Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation: The Common Position of the Group of 77 and China (Springer Climate) 303041020X, 9783030410209

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Springer Climate

María del Pilar Bueno Rubial Linda Siegele   Editors

Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation The Common Position of the Group of 77 and China

Springer Climate Series Editor John Dodson , Institute of Earth Environment, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xian, Shaanxi, China

Springer Climate is an interdisciplinary book series dedicated to climate research. This includes climatology, climate change impacts, climate change management, climate change policy, regional climate studies, climate monitoring and modeling, palaeoclimatology etc. The series publishes high quality research for scientists, researchers, students and policy makers. An author/editor questionnaire, instructions for authors and a book proposal form can be obtained from the Publishing Editor. Now indexed in Scopus® !

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11741

María del Pilar Bueno Rubial Linda Siegele

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Editors

Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation The Common Position of the Group of 77 and China

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Editors María del Pilar Bueno Rubial Universidad Nacional de Rosario National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) Rosario, Argentina

Linda Siegele Faculty of Laws University College London London, UK

ISSN 2352-0698 ISSN 2352-0701 (electronic) Springer Climate ISBN 978-3-030-41020-9 ISBN 978-3-030-41021-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to Fredrick (Fred) Kossam (in memoriam). Our brother and friend. A distinguished adaptation coordinator for the least developed countries group (LDCs) on behalf of his home country Malawi. He used to say that the passion underlying his work was motivated by the poverty he saw.

Foreword1

Over the past three decades, the role of adaptation to climate change has evolved considerably. In the early days, it was often misconstrued as being a defeatist approach to climate action. It subsequently evolved to becoming a niche for stand-alone projects in climate-vulnerable economic sectors, to finally constituting a holistic and comprehensive approach to climate-resilient development. The current outlook therefore transcends the climate context, and fully contributes and responds to the requirements of sustainable development priorities and aspirations. The latest science on climate change points to existential implications that require transformative actions which will entail a shift in paradigm towards scaled-up actions in the coming years. It is therefore important to reflect on and comprehend how the context of vulnerability and adaptation evolved in the UNFCCC negotiating process. This will not just help in understanding the history, but also in defining and shaping the future direction in which the world must embark, in order to protect the most vulnerable from the scourge of climate change impacts, and from their associated losses and damages. This book is an important step towards such an understanding. Having conceptualized the first ever workshop under the UNFCCC to propose initial actions to address the adverse effects of climate change back in September 1999, I reflect with profound gratification at how far the mindset has progressed in the negotiating process in support of adaptation action in developing countries over the ensuing two decades, in terms of both financial and technical support. Back then, methodological work was lacking in some sectors, such as in health and food security; and the interplay between different impacts was not well understood. There were no dedicated modalities for funding adaptation action nor for technology transfer. Integrated resource management was still at initial stages of evolution. There was no stand-alone arrangement or work program to address the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries (LDCs).

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The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations or the UNFCCC Secretariat.

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Foreword

Today, we are in a far better situation and have adopted a holistic planning overview. Methodological work has advanced significantly. Many iterations of assessment and prioritization of needs have taken place, notably in the LDCs where this was triggered by the National Adaptation Programs of Action—the NAPAs. In addition, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) currently play a central role in planning for adaptation. All developing countries now have tools available by which they can plan medium- and long-term adaptation actions. The UNFCCC’s financial mechanism has evolved to include multiple support channels that cater, inter alia, to adaptation: The Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Green Climate Fund. Complementary to the Convention process, a wide network exists of bilateral and international development cooperation agencies, as well as sectoral and non-governmental organizations, all of which are fully engaged in fostering the implementation of adaptation. There are mechanisms to fill adaptation knowledge gaps, including under the UNFCCC’s Nairobi Work Program on Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation; and to address loss and damage arising from climate impacts, under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. With this plethora of actions undertaken to further the adaptation agenda, the UNFCCC Adaptation Committee ensures the coherence and alignment of adaptation efforts within and outside of the Convention process. As we look ahead to a world where we achieve steady progress in adaptation and its actions are further supported, and where the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is steadily advanced, there is still a need to heed the call of the latest scientific findings. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services have both made the urgent case for a transformational paradigm in climate action. The principle of leaving no one behind is now most relevant to a redefined future in which climate resilience is achieved and sustained, especially for the most vulnerable. June 2019

Youssef Nassef Director, Adaptation UNFCCC Secretariat Bonn, Germany

Acknowledgements

As editors of this important and unique body of work, first and foremost, we would like to acknowledge the men and women who have worked tirelessly through the years to ensure that addressing adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change in particularly vulnerable developing countries is an indispensable part of the global response to the climate crisis. Included in this illustrious group of individuals are those who selflessly agreed to make a contribution to this project. Thank you for embracing our vision and for your efforts to set out the complex history of adaptation from the perspective of your countries. Without your contributions, we would not have a book. We must also acknowledge the Presidencies of the Group of 77 and China over the years for supporting the work of the lead coordinators for adaptation, helping them through sometimes challenging times to find solutions that all members of the Group would support—the underlying understanding from one President to the next being the fundamental importance of adaptation to developing countries. Converting country positions into consensual agreements could not have been done without the responsiveness (and sleepless hours) of members of the secretariat of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change who have worked on adaptation-related matters. Thank you for your dedication on our behalf. We also acknowledge the often-unheralded work of those in civil society who have championed adaptation on the global stage and helped present the hard evidence that has supported our arguments. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the support of Springer Nature, our publishers, for their guidance as we have navigated the waters on the journey toward finalizing this volume of work.

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Contents

Part I 1

Introduction

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maria del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele

Part II

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Building a Developing Country Position on Adapting to Climate Change in the UNFCCC: The Sub-groups of the G77 and China

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Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (A-B-U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ignacio Lorenzo Arana

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African Group of Negotiators (AGN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patience Thelma Melfah Damptey and Sumaya Zakieldeen

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Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pasha Carruthers, Orville Grey, Clifford Mahlung and Linda Siegele

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Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Laura Juliana Arciniegas Rojas and Julio Cordano Sagredo

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Least Developed Countries (LDCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cecília Silva Bernardo, Gebru Jember Endalew, Thinley Namgyel and Binyam Yakob Gebreyes

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Overview on Climate Change Adaptation Negotiations to Operationalize the Paris Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carlos Nicolás Zambrano Sánchez

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Contents

Part III 8

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The Lead Coordinators of the G77 and China on Adaptation to Climate Change

From the Cancun Adaptation Framework to the Paris Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lucas Di Pietro Paolo

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Coordination of the G77 and China on Adaptation. Looking for the Appropriate Space for Adaptation Under the UNFCCC . . . Maria del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele

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10 The Implementation Phase of the Paris Agreement: The Adaptation Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 María del Pilar Bueno Rubial Part IV

Concluding Reflections

11 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Maria del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Contributors

Laura Juliana Arciniegas Rojas Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia Cecília Silva Bernardo Climate Change Vulnerabilities Department, Ministry of Environment, Luanda, Angola María del Pilar Bueno Rubial National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina Pasha Carruthers Raratonga, Cook Islands Julio Cordano Sagredo Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile, Santiago, Chile Patience Thelma Melfah Damptey African Group of Negotiators, Accra, Ghana Lucas Di Pietro Paolo Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Buenos Aires, Argentina Gebru Jember Endalew Institutions Development and Strategic Partnerships, Ethiopia Country Programme, GGGI, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Binyam Yakob Gebreyes International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Edinburgh, UK Orville Grey Green Climate Fund, Songdo, Korea Ignacio Lorenzo Arana Ministry of Housing, Land Planning and Environment of Uruguay, Montevideo, Uruguay Clifford Mahlung Climate Change Division, Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation, Kingston, Jamaica Thinley Namgyel National Environment Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Thimphu, Bhutan

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Contributors

Linda Siegele University College London, London, UK Sumaya Zakieldeen Institute of Environmental Studies, Khartoum University, Khartoum, Sudan Carlos Nicolás Zambrano Sánchez Ministry of Environment Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador

Acronyms

ABU AC

ADP

AGN AILAC AMCEN

AOSIS APA AU

AWG-KP

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, negotiating group under the UNFCCC Adaptation Committee, established under the CAF, to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention Ad-hoc working group on the Durban Platform, established at COP 17 in Durban in 2011 to develop a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties African Group of Negotiators, negotiating group under the UNFCCC Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean, negotiating group under the UNFCCC African Ministerial Conference on Environment, a permanent forum where African ministers of the environment discuss mainly matters of relevance to the environment of the continent Alliance of Small Island States, negotiating group under the UNFCCC Ad-hoc working group on the Paris Agreement, established to prepare for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement African Union, consisting of 55 member states located on the continent of Africa, with exception of various territories of European possessions located in Africa Ad-hoc working group on further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, established in 2005 by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal to consider further commitments of industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol for the period beyond 2012

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AWG-LCA

CAF

CAHOSCC

CBDR-RC CDM

CGE

CMA CMP COP G77

GCF

GEF

GGA GST

Acronyms

Ad-hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the Convention, established in Bali in 2007 to conduct negotiations on a strengthened international deal on climate change Cancun Adaptation Framework, established by UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16 with the objective of enhancing action on adaptation, including through international cooperation and coherent consideration of matters relating to adaptation under the Convention Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change, established in 2009 with the primary objective of providing visible continent-wide political leadership in climate negotiations Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, guiding principle of the UNFCCC Clean development mechanism, a mechanism under the KP through which developed countries may finance greenhouse-gas emission reduction or removal projects in developing countries and receive credits for doing so Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from non-Annex I Parties, a panel established to improve the preparation of national communications from developing countries (renamed the Consultative Group of Experts at COP 24 in Katowice, Poland) Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, governing body of the Paris Agreement Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, governing body of the Kyoto Protocol Conference of the Parties, governing body of the UNFCCC Group of 77, along with China, a large negotiating alliance of developing countries that focuses on numerous international topics, including climate change Green Climate Fund, established by UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16 as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programs, policies, and other activities in developing country Parties Global Environment Facility, established on the eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to help tackle our planet’s most pressing environmental problems Global goal on adaptation, established by Paris Agreement Article 7, paragraph 1 Global stocktake, a process established by Article 14 of the Paris Agreement for a periodic assessment of collective progress toward achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals

Acronyms

INDC

IPCC

KP

LDCF

LDCs

LEG

LMDC

MERCOSUR

NAPAs

NAPs

NatCom

NDC

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Intended nationally determined contributions, pledges made by Parties to the UNFCCC, in advance of the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, on intended national actions to address climate change from 2020 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Program, to survey world-wide scientific and technical literature and publish assessment reports that are widely recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005, it commits developed country Parties to internationally binding emission reduction targets Least developed countries fund, established to support a work program to assist LDC Parties to carry out, inter alia, the preparation and implementation of NAPAs Least developed countries group, criteria currently used by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for designation as the world’s poorest countries include low income, human resource weakness, and economic vulnerability Least developed countries expert group, established in 2001, and currently mandated to provide technical guidance and support to the LDCs on the process to formulate and implement NAPs, the preparation and implementation of NAPAs and the implementation of the LDC work program Like-minded developing country group, a group of developing countries who organize themselves as a block of negotiators in international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization Southern Common Market, a South American trade bloc established in 1991, its full members being Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay National adaptation programs of action, documents prepared by LDCs identifying urgent and immediate needs for adapting to climate change National adaptation plans, a means of identifying medium- and long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and program to address those needs National communication, a document submitted in accordance with the Convention by which a Party informs other Parties of activities undertaken to address climate change Nationally determined contribution, Paris Agreement, Article 4, paragraph 2, requires each Party to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve

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NWP

PA

PAWP

RICE

SBI

SBs

SBSTA

SCCF

SCF

SIDS

TAR

TEP-A

Acronyms

Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change, a mechanism under the Convention to facilitate and catalyze the development, dissemination, and use of knowledge that would inform and support adaptation policies and practices Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015 and entered into force on 4 November 2016, it builds upon the UNFCCC and brings all Parties into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so Paris Agreement work program, the work program resulting from the relevant requests contained in UNFCCC decision 1/CP.21, which adopted the Paris Agreement Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy, a regionally disaggregated version of the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) Subsidiary body for implementation, a permanent body established by the UNFCCC to make recommendations on policy and implementation issues to the COP and, if requested, to other bodies Subsidiary bodies, the collective term for the two permanent subsidiary bodies established by the Convention, i.e. the SBI and the SBSTA Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice, a permanent body established by the UNFCCC to serve, inter alia, as a link between information and assessments provided by expert sources (such as the IPCC) and the COP, which focuses on setting policy Special climate change fund, established to finance projects relating to adaptation; technology transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste management; and economic diversification Standing committee on finance, established in 2010 to assist the COP in exercising its functions in relation to the Financial Mechanism of the Convention Small island developing States, group of small island and low-lying coastal countries that tend to share similar sustainable development challenges, including small but growing populations, limited resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, excessive dependence on international trade, and fragile environments Third Assessment Report, the third extensive review of global scientific research on climate change, published by the IPCC in 2001 Technical examination process on adaptation, established at COP 21 as part of enhanced action prior to 2020

Acronyms

UNFCCC

WIM

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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, entered into force on 21 March 1994, with near-universal membership of 197 countries Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, established by UNFCCC decision 2/CP.19 to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Introduction María del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele

The purpose of this book is to highlight the history of the negotiating position of the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China) on adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention). Some of the questions that arise and that this work seeks to answer are: What was the process for constructing a collective position of the G77 and China on adaptation? Why is it worthwhile to negotiate in a group of such dimensions? What are the incentives for reaching the broadest common position on adaptation? What is the role of the lead coordinators on adaptation for the G77 and China, and how is this linked to the revolving annual Presidency of the G77 and China? How do the subgroups of the G77 and China participate in reaching this general position? The exceptional nature of the G77 and China’s common position on adaptation can be described in many ways. We have identified the following main characteristics: A. Its relative autonomy from the leadership changes of the subgroups, as well as the Presidency and the coordination of the G77 and China itself, provides evidence that there are constructed ideas and concepts that are inherited and strengthened by developing country Parties over time. B. The position has not been weakened by the diversity among the subgroups in the G77 and China.

M. P. Bueno Rubial National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] L. Siegele (B) University College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_1

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M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele

C. The existence of a causal relationship between the position of the G77 and China on adaptation and outcomes in the UNFCCC negotiating process, to the extent that the issue was leveraged by developing country Parties to strengthen their overall position under the Convention and increase the self-confidence of the G77 and China to continue to make progress. D. The adaptation position is the only position of the G77 and China that constitutes the broadest set of common interests. Considering the difficulties in reaching a common position, when all developing country subgroups take ownership of an issue, the common position of the G77 and China becomes stronger than the original positions of the subgroups. This is an example of the whole being more than the sum of its parts. This book is structured as follows: this introduction; two main sections; and a conclusion. In the introduction, the editors familiarize the reader with the subject of adaptation to climate change, including the structural questions, ideas, and overarching concepts critical to the formation of a collective position. In the first substantive section of the book, the main developing country subgroups that comprise the G77 and China provide their own perspective of historical and current efforts toward developing a common position on climate change adaptation. These subgroups include • • • • • •

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU); African Group of Negotiators (AGN); Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC); Least Developed Countries (LDC); and Like Minded Developing Countries (LMDC).

In the second section of the book, a number of the lead coordinators on adaptation for the G77 and China from 2010 to 2018 provide the “inside story” of the adaptation negotiations during the periods they led the collective effort of developing a common position on adaptation. In one case, the editors have provided a collection of insights gathered during interviews with various past lead coordinators. The final section of the book reflects on the overarching issues drawn out in the individual chapters, as well as the methodologies employed by the different subgroups in the negotiating process. It also provides a look at the way forward for adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the potential role of the G77 and China in guiding progress. One of the primary assets of this book is that it is written by former and current adaptation negotiators from developing countries. Furthermore, and in contrast to previous analyses in the literature on climate change negotiations, which are focused mainly on the behavior or positioning of one group, this book provides a unique approach based on the strength of collectivism in the G77 and China.

Part II

Building a Developing Country Position on Adapting to Climate Change in the UNFCCC: The Sub-groups of the G77 and China

Chapter 2

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (A-B-U) Ignacio Lorenzo Arana

Abstract This chapter focuses on the adaptation related work of the most recently created negotiation group comprised of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (A-B-U) in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In particular, the chapter seeks to illustrate the group’s creation and the approach taken by the group in the area of adaptation negotiations under the UNFCCC, as well as to illustrate the author’s perspective on the relevance and urgency of adaptation action in the Latin–American region. In addition to the origins of the A-B-U group, the chapter highlights the main positions presented by the group from 2016 at the initiation of the negotiation of the Paris Agreement “official outcome” to 2018 when it was adopted at the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP 24) held in Katowice, Poland. The narrative also reflects how A-B-U has developed its positions constructively within the Group of 77 (G77) and China as a way of building and strengthening consensus on adaptation among developing countries, which are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Keywords Adaptation · Climate change · Negotiations · Argentina · Brazil–Uruguay

Introduction The UNFCCC negotiating group formed by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, known as A-B-U, is a recent collaboration of South American countries with substantial common backgrounds, interests and positions in several aspects of the multilateral agenda, including on key issues of the UNFCCC, and not less relevant their membership in MERCOSUR. The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and are not intended to represent any official position of the A-B-U group or of any of the organizations to which the author is currently related or has been related in the past. The author wishes to express a great deal of appreciation to Dr. Pilar Bueno for her support and substantive and detailed written input during the preparation of this chapter. I. Lorenzo Arana (B) Ministry of Housing, Land Planning and Environment of Uruguay, Montevideo, Uruguay © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_2

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I. Lorenzo Arana

It is interesting to reflect that the creation and work of A-B-U in the UNFCCC context started on adaptation issues and later the thematic scope was extended to cover all of the agenda items of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) and most of the relevant agenda items under the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP). This chapter focuses on the relevance of A-B-U in the UNFCCC negotiations from 2016 to 2018, understanding that the positions forged by the group on adaptation were conceived from a perspective of building consensus in the G77 and China, in order to deliver a stronger adaptation outcome for all developing countries. A-B-U’s approach relied on the idea that cooperation within the framework of the G77 and China allowed it to advocate more effectively for an issue of interest to all developing countries and whose evolution in the UNFCCC is inevitably tied to their stage of development.

Adaptation in the Context of Developing Countries, for the Latin–American Region, and in Relation to the Means of Implementation Adaptation is an urgent priority for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, since even if the temperature goal in the Paris Agreement of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” is achieved, adaptation action will be needed increasingly—as even a 1.5 ° or 2 °C degree world brings with it huge impacts on humanity’s well-being and the health of ecosystems across the globe. Developing countries will continue to be most impacted, and within these countries the poor and most vulnerable will suffer the greatest losses. From a regional perspective, the author has defended the idea of adaptation being a key strategic aspect of the sustainable development agenda for the Latin-American region. The Latin-American region is significantly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in terms of its population, with the starkest socio-economic inequality worldwide, and more than four-fifths of its urban populations being located in climate risky contexts, such as flood or mud-slide prone areas, being exposed to climaterelated vector-borne diseases or dependent on glaciers for drinking water, among other climate exposures. Beyond the main issue of its vulnerable population, the main economic drivers and economic sectors of the region are highly vulnerable to climate change as well, including food production, tourism, renewable energy (of which the region has the highest share in the world) or ecosystem-related value chains. After years of climate negotiations where most UNFCCC decisions and key UNFCCC processes focused mainly on mitigation, adaptation slowly became more

2 Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (A-B-U)

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visible and gained a higher profile—most notably with the adoption of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, an all-encompassing process initiated to bring balance between mitigation and adaptation, including clear references to parity of support in terms of the means of implementation: finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. The provision of means of implementation for adaptation action in developing countries was the overall balancer in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement and will be key to the actual implementation of adaptation action in the context of the broad scope of nationally determined contributions (NDCs). In this regard, the adaptation finance gap, which the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) included in the fourth edition of its Report on the Adaptation Gap in 2018 states that annual adaptation costs will vary from USD140 to 300 billion in 2030 and from USD280 to 500 billion in 2050 (UNEP 2018). These costs must be recognized in the context of the level of adaptation action required in developing countries, as a contribution to global climate action. It is also clear that current financing (and other means of implementation) for adaptation is insufficient and that developed countries will have to accelerate the provision of new and additional means of implementation, as agreed in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention has been essential to facilitating climate action in developing countries; however, the Mechanism still only covers the minimum of the resources required to cover adaptation needs in developing countries, and furthermore, there remains a significant disparity between the finance provided for adaptation and for mitigation. This disproportionate allocation between the two occurs, even within the Green Climate Fund, which aims to deliver finance for mitigation and adaptation in a 50:50 ratio, but where currently the ratio is 63% for mitigation and 37% for adaptation of approved projects, in nominal terms (GCF IEU 2019).

The Origins of the A-B-U Group in Relation to the Climate Change Adaptation Negotiations A-B-U’s contribution to the international climate change negotiations has been very recent in the history of the UNFCCC, but at the same time its participation has been intense and focused in the context of negotiations from Paris (2015) to Katowice (2018), where adaptation became a fundamental issue for maintaining overall balance in the negotiations aimed at developing the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement. The initial interactions between the three countries on the possibility of delivering, as a group, on adaptation issues under APA agenda item 4, took place informally at the end of the 43rd session of the Subsidary Bodies (SBs) of the UNFCCC in Bonn, in May 2016. That session was particularly complex since it took almost a week to conclude the debate on the adoption of the APA agenda, due mainly to the issue of the scope of negotiations on the guidance to NDCs, where the balance between

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mitigation and adaptation in the upcoming negotiations was at stake. The process of adopting the APA agenda resulted in a common dialogue and informal collaboration among the three countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Although the three countries saw adaptation as having a key role in the APA agenda, initially not all Parties shared that view; in particular some developed country Parties. The informal conversations among the three countries led to the identification of adaptation as a strategic agenda item, in particular around the development of further guidance for the adaptation communication provided for in Articles 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement. This additional agenda item provided a solution for achieving consensus and approval of the APA agenda as a balanced package. The inclusion of an adaptation agenda item in the work of the APA was a highlevel political decision since there was no mandate in decision 1/CP.21 for doing so. However, it was clear that there were open issues that required guidance before being able to fully implement Article 7 and that further guidance on the adaptation communication could provide the needed balance by complementing the matter of providing further guidance for the mitigation component of the NDC (APA agenda item 3). It is important also to recognize that in addition to there being no mandate for adaptation issues to be discussed under the APA, the wording of the agenda item itself prioritized the NDC “vehicle” for the Adaptation Communication, foregoing the mention of other vehicles explicit in the language of Article 7.11: “as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, …, and/or a national communication.” This fact created delicate boundaries in the adaptation negotiations, especially in relation to the issue of overall and/or “vehicle-specific” guidance, which in time, proved very complex during the negotiations, including when building and maintaining consensus within the G77 and China. It could be said that the origins of A-B-U were directly connected to the conversations and efforts of the three countries to provide technical inputs to the adaptation negotiations on the road to agreeing the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement. As a result, and after consultations at different political levels, the three countries agreed to take the opportunity to submit views on adaptation, in particular on APA agenda item 4 “further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement” in September 2016.1 The submission established a framework of principles and an explanation of the importance of adaptation in light of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. In the principles section, it included: common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; equity; political parity between mitigation and adaptation; vulnerability of developing countries to the adverse effects of climate change; the need for 1 The

first A-B-U submission on APA agenda item 4, date on September 28, 2016, is available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/209_280_131197072143429946APA%20agenda%20item%204%20Arg%20Br%20Uru.pdf. as well as https://www4.unfccc. int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/209_280_131197085010401383-Further%20views% 20APA%20agenda%20item%204%20Arg%20Br%20Uru.pdf.

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means of implementation to strengthen climate action; the role of science; and the country-driven nature of adaptation. It is relevant that later when the G77 and China defined the skeleton for further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, they agreed on a section on principles where the majority of the principles that were included in the A-B-U submission appeared also in the elements of the Group’s consensus around a skeleton text. Furthermore, the first submission affirmed that “the value added of an adaptation communication is to inform clearly, concisely and effectively Parties’ adaptation strategies, including priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, as outlined in Article 7, paragraph 10 of the Paris Agreement, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties.” These concepts were based around the language previously agreed by the G77 and China in the Paris Agreement negotiations, and that finally appeared in the Paris Agreement itself, as well as again in decision 9/CMA.1. Other features of the adaptation communication proposed by A-B-U in their first submission were taken up by the G77 and China and became part of its common position over the three years of negotiation. These included the idea that in their adaptation communication Parties could state their long-term vision or goals for national adaptation and articulate how they could contribute to the Global Goal on Adaptation; and secondly, that the adaptation communication could also serve as a source of information for the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing countries. In the first case, the G77 and China agreed quickly on the importance of linking the adaptation communication with the Global Goal on Adaptation. However, developed countries were particularly reticent to agree to this. In the second case, there was indeed much discussion within the G77 and China with respect to the inclusion of the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing countries in the adaptation communication. Some of the G77 and China subgroups maintained that the adaptation communication should be seen exclusively as an ex ante exercise where only forward-looking information should be included. For that reason, those subgroups preferred to avoid the inclusion of adaptation efforts as an element, which mainly implied ex post (backward-looking) information. At the same time, other subgroups were more flexible in terms of the timeline of information to be included in the adaptation communication. For A-B-U both in terms of content and choice of “vehicle,” there was a clear argument for flexibility, based on the fundamental notion that adaptation is a continuum, and that to be able to communicate information on future adaptation action it is useful to provide the past and current context around these actions, in order to describe the basis for future adaptation actions. The inclusion of the recognition of the adaptation efforts of developing countries as an optional element of the adaptation communication is one of the best examples of how solidarity within the G77 and China can resolve situations where positions among the subgroups are substantially different. This resolution, which involved

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much consultation within the group, and even ambiguous treatment in the overall position of the Group as discussions were ongoing, proved useful in helping to maintain the common position of the G77 and China negotiating bloc—a critical strategy for steering the direction of the negotiations. One of the outcomes of the conversations inside the G77 and China during COP 22 (Marrakech 2016) was developing a common list of elements for the adaptation communication that would better inform the collective assessment process of the global stocktake (GST) established under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. An additional optional list could solve the problem in the G77 and China of needing to accommodate the different positions on preferred elements among the subgroups. Incorporating this optional list of elements provided the group with space to accommodate these differing views, e.g., on adaptation efforts of developing countries and on the cobenefits of adaptation actions, while safeguarding a common position and allowing developing countries to continue to speak with a stronger unified voice when negotiating with developed countries. In practice this approach allowed smaller groups to promote specific issues of interest, with the backing of all developing countries, thus achieving higher impact during negotiations. The strategic solidarity among the subgroups of the G77 and China is essential to understanding how and why A-B-U, from the very beginning, developed its positions, developing ideas that could work as bridging proposals inside the Group, in order to build trust among subgroups and facilitate the ability of the Group to remain strong and united. Another key issue in A-B-U’s first submission was the flexibility of the “vehicle” in which the adaptation communication could be included, as provided in Article 7.11 of the Paris Agreement. This is another issue on which the G77 and China agreed in Paris and carried forward as a critical position to Katowice. In its first submission, A-B-U presented the idea of a set of elements in a nonprescriptive and non-exhaustive list. (The elements in bold were also recognized as priorities by the G77 and China.): • Ways in which the country is contributing to the Global Goal on Adaptation stated in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement (for developed and developing country Parties in terms of adaptation planning and implementation; for developed country Parties also in terms of support provided for adaptation action in developing country Parties); • National circumstances; • Legal framework and institutional arrangements at national and subnational level as appropriate; • Policies, strategies, programs and plans as a basis for adaptation actions at the national and subnational level as appropriate; • Adaptation measures and/or actions planned or under implementation; • Adaptation needs and costs (in relation to action and with assistance under country request); • Impact vulnerability and risks assessments; • Financial costs of actions already delivered or in implementation;

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• Means of implementation required to further develop adaptation at national, and subnational level as appropriate; • Losses and/or damages due to climate related impacts; • Monitoring and evaluation of adaptation; • Cooperative dimension at the national, regional and international level: arrangements/organizations/networks where countries share information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned; • Relation between adaptation and global mitigation actions in the context of temperature goal. In addition, A-B-U’s first submission included an annex which included the national adaptation policies and plans of each of the three countries, as well as the current and projected impacts related to climate change in southeastern South America, giving context to the position and priorities submitted. A second coordinating step for the new group came again in the territory of adaptation. A-B-U responded to a call for submissions related to the “Paris Mandates” to the Adaptation Committee (AC) in paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of decision 1/CP.21.2 These submissions were meant as a technical input to the AC looking to provide information and guidance on adaptation efforts, needs, types of efforts for recognition, types of needs, as well as ideas for the mobilization of support and the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support. When the AC, together with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG), issued their recommendations in 2017, A-B-U took a position that contributed to the common position of the G77 and China on these recommendations. A-B-U’s submission, as well as those from other subgroups of the G77 and China, was essential to the development of the alternative proposal of the Group that took shape in May 2018. In the view of the author, several of the main reasons a very young group such as A-B-U decided to prepare a submission on these mandates were, firstly, to support the strategic role of the AC in increasing the profile of adaptation in the UNFCCC; and secondly, because the group understood quickly that the mandates included in paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 were as important and strategic as APA agenda item 4 on the adaptation communication. In other words, the adaptation-related institutions; the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing countries; the methodologies for assessing adaptation needs; the methodologies to facilitate the mobilization of support and the methodologies for assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support were vital for the implementation of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. In March 2017, the first A-B-U coordination meeting was held in Montevideo. This meeting became an essential step toward strengthening the alliance at a general level, while consolidating the positions on adaptation issues and beginning the delineation of positions on the other APA agenda items, with the objective of preparing for the 2 A-B-U

submission to the Adaptation Committee on technical information concerning Decision 1/CP.21 paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 is available in: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/ Documents/693_287_131305064783595486-Submission%20ABU%20-%20AC%20Mandates. pdf.

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next session of the SBs that took place in May 2017. In the coming months, A-B-U was able to advance with common positions on all the issues of the APA agenda and was able to respond to calls for submissions under the APA more widely.

A-B-U Within the G77 and China in the Adaptation Negotiations from 2017 to 2018: Building Positions by Understanding Internal Opportunities for Consensus A-B-U’s first submission in 2017 in relation to adaptation communication was based on a call made by the APA Co-Chairs addressing a question on how to get the evolving system around the adaptation communication working coherently, with good alignment and taking full account of the range of vehicles available—including as a component of NCDs.3 The main themes included in this second submission by A-B-U on the adaptation communication, after the discussions held during COP 22 in Marrakech were 1. Purpose; 2. Elements; 3. Linkages to other elements of the Paris Agreement and arrangements under the Convention; 4. Vehicle and timing; 5. Flexibility. It is important to recognize that the position submitted by A-B-U was based on the work done by the G77 and China during COP 22, and A-B-U’s previous initial submission from September 2016. In terms of the purpose of Adaptation Communications, A-B-U highlighted the following ideas: • Enhancing the profile and visibility of adaptation in the context of the global response to climate change. • Informing clearly, concisely and effectively Parties’ adaptation strategies, including priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, as stated in Article 7, paragraph 10. • Acknowledging that adaptation is a continuous process, including past, present and future adaptation in the form of efforts and needs. • Providing a source of information (i) for the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing country Parties; (ii) on aggregate efforts by Parties contributing to the global goal on adaptation (Article 7, paragraph 1), to be considered within the global stocktake process; (iii) on Parties adaptation actions and climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as indicated in Article 13, paragraphs 5 and 8, respectively. • Catalyzing adaptation action and support through the identification of concrete opportunities to provide means of implementation from developed country Parties to developing country Parties. 3 Second submission of A-B-U on APA 4 is available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ SubmissionsStaging/Documents/597_322_131383847218347778-AR-BR-UY%20adaptation% 20communication.pdf.

