Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicennas Metaphysics of the Healing 9004430377, 9789004430372

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Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing

Investigating Medieval Philosophy Managing Editor John Marenbon Editorial Board Margaret Cameron Thérèse Cory Nadja Germann Simo Knuuttila Martin Lenz Charles H. Manekin Christopher J. Martin

volume 15

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp

Necessary Existence and the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing By

Daniel D. De Haan

leiden | boston

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: De Haan, Daniel D., author. Title: Necessary existence and the doctrine of being in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the healing / by Daniel D. De Haan. Other titles: Necessary existence and the doctrine of being in Avicenna's Metaphysics of the healing (Brill Academic Publishers) Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2020] | Series: Investigating medieval philosophy, 1879-9787 ; volume 15 | Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of St. Thomas and Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 2015. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020018038 (print) | LCCN 2020018039 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004430372 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004434523 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Avicenna, 980-1037. Samāʻ al-ṭabīʻī. | Necessity (Philosophy) | Ontology. Classification: LCC B751.S363 D4 2020 (print) | LCC B751.S363 (ebook) | DDC 181/.5--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020018038 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020018039

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1879-9787 ISBN 978-90-04-43037-2 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-43452-3 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

for Mark Anderson my first teacher

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Contents Acknowledgements  xi Abbreviations  xiii Primary Sources and Translations  xiii Works of Avicenna  xiii Other Primary Works  xv Introduction: Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing  1 The Problematic  2 An Outline of the Contents  3 Summary  8

Part 1 The Logical Context of the Metaphysics of the Healing 1

Logic, Knowledge, and Questions  13 1.1 Avicenna’s Logic in Context  14 1.2 Knowledge by Conceptualization and Assent  18 1.3 The Heuristic Order of Questions  22 Concluding Remarks  32

2

Conceptualization, Assent, and Scientific Knowledge  33 2.1 Primary and Acquired Knowledge by Conceptualization  33 2.2 Primary and Acquired Knowledge by Assent  56 2.3 Logic, Knowledge, and Demonstrative Science  74 Concluding Remarks  92

Part 2 Scientific Order of the Metaphysics of the Healing 3

Subject and Goal of the Science of Metaphysics  95 3.1 Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing in Context  96 3.2 The Subject and Goal of a Scientific Metaphysics  111 3.3 The Objects of Enquiry of a Scientific Metaphysics  141 Concluding Remarks  148

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Contents

The Scientific First Principles of the Science of Metaphysics  150 4.1 Scientific First Principles and Interpretations of Ilāhiyyāt I.5–8  150 4.2 Conceptualization, Assent, and the Textual Division of Ilāhiyyāt I.5–8  157 4.3 The Goal of Ilāhiyyāt I.5–8  164 Concluding Remarks  178

Part 3 Scientific Principles and the Senses of Being 5

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Formal Approach  183 5.1 The Four Senses of Being in Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna  183 5.2 Avicenna’s Integration of the Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles  201 Concluding Remarks  219

6

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Material Approach to the Principles of Conceptualization  221 6.1 Primary Notions  221 6.2 A Comparison of the Primary Notions  234 Concluding Remarks  267

7

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Material Approach to the Principles of Assent  270 7.1 Primary Hypotheses  270 7.2 Primary Axioms  290 Concluding Remarks  292

8

Being per se and Being per accidens: On the Analogy and Accidentality of Existence  294 8.1 Being per se and the Analogy of Existence  295 8.2 Being per accidens and the Accidentality of Existence  314 Concluding Remarks  335

Contents

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Part 4 Basic and Fundamental Principles in the Metaphysics of the Healing 9

The Basic Primary Notions in Avicenna’s Metaphysics  339 9.1 The Primary Notions as Prior to their Opposites  341 9.2 Primary Notions: Subordination by Intensional Priority  342 9.3 The Intensional Subordination of One (wāḥid)  343 9.4 The Intensional Subordination of Thing (šayʾ) to Being (mawjūd)  348 Concluding Remarks  359

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The Fundamental Primary Notion in Avicenna’s Metaphysics  361 10.1 The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Ontology  362 10.2 The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Aitiology  371 10.3 The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Theology  377 Concluding Remarks  385 Conclusion  387 Bibliography  393 Primary Sources and Translations  393 Secondary Sources  396 Index  418

Acknowledgements This monograph on Avicenna’s metaphysics is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation. I want to thank again R.E. Houser, Andrea Robiglio, Thomas Osborne, Thérèse-Anne Druart, and Mary Catherine Sommers for their encouragement, comments, and criticisms of my doctoral thesis, which I have tried to integrate into the present text. I am especially grateful to Dr. Houser whose lectures and research on Avicenna inspired this study, and whose guidance helped me to shape and bring to completion my dissertation just in the nick of time. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Druart for her meticulous corrections and insightful comments on numerous drafts of the dissertation manuscript, which made the task of later revision more manageable for me. I thank Richard Taylor who, through the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project and in many other ways, has unceasingly supported me and has enabled me to follow paths of research I would not have dreamed of pursuing. Over the course of my doctoral and postdoctoral studies there were many friends, colleagues, and professors who helped me in various ways with my dissertation and its later revisions. I must especially acknowledge all the prayers, encouragement, recommendations, or criticisms that I received from Brandon Dahm, Fr Jeff Dole, Mark Anderson, Ben Smith, Ted Rebard, Luca Gili, Alberto Kobec, the community at Keizersberg Abbey, Domenic D’Ettore, Therese Cory, Stephen Ogden, Eric Mabry, Nathan Poage, Ryan Womack, Jeremy Wilkins, Clint Brand, Edward Macierowski, David Twetten, Luis Xavier López-Farjeat, Jon McGinnis, Deborah Black, Peter Adamson, Jules Janssens, Wahid Amin, Amos Bertolacci, Tony Street, and many others. I thank Riccardo Strobino, who was kind enough to share with me draft versions of his unpublished translation of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān. I thank Mohammad Saleh Zarepour for the many conversations on Avicenna we had at Clare Hall and for his help on numerous parts of this book. I am grateful to Sarah Coakley for her frequent reminders and encouragement which kept me working on this book during my postdoctoral research with her at the University of Cambridge, which was generously funded by the Templeton World Charity Foundation. I am thankful to Alister McGrath, Andrew Pinsent, and the Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion in the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford for supporting me in my present postdoctoral fellowship on natural theology. John Marenbon has been so kind and supportive of my work and I appreciate all he has done to help me bring this book to publication in Brill’s Investigating Medieval Philosophy series.

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Acknowledgements

During my doctoral studies I received scholarships and institutional support from the Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, the DeWulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, at the Catholic University of Leuven, the Belgium American Educational Foundation, and the American Catholic Philosophical Association, which I gratefully acknowledge. I started studying philosophy in earnest thanks to my undergraduate encounters with Mark Anderson at the weekly Philologoi gatherings he hosted. Anderson was my first teacher and it was his philosophical way of life that inspired his many Belmont University undergraduate students, like myself, to pursue philosophical enquiries. I am exceptionally grateful to him for awakening in me the love of wisdom. Finally, I am overwhelmingly grateful to my parents, brother, sister, and my wife, Viktoria, for their prayers, patience, and love. And to you my beautiful baby daughter, Sophia Therese, thank you for sleeping so peacefully while I completed the final revisions of this book. Daniel De Haan February 29, 2020 Oxford

Abbreviations The first citation of a work includes its complete title; all further references to the same work appear in a shortened form. These shortened titles can be found along with complete bibliographical information in the bibliography. References to primary sources in the notes include internal divisions, such as book and chapter numbers; the divisions of the editor are included when more precision is required, such as page, paragraph, and line numbers. References to particular passages from primary sources include in brackets the editor’s name and page number from the edition used (and sometimes the line numbers following a colon). Quoted translations include in parentheses the translator’s name and page number from the translation used. Unless noted otherwise, all references are to the works of Avicenna, and all page numbers from works of the Book of Healing in brackets are from the Cairo edition. Exact citations of passages from the Healing. Metaphysics include the book (maqāla), chapter (faṣl), the paragraph number Marmura introduced into his translation, and the page number to the Cairo edition in brackets. For example, Ilāhiyyāt I.5.1 [29] indicates Healing, Metaphysics, book one, chapter five, paragraph one from Marmura’s translation, and page twenty-nine from the Cairo edition. Citations from other works of the Book of Healing follow a similar pattern. Primary Sources and Translations Works of Avicenna

Avicenna. Healing. Logic. Isagoge = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, Al-Madḵal, ed. G. Anawati, I. Madkūr et al. Cairo: alMaṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1952. Avicenna. Healing. Logic. Book of Categories = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, Al-Manṭiq, Al-Maqūlāt, ed. G. Anawati et al. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1959. Avicenna. Healing. Logic. Book of Interpretation = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, Al-Manṭiq, Al-ʿIbāra, ed. M. El-H̱ odeiri and I. Madkour, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1970. Avicenna. Al-ʿIbārā: Avicenna’s Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Part One and Part Two, trans., Allan Bäck. München: Philosophia-Verlag, 2013. All translations of the ʿIbārā are from Bäck’s translation unless noted otherwise. Avicenna. Healing. Logic. Book of Syllogism =

xiv

Abbreviations

Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, Al-Manṭiq, Al-Qiyās, ed. S. Zāyed. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1964. Avicenna. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān, ed. A.E. ʿAffīfī et al. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1956. All references to the Burhān are to ʿAffīfī’s edition, unless noted otherwise. Avicenna. Healing. Physics = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ, Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿi, ed. S. Zāyed. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1983. Avicenna. The Physics of the Healing Islamic Translation Series, 2 vols. trans., Jon McGinnis. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2009. All translations of the PH are from McGinnis’s translation unless noted otherwise. Avicenna. Healing. Metaphysics or Ilāhiyyāt = Avicenna. Al-Shifāʾ: Al-Ilāhiyyāt, 2 vols., ed. G. Anawati, M. Y. Moussa, S. Dunyā, S. Zāyed. Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa l-Amīriyya, 1960. All Emendations to the Cairo edition of the MH are based on Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix A, 483–558. Avicenna. The Metaphysics of the Healing, ed. and trans., Michael Marmura. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005. All translations of the MH are from Marmura’s translation unless noted otherwise. Avicenna. Scientia Divinia or SD = Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina, 3 vols., ed. S. Van Riet. Leiden: Peeters; Louvain: Brill, 1977–1983. Avicenna. Salvation = Avicenna. Kitāb an-Najāt, ed. M. T. Dānishpazhūh. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-yi Tihrān, 1985. Avicenna. Salvation. Logic = Avicenna. Avicenna’s Deliverance: Logic, trans., Asad Q. Ahmed. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011. All translations from the Salvation. Logic are from Ahmed’s translation unless noted otherwise. I cite chapter divisions, Ahmed’s chapter section numbers, page number to Dānishpazhūh’s edition in brackets, and page numbers to Ahmed’s translation in parentheses. For instance, Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 1.i [D, 7] (Ahmed, 3). Street’s and Ahmed’s introduction and notes are cited by “Street, Introduction,” “Ahmed, Introduction” or “Ahmed, Notes” and the page number. Avicenna. Pointers = Avicenna. Al-Ishārāt wa-t-Tanbīhāt li-Abī ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, maʿa Šarḥ Naṣīr ad Dīn aṭṬūsī, 4 vols., ed. Sulsymān Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-maʿārif, 1971. Avicenna. Pointers. Logic = Avicenna. Remarks and Admonitions. Part one: Logic, trans., Shams C. Inati. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984. All translations of Pointers. Logic

Abbreviations

xv

are from Inati’s translation unless noted otherwise. References to the Pointers. Logic, such as “Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 4 [138] (Inati, 47),” indicates Avicenna’s Pointers. Logic, first method (nahj), chapter four, page one hundred thirty eight from the Dunyā 2nd edition is in brackets, and page number forty seven in Inati’s translation is in parentheses. Inati’s introduction and notes are cited by “Inati, Introduction,” or “Inati, Notes” and the page number. Avicenna. Pointers. Metaphysics = Avicenna. Remarks and Admonitions: Physics and Metaphysics, trans., Shams C. Inati. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. All translations of Pointers. Metaphysics are from Inati’s translation unless otherwise noted. References to the Pointers. Metaphysics, include the class (namaṭ), chapter, page number to the Dunyā edition in brackets, and the page number to Inati’s translation in parentheses. For example: Avicenna. Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 5 [13–14] (Inati, 121).

Other Primary Works All translations from the works of Aristotle are from the Barnes’s The Complete Works of Aristotle, unless noted otherwise. Aristotle. Metaphysics in Arabic = Averroes. Tafsīr mā baʼd a-ṭabīʼat, 3 vols. Texte arabe inédit établi par M. Bouyges. Imprimerie Catholique. Beirut, 1938–1948. Al-Kindī. On First Philosophy = Al-Kindī. Kitāb al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy) in Rasāʼil al-Kindī al-falsafiyya. vol. 1. ed., M.ʿA. Abū-Rīda. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1950. Al-Kindī. The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī. trans., Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012. All translations of Al-Kindī’s On First Philosophy are from Adamson’s and Pormman’s The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī, unless noted otherwise. Al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics = Al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics (Fī Aǧrāḍ Kitāb Mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa) from Maqāla...fī Aǧrāḍ al-ḥakīm fī kulli maqāla min al-Kitāb al-mawsūm bi-l-ḥurāf, in Alfārābī’s Philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. F. Dieterici. Brill, Leiden 1890. 34–38. See the complete English translation in Bertolacci, Reception, 66–72; partial English translation in Gutas, AAT, 272–275 [240–242]; French translation Druart, “Le traité dʾal-Fārābī sur les buts de la Métaphysique d’Aristote,” Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale, 24 (1982): 38–43. All quotations of On the Goals of the Metaphysics are from Bertolacci’s translation. References to Dieterici’s edition are in square brackets; references to Bertolacci’s translation are in parentheses.

xvi

Abbreviations

Al-Fārābī, Book of Letters = Al-Fārābī. Alfarabi’s Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf). Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. ed. M. Mahdi. Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq. 1969. Ibn ʿAdī. On the Three Kinds of Existence = Yahyā Ibn ʿAdī. On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural, and Logical (Maqāla fī l-buḥūth al-ʿilmiyya al-arbaʿa ʿan aṣnāf al-wujūd al-thalātha al-ilāhī wa-l-ṭabīʿī wa-l-manṭiqī). Arabic edition and English translation in Stephen Menn and Robert Wisnovsky, ed. “Yahya ibn ʿAdī, “On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Editio princeps and Translation,” MIDEO 29 (2012): 73–96. Averroes. Epitome of the Metaphysics = Averroes. On Aristotle’s Metaphysics. An annotated translation of the so-called “Epitome,” ed. and trans., Rüdiger Arnzen. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.

Introduction

Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing The Metaphysics of the Healing (aš–Šifāʾ, al–Ilāhiyyāt = Ilāhiyyāt) of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980 ca.–1037 ad) is the thirteenth and final treatise (maqāla) in his extended Aristotelian philosophical summa, the Book of Healing (Kitāb aš– Šifāʾ). The Ilāhiyyāt is preceded by and brings to completion the enquiries addressed in the Book of Healing’s other treatises on logic, natural philosophy, and mathematics.1 The Ilāhiyyāt purports to present a complete metaphysical science according to the epistemological profile of an Aristotelian demonstrative science.2 Avicenna divides this metaphysical treatise from his Book of Healing into its three scientific elements: a subject, first principles, and objects of enquiry. Avicenna argues that the subject of metaphysics consists in an universal ontological science concerned with being qua being, which investigates various objects of enquiry (Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4). These objects of enquiry include the ontological species of being, i.e., the categories (Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii), and the quiddity and existence of the ontological proper accidents of absolute or common being, such as prior and posterior, act and potency, whole and part, universal and particular, cause and effect, one and many (Ilāhiyyāt iv–vii). Finally, metaphysics also takes up aitiological and theological questions into the various causal principles of being, such as the existence of uncaused first causes, the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence in itself, and the necessary voluntary emanation of all creatures from the divine being, all of which are among the ultimate objects of enquiry and the goal of metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt viii-x). Significantly, all of the investigations into these myriad objects of enquiry related to the subject of metaphysics require the first principles as primary notions, primary hypotheses, and axioms (Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8) that are

1 For a detailed examination of the chronology of Avicenna’s works and list of editions, see Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Second, Revised, and Enlarged Edition, Including an Inventory of Avicenna’s Authentic Works (Leiden: Brill, 1988, Rev. 2nd ed., 2014), (Henceforth: aat). 2 Avicenna’s vision of the “epistemological profile” of a demonstrative science and its application to metaphysics is discussed at length in Chapters 2–4. My treatment owes much to Bertolacci’s study on the “epistemological profile” or “scientific profile” of the Ilāhiyyāt, see Amos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitâb al-Shifâʾ: A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2006), (Henceforth: Reception), esp. Part 2, Chapters. 4–7, pp. 107–302.

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Introduction

deployed in first philosophy’s many scientific demonstrations connecting the subject with its demonstrated conclusions. In short, the Ilāhiyyāt is an Aristotelian metaphysical science whose subject is being qua being, and in virtue of its first principles and various ontological objects of enquiry, the Ilāhiyyāt eventually culminates in an aitiological and theological investigation into the existence and true-nature of the necessary existence in itself, which is the divine first cause of all created emanations. The Problematic This brings us to the central question of this monograph: Why does Avicenna contend the subject of metaphysics is concerned with an ontological study of being qua being and yet identifies its ultimate goal with a scientific study of the divine necessary existence in itself? What is the connection between Avicenna’s ontological doctrine of being and his theological doctrine of the necessary existence in itself? Said otherwise, what is the main argument of the Ilāhiyyāt that commences with his doctrine of being as the subject of first philosophy and that ultimately concludes with his demonstration of the existence of the divine being that alone is necessary existence in itself and is the first uncaused cause of the voluntary necessary emanation of all creation? In this book I argue that identifying and tracking the function performed by the scientific first principles of his metaphysics provides an answer to the question concerning the central argument of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Considered in general, the most significant function of the metaphysical first principles— and most importantly, the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary— is manifested in the way Avicenna incorporates them into all the propositions assented to as self-evident first principles or as conclusions acquired through demonstrative syllogisms. Consequently, the scientific first principles are absolutely fundamental for carrying out all of the demonstrative tasks of the Ilāhiyyāt, including working towards the Ilāhiyyāt’s ultimate goal to demonstrate that there is a divine necessary existence in itself. These scientific first principles function as “middle terms” that connect the doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence. More specifically, I contend that the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt is accomplished through the two most basic primary notions being and necessary; and in particular, by the necessary, which I shall argue is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt. We can therefore only resolve the central question of our investigation by getting clear about the scientific first principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics. In order to do this, however, our investigation must first answer a series of more

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general questions: What are the most basic and the most fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics (Chapters 9–10)? What is Avicenna’s account of the analogy and accidentality of existence (Chapter 8)? What are the scientific first principles of metaphysics (Chapters 5–7)? Where do first principles fit within the epistemological profile of the science of metaphysics (Chapters 3–4)? And, what is the epistemological profile of a demonstrative science for Avicenna (Chapters 1–2)? In other words, to answer the central question posed by this study we must pass through an ordered series of questions moving from the most general to the more specific, where each general problem provides the necessary support required for advancing on to more specific lines of enquiry through a series of narrowing concentric circles of enquiry that finally bring us to the central point of our study concerning the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. Put briefly, the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt runs as follows: by applying the scientific first principles to the ontological enquiries initiated by the subject of metaphysics, Avicenna can demonstrate why his doctrine of being entails that there must be divine necessary existence that is the ultimate uncaused cause of all caused possible beings. An Outline of the Contents This monograph consists of ten chapters divided into four parts. Part 1 pertains to the logical context of the Ilāhiyyāt. Part 2 addresses the scientific order of the Ilāhiyyāt. Part 3 explicates the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt. Part 4 brings this study to a close by establishing the basic and fundamental scientific principles in the Ilāhiyyāt and explaining their function with respect to the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. The first two chapters of Part 1 situate the logical context of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Both chapters introduce various logical and epistemological doctrines from the Book of Healing and Avicenna’s other works that provide the logical– cum–epistemological prerequisites required to pursue the line of enquiry taken up in Part 2’s treatment of the scientific order of the Ilāhiyyāt. Chapter 1 is divided into three sections. The first section (1.1) contextualizes Avicenna’s logical doctrines within the wider scope of his thought. The second section (1.2) introduces his account of the two most fundamental noetic acts of conceptualization (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq), which provide the first principles of his logic. The third section (1.3) expounds his doctrine of the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions—what, if, and why—and sets in relief the connections to be found among these basic questions and the acts of conceptualization and assent. Chapter 2 completes Chapter 1’s exposition

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Introduction

of Avicenna’s logic by examining in greater detail his account of primary and acquired knowledge by way of conceptualization in the first section (2.1), and then by way of assent in the second section (2.2). The third section (2.3) concludes the chapter by elucidating Avicenna’s Aristotelian theory of a demonstrative science and the need for primary knowledge by way of conceptualization and assent for the scientific first principles proper to any demonstrative science. Part 2 of this study takes as its point of departure Part 1’s discussion of the logical and epistemological features of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, which it employs to elucidate the scientific order of the Ilāhiyyāt. Chapter 3 addresses the subject, objects of enquiry—and so the goals—of the Ilāhiyyāt by examining in detail the matters touched upon in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4. Chapter 4 argues that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 contains the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt and so brings to a close Part 2’s investigation of the order of the scientific elements of the Ilāhiyyāt. Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. The first section (3.1) contextualizes the Ilāhiyyāt within the wider Aristotelian tradition’s conception of the science of metaphysics. The second section (3.2) then addresses the subject and goals of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, and the third section (3.3) distinguishes the various objects of enquiry taken up in the Ilāhiyyāt. This chapter establishes that Avicenna adopts an ontological construal of the subject of metaphysics as a science of being qua being, whose ultimate goal consists in the aitiological and theological objects of enquiry that pertain to the uncaused first cause that is the divine necessary existence in itself. The three sections of Chapter 4 argue that the overall goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to present the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt. The first section (4.1) introduces various interpretations of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, and points out the problematic features of all interpretations that are inconsistent with the view that i.5–8 concerns the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt. The second section (4.2) returns to Avicenna’s doctrine of primary knowledge by way of conceptualization and assent and identifies this with the material presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and the epistemological need for the science of metaphysics to have primary notions, hypotheses, and axioms. Finally, the third section (4.3) argues at length that the central aim of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to present the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt, wherein i.5 concerns the primary notions, i.6–7 pertains to the primary hypotheses, and i.8 introduces and defends the axiom of excluded middle. Part 3 draws upon Part 2’s extensive treatment of the scientific order of the Ilāhiyyāt, and in particular the treatment of the scientific first principles of metaphysics in Chapter 4. The four chapters in Part 3 aim to explicate the

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function and formal and material characteristics of these scientific first principles. Chapter 5 addresses the formal features of Avicenna’s integration of the scientific first principles of metaphysics as primary notions, hypotheses, and axioms with his own novel account of Aristotle’s four senses of being as per se, as per accidens, as divided into necessary and possible being, and as truth. Chapters 6–8 build upon Chapter 5’s formal approach by taking up the content or material aspects of this integration. Chapter 5 contains two sections. The first section (5.1) introduces the doctrine of the four senses of being in Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna. The second section (5.2) presents Avicenna’s novel appropriation of the Aristotelian tradition’s account of the four senses of being and its integration with his scientific first principles. Significantly, this chapter contends that with respect to the primary notions related to being per se, Avicenna departed from his Aristotelian predecessors by assigning the meaning of essence (ḏāt) or quiddity (māhiyya) to the primary notion thing (šayʾ), and subordinated thing to being (mawjūd), which he took to signify not the essence, but the existence (wujūd) of an entity. This chapter also establishes that, for Avicenna, the modal division of being into necessary existence and possible existence is the most fundamental division of being and that it supersedes Aristotle’s division of being into act and potency. It is on the basis of this more fundamental division of being that Avicenna formulated his account of the primary hypotheses concerning possible existents and the necessary existent. Chapters 6–7 expound at length the content or material features of Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being with the doctrine of scientific first principles as the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary in Chapter 6, and as the primary hypotheses concerning the necessary existent and possible existents (7.1), and the axiomatic principle of demonstration (7.2) in Chapter 7. Chapter 6 treats in two sections Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being (mawjūd), thing (šayʾ), necessary (ḍarūrī / wājib), and one (wāḥid). The first section (6.1) examines what it is to be a primary notion as such and the second section (6.2) compares these four primary notions with each other. This chapter details the way the primary notions are impressed on the intellect in a per se and primary way, are common to all other notions, cannot be defined by any other more common notions, yet they are principles of all other notions—that is, all other notions are conceptualized and defined through them—and they are coextensive in their transcategorical universality. Since these primary notions are coextensional with each other, they can only be distinguished according to their distinct intensions or significations. The primary notions thing, one, and necessary are notional amplifications of the meaning of

6

Introduction

being, the subject of metaphysics, insofar as they add distinct intensions not signified by being, but they are not notional constrictions of being since they do not change its absolutely universal extension. As coextensional, being, thing, one, and necessary all refer to the same entitative whole, but, in the case of ontological composites, they do so by pointing to distinct entitative features or explanantia of the very same entitative whole. Being signifies that which exists or that which has existence and so points to existence as an entitative explanatory principle of any composite entity. Likewise, thing signifies that which has quiddity or essence; thing then points to another entitative explanatory principle of any composite entity, namely, its essence. Necessary means that which has its existence invariantly; it points to the way the entitative principle of existence belongs to an entity invariantly. Finally, the one signifies that which is indivisible; it indicates the actual indivisibility of the existence and essence of an entity. Chapter 7 addresses in two sections the primary hypotheses (7.1) and axioms (7.2) of metaphysics. The first section (7.1) draws on Chapter 6’s account of the primary notion necessary in order to clarify the way Avicenna formulated and defended the primary hypotheses of metaphysics concerning the causal and compositional properties that belong to the necessary existence in itself and possible existences in themselves. These primary hypotheses are employed in the Ilāhiyyāt to set in stark relief the metaphysical chasm that separates the necessary existence in itself from all possible existences in themselves, which necessarily depend upon an extrinsic efficient cause of their necessary existence through another. Furthermore, these hypotheses reveal that the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt is entirely concerned with possible existents that only possess their necessary existence through another, which inevitably leads to the aitiological–cum–theological enquiries that are the ultimate goal of the Ilāhiyyāt. Finally, the second section (7.2) turns to Avicenna’s formulation of the axiomatic principle of demonstration. Chapter 8’s two sections investigate Avicenna’s integration of being per se and per accidens with the application of the scientific first principles to the objects of enquiry. The first section (8.1) concerns being per se and Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of existence (wujūd); the second section (8.2) examines Avicenna’s account of the many senses of being per accidens and attempts to make more perspicuous his doctrine of the accidentality of existence (wujūd). This chapter establishes that existence is analogical and is an accidental concomitant to the essence of a thing. Significantly, this chapter provides a close analysis of Avicenna’s eight different uses of the term accident which reveals that existence is neither a predicable accident nor a predicamental accident,

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nor subordinated to essence in any way, but is instead accidental to essence in the sense that it is beyond or extrinsic to and nonconstitutive of the quidditative determinations of a thing’s essence. Existence is shown to be accidental to the quiddity of a thing because it is caused by an extrinsic efficient cause; nevertheless, it is also necessary for the very existence of the quiddity of a thing. Finally, this chapter establishes that unity occurs to quiddity, not by virtue of any quidditative determination, but through the existential determinations of a being. Part 4 contains the final two chapters and a conclusion. Chapters 9–10 address the basic and fundamental scientific principles in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Chapter 9 proves in four sections that that being and necessary are the two most basic scientific principles as primary notions in the Ilāhiyyāt. After a brief recapitulation of the doctrine of the primary notions—being, thing, one, and necessary—the first section (9.1) clarifies the way these primary notions are both extensionally and intensionally prior to their opposites, such as nonbeing, nothing, many, and possible and impossible. The second section (9.2) shows that priority and posteriority among the primary notions can only be established on the basis of intensional priority. The third section (9.3) proves that the primary notion one is intensionally subordinated to being, thing, and necessary, because the indivisibility of entitative features signified by one is an entitative feature that is dependent upon the entitative features of existence and essence signified by being, necessary, and thing. The fourth section (9.4) demonstrates, contrary to Robert Wisnovsky and others, that thing is intensionally subordinated to being and necessary, insofar as the essence of a thing is posterior to the entitative principle of existence indicated by being and necessary. The chapter concludes that, because existence is prior to essence, and being and necessary both signify that which is or has existence, being and necessary are therefore the two most basic primary notions in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. Chapter 10 argues in three sections that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt. The first section (10.1) establishes that between being and necessary, the necessary is prior to being and so is the most fundamental notion in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. This is because being’s intrinsic construal of the existence of an entity is dependent upon the necessary’s extrinsic construal of the existence of a possible being, whose necessity of existence depends upon its extrinsic efficient cause of existence. The second section (10.2) proves that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt. This is because Avicenna’s investigation of ultimate causes leads him to the conclusion that the uncaused necessary

8

Introduction

existence in itself is the first efficient cause of necessary existence for all possible existences in themselves, and is also the first efficient cause of existence for the created first final, formal, and material causes. The third section (10.3) concludes that the necessary is also the most fundamental primary notion in theology. This is because Avicenna identifies God with the necessary existence in itself, and since the divine is necessary existence in every respect, this entails that God possesses such divine attributes as unity, simplicity, perfection, goodness, truth, intellect, will and, finally, that God’s creation of the emanated order of possible existents is willed necessarily. The conclusion of Part 4 then elucidates the way the necessary as the fundamental scientific principle of metaphysics functions in the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt and so connects its ontological subject with its aitiological and theological goal. Summary This study is concerned with answering the question: What is the central argument of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing that brings its opening ontological approach to the subject of first philosophy to its ultimate theological goal and conclusion? This monograph contends that it is the function of the fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics, and in particular the fundamental primary notion necessary (wājib), that provide the intelligible link which Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence in itself on the basis of his doctrine of being. This conclusion is pursued through a systematic and cumulative line of enquiry that begins in Part 1 with Avicenna’s logical–cum–epistemological doctrine of conceptualization and assent, the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions, and his theory of a demonstrative science. The enquiry then moves from the wider concentric circles concerned with logical matters into a series of narrowing concentric circles pertaining to the scientific order of the Ilāhiyyāt. Part 2 presents a close analysis of the Ilāhiyyāt’s novel reception and reorganization of Aristotelian metaphysics according to Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, which consists of a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of enquiry that includes the species, proper accidents, and the science’s ultimate goal which is the aitiological–cum–theological enquiry into the causes of being. Part 3 transitions into a still narrower set of concentric circles that provide a detailed explication of the formal and material aspects of the scientific first principles of the Ilāhiyyāt. Finally, the main argument of the thesis reaches the

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central point and question of the monograph in Part 4, which establishes the fundamentality of the primary notion the necessary in the ontology, aitiology, and theology of the Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Part 4 concludes that the principal function of the fundamental primary notion the necessary is to provide the intelligible link that connects Avicenna’s doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence in itself.

Part 1 The Logical Context of the Metaphysics of the Healing

∵

Chapter 1

Logic, Knowledge, and Questions The central question of our study concerns the way Avicenna demonstrates the existence and attributes of the divine necessary existence on the basis of his doctrine of being in his Ilāhiyyāt. It will be shown that the scientific first principles of his Ilāhiyyāt provide the middle terms, as it were, that are essential to the overarching demonstrations of his metaphysical science; demonstrative arguments which bring us from the subject of first philosophy as being qua being to the ultimate theological goal of establishing that the divine being is necessary existence in itself and the necessary voluntary emanation of all creation from God. In order to set in relief the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt a number of important doctrines of Avicenna must first be established. In the Introduction I presented the image of transitioning from the outermost concentric circles and progressing through a series of narrowing inner circles towards a center point. This image captures the way we must approach the fundamental question of this study, for the central issues in Avicenna’s metaphysics that our study aims to confront cannot be addressed without first passing through a series of prerequisite doctrines or ever narrowing concentric circles that contextualize and help situate our approach to the central problematic concerning Avicenna’s doctrine of being and necessary existence. Accordingly, this study begins with the logical and epistemological features of Avicenna’s metaphysics. In particular we must examine the epistemological profile of the scientific first principles of his metaphysics for these first principles connect the subject of the science with its ultimate objects of enquiry. Since all demonstrations rest on these scientific first principles, and in particular, upon the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary—which are integrated into the other the first principles employed in all of the Ilāhiyyāt’s metaphysical demonstrations—we must examine at length Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions. It will be shown that the central question of this study turns on our the answers to the questions: Which of these primary notions are the most basic? And which, if any, of these basic primary notions is the most fundamental first principle in the ontological, aitiological, and theological parts of his Ilāhiyyāt? These questions will be addressed in Chapters 9–10, but before taking up such metaphysical questions, we must first contextualize the significance of such questions. This will be accomplished in Chapters 3–8 on the subject, goal, first principles, and the many senses of being presented in Avicenna’s metaphysical science. But in order to understand the

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Chapter 1

way Avicenna applied the epistemological profile of an Aristotelian demonstrative science to the philosophical science of metaphysics, we must first present a general sketch of Avicenna’s logical doctrine of a demonstrative science. And in order to appreciate Avicenna’s understanding of a demonstrative science, we must introduce a number of logical doctrines that are presupposed by his theory of a demonstrative science. These logical and epistemological doctrines constitute the outermost concentric circles of our study and so we shall address them in these first two chapters. In this first chapter we shall explicate Avicenna’s understanding of the way logic and enquiry contribute to the acquisition of knowledge, and in the second chapter we shall expound Avicenna’s account of the way knowledge by conceptualization and assent can achieve scientific knowledge. This first chapter is divided into three parts. First (1.1), it begins with a short introduction to Avicenna’s logic that contextualizes it within the larger scope of his Book of Healing. The second section (1.2) presents a cursory outline of Avicenna’s division of human intellectual knowledge into conceptualization and assent; these two operations demarcate the two orders of knowing that are surveyed, delineated, and perfected through the study of logic. For Avicenna, acquired knowledge of the unknown by conceptualization and assent is governed by different kinds of questions, and so we must address his doctrine of the heuristic order of the basic questions, which is the subject of the third and final section of this chapter (1.3). 1.1

Avicenna’s Logic in Context

Avicenna’s Book of Healing (Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ) appropriates an overtly Aristotelian division of theoretical disciplines into four major areas: logic (al-manṭiq), physics (aṭ-ṭabīʿiyyāt), mathematics (ar-riyāḍiyyāt), and metaphysics (al-ilāhiyyāt).1 But the Healing is no mere commentary on the works of Aristotle—a point Avicenna makes explicit in his introduction to the Healing. The Healing presents Avicenna’s own views on the aforementioned theoretical matters, even if this requires criticizing, correcting, elaborating, enriching, or significantly innovating doctrines received from Aristotle and other ancient and medieval thinkers.

1 For the text of Avicenna’s prologue to the Healing and a detailed study, see Gutas, aat, text 9, 41–46 [49–54]. For a proposed chronology of Avicenna’s major works, including the Healing, see Gutas, aat, c. 2, 77–165 [79–145], esp. 165 [145].

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There is nothing reliable in the books of the ancients but we have included in this our book. If something is not found in a place where it is customarily found, it would be found in another place I judge more fit for it to be in. I have added to this what I have apprehended with my thought and attained through my reflection, particularly in physics, metaphysics and logic.2 Avicenna’s tremendous amplifications to Aristotelian thought in the areas of logic, physics, psychology, and metaphysics have yet to be adequately explored and charted. Avicenna’s logic remains an underdeveloped area of research; nevertheless, it is well known that Avicenna’s innovative developments in Aristotelian logic were significant and their implications were far reaching. Given the nescient state of research on Avicenna’s logic and that the present study is concerned with his metaphysics, I shall only present a general synoptic sketch of Avicenna’s logic as it relates to his account of a demonstrative science, and especially his doctrine of first principles of definition and demonstration. Scholars who have examined Avicenna’s various logical works throughout his prolific career have taken note of a few important shifts in his order of exposition.3 In his logical works prior to the decisive shift of the later 1020s— such as the Shorter Summary of Logic (al-Muẖtaṣar al-aṣjar fī l-manṭiq), which was utilized in the composition of the Salvation (Najāt) around 1027, and the Healing between 1020 and 1027—Avicenna’s exposition of logical doctrines reveals an attachment to the Aristotelian and somewhat exegetical approach. But the later approach of Avicenna—beginning with The Easterners (al-Mašriqiyyūn) 1027–1028 and continuing in his much later Pointers (Išarāt), around 1030–1034—dispenses with such expositional restrictions and he opts to set forth his logic according to an order of his own devising. Nevertheless, despite such shifts, “It should be stressed,” Tony Street notes, “that Avicenna’s journey from exegetical reform to abandonment of the Aristotelian Organon did not involve changing a single major logical doctrine. We can know this from the

2 Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.1 [9:17–10:4] (mod. trans., Marmura, “Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his Shifāʾ,” (Henceforth: Division of Sciences) in Marmura, Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī and Other Major Muslim Thinkers, 1 (Henceforth: Probing)). Cf. Marmura, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics, Encyclopedia Iranica,” in Probing, 17–32, 17; Bertolacci, Reception, 150; Akasoy and Fidora, “The Structure and Methods of the Sciences.” 3 Cf. Gutas, aat, c. 2, 77–165 [79–145], esp. 138–144 [125–130].

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work of the logicians of the twelfth century, who assessed substantive changes through his works with care. All in all, they are minor.”4 The logic (manṭiq) of the Healing is divided into nine topics (funūn) that correspond to the divisions of the Aristotelian Organon as it was received by many Arabic falāsifa, which included the Rhetoric and the Poetics as well as Porphyry’s Isagoge.5 These correspondences can be schematized as follows: Book of Healing: Logic (Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ: al-manṭiq)

Arabic Organon

1. Isagoge (al-madẖal) 2. Book of Categories (al-maqūlāt) 3. Book of Propositions (al-ʿibāra) 4. Book of Syllogism (al-qiyās) 5. Book of Demonstration (al-burhān) 6. Book of Dialectic (al-jadal) 7. Book of Sophistic (as-safsaṭa) 8. Book of Rhetoric (al-ẖiṭāba) 9. Book of Poetics (aš-šiʿr)

Porphyry’s Isagoge Categories On Propositions Prior Analytics Posterior Analytics Topics Sophistical Refutations Rhetoric Poetics

We shall be attending to the parts of Avicenna’s logic that correspond to his treatment of the Isagoge, and the Books on the Categories, Propositions, Syllogism, and Demonstration. Let us turn to a few general features of his logic, beginning with the subject of logic. The subject of logic, as you know, is given by the secondary intelligible intentions based on the first intelligible intentions, with regard to how it is possible to pass by means of them from the known to the unknown, not in so far as they are intelligible and possess intellectual existence ([an existence] which does not depend on matter at all, or depends on an incorporeal matter).6

4 Street, “Introduction,” xxii in Ahmed, Salvation. Logic. Cf. Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.” 5 Cf. Gutas, aat, 103–106 [101–103]; Black, Logic and Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’ and ‘Poetics’ in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Henceforth: Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy); Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition,” 113–115 (Henceforth: Indemonstrability of Definition); idem, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.” 6 Ilāhiyyāt i.2.4 [10–11], (mod. trans.). Cf. Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” 753; Bertolacci, Reception, 273; Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.”

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Conceptualization occurs through the formation of what are called maʿānī, that is, meanings, intentions, notions, ideas, or concepts. Avicenna distinguishes between first intelligible intentions (al-maʿānī al-maʿqāla al-ūlā) and second intelligible intentions (al-maʿānī al-maʿqāla al-ṯāniya).7 First intentions are formed through our conceptualization of the quiddities of things, whereas second intentions are formed through our conceptualization of the primary intentions. Said otherwise, first intentions are concepts about extramental things, but second intentions are concepts about concepts, and it is these second intentions that are the subject of logic. Michael Marmura notes, “The subject matter of logic is not the status of quiddities in their role, so to speak, as existents in the mind, but rather ‘inasmuch as they are predicates, subjects, universals, particulars, and the other things that occur to their meanings.’”8 If we wish to investigate things and gain knowledge of them we must conceive them; thus they necessarily acquire certain states (aḥwāl) that come to be in conception: we must therefore consider those states which belong to them in conception, especially as we seek by thought to arrive at things unknown from those that are known. Now things can be unknown or known only in relation to a mind; and it is as concepts that they acquire what they do acquire in order that we move from what is known to what is unknown regarding them, without however losing what belongs to them in themselves; we ought, therefore, to have knowledge of these states and of their quantity and quality and of how they may be examined in this new circumstance.9 When we conceptualize the quiddities or essences of things we form simple and complex statements about them whereby we combine concepts or first

7 “Thus wujūd in this sense is what Fārābī calls a “second intelligible” or “second intention” [maʿqūl thānī]. Fārābī is apparently the inventor of this expression (taken up by Avicenna and Averroes from him, and by the Latins from them), which he has introduced near the beginning of Ḥurūf Part 1 as transmitted (i,7). A second intention is a concept applying to concepts, so something that is predicated of thoughts or “intelligibles” in the soul rather than directly of external things. Being-a-predicate, for Fārābī, is a basic example of a second intention, and being-truly-predicated-of-some-external-thing is a second intention derived from that basic second intention.” Stephen Menn, “Al-Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf and His Analysis of the Senses of Being,” 81 (Henceforth: Fārābī on the Senses of Being). 8 Marmura, Notes, in Ilāhiyyāt, 384, n. 4. Marmura is quoting Healing. Logic. Isagoge, 1.4 [22] and cites Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.1 [13]. Cf. A.I. Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic.” 9 Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2 [15:9–17] (mod. trans., Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” 752). Cf. Marmura, “Division of the Sciences,” in Probing, 12.

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Chapter 1

intentions and render them as subjects and predicates, as particulars and universals, as essentials and non-essentials, as concomitants and as separable, as entailed by affirming this proposition, as adequately connected by a middle term, or as invalidly inferred due to an undistributed middle. “For in external things there is no essentiality or accidentality by way of predication, no [such thing as] a thing’s being a subject nor its being a predicate, no [such thing as] premise or syllogism, or anything of the sort.”10 Logic studies these second intentions that attach to first intentions through conceptualization, assent, and the formation of definitions and syllogisms. Avicenna holds that the goal (ġaraḍ) of logic is to examine acts of knowledge insofar as they lead us to make the unknown known. Said otherwise, the principal object of enquiry for logic concerns what is required to acquire knowledge of the unknown by the known. And because we come to know the unknown through forming definitions and syllogisms, logic investigates both definitions and syllogisms and whatever resembles them, all of which contribute to the goal or aim of logic as the study of “the acquisition of knowledge of the unknown from the known.”11 Related to the goal of logic is its utility (manfaʿa); logic enhances our ability to discover and acquire knowledge of reality and so, “Logic is intended to give the human being a canonical tool which, if attended to, preserves him from error in his thought.”12 In 2.3 we shall address the specific goal and utility proper to the branch of logic called demonstration (burhān). Let us turn now to a general survey of the principles of logic. 1.2

Knowledge by Conceptualization and Assent

It is fitting for our cursory exposition of Avicenna’s logic to begin where he, following al-Fārābī and others, commenced his own works on logic, namely, with the canonical division of knowledge into two intellectual acts: conceptualization (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq).13 10 11 12 13

Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2 [15], (mod. trans., Marmura, “Division of the Sciences” in Probing, 10). Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3 [16–17] (trans., Marmura, “Avicenna on Meno’s Paradox: On “Apprehending” Unknown Things through Known Things,” 47, n. 3; (Henceforth: Meno Paradox)). Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 1, Prologue [117] (Inati, 47). “One of the purposes of including a consideration of the taṣawwur-taṣdīq dichotomy in introductory discussions of the purpose of logic is to provide an epistemological foundation for the two pillars of Aristotelian logic, the definition and the syllogism. In accordance

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Something is scientifically known in two ways: One of them is that it is conceptualized only, such that if it has a name and [the name] is uttered, then what [the name] means is exemplified in the mind, regardless of whether it is true or false, such as when “man” or “do such and such” is said, for when you attend to the meaning of that which you are discussing, then you have conceptualized it. The second is assent (taṣdīq) together with the conceptualization (taṣawwur), and so, for example, when you are told that “all white is an accident,” then from this not only do you conceptualize (taṣawwur) the meaning of this statement, but also you believe (ṣaddaqta) that it is such. As for when you have doubts whether or not it is such, you still have conceptualized what is said (for you do not have doubts about what you have neither conceptualized nor understood); however, you have not assented to it yet. All assent, then, is together with conceptualization, but not conversely. In the case of what this [statement] means, the conceptualization informs you that [both] the form of this composite [statement] and that from which it is composed (like “white” and “accident”) occur in the mind, whereas [in] assent, this form’s relation to the things themselves occurs in the mind, that is, [the form in the mind] conforms (maṭābaqa) to [the things themselves].14 Conceptualization is the most basic kind of intellectual act; it consists in the formation of concepts or notions that, when linguistically expressed, correspond to names. In other words, what a name means is what is conceptualized by the intellect. Conceptualization is prior to and is presupposed in all assents, for “all assent … is together with conceptualization, but not conversely.” In other words, conceptualization or “taṣawwur is a necessary, but not a sufficient

14

with this aim, the purpose of definition comes to be identified with the production of an act of conception, whereas syllogism comes to be assigned the role of causing assent to the truth of propositions.” Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 74. Cf. Lameer, Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Chapter 2; Strobino, “What If That (Is) Why? Avicenna’s Taxonomy of Scientific Inquiries” (Henceforth: What If That (Is) Why?); idem, “Principles of Scientific Knowledge and the Psychology of (their) Intellection in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān.” (Henceforth: Principles of Scientific Knowledge); Lammer, The Elements of Avicenna’s Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations (Henceforth: Elements), Chapter 2. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, 1.3 [17:7–17] (mod. trans., McGinnis, Avicenna, 29). Cf. Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 74.

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condition for taṣdīq {i.e., assent}.”15 Intrinsic to assent is the belief one achieves when one confirms that the conceived content conforms to reality and so is true or does not so conform to reality and is false. Properly speaking, truth and falsity do not enter into acts of conceptualization, for the true and false belong to the purview of assent. Deborah Black notes, “the distinctive role of conception in human thought is best characterized by its contrast with the act of assent. Ultimately, this means that conception applies to any cognitive act that does not presuppose the assignment of a truth-value to some proposition.”16 Conceptualization can be either simple or composite; one can conceive the simple concept “human,” but one also can conceive composite statements or composite expository phrases. Some composite expository phrases take the form of statements, such as “white is an accident” or “humans are animals,” and others take the form of commands, such as “Do this!” (ifʿal kaḏā).17 It is not assent, but conceptualization that enacts both the matter and the form of such statements. Said otherwise, acts of conceptualization pertain to both elemental concepts and the composition of these concepts into various statements, such as “all humans are animals” and “some animals are humans.” Indeed, one might question or doubt the proposition “all humans are stones” without assenting to it as true or false, but one cannot question or doubt it without conceiving the meaning of each of these notions and understanding what is signified by their composition. Assent enters in when one confirms whether or not the conceived composite conforms to things themselves, for it is not conceptual composition, but truth-grasping that is characteristic of and proprietary to assent. To be clear, Avicenna’s point is not that all assents concern true statements, but that assents are truth-grasping insofar as truth-values are assigned to statements in the act of assent, whereas no truth-value is assigned to statements in conceptualization.18 The objects of conceptualization and assent concern what is known or unknown; the pursuit of knowledge is the endeavor to make what is unknown 15 16

17 18

Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 72, n. 59. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 102.i–iii [D, 112– 113] (Ahmed, 87–88). Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 72. Black also points out that Avicenna’s descriptions of conceptualization are predominantly made in negative terms, such as “pure conception” (taṣawwur sāḏij) and “conception without assent” (taṣawwur bi-lā taṣdīq). Cf. Black, ibid, p. 72, n. 59. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3 [17]; Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12; Cf. Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 72. Cf. Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 73; McGinnis, Avicenna, 28–29; Strobino, What if that (is) why?; idem, Principles of Scientific Knowledge.

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known by way of prior knowledge. When we ask questions about unknown objects, the unknown becomes an object of enquiry (maṭlab), and it is through various kinds of investigation of prior knowledge that the unknown objects of enquiry become known objects. Avicenna distinguishes the prior objects known by conceptualization and assent into primary and acquired knowledge. Every [instance of] assent and conceptualization is {either acquired} by means of some investigation or it exists in a primary [way]. Assent is acquired by means of syllogisms and [other] things resembling them…. Conceptualization is acquired by means of definition and [other] things resembling it…19 Primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent is the fundamental prior knowledge that provides the basis upon which one investigates unknown objects of enquiry and thereby acquires knowledge of unknown objects. Knowledge acquired through conceptualization and assent requires prior knowledge in these two orders of cognition. We acquire conceptual knowledge through investigations that produce definitions and we acquire knowledge by way of assent through syllogisms. What connection does this prior knowledge by conceptualization and assent have to what Avicenna identifies as primary knowledge in the orders of conceptualization and assent? A syllogism has parts that one assents to and others that are conceptualized; a definition has parts that are [only] conceptualized. [But] this does not proceed ad infinitum, in such a way that knowledge is obtained from these parts [only] due to [their] acquisition from other parts, this being their nature ad infinitum. Rather, things reach a limit with assents and conceptualizations that have no intermediaries.20 Just as knowledge acquired by assent is achieved by ordering prior knowledge syllogistically, so knowledge acquired by conceptualization is obtained through defining the definiendum by prior knowledge of the definiens. Accordingly, both kinds of acquired knowledge are complex and are achieved through a proper ordering of the parts of prior knowledge. Syllogisms consist in parts that are assented to and that are conceptualized whereas the parts of

19 20

Salvation. Logic, 102.ii [D, 112–113] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 87). Salvation. Logic, 102.iii [D, 113] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 87–88).

22

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definitions are only conceptualized. The parts of prior knowledge in conceptualization and assent can themselves be acquired from other parts of prior knowledge acquired through conceptualization and assent. But there cannot be an infinite regress of definitions of definitions or assents to assents via an infinite series of syllogisms. Avicenna avers that there is in fact a limit, a terminus within the orders of conceptualization and assent, and he identifies such termini with primary knowledge.21 This is significant, because in order for us to understand the logical background to Avicenna’s presentation of the scientific first principles of metaphysics, we must first set forth a clear account of his doctrine of primary knowledge in conceptualization and assent. But before we can explore in detail his account of primary and acquired knowledge we must turn our attention to the heuristic order of the fundamental questions, that is, the wonder and the natural desire to know that either directs our attention to our primary knowledge or that moves us to investigate and acquire knowledge of the unknown on the basis of what is already known. 1.3

The Heuristic Order of Questions

The influence of Aristotle and al-Fārābī on Avicenna’s approach to the basic questions appears unquestionable and merits an extensive study; such an investigation, however, is beyond the reach of our aims. The locus classicus for Aristotle’s well known introduction of the scientific questions begins in Posterior Analytics ii.1. The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is. For when we seek whether it is this or this, putting it into a number (e.g. whether the sun is eclipsed or not), we seek the fact. Evidence for this: on finding that it is eclipsed we stop; and if from the start we know that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. When we know the fact we seek the reason why (e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed and that the earth moves, we seek the reason why it is eclipsed or why it moves). Now while we seek these things in this way, we seek some things in another fashion—e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not (I mean if one is or not simpliciter and not if one 21

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.1–5 [29–30]; Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12; ii.6; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge.

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23

is white or not). And knowing that it is, we seek what it is (e.g. so what is a god? or what is a man?).22 Avicenna appropriated many features of Aristotle’s and al-Fārābī’s approach to scientific questions, but our focus shall be on Avicenna’s own presentation of the scientific questions.23 Let us begin with his succinct presentation in the Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1. The enquiries and the things that are known by seeking are equal [in number]. For something is sought only in order to be known. Thus, if it is [already] known, seeking it is pointless. The enquiries, even if one multiplies them by adding the ‘which,’ the ‘how much’, the ‘how’ and so on, according to what is investigated in this place, are four: two [of them] fall within the ‘if (hal)—one is [(1)] ‘if something exists’, that is absolutely, and the second is [(2)] ‘if something is something [else]’, e.g. ‘if body is composed of indivisible parts’. The enquiry into the [(4)] ‘why’ (limā) follows each of the two enquiries into the ‘if’; and the enquiry into the [(3)] ‘what’ (mā) connects to that one. As for the enquiry into the [(5)] ‘which’ (ayy), it is one of the things that follows (tawābiʿ) the enquiry into the ‘what’.24 We do not seek to known what is already known, but we investigate the unknown in order to make it known. Avicenna contends that the many ways in which things are known through investigation correspond to the varieties of questions or objects of enquiry. Now there are many kinds of enquiry, but there are four principal questions: (1) If X is? (2) If X is Y? (3) What is X? And, (4) Why is X? or Why X is Y? Additional questions, such as Which X?, are connected to these four. For each of these four principal questions Avicenna demarcates

22 23

24

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ii.1 89b23–35. (trans., Barnes). Cf. Rescher, “Avicenna on the Logic of Questions;” Menn, Aristotle on the Four Senses of Being; idem, Fārābī on the Senses of Being; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition; idem, What If That (Is) Why?; idem, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. My own presentation owes much to Strobino’s detailed studies on this topic. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [A, 261:1–6] (mod. trans., Strobino, Avicenna’s Book of Demonstration (Kitāb al-Burhān). Unless noted otherwise, all translations from the Book of Demonstration iv.1 are from Strobino’s forthcoming translation). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration i.5.

24

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important subdivisions that enter into his heuristic ordering of these distinct lines of enquiry. Avicenna distinguishes the question “if?” (hal) into simple and qualified forms that correspond to Aristotle’s “is it?” and “is X a Y?” I shall refer to the former as the simple-if question and to the latter as the composite-if question.25 Among questions is that [whereby] affirmation or negation—in sum, assent—is granted. It is either the question ‘if’ (maṭlab hal) in an absolute sense, such as our statement, ‘Does God exist?’ and ‘Does the void exist?’ [By this question,] one finds out only the state of a thing as existing or failing to exist in an absolute sense. As for the question ‘if’ in a qualified sense, well it is like our statement, ‘Is God the creator of man?’ and ‘Is the body created?’ [By this] one finds out whether a thing exists or fails to exist in a certain state.26 The question “if X is?” in the absolute sense enquires into the fact or existence of a thing, and any confirmation on the matter issues forth in an assent to an affirmation or negation. Accordingly, truth and falsity pertain to the simple-if question for it is answered by an assent. This is also the case for its composite or qualified form, “if X is Y?” for, as Avicenna notes in the Pointers, “the question, ‘Is the thing, absolutely?’ or ‘Is it in such and such a state?’ … asks about one of the two contradictory extremes.”27 The composite–if question pertains to the way a thing exists; it enquiries into whether a thing in fact has such-andsuch properties or exists in such-and-such a way. This is why Avicenna often takes the question “which?” (ayy) to be potentially or implicitly contained in the composite–if, for when we ask “if X is Y?” we are basically asking “is Y an attribute of X?” As for the question ‘which’ (ayy), well, in potentiality, it is included in the composite qualified [question] ‘if’. It only seeks to know the distinguishing

25

26 27

Cf. Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge; idem, What If That (Is) Why?, 51–61. On terminological developments in Avicenna’s framing of these scientific questions, see Strobino, “Avicenna’s Use of the Arabic Translations of the Posterior Analytics and the Ancient Commentary Tradition,” 367–371. Salvation. Logic, 115.i [D, 128–129] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 97). Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 6 [489] (mod. trans., Inati, 155).

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25

[characteristics of a thing] either with reference to per se attributes or properties.28 Examples of the simple-if question include: “if God exists?” and “if the void exists?” Avicenna maintains in Ilāhiyyāt viii that the answer to the former question is that God does exist, and that this truth is known through a demonstration. In the Physics of the Healing, he concludes that the enquiry into the latter question reveals that the void does not exist.29 Even though the answers to these questions require an assent, qua questions statements like “Does God exist?” and “Does the void exist?” are conceptualized but are not yet assented to until one has enquired and verified that the subject does or does not in fact exist. Avicenna’s examples of the complex–if, like “if God is the creator of humans?” clearly presupposes knowledge of such facts as the existence of God and humans, and knowledge of what the terms “God,” “creation,” and “human” mean. Accordingly, the composite–if question follows upon answers to the simple–if question and presupposes an enquiry into some version of the question what. But which what questions precede which if queries? As for the enquiry into the “what,” it plainly follows the simple enquiry among the two enquiries into the “if,” for when one knows that something exists, one seeks what that existent thing is. Thus it is already known that the enquiry into the “what” according to the essence (al-ḏāt) follows the enquiry into [A262] the “if and is a consequence (tābiʿ) of it, even if sometimes [the enquiry into the “what”] precedes [the enquiry into the “if”] in as much as [the former is an] enquiry into the “what” in the sense of the name. So if [the enquiry into the “what” in the sense of the name] is put forward [first], and then the enquiry into the “if” is put forward, it is evident at once (ittaḍaḥa fī l-ḥāl) that what is required [next] is seeking the “what” (muqtaḍá ṭalab mā) according to the essence (al-ḏāt).30 Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of what (mā) questions: questions that seek the meaning of a name (ism), which come before the questions concerning the

28 29 30

Salvation. Logic, 118.i [D, 130] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 98). Cf. McGinnis, “Avoiding the Void: Avicenna on the Impossibility of Circular Motion in a Void.” Healing. Logic, Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [A, 261:11–262:2], (mod. trans., Strobino). Cf. Book of Demonstration i.5; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge.

26

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essence (ḏāt), that is, the whatness or quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing. Situated between these two what questions is the simple–if question. One must first understand the meaning of a name before one can answer if the thing named exists. If the thing denoted by the meaning of a name does in fact exist extramentally or in the mind, then one can proceed to ask “what is it?” in the sense of enquiring into the essence or whatness of the thing. I shall call the former what question the nominal-what question and the second the quidditativewhat question.31 Both the simple and composite forms of the question if are answered by an assent that assigns a truth-value to the statement investigated, but what is the corresponding cognitive act that answers the two forms of the question what? The question “what” (maṭlab mā) [leads one] to conceptualize [a thing]. [This occurs] either in accordance with the name, as [when] one says, “What is the void?” the meaning of which is “What is intended by the name void?” This precedes every question. Or [this occurs] in accordance with the essence, as your statement, “What is man insofar as he is {what he is}?” [By means of this question] one comes to know the true-nature of [man’s] essence. The [question] “if” in an absolute sense precedes this [question].32 In contrast to the questions answered by an assent, both the nominal-what and quidditative-what questions concern conceptualization. This means that answers to the nominal-what question are conceptualized prior to any assents to answers to the simple–if question, which is itself prior to the conceptualization that responds to the quidditative-what question. In other words, prior to any quidditative investigation into the essence or true-nature of a thing considered in itself, we must first know whether such an essence or quiddity exists in the mind or extramentally.33 The Logic of the Pointers presents a similar 31 32 33

Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics ii.7–8; Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1. Salvation. Logic. 116.i [D, 129] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 97–98). Cf. Strobino, What If That (Is) Why?; idem, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Some of the most problematic interpretations of Avicenna’s metaphysics arise, in part, because they neglect to consider Avicenna’s heuristic order of the basic questions. The importance of this basic order is essential to understanding correctly Avicenna’s account of necessary and possible existence in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 as well as his famous thought experiment that invites us to consider a thing’s quiddity in itself, such as horseness, humanity, or animality. This thought experiment concerned with asking the quidditative-what question about an essence in itself presupposes a prior assent to the simple-if question that affirms or negates the existence of such quiddities as being mental or extramental existents. In short, even if such thought experiments ask us to consider the quiddity in

Logic, Knowledge, and Questions

27

order for these basic questions, and adds that the quidditative-what question is answered by providing a definition or a description of the essence of the thing, if the being can be defined or described.34 This last caveat is critical, for even though we might be able to enquire into what is meant by primary notions, categories, or simple beings, like God, when we conceptualize what such beings are, we are not always able to define them in the strict sense. This is because, as we shall see in Chapter 2.1, definitions require certain generic parts that are excluded from the nature of primary notions and simple beings, like being and God, respectively. Thus far we have summarized some key features of Avicenna’s account of the two what questions, which pertain to conceptualization, and the two if questions, which pertain to assent, but he also distinguishes two forms of why questions. Avicenna’s account of the heuristic order among the composite-if and quidditative-what questions, and their interconnections with why and other questions is extraordinarily complicated and the details of which go well beyond our present aims.35 It will be sufficient for our purposes to summarize a few key points concerning his twofold division of why questions as they related to his theory of the demonstrative syllogism, which is the logical machine that advances forward all scientific enquiries into the unknown. The enquiry into the “why” [is such] that one seeks [by means of it] either the cause for judging (ḥakama bi) the existence or non-existence (ʿadm) of a [given] subject absolutely; or the cause for judging (ḥakama bi) the existence or non-existence (lā wujūdihi) [of that subject] in a [given] state. And in all this, either the search for the cause of the judgment (ḥakama) extends to the search for the cause of the existence or it does not. And the most convenient thing is for the syllogism explaining the absolute “if” to be a repetitive conditional [syllogism] (šartī istiṯnā’ī) and that its cause resides in the condition. As for the rest {i.e., the other cases},

34 35

itself as being existentially neutral, this is, for Avicenna, a mere mode of consideration; for such quidditative considerations of true-natures or essences in themselves already assume that such essences exist in some fashion, and that they are not entirely indifferent to existence in every respect. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.1–2. We will return to this point in Chapters 6 and 9. For Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 see De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna demonstrate the existence of God?” Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 6. [490–92] (Inati, 156); Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition.” 120–122. Cf. Strobino, What If That (Is) Why?

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the most convenient thing is that the cause [involved] in it be a middle term.36 The question why (limā) can be posed to the answers to both if questions, for we can ask, “why does X exist?” and “why X is Y?.” When we ask why concerning the answers to the simple and composite if questions we are searching for a reason, that is to say, we are searching for the cause that explains why “X exists” or why “X is Y.” Avicenna holds that the best logical way to formulate the enquiry, “Why does X exist?” is by a “repetitive conditional,” that is, by a hypothetical syllogism that either repeats and thereby posits the antecedent (i.e., the condition), like modus ponens, or repeats and negates the consequent (i.e., the condition), like modus tollens. For example, “If there is an efficient cause of X, then X exists; there is such an efficient cause; so X exists.” The conclusion depends upon the repeated antecedent; since one assents to the repeated antecedent this satisfies the conditional that thereby causes one to assent to the truth of the conclusion.37 When Avicenna remarks “As for the rest” he means the many answers we might give to the various kinds of composite–if questions, such as the attribution of attributes to a thing. For these other cases the best logical form to employ is a connective categorical syllogism where the conclusion depends upon a middle term, which if assented to in the major and the minor premise, causes us to assent to the truth of the conclusion. Avicenna distinguishes two ways of asking why questions and both pertain to the answers provided for the simple and the composite question if. “[By the question] ‘why’ {limā} one finds out the cause for the answer to ‘if’. It is either only the cause for the assent or the cause for the existence [of a thing] itself.”38 When we ask why, we can either seek the reason for why we have assented to a statement as true, or we can enquire into the cause for why some thing in reality exists or why some attributes belong to a certain thing. The question, “what is the reason for the thing?” [In this question] it is as if one asks about what the middle term is, if the purpose is to obtain assent only, by the answer to the question, “Is it?” or about what the cause is, if the purpose is not the assent by that only—and in whatever manner—but the search for the cause in the thing itself. There is no 36 37 38

Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [A, 261:7–10] (mod. trans., Strobino). Cf. Salvation. Logic, 83 [90–92] (Ahmed, 71–72); Pointers: Logic, m. 8, c. 3 [448–452] (Inati, 145–147); Strobino, What If That (Is) Why?, 54. Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 117.i [D, 129] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 98).

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29

doubt that this question is posterior in order to the question, “Is it?” whether in potentiality, or in actuality.39 In the Book of Demonstration from the Healing and the Logic of the Pointers Avicenna places the question why concerning the reason for assenting to some statement, prior to the question why that concentrates on why some thing exists or that explains why some thing has a certain attribute. We first enquire into the reason why we assented to the statement “X exists” before we enquire into the cause that explains why “X exists” in reality. For example, we first grant that Socrates exists, because we can see him, or that God exists, because there must be an uncaused first cause of all caused causes, before we grant accounts that either purport to explain the very being of Socrates—in terms of his material, formal, efficient, and final causes—or that deny there can be any cause of God’s existence and so deny that he has any whyness.40 In Chapter 2.3 we shall address the connection these two why questions—the first concerning the cause of the assent, and the second concerning the cause of both the assent and the cause of the thing in reality—have to Avicenna’s distinction between the “demonstration of the that” (burhān inna) or sign (dalīl) and the “demonstration of the why” (burhān li-mā) or the “absolute demonstration” (burhān muṭlaq).41 Thus far we have surveyed Avicenna’s treatment of the scientific questions what, if, and why. We have seen that Avicenna distinguishes various forms of each of these questions that are crucial to his understanding of the heuristic order among these questions. He demarcates the question what into enquiries concerning the meaning of a name and seeking the quiddity or essence of thing; the question if admits of a simple and composite form. The question why—which pertains to the answers of the simple and composite if questions— seeks reasons that either explain why someone assented to a statement or that explain both why a statement was assented to and also presents the cause for why a thing exists as it does, which is the reason for the assent. In the previous section we presented Avicenna’s account of conceptualization and assent, primary and acquired knowledge. In this section we have shown that all answers

39 40 41

Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 6 [492–493] (Inati, 156). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.16 [348]; Healing. Physics, i.15. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 225, n. 45; Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 5 [485–488] (Inati, 154–155); Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 113–114 [D, 126–127] (Ahmed, 96–97); Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, i.13; McGinnis, Avicenna, 2.

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to the question if consist in an assent and that all responses to the question what require a conceptualization. But it still remains unclear which cognitive act is salient for enquiries and demonstrations that address the question why. We also have not yet addressed the way primary and acquired knowledge is related to these questions. We shall conclude this section by briefly addressing these two issues and then sketch, based on the evidence covered so far, the heuristic order Avicenna bestows upon these questions. All answers to the question why require acts of conceptualization that presuppose assents to statements responding to the question if. Such answers are achieved through syllogisms, and when these syllogisms are of the highest epistemic rank, they are demonstrative syllogisms. Avicenna unequivocally distinguishes the business of conceiving definitions as such from the purpose of demonstrations as such. Indeed, in the final section of his Book of Demonstration iv.1, he takes great pains to show the fundamental and irreducible differences between definitions and demonstrations.42 It is in this context that he makes clear which noetic acts are the most salient to demonstrations and so also which noetic acts are most pertinent to the question why. {Definition} makes per se a plain (sāḏaj) conceptualization and nothing else necessary, whereas {demonstration} makes per se a plain assent and nothing else necessary. As for the fact that assent [occurs] only by virtue of [a related] conceptualization, this is something granted not because that conceptualization [occurs] according to demonstration (min jihati l-burhāni), but [because] it is assent that [occurs] according to demonstration.43 Said otherwise, while a definition as such is formed through a conceptualization and in itself requires nothing else, a demonstration in itself is inherently ordered towards arriving at an assent. It is of course true, as we have seen, that in order to reach this assent one must conceptualize, but this is true of any assent, not just the assents involved in demonstrative syllogisms. Conceptualization is a sine qua non factor for any demonstration, but it is not a sufficient condition. This is because what is still required is an assent, which is the most

42 43

Cf. Strobino, “Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition;” idem, What If That (Is) Why?; idem, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1. [A, 269] (mod. trans., Strobino). Cf. Salvation. Logic, 139.i–iv [D, 146–149] (Ahmed, 114–116).

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salient factor for any demonstration. And this assent results from the deduction that proves the conclusion is true or false because of the necessary connection that has been established between the minor and the major terms in virtue of the middle contained in the propositions of prior assents. This brings us to the topic of prior knowledge. Avicenna clearly maintains that all why questions presuppose some prior knowledge, hence the answers to all why questions consist in some form of acquired knowledge. The prior knowledge presupposed by such why questions consists in our assents to whether some subject exists or whether a subject has certain attributes. In order to assent to whether certain properties belong to a subject, we must first know what that subject is, and this requires conceptualizing the essence of the thing. But Avicenna states unequivocally that we only ask what the essence of a thing is after we have verified and assented to the fact of its existence. Nevertheless, such simple and unqualified assents require prior knowledge, at least, of what the name means that denotes the subject. Hence, a minimal prerequisite for any assent, even in response to the simple enquiry concerning whether a subject exists or not, demands a conceptualization of the meaning of the name, and this corresponds to the simplest form of the question what. And according to Avicenna, the most basic or primary conceptualizations and assents—both to simple and composite if enquiries and to nominal and quidditative what questions—are not acquired through intermediate knowledge, but consist in immediate and primary impressions. Hence, there must be some forms of the questions what and if that can be answered without other definitions or syllogisms, that is, without drawing on intermediary and prior knowledge. What the content of such primary knowledge in conceptualization and assent consists in for the science of metaphysics is a very important question we shall return to in later chapters. Avicenna’s extraordinarily sophisticated account of the heuristic order of the basic questions what, if, and why goes beyond the scope of our investigation; nevertheless, it will be helpful to conclude by schematizing the major features of this heuristic order discussed in this section. Avicenna on the Heuristic Order of the Basic Questions 1) What is it? 2) If it is? 3) What is it? 4) If X is Y?

Conceptualization : nominal content Assent : truth-value Conceptualization : quidditative content Assent : truth-value

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Avicenna on the Heuristic Order of the Basic Questions 5) Why is X? or Why X is Y? 5a) Why assent?

5b) Why assent and Why the thing exists (the way it exists)?

Demonstration : conceptualization and assent Inna: Demonstration of the fact / cause of assent Dalīl : demonstration of the fact that is an effect of the connection of major and minor terms Limā: Demonstration of the cause of assent (i.e. reason for assent) and the cause of the thing

Concluding Remarks This chapter has situated Avicenna’s logic within the context of his wider philosophical concerns and in particular has shown the way his logic connects the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions with the enquisitive drive to acquire scientific knowledge that is based on primary knowledge. It was shown that Avicenna holds that all knowledge by way of conceptualization and assent—which he divides into primary and acquired knowledge—is motivated by and makes known the unknown that is investigated by the different questions what, if, and why. It is these questions that drive his metaphysical arguments and conclusions in the Ilāhiyyāt. Understanding both the doctrine of the heuristic order of these questions and their connections to the noetic acts of conceptualization and assent, helps elucidate and explain the way Avicenna orders the investigations in his philosophical works and the kinds of solutions he is seeking or has acquired through his investigations of the unknown by way of what is previously known. Consequently, it is critical that we pay attention to the kinds of questions Avicenna is asking and answering in his Ilāhiyyāt. In the next chapter we shall examine in more detail Avicenna’s account of the way that enquiry leads us to scientific knowledge through primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization and assent.

Chapter 2

Conceptualization, Assent, and Scientific Knowledge This chapter expands on the first chapter’s introduction to Avicenna’s doctrine of knowledge via conceptualization and assent by showing the way it is ordered towards scientific knowledge and so is connected to his theory of a demonstrative science. These logical doctrines are prerequisites for a proper understanding of the scientific profile of Avicenna’s metaphysical science that is treated in Part 2. This chapter covers these logical doctrines in three sections. Building on the exposition of the heuristic order of the basic questions from the last chapter, the first two sections of this chapter explore at length Avicenna’s understanding of primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization (2.1) and assent (2.2). The third section presents the elements of his theory of a demonstrative science (2.3), which are employed in the next two chapters in our analysis of the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt. 2.1

Primary and Acquired Knowledge by Conceptualization

In the last chapter we examined Avicenna’s account of the basic questions. Each of these scientific questions stimulates enquiries that seek to acquire knowledge of the unknown on the basis of prior knowledge that is either acquired or primary knowledge. We have also seen that Avicenna holds all acquired knowledge is ultimately grounded in prior knowledge that is not acquired but is primary, and so provides the principles of conceptualization (mabādiʾ al-taṣawwur) and principles of assent (mabādiʾ al-taṣdīq). It has been established how mental (ḏihnī) instruction and learning takes place and that this takes place only through previous knowledge, we must have first principles for conception and first principles for assent. If every instruction and learning was through previous knowledge, and every existing knowledge is through instruction and learning, the state of affairs would regress ad infinitum, and there would be neither instruction nor learning. It is hence necessary that we have matters believed to be true without mediation, and matters that are conceptualized without

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mediation, and that these would be the first principles for both assent and conceptualization.1 Primary knowledge of first principles in the orders of conceptualization and assent has no intermediaries; it is not acquired through prior knowledge. This is why primary knowledge can provide the various philosophical sciences with their first principles. Consequently, it is necessary for the logician to investigate the primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent that lays the foundations for all acquired knowledge by definitions and syllogisms.2 In this section we shall investigate the way primary knowledge by conceptualization situates or orients us towards knowledge of the unknown, that is, how enquiry into the unknown employs primary knowledge to attain acquired knowledge within the order of conceptualization. This section is divided into three subsections concerning Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions (2.1.1), his account of the five predicables (2.1.2), and his application of these logical distinctions and the five predicables to his theory of definition and description (2.1.3). Let us commence by returning to the fundamental distinction between conceptualization and assent. All primary cognition (maʿrifa) and scientific knowledge (ʿilm) is either {through} conceptualization or assent. Conceptualization is knowledge that comes first and is acquired by means of definition (ḥadd) and whatever is like it. [An example is] our conceptualization of the quiddity (māhiyya) of man. Assent comes about only by means of syllogism (qiyās) and whatever is like it. [An example is] our assenting [to the fact] that the universe (al-kull) has a single principle (mabdaʾ). Definition and syllogism are two tools by means of which one acquires objects of

1 Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration i.6 [A, 77:1–5] (mod. trans., Marmura, Meno Paradox, 61). My emphasis. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 102 [D, 112–113] (Ahmed, 87–88). 2 Cf. “The logician reflects on the prior principles that are appropriate for the sought objects, one by one, on how these principles lead the enquirer to the unknown object sought. Thus the logician must do his best to know the principles of the expository phrase and the manner of its composition—be that in the form of definition or otherwise; and to know the principles of proof and the manner of its composition—be that in the form of a syllogism or otherwise. What one must first begin with are just the single elements, of which definition, syllogism, and what resembles them are composed.” Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 4 [138] (mod. trans., Inati, 50). Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, i.5 [31: 16–32:2] (Bäck, 56–57); Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 72, n. 59; 75, n. 69; Lameer, Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Chapter 1–2.

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knowledge (maʿlūmāt) that are [at first] unknown and then become known by means of reflection (rawiyya).3 We have seen that conceptualization (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) function as first principles in Avicenna’s logic, for these two noetic acts exhaustively cover the foundations of all primary cognition (maʿrifa) and scientific knowledge (ʿilm).4 Conceptualization is prior to assent and we acquire further conceptualizations by means of forming definitions and whatever is like it; assent is a mode of knowing that follows upon conceptualization and employs syllogisms and similar means for acquiring additional knowledge by assent. These two elemental noetic acts provide the foundation upon which Avicenna builds up the whole edifice of logic. In this section on conceptualization and definition we shall be examining noetic content that especially pertains to the different kinds of what questions. In the next section we turn to assent, syllogisms, and the answers to the questions that pertain to the noetic act of assent. Avicenna holds that conceptualization is the most fundamental kind of knowledge, for even assent presupposes the conceptualized notions that are formed into the statements that are the proper object of assent. There are primary and acquired notions of conceptualization, and the latter are obtained through the former; accordingly, primary notions are the most fundamental kind of conceptualizations.5 So primary knowledge by conceptualization is what ultimately explains the acquisition of new conceptual knowledge via the

3 Salvation. Logic, 1.i [D, 7] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 3). 4 Cf. Wolfson. “The Terms Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek and Latin and Hebrew Equivalents,” 479–80 (Henceforth: Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq); Inati, Introduction, 5–6 and 50 in Pointers. Logic; McGinnis, Avicenna, 28–49; Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 72–74; Lameer Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Chapters 1–2; Strobino, What If That (Is) Why?; Lammer, Elements, Chapter 2. Cf. “Conceptualization and assenting can both occur in a primary and secondary fashion. Thus, the awareness of the concept of unity is primary and of the quiddity of man secondary, though both are conceptualizations. The latter type requires the process of deriving definitions. The awareness that the whole is greater than its part is primary and that God exists is secondary, though both involve the subject’s assent to a judgment. The latter type of knowledge requires a syllogism. Here maʿrifa refers to a primary sort of awareness (a direct gnosis of facts) and ʿilm to a derivative scientific knowledge (epistēmē).” Ahmed, Notes, 149 in Salvation. Logic. 5 Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 4 [138] (Inati, 50). For Avicenna’s doctrine of ideogenesis and account of the way in which the human intellect is impressed with the primary notions of conceptualization by an emanative abstraction, see McGinnis, Avicenna, 117–143; idem,, “Avicenna’s Naturalized Epistemology and Scientific Methods;” Gutas, aat, 213–220 [187–194]; 250–252 [219–222]; Black and Hasse, “Abstraction and Emanation in Avicenna;” Dag Hasse, “Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism;” Alpina, “Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect, and

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formation of definitions and descriptions. Since Avicenna’s treatment of definitions and descriptions presupposes his extensive taxonomical division of notions, phrases, predicables, predicaments, and a host of other related distinctions, we too must start with a survey of his matrix of logical distinctions. As we shall see, Avicenna’s taxonomical palate is wide-ranging and his terminology is fluid and ambiguous at times. Consequently, if we fail to appreciate how nuanced his logical distinctions are, we will also fail to recognize how subtle some of his metaphysical distinctions are which presuppose and employ his detailed divisions of logical taxa. 2.1.1 Knowledge by Conceptualization: The Matrix of Logical Distinctions Let us begin with the goal sought by a definition (ḥadd): “The primary aim in defining is to indicate by the expression the quiddity of the thing.”6 Here we must distinguish three elements: (1) beings or things, (2) essences, and (3) expressions or utterances. These three elements correspond to Aristotle’s socalled semantic triangle.7 Avicenna appropriated this doctrine and frequently presented his own version of it whenever he addressed the topics discussed in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. A thing is either a real being (mawjūd) or a form {that is} a being in the estimative power or the intellect (ʿaql), extracted from [the individual existent]. These [forms] do not differ with respect to regions and peoples. Or [a thing] is an utterance that indicates a form expressed in the estimative power or the intellect; or it is a writing that indicates an utterance. These last two differ with respect to peoples. For writing indicates an utterance; an utterance indicates an estimated or intellected form; and this form indicates an real being.8 A thing’s essence or form can either exist in an individual being independent from cognition or it can exist in the cognitional powers of estimation and intellect. These distinct ways of existing ascribed to the form or essence of a thing

Intellectual Memory in Avicenna’s Kitab al-Nafs and its Aristotelian Background;” Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. 6 Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.9 [48.3–4] (mod. trans., McGinnis, Avicenna, 38) Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 7 [204–207] (Inati, 70); Ilāhiyyāt, v.7.2 [236]; v.8.3 [244]; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ii.10, 93b29. 7 Cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione, i, 16a1–19. 8 Salvation. Logic, 17.i [D, 17–18] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 13); Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, i.1; Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 5 [139] (Inati, 50–51);

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are clarified by Avicenna’s well known doctrine that essences are in themselves neutral with respect to existing as individual beings in reality or as individuals or universals cognized; we shall discuss this doctrine in more detail in later chapters.9 Avicenna says that the forms found in beings or in these cognitive powers are natural and are universal to all humans despite any differences in region, language, or customs. But the linguistic expressions either by verbal utterances or writing, which communicate these known forms, are not the same for all people, for the meaning attached to a sound is merely conventional to one group of people. Avicenna also introduces a semiotic order among beings, cognized forms of beings, utterances, and writing. Writing signifies what is uttered, and what is uttered signifies what is cognized, and the form that is estimated or conceptualized signifies an individual being in reality.10 “Because there is a certain relation between the expression and the concept, and [because] some states of expressions often affect some states of concepts, the logician must also pay attention to the non-restricted aspect of the expression {i.e., its conventional linguistic aspects}.”11 The logician’s attention to either the intelligible meaning or its linguistic expression changes depending upon the logical art being pursued. As Deborah Black notes, “Only demonstrative syllogisms can be perfected and completed simply through their relation to intelligible meanings. In all other {logical} arts, communication is an essential, and often overriding, concern.”12 The syllogism which is understood (al-qiyās al-maʿqūl) may suffice for us by itself in attaining the end of the syllogism, if what is sought is demonstrative. As for dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical syllogisms, as well as poetics, the syllogism as heard cannot be dispensed with in bestowing the end of each of them.13 Because our concern is with conceptualization and assent as ordered to science, definitions, and demonstrative syllogisms, we too shall focus on the cognitive aspects over the linguistic features of Avicenna’s logic.

9 10 11 12 13

Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2; Ilāhiyyāt i.5; Ilāhiyyāt v.1–2; Ilāhiyyāt viii.4. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, i.1 [5:6–9] (Bäck, 29–30). Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 2 [131–132] (Inati, 48). Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 60. Healing. Logic. Book of Syllogism, i.6 [A, 55:6–9] (mod. trans., Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 60–61).

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Avicenna has a very detailed noetic doctrine of ideogenesis, which explicates at length the many psychological sources and causes of our primary knowledge of universals. We find a succinct summation of his doctrine in the Salvation. Intellectual understanding ( fikr ʿaqlī) acquires universals insofar as they are abstracted. Sensation, imagination, and memory acquire particulars. Thus, neither sensation nor imagination acquires man as said of the many. … The universals, assents, and conceptualizations that exist with respect to [humanity] are not apprehended by the senses or by the imagination. Nor are its causes [apprehended] except by insight or experience. These latter two aid the intellect. As for conceptualization, sensation presents mixed objects to the imagination and the imagination [does the same] for the intellect. Then the intellect distinguishes among them and abstracts them and takes each one of the non-sensory forms singly. [It then] arranges in order the most particular and the most general, the essential and the accidental. Thus, the primary meanings are imprinted in the intellect for [the process of ] conceptualization. Then definitions are compounded out of them. As for assent, well sensation and imagination may aid [it] by means of experience and insight; [or they may aid it] through induction.14 It is through sensory-perception, induction, and experiment that we come to intellectually understand intentions and form universal notions and utterances. In this text and many others Avicenna describes the way that the intellect distinguishes and orders the universal or common intentions of individual

14

Salvation. Logic, 148.v [D, 170–171] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 135) my emphasis. “… the faculty that procures us the first [principles of] knowledge [sc. the intellect] (1) contemplates (tuṭāliʿu) these objects of the internal senses, (2) discriminates (tumayyizu) what is similar and what is different, (3) strips (tanziʿu) every form of what is accidental to it, and (4) abstracts (tujarridu) what is essential. As a result, what comes about first in that [faculty] is the (5) conceptualization of simples (taṣawwur al-basāʾiṭ); then (6) those simples are combined with one another and separated from one another, with the assistance of a faculty called cogitative (mufakkira), in such a way that (7.1) some combinations (tarkībāt) involving those notions emerge clearly (lāḥa) to [the intellect] and happen to be such that [the intellect] knows them without being taught and immediately […] like [the principle] that the whole is greater than the part, (7.2) while for many of them, [the intellect] acquires the judgment about their composition and division from the senses by way of experience.” Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.10 [A 331] (trans., Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge, 38).

