wikileaks and the conflict between Google Earth and India1 (Kumar 2010, 154-176) have indicated, national boundaries are vulnerable and may be easily penetrated by new actors of international relations (Price 2002, 17). On the other hand, there is also evidence that new media may strengthen the potential of soft power (the ability to attract notice of visitors or investors etc.) of the country, which was the aim of the Republic of the Maldives and Sweden, which in 2007 opened their virtual embassies in Second Life, an online application constituting a virtual representation of the real world. The embassies were located on the “Diplomatic Island” of Second Life, and visitors were able to talk to a virtual diplomat about visas, trade, and were given basic information about the country. An attempt to create an online version of a diplomatic mission with the aim to promote the country is particularly characteristic of small countries due to their limited possibilities to pursue foreign policy goals on international forums. That was also the case of the Maldives. The republic has little potential to influence the discussion at international conferences to promote its own viewpoint but, as the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs put it, creation of a Virtual Embassy in Second Life was an opportunity for the foreign ministry to provide information on the country and to inform the global audience of the problem of climate warming which poses a real threat to this insular country (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the United Nations Office at Geneva 2012). New technologies have been widely used in diplomacy today. Whereas ten years ago the majority of diplomatic missions did not even use websites, today it is common for diplomats to use new media in order to communicate with the broader public. The popularity of social media makes them a convenient tool of public diplomacy as it enables effective communication with audiences; however, ICT has also been widely used in bilateral as well as in multilateral diplomacy. In my paper, I claim however that the information revolution in diplomacy refers not only to diplomats using social media like Facebook or Twitter. Social media constitute only one dimension of e-diplomacy. Modern e-diplomacy relies not only on social media but also on instruments which enable planning an

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online communication strategy or evaluating the effects of a campaign. It has to be underlined that the implementation of new media has had a profound influence on an organisational basis of diplomacy, creating a new phenomenon, e-diplomacy. What is more, the process of incorporating new media into diplomatic practices seems to be inevitable as there have been profound changes in social communication processes. Under the influence of new media, societies have been transforming from mass into information and network societies. This means that the position and the role of a sender and a recipient in the process of social communication has also been changing considerably. In my paper, I consider how new media is changing diplomatic practices by analysing them from the perspective of foreign ministries, and I present suggestions as to how foreign ministries can adjust to the information revolution in terms of reorganising their functions and adapting to the realities of the network society. Diplomacy supported by ICT is called e-diplomacy, a virtual, cyber, digital, web or internet diplomacy. The terms are used interchangeably although each prefix conveys a slightly different meaning. In a brief revision of the prefixes used in the context of new technologies, Jovan Kurbalija stated that the prefixes cyber and virtual refer mainly to the novelty of the internet as a technology of communication. Cyber is also used in the context of crimes that are committed by means of computers. The prefix which is an abbreviation of electronic (e-) is commonly used in the context of commercial services offered in the internet (e-business, elearning etc.) but also relates to the policies implemented by the European Union (e-health, e-learning, e-government) (Kurbalija 2010, 8). Besides, it needs to be emphasized that the prefix ‘digital’ has a very broad meaning and describes technology different from the analogue one (not only communication but also data storage, photography, broadcasting etc.). Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation in the Office of US Secretary of State represents the opinion that e-diplomacy is a modern form of diplomacy which connects governments and/or people with each other. This makes a considerable shift in the concept, as diplomacy was traditionally perceived as a conduct of official relations between sovereign states (governments to governments). In Ross’ opinion, e-diplomacy is a method of influencing the decisions and behaviour of foreign governments and people through a dialogue and negotiation by means of modern technologies (Ross 2012). A very similar definition is presented by the Office of eDiplomacy which functions within the American State Department and which is responsible for improving diplomatic service by providing “effective

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knowledge-sharing initiatives, guidance on the convergence of technology and diplomacy, and first-class IT consulting” (U.S. Department of State 2012a). Also the Digital Diplomacy Team in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office provides a very similar definition of diplomacy supported by ICT. The British government defines a new form of solving foreign policy problems as “digital diplomacy” and emphasizes the significance of internet as a crucial factor in this form of engagement (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012a). None of the definitions specify the possible forms of engagement which are representative of e-diplomacy. Yet, new technologies have been used both in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy (conferences, international organisations). The most frequent tools which may be applied by diplomats in their daily routine are not only e-mail and social media but also wiki, video conferencing, telepresence etc. (Kurbalija 2011). Recent developments have proven that there are many areas in which e-diplomacy may be used as a tool of the indirect and unofficial diplomatic pressure. The social unrest which took place in the Middle East during Iranian riots in 2009 and then social revolution in Egypt and Tunisia, called “Twitter revolution”, have shown that the social networking is a driving force that has a significant impact on the political change and as such it may be perceived as an instrument of diplomatic pressure from the outside. In 2009, during the Iranian revolution, the American State Department tried to influence the regime in Teheran by supporting the opposition. Despite the fact that official net connections had been blocked by the government, the Iranian opposition was able to communicate because the State Department had provided proxy servers which enabled the opposition to communicate over the internet. Moreover, the American government encouraged Twitter to enable the Iranians to communicate during the election. Also, Google and Facebook enhanced their service in order to improve the exchange of information in the Persian language. Additionally, the BBC and VOA cooperated with the Iranian social media integrating the posts, video and text into their news reports (Xiguan and Jing 2010, 9-10). Although the promotion of freedom and democracy as well as the use of social media as an early warning system of emerging social and political movements is a very spectacular form of e-diplomacy, there are also other areas of diplomacy where new media may be of use. In internal relations, ICT is an element of knowledge management and information management within foreign ministries, but they may also be an indispensable tool in relations with citizens living abroad (consular affairs)

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and in relations with the broader public (crisis management, public diplomacy). New media are used in processes of gathering, selecting and evaluating information, to formulate policy, to respond to emerging phenomena, to improve the state’s and nation’s image but also to communicate with diaspora. In a report for an Australian think-tank Lowy Institute, Fergus Hanson divided all e-tools used in diplomacy into three groups: internal communication, external communication and public diplomacy (Hanson 2010, 3). They constitute the three dimensions in which new media and ICT may be implemented as a technical enhancement of diplomatic service. From the perspective of a government, which in practice is responsible for pursuing foreign policy; they require structural adjustment of institutions which are coordinating and conducting diplomatic activities. The information revolution is changing the position of states in the international system and, more specifically, of their diplomats in the new information environment because they are no longer the main and independent sources of information in international relations. The management of information in modern diplomacy depends heavily on its ability to adapt to new circumstances. In order to achieve this goal, foreign ministries establish new structures and procedures for communication. As Jozef Bátora put it, one may distinguish three principles of diplomacy which are challenged by the information revolution. These include: hierarchy, secrecy and one-way communication with the public. Hierarchy and a strict order of importance are meant as a principle which enables the foreign ministries to prepare unified positions and statements before negotiations (Bátora 2008, 26). Hierarchy is strictly connected with secrecy, because only top diplomats may have access to the most guarded secrets of their states and as such, may represent the state in international relations. The lower the range of a diplomat in the hierarchy, the lesser is the degree of confidentiality of information that the diplomat may work on. This principle determines also the model of communication between the headquarters and diplomatic missions. In the traditional model, it is the headquarters (the ministry of foreign affairs) which gives instructions and is responsible for the information management. The third principle which has been challenged by the new media is the model of communication with the wider public. In the traditional model, the communication of diplomats was centralized and based mainly on press releases. In this model, feedback and reaction of the public were simply impossible (Bátora 2008, 32). In the opinion of Bátora, foreign ministries become more and more dependent on information and background information from non-

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diplomatic and non-state actors. In his institutionalist approach, Bátora considers how the information revolution influenced diplomacy as an institution of the inter-state order. He develops a theoretical framework which may explain the possible outcomes of the information revolution and its impact on contemporary diplomatic practices. Bátora differentiates between three models of structural change on the basis of diplomacy: transformation (radical change of organisational basis of diplomacy), status quo (no dramatic change in organisational basis of diplomacy) and renewal (path-dependant renewal of organisational basis of diplomacy). The key feature of transformation is a flexible approach to division of labour in an institution. It means that there might not only be diplomats working on projects but professional diplomats may be encouraged to create task forces or virtual teams and work together with external experts (non-diplomats). Hierarchical dependency of headquarters and embassies is very weak, which means that the missions may lead an autonomous information policy. Instead, the horizontal integration of diplomatic units with NGOs, scientific units and other governmental departments is becoming more and more frequent. The status quo is defined as a situation wherein only a marginal change in the organisational basis of diplomacy may be observed, hierarchy in relations between the headquarters and missions abroad is maintained as a core principle, the role of technology is limited and, in effect, bureaucracy is paper-based and secrecy has top priority. In the model called renewal, the structural changes may be defined as an intermediate stage between the status quo and the full transformation. It means that the information revolution does not lead to deep structural changes of the core basis of diplomacy. The hierarchy is maintained but embassies have more independence than in the status quo model. Although in this model diplomacy relies not only on paper documents but also on electronic sources, external actors are not taken into consideration in the analysis and the decision-making process. The communication with the public is two-way and the feedback from the public is welcomed. According to Bátora, who analysed the organisational structure of the Canadian, Slovak and Norwegian foreign ministries, out of those three cases, only the Canadian foreign ministry can be considered as having represented an innovative approach to new technologies, with the Norwegian foreign ministry being the most backward in terms of implementing electronic tools of communication, and the Slovak ministry representing a moderate version of the structural change. As it will be shown further, the American State Department and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office may also be ranked among the most

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technologically advanced foreign ministries, especially in terms of the ediplomacy tools. The instruments used in internal communication within the American State Department are: internal wiki, e.g. American Diplopedia (online encyclopedia of information on foreign affairs in a form of a website edited by diplomats for diplomats), meeting tools which enable registration and editing of meeting materials, remote access which enables tele-working, communities and internal blogs e.g. American Communities@State which promotes connections and conversations on certain topics and points of interests among personnel of the State Department; staff profiles which enable networking and expand professional network of connections, sentiment analysis which is an instrument designed for opinion mining and a tool based on linguistic analysis of digital texts in order to detect the general attitude of the readers/users of certain websites, blogs and social media. This tool may be crucial in the case of internet campaigns as it measures the attitude and polarity of the public opinion. As the most appropriate e-diplomacy tools to be used in inter-governmental relations, Hanson listed: crossgovernmental and intra-governmental wikis/websites, cloud computing, diaspora platforms, government - think tank – academic communities, websites and electronic recruitment tools. Cross-governmental websites may be created not only by diplomats but also by non-governmental actors. A good example of such an initiative may be ExportSource.ca (Export Source: Team Canada Inc 2012), a website networking federal government departments and agencies, working together with the Canadian provinces, territories and other partners to help the Canadian entrepreneurs succeed on world markets. The Canadian website provides information and assistance for companies which are interested in expanding on international markets. Cloud computing is currently one of the goals of the American State Department for the years 2011 - 2013. Cloud computing is a modern technology that enables consolidation and storage of data on servers in remote locations. The data stored in the cloud may be accessed through a web browser or a mobile application. The advantage of cloud computing is its accessibility and low cost of maintaining the infrastructure and software. The tool is useful especially in project management as it provides the possibility of accessing the same database from different locations in the world at the same time. Diaspora platforms are networks designed especially in order to connect expatriates and provide them with the information on the home land. A good example of a virtual website which also serves as a database and a contact point for the Canadians

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living in the USA is Connect2Canada.com, which is a website, blog and a network in one. It currently joins over 48,000 users (Connect2Canada 2012). A useful enhancement in diplomatic services are websites in the form of e-consulates. As in the case of American Virtual Presence Posts, they provide basic information on the country and consular affairs in the countries where physical presence is impossible. Currently, there are several virtual American consulates in the world, e.g. in Somalia and Gaza. The aim of the VPP’s is to broaden engagement with communities, regions, and countries without an American embassy or a consulate building (U.S. Department of State 2012b). Another form of maintaining contact with citizens living abroad are social media used in a crisis to keep people informed about the situation. This was the case of the American embassy in Bangkok, which used Facebook and Twitter to keep the American citizens and the general public informed about the unstable situation and the status of embassy operations during the political crisis in Thailand in 2009 and 2010 (Office of Inspections 2012). During the same consular crisis also the British embassy in Bangkok kept informing the British citizens living in Thailand about consular affairs (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012b). In this situation, the new technology was used as a part of an early warning system, which enabled the diplomats and the Americans living in Thailand to react to changing circumstances and take adequate measures to protect themselves. A relatively new but popular tool of the American e-diplomacy is the eInternship Programme, called Virtual Student Foreign Service. The programme is addressed to American students who are working from college or university campuses in the United States, and throughout the world are paired with the U.S. diplomats working abroad, and American institutions like the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to conduct digital diplomacy. The students are expected, among others, to develop public relations campaigns using social media, conduct research and prepare information material for the U.S. Embassy website, gathering and analysing media coverage, surveying social media efforts of U.S. diplomatic posts, NGOs, and private companies around the world. In Hanson’s opinion, not only governments may be a part of ediplomacy but also think tanks and academic communities which can be perceived as special hubs, composed of government agendas, and in this sense, new technologies may contribute to innovative problem-solving as they enable joint collaboration and gathering of shared information called crowdsourcing or collective intelligence. A good example of such

