New Middle Ages: Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World [1st ed.] 9783030586805, 9783030586812

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World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures

Bohumil Doboš

New Middle Ages Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World

World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures Series Editors Christopher Chase-Dunn, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA Barry K. Gills, Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland Leonid E. Grinin, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Andrey V. Korotayev, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

This series seeks to promote understanding of large-scale and long-term processes of social change, in particular the many facets and implications of globalization. It critically explores the factors that affect the historical formation and current evolution of social systems, on both the regional and global level. Processes and factors that are examined include economies, technologies, geopolitics, institutions, conflicts, demographic trends, climate change, global culture, social movements, global inequalities, etc. Building on world-systems analysis, the series addresses topics such as globalization from historical and comparative perspectives, trends in global inequalities, core-periphery relations and the rise and fall of hegemonic core states, transnational institutions, and the long-term energy transition. This ambitious interdisciplinary and international series presents cutting-edge research by social scientists who study whole human systems and is relevant for all readers interested in systems approaches to the emerging world society, especially historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, geographers and anthropologists. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15714

Bohumil Doboš

New Middle Ages Geopolitics of Post-Westphalian World

Bohumil Doboš Institute of Political Studies Charles University Prague 5, Czech Republic

ISSN 2522-0985     ISSN 2522-0993 (electronic) World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures ISBN 978-3-030-58680-5    ISBN 978-3-030-58681-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 2 Conceptual Framework��������������������������������������������������������������������������   7 2.1 Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory����������������������������������������������   7 2.2 Concepts��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  10 2.2.1 State��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  10 2.2.2 Unrecognized State ��������������������������������������������������������������  12 2.2.3 Non-State Actor��������������������������������������������������������������������  13 2.2.4 Sovereignty ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  13 2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots����������������������������������������������  15 2.3 Systemic Development ��������������������������������������������������������������������  16 2.3.1 Medieval System������������������������������������������������������������������  16 2.3.2 Westphalian System��������������������������������������������������������������  20 2.3.3 Globalization������������������������������������������������������������������������  22 3 New Middle Ages��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  23 3.1 Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism ��������������������������������  23 3.1.1 Regional Integration of States����������������������������������������������  24 3.1.2 Disintegration of States��������������������������������������������������������  24 3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence��������������������������������������������  25 3.1.4 Transnational Organizations ������������������������������������������������  25 3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World��������������������������������  26 3.2 Post-Cold War Reincarnation������������������������������������������������������������  26 3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs����������������������������������������������������������������������  26 3.2.2 Philip Cerny��������������������������������������������������������������������������  28 3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin ��������������������������������������������������������������������  29 3.2.4 Jan Zielonka��������������������������������������������������������������������������  30 3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little��������������������������������������������  32 3.2.6 Neil Winn������������������������������������������������������������������������������  33 3.2.7 John Rapley��������������������������������������������������������������������������  33 3.2.8 Phil Williams������������������������������������������������������������������������  34 3.3 End of State System?������������������������������������������������������������������������  35 3.3.1 Crumbling of State System ��������������������������������������������������  35 3.3.2 Alternative Actors ����������������������������������������������������������������  38

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3.4 Concept of the Three Worlds������������������������������������������������������������  41 3.4.1 Durable Disorder������������������������������������������������������������������  42 3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy�������������������������������������������������������������������  44 3.4.3 Westphalian System��������������������������������������������������������������  45 3.4.4 Relation ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  45 4 Analyzing the Global System������������������������������������������������������������������  47 4.1 Regions ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  47 4.2 Research Design��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  51 4.2.1 Axis A ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  54 4.2.2 Axis B ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  56 5 Distribution of the Three Worlds������������������������������������������������������������  61 5.1 Regional Analysis ����������������������������������������������������������������������������  61 5.1.1 The EU+��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  61 5.1.2 Balkans����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  64 5.1.3 East Europe ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  66 5.1.4 Russian Space ����������������������������������������������������������������������  68 5.1.5 The Caucasus������������������������������������������������������������������������  69 5.1.6 Central Asia��������������������������������������������������������������������������  70 5.1.7 Chinese Space ����������������������������������������������������������������������  71 5.1.8 East Asia�������������������������������������������������������������������������������  72 5.1.9 Southeast Asia����������������������������������������������������������������������  73 5.1.10 Oceania ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  74 5.1.11 Indian Space��������������������������������������������������������������������������  74 5.1.12 AfPak������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  75 5.1.13 Iran����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  76 5.1.14 Turkey ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  77 5.1.15 Larger Mesopotamia ������������������������������������������������������������  78 5.1.16 Gulf Monarchies ������������������������������������������������������������������  79 5.1.17 Western Middle East ������������������������������������������������������������  80 5.1.18 Northern Africa ��������������������������������������������������������������������  80 5.1.19 Northwest Africa������������������������������������������������������������������  81 5.1.20 Horn of Africa+��������������������������������������������������������������������  82 5.1.21 East Africa����������������������������������������������������������������������������  83 5.1.22 Central Africa������������������������������������������������������������������������  84 5.1.23 South Africa��������������������������������������������������������������������������  85 5.1.24 West Africa����������������������������������������������������������������������������  86 5.1.25 North America����������������������������������������������������������������������  86 5.1.26 Central America��������������������������������������������������������������������  87 5.1.27 The Caribbean����������������������������������������������������������������������  88 5.1.28 Northern South America ������������������������������������������������������  89 5.1.29 Southern South America ������������������������������������������������������  90 5.2 Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  90

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6 Effects on the International System ������������������������������������������������������  95 6.1 Adaptation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  95 6.1.1 Westphalian System��������������������������������������������������������������  96 6.1.2 Durable Disorder������������������������������������������������������������������  98 6.1.3 Chaotic Anarchy�������������������������������������������������������������������  101 6.2 Interaction ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  104 6.2.1 Westphalian-Durable Disorder����������������������������������������������  104 6.2.2 Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy����������������������������������������������  106 6.2.3 Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy��������������������������������������  108 7 Impact on Selected Regions��������������������������������������������������������������������  111 7.1 Adaptation����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  112 7.1.1 Al-Shabaab����������������������������������������������������������������������������  112 7.1.2 People’s Republic of China��������������������������������������������������  118 7.1.3 Facebook ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  124 7.2 Interaction ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 7.2.1 EU-Russia ����������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 7.2.2 EU-Sahel ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  135 7.2.3 Turkey-Syria ������������������������������������������������������������������������  140 8 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 Bibliography ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  151

List of Abbreviations

AMISOM AQAP ASEAN DRC EAC ETA EU FARC FSI FTA GDPR ICU IORA IRA NAFTA NATO NGO OBOR PKK PRC PYD RAF SDF UK UN USA VPN YPG YPJ

African Union Mission in Somalia Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula Association of Southeast Asian Nations Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community Euskadi Ta Askatasuna European Union Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Fragile State Index Free Trade Area General Data Protection Regulation Islamic Court Union Indian Ocean Rim Association Irish Republican Army North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization One Belt One Road Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) People’s Republic of China Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (United Democratic Party) Red Army Faction Syrian Democratic Forces United Kingdom United Nations United States of America Virtual Private Network Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Forces) Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (Women’s Protection Forces)

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War introduced significant shifts and changes to the world’s geopolitics (end of bipolarism and establishment of the new-world order), nature of the international system, and domestic political setting of many countries all over the globe. Bipolar competition disappeared, the world became dominated (at least for some time) by a single superpower – the United States (USA) – and many countries fell into the abyss of civil war that was this time not fumed by the competing superpowers. Other states failed due to the end of financing from former superpowers and lack of balancing between these behemoths inside the civil conflicts taking place in the third world context. The world became globalized and interconnected via the emerging cyberspace and effects of the new regionalism as in the case of the establishment of the European Union (EU) that spread across most of the European continent or an appearance of the free trade areas (FTAs). New non-state actors that appeared in the new environment (violent non-state actors or nongovernmental organizations) often utilized the caveats in the states’ territoriality and functioning and gained prominence. From these examples, it is clear that the changes in the international structure are systemic and profound. Consequently, a large amount of debates regarding the nature of the post-Cold War world took place. From Fukuyama (1992) to Huntington (1997) to Giddens (1998), many authors attempted to portray the nature of the international system following the fall of bipolarism. This work, however, goes even further and claims that the changes not only disrupted the bipolar balance of power but that they challenge the Westphalian system as we know it. It might even seem that the structural limits that empowered the state to become the dominant and mutually reinforcing unit in the international system that established itself since the end of Middle Ages (Spruyt 1994, 180) might shift toward a new equilibrium that might not favor a global dominance of the sovereign state anymore. This development is following the process of power diffusion (Nye Jr. 2011, 113). It is claimed that the world is slowly turning to a new geopolitical setting  – the neomedievalism. Nonetheless, as the grand theories mentioned above all failed to grasp the global landscape in totality, this work is not claiming that we can use a © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_1

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1 Introduction

single concept worldwide. Instead it helps the reader understand that the global distribution of power and organization of political space is uneven and the mutual interactions are key for the full understanding of the contemporary geopolitics. As noted by M. van Creveld (2000), the introduction of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War dramatically changed the nature of the international system which was for previous few centuries dominated by the integrating tendencies that began in the consolidation process on the European continent1 and culminated in the establishment of the bipolar order. These trends to consolidate territory via war effort were, however, ended by the emerging possibility of nuclear annihilation and since the fall of the Soviet Empire disintegration began to lead the way – the way that shifts the system into the neomedieval future. In this line of thought, the following text is based on the evolutionary theory of state development. The possible transformation into the New Middle Ages was, however, for the first time mentioned by a different author – A. Wolfers (1962). Despite leaving just a short comment on the topic, he scratched the possibility of a return of a system of the new medievalism where a distinction between domestic and foreign affairs blurs as a result of the struggle of communism against national state and transnational movements against nationalism (Wolfers 1962, 242). As noted in the title, the book argues that world is entering the post-Westphalian phase of its political development and states are playing still decreasing role in the international and domestic politics. The system is characterized by tensions and contradictions (Cerny and Prichard 2017, 3). This, however, does not mean that a state is about to disappear. The institution of state is so far prominent political actor and will in some territories and functions remain dominant or at least important for the times to come.2 The end of the Westphalian system and increased levels of instability, furthermore, do not necessarily mean that the world will become a less pleasant place to live  – as M. van Creveld argues, the state-based system brought horrors of Hiroshima and Auschwitz which are hardly perceivable in the neomedieval setting (van Creveld 2000). The first scholar to adequately describe the possible global neomedieval setting was H. Bull in his The Anarchical Society which was initially published in 1977. In this work, he delimits New Middle Ages as an alternative stream of thought regarding international politics in a post-bipolar era (Bull 1977, 254–255). The foundation of the stream of thought and the consequent analysis are thus rooted in the realist school of international relations. The neomedieval thinking was, however, abandoned as improbable until the beginning of the 1990s where it was reintroduced either explicitly (e.g., works of J.  Friedrichs (2001), P.  Cerny (1998), J.  Rapley (2006)) or implicitly (e.g., by R.  Kaplan (1994)). The stream thus gained some prominence despite remaining on the side of the mainstream academic debate. At this point, it is necessary to stress that the systemic changes presented in this work do not portray the nature of the political activity inside the global system in its entirety. There was no clear dramatic short-term switch from the medieval to modern system. Inside the Westphalian system, non-state actors used to play some or  See Tilly (1975).  See the discussion in 1999’s special issue of Political Studies 47 (3).

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3

even crucial role (e.g., the East India Company), and some, at least formally, alternative political units appeared (e.g., Libyan Jamahiriya). The prevalent logic of the political conduct, however, laid in the forces that are described in relation to the medieval, modern, and neomedieval systems as argued in the following text. The fact that the theory is a little bit too extravagant for the mainstream debate3 is not a fault in itself. What is more problematic is the fact that the stream remained to some extent shattered in different approaches toward the new nature of the international politics. Just by comparison of J.  Friedrichs’ historical neomedievalism and P. Williams’ New Dark Ages, we can find directly opposing ideas which, however, fall under the same basic framework. The first goal of this book is thus clear – a proper description of neomedievalism as a stream of thought. Given the fact that the specific authors usually dedicated only limited space to the development of their outlooks on the theory or its application, it is necessary to carefully describe large number of these divergent views as to find some common ground that is not rooted only in a one-time opposition of the selected author to the Westphalian reading of the international system. After this goal is achieved, the delimitation of the ideal types that can be extrapolated from the theoretical analysis of the international (geo) politics will be presented. Proper demarcation of these ideal types is essential as it will become the basis for the whole remaining work. The work will thus devote quite an ample space to a proper definition of basic terminology and overview of the literature dealing with the New Middle Ages. The first research question is thus stated as, what is the definition of neomedievalism? New Middle Ages as somehow fluid environment, nevertheless, cannot be seen as a rigid description of international system, and the thinking thus more resembles continuum where each case’s position in relation to the ideal types differs. This is why the next logical step in the attempt to examine the theory is to establish such continuum to which the cases might be plotted into. This will enable us to place all the cases into the complex model that presents the outlook of the neomedieval post-­ Westphalian system. For a successful analysis, we need to deal with one other issue – the nature of researched actors and scope of analysis. As New Middle Ages are based on a presumption about the decline of state power, it seems unsuitable to use state-based analysis as is usual in other geopolitical works. We will turn our attention to different units usually connected to geopolitical thought  – regions. Regions are not, however, used as actors themselves but are researched as an environment filled by different – both state and non-state – actors interacting with each other. For region selection and delimitation, vast amount of literature by such prominent figures such as S.  Cohen, Z.  Brzezinski, J.  Zielonka, S.  Huntington, or R.  Kaplan is available. Analysis of the position of the chosen regions inside the neomedieval context is the second principal aim of this work. Nonetheless, if different scope to macrolevel analysis is chosen, a more precise map of distribution of different more fine-grained models of organization of political space might be generated. Regional distribution of the new international geopolitical setting is thus 3  Despite the fact that for some authors the suggestions made by neomedievalists do not go far enough. See, for example, Bunker and Bunker (2016).

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only a step away. If it is found out that a vast majority of regions is dominated by the Westphalian setting and is not leaning toward some form of neomedieval form (meaning there is no evident shift toward non-Westphalian international setting), the basis on which the whole book is based upon will fail. The second research question thus states, what is the geographical distribution of the various geopolitical (Westphalian and neomedieval) settings? Once we know what neomedievalism is and how its different forms are distributed in different regions, we can move to the second goal of the book – analysis of the relationship among actors inside different types of political space (Westphalian and neomedieval) and relations among various actors inside these spaces and their adaptation to it. The work will look at the options given to the neomedieval and Westphalian actors in the new international setting with a focus on strategic options such as economic cooperation, shatter-belt creation, state-building, waging war, forms of external involvement, etc. It will be presented how different actors need to adapt their strategies and setting according to the context of the environment they are acting in4 and based on their capabilities and nature of their geopolitical setting. In the end, we should be able to imagine the world as more than a simple political map filled by territorial Westphalian states but as a complex structure with different settings, different actors, and various relationships. This is the primary justification for choosing the topic in the first place – presenting alternative to the classical geopolitical view on the international affairs and presenting practical advices on its impact. Understanding of the changes in the nature of the global geopolitics and reaction of different actors to such shifts are crucial for any subsequent analysis of the actions of different actors. The third and fourth research questions state: How do the political actors adapt to their geopolitical environments? How do the actors inside different spaces react to each other? Each of the questions will be researched using different methodological approach, and each chapter will, if necessary, describe used methodology in more substantial depth. At this moment, the basic summary of the major methodological points is presented. In defining and characterizing neomedievalism, we will analyze existing academic sources dealing with the issue  – heuristic research. After adequately explaining the theory, we will move to the description of its poles  – ideal types. Consequently, we will compare them to find main factors that distinguish them. Once adequately described, the factors will be prepared for operationalization. Operationalization will follow methodology that E. Berg and E. Kuusk (2010) used in their article where they presented empirical approach toward understanding sovereignty. Afterward, we will analyze the results and present geopolitical implications of state deterioration in a context of the empirical findings and the neomedieval theoretical framework. The methodological framework itself is based on the approach rooted in the systemic geopolitics – more consensual and liberal and lacking geographical determinism compared to the classical geopolitics and more focused on non-state actors as well. The selected school of geopolitics combines elements of classical and critical geopolitics, taking the essential thoughts from  According to the Darwinist theory – see Spruyt (1994, 24).

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1 Introduction

5

both of them. Systemic geopolitics presents tools to analyze space as a system. This will help us with a proper delimitation and understanding of the spatial properties of different regions in relation to the neomedieval theory. The book also holds clear limitations regarding the empirical work. First, the global focus leads to necessary simplifications. It is not a goal of the work to make a detailed analysis of every part of the world and it cannot be. The book covers the evaluation of the systemic forces inside the international order, and the application aims to better understand the geographical spread of the different types of geopolitical spaces. The second limitation deals with the development on the ground. As the book works with the recent data and evaluation of the contemporary events, it might not be capable of following all the most recent developments taking place. This, however, once again does not disqualify it from presenting the systemic evolution. Structure of the book will follow the abovementioned research goals. The first chapter deals with definitions and terminology; the second is dedicated to the theory itself  – description of both neomedievalism as an alternative to the Westphalian system and its ideal types; the third chapter discusses the way how to apply theory to empirical research – defining analyzed regions and presenting the research design of the work; the fourth chapter deals with the empirical analysis itself; the fifth chapter is dedicated to a study of the relations among different actors in neomedieval world and the way political actors adapted to their environment; the sixth chapter covers six case studies that illustrate the processes presented in the theoretical sphere – their aim is not testing the model but better explaining the nature of relations and adaptations; finally, conclusion summarizes the whole work. This book presents the world as being constructed of qualitatively different types of organization of political space. This complication of the reading of the world map will hopefully bring more clarity into its understanding.

2

Conceptual Framework

Before the introduction of the New Middle Age theory and the neomedieval framework that will be serving as a theoretical basis for the empirical part of this work, it is essential to describe the basic definitions, terminology, and concepts used throughout the book as some of the terms can be understood in several ways and we need to establish a clear baseline for the development of the theoretical framework. As the work problematizes our understanding of even basic concepts, it is essential to have a basic definition of these. Lack of common understanding would hinder any possible discussion over alternative geopolitical settings in non-Westphalian organizations of the political map. In the first part, an understanding of geopolitics and political geography and its applicability on neomedievalism as primarily international relations theory will be presented. The second part will focus on conceptualization of the fundamental concepts, and the third part will describe medieval and Westphalian systems as geopolitical settings from which the neomedieval system might be described as well as the process of globalization that is by many seen as major factor eroding modern state system.1

2.1

Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory

Despite being primarily created as an international relations’ framework, New Middle Ages is also well applicable in the field of geopolitics, and political geography as it in no small degree deals with the territorial dimension of politics. To prove this, a conceptualization of these two terms must be first presented. Geopolitics and political geography are understood as a field of social sciences studying relation between political processes and space/geography. This relationship, however, does include not only geographic patterns but also expertise 1  For the discussion over the role of globalization on the state system and sovereignty erosion, see the special issue of Political Studies 47 (3) (1999).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_2

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2  Conceptual Framework

from other fields (economy, demography, etc.), so the geopolitical analysis seeks to research distinct cases as profoundly as possible (Glassner 1996, 11–12). These other fields of expertise may include study of political and economic actors/agents/ systems, outlook of economic activity, or even role of ideas and ideology in the international system. It is important to point out that the perception throughout the book is not state-centric. A geopolitical actor is defined, by, for example, S. Mäkinen (2014, 101), as any actor whose influence might be felt in at least two regions on the globe, and so international organizations, individuals, etc. must also be included.2 This definition is, however, insufficient for this research. For its purposes, it is necessary to define political-geographical actor as well. While geopolitical actor is defined by its impact on more regions or by its influence on the power projection capabilities and the general dynamics of geopolitical development, regional actors are comparably more static and follow the logic of political geography as a fixed discipline. Actors that are part of the geopolitical processes are involved in dynamic3 power projection efforts, while every actor that holds some power in a set region is a part of the political-geographical analysis of more static power distribution. This distinction follows traditional division between political geography and geopolitics. Both fields are subfields of human geography which specializes in research of connection between human activity and geography in general. Political geography, as mentioned earlier, focuses on political processes and is thus oriented more on the state political system, while geopolitics is understood as a subfield of political geography specifically dedicated to studying of great-power/global/international politics from the spatial perspective. To quote B.  Hnízdo, geopolitics is merely a “(s)cale picked at a global level, trying to overcome the limitations given by the state as a territorial unit in researching the problems of political geography(…) (Hnízdo 1995, 10).”4 Neomedievalism can be integrated into the geopolitical thinking in two ways. The first is related to the nature of actors – neomedievalism stresses greater focus on the non-state actors. The second is a mode of territorial control – the notion of absolute territorial power of state is regarded as obsolete and unjustifiable. A justification for using neomedievalism in geopolitical framework is thus the focus on territory and interaction among actors who can be defined as geopolitical/political-­ geographical (although not all of them are necessarily territorial). Finally, two concepts related to the issue and coming from the systemic stream of geopolitical thought need to be tackled. The first is J. Lévy’s system of world spaces. He points to the fact that the existence of world system is a myth and that no global model is relevant for any scholar interested in honest description of a  Compare with the definition of a geopolitical agent in Flint (2006, 24–26).  “The geopolitical perspective is dynamic. It evolves as the international system and its operational environment changes” (Cohen 2014, 5). 4  Translation by the author of these (the same is applicable for all the translations from Czech in this book). 2 3

2.1  Geopolitics and Neomedieval Theory

9

contemporary world. He proposes presence of four types of spatial models based on the type and quality of interhuman relations – world of groupings (based on separation), world of forces (domination), hierarchical world (transaction), and world of society (communication). Each of these four models leads to a different end  – community, empire, market, society. Qualities of these spaces are then leading to different territorial outcomes  – horizon, borders, territorially determined network, and global network (Lévy 2000). If we fast-forward a little, we may see that this separation will be important for two reasons: 1. Three advanced systems (other than world of groupings) are basis for the three pillars we will examine in the description of Durable Disorder scenario. 2. Different territorial outcomes are similar to the setting of our three ideal types – border zones (horizon) for Chaotic Anarchy, border lines and globalization (borders and territorially determined network) for Westphalian model, and global (universal) network for Durable Disorder. The second important concept comes from the work of G. Dussuoy who tried to examine the composition of the world system. He shatters the idea of a single system into parts that can be adequately examined. Dussuoy presents five components of the world system  – physical, natural space; demographic or demo-political space; diplomatic-military field; socioeconomic field; and symbolic, idealistic, and cultural domain. He expresses a belief that these spaces are not separate, and one can become so important that it determines the outlook of the others. In his work, the influence of diplomatic-military field in the Cold War is presented as an example, or, similarly, the contemporary influence of socioeconomic field in the form of globalization can be seen as another example of such dominance (Dussuoy 2010). This division is essential for this study mainly because it once again points to the two-­and-­half pillar structure of Durable Disorder and it specifies its field of interest. We will be primarily interested in the diplomatic-military field (not only in its effects but also in actors playing major roles), demo-political space concerning the local political-geographic actors, or socioeconomic field as long as it affects these two domains. The book additionally needs to take into account the world-system theory as an evolutionary approach to the development of the global institutions and interactions. World-system analysis is historical, overcoming the limitations of the nation state and mapping the global perspective with additional focus on the nature of flows – world economy. Unlike the current study, the world-system analysis deals with the role of the interactions in the inequality of the different parts of the system (Wallerstein 2004). It consequently maps and conceptualizes the contemporary capitalist system including its spatial distributions (Arrighi 2001/2; 2002; 2004; Arrighi and Silver 2001) and historical development (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Frank and Gills 1993). The historical, globalist, and system-centric approach is crucial for the basis of the consequent analysis even if the world-system analysis is not utilized as the book covers the distribution of power on the political map with only secondary importance of the political economy.

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2.2

2  Conceptual Framework

Concepts

2.2.1 State A proper definition of a modern state is a far-reaching task which to be done exhaustively would, similarly to other definitions presented in this work, take much more space than available here – in fact, it would be a goal for a separate monography. This work will thus only briefly summarize primary arguments that will lead us in the following text. The modern state is usually defined by a set of objective and subjective geographic, social, and political factors. Objective factors are mainly understood as a defined territory,5 permanent resident population, government, organized economy, and a circulation system. Subjective factors are state sovereignty and international recognition (Glassner 1996, 45–46). A state might be defined as a set of four types of institutions – political, security, administrative, and judiciary – with the ultimate aim of providing security for its population in exchange for resource extraction (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 7, 16). Furthermore, modern state is a primary component of the modern international system, with unique position on the international scene, with an ability of prime invention of the legal system and expected behavior patterns inside its sovereign territory. H. Spruyt (1994, 3) identifies modern state as being defined by an internal hierarchy and external autonomy, while another definition identifies the modern international system by consisting of “(…) disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed territoriality (…) (Ruggie 1993, 174)”  – in effect a modern Westphalian state. The Westphalian state is thus a manifestation of this modernity in the international system that arose due to particular conjuncture of social and political interests in Europe (Spruyt 1994, 18–19). Main features of the modern state are according to G. Sørensen (2005, 91–99) these: • Centralized system of rules based on administrative, police, and army institutions, confirmed by law order, and claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence • Presence of people on a given territory creating highly coherent community, connecting a nation with a state • The existence of a national economy that consists of all major sectors needed for its reproduction Additionally, P. D. Miller defines state in following words: “The state is a human institution that successfully invokes a theory of justice: (1) to claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, the right to expropriate resources and perform other functions at its discretion, and sovereign authority to make and enforce rules within given territory and over a given human population, and to serve human life; (2) by providing (professedly) public goods to at least some of the population in a contractlike exchange: goods for legitimacy (agreement to its claims). The 5  Sovereign state is territorially defined – there is no authority over other units (such as was the case with Empire or Church) (Spruyt 1994, 36).

2.2 Concepts

11

kind of goods that the state provides are cast in terms of the theory of justice that the state embodies, and the provision of just services constitute, in part, the state’s claim to legitimacy (Miller 2013, 52).” According to R. Cooper, three types of states are observable in the post-Cold War world: premodern, modern, and postmodern. Premodern states are fragile and no longer fulfill their primary functions, and this, consequently, aids the de facto reemergence of terra nullius on maps. The existence of these states destabilizes the world more than in the past since the areas of chaos are not only connected to the rest of the world due to the effects of the modern transportation capabilities but also enable a rise of potentially dangerous non-state actors.6 The modern state is a classical state as we know it inside a Westphalian system and is intimately connected to the institution of sovereignty. A postmodern system is defined by the collapse of a modern state toward a higher order. Postmodern part of the world is defined by a high level of openness and mutual interference. It is thus defined by the breaking down of the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual interference and surveillance, rejection of the use of force,7 growing irrelevance of borders, and security based on transparency and openness. A postmodern state is, furthermore, oriented on individuality rather than a collective. These three kinds of states must, however, coexist, and different territories may move from one type to another (Cooper 2000). Similar distinction is made by G. Sørensen. His description of a modern state was presented above. He, furthermore, distinguishes two other forms of states – postcolonial and postmodern. A postcolonial state is a type of state with weak institutional basis, without proper legal system, with low societal coherence, and without an appropriate national economy. Postmodern state is, on the other hand, a state based on multilevel governance, connected to the supra and international institutions, with identity of population shared between state, substate, and suprastate levels and with developed transnational economy (Sørensen 2005, 100–107). Another concept connected to state is the so-called state capture. Captured states are taken over by particular groups in order to provide with some (economic) benefit. We can observe this process appearing inside states that have weak institutions. This is (was) applicable to the postcommunist part of Eurasia (Wedel 2003) or Africa (e.g., in connection to the capture of Liberia by warlord Charles Taylor (Reno 1998)). In our work, state is defined as an entity recognized by international community as a state. This recognition is manifested by the acceptance of the entity into the United Nations.8

 For a discussion over the nature of premodern states, see also Reno (1998, 18–24).  Rejection of use of force is relevant only when discussing interaction between postmodern entities, not in relation to the modern and premodern entities. 8  “(…) UN membership is commonly viewed as the ‘birth certificate’ of a state” (Geldenhuys 2009, 22). 6 7

12

2  Conceptual Framework

2.2.2 Unrecognized State Understanding a concept of the unrecognized state9 is an important task since this category consists of geopolitically important set of entities which are on one side unrecognized by the international community but are also different from a typical non-state actor. These entities hold many names such as quasi-state (Kolstø 2006), de facto state (Pegg 1998), or almost state (Stanislawski 2008), but the characteristics of these differ only slightly.10 Unrecognized state as used in this book is an entity attempting to control specific territory and actively seeking international recognition and able to survive for protracted period of time, and to control significant portion of territory, it lays claim to with a capability to establish at least basic institutions11  – concrete length of time or size of the controlled territory is not defined as its setting is in this work seen as superfluous and artificial. Using this definition, we can find these unrecognized states on the globe in places like East Asia (Republic of China  – Taiwan), post-Soviet space (Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.), Middle East (Palestine), or Africa (Somaliland). This is also why Daesh (known also as Islamic State) is not an unrecognized state and was not one even throughout its period of territorial control. The movement never aimed to obtain international recognition and become part of the system. Additionally, it is important to point out that there is no a priori stark contrast between unrecognized states and failed states. Unrecognized states are not by definition an opposition to the failed states, and many of these entities are failing or failed or entirely dependent on a patron state (Pelczynska-Nalecz et al. 2008). Furthermore, the existence of unrecognized states and their prolonged survival highlight major changes in the international state structure. It is important to point out that the way the regional powers incorporated unrecognized states into their structure and connection of some unrecognized states to the system of international (economic or security) system and flows tells us about qualitatively new phase in the international system (Chorev 2011, 39). The ability of the international system to accommodate these entities is of vital importance for the argument about the new phase of the international (geo)political system.

9  Term is selected as, in the author’s view, most clearly describing the nature of these entities – to some level undertaking state functions (indigenously or with foreign support) and not receiving full recognition – the terminology is, as pointed out, disputed. When dealing with other authors’ description, the terminology will be unified as to follow the unrecognized state term coherently and avoid unnecessary terminological confusion. 10  For more information on terminological confusion, see Harvey and Stansfield (2011, 14–16) and Riegl (2010). 11  More precise definition is presented by S. Pegg who argues that unrecognized state “exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability, receives popular support, and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for an extended period of time(…)and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state” (Pegg 1998, 1).

2.2 Concepts

13

2.2.3 Non-State Actor In the light of definitions of a state and unrecognized state, we could easily leave a definition of the non-state actor as the remaining set of actors – actors which are neither recognized as states nor are trying to achieve such recognition on some given and reasonably controlled territory. D. Josselin and W. Wallace (2001, 3–4) point out the variety of the non-state actors and define those important for the world politics as being mostly autonomous from the central government, operating as a part of a network establishing transnational relations, and acting in a way that affects the political outcomes. For a better understanding of the term, let us now define distinct categories of non-state actors and present basic terminological lines between separate groups of these. The first distinction is between territorial and non-territorial actors. The former are trying to hold on to some concrete territory and to use it in achieving their goals no matter what these are. On the contrary, non-territorial actors attempt to promote their goals via mobility and global, or at least regional, focus and seek non-­ territorial goals. The following is the differentiation based on the aim of non-state actors: political, economic, ideological, societal, humanitarian, or other. Here we understand political goals as those aiming at gaining power, economic as increasing wealth, ideological as promoting ideology/religion, societal as attempting to change society, and humanitarian as targeting to help people in need. These goals are often interconnected as this brief overview is only a simplified model. Another distinction is between primarily violent and nonviolent non-state actors or pre-state and modern non-state actors with the former forming without conceptual dependence on the Westphalian state (e.g., nomads) (MacKay et al. 2014, 104).

2.2.4 Sovereignty Attempt to define sovereignty is another difficult task that needs to be performed on an inadequately short space. Sovereignty can be understood as an execution of power over population on a defined territory without any control from the outside. State power has forceful and peaceful segment. The first is a classic military, police, and other security apparatus,12 and the second is understood as ideological and economic power (Glassner 1996, 46). Sovereignty is, furthermore, a judicial tool of states which enables them to escape a rule from the outside. Sovereignty is territorially13 limited norm which lies as a fundamental principle of the modern state system. It provides successfully sovereign states with final political power over given community. Sovereignty is a status, a legal standing. This legal standing can be defined as constitutional independence  “…state is that kind of a human community, which holds on a defined territory (…) monopoly for the legitimate use of violence” (Weber 2009, 244). 13  For the discussion over the notion of territoriality in its different forms, see, for example, Elden (2013), Gottmann (1973), Kahler and Walter (2006) and Sack (1986). 12

14

2  Conceptual Framework

which is crucial for this sovereign status (Jackson 1999, 432–434; Sørensen 2005, 171–172). It is also important to distinguish between sovereignty as a legal principle and independence as a political reality that might but also might not be connected – e.g., a state might be sovereign but dependent, and non-state actor might lack sovereignty but be independent. Independence is a prerequisite of statehood while sovereignty is its consequence (Crawford 2007, 4–34). R.  Jackson distinguishes between two forms of sovereignty. The first is socalled imperial and is characterized by the rule of one state on a different state’s territory. This type of sovereignty was disregarded and ultimately made illegitimate by the notion of the immorality of the control of foreign territory and population. This claim led to the appearance of currently prevailing form of sovereignty – popular sovereignty, a notion that sovereignty lies in consent of the population. The final judge deciding who is and is not a sovereign state is still, however, the state system. The sovereignty of many states is thus not based on the principle mentioned above of popular sovereignty but rather on a historical, political, and economic context leading to their emergence (Jackson 1999, 438–449). Another division of sovereignty comes from A. James. He recognizes three broad branches of sovereignty – or rather ways how the sovereignty is understood. The first is the sovereignty in the sense of the state doing what it wants, whereas the second is connected to the delimitation of the decision-maker and the third to the sovereignty as an expression of the nation’s trust in state which fulfills its duties to the nation (James 1999, 457–459). Another distinction might be made between negative and positive sovereignty as presented by R. Jackson (1993). Negative sovereignty is a legal entitlement upon which the community of formally equal states rests. It is based on judicial independence and the principle of nonintervention. Negative sovereignty lies at the basis of the post-Second World War international law.14 On the other hand, positive sovereignty is a relative concept related to the capacities of states. Positive sovereignty enables states to use their independence. Unlike negative sovereignty, this status is not defined legally but sociologically, economically, etc. It might be stronger in relation to some states, and it is a sign of state’s overall development (Jackson 1993, 27–29). This distinction is crucial for an evolution of the internal situation in many weak states as the personal interest of their leaders was in many cases easier to follow under the disguise of negative (judicial) sovereignty than in case these actors acted as non-state actors (Reno 1998, 222). Finally, it is helpful to tackle the issue of sovereignty from the political-­ philosophical point of view to get fuller picture of the ideas characterizing the term. For the needs of this work, only a few major ideas that appeared in a sphere of political philosophy are presented. First, there is an issue of legal adoption. This is one of the important issues discussed in the famous T. Hobbes’ Leviathan. For him “(…) the authority of the law (…) lies only in command of the sovereign” (Hobbes 2009, 190) and “(i)n all the states, the only legislator is sovereign, be it one person like in monarchy, or a gathering of people as in democracy or aristocracy” (Hobbes 2009, 14

 See also Reno (1998, 7–9).

2.2 Concepts

15

184). But not only law adoption defines sovereign. As C.  Schmitt famously presented: “Sovereign is he, who declares a state of emergency” (Schmitt 2012, 9). Schmitt furthermore defines sovereignty as “(…)the highest, non-derived power of the leader(…)” (Schmitt 2012, 9) and “(s)sovereign stands outside the normally valid law order while still belonging to it by holding the power to decide, when the constitution can be suspended in toto” (Schmitt 2012, 10). For C. Schmitt, the sovereignty is thus “(…)not a monopoly of coercion or rule, but rather a monopoly of decision(…)” with “(…)a monopoly of that last decision” (Schmitt 2012, 15). Last, but not least, it is important to point at the observation made by H. Arendt: “Amount of the violence disposable for a certain state does not have to be a reliable indicator of a power of that country, neither a reliable safeguard against its destruction by a much weaker and smaller power” (Arendt 2004, 12). Consequently, the power of the sovereign (or in this instance any other actor) is not directly derived from the amount of violence it uses. The more violent the actor needs to use, the less of actual power it holds (Arendt 2004). When discussing sovereignty in the following text,15 we will understand the term as the ability of a state to create an internal order, be independent in its decisions in domestic and foreign policy, and maintain means of provision of security. It is important to point out that any restrictions of the decision-making must be voluntary. Otherwise, it challenges the state’s sovereignty – e.g., voluntary accession to the defense alliance is not a breach while foreign occupation is. Factors challenging states’ sovereignty16 are thus the following: inability of a state to provide its law on the whole territory, inability to maintain order and promote its decisions on the entire territory, dependence on the external actors, and the constant high level of use of violence against its population to stay in power.

2.2.5 Terra Nullius and Black Spots Before approaching the systemic definitions, it is important to deal with two seemingly interconnected geopolitical phenomena.17 The first is so-called terra nullius. The term terra nullius can be best understood as a portion of land out of control of any political actor. These areas were historically quite widespread, but their number significantly decreased in the nineteenth and twentieth century due to the rapid rise of global population and technological and infrastructure developments. Nowadays they are mostly connected to the areas defined by harsh geography (largest terra nullius is the continent of Antarctica) and state failure. Out of  This is, naturally, not a case in parts where other authors’ ideas are presented.  J. Crawford in this respect divides formal (where power over territory of state is given to separate authority) and actual independence (degree of actual governmental power). They differ in factors that are (not) considered as a breach of the independence and in their impact upon the state (Crawford 2007, 62–88). 17  This work is not dealing with definitions of other forms of anomalous geopolitical units like states-within-states or insurgent states as these are not directly referred to throughout the text. 15 16

16

2  Conceptual Framework

Antarctica, all portions of land are claimed by some state structure18 but not all of this land is controlled efficiently, and effective power projection is in many times virtually impossible (deserts, high mountain ranges, etc.). Terra nullius is thus a portion of land with no (state) power efficiently controlling it. Terra nullius is a land without control. On the contrary, black spots are areas which are out of the control of the state institutions which nominally provide sovereign power over them; however, they are not without any authority. These areas are usually “hidden,” meaning that organizations that control them are not trying to bring international attention upon themselves. These territories are thus usually controlled by the international criminal groups or terrorist organizations, and they provide them with safe haven. These black spots are usually hardly penetrable and constantly remain out of the reach of the state power. Black spots are dominated by criminal and illegal activities. These black spots might thus create an illegal challenge to a state in the form of the outlaw communities or criminal entity (Stanislawski 2008, 366, 368–9).19 Black spots are thus areas out of state control which remain hardly accessible and try to stay out of the international radar due to the illegality of the activities of the actor(s) controlling them.