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things according to what it is more generic or specific, essential or accidental, concomitant or nonconcomitant, common to many or unique to the quiddity of the thing being examined. This matrix of logical distinctions consists in a variety of second intentions that as such do not exist in reality, even though their significations are grounded in the very quidditative and existential structure of things as known by first intentions.15 This matrix of logical distinctions provided the foundational schemata or taxa that Avicenna employed in his logical treatment of how we acquire knowledge of the unknown through conceptualization. Let us then turn to his matrix of logical distinctions before exploring their specific application to the five predicables, definitions, and descriptions.16 Avicenna distinguishes between simple and composite, complete and incomplete, universal and particular, and essential and accidental conceptualizations and utterances.17 What is especially pertinent to our study is Avicenna’s division of universals by essential notions (bi-ḏ-ḏātiyyāt) and by accidental notions (bi-l-ʿaraḍiyyāt). Not only does the division between the per se and per accidens help frame his accounts of the categories, five predicables, and the formation of definitions and descriptions, it is crucial for his metaphysical doctrine of being as well. This is because Avicenna’s ontological distinction between existence and quiddity requires a corresponding logical distinction that is not adequately captured either by the categories of substance and the nine accidents or by Porphyry’s five predicables of genus, species, difference, property, and accident.18 In particular, what is needed is a wider notion 15

16

17 18

“For in external things there is no essentiality or accidentality by way of predication, no [such thing as] a thing’s being a subject nor its being a predicate no [such thing as] premise or syllogism, or anything of the sort.” Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2 [15] (mod. trans., Marmura, Division of Sciences, in Probing, 10). In his amc, Robert Wisnovsky refers to Avicenna’s “matrix of distinctions” such as that between necessary existence and possible existence, in itself and through another, and uncaused and caused (Cf. amc, pp. 13–14, and cc. 11–14). Despite some obvious similarities and overlapping notions, my “matrix of logical distinctions” serves a different purpose from Wisnovsky’s “matrix of distinctions.” My overall goal beyond this chapter is to show that Avicenna presents a rich taxonomy of distinctions in his logic and then employs them within his natural philosophy and metaphysics. Hence, we must be attentive to this matrix of distinctions from the logic if we wish to understand Avicenna’s metaphysical distinctions that presuppose and utilize his matrix of logical distinctions. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 3–6 [D, 9–11] (Ahmed, 5–6); Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.5–8; Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 7–8 [143–150] (Inati, 51–53). For more detailed studies of Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions and their relevance to the predicables and categories, see Benevich, “Fire and Heat: Yaḥyā B. ʿAdī and Avicenna on the Essentiality of being Substance or Accident” (Henceforth: Fire and Heat), 254–266; Di Vincenzo, “Avicenna’s reworking of Porphyry’s ‘common accident’ in the light

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of accidental that captures the way existence (wujūd) occurs “accidentally” to quiddity (māhiyya) but without being posterior to and subordinated to the quiddity of a thing in the way that categorical accidents are subordinated to substance, predicable properties are subordinated concomitants of a quiddity, and predicable accidents are separable extrinsic and subordinated features of a thing’s quiddity. In order to capture this wider sense of “to occur accidentally” (ʿaraḍa), Avicenna situated his metaphysical doctrine within his own complex logical division of the various meanings of the notions essential and accidental. In this chapter we shall merely introduce the divisions of essential and accidental relevant to his account of the descriptions, definitions, and the five predicables. In Chapter 8.2’s treatment of Avicenna’s appropriation of Aristotle’s senses of being as per se and per accidens we shall present a more regimented division of Avicenna’s use of the polysemous notions essential and accidental and their relevance to existence and essence. For Avicenna, “Every universal [utterance] is either essential or accidental. The essential utterance sets down the quiddity of that which it is said.”19 The essential (ḏātī) pertains to the quiddity of a thing, and in particular the constitutive (muqawwim) meanings of the quiddity, whereas the accidental (ʿaraḍī) consists in what is not intrinsic to the quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing.20 It is crucial that we distinguish between Avicenna’s more restrictive account of the notions essential (ḏātī) and accidental (ʿaraḍī) within his Isagoge’s matrix of distinctions from the more inclusive use of these notions in his Book of Demonstration and other works. In the former context, which we are concerned with here, the essential (ḏātī) principally designates whatever is a constitutive (muqawwim) of some meaning and the accidental (ʿaraḍī) principally pertains to whatever is not constitutive (ġayr muqawwim). But these are not the only meanings of the essential and the accidental. For the essential, especially in the context of the Book of Demonstration, includes both constitutives and nonconstitutives that are per se accidents.21 Accordingly, we must be careful to distinguish what sense of essential or accidental Avicenna is employing in any

19 20 21

of Aristotle’s Categories” (Henceforth: Common Accident); idem, “Avicenna against Porphyry’s Definition of Differentia Specifica” (Henceforth: Differentia Specifica); Strobino, “Per se, Inseparability, Containment, and Implication: Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables” (Henceforth: Per se, Inseparability). Salvation. Logic, 7.i [D, 11] (Ahmed, 6). Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, I.5–6; I.14. Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.5–6; Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 184, n. 4. Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 243–255.

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particular text and acknowledge the important ways in which they are interconnected.22 Avicenna is often keen to eliminate a number of mistaken understandings of this distinction between the essential and the accidental. The first error consists in the strict identification of the essential with any constitutive meanings and the accidental with all non-constitutives; this mistaken identification arises from the failure to recognize the points just made concerning the wider sense of these terms when it comes to the definitions and demonstrations addressed in the Book of Demonstration. Other errors include identifying what is essential to a thing to be what is inseparable (lā yufāriq) from it or is a concomitant (lāzim) of it. Avicenna denies that these two features adequately capture what is proprietary to the essential as such. He argues that the essential is not the same as what is inseparable from a subject, because there are many nonessentials—such as predicable properties or per se accidents—that are also inseparable from a subject, either in cognition or in reality. So what is inseparable from a subject can apply to what is either essential or non-essential to a subject, and so it fails to identify what is unique to the essential.23 Similarly, the essential is also not identified with concomitants of the subject that are obvious or evident (bayyin), for even though some essentials are obvious inseparable concomitants of the subject, there are many other obvious concomitants that are not intrinsic, and so not essential, to the quiddity of the subject, but that do “follow after its quiddity.”24 These important qualifications with respect to the term “concomitants” (lawāzim) should not be overlooked. Avicenna clearly maintains that some evident concomitants do belong to the essential or per se meanings of a thing. So not all concomitants are nonessential universals as they are in the case of the “properties” of the five predicables, which follow after the quiddity. Avicenna understands concomitant in a much wider sense than is involved in the case of predicable properties. For Avicenna, a concomitant of a thing does not necessarily mean it is really (i.e., as independent from cognition), intensionally (i.e., as a primary intention), or 22 23 24

Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.5–6; Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.6; Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration ii.2; Benevich, Fire and Heat, 262, n. 96; 264–266; Strobino, Per se, Inseparability; Di Vincenzo, Common Accident. “It is not sufficient in the explanation of the essential to say ‘It is that which is inseparable.’ For many things which are not essential are still inseparable” Salvation. Logic, 7.i [D 11] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 6). “Nor is [the essential] something whose existence for its subject is obvious in addition to its being its concomitant. For many concomitants of a thing that follow after its quiddity has been established are [also] its evident concomitants.” Salvation. Logic, 7.i [D, 12] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 7). Cf. Strobino, Per Se, Inseparability, 255–262.

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even logically (i.e., as a secondary intention) subordinate to its quiddity. For instance, right and left are mutual concomitants, and the genus animal is a concomitant of the species human, but it is not thereby subordinated to human; indeed, the quiddity of human depends upon the generic quiddity of animal.25 In short, to be an obvious inseparable concomitant (lāzim) simply means that some item necessarily accompanies, is together with, and belongs with another thing. So even if subordination is common to most kinds of concomitance, subordination is an additional factor that is not required by the notion of concomitance. Instead of identifying the essential with what is a concomitant or inseparable, he holds that: “The characteristics (sifāt) that we call essential (ḏātiyya) to the notions that are objects of intellection (li-l-maʿānī l-maʿqūla), must necessarily be grasped by the intellect to hold of the thing in this way, since the quiddity is not conceived in the mind without their prior conception (taṣawwur).”26 In other words, the essential pertains to those aspects of a thing which we cannot fail to conceptualize whenever we are understanding what something is; for “it would be impossible for the essence of the subject to be understood unless first the meaning [of that which is essential to it] is already understood to belong to it.”27 One example he provides is that one cannot understand “human” without also understanding “animal.” And so animal is an essential universal with respect to humans.28 This distinction between the essential and accidental therefore concerns what are and are not constitutives of the quiddity of some subject; accordingly, what is called essential or accidental can pertain both to the quiddities of substances and the quiddities of accidents that divide the categories. There are meanings that are either essential or accidental to the notion “human” and there are meanings that are either essential or accidental to notions like “triangle,” “two,” “whiteness,” “fatherhood,” and so forth. Even though essentials concern what constitutes the quiddity of a thing, they do not thereby constitute the very existence of the subject after the manner of an efficient cause; rather, essential predicates are required for the realization of the quiddity of the subject, for an essential predicate “enters its 25 26

27 28

Cf. Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 257. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.6 [35] (trans., Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 249). “The constituents must be grasped by the intellect (maʿqūla) along with the conception of the thing (maʿa taṣawwur aš-šayʾ) […] and they cannot be negated of it.” Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.6 [34] (trans., Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 248). Salvation. Logic, 7.ii [D, 11] (Ahmed, 7). Cf. Healing. Physics i.1; Di Vincenzo, Differentia Specifica, 175; Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 241–242.

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quiddity as a part of it.”29 Because Avicenna distinguishes between the causes of existence and the causes of a thing’s quiddity, he can distinguish between what constitutes the realization of a being’s existence—by being created, generated, or made—from the essential constitutives that are the causes of the quiddity of a thing and are conceptualized in the formation of a notion that expresses a thing’s quiddity.30 In short, the essentials known by conceptualization pertain to the quidditative constitution of a thing.31 Avicenna’s account of the accidental (ʿaraḍī) contrasts the non-essential with the essential. The non-essential is not constitutive of a thing’s quiddity, and so it is not required for understanding the essence of a thing as such. In the Logic of the Salvation he supplies a series of illustrations of non-essentials that proceeds from what is less non-essential to what is more non-essential. First, there is the non-essential though necessary concomitant of location for a point; second are the non-essential per se accidents that must be discovered by investigation, even though they are necessary concomitants of the quiddity; for example, that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Third, there are the non-essentials that we can imagine as separate from the 29 30

31

Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 9 [153] (Inati, 54). “You must know that everything that has a quiddity is realized either as existing in individuals or as conceived in the mind, only inasmuch as its parts are present with it. If it has a true-nature other than its being in existence in one of these two modes of existence, and it is not constituted by it, then existence is a concept added to its true-nature—[either as] a concomitant [or as] a non-concomitant. Also the causes of its existence are other than the causes of its quiddity. Humanity, for example, is in itself a certain true-nature and quiddity, and its existence in individuals or in the minds is not constitutive of it but is [only] added to it. If concrete existence were constitutive of it, it would have been impossible to represent the concept [of humanity] in the soul free from that which is its constitutive part. And thus, it becomes impossible for the comprehension of humanity to be realized as existing in the soul. [If, on the other hand, the existence of the quiddity in the mind is constitutive of the quiddity, then] there is doubt as to whether or not [humanity] exists concretely. As for the human being, it is appropriate that there be no doubt concerning his existence, not by virtue of the comprehension of him, but by virtue of the perception of his parts. It is for you to find in other ideas an example of what we are trying to show. Thus all the constitutives of the quiddity enter the quiddity in the concept, even though they do not come to mind separately; as many things known do not come to mind, but if they do, they are represented [in the soul]. The essentials of a thing, according to the acknowledgement of this place in the logic, are these constitutives. Because the primary nature in which there is no difference other than in number, such as humanity, is constitutive of the particular individual coming under it, and which the individual exceeds by his own properties [only], it is then also essential.” Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 10 [154–157] (mod. trans., Inati, 54–55). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [265]; Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 5 [13–14] (Inati, 121). Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge i.6.

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subject even though they are inseparable in reality, and finally, there are the non-essential concomitants that we can separate in conceptualization, imagination, and in reality, like youth and adolescence for humans.32 The accidental or per accidens is identified with this notion of the non– essential that signifies the nonconstitutive features of a subject that are not essential to its quiddity. This sense of accidental must not be confused with, “that accident which is the counterpart of substance.”33 The sense of the accidental as that which is nonconstitutive of a thing’s quiddity is more general than the categorical meaning of accident; it can include the predicamental sense of accident, but it can also signify a substance, such as “the white thing,” which is distinct from the predicamental accident “whiteness” that belongs to the category of quality. This sense of the accidental is also more general than the meanings of the per se accident or property and the common accident of the five predicables, even though it applies to both predicable properties and predicable accidents. In order to distinguish this meaning of the accidental from these more familiar meanings—such as predicamental accidents and predicable accidents—I shall call it the nonconstitutive accidental. Avicenna identifies various divisions akin to species of the nonconstitutive accidental. Let us consider the two most relevant to his account of the five predicables. He contrasts the concomitant (lāzim) accidentals from the accidentals that can be separate (mufāriqa) from a subject; in short, he identifies two distinct kinds of nonconstitutive accidentals according to the two aforementioned mistaken ways of identifying the essential.34 The nonconstitutive concomitant accidental is not a part of the quiddity, but it does necessarily accompany the quiddity, such as the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Necessary concomitant accidentals, though nonconstitutive of the quiddity of a thing are concomitants without any intermediaries, and cannot be separated from the subject by imagination, such as “every number’s being equal to another or unequal.” By way of contrast, nonconcomitant 32 33

34

Cf. Salvation. Logic, 7.iv [D, 11–12] (Ahmed, 7–8). Salvation. Logic, 8.i [D, 12] (Ahmed, 8). Cf. Avicenna, Book of Definitions 44–45 (kkd, 108). “…the notion of ‘accident’ that is here [meant] is [that of] ‘accidental’, even if it is not an accident according to the other notion {i.e., categorical accidents}, so that ‘accidental’ can be either proper or common ; in fact, ‘accidental’ is opposed to ‘essential’ and ‘substantial’, whereas ‘accident’ is opposed to ‘substance’. The essential can either be an accident, like the genus of the accident for the accident, like ‘colour’ for ‘whiteness’, or be a substance, and the accidental can either be an accident or be a substance…” Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.14 [85–86] (mod. trans., Di Vincenzo, Common Accident, 190). Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 11–13 [158–167] (Inati, 55–57). Concerning the common accident as a concomitant or as separable, see Salvation. Logic, 16.i [D, 17] (Ahmed, 12–13).

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accidental predicates can be separated from the subject, such as the human that is “youthful or old, standing or sitting.”35 In the next subsection we will see that Avicenna uses this division of nonconstitutive accidentals into concomitant and separable accidentals to frame his account of the distinction between predicable properties and predicable accidents. In sum, Avicenna recognizes that the essential and accidental are polysemous notions with many—and often correspondingly—distinct and interconnected meanings. In this subsection we have only briefly surveyed most general characterization of the essential and accidental, which he distinguishes by such features as constitutives, concomitants, and separable notions, where each of these characteristics function like a differentia for the two quasi-generic notions of essential and accidental. The most precise sense of the essential is bound up with what is constitutive of the quiddity; all quidditative constitutives are also inseparable concomitants of the subject, but because concomitance and inseparability also apply to accidentals, concomitance and inseparability are not proprietary to what is essential. The accidental is connected with what is nonconstitutive of a subject, and it is divided into concomitant accidents and separable accidents.36 We will return to Avicenna’s multifaceted division of the per se and per accidens in 8.2, where it will be shown that a proper understanding of these two polysemous notions is required for negotiating the doctrines introduced in Avicenna’s metaphysics, such as his position that existence (wujūd) is prior and more fundamental than essence and yet it is also accidental to and a necessary inseparable concomitant of the essence or quiddity of an existent thing.37 Let us now turn to his application of this general division of the essential and accidental to the more specific doctrine of the five predicables. 2.1.2 Knowledge by Conceptualization: Predicables Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions—simple and composite, complete and incomplete, individual and universal, essential and accidental, constitutive, concomitant, and separable—introduces the preliminary common notions that are indispensable for understanding his application of the questions what and which to his appropriation of Porphyry’s five predicables and to the 35 36 37

Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 11–12 [164–166] (Inati, 57) For detailed studies of Avicenna’s complex matrix of logical distinction and the predicables, see Strobino, Per se, Inseparability; Di Vincenzo, Common Accident; idem, Differentia Specifica; Benevich, Fire and Heat. Cf. Chapter 8; Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Bertolacci, “The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture,” 255–259.

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task of categorization, definition, and description.38 It is important to understand the different and relatively independent uses to which Avicenna employs this matrix of distinctions; its application to the predicables is principally concerned with the way predicates are logically related to their subjects, whereas the categorization of quiddities within the categories is a more ontological endeavor.39 Let us first sketch how Avicenna employs them in his account of the predicables. Avicenna employs this matrix of logical distinctions in his analysis of the conceptualizations that result from responding to the questions what and which. The totality of essential predicates answer the question what, but they are by no means limited to the scope of this question. Furthermore, the question concerning what a thing is, is not adequately signified by any one of its essential quidditative constitutives. Indeed, “that a unique thing may have many attributes (awṣāf), all of them essential, but it is what it is, not because of any one of them but on account of their totality. For man is not man due to his being an animal, but due to the fact that, in addition to his animality, he is rational or mortal…”40 In short, an answer to the question what must be complete and it cannot leave any essentials out, it must include the totality of its quidditative constitutive essentials.41 The answer to the question which must indicate a meaning that is used to distinguish things that share a common meaning. Accordingly, responses to the question which can turn to essentials, like the rationality that differentiates the human animal from animals like horses or dogs, or to accidentals, “such as white which distinguishes snow from coal, the two being inanimate bodies.”42 Avicenna uses his matrix of distinctions and the two questions what and which in his own revised presentation of the five predicables of Porphyry’s Isagoge: genus (jins), difference (faṣl), species (nawʿ), property (ẖāṣṣa), and accident (ʿaraḍ). These five predicables provide a tidy subdivision of the essential and non-essential, but they do not exhaust the division between the essential and non-essential or accidental. Genus, difference, and species all belong among the constitutive or essential universals, whereas properties and accidents are kinds of nonconstitutive or non-essential accidental universals. Genera and species are both said of many things in response to the question, “what is it?”

38 39 40 41 42

Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 5 [139–140] (Inati, 50–51). Di Vincenzo, Common Accident, 164–5; 188. Salvation. Logic, 9.ii [D, 12–13] (Ahmed, 9). Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 15–16 [174–186] (Inati, 58–63). Salvation. Logic, 10.i [D, 13] (Ahmed, 9).

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whereas differences, properties, and accidents are said of many things in response to the question, “which is it?” To be more precise, “Genus is what is said of many things that differ with respect to [their] species in response to [the question] ‘What is it?’”43 The species is the “essential universal which is said of many things in response to [the question] ‘What is it?’”44 Now genus and species are both relative terms that are situated within a finite ordered hierarchy of intermediate genera and species where a universal, such as animal, can be a genus for the species human, but is a species with respect to the genus living body. The upper limit within this ordered hierarchy of genera and species is the genus of genera (jins alajnās), which is also called the summum genus or a category, and the lower limit of this hierarchy, beyond which there are no lower species, is called the species of species (nawʿ al-anwā) or the infima species.45 The difference, “is an essential universal [utterance] that is said of a species [that falls] under a genus; [and it is said] in response to the question, ‘which thing from [this genus] is it?”46 For example, rational, which differentiates the human animal from other animals. “Property, is the universal that indicates a single species in response to [the question] ‘which thing is it, not with respect to its essence but with respect to its accident?’”47 Finally, there is the predicable or common accident that is identified with “every simple accidental (i.e., nonessential) universal in whose meaning many species participate.”48 For example, 43 44 45 46 47 48

Salvation. Logic, 12.i [D, 14–15] (Ahmed, 10). Salvation. Logic, 13.i [D, 15] (Ahmed, 11). Cf. Salvation. Logic, 13.ii [D, 15–16] (Ahmed, 11). Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 2 [189–190] (Inati, 65); Ilāhiyyāt viii.3. Salvation. Logic, 14.i [D, 16] (Ahmed, 12). Avicenna distinguishes between the abstracted (mujarrad) specific difference (such as rationality) from the compound specific difference (such as rational), and identifies the latter as the logical specific difference. Salvation. Logic, 15.i [D, 16–17] (Ahmed, 12). In this passage Avicenna distinguishes three ways in which a property indicates a species. Salvation. Logic, 16.i [D, 17] (Ahmed, 12). “Do not concern yourself with whether it is a necessary concomitant of or separable from each member of the species or some of them. [Nor should you trouble yourself with] whether it is in itself a substance; such as the white [object], or an accidental such as whiteness, provided [it has been determined that] it is not constitutive of the essence. For the occurrence of the accident for the latter and for that which falls in the category of substance happens in two different senses in existence.” Salvation. Logic, 16.i [D, 17] (Ahmed, 12–13). Concerning the last point, Avicenna is distinguishing the predicable accident from two other senses of the accident that are signified by two different senses of existence. The predicamental accident is a kind of being per se, whereas the accidental as non-essential is a kind of being per accidens. We will return to this distinction in Chapter 8, when we treat Avicenna’s appropriation of Aristotle’s four senses of being from Metaphysics ∆ 7.

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whiteness is a common accident when predicated universally of swans, ivory, snow, stones, or painted walls, because it is not unique to any of these kinds of things. The common accident, moreover, is distinct both from the aforementioned sense of the accidental or non-essential universal and the predicamental accident proper to the categories. Predicable accidents signify characteristics that can be found in more than one species or genus, whereas predicable properties signify some characteristic that is unique to one kind of species or genus.49 Avicenna maintains that there are inseparable and separable predicable properties and predicable accidents. While risible is an inseparable property (i.e., a proprium) for humans, reading and writing are separable properties of humans. Even though all properties identify features that are unique to a species or a genus, not every member of that species must possess all of the separable properties.50 Of course, “The best properties are those which are common to the species, belong to it and are inseparable concomitants of it. And the most useful ones in the identification of a thing are those whose existence is evident.”51 Similarly, Avicenna holds that being black is a predicable common accident for humans, dogs, horses, and crows, but even though it is a separable accident for humans, dogs, and horses, it is an inseparable predicable accident for crows. Finally, what is a property of a genus, for instance, might be a predicable accident for a species. “Thus ‘walking’ and ‘eating’ are among the properties for ‘animal’ and among the common accidents for ‘human being.’”52 2.1.3 Knowledge by Conceptualization: Descriptions and Definitions Avicenna utilizes the aforementioned matrix of logical distinctions and the five predicables in his extended account of the way to acquire descriptions and definitions through conceptualization. And just as the five predicables are a more restricted and regimented classification of the broad strokes demarcated by his matrix of logical distinctions—that is, they do not exhaust the range and application of these logical distinctions—so also the utilization of this matrix of logical distinctions along with the five predicables in forming descriptions and definitions is itself a more limited application of these logical notions. The

49

50 51 52

For example, the predicable property “interior angles are equal to two right angles” is a unique property of the genus triangle; it is not unique to any species of equilateral, isosceles or scalene triangles in the way that risibility is a property unique to the species human. Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 4 [196–199] (Inati, 67–69). Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 4 [196–199] (Inati, 67–69); Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.14. Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 2 [197–198] (Inati, 68). Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 4 [199] (Inati, 69).

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significance of this point will become clearer when we examine the epistemological profile of metaphysics and Avicenna’s delineation of the primary notions, which properly speaking, can neither be defined and described, nor classified and clarified in terms of the five predicables. Hence, Avicenna’s frequent use of qualified ascriptions in the Ilāhiyyāt, such as the “quasi-properties” and “quasi-accidents.” Such words of warning alert us to the fact that he does not intend for these terms to be taken in the ordinary sense of the five predicables. Let us turn to his account of conceptualizing descriptions and definitions. Avicenna divides what he calls a differentiated phrase (qawl mufaṣṣal) or an expository phrase (qawl šāriḥ) into two kinds: description (rasm) and definition (ḥadd).53 An expository phrase is employed in conceptualization and brings us from a known concept to grasping an unknown concept; in other words, we use a differentiated phrase for the discrimination (tamyīz) and determination (taʿrīf) of a thing’s meaning.54 It is through differentiated phrases that we come to conceptualize a thing by its essential (bi-ḏ-ḏātiyyāt) or its accidental (bi-l-ʿaraḍiyyāt) notions, to grasp the whole or part of a thing, and to understand either what is unique to one kind of thing or what is common to more than one kind of a thing. Descriptions consist in the conceptualization of notions that are accidental with respect to a thing, but definitions conceptualize a thing according to its essential notions. Both descriptions and definitions can employ either complete or incomplete differentiated phrases, as well as phrases that discriminate between what is common or unique to certain kinds of things. An incomplete description (rasm nāqiṣ) only indicates accidental features that the thing might share with other things, like a common or predicable accident (ʿaraḍ), whereas a complete description (rasm tāmm) identifies features that are unique accidentals of some subject, like a property (ẖaṣṣa). To say that a human is black is an incomplete description, to say that a human is risible is a complete description, for black is an accidental notion common to other subjects but risible is an accidental notion unique to humans. Similarly, an incomplete definition (ḥadd nāqiṣ) identifies what is essential to a thing but does so by a meaning that is common to other things, like the genus (jins) animal for a human. But a complete definition (ḥadd tāmm) identifies what is essential and unique to a certain kind of thing, like the difference (faṣl) rational for human. Because our focus is on definitions, the paradigmatic expository phrase, we shall concentrate 53 54

For differentiated phrase, see Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition, 120; idem, What If That (Is) Why?, 69–71; for expository phrase, see Inati, Introduction, 8, n. 39 in Pointers. Logic. Cf. Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition, 120.

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the rest of this section on Avicenna’s treatment of definition, and forgo what he has to say about descriptions as such. A perfect definition requires a complete conceptualization of a thing that presents the whole quiddity or essence of a thing. Riccardo Strobino writes, “definition expresses the essence of a thing, and it does so by displaying the complete and ordered series of essential features of the thing in question.”55 How are such definitions acquired? Avicenna contends that definitions as such cannot be acquired by induction, demonstrations, by division, contradictories, or by the definitions of the opposites of a thing (if it has an opposite).56 Nevertheless, all of these methods can be employed to help us acquire definitions. Avicenna holds that definitions as such are sought and acquired through stages. {Acquiring definitions} consists in our relying on indivisible individual particulars and then investigating to which of the ten categories {…} do they belong. Then we take up all the predicates that are constitutive of them [and] which fall in that category or in the thing that is [like] a category for them. We gather a number of them after we learn which of them is primary for which one. Thus, sensation is primary for animal; [and] rationality [is secondary]. Likewise [is the case of] body, for it is primary for animal; rational [is secondary]. … When we collect these predicates and find something among them that is equal to the thing defined in two ways, that is the definition.57 First, we must canvas indivisible individuals and then place them within the appropriate category. Next, we gather all the predicates that are constitutive of the quiddity of the thing, that is, all of the essential predicates that are reduced to the same category (or whatever is like a category for some thing), and we then discriminate and order these constitutive notions according to those which are more primary and commensurate with respect to the thing in question. Finally, after collecting and ordering all of these non-redundant essential predicates we arrive at our definition, which is a complete ordered series of constitutive essentials that are, in two ways, equal to the thing defined. What are these two ways of equivalency?

55 56 57

Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition, 132, n. 33. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 139–141 [D, 146–153] (Ahmed, 114–120). Salvation. Logic, 140.i [D, 149–150] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 116–117). Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.9 [48–49].

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The complete expository phrase must be equal to the thing defined both by way of extension and intension. The definition and the thing, that is, the definiendum, must be coextensional, that is, “everything of which this predication holds is that [of which the defined thing is true] and that [of which the defined thing is true] has this predication.”58 The definition and the definiendum must also be cointensional. [The predicate should] indicate the perfection of the true-nature of the essence [of the thing defined], with nothing of [this essence] being excluded from [this predicate]. For many things that distinguish an essence fall short of some genera or of some properties, so as to be equivalent with respect to the extension, but not so with respect to the intension. [An example is] your statement, in defining man, that he is a mortal, rational body. For this is not a true definition; rather, it is deficient because the proximate genus is not posited in it. [Likewise is the case] in your statement, in defining animal, that it is a body having a sentient soul, without saying that [it also] moves by will. For [the predicate] is equivalent with respect to the extension, but deficient as far as the intension is concerned.59 Throughout his philosophy Avicenna uses to great effect the distinction between the extension and intension of a notion. In order to clarify conceptually the meaning of a notion he will often draw upon additional meanings, various synonyms, and examples. These notional explications require introducing distinct forms of conceptual or notional transformations that always involve intensional changes to the original notion or notions, and sometimes involve extensional changes as well. For example, the accumulation of essential differences in the definition of a species does not change the reference or extension, but it does amplify or add additional intensional shades to the definition of the definiendum. However, to add a difference to a genus, such as rational to animal, not only adds to the genus an intensional layer that is not present in the genus in actuality, but also extensionally constricts the genus by limiting its original extension such that it only applies to the species targeted by the difference. Let us call the former kind of notional transformation a notional amplification and the latter a notional constriction.

58 59

Salvation. Logic, 140.ii [D, 150] (Ahmed, 117). Salvation. Logic, 140.iii [D, 150–151] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 117).

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We shall henceforth employ these two terms of art to capture these two distinct kinds of notional intensional transformations. In both cases there is an intensional transformation, but a notional amplification adds an intensional layer of meaning to another notion without changing the extension of the original notion. For example, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the one (wāḥid) adds to being (mawjūd) the intension of indivisibility but it does so without changing the extension of being; in short, being and one are distinct in intension but the same in extension. A notional constriction consists in both an intensional and an extensional transformation, whereby an initial common or more general notion becomes extensionally less universal by virtue of gaining an additional meaning or new intensional layer. This is what occurs when we add the notions physical or cause to being, they add to being the significance of being attached to matter or bestowing reality on another, but such intensional additions also constrict the extension of being, for absolute being as such is not identical with being in matter or being a cause as it can also be applied to immaterial beings and caused beings. In sum, a notional amplification consists in adding an intensional layer without any extensional change, and a notional constriction consists in adding an intensional layer that thereby constricts or limits the scope or extension of the initial meaning of a notion. When it comes to forming definitions that are extensionally and intensionally equivalent to the thing defined, Avicenna warns us to avoid certain pitfalls, especially with respect to the collations of essential constitutive predicates. For example, “We [ought] to be careful that in the collection [of predicates] there is nothing that recurs without our being aware [of it].” Like saying a thing is a “body with a sensitive soul” and also that it is an “animal,” which is redundant.60 But we should not thereby think definitions must be concise; on the contrary: [A perfect definition] consists of a shared quiddity; after this, it is provided with all the essential specific differences, though they may be a thousand and though [only] one may suffice in distinguishing [the defined]. For if you leave aside some of the specific differences, you will leave aside some of the essence. The definition is also a denotation and an explanation for the essence. Thus, it is necessary for the definition to 60

Salvation. Logic, 140.i [D, 140] (Ahmed, 116). Cf. For other errors, see Salvation. Logic, 149 [D, 171–175] (Ahmed, 136–140). Avicenna also notes that even though division (qisma) can aid us in acquiring definitions, we must be careful not to stop in the middle or too soon, for divisions are only helpful in definitions if we arrive at fundamental essentials, which “if divided, lead to accidentals or individuals.” Salvation. Logic, 141.ii [D, 153] (Ahmed, 119).

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generate an intelligible form in the soul, one that is equivalent to the existing form in its perfection. [In this way,] the thing defined will come to be distinguished.61 Said otherwise, the perfect definition signifies the genus or shared essential quiddity of thing, and then presents a complete ordered series of all the essential differences of a species, leaving nothing out that is essential and constitutive of the quiddity of a thing. This is also why definitions must include both the form and the matter of physical things, for even though each of these principles indicates an essential cause, taken alone they are incomplete, and perfect definitions must be complete.62 The aim of a definition is not to distinguish one thing from another but to investigate and articulate completely the essence or quiddity of a thing. And this is the reason why, in truth, there is “no definition for that which has no existence. [What seems like a definition of such things] is only a statement that explicates their name.”63 Thus far we have surveyed how one proceeds to define the species of a thing in response to the question what. But the definition of a species is not the only kind of definition. Avicenna acknowledges that there are at least five analogous (taškīk) senses of definition. First, it can be said of the meaning of a name, for if the existence of a thing is not obvious, then the definition primarily explains the meaning of the name in response to the nominal-what question. This sense of definition would apply to both real and fictional entities.64 Next, the definition provides an expository phrase of the essence or quiddity of a real thing, but it can do so in three ways: either as the conclusion of a demonstration or as the principle of a demonstration, or by a perfect definition, which is

61 62

63 64

Salvation. Logic, 140.iv [D, 151] (Ahmed, 117–118). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.7–8. For a detailed study of the critical distinctions and connections Avicenna makes between material and formal causes and genus and difference, and Avicenna’s thorough account of differentiae, see McGinnis, “Logic and Science: The Role of Genus and Difference in Avicenna’s Logic, Science and Natural Philosophy,” 165–186 (Henceforth: Genus and Difference); idem, Avicenna, 37–44. Salvation. Logic, 140.v [D, 151] (Ahmed, 118). Cf. “[Nor] ought we to confine definitions to lexical explanations of a name, making the examples of these [real] definitions for this reason. For definition is that which indicates quiddity—this you have known. If it were the case that every statement beside which a name can be imposed is a definition, then all the books of al–Jāḥiẓ would be definitions.” Ilāhiyyāt v.8.3 [244]; Avicenna, Book of Definitions, 3–19 (kkd, 98–102); Black, “Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings,” (Henceforth: Fictional Beings); Druart, “Avicennan Troubles: The Mysteries of the Heptagonal House and of the Phoenix,” (Henceforth: Heptagonal House).

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comprised of both. Finally, the fifth sense of definition pertains to whatever has no cause or has causes that are external to the essence, such as a point, unity, and other simple and primary conceptualizations, “for their definitions are not given just with reference to a name or a principle or a conclusion or something compounded of these last two.”65 This fifth sense of definition is crucial for our study, because it intimates that there is a way to define, at least analogously, the peculiar primordial form of conceptualization that belongs to the scientific first principles as primary notions. As first principles of conceptualization, the primary notions cannot be defined in the usual ways, for no notions are more common or simple than the primary notions. Consequently, these primary intelligible meanings cannot be resolved into simpler notions. For, as Avicenna frequently notes, “not every intelligible can be divided into simpler intelligibles. There are intelligibles that are the simplest, and they are the starting point for combining the rest of the intelligibles; and they neither have genera or differences nor can they be divided by quantity or intention.”66 We shall address the ways in which these primary notions can be conceptually clarified in Chapter 6. Avicenna’s extensive and detailed account of the five predicables, definitions, descriptions, and similar matters exceed the scope of our enquiry. The foregoing synopsis of his doctrine will be sufficient for our purposes. Let us conclude this section on conceptualization with a brief note on Avicenna’s views on Aristotle’s ten categories, which, like the primary notions, cannot be defined in the strict sense. The ten categories or summa genera consist in substance (jawhar) and the nine accidents: quantity (kamm), quality (kayf), relation (ʾiḍāfa), place (makān) or where (ayn), time (zamān) or when (matā), position (waḍʿ), action (fiʿl), passion (in fiʿāl), and possession (mulk). In the Logic of the Salvation Avicenna presents a straightforward synopsis of these ten Aristotelian categories with some minor modifications and various qualifications. This short digest of the categories is basically concerned with responding to the question, what is substance, quantity, quality, and so on, and with explicating what their principal divisions are.67 In Avicenna’s introduction to the Book of Categories (Kitāb alMaqūlāt) from the Healing, he reveals his somewhat critical attitude towards the ten predicaments and their logical significance.68 65 66 67 68

Salvation. Logic, 144.iv [D, 160] (Ahmed, 126). Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.9. Healing. Psychology, v.2 [213] (trans., McGinnis and Reisman, Classical Arabic Philosophy, 190). Salvation. Logic, 142.i–xiv [D, 153– 157] (Ahmed, 120–123). See Gutas, aat, 300–303 [265–267]. For studies on Avicenna’s doctrine of the categories, substance, and accidents, see Janssens, “Ibn Sīnā on Substance in Chapter Two of the

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1. After becoming acquainted with such matters as we described relating to simple terms [Eisagoge], and after becoming acquainted with names and verbs [De Interpretatione], the student of logic can move on to study propositions and their parts, syllogisms, definitions, and their kinds [Prior Analytics], the matters of syllogisms, demonstrative and non-demonstrative terms along with their genera and species [Posterior Analytics], without having any idea that there are ten categories and that they signify either themselves or what pertains to them through the simple terms. 2. Disregarding the ten categories causes no harm to speak of, nor would it be a weakness in logic for one to labor under the misconception that there is a greater or smaller number of categories; furthermore, knowing whether some matters should be described as genera is not any more incumbent upon him than knowing whether some others should be described as species. No; knowledge about how all these exist should be sought from First Philosophy; knowledge about the way in which the soul forms concepts of them should be sought from that part of Physics which is close to First Philosophy [De Anima]; and the knowledge that they require terms which signify them should be sought from lexicography.69 Avicenna takes a clear stand on the irrelevance of the ten categories to logic; on the other hand, what is philosophically important with respect to the categories belongs to other disciplines like psychology and metaphysics. So why does Avicenna dedicate an entire work within the logic of the Healing to the categories? This is because, as Dimitri Gutas notes, “Avicenna takes care to point out that he is discussing them not because of their intrinsic worth but merely by way of following tradition: the Customary practice (ʿāda) and course of previous philosophers.”70 It is noteworthy, moreover, that when Avicenna does address the categories as quasi-species of being in Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii, with the exception of corporal substances, he is not principally concerned with answering the question what, but with responding to problems concerning the question if, such as whether the things that belong to the categories of quantity and quality exist as a substances

69 70

Maqūlāt (Categories) of the Shifāʾ,” (Henceforth: Ibn Sīnā on Substance); Stone, “Avicenna,” (Henceforth: Avicenna on Substance); Thom, “The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna;” Benevich, Fire and Heat. Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.1 [5–6] (trans., Gutas, aat, 301 [265–266]). See also Allan Bäck’s translation, Al-Maqūlāt: Commentary On Aristotle’s Categories, 32–33. Gutas, aat, 302–303 [267]. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.1 [8:10].

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or as accidents.71 Indeed, in his Book of Categories Avicenna is reluctant to provide any principled reasons for the divisions of the categories and is critical of his predecessors unsuccessful attempts to do so.72 In later chapters we shall discuss Avicenna’s treatment of the categories in the Ilāhiyyāt. In sum, this section has surveyed Avicenna’s doctrine of conceptualization and the matrix of logical distinctions he uses to order his answers to the questions what and which with respect to the predicables, descriptions, definitions, and the categories. The significance of these logical doctrines for Avicenna’s metaphysics and the reason for expounding them at length will become clear later on. “This is what we have wished [to show] by the pointer concerning the identification of the composition leading to the concept. We will now move to identify the composition leading to the assent.”73 2.2

Primary and Acquired Knowledge by Assent

We have seen that Avicenna distinguishes between propositions that are conceptualized from propositions that are objects of both conceptualized and assent. Primary and self-evident propositions are assented to immediately without any mediated syllogistic knowledge. This occurs whenever the meaning of a proposition, that is, a conceptualized composition of two simple notions (either a primary simple notion, e.g., being and one, or a secondary simple notion, e.g., animal and human), is sufficient for us to understand and assent to the truth of the proposition through itself. Said otherwise, self-evident objects of assent are verified by virtue of our understanding of the obvious necessary and immediate intensional connection between the meanings of the two notions that are composed in a proposition. This account of self-evident primary knowledge by assent also explains the way the first principles of assent that are common and proper to the different sciences are established. Acquired knowledge by assent occurs whenever the connection between the notions conceptually composed in the proposition is not immediately evident in virtue of the very meaning signified by the form of composition. Acquired knowledge by assent therefore requires some middle (awsaṭ) term or additional factor to 71 72 73

Cf. Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.1; ii.2; iii.1.1–6 [93–94]. Avicenna presents an extensive treatment of the way change from potency to act is found in all ten of the categories in Healing. Physics ii.1–3. Cf. Druart, “Al-Fārābī, the Categories, Metaphysics, and the Book of Letters;” Thom, “The Division of the Categories According to Avicenna.” Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 11 [221] (mod. trans., Inati, 76).

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make evident the intelligible connection between the subject and predicate, that is, the minor (aṣġar) and major (akbar) terms of a syllogism. This section explores Avicenna’s account of assent, which pertains to answering the questions if and why. It is divided into three subsections covering Avicenna’s doctrine of propositions, the relationship between assent, truth, and certainty, and then an examination of the function of assent in knowledge acquired through syllogisms that is ultimately based on primary knowledge. Let us begin with Avicenna’s general account of propositions. 2.2.1 Knowledge by Assent: Propositions Avicenna takes a statement or phrase (qawl) to be a compound (muʾallaf) or complex (murakkab) utterance. A proposition (qaḍiyya) and a predication or informative (ẖabar) statement are identified with “every statement in which there is a relationship between two things such that the judgment ‘true’ or ‘false’ follows from it.”74 Avicenna identifies two basic kinds of propositions that form the truth-value relationship between two things. There is the attributive or predicative (ḥamliyya) proposition and the conditional (šarṭiyya) proposition, which is divided into the conjunctive conditional (šarṭiyya muttaṣila) and the disjunctive conditional (šarṭiyya munfaṣila). [34:7] The predicative proposition is primary. The first [form] of that is the affirmation because it is composed of one (thing) relative to which there is one (thing) having an attribution (mansūb) named the “subject,” and another one being attributed (mansūb) named the “predicate” according to an attribution of existence. As for the negation, it comes about from one (thing) having an attribution and another one being attributed and the elimination of the existence of the attribution. [34:10] All nonexistence (ʿadam) is made definite and true by existence (wujūd), whereas existence does not need for its being made true to attend to nonexistence…. As for the affirmation, it is (something) existential not needing to be known by negation, and so the negation is posterior to the affirmation.75 Categorical or predicative propositions are the basic propositions that affirm or negate the existence of a predicate with respect to a subject. The primacy Avicenna gives to knowledge of affirmative propositions and existence with

74 75

Salvation. Logic, 22.i [D, 19] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 14). Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, i.5 [34] (mod. trans., Bäck, 59–60).

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respect to truth over negations and nonexistence should not be overlooked as they are among the most important ontologizing features of his logical account of assent. He claims that assent to the truth of predicative propositions of negation or statements that concern nonexistence, or even the privation of a thing, are all secondary or derivative upon our assent to true predicative propositions of affirmation.76 Indeed, he notes that nonexistence is made definite and can only be known as true through our prior knowledge of existence, which is known in virtue of itself without reference to nonexistence. Likewise, because affirmation is tied to existence, affirmation is also known independently of and prior to negation. The details of Avicenna’s doctrine of propositions is beyond the scope of our investigation; instead, we shall present a short account of Avicenna’s ontologization of the modal aspects of propositions.77 Consider Jon McGinnis’s perspicuous observation on the correspondence between Avicenna’s modal logic and his modal ontology. McGinnis’s remark begins with a statement from Tony Street’s summary of Avicenna’s syllogistic. “Every proposition in Avicenna’s system is either temporalized or modalized; there is no proposition which directly captures the non-modalized assertoric proposition used in introductory accounts of the categorical syllogistic.” {Street, “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” 132} So, for example, an assertoric statement such as “(Every) human is a rational body” is only the implicit way of stating “(Every) possible human is necessarily a rational body.” This fact, I believe, reflects Avicenna’s conviction that the basic ontological structure of the world is inherently modal. In other words, everything, from the lowliest mote to the divinity itself, is either necessary or possible in itself….78 The implications of Avicenna’s view that the structure of reality is intrinsically modal are of central importance to the main thesis of our enquiry. What we must introduce here are a few salient features of Avicenna’s modal logic. Avicenna identifies three modes that pertain to propositions.

76 77 78

Cf. Salvation. Logic, 43–44 [D, 26–29] (Ahmed, 21–23); Pointers. Logic, m. 3, c. 7 [239–245] (Inati, 83–86). For an examination of various ways Avicenna ontologized his logic, see Bertolacci, “The ‘Ontologization’ of Logic. Metaphysical Themes in Avicenna’s Reworking of the Organon” (Henceforth: Ontologization of Logic). McGinnis, Avicenna, 27–28.

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The mode is an expression signifying a relationship that the predicate has with respect to the subject. It specifies that it is a relationship of necessity or non-necessity, and so it signifies an invariance (taʾakkud) or admissibility (jawāz) {with respect to their relationship}. The mode may be called a type (naūʿ). There are three modes: one of them signifies the exigence (istiḥqāq) of permanent existence, namely the necessary, and another signifies the exigence of permanent nonexistence, namely the impossible, and another signifies that there is no exigence of permanent existence or nonexistence, namely, the possible mode.79 Given these three modalities, Avicenna also distinguishes between two basic kinds of the necessary and the possible. The two basic senses of the necessary are (1) ḍarūrī, that is, logical necessity, and (2) wājib, which I shall call ontological necessity. Avicenna connects all of these ontological forms of the modalities with diverse ways of existing. The necessary (wājib) is identified with permanent existence, the possible (mumkin) to neither permanent existence nor permanent nonexistence, and the impossible (mumtaniʿ) to permanent nonexistence. In short, ontological necessity is intensionally identified with existence. But ḍarūrī or logical necessity means both necessary existence and necessary nonexistence, and so signifies ontological necessity (i.e., permanent existence) and ontological impossibility (i.e., permanent nonexistence). There exists a diametrical difference between the necessary (wājib) and the impossible, despite the fact that they share in the concept of Necessity (ḍarūrī). For the former is Necessary (ḍarūrī) with respect to existence and the latter is Necessary (ḍarūrī) with respect to nonexistence. When we speak about the Necessary (ḍarūrī) it is permissible for us to shift the account, exactly as it is, to either one of them [i.e. the necessary and the impossible].80 What is noteworthy in this text is the way Avicenna—like in his distinction between affirmation and negation—uses the identification of diverse ways of being connected to existence to demarcate the ontological meanings of the

79 80

Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, ii.4 [112] (mod. trans., Bäck, 137). Cf. Ahmed, “The Jiha/Tropos-Mâdda/Hûlê Distinction in Arabic Logic and its Significance for Avicenna’s Modals,” 193–194. Salvation. Logic, 48.i [D, 34–35] (Ahmed, 28–29).

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necessary and the impossible. Even though ontological necessity and impossibility share in the meaning of logical-necessity, ontological necessity (wujūb) means logical necessity (ḍarūrī) with respect to existence, while ontological impossibility means logical necessity (ḍarūrī) with respect to nonexistence. Consequently, because of the primacy afforded to existence and affirmation, and the close connection between existence and the necessary (wājib), which signifies the permanence of existence, Avicenna also maintains that ontological necessity is intensionally prior to the possible and impossible.81 The metaphysical ramifications of this contention shall be addressed in Chapter 10. Avicenna also distinguishes two senses of the possible (mumkin): the common (ʿāmma) and the proper (ẖāṣṣa). The common-possible means the not impossible, but it includes both the necessary (wājib) and the contingent (i.e., the possible or not impossible with regard to existence, which is not necessary (wājib) with regard to existence). The proper-possible, however, excludes both the impossible and the necessary (wājib) with regard to existence, it means the non-necessary (ḍarūrī), that is, the negation of logical necessity. Said otherwise, the proper-possible means not necessary (wājib) with regard to existence and not necessary (wājib) with regard to nonexistence. So, when by the possible the common sense is meant, everything is either possible or impossible, where what is not possible is impossible and what is not impossible is possible. Here there is no other division. When the proper sense is meant, everything is either possible or impossible or necessary (wājib), and what is not possible is not impossible. Rather, what is not possible is necessary (ḍārūrī) either in existence or in nonexistence.82 It is on the basis of these two basic divisions of the necessary and the possible that Avicenna identifies many more fine-grained meanings of the necessary, possible, and impossible, establishes an ordered priority and posteriority among the different senses of these modal notions, and explicates their various truth-conditions, and forms of equivalence. These many aspects of Avicenna’s doctrine of modalities is beyond the scope of our study; we shall, however, return to his doctrine of priority among modal notions in Chapters 5–6.83

81 82 83

Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i.5.24 [36]. Healing. Logic. Book of Interpretation ii.4 [117] (Bäck, 143). Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic;” Thom, “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic.”

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Finally, let us note that since Avicenna is almost exclusively interested in ontological necessity (wujūb) in the Ilāhiyyāt, any mention of the “necessary” in this study is equivalent to ontological necessity or the necessary (wājib). In later chapters I shall always qualify when I am discussing the technical sense of ḍarūrī or logical-necessity. Similarly, Avicenna is principally interested in the proper sense of the possible in the Ilāhiyyāt; accordingly, unless noted otherwise, the term possible (mumkin) should always be taken in the proper sense, which means not necessary and not impossible with regard to existence. This subsection has sketched Avicenna’s account of propositions of assent that are fundamental to his theory of scientific knowledge; in the next subsection we shall see that the aim of scientific knowledge is certainty. Certainty is ultimately grounded on epistemological necessity and this in turn is grounded in ontological necessity. In other words, assents to true statements can only be as certain as the necessity of the propositions that are the objects of assent. These propositions are either assented to as true because they are evident through themselves or because they are made evident through another. What we must examine now is what it means for a proposition of assent to be true and certain. 2.2.2 Knowledge by Assent: Truth, Certainty, and the Syllogistic Arts Conceptualization “simply involves understanding the meaning or intention (maʿnā) of a word or a statement or even how statements work together to form an inference with no reference to whether that term refers, or the statement is true, or the inference is sound.”84 Assent, however, does seek to confirm and verify that the object of our conceptual understanding conforms to the thing itself. Hence, as objects of assent, the meaning of a term can refer to a thing, the statement can be true, and the inference can be sound.85 We have seen that truth-values pertain to propositions of assent insofar as statements affirm or deny the existence of something of something else, whether in the intellect or in reality. Accordingly, assent, truth-values, affirmation, and negation all pertain to the answers that respond to the question if. In its simple form, we ask, “if X exists?” and we answer by affirming or negating that “X is” or “X is not.” Similarly, in response to the composite–if question, we ask, “if X is Y?” and answer in affirmation or negation “X is Y” or “X is not Y.” If these propositions conform to reality, then we assent to them as true (ḥaqq). Avicenna maintains that truth is said in many ways, just as he holds that being is said in many ways. We will examine the corresponding senses of being 84 85

McGinnis, Avicenna, 29; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. McGinnis, Avicenna, 29; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge.

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and truth in Chapters 5–7 in the context of Avicenna’s account of the four senses of being, one of which is truth. Here we shall only present his basic divisions of truth as they pertain to propositions of assent. Avicenna distinguishes between propositions that are true (ḥaqīqī), partially true (dūn al-ḥaqīqī) and beneficial in a certain respect, and false (bāṭil), which resemble the true propositions.86 Assents are intrinsically connected with truth. Truth pertains to an assent insofar as in an “assent there occurs in the intellect a relation between this form {that has been conceived by the intellect} and the things themselves that conform to it {i.e., the form conceived}.”87 In the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna identifies one sense of the true with the conformity of a statement or a belief with something in reality or in the intellect, for we can assent to the truth (ḥaqq) of the proposition “All humans are animals,” which conforms to the true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of what humans are—whether or not they exist in reality. Nevertheless, what are most true or most worthy of being identified with the true are our statements or beliefs that conform to things that exist in reality.88 The false, then, pertains to a statement or belief that does not conform to something, and the partial truth, thereby consists in an inadequate conformity between a statement or belief and something.89 Recall the close connection Avicenna makes between truth and the affirmation of existence as known and assented to. “All nonexistence (ʿadam) is made definite and true by existence (wujūd), whereas existence does not need for its being made true to pay attention to nonexistence… As for the affirmation, it is (something) existential not needing to be known by negation, and negation is posterior to affirmation.”90 Our knowledge of truth is principally connected with our knowledge of a being’s existence, and since necessary existence is more fundamental than possible or impossible existence, and because truth is tied to affirmation prior to negation, so also does truth pertain both to the necessary prior to the possible and impossible and to affirmation prior to negation. Indeed, Avicenna contends that whatever is necessary existence in itself 86 87 88 89

90

Cf. Salvation. Logic, 1.i [D, 7] (Ahmed, 3). Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3 [17:16–17] (my trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1–2 [48]; Healing. Logic. Isagoge, I.3 [17]; Salvation. Logic, 115 [D, 128–129] (Ahmed, 97). By partial or inadequate (dūn) truths, Avicenna seems to mean propositions that are not false, but are also not completely accurate or precise, and so are not true simpliciter. Many vague propositions are approximations to the truth; they are beneficial insofar as they function as a first step towards a more precise and complete account of the truth. For instance, it is not false to call “drinking water” H2O, but it is also not very precise insofar as “drinking water” is a mixture of H2O and other chemicals. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Interpretation, i.5 [34] (Bäck, 59–60)

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is truth in itself, and whatever is necessary existence through another is true through another, but because it is only possible existence in itself, it is thereby false in itself.91 Avicenna distinguishes between true (ḥaqq) and veridical (ṣādiq) statements or beliefs. When we consider the statement (qawl) or belief (ʿaqd) of an assent (taṣdīq) insofar as it is related to a thing, this statement-to-thing conformity is more properly called veridical (ṣādiq). But when we consider the thing as related to the statement or belief, this thing-to-statement conformity is called true (ḥaqq) because, as we shall see in later chapters, a true statement is grounded in the true-nature (ḥaqīqa) or essence of the thing.92 Avicenna also uses the terms verification (taṣḥīḥ) and verified or correct (ṣaḥḥa) in ways that correspond to the sense of truth as veridical.93 Deborah Black notes that for Avicenna there are three basic ways in which “Propositions can command assent (1) “by way of necessity” (ʿalā wajḥ ḍarūra); (2) “by way of granting” (ʿalā taslīm); or (3) “by way of strong opinion” (ʿ alā ẓann ǧālib). The latter two categories are assigned to dialectic and rhetoric, respectively, and they include most of the beliefs that we form on the basis of authority and social consensus.”94 Such assents are connected to Avicenna’s threefold division of the degrees of certitude (yaqīn) achieved by distinct kinds of assent: as certain, quasi–certain, and by doxastic persuasion. The first kind of assent by way of necessity is connected with the highest degree of certainty, and it is the most relevant to our interests in Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science. Because certainty as such is the highest degree of assent one can achieve, granting assent to first principles and conclusions that are certain is the aim of all demonstrative sciences and pertains to the syllogistic art of demonstration (burhān). Second, quasi-certain assent to propositions that are granted pertains to the disciplines called dialectic (jadal) and sophistic 91 92 93

94

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1 [48]. Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3 [17]; Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1–2 [48]; De Haan “Avicenna’s Healing and the Metaphysics of Truth,” (Henceforth: Metaphysics of Truth). Cf. Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i.1.9 [5]; i.5.11 [31]; i.6.2 [37]; iii.9.14–16 [149–150]; iii.9.20–21 [151]; vi.3.30 [278]. Taking note of al-Fārābī’s use of the term taṣḥīḥ as “the verification or validation of truth and the prevention of error,” Black notes, “The basic meaning of taṣḥīḥ is ‘to make sound/healthy.’ It can be applied both to the process of confirming and validating true beliefs, and to the correction and rectification of beliefs that are found to be unsound.” Black, Logic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 58, n. 21. See also Black, “Knowledge (ʿilm) and Certitude (yaqin) in Al-Fārābī’s Epistemology,” (Henceforth: Farabian Certitude); Gutas, aat, 213–220 [187–194]. Black, “Certitude, Justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna’s Epistemology,” 124 (Henceforth: Avicenna’s Epistemology). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.4 [A, 63].

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(safsaṭa). Finally, the assent to propositions by mere strong opinion, which is called doxastic persuasion, pertains to rhetoric (ẖiṭāba). These three degrees of assent showcase Avicenna’s division of the degrees of epistemic certitude that can be achieved by either primary or acquired knowledge by assent. The criteria for a certain assent are twofold: (1) there needs to be a primary belief (i ʿtiqād) concerning the content or object of the assent, and (2) a secondary belief that the things that conform to the object of the primary belief are necessary and cannot be otherwise. In other words, a certain assent, “is when someone holds a second belief along with [the first belief] (ma ʿahu), either actually or in proximate potency to actuality, that what one has assented to cannot be otherwise than it is, since it is not possible for this belief concerning it to cease.”95 Propositions that are assented to necessarily and with certainty include both primary knowledge of first principles and acquired knowledge through demonstrative syllogisms. Primary knowledge by assent consists in assenting to propositions that are immediately understood to be true and are evident in themselves. Acquired knowledge by assent, however, pertains to assenting to propositions that are understood to be true in virtue of some other knowledge, such as a middle term. Because all acquired knowledge is grounded in primary knowledge, Avicenna’s division of the theoretical disciplines and their respective forms of acquired knowledge by assent through syllogisms is based upon his division of primary knowledge by assent. Let us survey his extensive division of assents without intermediaries before turning to assents that require prior knowledge. Avicenna’s division of primary principles of assent is complex, and since we are only concerned with the first principles of assent required for demonstrative sciences like metaphysics, we shall forgo expounding the details of each of the different kinds of assent. In the Logic of the Salvation he distinguishes nine ways in which assent is generated without mediate knowledge. The ninth way identifies the statements of assent that are primary (awwaliyyāt) and these are fundamental for any demonstrative science. «1» Primary [statements] are propositions or premises that are generated in man on account of his intellective power (quwwa ʿaqliyya), with no cause that necessitates assent to them except themselves and that thing which makes them proposition[s], i.e. the cogitative power (quwwa

95

Healing: Logic, Book of Demonstration, i.1 [A, 51] (mod. trans., Black, Avicenna’s Epistemology, 122). Cf. Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition, 118–119.

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mufakkira). [The latter] joins simple [elements] by way of affirmation and negation. «2» When the simple concepts come about in man either with the help of the senses or the formative imaginative power (ẖayāl) or [in] some other way and then the cogitative power compounds them, the mind must assent to them from the very beginning, without [recourse to] another cause and without feeling that this is something only recently acquired. Rather, man believes that he always knew it. The natural cognition of the estimative [power] does not propose it, as we explained. An example of this is, ‘The whole is greater than the part.’ This [proposition] is not acquired from a sense or induction or anything else. True, the sense[s] may supply [one] with [an example of] an image of the ‘the whole’ and ‘the greater’ and ‘the part’. As for assent to this proposition, well it is due to [primary] nature.96 Primary statements or first principles are self-evident propositions; this means that our assent to these first principles is not caused by mediated knowledge because the intelligibility of such propositions can be understood through themselves. Avicenna recognizes that the internal senses, especially the compositive imagination or cogitative power, dispose us towards intellectual assent to first principles qua primary propositions, just as they dispose us to conceptualize first principles qua primary notions. This occurs when the internal senses compose various utterances by way of affirmation or negation that can aid our intellectual assent, but the assent as such is an exclusively noetic operation. The composite expository phrases formed by the cogitative power merely propose for intellectual consideration various propositions. If any of these composite utterances consists in self-evident and true propositions, then the intellect’s assent follows naturally and necessarily, but this assent belongs to the intellect alone. Avicenna’s example of a first principle of assent is the axiomatic principle that a “whole is greater than its parts.” Once we understand the meaning of the terms and the meaning of their composition, we immediately assent to this self-evident truth. We might form images of these terms, and they might help dispose us to assent by making objects of conceptualization clearer, but the assent is properly intellectual and no mediate term is required. We can ask why first principles are true, but our explanations will not impart more knowledge

96

Salvation. Logic, 111.i-ii [D, 121–123] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 95). Cf. Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge, 37–42; Lammer, Elements, 81–109.

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or information of what is more known in itself, it will simply turn to the synonyms of “whole,” “greater than,” “parts,” or less universal notions, or examples of wholes and parts. Such reflections might, however, secure that our assent to these first principles is certain knowledge, for once we know that our beliefs in self-evident and true first principles are unchanging, our assent becomes certain, and the objects of certain assent are fundamental principles of certitude (yaqīniyyāt). It is important to recognize that Avicenna does not restrict these first principles of assent to the axiomatic self-evident truths that are common to all sciences. Indeed, Avicenna contends that demonstrative scientific syllogisms are composed of various propositions or premises of certitude that entail conclusions of certitude, and first among premises of certitude are the primaries or first principles of assent.97 But if the primary principles of certain assent were limited to these axiomatic first principles then all of the sciences would have the exact same first principles of assent, and so the only premises of certitude employed in the demonstrative syllogisms concerning the sciences of motion, the heavens, the soul, quantity, and being would be the common axioms concerning contradiction, identity, “excluded middle,” and wholes and parts.98 Clearly, this is not what Avicenna has in mind, for as we shall see, he distinguishes the specific first principles of assent that are proper to each science from the common first principles of assent that are treated by the logician and the metaphysician.99 These principles are either self-evident or they are verified in another science or later in the same science. In short, even though all sciences share in the common first principles of assent, each science also has its own first principles of assent that supply the propositions of certitude that are specific to the subjects of the different sciences. The presentation of first principles of assent without intermediaries in the Logic of the Salvation is significantly amplified in the division of principles of syllogisms (mabādīʾ al-qiyāsāt) elaborated in the Book of Demonstration from the Logic of the Healing and in the Logic of the Pointers. In the Pointers, Avicenna begins with the four basic kinds of propositions that are used in syllogisms and similar discursive lines of consideration, such as induction and analogy.100 Not all of these propositions are necessarily true, but they are as97 98 99 100

Salvation. Logic, 112.i [D, 126] (Ahmed, 95). Avicenna does not call the axiom that “there is no middle between affirmation and negation” the principle of “excluded middle,” however, we will refer to this principle using this somewhat anachronistic label. See Ilāhiyyāt i.8. Salvation. Logic, 129.i [D, 138–139] (Ahmed, 106); Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration i.12; ii.6. In this part, I have drawn upon the detailed division of the principles found in Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 97–98; Black, Avicenna’s Epistemology, 124; Inati, Intro-

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sented to because they are at least believed to be true. There are propositions of assent that are: (1) (2) (3) (4)

given or admitted (musullamāt) presumed or supposed (maẓnūnāt) ambiguous and resemble other propositions (mušabbahāt bi-ǧayrihā) imagined propositions (muẖayyalāt)

The principles or premises of demonstrative syllogisms are found within Avicenna’s subdivisions of (1) propositions of assent that are given. Given propositions of assent, “are either (1.i) beliefs (muʿtaqadāt) or (1.ii) based on outside sources (maʿẖūḏāt).”101 And (1.i) “beliefs are of three types: (A) propositions that must be accepted (al-wājib qubūl-hā), (B) widely-known propositions (mašhūrāt), and (C) estimative propositions (al-wahmiyyāt).”102 Avicenna identifies six (1.i.A) propositions that must be accepted by way of necessity (ʿala wajḥ ḍarūra), which, following Black’s presentation, I schematize as follows: Primaries/first principles (al-awwaliyyāt), i.e., immediate, self-evident truths Propositions with innate syllogisms (muqaddimāt fiṭriyya al-qiyāsāt) Sensible (or observed) propositions (al-maḥsūāt) Experiments (al-mujarrabāt) Testimonials (al-mutawātarāt) Insights or Intuited propositions (al-ḥadsiyyāt)103 It is the primaries or first principles of assent that are included in the premises of certitude required for demonstrative syllogisms. In the Pointers Avicenna takes note of another important detail concerning first principles that is not mentioned in the Logic of the Salvation. The primary propositions are those that are necessitated by the essence and instinct of a clear intellect, and not by any cause external to it. Thus

101 102 103

duction, 28–34, and Notes, 118–128; 148–149 in Pointers. Logic; Lammer, Elements, Chapter 2; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [342] (Inati, 119). Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [342] (Inati, 119). Cf. Black, Avicenna’s Epistemology, 124; Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [343] (Inati, 119); Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.4 [A, 63–67].

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whenever by itself the intellect conceives the terms of these propositions, it makes an assent. Therefore assent in these propositions does not depend except on the occurrence of the concept, and the discernment of [its] composition. Of these propositions, there are: [i] those which are evident to all, because [their] terms are conceived clearly; and [ii] those [whose evidence] may be concealed and need reflection on the concealed aspect of the concept of their terms. For if the concept is confused, {then} the assent too is confused. But this division does not present a difficulty for sharp minds that can penetrate the concept.104 What is novel in the Pointer’s account of assent to primary propositions is the distinction between self-evident first principles that are known or are evident to all (jail li-l-kulli), and those first principles whose evidence may be concealed (mā rabbamā ẖafā) and might be obvious only to the wise or learned. Sometimes the latter requires additional reflection in order to make clear the concepts employed in a proposition; once the conceptualization is made clear, then the self-evident truth of the proposition becomes obvious and one’s assent thereby follows of necessity. The division between first principles of certain assent that are either selfevident to all in common and those that are only self-evident to humans with the requisite proper conceptual understanding of the notions involved in the object of assent, also provides some clarification of Avicenna’s distinction between first principles of certain assent that are common and proper. While the axiom the “whole is greater than its parts” is common knowledge that is assented to by all because the notions that constitute it are conceptualized by all, this is often not true of the first principles of assent that are specific to the different sciences. The first principles of certain assent that pertain to natural philosophy and metaphysics involve conceptualizing primary notions that are not common knowledge to all, such as form, matter, act, potency, being, thing, and the necessary, or they use notions that are common knowledge to all, but they are conceptualized in confused or imprecise ways such as body, dimension,

104

Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [344–345] (Inati, 119–120). “They are known by the First Intellect and cannot be doubted. No one can even remember doubting them in the past. If a person imagines that he came into the world knowing nothing except the meaning of two parts of a First Principle premise and he was asked to doubt the truth of the premise he would not be able to do so. For example, if a person knows by intuition the meaning of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ ‘greater’ and ‘lesser,’ then he cannot help knowing that ‘the whole is greater than its parts,’ and that ‘things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.’” Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī. Logic, 40.

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and the possible. In order to show that such first principles of certain assent are indeed primary self-evident primaries, one must first reflect upon and clarify the meanings of the conceptualized notions, and only then will it become evident that one must necessarily assent to them as self-evident truths. To be clear, Avicenna does not strictly correlate the distinction between (A) what is self-evident to all versus (B) what is self-evident to some, with the distinction between (a) common axioms and (b) the specific first principles proper to different sciences, respectively. He recognizes that there are some who do not assent by necessity to the truth of some absolute common first principles, such as the axioms of contradiction and that there is no middle between affirmation and negation. Avicenna knew well that there are obdurate skeptics who utter with their mouths their denial of such axioms and that there are also perplexed persons who are confused about these axioms, in part because they are confused about the meanings of the notions and the composition of notions that must be conceptualized in order to assent to these self-evident axioms. What the perplexed need is a healing; they need to reflect on and clarify their conceptualization of these self-evident axioms. In short, even though common and some proper first principles of certain assent are self-evidently true, this does not mean they never require any additional reflection, clarification, or explanation.105 As we shall see in the next few chapters, Avicenna often expends a great deal of effort to clarify and explain the notions and compositions that must first be conceptualized clearly, prior to our ability to understand clearly why we must necessarily assent to these common and proper self-evident first principles. Avicenna also recognizes that sometimes first principles of certain assent must be conceded for the time being without understanding why they are true, either for the sake of learning or because the proper treatment or verification of these first principles is addressed in another science or later in the same science. Unlike the admitted propositions of (1.i) belief, these admitted propositions belong among those that are assented to (1.ii) on the basis of outside sources (ma ʿẖūḏāt). The latter are either (1.ii.a) received propositions (maqbūlāt) or (1.ii.b) determined propositions (taqriyyāt).106 Received propositions “are opinions adopted from a large or small number of scholars, or from a well-thought-of religious leader.”107 105

106 107

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8; Houser, “Let them Suffer into the Truth: Avicenna’s Remedy for those Denying the Axioms of Thought,” (Henceforth: Suffer); Houser, “The Place of the First Principle of Demonstration in Avicennian Metaphysics,” (Henceforth: First Principle of Demonstration); De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [356] (Inati, 125). Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [356] (Inati, 125)

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Determined propositions are premises, adopted in accordance with the admission of the interlocutor, or are propositions whose acceptance and acknowledgement are necessary in the principles of the sciences— either with some denunciation (these are called “postulates”) or with some tolerance and goodness of heart (these are called “suppositions”).108 Postulates (muṣādarāt) and suppositions (uṣūl mawḍūʿa) are propositions given by the teacher to the student, who is asked to grant them for the sake of learning, the former are accepted with some suspicion that the contradiction might be true, but the latter are admitted with confidence that they will not be undermined. We shall return to these admitted principles in our exposition of Avicenna’s account of the principles employed in demonstrative syllogisms in section 2.3. To summarize: this section has focused on Avicenna’s account of assent, truth, certainty, first principles, and premises as they pertain to demonstrative sciences. Avicenna’s division of the principles of syllogisms is considerably more complex than the account we have presented here, but his doctrine is beyond the scope of our enquiry into the first principles of knowledge. In the next subsection we shall turn to Avicenna’s account of syllogisms and his division of syllogisms based upon the varieties of assent. This will set up the final section concerning demonstrative syllogisms and Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science. Let us then conclude this subsection by taking note of where the first principles of demonstration fit within Avicenna’s overall account of principles. I present here Black’s schematization of Avicenna’s major divisions of propositions according to the various logical arts to which they belong.109 1 Demonstration: Propositions which must be accepted (al-wājib qubūl-hā). Subdivisions include: Primary propositions/First Principles (al-awwalīyāt) Sensibly-perceived propositions (al-maḥsūsāt) Empirical propositions (al-mujarrabāt) Intuited propositions (al-ḥadsīyāt) Propositions based on unanimous reports or traditions (al-tawāturīyāt) 108 109

Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1, [356] (mod. trans., Inati, p. 125). Cf. Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 97–98. Black’s schematization is drawn from the Pointers. Logic. For Avicenna’s detailed division, see Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1–2 [341–364] (Inati, 118–128); m. 9, c. 1 [460–464] (Inati, 148–149); Inati, Introduction, 28–34 in Pointers. Logic; Black, Avicenna’s Epistemology, 124.

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3 4 5

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Dialectic: Widely-Accepted Propositions (al-mašhūrāt) Subdivisions include: Primary propositions (al-awwalīyāt) not insofar as they require acceptance, but insofar as they are universally acknowledged as true (ʿumūm al-iʿtrāf) Esteemed or Praiseworthy Propositions (al-maḥmūdāt) Determined Propositions (al-taqrīrīyāt). Rhetoric: Received Propositions (al-maqbūlāt), based on authority Supposed or Presumed Propositions (al-maẓnūnāt) Poetics: Premises Productive of Imagining (al-muḵayyilāt) Sophistic: Propositions Resembling the other Propositions (al-mušabbahāt), used to deceive the hearer

This schematization of Avicenna’s division of propositions of assent reveals that the first principles of assent proper to demonstrative sciences are not simply one among five kinds of propositions proper to demonstrations, they are also but one kind of proposition identified by Avicenna within his overall division of propositions of assent. The first principles of assent are the most certain and fundamental, but they are not the only principles employed within or acquired through syllogisms. It is to his account of syllogisms that we must now turn our attention. 2.2.3 Knowledge by Assent: Syllogisms Let us begin with Avicenna’s basic account of what a syllogism is. Assent is the goal of the syllogistic arts, and Avicenna identifies three kinds of arguments or proofs oriented towards granting assent: syllogism (qiyās), induction (istiqrāʾ), and analogy (tamṯīl). Of the three, syllogism is the epistemological exemplar. “The syllogism is a discourse of composed statements. If the propositions which the syllogism involves are admitted, this by itself necessarily leads to another statement.”110 Avicenna appropriates his own formulation of what a syllogism is from Aristotle’s general definition of the syllogism in Prior Analytics.111 110 111

Pointers. Logic, m. 7, c.1 [370–371] (Inati, 130). “A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.” Aristotle, Prior Analytics, i.1, 24b18–20. Cf. Prior Analytics, ii.23, 68b9–14.

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A syllogism {qiyās} is a statement composed of [other] statements. When they are posited, a statement other than them follows from them. [The new statement is generated] through these [statements] themselves, not by accident, but by necessity {iḍṭirārā}. The meaning of “follows” is that assent [to the truth of the new statement] is granted and that [this new statement] must be inferred {lāzimā} due to the assent granted to the premises and their form (šakl).112 A true syllogism results in an assent to the truth of a new statement that is entailed by assenting to the formal composition of the premises in the syllogism. In short, we acquire knowledge by assent when we properly order our prior knowledge by assent. By organizing our prior knowledge by assent in the appropriate way (i.e., in a valid and sound manner), we acquire additional knowledge by assent. Avicenna correlates the logical works of the medieval Aristotelian Organon with five syllogistic arts: demonstration, dialectic, rhetoric, poetics, and sophistics. He unites these five syllogistic arts according to a formal identity and distinguishes them according to a material diversity. “And all of these [logical arts] are like participants, either actually or potentially, in the structure and the form of the syllogism. And the majority of their differences are in their matters.”113 All syllogisms share in the following formal features: they must assent (1) to the premises and (2) to the conceptualized formal connection between these premises that necessarily issues forth a new statement. “Any discourse that manifests both of these properties, whatever its epistemic status, and whatever its intended aim, is in Avicenna’s eye’s, a genuine instance of syllogistic argument.”114 Nevertheless, despite this formal unity among the five syllogistic arts, the pride of place belongs to demonstrative syllogisms. And our primary and essential intention in the art of logic is knowledge of syllogisms, and their principal division is demonstrative syllogisms. For the utility of this [art] is for us to acquire through it a tool for the acquisition of the demonstrative sciences. Our secondary intention is knowledge of the other varieties of syllogisms.115

112 113 114 115

Salvation. Logic, 58 [D, 51] (Ahmed, 42). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Syllogisms, i.6 [54–55]. Healing. Logic. Book of Syllogisms, i.1 [4:2–3] (trans., Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 84). Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 85. Healing. Logic. Book of Syllogisms, i.1 [3:8–11] (trans., Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 85).

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What distinguishes demonstrative syllogisms, materially speaking, from the other syllogistic arts is Avicenna’s premise based classification of the syllogistic arts that is rooted in his account of assent (taṣdīq) and certainty (yaqīn).116 The degrees of epistemic certainty that he assigns to assents that are certain, quasicertain, and doxastically persuasive each specify different kinds of syllogisms (qiyāsāt) as well as assents to conclusions that are acquired through them.117 Avicenna sums up nicely his account of the epistemological taxonomy of conceptualizations and assents and the classification of the syllogistic arts in his digest on the utility of logic (fī manfaʿa al-manṭiq) at the beginning of the Logic of the Salvation. Logic is a theoretical discipline (ṣināʿa naẓariyya) that explains to you from which forms and matters come about the correct definition that is truly called a definition (ḥadd), and the correct syllogism (qiyās) that is called a demonstration (burhān). And it explains to you from which forms and matters comes about the persuasive (iqnāʿī) definitions called a description (rasm); and from which forms and matters comes about the strong type of persuasive syllogism that generates [a kind of] assent that resembles certainty (šabīh bi-l-yaqīn) and is called the dialectical (jadalī) [syllogism]; and about the weak type that generates overwhelming belief [and is called] the rhetorical (ẖaṭābī) [syllogism]. [Logic also] explains to you from which form and matter come about the false definition and the false syllogism that is called the misleading (mujhāliṭī) and the sophistical (sūfisṭāʾī) [syllogism]. It is that which presents itself as a demonstrative

116 117

Cf. Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 95, n. 127. For a detailed explanation see Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 78–102; idem, Avicenna’s Epistemology. Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definitions, 119 provides the following division (I have modified the terminology to conform to my own): Types of Assent

Types of Belief

Types of syllogism

Certain

(1) content; (2) belief that things cannot be otherwise than they are according to (1) (1) content; (2) possibility of simultaneously denying (1) is not admitted (1) content; (2) possibility of simultaneously denying (1) is admitted

Demonstrative

Quasi-certain Persuasive relative to 0pinion

Dialectic or sophistical Rhetorical

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or dialectical [syllogism], while not being so. [And logic also explains to you] from which form and matter comes about the syllogism that generates no assent whatsoever; it effects imagination (taẖyīl) in the mind that causes the soul to desire a thing or to reject it; or it causes it to be disgusted, happy or sad. This is the poetic syllogism (qiyās šiʿrī).118 Because our interest is limited to Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, we shall focus all of our attention on Avicenna’s account of the assents proper to the demonstrative syllogism.119 But before examining his account of the demonstrative syllogism we must first address the epistemological elements Avicenna identifies as being essential to any demonstrative science. 2.3

Logic, Knowledge, and Demonstrative Science

The general contours of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science (ʿilm) are derived from Aristotle’s account of demonstrative science (επιστεµε) in the Posterior Analytics. Avicenna presents his own Aristotelian theory of science in a number of different works, but the extended account in the Book of Demonstration (Kitāb al-Burhān) of the Logic of the Healing, is by far the most developed.120 Let us begin with the goal and utility that Avicenna assigns to his Book of Demonstration.

118 119

120

Salvation. Logic, 2.i [D, 8–9], (mod. trans., Ahmad, 4). For Avicenna’s syllogistic, see Avicenna. The Propositional Logic of Avicenna: A Translation from al-Shifāʾ: al-Qiyās; Black, Logic and Medieval Arabic Philosophy, 78–102; Street, “Avicenna on the Syllogism;” idem, “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic;” Thom, “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic;” idem, “Avicenna,” in Thom, Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts, 81–91; Ahmed, “Avicenna’s Reception of Aristotelian Modal Syllogistics: A Study Based on Conversion Rules and the Barbara Problematic.” Avicenna’s brief treatment of his theory of a demonstrative science in the Salvation, Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī, and the Pointers is substantially amplified in the Book of Demonstration (Kitāb al-Burhān), which is the fifth work within the logical part of the Healing. The Book of Demonstration is divided into four treatises (maqālāt) that consist in his substantial reworking of the material found in the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. For a summation of the Book of Demonstration and schematic comparison of its divisions with the Posterior Analytics, see Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definitions, 115–118; Strobino, “Ibn Sina’s Logic;” For an examination of al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s reception of the theory of a demonstrative science from the Posterior Analytics, see Eichner, “Al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ on ‘Universal Science’ and the System of Sciences: Evidence of the Arabic Tradition of the Posterior Analytics,” (Henceforth: Posterior Analytics in Avicenna).

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This book is the one which provides us with those matters (mawādd) that, if employed as terms (ḥudūd) in a syllogism, the [resulting] syllogism conduces to the certain (kāna l-qiyās mūqiʿan li-lyaqīn)—i.e. the demonstrative syllogism (wa-huwa l-qiyās al-burhānī)—and it provides us with those matters that, if employed as the parts of a definition (aǧzāʾ ḥadd), the [resulting] definition conduces to the complete conceptualization (kāna l-ḥadd mūqiʿan li-t-taṣawwur at-tāmm).121 The aim of this logical art is to instruct one how to acquire certain assents through demonstrative syllogisms and how to acquire complete or perfect definitions through conceptualization. So even though this treatise bears its traditional title, Avicenna notes that the work would more aptly be called the Book of Demonstration and Definition. Avicenna clarifies further the goal of this logical art in his remarks concerning its utility. If we remember the goal of the book, namely providing the methods (ṭuruq) that produce certain assent and true conceptualizations, the utility (manfaʿa) of the book is evident, namely the access (tawaṣṣal) to the certain sciences (al-ʿulūm al-yaqīniyya) and to the true conceptualization (at-taṣawwurāt al-ḥaqīqiyya): not only are [these two achievements] useful to us, but also [they are] necessary if we begin to use this tool (āla), i.e. logic (manṭiq), and to weigh up by means of this scale (mīzān) the theoretical (naẓiriyya) and the practical (ʿamaliyya) sciences altogether.122 In short, the Book of Demonstration teaches us the methods that generate certain assent and complete conceptualizations that thereby help us to acquire the certain demonstrative syllogisms and true definitions. Crucial to our investigation is the question: What is the epistemological profile or what are the epistemological elements of a theoretical demonstrative science, like natural philosophy or metaphysics? «1» We say that every discipline—especially the theoretical one—has [i] principles, [ii] subjects (mawḍūʿāt) and [iii] questions (masāʾil). 121 122

Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.1 [A, 53] (mod. trans., Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definitions, p. 122). Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.1 [A, 53] (trans., Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition, 122–123). Cf. Marmura, “The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages” (Henceforth Fortuna), in Probing, 360–361; McGinnis, “Avicenna’s Naturalized Epistemology and Scientific Methods,” 110.

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[i] Principles are the premises from which that discipline demonstrates, without them being demonstrated in that discipline, either because they are evident, or because they are of too high a rank to be demonstrated in it, and are demonstrated only in a superior science, or because they are of too low a rank to be demonstrated in that science, but rather [they are demonstrated] in an inferior science (even though this is rare). [ii] Subjects are the things of which the discipline investigates only (innamā) the states related to them, and the essential accidents belonging to them. [iii] Questions are the propositions whose predicates are the essential accidents of this subject, or of its species, or of its accidents; doubts arise about them, and hence their state is clarified in that science. «2» Principles are the things from which the demonstrative proof is, questions are the things of which the demonstrative proof is, subjects are the things about which the demonstrative proof is. It is as if the purpose of that about which the demonstrative proof is were the essential accidents, [the purpose of] that for the sake of which that [i.e. the demonstrative proof] is were the subject, and [the purpose of that] from which [the demonstrative proof is] were the principles.123 This threefold division of the epistemological elements of a demonstrative science is found in Avicenna’s many logical and theoretical works.124 First, is the 123

124

Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 155] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 134). Bertolacci notes that Avicenna’s division of the elements of a science is drawn from the following passage from the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics i.10, 76b11–22: “For every demonstrative science is three things: [i] one are the things that we posit as existent, namely that [particular] genus [ḏālika l-ǧins, τὸ γένος], of which it considers the affections belonging to it in themselves; and [ii] the well-known knowledges called “common,” namely the first [things] from which they first clarify [the other things]; and third [iii] the affections, namely those of which they assume what each of them signifies. […] In the same way, nonetheless, there is the existence of these three things in the clarification of nature, I mean that about which [the science] demonstrates, the things that it demonstrates and the things from which it [demonstrates].” (trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 134–135). “For every one of the sciences, there is one or more things appropriate to it and whose state or states we investigate. These states are the essential accidents, and the thing is called ‘the subject’ of that science such as proportions for geometry. Further, for every science there are principles and questions. The principles are the definitions and the premises of which the syllogisms of that science are composed.” Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 3 [474–475] (Inati, 152). Cf. Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī. Logic, 43–44; Salvation. Logic, 119.i [D, 130] (Ahmed, 98); Salvation. Logic, 135.i [D, 144] (Ahmed, 111); Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]. For a comparison of Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s formulation of these three elements of a science in different works, see Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna, 84–95. Eichner’s study shows

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subject (mawḍuʿ); second, are the states (aḥwāl) or problems we investigate, that is, the objects of enquiry (maṭālib) or things that are sought after (ʼašyāʼ hiya al-maṭlūba).125 Third, there are the principles (mabādiʾ) of the science that are admitted (musallama) at its outset. The subject is that about which we investigate, the objects of enquiry are what we investigate and endeavor to make known with respect to the subject, and the principles are that whereby we make the unknown objects of enquiry into knowledge of the per se attributes of the subject.126 The principles become premises within the demonstrative syllogisms of a particular science, and unlike the objects of enquiry or per se attributes, they are not demonstrated within the same science in which they function as first principles. Such first principles are either self-evident primaries or they are assumed theses that are verified elsewhere, often in another higher science. Each of these three elements of a science corresponds in different ways to the acts of conceptualization and assent, and so to the basic questions as well. The things out of which demonstrations are constructed [are three:] {subjects, problems, and principles.} The first of them are subjects, whose definitions and quiddities must be supplied if their definitions are hidden (as in the case of point and unity). Their existence is conceded insofar as one concedes the premise, which is a primary principle (mabdaʾ), or a supposition (aṣl mawḍūʾ) of the subject. As for the problems that are per se accidents, well their definitions [must be] supplied if they are hidden. [Examples of these are] irrational and rational [numbers] and that which resembles these. As for the existence [of per se accidents] for the subject, well that [is a question] left for its [suitable] place in a demonstrative proof. As for principles (mabādiʾ), well they must be conceded and posited as theses with reference to [the question] “if.”127

125 126

127

that Avicenna consistently mentions theses three scientific elements—subject (mawḍuʿ), principles (mabādiʾ), and questions (masāʾil) or what is sought (maṭlūb) in his early, middle, and later works. Cf. Marmura, Division of Sciences; Bertolacci, The Reception; idem, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; Houser, Real Distinction; Strobino, Indemonstrability of Definition. Cf. “The things that constitute demonstrations are three: [1] the subject under investigation (mawḍūʿāt), [2] problems [related to the subject] (masāʾil), and [3] premises that are the principles [and starting points]. One demonstrates about subjects, demonstrates [the solution to] problems [related to the subject], and demonstrates by means of premises.” Salvation. Logic, 119.i [D, 130] (Ahmed, 98). Salvation. Logic, 135.i [D, 144] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 111).

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For the subject of a science we must know its quiddity or definition and that it exists. The subject of a science must be conceptualized and its quiddity must be made clear if the answer to the question what is concealed or confused. But we must also assent or concede that the subject of the science exists as one accepts the existence of a premise as a first principle, and this is to answer the question if the subject exists. Accordingly, in many sciences the subject is also admitted as one of the first principles of the science. In sum, for each science we must both understand what the subject is and assent to the existence of its subject, such as: Measurable [dimensions] (miqdār) for geometry, number for arithmetic (ḥisāb), body, insofar as, it moves and is at rest, for the science of nature (al-ʿilm al-ṭabīʿī), and being and one in the divine science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhi). Each one of these [subjects] has per se accidents that are particular to it, such as range, boundary, and form for measurable [dimensions], even and odd for number, change, growth, decay, etc. for the natural body, and potentiality, actuality, perfection, deficiency, generation, and eternity and similar things for being. The subject [of a science] may be one, such as the natural body, or it may be many things, homogeneous or commensurate, such as line and surface for geometry.128 The subjects of the different sciences are either distinct (such as arithmetic and physics), or correspond to each other; they correspond to each other either equally (such as arithmetic and geometry or physics and astronomy) or not equally by either containment (such as conics within geometry) or by subordination.129 The principal illustration of the subordination of one science to another is where, “the subject the higher [science] is not in reality a genus of the subject of the lower [science], being rather like a genus due to its generality, but not [existing] in the manner of the generality of genus.” This is the case for 128 129

Salvation. Logic, 125.i [D, 135] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 102). N.B. Avicenna further clarifies the relation between the subject of physics and astronomy as follows: “For their subjects are one and the same, i.e. the celestial bodies of the world, though their approaches [to this same subject] are different. For the former considers [them] insofar as they move and are at rest, come to be mixed and separated, etc. Most of [this science] centers on the quality [of the subject]. [On the other hand,] the latter investigates [this same subject] insofar as it and its accidents are quantified. For this reason, [these two sciences] often share their problems, though one of them supplies the demonstration-why (burhān limā) and the other the demonstration-that (burhān inna), [again,] one of them supplies a demonstration of the efficient cause (ʿilla fiʿliyya) and the other of the formal cause (ʿilla ṣūriyya).” Salvation. Logic, 130.iv [D, 139–140] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 107).