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initiatives is Policy eDiscussions, a project led by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2003, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, initiated a national web-based discussion under the name “A Dialogue on Foreign Policy” and asked Canadians to help shape the direction, priorities and choices of the Canadian foreign policy (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012). It was mainly academics and experts from government departments who were asked to shape the direction of the Canadian foreign policy at the beginning of 21st Century in the face of changing global security that took part in the online consultation. The third dimension of e-diplomacy, as presented by Hanson, is constituted by the public diplomacy activities supported by social media, blogs and mobile technologies. These activities are crucial for maintaining contact with broad audiences but require changes in the practice of the diplomatic service. This is also the basic assumption of the American diplomatic strategy called “21st century statecraft”, announced by Secretary Clinton in October 2010. In the document, new technologies are considered an extension of traditional diplomacy beyond government-togovernment communications. According to the strategy, American diplomacy services and agendas should be remodelled in order to adapt to new challenges. Apart from promotion of the internet freedom and supporting civil society 2.0, the aim of the new strategy is to improve the American diplomatic service. A basic assumption of the program is, among others, to appoint young, technology-minded staff, create new media platforms to reach new audiences and integrate technology deeper into diplomatic practices (U. S. Department of State 2011a). Public diplomacy is also a main area of interest of the British Communication Directorate, which is a part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The directorate is responsible not only for digital campaigns but mostly manages a corporate web platform which hosts over 250 websites of UK embassies, provides a set of advice for diplomats on how to prepare a public diplomacy campaign and recommends best tools which may enhance effective communication with the broad public. All tools are arranged around 4 stages which constitute an effective campaign: listen, publish, engage, and evaluate (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012c). New media were used as a part of public diplomacy during Barack Obama’s historic visit to Brazil in 2011. The aim of the visit was to restore American-Brazilian relationships; the visit was accompanied by a comprehensive online campaign coordinated by the State Department on a dedicated website and in social media, such as Facebook, Twitter,

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Youtube, Flickr and Orkut (Presidente Obama no Brasil 2011) directed to Brazilians. Although it was difficult to assess the effectiveness of the campaign, and whether or not it contributed to the success of the visit, it was an occasion to state that active participation in social media discussions helped to influence and shape the debate in the Brazilian media. If monitored on a regular basis, social media feeds may be a source of valuable information about the attitude of the target audience for campaign planners and may give opportunity to react to the opinions as it is the case of the American Digital Outreach Team. This special task group within the State Department engages with Arabic, Persian and Urdu native-speakers and is responsible for posting information on popular blogs, news sites and discussion forums in those languages. Its mission is to explain the U.S. foreign policy and to counter misinformation. What is more, the team members post messages about the American foreign policy on popular discussion websites and social networking sites and respond to the users individually, identifying themselves as members of the State Department (U.S. Department of State 2011b). Diplomacy supported by social media may be used also as an additional measure of influence on foreign audiences during international conflicts, as in the case of Israel and its image problem in winter 2008/2009, when the country was faced with massive protests during the military campaign Operation Cast Lead against the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. The reaction of the Israeli government was a combination of military intervention (hard power) and a communication campaign (soft power). It was not the government itself that played the main role in the communication with broader public, but a pro-Israeli non-governmental international organisation called ‘Stand With Us’, which joins people fighting against extremism and anti-Semitic comments about Israel. The state and its diplomats were acting not as main actors but only as a part of this project. So, this model of communication was based not on professional diplomats but on communication experts and volunteers who were “translating” the foreign policy interests into the language characteristic of new media and disseminating the message on the internet. The organisation, cooperating with the Israeli government and a college Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, was responsible for information management through an information platform, a website Helpuswin.org. The information on the conflict was managed and distributed by a “situation room”, which coordinated its work with the Israeli MFA. Although the contact with traditional media (such as television) was important for the crisis management team, it concentrated mainly on the

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web-based instruments. The main mission of the center included: monitoring of media content on blogs and other social media in the form of crowdsourcing and data mining, creating, editing and framing the content relevant to the current situation, distribution and promotion of proIsraeli content on social media in the form of viral marketing. Information management practiced during the operation Cast Lead was based on distribution of diversified information to audiences divided into three groups: the supporters of the Israeli government, the opponents and finally those who were indifferent in the face of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The main aim of the crisis management was to strengthen the positive image of Israel among supporters and to convince the undecided. This was achieved by implementing a communication strategy based on a multiplatform, multi-language and multi-medium network. The whole network of connections was created by volunteers - members of social networks (“nodes”) who helped to promote and distribute pro-Israeli content on the web. However, it was crucial to reach the “gate-keepers”, the individuals who would copy the information on their blogs and social media and, through these channels, reach new audiences, e.g. journalists or decisionmakers. They were treated as hubs, important nodes in a complicated structure of communication network created by the center (Lemelshtrich et al. 2010, 24). “Nodes” and “hubs” are basic elements of networks—horizontal structures which are characteristic of social communication in modern societies. Social communication in which ICT play a main role differs considerably from patterns which were dominant in mass societies. Ediplomats who aim to communicate effectively in this environment must adapt to highly decentralised, dispersed and heterogeneous audiences, consisting not of passive recipients but of prosuments, proactive recipients. These are crucial features of postmodern, postindustrial information society which, according to sociologists, is a new formation throughout history. For Manuell Castells and Jan van Dijk, however, the most appropriate term for this phenomenon is the “network society” because it is its structure and the relations which connect the members of the societies that is fundamental to network society. So, in contrast to mass societies, the core of network society are not social groups, organisations or masses but individuals who communicate by means of converging information technologies. There is a shift in the dominant forms of communication from direct one-way communication to indirect, multichannel communication in the polycentric environment (Van Dijk 2009, 53). As Castells outlines in “Communication Power”, the transition from broadcasting to narrowcasting, the introduction of open-source software,

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the technological revolution embodied in convergence of ICT development of Web 2.0 and implementation of interactive networked media has led to a rise of a new phenomenon, which he called “mass self communication” (Castells 2009, 58). It means that ordinary users have adopted new forms of communication and built their own systems of mass communication, via text messages, blogs, vlogs, podcasts, wikis, and other social media. Their constant activity and self-expression in cyber space contributes to an international and multilingual cyber space in which everyone can create their own content and distribute it within seconds to masses. Horizontal networks, the crucial element of Castells’ theory, are built around interests of active users. Depending on what kind of network is taken into consideration, and which values are programmed to the network, the networks may connect activists, fans or protagonists in political campaigns. Among them a rising group of diplomats is participating in the blogosphere, creating accounts on Twitter and Facebook, posting on Youtube 2. According to the theory of the network society, they may be considered “hubs” or “centers” (important “nodes”) in the global network, connected to other influential nodes. The centers are the most active and effective users of the network, they are highly important for other members of the network as they process the most relevant information. The example of prominent diplomats using Twitter as an element of their daily routine demonstrates that these are usually journalists, social activists and other prominent users, such as diplomats, politicians, organisations and NGOs that gather in their networks of followers. In many cases, twittering diplomats are the primary source of information for journalists and mainstream media, and so it cannot be denied that new technologies and social media are transforming diplomats into public diplomats who communicate not only with a selected circle of other diplomats (as this is the case in traditional diplomacy) but also immediately and constantly with the broader public, targeting them with key messages, and what is more — getting an immediate response from the audience. In today’s media environment, access to information is relatively quick and cheap, but while information may spread within seconds around the world, governments and experts still need time to consider their reactions and decisions, which may lead to tensions between governments and societies that expect quick and firm decisions. As Elisabeth Hanson puts it, in the age of television, politicians and diplomats were receiving television pictures of events before they could contact their diplomatic channels. In the age of the internet, the constant media flow is even intensified and

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accelerates the decision-making process which, as a result, leads to an increased demand for response (Hanson 2008, 99). From the perspective of political actors, information management in the pre-internet era was not complicated. The top-down, centralized, industrially organized media apparatus was relatively easy for political elites and other actors to manage, manipulate and control. In the new media environment, the possibilities of feedback and rapid public response are unlimited. Taking into consideration the number of actors participating in the new media sphere, who share and exchange information on blogs and another social media, it has to be noted that anyone with access to the internet or mobile technologies may easily participate in the global public sphere. The new communication space is relatively difficult to police and manage. Consumers are at the same time producers, and the network of information sources is no longer vertically organised, but horizontally. It also needs to be underlined that in the digitized media environment, which leads to policy visibility and transparency, little may be kept secret for long. However, as was mentioned above, diplomats have to accept the fact that the adoption of new communication tools will become inevitable in pursuing foreign policy in 21st century. To paraphrase the British FCO: those who do not take part in the digital debate are losing credibility and the argument by default (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012d).

Notes 1

In 2006, India accused Google of violating the right of the state to protect its territorial integrity as the popular and easily accessible virtual map Google Earth provided detailed and unhindered view of sensitive Indian security areas shown in high resolution quality. Finally, after negotiations, in 2007 Google agreed to blur the pictures of the most sensitive military and scientific establishments but the case shows that states have few instruments to resist interference of non-state transnational actors who are operating mainly in the cyberspace. 2 As it was reported in BBC News Magazine, the most popular cyber diplomats on Twitter are nowadays William Hague, UK foreign secretary (92 413 followers), Susan Rice, US ambassador to UN (165 389 followers), Carl Bildt, Swedish foreign minister (137 471 followers), Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General (107 478 followers), Bob Carr, Australian foreign minister (16,694 followers). Polish Foreign Minister, Radosáaw Sikorski has currently 56 832 followers on Twitter. See Bryant 2012.

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Reference list Bátora, J. 2008. Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution. Going Virtual?. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Bryant, N. 2012. “E-diplomacy: Foreign policy in 140 characters.” BBC News Magazine, July 17. Accessed August 18, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18856295?print=true. Canada's network in the United States. 2012. “Connect 2 Canada.” Accessed August 12, 2012. http://www.connect2canada.com/home-accueil/ accessed. Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2012. ”A Dialogue on Foreign Policy”. Accessed August 10. http://dataparc.com/projects/www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca/en/ discusspaper/index.html. Castells, M. 2009. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dijk van, J. 2009. Spoáeczne aspekty nowych mediów. Warszawa: KsiĊgarnia PWN. Export Source: Team Canada Inc. 2012. “ExportSource.ca is Team Canada Inc's online resource for export information”. Accessed August 12, 2012. http://www.gov.mb.ca/trade/export/links/ex_exsrce.html. Hanson, E. 2008. The Information Revolution and World Politics. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. —. 2012. “A Digital DFAT: Joining the 21st Century.” Policy Brief 11 (2010): 1-15. Accessed August 12, 2012 http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/digital-dfat-joining-21stcentury. Kumar, S. 2010. “Google Earth and the nation state: Sovereignty in the age of new media.” Global Media and Communication 6 (2): 154-176. Accessed Mai 31, 2011. doi: 10.1177/1742766510373716. Kurbalija, J. 2012. An Introduction to Internet Governance, Genèva: DiploFoundation, 2010. http://www.diplomacy.edu/ —. 2011. “Mapping e-Diplomacy”. Accessed April 19, 2012. http://www.diplomacy.edu/e-diplomacy/mapping. Lemelshtrich L. N., G. Asmolov, and A. Gekker. 2010. “State Cyber Advocacy.” A working paper in preparation for the Herzliya Conference 2010, Herzliya Conference, January 31-February 3. Accessed April 11, 2013. http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3035Newmediafinal.pdf. McNair, B. 2009. “The internet and the changing global media environment.” In Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, edited by

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Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard, 217-229. London: Routledge. Office of Inspections. 2012. “Review of the Use of Social Media by the Department of State.” Accessed August 19. http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/157926.pdf. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 2012. “Maldives Unveils World’s First Virtual Embassy.” Accessed August 19, 3013. http://maldivesmission.ch/index.php?id=65. “Presidente Obama no Brasil 2011.” Accessed August 21, 2013. http://obamabr.org. Price, M. E. 2002. Media and Sovereignty. Cambridge (Mass.), London: MIT Press. Ross, A. 2012. “A definition of digital diplomacy (video entry).” Accessed May 12, 2012. http://www.digitaldiplomacy.eu/a-definition-of-digitaldiplomacy/. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2012a. “About digital diplomacy.” Accessed April 27, 2012. http://digitaldiplomacy.fco.gov.uk/en/about/. —. 2012b. “Bangkok uses SMS.” Accessed August 12, 2012. http://digitaldiplomacy.fco.gov.uk/en/case-studies/help/bangkok-sms. —. 2012c. “Our methodology.” Accessed August 12, 2012. http://digitaldiplomacy.fco.gov.uk/en/about/how-to/lpee/. —. 2012d. “What is digital diplomacy.” Accessed August 12, 2012. http://digitaldiplomacy.fco.gov.uk/en/about/digital-diplomacy/. U. S. Department of State. 2011a. “21st Century Statecraft.” Accessed November 21, 2012. http://www.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm. —. 2011b. “Digital Outreach Team.” Accessed November 21, 2012. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/116709.pdf. —. 2012a. “About eDiplomacy.” Accessed April 13, 2012. http://www.state.gov/m/irm/ediplomacy/. —. 2012b. “Websites of US embassies, consulates and diplomatic missions”. Accessed August 21, 2012. http://www.usembassy.gov/. Xiguang, L, J. Wang. “Web based public diplomacy. The role of social media in the Iranian and Xinjiang riots.” The Journal of International Communication, 16 (2010): 7-22.

NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INFORMATION AGE AGATA ZIĉTEK

Traditionally, diplomacy is defined as the external activity of a country and its government. There is no doubt that it is a very important tool in foreign policy. Public diplomacy is derived from its traditional counterpart and it is a consequence of the extension of the subjective and objective dimensions of international relations. Traditional diplomacy is an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with another international actor. Public diplomacy, in turn, is an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public. So we may say that traditional diplomacy engages at least two governments (g2g) while public diplomacy engages a government and people from another country (g2p). Today we may define it as traditional public diplomacy, because in the first decade of the 21st century, some scholars have begun to employ the term “new public diplomacy” as a result of the rise in non-state actors. NPD represents an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the condition of the information age. As Ian Bremmer suggests, as advances in communication technology allow an ever-widening circle of people to easily and inexpensively share ideas and aspirations, technology will break down barriers between people and nations. In Poland, public diplomacy is identified mostly with cultural diplomacy or branding, which can be described as creating a specific image of the country through image symbols, logos and information. Public diplomacy is new neither as a term nor as a phenomenon, and yet it has recently been increasingly significant as an important tool in the foreign policy of all countries. It enables states to reach specific goals that are otherwise difficult to achieve through traditional diplomatic channels. The relevance of public diplomacy is established by the expansion of the range of actors that fall within the interests of international relations – most commonly non-governmental parties that are increasingly prominent

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in complementing the state. Its importance is also determined by the development of new technologies in the information era. In this article, I will focus on familiarizing the reader with the phenomenon that is new public diplomacy, what distinguishes it from traditional public diplomacy, what are its necessary conditions and expected consequences. My country of reference will be Poland and I will place emphasis on the extent to which new technologies are used both as a means of realizing the goals of foreign policy and of building strong, lasting relations in the political and social spheres.

Concepts and Definitions Diplomacy is the external activity of state structures and institutions whose goal it is to carry out the premises of the country’s foreign policy. It draws from methods used in foreign policy and international relations, and features a host of actors that engage in diplomatic activity and constitute the country’s diplomatic corps (Sutor 2000, 29). Public diplomacy is derived from traditional diplomacy and is connected to the expansion of both the subject and the object range in international relations. What causes underlie the increased importance of public diplomacy in this day and age? Nancy Snow argues that moving the center of mass from traditional (state-based) diplomacy to the public sphere is conditioned primarily by concerns of public utility. She underlines that even if there are those who consider public diplomacy as a necessary evil, there is universal agreement that it should be accepted and sustained because it enhances traditional diplomatic activity. Snow also highlights that public diplomacy today creates a sort of international microcosm in which contact, both formal and informal, is established between the representatives of different nations (Snow 2009, 6). Generally, this sort of diplomacy has been in place ever since the dawn of the art of negotiating (someone then see public diplomacy as old wine in new bottles); however, recent years have transformed its specifics, partly as a result of the rise of new technologies. Public diplomacy, as opposed to traditional diplomacy, is transparent and socialized. It can be conducted by both a government and non-governmental subjects, while its intended audience can be either broad or carefully and individually selected. Traditional diplomacy is most strongly associated with the state level, and states are both its subjects and its objects. The topics of interest of traditional diplomacy include the behavior and politics of governments whereas public diplomacy locates its points of interest in a much broader sphere, often referring to the attitudes, behaviors and opinions that

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permeate society (Wolf and Rosen 2004, 16). Of course both domains are fluid and interdependent, as the position and attitudes of the government influences public opinion and vice versa. The concept of public diplomacy is not unambiguous. Many definitions have been attempted in the literature on the subject. For instance, it is common to associate public diplomacy with propaganda1, PR, international PR, psychological warfare, and public affairs2. Eytan Gilboa correctly observes that “public diplomacy” as a term contains within it a piece of each of the above associations, and each of them are of considerable weight in constructing the whole (Gilboa 2008, 56). The range of the term is therefore very wide and stretches across three spheres: political, economic and cultural. In practice, public diplomacy in individual countries tends to emphasize one of these spheres over the two others; in Poland, for example, it is correlated with cultural diplomacy or branding, that is constructing an image of the country through representative products and services. Public diplomacy as a term was coined in 1965 by Dean E. Gullion, who defined it thus: “Public diplomacy (…) deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communication” (The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy 2012).

The U.S. Department of State defines public diplomacy as a “program sponsored by the government whose goal is to disseminate information and influence public opinion in other countries” (Wolf and Rosen 2004, 15). In Beata Ociepka’s view, public diplomacy is: “a bilateral, dialogue-reliant form of international political communication targeting a foreign audience, carried out through the assistance of the media and through direct channels. Its stated purpose is to shape and/or sustain a positive image of a country and its citizens abroad, as well as to evoke positive responses with regard to said country in the minds of foreign citizens” (Ociepka 2008, 12).

Gifford Malone champions a view of public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their

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thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments” (Malone 1985, 199). According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, public diplomacy can be described as “efforts taken by the country on the international stage whose primary goal is to influence public opinion in other countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, 2013). Joseph Nye posits that public diplomacy is an “instrument that governments use to mobilize resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the public of other countries” (Nye 2004, 95). With respect to the many overlapping and distinct definitions above, we can infer that public diplomacy is based on a two-level model of influence. Its primary goal is to affect public opinion in another country, thereby indirectly affecting the position of its respective government. That said, not all definitions unequivocally state who is the subject of this process; observation suggests that it could be states and their governments as well as non-state actors. Modern approaches to public diplomacy tend to distinguish two subtypes. Traditional public diplomacy, which revolves around bilateral contact flowing down from the government to the people (g2p). Here, the efforts of the government are directed towards informing, influencing, and attracting society with the purpose of garnering support for certain projects on a national level as well as in foreign policy. New public diplomacy, on the other hand, sees people as both subject and object (p2p) (Signitzer, Coombs 1992, 138) in what has been described by Brian Hocking as a “network model of diplomacy” (Hocking 2007, 29). New public diplomacy emphasizes the contribution and importance of actors other than states and governments. As Gilboa point out, this can indeed lead to a blurring of boundaries between PR and public diplomacy, given that the two areas have similar goals and make use of similar tools to achieve them (Gilboa 2008, 57). The objective of public diplomacy is delivering content that plays into national interests to the part of a foreign audience that is composed of influential opinion-makers, without the intercession of the administrative and governmental structures of other countries. In new public diplomacy, in turn, what matters most is the more localized, personal contact between individuals or social groups living and functioning in different countries, with a view to exchanging opinions, laying the groundwork for collaboration, and pursuing common goals. These actions can indirectly influence formal relations and shape public opinion, thus forcing certain diplomatic resolutions. This constitutes an essential difference between this modern kind of diplomacy and the premises of traditional diplomacy.

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Three Revolutions Many factors come into play when considering the growing importance of public diplomacy. Gilboa even speaks of three interrelated modern-day revolutions – in communication, politics and international relations – that facilitated the rise of this new diplomatic ideal (Gilboa 2008, 56; Gilboa 2000, 2001). The first of these brought the Internet and global television news channels (CNN, BBC World, Sky News, AlJazeera) to the international public. This made it possible to transmit information in real time all around the world. At the same time, it created new roads for non-state actors to directly reach their audiences and promote their values; as such, the importance of non-state parties increased dramatically to the point where one could speak of diplomacy of the media, or the diplomacy of media intermediaries. Gilboa states that in public diplomacy, both states and non-state subjects use the media and other communication channels to exert influence on public opinion in other countries. The innovation that modern times have introduced into the picture is that governments no longer have a monopoly in the area. “Media diplomacy” (telediplomacy) uses the media to seek out and promote common interests, negotiate and resolve conflicts. In media diplomacy, it is the reporters and journalists that play the role of diplomats, as they themselves sometimes engage in mediation on an international level (Gilboa 2008 58; Gilboa 2004). It should be point out, however, that the media is able to act both as an agenda-setter and gatekeeper in international politics, determining and regulating flows of information to different publics; thus, in practice, it plays a variety of roles (Hocking 2007, 31). But also technological development and the miniaturization of products and devices has brought about even greater transparency and even more enhanced access to information. It has also had the side effect of curtailing veiled or clandestine diplomatic activity. The dynamic growth and expansion of technology has also triggered another revolution whose symptom is the democratizing wave of transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The development of civil society and global social movements has increased the level of involvement of regular citizens (citizen diplomacy) in the decision-making process and has changed the face of diplomatic activity. It has also made it possible to realize national goals through citizens, who are highly involved in public affairs despite not working as state officials. Clay Shirky demonstrates the ties and points of convergence between technological progress and political transformations (Shirky 2001). Shirky claims that new technology

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and the social media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world’s political movements. The third revolution, in international relations, brought about a reevaluation of goals and means in foreign policy. The image of the state began receiving increased attention, and it was noticed that its attractiveness could be tailored by placing emphasis on areas such as values, culture, but also foreign policy. Granted, the image of the state has always been an essential goal in politics. References to the nation and its image go as far back as the Bible. The recent change, however, is connected to the appearance of non-state actors, which the state cannot hope to influence, but which could go far in contributing to the external image of the state. The growing role of technology has had a strong impact on these revolutions, and together they allow an ever-widening circle of people to easily and inexpensively share ideas and aspirations; we can therefore say that technology is breaking down barriers between people as well as between nations (Bremmer 2010, 86). It is important to stress that, in NPD, the forms are not what matters most. What is important is the message – and it is one that can effectively be delivered by using new technologies.

Dimensions and Levels of Public Diplomacy Effective public diplomacy requires communication with other nations on the part of both the state and non-governmental subjects using different forms of communication. Referring to the three forms of communication, Cowan and Arsenault characterize three levels of public diplomacy: monologue, dialogue and collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 10). The lowest category – the monologue – is essentially a one-sided form of communication, and encompasses all kinds of instances where public speaking is employed, with a specific speaker addressing a specific audience. Its goal is to make an impression on the listeners, cause a given effect, gain public acceptance for one’s program or activities. The progress of technology today enables the speaker’s words to resonate among a very wide audience. One example of the negative consequences of this effect is Osama bin Laden’s 2004 video, broadcast by Al-Jazeera, in which the founder of al-Qaeda took responsibility for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, justifying them as one chapter in a fight for freedom. The authenticity of the recording was never confirmed, but the impact it had on the media was momentous. The monologue can be used as a tool by the highest-ranking state officials as well as the opposition, and

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individuals with authority and in high positions, but also anyone who wishes to reach a wider audience with a specific message – and modern technology provides all of the ingredients. This form of communication can be used in daily communication, which is considered one of the dimensions of public diplomacy3. It involves transferring information, supporting and explaining decisions made by the government, most notably through press conferences. The message can be handed down to both national journalists and foreign correspondents. Openness and communication skills are paramount. Notes for the press and briefings are prepared as part of daily communication. This method was used by some politicians following the Smolensk air crash on April 10, 2010. The rightwing Prawo i SprawiedliwoĞü (Law and Justice) party’s presidential candidate, Jarosáaw KaczyĔski, publicly addressed the people of Russia in the lead-up to the election, in a move that was described as an effort to change his image from that of a Russophobe to an individual more open to the East despite the lingering pain and the tragic circumstances. In his speech, KaczyĔski underlined that the two nations are bound not only by bad memories, but also positive experiences, and the latter are the foundation on which the new relations between Poland and Russia should be built. The message was clear: KaczyĔski’s victory in presidential election (2010) would not equate to a conflict with Russia. As it turned out, reality later confirmed this publicly declared attitude. Online chats can be another, quite distinct form of daily communication; as opposed to speeches, these can be placed squarely in the higher levels of dialogue and collaboration. Blogs are another effective form of communication as well as a very popular type of social network. Most Polish bloggers are young, but it is important to note that 1/3 of them are over 30. 66% work while half of them are students. 85% of bloggers in Poland use the Internet to participate in discussion forums. When asked why they write a blog they mostly give personal reasons as their primary motivation, and that they want a venue to express their opinions and emotions. On the other side, the most commonly cited reasons for reading blogs include: entertainment (76%), interests and hobbies (66%), but also curiosity about the opinions and attitudes of other people (59%) (ECCO Social Media 2010). Blogging is also very popular among members of the Polish parliament, and in politics in general (http://blogi-politykow.com/). In addition to the traditional blog, more and more politicians and political institutions are also appearing on Twitter. One prominent example is the Polish Minster of Foreign Affairs, Radek Sikorski, who uses Twitter regularly to present his opinions on different topics (also private), mostly related to foreign policy

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and the contemporary situation of Poland in Europe. Today the worldwide popularity of the microblogging service has attracted 500 million active users, and Twitter itself has been described as “the SMS of the Internet” with a variety of potential uses. It is often used to massively mobilize people to political action. The same can be said of Facebook. In October 2012, Facebook reached a billion active users, of which Poland can boast around 9 million (Internet World Stats 2012, Socialbakers 2012). For instance, Facebook was used actively throughout the Polish presidency of the European Union. The use of Twitter by politicians is increasingly being referred to as “twiplomacy”. This shows just how the nature of diplomacy and diplomats has transformed over time. Twitter has become a very helpful tool of diplomacy because it enables diplomats to communicate with citizens both at home and abroad. Another form of reaching the public are video blogs, also used in Poland. A good example is the presentation prepared for the signing of the accession treaty to the European Union by Croatia, which took place during the Polish presidency of the EU Council. In this period, Poland sought to exploit the opportunity to highlight and boost its image. Many events and actions were planned with the intention of presenting the country as dynamic and modern. The Internet became a helpful medium through the pl2011 portal, which turned out to be the main channel of information about events related to the Polish presidency. The Polish government is aware of the power of the Internet, and tries to harness it effectively. The most important portals for dealing with public diplomacy include poland.gov.pl (which delivers information in 9 languages, offers an interactive website for kids and basic information about the country), solidarnosc.gov.pl, and the portal on diplomatic history ww2.pl (6 languages). These resources can help create the external image of Poland, and are also very good sources of information both on contemporary Poland and on the country’s rich and tumultuous past. 2011 marked the inauguration of a new website, DoYouKnowPolska.com, directed toward and catering to the young consumer. It is available in two language versions: English and Polish. Its purpose is to bring the Polish language, culture, landscapes, and people to the attention of other countries. The website is dynamic and interactive in that it creates the possibility not only to participate in the fun of exploring and “surfing” Poland, but also to add one’s own photos and comments. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also runs themed sites and is active on social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, and Flickr. It should be noted that nowadays the traditional monologue, through increasingly new, dynamic technology,