2.3

Systemic Development

2.3.1 Medieval System European medieval system came into existence as a consequence of the fall of Pax Romana in the fifth century. European landscape was dominated by the barbaric tribes which made political and social environment more chaotic compared to the era of the Roman dominance. Newly established states faced instability due to their incapability to properly settle and govern newly acquired local population – kingdoms which did not successfully integrate locals usually disintegrated and vanished. This led to the incorporation of some basic properties of Roman law and Roman structure which proved to be rather effective. It is important to realize that during the Middle Ages we cannot speak about the modern state. The importance of personal contacts was much more important than an abstract idea of state/kingdom. The medieval state and society are basically identical – there was no widespread  With minor exceptions like small part of the Croatian-Serbian border where the so-called Liberland was proclaimed. 19  Stanislawski uses definition of black spots as follows: “(…) Black Spots constitute areas that are neither recognized by the international community nor are they under the true governmental control of the host states; they remain in the grey area between formal international recognition and semi-formal central control. On international security maps, they often are reflected as demonstrating that government control and authority are either uncertain, incomplete, or non-existent and that the internal dynamics concerning what goes on in these areas are not entirely known to the outside world. What is known is that some internal dynamics exist, so they are not empty or blank spaces, which might suggest a form of vacuum in that location. Nor are they ‘ungoverned’” (Stanislawski 2008, 369). 18

2.3  Systemic Development

17

sense of impersonal institution, and there is a vast variety of contacts on both vertical (feudal20) and horizontal level. On the lowest societal level, we can observe the emergence of neighborhood communities primarily based on the common use of the agricultural soil and other means of living. These units were primarily territorial (Müller 2011a, 317–329; Contamine 2004, 15–49). Another factor observable was the growing independence of cities,21 which was later formally recognized as the city councils were created. Power of cities was important and visible especially during the times of crisis.22 Moreover the higher level of local affinity and the importance of the local environment for the people were mirroring in the creation of different local communities or guilds (Herold 2011, 291–318; Müller 2011a, 317–325) – the local identities and interests were by the time the most important ones (Strayer 1970, 14). Medieval Europe thus consisted of many mutually interconnected societies with different competencies, aims, and claims. Another important factor of the medieval European state is the presence of king on the top of a hierarchy. The state was still understood as a personal belonging of the king.23 The power of an individual, however, was not only important for the secular powers but even for the Church. For example, appearance of weak popes enabled the existence of the Church schism (Müller 2011a, 330–403). The importance of a strong monarch was crucial for the strength of a medieval state. We can see, for example, that after the end of the reign of Charles le Magne, vast and robust Frank Empire simply crumbled. This era can be furthermore seen as an example of unorganized medieval system with many small units competing with each other, leaving no possibility for an effective rule over them. Another factor characterizing medieval system is the feudal system which led to the establishment of feudal dominions so interconnected and fragmented that in some periods vast territories were, again, practically uncontrollable (Müller 2011a, 317–329). The map of Europe during the Middle Ages was more a chaotic mixture of different personal and collective governments territorially overlapping each other than a clear system of territorially based units as we know it from the post-1648 maps (Jackson 1999, 435–438; Spruyt 1994, 12). The system, moreover, lacked a monopoly on coercive force (Spruyt 1994, 12). On the other hand, in many ways church hierarchy was able to work as a unifying element. The Church was also based on a territorial principle of dioceses, while state was until the beginning of the eleventh century mostly defined by its population24 (Müller 2011a, 367–403). State and Church were on the one hand still more resembling each other in a structure while on the other were fighting over who will  With feudals being under multiple loyalties (Spruyt 1994, 38–39).  The most important city-community was probably the Hanseatic League, while the most prominent city-states laid in contemporary Italy. 22  For example, the power of cities during the Hussite Revolution in Bohemia (Herold 2011, 291–318). 23  As noted earlier when the development of the understanding of the word state was described. 24  J. Grygiel presents importance of control over population in opposition to control of land as one of the defining factors of medieval system (Grygiel 2013, 7–9). Empire can also be understood as a spiritual and military authority inside vaguely defined boundaries (Spruyt 1994, 51). 20 21

18

2  Conceptual Framework

receive the major power in the contemporary society. Even before the Investiture Contest (despite larger resemblance of the two powers compared to post-Investiture Conflict era (Spruyt 1994, 47)), there was a struggle present between religious and secular power over the establishment of the supreme authority based on a Roman legacy. This led to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire on one side and the universal Church structure on the other25 (Müller 2011a, 317–403; Müller 2011b, 447– 471). By 1300, the medieval state began institutionalization and centralization of its powers – mainly in England and France and in legal and economic domains (Strayer 1970, 3–56). Another important factor is a power of non-state and non-Church actors. As S. Sousedlík writes: “(…)due to the weakness of the central power, war could have been quite easily waged by persons or groups(…)called private” (Sousedlík 2011, 538). Furthermore, with the growth of the wealth and power of the cities, these cities were able to create strong alliances which were able to oppose the central power effectively. Popular movements challenging legitimacy of both monarchy and Catholic Church emerged, and even the importance and power of independent universities arose (Žemla and Dostál 2011, 94–95). Actors relevant for “international” situation of medieval Europe were multiple – both territorial and mobile – and the means of military conduct were cheap and easily accessible (Grygiel 2013, 5–7), so the whole situation in Europe was more volatile. The nature of the medieval system was not primarily territorial but dominated by the existing personal ties (Taylor 1994, 152). To sum up, the Western and Central European Middle Ages were characterized by the struggle between the universal claims26 of the secular Empire27 and the Catholic Church, complicated structure of the territorial control by feudal masters, and the vast power of smaller actors. Society was strongly territorially determined with the exception of certain parts of elite with religious, secular, and university background. The private violence was nothing extraordinary, and during significant periods of time, vast territories were effectively ungoverned. Furthermore, the borders of these different actors did not necessarily respect those of others, so even those actors with some sense of territoriality overlapped each other’s claims, and population could have been quite easily caught in a system of multiple identity and loyalty. This was even more problematic due to the presence of the clashing territorial units loyal to a kingdom and the Church. It is important to point out that despite the fact that the state was in 1300 the comparatively strongest political form present in Europe, it remained rather weak by today’s standards (Strayer 1970, 57). The shift from this medieval system to the Westphalian system presented in the next subchapter was caused by some conditions specific to the European  We may observe that in an attempt to create a universal empire, both sides failed. Holy Roman Empire reduced its claims over German “nation” only (Müller 2011a, 2011b), and Catholic Church was in its claims held back by reformation and spread of Protestantism. 26  One of the main transformations between medieval and modern political system is in “transition from the medieval universality founded on the unity of faith to the coexistence of a multiplicity of sovereign states based on the diversity of geography and of religion (...)” (Gottmann 1973, 43). 27  “Secular arm of God” (Spruyt 1994, 53). 25

2.3  Systemic Development

19

environment. In 1500, Europe was ethnically and socially more homogenous compared to the rest of the world; society was stratified among peasantry, landlords, and nobility; urbanization levels were growing; important theories of sovereignty were already created; ad hoc assemblies begun to emerge; and everyone had, at least nominally, at least one king (Tilly 1975, 17–21). These conditions were important prerequisites for creation of European nation states, but the centralizing efforts of kings were opposed not only by rivals (noblemen, bishops) but even by local population which was subjugated by the combination of positive incentives and ruthless crushing of rebellions (Tilly 1975, 22–24; Mampilly 2011, 31–34). The formation of modern state was, furthermore, not the only possibility for the political development in Europe  – challenging institutions contain political federation or empire, theocratic federation, trading network, or feudal structure (Tilly 1975, 26) with other possible alternatives in independent city communes or urban leagues (Curtis 2016, 90; Spruyt 1994). These entities established themselves as adaptations to the shifts in the social, political, and economic structure of Europe and established a basis for the growth of the sovereign state (Spruyt 1994, 61–63). They also adapted their internal methods of controlling population that allowed them to become more efficient (Foucault 2009) – additional necessary step toward the Westphalian mode of organization of the political map. During the creation of the Westphalian system (1500–1900), the majority of the states simply died and disappeared. Survivability of a state in Europe was determined by its access to resources, protected position in time and space, availability of political entrepreneurs, success in wars, relative homogeneity, and strong relations between state and landowners (with the possibility of one factor supplementing for another) (Tilly 1975, 40–41) in relation to the, by then, unparalleled advantage in mobilizing social resources (Spruyt 1994, 185). The transformation toward modern state system was thus characterized by a change into an increasingly more contiguous pattern of territories. This was marked by the establishment of the principle of noninterference and decline of the last powers of the Church and the Empire (Taylor 1994, 153). This development, however, was not true for the entire globe. As a large number of states came into being after the Second World War, the new principles of state recognition abandoning the de facto statehood prerequisite and focusing on importance of the territorial integrity of even artificial postcolonial states enabled foundation of many states that, unlike states in Tilly’s argument (meaning mainly states located in Europe and Americas), were unable to control their own territory (Fabry 2010, 12–13). Following C. Tilly’s argument, we must mention another important transformation that took place during eighteenth and nineteenth century when states gradually abolished the utilization of the non-state violence. Use of the non-state violence was blurring boundaries between state and non-state authority, political and economic domain, and domestic and international realms (Thomson 1996, 19). The transitional period between the medieval and modern state system was characterized by the utilization of private violence, hiring of foreigners to the armies, and existence of mercantile companies, all with many powers and ability to utilize a legitimate use of violence (Thomson 1996, 31–2). With the emergence of the modern national

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state, armed forces were becoming less dependent on mercenaries bought abroad and more dependent on popular opinion (Thomson 1996, 59). Despite the fact that there was no concentrated effort to forbid non-state violence, states were continually able to banish most of the practices that were present between the 1600s and 1800s as their interests were endangered. This process was both a sequence of unrelated actions against concrete non-state actors and progressive evolution in the state system (Thomson 1996, 105, 145). Control of non-state violence thus became a newly acquired function of the modern state. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the use of non-state violence can no longer be used openly, and the states might use it only in secrecy as the practice is widely condemned as the state is perceived as the only legitimate source of violence and it can use this right only through its legitimate institutions (Thomson 1996, 149–53). The practice is thus mainly present in the so-called proxy wars and utilization of these actors as proxies inside many conflicts (Mumford 2013). At this point, we can observe the first division that will become important for the further text. As part of the world went through the specific process of development that led to the Westphalian organization of political space, other parts did not. This holds many reasons that are contextual for the specific regions. So as for the part of the global communities, we can progress with the discussion over the Westphalian evolution of the political institutions; others took different direction. This will be more explained in the discussion over the Chaotic Anarchy part of the globe.

2.3.2 Westphalian System We have discussed the nature of the Middle Ages and the main events that led to its gradual transformation into the Westphalian or modern global system. Let us continue with a description of the main factors of this newly emerged global order. First, it is useful to read a quote from H. Bull who analyzed the basics of the modern international system: “The starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population. On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty (…) (o)n the other hand, they asset what may be called external sovereignty (…)” (Bull 1977, 8). As we can see, the key features of the Westphalian system are sovereignty, territoriality, and state. States interact with each other in the international domain and set different goals. These goals are not necessarily political as are the actions taken in relation to another state. States are, furthermore, internationally active in varying degree  – from active interference to isolation (Morgenthau 1993, 29–30). Fundamental principle of the international relations under Westphalia is the balance of power among sovereign states (Morgenthau 1993, 183). Balancing can be achieved by several strategies (Morgenthau 1993, 194–212), but it is unnecessary to

2.3  Systemic Development

21

discuss them at this place and in context of this work. We can, furthermore, differentiate states in their capabilities which enable them to equip these different strategies – these capabilities are political, economic, military, etc. (Waltz 1979, 131) – and even set up a hierarchical order of powers (Cohen 2014). The Westphalian system is based on an existence of sovereign states which are independent in their decision-making. The system is decentralized, and no formal hierarchy exists. The anarchy in the relations among the states is the basic principle of functioning of this system. Each state is responsible for its survival and other actions on domestic or international level. Essential characteristic of every state toward the system is its relative power which delimits the scope of its respective area of interest. The balance of this system then lies in balancing of the power among the individual states (Kovářová 2012, 39–41). Westphalia defined state as a legitimate member of the European and, later of a global, international politics. The principle of sovereignty started to be the most important attribute of an international actor, and up to nowadays, any international organization aims primarily on the realm of states in a definition of its membership (Philpott 1999, 578–582). For R.  Cooper, the main difference between the European medieval and Westphalian system is its focus – medieval on universal Christendom and Westphalian on a balance of power among modern states (Cooper 2000, 10–14). The Westphalian system destroyed the ambiguous and intermediary forms of authority (under universal claims) and brought in the principle of sovereignty as opposed to the division of power in the Middle Ages (Keating 2001, 11, 13). An important feature of the modern state system is its statist and territorial nature of the use of violence – in comparison with the previous eras, it is democratized, demarketized, and territorialized (Thomson 1996, 4). The Westphalian system is characterized by two major characteristics  – balance of power and unification of power which lies at the core of the system. Balancing was guided to the perfection by the creation of bipolar system where both actors were able to destroy the opponent due to the existence of the enormous number of nuclear weapons and their carriers. Unification of power was in effect ended by this development (van Creveld 2000). Impossibility to break the balance and to unify the power militarily led to the economic and cultural warfare and ultimately to the decay of the Westphalian system which now, as the argument stands, undergoes yet another transformation. The Westphalian state system is, furthermore, challenged by stateless nationalism, globalization, and transnational integration. The contemporary world is characterized by the spread of modern means of communication, effects of globalization, and decline of a nation-state, and we may observe that multiple territorial identities and systems of action coexist with the alternatives that may be found in the past (Keating 2001, 1, 16, 21). “The nation state as we have known it since the nineteenth century is merely one way of organizing the polity, and changes in the relationship among territory, identity, political institutions, and function may open new possibilities for the future (…). Nationality as a form of collective identity is neither more nor less ‘natural’ than others, and is constantly made and remade in the course of political experience” (Keating 2001, 2).

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2.3.3 Globalization Globalization28 is a complex process with many meanings for the different authors and in different contexts. The process came in the past centuries through dramatic changes (Zinkina et al. 2019; Hall 2018). It can be defined as positive or negative depending on whether one is gaining or losing from it, and authors usually focus only on one specific part or aspect of globalization (economy, culture, politics, security, health risks, etc.) (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). As pointed out by Derruder and Taylor (2020, 2), it can be sequenced into three phases – first being the final domination of the state system on the global stage, the second following the Second World War aiding the global corporations to flourish, and third being connected to the development of the modern communication and information technologies. Despite the complexity and multisectored nature of the process, N.  Al-Rodhan proposes a definition: “Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities” (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Furthermore, as pointed out by W. Robinson, there are many schools of thought dealing with the issue, but despite the substantial disagreements, there are three factors these authors can agree on – the fact that pace of social change has changed dramatically in later decades of the twentieth century, that the process is connected to increasing connectivity among people, and that it is multidimensional (Robinson 2008, 126–7). It is also the latest stage of spatial expansion of capitalist system (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005, 192). In the following text, we will specify our use of term globalization as we will usually be interested in only some part of the process. Importantly as we deal with geopolitical framing of the neomedieval theory, we follow the work of, among others, M. Kahler and B. F. Walter who point out that despite the fact that globalization led to significant changes in our thinking of territoriality, it did not diminish human attachment to territory or its importance for the human society (Kahler and Walter 2006, 19). Yet again, it is important to point out that the uneven effects of globalization have a direct impact upon the organization of the political space. While parts of the world are shielding themselves from the effects of the connectivity on the nature of the organization of the political map, others are more opened to its effect. This again, similarly to the shift to the Westphalian type of organization of the political map, creates unevenness inside the development of the political map. This type of evolution will become important for the discussion over the Durable Disorder part of the neomedieval spectrum.

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 For a discussion over globalization, see also Khanna (2016).

3

New Middle Ages

The next chapter is dedicated to the development of the theoretical framework of the work. New Middle Ages as a theory is gaining prominence due to the fact that it offers a systematic alternative to the Westphalian understanding of the world system in a period when we can observe many exceptions from the Westphalian understanding of the international politics. In the following text, the work will first deal with the theoretical development of the theory as it occurred in the literature of the past four decades. Consequently, the chapter brings up some important observations regarding the decay of state-centric system and rise of non-state actors that are crucial for the subsequent analysis. Afterward, the argument moves to the description and delimitation of Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy scenarios as challenging geopolitical environments significantly different from the currently accepted Westphalian norm.

3.1

Hedley Bull and the Birth of Neomedievalism

Although the first author to present the term New Middle Ages in the international relations field1 was A. Wolfers, the proper delimitation of the concept was firstly adequately introduced by H. Bull in his The Anarchical Society. At first, the concept was somewhat shallow, but in the next reprints, Bull turned the scheme into a properly developed alternative to the Westphalian system. The overview of the “neomedieval literature” must thus begin by presenting Bull’s ideas about the neomedieval system. H.  Bull introduces the New Middle Ages as one of the alternatives to the Westphalian system despite the fact that he himself does not believe that such a 1  The term New Middle Ages is presented in other fields like philosophy (e.g., Berdajev 2004) or law (e.g., Holsinger 2007), and the book will reflect these works only to the extent they are relevant for the study of the geopolitical setting.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_3

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concept will come into existence. Neomedieval system is in his opinion defined by a qualitative change in the state system – the disintegration of states being more than just a fragmentation of the political map ending in the creation of the new sovereign states (Bull 2002, 257–258). Thus, the establishment of the Czech Republic and Slovakia out of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was entirely Westphalian development, while disintegration of countries like Somalia, Yemen, or Pakistan is turning these areas into the qualitatively new position. Second, the neomedieval order requires establishment of alternative universal pillars comparable to the medieval Christendom as a new universal actor. These pillars would be its functional secular alternative sharing power with lower overlapping entities struggling with each other for power. Finally, neomedievalism would be aided by the process of regionalism which further weakens the state system (Bull 2002, 245–246). H. Bull furthermore defined five factors which are necessary for the introduction of the neomedieval order. These features are the regional integration of states; disintegration of states; the restoration of private international violence; the importance of transnational organizations; and the technological unification of the world (Bull 2002, 254–266). As these points constitute the original principles of neomedievalism, we will describe them in more detail.

3.1.1 Regional Integration of States The first criterion consists of the wide spread of regional bodies across the globe. For H.  Bull, the first such important regional organization is the European Community. He, however, does not connect the strengthening of regional bodies with the issue of the loss of sovereignty as states give up their powers to the external bodies willingly. For Bull’s neomedievalism the shift of the identification of their population toward the inter-/supra-state body is the much important factor of regional integration. In this respect, states might be free to leave the organization, but their population might gain strong affection toward the new political unit, thus weakening the power of states. While (soft) power politics inside the regional bodies is not overcome, countries might in time become less relevant as the prime target of identification for its population (Bull 2002, 255–257).

3.1.2 Disintegration of States As noted earlier, a disintegration of states is one of the prime prerequisites of the neomedieval system. However, this disintegration must be qualitatively changing the mode of governance of the given territory (Bull 2002, 257–258). This means that the dissolution of the state (e.g., the dissolution of Pakistan in 1971) does not constitute an example of this disintegration, while crumbling of the capabilities of the Somalian state to govern its territory does. Disintegration of states is clearly observable in the contemporary world filled with many failed states (e.g., Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Syria), unrecognized states

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(e.g., Transnistria, Somaliland, South Ossetia), territorial non-state actors (e.g., Afghan Taliban, pre-2017 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Hezbollah), and other non-state challengers to the state sovereignty and system as such (e.g., Al-Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Boko Haram, Mexican narco-­ cartels, etc.).

3.1.3 Restoration of Private Violence By private violence, H. Bull means violence entirely disconnected from the control or oversight by the institution of the state. Thus, the use of force by an international organization, for example, the United Nations, is not private because the means of violence and military personnel are directly connected to and provided by states. Furthermore, H. Bull distinguishes between private violence approved by (part of) the international community aiming at a creation of the new state or regime change inside set border (e.g., Kurdish struggle against Daesh)2 and actors who use the force illegitimately such as pirate or terrorist groups (e.g., Al-Shabaab) (Bull 2002, 258–260). The number of violent non-state actors rises, and the means of violence among the non-state actors are spreading. This objectively decreases some states’ ability to provide basic functions as security to their population. In fact, even some advanced modern armies use private contractors to fulfill some of the missions these armies are tasked to do (e.g., private contractors in Iraq during the US occupation). The spread of arms still more resembles their availability during the Middle Ages (Grygiel 2013).3

3.1.4 Transnational Organizations As the transnational organizations relevant for the observation of the shift to the new medievalism, H. Bull counts multinational organizations; political movements; nongovernmental organizations; religious organizations; intergovernmental organizations; and others. These organizations usually aim at goals which explicitly or implicitly disregard state borders as they try to operate out of the state control. All of these organizations are, however, in case a state holds sufficient power, dependent on the state’s will. It is usually the state that creates a legal environment, provides security, or decides whether or not to let the organization inside its territory (Bull 2002, 260–263). This importance of state can be, nevertheless, decreased by both decaying power of states and growing power of non-state actors and organizations – more on this later.

2  Here we can add actors used by a state against another one in a proxy warfare (e.g., Russian troops in Ukraine in 2014–2015). 3  For more information on the private security corporations’ power, see, for example, Rothkopf (2008, 138–163).

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3.1.5 Technological Unification of the World Finally, H. Bull presents the technological unification of the world as a necessary condition for the emergence of the New Middle Ages. Unification virtually shrinks the world establishing a so-called global village while simultaneously creating new frictions and issues. This larger closeness of interconnected population thus leads to further fragmentations that develop new identities and interest groups that are present in yet another complication of an already complex structure (Bull 2002, 263–266).

3.2

Post-Cold War Reincarnation

The end of the Cold War, crumbling of the bipolar system, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led many authors to change their view of the international politics and offer different visions of the future. Among theories of unipolarism, end of history, or clash of civilizations, an idea of neomedieval world setting started to gain prominence. The neomedieval reading of the international system – initially refused as improbable even by H.  Bull himself  – begun to spur intellectual interest as a number of civil conflicts, failed states, and non-state actors with actual economic or political power in their region grew. Just looking at the conflicts in places like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Afghanistan, it is easy to understand the reasoning behind the visions of incoming instability and shift in the international system toward lower stability. In the following subchapter, works of some of the authors that directly dealt with the issue of neomedievalism are discussed. The purpose of this chapter is not to present works of all the authors who dealt with the theory (as this list would be likely incomplete anyway and unnecessarily long) but to display all the main intellectual streams connected to the New Middle Ages as an international relations and geopolitical theory.

3.2.1 Jörg Friedrichs The first author to be mentioned in this section is J.  Friedrichs. In his 2001 The Meaning of New Medievalism, the author presented the idea that might be called “historical neomedievalism.” For J.  Friedrichs the comparison of the European Middle Ages and the New Middle Ages is essential: “For the present purpose, medievalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims. Thus, the Middle Ages were characterized by a highly fragmented and decentralized network of sociopolitical relationships, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the Empire and the Church. Analogously, the post-international world is characterized by a complicated web of societal identities, held together by the antagonistic organizational claims of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy” (Friedrichs 2001, 475). J. Friedrichs dismisses the utility of modern international relations’ theories for an understanding the post-Cold War system and rather

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presents neomedieval order4 as much more useful analytical tool to grasp the international politics. Mainstream ideas about the working of the global system (statecentric, weakening through globalization, split across internal lines) are in his opinion problematic as he offers an alternative view in neomedievalism (Friedrichs 2001, 477–481). In his concept, the Westphalian system is to be ended (it is not a final state of international politics), and a new system is about to replace it. Neomedievalism can explain the competing developments of fragmentation and globalization. Another important factor vital for the neomedieval explanation is a shift of personal allegiance toward distinct non-state objects. This process will create a structure of multiple loyalties. J.  Friedrichs furthermore alters the original Bull’s idea by adding duality of competing claims (as inspired by the medieval European system) and thus “stabilizes” the whole system. These universal claims are connected to the institution of a nation-state system and a transnational market economy which are perceived as powerful enough to effectively counterbalance each other and bring some relative stability into the whole system (Friedrichs 2001, 481–486). Given this premise, the author does not see the neomedieval system as something horrific, as he points out, “equation of the Middle Ages with the Hobbesian state of nature is wrong” (Friedrichs 2001, 485). The system will not be as rationalized as the modern state system, but it will not necessarily lead to the emergence of bellum omnium contra omnes situation. For the comprehension of Friedrich’s theory, it is furthermore important to understand his ideas about the two main powers in the New Middle Ages  – nation-state system and the transnational market economy5 (Friedrichs 2001, 485–486). The author calls the first pillar of the structure a political universalism. State system is based on the existence of sovereign units in formally equal position in relation to the international law. This model has been accepted worldwide, and we might observe worldwide establishment of units trying to, at least formally, fit into the international community. This system is self-preserving and survives by establishing a perception of the unique role the state plays in the maintenance of order and independent action on the international level. This system thus creates units of political action which seek control of territory, sovereignty, and place in the international system (Friedrichs 2001, 486–488). On the other side, we will find the so-­ called economic universalism. Friedrichs points out that the allocation of capital and production is still more determined by the private non-territorial actors. The economic liberalism of the transnational market leads to the creation of strong actors which can interfere into the political sphere. By this process, a class of businessmen promoting free trade can ignore state borders and is capable of challenging the power of a state just by using its production potential. Anyway, Friedrichs points out that even though these two pillars are competing, they remain interdependent and must coexist (Friedrichs 2001, 488–491). J. Friedrichs, furthermore, adds third balancing half-pillar – society – into the mix.  Resemblance of some features of the post-bipolar system to those of the European Middle Ages.  For a discussion on the resemblance of the medieval Church and post-Cold War Market, see also Reno (1998, 72–73). 4 5

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These three realms create the above-presented system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties, but they each work on a different principle: the state as a voice of popular decisions, the market as a holder of the means for the superior efficiency, and the society as a promoter of substantial values. As the New Middle Ages does not create any ultimate authority, it is necessary that each of these spheres sticks to its targets and advantages. For the author these are – society’s attempt to protect itself from being overcome by both other pillars – state control and market; economy’s effort to remain independent and not being used by states for their political targets; and finally states’ attempt to keep their political power and stay alive and as powerful as possible between economy’s universalism and societal particularism. Friedrichs points out that nowadays the leverage is inclined toward a more immense power of the market over the remaining two, but this balance can be in future altered (Friedrichs 2001, 491–493). J. Friedrich’s commonalities between the medieval and neomedieval system thus include system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties held together by two antagonistic forces – church, empire, or state, and market; existence of dominant class which is in the center of each of the systems – feudal aristocracy, or international policymakers and bureaucrats; characterization of both church6 and market by a high level of spatial and social mobility; propagation of both antagonistic claims by its own set of intellectuals and writers; and the inability of both of the challenging universal claims to prevail (Friedrichs 2001, 492).

3.2.2 Philip Cerny P. Cerny is another author who in his work reflected upon the theory of neomedievalism. Cerny points out the fact that state as an institution is in many functions replaced by non-state actors and that population is increasingly concerned about transnational issues. States, furthermore, increasingly fail in the provision of security as a primary good they were created to grant. Traditional balance of power logic is in decay as the most powerful weapons available – thermonuclear weapons – are useless in a low-intensity conflict such as tribal or religious clashes or in countering terrorism or drug trade. The author presents globalization as the main cause of the change in the international system – globalization that was enabled by states but threatens to destroy the state system. This globalization, however, does not create the unified world but instead increases interaction among different groups around the globe. A state is not diminished altogether and remains an important actor providing social net and welfare support while implementing regulations on the international level. In the neomedieval world, states will not lose their place altogether, but their legitimacy will be contested by a number of transnational organizations which can ignore state boundaries and are more fluid in their activities (Cerny 1998). 6  Despite the fact that both hold important territorial dimension, for the case of the Church, see Sack (1986, 92–126).

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P.  Cerny names a few major features which are or will be significant for the neomedieval world – the existence of competing organizations with overlapping jurisdictions; appearance of much more fluid territorial boundaries; alienation between virtual global cities and fragmented hinterlands; increased inequality between those able to use the opportunities present from higher mobility and those who cannot; system of multiple and fragmented loyalties and identities; attempts to contest property rights and legal boundaries; and spread of areas of lawlessness. The author calls the New Middle Ages a Durable Disorder, meaning that the current, at least formally, orderly arranged world will become much more unstable but that this development will not lead to total chaos. The new system will contest a right to life of every political, economic, and social organization and will lead to the strengthening of the survival of the fittest scenario.7 P.  Cerny, same as the authors above, considers the future world as a system with an overlapping set of different organizations. States will play just a role of “one among many” in the international politics. The whole system will be able to survive because there will be no strong enough exogenous pressure on it. There is a possibility that the importance of virtual spaces will overcome the significance of actual territorial ones. People will remain localized on the microlevel, but the principle of physical territoriality itself will be still less important. This emerging system cannot, according to P. Cerny, be possibly captured by a single holistic vision and by no collective identity (Cerny 1998).

3.2.3 Stephen Kobrin S. Kobrin presents the transition from medieval system to the modern one as characterized by territorialization of politics and by replacement of overlapping vertical hierarchies by horizontal geographically defined sovereign states. Postmodern world is similarly characterized by interconnectivity and growing irrelevance of the geography due to the spread of cyberspace and global market. Technological evolution, furthermore, leads to the establishment of the global civil society united by unregulated and non-territorial cyberspace. This non-territorial identity leads to the emergence of multiple identities and transnational elites. Another effect of the neomedieval setting is the privatization of public services (Kobrin 1998). S. Kobrin thus focuses on the role of cyberspace in the emergence of the neomedieval setting, and despite some in today’s perspective hardly justifiable claims present an impact of the cyber-domain on the nature of international politics.8

7  It is important that Cerny does not use the social Darwinist term survival of the strongest but rather the classical thesis about the survival of the fittest and thus gives a chance for smaller units to survive by adaptation. For the debate on the adaptation of the social institutions, see also Spruyt (1994). 8  Cyberspace is not entirely unregulated, and territorialisation is also possible as evident from the Chinese, Turkish, or Russian censorship attempts. For another discussion over the role of cyberspace on the international system, see also Nye (2011, 113–151).

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3.2.4 Jan Zielonka J. Zielonka dealt with the concept of neomedievalism in relation to the process of the European integration. He points out that the linear concept of borders was not known in the Middle Ages as borders were understood more like zones than lines. Similarly, administrative, economic, military, and cultural borders rarely overlapped unlike the Westphalian system where these borders usually follow state borders (Zielonka 2007, 3–4). Zielonka, furthermore, points out that throughout history of the modern era, the globe was filled by many types of states. These states turned into a centerpiece of the Westphalian system and are hierarchical with one center of authority. Growth in the importance of the territorial dimension was enabled by the technological advances which allowed states to control large regions. Despite the seeming homogeneity of the Westphalian system, it was always challenged by irregular entities. The point is that the medieval system was characterized by shared and fragmented authority. Central authority was inexistent and competing network of clients was in the center of the system. Multiple allegiances were common and public authority was disunited and privatized. Jurisdiction over different areas was fragmented and overlapping. Government was, furthermore, multiplied by the existence of cities with strong guilds. Territorial “sovereignty” was usually supplemented by the universal authority of the emperor and the pope. Cultural identity was not connected to the nation – which did not exist – but to the network of authority. Tasks were not given to state  – they were functionally, rather than territorially, divided (Zielonka 2007, 9–11).9

9  “New medievalism symbolizes a break with the Westphalian era, and the failure of its modernist institutional embodiment: the EU. However, it does not suggest a ‘back to the future’ scenario with a computerized version of the Middle Ages. It only suggests that the future structure and exercise of political authority will resemble the medieval model more than the Westphalian one. The latter is about concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty and clear-cut identity. The former is about overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, differentiated institutional arrangements and multiple identities. The latter is about fixed and relatively hard external border lines, while the former is about fuzzy borders with ample opportunity for entrance and exit. The latter is about centrally regulated redistribution within a closed national or European system. The former is about redistribution based on different types of solidarity between various transnational networks. The latter is about strict rules, commands and penalties, while the former is about bargaining, flexible arrangements and incentives. Nor does new medievalism mean the death of European nation-states; rather it implies further transformation of these states and the increased importance of other polities, be they large cities or regions. NGOs will also grow in importance, some of them defending certain values such as environmental or minority rights, while others will represent corporate or consumer interests. The result will be a multiplication of various hybrid institutional arrangements, and increased plurality of political allegiances. This is a trend that has been noted by academics for some time. The expected fall of the EU will only accelerate it and make it more pronounced. In some fields, such as defence, states may well remain the principal actors, but in other fields, such as market regulation, social policy or internal security, numerous local or transnational actors, private or public or mixed, will have a chance to gain in importance. Even democracy is likely to be less territorial with the media and NGOs monitoring politicians across Europe’s borders more skilfully than national parliaments” (Zielonka 2014, 81–82).

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J. Zielonka compares two competing visions of the European Union – superstate and the neomedieval empire10 – and points out that the decentralized and limited scope of the neomedieval model is a more probable scenario for the future of the EU. Main features of such an empire are soft borders in flux; persistence of socioeconomic discrepancies; coexistence of multiple cultural identities; disassociation between authoritative allocations, functional competencies, and territorial constituencies; interpenetrations of various types of political units and loyalties; crucial but blurred distinction between the center and the periphery; different types of solidarity as a basis for redistribution between transnational networks; diversified types of citizenship with a distinct set of rights and duties; multiplicity of overlapping military and police institutions; and divided sovereignty along different functional and territorial lines (Zielonka 2007, 12). Furthermore, neomedieval empire holds some distinctions compared to the neo-Westphalian one: territorial acquisition through invitation and not conquest; polycentric rather than centralized governance structure; control through incentives and their denial as opposed to control through coercion and bribes; control by economic and bureaucratic and not military and political means; existence of fuzzy borders between metropolis and periphery – not sharp and clear ones; periphery gradually gains access to the metropolis and is not asymmetrically and hierarchically controlled; the degree of universalism is low; and the sovereignty of periphery is constrained through sharing and not denied altogether (Zielonka 2007, 14). Neomedieval empire is thus a voluntary union of asymmetrical units that does not seek punishment as a mean to enlarge itself. The precondition for the entrance is a voluntary decision and not threat or actual use of physical force (Zielonka 2007, 55–57). The EU will be inherently heterogeneous with many units in different categories (Zielonka 2007, 70). Administrative models will grow more complex, and sharing of functions between various levels of government will increase. Decentralized and flexible alliances over different issues will emerge. This intersection between markets and jurisdiction is in Zielonka’s work called neo-feudalism (Zielonka 2007, 94). The system will be linked in a multilevel and multisector arrangement with the EU as only one of the sides. Social policy effort will be in the hands of many public, semipublic, and private actors. The role of municipalities or welfare institutions is about to grow (Zielonka 2007, 100). The next important actors are cities and regions which gain additional power. Cities are territories with the major concentration of population and thus welfare, etc.  – centers of human activity. Regions are adapted to the local environment and cannot be possibly unified on such a significant level as is the whole EU – they will remain their specifics (Zielonka 2007, 124). However, the current system in the EU is not medieval and stands somewhere between Westphalian sovereign state and medievalism (e.g., due to the existence of democratic self-aware communities) (Zielonka 2007, 134) – another sign of a new system. For J. Zielonka, European system represents Bull’s system of overlapping  The analogy between the EU and an empire is used in a larger variety of academic literature – see, for example, Pänke (2019).

10

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identities and multiple loyalties – system held together by two competing claims (the EU and the USA), where members voluntarily integrated, where force is not applied, where procedures are in the center of bargaining, and where intervention into internal affairs is not an anathema (Zielonka 2007, 162). Governance in the neomedieval empire is polycentric, diffused, non-territorial, multicentered, and multilevel (Zielonka 2007, 179). Even in his vision of the possible post-EU future, Zielonka follows the similar pattern. In case of the EU breakup, he predicts an introduction of the system with the changed balance of political and economic forces and new political geography. In case of the weakening of the EU institutions, new challengers to state power will rise in regions and influential cities; growing importance will be assigned to networks. States will take different shapes from quasi-failed states to quasi-empires, and the power of NGOs will grow. Citizens will live under the scheme of multiple loyalties and with increasing disrespect to traditional communal hierarchies and values. Europe will resemble a complicated puzzle rather than a single institutionalized and legal entity. Europe with significantly weakened EU would thus be filled with plural political allegiances, overlapping jurisdictions, and sociocultural heterogeneity (Zielonka 2014, 73–75).

3.2.5 Barry Buzan and Richard Little As part of their monography on the development of the international system, B. Buzan and R. Little discuss the nature of the coming postmodern international system. They divide world system into two parts  – the first postmodern without security dilemma (so-called zone of peace) and the second filled with modern and pre-modern entities obeying realist “laws” of international relations (so-called zone of conflict). Important to notice is the fact that these two zones are not entirely separated and affect each other. Even some parts of one zone may exhibit factors related to the other (conflict in the Northern Ireland or success of regional development in Southeast Asia) (Buzan and Little 2000, 353–358). The new system is defined by a sectoral transformation from the military-­ political sector to the economic one. This change is marked by the shift in the nature of the dominant unit in the system as physical borders, and the principle of sovereignty is eroding. This erosion is followed by an emergence of principles that allow for negotiated fluid boundaries, multileveled sovereignty, and appearance of transnational spaces such as cyberspace or commercial space (Buzan and Little 2000, 359). This process is followed by the increase in a number of dominant units inside the political-­military sector and appearance of new political units such as the EU that do not neatly fit the traditional outlook of a modern state. Not all of these new units – differentiated in their aims – will be necessarily territorial (Buzan and Little 2000, 360–361). The new international structure is thus influenced by the intensification of the global market and international society that affects political sphere and changes rules of the game. The emergence of new dominant units leads to the establishment

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of their quasi-autonomous status and the appearance of multiple types of units – neomedievalism. The appearance of a robust international society that might occur in the future might be seen as a major game changer in the neomedieval zone of peace (Buzan and Little 2000, 364–366).11

3.2.6 Neil Winn N. Winn in his conclusion to the special issue of the civil wars journal dedicated to the topic of neomedievalism addresses the subject of the New Middle Ages as a theory. He points to the fact that state is degenerating from below and above and that territory becomes a porous concept due to the effect of the increased importance of networks and by an appearance of a number of alternative actors with blurrily defined responsibilities. The whole structure is complicated by the presence of alternative identities and emergence of global social identity. Reappearance of ancient identities leads to re-establishment of historical grievances that lay in the heart of many civil conflicts. On the other hand, in many parts of the world, the institution of the state is challenged by more stable effects of regionalism. Neomedieval system is more complicated and unstable than modern state system, with the more important role of alternative non-state actors and privatization of essential functions connected to the Westphalian state (Winn 2003).

3.2.7 John Rapley J. Rapley in his description of the New Middle Ages presents a vision based on the example of Jamaica where gangs took over many neighborhoods previously left  In one of the debates regarding the nature of political system B. Buzan further explained his view. He states that the international system is created out two or three different spheres with diverse rules of the game. This, however, does not mean that institution of the state is going to disappear as it still stands as a major representative of the political sphere. To quote Buzan himself: “First, as the process of globalization unfolds, deepens and strengthens (…) this is going to raise serious questions for political structure. I think these questions are going to be answered in different ways in different parts of the global system. My sense is that in the most developed and most democratic parts of the system, like western Europe and North America, there is probably going to be a layering of power so that there will be, if you like, an unpacking or disaggregation of sovereignty. Political authority will move upwards and downwards, and will exist simultaneously on several different levels. Hedley Bull once referred to this as neo-medievalism and that is not a bad metaphor in some ways. (…) There are a lot of weak states in the international system and these are going to have much more difficulty dealing with life in the strong system. Some of them are already falling to pieces and it would not surprise me, putting on a futurist hat, if a number of quite substantial unstable zones opened up and became semi-permanent features of the system (…).One could imagine there being no effective state structures, indeed no effective political structures at all in such places except for some kind of reversion to warlordism, tribalism or gangsterism, or combinations thereof. (…) (I)t would not surprise me to see this phenomenon spread so that one had a part of the world which was very highly organised, postmodern perhaps, parts of the world which had politically collapsed and then bits in-between” (Global Transformations 1996).

11

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abandoned by the state. State structure is supplemented by the private actors, and failure of the state to provide basic functions increases instability but does not lead to chaos as other actors can step in. J. Rapley uses parallel of the fall of Pax Romana. At the time Rome fell, the whole Europe became less safe, and the development created many forms of authority and political units but did not completely shatter. On the other hand, the fragmentation led to the creation of localized economies, plural identities, and multiple authorities. The system was sustained by the cooperation and negotiation or conflict. The medieval system was, however, in the author’s thought destroyed by capitalism. The spread of trade and growth of bureaucracy led to the appointment of the richest to the offices. The need for increased military force protecting trade routes led to the establishment of centrally controlled armies with the significant portion of conscripts gathered around the patriotic symbols of states. To maintain the economic growth, countries started to enforce many kinds of regulations and other policies, increased education of their population, and built modern infrastructure. The modern system is, however, similarly transformed by the influence of globalization. States continue to decrease the number of services they provide and increasingly use private contractors for an increasing number of tasks. State’s role as a mediator between local and world economy is increasingly useless. Some parts of certain states are so dangerous that no country’s officials dare to enter them. Successful companies are effectively able to evade state control. Many former soldiers and fighters are now members of gangs and mercenary militias providing security for those able to pay or just controlling parts of territory on their own. These processes are visible in all states – more evident in less developed but present all across the globe. In parts of the world where state never efficiently worked, non-­state actors can provide services which the population would have otherwise never received. This existence of local authorities and transnational actors consequently leads to re-emergence of the medieval coexistence of multiple identities (Rapley 2006).

3.2.8 Phil Williams P.  Williams in his work shifts attention toward the emergence of the New Dark Age – a scenario that can in his opinion easily follow the potential appearance of neomedievalism. He challenges Friedrichs’ dualism as highly selective and sees globalized market not as one of the two stabilizing pillars but rather as a cause of the disorder. Furthermore, he sees Cerny’s vision of a durable disorder as an attempt to give the dark future a silver lining and predicts that the New Middle Ages12 are just an interim on a path to the New Dark Age. For Williams, the decay of the state might become self-perpetuating, and the drivers causing this problem have a cumulative impact. Among the factors weakening the state, the author counts the inability of the  In one of his other works, he defines current system as facing “a combination of disorder similar to that of the Middle Ages, with modern technologies that allow dangers to spread and even mutate in complex and unpredictable ways” (Williams 2010, 40).

12

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most of the states to meet the needs of their citizens such as employment, redistribution, or security; the persistence of alternative loyalties which deteriorates the identification with a state, and empowers primordial division of a society,13 giving those actors a larger credibility compared to state; the rise of “sovereign-free” transnational actors which can operate without state control, providing network for illegal activities established on a base of organized crime or the above-mentioned primordial divisions which does not respect state borders; the rise of cities and the emergence of alternatively governed spaces, with more than a half of the global population living in cities with many of those cities becoming ungovernable, filled with slums so dangerous that even police forces are afraid to enter and with a self-made system of alternative governance leaving behind other forms of alternatively governed spaces all around the world, with not even prisons effectively under the states’ control; and porous borders which successfully undermine the states’ territorial claim, when state is unable to prevent a transborder flow of goods, immigrants, etc., which is further undermined by the possibilities given to people by the Internet (Williams 2008a, 5–30). This set of challenges is creating a number of highly unpredictable outcomes. P. Williams visualizes that the limits of a state will be furthermore exposed by the struggle between forces of order and disorder. Most of the states will fail and become hollow. Formal emphasis on sovereignty will be only an illusion veiling the fact that the state structure will be unable to contest the presence of violent non-state actors on its territory. This process will begin in the developing world and will furthermore spread into the developed world. This disorder will not only be characterized by the emergence of warlordism and organized crime, but also by the rise of religious and civilization wars. For the author, a spread of transnational organized crime, terrorism, and possible pandemics could turn Friedrichs’ durable disorder into chaos. Even larger calamity will come if there is a nuclear state among the collapsed states (Williams 2008a, 30–35). This would lead to the emergence of “loose nukes” (Williams 2008a, 35) creating an even higher level of insecurity.

3.3

End of State System?

Before moving to the establishment of a unified neomedievalist theory of the three geopolitical worlds, it is important to point out two issues connected to the transformation of the state system – states’ disappearance in the post-Cold War system and the emergence of alternative actors.

3.3.1 Crumbling of State System There are many works considering the factors and effects of the crumbling of the international system. In this part, the aim is to point at some of the most relevant of these in order to frame the subsequent theory into a clear context. The first 13

 Tribal, religious, ethnic, etc.