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“the particular sciences that fall under first philosophy, whose subject is absolute being (mawjūd muṭlaq) insofar as it is absolute being.”130 Said otherwise, “A science may be superior to one science, and subordinate to another. This leads to the science whose subject is being qua being, and which investigates its per se attributes. This is the science called ‘first philosophy.’”131 What basic questions pertain to demonstrative problems or objects of enquiry? As for demonstrative problems, well they are propositions that are specific to each science and one seeks the demonstration of those among them that are uncertain. The subjects [of demonstrative problems] are [of the following types]: [1] they are the subject of the science itself, like our statement, “Every measurable [dimension] is either a number that has a common factor with another, [like four to six,] or not.” [2] Or they are subjects, along with a per se accident, like our statement, “Every measurable [dimension] that is placed in the middle of the relation is a side bound by two extremes.” [3] Or they are a species of the subject, like [the statement that] every line may be divided into two halves. [4] Or they are a species of the subject, along with an accident, like our statement, “Every line that is set upon another has such and such two angles. [5] Or they are [species of the subject, along with] a per se accident, like our statement, “The angles of every triangle are such and such.”132 Scientific demonstrations principally consist in establishing the existence of these per se accidents with respect to the subject of a science. Prior to any demonstrations, however, we must conceptualize the quiddities of these objects of enquiry. And if what these objects of enquiry are is unclear—as also happens with the subject and principles of a science—then the notions that constitute these problems must be conceptually clarified first. We do not, however, know if such per se accidents exist with respect to the subject of the science, because it is the aim of demonstrative syllogisms to establish whether these per se accidens exist and belong to the subject. And the demonstrative problems or objects of enquiry with respect to the subject of a science consist in, “nothing

130 131 132

Salvation. Logic, 130.vi [D, 140] (Ahmed, 107–108). Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 4 [482–483] (Inati, 154). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration ii.6 [156–157]; Marmura, Division of Sciences; Bertolacci, Reception, c. 7, 265–302. Salvation. Logic, 126.i [D, 135] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 103). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [157–159].

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else than the per se accidents (al-ʿawāriḍ al-ḏātiyya) occurring to it, or to its parts (aǧzāʾ), or to its species (anwāʿ).”133 In the premises of the demonstration, essential predicates are used, under the two aspects [mentioned] earlier attributed to the “essential” in the premises {i.e., the constitutive and nonconstitutive per se accidents}. But in the enquiries, the constitutive essentials are never sought. You have already learned this, and learned the error of him who opposes it. Rather, [in them], the essentials are only sought in the other sense {i.e., the nonconstitutive per se accidents}.134 A science makes conceptually perspicuous, but does not demonstrate, the constitutionally concomitant parts of its subject (e.g., what is a corporeal substance), its various species (e.g., the division of corporal substance into its various species), but it both makes conceptually clear and demonstrates various generic and specific essential or per se accidents and other attributes that belong to the subject. They are called accidents or accidentals because they concern matters that are nonconstitutive of the subject itself, yet such accidents are in some way or other necessary concomitants or per se attributes that belong to the subject in virtue of the subject itself. What must be demonstrated is the precise way in which these per se accidents exist with respect to the subject. The predicates of demonstrative problems do not belong to the subject essentially in the quidditatively constitutional sense of essential. Said otherwise, the predicates of demonstrative problems are not included in the definition of the subject, because the existence of the predicate for the subject is not evident in itself.135 Because these predicates must be demonstrated, the 133

134 135

Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iii.8 [A, 247] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 196). To quote in full: “[Different] investigations belong to a single science only [a] when they share the first subject and concern nothing else than the per se accidents (al-ʿawāriḍ al-ḏātiyya) occurring to it, or to its parts (aǧzāʾ), or to its species (anwāʿ), and [b] when they share the first principles from which those per se accidents are demonstrated as belonging to the first subject-matter, or to its parts (aǧzāʾ), or to its species (anwāʿ).” Ibid. Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.28, 87a38–39; Bertolacci, Reception, 196ff. Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 2 [471–472] (Inati, 151) Cf. Salvation. Logic, 127.i [D, 136] (Ahmed, 103). Avicenna, however, points out two exceptions. The first occurs when the essence of a thing is not yet known, but the name or externals or accidentals of the thing are known, such as someone who knows the soul is an agent, mover, and perceiver, which are its per se accidents, but does not yet know that it is a substance. “[In all this,] what one seeks to find out is the accident-substrate’s genus, which is not constitutive of the quiddity of the accidental in the manner in which essential predicates are.” Salvation. Logic, 127.ii [D, 136] (Ahmed, 104). The second exception

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predicates involved in demonstrative problems can only be essential or per se in the sense of essential that means nonconstitutive per se accidents.136 Hence, even though conceptualization and the question what are sometimes required for the objects of enquiry, this is not intrinsic to the demonstrative problems as such; rather, such conceptual clarifications are incidental to the acts of assent achieved through demonstrative syllogisms motivated by the questions if and why. In addition to the subject and objects of enquiry, every science must also include first principles. “A principle is something ‘first’ or ‘primary.’ In this spirit, the Greek ἀρχαί are πρῶτα, the Latin principia are prima, and the Arabic mabādiʾ are awāʾil.”137 As with his general account of a demonstrative science, Avicenna appropriates his doctrine of first principles from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and transforms it into an epistemologically more regimented division of principles. But even Avicenna’s doctrine and terminology of principles varies slightly in his different works. A brief digest of Aristotle’s account of these scientific principles will help us understand Avicenna’s appropriation of this Aristotelian division of scientific principles. Aristotle presents his division of scientific first principles and their epistemic requirements in the Posterior Analytics. Consider the following representative quotations from different parts of his account of scientific principles. I call an immediate syllogistic principle “a thesis” if it cannot be proved and if it is not necessary for a learner to possess it in order to learn something; but I call it “an axiom” if the learner must possess it to learn anything…. If a thesis takes the form of either part of a statement (I mean, for example, if it states that something is the case, or that it is not the case), it is a hypothesis, but if this is not so, it is a definition (for a definition is a thesis, e.g., the arithmetician posits the expression “a unit is that which is indivisible with respect to quantity,” and this is not a hypothesis; for what a unit is, and that a unit exists, are not the same).138

136 137 138

occurs when one intends to demonstrate the cause only, but unintentionally produces a demonstration that (inna) and why (limā) together. “[An example of this is] if we had known that man is a substance [and that] substance does not belong to him in a primary fashion, then [if] we wished to learn of the cause [for man’s being a substance] and said, ‘Because [man] is a body.’” Salvation. Logic, 127.iii [D, 137] (Ahmed, 104). Cf. Salvation. Logic, 127.iv [D, 137] (Ahmed, 104–105). Lammer, Elements, 45. Cf. Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.2, 72a15–24 (trans., Apostle).

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Of the [principles] used in demonstrative sciences, some are proper to each science but others are common to many sciences, and the latter [principles] are common by analogy since they are used as far as the genus of things under each science extends.139 Avicenna largely accepts Aristotle’s division of first principles, but he introduces some of his own terminology and distinctions to make more systematic and perspicuous his own account of first principles (ἀρχαί, mabādiʾ; sg., ἀρχή, mabdaʾ)140 For instance, in some cases he distinguishes three kinds of fundamental principles (uṣūl)—literally “roots.”141 139 140

141

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.10, 76a38–40 (trans., Apostle). Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.7, 75a39–b3; i.10, 76a32–77a4. Avicenna’s standard account of the fundamental principles of a science rarely uses the term ʿilm mutaʿāraf, which Abū Bišr Mattá’s used to translate Aristotle ἀξίωµα, see Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna, 86–89. Avicenna more frequently uses the terms principles (mabādiʾ) and fundamental principles (uṣūl), or even principles of certitude (yaqīniyyāt). Heidrun Eichner has recently argued one reason for this difference might be due to an alternative translation of the Posterior Analytics. “I argue, the option that Ibn Sīnā had access to a (Greek?) commentary on the Posterior Analytics which is not preserved today needs to be considered more seriously than has been done so far. The terminology of central notions for the constitution of a system of sciences both in al-Fārābī’s treatise {i.e., his Kitāb al-Burhān} and in Ibn Sīnā’s works is not that of Abū Bišr Mattá’s translation nor that of the paraphrase preserved in Averroes’ commentary. This will be substantiated for the three terms mawḍūʿ, masʾala and mabādiʾ.” Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna, 85. As for the division of principles, Averroes appears to retain the Aristotelian terminology. Rüdiger Arnzen notes that: “Aṣl mawḍūʿ is the analytical translation of the epistemological technical term ὑπόθεσις, ‘supposition,’ Ibn Rushd encountered in the translations of Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, e.g. An. post. i 2, 72 a 20–23; i 10, 76 b 23–77 a 4, etc. It is one of two kinds of what Aristotle calls a posit (θέσις, waḍʿ), i.e. a principle of syllogistics which cannot be proved and need not necessarily be known within a science in order to learn that science (An. post. i 2, 72 a 14–16). The supposition differs from the other kind of posit, the definition (ὁρισµός, ḥadd), in that it assumes either that something is or that something is not, whereas the definition posits what something is. Both kinds of posits, in turn, are distinct from the principle which likewise cannot be proved but must be known necessarily to practise any science, i.e. the axiom or general principle of demonstration (An. post. i 2, 72 a 16–23). A supposition can be universal or particular (An. post. i 10, 77 a 3sq.). Ibn Rushd follows this terminology and employs the term aṣl mawḍūʿ in this technical sense in various works…” Arnzen, “Notes” in Averroes, Epitome of Metaphysics, 186. Arzen also points out that, for Averroes, “the specific suppositions (ὑπόθεσις) form part of that which is posited (mawḍūʿ) in any science. This includes not only the genus or subject matter, the common axioms and the attributes of the subject matter taken into consideration, but also suppositions and postulates (cf. An. post. i 10, 76 b 23–77 a 4).” Arnzen, “Notes,” 187 in Averroes, Epitome of Metaphysics. Cf. Lammer, Elements, 81–109. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration i.12; ii.6–7; Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 3 [477] (Inati, 153). On fundamental principles (uṣūl), see Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix E, 607–612; Lammer, Elements, 72, n. 99 and 97–98.

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The fundamental principles (al-uṣūl) that are known first prior to demonstrations are three: «1» definitions (ḥudūd), «2» theses (awḍāʿ), and «3» principles of certitude (yaqīniyyāt). «1» Definitions supply the conceptualization of those subjects and accidentals of the disciplines that are not clearly conceptualized. [Examples are:] that the point is an extreme that has no part; that the line is a length that has no width and that the triangle is a figure enclosed in such and such a way. [Definitions] do not supply assent in any way; nor is there any affirmation or negation in them. «2» As for theses, they are premises that are not obvious in themselves, but the student is tempted to concede them and their explanation. {Their explanation is found} either in some other discipline or, after some time, in the same discipline. [Examples are] found among the primary [premises] of geometry: that we can travel between two points by means of a straight line; that we can make a circle around every point and with every measure of distance; and that if a straight line is posited over two [intersecting] lines, then the two angles that are on the same side are less than two right angles. For the two [original] lines intersect on that [same] side. «2.a» Whichever of the theses a student concedes, without there being any resistance to it in his soul, is called a supposition (aṣl mawḍūʿ) in an absolute fashion. «2.b» And that which [requires some degree of] concession and against which the soul of the student has some resistance is called a postulate (muṣādara).142 Whereas Aristotle grouped together definitions, suppositions, and postulates under the heading of a “thesis” (θέσις, waḍʿ), Avicenna does not do so here.143 A “definition” (ὁρισµός, ḥadd) states what something is. For example, the arithmetician defines the notion of a unit as that which is indivisible with respect to quantity. “Theses” (awḍāʿ) are statements that either affirm or negate that something is the case. Like axioms, theses answer the various forms of the question if. To be clear, notions or definitions, despite being frequently articulated in the form of statements or expository phrases should not be confused 142 143

Salvation. Logic 128.i– ii [D, 137–138] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 105). Elsewhere he follows Aristotle’s use of thesis. “Propositions that are admitted by virtue of confidence in the teacher and the definitions may be grouped under the name “thesis” (waḍʿ)…. Of these {theses}, the admitted propositions {by virtue of confidence in the teacher} are properly called “suppositions.” And “postulates” is the name given to admitted propositions under the second aspect {i.e., those principles the student suspects might not be true}. If a certain science has suppositions, these must be presented at the beginning, as an introduction to the science.” Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 3 [476–477] (mod trans., Inati, 152–153). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 [A, 110–111].

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with theses. A definition only formulates what a unit is and pertains to conceptualization, not assent; a thesis—whether it be a supposition or a postulate—involves assent and asserts that a unit exists or that a unit has certain attributes.144 First principles as definitions or notions conceptualized must be given at the beginning of any science. These primary notions make clear the meaning or quiddity of the subject of the discipline and the meanings of various accidentals that are not yet clearly conceptualized—which includes the notions that pertain to the parts, species, or per se attributes of the subject. For the first principles as definitions, “are given of the subject of a discipline, of its parts, and of its {species}, if it has any, and…of its essential accidents. These too are given in the preface to the sciences.”145 In short, many sciences will require some conceptual clarification of the subject of the science and the concomitant notions required for investigating its many objects of enquiry. We should not be surprised then if immediately following a nominal conceptualization and assent to the existence to the subject of a science, we must straight away clarify the quiddity of this subject taken as a primary notion or definition.146 But even though the definitions of the concomitant notions of the subject of the science also require conceptual clarification, since they are among the objects of enquiry whose manner of existence with respect to the subject must be demonstrated, the initial conceptual clarification of these concomitant notions is not sufficient to issue forth in an assent to their existence. In addition to these notions or definitions that belong to the objects of enquiry and which refrain any initial response to the question if, there are also propositional principles (mabādiʾ) that must be admitted—or at least posited as a thesis (waḍʿ)—at the start of any science.147 Suppositions (al-uṣūl al-mawḍūʿa) are premises unknown in themselves (al-muqaddimāt al-maǧhūla fī anfusihā) which, with respect to their truth, are proven (tubayyana) in another discipline, since the student (almutaʿallim) has already accepted them and believes them on account of the high esteem in which he holds the teacher (bi-ḥusn ẓannihī bi-lmuʿallim) and his trust in him (wa-ṯiqatihī) in that what he thinks about 144 145 146 147

Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 [A, 110–111]. Avicenna, Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 3 [476] (Inati, 152). As we shall see in Chapters 3–4, this is precisely what Avicenna does in Ilāhiyyāt, where being (mawjūd) is shown to be the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 and then is conceptually clarified as a first principle as primary notion in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Cf. Lammer, Elements, 82.

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this is true. A postulate (al-muṣādara) is something similar, but the student does not believe what the teacher thinks [and instead] believes the opposite or does not believe anything. On the whole, what is certain about it is that the student has a belief which is contrary to [what the teacher believes] – indeed, what is most fitting is that the postulate is what the student accepts reluctantly (takallafa … taslīmahū), even though he does not believe it, be it among the principles (al-mabādiʾ) or the questions (al-masāʾil) in this current science, because questions are what are proven later on, and so asking for accepting them as premises is permitted. Thus, one [and the same] principle which is in itself not evident at all may be a supposition (aṣlan mawḍūʿan) from one point of view and a postulate (muṣādaratan) from another.148 A “supposition” (ὑπόθεσις, aṣl mawḍūʿ) is a “thesis” (θέσις, waḍʿ) that students accept because they trust the teacher. A “postulate” (αἴτηµα, muṣādara) is also a kind of thesis. Avicenna variously characterizes postulates as being theses that a student accepts with some suspicion or hesitation or reluctance. He also notes how the same principle qua thesis which is not self-evident can be a supposition for one student and a postulate for another.149 Because both of these two kinds of theses are unknown in themselves, their truth must be proven elsewhere. Avicenna contrasts these theses with the “principles of certitude” (yaqīniyyāt) that are known in themselves. Like theses, principles of certitude must be presented at the beginning of a science. «3» As for principles of certitude (yaqīniyyāt), well they are [of the following type:] that measurable [dimensions] that are equal to a single measurable [dimension] are equal. Among them are those that are specific to a science, such as our statement, “Every measurable [dimension] is either the same as or different from [another].” Among [such propositions] are [also] those that are common, such as “Either affirmation or negation is truly applied to everything.” In the sciences, the common propositions are made specific, so that in geometry one does not say, “Everything is either equal or unequal [to another];” rather, [one says,] “Every measurable [dimension is either equal or unequal to another].” Sometimes [such propositions] are specific with reference to both sides,

148 149

Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 [A, 114: 4–11] (mod. trans., Lammer, Elements, 96). Cf. Lammer, Elements, 81–97.

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as in their statement, “Every measurable [dimension] is either rational or irrational.”150 Here we see Avicenna explicating his own account the self-evident principles of certitude required for every demonstrative science, by drawing upon Aristotle’s distinction between principles that are “common” (κοινὰ, ʿāmma) from those that are “proper” or “special” (ἴδια, ẖaṣṣa) to a certain science. Proper principles (mabādīʾ ẖaṣṣa) are scientific principles that are specific to a certain science, such the natural philosopher’s belief in the existence of motion or the mathematician’s belief in the possibility of a magnitude being infinitely divisible.151 Common principles (mabādīʾ ʿāmma) are applicable to many sciences. Sometimes Avicenna calls the principles of conceptualization “principles of definition” (mabādiʾ al-ḥadd), and calls the primary principles of assent “principles of demonstration” (mabādiʾ al-burhān).152 The latter seem to be equivalent to fundamental principles of certitude (yaqīniyyāt) because Avicenna distinguishes principles of demonstration into proper and common principles of demonstration,153 and also says that principles of demonstration either belong to science absolutely or belong to a certain science. The principle of demonstration is said in two ways, and so the principle of demonstration is said with regard to science absolutely (bi-ḥasab alʿilm muṭlaqan) or it is said with regard to a certain science (bi-ḥasab ʿilm mā). The principle of demonstration with regard to science absolutely is a premise that has no middle [term] absolutely, i.e., it is not such that the proof of the relation of its predicate to its subject—be that an affirmation or negation—depends on a middle term, so that another premise would be prior to it and before it. By contrast, the principle of demonstration with regard to a certain science may have a middle [term] in itself, yet it 150 151

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Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 129.i [D, 138–139] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 106). Avicenna holds that the subjects of the first principles that are specific or proper principles include the subject of the science or the constitutive parts, species, and specific accidents of the science’s subject. The predicates of these first principles are either specific to the subject of the science or are at least specific to the genus of the subject. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 156]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.13–16 [53–54]. Cf. Wolfson. “Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq;” Houser, First Principle of Demonstration, 117–119; 121–125; idem, Suffer, 110–114; idem, Real Distinction, 76; Bertolacci, Reception, 390–393; idem, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 65–73; Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna; Lammer, Elements, Chapter 2; Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge; Akasoy and Alexander, “The Structure and Methods of the Sciences,” 108–110. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 155–56].

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is laid down in that science as a thesis (yūḍaʿu fī ḏālika l-ʿilm waḍʿan) and does not have a middle [term] at this stage in that science. Rather its middle [term] belongs to a science before it or on a par with it, or its middle [term] belongs to that [same] science after that stage, just as that whose state will be made known [later].154 Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of common principles of demonstration. The most obvious common principles are the well known axiomatic first principles. An axiom “axiom” (ἀξίωµα, ʿilm mutaʿāraf) is a principle of demonstration that is accepted necessarily.155 Axioms are absolutely universal principles that are employed by all demonstrative sciences, such as “all veridical statements either affirm or negate something.” But there are also common principles that are shared by, at least, more than one science, such as “things which equal the same thing also equal one another,” which is a universal principle that is made specific in the distinct ways it is applied within geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.156 Similarly, there are the common principles of natural philosophy that are applied differently to the subjects and objects of enquiry within the more specific divisions of natural philosophy. For example, the common principles of natural philosophy, such as “matter can only exist through its connection to form,” are manifested in specifically different ways with respect to natural perfection, generation and corruption, augmentation and diminution, alteration, local motion, and so forth.157 The principles of demonstration proper to a specific science are also called principles of certitude and as principles of certitude they are either selfevident (bayyin bi–nafsihī) or verified elsewhere.158 These proper principles of assent consist of propositions with more substantive content relevant to the particular sciences than the more general propositions that comprise the universal axioms. Accordingly, a proper principle can serve as primary premise (muqaddima awwaliyya) in a demonstrative syllogism within a demonstrative science.

154 155 156 157 158

Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 [A, 110:3–9] (mod. trans., Lammer, Elements, 95). Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 [A, 100: 13–14]. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 155]. Cf. Healing. Physics, i.1–3; 8; Lammer, Elements. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12 and ii.6; Salvation. Logic, 112.i [D, 126] (Ahmed, 95–96); 128.i–129.i [D, 137–139] (Ahmed, 105–106); Gutas, aat, 213–220 [187–194]; Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix E, 607–612.

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Moreover, the [particular] sciences also have principles and primaries (mabādiʾ wa-awāʾil) with regard to that which is demonstrated on their basis. They are the premises which demonstrate this science but which are not demonstrated in it either because of their obviousness or their being [too] exalted to be demonstrated in this science. Instead they are demonstrated only in another science. Natural philosophy belongs to this group [of particular sciences]. It is not up to one of the proponents of a particular science to establish (iṯbāt) the principles of his science nor to establish the soundness of the premises through which this science is demonstrated (bihā tabarhana ḏālika l-ʿilm), rather proving the principles of a particular science is up to the proponent of the universal science, and this is the divine science and the science investigating what is after nature (fī mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa). Its subject is absolute being and what is sought in it are the general principles and general concomitants. So, let us lay down the universal principles as theses (fa-l-naḍaʿu l-mabādiʾ alkulliyya … waḍʿan) for natural philosophy, which is one of the particular sciences.159 The primary proper principles in a particular science like natural philosophy— which are assented to at the outset of this science—are like theses insofar as they are verified by another science, like metaphysics. As we have seen, in many cases the first principles of assent proper to some science must be assumed in one science, only to be clarified and defended in another. Furthermore, because theses are ultimately demonstrated to be true, typically by a higher science, theses are thereby ultimately grounded in the fundamental principles of primary knowledge by assent that are true, certain, and evident in themselves.160 And these fundamental primary principles belong to the universal science of metaphysics. The proper principles of metaphysics are therefore distinctive, for—unlike the proper principles that belong to more particular sciences like mathematics or natural philosophy—they cannot be verified by another science. Consequently, the first principles of demonstration proper to the science of metaphysics must be true, certain, and evident in themselves— and so neither conceptualized through an acquired definition nor acquired by 159 160

Avicenna, Salvation. Physics, ii.1 [D, 189.13–190.8] (mod. trans., Lammer, Elements, 107–108). “Most of the suppositions in a particular science which is made subordinate to another are nothing but true in the universal science which is made superior [to it]. For often the principles of the superior universal science are true in the subordinate particular one.” Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 4 [482–483] (mod. trans., Inati, 154).

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assent through a syllogism—for the fundamental principles proper to all the other sciences ultimately are derived (tafrīʿ) from the first principles proper to metaphysics. Finally, because all first principles of primary knowledge by assent depend upon conceptualized notions, it is the first principles as primary notions of conceptualization that are the primordial foundations and first principles of all knowledge. And, because metaphysics is the ultimate philosophical science, the primary notions of metaphysics provide the foundations for all other primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent.161 We can schematize Avicenna’s complex account of scientific first principles as follows: Principle (ἀρχή, mabdaʾ); Primaries (awāʾil); Fundaments (uṣūl) Definition (ὁρισµός, ḥadd) Thesis (θέσις, waḍʿ) Supposition (ὑπόθεσις, aṣl mawḍūʿ) Postulate (αἴτηµα, muṣādara) Axiom (ἀξίωµα, ʿilm mutaʿāraf) Principles of Definition (mabādiʾ al-ḥadd) Principles of Demonstration (mabādiʾ al-burhān); Principles of Certitude (yaqīniyyāt) Proper Principles (mabādiʾ ẖaṣṣa) Common Principles (mabādiʾ ʿāmma) The subject, principles, and objects of enquiry of a demonstrative science are ordered towards producing acquired knowledge by assent through a demonstration, and “a demonstration is a syllogism that constitutes certainty.”162 Following Aristotle, Avicenna assigns a number of rigorous epistemic requirements for the proper construction of a demonstrative syllogism; let us take note of a few of these conditions. A demonstration is a syllogism composed of [premises of] certitude that yield conclusion[s] of certitude. [Premises of] certitude are [1] primary [propositions] and whatever is collected within [their category] or [2] [propositions based in] experience (tajribiyyāt) or [3] [based on] 161

162

For Avicenna’s account of metaphysics as a demonstrative science, see Bertolacci, Reception, c. 6, 213–263; for Avicenna’s view that corollaries (furūʿ) in the sciences are rooted in or derived (tafrīʿ) from the fundamental principles (uṣūl), see Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix E, 607–612. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.7 [A, 78].

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sensibles…. As for [propositions that are] widespread, commonly accepted, and presumed [true], well they fall outside this rubric.163 This familiar list of premises of certitude corresponds to the division of principles of certain assent that we treated in the previous section. These premises of certitude concern some matter that we assent to as true by necessity and which we know cannot be otherwise. These scientific principles of certitude are used as premises in demonstrative syllogisms and are ultimately grounded in the primary principles of a science. The premises of demonstration are per se, certain, and veridical. They reduce to primary premises that are universally predicated (maqūla) of the whole. They may be necessary, except as regards things that change, which [exist] in a certain mode in most cases. Thus, they [also fall in the category of things that are true] for the most part (akṯariyya). [If] they are causes for the existence of the conclusion, they are appropriate.164 Let us unpack this condensed account of what is required for the premises of a demonstrative syllogism. Demonstrative knowledge is causal knowledge; our assent to the premises of a syllogism causes our assent to the conclusion, that is, the new knowledge generated by the demonstration. Consequently, demonstrative conclusions can only be caused by the right kind of premises ordered in the proper way.165 Demonstrative syllogisms require premises that are per se, certain, and true. The premises are per se (1) either when “the subject is taken in the definition of the subject, as animal is [taken] in the definition of man; (2) or [when] the subject or its genus is taken in the definition of the predicate, as nose is taken in the definition of snub-nose or as surface is taken in the definition of triangle.”166 The premises are certain when, as we have seen, one holds a second belief that the truth assented to by a first belief cannot be otherwise than it is because it is impossible for this first belief not to be true. And premises are true or veridical when the statement or belief conforms to the way things are. All of these premises must ultimately reduce to primary

163 164 165 166

Salvation. Logic, 112.i [D, 126] (Ahmed, 95–96). Salvation. Logic, 120.i [D, 130–131] (Ahmed, 99). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.6 [A, 78–79]. Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 121.i [D, 131] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 99). Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.4.

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first principles of assent that also meet these epistemic conditions. These primary principles, however, are not acquired by any syllogisms; this is because they are necessarily assented to in virtue of the immediately evident truth that is revealed by clearly conceptualizing the connection among the terms of the proposition. These primary and acquired demonstrative premises pave the way for the two kinds of demonstrations that Avicenna identifies. In Chapter 1.3’s examination of Avicenna’s account of the basic questions what, if, and why, we briefly touched on his distinction between a demonstration-why (burhān limā) and demonstration-that (burhān inna). These two kinds of demonstrations are similar to Aristotle’s distinction between a demonstration of the reason why (το διότι) and a demonstration of fact that (τὸ ὅτι).167 For Avicenna, both kinds of demonstrations conclude in a certain assent to a statement that responds to the question why. What distinguishes these two kinds of demonstrations is the way in which they provide more or less complete explanations in response to the question why. A demonstration-why generates an assent to a conclusion whereby we know both that something is true and why it is true. Demonstrations-why establish acquired knowledge of both the cause of the assent and the cause of the thing itself.168 A demonstration-that, however, only establishes that something is true, without explaining why this is so or illuminating the cause of this fact.169 Avicenna also identifies a distinct kind of demonstration-that, which is called a demonstration of the sign or indication (dalīl).170 If the middle term of a demonstration-that—in addition to not being the cause of the thing and the reason why the minor and major terms are united in the conclusion—is an effect of the connection between the major and minor terms, and this middle term is more known to us, then it is more properly called a demonstration-of-theindication.171

167 168

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170 171

Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics i.13. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 113.i [D, 126–127] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 96); Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 5 [485] (Inati, 154). Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.7 [A, 78–84]; Healing. Physics, i.1.11–13 [10]; McGinnis, Avicenna, c. 2, 44–52; Strobino, “Avicenna on Knowledge (ʿilm), Certainty (yaqīn), Cause (ʿilla/sabab) and the Relative (muḍāf);” idem, “Ibn Sina’s Logic.” “If the middle term is not such, but is the cause of the assent only—thus giving the reason for the assent without giving the reason for the existence [of the judgment]—then the demonstration is called “factual demonstration,” {i.e., a demonstration-that} since it indicates the factuality of the judgment in itself, without its cause in itself.” Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 5 [486] (Inati, 154). Cf. Salvation. Logic, 114.i [D, 127–128] (Ahmed, 97). Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 5 [486–487] (Inati, 154–155).

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Concluding Remarks Let us recapitulate what has been accomplished in our survey of Avicenna’s logical treatment of enquiry, conceptualization, assent, and scientific knowledge in these first two chapters. The first chapter commenced with a contextualization of Avicenna’s logic and his identification of the subject of logic with secondary intentions. We then presented a brief account of the principles of logic and the division of knowledge into conceptualization and assent. In the third section of the first chapter we explored Avicenna’s doctrine of the basic questions what, if, and why. Such enquiries motivate us to seek knowledge of the unknown by way of the known, and it is through primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization and assent that the natural desire of all humans to know develops into the theoretical knowledge of the myriad sciences. The first two sections of chapter two explicated in greater detail Avicenna’s rich doctrine of primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization and assent. The first section of this chapter presented his account of the matrix of logical distinctions, predicables, definitions, descriptions, and categories, which all pertain to primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization. The second section addressed a series of topics that all orbited around primary and acquired knowledge by assent, such as propositions, truth, certainty, and syllogisms. The third and final section of this chapter brought all of the foregoing together in a brief exposition of the epistemological elements identified in Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science. These first two chapters of Part 1 have established the logical and epistemological framework required for approaching Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt as a demonstrative philosophical science. If the exegete intends to read this recondite metaphysical treatise as Avicenna intended it to be read, namely, as demonstrative philosophical science, then some familiarity with his theory of demonstrative science is hermeneutically exigent. The crucial importance and exegetical value of the many detailed divisions and complex doctrines surveyed in these chapters, especially the thematization of Avicenna’s account of the primary principles in the orders of conceptualization and assent, will become readily apparent in the extensive examination of the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt as demonstrative science in the next two chapters in Part 2. In short, this first part has presented the logical and epistemological foundations needed for understanding the scientific structure of the main arguments presented in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. The task of the next two chapters is to elucidate the way Avicenna applied this scientific profile to his metaphysical science.

Part 2 Scientific Order of the Metaphysics of the Healing

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Subject and Goal of the Science of Metaphysics The primary aim of this study is to identify and present the central argument of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt of his Kitāb al-Šifāʾ. To identify this argument requires considering how Avicenna applied the scientific principles of metaphysics to its subject of being qua being, the objects of enquiry of metaphysics, and their culmination in his demonstration of the existence of the divine necessary existence in itself. First and foremost among these scientific principles are the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary, which are first conceptualized, and then become terms within the proper and common primary propositional principles of assent. By showing how these scientific principles as notions enter into various demonstrated doctrines within the ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of metaphysical enquiry, this study attempts to make clear the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. In order to understand the way these primary notions figure into that argument, we must first establish whether there is any priority to be found among these primary notions. Hence, to resolve the central question of this study requires that we first answer the question of priority among the primary notions in Avicenna’s ontology, aitiology, and theology (Chapters 9–10). But before the investigations in these chapters can get off the ground, we must first make clear the way these primary notions fit into Avicenna’s division of scientific first principles (Chapters 5–8). And this, in turn, can only be answered by grasping the way his Ilāhiyyāt is structured to fit the epistemological profile of his theory of a demonstrative science (Chapters 3–4). The aim of this chapter is to present the epistemological profile of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, by availing ourselves of his theory of a demonstrative science. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section (3.1) outlines the epistemological profile of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8. It commences with a brief historical contextualization of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt that sketches the way the Aristotelian tradition influenced the epistemological profile of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. The second section (3.2) initiates our detailed exposition of the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt by addressing Avicenna’s understanding of the subject of metaphysics as being qua being in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2. In the third section (3.3) we examine Avicenna’s treatment of the utility, rank, and programmatic description of the objects of enquiry of the science of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.3–4.

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Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing in Context

The goal of this first section is to contextualize Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt within the Aristotelian tradition that he inherited, and to outline the general structure of the Ilāhiyyāt. I do this by presenting a condensed digest of the historical and philosophical conclusions arrived at in Amos Bertolacci’s The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ and in number of studies on the major division of the Ilāhiyyāt by R.E. Houser. Let us start with an overview of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Outline of Aristotle, Metaphysics1 Α (i) 1–10 i.1–2: Experience, wisdom, philosophy, theology, science of first causes and principles i.3–10: Ancients, four causes, and ultimate principles α (ii) 1–3 ii.1: Science of truth, gradations of truth, eternal truth, truth and being ii.2: Each of the four causal orders is finite ii.3 Division of sciences and epistemic degrees Β (iii) 1–6 iii.1–6: 15 Aporiae Γ (iv) 1–8 iv.1: First Philosophy, science of being qua being, universal being, its species, properties and causes iv.2: Pros hen equivocation, unity of the subject, coextensionality of being and one iv.3–8: Universal science, defense of axioms, principle of contradiction & excluded middle ∆ (v) 1–30 v.1–30: Philosophical lexicon of definitions of 30 common notions said in many ways E (vi) 1–4 vi.1: Science of being qua being, first principles & causes, being is said in many ways, division of the sciences, first science, first philosophy & theology of what is eternal, immobile, and separate 3.1.1

1 Cf. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Henceforth: dbam), 83–92; Bertolacci, Reception, 149.

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vi.2–3:

Being said in four ways (accidental, essential, true, act and potency), science of being does not concern the accidental vi.4: Science of being does not concern the truth of propositions Ζ (vii) 1–17 vii.1–2: Science of being principally concerns substance (ousia); substance as corporeal and ancient and Platonic opinions about substance vii.3: Substance said in four ways: essence, universal, genus, substrate; substrate or matter is not the principal sense of substance vii.4–12: Substance as essence vii.13–16: Substance is not a universal or genus; error of the Platonists vii.17: Substance as essence and formal cause Η (viii) 1–6 viii.1–6: Division of substances, substance as form & matter, as act & potency Θ (ix) 1–10 ix.1–5: Analysis of potency ix.6–10: Analysis of actuality; actuality as substance, goodness, and truth I (x) 1–10 x. 1–6: One; being, substance, unity; opposition of one & many; problems x. 7–10: Intermediates, contraries; genus, species, difference; men & women not different; destructible & indestructible per se contraries within the genus of substance K (xi) 1–12 xi. 1–7: Synopsis of books iii, iv, & vi xi. 8–12: Material derived from Physics Λ (xii) 1–10 xii.1–5: Substance, change, four causes, potency and act, immovable substance, first act xii.6–10: Theology, eternal, immovable, separate substance, pure act, unmoved movers, Intelligence Understanding Itself, highest good Μ (xiii) 1–10 xiii.1–10: Mathematicals, immovable substances, Platonic ideas; other Platonists; Pythagoreans; problems and difficulties with these doctrines N (xiv) 1–6 xiv.1–3: Errors about contraries, immovable substances, senses of being, tode ti xiv.4–6: Errors with positing superfluous Ideas & Numbers as separate Aristotle envisions three ways of conceiving the science of first philosophy. (i) In Metaphysics A he describes metaphysics as a “wisdom” which treats the

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first causes and principles.2 (ii) In Metaphysics Γ 1, he portrays it as the universal science of being qua being that differs from the particular sciences which only examine some aspect of being.3 Metaphysics Ε 1 reiterates the account of first philosophy as (i) the science of first causes and principles of being qua being, which—in contrast to the particular sciences—is a (ii) universal science of being qua being.4 But Ε 1 also adds that first philosophy is a (iii) divine science because it studies what is eternal, immobile, separate from matter, which is superior to the beings studied by the other sciences.5 Let us identify these three perspectives as the (i) aitiological, (ii) ontological, and the (iii) theological conceptions of metaphysics, where aitiology investigates the ultimate causes, ontology examines being in its universality, and theology pertains to divine beings.6 Aristotle does not seem to regard these three visions of the science of first philosophy to be irreconcilable. Indeed, in the Metaphysics he identifies the aitiological and theological themes,7 and he connects the ontological perspective with the aitiological and theological, for, insofar as first philosophy enquiries into universal being, it is the first science that studies the immobile divine substances.8 In short, first philosophy is a wisdom and a universal science that attends to what is first in reality, and so it is a divine science.9 Aristotle, however, does not address how the harmonization of ontological, aitiological, and

2 Cf. “…the purpose of our present discussion is to bring out this: all men believe that what is called ‘wisdom’ is concerned with first causes and principles…. Clearly, then, wisdom is a science of certain causes and principles.” Metaphysics Α 1, 981b27–982a3 (trans., Apostle). Cf. Α 2, 982a5–10; Α 3, 983a24–25; A 10, 993a13–27. Aristotle also identifies philosophy as a “science of truth,” notes that “we do not understand a truth without its cause,” and that whatever is “most true … is the cause of truth in whatever is posterior to it.” Metaphysics α 1, 993b20–28 (trans., Apostle). 3 “There is a science which investigates being qua being and what belongs essentially to it. This science is not the same as any of the so-called ‘special sciences;’ for none of those sciences examines universally being qua being, but, cutting off some part of it, each of them investigates the attributes of that part …” Metaphysics Γ 1, 1003a21–32 (trans., Apostle). Cf. Ε 1, 1025b8–11; Α 2, 982a22-b10; Κ 3, 1060b31–36; Κ 3, 1061a8–18; K 3, 1061b3–18; K 4, 1061b18–34. 4 Cf. Metaphysics E 1, 1025b3–10; Γ, 2, 1003b19–22. 5 Cf. Metaphysics E 1, 1026a13–23. Metaphysics Α 2, 983a5–12. 6 Cf. Owens, dbam, 51–55; Bertolacci, Reception, 57; 141; Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the ‘Metaphysics’ of Aristotle. 7 Cf. Metaphysics A 2, 982b28–983a11; E 1, 1026a16–18. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 143–145. 8 Metaphysics E 1, 1026a23–32. 9 Cf. Metaphysics A 2, 982a19–b10; Γ 3, 1005a34–b1; Owens, dbam, 79; 157–209; 456–473; Bertolacci, Reception, 111.

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theological trajectories is achieved.10 It is clearly beyond the aims of this study to address these tensions in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the many interpretations it has generated over the past two millennia.11 What is relevant to our enquiry is the way these tensions entered into Avicenna’s own account of the subject of metaphysics. Bertolacci credits to medieval philosophy in the Arabic world one of the more fruitful periods of wrestling with conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. These debates were launched with al-Kindī’s rather extreme “theologizing” account of metaphysics, followed by al-Fārābī’s response, which insists on both the ontological and theological dimensions of first philosophy. Bertolacci argues that Avicenna’s own reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics passed through Kindian, Aporetic, and Farabian phases before arriving at Avicenna’s own clear and completely articulated position found in the Ilāhiyyāt.12 Let us turn our attention to Bertolacci’s account of how Aristotle’s Metaphysics came to be received into Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, starting with the early Arabic philosophers’ interpretations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

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For studies on the overall structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development; Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism; Owens, dbam; idem, “The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics—Revisited” (henceforth: dbam–Revisited); idem, Aristotle’s Gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z (Henceforth: Gradations of Being); Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists; Patzig, “Theology and Ontology in Aristotle’s Metaphysics;” Frede, “The Unity of General and Special Metaphysics: Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics;” Kahn, “On the Intended Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics;” Bolton, “Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics as a Science;” Berti, “Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle;” Menn, Aim and Argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Owens, dbam, 9. For a brief summation of the views on the Metaphysics from Theophrastus to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Asclepius, and even Greek Patristics, like Clement of Alexandria, see Owens, dbam, 9–15. Bertolacci, Reception, 79–88; 131–147; Wisnovsky, amc; Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle;” Fazzo, “Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition;” Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias and the End of Aristotelian Theology;” Steel, “Theology as First Philosophy: The Neoplatonic Concept of Metaphysics;” O’Meara, “The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity;” D’Ancona, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation;” Adamson, “Al-Kindī and the Reception of Greek Philosophy;” Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; idem, “The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture;” Adamson, “Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī and Averroes on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton;” Galluzzo “Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics;” Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, and Their Use of Avicenna in Clarifying The Subject of Metaphysics,” King, “Scotus on Metaphysics;” Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik?; Forlivesi, “Approaching the Debate on the Subject of Metaphysics from the Later Middle Ages to the Early Modern Age.” Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 2, 37–64; idem, “Establishing the Science of Metaphysics;” idem, “Arabic and Islamic Metaphysics.”

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3.1.2 The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics into Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt Bertolacci argues that Avicenna’s developmental reception of the Metaphysics can be explained partly by the interests of different figures involved in the Greco-Arabic translation movement. His detailed examination of the Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics identifies possibly eight, “distinct scholars, with different philosophical backgrounds and affiliations, who engaged in rendering (larger or smaller) portions of the Metaphysics into Arabic. Few other Greek philosophical works have been translated into Arabic so many times and by so many authors… [T]he Metaphysics was repeatedly translated into Arabic during the last two of the three centuries of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (viii–x cc.). All this attests to the great and persistent importance of this work in the Arab world.”13 Bertolacci distinguishes within this translation movement three major phases that reflect three ways in which Arabic philosophers approached the Metaphysics. The first phase concerned the overall transmission of the Metaphysics, the second phase consisted of a “closer inspection and deeper analysis” of what some philosophers regarded as its key parts, such as book Λ. Finally, in the third phase, Arabic philosophers turned to address parts of the Metaphysics that had not yet been fully appreciated and “the need was felt to fill in the gaps, i.e. to translate the parts of the Greek original still missing in Arabic.”14 The first two phases mirror two significant stages of the history of early Arabic philosophy, for they are linked, respectively, with two of the most important schools of the Arabic falsafa. The first phase can be associated with the circle of al-Kindī, to which the main translator of this phase (Usṭāṯ) belonged. The theological emphasis typical of al-Kindī’s approach to the Metaphysics is congruent with the focus on book Λ which we have seen to mark this initial phase. The entire second phase, on the other hand, is the expression of the group of Aristotelian scholars working in Baǧdād, whose first master (Mattā) and most significant exponent (Yaḥyā {ibn-ʿAdī}) were the two translators of this phase. The kind of exegesis of Aristotle’s corpus inspired by the Peripatetic tradition, typical of the Baǧdādī school, is evident in the translations of the commentaries on the Metaphysics by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Syrianus, that Mattā and Yaḥyā joined to their Arabic version of the corresponding  books of Aristotle’s work. The diachronic overview of the Arabic

13 14

Bertolacci, Reception, 31. Bertolacci, Reception, 31.

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translations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, therefore, sheds further light on the history of Arabic philosophy, in so far as it is the reflex of the different trends and sensibilities that were at work in the Arab philosophical milieu when these translations were accomplished.15 According to Bertolacci, Avicenna’s initial studies of the Metaphysics began with the line of interpretation associated with al-Kindī (c. 800–873 a.d.) and his circle. The extant portions of al-Kindī’s Book on First Philosophy (Kitāb alFalsafa al-Ūlā) nicely epitomize the theologizing approach to the Metaphysics found in the earlier history of Arabic Aristotelian falsafa. In his Book on First Philosophy, al-Kindī emphasizes a theological presentation of the Metaphysics that both privileges and connects books α and Λ as a doctrinal unit. Given alKindī’s interest in harmonizing Neoplatonic thought and Islam with Aristotelian philosophy, it is not surprising that his Book on First Philosophy gives metaphysics a decidedly theological cast. «3» The most noble philosophy of the highest degree is the first philosophy, by which I mean the knowledge of the first truth who is the cause of all truth. The complete and most noble philosopher is therefore necessarily the man who comprehends this most noble knowledge, because the knowledge of the cause is more noble than the knowledge of the effect. For we only know each of the effects completely when we comprehend the knowledge of its cause. {…} «5» One may with good reason (bi-ḥaqq) call the knowledge of the First Cause “first philosophy,” since all aspects of philosophy are comprised in knowledge of it [sc. this First Cause or first philosophy]. Thus it is first in nobility, first in genus, first in order with respect to scientific certainty, and first in time, since it [sc. the First Cause] is the cause of time.16 Presented in this Kindian fashion, metaphysics appears to discuss only the aitiological and theological matters found in books α and Λ of the Metaphysics, and thereby suggests that Aristotelian first philosophy simply is a metaphysical theology, where the aitiological investigation in book α serves as an 15 16

Bertolacci, Reception, 33. Cf. Gutas, aat, Chapter 3, 169–255 [149–198]. Al-Kindī, On First Philosophy (trans., Adamson and Pormann in The Philosophical Works of Al-Kindī, 10–11). Cf. Adamson, “Al-Kindi and the Reception of Greek Philosophy;” idem, Al-Kindī; Bertolacci, Reception, 60, n. 74; D’Ancona, “Al-Kindī on the Subject-Matter of the First Philosophy: Direct and Indirect Sources of Falsafa al-ūlā, Chapter One.”

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introduction to the theological matters addressed in Λ.17 This theologization of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, typical of the Kindian circle, informed Avicenna’s initial reception of the Metaphysics during his secondary education, which Bertolacci calls the Kindian phase.18 A later stage in the history of the reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Arabic falsafa is succinctly articulated by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s (c. 870–950/1) On the Goals of the Metaphysics (Fī Aǧrāḍ Kitāb Mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa).19 In this short work, al-Fārābī critiques the overly theological readings of the Metaphysics, especially those that identify the aims of metaphysics with the study of the Neoplatonic triad of “the Creator, the Intellect, and the Soul” (al-bārī… wa–l– ʿaql wa–l–nafs) or the Islamic theological science of God’s oneness, that is, ʿilm al-tawḥīd. Al-Fārābī proposes an alternative interpretation of the Metaphysics that incorporates both ontological and theological dimensions.20 He explicitly identifies the primary subject (mawḍūʿ awwal) of metaphysics with absolute being (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq), which is equivalent to universal being or being inasmuch as it is being. Al-Fārābī identifies the overall goal (ǧaraḍ) of the Metaphysics with the theological matters addressed in book Λ, which he connects with the name (ism) “metaphysics” or “what comes after physics” (mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa).21 Finally, he presents a survey of the divisions (aqsām) of the Metaphysics and the goals of each of the books (except books Α and Ν).22 Al-Fārābī holds that metaphysics stands alone as the universal science (ʿilm kullī); it is a higher science than natural philosophy and the other particular sciences, and it includes philosophical theology as one of its parts. “The divine science ought to belong to this [universal] science, because God is a principle of absolute being, not of one being to the exclusion of another. That division [of the universal science], then, which contains… the principle of being ought to be the divine science.”23 In other words, the theological vector of metaphysics belongs to the part of first philosophy that investigates the principles or causes of absolute being. The investigation into the principles of being is placed among the other parts of metaphysics identified by al-Fārābī, including 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 58–62. Cf. Gutas, aat, 275–285 [243–251]. Cf. Gutas, aat, 269–288 [237–254]; Houser, Suffer, 108–109; Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 3, 66–103; McGinnis, Avicenna, 3–26; Reisman, “The Life and Times of Avicenna Patronage and Learning in Medieval Islam;” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 3, esp. 72–79. Cf. al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, [35:19–36:9] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 68–69). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix D, 593–605. For al–Fārābī’s divisions of metaphysics, see al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, [36:21–38:5] (Bertolacci, Reception, 70–72). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 77; 93. al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, [35:16–19] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 68).

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the subject, species, and properties of being, along with the clarification and grounding of the principles and subjects of the particular sciences. [a] The primary subject of this science is the absolute being (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq) and what is equivalent to it in universality, namely the one (al-wāḥid). But since the knowledge of opposite correlatives is one, the investigation of nonbeing and multiplicity is also included in this science. [b] Then, after these subjects and their verification, it investigates the things which are like species to them, like the ten categories of being (al-mawjūd), the species of the one (like the individual one, the one by species, the one by genus, the one by analogy, and the divisions of each one of these), and similarly the species of non-existence and many. [c] Then [it investigates] into the attributes of being—like potency and act, perfect and deficient, cause and effect—the attributes of unity— like sameness (huwahuwiyya), similarity, equality, coincidence, parallelism, analogy etc.—and the attributes of non-existence and multiplicity. [d] Then [it investigates] into the principles of each one of these [i.e. of being, one, nonbeing and multiplicity]. [e] [Each one of these] is branched out and divided, until the subject of the particular sciences are reached and [consequently] this science ends. In it the principles of all the particular sciences and the definitions of their subject are clarified. These are all the things investigated in this science.24 In sum, Al-Fārābī identifies (1) the primary subject (mawḍūʿ awwal) of the universal science of metaphysics with being (mawjūd) and the one (wāḥid).25 The (a) species of the science are connected with the categories of being, its (b)  properties constitute the attributes of being that are common to all the sciences, and the (c) causal principle that is common or shared (muštarak) by 24 25

al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, [36: 9–20] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 69–70). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 74. “Universal science, on the other hand, investigates the thing that is common to all beings (like existence and unity), its species and attributes, the things which are not proper accidents of any of the subjects of the particular sciences (like priority and posteriority, potency and act, perfect and deficient, and similar things) and the common Principle (al-mabdaʾ al-muštarak) of all beings, namely the thing that ought to be called by the name of God—may His glory be exalted.” al-Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, [35:8–12] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 68).

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all beings is explicitly identified with the divine being. Let us turn now to the significance this rich text had for Avicenna’s own conception of the epistemological profile of metaphysics. In his detailed study of the “autobiography/biography complex” of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980 ca.–1037 ad), Bertolacci, following Dimitri Gutas, distinguishes four stages in Avicenna’s education, and refers to them as “elementary,” “secondary,” “undergraduate,” and “graduate education.”26 He also identifies a number of significant markers in Avicenna’s reception and understanding of the Metaphysics. It appears that prior to his “undergraduate” education, Avicenna was only familiar with the “essential parts” (fuṣūṣ) of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, namely, its theological elements, principally α, 1–2 and Λ, 6–10, and various Aristotelian commentaries on these parts. Up to this point in his studies, Avicenna was under the impression that the Metaphysics consisted principally in books α and Λ, and was a work of theological metaphysics ordered to the goal of understanding the divine being. Later, during his “undergraduate” education, Avicenna came into contact with the whole of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Arabic translation, including book Α.27 Avicenna was initially perplexed to discover the true magnitude of the Metaphysics, that it addresses many matters that do not pertain to the goal of the metaphysical theology of books α and Λ, that α and Λ are not contiguous books, but that α served as an introduction to the whole work, and that Λ functioned more like a conclusion to the Metaphysics.28 This 26

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For detailed studies of Avicenna’s autobiography and al-Jūzjānī’s biography, see Gohlman, ed., The Life of Ibn Sina. A Critical edition and Annotated Translation; Gutas, aat, Chapter 3, 169–255 [149–198]; Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 2, 37–64 (esp., 37–38); McGinnis, Avicenna, 3–26; Reisman, “The life and times of Avicenna Patronage and learning in medieval Islam,” 7–27. Ν.Β. Even after book Α was translated, Arabic philosophers continued to regard α as the opening book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. For Averroes, see Bertolacci, Reception, 14 ff. Averroes’s Tafsīr ascribes a translation of book A to Naẓīf (cf. Reception, 15). In On the Goals of the Metaphysics al-Fārābī discusses books α-Μ (K included), but omits A and N and does not seem to be acquainted with an edition of the Metaphysics that exceeds “the boundaries of Usṭāṯ’s translation.” Reception, 21. For the “Indirect Tradition Concerning Book A” see Reception, Chapter 1.3, 20–30. Bertolacci’s analysis of quotations from book A by Avicenna and al-Šahrastānī, provides a witness to the existence of another, but no longer existent, translation of book A, in addition to Naẓīf’s. He also posits that there must have been an “integral version” of book A that was translated either by Naẓīf’ or someone else (cf. Reception, 30). “The indirect tradition of book A in Arabic witnesses the progressive assimilation of this book. Absent in Usṭāṯ’s translation, referred to indirectly by alKindī and probably unknown to al-Fārābī, from the second half of the x century it was translated at least once (by Naẓīf), possibly a second time. In this way, it was mentioned by Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (x c.), quoted by Avicenna (xi c.) and al-Šahrastānī (xii c.), and extensively paraphrased by ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī (xiii c.).” Bertolacci, Reception, 30. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 62; 44–46; 88–95.

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encounter with the whole of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Avicenna’s perplexity with the work marks his transition from the “Kindian phase” to the “Aporetic phase” of understanding the Metaphysics. Indeed, according to his autobiography, prior to reading al-Fārābī’s On the Goals of the Metaphysics, he was convinced that metaphysics is a useless discipline. Avicenna recounts this transition in a much discussed passage from his autobiography. Having mastered logic, natural philosophy and mathematics, I had now reached metaphysics (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī). I read the Metaphysics (Kitāb Mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa) but did not understand what it contained and was confused about the author’s purpose to the point that I reread it forty times and consequently memorized it. In spite of this I still did not understand it or what was intended by it, and I said, despairing of myself: “There is no way to understand this book (kitāb)!.” One afternoon I was at the booksellers’ quarter when a crier came up holding a volume which he was hawking for sale. He offered it to me but I refused in vexation, believing that there was no use in this particular science. But he said to me: “Buy it; its owner needs the money and it’s cheap; I’ll sell it to you for three dirhams.” So I bought it and it turned out to be Abū-Naṣr al-Fārābī’s book On the Goals of Metaphysics (Fī Aǧrāḍ Kitāb Mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa). I returned home and hastened to read it, and at once the purposes of that book (kitāb) were disclosed to me because I had learned it by heart. I rejoiced at this and the next day I gave much in alms to the poor in gratitude to God Exalted.29 Bertolacci describes this transformation in Avicenna’s understanding of the Metaphysics as his transition from the “Aporetic phase” to the “Farabian phase.”30 Avicenna’s aporetic confusions consisted principally in not grasping

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Avicenna, Autobiography [30.7–34.4] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 44). Cf. Gutas, aat, 17–18 [28]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 44. Bertolacci writes, “the main point of {this text from the Autobiography} is that, when reading Aristotle’s work in its entirety, Avicenna encountered some serious problems. But this situation is better explained if we assume that Avicenna was reading for the first time the Metaphysics in its entirety, by means of one of the two comprehensive Arabic translations of the Metaphysics analyzed in {Reception,} Chapter 1 (Usṭāṯ, Isḥāq); the emergence of these problems at this stage cannot be reasonably accounted for, unless we suppose that Avicenna was having his first acquaintance with the full text of Aristotle’s work. This implies that Avicenna did not read the Metaphysics in its entirety before this stage, namely during his secondary education.” Bertolacci, Reception, 45.

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the overall goal (ǧaraḍ) or purpose of the Metaphysics.31 If the goal of the Metaphysics is to present a philosophical theology, as proposed by the Kindian line of interpretation, why does it only address theological matters in book Λ? How do the many other books of the Metaphysics, which do not discuss overtly theological matters, fit within this overall goal as a divine science? An answer to his confusions on the goal of the Metaphysics was finally provided when Avicenna read al-Fārābī’s On the Goals of the Metaphysics and grasped its clear distinction between the ontological subject of metaphysics and its aitiological– cum–theological goal. Avicenna drew upon the solution of al-Fārābī’s On the Goals of the Metaphysics in his Ilāhiyyāt, which presents his own account of the form of the science of metaphysics and its unification of Aristotle’s vision of metaphysics as an (i) ontology, (ii), aitiology, and (iii) theology.32 Following his own appropriation of the Aristotelian model of the epistemological profile of science, Avicenna divides the science of metaphysics into its (1) subject, (2) scientific principles, and (3) objects of enquiry, including al-Fārābī’s subdivision of the things investigated into (3.a) quasi-species, (3.b) quasi-proper accidents, and (3.c) causal principles of being.33 Like al-Fārābī, Avicenna employs a sharp distinction between the (1) subject and (3) things searched for (maṭālib), that is, the 31 32

33

Gutas, aat, 269–296 [237–261]. “The background of the entire discussion {on the form of metaphysics} is the relationship of falsafa and Islam: whereas al-Kindī emphasizes the theological part of the Metaphysics in order to assimilate Aristotelian metaphysics (and Greek metaphysics in general) and Islamic theology, al-Fārābī stresses the distinction of metaphysics and philosophical theology and assigns a broader scope (and, implicitly, a higher rank) to the former with regard to the latter. Avicenna further develops al-Fārābī’s point of view, somehow incorporating in it al-Kindī’s perspective, and presents the fullest and most articulated account of the relationship of ontology and theology within metaphysics in the history of Medieval philosophy.” Bertolacci, Reception, 113. Cf. Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]; i.1.18 [9]; i.2.12–13 [13–14]. Bertolacci and Houser both point out the significance of Avicenna’s Farabian distinction between the subject and goal of metaphysics. They also both take note of Avicenna’s application of the epistemological profile of a demonstrative science from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. By way of contrast, Bertolacci emphasizes the division of the Ilāhiyyāt into its subject, species, proper accidents and causal principles, whereas Houser concentrates on the division of the Ilāhiyyāt into its subject, scientific principles, and objects of enquiry. In other words, Bertolacci tends to concentrate on the influence of al-Fārābī’s On the Goals of the Metaphysics and does not address the scientific principles, whereas Houser concentrates on the influence of the Posterior Analytics with a particular focus on the scientific first principles. I take these to be differences in emphasis and not incompatible interpretations, which is why I have integrated them here. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Chapters 4–5, 111–211; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 65–73; Houser, First Principle of Demonstration, 121– 125; idem, Suffer, 110–114; idem, Real Distinction, 76; idem, “Why the Christian Magistri

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objects of enquiry, in order to illuminate the way one and the same science of metaphysics consists of an (i) ontological (1) subject, which has (i) ontological, (ii) aitiological and (iii) theological (3) objects of enquiry. Finally, Avicenna distinguishes between the (2) scientific principles admitted at the beginning of the science—such as being, thing, one, and necessary—from the (3.c) causal principles of being investigated among the objects of enquiry—such as God.34 These divisions of metaphysics constitute what I shall call, following Bertolacci, Avicenna’s “epistemological profile” of metaphysics as a philosophical science.35 This epistemological profile provides an important interpretative paradigm for understanding the intelligible contours of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt and his synthetic vision of Aristotelian metaphysics. In order to see the way the Ilāhiyyāt exhibits the divisions of this epistemological profile of the science of metaphysics we shall first outline our interpretation of the overall divisions of the Ilāhiyyāt, and then we shall defend this interpretation in our exegesis of the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt in the present chapter, which concerns Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, and in the next chapter, which concerns Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8.

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Turned to Arabic and Jewish Falāsifa: Aquinas and Avicenna,” 36–38 (Henceforth: Christian Magistri); idem, “Essence and Existence in Ibn Sīnā.” Cf. Healing. Physics, i.2.8–10 [16–17]. Bertolacci’s slightly different account of the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt omits the division of scientific principles and refers to Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 as the Introduction. More significantly, however, is his distinction between the ontological axis and henological axis of the Ilāhiyyāt. “The structure of metaphysics in the Ilāhiyyāt is the combination of seven units (Prolegomena, Introduction, OntologyS, HenologyS, OntologyP, HenologyP, OntologyC/Theology). These units result from the intersection of two main vertical ‘doctrinal’ axes (Ontology and Henology), with four horizontal ‘epistemological’ layers (subjectmatter, species, properties, causes).” Reception, 189. Bertolacci is correct to take note of the various henological topics addressed throughout the Ilāhiyyāt, but Avicenna himself does not appear to distinguish his treatment of henological issues from his overall treatment of being qua being. Indeed, even Bertolacci makes such concessions about the importance of these henological parts of the Ilāhiyyāt. “In comparison with Ontology, Henology appears as a second and subsidiary axis: it is not present in all the main parts, and, wherever is present, it results shorter.” Bertolacci, Reception, 168. “In the actual structure of metaphysics, these two axes coexist and partially overlap. OntologyS is intermingled with HenologyS; OntologyP and HenologyP, on the other hand, are distinct sections, consecutive to each other. Among these parts, OntologyC/Theology is the most important: it is the first part of metaphysics to be mentioned in the outline of this discipline in i, 2…, and is portrayed by Avicenna as the ‘seal’ of the metaphysics…” Reception, 210. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Part 2, cc. 4–7, pp. 107–302, esp. 168; 179–180; 209–210; 472–473. Because Avicenna does not clearly distinguish the henological parts of the Ilāhiyyāt from the ontological parts, I have not distinguished them from each other in my account of the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt.

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Avicenna regards metaphysics as the apogee of human knowledge, and it is for this reason that it is placed at the end of his philosophical summa, the Healing (Šifāʾ), as the fourth part (jumla) and the thirteenth topic (fann) that follows the topics treated by the other philosophical disciplines of logic, natural philosophy, and mathematics. Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt is ten books (maqālāt). The first nine books address the metaphysical topics that are the focus of our study; the final book touches upon the return of creation to the creator and a number of moral matters and that we shall not discuss in this study. Outline of Avicenna, Healing. Metaphysics I. Subject (1–2), Objects of Enquiry (3–4), and Scientific Principles (5–8) II. Substance (1–4) III. Accidents: Quantity (1–6), Quality (7–9), Relation (10) IV. Prior and Posterior (1), Potency and Act (2), Perfect and Imperfect, Mereology (3) V. Particulars and Universals, Definitions (1–9) VI. Four Causes (1–5) VII. Henology, Platonism, Pythagoreanism, and False Ultimate Causes (1–3) VIII. Aitiology (1–3) and Theology (3–7) IX. Creative Emanation and Return (1–7) X. Return, Prophesy, Ethics, Economics, Politics, the Law (1–5) Based on the interpretive paradigm provided by Avicenna’s epistemological profile of the science of metaphysics, the Ilāhiyyāt i–ix admits of the following division: (1) Subject (Prolegomena), i.1–4 (2) Scientific principles (Introduction), i.5–8 (3) Objects of Enquiry (3.a) Species of being, ii–iii (3.b) Proper Accidents of being, iv–vii (3.c) Causal principles of being, viii–ix

(ontology) (ontology) (ontology) (ontology) (aitiology & theology)

The first book of the Ilāhiyyāt introduces the (1) subject, outlines the (3) objects of enquiry, and presents the (2) scientific principles of Avicenna’s metaphysical science. The (1) subject of metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4) consists in a (i) universal ontological science of being qua being. This subject, absolute being (mawjūd al-muṭlaq), is common to all the objects of enquiry sought by the science of metaphysics, but the subject itself is not among the objects of enquiry in the

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science of metaphysics. Because the science of metaphysics investigates a wide range of objects of enquiry—some of which are material, others are united to matter, or can be found both mixed and without matter, and still others are entirely separate from matter—I shall refer to Avicenna’s account of the notion of absolute being considered in itself, that is, the subject of metaphysics, as being neutrally nonmaterial or neutrally immaterial. In short, being is common by analogy to all of the objects of enquiry sought by metaphysics.36 The (2) scientific first principles (Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8) include the (2.a) primary notions of being, thing, one, and necessary, (2.b) the primary proper principles or hypotheses concerning necessary existence and possible existence, and (2.c) the axiom that there is no middle between affirmation and negation, all of which are admitted at the beginning of the science and are employed in the demonstrations developed throughout the objects of enquiry. The (3) objects of enquiry (Ilāhiyyāt ii–x) dealt with by metaphysics are the (3.a) species, (3.b) proper accidents, and (3.c) causal principles of being.37 (3) The ontological enquiries of metaphysics pertain to the (3.a) species and (3.b) proper accidents of being. Books two and three, on substance (Ilāhiyyāt ii) and accidents (Ilāhiyyāt iii), consist in Avicenna’s ontological treatment of the categories or what he identifies with the metaphysical enquiry into the (3.a) quasi-species of being, and also deals with the verification (taḥqīq) of the scientific subjects and principles of the particular sciences.38 36

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In the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna takes for granted that being and existence are analogical (cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.21 [34–35]), because he has already presented his doctrine of the analogy of being and existence at length in Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10–11]. We shall examine Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of existence in Chapter 8.1. Cf. De Haan, “The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing” (Henceforth, Analogy of Being). Cf. “The ‘objects of enquiry’ fall into two groups: The ‘quasi species’ of being are the ten Aristotelian categories, conceived as ‘like’ species under a genus (Avicenna treats them in Met., Bks. 2–3). Some ‘quasi proper accidents’ come in disjunctive pairs: one and many (Bks. 3 and 7), potency and act (Bk. 4), universal and particular (Bk. 5), and possible and necessary (Bk. 1). But the four causes are also quasi proper accidents’ (Bk. 6). And Avicenna also takes up notions equally as universal as being: the one (treated at Met. 1.5, 3.1–3, and 7.1), the true (treated at 1.5 and 8), and the good (8.6). So, Avicenna was the direct source for the Latin doctrine of the four transcendentals. ‘The usefulness of this science [metaphysics],’ Avicenna adds, ‘is in attaining certitude about the principles of the particular sciences. … Therefore, this is like the usefulness of the ruler (al-raʾīs) in relation to the ruled.’ Finally, if we look forward, ontology prepares the way for Avicenna’s philosophical theology (Met. Bk. 8–10).” Houser, Christian Magistri, 36. Cf. Houser, Christian Magistri, 36–38; Houser, Suffer, 111–112. For extended treatment of the various ways Avicenna verifies by conceptual clarification and demonstrative syllogisms the subject and principles of the lower sciences, see Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 7, 265–302.

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Avicenna refers to the matters treated in Ilāhiyyāt iv–vii as the enquiries into the (3.b) quasi-properties or quasi-accidents of being. The proper accidents of being pertain to the ontological study of the notions that are common to being and to all the particular sciences, such as the prior and posterior, potency and act, perfect and imperfect, wholes and parts (Ilāhiyyāt iv); universals and particulars (Ilāhiyyāt v); causes and effects (Ilāhiyyāt vi); and the one and the many, and false accounts of the ultimate causes (Ilāhiyyāt vii).39 Finally, Avicenna presents arguments that establish (3.c) that there are four ultimate first causes of four finite causal orders, that God exists and is necessary existence in itself and possesses various divine attributes (Ilāhiyyāt viii). He concludes his metaphysical science with an extended explanation of his doctrine of creative emanation and the return of all creation to the divine (Ilāhiyyāt ix–x). These final books on the (3.c) causal principles of being (i.e., causes of caused being) correspond to the (ii) aitiological and (iii) theological (3) objects of enquiry into the “parts” of being (i.e., uncaused divine being and other immaterial and separate beings) that are the ultimate goal of metaphysics. “Adopting a metaphor that Avicenna applies to metaphysics elsewhere, it can be said that, according to him, the study of ‘being qua being’ is the ‘root’ of metaphysics, whereas the investigation of the first causes and God is its ‘fruit.’40 Drawing upon the studies of Bertolacci and Houser, we can identify the following sources for Avicenna’s synthetic account of the epistemological profile of metaphysics. First, Avicenna looks to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics for the division of a science into its subject, scientific principles, and objects of enquiry.41 Second, the view that metaphysics is an aitiological and theological

39

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Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.13 [13–14]; i.4.2–6 [26–27]. Houser contends that in addition to treating the henological quasi-properties of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt vii, book vii also forms a “bridge to the second half of the Metaphysics, dealing with God, since it eliminates false notions of the divine and immaterial, thereby paving the way for true doctrine.” Houser, Thomas Aquinas on Transcendental Unity: The Scholastic and Aristotelian Predecessors, Chapter 8, {2} n. 4 (Henceforth: Transcendental Unity). Bertolacci interprets Ilāhiyyāt vii as consisting in Avicenna’s treatment of the henological properties of the subject of metaphysics. While this is true, Houser’s interpretation captures the whole of book vii and its place within the Ilāhiyyāt. Bertolacci, Reception, 114–115. Cf. Reception, Appendix E, 585–586. Cf. Houser, Suffer, 110–114; idem, Real Distinction, 75–82; idem, Christian Magistri, 36–38; idem, “Aristotle and Two Medieval Aristotelians on the Nature of God,” (Henceforth: Two Aristotelians on God) 360–361; idem, “The Language of Being and the Nature of God in the Aristotelian Tradition,” 121–122 (Henceforth: Language of Being); Bertolacci, Subject– Matter of Metaphysics; idem, Reception, 193–203.

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science of what is immaterial and separate is found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in the Aristotelian commentary tradition of Late Antiquity, and is appropriated from these sources at the outset of medieval philosophy in the Arabic world.42 Third, the identification of the subject of first philosophy as being qua being in contrast to its aitiological and theological goal is “present in nuce in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Ammonius/Asclepius’ commentaries on the Metaphysics, from which they passed {on to} al-Fārābī.”43 Avicenna’s conception of being in itself as a neutrally immaterial common notion, which “becomes material in so far as it gets specified and particularized can be regarded as Proclean; its proximate source is probably the Liber de Causis.”44 In other words, while Avicenna’s notion of being as the subject of metaphysics draws upon Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics, it is “enriched with elements originally deriving from pseudo-Aristotelian Arabic reworking of Neoplatonic metaphysical works: both the idea of ‘existent’ as an immaterial and motionless reality, and the doctrine of the causation of ‘existent’ by the first causes and God, reveal the influence, for example, of the Liber de Causis.”45 Unique to Houser’s interpretation of the major divisions of the Ilāhiyyāt is his identification of Avicenna’s treatment of the scientific first principles of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. He contends that Avicenna also appropriates the division of scientific principles into definitions, hypotheses, and axioms from Posterior Analytics, and presents his own metaphysical primary notions (Ilāhiyyāt i.5), hypotheses or proper principles (Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7), and axioms (Ilāhiyyāt i.8).46 The task of the next chapter (iv) is to develop and establish the cogency of Houser’s interpretation of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 as consisting in Avicenna’s account of the scientific first principles of metaphysics. 3.2

The Subject and Goal of a Scientific Metaphysics

We have just surveyed the historical context of the problem of the subject of Aristotelian metaphysics as Avicenna received it from the Aristotelian tradition of falsafa. This historical contextualization of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt as an Aristotelian philosophical science has set in relief the epistemological profile that framed Avicenna’s own approach to the question, “what is the subject of 42 43 44 45 46

Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 115 and 146–147. Bertolacci, Reception, 115. Bertolacci, Reception, 115. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 143–144. Bertolacci suggests this doctrine might have been inspired by proposition four of the Liber de Causis. Bertolacci, Reception, 147. Houser, Suffer, 110–114; idem, Real Distinction, 76–88; idem, Christian Magistri, 36–38.

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metaphysics?” in the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt. Before addressing Avicenna’s presentation of the subject of metaphysics, let us begin with an overview of the chapter divisions of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8. Book one of the Ilāhiyyāt is eight chapters. The subject of metaphysics is addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, which Bertolacci calls the Prolegomena.47 Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 focuses on the subject and goal of metaphysics, Ilāhiyyāt i.3 addresses the utility, rank, names, and relationship of first philosophy to the other sciences, and in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 Avicenna sketches the topics to be pursued from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 to Ilāhiyyāt x. The scientific principles of metaphysics are presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8; Bertolacci calls these chapters the Introduction.48 These chapters are divided into Avicenna’s account of the first principles as primary notions of conceptualization in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, the primary principles of assent proper to metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, and the primary principles of assent common to all the sciences treated in the universal science of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. Outline of Avicenna, Healing. Metaphysics, i.1–8 Subject of Metaphysics (=Bertolacci’s Prolegomena) I.1. The subject of metaphysics is neither aitiological nor theological I.2. The subject of metaphysics concerns the ontological study of being qua being I.3. The Utility, Rank and Names of Metaphysics, its relation to the particular sciences I.4. An Outline of the principles and objects of enquiry of metaphysics First Principles of Metaphysics (=Bertolacci’s Introduction) I.5. The Metaphysical Principles as Primary Notions of Conceptualization I.6. The Metaphysical Principles as Specific Primary Principles of Assent (Part 1) I.7. The Metaphysical Principles as Specific Primary Principles of Assent (Part 2) I.8. The Metaphysical Principles as Common Primary Principles of Assent Avicenna begins his investigation of the subject of metaphysics by rehearsing the three basic elements of an Aristotelian demonstrative science. All sciences consist in: 47 48

Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 169–170. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 170–172.

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Something which is a subject; things that are searched after; and principles, [universally] admitted, from which demonstrations are constructed.49 In the last chapter’s treatment of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science we examined his account of the subject, principles, and objects of enquiry of a science, and in this chapter we have seen the way Avicenna, drawing upon al-Fārābī and other sources, amplified these three elements into the further divisions found in the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt. Our task here, in Chapters 3–4 of Part 2, is to examine Avicenna’s division of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8 into these three elements. In the present chapter’s exposition of the text from Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, we will elucidate Avicenna’s complex—sometimes repetitive, and even obscure—presentation of the subject, goal, and objects of enquiry in Ilāhiyyāt. In this section (3.2) we shall examine Avicenna’s presentation of the subject (mawḍūʿ) and goal (ǧaraḍ) of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2.50 In the next section (3.3) we shall treat Avicenna’s account of metaphysics’ utility, rank, names, relation to other sciences, and the objects of enquiry (maṭālib) or things that are sought after (ʾašyāʾ hiya al-maṭlūba) in first philosophy as presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.3–4. In the next chapter (4) we shall examine the principles (mabādiʾ) that are admitted (musallama) at the outset of first philosophy. Let us turn to Avicenna’s treatment of the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1. 3.2.1 Ilāhiyyāt i.1 on the Subject of Metaphysics: Aitiology or Theology? The first chapter (faṣl) of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt I comprises three major divisions concerning (1) the question of the subject of metaphysics and its relation to the subjects of other sciences, and Avicenna’s rejection of the views that make the subject of metaphysics into an (2) aitiology or a (3) theology. The chapter commences with the heading: “On the beginning of the search of the subject of first philosophy, so that its whichness (ayyiyya) among the sciences becomes evident.”51 Not only must we seek to make clear the subject (mawḍūʿ)

49 50 51

Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]. Cf. Salvation. Logic, 119 [D, 130] (Ahmed, 98); ibid., 135 [D, 144] (Ahmed, 111). For Bertolacci’s detailed treatment of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2, see Reception, 116–131; 153–159; 165–170. Ilāhiyyāt i.1 [3:7]. Bertolacci has argued at length that the heading of Ilāhiyyāt i.1 should read whichness (ayyiyya) instead of quoddity or existential–thatness (anniyya), see Bertolacci, “A Hidden Hapax Legomenon in Avicenna’s Metaphysics: Considerations on the Use

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of metaphysics—both that it is and what it is—but we must also identify its distinctive characteristic or its whichness that differentiates it from the other sciences. Accordingly, the initial project of the prolegomena of metaphysics consists in answering the most fundamental questions if (hal), what (mā), and the concomitant which (ayy) with respect to the subject of first philosophy. In our first chapter (1.3) we presented Avicenna’s account of the proper order of these questions. Unless it is obvious, enquiry begins with the nominal–what question, then the simple–if question, and then the quidditative–what question, which consists in the generic–what and the specific–which questions. Avicenna’s treatment of the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 proceeds precisely in this fashion. First, Avicenna gives us a sense of the various proposals for the subject of metaphysics. He does this by reviewing the common views of his predecessors and his own intimations of the subject of metaphysics as mentioned in earlier parts of the Healing. This answers the nominal-what question and assembles together a range of possible answers to the question: if the science of metaphysics has an ontological, aitiological, or theological subject? Second, we must establish from among these alternatives if any one of them is the subject of metaphysics. And then we must refine our answer to the question what the subject of metaphysics is. This is accomplished by answering the question which (ayy) so as to discern the unique characteristics of the subject of metaphysics and thereby to identify the whichness (ayyiyya) that distinguishes the subject of metaphysics from the subjects of other sciences. The task of establishing the subject of first philosophy and identifying its whichness is initiated in Ilāhiyyāt i.1, but it is not completed until Ilāhiyyāt i.2, which has the following heading: “On attaining the subject of this science.”52 In short, Ilāhiyyāt i.1 is largely negative; it shows what the subject of metaphysics is not, while Ilāhiyyāt i.2 establishes what the subject of first philosophy is and distinguishes it from the other sciences by identifying its whichness. Accordingly, in this subsection (3.2.1) we will present Avicenna’s account of what the

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of Anniyya and Ayyiyya in the Ilāhiyyāt of the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ,” (Henceforth: Hapax Legomenon). Bertolacci translates the heading as follows: “Chapter on beginning to seek the subject of first philosophy, so that its distinctive quality (ayyiyya) among the sciences becomes evident.” I have slightly modified Bertolacci’s translation of ayyiyya to bring out what I, following Bertolacci, assume is Avicenna’s explicit intention to connect whichness (ayyiyya) to the question which (ayy). My interpretation of the chapter heading of Ilāhiyyāt i.1 owes much to Bertolacci’s textual emendation and detailed study on this topic. Ilāhiyyāt i.1 [10:3].

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subject of first philosophy is not, and in the next subsection (3.2.2) we will address what the subject of metaphysics is. Ilāhiyyāt i.1 begins: Now that God, patron of mercy and success, has granted us success so that we have set forth [those] ideas of the logical, natural, and mathematical sciences that ought to be conveyed, it behooves us to commence making known the ideas of metaphysics.53 Ilāhiyyāt i.1 commences with a review of the Isagoge of the Logic of the Healing’s division of philosophical sciences into the theoretical and practical disciplines.54 This short recapitulation of the various sciences and their subjects allows Avicenna to situate the whichness of the universal science of metaphysics with respect to the more particular sciences.55 Avicenna’s conviction that all intellectual knowledge is rooted in the acts of conceptualization and assent emerges again here within his recapitulation of the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, which are demarcated according to their distinct ends. The theoretical {disciplines} are those wherein we seek the perfection of the theoretical power of the soul through the attainment of the intellect in act—this by the attainment of knowledge by conceptualization and assent of things that are [the things] they are, without [reference to their] being our [own] actions and states.56 The theoretical philosophical sciences of natural philosophy, mathematics, and the divine science are concerned with knowledge of things in themselves. The subject of natural philosophy is “bodies, with respect to their being in motion and at rest, and [that] its investigation pertains to the accidents that happen to them essentially in this respect.”57 “The subject of mathematics is either that which is quantity essentially abstracted from matter, or that which has quantity—the thing investigated therein being states that are accidental to quantity inasmuch as it is quantity and where one includes in its definition

53 54 55 56 57

Ilāhiyyāt i.1.1 [3]. Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2; Marmura, Division of Sciences. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.2–8 [3–5]. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.4 [4] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt i.1.4 [4] (mod. trans.).

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neither a species of matter nor a motive power.”58 There are a number of common opinions about the subject of metaphysics. The divine science investigates the things that are separate (mufāriqa) from matter in subsistence (qiwām) and definition (ḥadd). You have also heard that the divine science is the one in which the first causes (asbāb ūlā) of natural and mathematical existence and what relates to them are investigated; and [so also is] the Cause of causes and Principle of principles—namely, God, exalted be His greatness.59 Following the Aristotelian tradition’s division of the theoretical sciences, Avicenna distinguishes natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics in terms of the way these disciplines conceptualize the definitions and assent to the subsistence of these things with respect to matter. The distinct whichness of each of the sciences is tied to the way its subject is conceptualized and assented to with respect to matter.60 Avicenna notes three points about metaphysics that are commonly held: (i) it addresses what is separate from matter in definition and subsistence, that is, the answers by conceptualization and assent to the questions what and if, respectively. (ii) It studies the first causes of the beings investigated by natural philosophy and mathematics. Finally, (iii) it studies the Cause of causes and the Principle of principles, which is God. According to Avicenna, this survey of the topics treated by metaphysics is accurate, but it fails to make explicit the way these questions are investigated and it does not make “evident to you what the subject of metaphysics truly is.”61 While we might grasp what each of these names means, we must still settle if any of these are in fact the subject or the objects of enquiry of metaphysics and what each of these notions means in itself. Furthermore, we still must settle what the subject, principles, and objects of enquiry are in the science of metaphysics, for it too is like “the other sciences,” in the Healing that “have something which is a subject; things searched

58 59 60

61

Ilāhiyyāt i.1.5 [3]. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.6–7 [4] (mod. trans.). Bertolacci notes that a recurrent theme in the Ilāhiyyāt is the way various subjects are separate from matter by definition and subsistence. See Bertolacci, Reception, 118, citing Ilāhiyyāt i.2 [11:9] (SD, 10:87–88); i.2 [12:11] (SD, 12:12–13); i.2 [15:13–14] (SD, 16:95–96); Porro, “Immateriality and Separation in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas” (Henceforth: Separation). Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]. My emphasis.

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after; and principles, [universally] admitted, from which demonstrations are constructed.”62 Related to the question of the subject of metaphysics is the question of the relation of metaphysics to “first philosophy” and “wisdom.” Avicenna notes that the science of metaphysics is thought to be true and first philosophy, that it validates or verifies (taṣḥīḥ) the principles of the other sciences, and is true wisdom. Furthermore, as first philosophy, it is absolute wisdom, which is the best knowledge of the best object, is the most certain, and is knowledge of the first causes of all things.63 Based on such descriptions of first philosophy, and given the aforementioned Kindian approach to Aristotelian metaphysics— which takes the whole of the Metaphysics to be encompassed by the aitiological and theological agenda of books α, 1–2 and Λ, 6–10, respectively—it would seem reasonable to maintain that the subject of metaphysics consists in an aitiological study of the ultimate first causes or a theological account of the existential-thatness of God (anniyyat Allāh).64 Avicenna entertains both of these possibilities in Ilāhiyyāt i.1. He begins by showing that the subject of the divine science of metaphysics is not God, because God’s existential-thatness (anniyya) is among its objects of enquiry. «a» It is not possible that [God’s existence] should be the subject. This is because the subject of every science is something whose existence is admitted in that science, the only thing researched being its states. (This was known in other places.)65 62 63 64

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Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.9–10 [5]. Ilāhiyyāt i.1 [5:17] (SD, 4:59). Bertolacci justifies this existential reading of anniyya and also identifies it as being synonymous with existence (wujūd) based on passages where Avicenna clearly uses the terms as synonyms or makes obvious parallels between them, such as the “existential-thatness of God” (anniyyat Allāh) which, a few lines later, is articulated in terms of, “the existence of the divinity” (wujūd al-ilāhi) Ilāhiyyāt i.1 [6:1] (SD, 4:64). See also, “the existential-thatness of the First Principle” (anniyyat al-mabdaʾ al-awwal) in Ilāhiyyāt i.1 [7:4] (SD, 5:94). Cf. Bertolacci, Hapax Legomenon, 297, n. 18. We shall discuss the connections between anniyya, wujūd, qiwām and other significations or meanings of the primary notion mawjūd in Chapter 6. “Existential-thatness” is my own cumbersome, though preferred translation of anniyya insofar as it makes explicit the existential significance of anniyya and makes explicit the abstract sense of the root term that (anna) as thatness similar to the way whatness (māhiyya) is the abstract form of what (mā) and true-nature or truthness (ḥaqīqa) is the abstract form of true (ḥaqq). I consistently translate wujūd as existence, qiwām as subsistence, and mawjūd as being. Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 257–288. Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 155]; Bertolacci, Reception, 120; n. 26.

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«b» The existence of God (wujūd al-ilāhi)—exalted be His greatness— cannot be admitted as the subject of this science; rather, it is [something] sought in it. This is because, if this were not the case, then [God’s existence] would have to be either «i» admitted in this science but searched for in another, or «ii» else admitted in this science but not searched for in another. Both alternatives are false. «c» «i» For it cannot be sought in another science, since the other sciences are either moral, political, natural, mathematical, or logical. None of the philosophical sciences lies outside this division. There is [absolutely] nothing in them wherein the proof of God—exalted be His greatness— is investigated. [Indeed,] this is impossible. (You will know this with minimum reflection from principles repeated to you.) «d» «ii» Nor can it be sought in sciences other than these, for then it would not be sought in any science at all. [God’s existence] would then have to be either «1» self-evident or [else] «2» something one despairs of proving through theoretical reflection. But it is neither self-evident nor something one despairs of demonstrating; for [in fact] there is a proof for it. Moreover, how can an existence which one despairs of demonstrating be legitimately admitted [as the subject of this science]? «e» It thus remains that the investigation [of God’s existence belongs] only in this science.66 According to Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, the subject and principles of every science must be admitted from the outset, and its objects of enquiry are sought on the basis of the subject and principles.67 Indeed, with respect to the subject of a science we must at the outset know by conceptualization its definition or meaning and know by assent its existence, that is, we must have knowledge that answers the two questions what and if. It is the aim of the science’s objects of enquiry to establish answers to the questions if and why certain objects are connected to the subject. In «a» Avicenna derives two criteria for the subject of a science based on the epistemological requirements for the subject of a science—namely, that we must admit both that it is and what it is from the outset. First, the existence of the subject of a science cannot be demonstrated or proved in that very science. Second, the only things researched or sought in a science are the states (aḥwāl)

66 67

Ilāhiyyāt i.1.11 [5–6] (mod. trans.). Cf. Chapter 2.3.