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The majority of the issues included in the submission were already supported by the G77 and China at COP 22 (these are highlighted in bold above). The issue of the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing countries was still not a common position at that time, as explained in the previous section. In light of decision 9/CMA.1, it is also important to emphasize that, against the interests of some developed countries, which called for the deletion of the purpose and principles sections of the decision, the insistence of the G77 and China was critical to retaining the purpose of the adaptation communication in paragraph 1 of the decision, including to increase the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation; strengthen adaptation action and support for developing countries; provide input to the global stocktake and enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions. In particular, the first three elements in the purpose were put forward consistently by the G77 and China from 2016 to 2018. With respect to the elements of the Adaptation Communication, A-B-U held a firm position that those elements identified in its previous submission be included with some refinements in language. In its new submission, A-B-U took a position that was supported by the G77 and China and which appeared later in the Katowice decision: that the adaptation communication is not a basis for comparison between Parties and is not subject to review. The linkages to the adaptation communication identified by A-B-U in relation to the means of implementation, as well as the GST and the transparency framework for action and support were agreed to by the G77 and China. However, the positions inside the G77 and China on the relationship between APA agenda items 4 and 5 (transparency framework of action and support) differed. In this regard, there was an important difference among the Group’s members on the treatment of APA 4 and 5 in relation to the adaptation communication, mainly on the nature of the timeline for its content, i.e., ex ante versus ex post, as previously discussed. Even when the common position of the G77 and China on adaptation wavered in particular moments during 2018, there was an overall common message that the subgroups maintained in the APA 4 discussions, based on three years of work and coordination. This situation was not applicable to discussions under APA 5, where there was indeed overall G77 and China coordination, but in practice, the subgroups negotiated the substance of the decision in isolation. A-B-U considered itself part of the consensus in APA 4, and developed its own positions in APA 5, in dialogue with the ideas built under APA 4. In its 2017 submission, A-B-U held a firm position on preserving the flexibility provided in Article 7.11 of the Paris Agreement, and in this context signaled additional ideas, one of them was supported by the G77 and China, and later became an integral part of the CMA decision in paragraph 10: Parties are encouraged to clearly identify the part of the communication or document chosen, in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 11, that constitutes their adaptation communication, and to number their adaptation communication s sequentially. This was seen by A-B-U as a way of allowing the adaptation communication to be part of any other document and strengthening the operationalization of the flexibility of vehicle choice,

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while at the same time providing for visibility and higher profile of the adaptation communication. In May 2017, the G77 and China agreed and submitted a conference room paper on the purpose and elements of the adaptation communication based on past orally stated positions. This allowed the Group to take the lead role in discussions on the adaptation communication. Additionally, the G77 and China submitted a structure or “skeleton” for the outcome of the APA 4 discussions based on internal coordination on inputs from the subgroups. The skeleton included Preamble/Introductory remarks; Guiding Principles/Guidance; Purpose; Elements; Common elements; Additional/Opt in Opt out/Optional; Vehicles; Linkages; Support for developing country Parties (including in the preparation, submission; and implementation of adaptation communications) and Other matters.4 A-B-U was very active in the drafting of this consensus text, which would later prove to be strategic for the G77 and China, both because it helped consolidate a detailed common position and allowed the G77 and China to take the lead in negotiations on the adaptation communication. More importantly, the draft provided a robust structure that could be useful for Parties when implementing Articles 7.10 and 11. A-B-U used the agreed skeleton submitted by the G77 and China for its third submission in September 2017.5 The subgroup worked to populate the headings working with the ideas on which consensus had been reached by the G77 and China, as well as, previous submissions by A-B-U on the topic. An important issue to stress is that the use of a common and opt in/opt out set of elements split the operationalization of the list of elements in two. Regarding the common elements A-B-U proposed national circumstances, including legal framework and institutional arrangements; Impacts, vulnerabilities and risk assessments (including future scenarios); National adaptation priorities, policies, plans, actions, strategies and/or programs, as appropriate; Adaptation support needs of developing country Parties, understood as means of implementation; Biennial communication of indicative support by developed country Parties; and Adaptation efforts of developing country Parties for recognition. For additional opt in/opt out elements, A-BU proposed: Monitoring and evaluation and the Cooperative dimension including arrangements and organizations where countries share information, good practices, experiences and lessons learnt. The coordinated work of the G77 and China during 2017 allowed the subgroups and specifically A-B-U to safeguard their most significant interests, leaving the more complex issues inside the Group, instead of taking them openly to facilitated sessions with the developed country partners. As indicated, there were issues of interest to A-B-U, such as the recognition of adaptation efforts, that were not those of other 4 G77

and China submission is available at http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/apa/application/pdf/ proposals.pdf. 5 The third submission of A-B-U on APA4 was in September 2017 and it is available at: https:// www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/597_357_131503380699589314-Item% 204%20Argentina-Brazil-Uruguay.pdf.

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subgroups. However, the G77 and China strived to resolve differences internally looking for approaches that safeguarded the positions of others. Another discussion that arose in the G77 and China toward the end of COP 23 (Bonn, 2017) centered around the level of detail of the elements. This was connected to the interest of some subgroups for having more detailed guidance on the adaptation communication and a comparison with the number of pages in the negotiating text being considered under APA agenda item 3 on mitigation. In any case, during 2017, the G77 and China managed the differences among the subgroups, partly on the basis of the argument that a less detailed outcome could be more advantageous to developing countries as it would be less prescriptive. In this regard, A-B-U in the final stages of the negotiation clearly defended the concept of a short, more concise, less detailed, and therefore less prescriptive list of elements. During 2018, three negotiation sessions were held: the traditional session of the SBs at mid-year, an additional session in Bangkok in September and COP 24 in Katowice where the work on adaptation under the PAWP was finalized. The adaptation negotiations took place on several fronts: the APA agenda item 4 discussions on the adaptation communication and the discussions on paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of decision 1/CP.21. Also, adaptation was discussed in other agenda items such as those on finance and the global stocktake. In addition, negotiations continued regarding the public registry for logging the adaptation communication, on APA 5 on transparency, where adaptation had a specific but more marginal chapter, similar to APA 6 on the global stocktake. A-B-U continued to actively participate and support the G77 and China in APA 4 discussions and on paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of decision 1/CP.21 from a consensus building approach. Regarding the AC mandates, the result achieved was largely in line with the initial proposals of the G77 and China, and that was possible due to the endurance of the solidarity among subgroups, strengthening the G77 and China’s detailed position. One particular paragraph achieved in the final decision text which was an initial concept developed by A-B-U is the request to the secretariat “to include in the synthesis report prepared for the global stocktake … an assessment of the support needs for adaptation of developing country Parties…”. The proposal from A-B-U was embraced by the G77 and China, and this increased the possibility of this favorable language to be included as an outcome in the Katowice climate package. On the road to Katowice, there were several moments where the G77 and China position was difficult to sustain Several times A-B-U opted to support consensus language including where this language was not the first preference of A-B-U but was key to building consensus among subgroups. The strategy employed by A-B-U was aimed at ensuring the least number of fissures as possible among the subgroup positions and to allow time for consensus to be built again at the next session. In this regard, the results of the APA 4 negotiations were successful and represent the common position of the G77 and China built over three years, mainly deriving from the agreed skeleton and relevant operationalization paragraphs.

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Conclusions Adaptation is a key aspect of the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the context of the temperature goal, especially for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, such as countries in Latin America. In this regard, the provision of new and additional means of implementation from developed countries is required to support developing countries in implementing adaptation action. Adaptation also provides for political balance in the UNFCCC negotiations and became the aspect that achieved agreement to the APA agenda in 2016 and a balanced Katowice rulebook in 2018. Many developing country groups involved in the adaptation negotiations, such as A-B-U, worked constructively to build a common position in the G77 and China to strengthen their negotiating capacity, by bringing up specific issues, including specific language to be added or deleted, which while being supported by only one subgroup, by virtue of the solidarity of the Group became an integral part of a unified and stronger position, allowing for “marginal” issues to increase their probability of being agreed to in decision text.

References GCF IEU (2019) Forward looking performance review of the GCF, independent evaluation unit of the green climate fund, figure VIII-11, p 116. https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/ 20182/1674504/GCF_B.23_20_-_Forward-Looking_Performance_Review_of_the_GCF.pdf/ 525f359f-cd33-81f2-0bf0-ff8e41353ede UNEP (2018) The adaptation gap report 2018. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500. 11822/27114/AGR_2018.pdf?sequence=3

Ignacio Lorenzo Arana Director of Climate Change in the Ministry of Housing, Land Planning and Environment of Uruguay, President of the Coordination Board of the National Climate Change Response System of Uruguay, A-B-U Coordinator for Adaptation negotiations at the UNFCCC, Uruguay’s Focal Point to the UNFCCC and Alternate Member of the Board of the Green Climate Fund representing GRULAC, since October 2016. Ignacio has also acted as Head of Delegation of Uruguay in the UNFCCC negotiations in several sessions and as Adaptation and Loss and Damage Thematic Coordinator for the G77 and China, between December 2015 and November 2016. Ignacio holds a full professional degree in Architecture from Universidad de la República and is currently in a Masters’ degree program on Public Policy at Universidad Católica del Uruguay. He is also Assistant Professor in Urban Economics at Universidad de la República. Ignacio has acted as an expert advisor and consultant on climate change adaptation for public and international organizations such as AECID, CAF, IADB, and UNDP.

Chapter 3

African Group of Negotiators (AGN) Patience Thelma Melfah Damptey and Sumaya Zakieldeen

Abstract Africa is among the most vulnerable regions in the world to the impacts of climate change. Not only is Africa expected to be more vulnerable to climate change than any other region in the world, but this vulnerability increases with higher temperature increases. Africa is anticipated to be the most negatively affected continent due to a combination of particularly severe projected impacts and relatively low adaptive capacity. Adaptation is therefore a high priority for Africa, especially in light of the existing deficit in adaptation to current climate variability. Addressing climate change risks and impacts will contribute to achieving long-term sustainable development; and, therefore, it is important to address adaptation planning in the broader context of sustainable development to ensure poverty reduction and food security, and to improve livelihoods. The African Group of Negotiators believe that the strength of developing countries is in the unity of the G77 and China which builds consensus and understanding and thus enhances the importance of the group in fighting for the interests of the African continent and other developing countries. In that regard, the African Group has always been proactive in the negotiations, through reaching out to the G77 and China and its other subgroups and sharing its narratives and positions. Keywords African group · Adaptation · AMCEN · CAHOSCC · Climate change · Global goal on adaptation

Introduction Africa, which is a continent of 54 countries, is responsible for just 2.3% of global CO2 emissions (Africa Progress Panel 2015). According to Africa’s Adaptation Gap P. T. M. Damptey (B) African Group of Negotiators, Accra, Ghana e-mail: [email protected] S. Zakieldeen Institute of Environmental Studies, Khartoum University, Khartoum, Sudan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_3

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Report (UNEP 2014), past emissions have already committed the African continent to adaptation costs in the range of 7–15 billion USD per year until 2020. The Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) shows that Africa’s relative vulnerability increases for higher temperature increases. A 4 °C world can be avoided through ambitious mitigation action but the window of opportunity for keeping warming below 2 °C is quickly narrowing (Collins et al. 2014). Even if warming is kept below 2 °C, adaptation needs in developing countries will be significant. Adaptation costs in Africa alone could rise to 50 billion USD per year by 2050 (Ibid.). The situation is aggravated by the interaction of “multiple stresses” occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity (IPCC AR4). Given this situation, adaptation has long been a top priority for Africa in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention) negotiating process (ClimDev-Africa 2015). As the region that bears the greatest share of the global climate risk burden, there is a strong incentive for Africa to seek a more decisive global response to climate change. Africa’s commitment to the UNFCCC process has been rooted in its shared concern for safeguarding humanity and the planet that all people cherish. Within the global climate change negotiations, Africa’s concerns have been to safeguard the earth for present and future generations and to advance Africa’s interests in the context of globally shared values such as equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. African states have consistently echoed the guiding principles of the Convention and set out the specific goals of how to achieve the response to the impacts of climate change especially in the context of adaptation. In spite of the fact that Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions are relatively low, a lot of effort is being undertaken by African countries on mitigation. However, Africa’s main priority is reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development in the context of focusing on adaptation as a forward-looking strategy. As adaptation is the key concern and challenge, with which developing countries are struggling, the African Group has always worked for a G77 and China unified position on adaptation, as that increases the opportunity of arriving at good decisions. In addition to that, a unified G77 and China position on adaptation stands as an indicator for identifying the challenges, priorities, and needs of developing countries. Accordingly, this sends strong messages to the world about the importance of adaptation to developing countries. In general, the AGN believes that the strength of developing countries is in the unity of the G77 and China. The consensus building within the latter is very challenging and requires continuous coordination and lengthy discussion to fully understand the different subgroup’s positions. The African group understands the importance of the G77 and China in fighting for the interests of the African continent. In that regard, the African Group has always been proactive in the negotiations, through reaching out to the G77 and China and its other subgroups and sharing its narratives and positions. The African Group has always been open to working in an inclusive manner and works toward streamlining positions, for the benefit of the G77 and China. The African Group has always comprehended the importance and the challenge of defending diverse interests of different countries that constitute its Group (e.g., least

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developed countries, Arab and small island countries). Accordingly, for defending the interests of the African continent, the Group maintains its strength by covering the interests of all its member states. In its positions and submissions, the AGN has always accommodated and defended the interests of its subgroups, e.g., working on NAPS, the Group defended the interests of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) while taking care of the interests of other subgroups and Parties. Thereafter, the AGN worked with the G77 and China and its subgroups for a unified position that could be supported by all of the member countries of the G77 and China. Because of the diversity of the African Group, its agreement on issues, represents an important step toward consensus building for the G77 and China.

The Role of AMCEN and CAHOSCC African leaders have consistently stressed the urgency of prioritizing adaptation in the UNFCCC. However, despite the proliferation of initiatives in this area, there is still a wide adaptation gap in Africa, with needs far surpassing available resources. Therefore, scaling-up support for and efforts toward adaptation remains a critical strategy in the response to the impacts of climate change. The contribution and involvement of the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN) have been a great source of encouragement to the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). AMCEN has been in existence since 1985, with the main objective of AMCEN being to strengthen cooperation among African governments in economic, technical, and scientific activities, with the prime objective of halting and reversing the degradation of the African environment in order to satisfy the food and energy needs of the peoples of the continent. Then in 2009, heads of state of African countries decided that Africa needed to show further leadership in the global climate change negotiations and therefore established the committee of heads of state on climate change (CAHOSCC). CAHOSCC coordinates the work of AMCEN and the AGN on behalf of the African Heads of State and Government Assembly of the African Union (AU). Climate change and climate variability are now placed firmly on the agenda of AU Summits. This ensures that Africa will, inter alia, continue to speak with one voice at all levels—Heads of State and Government; Ministers and Technical Groups. The AU Summit also decided that the host country of the Presidency of AMCEN should serve as the Coordinator of CAHOSCC to further enhance the coordination of the African Group at global climate change meetings. It has also placed Africa in a much stronger position to negotiate more effectively at the meetings. The first and second African Common Positions on Climate Change prepared in Nairobi, Kenya in 2005 and 2006, respectively, by the AGN, under the auspices of AMCEN, enabled the AGN to advance Africa’s interests more effectively. Subsequently, the third African Common Position on Climate Change and the related key messages were prepared by AGN under the auspices of CAHOSCC and AMCEN, and this empowered the AGN to negotiate coherently at COP 15, particularly on

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adaptation since there was no G77 and China position at that time (ClimDev-Africa 2015). The African Group prepares and drafts text and common positions, guided by decisions and key messages from CAHOSCC and AMCEN, and prepares text for adoption by Ministers during the COPs. The key ministerial message from AMCEN has always been to emphasize the urgent need to tackle the current and future adaptation challenges facing Africa and other developing countries. AMCEN has always highlighted the importance of considering, as a priority, support for adaptation in developing countries to ensure the implementation of the adaptation actions needed to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change by provision of means of implementation required for adaptation. The involvement of CAHOSCC and AMCEN helps to map out the decisions that emerge from the UNFCCC negotiations and other environmental agreements with a view to supporting regional and national response efforts.

The Link Between AGN and the G77 and China Even before the establishment of the CAHOSCC the AGN worked tirelessly with the G77 and China to defend the whole Group as well as covering the interests of its subgroups, such as the LDCs, particularly in the fight for the National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA) and the LDC Fund (LDCF). Climate change negotiations gained their currently high political momentum beginning with COP 11/CMP 1 in Montreal, Canada (2005), when negotiations commenced on the long-term issues of defining further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and enhancing the implementation of the Convention, both processes evolved into the Bali Road Map, agreed at COP 13/CMP 3 (Bali, 2007). The Bali Road Map followed two negotiations tracks under two separate subsidiary bodies: the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which were planned to conclude by COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009), but due to various challenges the desired results were not achieved at that meeting. In Cancun, Mexico (COP 16, 2010) an agreement was reached in the AWGLCA on key issues, including adaptation, finance, technology transfer, transparency, and the establishment of related institutions, which included the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF). The CAF seeks to ensure coherence, synergies, and effective implementation of all adaptation actions. With the establishment of the CAF came the establishment of a national adaptation planning process (NAPs), the Adaptation Committee and the work program on Loss and Damage. During the two years of negotiations under the AWG-LCA, there was no consensus on adaptation within the G77 and China, so the subregional groups and other countries negotiated separately on adaptation. The AGN negotiated during that time based on the third African Common position also known as the Algiers platform. The African Common position has been regularly reviewed based on the needs of

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African countries and how to achieve sustainable climate-resilient economic growth, equitable participation in global climate governance processes and agreements that fairly distribute costs and benefits. Between Bali (2007) and Cancun (2010), the African Group worked with the G77 and China to raise the profile of adaptation within the UNFCCC, until good decisions were adopted on institutions, such as the CAF, the Adaptation Committee and the National Adaptation Plan Process (NAPs).

The AGN and Adaptation in Negotiations on the Paris Agreement During the preparation for the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the AGN worked with the G77 and China to reach a comprehensive scope of the Paris Agreement, which included mitigation, as well as specific provisions on adaptation and support (particularly finance) and pursued the goal of limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, since increases beyond this level are unfathomable for economies and communities in Africa, and many other developing countries, that depend on natural resources. In the run-up to Paris, the AGN fought for the integration of key proposals into the Paris Agreement, including the adaptation component of intended nationally determined contributions (iNDCs) and the global goal for adaptation. The AGN introduced the narrative for the global goal on adaptation (GGA) and worked closely with the G77 and China and its subgroups, until the GGA became a G77 and China position. In the months leading up to the Paris COP, the AGN developed a paper articulating its conceptualization for the GGA so that other countries could better understand the proposal. The Paris Agreement established the GGA and its associated provisions as reflected in Article 7 of the Agreement. The structure of the Agreement provides an excellent opportunity for putting the notion of the GGA into action, as it provides for the assessment of collective progress by individual country contributions to agreed goals, with the latter explicitly linked to the temperature goal. The African Group believed in the importance of, and strongly supported, pre2020 action on adaptation. As adaptation is a crucial issue for Africa, the AGN championed the establishment of the Technical Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A) together with other Groups and Parties. The AGN developed the concept for the TEP-A and worked with subgroups under the G77 and China to ensure that subgroups saw their interests captured in the proposal also. The TEP-A then became a G77 and China position. This unity was critical to achieving not just the TEP-A but also the GGA and other adaptation provisions contained in the Paris Agreement. The original intention of the AGN was for the TEP-A to address the gaps and needs of developing countries under the Convention to enhance action on adaptation including support to developing countries for the implementation of adaptation measures. The result of negotiations on the TEP-A is a living process

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that not only addresses the needs, gaps, and challenges of developing countries and enhances adaptation action on the ground, but also aims to strengthen voluntary efforts and initiatives. At the continental level, the African Group has engaged in addressing climate change beyond the negotiations by developing initiatives that facilitate concrete actions on the ground in Africa. These initiatives are the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) and the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI).

The AGN and Negotiations on the Paris Agreement Work Program After Paris and in the run-up to COP 24 (Katowice, 2018) the AGN continued its active engagement on the rulebook for implementation of the Paris Agreement, that defines how climate action is implemented, and accounted for, over the coming decades i.e., agreement on the procedures, modalities, and guidelines for implementing the Paris Agreement. The latter was very challenging as it involved active work not only on adaptation, but also on interlinkages with related themes under the Paris Agreement (e.g., finance, transparency, global stocktake). The AGN actively contributed with submissions on specific issues as well as “cross fertilized” submissions with other G77 and China subgroups on adaptation and other related themes. The AGN also engaged tirelessly with the G77 and China and its subgroups until agreement on the rulebook was reached at COP 24.

Conclusions The policy focus in Africa is on adaptation, because that is the most important way of reducing the impacts of climate change. Africa has significant challenges in its capacity to cope with climate change impacts and therefore there is the need to collaborate with other developing countries to ensure the development of comprehensive processes to facilitate the implementation of adaptation measures in the different countries. The AGN being an integral part of the G77 and China will continue to collaborate and coordinate within the group to advance the work on adaptation in the climate change negotiations.

References African Development Bank (2011) The cost of adaptation to climate change in Africa Africa Progress Panel Report (2015) ClimDev-Africa (2015) Africa’s journey in the global climate negotiations Collins et al (2014) Long-term climate change: projections, commitments and irreversibility

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IPCC (2007) Fourth assessment report UNEP (2014) Africa’s adaptation gap https://africangroupofnegotiators.org

Mrs. Patience Thelma Melfah Damptey is an environmental and gender consultant in Ghana and a lead coordinator on adaptation issues for the African Group of Negotiators in the climate change negotiations. She undertakes research and consulting work in environmental management, environmental impact assessment and gender issues. She was a member of the team that prepared Ghana’s initial national communication on climate change, and also undertook the vulnerability assessment of climate change on women’s livelihoods for the preparation of the second national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. She was also a member of the team that prepared the adaptation component of Ghana’s nationally determined contribution ([email protected]). Dr. Sumaya Zakieldeen is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Environmental Studies, Khartoum University, Sudan and Lead coordinator for the African Group of Negotiators on loss and damage and adaptation. She is IPCC Lead Author (participated in AR5 and currently involved in AR6). She closely collaborates with the climate change programme in Sudan (at the Higher council for Environment and Natural Resources) and contributed significantly to national programs/projects including NAPA, NAPs, INDC and national communications ([email protected]).

Chapter 4

Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) Pasha Carruthers, Orville Grey, Clifford Mahlung and Linda Siegele

Abstract From the outset of negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention), AOSIS urged the global community to focus on the plight of those countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of a changing climate system. While the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC focuses on the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations” at a level which prevents dangerous human “interference with the climate system,” this objective is explicitly bounded by a timeframe that is based on adaptation parameters, i.e., the natural adaptation of ecosystems; maintaining global food production; and the continuation of sustainable economic development. The Bali Action Plan, negotiated in 2007 at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, marked a breakthrough on adaptation for AOSIS, with the clear separation it makes between the impact of the implementation of response measures and enhanced action on adaptation, a framing that has persisted under the UNFCCC to the present day. Despite the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations at COP 15 (2009), the Bali approach to adaptation led in 2010 to the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Adaptation Committee, the process for developing medium- to long-term national adaptation plans and the work program on loss and damage—each of which were outcomes strongly supported by AOSIS and depended on its close cooperation with the G77 and China. With the Paris Agreement, the issue of adaptation has been set legally “in stone” at the international level. And though the special needs and interests of individual members of the G77 and China add a seemingly insurmountable level of complexity to the equation of addressing P. Carruthers Raratonga, Cook Islands e-mail: [email protected] O. Grey Green Climate Fund, Songdo, Korea e-mail: [email protected] C. Mahlung Climate Change Division, Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation, Kingston, Jamaica e-mail: [email protected] L. Siegele (B) University College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_4

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adaptation, the rich history of positive change on adaptation that the joint effort of members of the G77 and China have managed to engineer is truly remarkable. AOSIS and its members are extremely proud of their contribution to the sum of this effort which is truly greater than its parts. Keywords AOSIS · Particularly vulnerable developing countries · Bali Action Plan · Cancun Agreements · Adaptation Committee · National adaptation plans · Work program on loss and damage · Adaptation communication · Flexibility · Capacity-building · Adaptation finance

Introduction and Background The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. It functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing states (SIDS) within the United Nations system. AOSIS has a membership of 44 States and observers, drawn from all oceans and regions of the world: Africa, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Pacific and South China Sea. Thirty-nine are members of the United Nations, close to 28% of developing countries, and 20% of the UN’s total membership. Together, SIDS communities constitute some 5% of the global population. Most AOSIS members are also part of the G77 and China; however, some members are not. Nevertheless, the relationship is entwined as these AOSIS members are also least developed countries or have led negotiations for AOSIS on areas such as adaptation where consensus was sought with the G77 and China before engaging with other Parties. From time to time having non-G77 and China members has enabled AOSIS positions to be advanced on particularly fractious points without consensus of the Group, and then consolidated towards a common goal for all developing countries. Member States of AOSIS work together primarily through their New York diplomatic Missions to the United Nations. AOSIS functions on the basis of consultation and consensus. Major policy decisions are taken at ambassadorial-level plenary sessions. The Alliance does not have a formal charter. There is no regular budget, nor a secretariat. The Permanent Representative of Belize, Ambassador Lois Young, is its current chairman (2019–). AOSIS currently operates, as it has under previous chairmanships, out of the chairman’s Mission to the United Nations. AOSIS’s first chairman was Ambassador Robert Van Lierop of Vanuatu (1991– 1994), followed by Ambassador Annette des Iles of Trinidad and Tobago (1994– 1997), Ambassador Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Samoa (1997–2002), Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul of Mauritius (2002–2005), Ambassador Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu (acting chairman 2005–2006), Ambassador Julian R. Hunte of Saint Lucia (2006), Ambassador Angus Friday of Grenada (2006–2009), Ambassador Dessima Williams

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of Grenada (2009–2011), Ambassador Marlene Moses of Nauru (2011–2014), and Ambassadors Ahmed Sareer (2015–2017), and Ali Naseer Mohamed (2017–2018) of the Maldives.1 The Barbados Program of Action (1994), the Mauritius Strategy of Implementation (2005) and the Samoa Pathway (2014) recognize climate change as the main challenge facing SIDS in achieving sustainable development. Each of the processes leading up to these sustainable development programs and strategies was mandated by a UN General Assembly Resolution and has subsequently been universally recognized.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Early Days From the outset of negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention), AOSIS urged the global community to focus on the plight of those countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of a changing climate system.2 In 1991, Vanuatu, on behalf of AOSIS, proposed an insurance mechanism3 to the International Negotiating Committee, the body tasked by the UN General Assembly with negotiating “an effective framework convention on climate change”.4 The AOSIS proposal for an insurance mechanism included a call for the establishment of “an International Climate Fund to finance measures to counter the adverse consequences of climate change”, which elaborated on previous proposals for climate funds, as noted by the UN General Assembly.5 While this proposal for an international insurance mechanism did not survive the negotiating process, the UNFCCC does address adaptation and the funding of it and includes a provision for insurance as one of the actions that might be taken “to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change”.6 Most significantly, while the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC focuses on the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations” at a level which prevents dangerous human “interference with the climate system,”7 this objective is explicitly bounded by a timeframe that is based on adaptation parameters, i.e., the natural

1 http://aosis.org/about/. 2 See

Verheyen (2005) for a history of the negotiation of the UNFCCC. UN Document A/A.237/15, Report of the International Negotiating Committee, Fourth Session, Annex V available at https://undocs.org/en/a/ac.237/15. 4 UNGA Resolution 45/212, paragraph 7 available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/ a45r212.htm. 5 See UNGA Resolution 44/207, Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind, paragraph 14 available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r207.htm. 6 UNFCCC, article 4.8. 7 UNFCCC, article 2. 3 See

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adaptation of ecosystems; maintaining global food production; and the continuation of sustainable economic development.8 AOSIS has consistently advocated for addressing the special needs of SIDS based on the precautionary principle, the unique national circumstances of the group that is universally accepted as particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as well as a champion for financial assistance, in particular for the formulation and implementation of adaptation strategies.9 On balance, however, in the view of many SIDS, the UNFCCC with its primary focus on mitigation fell short in its approach to adaptation. There is, for example, no formal definition of adaptation that is accepted in the UNFCCC,10 and international commitments on adaptation under the Convention do not move past cooperation and planning efforts.11 Regardless, over time much support has come from multilateral efforts and bilateral sources. Developed country Parties are obligated to “assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” to meet the costs of adaptation12 ; however, UNFCCC Article 4.8, which imposes an obligation on Parties to “give full consideration” to the actions necessary “to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change” muddies the waters somewhat for AOSIS members and other particularly vulnerable developing countries. Article 4.8 lumps together those countries vulnerable to the impacts of climate change with those countries potentially impacted by measures taken to mitigate climate change, i.e., countries “whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export…of fossil fuels.”13 The coupling of this obligation on developed country Parties to provide support to developing countries affected by the adverse effects of changes to the climate system and those facing economic and social consequences of a likely reduction in oil sales created a “standoff” that made the development of a common position on adaptation in many instances within the G77 and China extremely challenging, if not almost impossible14 since all decisions within the UNFCCC process are taken based on the consensus of all Parties. Regardless of these challenges, AOSIS has worked closely across the years with its negotiating partners within the G77 and China to successfully carve out a positive space for adaptation to be addressed under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

8 Id. 9 See

UN Document A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.3, Elements for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, proposed by Vanuatu on behalf of AOSIS (4 June 1991) available at https://undocs.org/en/ a/ac.237/misc.1/add.3. 10 See UNFCCC article 1.1, which does define the “adverse effects of climate change.” 11 UNFCCC, article 4.1(e). 12 UNFCCC, article 4.4. 13 UNFCCC, article 4.8(h). 14 See for e.g. Khan and Timmons Roberts (2013).

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AOSIS and Adaptation Under the UNFCCC (from Marrakech to Bali) This chapter tells the story of that collaboration from its inception.15 AOSIS considers adaptation and also addressing loss and damage from slow onset and extreme weather events of highest priority. The AOSIS proposal for an insurance mechanism, including the proposal for an International Climate Fund to finance adaptation measures, did not become part of the architecture of the UNFCCC. Nevertheless, AOSIS along with other developing country Parties in the G77 and China have continued to raise the issue of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and financing for it in all relevant venues.16 Indeed, adaptation was given consideration at the very first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) in Berlin, Germany; and decision 11/CP.1 sets out a scheme for funding adaptation on a stage-wise basis, with a short-term focus on planning (Stage I), including “studies of possible impacts of climate change, to identify particularly vulnerable countries or regions and policy options.”17 Funding for future capacitybuilding and implementation needs (Stages II and III) were considered to be mediumor long-term concerns and not deemed necessary until Stage I studies had identified particularly vulnerable countries or regions.18 As evidenced by this 1995 decision, while adaptation was recognized as an issue the COP should consider, the immediate appetite for addressing it centered mainly around planning and investigatory activities. In this same decision, what was then considered as the “complex and difficult” nature regarding “incremental costs” was kicked down the road by COP 1, with the promise to develop guidelines “at a later stage on the basis of experience.”19 It was clear to AOSIS and other members of the G77 and China that the adaptation discussions were being somewhat “sidelined” by the mitigation discussions that resulted in the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.20 At COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan where the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was adopted, the discussion of adaptation issues was formally “grouped” under the UNFCCC’s agenda items for Articles 4.8 and 4.9 resulting in the adoption of decision 3/CP.3. The decision requested the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to undertake a process to identify and determine actions necessary to meet the specific needs of developing country Parties, as specified in Articles 4.8 and 4.9, arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures. The specific issues to be considered included actions related to funding, insurance, and the transfer of technology.

