Neutrality and the Neutral States in Soviet New Political Thinking

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Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien Neutrality and the Neutral States in Soviet New Political Thinking Stephan Kux

52-1990

Die Meinungen, die in den vom BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN herausgegebenen Veröffentlichungen geäußert werden, geben ausschließlich die Auffassung der Autoren wieder. © 1990 by Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln Abdruck und sonstige publizistische Nutzung - auch auszugsweise nur mit vorheriger Zustimmung des Bundesinstituts sowie mit Angabe des Verfassers und der Quelle gestattet. Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien Lindenbornstraße 22, D-5000 Köln 30, Telefon 02 21/5747-0

INHALT Seite Kurzfassung

i

Introduction

1

The Evolving Soviet View of Neutrality

3

- The Soviet Notion of Neutrality

3

- Neutrality and the Cold War

4

- Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland

7

- Finland: Neutrality Plus

8

Neutrality and "New Thinking"

12

- The Neutrals as Role Models

12

- Neutrality and the Common European Home

15

- The Neutrals and Economic Integration

16

Neutrality in the 1990s

22

- The Changing Meaning of Neutrality

22

- The Changing Strategic Position of the European Neutrals

23

"Finlandization" of Eastern Central Europe ?

26

Shades of Neutrality

28

"Finlandization" and "Neutralization" within the USSR

37

Conclusions

40

Summary

43 September 1990

Der Verfasser dieses "Berichts" ist Forschungsbeauftragter an der Universität Zürich. Redaktion: Gerhard Wettig

Stephan Kux Neutralität und die neutralen Staaten im "neuen politischen Denken" der Sowjetunion Bericht des BlOst Nr. 52/1990

Kurzfassung Der vorliegende Bericht analysiert die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Haltung zur Neutralität und den europäischen Neutralen im Lichte des "neuen politischen Denkens". Im Zuge der militärischen und politischen Veränderungen in Europa gewinnt die Fragestellung an Relevanz, da gerade von westlichen Beobachtern "Finnlandisierung" oder "Neutralisierung" als Modelle für die Neuordnung der Beziehungen Moskaus zu den osteuropäischen Nachbarn und selbst zu den Teilrepubliken der Union angeboten werden. Die Studie kommt zu folgenden Ergebnissen: 1.

Beziehungen zu den europäischen Neutralen nahmen in der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik kaum je einen hohen Stellenwert ein. Mit Finnland, Irland, Österreich, Schweden und der Schweiz wurden im Aussenministerium und im Zentralkomitee auf untergeordneter Ebene und auf einer Fall-zu-Fall - Ebene verfahren. Von einer konsistenten, zielgerichteten Politik gegenüber den Neutralen kann nicht die Rede sein. Sie wurden als fester Bestandteil des europäischen Status quo betrachtet; die Kontinuität, Zuverlässigkeit und Berechenbarkeit ihres Verhaltens -wurden besonders gewürdigt. 2.

Auf der theoretischen Ebene wirkt sich das "neue politische Denken", insbesondere die veränderte Auffassung von "friedlicher Koexistenz" und die Verpflichtung zur Einhaltung völkerrechtlicher Normen, nachhaltig auf die sowjetische Sicht von Neutralität aus. In der Praxis ist seit Gorbatschows Amtsantritt eine beachtliche Intensivierung der Kontakte zu den Neutralen festzustellen. Die Kategorie der "kleinen und mittleren Staaten Europas" gewinnen an Gewicht in Moskaus Aussenpolitik.

ii

3.

Die Beziehungen zu den Neutralen, insbesondere zu Finnland, werden als Modelle der "friedlichen Koexistenz" und als Prototypen des Zusammenlebens im "gemeinsamen europäischen Haus" gepriesen. Hervorgehoben wird die Rolle der "friedliebenden, aktiven Aussenpolitik" der Neutralen und eine gewisse Konvergenz der Positionen in Fragen der Abrüstung, Kriegsverhütung, Auflösung militärischer Blöcke, Bildung von kernwaffenfreien Zonen etc. In dieser Hinsicht nehmen die Neutralen aber keine besondere Stellung ein, da sich aus sowjetischer Sicht andere Staaten ebenfalls als flexibel und kooperativ erweisen. 4.

Die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Veränderungen in Europa wirken sich nachhaltig auf die Rolle der Neutralität und der neutralen Staaten aus. Mit dem Verschwinden der militärischen Konfrontation in Zentraleuropa werden Österreich und die Schweiz zu strategischen Hinterbänklern, vergleichbar mit Irland. Dafür steigt die relative militärische Bedeutung der neutralen und nicht-paktgebundenen Staaten in der Nord- und Südflanke. 5.

Die Neudefinierung des Verhältnisses der Neutralen zur europäischen Gemeinschaft scheint der UdSSR besondere Schwierigkeiten zu bereiten wie die Interventionen gegen die österreichischen Beitrittsbestrebungen verdeutlichen. Moskau begründet seine Einwände mit konservativen Interpretationen des Neutralitätsbegriffs, wie sie von dieser Seite bisher noch nicht zu hören waren. Hintergründig geht es um die sowjetische Verhandlungsstrategie gegenüber der EG. Die UdSSR würde einen trilateralen Verhandlungsrahmen unter Einschluss der EG, der EFTA und des RGW bevorzugen. Deshalb befürwortet Moskau die Stärkung der EFTA und anderer regionaler wirtschaftlicher und politischer Bündnisse. 6.

Mit dem Zerfall des Warschauer Pakts stellt sich die Frage, was die künftige sicherheitspolitische Stellung der osteuropäischen Staaten sein wird und welche Rolle die UdSSR dabei spielen soll. Westliche, osteuropäische und sowjetische Beobachter haben verschiedentlich mit Modellen der "Finnlandisierung" und "Neutralisierung" gespielt. Die sowjetische Erwartungshaltung gegenüber den osteuropäischen Staaten lässt sich tatsächlich mit derjenigen gegenüber den Neutralen vergleichen. Die Rede ist von zuverlässigen, berechenbaren, gutnachbarschaftlichen Beziehungen, die nicht auf ideologischen Gemeinsamkeiten, sondern gegenseitigen Interessen basieren; von Sicherheitgarantien; von politischem Wohlverhalten und aussenpolitischer Abstimmung. Bisher hat die sowjetische Führung allerdings nicht eindeutig Stellung hinsichtlich einer "Neutralisierung" Osteuropas bezogen. Und es bleibt fraglich, wie attraktiv Neutralität für die unabhängigen osteuropäischen Staaten ist, die Anlehnung an die europäische Gemeinschaft suchen.

iii

7.

Mit der Unabhängigkeitserklärung der baltischen Staaten und der Ausrufung der Neutralität durch die Ukraine und Weissrussland gewinnt die Neutralitätsproblematik eine innenpolitische Dimension. Zur Frage steht die künftige sicherheitspolitische Stellung der nach mehr Unabhängigkeit strebenden sowjetischen Teilrepubliken und die Natur der militärischen Arrangements in einem veränderten sowjetischen Staatenbund. Vorerst bilden Postulate der Demilitarisierung, Denuklearisierung und Neutralisierung Instrumente zur politischen und militärischen Entflechtung der Teilrepubliken vom sowjetischen Imperium. 8.

Im Lichte der jüngsten strategischen Veränderungen, der fortschreitenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Integration und der sicherheitspolitischen Neuordnung Europas stellt sich die Frage nach der zukünftigen Rolle der Neutralität aus sowjetischer Sicht. Kommentatoren loben den aktiven Beitrag der Neutralen zur Errichtung des "gemeinsamen Hauses", äussern aber gleichzeitig Besorgnis, dass Neutralität auch als Vorwand für die Nicht-Teilnahme an gesamteuropäischen Institutionen dienen könnte. Auch aus sowjetischer Sicht bildet der "Spezialfall" der kleinen neutralen Staaten zunehmend ein Hindernis für die europäische Zusammenarbeit. Mit der Überwindung der europäischen Teilung haben sie ihre Funktion als Vermittler erfüllt, eine neue Rolle haben sie noch nicht gefunden.

1

INTRODUCTION Relations with the European neutrals hardly ranked high in priority on the Soviet agenda of foreign affairs in the post-war period. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland were dealt with on a case-by-case basis at a subordinated level in the Central Committee or the Foreign Ministry. While neutralization was considered as an important weapon in the zero-sum confrontation of the Cold War, the notion of neutrality - with few exceptions in the 1950s - never received much attention in Soviet academic and political literature. Only recently, in the light of "new thinking" and a more differentiated approach in the USSR's relations with Western Europe, the European small and medium-sized countries in general, and the neutral and non-aligned countries in particular, experienced a renaissance in Soviet foreign policy. The real turn-about has, however, come with the revolutionary developments in Eastern Central Europe and within the Soviet Union which force Moscow to reassess its relations with its neighbors. In this respect, the experiences with the European neutrals are likely to become highly relevant. This paper starts with a brief analysis of the evolving Soviet view on neutrality, continues with an assessment of the implications of new thinking on the USSR's attitude toward the European neutrals, and concludes with a tentative discussion of the impacts of recent changes in the European strategic landscape on the relevance of neutrality for the USSR. In this respect, a preliminary definition of neutrality proves useful. In essence, the term describes the behavior of a state which does not participate in a war between third powers. Niklaus von Flueh, an early advocate of Swiss neutrality, used the term "sitting still". The rights and obligations of nonparticipants in war have been codified in the 1907 The Hague Convention on Neutrality in War at Land and on Sea. A neutral

2

country is, for instance, obliged to deny the parties in conflict the use of its territory, sea or airspace for hostile acts, the transportation of troops or supplies, or the installation of communication facilities. Other rules of noninvolvement and disengagement apply. In the strict sense, neutrality thus only applies to a situation of war. Some states, of course, have committed themselves to stay permanently neutral; in this case, an additional set of obligations applies. Permanently neutral countries are expected to conduct a policy of neutrality making future neutral conduct in war credible already in times of peace. First and foremost, this includes the non-participation in military alliances, since membership in an organization of collective defense would prevent a country to exercise its neutrality in case of war. In most cases, the principle of non-alliance has been expanded to non-military organizations which are highly integrated and nonuniversal such as the European Community (EC). Another precondition is the maintenance of a credible defense demonstrating the country's capability to discharge its duties as a neutral and to defend its territory. In the case of Austria or Finland, additional security guarantees and restrictions apply based on bilateral or multilateral agreements. Other expectations such as ideological neutrality, equidistance or bipartisanship in international relations have evolved over the years without finding approval by the neutral states or in international law. The contents of a policy of neutrality cannot be regulated in detail. They derive rather from the individual domestic and • international situation of a neutral country than from a generalized code of conduct. 1 The

real

neutrality

difficulty and

the

in

analyzing

neutral

states

Soviet is

to

attitudes identify

toward distinct

(1) For a discussion of the concept of neutrality see: D. Frei, Dinensionen neutraler Politik, Geneva 1969; H. Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality. Oxford 1988.