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of its subject.68 Avicenna uses these two criteria to show that neither God nor the ultimate causes can be the subject of metaphysics. In «b–d» Avicenna rejects the view that God is the subject of metaphysics on the basis of the first criterion.69 If God is the subject of metaphysics, this would mean either «i» that God’s existence is demonstrated in another science, so that it could be admitted in first philosophy, or «ii» that God’s existence is not demonstrated in any science. In «c» Avicenna rejects the first option because he holds that God’s existence is not demonstrated in any of the other philosophical disciplines such as the practical sciences of ethics and politics, or the theoretical disciplines of logic, philosophy of nature, and mathematics. And because Avicenna takes this division of the philosophical disciplines to be exhaustive, it is impossible that there could be any science outside of metaphysics wherein the existence of God is demonstrated. In short, one reason why God cannot be the subject of metaphysics is based on the fact that God’s existence has not been demonstrated in any other philosophical science. In «d» Avicenna shows that the second option «ii» is no better; this is because if God’s existence is not demonstrated in any science, then God’s existence is either «1» self-evident or «2» it is something that cannot be theoretically proven at all. Avicenna rejects both of these alternatives. The first «1» because the conceptualization of the composition of “God” and “existence” does not issue forth in a certain assent to a primary, self-evident, truth that “God exists.” According to Avicenna, God’s existence is not an obvious self-evident truth. This brings us to the second alternative of option two «2», which addresses the theoretical despair we might have concerning the existence of God. If God’s existence is not demonstrated in any other theoretical discipline, and it is not self-evident, then it appears that there is no way to establish any theoretical knowledge of God’s existence. Consequently, if there is no theoretical knowledge of God’s existence, then God’s existence cannot be the subject of metaphysics, the highest theoretical science. Avicenna, however, makes one important qualification: even though God’s existence is not self-evident and is not theoretically proven in the other sciences, this does not mean it cannot be proven at all.70 Indeed, the demonstration of God’s existence pertains to the ultimate goal addressed within the science of first philosophy; hence, even 68 69 70

Avicenna uses the term “states” (aḥwāl) of being in a wide sense that refers to all the attributes of being, including both the quasi-species and quasi-accidents of being. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 155, n. 16; Appendix F, iii, 615. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 120. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.11 [6].

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though the subject of metaphysics cannot be theological, its ultimate objects of enquiry are theological.71 The enquiry concerning [God] would, then, have two aspects one [being] an enquiry concerning Him with respect to His existence and the other [an enquiry] with respect to His attributes. If, then, the enquiry concerning His existence is in this science, it cannot be the subject of this science. For it is not for any science to establish its own subject.72 In short, God’s existence belongs among the first of two theological enquiries, which Avicenna will not attend to until Ilāhiyyāt viii: the existence of God will be demonstrated in Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3, and the attributes of God will be established in Ilāhiyyāt viii.3–7.73 Furthermore, God’s existence can only be demonstrated in metaphysics because it is the only science that investigates what is entirely separate from matter. We shall return to this last point. Since God cannot be the subject of metaphysics, and “since it is inescapable that there should be a subject for this science,” Avicenna next turns to consider: “Is its subject the ultimate causes for all the beings—the four of them—not one being excluded from the discussion? For this is also [a view] which some people may believe.”74 Just as many Aristotelians took God to be the subject of the Aristotelian divine science, so also, some might hold that the subject of the divine science of first philosophy is aitiological and concerns the ultimate causes.75 But Avicenna rejects both the theological and the aitiological construals of the subject of first philosophy.

71 72 73

74 75

Cf. Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; De Haan, “Why the Five Ways? Aquinas’s Avicennian Insight into the Problem of Unity in the Aristotelian Metaphysics and Sacra Doctrina;” idem, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Ilāhiyyāt i.1.12 [6] (mod. trans.). In his Book of Demonstration, Avicenna notes the following concerning the subject of metaphysics and its theological enquiries: “Since what is not the principle of the existence of some beings rather than others, but is rather the principle of every caused being, cannot be investigated in one of the particular sciences, nor can it be itself the subject of a particular science, since it conveys a relationship with every being, nor is it the subject of the common universal science, since it is not something common and universal, its knowledge is necessarily part of this [common universal] science.” Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.7 [A, 165:7–10] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 119, n. 23). Ilāhiyyāt i.1.13 [7] (mod. trans.). Avicenna does not mention who might have held such a view, see Bertolacci, Reception, 120, n. 25. This view is taken from the Prologue to the Theology of Aristotle.

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The aitiological construal of the subject of first philosophy contends that the four ultimate first causes—efficient, material, formal, and final—are admitted as the subject of metaphysics. The difficulty with this proposal is that the examination of ultimate causes must also include studying all four causes inasmuch as they are (1) beings (mawjūdāt), (2) absolute causes (asbāb muṭlaqa), that is, causes as such, (3) what pertains uniquely to each of these four causal ways of being, and (4) what pertains to their composite effect.76 Avicenna argues that the required metaphysical demonstrative research into these aitiological issues is incompatible with the ultimate causes being the subject of metaphysics. Avicenna uses both of the aforementioned two criteria for the subject of metaphysics from «a» to argue that its subject is not aitiological.77 His first argument begins with the presumption that it belongs to metaphysics to address universals and particulars, potency and act, possibility and necessity, and other transcategorical notions. This is because these fundamental notions are not treated in natural philosophy, mathematics, or in the practical disciplines, but since they must be addressed in some science, it belongs to the universal science of metaphysics to treat these fundamental common notions. Now, if the subject of metaphysics were aitiological, that is, if first philosophy only addressed what is per se with respect to causes as causes, then it would, according to the second criterion, only investigate the per se states of causes as such, and so then metaphysics would not address these other transcategorical notions, because they are only accidental to causes as causes.78 Because Avicenna rejects this result as being obviously unacceptable, it follows by modus tollens that the subject of first philosophy cannot be aitiological.79 Avicenna’s second argument appeals to the first criterion and contends that, unlike the subject of metaphysics, the existence of the ultimate causes must be demonstrated; indeed, we must first investigate and establish that all effects necessarily have causes. Knowledge of the absolute causes comes about after the science establishing the existence of causes for those things that have causes. For, as long as we have not established the existence of causes for those things that are effects (by establishing that the existence of [the latter] has a relation to what precedes them in existence), it does not become a 76 77 78 79

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.14 [7]; Bertolacci, Reception, 341. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 120. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.15 [7–8]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 120–121; 225–229.

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rational necessity that there is an absolute cause and that there is here some cause.80 Avicenna’s argument appeals to his account of the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions.81 Before we can understand the quiddity of what causality as such is, that is, what absolute causes (asbāb muṭlaqa) are in themselves, we must first intellectually establish that causality exists. This is because the intelligible per se necessary connection between effects and causes, and their posteriority and priority cannot be grasped simply on the basis of sensation alone, for sensation can only garner knowledge of concomitance. And it is not the case that, if two things are concomitants, it then follows necessarily that one of them is the cause of the other. The persuaded belief that occurs to the soul due to the multiplicity [of things] conveyed by sensation and experience does not become assured, as you have known, except through the knowledge that the things that exist are, for the most part, either natural or voluntary. And this, in truth depends on the establishment of causes (ʿilal) and the confirmation of the existence of causes and reasons–why (asbāb). This is not a primary [self]-evident [knowledge] but is something commonly held; and you have known the difference between the two.82 Like universality, necessity, and quiddity, Avicenna holds that causality belongs to the order of intelligibility, and so it cannot, as such, be known apart from intellectual understanding. Accordingly, sensation and experience only confirm concomitance and incline the soul towards common belief, even though the existential and quidditative connections and priority and posteriority between causes and caused things, that is, effects, might appear to be known with certainty as self-evident. To verify the necessary connection between causes and effects, however, requires establishing the existence of natures, the intrinsic dependency of certain effects on their causes, efficient causes or causes (ʿilal), and final causes or reasons-why (asbāb).83 It belongs to metaphysics

80 81 82 83

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.16 [8]. Cf. Chapter i.3. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.16 [8] (mod. trans.). Here Avicenna appears to take ʿilla to mean causality as such or efficient causality in particular, which he is contrasting with a reason-why (sabab). Cf. “…[T]he Arabic sabab translates Aristotle’s to dioti. … [B]y the time Ibn Sînâ is writing, the Arabic ʿilla is the common translation for aition. Furthermore, if we consult the Arabic translation of the Posterior

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alone to establish these features of absolute causes (asbāb muṭlaqa), that is, causality as such.84 Consequently, because metaphysics must enquire into and establish the existence of causality as such prior to any investigation into what causality is as such, neither the existence nor quiddity of causality can be admitted at the beginning of metaphysics. Hence, causality as such cannot be the subject of metaphysics, for no science takes for granted the existence of a subject for which it must also establish its very existence. Because causality as such cannot be admitted as the subject of metaphysics, but must be established along with its other objects of enquiry, Avicenna can also rule out the other causal candidates for the subject of metaphysics insofar as they depend upon establishing the existence and nature of absolute causes. This includes the (3) particular nature of each kind of cause and their (4) aggregate effect. But more importantly, it also excludes the four ultimate first causes from being the subject of metaphysics. Not only are the ultimate first causes not self-evident, but they also presuppose the very existence and nature of causality as such, and the existence and particular nature of each of the four causes. Consequently, if none of these aspects of causality can stand as the subject of metaphysics—because they cannot be assumed, but must be established—then a fortiori the ultimate first causes cannot be admitted as the subject of metaphysics.85 And so the aitiological enquiry into ultimate first

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Analytics, sabab translates dioti, or ‘reason why.’” McGinnis, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam: Induction and Experimentation in the Philosophy of Ibn Sînâ,” 311, n. 8. Cf. Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā);” idem, “Avicenna on Causal Priority;” Richardson, “Avicenna’s Conception of the Efficient Cause.” Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6; iv.1; vi.1–5. It is important to point out that in the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna uses the term absolute causes (asbāb muṭlaqa) in two ways. Here in Ilāhiyyāt i.1, he uses it to mean causality as such, but in Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3 he uses the phrase to mean the ultimate uncaused first cause. It belongs to the science of metaphysics to establish the existence of both kinds of absolute causes. Bertolacci analyzes Avicenna’s argument from Ilāhiyyāt i.1 as follows: “In i, 1, p. 8, 5–8 [p. 7, 21–25], Avicenna states, literally, that (i) the knowledge of the absolute causes follows from (ii) the knowledge establishing the existence of causes for the caused things: without (ii)—which follows, on its turn, on (iii) establishing that the existence of the caused things depends on what is anterior to them in existence—we do not know (ia) the existence of the absolute cause. It seems that, according to Avicenna, point (i) is equivalent to, or follows immediately from, point (ia), and mediately from points (ii) and (iii). Thus, in order to convey point (i), metaphysics has to provide point (ia), i.e. the existence of the absolute causes, which implies that the absolute causes cannot be the subject-matter of metaphysics. In the following lines (p. 8, 8–18 [pp. 7, 25–8, 39]), Avicenna shows that neither sensation nor any of the sciences other than metaphysics can provide points (ii) and (iii), and that metaphysics consequently provides them.” Bertolacci, Reception, 121, n. 29. Cf. Reception, 225–229.

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causes must be found in some other science or is treated in metaphysics among its objects of enquiry. But no science except {metaphysics} includes a discussion of the ultimate causes. If, however, the examination of the causes pertains to them inasmuch as they exist and [pertains] to the things that relate to them in this respect, then the primary subject [of metaphysics] must be being inasmuch as it is being. Thus, the falsity of this theoretical {position}— namely, that the subject of this science is the ultimate causes—becomes evident. Rather, it should be known that [probing the ultimate causes] is its perfection and what it seeks after.86 Just as theological objects of enquiry pertain to the ultimate goal of the divine science of metaphysics, so also do the ultimate causes (al-asbāb al-quṣwā) belong to the ultimate goal sought after (maṭlūb); causality is among the objects of enquiry which perfect (kamāl) or bring to completion the science of metaphysics. Metaphysics does investigate the causes and what relates to them insofar as they exist, but if metaphysics enquires into such causal matters insofar as they exist, then being insofar as it is being should be the subject of metaphysics, not its causes.87 And this brings us to what Avicenna takes the subject of metaphysics to be, namely, the science of being inasmuch as it is being (mawjūd bi mā huwa mawjūd). Avicenna presents his own understanding of this famous Aristotelian locution in Ilāhiyyāt i.2. Ilāhiyyāt i.2 on the Subject of Metaphysics: An Ontology of Being qua Being We have just seen that Avicenna clearly rejects the Kindian view that the subject of metaphysics is aitiological or theological; rather, he holds that the science of metaphysics pursues aitiological and theological questions as its goal. Such topics are among its ultimate objects of enquiry, and this is why these questions are not entertained until Ilāhiyyāt viii. In contrast to Ilāhiyyāt i.1, which focuses on rejecting a number of positions from the Aristotelian tradition concerning the subject of metaphysics, the central goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.2 is to establish and clarify the subject of metaphysics as the science of being qua being, and so also to identify the whichness that distinguishes it from the other sciences. The chapter has four major divisions. First, it examines the subjects 3.2.2

86 87

Ilāhiyyāt i.1.17–18 [9]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 121.

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of the various sciences in order to show that there must be a scientific enquiry concerning being qua being. Second, it establishes the subject and major divisions of metaphysics as the science of being qua being. Third, it addresses an objection that challenges Avicenna’s vision of the way the common science of metaphysics unites all of the sciences by verifying the principles of the other sciences. Fourth, the chapter concludes by identifying the science of metaphysics with first philosophy, wisdom, and divine science, and thereby establishes its goal and distinguishes it from dialectics and sophistry. We shall address each of these topics in this order. 3.2.2.1 Being and the Other Sciences Avicenna opens Ilāhiyyāt i.2 stating that, “we must inescapably indicate the subject of this science so that the goal (ǧaraḍ) that lies in this science becomes evident for us.”88 He accomplishes this by way of three main arguments.89 He first shows that the subjects of the other sciences as existing beings are the states and accidents (ḥālāt wa-ʿawāriḍ) of being qua being.90 Second, that the notions common to all the other sciences, but not treated by any of them, are proper accidents (ʿawāriḍ ẖāṣṣa) of being qua being.91 Third, that the meaning and existence of being qua being are self-evident, and so can be admitted— that is, known in a primary way by conceptualization and assent—without being demonstrated in another science as states or properties of being.92 The first argument shows that none of the other sciences addresses the subject of their discipline insofar as it exists; indeed, being (mawjūd) and existence (wujūd) are the common philosophical remainders that are assumed in all sciences, but are not explained by any of them. In contrast to Ilāhiyyāt i.1— which argued that the subject of metaphysics could not be aitiological or theological because the existence of the ultimate causes and God is something that must be demonstrated in metaphysics—Ilāhiyyāt i.2 shows that while the existence of the diverse subjects are admitted in the different particular sciences, existence as such is never investigated. When Ilāhiyyāt i.1 and i.2 are taken together, a common point emerges, namely, that even though existence is the most basic and fundamental object of all assents, and is contained, at least implicitly, in every response to the question if, the question of being and existence nevertheless remains an enquiry unexplored in its own right, and which 88 89 90 91 92

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.1 [10] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 121–124. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.1–10 [10:5–12:14]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.11–12 [12:15–13:9]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.12 [13:9–12].

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requires investigating. And thus, the first argument establishes that the subject of metaphysics must in some way concern being. Let us examine the way Avicenna shows that being and existence figure into the subjects of the various sciences, even though they are not treated by any one of them. The subject of natural philosophy studies being insofar as it pertains to motion and rest. But it does not study being insofar as it is being, substance, or composed of form and matter, even though these principles are common to all the particular sciences of natural philosophy, such as those concerned with the heavens, generation and corruption, meteorology, mineralogy, life or the soul, botany, and zoology.93 In other words, the principles that are common to all the disciplines of natural philosophy, such as being, substance, and form and matter, are simply assumed in these disciplines without any enquiry into what these notions are in themselves. The mathematical sciences take as their subject either continuous quantity abstracted from matter, as in geometry; or continuous quantity conceived with matter, as in astronomy; or discrete quantity as abstracted from matter, as in arithmetic; or discrete quantity conceived in matter, as in music.94 The subject of logic, as we saw in the first chapter, is the secondary intentions derived from primary intentions; but logic does not address whether these intelligible intentions have cognitional existence, or whether this intentional mode of existence is attached to some sort of “matter,” such as “noncorporeal matter” (mādda ǧayr jismāniyya).95 In short, none of these sciences examine the very mode of being that belongs to their respective subjects of enquiry. These diverse philosophical disciplines, plus metaphysics, exhaust the sciences for Avicenna, and since these other philosophical sciences only get more specific in their investigations of kinds of being, none of these sciences ever address the being that is common to all of them. Avicenna draws our attention to this glaring philosophical lacuna in the first part of Ilāhiyyāt i.2. He sums up this lacuna as follows: Investigating the state of substance inasmuch as it is a being and a substance; of body inasmuch as it is a substance; of continuous quantity and discrete quantity inasmuch as [these] two are beings, and the manner of their existence; and [the state of] formal things that are either not in matter or are in matter which is not corporeal matter, and the manner of 93 94 95

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.2 [10]; Healing. Physics, i.1–10. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.3 [10]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.4 [10–11]. By noncorporeal matter (mādda ǧayr jismāniyya), Avicenna means non-particular matter, that is, the abstract notion of materiality included in the essence of a horse, but which does not indicate any single particular horse. Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3 [12–14]; Marmura, Division of Sciences, in Probing, 5–9.

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their existence and what mode of existence is proper to them—[all this] is one of the things to which one ought to devote {a distinct} enquiry.96 There must be a unique enquiry into these common principles, one that is especially concerned with addressing the subjects and principles of the various sciences insofar as they are beings that exist. This unique enquiry, however, must be carefully distinguished from the way we know sensible things and the forms abstracted from matter and sensible things. For this enquiry “can neither be part of the knowledge of sensible things nor [be] part of the knowledge of what exists in sensible things.” In other words, this unique enquiry into being and existence as such cannot be part of the sciences of natural philosophy (its notions are conceptualized in terms of change and its objects must exist in sensible matter) or mathematics (its notions are abstracted from and can be conceptualized apart from sensible matter, but its objects exist in sensible matter), or logic (its notions are secondary intentions, dependent on primary intentions). In short, this unique enquiry into being cannot be intrinsically tied to sensible matter either in its conceptual intelligibility or its existence. Consequently, this special enquiry into being must be “part of the knowledge of that whose existence is separable (mubāyin).”97 Here Avicenna is drawing on his earlier division of the sciences taken from the Isagoge in the Logic of the Healing. What distinguishes divine science is that it considers beings that are separable from matter both in conceptualization and existence (wujūd) or subsistence (qiwām).98 Furthermore, the investigations of metaphysics into the very notions of substance, discrete and continuous quantity (given appropriate qualifications),99 and the secondary

96 97 98

99

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.5 [11] (mod. trans.), emphasis added. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.5 [11]. “The various kinds of the sciences therefore either [(a)] treat the consideration of beings inasmuch as they are in motion, both in conceptualization (taṣawwuran) and in subsistence, and are related to materials of particular species; [(b)] treat the consideration of beings inasmuch as they separate from materials of a particular species in conceptualization, but not in subsistence; or [(c)] treat the consideration of beings inasmuch as they are separated from motion and matter in subsistence and conceptualization. The first part of the sciences is natural science. The second is the pure mathematical science, to which belongs the well known science of number, although knowing the nature of number inasmuch as it is number does not belong to this science. The third part is divine science [i.e., metaphysics]. Since beings are naturally divided into these three divisions, the theoretical philosophical sciences are these.” Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.2 [14:3–10] (mod. trans., Marmura, Division of Sciences, in Probing, 9). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.7–8 [11–12].

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intentions of logic insofar as they are considered as such, do not depend upon sensible matter. It is thus evident that all these {notions} fall under the science that is engaged with [those things] whose subsistence (qiwām) is not connected with sensibles. It is impossible to posit for them a common subject other than being (mawjūd) of which they would all constitute the states and accidents. For some of them are substances, some are quantities, and some are other categories. No ascertainable meaning can be common to all of them other than the true meaning of existence (wujūd).100 Avicenna’s panning for existential gold has revealed that the only meaning or notion common to the diverse subjects and notions assumed within all of the other philosophical sciences—which treat notions with various attachments to matter and are concerned with the various categories, not just substance and quantitative accidents—is the true meaning of existence, and so also being. And the subject and principles of the other sciences are counted among the states and accidents (ḥālāt wa-ʿawāriḍ) of being (mawjūd). Metaphysics is concerned with notions that go beyond the limited ways in which beings are connected to sensibles, matter, and all that is more known to us. For metaphysics must address existence according to all of its diverse ways of being, which spans from (1) the existence of things that are absolutely independent from matter and material attachments, like separate intellectual substances, to (2) beings composed with but prior to matter as causes of its subsistence, like form, (3) or things that are able to be found existing either in matter or subsisting separate from it, such as unity and causality, and (4) material things, like motion and rest, which metaphysics studies insofar as they are beings that exist, and not insofar as they are material.101 Hence, by studying being qua being, Avicenna means that metaphysics studies being as neutrally nonmaterial. Furthermore, unlike the univocal meanings of the categorical notions, such as substance, quantity, quality, and the other accidents, the meanings of existence, subsistence, and being are not univocal, for they are shared in common by all the categorical notions, and so being, existence, and subsistence are transcategorical.102 In short, what unites all of these diverse topics is being (mawjūd) and its

100 101 102

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.10 [12]. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.11 [12–13]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 91–93; 123, n. 32; Porro, Separation. Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Categories, i.2. Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of existence will be addressed in Chapter 8.1.

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meaning as that which has existence (wujūd) or subsistence (qiwām).103 Consequently, being (mawjūd) is the only suitable subject for the science of metaphysics which investigates a wide range of beings, indeed, being as transcategorical, which spans from things whose essence and existence are immersed in matter to the divine being which is entirely separate from matter and transcends categorical beings. This brings us to Avicenna’s second argument for the subject of metaphysics as being qua being. The first argument established both that the subjects and principles of the other sciences as existing beings are not addressed by any of these sciences, and that it belongs to the unique enquiry of metaphysics to study them insofar as they fall under the investigations into being qua being. The second argument builds on the first by establishing that the many common notions assumed in the other sciences, but not addressed by any of them, must be treated, and that they are treated among the proper accidents (ʿawāriḍ ẖāṣṣa) of being qua being. Similarly, there are also things that must be defined and verified in the soul and that are common in the sciences, even though not even one of the sciences takes upon itself the task of discussing them, like one inasmuch as it is one, many inasmuch as it is many, correspondent, different, contrary, and so on. Some of {the sciences} only use them, others only assume their definitions, without discussing the mode of their existence. They are not proper accidents of any thing pertaining to the subjects of these particular sciences, nor are they among the things whose {mode of} existence is anything other than the existence of attributes for entities (ḏawāt); nor are they among the attributes shared by all things so that each one of them would be common to every thing. And, they cannot be specifically confined to any one category, nor can they be the [proper] accidents of anything except being inasmuch as it is being.104 We must conceptualize the meaning and assent to subsistence of a number of common notions that are deployed in many of the sciences, yet without defining them or treating their existence in these sciences. Nevertheless, some science must examine the meaning and existence of these common notions, and 103 104

I shall explain the connection between the primary notion being (mawjūd) and its meanings such as that which is/has existence (wujūd) and subsistence (qiwām) in Chapter 6. Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; De Haan, Mereological Construal. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.11 [12–13] (mod. trans. of Marmura and Bertolacci, Reception, 89).

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since these common notions are neither the proper accidents of any of the particulars sciences, nor common to all things, nor restricted to any of the categories, Avicenna concludes that they too must fall under the proper accidents of being treated by metaphysics. Hence, Avicenna draws the following conclusion: It is thus clear to you from this totality [of what has been said] that being inasmuch as it is being (mawjūd bi mā huwa mawjūd) is something common to all these things and that it must be made the subject of this art for the reasons we have stated.105 The science of metaphysics consists in a unique line of enquiry not attended to by any other science, which—according to his first two arguments—includes (1) researching the subjects and principles of the particular sciences insofar as they exist and (2) examining the meaning and existence of the common notions (e.g., one and many, act and potency). And the only subject that can unite these diverse enquiries is being inasmuch as it is being, because being (mawjūd) is neutrally nonmaterial, transcategorical, and common to all things. But does being qua being pass the two conditions required for the subject of a science that Avicenna introduced in Ilāhiyyāt i.1?106 The first criterion is that the existence of the subject of a science cannot be demonstrated in that science, and the second criterion is that a science only investigates topics that essentially pertain to its subject as such. Clearly, insofar as they are beings, the subject and principles of the various sciences and the common notions all fall under the scope of first philosophy’s investigations into being qua being. But does the subject of being qua being meet the first criterion, that is, does metaphysics need to demonstrate the existence of its subject as being qua being? Or does metaphysics require another science to demonstrate the existence of its subject? These questions are answered by Avicenna’s third argument. Moreover, because it {i.e., being qua being} is above the need either for its quiddity to be learned or for itself to be established so as to require another science to undertake to clarify [such] a state therein ([this] because of the impossibility of establishing (iṯbāt) {the existence of} the subject

105 106

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.12 [13] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.11 [5].

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of a science and verifying its quiddity (māhiyya) in the very science that has that subject), but only the admission of its existential-thatness (anniyya) and quiddity (māhiyya).107 Unlike God and the ultimate causes, being (mawjūd) and its meaning as that which has existence (wujūd), are self-evident, and so there is no exigency for any science, including metaphysics, to acquire knowledge of its meaning by conceptualization or to establish its existence by an assent acquired through a demonstration. Accordingly, being qua being fulfills the first criterion that it is impossible to establish (iṯbāt) by a demonstration the existence or verify the quiddity of the subject of a science in that very science. Because being (mawjūd) is self-evident, we can admit the existential-thatness (anniyya) and whatness (māhiyya) of being from the outset. Again, as self-evident, our knowledge of being is primary, that is, it is not acquired, for being cannot be defined and cannot be demonstrated. Hence, our knowledge of being with respect to the questions what and if belongs to our primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent, which we discussed at length in the first two chapters of our study.108 3.2.2.2 Being as the Subject of Metaphysics After an extended examination of what is lacking in the subjects and enquiries of the other sciences, Avicenna has shown that the science of metaphysics can treat each of these overlooked questions and notions insofar as they are all related to being. The purpose of this investigation was to establish the subject of metaphysics, and this is precisely what Avicenna addresses at the beginning of the second part of Ilāhiyyāt i.2.

107 108

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.12 [13] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Hapax Legomenon, 295, n. 15 for a discussion of Avicenna’s use of anniyya and for alternative translations. The putative givenness of being and existence is mirrored in the cognitional structure of assent. Recall that in Avicenna’s logic he takes existence to be intrinsic to all propositions of assent—even the most primary and certain principles of assent. Every assent to every response to the question if is always directly or indirectly an existential (and a modal) assent to a proposition wherein affirmation of existence is primary and all other forms of propositions are derivatives from this basic propositional structure. For example, nonexistence is known through existence, negation through affirmation, and impossibility and possibility, through necessity. In short, if we do not know existence, we do not know anything. See Chapter 2.2.

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Therefore, the primary subject of this science is being inasmuch as it is being; and the things sought after in [this science] are those that accompany it {i.e., being,} inasmuch as it is being, unconditionally.109 The whichness of the science of metaphysics that distinguishes its subject from the subjects of all the other sciences is found in the universality of its subject. Instead of studying some mere part of reality, metaphysics alone takes as its subject the comprehensive enquiry into being qua being (mawjūd bi mā huwa mawjūd) and everything that accompanies it essentially. As we have seen being is common to all things and the signification of being as that which has existence (wujūd) or subsistence (qiwām) does not need to be learned, established, or verified by another science, because it is self-evident. Finally, by setting up being as the subject of first philosophy, we also solidify the goal and the objects of enquiry that it seeks, namely, all the objects of enquiry that attach to (talḥaqu) being qua being without qualification. Avicenna draws upon the topics not treated by the other sciences and distinguishes two ways in which these objects of enquiry attach or pertain to the subject of metaphysics. Some objects of enquiry are quasi-species of being and many others are quasi-accidents of being.110 Some of these things {that} belong to it {i.e., being, are} akin to species— as, for example, substance, quantity, and quality. For, in undergoing such a division, being does not require, [as is] required by substance, [a] prior division into many divisions, where it must [for example] be divided into human and not human. The division (qisma) of being into the categories of substance and accidents belongs to the investigation into the quasi-species of being.111 But this division is not a proper division of a genus into its species, for being is not a genus, it is only a “quasi-genus” insofar as it is more universal than and common to all the summa genera. Likewise, substance and accidents are not species of being, but are “akin to” or are “quasi-species” of being insofar as they are both divisions of 109 110

111

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.12 [13] (mod. trans.). In Chapter 8 we shall treat these quasi-species and quasi-accidents of being along with the distinction between in itself and through another (cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6–8), and the many senses of essential and accidental found in Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions introduced in Chapter 2.1. On the method of division in Avicenna, see Bertolacci, Reception, 230–232.

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being. Accordingly, being’s division into the quasi-species is not like the ordinary categorical—and so univocal—division of substance into more specific substances or division of accidents into more specific accidents.112 Avicenna then turns to the “quasi-proper accidents” of being. Some {of the things pertaining to being qua being} belong to it as proper accidents, like one and many, potency and act, universal and particular, possible and necessary. For being, in order to receive these accidents and be predisposed to them, does not need to be specified as natural, mathematical, ethical, and so on.113 The quasi-proper accidents of being listed here consist in the various disjunctive common notions. Considered as common notions these proper accidents do constrict being notionally, but they do not diminish the universality of being such that it would thereby become specified or restricted to the subject of the particular sciences. In short, and to reiterate the point from Avicenna’s second argument, the common notions are employed in the more specific sciences, but because they pertain to matters more common than the scope of these sciences, such as being, they are only treated by metaphysics. Avicenna situates these quasispecies and quasi-accidents of being within the Farabian paradigm of a science’s species, proper accidents, and causal principles.114 But before doing so, Avicenna first addresses an important objection concerning the principles of being, and this brings us to the problem treated in the third major division of Ilāhiyyāt i.2. 3.2.2.3 The Principles of Being and the Subject of Metaphysics The third part of Ilāhiyyāt i.2115 commences with an objection to Avicenna’s identification of the subject of metaphysics with being qua being, and concludes with Avicenna’s Farabian division of the parts of metaphysics. Let us start with the objection.

112 113 114 115

I shall return to the division of being per se into the categories or quasi-species of being in Chapter 8.1. Ilāhiyyāt i, 2.13 [13] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 125). Cf. al–Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics [36: 9–20]; Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 3, 65–103. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 124–126.

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If being is made the subject of this science, then the principles of being cannot be established in it, because, in every science, research (baḥṯ) is of the things that follow its subject, not of its principles.116 This objection makes explicit a third criterion for the subject of a science, not only must the subject’s existence and essence be admitted and its objects of enquiry researched through demonstration, the principles of a science, like its subject, must also be admitted at the outset, which excludes any demonstrative research of a science’s principles in that very science. The root difficulty here is based upon an important equivocation in the meaning of the term “principle,” which is explicitly addressed in Avicenna’s Physics of the Healing. In the first book of the Physics of the Healing, he presents the first principles as primary notions of natural philosophy, such as form and matter. It is in this context that he distinguishes between two kinds of common principles. «1» Since our present discussion concerns the common principles, the agent and end considered here are common to them. Now, what is common may be understood in two ways. (1) One is the way in which the agent is common as producing the first actuality from which all other actualities follow, such as that actuality that provides Prime Matter with the initial corporeal form. If there is such a thing (as you will learn in its proper place),117 it would provide the initial foundation subsequent to which what comes next reaches completion. The end would be common [in this sense], if there is such an end (as you will learn in its proper place),118 in that it is the end toward which all natural things tend. This is one way. (2) The other way that something is common is by way of generality, as the universal [predicate] agent is said of each of the particular agents of particular things, and the universal [predicate] end is said of each one of the particular ends of particular things. «2» The difference between the two is that in the first sense, common denotes a determinately existing entity that is numerically one [and] which the intellect indicates that it cannot be said of many, whereas in the second sense, common does not denote a single determinately

116 117 118

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.14 [14]. For Avicenna’s technical use of “research” (baḥt) as knowledge acquired by demonstrations and syllogisms, see Gutas, aat, 74 [77]; 200–201 [176]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.1–2; vi.1–3; viii.3. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.

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existing entity in reality, but an object of the intellect that applies to many that are common in the intellect in that they are agents or ends, and so this common thing is predicated of many.119 First, there are (1) the causal principles that are common by way of causality, such as the uncaused first efficient cause, which is the ultimate efficient cause of existence for all caused existents. Because such an agent or efficient cause is beyond the realm of nature, it is not treated by natural philosophy, but by first philosophy.120 Second, there are (2) the scientific principles that are common by generality and predication, and are said of every instance of a kind. The former are singular beings that are the cause of many, the latter are universals said of  many. The primary principles of natural philosophy as notions—such as form, matter, agent, end—and hypotheses—such as those pertaining to act and potency—are all common principles by way of predication. These common scientific principles, however, are only “assumed in natural philosophy but are demonstrated in first philosophy.”121 The science of metaphysics includes both common principles by predication and by causality. The common notions such as being and thing, necessary and possible existence are included in the scientific principles of metaphysics. The first causes and divine being are examples of causal principles.122 This objection concerning the principles of being, then, fails to distinguish between these two kinds of principles, which the science of metaphysics approaches in two distinct ways. Metaphysics does not research but admits, that is, it knows in a primary way by conceptualization and assent, its own self-evident scientific first principles (Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8), but it researches and demonstrates the existence of the divine first causal principle of all caused beings (Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3). Hence, the “theoretical enquiry into the {causal} principles is also research (baḥṯ) into the things that occur as accidents to this subject.”123 What does it mean to say that the causal principles of being are accidental occurrences to being qua being? Avicenna clarifies this last point by explaining the way the accidents of being are related to the notion of being that is

119 120 121 122 123

Healing. Physics, i.2.8–9 [16–17]. For the Farabian background to this distinction between causal principles and scientific principles, see Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna, 81–83. Cf. Healing. Physics, i.2.10–11 [17–18]. Healing. Physics, i.2.11 [18] (mod. trans.). Cf. Healing. Physics, ii.1.2 [107–108]. We will treat the scientific principles of metaphysics in Chapter 4 and the causal principles of metaphysics in Chapters 9–10. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.15 [14] (mod. trans.).

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the subject of metaphysics. Four qualifications are noteworthy. First, being (mawjūd) is a notion that is common, prior to, and not constituted by being caused or being a causal principle, for being can be considered without one or the other ascription; indeed, such disjunctive notions only characterize distinct parts of being. And because being a causal principle is only a part of common being and not the whole of being, it occurs accidentally to the nature of being (ṭabīʿa al-mawjūd).124 Second, there is no notion that is more general than being to which being might attach in a primary way. Hence, accidents of being, such as being caused, cannot occur to a more primary notion than being. But these accidental transcategorical common notions are not equivalent to being as such; rather, they are distinct notional amplifications of being insofar as they add intensions to being that are not signified by the notion of being itself. Third, being as being caused and as being a causal principle, do not require such notional constrictions of the notion of being that it must be identified with the subject and principles of natural philosophy, mathematics, logic or any other science. This is because the notional constrictions of being by such causal specifications are still antecedent to the particular specifications of the notional constrictions of the particular sciences, like being as in motion and rest, as quantified, and as a secondary intention. And this is why being caused or being a causal principle belongs among the investigations of the universal science of metaphysics.125 Fourth, being inasmuch as it is a causal principle is not a causal principle of being in its entirety, because then being as such would be a causal principle of itself. This is because, as was noted in the first point, absolute being or being in toto has no causal principle; rather, being as a causal principle is only a causal principle of being that is caused. Hence, being as a causal principle only causes a part of being, namely, caused being. And, as was shown in Ilāhiyyāt i.1, metaphysics does not take as its subject the causal principles of being as such, for that would make its subject aitiological or theological.126 Metaphysics, then, does not demonstrate the causal principles of absolute being (mawjūd muṭlaq),

124 125

126

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.15 [14:5]. Cf. “[a] The fact of being a principle is neither constitutive of being nor excluded from it; rather, with regard to the nature of being, it is something inherent in it and one of the proper accidents of it. [b] For there is nothing more common than being, so that existent would be an attribute of something else in a primary way. [c] Being does not even need to become natural, mathematical or something else in order that the fact of being a principle inheres in it.” Ilāhiyyāt i.2.15 [14] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 125). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.15 [14].

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but it does research among its objects of enquiry the causal principles of caused beings. Some significant clarifications to Avicenna’s doctrine of being have emerged from these four qualifications on the way causal principles accidentally occur to absolute being.127 Let us summarize these features, before turning to the parts of metaphysics. Avicenna holds that the notion of being (mawjūd) that is the subject of metaphysics is the most universal notion; it means that which is or has existence (wujūd), subsistence (qiwām), or existential-thatness (anniyya).128 But while being always signifies these meanings, absolute being or common being as such signifies these meanings in such a way that (1) it precedes the notional constriction of being into being caused or being a first causal principle, and (2) it is neutrally nonmaterial and so prior to all the notional determinations of being, such as “in matter,” “attached to matter,” as “able to be in or apart from matter,” or as “entirely separate from matter.”129 For “being qua being, and its principles and its [proper] accidents are all prior in existence to matter, and none of them is dependent for its existence on the existence {of matter}.”130 Furthermore, all common notions of being belong to the science of metaphysics because being qua being, as well as these common notions of being, are (3) prior to the specific modes of being as quantified in mathematics, being as subject to motion and rest in physics, and being as secondary intentions in logic. After resolving the objection from the beginning of this third part of Ilāhiyyāt i.2, Avicenna concludes the third part by turning to the epistemological profile of Ilāhiyyāt and explains the parts of the objects of enquiry of the science of metaphysics. «1» It is requisite for this discipline to be necessarily divided into some parts. «2» One of them is that [part] investigating the ultimate causes (alasbāb al-quṣwā), since they are the causes of every caused being (mawjūd

127 128 129

130

We will address Avicenna’s division of the many senses of accidental in Chapter 8. These meanings of being will be treated in Chapters 4–6. Being in matter is therefore accidental or incidental to the study of being as such. This is why metaphysics considers the notion of being, even of material things, insofar as they exist. Metaphysics is only concerned with material things as beings, and being is a notion that does not require matter for things to subsist as beings. This is similar to what occurs in the mathematical sciences which sometimes study things that exist in matter; however, they are only considered insofar as they are quantified, as the notion of being quantified is not conceptually tied to being material. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.19 [15–16]. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15] (mod. trans.).

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maʿlūl) with regard to its existence, and the First Cause (al-sabab alawwal) from which emanates every caused being qua caused being—not qua in motion only or quantified only. «3» Another is that [part] investigating the accidents (ʿawāriḍ) of “being.” «4» Another is that [part] investigating the principles of the particular sciences. Since the principles of each science [that is] more specific are questions [discussed] in the science [that is] more general, as the principles of medicine in natural [science] and [the principles] of surveying in geometry, it occurs therefore that the principles of the particular sciences—which investigate the states of the particular [aspects] of “being”—become clear in this science. Thus this science investigates the states (aḥwāl) of “being” and the things that are like its divisions (aqsām) and species (anwāʿ) until it reaches [a stage] specifying [such divisions and species] at which the subject (mawḍūʿ) of natural science comes about—then [this science] delivers it [i.e. the subject] to it [i.e. to natural science]—and [a stage] specifying [such divisions and species] at which the subject (mawḍūʿ) of mathematics comes about—then [this science] delivers it [i.e. the subject] to it [i.e. to mathematics]—and similarly in the other cases. Of what precedes that specification and is as its principle, on the contrary, [this science] investigates and determines the state (ḥāl). «5» Therefore [some] questions (masā’il) of this science regard the causes of the caused being qua caused being, some other the accidents of “being,” some other the principles of the particular sciences.131 In this text Avicenna clearly appropriates al-Fārābī’s division of the objects of enquiry or questions (masā’il) investigated by metaphysics into three major parts, which we identified before in terms of the causal principles, proper accidents, and species of being.132 The causal principles address aitiological and theological objects of enquiry (i.e., the first and divine causes of every caused being qua caused being), the proper accidents of being concern the transcategorical common notions (such as necessary and possible, actuality and potentiality, universal and particular, one and many, coincident, different, and contrary), and the states (aḥwāl) of being fall under the divisions (aqsām) of being

131 132

Ilāhiyyāt i.2.16–17 [14–15] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 153–154). Cf. al–Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics [36: 9–20]; Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 3, 65–103 and 153–159.

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into the categories or species (anwāʿ) of being. Once sufficiently specified and divided, these states become identified with particular modes of being that make up the subject and principles of the various particular sciences. Taken prior to this order of specification, however, these states of being are principles of the subjects of the particular sciences, and are treated among the species of being in the science of metaphysics. It is in this way that metaphysics verifies the subject and principles of the particular sciences. Avicenna provides an additional clarification of this last point in Ilāhiyyāt i.3, which we shall examine in the next subsection. Let us then conclude this subsection by taking note of the different ways in which metaphysics addresses three kinds of principles, and so provides Avicenna with a response to the objection at the start of this subsection on the third part of Ilāhiyyāt i.2. The third criterion implicit in the objection from the beginning of this subsection maintained that, like the subject of a science, a science cannot investigate its own principles. Avicenna agrees with this point, but in the course of responding to this objection he distinguished three kinds of principles dealt with in the science of metaphysics. First, there are the scientific principles proper to metaphysics that are not demonstrated in first philosophy, but are admitted from the outset; we shall examine these in the next chapter. Second, there are the scientific principles admitted in the lower particular sciences; these principles are demonstrated and verified in metaphysics among the states of being and its division into the categories or species of being. Third, there are causal principles of being; these are accidents of being and they too are demonstrated in metaphysics among its ultimate objects of enquiry. This threefold distinction of principles elucidates the way Avicenna’s account of metaphysics meets the third criterion, for only the self-evident scientific principles are admitted at the beginning of metaphysics; the scientific principles of the lower sciences are verified in metaphysics, and the causal principles of being are demonstrated in first philosophy. 3.2.2.4 Metaphysics as First Philosophy, Wisdom, and Divine Science The fourth and final major division of Ilāhiyyāt i.2 concerns Avicenna’s identification of metaphysics with first philosophy, wisdom, and divine science, and thereby decisively settles its distinctive whichness that differentiates it from all the other sciences133 and so also makes “the goal (ǧaraḍ) of this science” of metaphysics “manifest and apparent.”134

133 134

Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 126–131. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.20 [16].

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This, then, is the science sought after in this discipline. It is first philosophy, because it is the science of the first thing in existence, namely, the First Cause, and the first thing in universality, namely, existence and unity. It is also wisdom, which is the best knowledge of the best thing known. For, it is the best knowledge, that is, certainty, of the best thing known, that is, God, exalted be He, and the causes that are after Him. It is also knowledge of the ultimate causes of all {caused beings}. Moreover, it is knowledge of God and has the definition of divine science, which consists of a knowledge of the things that are separate from matter in definition and existence.135 Here Avicenna confirms Ilāhiyyāt i.1’s suggestions that metaphysics is, as the Aristotelian tradition maintains, first philosophy, wisdom, and divine science.136 He argues that metaphysics is “first philosophy” (al-falsafa al-ūlā) for two reasons: it is the science of the first thing in existence, that is, the First cause; but it is also concerned with the first things in universality, such as existence (wujūd) and unity (waḥda). Both of these reasons for metaphysics being “first philosophy” concern existence. Hence, metaphysics is first philosophy because it is both an ontological science of the universal scientific principles, such as being (mawjūd) and one (wāḥid), which signify that which has existence and unity, respectively,137 and it is an aitiological science concerning the first, ultimate, and universal causal principle of all caused beings.

135 136

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Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15] (mod. trans.) Italics mine. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 126; 129, n. 43; 594, n. 4; “Avicenna brings to unity Aristotle’s view of metaphysics as science of “being qua being” (Metaphysics Γ, 1), science of what is unmoved, eternal and immaterial (Metaphysics E, 1) and science of the ultimate causes and principles (Metaphysics A, 1–2). At the same time, his account of metaphysics fully satisfies the epistemological requirements of the Posterior Analytics.” Bertolacci, Reception, 131. For the different names ascribed to metaphysics, see Bertolacci, Reception, Appendix D, 593–605. Cf. “Since “being” and “one” are common (ʿammān) to all subjects, it is necessary that all the other sciences be subordinate to the science that studies them. And since there is no subject that is more general (aʿamm) than {being and one}, it cannot be that the science that studies them is subordinate to another science. And since what is not the {causal} principle of existence of some beings and not of others, but is instead the {causal} principle of the totality of caused being, cannot possibly be studied in one of the particular sciences nor can it be in itself the subject of a particular science—it, in fact, requires a relation (nisba) with every being—and [since, furthermore] it is not the subject of the universal and general science either, because it is not something universal and general, it is accordingly necessary for the science of it to be a part of this science {i.e., metaphysics}.”

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Metaphysics is “wisdom” (ḥikmiyya) because it “is the best knowledge of the best thing known.” In the last chapter we saw that the best knowledge is certain (yaqīn) knowledge, which is the aim of demonstrative knowledge. Because metaphysics attains certain demonstrative knowledge of God, who is truth itself and the ultimate cause, it also attains knowledge of the best being known.138 Finally, because metaphysics attains knowledge of God, who is both conceived and assented to as being separate from matter, metaphysics is classified as the “divine science” (ʿilm ilāhī).139 Avicenna concludes Ilāhiyyāt i.2 by noting the ways metaphysics differs from dialectic and sophistic since it does not address the problems of the particular sciences. It differs from dialectic since it attains certainty, whereas dialectic only attains knowledge of what is probable. And it differs from sophistic in terms of desire. “This is because [the metaphysician] desires the truth itself, whereas [the sophist] desires to be thought of as a wise man who utters truth, even though he is not a wise man.”140 Let us conclude this section by reiterating Avicenna’s account of the subject (mawḍūʿ) and goal (ǧaraḍ) of metaphysics. In Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 Avicenna argues that the subject of metaphysics is not aitiological or theological, but that it concerns an ontological investigation into being inasmuch as it is being. This, however, does not mean that the ultimate causes and God are not dealt with by metaphysics; indeed, metaphysics is first philosophy, wisdom, and divine science precisely because it does acquire certain demonstrative knowledge of the ultimate divine first cause. It is this aitiological and theological knowledge that constitutes the ultimate goal (ǧaraḍ) of the science of metaphysics. In short, metaphysics is a science that commences with being qua being as its ontological subject, which is itself ordered towards investigating the ultimate causes and God as the final goal of the many objects of enquiry of metaphysics. 3.3

The Objects of Enquiry of a Scientific Metaphysics

The previous section examined Avicenna’ s presentation of the subject of metaphysics as an ontological study of being qua being, which also pinpointed the ultimate goal of metaphysics as the investigation of aitiological and

138 139 140

Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.7 [A, 165: 5–10], (mod. trans., Lizzini, “Utility and Gratuitousness of Metaphysics: Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i, 3,” 334). Cf. De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 116–131. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.21 [16]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 232–245.

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theological objects of enquiry (Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2). This section explores Ilāhiyyāt i.3–4, beginning with Ilāhiyyāt i.3. 3.3.1 The Utility, Rank, and Name of Metaphysics Ilāhiyyāt i.3 is entitled, “On the utility (manfaʿa) of this science, and its rank (martaba), and name (ism).”141 Accordingly, Ilāhiyyāt i.3 admits of three major divisions concerning each one of these issues.142 Our examination of Ilāhiyyāt i.3 focuses on the way these issues are connected to Ilāhiyyāt’s epistemological profile. Avicenna begins with the utility (manfaʿa) of metaphysics.143 He accepts the distinction between what is useful and what is good in itself, where the useful is the cause that brings us to the intrinsic good. All of the sciences have in common that they are useful for “the attainment of the human soul’s perfection in act, preparing it for happiness in the hereafter.”144 But there is another utility among the sciences insofar as we consider the order and rank among the sciences, for the more universal sciences aid the more particular sciences by verifying their scientific principles.145 Avicenna identifies a number of senses of utility, but the specific utility of metaphysics consists in the following: The utility of this science … is to bestow certainty (yaqīn) on the principles (mabādiʾ) of the particular sciences, and to verify (taḥaqquq) the quiddity of the things that they share in common (al-umūr al-muštariqa fīhā), even if they are not principles. This is the utility of the leader to the subordinate and of the one served to the servant.146 Metaphysics is not used by lower sciences, just as those led do not use the leader and God is not used by his creation, but this does not mean the superior is not beneficial to what is inferior. The specific benefit or utility of metaphysics

141 142 143 144 145 146

Ilāhiyyāt i.3 [17]. For a detailed study of Ilāhiyyāt i.3, especially concerning the utility of metaphysics, see Lizzini, “Utility and Gratuitousness of Metaphysics: Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i, 3,” (Henceforth: Utility). For the historical background to Avicenna’s interest in the utility, rank, and name of metaphysics, see Lizzini, Utility, 309, n. 8; Bertolacci, Reception, 169–170. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.1–5 [17–18]. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.1 [17]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.1 [17]. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.5 [18] (mod. trans.). For alternative translations, see Bertolacci, Reception, 270; Lizzini, Utility, 335.

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to the particular sciences is found in the investigations of metaphysics that provide certainty (yaqīn) for the scientific principles of the other sciences and that verify (taḥaqquq) the meanings of the notions that are common to the particular sciences. Some of these latter are also scientific principles in the particular sciences, such as act and potency in natural philosophy, but others are not, such as the prior and the posterior, but all of these common notions are transcategorical proper accidents of being, and so belong to the science of metaphysics. Consequently, Avicenna assigns two principal benefits to the science of metaphysics. First, insofar as it investigates the scientific principles of the particular sciences it provides an epistemological verification of the knowledge acquired in all the other sciences.147 Second, insofar as it investigates the existence of the divine first cause it establishes the causal principle for the existence of the subjects and scientific principles of all the other sciences. Avicenna then turns to the rank (martaba) of metaphysics,148 which turns on the Aristotelian distinction between what is more known in relation to us, and so first in the order of learning, and what is more known in itself, and so is arrived at last in the order of knowledge.149 As was shown in the last section, metaphysics is first philosophy, wisdom, and divine science, and so it is the first and highest science in itself, concerned with the best and most certain knowledge of the best object of enquiry in itself, namely, divine being. But even though metaphysics is the first and highest ranking science in itself, in terms of the order of learning in relation to us it is last. “Thus, in its own right, 147

148 149

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.5 [18]. “Since we have established that among the principles of the sciences there are some that are not self-evident, it is necessary that these be made evident in another science, whether it be particular …or more general, until ending with the most general of the sciences. And so that is why it is necessary for the principles of all the other sciences to be verified in this science […]” Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii, 7 [A, 165: 11–12] (trans., Lizzini, Utility, 338). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 7, 265–302; Appendix E, 585–586. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.6–10 [19–21]. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics α 1, 993b5–12, where one finds the famous example of night birds; see also Posterior Analytics i.2, 72a1–5; Physics i.1, 184a16. “Or again: something that is a principle in a given science is a question in another, and this in two ways: either both the sciences differ in subject in terms of generality and particularity, so that a thing will be made clear in a superior science and will be taken as a principle in an inferior science, and this is a true principle (mabdaʾ ḥaqīqī); or else, a thing will be made clear in an inferior science and will be taken as a principle in the superior science, and this is a principle in relation to us (bi-l-qiyās ilay-nā). Or else, the two sciences will not differ in generality or particularity, but will be like calculus and geometry and then the questions of one of the two will be principles for the questions of the other […]” Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii, 7 [A, 168:1–5] (mod. trans., Lizzini, Utility, 338–339). See Chapter 2.3.

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this science should be prior to all the [other] sciences; but, from our point of view, it is posterior to all of them.”150 The study of metaphysics follows after the study of natural philosophy and mathematics, because of the superiority of first philosophy’s subject and goal. This order of learning has other advantages as well, for it allows metaphysics to take for granted many topics that are treated in natural philosophy, such as the generation and corruption of substances, the many senses of act and potency, change and motion, place, time, the connection of the moved and the mover, that all moved things necessarily terminate in a first mover, and many others. It also assumes what has been established in mathematics insofar as it relates to “knowledge of God’s governance, knowledge of the spiritual angels and their ranks, and knowledge of the order of the arrangement of the spheres,” for many of these topics, “can only be arrived at through astronomy; and astronomy is only arrived at through the science of arithmetic and geometry.”151 The rank of metaphysics is also connected to its name (ism): “what is after nature.”152 “By ‘nature’ is not meant the power which is a principle of motion and rest, but the totality of the things that come about through corporeal matter— [including corporeal matter’s] power and accidents.”153 Metaphysics is described as the “science of what is after nature” (ʿilm fī mā baʿda l-ṭabīʿa) in relation to us because, “when we first observe existence and get to know its states, we observe this natural existence.”154 In relation to itself, however, it is more properly the “science of what is before nature” (ʿilm mā qabla l–ṭabīʿa), because what it investigates is in itself and in generality prior to nature absolutely—like divine existence and existence as such.155 Avicenna addresses two objections in Ilāhiyyāt i.3. The first concerns the rank of metaphysics,156 and the second concerns its name in relation to what is prior to nature.157 Only the first objection with respect to the rank of metaphysics is relevant to our study. This objection touches on the way the science of metaphysics admits the principles of the lower sciences and yet also demonstrates and verifies the scientific principles of the lower sciences. The 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

Ilāhiyyāt i.3.12 [21]. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.6 [19]. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.13–20 [21–24]. For the Farabian background to Avicenna’s interpretation of the name, see Bertolacci, Reception, 93–94. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.13 [21] (mod. trans.). For the many senses of “nature” distinguished in natural philosophy, see Avicenna, Healing. Physics, i.5. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.13 [21–22]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.13 [22]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.7–12 [19–21] Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.14–20 [21–24].

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difficulty is: (a) if the principles and conclusions of natural philosophy and mathematics are admitted as principles in metaphysics, and (b) if the objects of enquiry in those two sciences are demonstrated through the scientific principles of those sciences, and yet (c) if the scientific principles of natural philosophy and mathematics are demonstrated in metaphysics by way of the scientific principles it admits, then it appears that (a) is demonstrated circularly through itself, for (a) depends on (b), which is established by (c), which relies upon (a).158 As we saw in the previous section, “principle” is said in many ways, and Avicenna’s response to this objection in Ilāhiyyāt i.3 distinguishes the variety of ways principles are included in a science. Concerning scientific principles: (i) some of the principles that scientific demonstrations depend on, are admitted from another science, but there are also (ii) questions and demonstrations within a science that do not need to admit principles from another science at all, because these demonstrations employ self-evident premises that cannot be demonstrated. The principle of a science, however, is only a truly scientific principle if its adoption bestows the certainty acquired from the cause. If, however, it does not give the cause, [then it is] only said to be a principle of a science in a different manner; it is more fitting to speak of it as a principle in the way that sense is said to be a principle, where sense inasmuch as it is sense bestows only [knowledge of] existence.159 The truly scientific principles are those that attain certainty, and this requires that the principles in question can provide a causal explanation or reason why that bestows certain knowledge. Other scientific principles are epistemically inferior; they are like what are called principles with respect to knowledge attained through sensation, which only provides knowledge that. For sensoryperception provides the intellect with knowledge that something exists, but it does not bestow knowledge of principles that explain the cause or reason why something exists. With this division of principles in hand, Avicenna can respond to the objection by distinguishing three possibilities. The scientific principles of natural philosophy admitted in metaphysics are either (1) self-evident, and require no demonstration, or (2) they are demonstrated in metaphysics, but these

158 159

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.7 [19]. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.8 [20].

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demonstrations do not depend on any conclusions demonstrated in natural philosophy. Finally, (3) it is also possible that natural philosophy only acquires a demonstration-that (burhān inna), but metaphysics goes further and acquires a demonstration-why (burhān lima); this especially pertains to the remote final causes addressed by metaphysics.160 Consequently, insofar as metaphysics draws upon the principles of natural philosophy in one of these three ways, then the demonstrations in metaphysics are not circular.161 3.3.2 The Programmatic Description of Metaphysics After assaying the subject, goal, utility, rank, and name of the science of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3, Avicenna presents a “programmatic description” of the rest of the Ilāhiyyāt in Ilāhiyyāt i.4, “On the totality of what is discussed in this science.”162 In this short chapter Avicenna’s presentation of the topics to 160 161

162

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.9–10 [20]. Cf. Chapter 2.3. N.B. Avicenna brings to a close the section on the rank of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.3 with a much discussed cryptic passage that hints there is a way in which metaphysics can show that the goal of this science is to establish a principle without any other science (cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.3.11 [21]). Avicenna intimates that, if the human intellect were less feeble— which he concedes it is not—and if it were able to know the first divine cause in itself directly, without demonstrating its existence from its effects, then we could use our per se knowledge of this divine causal principle to demonstrate from cause to effect all of the matters addressed in the science of metaphysics. This obscure passage has occasioned various and sundry interpretations from the reasonable to the completely confused. These myriad interpretations have been discussed at some length in Lizzini, Utility; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, and De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” What is rarely considered in most interpretations, however, is the context of this passage. It is found at the end of Avicenna’s division of the different senses of principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.3, a chapter whose leitmotif concerns the distinction between what is more known in relation to us and what is more known in relation to itself; indeed, the different principles exhibit the importance of this distinction. The first divine causal principle would a fortiori be the principle prior in relation to itself above all else, and knowledge of that principle in itself—which is, in fact, the ultimate goal of the last science with respect to what is more known in relation to us—would provide one with knowledge of all creation beginning with its cause in the divine causal principle and moving to creation, which is the effect of the divine cause. Accordingly, knowledge of this causal principle in itself—that is to possess something akin to God’s own self-knowledge—would indeed provide one with an alternative way of attaining the ultimate theological goal of the science of metaphysics and would clearly not require the use of any other inferior sciences. Of course, this mode of knowing the divine causal principle is not available to us, and so we can only know creation by the mode of demonstration from cause to effect imperfectly, and only after we have first demonstrated the existence of God as the first causal principle of creation by demonstrating from effects to cause—as Avicenna does in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. Ilāhiyyāt i.4. [25]. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 152.

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be addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–x basically corresponds to the order of topics he in fact addresses in those books.163 Ilāhiyyāt i.4’s presentation of the programmatic description of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–x also follows the interpretative paradigm of  Avicenna’s epistemological profile of metaphysics, that is, the division of Ilāhiyyāt into its subject, scientific principles, species, proper accidents, and causal principles. Avicenna first lists the topics addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 that we shall identify with his account of the scientific principles of metaphysics in the next chapter (iv).164 He then introduces a series of problems and questions concerning substance and accidents, that is, the categories or species of being, which he addresses in Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii.165 This is followed by questions that concern the proper accidents of being, such as universal and particular, whole and part, cause and effect, prior and posterior, all of which are treated in Ilāhiyyāt iv–vi.166 Avicenna then notes that since the topics mentioned so far are more or less concerned with the “attributes” (lawāhiq) of being, and since the “one is coextensive with existence, it is incumbent upon us to investigate ‘one’ as well.”167 He then presents an outline of what is connected with the one, such as its opposite, the many, as well as a whole series of related henological issues. First are the objects of enquiry that concern the henological species, such as 163

164 165 166

167

Bertolacci notes some of the variances in Reception, 162, n. 40: “Chapter 1, 4 of the Ilāhiyyāt is entirely devoted to describing the contents of this work: its presence—a unique case in the Avicennian writings—is due to the influence of the Neoplatonic introductions to Aristotle’s writings (see §4.2 {i.e., Reception, 131–146}). Chapter 1, 4, however, is not the mirror image of the Ilāhiyyāt as this latter actually is: i, 6 (“necessity” and “possibility”), for example, is mentioned in connection with iv, 2 (“potency” and “act,” p. 25, 5–6 [pp. 27, 17–28, 20]); i, 8 is mentioned within the description of ii, 1 (p. 25, 6–7 [p. 28, 20–22]); chapters v, 7–9 are mentioned immediately after the description of chapter ii, 4 (p. 25, 12–13 [p. 28, 29–31]); only the first chapter of treatise vii is described (p. 27, 4–8 [p. 30, 69–74]), and so on.” See also “The main differences between the actual structure of metaphysics and its outline (§1) {i.e., Ilāhiyyāt i.2 [14–15]} and description (§3) {i.e., Ilāhiyyāt i.4} are the following. In the outline, Prolegomena, Introduction, HenologyS and HenologyP are missing, and the sequence OntologyS-OntologyP-OntologyC/Theology is inverted. In the description, the Prolegomena and HenologyS are missing (although the content of the Introduction—i, 5–8—is described in i, 4, it is not depicted there as an independent part of metaphysics) and OntologyS and OntologyP are merged together.” Bertolacci, Reception, 168–169, n. 52. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 [25]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1–2 [25–26]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.3–6 [26]. The order of the proper accidents presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 does not correspond to the order of their actual treatment in the Ilāhiyyāt; rather, the prior and posterior are in Ilāhiyyāt iv.1, wholes and parts in Ilāhiyyāt iv.3, universals and particulars in Ilāhiyyāt v.1–9, and cause and effect in Ilāhiyyāt vi.1–5. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.6 [26] (trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 163).

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discrete and continuous quantity, which will be addressed in Ilāhiyyāt iii. Second, is the cadre of henological proper accidents treated in Ilāhiyyāt vii, and which consist in the conjuncts (tawābiʿ) of the one, such as “similar,” “equal,” “correspondent” (muwāfiq), “homogeneous,” (mujānis), “conformable,” “like,” and “same,” which are contrasted with their opposites that are attached to the many, such as “dissimilar,” “unequal,” “non-homogeneous,” “non-conformable,” and the “other” in general, as well as “difference” (ḥilāf ), the various kinds of “opposition,” then true “contrariety” (taḍādd) and its quiddity.168 Thus far Ilāhiyyāt i.4 has identified and ordered the topics to be addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–vii.3 according to the scientific principles and then the species and proper accidents, first of being, then of the one. Avicenna concludes Ilāhiyyāt i.4 with a description of the topics to be addressed in Ilāhiyyāt viii–x, beginning with the causal “principles of being.” He proposes to first demonstrate the existence the First Principle and then establish the divinity of the first principle. Next, to establish the way all beings emanate from God according to their various ranks and ultimately return to God. Such aitiological and theological topics are treated in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. Finally, Avicenna takes note of the moral and religious topics to be address in Ilāhiyyāt X’s treatment of the return of all creatures, especially humans, to God. Concluding Remarks The three sections of this chapter have set in relief the epistemological profile of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Based on the various divisions of the science of metaphysics introduced in Ilāhiyyāt i.1, i.2, and i.4, which conform to Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, the following structure of the Ilāhiyyāt has emerged. Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt can be demarcated into five epistemological parts that correspond to the elements required for a demonstrative science: (1) a subject, (2) scientific principles, and (3) the objects of enquiry, which are divided into the (3a) species, (3b) proper accidents, and (3c) causal principles. The subject and scientific principles are admitted at the outset of any science, whereas the objects of enquiry are established within the science. In metaphysics, the subject, scientific principles, and objects of enquiry into the species and proper accidents principally concern ontological issues insofar as the subject of metaphysics is being qua being. The objects of enquiry into the causal principles of being, however, pertain to the aitiological–cum–theological goal of first philosophy. 168

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.6 [27]. Cf. Bertolacci, 163–164.

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Hence, this chapter’s analysis of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 has established that the subject of metaphysics is being qua being and that its ultimate goal is to demonstrate the existence of God as the ultimate first cause of being. Accordingly, the distinctive whichness of metaphysics consists in the universality of its ontological subject and theological goal. This chapter has also expounded Ilāhiyyāt i.3–4’s account of the utility, rank, name, and programmatic description of the Ilāhiyyāt. Finally, this chapter has clarified the relation of metaphysics to the common notions and subject and principles that are assumed in the other sciences, and the way they are verified in first philosophy’s treatment of the species, proper accidents, and causal principles of being. Consequently, the only part from the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt that has not yet been examined is the scientific principles of metaphysics. This is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

The Scientific First Principles of the Science of Metaphysics The last chapter addressed Avicenna’s account of the subject and goals of metaphysics as presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4. It was shown that the subject of metaphysics is being qua being and that its ultimate goal is to investigate the ultimate causes and the divine being. We must now begin our explication of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. Our examination of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is divided into three stages that are addressed in four chapters. This chapter investigates if the scientific first principles of metaphysics are presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. Chapter five addresses what the overall form of Avicenna’s doctrine of metaphysical first principles is, and chapters six and seven examine what the matter or content of these first principles is. This chapter will establish that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 consists in Avicenna’s presentation and verification of the first scientific principles of his metaphysics, which, as we have seen, are one of the three basic elements of the epistemological profile of a demonstrative science. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section (4.1) reviews Avicenna’s doctrine of scientific first principles and argues that the goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to introduce the scientific first principles of metaphysics. The second section (4.2) examines in greater detail the basic divisions of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and the way they correspond to Avicenna’s divisions of primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent. Finally, section three (4.3) investigates four questions concerning the overall goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 taken as a doctrinal unit. This final section concludes that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 does constitute Avicenna’s presentation of his metaphysical scientific first principles, and in particular, that the primary notions are introduced in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, the primary hypotheses are presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, and axioms are addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. 4.1

Scientific First Principles and Interpretations of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8

Let us begin our explication of Avicenna Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, by taking note of its three major divisions. According to Avicenna’s own chapter headings, Ilāhiyyāt i.5 concerns primary “notions” (maʿāni), in particular, being (mawjūd) and

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thing (šayʾ). Taken together, Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and i.7 establish certain “properties” (ẖawāṣṣ) that belong to “necessary existence” (al-wājib al-wujūd) and “possible existence” (al-mumkin al-wujūd). Ilāhiyyāt i.8 is dedicated to clarifying the notions true (ḥaqq) and veridical (ṣidq), as well as defending the first “principles of demonstration” (mabādiʾ al-burhān). 4.1.1 Avicenna’s Doctrine of Scientific First Principles In 2.3 we introduced Avicenna’s doctrine of scientific first principles that must be admitted at the outset of any science. Drawing upon Aristotle’s account of first principles from the Posterior Analytics, Avicenna articulated his own innovative account of scientific first principles. Scientific first principles consist in (1) the primary notions or definitions of conceptualization, (2) theses of assent, such as (2.a) suppositions and (2.b) postulates, and (3) assent to the principles of certitude or the principles of demonstration, which consisted in (3.a) primary proper principles, and (3.b) primary common principles. Recall our earlier schematization of this doctrine: Principle (ἀρχή, mabdaʾ); Primaries (awāʾil); Fundaments (uṣūl) Definition (ὁρισµός, ḥadd) Thesis (θέσις, waḍʿ) Supposition (ὑπόθεσις, aṣl mawḍūʿ) Postulate (αἴτηµα, muṣādara) Axiom (ἀξίωµα, ʿilm mutaʿāraf) Principles of Definition (mabādiʾ al-ḥadd) Principles of Demonstration (mabādiʾ al-burhān); Principles of Certitude (yaqīniyyāt) Proper Principles (mabādiʾ ẖaṣṣa) Common Principles (mabādiʾ ʿāmma) Our examination of the function these different kinds of scientific first principles perform in different demonstrative sciences concluded that metaphysics, the most fundamental science, needs to have primary “principles of conceptualization” (mabādiʾ al-taṣawwur) and primary “principles of assent” (mabādiʾ al-taṣdīq), and the former will be “principles of definitions” (mabādiʾ al-ḥadd) and the latter will be “principles of certitude” (yaqīniyyāt) or principles of demonstration” (mabādiʾ al-burhān) that are either proper (ẖaṣṣa) or common (ʿāmma) to the science of metaphysics. Since we are only dealing with the first principles of metaphysics, our interests are not in the assumed suppositions and postulates, but in the true and

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absolutely fundamental scientific first principles of conceptualization and assent that are self-evident and certain. In order to simplify Avicenna’s complex and different terminology, I will employ the traditional Aristotelian terminology of axioms, hypotheses, and definitions or notions, to capture Avicenna’s division of the fundamental scientific principles.1 I call the first principles of conceptualization “primary notions.” I call the first principles of assent proper to the science of metaphysics “primary hypotheses” and I call those first principles of assent common to all sciences “axioms.” In short, I divide the fundamental scientific principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics into (1) primary notions of conceptualization, (2) primary hypotheses of assent, and (3) primary axioms of assent. This brief recapitulation of Avicenna’s doctrine of scientific first principles allows us to set up the central question governing our investigation over the course of the next few chapters (4–6): what are the first principles of Avicenna’s metaphysical science? To answer this query we must first address in the present chapter: if, and then where, does Avicenna introduce the first principles of his metaphysical science? 4.1.2 What is the Goal of Ilāhiyyāt I.5–8? Neither in his programmatic description of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.4, nor in any of the chapter headings from the Ilāhiyyāt does Avicenna indicate explicitly and unequivocally which chapters take up the issue of the scientific principles of metaphysics. Nevertheless, we saw in 3.2 Avicenna does acknowledge in Ilāhiyyāt i.1 that all sciences have “something which is a subject; things that are searched after; and principles, [universally] admitted, from which 1 Given the historical background to Avicenna’s somewhat novel use of the traditional terminology, the exegete is forced to make a decision between retaining the fluid and complex historical terminology or adopting more regimented and consistent terminology. Since this study of Avicenna’s metaphysics is principally philosophical, I have chosen to go with the second solution. Consequently, for the sake of terminological clarity and consistency, I have chosen to render each of Avicenna’s technical Arabic terms in such a way that captures a precise philosophical meaning in English, even though it does not always preserve the Arabic terms used to translate the technical terms in Aristotle. Because our study is not concerned with the propositional theses that are either suppositions or postulates, I can consistently use the terms notions, hypotheses, and axioms within the strict context of scientific principles without confusing them with the theses of a science. I prefer to use the term notions over definitions, because technically speaking, while every being can be described by a meaning, notion, or intention, not all beings can be defined sensu stricto, such as the categories (e.g., substance, quantity), the transcategorical terms (e.g., being, thing, one, and necessary), and the simple divine being. Finally, I use axioms and hypotheses for primary common principles and primary proper principles, respectively, because they are traditional Aristotelian terms as well as for the sake of simplicity and variety of expression.

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demonstrations are constructed.”2 This threefold division of the epistemological elements of a science also conforms to his theory of a demonstrative science treated in 2.3. Are these first principles addressed in the Ilāhiyyāt? In 3.2–3 we established that Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4 concerns matters related to the subject of first philosophy whereas Ilāhiyyāt ii–x clearly belong among the objects of enquiry of metaphysics. Since the first principles of metaphysics are not treated in either of these parts, we are left with the four chapters that constitute the second half of book one of the Ilāhiyyāt—which Bertolacci identifies as the “introduction.”3 What is the purpose of these four introductory chapters? Despite the deluge of contemporary literature on Avicenna’s doctrines concerning the distinction and composition of existence and essence, necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself, the primary notions or transcendentals of being, specified existence (wujūd ẖāṣṣ, esse proprium) and the mode of existence of the possibles in themselves, the problem of universals, and other metaphysical topics related to what is discussed in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8,4 very few scholars have tackled head-on the context, overall structure, epistemological profile, and purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. Let us briefly review some of the more noteworthy interpretations of these chapters. No scholars appear to dispute that Ilāhiyyāt i.5 concerns the primary notions and the distinction between existence and essence, and that Ilāhiyyāt i.8 defends the principle that there is no intermediary between affirmation and 2 Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5]. Cf. Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 119.i [D, 130] (Ahmed, 98); Salvation. Logic, 135.i [D, 144] (Ahmed, 111); Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, ii.6 [A, 155]; Pointers. Logic, m. 9, c. 3 [474–475] (Inati, 152); Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī. Logic, 43–44; Eichner, Posterior Analytics in Avicenna, 84–95. 3 Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 171–172. 4 Cf. Aertsen, “Avicenna’s Doctrine of the Primary Notions and its Impact on Medieval Philosophy,” (Henceforth: Doctrine of Primary Notions); idem, “‘Res’ as Transcendental: Its Introduction and Significance,” (Henceforth: Res as Transcendental); Bertolacci, “Albert the Great, Metaph. iv, 1, 5: From the Refutatio to the Excusatio of Avicenna’s Theory of Unity,” (Henceforth: Albert on Avicenna); idem, Essence and Existence; idem, “‘Necessary’ as Primary Concept in Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” (Henceforth: Necessary); Black, Fictional Beings; Druart, Shayʾ or Res; Galluzzo, “Two Senses of ‘Common’: Avicenna’s Doctrine of Essence and Aquinas’s View on Individuation;” Gilson, “Avicenne en Occident au Moyen âge;” Nasr, “Existence (‘wujud’) and Quiddity (ʿmahiyyah’) in Islamic Philosophy;” Houser, Real Distinction; idem, Thomas Aquinas on Transcendental Unity: The Scholastic and Aristotelian Predecessors (Henceforth: Transcendental Unity); Lizzini, Existence-Existent; idem, “Ibn Sina’s Metaphysics;” Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts; McGinnis, Avicenna; Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; O’Shaughnessy, “St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One;” Owens, “Common Nature: A point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics;” Wisnovsky, Thingness; idem, amc.

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negation as an axiomatic first principle of demonstration.5 Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, however, has inspired a surprising number of completely inconsistent interpretations, such as that it contains either an argument for God’s existence (one that is ontological or cosmological or some synthesis of both) or that it absolutely does not present any kind of demonstration for God’s existence. A close analysis of the context of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 within the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt, Avicenna’s explicit intentions, and the very structure of the arguments themselves, all reveal that the latter interpretation is unquestionably correct. Avicenna clearly does not provide any kind of formal demonstration for God’s existence in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7.6 Scholars who hold that Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 does not provide a demonstration for God’s existence have maintained instead that these chapters present either a conceptual clarification of the notions necessary existence and possible existence,7 or that it aims to clarify further the subject and primary notions of metaphysics by dividing being into necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself,8 or that Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 consists in a dialectical presentation and defense of the primary hypotheses or proper scientific principles of assent.9 These three interpretations are not necessarily inconsistent, but in order to see how they can be reconciled with each other we must first take a step back and examine the overall context. Because each of these interpretations of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is connected with various presentations of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 as a whole, let us consider two different interpretations that attempt to understand these four chapters taken as a doctrinal unit. Bertolacci calls Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 the “introduction” and describes it as the “doctrinal complement” to Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4’s “prolegomena.” As the “introduction,” Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 addresses the “foundation of knowledge.” “It takes into account

5 Cf. Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts; Houser, First Principle of Demonstration; idem, Suffer; idem, Real Distinction; Bertolacci, Reception, 170–172; idem, Necessary, 36–50; Lizzini, Utility, 308, n. 5; 309, n. 8; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149–160. 6 I have discussed this secondary literature at length and refuted any interpretation that suggests there is an argument for God’s existence in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, see De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Cf. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, 281–310 (Henceforth: Proofs For Eternity); Houser, Real Distinction, 79–81; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 78–80; idem, Necessary, 47–48, n. 38. 7 Cf. McGinnis, Avicenna, 272, n. 20; Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 289; Bertolacci, Reception, 171, n. 63. 8 Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 171–172. 9 Cf. Houser, Real Distinction, 79–88; De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?”

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the primary concepts (i, 5–7) and the primary propositions (i, 8).”10 Bertolacci identifies these primary concepts with the principles of conceptualization and principles of definition and seems to identify the primary propositions with the principles of granting assent and the principles of demonstration.11 He assigns Ilāhiyyāt i.5–7 the task of clarifying the principles of conceptualization such as being, nonbeing, thing, necessary, possible, impossible, necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself. He describes Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 in particular as being “mainly devoted to provide an investigation of the Necessary Existent based on the sole analysis of concepts.”12 In contrast to Ilāhiyyāt i.5–7’s pure analysis of concepts, he ascribes to Ilāhiyyāt i.8 the task of dealing with the principles of assent and primary propositions. The latter are identified with axioms which are not defended by a mere conceptual analysis, but by deductive reductio ad absurdum arguments that are not demonstrative, but are forms of syllogistic reasoning.13 In short, Bertolacci identifies Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 as Avicenna’s treatment of the scientific principles or the “gnoseological starting points of metaphysics,”14 and in particular, it addresses the primary notions and axioms. Many scholars hold similar interpretations, and aver that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 consists in an account of the primary notions known by conceptualization and the axioms known by assent; indeed, most scholars tend to reduce the primary principles by conception and assent to these two kinds of first principles.15 Admittedly, Avicenna’s own use of such paradigmatic examples of axioms 10 11 12 13

14 15

Bertolacci, Reception, 171. Bertolacci, Reception, 270–271. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 132, n. 52; 171, n. 60; 171–171; 209– 210; 301–302. Bertolacci, Reception, 171. “{A}ccording to Avicenna, axioms cannot be demonstrated: if there were such a demonstration, since the axioms are the first principles of demonstration, a regressum ad infinitum in demonstrations would follow. However, within the defense of the axiom of the excluded-middle in i, 8, Avicenna adds a long section devoted to show that this defense, despite not being a demonstration, is nonetheless a form of syllogistic argumentation.” Bertolacci, Reception, 224. Cf. Reception, 171–172; 172, n. 65; 209–210; 222–224; 236; 270–271; 301–302; 390–393; 409–416; 472; 476. Bertolacci, Reception, 472. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 171, n. 60; Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, in Probing, 149–150; idem, “Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of the Shifāʾ,” (Henceforth: Proof from Contingency), in Probing, 131; idem, “Meno Paradox,” 62; Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160–1300, 179–180 (Henceforth: Avicenna’s Latin De Anima); Lizzini, Utility, 308, n. 5; 309, n. 8; McGinnis, Avicenna, 119; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149, n. 15. Black and Wolfson appear to avoid identifying first principles of assent with axioms, see Black, Avicenna’s Epistemology, 123–127; Wolfson, Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq, 479–483. Cf. Adamson,

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(such as contradiction or that a whole is greater than its parts) encourages the reduction of first principles of assent to the axiomatic principles of demonstration.16 The difficulty with such readings is that they fail to identify that other kind of first principle of assent that Avicenna, following Aristotle, recognizes as being proper to a science, and which he distinguishes from both first principles of conceptualization and the axiomatic first principles of assent common to all the sciences. In other words, because most interpretations of Avicenna’s scientific first principles collapse the distinction between principles of assent and principles of demonstration, they also fail to distinguish between proper principles of assent that are not axioms from common principles of assent that are axioms and so are principles of demonstration. But as we have seen, Avicenna does distinguish between primary notions, primary hypotheses, and axioms. Accordingly, we must ask: where does Avicenna introduce the primary hypotheses or first principles by assent that are proper to the science of metaphysics? Bertolacci recognizes that hypotheses are among the first principles of a science, as he identifies them as being among the Aristotelian, “epistemological premises (axioms, hypothesis or definitions).”17 He also acknowledges that “hypotheses of metaphysics do not need to be proved,”18 for the principles of metaphysics must be admitted like the subject of the science, which cannot be defined by more primary notions and cannot be demonstrated, because it has no cause. “In so far as it is the science of ‘existent qua existent’ and provides a sort of epistemological ‘self-certification’ in the Introduction (i, 5–8), metaphysics is entitled to clarify the other sciences’ fundamental hypotheses or ‘principles,’ i.e. to prove the existence and to elucidate the essence of their subject-matters.”19 So even though he clearly identifies Avicenna’s treatment of the primary notions and axioms with Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, and despite his recognition of the need for non-demonstrable primary hypotheses in the science of metaphysics, Bertolacci neither identifies for us where these hypotheses are discussed in Ilāhiyyāt nor addresses what they are.

16

17 18 19

“Non-discursive Thought in Avicenna’s Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle;” Gutas, aat, 179–201, [159–176]. There are exceptions, however, such as Avicenna’s illustration of the way common principles become specified into the proper principles of different mathematical sciences. Cf. Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 129.i [D, 138–139] (Ahmed, 106). See the discussion in Chapter 2.2–3. Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 75. Bertolacci, Reception, 269, n. 9. Bertolacci, Reception, 301. Cf. Reception, 269, n. 9.

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R.E. Houser also maintains that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 concerns the first principles of metaphysics, but unlike the interpretations of Bertolacci and others, he argues that Avicenna presents not two, but all three kinds of first principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. Houser contends that Ilāhiyyāt i.5 concerns the primary notions or principles of definition, and that Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 does not simply clarify concepts, as Bertolacci and others aver; rather, it shifts to treat the primary hypotheses of metaphysics, that is, the primary propositions and principles of assent that are proper to the science of first philosophy. Finally, he also holds that the axioms or common first principles of assent are addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.8.20 In what follows I defend at length a version of Houser’s interpretation of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, and will show that these chapters consist of three major divisions concerning the primary notions (Ilāhiyyāt i.5), primary hypotheses (Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7), and axioms (Ilāhiyyāt i.8) of the science of metaphysics. Accordingly, we must first ask: does Avicenna provide us any hints or intimations that these four chapters address the first principles of his metaphysical science? 4.2

Conceptualization, Assent, and the Textual Division of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8

Let us recapitulate and amplify our earlier outline of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 by comparing Avicenna’s summation of these chapters in the synopsis of topics he introduces in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 with the aforementioned chapter headings that Avicenna provides for Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. In 3.3 we surveyed the contents of Ilāhiyyāt i.4’s outline of the whole of Avicenna’s metaphysical science. Unsurprisingly, Avicenna begins his programmatic description of the Ilāhiyyāt with the topics to be addressed in the chapters that immediately follow Ilāhiyyāt i.4. He states his aim to investigate the relation of being (mawjūd) and thing (šayʾ) to the categories (maqūlāt) (Ilāhiyyāt i.5), along with nonbeing (ʿadam) (Ilāhiyyāt i.5), necessity (wujūb), necessary existence (wujūd al-ḍarūrī), possibility (imkān), and their conditions (Ilāhiyyāt i.5–7), what is per se (bi-l-ḏāt) and per accidens (bi-lʿaraḍ) (Ilāhiyyāt ii.1), and the true (ḥaqq) and the false (bāṭil) (Ilāhiyyāt i.8). And as we have seen, he then goes on to spell out the contents of Ilāhiyyāt ii’s treatment of substance and the rest of the books of the Ilāhiyyāt. His outline does not indicate the chapter divisions, and the order of topics described in

20

Cf. Houser, First Principle of Demonstration; idem, Suffer; idem, Real Distinction; idem, Christian Magistri.

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Ilāhiyyāt i.4 do not exactly follow the order in which these topics are addressed in the Ilāhiyyāt. For example, the true and the false are treated in Ilāhiyyāt i.8, before the distinction between what is per se and per accidens, which is not introduced until the opening lines of Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. This distinction between being per se and per accidens serves as a preface to Avicenna’s enquiry into the universal divisions of substance, which, like in Aristotle, turns out to be one kind of being per se. In short, as we have already noted, the outline of topics from Ilāhiyyāt i.4 only provides a sketch of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and the other nine books of the Ilāhiyyāt. It does not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of the goals or contents of these chapters, and it should not be read as aiming to provide a completely accurate presentation of the order in which these topics will be introduced in the Ilāhiyyāt. Furthermore, if there is any importance to the four topics mentioned at the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.4—aside from presenting the forthcoming order of topics in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–ii.1—the significance of these four is not obvious; this is a question we shall return to in the next chapter. What is illuminating, however, is to read this outline of topics from Ilāhiyyāt i.4 in light of the additional specification they receive in the chapter headings Avicenna provides for Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8: Ilāhiyyāt i.5

On indicating being, thing, their first divisions; by means of what contains a reminder (tanbīh) of the goal (ǧaraḍ)21 Ilāhiyyāt i.6 On commencing a discourse on the necessary existence and the possible existence; that the necessary existence has no cause; that the possible existence is caused; that the necessary existence has no equivalent in existence and is not dependent [in existence] on another22 Ilāhiyyāt i.7 That necessary existence is one23 Ilāhiyyāt i.8 On clarifying the true, the veridical, and a defense of the primary statements in true premises24 Like the outline from Ilāhiyyāt i.4, the heading for Ilāhiyyāt i.5 mentions being and thing and also hints that these notions will be treated in relation to the categories, that is, according to the first division (aqsām) of being and thing into the ultimate genera. It also intimates the method to be employed, namely, 21 22 23 24

Ilāhiyyāt i.5 [29:3–4] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 172, n. 65). Ilāhiyyāt i.6 [37:6–7] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt i.7 [43:3] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt i.8 [48:3–4] (mod. trans.).

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the chapter will not define, but will direct our attention to the primary notions of being and thing by reminders. What the heading fails to mention, but which was noted in the outline from Ilāhiyyāt i.4, is that this chapter will also address nonbeing and the primary notion the necessary. The headings for Ilāhiyyāt i.6–8 include, more or less, all of the topics that are in fact addressed in these three chapters and they even provide us with more information than was contained in the outline from Ilāhiyyāt i.4. Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is exclusively focused on the distinction between necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself, their respective connections to metaphysical composition and causality, and establishing that necessary existence in itself is one. Likewise the notions of the true, the veridical, and the defense of the primary statements or axioms involved in all true premises do aptly summarize the topics treated in i.8. In sum, reading the topics from Ilāhiyyāt i.4 along with the headings from Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 suggests that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is concerned with addressing the notions being, thing, nonbeing, necessary and possible existence with respect to causality, ontological equivalents, and unity, then truth, falsity, and a defense of the primary propositions that govern all true premises. Clearly, these chapters concern significant metaphysical notions, some of which were mentioned among the common notions that are transcategorical “accidents” of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.2,25 but only the heading from Ilāhiyyāt i.8 provides us with any suggestion that these chapters might contain a few remarks on the first principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics. Consequently, only one of these chapter headings is even suggestive of the possibility that these four introductory chapters taken as a whole are concerned with a thematic and unified treatment of the first principles of metaphysics. Is there any stronger evidence for the proposal that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 concerns the first principles of metaphysics? Many of the chapters of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt begin and end with short prefaces and conclusions, and as we shall see, a preliminary examination of these provides sufficient evidence to support the proposal that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 concerns the scientific principles of metaphysics. Let us, then begin with the introduction to Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Avicenna commences Ilāhiyyāt i.5 with the famous remark that being, thing, necessary, as well as the one, are meanings that are impressed upon the intellect in a primary and immediate way. We will examine each of these primary notions at length in the next two chapters, but what is worthy of note at present is what follows these opening lines. Avicenna introduces an analogy to 25

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.13 [13].