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takes the form of a dialogue. Each blog can be commented on. This is no longer classical one-way communication. Dialogue as a form of bilateral communication is more effective and favors the exchange of ideas, opinions, information and attitudes. Additionally, technological development can go very far in facilitating it. This two-way form of communication enables us to establish or improve relations between people beyond borders. Dialogue assures us that the other side will hear us out and our position will be taken into account because the crux of every dialogue is the assumption of the equal rights of all participants. Much like multilateral cooperation, whose purpose is the realization of common projects by individuals who hail from different countries, is about reaching pre-determined goals (Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 12) and can be used both in the realm of strategic communication and in establishing strong, long-lasting ties with top-ranking officials in other countries. As such, both kinds of communication are of the widest, transnational nature. Strategic communication emphasizes a well thought-out selection and appropriate presentation of a catalogue of topics, not unlike what is typical of advertising or political campaigns. The content of the message should be adjusted and tuned to the needs and expectations of the receivers. Saturating the receiver with information leads to disinformation, which furthers the point that we must pay attention to what we wish to spotlight, how we wish to spotlight it and who we are presenting it to. For several years now, Poland has been pushing an image campaign of the country in CNN (Eye on Poland), as well as other TV stations. Due to the expanding role of the media in crafting the foreign policy of a country, marketing and promoting a country involves both building ties, creating a stable network of both formal and informal contacts, and the external projection of a specific image through symbols, logos, visuals and messages. In the modern world, the individual state exists in a very competitive environment, much like the multinational corporation. Getting the right message across is very important in this contentious landscape, as is ensuring that the message is understood and interpreted in the intended manner. While it would seem that branding and public diplomacy stem from two different approaches to the promotion of a country, in practice they do not need to be separate concepts; in fact, they complement each other (Szczepankiewicz 2006, 270). The ongoing campaign to improve and observe Poland’s image in the media has been active for several years, most notably with respect to the common misconception in foreign media about “Polish concentration camps” – arguably one of the phrases to which Poles are most sensitive.

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The goal of the campaign is to eradicate the use of this damaging “mental shortcut” that so often appears in media outlets. Nevertheless, the campaign’s effectiveness is open to question, if we are to judge based on the notorious case of President Barack Obama’s 2012 “slipup”, when he paradoxically used the phrase while awarding a posthumous Presidential Medal of Freedom to Jan Karski through Adam Rodfeld, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs. This unfortunate incident may, however, bring positive effects. The media frenzy it created in Poland and the questions raised on who the author of the phrase had been may eventually benefit the campaign against “Polish camps”. It is worth noting that the campaign has its expression on Facebook, although the people who express their support by “liking” the page are only 10, including myself. Strategic communication therefore places much emphasis on organizing media campaigns, shaping the image and brand of a country, drawing inspiration from the world of advertising and marketing. Any consideration of the image of a nation has to take into account the way it is perceived abroad by all levels of society, from the citizens up to their governments and administrative structures, the media, institutions, organizations and business actors. Image can be an aggregate of elements such as: economic potential, dynamics of growth, cultural heritage, level of education and desirability for tourism. Oftentimes, countries make use of their cultural potential, turning their culture into signs of recognition. In this case, technology could be a useful tool for governments and countries to create their own likeness, and could be used to attract outside audiences by introducing specific values or individuals’ point of view. These tools have the capacity to reveal to other people values like democracy, equality or solidarity – values they may not yet have – and provide them with the means to demand them. The use of new technologies to render a given message more attractive drives the entire cultural industry. Unfortunately, in Poland, there is still much to do in this field. The first efforts toward the construction of a marketing strategy for Poland’s image were made in 2003. The Polish Chamber of Commerce tasked the international brand consultancy firm Saffron, whose CEO is British-born branding expert Wally Olins, with rolling out the “Brand for Poland” project. The leading idea of the project was the concept of creative tension. In spite of this respectable effort, many analysts continue to state that Poland is either badly perceived abroad, or the image is blurry, unclear and therefore ambiguous. This may be the result of the lack of a consolidated, unified action strategy, which has sent contradictory signals about Poland to the world. For example, the promotional video for Poland broadcast on CNN portrays the country as modern and progressive, which

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is only partially true. According to the World Economic Forum (WFE), in 2008 Poland placed 53rd out of 133 countries in terms of economic competitiveness. Worse still was the respondents’ assessment of Poland in terms of the competitiveness of its tourism industry – on a European scale, out of 42 countries included in the study, Poland placed a distant 32nd, behind the Czech Republic (19th), Estonia (20th), Slovenia (24th), Hungary (25th), Slovakia (26th), Latvia (27th), Lithuania (28th), Bulgaria (29th) and Montenegro (30th). Another WFE ranking, entitled Global Information Technology Report 2008-2009, considered the relative positions of 134 countries of the world in terms of their connectedness, preparedness for the networked economy and Internet use. Poland came in 69th, once again a far cry away from Estonia (18th), Czech Republic (32nd) and Slovakia (42nd) (Onet 2009). The City Brand Index placed Warsaw in a disappointing 52nd position out of 60. Slight comfort can be taken in the fact that, in 2009, Poland moved up in the both the ranking and the WFE report, from 53rd to 46th place. On a wider level, the Nation Brand Index puts Poland in the 30th position out of 50 countries. 6 criteria make up the index: tourism, exports, culture and heritage, investment and immigration, people, and governance. In none of these categories has Poland been ranked in the first fifteen, a most unsatisfying result if Poland is to aspire to join the European vanguard. The country registered its highest rank – 23rd – in the “Politics” category, which evaluates the level of competence and integrity of the government, respect for citizens’ rights, foreign policy and involvement in the resolution of international conflicts. In this, Poland occupies a space just behind the United States and before the Czech Republic. As a potential place for investment and immigration we are also classified higher than in the overall scale (26th). In the sub-ranking of exports, which carries over to the perception of brands and innovative qualities of the economy – Poland comes in 25th, 5 places down from Ireland. In the “People” category, denoting friendliness and social camaraderie, Poland is 28th. The country’s overall position is dragged down by the results in two areas that are traditionally considered strong in Poland: tourism and culture (The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index SM 2009). In all countries, the latter conditions the former, as it is the cultural package a nation has to offer that determines the interest of tourists – in addition, of course, to a warm sea and sunshine. Poland lacks significantly in both one and the other. The recognition of this pressing matter produced the “Marketing Strategy for the Promotion of Poland in the Tourism Sector for 2008-2015”, which itself was created within the scope of the “Strategy for the Promotion of the Polish Economy for 20072015” (Michaáowska 2010, 323). These efforts notwithstanding, Poland is

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still far from the travel priorities of most foreign tourists looking to spend time in Europe. The weakness of Poland’s image can be symbolically represented in the illustrations on the commemorative medals designed for the FIFA World Cup in 2006. France’s medal displayed the Eiffel Tower; Germany’s – the Brandenburg Gate; Czech Republic’s – a lion; while the United States were represented by the Statue of Liberty. Poland’s image was a herdsman and two geese. It can be seen as rather surprising that the German company that designed the project and handled the distribution of the medals associated Poland with such a bucolic, pastoral or perhaps backward image. It also begs the question of whether these are the results of our efforts for self-promotion and if we are indeed perceived as the retrograde countryside of Europe or if this particular German perspective associated Poland with geese because they are one of our primary export products for the German market. So, overall, how are our p2p contacts with our western neighbor? It seems that there is a lack of any clear strategy. This was amply demonstrated in an unfortunate incident in 2010, the year of Chopin. At the end of the event there were plans to distribute a comic book prepared by a joint Polish and German team entitled "Chopin: New Romantic". The publication was prepared in English and German, and its purpose was to show another image of Poland – one not so conservative and orthodox. Unfortunately, due to concern about potentially offensive content, the publication did not reach the hands of its German audience, especially young people. This situation sparked a media debate. The question remains open as to whether the publication in its present form would change the image of Poland beyond our western border. A more positive example is Poland’s response to the tension and fears that surrounded the expansion of the European Union in 2004. The effigy of the “Polish plumber” was created at that time as Europe remained fearful of waves of cheap manual labor from Eastern Europe flooding their labor markets. The stereotype of the Polish plumber was picked up and reused in a rather spontaneous fashion, in an advertising campaign carried out by the Polish Tourism Organization. The associated poster featured a handsome young man in plumber’s garb and with plumber’s gear, and the slogan “I’m staying in Poland – come one, come all”. In this way, a negative stereotype and attitudes were used to fuel the fire of Polish tourism and encourage foreigners to visit. The campaign was very fruitful and rose high above the expectations of the organizers. According to the PTO, Poland experienced a leap of 14% in the number of French tourists

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coming to Poland – well above the average of 4.6% registered for other countries. The dissemination of objective knowledge about modern Poland, challenging and countering harmful stereotypes, and shaping the image of Poland are all the task of Polish foreign policy and diplomacy. As Anholt notes, countries like Poland simply do not have time to wait until their reputation catches up to reality (Anholt 2006). For this reason, a new marketing strategy for Poland was accepted in 2009, and is expected to apply until 2015. According to its premises, Poland is to be associated with a country that is at once modern and developed, both economically and educationally. In addition to the aforementioned collaboration with CNN, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperated and prepared media projects with France 24, TBi and, in 2011, with Al-Jazeera, as part of a program for the promotion of the Polish experience in North Africa and the Middle East. Within the framework of the project, meetings were organized for journalists with former President of Poland Lech WaáĊsa, and a lot of materials were produced that appeared on websites and have been shown in Arabic TV channels. In 2011, another interesting project was prepared – a short promotional movie entitled Poland? Yes! It consists of fragments of interviews conducted by Roman Rogowiecki with famous individuals representing international cultural perspectives on Poland. In these miniinterviews, actors, models and politicians talk about their positive associations with Poland, sometimes going back to their Polish roots, highlighting the beauty of the landscape, the spirit of the Poles. The film was met with great interest, as evidenced by the fact that it has been seen by more than 400,000 people since it debuted on YouTube, with about 95% positive comments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland, Public Diplomacy 2011). Also, there is no doubt that social media can be extremely helpful in this overhaul of the image of Poland. Social media has become an integral part of life for civil society worldwide, and involves numerous actors on numerous levels. The networked population is gaining greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public discourse, and the ability to undertake collective action. The use of social media tools like text messaging, e-mail, photo sharing and social networking could be useful in public diplomacy and could also help create an attractive image of Poland for the outside world. A good example is the virtual world that is Second Life. Developed in 2003 by a San Francisco-based company in 2003, it made its way to Poland in 2007. Among the locations that received their own digital

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treatment are cities like Kraków, the Smolensk memorial, and party offices like the headquarters of SLD (Democratic Left Alliance). It seems like an excellent venue for intercultural communication and collaboration. An important advantage is that the virtual journey is open to all those who are willing to participate, and there are no barriers to access. One can, of course, wonder whether what is done in virtual reality will find any reflection in the real world, and if it is indeed a good way to attract the undecided tourist to Poland. Another example is the growing trend of netizen (Internet citizen) journalism in Poland. This type of social media provides rich layers of informative content created by Internet users and is based on the ideas of knowledge and information sharing. Examples include: iThink, wiadomosci24.pl, alert24.pl and portals that are owned by the opinionmaking press, such as infotuba.pl. There are also some limitations to the applicability of new public diplomacy in the information age, and these limitations cannot be brought down to our imagination. Technology itself is the first, as the Internet access is not universal and is still restricted to elites in many parts of the world. In others, Internet availability is not even a remote reality at a time when the most destitute families are too poor to own even a telephone, while at the same time, political regimes in many countries are inclined to block and censor the media. The other limitation is language. If we want to share our opinion, we have to communicate in the same language. Of course, governments could afford to present their opinions in other languages, but the case of NPD is trickier, especially when we consider the difficulties in direct people-to-people communication. But there is some hope. New and innovative social networks like Themultilife, which strives to reduce the language barrier between the users of social networks and make them more accessible to the disabled, are the way to go in improving communication between people.

Conclusions As we can see, new technology plays an important role in helping to create an attractive image of a country that can improve its prospects for reaching a desired outcome. Technology could help generate public opinion, help us listen to other people as well as they can hear us. But the onset of the information age is only the beginning of a long process. Beginning with Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press, it has had a strong and lasting impact on international relations and will continue to

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have it in the future. There is no doubt that technology will carve new pathways for diplomacy.

Notes 1

I believe associating public diplomacy with propaganda is mistaken, even if it is true that the borders that separate them are not always clear. Standard, run-of-themill propaganda lacks credibility and produces the opposite of the intended effect as a tool of public diplomacy. It is also not synonymous with PR. Transmitting information and creating a positive self-image form part of it, but public diplomacy also encompasses the establishing of long-term relations, which themselves create a favorable environment for the successful execution of state politics. 2 Public affairs revolves around building sustained relations with target groups. Public diplomacy was split from public affairs following the integration of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) with the Department of State in 1997. The goal of public diplomacy was the promotion of American national interests through understanding, information and influence on the foreign public. Public affairs, in contrast, was focused on informing society, the media and other institutions of the goals, policies and activities of the U.S. government. 3 J. Nye, citing the published work of Leonard, distinguished three dimensions of public diplomacy: daily communications, strategic communication and the development of lasting international relationships.