15 Information

about AOSIS is available at http://aosis.org/. Khan and Timmons Roberts, above. 17 UNFCCC, decision 11/CP.1, paragraph 1(d)(i). 18 UNFCCC, decision 11/CP.1, paragraphs 1(d)(i)–(iv). 19 UNFCCC, decision 11/CP.1, paragraph 1(e). 20 Khan and Roberts. 16 See

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The categorization of adaptation issues under these two articles, Article 4.8, which included response measures, and Article 4.9, which considered the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries (LDCs), was the paradigm under which adaptation was considered for the following decade. While progress under this paradigm was slow by AOSIS standards and not without its challenges from the perspective of developing country unity, it did continue, with the understanding that any gains on adaptation would be matched by gains on the treatment of the impact of response measures. COP 7 in Marrakech (2001) was a watershed moment for adaptation under the Convention, both from an operational as well as a funding standpoint. The series of COP 7 decisions, known as the “Marrakech Accords” paved the way for “the timely entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol”21 and recognized the then upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 2002)22 as an “opportunity for addressing the linkages between climate change and sustainable development.”23 Within this context, Parties expressed their deep concern that “all countries, particularly developing countries including the least developed countries and small island developing States” faced an increased risk of the negative impacts of climate change.24 In fact, the Marrakech Accords breathed new life into the critical building blocks that would be required for assisting developing countries to address the global climate change problem through adaptation, capacity-building, technology transfer and financing. By “kick-starting” work in each of these areas, it could be argued that the Marrakech Accords provided the vision for the framing of the Bali Action Plan25 and, ultimately, the Paris Agreement. Decision 5/CP.7 is the core adaptation-related decision coming out of the 2001 Marrakech COP, but it was bolstered by other decisions that provided guidance to the financial mechanism of the Convention specifically on: funding for adaptation,26 establishing the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF),27 establishing the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)28 and the Adaptation Fund.29 They all refer back to actions set out in decision 5/CP.7, and provide a substantial portion of the financial support required to conduct adaptation-related work at the country level. It is important to note that both the LDCF and the SCCF “are supported only by discretionary

21 UNFCCC,

decision 1/CP.7, paragraph 1. and relevant documents, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ milesstones/wssd. 23 UNFCCC decision 1/CP.7, preambular paragraph 4. 24 UNFCCC decision 1/CP.7, paragraph 2. 25 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13. 26 UNFCCC, decision 6/CP.7. 27 UNFCCC, decision 7/CP.7. 28 Id. It should be noted that the Special Climate Change Fund also covers the impact of the implementation of response measures. 29 UNFCCC, decision 10/CP.7. 22 Description

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pledges from donors”30 and are governed by the decisions of the Governing Council of the Global Environmental Facility. Both of these aspects have at times resulted in frustration around the availability, timing and awarding of adequate funding for these sources.31 In considering the implementation of UNFCCC Articles 4.8 and 4.9, decision 5/CP.7 was intended to provide meat to the bones, so to speak, of the three-stage approach to addressing the adverse effects of climate change as envisioned in decision 11/CP.1. It asserts the importance of taking a “country-driven” approach to adaptation32 and identifies a concrete set of activities that developing countries might take to address their information and assessment needs, with the guarantee of support.33 Of continuing relevance to AOSIS, these activities include, inter alia: • Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national and regional research programs on climate variability and climate change, oriented towards improving knowledge of the climate system at the regional level, and creating national and regional scientific capability; • Establishing pilot or demonstration projects to show how adaptation planning and assessment can be practically translated into projects that will provide real benefits, and may be integrated into national policy and sustainable development planning, on the basis of information provided in the national communications from non-Annex I Parties and/or other relevant sources; and • Supporting capacity-building, including institutional capacity, for preventive measures, planning, preparedness of disasters relating to climate change; • Strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing early warning systems for extreme weather events. Of equal significance to AOSIS, decision 5/CP.7 goes beyond the articulation and promised guarantee of funding for in-country activities, by setting out a concrete plan for multilateral work, mainly in the form of regional workshops.34 The multilateral aspect of this “adaptation decision” began to cement the notion that while adaptation actions taken by developing countries should be country driven, work at the multilateral level could provide benefit and coherence—giving rise to the argument for formalized institutional arrangements under the Convention to address the adaptation needs of “particularly” vulnerable developing countries. There were a number of workshops agreed to under decision 5/CP.7, but those of particular relevance to AOSIS, included

30 Mace

(2005). e.g., Möhner and Klein (2007). 32 UNFCCC, decision 5/CP.7, paragraph 1. 33 UNFCCC, decision 5/CP.7, paragraph 7. 34 Id., paragraphs 33–37. The outcomes of these workshops are available at https://unfccc.int/topics/ adaptation-and-resilience/events-meetings/related-to-5/cp7-1/cp10. 31 See,

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• Regional workshops to facilitate information exchange and integrated assessments on adaptation35 ; and • Workshops on insurance and risk assessment in the context of climate change and extreme weather events and insurance-related actions to address the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and from the impact of the implementation of response measures. Outcomes of the multilateral work agreed to under decision 5/CP.7 helped to support the call by AOSIS and other developing countries for urgent attention to the adverse impacts of climate change, which had already begun to manifest themselves.36 For example, as a result of the SIDS expert group meetings, AOSIS identified a detailed list of possible follow-up actions in areas, including the following: • Vulnerability and adaptation assessments (including promoting interregional and intraregional cooperation on modeling, economic valuation and adaptation assessments, and quantifying the costs of adaptation); • Adaptation planning and implementation (including a call for a NAPA-like process for SIDS); • Risk management and risk reduction (including conducting comprehensive economic assessments of the risks of impacts of climate change); • Insurance (including the establishment of a forum under the Convention to explore the feasibility of using risk transfer mechanisms as tools for adapting to climate change); • Regional and international collaboration and other cross-cutting issues. Armed with the evidence gathered during this multilateral work, including peerreviewed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Reports and proposals for follow-up action, AOSIS and other developing country Parties began to push for institutional arrangements at the level of the Convention to tackle the impacts of climate change. The first manifestation of an institutional arrangement to address the adverse effects of climate change came in the form of the “Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change” (NWP).37 The NWP had its roots in work undertaken by the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to consider the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR).38 At COP 10 (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2004), led by AOSIS and other developing country Parties, the SBSTA was requested to develop a structured five-year program of work on the scientific, technical, and socio-economic aspects of impacts of, and

35 The regional workshop

for SIDS took the form of a two-part expert meeting on adaptation. Part I was held in Kingston, Jamaica, and Part II was held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands. Workshop materials and documents are available at https://unfccc.int/event/sids-expert-meeting-adaptation. 36 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only entered into force in 2005, along with its first commitment period (2008–2012). 37 A chronology of the NWP and access to its current work are available at https://unfccc.int/nwp. 38 The TAR Synthesis Report is available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar3/syr/.

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vulnerability and adaptation to, climate change, which would address the following issues: methodologies; data and modeling; vulnerability assessments; adaptation planning; measures and actions.39 While AOSIS had advocated for work on adaptation to be taken up by the SBI, the compromise position was a SBSTA work program. The following year, at COP 11 (Montreal, Canada, 2005), Parties adopted the SBSTA’s five-year program of work on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.40 The program itself was set out in an annex to decision 2/CP.11 and included its objective, expected outcomes, and scope of work.41 The objective of this five-year work program was …to assist all Parties, in particular developing countries, including the least developed countries and small island developing States, to improve their understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and to make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures to respond to climate change…42

Expected outcomes included an enhanced capacity at all levels to identify and understand impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation responses, and to select and implement practical, effective, and high priority adaptation actions. The scope of work of this five-year work program included a number of “action-oriented sub-themes” based on the categories set out in 1/CP.10 (see above). Notably, one of these subthemes included the notion of economic diversification and directly mentioned the “relevant categories of countries listed in Article 4, paragraph 8 of the Convention.”43 While AOSIS continued to advocate for a separation in negotiations around the adverse effects of climate change and the impacts of the implementation of response measures, the group saw benefits in inclusion of the sub-theme on economic diversification in the NWP. Indeed, the G77 and China were unified in the negotiation of the SBSTA’s five-year work program on adaptation, and it could be argued that the inclusion of the sub-theme on economic diversification in the scope of the NWP, along with the explicit reference to Article 4.8 facilitated this unified front. It is important to note that while decision 2/CP.11 adopted the SBSTA’s five-year program of work on adaptation, Parties ran short of time in agreeing on a set of activities to be undertaken under the work program. It took another year of intense negotiation to arrive at this set of activities, which were finally agreed upon by the SBSTA in Nairobi at COP 12.44 Upon a suggestion by Canada, the SBSTA’s five-year

39 UNFCCC,

decision 1/CP.10 (Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation and response measures), paragraph 23. 40 UNFCCC, decision 2/CP.11, paragraph 1. 41 Id. Annex. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 FCCC/SBSTA/2006/L.26, available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/l26.pdf.

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work program was branded as the “Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change” by the COP President in a final plenary meeting.45 The range and level of detail of the activities agreed under the NWP was hard fought and likely would not have been as expansive had the G77 and China not worked together to achieve the result. AOSIS continued to be a pivotal voice in helping to develop the unity of the G77 and China and focused particular attention on activities such as data observations; climate modeling, scenarios and downscaling; climaterelated risks and extreme events; and adaptation practices and planning. Nevertheless, this shining example of the benefits of solidarity of the G77 and China should be evaluated in the larger context of addressing adaptation under Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention. Also, as per its mandate, the SBSTA is primarily an advice-giving body; 46 therefore, work done under the NWP was at least a step removed from implementation of adaptation action “on the ground.” In addition to setting in motion the adoption of the NWP under SBSTA, Buenos Aires decision 1/CP.10 also referred back to work under decision 5/CP.7 and allowed for addressing the specific needs of developing countries to be considered under the bi-partite framework of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the impact of the implementation of response measures under the SBI.47 As a result, from an AOSIS perspective, very little progress on adaptation was made under this “implementing” body of the Convention, and frustration over this arrangement led to two AOSIS members formally opting out of G77 and China membership. A scheduled review of work under decision 1/CP.10 (and 5/CP.7) at COP 14 (Poznan, Poland, 2008)48 led nowhere49 and attempts by developing countries, led by the G77 and China, with the full support of AOSIS, to establish an expert group on adaptation and have the SBI examine and “action” the work done under the NWP were muffled.50 The disheartening results on adaptation in 2008 were, however, played out on the background of the “game changing” treatment of adaptation under the newly minted Bali Action Plan,51 agreed in late 2007 at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia.

45 Report of COP 12, FCCC/CP/2006/5, paragraph 80 available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/ files/resource/docs/2006/cop12/eng/05.pdf#page=17. 46 See UNFCCC, Article 9 for the role of the SBSTA. 47 See UNFCCC, Article 10. The role of the SBI is to assess and review the effective implementation of the Convention. 48 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.10, paragraph 22. 49 See report of SBI 29, paraphs 45–47, available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ docs/2008/sbi/eng/19.pdf#page=11. 50 See report of SBSTA 29, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/13, paragraphs 17 and 19, available at https:// unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2008/sbsta/eng/13.pdf#page=6. 51 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c).

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AOSIS and Adaptation Under the UNFCCC: From the Bali Action Plan to the Copenhagen Accord The Bali Action Plan (decision 1/CP.13) was the culmination of a two-year process that Parties agreed to engage in at COP 11.52 The process was called the “Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention” (Dialogue) and covered four key areas, action on adaptation being one of them.53 A wide range of developing countries and developing country groups, including AOSIS, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, and South Africa made submissions and presentations on adaptation over the course of the four workshops held under the Dialogue in 2006 and 2007.54 AOSIS called for urgent action on adaptation, which included the establishment of an adaptation fund under the Convention and addressing risk management and insurance. As the Dialogue neared its end, many countries, both developing and developed, signaled a willingness to extend discussions on long-term cooperative action, with a specific focus on addressing climate change post-2012,55 and COP 13 in Bali culminated in the adoption of the Bali Road Map56 —a two-year plan for delivering on a global decision for tackling climate change beyond 2012. From an adaptation perspective, one of the most significant aspects of the Bali Action Plan—the guiding set of instructions for the Bali Road Map—is the clear separation it makes between the impact of the implementation of response measures and enhanced action on adaptation. Response measures are addressed under the mitigation section of the Bali Action Plan57 whereas enhanced action on adaptation is addressed in a separate section.58 The Bali Action Plan also serves to distinguish action taken on response measures (mitigation) and action taken to diversify economies to build resilience (adaptation).59 On adaptation, more specifically, the Bali Action Plan addresses a number of calls that had been made by AOSIS and other particularly vulnerable developing countries up to that point. First and foremost, it acknowledges that international cooperation is essential to supporting developing

52 UNFCCC,

decision 1/CP.11. paragraph 1. 54 See the UNFCCC webpage on the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action under the Convention, available at //unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/montreal-climatechange-conference-december-2005/statements-and-resources/dialogue-on-long-term-cooperativeaction-under-the-convention. 55 IISD (2016). 2012 was significant as it was the year in which the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol came to an end. 56 See UNFCCC webpage on the Bali Road Map, available at https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/ the-big-picture/milestones/bali-road-map. 57 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(b)(iv). 58 Id., paragraph 1(c). 59 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(iv). 53 Id.,

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countries in their adaptation efforts60 and that the Convention has a central role in catalyzing action on adaptation.61 The Bali Action Plan includes a comprehensive summary of issues for consideration to enhance action on adaptation, including: • • • • • • • •

vulnerability assessments; prioritization of actions; financial needs assessments; capacity-building and response strategies; integration of adaptation actions into sectoral and national planning; specific projects and programs; means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions; and other ways to enable climate-resilient development and reduce vulnerability.62

As importantly, it recognizes the urgent and immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries to the adverse effects of climate change, “especially the least developed countries and small island developing States, and further tak[es] into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods.”63 In addition, and of great importance to AOSIS, the Bali Action Plan includes the consideration of risk management and risk reduction and disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.64 To complement these important provisions on adaptation, the Bali Action Plan clearly sets out the need for enhanced financing for adaptation, including financing for capacity-building and adaptation technologies.65 This agreement by Parties of what constitutes enhanced action on adaptation and the central role of the Convention in catalyzing international cooperation to address the urgent and immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries (with a broad indication of who these countries are) radically changed the paradigm by which adaptation was addressed under the UNFCCC process going forward, and provided a platform upon which the G77 and China could develop a common position on adaptation in the run up to the outcome mandated at COP 15 in Copenhagen.66 Using the platform provided by the Bali Action Plan’s paragraph 1(c), members of the G77 and China were able to work together from Bali (COP 13) to Copenhagen (COP 15) on a common position on adaptation that accommodated the priorities of its sub-groups. Evidence of the similarity in positions held by the major G77 and China sub-groups on adaptation heading into the Copenhagen negotiations can be found

60 UNFCCC,

decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(i). decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(v). 62 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 1(c)(i). 63 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(i). 64 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraphs 1(c)(ii) and (iii). 65 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraphs 1(d) and 1(e). 66 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1 (chapeau). 61 UNFCCC,

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in relevant submissions.67 A brief survey of these submissions reveals a number of common elements among developing countries for addressing enhanced action on adaptation, including calls for: • The establishment of a framework for action on adaptation; • Permanent institutional arrangements dedicated to adaptation at the level of the Convention; • The establishment of regional centers to support the implementation of adaptation actions; • Work on adaptation to cover the full spectrum from assessment through planning to implementation; • Dedicated flows of financial resources to support adaptation actions in developing countries. Both the LDCs68 and AOSIS69 also called for arrangements to cover risk management and for the provision of measures to address loss and damage. A collection of statements made by the Chair of the G77 and China during 2007 emphasizes the high priority of adaptation for all of its members.70 The end of the Copenhagen COP was extremely disappointing for AOSIS and most, if not all, of its fellow developing country Party colleagues. Parties were unable to agree on an outcome on the aspirational provisions of the Bali Action Plan, and merely noted a document called the Copenhagen Accord.71 The Copenhagen Accord includes a paragraph on adaptation, but “adaptation” is mentioned in the same sentence as “the potential impact of the implementation of response measures,” which slips back to the “Article 4.8 approach” to addressing adaptation,72 one that AOSIS had worked hard to break away from, mainly through the Dialogue and the Bali Action Plan. Helpfully, the Copenhagen Accord signals agreement among Parties that the provision by developed countries to developing countries of finance, technology, and capacity-building for adaptation is required; and regardless of the collapse of the Copenhagen discussions, the Copenhagen Accord articulated concrete

67 All Party submissions up to COP 15 made in relation to the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action are available at //unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-nonparty-stakeholders/parties/archive-of-party-submissions/previous-submissions-from-parties-tothe-awg-lca-2008-2011. 68 See a compilation of submissions, available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/ 2009/awglca6/eng/misc04p01.pdf. 69 See a compilation of submissions, available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/ 2009/awglca8/eng/misc08.pdf. 70 G77 and China statements throughout 2007 demonstrate the priority of adaptation to its members, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2009/awglca7/eng/misc06a01.pdf#page=20. 71 UNFCCC, decision 2/CP.15. 72 UNFCCC, decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 3.

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funding targets for developed countries.73 The Copenhagen Accord also presaged the establishment of the Green Climate Fund.74

AOSIS and Adaptation Under the UNFCCC: The Cancun Agreements All was not lost after the disappointment of Copenhagen. The concrete outcomes gained by AOSIS and the collaborative effort of the G77 and China on adaptation leading up to Copenhagen remained on the table; and in 2010 developing country Parties “picked up where they left off,” so to speak. The 2010 Cancun Agreements75 cemented into reality the vision for enhanced action on adaptation that was first provided for in the Bali Action Plan. On adaptation, the Cancun Agreements managed to cover almost every “ask” of developing country Parties (including on loss and damage) and set the stage for a new era under the Convention in its approach to addressing adaptation. The spirit of working together on adaptation (by accommodating the needs of all) that had been forged by the G77 and China during the pre-Copenhagen talks clearly remained and helped influence the solid outcome at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico. In Cancun, Parties acknowledged that adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is a critical pillar in the global response to the challenge of climate change and that addressing it is a matter of urgency for particularly vulnerable developing countries. Accordingly, Parties agreed to establish the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which was underpinned by the following all-encompassing philosophy: …enhanced action on adaptation should be undertaken in accordance with the Convention, should follow a country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional and indigenous knowledge, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate…76

73 UNFCCC,

decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 8. A collective short-term commitment to 2012 for developed countries of USD 30 billion and a longer term commitment of USD 100 billion/per year by 2020 are set out in this paragraph. The USD 100 commitment persists to this day and is enshrined in the COP 21 Paris outcomes. 74 UNFCCC, decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, paragraph 10. 75 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.16. 76 UNFCCC, decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 12.

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Arguably, the most significant outcome on adaptation under the Cancun Agreements was the establishment of a body under the Convention to “promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention”—the Adaptation Committee.77 While Parties had yet to agree on its composition, modalities, and procedures, they had already defined its functions.78 The G77 and China remained united in the negotiation of the details of the functioning of this seminal body and its workings, as evidenced in future decisions on the Committee agreed at COP 17 (Durban, South Africa, 2011) and COP 18 (Doha, Qatar, 2012).79 Measuring the adaptation-related outcomes in the Cancun Agreements against the pre-Copenhagen demands by developing country Parties provides compelling evidence of the power of a unified G77 and China to deliver robust results. The Cancun Agreements delivered on each of the following (from the list above): • The establishment of a framework for action on adaptation—established the Cancun Adaptation Framework (paragraph 13); • Permanent institutional arrangements dedicated to adaptation at the level of the Convention—established the Adaptation Committee (paragraph 20); • The establishment of regional centers to support implementation of adaptation actions—call for establishing or strengthening regional centers (paragraph 30); • Work on adaptation to cover the full spectrum from assessment through planning to implementation—established a process for formulating and implementing national adaptation plans (NAPs, paragraphs 15 and 16) and lists the types of enhanced adaptation actions Parties should undertake (paragraph 14); • Dedicated flows of financial resources to support adaptation actions in developing countries—reinforced the developed country commitment to provide support for adaptation in developing countries (paragraph 18), and that a significant share of multilateral funding for adaptation would flow through the Green Climate Fund (paragraph 100). In addition, the Cancun Agreements recognized the “need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise in order to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”80 and set in motion a body of work on loss and damage by establishing a work program on loss and damage— an issue squarely addressed in the Bali Action Plan and of the highest priority for AOSIS, and which soon became another issue around which the G77 and China would find unity. Achieving the unity of the large group of countries, of which the G77 and China are comprised, with its diverse set of interests, is a very challenging task, and compromises must be made along the way. Tensions remain around the treatment of the impact of response measures vis-à-vis the adverse effects of climate change, as well as questions around those developing countries that should be considered “particularly vulnerable.” However, to date, skilled and patient coordinators 77 UNFCCC,

decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 20.

78 Id. 79 See,

e.g., decisions 2/CP.17 and 11/CP.18. decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 25.

80 UNFCCC,

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within the G77 and China have helped the group steer around these and other areas of concern in reaching consensus on adaptation as an issue of the highest priority for all developing country Parties.

AOSIS and Adaptation Under the UNFCCC: The Paris Agreement and the Paris Rulebook Adaptation clearly represents a major issue for AOSIS. The five-year period culminating in 2011 saw an increasing number of AOSIS member states articulating clear needs on adaptation in individual submissions, reiterating the needs of the collective—a marked increase from the previous five-year period from 2001 to 2006.81 This does not negate the fact that there were disagreements on matters related to adaptation, most notably how to treat with the Copenhagen Accord. Despite these differences, AOSIS remained united and together with the G77 and China forged a critical partnership on adaptation issues. After the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework in 2010, AOSIS continued to seek common positions with the G77 and China on adaptation matters. Members of the G77 and China have supported each other on a rapidly expanding adaptation agenda, based on the strong precedent set during the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen and beyond that includes the ongoing work of the Adaptation Committee, the formulation and implementation of NAPs (in collaboration with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group) and the work of the NWP. The negotiation of provisions on adaptation under the Paris Agreement and its implementation guidelines have been the latest test of the unity of the G77 and China on adaptation, but most likely will not be its last. The negotiations on adaptation leading up to COP 21 in Paris, France, proved a test of faith for AOSIS and its membership. AOSIS worked with the larger group of developing countries in the G77 and China to achieve consensus on key asks including the parity of mitigation and adaptation; the continued recognition and acceptance of special circumstances and particular vulnerabilities of developing countries; support for the 1.5 °C temperature goal; efforts to manage reporting burdens while increasing transparency in communicating adaptation needs and priorities; and the recognition of loss and damage as a possible result of impacts for SIDS where their ability to adapt to a changing climate reaches its limits. The challenge of finding consensus among G77 and China members was made evident in the diverse range of views expressed in the pre-Paris (Geneva) text. This text gave rise to the rich range of fundamental building blocks under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, including the global goal on adaptation; the direct link of adaptation to the overall aims of the Paris Agreement; the principles under which adaptation actions should be conducted and the process for communicating adaptation needs and priorities to the world at large. 81 See

Betzold et al. (2012).

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The Paris Agreement gives voice to the collective G77 and China position on the global challenge that is adaptation, and AOSIS sees its particular concerns addressed in this collective voice.82 The Paris Agreement explicitly states that “adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions.” Though developing consensus on adaptation within the G77 and China was difficult at times, the Paris Agreement cemented one of AOSIS demands, which was the recognition of the special circumstances and particular vulnerabilities of certain developing countries.83 Despite these victories there were disappointments, particularly on finance for adaptation, including “…provisions to enhance SIDS access, especially to public, grant-based support for adaptation, given our unique challenges and the existential threat…”84 With the adoption in Paris and subsequent entry into force of the Paris Agreement, adaptation is now firmly “on the map” in a legally binding international treaty. While the Cancun Agreements and the work on adaptation it engendered were ground breaking prior to Paris, adaptation and its evolution were still relegated to interpretations of rather vague provisions in the Convention and in annual COP decisions. The Paris Agreement not only dedicates an entire article to adaptation,85 but goes further by entwining adaptation in its overall aim of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, including by …Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience…86

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Paris Agreement sets Parties’ efforts on adaptation in the context of the Agreement’s temperature goal87 of holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C while pursuing efforts to limit this increase to 1.5 °C88 —the bedrock on which the Paris Agreement architecture rests. For AOSIS, the driver of progress on adaptation in the Paris Agreement, and one which harks back to the AOSIS vision of adaptation in Copenhagen,89 is the adaptation communication.90 For AOSIS, the adaptation communication is meant to serve a dual purpose: (1) focusing attention at the national level on the communication of adaptation “priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions,”91 and (2) focusing international attention to these concerns and to the progress made in implementing 82 Paris

Agreement, Article 7.2. Agreement, Preamble, paragraph 5. 84 AOSIS, 2015. AOSIS ministers lay out priorities ahead of week two (http://aosis.org/press-releaseaosis-ministers-lay-out-priorities-ahead-of-week-two/). 85 Paris Agreement, Article 7. 86 Paris Agreement, Article 2, paragraph 1(b). 87 Paris Agreement, Article 7, paragraph 1. 88 Paris Agreement, Article 2, paragraph 1(a). 89 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/misc08.pdf#page=20. 90 Paris Agreement, Article 7, paragraph 10. 91 Paris Agreement, Article 7, paragraph 11. 83 Paris

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adaptation action “on the ground.” The financing and other support provisions in the Paris Agreement will help facilitate the first purpose of the adaptation communication. Its second purpose will be supported both by the publishing of adaptation communications in a public registry92 and the agreement to feed them into the fiveyearly global stocktakes established by the Paris Agreement, and the ensuing scrutiny we expect this stock-taking process to fulfill.93 The Paris Agreement provides Parties with flexibility in the form and timing of submission of the adaptation communication. This is paramount for AOSIS, given the experience of many of its members in the preparation of national communications, national adaptation plans and more recently nationally determined contributions. AOSIS member countries understand the importance of assessment, planning, and reporting, and are prepared to deliver, but have significant capacity constraints on many levels. Throughout the negotiation of the Paris Agreement and its implementing guidelines, AOSIS expressed the need for a flexible set of “rules” regarding the adaptation communication and found support in this position among its G77 and China colleagues. The concerted efforts and unified voice of the G77 and China on climate finance, and specifically finance for adaptation, as well as methodologies for measuring the quality and effectiveness of climate finance, has set in motion yet another “paradigm shift” in the global response to the impacts of climate change in particularly vulnerable developing countries. This can be seen, in part, in the acceptance of the Green Climate Fund to creating a funding window to address the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans and other adaptation planning processes. The Paris “rulebook” represents an area of continued negotiations on adaptation. Agreeing definitions for adaptation and climate finance remains elusive. The latter would provide clarity on financial accounting, including for adaptation. AOSIS and other members of the G77 and China have pushed back strongly on the argument made by some developed countries to specify the proportion of climate finance to be reserved for adaptation through quantified targets. This is an example of how a unified position has led to final agreement that recognizes the need for a ‘balance between mitigation and adaptation’94 and a mandate to ‘significantly increase adaptation finance from current levels’.95

92 Paris

Agreement, Article 7, paragraph 12. Agreement, Article 7, paragraph 14(b). 94 Paris Agreement, Article 9.4. 95 Decision 1/CP.21, para. 114. 93 Paris

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Coda Almost daily, science tells us, with greater clarity and increasing volume, that particularly vulnerable developing countries will suffer from the impacts of climate change. The IPCC’s special report on global warming of 1.5 °C tells us that at …1.5°C, limits to adaptation will be reached for several key impacts in SIDS, resulting in residual impacts, as well as loss and damage. Limiting temperature increase to 1.5°C versus 2°C is expected to reduce a number of risks, particularly when coupled with adaptation efforts that take into account sustainable development…96

This shows that adaptation efforts are critical for the members of AOSIS, and if implemented with the urgency required will define the difference in the severity of impacts from climate change that we now understand will be inevitable. It will also go a far way toward achieving the adaptation goal as set out in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. From the outset of the UNFCCC process, in fact during the negotiation of the UNFCCC itself, AOSIS has trumpeted the need for the world to assist its members in addressing the adverse impacts of climate change—often feeling like the lone voice in a vast ocean. It took time in the UNFCCC process for progress to be made on adaptation, but once the engine was revved, the movement was swift. In the five years from 2005 to 2010, work on adaptation under the UNFCCC progressed from a five-year SBSTA-based work program97 to a full-blown framework on adaptation complete with formal institutional arrangements and “off-shoot” work on loss and damage.98 By multilateral negotiation standards, this is a meteoric pace of change.99 Bumps and hiccups notwithstanding, this “quantum leap” in the treatment of adaptation under the Convention would not have been possible without the full force of the G77 and China behind it. The robust structure wrought under the Cancun Agreements remains- the Green Climate Fund allocating 50% of its funds for adaptation, and now the Paris Agreement, has set the issue of adaptation legally “in stone” at the international level. And though the special needs and interests of individual members of the G77 and China add a seemingly insurmountable level of complexity to the equation of addressing adaptation, the rich history of positive change on adaptation that the joint effort of members of the G77 and China has managed to engineer is truly remarkable. AOSIS and its members are extremely proud of their contribution to the sum of this effort which is truly greater than its parts.

96 IPCC,

Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, Chapter 3, Box 3.5. NWP, which was adopted in 2005 at COP 11 by decision 2/CP.15, noting that the role of the SBSTA is to provide information and advice on scientific and technological matters (UNFCCC, Article 9). The SBI, on the other hand, assesses and reviews the effective implementation of the Convention (UNFCCC, Article 10). 98 See Cancun Agreements, decision 1/CP.16, Enhanced action on adaptation, paragraphs 11–35. 99 For example, it took eight years from adoption to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. 97 The

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References Books Verheyen R (2005) Chapter 3. In: Climate change damage and international law: prevention duties and state responsibility. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston

Articles Betzold C, Castro P, Weiler F (2012) Climate policy, 2012—AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations: from unity to fragmentation? IISD (2016) From Bali to Marrakech: a decade of international climate negotiations (2016). In: Allan J et al (eds), pp 8–13. https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/bali-marrakechdecade-international-climate-negotiations.pdf Khan MR, Timmons Roberts J (2013) Adaptation and international climate policy. WIREs Clim Change 4:171–189. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.212 Mace MJ (2005) Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF developments since COP-7. RECIEL 14(3):245 Möhner A, Klein RJT (2007) The global environment facility: funding for adaptation or adapting to funds?. SEI, Stockholm

Treaties Kyoto Protocol Paris Agreement United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UN Documents FCCC/SBSTA/2006/L.26. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/l26.pdf IPCC, Third Assessment Report. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar3/syr/ IPCC, Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C Report of COP 12, FCCC/CP/2006/5. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2006/ cop12/eng/05.pdf Report of SBI 29. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2008/sbi/eng/19.pdf Report of SBSTA 29, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/13. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/ 2008/sbsta/eng/13.pdf UN Document A/A.237/15, Report of the International Negotiating Committee, Fourth Session, Annex V. https://undocs.org/en/a/ac.237/15 UN Document A/AC.237/Misc.1/Add.3, Elements for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, proposed by Vanuatu on behalf of AOSIS (4 June 1991). https://undocs.org/en/a/ac.237/misc.1/ add.3

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UNGA Resolution 44/207, Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind, paragraph 14. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r207.htm UNGA Resolution 45/212, paragraph 7. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm

Websites AOSIS. http://aosis.org/about/ UNFCCC, Dialogue on long term cooperative action under the Convention. https://unfccc.int/ process/conferences/pastconferences/montreal-climate-change-conference-december-2005/ statements-and-resources/dialogue-on-long-term-cooperative-action-under-the-convention UNFCCC, Bali Road Map. https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/the-big-picture/milestones/baliroad-map WSSD. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/mile

Pasha Carruthers Environmental Sustainability Advisor, Raratonga, Cook Islands, [email protected] (Climate Change Advisor, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2012–2016, adaptation lead negotiator for AOSIS, 2004–2011). Orville Grey Adaptation Planning Specialist, Green Climate Fund, Songdo, Korea, [email protected] (co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage, 2018, adaptation lead negotiator for AOSIS, 2015–2018). Clifford Mahlung Project Administrator, Climate Change Division, Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation, Kingston, Jamaica, [email protected] (co-Chair of the Adaptation Committee, 2017, adaptation lead negotiator for AOSIS, 2018). Linda Siegele JD, LLM, Ph.D. (cand), University College London, London, UK, [email protected] (advisor to AOSIS on adaptation and loss and damage, 2005–2020).