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help clarify the nature of these primary notions. For the impression of such primary notions is akin to what occurs: In the realm of assent…there are primary principles, found to be true in themselves, causing [in turn] assent to the truths of other [propositions]… Similarly, in conceptual matters, there are things which are principles for conceptualization that are conceived in themselves.26 In Chapter 2.1–2 we examined at length Avicenna’s distinction between the primary principles in the order of assent (mabādiʾ al-taṣdīq) that involve assent to primary propositions, from the primary principles of conceptualization (mabādiʾ al-taṣawwur), that consist in the ideation of primary notions.27 What is remarkable here in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is Avicenna’s introduction of the canonical logical distinction between conceptualization (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) into his metaphysical presentation of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. As was shown in Chapters 1–2, the distinction between conceptualization and assent is of paramount importance to Avicenna’s logic, for the distinction serves as the methodological framework for the two of main tasks of logic, in short, to instruct one how to define and to syllogize well. By mentioning the distinction between conceptualization and assent, Avicenna wishes to place in the mind of his reader the entire logical and epistemological framework concerning the myriad ways of conceiving descriptions and definitions and of assenting to the truth of propositions via syllogisms and other forms of reasoning. What is especially significant is that Avicenna introduces this canonical distinction proper to the beginning of the discipline of logic28 at the beginning of his treatment of the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1,29 and again here at the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.5, that is, immediately following his prolegomena on the subject and goals of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4. This is no coincidence. Avicenna has just finished presenting that and what the subject of metaphysics is as a science of being qua being, identified the whichness that distinguishes it from the other sciences, and has sketched the outline of questions or objects of enquiry to be pursued in the universal science of first 26 27 28 29

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.2 [29] (mod. trans.). Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.6 [A, 77]; Salvation. Logic, 102 [D, 112–113] (Ahmed, 87–88). Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.3; Salvation. Logic, 1.i [D, 7] (Ahmed, 3); Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 3 [133–136] (Inati, 49). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.2 [4].

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philosophy. He now wants us to consider the foundations of our metaphysical knowledge, and thereby the foundations of all scientific knowledge, and this brings us once again to the distinction between conceptualization and assent and the questions what and if, respectively. Avicenna’s interest is not simply in conceptualization and assent, definitions and demonstrative syllogisms, but in the primary conceptions and primary assents, that is, in those first principles of conceptualization and assent that are without any intermediaries, are selfevident, and which are related to the subject of being and whatever directly pertains to being qua being. For without such evident first principles in the orders of conceptualization and assent, metaphysics will not be able to fulfill its epistemological function as wisdom and first philosophy, that is, to provide the ground for and verification of the subject and first principles of the particular sciences. In other words, given that Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4 has shown that the subject of metaphysics is the absolutely universal consideration of being qua being, we must now, in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 begin to consider: what do we know about the notion of being? And, given the distinction of human knowing into conceptualization and assent, the question of being admits of a proportional demarcation according to these two ways in which it is known: first, what are the primary notions of conceptualization related to being? And second, what are the primary propositions of assent related to being? Avicenna starts with both of these two ways of considering being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, because if we are to demonstrate anything with respect to the subject of being concerning its many objects of enquiry, we must first be clear about what we primarily and universally conceptualize and assent to with respect to being. Accordingly, Avicenna commences his treatment of primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent by introducing being, thing, necessary, and one as the primary notions that we must first direct our attention to, prior to our application of these primary notions within the formation of any primary propositions of assent concerning being and the other primary notions. Given the foregoing implications of Avicenna’s introduction of the distinction between conceptualization and assent here in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, it would be reasonable to anticipate that his aim is to begin treating the scientific first principles of metaphysics. This becomes unequivocally clear after considering what Avicenna does next in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Immediately following his introduction of the primary notions, he makes his intentions explicit in a short argument that purports to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity both in matters pertaining to conceptualization and in those pertaining to assent. This is because there cannot be an infinite train of intermediary conceptualizations of definitions of definitions, or assents to conclusions based upon assents to

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conclusions, and so on. There must, therefore, be primary or first principles in the orders of conceptualization and assent.30 We have already seen this doctrine of primary conceptualizations and primary assents in his logic, but we have not yet addressed its application to metaphysics.31 We see for the first time in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 his explication of the “primaries” (awwaliyyāt) for the science of metaphysics. And according to Avicenna, being, thing, one, and necessary are the primary notions in the order of conceptualization, but what the first principles are in the order of assent is not yet disclosed to us in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. The preceding examination of conceptualization and assent in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 allows us to draw a few conclusions. First, Avicenna employs the distinction between conceptualization and assent in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 to provide an intelligible framework that clarifies his account of the four primary notions—being, thing, one, and necessary—and anticipates what he also makes explicit in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, namely, that these primary notions are first principles in the order of conceptualization, are absolutely universal, cannot be defined, but can only be “indicated” by the less known notions which presuppose each of these primary common notions. We have yet to see, however, if a similar set of points should be anticipated with respect to the first principles in the order of assent. Second, given his emphasis, not merely on conceptualization and assent, but on getting to the primary notions and primary assents within these orders, it is clear that Avicenna does in fact intend for the introduction of Ilāhiyyāt i.5 to signal the transition from the questions concerning the subject and the outline of the objects of enquiry of metaphysics addressed in the prolegomena of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, to the topic of the first principles of metaphysics. Indeed, as he notes in Ilāhiyyāt i.1, scientific principles are absolutely required, for they will be deployed in the investigation of the objects of enquiry in Ilāhiyyāt ii–x.32 Hence, we can conclude that at least Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is directed to making clear what the first principles of conceptualization are for the science of metaphysics, and, based upon the chapter heading from Ilāhiyyāt i.8, we have good reasons 30 31

32

Cf. “If every conceptualization were to require that [another] conceptualization should precede it, then [such a] state of affairs would lead either to an infinite regress or to circularity.” Ilāhiyyāt i.5.4 [30]. Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.6 [A, 77]. “Intellectual understanding (ʿaql) is the belief that a thing is so and so because it is not possible for it not to be so. [This epistemic state exists] by nature and without any intermediary. [An example is] conviction in [the truth of] the first principles of demonstrations. [The appellation] may apply to the conceptualization of the quiddity [of a thing] through itself, without the [intermediary] process of giving a definition, such as the conceptualization of the first principles of definition.” Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 148.i [D, 168–169] (mod. trans., Ahmed, 133–134). Cf. Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.8 [5].

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to suspect that he will address the first principles in the order of assent somewhere in the course of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. Finally, we have arrived at the point in our investigation of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 that we can address the question: where are the scientific first principles presented in Avicenna’s metaphysics? We have just seen that Avicenna initiates his treatment of first principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 with the distinction between principles of conceptualization and principles of assent. And since metaphysics is a demonstrative science that employs demonstrative syllogisms throughout its objects of enquiry, the science of first philosophy must include both primary definitions and primary propositions of certitude, that is, scientific first principles of conceptualization and assent. We have drawn the conclusion that it is reasonable to suggest that the aim of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to disclose, defend, and explicate the metaphysical first principles found at the foundations of conceptualization and assent, and have shown that Avicenna makes unequivocally clear that the task of Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is to direct our attention to the first principles in the order of conceptualization, namely, the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary, and clearly, these primary notions, which are the first principles of all definitions and descriptions, correspond to Aristotle’s first principles in the order of definition. So where in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 does the enquiry into the first principles of conceptualization end and the first principles in the order of assent begin? In his account of the scientific principles of a demonstrative science, Avicenna distinguishes between two kinds of primary principles in the order of assent. There are proper first principles of assent that are unique to a science, which I call primary hypotheses, and there are common first principles of assent that are common to many or all sciences, which I call axioms. Are both of these kinds of primary principles within the order of assent treated in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8? Ilāhiyyāt i.8 commences with a division of truth that is immediately followed by Avicenna’s introduction of the principle that there is no intermediary between affirmation and negation, which he claims is pervasive for all existing beings qua beings, is the most primary of all true statements, and is the first truth to which all true statements are ultimately resolved. After his extended defense of this axiomatic first principle, Avicenna concludes i.8 and so the whole of the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt, with a few final points concerning the investigation into principles in the order of conceptualization and those that are principles of demonstration. This short account of principles at the end of i.8 provides a complementary “bookend” to the introduction of principles found in i.5, and additional evidence that Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 does concern the scientific principles of metaphysics. Indeed, at the end of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 Avicenna refers to the primary principles of conceptualization as “principles of defini-

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tion” (mabādiʾ al-ḥadd) and classifies the common or axiomatic principles of assent as “principles of demonstration” (mabādiʾ al-burhān).33 But this conclusion leaves unresolved three interrelated questions which must be answered before we can conclude definitively that the overall goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to treat all the scientific principles of metaphysics. First, what is the aim of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7? Second, where does Avicenna’s treatment of the primary notions in the order of conceptualization from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 end, and where does his treatment of first principles in the order of assent begin? We know he begins treating primary notions in i.5, but does it continue into i.6–8? We also know he treats the axiom of excluded middle in i.8, but where does his account of scientific principles in the order of assent begin? Third, where are the primary hypotheses or proper scientific first principles within the order of assent? In other words, where, if anywhere, does Avicenna address the first principles of metaphysics as primary hypotheses? Let us return to our survey of the prefaces and conclusions of the chapters of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 in order to see how Avicenna conceives of the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and Ilāhiyyāt i.7, before turning to the second and third questions. 4.3

The Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8

4.3.1 Question 1: What is the Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7? Ilāhiyyāt i.5 begins with an argument that shows why there must be primary notions in the order of conceptualization.34 The rest of the chapter is occupied with clarifying the meanings of the primary notions—being, thing, and necessary—and contains an extended account of nonbeing and how we can

33

34

Ilāhiyyāt i.8.13–16 [54]. Bertolacci, Reception, 171, n. 60; 270–271 seems to treat the principles of demonstration as being equivalent to the principles of assent. “Primary concepts and primary propositions are mentioned together both at the beginning of i, 5 (p. 29, 7–16 [p. 32, 4–15]), where they are described as the principles of “conceptualization” (taṣawwur) and the principles of “the act of granting assent” (taṣdīq), and at the end of i, 8 (p. 54, 16–17 [p. 64, 14–17]), where they are canvassed as principles of “definition” (ḥadd) and principles of “demonstration” (burhān).” Reception, 171, n. 60. This identification, however, leaves out Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s clear division of the principles of assent into hypotheses and axioms, or proper and common first principles of assent. Axioms are equivalent to principles of demonstration, not to principles of assent. Consequently, Bertolacci rightly recognizes that Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is on the first principles of definition and that Ilāhiyyāt i.8 is on the first principles of demonstration, but he neither tells us what the hypotheses of metaphysics are, nor accurately identifies what Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is about. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.1–4 [29–30].

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form statements about things that do not exist.35 The chapter concludes with an analysis of the necessary that is interrupted by a digression on whether nonexistent things can return to existence.36 Ilāhiyyāt i.6 commences with an explicit return to the topic of the necessary; however, the chapter heading of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 announces a new “beginning” (ibtidā’) with a discussion on necessary existence and possible existence, neither of which is addressed in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Avicenna’s methodological approach has also shifted, for he is no longer concerned with the notion of the necessary and its meaning, but with the “properties (ẖawāṣṣ) that belong to each of these: the necessary existence and the possible existence.”37 In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 Avicenna distinguishes the synonyms (murādifāt) and meanings (maʿānī) of being, thing, and necessary, but he does not mention any “properties” that belong to these primary notions, and he certainly does not attempt to defend at length the ascription of any properties to primary notions by syllogistic forms of argumentation as he does in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s defense of the properties of necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself. The transition from Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and Ilāhiyyāt i.7 is virtually seamless; Avicenna moves from the question of the necessary existence in itself being peerless to the question of the necessary existence in itself being one. It is indisputable that the aims of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 to indicate the properties of the necessary existence are continued in Ilāhiyyāt i.7. This link becomes explicit at the conclusion of Ilāhiyyāt i.7, which summarizes the results of the investigation of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 by rearticulating the properties that have been affirmed and defended with respect to necessary existence in itself and possible existence with respect to itself.38 The opening lines of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and the closing paragraph of Ilāhiyyāt i.7 are perfect bookends that obviously mirror each other; the former sets up an examination of the properties of necessary and possible existence, and the latter basically summarizes the properties that have been verified. Avicenna plainly intends for us to read i.6–7 as a doctrinal unit, and this appears to be the consensus among many of his contemporary interpreters as well.39 What connections are there between i.6–7 and i.8? 35 36 37 38 39

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.5–24 [30–36]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.22–27 [35–36]. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.1 [37:6–7] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.13–14 [47]. For scholars who treat Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 as a kind of doctrinal unit on necessary and possible existence, see Houser, Real Distinction, 79–81; Bertolacci, Reception, 171, n. 63; 172, n. 65; 187, n. 130; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 82; Acar, Talking About God and Talking About Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions, 86–89 (Henceforth: Talking about God); Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149, n. 14.

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The preface to Ilāhiyyāt i.8 utilizes the causal properties unique to necessary and possible existence established in i.6–7 to frame its threefold division of truth: truth as necessary in itself, caused truth as possible and false in itself, and truth as proper to propositions and beliefs about propositions.40 The rest of i.8 focuses on the truth of propositions and beliefs and defends the first principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation as the axiomatic first truth that all true propositions and beliefs can ultimately be resolved to.41 The chapter—and so the whole of i.5–8—concludes with a brief excursus on the first principles of definition and demonstration.42 Based on this survey of the prefaces and conclusions of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, the answer to the first question is now clear. The purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is to introduce the primary notions, the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is to establish the specific properties that belong to the necessary existence in itself and the specific properties that belong to possible existence in itself, and the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 is to defend the truth of the first principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation as a first principle of demonstration. A fourth question emerges from this answer to the first question: Is there an overall purpose that we can definitively assign to Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and its three doctrinal subunits? More specifically: Is there sufficient evidence for us to hold that the overall aim of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8—including Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7—is to present the scientific first principles of metaphysics? 4.3.2 Question 2: Where do the Primary Notions End and Axioms Begin? We must first answer the other two questions before this fourth question can be addressed. Let us begin with the second question concerning where the account of primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 ends and the treatment of axioms found in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 in fact begins. The sketch of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 provided thus far makes it clear that all of these chapters are concerned with getting to the bottom of the most fundamental metaphysical and epistemological matters concerning primary ontological notions, the basic properties that belong to a fundamental metaphysical distinction between existence as possible or necessary, and the first axiomatic principle that is employed in all demonstrations. It is not obvious how we should understand the matters discussed in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 with respect to the account of primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and axioms in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. For unlike Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and Ilāhiyyāt i.8, Avicenna 40 41 42

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1–2 [48]; De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.2–13 [48–53]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.13–16 [54].

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does not explicitly mention the distinction between conceptualization and assent in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, and so it is unclear whether he intends for Ilāhiyyāt i.6 to simply be a further conceptual clarification of the primary notion the necessary as Bertolacci holds, or for Ilāhiyyāt i.6 to be shifting to the primary propositions in the order of assent as Houser maintains.43 Despite this ambiguity, the connections among these three doctrinal units found in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 do set in relief another noteworthy feature concerning the function of the necessary with respect to these three doctrinal units. Ilāhiyyāt i.5 ends with a discussion of the notion of the necessary. The treatment of necessary existence in itself and through another pervades the whole of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. Ilāhiyyāt i.8 begins its demarcation of the many senses of truth by identifying the most fundamental sense of truth in itself with the necessary existence in itself that is discussed in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. In other words, neither being, nor thing, nor the one, but only the necessary—and the notions pertaining directly to it—provides the common thread that weaves together and marks the transitions from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 to i.6–7 to i.8. This also means that the mere presence of the notion the necessary in any of these three doctrinal units cannot by itself be taken as probative evidence for or against Bertolacci’s interpretation of i.6–7 as being continuous with i.5’s account of the principles of conceptualization. We must then find some other way to address the second question concerning where the treatment of scientific principles of conceptualization initiated in i.5 ends, and, where the presentation of the scientific principles of assent that terminates in i.8 begins. The answer to this second query turns on the difference between conceptualization and assent. As we have seen in Avicenna’s logic, knowledge by conceptualization and assent are motivated by different kinds of questions and are achieved by means of different methodological approaches. This is especially the case when it comes to primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent, for the first principles of conceptualization—which concern the question what—cannot themselves be defined by appealing to higher genera, and the verification of the first principles of assent—which concern the question if—cannot be demonstrated. We shall have to settle our second question by being attentive to the scientific queries being asked or answered in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and the different methodologies being employed to achieve the threefold purpose of the threefold doctrinal unit that comprises Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8.

43

Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 170–172; idem, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics, 78–84 Houser, Real Distinction, 75–81; 82–88.

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The central purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is to make perspicuous the meanings of the primary notions being, thing, and necessary; in a word, the presentation of the primary notions as the first principles of conceptualization is obviously oriented towards answering the question what. And because these primary notions cannot be defined sensu stricto Avicenna is forced to answer the question what by demarcating the diverse primary notions according to their diverse synonyms, meanings, and directing our attention to their meanings by pointing out less universal and less primary conceptualizations (e.g., categories of action and passion for being, different informative statements for thing, and the possible and impossible for the necessary). It is therefore not surprising that there are no syllogistic-style arguments employed to confirm the meanings assigned to the primary notions being, thing, and necessary in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Aside from the arguments to show there must be first principles in the order of conceptualization and assent or else there will be an infinite regress or circularity, and the various arguments that emerge in his extended digression on predications concerning nonbeing, Avicenna’s treatment of the synonyms and meanings of the primary notions neither introduces any properties that must be affirmed of these primary notions, nor a fortiori does Ilāhiyyāt i.5 employ any reductio ad absurdum arguments to show it is absurd to deny certain properties belong to being, thing, and necessary. The methods Avicenna does use for answering the question what are precisely what one would expect from a clarification of the first principles of conceptualization, and so if the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 also concerns the principles of conceptualization, we should find similar methods being employed. But this is not what we find in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. On the contrary, Avicenna appears to have completely moved on from the question what with respect to necessary—as that was resolved in Ilāhiyyāt i.5’s treatment of necessary as a primary notion—and is now attending to the question if. But he is not concerned with the simple question, “if X is?” For the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 takes this for granted. There are properties that belong each to the necessary existence and to the possible existence. We say that: anything that enters into existence admits of being intellectually divided into two divisions. One of these is [given by] that which [is such that], when it is considered in itself, its existence is not necessary [i.e. the possible existence]. But it is evident that its existence is not even impossible, otherwise [this type of existence] would not enter into the [realm of] existence. This thing, therefore, is in the realm of possibility. The other of these [divisions] is [given

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by] that which [is such that], when it is considered in itself, its existence is necessary [i.e. the necessary existence].44 The goal of i.6–7 therefore is unequivocally not if the necessary existence or  the possible existence do in fact exist, for Avicenna assumes from the outset that there are such notions, at least in the mind. The goal is to answer the complex question, “if X is Y?” Indeed, in the next few lines Avicenna presents a series of propositions that list many of the properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence that he will verify in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. That which in itself is necessary existence has no cause, while that which in itself is possible existence has a cause. Whatever is necessary existence in itself is necessary existence in all its aspects. The existence of the necessary existence cannot be equivalent to the existence of another where each would equal the other as regards necessary existence, becoming [thereby] necessary concomitants. The existence of the necessary with respect to existence cannot at all be a composite, [deriving] from multiplicity. The true-nature of the necessary existence can in no manner be shared by another. From our verifying [all] this, it follows necessarily that the necessary existence is not [dependent on] relation, is neither changing nor multiple, and has nothing associated with its existence that is proper to itself.45 First, it is noteworthy that nearly all of these properties belonging to necessary existence and possible existence are compositional and causal properties, and that Ilāhiyyāt i.5 neither explicitly mentions any compositional or causal properties nor affirms such properties of being, thing, one, or necessary. In a word, Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is doing something quite different from Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Second, while none of these statements is, properly speaking, an answer to the question what, all of these propositions affirm certain properties of necessary existence and possible existence that can be taken as responses to the complex question if, such as: “if necessary existence in itself is uncaused?” Or, “if possible existence in itself is caused?” It is clear then, that the purpose of i.6–7 cannot be construed as responding to the question what—which pertains

44 45

Ilāhiyyāt i.6.1 [37] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Necessary, 47). Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37] (mod. trans.).

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to the principles of conceptualization—but must be taken as a series of answers to the complex form of the question concerning if some property belongs to necessary existence or possible existence. And the question if can only be answered by an assent, and not through conceptualization alone. In short, a brief examination of the basic content and implicit questions involved in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s treatment of necessary existence and possible existence, reveals that Avicenna’s account of the primary notions as principles of conceptualization terminates at the end of Ilāhiyyāt i.5, and Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 launches his enquiry into if we should assent to certain propositions concerning the properties of necessary existence and possible existence. Ilāhiyyāt i. 6–7 is addressing certain propositions that are verified by assent, but whether or not these are primary propositions has yet to be established. We must, however, first address the method Avicenna employs to verify these propositions pertaining to the properties of necessary existence and possible existence. Avicenna’s argumentative strategy in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 does not deploy the methods required for assigning a definition or for providing a meaning for the principles of definitions, such as by introducing synonyms, meanings, and distinguishing circular descriptions from primitive meanings. He instead utilizes a host of arguments to defend certain propositions that affirm the most basic compositional and causal properties that belong to necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself. Most of these arguments take the form of reductio ad absurdum arguments that use modus tollens to show that the denial of the initial proposition results in falsity, a contradiction, or an impossibility.46 And as with the question if, these are the methods proper to the domain of assent, not conceptualization. Consequently, the very nature of the questions, the methods, and the doctrinal content employed for attaining the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 clearly reveal that these two chapters are not concerned with continuing Ilāhiyyāt i.5’s presentation of the primary notions. 46

Cf. Houser, Real Distinction, 82–88. Consider, for instance, Avicenna’s first arguments to defend the proposition, “necessary existence in itself has no cause.” “That the necessary existence has no cause is obvious. For if in its existence the necessary existence were to have a cause, its existence would be by [that cause]. But whatever exists by something [else], if considered in itself, apart from another, existence for it would not be necessary. And every[thing] for which existence is not [found to be] necessary—if [the thing is] considered in itself, apart from another—is not necessary existence in itself. It is thus evident that if what is in itself a necessary existence were to have a cause, it would not be in itself necessary existence. Thus, it becomes clear that the necessary existence has no cause. From this it is [also] clear that it is impossible for a thing to be [both] a necessary existence in itself and necessary existence though another.” Ilāhiyyāt i.6.3 [38] (mod. trans.). We will examine some of these arguments from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 in Chapter 7.

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Avicenna has moved on in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 to treat the compositional and causal properties that belong to the necessary as divided into necessary existence and possible existence. But if Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is not concerned with the primary notions that are principles of conceptualization, are the propositions assented to in these chapters to be identified with the axiomatic scientific first principles common to all of the sciences? In other words, does Avicenna’s treatment of the first principles of demonstration actually begin in Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and not Ilāhiyyāt i.8 as is held by some of his closest readers? To answer this we must consider where the treatment of axioms begins in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 by comparing the questions, the methods, and the doctrinal content of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 with Ilāhiyyāt i.8. While Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is concerned with what being, thing, and necessary mean, and Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is focused on if necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself have certain compositional and causal properties, Ilāhiyyāt i.8 defends that the principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation is true, which is an implicit response to the question if this principle of demonstration is true. With the exception of clarifying for the perplexed person what the terms that compose the principle mean, the entire focus in i.8 is on defending that the principle is true and must be admitted. Most of i.8 is, in fact, dedicated to showing how one should respond to skeptics and the perplexed whose answer to the implicit question: “if this first principle of demonstration is true?” is negative. Hence, Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8 are both concerned with assents to propositions that respond to the question if. Do Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8 both employ the same argumentative strategies to defend their assents as well? The argumentative strategies or methods for defending the specific properties affirmed of necessary and possible existence in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are similar to the reductio ad absurdum arguments employed by Avicenna to defend this first principle of demonstration in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. For in both places he defends and verifies the self-evidence and truth of certain propositions by refuting its denial. In Ilāhiyyāt i.8 Avicenna even adds a digression which observes that despite not being, properly speaking, demonstrative syllogisms, these refutations are akin to syllogisms or are syllogisms by analogy insofar as they do provide a deductive defense of these principles of assent.47 Given such palpable 47

Cf. “Aristotle’s dialectical defense of the axioms (Γ, 3–8) is reworked by Avicenna in i, 8 with two main modifications: on the one hand, he adds a long section devoted to show that this defense is a form of syllogistic argumentation; on the other hand, he shortens drastically Aristotle’s discussion of the opinions of those who deny the axioms. Thus, Avicenna’s defense of the axioms is both closer to a demonstration and less dialectical than

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similarities in the questions and methods found in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8, we must consider whether the treatment of the axiomatic first principles of demonstration begins in Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and not i.8 as is commonly held. In other words, our investigation so far has made clear that both Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8 are concerned with primary propositions and first principles of assent; what we must now determine is whether they are both concerned with indemonstrable primary propositions that are axioms common to all of the sciences, or if Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 has a more limited scope and is only explicating the indemonstrable primary hypotheses in the order of assent that are proper to metaphysics. To resolve this problem we must turn to the content of the different propositions introduced in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8. The basic content of the propositions from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is formed on the basis of a division of existence (wujūd)—which is the shared meaning signified by the primary notions being (mawjūd) and necessary (wājib)—and other common notions, such as in itself, through another, unity and multiplicity (i.e., the simple and composed), cause and caused, which all characterize further the primary notions being and necessary via various notional amplifications and constrictions. Because the subject of these propositions pertains directly to the subject of metaphysics and its coextensional primary notion, that is, necessary, it seems reasonable to maintain that the various propositions formed on the basis of the transcategorical disjunctive division of existence into necessary existence and possible existence do indeed constitute primary propositions. In the next chapter we shall establish that the transcategorical disjunctive of existence into necessary existence and possible existence is, for Avicenna, the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive in metaphysics. Hence, even if not all of the propositions assented to in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are sensu stricto primary propositions it seems quite reasonable to conclude that at least the most basic propositions verified in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are primary propositions and thereby are first principles of assent.48

48

Aristotle’s.” Bertolacci, Reception, 236. Cf. Reception, 220–225; 235–236; 390–393; 409–417; Houser, First Principles of Demonstration; idem, “Suffer;” idem, Real Distinction, 82–84. N.B. In the next chapter we shall examine Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary and will show that he considers them all to be coextensional with each other. This doctrine is relevant to the point at hand concerning whether the propositions of assent treated in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are primary propositions, for insofar as they pertain to fundamental indemonstrable per se evident truths concerning the primary notions, they are first principles of assent. Now, just as the transcategorical disjunctive articulated by the common notions caused-being and cause-of-being are not equivalent to being qua being or being absolutely, the same is true of the transcategorical disjunctives necessary existence and possible existence; neither term is equivalent to the primary notion necessary. Both terms of this transcategorical disjunctive are restrictive

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The primacy of the axioms as primary propositions is confirmed by their pervasiveness with respect to the subject of metaphysics and their universal applicability. Avicenna explicitly holds that the principle there is no middle between affirmation and negation is an ubiquitous property of being qua being. “There is no intermediary between affirmation and negation.” This property is not an accident for one [particular] thing but is one of the accidents of being inasmuch as it is being, because of its pervasiveness in all beings.49 This principle of demonstration states that the scope of affirmation and negation are mutually exclusive and this applies universally to all beings and to all discourse. A being either is or it is not, either ‘S is P’ or it is not; there is no middle between being and nonbeing. Like this principle of demonstration from Ilāhiyyāt i.8, Ilāhiyyāt i.6’s division of existence into necessary existence and possible existence is also universal and cuts directly into being inasmuch as it is being. The propositions of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 concern the most fundamental proper accidents of being with respect to necessary existence and possible existence, namely, their compositional and causal properties. Taken together in the form of the propositions defended in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, one cannot find in the Ilāhiyyāt any other alternative candidates that articulate more universal and more fundamental primary propositions, and which are also proper to the science of metaphysics Hence, the content of the propositions from both Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and i.8 concern universal and fundamental matters of crucial importance for metaphysics. The question is: Do such universal and fundamental matters pertain directly to all of the sciences? The axiomatic principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation obviously does pertain to all of the sciences. This is because no science can proceed by way of primary or acquired knowledge by

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senses of the primary notion necessary, that is, they notionally constrict the notion necessary. But they are, however, formed from an intension that is shared by the primary notions being and necessary, for both mean that which is/has existence. In other words, the disjunction between necessary existence and possible existence is forged from the division of existence (which is indicated by the primary notions being and necessary), and so is absolutely fundamental and cannot be demonstrated through any prior notions or propositional composition of more primary notions. These points shall be addressed at length in Chapters 6–10. Ilāhiyyāt, i.8.2 [48] (mod. trans.).

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assent without this axiomatic principle of demonstration which governs all affirmations and negations that pertain to existence simpliciter, or to the existence of some property that belongs to some subject, and so of all true propositions, as Avicenna makes clear in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. Indeed, this axiomatic principle of demonstration even governs all the propositions and reductio ad absurdum arguments employed in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7.50 In contrast to this axiomatic principle of demonstration, the scope of the propositions pertaining to necessary existence and possible existence is significantly limited with respect to the other sciences. It is not that possible existences are not treated in the particular sciences—for Avicenna, that is all these other sciences treat; rather, the primary propositions in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are not directly relevant to the myriad assents formed in all of the other sciences. This is especially clear in the case of mathematics and logic, for both form propositions of assent that have nothing directly to do with the causal properties affirmed of necessary existence and possible existence in the propositions from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. But all of the assents in mathematics and logic do presuppose and employ the axiomatic principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation. Therefore, it is clear that this axiomatic principle has a common application to all discourse and thereby to all of the philosophical disciplines, whereas the primary propositions from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are not directly applicable to all of the sciences, and only pertain, properly speaking, to the science of metaphysics. Consequently, and in response to the aforementioned second question concerning where the treatment of the primary notions ends and that of the axioms begins, we must maintain that the primary propositions defended in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are principles of assent for matters that are proper to the science of metaphysics. This discourse on primary propositions of assent that are proper to metaphysics begins at Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and ends with Ilāhiyyāt i.7, just after the treatment of primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and just before the defense of the axiomatic principle of demonstration in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. This also means that Avicenna does not in fact intend for us to identify the first principles of assent mentioned in the preface of Ilāhiyyāt i.5 with the first principles of demonstration mentioned in Ilāhiyyāt i.8; for even though the axiomatic principles of demonstration are one kind of first principle by assent, albeit, the most fundamental and universal kind, they are not the only kind of scientific 50

N.B. All of the propositions presented and defended in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 can be rearticulated so as to bring out the implicit use of this axiomatic principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation, such as: “existence is either necessary or possible,” “necessary existence is either in itself or through another,” and “necessary existence in itself does not have a cause and cannot be caused.”

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principle by assent treated in metaphysics. This answer to the second question brings us to the third question: where does Avicenna introduce the scientific principles of metaphysics as primary hypotheses? Question 3: Where Does Avicenna Treat the Primary Hypotheses of Metaphysics? In order to answer this question we should first grasp what it is we are looking for. What should we expect the primary hypotheses of metaphysics to consist in? There is no need to speculate, because, as we have seen, Avicenna clearly delineates the criteria for such primary hypotheses in his logic. First, as Bertolacci aptly insists, “The hypotheses of metaphysics do not need to be proved since the subject-matter of metaphysics, i.e. “existent qua existent,” cannot be demonstrated as existent (having, properly speaking, no cause), nor can it be further determined with regard to essence (due to the impossibility of defining it).”51 Accordingly, the primary hypotheses of metaphysics must be self-evident, true, and certain assents that respond to the question if. Such primary certain propositions in metaphysics must consist in the composition of notions that are more known in themselves—like the primary notions of metaphysics— and whose conceptualization as composed in a proposition immediately issues forth in a true and certain primary assent to what is self-evident. The primary hypotheses of a science must employ the primary notions of the science, at least for the subject of the proposition, but might affirm notions that are proper to the science in question or common to all the sciences in the predicate of the proposition. Finally, the primary hypotheses, as compositions of primary notions with proper or common notions, should apply universally and properly to all of the matters to be investigated in the science. In geometry, for example, Avicenna states that we posit specific primary principles such as, “every measurable [dimension] is either rational or irrational”52 4.3.3

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Bertolacci, Reception, 269, n. 9. Cf. “No science, metaphysics included, can assess the existence and clarify the essence of its own subject-matter: it takes both for granted, and investigates only its properties. This epistemological rule applies equally to metaphysics and to the particular sciences: but whereas the fundamental assumptions of metaphysics (the existence and essence of “existent” {i.e., being qua being, the subject of metaphysics}) do not need, and cannot, be ascertained, those of all the other sciences must. In so far as it is the science of “existent qua existent” and provides a sort of epistemological “self-certification” in the Introduction (i, 5–8), metaphysics is entitled to clarify the other sciences’ fundamental hypotheses or “principles,” i.e. to prove the existence and to elucidate the essence of their subject-matters. This applies primarily to logic and the other two branches of theoretical philosophy, namely natural philosophy and mathematics.” Bertolacci, Reception, 301. Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 129.i [D, 138–139] (Ahmed, 106).

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and in natural philosophy, Avicenna employs the transcategorical disjunctive of act and potency in his presentation of such primary hypotheses as: Some beings are actual in every respect, while others are actual in one respect but potential in another. It is impossible, however, that there be something that is potential in every respect, itself having no actuality whatsoever. Let this be accepted and set down as a hypothesis (waḍʿā), although an enquiry into it will be taken up soon {i.e., in metaphysics which verifies the principles of the particular sciences}.53 The primary propositions introduced at the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 satisfy all of the aforementioned criteria and are strikingly similar to the hypotheses of natural philosophy. This last point is not too surprising for in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 Avicenna intimated that the transcategorical disjunctive of being into act and potency—which is used in the hypotheses of natural philosophy—is superseded by the theoretical examination that belongs to metaphysics to address the transcategorical disjunctive of existence as divided into necessary existence and possible existence.54 And this is precisely what Avicenna does in the Ilāhiyyāt. In natural philosophy he takes note of being’s division into entities that are pure act from those that are mixed with act and potency, but in metaphysics he begins instead with the division of existence into the necessary existence in itself and the possible existences in themselves that are necessary existences through another. The significance of these similarities and dissimilarities in the primary hypotheses proper to natural philosophy and proper to metaphysics will be discussed at length in the next chapter. What is relevant here, however, is the obvious parallel between the hypotheses of natural philosophy and the primary propositions of metaphysics introduced in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. Both introduce and employ transcategorical disjunctives of being to articulate primary propositions proper to the science at hand, and since Avicenna explicitly identifies such propositions in natural philosophy as hypotheses, we should also identify the appropriately similar propositions in metaphysics as its primary hypotheses. But the primary propositions in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 also meet the aforementioned criteria for being primary hypotheses insofar as they employ a primary

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Healing. Physics, ii.1.2 [107] (mod. trans.). I examine this passage from Ilāhiyyāt i.4 later in 5.2.2.

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notion of the science (e.g., necessary) as well as some of the common notions that are treated in the universal science of metaphysics (e.g., in itself and through another, cause and caused, one and many, simple and composite). And even if such primary propositions, like the axioms, admit of elaborate deductive syllogistic defenses and refutations of their denials, because these propositions compose the most primary and universal metaphysical notions, these primary propositions cannot be demonstrated but must be assented to as self-evident, true, and certain in response to the question if (such as, “existence is either necessary existence or possible existence,” “necessary existence in itself is simple,” and “possible existence is composite). Finally, the primary propositions from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 also apply to the entire host of ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry of the science of metaphysics— as we shall endeavor to make explicit in subsequent chapters. Consequently, even though Avicenna does not explicitly identify the task of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 with addressing the primary hypotheses of metaphysics, he does intimate as much by beginning and ending i.6–7 with statements that introduce or recapitulate the properties we must affirm of necessary existence and possible existence. Such ambiguities do not, however, militate against the probative reasons we have provided in defense of Houser’s interpretation that i.6–7 is addressing the primary hypotheses of metaphysics. Furthermore, given the place of these two chapters within the Ilāhiyyāt in the middle of the treatment of first principles, and given the absence of any explicit statement to the contrary and the lack of any other reasonable location for identifying an account of the primary hypotheses, the best way to understand Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is to recognize it as presenting the primary hypotheses proper to metaphysics, which follow upon the primary notions proper to metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and just prior to the axioms common to all sciences in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. In sum, we have argued that the primary propositions in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are neither used to demonstrate God’s existence nor to establish the existence of any causal principles of being, for they concern scientific principles, but which scientific principles? We have shown that these primary propositions in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 cannot be a continuation of i.5’s presentation of the primary notions of conceptualization, because i.6–7 addresses topics that answer the question if and require granting assent to true propositions. But neither are the propositions of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 addressing the common axioms and principles of demonstration, like in i.8, because the propositions in i.6–7 concern matters that only pertain, properly speaking, to metaphysics. Consequently, the only reasonable interpretation that remains is to answer the third question by identifying the purpose of i.6–7’s defense of propositions concerning the properties

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that belong to necessary existence and possible existence with the introduction and defense of the primary hypotheses that pertain to the science of metaphysics. 4.3.4 Question 4: What is the Overall Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8? This brings us to the fourth and final question, which is isomorphic with the conclusion of this chapter’s enquiry into the epistemological profile of the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt: what is the overall Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8? We have just concluded that the purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is to present and defend the primary hypotheses of the science of metaphysics. This identification of where Avicenna introduces the primary hypotheses also completes the trio of scientific first principles, where the primary notions are taken up in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, primary hypotheses in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, and axioms in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. Consequently, since all three doctrinal subunits in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 are tasked with the goal of presenting three different kinds of scientific first principles, and these three kinds of scientific first principles correspond to Avicenna’s division of first principles in his logic into primary notions, primary proper principles, and primary common principles,55 we must conclude that the overall Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to present and defend the scientific first principles of metaphysics. Concluding Remarks Let us conclude this chapter by recapitulating the four major topics treated in Chapters 3 and 4 in Part 2 of this study. Chapter 3 addressed three issues. In 3.1 we drew on recent scholarly studies to help contextualize Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing within the wider Aristotelian tradition and to establish the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt. In 3.2–3 and 4.1–3 we explored at length the complex set of doctrines presented in the first book of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. In 3.2 we addressed Avicenna’s account of the subject and goals of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2, and established that it is an ontological science concerned with being qua being that pursues aitiological and theological objects of enquiry as its ultimate goal. In particular, we delineated the overall epistemological profile of metaphysics as an Aristotelian science that consists of a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of enquiry—which includes a study of the species, proper accidents, and causal principles of being qua being. In 3.3 we addressed the other topics that pertain to the prolegomena of the metaphysics, 55

Cf. Chapter 2.3.

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such as the utility, rank, and names of metaphysics as well as its programmatic description of the overall project of first philosophy in Ilāhiyyāt i.3–4. In 4.1 we surveyed various interpretations of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, thus preparing for 4.2’s presentation of the basic divisions of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 that correspond to Avicenna’s divisions of primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent. Finally, in 4.3 we argued that the overall Goal of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 is to present the scientific first principles of metaphysics as primary notions (Ilāhiyyāt i.5), primary hypotheses (Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7), and axioms (Ilāhiyyāt i.8). This division of first principles exemplifies the epistemological profile of first principles that Avicenna presents in his logical works and which were assimilated from Aristotle. In short, we have established that Avicenna’s division of the Ilāhiyyāt into the (1) subject, (2) scientific principles—such as notions, hypotheses, axioms—and (3) objects of enquiry—such as species, proper accidents, and causal principles—clearly follows his doctrine of the epistemological elements required for a demonstrative science. Thus far we have only hinted at what the complete picture of his metaphysical first principles looks like, for our concern in Chapters 3 and 4 has been to sketch the epistemological profile of the Ilāhiyyāt and to outline its scientific principles. In the next three chapters we shall turn to consider the way Avicenna integrated his own novel appropriation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the four senses of being into the formal framework of his scientific first principles. Chapter 5 will attend to the formal features of this integration, and Chapters 6–7 will then explicate the material features of this integration.

Part 3 Scientific Principles and the Senses of Being

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Chapter 5

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Formal Approach Chapter 3 commenced with a presentation of the various ways philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition have understood the subject of metaphysics, and where Avicenna’s own view fits within this tradition. It was shown that Avicenna drew on Aristotle’s and al-Fārābī’s accounts of the science of metaphysics to develop his own account of the epistemological elements of metaphysics as a demonstrative science (3.1). We then examined the formal organization of the first book of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt according to its epistemological profile as a demonstrative science which consists of a subject, principles, and objects of enquiry. We identified Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4 as being Avicenna’s treatment of the subject and goal of metaphysics (3.2), which also contains a programmatic description of its objects of enquiry (3.3). In Chapter 4 we established that Avicenna presents his doctrine of the scientific principles as primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, primary hypotheses in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, and axioms in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. This chapter deepens that account of the scientific principles from Ilāhiyyāt Ι.5–8 by explicating the way Avicenna integrated his own innovative appropriation of Aristotle’s four senses of being into his scientific principles. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section (5.1) presents a sketch of the way Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna each understood the doctrine of the four senses of being. The second section (5.2) addresses Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being with the scientific principles of metaphysics. 5.1

The Four Senses of Being in Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna

This first section is divided into three subsections. The first subsection (5.1.1) commences with Aristotle’s account of the four senses of being and outlines their formal function with respect to the arguments he develops in his causal investigation into being in Metaphysics ∆ΕΖΗΘ and Λ. My aim is to present Aristotle’s Metaphysics as it was interpreted by some medieval Aristotelians like al-Fārābī and Avicenna. In the second subsection (5.1.2) we turn to alFārābī’s appropriation of the four senses of being in his Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf) and, based on the recent work of Stephen Menn, outline al-Fārābī’s

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own Aristotelian doctrine of being.1 The third subsection (5.1.3) presents the general contours of Avicenna’s novel appropriation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the four senses of being. 5.1.1 Aristotle on the Four Senses of Being In Chapter 3.1 we saw that Aristotle introduces the subject of metaphysics as being qua being in Metaphysics Γ 1 and Ε 1. But what is being? This is the question Aristotle turns to in Γ 2 and Ε 2. Being is a polysemous notion, and because it has many meanings, we need to be clear what notion of being is relevant to the science of metaphysics. Aristotle approaches this question of being in the context of the aitiological enquiry that he inaugurated in books Α and α. Both Γ and E present this aitiological trajectory in terms of a science of being qua being. These books announce that our study of being is especially concerned with uncovering the ultimate principles and causes of being. Since first philosophy is a science, it must track beings that are in some sense universal and necessary causes of being. It is with this scientific perspective in mind that we must approach Aristotle’s account of the many senses of being. Aristotle acknowledges that being (ὂν) is said in many ways;2 however, he also maintains that it can be reduced to four basic senses. Aristotle’s fourfold division of being is recapitulated numerous times and in various ways throughout the Metaphysics. Let us examine its first and second appearance in the Metaphysics. In Metaphysics ∆ 7, Aristotle says that “the term ‘being’ is used either accidentally or essentially,”3 and that “those things are said to be essentially which are signified by the various ways of predication; for these are as many as there are meanings of “being.”4 “Again, ‘to be’ and ‘is’ mean that something is true, and ‘not to be’ that it is not true but false.”5 And finally, “‘to be’ or ‘being’ in each of the cases mentioned means, in one sense, that the thing is potentially as

1 Menn, Fārābī on the Senses of Being. Menn’s study of the Book of Letters uses Muhsin Mahdi’s 1969 edition of the Kitāb al-Ḥurūf. 2 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ 2, 1003a33–b5; Ε 2, 1026a34–b4; Owens, dbam, 107–135; Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being; Owen, “Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology;” Berti, “Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle;” Kahn, “Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy;” idem, “Retrospect on the Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being.” 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a7–8, (trans., Apostle). 4 Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a22-b3, (trans., Apostle). 5 Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a31–2, (trans., Apostle).

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stated, and, in another, that it is actually stated.”6 This division of being is repeated in Metaphysics Ε 2. But since the unspecified term “being” has many senses, one of which is being by accident, another is that which is true (and nonbeing is that which is false), and besides these senses there are the various categories (for example, whatness, quality, quantity, whereness, whenness, and similarly any other meaning which the term may have), and in addition to these there is potential being and also actual being…7 In ∆ 7 and E 2, being is divided into being as per accidens, being as per se, being as the truth of propositions, and being as potential and actual. The order of these four senses of being shifts in different contexts in the Metaphysics depending on Aristotle’s various concerns, and not every list contains all four senses of being. Nevertheless, these complete and partial enumerations reveal that the later books rely upon the extended division found in book ∆ 7.8 These four senses of being also provide the argumentative point of departure for the central books of the metaphysics, as the senses of being are often partially or fully rearticulated at key junctures and transitions in books ΕΖΗΘ. Metaphysics ∆ 7 begins with a division between being per se and being per accidens, that is, into essential being and accidental being, respectively. The scope of being per accidens is not identical to the categorical sense of accident that is contrasted with substance, since being per accidens covers a wider range of territory concerning what happens or occurs to that which is, such as “the just is musical,” “the man is musical,” “the musical is a man,” “the musical

6 Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a35-b2, (trans., Apostle). 7 Aristotle Metaphysics Ε 2, 1026a34–1026b3 (trans., Apostle). 8 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Ζ 1, 1028A10–13; Θ 1, 1045b28–35; Θ 10, 1051a35–b2ff; Κ 8, 1065a 21–25 ff; Κ 9, 1065b5–15; Ν 2, 1089a1–31. Cf. Owens, dbam, 307–311; 415–417. Aristotle’s partial and complete recapitulations of this fourfold division of being throughout the Metaphysics reveals a real reliance of the later books on ∆. Stephen Menn has recently presented a formidable defense of ∆᾽s position in the Metaphysics and has shown that it is in fact reasonable to maintain that it was Aristotle’s intention to place ∆ in its present place. “Metaphysics ∆, as a general rule, draws not every distinction which could be drawn among the senses of a term, but only those distinctions which will be needed later in the Metaphysics. ∆ 7, in particular, distinguishes those senses of being whose causes will be investigated separately in ezhΘ: being per accidens in E2–3, being as truth in E4 and Θ10, being as divided into the categories in ZH, being as actuality and potentiality in Θ1–9.” Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being, 9. Cf. Menn, The Aim and the Argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Iγ1.

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builds,” “the white is musical” and “the musical is white.”9 “The just is musical” means these two attributes happen to belong to the same thing, that is, it is accidental to the nature of “justice” and “musical” that they accompany each other in the same subject. The other examples of being per accidens signify similar senses of being accidental to something. “The man is musical” means that an attribute happens to occur to that which is in a basic and primary way, “and in ‘the musical is a man’ the fact is that it is of the man that the musical is an accident. And it is in this last sense that we say ‘the not-white is,’ the fact being that that of which the not-white is an accident is.”10 Aristotle identifies three main senses of being per accidens amongst this collation of what happens: “Accordingly, things are said to be by accident, as in ‘A is B,’ either because both A and B belong to the same thing, which is, or in view of the fact that the latter, B, belongs to the former, which is, or in view of the fact that the latter is, to which belongs the former, of which the latter is predicated.”11 To understand being in each case requires drawing two items together and taking them as a whole or unit; we do not simply consider any item in itself or per se, for we must in each case grasp something as it is with another, and each of these distinct per accidens unions identifies more or less direct ways of being connected. For instance, the first sense of being per accidens concerns the loosest sense of being united, for here being per accidens concerns a happenstance correlation or association between two things, such as “the musical builder” or “the musical is a builder.” Neither the former nor the latter identifies a kind of substance, but in both cases categorical accidents are taken as substantives. The two attributes are not linked to each other as such, but are through another, for there is no cause for why the musical is a builder that connects them per se or as such; rather, they are only connected per accidens inasmuch as a human might happen to be both a musician and a builder. Common to all the senses of being per accidens is that they are derivative senses of being that rely upon a more fundamental sense of being, namely, being per se or essential being, which grounds the derivative being of these many senses of accidental being.

9 10 11

Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆, 7, 1017a8–1017a22 (trans., Apostle). Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a17–1017a20 (trans., Apostle). See Barnes translation: “while ‘the musical is a man’ means that musical is an accident of man. In this sense, too, the not-white is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is.” Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a20–1017a22 (trans., Apostle). See Barnes translation: “when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.”

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The second sense of being, namely, being per se, applies to both substance and accidents, that is, to the figures of predication or the categories of being.12 Being has a distinct meaning for each of the diverse ways of being in reality with respect to what it is, or what it is with respect to its quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, and position. Each of these ways of being is a kind of being per se or essential being. These essential ways of being are real features of things and as such they can be causes in the world that are worthy of scientific investigation. Being as true is connected to the sense of being that is implicit in every proposition and can be made explicit by the copula. It applies to propositions, such as “X is” and “X is Y,” where what X is or what is affirmed of X is the case. Similarly, it also applies to propositions like “X is not” or “X is not Y,” where what is denied of X, does not belong to X in reality. Finally, it is false to state something is otherwise than it is. “Being” and “is” mean that a statement is true, “not being” that it is not true but false—and this alike in affirmation and negation; e.g. “Socrates is musical” means that this is true, or “Socrates is not-white” means that this is true; but “the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side” means that it is false to say it is.13 In contrast to being per se, being as true is said of both “affirmation and negation.” What this means is that being per se and the categories only pertain to real features of things, such as the musical or white, but because the not-white or not-musical are privations and not real positive features of the world, they cannot belong to being per se. Being as truth does not have this restriction, for we can equally affirm or negate, as true (or as false), either “white” or the “notmusical” of “Socrates,” and both can be true (or false) so long as they stand up to (or fail to conform to) the way things are in reality. So even though the notmusical is not a real positive feature of the world, and to say “Socrates is notmusical” is obviously a denial or a privation of a real attribute of Socrates, it can also be a true affirmation that Socrates is not-musical.14

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“Those things are said to be essentially which are signified by the various ways of predication; for these are as many as there are meanings of “being.” Since some predicates signify whatness, others a quality, others a quantity, others a relation, others acting or being acted upon, others whereness, others whenness, ‘being’ has the same significance as each of these.” Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆, 7, 1017a23–30 (trans., Apostle). Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆, 7, 1017a31–b1 (trans., Barnes). Cf. Owens, dbam, 307–310.

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Finally, there is the sense of being as divided into actual and potential being.15 For we take being-able-to-know and knowing—that is, that ability to know and exercising one’s knowledge, respectively—to be ways of being. To see potentially and to be actually seeing are both real modes of being, and as such they are suitable subjects for scientific investigations into the causes of being. Each of these four senses of being has its own extension that is not necessarily equivalent to the other senses of being. In a certain sense, being per accidens has the widest extension because it can refer to any coincidental correlation that can be drawn between two kinds of being, whether or not they are also essential beings (such as white or non-white, respectively), true or false, or actual or potential beings. This is why Aristotle dispatches with it rather quickly in Metaphysics Ε 2–3 at the beginning of his investigation into which of the four senses of being are the most relevant to the science of being qua being.16 Similarly, being as true can apply to any modes of being whether they are per accidens, per se, or actual and potential being, insofar as the statements that reflect them do in fact conform to such modes of being as they are. Accordingly, the limit of being as true is being as false. But since being as true exists in thought and is grounded in a more fundamental kind of being, Aristotle in E 4 eliminates being in the sense of true propositions from the scientific enquiry of being qua being.17 The scope of the sense of being per se is not particularly clear in Aristotle. Even though he does identify being per se with the division of being into the categories, he does not explain the relation of being per se to being as true and as divided into act and potency. Does being per se admit of a threefold division, 15

16 17

“Again, ‘to be’ or ‘being’ in each of these cases mentioned means, in one sense, that the thing is potentially as stated, and, in another, that it is actually as stated. For we say ‘it is seeing’ both of that which can see and that which is actually seeing, we say ‘to know’ both of that which can use knowledge and that which is using it, and we say ‘the thing that rests’ both of that which is at the time resting and that which can rest. In substances the situation is similar; for we say ‘Hermes is in the marble’, and ‘half of the line is in the line’, and ‘it is corn’ even if it is not yet ripe. However, as to when a thing exists potentially and when it does not yet so exist, this must be determined elsewhere.” Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017b1–1017b9 (trans., Apostle). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics E 2–3, 1026a34–1027b15. Cf. “But since combining and dividing exists in thought and not in things, and being in this sense is distinct from being in the main sense (for thought attaches to or detaches from the subject either a whatness or a quality or a quantity or something else), we must leave aside accidental being and being in the sense of truth. For in the first case the cause is indefinite, the second it is an affection of thought; both are about the remaining genus of being, and they do not make clear any nature of being as existing outside. And so, leaving these aside, we should examine the causes and principles of being itself qua being.” Aristotle, Metaphysics E 4, 1027b30–1028a6 (trans., Apostle).

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and so applies to the categories, true propositions, and to act and potency? Or, is being per se only divided into the categories? Act and potency do apply to all of the categories, but this does not entail that being per se is divided into the categories and into act and potency. Stephen Menn points out that being per se cannot be equivalent to being as true, because we can affirm as true propositions that contain negations of being, and negations, that is, nonbeings, cannot be beings per se.18 As for the connection between being per se and being as act and potency, Menn contends that we should not regard these as two distinct modes of being, but as “two dimensions along which the senses of being can be distinguished.”19 Indeed, this is how they function in the argument of the central books of the metaphysics. Let us sketch the formal function being per se and being as act and potency play in Aristotle’s investigations in Metaphysics ZHΘ. Aristotle addresses the division of being per se into the categories in Metaphysics ΖH. Z 1 commences with a nod to ∆ 7’s many senses of being. In particular, it turns to being per se as divided into the categories, and immediately focuses our attention on whatness and the many senses of substance. Metaphysics H 1 recapitulates that the enquiry in Z concerns the causes, principles, and elements of substance. Aristotle’s overall investigation in ZH gradually isolates the sense of substance that is essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), form, act, and it identifies this as the fundamental sense of being per se. Metaphysics Θ 1–9 shifts our attention to being as act and potency, but not without connecting actual and potential being to ZH’s treatment of primary being as substance, which grounds the other categories of being. Metaphysics Θ 1–9 shows us the priority of actual being over potential being and so establishes the fundamental primacy of substantial form or essence as the primary act of being. And Θ 10 concludes with a treatment of simple beings as true. Later in Λ the distinction of being as act

18

19

Cf. Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being, 5–6; 19–21. Cf. “Aristotle’s reason for teasing out the concepts of being as truth and of being per accidens, and distinguishing them from being per se, is to mark out the senses of being which are too broad and too weak to possibly yield valid arguments for (or successful causal routes toward) separate eternal substances, and are indeed too weak for causal investigation of them to yield any science at all.” Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being, 21. Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being, 6. For alternative ancient and medieval views on the way being per se is related to the other senses of being, see Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, 7, 372, 1:33–35; Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 77–78; Averroes, Epitome of the Metaphysics, i.27–38; Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Exposito, iv, lt. 9, n. 889; vi, lt. 4, nn. 1241–144; vii, lt.1, n. 1245; xi, lt.8, nn. 2269, 2283. For a discussion, see Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna.

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and potency drives the causal argument for the existence of divine being as separate substance and pure formal act.20 In sum, the doctrine of the four senses of being orients Aristotle’s causal investigation of being qua being. Aristotle begins with the elimination of being as per accidens and as truth in book E, before moving on to focus on substance, essence, substantial form, formal cause, and formal act as the principal sense of being per se in ZH, and the division of being into act and potency and the recognition of the primary sense of being as substantial formal actuality in Θ, all of which is ultimately resumed and utilized in Aristotle’s enquiry into the existence and nature of divine being as pure separate substantial formal actuality in Λ. In the next two subsections we shall see how Aristotle’s doctrine of the many senses of being was appropriated by al-Fārābī and Avicenna in their own presentations of metaphysics as an Aristotelian science. 5.1.2 Al-Fārābī on the Four Senses of Being In Chapter 3 we discussed the influence al-Fārābī’s On the Goals of the Metaphysics had on Avicenna’s own appreciation of the epistemological profile of the Aristotelian science of metaphysics. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine whether Avicenna knew in any detail al-Fārābī’s appropriation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the four senses of being as presented in the Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf).21 This work by al-Fārābī was certainly well known to Averroes, who enlisted al-Fārābī’s Aristotelian doctrine of being in his relentless criticisms of Avicenna’s innovative doctrine of being.22 In later chapters we shall show that Averroes’ criticisms of Avicenna’s doctrine of being misinterpret a number of fundamental features of Avicenna’s metaphysics; but if we wish to understand Averroes’ critique we should first understand its Farabian source. Whether or not al-Fārābī directly influenced Avicenna’s own views on the four senses of being and the principles of metaphysics is a question that we shall not endeavor to answer here. Nonetheless, even a cursory account of 20 21

22

Cf. Owens, dbam; Owens, Gradations of Being; Menn, Aristotle on the Senses of Being. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being; idem, Averroes against Avicenna; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 151–153; Druart, “Al-Fārābī, the Categories, Metaphysics, and the Book of Letters;” idem, “Al-Fārābī: An Arabic Account of the Origin of Language and of Philosophical Vocabulary.” Given Avicenna’s own acknowledged dependence on al-Fārābī as an interpreter of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and as a metaphysician in his own right, it seems reasonable that he also attempted to consult al-Fārābī’s works on Aristotelian metaphysics, such as the Book of Letters, insofar as they were known and available to him. For a brief discussion, see Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 97; idem Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 147; 151–155. For Avicenna’s knowledge and approach to the Baghdad philosophers and alFārābī, see Gutas, aat 53–67 [60–72]; 119–144 [115–130]. Cf. Menn, Averroes against Avicenna; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics.

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al-Fārābī’s views will help us, at least by way of contrast, to understand Avicenna’s distinctive interpretation of Aristotle. As we shall see, there are certain novel features of Avicenna’s innovative Aristotelian doctrine of being that become even more pronounced when set against what Averroes regarded as the more authentic Aristotelian doctrine of being defended by al-Fārābī. Al-Fārābī’s own treatment of Aristotle’s four senses of being is detailed in his Book of Letters. Guided by Aristotle’s division of scientific questions in the Posterior Analytics, al-Fārābī launches a detailed investigation of being (mawjūd) that marshals a formidable grammatical–cum–philosophical challenge to certain conceptions of being and existence that emerged from the Kindian school’s reception of Aristotelian metaphysics, and also presents an epistemologically more regimented approach to the Aristotelian doctrine of being.23 Stephen Menn has shown in a number of detailed studies that al-Fārābī’s appropriation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the many senses of being is best seen in contrast to what al-Fārābī took to be certain metaphysical and logical confusions about the notion being (mawjūd) that are encouraged by grammatical features of the Arabic language. {One} of Fārābī’s main concerns in the Ḥurūf is with what Aristotle calls sophisms of σχῆµα τῆς λέξεως, logical errors arising when the grammatical form of some word or sentence does not correspond to its logical form and so misleads us about its logical form: he is particularly concerned with errors that arise when a term is grammatically but not logically paronymous, i.e. when ‘F’ does not signify ‘that in which an F-ness is present’, where ‘F-ness’ is the maṣdar corresponding to the paronymous term ‘F’. Fārābī thinks that this happens especially when a term that is not paronymous in Greek is translated by a paronymous term in Arabic, and he thinks that this is what has happened to the Greek word ‘astīn’,24 which is rendered into Arabic by some translators as mawjūd and by others by terms derived from huwa in its use as a pronoun of separation.25

23 24 25

Menn suggests that another target might be the doctrine, held by some Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn, that what is nonexistent is a thing (maʿdūm šayʾ). Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 90–97. For Menn’s use of astīn and Al-Fārābī’s peculiar account of the Arabic translation of the Greek term ἔστιν into astīn, see Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 72–76. Menn, Averroes against Avicenna, 59 (modified orthography). Cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10–19.

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Al-Fārābī is particularly concerned with the metaphysical ramifications that result from such errors.26 For instance, he contends that because the word being (mawjūd) in Arabic is grammatically paronymous with the term to be (wujūd), being (mawjūd) is also understood to be ontologically paronymous. Consequently, being (mawjūd) is often mistakenly understood to signify that some subject only exists due to an accident present in the subject, namely, its to be (wujūd). And this grammatical-cum-ontological confusion has misled some philosophers to hold that to be (wujūd) is a real accidental feature of any existent being (mawjūd) distinct from its essence or quiddity (māhiyya). The expression “mawjūd” is, in its first imposition in Arabic, paronymous, and every paronymous term by its construction gives the impression that there is in what it signifies an implicit subject and, in this subject, the meaning [maʿnā] of the maṣdar from which [the term] was derived [i.e. as “white” implies, without explicitly mentioning, a subject in which whiteness is present]. For this reason the expression “mawjūd” has given the impression that there is in every thing a meaning / entity [maʿnā] in an implicit subject, and that this meaning / entity is what is signified by the expression “wujūd”: so it gave the impression that wujūd is in an implicit subject, and wujūd was understood as being like an accident in a subject.27 Al-Fārābī insists, however, that to be (wujūd) is not a real accidental feature of being (mawjūd) distinct from the quiddity or whatness (māhiyya) of a being, and that we should not be misled into adopting this erroneous metaphysical doctrine of being by failing to distinguish grammar from ontology. But this is only one of the issues surrounding the meaning of being that alFārābī addresses in his Book of Letters. No less significant is his treatment of Aristotle’s four senses of being (mawjūd); for distinguishing the various senses of being can also help one avoid making mistakes about the nature of being.

26 27

Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 65. Fārābī, Book of Letters, i.84 [113: 9–14] (trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 75–76). Cf. “One of Fārābī’s main concerns is to ask, for each meaning of “mawjūd,” whether the things that are mawjūd are mawjūd through a wujūd really distinct from their essences, as the things that are white are white through a whiteness really distinct from their essences. The fact that “mawjūd” in Arabic is grammatically paronymous creates the appearance that this is so, but Fārābī thinks that this is a basic metaphysical error, and he wants to eliminate this error by an examination of each sense of “mawjūd.”” Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 77.

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Al-Fārābī concentrates most of his attention on two of Aristotle’s four senses of being, namely, being as truth and being per se, where the latter is sometimes divided into being as signifying a quiddity outside the soul and being as signifying a categorized quiddity.28 Even the distinction of actual and potential being is subordinated to the division of being per se into real quiddities; it is not regarded as a sense of being in itself, but follows being per se.29 These two senses of being (that is, per se as quiddity in reality and as truth) admit of enquiries that take the form of what Menn calls “1-place questions,” such as “Whether X is?” and “What is X?” as well as “2-place questions,” such as “Whether X is Y?” and “Why is X Y?” Menn’s detailed studies explicate at length the connections al-Fārābī makes between the four Aristotelian questions from Posterior Analytics ii and the four senses of being from Metaphysics ∆ 7. Our own interest is in al-Fārābī’s account of the two senses of being (mawjūd) and their corresponding senses of to be (wujūd). Accordingly, the rest of this subsection will focus on summarizing al-Fārābī’s doctrine of being per se and its sense of to be (wujūd) as an extramental quiddity (māhiyya) that is distinct from being as true and its sense of to be (wujūd) as a second intention in the mind.30 Like Avicenna, al-Fārābī gives a heuristic order to the basic questions what, if, and why. But he also connects the order of questions with his doctrine of the senses of being and his distinction between dialectical and scientific disciplines. He holds that enquiry begins with a dialectical examination of (1) being as true and gradually progresses to scientific questions concerning (2) being per se as conceptualized within the categories, and finally, to a recognition of a thing as (3) a being per se with a quiddity in reality.31 Let us then begin with his doctrine of being as truth. Al-Fārābī holds that being as truth means, “being outside the soul and being by itself [bi-ʿaynihi] as it is in the soul.”32 His idea of being as truth is further clarified in a point he makes about the question if or whether. {The} meaning of the question is whether what is grasped in the soul through the expression is outside the soul or not, i.e., whether what of it is in the soul is true or not, for the meaning of truth is that what is 28 29 30 31 32

Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 78, citing Fārābī, Book of Letters, i.88 for the division, and i.90 for the union. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 77–78, n. 26. In what follows I shall utilize Menn’s erudite study of al-Fārābī’s division of being (mawjūd) and to be (wujūd). Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 80; 88–89. Fārābī, Book of Letters, i.88 [116:5] (trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 78).

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represented in the soul is by itself outside the soul, and the meaning of being and of truth here is one and the same….”33 Being as conceptualized in the intellect is true when it conforms to being in reality, where what is affirmed or negated obtains in reality, even if what is affirmed is not real, like a privation. For, “it is not the case that everything which is grasped through some expression, such that what is understood by it is also outside the soul, also has an essence, e.g. the meaning of privation: for it is a meaning which is grasped, and it is outside the soul as it is understood [to be], but it neither is nor has an essence.”34 This is why being as truth has a broader scope than being per se, because being as truth can be ascribed to what does not have a quiddity in reality, cannot be properly categorized, is a negation or a privation, or is a being per accidens such as “white man” or “musical builder.” Accordingly, for al-Fārābī, Menn concludes: “Thus we can say that X is mawjūd in the sense of the true when we do not yet know what category X falls under, or even whether it falls under any category at all (since X may turn out to be a negation or privation or a per accidens unity), and thus the meaning of “mawjūd,” in the sense of the true, must apply univocally to all categories and even to negations.”35 Hence, we must first assent to the truth that “X exists” or “X is Y” and achieve knowledge of being as truth, before we can ask whether X or Y fall under the categories or have quiddities in reality, both of which pertain to knowledge of being per se.36 Menn connects al-Fārābī’s view that being as truth applies univocally to all categories, negations, and privations, to Aristotle’s claim in Metaphysics ∆ 7 that being as true applies equally to affirmative and negative propositions.37 Al-Fārābī contrasts this univocal application of being as truth to all propositions with the non-univocal way in which being per se is applied to the categories by priority and posteriority, for being applies first to substance and then to accidents, and even within the category of substance, first to separate

33 34 35 36 37

Fārābī, Book of Letters, iii.228 [213:23–214:3] (trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 79). Fārābī, Book of Letters, iii, 240 [218:12–15] (trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 80). Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 80. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 80; Fārābī, Book of Letters iii, 229. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 80; Aristotle, Metaphysics ∆ 7, 1017a31–4. N.B. As we have seen in Chapter 2.2, Avicenna denies this claim insofar as he gives priority to being, truth, necessity, and affirmation over nonbeing, falsity, possibility and impossibility, and negation.

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substances prior to other substances.38 What is the sense of to be (wujūd) that corresponds to al-Fārābī’s account of being (mawjūd) as truth? The sense of to be (wujūd) that corresponds to being as truth is a “second intelligible” or “second intention” (maʿqūl ṯānī), which, as Menn notes, seems to be have been an expression coined by al-Fārābī that was adopted by Avicenna and Averroes, and through them, by the Latin Scholastic tradition. Second intentions are notions about notions or conceptualizations about conceptualizations, where we predicate something about intelligibles or intentions or notions in the intellect and not of real things directly. “Being-a-predicate, for Fārābī, is a basic example of a second intention, and being-truly-predicated-ofsome-external-thing is a second intention derived from that basic second intention.”39 Hence, to be (wujūd) as truth is, for al-Fārābī, not something real, but is a second intention in the soul that is applied univocally to all propositions that affirm or negate truly that something obtains in reality.40 In other words, the to be (wujūd) as truth is a second intention univocally applied to a true proposition composed of first intentions. And because this to be as truth is extrinsic to the meaning signified by the proposition said to be true, if such propositions signify a real quiddity or essence, then the to be (wujūd) as truth is also clearly extrinsic to the essence of any real extramental beings. To say it is true that “Socrates exists” or “Socrates is not-musical” is merely to affirm something of the notion of Socrates in the mind, namely, that what is mentally affirmed of the thing, Socrates, in fact conforms and obtains with respect to what “is outside the soul as it is inside the soul.” The affirmation of to be (wujūd) as true to these statements, then, does not mean that we are ascribing some real attribute of “to be” (wujūd) or “not-musical” to “Socrates.”41 To be (wujūd) as truth is a mere second intention in the mind that is extrinsic to the true propositions formed by the mind to which it is applied. In sum, al-Fārābī holds that the sense of being (mawjūd) as true corresponds to a sense of to be (wujūd) that is univocal, extrinsic to the essence or quiddity of a being, and is not real because it is a second intention.42 The questions that 38 39

40 41 42

Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 81; Fārābī, Book of Letters i. 92. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 81. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 81–82. For Menn’s comparison of al-Fārābī’s doctrine of existence as truth as a second intention with Post-Fregean logic, and accounts of existence as a second-order predicate and the existential quantifier, see Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna, 60 ff. Cf. “The to be (wujūd) of what is true is a relation of the intelligibles to what is outside the soul.” Fārābī, Book of Letters, i, 89 [117:4–5] (mod. trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 81). Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 81; Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna, 60–61. Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 84.

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concern being as truth pertain to dialectic, but they open the way for a scientific enquiry into whether what obtains in conformity with a proposition, is in fact a quiddity that exists in reality and is a being per se.43 In contrast to being as true, Al-Fārābī takes being per se to mean, “being circumscribed [munḥāz] by some quiddity outside the soul, whether it has been conceptualized [tuṣawwira] in the soul or has not been conceptualized.”44 He distinguishes two senses of being per se that are intimately connected. There is the primary sense of being per se which signifies a quiddity in reality, independently of whether it has been conceptualized and categorized by the intellect. The secondary sense of being per se pertains to the quiddity in reality insofar as it has been conceptualized and categorized or articulated as a definition. This secondary sense of being per se is derived from the first and both signify correspondingly distinct senses of to be (wujūd).45 Accordingly, we shall focus on the primary sense of being per se and its corresponding sense of to be. What is the meaning of the to be (wujūd) that corresponds to being per se? Like Aristotle, al-Fārābī’s principal ontological sense of the to be (wujūd) that corresponds to being per se is identified with the essence or quiddity (māhiyya) that is specific to every being and which it has in common with other members of the same species.46 In contrast to being as truth, where being (mawjūd) signifies a sense of to be (wujūd) that is univocal, extrinsic to quiddity, is a second intention and so is not real, being per se means “having-aquiddity-outside-the-soul,” that is, being per se signifies a real quiddity, and its corresponding sense of to be (wujūd) is identical with that quiddity. Said otherwise, the principal sense of being per se signifies its to be (wujūd), which means its quiddity, and this quiddity or to be is a real feature of a being in the world, is not extrinsic to its essence, but is identical to essence. Furthermore, this sense

43 44 45

46

Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 88–90. Fārābī, Book of Letters, i, 88 [116:7], (mod. trans., Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 78). Druart points out that al-Fārābī also takes the notion “thing” (šayʾ) to be ascribable to any entity that has quiddity in any way, whether extramentally or in the mind, and so has certain affinities with his twofold use of being (mawjūd) per se. But unlike being (mawjūd), al-Fārābī does not assign any role for thing (šayʾ) with respect to the truth of propositions. Cf. Druart, Shayʾ or Res, 128–130; Wisnovsky, amc, 150–153; Lizzini, Existence–Essence, 117, n. 23. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Γ 2, 1003b32–33; For an analysis of Aristotle’s essentialist doctrine of being, especially as it is worked out in Z, see Joseph Owens, Gradations of Being, 82–179.

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of to be cannot be a univocal sense of to be as it applies to different categories of beings according to priority and posteriority. Finally, with respect to being per se, Menn notes that the “distinction between a mawjūd in this sense and its wujūd can be no greater than that between a thing and an essential part through which the thing exists; in the case of a simple indivisible mawjūd there is no distinction at all.”47 For beings composed of form and matter, their quiddity or to be (wujūd)—which are the same thing—is that by virtue of which the thing exists as what it is, but a simple being is identical with its very quiddity or to be. The former might be said to “have to be or quiddity,” but the latter is its quiddity or to be. The secondary sense of being per se mirrors the primary sense; for it, being (mawjūd) means what can be articulated as a definition and categorized. Its corresponding sense of to be (wujūd) is simply the pertinent category that the quiddity falls under. For example, a human is a being (mawjūd) and rational animal is its to be (wujūd) or quiddity by virtue of which a human is a being (mawjūd). The sense of to be (wujūd) that is identified with a category is a genus—and so is univocal—and is ultimately reducible to the to be (wujūd) that is a quiddity in reality. “Fārābī uses this to justify subsuming mawjūdsignifying-the-categories under mawjūd-as-having-a-quiddity-outside-thesoul ({Book of Letters} i, 89–90; thus typically he speaks of only two senses of mawjūd, having-a-quiddity-outside-the-soul and the true).”48 In sum, al-Fārābī’s account of the four senses of being takes as basic the division between being as truth and being per se. Being (mawjūd) per se in the primary sense signifies a sense of to be (wujūd) that simply is the same as the real quiddity of the being. This latter sense of to be is not extrinsic or accidental to the quiddity, it is real, and it is applied to various beings according to priority and posteriority and so not univocally. Sometimes al-Fārābī distinguishes a secondary sense of being per se that is derived from the primary sense of being per se. It signifies the categorization of quiddity and its corresponding sense of to be (wujūd) simply is a categorized definition of a quiddity that exists in the mind. Being (mawjūd) as truth signifies a sense of to be (wujūd) that is univocal, extrinsic to essences, and is a second intention that is not real. These three senses of being can be schematized as follows:

47 48

Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 83; Cf. ibid., 90–97, esp. 95. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 83.

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Being per se (1st sense)

Being per se (2nd sense)

– To be (wujūd) = a quiddity that is real or extramental

– To be (wujūd) = a – To be (wujūd) = a categorized definition second intention that of a quiddity is extrinsic to all quiddities – Exists in the mind – Exists as a second – Distinguished into intention in the mind different categories – Applied univocally to that are all univocal all true propositions

– Exists in reality – Distinguished into real substances and accidents by priority and posteriority

Being as truth

The distinction between the two senses of being (mawjūd)—as truth and as per se—and their corresponding senses of to be (wujūd) are important for alFārābī’s overall critique of ontological accounts of beings that are misled by certain grammatical forms.49 He believes that perspicuously demarcating these various senses of being and to be helps us avoid certain ontological blunders such as confusing the characteristics of the sense of to be as truth, with the real sense of to be (wujūd) that belongs to being per se. Without such distinctions in hand, the paronymous grammatical forms of the terms being (mawjūd) and to be (wujūd) might encourage us to confuse the to be (wujūd) of being as truth that is extrinsic to quiddity with the to be (wujūd) of being per se that is a real attribute in the extramental thing that makes the thing actually to be. But for al-Fārābī, such confusions are mistaken, because there is no to be (wujūd) in reality that is distinct from or extrinsic to a thing’s quiddity. The to be (wujūd) of a being (mawjūd) that is real, is not extrinsic and accidental to its quiddity; rather, any extramental to be (wujūd) is simply identical to the real quiddity of the being (mawjūd). But whenever the to be (wujūd) of a being is a mere second intention, it is the to be (wujūd) of being as truth, which is extrinsic to essence, and is applied univocally to all true assents.50 49

50

Cf. Menn, Fārābī and the Senses of Being, 84. For Averroes’s use of al-Fārābī to launch a similar attack against Avicenna’s doctrine of being, see Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna, 54–64. Cf. Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, Discussion 5; idem, Epitome of the Metaphysics, Chapter 1; idem, Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 557 sq. This division of being as truth and being per se also is integral to al-Fārābī’s account of the distinct methodologies employed by dialectic and science. Those who confuse the two senses of to be (wujūd) also frequently fail to distinguish the questions that belong to dialectic from those that belong to science. Cf. Menn, “Fārābī and the Senses of Being,” 89– 90. As we have already seen, Avicenna’s own approach to the quidditative what question

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As we shall begin to see in the next section, there are good reasons to hold with Averroes that Avicenna’s doctrine of being appears to maintain certain views about being and the accidentality of existence (wujūd) that are quite similar to the doctrines criticized by al-Fārābī. In other words, from Averroes’s perspective it appeared as though Avicenna’s innovative doctrine of being intentionally disregarded al-Fārābī’s Aristotelian warnings not to confuse the to be (wujūd) of being as truth with the to be (wujūd) of being per se. In Chapter 8.2 we shall address the accuracy of Averroes’s criticisms of Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence. Let us turn now to Avicenna’s own innovative formulation of the four senses of being. 5.1.3 Avicenna on the Four Senses of Being Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt does not contain any explicit reference to Aristotle’s four senses of being, but as we shall see, their presence in the Ilāhiyyāt is unmistakable. In Chapter 3.3 we saw that Avicenna dedicates the whole of Ilāhiyyāt i.4 to the task of outlining the order of topics to be addressed in his science of being qua being. In the last chapter we discovered that Avicenna begins Ilāhiyyāt 1.4 with the contents of Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, then surveys the issues to be taken up from Ilāhiyyāt ii–x. Let us examine in detail the opening lines of Ilāhiyyāt i.4. We must in this discipline know the «1.a» state (ḥāl) of the relation of thing (šayʾ) and being (mawjūd) to the categories (maqūlāt), and the state of nonbeing (ʿadam), and the state of necessity (wujūb), that is, «2» necessary existence (wujūd al-ḍarūrī) and its conditions, and the state of possibility (imkān) and its true-nature (ḥaqīqa)—and this is in itself the theoretical examination (naẓar) of potency and act. {And we must also} theoretically examine (naẓara) the state of «1.b» that which is per se (bil-ḏāt) and «3» that which is per accidens (bi-l-ʿaraḍ), and «4» the true (ḥaqq) and the false (bāṭil).51 The resemblance between these opening remarks of Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and Aristotle’s four senses of being is instantly recognizable, for «1.a» and «1.b» correspond to Aristotle’s being per se, «3» to being per accidens, «4» to being as truth, and

51

presupposes the assent to the real existence of a thing and its quiddity. Consequently, because Avicenna’s own doctrine of the “indifference” or existential neutrality of quiddity or essence to existence presupposes that the quiddity does in fact exist (for impossible quiddities cannot be studied), his doctrine does not fall within this Farabian line of criticism. Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 [25], (mod. trans.).

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«2» to being as act and potency. Nonetheless, their dissimilarities should not be overlooked.52 Avicenna has not merely quoted Aristotle. On the contrary, his own presentation of the four senses of being contains subtle and intentional shifts away from Aristotle’s metaphysics, all of which signal Avicenna’s own novel approach, not only to the four senses of being, but to the whole project of metaphysics. Avicenna begins with «1.a» the relation of being and thing to the categories (al-maqūlāt). A few lines later he brings in the distinction between «1.b» being per se and «3» being per accidens. Because Aristotle and Avicenna both connect being per se with the categories, it appears that being per se is introduced twice here in Ilāhiyyāt i.4, first with respect to being and thing, then in contradistinction to being per accidens. The actual treatment of the relation of being to the categories (al-maqūlāt) is executed first in i.5, but Avicenna goes beyond Aristotle in adding thing and necessary to his account of being in i.5. After mentioning the notions being and thing, Avicenna introduces «2» the topic of necessary existence and possible existence and connects it with the division of being into act and potency, which is one of the four Aristotelian senses of being. The division of existence into necessary existence and possible existence is, as we have seen, the central occupation of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, but which only mentions act and potency in passing; they are not addressed as such in i.6–7. Next, Avicenna explicitly distinguishes between the senses of «1.b» being per se and «3» being per accidens, and as we have seen, being per se and being per accidens are two of Aristotle’s four senses of being from Metaphysics ∆ 7. Avicenna will address the division between being per se and being per accidens 52

Bertolacci has also pointed out the striking resemblance between Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 and Aristotle’s four senses of being. Commenting on Ilāhiyyāt i.4, he notes, “The division of ‘existent’ in ‘Necessary Existent’ and ‘possible existent’ can therefore be regarded as an instance of the second kind of division envisaged in the Naǧāt, the one deriving from the properties of a subject-matter …. The distinctions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ at the beginning of i, 8 (i, 8, p. 48, 5–11), and of ‘existent by essence’ and ‘existent by accident’ at the beginning of ii, 1 (ii, 1, p. 57, 4–5), can perhaps be considered, in the same vein, two further noncategorial divisions of ‘existent’. In i, 4, p. 25, 6, another pair of properties of ‘existent’, namely ‘potency’ and ‘act’, are mentioned in connection with ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ (as a matter of fact, they are taken into account in iv, 2). It has to be recalled that ‘being’ by accident and—among ‘being’ per se—categorical ‘being’, ‘being’ as true and ‘being’ in potency and in act are the four main meanings of ‘being’ according to Aristotle (Metaphysics ∆, 7; E, 2, 1026 a 33-b 2).” Bertolacci, “The Structure of Metaphysical Science in the Ilāhiyyāt (Divine Science) of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Book of the Cure),” 25, n. 77 (Henceforth: Structure). So far as I can tell Bertolacci omits this point in his revised version of this article in chapter five of his monograph, see Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 5, 149–211. Cf. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149, n. 14.

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in the opening lines of Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, where they are brought in to help frame his treatment of the quasi-species of being, namely, substance and accidents. Finally, Avicenna introduces the sense of «4» being as true and false, which he takes up in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. The sense of being as true is also one of four senses of being mentioned by Aristotle. Hence, Avicenna commences Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 with his own appropriation of the four senses of being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics ∆ 7, namely, as being per se, being per accidens, being as act and potency, and being as true. Thus far we have only pointed out the correspondence between Aristotle’s four senses of being and Avicenna’s novel appropriation of this doctrine in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. We shall examine at length the content of his doctrine of the four senses of being in Chapters 6–8. What we must do now, however, is examine the formal features of his integration of these four senses of being with his doctrine of scientific principles and their application to the quasi-species of being. 5.2

Avicenna’s Integration of the Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles

It is no coincidence that Avicenna explicitly mentions his own version of the four senses of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1, right at the outset of his programmatic description of the topics to be addressed in his metaphysical science. Just as Aristotle initiated the study of being qua being mentioned in E 1, by distinguishing the four senses of being in E 2, so also Avicenna commences his ontological science of being qua being—treated in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3—by setting forth his own version of the Aristotelian doctrine of the four senses of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. What is of particular note for our study is that Avicenna integrates the material distinguished by the four senses of being into the framework of his scientific principles of metaphysics at Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. But he does not simply repeat Aristotle’s fourfold division of being; instead he introduces a number of significant metaphysical innovations into his own account of the four senses of being. Let us explore some of the subtle shifts Avicenna has introduced into his own presentation of the four senses of being and their formal integration into the scientific first principles from Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. In this section (5.2) we shall establish that Avicenna integrated his account of the four senses of being into the structure of his presentation of scientific principles as primary notions (5.2.1), primary hypotheses (5.2.2), axioms (5.2.3), and their application to species of being (5.2.4) in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–ii.1. The account of the formal structure of this integration presented in this chapter, will be followed by a consideration of the material content of his integration of the

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four senses of being with the scientific first principles and species of being in later chapters (6–8). 5.2.1 The Primary Notions as Antecedent to Being Per Se in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 In this subsection we show the way Avicenna integrated his account of the primary notions—being, thing, one, and necessary—with the Aristotelian sense of being per se. Avicenna presents his doctrine of these four primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, beginning with being (mawjūd) and thing (šayʾ). The treatment of being and thing in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is not explicitly connected with being per se, but with the categories. Nevertheless, since Aristotle connects being per se with the categories, and the primary notions being and thing are introduced in connection with the categories in both Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.5, there does appear to be some connection between the primary notions and being per se. This connection becomes clearer when we read the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 in light of the doctrine of the primary notion being presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 we learn that, in contrast to al-Fārābī’s essentialist account of wujūd as to be, Avicenna takes the primary sense of wujūd to mean to exist. But like al-Fārābī, he holds that being is divided into the categories of substance and accident by priority and posteriority.53 This doctrine is repeated in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 where Avicenna explicitly introduces being per se as that which means existence in itself, and then, following Aristotle, divides being per se by priority and posteriority into substance and accidents. Avicenna clearly takes being per se in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 to be the same notion of being that is treated in Ilāhiyyāt i.5.54 But why does Avicenna appear to treat being per se twice, first in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and then again in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1? He does this because being per se can be considered in two ways, as (1) prior to its notional constriction by the quasi-species and quasi-proper accidents of being, and as (2) notionally constricted, either by the division of being per se into the categories or through various common notions, such as prior and posterior, particular and universal. This twofold consideration of being per se is integral to the way Avicenna conceptually clarifies his doctrine of being in stages. Even though being is self–evident, this does not mean it is obvious to everyone.55 He lays out these stages by beginning with what being qua being (or absolute being) means in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3, outlining its four senses at the 53 54 55

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.21 [34–35]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.1–2 [57]. See the earlier presentation of Avicenna’s distinction between self-evident principles known to all and those that are known to the learned in Chapter 2.2.2. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 6, c. 1 [344–345] (Inati, 119–120).

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beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.4, treating being as a primary notion in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, and then presenting the division of being per se into the categories in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. In Chapter 3.2 we showed that the subject of metaphysics as being qua being is the scientific study of absolute being (mawjūd muṭlaq) or being as such. Absolute being signifies existence (wujūd) as neutrally nonmaterial and universal to everything that is. This conception of absolute being is antecedent to any notional constriction by the objects of enquiry, into (a) being as divided into the quasi-species or categories of being, (b) being as delimited by quasi-proper accidents, such as actual being or potential being, and also is prior to (c) causal characterizations of being by such common notions as being a cause or being caused. In Ilāhiyyāt 1.5, Avicenna also introduces being (mawjūd) as the first primary notion, along with the other primary notions: thing, one, and necessary. It is in this context that Avicenna clarifies the extension, intensions, synonyms, and opposites of the primary notion being prior to and along with its division into the categories. He shifts to the consideration of being per se as divided into the categories of substance and accidents in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.56 What is the relationship between absolute being as the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3 and the primary notion of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, which is applied to the categories through the division of being per se in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1? Is absolute being the same as the primary notion of being? The transition from the verification and clarification of the subject of metaphysics as being qua being in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4 to the introduction of being as a primary notion in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is, with respect to the notion of being, seamless. Ilāhiyyāt i.1 rejects the views that the subject of metaphysics might be aitiological or theological, Ilāhiyyāt i.2 establishes that it must be being qua being, and this is further clarified with respect to the other sciences in Ilāhiyyāt i.3, and with respect to the senses of being and objects of enquiry in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. Accordingly, the introduction of the primary and universal notion of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 seems to employ a notion of being that is entirely continuous with the meaning of absolute being that is the subject of first philosophy. Indeed, Avicenna does not even hint that the two notions of being are discontinuous, and he makes no effort to distinguish them; on the contrary, he suggests that they are the same. For example, in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, just before he introduces a number of meanings for the primary notion thing, he mentions the primary notion being and its synonyms, namely, established and realized, but he does 56

In the next chapter we shall address the identification of absolute being, the primary notion being, and being per se prior to any notional constrictions.