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author relevant to the research is R. D. Kaplan. Based on his experience from the early 1990 Western Africa, R. Kaplan in his 1994 article presented an image of the future world where the majority of the states is collapsed, and lawlessness spreads across vast territories. He compares Western Africa in the 1990s to pre-1648 Europe where large portions of land are not controlled by government forces but by local militias independent on the state’s will or national borders. Furthermore, governments in this area are unable to run basic infrastructure, or even control borders, which are becoming mostly useless and imaginary. Money is being smuggled out of the area, and this additionally impoverishes the whole area. States are, however, trying to keep an illusion of power and are requiring high standards for formal actions such as obtaining a visa throughout a very formal and laborious process (Kaplan 1994). He predicted a future of the region to follow a Somalian scenario – ungovernable. The region would be left without any central power with many poor and uneducated people. The whole region was to sink into violence. R. Kaplan judged that Africa would become the parallel to the pre-World War One Balkans inside the post-Cold War world, meaning that its development will predict the future world’s development. The world of the future was for him to be one full of authoritarian and failed states, with a return of primordial anxieties and with only a few safe places where the well-being will survive. Conflicts will be depoliticized and large states’ militaries useless in a number of small-scale conflicts (Kaplan 1994). It must be, furthermore, added that many conflicts described by the author are additionally fueled by the external state patrons leading proxy wars via support of different violent non-state actors in unstable areas – Eritrea in Somalia, Pakistan in Afghanistan, Qatar in Libya, etc. Furthermore, many of the actors use statelessness as a successful strategy for survival. In many contexts being a state may be a disadvantage in conflict with non-state actors able to attack centralized critical infrastructure (Grygiel 2009). While the development of the political and security situation inside Western Africa did not follow the bleak visions of Kaplan, his overall points regarding the causes of state weakening like the environmental degradation, overpopulation, or presence of low-intensity conflict remain relevant up until today. Looking at the issue from a more theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, M. van Creveld points out that states are continually losing their most important characteristics – they are unable to fight each other due to the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation; their provision of security is no longer exclusive and is increasingly shared with other actors (e.g., spread of so-called gated communities or utilization of private contractors in missions in Afghanistan or Iraq); their financial and welfare systems are still weaker and more dependent; and they are members of a growing number of international organizations (van Creveld 2006). Another issue facing the state system are the effects of globalization that is no longer controlled by states despite the fact that states enabled globalization to emerge in the first place. The new system created challengers to state sovereignty on both territorial and functional levels. P. Khanna in his work stresses out that on the global level, the establishment of supply chains and global links slowly degenerates the importance of political geography (division by borders) and increases the role of functional

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geography (connection by infrastructure) (Khanna 2016, 28). Some of the issues were deliberately created by some countries as they tried to achieve their goals via creating areas of softened sovereignty or by increasing importance of virtual spaces. States are thus likely to lose much of their influence, and their role as a guarantor of an order will be limited. Inside this system, non-state actors will be able to fill many functions previously provided by the state.14 This shift is observable, among other areas, in a way nongovernmental actors are utilized in some areas to provide state-­ like functions – be it NGOs and their humanitarian work or mercenaries and their aid to military capacities of weak states15 (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 23–30). The most important dimension of state activity is security – the state is bound to provide security as its basic good for society. First, many countries are dependent on support from mercenaries or troops of other states’ armies (external support) – e.g., Gulf states or some African states – and, in general, mercenaries and private contractors continue to be used on an ad hoc basis in many conflicts around the world (Thomson 1996, 90–95) – e.g., 2014/2015 Nigerian Army operations against Boko Haram. There are many reasons for the reappearance of the private military forces,16 but the post-Cold War development led to the proliferation of their activities throughout the world (McFate 2014, 55), and, for example, Liberia was in the period following the civil war almost entirely dependent on the presence and activities of nongovernmental organizations and private military contractors for a provision of services to its population (McFate 2014, 100). Second, one of the primary reasons why the state is losing its ability to provide its basic functions lies in the growth of importance of violent non-state actors – actors like warlords, militias, paramilitary groups, insurgencies, terrorist organizations, or criminal organizations (P. Williams 2008b, 9–15). “Illicit cross-border global transfers” introduced by some of these groups “can, in effect, set up covert transnational governance systems to replace existing state-centric world order” (Mandel 2011, 64). These actors prosper well in a situation where the state is seen as illegitimate (due to its failure or the fact that it never correctly worked in the first place – e.g., Pashtun areas in Southern Asia) and cannot provide basic goods. Many of such areas appear in the largest cities on our planet where large parts are ungovernable and ungoverned by state institutions and where the police are not present or enter them only during raids – some cities might become one of the most unstable parts of the world. Violent non-state actors, however, do not only fill territorial spaces but in many cases functional spaces as well (Williams 2008b, 6–8). In some instances, these actors and organizations create a sort of parallel state (Mandel 2011, 38). In some parts of the world, the state is so weak that even violent criminal groups provide the needed relief and at least some basic governance and security structure despite their otherwise primarily predatory nature (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, 8–9).  P. Williams points at the issue of a growing number of states with functional gaps as a reason for the empowerment of non-state actors (Williams and Felbab-Brown 2012, vii). 15  For more on this issue, see, for example, Coker (2001) and McFate (2014). 16  Despite the fact that a limited role of this type of non-state actors was evident even throughout the Cold War, especially in African internal conflicts. 14

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Despite the challenge these actors pose to some states, others will try to make alliances with some of these groups to achieve their strategic goals on other state’s territory (Williams 2008b, 18). This leads to the above-mentioned use of proxies in unstable regions (Mumford 2013).

3.3.2 Alternative Actors In the second part of this brief excurse to the topic of state weakening, it is necessary to present some of the actors that (may) play an alternative role to the state. Understanding of these will help us grasp the varied nature of the possible territorial settings and the different shapes that the organization of political space can maintain. Looking at the topic of non-state actors, we can distinguish among territorial and non-territorial actors (imagined on a continuum rather than as two distinct categories). It is, furthermore, necessary to point out that the distinction of the two ways non-state actors can operate on the territory is vital for an understanding of their role as a supplement of the state power. As observable, the more territorial actors (especially, the more successful in their pursuit of the territorial control and governance) are the more viable alternative in their relation to the state power as a sovereign entity they present. Additionally, non-territorial and territorial non-state actors can cooperate in an attempt to achieve their goals. This can be demonstrated on the case of the pre-9/11 Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda aided Taliban with its money and expertise to achieve dominance in Afghanistan (territorial pursuit) while Taliban consequently provided Al-Qaeda with a safe haven from which it could operate its global network aiming at propagation of global jihad (non-territorial quest) (Abbas 2014, 78–80). Given the realities and development of any organization, it can through time move from territorial to non-territorial and vice versa. This can be presented on the example of Al-Shabaab and its rise to territorial importance with the consequent decline in importance of territorial control for the movement and shift toward guerrilla, non-territorial, strategy (e.g., (Hansen 2013)) with the return to more territorial strategy since 2016. Territorial dynamics can be alternatively observable among other violent non-state actors such as narco-gangs in the Latin America (Grillo 2016; van Dun 2017). The impact of territoriality on the nature of the non-state actors can be well introduced on the different modus operandi among the jihadist violent non-state actors as present throughout the globe (Doboš et al. 2019). A specific type of non-state actors establishes so-called superclass or transnational capitalist class (Carroll 2010). This set of actors concentrate an enormous amount of power and wealth in their hands and thus affects global political and economic system in various ways. D. Rothkopf points out that the wealth of the largest companies in the USA is enormous with two on the top having revenues comparable to 50% of the US defense budget (in 2015 Walmart itself generated a revenue of almost 500 billion USD17). D.  Rothkopf further notices that 17

 See http://www.statista.com/statistics/263265/top-companies-in-the-world-by-revenue/

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concentration of power shifts not only geographically but also away from nations/ states as the major companies can force their goals on states which adapt to attract their investments and not vice versa. Some companies also hold budgets larger than most of the states and employ a larger number of employees (Rothkopf 2012; Rothkopf 2008, 25). This way, the elite dominates the economies of the capitalist societies (Carroll 2010, 6), establishing the basis of the economic pillar of the geopolitical setting. A.-M. Slaughter points out that out of the 175 largest nation-states and private companies, 112 are corporations, and many of the largest have their quasi-diplomatic corps. This implies that the role of the large corporations in the international system is strong and that states need to incorporate their interests into their decision-­making. Similar power is connected to the global humanitarian NGOs (Slaughter 2017, 22). Additionally, the privatization of supply chains to a large degree changes the role of the state in the global politics forcing them to play more of market regulation and co-governing role as compared to their traditional role (Khanna 2016, 31). Companies can also play an important role in internal conflicts harboring profits from predatory behavior (Ganson and Wennmann 2016). Of course, attempts to establish large corporate entities came earlier than with the end of the Cold War, but the post-1991 proliferation of the globalized market helped this process to spread to a size described by the above-mentioned authors. Some private actors, furthermore, take over some state functions as setting standards or resolving disputes. This is observable on the importance of the rating and ranking organizations, especially in the post-2008 (economic crisis) environment. Many of such organizations are widely perceived as an ultimate authority in their fields – e.g., Transparency International in the measurement of the level of corruption, or big three rating companies18 in financial credibility (Cooley 2015, 17). “Over the last century, the world’s biggest private-sector organizations have come to dwarf all but the largest governments in resources, global reach, and influence. At the same time, even wealthy countries are now struggling with overwhelmed bureaucracies, budget crises, and plummeting confidence in government. And governments everywhere are compromised by the limitations of their borders in an era when the issues that affect their people are increasingly transnational” (Rothkopf 2012). Furthermore, the newly established “superclass” might provide an impetus for the change of identification of population from state to alternative actors as its members are more connected to their peers in the similar group than to the place of their origin or citizenship (Rothkopf 2008, 26). This group thus directly challenges state as an institution by replacing some of its roles on a global level (Rothkopf 2008, 136). Emergence of the “superclass” and working of the global system, in general, have a direct consequence in extremely disproportionate concentration of global power in all major areas – wealth (10% of population owns 85% of world’s wealth with 2% owning over 50% of wealth), finance, business, religion (only two have over billion followers – Christianity and Islam), force (12% of global population in NATO countries account for more than 80% of military expenditure), and politics (relative strength of states is diametrically different, e.g., importance of 18

 Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch.

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countries in the United Nations Security Council) (Rothkopf 2008, 246–247). This all is tied to the fact that technological development is clustered in time and space and tied to these inequalities (Thompson 2020, 75–98). Not only is world uneven, but it is also becoming increasingly dominated by the non-state actors that can successfully challenge states just by concentrating a large amount of power.19 Another important actor that re-emerges as an important alternative to the modern modes of government is cities.20 B. Barber points out that the newly emerging reality of global challenges and transborder networking is incompatible with the state system based on sovereignty, and he sees the solution of the governance crisis in the increasing role of the prosperous cities in the global politics (Barber 2013, 20–24). Cities act as connection points as they are dependent not only on rural agricultural production but are also interconnected and interdependent with each other on a global scale. They also serve as natural centers of regions with a concentration of working places, wealth, and power (Barber 2013, 63) – they are nodal points in the global network (Curtis 2016, 2). These nodes are then territorial settings of the postmodern networks inside the space of flows that is establishing in some regions of the world (Curtis 2016, 19). Cities may overtake some of the state functions due to their peaceful nature – they do not border each other and create a global network that is more cooperative in comparison with the state system (Barber 2013, 113– 114). Cities might thus provide the connection point between local politics and global economy and global and local spaces in general, thus altering the political structure at the national level (Barber 2013, 192; Curtis 2016, 11). Moreover, world hubs concentrate about half of the world population into an area of about 2% of world’s surface with 66% of global economic output and 85% of scientific and technological innovations arising from 40 largest megacities (Curtis 2016, 10). On the other hand, cities are still part of the state structure and are directly dependent on state, so their influence is more informal, and their progress toward interconnection, and thus disintegration of the sovereign state system, can be halted by the state policies (Barber 2013, 214–215). Nonetheless, the relevance of city policies inside the neomedieval system is to increase (Lewicki 2016). Cities, therefore, may, despite many setbacks, overtake some of the roles of states in relation to local governance and networking global economy as they are at the same time a local political structure and global economic hubs. In states with failing governments, cities can, additionally, provide a functioning alternative for its citizens and mitigate the impact of the inefficient state structure. As we can see from this brief review, the institution of the state is losing its powers in all of the spheres of geopolitical analysis as defined by the systemic geopolitical school that serves as a basis of this work. These functional and territorial gaps are filled by non-state actors with larger or smaller success. The economic role of multinational corporations or international organizations is undisputed; the role of NGOs and others in societal development holds similar status. Spheres connected to  Role of global governing agents is also, among others, discussed in Avant et al. (2010).  For a prolonged discussion over the importance of cities and special economic zones for the global system, see Khanna (2016).

19 20

3.4  Concept of the Three Worlds

41

the politics and security might be contested, but as we may observe in the case of the EU or regions of state failure, non-state actors might be effective both in the political role and as guarantors of some form of security inside a given territory.

3.4

Concept of the Three Worlds

In the following chapter, the neomedieval model based on the presence of three geopolitical ideal-type environments that appear inside the global system is presented. Before that, however, it is necessary to establish an understanding of neomedievalism that stands as a general theoretical standpoint from which these modes might be derived. Neomedievalism is a system that combines factors from pre-­ modern and modern era21 appearing in a context of decreased stability and importance of the state as a dominant political institution inside the international relations. Pre-modern factors returning to the global system are increased importance and power of non-state actors; existence of competing universalistic claims; presence of competing overlapping identities; issue of appearance of overlapping territorial claims in a context of reappearance of terra nullius on the map; proliferation of the means of violence; and importance of the control over population rather than the control of territory. Modern factors important for neomedievalism are effects of globalization; technological unification of the world; high mobility of people, goods (at least in the developed world), and information; effects of regionalism; the appearance of connected cities with nonintegrated hinterland surroundings; and a crucial role of cyberspace. The system can be described as “the emergence of multiple, overlapping and autonomous areas of sovereignty side by side with a weak central competence” (Duffield 1998, 88), manifesting different outcomes regarding the political, social, economic, and security context. This has been, for example, manifested on the nature of the post-Cold War civil wars (Reno and Matisek 2018). Neomedievalism is a system where the traditional state is challenged by non-­ state actors and effects of regionalism.22 This degradation might be more orderly or disorderly given the broader context of the region. The new system is generally less stable with many actors holding overlapping functional, territorial, or identity claims (or any combination of these) taking over many functions previously provided by the institution of the state. These new actors might be peaceful or violent, the state might survive in some diminished role, new political units might arise, and the effect of two-and-half pillars (political, economic, and societal) might stabilize the system. There are many “mays” and “mights,” and many of the effects are having different effects closely connected to the context inside which they take place, establishing different models of state transformation based on the context of the  For an analysis of the mutual relations of pre-modern and modern factors in the international politics, see, for example, Welsh (2016). 22  In this respect, it is important to point out that the coexistence of different types of units – even from a historical or developmental point of view – is nothing extraordinary in the human history (Ruggie 1993, 167). 21

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political environment (Duffield 1998, 71). To better describe the newly emerging system, let us now introduce the system of the three geopolitical environments: Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian model. The importance of these three environments lies in their effect for the political units appearing inside them – they establish an environment which is shaped by the units inside, but which also shapes their policies and behavior. This work operates with a regional analysis of the spread of the three types of geopolitical environment, but this does not establish a notion that the regions are homogeneous. If country level was selected, we would observe that some of the countries do not follow the regional trend. In the same vein, some of the countries are on a local level also split among different types of environment or establish transitional cases (e.g., Colombia, Venezuela, the Balkans states, or Singapore). Similarly to the uneven and multifaceted transformation from medieval to the modern system that witnessed many forms of adaptation to the new conditions (Spruyt 1994), the transformation to the neomedievalism will be accompanied by an establishment of different units reacting to their environment in order to evolve and be successful in the new setting. The difference from a European transition to the Westphalian era, nevertheless, lies in uneven geopolitical conditions that different actors in different regions face. These different conditions are summed up in the following three ideal types.

3.4.1 Durable Disorder Durable Disorder is a nonviolent networked (postmodern) outcome of the neomedieval transformation. It is connected to concepts of postmodern state/zone of peace as discussed previously. The concept of the Durable Disorder follows Friedrichs’ historical neomedievalism and the overall Eurocentric vision of the neomedieval development. This vision is based on the development of the state in Europe and follows the evolutionary theory of a state toward a point of return to the model that was in some aspects resembles the earlier period of the development of the international system as described, for example, by M. van Creveld. Despite its weakness, the state still exists and may provide some important goods for its citizens. As a functional unit, it is, however, in many functions overcome by non-territorial or regional actors. As state abandons many of its functions, alternative actors take place and provide these functions for the population. Nature of the system is peaceful, and war between states in Durable Disorder is very unlikely or impossible. Territory governed in this way is caught in a struggle between economic (globalist, Lévy’s hierarchical world of transaction),23 political (geographical, world of  Here we can find a clear analogy to the medieval Church. As H. Spruyt (1994, 44–46) points out, Church established a non-territorial means of effective capital generation, and many other actors competed to get on good terms with the organization to tap into these resources. This is similar to the logic of attempting to attract important market players (e.g., large companies) to conduct their activity on one’s actors’ territory to get financial benefits.

23

3.4  Concept of the Three Worlds

43

forces),24 and societal (both local and global, world of society) pillars that are interconnected while still seeking to gain power over the other two pillars. This creates a complicated structure of territorial control. Unlike the Westphalian mode of territorial control, Durable Disorder is based on an existence of a set of geopolitical actors that overlap in their functions and territorial claims on different levels (regional, supranational). These actors are connected through cyberspace that provides network for fast exchange of ideas, information, and capital and modern means of transportation that allow people and goods to travel across vast distances in a relatively short period. Population develops global and local awareness and identities that directly challenge limitations of state-based identity. Actors in the system need to fill functional holes or provide some goods more efficiently than its opponents; otherwise, they perish – survival of the fittest model. As the non-state actors usually capable of providing goods more effectively in the environments where the provision was a norm before their takeover (e.g., capable state) (Mampilly 2011), these are then the follow-ups of the historical development of the social system. Actors, moreover, usually do not incline to the use of violence. The decreasing capacities of state regarding regulations will be substituted by non-state actors (Schuppert 2011, 74). The system is additionally defined by a decreased importance of borders as they are turning irrelevant due to the effects of networking manifested in the rapid spread of functions conducted inside cyberspace, modern means of transportation, and effects of regionalism. An important principle of Durable Disorder is mobility as a factor eroding sovereign territoriality. This mobility is connected to the economic pillar, while political and societal pillars are more territorial – in case of societal actors, their level of territorial setting depends mainly on their aims. The existence of the societal pillar also helps to explain while the Durable Disorder actor can overcome the previously predicted inability of the neomedieval actors to solve the transnational issues (Duffield 1998, 70). Borders are also playing a different role. They might be seen in a similar way to what A.-M. Slaughter based on the work of F.  Capra describes as “not boundaries of separation but boundaries of identity,” keeping the unite distinct but connected (Slaughter 2017, 57). Actors in this environment can succeed by opening themselves and connecting to others (Slaughter 2017, 203). They also need to get involved as nodes in the networks of the international politics as to increase their relevance for the newly established connective environment (Manulak 2019), thus establishing a space of concentration of the economic activity (Duffield 1998, 72). Territorial control is based on overlapping claims of actors on different levels of governance. Territoriality is eroded by advanced networking in the system. Violence is disregarded as a legitimate mean to achieve goals. Many actors are focused on functional or identity (religious groups, etc.) level rather than on territorial25 control  Similar distinction to the struggle between territoriality of sovereignty and de-territorializing effects of a capitalist economic system as noted by Curtis (2016, 2). 25  Territorial, functional, and personal delimitations of political space are three possible strategies for political actors to mark their area of authority (Vollaard 2009, 690). 24

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and may overcome some of the functions of the state similarly to territorial actors in areas of no state power in pre-modern/postcolonial states. The system is less predictable than the Westphalian state system but remains peaceful with war improbable not only due to the preferences of population but even due to the inability of states to wage it due to their interconnected nature. They, however, will be, to some extent, able to defend the region against the outside attacks and threats either via interventions in the regions posing a threat or via an establishment of military force capable of protecting the borders themselves or deterring a potential invader. This protection might, however, be provided by private companies or combination of private and public forces instead. The internal functioning of the region in a Durable Disorder setting is defined by predominance of the socioeconomic domain. The aim is to establish a global (universalistic) network as per Lévy’s definition.

3.4.2 Chaotic Anarchy The second geopolitical environment discussed in this work is Chaotic Anarchy. As the name suggests, this mode of governance is highly unstable and violent. The state disappears into larger instability, and the environment is left with many functional and territorial holes. Security is usually provided only on minimal level or is missing altogether. The environment is filled by predatory actors. The region defined by Chaotic Anarchy is characterized by the emergence of state failure, disconnection from the global network, high levels of violence, conflict between local population and mobile predatory groups, rise of primordial tensions, decreased importance of borders leading to emergence of J.  Lévy’s border zones, spread of terra nullius, economic decline, and general insecurity. Actors are usually unable to cooperate in a longer run. Local communities are misused by violent non-state actors seeking profit, and many of such actors are used as proxies by outside forces. The environment is also a target of the activities of the private military companies (Nossal 1998). The environment is also often described by harsh geographical and climate conditions that make the sustained territorial presence even more complicated. Territoriality is important for local communities and ethnic groups. Predatory actors are usually mobile, and use settled population for its aims.26 There are no actors willing or able to govern territory in a longer run other than local communities interested in their neighborhood. This inability and unwillingness to govern and provide basic goods for the population is one of the most important defining factors of Chaotic Anarchy, similarly to the proliferation of cheap means of violence. A region in Chaotic Anarchy setting is easily penetrable from the outside, but any sustained activity is challenging and requires extraordinary security measurements. The appearance of quasi-states is possible as some actors might hide their activities behind a veil of establishing a legitimate state structure.27 The internal setting is predominated by the physical and demographic characteristics of space.  Here the examples of Boko Haram’s misuse of local communities can be named.  For a discussion over the use of sovereignty veil for personal enrichment, see, for example, Reno (1998).

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3.4  Concept of the Three Worlds

45

3.4.3 Westphalian System Despite the fact that many parts of the world shift into qualitatively new stage of institutional organization of the international politics, the Westphalian setting is still a viable and preferred option in some areas of the world. The system is based on state as the central and most important geopolitical actor. The state is delimited by its territory and population with centralized government and functions organized around its structure. As the pressures from the developing international networked community grow, states that wish to sustain their relevance need to protect their borders and their societies which leads them to an inclination toward more authoritarian forms of rule and protection against the impact of the world networks  – mainly the Internet, process evident from blockages of the Internet in places like Russia and China, or throughout political turmoil in Turkey in 2016 or Iran in 2017/2018. The state controls most of the functions, mainly the provision of security, and it overlooks actors that are allowed to provide functions on its behalf and are connected to the state structure. The state is a sole creator and guarantor of the legal system on its clearly delimited territory and is the only representative of its population on the international level. The state can limit the movement of people and goods across its borders and remains the primary holder of people’s identification as well as sovereignty. The Westphalian system is dominated by the military-­ diplomatic field with the power center being located inside political circles.

3.4.4 Relation As geopolitics is dynamic, these three worlds are interconnected, and regions may enter one or another if the right set of factors is met. Regions in the Westphalian model may collapse and become areas resembling Chaotic Anarchy or start integrating and connecting and enter the Durable Disorder model. The region in the Durable Disorder might be infected by areas of lawlessness (city suburbs, neglected ethnic groups, terrorist groups), or some catastrophe (natural disaster, pandemics, etc.) and collapse into the Chaotic Anarchy, or by a strong populist nationalistic case made by some local actor(s) that might re-establish a robust Westphalian state. Chaotic Anarchy might be stabilized by actors able to provide governance and security and developed into one of the more stable scenarios depending on what degree these stabilizing tendencies promote strength of a state. There, however, seems to be a sort of a barrier between the two neomedieval ideal types that disallow a region to move from the Chaotic Anarchy directly to the Durable Disorder. First, unlike in the era of origins of the state, the current proto-states are facing harsh competition from external more capable actors. Second, the international community is still state-­ centric and is unlikely to support alternative forms of political territoriality. In a development toward larger stability, the region seems to be forced to move through the state-centered period.

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Table 3.1  Three modes of territorial control Sovereignty Borders State Non-state actors Stability

Westphalian system Full Borderlines

Durable Disorder Shared/pooled Frontiers, penetrable

Central to system Operating under state Balance of power

One among others Overtake state functions

Nature of relations Territoriality

Peace/war

Type of state Provision of basic goods Nature of operations out of the region

Modern State

State-centered

Interventions, diplomatic relations, balance of power

Interdependence/ universal pillars Cooperative/challenging Local/regional x global network of flows, city networks Postmodern State and non-state actors Economic network, interventions, NGO activity, soft power

Chaotic Anarchy Judicial De facto nonexistent, border zones None/predatory Predatory/local communities Inherently unstable Ad hoc coalitions/ violent clashes Ethnoterritoriality x disconnection from global network Pre-modern/postcolonial None Limited violent spillovers, migration, terrorism

For a better introduction of the three modes system, the table comparing their basic features is presented (Table 3.1).

4

Analyzing the Global System

Having a theoretical model is, nevertheless, not enough to grasp the nature of the contemporary system. So, after the development of the theoretical foundations of neomedievalism, it is crucial to establish a framework inside which the book explores the geographical spread of the different geopolitical environments  – Durable Disorder, Chaotic Anarchy, and the Westphalian system. This research will consequently lead to answer the question of whether the neomedieval setting is overcoming the Westphalian model of international politics. The first task is the establishment of the regional division of the world. Consequently, the research design is being set up.

4.1

Regions

Defining regions is an intriguing task as any division will always be to some extent subjective. This might be shown in the example of the Indian Ocean. The region defined as the Indian Ocean (rim) region can be examined as a single geopolitical unit with significant internal interactions and dynamics (Kaplan 2010) and with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an organization attempting to unite the area.1 On the other hand, the geopolitical nature of alternatively chosen regions located on the Indian Ocean rim is very different, the nature of the countries even vis-à-vis the neomedieval setting differs substantially (Doboš 2014), and many other regional organizations are arguably more important than the IORA.2 Also, the regional division will always lead to some generalizations that might not apply to all of the regional countries. We, in this sense, can, for example, see a unique position of Tunisia in Maghreb or long-term stability of Ghana inside the otherwise tumultuous Western Africa. It is thus necessary to distinguish among different possible  See http://www.iora.net/default.aspx  For discussion over the Indian Ocean regionalism, see Muni (2005).

1 2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_4

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delimitations of regions and select those that are the most suitable for the following research. The presented approaches toward the issue as well as the final selection of regions thus aim to delimit studied geographical areas in a way that they present internally coherent units vis-à-vis the main factors included in the theoretical delimitation of the three geopolitical worlds. Any delimitation will, however, leave some simplifications and generalizations in place. The first regional definition that must be taken into account and that will serve as a basis for the further specifications comes from the United Nations (UN). The UN divides the world into the following regions: Eastern, Middle, Northern, Southern, and Western Africa; Central, North, and South America; Caribbean; Central, Eastern, Southern, Southeast, and Western Asia; Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe; Australia and New Zealand; Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia (UNdata 2013). The second important idea the work deals with while delimiting the regional division of the world is the T. Barnett’s concept of the functioning core that divides the world into two parts regarding their connectedness to the globalized world. Barnett presents the world as divided between functioning core and non-­ integrating gap  – the former enjoying the benefits of globalization while later falling into the chaotic and disorganized setting (Barnett 2004). As the connectivity to the global economy and network is also important in the neomedieval world setting, the understanding of this division is also useful for the delimitation of the regional setting. R. Kaplan in his work presents a geographically and historically rooted approach toward the description of the Eurasian continent. He points out that “as the map of Eurasia gets smaller thanks to technology and population growth, artificial frontiers will begin to weaken inside it” (Kaplan 2012, 125). He afterward divides the entity into the following parts: Europe as a geographical expression of liberal humanism (Kaplan 2012, 138); Russia as a preeminent land power with power projection strategies aiming to Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and the Central Asia (Kaplan 2012, 155–177); China with its favorable geography which makes it a natural hub of geopolitics with a power projection capabilities over artificial borders with Mongolia and Central Asia, as well as in the Southeast Asia and Korean peninsula (Kaplan 2012, 188–211); India with its unstable neighborhood (Kaplan 2012, 228); Arabian peninsula dominated by Saudi Arabia with a little importance in the pre-twentieth-­ century geopolitics (Kaplan 2012, 261, 302); Iran as a distinct entity located between Turkey and Indian subcontinent (Kaplan 2012, 266); and Turkey as a relatively stable land bridge between the Mediterranean and Black Sea bordering unstable Arab world (Kaplan 2012, 285). R. Kaplan’s division is important for our understanding of the geopolitical dynamics inside the Eurasian environment. Similarly, Z. Brzezinski points at the geographic and political division of the world. He identifies the presence of the distinct European space, Russian space, “Eurasian Balkans” in Central Asia, and the Far East dominated by the clash between China and its competitors in Eurasia. Despite the fact that his work deals mainly with the US power projection, the division of Eurasia he presents is useful for the understanding of the possible delimitation of the regions inside Eurasia (Brzezinski 1998). We must not also forget about the work done by S. Huntington.

4.1 Regions

Despite the fact that this work does not follow the clash of civilization hypothesis, it is useful to at least mention the distinction between core states, cleft countries, and lone countries. Core countries are those located at the center of their respective civilization and are those that are at the center of the global great power politics. Cleft countries are located on the fault lines of the civilizations and have troubles in maintaining their unity, thus becoming less stable. Lone country is a state that lacks common cultural background with others (Huntington 1997, 136–139, 207–208). Another relevant factor for the delimitation of regions is the presence of regional organizations. There is an enormous amount of more or less successful regional organizations with different functions and varying level of enthusiasm from its member states. To mention some of the most important, we may remark subregional units as the Economic Community of West African States, the South African Development Community, or the East African Community; regional as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), or Mercosur; transregional as Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); or global like Organization of Arab States, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and BRIC(S). Furthermore, some new joint economic spaces are/were being set up, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. These initiatives are, nevertheless, less geographically determined and represent a new stage of the regional development with yet uncertain future. We can observe that different territories are parts of different regions depending on the criteria chosen, and even then, the possible regional delimitation overlaps. For example, just looking at the case of People’s Republic of China (PRC), it might be considered as a unique entity and a power center of its own, it might be part of broader geographical region encompassing Mongolia and Koreas, and it is economically tied to both Central Asia and the Pacific region. Similarly, is for Mexico’s regional position more important its connection to the failing states of Central America or its membership in NAFTA/United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement? And what about the Turkish location between the Middle East, Europe, and Caucasus? There are many factors that need to be taken into account  – regional cooperation, culture, geography, or power relations – and these factors are not of uniform importance around the globe. Next step is thus an attempt to define regions that will serve as a basis for the following analysis. As evident regions in the world may be defined by many characteristics, they may have different sizes and may even disregard national borders. In the previous chapter we have explained the division of the world into the three ideal-type geopolitical settings, and so the purpose of the regional setting is to make the studied entities as coherent as possible in the context of our understanding of the neomedievalism. On the other hand, for the sake of data gathering, the regions will be based on the borders of currently internationally recognized states (with an exception of Taiwan that, nevertheless, used to constitute an internationally recognized entity up

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until the 1970s)  – the regional division is thus geographic and state-centric. Following is the list of regions that will be used in the following analysis with the short justification of the selection in each case. The first region is an obvious case of the European Union.3 The EU will be dealt with as a single entity together with countries of Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, and European microstates were added to the list as these non-EU members are, nonetheless, intimately connected to the bloc (customs union, Schengen zone, security aspects, etc.) and do not create any distinct regional entity. Also, entities like Greenland or Faroe Islands (and many others) that are not the EU members will be a part of the region as they share similar characteristics with the bloc. This vast region is to some degree less homogeneous than the others, but it is considered that the regional dynamics are so important that this shortcoming is overcome by the strength of dealing with these countries in a single package. Staying on the European continent, three other regions can be defined  – non-EU (Western) Balkan states; Ukraine and Moldova as the postSoviet countries striving to escape Russian hegemony geographically distinct from the other post-Soviet countries that to some degree share their fate (Georgia, Azerbaijan) and also distinct geographically and politically from the non-EU Balkan countries; and Russia and Belarus as post-­Soviet countries in many aspects following the Soviet legacy. The post-Soviet region also inhabits two other regions geographically located in Asia – post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia (post-Soviet “Stans”). The remainder of the Russian neighborhood comprises of Mongolia that is difficult to assign as it is stretched between the influence of China and Russia and will be included into the same region as China with the addition of Chinese protégée, North Korea. This is due to the fact that China is more dynamic of the two Mongolia’s neighbors. The East Asian dynamic is projected into the creation of the East Asian region comprising of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (the only de facto state included in a different region than its parent state)  – all countries are in some opposition to China and protected by the US military presence. Southeast Asia is defined by its membership in ASEAN.  Oceania comprises of Australia, New Zealand, and smaller Pacific nations not included in other regions. Following the Asian part of the Indian Ocean rim, the Indian region including India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka is defined as a territory dominated by the Indian influence. Neighboring Pakistan will form a distinct entity together with Afghanistan – as the borders between those entities are virtually nonexistent and their regional dynamics is interconnected. Iran will be dealt with as a single region same as Turkey. In the Middle East, we can identify region comprising Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon – places of great instability and civil conflict; Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Gulf kingdoms – stable part of the Persian Gulf and Israel, Jordan, and Egypt as a single security region. These three regions are mainly established as to follow regional political dynamics. 3  S. Cohen characterizes the EU as a single geopolitical power (Cohen 2014, 52–53); J. Zielonka, as mentioned earlier, talks about the (emerging) neomedieval Empire (Zielonka 2007).

4.2  Research Design

Moving to Africa, the issue of regional identification becomes even more problematic as the countries in many parts of the continent constitute just a fiction. Libya will be analyzed together with Sudan, Chad, and Niger. Remaining North African countries will establish a separate region. This is mainly to accent different security challenges despite the fact that many of these are interconnected throughout the whole of Sahel. The Horn of Africa is understood as comprising of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia with Yemen included as well due to its internal issues similar to those experienced by the countries of the Horn and its connection to the region via migrant routes and other cultural traits. Continuing south, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda establish the East African region as they seek to enhance the regional cooperation in the region. The Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea are deemed as Central Africa. All the countries south of the Central African region are to be included in the South African region as economically connected to South Africa as a regional hegemon.4 Western Africa will comprise all the remaining African countries. As we do not deal with virtually uninhabited Antarctica, the last two continents to be parceled are Americas. There are three regions in North and Central America – Canada and the USA as North America (Mexico is excluded as it shares more security aspects with its Central American neighbors5) as connected through a common cultural, security, and economic interests and similarities; countries from Mexico to Panama as Central America as countries sharing similar geopolitical dynamics and faith connected to a strong presence of the USA and effects of drug trade; and the Caribbean with its specific geography being identified as following the UN delimitation. South America is to be divided between Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Surinam, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Guyana; and the remaining follow the Barnetts’ division. Table 4.1 and Map 4.1 summarize the regional selection.

4.2

Research Design

Once the borders of the geographical entities that are to be researched are known, it is possible to move to the presentation of the research design that will be used to place these regions in a right position in relation to the global distribution of the 4  Some authorities enhance the size of the Eastern and Central Africa and decrease the size of the Southern African region, but the influence of South Africa is so important that it constitutes the basis of the future geopolitical region that must be taken into consideration. The delimitation also to a large degree follows the similar delineation made by Cohen (2014, 434–437). For historical development of the ties and their importance in the postapartheid era, see also Reno (1998, 45–78). 5  Some authors as S. Cohen (2014, 136–137) tie the Mexican geopolitical position to that of the USA that in a major way affect the Mexican politics. Despite the fact that Mexico is apparently on a border between the two regions, it is here placed among the Central American states for reason of having the same security challenges such as gang violence and drug trafficking that affect state strength in a more substantial way than its membership in NAFTA/United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

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Table 4.1 Regions Region EU+ Balkans East Europe Russian space The Caucasus Central Asia Chinese space East Asia Southeast Asia Oceania Indian space AfPak Iran Turkey Larger Mesopotamia Gulf monarchies Western Middle East Northern Africa Northwest Africa Horn of Africa+ East Africa Central Africa South Africa West Africa North America Central America The Caribbean Northern South America Southern South America

Countries EU27, United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, microstates, minor dependent territories Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania Ukraine, Moldova Belarus, Russia Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan China, Mongolia, North Korea Japan, South Korea, Taiwan ASEAN Australia, New Zealand, Pacific islands India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles Afghanistan, Pakistan Iran Turkey Iraq, Syria, Lebanon Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait Jordan, Israel, Egypt Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Niger Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Mauritania Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Republic of South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Madagascar, Comoros Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia Canada, USA Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama Caribbean island nations Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile

three geopolitical environments. As the neomedieval world can be ideally divided among three poles, the research design will start with the idea of a triangle with each ideal type as one of its peaks. The position of the concrete region inside the triangle is defined by two sets of factors – one related to axis A and one to axis B as depicted in Figure 4.1.

4.2  Research Design

Map 4.1  Regional selection

Westphalian system

Axis A

Durable Disorder

Fig. 4.1  Research triangle

Axis B

Chaotic Anarchy

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Axis A is identifying the factors influencing the state strength and relevance inside the selected regions, and Axis B is dedicated to the difference in the stability of the other elements of the system. The rationale behind this distinction is that a strong state, if it is willing to, is through its security apparatus able to mitigate the effects of the other elements on its role in the system. As an archetypical example, North Korea is unable to provide basic functions such as food and is totalitarian and arbitrary but is, from a geopolitical and international politics perspective, stable and relevant entity and a fully sovereign member using its strengths (blackmailing) and trying to overcome its weaknesses (mainly by totalitarian control of its population). Despite the normative issues related to the case, the government in Pyongyang acts, unlike many failed states, as a relevant regional player fully in the context of the traditional Westphalian geopolitics. However, due to this nature of policy conduct, it is challenging for the country to transition into Durable Disorder that requires openness and networking to emerge. In case of state collapse, the country will most likely enter into some form of Chaotic Anarchy environment. It is now important to dislodge the factors distinguishing the three ideal types into measurable units that fit one of the two axes. Beginning with the Axis A, the following criteria define the case’s position on the spectrum between state failure and a presence of capable state institutions: breaches of sovereignty, the presence of state defying non-state actors, the level of state failure, and state as being the primary actor in international relations. Each of the factors is further divided into sub-factors. These sub-factors are a basis for the empirical study on the Axis A. They are regional dependence on outside agents, border control, state failure, state as a provider of social services, presence of nonstate actors defying state on a functional level, presence of non-state actors defying state on a territorial level, and number of types of politically relevant actors in the region. Axis B is consequently consisting of the following criteria: overall use of violence, a level of provision of goods, connection to the global network, development of regionalism, and nature of actors supplementing state. Sub-factors will be use of violence, the presence of armed conflict, provision of basic goods and social services, connection to global flows, intraregional openness, peaceful/violent nature of non-state actors, strength of regional bodies, and a spread of weaponry. Both sets of criteria follow the theoretical foundation as set previously. Axis A is thus characterized by seven sub-factors while Axis B by eight. Next step is to quantify these sub-factors to establish a framework in which selected regions might be placed on a research triangle.

4.2.1 Axis A Regional dependence on foreign agents  To understand this factor, it must be pointed out that a connection to the international economy and establishment of a system that is not based on autarchy do not have equal regional dependence on the foreign agents. What is meant here is the dependence of states’ survival on a

4.2  Research Design

provision of direct aid. Thus, giving money to a state is (at least partial) dependence while being dependent on foreign trade is not. Buying army supplies from abroad is, in this context, not making state dependent, while receiving direct military support or being under foreign occupation is. The work will thus distinguish these possible values: independent, minor foreign aid, major foreign aid, direct humanitarian intervention, and occupation. Border control  State as a territorial institution with precisely demarcated borders needs to be able to protect its boundaries in order to remain fully sovereign on its territory. This, however, does not imply fencing the territory but rather having the ability to ensure that borders can be closed and movement can be effectively tracked. That is why the following values are proposed: full control, minor defects, major defects, and complete inability to control. State failure  There are many possible ways how to measure state failure all of them having larger or smaller problems regarding conceptualization and methodology.6 Despite the many problems with the term failed state,7 the book will include the ranking as one of the categories as it points at some important systemic defects. The scale used will follow Fragile State Index (FSI) rating where every region will be judged according to the average value of the states included in it comparing data8 from 2017 and 2012 to present the longer-term trends as well as 2017 scores. Possible outcomes are sustainable, stable, warning, and alert. State as a provider of social services  Provision of basic social services is one of the basic state functions (healthcare, social net, education, etc.). However, a state may stop providing these or simply lose control over their provision over time. The scale suggested is fully competent provider/controlled and regulates privatization, parallel institutions, and collapse/complete loss of control. Non-state actors on a functional level  Another prominent symptom of the weakening of the state is the presence of non-state actors overtaking state functions. Here it must be pointed out that it is to some extent different whether state willingly shares its power (liberal approach) or whether it is unable to mitigate the impact of non-state actors. Values are thus as follows: no presence, willing sharing, overtaking, and important/full presence of non-state actors.

 See Cooley and Snyder (2015) and Dingli (2013).  See Ezrow and Frantz (2013, 15–43). 8  Data taken from http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ 6 7

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Non-state actors on territorial level  As territory is the primary manifestation of the state’s sovereignty, any actor operating on a territorial level and effectively challenging state’s territorial control presents a direct challenge to the institution itself. Values are no territorial competition, minor parts of territory out of effective reach, major organized territorial units present, and large areas out of the reach of the central government. A number of relevant political actors  Last but not least, a region with effective states will have only these as major power brokers, while in case of less effective states’ presence, other types of actors appear. We will differ among these situations states as only actors, states influenced by non-state actors, non-state actors as important brokers, and state not effectively present in regional political dynamics. In the case the important regional bodies are not geographically overlapping with our selected regions, the issue will be dealt with according to the local context.