Reference list Anholt, S. 2006. SprawiedliwoĞü marek. Warsaw: Instytut Marki Polskiej. Bremmer, I. 2010. “Democracy in Cyberspace.” Foreign Affairs 86 (6): 86-93. Cowan, G., and A. Arsenault. 2008. “Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 10-30. ECCO Social Media 2010. “Everything You Need to Know about Social Media But Were Afraid to Ask/Poland.” Accessed April 20, 2012, http://eccosocialmedia.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/poland.pdf. Gilboa, E. 2000. “Mass Communications and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework.” Communication Theory 103: 275-309. —. 2001. “Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12 (2): 1-28. —. 2004. “Media-Broker Diplomacy: Journalists Turning International Mediators.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International

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Communication Association, New Orleans Sheraton, New Orleans, AccessSeptember 7, 2009. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p112611_index.html. —. 2008. “Dypolmacja w epoce informacji.” In Dyplomacja publiczna, edited by B. Ociepka, 37-59. Wrocáaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. —. 2008. “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 55-77. Hocking, B. 2007. “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy.” In The Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, edited by J. Melissen, 28-47. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Internet World Stats 2012. Access May 12, 2012, http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm. Malone, G. 1985. “Managing Public Diplomacy.” Washington Quarterly 8 (3): 199-213. Michaáowska, G. 2010. “Promocja kultury i wizerunku Polski w Ğwiecie.” In Polityka zagraniczna Polski po wstąpieniu do NATO i do Unii Europejskiej. Problemy toĪsamoĞci i adaptacji, edited by Stnaisáaw BieleĔ, 314-337. Warsaw: Difin. Mikuáowski Pomorski, J. 2005. “MiĊdzynarodowoĞü jako páaszczyzna komunikacji.” Euro-limes, 1 (5). Accessed May 20, 2013. http://janek.uek.krakow.pl/~limes/files/el1(5)2005/jmp_limes1(5).pdf. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych RP 2011. „Dyplomacja publiczna”. Accessed March 10, 2011, http://broszury.msz.gov.pl/dp_pl/MSZ_ Dyplomacja_Publiczna_2011.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 2013. “About Public Diplomacy”. Access August 16, 2013. http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/ foreign_policy/public_diplomacy/about_public_diplomacy/. Nye, J. S. 2007. Soft Power: Jak osiągnąü sukces w polityce Ğwiatowej. Warsaw: WAIP. —. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the America Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 94-109. Ociepka, B. 2008. “Dyplomacja publiczna jako forma komunikowania.” In Dyplomacja publiczna, edited by Beata Ociepka, 11-37. Wrocáaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. Onet.pl Biznes 2009. “Polska to záa marka.” Accessed August 10, 2009, http://www.marketingandmore.pl/search/artykuly10/article/12/polska_t o_zla_marka.html?tx_ttnews%5BsViewPointer%5D=2. Report October 2009. “The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index SM 2009.” Accessed April 10, 2010,

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http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdfs/2009_Anholt_GFK_Nation_Brand s_Index.pdf. Sharp, P. 2001. “Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats: The People of Duluth, Minnesota, as International Actors.” International Studies Perspectives 2: 131-150. Shirky, C. 2011. “The Political Power of Social Media.” Foreign Affairs 90 (1): 28-38. Signitzer, B., and T. Coombs. 1992. “Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergence.” Public Relations Review 18: 137-147. Snow, N. 2009. “Rethinking Public Diplomacy.” In Public Diplomacy, edited by N. Snow and P. M. Taylor, 3-12. New York: Routledge. Sutor, J. 2000. Prawo dyplomatyczne i konsularne. Warsaw: PWN. Szczepankiewicz, J. 2006. “From Public Diplomacy to a Brand for Poland.” Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy: 269-276. The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. 2012. Accessed August 26, 2012. http://www.publicdiplomacy.org.pl/. Wolf, C. and B. Rosen. 2004. Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It. RAND Corporation. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf.

E-VOTING: LEADING US TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE? MAàGORZATA KWIATKOWSKA

In our contemporary world there is a serious need to revitalize democracy. The evolution of the world caused by different globalisation processes raises a question about the condition of democracy in this changed globalised framework. How to maintain the current achievements and face the challenges such as the vanishing of the dominant national– state context, increased global interdependency, significant impacts of market-based mechanisms, emergence of the global society and development of new technologies influencing political and social relations? This paper concentrates on the e-voting phenomenon understood not only as the act of voting by using technological media but also as a new way of putting across different subjects in relation to each other. As it is more accessible, more direct, and more flexible, this method seems to create new areas for democracy, development and the support of governance processes on a global scale. In combination with the idea of eparticipation, global citizens' assemblies and network society, it adds a new quality to the world politics. But to be effective it cannot be limited to a technical solution, and should instead form a part of the worldwide system of pro-democratic values and attitudes. I shall proceed as follows – at the beginning I define the term of evoting and try to situate it in the political and technological context. The following sections discuss the new circumstances of the globalising world and their influence on international relations and structures of power in the world politics. The impact of new technologies and tools which enable their application in the art of governing on a global scale, as well as the opportunities they open but also challenges they create are explored in the final part.

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E-voting – a technical revolution of the voting system? The term e-voting, which is a short form for electronic voting, refers to various types of voting systems using electronic tools to conduct operations at different stages of the electoral process. While the first voting machines, which date back to the end of the 19th century1, only served as an aid in counting the votes, now - as mentioned by Robert Krimmer - they can support all three main voting processes: a voter identification and eligibility checking in the pre-election phase, casting a vote during elections and counting votes in the post-election phase (Krimmer). Regarding the potential voting tool, three main types of e-voting systems can be distinguished: 1. poll site Internet voting 2. kiosk voting 3. remote Internet voting. The first category refers to the electronic voting machines located at polling stations used during strictly defined polling times. The act of voting is supervised by authorities’ representatives who might control the identity and the right to vote as in the traditional system. However, voting does not consist in casting the ballot manually – it is done by using an electronic display. This simplifies the counting process and - if the authentication and authorization are guaranteed by a machine - can also make the act of voting easier and more convenient because voters are not restricted to their residential polling station and can cast their ballots from any electoral location in the country. The kiosk voting model means that the polling station, changed into a talking machine similar to an ATM, comes closer to the voter. It leaves traditional polling places and is brought into the areas of voters’ daily routine – shops, gas stations, public places etc. The voting act becomes less complicated in an organizational way but also less ceremonial, becoming like a filling in a lotto ticket. The last group comprises all systems allowing voters to cast their ballots virtually from any location with the access to the Internet. In this case the role of a voting machine is played by any Internet accessible device that does not have to be owned or operated by election personnel. It could be a personal computer at home or, with the mobile technologies expansion also a notebook, a smartphone or a simple mobile phone connected from anywhere on the globe. This way the voting act is moved

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into a private sphere where the questions of system security as well as of the perceived importance of the voting act should be taken into account. Using the criterion of potential voting tool monitoring, Thomas M. Buchsbaum summed up e-voting systems in two categories: 1. e-voting supervised by the physical presence of representatives of governmental or independent electoral authorities, e.g. electronic voting machines at official polling stations or municipal offices, or at diplomatic or consular missions abroad 2. e-voting under the voter’s sole influence, not physically supervised by governmental authorities’ representatives, that encompasses voting from one’s own or another person’s computer via the Internet (i-voting), by touch-tone telephones, mobile phones (including SMS), or vía Digital TV, or at public open-air kiosks (Buchsbaum 2004). In the past few years, e-voting as one of the main applications of electronic democracy has come to the attention of many governments in their attempts to modernize elections. Government administrations in many countries have started to adopt electronic voting machines for their elections, proceeding from the use of direct recording electronic voting machines (DRE) to real Internet voting (known also as i-voting) i.e. a system that uses public network. In 1995 Belgium introduced e-voting using a magnetic card inserted in a computer and in 1996 Finland was testing electronic voting in polling stations. The first pre-application of i-voting in real elections occurred in extremely unusual circumstances - as Thomas W. Lauer describes: ”the first Internet vote was cast by US astronaut David Wolf who was allowed to vote by e-mail from the space station Mir in the 1997 Texas election” (Lauer 2004). Ballots were sent via a secure e-mail to the Johnson Spaceflight Center and then passed on to the astronauts' polling station in Texas. After that, Internet voting attempts were carried out in Germany (1998), France (1999) and several US states (2000). The new millennium has brought about the introduction of Internet voting in chosen election processes of public and private organizations from the sectors of politics, economics and education (Krimmer, Volkamer and Triessnig 2007, 13). All of these tentative attempts have also provoked heated disputes and controversy about risks and chances the electronic solutions present for the future of electoral systems. For these reasons they generally were not held at a high electoral level but were limited to local councils in pilot areas (UK, Spain), special assemblies (e.g. the Assembly of the French Citizens

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Abroad in the case of France), some categories of voters (in 2003 Spanish Catalunya residents abroad could participate in regional parliament elections vía Internet ) or even “non-governmental” elections of university boards or employees councils in enterprises. The first country in the world that introduced e-voting for parliamentary elections was Estonia in 2007. Since then an increase in the number of e-voters has been noticeable while in 2007 only 5.5% of voters voted online, this number soared to 24.3% in 2011 (Estonian National Electoral Committee). Currently, the main challenge for e-voting applications is their compatibility with democratic system requirements. Democracy depends partly on citizens’ trust in public institutions such as elections. Application of e-voting systems should not be done at the expense of conducting democratic, free and fair elections that must assure vote confidentiality and integrity as well as the ability to audit the election. Epp Maaten and Thad Hall state that transparency should remain a critical component of all e-voting conceptions because of its capability to increase the credibility of the process and legitimacy of the final result (Matten and Hall 2008, 33). Thus, the introduction of an electronic tool in the electoral process is much more complex than simply having an appropriate technology in place. Not only should it guarantee special features, but it should also be seen by electors as guaranteeing them. The introduction of any electronic tool into a political process is likely to deepen the digital divide between citizens. Those who are familiar with new technologies seem to be privileged at the expense of those who let themselves be pushed to the margins of life in the digital world. This can create an inequality situation and thereby betray democratic rules. Equal importance is attached to security problems, the origin of which is not necessarily technical. Especially when the voting system as a whole is taken into account: the technical equipment, as well as maintenance personnel and elements of physical environment where the election and post-election processes occur. The use of hardware and software applications in the election process results in transferring the control over the access to the election data to a narrow group of technological experts. Their knowledge and work character (black box syndrome2) make them difficult to be supervised by traditional shop stewards and increase systems’ vulnerability to fraud or a simple error. Hard- and software producers are also a weak link of this system because of their commercial interests and vulnerability to political pressures. Moreover, the open systems used by remote Internet voting cannot be fully controlled and are susceptible to external attacks like hacking, connection manipulation or server clogging resulting in a system crash or data loss. Numerous

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incidents documented during elections or electoral experiments (Black Box Voting)3 prove that security threats, beside the financial costs, (Mider 2008) are a real problem in view of the introduction of this voting method on a larger scale. A little less dangerous, but not completely unthreatening, seems the potential influence of the new voting method on political attitudes. There are some voices that e-voting distorts the electoral process. Laurence Monnoyer-Smith suggests that “introduction of online and other new voting technologies is a symbolically and politically loaded event” (Monnoyer-Smith 2006, 63) of a revolutionary dimension because it alters the traditional voting ritual based on physical aspects. The walk to the polling station on election days has symbolised the equality of all voters but also demonstrated their political unity - “the voting ritual operates transmutation of the people into the Nation-State” (Monnoyer-Smith 2006, 64). By transferring this symbolic activity into virtual private sphere without physical dimension we undermine the community based foundations of the State and lose a huge part of citizenship rites which indeed make up the national identity. As we have seen, the e-voting issue has attracted considerable attention during the recent years, provoking heated discussions on potential cost and risks it involves for a political community which decides to adopt it. On the other hand, there is a strong conviction about uselessness of this kind of discussion because in fact there is no choice. Social and political reality transformation forces us to adapt all aspects of the state life to changing circumstances. The question is not “whether” but “how” it should be done in the best way to bring new input into the election activity that seems to be flagging in the globalized political reality.

Democratic global governance – what is it and why does it matter? Living in the age of globalisation, we are witnessing important changes in social structures, institutions and mentalities that also affect the area of politics. David Held finds that: “globalization can be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power” (Held et al. 1999).

It is characterized by growing extensity, intensity and velocity of interactions on a global scale resulting in three fundamental transformations:

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the appearance of the new social dimension, new state concept and new principles of concomitance between political actors concerned (Kwiatkowska 2010, 38-41). Globalization involves a rise in inequality, stratification, the marginalization of some, and yet the integration of others. This is why the emerging global community is originally marked by internal diversity. It is very difficult to define what demos on a global scale signifies: all inhabitants of the Earth, citizens of all world countries, only globally active citizens? The transformation of modern societies, due to the development and spread of new technologies which facilitate the information exchange and circulation, emancipates demos on the political global stage freeing it from the state intermediary. The change in the functioning of the societies led to new rules of state existence. In the modern world the growth of governance beyond the nation-state is being witnessed. The latter has lost its central position in political action in three areas: international relations, economic regulations, and relations with local authorities (Canet 2004). The increase in interdependency leads to weakening of the national state sovereignty, the principal fundament of the Westphalian order, and simultaneously to the appearance of new actors whose importance is growing in international relations: economic players, subnational entities or non-governmental organisations. The consistent, circled by strict boundaries nation-state evolves into a “disaggregated state” (Slaughter 2004) whose components maintain unhindered, unmediated relations with chosen international environment sectors. On so transformed international stage the economic aspects and the care of competitiveness put the geopolitics off to the back side. However, the state is still the only entity likely to assume responsibility for effects of progressing globalization processes. Public policies seem to be essential to translate positive trends into tangible achievements as well as to anticipate and correct negative consequences of global trends (Sachwald 2003, 260). New circumstances and rules of global play prompt involved actors to give up a part of their sovereignty and independence in favour of cooperation. A new paradigm of international relations is formed in this way. This new approach, referring to such matters as partnership, variety of entities and power diffusion rejects the classic vertical relationship analysis (the “ladder model”), tends towards a reality perception in terms of heterogeneous intersecting relationships without fixed hierarchy (the “network model” - Castells 1996). In such an evolving international environment previously existing mechanisms and institutions are no longer relevant. The state position

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weakening entails advent and empowerment of new institutional actors – in the past fifty years a huge proliferation of international institutions and agencies which cover and regulate the majority of world issues was observed. Like many researchers, Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko claims that whilst “complexity, corporate power, and global interdependency increase, actual development indicates a transition towards managerialist multi-level governance” (Veikko Anttiroiko 2003, 122). It is about the institutionalization of a multilayered system of extensive cooperation and the coordination of international players’ activity. The latter are broadly defined as governments, intergovernmental and transnational organisations and agencies, integration groups, private global actors including global companies and corporations and also international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) but also networks among all these categories of players. By conceiving and implementing global or transnational rules they fulfil common purposes in order to cope with the main global issues of trade, development, environment, security and human rights. In fact the areas covered by this system of international cooperation aimed to manage transborder problems are unlimited. Thomas Risse suggests that: “from international standard-setting to telecommunications, to world trade in general, to human rights promotion, to nuclear non-proliferation, to the preservation of wildlife, it is very hard to find an issue-area in international affairs which is currently not covered by international or at least regional agreements” (Risse 1999).