3 i

patterns of behavior as compared to Soviet-European relations or Soviet foreign affairs in general. There are few comprehensive studies on the subject. 2 Most s c h o l a r s r e f e r t o t h e u n i q u e n e s s o r s p e c i a l n a t u r e o f t h e USSR's b e h a v i o r t o w a r d t h e E u r o p e a n n e u t r a l s . And some s t u d i e s s t r e s s t h e c o n s i s t e n c y a n d c o n t i n u i t y of S o v i e t p o l i c i e s a n d assume a d e l i b e r a t e s t r a t e g y v i s - ä - v i s t h e n e u t r a l s t a t e s . Y e t most a n a l y s e s a r e e i t h e r l i m i t e d t o t h e discussion of c o n c e p t s of n e u t r a l i t y in Soviet t h e o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s o r t h e s t u d y of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h individual neutral countries. Few works t a k e a c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , a n a l y z i n g t h e USSR's a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d n e u t r a l i t y and t h e n e u t r a l s t a t e s i n t h e b r o a d e r c o n t e x t of S o v i e t - E u r o p e a n or East-West relations. In absence of s u c h a n a n a l y t i c a l framework, it is thus difficult to elaborate on t h e d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d n e u t r a l i t y o r t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e p a t t e r n s of t h e USSR's r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e E u r o p e a n neutral states.

THE EVOLVING SOVIET VIEW OF NEUTRALITY The S o v i e t N o t i o n of N e u t r a l i t y I n t h e p o s t - w a r p e r i o d , n e u t r a l i t y was h a r d l y a c c e p t e d a s a g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e concept i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s n o r a s an u n a l t e r a b l e c o n v e n t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w i n S o v i e t l e g a l a n d p o l i t i c a l doctrine. In t h e Soviet i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a functional v i e w of n e u t r a l i t y p r e v a i l e d . N e u t r a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e d a m e a n s , n o t a n e n d i n i t s e l f . I d e o l o g i c a l l y , n e u t r a l i t y was c o n s i d e r e d (2) See: H. Fiedler, Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis: Ein Beitrag zum Problea des Disengageaent, Cologne 1959; D. Bindschedler-Robert, Völkerrecht und Neutralität in sowjetischer Sicht, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, 5/1965, pp.144-163; P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, London 1975; N. Light, Neutralise and Nonalignient: The Dialectics of Soviet Theory, Millennium Journal of International Affairs, 1/1987, pp.79-92; R. Allison, The Soviet Dnion and NonAligraent, London 1988; Curt Gasteyger, The Neutrals, the Soviet Union, and the West, in: Bissell, R./Gasteyger, C. (eds.), The Missing Link, West European Neutrals and Regional Security, Durhan 1990, pp.136-149.

4

unacceptable; politically, at times, it proved to be useful. Accordingly, the importance of neutrality and the neutral states experienced ups and downs in Soviet thinking. Interpretations of the essence of neutrality and expectations regarding the behavior of the neutral states also changed frequently. As one observer stresses, what is important is the essence of a country's policy and not the label or definition attached to it: Since there are no universally recognized international legal norms for a policy of neutrality in peacetime, it is obvious that the main point is the essence of the political course pursued by Finland and not its definition by one or the other term. 3 E m p h a s i s w a s t h u s p u t o n t h e n o n - m e m b e r s h i p of A u s t r i a , F i n l a n d , Ireland, status, Only

Sweden

and

Switzerland

and the absence

bases

on their

Austria's

membership

in t h e E C a r e b a s e d

organization

is

on the argument that

non-universal

incompatible

started

territory.

in a m o r e o r t h o d o x w a y . O b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t integrated,

commentators

denuclearized

neutrality

highly

Soviet

their

interpret

a

recently,

foreign

NATO,

to

in

more

of

in

with

economic

permanent

and

membership political

neutrality,

an

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h is d i s p u t e d e v e n b y t h e n e u t r a l s t a t e s .

N e u t r a l i t y a n d t h e Cold W a r The

Soviet

neutrality

leadership during

the

expressed period

of

particular European

interest

in

disengagement

and

d i v i s i o n u p t o 1 9 5 5 . T h e r e s t o r a t i o n of i n d e p e n d e n t s t a t e h o o d o f A u s t r i a a n d F i n l a n d w a s t i e d t o t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e s e t w o countries

on

important,

neutrality

for base

German from

the

fringes

European

was seriously

reunification. the Finnish

of

port

confrontation.

considered

The withdrawal of P o r k k a l a

of

as

the

a

condition

Soviet

and the signing

(3) L.S. Voronkov, Non-Nuclear Status to Northern Europe, Moscow 1984, p.24.

More naval of t h e

5

Austrian State Treaty in 1955 probably only served as cases in point that Moscow takes neutrality seriously and knows to honor it. After expectations of revolutionary change in Western Europe declined with the failed revolution in Portugal in 1973, emphasis shifted again on gradual, evolutionary change. Against this background, interest in neutrality, neutralization and nonalignment grew on the part of at least some Soviet strategists. In the eyes of strategists in East and West, within the confines of the post-war status-quo the European neutrals provided a margin of flexibility, a mass of manoeuvre in the zero-sum game of East-West confrontation. In the traditional interpretation, the USSR viewed neutrality or neutralization as improving Soviet security through a "cordon sanitaire", as broadening the "zone of peace". Neutrality or non-alignment, directly or indirectly, weakened the adversary or at least prevented him from becoming stronger. And neutrality or non-alignment offered a universally respected status, a half-way house for those countries which were eventually perceived as moving from a pro-Western to a proSoviet orientation. Yet the Soviet perception of neutrality as a political weapon and of the neutral states as dominos in the East-West confrontation is frequently overstated. While there are numerous references in Soviet literature to neutrality as a dynamic notion, a state of flux, a leverage of change, the USSR soon came to realize that the neutrals formed an integral part of the post-war order, contributed to its stabilization and provided little potential for a shift in the alignment of forces frasstanovka or gruppirovka silK Moreover, given the neutrals' strategic location and their considerable economic and military potential, the Soviet Union had probably more interests in preserving the situation than provoking risky change. NATO was also perceived to court for the favors of the neutrals. And any other status of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden or Switzerland

6

than neutrality could change the European balance to the disadvantage of the USSR. For both sides, realistic options for changing the neutrals' political course were limited. In this respect, the non-aligned countries of the Third World proved to be much more flexible and promissing. The real difference between neutrality and non-alignment is not so much one of legal status or of foreign policy, but one of attitudes toward the existing international order. Neutral countries not only accept, but form an integral part of the status-quo, and thus have a stake in maintaining it. Non-alignment implies an active form of foreign policy challenging the dominance of the great power system as a whole and seeking a revision of the existing political and economic order. Non-alignment, at least in its radical form, has thus become virtually the opposite of neutrality. Starting in the 1960s, the USSR became accordingly more relaxed with regard to the neutrals. With the growing confidence in its military preponderance and the more realistic perception of the probability, or rather improbability, of shifts in the correlation of forces, the Soviet Union obviously grew aware that she could "afford" some neutrals as part of the European status-quo and started to treat them with benign, but watchful neglect. It is precisely the relative stability, predictability and reliability in the behavior of the neutral countries and the irreversibility of their status that best suited the Soviet leadership. While the European neutrals remained of limited importance for the achievement of central strategic objectives, they proved helpful on the operational and tactical level. In the bipolar, confrontational world of the Cold War, the neutrals proved to be reliable, predictable partners serving as honest brokers for diplomatic initiatives and as bridges for trade and other

7

contacts helping the USSR and its allies to isolation of containment. As Gorbachev praises:

overcome

the

It is difficult to overestimate their importance to us at the height of the Cold War, when the Western world built a wall of alienation around us. They have held out against all short-term anti-Soviet tempests. 4

Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland During most of the post-war period, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland were politically of limited importance. Relations were mixed, at times contradictory, follwing the cycles of EastWest detente. There has probably never been an official line toward these countries, relations were handled on a bilateral and case-by-case basis at subordinated levels. Analysis of the neutral states and the state and objectives of their relations with the USSR seldom appear in the Soviet press, the few that are written are carefully read in Berne, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna, since they are considered to convey a clear message on the kinds of policy the Soviet leadership approves or disapproves. On the one hand, Soviet commentators expressed their satisfaction with the state of economic, political and diplomatic relations. On the other hand, they did not hold back with criticism of the particular behavior of a neutral state or of specific incidents in bilateral relations. "Spy mania", overarmament or too much affinity with NATO countries are among the most frequent "misdemeanors". Such criticism continues, even during the Gorbachev period, with almost predictable regularity. 5 Signals regarding "limits of neutrality" have been conveyed, for instance, in the case of submarine incursions in Swedish waters, Austria's application (4) M.S. Gorbachev, Speech at Finiandia Hall, in: Pravda, 27.10.1989. (5) See: V. Antonov, Russian ? - That Means A Spy !, KoBsoiolskaia pravda, 10.3.1989; S. Morgachev, Military and Military-Industrial Circles in Sweden, Mirovaia ekonoidka i Bezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 4/1989, pp.121127.