4.2.2 Axis B Use of violence  Crucial for the nature of the system is the amount and quality of violence conducted. No matter whether the state needs to use violence as to preserve itself, civil war is raging, or a non-state actor attacks the population, this use of violence significantly pushes the region toward the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum. Values selected for this sub-factor are thus no/insignificant amount of mainly legitimate violence, manageable use of violence, and a large amount of violent attacks. Presence of armed conflict  As the violence is a crucial factor for the model, another factor that will help project it into the neomedieval model is added. Herein, the nature of armed conflict on the region’s territory is diversified. The following units are used: no conflict, limited rebellion, full-blown rebellion, foreign intervention/limited civil conflict, and unmitigated civil war/ethnoreligious conflict. Provision of basic goods  To help place cases on a correct position, it is crucial to examine who in the given region provides basic social services and goods. As the provision by the state is examined on Axis A, state provision will here be seen as neutral as not to mingle with the outcomes: (post-)modern non-state actors, combined, state, traditional actors, and no one. Connection to global flows  Region that is set up in the postmodern Durable Disorder is to a larger degree connected to the global economy and the world of

4.2  Research Design

flows. On the other hand, Chaotic Anarchy is defined by very limited access to the gains of economic globalization mainly via illegal flows. Values are fully connected, limited connectedness, and minimum connection. Intraregional openness  Postmodern world is defined by a high level of interdependency and interconnectedness, so the Durable Disorder scenario is to be expected to establish such norms that will allow free flows of capital, movement, and goods as to provide the smoothest possible economic transactions. Also, with the role of state significantly weakened, many barriers fall. Values picked for this sub-factor are thus high level of openness, limited openness, closed border regime, and lack of openness due to collapse of mutual relations. The strength of regional bodies  Another defining factor of Durable Disorder is an enormous power of regional organizations that overtake part of the functions usually connected with the institution of state. The scale is political union, economic union, free trade area, and no effective regional body. Nature of non-state actors  Whether non-state actors successfully utilize violence is of great importance for the stability of the system. The more violent the region is, the closer it gets to the Chaotic Anarchy part of spectrum. Variables are thus peaceful nature, limited amount of violence, and violent nature. Spread of weaponry  Finally, we move to the issue of spread of weaponry. As noted earlier by J. Grygiel, the proliferation of firearms is one of the reasons many parts of the world resemble premodern era (Grygiel 2013). It is crucial that the actual number is not as significant as the ability of regulative institutions to limit this spread. The analysis thus distinguishes these values: low spread of weaponry, spread limited by state, state unable to properly control spread, and unregulated high proliferation. As evident, different sub-factors are divided into the different number of values; some of them will thus provide more precise differentiation than others which is also mirrored in the operationalization of the various factors. Some of the factors deemed more important are given larger total values as to differentiate among more and less determining variables. Selection of different scales is also aiming to distinguish among different distances between neighboring positions, as actual difference of impact between, for example, presence of territorially bounded non-state actors on a state territory and presence of large areas of lawlessness is for our purposes much more significant than distance between the impact of free trade area and establishment of the economic union. The following table presents values given to different sub-factors (Table 4.2).

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Table 4.2 Operationalization Sub-factor Regional dependence on outside agents Border control State failure State as a provider of social services Non-state actors on functional level Non-state actors on territorial level

Number of relevant actors

Use of violence

Presence of armed conflict Provision of basic goods Connection to global flows Intraregional openness Strength of regional bodies Nature of non-state actors Spread of weaponry

Values Independent; minor foreign aid; major foreign aid; direct humanitarian intervention; occupation Full control; minor defects; major defects; complete inability to control Sustainable; stable; warning; alert Fully competent provider or regulated privatization; parallel institutions; collapse/ (almost) complete loss of control No presence; willing sharing; overtaking; important/full presence of non-state actors No territorial competition; minor parts of territory out of effective reach; major organized territorial units present; large areas out of the reach of the central government States as only actors; states are influenced by non-state actors; non-state actors as important brokers; state not effectively present in regional political dynamics No/insignificant amount of mainly legitimate violence; manageable use of violence; large amount of illegitimate violent attacks No conflict; limited rebellion; full-blown rebellion; foreign intervention/limited civil conflict; unmitigated civil war/ethno-religious conflict (Post)modern non-state actors; combined; state; traditional actors; no one Fully connected; limited connectedness; minimum connection High level of openness; limited openness; closed border regime; lack of openness due to collapse of mutual relations Political union; economic union; free trade area; no effective regional body Peaceful nature; limited amount of violence/ combined; violent nature Low spread of weaponry; spread limited by state; state unable to properly control spread; high proliferation

Operationalization of values 3; 1; −1; −2; −3 2; 1; −1; −2 2; 1; −1; −2 1; 0; −1 2; 1; −1; −2 3; 0; −1,5; −3

2; 1; −1; −2

2; 0; −2 3; 0; −1; −2; −4 2; 1; 0; −1; −2 2; 0; −2 2; 0,5; 0; −1 2; 1; 0,5; 0 2; 0; −2 2; 1; −1; −2

In the empirical analysis, cases will be placed into the research triangle according to the values they receive, and their final position will determine their location in the neomedieval model. A hypothetical case that receives final score of −8; −11 will thus approach Chaotic Anarchy; −10; 13 Durable Disorder; and 12; 1 the Westphalian system. Cases will be therefore divided into groups that are close to one of the poles – Westphalian world with cases scoring 0 – 15; 17 – −15; Durable

4.2  Research Design Westphalian system 15

0

Durable Disorder

-15 17

0

Chaotic Anarchy -15

Fig. 4.2.  Visualization of operationalization

Disorder 0  – −15; 17  – 0; and Chaotic Anarchy 0  – −15; 0  – −15. These three groups will then serve as a basis for the following analysis. Figure  4.2 presents operationalization in the research triangle.

5

Distribution of the Three Worlds

The following chapter aims at the introduction of the map crudely presenting the distribution of the three geopolitical environments across the globe. The actual position of different regions, as will be visible later on, does not neatly correspond with the ideal types, but all of them can be assigned a position inside the model. The aim of this exercise is to test the usefulness of the application of the neomedievalist model. It will also serve as a basis for the final analysis of the international dynamics in this configuration. To this end, the previously selected criteria on the regions are applied.

5.1

Regional Analysis

5.1.1 The EU+ The first set of criteria begins with the dependence on the outside actors. Despite the fact that the EU is the largest economy in the world,1 the region is in no small extent reliable on NATO for its defense. Out of the 35 (including Vatican) countries included in this category, 24 are members of the defense organization2 that is dominated by the USA who provides the most significant part of the total spending of the alliance.3 Despite the economic strength and otherwise independent policy-making, it is essential to establish whether the strong US presence on the old continent presents a sort of dependence or not. This is a somewhat tricky issue, but in this text, the solution is that it does not consider the continent to be dependent as it provides an 1  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_ and_finance 2  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm 3  https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/us-pays-2214-nato-budgetgermany-1465-13-allies-pay-below-1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_5

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important market for the USA and has its capabilities including the nuclear weapons and UN Security Council seats and slowly moves forward toward an establishment of more competent defense and security policy. So, despite the fact that the US presence makes the continent’s defense more viable and stable, and the post-­American Europe would find itself in a more uncertain security environment, the first criterion is understood as independent (3). The issue of border control is of dual nature – country level (in some regions influenced by Schengen agreement) and the outside borders. Leaving microstates aside, out of the 31 states in the selected region, 26 are members of the Schengen area,4 leaving only the UK, Ireland, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria out. Ireland and the UK also hold no-border control regime that is likely to remain intact even after the UK exit from the EU. This area is characterized by the abolishment of the internal borders establishing an area of free movement of people, goods, and capital. Nevertheless, the Schengen countries have the ability to close their borders in case of a crisis – e.g., the recent migration crisis – and from time to time (World Cup in Germany, follow-up of the terrorist attacks in France) exercise this right quite successfully.5 The establishment of the internal free movement regime thus does not qualify as a breach of the border control principle. The second issue, however, to a certain degree does. Regional external borders are hardly guarded mainly due to the complicated geography connected primarily to the long coastline of Europe. The issue was highlighted by the inability of the EU to control the migration wave that took place as a consequence of the protracted Syrian civil war. Given the limited ability to intern and vet the refugees, the region proved that it lacks proper ability to control its borders. The issue, however, also proved that the shortcomings of the border protection are manageable inside the region and that countries are to a reasonable degree able to mitigate them. The final result is thus “minor defects” (1). State failure is, in FSI methodology, not a significant issue for the regional countries, except for Cyprus due to the Northern Cyprus issue. In 2012, the average score was 38.6, and in 2017 it fell to 36.2. Summed up, the score is 37.4 – stable (1). The EU+ region is globally known for the high level of social services it provides to its population. Basic healthcare systems and insurance are available in all of the countries and are even established on an EU level by the institution of the European Health Insurance Card.6 European countries provide many other benefits in areas like maternal leave, unemployment support, education (some parts of Europe provide free education on all levels), or pensions. Some parts of the service provision are privatized, but states set standards of the quality and have reasonable control over the most of the advanced and all basic services that are offered to the population as a part of the goods provision and establishment of the social net (1). 4  See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/ schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf 5   More on Schengen at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-andvisas/schengen/index_en.htm 6  See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=559

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The issue of non-state actors on a functional level is somewhat complicated. We can observe that different non-state actors play an important role in economy and society. There are also a number of think tanks, newspapers, and other private enterprises that are directly affecting the political sphere. It can be argued that Europe in many respects follows suit described by D. Rothkopf. Non-state actors thus play an important role but arguably can still be regulated by state institutions  – e.g., Volkswagen emission scandal.7 So despite their strong, mainly economic, presence, their role can be best described as sharing the functions with state (1). Looking at the issue of territorial non-state actors, the selected region, so far, does not have any territories out of the state control with the occasional exception of parts of the largest cities like Parisian suburbs. These territories are, nevertheless, not posing a challenge to the state institutions. There are also no successful territorial non-state actors challenging the state institutions present in any part of the region (3). Looking at the last issue, we need to assess the role of the EU structures as an independent power broker, as well as the position of the private commercial organizations on the politics of the region. First, it is hardly speculative whether one can understand the EU structures as an independent body or as a follow-up of the national governments. While looking at the issues crucial to the analysis, it is observable that the basic state functions are still primarily based on state level (police, army, right to close borders, power to declare state of emergency, etc.) but also that the EU structures follow the national principle in most of its decision-­ making. More problematic is the role of the EU toward the other regional actors who must negotiate with the entity as a whole. The EU thus has its bargaining potential in the intraregional politics, but the role of states is still strong enough. Looking at the other issue, the role of corporations on some bilateral and multilateral treaties is visible, but their influence is in the most important topics overrun by the EU (e.g., Google and the right for privacy8) or state interests (e.g., sanctions against Russia following the Ukrainian crisis). In sum, this factor is awarded as influenced by the non-state actors (1). Moving to the second set of factors, it is necessary to begin with the use of violence. Despite the recent surge in the number of terrorist attacks inside the region, the number of killed is still rather low in comparison with the other regions9 and mostly legitimate. There is no interstate armed conflict taking place, and the amount of people dying in violent incidents is low.10 The EU+ thus receives score (2). This factor is connected to the second variable – presence of conflict. The score is no conflict (3). Turning to the less security-oriented factors, the provision of basic goods in the region is primarily a responsibility of states or is regulated by states (0). The whole region is fully connected to the global system of flows and establishes  See http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772  For example, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-eu-privacy/google-under-fire-from-regu lators-on-eu-privacy-ruling-idUSKBN0FT1AZ20140724 9  See, for example, http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/violence/by-country/ 10  Hear, for example, http://www.rozhlas.cz/plus/interviewplus/_zprava/utoky-v-evrope-je-duvodk-panice-evropa-neni-epicentrem-nasili-odpovida-politolog-ditrych%2D%2D1636057 7 8

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one of the centers of the globalized economy (2). The level of intraregional openness is high (2). Placing the region inside a regionalist framework is a daunting task. Given the scale selected, we can easily see that the European project overcame the free trade area phase, but the selection of a proper conceptualization is slightly problematic. This is mainly due to the issue of the uneven integration of different parts of the selected region into different integrative projects on the European continent. The issue can be illustrated on the various memberships of countries in structures like the EU, Schengen area, the Eurozone, or the Nordic Council. Nevertheless, the region will be awarded (1). The final set of factors includes the nature of non-state actors and the spread of weaponry. Despite the fact that the threat of terrorism inside the region is growing, many far-right groups establish their militias, and many criminal organized groups operate in the region. It must be concluded that the nature of the vast majority of the non-state actors in the region is so far peaceful. This is especially true following the end of the armed struggles by groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Red Army Faction (RAF), or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (2). The issue of weaponry proliferation is twofold. On the one hand, there is the overall high amount of weapons present on the continent. Despite the fact that the exact numbers differ, many regional countries are ranked as the most proliferated states in the world (e.g., Karp 2007). On the other hand, a vast majority of these weapons are licensed and legally owned so the factor is ranked as spread controlled by state (2).

5.1.2 Balkans The second region comprises of the remaining Balkans countries – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Kosovo is for the purposes of this chapter not considered to be a state as it is still too intimately connected to the Serbian politics and its open status plays a vital role in the regional dynamics. The issue of the foreign intervention is twofold. First, there is sizeable monetary support by the EU that since the 1990s helped the region to progress in economic and social terms (the summary can be found in (Huliaras 2011, 422–426)). The second issue is connected to the direct foreign intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is a de facto protectorate and Kosovo that hosts international military and civilian mission. The outside influence in the region is thus significant and is for the whole region ranked as major foreign aid (−1). Border control variable shifted in the recent years. Despite the fact that the countries had their issues with border control throughout the 1990s and 2000s (first as a consequence of the civil war and following as many non-state groups operated across the whole region), the current migration wave put the entire border system under enormous pressure, and after initial collapse of the border regime, the countries were able to facilitate a reasonable degree of border protection. Nevertheless, the countries were able to react and except for the Kosovo border that is out of the Serbian control to a reasonable degree established effective regulations. Border

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control thus shows only minor defects (1). FSI ranked the region in average on 68.7 in 2012 and 65.1 in 2017. This means the score of 66.9 – warning (−1). Despite the fact that the provision of the social goods is not as developed as in the case of the EU+, the regional state is reasonably capable of taking care the basic social functions of its population11 (1). The issue of non-state actors on functional level is to a large degree connected to the presence of the organized crime in the region.12 The issue is mostly intertwined with illegal drug trade and human trafficking with the follow-up issue of corruption. There is also a limited but growing influence of the radical Islamist groups, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 The variable is thus ranked as (1) as the actors do not wish to overtake the state functions, only to make the space for their criminal activities, or are yet incapable of doing so. The related issue of the territorial non-state actors is ranked as (−1.5) due to the presence of significant Kosovo enclave that presents a substantial territorial unit out of the state control. Despite its wide recognition14 and state-like status, it still displays an important derogation as Kosovo is not admitted as the UN member and fully independent and in no small degree still dependent on foreign support (situation to some degree shared by Bosnia and Herzegovina). Finally, as for the first part of the analysis, we can feel somewhat strong presence of the international organizations as brokers in the region (mainly the EU or NATO). These are, however, not non-state actors in their right, so this variable is given score (1) as the influence of Kosovo and some other non-state actors like violent non-state actors or NGOs affects the regional policy. Moving to the second axis, the first variable is the use of violence. The Balkans is well-known for occasional outbreaks of localized violence as exemplified, for example, by the 2016 attacks in Kosovo parliament,15 or other usually unnoticed outbursts connected to politics, ethnicity, or more recently the migrant crisis. The variable is, nevertheless, scored (2) as the comparative use of violence in the global context after the violent 1990s is still low. Given the presence of armed conflict, the region has been largely stabilized. After the end of Yugoslav civil war and stabilization of situation in places like Kosovo and Macedonia, the variable can be given (3). The next set of factors includes the provision of basic goods, in case of Balkans, mainly connected to (unrecognized) states (0) and connection to the global flows. This link is increased mostly, thanks to the influence of the neighboring EU. Most of the economic cooperation is related to the European space, but the overall connection can still be ranked (2).16 The level of an intraregional openness is ranked as limited (0.5) as many barriers are decreased mainly due to the influence of the EU,  See, for example, http://www.socialwatch.eu/wcm/national_reports.html  See https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Balkan_study.pdf 13  See http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-presence-in-bosnia-cause-for-concern-a-1085326.html, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/radical-islam ists-see-an-opening-in-bosnia/273633/ 14  Current level of recognition is presented at https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ 15  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-parliament-idUSKCN0VZ26F 16  See, for example, data from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ 11 12

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while some regions (e.g., Kosovo) and issues (e.g., migrant issue) prevent the region from a higher level of connectedness. The issue of regional bodies is ranked (0) as the ultimate aim of all countries in the region (with certain ambiguity in case of Serbia) is the admission into the European structures. The issue of the nature of non-state actors currently active and relevant in the region is hard to assess unambiguously. The Balkan region is well-known for its spread of criminal organizations or activities of particular terrorist cells, while on the other hand many NGOs are present, mainly connected to the regional development (Rossi 2015). The nature of non-state actors is thus ranked as combined (0). Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is rated as (1) based on the research by Small Arms Survey (2014).

5.1.3 East Europe The two countries of Moldova and Ukraine face a difficult position vis-à-vis their neighborhood. Both states have parts of their claimed territories carved out with an important presence of Russian forces taking place. Following the Maidan Revolution, Ukraine became a major target of different humanitarian and development aid programs,17 Crimea is under Russian occupation, and Eastern Ukraine is heavily influenced by Russian politics and de facto controlled by local militias/Russian forces. Similarly, Moldova is a recipient of important foreign aid,18 and Transnistria is hosting Russian armed forces. Given the different nature of foreign intervention in various territories of the selected region, we award the first category (−1). Border control issue is connected to the inability of both Ukraine and Moldova to control their respective Eastern borders. The criterion is awarded (−1)  – major defects. Countries’ FSI scores were in average 73 in both years, while both countries showed utterly opposing dynamics – Moldova toward stability while Ukraine on the contrary. The resulting score is warning (−1). State functions are in both cases taken care of very problematically. First, there is an apparent lack of provision of state functions by Ukraine and Moldova on territories of Crimea, Donbass, and Transnistria. Second, even the functions in places under the state’s control, this provision is somewhat problematic, while in a global comparative perspective it is still present. The countries show some important gaps in the provision. It is thus awarded (0) as the presence of parallel structures (oligarch, externally funded Transnistria, etc.) is rather strong. The presence of non-­ state actors on the functional level is rather strong. This is mainly observable in case of Ukraine and strong penetration of oligarchs into politics. This penetration corrupts the whole political, economic, and social structure of the country. Another example of the significant importance of the non-state actors on functional level is a high level of influence of Sheriff company in Transnistria (Całus 2013). The factor  For example, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-jaresko-10-billion-foreign-aid/27512149.html  For example, http://us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/l/115/Moldova, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/moldova_en.htm

17

18

5.1  Regional Analysis

67

is awarded (−1). Non-state actors on territorial level constitute a significant issue of the region with the presence of self-proclaimed Transnistria, Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and Crimea as an occupied territory. The region thus holds major territorial units present (−1.5). Last, but not least, all of the above-mentioned non-state actors are very influential in regional negotiations and politics in general. States are thus apparently not the only power brokers (despite the fact that most of these non-state actors are connected to and dominated by the Russian interests), and the factor is awarded (−1). The issue of the use of violence is diverse. The area of Eastern Ukraine is undergoing a period of active armed conflict with varying levels of violence used. The rest of the region is rather quiet. The region is thus awarded an overall (0). This issue is intimately connected to the next factor. The region is currently facing one case of violent externalized conflict (Eastern Ukraine) and three instances of foreign intervention (Eastern Ukraine, Crimea, Transnistria). Presence of armed conflict is thus awarded (−2). The provision of basic goods is also different across the region. In areas controlled by the state, the state remains the most important facilitator of the goods no matter the origins of these. In war-torn Eastern Ukraine, the provision of goods is, in general, very problematic. Transnistria is, as noted earlier, de facto controlled by Sheriff and Russia, and Crimea by Russia, who claims sovereignty over the region. The final grade is thus (−1). The connection of both Ukraine and Moldova to the global flows is limited but getting stronger as the two countries re-orient their economies toward the EU19 following the Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine. The factor is currently limited (0). Given the issues on the East and attempts to protect the borders from the side of the EU on the west, we can safely claim that the intraregional openness is limited by the closed border regime and the presence of territories out of the state control (0). The region does not harbor any efficient regional organization. Both countries to some degree, nevertheless, aim to enter the Western structures (0). The nature of the non-­state actors can be seen as combined (0) – oligarchs aim for power, Eastern Ukrainian rebels with Russian aid use violence to create a separate instable zone on the Russian borders, and Transnistria attempts to govern its territory without creation of the unnecessary hostilities vis-à-vis its parent state. The spread of weaponry issue is also double-edged. First, it must be pointed out that the area of Eastern Ukraine is flooded with arms as a consequence of the armed conflict taking place there.20 In the other parts of the region, the spread of weaponry is average to other regions in its neighborhood.21 This factor is thus awarded (−1) as the issues of the uncontrolled proliferation in regions out of effective state control are very grief.

19  See https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/international-affairs/international-customscooperation-mutual-administrative-assistance-agreements/georgia-republic-moldova-ukraine_en 20  See http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-flood-of-arms-east-conflict-smuggling/27797454.html 21  See http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/moldova, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/ region/ukraine

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5.1.4 Russian Space The region of the Russian space is in this work defined as Russia and Belarus as the two allied and interconnected states with their power centers located in Europe. Looking at the issue of regional dependence, we have to award the Russian space (3), as the region is independent on foreign aid and there is no foreign intervention taking place. As for the second criterion, the border control is ranked as (1), minor defects, mainly given the sheer length of Russian borders and a limited ability to control the Siberian part of the borders. On the other hand, with an ability to protect borders at the most exposed parts like in the Baltic countries or the places of conflict (Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Russian troops are in control of the border lines. FSI ranked both countries on average 76.9 in 2012 and 75.8 in 2017. In this period Russia’s score increased, while the one of Belarus went down. The average is 76.3 – warning (−1). The state is the full provider of services (even if of disputable quality22) (1), and non-state actors at the institutional level are either sharing or persecuted (1) – issue in no small degree connected to the power of oligarchs. Ever since the end of the Chechen wars, there are no challenging territorial non-state actors (3). Finally, the state can be seen as the only relevant actor on the regional scene, as the important non-state actors that influenced policy were incorporated into the state structures or marginalized (2). These actors mainly comprise of oligarchs and insurgents in places like the Northern Caucasus. Regarding the second set of criteria, the use of violence is limited, and the acts of violence are usually conducted mainly by the Russian governmental forces or pro-­ Russian government elements (groups connected to the Chechen leadership) in the society, and the same goes for Belarus (2). Any major armed conflict in the region is currently nonexistent (3). Provision of basic goods (even of limited quality and quantity) is done by the state (0), and the connection to the global flows is limited, mainly due to the political reasons. On the one side, the region is a major exporter of natural resources; on the other, it is a target of sanctions and cuts itself from the foreign influence by, among others, censorship of the Internet (0). Border regime in the region is closed with attempts to incorporate Belarus closer to the Russian influence (0). Both states are united in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite its many problems, it is still ranked as an economic union (1). The nature of the non-state actors must be understood as combined (0). This is mainly due to the presence of pro-governmental militias in the Caucasus (Souleimanov 2015), actions of pro-­regime groups against the opposition figures, or presence of terrorist and criminal groups. The issue of gun proliferation is somewhat problematic and is awarded (1) despite the problems of the state to tackle the spread of weaponry in some regions and among some groups. The general number of weapons among the population is understood not to be extraordinary or higher than among other countries of the wider region.23  For example, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-health-care-is-dying-a-slow-death45839 23  http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/russia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/ belarus 22

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5.1.5 The Caucasus Caucasus region is defined as comprising of the three post-Soviet countries of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The issue of dependence on foreign actors varies. Part of Georgia is under direct Russian occupation (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), and Armenia is mainly dependent on foreign aid from Russia as well. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is economically rather stable, despite the presence of Nagorno-­ Karabakh region on its territory. As even Georgia receives the major level of foreign aid,24 mainly from its Western partners, this factor is awarded (−2). Border control has minor defects (1) as both Georgia and Azerbaijan do not control all of their claimed borders but can to some degree enforce the de facto borders with the secessionist entities. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the border is ensured by a presence of a frontline; in case of Georgian separatist entities, the borderline is stable as long as the Russian troops do not move it as to gain some form of an advantage. These shifts are, however, minor. The region was ranked with an average FSI score of 78.9 in 2012 and 74.6 in 2017, totaling score 76.8 – warning (−1). Provision of the basic services is at least to a relevant degree controlled by a state except for the de facto states’ territories (1). The issue of non-state actors on a functional level is not a grief one (1), but the issue of territorial units is (−1.5). This is the case, once again, connected to the presence of unrecognized entities. There are three established de facto states inside the region – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite the fact that they differ in their composition, effectiveness, level of democracy, etc. (O’Loughlin et al. 2015), they are all capable (with external support) of denying their parent states’ access to their territory. As for the importance of non-state actors as regional power brokers, this last factor is awarded (1) as the de facto states present important actors affecting the regional policy-­ making, but they are to a large extent controlled by the interests of the Russian Federation – a state actor. The use of violence in the region is primarily connected to the conflict about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh where occasional outbursts of violence appear.25 This accounts for a manageable use of violence (0). After a settlement of the Georgian separatist issues by force, the presence of armed conflict is awarded (0) – limited rebellion. Provision of basic goods is once again granted (0) as these are provided either by a state or state-like units, with different effectiveness. Connection to the global flows is limited, mainly given the geography, autocratic type of governance in Azerbaijan and to a certain degree in Armenia, and the internal problems (0). Nevertheless, Georgia attempts to connect to the Western structures, and Azerbaijan aims to become fully connected to the global oil and gas market. Intraregional border regime is closed (0), and there is no effective regional body present (0). Important non-state actors use limited amounts of violence (0), be it de facto states

24  For example, https://www.usaid.gov/georgia, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neigh bourhood-region-and-russia_en 25  For example, http://www.rferl.org/a/nagorno-Karabakh-heavy-fighting-armenia-azerbaijan/276 49973.html

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or criminal gangs, etc. Finally, the issue of spread of weaponry is limited by state (1) with the regulation most effective in Azerbaijan.26

5.1.6 Central Asia The Central Asian region is delimited by the post-Soviet “Stans”  – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The issue of dependence on foreign actors is mostly connected to the reliance on profit from sales of natural resources in cases of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan which is still in a vast majority dependent on the infrastructure going through a single country  – Russia. There are also some forms of foreign assistance to the remaining two countries,27 but the most important path of foreign intervention is via political, economic, and security influence and/or dependence on Russia and increasingly the PRC. The region is thus ranked (1). Given the large areas the countries claim control of and the high level of illegal trade passing through the region (Kupatadze 2012, 140–152; Cornell 2007), the border control can be assessed as having major defects (−1). According to the FSI, the stability of the region increased throughout the last 5 years from 81.4 in 2012 to 77.1 in 2017. This makes an average of 79.3 – warning (−1). The provision of social services is usually not restricted to weak or authoritarian states but is also largely provided by illicit means (Asia Today 2016). A significant amount of services that are traditionally connected to state is also provided by different non-state actors (Ziegler 2015, 137–196). The factor is ranked (0). Similarly, the non-state actors on the functional level can be seen as overtaking not only because of the provision of basic services but also due to the significant presence of different mafias and illicit economy actors28 (−1). There is currently no significant territorial non-state actor present (0). Regional policy dynamics is mainly dominated by state actors (countries geographically located in the area plus Russia, China, the USA, European countries) with some influence by non-state actors which is, however, not so significant (2). The issue of the use of violence is problematic. The state actors being mainly authoritative regimes used the veil of war against terror to crack down on opposition and minorities. Also, the use of violence by organized crime groups can be seen as an issue. The region is thus ranked (0). The region currently undergoes no significant violent conflict (3). As noted earlier, the provision of basic goods can be rated as combined (0). The region has, mainly due to geographic and historical context, only limited connection to the international flows. This link is mainly established by penetration of the world markets via Russia or increasingly China. Also, the authoritative character of the regimes leads to a lesser connection to the  http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/georgia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/ armenia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/armenia 27  http://amcu.gki.tj/eng/images/FAR-2014/foreign_aid_for_tajikistan_in_figures_en.pdf; http:// www.ecrg.ro/files/p2012.2(1)7y8.pdf 28  For example, https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=78 26

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outside world via the Internet or other means (0). The border regime is closed despite much inefficiency in border control (0). There are no efficient regional organizations (0). The nature of non-state actors is dual – there are those providing the basic services in cases the state is unable/unwilling to, and there are also violent actors like organized crime groups and terrorist organizations (0). The spread of arms is limited (1).29

5.1.7 Chinese Space The countries in the Chinese region  – People’s Republic of China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Mongolia  – are not dependent on the outside actors. North Korea is in this respect largely economically dependent on the external aid (coming mainly from China), but there is no direct foreign presence on its territory (3). Despite the enormous length of the Chinese borders, the country is to a relevant degree able to control the movement. Mongolia, on the other hand, lacks human resources to control its border effectively – this border is, nevertheless, not challenged (1). FSI scores decreased on average from 2012’s 74.9 to 77.5 in 2017. This establishes a final score of 76.2 – warning (−1). The PRC can provide basic services with some deficiencies especially in the hinterland regions, while the North Korea lacks an ability of even basic provision on a continuous basis. Mongolia in this respect once again faces an issue of enormously low population density (1). There are no major non-state actors on both functional (2) and territorial (3) levels. The most important non-state actors comprise of national movement in places like Xinjiang, but these are generally successfully repressed by the central government. States are the only main actors present in the intraregional dynamics (2). The use of (state-based) violence is quite high. Not only is the North Korean regime very repressive but also China is a world leader in capital punishment.30 This factor is thus ranked (0) as the violence is almost exclusively perpetrated by the central governments. The region does not face a major rebellion with the exception of the Xinjiang issue that is being pacified. However, there are many flash points in the region such as Tibet or the whole of North Korea. This factor is thus also awarded (0). Basic goods are in general provided by a state (0). The whole region is connected to the world markets mainly via China. The effects of closed North Korea and hinterland Mongolia are in this respect irrelevant (2). The region operates in a closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in the region, but China is an important member of some wider bodies (0). Non-state actors are either connected to state (e.g., large businesses) or in minority comprise of rebel movements like the one in Xinjiang. Violent non-state actors, however, remain 29  http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/uzbekistan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/ region/turkmenistan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/tajikistan, http://www.gunpolicy. org/firearms/region/kyrgyzstan, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/kazakhstan, http:// www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/central-asia 30  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective#interexec

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successfully pacified in the major parts of the region (2). The spread of weaponry can be regarded as managed by the state with some exceptions in the Xinjiang region (1).31

5.1.8 East Asia In the next section, we are going to introduce the region of East Asia which is for the purposes of this work delimited by countries of South Korea, Japan, and de facto state Taiwan. Taiwan is included as it used to be fully recognized state and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council that lost its international recognition purely on a political basis without any loss of effectiveness. Unlike Kosovo, it does not affect its parent state as far as the selected criteria are considered. It is also geographically distinct. For this study, Taiwan (or the Republic of China) is attributed as a state inside this region. The region is fully self-sufficient except for the security guarantees given to it by the US military (3). It also holds full control of its borders – in case Taiwan’s claims for a mainland China territory are disregarded as de facto irrelevant – as these are either islands or the heavily militarized border between North and South Korea (2). FSI (not accounting for Taiwan) gives the region averages of 40.6  in 2012 and 37.8 in 2017 – in average 39.2 meaning stable (1). The state is a fully competent provider of basic services (1), and the non-state actors on the functional level are part of the system not opposing it in any significant way as evident from the position of Japanese or South Korean companies (1). There is no non-state territorial competition to states as these are capable of projecting the power throughout the whole of their territory (3). Conceptualizing Taiwan as a state, states remain the only relevant actors in the regional politics (2). Despite the threat coming from the North Korean military and nuclear program, there are currently no significant levels of violence, and the change of the internal setting toward the appearance of violent clashes is unlikely (2). The North Korean issue seems to remain the only possible flash point regarding the appearance of a violent conflict as the Chinese invasion of Taiwan is improbable. There is no violent conflict taking place (3). The state in all the cases remains the primary provider of basic services (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2) both on the trade and information levels. There are no barriers to the spread of communication technologies, and the region is at a global forefront of the technological development. The level of intraregional openness is also high due to the reasons described earlier (2). The region is currently dealing with the establishment of the free trade area (0.5). Predominantly, the nature of the non-state actors is peaceful (2) even as Japan gave the world one of the most famous criminal groups – Yakuza. The spread of weaponry is low32 (2). 31  http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/china, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/ mongolia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/north-korea 32  For example, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-38365729

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5.1.9 Southeast Asia Southeast Asia is in this work defined by the membership in ASEAN organization as one of the more effective regional bodies. States in the region are mainly independent on the outside actors (3). Border control is characterized by minor defects primarily connected to the massive waves of migration arriving mainly into Indonesia and Malaysia mostly from Myanmar (Thom 2016) (1). The level of state fragility overall decreased from 75.3 in 2012 to 72.7 in 2017. The average score is 74 – warning (−1). The state is to a relevant degree able to provide basic services (1), and non-state actors on a functional level are usually cooperating except for the insurgency movements in places like Myanmar (ethnic and religious minorities33), the Philippines (connected to the presence of the IS and resistance movements operating in the region for a protracted period of time34), or Indonesia (ethnic and religious minorities35). Another problem in this respect is connected to the effects of drug trafficking (Cornell 2007) or piracy36 (0). The same goes for the presence of territorial non-state actors that control some territory like Shan or Kachin in Myanmar, or Islamic uprising in Mindanao, the Philippines (0). Due to this factor, the actions of states are to a certain degree affected by the non-state actors but are still the dominant actors (1). Due to the proliferation of violence in places like Myanmar (ethnic and religiously based) and Philippines (violent actions against criminal activities, religiously motivated insurgency), the next factor is awarded (0) despite the fact that large swaths of the region are otherwise rather calm. The region undergoes a period of full-blown rebellions in places like Myanmar, the Philippines, or Indonesia (−1), and the provision of basic goods is combined, depending on the location (0). The region is with exceptions of some subregions fully connected to the global flows (2) and lies at the main transport routes from East Asia to the Persian Gulf and Europe. The level of intraregional openness is of limited openness (0.5). The ASEAN is based on economic integration without political ties – its membership does not include any provisions regarding the political system, etc. It is in this respect a somewhat successful organization (0.5). The nature of non-state actors is, as noted earlier, combined (0). States in the region are unable to effectively limit the spread of weaponry (−1) which is manifested in the ability of armed rebellions and other violent non-state actors to challenge the state institutions. This is a consequence of limited state capabilities and complicated geography of the region.

 For example, http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-rohingya-insurgents-myanmar-creates-itsown-frankenstein/ 34  For example, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/asia/marawi-philippines-isis-civilians.html?mcubz=0 35  For example, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-human-tragedy-of-west-papua/ 36  For example, http://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/ 33

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5.1.10 Oceania The tenth region covered in this work comprises of Australia, New Zealand, and the smaller Pacific Ocean states. The region is entirely independent except for the non-­ sovereign territories37 located in the Pacific Ocean (3). But some of the smaller Pacific nations are increasingly influenced by the external actors. While the historical presence of the USA is well established and institutionalized, the Chinese interest might change the shape of the political landscape in the region. The states generally provide a high level of border control (Dickson 2015) to a point allowed by the geographic conditions (2). FSI score moved from an average 67.2 to 65.9 with Australia and New Zealand showing much better record than average. The overall rating is 66.5 – warning (−1). States are generally capable of providing the basic services with the exception of minority cases like East Timor (1), and the non-­ state actors can be described as willing and sharing (1). Non-state actors on the territorial level can be currently summed up in the case of Bougainville which is, however, currently peaceful and in the process of transition to independent statehood (Baar 2017). The independence referendum is planned to take place in June 2019 (3). States are the chief actors in the intraregional development (2). There is no significant amount of illegitimate violence taking place (2), nor any significant armed conflict (3). Despite the violent past of some of the islands and secessionist movements that took place all over the region, the situation seems to stabilize by the time of writing of this work. States are in general providers or facilitators of basic services (0) with some exceptions. The provision of goods varies between Australia and New Zealand, and the remaining less effective countries in the region. The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The regional setting is mainly closed (0). This is connected to the issues of migration but also environmental protection that is taken seriously by governments protecting the unique landscapes of Australia and New Zealand. There is no important regional organization (0). The non-state actors are mostly peaceful (2), and the spread of weaponry is limited efficiently (2).38

5.1.11 Indian Space The region is to a reasonable level independent on the foreign support (1). India plays a dominant role and while being a partner of many external players seems to operate to a relevant degree independently. The external pressures are stronger in Sri Lanka with a significant Chinese presence connected to the port of Hambantota. The border defects are just minor (1) with the most substantial issues related to the lower capacity of the smaller states to control their frontiers and many border

 Examples include American Samoa, Guam, French Polynesia, Niue, New Caledonia, or Tokelau.  For example, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/australia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/new-zealand

37 38

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disputes of India with mainly China and Pakistan.39 State failure has been ranked at 87.6 in 2012 and 84.1 in 2017 making an average of 85.4 – warning (−1). Provision of basic social services is far from ideal, while the basic functions are to some degree provided. The developmental policy is one of the key areas of the policymaking in the region (0). Presence of the functional non-state actors can be awarded as average (1). After the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the only significant semi-territorial actors remain in Kashmiri bid for independence and localized insurgencies in Indian periphery (0). The most important actors are states. They are, to some degree, influenced by non-state actors such as regional movements in India or, in the near past, Maoist guerrillas in Nepal (1). The use of violence is manageable. There are occasional riots and waves of violence along the ethnic and/or religious lines, but the situation is not outgrown to a point of major troubles known from other less stable regions (0). There is no significant armed conflict taking place in the region, while some smaller issues are related to the ethnic tensions in Bangladesh,40 regional disputes in India,41 or political instability in Nepal42 (0). The main, if not always capable, provider of the social goods is the state, with limited reach in peripheral and less developed parts of the region (0). The region is in general connected to the global system of flows (2). The region is defined by limited openness (0.5), and there is no effective regional body present (0). Non-state actors, in general, use a limited amount of violence (0) – there are many economically oriented important actors as well as secessionist and terrorist organizations in place. The spread of weaponry can be deemed as quite high with states unable to adequately control the spread (−1).43

5.1.12 AfPak The so-called AfPak region (term coined by the Obama administration) is one of the areas that remain in the spotlight of the international community. Afghanistan for a protracted period of time (lastly since 2001) hosts foreign forces and is highly dependent on the development assistance from abroad, while Pakistan depends on the foreign aid from the USA and China (−2). Border control is characterized by major defects with the border running through the Pashtun region practically invisible (Synnott 2009). On the other hand, the Pakistani-Indian border is heavily militarized and hardly penetrable (−1). The region is rated rather high in the FSI. In 2012 the average score was 103.8, while in 2017 it decreased to 103.1 mainly due to the improvement of the situation in Pakistan. The average score is thus  See, for example, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm  For example, http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2015/06/bangladesh-indigenous-ban-worseapartheid-150616134617804.html 41  For example, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/05/sight-india-bloody-maoistconflict-170508120738882.html 42  For example, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/nepals-unending-political-instability/ 43  For example, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/20/world/la-fg-india-guns-20120221 39 40

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103.5 – alert (−2). Both countries lost most of the ability to provide social services44 with the situation being significantly better in Pakistan (−1). Non-state actors in many parts of the region overtake the state functions (−1) with the most prominent actors being Taliban in increasingly large parts of Afghanistan and historically Afghan warlords that to some degree interact with the state institutions while keeping a high level of independence (Mukhopadhyay 2014). The same actors control large swath of land in the northwest of Pakistan (−3). Non-state actors as thus in effect important power brokers (−1)  – especially Taliban and local warlords in Afghanistan. Taliban can be considered an equal to the Afghan government and some form of power-sharing agreement seems to be likely. There is a significant amount of illegitimate violence being used (−2) and a long-­ running ethnonationalist conflict in both countries (−2). The conflict itself has an international dimension added via the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and penetration of the international terrorist groups into the region to name a few. It is not only run on the line between insurgents and the central government supported by the external actors (both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also among the groups themselves – most prominently Taliban and the Islamic State). Goods are in large parts of the region provided by the traditional actors and Taliban (−1). Connection to the global flows is limited (0). Intraregional openness is determined by the collapse of the border regime between the two countries (−1). There is no effective regional body (0). The local non-state actors are in large very violent and aggressive (−2) and have access to abundant amount of weaponry (−2) that was pouring to the region in high quantities since the 1980s.

5.1.13 Iran Iran is mainly independent with a meaningful possibility of foreign assistance blocked in the past by the application of international sanctions connected to the Iranian nuclear program, support to groups deemed as terrorist, and testing of rocket systems. The contemporary development seems to continue this trend of forced isolation and indigenous power projection in the Middle Eastern region (3). The ability to control borders is high even given the problematic geography and demography (Marshall 2015, 116–119) (2). Scores for the FSI in 2017 is 85.8 and in 2012 89.6. The average is thus 87.7 – warning (−1). The state is to a relevant extent relatively capable provider of basic functions. This provision differs throughout the territory and in relation to the extent of sanctions imposed. Limitations in a provision of basic goods were manifested in 2017/2018 protests that took place inside the country (0). There are no important non-state actors on functional (2) or territorial45 (3) level. This does not mean that Iran is not facing a threat from these actors; it is just so far capable of managing them. The state is the only relevant actor (2).  See, for example, Thruelsen (2010).  For the discussion over the Iranian secessionist groups, see Czulda (2017).