This multilateral cooperation commonly called global governance (GG) is based on non-hierarchical and non-centred structure of ad-hoc arrangements whose non-coordinated character cannot be compared with any state government framework. For this reason the new form of international problem-solving practice cannot be associated with the idea of world government but it rather refers to the conception of governance. James Rosenau distinguishes governance from government by the criterion of authority allocation: “while the rule systems of governments can be thought of as structures, those of governance are social functions or processes that can be performed or implemented in a variety of ways at different times and places (or even at the same time) by a wide variety of organizations" (Rosenau 2002, 72).

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More than an exercise of power, governance refers to the control and creation of opportunities in different forms and at different levels, as well as orientation to problems (power to) and not to the fragmentary structures associated with them (power over). Global governance has a double signification. Firstly, it means a process, a way of policy implementation on a global scale with a view to controlling the process of globalization. On the other hand, used interchangeably with "global governance system" it refers to the structures within which the process of global governance takes place. These structures cover both the actors (institutions, entities, organisations, communities) involved in a governance process, and all types of relations and connections linking them, defining their position in the system, but also resulting from the system itself (integration, cooperation, partnership, agreement). In fact, citing Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg: “the concept of governance captures this plurality of mechanisms that horizontally link activities of various actors. [On the international level] where central authority is largely absent, governance accordingly encompasses intergovernmental negotiations as well as other, less formal processes of coordination among a number of public and private actors” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006, 192-193).

The consequence of this new pattern of authority and interdependence relations is our social and political functioning in a (hyper)-complexity4 (Qvortrup 2003, 6) system where the notions of democracy and community gain a new meaning. Michel Saward points out the territorial basis of political authority: “A democracy [...] always exists somewhere, within some unique set of background conditions” (Saward 1994, 19-20). So, every democratic system is a part of a particular political entity in the form of a territory segment over which ultimate authority exercises its power. Meanwhile, the globalization favours the increase of international issues and transboundary problem areas, management of which interferes with the idea of territorial self-determination. The global dimension of policy leads to the situation where a decision taken in one place alters considerably the life of people on the other side of the world, who can hardly ever counteract it. There is a huge lack of a subordination mechanism of transnational decisional actors to the will of communities affected by their decisions. Furthermore, the unequal impact of globalization processes leads to the formation of a sort of global avant-garde: a group of the most powerful, huge and dynamic entities who take control over world politics and by their total weight shape it at their sole discretion. It results in “distorted

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global policy” (McGrew 2008, 37) and denies the democratic ideal of equality. The over-representation of various sorts of agents from western, advanced, and rich countries is conspicuous in global financial institutions as well as in formal and informal decision-making centres and arouses objection on the part of the rest of the world. The apparently democratic rules and procedures adopted by global actors do not improve the abstruse situation. The majority of global organizations function on the democratic principle of "one actor = one vote". But the legacy of the Westphalian order associates “actor” to “state” and so the principle of “one state = one vote” runs counter to the human dimension of the democratic ideal in the form of “one person = one vote”. As a result, a group of micro-states could have more influence on the global stage than one populous country, inhabitants of which represent a large part of the world population. This deforms significantly the map of the world and gives a completely different meaning to the notion of global community. However, the attempts to enlarge the global community through the involvement of non-state actors in the decision-making process do not bring satisfactory results either. Fake consultations, negative cooptation practices or the use of NGOs to build positive images and win the favour of public opinion – these are the methods often used by those who wield power globally. It should also be noted that actors of global governance are not subject to the procedures of democratic control. The principal mechanism for citizens to make political choices and influence decision makers is almost completely absent on the international institutions level. As Darin Barney points out, institutions of global governance “with few exceptions lack the institutionalized mechanism for participation, representation, scrutiny, and accountability that are necessary for them to claim democratic legitimacy” (Barney 2004, 118). There are no global elections to International Monetary Fund (IMF), to G8 or G20, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or World Bank membership based on criteria other than support among citizens, and all these entities elude global transparency and accountability. Because of international anarchy, on the global stage there is no supreme authority which will hold inter- and transnational actors accountable through any control mechanisms and insist on justification or legitimacy of their actions. In fact, the power of global institutions is disproportionate relative to the responsibility they should bear. And procedural inadequacies are even detracting the democratic character of their decisions which results in lower trust in the system and weakening social participation and engagement. People disengage from formal

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political activity because of lack of confidence in global institutions, as well as because of crumbling citizens' belief in their own capacity to influence public affairs. All these symptoms make up the phenomenon of a democratic deficit which increasingly affects the global governance system and has a negative impact upon its future developments. Since “the traditional source of legitimacy for international institutions – problem-solving effectiveness – is no longer sufficient in itself, but must be supplemented with more democratic procedures of decision-making” (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhling 2010, 85), it is very important to increase what Joseph S. Nye calls “perceived legitimacy of international governance” (Nye 2001) and which boils down to three points: to increase clarity of democracy, to enhance understanding of accountability and to foster willingness to experiment with new ways to preserve democratic values. So a real challenge for democratic theory as well as practice would be to accommodate the notion of “rule by the people” to the new, geographically broader, but most of all, socially distinct environment. The most relevant questions are if it is possible to transfer to the global stage the models of democracy originally developed for national context and how to develop the new models tailored for the international level (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhling 2010, 82). It could be interesting to see how new technologies, especially e-voting systems, help to experiment in the area of preserving and developing democratic values on a planetary scale.

E-voting – serving democracy on the global scale Analyzing previous attempts of adapting democracy as political praxis to the new socially and technologically transformed environment, two main trends stand out: development of more direct citizen participation using digital channels and tools, and improvement of transparency and accountability of representative democracy. The main aim is to improve effectiveness and responsibility of democratic institutions as well as to create new channels through which people can participate in democratic processes. According to Benjamin Barber, democracy is a form of government that depends on information and communication, so considerable use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in political action promises a beneficial effect and there is a widespread belief that new technologies can cure the democratic deficit on various stages of political life, first of all the global one. Nowadays, an increasing use of ICT is observed in population. Facing a decreasing participation in elections at every stage of the political

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structure, there is speculation about using e-voting as a means to invert this disadvantageous condition and to increase turnout rates in political elections. In fact, seen in the narrow technological sense, e-voting is an electronic tool, an effect of the digitalization of the voting process, and used only in the narrow frame of a polling station remains a new form of an old utility, promising at most better accessibility for the user and facilitating the election activity. But the requirements of the digital era no longer fit the traditional definition of a voting act. As shown, e-voting as a new election concept affects substantially the political reality in general by creating new perspectives and ways of thinking about a citizen’s role. It would not be possible without the whole technologically transformed background which altered social relations and different political life areas. Steven L. Clift claims that “technology is essentially neutral, but that strategic and organized use of information technology and networks by citizen-based efforts will make an important contribution to improved democracy at many levels” (Clift 1997). In fact e-voting is associated with such phenomena as: e-consultation, online deliberation, online rule-making, on-line engagement and eparticipation, and therefore fits into a broader model of e-democracy, which means the use of information and communication technologies within the political processes of local communities, states, regions, nations and on the global stage too, with the aim of creating new relationships. Or in other words, new online public spaces for interaction among citizens and organized interests, a sort of arena of public expression and the exchange of ideas. The capacity to enable voters’ mobility and facilitate the participation of voters from abroad in the election act, as well as a perspective of cost reduction and potential turnout rise due to additional channels offered – these are indisputable, but not exhaustive advantages of new electoral tools. In addition, this also suggests a different role for government and more participatory forms of direct citizen involvement in efforts to address public challenges. Seen by Giovanni Sartori as “sitting before a video and allegedly self-governing itself by responding to the issues in the air by pressing a button” (Sartori 1987, 246) this “pushbutton democracy” named also “democracy by direct referendum” seems to offer quite precise and accurate demonstration of public opinion (Hilbert 2007, 79-80)5. As electronic vote on various issues, it will “reflect” the will of people in real time, and the challenge for governors will be to be able to catch it, decode in appropriate context and use it in political action – in other words: to accommodate and react to “electric floods” (Clift 2003).

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Easier access to decision-making processes can make political participation more interesting and even tempting. “New technologies can make it easier for citizens to access public information, follow the political process, discuss and form groups on specific issues, scrutinise governors and vote in elections” (Waller, Livesey and Edin 2002, 3). Different social groups who for various reasons stay on the margin of traditional political activity (party meetings, traditional consultations, support demonstrations etc) could find the use of technological tools an attractive way to express their opinions. Even more if we take into consideration what “margin” in the global perspective means. There are many who feel excluded from the democratic process or unable to participate fully in it. The participation restriction can be of a different – geographic, economic, demographic or socio–cultural nature (Hilbert 2007, 79-80) – the democratic deficit touches people from less rich and powerful countries, non-institutional actors or entities made insignificant in proportion to huge transnational organisations. For all of them the possibility to use electronic channels to declare their position could launch their political activity in a global environment and even put forward their identity among global players – see example of initiatives like Greenpeace or Zapatista guerrilla movement (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación National) whose developed web structure based on electronic media enabled them to come into being in global consciousness (Rothert 2005, 124-128). To facilitate, broaden and deepen participation (Waller, Livesey and Edin 2002, 3) is not the only way that e-voting techniques can contribute to reduction of democratic deficit. Although new technologies are not a universal remedy, they may provide a means of enabling global actors to seek the views, knowledge and experience of the population on whose lives they decide. Online or e-consultations, defined by Steven Clift as “structured, often time-limited, use of online tools to inform about public policy processes and encourage civic participation” (Clift 2003) serve to discover public opinion but also to gain its favour presenting an open, public-oriented and more cooperative than coercive image of decisionmaking centres. Enabling people to interact with authorities on issues concerning them, contributes to an increase in system transparency and accountability. As members of the so-called global society, people often are not aware what decisions are taken in global governance, and feel powerless. Their introduction into decision-making process could considerably increase their will to participate in the system and make it more legible. The right to be informed by public institutions, to be kept notified of their activity and plans, makes up public transparency, which is defined by

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Joshi as “any attempts to place information or processes that were previously opaque in the public domain accessible for use by citizen groups, providers or policy makers” (Joshi 2010, 2). Technology-based transparency efforts stand out for their stimulating impact. Two main categories are classified as “pull” and “push” efforts. As can be read in the report of Renee Kuriyan’s team (Kuriyan et al.), the first one tries to provide an accessible information pool from which the public can pull relevant information about governance and service delivery; The other one “pushes” efforts to give voice to civil society, inciting it to demand more transparency. The role of new technologies in this kind of activities is an added value and shows positive effect on government information and services provision (Kuriyan et al.). In the broader global area, the impact could be similar. E-voting as a tool of participation could be used to express support or criticism towards global initiatives or enterprises. Let us imagine the adoption of digital budgeting in World Bank or International Monetary Fund. It does not need to be participatory right away, but made public still at the working stage by posting all formal information online and exposing it to public opinion. The ratio of for and against voices would indicate to decision-makers the coincidence with people’s needs and the easy access to information. Moreover, the possibility to express one’s opinion on current and future spending projects or decisions taken fosters public satisfaction. This approach enables citizens to interact with decisionmakers and favours social inclusion also globally, which may help reverse the trend of decreasing political communication. Even if Alvin Toffler’s idea of "anticipatory democracy" (anticipate + participatory) defined as a “continuing plebiscite on the future" (Toffler 1970) seems, after 40 years, still too futuristic as a whole; some elements become a part of our reality. The concepts of citizen empowerment and their feedback on the world shape or of popular assemblies appear currently in reflection on and implementation of global governance. There are numerous examples of people’s assemblies at various stages of political and social life that embody the ideas of democratic selfmanagement and simulate more participatory forms of direct citizen involvement in public affairs. The European Union (EU), considered an experimental plot of transnational governance initiatives, presents an example of a parliamentary assembly that crosses borders of national states as well as promotes citizens’ participation in the international policy shaping process. Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Citizens Initiative allows one million citizens from at least one quarter of the EU Member States to

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invite the European Commission to propose legislation on matters where the EU has competence to legislate. Support to an initiative can be declared traditionally on paper or online by filling in a specific statement of support form on the website provided by the organisers for that purpose6. It is one of the many steps made within the framework of the digitalization process. As ICTs are becoming more and more popular and widely available, inclusion of e-voting into the political process is getting technically feasible and socially welcome. The members of the European Technology Assessment Group suggest that it should not be underestimated that people, used to doing more and more things online, will sooner or later ask for the opportunity to vote via Internet (European Technology Assessment Group 2010). On the global level even sooner because of fewer formal restrictions related to still anarchic and disaggregated character of the international community as well as transnational character of global issues that are impossible to be managed individually and require a broader range of stakeholder participation.