8

for

EC

membership

Baltic

or

the

independence.

Moscow

expectations

regarding

certain

de

droit

Nordic

thus

neutral

regard,

or

countries'

at

attitude

clearly

projects

well-behavior least t h e

toward

and

right

to

its

claims prevent

n e u t r a l s from d o i n g w h a t r u n s c o u n t e r S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s . W h i l e is d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h p a t t e r n s of s i g n a l l i n g , t h e s e

a the it

messages

n e v e r t h e l e s s r e f l e c t e l e m e n t s of c a l c u l a t i o n and d e c i s i o n on t h e s i d e of t h e U S S R .

Such

criticism

is

probably

carrot-and-stick irritations behavior

over

of

not

policy, the

the

but

notion

neutrals

only an

of in

the

result

of

expression

neutrality

in

particular,

a

dialectic

of

genuine

general,

often

and

perceived

the as

" e r r a t i c " o r " i r r a t i o n a l " . T h e t e n s i o n s and c o n f l i c t s in S o v i e t S w i s s r e l a t i o n s s e r v e as an e x a m p l e . And it h a s t o b e that

at

times

independent, states,

but

the

USSR

had

difficulties

self-interested of

most

small

behavior

and

not

medium

sized

in

mentioned

accepting

only

of

the

neutral

countries

in

its

neighborhood.

Finland: Neutrality Plus Finland toward

can

be

considered

neutrality.

The

legal

as

showcase

basis

of

for

Soviet

Finland's

attitudes

neutrality

t h e 1948 T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p , C o o p e r a t i o n and M u t u a l

is

Assistance

w i t h t h e U S S R , in w h i c h H e l s i n k i e x p r e s s e d its " d e s i r e t o

remain

outside

6

the

conflicting

interests

of

the

Great

Powers"

.

In

1 9 8 3 , t h e T r e a t y h a s b e e n e x t e n d e d for a n o t h e r 20 y e a r s . F i n l a n d has

repeatedly

reiterated

its

commitment

to

a

policy

of

permanent neutrality.

(6) Preaable of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, reprinted in: R. Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84, London 1985, p.174.

9

In this respect, an interesting, yet typical development occured in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite widespread international recognition of Finnish neutrality, Soviet commentators became increasingly reluctant to refer to neutrality in the case of that country. Since the early 1970s, the term almost disappeared from bilateral statements or Soviet comments on Finland. 7 At best, it was conceded that Finland is "striving to exercise a peaceloving neutral policy" 8 Commentators started to point at the relatively weak legal foundations of Finnish neutrality, to question the very wisdom of this posture, and to emphasize the priority of Finland's commitments in the 1948 Treaty with the Soviet Union over other international obligations. As two leading experts explain: The provision, which was laid down in the preamble of the 1948 Treaty, does not create any obligations for Finland to remain neutral under all circumstances. It only denotes that in matters not concerning the friendly Soviet-Finnish relations or the interests of defending the northwestern border of the USSR or Finland itself against aggression, Finland may, if it so wishes, in accordance with its strivings to remain outside of the conflicts of interest of the Great Powers, take a neutral stance. 9 What exactly concerns friendly Soviet-Finnish relations or the security of the two countries is, of course, open to wide interpretation. From a Western point of view, this understanding drastically narrows down the essence of Finnish neutrality. In the Soviet perception, the Finnish combination of restraint,

(7) See: Allison, op.cit.; B. Petersson, Fro« Avoiding the Subject to Outright Criticiss: Soviet Coaaeiitators and the Vexing Case of Finnish Neutrality, Nordic. Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, 4/1987, pp.49-60; L. Jonson, Soviet Policy Towards Sweden and the Region of Northern Europe under Gorbachev, Cooperation and Conflict, 2/1990, pp.1-19. (8) Pravda, 12.12.1982. (9) T. Bartenev/Yu. Konissarov, Thirty Years of Cooperation, On the History of Soviet-Finnish Relations, Moscow 1978, p.108, quot. in: Petersson, op.cit., p.54.

10

well*-behavior toward the USSR, security guarantees, and classical neutrality represents a more advanced, more progressive posture of neutrality. As Gorbachev stressed during his visit to Finland in October 1989: The 1948 Treaty and Finland's neutrality are, as you say here, the basis of (Finland's) foreign policy, the two elements, the Treaty and neutrality, do not contradict, but rather reinforce each other. 10 At the same time, the Soviet President unambiguously expressed recognition of Finland's neutrality: It is known that at one time there were debates on the interpretation of Finnish neutrality. Sometimes they are resumed today as well. We will not repeat old stereotypes and recall groundless fears. Yes, Finnish neutrality, as the neutrality of all countries with such a status for that matter, has its peculiarities, but I would like to state with all certainty that the Soviet Union unreservedly recognizes Finland's neutral status and will continue to fully observe it. u Neutrality and bilateral commitments do not contradict, but reinforce each other, making Finland a more predictable, more reliable partner than Sweden or Switzerland. "Neutrality plus", or neutrality restricted by bilateral treaties, forms the role model for other small and medium-sized Western countries. Finland's return to a classical, unconditional form of permanent neutrality would, in turn, limit the importance of the 1948 Treaty and undermine the so-called "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line", which are considered as "historical achievements" in Soviet foreign policy and as important pillars of the post-war order. 12 Gorbachev reiterates "we should not alter one word of the (10) M.S. Gorbachev, Speech at Finlandia Hall, p.l. (11) ibid.. (12) Cf. Yu. Koaissarov, The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Moscow 1985, pp.30ff..

11

treaty, but give it new content." Yet with German unification and the renunciation of the four powers' special rights, there is growing pressure to review Finnish-Soviet arrangements. The very raison d'etre of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is at stake. During a visit to Finland, former chief-of-staff Marshal S. Akhromeyev, for instance, hinted that the explicit reference to a German threat in the Treaty could be dropped. 13 Finland, in turn, has announced that it seeks a revision of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty which sets limits to the size of Finnish armed forces and prohibits armament purchases from Germany. 14 Yet the Soviet leadership might be afraid of a restoration of an independent Finnish foreign policy, similar to the one during the pre-war period, which might not always be as predictable and friendly toward the USSR as under current arrangements. The case of Finland illustrates the trap between too high Soviet expectations toward the neutrals and the realities of their self-interested political, economic and military behavior. While there seems to be a considerable degree of pragmatism and tolerance in Soviet attitudes toward Sweden or Switzerland, there is much more sensitivity and nervosity in the USSR's perception of Finland and - to a lesser degree - Austria. While Moscow continues to be extremely possitive about the state of its relationship with Helsinki, it notices the slightest twist and turn in Finland's domestic politics or foreign policy with seismographic exactitude. The higher the expectations are, the greater the chances of disappointments and "misdemeanors". Finland's attempts to focus its foreign relations and trade more toward European cooperation and integration, i.e. the gradual "de-Finlandization" of Finland, are likely to require a reorientation of Soviet attitudes toward that country.

(13) Helsinqin Sanoaat, 15.9.1989. (14) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22.-23.9.1990.

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NEUTRALITY AND "NEW THINKING" The Neutrals as Role Models On a theoretical level, the changing notions of "peaceful coexistence", "common security" and "global interdependence" have profound implications for the Soviet view of neutrality. In a related development, Gorbachev's commitment to the primacy of international law in interstate relations also contributes to a better Soviet understanding of neutrality, which has a strong legal connotation. On a practical level, the most important development of "new thinking" is the acceptance of the right to sovereignty, independence and self-determination and the recognition that all states, big and small, have genuine interests of their own and act accordingly, including the European neutrals. Since 1985, the USSR showed greater interest in, and demonstrated more differentiation and sophistication in its policy toward the small and medium-sized countries of Europe. At a 1988 scientific conference of the Foreign Ministry, participants stressed the need to step up dialogue with the European neutrals. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze concluded: We are not working efficiently enough to develop relations with neutral states. I accept this criticism. We will try to rectify the situation. 15 Since 1985, bilateral relations have improved substantially. In the case of the USSR's relations with Sweden and Switzerland, a detente and normalization of previously tense ties can be observed. In light of the renaissance of neutrality in Soviet foreign affairs, relations with the European neutrals are praised as models for "peaceful coexistence", as "examples of what an important role can be played in world politics by a partner's (15) International Affairs (Moscow), 10/1988, p.63.

13

reliability and trust in bilateral relations", as "trailblazers in international affairs". In the words of Gorbachev, for example: Soviet-Finnish relations are a model for relations between a large country and a small country. It is a model for relations between states belonging to different systems. For me, it is a model for relations between neighboring states. 16 Relations with the European neutrals, particularly with Finland, thus serve as prototypes for the future relationships in the common European home. As Gorbachev stresses, the movement toward a new Europe will be a lengthy and difficult process, and I believe that we have already felt in the first stage that we cannot do without the constructive contribution of states such as Finland and other neutral and non-aligned states. 17 Incidentally, Austria and Sweden also serve as models for modern socialist societies, Switzerland as an example of a working federation. In recent years, numerous Soviet delegations visited Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland to study the respective cases. 18 An important element of the neutrals' trailblazer role is their "active, peaceloving foreign policy". As one Soviet official explains, "the struggle (against the militarization of outer space, for the ending of nuclear tests and for the reduction of nuclear arsenals) is waged also by the non-aligned and neutral

(16) M.S. Gorbachev, Conversation on Helsinki Street, reported in Vreiya newscast, 25.10.1989, translated in: Foreign Broadcast Intonation Service (FBIS), Soviet union, 26.10.1989, p.32. (17) M.S. Gorbachev, Sews Conference, TJSS (English), 26.10.1989. (18) Cf. A. Aganbegyan, Daqens Myheter, 29.5.1988; L. Abalkin, Swedish Door Opened, Konsoiolskaia pravda, 16.9.1989; 0. Bogosolov, Socialiss and the Nineties, KonsoBolskaia pravda, 3.10.1989.