44 45

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The use of violence is mainly legitimate (meaning state-based) with some problems stemming from regions like Balochistan and Sistan (Czulda 2017) (2), and there is no serious armed conflict taking place on the Iranian territory (3). Provision of basic goods is mainly connected to state institutions (0). Iran’s connection to global flows is primarily limited by the international sanctions connected to its political and military activity (0). Currently, the level of export of natural resources is depending on the current state of sanctions against the regime in Tehran that are uncertain. The rupture between the US Trump administration and the European position is well-known. Other partners like India and Russia are cooperating with Iran on different levels and with different intensity. The issue of intraregional openness is irrelevant given that the region is defined by just one country, but it can be substituted with its relation to the surrounding countries. In this case, the factor can be graded as closed border regime (0). There is no effective regional body in place even if taking into account Iran’s external relations (0). The nature of non-state actors is mixed between peaceful like different commercial or local actors and rebellious actors in regions like Balochistan and Sistan (0). The spread of weaponry is quite high but still manageable (1).46

5.1.14 Turkey The next region is also defined by only one country – Turkey. Turkey is relatively independent on the foreign actors. The example of the foreign aid provision is connected to the EU financing related to the Turkish settling of the Syrian refugees47 (3). Turkish border control is affected by minor defects connected to its restive southern border, but as evident from the reaction to the development in the conflict and the migration crisis, the state is capable of rather effective border protection (1). FSI highlights a trend toward decreasing stability in Turkey. In 2012 the score was 76.6, while in 2017 it raised up to 80.8. The average is 78.7 – warning (−1). The state is quite a relevant provider of social services with exceptions in hinterland (mainly Eastern) regions (1). The most important alternative actor on a functional level is an army. However, the army itself can be hardly described as a non-state actor, and its role in the society is decreasing. The second important actor, Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or the Kurdish Worker’s Party) is a semi-­ territorial group operating inside Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. The issue of functional non-state actors is thus awarded (2) as PKK does not overcome any important state functions, and territorial groups are ranked (0) as the group’s operations are capable of making some parts of territory hardly accessible for the Turkish state authorities but are incapable of providing quasi-governance. State operations are to some degree affected by the non-state actors (1), not only PKK but also other groups that affect the country mainly since the beginning of the civil war in Syria and Iraq. 46 47

 See http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/iran  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413

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The country is defined by manageable use of violence connected mainly to the activities of the PKK and radical Islamist movements (0). There is a limited rebellion taking place in Kurdish separatist movement (0). Basic goods are provided mainly by state (0). The country is fully connected to the global flows (2). This variable might change in the future if the Turkish government increases the limitations in the access to the World Wide Web. The border regime is closed (0). There is no effective regional body that Turkey is a member of (0) despite its long-term (fading) interest in joining the EU and NATO membership which does not influence the country’s sovereignty in the sense of sovereignty pooling. Despite the presence of the PKK and other radical elements in the country, the Turkish non-state actors’ relation to violence can be assessed as combined (0). Even the PKK itself was repeatedly willing to follow cease-fires (White 2015). The spread of weapons can still be seen as limited by state with a possible change to less stable situation in connection with the ongoing Syrian war and a potential penetration of the Turkish territory by violent non-state actors (1).

5.1.15 Larger Mesopotamia Countries of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq became a global symbol of instability. They face direct intervention from countries inside and outside the Middle East (Iraq since 2003, Syria since 2011, Lebanon for different periods of time). These interventions are manifested in a direct support for the regimes (e.g., Russia and Assad regime, the USA and regime in Baghdad) or the use of proxy elements (e.g., Iran and Hezbollah, the USA and YPG) (−2). The countries are unable to control most of their borders. This is evident in places like the Syrian-Iraqi border that is penetrable for a long time mainly due to the states’ weakness and complicated geography (−2). State failure rating raised from 2012’s 94.9 to 2017’s 101.4 making average 98.1 – alert (−2). The state is unable to provide basic services to a majority of population (−1) given their institutional weakness and incapacity to control territory. The situation is the most severe in Syria that is hit by a protracted civil war. Many state functions on large swaths of land are overtaken by non-state actors like Hezbollah48 or Kurdish political institutions in Syria (Iraqi Kurdish institutions are incorporated into the state administration). These alternative actors often provide much better service related to the provision of goods than the state in some regions ever did (−2). Large areas are also controlled by these and more radical groups like Daesh (mainly in the period 2014–2016) or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This is once again an issue most relevant for Syria but present all over the region (−3). Non-state actors are also important and sometimes key brokers in the regional politics (−1). When it comes to the use of violence, the whole region is for a protracted period of time a center of massive atrocities and loss of lives (−2). The region is in the 48

 See Avon et al. (2012).

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midst of a violent civil conflict (Lebanon is highly unstable since civil war in the 1980s (Norton 2007), Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003, and Syria since 2011 (Byman 2015)) (−4). The basic goods are provided on a minimal level and only in limited areas. Large swaths of territory are not covered either by a state or some of the non-state actors (−2). The region has a limited connection to global flows (0) – mainly via the oil sales and human migration. The limitations are connected to the low capability of the states to establish the proper connection. The region is incapable of cooperation due to collapse (−1), and there are no effective regional bodies (0). Non-state actors are predominantly violent – no matter whether aggressively like the IS or defensively like Peshmerga (−2). The spread of weaponry is high and unmitigated (−2).

5.1.16 Gulf Monarchies Gulf monarchies are generally independent, basing their power on wealth coming from the oil drilling. The only exception is a form of security guarantee given to the countries by the US military (3). The countries in the region can generate full control over their borders. This control can be complicated by geographical factors, but given the enormous wealth available, the obstacles can be overcome (2). The level of state fragility in the Gulf was in 2012 57.2 and 55.8 in 2017. This set the region as stable (1) with 56.5 on average. The states are full providers of basic services for its citizens that are also one of the leading sources of regimes’ legitimacy. This provision is usually connected to the citizens only, while the foreigners working in the countries are often disqualified from these (1). Non-state actors on both functional and territorial levels are either incorporated into the state structures/cooperating with a state (large companies) or forced out of the region (jihadist groups (Hegghammer 2010)). Challenges from the non-state actors come generally from abroad (2), (3). States are the only relevant actors in the region as they are so far able to force the non-state actors into the surrounding regions (2). The region is not witnessing any significant degree of illegitimate violence. Violence is usually state-based (2). There is no significant armed conflict taking place (3), while the regional actors are involved in conflicts in places like Syria, Yemen, or Libya. The proxy warfare that takes place among the Gulf monarchies and between the likes of Saudi Arabia and Iran is taking place outside of the region. Goods are provided by the state (0). The region is, with occasional restrictions of information flows, fully connected to the global flows. This connection is crucial for the wealth of the region either regarding the selling of the natural resources or import of work labor from other regions (2). The intraregional system is closed (0). There are no effective regional bodies present – despite some common forums being set up to deal with some particular issues like the oil production or security (like Gulf Cooperation Council) (0). Non-state actors use limited means of violence (reoccurring terrorist attacks, violent protests, etc.) (0). The spread of weaponry is high with the countries able to somehow control the spread (1).

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5.1.17 Western Middle East The three countries located in the region – Israel, Jordan, and Egypt – can be called partially independent. The most visible form of foreign assistance can be found in military support for the regimes.49 All of the countries are recipients of some of the largest number of foreign military support from the USA (1). The border control has minor defects. These are mainly connected to the limitations regarding the control over the vast Egyptian-African borders (1). The average FSI score in 2012 and 2017 was the same 82.5 – warning (−1). In all cases, we can assess the provision of basic services as parallel. Israel is the most capable actor. However, part of its territory is to some degree governed by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas (0). There are important actors challenging the state on the functional level – mainly the Islamic opposition (−1). The only important territorial non-state actor is Palestine divided between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Another problematic region is the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula (−1.5). Non-state actors influence the regional relations, but the central power still goes with states (1). Use of violence is medium and can still be considered manageable. It is mainly connected to the Palestine question and spill-over effects in combination with outbursts of social and other unrest mainly inside Egypt and Jordan (0). Conflict in the region can be in terms of this work’s methodology best described as a limited rebellion (Palestine, Sinai) (0). Basic goods are mainly provided by (de facto) state entities in combination with post-modern (NGOs) and traditional actors (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows with exception of some less developed hinterland regions (2). The border regime is closed (0). There is no effective regional body (0). The region hosts a combination of violent and peaceful nonstate actors. Some of them have their military and civil wing (e.g., Hamas) (0). States are unable to adequately control the spread of weaponry as evident from places like the Gaza Strip or Sinai Peninsula, or as manifested by terrorist attacks in all three countries (−1).

5.1.18 Northern Africa As the region usually understood as Northern Africa is too extensive for the purposes of this study, it begins with examination of the part consisting of more homogeneous group of countries – Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, and Niger. Some of the countries are directly affected by the foreign agents – be it attempts to use some of the sides of the Libyan conflict for their strategic interests50 or to end the  For example, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement/u-s-israel-sign-38-billionmilitary-aid-package-idUSKCN11K2CI, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/obama-signslaw-increase-military-support-jordan, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-aid/u-s-mili tary-aid-for-egypt-seen-continuing-despite-rights-concerns-idUSKCN0T22E520151113 50  For example, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/libya-from-interventionto-proxy-war 49

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South Sudanese civil war. Also, Chad and Niger are recipients of important amount of foreign aid (Griffin 2016) (−1). Border control is usually at a very low level mainly due to the small efficiency of the state apparatus, complicated geography of the region, and existence of nomadic trade and smuggling routes in the area (−2). FSI ranks the region in average at 103.5 – alert (−2) – with scores of 101.4 for 2012 and 105.5 for 2017. The state is almost completely unable to present basic social goods to its population all over the region (Hicks 2015). The issue is not only connected to the war-torn Libya and South Sudan but also the remaining three countries with limited capabilities (−1). There is an important presence of non-state actors on both functional (nomadic tribes, alternative governments (Libya), ethnic militias) (−2) and territorial (connected to different civil conflicts) (−3) levels. As examples, the actors like the Islamic State in Libya, competing Libyan governments, rebels in Western Sudan and South Sudan, or other jihadist groups in Chad and Niger might be presented. Non-state actors are important power brokers in the region, and states are in some respect missing as their representation is unclearly defined (e.g., Libya) (−1). The region witnesses a widespread utilization of illegal and illegitimate violence. States are generally unable to control the spread of violence, and also the level of ability to conduct and control armed operations is variable (−2). The region oscillates between mitigated and unmitigated civil war and ethnopolitical conflicts with the latter being true in the majority of the region (Libya, Sudan, South Sudan). The general level of instability is high, and the history of armed conflict is long (−4). Basic goods are usually missing as nor the state neither the alternative actors can provide these outsides of the main population centers controlled by the state, and even there the situation is very problematic (−2). The connection to the global flows is very low and mostly connected to the illegal flows. Before 2011, Libya was connected via oil trade, but this link is since the beginning of the civil war largely missing (−2). Intraregional relations are mainly defined by a collapse of the ability of the states to cooperate (once again less visible in more effective Niger and Chad) (−1). There is no effective regional body present (0). The predominant nature of the significant non-state actors is violent (−2). The region is a zone of high unsanctioned spread of weaponry (−2).

5.1.19 Northwest Africa The next region comprised of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania is located in the Western part of the Sahara desert. States are to a relevant degree supported by the foreign powers – especially in the case of Mali with direct military presence of mainly French army with additional presence of the EU and UN troops (Wing 2016) (−1). Given the problematic geography and limited power of state institutions, the border control is limited. The situation is more controlled by Tunisia and Morocco that were capable of fencing parts of their border (−1). The estimated level of state fragility grew from 78.8 in 2012 to 82.5 in 2017. This makes an average of 80.6 – warning (−1). States in many areas fail to provide basic services while

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not losing their ability altogether. It must be pointed out that the situation differs and is worse in locations like northern Mali or Mauritania, while the state is more effective in coastal regions of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (0). There are important non-state actors on both functional (−1) and territorial (−1.5) levels. These include traditional nomadic tribes as well as jihadist movements connected to both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. It must be also pointed out that these actors are included in the smuggling business that is characteristic for the region. Non-state actors like Tuareg movements or radical Islamists are important power brokers (−1). The region witnesses a significant amount of illegitimate violence that is, however, to a certain degree managed by either local state or foreign actors. The level of violence is mainly connected to the Islamist insurgency as the Tuareg ethnic movement is currently pacified (0). The region is an area of irregular conflict mainly against local jihadist groups merged into Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (Solomon 2015) (−1). The state is the primary provider of basic goods where applicable – the provision by the alternative actors in zones out of state control is reportedly very limited (0). The region has only limited connection to the global flows, mainly via illegal activities or tourism in the north of the region (0). The region attempts to handle a closed border regime that is however impossible due to the local geography and limited state capacities in some parts (−1). There is no effective regional body present with an attempt to establish regional security cooperation in G5 Sahel51 (0). The nature of non-state actors is predominantly violent (−2). There is a high spread of weaponry unsanctioned by states – issue that worsened after the fall of Gaddafi regime in Libya and return of his Tuareg soldiers to Mali52 (−2).

5.1.20 Horn of Africa+ The next region comprises of wider Horn of Africa to which Yemen is added as having more in common with the selected African countries than the likes of Saudi Arabia or Oman. Many of the countries are facing direct intervention (Somalia, Yemen) or are recipients of a large amount of foreign aid (−2). Border control shifts between major problems and absolute inability to control. The situation is better in countries like Ethiopia or Eritrea, while Somalia and Yemen provide no control to speak of (−1). The level of state failure according to the FSI methodology reached 99.2 in 2012 and grew to 102.5 in 2017 with an average score of 100.9 points – alert (−2). The state is generally very weak in provision of social services even in cases where the state institutions do not face a total collapse. The worst situation is in Yemen and Somalia (−1). There are important non-state actors on a functional level supplementing in many places state functions (e.g., Menkhaus 2006/7). These include local and traditional actors as well as limited attempts by the radical jihadist 51  https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regionalsecurity 52  For example, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-forrebellion-in-mali.html?mcubz=0

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movements to provide some relief to the local population (−2). Large areas are furthermore out of the state control with examples of Al-Qaeda or Houthi-controlled regions in Yemen, large swaths of Somalia, etc. (−3). Non-state and de facto state actors are important power brokers and, in some locations, hold more power than formal institution of the state (−1). The region undergoes large excesses of violent attacks (−2) and civil conflict accompanied by foreign interventions (−2). This was true even before the end of the Cold War and is relevant up until today with conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yemen and past hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Provision of basic goods out of governmental bases is provided either by alternative pre-modern actors or by no one (−1)  – the state is better functioning in Ethiopia while being completely missing in Somalia with the rest of the cases located somewhere between these two. Connection to the global flows is limited at best (−2). Mutual cooperation is lacking due to the widespread state collapse and mutual animosities (−1). There is no effective regional body (0). A significant amount of non-state actors is violent (Al-Shabaab, AQAP, Houthi movement, etc.) (−2). The proliferation of weapons in the region is high and mostly unsanctioned as documented by existence of many violent non-state actors across the region (−2).

5.1.21 East Africa Moving further south, we can identify the region of East Africa. The region has minor dependence on foreign agents, especially in the form of humanitarian and military assistance (1). The border control has minor defects mainly in connection with the inability to properly control borders with Somalia and central African region with a high level of instability present (1). The level of state failure is measured as stable, growing insignificantly from 92.4 to 92.5 between 2012 and 2017. The final rank is thus alert (−2). States can provide basic services to a relevant degree with some exceptions especially in remote areas. The quality of goods provided also varies (0). There is only minor presence of non-state actors connected mainly to Al-Shabaab in Kenya and some minor rebel groups in the rest of the region (1). There are no significant areas out of state control with possible exceptions in northeast Kenya and refugee camps (3). States are, nevertheless, influenced by some tribal and other non-state actors (1). The use of force is manageable and mainly oriented against the violent non-state actors operating in the region. Nevertheless, the state security forces also use the force against its own population following a political motivation (0). Despite some incursions from bordering regions and occasional cases of terrorism, there is no significant armed conflict taking place in the countries (3). Provision of basic goods is connected mainly to the state (0). The region is becoming fully connected to the global flows via high-speed Internet53 and trade. Kenya is also a popular destination of the Western tourists. The connection can be decreased if the central governments 53

 http://www.reuters.com/article/ozabs-rwanda-telecoms-idAFJOE72F07D20110316

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decide to apply restriction upon the access to the World Wide Web (2). Regional politics holds limited openness (as illustrated by the attempts to establish East African Community (EAC54)) (0.5). Despite the attempts to establish some form of regional cooperation, there is no effective regional body in place with EAC holding potential to change this in the future55 (0). The nature of non-state actors is mixed. We can see the presence of violent groups like Al-Shabaab but also nonviolent like the traditional actors or NGOs (0). The ability of states to limit historically high and geographically determined spread of weaponry is limited (−1).

5.1.22 Central Africa The region of Central Africa is quite profoundly affected by the foreign intervention, be it a direct military presence of forces sent by the external players like Chad or Uganda, or the United Nations missions connected to the many local and transregional conflicts and violent non-state actors (Carayannis et al. 2015). It has been repeatedly reported that the security forces of the Central African Republic are, to give an example, dependent on the support from the Russian state through the private military groups controlled by the Russian government (−2). Regional countries are in most instances unable to control their borders as well as most of their territories. The porous nature of the borders is a well-known phenomenon connected to the regional geopolitical dynamics (−2). FSI ranked the region with 93.2 points for 2012 and 95 points for 2017. This establishes an average of 94.1 – alert (−2). The state is generally unable to provide basic services to the most of its population. Large swaths of territory are out of reach of the central institutions – for example, the Central African Republic has never filled its territory by an effective power projection since it gained independence (Lombard 2017) (−1). There are important non-state actors on both functional (−2) and territorial (−3) levels (e.g., DRC rebels, Seleka movement, Lord’s Resistance Army, etc.). States are only one of the regional power brokers (−1). The non-state actors thus overcome functions of the state in many of the regions and are successful in preventing it from controlling the territory. The region undergoes a period of large sustained violence dating back before the era of decolonization (Marshall 2015, 79–97). Eastern DRC and contemporary Central African Republic are sights of violent conflict (−2). In many places the region witnesses a full-blown civil conflict coupled with multiple foreign interventions (issue especially visible in a case of the Democratic Republic of Congo) (−4). The provision of basic services is usually missing as the alternative actors are often incapable or unwilling to conduct such an operation (−2). The connection to the global flows is also very low and based on the economic exploitation (−2). Mutual  http://www.eac.int/  D. Bach, a leading expert on African regionalism, called the grouping as having the largest potential to establish an effective framework from all African regional organizations on his November 2017 lecture in Prague.

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cooperation is impossible due to low capacity of states (−1). There are no effective regional organizations (0). The non-state actors are in many instances violent, be it separatist movements, ethnic militias, or other violent non-state actors (−2). The spread of weaponry is very high and unmitigated (−2).

5.1.23 South Africa The next region is a widely defined space mostly economically connected to South Africa. As such, the region has only limited levels of foreign aid present (1). Border control can be characterized by minor defects. These are mainly connected to a complicated geography and limited capacity of states (1). The level of state failure in the region was ranked as 79.8 in 2012 and 81.3 in 2017. This means an average of 80.5 – warning (−1). The capability of states to provide basic services is limited and usually weak in the peripheral regions. This is the case even for the Republic of South Africa as the most capable nation in the region as well (0). Non-state actors are generally not threatening with the exception of gangs and other forms of criminal organizations56 with a history of civil war throughout the region. The region has in the past witnessed solutions to many of the civil conflicts that faced the region throughout the Cold War era, but the problem with criminality is still present (1). There are no large regions under control of territorial non-state actors – issue solved after the end of the Cold War proxy civil wars. Some regions, nevertheless, still hold some separatist tendencies57 (3). States are the major power brokers (2). The level of violence is manageable and connected mainly to the issue of criminality. The issue, nevertheless, still holds a significant potential toward worsening. Many parts of the region can turn into no-go zones, and some of the countries might face reappearance of civil armed conflict (0). There is no armed conflict taking place with only limited rebellions in some peripheral regions (3). Provision of basic goods is mainly connected to the state or limited. Currently, there are no significant alternative actors that would take over the provision (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows – mainly through South African economy (2). The region has a closed border regime that it quite successfully enforces. Some of the regional countries even enforced construction of border barriers (e.g., Botswana on borders with Zimbabwe) (0). South African Development Community is established, and its membership consists of most of the regional states. In 2008 this organization established a free trade area around much of the region58 (0.5). Non-state actors do not usually use violence on a mass level, but they cannot be classified as nonviolent as well (0). States are unable to properly control the spread of weaponry (−1).  For example, https://www.vice.com/sv/article/4wbyqg/stars-stripes-and-blood-south-africasmost-notorious-gang-is-called-the-americans 57  For example, https://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics%2D%2Dpower_on-the-line/ 2012/10/20/separatist-movement-spreading-like-wildfire-in-zanzibar,107928541-BRE 58  http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/free-trade-area/ 56

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5.1.24 West Africa The remaining African region comprises of the western African states not included in other regions. As a region historically troubled by civil wars and internal conflicts, the level of foreign aid is quite high with direct involvement especially in the fight against Boko Haram and developmental aid in most of the region (−1). Borders manifest major defects in many parts of the region. This is not only connected to the issues with the control over the borders with the restive regions like Mali but also to the borders between these nations themselves (−1). According to the FSI data, the overall level of state failure in the region is quite steady. In 2012 the average score was 89.5, and in 2017 it rose to 90. These give an overall score of 89.7 – warning (−1). The degree of a provision of services by a state is different across the region but, overall, rather problematic (0). Non-state actors on functional level are quite important, be it NGOs helping develop the region or private military companies providing security (McFate 2014). Also, traditional and other local non-state actors play an important role (−1). On the territorial level, the most prominent example of the non-state actor challenging the state supremacy is Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, areas under sustained non-state control are on the regional level only limited (0). Non-state actors are important power brokers (−1). The region undergoes major periods of high illegitimate use of violence. These, however, do not affect all of the regions as countries like Ghana, Liberia, or Sierra Leone are currently mostly peaceful (−2). The region experiences a period of full-­ blown conflict mostly connected to the fight against Boko Haram (−1). The provision of basic goods is divided between state in some areas and local actors in the rest (−1). Connection to the global flows is limited and mainly of economic nature. Western Africa is, however, an increasingly important region with a potential of further connection in the near future (0). The issue of border regime and mutual cooperation is rather problematic due to the inability of states to control their territory (−1). Despite the presence of the Economic Community of West African States, we cannot speak of a fully functioning regional organization yet (0). The nature of non-state actors is combined with NGOs and state-supporting organizations and violent non-state actors located around the region (0). States are unable to properly manage the spread of weaponry (−2).

5.1.25 North America The region defined by territories of Canada and the USA can be characterized as independent on outside forces (3). Despite the recent hysteria regarding the need for increased border protection, in comparative perspective, the region holds full control over its borders (thanks to geography on the north and high state capability on the south) (2). FSI gives the region scores of 30.8 in 2012 and 29.1 in 2017 – average of 30 makes it fit into a category stable (1). Provision of basic services is conducted or regulated by state with different effectivity in both countries and inside

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them (1). Non-state actors on a functional level are usually not challenging the state capacities or undermine its basic power – be it NGOs, large businesses, or others (1). There are no non-state actors at the territorial level challenging the authority of state (3). The power holders in the region are states affected by large businesses and other actors described in the chapter dedicated to work of D. Rothkopf (1). Use of violence is comparatively low and mainly connected to the classical criminality rather than civil conflict (2). There is no armed conflict taking place and an appearance of one is highly unlikely (3). The provision of goods is combined between state and (post-)modern non-state actors (more prevalent in the USA). There is a debate over the nature of the provision of some of these (like healthcare) but the score, given the US experience, remains at (1). The region is fully connected to the global flows and establishes one of the key nodes of the globalization (2). Its border regime is partially opened – having weaker internal protection (US-Canadian border) while keeping strict control over outside borders (0.5). The region is part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (renamed in 2018 to US-Mexico-Canada agreement) and establishes other economic partnership throughout the globe (0.5). The non-state actors are predominantly peaceful with major exception of criminal gangs and lone-wolf attackers mainly in the USA (2). The spread of weaponry is medium and to a relevant degree sanctioned by state with the oversight in the US weak by design instead of incapacity (1).

5.1.26 Central America Independence of Central America is to a significant degree historically limited by the geographic proximity of the USA (a similar connection of Central Asia to the Russian interests). Despite that, nowadays, the situation can be evaluated as minor foreign assistance (primarily connected to the aid with security) (1). Border control has major defects related mainly to illegal migration and smuggling of illegal substances in combination with high level of gang violence59 (−1). Average FSI scores for the region were 69.8 in 2012 and 68.4 in 2017. This totals 69.1 – warning (−1). The ability of states to provide social services is limited and, in many places, substituted by parallel institutions.60 Many of the states in the region are losing capability to control parts of their territory. The situation is, however, contextual, and there are important differences between countries like Costa Rica and El Salvador (0). There is an important presence of non-state actors on a functional level, mainly connected to the activities of gangs and narcomafias. These are not only acting parallel to the state but also slowly overcoming the state institutions in regions where they developed to a third type of cartels as predicted in (Sullivan and Bunker 2002) (−1). On a territorial level, so far, the region does not witness the presence of any important non-state entity with parts of the territories under the influence of criminal organizations without broader territorial ambitions. 59 60

 See http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/tsearch?q=violence  See Grillo (2016).

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The non-state actors are territorial only in respect to their operations not in respect to establishment of an alternative political entity (3). States are in their dealings influenced by the non-state actors (1). The overall use of violence in the region is high and mainly connected to criminality and drug trade.61 Central American states for some time top the table of countries with the largest number of homicides per capita (−2). Despite the high levels of violence, there is no civil or interstate conflict in place. The nature of violence is in essence primarily criminal (3). Provision of basic goods is combined between state and in some areas criminal organizations and lacking in many as well. The situation also differs between different countries (−1). The region is fully connected to the global flows (2). The region attempts to hold a close border regime (0). Besides Mexican participation in the free trade agreement with the USA and Canada, there is no effective regional body (0). Non-state actors are mainly violent with nonviolent present but with a limited impact (−2). The proliferation of weapons is high (−2).

5.1.27 The Caribbean Caribbean region is defined by a presence of many small island states and a significant influence of the nearby USA. The foreign assistance can be rated as minor (1). Control of borders declares minor defects (1) mainly due to complicated geography and weakness of some of the states. FSI scores are to some degree affected by high level of state failure on Haiti, but due to the high number of countries in the region, the final score is representative. In 2012 it was 68.1 and in 2017 64.3 (for comparison, Haiti’s scores are 104.9 and 105.3). The average for both years is 66.2 – warning (−1). The institution of state is a leading but usually inefficient provider of the social services (0). Non-state actors on the functional level are often criminal gangs that, nevertheless, have only limited power inside some of the states (Grillo 2016) (1). There is no sustained territorial competition except for parts of the slums being controlled by the criminal gangs. The sheer geographical limits prevent the occurrence of territorial competitor on most of the small islands (3). States are the only relevant power brokers (2). The amount of violence is large62 but still not overwhelming. The situation is similarly to previous region connected to the higher levels of criminality, but the overall issue is not as grave as in the Central America (0). There is no armed conflict taking place out of the criminality issue (3). The provision of goods is divided between state and in some regions local criminal actors or gang structures (−1). Regional connection to the global flows is full mainly due to the maritime nature of the region and proximity to the USA (2). The region attempts to hold a close border regime. An attempt is limited by the geographical restrictions and limited capability (0). There is no effective regional body present (0). The nature of the non-state 61 62

 http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286  See, for example, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41175

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actors can be best described as combined (with NGOs or church on one side and drug gangs on the other). The relative power differs throughout the region (0). Finally, states are unable to adequately regulate the spread of weapons around the region (−1).

5.1.28 Northern South America The northern part of South America, as defined for the purposes of this work, is the generally poorer part of the continent. It is thus a recipient of minor amount of foreign aid also historically connected to the Colombian internal conflict (1). Border control has minor defects mostly connected to the presence of armed guerrillas and criminal activities but also to the failing capabilities of state in Venezuela (1). According to the FSI data and methodology, a situation in the majority of the countries in the region is either stable or improving. Large exception is Venezuela and to lesser degree Paraguay. In 2012 the average score was 76.4, and in 2017 it decreased to 74.4. The total score is thus 75.4  – warning (−1). Social services provision is mixed with Venezuela unable to establish the basic institutions and provide basic goods,63 Colombia having alternative actors in place (Leech 2011) (despite the shift toward their disarmament and inclusion into the state structure) and others capable of service provision on different rates (0). Non-state actors on functional level present a combination of criminal gangs, relief organizations, and other local groups. Their strength is significant but arguably, in a regional scale, decreasing (1). With the peace agreement with FARC, the most significant territorial non-state actor is to disband. Only minor parts of territories of the countries in the region thus remain under some form of control of non-state actors. The reappearance of some territorial guerrilla based either on ideology or economy is, however, possible (0). Non-state actors, furthermore, affect the local power dynamics but do not dominate it (1). Use of violence is manageable in the majority of the region with situation worse in places like slums and the country of Venezuela that is on a brink of collapse (0). The situation in the region can be described as limited rebellion (0) with a potential for improvement once again notwithstanding the situation in Venezuela. Provision of basic goods is (where present) mainly conducted by states with some local and traditional actors stepping up in specific areas (−1). Connection to global flows is limited (0) – either involuntarily as in case of landlocked Paraguay or voluntarily as by the government of Venezuela. Border regime is closed with some irregularities connected to the ineffectiveness of state apparatus or criminal activity taking place (0). Paraguay is part of Mercosur, but most of the region is not part of any effective regional organization (0). The nature of non-state actors is mixed (0). The spread of weaponry is hardly controlled by states and is quite large (−1).

 http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/01/09/508986586/as-venezuelan-go-hungry-themilitary-is-trafficking-in-food

63

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5.1.29 Southern South America The southern part of South America as defined here can be perceived as a region independent of foreign aid (3). Border control shows minor defects mainly connected to the complicated geography (jungle, high mountain ranges, etc.) and length. The most well-known issue is currently the Tri-Border area smuggling (1). The level of state failure in the region is similar to all countries, but Brazil is showing somehow higher scores. On average, the scores for 2012 are 48.7 and for 2017 48.6 – total of 48.6 – stable (1). Comparatively speaking, states are quite capable of providing basic services with exception of remote regions and parts of large cities (1). The presence of non-state actors is connected to big businesses and in some cases with criminal gangs establishing parallel institutions in peripheral parts of towns. In some remote areas, traditional structures also play a role (1). On a territorial level, non-state actors are active mainly in suburbs of large cities which are mostly out of governmental control (Grillo 2016). Nevertheless, security forces are capable of penetrating these areas in case they need to do so (0). States are the only relevant regional power brokers (2). Despite the issue of gang violence in some parts of the region, the amount of violence is quite low (except for Brazil64). Also, Brazil seems to be the only country with a potential for witnessing larger amount of violence in the future (2). There is no active armed conflict taking place (3). The state is a primary provider of social services with the slums without such services or locally provided supplements (0). The region is fully connected to the global flows with exception of hinterland regions disconnected from the state structures in general (2). It holds a policy of limited openness related to an early stage of economic integration (0.5). With the exception of Chile, all the countries are core members of Mercosur (0.5). The nature of non-state actors is combined – criminal gangs on one side and church and NGOs on the other (0). The spread of weaponry is (mostly) limited, again except for the remote or excluded areas like slums (1).

5.2

Analysis

Table 5.1, Fig. 5.1, and Maps 5.1 and 5.2 present the outcome of the empirical part of the research. Map 5.1 presents static results closely following the results, while Map 5.2 presents dynamic results showing the probable shift of regions in the near future given the current situation in them. This model takes into consideration the major shifts in the regions and a potential of the regions to enter new or remain in the current geopolitical environments. Despite the oversimplifications that were necessary for the analysis to be possible, the final results offer the basic outline of the separation of different environments.  For example, https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/ kenrapoza/2016/01/29/months-before-rio-olympics-murder-rate-rises-in-brazil/&refURL=https:// www.google.cz/&referrer=https://www.google.cz/

64

BC

1

−1 −1 1 1 −1 1 2 1 2 1 −1 2 1 −2 2 1 −2 −1 −1 1 −2 1 −1 2 −1 1 1 1

RD

3

−1 −1 3 −2 1 3 3 3 3 1 −2 3 3 −2 3 1 −1 −1 −2 1 −2 1 −1 3 1 1 1 3

Region EU+

Balkan E Eur. RUS Cauc. Cen. As. PRC E Asia SE Asia Oceania Ind. Sp. AfPak Iran Turkey Mesop. Gulf West ME N Afr. NW Afr. Horn E Africa Cen. Afr. S Africa W Africa N Am. Cen Am. Caribb. NS Am. SS Am.

1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −2 −1 −1 −2 1 −1 −2 −1 −2 −2 −2 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 1

1

SF

Table 5.1  Position of regions

SP

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 −1 0 1 −1 1 0 −1 0 −1 0 −1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

1

NF 1 −1 1 1 −1 2 1 0 1 1 −1 2 2 −2 2 −1 −2 −1 −2 1 −2 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1

1

NT −1.5 −1.5 3 −1.5 0 3 3 0 3 0 −3 3 0 −3 3 −1.5 −3 −1.5 −3 3 −3 3 0 3 3 3 0 0

3

NR 1 −1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 −1 2 1 −1 2 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 2 −1 1 1 2 1 2

1 1.5 −6.5 10 −0.5 0 11 13 5 11 3 −11 11 6 −13 14 −0.5 −12 −6.5 −12 5 −13 7 −5 12 2 7 3 9 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 −2 2 0 −2 2 0 −2 0 −2 0 −2 0 −2 2 −2 0 0 2

UV 2

A 11

PA 3 −2 3 0 3 0 3 −1 3 0 −2 3 0 −4 3 0 −4 −1 −2 3 −4 3 −1 3 3 3 0 3

3

PB 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 −2 0 0 −2 0 −1 0 −2 0 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 0

0

CG 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 −2 0 −2 2 −2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2

2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.5 0 0.5 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 0.5 −1 0 −1 0.5 0 0 0 0.5

2

IO 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5

1

SR 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 −2 0 0 −2 0 0 −2 −2 −2 0 −2 0 0 2 −2 0 0 0

2

NN 0 −1 1 1 1 1 2 −1 2 −1 −2 1 1 −2 1 −1 −2 −2 −2 −1 −2 −1 −2 1 −2 −1 −1 1

2

SW 8.5 −4 7 1 4 5 13.5 1 11 0.5 −10 6 3 −13 8 1 −14 −6 −12 4.5 −15 4.5 −7 12 −2 3 −2 9

B 14

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Fig. 5.1  Position of regions inside the research triangle

Map 5.1  A neomedieval map – static

Reading the results, we can observe specific dynamics that currently occurs inside the international system. Especially the outlook of the outcomes projected into the research triangle establishes the notion that the weakening of a state is connected to its move toward the Chaotic Anarchy part of the neomedieval spectrum, while the strong states shift to the other pole. It remains to be seen whether the three regions (EU+, North America, East Asia) that move most closely to the left  – Durable Disorder  – and potentially Oceania where similar development can be expected mainly due to the situation in Australia and New Zealand will in the future undergo a state retreat as promoted by the neomedieval theory or whether their

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Map 5.2  A neomedieval map – dynamic

states keep their sustainably strong role in the regional geopolitical environment. Example of the possible divergence of the development of the environment is the EU+. In case of the strengthening of the supranational and common institutions combined with a process of privatization, the region might move closer to the Durable Disorder scenario. Already now we can see this shift at least at the symbolical level with many places presented as identified by the combination of local, national, and supranational identity – as is the case of the majestic aula in Karolinum, the oldest building of Charles University founded in 1348. There we can find three flags  – regional (city of Prague), national (Czech Republic), and supranational (European Union) – standing next to each other with none given more focus than the other. If the populist and nationalist voices grow stronger and more powerful, the region will be shifting back to the center of the model. This is the idea of movements appearing throughout the Europe that were most successfully manifested in the British vote to leave the common union in 2016. Similarly, would the USA follow the liberalization and connectivity of the past decade, they are likely to move closer to the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum. On the other hand, a recent rebuff connected to the election of Donald Trump and his nationalizing and anti-trade initiatives might increase the opposing forces that would keep the USA inside the Westphalian world. In Oceania, the future might bring a divergence between networking Australia and the New Zealand, and some of the Pacific Islands more closely following relationships with and geopolitical logic of China. On the other hand, regions with a robust political centralization like Turkey, Iran, or Gulf states are more likely to remain inside the Westphalian world. It can be seen that there are currently no regions firmly set inside the Durable Disorder environment. The two regions that appear in green on the static map are on the borders of the three geopolitical environments and constitute more anomalies shifting toward the Westphalian world rather than genuine transfer of their geopolitical environment toward post-modern networked and connected setting. Many regions are to some degree still following the Westphalian model without a visible

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shift toward either one or the other neomedieval scenarios. It seems that unlike the proposed model, states still ensure their dominance even in the liberal globalizing part of the world while choosing different strategy compared to those in the Westphalian world. Nevertheless, we may observe an important number of regions located clearly in the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum. This distinction among the environments tending toward Durable Disorder, those holding to the Westphalian model, drifting to the Chaotic Anarchy, and witnessing Chaotic Anarchy is crucial for the following analysis of the adaptation of the political units and interaction among the different spaces. The empirical analysis thus points to some crucial points in relation to the presented theoretical framework. The 1990s Eurocentric neomedieval literature is not corresponding with the global reality. Even the European space is still empirically Westphalian, nevertheless, with a potential future (gradual) shift probable. There are specific qualitative shifts inside the Westphalian world that set apart the closed and opened regions. Development of some sort of a Durable Disorder environment is still a bid for the future and will not come through some dramatic one-time event. Decreased capacity of state institution is so far connected to the decrease in stability and appearance of the Chaotic Anarchy environment.

6

Effects on the International System

The following chapter will present two issues that are connected to the previous analysis and sketch the consequences of the transformation of the global system. The chapter will present two interrelated topics – an adaptation of the political units on the changes in the system and the interaction among different types of geopolitical spaces. In both parts, the overall trends and some examples are examined. The analysis looks at contemporary effects of the Chaotic Anarchy, the Westphalian system, and regions heading toward the Durable Disorder. The analysis will help us better grasp the effects of the global system on the political activities of the members of the international community.

6.1

Adaptation

Similar to the transformation from the medieval to the modern state system, the new political units will appear, and the old will have to adapt to the processes that shape their environment. Each of the environments will require a different set of factors for the actors to survive and thrive. Every subchapter thus deals with one of the three geopolitical environments and the adaptations that allow political units inside them to effectively hold power or successfully survive. It will be argued that the shift of the EU+, North America, East Asia, and (part of) Oceania toward the Durable Disorder scenario allows us to observe at least some of these effects, despite the fact that the empirical analysis established that in all of these three regions, the state remains rather strong and these regions are in a transition period rather than constituting a completely separate geopolitical environment.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_6

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6.1.1 Westphalian System Seemingly, there is no need for the political actors to adapt inside the part of the world that remains embedded in a Westphalian state-based model. Nevertheless, even this space undergoes pressures and changes upon which a state that wishes to maintain its traditional central role must react. As noted earlier, modern state is defined by the centralized sovereign authority over a clearly demarcated territory. Any challenge to its sovereignty, territoriality, or ability to centralize power is thus a direct challenge to a state as an institution.1 States attempting to keep themselves inside the traditional Westphalian setting must thus react to effects of such factors as globalization, regionalism, cybernatization, and state failure. In reality, two types of reaction toward the process of globalization and regionalism can be witnessed among the capable and centralized states – acceptance and defense. Those states that accept these trends slowly move toward the Durable Disorder scenario; those who attempt to defend themselves against (at least part of) these developments try to maintain in the Westphalian framework. The next chapter will deal with the former option. The latter option will be demonstrated on the cases of Russia and China. One other point taken here is that the states must also avoid a slip to the Chaotic Anarchy – the possible survival strategy is to be examined on a case of North Korea. The first factor that must be taken into consideration is a reaction to the process of globalization. As noted at the beginning of this work, globalization is a multifaceted issue. We can distinguish, among others, political, cultural, and economic globalization (Al-Rodhan 2006, 5). Political globalization is connected to the issue of an increasing number of interrelations among political actors and growing strength of the intergovernmental organizations and global governance, thus directly challenging the central authority of the nation-state (Steger 2009, 58). Cultural globalization refers to the increase of cultural flows (as music, movies, languages, etc.) among different parts of the planet (Steger 2009, 71). Economic globalization includes the growth of markets and interconnectivity of the various regional markets (Steger 2009, 38). States wishing to remain in their modern form and establish a region characterized by the modern international system will approach each of these forms of globalization differently. Modern Westphalian states aiming to preserve themselves in a neomedieval era without the shift toward Durable Disorder must carefully operate between absolute disconnection from the world flows that would lead them toward instability and acceptance of the globalization that would increase the role of non-state actors and flows in general. This means that the neomedieval Westphalian states are more reserved toward political and cultural globalization while more integrated into (at least parts of) the global market. Westphalian states do not disregard all of the international organizations but see them as a way to propagate their goals rather than as transformative units that would allow for a new power structure to appear. 1  As seen by the reaction on the process of cybernatization by the so-called balkanization of the Internet in places like China (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 67–75).