Conclusions E-voting which describes a new technique and a new approach to the electoral process has become for good a part of the present political reality. It fits into the wider phenomenon of e-democracy being an ICT application in the area of politics that results from profound social, economic and technological changes due to globalisation processes. By facilitating, broadening and deepening the participation as well as by promoting transparency and accountability, new technological tools seem to have supportive effect on the condition of democracy, also in the global dimension where the democratic deficit is highly noticeable. Global governance structures and mechanisms of expansion, due to their undefined, multilayer and diffuse nature, suffer from lack of control and tempering capabilities on the part of those who are affected by their activity. This in turn undermines the democratic character of the global system and results in legitimacy crisis. Introduction of new ways to develop relationships inside political community and to create new areas of social interaction, brings hope of remedying present deficiencies and contributing to the emergence of fully democratic global governance. Of course, it should be clearly stated that a simple change of a voting method from traditional to electronic, will not increase dramatically democratic indices on a global scale, because of being in fact nothing else but “digitalization of existing democratic practices” (Hilbert 2009, 88). And since the issue is more cultural than technical, there is no miraculous

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panacea but a need for intensive efforts on the political conscience level. As Lincoln Dahlberg notes “the public sphere will not be extended merely through the diffusion of a new technological artefact. People must be drawn into rational-critical discourse before new technologies can be successfully employed to extend the public sphere” (Dahlberg 2001, 630). Therefore, not everything that is technologically possible is democratically directly applicable.

Notes 1

In 1849 de Brettes developed an electronic decision-making telegraph and in 1892 Jacob H. Meyr's mechanical voting machine was first used in public in Lockport, New York, US. The goal was to provide a plain, simple and secret voting process (History of e-voting 2011, 8). 2 The name refers to any system or device whose internal functioning remains unknown to the potential user who analyses it only in terms of input and output without examining how exactly it works. 3 The documentation of election frauds and errors which occurred at e-voting is growing quickly; one of the most extensive, continually updated compendiums is managed by Bev Harris, founder of Black Box Voting - an election watchdog group http://www.blackboxvoting.org/. 4 The notion developed by Lars Qvortrup in The Hypercomplex Society defined as “the result of one observer’s description of another observer’s descriptions of complexity, or it is the result of a complex observer’s description of its own complexity” (Qvortrup 2003, 6). 5 Although the direct access to decision-making process is an advantage, it can also raise profound problems related to the entertainment-oriented character that this activity can unintentionally assume. The list of consequences of pushbutton democracy is well presented by Martin Hilbert (Hilbert 2007, 79-81). 6 The organizers of a citizens' initiative, a citizens' committee composed of at least 7 EU citizens who are resident in at least 7 different Member States, will have 1 year to collect the necessary statements of support. The number of statements of support has to be certified by the competent authorities in the Member States. The Commission will then have 3 months to examine the initiative and decide how to act on it. http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome?lg=en.

Reference list Barney D. 2004. The Network Society. Cambridge: Polity. Bexel M., J. Tallberg, and A. Uhling. 2010. “Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors.” Global Governance 16 (1): 81-101.

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Buchsbaum, T. M. 2004. E-Voting: International Developments and Lessons Learnt. Accessed August 17, 2013. http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings47/Proceeding.GI.474.pdf. Canet, R. 2004. Qu’est-ce que la gouvernance? Accessed August 17, 2013. http://er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/canet-mars-2004.pdf. Castells, M. 1996. Rise of the network society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. I., Oxford: Blackwell Publishars. Clift, S. L. 1997. Building Citizen-based Electronic Democracy Efforts, paper presented in Munich, Germany on Feb. 19-21. Accessed September 4, 2013. http://www.publicus.net/articles/build.html. —. 2003, E-Democracy, E-Governance and Public Net-Work. Accessed September 2, 2013. http://www.publicus.net/articles/edempublicnetwork.html. Dahlberg, L. 2001. “The Internet and democratic discourse. Exploring the prospects of online deliberative forums extending the public sphere.” Information, Communication & Society 4 (4): 615-633. Dingwerth K., and P. Pattberg 2006. “Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 12 (2): 185-203. European Technology Assessment Group. 2010. E-democracy in Europe. Prospects of Internet-based political participation. Accessed Jun 6, 2013. http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/isi-media/docs/t/de/veranstaltungen/ STOA_E-Democracy_Deliverable2_final-version_02-2011.pdf. Held, D., et al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hilbert, M. 2007. Digital Processes and Democratic Theory: Dynamics, risks and opportunities that arise when democratic institutions meet digital information and communication technologies. Peer-reviewed online publication. Accessed September 2, 2013. www.martinhilbert.net/democracy.html. “History of e-voting”. 2011. Modern Democracy – The Electronic Voting and Participation Magazine 1. Joshi, A. 2010. Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Annex I. Service Delivery. Prepared for the Transparency and Accountability Initiative Workshop. Accessed September 15, 2013. http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/IETAAnnex1ServicedeliveryJoshiFi nal28Oct2010.pdf.

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Krimmer, R. Overview. Accessed September 15, 2013. http://www.evoting.cc/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2012/05/krimmer_overview_9-12.pdf. Krimmer R., M. Volkamer, and S. Triessnig. 2007. “The Development of Remote e-voting around the World. A Review of Roads and Directions.” In E-Voting and Identity. First International Conference VOTE-ID 2007, edited by A. Alkassar and M. Volkamer, 1-15. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4896. Berlin: Springer. Kuriyan, R., et al., Technologies for Transparency and Accountability: Implications for ICT Policy and Implementation. Accessed September 9, 2013. http://www.scribd.com/doc/75642405/Technologies-for-Transparencyand-Accountability-Implications-for-ICT-Policy-and-Recommendations. Kwiatkowska, M. 2010. “NGOs a demokracja w Ğwiecie globalizacji.” In NiepaĔstwowi uczestnicy stosunków miĊdzynarodowych, edited by A. Pawáowska, 35-46. Lublin: Wydawnictwo WSPiA. Lauer, T. W. 2004. ‘The Risk of e-Voting.” Electronic Journal of eGovernment 2 (3): 177-186. Maaten, E., and T. Hall. 2008. “Improving the Transparency of Remote EVoting: The Estonian Experience.” In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Electronic Voting, edited by R. Krimmer and R. Grimm, 31-44. Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik. McGrew, A. 2008. “Globalizacja i polityka globalna.” In Globalizacja polityki Ğwiatowej: Wprowadzenie do stosunków miĊdzynarodowych, edited by J. Baylis and S. Smith. Cracow: Wydawnictwo UJ. Mider, D. 2008. Partycypacja polityczna w Internecie. Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa. Monnoyer-Smith L. 2006. “How e-voting technology challenges traditional concepts of citizenship: an analysis of French voting rituals.” In: Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Electronic Voting, edited by R. Krimmer, 61-68. Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik. Nye, J. S. 2001. “Globalization's Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More Accountable.” Foreign Affairs 80 (4): 2-6. Qvortrup, L. 2003. The Hypercomplex Society. New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers. Risse, T. 1999. Democratic Global Governance in the 21st Century. Accessed August 15, 2013. http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/seminars/gb/ euracowa/document/globgov.pdf.

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Rosenau, J. 2002. “Governance in a New Global Order.” In Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance, edited by D. Held and A. McGrew, 70-86. Cambridge: Polity Press. Rothert, A. 2005. Cybernetyczny porządek polityczny. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Aspra. Sachwald, F. 2003. „Du bon usage de la mondialisation.“ Politique étrangère 68 (2): 259-273. Sartori, G. 1987. The Theory of Democracy. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers. Saward, M. 1994. “Democratic theory and indices of democratization.” In: Defining and Measuring Democracy, edited by D. Beetham, 6-24. London: Sage. Slaughter, A-M. 2004. New World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Toffler A. 1970. Future Shock. London: Bodley Head. Veikko, A. A. 2003. “Building strong e-democracy - the role of technology in developing democracy for the information age.” Communications of the ACM 46 (9): 121-128. Waller P., P. Livesey, and K. Edin. 2002. “E-Government In The Service Of Democracy.” ICA Information.

PART III NEW TECHNOLOGIES AS A FACTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW

SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE1 MAREK PIETRAĝ

The progressing complexity of social life and the process of historical acceleration under the conditions of the growing importance of technological factors results in a systematic increase in demand for specialist knowledge and the accompanying participation of experts in political actions and decision-making. This tendency appears to be a characteristic of the emerging Late-Westphalian international order, replacing the Westphalian one based on the almost exclusive organization of social life as part of centralized, territorial nation-states (PietraĞ and MarzĊda 2008; PietraĞ 2007). Under such circumstances it is necessary that political decision-making, which denotes a non-random choice of action (PietraĞ, Z. J. 2011), be based on knowledge. However, the progressing complexity of many, especially present-day international social, economic, cultural and other problems may cause the knowledge about them to be incomplete or to become an object of contention in the scientific community (Smith and Stern 2011, 1-24). Consequently, an additional challenge to the decision-making process in international relations will be the problem of scientific uncertainty. It is a challenge in itself to optimize decisions but at the same time it may become a separate factor that determines the specification of the interests of states participants in the decision-making process, defining their negotiation strategies. This means that along with the knowledge deficit, which is a problem in itself, scientific uncertainty may become a separate, autonomous subject of negotiations and power games of various states. “The autonomization” of the problem of scientific uncertainty is fully confirmed in climate change negotiations, which are a complex political process. Despite the consensus among scholars about the fact of climate warming, there are still elements of scientific uncertainty as to, for example, the mechanism of the climate warming on Earth, the role of the factor of social behaviors, and possible impacts. For many countries, particularly those opposing measures for the reduction of greenhouse gas

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emission in order to focus on their stability, these facts became a factor defining their interests and negotiation strategies. In other words, the objectively existing scientific uncertainty - apparently an element of the “generic essence” of climatic changes and a permanent feature of the process of investigating them - has become the object of political games of many states. This thesis will be verified in the present paper. Hence, for the purpose of this study, it has been assumed that the process of climate negotiations conducted under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) (Ramowa konwencja Narodów Zjednoczonych w sprawie zmian klimatu), and under the Convention-based international regime of climate change is a multifaceted decision-making process, in which one of its determinant variables is scientific uncertainty. In this context, the goal of the article is to analyze the essence of scientific uncertainty in political decision-making (equated with negotiations on climate change), the scope and specificity of scientific uncertainty in the context of the global problem of climate change, and the debate spurred by the foregoing fact, and, subsequently, to analyze of the decision-making center, in which political decision-making on climate change is taking place and in which, in the process of negotiations, scientific uncertainty is a variable determining interests and the strategy for behavior.

The essence of scientific uncertainty in the political process of the problem of climate change Uncertainty is an inherent feature of scientific investigations (Sense About Science 2013) although their aim is to reduce uncertainty (Schneider and Mastrandrea 2010a, 17). With regard to such a dynamic, complex and still prospective phenomenon which is climatic changes this means – with some oversimplification - the absence of a complete scientific explanation of their causes, functioning, effects, and prospects. This is so despite the fact that, apart from few exceptions, the phenomenon of climate change is not challenged. Scientific uncertainty thus conceived is, apart from defining of interests and consequent actions of countries, one of the most significant factors determining the process of climate negotiations both now and in the future. The two factors, i.e. defining of interests and scientific uncertainty, mutually determine each other. Of special significance, however, is the impact of scientific uncertainty on the process of defining the interests of states and the actions they undertake. This means that scientific uncertainty thus conceived is a factor determining political decisions and actions. While being a scientific problem, it is at the same time one that requires political decisions.