Chapter 5

Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) Laura Juliana Arciniegas Rojas and Julio Cordano Sagredo

Abstract Compared to mitigation, which is—in its own right—fundamental to the Convention, adaptation had a late appearance as a central piece in climate action. This created a difficult situation, where developing countries asked for a balance between mitigation and adaptation, but the latter had almost no technical development compared to the former. It was only with the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) in 2010 when adaptation started to pick up in relevance and received more attention. G77 and China positions were the basis of all discussions on adaptation in the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement. In fact, the adaptation section of the so-called “Geneva Text,” which was constructed from submissions from all groups and Parties of the Convention some months before Paris, is mostly built on positions and ideas from G77 and China Parties and groups. This was to be the case during the entire process to COP 21, with developed countries assuming a position of reacting to the G77 and China proposals instead of suggesting their own ideas. AILAC played an active part in building consensus among members of the G77 and China, contributing to it through its own ideas and proposals. The results of the negotiations on adaptation, today reflected not only under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, but also in the preamble, the objective, the articles on finance, transparency, and the global stocktake, among other provisions, evidence that political parity was raised. Adaptation managed to be at the center of the discussions as a key component of climate action, along with mitigation, that will have, for the first time, proper follow up and visibility. For AILAC, the Paris Agreement represents a platform for continuing to push for more of this progress, built on the G77 and China accomplishments. Keywords AILAC (Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean) · Cancun adaptation framework (CAF) · National adaptation programs of action (NAPAs) · National adaptation plans (NAPs) · Adaptation Gap Report · L. J. Arciniegas Rojas Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] J. Cordano Sagredo (B) Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile, Santiago, Chile e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_5

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L. J. Arciniegas Rojas and J. Cordano Sagredo

United nations environment program (UNEP) · Intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) · Geneva Text · National communication (NatCom) · Adaptation communication · Vulnerability · Human rights · Geneva Pledge

The Value of a Common G77 and China Position for AILAC Compared to mitigation, which is—in its own right—fundamental to the Convention, adaptation had a late appearance as a central piece in climate action. This created a difficult situation, where developing countries asked for a balance between mitigation and adaptation, but the latter had almost no technical development compared to the former. It was only with the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) in 2010 when adaptation started to pick up in relevance and received more attention. The CAF, adopted in Mexico, at one of the four COPs that have been organized in Latin America and the Caribbean, set the basic institutions and arrangements for adaptation under the Convention and promoted practices and tools to better address the impacts of climate change. Adaptation has always been a priority for developing countries. In fact, for many years before Paris, adaptation was associated with a demand mostly from these countries. However, time has demonstrated that adaptation is equally crucial for all countries, regardless of their development, since climate change does not make any distinction in its negative effects. The extreme events that have occurred during the last decades, and even when the negotiation of the Paris Agreement was taking place, including the devastating hurricanes in the Caribbean, the most severe drought in the history of California, the floods of South America, and the heatwaves in Europe, are clear proof of that. Some of the concerns of developed countries for opening the door to adaptation hinged on how new processes and windows of support could deviate financial resources and political attention away from mitigation. It was common to hear the statement that “mitigation was already a good way to address adaptation, since the more you mitigate now the less you will have to adapt in the future”. Unfortunately, that premise—although not entirely wrong—did not take into account the already existing impacts of climate change caused by gases emitted decades ago. The costs of adaptation loom on the horizon of all countries, especially if mitigation efforts are not enough to prevent further warming. The only difference between developed and developing countries is that developed countries are better prepared for facing those consequences. Therefore, participating in the negotiations to protect vulnerable populations, already struggling with poverty, hunger, and many other development challenges, made having a common position among the largest group of developing countries, the G77 and China, a very valuable endeavor. It is important from this perspective to note that by COP 21 (Paris 2015) there was a ripening moment in the Convention processes, that needed to lead to a higher profile for adaptation. On one hand, the CAF had inaugurated a more institutional approach to the topic of adaptation, which consolidated it as an issue of collective interest. On

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the other hand, developing countries had already walked a road of trial and error, starting with National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) and eventually developing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) processes. Somehow all developing countries were doing the same in parallel, planning for adaptation but with no clear spaces to learn from each other, or to identify common features that would allow for a quicker response to climate change, or the development of technologies, or methodologies for planning and measuring impacts. This reality was also reflected in the INDCs (intended Nationally Determined Contributions), which most countries presented in the months preceding COP 21. Almost all developing countries included adaptation components, in a spontaneous and unplanned manner across regions. This was an extremely interesting development, considering that there was no political coordination to this common approach. It was rather a way to confirm that adaptation was understood as a component of any climate policy, regardless of what was being negotiated in Bonn or during COPs. Even some developed countries, responding to a decision adopted at COP 20 (Lima, 2014) decided to present their “adaptation undertakings,” to be registered in a separate document to NDCs. The collection of these adaptation components and undertakings showcased the variety of approaches, actions, sectors, plans, innovations, and needs on adaptation around the globe. From the very start, the consensus within the G77 and China was crucial for these ideas to get traction in the negotiations. As Ambassador Diseko from South Africa used to say, the G77 and China is a complex tapestry of visions, and its diversity has to be understood not as a weakness but as a strength. This was very much the case for adaptation. All of the subgroups of the G77 and China had different approaches and perspectives on adaptation. Some of them were more concerned about the possible additional burden it could imply as reporting for actions and goals; others had a particular focus on the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation actions; others expressed yet more distinct visions. However, it is very interesting to see how the group converged in a common position and that it spoke with one strong single voice, throughout the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Subgroups had to make concessions and sacrifice the opportunity to raise their own particular perspectives, but everybody understood that the collective interest was more important. G77 and China positions were the basis of all discussions. In fact, the adaptation section of the so-called “Geneva Text,” which was constructed from submissions from all groups and Parties of the Convention some months before Paris, is mostly built on positions and ideas from G77 and China Parties and groups. This was to be the case during the entire process to COP 21, with developed countries assuming a position of reacting to the G77 and China proposals instead of suggesting their own ideas. The Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) put its main concern in the ability of Parties to communicate their priorities and needs, as a way to send a strong indication to purveyors of international investment and support, of where action would be needed.

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AILAC’s Incentive for Collaborating with the G77 and China on Adaptation AILAC is a negotiation group composed of eight countries in the Latin American region (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá, Paraguay, and Peru) and was formally established in 2012. Although the geographical, political and development context might differ substantially between some of the AILAC countries, there was a common challenge identified by all from the beginning: their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the urgent need to find solutions to a problem that had caused severe environmental, social, and economic losses in the last decades in the region. As expressed before, this challenge is faced both by developing and developed countries. However, being aware that the latter would focus their efforts more on mitigation, it would be in the hands of developing countries to position adaptation discussions high on the agenda and ensure a robust result in the Paris Agreement. In fact, it was the G77 and China that provided the leadership to make the case for adaptation. The objective of using the Paris Agreement as a springboard for more action on adaptation comes from the fact that there is a considerable adaptation gap, both in terms of action and finance. This has been underlined in many reports and documents, including the yearly publication of the “Adaptation Gap Report,” by the UN Environment Program (UNEP).1 The gap has many aspects that reflect how far behind adaptation was at the time of COP 21 (and continues to be) with respect to mitigation and indicate the substantial work that lies ahead. This covers issues such as – Refining reporting mechanisms and documents under the Convention; – Making progress toward a better understanding on how to monitor and evaluate adaptation at the national level; – Agreeing on methods to track progress toward the global goal on adaptation; – Ensuring that financial flows cover the adaptation needs in volumes that match these needs; – Building more clarity on technical information needed to effectively access multilateral funding; – Best practices to align private investments to adaptation needs.

1 See,

e.g., UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report (2018), available at https://www.unenvironment.org/ resources/adaptation-gap-report.

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The Evolution of AILAC’s Involvement with the G77 and China Position on Adaptation—From First Steps to Present Day The G77 and China, with its complex and heterogeneous composition, has always faced the challenge of achieving common positions. Many hours have been devoted to internal discussions that aim at having a collective proposal that is both useful for promoting Parties’ visions and at the same time is not the lowest common denominator. However, as indicated previously, adaptation has been a natural environment to achieve a consensus, which has continued over the years. From this perspective, AILAC has played an active part in building that consensus, contributing to it through its own ideas and proposals. This has also included a clear effort of building bridges with other Parties and groups, outside AILAC and in some cases even outside the G77 and China. Such was the case of the submission presented by AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican Republic in late 2013 in which the broad position of the group was outlined. The submission included some notions that were later incorporated into the G77 and China position, and eventually into the Paris Agreement, such as a global goal on adaptation, collective and individual commitments, and the need to enhance the institutional framework as well as developing metrics and indicators to track progress. Other elements of the submission were not as successful, and were not pursued either as part of the AILAC negotiation strategy or for the sake of keeping the unity of the G77 and China, such as the process on developing metrics proposed to be led by the Adaptation Committee in coordination with the Nairobi Work Program.

The Main Contributions of AILAC to the Collective Position of the G77 and China on Adaptation Since the early stages of the Paris Agreement negotiation, AILAC was vocal in conveying the political messages agreed within the G77 and China, including the need for political parity between mitigation and adaptation, the importance of revising and enhancing the existing adaptation framework and the need to ensure that financial flows for climate change would address both climate change causes and impacts in the world. Later on, when more specific proposals were discussed, AILAC focused on the need to be more strategic in the communication of priorities and needs, in order to strengthen international support and to identify trends and opportunities for collaboration. Experience showed that Parties were not being effective in transmitting their real concerns and plans on adaptation and therefore, technical and financial support was not allocated efficiently. In addition, countries were not taking enough advantage of South-South cooperation opportunities because of this lack of clarity and information.

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To make this happen, the group proposed as one of its strategic positions that INDCs, decided upon at COP 19 in Warsaw, had to include all components of climate action if they were to be comprehensive and up to the standard needed to face the challenge of a warming planet. This included mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation as three components that reinforced each other in a virtual cycle. From Warsaw (2013) to Paris (2015), the INDCs gained the full attention of politicians and decision-makers, as they would constitute the heart of the Paris Agreement and were the key instrument for its implementation. Heads of State and Ministers presented their vision and progress in the elaboration of their INDCs at high-level meetings, including at the Summit hosted by the Secretary General of the United Nations in September 2014 and at COP 20 in Lima (2014). At this COP, an entire parallel process was launched to engage non-state actors in the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions, based on thematic areas to be considered in the INDCs, such as forests, energy, cities, and water. The process of formulating INDCs before Paris, also served to mobilize a wide range of stakeholders nationally, including productive sectors, local governments, private companies, and academia. All these actors came together to present their ideas and plans on how to transition to a low or zero-carbon development model. It was a great opportunity to set specific targets that could be determined by each country, according not only to their historic responsibilities, but also to their respective capacities to contribute to a solution to climate change. For AILAC, this mobilization around INDCs, reaffirmed the importance of including adaptation in the instrument, as a separate document or in a single document in conjunction with mitigation. The group also believed that the NDC would represent an advantage in comparison to the National Communication (NatCom), established for reporting progress on already implemented actions, and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), created for the identification of priorities and planning purposes at the national level. However, both the NatCom and the NAP would play a fundamental role in relation to the NDC, to follow up in the implementation of communicated actions and to provide inputs on national priorities for its formulation, respectively. AILAC’s proposal was presented to the members of the G77 and China, as a manner of raising the profile of adaptation, making needs and priorities more visible and following up on them periodically. At first, some groups and Parties raised their concern about establishing new instruments that would pose additional burdens at the technical level and highlighted that the Convention already set the NatCom as a reporting vehicle, where Parties included in flexible terms their information on adaptation. On the other side, there were countries which considered that the proposal would serve to facilitate international support. With further discussions, the proposal gained traction within the G77 and China as a manner to improve the way information on adaptation had been presented before, with a forward-looking perspective to be able to enhance action and support in time. The proposal evolved from being a stand-alone iNDC for adaptation to an “Adaptation Communication” that should be submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including

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a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution or other existing instruments under the Convention (Article 7, paragraph 11 of the Paris Agreement). AILAC also supported the proposals of other groups including on the importance of establishing a global goal on adaptation to set the direction of travel as well as a robust outcome on loss and damage that would be negotiated separately to adaptation. All these elements would converge together to make the adaptation process consistent with the new framework of the Paris Agreement.

How the Paris Agreement Reflects AILAC’s Interests on Adaptation and How the Common Position Within the G77 and China Was Instrumental in Achieving Them The results of the negotiations on adaptation, today reflected not only under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, but also in the preamble, the objective, the articles on finance, transparency, and the global stocktake, among other provisions, evidence that political parity was raised. Adaptation managed to be at the center of the discussions as a key component of climate action, along with mitigation, that will have, for the first time, proper follow up and visibility. Nonetheless, this technical parity has yet to be achieved with the development of metrics, indicators, and information that can allow for a better understanding of effective measures beyond the local processes. The flexibility established under Article 7 for the presentation of the Adaptation Communication allows for Parties to communicate their priorities, needs, plans, and actions through the document each would consider most useful or strategic, or the one that would avoid creating additional burdens to the national teams working on climate change. This provision accommodated all groups in the negotiations. However, it presents the challenge of being able to understand easily what the trends, opportunities and main sectors of interest on adaptation are, among others, in the different documents, especially if these are presented at different periods of time. Fortunately, Article 7 also established a public registry for lodging the Adaptation Communication that will help to gather this information and facilitate the visibility of adaptation plans and priorities. In addition, Article 7 sets clear mandates for the Global Stocktake, that will take place every five years, to enhance action on adaptation taking into account the new Adaptation Communication. The Global Stocktake will also recognize the adaptation efforts of Parties and will allow for an analysis of the adequacy of support provided for adaptation. To complement this, Parties will report on progress in the implementation of their plans, experiences and lessons learned through the Transparency Framework. These provisions of the Paris Agreement, when combined, make it possible to have a process or cycle on adaptation. Looking back on discussions on the INDCs, it is unfortunate that the initial proposal of INDCs with an adaptation component was not successful in its entirety. In fact, we can see that NDCs under the Paris Agreement are mostly mitigation centered. Meanwhile, adaptation and the means of implementation continue on a

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winding path of trial and error, with no clear understanding of how the goals of the Paris Agreement will be achieved in these two elements. In hindsight, these “three-dimensional NDCs” would have represented a political indication of the urgency of achieving a balance in climate action, reflecting the priorities expressed by Parties in their INDCs, while at the same time pressing for the needed technical work to understand accounting for finance, adaptation planning and monitoring, as well as providing a definition of standards for adequate resilience under different temperature scenarios. In part, this proposal was not agreed because some countries believed that including adaptation and mitigation information in the same document would dilute or undermine efforts on emissions reductions and duplicate other means to communicate or report on means of implementation. The discussion on the scope of NDCs is still open, and that presents an opportunity to find a comfortable space to address adaptation in NDCs in a way that recognizes its importance for all Parties, regardless of their level of development. This is undoubtedly one of the important challenges of the upcoming years.

Lessons Learned from Achieving a Common Position on Adaptation in the G77 and China The Pitfalls of the Never-Ending Quest for Defining Vulnerabilities As expressed before, in the run up to Paris, the G77 and China managed to build a common position on adaptation and kept this position intact until the very end of the process. This common purpose allowed for the current Article 7 of the Paris Agreement to reflect all of the G77 and China proposals. Latin America and the Caribbean were particularly active, not only in the participation of AILAC, but also in the provision of three consecutive coordinators, who came from Bolivia (Mr. Juan Hoffmaister), Uruguay (Mr. Ignacio Lorenzo), and later at COPs 22, 23, and 24 Argentina (Ms. Pilar Bueno). Colombia would also facilitate, on behalf of developing countries, the Contact Group on Adaptation that lead to the final outcome in Paris (Ms. Andrea Guerrero). The common position of the G77 and China, however, suffered a blow when the issue of the characterization of vulnerability was brought into the discussion. Vulnerability refers to a particular country or region’s level of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change. This can be assessed in the medium-term, based on the criteria indicated in article 4.8 of the Convention, combined with an estimation of how well prepared that particular country or region is to face those threats, i.e., its resilience. There is no universally accepted method to establish the level of vulnerability of one country or region, much less to compare countries in order to determine who is

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more vulnerable. Nonetheless, this debate has emerged periodically within the G77 and China, including in Paris. It was not merely restricted to the adaptation debate, but it would create a significant impact on our deliberations within the group, more generally, and in the exchanges with our partners. The lack of conceptual development in the adaptation debate on vulnerability as well as the unclear connections with finance led to a notion that any subgroup that was identified as “particularly vulnerable” would be in a better position to access funds. This idea ignored the complete lack of clarity about the sources of those funds, as well as the undefined technical requirements that would be needed in order to access them. At the end, it was clear that as long as there is no common understanding of how to assess resilience, it will be impossible to agree on language that describes the vulnerability of one particular country or region over another. It was also clear that to be successful the Paris Agreement had to consider different national circumstances and leave no country or region behind. The very idea of comparing levels of vulnerability makes no sense, considering that every country (understood not only by its ecosystems and economy, but also as a cultural reality) must consider its own needs and develop its own strategies to be successful in adapting to climate change. In any case, the discussion on vulnerability was unsuccessful, hitting a wall that could not be overcome, the same result each time there has been an attempt to broach it.

The Other Side of the Coin: Adaptation from a Human Rights Perspective In the run up to the Paris Agreement, many Parties expressed the view that this was an opportunity to articulate how climate change can affect the enjoyment of human rights and call for Parties to include this perspective in their climate actions. This perspective addressed the need to focus on the most vulnerable groups, whose human rights are most affected by climate-related disasters and slow-onset events. In a way, this was the other side of the coin of the debate on vulnerability, shifting the focus from countries to individuals, from regions and national circumstances to the specific conditions of individual human beings being affected by climate change. In the same session that the Geneva Text was adopted, another important step was taken, under the leadership of Costa Rica. After a meeting organized by the Mary Robinson Foundation on Climate Justice (MRFCJ), a group of Parties gathered around the need to have a more coherent approach between climate change and human rights. An AILAC country, Costa Rica, led the way on a declaration (the “Geneva Pledge”) that outlined this idea, and supported continuing these discussions in the crucial months to follow. The declaration was signed by 18 countries in 2015, both within and outside the G77 and China.

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With this in mind, AILAC and other Parties (notably Mexico) jointly promoted the inclusion of human rights in the Geneva Text. Mexico even included a reference in the article related to the ultimate goal of the Agreement, signaling the importance of the matter. At the time of the Geneva Pledge, climate change was no stranger in human rights discussions under the United Nations, including in the Human Rights Council seated in Geneva. The topic had already been discussed in a number of high-level reports such as the human rights report from 2009,2 and there was a growing interest in understanding the connections between climate action and specific rights such as the right to enjoy a healthy environment, the right to life, the right to health, the right to housing, and many others. In October 2014, 28 special rapporteurs and independent experts of the Human Rights Council wrote an open letter to the Parties to the UNFCCC emphasizing that climate change threatens to undermine the protection of human rights, and that the UNFCCC has a crucial role in effectively protecting human rights for all. Therefore, the special rapporteurs called on Parties to include language in the Paris Agreement to indicate that “Parties shall, in all climate change related actions, respect, protect, promote, and fulfill human rights for all.”3 Once human rights were introduced into the Geneva Text, AILAC presented a submission that provided specific reasons to keep those references. In the submission, AILAC indicated that “environmental damage and the consequences of climate change have multiple negative effects on the livelihoods of people. These negative impacts affect with particular force those groups commonly identified as the most vulnerable, owing to factors such as geography, poverty, gender, age, indigenous or minority status and disability. The inequity resulting from the impacts on these people is aggravated by the fact that they bear the smallest share of responsibility in causing climate change.” The proposal of AILAC was not to create or develop new categories of human rights, but to establish a link with existing obligations under human rights conventions in such a way that would reinforce climate policies. This became an important element in the adaptation negotiations of the Paris Agreement. Although the Geneva Text had three references to human rights (preamble, objective, and adaptation), only the reference in the preamble survived, indicating that “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights.” Although the reference to human rights in the objective of the Agreement was not agreed, important language was kept in the adaptation article. In fact, Article 7, paragraph 5 picks up previously agreed text from the Cancun Adaptation Framework,

2 OHCHR

(15 January 2009). “Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights” (A/HRC/10/61), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/103/44/PDF/G0910344.pdf? OpenElement. 3 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/SP_To_UNFCCC.pdf.

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stating that “Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow…a genderresponsive and participatory approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based and guided on the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, as appropriate.”

Final Reflections The negotiations of the adaptation contents of the Paris Agreement represent a vivid experience on how the G77 and China can determine the progress of an issue that has proven fundamental to all Parties, developed and developing. No specific group of the G77 and China achieved everything. We all had to make compromises, to avoid ideas that could be detrimental to specific Parties or subgroups of the G77 and China. From this perspective, while we did not agree on many things, we also took care of each other, knowing that the group is strong when united, and when that union is struck, many things can be accomplished. The Paris Agreement was a remarkable achievement, in part because of the new approach given to adaptation, as a core component of climate action that will be considered in the major processes established, including the Global Stocktake, that will take into consideration the Adaptation Communication to enhance action periodically, and the Transparency Framework, that will track progress with the information reported. For AILAC, the Paris Agreement also represents a platform for continuing to push for more of this progress, built on the G77 and China accomplishments. Important challenges remain ahead to translate the decisions for implementation of the Agreement into action on the ground for the benefit of vulnerable populations and ecosystems. On adaptation, there is an urgent need to advance from the collective aspirational goal to concrete practices and targets at the national and local levels. This will require more effective ways to measure progress and effectiveness in adaptation actions, as well as support to prevent and attend the increasing impacts of climate change. Climate change requires immediate action; but at the same time, one needs to admit that progress under the UNFCCC is slow, and many small steps are needed in order to achieve great outcomes. AILAC will continue to contribute to these efforts with the spirit of urgency and compromise that this challenge demands. For the G77 and China, the Fijian motto of COP 23: “if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together” cannot be truer. The Paris Agreement is the basis for this effort. The G77 and China from this perspective have been in the avant-garde of this debate, promoting the idea that adaptation is not only a local reality, but a process that is crucial for the successful global response to climate change. This very collective nature of adaptation makes it necessary for us, as the international community represented by Parties, to develop tools and mechanisms

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to allow us to build resilience and adapt to future scenarios more effectively and in a timely manner. This is one of the central challenges that is still to come as we implement the Paris Agreement.

Laura Juliana Arciniegas Rojas Coordinator for Environmental Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia. AILAC lead negotiator for Adaptation (2016–2018) and Head of Delegation of Colombia under the UNFCCC since 2017. Double Degree on International Relations from Universidad Externado de Colombia and International University in Geneva, Postgraduate degree on Environmental Law at Universidad Externado de Colombia, [email protected]. Julio Cordano Sagredo Foreign Service officer of Chile since 1996. MA in Public Management, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Member of the Adaptation Committee of UNFCCC (2016–2020). Head of the Department of Climate Change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile since 2012, [email protected].

Chapter 6

Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Cecília Silva Bernardo, Gebru Jember Endalew, Thinley Namgyel and Binyam Yakob Gebreyes

Abstract The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group supports LDCs to negotiate as a bloc at the intergovernmental negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change sessions, to effectively represent their collective needs. As the poorest countries in the world, the 47 LDCs are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The LDC Group represents these nations at the UN climate change negotiations, where we work to secure fair and ambitious action to tackle the global challenge of climate change. Accordingly, the 47 countries that form the LDC Group are actively voicing their interests and needs within the international climate change negotiation process not only within but under the group of G77 and China. The LDC Group has been an advocate for a strong G77 and China position, especially on adaptation. Even though in many instances finding a common position has been difficult among the member countries of the G77 and China, adaptation is one of the issues that makes developing countries one. Keywords LDCs · Adaptation · Particularly vulnerable · Most vulnerable · Least Developed Countries · Global goal on adaptation · Paris Agreement · United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

C. S. Bernardo (B) Climate Change Vulnerabilities Department, Ministry of Environment, Luanda, Angola e-mail: [email protected] G. J. Endalew Institutions Development and Strategic Partnerships, Ethiopia Country Programme, GGGI, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia e-mail: [email protected] T. Namgyel National Environment Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Thimphu, Bhutan e-mail: [email protected] B. Y. Gebreyes International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_6

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The Value of Having a G77 and China Position The survival of the LDCs is dependent on all countries cooperating in a global response to climate change. LDCs are the least responsible for climate change yet have the most to lose due to climate change impacts. LDCs face “unique and unprecedented” challenges to end poverty and achieve sustainable development in the context of escalating climate change risks. Effective adaptation is necessary to deliver the SDGs and to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. Adaptation is vital for the resilience of those people facing both poverty and climate impacts on their livelihoods and wellbeing. Many such people live in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). For such a critical agenda, the LDC Group promotes a common G77 and China position on adaptation. The LDC Group firmly believes adaptation is mainly the agenda of developing countries which requires a common platform and one voice to advocate for better support in terms of means of implementation for adaptation action. Thus, the common objective among member countries in the G77 and China toward increasing the profile of adaptation for better access to finance, capacity building, and technology transfer helps the group find a common position. Even though there is still work remaining to be done, parity between adaptation and mitigation has increased because of the strong unity and common position of countries within the G77 and China. Parity should not only be seen in the allocation of funding toward adaptation and mitigation but the overall recognition of the need for adaptation action. Over the years, the united push for adaptation has led to the recognition of different agendas which never would have surfaced in the negotiation process otherwise. LDCs require adequate finance for implementing national adaptation plans. With increasing climate impacts, adaptation is a matter of survival for poor nations, thus adequate provision of support needs to be recognized, provided, and further enhanced. This has been and is a key common position that brings the G77 and China together and it is better off fighting this big issue as one than individually as subgroups.

Evolution of the LDC Group and Its Involvement in the G77 and China Position on Adaptation Under the UNFCCC negotiations, one of the primary interests of the LDC Group is to address the adverse effects of climate change, while ensuring that the special circumstances of the group are considered. The special needs and circumstances of the LDCs relate to the structural challenges to sustainable development and are characterized by low levels of income, low levels of human assets, and vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. The LDC Group is unique in that countries are considered to be LDCs through a United Nations process that assesses three criteria of low income, weak human assets, and economic vulnerability. LDCs can

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also graduate from this category when thresholds for two of the criteria are met in two consecutive triennial reviews. The vulnerability of LDCs has long been a concern of the international community, and the special situation of the LDCs is also recognized by the UNFCCC in Article 4, paragraph 9, which states that “The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of technology”.1 Presently there are a total of 47 LDCs from Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean regions2 and almost all LDCs are also members of the larger negotiating bloc of the G77 and China and constitute significant membership in other negotiating groups such as the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) and small island developing States (SIDS). While the Convention, adopted in 1992 and in force since 1994, recognized these special needs and circumstance, the LDCs had not been active as a group until the 13th session of the Subsidiary Bodies in September 2000 when the group was formed with Vanuatu as the chair.3 The LDCs emerged as a new negotiating group under the UNFCCC and started to pursue their specific needs in the lead up to the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP 6), particularly under the agenda item on the “Implementation of UNFCCC Articles 4.8 and 4.9 and matters relating to Kyoto Protocol Article 3.14 (adverse effects)”.4

The Emergence of the LDC Negotiating Group Under the UNFCCC The emergence of the LDCs as a group was driven by the generally slow progress in implementing Articles 4.8 and 4.9, and the marginalization of LDC issues in the process5 where LDCs had difficulty in garnering support from other developing countries for their proposals to implement Article 4.9. The marginalization was also evident in other areas such as the low distribution of climate change projects and funding to LDCs during this period.6 The emergence of the LDCs as a negotiating group under the UNFCCC was initially met with some reluctance within the larger 1 Article

4, paragraph 9 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. on the categorization, listing, criteria and status of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is maintained by the United Nation’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs. For more information, visit, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-countrycategory.html. 3 Personal notes, Thinley Namgyel, 2000. 4 The LDCs formally formed as a negotiating group at the 13th Session of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC with Vanuatu as the chair of the group. For records of first statements by LDCs as group see http://enb.iisd.org/climate/sb13/15sept.html and http://www.iisd.ca/climate/sb13/. 5 See report on statement by Vanuatu on behalf of LDCs in “Summary of The Thirteenth Sessions of The Subsidiary Bodies of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 4–15 September 2000, Vol. 12 No. 151, Page 10. 6 Desanker (2004), 192p. 2 Information

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group of developing countries but was eventually also given support by the G777 and China later in the same year in the consultations prior to COP 6. The efforts of the nascent group resulted in COP 6 adopting a resolution8 as an input to the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in 2001, and eventually in the adoption of an LDC Work Program by the seventh Conference of the Parties (COP 7). The LDC Work Program that was adopted at COP 7 included the establishment of a process to prepare and implement national adaptation programs of action (NAPA), and other capacity-building activities for LDCs, which were to be supported by an LDC Expert Group and funded by an LDC Fund (LDCF). In the subsequent years leading up to the negotiations under the Bali Action Plan (2007) to the eventual adoption of the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the national adaptation planning process in Cancun in 2010 at COP 16, the LDC position on adaptation was shaped by several factors. The NAPAs, which had been proposed as a result of difficulties LDCs had faced in preparing national communications, remained one of the primary interests of the group as the group worked to ensure progress in support for the preparation and implementation of NAPAs by all LDCs. At the same time, the experience of the LDCs with NAPAs, which were focused on short-term and urgent needs to reduce vulnerability, would also inform the group’s views on the technical aspects of the planning process for adaptation in the medium to longer term. The position of the LDC Group in pushing forward these ideas in the adaptation negotiations would again be influenced by the issue of the special consideration of LDCs under Article 4.9, and dynamics with other developing countries within the G77 and China.

The LDCs Before Copenhagen In the years leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the LDCs’ views on adaptation did not diverge significantly from those of other developing countries and the LDC group generally supported the larger developing countries’ approach for a unified approach to measures for ensuring adaptation in the medium to long term. Based on their experience of the NAPAs, the group did, however, propose during negotiations under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) that the NAPAs could be applied to all developing countries and scaled up to address longer term adaptation needs. This proposal was made in view of the particularly long time taken from establishing the NAPA in

7 Ibid. 8 Resolution

2/CP.6 of 25 November 2000 was adopted by the Sixth Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC as input to Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in May 2001, where the “Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001–2010” was adopted.

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2001 to realizing the guidelines and support for the implementation of NAPAs.9 This proposal evolved into the preparation of National Adaptation Programs as part of an Adaptation Framework10 and the overall ideas and principles were generally like the proposals of other members of the G77 and China. The LDCs were also of the view that the need for finance and technology support were to be ensured for adaptation in all developing countries although considering the particular needs of the LDCs and SIDS.11 While the LDCs had been supporting an overall process for medium- to long-term adaptation by all developing countries, their call for considering the particular needs for LDCs including flexibilities did not receive universal support within the G77 and China starting from Bali in 2007 to Copenhagen in 2009. Over this time period, the LDC adaptation negotiators faced consistent opposition from a few developing countries toward any mention of the “particular needs of LDCs” in the group position of the G77 and China.12 This reluctance for any special consideration for LDCs as provided in Article 4.9, coupled with the background of lack of a meaningful outcome in the overall negotiations in Copenhagen would affect the positioning of the LDCs on adaptation. Through 2010, the LDC Group with its underlying position as the most vulnerable group of countries to climate change, but with the least capacity to respond, led to the group holding a position that would ensure there would be an adaptation outcome for LDCs in the absence of support from the larger group of developing countries for the particular concerns of LDCs.

The LDC Group and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Process In the post Cancun period, the LDCs’ focus on adaptation centered on ensuring progress in the preparation and implementation of NAPAs and the rolling out of the technical details of the national adaptation plan (NAP) process and securing support for the preparation of NAPs. Similar to the experience with NAPAs, rolling out the support elements such as guidelines, modalities, and financing to start formulating NAPs would take several years of negotiations with the first projects for NAP-specific activities from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the LDCF being received directly by LDCs only in 2016 and 2017.13

9 Submission

by Lesotho on Behalf of the Least Developed Countries on Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and the components of the agreed outcome to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session (AWG-LCA). Submitted on 30 April 2009. 10 Submission by Lesotho for LDCs on AWG-LCA: Adaptation submitted on 8 June 2009. 11 LDC Position on Adaptation for AWG-LCA finalized on 02 October 2009. 12 Personal notes, Thinley Namgyel 2007–2009. 13 See report of GCF and the GEF to the Conference of Parties. The dates of approval of financing by the funds and receipt of funds by recipient LDCs do vary as do the types of support with some

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The LDCs also led the push to clarify that the NAPs were not just a national process for planning and mainstreaming but that NAPs themselves would also be plans and priorities for adaptation that would be communicated internationally to the UNFCCC.14 This was also driven by the position of the group that adaptation support measures and processes should not be reduced to merely process-oriented activities of institutions and a policy of mainstreaming, which ran the risk of downplaying the planning and implementation of adaptation actions. While the LDCs continued to negotiate for financial support for the LDCs to begin formulating NAPs, the group also worked within the G77 and China to ensure that other developing countries wishing to use the NAP process would be able to do so, and worked closely with the G77 and China and other subgroups in the review of progress of the guidelines and the implementation of COP decisions on NAPs.

The LDC Group and the Negotiation of the Paris Agreement With regard to the positions on adaptation under the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP), the LDCs were in agreement in ensuring a unified approach of the G77 and China to pursue parity in action on adaptation and mitigation. The group also maintained the position that the costs of adaptation should be supported by developed countries based on principles in the Convention and was averse to the risks of mainstreaming adaptation actions completely into national development planning. Based on the experience of the NAPs, the LDC Group chose the NAPs as the vehicle for communicating adaptation priorities, implementation and support needs under the new agreement. This position was taken in view of reducing the burden of multiple reporting requirements, and also given the considerable time and resources that had already been spent in elaborating the NAP process including the technical guidelines for NAPs that had been determined to be applicable to all developing countries by the Adaptation Committee15 and that some NAPs had already been submitted by both LDCs and non-LDC parties. However, just as the membership of the G77 and China is large and diverse, this view was not agreeable to all members of the larger group of developing countries. The LDCs were, however, open to other proposals provided that the minimum elements of communicating national priorities and needs for adaptation at the international level would be captured and that there would be no additional burdens for adaptation planning and reporting given that the NAP process was already well underway. The differing views on the conveyance of adaptation priorities and plans support specifically for NAP formulation and others nebulously described as support for elements of the NAP process. 14 The decision 3/CP.24 by COP in 2014 at Lima on NAPs would for the first time explicitly mention that LDCs and other interested developing countries could forward NAPs documents as an out of their national NAP process to NAP Central of the UNFCCC. 15 See reports of the Adaptation Committee to the COP in 2013 and 2014 based on its mandate to develop modalities and guidelines for NAPs to support non-LDC developing countries.