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c o u n t r i e s " . 19 Other "points of coincidence" include the n e u t r a l s ' support for nuclear-free zones, the d i s s o l u t i o n of blocs or naval arms c o n t r o l . 20 Of importance i s thus a c e r t a i n commonality between the n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s ' a c t i v e foreign policy and the USSR's i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s agenda. These common denominators are frequently codified in j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n s , mutual commitments, and action programs. In Gorbachev's view, t h e r e are vast o p p o r t u n i t i e s for cooperation between the USSR and the n e u t r a l s t a t e s in removing the t h r e a t of war. 21 The Soviet Union seems thus t o be i n t e r e s t e d not so much in the European n e u t r a l s ' stance toward future war, but in t h e i r a t t i t u d e toward e s s e n t i a l questions of Soviet i n t e r e s t , such as peace, prevention of war, disarmament, denuclearization or the future order of Europe. Yet the n e u t r a l c o u n t r i e s are far from unique. Other c o u n t r i e s are as f l e x i b l e and cooperative in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the USSR as the t r a d i t i o n a l n e u t r a l s . From a Soviet point of view, t h e r e are few differences between the behavior of Finland or Sweden and t h a t of Denmark or Greece. All are considered t o belong t o the category of "small and medium-sized European c o u n t r i e s " . 22 In recent months, r e l a t i o n s with other West European s t a t e s have achieved q u a l i t i e s comparable t o those with the n e u t r a l s . The Soviet-West German d e c l a r a t i o n of June 1989, for i n s t a n c e , i s in form and substance q u i t e similar t o the Finnish-Soviet 23 d e c l a r a t i o n of October 1989. And the new German-Soviet Treaty

(19) V. Zagladin, 1986 - No Ordinary Year, Mew Tines, 1/1986, p.4. (20) Cf. the Soviet-Finnish Declaration - New Thinking in Action, Pravda, 27.10.1989. (21) M.S. Gorbachev, Preface, Selected Articles and Speeches, Goeteborg 1986, guot. in: TASS (English), 5.9.1986. (22) L.S. Voronkov, The Siall Countries of Western Europe in International Relations, in: Yu. Yudanov (ed.), The Small Countries of Western Europe, Moscow 1984, pp. 338-357; I. Melnikov, A Voice That Is Growing Stronger, Pravda, 30.4.1985; I. Melnikov, The Role of the Stall and Mediui-Sized West European Countries in International Affairs, Mirovaia ekonoaika i aezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2/1986, pp.89-92; Yu. Karelov, The Saaller Countries of Europe in the Modern World, International Affairs (Moscow), 2/1986, pp.65-71.

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on Partnership sets new standards for bilateral relations which go beyond most of what the USSR has achieved in its ties with any of the neutral states. With the USSR's reevaluation of NATO and the transformation of the military blocs, the distinctiveness of the neutrals will also decline rapidly. The family of neutrals has also been constantly expanded. The 1985 edition of the Diplomatic Dictionary, for instance, includes Cyprus and Malta among the permanently neutral states in Europe. 24 And the increased co-operation of the European neutrals with other states in the group of the Neutrals and NonAligned in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has contributed to obscure the characteristics of permanent neutrality, allowing the concept of neutrality to be confused with those of neutralism or nonalignment.

NEUTRALITY AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME The Soviet leadership, while advocating the dissolution of blocs and the construction of a comprehensive system of European security, hardly explains what the future status of the individual nations will be in this common home. 25 In Gorbachev's view, under such circumstances, neutrality will be conceivable for all - at least for the small and medium-sized countries. For Valentin Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, in turn, the notion of neutrality will (23) Cf. Pravda, 14.6.1989; Pravda 27.10.1989. (24) A.A. Gromyko et al. (eds.), DiplOBatic Dictionary, Moscow 1985, vol.2, p.272; cf. TASS (English), 26.11.1989.

(25) For a discussion of Soviet views on a new European order, see: G. Wettig, The Soviet Concept of Security in a "Coiwon European House", Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 13/1990. (26) Meeting Between M.S. Gorbachev and K. Grosz, Pravda, 25.3.1989.

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lose its meaning altogether once the military alliances are eliminated, Europe is unified and every country enjoys equal security. 27 In their advocacy of a pan-European order, Soviet experts pay little attention to the particular concerns of the neutral countries. They seem to envision a highly integrated, regulated Europe with supranational institutions and majority rule. Similar to American, British or Soviet attitudes after 1945, every state is expected to participate in the "United Nations of Europe", solidarity does not allow for non-participation and neutrality. There is little room for the quest of the smaller countries to protect their identity and independence against the preponderance of the more powerful European nations. So far, the neutral and non-aligned countries have been most reluctant in their advocacy of a highly institutionalized common European home as proposed by the USSR. It is probably exactly on this point, i.e. the degree of local, regional and national sovereignty in a future Europe, on which the views of the current Soviet leadership and the neutral states are likely to clash.

THE NEUTRALS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Despite the normalization of relations, changing patterns of political, economic and scientific cooperation in Western Europe and the deterioriation of the USSR's economic situation pose a growing challenge to Moscow's bilateral relations with the individual neutral countries and - to a lesser degree - to the Soviet notion of neutrality. First, the absolute and relative volume of Soviet trade with the neutrals declined dramatically in the 1980s. Finnish-Soviet trade, for instance, dropped from 23 percent of Finland's total foreign trade in 1987 to 14,5

(27) V. Falin, Interview, Pi Forun (Budapest), 28.7.1989.

17

percent in 1989. 28 While Soviet trade with most West European countries experienced a decline in this period, Austria, Finland and, to a lesser degree, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland were hit particularly hard. This contradicts frequent Soviet references to the priviledged status of trade with the neutrals, which would be insulated against fluctuations in the economic and political climate. Finland's particular barter agreement with the Soviet Union is also under review. In October 1989, the two countries renewed their five-year trade pact covering the period 1991-1995. Yet this bilateral arrangement, which has been in place for 40 years, and has allowed the bartering of Soviet oil and gas in exchange for Finnish industrial products, ships, and consumer goods, is likely to be terminated soon. In June 1990, Soviet negotiators surprised their Finnish counterparts indicating that they want to abandon the bilateral trade and payments system prematurely and replace it through a multilateral system based on convertible currencies. ^ Nevertheless, the neutral countries remain in a good position to exploit opportunities arising from new forms of Soviet foreign trade and investment, republican economic sovereignty and subregional integration. Finland, for instance, has started a promising cross-border cooperation with Soviet Karelia. In July 1990, the RSFSR announced the creation of special economic zones in Leningrad and Vyborg (Viipuri). And the Baltic states have indicated their interest in a new "Hanseatic League" involving Germany, Finland and Sweden. Given the recent date of the introduction of regional khozraschet in and the declaration of independence of the Baltic states, no data on the new patterns of direct cooperation and trade with neighboring Finland and

(28) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.6.1990. (29) The Wall Street Journal, 27.6.1990.

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Sweden are available. These opportunities are likely to take years to be realized.

In the light of the Single European Market planned for 1992, the neutrals also started to redefine their places in the future Europe. This is most visible in the case of Finland, which for many years remained at the fringes of European integration. In 1986, Finland decided to participate in the EC's high-technology research program EUREKA. In 1987, Finland's status as associate member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was upgraded to full membership. And in 1989, Helsinki became full member of the Council of Europe. This "Europeanization" of Finland is an expression of the country's independence and selfassertiveness. It results in a virtual renversement des alliances in the pattern of the country's economic and political cooperation. Austria constitutes a similar case. In 1989, after years of deliberations, Vienna submitted its application for full membership in the European Community. Given the more pragmatic approach to foreign affairs, Soviet reactions to these developments have been mixed. Officials regularly deplore the poor state of economic relations with the neutral countries and propose in turn ambitious, but not always realistic projects to promote bilateral cooperation and trade. An example are the optimistic targets in the five-year and longterm trade agreements with Austria or Finland or the multibillion dollar project for the economic and social development of the Kola peninsula proposed by Gorbachev in his 1987 speech in Murmansk. 30 Moscow's more realistic appreciation of European integration has also facilitated understanding of the neutrals' endeavor not to be left out of the EC's benefits. On few occasions, however,

(30) Pravda, 2.10.1987.

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Soviet concerns over the dynamics of European integration and its band-wagoning impact on the post-war order have been aired. In one of the few speeches on foreign affairs at the 19th Party Conference in July 1988, then Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Yuii Kvitzinski, warned that . . more and more European states may begin to be sucked into the EEC and via the EEC into NATO - that is, there may be the construction of an all-European branch of NATO and no development in the direction of equal and constructive cooperation of the two systems on an allEuropean basis. 31 The neutral (and East Central European) countries as dominos of European integration ? Similar concerns are reflected in Moscow's ambiguous attitude toward Austria's application for EC membership. Soviet commentators have namely three reservations. A first objection relates to the lack of previous consultations with the USSR. In the view of Vladimir Shenaiev, director of the European Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the determination of neutrality is an issue that concerns not only Austria. In his view, the 1955 State Treaty has been concluded on the clear understanding that the country remains permanently neutral. Anything else would constitute a unilateral revision of the treaty. 32 Second, short of claiming a droit de leadership sent the Austrian government an the USSR's position on trie EC application. speaking out against Austria joining the nevertheless states unambiguously that

(31) Pravda, 3.7.1988. (32) V. Shenaiev, Interview, in: Wochenpresse (Vienna), 1.9.1989.