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Difficulties in formulating explicit scientific estimates of risk to social life, caused by climate change, contribute to fears that mitigation of this risk may lead to the incurrence of costs that are not necessary and can be expended to meet other social needs, when the intensity and scale of the changes will be negligible and so will be their consequences for the functioning of societies (Schneider and Mastrandrea 2010a, 18) However, two kinds of political errors are possible here. Firstly, human-made climatic changes may be mild and evolutionary while political decisions have spurred “overly cautious” and costly actions. Secondly, the effects of climate change on social life have proved serious, having significant consequences for social life, while the decisions taken and the consequent measures have turned out to be insufficiently commensurate with the scale of changes. This has happened because of a failure to take the argument of scientific uncertainty into account has contributed to a delay in actions and to their limited range and intensity because it was expected that the development of scientific research would reduce the scale of uncertainty concerning climate changes. Such a situation creates special determinants of and at the same time the criteria for the rationality of political decisionmaking. Political decision-makers then face the dilemma of assessing dangers associated with climate change while at the same time there are other social problems, with both climatic changes and those problems “competing” for the same, limited economic resources (Schneider and Mastrandrea 2010a, 18-19). It should be observed, however, that the impact of scientific uncertainty on the political process concerning climate change is highly diverse and forms the foundations of a different, even opposing rationality of thinking. For some, the lack of scientific certainty does not excuse us – if only for the sake of the precautionary principle fundamental in solving global ecological problems – from involvement in mitigating climate change (PietraĞ 2010, 5-35). What is more, it is regarded as rational behavior in accordance with the rule of “lest it be too late”. An important element of rationality of this kind of thinking is the prevention of possible future results of climate change. For others, however, when explicit scientific evidence is lacking, it is rational to refrain from costly actions that are not unequivocally justified from the “here and now” perspective, and to avoid incurring costs. Among the overwhelming majority of scholars studying climate change a conviction arose - already during the preliminary negotiation period – that because of the complexity of the investigation subject, which is the physical properties of the atmosphere and processes occurring in it, scientific uncertainty appears to be their permanent characteristic. Already

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the second report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of 1995 pointed out that political decisions taken regarding climate change have to take into consideration the unique feature of this problem, i.e. scientific and economic uncertainty. It can manifest itself as the nonlinear development of the problem and as irreversibility of changes, asymmetric consequences for individual parts of the world, a very long time horizon, and as the global character of climatic changes. This is combined with uncertainty about socio-economic effects of climate change and socio-economic effects of greenhouse gas emission reduction (IPCC 1995, 47). However, regardless of the manifestation of scientific uncertainty about climate change in the IPCC reports, at the same time these reports constitute the foundation of the developed scientific consensus. The consensus is identified with the IPCC’s position on climate change. Each of the four IPCC reports published to date (IPCC 1990; IPCC 2001; IPCC 2007) contains evidence of climate warming and conclusions showing the interrelations between human actions and climate changes. Underlying the consensus is the belief that climate change poses a significant threat to the functioning or even existence of humankind. It should be also emphasized that the IPCC is an intergovernmental structure, which means that the results of research contained in the reports, apart from sporadically articulated different views, are accepted by governments (Brown 2013, 92), yet they reflect the lowest level of acceptable agreements. Some opinions are even expressed that these assessments understate the degree of existing threats. These opinions notwithstanding, there is political acceptance of the IPCC’s findings. However, this does not change the fact that some of the states participating in climate negotiations try to avoid cooperation and the incurrence of costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction, and mitigation of the impacts of climate change, the developed consensus being the object of criticism, including scientific objections. In view of the complexity and seriousness of the problem of scientific uncertainty an important question arises about its effect on decisionmaking processes aimed to mitigate climate change. Some of the more significant questions are those concerning the issue of time. It can be argued on the one hand that actions for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions should be delayed because climatic changes may turn out to be less dangerous than anticipated, and in consequence of the assessment, unnecessary but costly actions have been undertaken. On the other hand, we may learn that changes are more serious than it was suspected (Ingham and Ulph 2005, 43). A view is advanced, however, that the “first learn, then act” approach is rational, provided that the greenhouse gas

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accumulation were reversible. It is, however, not reversible in the short term. Computer models enable estimates that carbon dioxide emission reductions will allow us to return to its present level after ca. 300 years and to the pre-industrial revolution condition after ca. 1,000 years. The lack of response may thus produce the concentration of greenhouse gases with dramatic consequences (idid., 44). The foregoing analyses explicitly show that the state of scientific knowledge is a challenge to the processes of political decision-making on the mitigation of climate change. Opponents of involvement often point out that the state of scientific knowledge does not justify firmer actions because we need more accurate information about future climatic changes and their impacts. It is then that conditions will be met in order to make decisions about measures appropriate to the state of climate change (Houghton 2009, 44). This is a “wait and see” attitude, characteristic of the countries unwilling to become involved in mitigating global climate change and taking on binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The lack of scientific certainty is therefore used – especially under the conditions of lobbying by different interest groups – as a justification for delaying any actions until the phenomenon of climate change has been better explained, and the costs of risk entailed by climate change have become more acceptable and predictable (Schneider and Mastrandrea 2010b, 162). The states which invoke the argument of uncertainty at the forum of the climate change regime in order to avoid being involved in actions aimed to mitigate climate change include inter alia Australia, Saudi Arabia, and first all the United States. The argument of scientific uncertainty was adduced by President George Bush when justifying the decision to withdraw the motion to ratify the Kyoto Protocol from the US Senate. In his letter to Senator Chuck Hagel of March 13, 2001 he emphasized the need for caution in approaching the climate change issue to avoid actions that might be harmful to consumers. He added that it was extremely important, given the incomplete scientific knowledge on the causes and solutions of the global problem of climate change (Letter, 2001). The instrumental treatment of scientific uncertainty by states in the process of defining their interests provokes the question about the role of scientific knowledge and scientific communities in influencing political actions in the face of increasingly complex present-day civilizational challenges, climate change being one of them. There should be no doubt that scientific uncertainty is becoming one of the variables determining processes of negotiations on many ecological problems. This in turn strengthens the position of scientific communities and the role of knowledge. Already, over a dozen years ago, Karen Litfin expressed a

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view that the culture of scientific research was becoming a policy factor in postindustrial societies. She believes that with the growing demand for knowledge in political decision-making, the role of experts increases, who themselves become political actors. (Litfin 1994, 1). While not challenging the cognitive value of the direction of thinking proposed by Karen Litfin, it appears that relationships between the scientific community and politicians, which is evidenced by the example of the global problem of climate change, are a kind of more complex symbiosis. On the one hand, the scientific community plays a central role in negotiating the ways of solving climatic changes. It is the scientific communities who discovered the greenhouse effect and provide information about it, which is a factor of strengthening their position and building their status as some kind of actors in political decision-making processes. A view is even expressed that climate change looks “at first glance” like a purely scientific problem in physics (Malone 2009, 18). Whether this opinion is justified or not, it should be emphasized that conducting climate negotiations, for example on the successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, requires not only scientific knowledge but it is the knowledge about the long-term evolution of Earth’s temperature and greenhouse gas concentration that should be the basis for these negotiations. Todd Stern and Antholis William even advanced a view that in climate negotiations it is the opinions of scientists that should be relied upon rather than those of politicians (Stern and Antholis 2007-2008, 179). On the other hand, knowledge provided by the scientific community to politicians becomes a specific source of their power in the decisionmaking process. It enables justification of decisions made and actions undertaken, thus giving them a kind of legitimacy. In particular, this applies to international ecological problems. Due to the complexity of causes and effects, the possibility of solving them is determined by the state of scientific knowledge (Litfin 1994, 3-5). However, conflicting views between experts may be used by politicians as an “excuse” to ignore the opinions of the scientific community, that are considered to be “inconvenient” from the point of view of defined interests and preferred actions (ibid., 31). This is evidenced for example by the US position on climate change. In view of the foregoing remarks on the instrumental treatment of scientific knowledge by politicians, a serious research problem will be the analysis of the impact of scientific uncertainty on political decisionmaking. Interesting views on the subject were proposed by Dale Jamieson, who presented a functional and cultural interpretation of scientific uncertainty. In his view it is not an objective condition that can be reduced by science itself because uncertainty has been created by science and

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society in order to serve specific purposes: it meets social or political demand. Furthermore, he believes that many of our problems related to risk states are profoundly cultural and they cannot be overcome only by the use of “better science” (Jamieson 1996, 35). Jamieson stresses that in the ordinary opinion uncertainty is perceived as a state that can be reduced by investing in research and acquired knowledge. In political practice, however, rather than being a cause of controversies, scientific uncertainty is often their result. Scientific communities participate in creating uncertainty: understanding it requires taking into account social or political factors that have produced it (ibid., 37). Consequently, scientific uncertainly is not merely a “product” of “narrow” scientific causes, i.e. imperfect investigations, but also of the broad context. Therefore, it is not an expression of scientific ignorance only, but also a part of that which structures our perception of the world. As Jamieson argues, theses about uncertainty reflect and mold the epistemological order and determine the research process (ibid., 39). Uncertainty, thus conceived, mediates between the closed world of knowledge and the open world of public activities while cultural determinants do not serve to reduce uncertainty but to manage it (ibid., 41). Jamieson agrees with the fairly prevailing view that one of the most complex cases of scientific uncertainty, with significant implications for political practice, is the global problem of climate change. This is so inter alia because the knowledge about this phenomenon is gained to a minimal degree from empirical studies but rather from experiments conducted on simulation models of climate change. Consequently, science was effective in actions for stimulating the interest of public opinion and politicians in the problem of climate change but it is not effective in offering solutions to this problem. That is why problems such as climatic changes, which are distinguished by a high degree of scientific uncertainty, can be freely used by politicians for their political ends. There are so many factors determining climatic changes that supporters and opponents of the idea can use research results to substantiate their arguments, and can also accuse their opponents of abusing these results (ibid., 38). Scientific uncertainty thus plays a functional role in political decision-making.

The scope and specificity of scientific uncertainty in the political process of the problem of climate change Scientific uncertainty concerning climate change, no matter how it is perceived, interpreted and instrumentally treated by countries, is an objective state. It is therefore part of the objective reality, pertaining to a

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phenomenon with specific, special characteristics. Climatic changes are classified as belonging to the group of humankind’s long-term problems, whose features are: a) duration for at least the life-span of one generation, many things showing this to be a far longer term; b) profound uncertainty, c) posing a threat to international community (Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2009, 20). Uncertainty is treated even as an attribute of climate change (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, 37). Although one indisputable fact is pointed out, which is that some gases in the atmosphere let in ultraviolet radiation and trap infrared radiation, which is called greenhouse effect (Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2009, 9; Mastrandrea and Schneider 2010, 26). In this context the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and in the Earth’s average temperatures is not disputed. The two phenomena have been confirmed by the results of empirical tests. The fourth IPCC report explicitly shows that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level” (IPCC 2009, 30). The scope of scientific uncertainty about climate change, i.e. about which phenomena and processes it concerns, is the subject of debate. However, the tendency is to broaden, rather than confine, it only to uncertainty accompanying the role of the anthropogenic factor, i.e. social behaviors in causing increases in global average temperatures. Apart from that, the elements of scientific uncertainty determining climate negotiations as a kind of political process also include, firstly, uncertainty about the intensity and consequent severity of the global problem of climate change, the scale of global temperature increase, the scale of rising sea levels, and other impacts. It should be observed in this context that atmospheric processes are complex, social behaviors being an additional factor that complicates them (International Monetary Fund 2008, 139). We have only incomplete knowledge on the rate of increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases and the sensitivity to it of climate and biological systems. Secondly, there is uncertainty about regional and local impacts of climate change since it is difficult to assess how social, economic, and political systems will adapt to climate change in time and space. What is obvious is that only the varying sensitivity and susceptibility of individual countries (but also of their regions) to climate change. It is difficult, if possible, to determine the degree of that diversity. Thirdly, scientific uncertainty also applies to the costs of and benefits from individual action options taking at the same time the costs and effects of alternative options into consideration (Thompson 2010, 277-279).

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Particularly emphasized is uncertainty as to the effects of climate change. It is further complicated by the global scale of the problem and the fact that climatic changes are not only a scientific problem but also the subject of political debate. Two causes of uncertainty in determining the future impacts of climate change are pointed out: a) what people did and do, resulting in the emission of greenhouse gases; b) the way the climate system reacts to greenhouse gas emissions (Mastrandrea and Schneider 2010, 26; Schneider and Mastrandrea 2010b, 172). Without denying the validity of the two variables determining the uncertainty of the effects of climate change, it is necessary to show the third one, i.e. varying sensitivity and susceptibility to them of social systems. As regards the first variable, there is a consensus that it is difficult to foresee future greenhouse gas emissions. This uncertainty stems from two reasons: a) uncertainty about the adequacy of models of the world economy; b) uncertainty as to the variables determining the functioning of the world economy (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, 17). Of particular importance in relation to these variables is the consumption of fossil fuels. It can be determined by many factors, e.g. economic ones such as prices of fossil fuels, by investment in alternative sources of energy, demographic factors and consumption patterns, and by political factors such as, for example, conflicts in the areas of fossil fuels exploitation. A confirmation of the uncertainty of forecasts concerning future greenhouse gas emissions is as many as seven forecasting scenarios described in the fourth IPCC report of 2007 (IPCC 2009, 7). With reference to the second variable – the reaction of the climate system to the emission of greenhouse gases – it should be stressed that it is not clear how much the climate will warm and what the consequences of it will be for other atmospheric phenomena, for example rainfall. While the first variable can be corrected by political actions, this is highly limited in the case of the second. With regards to the third variable – varying sensitivity and susceptibility of social systems, Warwick McKibbin and Peter Wilcoxen expressed a view that the impacts of climate change on social systems are less predictable and more uncertain than climatic changes themselves (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, 30), because they depend on the scale of warming, which is encumbered with uncertainty. It is difficult to predict the impacts on individual regions of the globe, human health, crop zones and food production, on the rising sea level, and on possible migration processes and conflicts. The global problem of climate change is a complex, dynamic, and hard-to-predict process determined by many variables. It is a process of

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lengthy duration whose analysis requires taking into account, first of all, long-term tendencies rather than immediate, short-term changes. This produces challenges to political decision-making processes. Although it was in the context of economic processes but also rightly applicable to the problem of climate change that Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott pointed out already in the 1970s that decisions which appeared optimal at the moment of making them might prove non-optimal and even erroneous in the future (Kydland and Preskott 1977, 481). The complexity of causes and, in particular, effects of climatic changes, their characteristic elements of uncertainty and lack of strict determinacy are reflected in IPCC reports. In the fourth report of 2007 the analyses of many observable elements of climate change, its causes and effects, were made with reference to defining the degree of the probability of occurrence (Pachauri 2008, 15). This solution was used earlier in the third IPCC report of 2001 (IPCC 2001). The 2007 report, when presenting the phenomena in which uncertainty is assessed in more quantitative terms, used the following scale of confidence level to express the assessed chance of a finding being correct: very high confidence - at least 9 out of 10; high confidence - about 8 out of 10; medium confidence - about 5 out of 10; low confidence - about 2 out of 10; and very low confidence: less than 1 out of 10. Where uncertainty in specific results was assessed using expert judgment and statistical analysis of the collected data, the following likelihood ranges were used to express the assessed probability of occurrence: virtually certain >99%; extremely likely >95%; very likely >90%; likely >66%; more likely than not > 50%; about as likely as not 33% to 66%; unlikely