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Such approach can be manifested on cases like the UNSC membership or the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or former BRICS Development Bank. The disconnection of the different parts of globalization among various political actors in the Westphalian environment is quite important. Looking at China, we can see that the country is connected to the benefits (as well as ills) of the economic globalization. It acts as a large manufacturer, shipping its goods all over the globe. It serves as a central node of some of the most important trading routes in the contemporary world. The most recent manifestation of this process is an establishment of the One Belt One Road initiative that aims to connect China with Central Asia and have Europe as its endpoint. Despite clear geopolitical motives for the establishment of this project, it is also a manifestation of the need to connect the Chinese economy to new markets (Brewster 2016). China also holds interests according to the lines of economic globalization in places like the Indian Ocean or sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, China attempts to disconnect itself from other parts of the globalization  – mostly visible in political domain and its efforts to downplay an existence of universal human rights or importance of Western-style democracy. One of the projects that manifests the issue is the Great Firewall aiming to censor the access to the Internet from the Chinese territory as to minimize the impact of the free flow of information on its population.2 This approach of a controlled connection is evident in the Chinese strategy since the beginning of its opening to the global market in the end of the 1970s (Friedberg 2018). This approach to the globalization presents a balancing act that aims at strengthening of the central power and the state in general by economic means without an inclusion of potentially malign effects that would lead to decreasing of this power via political shift. Similar practices can also be identified in the Russian Federation. Russian budget is on the one hand heavily dependent on the export of natural resources,3 while on the other, the Russian political elites try to minimize impact of the outside influences on its “sovereign democracy.”4 This attempt is connected with a shift toward a more considerable authoritarianism as well as substantial reliance on conservative values. This shift characterizes the Putin’s government of at least the last decade. This all aims to differentiate the country from the liberalizing and interconnected Durable Disorder environment while keeping profits necessary to keep the state machinery running. The two cases present a strategy of limited and mainly economic connection to the world of flows. Somehow different model is adopted by the political elite in North Korea. The country attempts to completely cut itself from the globalization forces and decrease its cross-border interactions to minimum. This is done via establishment of extremely closed authoritarian regime based on an existence of strong security forces. It chooses very aggressive survival strategy 2  See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/everything-you-should-know-about-thegreat-firewall-of-china/slows-down-cross-border-internet-traffic/slideshow/59864430.cms 3  See http://www.factosphere.com/pubfinance/budget/budgetstruct 4  See https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp

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aiming to retain the state in the Westphalian environment with a government firmly in control of the country. It thus presents an extreme version of willing disconnection from the globalized world.5 North Korea does not accept any form of globalization and is thus deprived of funding that comes together with the economic opening. It does not risk entering the Durable Disorder part of the scenario, but it might be affected by a state failure. Dominant political actors inside the Westphalian environment thus aim at the different levels of disconnection from the enhanced process of globalization that arrives in connection with cybernatization. The level of this disconnection may vary and can dictate the success of this attempt. Among the actors that do not seek transfer into the Durable Disorder part of the spectrum, we can clearly witness efforts to limit effects of political and cultural globalization on their societies and strong incentive to focus on issues like sovereignty, territorial integrity,6 and non-­ interference (at least on a limited scale as observable from Russian actions in its “Near Abroad”). Actors in this level, nevertheless, operate under the shadow of a double threat. First, their need to operate on the global market may lead to further adaptation to the networking nature of the post-modern policy and bring the rigid regimes closer to the Durable Disorder scenario. Second, their attempt to disconnect themselves from the effects of globalization may send their economy into a collapse, and these countries may find themselves unable to control their territory and population. Reaction to the first might be selective disconnection (e.g., the Chinese Great Firewall), the response to the second is usually a more significant focus on the role of security services and foreign policy (e.g., Russian actions in Ukraine/Syria and systematic constitution of domestic perception of NATO as an existential threat; North Korean development of nuclear weapons and support for the police state with large military forces). Finally, there are regions that willingly strive to shift to the interconnected post-modern environment – Durable Disorder.

6.1.2 Durable Disorder Political actors moving into the realm of Durable Disorder need to amend their modus operandi to be able to fully exploit the opportunities arising from the new constellation and ameliorate threats that appear. Despite the fact that this environment is so far only more a theoretical model than practice, we can observe some practical steps that are undertaken in regions closing to this geopolitical setting and analyze some of the processes that characterize the transformation that takes place. As the environment is still in the process of shaping, we can mostly observe transformational processes that distinguish the regions from the Westphalian closed system – embracing globalization, enlargement without clear territorial limitation, 5  For a discussion over the North Korean adaptation to the neomedievalism, see also Doboš (2013, 91–100). 6  As evident from laws strongly protecting territorial integrity that were passed in China (Tancredi 2014, 74) and Russia (Maleshin 2014).

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and diffusion of functions and power. This all leads to the multiplication of a number of political actors on a local, regional, and transregional level with both territorial and networking focus. All of these actors consequently need to adapt to the new realities or risk either dying out or returning to the Westphalian model that has been observable throughout several countries in the group of regions that closed themselves to the transformation to the Durable Disorder environment. The first adaptations must come from the side of states that to a certain degree begin to lose their authority in many aspects of the decision-making. Nevertheless, they are still the prime holder of sovereignty and authority over means of violence. They also still serve as a primary creator and enforcer of the legal system. In this way, the state recalls the same institution from the Westphalian environment. The shift, however, lies in its embrace of globalization and willingness to pool its sovereignty with other like-minded state actors. Additionally, the environment and its power brokers have a limit set of tools to use in their arsenal of foreign policymaking as they need to be perceived as credible and legitimate (Pänke 2019, 109); otherwise, the soft-power attraction would be lost and the space would reverse to a Westphalian state of affairs. This shift is manifesting in the establishment of many different organizations with collective decision-making and enforceable rules (most prominently the EU) and opening of borders for different types of flows. The process is not straightforward (e.g., cancellation of the US participation in the Trans-­ Pacific Partnership under the Trump administration), but the states realize that in order to adapt to the new environment defined by flows, globalization, and multiplication of relevant actors, the focus on strictly defined territorial sovereignty and larger control of its political, cultural, and economic system on purely domestic level makes them less effective. They, to a large extent, follow what A.-M. Slaughter calls Open Order Building where the institution of state must remain relevant in many functions (like security) but will have a decreased impact on other spheres of social reality and decision-making (Slaughter 2017, 204–228). Similar, yet less ambitious, course of action is also advised by (Colgan 2019). An ability to operate on an independent level enables establishment of sociopolitical units and actors on sub-state or regional level. These actors address many issues no longer sanctioned by a state. The range of actors is broad, from cross-­ border initiatives to sub-state units, to cities, and to civil society groups, and covers a large number of topics. B. Barber (2013) in his work maps some of these efforts undertaken by cities. Nevertheless, the same can be written about other actors as well. As a case in point, recent attempts of California in relation to the mitigation of the climate change can be highlighted – move that was conducted despite the fact that the Trump administration since early 2017 undermines obligations pledged by the previous government.7 This is unthinkable in states inside the Westphalian environment. Similar efforts are undertaken by groups and individuals empowered by the access to the cyberspace with global agenda promoting different goals and thus shape the nature of parts of the globalization. Economic globalization in this part of 7  See, for example, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/california-climate-change-captrade.html

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the world is increasingly dominated by large supranational organizations as pointed previously by D. Rothkopf (2008), and they play a balancing game with the local political units increasingly resembling the theorized Durable Disorder pillar system. The power of the state and the differentiation of the pillars are, however, still not far enough to talk about a fully developed Durable Disorder system. On the international scene, the countries aiming for the networked model of existence attempt to increase their strength by sharing not by militarization. This cooperation is visible in all aspects of the international politics. In security provision, alliances and treaties centered on the USA from both sides – be it NATO or the US guarantees for countries like Japan or South Korea – are a clear example. In economic cooperation, we can see unprecedented effort to harmonize markets inside the EU and increased the amount of economic cooperation inside the newly emerging environment as professed by for now buried Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or successfully negotiated EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Regional actors also attempt to set the global regimes on issues ranging from trade (through the World Trade Organization) to the outer space utilization (European proposal of Code of Conduct). Unlike Westphalian states that cherish territorially defined sovereignty and are skeptical about many aspects of globalization, the regions moving toward the Durable Disorder part of a spectrum adapt to pooling of sovereignty, decreasing role of territoriality inside the region, utilization of soft power, and networking to achieve some of the goals and cooperation in critical spheres such as defense. These tendencies are observable with different strength across these regions with higher US focus on sovereignty, higher level of pooling of the same inside the EU, etc. The shifting regions are highly dynamic, and the pooling and pillar creation is not a completed process. The future outlook from functional, territorial, and security perspective is thus still not set. What is also important for the adaptation of the political entities is the transformative nature of the environment. This shift from a clearly established Westphalian structure to the Durable Disorder characterized by a lesser level of stability and hierarchy brings with itself specific issues. It can be argued that troubles connected to the stability of Euro as a currency or British exit from the EU are in sync with this trend. Also, the unwillingness of some parts of the EU to fully support some of its decisions (recently most notably connected to the refugee crisis) points at the uneven structure that is directly connected to the nature of the newly emerging space. Similarly, the backlash to globalization mirrored in the election of Donald J. Trump as the US president points at the issues connected to the similar transformation in North America. The change to a less hierarchical and orderly environment will not go without troubles, and it is not set that it will be completed. There are large portions of societies that are yet to adapt to the new networked globalized model of politics/economy, and these parts of society are often feeling left behind supporting political streams opposing the shift toward the Durable Disorder. Nevertheless, the irregularities and backlashes are not signs of the dissolution of these spaces but of the steady shift to the Durable Disorder scenario. If the EU was to establish a clear hierarchical federal state, this would mean a return back to a

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form of Westphalian model. The same would be true with the end of the pooling, sharing, and networking processes among the regional actors.

6.1.3 Chaotic Anarchy The third type of geopolitical environment, political actors need to adapt to, is the Chaotic Anarchy. As noted earlier, this kind of environment hosts numerous types of different political actors with state often playing no or only limited role. The main reason for the state existence is often keeping the head of state in power. This is often manifested in a lack of bureaucracy and state capacity building by rulers who fear that capable state institutions would challenge their power (Reno, Warlord Politics and African States 1998). Many of the rulers act in a way that makes the binary nature of geopolitics – state/non-state – de facto irrelevant. The distinction between the two turns into a continuum with unrecognized self-centered non-state actors on one side, recognized state attempting to establish institutions on the other, and self-centered government not establishing institution while keeping sovereignty protection on the international stage in the middle. The nature and adaptations of these actors, especially to the violent environments, widely differ (Raeymaekers et al. 2008; Staniland 2012). As an example, one may look at the development of the Chadian army. This previously ineffective force was made comparatively gradually robust due to the need of the ruling elite to protect itself against the attacks of eastern separatists capable of reaching the capital N’Djamena. Another reason was to protect the elite from possible coup d’état held by part of the army with lower level of commitment to the ruling clique (Hicks 2015, 16–38). This same army is currently capable of playing a part in efforts to contain Boko Haram forces in northern Nigeria. Similarly, Pakistan is dominated by Punjabi ethnic group, and the state institutions are predominantly established to keeping the members of this group in power (Bennett Jones 2009, 43–75, 226–290). Another region heading toward the Chaotic Anarchy environment is Central America, where we can observe a retreat of a state as well. This retreat takes place in the face of the inability of the security forces to face the growing power of narcomafias, thus protecting only limited portions of state’s territory, while remaining able of limited incursions against the violent non-state actors without a capacity to hold on the territory for a protracted period of time (e.g., slums in large cities). We can clearly observe that as the power of the state decreases, it is not only unable to provide basic functions to its population, but its level of territorial control will decrease, and its boundaries move closer to the seat of power. In case of the Central American countries that yet still did not enter the Chaotic Anarchy, this means reduced ability to control the whole territory at all time. For Pakistan, this means abandoning parts of its territory (northwest and part of Balochistan). In places like Mali or Afghanistan, the army controls capital, its neighborhood, and some strategic hubs. In places like Somalia, the center of power needed to be temporarily moved out of country altogether. In some cases, like Sudan, the state forces rely on the utilization of violent non-state actors to provide power projection capability on its territory (Schneckener 2017).

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This outcome leaves a power vacuum to be filled by different types of nonstate actors that operate in different ways. A level of inclusion of various actors reflects the nature of a power vacuum left for them by the state and traditional actors. In this way, Al-Shabaab between 2009 and 2011 successfully controlled large portions of southern Somalia, providing basic governance and legal framework for its population. It also conducted a basic economic activity connected to trade (mainly via port city of Kismayo), smuggling of sugar and charcoal around the Kenyan borders, and other activities. Al-Shabaab was also capable of conducting semi-conventional military activity against actors connected to the Somali government (Doboš 2016). Similarly, paramilitary groups in Colombia (despite not being ranked as in Chaotic Anarchy region, but in specifics on local level manifesting similar development unnoticed on a macrolevel) successfully control(led) large swaths of land inaccessible by the governmental forces to wage an insurgency and conduct drug production and trade operations.8 Similarly, Ejército Zapatista De Liberación Nacional, better known as Zapatistas, was able to fill the territorial void left by the Mexican government in the southern Mexico (Ross 2019). The same can be repeated for many parts of the world where different non-state actors successfully filled territorial void left by state and traditional actors like in Syria-Iraq (Daesh), Afghanistan (Taliban), southern Lebanon (Hezbollah), Mali (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine), and more. These actors need to adapt their strategies in relation to the opposition pressure caused by either domestic or external actors that to a large degree decrease the ability of the non-state actors to hold territory. The type of the operations of the violent nonstate actors is also connected to their ability to establish some form of order among the population on the territory of its activity and nature of this order (Arjona 2016, 26–29). There are also nonviolent non-state actors operating in the regions. Nevertheless, without the protection of some other actors, their reach is very limited, as can be presented on the case of Yemen and efforts to provide humanitarian relief to its population (Almosawa et al. 2017). Types of operation of different actors to a large extent resemble strategies of roving and stationary bandits as presented by Olson (1993). There are also different ways of adapting to the local environment. These usually reflect the local environment and culture either in accepting or rejecting way. The former might be exemplified in a case of political marketplace as described by A. de Waal. A. de Waal convincingly argues that the political relations in the Horn of Africa reflect the money-services relationship and that possession of funds is key for any political actor to succeed in the area. A level of adaptation of different actors to this environment then determines their success (de Waal 2015). Another example is the attempt of Al-Qaeda affiliates to merge with a local population to receive acceptance and possibly dominate the local political environment (as exemplified by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Zimmerman 2017)). The latter can also be illustrated by the Al-Shabaab attempts to dismantle Somali clan structure to strengthen its message of pan-Islamism and Somali nationalism (in its  For an examination of the nature of the governance inside Colombia, see Arjona (2016).

8

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103

Table 6.1 Adaptations Environment Westphalian

State Disconnection, territorial protection

Durable Disorder

Networking, privatization, attempt to dominate regulatory framework Limited protection of the power center

Chaotic Anarchy

Nonviolent non-state actors Submission to state

Networking, functional and territorial specialization, survival of the fittest Provision of basic functions, basic community bound

Violent non-state actors Anti-state struggle, state-controlled militias Cooperation with state (private military companies), terrorism Liquid strategy

earlier phases) (Mwangi 2012, 514). A similar process was observable in the Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor where the Islamic State attempted to weaken the tribal structure by imposing strict Islamic rule, overtaking security provision, and incorporating local population into its socioeconomic structure (Heras et al. 2017). There is also an interesting cooperation among market forces and Islamic movements taking place in places like Afghanistan or Somalia. This interaction appears to establish a mutually reinforcing novel proto-state type of social structures (Ahmad 2017). As this kind of environment is the most complicated one, one may find many different forms of adaptations that took place in relation to the economic activity as well. Given weak law-enforcement mechanisms on ground and presence of nearby shipping lines, piracy was a large business in Somalia for a large part of the 2000s. Jihadist groups in northern Africa overtook old smuggling lines to help them finance themselves (Boeke 2016; Caulderwood 2015). In Afghanistan, Taliban tapped on the local production of opium and consequently heroin (Peters 2009). The whole jihadist movement in general, to name but one example, presents quite a varied financing stream adapting to the local environment (Neumann 2017). While the Durable Disorder pushes the political, economic, and societal actors to operate in networked interaction with other actors and Westphalian system under the dominance of state, Chaotic Anarchy forces these actors to utilize the local environment. Actors do not need to adapt to a rapid movement of globalization or sovereign dominance of state but historical, cultural, geographic, or environmental specifics of their area of operation. Actors operating in this environment are thus more liquid, filling the void left by stronger actors and avoiding their areas (both geographic and functional) of dominance.9 This liquid strategy is one of the critical factors influencing the strategies of different actors. In the absence of state power, the extended kinship structures sometimes provide the most reliable security structures (Hudson and Matfess 2017, 11–12) putting the traditional structures back into the central position in societies’ social and political life. Table 6.1 presents the summary of this part of the study.  See among others (Hansen 2019).

9

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6.2

6  Effects on the International System

Interaction

In the following section, the interaction among the different types of geopolitical spaces will be analyzed. As we have seen in the development of the international politics of the past decade, the fault lines along the borders of the geopolitical environments as defined by the theoretical and empirical part of this work are deepening. Be it the troubling relation between the EU and Russia,10 European reaction to the migration crisis,11 or election of Donald Trump with his slogan about a beautiful wall,12 there is an increased amount of evidence about a division in the global politics. The following section will hint at some significant issues in three dyads that logically emerge in the contemporary world as based on the above-researched theoretical model.

6.2.1 Westphalian-Durable Disorder The first dyad to be introduced is the one between the Westphalian world and soon-­ to-­be Durable Disorder. It has been empirically examined that no region is firmly embedded in the Durable Disorder. Nevertheless, as projected, some of the regions head toward the Durable Disorder future and exhibit some of the features that allow to present at least some interaction tendencies.13 By looking at the map presented in the empirical part of the world, one can observe lines of contact in places like East Asia and the Russian neighborhood. The following section looks at these two regions of contact to briefly examine the selected strategies of the actors on both sides of the divide. To begin with Pacific Asia, there is a clear observable division between the soon-­ to-­be Durable Disorder region – containing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan – and the modern Westphalian North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Despite the connectedness of both types of actors (besides North Korea, but including Westphalian Russia also included in the regional geopolitics, even if only in a smaller degree) to the global trade network, their mutual relations remain edgy. Korean Peninsula is divided by an almost impenetrable demilitarized zone. Japan holds many disputes with the PRC, Russia, and North Korea. But while Japan and South Korea also have disputes among themselves, the strategic setting of the two camps points at the difference between this type of conflict and the ones along the line dividing the geopolitical environments. The primary difference can be observed in a type of defensive postures both sets of actors utilize. While the PRC and North Korea aim at self-sufficient deterrent – a  For example, https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-againstrussia-over-ukraine-crisis_en 11  For example, http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-refugees-europe-migrants-2016-2 12  For example, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/04/25/donald-trump-wallcanada/100894606/ 13  That is the reason why “soon-to-be Durable Disorder” is used in this section. 10

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move most recently manifested by the North Korean nuclear program  – Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan share their defense with common (soon-to-be Durable Disorder) ally, the USA. This shared defense is a significant strategy for the emerging Durable Disorder environment that holds a potential to further increase the role of private actors in the future as well. This approach combined with this networking approach toward security lies in the heart of the predicted Durable Disorder defense and security logic. This is not to say that these nations do not establish their indigenous capabilities, but they, for example, do not seek independent nuclear capabilities. The defense policy is thus the best example to picture the difference between the nature of actors in these two environments. The example of Koreas exhibits a picture of a highly centralized military-oriented institution on the one side and a combination of effective military forces combined with the private initiative like the spread of information to the North on the other.14 The case of North Korea is also an illustrative example of the different approaches of Westphalian states toward different types of actors. While the border to its southern neighbor is tightly sealed, its northern frontier is much more penetrable to all types of exchanges  – both legal (trade) and illegal (migration). This concrete illustration is burdened by the historical baggage present in the region but remains the most visible realization of the divide in the international politics between the two types of environment presented in this subchapter. The second set of actors worth looking at is the one defined by an interaction between Russia and the “West” – mainly Europe. The basic logic here remains the same  – division. While in the North Korean case this division is based on clear geographical separation by the border hardening process, Russia (given its geography15) in recent decades prefers a strategy of shatter-belt creation. This strategy was already manifested in many regions on the Russian border like Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, or Moldova and presents a de facto alternative to the situation on the Korean Peninsula even though not even closely as impenetrable. Geography (and history) once again plays a role – Koreas need tighter division due to their small area and closeness of population, economic centers, and history of hot conflict; Russia attempts to prevent its neighborhood from joining the Western structures and has largely unbounded geographical scale and history of imperialism. This shatter-belt creation comprises of setting up of unrecognized states like South Ossetia or Transnistria and destabilization of regions like the Donbas (Riegl and Doboš 2018). The strategy of the Westphalian actors thus clearly follows the separation logic of their environment. On the other hand, the soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors seek to engage as many parts of the world as possible and enhance the post-modern networking logic around the globe. Examples of this can be found in the Sunshine policy of South Korea (Sundal 2014) that is to be replicated by the government  For example, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-23/fighting-north-korea-with-balloons/88 34730 15  See Marshall (2015, 15–32), Kotkin (2016). 14

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elected in 2017, the EU’s Eastern Partnership,16 mediation of the Serbian-Kosovar conflict,17 or other initiatives aiming at engaging regions outside the networking part of the world to bring them in – thus following the logic of a neomedieval empire as described by J. Zielonka (2007).18 While the Westphalian states aim at separating themselves from the spill-over effects of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment, the opposite strategy is the one of engagement and amendment of the Westphalian actors as to pull them inside the networked world. This is the case with the engagement of smaller states like Georgia or economically weaker countries like Ukraine, but also the involvement of NGOs in Russia (prevention of their activities is another show of separation logic19) or information campaigns targeting the North Korean public. In the relations between the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment and the Westphalian states, the selection of strategies reflects the theorized nature of the actors.

6.2.2 Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy The second dyad of actors is the one between the Westphalian world and Chaotic Anarchy. On the above-presented maps, few lines of contact between these two kinds of actors can be identified  – mainly Russia/Ukraine, Saudi Arabia/ Mesopotamia and Yemen, Turkey and Iran/Mesopotamia, India and Iran/AfPak, East and South Africa/rest of Africa, and potentially South and North America/ Central America. Despite the significant differences among these dividing lines, we can observe one re-appearing theme, an intervention of the Westphalian actors in an attempt to prevent the negative effect spillover in one way and migration flow in the other. Clearly, Russia/Ukraine node is different as the destabilization of Ukraine into the Chaotic Anarchy environment was initiated by the Russian intervention and strategy as noted above. Nevertheless, the flow of migrants from affected regions still takes place.20 In other regions, the pattern seems to be observable, even though not uniform and not universally applicable on each and every case. Saudi Arabia is directly involved in the Yemeni conflict21 and uses its proxies in the Syrian conflict and Iraqi power struggle (Phillips 2017); Turkey is militarily present in the northern Syria and Iraq and hosts around three million refugees from the region.22 Iran is largely involved in Mesopotamia via its proxies like Hezbollah  https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eastern-partnership_en  For example, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations_en 18  A similar argument is also being developed in Ferguson (2017). 19  For example, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putinsforeign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/ 20  For example, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-refugees/floods-of-ukrainian-refu gees-seek-new-life-in-russia-idUSKCN0HW0UP20141007 21  For example, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 22  According to http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 16 17

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or Shiites militias in Iraq (Jeffrey, et al. 2017). In Afghanistan, Iran historically supports some of the warlords in the western part of that country (Mukhopadhyay 2014). India with Pakistan presents a unique case of states that fenced their border in a way that their relationship does not follow the pattern. Nevertheless, there are increasing attempts of India to penetrate Afghanistan.23 Afghans, on the other hand, fled to Pakistan24 which reflects an era of enhanced stability of Pakistan that took place in history relative to the contemporary pattern that is dominated by the attempt to flee to other parts of the world. Westphalian interventionism, as a mean to prevent spillover of negative effects, re-appears in Africa as evidenced by the intervention of the Kenyan Defence Force in the Somali conflict (since 2011) or by Burundi and Uganda (as a part of the African Union mission) forces in the same conflict. On the contrary, Kenya is an important settling location for the Somali refugees.25 Let us look more closely at two archetypical cases – Turkey and Syria/Iraq and Kenya/Somalia. Turkey has a long-standing conflict with its Kurdish minority, especially the PKK (White 2015). As evident by looking at the map, Kurds are settled in areas not only in Turkey but also in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For a longer period, Turkey to some degree cooperated with the representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq who allowed the Turkish army to penetrate its territory in its pursuit of the PKK members.26 On the other hand, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, People’s Protection Units) that are fighting under the umbrella of the Syrian Defence Forces hold close ties to the PKK (Aras and Yorulmazlar 2017; Gunter 2017). This led to Turkish intervention in the Syrian conflict, an intervention Turkey long avoided despite many negative impacts related to the strengthening of the Islamic State on its borders. The so-called Euphrates Shield27 followed by support for the pro-Turkish opposition groups is a consequence of the interaction of the negative effects stemming from the Chaotic Anarchy environment on the Westphalian state. On the contrary, Turkey hosts an enormous number of Syrian refugees and was a target of numerous terrorist attacks, exemplified by the opposite direction relationship. The second case that is an archetype of the pattern of interaction among the two types of spaces is the Kenya/Somalia dyad. Kenya has been for a protracted period of time a place of settlement for Somali refugees given its proximity to the conflict regions, relative stability, and a presence of historical Somali regions in the northeastern part of the country.28 Kenyan forces entered Somalia in 2011 as a reaction to the increased threat posed by Al-Shabaab militias and an attempt to better integrate the frontier provinces (Doboš 2016; Anderson and McKnight 2014). Despite the  For example, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3437668/Why-Indiaremains-power-Afghanistan.html 24  For example, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/213557-16-million-Afghan-refugees-still-inPakistan 25  See Rawlence (2016). 26  Riegl et al. (2017). 27  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/syria-euphrates-shield.htm 28  See Rawlence (2016). 23

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mixed result of the intervention (re-appearance of Al-Shabaab, increase in the number of spectacular attacks on Kenyan soil), the strategy selected follows the above-­ mentioned pattern.

6.2.3 Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy The final dyad consists of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment and the Chaotic Anarchy. The areas of contact can be identified as the European maritime frontier, border of the EU, and Ukraine/Moldova; possibly the USA/Mexico border will fall into this group as well. The dyad of the EU/Ukraine and Moldova constitutes a specific case as the border follows a stable part of these countries, and the destabilization is caused mainly by a foreign intervention that leads to an introduction of the different set of policies. Soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors seek to introduce an interconnected, networked space of flows that would establish a basic logic of social, economic, and political behavior inside the region. This, however, does not reflect its policies toward its neighborhood in a qualitatively different geopolitical environment. While, as presented earlier, soon-to-be Durable Disorder actors tend to spread their environment by incorporating actors from the Westphalian world, the approach toward Chaotic Anarchy is different – separation and stabilization. Both reactions stem from the need to prevent spillover of negative trends into a highly mobile internal environment of the networked societies. Separation is identifiable in the newly built/proposed border barriers that are aiming to prevent this form of spillover. We are witnessing an appearance of this form of border barriers all over the world with a pattern at the above-identified fault lines. Spain protects its African exclaves Ceuta and Melilla as well as the maritime border,29 numerous walls emerged as a consequence of the migration crisis on the Balkans, and one of the most vocal promises of Donald J. Trump throughout his presidential campaign contained establishment of border wall with Mexico. No matter the role or effectiveness of these proposals regarding the changing border regimes or a role of sovereignty in the affected regions,30 this search for separation is quite obvious. This separation is not total, and there are many connecting points among the two environments on all levels of human society, but unlike the attempt to incorporate more stable parts of the world, the need to prevent negative spillover is quite strongly visible. The second strategy is that of stabilization. As the networking world seeks enlargement, it needs to stabilize parts of the world that present a threat to the stability of this environment and its enlargement. Durable Disorder actors are prone toward stabilization missions in distinct areas of instability that are threatening their security. As an example, one can mention French operations in the Sahel region  For example, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/02/hundreds-of-refugees-try-toscale-fence-dividing-morocco-and-spanish-enclave 30  See Pusterla and Piccin (2012), Rosiere and Jones (2012). 29

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against the activities of the violent non-state actors there. France intervened in Mali following the collapse of its security apparatus in the face of the mixed Tuareg nationalist and Ansar Dine-led Islamist uprising. Since then, the French-led European forces operate in the area to prevent the negative effects of smuggling, terrorism, and migration connected to the decrease of the security in Europe (Wing 2016). Similar logic can be found behind the NGO work in places like Western Africa with the ultimate security perspective of stabilizing the region for the local population to prevent massive migration and spread of epidemics to name at least some threats. The EU accession requirements31 also reflect this strategy. The strategies following the opposite direction are rooted in an unstable nature of the geopolitical environment. Actors aiming at interaction with the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment seek to utilize its borderless networking nature to its different ends. In here, two most debated ways of this interaction will be presented. The first is the utilization of the flows to conduct acts of violence. Despite the fact that the nature of the violent attacks planned or inspired by the violent non-state actors has in the past decade decreased in its sophistication, it far better utilizes the nature of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder networking world. Freedom of movement and information gives disenfranchised segments of population possibility to reach violent propaganda and instructions on how to conduct a “lone-wolf attack” (e.g., in Inspire or Dabiq magazines). Strategy utilized toward destabilization of the “West” than follow the path of radicalization of the local population and utilization of the deficiencies of the democratic process that allow right-wing populists to quickly get a strong voice and further cast fuel into the fire.32 Right timing can indeed change the countries’ policies as evident from the impact of the 2004 Madrid bombing on consequent Spanish election (Wright 2016, 147–166). A similar principle can be found among the migrant population escaping conflicts or just thriving to improve their economic situation by moving to safer and more prosperous regions of the networking part of the globe. A large portion of this population has made use of the nature of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment to move throughout the region to the parts with more hospitable policies. Given the decreased restrictions on movement and widespread access to information, the utilization of these possibilities to nonviolent means follows similar logic as the previous argument. Finally, actors holding political and military power often utilize attempts by the soon-to-be Durable Disorder political actors to prevent negative spillovers to increase their capital. The foreign aid given to these regimes despite their low level of effectiveness and disregard to human and civil rights and the rule of law, not mentioning development, strengthens otherwise very weak and challenged regimes in places like sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt, or the AfPak region. Political actors from networking part of the globe usually prefer stability and decrease in possible spillovers over values that are inherently connected with the Durable Disorder part of the world (at least for now). Table 6.2 summarizes the interactions. 31 32

 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en  See, for example, Fihsman (2016).

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Table 6.2 Interactions X Westphalian

Westphalian X

Chaotic Anarchy Durable Disorder

Spillover Incorporation

Chaotic Anarchy Intervention, separation X Separation, stabilization

Durable Disorder Separation Utilization of internal networks, obtaining resources X

Despite a definitive distinction among strategies related to different dyads, we can observe certain patterns of behavior that to some degree support the existence of pillars of society as theorized by J. Friedrichs and others. First of all, it seems that the state “political-pillar” actors in all three environments seek stability. In Chaotic Anarchy environment, this means obtaining enough resources to stay in power and in charge of resource redistribution. In the Westphalian world, this need is manifested by an attempt of states to control economic and social spheres of life and prevent intervention from other actors. In Durable Disorder, the same phenomenon is demonstrated in an attempt to shield the environment from the external negative spillovers. Economic actors, in a similar manner, seek mobility  – utilizing state weakness, attempting to obtain better deals, and using the networks to enhance its productivity. Social actors then usually seek to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants, no matter how they perceive the idealized end state (socially just society, clan hierarchy, Islamic Caliphate, etc.).

7

Impact on Selected Regions

To provide a more precise and fuller picture regarding the possibilities that the above-presented analysis of the international order brings, the next chapter is dedicated to a more in-depth analysis of selected cases that point at the issues raised. Similarly to the previous chapter, cases are divided between adaptation and interaction. They also follow the division of the world politics into three systems. In the first case, cases from all three worlds are analyzed. They are also divided along the lines of the three basic types of actors that are relevant for this study – violent non-­ state actor (Somali Al-Shabaab), state actor (People’s Republic of China), and nonviolent non-state actor (Facebook). Interactions are also presented along the three possible dyads of relations  – Durable Disorder-Westphalian (EU-Russia), Durable Disorder-Chaotic Anarchy (EU-Sahel), and Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy (Turkey-Syria). The reason for the case selection is the following: Al-Shabaab was the most successful territorial organization connected to AL-Qaeda and also the most successful non-state actor operating in the Somali environment that can be called a prototype of Chaotic Anarchy geopolitical setting. The PRC is probably the biggest challenger of the US-led system with a strong authoritarian drive strengthening under the current Xi Jinping’s presidency. Facebook is a large private organization that establishes an entirely new product, is present worldwide, is heavily dependent on the presence online, and is in disputes with the state administrations in all corners of the world. All three thus provide fitting examples of the theorized adaptations. Furthermore, the three dyads representing the relationships between the geopolitical settings are also selected to be as illustrative as possible. As the EU is the closest region to the Durable Disorder political organization, the two dyads related to Durable Disorder incorporate the organization. Last, but not least, the Turkey-Syria relationship changed dramatically throughout the twenty-first century, clearly pointing at the difference between state-to-state relations and Westphalian-Chaotic Anarchy one. The aim of this section is to present the theoretical model on concrete cases that fit the model to illustrate the argument at hand better. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_7

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7  Impact on Selected Regions

Adaptation

This section analyzes the ways how qualitatively different actors adapted to the nature of the political environment in which they operate. The case of Somalia is a prototypical example of state failure, and Al-Shabaab operates inside a context that allows for the utilization of the liquid strategy. PRC is a traditional centralizing Westphalian state adapting to the increased levels of globalization in the world. Facebook is a huge company that needs to operate inside regulations set by the state actors primarily inside the Durable Disorder environment.

7.1.1 Al-Shabaab Somalia is a prime example of state failure that is observable since at least the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. Since Barre’s escape from the country, a wide variety of different actors appeared and disappeared on its territory ranging from those attempting to establish formal state institutions like in the case of Somaliland to groups violently utilizing the situation on the ground to achieve their particular goals – e.g., warlords. The country began to collapse in the face of the strong internal opposition to Barre’s policies throughout the 1980s, but the final defeat of the strongmen and his exit from the country in 1991 moved the country into total anarchy. The opposition groups, united in their struggle against Barre, had no other common bound and started to fight against each other. This struggle was further aggravated by the strengthening of clan identification that further separated the population and was utilized by armed groups with competing interests. The former British protectorate of Somaliland located to the north of the country and also the place where the armed rebellion against Barre’s rule was the strongest declared independence and remains in a category of unrecognized states up until today. The entity developed, in the regional context, somewhat effective and democratic institutions and is the most stable and sustainable part of what is internationally recognized as Somalia. It is also in contact with some of the countries like Ethiopia that uses the port of Berbera for part of its maritime trade or the United Arab Emirates using the same port for military purposes. Bordering Somaliland from the east is the semiautonomous province of Puntland. Despite the fact that the region never declared independence, it acts as a de facto independent unit officially supporting federative Somalia with Puntland as one of the parts of the federation. Puntland declared its autonomous status in 1998 and establishes the second more stable region inside Somalia. It is, however, weaker in all aspects of the governmental performance than Somaliland and is arguably less posited to any international cooperation. For example, while Somaliland aided the anti-piracy operations around Somalia, Puntland government was reportedly directly tied to the pirate leaders (Bruton 2010). Finally, there is the south of the country where a wide variety of actors and units appeared. From proto-states like Jubaland to local traditional actors to roving warlords to Islamist groups like Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (who already in 1991 faced the

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issues of inability to face the state institutions (Maruf and Jospeh 2018, 23), a relevant point for the sake of this chapter), the south witnessed it all. Despite the international attempts to stabilize the situation, most prominently manifested by the UN missions to the country that took place between 1992 and 1995, the south never had an effective government. The attempts to set up foreign-supported, internationally recognized government like the Transitional National Government or Transitional Federative Government were usually either purely externally backed (to the point that they were sometimes incapable of even being seated in the capital of Mogadishu) or dominated by one of the clans and perceived (and utilized) as a way for that clan to get to the power. This development opened a space for the alternative actors to establish their hold on the territory and fill the spaces emptied by state institutions. Clans, in this respect, play an important role as an explanation of the fault lines inside the Somali political and social life. While the primordial nature of the clannism is disputed, and the utilization of this form of identity is much more instrumental (Gaas 2019), the clans play an essential role for the Somalis. The Somali society, while ethnically and religiously homogeneous, is divided into several clans that are further subdivided, establishing a very complex system. The main clans include Digil, Rahanweyn, Hawiye, Dir, Isaq, and Darod (Lewis 2011, 109), and many of the units and governmental efforts revolve around a clan lineage. A prominent actor operating in the twenty-first century inside anarchical southern Somalia utilizing the liquid strategy is Al-Shabaab. Since the collapse of the state institutions in Somalia, the primary security concern was the unchecked power of warlords, maintaining a predatory strategy in order to obtain increased resources for their self-interested goals. The local population was organizing self-protection units in order to enhance its ability to survive in such a violent context, out of which the so-called Islamic courts emerged as the most successful adaptation of the social environment to the violent threat. These local initiatives that managed to organize the political space around the traditional values based on the combination of sharia law and the traditional Somali law code called xeer, consequently, united themselves in the so-called Islamic Court Union (ICU). ICU, given its ability to present a clear legal framework and basic security combined with military capability, soon became the dominant force in the south of the country despite the fact that it included even some radical elements. The introduction of some form of a predictable environment was a welcomed change for the population living in the area (see Hansen 2013; Maruf and Jospeh 2018). Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Young Fighters) is a radical Islamist group that gained notoriety throughout the post-2006 period. Initially a fringe, radical, and militarily effective group inside the ICU that briefly managed to take control over large portions of southern Somalia including majority of Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab became the primary opposing force to the activities of the Ethiopian and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces operating inside Somalia following the 2006 invasion of the Ethiopian troops into the southern part of the country. Here, the first adaptation presents itself. Al-Shabaab operated as a local opposition toward a foreign invasion (utilizing to a limited nature the Somali nationalism), a somehow known actor with historical ties to the ICU that served as

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a stabilization force in the region and an option for the locals to live in a predictable, even if harsh, environment. Al-Shabaab of that time was no match for the regular forces of the Ethiopian army and other forces operating in the region. It thus developed a strategy of the non-territorial armed opposition and the war of attrition that should have led to the retreat of the foreign troops from the region. The sought-after retreat would, afterward, allow for the power vacuum to reappear, which could be filled by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab operated as a de-territorialized terrorist group/ insurgency that targeted the foreign troops via hit-and-run attacks without an establishment of important permanent control that would be vulnerable to targeting and avoiding direct battles with a militarily superior enemy. By 2009, the Ethiopian troops finally retreated, leaving behind a small number of Ugandan and Burundi AMISOM forces and poorly trained national armed forces with a low level of morale (Hansen 2013; Doboš 2016; Maruf and Jospeh 2018). In this moment, Al-Shabaab went through another transformation as the political and security environment allowed it to fill the territorial and functional holes appearing in the south of Somalia that neither the remaining external AMISOM troops nor the national institutions and security forces were capable of filling (as evident from the Al-Shabaab’s ability to occupy the city of Baidoa near Mogadishu just after the Ethiopian retreat (Maruf and Jospeh 2018, 78)). Al-Shabaab appeared as the ablest actor to control territory in the region and slowly occupied major populated territories. It not only gained military dominance over the countryside but also took over some key towns like the port city of Kismaayo or parts of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab set up a system of roadblocks in order to control movement through its territories that were reasonably well organized, and it set up clear, if brutal and sometimes arbitrary, legal code and began to implement basic administrative functions – the locals not targeted by Al-Shabaab were facing a stable and comparatively safe environment with significantly lower levels of crime and violence involved. It also attempted to standardize the curriculum for schools and establish educational programs for the wider population where its ideology would be presented (Hansen 2013, 84). This extremist stability was even preferred by the economic class that could not operate in the anarchical security environment (Ahmad 2017). Despite its radical ideology, it operated in a way that allowed for the development of basic governance institutions. This way, it got access to important financial means as well as population centers, and it seemed that it would be capable of replicating the ICU feat of somewhat effective control over southern Somalia that was since the early 1990s unmatched by any other actor. While being perceived as a hostile actor from abroad – especially in the context of the so-called War on Terror – and some local opposition to its harsh and sometimes arbitrary punishments, increasing throughout the time, it was still capable of generating comparatively orderly societal organization (Doboš 2016). Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab still did not meet the criteria of a group capable of challenging regular state armed forces of any other state, but its own internationally recognized government and the number of fighters and members, in general, were for the purposes of defeating the intervening forces quite low. This limit became apparent throughout the botched-up Ramadan Offensive in 2010 when Al-Shabaab

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troops attacked AMISOM forces ending up defeated. The losses of fighters in just this one battle caused Al-Shabaab to become less able to conduct any sustained activity. The Ramadan Offensive thus points at one specific characteristic of the territorial operations of the violent non-state actors in the Chaotic Anarchy environment  – its limits vis-à-vis able state institutions. The event was preceded by the internal struggle over the wisdom of attacking the conventional military forces by conventional means; nevertheless, A. Godane successfully pushed through his idea of attacking Makkah al Mukarramah road (connecting the seat of government in Villa Somalia and the international airport) in Mogadishu that aimed at isolating around 40 percent of the AMISOM troops in Somalia that were located in Villa Somalia that would leave them surrounded by the Al-Shabaab forces. The attack itself took place on August 23, 2010. Despite the initial success, it was soon clear that the Al-Shabaab troops were in direct combat inferior to the regular army units. This was especially the case following the introduction of reinforcements and armored vehicles by the Ugandan AMISOM forces. After 2  weeks of fighting, Al-Shabaab attacking power decreased as the time went, and when the offensive finally stopped in mid-September, it was estimated that the group lost some 500 to 700 fighters with more being injured that meant a loss of some 25 percent of its fighting power including many leaders. The event also costs Al-Shabaab a substantial amount of finances (Hansen 2013, 100–102; Maruf and Jospeh 2018, 103–113). Also, throughout the same period, and enhanced by the losses, the internal power struggle led to killing or defection of many key members of the movement leaving internationalist Ahmed Godane as the sole key leader causing Al-Shabaab to focus on its international side (proclamation of allegiance to Al-Qaeda) and anti-clanism even more than before. Al-Shabaab thus became part of the wider Al-Qaeda network inside East Africa. In 2011, one more key event led to another redefinition of Al-Shabaab’s modus operandi. This year was the beginning of the invasion of another neighbor of Somalia into its territory in the context of already weakening hold over some central regions and mishandled 2011 drought and famine crisis on Al-Shabaab territories.1 This time, the invading country was Kenya that was threatened by the Al-Shabaab in its northeast where a large community of Somalis historically lives as the region became increasingly economically important to the central Kenyan government (Hansen 2013). Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) led to another process of de-­ territorialization as the less capable Al-Shabaab forces were unable to hold territory over the Kenyan army incursion. Even though the Kenyan advance was slower than generally expected, it was at the end capable of pushing Al-Shabaab from all significant population and economic centers. This, however, does not mean that Al-Shabaab would be completely destroyed or pushed away. Intervening troops were unwilling to sustain territorial control away from the main population and economic centers in the south of the country, leaving a large yet sparsely populated space for the group to exploit. Al-Shabaab proved capable of filling the space left void for it to take over.  See Maruf and Jospeh (2018, 121).