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would result in the Adaptation Communication as the primary means of conveying adaptation needs and priorities in the Paris Agreement and the different vehicles of NAPs, NDCs and National Communications as the means of communicating these needs and priorities. In addition to the technical aspects of enhancing adaptation action under the new agreement, the LDCs also sought the consideration of the specific needs and special situations of LDCs in the context of support, communication, and individual action.16 Such considerations were meant to ensure flexibilities in reporting and support arising from the low capacities of LDCs. This issue of special needs and circumstances of LDCs would however again be mired in the unresolved question of vulnerability.17 During the negotiations, the moment the special needs of LDCs were proposed on the basis of Article 4.9, other subgroups would latch on to the proposal to be listed for special consideration. The issue of vulnerability would take up a considerable amount of time within the G77 and China to the detriment of being able to effectively coordinate a full position on adaptation. For the LDCs, the issue of vulnerability to climate change is viewed as different from the classification of countries with least developed country status, as the LDC classification is essentially a capacity issue determined outside of the UNFCCC process. As a result of this method of classifying LDCs, LDC countries span different geographic regions and different sub-groups of the G77 and China such as the SIDS and AGN, while at the same time also having members that do not fall within any of these subgroups. Given this context, and that the issue had implications for the new agreement, the LDC Group also debated the issue of vulnerability and decided to follow the principle of not harming other developing countries, opting to neither oppose nor support any other particular groupings of countries on the issue of vulnerability, and thus the special consideration of the LDCs was pursued as a capacity issue recognized under Article 4.9 of the Convention.18

LDCs Contribution to G77 and China Common Position The LDCs have always believed that there is strength in union. Despite being the most vulnerable group, the LDC Group plays a very active role in the G77 and China adaptation negotiations, and operates in the spirit of cooperation and flexibility, willing to give up some of the group’s interests in the interest of reaching a common position as a larger group with a more comprehensive approach that doesn’t harm any group or Party within the G77 and China. At the Tianjin negotiations in October 2010, the proposal for the National Adaptation Programs as a process for LDCs to implement medium- to long-term adaptation 16 LDC

adaptation group position in 2015. 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. 18 Personal notes during the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Thinley Namgyel, 2015. 17 Decision

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action was elaborated by building on the features and elements of the short-term National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPA).19 Not surprisingly, the idea of an adaptation process only for LDCs supported by the LEG, received support from developed country Parties, and the National Adaptation Programs were eventually adopted as the process to formulate and implement National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) for LDCs with an invitation for other interested developing countries to engage in the same process. With regard to the institutions and principles for adaptation eventually established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the LDC Group supported the overall position of the G77 and China with only the added need for LDC-specific support of the LEG to be maintained and seeking the representation of LDCs in newly constituted bodies. Recalling the Paris Agreement negotiations, the Least Developed Countries strongly supported the G77 and China position on the need to see parity between mitigation ambition and adaptation needs. It is important to highlight that not every G77 and China position was a priority or the best option for the LDCs but the spirit of unity and the need to achieve consensus among developing countries influenced the group to opt for a position that would benefit all. For instance, it was important for the LDCs to be specifically referred to in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement but thinking of a broader result for all developing country Parties, the LDCs agreed to maintain a position that could benefit all developing countries, for example, agreeing to language including “developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable,” as stated in Article 7.2. After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the LDC Chair, Giza Gaspar Martins from Angola, praised it as ‘the best outcome we could have’,20 stating that in terms of adaptation ambition the Paris Agreement reflects the main interests of the group. During negotiations of the Agreement, one of the most important issues the group pushed for was a strong and legally binding instrument that among other issues reflected the LDCs special circumstances in implementing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) as per Article 4.9 of the Convention. This is reflected in the preamble of the Paris Agreement. In addition to that, the LDC Group pushed for the Agreement to have effective provisions for implementing adaptation actions rather than merely establishing adaptation planning processes.21 LDC countries struggle to implement adaptation without enough capacity building, funding, and technology transfer. For that to happen it was necessary to have clear provisions in the Agreement. These provisions are reflected in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. In Article 7.2, Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with different dimensions taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable 19 Personal

notes, Thinley Namgyel 2010. the Paris Climate Agreement means for vulnerable nations. The New Yorker-Dec 15, 2015 4:40 pm. 21 Abeysinghe, A., Craft, B., & Tenzing, J. (2016). (REP.). International Institute for Environment and Development. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02657. 20 What

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to the adverse effects of climate change. Article 7.4 correlates mitigation and adaptation, with Parties recognizing that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs. As a result of the ask for parity between mitigation and adaptation, the Paris Agreement states in its Article 9.1 that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to mitigation and adaptation. This provision reflects one of the LDCs’ interests that was made possible through efforts to achieve a common position in the G77 and China on adaptation.

LDCs and the Paris Agreement Implementation from 2016 to 2018 In the most recent negotiations under the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP), the LDCs continued to work within the G77 and China with a unified voice to complete the elaboration of the details for implementation of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement and other related issues. Although COP 21 delivered on most of the core elements, there was remaining work for Parties. Since the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference, countries gathered to develop rules to guide the implementation of the Paris Agreement, colloquially referred to as the “Paris Rulebook”. The major work remaining on adaptation under the Paris Agreement was on matters relating to Article 7 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of decision 1/CP.21. The LDC group did not differ much in its position from the previous understanding of the primary purpose of the adaptation communication to convey priorities, implementation and support needs, plans, and actions for adaptation and recognizing the flexibilities in vehicles, highlighting the preference of the LDCs to use the NAPs.22 With this, the group was once again open to a simple structure and clear guidance for the adaptation communication and provided the primary purpose of communicating support needs, plans, and actions for adaptation was to capture them as primary elements, and the group was not strongly opposed to any other elements as part of the adaptation communication. The decision on the guidance for the adaptation communication and the preference of the LDCs to prioritize NAPs as the vehicle also closed one of the gaps identified by the LDCs in the guidelines for the NAPs process. The form and structure of the NAPs as a document had not been covered in either the initial guidelines or the Technical Guidance for the NAP process. The “elements of an adaptation communication” in the annex to the decision on the adaptation communication from COP 24, and the flexibilities in how the adaptation communication can be applied across a variety of 22 Submissions

by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Group of Least Developed Countries on agenda item 4: Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement. Submitted in March and September 2017.

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vehicles, now provides the guidance to LDCs and any other developing countries that wish to use NAPs as the vehicle for the adaptation communication. At the same time, the choice of submitting an adaptation communication and the flexibilities in vehicles as provided in the Paris Agreement, and the diverse manner in which this information may be provided, while proving convenient for countries, may also pose challenges in the near to medium term. The experience of the LDCs from the NAPA to NAPs shows that it takes time before support and clarity in preparing and implementing another new modality for adaptation in the UNFCCC process can be realized. The developing countries in the G77 and China, with their diversity in membership, also now have more diversity and flexibility in how adaptation planning is pursued and communicated across several processes, which contrasts with the clearer planning and reporting for mitigation. These diverse pathways for adaptation ahead may add to the complexity in enhancing adaptation action. However, based on the experience of the LDCs in working with other developing countries with diverse interests and capacities on the critical issue of adaptation, it is evident that there is strength in unity and that the developing countries can continue to work toward ensuring the common goal of reducing vulnerability and adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change.

Final Reflections Adaptation is the top priority for the group of the world’s poorest countries who contribute the least to climate change yet suffer some of its worst impacts. Therefore, LDCs are aware that key elements such as capacity building, technology transfer, finance, and others are the basis for the development and implementation of longterm strategies to achieve the the global goal on adaptation (GGA) and for effective implementation of the Agreement. To this effect, the LDC group has launched several initiatives focusing on effective adaptation and resilience, renewable energy, and capacity building. The LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR), launched in 2018, aims to develop a long-term LDC vision for adapting towards a climate resilient future by 2050. The LDC vision will be in line with LDC needs and priorities and will outline effective adaptation and resilience mechanisms to further build national institutions, domestic systems and capabilities, and wider national efforts to address poverty. For example, the LDC group launched in 2017 the Least Developed Countries Universities Consortium on Climate Change (LUCCC), which is a South-South Consortium of ten Universities from across LDCs to enhance knowledge on climate change through climate capacity building, with a focus on adaptation measures, such as education and research. LUCCC aims to network and develop the capacity of South-South universities to develop common research projects and implement teaching and training programs in different climate change aspects.

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The survival of the LDCs is dependent on all countries cooperating in a global response to climate change. The Least Developed Countries play a crucial role in the G77 and China discussions, mostly for being the major group inside it.

References Desanker P (2004) The NAPA primer. In: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG). Bonn, Germany Development Policy & Analysis Division|Dept of Economic & Social Affairs|United Nations (2019) Least Developed Countries (LDCs)|Economic Analysis & Policy Division. https://www. un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html. Accessed 16 July 2019 Enb.iisd.org (2019) ENB @ UNFCCC SB-13: 15 September. http://enb.iisd.org/climate/sb13/ 15sept.html. Accessed 16 July 2019 Enb.iisd.org (2019). UNFCCC SB-13 summary and analysis. https://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12151e. html Accessed 16 July 2019 The New Yorker (2019). https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-paris-climateagreement-means-for-vulnerable-nations. Accessed 16 July 2019 Un.org (2000) Resolution 2/CP.6 of 25 November 2000, Brussels program of action for the least developed countries for the decade 2001–2010. https://www.un.org/en/conf/ldc/pdf/ aconf191d13.en.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2019 Unfccc.int (2007) Decision 1/CP.13 Bali action plan. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/ eng/06a01.pdf. Accessed 16 July 2019 Unfccc.int (2009) Submission by Lesotho for LDCs on AWG-LCA: adaptation. https://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/misc04p02.pdf Accessed 16 July 2019 Unfccc.int (2017) Submissions by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Group of Least Developed Countries on agenda item 4: Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement. https://www4.unfccc. int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/786_322_131391617225915665-Submission% 20by%20LDC%20Group%20on%20adaptation%20communications.pdf Accessed 16 July 2019 UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, FCCC/INFORMAL/84 GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bonn, Germany United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change (2018) Decision 3/CP.24. https://undocs. org/FCCC/CP/2018/10/ADD.1 Accessed 16 July 2019

Chapter 7

Overview on Climate Change Adaptation Negotiations to Operationalize the Paris Agreement Carlos Nicolás Zambrano Sánchez

Abstract Climate change multilateral negotiations are a tough and long process due to the fact that the mode of taking decisions by consensus is quite hard when hundreds of people come to an agreement. In that regard, the Group of 77 and China is crucial in the adaptation cluster, given the high relevance this action is for developing countries. The three-year process to operationalize the Paris Agreement from the adaptation perspective demanded rich and extended discussions among Parties in order to understand the provisions and implications, as well as the positions of different groups. In a cooperative mode of work, the G77 and China was able to maintain a common position until the very end of the process, securing most of the groups’ positions. Keywords Adaptation · Developing countries · Negotiation · Nationally determined contribution · Paris Agreement

Introduction The Paris Agreement set under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides a platform where country Parties can interact under the principles of the Convention to address climate change. Adaptation is anchored in the overall Paris Agreement (PA) and its Work Program (PAWP) and is of utmost importance for developing countries. In that regard, the leadership of the Group of 77 and China (G77 and China) was crucial, due to the constant work to highlight and increase the importance of adaptation as part of climate action during the whole process of negotiation. Strong focus regarding adaptation has been put forward in the PAWP, especially with Nationally Determined Contributions, the Enhanced Transparency Framework, as well as in the overall structure of climate finance.

C. N. Zambrano Sánchez (B) Ministry of Environment Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_7

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This chapter intends to describe my personal experience from the role I undertook in the climate change adaptation negotiations process to operationalize the PA through the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP).

Collaboration with the G77 and China A strong commitment from developing country groups as part of the G77 and China was showcased from the very beginning of the process to operationalize the Paris Agreement. Because there was not enough clarity, groups put forward different positions towards the negotiation process of the PAWP. In this regard, for the G77 and China to build a common position, the experience is that this is only achieved by building trust during the negotiations. This was not an easy task. Therefore, as a key component of climate change negotiations, the trust required to keep different groups on board demands a long and lasting exchange of views and positions within different groups of the G77 and China. Building trust among each other’s groups and their thematic coordinators allowed the G77 and China to keep working through the three years of PAWP negotiations, coordinating during hundreds of hours in different sites and formats, as well as in the formal process during negotiation slots with developed countries. As developing countries, adaptation action and finance are the natural spots where common interests can be reflected. It was such an important task to keep working together and putting in place all the efforts needed not to let any views left behind during the process. Principles guiding the G77 and China negotiators such as the principle of doing “no harm” to each other’s positions are crucial to achieve one voice for the entire group in the negotiation process. However, it could be challenging given the diversity of groups’ positions. In that regard, the groups worked closely in order to build a common position, with the facilitation of the G77 and China coordinator for adaptation. To keep the principles on board required efforts at different levels, from the negotiators during the meetings, as well as at the level of Heads of Delegation, where the groups had to come to an agreement to maintain one voice for the G77 and China as much as possible. Recognizing this task was not achieved in all the cross-cutting red lines from each other’s groups, the value added to maintaining one voice in the process is remarkable. The experience especially is focused in the collaboration with G77 and China towards the articulation and rationale behind the operationalization of the provisions regarding adaptation and the nationally determined contribution (NDC). Given that the political agreement to include adaptation as part of or a component of the NDC was already set in the PA, it was important to work towards the operationalization of these provisions through the entire PAWP including guidance for NDCs, the adaptation communication, the biennial transparency reports (BTRs), and the public registries of the Paris Agreement, among other elements. Rich cooperation and collaboration among the groups of the G77 and China were crucial for the whole process. Even in the moments where disagreement was

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clear and cross-cutting red lines threatened, with the implementation of the “no harm” principle, groups tried to work together as far as they could until the very last moment of the process. It was evident that having the groups of the G77 and China, representing more than 130 countries, losing one voice as a whole group harmed important elements in each other group’s positions at the final stage. As well as in the bigger group of the G77 and China, it was essential to spend several hours coordinating the common position of the sub-groups, and not only under the adaptation cluster but also on the other topics under the PAWP. This work provided an important input for the discussions in order to provide strong coherence in the operationalization of the PA under its different clusters. With a clearer pathway in the understanding of the PAWP, the position fed the discussions, in an attempt not to lose what was already decided in the PA.

Incentives to Collaborate with the G77 and China A country or group of countries will definitely not be able to cover all the topics, details, dynamics of each cluster of negotiations. Therefore, it has been relevant to work in “tandem” in the G77 and China during the whole negotiating process. For that purpose, the experience started with an active exchange of views, stating positions during internal coordination meetings of the bigger group of developing countries. Hence, significant work to align views was needed before and during the period of negotiations. Keeping the group’s positions safe while formal negotiations are taking place is part of the incentive to collaborate with the G77 and China. A coordinated and “crystal clear” communication during internal coordination meetings in the G77 and China is needed. Yet this is quite a difficult task given that some group’s positions might harm one or more other groups. Generally, the “no harm” principle applies when one group has one position that might harm other groups. Under the principle, the G77 and China will not support a position that might result in harm to one sub-group, but the sub-group could state it. Hence, the sub-group’s position is excluded from the common position. Therefore, given the situation where a sub-group wanted to state a harmful position in the formal negotiations, other sub-groups might remain silent or react to defend their positions. In that scenario, the G77 and China might not be able to state anything related to that sub-group’s position and continue with one voice. The difficult situations were on one hand that during the process there were occasions when the G77 and China had to maintain all the positions on board, even those sub-group’s positions that might result in harm to others. Otherwise, the G77 and China would not be able to state anything as a group. Therefore, in that scenario, the “no harm” principle was not able to be applied given that positions were stated including those positions that might result in harm. On the other hand, there were occasions when the views from Parties, especially those positions resulting in harm, were not captured in a balanced manner. Therefore, a sub-group might not be able to

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accept the progress captured in the negotiations from the facilitators. Hence, it could be understood that the G77 and China might have lost the one voice given that some sub-groups might accept the way views were captured and others not. Therefore, the lesson learned is not to confuse the “no harm” principle with no G77 and China position. Due to the fact that, if the sub-groups do not agree in every single point including the acceptance or not of the progress captured, the agreed ones could be stated by the G77 and China, and the harmful ones or non-acceptance of the progress captured could be stated by the sub- groups. This situation does not imply that the G77 and China lost its common position. Implementing the “no harm” principle under the adaptation cluster was challenging at times. While adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change is an issue of critical importance to the survival of all developing countries, the nature of the impacts varies significantly across the world. This often means that the needs and priorities of developing countries also vary significantly. Essentially for that reason, there were moments where the G77 and China struggled to find a common voice. Notwithstanding, implementing the “no harm” principle in the adaptation cluster helped to give developing countries a stronger union on the “floor” during formal negotiations with developed countries—given the fact that it urges developing country groups to arrive at compromise solutions in order to go forward in the process and with that the communication and exchange of views were the most important tasks. In this regard, bearing in mind that for some groups operationalizing adaptation in the NDC was a red line; the discussions around it took a pivotal role in the whole process. Therefore, negotiators spent many hours coordinating and exchanging views to understand the way forward to secure that adaptation would not be lost in the NDC. At the final stage, enough leverage was achieved and even developed country groups ratified what was agreed in the PA including a specific clause that gives the opportunity for Parties to use the further guidance on the adaptation communication to include adaptation in the NDC. In conclusion, a unified voice from more than 130 countries of the world definitely shifts how the positions are reflected in the negotiation text and final outputs. In addition, building knowledge and understanding among developing countries is crucial and a matter of urgency for our populations, in order to empower the adaptation process and strengthen the overall outcome towards an enhanced adaptation framework.

Towards a Common Position in the G77 and China It is fundamental to firmly commit to working towards a common position and not to harm each other’s group positions in the G77 and China. In that regard, all efforts were made to maintain coordination and exchanges during internal meetings, as well as supporting the G77 and China position in the formal negotiations. However, it has been a long process to understand each other’s positions, clarify them and actually

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prioritize them in order to push forward internally and externally in the G77 and China. During the three years, it took to develop the PAWP, it was essential to focus on keeping in the discussion the importance of i. operationalizing the PA applying the principles of the UNFCCC especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC); ii. operationalizing adaptation in the NDC; iii. giving coherence to the nature of the information in the NDC (forward looking or ex ante information) and the BTR (backward looking or ex post information); iv. achieving enhanced mobilization of climate financial resources towards adaptation including support to develop the adaptation communication as part or as a component of the NDC; v. not isolating the adaptation communication from the NDC through the PA public registries; and vi. operationalizing adaptation actions with mitigation co-benefits. It is important to highlight that even having some cross-cutting red lines with other groups, developing countries groups made efforts to exchange views and build a common understanding through the facilitation of G77 and China coordination. Applying the “no harm” principle and cooperation, developing country groups worked towards the understanding and assimilation of those sensible positions, showing flexibility especially in the formal negotiations where developed countries may have pushed. In that regard, the facilitation of the G77 and China played a key role; due to that fact, internal compromises were made in order to have one voice among developing countries until the very last moment of the negotiations. The experience provides a clear sense that the common position of the G77 and China on adaptation is of utmost importance. Indeed, almost all the elements put forward were part of the common position of the G77 and China. Therefore, since developing countries are the flagbearers for adaptation, all efforts need to be made in order to build and achieve a common position.

Contributions to the Collective Position of the G77 and China The contributions constructed through the process of internal coordination within G77 and China, as well as on the floor during formal negotiations, went through different agenda items to operationalize the PA and are expressed as follows. The PA and the PAWP are strictly agreements to operationalize the UNFCCC. Furthermore, the principles and elements of the Convention had to be reflected during the whole process. The PA and the PAWP must not supersede the UNFCCC. Therefore, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities was one of the most delicate issues discussed between developing and developed countries. The task was to come up with agreement in order to implement those principles through the provisions of the PAWP. Adaptation is an integral part of the UNFCCC, the PA and the PAWP, a priority for developing countries worldwide and a challenge given the increasing extreme weather events. As a matter of fact, the NDC is one of the pivotal instruments of

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the PA regime, where Articles 7.10 and 7.111 already state the agreement of Parties to include adaptation as part or as a component of the NDC. Hence, it was crucial to operationalize those provisions in the PAWP. Certainly, for developing countries, adaptation is a priority and a difficult task taking into account the lack of financial support to increase adaptive capacity. Therefore, adaptation included in the NDC was decisive to highlight the fact that developing countries’ focus is adaptation, as well as to mobilize finance for adaptation action through the PA architecture. The BTR is as important as the NDC given the enhanced transparency required in order for Parties to maintain global efforts to tackle climate change. Furthermore, the BTR will allow Parties to report on the actions they undertake to implement the PA. Therefore, strong links between the NDC and the BTR are put in place especially those regarding the nature of the information they provide. Hence, giving a coherent rationale behind the nature of the information in the NDC and the BTR was crucial to assure consistency in the implementation of the PA; especially in the actual contribution, where the NDC includes it, and the BTR mainly reports on the basis of what is stated in the NDC. In addition, in order not to add a burden to developing countries, the NDC and the BTR should not overlap. In fact, the BTR will serve as a reporting communication with mainly backward looking or ex post information while on the other hand, the NDC mainly includes forward-looking or ex ante information given that Parties communicate their contributions for a period in the future. Developing countries pushed forward during the entire PAWP process the need to enhance mobilization of support for adaptation. There were different negotiations where the discussions on this issue took place. Regarding adaptation in the NDC, the issue of support was deeply important given the fact that without support developing countries might not be able to develop adaptation information as part or as a component of the NDC. In addition, a new chapter on support for adaptation is centered on the reporting of information regarding support where developing countries may communicate their adaptation support needs and developed countries must communicate adaptation support provided. Furthermore, under this framework, the principle of CBDR-RC is clearly implemented. Specific methodologies will be in place in the coming years in order to assess adaptation needs without placing undue burden on developing countries. These methodologies will help developing countries to develop this information given that quantifying support needs is an issue where there is little experience worldwide. In addition, providing this information will likely help set a Global Goal on Adaptation on financial support for adaptation, 1 Annex of the Decision 1/CP.21—Paris Agreement. Article 7.10. Each Party should, as appropriate,

submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties. Annex of the Decision 1/CP.21—Paris Agreement. Article 7.11. The adaptation communication referred to in Paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 2, and/or a national communication.

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given that support needs might be higher than the financial flows for adaptation. Quantifying support needs will facilitate setting and measuring this Goal. Public registries under the PA provided for in Articles 4.12 and 7.12 are important to the operationalization of the PAWP. Therefore, there was a strong need to have consistency behind the information of those public registries, especially taking into account that Parties might decide where the adaptation information in the NDC will appear. Therefore, it was not an option to exclude adaptation information from the NDC as part or as a component of it. Furthermore, there will be Parties interested in not including adaptation in the NDC, because they may choose to implement Articles 7.10 and 7.11 through the National Adaptation Plan, National Communication or BTR. Recognizing that all of those documents have digital platforms to record information, adaptation information in the form of an “Adaptation Communication” as part or as a component of the NDC needed to be included in the public registry referred to in Article 4.12. If a Party chooses to use the public registry referred in Article 7.12, even duplicating information from other digital platforms including the one set for Article 4.12, they will be allowed to do that. Therefore, it was crucial not to isolate adaptation information from the NDC in a simple process to record and register the NDC. Adaptation actions are key for developing countries even to quantify emission reductions. For those Parties that due to their national circumstances choose to contribute especially with adaptation actions, operationalizing provisions in the PA regarding adaptation actions with mitigation co-benefits were a key part of the process. Therefore, the rationale behind this position provides countries with the opportunity to incorporate emissions reductions from different adaptation actions in their communications and with that to fulfill the target agreed in their NDCs. The contribution made to the common position of the G77 and China, and further to the whole process, was to set the ground from the principles of the Convention, not to renegotiate the PA, using all the provisions to give coherence to the PAWP, and finally working together with different streams in order to have a common rationale for operationalizing the PA.

Reflected Interests in the Outcome of the PAWP Negotiations The PAWP process as every negotiation system ended with an “equally unhappy” outcome. Given the cross-cutting red lines, not just internally in the G77 and China but as stated by developed countries, facilitators of the negotiations, the UNFCCC secretariat, and the Presidency of COP 24, had a hard task to achieve the balance required to have all Parties on board—a delicate balance where explicit or implicit interests from all groups might appear at the end. Taking into account that the PAWP achieved agreement regarding the provisions of the adaptation cluster of the PA, the outcome is understood as follows. Even though explicit information regarding the CBDR-RC principle is not in the further guidance on the adaptation communication, it is clear enough that in terms

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of the information regarding support, developing countries will communicate adaptation support needs and developed countries will communicate adaptation support provided.2 In addition, the support to develop the information of the Adaptation Communication in the NDC follows the principles of the Convention and it will be allocated to developing countries. Acknowledging that Parties already decided at the political level in the PA that adaptation will be included in the NDC as stated in the Articles 7.10 and 7.11, the PAWP had to provide the rationale and consistency required to include that information. Therefore, an explicit clause3 was included in the Katowice decision in order to keep the agreement achieved in the PA in the PAWP outcomes. Regarding the nature of the information to be included in the NDC4 and BTR, there is a specific provision included in the PAWP outcomes that provides the consistency required in order for practitioners, at national level, to develop new or updated NDCs with forward looking or ex-ante information, and based on that, reporting on progress in the BTRs. Although, the provision is not mandatory, including it in the decision provides Parties with the understanding not to duplicate information in the NDC and BTR, and skip this eventual undue burden on developing countries. Certainly, the financial support required to develop adaptation information under the guidance on the adaptation communication as part or as a component of the NDC fell at the very last moment. The G77 and China stated the importance to have at least the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) on board to provide support for developing countries to prepare and implement the

2 Annex

of the Decision 9/CMA.1 “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement”. (d) Implementation and support needs of, and provision of support to, developing country Parties. 3 Decision 9/CMA.1 “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement”. Paragraph 3. Recalls that, as provided in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement, each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update an adaptation communication, and that the adaptation communication shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement and/or a national communication. 4 Decision 9/CMA.1 “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement”. Paragraph 8. Further invites Parties to include, as appropriate, ex ante information in their adaptation communication, based on the elements identified in the annex.

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adaptation communication. Notwithstanding, in the final version that provision5 was modified deleting implementation support and mention of the GCF. The discussion among Parties on the public registries6 provided for in the PA was challenging. Given that there was no G77 and China position on this matter, it was important to reflect the understanding strongly on the floor. However, discussions allowed for a common understanding with other groups of negotiators ending with a decision that was consistent for different group’s positions. The key discussion was how to frame the provisions in order not to duplicate information, impose the way Parties register and record their communications, and lose adaptation information from the NDC in the act of recording it in the public registry established in Article 4.12 of the PA. Finally, prototypes for the public registries were developed where Parties had the opportunity to consider and address any flaws in their design during COP25. The conversation continues. Definitely, adaptation actions with mitigation co-benefits were one of the most difficult issues on the floor both for developing countries and developed countries. It was very hard to maintain this point as part of the discussions and outputs during the three years of PAWP negotiations. Finally, the option7 for Parties to communicate this information under the adaptation cluster was provided in the guidance, as well as in different provisions under the mitigation and transparency clusters.

Final Reflections On the basis of the platform of exchange and coordination that the G77 and China provides to its sub-groups, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation. It is quite a difficult task taking into account the cross-cutting red lines that could potentially harm one or another group and make a common position under the G77 and China difficult. However, with additional exchange, at least most of those cross-cutting red lines were resolved. For instance, developing a common understanding can benefit from more intersessional work, as well as more time to coordinate. Furthermore, for 5 Decision 9/CMA.1 “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter

alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement”. Paragraph 20. Invites the Global Environment Facility, in line with its existing mandate, to consider channeling support to developing country Parties for the preparation and submission of their adaptation communications, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, and/or a national communication. 6 Decision 10/CMA.1 “Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement”. 7 Annex of the Decision 9/CMA.1 “Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement”. (f) Adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans, including those that result in mitigation co-benefits.

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those remaining cross-cutting red lines, targeted work is especially required at the Head of Delegations level. Developing country groups kept working closely as the G77 and China in order to build, support, and maintain a unified voice. In that regard, hundreds of hours were required not only in the coordination of the G77 and China but in the internal coordination of the sub-groups themselves. Consequently, during the meetings and sessions throughout the PAWP negotiating process the understanding among developing countries about the provisions to be included largely increased. The work of coordinating the G77 and China is crucial due to the fact that one voice on the floor representing over 130 countries leads discussions. However, that big representation comes with a big responsibility, working very hard to make one step further at every session. Not letting any position behind either as a G77 and China common position or as progress captured from individual sub-groups’ contributions is of utmost importance. However, the cooperation among developing countries through the implementation of the “no harm” principle is surely the best expression of the importance of adaptation for our nations. It provides the opportunity to work closely to resolve crossed red lines as well as to state strongly a unified voice in the negotiations. Even with three years to develop provisions to operationalize the PA through the PAWP, there was a big challenge given the capacity of delegations in terms of quantity of negotiators covering different agenda items, the level of understanding of each of the clusters not only internally as groups but in the bigger room in formal negotiations, and the final hours of negotiation. Probably, less negotiation time might have resulted in the same output taking into account that the red lines became more entrenched over time, and in the final hours of the process, the text was in the hands of the COP President where red lines could be less easily defended. On the other hand, the level of understanding, especially regarding the implications of each provision, might not have matured enough to end with the coherence between different clusters under the PAWP, namely, adaptation, mitigation, transparency, finance, among others. Finally, given that developing countries are generally unable to participate with enough delegates to cover the hundreds of meetings even in one of the PAWP clusters, the three years of the process appears to have been required.

Carlos Nicolás Zambrano Sánchez Environmental Engineer, with experience as climate change adaptation specialist, manager for climate projects, Ecuador’s negotiator for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate, and focal point for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Adaptation coordinator for the Like-Minded Developing Countries Group during the development of the PAWP.

Part III

The Lead Coordinators of the G77 and China on Adaptation to Climate Change

Chapter 8

From the Cancun Adaptation Framework to the Paris Agreement Lucas Di Pietro Paolo

Abstract In almost 15 years of representation under the United Nations, the world has witnessed how the treatment of adaptation has evolved at international level (and the repercussions this evolution has had at national level): from the beginning of the negotiation of what would later be called the Nairobi Work Program (NWP), with debates as to whether climate change was the product of human-induced climate change, to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and its subsequent implementation, where, based on scientific evidence, there is no longer a margin of doubt in establishing the relationship among anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and the related spectrum of effects that are materializing today. The advances made during the period that led to the Cancun Adaptation Framework were of great significance and far-reaching. They allowed for the establishment of different lines of work that in the following years evolved, incorporating new elements, and allowing adaptation to gain space in the international agenda with subsequent internalization within countries. Today it is fair to say that what was once more of a political discourse, today is a reality: adaptation is as relevant to developing countries and is more important than mitigation. Independent of the internal differences that arose during the years under the adaptation discussions, which were not minor challenges, we always knew that our strength was in reaching internal consensus and positions. It was clear from the beginning that if Argentina (or any of the other country for that matter) was required to negotiate on its own, it would have no chance of reaching the outcomes achieved through the unity of capabilities and mutual support in the G77 and China. Keywords UNFCCC · AWG-LCA · Cancun Adaptation Framework · Adaptation Committee · SCCF · LDCF · Green Climate Fund · ADP · NWP

L. Di Pietro Paolo (B) Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Tucuman 633, Buenos Aires, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_8

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Introduction This chapter is written in the context of my experience in the area of adaptation to climate change in the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development of Argentina since the end of 2005. This experience at the international level of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention) began also in 2005 during the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP 11) which was held in Montreal, Canada. Argentina recently started the implementation of the national adaptation plan (NAP) for which it has received funding from the Green Climate Fund through its window dedicated to funding the preparation of national adaptation plans. During the years involved in the multilateral forum, I have performed a number of different functions. Initially was the responsibility of representing Argentina in negotiations related to adaptation issues, particularly those under the scope of the Nairobi Work Program on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation, which was established in 2005 at COP 11. Between COP 16 in Cancun and COP 17 in Durban, I had the opportunity of coordinating adaptation for the G77 and China, which implied representing the group under the process of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) established by decision 1/CP.13, known as the Bali Action Plan (2007). Furthermore, Argentina was offered the opportunity to co-facilitate the negotiations on loss and damage at COP 18 in Doha in 2012, and again during the recent COP 24 in Katowice. During the first period we co-facilitated with Canada, and the last time with Australia. In almost 15 years of representation under the United Nations, the world has witnessed how the treatment of adaptation has evolved at international level (and the repercussions this evolution has had at national level): from the beginning of the negotiation of what would later be called the Nairobi Work Program (NWP), with debates as to whether climate change was the product of human-induced climate change, to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and its subsequent implementation, where, based on scientific evidence, there is no longer a margin of doubt in establishing the relationship among anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and the related spectrum of effects that are materializing today.