regard, the Soviet aide-memoire stating While not explicitly Community, the note

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the Soviet government i s convinced t h a t a permanently n e u t r a l s t a t e ' s membership in such an organization as the EC would r e s u l t in the loss of i t s concrete o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o implement i t s n e u t r a l i t y p o l i c y . 33 The aide-memoire c a l l s for a " s t r i c t and complete adherence t o the State Treaty and the law on A u s t r i a ' s permanent n e u t r a l i t y " . In a r a r e case of orthodoxy in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n regarding the l e g a l provisions of n e u t r a l i t y , and in d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o A u s t r i a ' s government and l e g a l e x p e r t s , the USSR considers n e u t r a l i t y as incompatible with EC membership " j u s t l i k e f i r e and water". 34 Soviet comments on opponents of an EC a p p l i c a t i o n in Austria, Finland, Sweden, or Switzerland, and on EC governments c r i t i c a l of the accession of another n e u t r a l member t o the Community such as Belgium or Denmark are thus the more p o s i t i v e . Similar concerns are also r e f l e c t e d in t e n d e n t i a l i y c r i t i c a l Soviet commentaries on the EC a p p l i c a t i o n of the Republic of Cyprus or Malta. 35 A t h i r d r e s e r v a t i o n r e l a t e s t o the USSR's growing i n t e r e s t in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and other organizations apart from the EC. Soviet economists s t a r t t o study the experience of the EFTA countries as example for the USSR's own r e l a t i o n s h i p with the EC. 36 EFTA i s also considered as a model for revamping the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). 37 In h i s speech t o the Council of Europe, (33) Aide-Meaoire subiitted by Soviet Ambassador Gennadii Shikin to Chancellor Franz Vranitzky on 10.8.1989, in: Die Presse (Vienna), 11.8.1989, p.2. On the saie date, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadii Perfilev reiterated these concerns in a press briefing. (TASS (English), 11.8.1989) For earlier criticise, see: G. Shishkin, TASS (English), 12.2.1988; A. Bondarenko, Interview, in: Die Presse (Vienna), 22.6.1988. (34) V. Falin, Interview, in: Per Standard (Vienna), 11.5.1989. (35) See for instance: V. Potapov, Cyprus and the Coaaon Market, Pravda, 18.7.90. (36) Cf. The Consequences of the Foraation of a Joint Market in the European Comunity (Material prepared by the Western Europe Research Department of IHFJO), iirovaia ekonoaika i aezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 4/1989, pp.38-44. (37) I. Frantseva, Difficult Return to Europe, Izvestiya, 23.7.1990.

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Gorbachev suggested a "deeper relationship" with EFTA and during his visit to Finland he proposed the promotion of trilateral interaction between the EC, the EFTA and the CMEA, and the formation of a trilateral commission of experts in order to promote a common European economic space. 38 As Shenaiev stresses, the USSR has thus no interest in weakening EFTA and strengthening the EC: Austria, like the other neutral countries, plays a key role in EFTA. Thus, it would be regrettable if Austria's departure would weaken this organization. Together, and within EFTA, the neutral countries can do much more for the future cf Europe, as long as they act jointly and not individually. He explains the USSR's trilateral approach toward building the economic pillar of Gorbachev's common European home: I think it would be best for the future of Europe if the common home were to include all three integrative organizations: EC, EFTA, and CMEA. To eliminate EFTA and CMEA for the benefit of the EC - or even weakening EFTA would disturb the construction of the common home. .. If Austria joins the EC - which it probably will - it will not be conducive to the common home. 39 In this trilateral approach toward pan-European economic integration, the EFTA countries thus play an important role in overcoming Moscow's growing isolation and boosting its increasingly weak bargaining position vis-ä-vis the EC. A similar observation applies to other European institutions such as the Nordic Council (including the NATO members Denmark, Iceland and Norway and the neutrals Finland and Sweden), or the Council of Europe, in which the neutral and non-aligned

(38) M.S. Gorbachev, Speech to the Council of Europe, Pravda, 11.7.1989; M.S. Gorbachev, Speech at Finlandia Hall. (39) V. Shenaiev, op.cit..

I

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countries hold approximately half of the seats and chair important commissions and committees. Thus, during the period of construction and the subsequent period of operation of panEuropean institutions, the neutral and non-aligned countries, which currently constitute one-third of all European states, will be of increasing interest to the USSR as potential trailblazers and allies. Or, as the Soviet aide-memoire to the Austrian government stresses: There is every reason to believe that the European Continent's further progress on the road toward strengthening security and cooperation, toward building a common European home, will considerably depend on the goodwill .. of the neutral and non-aligned states. 40

NEUTRALITY IN THE 1990S The Changing Meaning of Neutrality Six years of perestroika in Soviet foreign and security policy and the democratic revolutions in Eastern Central Europe have resulted in a radical reversal of the strategic situation on the continent. Traditional landmarks of East-West relations - a term which becomes increasingly meaningless with the transformation in the ideological and political composition of the East - are disappearing, new ones are not yet visible. In this context, the notion of neutrality, the position of the European neutrals and the Soviet view thereof is likely to undergo substantial change: (1) With the virtual disappearance of the Central Front and the disengagement of forces in Central Europe, the strategic position of the European neutrals is changing. While Austria and Switzerland are relegated to a status of near irrelevance, the

(40) Aide-Menoire, op.cit..

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neutral and non-aligned countries on the Northern and Southern flank become strategically more important. (2) Neutrality and non-alliance are considered as options for the newly independent countries in Eastern Central Europe, the Soviet republics and states seeking more independence from the center. Until recently, a similar option has been voiced also for a unified Germany. (3) With the disappearance of East-West confrontation, the shift toward a multipolar European order and the creation of panEuropean institutions, the very meaning of neutrality and its functionality is changing. At this point, it is difficult to assess the full implication of these revolutionary changes on the Soviet view of neutrality. Soviet observers have hardly addressed the issue. Given the importance of the subject, some tentative considerations are nevertheless in place.

The Changing Strategic Position of the European Neutrals With the withdrawal of all Soviet ground and air forces from the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia until 1994, the military situation of Austria and Switzerland will change considerably. Current Soviet plans for the Theater of War Europe will become largely irrelevant, there will be no direct contact with Soviet troops, and the forces of the East Central European countries will constitute no real threat potential. With some reservations, Austria and Switzerland will become strategic backbenchers comparable to Ireland. 41

(41) For a discussion of Soviet Military considerations vis-ä-vis the neutrals, see: J.G. Hines/Ph.A. Petersen, European feutrals in Soviet Military Strategy, in: Bissell/Gasteyger, The Missing Link, pp. 150175.

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Conversely, Europe's Northern and Southern flank have become s t r a t e g i c a l l y more important - a t l e a s t in r e l a t i v e terms. Soviet m i l i t a r y experts have long s t r e s s e d the fact t h a t , given technological and s t r a t e g i c developments, the " s t r a t e g i c North" i s becoming more important for the defense of Europe and the global equation of forces. 42 The deployment of s t r a t e g i c systems, a i r , naval and ground forces and the i n t e n s i t y of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s in t h i s region have markedly increased over the l a s t decade. Soviet planners are p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the nuclear and conventional firepower deployed on NATO ships in the B a l t i c and North Sea. In t h i s r e s p e c t , Finland and Sweden and t h e i r a t t i t u d e toward nuclear-free zones become of g r e a t e r importance. From a m i l i t a r y point of view, Finish and Swedish t e r r i t o r y , a i r space and t e r r i t o r i a l waters are also of g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t as the continued incursions of unidentified submarines i n t o Swedish waters seems t o demonstrate. In 1985, when Gorbachev came t o power, 18 v i o l a t i o n s were reported according t o a RAND study. Since then, the number has jumped t o an average of nearly t h r e e v i o l a t i o n s a month or more than 30 a year. 43 The recent loss of a i r and naval bases in the GDR and on the B a l t i c shores could render Swedish a i r s t r i p s and fjords in Malmö or around Stockholm h y p o t h e t i c a l l y more i n t e r e s t i n g for m i l i t a r y planners. In an unrelated development, Central Europe have r e s u l t e d

troop withdrawals from Eastern in a g r e a t e r concentration of

(42) For Soviet assessaents of the growing strategic iaportance of the Northern flank, see: V. Pavlov, 'Arctic Option' and i t s Alternative, Krasnaia zvezda, 11.3.1989; Northern Fleet Coaaander F. Groaov, Coaaon Sense, Krasnaia zvezda, 22.7.1990. For a Western analysis, see: B. Huldt, The Strategic North, The Washington Quarterly. 3/1985, pp.99-109. (43) See: G. McCoriick, Stranger Than Fiction, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1990. Cf. Gen. S. Gustavsson, Coaaander-in-Chief, guot. in: The Wall Street Journal, 15.5.1990. For an evaluation of the •ilitary rationales, see: W.Agrell, Soviet Strategy and War Planning in the North: The Interpretation of Military Incidents, Nordic Journal of Soviet k East European Studies, 1/1987, pp.79-90. For Soviet denials, see: H. Zubko, Periscope Disease, Izvestiya, 14.2.1989; Vice Adiiral V. Sakharin, Swedish Delusions, Pravda, 21.2.1990.

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Soviet ground and air forces for instance, a Soviet air Debrecen airfield in Hungary MiG-27s have a substantial forces.

in the Nordic region. In May 1990, regiment has been redeployed from to a location near Murmansk. The 39 impact on the regional balance of

In this context, it has to be mentioned that the quasidemilitarization of Eastern Central Europe and the resulting disengagement of ground forces have some significant militaryoperational and military-technical implications for the military situation of the European neutrals. Space and range have become militarily more relevant. With the unification of Germany, the conversion of the neighboring states into friends and the withdrawal of most Soviet forces behind the Bug, most targets within striking distance of NATO's and the WTO's short- and medium-range systems have disappeared. Consequently, the focus will shift toward long-range land-, air- and sea-based power projection capabilities in order to put the forces of a potential. enemy at risk. Deep-strike aircrafts, stand-off weapons, long-range artillery and air-mobile rapid deployment forces belong into this category. The USSR's six air-borne divisions and five air-borne brigades stationned West of the Urals, the medium-range bombers of the Air Armies Smolensk, Legnica, and Vinnitsa, the American and British carrier taskforces in the European waters and air- and sea-based cruisemissiles are of particular concern. It can thus be assumed, that the Central and East European airspace will grow in importance. The European neutrals and the East Central European countries could face increasing pressure from the USSR and NATO to improve their air defense capabilities in order to prevent the utilization of their airspace by either side. 44

(44) For an earlier Soviet request to Finland and Sweden to upgrade their air defenses in order to provide the dSSR protection froa cruise aissiles, see: Yu. Koaissarov, Cruise Missiles and Northern Europe, Helsingin Sanoaat, 15.1.1984.