1

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It maintained a territorial presence in the hinterland and utilized cross-border smuggling of goods like charcoal and sugar and setting up roadblocks as means of its economic benefit. Security-wise it also realized that it could not force the Kenyan forces away from the country via direct clash with the superior forces. It thus enhanced its presence in Kenya itself, making use of the local Somali Diaspora and Kenyan policies targeting it to go through with some of the very well-known attacks like Westgate shopping mall shootout in 2013 (71 deaths including 4 attackers), Garissa University College onslaught in 2015 (148 deaths), or Mogadishu bombing in 2017 when a truck exploded on its way to its intended target reportedly killing 587 people. In this way, Al-Shabaab aimed to force the external troops out of the country in order to reestablish the void that could be filled by its own structures while simultaneously still threatening the recognized government. The Kenyan policies also did not help its cause as the government targeted the Somali community in the country  – most prominently the Eastleigh district of Nairobi – as a follow-up of any troubles. This victimization of the Somali communities let the Al-Shabaab use the card of the protector of the weak against the strong and thus get another support and recruits even throughout the period of comparative decline. Al-Shabaab also portrayed itself as a protector of the disadvantaged clans in southern Somalia. A combination of territorial activity in remote, but still useful, areas with the “protector” propaganda and utilization of the terrorist and hit-and-run attacks allowed the group to remain significant relevant force even after the loss of its territories (Doboš 2016; Doboš et al. 2019; Hansen 2019, 163–184). Through the survival as hinterland/networking group, Al-Shabaab managed to bring a fatigue to the intervening forces as the countries involved make their willingness to retreat heard in increasingly strong voice with the consequent environment being left without an external (the USA is providing light footprint operations only) or internal (beside Somaliland and parts of Puntland) alternatives. Al-Shabaab’s areas of operations are, despite the killing of its leader A. Godane in an airstrike that took place on September 1, 2014, since 2016 constantly moving toward the population centers, and the group seems to be engaged in a struggle to reterritorialize once the external actors decrease their presence in the region (Doboš et al. 2019, 551). Al-Shabaab, with its activities, furthermore, pushes other local actors on the fringes of the struggle. This is clearly the case of the Deash’s affiliate in the country that was forced into retreat to the north of the country where hardly penetrable Golis Mountains are located, providing the group a much-needed shelter (Hansen 2019, 185). Al-Shabaab thus remains a potent force in the south Somali environment, and there is a high chance that it will regain territorial control once the intervening forces leave or substantially decrease their presence. This is, furthermore, reflected in the behavior of many communities that act in a way that would not leave them too connected to the intervening forces that would in the future lead to a possible punishment by Al-Shabaab once the group regains its power over the now inaccessible territories (Hansen 2019, 180). Furthermore, Al-Shabaab is still capable of retaining limited judiciary and taxation systems even on territories nominally under the state’s jurisdiction, pointing at its ability to fill the functional and territorial void left by the incapable state institutions (Hansen 2019, 183).

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These general shifts in types of Al-Shabaab’s operations and successful adaptations helping it survive are also mirrored in approaches to the specific issues. In this chapter, we will look at two of them – approach to population and ideology – to further explore the issue at hand. The relation toward the population and ideology evolved together with the changing internal security environment in the country. The ICU and later Al-Shabaab throughout the Ethiopian intervention utilized the nationalist narratives and historical disputes in order to gather strong backing from the Somali population. It focused, besides the obligatory religious framing, on issues of national liberation against the (Christian) forces of historical Somali enemy (no matter that Ethiopian army in Somalia was composed largely of non-­ Christian soldiers). Also, the historical geopolitical images like the vision of greater Somalia (including predominantly Somali regions of Somalia, Djibouti, Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and northwestern part of Kenya) were spurred. This localized and nationalistic framing of the Al-Shabaab’s attempt to establish an Islamic State in Somalia helped it receive funding from the Somali Diaspora (including from its members in North America and Europe) and strengthen its position inside the country. Al-Shabaab, to a degree, also attempted to overcome the clan divisions inside the country in order to promote unity against the infidels (Hansen 2013; Maruf and Jospeh 2018). Following the spread of Al-Shabaab throughout the southern part of the country, the group’s framing of its activities much more clearly focused on the religious part of its struggle. Nationalism was largely forgotten in its rhetoric, and the issue at hand was the indoctrination of the population through its educational and social activity. This shift is also connected to the process of centralization of the group’s hierarchy under Godane’s leadership but was not abandoned even after his death. Al-Shabaab became a part of the Al-Qaeda network, and its focus shifted from the Somalis as a nation to East African Muslims in general. The group was increasingly targeting civilians based on the religious principle (evident, e.g., in the Westgate attack) and was attempting to win favor among the disadvantaged part of the population in areas of its territorial presence. With the decrease in territorial control, this shift grew even stronger, and the group became more interested in and dependent on the ad hoc support from the communities it did not have to control and was incapable of doing so. It also definitely framed its activities as a part of the global jihadist struggle under the Al-Qaeda leadership. We can thus observe a move from more nationalistic Somali-oriented framing of actions toward religiously oriented identification with East Africa playing the role of a province in a larger global struggle. The approach to the population also differs according to the ability of the group to actually control any population centers. When it does, Al-Shabaab forces through a social and legal code based on its literal reading of sharia disregarding the traditional norms (Doboš 2016). The case of Al-Shabaab clearly points to the behavior violent non-state actors operating in the Chaotic Anarchy environment generally put through if they are to survive and thrive. In case this does not happen, even the originally successful units such as Daesh in Syria and Iraq are poised for failure. Al-Shabaab does not hide by a transformation into a network but utilizes a process of liquid territoriality, thus avoiding direct confrontation with stronger opponents while being able to control

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some territory and controlling population when possible and when stronger opponents are not present. This in mid-2020, by the time of writing, allows the group to be territorially present even in capital Mogadishu. The stronger the opposition, the more the group needs to avoid any possible direct combat operation on a larger scale, as evident from the case of Ramadan Offensive. Also, despite its highly ideologized nature, Al-Shabaab showed quite a large level of pragmatism when it came to such a contentious issue such as generating money from pirate activities or approach to clan structure – it is evident that groups that are capable of operating in this environment need to skillfully exploit the environment and not remain ideologically purist. On the other hand, given space, groups challenge each other over the utilization of such territory in what resembles the power competition of the early international system. The number of outcomes of such a challenge is very high, and flexibility is a key factor of success.

7.1.2 People’s Republic of China The second case study focusing on the adaptation of political units to different types of environments concerns the PRC as a Westphalian actor attempting to maintain centralized power against the force of political globalization without the destruction of its economy to the point of collapse. The case thus presents the adaptation of state institutions wishing to maintain the status quo in the nature of interactions in the international system. Even though the history of political development in China is extremely long and complex, for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to go back only to the end of the Second World War. After the defeat of the Japanese Empire throughout 1945, the conflict in China continued with a return of the civil war between nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek and communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Despite the strategic and material advantage of the anti-­communist forces, the nationalists were on the losing side of the conflict and finally in 1949 retreated from the mainland to Taiwan, where it operated as an internationally recognized government of China until 1979, when the status shifted to the PRC, and the Republic of China with capital of Taipei remains an unrecognized state ever since. Despite the mutual claims on their respective territories, the two entities remain distinct, each retaining its own effective government and, as evident from the previous analysis, each drifting toward a different type of geopolitical environment. However, the process of state-building in the mainland did not wait until the recognition from outside of the socialist bloc, meaning the acceptance of the entity into the UN. The country’s geographical extent was formed in the following years as the Beijing government conquered the Hainan island and annexed Tibet, while the last territories were added to the country in 1997 and 1999 when the former British colony of Hong Kong and later the former Portuguese Macao were transferred under the country’s sovereignty – establishing what is known as one country, two systems. Also, the internal development came through different phases that allow us to observe a shift from the twentieth-century totalitarianism to a

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centralized authoritarian regime clearly adapting to the changes of the post-Cold War world accompanied by a promotion of the Westphalian model of the organization of the political space. First, the Maoist attempts to establish a totalitarian state following the amended Soviet approach led the country into two significant ventures. The Great Leap Forward taking place between 1958 and 1962 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1976 were, nonetheless, both major disasters for the Chinese society and economy. This only added to the Sino-Soviet split taking place in appearing since the late 1950s escalating in a border conflict that entered a hot phase in 1969. The issue of border delimitation between the two entities was finally settled in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the dispute between the two countries in a context of the steep economic decline in China and a change in the US approach led to a new phase of opening of the PRC. Realizing the negative impact of the pat policies, the country began to move in a different direction that, to a degree, affects its policies up until today. Beginning with the 1970s, the relations between the USA and China started to improve. The 1970s were marked by an attempt to establish the relationship between the two countries, and the PRC was finally recognized as a UN member in 1979. The same period was also marked by the death of Chairman Mao in 1976 and change in the direction the country took under the rule of Deng Xiaoping. The country turned toward an economy based on capitalist rather than a centrally planned socialist mode of organization, however, without liberalization of its political system as evident from the crackdown on the 1989 protests. The country thus did not follow the wave of revolutions that shook the communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe. After Deng stepped down in 1992, his followers continued in the rational policies of development of economy in order to turn the PRC into a developed great power, making sure that their personal ambitions do not obstruct the country’s development. The PRC was to behave in a less ideological way, promoting mutual respect and principle of noninterference; however, its policies became increasingly ambitious and its foreign policy more intrusive. This change was rapidly fastened with the election of Xi Jinping as the new leader of the country and the communist party. Under his term, the turn toward a more personalized rule can be once again observed. Indisputably, China has become a great economic power with increasing political ambitions and interests all around the globe and with increasing capacity to meet them. Its authoritarian setting combining with the liberal economic policies makes it a great study of the adaptations that Westphalian states focused on the preservation of sovereignty in its nineteenth and twentieth century understanding need to undertake in order to retain their position and focus on sovereignty. The key part of the adaptation is a need to make use of the advantages of economic globalization without losing sovereign control over its social and political development. This way, a country does not collapse economic-wise while retaining the features of the sovereign Westphalian state. The first illustration of this type of adaptation can be the one state-two systems principle connected to the governance of Hong Kong and Macao. As these enclaves (especially Hong Kong) are very important for the Chinese economy and its access to the international market, we can see an

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adaptation when political control over a limited territory is partially exchanged for the chance to benefit from participation in economic globalization. Nonetheless, the PRC is focused on maintaining the entities strongly inside its sphere of influence and not allowing them to liberalize in any meaningful way, as evident from the reaction on the 2019 protests taking place in Hong Kong. Nonetheless, another initiative, that appeared more recently, also points in the same direction. One Belt One Road (OBOR) is a set of loosely connected projects aiming to project the Chinese economic power to the world and strengthening its economic and often political standing. While the primary geographic direction of the OBOR initiative was the “Heartland” of Eurasia (Riegl et al. 2018, 137), it grew to encompass different, often disconnected, economic projects all over the world. Besides the main corridors connecting the PRC and Europe on land and sea, the initiative also projects as varied as the rail corridors in the Southeast Asia and Horn of Africa and investments in the Balkans. The project in its setting aims to become the largest infrastructural project in history (Khanna 2016, 28). It is often argued that there are several reasons behind the initiation of OBOR. The main sets of arguments are connected to the economy, internal politics, and geopolitics. As for the economic reasons behind OBOR, we can mention the need to access new markets (markedly in Central Asia) as a way to allow for the overproduction inside China to be shipped to new destinations. Also, a connection of the PRC with the Central Asian region will allow for the exploitation of the natural resources, whose extraction is a backbone of most of the countries’ economies, to be directly transited to China. In this way, the Chinese import diversifies, and it allows the Central Asian autocracies to export to more markets than just the Russian. For China, the maintenance of the safe influx of oil and natural gas establishes a backbone of its foreign policy. The fear of a potential cutoff from the oil produced in the Persian Gulf is a good explanation for the Chinese infrastructural projects in Pakistan and Myanmar. Both of the corridors planned to connect the countries’ ports with the Chinese territory via land would allow the imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca, and the First Island Chain and the Pakistani corridor, furthermore, circumvent India. These are the geostrategic chokepoints that can be used to prevent the import of oil and natural gas into China in case of a conflict. Direct connection to the Central Asian countries brings China further stability in the energy domain. The second factor is internal – land part of OBOR will connect the hinterland parts of mainland China to its developed shore and would unite the population behind a grand national project. Given the lower level of stability in the peripheral regions, this step is seen as a positive move toward increasing the power projection capabilities of the Chinese state inside its borders. Furthermore, it is a way for Xi Jinping to portray himself as a great leader. Finally, there are geopolitical considerations in place, as well. The project strengthens the Chinese presence in many parts of the globe, including key geostrategically important locations like Djibouti. It will also strengthen the Chinese maritime capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean region, and allow the PRC to overcome the Pacific containment conducted by the United States and its allies. The construction of the infrastructural projects additionally leads some of the countries into debt traps, making them more dependent on the

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PRC and turning others into the Chinese allies copying some of the practices of the Chinese government, thus strengthening the role of the Westphalian geopolitical setting in general (Dargnat 2016, 69–71; Herd 2015, 223; Brewster 2016). As evident, the OBOR is a multifaceted complex and somewhat loosely connected set of different, mainly infrastructural projects. While they meet the different needs of the Chinese state, they are all connected to the process of economic globalization and allow the strengthening of the Chinese state as an institution. This utilization of economic globalization toward nationally oriented goals lacking larger connectivity to other units in other domains is a typical example of adaptations of Westphalian states leaning toward autocracy inside the neomedieval framework. Additionally, the initiative allows the Chinese government to promote its preference regarding the political organization of space. The PRC is opened to economic globalization and international trade since the end of the 1970s, so this development is nothing new. That the state apparatus is attempting to combine economic liberalism and its efficiency with political autocracy is clear at least since the 1989 suppression of the protests, and it established a quite effective modus operandi for similar types of actors inside the neomedieval twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the external domain defined by at least limited opening to economic exchanges while limiting political and social influences stemming from the liberal part of the international society and connected to political and cultural globalization is not the only important point to be raised. There is also a predominantly internal, authoritarian level of adaptation. The centralized state must assure that the transformation into a Durable Disorder is not being perceived as a preferred option by the critical mass of the population and that its hold over the territory and people living inside is effective. In the Chinese case, these processes can be manifested in the so-called Great Firewall as a way to shield the environment from external influences and the Social Credit System as a purely internal coercive measure. The Great Firewall is a part of the system deployed by the Chinese government to promote the doctrine of cyber-sovereignty that stands as a central piece of the Chinese approach to the Internet (Griffiths 2019, 14). Even though the Chinese government pushed through the rapid development of the Internet connection in the country beginning in the early 1990s, it simultaneously developed ways of control of the network. While the network was perceived as a mean of economic development, it was not to become an uncontrolled space (Roberts 2018, 104)  – clearly mirroring policies in other domains. The Chinese government set up a set of vague laws and regulations that can be utilized in case a state response is seen as valuable to protect the interests of the communist party. While the laws can be in theory used against the whole of the population, they are more strictly utilized against actors with more significant impacts  – e.g., journalists (Roberts 2018, 107–117). Additionally, the Chinese government passed in February 1996 the State Council Order 195 that places total control over the Internet and its future development in the country to the state apparatus. The supervision of the Internet was given to the security services, and it was disallowed to use the network to incite to overthrow the government or the socialist system – no matter how vague the regulation is (Griffiths 2019, 24). The censorship is thus both external and internal, and the Great Firewall

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is the outer part of the whole system designed to allow control over the network and promote the doctrine of cyber-sovereignty. What is also important is that the legal system forces Chinese companies to cooperate with the Chinese state and provide it with data if asked to do so. This provision became one of the key issues in the recent debate in the West over the development of the 5G networks and the role of Huawei and ZTE companies in this process. The Great Firewall operates as a regular firewall, however, on a state level. It blocks external selected pages, keywords, images, and so on in order to disallow for the organization of population outside the party structure and put a higher price on receipt of information for the Internet users inside the country. It slows downloading of the foreign-based websites as these need to be checked several times before allowed to load as the data passes through one of the three locations that connect the Chinese network to the global Internet. These are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In case the website is censored, it produces an error message, so it might be unclear whether the page is blocked or simply not working (Griffiths 2019, 16–26; Roberts 2018, 60, 109–110). The PRC also set up substitutes to large companies like Google (Baidu), Facebook (Weibo), or Amazon (Alibaba) in order to decrease to incentives of the Chinese population to attempt to avoid the system or, in general, visit pages located out of the Chinese part of the Internet (Griffiths 2019, 68). The fact is that the Great Firewall can be circumvented using the virtual private network (VPN) that allows a user to operate on the Internet via another computer located out of China, thus not being located behind the firewall. Nonetheless, utilization of a VPN further slows down the connection, and obtaining one is usually not for free, even if the cost is usually quite low. The VPNs are also sometimes shut down by the government. This obstacle, in combination with the presence of alternatives inside the Chinese web, decreases the willingness of the majority of the population to seek foreign-based websites blocked by the firewall. If the censorship is not sudden, it is mostly hidden and thus more effective as the basic population does not even feel the government’s meddling (Roberts 2018). It is clear that the system together with the promotion of the doctrine of cyber-sovereignty is a tool of blocking the population from the influence stemming mainly from the appearing Durable Disorder part of the world and the growth of the networks that establish the multiple overlapping services, thus allowing the Chinese government to centralize the system and promote its point of view regarding the organization of political space abroad as many countries follow the Chinese precedent regarding the Internet access. While the Great Firewall represents an attempt to prevent spillover of Durable Disorder and decentralization into China, Social Credit System is one of the parts of the internal control utilized by the government in Beijing. The system is being developed since the 2013/2014 and aims to promote “sincerity” in Chinese society.2 By the time of writing, the system is being deployed only in a limited area. Nevertheless, the push to expand it nationwide is continuing. The initiative is to a 2  See https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-const ruction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/

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degree similar to other rating systems used around the globe for the purposes of private companies in areas like healthcare or insurance. Nonetheless, the Chinese version is more intrusive and takes into account a wider number of factors. It is projected to evaluate the behavior of Chinese citizens and allow them to utilize selected services accordingly. To this end, the system manages a large amount of data that should be automatically evaluated and calculated into a form of social credit. Increasingly, technological progress should allow for as extensive automation in the data gathering process (e.g., thanks to the facial recognition process) as possible. As mentioned, nonetheless, the system is not yet deployed and is sometimes described as erring and confusing. Also, given a high level of already existing surveillance, censorship, and state control, it, in fact, so far does not bring as substantial changes as might have been expected. The expected future shape of the project, however, will likely give the Chinese authorities a tool to more efficiently control the population, thus further centralizing the system and strengthening its position in the Westphalian geopolitical environment (Fickling 2019; Kobie 2019). The abovementioned examples point at some features that characterize the behavior of the state willing and capable of remaining in the Westphalian environment. It is crucial to point out that given the changing structure of the international system, even the centralized Westphalian state must, to a degree, change its behavior in order to adapt to the shifts. First, it needs to take into account the influence of globalization as to maintain its internal effectiveness. If the country were to bankrupt, it would likely move into the Chaotic Anarchy spectrum (a notable exception is, e.g., North Korea). China realized this even before the end of the Cold War and began to transform its economic model to remain sustainable even in the twenty-­ first century. It can also use globalization to promote its own vision of the international order. If we look at the case of China, this means incorporation into the economic web of the world trade and setting up the OBOR initiative. The PRC additionally promotes its vision of the world according to the respect to the sovereign decisions of nations (however, often only in word and not deed) or doctrine of cyber-sovereignty. On the other hand, the government in Beijing is successful in shielding the internal environment from external influences that would be promoting the liberal vision of international order and the spread of the emerging Durable Disorder environment. Additionally, it is crucial to react to the technological progress that, as evident, is not the one-sided liberal utopia as was once presented to be. Internet was to become a tool of the free spread of data and ideas unbound by the national jurisdiction. China made use of the economic, scientific, and other benefits of the connection that is necessary for the country’s prosperity while simultaneously setting up a system of rather effective censorship. It also utilizes increasingly advanced methods of surveillance and population control to make use of its scientific potential necessary for its development. This smart adaptation allows the PRC to remain relevant centralized state on the international scene and to remain in and possibly spread the Westphalian political organization based on centralization and state territoriality.

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7.1.3 Facebook Last, but not least, we will look at an example of the nonviolent non-state actor primarily based on the emerging Durable Disorder environment and utilizing networks as its primary asset. Facebook was set up on the 4th of February 2004 as a project at Harvard University but quickly spread to become one of the most influential social networks in the contemporary world. Only a month after its foundation, the site opened to students of other selected universities  – Yale, Columbia, and Stanford. In quick succession, Mark Zuckerberg – one of the founders of the site – moved to develop the network in California and improved Facebook with features it is known for today. The potential of the company was quickly recognized, and Yahoo reportedly offered 1 billion USD to take over Facebook. Throughout 2006, the availability of Facebook further increased by lowering the minimum age of registration, and new features connected with increasing issues over the users’ privacy appeared. These two – new features and privacy concerns – are to reappear throughout the later development. In 2007 Microsoft invested in the company, and the projected value of Facebook was on the rise. What has initially been mostly a tool for sharing details from users’ personal lives later turned out to be a powerful political tool, as well. This became all too obvious throughout the Arab Spring in which Facebook, in particular, and social media, in general, played a crucial role in social and political mobilization. In 2012, Facebook decided to go on stock markets, thus changing its ownership structure. Furthermore, the company made a large acquisition in buying the photo-­ sharing site Instagram – 2 years later – followed by WhatsApp. By the end of the year, Facebook crossed the 1 billion active users per week landmark, pointing at its key role in the Internet traffic. The number grew to 2 billion in 2017. Nevertheless, throughout the same period, the company was hit with scandals connected to the political aspect of its business – most notably the Cambridge Analytica case that made headlines around the globe and led to a set of reactions and counterreactions around the Durable Disorder environment (Greiner, et al. 2019) – issue discussed in this section. It is evident that Facebook operates as a nonviolent non-state actor clearly embedded in the Durable Disorder environment and with an economic profit as a primary motivation – thus being part of the economic pillar. It is also a company that began to dominate an important and increasingly important segment of Internet traffic  – social media. As such, it managed to fill the functional holes, set up a new business portfolio, and become an important global player. Nonetheless, at the time, it clashed with the interest of political actors and needed to adapt in order to continue operating. While this is almost impossible inside the Westphalian environment (see the previous section on the PRC) and there is not a market interesting enough located inside the Chaotic Anarchy, the company needs to avoid a too extreme clash with the political authorities while leaving as many business options open as possible. For the remainder of the section, we shall look at the role of Facebook inside the Durable Disorder environment and the interaction with the political actors, especially in the post-2016 US election era.

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Facebook is, first and foremost, a business venture. As such, it aims for profit being a part of the economic pillar of the emerging Durable Disorder environment. The characteristic of this pillar is the strive for economic efficiency and mobility that allows the companies to move across the networked space aiming to settle inside countries where the regulations allow for maximization of the profit. This is clearly manifested by the rapid growth of the company not only membership-wise as it opened to the broad public but also regarding the purchases of other platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp. In this regard, Facebook should be a target of market regulations and traditional economic policies of states. Nonetheless, Facebook holds a definite impact on the political pillar itself, making it a focal point of the discussions concerning Internet regulations. As the membership and basic traffic on the platform is free, Facebook developed different means of profit, not unlike other websites with varying primary function for their users. The majority of the revenue comes from the advertisement targeting users based on data gathered by the company. This means that Facebook is capable of collecting and analyzing the information put on the website by the users and monitor their behavior as to develop very specific profiles that the adverts can target. This allows for the largest possible response from users to the adverts they see as they are not overwhelmed by the promotion of the products that are not likely to interest them. Such a model on one side makes the whole process more effective and efficient. On the other, it risks the breach of privacy as the tools need to collect as precise data about the users as possible. So far, the issue is mostly connected to the protection of user privacy in the context of customer protection. The set of policies connected to this topic is well-known from other fields and just needs to be updated for the digital age. However, the business model opened Facebook to a more extensive inquiry connected to the political consequences of its operations. The same way the commercial advert aims at a specific customer with a certain income, interests, and area of residence, the political campaigns want to target a specific part of population with a message tailored to their age, education, income, or occupation as to increase the chances that they will need to spend as little funds as possible to win as much additional voters/supporters as possible. Facebook, additionally, targets not only the advert on the personal characteristics of the users and their connections but also on the likelihood that they will like the message presented to them (Kreiss and McGregor 2019, 6). So, it makes no sense to target firm supporters of the party from the other side of the political spectrum and similarly to show a message regarding the plan for pension funds to first-­ time voters, usually still at high school. This approach, nonetheless, established a toxic environment in which different and often rather specific groups of users got access to different information without being confronted with challenging views. The sources of information were filtered according to the same criteria, and the most likely match was promoted by Facebook. The situation thus aided the increasing polarization of the political views in the societies. Added to that, it was not always clear who is paying for and spreading the information at hand, and the sites were not checked for disinformation that set up a mix in which relevant groups were targeted by a sustained influx of what can be best described as conspiracy theories,

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thus further enhancing the division. Jorgensen and Desai (2017, 115–119) characterized the largest issues of the company as provision of inaccurate information to users, instability of the ability of the users to restrict access to the information on their profiles, lack of consent with how the data are handled, sharing of information with the third parties and tracking of the activity of users, privacy issues in general, and data retention. In the political sphere, specifically, Facebook tends to be connected to issues like fake news, targeted advertising, clickbait pages, or emotional outrage (Kreiss and McGregor 2019, 3). The political will to deal with the issue (following the sustained campaign by the part of the civil society – thus connecting the social pillar and political pillar in an effort to balance the economic one) was connected to a massive scandal involving the company Cambridge Analytica. The scandal involved both parts of the issues connected to Facebook activities  – privacy issues and the ability to influence the political debate. Cambridge Analytica company, as it was revealed in 2018, harvested personal data of millions of users and without their consent and used them for political marketing goals, thus helping with the targeting of the political campaigns, most notably that of Donald Trump. The revelation of the practices led to a public outcry that placed Facebook, and notably its head Mark Zuckerberg, into the spotlight of the international attention. The issue of campaigning on social media became a key point of the Internet regulations, and Zuckerberg was testifying before the US Congress. Facebook was also penalized for misconduct. Nevertheless, the whole process increased the tempo of the reactions and counterreactions regarding the regulation of Facebook activities. While the USA utilized a reactive consumer protection approach, the EU took the path of the development of specific rules guiding the activities of the company (Jorgensen and Desai 2017, 121–122). In the end, the EU set up rules concerning consumer protection and struggle against disinformation as to better regulate the activities of the company and other similar ventures. A closer look at these will clarify the point regarding the position of the nonviolent non-state actors even more. The issue of data privacy on the Internet affecting the operations of Facebook was tackled, among others, by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that is effective since the 25th of May 2018.3 The aim of the regulation is to clearly establish rules connected to the utilization of personal data and punishments for breaching these. GDPR also sets up a system in which the user needs to be informed about reasons for data collection, and this information cannot be used for any other reason. Collected data can also be stored for the minimum time period possible to minimize the risk of misuse. The regulation also explicitly calls for the secure handling of the collected data. In summary, GDPR established a system in which any person’s personal data can be collected only in exceptional instances or with the explicit consent of the person involved, for the stated purposes only, and can be stored only for the relevant time period. Importantly, the  Full text is available at https://gdpr-info.eu

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regulation covers the processing of data of individuals in the EU, no matter the place of origin of the company that asks for permission. Facebook announced that it would comply with the regulation and was prepared to enhance the data protection capabilities.4 In addition, Facebook promised to make the procession of the data more transparent, to increase the control of the users over their data, and that it will increase its own accountability for following the rules. This clearly manifests two issues. First, the ability of the company to operate its business is tightly connected to the perception of its users that the services Facebook provides are safe. The more active users, the larger the income from the adverts and other sources of income. In the EU, the social pillar of the environment for some time pushed forward the agenda of privacy, and this made the perception of the company’s activities more negative. By attempting to portray itself as a responsible actor, Facebook tried to pacify this form of opposition. Second, the company was unable to struggle against such a large bloc as the EU successfully. The functional hole regarding the utilization of private information online was closed, and it became increasingly problematic and costly to run against the new regulations. Despite its claims, Facebook faced numerous investigations related to the breach of GDPR and thus manifests the struggle between the business logic of the economic pillar – make profit on the utilization of shared and harvested personal data – and political pillar – represent the will of the voters to increase their privacy and control over the data they provide to the platform. Another issue that must be raised is the attempt of the EU to fight disinformation online. The issue of election meddling, lack of transparency regarding political messages, and the spread of disinformation increased on its importance since at least 2016. The EU, in reaction to these phenomena and in the wake of the election to the European Parliament that took place in May 2019, attempted to tackle these and clear the information space from the negative influences enhanced by the effect of social media. In October 2018, the EU presented a Code of Practice on Disinformation5 that set up the best practices as identified by the European Commission in order to secure the online environment against malicious content. The signatories were to take voluntary measures that would improve the situation regarding the issue to avoid any further legally binding regulations by the EU. To illustrate that the steps taken can hold measurable impact, it was tested that just flagging the posts as disputed decreases the willingness of the users to share them, thus decreasing the spread potential of disinformation (Mena 2019, 11). The measures taken and the improvement will be evaluated a year after the adoption of the Code, and then the European Commission will decide on the next approach. The whole initiative is, additionally, only a part of the overall Action Plan Against Disinformation aiming at the protection of the European democratic system.6  See, for example, https://www.facebook.com/business/gdpr  See full text at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 6  See, for example, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/europe-protects-eu-stepsaction-against-disinformation 4 5

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On the 17th of May 2019, the European Commission presented an evaluation of the steps that different online platforms took in order to comply with the Code of Practice. If we look at the part dedicated to Facebook, the report states: “Facebook reported on measures taken in the EU against ads that violated its policies for containing low quality, disruptive, misleading or false content or trying to circumvent its systems. It started enforcing its policy on political and issue-based advertising mid-April and removing non-compliant ads from Facebook and Instagram” (European Commission 2019). As evident, Facebook took the warning rather seriously as far as self-promotion is concerned. The actual changes are yet to be evaluated, and it remains doubtful whether the EU will be satisfied with the exercised changes in the company’s policy. The decision to allow 2020 US presidential candidates to share any political campaign on the network without even open lies breaking the community rules also did not bring much optimism to the regulators. What is observable in this case is a coordination between the representatives of the two pillars that realize their relative strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis each other. The nature of the environment incentives the EU to take a softer approach toward regulation. Facebook, as well as other major online platforms, nonetheless, need to self-regulate and adapt in order to avoid a broader confrontation with the political power. While in the case of the violent non-state actors operating in the Chaotic Environment, it was argued that these fill territorial and functional holes via the use of force and establishment of alternative governance structures, and in the case of nonviolent non-state actors in the Durable Disorder, the functional holes are filled according to the appearance of these as a result of technological and business progress (e.g., the Facebook’s attempt to develop its own cryptocurrency Libra) and interaction with the regulation frameworks set up by the political pillar. The adaptation is thus not that much a result of power confrontation as the negotiations and innovations. The case of Facebook thus points not only at the ways a private company adapts inside the emerging Durable Disorder environment but also at a broader dynamic between the political and economic pillar inside this geopolitical space. The economic pillar aims at the maximization of profit and can be often connected to the presence of influential billionaires shaping international affairs. Facebook founder and chair Mark Zuckerberg, for example, donated in 2015 the vast majority of his shares of the company to the charity. Similarly, the wealthy elite represented famously by Bill Gates shapes the international perception of global issues. This in no small degree decreases the democratic control over the global politics (Partzsch 2017, 11–12), but the aim of the economic pillar is not to be democratic, and the aim of social pillar that to some degree manifests in the activities of these rich businessmen is not a representation of the will of the majority. Representation is the role of the political pillar that interacts with the two. In the case of Facebook, the political pillar in both the USA and the EU acted to represent the interest in securing the information flow and improve the data privacy and will continue to do so. The selected case thus nicely portrays some of the main points from the theorized internal working of the environment.

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7.2.1 EU-Russia As mentioned earlier, the Durable Disorder environment is not yet fully formed, and so the proper analysis of the interactions based on the case study faces clear limits. Nonetheless, the EU is already manifesting many of the specifics connected to the theorized nature of the environment and is the region most directly moving to the full transformation of the political organization of the space according to its specifics. It will thus be used in the next two sections dedicated to the cases of relationship between different types of environment – the nature of interactions is already very close to what is expected by the theoretical framework as space increases its size through the power of attraction, and this causes counterreaction in the neighborhood. The first line of contact examined here is that with the Westphalian state. In the case of the EU, the clear choice is Russia as the main actor of this type in the European neighborhood. Russia, moreover, clearly manifests all the theorized adaptations of the Westphalian state (utilization of economic globalization (mainly natural resources trade), protection against other forms of globalization (protection of “traditional” values and illiberalism, development of alternative regional bodies), focus on sovereignty and centralization, attempts to disconnect from the global Internet by the establishment of a connection working independently inside Russia only, etc.). The Russian government, furthermore, pursues a doctrine of the so-­ called sovereign democracy for its internal development that is somewhat close to what Fareed Zakaria (2003) called an illiberal democracy – once again a development in line with the theorized nature of the environment. The theorized types of interaction are basically contradictory to each other and highlight the level to which the traditionally thinking Westphalian-oriented governments are skeptical of many facets of globalization and networking. As already pointed out earlier, and as thoroughly described, for example, by Zielonka (2007) on the European case, the Durable Disorder environment naturally attracts its neighboring territories that attempt to enter the economically efficient and politically and socially liberal world of flows and movement in what can be called a “normative imperialism” (Pänke 2019, 102). The soft-power attraction of the environment pulls the stable actors in the neighborhood as they adapt their internal setting and behavior in order to be allowed inside the common framework and further economically develop. They get bound in the system of overlapping institutions and multiple loyalties and arrange their inner workings according to the decentralized Durable Disorder model. The attraction of the environment for the population of the neighboring regions has been manifested, among others, in the so-called colored revolutions that are negatively perceived by the Russian government. The attraction also works for the actors coming from the less stable parts of the neighborhood, but these will be dealt with in the next section. The politics of incorporation and harmonization is thus a clear policy of the Durable Disorder geopolitical environment. It is directly connected to the impact of

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globalization and embraces its effects. On the contrary, the Westphalian states that are wishing to remain in their current geopolitical setting proceed with separation policies based on conservative and statist thinking that would disallow for the spread of the Durable Disorder environment into its neighborhood and thus challenge its mode of government. Both of these tendencies are clearly visible in the relationship between Russia and the EU and especially in the shatter belt dividing the two, manifesting as a tension between the liberal normative European space and the sphere of influence that Russia aims to develop (Raik 2019, 52). For this reason, this case study will look at the interaction in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Balkans, starting in 2008, that definitely put an end to the attempts to involve Russia inside the liberal part of the world following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The year was selected due to its tumultuous nature that was marked by the wide US-led recognition of Kosovo and followed by the war in Georgia, leading to the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia and several other countries. Georgia and Ukraine,7 as the post-Soviet countries seeking closer alignment with the West in general, faced a strong Russian opposition that materialized in their destabilization via an establishment of the geopolitical outposts on their territory and destabilization of the internal political and security situation preventing any meaningful discussion over their potential entrance into the Western structures (Riegl and Doboš 2018). While the Baltics constitute a very specific case in the post-Soviet context, other former Soviet countries attempting to enter the EU, NATO, or both were actively prevented to do so via the direct or indirect Russian involvement aiming at the separation of its sphere of Westphalian political organization from the networking space defined by the presence of the EU, NATO, and other institutions and formats of collaboration. While the Westphalian centralized initiatives aim at the establishment of a map covered by other similarly centralized units, Durable Disorder aims at defusing the power among different entities and setting up the system of multiple loyalties and overlapping institutional settings. This is why all the regional initiatives and connections between the post-Soviet states and the institutions inside the emerging Durable Disorder region can be perceived as a threat by the Westphalian actors. The first case that is illustrative of the relationship is one of Georgia. The Caucasian country is since the dissolution of the USSR one of the most vocal proponents of a closer cooperation with the West, including NATO and the EU. It is also a country that faced internal instability and was not very capable of managing the ethnic tensions that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to the emergence of two breakaway regions on its territory as soon as the beginning of the 1990s  – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a situation that was mirrored, for example, in Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Moldova (Transnistria), or Russia itself (Chechnya) and was tied to the unthawing of the political map in general. The third separatist region of Adjara was successfully incorporated into the state structures and is not a cause of any major disputes. While it is undoubtedly true that these entities are a manifestation of the distinctiveness of the entities from the Georgian  For an overview of the situation in these two countries, see, for example, Toal (2017).