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not make explicit their meanings. He notes instead that with respect to being, established, and realized, “We do not doubt that their meaning has been realized in the soul of whoever is reading this book.”57 Whether the reference is to the Šifāʾ as a whole, or the Ilāhiyyāt in particular—which seems more likely— up to this point the only meanings that have been given for being are those connected with being qua being, namely, existence (wujūd) and subsistence (qiwām).58 Finally, given that being as the subject of metaphysics and being as a primary notion are both described as notions that are first known, are most universal, are known through themselves, and are antecedent to any notional constriction by division into the categories of being per se, we must conclude that the two notions of being are the same and that Avicenna intends for us to take them to be identical. Consequently, because the primary notion of being is identified with being per se as prior to any notional constriction by the quasispecies of being, absolute being also must be extensionally and intensionally equivalent to the primary notion of being, namely, being per se. Thus far we have seen that Avicenna recognizes a polarity with respect to the way we consider being per se. Prior to its division into the categories being per se is extensionally and intensionally equivalent to absolute being and the primary notion being, but when being per se is divided into the categories of substance and accident, then it is notionally constricted, and so it is no longer extensionally and intensionally equivalent to absolute being and the primary notion being. This explains why he divides his treatment of being per se in his presentation of the four senses of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. We must first consider being per se as a primary notion antecedent to its division into the categories in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, before we consider being per se as actually divided into substance and accidents in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. Hence, Avicenna integrates the sense of being per se into both his consideration of the primary notions as prior to any notional constrictions, and his consideration of the application of the primary notions to the quasi-species of being and their division into the categories. Avicenna’s twofold approach to being per se also applies to the way we investigate the other primary notions—thing, one, and necessary. Each of these primary notions is coextensional with being. Hence, just as the primary notion of being is extensionally equivalent to absolute being, so also are the primary notions thing, one, and necessary extensionally equivalent to the scope of absolute being. Furthermore, just as we can consider the primary notion being, or 57 58

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.8 [31]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.6–7 [4]; i.2.10 [12]. We shall treat the synonyms and intensions of being at length in the next chapter.

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being per se, prior to its division into the categories by transcending or hovering above substance and accidents, so also can we survey the other primary notions that are coextensive with the transcategorical horizon of absolute being. Such an approach allows us to demarcate their respective synonyms, intensions, and opposites, all of which can permeate the categorical divisions of being per se. But we can also enter into the divisions (aqsām) of being per se and the other primary notions by considering the analogical distribution of existence, diverse quiddities, and distinct indivisibilities into the categories. Aristotle had followed a similar order of enquiry in the Metaphysics. In Metaphysics Γ 2, he said that being and one are coextensional concomitant primary notions with distinct meanings, but are not genera, because they apply to all of the categories. This universality of being and one also seems to explain why Aristotle treats them in general prior to any extended account of their application to the categories, which he does for being in Metaphysics Z, and for the one in i. He treats the more common prior to the less common.59 Despite such similarities, there are remarkable differences between the ways the two philosophers approach the primary notions. Aristotle identifies being and one as the primary notions prior to the categories, whereas in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.5 Avicenna adds to being the notions thing (šayʾ) and necessary (wājib), and in i.5 he focuses his attention on thing and necessary instead of discussing the one (wāḥid). In the next chapter we shall address the material content of Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions. What is important at this point is the way Avicenna’s presentation of the primary notions—being, one, thing, and necessary—draws upon the treatment of being and one in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ 2.60 Avicenna took Aristotle’s presentation of these notions to be a suitable point of departure for his own account of the primary notions of metaphysics.61 59

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Cf. “If, now, being and unity are same and are one in nature in the sense that they follow each other in the same way in which a principle and a cause do, but not in the sense that they are signified by one formula (however, it makes no difference even if we were to believe the latter; in fact, it would be even more suitable), seeing that one man and being a man and a man are the same and that the added word in ‘one man exists’ does not make it signify something other than what ‘a man exists’ does … it is evident then that the same thing is indicated by the addition of any one of these, and what is one is not distinct from what is a being.” Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ 2, 1003b23–33 (trans., Apostle). Cf. Metaphysics ∆ 6–7. We find additional confirmation for the correspondence between Metaphysics Γ 2 and Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.5 in Avicenna’s introduction of nonbeing (ʿadam) in connection with being and thing in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.5, which is similar to the way Aristotle introduces “nonbeing” in connection with “being” in Metaphysics Γ 2, 1003b5–12. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, Chapters 8–9, esp. 386–390, 393–397.

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Thus far, we have established that Avicenna approaches being (mawjūd) per se by two distinct considerations. First, we can examine being per se as prior to its notional constrictions by the objects of enquiry into the species, proper accidents, and causal principles of being. This is the way being in itself is considered as the subject of metaphysics—being qua being or absolute being (Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3), and is considered as a primary notion (Ilāhiyyāt i.5). Second, we can also study being per se as it is notionally constricted through its division into substance and accidents (Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii) as the first of the objects of enquiry in metaphysics. Furthermore, like being, the other primary notions can also be considered both as they are prior to any notional constrictions, and according to their various divisions into the species and characterizations as proper accidents of being. Finally, we have pointed out that the connection Avicenna makes between being (and thing) with the categories in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.5 suggests that he links Aristotle’s account of the universal and pros hen equivocal primary notions coextensive with being in Γ 2 with the way being per se is related to the categories in ∆ 7. Avicenna does this by relating the scientific principles as primary notions—which are coextensional with absolute being—to the sense of being per se that he took from Aristotle. Primary Hypotheses: The Subordination of Act and Potency to Necessity and Possibility in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 In the last chapter we established that Avicenna presents his scientific principles as primary notions in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and as primary hypotheses in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. We have just seen that Avicenna connects i.5’s treatment of the primary notions with Aristotle’s sense of being per se. In this subsection we consider the connection between the primary hypotheses of i.6–7 and Avicenna’s appropriation of the Aristotelian sense of being as act and potency. In Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 Avicenna connects Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency with necessity and possibility:

5.2.2

{We must know…} the state of necessity (wujūb), that is, necessary existence (wujūd al-ḍarūrī) and its conditions, and the state of possibility (imkān) and its true-nature (ḥaqīqa)—and this is in itself (wa huwa biʿaynihi) the theoretical examination (naẓar) of potency and act.62 Avicenna seems to suggest that the theoretical examination of Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency reveals a connection to the division of existence 62

Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 [25:5–6] (mod. trans.).

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into necessity and possibility, which he will treat in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. But what connection does he have in mind? We must answer this question before we can attempt to explain what connection these two transcategorical disjunctives have to scientific hypotheses. The last clause of the quotation is critical, “and this is in itself the theoretical examination of potency and act” or, as Marmura translates it, “this being the same as the theoretical investigation of potentiality and actuality.” The proper understanding of Avicenna’s point turns, in part, on how one interprets wa huwa bi-ʿaynihi, as “et quia ipsamet est…,” or “and this is in itself…,” or “and the very…,” or “and this is the same as….”63 Does Avicenna intend for us to consider the theoretical study of act and potency to be the same as the study of necessity and possibility? Or, is the latter study related to the former in some other special way? Marmura’s translation appears to identify the investigation of necessity and possibility with the theoretical investigation of potentiality and actuality. Menn also suggests that Avicenna takes the two investigations to be the same. He notes that “Necessity and contingency (imkān) will be fundamental for Avicenna’s project in a way that actuality and potentiality (quwwa) will not, and this is a striking difference from Aristotle (although Avicenna says at 1.4.1, p. 25, that the investigation of necessity and contingency is the same as the investigation of potentiality and actuality).”64 The difficultly with this interpretation of Avicenna’s statement is that the study of act and potency in the Ilāhiyyāt is not, in any obvious way, the same as

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The Arabic (Cairo, 25:6) is translated into Latin as, “… et dispositionem necessitatis in esse necessario et eius condiciones, et dispositionem possibilitatis et eius certitudinem et quia ipsamet est speculatio de potentia et effectu, …” (SD, 27:17–28:20), n.b. the critical apparatus notes that “et quia] om. A;” Anawati’s French translation as, “…et celui de la nécessité cʾest-à-dire lʾexistence nécessaire et ses conditions et lʾétat de la possibilité et sa nature (ḥaqīqā). Et cʾest lʾétude même de la puissance et de lʾacte.” (Anawati, La Métaphysique du Shifāʾ, 103); Lizzini’s Italian translation, “…il necessario—cioè lʾesistenza “obbligatoria” e le sue condizioni—la possibilià e la realtà di essa, che è poi propriamente lo studio della potenza e dellʾatto.” (Lizzini, Metafisica, 61); Bertolacci’s Italian translation, “… lo stato della necessità [che si trova] nellʾesistenza necessaria ed i suoi requisiti, e lo stato e lʾessenza della possibilità (questo, di per sé, è lʾesame della potenza e dellʾatto).” (Bertolacci, Libro della guarigione: Le cose divine, 175). Marmura’s English translation: “… the state of necessity (that is, necessary existence and its conditions), and the state of possibility and its true nature (this being the same as the theoretical investigation of potentiality and actuality).” (Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 19). Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149, n. 14. Cf. Rahman, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna,” 13–14; idem. “Essence and Existence in Ibn Sīnā: The Myth and the Reality.”

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the study or theoretical examination of necessity and possibility, for the former is addressed in Ilāhiyyāt iv.2, whereas the latter is treated in Ilāhiyyāt i. 6–7.65 It would be strange if Avicenna took the examination of these two topics to be the same, and then did not address act and potency as such in his principal treatment of necessity and possibility in i.6–7, that is, the very examination referenced here in Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1. We should not interpret Avicenna to mean that these two investigations are exactly the same. It seems more reasonable to translate bi-ʿaynihi as “in itself,” which, nonetheless, still leaves it up to Avicenna’s reader to figure out what the connection is between the theoretical examination of being as necessity and possibility and Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency.66 In order to clarify this connection, we should take a step back and survey the way these two disjunctives of being function in the Ilāhiyyāt. In contrast to al-Fārābī’s account of the properties of Aristotelian metaphysics, Avicenna’s list of the proper accidents of being treated by metaphysics includes the necessary and possible. This is noteworthy, because Avicenna intentionally adds the transcategorical disjunctive notions necessity and possibility to his recitation of al-Fārābī’s own list of proper accidents of being.67 In Ilāhiyyāt i.1 and i.2, necessity and possibility, as well as act and potency, are mentioned among the proper accidents of absolute being, such as the one and many, prior and posterior, perfect and imperfect, whole and part, particular and universal, cause and caused.68 Why is Avicenna’s introduction of necessity and possibility among the transcategorical disjunctives significant? In the previous section (5.1.1) we noted that Aristotle includes act and potency among the four main senses of being, and that they function as the most

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Cf. “In i, 4, p. 25, 6, another pair of properties of ‘existent’, namely ‘potency’ and ‘act’, are mentioned in connection with ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ (as a matter of fact, they are taken into account in iv, 2).” Bertolacci, Structure, 25, n. 77. One possible interpretation of Avicenna’s meaning is suggested by the Arabic word ʿayn, which means eye as well as a spring or source (of water). Avicenna might be using the expression bi-ʿaynihi to capture the way something can be the source or principle for another thing. Accordingly, this would mean that the doctrine of necessity and possibility is in its principle (bi-ʿaynihi), that is, it is the source or principle, for the doctrine of act and potency. Said otherwise, necessity and possibility provide the principles through which we must intellectually see, and so ground, act and potency. I thank R.E Houser for suggesting this interpretation. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.15 [7]; i.2.13 [13]; Fārābī, On the Goals of the Metaphysics, 36:9–20 (trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 69–70); Bertolacci, “Necessary,” 41–44; idem, Reception, 197–211. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.15 [7]; i.2.13 [13]. Cf. i.2.15 [14]; i.2.19–18 [15–16]; i.4.3–6 [26–27]. Cf. Reception, 116–126; 153–180.

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fundamental transcategorical disjunctive of being qua being in his metaphysics. Avicenna, however, presents act and potency as being the fundamental disjunctive in natural philosophy—which has a narrower scope than the metaphysical study of being qua being—where they are integral to the primary hypotheses of natural philosophy.69 This is a noteworthy contrast, and it prompts us to ask: Is being, considered as act and potency, also the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive for Avicenna’s metaphysics? Furthermore, is there any priority or subordination between the transcategorical disjunctives of act and potency and necessity and possibility? A few points of comparison are noteworthy. First, necessity and possibility play a far greater role in the ontological, aitiological, and theological doctrines in his Ilāhiyyāt than do any of the other transcategorical disjunctives that Avicenna identifies as proper accidents of being. Second, Menn and other scholars have contended that, in contrast to Aristotle’s first philosophy, act and potency do not occupy the pride of place in Avicenna’s first philosophy.70 Indeed, act and potency seems to be subordinated in some way to necessity and possibility. Third, in the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna addresses and employs necessity and possibility far more often than act and potency. Necessity and possibility are treated at length as early as Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, and they perform a significant doctrinal function in the classification of composite substances in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, in the treatment of priority and posteriority in Ilāhiyyāt iv.1, in his account of efficient causes of existence in vi.1–3, and they are central to his aitiology and theology in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. The detailed treatments of act and potency, however, are exclusively limited to Ilāhiyyāt ii.2–4, iv.2, and vi.1–5, where Avicenna is often attending to metaphysical topics that pertain to the verification of the principles of natural philosophy. Hence, between these two transcategorical disjunctives, act and potency seems to be subordinated in some way to the division of being into necessity and possibility in the Ilāhiyyāt. This subordination of act and potency to 69 70

Cf. Healing. Physics, ii.1. Many studies on Avicenna’s metaphysics emphasize the central function played by the modalities of necessity and possibility, and some of these studies also note their significance over act and potency. Cf. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149, n. 14; Lizzini, Existence– Existent; idem, “A Mysterious Order of Possibles: Some Remarks on Essentialism and on Beatrice Zedler’s Interpretation of Avicenna and Aquinas on Creation (al-Ilāhiyyāt, the Quaestiones de Potentia),” (Henceforth: Order of Possibles); McGinnis, “The Ultimate Why Question: Avicenna on Why God Is Absolutely Necessary,” (Henceforth: God is Absolutely Necessary); idem, “Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility and Potential in Avicenna and Aquinas;” Wisnovsky, amc, Chapters 11–14; Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles.”

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necessity and possibility provides us with a way to understand the ambiguous connection Avicenna suggests concerning the study of these two transcategorical disjunctives. In what way are act and potency subordinated to necessity and possibility? I contend that, for Avicenna, act and potency are superseded by necessity and possibility as the regnant transcategorical disjunctives of being. The theoretical investigation of metaphysics brings us from the enquiry into act and potency from natural philosophy, which is more known to us, into the more fundamental enquiry into necessity and possibility, which is more known it itself and grounds and governs act and potency. What makes any theoretical examination theoretical is that it treats things as they are in themselves. This kind of subordination clearly takes place throughout Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. For instance, in metaphysics we proceed from a sense of being as more known to us, which is the subject of first philosophy, to a demonstration of the existence of a divine uncaused first cause that is being and necessary existence as it is in itself. Similarly, Avicenna’s shift from the agent causality more known to us in natural philosophy to a metaphysical examination of efficient causality of existence as it is in itself.71 Natural philosophy concerns various kinds of agent causality that are more known to us, but in metaphysics we learn that the whole order of agent causality is subordinated to the realm of efficient causality, which is more known in itself.72 Agent causes bring about various kinds of motion and change, but only efficient causes can bring about the very existence of things, their agent causes, and their respective motions and effects. Given this subordination we could say that the examination of efficient causality, is in itself the theoretical examination of agent causality, which means the metaphysical study of efficient causality goes beyond mere agent causality and penetrates to the very root or principle of agent causality. If we interpret Avicenna’s subordination of act and potency to necessity and possibility in a similar way, this would mean that the transcategorical disjunctive of being as act and potency is metaphysically inferior to the transcategorical disjunctive of being as necessity and possibility. Moreover, the metaphysical examination of necessity and possibility “is in itself the theoretical examination of act and potency.” This interpretation of the subordination of act and potency to necessity and possibility also explains one of the significant differences between the four senses of being in Aristotle and Avicenna. Earlier we noted that Aristotle’s primary division of being is into act and potency, but

71 72

Cf. Healing. Physics, i.2–12; Ilāhiyyāt vi.1–3. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.2 [258].

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that in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and i.6–7, Avicenna concentrates on necessity and possibility and only mentions act and potency in passing. We now know why. Avicenna has demoted Aristotle’s sense of being that is divided into act and potency, and has put in its place being divided into necessity and possibility as the fundamental transcategorical disjunctive of metaphysics. For Avicenna, being as divided into necessity and possibility transcends natural philosophy’s division of being into act and potency, because necessity and possibility are in themselves a more fundamental transcategorical disjunctive of being than act and potency. Consequently, natural philosophy assumes and explicates the transcategorical disjunctive of act and potency that is more known to us, and metaphysics verifies it. But metaphysics also takes up the theoretical examination of the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive as known in itself. Aristotelians had mistakenly thought this to be act and potency; but for Avicenna it is the division of being into necessity and possibility. In sum, it has been shown that Avicenna’s obscure description of the relation of the study of act and potency to the examination of necessity and possibility in Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 cannot be taken to mean that the two studies are the same. What Avicenna means instead is that the transcategorical disjunctive of act and potency is superseded by the theoretical examination of metaphysics into the more fundamental transcategorical disjunctive that divides being into necessity and possibility. By studying the latter, metaphysics thereby embarks upon an examination of being as act and potency as it is more known in itself, and this turns out to be equivalent to a metaphysical explication of the theoretically more fundamental doctrine of the transcategorical disjunctive of necessity and possibility, which grounds the transcategorical disjunctive of act and potency. Consequently, it is not Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency, but Avicenna’s sense of being as divided into necessity and possibility that is the point of departure for his presentation and defense of the primary hypotheses of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. In Chapter 7 we will examine Avicenna’s integration of the sense of being as divided into necessity and possibility with the scientific primary hypotheses of metaphysics concerning the causal and compositional properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence—e.g., necessary existence in itself is simple and uncaused, and possible existence in itself is caused and composite—presented in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. 5.2.3 Being as Truth and the Axioms in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 In this subsection we explore Avicenna’s integration of Aristotle’s sense of being as truth with the defense of the axiomatic first principles of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.8. In Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 Avicenna mentions the true and false after the

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division of being per se and being per accidens, but being as truth is actually taken up in the last chapter of book i, before the distinction between being per se and per accidens is explicated in the first chapter of book ii.73 Avicenna’s account of being as truth in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 unites a hierarchy of theological, ontological, and epistemological senses of truth. Its doctrinal point of departure is Avicenna’s just completed introduction and defense of primary hypotheses in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 concerning the properties of necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself. Let us first examine the opening passage of Ilāhiyyāt i.8, as it clearly follows directly upon the conclusions of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. «1» As regards truth, one understands by it existence in external things absolutely, and one understands by it permanent existence, and one understands by it the state of the statement or of the belief indicating the state of the external thing, whether it {i.e., the statement or belief} conforms with it {i.e., the external thing}, such that we would say, “This is a true (ḥaqq) statement” and “This is a true (ḥaqq) belief.” «2» The necessary existence would be thus the permanently true in itself, while the possible existence would be true through another and false in itself. Hence, all things other than one necessary existence are, in themselves, false. «3» As for the true (ḥaqq) by way of conformity it is similar to the veridical (ṣādiq), except that {as I distinguish them}, {a statement or belief} is veridical when its relation to something is considered, and {a statement or belief} is true when the relation of something to it is considered. «4» The statements {that are} most worthy of being [called] true (ḥaqqan), are those whose veridicality (ṣidqahu) is permanent (dā’iman) and the most true among these are those whose veridicality (ṣidqahu) is primary, and not due to a cause. And the most primary of all veridical statements (al-ʼaqāwīl al-ṣādiqa), to which everything in analysis reduces (so that it is predicated either potentially or actually of all things demonstrated or made evident through it), is—as we have shown in the Book of Demonstrations—[as follows]: “There is no intermediary between affirmation and negation.” This property (ẖāṣṣa) is not an accident to one [particular] thing but is one of the accidents (ʿawāriḍ) to being inasmuch as it is being, because of its pervasiveness in all being.74

73 74

This section presents a digest of De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Ilāhiyyāt 1.8.1–2 [48] (mod. trans.).

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Avicenna begins the chapter at «1» with a threefold division of truth (ḥaqq) that starts with ontological and theological truth and shifts to epistemological truth. Truth can mean existence in external things simpliciter, or permanent existence, or the condition of a statement with respect to its conformity with reality. The first two senses of truth depend on the distinction between necessary and possible existence established in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. Later, in Ilāhiyyāt viii, we discover that the first sense turns out to be theological truth, whereas the second sense concerns the ontological truth of created possible existents.75 The first and second senses of truth closely resemble Aristotle’s distinction between caused inferior truths and uncaused superior truths from Metaphysics α 1.76 Avicenna derives the third sense of truth proper to propositions from Aristotle’s sense of being as true in Metaphysics ∆ 7, E 2, Ε 4, and Θ 10. In «4» Avicenna connects Aristotle’s sense of being as the truth of propositions to the principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation. This axiomatic principle is, epistemologically speaking, the first truth and the foundation that governs all true propositions, but it is itself dependent on ontological truths, which are themselves causally dependent upon the first theological truth that is necessary existence in itself. Following this short preface on the analogical divisions of truth, the rest of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 is devoted to Avicenna’s spirited defense of this axiomatic principle which he identifies with the first principle of demonstration.77 It is called the first principle of demonstration because this axiomatic principle is necessarily presupposed by and is implicitly employed in all demonstrations; it is a proper accident of being that is pervasive to being qua being. Accordingly, this first principle of demonstration is the principle or source that grounds and governs the truth of all premises and conclusions of scientific demonstrations. Avicenna’s treatment of this scientific axiom—which he claims belongs to the metaphysician to defend—draws on Aristotle’s own defense of the first principles of demonstration in Metaphysics Γ 3–8. What is especially innovative in Avicenna’s doctrine of truth in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 is his systematic synthesis of Aristotle’s scattered points about truth. Avicenna brings together Aristotle’s more ontological and theological statements about truth from Metaphysics α 1 and Θ 10, with the brief account of the sense of being as the truth of propositions in ∆ 7 and E 4, as well the extended defense of 75 76

77

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.4–5 [356]. Cf. “Therefore the principles of eternal things must be always most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth.” Aristotle, Metaphysics α 1, 993b25–33 (trans., Barnes). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.8.13–16 [53–54].

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the axiomatic first principles of demonstration in Γ 3–8. Avicenna integrates these diverse forms of truth into a coherent and systematic hierarchy of truths that grounds being in the sense of true propositions within the axiomatic first truths, which are themselves rooted in ontological truths, and these mutable truths of possible existents ultimately depend upon the unchanging first truth that is necessary existence in itself. What is most pertinent to our own concerns, however, is that in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 Avicenna integrates Aristotle’s sense of being as true into his epistemological presentation and defense of the scientific principles as axioms.78 Placing Ilāhiyyāt i.8’s division of truth within the wider context of Avicenna’s metaphysical first principles, makes it clearer that Avicenna’s doctrine of being as truth completes his assimilation of three of Aristotle’s four senses of being into his own account of metaphysical principles as primary notions, hypotheses, and axioms. In the next subsection, we turn to Avicenna’s reception of Aristotle’s division of the senses of being into being per se and being per accidens. To do so, however, requires that we leave the territory of the subject and scientific principles introduced in Ilāhiyyāt I and proceed to their first application to the objects of enquiry that Avicenna describes as the quasi-species of being, the first of which is substance (jawhar), which is treated in Ilāhiyyāt ii. The Categories and Division of Being per se and per accidens in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. At the beginning of this section (5.2.1) we established that Avicenna approaches being per se in two ways, namely, as prior to its notional constriction into the categories and as actually divided into the ten categories. Ilāhiyyāt i.5 addresses being per se—along with the other primary notions one, thing, and necessary—as prior to any notional constriction by the notions of substance or accident. Since we already sketched Avicenna’s integration of Aristotle’s sense of being per se with the doctrine of the primary notions from Ilāhiyyāt i.5, let us now turn to his application of being per se to the categories of substance and accidents. In his programmatic description of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.4 Avicenna writes that, after investigating being, thing, and necessary existence and possible existence, we must examine “the state of what is per se (bi-l-ḏāt) and per accidens (bi-l-ʿaraḍ).” He then notes a few lines later that he will also treat, “the 5.2.4

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For a more detailed exposition of content of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 and its Aristotelian sources, see Houser, First Principles of Demonstration; idem, Suffer; idem, Real Distinction, 82–84; Bertolacci, Reception, 220–225; 235–236; 390–393; 409–417; De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth.

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state of substance (al-jawhar) and [the number] of divisions it has.” (Ilāhiyyāt i.4.1 [25]) This corresponds to the order in which Avicenna takes up these topics in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. Let us examine his first point. Avicenna opens Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 with Aristotle’s first two senses of being from Metaphysics ∆, 7. As we have seen, Aristotle divides being into four senses: the accidental or per accidens (e.g., musical builder), the essential or per se (e.g., substance, quantity, quality, etc.), the truth of propositions, and the actual and potential. Aristotle contrasts being per accidens with being per se, and he identifies being per se with the division of being into the categories of substance and accident. Avicenna also distinguishes being per accidens from being per se and identifies being per se with the division of being into the categories or the quasi-species of being. We say: existence (wujūd) may belong to a thing (šayʾ) in itself (as, for example, the existence of the human as human), and it may [belong to it] accidentally (as, for example, the existence of Zayd as white). The things that are by accident are limitless. Let us, therefore, now leave [this topic] and concern ourselves with being (mawjūd) which exists in itself.79 Avicenna reformulates Aristotle’s division of being using his own metaphysical primary notions: being (mawjūd) and thing (šayʾ). Existence can either belong to a thing in itself (bi–ḏātihi), or existence can belong to a thing by accident (bi–l–ʿaraḍ). Since being per accidens or happenstance existence is limitless, it can be omitted from the scientific purview of metaphysics—a point Aristotle established in Metaphysics Ε, 2–3. Avicenna’s reference to the Aristotelian distinction between being per accidens and per se suggests that he aims to commence his metaphysical treatment of substance and the quasi-species of being in a way similar to Aristotle. Indeed, there are some noteworthy parallels. Aristotle introduced the subject of metaphysics in E, 1 as being qua being, just as Avicenna shows that being qua being is the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–3. And like Aristotle’s identification of four senses of being in E, 2, Avicenna identifies four senses of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. Aristotle eliminates accidental being and being as the truth of propositions as irrelevant to the science of being in E, 2–3 and E 4, respectively. This sets up the enquiry into the division of being per se into the categories and act and potency, which Aristotle addresses at length in Metaphysics Z–H and Θ, respectively. Avicenna does not disregard the importance of truth 79

Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.1 [57].

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to the science of being, but he does eliminate being per accidens from any scientific enquiry just before he focuses his attention on the division of being per se into substance and accidents. Despite such similarities, we should not overlook Avicenna’s innovative way of presenting these Aristotelian doctrines, especially the way he presents the distinction of being per se and per accidens by drawing upon his doctrine of the primary notion being (mawjūd) and its intension of existence (wujūd) established in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. After eliminating being per accidens from his scientific enquiry, and thereby orienting his metaphysical science to being (mawjūd) and the existence (wujūd) that belongs to things in themselves, Avicenna turns to another division. He divides the existence of being per se into substance and accidents, which, again, follows the topics proposed in Ilāhiyyāt i.4. The most prior of the divisions of beings in themselves is substance (jawhar). This is because being is of two divisions. One of them is being in another thing (that other thing being [one] that realizes substances and species in itself) in a manner dissimilar to the existence of a part of [that other], but whose separation from that [other] cannot take place. This is being in a subject. The second is the being that does not inhere in anything in this manner.80 According to Avicenna’s epistemological profile of metaphysics, the subject of metaphysics is being as being and whatever occurs to it as quasi-species and quasi-proper accidents. The metaphysical treatment of substance (jawhar) and accident (ʿaraḍ) is identified with the division of being into its quasispecies.81 The “most prior division” of being per se is substance (jawhar), which was alluded to before in Avicenna’s account of being as a primary notion.82 A substance has a quiddity that exists in itself, and it does not receive its per se existence in another. An accident has a quiddity that exists in itself, but it does receive its per se existence in another, that is, an accident has its per se existence as a being in a subject.83 Avicenna’s application of the primary notion of being per se to substance and accident admits of many further divisions into the various species of 80 81 82 83

Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.2 [57] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.13 [13]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.22 [34–35]. Cf. Gilson, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae;” Stone, Avicenna on Substance; Janssens, Ibn Sīnā on Substance; Legenhausen, “Ibn Sina’s Arguments Against God’s Being a Substance;” Pazouki, “From Aristotle’s Ousia to Ibn Sina’s Jawhar.”

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substance and accidents according to an analogy of priority and posteriority. This analogical application of the primary notion being (mawjūd) to the quasispecies of being will be addressed later in Chapter 8’s examination of the content of the cascade of divisions from absolute being to being per se and being per accidens, to being per se as substance and accidents, and the divisions of substance. We shall also return to chapter two’s matrix of logical distinctions which will provide us with the conceptual scaffolding needed to explicate the myriad senses of being per se and being per accidens employed by Avicenna in the Ilāhiyyāt. In this subsection we have merely sketched the way Avicenna integrated the Aristotelian sense of being per se within his account of the application of the primary notion being to objects of metaphysical enquiry concerned with the quasi-species of being. This section has presented the formal outline of Avicenna’s integration of his novel appropriation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the four senses of being with the Ilāhiyyāt’s account of the scientific principles of metaphysics and their application to the quasi-species of being. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 Avicenna identifies his account of the primary notions with the consideration of the sense of being per se as prior to any notional constriction by being divided into substance and accidents. Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 presents the primary hypotheses of metaphysics by drawing on Avicenna’s division of being into necessary and possible existence, which supersedes Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency as the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive of being. Ilāhiyyāt i.8 addresses the way being as the truth of propositions is epistemologically grounded in the first axiomatic propositional truth, namely, that there is no middle between affirmation and negation, which Avicenna identifies as the first principle of demonstration. Finally, Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 introduces the senses of being as being per se and being per accidens. Avicenna concentrates on being per se, and illustrates the way the primary notion of being is divided into the categories of substance and accident. Hence, Avicenna integrates his own version of the four senses of being with his scientific principles and their application to the objects of enquiry. The application of being per se to the objects of enquiry in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, follows on the treatment of the scientific principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, and sets up the first of many objects of enquiry that take as their doctrinal point of departure Avicenna’s primary notions, hypotheses, and axioms, all of which concern the most fundamental matters that pertain to being qua being. Consequently, this section has shown that Avicenna utilizes the scientific principles of his metaphysics as a framing principle for organizing his own innovative assimilation of Aristotle’s four senses of being. The most significant of these innovations is the priority Avicenna places on being as necessity and

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possibility, which supersedes Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency as the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive. It is not act and potency that is central to Avicenna’s ontology, aitiology, and theology but the transcategorical disjunctive of being as necessity and possibility. Indeed, the sense of being as necessity and possibility contributes the matter to Avicenna’s formulation of the primary hypotheses of metaphysics which concern the properties of necessary existence and possible existence. Avicenna then utilizes these scientific first principles to demarcate the host of ontological enquiries into the nature of possible existents, which ultimately lead to the aitiological and theological investigations into the existence of the uncaused divine being that is necessary existence in itself. Hence, Aristotle’s four senses of being—being per se, being per accidens, being as truth, and being as act and potency—are sublimated into Avicenna’s corresponding fourfold division—being per se, being per accidens, being as truth, and being as necessity and possibility. Avicenna then employs his own account of the four senses of being to provide the matter for his scientific principles and investigation into the quasi-species of being. And it is the latter two epistemological elements of his metaphysical science—that is, scientific principles and their application to the objects of enquiry—that provide the form as well as the formal function that the four senses of being take on in the Ilāhiyyāt. Formally speaking, the content of the senses of being are, for Avicenna, distributed into the scientific principles of the Ilāhiyyāt. This also means that the examination of the content of the senses of being as such, is introduced and completed within the context of Avicenna’s scientific principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8 and their application to the categories in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. Hence, in contrast to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the senses of being are not used as beacons to signal important shifts within an extended causal argument akin to the way that Aristotle uses them at E 2, E 4, Z 1, H 1, Θ 1, Θ 10, and elsewhere as markers to track his transition from the investigation of one sense of being to another. In Avicenna, the proper senses of being correspond to the presentation of the scientific principles in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. But this also means that as scientific principles their application to the objects of enquiry is presupposed in every investigation within the metaphysics, beginning with the ontological division of being per se into the categories in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, and ending with the aitiological and theological treatment of God’s existence as the first cause of all creaturely emanations in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. In short, by integrating the senses of being into the epistemological profile of his scientific principles, Avicenna thereby also ensures their relevance for the whole of his metaphysical science. Indeed, by distributing the four senses of being into the various kinds of scientific principles, the senses of being take

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on the formal function of scientific principles whose application to the objects of enquiry within the science of metaphysics are exigent for all scientific demonstrated conclusions achieved in first philosophy’s various investigations into the ontological, aitiological, and theological questions with respect to being qua being. This sketch of the way the doctrine of the senses of being is employed within the overall arc of the Ilāhiyyāt provides us with a hint of an answer to the central question of this study: How does Avicenna bring us from the subject of metaphysics as being in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 to the existence of the divine necessary existence in itself that is the theological goal and ultimate conclusion of the many objects of enquiry of metaphysics? It appears that our answer will be inextricably tied up with Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being into his scientific principles, which function as an intermediary between the subject of first philosophy and the objects of enquiry of this divine science. Concluding Remarks This chapter has established that Avicenna drew upon Aristotle’s four senses of being and integrated them into his account of the primary notions, hypotheses, and axioms of metaphysics. In the first section we explored the doctrine of the four senses of being in Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna. In the second section we examined the way Avicenna used the scientific first principles of his metaphysics to provide an intelligible framework that gave the four senses of being a clear and organized structure within his own doctrine of being. It was shown that Avicenna’s reception of Aristotle’s senses of being seeks to present an account of the intelligibility of being that is deeper than Aristotle’s and alFārābī’s. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 Avicenna addresses the primary notions of being, but he enlarges Aristotle’s sense of being per se and the one, which are both divisible into the categories from Metaphysics Γ 2 and ∆ 6–7, with the addition of the primary notions thing and necessary. In Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 Avicenna goes beyond Aristotle’s division of being into act and potency from ∆ 7 and supersedes Aristotle’s transcategorical disjunctive of potency and act by displacing it with what is metaphysically more known in itself, namely, the ontological priority that belongs to the division of being into necessity and possibility. This priority of necessary existence and possible existence and their properties is worked out in his verification of the primary hypotheses proper to the science of metaphysics. In our consideration of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 we limned the way Avicenna synthesized Aristotle’s scattered accounts of truth from Metaphysics α 1, Γ 3–8, Ε 4,

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and elsewhere, into a systematic and hierarchical doctrine of truth connected with his metaphysical defense of axioms. This grounding of being as the truth of propositions in the first truths and axiomatic first principles of demonstration, and, beyond that, their ontological dependence upon metaphysical truths, which themselves ultimately depend on the first truth that is necessary existence in itself, completes Avicenna’s emendation of Aristotle’s senses of being into his own account of the scientific first principles of his metaphysics. We then expounded how Avicenna applies these first principles of metaphysics to the quasi-species of being, which he integrated with Aristotle’s senses of being per se and being per accidens. So far we have concentrated on setting in relief the form of Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being into his division of the scientific principles of metaphysics as primary notions, primary hypotheses, and axioms. But we have said very little about what these distinct first principles of metaphysics are. The next few chapters draw upon this chapter’s focus on the formal aspects of Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being into his account of the scientific principles of metaphysics in our examination of the material aspects of this integration.

Chapter 6

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Material Approach to the Principles of Conceptualization We have arrived at the point in our enquiry where we must transition from the formal investigation of the epistemological profile of the subject, principles, and objects of enquiry of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, to an examination of the metaphysical material content that is framed by these epistemological elements. In the first two chapters we presented the logical and epistemological contours of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science, which he fashions out of his account of primary and acquired knowledge by conceptualization and assent. In the third and fourth chapters we explicated at length the way this epistemological profile of a demonstrative science was applied to the Ilāhiyyāt, and thereby provided the organizing principle for his presentation of the subject, goal, and scientific principles of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8. In the fifth chapter we examined the formal aspects of his integration of the four senses of being with metaphysics’ scientific principles and ontological enquiry into the quasi-species of being. The present chapter shifts to an explication of the material aspects of this integration of the four senses of being with Avicenna’s scientific principles as principles of conceptualization and in the next chapter we consider the integration with respect to the principles of assent. In chapter eight we shall address the application of these scientific principles to the division of being per se into the categories. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents a general introduction of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. The second section examines each notion in detail and clarifies their intensions and connections to the other primary notions. 6.1

Primary Notions

Avicenna commences his treatment of the primary notions as scientific principles of metaphysics in the famous opening lines of Ilāhiyyāt i.5. [The] notions of “being” (mawjūd) “thing” (šayʾ), and “necessary” (ḍarūrī) are impressed in the soul in a primary way. This impression does not

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require better known things to bring it about. [This is similar] to what obtains in the domain of assent, where there are primary principles found to be true in themselves, causing [in turn] assent to the truths of other [propositions].1 This initial introduction of the primary notions as being, thing, and necessary is supplemented a few lines later with the addition of the one (wāḥid) to the cohort of primary notions. The things that have the highest claim to be conceptualized in themselves are those most common to all entities—such as: “being” (mawjūd), “thing” (šayʾ), “one” (wāḥid) and others.2 Our aim in this section is to demarcate the main contours of Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. To this end we shall address Avicenna’s account of what a primary notion is (6.1.1), the coextensionality of the primary notions (6.1.2), their relation to the subject of metaphysics and being per se, that is, their extensional and intensional priority to all notional amplifications and constrictions of being by its myriad species, proper accidents, and causal principles (6.1.3), and their respective synonyms, intensions, opposites (6.1.4). 6.1.1 What is a Primary Notion? The four primary notions (maʿnā) Avicenna introduces in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 are “being” (mawjūd), “thing” (šayʾ), “one” (wāḥid), and “necessary” (ḍarūrī / wājib). As primary notions they are the scientific principles of conceptualization; they are the first notions impressed on the intellect, they are notions that are more

1 Ilāhiyyāt i. 5, 1 [29] (mod. trans.), (SD, 31–32: 2–5). 2 Ilāhiyyāt i. 5, 5 [30] (mod. trans.), (SD, 33: 25–27). See also Ilāhiyyāt i. 2, 18 [15], where we are told that existence and unity are firsts in generality, and Ilāhiyyāt vii.1 where one is said to be convertible with being. Like Bertolacci, I do not believe there is any great importance to be found in the differences between the notions enumerated within these two lists of primary notions that transcend the categories. See Bertolacci, Necessary, 36, n. 18. As for the “others,” we can only speculate. Given the way Avicenna treats truth (ḥaqq) and the good (ẖayr)— such as in Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1–2 [48–49]; vi.5; vii.1.11 [306]; viii.6.3–5 [355–356]—he would probably include truth and goodness among the most common notions. What is significant, is that the good is not mentioned and employed within the epistemological framework as scientific principles.

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known in themselves, and they do not require any better known notions to make them known. Like the first principles in the order of assent, which are assented to in themselves without any middle terms, the first principles of conceptualization are conceived in themselves. In short, such first principles of conceptualization and assent are primarily clear (bayyin awwalī) and selfevident (bayyin bi-nafsihī).3 We shall treat the first principles of assent in the next chapter on the primary hypotheses and axioms. As principles of conceptualization, the primary notions pertain to all forms of the question what, and are implied in the conceptualization of all secondary notions (e.g., the substances and accidents that fall under the categories). Primary notions are also the most common or universal notions, that is, there are no notions more general than the primary notions. Consequently, because the primary notions are the first known, most known through themselves, most universal notions, and are the principles of conceptualization, the primary notions as scientific principles do not admit of proper definitions. This is because a true definition has three aspects: its genus, difference(s), and its species;4 and since these primary notions are the most common notions, they cannot be classified by any generic notions that have a more general extension or intension than the primary notions themselves. In short, since it is impossible to give a proper definition of the primary notions, all attempts to define them will inevitably be either circular or will apply lesser known notions to define what is more known and proper to the primary notions in themselves. As principles of conceptualization, the primary notions do figure into the definitions of other less universal notions. Indeed, given the absolute priority and universality of the primary notions, they are implicitly contained in all responses to the question what, in all conceptualizations of other notions, and in all descriptions and definitions. This is why the primary notions are called the principles of conceptualization and the principles of definition.5 Furthermore, because all assents—even the principles of assent—presuppose and consist in the composition of various conceptualized notions, these primary notions or principles of conceptualization are also the first principles with respect to the whole order of assent. In short, the primary notions of metaphysics are the primaries (awwaliyyāt) or fundamental principles (uṣūl) of all knowledge par excellence. Bertolacci identifies the following four criteria from Avicenna that characterize all of the primary notions. They are all (1) first notions, (2) principles or 3 Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 223 and Appendix E, 607–612. 4 Cf. Chapter 2.1. 5 Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.2 [29]; Ilāhiyyāt i.8.16 [54].

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starting points for conceptualization and the formulation of definitions, (3) the most known in themselves, and (4) the most universal notions.6 He notes that the first three criteria all pertain to the intension or meaning, that is, the intelligible content, of what each notion signifies with respect to an entitative whole. The fourth criterion concerns the extension or reference of the primary notions, which we must consider prior to our treatment of the distinct intensions of the primary notions. 6.1.2 The Coextensionality of the Primary Notions In addition to being the most universal notions of conceptualization, each of the primary notions is also coextensional with the other primary notions.7 Being, thing, one, and necessary all share in the same extension, that is, they each have the same reference. Each primary notion is distinguished from the others in virtue of the distinct intension or meaning it signifies. So even though each primary notion refers to the same entity, each primary notion also highlights or denotes a distinct entitative characteristic, principle, or part of the same entity. In short, the primary notions are the same in reference but distinct in signification; they are coextensional but not cointensional. With respect to their coextensionality, Avicenna states that the primary notions are the notions that are the “most common to all entities.”8 Each of the primary notions permeates all of the categories of being; they are transcategorical as intracategorical. Every notion that falls under the categorical divisions of being implies in its reference and signification all of the primary notions. This is because the primary notions are the principles of conceptualization for all of the secondary notions that belong to the categories. In the final chapters we will investigate whether each one of the primary notions is transcategorical as extracategorical, and so can refer to entities that transcend the categories, such as God. In the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna articulates the coextensionality of these transcategorical primary notions in terms of their mutual concomitance and inseparability. We have seen that the terms “concomitance” and “separable” come from Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions. These two notions, along with the essential and accidental are the more general logical distinctions that are applied, and thereby constricted, within Avicenna’s doctrines of 6 Cf. Bertolacci, Necessary, 38. 7 For the time being I take for granted that Avicenna maintains the coextensionality of the primary notions throughout his ontology. In Chapter 9 I address some objections to this contention. 8 Ilāhiyyāt i.5.5 [30:3] (mod. trans.).

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the five predicables and the categories of being.9 He uses the terms concomitance and inseparability in both extensional and intensional senses. We will address the intensional sense of these terms in the later subsections on the synonyms, opposites, and intensions of the primary notions. The extensional sense of concomitance and inseparable means that wherever there is being, there is thing, one, and necessary; where there is necessary, there is also a being that is a thing and it is one; and so forth. Each primary notion is an inseparable concomitant of the others, and they are all reciprocally inseparable from each other.10 Avicenna’s descriptions of being as an inseparable concomitant of thing and of existence and unity as common inseparable concomitants of quiddity, have sometimes been interpreted to mean that because they are concomitants, existence and unity are thereby subordinated to quiddity.11 As we have seen, however, this is not the only meaning of the term concomitance. In the context of the primary notions, Avicenna does not employ the term “concomitance” to mean that the primary notions or their intensions are extensionally subordinate to other notions, or that they are akin to predicable properties or predicable accidents of the other primary notions. By using these terms from his matrix of logical distinctions, Avicenna simply means that being, thing, one, and necessary are all coextensional primary notions that are inextricably bound up together. 9 10 11

Cf. Chapter 2.1. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.19 [34]; Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15]; Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.15–17 [109–110]. For an extended account of the mutual concomitance of being and thing in Avicenna, see Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Druart, Shayʾ or Res. Even though Avicenna explicitly states that being and thing are mutually inseparable concomitants in numerous passages throughout the Ilāhiyyāt—and in later works, see Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 5–6 [13–15] (Inati, 121); c. 17 [30–34] (Inati, 125)—there are still scholars who contend Avicenna does not hold that being and thing are coextensional, and that being is actually subordinated to thing. Furthermore, since they interpret being to be subordinated to thing, some of these scholars also argue that existence and unity are subordinated concomitants of quiddity, and a few of his interpreters even contend that quiddities can be in some sense independent from the existence and unity that accrues to the quiddity. For scholars who defend some version of this line of interpretation, see Wisnovsky, Thingness; idem, amc; idem, “Essence and Existence in the Islamic East (Mashriq) in the 11th and 12th Centuries ce: A sketch,” (Henceforth: Islamic East on Essence and Existence); Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions; idem, Res as Transcendental; Owens, “The Relevance of Avicennian Neoplatonism.” For other relevant studies on this issue, see infra, n. 69. More recently, this problematic line of interpretation has been discussed and refuted in Bertolacci, Essence and Existence and Lizzini, Order of Possibles. Bertolacci in particular has shown that being (and so existence) and thing (and so quiddity) are indeed inseparable mutual concomitants in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt.

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Primary Notions in Relation to the Subject of Metaphysics and Being per se This brings us to a topic addressed in the last chapter, namely, Avicenna’s understanding of the relation of the primary notions to the subject of metaphysics as being qua being or absolute being, and their relation to being per se. The subject of metaphysics is being qua being (mawjūd bi mā huwa mawjūd). This means that first philosophy is the study of being (mawjūd), that is, any being whatsoever insofar as it is being as such—what Avicenna calls absolute being (mawjūd muṭlaq). Let us recapitulate what we have said thus far about absolute being. Absolute being is extensionally and intensionally antecedent to all notional amplifications and constrictions by the species, proper accidents, and causal principles of being. Absolute being as such admits of sundry notional amplifications and constrictions, but absolute being is also antecedent or prior to such notional constrictions as substance and accident, act and potency, cause and caused. Absolute being is transcategorical in the fullest sense, that is, it is intracategorical (and so it permeates all of the categories) and extracatgorical (and so it applies to whatever does not fall within the categories, such as God). Furthermore, even when absolute being is characterized by any one of these species, proper accidents, or causal principles, being does not become so notionally constricted and specified as to become equivalent to the subjects of any of the particular sciences. This is because absolute being as such—and even being as construed by the aforementioned notional constrictions—remains a notion that is existentially and intensionally neutral with respect to matter; it is neutrally nonmaterial. In other words, absolute being is a notion that is common to all entities regardless of their existential and intensional connections to matter, for there are beings that exist and are defined in terms of their mixture with matter, beings that are attached to matter, beings that can be separate from matter, and beings that are immaterial and so entirely independent from matter. This notional neutrality with respect to matter is also what secures the whichness of metaphysics with respect to the particular sciences, such as mathematics and natural philosophy, each of which have their own particular existential and conceptual connections to matter. Such is the doctrine of being as presented as the subject of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4. Avicenna resumes the presentation of his doctrine of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 where he treats absolute being as a primary notion. In the last chapter we examined the way Avicenna appropriated the sense of being per se into the epistemological profile of his Ilāhiyyāt and distinguished two ways in which we can consider being per se. When being per se is considered prior to any notional constrictions, it is integrated into his treatment of the scientific principles as primary notions. When being per se is considered as divided into the categories 6.1.3

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of substance and accident—and so is notionally constricted by them—then being per se is integrated into the application of the primary notion being to the objects of enquiry concerned with the quasi-species of being. Accordingly, Ilāhiyyāt i.5’s account of being as a primary notion is concerned with conceptually clarifying further the notion of being per se or being in itself prior to any notional constrictions. It is here, in the context of treating the primary notions of metaphysics, that Avicenna will elucidate the synonyms, intensions, and opposites of the primary notion being. Finally, because absolute being, the subject of metaphysics, is the same as the primary notion of being, and being per se is prior to any notional constrictions, and the primary notion of being is coextensional with the primary notions of thing, one, and necessary, it follows that the other primary notions are also extensionally and intensionally antecedent to the notional constrictions of the quasi-species, proper accidents, causal principles, and the myriad connections to matter proper to the particular sciences. In other words, the extension and intension of the primary notions as such, that is, as taken absolutely, are antecedent to the other pole of being per se, which is its division into the categories. Finally, since all of the primary notions are coextensionally transcategorical, each of the primary notions, like being, can also be applied to all of the categorical divisions of being per se. A substance or accident is not only a division of being per se, it is also a division of thing, one, and necessary. Thus far we have touched on the way all the primary notions are coextensional and, like absolute being, have an intension prior to any notional amplifications or constrictions that are acquired through being divided into the categories or characterized by proper accidents and causal principles. What is the antecedent meaning or intension of each of these primary notions as such and prior to any notional modifications? 6.1.4 The Synonyms, Intensions, and Opposites of the Primary Notions Before we can present the intensions of each of the four primary notions, we must first address the problem of how to make known the meanings of the primary notions. Because the primary notions are the first known conceptualizations, known in themselves, are the most universal notions which are antecedent to all other meanings, are the principles of all conceptualizations, and cannot be defined, it seems problematic to provide any account of how to make known what is supposedly known already. Avicenna is aware of the apparent difficulty of making known what is evident in itself, and he addresses it in tandem with his probative account of why there must be primary principles in the order of conceptualization.

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{With respect to} conceptualizations, there are things which are principles for conceptualization that are conceptualized in themselves. If one desires to indicate them, [such indication] would not, in truth, constitute making an unknown thing known but would merely consist in drawing attention to them or bringing them to mind through the use of a name or a sign which, in itself, may be less known than [the principles] but which, for some cause or circumstance, happens to be more obvious in its signification. If, then, such a sign is used, the soul is awakened [to the fact] that such a meaning is being brought to mind, in [the sense] that it is the intended [meaning and] not another, without the sign in reality having given [any] knowledge of it. If every conceptualization were to require that [another] conceptualization should precede it, then [such a] state of affairs would lead either to an infinite regress or to circularity…. For this reason, none of these things can be shown by a proof totally devoid of circularity or by the exposition of better known things. Hence, whoever attempts to place in them something as a [defining] constituent falters.12 Avicenna’s logical treatment of the first principles of conceptualization and assent noted that sometimes what is first in these two orders of what is more known in itself may still require some clarification through the use of signs or expressions that bring what is more known in itself to mind.13 He repeats this point about conceptualization and assent in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. When we indicate the meanings of the primary notions, it might appear that we are making the 12 13

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.2–5 [34–35] (mod. trans.). Cf. Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge, 37–42. “The reason why we do not know these principles is our lacking (fiqdānunā) the principle of their attainment, i.e., conceptualization. For the first principles, even if they do not have [further] principles with respect to assent, they still have principles with respect to conceptualization. Their principles with respect to conceptualization are obtained through (i) the senses (ḥiss), (ii) compositive imagination (taẖayyul) and (iii) estimation (tawahhum).” Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.10 [A 331] (trans., Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge, 41). “The remaining [principles of] knowledge {i.e., for all other secondary notions,} are acquired either from experience or through a middle, when the composition (taʾlīf) of the simples does not itself require assent, and so the [principles of] knowledge that are obtained are preceded by two reasons of ignorance, namely, the fact that the simples have not emerged clearly to the mind, and the lack of a middle or of experience. The first [principles] evident in themselves, [by contrast] are preceded by [only] one of the two reasons, namely the first.” Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.10 [A 332] (mod. trans., Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge, 42).

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unknown known, but this is not so, for all we are doing is bringing to someone’s attention what is already known but is not readily apparent. This often requires making use of a name (ism) or a sign (ʿalāma) that is less known in itself with respect to the primary notions (which are the most known in themselves), but which is for some reason more apparent to us than the primary notions. In short, to indicate the meanings of the primary notions we have to make use of signs of what is more known in relation to us, in order to bring to mind what is more known in itself.14 Avicenna provides examples of various failures to define being, thing, necessary, and one. He first shows that it is impossible to use any notions from the categories to define being (mawjūd), such as action and passion. Someone might contend that, “it is the true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of being (mawjūd) to be either active or acted on.”15 But Avicenna denies that this provides us with any definition of being, because the division of being into the active or passive, “while inescapably the case, belongs to the division of being, {but} being is better known than the active and the passive. The masses conceive the true-nature of being without knowing at all that it must be either active or passive.”16 In short, being cannot become known by defining it in terms of categorical notions like action and passion that imply being itself in their meanings—especially since being can be known independently of these categorical meanings. As for thing (šayʾ), “the case is similar with somebody’s statement: ‘The thing is that about which it is correct [to give] an informative statement’ for ‘is correct’ is less known than ‘the thing,’ and ‘informative statement’ is [likewise] less known than ‘the thing.’ How, then, can this be the definition of the thing?”17 For even though these notions are connected with the notion thing, the meanings of “correct” and “informative statement” cannot be described without understanding each of these two notions in relation to a thing or some other synonym with the notion thing. A similar difficulty arises for the notion necessary (ḍarūrī, wājib). Avicenna notes that all attempts to define it always involve the notions the possible and impossible; then when one turns to define the possible and impossible one 14

15 16 17

Cf. Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts; Druart, Shayʾ or Res; Houser, Real Distinction; Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; idem, Necessary; Lizzini, Existence-Existent; Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions; Black, Fictional Beings; De Haan, Mereological Construal; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Janssens, “Elements of Avicennian Metaphysics in the Summa;” Strobino, Principles of Scientific Knowledge. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.5 [35]. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.5 [30] (mod. trans.). My emphasis. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.6 [30] (mod. trans.).

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always uses the notion the necessary. This is why one finds such statements as, “‘The impossible is that whose existence is not possible, or that whose nonexistence is necessary; the necessary is that whose nonexistence is not allowable and is impossible, or that for which it is not possible not to be; the possible is that for which it is not impossible to be or not to be, or that for which it is not necessary to be or not to be.’ All this, as you see, is clearly circular.”18 In Ilāhiyyāt iii.3, Avicenna states that it is “difficult for us to ascertain … the quiddity of the one (wāḥid). This is because, if we say, ‘The one is not divisible,’ we will have said, ‘The one is that which necessarily does not become multiple,’ [in which case] we will have included multiplicity in the explanation of the one. As for multiplicity, it is necessarily defined in terms of the one because the one is the principle of multiplicity, the existence and quiddity [of the latter] deriving from it. Moreover, whatever definition [we use] in defining multiplicity, we necessarily use in it the one. … How difficult it is, then, for us to say something that is reliable on this topic!”19 Nonetheless, even though these other notions do not provide definitions of the primary notions, they can help bring to mind the meanings of the primary notions. Avicenna makes this point with respect to the attempts to define the notion thing: “we do not deny that through {a less known statement} and its like, despite its vitiating starting point, there occurs in some manner a directing of attention to the thing.”20 In other words, even though less universal or opposite notions do not provide proper and noncircular definitions or descriptions of the primary notions, they do provide aids for bringing one’s attention to the primary notions and their respective intensions. This is why Avicenna provides various means to indicate the meanings of the primary notions by drawing our attention to their various synonyms, opposites, and of course, by presenting their intensions. In the Ilāhiyyāt being (mawjūd) is used synonymously with the “established” (muṯbat), “realized” (muḥaṣṣal), and “entity” (huwiyya);21 thing (šayʾ) is synonymous with “anything” or “something” (amr), “what” or “whatever” (mā), and “that which” (al-laḏī).22 Avicenna does 18 19 20 21

22

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.23 [35–36]. Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.1–3 [104–105]. My emphasis. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.7 [31]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.8 [31]; i.5.19 [34]; vii.1.1 [303]. On being (mawjūd), established (muṯbat), and realized (muḥaṣṣal), see Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, in Probing, 154–155. On being (mawjūd) and entity (huwiyya) see Bertolacci, “Some Texts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the Ilāhīyāt of Avicenna’s Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ.” (Henceforth: Some Texts). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.6 [30]; i.5.19–20 [34].

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not identify any synonyms for the one (wāḥid) or necessary (ḍarūrī, wājib). He opposes being and thing to nonbeing or nothing (maʿdūm),23 and opposes the one to the many,24 and the necessary to possible and impossible.25 It is noteworthy that, even though all the primary notions are coextensional, they do not have the same synonyms, intensions, or opposites. Thing is not synonymous with the one, necessary, or being, but it is synonymous with anything, whatever, and that which. The one is opposed to the many, but being is not opposed to the many.26 What distinguishes these coextensional primary common notions are their diverse meanings or intensions, for each primary notion is the same in extension as the others, but distinct in intension. Each of the primary notions indicates the same entitative whole, but their distinct intensions do so by indicating distinct entitative characteristics of that entitative whole. In other words, the primary notions illuminate distinct entitative parts, principles, or characteristics of entities.27 These distinct intensions of the primary notions function analogously to the way definitions identify the meanings of definable notions.28 In the Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna uses the primary notion being (mawjūd) to mean the entitative principle which he calls “existence” (wujūd), “established existence” (wujūd iṯbātī), “existential-thatness” (anniyya), “realized subsistence” (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) and “subsistence” (qiwām).29 Thing (šayʾ) means the entitative principle variously called “quiddity” or “whatness” (māhiyya), “true-nature” or “truthness” (ḥaqīqa), “specified to be” (wujūd

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.12–20 [32–34]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.2–6; vii.1. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.22–24 [35–36]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303]. Cf. De Haan, Mereological Construal. In Chapter 2.1.3 we discussed Avicenna’s five senses of definition; the distinct intensions of the primary notions can be called definitions in Avicenna’s fifth and loosest sense of definition. In the Ilāhiyyāt, Avicenna takes it for granted that being (mawjūd) means existence (wujūd), see, in particular, Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15]; i.5.8–11 [31–32]. The meaning of being as “existence” (wujūd) is also identified with “established existence” (wujūd iṯbātī) in i.5.8–11 [31–32] and “existence” (wujūd) is taken to be convertible with “existential-thatness” (anniyya) in Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.10–11 [346–347]. Avicenna uses the terms “realized subsistence” (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) and subsistence (qiwām) as notions convertible with “existence” (wujūd), and especially in the context of treating metaphysical issues related to the principles of natural philosophy, see Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.2–3 [57–58]; ii.1.7 [59]; ii.3.1 [72]; i.7.5 [45]; ii.3.16 [79]; ii.4.22 [89].

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ẖāṣṣ),30 “essence” (ḏāt),31 “thingness” (šayʾiyya),32 and “nature” (ṭabīʿa).33 The one (wāḥid) means the entitative characteristic denoted by the terms “unity” (waḥda), “indivisibility” (lā qisma), “indivisible” (lā yanqasim), and “indivisible to be” (wujūd lā yanqasim).34 Finally, the necessary (ḍarūrī or wājib) means the entitative part identified by the terms “necessity” (wujūb), “invariance of existence” (taʾakkud al-wujūd), “necessary with regard to existence” or “necessary existence” (wājib al-wujūd), and “permanence of existence” (dawām alwujūd).35 In short, being signifies that which is/has existence, thing signifies that which is/has quiddity, one signifies that which is indivisible, and necessary signifies that which is/has existence invariantly. However, for the sake of consistency, simplicity, and avoiding circumlocutions (e.g., X signifies that which is/has Y), I shall often speak of the meanings or intentions of being as signifying existence, and thing as meaning essence or quiddity, one as meaning indivisible, and necessary as denoting an entity’s invariance of existence. Each of these primary notions signifies a conceptually distinct feature about entities, whether they exist in reality or in the mind. By conceptualizing an entity as a being, we are concerned with it insofar as it exists; but when we think of the same entity as a thing, our mind is directed towards the essence or quiddity of the entity. If we consider any entity as being one, then we are conceptualizing the same entity insofar as it is actually indivisible in its existence and essence.36 Finally, to take the same entity as necessary, means that we are considering the invariance or necessity of its existence. The following chart is a representative division of the primary notions and the synonyms and intensions Avicenna ascribes to them throughout the Ilāhiyyāt. 30 31 32

33 34 35

36

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Avicenna introduces the terms “quiddity” (māhiyya), “true-nature” (ḥaqīqa), and “specified existence” (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) as the intensions for thing (šayʾ) in Ilāhiyyāt i.5.8–11 [31–32]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.7 [40]; Ilāhiyyāt viii.5.1 [349]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.5.27–31 [292–294]. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 thingness (šayʾiyya) is translated into Latin as similitudinem (Scientia divina, i.5, 38:21), but in Ilāhiyyāt vi.5 thingness (šayʾiyya) is mistranslated into Latin as causalitatem, (Scientia divina, i.5, 337:88). For an extended study of this translation error, see Wisnovsky, Thingness. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.1.16–30 [200–206]; Ilāhiyyāt v.2. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.1 [97]; iii.3.4 [106]; iii.3.15 [109]. For “necessity” (wujūb), “invariance of existence” (taʾakkud al-wujūd), “necessary with regard to existence” (wājib al-wujūd), see Ilāhiyyāt i.5.24 [36]; i.6–7. For “permanence of existence” (dawām al-wujūd) and similar variations (such as dāʾim al-wujūd), see Avicenna, Salvation. Logic, 45, i [D, 29] (Ahmed, 24); 48, ii [D, 35] (Ahmed, 29); Healing. Logic. Book of Propositions, ii.4 [112] (Bäck, 137); Ilāhiyyāt i.7.14 [47]; i.8.1 [48]; ix.1.2 [374]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.1 [97].

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Primary Notions (maʿānī)

Synonyms (murādifāt)

Meanings Intensions/ Notions (maʿānī)

being/existent (mawjūd)

established (muṯbat), realized (muḥaṣṣal), being/entity (huwiyya)

existence (wujūd), subsistence (qiwām), realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām), existential-thatness (anniyya), established existence (wujūd iṯbātī)

thing (šayʾ)

anything/something (amr), what/whatever (mā), that which (al-laḏī)

quiddity (māhiyya), truenature (ḥaqīqa), thingness (šayʾiyya), essence (ḏāt), nature (ṭabīʿa), specified to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ)

one (wāḥid)

N/A

unity (waḥda), indivisibility (lā qisma), indivisible (lā yanqasim), indivisible to be (wujūd lā yanqasim)

necessary (ḍarūrī / wājib)

N/A

necessity (wujūb), “necessary with regard to existence” (wājib al-wujūd), permanence of existence (dawām al-wujūd), invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd)

Avicenna introduces each of these meanings of the primary notions to help describe an indefinable primary notion, but he says very little about these meanings. Consequently, it is difficult to clarify the intensions or meanings of these primary notions. In the next few subsections we will attempt to elucidate the diverse meanings of each of these primary notions. In Chapters 9 and 10 we shall investigate which of these four primary notions are the most basic primary notions and which one of the four is the most fundamental primary notion

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in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Let us now concentrate on Avicenna’s doctrine of being and thing, before turning to the notions one and necessary. 6.2

A Comparison of the Primary Notions

6.2.1 Being and Thing in Context The terms being (mawjūd) and existence (wujūd) are especially significant for Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Both terms are derived from the verbal root w–j–d meaning “to find” (wajada); its “derivatives may be used for a copula and do the work of the is of predication, or they may denote existence, either in the absolute sense or in the sense that carries locational connotation. In either case those derivatives could at the same time mean ‘to be so,’ ‘to be true.’”37 The terms mawjūd and huwiyya were both used to render the Greek term τὸ ὄν.38 Mawjūd means “is found” or “exists” and with the definite article al-mawjūd can mean “what is found,” “what is there,” “what exists,” and can be translated into English as “existent” or “being.”39 The term wujūd was often used to translate the Greek τὸ εἶναι. “The literal meaning of wujūd, from wajada ‘to find’, is in the passive form ‘the fact of being found’ (hence ‘the fact of being there’) and the term is consequently employed, even in non-philosophical Arabic, to mean ‘existence’ or ‘to exist’, in distinct opposition to ‘adam, i.e. ‘lack’ and hence ‘absence’, ‘nonexistence.’”40 The term wujūd can mean “to be found” with a locational connotation, meaning “to be found there,” but it also can mean “to be found” as in “to be” or “to exist” as well as to be with some qualification, such as “to be found in a certain way,” “to be in a certain way” or “to exist in a certain way.”41 Both mawjūd and wujūd can be given essentialist interpretations, as in al-Fārābī, or existentialist interpretations, as in Avicenna. 37 38

39

40 41

Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, 16. A nice illustration of philosopher’s preference for various uses of w–j–d derivatives over the derivatives of the being term he was (kāna) from k–w–n is given in Menn, Fārābī on the Senses of Being, 75. Al-Fārābī contended that the reason some translators preferred huwiyya over mawjūd was due to their concern to avoid the grammatically misleading impression that every being (mawjūd) had some to be (wujūd) that rendered it a being. See Menn, Fārābī on the Senses of Being, 76. Cf. “The present passive yūjadu (past passive wujida) give the nominal form mawjūd, which means is found, or exists. With the addition of the definite article, al-mawjūd means what exists, and the plural al-mawjudāt refers to all the things that exist. Another derivative, wujūd, is the abstract noun meaning existence.” Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, 13–14. Lizzini, Existence-Existent, 114, modified orthography. Cf. Lizzini, Existence-Existent, 114–115; Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, 13–16.

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In the last chapter we saw that al-Fārābī holds that when wujūd is connected to the sense of being as truth, it is univocal, extrinsic to essence, and is a second intention, and so does not refer to an extramental entity in reality. When wujūd corresponds to the sense of being per se it is identical to the real quiddity of an extramental thing, and is applied to beings, not by univocity, but by priority and posteriority. Avicenna develops a radically different doctrine of being; indeed, it appears that his own doctrine of being directly opposes al-Fārābī’s on a number of scores. But one common feature to both of their doctrines of being is their mutual recognition of the polysemous character of wujūd, which is not a primary notion, but is what is meant or signified in diverse ways by the primary notions. Like al-Fārābī, Avicenna is clearly aware of the fact that wujūd has been employed in many different ways among philosophers and theologians. Indeed, the way Avicenna explicates wujūd, as well as most of the other key terms in his doctrine of the primary metaphysical notions, signals his own stance—often an implicitly critical position—with respect to the way wujūd, mawjūd, šayʾ, and other notions were understood by the mutakallimūn, the dialectical theologians of kalām, and Neoplatonic and Aristotelian Arabic philosophers (falāsifa). The Muʿtazilites and the Ašʿarites were two representative schools of kalām whose views on the one God, being, thing, and necessary came to influence later philosophers like Avicenna. One point of the departure for the doctrine of being and thing articulated by these Islamic theologians can be found in the Qurʾān’s account of the divine act of creation from 16:40 and 36:82; when God says “Be!” to a thing (šayʾ), the thing is.42 Based on such passages, the Muʿtazilite mutakallimūn held that thing had ontological primacy and that there could be both existent things and nonexistent things, for prior to these existent things there must be nonexistent things which God wills to create.43 They also attributed to thing (šayʾ) such synonyms as the “established” (muṯbat) or the “realized” (muḥaṣṣal).44 Their doctrine of thing inspired numerous theological 42 43

44

Wisnovsky, Thingness, 184. Druart sums up the Muʿtazilite view as: “The Mutazilites … generally claim that absolute nonexistence al-ʿadam, i.e., that which exists neither mentally nor extramentally, is a shayʾ. They also claim that at the resurrection the same thing is brought back to existence and, therefore, that ‘non-being’ is a shayʾ to which existence is a state that may occur. This also implies that fictional beings, such as phoenixes, which have mental existence, can be called shayʾ, even if extramental existence is a state that never has nor ever will occur to them. They hold that shayʾ and mawjūd are not convertible but assert as the Aristotelians do that ‘being’ is not purely univocal.” Druart, Shayʾ or Res, 128. Cf. Frank, “The Science of Kalām;” idem, “The Ashʿarite Ontology: i. Primary Entities,” (Henceforth: Ashʿarite Ontology); idem, “The Non-Existent and the Possible In Classical Ashʿarite Teaching.” Cf. Frank, Ashʿarite Ontology, 164–165.

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difficulties that led to various attempts to explain the precise ontological status of the “thingness” of a “nonexistent” (šayʾiyya al-maʿdūm).45 Many Muʿtazilites held that because being or the existent (mawjūd) could be separated from the thing (šayʾ) or thingness (šayʾiyya) of an entity, we must countenance such metaphysically quixotic items as a nonexistent thingness (šayʾiyya al-maʿdūm). This is because the thing, even the nonexistent thing, is that about which informative statements can be given. In direct contrast to the Muʿtazilites, Avicenna maintains the inseparable concomitance of being (mawjūd) and thing (šayʾ), and contends that the established (muṯbat) and the realized (muḥaṣṣal) are neither synonyms of thing (šayʾ) nor of the nonexistent (maʿdūm), but are synonyms of being (mawjūd). Hence, for Avicenna, to be a being (mawjūd) is also to be realized (muḥaṣṣal) and established (muṯbat). Avicenna’s account of the inseparable concomitance and coextensionality of being and thing is in certain respects closer to the Ašʿarite doctrine that does not separate existence (wujūd) and thingness (šayʾiyya). The founder of the Ašʿarite school, al-Ašʿarī (c. 874–936), initially a Muʿtazilite theologian, came to reject many of the core features of the Muʿtazilite views on God’s nature and the notions being and thing. The Ašʿarites held that thing and being or existent have the same meaning and reference;46 indeed, being (mawjūd), entity (ḏāt), self (nafs) are all expressions of thing (šayʾ).47 Every thing is a being and every being is a thing; there is not any entity described by is a thing that is not also described as that which is a being. Consequently, and contrary to the Muʿtazilite doctrine on nonexistent thingness, the Ašʿarites contended that the thing’s thingness (šayʾiyya) is that being’s existence (wujūd).48 Unlike the Ašʿarite identification of existence and thingness, Avicenna distinguishes sharply between the real entitative composition of the thingness (šayʾiyya) of a thing—which is the same as its whatness (māhiyya) or truthness (ḥaqīqa)—with the existence

45

46 47 48

“The mutakallimūn had to contend with the implication of verses 16:40 and 36:82 {of the Qurʾān} that things were somehow there before God said “Be!” to them; for otherwise, what would God be saying “Be!” to? It seemed perfectly sensible to draw the conclusion, as most Muʿtazilites did, that thing applies not only to what exists (al-mawjūd) but also to what does not exist (al-maʿdūm); and that what does not exist in turn applies not only to what did not exist and now exists, such as the world, but also to what does not now exist but will exist, such as the Day of Resurrection.” Wisnovsky, Thingness, 184, Modified orthography. Cf. Druart, Shayʾ or Res, 127–128; Frank, Ashʿarite Ontology. Frank, Ashʿarite Ontology, 164–177. Cf. Frank, Ashʿarite Ontology, 165 and n. 6.

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(wujūd) of the same being—which is equivalent to its existential-thatness (anniyya) and established existence (wujūd iṯbātī).49 There are a variety of philosophical views on the notions being and thing to be found in medieval Arabic philosophy. As was shown in the last chapter, Avicenna rejects the Aristotelian essentialism defended by al-Fārābī, which identifies to be (wujūd) and quiddity (māhiyya) in all real extramental beings. For Avicenna, wujūd principally means to exist, and it is really distinct from a thing’s quiddity (māhiyya), both extramentally and in the mind. But Avicenna also rejects the doctrine of essence and existence expounded by the Jacobite Christian theologian, philosopher, and translator, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 974), and his later disciples from the school of Baghdad Peripatetics. Like al-Fārābī, Ibn ʿAdī, was a student of the Nestorian Christian Abū Bishr Mattá (d. 940), who was the “founder” of the Baghdad Peripatetics. Ibn ʿAdī, like Mattá, was of Syrian origins, and they both translated some of the logical works of Aristotle from Syriac into Arabic. Ibn ʿAdī was a student of Mattá, then of al-Fārābī, and eventually became the teacher of the early eleventh century generation of Baghdad Peripatetics, who were frequently the object of Avicenna’s criticisms.50 Our interest in Ibn ʿAdī pertains to his doctrine of three modes of existence for essences or forms, and this is because his doctrine in many respects appears to be the metaphysical precursor to Avicenna’s own threefold consideration of 49

50

Marmura argues that Avicenna’s account of being and its synonyms constitutes an implicit “criticism of Muʿtazilism.” For Avicenna, “The non-existent, in the absolute sense, that is, that which exists neither extramentally nor mentally, cannot be a thing. By contrast such terms as “the existent” (al-mawjūd), “the established” (al-muthbat) and “the realized” (al-muḥaṣṣal) are synonyms. This again is {a} rejection of the Muʿtazilite identification of the non-existent with the established or affirmed and the realized. In this connection it should be remarked that the Ašʿarite school of speculative theology identifies “thingness” (al-shayʾiyya) with existence (al-wujūd) a position closer to that of Avicenna, though not identical with it.” Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, in Probing, 155, see also 165. For Avicenna’s criticisms of the Baghdad Peripatetics and Ibn ʿAdī’s students, see Gutas, aat, 54–67 [60–72]. For the works of Ibn ʿAdī, see Wisnovsky, “New Philosophical Texts of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: A Supplement to Endress’ Analytical Inventory” and Endress, The Works of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: An Analytical Inventory. For recent studies on Ibn ʿAdī and his work, see M. Rashed “Ibn ʿAdī et Avicenne: sur les types dʾexistants,” (Henceforth: Ibn ʿAdī et Avicenne) Adamson, “Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī and Averroes on Metaphysics Alpha Elatton;” Adamson and Wisnovsky. “Yaḥya Ibn ʿAdī on the Location of God.” It is noteworthy that recent scholarship has argued the work, On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages, should not be attributed to al-Fārābī, but to Ibn ʿAdī, and his efforts to harmonize the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Cf. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 151, n. 17. M. Rashed, “On the Authorship of the Treatise On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages attributed to al-Fārābī.”

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essences. Ibn ʿAdī expounds this metaphysical doctrine in his On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural, and Logical.51 Ibn ʿAdī introduces his doctrine of the threefold ways in which essences exist within the context of the basic scientific questions: “if it is?” “what it is?” “which thing it is?” and “why it is?” By examining these questions with respect to the distinct modes of existence Ibn ʿAdī also aims to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. He begins with the nominal question what, and makes clear the names of natural, logical, and divine existence, before arguing that there are these three modes of existence (wujūd). An essence that exists in matter has “natural being” (mawjūd ṭabīʿiyya). A form or essence that is conceptualized in the intellectual soul has “logical being” (mawjūd manṭiqiyya). And, in contrast to an essence with natural being and logical being, any essence in itself has “divine being” or “metaphysical being” (mawjūd ilāhiyya) and so is independent from matter and soul and from the many concomitants of matter and soul.52 «1» Let no one imagine that I believe that the forms that are apt to be clothed in matter—the ones that can become sensed—are actually separated from matter, such that they /66bl5/ exist with a sensible existence [while] separated from it [i.e., matter]; nor [let anyone imagine that] I believe that the form of man, for example, [can] at some moment in time exist unclothed in matter. I did not maintain this in my saying that simple forms that are independent of matter and free of all other concomitants exist devoid of matter and of all other concomitants. Rather, I mean only that simple forms, in their essences—which correspond [exactly] to what their definitions signify—are utterly unclothed in matter and do not need it; they need it only for their sensible existence. 51

52

On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Divine, Natural, and Logical (Maqāla fī l-buḥūth al-ʿilmiyya al-arbaʿa ʿan aṣnāf al-wujūd al-thalātha al-ilāhī wa-l-ṭabīʿī wa-l-manṭiqī) (Henceforth: On the Three Kinds of Existence). All translations are from Stephen Menn and Robert Wisnovsky, “Yahya ibn ʿAdī, ‘On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three Kinds of Existence: Editio princeps and Translation,’” 73–96. Cf. Menn, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics,” 151, n. 17. Ibn ʿAdī’s On the Three Kinds of Existence is partially reproduced in his Treatise on the Necessity of the Incarnation, as well as in his On the Existence of Common Things, all of which is connected to his account of possibles in his work on Establishing the Nature of the Possible, which also included his partial commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. Cf. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 151–160; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī et Avicenne. Ibn ʿAdī, On the Three Kinds of Existence, 88–89.

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«2» As for their intellectual existence, they do not need matter for it, although they do need the intellect. «3» Now for their divine existence, which is their real existence (I mean [their existing] in their [essential] realities), and in which they are not clothed with anything else, they need nothing at all apart from themselves—even though they do not exist at any given moment in one of the three kinds of existence without [also existing in] the other two [kinds of existence]. Rather, all of these three existences must always attach to it, as long as their Creator and Existentiator…wishes it. This is [what we have to say] about proving the existence of divine forms. «4» As for their general quiddity, it is “forms”; their specific quiddity is “forms stripped of matter and of all concomitants and /66b20/ free of all things other than themselves.”53 To be clear, essences that exist according to divine or metaphysical being are present in the mind of God, and this is a mode of existence that essences have in themselves prior to and distinct from natural being and logical being.54 Ibn ʿAdī believes that Plato’s Forms exist as divine beings, and he insists that natural forms that exist in matter with natural being do not also exist separately from matter in the way many interpret Plato’s doctrine of the Forms. Ibn ʿAdī thinks his account of divine being saves Plato’s Forms from the latter charge that the natural being of Forms is separate from matter. The quiddity’s divine being is the most true or real kind of existence (wujūd); this is the general quiddity or simple form; it is general, because quiddities with divine being are to both natural and logical beings. Quiddities or essences in themselves have this divine mode of being which is not attached to the material existence proper to natural being or the intellectual existence proper to logical being. Insofar as God wills it, the essence of a thing can exist in all three ways of being. 53 54

Ibn ʿAdī, On the Three Kinds of Existence, 88–89. “While Ibn ʿAdī’s official view, following Alexander, is that the universal exists only in the mind and that the simple quiddity (say, horseness), which is mind-independent, is neither individual nor universal, in practice this seems to amount to thinking of horseness as a real immanent universal fully present in each individual horse. (And he will say that horseness does indeed have divine existence, since it exists in God, since God knows everything, and whenever X knows Y, Y is present in X, stripped of its matter, if any.)” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 157. “Ibn ʿAdī’s argument that the form of each natural thing is present in God recalls Proclus’ description of the one-before-the-many as a paradigmform (e.g. of horse) present in the divine nous, as the God’s knowledge of that thing which guides him in producing that thing, or as an aspect of the self-subsisting knowledge which the God is.” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 157, n. 28; cf. 154, n. 22.

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Priority belongs to the (1) divine being of the quiddity, that is, the quiddity in itself prior to the concomitants it acquires by existing extramentally as a (2) natural being with matter, or the concomitants that come from existing in the mind as a (3) logical being, such as universality. The ramifications of Ibn ʿAdī’s doctrine are clarified further when it is seen in light of the mutakallimūn debates over the status of things that do not exist. The Muʿtazilites held that there are nonexistent things that become existent things when God creates them, whereas the Ašʿarites held that there are no nonexistent things, for whatever is a thing is a being, and vice-versa. If the former view is coherent then the Muʿtazilites have an answer ready at hand for dealing with how we form true statements and provide information (ẖabar) about nonexistent things or even fictional things. The Ašʿarites, however, must determine what the existential status is of a nonexistent thing or a fictional entity that we conceptualize. Some Ašʿarites held that things with extramental and mental existence have the same ontological status. Others maintained that mentally conceived things do not exist at all, which undermines the distinction between impossible and possible items of conceptualization.55 Ibn ʿAdī adopts a middle position between the extreme positions of the mutakallimūn. In contrast to the views of the mutakallimūn, Ibn ʿAdī rejects the Muʿtazilite notion of a nonexistent thingness and the Ašʿarite views that either identify the reality of essences with mental existence or make mental and extramental essences equivalent in existence. Ibn ʿAdī identifies a third kind of existence where the essence of a being exists prior to its existence as an extramental natural thing or logical being in the mind. This divine being is common to both natural and logical beings; (1) it is not the universal logical being that is only conceived in the intellect and which is not in Socrates or Plato, and (2) it is not the natural being of the individual human essence that is proper to Socrates alone. In Chapter 9 we will address some of the significant similarities between the doctrines of Avicenna and Ibn ʿAdī; here we will note a few important points of contrast. Unlike Ibn ʿAdī, who regards the essences existing as divine being as prior to and more real than such essences existing as a natural being or a logical being, Avicenna takes the quiddity in itself that is prior to its existence in natural things or its mental existence in the intellect, not to have any existence in itself. The essence considered in itself does not exist at all; rather, for Avicenna existence (wujūd), like matter, particularity, universality, and so on, is a concomitant of the essence or quiddity in itself. 55

Cf. Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition,” 107 (Henceforth: Avicennian Tradition).

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We have just considered a variety of distinct philosophical and theological views on being and thing. It is against this historical background and spectrum of various views on being, thing, existence, and essence, that we should understand Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being and thing. 6.2.2 Being and Thing in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt Avicenna identifies a number of synonyms and intensions for the primary notions being and thing. Let us begin with the synonyms of being. In contrast to the Muʿtazilite, Avicenna holds that being (mawjūd) is synonymous with the realized (muḥaṣṣal) and established (muṯbat). The term realized (muḥaṣṣal) is drawn from the root ḥ–ṣ–l; it covers a semantic range that includes such meanings as to be there and to be existent and meanings like to result, to happen, to take place; in nuce, it means to be that which is accomplished or achieved.56 As a synonym of being (mawjūd), Avicenna appears to take realized (muḥaṣṣal) to mean that which is accomplished; hence to be a being is also to be that which is achieved or accomplished in its existence. The term established (muṯbat) is derived from the root ṯ–b–t; it means to stand firm, to be fixed, to be firm, to be stable.57 Avicenna introduces established (muṯbat) as a synonym of being (mawjūd) to capture the way in which a being is stable or firm in its very existence insofar as it is established, which nicely complements the way in which a being is accomplished in its existence insofar as it is realized. Avicenna also uses these synonyms of the primary notion being (mawjūd) to form corresponding synonyms for the intension of existence (wujūd), which is the principal meaning of being. The entitative principle or part that is existence is convertible with realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) or subsistence (qiwām), and established existence (wujūd iṯbātī). The root of subsistence (qiwām) is q–w–m, which is associated with a broad range of meanings related to the sense of to get up and to stand up; the term qiwām means support, basis, foundation, or sustain.58 Given the metaphysical context, Avicenna employs the term subsistence (qiwām) as a synonym of existence (wujūd), which adds to existence the idea of supporting and being the foundation for the other entitative aspects of an entity, such as its essence, unity, substantial form, and accidental forms. Like existence (wujūd) and subsistence (qiwām), the term “realized subsistence” indicates the existential entitative part of any being. But it also notionally amplifies the meanings of existence and subsistence by 56 57 58

Cf. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, i, 585–586. Cf. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, i, 328d; 329d–330a; Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, in Probing, 154–155. Cf. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Suppl., 2995–2996.

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adding to it the semantic tone of foundational achievement or existential accomplishment insofar as realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) and realized (muḥaṣṣal) share the root ḥ–ṣ–l, which is associated with being accomplished. Similarly, existence is notionally amplified by the term established existence (wujūd iṯbātī), which shares in the root ṯ–b–t with established (muṯbat), a synonym of being.59 Hence, established existence adds to the entitative part of existence the sense of existential stability. In short, Avicenna identifies two principal synonyms for the primary notion being (mawjūd), namely, established (muṯbat) and realized (muḥaṣṣal). And each of these coextensional and cointensional notions indicates the entitative part of existence, but does so by highlighting a slightly distinct shade of existence (wujūd). Being simply indicates the existence of an entity: that which is/has existence. Realized signifies the way the existence of a being is achieved; that its subsistence is realized or accomplished: that which is/has realized existence or is/has accomplished subsistence. And, established signifies that the existence of an entity is stable: that which is/has stable or established existence. Primary Notion & Synonyms

Meanings

Shared Arabic Root

Being (mawjūd) Realized (muḥassal)

Existence (wujūd) Realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) Established existence (wujūd iṯbātī)

w–j–d ḥ–ṣ–l

Established (muṯbat)

ṯ–b–t

Avicenna identifies three rather vague synonyms for the primary notion thing (šayʾ). These synonyms of thing are anything or something (amr), what or whatever (mā), and that which (al-laḏī). These three general terms, like the primary notion thing, all point to the essence (ḏāt) or quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing. Any entity with a quiddity is something about which we can say, at least, what it is. Anything with a quiddity is also a that which, that is, it has some quidditative determination that distinguishes what this thing is from what that thing is. 59

Following Marmura, I have translated the two similar but distinct Arabic words mutaḥaṣṣal and muḥaṣṣal, with the same English word realized. I have also done this for the two Arabic words muṯbat and iṯbātī, which I have translated with the same English term established.