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"FINLANDIZATION" OF EASTERN CENTRAL EUROPE ? With Gorbachev's renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty and the recognition of the former satellites' right to national self-determination, Soviet attitudes toward the requirements of bloc membership started to change. At least theoretically, freedom of choice implies a possible transformation of the bloc structures. 45 More important, given the revolutionary changes in the political and military landscape of Europe the question arises how the East Central European countries could fit into an emerging European strategic order and what their future relationship with the USSR should be. Can "Finlandization" and "neutralization" serve as models for the newly independent states ? For the USSR, neutrality first became important in the context of the rapid developments in the GDR. In February 1990, once Gorbachev understood that German unification was inevitable, he tried in a last ditch effort to prevent NATO membership of the future Germany. The historic deal unification versus neutrality was again on the table. As in Stalin's initiatives, neutrality was simply equalized with neutralization and non-alliance. Gorbachev did not elaborate on the specific provisions of neutrality in terms of rights and obligations of this increasingly independent and self-assertive great power in the center of Europe. 46 A t t h e historic Arkhyz meeting between President Gorbachev a n d Chancellor Kohl in July 1 9 9 0 , t h e Soviet leadership finally abandonned neutrality a s condition f o r German unification. This does n o t necessarily m e a n , h o w e v e r , that t h e objective of neutralizing Germany h a s been fully abandonned. Soviet observers d o n o t exclude such an outcome either a s a

(45) See Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze's explanations of the practical aeaning of the teri in his speech to the Political Coaaittee of the European Parliaaent, in: Pravda, 20.12.1989. (46) M.S. Gorbachev, Interview, Pravda, 21.2.1990.

27

result of a change of power in Bonn or of a transformation or dissolution of NATO. In the meantime, neutrality has become a major issue in the former socialist camp and even within the Soviet Union. The newly elected leaders started immediately to cash in on Gorbachev's premisses and demanded the change of the former unequal treaties, the abolition of the colonialist institutions in their countries, and the total withdrawal of the Soviet troops from their territories. In May 1990, Mongolia formally joined the non-aligned movement. Exercising their newly gained freedom of choice, most WTO members have expressed their intention to reduce their commitments to or withdraw altogether from the Pact. On June 26, 1990, the Hungarian National Assembly passed a resolution charging the government to freeze Hungary's participation in the WTO's military organization and to begin talks on the country's withdrawal from the pact by the end of 1991. The resolution formally reestablishes Imre Nagy's unilateral declaration of neutrality of November 1, 1956. 47 Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania seem to share the same objectives. But withdrawal is being delayed in order not to create further disruptions in Europe. The Polish government, for instance, has announced that the country would gradually, but definitely, leave the military structures of the Warsaw Pact. 48 And Czechoslovakia and Romania have also declared to reduce their participation in military integration. Few East Central European or Soviet observers believe that the WTO will survive at all. The East Central European countries have grown more self-assertive in expressing their genuine national interests. Alliance with the USSR is not considered as conditio sine qua non for achieving security. New unique national military

(47) For a discussion of the Hungarian debate on neutrality, see: A. Reisen, Hungarian Neutrality: Hopes and Realities, Radio Free Europe, Report on Eastern Europe, 30.3.1990, pp.11-28. (48) Minister of Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9.8.1990.

28

doctrines are emerging. Hungary, for instance, has switched to a defense posture a tout azimut with little regard for WTO requirements. It is assumed that there is no specific threat to Hungarian security neither in the East, West, North, or South. In moves of unilateral or anticipatory disarmament, most East Central European countries have cut back their armed forces and slowed down force modernization. They have virtually opted-out of the military confrontation between the blocs and have indicated that they are more interested in the destruction of the old military establishments and the construction of a new type security order. These nations, quasi-neutralized and semi-demilitarized, have become nobody's friend and nobody's foe. Poland and its neighbors are sandwiched in-between two sides, a Soviet Union in turmoil and a reemerging Germany anchored within NATO and the EC. Western and Soviet observers are concerned that with the gradual disengagement of military potentials in the center of Europe a new strategic vacuum, a "hole in the doughnut", will emerge in East Central Europe. 49 In the view of Igor Malashenko, an expert in the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, geopolitics teaches that there will always be struggle for control of the rimlands bordering on the heartland no matter what the ideological dimensions of the conflict are. ^

SHADES OF NEUTRALITY In this context, the USSR's past experiences with neutrality and neutral states could become relevant. Elements of this relationship include (49) Chief-of-Staff M. Moiseyev, Report to the 28th CPSO Congress section on the CPSO's international activities, in: Kraznaya zvezda. 7.7.1990; S. Karaganov, The Probleas of the USSR's European Policy, International Affairs (Moscow), 7/1990, pp.72-80; M. Antyasov, Eastern Europe: Tiaes of Change, Izvestiya, 31.7.1990. (50) I. Malashenko, Russia: The Earth's Heartland, International Affairs (Moscow), 7/1990, pp.46-54.

29

(1) a certain stability, predictability and reliability in the behavior of the neutrals; (2) good relations not based on ideological commonalities, but on mutual respect, common interests and political affinities; (3) a certain cooperation and coordination foreign affairs and arms control;

in

questions

of

(4) certain security guarantees and reassurances, i.e. the implicit or explicit stipulation, on a uni-, bior mulitilateral basis, of military rights and obligations relating to the neutrals' declared intention to stay out of a future conflict. Most

of

these

elements

appear

in

Soviet

discussions

on

the

future relationship with the countries of East Central Europe. The

East

Central

security West.

interests

In t h e

perform forces.

In

have

assume

the

or

context,

the

territory

primary thus

of

in

of

order

use

by

a

the

states

is

to

on

disengage

Neutrality

in

of War

rights two

at

certain defense

Land

power.

In

this could

area

obligations

or

whose

parties

Sea

or

national

zones

a certain

on

to

will

explicit

conflict. and

the

army

of

buffer

and

to

likely

country's

of

some

self-defense

conflicting

military

and

are

and

third

and

commitment

function

Convention

honor the

well-defined

likelihood

each

address

East

forces

as

of

the

armed

to

to

the

such

set

reduce

to

context,

buffer i.e.

have

firefighters

against

important, a

neighbors

guarantees,

notion

will

context, their

functions

airspace

to

their

international

security

become more

nations

functions

implicit

region

of

national

limited

to

European

51

and

The

Hague

of

1907,

(51) See: G. Wettig, Die UdSSR und der politische Wandel in Osteuropa, ^richte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 25/1990; H. Tiaaeraann, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Dynaaics of 'Finlandization', Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, 33/1990, pp.15-18.

30

which specifies such rights and obligations, could serve as model. They are, however, increasingly outdated and limited in their application to neutral countries in case of war. For the East Central European countries, a more appropriate, universal codex of mutual rights and obligations of European armed forces in times of peace, crisis and war might be more appropriate. Certain elements have already been worked out in the context of the negotiations on conventional arms control and confidenceand security-building measures. Another interesting aspect are the political-ideological dimensions of future Soviet-East European relations discussed by Soviet experts. As in the case of the European neutrals, Soviet spokesmen refer to a "new type" of relations with the East Central European countries based on a "voluntary partnership", to "voluntary contacts of mutual benefit on a natural and more stable basis". 52 Most commentators agree that, with t h e collapse of t h e "Socialist community", ties cannot b e built on t h e pillars of a common ideology anymore. B u t , a s o n e observer concludes, ideological commonalities d o n o t automatically guarantee friendly relations. Relations with Finland, in t u r n , "which is remote from u s in terms of social structure, have become .. an ideal of genuinely friendly relations" 53. The Soviet Union h a s a long tradition in establishing good relations with countries "belonging t o a different social system." Finland and t h e other neutral states in particular seem to provide an important experience in dealing with different, non-communist political forces. A s Gennadyi Yanayev, t h e n e w Politburo member in charge of international affairs, stresses:

(52) A. Bogatyrov/M. Nosov/K. Pleshakov, Who Are They, Our Allies, Koaaunist, 1/1990, pp. 105-114; Draft CPSO Prograa, Pravda. 13.2.1990. (53) Antyasov, op.cit..

31

We are ready to cooperate with all progressive, democratic parties and movements in Eastern Europe which seek to create equitable relations between our countries and a climate of trust on the continent. 54 Yet considerable sensitivities regarding the attitude of the new leaders toward the USSR persist on the Soviet side. The sharp reactions to allegedly anti-Soviet remarks by Hungarian Prime Minister Jozef Antall are a case in point. 55 Observers are concerned about rising anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, or anticommunist attitudes in the newly independent, post-communist societies. Gorbachev warns that "democracy should not be substituted by demagogy, or some ideological stereotypes by others." 56 And the resolution "In Defense of Democratic Rights and Against the Persecution of Communists", passed at the 28th CPSU Party Congress is an appeal against McCarthism in Eastern Central Europe. 57 The Soviet leadership's political-ideological profile of the newly elected East Central European leaders is comparable to that it had of the European neutrals over the past twenty years. They are expected to share a minimum of Gorbachev's interests and perspectives, namely to promote partner-like, goodneighborly relations with the USSR, to avoid isolation of the Soviet Union from the processes of European cooperation and integration, to oppose extreme forms of anti-Soviet nationalism, to advocate the dissolution of the military alliances, the denuclearization of Europe and the creation of a European system of collective security.

(54) Interview, in: Pravda, 13.8.1990. (55) TJSS (English), 23.8.1990? |ASS, 27.8.1990. (56) Meeting with CSFR Pri» Minister Marian Calfa, TASS (English), 20.12.89. (57) Pravda, 11.7.1990.