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state and often poor policy choice toward their administration and representation of non-Georgian minorities (Hoch et  al. 2017; O’Loughlin et  al. 2015), they were increasingly instrumentalized as to become the de facto Russian proxies on the Georgian territory. The final straw that broke the camel’s neck was the wide US-supported recognition of the Kosovar bid for recognition in 2008 that led to an escalation of the previously frozen conflict in Georgia followed by the incursion of the Russian troops and recognition of the two entities as sovereign states by Russia. While up until today the entities hold only marginal level of recognition (as of the time of writing only five countries maintain their recognition – Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria), their presence disqualifies Georgia from entering any of the two organizations and thus establishes a separation zone between the Westphalian actor and the growing soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment. As the Russian soft power in the face of the attraction of the Western liberal institutions cannot compete over the geopolitical orientation of Georgia in a way China shapes the international order, it utilizes more traditional forms of great power influence to project its goals. It thus, maybe paradoxically, strips Georgia of its full Westphalian sovereignty, in order to prevent it from integrating into the Durable Disorder environment and shields itself from the possible attraction of this environment to its population. If the bordering regions visited by the Russian population exhibit a more attractive alternative to the current state of affairs inside Russia, this might lead to a heightened level of discontent and possible strengthening of the public displays of opposition to the regime. The second example of the separation reaction to the tendencies to incorporate additional territory via the attraction of the networking space is that of Ukraine and, in its nature, a very similar situation to that in Georgia. Ukraine faces many internal and external issues connected to its geographic location (unclear borders, Crimean issue), population characteristics (language differences), history (part of the USSR, often challenged statehood rights), economy (high levels of corruption, low wages, unemployment), and other factors. For the purposes of this study, one geopolitical detail is crucial – Ukraine establishes a shatter belt between the two spheres of influence (Ferguson 2017). This location on a dividing line between the two geopolitical spaces with their inherent power rivalries leads to sustained internal disputes over the orientation of the country’s foreign policy and internal setting. While for a long time, this dispute was manifested in electoral politics or internal protests like the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004–2005, this changed in early 2014. Another in waves of protests that shape the modern Ukrainian politics followed the refusal of the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych to sign the agreed Association Agreement with the EU in November of the previous year in Vilnius. While first announcing that he will join the agreement, Yanukovych was, in the end, pushed by the Russian government to abandon the plan and instead focus more on integration with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. The following period is known as the Euromaidan and was manifested by the outpouring of the people into the streets demanding signature of the document and a return to the pro-European course of the foreign policy. This, combined with the demand to change the government, specifically focused on the person of the country’s president. In this sense, we

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can observe another manifestation of the Durable Disorder appeal. Once again, the EU did not try to force its membership upon Ukraine. Instead, the appeal of the membership was enough to set up a very volatile and, in the end, violent situation. The reaction of the Westphalian environment did not take long. Once the protestors succeeded in ousting Yanukovych, despite the extensive use of violence by the pro-regime forces, the concealed Russian forces, together with the pro-Russian militias, initiated violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean peninsula. While the situation on the peninsula is now pacified with the Russian presence de facto uncontested while widely perceived as illegal and illegitimate, the Donbas region in the east along the Russian borders is still a site of active hostilities with the end of fighting improbable in the near future. At the beginning of the fighting in the eastern part of the country, there was a fear that the Russian-supported and Russian-led forces will attempt to occupy a broader swath of territory. In the end, it became clear that the destabilization of Ukraine is enough for the goals of the Russian government, as this sets up another barrier against the spread of the Durable Disorder environment. The fighting got off the radar of the majority of the international community as the Russian-backed fighters have successfully managed to avoid major blunders and mistakes like the downing of the Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing 777 on the 17th of July 2014 on its way from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The intensification of the Syrian conflict and the migration crises also overshadowed the Ukrainian issue. While the EU is promoting reforms and consolidation of the Ukrainian state that would allow it to enter the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment, Russia is preventing this by destabilizing the country and further separating itself from the EU. The persistent, if comparatively low, levels of violence in Donbas thus follow the separation logic. Finally, there is the case of the Balkans. The Balkans is the central region of the EU integration processes in the post-2004 era. In 2007, two eastern Balkans countries of Romania and Bulgaria were admitted into the union, and in 2013, Croatia followed suit. The region also witnessed an expansion of NATO membership as Croatia and Albania joined the pact in 2009, and Montenegro did the same in 2017. North Macedonia is likely to become the next member state by the end of 2019. As of the time of writing, all of the countries in the Balkans, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (whose status as a state is, however, disputed), are in a category of the EU candidate country. The encroachment of other Western institutions into the region further moves the countries from centralized to Durable Disorder mode of the organization of political space. Montenegro and North Macedonia, nonetheless, witnessed the counterreaction from the Westphalian power in their vicinity and can present another case of challenge between the two geopolitical spaces. Montenegro was in October 2016, preceding its entrance into NATO, targeted with a plotted coup d’état reportedly originating from abroad. The attempted coup was, nonetheless, unsuccessful, and the country, in the end, joined the alliance and thus stepped closer toward incorporation into the emerging Durable Disorder structures. In 2019, the Montenegrin High Court in Podgorica confirmed that the plotters were connected to Russia and Serbia and actually sentenced two Russian citizens, identified as Eduard Shishmakov and

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Vladimir Popov, to jail terms of 15 and 12  years, respectively.8 However, they remain outside Montenegro. The aim of the attempt to overthrow the government was to prevent the accession of the country to NATO, a move opposed by Russia that brings Montenegro closer toward a union with the Euro-Atlantic space. Montenegro is already using Euro as its currency and is thus on the way toward the EU membership. It is willingly and increasingly incorporating itself into the Durable Disorder system of multiple and overlapping authorities with a view of the utilization of the presence in the networked space to enhance the living, economic and social conditions in the country or, alternatively, enhance the business opportunities for some of its citizens. A similar picture was observable in the case of North Macedonia. The country’s membership in both NATO and the EU was blocked by Greece due to the name dispute that dates back into the era of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The country claimed the name Macedonia while Greece stated that Macedonia, as a historical region, is located in the contemporary northern part of their territory, and the name suggests the Macedonian claims over the Greek land. For almost 30 years, the country officially used the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The name dispute became a central focus of many nationalist movements and parties. As an example, the renovation of the center of the city of Skopje can be named. The newly constructed buildings and statues – part of the Skopje 2014 project – hold a substantial connection to the ancient Greek architecture, thus reminding the visitors of the perceived historical heritage connected to Alexander the Macedon. Nonetheless, by 2018 the governments in Skopje and Athens reached an agreement that would unblock the accession process by renaming the former Yugoslav country to the Republic of North Macedonia. The deal was to be confirmed by voters in the referendum taking place in September 2018 around the Balkans country. As the Russian side was firmly opposed to the plan, it attempted to block the affirmative vote. The resulting propaganda effort succeeded in persuading the majority of voters not to participate, thus invalidating the otherwise pro-change referendum results. The deal was finally confirmed by the parliament on the 11th of January 2019. A similar issue was observable in the Greek parliament, where the Russian-supported nationalist voices tried to block the ratification process, also unsuccessfully. The path toward NATO and possible future EU membership is thus opened for North Macedonia. Finally, there is the case of Serbia that does not strive for the NATO membership but is positive about the possible accession to the EU, thus limiting its willingness to get fully included into all of the Durable Disorder institutions for mainly historical reasons  – issue, nonetheless, predicted by the theory of neomedievalism. Historically, the EU has been active in the regime change in the country that in 2000 took down the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic – an exceptional move by the EU (Raik 2019, 57). A year earlier, NATO bombed the county in connection to its war in Kosovo leaving to deep resent toward the alliance ever since. While, 8  See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-court/russians-opposition-figures-sentencedover-role-in-2016-montenegro-coup-attempt-idUSKCN1SF144

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economically, the EU offers the most important level of support to Serbia, Russia plays on a nationalistic and symbolic card, attempting to persuade the public opinion and the political leaders not to pursue the pro-Western course. There are reports of many types of cooperation, mainly on a symbolic level (rides of pro-Putin motorcycle gang the Night Wolves, joint military drills called the “Slavic Brotherhood,” etc.), while we cannot omit the Chinese economic influence, framed as a part of the One Belt One Road initiative, as well. Repeatedly, we can see the Russian attempt to decrease the attractiveness of the European project for the inhabitants in order to overcome the limited ability to match the EU economic influence. The outcome of this endeavor is to be seen. The relationship thus clearly follows the theorized nature of the interaction. Europe acts, in Zielonka’s words, as a neomedieval empire, setting up standards for entry and allowing the territories on its periphery to join the common project. By setting the standards, it increases the territory that is shifting toward the interconnected, post-modern Durable Disorder. The growth is one of soft-power attraction and economic incentives. In this sense, the example of Eastern Partnership as an initiative aiming to improve the relationship with some of the nonmember countries (as of 2019, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)  – officially aiming at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability, and increased cooperation9 – is a case in point. On the contrary, the Russian government, utilizing the Westphalian arrangement of the political space, is attempting to separate itself from this slowly growing networked space. It does so mostly by setting up instability that, by nature, disallows the Durable Disorder environment to spread. The EU-type democratic model of governance is a direct threat to the current Russian elite (Raik 2019, 58). The presence of Russian-supported separatist conflicts and entities on the territory of potential candidate EU members – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan – points at a strategic level of thinking in the initiation of instability in the Russian neighborhood. Russia also attempts to destabilize the Durable Disorder environment itself via the support for the nationalist movements, support for and spread of disinformation, and other methods of the so-called hybrid campaign. In this sense, it is interesting to map the development of the portraying of the EU by the Russian government (Foxall 2019) that allows us to visualize the way how the government felt increasingly threatened by the European soft power, thus presenting the domestic audience with an alternative and increasingly negative view of the European project to decrease the power of attraction. It is also illustrative how the post-2008 normalization of the relations between the West and Russia was in the Kremlin perceived as a gratification of the privileged role to Russia in the post-Soviet space by the Western institutions, while this was certainly not the case and the EU clearly opposes any such behavior (Raik 2019, 62). It is highly likely that we will witness this type of interaction for the time to come.

 See https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en

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7.2.2 EU-Sahel The interaction between Europe and the Sahel region is long, rich, and complex. The western Sahel served as a connection between the Mediterranean and West Africa as early as the control of the North Africa ports by ancient Rome (Naylor 2009), and the routes transiting Sahara are used until the present days. Additionally, the region faced a period of colonization by the European countries. Looking at the countries that are of the largest interest for this section (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Chad), they all witnessed an era of the French presence, while we cannot disregard the Spanish presence in Western Sahara and Italian in Libya or the British colonization of parts of West Africa. This factor is essential for the nature of the relations between the Chaotic Anarchy and Durable Disorder environment up to date as the French foreign and security policy stresses the importance of the interests in the region. Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that the region is defined by a presence of a physical environment – mainly desert and savanna – that is not conducive toward a sustained settlement of the larger regions that become hardly controllable. The land without population disallows power projection. The population was traditionally mostly nomadic, and the low levels of territoriality are visible even today. The low population density combined with structural issues of the Sahelian states establishes a political space that is characterized by a low level of stability and presence of violent non-state actors inside weak states located in the vicinity of the soon-to-be Durable Disorder environment. The theorized nature of the relationship is as follows: Durable Disorder actors aim to stabilize the Chaotic Anarchy environment and separate itself from the negative spillover. To this end, they will intervene both militarily and also via humanitarian assistance and development aid. The Chaotic Anarchy environment remains too institutionally weak to be incorporated into the growing networking space, and so the aim is to help the local actors overcome this deficiency and secure the borders of the Durable Disorder part of the world. On the other hand, the actors in the less peaceful region attempt to make use of the stabilization efforts (especially state administration) and utilize the networks inside Durable Disorder as to meet their goals (e.g., profit, political goals, etc.). This approach manifests itself either in increased calls for humanitarian assistance and other forms of cooperation by the ineffective regimes or in the attempt of the criminal group terrorist organizations to penetrate the Durable Disorder environment. All of these can be identified in the relationship between the EU and the Sahel region. First, let us start with the issue of negative spillover and utilization of the internal networking of the Durable Disorder environment by the Chaotic Anarchy actors. The EU has generally seen three types of movements perceived as negative that originate in or pass through the Sahel. The first is terrorism. Looking at the modern history, the main spread of the terrorist groups in the region is connected to the era of Algerian civil war in which the Islamists, who previously won the first competitive elections but were ousted by the army, waged a violent insurgency against the state. The civil war began in 1991 and originally poised the Algerian government mainly against the Armed Islamic Group. The organization utilized a very violent

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strategy that, in time, led to its discreditation and split inside the movement. The splinter groups stood against the targeting of civilians and, in the end, aided with the defeat of the group. The civil war ended in 2002, but the terrorist issue was not resolved. After the civil war ended, the remaining militants began to operate in southern Algeria under the name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat that later affiliated itself with Al-Qaeda. Despite the shattered institutional setting of jihad in the Sahel, the emerging groups (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, etc.) posed a clear danger both inside and to the external environment. This danger increased with the beginning of the 2013 Malian civil war that started as an ethnic conflict but was hijacked by the Islamist militias – most importantly Ansar Dine. Facing the external intervention, the Sahelian groups united inside Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. Additionally, the situation is made even more complex due to the clientelist networks present in the region. The loyalty of many of the local leaders thus shifts as evident from the case of Iyad ag Ghaly – current leader of the group. He previously acted as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia. So not only are the relations inside the violent non-state groups dynamic, but the state is basically one of the many actors as well. Currently, the region (most importantly central and northern Mali and border regions in Niger and Burkina Faso) is facing activities from both Al-Qaeda (beside already mentioned also Burkinabe Ansarul Islam) and Daesh  – who also established its own regional branch called Islamic State in Greater Sahara – related groups that cause high levels of instability while simultaneously posing a threat to the EU itself. The spread of militancy southward also threatens to enter the populous West Africa region, which might further cause another migration wave that might target the EU. This threat is most acutely felt by France that was already targeted by the attacks connected to groups active in the Algerian civil war that later morphed in the current Islamist insurgencies. However, given the principle of free movement inside the Schengen area, the attacks might migrate elsewhere as well if not disrupted by rather efficient security services. Another issue is spreading propaganda via the digital networks that are widespread in the emerging Durable Disorder EU to inspire so-called lone-wolf attacks. So far, this propaganda, nonetheless, originated from other sources than the Sahelian groups. To name some examples of the attacks stemming from the Chaotic Anarchical Sahel, we may first name the Armed Islamic Group hijacking an Air France flight 8969 in 1994 in Algiers, which was flown to Marseille with an intention to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. The plane was, nonetheless, taken over by the French security services. Second, there was a wave of bomb attacks inside France conducted by in 1995 the same group. These two events portray the historical connection between the two environments. Additionally, both Al-Qaeda and Daesh already conducted attacks inside the EU, so there exists a risk that the Sahelian groups might get involved in additional attacks on the continent (as of the time of writing, the affiliates did not yet participate at any successful attack) if strong enough. This is the reason for fierce opposition to an establishment of any safe haven in the region that would territorially root the groups in question. This all unifies with the other two issues – smuggling and migration – that connect the militants to the utilization of the transit routes in Sahel and networks inside the EU.

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Smuggling is mainly a local issue with a lesser direct impact on the EU but is also relevant for the purposes of this section. First of all, there is a close and complex connection between the Islamist groups and smuggling. The leaders of the militant groups are very often participating in the smuggling business as well (Boeke 2016) as one of the prominent figures of the Sahelian jihad, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, holds a nickname Mr. Marlboro due to his participation in the cigarette smuggling. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish whether a certain group is a criminal smuggling organization or a terrorist group or an Islamist insurgency. The combination of criminality aiming at self-profit and propagation of violent Islamism goes hand in hand. The activity thus presents a welcomed income for many of the jihadists/warlords active in the conflicts relevant to European security. Additionally, the smuggling also includes the movement of weapons and other dangerous substances, which became especially prominent with the collapse of the state structures in Libya and the subsequent opening of the army arsenals. The routes transit the Sahel and Sahara, ending at the Mediterranean shore. We can thus identify not only a flow of goods and people northward but also a flow of weapons to the south, which further enables the insurgencies in the studied region. The possible breach of the external EU border additionally presents a risk for the EU that can be faced by the influx of these goods that further spread inside the space of free flows, where the movement is less monitored. One of the substances that are smuggled into the EU via the mentioned routes is cocaine that is reportedly transported from Latin America via West Africa and the Sahel to Europe. This way, it can overcome the increased monitoring of the goods coming directly from Latin America to Europe (Stambøl 2016) and utilize clandestine networks and internal openness of the Durable Disorder. It was estimated that in 2015, cocaine was used by around 3.6 million adults inside the EU (EMCDDA 2016)  – the demand is thus present on the continent. This smuggling also connects different militants in the Sahel and North Africa, further strengthening the potential for planning the attacks inside the EU. The same methods to penetrate the environment as used for the drug business might be utilized for other purposes as well. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the security and intelligence services inside Durable Disorder so far seems to prevent many of these negative effects. Last, but not least, smuggling also brings additional financial means to the Al-Qaeda connected group – currently most importantly Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin  – whose leaders are the most experienced in the smuggling business. The smuggling is one of the major sources of financing of the radicals (together with kidnapping for ransom) (Clarke 2015) and strengthens the armed groups that might pose a direct threat to the EU. Finally, there is the issue of illegal migration. The Sahel is both a source region of migration and, more importantly, a transit region mainly for migrants coming from West Africa. The city of Agadez in Niger is, in this sense, a focal point of the transit routes going through Sahara north to the Libyan coast and a transit hub for the people attempting to reach the EU. The (mostly regional or internal) migration in the Sahel is primarily connected to the numerous local conflicts taking place mainly in Mali. Another cause of migration are the environmental factors as the

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region is facing periods of droughts connected to famine, exacerbating existing tensions and leading to additional conflicts among the local communities. The issue of illegal migration is first and foremost felt like a negative spillover itself inside the EU.  The topic of illegal migration was raised by many political actors as a consequence of the increased number of people resettling mainly from Syria. It became, for some time, the main topic of the political debates on the continent and remained one of the key topics for the right-wing populist parties. Inside the mainstream thinking inside the EU, the topic of illegal migration (and often migration in general) was connected to that of terrorism and other negative effects. While the migration into the EU is mainly connected to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the migration from Africa is not overlooked as well. The more important part of this distinction is that unlike war refugees coming from the abovementioned countries, migrants from West Africa rarely qualify as asylum seekers. In this sense, the Sahel is given priority status for two reasons connected to migration. First, the EU wants to prevent the current illegal migration coming from West Africa as the migrants do not qualify for asylum status. Additionally, the smuggling routes are very hostile and present numerous risks to the migrants that clash with the normative framework of the EU. Second, the EU seeks to prevent further spillover of the conflict in the Sahel into West Africa with its high population and tensions among ethnic and religious communities. This would increase the flow of people that would at least partially target Europe. Additionally, the migration routes follow the old smuggling routes and are operated by a similar type of militants, thus connecting all three issues together, even in reality. So, while it is rarely the case that migrants conduct the cases of terrorism or plan to do so, the smugglers indeed often hold ties to radical groups in the Sahel. It must also be noted that there exists a threat perception regarding the possible entrance of the EU by the militants masking themselves as refugees. While this is not the most efficient way of entry and is used in order to stigmatize the refugees, and while the issue is mostly connected to migration originating from the Middle East, it should not be overlooked in this case as well. As evident, the three issues of negative spillovers are interconnected, and all utilize the weak state control in Sahel and Sahara region plus, if they succeed in entering the EU, make use of the networking nature of the space reaching different parts of the union given to fulfill the aim of the group. It is thus clearly observable that the interaction among the two environments follows, in this case, the theorized model. The reaction of the emerging Durable Disorder actors also follows the approach as modeled above. First, there is a stabilization effort. EU in this respect holds several instruments that are available in relation to different types of entities according to their internal sovereignty and level of international recognition (Noutcheva 2020, 456). A clear case of such stabilization effort is the intervention of the EU countries in the western Sahel following the destabilization of Mali connected to the beginning of the latest internal conflict beginning in 2014. The conflict began as the Libyan regime collapsed, and the Tuaregs serving for the Qaddafi regime returned to Mali, reigniting the secessionist movement that is present in the country since independence. The first reaction upon the march of Tuareg rebels supported by

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Islamist radicals on Bamako following the coup d’état in the country came from France. As the national government and armed forces were unable to face the armed opposition, and there was a fear that the country would turn into a jihadist state, the external troops stabilized the country and successfully militarily stopped the threat (Ludvík 2016) turning the conflict into a lower-intensity insurgency that is on the time of writing still present in not only Mali but Niger and Burkina Faso as well. Throughout the conflict, the Tuareg nationalist rebels disconnected themselves from the jihadist movements that hijacked the rebellion, turning it from the self-­ determination struggle into a part of the global jihadist insurgency. Following the operation Serval that aimed and succeeded at stopping the most threatening phase of the rebellion, the French set up operation Barkhane that aims at further stabilization efforts inside the region (Griffin 2016), including special operations mission Takuba. This long-term mission, part of the broader international effort to pacify and stabilize the western Sahel, is the French contribution to the stabilization of its former colonies that hold potential for a negative spillover into the Durable Disorder environment generally and France specifically. Nonetheless, there are other stabilization efforts taking place. One of them is not conducted under the EU umbrella, even though the EU countries participate in its operations. The UN operates the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as a peacekeeping mission in the country.10 The mission is one of the many UN missions as set up around the globe. The purely Durable Disorder reaction is the establishment of the European Union Training Mission Mali that aims to develop the capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces in order to ensure that the state administration can prevent the negative effects on its territory.11 The Europeans are also supporting local initiatives like G5 Sahel that aims at the increase of interoperability of the five Sahelian countries – Mauretania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad – in order to increase their effectiveness in countering armed threats to the region. The region is also a recipient of humanitarian aid on a multilateral and bilateral basis. There is also a significant number of NGOs operating in the Sahel in order to increase the living standard in the countries. Just for the EU itself, it was noted that the union provided humanitarian assistance worth 152 million euros in 2019 alone.12 The focus of the EU regarding migration is additionally on education as an essential mean of enhancing the living conditions of the local population.13 The separation logic is also in effect. The EU strengthens its activities in the Mediterranean and cooperates with the actors located on the shoreline of the sea to decrease the number of attempts to cross into the EU. Additionally, provinces of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African continent while being an integral part of Spain, are physically separated from their neighborhood by border barrier in order to prevent the influx of migrants seeking asylum in the union. The union also acts to prevent the influx of smuggled goods, thus separating itself from the clandestine  See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma  See https://eutmmali.eu/en/aboutus/ 12  See https://eutmmali.eu/en/aboutus/ 13  https://dw.com/en/eu-focuses-on-sahel-region-in-containing-migration/av-49721956 10 11

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networks. The process of strengthening of the external border further continues and remains one of the priorities of the common security policy of the EU. Finally, we can see how the actors in the region utilize the aid in order to strengthen themselves and play on fears of the Durable Disorder actors in order to generate additional funding. Looking at the selected region, Sudan played a role in stopping the migration from sub-Saharan Africa northward, and similarly, Libyan factions utilized money coming from abroad in relation to the issue. These funds are consequently used for enhancing the position of these actors inside the unstable environment in which they operate. The French and other external troops stabilized and basically saved the otherwise weak government in Bamako and are supporting similarly weak Nigerien regime. The government of Burkina Faso that took power in the 2014 protests is also targeted by the increasing amount of foreign assistance as a consequence of the spread of militancy connected to the Islamist groups on its territory. The leaders of the states in question or other actors capable of generating external support thus see a utility in aiding the European security needs in exchange for additional resources that help them to stay in power.

7.2.3 Turkey-Syria The relations between the two Middle Eastern neighbors of Turkey and Syria are rich and complex and in their last phase, starting with the 2011 revolution in Syria, entered a new qualitative period – shifting from relations between two Westphalian countries into a relation between spaces characterized by different type of geopolitical environment as the territory of Syria succumbed into a Chaotic Anarchy environment. The relationship between the two countries was historically strained. Be it over the sovereignty over the Hatay province or the issue of provision of safe haven for the PKK fighters to the participation of Turkey in NATO, the history presented many of the issues that are in different configurations observable across the region. Before moving to the manifestation of the bordering of the two qualitatively different types of environments, it is necessary to briefly sketch the issues between the governments in Ankara and Damascus that, to a degree, establish the conditions playing out in a different setting today. As the nature of the political environment in the Chaotic Anarchy in no small degree depends on the context, the information sets up the scene for the post-2011 development. The first topic, that to a limited degree reappeared after the civil war in Syria began, is that of the control over the Hatay province. The region was transferred under Turkish sovereignty in 1939. However, this move was never officially accepted by the Syrian regime, which still considers it as a part of its territory. The issue was important for the delimitation of the airspaces throughout the conflict periods. The second historically contentious issue is that of a relationship to different Cold War camps. While Turkey in 1952 entered NATO and for a protracted period of time actively attempted to enter the European communities in their different institutional settings, Syria was a Cold War Soviet ally. The animosities were then translated into mutual distrust even after the end of the Cold War. Then, there

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is an everlasting topic of the Kurdish independence movements. The movement in Turkey morphed into the shape of the radically leftist PKK. The group for some time operated from Syria, which allowed the group to use its territory as a base and provided it with military training, using it as an asset in its regional struggle with Turkey (Strategic Comments 2017). The improvement of the relations between the two governments in the late 1990s and 2000s is connected to the expulsion of the PKK from Syria and the consequent jailing of its leader Abdullah Öcalan. The Syrian Kurdish militias of YPG are tightly connected to PKK  – are sometimes regarded as a Syrian branch of the party – which explains many of the post-2011 developments (Pusane 2018, 75–79). The post-2011 situation is further complicated by the existence of a de facto nonaggression pact between the Kurdish militias and the Syrian government (Ergun 2018, 156). Other thorny issues included, for example, water sharing or broader regional dynamics.14 The situation, nevertheless, changed with the collapse of the state in Syria following the 2011 protests, themselves part of the Arab Spring. The history of the state collapse and the beginning of the internal conflict was described in many publications (e.g., Lister 2015). We will thus briefly look at just three moments relevant for the relations between the two spaces and the reaction of the Turkish state  – spread of Daesh inside the proxy conflict, migration, and Kurdish autonomy. The spread of radical jihadist Daesh set up a context that was enormously complex, further destabilizing the already complex and violent situation. The significant levels of violence inside the Syrian theater, combined with the introduction of the radical organization, threatened the neighboring countries. With the exception of Israel, the bordering countries were increasingly targeted by some level of violence originating in the group ranging from the 2015 immolation of the Jordanian pilot to the 2017 terrorist attack in Istanbul to sporadic fighting in Lebanon to a full-scale war in Iraq. The group was in the context of the shattered battlefield for some time rather successful and presented a clear danger to its neighborhood. The presence of unstable, dangerous, and violent environment directly at the borders as one of the defining features of the relationship was thus clearly present. This is, even more, the case as the Syrian civil war was targeted by many regional and global player, turning it into enormous proxy warfare. The second issue, that of migration, also affected the nature of the Turkish response to the situation unfolding on its neighbor’s territory. The conditions inside the worn-torn country forced a significant part of the population to flee their homes and settle elsewhere to increase its chances to survive the period of fighting. While the medially attractive part of the migration movement targeting Europe made headlines, the majority of the resettled population stayed in the region – mainly in Syria itself or the neighboring countries. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees informed that by mid-2019, there were around 6.2 million internally displaced people inside Syria.15 Additionally, there were over 5.5 million registered refugees in

 For an overview, see, for example, Bishku (2012).  https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people

14 15

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the neighboring countries. Out of these, 3.6 million settled in Turkey.16 The high number of refugees settled in Turkey creates additional strains to Turkish society and economy. Despite the signature of the agreement with the EU on 18th of March 2016 that provides Turkey with economic aid and gives the Syrian refugees a possibility for being legally resettled to the EU countries,17 the situation is perceived as increasingly negative. Turkey thus aims to act in a way as to decrease any potential for additional refugee resettlement inside its territory. Finally, there is the last significant threat as perceived from Ankara – an emergence of the autonomous Kurdish region on the Syrian-Turkish borders. The topic of the Kurdish autonomy and self-determination is a thorny one, and its many manifestations in a context of disputes inside the ethnic community establish a very complex picture. As for the studied subject, it is crucial to point out just a few important points. The autonomous region of Rojava established in the north and northeast of Syria is governed according to the ideology of democratic confederalism as developed by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The YPG is directly tied to the PKK, which is perceived as one of the most actual threats to the Turkish state (Pusane 2018, 75–79). Turkey thus feels insecure as a consequence of the emergence of the autonomous, not to say independent, Kurdish region on its borders that would, in its point of view, further fuel the independence movement inside Turkish Kurdistan. The evolution of the Syrian militias, to some degree, reflects the need to settle any potential disputes without unnecessarily antagonizing the actors located in the region. Originally, the Kurdish population was mainly represented by the YPG, together with the women protection units (YPJ) and the political party known in English as the United Democratic Party (PYD). Later on, the military branch renamed itself to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to portray the inclusive nature of the forces that were composed of a non-Kurdish element as well. While this is a largely simplified picture, it is sufficient for our current purposes. The amount of the territory under the Kurdish control sustainably grew following the 2015 defense of Kobani, and the local opposition to the Daesh activity was united under the Kurdish umbrella (Ünver 2018, 40). This tendency was another issue in the eyes of the Turkish policymakers and resulted in the reaction from Ankara. The nature of relations between Westphalian and Chaotic Anarchy environments are theorized as follows – the Westphalian actor attempts to stabilize a region in the Chaotic Anarchy by intervening and, at least to some degree, separates itself as to prevent spillover of the negative trends; the Chaotic Anarchy environment tends to spill over into the Westphalian space and destabilize it. We can see the processes appearing in all three sketched main topics of the mutual post-2011 relations. In the first case, it was the issue of general instability and the presence of Daesh as the most aggressive violent actor operating in the Syrian civil war. While the intervention of the Turkish forces is more directly connected to the Kurdish issue and will be covered later, the attempt to separate Turkish territory from the violence was  https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria  See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/ file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan 16 17

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evident. The pictures of the Turkish tanks standing on the borders with Syria were very famous, and the presence of the Turkish troops followed the perceived threats appearing in the neighborhood. Turkey, additionally, constructed a border barrier that should further allow for the separation of its territory from Syria, thus limiting the spill over the potential of the environment. Once again, this separation process begun only after the Syrian environment shifted from the Westphalian into a Chaotic Anarchy setting. Additionally, the Turkish government attempted to protect its territory by acting very rationally and self-centered regarding the different parties in the conflict. While it supported the Free Syrian Army as a first important actor opposed to the Assad government and the Turkic communities on living along the borders, it also tied itself to the Ahrar al-Sham, an Islamist umbrella organization, with a potential to become a dominant actor in (parts of) Syria. This support follows the logic of the Turkish foreign policy in the region in general as Turkey supports political Islamist forces, usually connected to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ahrar al-­ Sham was, in this respect, an obvious choice as it was politically Islamist, not connected to either Al-Qaeda or Daesh and relevant on the ground. Turkey also attempted to manage its relations with the actors in the conflict as not to become an unnecessary target of an attack – issue evidently present in its dealing with Daesh, to name just one example. It thus made sure that its proxies can intervene in a way to shape the conflict to an image welcomed by the Turkish foreign policy and that the level of spillover will be minimized. This worked to a point as Turkey was targeted by Daesh only in a limited yet still significant, way. On the other hand, none of the two main proxies successfully defeated the Assad government, thus not achieving another strategic objective of Turkey. The Kurdish question was, as mentioned, later on, dealt with by the Turkish forces themselves. On the other hand, the actors operating in the conflict conducted spillover operations that directly involved Turkey. First, Turkey entered into an opened conflict with Russia as a backer of the Assad government to a point when it shot down the Russian jet fighter Su-24 that on 24th of November 2015 appeared in the Turkish airspace. The relations with Russia, nevertheless, improved rapidly since that point. Another example of spillover can be named in the cases of terrorist attacks conducted or inspired by Daesh on the Turkish territory. Of these, the two prominent are 2016 attack on the Atatürk Airport in Istanbul and the January 2017 attack on the night club in the same city. PKK operations on the Turkish territory may also fall into this category. There thus exists a tendency to spread the zone of conflict across the border into the Turkish territory. Turkey is thus directly engaged in a conflict with more sides of the conflict while utilizing the proxy warfare itself in order to shape the outcome of the civil war. The physical separation is clearly present, and the spillover tendencies are observable. The second issue presented in this section is the migration crisis that affected the Syrian neighborhood. The spillover effect is, in this case, clear. The neighboring countries, including Turkey, needed to take care of the massive number of people fleeing the civil war incapable of finding a safe refuge inside Syria itself. Such a movement brings with itself not only economic costs but also tensions related to the cohabitation of the local population with the incoming refugees. The presence of the

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refugee camps becomes increasingly problematic. Even if the actual connection of the refugees to the violent actors is minimal, the presence itself brings economic and security risks on its own that are further aggravated by the reaction of the local population. On the other hand, the neighboring countries are well aware that it is currently impossible to relocate the settled Syrians back to their country as this would establish a very dangerous situation for them and on the lowest level would bring enormous negative attention to the country refusing to help. Again, this spillover was matched by an adequate policy along the theorized lines as Turkey intervened in the conflict in the Idlib province, attempting to manage the crisis in the region and thus prevent another additional movement of the civilian population. Idlib is, as of the time of writing, the last bastion of opposition to the Assad regime containing a mix of groups from Islamist connected to Al-Qaeda to more or less secular outfits. According to the outcomes of the sixth Astana peace talks held in a city nowadays known as Nur-Sultan in Kazakhstan in September 2017, Turkey is one of the parties responsible for the securing of the status quo in the deescalation zone setup in the region and did deploy the troops in the region.18 The second reason for this deployment is clearly the mitigation of the potential impacts on the civilian population that remains in the region. Idlib is a target of Assad forces supported by Russia, Iran, and their proxies, and the potential full-­ scale invasion would surely lead to another deterioration in the living conditions of the local population and massive movement of the inhabitants located on its territory. As of the time of the writing, Turkey basically prevents the Syrian government troops supported by Russia and Iran from entering the zone and, despite the appearance of active hostilities, keeps the zone safe from the worst impacts of the potential full-scale invasion. This development would trigger another massive movement of people and increase the number of migrants in Turkey. Once again, the double logic of mutual relations appears. Finally, we come to the Kurdish question. This is probably the thorniest issue related to the Turkish foreign and security policy in the region. It is also one tightly connected to the presence of non-state actors in the Chaotic Anarchy environment in both Syria and Iraq. Not discussing the effectiveness of the domestic approach to the Kurdish population (that could be successfully challenged), the government feels threatened by the existence of an independent Kurdish entity in the Middle East. While Turkey is in contact with the Iraqi Kurdish regional government, the situation in Syria is different. Due to the internal tensions inside the Kurdish community, the Iraqi Kurdistan is rather hostile toward the activities of the PKK and its leftist ideological setting. While the Iraqi Peshmergas aided their Syrian counterparts in defense of Kobani, such an interaction was rather an exception. On the contrary, the YPG as a military wing of PYD is basically a Syrian offshoot of the party and is tightly connected to its activities ideologically as well as personally. Prior to its expulsion in the late 1990s, PKK was operating from the Syrian Kurdistan, setting up YPG once it was forced out of its territory 18  See https://www.astanacalling.com/6th-astana-process-talks-produce-de-escalation-zone-agree ment/

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(Pusane 2018, 75–79). Turkey regularly objects to the cooperation of the USA and other allies with the group and presents the Kurdish autonomous movement as a terrorist organization. The spillover is connected to the PKK connection. The utilization of northern Syria is a precedented action as the PKK was allowed to operate from the region by the Syrian regime in the past. Northern Syria and the Turkish Kurdistan may develop into a single zone of conflict that might lead to the creation of a unified region of unrest  – something feared by the Turkish authorities. Turkey, however, yet again utilizes the theorized response. First, it once again protects its territory in the same way mentioned before by separating the territories of the two countries in question. Second, it conducted two interventions  – Operation Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch – that first allowed the Turkish army to take control of the part of northern Syria along the Euphrates river – thus preventing connection of the Kurdish enclaves in the region (Ünver 2018, 40) – and then led it to conquer Afrin region in the northwest. It thus took over one part of the territory the Kurdish militias took over throughout the civil war. Consequently, Turkey threatened a full-scale invasion into Rojava located on the eastern bank of Euphrates under the pretext of fighting the Kurdish terrorism. It would thus directly take over the potentially threatening regions and attempt to pacify them by a similar means it does in Turkey. It is questionable what would be the result of such endeavor given the long-lasting struggle against the PKK, but it would be a course of action in line with the general type of interaction between the two environments. As of the time of writing, it seems that Turkey will negotiate with the USA as a guarantee of the Kurdish militias an introduction of the demilitarized zone along the border to decrease its anxiety regarding the situation. This would enable Turkey to further separate itself from the perceived threat without the need to intervene, which is more costly in both economic and personal terms. This could also be a solution more acceptable to the Kurdish representation and population itself and might allow for less violent relations to develop. Nonetheless, a prospect for the nonviolent solution to the Kurdish issue was put to an end on 9th of October 2019 when the Turkish forces entered the province of Rojava, beginning a military action against the SDF. The separation-and-intervention logic is, nonetheless, once again present.

8

Conclusion

The geopolitical environment in the post-Cold War world came through a continuous transformation. The end of the bipolar competition connected to the final demise of the attempts to unify the political map of the world had a clear impact on the nature of the outlook of the world system. Many authors attempted to capture the ongoing changes in unified theories that were to explain the new nature of the global geopolitics. This book dealt with one of these approaches  – neomedievalism. Its primary goal was to look at the nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics through the lenses of the neomedieval thinking and evaluate to what degree is this approach justifiable and what consequences does it bring to the nature of the political activity and our understanding of it. The first, seemingly straightforward, question dealt with a conceptualization of the neomedievalism as a theory. After an in-depth literature review, it turned out that the stream of thought is significantly shattered. Set on a continuum between a historical neomedievalism based on the European Middle Ages and almost apocalyptic New Dark Ages or Coming Anarchy, each author presented a little different vision of the neomedieval future. This points to the most important defining feature of the neomedievalism – an unequal level of development. As the theory is based on the assumption of the multiplication of authorities and establishment of competing global authorities, it is only natural that, unlike the seemingly homogenized Westphalian system, it will create systematically different outcomes. In the presented model, three poles – geopolitical environments – are described as ideal types that establish a continuum within which the real-world examples oscillate. These three poles are the Westphalian system, Durable Disorder, and Chaotic Anarchy. To summarize the main features of the three ideal types, let us begin with the Westphalian system that, despite the visible shift in the nature of global geopolitical

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 B. Doboš, New Middle Ages, World-Systems Evolution and Global Futures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58681-2_8

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setting, is still appearing on the map of the world and is unlikely to disappear. The first important factor (as summarized in Table 3.1) is the nature of sovereignty, in which the Westphalian environment is full, territorial, and based on the modern nineteenth/twentieth-century idea of a state and the post-Second World War international practice based on the respect for the territorial integrity and negative sovereignty. The nature of borders is that of border lines and state is a central political unit in the system. Non-state actors are operating under the authority of a state. Stability of the system is based on a balance of power with the most likely outcomes of the relations among the important actors inside the system being peace or war. The nature of territoriality is connected to the nature of borders and the overall political setting and is state-centered. State in the Westphalian environment is, according to R. Cooper and G. Sørensen, modern. A state is the primary provider of the function and services inside its territory and the main conductor of the interactions with the external environments. Durable Disorder’s first characteristic is the pooling and sharing of sovereignty among the states located inside the networked region. Borders are more penetrable, and many political, territorial actors will deal with the borders as frontiers rather than borderlines. This is, however, the case for the internal borders only as the environment attempts to some degree protect and close its external borders. The state has its defined role inside the system but is only one among the many relevant actors with limited reach and power. Non-state actors overtake many of the state functions while refraining from the use of violence. The stability is based on an existence of three universal pillars – political, economic, and societal – that challenge and check each other out. Nature of the relations inside this environment is defined by cooperation and challenge rather than war or another form of the physical armed conflict. The nature of territoriality is influenced by networking that to a large extent defines the environment and localization which is a natural outgrowth of the connection and degradation of the identification with the state. The nature of the state is postmodern, and the basic services are provided by either state or non-state actors. Outside interests are to a large extent propagated by commercial actors and NGOs as is clear from the presentation of the interactive effects among the different environments presented in Chap. 6. The final type of geopolitical environment identified in this model is the Chaotic Anarchy. The nature of sovereignty is judicial or negative. Borders are de facto defined as border zones or are nonexistent. The state is present only at a level needed to protect the ruling elite and bring it enough resources to buy off the needed support. The environment is highly unstable and defined by a presence of ad hoc coalitions and many violent clashes. The nature of territoriality is variable with control over population usually more important to the control over territory. The nature of the state is premodern/postcolonial. The basic goods are usually unavailable, and the connection to the external environments is characterized by spontaneous spillovers whether in the form of violent outgrowth or migration. Neomedievalism is thus a system combining defining characteristics of the premodern, modern, and postmodern system that manifests itself in different ways inside different territories.

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This answer to the first research question brings the work toward the second one, the one regarding the geographic distribution of the presented geopolitical environments. As evident from the analysis, none of the regions is currently firmly set inside the Durable Disorder environment. The only two regions that appear to be located inside this framework constitute borderline situations, and it can be expected that they will shift toward the Westphalian model. The rest of the globe can be separated between the remaining two types of environment. The nature of the environment, in this case, follows the capability of the state institutions. We still cannot experimentally observe the decrease of the state power toward larger stability as predicted by the model. Nevertheless, the transformative effects can be found in some of the regions (EU+, North America, East Asia, part of Oceania), and without a strong backlash, these regions will probably establish a core of the future Durable Disorder part of the world. Knowing the distribution of the geopolitical environments, it is important to understand how do the different political actors act inside them and how do the different environments affect each other. The emphasis on different structural factors inside the three types of spaces and varying level of stability affects the possible courses of action inside the different regions. As for the Westphalian system, states try to disconnect from the part of the flows that it perceives as threatening for their power. They also strictly follow a principle of territorial protection of its borders (as clear from the Russian experience, this does not necessarily involve the same for other countries). Nonviolent non-state actors are operating under the power of the state and are limited by the state. Violent non-state actors consequently either challenge the state (separatist movements, insurgencies) or are captured by the state and used as paramilitary forces (e.g., kadyrovtsy in Chechen conflict (Souleimanov 2015; Williams 2015, 153–205)). The state inside the Durable Disorder, on the contrary, accepts the globalization in all its forms and a transformation into networking setting defined by the privatization of a large portion of services. It, nevertheless, still provides some of these and acts as a territorially bound provider of the basic regulation framework. Nonviolent non-state actors attempt to utilize the possibilities of the functional caveats to maximize their chances of survival inside the new system. They also overcome many functions formerly provided by states. Violent non-state actors, consequently, either cooperate with the systemic forces – e.g., private military companies – or utilize its nature to penetrate it, e.g., terrorist groups. Last, but not least, the state in the Chaotic Anarchy is mostly interested in the protection of the power center against possible challengers, and its impact on most of the territory is very limited or nonexistent. It adopts strategies of regime survival not of the development of the state institutions. Nonviolent non-state actors mostly act as protectors of the local communities with a limited ability to challenge the violent competitors. They also attempt to provide some basic services based primarily on the traditional societal structure. Violent non-state actors follow the liquid strategy of expansion into the functional and mostly territorial spaces lacking effective power. When faced with a strong counterpressure or exhausting local resources, they will leave these spaces. They are rarely interested in sustained development.

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Exceptions are formed by hybrid groups that hold both traditional or nonviolent part and violent segment (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon). These actors can present the most effective domestic political actors as evident from 2009 to 2011 activities of Al-Shabaab inside southern Somalia. Final question deals with the interaction of the three geopolitical environments. Different environments can react on each other in three logical dyads. The first is the interaction between the Westphalian system and Durable Disorder (or what is here called soon-to-be Durable Disorder) space. Political actors in the Durable Disorder follow the notion of connection and enlargement of the space via the power of attraction and economic and soft-power potential. The Westphalian space, on the other hand, attempts to separate itself from the spillover of this notion via border creation or establishment of shatter belts. The reaction of the Westphalian system actors vis-à-vis the Chaotic Anarchy system is the one of the prevention of a spillover of the negative effects via intervention and separation, while the Chaotic Anarchy actors to some degree conduct such spillover activities connected to the destabilization of the Westphalian states. The final dyad of Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy establishes an interaction in which the Chaotic Anarchy actors seek to utilize the security specifics of the Durable Disorder actors, and these actors try to diminish the possible threat. While the Chaotic Anarchy actors either utilize networks and the free movement to its (often predatory) goals or attempt to obtain resources (mainly states) to seemingly prevent this effect, Durable Disorder actors try to separate themselves from the environment and stabilize via different projects. The nature of the post-Cold War geopolitics is complex and more disorganized than in the pre-1991 system. Any attempt to theorize the nature of the global relations that aims at oversimplification will undoubtedly fail to understand some of the important phenomena crucial for certain regions. This said it must be noted that this work has its large share of simplifications as well. The real-world cases will surely show lower level of cohesion than presented, and many anomalies will appear. It nevertheless presents a possible first step toward a clearer understanding of the different processes that affect the behavior of political actors around the globe. By separating it into the three types of spaces, the neomedieval framework allows researchers to better grasp the different logic behind the actions of seemingly similar actors in separate regions. This understanding can stand at the beginning of a more nuanced and localized research that would present a clearer picture of the impacts this division of the globe holds for the future of power, politics, and security in the twenty-first century.

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