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The generality and vagueness of these notions should not be surprising, since Avicenna is attempting to clarify and direct our attention to the most common primary notions, which cannot be defined, but through which we conceptualize and define all other less universal notions.60 The intensions of the primary notion thing provide us with more semantic traction than its synonyms. Avicenna identifies a host of intensions for thing (šayʾ). It means quiddity, true-nature, essence, nature, thingness, and specified to be. Each of these intensions of the primary notion thing signify the same entitative principle or part of every composite whole, namely, the quidditative part that is really composed and yet distinct from its existential part. Avicenna typically calls this entitative principle the māhiyya, literally the whatness of a thing. The quiddity or whatness (māhiyya) of a thing is specific to a thing and is expressed by its definition; it is that by virtue of which the thing is what (mā) it is.61 The Arabic term whatness (māhiyya) is the abstract form of the term what (mā). Hence, from what (mā), the synonym of thing, Avicenna, following the Aristotelian tradition, calls the entitative part by virtue of which an entity is what it is, its quiddity or whatness (māhiyya). Similarly, Avicenna also calls this quidditative part of every composite thing its truthness or true-nature (ḥaqīqa), which is the abstract form of the term true (ḥaqq). Accordingly, the true-nature is that entitative principle of every entity by virtue of which we know what it truly is; it is the truth-maker that provides the ontological ground for true propositions.62 Avicenna also calls this entitative part of every thing (šayʾ) its thingness (šayʾiyya)—šayʾiyya being the abstract form of šayʾ—because the quiddity or thingness is that by which an entity is a thing. Avicenna makes use of traditional Aristotelian terminology for the quiddity as well. He calls the quidditative part its nature (ṭabīʿa) and its essence (ḏāt), for it is that by which a thing has an intrinsic principle of motion, rest, and intelligibility, and it is that principle in itself or essentially by which a thing is its very self.63 Avicenna addresses the term nature at length in his natural philosophy, where he correlates it with the primary notions proper to the science of nature, 60 61 62 63

Cf. Druart, Shayʾ or Res, 131–132; Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 273–275; Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, in Probing, 153–155. Ilāhiyyāt v.8.3: “For definition is that which indicates quiddity.” Cf. Chapter 6.3; De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. “The definition of nature (tabiʿya). Nature is a first principle in itself of motion and rest, which are in something essentially. In the whole universe it belongs to each essential change and stasis.” Avicenna, Book of Definitions §36 (kkd, 106). Cf. Avicenna, Healing. Physics, i.5–6; Lammer, Elements, Chapter 4; idem, “Defining Nature: From Aristotle to Philoponus to Avicenna.” For Avicenna’s use of nature in the context of the problem of universals, see Ilāhiyyāt v.1–2.

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namely, form and matter. “Its form is its quiddity by which it is what it is, while its matter is the thing bearing its quiddity.”64 The terms nature, essence, truenature, and quiddity are also frequently used interchangeably in Avicenna’s logical and metaphysical treatments of definitions and universals. He holds that for all composite physical substances the nature and quiddity of a thing consists in the composition of its form and matter, but the essence or nature in all simple immaterial substances is identified with its form.65 As we noted before, Avicenna acknowledges that there are many senses of wujūd. So even though in his own metaphysics wujūd principally means existence, he also recognizes that wujūd can be used to mean to be as in the essence or quiddity by which a being is specified to be an entity of a certain kind of nature. Avicenna calls this quidditative or essentialist meaning of wujūd the entity’s specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ), which he contrasts sharply from the properly existential meaning he gives to wujūd that identifies an entity’s established existence (wujūd iṯbātī). Established existence (wujūd iṯbātī) and specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ), that is, existence and quiddity, respectively, are two distinct but inseparable entitative principles that are required for any entitative whole to be. Avicenna introduces this distinction between established existence and specific to be in the context of clarifying the many senses of wujūd and the way they correspond to the meanings of the primary notions being and thing in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. «1» We say that the notion (maʿnā) of “being” and the notion of “thing” (šayʾ) are conceptualized in the soul as two [distinct] notions. “Being,” “established” (muṯbat) and “realized” (muḥaṣṣal) are synonyms [that signify] a single meaning (maʿnā wāḥid). We have no doubt that their meaning is already present in the soul of the reader of this book. With “thing” and its equivalents another meaning is signified in every language. For anything (li-kull amr) has a true-nature (ḥaqīqa) by means of which it is what it is. Thus the triangle has as [its] true-nature that it is a triangle, and the whiteness has as [its] true-nature that it is whiteness. This is what we call sometimes “specific to be” (wujūd ẖāṣṣ). We do not mean by it the notion of “established existence” (wujūd iṯbātī). For the term “to

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Healing. Physics, i.6.1 [45] (mod. trans., McGinnis). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.8.5 [245–246]; Healing. Physics, i.6. For detailed study of this point that compares Avicenna’s doctrine with Aristotle, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas, see Maurer, “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas.”

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be” (wujūd) is also used to signify many notions, one of which is the truenature according to which a thing is. That according to which a thing is, therefore, is like its specific to be. «2» To resume: We say it is clear that every thing (šayʾ) has a specific true-nature (ḥaqīqa ẖāṣṣ), which is its quiddity (māhiyya). Now, it is known that the specific true-nature of every thing is other than the existence that is synonymous with “being established” (iṯbāt). … «3» With “thing” (šayʾ) therefore, this notion is meant. The concomitance (luzūm) of the meaning “being” (mawjūd) does not separate itself (lā yufāriqu) from it [i.e., from the notion of “thing”] at all (al-battata). On the contrary, the notion of “being” always (dāʾiman) accompanies it inseparably (yalzamu), since it [i.e., “thing”] is either a “being” in concrete objects, or a “being” in the estimative faculty and the intellect. Were it not so, it would not be a “thing.”66 In this passage Avicenna draws a sharp distinction between the primary notions being and thing and their corresponding meanings as the entitative parts or principles of existence and quiddity. Being means that which is/has existence, and thing means that which is/has quiddity or true-nature. These distinct primary notions bring our attention to these two distinct entitative principles of any whole entity. A thing’s true-nature (ḥaqīqa) or quiddity (māhiyya) is that by which a thing or entity is what it is. Avicenna says that the specific true-nature (ḥaqīqa ẖāṣṣ) of a thing is also called its specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ), which he contrasts with the being’s established existence (wujūd iṯbātī). Both of these diverse meanings of wujūd target real features of entities, but they each direct our attention to distinct entitative principles of the same composite entitative whole, and it is these distinct characteristics of entities that are signified by the primary notions being and thing. Being (mawjūd) signifies the sense of wujūd as established existence, which is a real aspect of entities and is distinct from the sense of wujūd as specific to be, which is equivalent to the quiddity and infima species of a thing (šayʾ). Thing (šayʾ) signifies this distinct sense of wujūd as specific to be, which is the essence, whatness, or ontological principle in virtue of which every member of a species belongs to that species. Set in the framework of the basic scientific questions, the established existence of a being is known principally by an assent that responds to the question, if it exists? The specified to be of a thing is known properly by conceptualizing

66

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.8–11 [31–32] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 266–267).

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an answer to the question, what is it? and so identifying the species that the thing’s quiddity falls under.67 In short, Avicenna makes room for the Aristotelian essentialist understanding of to be (wujūd) that is so clearly articulated in al-Fārābī’s doctrine of being. 67

Commenting on this text from Ilāhiyyāt i.5.8–11 [31–32], Wisnovsky writes, “In that passage Avicenna starts by asserting that every thing (šayʾ) or entity (amr) has an inner reality (ḥaqīqa) by which it is what it is (31, 5–6). This inner reality (e.g. triangularity) is sometimes called ‘existence that is specific’ (al-wuǧūd al-ẖāṣṣ); specific, that is, to one class of things (triangles) as opposed to another class of things (cats). Existence that is specific is distinct from the more general type of existence which Avicenna calls ‘affirmative existence’ (al-wuǧūd al-iṯbātī) (31, 7–8). To predicate affirmative existence of an entity is to assert that the entity is, not what the entity is. To predicate existence that is specific, on the other hand, is to assert what the entity is, not that the entity is. Since existence that is specific is identical to inner reality, and inner reality is identical to whatness (māhiyya), it follows that existence that is specific is identical to whatness (31, 10).” Wisnovsky, Thingness, 193. Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, 105–113. This interpretation of al-wujūd al-ẖāṣṣ or esse proprium is also held by Deborah Black, see Black, Fictional Beings, 440–443; idem, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” 60–65 (Henceforth: Mental Existence). Bertolacci holds that, “By ‘proper existence’ Avicenna apparently means the concrete way of existing proper to a determinate species of realities, conveyed by their distinctive essence.” Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 268. Bertolacci cites Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ, 2, 1003a33 and b32–33 as sources for Avicenna’s remark that being is said in many ways, and for the term “proper existence” (wujūd al-ẖāṣṣ or esse proprium) he identifies Aristotle’s statement that “The essence of everything…is from its very nature something that is.” (Γ, 2, 1003b32–33). Bertolacci notes that many of Avicenna’s predecessors found some connection between existence and essence, such as in al-Kindī (e.g., being of essence, kawn ḏāt) and Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (e.g., essential existence, wujūd ḏātī). He even suggests that Avicenna’s wujūd al-ẖāṣṣ might be “a denomination possibly directed against Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s Platonism.” Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 268, n. 17. Bertolacci also collates the other occurrences of the expression wujūd ẖāṣṣ in the Ilāhiyyāt, which I represent here in a slightly modified form so as to conform to the citation and orthographical conventions of the present study: “Ilāhiyyāt i.1.17 [9:1] (wujūd allaḏī yaẖuṣṣu); i.6.2 [37:18] (wujūd allaḏī yaẖuṣṣu); i.6.13 [41:16] (wujūd ẖāṣṣ); i.6.13 [41:16–17] (wujūd allaḏī yaẖuṣṣu); ii.3.7 [74:14– 15] (wujūd ẖāṣṣ); ii.3.8 [75.7] (wujūd ẖāṣṣ yataqawwamu bihī); iii.10.22 [159:17] (wujūd ẖāṣṣ); viii.5.2 [350:2] (wujūd ẖāṣṣ); viii.6.4 [356,9] (ẖuṣūṣīyat wujūd). The expression “proper essence” is comparatively rare in Avicenna’s works.” Bertolacci, 268, n. 18. Bertolacci describes “proper existence” (wujūd ẖāṣṣ)—what I have translated as specific to be— as a widespread notion in Ilāhiyyāt, and that by comparison “proper essence” (ḥaqīqa ẖāṣṣ)—what I translate as specific true-nature—is rare in Avicenna’s work. This is at least misleading. It is true that the term ḥaqīqa ẖāṣṣ is an ad hoc description of true-nature employed to show its connection with quiddity and wujūd ẖāṣṣ. But both wujūd ẖāṣṣ and ḥaqīqa ẖāṣṣ are unusual terms that Avicenna rarely employs, and often without any technical sense in the Ilāhiyyāt; whereas true-nature (ḥaqīqa) is pervasive throughout the whole Ilāhiyyāt and along with quiddity (māhiyya) is one of two principal terms he employs to indicate the essence of a thing.

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But whereas al-Fārābī identified the primary metaphysical sense of wujūd with the quiddity signified by being per se, Avicenna identifies this quidditative intension of wujūd with the primary notion thing, which is subordinated to his identification of the primary meaning of wujūd with existence.68 Avicenna’s introduction of the term proper to be or specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) in Ilāhiyyāt i.5—which was translated into Latin as esse proprium—has inspired needless confusions and controversies with respect to the Vizier’s doctrine of being. We must briefly address a few of these misinterpretations here. Some of Avicenna’s medieval and contemporary readers have contended that because the quiddity or true-nature of a thing is also said to be a wujūd ẖāṣṣ or esse proprium, this entails that Avicenna attributed a proper or special mode of existence to essences in themselves, which is independent from that other kind of wujūd that Avicenna calls the established existence (wujūd iṯbātī) of a being. Hence, every entity has two kinds of existence, the existence that is proper or specific to its essence, and the existence added to the essence that establishes its being in reality. The difficulties with this well known line of interpretation are many.69

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Stephen Menn notes that Avicenna is “close to al-Fārābī in distinguishing two senses of (1-place) being, Avicenna’s ‘positing being’ (wujūd ithbātī) corresponding to al-Fārābī’s ‘being as truth’ or ‘being outside the soul as it is in the soul,’ and Avicenna’s ‘proper being’ (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) corresponding to al-Fārābī’s ‘being as divided into the categories’ or ‘delimited by an essence outside the soul.’ But, unlike al-Fārābī, he does not say that wujūd in the positing sense is a second intention, something mind-dependent and an object of logic rather than metaphysics. On the contrary, Avicenna thinks that being in this sense is an objective feature of things, and is (alongside unity) one of the universal attributes of things that are central objects of metaphysics.” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153. Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Black, Mental Existence; Lizzini, Order of Possibles; idem, Existence–Existent; Marmura, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna;” Wisnovsky, Thingness; idem, Avicennian Tradition; Owens, “The Relevance of Avicennian Neoplatonism;” idem, Common Nature; Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Chapter 3; Rahman, “Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina: The Myth and the Reality;” idem, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna;” Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles;” Zedler, “St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna;” idem, “Another look at Avicenna;” idem, “Why are the Possibles Possible?;” Pessin, “Proclean ‘Remaining’ and Avicenna on Existence as Accident: Neoplatonic Methodology and a Defense of ‘Pre-Existing’ Essence,” (Henceforth: Proclean ‘Remaining’); OʾShaughnessy, “St Thomas’s Changing Estimate of Avicenna’s Teaching on Existence as an Accident,” (Henceforth: Avicenna on Existence as an Accident). Gracia, “Cutting the Gordian Knot of Ontology: Thomas’s Solution to the Problem of Universals,” 24–27, 36; Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles according to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines;” Yasin, “A Critical Approach to the Avicennian Distinction of Essence and Existence.”

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The first difficulty with this misinterpretation is that it assumes whenever Avicenna uses the term wujūd (esse in the Latin Avicenna) that it must mean existence. Not only is this interpretation of wujūd almost completely contrary to the ordinary sense of wujūd employed by the essentialist metaphysics of Avicenna’s Aristotelian predecessors, but it also fails to take note of the fact that when Avicenna introduces the term wujūd ẖāṣṣ in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, he immediately makes the explicit qualification that wujūd is said in many senses. He writes, “For the term “to be” (wujūd) is also used to signify many notions, one of which is the true-nature according to which a thing is.”70 Hence, even though Avicenna primarily uses wujūd to mean the existence of a being (mawjūd), here, in his clarification of the meanings of thing (šayʾ), he observes that the true-nature and quiddity of a thing can also be described as a kind of to be (wujūd), namely, the specific to be, which is distinct from the wujūd that means existence. The second difficulty with this misinterpretation is that it incorrectly attempts to explain the meaning of quiddity (māhiyya) and true-nature (ḥaqīqa) in light of wujūd ẖāṣṣ, whereas wujūd ẖāṣṣ must be understood as a secondary and subsidiary way of amplifying the meanings of quiddity and true-nature. Significantly, in the Ilāhiyyāt, the term specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) is rarely used, whereas the terms quiddity and true-nature permeate the entire Ilāhiyyāt and are Avicenna’s primary and preferred meanings for thing (šayʾ). The sparse use of specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) in contrast to the abundant use of the terms quiddity and true-nature in the Ilāhiyyāt, is indicative of the greater importance placed on quiddity and true-nature in Avicenna’s doctrine of essence. Clearly, Avicenna intends for us to understand the marginal term specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) in light of his extended remarks about the quiddity and true-nature of a thing, and not vice-versa. It is far more reasonable to interpret the rare uses of specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) as Avicenna acknowledging that others, especially Aristotelians, use wujūd in an essentialist sense, but that Avicenna wants to indicate by way of contrast that this is not how he primarily uses the term wujūd; for him, wujūd primarily means existence not essence. Third, this misinterpretation attributes to Avicenna a doctrine of essences that exist prior to receiving their existence, which would entail that there can be things that are not beings. Some of Avicenna’s readers have suggested that like in Ibn ʿAbā, there is a kind of Platonic residue in Avicenna’s account of a thing having a quiddity that is its specific to be in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Such a doctrine would imply that quiddities in themselves have a kind of being or existence apart from their actual existence or established existence that is also distinct from strict nonexistence. This is a remarkable interpretation of the doctrine 70

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.9 [31].

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from Ilāhiyyāt i.5, especially considering that a few pages later in i.5, Avicenna fiercely upbraids a similar position that there are nonexistent thingnesses, which as we saw, was held by some of the Muʿtazilite theologians. Hence, you have now understood the way in which the thing differs from what is understood by being and the realized and that, despite this difference, the two [that is, thing and being] are necessary concomitants. Yet, it has reached me that some people say that what is realized is realized without being a being, that the description of a thing can be something {that is} neither a being nor nonbeing and that the [expressions] that which and whatever denote something other than that which [the expression] the thing denotes. Such people are not among the assemblage of the discerning; if challenged to distinguish between these expressions in terms of their meaning, they would be exposed.71 The difficulty with such interpretations is that Avicenna explicitly rejects the doctrine of nonexistent thingnesses or essences. Instead, he maintains that existence and quiddity are not two distinct realities or whole entities, and this is because—as he makes clear in Ilāhiyyāt i.5—the meanings of being and thing are inseparable, there is no established existence without essence, and no essence without existence.72 Being is never in fact separated from thing; rather, it is concomitant to all instances of thing, whether it is a thing that is a being in reality, or a being that is a thing in the mind. For being and thing, as primary notions, are antecedent to the notional constrictions of existing in reality or in the mind; of being a substance or being an accident. Furthermore, Avicenna gives no impression that he is introducing here in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, a doctrine of essences that have their own proper kind of existence—or any kind of existence whatsoever—antecedent to receiving established existence from an efficient cause of existence. And as we shall see in the next chapter’s account of possible

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Ilāhiyyāt i.5.19–20 [34]. Marmura notes, “Here, Avicenna has as his target another Muʿtazilite doctrine, the doctrine of ‘states’ (al-aḥwāl) intended as a solution to the problem of affirming God’s eternal attributes without infringing on His utter unity—a doctrines associated with the Muʿtazilite theologian Abū Hāshim al–Jubbāʾī (d. ca. 933). According to this doctrine, when one describes God as a knower, for example, what is being affirmed is simply a state that differentiates Him from a nonknower. This state can only be understood in terms of the divine essence but it is not a positive attribute, an ontological entity. Accordingly, it would be improper to speak of it as either existing or nonexisting.” Marmura, Notes, 387, n. 11 in Ilāhiyyāt. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5, esp. i.5.19 [34].

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existences in themselves, quiddities in themselves do not have any special, specific, or proper existence of their own at all. In itself and apart from its established existence by an efficient cause, a quiddity or specific to be is nothing. In short, Avicenna’s nonce term specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) does not entail a doctrine of quiddities that exist on their own; it is merely another essence term that is synonymous with the existentially neutral true-nature or quiddity of a thing. Because the quiddity really does contribute to a thing by constituting a being to be what it is, it is reasonable for Avicenna to recognize with the Aristotelian tradition that one sense of to be or to be found (wujūd) is equivalent to the quiddity, true-nature, or essence of a thing—even if it is not Avicenna’s principal and preferred sense of wujūd. For it is true to say the triangle is a triangle insofar as it has what it is to be triangular, which can be called its specific to be, even though he prefers to call it the proper or specific true-nature, quiddity, or essence of a thing. On this reading, Avicenna’s term proper or specified wujūd captures the Aristotelian essentialist notion of to be defended by alFārābī, which Avicenna subordinates to his own favored existentialist account of wujūd as a distinct entitative principle from the quiddity of an entity. Let us conclude our treatment of being and thing in the Ilāhiyyāt by addressing a few other being terms employed by Avicenna in the Ilāhiyyāt. In order to render Greek philosophy into Arabic and to accommodate various features of their own philosophical theology, the Kindian circle introduced a variety of new philosophical terms into Arabic. The Arabic neologisms anniyya and huwiyya both seem to show up for the first time in the Kindian circle in the works of al-Kindī, the Plotiniana Arabica, Proclus Arabus, and in Usṭāṯ’s translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.73 Various speculative etymologies have been proposed for the term anniyya. Following the proposal of Gerhard Endress and others, it seems to be an abstract noun formed from the Arabic particle anna meaning that, where anniyya is thereby taken to mean thatness.74 The term 73

74

Cf. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the “Theology of Aristotle,” 125– 128 (Henceforth: The Arabic Plotinus); idem, “Al-Kindī and the Reception of Greek Philosophy;” Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy;” Bertolacci, Reception, Chapter 1, 5–35; D’Ancona, “Platonic and Neoplatonic Terminology for Being in Arabic Translation,” (Henceforth: Terminology for Being); idem, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation;” Lizzini, ExistenceEssence, 112, n. 5. Cf. Endress and Gutas, A Greek and Arabic Lexicon, vol. 1, 428–436; Endress, Proclus Arabus, 80–109; Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 125–128; idem, Before Essence and Existence, 299; Bertolacci, Some Texts; idem, Reception, Chapter 1, 5–35; idem, Hapax Legomenon; Lizzini, Existence–Essence; D’Ancona, Terminology for Being; D’Alverny, “Anniyya-Anitas;” Hasnawi, “Anniyya ou Inniyya (essence – existence);” Frank, “The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term anniyya.” For an extensive bibliography and summary of alternative

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anniyya is often employed to translate the Greek terms τὸ ὄν (being)—anniyyāt for τὸ ὄντα (beings)—as well as τὸ εἶναι (to be), τὸ τί ἐστιν (what is it), and it is also used in Usṭāṯ’s translation of Aristotle’s technical term for essence or the what–IS–being: τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as mā huwa bi-l-anniyyati (what-it-is-by-thatness or what-is-by-thatness).75 Accordingly, anniyya can be construed to mean essence or to be, where to be admits of both essentialist and existentialist interpretations. Al-Kindī appears to use anniyya in both senses.76 Avicenna uses the term thatness (anniyya) in the Ilāhiyyāt with an existential meaning that is convertible with the entitative principle or part named by the terms to exist or existence (wujūd) and necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd). And like existence and the invariance of existence, he uses thatness as an intension of the primary notions being (mawjūd) and necessary (wājib). To be clear, the thatness (anniyya) of a being does not merely indicate the fact of being; rather, it signifies the very principle or entitative part of a being that existentializes an entity or constitutes it as existing. Accordingly, I translate Avicenna’s use of the term anniyya as existential-thatness, to contrast it from essentialist and merely factive renderings of anniyya. Further confirmation of Avicenna’s existential construal of anniyya can be found in the way he explicitly contrasts whatness (māhiyya) with thatness (anniyya), which he identifies with existence (wujūd).77 The quiddity or whatness (māhiyya) of a thing answers the question “what?” (mā) through conceptualization and identifies the quidditative entitative part of a thing that makes a thing to be what it is. But the thatness (anniyya) and existence (wujūd) of a being answers by way of assent that it is to the simple question “if it is?” The terms existence (wujūd) and thatness (anniyya), then identify the non-quidditative entitative part of a being that renders an entity to exist and to be a that. Hence, while thing targets the whatness of an entity, being focuses on the existentialthatness of the very same entity. Avicenna employs the term huwiyya with various senses throughout the Ilāhiyyāt. Bertolacci takes note of three philosophical meanings given to the term huwiyya in the Arabic philosophical tradition.

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proposals for the etymology, vocalization, and meaning of anniyya, see Lizzini, “ExistenceExistent,” 112, n. 5; Bertolacci, “Hapax Legomenon,” 291–293, nn. 4–8. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Z 4, 1030a6 (Metaphysics in Arabic, T.13, 795:10); 1030a17 (Metaphysics in Arabic, T.14, 798:6). For an extensive interpretive analysis of Aristotle’s τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, which renders it as what-IS-Being, see Owens, dbam, 180–189; for “essential being” see Owens, Gradations of Being, 97. Cf. Adamson, Before Essence and Existence, 306–310. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.3 [344].

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In philosophical Arabic huwīya bears three main meanings. First, in so far as it corresponds to the Syriac hāwyā, it means, as the latter does, the present participle “being” in the sense of “something that is” or “exists.” Second, in so far as it is an abstract noun, huwīya conveys the meaning of the infinitive “to be” in the sense of “essence.” Third, in so far as it was regarded as deriving from the particle huwa (the personal pronoun “he”), it occasionally means “identity,” in the sense of the identity of something with something else, or “sameness.”78 The term huwiyya was also employed to translate ὄν (being), εἶναι (to be), and Plotinus’s ταὐτότης (identity or sameness).79 Later philosophers adopted, with important qualifications, the general tendency of the Kindian circle to use anniyya and huwiyya as interchangeable terms for to be and being.80 In the Ilāhiyyāt, Avicenna frequently uses huwiyya to mean “essence,” but it is also employed as a synonym for “being” (mawjūd), especially in his paraphrased quotations from Usṭāṯ’s translation of ὄν as huwiyya in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.81 Bertolacci has shown that Avicenna never uses the term huwiyya to mean identity or sameness.82 In the rare instances in the Ilāhiyyāt where huwiyya is used as a synonym for being (mawjūd), I translate it as entity (huwiyya). In sum: Avicenna drew upon a complex history of theological and philosophical doctrines of being and thing to frame his own account of the 78 79 80

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Bertolacci, Some Texts, 27–28. Cf. Afnan, Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, 121–124; Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, 11–13. See Adamson, “Before Essence and Existence,” 299; idem, The Arabic Plotinus, 126 where he records this use of huwiyya to translate Plotinus’s identity (ταὐτότης) from Enneads v.1.4, in Theology of Aristotle, viii.125; Bertolacci, Some Texts, 28, n. 7. Cf. al-Kindī, On First Philosophy, anniyya at 117.4; huwiyya at 113.2; Bertolacci, Some Texts, 29–30, n. 11. For al-Fārābī’s use of these terms, especially in the Book of Letters and his Commentary on De Interpretatione, see Shehadi, Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy, 45–69; al-Fārābī, Book of Letters, 112–115, 83–86. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303]. Cf. Bertolacci, Some Texts, 28–31. Avicenna uses huwiyya to mean “essence” in many passages, such as Ilāhiyyāt v.1.6 [97]. The term huwiyya is sometimes used as a synonym of “being” (mawjūd) in Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303], which is a paraphrased quotation or reference to Usṭāṯ’s translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Γ 1, 1003a21–22 (Bourges, T.1, 296:5–7), see Bertolacci, Reception, 293–397. And, given Bertolacci’s textual emendations to the Cario edition of the Ilāhiyyāt, it turns out that the salient passages were Avicenna speaks of sameness or identity, the term he uses is huwahuwiyya, not huwiyya, like in Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303], which draws on Usṭāṯ’s translation of Metaphysics Γ 2, 1003b33–36; 1009a9–20 and Metaphysics i 3, 1054a29–32, where the Greek term tauto (same) is rendered as muttafiq in the former, and as huwahuwa in the latter. Avicenna appears to draw upon both texts from Metaphysics Γ 2 and i 3 in his presentation of the various divisions of one in Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303], such as huwahuwiyya (sameness) and muwāfaqa (coincidence)—which is a hapax legomenon in the Ilāhiyyāt, see Bertolacci, Some Texts, 44 ff.

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synonyms and intensions that direct our attention to the primary notions being and thing. Being is synonymous with the terms entity, realized, and established. The intensions targeted by being are existence, subsistence, established existence, realized subsistence, and existential-thatness. Thing is synonymous with anything, what, and that which; it directs our attention to such intensions as quiddity, true-nature, essence, thingness, nature, and, on rare occasions, specific to be. Every entitative whole is composed of two entitative principles or parts: existence and essence.83 Being and thing are coextensional, and so, they both refer to the same entitative whole, but as intensionally distinct primary notions, they signpost distinct entitative principles that are themselves intensionally distinct. Being points to the existence of an entity; thing directs us to the essence of the same entity. Accordingly, the primary notion being indicates the existential principle or part of an entitative whole that brings that entity into existence. This existential principle is that by which an entity has its existence accomplished in a stabilized way, such that a being per se exists as a that and receives its existence in itself. The notion thing indicates the quidditative principle or entitative part of an entity; its essence or true-nature is that by which any thing is what it is. The quiddity or thingness a thing has renders it to be specifically a certain kind of nature that can be classified as a species within the categories. It is in this way that Avicenna’s metaphysical primary notions being and thing manifest his doctrine of the real composition and distinction between the entitative principle of existence on the one hand, and the entitative principle called a thing’s true-nature, quiddity, or essence, on the other hand. Finally, even though being and thing are extensionally identical and intensionally distinct, the distinct entitative principles signified by the distinct intensions of being and thing, namely, existence and quiddity, respectively, are neither coextensional nor cointensional. To be clear, the primary notions being and thing are coextensional insofar as they both refer to the same entitative whole composed of the entitative principles of existence and essence. But they are intensionally distinct because they signify in distinct ways the same entitative composite; for being signifies the existence of an entity and thing signifies the quiddity of that entity. Existence and essence, however, are two 83

This account of parts and wholes will seem perplexing in comparison with standard accounts of wholes and parts within contemporary mereology. As employed here, entitative parts or principles are constituents of a whole and their intelligibility depends upon the whole—i.e., they can only be known through an intellectual abstractive analysis of the whole into its principles. Furthermore, such constituent parts or principles are incapable of being wholes in their own right. As with the composition of form and matter, existence and essence are interpenetrating or fused constituents of a whole, they are not parts outside of parts. See De Haan, Mereological Construal.

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distinct inseparable concomitant entitative principles that are fused in every composite entity, and so existence and essence are distinct in their extension and intension, even though they can neither be on their own, nor be separated from each other in any existent thing. In Chapter 9 we will return to Avicenna’s doctrine of being and thing to consider whether there is any kind of intensional priority between existence and essence and so between the primary notions being and thing. Let us now turn our attention to the primary notions one and necessary. 6.2.3 One in Comparison to Being and Thing The primary notion one (wāḥid) does not receive an extended examination in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, but it is mentioned throughout the first book of the Ilāhiyyāt.84 In Ilāhiyyāt i.2 we are told that metaphysics is called first philosophy “because it is knowledge of … the first thing in generality, namely, existence and unity.”85 In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 it is merely identified as a primary notion. “The things most worthy to be conceptualized by themselves are those that are common to everything (li-lʿamūr), like “being” (mawjūd), “thing” (šayʾ), “one” (wāḥid), and so forth.”86 The most extended treatments of the one are in the henological investigations of Ilāhiyyāt iii and vii, and its shorter discussion in i.7 and viii.3–5, which concern the unity of the necessary existence in itself. Avicenna’s more extended examinations of the primary notion one are frequently in the context of distinguishing the various analogical, generic, specific, and individual senses of the one in contrast to the various meanings of the notion the many. In Ilāhiyyāt iii.1 he distinguishes two approaches to the one. What is foremost [in importance] for us [to do] is to make known the nature of the one. For it is incumbent on us to make known the nature of the one in these places in terms of two things. One of them is that the one is very closely related to being, which is the subject of this [metaphysical] science. The second is that the one is, in some respect, the principle of quantity.87

84 85 86 87

Cf. Houser, Transcendental Unity; Bertolacci, Albert on Avicenna; Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions; O’ Shaughnessy, “St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One;” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God.” Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt i.5.5 [30] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Necessary, 36. Ilāhiyyāt iii.1.10 [95].

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Metaphysics must investigate the one insofar as it is an analogical transcategorical primary notion that is coextensional with the primary notion being, the subject of metaphysics. But it must also address the one as a categorical notion that is the first principle for the science of mathematics insofar as the categorical sense of the one is the principle of the category of quantity, which is divisible into discrete and continuous quantity. Like the primary notion thing, the one is distinct in intension yet inseparable from the notion being, for all primary notions are equivalent in their universal extension and transcategorical application to the categories by priority and posteriority. The one (wāḥid) may correspond with being (mawjūd) in that the one, like being, is said of each one of the categories. But the meaning of the two differs, as you have known. They agree in that neither of them designates the essence (jawhar) of any one thing.88 The one (wāḥid) and being (mawjūd) may be equivalent in being predicates of things, so that whatever that is said to be a being from one consideration is, from a certain consideration, correctly said to be one. [Now,] every thing has one existence. For this reason, it is perhaps thought that what is understood by both is one [and the same]. But this is not the case. Rather, the two are one in subject—that is, whatever is described by the one is described by the other.89 The primary notions being and one are the same in extension insofar as they both refer to one and the same entitative whole or subject, but they signify distinct entitative characteristics of this entitative whole. As we have seen, being signifies the existential entitative principle of any entity and thing signifies its quidditative entitative principle. What is the distinct intension of the one, and what entitative feature does it signify? The intension of the one is indivisibility. Like being, the primary notion one is applied to the categories by an analogy of priority and posteriority. But

88 89

Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.20 [103] (mod. trans.,) (DS, 114:17–20). Bertolacci also insists that jawhar here means, not “substance,” but “essence.” Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, p. 274, n. 22. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 164, n. 47; 393.

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whereas being is distributed according diverse categorical senses of existence, the one adds to the notion of being as such—as well as to the notion of being as divided into the categories—the intension indivisible or not divisible in actuality. The one is spoken of “analogically” (bi-l-taškīk) in [several] senses that agree in that they partake of no divisibility in actuality insofar as each one is what it is. But this meaning is found in them in terms of priority and posteriority.90 As we have seen, Avicenna acknowledges that the intension of indivisibility is not a proper definition of the one; indeed, it is a circular definition for it implicitly means that the one is not many. Rather, for Avicenna, the many is properly understood and conceptualized in light of the priority of the one over the many. Avicenna defends his contention that the one is conceptually prior to the many by arguing that multiplicity is in fact more proper to imagination, whereas unity is more properly an intellectual notion. It seems, however, that multiplicity is better known to our act of imagining; unity, better known to our intellects. It seems that unity and multiplicity are among the things that we conceptualize primordially. However, we imagine multiplicity first, whereas we apprehend unity intellectually, without a [prior] intellectual principle for its conceptualization; but, if [a principle] is needed at all, it would be imaginative. Our defining multiplicity in terms of unity would, then, be an intellectual definition. Here, unity is taken as conceptualized in itself and as one of the first principles of conceptualization. [On the other hand,] our describing unity in terms of multiplicity would be a directing of attention (tanbīhā) wherein the imaginative course is used to hint at an intelligible [which] we [already] have but which we do not conceptualize to be present in the mind. If they say, “unity is the thing which has no multiplicity,” they indicate that what is intended by this expression is the thing which for us is a primordial

90

Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.1 [97]. Cf. “Just as being (mawjūd) and the one (wāḥid) are among the things that are common to [all] the categories, but according to priority and posteriority, the case is also similar with things (ašyāʼ) that have quiddity and definition, for this is not on the same level in all things.” Ilāhiyyāt v.8.1 [243] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Necessary 38, n. 24.

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intelligible that opposes this other or is not it. It thus draws attention to [what is already in the mind] by negating [multiplicity] from it.91 In this passage from Ilāhiyyāt iii.3 Avicenna confirms the status of the one as a primary notion by describing the one or unity as a primordial notion that is conceptualized in itself, is among the first principles of conceptualization, and that employing the many or multiplicity to indicate the meaning of the one does not make the unknown known, but only directs our attention to this primary notion.92 Such features clearly echo the criteria of the primary notions articulated in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Descriptions of the one or unity that make use of the terms the many or multiplicity, merely direct our attention to the primary notion of the one, which is a primary intellectual conceptualization that opposes the many and is not many, that is, it is not divisible. In short, the one means the indivisible, and as a primary notion it is notionally prior to the many, because it is intellectually conceptualized first and is a principle of conceptualization for the many. In comparison to the primary notions being and thing, the one does not indicate the existence or essence of an entity, but the indivisibility or unity of an entity. Avicenna does not provide any synonyms for the one, however, like being and thing, Avicenna does take note of a corresponding sense of wujūd that describes the one. Again, wujūd is said in many ways. But as with thing, Avicenna does not typically describe the meaning of the one in terms of wujūd, since he prefers to reserve the term wujūd to mean existence. The corresponding sense of wujūd that is signified by the one does not mean the established existence (wujūd) of a being (mawjūd), or the quiddity, that is, the specified to be (wujūd) of a thing (šayʾ); rather, the one (wāḥid) can mean to be indivisible (wujūd lā yanqasim), or, more literally, to be [that is] not divisible. Comprehensive unity is more general than {the more specific meanings of unity}, and this is what we are discussing—and only inasmuch as it is to be indivisible, without anything additional. And [this meaning] does not separate from its subjects; otherwise, it would become that other,

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Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.4 [106]. These many acts of drawing attention are “similar to the attention drawn by examples, names, and synonymous terms—and that some or all of these meanings are conceived in [terms of] their essence. They are indicated by these things only in order to draw attention to them and to differentiate them.” Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.9 [106].

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more specific meaning. For it is impossible for unity to be an indivisible to be in [both] accidents and substances and, with [all] this, to be permitted to separate. For then [it would be the case] that [either] substance occurs to a {categorical} accident [as something that comes to inhere in it] or that the unity in substances and {categorical} accidents differs. It is, hence, clear that the true-nature of unity is a meaning [pertaining] to {proper} accidents and one of the necessary concomitants of things.93 The one and the many are disjunctive proper accidents of being, but unlike the many, the one is also a primary notion because it is a coextensional concomitant with being. As a proper accident it occurs to being accidentally, not extensionally, but intensionally, in the sense that it adds an intensional layer of meaning to being. Like absolute being, comprehensive unity as such—that is, the most universal sense of unity as a primary notion—is antecedent to any division into the quasi-species of substance and accident, and it is also prior to any additional characterization and notional constriction by the proper accidents or causal principles of metaphysics. As such, comprehensive unity means indivisibility or to be indivisible (wujūd lā yanqasim) and it is neither a categorical substance nor a categorical accident, but pertains and occurs to both. This is why the true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of the one (wāḥid) as a primary notion is taken to be a proper accident of being insofar as it adds the intension of indivisibility to the notion of being. One is an intension that is not signified by being, but is beyond or accidental to what is constituted by the intension of being, which is existence (wujūd).94 Hence, the one notionally amplifies the intension of being, without extensionally constricting absolute being, for every being is one, and every one is a being. What entitative characteristic does indivisibility—the intension of the one—signify? In contrast to the positive significations of being as having established existence and thing as having quiddity, the intension of the one as indivisible or to be indivisible is negative, for it negates actual division and multiplicity of the entity that is one. In the case of an entity that is a being or thing composed of the entitative principles of existence and quiddity, the one signifies the actual indivision of the composition of existence and quiddity that is intrinsic to the entity that is a being or a thing. Said otherwise, while being and thing signify really composed but distinct intrinsic ontological principles of a whole—that is,

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Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.15 [109] (mod. trans.), my emphasis. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303].

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existence and quiddity, respectively—the one signifies the confluent relationship between these intrinsic principles of an entity. The one characterizes the concomitance and inseparability of existence and essence in entities as being entitative principles of an actually indivisible entity. In short, the primary notion one is coextensional but distinct in intension from being and thing. And since the intension of indivisibility signifies the real union of the two entitative principles of existence and quiddity, indivisibility is itself distinct in intension and extension from the intensions existence and essence. In Chapter 9 we shall examine further the significance of the one’s connection to being and thing. Let us now turn to the primary notion necessary. 6.2.4 The Necessary in Comparison to Being The necessary (ḍarūrī / wājib) is the third primary metaphysical notion introduced and treated by Avicenna in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. This modal notion is opposed to the possible and the impossible; but unlike for being and thing, Avicenna does not provide any synonyms for the necessary. Robert Wisnovsky has shown that Avicenna’s understanding of the necessary drew upon many philosophical and theological sources.95 Significant for our account of the primary notion necessary are the five senses of necessary that Aristotle presents in Metaphysics ∆ 5. Following Wisnovsky’s division of the text, the first two senses of the necessary both concern necessity as what is indispensable. The (1) first kind of indispensable necessity pertains to that without which something cannot be; such as breathing and nourishment, which are causes required for an animal to live. The (2) second kind of indispensable necessity concerns other forms of hypothetical necessity, such that certain goods cannot be achieved or evils avoided without granting certain conditions, like taking medicine in order to prevent an illness. The (3) third kind of necessity is the compulsory, which belongs to whatever stands in the way of and frustrates what is voluntary or naturally sought. The (4) fourth kind of necessity is the invariable, which means that something which is cannot be otherwise than it is. For Aristotle, the necessary as the invariable describes the fundamental sense or focal meaning of the necessary to which all the other senses of the necessary are in some way connected. The (5) fifth sense of the necessary means the inevitable, such as the way a conclusion is necessitated by its premises.96 Aristotle then makes two very important general claims about the necessary. First, he asserts that category [4], the invariable, is the most basic 95 96

Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, Chapters 11–14, 197–263. Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, 201–205.

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type of necessary thing, that is, the category to which the other categories of the necessary ultimately refer. As I shall show, this prompted later commentators such as Alexander and Asclepius to make explicit Aristotle’s implication that category [4] refers to the kind of necessity possessed by divine things. Aristotle’s claim that category [4] is the necessary in a primary sense, and the commentators’ interpretation of category [4] as referring to divine things, will play some role in helping shape Avicenna’s claim that God is necessary of existence (wājib al-wujūd) in some primary or absolute way. The second general claim Aristotle makes is that the necessary may refer either to something which is necessary because a cause other than itself has made it necessary, or to something which is itself necessary and which makes other things necessary. This claim, I believe, is one of the main sources of Avicenna’s distinction between that which is necessary of existence in itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi) and that which is necessary of existence through another (wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi).97 Aristotle’s account of the necessary did find its way into Avicenna’s own doctrine of the necessary. In this section we will concentrate on his treatment of the necessary as a primary notion. The treatment of the necessary and possible in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt is similar to the account we saw earlier from his logic, which drew upon the innovations of Aristotelians like al-Fārābī and Ibn ʿAdī.98 In his logic he distinguished two senses of the necessary: the necessary (ḍarūrī) as logical necessity and (2) the necessary (wājib) as ontological necessity, which is opposed to ontological possibility and impossibility. All of the ontological forms of modality are intensionally connected with existence or nonexistence. The necessary (wājib) as ontological necessity signifies the permanence of existence (dawām al-wujūd). Ontological possibility or contingency means neither permanent existence nor permanent nonexistence, and ontological impossibility means permanent nonexistence. In contrast, the necessary (ḍarūrī) as logical necessity signifies both necessary existence and necessary nonexistence; it includes both ontological necessity, that is, permanent existence, and ontological impossibility, that is, permanent nonexistence. 97 98

Wisnovsky, amc, 204. Cf. Wisnovsky, amc; McGinnis, “Old Complexes and New Possibilities: Avicenna’s Modal Metaphysics in Context,” (Henceforth: Old Complexes) Bertolacci, Necessary; Davidson, Proofs for Eternity; Bäck, “Avicenna and Averroes: Modality and Theology;” idem, “Avicenna’s Conception of the Modalities;” Adamson, “The Arabic Sea Battle: al-Fārābī on the Problem of Future Contingents.”

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In his logic, Avicenna’s also identifies two corresponding senses of possibility: the common (ʿāmma) and the proper (ẖāṣṣa). Common possibility signifies the not impossible, and it includes both ontological necessity and contingency, that is, the possible or not impossible with respect to existence, and yet not ontologically necessary with respect to existence. The proper possible excludes both ontological necessity and impossibility from its signification, for it denotes the non-logical-necessity or the non-necessary (ḍarūrī). Said otherwise, the proper possible signifies not necessary existence and not necessary nonexistence. In the Ilāhiyyāt, the logical senses of necessity and possibility seem to drop out and only the ontological senses of necessity and possibility are employed. Hence, even though Avicenna uses the term ḍarūrī to indicate logical-necessity in the logic, it appears that in the Ilāhiyyāt, ḍarūrī, like wājib, always means the necessary as ontological necessity. But in both the logic and in the metaphysics, the necessary signifies existence (wujūd) construed as the permanence of existence (dawām al-wujūd) and as the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd). Avicenna’s brief treatment of the necessary in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 is directed to the task of establishing which modal notion is primary among the necessary (wājib), the possible (mumkin), or the impossible (mumtaniʿ). Like being, thing, and one, necessary cannot be known by a definition; its meaning must be directed to by a sign. The priority of the necessary cannot be established through a definition for all attempts to define the necessary by the possible or impossible results in the circularity of defining the possible or impossible in terms of the necessary. As was noted, Avicenna briefly explores the futility of earlier attempts to define one of these modal notions in terms of the others. In order to break out of this circularity, Avicenna establishes the priority of the necessary over the possible and impossible, and the possible over the impossible, by “invoking the priority of existence over non-existence”99 and pointing out the intensional identity of the necessary (wājib) with existence (wujūd). Nonetheless, of these three, the one with the highest claim to be first conceptualized is the necessary (wājib). This is because the necessary signifies the “invariance of existence” (taʾakkud al-wujūd), existence (wujūd) being more known than nonexistence (ʿadam). [This is] because existence

99

Bertolacci, Necessary, 46.

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is known in itself, whereas nonexistence is known, in a certain respect, through existence.100 Avicenna identifies the meaning of the primary notion the necessary with the “invariance of existence” (taʾakkud al-wujūd), which also sanctions its priority over the possible and impossible and connects the intension of the primary notion necessary with the intension of the primary notion being. What precisely this latter connection is, and what its metaphysical ramifications are, will be explored in the final chapters. In the passage just quoted from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 Avicenna directs our attention to the obvious priority of existence over nonexistence. Existence is putative and is known in itself, whereas nonexistence is only known through existence. We have seen this doctrine in Avicenna’s logical treatment of the absolute priority of assent to categorical affirmations of existence.101 The necessary is identified with existence—inasmuch as it means the invariance of existence—and so it has priority over possibility and impossibility. This is because possibility signifies a kind of relative nonexistence known first through necessary existence, whereas impossibility means nonexistence simpliciter, which is known by a complete denial of necessary existence. This identification of the meaning of the necessary with the invariance of existence establishes to Avicenna’s satisfaction that the possible and impossible are known through the necessary, giving the notion necessary ontological and also notional, that is, both extensional and intensional, primacy over possible and impossible in his metaphysics. Avicenna’s identification of the necessary with the intension and entitative principle of existence (wujūd) is significant. Unlike his qualified secondary applications of the term wujūd to the quiddity denoted by thing and the indivisibility identified by one, the necessary, like being, indicates the very existence of an entity. Consequently, Avicenna’s metaphysical doctrine of necessary (wājib) first and foremost understands necessity according to an existential construal. The primary sense of the necessary does not, for Avicenna, mean that which necessarily or unexceptionally is quidditatively constitutional to an essence or flows from the essence of a thing; rather, the necessary principally concerns the existence of a being. This is not an essentialist doctrine of necessity, but an existentialist doctrine of necessity where the necessary pertains fundamentally to existence (wujūd), and only secondarily to essence. Hence, existence, for

100 101

Avicenna, Ilāhiyyāt i.5.24 [36:4–6] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1.17 [9]; i.2.18 [15]; i.3.8 [20]; i.3.13. [21–22].

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Avicenna, is convertible with necessity, and so all beings that exist are necessary and their existence is necessary. As we shall see in the next chapter on the primary hypotheses of metaphysics, if a being fails to be necessary existence in itself, then it must have a quiddity other than its necessary existence, and so its true-nature is to be possible existence in itself and necessary existence through another. Furthermore, because being and the necessary both signify the existence (wujūd) of an entity, the most universal feature of all entities, the necessary is also included among the coextensional primary notions.102 Consequently, like the other primary notions with which it is coextensional, necessary is among the most universal transcategorical notions. It is first known, known in itself, and is a principle of conceptualization, especially for conceptualizing other modal notions, such as possibility, impossibility, act, and potency. The necessary is distinguished from the other primary notions by its distinct intension, which is the invariance of existence. But since the invariance of existence denotes the same existential entitative principle as the established existence signified by being, the invariance of existence and established existence are coextensional but distinct in intension. Accordingly, the necessary existence, like established existence is both extensionally and intensionally distinct from quiddity and indivisibility. It is difficult to know what exactly this technical expression the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd) means, since Avicenna does not provide any explanation. He gets this description of necessary from al-Fārābī’s epistemological account of certainty. “Fārābī’s account of the eternity condition {for absolute certitude} prefigures Avicennian modal metaphysics terminologically, for Avicenna echoes Fārābī when he adopts the phrase “assurance of existence” (taʾakkud al-wuǧūd) to describe the characteristic of necessity that gives it priority over the other modal notions.”103 The phrase taʾakkud al-wujūd was translated into Latin as the “vehemence of existence” (vehementia essendi).104 Black, Marmura, and Bertolacci translate taʾakkud al-wujūd more literally as the “assuredness of existence” or “assurance of existence.”105 Davidson translates it as the “certainty of existence.”106 The difficulty with these more literal translations is that they cast the intension of the necessary in terms that are too psychological and epistemological. Avicenna is attempting to capture the way 102 103 104 105 106

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15]. Black, “Knowledge (ʿilm) and Certitude (yaqīn) in al-Fārābī’s Epistemology,” 26. Cf. Scientia Divina, i.5 [41:80]. Cf. Marmura, Avicenna on Primary Concepts, 163–164; Black, “Knowledge (ʿilm) and Certitude (yaqīn) in al-Fārābī’s Epistemology,” 26; Bertolacci, Necessary, 46–47. Davidson, Proofs from Eternity, 290.

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the very existence of an entity is fixed, unfailing, constant, and invariable; his point is not about the certainty and the assurance of our knowledge about the necessary existence of a being. Jon McGinnis translates taʾakkud al-wujūd as the “givenness of being,” which is less literal, but it does get at the ontological sense of the term. McGinnis’s translation, however, does not identify the fixedness and invariant modal characteristic of existence that Avicenna ascribes to the necessary.107 I translate taʾakkud al-wujūd less literally as the “invariance of existence,” which captures both the ontological and the modal sense required for understanding Avicenna’s doctrine of the necessary. This interpretative translation of taʾakkud al-wujūd is corroborated by the other terms Avicenna uses to describe the intension of the primary notion the necessary, such as “necessity” (wujūb), “necessary of existence” (wājib alwujūd), and the “permanence of existence” (dawām al-wujūd). And it is also in line with Aristotle’s view that the primary sense of the necessary means that which is and cannot be otherwise than it is, which Wisnovsky calls the invariable.108 Avicenna’s doctrine that all beings are necessary, indeed, that the very existence of every existent entity is necessary, must be recognized for the novel metaphysical doctrine it is. Michael Marmura has rightly described Avicenna’s first philosophy as “necessitarian metaphysics.”109 His identification of the intension of the necessary with the invariance of existence does not merely mean that if a being exists, then it exists necessarily insofar as it exists. While his doctrine of the necessary does capture this fact, it also implies a lot more. As we shall see in the next chapter, it means that insofar as any existent entity exists, its existence is necessary; its necessary existence is either necessary existence in itself or it is necessary existence through another. In the former case, 107 108 109

Cf. McGinnis, Old Complexes, 28–29. Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, 203. Cf. Marmura, “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Alfarabi and Avicenna,” in Probing, 386. See also Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 289–293. With reference to Ilāhiyyāt i.5, Davidson remarks that, “Here Avicenna makes a point that has escaped some students of his philosophy. Of the three categories, the first two, he states unambiguously, are the only conceivable categories of actual existence. Everything actually existent, including everything “entering existence” in the physical world—as combustion, to take the illustration used by Avicenna—is necessary in one sense or the other. Put in another way, the possibly existent can never actually exist unless rendered necessary by something distinct from itself.” Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 291–292. “Avicenna … insists that all objects that actually exist, even transient beings, are to be characterized as necessarily existent, and all objects that exist by reason of something else, even eternal beings, are possibly existent. Both sets belong to the single category of the necessarily existent by virtue of another, possibly existent by virtue of itself.” Ibid., 292.

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it means necessary existence is identical to the being’s true-nature; in the latter case, it entails that the necessary existence of a thing is caused by an efficient cause that could not fail to cause the essence to exist necessarily. In the final chapters I shall touch upon what I believe motivated Avicenna to adopt this necessitarian construal of existence. At this point it is important to place some distance between Avicenna’s doctrine of existence and essence, and the later Latin Scholastics he influenced, such as Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas’s well known doctrine of being (ens) and the composition and distinction of essence (essentia) with its distinct act of existence (actus essendi), was certainly influenced by Avicenna’s doctrine of existence and essence.110 But it is significant that Avicenna does not in any systematic or preferential way explicate his doctrine of existence and essence in terms of the Aristotelian transcategorical disjunctive of act and potency. Instead, as we have seen, Avicenna works out the real distinction of existence and essence independently from the notions of act and potency, and often in light of his doctrine of the fundamentality of the transcategorical disjunctive of necessary and possible existence. Avicenna does use the expression actual to be or to exist, but it is normally—though not always—in the context of treating issues related to natural philosophy.111 Furthermore, unlike Thomas Aquinas, Avicenna does not contend that the notions of act and potency can be applied beyond the order of form and matter such that, as form is the act of the potentiality of matter, so also existence is related to essence as act is to potency. Consequently, it is imprecise and even misleading for Avicenna’s interpreters to explicate the Avicenna’s doctrine of existence in terms of the “act of existence” without any qualifications.112 For Avicenna, necessity and possibility are the key disjunctive terms, accordingly we should refer to Avicenna’s doctrine of the necessity of existence, simpliciter. Hence, in the rare cases where he does describes a being’s existence as its act 110

111 112

Cf. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers; idem, “Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age;” idem, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae;” Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas;” idem, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics;” idem, “The Relevance of Avicennian Neoplatonism;” Wippel, “The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas Aquinas’s Metaphysics;” Houser, Real Distinction; idem, Christian Magistri; De Haan, Mereological Construal. For Avicenna’s use of various versions of the phrase existence in act or actual existence (wujūd bi-ʾl-fiʿl; esse in effectu), see Ilāhiyyāt i.7.5 [45:8], SD i.7 (51:91); ii.2.17 [66:8], SD ii.2 (76:18); Ilāhiyyāt ii.2.27 [70:8], SD ii.2 (81:22); Ilāhiyyāt v.6.2 (231:1–2); vi.5.28 [292]. Cf. Rahman, “Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina: The Myth and the Reality;” McGinnis, Avicenna, 159–163; Schöck, “Name (ism), Derived Name (ism mushtaqq) and Description (waṣf) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic,” 347–357.

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of existence, this must be taken as a notional amplification of his doctrine of necessary existence, and not vice-versa.113 The principal sense of existence for Avicenna is captured by the primary notion necessary, and it means the necessity or invariance of existence. Let us conclude this section on the primary notion of necessary by comparing necessary with Avicenna’s doctrine of being. Being and necessary both signify that which is/has existence (wujūd) but they cannot signify it in the same way. Accordingly, to distinguish their respective intensions with regard to existence, we must set in relief the two distinct ways the notions of being and necessary differently construe the meaning of the very same existential entitative principle of every entitative whole. Being is synonymous with entity (huwiyya), realized (muḥaṣṣal), and established (muṯbat). Being construes existence (wujūd) as being synonymous with such intensions as subsistence (qiwām), realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām), established existence (wujūd iṯbātī), and existential-thatness (anniyya), all of which hit on the putative givenness of existence, which constitutes an entity to have its existence accomplished in itself and in a stabilized way. The necessary construes existence (wujūd) as synonymous with intensions such as necessity (wujūb), invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd), permanence of existence (dawām al-wujūd), and necessary of existence (wājib al-wujūd). Hence, being and necessary provide two distinct construals of the same entitative principle of every entity, namely, existence (wujūd), which in composite entities is distinct from that other entitative principle of a thing, namely, its quiddity. Within the scope of Avicenna’s ontological doctrine of being and thing, I shall characterize the notion of being’s construal of existence as an intrinsic construal because it emphasizes the existential-thatness and realized subsistence of a being’s wujūd. In other words, being characterizes existence as that which constitutes the whole being to be by virtue of the established existence of the quiddity of the thing. I shall characterize the necessary’s construal of existence as an extrinsic construal on the basis of the way the primary notion necessary is applied in Avicenna’s ontology. As we shall see in the next chapter, Avicenna divides existence into necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself. He also holds that the possible existence in itself is necessary existence from or through another. The primary notion necessary is applied to both, in the case of necessary existence in itself, it signifies invariance of existence in itself, but as applied to possible existence in itself it means the invariance of existence through another insofar as it is necessary existence through 113

This is also true of his description of existence as a perfection (tāmm), see Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.1 [355].

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another. Accordingly, when necessary is applied to a possible existent that has its invariant existence through another, the primary notion necessary signifies the extrinsic dependence of a composite entity’s existence on another. Said otherwise, whereas being (mawjūd) intensionally construes the existence of an entity as it is established and realized intrinsically, and without any explicit causal or modal resonances, the necessary (wājib) intensionally construes the very same existence and entitative principle of a composite entity in causal terms, that is to say, as an effect that is necessary existence through a cause that is extrinsic to it. Of course existence is an intrinsic entitative principle of a whole in both cases, for both primary notions—being and necessary—indicate the very same existence of an entity. Likewise, that very same existence of a possible existent that is signified by being and necessary is extrinsically dependent on some cause. The point of the intrinsic and extrinsic construal distinction is that it is being that highlights the achievement of the intrinsic existence of an entity and it is necessary that illuminates for us that the intrinsic entitative principle of existence depends on an extrinsic cause. Finally, because the existence (wujūd) of every possible existent in Avicenna’s ontology has its invariance of existence through another, it means that the necessary signifies the existence (wujūd) for every possible existent in his ontology according to an extrinsic construal of existence. Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have canvassed Avicenna’s account of the four primary notions of metaphysics as being, thing, one, and necessary. It was shown that each of these primary notions is the same in extension but distinct in intention. They are known first and through themselves, and are the first principles of conceptualization for all other notions. As primary notions they are also related to the categories of being as transcategorical notions that can be found in all of the figures of predication. We also addressed Avicenna’s doctrine that wujūd is said in many ways. First and foremost, Avicenna understands wujūd to mean not quiddity, but the existence of a being (mawjūd), that is, the existential entitative principle by virtue of which any being exists at all. But this primary identification of wujūd with existence does not prevent Avicenna from acknowledging other meanings that have been associated with wujūd. In fact, Avicenna recognizes that for each of the four primary notions, there is a corresponding sense of wujūd. The primary sense of wujūd is the existential sense Avicenna identifies with the primary notions being and necessary. Being (mawjūd) means that which

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is/has existence (wujūd) or established existence (wujūd iṯbātī) and necessary (wājib) means that which is/has the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd). Avicenna also takes note of the quidditative and henological senses of wujūd employed by his predecessors, which, in his own metaphysics are no more than secondary or subsidiary meanings of wujūd that are always subordinate to the primary sense of wujūd meaning to exist. The sense of wujūd that corresponds to thing (šayʾ) is, like in al-Fārābī, equivalent to the quiddity (māhiyya) of a thing. Avicenna describes this sense of wujūd as the proper to be or specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) of a thing in contrast to the same being’s established existence (wujūd iṯbātī). Similarly, in the case of the primary notion the one (wāḥid) he describes the indivisibility signified by the one as the indivisible to be (wujūd lā yanqasim) of that which is one. Given the complex and diverse spectrum of metaphysical doctrines of wujūd found in his predecessors, it is not surprising that Avicenna found a way to accommodate the various characteristics of these distinct doctrines of being. This means we too must be attentive to the subtle discriminations Avicenna makes with respect to the diverse senses of wujūd as established being, wujūd as specified thing, wujūd as indivisible one, and wujūd as the invariance of the necessary, that is, to be found establishedly, to be found specifically, to be found indivisibly, and to be found invariantly, for being, thing, one, and necessary, respectively. In each case wujūd has a distinct meaning, and even though its principal technical Avicennian use means to be as in to exist, to be present, presence, and existence, Avicenna acknowledges and does not fail to mention the manifold meanings of wujūd. Each of these various senses of to be (wujūd) adds a notional amplification to the basic meaning of existence (wujūd) as signified by being, but without constricting the universal extension of the notion being. Viewed within the context of Aristotelian metaphysics, Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, seems to have assimilated Aristotle’s treatment of being and the one from Metaphysics Γ 2, but not without substantially changing the Aristotelian doctrine of being. Why does Avicenna modify Aristotle’s notions of being and one and add the notions thing and necessary? Our survey of his doctrine of primary notions suggests a tentative answer. Avicenna does not simply accept Aristotle’s doctrine of being wherein substantial formal act is the most fundamental sense of being. For Avicenna, being no longer means essence, but established existence, and Aristotle’s preference for the formal act of being, is subordinated to the primacy Avicenna gives to the necessary and the invariance of existence. This doctrine of being and existence (wujūd) is, as we have seen, at odds with al-Fārābī’s more faithful Aristotelian

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doctrine of being and quidditative to be (wujūd). With the notion of being now identified with the intension of existence, Avicenna redistributes the channel of quidditative actuality to the notion thing, which becomes the intensional bearer of essence in the metaphysics of Avicenna. In short, Avicenna’s existentialized notion of being, along with his modalization of existential being by the necessary, requires the introduction of thing and the necessary into the Aristotelian doctrine of the primary notions being and one. We have also see that Avicenna identifies these primary notions with one of Aristotle’s four senses of being inasmuch as these primary notions are coextensive with being per se as antecedent to its division into the categories. In Avicenna we find a clearer distinction between being per se as a transcategorical notion and the categorical divisions of being. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 he presents an extended account of the primary and transcategorical notions that will be divided into a categorical treatment of substance and accidents in Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii. In sum, Avicenna’s synthesizes and develops a number of elements from Aristotle in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. He draws on the Aristotle’s doctrine of primary notions as scientific first principles from the Posterior Analytics. He adapts Aristotle’s account of the convertibility of being and one from Metaphysics Γ 2 along with the sense of being per se found in all the categories from ∆ 7 and Ε 2, and situates them both within the contours of his own doctrine of the primary notions, to which he adds the notions thing and necessary. By combining Aristotle’s distinct approaches to being in Γ 2, ∆ 7, Ε 2 and other passages from the Metaphysics, Avicenna achieved a highly original account of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. But Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions is not simply directed towards delineating an account of the transcategorical notions of being; for they are identified as the scientific principles of his metaphysical science, and as primary notions they will be integrated into the complex primary hypotheses and axioms or scientific principles of assent. In the next chapter we shall examine the way Avicenna integrates these notions into his presentation of the scientific principles of metaphysics as primary principles of assent.

Chapter 7

The Four Senses of Being and the Scientific Principles of Metaphysics: A Material Approach to the Principles of Assent The last chapter explicated the material content of Avicenna’s integration of the scientific principles as primary notions of conceptualization with the sense of being per se. The aim of this chapter is to expound Avicenna’s integration of the senses of being as necessity and possibility, and being as truth with the scientific principles as primary hypotheses and axioms of assent, respectively. Since all principles of assent are derived from principles of conceptualization, our investigation of the primary hypotheses and axioms of assent will also elucidate the way the primary notions of conceptualization provide the conceptual basis for the propositional compositions required for assent. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section we treat the scientific principles of assent that are proper to the science of metaphysics. The second section presents, albeit briefly, Avicenna’s account of the axiomatic scientific principle that is common to all the sciences. 7.1

Primary Hypotheses

In Chapter 5 we established that Avicenna introduces and defends the primary hypotheses of his metaphysical science in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. We also showed that Avicenna displaced Aristotle’s sense of being as act and potency by setting up the division of being into necessary and possible as the most fundamental transcategorical disjunctive of being, and that he integrated this more fundamental modal disjunctive into his formulation of the primary hypotheses of metaphysics. This section examines Avicenna’s presentation and verification of these primary hypotheses or fundamental scientific principles that are proper to the science of metaphysics. As principles of assent they are derived from the principles of conceptualization; in particular, Avicenna’s primary hypotheses are grounded in his account of the primary notion necessary (wājib). Accordingly, his primary hypotheses concern the causal and compositional properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence. Our aim in this section is to set in relief what these primary hypotheses of metaphysics are.

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7.1.1 Existence as Necessity and Possibility Avicenna’s primary hypotheses are worked out in light of his doctrine of the necessary and its division into necessary existence in itself and necessary existence through another. His doctrine of the necessary drew upon rich philosophical and theological accounts of the necessary that contributed to what Wisnovsky describes as Avicenna’s matrix of distinctions between necessary of existence (wājib al-wujūd) and possible of existence (mumkin al-wujūd), in itself (bi–ḏātihi) and through another (bi–ǧayrihi), uncaused and caused, and eternal and originated.1 Aristotle’s own fivefold division of the necessary in Metaphysics ∆ 5, 1015a20– b15 provided the point of departure for later Aristotelian accounts of the necessary. As we have mentioned, Aristotle’s fourth sense of the necessary as that which cannot be otherwise is held to be basic; the other senses of the necessary are derived from it.2 Wisnovsky describes this sense of the necessary as invariable.3 Alexander of Aphrodisias and Asclepius tended to theologize this fourth sense of the necessary in their commentaries on the Metaphysics.4 Wisnovsky argues that this theological emphasis with respect to the sense of the necessary as invariable influenced later Arabic philosophers’ interpretations of Metaphysics ∆ 5, such as Avicenna’s. These readings were rooted in the way ∆ 5 connects the necessary with notions of transitivity, simplicity, eternity, and immutability. With some necessary things there is another cause [of their being necessary]; with others there is no [other cause], but instead it is on account of them that other things are of necessity. It is clear, then, that what is necessary in a primary and real sense is the simple [al-mabsūṭ = to haploun]; for that [i.e., what is simple] cannot exist in many ways, nor even in one other way (for otherwise it will exist in many ways). So if there are 1 2 3 4

Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, pp. 13–14, and cc. 11–14, pp. 197–263. Cf. Chapter 6.2.4. Cf. Wisnovsky, amc, 201–205. Cf. “But eternal things are also necessary in this way [viz., in the way necessary premises are necessary], for they have no cause extrinsic to them and they are of necessity causes of being for other things too; for all things that are naturally constituted owe to the gods the fact that they are immediately necessary because they have a cause of their being that is eternal. Moreover, that which either cannot be or be in a good state without something else has from that other of necessity the cause both of its being and of its well-being. Only the eternal beings, those that are divine, do not have another thing as cause of their eternal being, and it is because of them that the things naturally constituted are and come to be of necessity.” Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 5.5 (ad 1015b9–11), 361,24–36 (trans., Dooley, 32–33).

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certain things which are simple, eternal and not subject to change [in kānat ashyāʾu mabsāṭatan wa-azaliyyatan wa-ghayra mutaḥarrikatin = ei ara estin atta aïdia kai akinêta], none of them will be subject to compulsion nor [will they be] outside nature [khārija ʿani ṭ-ṭibāʿi = para phusin].5 The primary and most true sense of the necessary is the simple. It is uncaused, eternal, and immutable; in a word, it is invariable in relation to itself. But it is also the cause of necessity in other things, namely, in those beings whose necessity is caused. Avicenna’s own division of the necessary clearly drew upon Aristotle’s division of the necessary, but he also ontologized, aitiologized, and theologized the Aristotelian doctrine of the necessary in ways that none of his predecessors attempted to do.6 The most significant innovation is Avicenna’s existentialization of the necessary as a primary notion that points to the invariance of existence. Let us turn to Avicenna’s own account of the necessary in his introduction of the division of existence into necessary existence and possible existence at the outset of Ilāhiyyāt i.6. There are properties (ẖawāṣṣ) that belong each to the necessary existence and to the possible existence. We say that: anything that enters into existence admits of being intellectually divided into two divisions. One of these is [given by] that which [is such that], when it is considered in itself, its existence is not necessary [i.e. the possible existence]. But it is evident that its existence is not even impossible, otherwise [this type of existence] would not enter into the [realm of] existence. This thing, therefore, is in the realm of possibility. The other of these [divisions] is [given by] that which [is such that], when it is considered in itself, its existence is necessary [i.e. the necessary existence].7 The chapter commences with the statement that there are properties that belong to necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd) and possible existence (mumkin al-wujūd). The significance of this opening line should not be overlooked.

5 Aristotle, Metaphysics in Arabic ∆ 5, 1015b10–b15 [Arabic in Bouyges ed. of Averroes, Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, 517:2–7] (English trans., Wisnovsky, amc, 201–202). 6 Cf. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 281–310; McGinnis, Avicenna, 149–208; idem, Old Complexes; Wisnovsky, amc, 197–267; Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God;” Bäck, “Avicenna and Averroes: Modality and Theology;” Bertolacci, Necessary. 7 Ilāhiyyāt i.6.1 [37] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Necessary, 47).

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Avicenna is no longer introducing new primary notions and dealing simply with conceptual matters, he is now addressing the properties (ẖawāṣṣ) ascribed to necessary existence and possible existence. In short, he is dealing with primary hypotheses known by a primary assent. The point of departure of Ilāhiyyāt i.6 is, however, doctrinally continuous with Avicenna’s description of the primary notion the necessary (wājib) in i.5, which he connects with existence. He begins i.6 with what enters existence insofar as it can be considered as existing, and what enters existence is necessary. Since the necessary indicates the invariance of existence, everything that exists is also necessary. This is because, in the metaphysics of Avicenna, to exist is always to exist necessarily or invariantly; every existent is or has necessary existence. But there are two ways in which the necessity of existence is exhibited by entities, and so also all existent beings are said to be necessary in one of two ways. The first kind of necessary entities are called possible existents; they are things that when considered in themselves, their existence is not necessary, that is, they are not necessary existence in themselves. But since such entities do exist, their existence is not impossible. Hence, they are possible with regard to their existence, and so Avicenna calls any instance of this kind of being a possible existence in itself. Possible existents are necessary, as Avicenna will show, but instead of having their necessity of existence through themselves, their necessity of existence is through another. The second kind of necessary entity is called the necessary existent; when considered in itself it is necessary with respect to its existence, and so it is described as necessary existence in itself. As applied to the necessary existent, the primary notion of the necessary is notionally constricted to mean the invariance of existence in itself, or necessary existence in itself, or the permanence of existence in itself. The necessary, as a primary notion, applies to every entity that exists, for all entities that exist do so necessarily; but the necessary existence in itself, as we shall see, can only apply to one entity. Consequently, necessary existence in itself is a notional constriction of the primary notion the necessary, because, by adding the intension of “in itself” (bi–ḏātihi) to the “necessary,” it also thereby has a narrower extension than the “necessary.” Similarly, the intension “through another” (bi–ǧayrihi) also notionally constricts the “necessary” as a primary notion, since not every being is necessary existence through another. This transcategorical modal disjunctive of the primary notions being and necessary into necessary existence and possible existence provides Avicenna with his first primary hypothesis: “existence is either necessary existence or possible existence.” As noted before, this is a significant departure from the metaphysics of Aristotle who takes the basic disjunctive of being to be act and

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potency. In contrast to Aristotle, Avicenna employs the disjunctive between act and potency to frame the primary hypotheses of his natural philosophy, such as “being is either in pure act or is mixed with act and potency.”8 Avicenna develops his metaphysical primary hypotheses in terms of the more fundamental disjunctive of being into necessity and possibility. Based on this transcategorical modal division of existence and the first primary hypothesis, Avicenna puts forward a number of primary hypotheses and derivative theses concerning the properties that belong to necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself, each of which will be defended and verified over the course of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. «i» That which in itself is necessary existence has no cause, «ii» while that which in itself is possible existence has a cause. «iii» Whatever is necessary existence in itself is necessary existence in all its aspects. «iv» The existence of the necessary existence cannot be equivalent to the existence of another where each would equal the other as regards necessary existence, becoming [thereby] necessary concomitants. «v» The existence of the necessary with respect to existence cannot at all be a composite, [deriving] from multiplicity. «vi» The true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of the necessary existence can in no manner be shared by another. From our verifying [all] this, it follows necessarily that «vii» necessary existence is not [dependent on] relation, «viii» is neither changing «ix» nor multiple, and «x» has nothing associated with its existence that is proper to itself.9 Since it is beyond the aims of this study to treat each of these propositions at length, I shall focus on the primary hypotheses and derivative theses that deal with the compositional and causal properties of the necessary existent and possible existents.10 What is especially pertinent to our present concerns is (1) the way these statements that affirm properties of necessary existence and possible existence figure into Avicenna’s account of the primary hypotheses of

8

9 10

“Some beings are actual in every respect, while others are actual in one respect but potential in another. It is impossible, however, that there be something that is potential in every respect, itself having no actuality whatsoever. Let this be accepted and set down as a hypothesis (waḍʿā), although an enquiry into it will be taken up soon.” Healing. Physics, ii.1.1 [107] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37] (mod. trans.,). For studies on the primary hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, see Houser, Real Distinction; De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?”

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metaphysics, and (2) the way his investigation of necessary and possible existence supersedes Aristotle’s division of being as act and potency. A primary hypothesis employs primary notions or their meanings in its propositional formulations. The per se and commensurately universal connection between the subject and predicate is evident through itself and cannot be demonstrated on the basis of more fundamental propositions; furthermore, the notions or concepts that they compose and divide cannot be based on more common notions. Still, these propositions do not pertain to matters that are universally relevant to all sciences in the way the principles of contradiction and “there is no middle between affirmation and negation” are universal to all discourse. The division of being into necessary existence and possible existence and the respective properties that belong to each concerns propositional matters that are proper to metaphysics, just as the primary notions concern conceptual matters that are proper to metaphysics. This is why we concluded in Chapter 4 that Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 concerns Avicenna’s presentation of the primary hypotheses proper to metaphysics. 7.1.2 The Causal Properties of Necessary and Possible Existence Avicenna begins with the metaphysical hypotheses concerning the causal properties of the necessary existent and the possible existent. The «i» first of these is, “that the necessary existence has no cause is evident.”11 Avicenna contends it is evident that there is no cause for necessary existence in itself, because the denial of “existence in itself” is “existence by another,” which means to have existence derived from or caused by another. If one grasps what “necessary existence in itself” and what its synthesis with “uncaused” or “no cause” means, one immediately assents to the primary hypothesis that “necessary existence in itself is uncaused.” Nevertheless, to help elucidate, verify, and defend this hypothesis Avicenna proves that its denial entails a contradiction. For if the necessary existence in itself had a cause, then its existence would be due to that cause. And anything that when considered in itself turns out to exist by another, if it were separated from that other, then its existence would not be necessary. But if an entity’s existence is not necessary insofar as the thing is considered in itself and separate from everything else, then it is not necessary existence in itself. Hence, it is evident that if the necessary existence in itself has a cause, then it would not be in itself a necessary existence, for the only causal property—between caused and uncaused—that can be affirmed of the necessary existence in itself without contradicting the true-nature of 11

Ilāhiyyāt i.6.3 [38:1] (mod. trans.).

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necessary existence in itself is that it is uncaused.12 Consequently, “From this it is [also] clear that it is impossible for a thing to be [both] necessary existence in itself and a necessary existence though another,”13 which Avicenna also defends by deducing that its denial entails a contradiction.14 Contrary to the many misinterpretations of these two arguments from Ilāhiyyāt i.6, a closer inspection of i.6 reveals that Avicenna does not intend these arguments to provide probative evidence for the existence of a being that is necessary existence in itself. Indeed, his aim is much more modest. He intends to establish the properties that belong to necessary existence in itself, and he does this without addressing whether such an entity exists.15 He first distinguishes between two kinds of existents; an existent being is either necessary existence in itself or possible existence in itself. Next he asserts it is evident that a necessary existence in itself is uncaused, and then provides one modus tollens argument to show that its denial entails a contradiction. Finally, he contends that it is impossible for one and the same being to be both necessary existence in itself and necessary existence through another, which he defends by a similar modus tollens argument. Consequently, the conclusions of these two arguments leave us with the two aforementioned theses, and a question: if the necessary existence in itself is uncaused and cannot be necessary existence through another, what is necessary existence through another? To answer this we must turn to the hypotheses concerning possible existents. The «ii» next hypothesis concerns the causal properties of possible existents: “whatever is possible in existence when considered in itself, its existence and nonexistence are both due to a cause,”16 and this too is defended by a modus tollens argument that provides additional clarification of the connection Avicenna makes between being through another and causality. If what is possible existence in itself enters into existence, then this is because existence has occurred to it by a cause; and, mutatis mutandis, there must also be a cause for its nonexistence. In both cases, what occurs to the possible existent is either 12 13

14 15 16

Ilāhiyyāt i.6.3 [38] Ilāhiyyāt i.6.3 [38]. “[This is] because, if its existence is rendered necessary through another, it cannot exist without the other. But [if anything] whatsoever cannot exist without another, its existence [as] necessary in itself is impossible. For if it were necessary in itself, then it would have to come into existence, there being no influence on its existence by way of necessity from that which is other and which affects the existence of something else. [But since such an influence has been supposed,] its existence would not be necessary in itself.” Ilāhiyyāt i.6.3 [38]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2–3 [37–38]. Cf. Davidson, Proofs from Eternity; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Ilāhiyyāt i.6.4 [38].

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through another or not through another. If it occurs to it through another, then that other is its cause. If it does not occur through another, then it is necessary existence in itself, and so not possible existence in itself as was originally granted. And this is why everything that does not exist in itself but comes to exist, is caused by another.17 Avicenna provides an additional clarification of this causal property of possible existents by presenting another modus tollens argument that appeals to his doctrine of the primary notion thing and quiddity.18 He contends that the quiddity of a thing that is a possible existent in itself is either sufficient for its existence or it is not. If the quiddity of a possible thing considered in itself is sufficient for its existence, then that thing is in itself a necessarily existent quiddity. But this entails a contradiction, because it was already granted that this thing is not necessary existence in itself. If, however, its quiddity is not sufficient for its own existence—because its existence accrues to its quiddity from another—then the existence of such a quiddity is through another, which is its cause. And so, it is true that an existentially insufficient quiddity in itself, that is, a possible existence in itself, has a cause. In sum, then, one of the two conditions {i.e., existence or nonexistence} is necessary for it {i.e., the possible existent} not through itself but by a cause. The aspect of existence (al-maʿna l-wujūdī) is from a cause, this is the cause of existence, while the aspect of nonexistence is from a cause, this is the nonexistence of the cause for the aspect of existence, as you have known.19 There are two noteworthy features that emerge from Avicenna’s defense of this hypothesis concerning the causal properties of possible existents. First, Avicenna discloses to us for the first time that the quiddity of a thing—at least within the scope of his ontology—is identified with possible existence in itself. The second point concerns the existential insufficiency of a quiddity considered in itself or a possible existence in itself. As considered in itself, the quiddity of a possible existence in itself is existentially insufficient; it does not exist as such, and so it requires a cause for its existence.20 This existential insufficiency

17 18 19 20

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.4–5 [38]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.5 [38–39]. Houser calls this Avicenna’s “sufficiency argument,” see Houser, Real Distinction, 84–86. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.5 [39] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.8 [260]. Avicenna clarifies this doctrine later in Ilāhiyyāt iv.1; vi.1–3; viii.1; viii.3–4.

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argument provides Avicenna with a second way for establishing the real distinction and composition of existence and quiddity in things. Whereas the first way from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 attended to the distinction between the conceptualization of quiddity as answering the question what, and the assent to the established existence or existential-thatness as responding to the question if, this second way looks intrinsically to the quiddity in itself as a possible existence in itself and exposes its existential insufficiency in itself. Avicenna next goes on to introduce another hypothesis that reveals what is necessary existence through another.21 He states that the possible existence in itself “must become necessary through a cause and with respect to it.” This is because it would still be possible existence in itself if it were not necessary existence through a cause. “It would then be possible for it to exist or not to exist, being specified with neither of the two states,” but this is impossible because it was already supposed to exist. Avicenna buttresses this argument with another modus tollens argument and on the basis of the two arguments concludes: “Hence, it has been shown to be true that whatever is possible in its existence does not exist unless rendered necessary with respect to its cause.”22 Two points are noteworthy concerning this second proposition concerning possible existents. First, it shows us that, for Avicenna, all possible existences in themselves must be caused to be necessary existence by another. All possible existents are contingent existents that depend upon and only exist in virtue of the efficient cause of their necessary existence. Said otherwise, unlike the intrinsically necessary existence in itself, all possible existents are extrinsically necessary existence, insofar as they exist necessarily through another. Second, Ilāhiyyāt i.5 already identified the existential connection between being and the modal primary notion necessary, but it is here in Ilāhiyyāt i.6 that Avicenna reveals the connection between the primary notions necessary and thing. For a composite thing’s quiddity considered in itself is a possible existence in itself and is existentially insufficient in itself. Hence, insofar as any possible existent exists, it is thereby necessary existence through another, that is, its invariance of existence is through another. And this is the way that the primary notion necessary is universally applied to the quiddity of a thing that is a possible existent. This second point also complements the previous argument and shows that the primary notion necessary is also relevant to the second way for disclosing the real distinction and composition of existence and quiddity. A possible existent is called necessary because its determination of existence depends on 21 22

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.6 [39]. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.6 [39].

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its necessary existence from another, which is really distinct from the thing’s existentially insufficient quiddity that is only possible existence in itself. Existential determinations are distinct from quidditative determinations; the latter make an entity what it is and also quidditatively determine the various properties and accidents possessed by an individual of a certain species, such as risibility for humans, or black for crows. But such quidditative determinations are insufficient for bringing about a thing’s existence; what is exigent is an existential determination from its necessary existence through another, that is, from the efficient cause of its necessary existence through another. In sum, Avicenna puts forth and verifies two hypotheses concerning the causal properties of possible existents. First, possible existents are existentially insufficient in themselves and require a cause for their existence, which is through another. Second, the cause of the existence of a possible existent must be a necessary cause of existence with respect to its possible existence. Avicenna’s does not present any explicit arguments to defend the proposition that «iii» that whatever is necessary existence in itself is necessary existence in all of its aspects. He either takes this to be evident or that its defense is implicitly contained in the verification of the proposition that necessary existence in itself is in no respect something other than necessary existence. The next proposition Avicenna introduces and defends in i.6 is «iv» “It is impossible for the necessary existence to be equivalent to another necessary existence so that this would exist with that and that would exist with this, neither being the cause of the other [but] both, rather, being equal with respect to the matter of the necessity of existence.”23 He provides a number of different arguments for this statement that extend to the end of i.6, which I shall not examine.24 Most of these arguments are similar to the modus tollens arguments employed to defend the hypotheses concerning the causal properties of the necessary existent and possible existents. 7.1.3 The Compositional Properties of Necessary and Possible Existents In Ilāhiyyāt i.7 Avicenna turns to the compositional properties of the necessary existent and possible existents, and commences with the primary hypothesis that «v» “the necessary existent must be one entity,” which is the obversion of i.6’s “the existence of the necessary with respect to existence cannot at all be a composite, [deriving] from multiplicity.”25 Like the other hypotheses, Avicenna defends this primary hypothesis by showing that its denial entails 23 24 25

Ilāhiyyāt i.6.7 [39–40]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.7–13 [39–42]. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37].

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a contradiction, impossibility, or absurdity.26 Most of the chapter is occupied with various strands of argumentation that defend the hypothesis that the necessary existent is one by showing that its true-nature cannot be multiplied or shared after the fashion of a genus. Accordingly, Avicenna’s arguments in defense of the necessary existent being one, also marshal forward a defense of the proposition that «vi» “The true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of the necessary existence can in no manner be shared by another.”27 The first two lines of argumentation from Ilāhiyyāt i.7 show that the truenature of necessary existence in itself cannot be shared or distinguished by quasi-differentiae or quasi-accidents.28 All attempts to differentiate multiple necessary existents entail adding something to its true-nature that results in its true-nature being caused, and this is impossible, because, as we have seen, necessary existence in itself is uncaused. Avicenna concludes the first section noting that, “it has become evident that the meaning that entails necessary existence cannot be a generic meaning, divisible by differentiae and accidents.”29 Like being itself, necessary existence in itself cannot be a genus. Avicenna then shows by similar arguments that the true-nature of necessary existence in itself cannot be shared like a quasi-species without entailing that its truenature is caused. In short, Avicenna employs the schema of the predicables to show that the necessary existent must be one and cannot be akin to a genus that is shared by some sort of species distinguished by quasi-differentiae or quasi-accidents.30 Let us look briefly at the first argument, since it is representative of the general line of argumentation taken by all the proofs in Ilāhiyyāt i.7.31 The first line of argumentation assumes that if there are multiple necessary existents with the exact same true-nature as necessary existence in itself, then they are either different from each other or they not different at all. The first argument adopts the second horn and proceeds to eliminate this option. Avicenna argues that if necessary existents do not differ essentially as being necessary existence in itself, then they must differ in some other meaning that conjoins to both and thereby makes one of them “this” and the other one “that.” Hence, these 26 27 28 29 30 31

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.1–13 [44–47]. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37]. Cf. Houser, Real Distinction. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.8 [45–46]. Houser calls this the “predicables argument,” see Houser, Real Distinction, 91; 98–99. These arguments have been examined in Davidson, Proofs for Eternity; Houser, Real Distinction; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; McGinnis, Avicenna; De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God.”

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necessary existents differ but not with respect to their true-nature as necessary existence in itself. These other meanings that conjoin to the supposed necessary existents are accidents or nonessential concomitants. “These concomitants either occur to the thing’s existence inasmuch as it is that existence ([in which case] it is necessary that everything in this existence [must] agree, when [in fact] these were supposed to be different—and this is contradictory), or [these sequels] occur to [the thing’s existence] from external causes, not from [the thing’s] quiddity itself.”32 But if it were not for the external causes of these concomitants then these necessary existents would be one and the same and would not differ from each other as this from that. Thus, the necessity of existence of each, particular to each and singled out [for each], would be derived from another. But it has been stated that whatever is a necessary existence through another is not a necessary existence in itself; rather, within its own domain it is a possible existence. It would then [follow] that, although each one of this [supposed multiplicity] is in itself a necessary existence, it is [also], within its own domain, a possible existence—and this is impossible.33 Avicenna appeals to the earlier metaphysical hypotheses concerning the causal properties of possible existents and the necessary existent to clinch his argument that the postulated multiple necessary existents cannot be distinguished according to accidental concomitants without thereby making these necessary existents in themselves to be caused necessary existences, which is impossible. His arguments against distinguishing necessary existents by quasi-differentiae or quasi-species are very similar. His arguments show that postulating multiple necessary existents always entails that the true-nature of necessary existence in itself must then be caused, which is impossible and contradicts the first hypothesis concerning the necessary existent being uncaused. Avicenna takes these arguments in defense of the uniqueness of the necessary existent to be sufficient to verify that there can be only one necessary existence.34 And he concludes his treatment of the hypothesis concerning the compositional properties of the necessary existent as follows:

32 33 34

Ilāhiyyāt i.7.2 [43–44]. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.3 [44]. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.9. [46].