32

While this comparison with the case of the European neutrals has various flaws, a "neutralization" or "Finlandization" of its Eastern Central European neighbors would have distinctive advantages and could encourage the Soviet Union to distinguish between genuine security concerns and ambitions to preserve the crumbling empire. Moreover, with the disintegration of the WTO, some East Central European countries start to show growing interests in closer ties with NATO. Neutralization could thus assume its classical function of denying a potential opponent to gain new allies. Theory and history of neutrality offer a variety of options: (1) a "Finnish solution", i.e. a combination of non-alliance, good-neighborly relations and specific security guarantees toward the USSR in form of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance ("neutrality plus"); (2) an "Austrian or Swiss solution", i.e. unconditional neutrality based on a unilateral declaration or a multilateral agreement without specific security guarantees toward the USSR or another side; (3) a "Greek solution", i.e. continued, but loose membership in the WTO combined with active efforts to weaken the Pact's military and political integration (internal neutralization). Differentiation will be necessary, not only between distinct East Central European countries, but also between distinct dimensions of security and cooperation. The option most popular among Western observers is the "Finlandization" of East Central Europe. 58 W h i l e t h e m e r i t s o f the model have been discussed, there a r e some serious drawbacks

(58) Tiaaemann, op.cit.; K. Kerner/S.Stopinski, Finnlandisierung als Perspektive ?, Osteuropa, 3/1990, pp.255-271.

33

as well. First, the term "Finlandization" is widely disputed. Its exact meaning depends, among others, on the periodization of Soviet-Finnish relations. Until 1956, for instance, the USSR maintained a naval base in Porkkala near Helsinki. This particular interpretation could allow Soviet troops to remain in Poland, while Warsaw formally leaves the Warsaw Pact. Or, until 1984, Finland was governed by a predominantly socialist government which the USSR considered as a guarantor of the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line". Most of the newly elected East Central European governments, however, are dominated by liberal or conservative forces, comparable to the current Holkeri government in Finland. A related problem is the interpretation of the provisions of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1948. It is, for instance, widely disputed whether Article 2 requires the coordination or integration of Finnish and Soviet air defenses in times of crisis - in the context of the WTO a highly relevant problem. Thus there is not one, but various models of "Finlandization", models which reflect the unique situation and experience of Finland in a given historic period. Second, the term roots in the period of the Cold War. It is historically tainted and politically stigmatized. Exactly for these reasons, it is doubtfully whether the East Central European countries are willing to sacrifice their newly gained independence for limited sovereignty, conditional neutrality, and a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the former colonial power USSR. Third, "Finlandization" could become very costly, both for the East Central European states, which could be expected to maintain a strong defense comparable to that of Finland, and the USSR, which could be expected to subsidize the East Central European countries with cheap oil and raw materials as, until

34

recently, in the case of Finland. As discussed above, even Finnish-Soviet relations are currently "de-Finlandized". Yet also the "Austrian" or "Swiss models" are not very attractive for the East Central European countries. Classical neutrality does not exactly transcend East-West structures, but is very much part of the status-quo. Moreover, these countries are not seeking non-alliance, segregation and isolation, but realliance, cooperation and integration. And especially for relations with the European Community, neutrality is a liability rather than an asset. The notion of differentiated neutrality, for instance, attempts to bridge this gap. Assuming a strict delineation between the different dimensions of security, it requires a country to remain neutral in the military field, while allowing participation in political and economic cooperation and integration. The declared devolution of the WTO from a military to a merely political organization could facilitate such a differentiated posture. Yet to be not-aligned, i.e. not a member of a military alliance, does not necessarily require to be non-aligned or neutral. With changing notions of alliance, integration and cooperation there are more attractive models for asserting a state's sovereignty and independence than classical neutrality. So far, notions of "Finlandization" or "neutralization" of East Central Europe have remained more popular among Western observers and East European politicians than among Soviet officials or observers. They rarely refer to these options. During his visit to Finland, Gorbachev praised the notion of "Finlandization": What was called 'Finlandization' and still recently subjected to criticism .. it has turned out that all that has collapsed, while life has demonstrated the vitality of these relations. .. We and Finland have fulfilled and are fulfilling pioneering work, .. and this experience what used to be called Finlandization - must now be

35

called an asset and a large contribution toward building new relations in Europe. I think that there is a very great deal that is useful here. Europeans, all of us together have to think about it. . . What was once the object of criticism and all kinds of speculation is now standing up as an example, as a reference point, showing what relations can be like. 59 Gorbachev actually might have thought of "Finlandization" as a model for reshaping the USSR's relationship with its East European neighbors. In an earlier interview with the West German weekly Die Zeit, then Politburo member and Gorbachev advisor Aleksandr Yakovlev was more explicit suggesting "that many of the Eastern rooms in the common European home could be furnished in the Finnish style" 60. Other experts in Gorbachev's entourage hinted that some of the USSR's lesser allies such as Hungary or the CSSR could become neutral. In February 1989, Oleg Bogomolov, the Director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, created a considerable stir when he stated at an international press conference that it was theoretically possible for Hungary to become neutral without threatening the security of the USSR. In later statements, Bogomolov stressed that his remarks had been "hypothetical responses to hypothetical questions". He himself felt, he said, that Hungary should not give up its ties with the WTO, since neutrality was not always the best guarantee of security. 61 And according to Hungarian media reports, former chief-of-staff Marshal Akhromeyev told journalists in Washington that members of the WTO had the right to complete self-determination, including the right to choose neutrality if they wished. 62 These statements

(59) M.S. Gorbachev, Sews Conference, TASS (English), 26.10.1989. (60) Die Zeit, 12.5.1989. (61) Reported in: New York Tiaes, 11.2.1989. (62) Frankfurter Allqeaeine Zeitung, 31.7.1989. Akhroaeev subsequently denied that he had Bentioned neutrality.

36

were, however, made before the dramatic developments of fall and winter 1989. So far, the Soviet leadership has hardly reacted to attempts by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland to leave the WTO. Soviet commentators consider these declarations as in line with the postulates of freedom of choice and self-determination of nations. As Foreign Minister Shevardnadze emphasizes, it will be up to the individual countries to choose their future status, the USSR does not intend to impose models on her neighbors or to limit their newly gained sovereignty and independence. 63 Officials only express their expectation that the processes of disengagement are managed in an orderly way and based on bilateral or multilateral negotiations. There are few warnings that changes in bloc membership would result in a dangerous shift in the "balance" or "alliance of forces" (sootnoshenie or rasstanovka sill. 64 Most statements are limited to pledges to renew and transform the WTO to a more genuine, politically oriented democratic alliance of equal partners based on mutual interests. The Soviet leadership seems to have no specific concepts for future relations with its East Central European neighbors. 65 In June, former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev complained that the CPSU leadership had not yet undertaken a thorough analysis of the developments in Eastern Europe. And a commentator conceded that "unfortunately .. there are still no integral conceptual elaborations based on new approaches" 66. As a result, there is a virtual policy vacuum. Yet there is a stated need to overcome ambiguity and to define bilateral relations within a broader strategic framework. Some of the

(63) E. Shevardnadze, Interview, in: Ogoniok, 11/1990, p.3. (64) Moiseyev, op.cit.. (65) TASS (English), 5.5.1990. (66) Y. Shashkov, Eastern Europe: Reminiscences and New Realities, Koaaunist, 10/1990, pp.113-119.

37

arguments discussed in this chapter are likely to be pondered by Soviet experts. Especially since it might be more attractive for the USSR to have a. predictable, stable, neutral neighbor rather than a dissatisfied, rebellious ally torn between extreme positions.

"FINLANDIZATION" AND "NEUTRALIZATION" WITHIN THE USSR With the Baltic states' declaration of independence and the rapid disintegration of the USSR's state structure the issue of neutrality has gained an important domestic dimension for the Soviet leadership. At stake is the future military-political status of the independence-minded republics and the military integration within the USSR. The status of the Soviet army in the Baltic region will form an important issue in the negotiations between the Baltic states and the USSR. Formulating their independent security policies, Baltic leaders seem to take into account the USSR's difficult situation and strategic interests in the region. 67 They do not exclude arrangements allowing the Soviet army to continue to utilize key installations on their territory. Lithuania's President Vytautas Landsbergis reiterates that while independence itself is not an issue for negotiations, the conditions and the period for achieving it can be discussed. During his visit to Switzerland, in August 1990, he is reported as saying: Lithuania is willing to take Soviet security interests into account and to guarantee the transit routes to the area of Kaliningrad as well as the use of the port of Klaipeda by the Soviet Navy. Concluding a treaty on the preservation of Soviet bases in an independent Lithuania seems conceivable. However, the strength and the duration (67) For a discussion of Soviet interests, see: Coasodore V. Miasnikov, Soviet Baltic Fleet Could Survive Lithuanian Independence, Svenska Dagbladet, 26.7.1990.

38

of the stay discussed. 68

of

Soviet

forces

in Lithuania

must

be

Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene also concedes that the Soviet government is already overburdened with the exit of troops from Eastern Europe. Although the troop withdrawal and the definitive solution of the border question could, in my view, occur within three years, it would not be before the Soviet Army's withdrawal from states more to the West. 69 Estonian and Latvian politicians made similar statements. 70 On the long term, the Baltic states envisage a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and bases. Their international status in the 19th century and security arrangements during the inter-war period serve as models. The Ukrainian parliament has been more explicit. Article IX of the Declaration of Sovereignty, passed on July 16, 1990, stipulates: The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its own intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not take part in military blocs and that adheres to three nonnuclear principles: not to produce, not to acquire and not to use nuclear weapons. 71 While the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet intends to remain part of the USSR, it proclaims the Ukraine's right to its own armed forces, internal troops and organs of state security. Representatives of Rukh and other opposition groups call for the immediate

(68) Reported by: A.Oplatka, Landsbergis on Lithuania's Goals and Prospects, Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 9.8.1990. (69) Interview, in: Izvestia, 21.8.1990. (70) M.L. Lauristin, in: Sovetskaia Estonia, 19.1.1990. (71) Pravda Ukrainy, 17.7.1990.