Inception of Adaptation Under the Convention The NWP was the first institutional arrangement under the UNFCCC on adaptation to climate change and had the aim of improving the understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, as well as supporting decision-making. Among its objectives was the establishment of a network of relevant institutions and stakeholders to facilitate the exchange of experience, compile and disseminate information, and identify knowledge gaps.

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Established under the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the NWP fell short of meeting the expectations of developing country Parties on the role of the UNFCCC in assisting them to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. A program focused on the compilation and dissemination of scientific information and knowledge, while an important first step, did not provide the necessary frameworks and tools to help developing countries deal with a phenomenon that was already manifesting itself in different parts of the globe. The launch of the Bali Action Plan (COP 13, 2007) paved the way for the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) , one of the main results of COP 16 (2010), and marked a long-awaited comprehensive approach to adaptation under the Convention. The Cancun decision, which established the CAF, radically changed the approach to adaptation by the United Nations. Its ground-breaking feature is the recognition that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to society and the planet, and that it requires immediate action. This includes not only reducing emissions but also carrying out actions to improve adaptive processes, including the provision of means of implementation (finance, technology, and capacity building). The consequence of this vision is that adaptation must be treated at the same level and with the same priority as mitigation. This signaled a paradigm shift for priorities under the Convention and was a significant achievement on the part of the G77 and China that had been demanding this political parity from the outset of the UNFCCC’s entry into force.

Adaptation and Beyond Reviewing the main achievements in Cancun on adaptation (and loss and damage) leads to a review of the different aspirations of the groups that make up the G77 and China, and also, reveals the issues that generated tension within the group. With the establishment of the CAF, the focus on adaptation shifted from a stage linked to knowledge exchange and information gathering to a stage of concrete action on adaptation from planning to implementation, including, importantly, the implementation of projects and programs. The shift to planning and programming that came out of Cancun has encouraged (and continues to encourage) developing countries to seek the integration of adaptation into national development plans, enabling intersectoral and territorial dialogues within countries that had occurred previously only in some cases, and then often in a fragmented way. More specifically, the establishment of a process to enable LDCs to formulate and implement national adaptation plans, and the invitation to other developing countries to use the modalities that would be formulated, was the first step in this direction. But for the process to work, a space was required for the provision of technical support that would allow for the interpretation of relevant modalities and the elaboration of new techniques to assist developing countries as they pursued their national

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and regional planning processes. To that end, the Adaptation Committee was established, with the function of promoting the implementation of improved action on adaptation under the Convention. The Adaptation Committee filled a gap with respect to one of the main calls by developing countries to have a group of experts that could support them in the implementation of the actions outlined to address adaptation under the CAF. Since its establishment in Cancun, the Adaptation Committee has demonstrated its value by providing valuable inputs into the design and implementation of national adaptation plans. Finally, in Cancun, Parties recognized the need to strengthen international cooperation to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme weather events and slow onset events. The issue of slow onset events is not a minor one, and it is significant that these “silent” impacts that over time could lead to substantive losses were finally recognized under the Convention. Those systems that accumulate sufficient small accumulated impacts would eventually cease to function in the most extreme cases, such as the destruction of coral reefs or the gradual disappearance of continental glaciers. Likewise, it is assumed that these changes would affect food production through the process of land degradation, among other things. This focus on loss and damage puts on the table the fact that no matter how great the efforts of countries are in developing and implementing adaptation strategies, considering the trajectory in the increase of the global average temperature linked to low ambition in the fulfillment of mitigation goals, there are limits to what can be achieved by adaptation efforts, leaving impacts that cannot be addressed directly, requiring, therefore, approaches to deal with them. With this in mind, and with the leadership of the small island developing States (SIDS), during COP16, the G77 and China had as another of its great achievements the establishment of a work program to consider approaches to deal with loss and damage associated with climate change impacts. The work program on loss and damage was divided into thematic areas, the first being the possible development of approaches linked to climate risk insurance to deal with climate change impacts associated with extreme weather events. Second, the work program contemplated options for risk management and reduction, mechanisms for the transfer of risk such as insurance, and building resilience, including through economic diversification, among others. The third element focused on measures to promote rehabilitation associated with slow onset events. The fourth and final element was of a more general nature and of great importance to the three previous ones as it had to do with the participation of relevant actors with different knowledge capacities. The outcome of the work program resulted in time in the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanisms on Loss and Damage, which carries out important work to explore the fundamental aspects of the matter, including topics related to the displacement of people in response to the adverse effects of climate change.

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Means of Implementation The absence of specific funding flows for the development of plans and projects left the main financing tool for adaptation to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), where its two windows on climate change, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), both established in 2001, tended to fund mitigation projects. Of the two funds, only the LDCF had a special mandate to support least developed countries (LDCs) with the preparation and implementation of National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs), which were relatively successful although this success was linked more to their preparation, and much less to their implementation. It would take several more years until the establishment of the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol (2007), and even more time for the start-up of the Green Climate Fund (2010), both of which provide financial resources for the implementation of concrete adaptation measures. These funds were the result of historic calls by the G77 and China for financing frameworks and financing to address adaptation processes at the national and regional levels. Throughout the negotiation on adaptation that led to Cancun and its results, a large part of the challenge focused on how to link all the required activities, particularly those implemented at the national level, with new and additional sources of financing, access to technology, and spaces for capacity building. This challenge was partially overcome by including a request to developed countries to provide developing countries with financing, which should be new and additional to the existing flows of development support. In turn, this financing was to comply with a series of requirements: (1) that it be long-term and predictable, in order to allow for adaptation planning and the linking of a series of temporary implementation goals without interruptions in funding; and (2) an escalation in the amounts that would be dedicated to adaptation, in order to be able to cover the growing needs of developing countries. The financial provisions included in the adaptation framework and the aforementioned creation of the Green Climate Fund establishes a way to, increasingly, respond to the emerging demand by developing countries, matched to needs, that adaptation not be approached using a piecemeal approach and that funding be available on a timely basis. On the contrary, adaptation must be incorporated into all development plans and the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries must be fully supported in compliance with developed country obligations established under the Convention.

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Progress and Obstacles Experienced by the G77 and China: Differentiation, Vulnerability, and Response Measures The advances made during the period that led to the Cancun Adaptation Framework were of great significance and far-reaching. They allowed for the establishment of different lines of work that in the following years evolved, incorporating new elements, and allowing adaptation to gain space in the international agenda with subsequent internalization within countries. Today it is fair to say that what was once more of a political discourse, today is a reality: adaptation is as relevant to developing countries and is more important than mitigation. The path that led to the adoption of this important milestone in Cancun was not free of significant challenges. Many were linked to the resistance on the part of the developed countries to recognize the demands of the G77 and China, concerned that these would have consequences for an increase in the transfer of means of implementation. The negotiations leading up to Cancun progressed in a tortuous manner, and exercises were carried out to identify the elements that were later captured but took us back several steps. We were required to revise our strategy in order to continue maintaining the unity of the group and thus strengthen our position, among the many. A theme that at different times generated clear tensions within the group, and posed a great challenge, was that linked to vulnerability. This concept, intimately linked to the theoretical and practical evolution of approaches to adapt to climate change, is difficult to articulate since it is not defined, opening the door to multiple interpretations, based on self-determined parameters. Issues related to GDP, with socio-economic development indices, economic losses from the impacts of climate change, the regionalization of these impacts, and even the loss of lives, all combined in a set of internal discussions that were difficult to resolve within the G77 and China as negotiations progressed and there was greater clarity on what form the final decision might take. This discussion on differentiation not only responded to a need of the different developing countries to establish some type of categorization regarding relative vulnerabilities amongst them, but also to a corresponding strategy used by the developed countries during different stages of the negotiations that only some of the most vulnerable developing country Parties had the right to request support from the international community to advance their national adaptation agendas. This differentiation amongst developing country Parties, based on greater or lesser vulnerability, establishes a principle of prioritization regarding the possibility of accessing the means of implementation for the planning and implementation of adaptation policies, programs, and projects. Although this tension was tinged with aspects that were more related to regional loyalties, it should be noted that the issue of the different vulnerabilities of developing countries was not novel to discussions within the framework of the negotiations that led to the Cancun Agreements.

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In fact, in the text that gave birth to the UNFCCC itself there is a recognition in the preamble of the characteristics of developing countries that render them particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, this is not a prioritization. Article 4.8 extends this recognition to a commitment of Parties to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change, which includes a list of developing countries with characteristics that could lead to these specific needs and concerns, e.g., small island states, countries with low coastal zones, those with arid zones, with fragile ecosystems, or countries with areas exposed to drought, to name just a few. However, the same article also includes commitments to give full consideration to the actions necessary to meet the specific needs and concerns of those countries that are susceptible to the impacts of the implementation of response measures. In its subparagraph (h), Article 4.8 lists those countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the fossil fuel trade as a characteristic generating special needs and concerns. The great difference between the other subparagraphs included in Article 4.8 from subparagraph (h) is that the former has its focus on characteristics that refer to vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, while the latter is linked to economic vulnerability. This situation, which was later reflected in decision 1/CP.10 approved during COP 10 (Buenos Aires, 2004) with the creation of the Buenos Aires Program of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures, would establish two separate lines of work, one focused on adaptation, the other on response measures, generating a situation of conflict within the G77 and China due to different interpretations about what adaptation should cover and what its political limits were. The body of work on adaptation would be born the following year at COP 11 (Montreal, 2005) with establishment of the five-year program of work on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation. The following year at COP 12 (Nairobi, 2006) this program was renamed the Nairobi Work Program (on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation). The elements of Article 4.8 linked to the impact of the implementation of response measures would take several more years to find their space on the agenda of the negotiations, and it was on this issue that the G77 and China did not have a common position, since many of its members considered it inappropriate to include response measures in discussions on adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. This led to situations where it a became impossible to reach a common position on adaptation in the G77 and China, requiring the different subgroups to defend their own interests, forfeiting the ability to speak with a common voice, and in turn weakening the process of reaching G77 and China objectives, with this playing out in front of developed country Parties, and extending the negotiations during several sessions. Presently, the tensions around adaptation and response measures still exist, particularly in the context of climate finance, where some developed country members of the Green Climate Fund have refused to grant funding for adaptation to middleincome developing countries. This categorization of developing countries does not

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exist in any provision under the Convention, its subsidiary bodies, decisions, or regulations of the Green Climate Fund, and clearly marks the political position of those who have resorted to this position. In the lead up to the Cancun Agreements, the internal disagreement around the categorization of vulnerable developing countries generated friction amongst the different groups that make up the G77 and China, where it was interpreted that where one group or groups were identified as more vulnerable, the remaining groups would be deprived of access to the means of implementation. Finally, the political agreement is provided in the text of the decision on the CAF, specifically in the finance and technology provision, with the formula being to refer to all developing country Parties, taking into consideration the needs of those who are particularly vulnerable. This compromise solution did no more than push the discussion into the future, since once again it opened room for interpretation, and it did not resolve to the matter of which countries are particularly vulnerable. In the years following the Cancun outcomes, various studies and reports have tried to establish metrics to be able to define the relative vulnerability of countries using a variety of formulations, often influenced by the interests of those behind the production of the same studies and reports. However, the clear message from Cancun was that adaptation was a necessity for all countries, that no one was exempt from susceptibility to the adverse impacts of climate change, and that from that moment on all countries, agencies, non-governmental actors, the private sector, and academics would need to collaborate in order to be better prepared to respond in the years to come.

The Value of a Common Position on Adaptation of the G77 and China Independent of the internal differences that arose during the years under the adaptation discussions, which were not minor challenges, we always knew that our strength was in reaching internal consensus and positions. It was clear from the beginning that if Argentina (or any of the other country for that matter) was required to negotiate on its own, it would have no chance of reaching the outcomes achieved through the unity of capabilities and mutual support in the G77 and China. When the G77 and China reaches a common position, the possibilities of achieving our collective aspirations as a group becomes a palpable reality. On the contrary, on the occasions where the G77 and China was unable to find a common voice, at least beyond general messaging, the expectation of success for developing countries fell noticeably. Another great value that the common position on adaptation has always had within the G77 and China was and continues to be that it is the theme that most unites us as a group. All developing countries recognize the urgency of advancing our plans and

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adaptation strategies to reduce associated losses, at all levels. Being able to advance this agenda in a multilateral forum gives us different tools and possibilities that enable us to mobilize society in our own countries, providing us with greater strength in the face of inevitable impacts. Where in other agenda items of the negotiations, the group has not been able to find a common voice, adaptation has always been a bastion of internal strength, despite all of our differences and priorities. It is clear that each developing country Party with its own national and regional circumstances, with its profiles and priorities of social and economic development, and its climatic, geographical, and biodiversity particularities brings a unique profile to the negotiating table. Hence, the various subgroups (and countries within them) provide areas of work and views on which the group must work hard to fit together in a way that the final product is internally consistent, and that our position does not generate cracks that generate confusion. The subgroups of the G77 and China develop their priorities based on the pursuit of the protection of their natural resources, means of subsistence, productive systems, and the maximum goal, protection of their inhabitants. Depending on the case, some will have a greater inclination toward some of these elements depending on which ones are seen to be most affected, or for which an urgent response is required. From facing an imminent loss of sovereignty due to the impacts of climate change, seeing their populations pressured by the loss of livelihoods, the potential damage to the population and forced migration, to the losses of several points of GDP due to impacts on productive systems central to the economy or the vital infrastructure, all contribute their particular vision of development in a context of permanent qualitative erosion of the planet and its systems. At the end of all analyses, what remains is the urgent need to be able to take responses to the communities of each of the countries we represent, but at the same time, make a contribution to ensure that everyone, wherever we are, can face the greatest challenges that climate change poses. It is no coincidence that the first paragraph of Article 7 on adaptation in the 2015 Paris Agreement establishes the global goal on adaptation to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, with the aim of contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response.

The Mandate of the Durban Negotiations and the Role of the Adaptation Committee The results of COP 17 held in Durban in 2011 not only launched the process under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) that would result in the adoption of the Paris Agreement four years later, but also led

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to agreement on the guidelines, modalities, and procedures of the Adaptation Committee and a similar agreement on the elements of the national adaptation planning process. First, it was agreed that the Adaptation Committee would be the overall advisor to the COP on issues related to adaptation, which gives it an even higher status than that reached in Cancun. It is in Durban, after arduous negotiations, that the operating modalities of the Adaptation Committee were established, which will determine its true reach for years to come. One of the most relevant elements decided was that the Adaptation Committee would report directly to the COP through its two subsidiary bodies. This fact gives it a place of high relevance within the structure of the Convention, since all its actions will be evaluated at the highest level of decision-making within the Convention, in accordance with the achievements already obtained the previous year in Cancun regarding the political parity of adaptation and mitigation under the Convention. Moreover, the Adaptation Committee is requested to engage and develop links with all relevant institutional arrangements under the Convention, which allows it an overview of all relevant adaptation activities under the Convention, facilitating the implementation of a comprehensive approach to adaptation in the Convention process. The operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention are included in this mandate, providing the Adaptation Committee with oversight of the progress in mobilizing financial resources for adaptation. Finally, as was decided years before with the Adaptation Fund, the Committee has a majority of members from developing countries, something that the members of the G77 and China advocated for strongly given the critical importance of adaptation for them. The creation of the Adaptation Committee was a major step forward for developing countries in the sense that as a new institutional arrangement under the Convention it became a permanent body that can advance the adaptation agenda and enhance implementation, while at the same time support core COP decisions.

Chapter 9

Coordination of the G77 and China on Adaptation. Looking for the Appropriate Space for Adaptation Under the UNFCCC María del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele Abstract In the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Group of 77 (G77) and China’s role is particularly relevant in certain sub-themes of the climate agenda and there are practices and individuals that are very symbolic to the negotiating process that only those working in this area know. The coordinator of the G77 and China is a unique figure in the context of climate change negotiations and has been particularly important for the defense of issues of special relevance to developing countries, in particular, adaptation, as a flagship issue for all developing countries. Our approach here lies in recognizing that the political and conceptual shift on adaptation is closely linked to the struggle fostered by developing countries in isolation, first, and, then, together in groups and subgroups, to achieve parity between mitigation and adaptation in the UNFCCC process. Keywords Group of 77 and China · Adaptation · Global south · Cooperation

Introduction The role of the G77 and China has been studied and analyzed in light of various topics of the contemporary international agenda, in particular, on environmental regimes and the case of climate change (Blaxekjaer et al. 2015; Bueno 2019; Chasek and Rajamani 2003; Kasa et al. 2008; Miller 1995, 1998; Najam 2005; Vihma et al. 2011; Williams 1997, 2005). However, there are certain practices of the group that Maria del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele based on interviews with various lead coordinators on adaptation for the G77 and China. M. P. Bueno Rubial National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] L. Siegele (B) University College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_9

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only international negotiators know and that, in some cases, vary from agenda to agenda. The annual rotation of the presidency of the Group makes for different driving styles, which has either favored or spoiled key victories for the Group. In the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the G77 and China’s role is particularly relevant in certain sub-themes of the climate agenda, and there are practices and individuals that are very symbolic to the negotiating process, but that only those working in this area know. For example, the coordinator of the G77 and China is a unique figure in the context of climate change negotiations and has been particularly important for the defense of issues of special relevance to developing countries. Therefore, some topics such as adaptation and climate finance, among others, operate as flagships for the positions of developing countries in this arena. In this regard, although there are several studies that show the evolution of adaptation in the UNFCCC (Burton et al. 2002; Magnan and Ribera 2016; Pielke et al. 2007; Schipper 2006; Schipper and Burton 2009; Khan and Roberts 2013), our approach is different. This approach lies in recognizing that the political and conceptual shift on adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is closely linked to the struggle fostered by developing countries in isolation, first, and, then, together in groups and subgroups, to achieve parity between mitigation and adaptation. We still discuss inside and outside the G77 and China what that parity means, and we believe that, even today, the subgroups have different views on that. Some of these aspects include achieving a 50:50 balance between adaptation and mitigation finance; creating international institutions that provide equal treatment to both topics; and recognizing that adaptation efforts of developing countries are an integral part of the global response to climate change as well as that adaptation efforts can have mitigation co-benefits. Regardless of this diversity of views, for the developing countries, adaptation is not merely a fashionable item of the climate policy agenda (Shipper 2006), it is an issue of survival and a matter of urgency. Therefore, the coordination of adaptation by the G77 and China has its own history and rules. Since the G77 and China has failed to coordinate on mitigation issues, it is difficult to find evidence of another case comparable to adaptation. Only climate finance is comparable and even if there are similarities, the two issues have a different history. The rules and practices of adaptation coordination in the G77 and China have been shaped by individual coordinators and are inherited from coordinator to coordinator. As such, specific milestones facilitate the understanding of their establishment. Examples in this regard are the long hours of consultations to reach a common position, the aim of speaking with one voice and the interpretation of the principle of no harm, among others. Adaptation negotiators from developing countries have understood that, even when the subgroups are the first port of call for the construction of negotiating positions, the G77 and China has the opportunity to integrate those efforts into a common position. It is undeniable that a group that brings together two-thirds of the Parties to the Convention, gives the voices of the developing world and the Global South special weight and, therefore, greater negotiating power.

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From interviews conducted with G77 and China coordinators on adaptation from 2009 to 2018, as well as, the active participation of the authors in the process, it is possible to recognize key stages experienced by the Group, identifying milestones in the collective construction of a common position on adaptation. This analysis, therefore, reflects the history of adaptation under the Convention through the lens of developing countries’ demands and needs.

Background Information on Adaptation at the UNFCCC from COP 1 to COP 10 Even where many authors recognize that adaptation was significant from the very beginning of the climate change negotiations, and particularly from COP 1 in Berlin, frequently, milestones are identified in retrospect. However, COP 1 comprises important movements in terms of adaptation action linked to adaptation in national communications; policies and strategies related to the financial mechanism including adaptation; and Global Environment Facility (GEF) financing for national communications containing adaptation actions. More importantly, was the establishment of the concept of agreed full incremental costs associated with adaptation actions of developing countries as a way of operationalizing differentiation.1 Decisions adopted during COP 2 also referred to the preparation of reports on adaptation technology and the terms of transfer of technology and know-how conducive to mitigating and adapting to climate change, as well as guidelines for the preparation of national communications including adaptation actions.2 The first exercise to concretize the commitments under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol (KP), also encompassed adaptation provisions even when their nature is particularly routed in mitigation actions. Article 12.8 of the KP establishes that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.3 The idea of agreed full costs as well as the inclusion of this provision in the KP confirms that adaptation and climate finance have been related from the very beginning in the Convention, even when each of the two issues developed along its own pathway. The share of proceeds of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which resulted in the establishment of the Adaptation Fund by the Marrakech Accords agreed at COP 7, is an outstanding milestone. Nevertheless, there are other remarkable antecedents to mention from COP 3 to COP 7. Some of them took place in Buenos Aires during COP 4 where the Parties noted the need to examine and address 1 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf. 2 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/15a01.pdf. 3 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf.

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climate change impacts and minimize adverse impacts, in particular for the Parties identified in Article 4.8 of the Convention, and decided that the GEF should provide funding to developing country Parties to implement adaptation and other measures under Article 4.1 of the Convention for activities envisaged in decision 11/CP.1. The inclusion of Article 4.8 is particularly important since one of the main issues in terms of the history of adaptation under the UNFCCC and the role of the G77 and China is the difficult task of splitting adaptation from response measures. An important component of the COP 4 outcomes was the reiteration of the idea of meeting the agreed full incremental costs of adaptation in the context of mobilizing and facilitating efforts to provide financial resources needed by developing country Parties.4 Decision 8/CP.5 of COP 5 held in Bonn also reaffirmed that the GEF should provide funding for developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, for activities related to the assessment of vulnerability and adaptation options, in accordance with decisions 10/CP.2 and 2/CP.4. In addition, the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications (CGE) included in an annex to the same decision, acknowledged that the CGE shall be composed of experts drawn from the roster of experts with expertise in greenhouse gas inventories, vulnerability assessments and adaptation, abatement issues and preparation of national communications.5 As far as milestones are concerned, the Marrakech Accords agreed at COP 7 were a game changer. The Accords not only established the Adaptation Fund, but also the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). This COP was critical for least developed countries (LDCs) since in matters related to the LDCs, the LDC Group of Experts (LEG) was also created. The terms of reference of the LEG assumed the objective of the group was to advise on the preparation and implementation strategy for national adaptation programs of action (NAPAs), which would meet the urgent and immediate adaptation needs of the LDCs. NAPAs were the most important forerunner of national adaptation plans (NAPs) which were recognized as a universal instrument of adaptation action in Cancun in 2010.6 Two seemingly lesser interlinked issues came from the title of the element under the guidelines for the national communications: vulnerability assessment, climate change impacts, and adaptation measures. This title explains the name of the cluster under which adaptation was treated in the UNFCCC for some time, including the G77 and China, as impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation—with response measures and adaptation not clearly separated in nature and scope, as mentioned above. In Marrakech, we can also identify the inclusion of vulnerability assessments and adaptation under the framework of capacity building for developing countries, as well as the implementation of Article 4.5 of the Convention on technology, where an expert group on technology transfer was established that covered adaptation technologies.

4 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop4/16a01.pdf. 5 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop5/06a01.pdf. 6 https://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf.

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The outcomes of COP 10 in Buenos Aires were also significant to the evolution of adaptation under the UNFCCC, since decision 1/CP.10 adopted the Buenos Aires program of work on adaptation and response measures.7 The background to decision 1/CP.10 is Marrakech decision 5/CP.7 which is based on the implementation of Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention. The first article recognizes the specific needs and concerns of developing counties and the second the specific needs and special situations of LDCs. This shows that adaptation history was continuously linked to developing country needs and circumstances. It should be noted that decision 10/CP.9 adopted in Milan in 2003, was the immediate precursor to decision 1/CP.10 and requested the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to initiate its work on scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of the impacts of, and vulnerability and adaptation to, climate change, and to report to the COP. The Buenos Aires program of work on adaptation and response measures encourages the IPCC to incorporate region-specific modeling information on the adverse effects of climate change into its Fourth Assessment Report, and to engage developing country researchers in the assessment process. This is vital when referring to the parity between mitigation and adaptation, considering the gap in scientific information on vulnerabilities and adaptation actions in comparison with mitigation. The Buenos Aires program of work also requests SBSTA to develop a structured five-year program of work addressing methodologies, data and modeling, vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning, measures and actions, and integration into sustainable development. The strong relationship built between adaptation and finance during this period, including the first identification of needs by developing countries, prompted the UNFCCC Secretariat to say that by 2030 developing countries would require USD 28—67 billion in funds to enable adaptation to climate change.8 In time, these numbers grew dramatically with UNEP affirming that the annual costs of adaptation could range from USD 140 billion to USD 300 billion by 2030 and from USD 280 billion to USD 500 billion by 2050 (UNEP 2018). Finally, at COP 11 another milestone was reached with the establishment of what was to become the Nairobi Work Program (NWP) by decision 2/CP.11,9 as part of the five-year program of work of the SBSTA on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. It was renamed one year later as the Nairobi Work Program on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change at COP 12 in Nairobi. The NWP was the first arrangement under the Convention to deal with adaptation and, in that way, it is a landmark in the history of the topic.

7 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf#page=2. 8 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf. 9 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/05a01.pdf.

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Looking for a New Agreement with Available Space for Adaptation Actions After the failure of the KP to achieve its primary purpose of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, exacerbated by the non-participation of the United States, growing scientific-based information provided evidence of the deterioration caused by and upsurge of the impacts of climate change in different regions of the world, as well as distressing future projections, a new agreement began to be negotiated in the UNFCCC. COP 13 was the scenario for the adoption of the Bali Road Map which structured the work for this new agreement under various negotiating “tracks”. The Bali Action Plan was designed as a way to enable sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, with a process conducted under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). The Bali Action Plan was organized into five main categories: shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance. These building blocks formally broke the mitigation-centric process of negotiation under the Convention. The statement made by the Ambassador of Pakistan, Attiya Mahmood, on behalf of the G77 and China at the opening session of COP 13 portrays many of the ideas on which the G77 and China continues to find consensus today. One of them is that “adaptation remains at the forefront of the G77 and China’s concerns”. Furthermore, the intervention included a specific mention of the launch of the Adaptation Fund and the importance of the implementation of the Nairobi Work Program. It also stated that the most important issues during that session included mustering the political will to agree on an approach based upon the key principles of Rio and those in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, as well as the equal treatment of mitigation and adaptation, including a legally binding instrument for adaptation and technology transfer.10 Beyond the debate about the failure of the Copenhagen Conference (COP 15, 2009) to reach a new multilateral climate agreement, there is no doubt that new consolidated rules were instituted there, which were reaffirmed a year later in Cancun, where the international climate change regime managed to recover with a vote of confidence. In Copenhagen, the issue of adaptation had matured and was significantly strengthened at COP 16. The Copenhagen Accord (decision 2/CP.15) continued to acknowledge adaptation in the context of response measures but it also recognized the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation program, which included international support. There are also very significant provisions in the Accord including the G77 and China’s traditional phrase on climate finance, that [s]caled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including

10 http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=071203.

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substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDDplus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention.

This was a sustained call after the letdown developing countries experienced around the notion of covering agreed full costs. Another important outcome of Copenhagen was the collective commitment by developed countries to provide USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation, as well as the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. Part of this money should flow through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention. It was not the first fund to finance adaptation, but the GCF, formally established a year later in Cancun, was the first specific fund with its dimensions set by an environmental agreement since the GEF. Other funds, such as the Adaptation Fund, have other roles in the climate finance landscape, including financing small scale projects with a transformative power for communities. In that sense, the GCF is an important achievement resulting from the struggle of the developing world to ensure that the Convention commitments were met, but it has the added benefit of striving for a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Moreover, in Copenhagen a Technology Mechanism was established, including for the support of action on adaptation. One year later, in Cancun, it is not only the achievements on adaptation up to Copenhagen should be mentioned, but also the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) that, as mentioned by many others in this book, was the most structured international effort on adaptation to date. The CAF comprised the establishment of the first body exclusively focused on adaptation under the Convention, the Adaptation Committee, as well as, the recognition of the importance of improving adaptation planning as a critical feature of multilateral cooperation through National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). In many senses, the CAF was so comprehensive, that the Paris Agreement (PA) seems more general, in some cases, and in others, merely a reaffirmation. For example, the CAF included a list of principles on adaptation action, which provides the background for article 7.5 of the PA. The main question is why five years later the international community needed to reaffirm what was already achieved in Cancun. In some cases, the provisions on adaptation under the PA were diminished, in particular, in terms of adaptation finance. Paragraph 18 of decision 1/CP.16, which established the CAF, used the G77 and China language: …requesting developed country Parties to provide developing country Parties, taking into account the needs of those that are particularly vulnerable, with long-term, scaled-up, predictable, new and additional finance, technology and capacity-building, consistent with relevant provisions, to implement urgent, short-, medium- and long-term adaptation actions, plans, programs and projects at the local, national, subregional and regional levels, in and across different economic and social sectors and ecosystems.

Also, under the CAF is the step-up provided by the NAPs process, which benefited from the experience under the LDC’s matters and NAPAs, universalizing adaptation

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planning in a structured way that allowed for—at a later stage—a framework under the GCF to finance the adaptation planning of developing countries. Likewise, the CAF allowed for the qualitative leap for implementation of adaptation actions from SBSTA (where the NWP sits) to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)—a call that had been made by the G77 and China for many years. Another outstanding outcome of Cancun, pioneered by the G77 and China, was the work program to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change—which resulted in the establishment of the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage and its Executive Committee in 2013. A distinctive feature of the stage from Bali to Cancun was enhancing the definition of adaptation and distinguishing between addressing adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and addressing the impact of response measures. This was one of the main issues that kept the G77 and China from having a coordinated position on adaptation, since members had different views on the matter. These divergences were irreconcilable. Work done on adaptation in the multilateral process from Bali to Cancun helps shed light on the internal process in the G77 and China of arriving at a common position and developing specific inputs on adaptation to send the political message that adaptation is at the forefront of the developing world´s interests thus there should be parity between the treatment of mitigation and adaptation under the Convention. In carrying out this effort, the NWP played a very important role that is sometimes ignored, by helping to build knowledge on adaptation and collecting lessons learned from those that had already begun addressing adaptation nationally, including the developed countries. Nevertheless, even with the significant evolution of adaptation in the lead up to Copenhagen, solidified in Cancun, adaptation remained marginalized, and decisions on adaptation often ended up being made toward the end of the meetings of the COP, with adaptation used as a “bargaining chip” in a larger “package” of decisions. This occurred in part because generally, all the discussions on adaptation were clustered in one room, unlike mitigation, with different conversations occurring across a number of agenda items—one of the reasons why the G77 and China required that every topic of discussion after Durban should have the same treatment in the process, including the same allocation of time. At the same time, helped by the Cancun Agreements, the profile of adaptation had been raised, leading to growing interest in adaptation globally, backed up by climate science. Hence, the historical struggle of the G77 and China to gain attention for adaptation was coupled with other voices at long last making addressing adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change fashionable. The process of building a framework on adaptation led by the G77 and China, with its internal conflicts and divergences, shows what is required to speak with one voice in the climate negotiations. As expressed by a number of the coordinators and negotiators in this book, in its early stages, the G77 and China was more a space for discussion. However, there was growing awareness during these sessions among the subgroups of the benefits of speaking with one voice where the larger group was able to defend the collection of different interests expressed by the subgroups. The

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principle of not harming the positions of other subgroups was critical to achieving this aim.

The Durban Platform to the Paris Agreement After the Bali building blocks and the establishment of the CAF, the relevance of the argument for a set of adaptation elements with equal treatment in a new agreement became clearer, and the Durban Platform provided a second road map for achieving this. Paragraph 5 of decision 1/CP.17 comprised six elements, inter alia, for the work to be conducted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP): mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building. For adaptation, the Durban COP (2011) advanced the footprint of the CAF, by specifying the functions, modalities of work and composition of the Adaptation Committee.11 Another adaptation advancement in Durban was decision 5/CP.17 on NAPs. It was the first time that different elements of the adaptation agenda were reflected in separate COP decisions, showing that adaptation work under the Convention was maturing and increasing in complexity. By this decision, initial guidelines on NAPs were adopted and the preparation of technical guidelines was assigned to the LEG recognizing the work of LDCs with NAPAs—a process that was emulated with the adaptation communications under the PA, since further guidance on the adaptation communication was adopted in Katowice (COP 24, 2018) while specific guidelines will be delivered by the Adaptation Committee (AC) as per decision 9/CMA.1. Moreover, Durban decision 6/CP.17 was adopted on the NWP, requesting SBSTA to reconsider its work areas and to make recommendations to the COP.12 Additional work was also managed here, inviting the Secretariat to organize with the NWP and its partner organizations workshops on specific emerging areas and to prepare a compilation of case studies on national adaptation planning processes, including tools and approaches used for the prioritization and implementation of actions, among other activities. During COP 17 Argentina chaired the G77 and China. In his statement during the high-level segment, Ambassador Pedro D’Alotto expressed that adaptation is a key priority of developing countries and it is urgent to revisit the historical imbalance between mitigation and adaptation finance. Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of the CAF and that the AC should be operationalized as soon as possible.13

11 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf. 12 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a02.pdf. 13 https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/statements/application/pdf/111206_cop17_

hls_argentina_behalf_g77_china.pdf.

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In Durban, two tracks of negotiations were established on pre- and post-2020 action. However, the track of pre-2020 action, associated with the second commitment period of the KP, whose amendment was adopted one year after in Doha (COP 18, 2012), did not include adaptation provisions. This is why the G77 and China pushed hard to include adaptation and means of implementation in this track from 2012 to 2015. The related outcome of this position is found in Paris decision 1/CP.21, paragraphs 106–133. In particular, with the creation of the technical examination process on adaptation (TEP-A, paragraphs 126–133) to identify concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerabilities, and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions—a process conducted by the Adaptation Committee (AC). One other issue worth mentioning is that the G77 and China also pushed very hard to balance the allocation of time for adaptation and mitigation during the negotiations, as expressed before. So that time provided for work under the ADP, in contrast to that under the AWG-LCA, was divided equitably across the elements of the Durban Platform. One of the most import outcomes of COP 19 in Warsaw was the establishment of the WIM with decision 2/CP.19. Additionally, with decision 1/CP.19 the COP requested the ADP to prepare elements for a draft negotiating text covering all the elements referred to in the Durban Platform, including adaptation.14 The other three decisions that compose the Warsaw landscape are decision 16/CP.19 on the report of the AC with general provisions on the governance of the body; decision 17/CP.19 with agreement that the NWP continues to work within the framework of the provisions of decision 2/CP.11, addressing the knowledge needs arising from, inter alia, the CAF and other relevant workstreams and bodies under the Convention and the knowledge needs to be identified by Parties; and finally, decision 18/CP.19 which welcomes the NAPs guidelines prepared by the LEG.15,16 It is important to emphasize that the concept of intended national determined contributions (INDCs) was born in Warsaw. And, even though, the text of decision 1/CP.19 does not refer to the scope of the INDCs being exclusively focused on mitigation, during COP 20 held in Lima (2014), determining the scope of the INDCs was one of the main struggles. Decision 1/CP.20, called the Lima Call for Climate Action,17 repeated the formula that a protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties shall address in a balanced manner, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, and capacitybuilding, and transparency of action and support. In addition, it invited all Parties to communicate their INDCs well in advance of COP 21 and to consider communicating

14 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf. 15 https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-plans-naps/

guidelines-for-national-adaptation-plans-naps. 16 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a02r01.pdf. 17 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf.

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their undertakings on adaptation planning or including an adaptation component in their INDCs. As of November 2018, adaptation information from developing countries was included in 132 NDCs. Also, the first synthesis report of the Secretariat on the aggregated effect of INDCs (October 2015) issued before COP 21 in Paris, affirmed that 100 Parties included adaptation components.18 The second synthesis report issued in May 2016 informed that 137 of the 189 Parties that had submitted INDCs included an adaptation component, most of them from developing countries.19 This was not planned or agreed by the G77 and China, but it provided a clear signal from the global South to the world that adaptation was indeed the priority that developing countries had been mentioning in their statements and interventions for so long. This strong signal was a substantial aspect contributing toward realizing article 7 of the PA and it helped to ensure a diverse scope for the content of NDCs in Article 3 of the PA. A point of interest is that the information provided by developing countries in the adaptation components of their INDCs (as reported by the Secretariat in May 2016, and listed in Paragraph 61 of the report) are very similar to those adopted in the annex of Katowice decision 9/CMA.1 providing further guidance on the adaptation communication. COP 20 also accomplished what was agreed in Warsaw the year before by delivering the elements of a draft text for negotiations that took different forms from Lima to Paris. Other decisions adopted in Lima with respect to adaptation included decision 3/CP.20 on NAPs and 4/CP.20 on the report of the AC.20 With respect to NAPs, one of the priorities of the G77 and China was to link a better NAP process with finance for adaptation planning. For that reason, this decision requested the AC, LEG and GCF to work together to consider ways of supporting developing countries in accessing funding. Similar provisions were repeated in Paris and achieved at the 13th meeting of the GCF Board where the Executive Director approved USD 3 million per country through the GCF Readiness and Preparatory Support Program to support the formulation of NAPs. Even though the G77 and China worked hard in Lima to agree common positions, the focus of the subgroups was to include their particular interests in the draft text. This was the approach taken during 2015 sessions in the run up to Paris and, in particular, in the Geneva text of February 2015. This did not prevent coordination by the G77 and China on adaptation in order to find common textual proposals based on the inputs of the subgroups. When looking at Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, it is easy for adaptation negotiators (who participated in COP 21) to identify how particular paragraphs were arrived at. More than ever, this article portrays collaboration in the G77 and China as a puzzle of interests and needs grounded in the solidarity of the Global South. The Global Goal on Adaptation, the principles, the relationship with mitigation action, the importance of support for adaptation action, the prominence of CAF-like elements, 18 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf. 19 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2016/cop22/eng/02.pdf. 20 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a02.pdf.

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the involvement in adaptation planning processes, the adaptation communications and the flexibility of the vehicle for submitting them, as well as the linkage with the global stocktake, are all clear signs of developing world cooperation. Each of these elements came from G77 and China proposals with the same or similar language reflecting negotiation with developed country partners. When analyzing the outcome in Paris, not only the PA but also decision 1/CP.21, there are several conclusions that can be made: adaptation finance was the weakest part of the outcome; the bodies, in particular, the AC and LEG were assigned very difficult tasks considering their functions, as evidenced during 2016–2017 and the final recommendations emanating from the work; very few new things were achieved in comparison with the CAF; one of the most important wins was parity with mitigation that can be seen in the different provisions of the PA, e.g., purpose, scope of the NDC, means of implementation and scope of the global stocktake, but that parity does not necessarily translate to equal treatment and a fair burden. An example of this appears under the transparency framework, where there are clear differences between articles 13.7 (where Parties shall provide mitigation information) and 13.8 (where Parties should provide information on adaptation).

The Paris Agreement as a Reflection of the History of Adaptation Under the Convention As stated by the coordinators and negotiators in their respective contributions to this book, the history of adaptation under the Convention is the history of the struggles of the G77 and China. This fight was, first, internal since the subgroups had different views on what adaptation was and differences with other issues such as response measures and loss and damage. While divergences in interests and positions of the subgroups to the G77 and China remain, the common understanding in the G77 and China is that what has been achieved on adaptation under the Convention was achieved collectively and supersedes the differences. So far, the evolution of adaptation under the Convention has been an incremental process from Berlin to Katowice, with different stages and chapters. Working toward the implementation of the Paris Agreement from 2016 to 2018 showed the same strengths and weaknesses of the Group. The Katowice outcome resulted in progress on guidance for the adaptation communication, as well as what others in this book have called the Paris Mandates to the constituted bodies (AC, LEG and SCF) in paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21. Yet, many other provisions of the Agreement need more work, including those on the Global Goal on Adaptation, adaptation finance, adaptation in the global stocktake and reporting on adaptation without creating additional burdens for developing countries, among others. Consequently, the work under the PAWP represents another step forward in the history of adaptation under the multilateral process, which has evolved more slowly than wished and generally not in step with the urgency that the

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adverse impacts of climate change impose, in particular, for developing countries. However, much has been learned together through the collective process of coordination of the G77 and China, which has amplified the voices of developing countries when needed and resulted in a solidarity that is stronger than the differences and has been the most effective way of realizing change.

References Blaxekjaer L, Nielsen Ø, Dan T (2015) Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC. Clim Policy 15(6):751–766 Bueno M (2019) Identity-based cooperation in the multilateral negotiations on climate change: The group of 77 and China. In: Lorenzo C (ed) Latin America in times of global environmental change, The Latin American Studies Book Series, pp 57–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03024254-1_5 Burton I, Huq S, Lim B, Pilifosova O, Schipper EL (2002) From impacts assessment to adaptation priorities: the shaping of adaptation policy. Clim Policy 2(2–3):145–159 Chasek P, Rajamani L (2003) Steps toward enhanced parity: negotiating capacity and strategies of developing countries. In: Kaul I, Conceico P, Le Gouben K, Mendoza R (eds) Providing global public goods. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 245–262 Kasa S, Gullberg A, Heggelund G (2008) The group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent developments and future directions. Environ Agreem Politics Law Econ 8:113–127. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10784-007-9060-4 Khan MR, Roberts T (2013) Towards a binding adaptation regime: three levers and two instruments. In: Moser S, Boykoff M (eds) Successful adaptation to climate change. Linking science and policy in a rapidly changing world, 1st edn. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 156–172 Magnan AK, Ribera T (2016) Global adaptation after Paris. Science 352(6291):1280–1282 Miller M (1995) The third world in global environmental politics. Open University Press, Buckingham Miller M (1998) Reconfigured: environmental regimes and third world states. In: Liftin K (ed) The greening of sovereignty in world politics. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 173–192 Najam A (2005) Developing countries and global environmental governance: from contestation to participation to engagement. Environ Agreem Politics Law Econ 5(3):303–321. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10784-005-3807-6 Pielke R Jr, Prins G, Rayner S, Sarewitz D (2007) Climate change 2007: lifting the taboo on adaptation. Nature 445(7128):597 Schipper L (2006) Conceptual history of adaptation in the UNFCCC process. Rev Eur Community Intern Environ Law 15(1):82–92 Schipper ELF, Burton I (2009) Understanding adaptation: origins, concepts, practice and policy. In: The earth can reader on adaptation to climate change vol 19, p 19 Vihma A, Mulugetta Y, Karlsson (2011) Negotiating solidarity? The G77 through the prism of climate change negotiations. Glob Change, Peace Secur 23(3):315–334 Williams M (1997) The Group of 77 and global environmental politics. Glob Environ Change 7(3):295–298 Williams M (2005) The third world and global environmental negotiations: interests, institutions and ideas. Global Environ Politics 5(3):48–69. https://doi.org/10.1162/1526380054794826

Chapter 10

The Implementation Phase of the Paris Agreement: The Adaptation Provisions María del Pilar Bueno Rubial

Abstract This chapter focuses on the last stage of negotiations on adaptation under the UNFCCC, and therefore, is the most recent negotiation experience, concentrated in the period from 2016 to 2018. This period is key, since it provided the framework for the negotiation of the implementation of the Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015. The analysis focuses on the key moments of negotiation telling the story from the perspective of the lead coordinator of the G77 and China on adaptation. It is argued that the Group conquered almost all the big issues on which it achieved commonalities with the exception of adaptation finance as an overarching problem of the final outcome in Katowice. The majority of the subgroups of the G77 and China for most of this time maintained a cooperative approach in order to arrive at a common position with the conviction that better results could be achieved with the unity of developing countries on an agenda that was established and built up by those countries in the international regime. Keywords Climate change adaptation · Group of 77 and China · Cooperation · Negotiation

Introduction One of the main assets of this book is the possibility to tell the story of climate change adaptation at the UNFCCC from the perspective of different actors of the developing world who have been involved in the negotiations for some time. In that way, it should be highlighted that this is an opportunity for sharing with readers what we usually call the kitchen table of the negotiations. Given that the negotiations at the UNFCCC are known for their syncretism and because many things are solved in the final minutes of meetings in which only a few actors have access to the negotiation table, the added value of this book is that it opens a window on ‘the kitchen’. M. P. Bueno Rubial (B) National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_10

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One of the main challenge of this section of the book is to provide the reader with that additional perspective that the lead coordinators of the G77 and China on adaptation can offer as a result of facilitating the process of building a common position. The idea is not only to share the gains but also the obstacles experienced coming from inside or outside the Group. Thematic coordination is a traditional task in the practice of the G77 and China at the UNFCCC. At each meeting, usually the COPs and the meetings of the subsidiary bodies, the list of coordinators is reviewed by the Chair of the G77 and China based on the current meeting agendas. This chapter focuses on the latest stage of negotiations on adaptation under the UNFCCC, and therefore, is the most recent negotiation experience, concentrated on the period from 2016 to 2018. This period is key, since it provided the framework for the negotiation of the first period of implementation of the Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015. The analysis focuses on the key moments of negotiation in this period, chronologically, taking the three years since COP 22, in Marrakech 2016, as three steps towards the outcomes adopted at COP 24 held in Katowice in December 2018. This analysis provides the inside story, including the key contextual elements of each negotiation phase; some aspects of the coordination itself where appropriate; the process of building a common position; and the challenges in light of the agendas, as well as the outcomes of the meetings and how the position was reflected in those results. In doing so, we recognize the broad range of authors that have studied the alliances and groups in the negotiations under the UNFCCC (Ashe et al. 1999; Chasek 2005; Kasa et al. 2008; Betzold 2010; Qi 2011; Vihma et al. 2011; Betzold et al. 2012; Hochstetler 2012; Makina 2013; Blaxekjær and Nielsen 2015; Hirsch 2016; Edwards 2017; Tobin et al. 2018; Bueno and Pascual 2016; Bueno 2016, 2018). Moreover, we acknowledge the variety of authors analyzing at the present time the prevalence of categories such as the South and the Third World (Bayart 1991; Miller 1992, 1995, 1998; Kamrava 1993, 1995; Berger 2004; Najam 2005; Williams 2005; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012; Bueno 2013). The chapter aims to put this negotiating period in perspective, seeking to draw linkages with the main ideas expressed in this book, including the relative autonomy of the issue of adaptation from leadership and other changes of the sub-groups of the G77 and China, as well as the COP Presidency and the coordination of the G77 and China itself; the causal relationship between the position of coordinator and the outcomes and the capacity to build the broadest set of common proposals. These ideas provide the solid ground for reflection on why it was worth having a common position of the G77 and China on adaptation at the UNFCCC.

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The First COP After the Entry into Force of the Paris Agreement and the Beginning of a New Coordination COP 22, whick took place in Marrakech, Morocco, was surrounded by a very particular international context due to the outcome of the Presidential elections in the United States. In fact, all the UNFCCC processes prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, including the legal form of the document, were branded by this event. The possibility of a Republican candidate winning, and in particular, Donald Trump, who built a campaign based on the denial of the climate change phenomenon, was a menace to the process and to the future of the Paris Agreement (PA). As a result, 2016 was focused on the efforts of different actors, including from the UN, the European Union and China, to achieve a record entry into force of the PA. This desirable outcome was reached in time for the COP, which was hugely promising in terms of maintaining the momentum held in Paris. In addition to this context, it should be said that in the May session of the subsidiary bodies (SBs) in 2016, the agenda of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) was adopted,1 reflecting all the tensions and differences among the Parties that the PA had not solved. Thus, the so-called balanced outcome of COP 21, comprising Decision 1/CP.21 and the PA as an annex, was not necessarily accurately reflected in the agenda. Considering the objective of this chapter, I concentrate my attention on the discussions around adaptation agenda items. With the adoption of the APA agenda, the implementation of Article 7 of the PA seemed to be limited to further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement. However, there were other vital features, including paragraphs 41, 42, and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21 which gave a mandate to the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Least Developed Countries Group of Experts (LEG) and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), as appropriate. These bodies produced their recommendations in late 2017 at COP 23 chaired by Fiji and held in Bonn. As a result, the negotiation of this significant part of the Paris package on adaptation was only negotiated after that COP. Another important feature of this package was the public registry established by Article 7.12 of the PA. However, the author of this chapter did not lead that negotiation. There were also other important pieces of the puzzle, since adaptation is a crosscutting issue, including adaptation in relation to the means of implementation (finance, technology, and capacity building), as well as transparency of adaptation and adaptation in the global stocktake (GST), to be complete. Nevertheless, the intentional absence of the means of implementation from the APA agenda should be recognized. It was sacrificed in the negotiations of May 2016 and afterwards was only partially included under agenda item 8 on “further matters”, at the cost of developing countries. 1 The APA agenda adopted in May 2016 is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/

docs/2016/apa/eng/l01.pdf, accessed in January 2019.

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On the aspect of coordination itself, it should be said that the COP held in Marrakech required a new coordinator, and this always entails a process of the mutual building of trust. Since the adaptation family of the G77 and China is a group of old and new friends that share a lot of time together during the year, as well as many dilemmas, the new coordinator normally relies on trusted friends and sustaining practices that have been typical of this work space over the years. These practices include the compilation of written inputs from the subgroups; the development of tools based on those inputs; long hours of coordination meetings to discuss these inputs and tools among all the sub-groups facilitated by the coordinator with the intent of arriving at a point where the G77 and China may speak with one voice during the negotiating sessions with the support of the subgroups. These practices should not be underestimated, since they have been the basis of a democratic system that has allowed the G77 and China to position adaptation in an increasingly predominant place on the UNFCCC agenda, even in the face of opposition from developed countries. It is also worth mentioning, that beyond the practices established in the G77 and China on adaptation, the lead coordinator exercises his/her prerogatives that also coincide with his/her own style of negotiation. In the context of sustaining these practices and trying to build trust with the subgroups, some of the main challenges posed for the G77 and China in Marrakech were due to both internal and external reasons. Among the external ones was: the facilitation of the agenda item (agenda item 4 of the APA), recognizing that although facilitated informal consultations had been a modality in the run up to adoption of the Paris Agreement, a new set of facilitators2 was selected in Marrakech; the need to deal with cross-cutting issues as aforementioned and, especially, how to start with the adaptation communication guidance considering the document was something newly created by the PA. In addition, the adaptation communication was pushed by the G77 and China and the language of Article 7.11 reflects the group’s internal agreement regarding the essential balance between not generating additional burdens (that opens the possibility to submit the adaptation communication as a component of or in conjunction with existing documents), raising the profile of adaptation and allowing those countries that had already submitted an adaptation component in their NDCs to continue doing so. Among the internal challenges, worth mentioning: the problem of interpretation and the positioning of the subgroups regarding the agenda item itself (APA agenda item 4 ), i.e., if it was further guidance on the adaptation communication or further guidance on the NDC; the issue of particular vulnerabilities inside the G77 and China, amplified by an African COP; the Thai Presidency of the Group; the separation of the traditional joint adaptation and loss and damage coordination; and the role of the recognition of adaptation efforts—all issues that I take up in this chapter. A first gain came when the Group was given the possibility of meeting with the new facilitators to provide ideas about how to start. This provoked a dialogue that was naturally divided between substance and process. It should be recognized that on 2 The list of facilitators in Morocco is available at https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/apa/application/pdf/

cop22_list_of_confirmed_co-facilitators.pdf, accessed in January 2019.

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the latter, how to continue the intersessional work, the G77 and China were not able to achieve a common position. Given that, each sub-group proposed its own vision about workshops, submissions, and other possibilities to advance the work. On the matter of substance, the Group was more unified and suggested to move forward by discussing the purpose and the possible elements of the adaptation communication, which is the direction the conversation took. It is also important to emphasize the role of the flexibility of the so-called vehicles under Article 7.11, meaning the flexibility agreed in the G77 and China in Paris, which allowed Parties to submit the adaptation communication through different existing documents. The position of the Group in terms of the scope of the negotiations was a result of the compilation of the preferences of the different subgroups to date. Consequently, the lead coordinator expressed on behalf of the G77 and China that adaptation communications should be a way to catalyze adaptation action and also to enhance the profile of adaptation. In addition, they should be a tool to communicate national priorities and needs, plans, and actions. Another important aspect of the scope that was highlighted was the need for support. For the Group, the adaptation communication should provide an opportunity for the identification of the implementation and support needs and priorities of developing countries in order to enhance and strengthen the provision of means of implementation (MOIs) for adaptation action. The global goal on adaptation (GGA) as part of the scope of the adaptation communication itself was also an issue where some of the subgroups showed stronger voices, such as the African Group. However, it was considered a common position in the spirit of internal flexibility of the G77 and China. In consideration of the nature of the scope of the adaptation communication, the Group expressed that it should continue to be country driven, reflect the differences, but also the synergies, between national and international processes. This idea evolved in following sessions, and became what the G77 and China referred to as the principles. Early on in the Marrakech negotiations, it was clear that one of the differences between the subgroups of the G77 and China was the varying interpretations of the agenda item on the adaptation communication, with two subgroups (the Arab Group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries) maintaining that the only document lacking guidance was the NDC, meaning to them that the agenda item should be interpreted in those terms, i.e., that it would develop further guidance for adaptation in the NDCs. At the same time, the other subgroups considered the language of the agenda item allowed for the development of further guidance applicable to all vehicles under Article 7.11. This is a key point since it led to intense debates within the Group up to COP 24. At the end of the process, it became clear that this was more than a difference of interpretation; it was a matter of strategy of these sub-groups to implement the full scope of the NDC under APA agenda item 3—something that all the subgroups supported but with different levels of interest. The negotiation strategy around this divergence of views amongst the sub-groups of the G77 and China was to avoid public conflict (outside the Group) while conversations continued (inside the Group) in the spirit of the no harm principle.

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Another sticky issue for adaptation coordination was the different positions of the subgroups in terms of the recognition of efforts. In Morocco, one subgroup, AILAC, was already against its inclusion as part of the adaptation communication since it understood that adaptation efforts should be reported in the national communication. At that point in time, the other subgroups were either strongly in favor of its inclusion (ABU), or without a conclusive position (all the others). The negotiation strategy in this case was to signal from the floor that “some countries of the G77 and China”, also considered the recognition of adaptation efforts an integral part of the scope of the adaptation communication. This was a formula that allowed the Group to continue to show a unified face despite the disparities. In terms of the elements of the adaptation communication, the internal G77 and China discussions advanced around two positions: a possible list of elements, which eventually were called common elements, and a more open-ended and nonexhaustive list. However, the position expressed by the lead coordinator on behalf of the Group exclusively concentrated on possible elements coming from the compilation work done internally: information on vulnerabilities; adaptation priorities and needs; needs on means of implementation; adequacy of support provided; efforts already developed considering their recognition; future planned actions, programs, plans and policies; as well as, national circumstances and legal frameworks and institutional arrangements. The facilitated dialogue in Marrakech also included the first conversations about the linkages with other agenda items, including mitigation, support provisions, the global goal on adaptation, the transparency framework, the global stocktake and National Communications. With respect to the relative autonomy of the position on adaptation from the various and regular changes that the Group experiences, one of the most important is the annual shift in Presidency of the G77 and China. There are certain things that do not change from year to year in the G77 and China as they are common practices, such as those previously identified. However, each Presidency provides its own perspectives, positions, and instructions to the lead coordinators. In addition, the role of the Presidency is also impacted by progress on negotiations at a given moment. During the period analyzed in this contribution, the most sensitive political moment was during COP 24 (2018) in Katowice under the Egyptian Presidency of the G77 and China. Nevertheless, the Thai Presidency (2016) faced many challenges including the due date of the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP), as well as the treatment of the so-called orphan issues, as some delegations and groups considered they had not been integrated sufficiently into the APA and SBs agendas. Also, internally in the G77 and China, the debate on Africa’s special circumstances was crucial. This issue was discussed but not resolved in Paris, leaving the agenda item open and causing animated discussions within the Group up to COP 24. Recognition of the special circumstances of Africa and its vulnerability had a spillover effect on the issues of financing, as well as transparency, that some constituencies such as GRULAC were not willing to accept. This debate also spilled over into

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the adaptation group although in Paris it had been decided that differences between developing countries would not be recognized in Article 7. Last but not least, the proposal of the new lead coordinator to divide the traditionally joint coordination of adaptation and loss and damage (LnD) was not very popular, in particular, among the groups that had stronger positions and interests in terms of LnD, including AOSIS and LDCs. In any case, in the long term, the decision did not end up affecting the building of confidence in the coordination of adaptation issues. Although it is recognized that stability was not achieved in the coordination of LnD, which for the most part was left to the sub-groups in the three years from Marrakech to Katowice, unlike with adaptation that was covered by Argentina throughout. Ultimately, the outcome of the Marrakech session was an informal note prepared by the facilitators under their responsibility.3 According to the position held by the G77 and China, the results were acceptable and reflected the positions expressed from the floor by the lead coordinator based on the internal discussions. The result included a table where all group positions were included as requested by the G77 and China, which could be a basis for subsequent rounds of negotiations, although much work remained to be done.

The Trail Towards the First COP Presidency from a Small Island Developing State In 2017, the third part of the first session of the APA (APA 1–3) and the forty-six session of the SBs took place in May, in Bonn. COP 23 also took place in Bonn, but was chaired by Fiji. It was the first COP with a SIDS Presidency, triggering new challenges for the country itself, for AOSIS, as well as the UNFCCC system. In addition, the 2017 May session was characterized by tensions linked to the new President of the United States and his campaign promising to abandon the Paris Agreement. This promise became a reality in June of the same year,4 despite the fact that the procedures for withdrawal established in Article 28 of the PA postpone the final decision to a subsequent President or a second term. With this, the negotiations during this year were deeply vexed by the anxieties linked to the role that the United States would assume after the announcement, including possible scenarios to hinder the process. Nonetheless, these concerns did not materialize. The position of the US was rather moderate in the negotiation rooms and the country was even cooperative in some cases. In any case, this meant that the efforts of the European Union had to be 3 The

informal note is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/apa_item_4_informal_ summary_note_final_version_14112016_1920.pdf, last accessed in January 2019. 4 The statement pronounced by President Trump of the US in June 2017 is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climateaccord/, last accessed in January 2019.

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reinforced, as well as those of other actors such as China, showing its support for the Paris Agreement and the process. One of the most noticeable consequences of the US situation was the financing gap, with the understanding that the possibilities of delivering the outcomes of the PAWP in 2018 could be diluted without sufficient clarity on climate finance for developing countries. In this regard, at COP 23, various European countries made announcements related to the strengthening of climate finance. The Adaptation Fund broke its single-year resource mobilization record by raising USD 95.5 million, as well as a mobilization of one billion dollars from different sources was announced during COP 23 (Bonn, 2017). The challenges faced by the G77 and China during negotiations in 2017 were of a different nature, but, in comparison with 2018 events, the internal process was smooth and allowed the Group to submit during both the May session and the COP, deliverables based on its leadership on the topic of adaptation at the UNFCCC. The conclusions of Marrakech included the request to the Secretariat for an informal note by 15 February 2017, an invitation for submissions from Parties by March 30 2017, a request to the Secretariat for a synthesis of these submissions by April 30 and a pre-sessional workshop before the 2017 May session. All of these were very useful for the internal process in the G77 and China, in particular the submissions, since they helped the countries and the subgroups to organize their ideas and enabled the traditional practice of the compilation of views by the lead coordinator. The informal consultations on the adaptation communication during the May session focused mainly on purpose and elements. The conversation on linkages and flexibility continued as well. The G77 and China submitted its inputs on purpose and elements of the adaptation communication to the negotiating process. The inputs for purpose recognized that some of the themes might be incorporated in the purpose, or in some other heading of the adaptation communication, including as “common” or “additional”/“opt in–opt out” elements. This was the formula agreed inside the Group in order to include in the purpose the recognition of adaptation efforts of developing countries that did not have the support of all the sub-groups. In addition to the efforts, the list included: communicating adaptation actions and plans; enhancing support for adaptation actions and plans; catalyzing support to implement adaptation communications; contributing to and informing on progress towards the global goal on adaptation; and raising the profile of adaptation/parity with mitigation. At APA 1–3 (May 2017), the idea of a common list of elements emerged coming from previous internal deliberations. One of the main reasons for this proposal, based on conversations at this session, was that the flexibility of Article 7.11 regarding the vehicles for the presentation of the adaptation communication would cause the communications to be very different from one another, which would complicate the collective processes of the PA such as the GST. The proposal for developing a common list of elements was maintained by the Group until COP 24 when internal divergences became more apparent. The initial list of elements identified and submitted by the Group in May 2017 was as follows: national circumstances, including legal framework and institutional

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arrangements; impacts, vulnerabilities and risk assessments (including future scenarios); priorities, policies, plans, actions, strategies and/or programs, as appropriate; adaptation support needs of developing country Parties; adaptation efforts of developing countries (for recognition); and biennial communication of indicative support by developed countries, including finance, technology and capacity building. During the last part of the May session, the APA Co-chairs, Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Jo Tyndall (New Zealand), instructed the facilitators to advance with possible skeletons for future negotiation of the different agenda items. The skeleton submitted by the Group during the informal consultations included the following potential headings: 1. Preamble/Introductory remarks 1.1. Guiding Principles/Guidance 2. Purpose 3. Elements 3.1. Common elements 3.2. Additional/Opt in Opt out/Optional 4. 5. 6. 7.

Vehicles Linkages Support for the implementation of adaptation action Support for developing country Parties (including in the preparation, submission and implementation of adaptation communications) 8. Other matters Internally, the G77 and China worked on the content under other headings such as principles, vehicles, linkages and support. It is also important to highlight that the elements identified concurred with items already reported under the national communications as a way to avoid the additional burden for developing countries. The final version5 of the informal note of the co-facilitators of APA agenda item 6 4 captured accurately the proposals made by the G77 and China. The fact that the G77 and China was the only negotiating group to put written proposals on the table, compelled the EU to do the same. In any case, the Group’s position was that these proposals should not be merged in order to preserve their internal logic. The conclusions of APA 1–3 for agenda item 4 focused on next steps and followup activities, including new submissions on elements and skeleton, a technical paper by the Secretariat synthesizing the adaptation-related information included in NDCs, NAPs and recent NatComs, and a non-paper from the facilitators synthesizing the

5 It should be noted that the several iterations of the informal notes of the co facilitators were prepared

during the APA sessions as a way to capture progress. final version of the informal note is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/apa_4_ informal_note_final.pdf, last accessed in January 2019. 6 The

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submissions and the organization of a roundtable in advance of COP 23 (November 2017).7 During COP 23, the work in the informal consultations progressed on the basis of the skeletons noted above. The G77 and China had already submitted a proposal for a skeleton in the last days of the May session and continued its internal deliberations based on the compilation of the submissions of the subgroups, as per usual. However, as a result of the discussions during the informal consultations, other headings were added such as operational paragraphs and approaches for applying the guidance. The dilemma here was how to capture in the informal notes the different visions with respect to the headings. For example, some countries of the Umbrella Group were insistent on the idea of deleting headings proposed by the G77 and China including the one on principles. The different iterations of the informal notes coming from the negotiating sessions included options to reflect the disagreement in this regard. Moreover, negotiations continued to refer to NDC-specific guidance for adaptation communications inside the G77 and China and during the informal consultations. Since the Group was not able to agree on this topic, the subgroups did not obstruct the inclusion of options in the informal note reflecting the possibility of having specific guidance as a way of implementing the G77 and China’s no harm principle. Nevertheless, the challenges associated with diverging strategies increased and became more obvious from session to session. Besides, the addition of options under the headings such as specific elements for NDC guidance made the note and the structure more difficult to read. Another issue that became clearer as the sessions advanced was the interest of the African Group in having more detailed guidance including specific content for each element. This position clashed with other subgroup proposals, which supported more general guidance. Even though challenges were on the rise for the Group, the structured approach to work during coordination, guided by the submissions and inputs from the subgroups made a big difference during deliberations. The subgroups showed willingness to be cooperative and it was possible to navigate the differences among them even when they were deep. Most important was the will to progress together and the understanding that progress on this agenda item relied on the G77 and China. Given this, the negotiation strategy of the G77 and China on adaptation during 2017 took two paths. On the one hand, the internal coordination progressed by deliberating on possible details and content for the headings and subheadings of guidance on the adaptation communication. On the other hand, informal consultations (with negotiating partners) advanced by securing the skeleton or structure of the communication. Being ahead of the game in the negotiations, to the greatest extent possible, both on concrete oral and written proposals, was a strategy that favored leadership of the Group in the negotiations.