39

withdrawal of Soviet forces and bases from the republic's territory. On July 27, 1990, the Belorussian parliament followed suit declaring "the aim of the Belorussian SSR of making its territory a non-nuclear zone, and the republic - a neutral state." 72 Demilitarization, denuclearization and neutralization obviously serve as means to an end, i.e. the military and political disengagement of Belorussia and the Ukraine from the Soviet empire. They can also be considered as bargaining-chips for negotiations on a redistribution of powers between the center and the constituent republics in the context of a new Treaty of Union. Other republics pursue less confrontational strategies of denial and disengagement. Refusals to implement the military draft and other acts challenging the center's prerogatives in foreign and security policy can be considered as attempts at neutralization from within. Reactions of the central authorities to these developments are much more categoric than in the case of Eastern Central Europe. Political and military leaders insist on the center's right and the strategic necessities to draft and mobilize soldiers and to deploy troops on the entire territory of the union. 73 Privately, Soviet experts nevertheless concede the necessity to address issues of military alignment in the context of the new Treaty of Union. Ideas include the conclusion of a "Vilnius Pact", i.e. a multilateral military alliance within a future Soviet federation or confederation, in which former Soviet territories such as the Baltic states could also participate. The agreement between the Estonian government and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on

(72) Art. X of the Belorussian Declaration on Sovereignty, reprinted in: Arguaenty i faktv, 31/1990, pp.1-2. (73) See: M.S. Gorbachev, Worthily Overconing the Obstacle in the Country's History - Speech in Odessa Military District, Pravda, 19.8.1990.

40

the cooperation and coordination of militia organs provides an interesting example for such future security arrangements. 74 Another the

commentator

Second

would

World

still

Whatever

a

in

the

at the negative

War and remarks

be

participating

points more

an

favorable

alliance

outcome

of

that,

the

experiences

say, a neutral

outcome

potentially domestic

a

Ukraine

hostile

to

Russia.

tug-of-war,

likely t o i n f l u e n c e t h e d e b a t e o n t h e f u t u r e of

the

confederation.

(former) While

appropriate

model

relations,

it

republics

in

a

the

for

reshaping

could

serve

a

states are

federation

might

Soviet-East

as

Soviet

military-political

renewed

"Finlandization"

Ukraine

than

leadership's experiences with neutrality and neutral status

during

not

be

Central

yardstick

or the

European

for

security

arrangements within the USSR.

CONCLUSIONS

In

the light

and

within

of r e c e n t

the

Soviet

developments Union,

the

in E a s t e r n various

Central

forms

of

Europe European

n e u t r a l i t y a r e likely t o b e c o m e o f g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t t o t h e U S S R . S h o u l d t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of A u s t r i a , F i n l a n d ,

Ireland, Sweden and

Switzerland

future

with

serve

as models

its E a s t C e n t r a l

countries

for the USSR's

European

neighbors

relationship

or the other

in g e n e r a l , h o w e v e r , m o r e d e t a i l e d

European

and differentiated

s t u d i e s of t h e p h e n o m e n o n n e u t r a l i t y a n d t h e u n i q u e c a s e s of t h e European

neutrals

would

be

necessary

on

the

part

of

Soviet

At the same time, it has to be stressed that neutrality

in i t s

experts.

classical changing

sense

is i n c r e a s i n g l y

patterns

loosing

of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

its m e a n i n g .

cooperation,

Given the

integration and

(74) Agreeaent Between the Governaent of the Estonian Republic and the USSR MVD on Relations in the Sphere of Internal Affairs Organs' Activities, reported in: Izvestiya, 3.8.1990.

41

alliance, among the various dimensions of neutrality, only the military-political one continues to be relevant, i.e. nonalliance and armed neutrality, yet also to a diminishing degree. More often than not, neutrality is mystified and serves as rationalization for protectionism, particularism and nonparticipation in international affairs. Soviet observers also see less and less differences in the political, economic and military behavior of the European neutrals and other small and medium-sized countries such as Denmark, Greece or Hungary. The normalization of European relations and the competition of newly emerging East Central European varieties of neutrality or quasi-neutrality thus lead to a gradual blurring of the classical notion of neutrality, not only in the Soviet view. Europe could well return to the 19th century pattern when alliances and coalitions were short-term affairs and neutrality and non-alliance were normal. In such a changing environment, the traditional neutrals will find it much more difficult to explain to the USSR and other European powers their unique political and legal status than during the period of the Cold War. From the Soviet side, tolerance toward the particularism of the neutrals is also likely to decline.

%

43 Stephan Kux Neutrality and the Neutral States in Soviet New Political Thinking Bericht des BlOst Nr. 52/1990

The present Report analyzes the evolution of Soviet attitude to neutrality and to the neutral countries of Europe in the light of the "new political thinking". In line with the ongoing military and political changes in Europe, this issue is becoming more and more relevant as Western observers, especially, are advancing "Finlandization" or "neutralization" as potential models for the re-organization of Moscow's relations with its neighbours in Eastern Europe and even with the Republics of the Union. The study arrives at the following findings: 1. Relations with the neutral states of Europe have seldom rated high in Soviet foreign policy. Matters involving Finland, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland have traditionally been dealt with at a subordinate level and on a case-by-case basis in the Foreign Ministry and in the Central Committee. There has been no such thing as a consistent, well-reflected policy towards the neutral countries. They were always regarded as a permanent component of the European status quo; the continuity, reliability, and calculability of their actions were specially appreciated. 2. At the theoretical level, the "new political thinking", and in particular the re-definition of "peaceful coexistence" and the commitment to adhere to the principles of international law, have had a profound effect on the Soviet view of neutrality. In practice, a significant intensification of contacts with the neutral states Is to be observed since Gorbachev's coming to office. The category of the "small and intermediate states of Europe" is gaining weight in Moscow's foreign policy. 3. Relations with the neutral countries, and in particular with Finland, are extolled as models of "peaceful coexistence" and as prototypes for living together in the "common European home". Emphasis is placed on the role of the neutral states' "peaceloving, active foreign policy" and on a certain convergence of positions on questions of disarmament, the prevention of war, the dissolution of the military blocks, the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones, etc. In this respect, however, the neutral states no longer enjoy a special status, because other countries are, from the Soviet point of view, also showing themselves to be flexible and cooperative.

44 4. The political, economic, and military changes in Europe are also making a profound impression on the role of neutrality and of the neutral states themselves. As the military confrontation in Central Europe subsides, Austria and Switzerland are being turned into back-benchers in strategic terms, comparable with Ireland. Conversely, the relative military importance of the neutral and non-aligned countries on Europe's northern and southern flanks is rising . 5. The neutral countries' re-definition of their relations with the European Community appears to be causing the USSR particular discomfort, as Soviet interventions against Austria's attempts to join the Community indicate. Moscow bases its objections on conservative interpretations of the concept of neutrality that had never before been heard from these quarters. Behind the scenes, what is actually at stake is the Soviet strategy for negotiations with the EC. The USSR would prefer a trilateral framework for negotiations involving the EC, EFTA, and COMECON. For this reason, Moscow favours a stronger EFTA and stronger regional economic and political associations. 6. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact poses the question as to what the security role of the countries of Eastern Europe is going to look like in the future and what part the USSR itself is going to play. Western, Eastern European, and Soviet observers have occasionally toyed with models such as "Finlandization" and "neutralization". And in fact the Soviet Union's expectations as regards the countries of Eastern Europe can be compared with its expectations as regards, the neutral states: expectations of reliable, calculable, good-neighbourly relations based not on a shared ideology but on mutual interest; of security guarantees; of political goodwill and coordinated foreign policies. Up to now, however, the Soviet leadership has avoided making any clear statement of its views on a "neutralization" of Eastern Europe. And it is still doubtful whether the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, which are seeking closer links with the European Community, find the notion of neutrality attractive at all. 7. The declaration of independence by the Baltic states and the proclamation of neutrality by the Ukraine and White Russia have added a domestic dimension to the neutrality issue. They have cast doubt upon the future security status of the Soviet Republics as they strive for more independence and on the nature of the military accord within a transformed Soviet federation. For the time being, de-militarization, de-nuclearization, and neutralization are being proclaimed as instruments for the political and military detachment of the Republics from the Soviet Empire. 8. In the light of recent strategic changes, of progress made in the political and economic integration and security reorientation of Europe, the question arises as to the future role of neutrality from the Soviet perspective. Commentators praise the active contribution being made by the neutral states to the construction of the "common European home" but at the same time ex-

45 press concern that neutrality could be used as an excuse for not participating in all-European institutions. From the Soviet viewpoint, too, the "special case" of the small neutral states is becoming more and more of an obstacle to European cooperation. As the division of Europe is being overcome, these states are losing their traditional function as mediators, but have yet to find a new one .

Neuere Arbeiten aus dem Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien Sowjetunion 1988/89 Perestrojka in der Krise? Carl Hanser Verlag, München/Wien 1989, 359 S. The Soviet Union 1986/87 Events, Problems, Perspectives. Westview Press, Boulder/London 1989, 373 S. Christopher Davis/Hans-Hermann Höhmann/Hans-Henning Schröder (Hg.) Rüstung - Modernisierung - Reform Die sowjetische Verteidigungswirtschaft in der Perestrojka. Bund Verlag, Köln 1990, 274 S. Hans-Hennann Höhmann/Gertraud Seidenstecher (Hg.) Die Wirtschaft Osteuropas und der VR China 1980-1990. Bilanz und Perspektiven. Verlag Weltarchiv, Hamburg 1988, 648 S. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath China - Kultur und Wirtschaftsordnung. Eine system- und evolutionstheoretische Untersuchung. Gustav Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart/New York 1989, 420 S. Osteuropa und der internationale Kommunismus: Band 18: Joachim Glaubitz/Dieter Heinzig (Hg.) Die Sowjetunion und Asien in den 80er Jahren. Ziele und Grenzen sowjetischer Politik zwischen Indischem Ozean und Pazifik. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1988, 370 S.