7 The conclusions of May 2017 session are available at https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_

2017/in-session/application/pdf/apa2017_l2_amended_unedited.pdf, last accessed January 2019.

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The final iteration of the informal note from the COP 23 negotiations revealed the commonalities as well as the divergences inside the Group.8 In terms of the differences, and supported by the no harm principle, it continued to recognize two main options for the vehicle-specific conversation. It also included a particular paragraph expressing the request of some Parties for the IPCC to provide guidelines on a suite of methodologies and approaches for communicating adaptation information. This idea was of primary interest to the African Group that not only wanted more detailed guidance, but also maintained the IPCC was the most suitable body to develop guidelines for the adaptation communication.9 The divergences focused on the level of detail of the guidance, additional discrepancies that the Group had in terms of the IPCC role, as well as the necessity for additional guidelines before the work on further guidance could be finished. The commonalities built by the Group during the COP 23 negotiations allowed the G77 and China to participate actively in the process of populating the skeleton with possible preambular provisions, guiding principles, operational paragraphs, the approach, the elements, as well as continuing the conversation on the content of the purpose while some Parties supported having a purpose of the guidance. With respect to the level of detail under each element, it was clear at COP 23 that the old formula based on how many pages do we have in each item in order to measure the balance between mitigation and adaptation was still a valid parameter in the negotiations. Nevertheless, this type of comparison seemed impossible as the mitigation section under APA agenda item 3 was 170 pages long while the adaptation section under agenda item 4 had eight. However, in the last hours a list of details below the elements section appeared causing much debate and in the last moments it was only accepted on the condition that the detail of this list be revisited at in the next session of the APA. Another critical issue that arose during COP 23, and which added to the work of the PAWP on adaptation, involved the presentation of the recommendations requested of the AC and LEG, in collaboration with the SCF in some cases, based on paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21. Even though some adaptation negotiators were also members of the AC and were familiar with the recommendations, this familiarity was not general to all negotiators. Some of the G77 and China subgroups, such as the African Group of Negotiators, as well as the Least Developed Countries, AOSIS and ABU were more involved with the development of the recommendations and reacted more quickly. These reactions included significant discomfort with the recommendations as they were presented. Among other things, there were concerns that they were unbalanced in nature on the mobilization of support; the lack of clarity of the recognition of adaptation efforts (when, who and what should be recognized);

8 The last iteration of the informal note of agenda item 4 of APA 1–4 is available at https://unfccc.int/

sites/default/files/apa_item_4_informal_note_14112017_final_iteration.pdf, last accessed in January 2019. 9 Antecedents to this discussion can be founded in the NAPs guidance developed by the COP and the guidelines prepared by the LEG.

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and the lack of substance on the methodologies recommended for assessing the adaptation needs of developing countries. The G77 and China agreed as a group, therefore, that more time was needed for internal deliberations on these recommendations in subgroups to be able to come back with a common position, which was not the position of the EU and the Umbrella Group, both of which preferred to take these recommendations on board and consider this part of the work finished. However, by applying Rule 16 of the rules of procedure of the UNFCCC,10 the continuation of the topic was assured for the next session of the SBs in May 2018, as requested by the G77 and China. It also is worth noting that the Ecuadorian Presidency of G77 and China was very conciliatory. The role was taken on that year by a diplomat with great knowledge of the process as a long-time experienced negotiator in the UNFCCC, including participation at the Bureau level. As with other G77 and China Presidencies, the rules of engagement with coordinators and the understanding of the fundamental importance of adaptation to the G77 and China, the G77 and China Presidency supported the position on adaptation at COP 23 but was not overly intrusive. One year before completing the work program, the process was slowing down, which is not unusual as issues grow more complex. However, it was a good year for the G77 and China in terms of collaboration and advancement of a common position. Nevertheless, the disparities grew deeper, both in the case of pre-existing ones, as well as newly emerging ones that lead to significant flashpoints within the Group in 2018.

The Last Stretch of the Road and the End of the Paris Work Program The year 2018 was key in the negotiation process of the Convention since all the energy of the years following Paris was focused on completing the PAWP. COP 24 held in the Polish city of Katowice was full of questions beginning with the Presidency itself. Once again, there was a European Presidency of the COP with the task of closing a significant moment in the history of the UNFCCC. It should be recognized that the Polish Presidency achieved the proposed outcome, which, as the PA itself, could never be ambitious enough nor meet all expectations or overcome all challenges. However, as with the PA and the agenda of the APA, it was an acceptable outcome for all Parties that maintains the balance of the Agreement without changing its nationally determined nature, while respecting the differentiation between developed and developing countries.

10 Rule

16 points out that any item of the agenda of an ordinary session that was not completed at the session, shall be included automatically in the agenda of the next ordinary session. Rules of procedure are available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/02_0.pdf, las accessed in January 2019.

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The conclusion of the COP was delayed because of the market-transparency disagreements between the EU and its allies and the friends of Brazil, including the BASIC group. In that sense, the only issue on which the COP did not deliver the expected outcome of the PAWP was on Article 6 of the PA. Nevertheless, an overall outcome was achieved due in part to recognition by the EU that the larger outcome could not be sacrificed for this one issue whose negotiations were at such a stage of immaturity that a substantive advance was impossible in the time allotted. During the year, the building anxieties and political pressures were expressed from different perspectives according to the needs and interests of each sector and actor. The financial chapter of the PAWP became a key feature, and achieving an outcome was critical as articulated by many leaders of the developing world, clearly stating that there could be no more mitigation and transparency pledges without financial commitments from developed countries. The gravity of these words coming from prominent leaders of the different subgroups of the G77 and China, fortified by the Egyptian Presidency of the Group, set the landscape for the COP and sent a message to the European leaders who would need to balance the financing gap created by the United States. In that vein, a result in terms of transparency of support, in particular on Article 9.5 was a must have in order to unlock progress on many other articles, including on the transparency of mitigation. For that reason, the EU, and the Polish Presidency in particular, had to be very strategic in convincing the members of the Umbrella Group that were far more reluctant to the very end. Three sessions took place during 2018. In addition to the traditional SB session as well as the COP in Poland, an extra session in Bangkok was added in September. The session of the SBs in May was a study in contrasts for the adaptation team of the G77 and China, for at least two reasons. One of them was the disparity between the divergences on APA agenda item 4 inside the Group and the cooperative mode on paragraphs 41, 42 and 45. The other was the distance between the first and the second week in terms of technical work on APA agenda item 4.

Paris Mandates on Adaptation Given to the Bodies During 2018 The subgroups had the opportunity to develop their positions between the COP and the SBs session. For that reason, the G77 and China worked supportively to achieve a common position with respect to paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21. In this regard, the approach was to delete paragraphs in the recommendations made by the relevant bodies that were not acceptable, in particular in the mandate related to the mobilization of support (paragraph 45.a), to add ideas that were missing or not clear on the mandates of methodologies for assessing needs and the recognition of efforts (paragraphs 41 and 42b, respectively) and leaving the recommendations, with minor changes, on the review of adaptation related institutional arrangements and

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the review of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support (paragraphs 42a and 45b respectively). During this session and to the very end, the G77 and China remained strong and together on the so-called Paris Mandates to the bodies, negotiating with one voice in discussions with the negotiating partners from the EU, the US and other Umbrella Group colleagues. From the first position of the partners of not moving from the recommendations made by the bodies to the final outcome,11 it can be said that the result benefited the members of the G77 and China. In the case of the two mandates where the Group supported the original recommendations with slight amendments, the final outcome reflects exactly that spirit. In terms of the recognition of adaptation efforts, the debates were deep and confusing on the GST and the role of recognition of adaptation efforts in it. The negotiated outcome clearly articulates the sequence of events toward including adaptation efforts in the GST. The CMA decision includes a first step where the information on adaptation efforts is gathered in a synthesis report prepared by the Secretariat, based on the most recent adaptation-related documents prepared by countries and other relevant bodies. The second step is where the recognition of these efforts takes place during the high-level phase of the GST, and the final step is where this recognition becomes part of a report prepared by the Secretariat summarizing the GST process, all taking into account a country-driven approach. The issue of the methodologies for assessing adaptation needs was more contentious inside the Group in the final hours of Katowice, in particular in the consideration of the role of the IPCC participating in the development of these methodologies. This issue was also linked to the role of the IPCC in APA agenda item 4. The CMA Decision reflects a collaborative approach for development of an inventory of methodologies which includes the role of the AC, as requested by the G77 and China; the participation of the IPCC in the preparation of a technical paper with the AC (a compromise made by the Group, which had proposed giving the IPCC a more important role in the development of methodologies) and, finally, submissions from Parties on the matter. Each of these points was included in the common position of the Group. The issue on the mobilization of support was a complicated one from the very beginning, since it was negotiated in the context of the financial package that was critical to the success of COP 24. From the Group’s perspective, the original recommendations made by the relevant bodies were very unbalanced in terms of all the activities that developing countries were required to conduct in order to receive the support that theoretically was already available.

11 CMA Decision with respect to paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21 is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma_auv_paras%2041%2042%2045.pdf, last accessed in January 2019.

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Further Guidance on the Adaptation Communication from May to December On the matter of further guidance on the adaptation communication process, reaching an outcome was intricate since many Parties and subgroups were concerned about the risk of sacrificing national determination and preserving their own approach to the relationship between mitigation and adaptation in the NDC. More than anything, the primary problem was about the scope of the NDC and this was a very tricky political discussion. During the May 2018 session the common position of the G77 and China on the adaptation communication agenda item was put in jeopardy, and it was finally lost during the second week of the session. The very agitated second week was a contrast to the first week of very productive internal work as well as interesting progress in the informal consultations based on the G77 and China proposal of a new structure for the emerging text. The first diagnosis made by the Group was that the informal note coming from the previous (2017) session was difficult to read. After internal work and using the submissions and inputs of the subgroups a new structure was proposed by the G77 and China, informed by the previous one, but allocating the contentious problem of the vehicle specific vs common guidance issue to annexes. Without prejudice to the final format of the outcome, the Group submitted a structure with the following elements: preamble; purpose; adoption of the guidance; principles; modalities for communication, submissions and updating of the adaptation communication; modalities to update/revise/review the guidance; modalities of support for preparation, submission, updating and implementing the adaptation communication; and linkages. Then two annexes were proposed with the aim of protecting the internal differences within the Group. The first annex was on common guidance and the second one was on vehicle-specific guidance. The structure was accepted by the negotiating partners and the first and second iterations of the informal note reflected that consensus. There was, however, a disagreement during the informal consultations around the “no headings” options, where the G77 and China suggested the inclusion of square brackets instead of having additional options. This approach was not agreed to in Bonn but in the next session held in Bangkok in September the Co-Chairs of the APA applied it to all the agenda items in the tool they developed under their responsibility as a basis for negotiations. At the same time, the Group’s internal deliberations persisted, such as those around the level of detail included below each of the elements discussed in the May session and the paragraph on the IPCC developing guidelines. Unfortunately, the second week of the May 2018 session was nearly lost in the internal discussions of the G77 and China resulting from disparities in political strategies. Some of the subgroups understood that this session was the last opportunity to include their positions in text before the version to be provided by the APA CoChairs at the last session. For this reason, the discussion on the inclusion of adaptation actions that result in mitigation co-benefits was included throughout the text including

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all the headings and subheadings of the structure being negotiated. Since this proposal could not be supported by other subgroups, the common position of the G77 and China was lost which had a number of procedural implications, not least of which was the paralysis of the informal consultations for almost three days. After very agitated deliberations, the second iteration of the text prepared by the co-facilitators was considered to be the final one with the annexation of submissions made by different subgroups. Even though the different strategies of G77 and China subgroups were acknowledged as early as Morocco, in the final hours they became deal breakers. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Presidency did its best to build a pathway to continuation of the deliberations in the next session preventing the complete loss of the common position of the G77 and China.12 The additional session in Bangkok in September 2018 proved to be as difficult as the previous one in May for the same reason—divergences on APA agenda item 4. However, some common work was possible in suggestions on the removal of brackets around negotiating text, the improvement of language in the text, as well as textual proposals for purpose, principles and modalities of support for the adaptation communication. Even with all the problems inside and outside the Group, we were able to preserve a G77 and China text as a clear option in the final iteration of the APA co-Chairs’ tool. The first approach to dealing with our internal differences was to raise from the floor during the informal consultations, still discussing certain concepts, that these discussions included economic diversification, co-benefits and the recognition of adaptation efforts. Consideration of the structure of the proposed skeleton without the annexes was possible with some consensus in the G77 and China and that helped refine the text and make some progress. However, the debate on the annexes was not delayed for long, which exposed the profound divergences inside the Group. The no harm principle no longer applied since the subgroups felt they could not support ideas coming from other subgroups of the G77 and China that harmed their own interests.13 As a result of the divergent approaches to the annexes, at the Bangkok session the co-facilitators proposed tables as a possible interpretation of the combination of elements. The final step in the negotiation of further guidance on the adaptation communication came at COP 24 where both the internal and external struggles were as difficult as had been expected. It is worth noting that with APA agenda item 4, where the common position was in jeopardy, some of the G77 and China subgroups organized informally to try to save aspects of the common position without losing everything and avoid tearing one another apart during the informal consultations. Even without

12 Last

iteration of the informal not is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ Final%20iteration%20informal%20note.pdf, last accessed in January 2019. 13 Last iteration of the informal not is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ APA%20item%204%20informal%20document%20final%20iteration.pdf, last accessed in January 2019.

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a formal G77 and China spokesperson at times, the individual G77 and China subgroups did their best to support each other where possible. This ad hoc cooperation proved extremely productive during the long nights of informal meetings trying to reorganize the text. Finally, the outcome of the negotiations on further guidance tends to accommodate everyone and, in that way, is very Solomonic. The CMA decision includes the different sections under the headings proposed by the G77 and China, but the actual headings were deleted (as had been expected). In an assessment of the losses and gains of what had been components of the common position of the G77 and China up to the final days, it is possible to say that the purpose and principles had been preserved, albeit in a less robust formulation. The CMA decision notes the purpose of the adaptation communication that includes the increase in visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation; the strengthening of adaptation action and support for developing countries; providing input to the GST and enhancing learning and understanding on adaptation needs and actions. The first three components were very important features of the G77 and China position on purpose. However, reference to the global goal on adaptation was lost, as were other components. With respect to the principles of the adaptation communication, they include the country-driven approach, that it shall not pose an additional burden for developing countries and is not a basis for comparison between Parties and is not subject to review. All these concepts can be attributed to the common position of the Group. One of the most important losses here was the failure to agree on inclusion of the principle of CBDR that appeared in earlier drafts in both the principles and the preamble, but was then was deleted everywhere in what can be considered as backsliding when compared with the PA. Among other gains based on the common position are the linkage with the GST (even when internally the positions were divergent in terms of a flexible relationship versus strong temporal alignment with GST cycles), as well as a differentiation in the elements that the Group named common and opt in/opt out or optional elements. On this last point, some divergences emerged in Poland, so that the distinction between elements in paragraph 7 of the CMA decision is gentle and acceptable for developed countries. Also related to the approach to the elements, the ex-ante vs ex-post nature of information was resolved by inviting Parties to include, as appropriate, ex-ante information based on the elements in the annex, as proposed in May 2018. Another gain is the clear identification of the adaptation communication in the document chosen and to number the adaptation communication sequentially. Furthermore, the flexibility of vehicle choice is conserved very strongly in many paragraphs of the Decision. The list of achievements is also enriched by the contribution of the adaptation communication toward the progress in achieving the GGA, even when the GGA was lost in the purpose. Moreover, the process of revision of the guidance comes word for word from a textual proposal made by the G77 and China. Among the losses, the support section of the adaptation communication decision is very weak. The CMA decision urges developed countries and invited others to

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provide voluntary resources for adaptation; it also invites the GCF to consider channeling support to developing countries for the preparation and submission of the adaptation communication and encourages different funds and bodies to continue channeling support for the implementation of adaptation actions. As feared by the Group, this is “a business as usual” solution in terms of support with a possible window for the GCF to open a new channel for the preparation and submission of this particular document. The list of elements of the adaptation communication set out in the annex of the CMA decision is more or less as the G77 and China had proposed with some differences in language, as expected, including what the Group classified both as common and optional elements. The internal difficulty with the recognition of adaptation efforts was resolved by including them exclusively as an element in the decision on paragraph 41 of Decision 1/CP.21. This approach was also agreed internally within the Group. The big issue that splintered the G77 and China throughout the year, was the approach to mitigation co-benefits and economic diversification. The resolution to these matters was very similar to what many groups had suggested originally when the problems became weighty in May: to include them as an element with some safeguards in the text (paragraph 12 of Decision 9/CMA.1). The other big issue about vehicle-specific guidance was also resolved on paragraph 11 of the Decision, which provides that Parties that choose to submit an adaptation communication as a component of or in conjunction with an NDC are encouraged to use the guidance. This means that the NDC as a vehicle is preserved as was one of the primary interests of some subgroups. However, as mentioned above, the majority of the countries of the G77 and China said that they were interested in using this vehicle. Thus, the discrepancy on this matter was more one of the political strategies chosen during three years of negotiations than one of the essence of the proposal itself. There are two more issues that were very contentious inside the Group. Firstly, the introduction of the word “review” applied to the adaptation actions resulting in mitigation co-benefits that divided the Group in May. As suggested by more than one subgroup, what was needed was the introduction of this assurance in the mitigation section as well as in the transparency of mitigation; it was not necessary under APA agenda item 4. Secondly, on the issue of the IPCC preparing guidelines, the Group was divided in the end. The Decision stipulates that the AC with the engagement of IPCC Working Group II will develop the guidelines. This was not acceptable for everyone in the G77 and China, as the AGN pushed for the development of the guidelines by the IPCC, but it was part of the final compromise.14

14 The

CMA Decision on further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement is available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma1_ auv_L.21_Adaptation%20communication.pdf, last accessed in January 2019.

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Conclusions The period analyzed, from 2016 to 2018, was turbulent internationally and just focusing on the climate change regime, the very fast entry into force of the Paris Agreement drove the entire system to schedule and develop the activities adopted in the PAWP in record time. Furthermore, the decision of the Trump administration to announce its withdrawal from the PA destabilized an already unstable regime. This disruption not only impacted the mitigation agenda, considering the NDC submitted by the US, but also the financial feature of the puzzle that was critical to achieving a balanced outcome in the context of the existing differentiation between developed and developing countries. The adaptation package was delivered in Katowice including on APA agenda item 4 and the Paris Mandates in paragraphs 41, 42 and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21, as well as the public registry15 established in article 7.12 of the PA. Considering the very difficult process of building a common position inside the G77 and China during this time, the Group conquered almost all the big issues on which it achieved commonalities. The big exception is finance which was worsened by the financial gap created by the US. However, this gap was an umbrella problem that encompasses more than the adaptation agenda and the temporal phase discussed here. Besides, this issue exceeds the United States climate denial. The majority of the subgroups of the G77 and China for most of the time maintained a cooperative approach in order to arrive at a common position. That position resulted from the conviction that better results could be achieved with the unity of the developing countries on an agenda that was established and built up by those countries in the international regime. The challenges inside the Group were numerous but they came more from the political strategies than the positions and interests. That is something to reflect upon for the future in light of the outcomes. The Presidencies of the G77 and China did not change the rules of engagement that were very particular in comparison with other coordinations. However, it is recognized that in some cases they helped to maintain the common position and understood its importance, and in other cases were not effective enough. The conflict of interest of the subgroups should also be recognized since it is not simple to serve two masters. The fight for ensuring adaptation action in developing countries has been and continues to be a long road and these words try to account for the victories of the unity of the G77 and China and the difficulties we faced when we were separated.

15 The

negotiation of the public registry was not included in this analysis since its negotiation was not coordinated by the author of this contribution.

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References Ashe J, Van Lierop R, Cherian A (1999) The role of the alliance of small island states (AOSIS) in the negotiation of the United Nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC). Natural resources forum. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK, pp 209–220 Bayart J-F (1991) Finishing with the Idea of the Third World: the concept of political trajectory. In: James M (ed) Rethinking third world politics. Longman, Harlow, pp 51–71 Berger MT (2004) After the third world? History, destiny and the fate of third worldism. Third World Q 25(1):9–39 Betzold C, Castro P, Weiler F (2012) AOSIS in the UNFCCC negotiations: from unity to fragmentation? Clim Policy 12(5):591–613 Betzold C (2010) Borrowing power to influence international negotiations: AOSIS in the climate change regime, 1990–1997. Politics 30(3):131–148 Blaxekjær LØ, Nielsen TD (2015) Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC. Clim Policy 15(6):751–766 Bueno MP (2018) Cambio, identidades e intereses: Argentina en las negociaciones multilaterales de cambio climático 2015–2017. Colombia Internacional, Universidad de los Andes, vol 96, pp 115–145 Bueno MP (2016) El grupo africano en las negociaciones multilaterales climáticas recientes (2009– 2016). Voces en el Fenix, no 57, pp 130–138 Bueno MP, Pascual G (2016) International climate framework: the role of the BASIC countries in the negotiations towards the Paris Agreement. Janus Net J Int Relat 7(2):121–140 Bueno MP (2013) Las potencias medias en la arquitectura climática global: la hibridación de la brecha Norte-Sur. Austral. Revista Brasilera de Estrategia y Relaciones Internacionales 2(4):207– 230 Chasek P (2005) Margins of power: coalition building and coalition maintenance of the South Pacific island states and the alliance of small island states. Rev Eur Comp Int’l Envtl L 14:125 Edwards G et al (2017) Small group, big impact: how AILAC helped shape the Paris Agreement. Clim Policy 17(1):71–85 Hirsch T (2016) The role of alliances in international climate policy after Paris. Friedrich-EbertStiftung, Global Policy and Development Hochstetler KA (2012) The G-77, BASIC, and global climate governance: a new era in multilateral environmental negotiations. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55:53–69 Hurrell A, Sengupta S (2012) Emerging powers, North–South relations and global climate politics. Int Affairs 88(3):463–484 Kamrava M (1993) Conceptualizing Third World politics: the state-society see-saw. Third World Q 14(4):703–716 Kamrava M (1995) Political culture and a new definition of the Third World. Third World Q 16(4):691–702 Kasa S, Gullberg A, Heggelund G (2008) The group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent developments and future directions. Int Environ Agreements Polit Law Econ 8(2):113–127 Makina A (2013) Managing climate change: the Africa Group in multilateral environmental negotiations. J Int Organ Stud 4(1) Miller M (1992) Addressing resource management concerns: the Third World in global environmental politics. In: Kenneth B (ed) Development and Democratization in the Third World: myths, hopes and realities. Taylor and Francis, New York, pp 169–181 Miller M (1995) The Third World in global environmental politics. Open University Press, Buckingham Miller M (1998) Reconfigured: environmental regimes and Third World states. In: Karen L (ed) The greening of sovereignty in world politics. MIT Press„ Cambridge, pp 173–192 Najam A (2005) Developing countries and global environmental governance: from contestation to participation to engagement. Int Environ Agreements: Polit Law Econ 5(3):303–321 Qi X (2011) The rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations. S Afr J Int Affairs 18(3):295–318

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Tobin P, Schmidt N, Tosun J, Burns C (2018) Mapping states’ Paris climate pledges: analyzing targets and groups at COP 21. Glob Environ Change 48:11–21 UNFCCC (2017) Annual Report 2017. Available at https://unfccc.int/resource/annualreport/. Last accessed in Jan 2019 Vihma A, Mulugetta Y, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen S (2011) Negotiating solidarity? The G77 through the prism of climate change negotiations. Glob Change Peace Secur 23(3):315–334 Williams M (2005) The Third World and global environmental negotiations: interests, institutions and ideas. Glob Environ Polit 5(3):48–69

María del Pilar Bueno Rubial Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), teacher and professor at several universities including Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Universidad Nacional de Entre Rios, Universidad Nacional de La Plata and Universidad de San Andrés. Climate change negotiator and advisor to the Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lead Negotiator of the G77 and China on Adaptation from 2016 to 2018; Co-Chair of the Adaptation Committee since 2018 and member of the Task Force on Displacement at the UNFCCC from 2017 to 2018.

Part IV

Concluding Reflections

Chapter 11

Conclusions María del Pilar Bueno Rubial and Linda Siegele

In our role as co-editors, this book has given us the opportunity to continue the dialogue with our friends and colleagues on the role of the Group of 77 and China in the evolution of adaptation under the UNFCCC, as well as its relevance as the main negotiating Group which brings together developing countries and amplifies their voice in the climate change negotiations at the UNFCCC. Much has been said about the heterogeneity of the G77 and China and its relative relevance over time in the negotiations. It has even been suggested that the increase in the number of subgroups of developing countries is an example of diminishing relevance. It has also been said that the lack of a common position on mitigation, as the soul of the climate change regime, depicts the weakness of the Group. However, beyond the academic studies that portray this situation, we believe as negotiators that it is important to tell the story of adaptation as the narrative of the struggle of developing countries. In its effort to develop a common position on adaptation, the G77 and China has found its most important space of reference, since the adaptation arena is the logical flagship where finding a common position is possible. We are grateful to the subgroups that provided their insights and answers to the questions we posed to them in the introduction to this book. Through their inputs and perspectives, it is extremely interesting to note that the subgroups have told the same story with different emphasis. Each one identified landmarks and milestones in the adaptation process, and also gave us a picture of the negotiations through their own eyes. All of them agreed that constructing a collective position of the G77 and China on adaptation was a winding road. Nevertheless, each of them said in different M. P. Bueno Rubial National Council for Scientific and Technical Research of Argentina (CONICET), Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Rosario, Argentina e-mail: [email protected] L. Siegele (B) University College London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6_11

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words that all the effort was worthwhile since the Group amplified our voices, needs and interests. Finally, adaptation itself under the UNFCCC is a vivid reflection of the construction of a common position, in this case on adaptation, in the G77 and China. While some of subgroups identified the difficulties and costs of looking for this aggregated position that is more than the sum of its parts, the costs comprising, among other things, the long hours of coordination – the conclusion was that these costs were outweighed by the faith in building something bigger, and ultimately game changing, compared to the internal processes of the Parties and their subgroups. We also benefit from the experiences of the lead coordinators on adaptation of the G77 and China for the last ten years. We have learned how the group evolved from questioning the nature, definition and scope of adaptation, to speaking with one voice at the dawn of the Paris Agreement. We have shared the fight for the equal treatment of adaptation with mitigation. We recognize that assertions of the parity between mitigation and adaptation appear in many decisions and other documents of the Convention, but it has yet to be completely achieved. We are closer but still, beyond these written assertions, a 50:50 balance between mitigation and adaptation finance is not yet reality. We continue to fight for agenda space during the negotiations with our developed country partners. But we hope this new phase of implementation under the Paris Agreement will help us move from the defensive position of some Parties against addressing adaptation to a more cooperative approach where we pull together in all possible places and ways to adapt to climate change impacts. In this long story of adaptation seen through a G77 and China lens, we observe that firstly we needed to understand each other, the needs, the interests, the gaps and the concerns of the different subgroups. But doing this has helped us to recognize our great strength. This is not the story of the developing world against others on adaptation or adaptation finance. Instead, it is the story of how we have worked to understand adaptation together and made addressing it robustly possible under the Convention even when it was not fashionable. Of course, the G77 and China was not alone in this effort, but it played a key role in building internationally the critical mass necessary to seek parity in the treatment of adaptation and improve international collaboration on adaptation. To some extent, it is not only the G77 and China that has strengthened the adaptation position of developing countries, but it is also adaptation that has strengthened the G77 and China. Consequently, we collectively believe the struggle was and still is worth it.

Index

A Adaptation, 3, 4, 7–24, 27–45, 49–62, 64– 70, 73–82, 85–106, 109–127, 133, 134 Adaptation committee, 13, 22, 23, 27, 41, 42, 53, 66, 88, 94, 101, 103, 111 Adaptation communication, 10–17, 43, 44, 54, 55, 59, 67, 69, 70, 74, 76, 77, 79–81, 103, 105, 106, 111–114, 116– 119, 123–126 Adaptation finance, 9, 44, 101, 103, 106, 109 Adaptation gap report, 20, 52 Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), 22, 64, 86, 100, 104 Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP), 66, 93, 103, 104 African group, 4, 19–24, 63, 113, 118, 119 African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), 21, 22 Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 4, 27–45, 115, 119 Argentina–Brazil–Uruguay (ABU), 4, 7, 10

B Bali action plan, 27, 32, 36–41, 64, 86, 87, 100

C Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF), 22, 27, 40–42, 49, 50, 58, 64, 68, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 101–106 Cancun agreements, 40, 41, 43, 45, 90, 92, 102

Capacity-building, 31, 32, 38, 39, 64, 101, 103, 104 Climate change, 3, 4, 7–10, 13, 14, 18–22, 24, 27–38, 40, 41, 43–45, 50–59, 61– 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78, 85–93, 95–100, 102, 107, 109, 111, 127 Climate change adaptation, 9 Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), 21, 22 Cooperation, 8, 21, 27, 30, 34, 37, 38, 41, 53, 67, 74, 77, 81, 82, 88, 101, 106, 125

D Developing countries, 4, 7–13, 15, 17–20, 22–24, 28, 30, 32–45, 49–52, 56, 61– 68, 70, 73–82, 85, 87–92, 94–103, 105–107, 109, 111, 113, 115–117, 120, 122, 125–127

F Flexibility, 11, 12, 14, 15, 55, 65, 67, 69, 70, 77, 106, 113, 116, 125

G Geneva Pledge, 57, 58 Geneva Text, 42, 49, 51, 57, 58, 105 Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), 11, 12, 14, 23, 42, 52, 53, 55, 70, 78, 93, 105, 106, 113, 114, 116, 125 Global South, 96, 105

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. P. Bueno Rubial and L. Siegele (eds.), Negotiating Climate Change Adaptation, Springer Climate, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41021-6

135

136 Green Climate Fund (GCF), 9, 40, 41, 44, 45, 65, 80, 81, 86, 89, 91, 92, 101, 102, 105, 126 Group of 77 and China, 3

Index Negotiations, 7–12, 14, 16–24, 27–29, 35, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49–53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64–69, 73–79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 89–91, 93–97, 100, 102, 104–106, 109–116, 118–121, 123–126, 133, 134

H Human rights, 57, 58 I Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), 4, 49–59, 114 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (iNDCs), 23, 51, 54–56, 104, 105 L Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 4, 13, 21, 22, 28, 32, 35, 38, 39, 42, 61–71, 87, 89, 98, 99, 103, 111, 115, 119 Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), 32, 98 M Most vulnerable, 7, 8, 19, 57, 58, 65, 67, 90 N Nairobi Work Program (NWP), 34–36, 42, 53, 85–87, 91, 99, 100, 102–104 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), 21–23, 27, 41, 42, 44, 51, 54, 55, 62, 65–70, 79, 86–88, 98, 101, 103–105, 117 National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs), 51, 64, 65, 89, 98, 101, 103 National Communication (NatCom), 10, 33, 44, 54, 64, 67, 79, 97, 98, 114, 117 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 9, 10, 23, 44, 51, 55, 56, 67, 74, 79, 80, 105, 111–113, 117

P Paris agreement, 4, 7–15, 18, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 42–45, 49–60, 67–70, 73, 74, 85, 86, 93, 101, 105, 106, 109–112, 114–116, 127 Particularly vulnerable developing countries, 30, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45

S Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), 32, 89

U United

Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 9, 52, 99, 105 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 3, 4, 7– 10, 13, 18, 20–23, 27, 29–31, 33, 34, 38, 42, 45, 58, 59, 62, 63, 66, 67, 70, 73, 77, 79, 86, 87, 91, 95, 96, 98–100, 109–112, 115, 116, 120

V Vulnerability, 10, 16, 19, 20, 28, 34–36, 38, 42, 43, 52, 56, 57, 62–64, 67, 70, 86, 90–93, 98, 99, 104, 112, 114, 117

W Work program on loss and damage, 22, 27, 41, 88