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The necessary existence is therefore one in [its] entirety (not as species are [subsumed] under genus) and one in number (not as individuals [subsumed] under species). Rather, it is a meaning, the explication of whose notion belongs only to it; and its existence is not shared by any other. We will clarify this in another place. These are the properties with which the necessary existence is exclusively endowed.35 Like his position on the primary notion one, which means indivision or not actually divisible, Avicenna’s explication of the significance of the primary hypothesis that the necessary existent is one, is cast in negative terms. It is one in its entirety, yet neither as a species under a genus, nor is it one individual as an individual that is individuated under a species. What it means for the necessary existent to be one is a notion that belongs only to the necessary existence in itself, and it is not shared by another being. Avicenna addresses the unity of necessary existence in itself again in Ilāhiyyāt viii, after he demonstrates that the necessary existence in fact exists and is the first uncaused efficient cause of the existence of all possible existents.36 Avicenna concludes Ilāhiyyāt i.7—and so the whole of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s treatment of the primary hypotheses of metaphysics—by addressing the compositional properties that belong to possible existents. As regards the possible existence, from this {i.e., from the hypotheses on possible existents from Ilāhiyyāt i.6} its property {i.e., its compositional property,} has become evident.37 Before articulating the compositional properties of possible existents, Avicenna first recapitulates the hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6 that pertain to the causal properties of possible existents. A possible existent: necessarily needs some other thing to render it a being (mawjūd) in actuality. Whatever is a possible existence is always, considered in itself, a possible existence; but it may happen that its existence becomes necessary through another. This may either occur to it always, or else its necessary existence through another may not be permanent—occurring,

35 36 37

Ilāhiyyāt i.7.13 [47]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3–5; ix.1. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.14 [47].

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rather, at one time and not another. This [latter] must have matter that precedes its existence in time, as we will clarify.38 What is noteworthy about this recapitulation of the hypotheses concerning the possible existent from Ilāhiyyāt i.6 is that it is the first time Avicenna casts the causal properties of the possible existent in terms of actuality, and as we shall see, in terms of potentiality as well. His recapitulation focuses on a second hypothesis, one concerning the possible existent. Avicenna states that a possible existence in itself is always in itself nothing more than possible existence. Said otherwise, in itself and separated from what is other, a possible existent is not a being in potentiality and it is not a quasi-Platonic nonexistent thing with its own proper existence; on its own a possible existent is nothing. All possible existents necessarily need some other, namely, a cause, to make them to be beings in actuality, that is, to have their existence be necessary existence through another.39 Also noteworthy is Avicenna’s subdivision of possible existents with respect to the distinct ways in which they can be necessary existence through another. Some possible existents are necessary existence through another eternally, and others are not eternally necessary existence through another, but only at one period of time and not during other periods of time. The first kind of possible existents that are necessary existence through another eternally are immaterial beings, whereas the second kind are material, and must have matter as an antecedent subject of potentiality prior to their existence. Avicenna addresses both of these kinds of possible existents at greater length in later books of the Ilāhiyyāt.40 Avicenna then introduces the third hypothesis concerning possible existents, which pertains to their compositional property, just before his concluding Ilāhiyyāt i.7 with a numerical metaphor that contrasts the necessary existent from all possible existents. That whose existence is always necessitated by another is also not simple in its true-nature (ḥaqīqa). [This is] because what belongs to it [when] considered in itself is other than what belongs to it from another. It

38 39 40

Ilāhiyyāt i.7.14 [47]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.6–8 [342–343]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii; iv.1–2; vi.1–3; vii.2–3; ix. Cf. Janssens, “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sīnā,” Lizzini, Form and Matter; idem, Order of Possibles; McGinnis, “Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility and Potential in Avicenna and Aquinas.”

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realizes (ḥāṣil) its entity (huwiyya) in existence (wujūd) from both together. For this reason, nothing other than the necessary existence, considered in itself, is stripped of associating with what is in potentiality and [what is within the realm of] possibility. It is the odd, and [every] other a composite, even.41 The conclusion of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 makes unequivocally clear that the truenature (ḥaqīqa) of all possible existents, that is, those beings “whose existence is always necessitated by another” is “not simple.” Accordingly, the third hypothesis for possible existents can be formulated as: “All possible existents are composite things.” Avicenna does not present any arguments to defend this, but given the series of arguments he used in Ilāhiyyāt i.7 to defend that the necessary existent is one, it is clear what his arguments would be. He does however clarify why the true-nature of possible existents is not simple; it is because what a possible existence is “considered in itself is other than what belongs to it from another.” In short, the quiddity of a possible existent is distinct from its existence, for both the cause of necessary existence and the necessary existence received from that cause are extrinsic to its quiddity. Avicenna also makes clear that despite this distinction there are no possible existents without both entitative principles, for a possible existent only realizes its entity or being in existence through the composition and union of both existence and quiddity together. The significance of this last point should not be overlooked, for it demonstrates how Avicenna understands the interconnection of the intensions of all four primary notions in his ontological doctrine of possible existents. The quiddity of a thing cannot be without being united to its existence, and the actual indivisibility of its existence and quiddity is what constitutes an entity as one possible existent. But the existence of such a being, only occurs to it by its necessary existence through another, which causes it to be a necessary entity that has the necessity and invariance of its existence through another. Finally, the last few lines of Ilāhiyyāt i.7 conclude the whole of i.6–7 by emphasizing the radical distance between the metaphysical constitution of possible existences in themselves and the necessary existence in itself. Necessary existence in itself alone is entirely separate from or stripped of any association with potentiality and possibility. This ontological gulf cannot be crossed. Even though all possible existences in themselves are rendered necessary existence

41

Ilāhiyyāt i.7.14 [47] (mod. trans. from alternative trans. by Marmura, Ilāhiyyāt, p. 38 and Ilāhiyyāt, p. 388, n. 2).

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by another, they still remain possible existents. This is why all possible existents are composite entities, and are metaphorically described as even, whereas only necessary existence in itself is absolutely simple and so alone is odd. In these last lines Avicenna also mentions for the first time in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 the connection between possibility and potentiality. The remark, however, is made in passing with no clarification of what the connection is. Indeed, all Avicenna says is that the necessary existence in itself is entirely independent from any association or connection to what is in potentiality and possibility. If there is any connection between possibility and potentiality for things that are possible existents, Avicenna does not identify such a link here in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. At best, we can merely speculate that insofar as he mentions that there is a subdivision of possible existents that must exist in matter, and matter is potentiality, it is these possible existents that are associated with potentiality. Such speculations, however, anticipate the doctrines that Avicenna addresses in Ilāhiyyāt ii and iv.42 7.1.4 Concluding Remarks on the Metaphysical Hypotheses Let us summarize what has been set forth so far by reflecting on the overall purpose of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7. What Avicenna has accomplished in the course of these two difficult chapters is a contentious issue for contemporary scholars; our exegesis has put forth the following contentions. First, Avicenna definitely does not intend to or even attempt to demonstrate the existence of God anywhere in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8; rather, God’s existence is not established until Ilāhiyyāt viii.3. Second, what he does seek to do is clearly laid out in the introductory comments we have examined from the beginning of Ilāhiyyāt i.4 and Ilāhiyyāt i.6 and in the closing remarks of Ilāhiyyāt i.7. What Avicenna is doing is establishing and verifying the properties of necessary existence and possible existence, and he does this by drawing on the primary notions and various common notions to form the basic metaphysical propositions of primary assent, and then defends them by way of numerous modus tollens and reductio ad absurdum arguments.43 In other words, Avicenna does not demonstrate that these properties belong to necessary and possible existence, they are admitted from the beginning as self-evident; he then shows that contradictory, impossible, or absurd consequences follow when these propositions are denied. This 42 43

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.2–4; iv.1.5 [172]. Cf. Lizzini, Form and Matter; idem, Order of Possibles; McGinnis, “Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility and Potential in Avicenna and Aquinas.” I have examined these points at length in De Haan, “Where does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?”

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is the way one establishes primary principles of assent, and this is why we have argued his aim in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 is to present and defend the hypotheses or proper scientific principles of assent that belong to the science of metaphysics. In the course of Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 Avicenna introduces and verifies the following hypotheses and theses, all of which are based upon the fundamental primary hypothesis that “existence is either necessary existence in itself or possible existence in itself.” Theses

Introduced

PE1 – possible existence in itself has a cause PE2 – possible existence in itself is rendered necessary existence through another by its cause PE3 – possible existence is composite NE1 – necessary existence in itself has no cause NE2 – necessary existence in itself is a necessary existence in every respect (and so it is not dependent on relation, neither changing, nor multiple) NE3 – necessary existence in itself has no equivalent NE4 – necessary existence in itself cannot be composite in any way, it is not composed of multiplicity NE5 – the true-nature of necessary existence in itself cannot be shared by another in any way

i.6.2 [37]

i.6.4–6 [38–9]

i.6.5–6 [38]

i.6.5–6 [38–9]

i.7.14 [47]

i.7.14 [47]

i.6.2 [37]

i.6.3 [38]

i.6.2 [37]

Addressed

N/A

i.6.2 [37]

i.6.7–13 [39–42]

i.6.2 [37]

i.7.1–13 [44–47]

i.6.2 [37]

i.7.1–13 [44–47]

If we reduce these propositions to their essentials, we can identify two primary hypotheses that pertain to all possible existents. First, every possible existence

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in itself that is necessary existence through another is caused. Second, every possible existence in itself that is necessary existence through another is composite. Or even more to the point: all possible existents are composite and their necessary existence is caused by another. For the necessary existent we can state: the necessary existence in itself is uncaused, is necessary existence in every respect, is peerless, and is absolutely one, unique, and simple. In short, the unique necessary existent is uncaused, peerless, and completely simple. Many of Avicenna’s interpreters have overlooked the importance of the metaphysical hypotheses verified in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and the central role they perform in governing the doctrines demonstrated throughout his metaphysics. For instance, these hypotheses are utilized as soon as the first chapter of the second book. Ilāhiyyāt ii commences his investigation into the objects of enquiry concerning the quasi-species of being, namely, Ilāhiyyāt ii.1’s account of the universal division of the category of substance. Just before presenting his own Porphyrian tree of the multitudinous divisions of the category of substance, Avicenna stops to consider whether substances are necessary existents or possible existents. To answer this question he appeals to Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s presentation of the metaphysical hypotheses. You have known from the properties belonging to the necessary of existence that the necessary of existence can only be one and that that which has parts, or that which is equivalent to the existence [of that which has parts], cannot be the necessary of existence. From this it becomes known that this compound {i.e., physical substance} and these parts {i.e., matter and form} are all, in themselves, possible in existence and that they necessarily have a cause that necessitates their existence.44 Based on the passages we have just examined it should be evident that not only does Avicenna work out his well-known doctrine of the distinction and composition of existence and essence in terms of the primary notions being and thing in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, as many of his readers have accurately recognized, but he also clearly elaborates it and verifies it further via the metaphysical hypotheses that he generates on the basis of the primary notion necessary, which signifies that which is/has the invariance of existence and necessary existence. In short, any interpretation of Avicenna’s doctrine of being—especially as it pertains to the ontologically crucial doctrine of the real distinction and composition of essence and existence—that omits the primary notion necessary and the primary hypotheses concerning necessary existence and possible existence, has 44

Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.9 [60].

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completely overlooked what I will argue in the final chapters is the most salient feature of his doctrine of being and the most essential piece to the puzzle of how he brings us from being qua being to the divine necessary existence in itself. This is because, as Bertolacci has noted, for Avicenna, existence, “is always necessary. Thus, existence is equated with the ‘necessity of existence’ (wujūb al-wujūd)….”45 All beings exist, and because they exist they are necessary, either in themselves or through another. Indeed, what emerges from Avicenna’s verification of his metaphysical hypotheses is that the “invariance of existence” from Ilāhiyyāt i.5 and “necessary existence” from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 are interchangeable intensions that are indicated by the primary notion necessary. Avicenna makes this explicit in Ilāhiyyāt i.7. «a» The true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of necessary existence (wujūb al-wujūd) is nothing else than the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd) itself. «b» [It is] not like the true-nature of animality, which is a meaning other than the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd), of which existence (wujūd) is an inseparable concomitant or [that which] supervenes on it, as you know.46 Hence, as Bertolacci points out, “‘Necessity of existence’ is identified with ‘assuredness of existence’ {i.e., invariance of existence,} in section [a], and this latter is mentioned as synonym of ‘existence’ in section [b] – along the lines of Avicenna’s famous theory of existence as ‘concomitant’ (lāzim) or ‘thing supervening’ (dāẖil ʿalā) to essence {i.e., its true-nature} – thus positing a transitive identity between necessity of existence and existence.”47 The overall ontological ramifications of these identifications will be explored at length in the final chapters, but they already make clear the ontological weight Avicenna assigns to the primary notion necessary and the primary hypotheses he generates from it. Even when he describes a cause as actualizing the existence in a possible existence in itself, the actual existence is always specified and subordinated to the priority that Avicenna gives to the necessity of existence in his doctrine of being. Avicenna’s identification of the “invariance of existence through another” and the “necessity of existence through another” as meanings or intensions bound up with the primary notion necessary also provides additional

45 46 47

Bertolacci, Necessary, 49. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.6 [45: 9–11] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Necessary, 49). Bertolacci, Necessary, 49.

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elucidation of our earlier account of the way the necessary’s intension discloses an extrinsic construal of existence for all possible existents.48 This is because to call any possible existent necessary means that it has existence and that its existence is the same as its invariance of existence, but it does not have its invariance of existence or its necessity of existence in itself; rather, the necessity of its existence is an effect that is caused by another. In other words, when it comes to possible existents, the primary notion being (mawjūd) signifies the way a possible existent has its existence achieved and stabilized in itself. The necessary (wājib) also indicates to the very same entitative principle of existence of the very same possible existent, yet it construes this existence in causal terms. This is because the necessary as applied to a possible existent means that this entity only has its necessary existence, that is, its necessary existence is through another. Again, being construes an entity’s existence in such a way that we can simply consider the entity in itself, that is, intrinsically. But when we call the same possible existent a necessary entity, the very signification of the necessary forces us to construe the existence of this entity in terms of an effect that it necessarily receives from another, that is, from an extrinsic cause. And this is what it means to say that the necessary (wājib) signifies the existence of an entity according to an extrinsic construal of existence, and being (mawjūd) denotes the same existence of the same entity according to an intrinsic construal of existence. Finally, we must briefly address what connection these hypotheses have to Aristotle’s four senses of being. That is, what sense can we make of Avicenna’s contention that the theoretical examination of act and potency is in fact concerned with the more fundamental division between the necessary and the possible? In Chapter 5 we argued that this theoretical examination of act and potency in itself penetrates into a deeper ontological order where we find the distinction between necessity and possibility. For Avicenna, Aristotle’s division of being into act and potency belongs to the more known to us and is more properly treated in natural philosophy. The modal disjunctive of necessary existence and possible existence is a still more fundamental division of being in itself and so it belongs among the first principles of metaphysics. Accordingly, Avicenna’s metaphysical primary hypotheses do not concern the way beings that are pure act are simple, and beings mixed with act and potency are composite. Instead, the analysis of the properties of the modal notions necessity and possibility in Ilāhiyyāt i, 6–7 provide him with his own metaphysical primary hypotheses: possible existences are caused and composite, and necessary existence in itself is uncaused, simple, one, and peerless. 48

Cf. Chapter 6.2.4.

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Primary Axioms

Being as truth and the common axioms of metaphysics and all the other sciences are the two central issues in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt i.8, the final chapter of book one.49 As we saw in Chapter 5, what is especially novel about Avicenna’s doctrine of truth is the way he appropriates Aristotle’s sense of being as truth and integrates it with the axioms, and uses this connection to nest his defense of axioms or the first principles of demonstration into a comprehensive division of the various sorts of epistemological, ontological, and theological truths. In Ilāhiyyāt i.8 Avicenna identifies necessary existence in itself with truth itself, and possible existence in itself—which is necessary existence through another—is equated with being true through another and false in itself. The latter belongs to ontological truth and the former turns out to be equivalent to theological truth.50 Given our last section’s treatment of possible existents and the necessary existent, it should be even clearer now that Ilāhiyyāt i.8’s doctrinal point of departure picks up right where Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 left off. Indeed, Avicenna’s doctrine of truth and necessity in Ilāhiyyāt i.8 appears to have integrated (i) his metaphysical hypotheses (ii) with Metaphysics α 1’s account of being and truth in itself and through another (iii) with ∆ 5’s similar division of the necessary into what is necessary through another and what is necessary in itself and simple. Subordinated to these senses of theological and ontological truth is epistemological truth, that is, being as the truth of propositions or beliefs that conform to reality. Among true propositions, the most fundamental and universal epistemological truth is, for Avicenna, the principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation.51 And Avicenna dedicates the rest of Ilāhiyyāt i.8 to the clarification and defense of this axiomatic first principle of demonstration. Consequently, given these gradations of truth, and contrary to al-Fārābī, being as truth for Avicenna is thoroughly analogical. This is because Avicenna recognizes an ontological hierarchical dependency among real truths, as well as an epistemological gradation and dependency among the truths of propositions. Accordingly, truth as a real feature of things and truth as epistemological, are both analogical senses of truth according to the

49 50 51

For a more detailed examination of Avicenna’s doctrine of truth, see De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.30 [278]; viii.6.4–5 [356]. Avicenna also treats the axiomatic common principles in his Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, i.12–ii.1.

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analogy by way of worthiness and appropriateness and so also, as we will see in the next chapter, by way of priority and posteriority. The primary epistemological sense of being as truth for Avicenna is the principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation. Let us briefly examine not Avicenna’s defense of this axiomatic first principle, but his introduction of the principle and the way he relates it to being.52 The statements {that are} most worthy of being [called] true (ḥaqqā), are {permanently (dāʼimā) veridical (ṣadiq)}, and the most true among these are those whose veridicality (ṣidqu) is primary, {and without} a cause. And the most primary of all veridical statements (al-ʼaqāwīl al-ṣādiqa), to which everything in analysis reduces (so that it is predicated either potentially or actually of all things demonstrated or made evident through it), is—as we have shown in the Book of Demonstrations—[as follows]: “There is no intermediary between affirmation and negation.” This property is not an occurrence to one [particular] thing but is one of the occurrences to being inasmuch as it is being, because of its pervasiveness in all being.53 Avicenna claims that the most fundamental epistemological truth is the first principle of demonstration, which he identifies with the axiom: “There is no middle between affirmation and negation.” He describes this principle as a property of being qua being, for it does not merely occur to one particular being but is absolutely pervasive and ubiquitous to all of being. Nevertheless, it does occur to being qua being; it is not identical to being even though it does appear to match its universal extensionality, that is, the principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation, as the axiomatic first principle of demonstration, is taken to be coextensional with absolute being. But as a property of being it occurs or happens to being, not in the sense that it notionally constricts the extension of being, but insofar as its universal occurrence to being adds another intensional layer not signified by being qua being. In short, this axiom is a notional amplification of the notion being; for the axiom is like the primary notions thing, one, and necessary, which are all coextensional with

52 53

For a detailed examination of Avicenna’s account of the axiom or first principle of demonstration, see Houser, First Principle of Demonstration; idem, Suffer. Ilāhiyyāt 1.8.2 [48]. sd 1.8 (56: 67–76). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.20 [309].

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being qua being, and yet occur to being inasmuch as they add intensions not denoted by being as such.54 Avicenna’s understanding of this axiom is also rooted in his existential metaphysics in another way. Truth is grounded primarily on the affirmation of existence, that is, necessary existence in itself or through another. And even though being, existence, and truth are all analogical according to degrees of worthiness, there is no analogy of existence according to degrees of intensity.55 The demarcation between existence and nonexistence is absolute; there is no middle between being and nonbeing, and it is this ontological truth that grounds the epistemologically fundamental principle that there is no middle between affirmation and negation.56 It applies to the whole of being because it captures the most fundamental division of being, namely, the distinction between an existent something and a nonexistent nothing. This brief account of the relation of the axiom as a property belonging to all beings anticipates the second part of the next chapter where we shall treat Avicenna’s many senses of being per accidens. Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have presented Avicenna’s integration of two of the four senses of being with his scientific principles of assent, which complement the last chapter’s treatment of the scientific principles of conceptualization. In the first part we explicated Avicenna’s verification of his metaphysical hypotheses concerning the compositional and causal properties that belong to necessary 54

55 56

“These things which have been subjects in other [particular] sciences become accidental occurrences in this [metaphysical] science, because they are states that occur to the existent and are a division of it. Thus, that which is not demonstrated in another science is demonstrated here. Moreover, if no attention is paid to another science, and [if] the subject of this [metaphysical] science itself is divided into substance and accidental happenings proper to it, then that substance, whether the subject of some [particular] science or of absolute substance, would not be the subject of this science but a part of its subject. Thus, this in some manner would be something occurring to the nature of its subject, which is being, where it would belong to the nature of being to attach to that substance and no other thing, or to be identical with it. For being has a nature that is properly predicated of all things, whether it is that substance or something else. For it is not because [that thing] is a being that it is a substance, some substance, or some subject-as you have previously understood.” Ilāhiyyāt i.8.15 [54]. Avicenna’s doctrine of analogy will be addressed in the next chapter. Similarly, there is no middle between existence as necessary existence in itself and necessary existence through another, or for truth as true in itself and true through another.

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existence and possible existence, that is, Avicenna’s division of being and existence into the transcategorical modal disjunctive of necessity and possibility. The second part briefly expounded Avicenna’s integration of being as truth with the axiomatic first principle of demonstration. In the next chapter we shall examine Avicenna’s analogical application of his scientific first principles to the division of being per se into the categories and his doctrine of the accidentality of existence.

Chapter 8

Being per se and Being per accidens: On the Analogy and Accidentality of Existence In the previous two chapters we explicated the material aspects of Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being with the scientific first principles of metaphysics. This chapter amplifies and complements these chapters in two ways. In the first section (8.1), we explore Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of existence and his application of the scientific principles to the division of being per se into the categories. In the second section (8.2) we present an extended investigation into the many senses of being per accidens or accidental being employed by Avicenna in order to determine the true meaning of his doctrine of the accidentality of existence. This chapter presents the final materials required for us to investigate the crucial questions concerning which primary notions are the most basic and fundamental to Avicenna’s metaphysical enterprise. Avicenna’s treatment of the division of being into being per se and being per accidens in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 is brief. He makes the distinction, introduces an example for each, notes that being per accidens is limitless, and shifts his attention to being per se. Being per se is then divided into the categories of substance and accidents, what Avicenna often calls the quasi-species of being. This division of being per se represents the two fundamental ways in which a categorical being exists in itself. This is why we have claimed that the notion being indicates existence according to an intrinsic construal of existence, for being pertains to the stabilized achievement of existence per se, even with respect to possible existents, such as humans. The necessary, however, points out either necessary existence in itself or necessary existence through another. When the notion necessary is applied to possible beings, it targets their existence according to an extrinsic construal of existence, since their necessary existence is through another, namely, an extrinsic cause of existence, which all possible existents depend upon. In Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, Avicenna identifies substance as the primary division of being per se; accidents are also kinds of being per se, yet they depend upon substance for their being. The rest of Ilāhiyyāt ii.1–4 is concerned with Avicenna’s doctrine of substance, and especially with the verification of the notions related to substance that are assumed as principles in natural philosophy. In

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short, Avicenna uses Aristotle’s senses of being as being per accidens and being per se to introduce his own investigation of the categories, first the notion of substance in Ilāhiyyāt ii, and then the accidents in Ilāhiyyāt iii. 8.1

Being per se and the Analogy of Existence

Before we can turn to the actual divisions of being per se into substance and accidents, and their respective ways of being, we must first attend to a fundamental doctrine concerning the way being, and in particular, being per se is divided, with respect to existence. This brings us to Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of being, for it is impossible to provide a perspicuous exposition of his application of existence to the division of being per se without first appreciating his account of the many modes of predication found between pure univocity and pure equivocation.1 We have already seen evidence of Avicenna’s doctrine that being and the other primary notions can be divided into the categories according to priority and posteriority, but we have not yet come to terms with what this means. Here are three representative passages from the Ilāhiyyāt: Although being (mawjūd), as you have known, is not a genus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaning in which convergence occurs (maʿnā muttafaq fīhi) by means of priority and posteriority. The first thing to which it belongs is the quiddity (māhiyya), which is substance (jawhar), then to what comes after it. Insofar as it 1 The doctrine of the analogy of being remains a contentious topic in Avicennian scholarship. Some scholars take the position that Avicenna does not hold that being and existence are analogical, but instead hold that being is univocal, loosely univocal, not so equivocal as to be equivocal by chance, is systematically ambiguous, or is a form of transcendental modulation. Other scholars maintain that Avicenna does hold being is analogical. It seems to me that many of the major differences among these distinct interpretations are terminological, not doctrinal. It is outside the scope of the present study to examine and respond to these various interpretations and disputes; instead, I present my own interpretation of the relevant texts which I think justifies describing Avicenna’s doctrine of existence as analogical. For studies on these topics, see Bertolacci, Reception, 386–390; idem, Ontologization of Logic; 30–31; Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (tashîk alwujûd, analogia entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources,” (Henceforth: Transcendental Modulation); Wolfson, “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 163, n. 35; Druart, “Ibn Sīnā and the Ambiguity of Being’s Univocity;” Ešots, “The Principle of the Systematic Ambiguity of Existence in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra,” (Henceforth: Systematic Ambiguity of Existence); De Haan, Analogy of Being.

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[has] one meaning, in the manner to which we have alluded, accidents that are proper to it adhere to it, as we have clarified before. Therefore it has one science encharged with studying it, as everything that is healthy has one science [encharged with studying it].2 The one (wāḥid) may correspond with being (mawjūd) in that the one, like being, is said of each one of the categories. But the meaning of the two differs, as you have known. They agree in that neither of them designates the essence (jawhar) of any one thing.3 Just as being (mawjūd) and the one (wāḥid) are among the things that are common to [all] the categories, but according to priority and posteriority, the case is also similar with things (ašyāʾ) that have quiddity and definition, for this is not on the same level in all things.4 Taken together we get the following vision: being—as well as the other primary notions—is not a genus and it is not predicated equally or univocally of what is beneath it, namely, the categories of substance and accidents, which are genera that are predicated equally or univocally of what is beneath them. So if being is not a genus and is not predicated univocally, how else should we construe it? Avicenna notes it has a convergent or shared meaning with respect to its application to the categories according to priority and posteriority. Whatever this convergent or coincident signification is, it is primarily applied to the quiddity of substance (jawhar) prior to its secondary or derivative application to the other categories. Still this shared meaning does have some unified and convergent meaning notwithstanding its diverse application to these distinct instances, and it is also capable of taking on additional intensional layers of meaning, yet without changing its extension, such as thing, one, necessary, other proper accidents, and the principle of excluded middle. Nonetheless, despite such diversity of notional amplifications being somehow retains one meaning that is neither generically nor equally applied to all entities, such that it has a unified application to various matters in the science of metaphysics.

2 Ilāhiyyāt i.5.22 [34–35] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Reception, 387–388). 3 Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.20 [103] (mod. trans.) Like Marmura, Bertolacci also takes jawhar here to mean “essence,” not “substance.” Cf. Bertolacci, “Essence and Existence,” 274, n. 22. 4 Ilāhiyyāt v.8.1 [243] (mod. trans.). Cf. Bertolacci, Necessary, 38, n. 24; Wisnovsky, Thingness, 158.

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This, we are told, is similar to the way health is applied to everything in the one science of health—which is a clear allusion to Aristotle’s doctrine of pros hen equivocation from Metaphysics Γ 2. What is the unified meaning that belongs to being, and yet is applied by priority and posteriority to all the categorical divisions of being? Furthermore, what are the corresponding meanings for the primary notions thing, one, and necessary, which also share this kind of priority and posteriority with being? Avicenna’s answer to the first question is quite clear. With respect to the universal variety of topics addressed in metaphysics: It is impossible to posit for them a common subject other than being (mawjūd) of which they would all constitute the states and accidental circumstances. For some of them are substances, some are quantities, and some are other categories. No ascertainable meaning can be common to all of them other than the true meaning of existence (wujūd).5 Like absolute being, all of the primary notions have a neutrally nonmaterial intension that is antecedent to any division into the categories and is prior to any notional amplification or constriction by other common notions or causal principles.6 In the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt, being denotes that which has existence, thing signifies that which has quiddity, one means that which is indivisible, and the necessary signifies the invariance of existence. Since each of these intensions of the primary notions is applied to the division of being per se into categories according to priority and posteriority, we shall examine Avicenna’s extended treatment of the various ways of predicating existence (wujūd) and take it as a representative case that can be applied mutatis mutandis to the other intensions of the primary notions. 8.1.1 The Analogy of Existence Avicenna provides a careful exposition of the ways existence (wujūd) is predicated in his Book of Categories in the Logic of the Healing. Let us begin with his divisions of the modes of predication that are not univocal.7 5 Ilāhiyyāt i.2.10 [12]. 6 Recall, that in Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15] existence and unity are said to be the most universal intensions and in Ilāhiyyāt i.2.19 [16] existence is analogically applied to four distinct ways of being connected or independent from matter. 7 This passage from Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10–11] is translated and discussed in both Bertolacci, Ontologization of Logic, 41–49 and Treiger, Transcendental

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Concerning all that is not [predicated] univocally (ʿalā sabīl at-tawāṭuʾ) one says that it is [predicated] as a shared name (bi-ttifāq al-ism). [This type of predication] is divided into three classes, since the intended meaning is either (1) one and the same, albeit different in another way; or (2) not one [and the same], but with some similarity between the two [meanings]; or (3) not one and the same without there being any similarity between the two [meanings].8 Avicenna distinguishes predications by way of a pure univocal (ʿalā sabīl attawāṭu’) name from those by a shared name (bi-ttifāq al-ism). He identifies three non-univocal forms of predication that all employ a shared name in distinct ways. I designate these three modes of non-univocal predication of a name as follows: (1) analogy for ism mušakkik, (2) resemblance for bi-tašābuh al-ism, and (3) pure equivocation for bi-štirāk al-ism. Analogy concerns notions whose meanings are intensionally unified as such, but which are dissimilar in some other respect; existence (wujūd) is Avicenna’s paradigmatic example. Resemblance pertains to notions that do not have one and the same intension, but nevertheless among the diverse meanings there is some shared resemblance to each other, such as the way diverse games resemble each other. And strict equivocation involves notions that are not one and the same in their intension and there is not even any similarity between the two meanings, such as pens that are writing instruments as distinct from pens that are animal enclosures. What is striking is Avicenna’s systematic division of different forms of predication based upon the extensional and intensional unity of univocal and non-univocal predications of names. These divisions are rooted in Avicenna’s appropriation of Aristotle’s so-called semantic triangle, which distinguishes the quiddity of things, from the quiddities as understood and conceptualized in the intellect, and from the linguistic expression of what is understood by

Modulation, 353–358. See also Allan Bäck’s translation, Al-Maqūlāt: Commentary On Aristotle’s Categories. 8 Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10] (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 353). In the Healing. Logic. Book of Dialectic, Avicenna describes mušakkik as “The term, whose concept (mafhūm) is identical if it is considered abstractly, but which [itself] is not identical in all aspects, and which is similar in all things [which are] united by it, is called analogical (mušakkik). This is a term whose meaning is one, but this one meaning is not shared by all referents in an identical way, as it is the case with a univocal (mutawātin) term, where the same meaning is shared [by all referents] in the same degree.” Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Book of Dialectic, [118] (mod. trans., Ešots, Systematic Ambiguity of Existence, 1).

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names.9 Various forms of predication are identified or distinguished from each other based on whether they are united according to the same name, the same intellectually understood intension, or by the same extension to various things. Pure univocity requires perfectly unified intensionality and extensionality, but this is not true of the three kinds of non-univocal predications of corresponding names. The intensional unity found among the notions with a shared name diminishes from analogy, to resemblance, to pure equivocation. The latter does not include any intensional unity, but only a shared name. Diverse analogical notions are, despite their respective dissimilarities, intensionally unified by some central governing meaning that permeates all of the notions with a shared name. What distinguishes analogical notions from notions of resemblance is the absence of any proportionally unified and distributed central meaning in notions that are merely notions of resemblance; whereas this shared unified central meaning is required for all analogical notions. Said otherwise, there is a proportionally similar intensional thread that ties together and semantically unifies the various proportionally dissimilar analogical notions. But this intensional unity is not found in notions of resemblance, which are dissimilarly similar; they lack the added caveat that the entire manifold of similarly dissimilar notions shares some proportionally unified intensional note. In sum, pure equivocal notions are merely accidentally united by the convention of names, whereas notions of resemblance, analogy, and univocity are essentially united by the convention of names. But while univocal and analogical notions are essentially united by intension, notions of resemblance are only intensionally unified by accident. Finally, analogical notions stand between notions of resemblance and univocity insofar as they have more intensional unity than notions of resemblance, but less intensional unity than univocal notions. The essential intensional unity of analogical notions is imperfect and falls short of the perfect essential intensional unity of univocal notions, which applies in the exact same way and exact same sense, to every instance of the univocal notion.10 Let us take a closer look at Avicenna’s doctrine of analogical notions. That in which the intended meaning is the same but which becomes differentiated afterwards is like the meaning of existence (wujūd), for [the

9 10

Cf. Chapter 2.1.1. For more details, see De Haan, Analogy of Being.

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latter] is one in many things but is different in them [in another respect], since it is not present in them in a completely identical way.11 Existence (wujūd) is Avicenna’s paradigmatic example of an absolute analogical notion. This is because existence is a notion whose intended meaning is intensionally unified prior to its application across the manifold of beings to which it belongs; yet existence is also dissimilarly manifested by this manifold of beings. For even though all beings exist, they do not exist in exactly the same way. Avicenna takes it to be obvious that the manifold of beings do not exist in completely identical ways; so even though they are all intensionally united insofar as they exist, they are also intensionally dissimilar in some respect insofar as they exist in diverse ways. In short, Avicenna maintains that the analogical notion of existence is at once among the most common and most similarly dissimilar notions. Like all absolute analogical notions, existence is a meaning that is intensionally united in a more straightforward fashion when it is abstracted or separated from the manifold of being. Taken in this way, it is considered in itself antecedent to its application to the division of being per se or its other notional amplifications or constrictions by added notions that are distinct in intension or are extensionally less universal than existence. Nevertheless, and despite such antecedent intensional unity, existence (wujūd) is not intensionally the same in every way with respect to the diverse instances of existence, but it is similar in all these dissimilar entities. And it is this intensional connection or unity across similarly dissimilar instances that is required for any notion that is called an analogical name (isman mušakkikan). A term whose meaning is the same when abstracted (iḏā jurrida) {from its instances}, yet not the same in every way but similar (mutašābihan) in things subsumed under this term is called “an analogical name” (isman mušakkikan) and may sometimes be called by another name. An analogical term can be [used] in the absolute [sense] (muṭlaqan), as we have indicated [in the examples given above], and can be [used] [in the relative sense].12

11 12

Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10] (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 353). Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [11] (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 354).

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Avicenna distinguishes analogical notions that are predicated analogically in an absolute sense (muṭlaqā) from those that are predicated by or according to a relation (bi-ḥasab an-nisba). Thus far we have been focusing on the absolute sense of analogy. Absolute analogical notions are divided into three kinds: (1) by priority and posteriority, (2) by worthiness or deservingness and appropriateness, and (3) by intensity or strength and weakness. Let us look at these diverse kinds of absolute analogical notions, each of which illustrates for us a distinct way in which analogical notions, such as existence, maintain intensional unity even though they are not present in a diverse manifold of instances “in a completely identical way.” This is because in some {beings} it is present before and in others after, since the existence of a substance is before the existence of all that follows it [i.e. the accidents]; and also since the existence of some substances is before the existence of other substances, and similarly the existence of some accidents is before the existence of other accidents. This is the way of priority and posteriority (ṭarīq at-taqaddum wa-t-taʾaẖẖur).13 The first way in which existence is found in the manifold of being is by way of priority and posteriority, which is the kind of analogy that Avicenna frequently mentions in connection with the primary notions in the Ilāhiyyāt. As we have seen, this kind of analogy is especially relevant to the way being and existence are diversely manifested by the categories, for existence is manifested by and is present in substance prior to the existence of accidents, which exist and have their being in and through a substance. Similarly, some substances exist before the existence of other substances, such as when there is some order of substantial dependency among prior and posterior substances (such as parents and their offspring, or one substance being the necessary nourishment for another), or where there is simply the coincidental priority and posteriority of this tree existing before this human. There is also priority and posteriority with respect to the existence of accidents, some of which exist prior to others, such as a surface, which changes colors or is altered by other qualities. In short, when it comes to the division of being per se, existence is principally understood in terms of being analogically applied to the various categories by way of priority and posteriority. And in each of these cases, what is intensionally unified in the existence of substances prior to accidents or other

13

Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10] (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 353).

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substances, and accidents prior to other accidents is the shared presence of existence in each case, despite the priority and posteriority assigned with respect to these various modes of existing. In other words, there is an intrinsic order according to priority and posteriority within the intensional unity of existence’s manifestation in various similarly dissimilar instances. Let us consider a second way existence is captured by another kind of absolute analogy. {Existence as an absolute analogical notion} can also be different by way of being more worthy and more appropriate (ṭarīq al-awlā wa-l-aḥrā), since the existence of some things comes in virtue of themselves (min ḏātihī), and the existence of other things comes in virtue of another {being} (min ǧayrihī), and that which exists in virtue of itself (al-mawjūd biḏātihī) is worthier of existence than that which exists in virtue of another {being} (al-mawjūd bi-ǧayrihī). Everything that is prior with respect to a meaning is also worthier of it, but not vice versa, for it can be that two things share a meaning that does not belong to one of them before [the other] but rather belongs to both [things] simultaneously (maʿan), yet one of them is worthier of it because it is more perfect and more established with regard to it.14 Existence is not evenly distributed amongst beings, for the exigency, worthiness, and appropriateness for having existence is not the same for all beings. Avicenna’s example of the diverse ways in which existence is distributed according to worthiness makes use of his fundamental distinction between beings that exist in virtue of themselves and those that exist in virtue of another. Clearly whatever exists in virtue of itself is worthier of existence than that which exists in virtue of another, for any being that exists in virtue of itself is self-sufficient and does not depend upon another. Any being that does not depend on another, in comparison to any being that does depend on others, is more appropriately said to exist, and so to deserve existence more. We have seen this mode of analogy applied to the way beings are called necessary in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 (e.g., necessary existence in itself or necessary existence through another) and true in i.8 (e.g., true in itself or true through another), and in the

14

Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10] (mod. trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 354).

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distinction between being per se (which is divided into substance and accident) and per accidens from Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.15 Avicenna also relates this sense of absolute analogy by way of appropriateness to the mode of analogy by way of priority and posteriority. Any thing that is prior with respect to some notion or meaning is also worthier of that notion; however, as Avicenna notes, just because a thing is worthier with respect to some notion does not mean that it is prior with respect to it, as well. This is because two things might simultaneously come to share in a meaning, with no priority or posteriority between them, and yet one of them could still be worthier of the notion “because it is more perfect and more established with respect to it.” As was just noted, substance is prior in existence over accidents, for accidents only exist in virtue of the substance they exist in. Consequently, substance is also more deserving of existence, and so existence is more appropriately and deservingly applied to substances over accidents. In short, a tight connection can be found between these first two ways in which a notion can be analogical absolutely. As for that which differs with respect to intensity and weakness, this only applies to meanings that admit of intensity and weakness (bi-š-šadda waḍ-ḍuʿf), e.g. whiteness. It is [in this sense that] “whiteness” is not predicated of [the whiteness] of snow and of that of ivory as a pure univocal (ʿalā t-tawāṭuʾ al-muṭlaq), and “philosophy” is not predicated of [the philosophy] of the Peripatetics and of that of the Stoics as a pure univocal. We are giving you only well-known examples that should be treated with indulgence, if one has already understood the matter.16 This third sense of analogy by way of intensity and weakness contains an important limiting proviso, namely, not all meanings, including analogical notions, admit of intensification and weakness. Elsewhere Avicenna explicitly contends that existence as such does not admit of such degrees by intensification and

15

16

Avicenna applies this mode of analogy to unity (cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.1.19 [103]) and appears to apply it to the good. Cf. “As for good and evil, they are not, in truth, high genera. Good does not denote a univocal meaning, nor does evil. Nonetheless, evil in some respect denotes in each thing the privation of the perfection belonging to it; [as for] the good, [it denotes the] existence [of such a perfection]. There is, hence, between them the opposition of privation and existence.” Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.11 [306]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.5.20 [289]; vi.5.38–48 [295–298]; vii.3.20–24 [323–324]; viii.6.1–4 [355–356]. Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [10–11] (mod. trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 354).

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remission, for between to be and not to be there is no mediate mode of existence. “Existence inasmuch as it is existence does not vary in terms of intensity and weakness and is not receptive of what is less and what is more deficient. It only varies in terms of a number of [modes], namely, priority and posteriority, absence of need and need, and necessity and possibility.”17 Still there are other kinds of beings in which various analogical notions capture the gradations of intensification or weakness of diverse characteristics. Avicenna also distinguishes three kinds of relational analogies. An analogical name can be [used] in the absolute [sense] (muṭlaqan), as we have indicated [in the examples given above], and can be [used] [in the relative sense]: with respect to a relation (bi-ḥasab al-nisba) to a single principle, as when we apply the term “medical” to a book, a scalpel, or a medication, or to a single goal (as when we apply the term “healthy” to a medication, an exercise, or venesection), or else with respect to a relation to both a [single] principle and a single goal, as when we say that all things {of the universe} are divine.18 The first kind of relational analogy concerns the way things are analogously related to one principle (ilā mabdaʾ wāḥid), such as the way a book, scalpel, and medication are all called medical insofar as they are related to the one principle, namely, the medical art which employs these “medical” instruments. The second kind of relational analogy pertains to being analogically related to one goal (ilā ǧāya wāḥida), such as the way medication, exercise, and a venesection are all called healthy because they are all thought to be similarly ordered to the one goal of bodily health. And finally, there are relational analogies that are analogically related both to one principle and goal (ilā mabdaʾ wa-ǧāya wāḥida), such as the way all things in creation are called divine insofar as they are analogically ordered to the divine being as first efficient and final cause. Avicenna does not address which of these relational analogies concern existence, but his descriptions and examples of each of the three kinds make it apparent that relational analogies pertaining to one principle concern efficient causes, and those concerning one goal are about final causes. Elsewhere Avicenna distinguishes the four causes into intrinsic and extrinsic causes. Formal and material causes are taken to be the intrinsic causes of a thing’s quiddity,

17 18

Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.27 [276] (mod. trans.). Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, i.2 [11] (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 354–355).

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and efficient and final causes are the extrinsic causes of a being’s existence, but especially the efficient cause.19 In short, it seems that existence can be employed in all three modes of relational analogies, for the third mode manifests the way all created existents are analogically related to one and the same divine principle which is the ultimate efficient cause of existence and ultimate end for all beings.20 This exposition of Avicenna’s doctrine of analogy elucidates for our investigation the many ways that existence can be found, conceptualized, and assented to within the whole order of being. First and foremost, he takes existence (wujūd) to be a kind of absolute analogical notion that has less intensional unity than univocity, but more than pure equivocity and mere resemblance with respect to all of the diverse instances of existence. Second, and as an absolute analogical notion, existence is an intensionally unified meaning that is antecedent to any notional amplifications or constrictions, such as its division and application to the categories of being or its characterization by such proper accidents as unity or causality. Third, existence is an intensionally unified meaning that can be proportionally manifested according to priority and posteriority, such as the way existence belongs to substances prior to accidents, and according to degrees of worthiness, such as the way existence is most deservingly ascribed to necessary existence in itself, and is to a lesser degree of appropriateness attributed to possible existents that are necessary existence through another. But existence is not said of beings according to the analogy of degrees of intensity and weakness. Fourth, existence can also be predicated according to all three modes of relational analogies. Fifth, it is noteworthy that in his Book of Categories, Avicenna only identifies the analogies pertaining to existence with the absolute analogies according to priority and posteriority and degrees of worthiness. The connection between existence and relational analogies is not made explicit in this context. Avicenna applies these various kinds of analogy throughout his natural philosophy and metaphysics. In order to understand his analogical application of existence to the division of being per se, we should briefly examine a few treatments of analogy and existence found in his natural philosophy. 8.1.2 The Analogy of Being in Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics Avicenna’s natural philosophy begins with an account of its primary notions, such as form, matter, and privation. After presenting the primary notions of 19 20

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.2 –3 [257–258] vi.5.27–30 [292–293]; Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [A, 265]; Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 5–7 [13–17] (Inati, 121–122); Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.5 [342]; viii.7.13 [367–368].

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natural philosophy he turns to consider whether such principles common to the science of nature are common by equivocation, univocity, or analogy. He criticizes the views of those that hold the primary notions of nature are equivocal or univocal—a criticism that also applies to the most universal scientific principles employed in metaphysics. Avicenna argues that pure equivocation makes all collaborative scientific efforts fruitless, for equivocal terms have no common meaning, and cannot provide the foundation required for any advances in understanding things or their principles. Hence the principles of a science cannot be common by equivocation. But they also cannot be purely univocal because they are applied to the different categories in diverse ways according to priority and posteriority, just like existence, principle, and unity.21 Avicenna also brings up the analogical character of existence in his treatment of the ancient schools of thought, “for example, the one associated with Melissus and Parmenides—namely, that being is one and unmovable, of which Melissus further says that it is infinite, while Parmenides says that it is finite.”22 I quote at length Avicenna’s efforts to render their views intelligible in light of his own position, wherein he makes some important points concerning his own metaphysical doctrine of being.

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22

Cf. “«1» Concerning these three common principles, we should also know in what way they are common in relation to whatever falls under any one of the things in which they are common. The claim of those who say that each one of them is an equivocal term we find distressing, since, if that is the case, then the efforts of this group would be limited to finding three terms for the many principles, each one of which would include a subset of the principles, while the three terms [together] would encompass all. Had it been possible that this were enough, the important issue would have been that, among ourselves, certain terms are adopted as a matter of convention and there is agreement upon them. Whether we should have been the ones to do that or not and instead we accepted what others did, we would have nothing available to us but three terms and would not be one step closer [to understanding] what the principles signify. What an awful thing to inflict upon whoever would content himself with this! «2» Equally, we cannot say that each one of them indicated what is included in it by way of sheer univocity. How could that be, when different kinds of various categories fall under each one of them, differing with respect to the meaning of principles by way of priority and posteriority? In fact, they must signify by way of analogy, just as existence, principle, and unity signify. We have already explained in the section on logic the difference between what is analogous as compared with what is agreed upon and what is univocal.” Healing. Physics, i.3.9 [31]. (my emphasis). Avicenna’s reference at the end is to the passage we just examined from the Book of Categories i.2. Healing. Physics, i.4.1 [33]. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, i.2–3.

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«1» As for the view of Melissus and Parmenides, I do not get it. I can neither state what their aim is nor believe that they reached the level of foolish nonsense that their words, taken at face value, might indicate, since they also spoke about natural things and about [those natural things] having more than one principle—as, for example, Parmenides, who held that there is earth and fire and that from them, there is the composition of things subject to generation. «2» It is almost to the point that what they mean by being is the necessary existence, the being whose true-nature is being, as you will learn in its proper place, and that it is what is infinite, immobile, and infinitely powerful, or that it is “finite” in the sense that it is an end at which everything terminates, where that at which [something] terminates is imagined to be finite insofar as [something] terminates at it. «3» Or their aim [could] be something different—namely, that the nature of existence qua the nature of existence is a single account in definition and description, and that the other quiddities are different from the nature of existence itself because they are things, such as humanity, to which [existence] just happens to belong while being inseparable from them (for humanity is a quiddity that is not itself a being, but neither does existence belong to it as a part). Instead, existence is something outside of the definition of [humanity], while concomitant with its quiddity that it happens to have, as we have explained in other places. So it seems that whoever says that [being] is finite means that what is defined in itself is not the natures that pass into the many, whereas whoever says that it is infinite means that it happens to belong to infinitely many things. «4» Now you know very well from other places that the man qua man is not being qua being, which, in fact, is something extrinsic to [man qua man]. The same holds for anyone of the states that fall within the categories; and in fact, anything involving them is a subject for existence, [albeit] the existence is inseparable from it. «5» If, however, this is not their opinion and they obstinately hold the view [that is foolish nonsense], then I actually cannot refute them. That is because the syllogism by which I would refute their view is inevitably composed of premises. Now, those premises either [(1)] must be better known in themselves than the conclusion or [(2)] must be granted by the opponent. «6» As for the first, I do not find anything that is more evident than this conclusion [namely, that existence qua existence is different, for example, from what humanity is qua humanity]. As for the second, it is not up

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to me to suggest which of the premises these two should concede, since if they can live with this absurdity, then who is to assure me that they would not unabashedly deny any premise used in the syllogism against them?23 This rich text merits close investigation, but we shall only mention four points. First, Avicenna attempts to interpret charitably the view of Melissus and Parmenides that “being is one” in terms of his own doctrines of necessary existence in itself and the distinction between existence and quiddity in beings. Second, in «2» he suggests that they might have understood being (mawjūd) to be the same as necessary existence in itself, whose true-nature (ḥaqīqa) is to be existence in itself and is infinite itself, yet can be taken as finite insofar as the divine is the end or terminus of all things. Avicenna, of course, rejects that absolute being is identical to divine being, but this interpretation of their respective views at least seems intelligible to Avicenna. Third, in «3–4» Avicenna interprets the view that being (mawjūd) is one (wāḥid) in terms of the distinction between existence and quiddity, where there is one proportionally similar intension of existence that is extrinsic to the multiplicity of quiddities from the categories. Existence occurs to these quiddities as an inseparable concomitant; indeed, all of these quiddities are subjects for the accidental occurrence of existence (wujūd). No quiddity or definition of a thing includes its own existence, not even as a constitutional quidditative part, as we saw in Avicenna’s hypothesis concerning the existential insufficiency of the quiddities of possible existents in Ilāhiyyāt i.6.24 On this reading of Melissus and Parmenides, being would be finite because it is itself extrinsic to the quiddities or natures that are manifested in the many beings that all share in being made to subsist by existence. Being in this case can also be called infinite because existence, though extrinsic to quiddity, applies to infinitely many existent quiddities. Fourth, in «5–6» Avicenna acknowledges the difficulty of refuting their views as they are normally understood—something he notes he was asked to do. It is difficult because the syllogism he would employ would be composed of premises of what he takes to be evident in itself and more known in itself than the conclusion or what the opponent need to grant. What is noteworthy here is that Avicenna does not think there are any more fundamental principles than the distinction between existence and quiddity. In short, the intensional

23 24

Healing. Physics, i.4.2–3 [33–34] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.5[38–39]; v.6.6 [232]; viii.3.6–8 [342–343].

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distinction between being and thing that is grounded in the really distinct and composed intrinsic entitative principles of existence and quiddity is a primitive truth for Avicenna. In his later treatment of motion, Avicenna also addresses the ways that act, potency, and perfection, like existence are applied analogically to the categories. He first points out that the transition from potency to act as considered most generally, “belongs to every category, for there is no category in which there is not some passage from a certain potency belonging to it to a certain actuality belonging to it.”25 Later he notes: Even if the expressions perfection and act apply to substance and the remaining nine [categories] analogically, their application to the kinds of motion is not purely analogical. That is because analogy expresses a single concept, but the things that that concept includes differ with respect to it in priority and posteriority—such as existence (wujūd), since [existence] belongs to substance primarily and to the accidents secondarily.26

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Healing. Physics, ii.1.2 [108]. Cf. “There has been a disagreement about motion’s relation to the categories. Some said that motion is the category of passion, while others said that the term motion applies purely equivocally to the kinds under which it falls. Still others said that motion is an analogical term similar to the term existence, which includes many things neither purely univocally nor equivocally, but analogically (taškīk); however, [they continued,] the kinds primarily included under the terms existence and accident are the categories [themselves], whereas the kinds included under the term motion are certain species or kinds from the categories.” Healing. Physics, ii.2.1 [128]. Healing. Physics, ii.2.6 [132]. Avicenna continues: “As for the concept of motion that is, the first perfection belonging to what is in potency insofar as it is in potency—it has nothing to do with [the situation] where one thing called motion is derived from another. So locomotion’s having this description [namely, being a motion] is not a cause of alteration’s having this description. The existence of locomotion might, in fact, be a cause for the existence of alteration, in which case the priority and posteriority would concern the concept expressed by existence, but not the concept expressed by motion. It is just as the couplet precedes the triplet with respect to the concept of existence, while not preceding it with respect to the concept of being a number, for both have a number simultaneously. The triplet does not have a number because the couplet has a number in the way that the triplet’s existence is dependent upon the existence of the couplet: the concept of existence is different from the concept of number, the sense of which you have learned elsewhere. So it is quite likely that, even if perfection is analogical in relation to other things, it is univocal in relation to these [that is, the kinds of motion], just as it quite likely that it is equivocal in relation to certain things while univocal in relation to what falls under some of them.” Healing. Physics, ii.2.6 [132–133].

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So even though existence, perfection, and act are applied to the categories analogically, the more restricted applications of act and perfection to each of the species of motion are univocal, for all kinds of alteration and all kinds of local motion are univocally alteration or local motion, respectively. To summarize: Avicenna puts forward a rich doctrine of predication by way of analogical notions and notions of resemblance which both fall in between the extremes of pure univocity and pure equivocation. His division of analogy into kinds of absolute and relational analogies sets in relief some of the more complex subtleties of his metaphysical doctrine of being, and in particular his understanding of the way existence (wujūd) is analogically applied to diverse entities according to the ways of priority and posteriority and by way of worthiness and appropriateness, but not by way of intensification and weakness or deficiency. The absolute analogies—especially those that pertain to being, existence and the other primary notions and their intensions—are fundamental to Avicenna’s ontological project, but no less important are the relational analogies that are crucial for any consideration of material, formal, efficient, and final causes. These relational analogies are especially critical for the aitiological and theological investigations that establish that all beings are related to the divine first cause as the first uncaused efficient cause and final cause for all possible existents. The importance of these complex and nuanced ways of being and their corresponding forms of predication will become clearer as we move forward to address Avicenna’s analogical application of existence to the categories. For it was necessary that we first appreciate that existence is not said of the categories by way of univocity or equivocity, but by way of analogy, before venturing into Avicenna’s account of existence and its application to the division of being per se. 8.1.3 Being per se and its Analogical Division into Substance and Accident As we have seen, Avicenna begins Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 with Aristotle’s two senses of being as being per se and being per accidens; however, the Vizier reformulates this distinction according to his own doctrine of being. He describes the former as the way an entity exists per se and takes the latter as being the way an entity exists per accidens. Because the kinds of being per accidens are infinite having no per se unity, but include such aggregate congeries as happenstance collectives and random heaps, they can be omitted from the metaphysician’s scientific investigations of what is per se. Accordingly, Avicenna turns to the division that is proper to being per se and whatever exists per se. The most prior of the divisions of beings in themselves is substance (jawhar). This is because being is of two divisions. One of them is being

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in another thing (that other thing being [one] that realizes subsistence and species in itself) in a manner dissimilar to the existence of a part of [that other], but whose separation from that [other] cannot take place. This is being in a subject. The second is the being that does not inhere in anything in this manner.27 Being per se is divided into substance and accidents; both have existence per se, yet in two distinct ways according to the analogies of priority and posteriority and worthiness and appropriateness. This means that there is an intensionally unified notion of being and existence that applies to substance and accidents according to an intrinsic order of priority where substance is first, and accidents are derivative modes of existence per se. Avicenna holds that accidents are beings (mawjūd) in another thing (fī šayʾ ʾāẖar), which is akin to Aristotle’s formulation in Metaphysics ∆, 7. Or, we might say, an accident is a being in a subject (al-mawjūd fī mawḍūʿ), which is similar to the view introduced in Categories 3. While accidents are being in another, Avicenna makes clear that accidents are not in another in the way that substantial parts, such as form and matter, are in another, namely, in the whole composite substance. Finally, accidents cannot exist separate from the subject they exist in.28 Substance does not inhere in any other thing; it is not in a subject at all. Substance is “that other thing,” which accidents are in. In Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, Avicenna notes that substance realizes subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal al-qiwām) and species in itself (al-nawʿ fī nafshu). Here we must take note of Avicenna’s metaphysical terminology. Being (mawjūd) has two prominent synonyms: “realized” (muḥaṣṣal) and “established” (muṯbat). Being means or denotes “established existence” (wujūd iṯbati) and “realized subsistence” (mutaḥaṣṣal al-qiwām); just as thing (šayʾ) means “quiddity” (māhiyya) and “true-nature” (ḥaqīqa). As a being (mawjūd), substance has its “realized subsistence” in itself and receives its existence not in a subject. As a thing (šayʾ), a substance has its “species in itself.” This is because every thing, considered in itself, has a specific truenature or quiddity which is shared by all members of the species. In short, by mentioning that a substance is a realized subsistence of a species in itself, Avicenna has indicated the way a substance is a being and a thing, respectively, and shown us that these two primary notions are principles for the

27 28

Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.2 [57] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.2 [57].

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conceptualization of all secondary notions, such as the conceptualization of the basic intensional features of the category of substance. We should also take note of the correspondence between Avicenna’s “realized subsistence” and the “primary substance” of Aristotle, and the correlation between Avicenna’s “species in itself” and Aristotle’s idea of “secondary substance.” The former pair pertains to what is concrete, whereas the latter pair belong to what is intellectually understood in an abstract fashion. We must, however, be careful not to identify “realized subsistence” with “primary substance,” and for two reasons. First, Avicenna’s notion must be understood in terms of his own existential metaphysics. Second, the term “subsistence” (qiwām) is, like being and existence, broader than the term substance and can also apply to accidents. Avicenna frequently refers to the subsistence of an accident in the substance.29 Hence, the term subsistence should not be identified with substance, primary or otherwise; for like the other intensions of the primary notion being, it is coextensional with being and is transcategorical, and thereby has a much wider metaphysical scope than the category of substance. These qualifications also apply mutatis mutandis to the distinction between Avicenna’s “species in itself” and Aristotle’s “secondary substance.” Finally, we should also take note of the fact that Avicenna does not accept Aristotle’s formulation of substance and accidents in toto. Whereas Aristotle did not distinguish between being and thing, Avicenna does. For Aristotle, substance or essence simply is “what the thing is said to be in virtue of itself,” and this is being in the primary sense.30 But Aristotle’s essentialist and ousiological ontology restricts being too much in the eyes of Avicenna. This is why Avicenna subtly transforms the Aristotelian view of substance and formulates his account of substance in light of his primary metaphysical notions being and thing.31 Avicenna explicitly rejects that the meaning of substance that is a category is that which does not exist in a subject. “This is not the meaning of the substance we have made a genus. Rather, the meaning of {substance that is a category} is that it is the thing (šayʾ) having an established quiddity (māhiyya) whose existence (wujūd) is not in a subject.”32 Avicenna articulates his own

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“If the subject is a substance, then the subsistence of the accident would be in a substance. … [T]he substance that renders the accident subsistent (muqawwam) is a being (mawjūd) and is not rendered subsistent (muqawwam) by the accident. Substance would thus be the one that is prior in existence (wujūd).” Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.3 [57–58] (mod. trans.). Emendations based on Bertolacci, Reception, 496. Cf. Metaphysics Z 4, 1029b14; ∆ 18. Cf. Gilson, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.18 [348].

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doctrine of substance as a category—as well as accidents—in terms of his doctrine of the primary notions and the corresponding metaphysical distinction between existence and quiddity. As a thing, a substance is a kind of quiddity, and as a being, it is the first and prior sense of being per se, which receives its existence in itself, but not in a subject. Avicenna also applies his metaphysical hypotheses to his doctrine of substance. As we have seen, at the end of his initial treatment of substances composed of form and matter in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, he considers whether the per se existence that belongs to substance should be classified as necessary existence in itself or possible existence in itself. Because such substances are composed, and necessary existence in itself is simple—as was verified among the hypotheses of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7—Avicenna identifies such composite substances as being possible existences. “This compound and these parts are all, in themselves, possible in existence and … necessarily have a cause that necessitates their existence.”33 He then applies this identification of categorical substances with possible existents to his universal division of the category of substance. Each substance is either body or other than body. If [it is] other than body, then it is either part of a body or it is not part of a body but is something altogether separate from bodies. If it is part of a body, then either it is its form or it is its matter. If it is separate [and] not a part of a body, then either it has some administrative relation to bodies in terms of moving [them]—and this is called “soul”—or it is free from material things in all respects and is called “intellect.”34 In sum, Avicenna holds that every thing that falls within the category of substance is a possible existent. This includes composite substances of form and matter and immaterial intellectual substances.35 And since all accidents are derivative or secondary beings per se, they too must be possible existents. This is because all accidents are things whose quiddities receive their existence in and through a subject, that is, the existence of all quidditative accidents depends upon the existence of a substance. This means all mental beings are also possible existents, for their mode of existence depends upon being known through the operations of a cognitive power, and operations and powers are

33 34 35

Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.9 [20]. Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.10 [60]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.7.14 [47]; viii.3.6–8 [342–343].

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both accidents.36 Hence, mental beings—like all other accidents—are also derivative forms of possible existents that are necessary existents through another. This ordered division of being per se exhibits the analogical range of the many similarly dissimilar ways necessary existence through another is received by incorporeal substances, corporeal substances, real accidents, and mental accidents according to priority and posteriority. Finally, because Avicenna identifies the division of being per se with the categories of being or the quasi-species of being, and because all categorical substances and accidents are quiddities that receive their per se existence from another, it follows that Avicenna’s ontological treatment of being per se is an investigation of possible existence in itself that is necessary existence through another. In short, Avicenna’s ontological investigation of the quasi-species of being is exclusively concerned with possible existents that have their necessary existence through another. 8.2

Being per accidens and the Accidentality of Existence

We have just examined Avicenna’s doctrine of being per se as it relates to the analogy of being and existence and the division of being per se into the categories. Avicenna introduces his account of the division of being per se into the categories following a very brief presentation of the distinction between being per se and being per accidens at the outset of Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. His account of the sense of being per accidens (bi-l-ʿaraḍ) here and elsewhere in the Ilāhiyyāt ii.1 is remarkably short and vague, despite his frequent use of the noun “accident” (ʿaraḍ), the adjective “accidental” (ʿaraḍī), and the verb “to occur accidentally” (ʿarada) according to a multitudinous array of meanings. Such ambiguities in his use of the term accident have encouraged various misinterpretations of his own doctrine of being. In particular, Avicenna has long been associated with the doctrine that existence is accidental to being, which some of his readers consider to be the greatest blunder of his metaphysical system. That Avicenna does describe existence (wujūd) as accidental to quiddity is unquestionable, “We say: existential–thatness (anniyya) and existence (wujūd) are two things that occur accidentally (ʿāriḍāni) to the quiddity (māhiyya).”37 Statements to this effect are found throughout the Ilāhiyyāt; however, as Bertolacci has shown, Avicenna more frequently describes existence as being an inseparable concomitant (lāzim) of quiddity. The central question of this section is: what 36 37

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.8; vii.2; vii.3. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.10 [346]. (my trans.)

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does Avicenna mean by such descriptions?38 Said otherwise, what does it mean to say existence (wujūd) is an accident (ʿaraḍ) of being (mawjūd); that existence occurs to the quiddity of a thing accidentally? The difficulty with the answers provided to these questions by some of Avicenna’s most careful readers is that they fail to identify and distinguish the wide variety of ways in which Avicenna uses the terms accident and concomitant.39 Indeed, most of his readers attempt to interpret his doctrine of the 38

39

Bertolacci has documented the most relevant passages in the Ilāhiyyāt where Avicenna directly or indirectly treats the relation between essence and its added features, like existence. He notes, “Avicenna only very rarely uses the verb ‘to occur accidentally’ (ʿaraḍa) to designate the relationship of essence and existence. This happens only once (n. 30 {i.e., Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.10 [346], ʿāraḍ – “that-ness (anniyya) and existence with regard to quiddity”}); another case (n. 13 {i.e., Ilāhiyyāt v.1.18 [201:9] (SD, 233:38) amr ʿariḍ / quiddam quod accidit – “to be united to external features, with regard to animality”}) does not regard existence in particular, but, in general, all the features external to essence. The verb that Avicenna most frequently employs to indicate the relationship of essence and existence is rather ‘to accompany inseparably’ (lazima)…. The verb ‘to occur accidentally’ is employed in all other cases to characterize the relationship of essence with universality and particularity and related issues …, rather than the relationship of essence with existence. Moreover, the same verb ʿaraḍa is occasionally used as a synonym of lazima ….” Bertolacci, “The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture,” 256–258. With respect to the first text mentioned (i.e., Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.10 [346:13–347:2] (SD, 401:33–6)), Bertolacci notes elsewhere: “The accidentality mentioned here, however, has to be understood as logical, rather than metaphysical, as its immediate replacement with the idea of inseparable concomitance in sections [b] and [c] makes clear. Section [c] explains the logical accidentality of existence with respect to essence, stressing the status of that-ness and existence as other, external, and non-constitutive with respect to quiddity and essence, and their condition of being inseparable concomitants of the quiddity and essence.” Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 283. While Bertolacci is certainty correct to insist on prevalence of the “inseparable concomitant” feature of existence with respect to quiddity over its accidentality, I do not think any clarity is gained by saying this accidentality is only “logical” and not “metaphysical.” Furthermore, does this also mean the inseparable concomitance is also logical? What is the difference between logical and metaphysical accidentality? Is it the difference between predicable and categorical accidents, respectively? If so, then, as we shall see, this is not precise enough. If it instead means, existence is not really distinct from essence, this is false, for, as Bertolacci notes, existence is “other, external, and non-constitutive with respect to quiddity,” and such conditions are more than sufficient for existence being really distinct from essence, even if they are not really distinct whole entities. If it is only logical because existence does not add another entity to essence, that is true, but his distinction does not make this clear. For studies that touch on Avicenna’s doctrine of the real distinction of existence and essence and the accidentality and concomitance of existence, see Belo, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna and Averroes;” Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Black, Mental Existence; Lizzini, Order of Possibles; idem, Existence–Existent; Marmura, “Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna;” Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; idem, Averroes Against Avicenna; Morewedge, “Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Essence-existence’ Distinction;” Owens,

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accidentality of existence in terms of the properties and accidents identified by the five predicables or the ten categories. Similarly, many of his readers only interpret his doctrine of existence and essence in terms of the primary notions being and thing without even considering the way the primary notions one and necessary might also shed some light on his account of the distinction and composition of existence and essence. As we will see, these hermeneutical frameworks are far too restrictive, and cannot adequately capture the sui generis way in which existence is an accident and inseparable concomitant of quiddity. In this section I draw upon Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions as well as the matrix of logical distinctions introduced in Chapter 2—such as the essential and accidental, constitutive, concomitant, and inseparable—to help set in relief his doctrine of the accidentality of existence. 8.2.1 Avicenna on the Many Senses of Accident Let us begin with the various kinds of accidents that were identified in the course of our investigation of Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions. We shall then identify a number of additional senses of accident that can be found in other texts of Avicenna.40 The first and most general kind of accident belongs to the division between the essential (ḏātī) and the accidental (ʿaraḍī).41 Essential notions are constitutives of a thing, whereas accidentals are nonconstitutives of a thing. I shall call this kind of accident a (1) “nonconstitutive accidental.” Avicenna uses the

40

41

“The Relevance of Avicennian Neoplatonism;” idem, Common Nature; Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, Chapter 3; Rahman, “Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina: The Myth and the Reality;” idem, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna;” Smith, “Avicenna and the Possibles;” Pessin, Proclean ‘Remaining’; O’Shaughnessy, Avicenna on Existence as an Accident. Wisnovsky, Thingness; idem, Avicennian Tradition; Druart, Shayʾ or Res. For a detailed study of Avicenna’s various senses of essential and accidental predication, see Strobino, Per se, Inseparability; Di Vincenzo, Common Accident; Benevich, Fire and Heat, 259, n. 84; 265; Strobino summarizes Avicenna’s division of eight senses of the distinction between predicating essentially and accidentally from Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iii.5. “The eight senses may be summarized as follows—I only give the bi-ḏ-ḏātī side of the dichotomies and omit the examples for the sake of brevity: (1) what is predicated by natural predication; (2) what does not hold of something else for the sake of which it holds of the subject; (3) the more general as predicated of the less general; (4) what is predicated primarily; (5) what holds not as an extrinsic and foreign attribute but as something required by the nature of the subject; (6) what is inseparable; (7) what is inseparable in the sense of constituent (per se 1); (8) per se 1 and per se 2, i.e., (i) what is taken in the definition of the subject or (ii) that in whose definition the subject is taken (the characterization of per se 2 fails to mention the constituents of the subject).” Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 236, n. 98. Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.6–7; Chapter 2.1

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distinction between essential and accidental universals to formulate his doctrines of the five predicables, where genus, species, and difference are kinds of “constitutive essentials,” and properties and common accidents are kinds of “nonconstitutive accidentals.”42 I call these common accidents from the five predicables (2) “predicable accidents.”43 Third is the division between substance and the nine accidents of the categories; I shall call these accidents (3) “categorical accidents.”44 Fourth, is the sense of being per accidens (bi-l-ʿaraḍ) that Avicenna appropriates from Aristotle’s four senses of being and treats briefly in contradistinction to being per se (bi–l–ḏāt) in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1. For the remainder of this chapter I shall consistently and exclusively refer to this kind of accident as (4) “being per accidens.” Fifth, and also relevant, is Avicenna’s frequently used distinction between “in itself” (bi-ḏātihi) and “through another” (bi-ǧayrihi), like in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s account of necessary existence in itself and necessary existence through another.45 To be through another is a kind of accident insofar as it identifies what occurs or happens by something extrinsic. I shall call this kind of accident a (5) “per aliud accident.” Sixth, and related to the last distinction is Avicenna’s account of “per se accidents,” which are attributes that are connected to the subject by its very quiddity, such as evenness and oddness to numbers. I shall call this kind of accident a (6) “per se accident.”46 Seventh, and in opposition to per se accidents, is an alternative sense of “through another” that occurs to a thing extrinsically, either because it is more general, as motion attaches to the “white body,” or because it is more specific, as motion attaches to “being.” For motion is proper to bodies, but is more general than “white body” and more specific than “being;” I shall call this (7) “generic per aliud” and “specific per aliud.”47 Eighth, there is Avicenna’s semantically loose and extended application of the five predicables to the epistemological profile of metaphysics which is divided into what he describes as being like, akin to, or 42 43 44 45 46

47

Cf. Healing. Logic. Isagoge i.8–14. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 12–13 [166–167] (Inati, 57); m. 2, c. 4 [196–199] (Inati, 67–69). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.1. Avicenna identifies various kinds of categorical and predicable accidents in his Book of Definitions §§ 44–45 (kkd, 108). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.1–6 [37–39]. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 14 [168–170] (Inati, 57–58). Avicenna even suggests that “It is [also] possible to give the per se a description combining both aspects.” Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 14 [168–173] (Inati, 57–58), wherein one could even call “essential” the combination of the first sense of essential as constitutive with the sense of (6) “per se accidents,” which we could call the “combinatorial essential.” In other words, there is an additional sense of the per se that includes both the essential universal that is constitutive of a quiddity and the per se that indicates what belongs to a subject in virtue of its very own quiddity, which includes some accidentals. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 14 [172–173] (Inati, 58).

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as a quasi (kāl) genus, species, property, or accident. He treats the subject of first philosophy to be akin to a genus, and the investigation into the categories is described as a “quasi–species” of being and the treatment of the transcategorical disjunctives and ultimate causes are referred to as the “quasi-properties” or “quasi-accidents” or “proper accidents” or “common accidents” of being.48 I shall call this kind of accident a (8) “quasi-accident.” In sum, Avicenna employs at least eight senses of the term accident. (1) Nonconstitutive accidentals (2) Predicable accidents (3) Categorical accidents (4) Being per accidens (5) Per aliud accidentals (6) Per se accidents (7) Generic and Specific per aliud accidents (8) Quasi-accidents Given such myriad meanings of the term accident in Avicenna, it should be clear that the question, “what does it mean for existence to be accidental?” does not admit of an obvious answer. Most of these senses of accident admit of additional qualifications. Furthermore, many of these meanings of accident overlap with each other in various ways; indeed, some are just more restrictive applications of others. Let us carefully walk through each of these senses of accident and determine which senses of accident do not apply to Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence and which senses of accident can be used to describe his doctrine. Based on what we have examined already concerning Avicenna’s doctrine of existence and essence, a few of these senses of accident can be eliminated right away. 8.2.2 The Accidentality of Existence as Nonconstitutive So far we have seen that the primary notions being and thing signify the entitative principles of existence and essence, respectively. Existence (wujūd), for Avicenna, is an analogical notion that is common to all entities. Furthermore, existence is an entitative principle of every possible existent that is composed with its quidditative entitative principle. Existence is said to be accidental to quiddity, but is also an inseparable concomitant of the quiddity. The existence of every possible existence in itself is also its necessary existence through another, namely, its extrinsic efficient cause; and since no essence can exist without its existence, existence must in some way be prior to the quiddity it 48

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.13 [14]; i.2.17 [15]; iv.1.1 [163].

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existentially establishes into being.49 Which senses of accident capture all of these features of Avicenna’s doctrine of existence? And, which primary notions are needed to identify these accidental characteristics of his doctrine of existence? The most famous critic of Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence is Averroes. In its most extreme version, Averroes’s criticism ascribes to Avicenna the view that existence is a (3) “categorical accident.” If {‘existence’} signifies an accident in a thing, as stated repeatedly by Ibn Sīnā, one of the [following] two cases must apply to it: this accident is either one of the second intentions or one of the first intentions. If it is one of the first intentions, it is necessarily one of the nine [accidental] categories, and [consequently] the term “being” cannot apply to the substance and the remaining categories of the accident, unless this [mode of] predication is somehow accidental to [all of] them or there is one genus of accidents common to [all] ten categories. But all this is absurd and unacceptable. According to this [doctrine], if one were asked what each of the ten categories contains, it would be incorrect to answer {“existence”}, but all this is self-evident.50 In the previous section’s treatment of the analogy of existence, we saw that Avicenna clearly rejects that being and existence are univocal. Contrary to what Averroes claims about Avicenna’s doctrine, Avicenna repeatedly insists that existence is not a genus but is transcategorical and applies to all of the quiddities found in the ten categories according to the analogy of priority and posteriority. This is also the reason why existence cannot be another kind of (3) “categorical accident.” Existence is also not accidental in the sense of being a (6) “per se accident” of a thing that results or is derived from the thing’s quiddity in the way oddness

49 50

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.6–8 [342–343]. Averroes, Epitome of the Metaphysics, c. i §1 (Arnzen, 29). My emphasis. Cf. “The theory that existence (wujūd) is something additional to the quiddity and that a being in its substance is not constituted by it is a most erroneous theory, for this would imply that the term “existence” signified an accident outside the soul common to the ten categories— and this is the theory of Avicenna. And then one may ask about this accident, when it is said to exist, if “exist” is taken here in the meaning of the “true” or whether it is meant that an accident exists in this accident and accidents would be found in it ad infinitum, which is impossible, as we have shown elsewhere.” Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, 5th Discussion [Bouyges, 304–305] (Van den Bergh, 180–181).

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and evenness are per se accidents of number. This is because, as Avicenna’s hypothesis from Ilāhiyyāt i.6 contends, the quiddity of a possible existence in itself is existentially insufficient and cannot bring about its own existence.51 It is also evident that existence is not accidental to the quiddity of a thing according to the kinds of (7) “generic per aliud accidents” and “specific per aliud accidents,” for existence and quiddity are both transcategorical intensions that are signified by the coextensional primary notions being, necessary, and thing. Neither quiddity nor existence occur to each other through another in such a way that one is more generic or specific, for insofar as they are the most universal mutual concomitants, they are inseparable concomitants on the same transcategorical level of reality. We are then left with (1) “nonconstitutive accidentals,” (2) “predicable accidents,” (4) “being per accidens,” (5) “per aliud accidents,” and (8) “quasi-accidents.” Because Avicenna tends to use most of these senses of accident in loose and overlapping ways, we shall have to tread carefully through each of them in order to identify in what ways any of them can be used to describe his doctrine of the accidentality of existence. Avicenna’s various uses of the term (2) “predicable accident” make it difficult to pinpoint one meaning for this sense of accident. It belongs to the “nonconstitutive accidentals” side of the predicables along with predicable properties. Predicable properties are specifically unique nonconstitutive inseparable concomitants of the quiddity of the “constitutive essentials,” they are not shared by other species, and they are often indistinguishable from the (6) “per se accidents” that necessarily result from the quiddity of a thing. Because the accidentality of existence is analogically common to every quiddity insofar as it is, and is not a concomitant derived from or resulting from the quiddity, like per se accidents, it is completely inaccurate to describe Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence in terms of “predicable properties.” Avicenna characterizes “predicable accidents” as being “common accidents” and “unrestricted accidentals.”52 So long as we do not take these descriptions of “predicable accidents” to collapse the division of “nonconstitutive accidentals” into predicable properties and predicable accidents, then such descriptions indicate that predicable accidents are common to more than one kind of species, and that they can be either separable noncomitants (e.g., black of cows) or inseparable concomitants (black of crows). Predicable accidents can occur to an entity either as the intrinsic result from the quiddity, or they can be

51 52

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.4–6 [38–39]. Cf. Pointers. Logic, m. 2, c. 4 [196–198] (Inati, 67–68).

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separable nonconcomitants that are brought about by an extrinsic cause, like the “knocked-over cow.” Existence is not accidental in any of these senses of being a “predicable accident,” because is not derived intrinsically from the quiddity in any respect, and even though it is brought about by an extrinsic cause, it is not a separable nonconcomitant of any quiddity. Furthermore, each of these examples of predicable accidents are instances of “nonconstitutive accidentals” that are posterior to their subjects, but existence is never posterior to quiddity for Avicenna.53 In short, existence cannot be a (2) “predicable accident” if this means it is a nonconstitutive accidental that, like (6) “per se accidents” and predicable properties, presupposes and is posterior to the existence of its subject, and is any kind of nonconcomitant separable feature of its subject or quiddity. Avicenna also uses the common predicable accident in an even wider sense that is equivalent to or indistinguishable from the way he uses (4) “being per accidens” and (1) “nonconstitutive accidental” to identify types of nonconstitutive “substances,” such as “the white thing.” Accordingly, insofar as “predicable accidents,” “being per accidens,” and “nonconstitutive accidentals” include congeries, happenstance units, nonconcomitants, and separables, they are indistinguishable from each other, and they do not accurately describe the doctrine of the accidentality of existence. This is because Avicenna repeatedly insists that existence is a necessary and inseparable concomitant of quiddity.54 Furthermore, since Avicenna contrasts being per accidens with his own account of the division of being per se—which applies by priority and posteriority to the existence of substance and categorical accidents—it is clear that the existence of a substance or categorical accident cannot be characterized as a mere happenstance unit. Accordingly, if we are to employ (1) “nonconstitutive accidentals,” (2) “predicable accidents,” and (4) “being per accidens” as terms for three distinct kinds of accidents, we must adopt some regimented distinctions for how we employ these terms. Avicenna’s use of being per accidens is clearly taken from Aristotle’s four senses of being; it is used in such a broad way that, according to Metaphysics E 2–3, it is irrelevant to metaphysics. Avicenna also characterizes this kind of accident as “limitless” in Ilāhiyyāt ii.1, and so is not relevant to metaphysics. Consequently, I shall use (4) “being per accidens” to indicate the widest sense of accident. So even though it captures any kind of ontological 53 54

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.19 [34]; vi.5.27 [292]; viii.3.6–8 [342–343]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.11 [32]; i.5.19 [34]; i.7.6 [45]; vi.5.27 [292]; viii.4.10 [346]; viii.4.12 [347]; Bertolacci, “The Reception of Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture,” 255–259; idem, Essence and Existence; Druart, Shayʾ or Res;

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composition—including “substances” such as “the white thing” or “the musical man who happens to be a builder,”55 as well as the accidentality of existence to quiddity—it is so general and vague that it does not in any precise or accurate way capture the inseparability of existence as an accident. Hence, existence is not accidental in the sense of (4) “being per accidens.” In order to distinguish (2) “predicable accidents” from (4) “being per accidens” and (1) “nonconstitutive accidentals,” I shall employ the term predicable accident to indicate any nonconstitutive and nonspecific categorical accidents of a subject, whether they are separable nonconcomitants or inseparable concomitants. This means my more regimented use of the term predicable accident excludes Avicenna’s rare, but permitted unrestricted use which describes the substance “white thing” as a predicable accident. Because this regimented sense of predicable accident presupposes a prior subject and has been restricted to nonconstitutive and nonspecific categorical accidents it does not accurately describe the accidentality of existence, which is transcategorical. Similarly, because Avicenna’s term the (8) “quasi-accidents” of being presupposes a subject, namely, the quasi-genus of being qua being, the term quasi-accident does not capture the sense of existence as accidental. Indeed, Avicenna’s frequent use of the terms quasi-properties, quasi-accidents, or simply the “proper accidents” or “common accidents” of being, are loose extended senses of the predicables that he employs to capture the transcategorical and analogical relationship between absolute being and the categories, transcategorical disjunctives, and causal principles of being qua being. What Avicenna means is that these quasi-properties and quasi-accidents are either notional amplifications of being insofar as they merely add intensional layers to the term being—like the primary notions one and necessary—without any restriction of the universal extension of absolute being. Or, by adding an intensional layer to being they thereby notionally constrict the universal extension of absolute being, as occurs to being when it is qualified by proper accidents such as many, possible and impossible, universal and particular, cause and effect. Unlike one and necessary, these proper accidents are notional constrictions of being because these notions do not apply to every being as such. Their additions to absolute being always restrict the extensional scope of absolute being to some part of being, such as all beings as particular, or all beings as caused. Finally, Avicenna’s use of the term quasi-accidents of being is a particularly infelicitous kind of accident for describing the accidentality of existence; this is because Avicenna almost exclusively uses the term to describe the way the 55

Benevich, Fire and Heat, 262–263; Strobino, Per se, Inseparability; Di Vincenzo, Common Accident, 187.

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transcategorical disjunctives or “common accidents” occur to being given the epistemological profile of metaphysics.56 Consequently, we are left with two remaining kinds of accidents: the (1) “nonconstitutive accidentals” and the (5) “per aliud accidents.” In order to identify a more regimented sense of the term “nonconstitutive accidental” that distinguishes it from “being per accidens” and “predicable accidents” I shall take this term to mean any nonconstitutives that are not happenstance. So unlike predicable properties and predicable accidents, I shall take nonconstitutive accident in a sense that does not require a prior subject, and unlike being per accidens, nonconstitutive accidents do not include, but rather exclude any happenstance substantial units, such as “the musical builder.” In short, a “nonconstitutive accident” identifies whatever is beyond the intrinsic “constitutive essence” of an item, but could be prior, posterior, or even simultaneous with the essence. This meaning of a “nonconstitutive accident” is completely consistent with Avicenna’s ordinary use of the term accident, which functions as a more general term that includes both predicable properties and predicable accidents. Given these refinements the term “nonconstitutive accidental” does accurately describe the accidentality of existence insofar as it applies to anything nonconstitutive of a quiddity.57 Indeed, Avicenna confirms that he takes existence to be an accident that is a “nonconstitutive concomitant” (lāzim ǧayr muqawwim) in his later work, Discussions (Mubāḥaṭāt). 56

57

Cf. “Since we have discussed the things that [relate to] existence and unity in a manner akin to species, it behooves us [now] to discuss the things that [relate] to these two in a manner akin to properties and accidents that are necessary concomitants. We will begin first with the things belonging to existence, and of these [we will begin] with priority and posteriority.” Ilāhiyyāt iv.1.1 [163]. “What may remain problematic [in this connection] is the question of potentiality and actuality—which of them is prior and which more posterior. For, knowing the answer to this is one of the important matters relating to the knowledge of priority and posteriority; also, [this question is problematic] because potentiality and actuality are themselves among the accidents and concomitants of being {Bertolacci’s textual emendation changes this to al-mawjūdi}, being things that must be known when knowing the states of absolute being (mawjūd).” Ilāhiyyāt iv.1.20 [169] (mod. trans.). “It behooves us now to discuss the universal and the particular. For this is also properly related to what we have finished [discussing]. [These] are among the accidents specifically belonging to existence.” Ilāhiyyāt v.1.1 [195] (mod. trans.). “We have discoursed on the matter of substances and accidents, on considering the priority and posteriority pertaining to them, and on knowing the correspondence between definitions and the universal and particular things defined. It behooves us now to discuss cause and effect, because these two are also among the things that attach to being inasmuch as it is a being.” Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.1 [257] (mod. trans.). Benevich, Fire and Heat, 263–266.

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[§647] If existence were predicated of what is below it the way genus is predicated [of its species], it would necessarily follow that what is below it must be differentiated from one another by a differentia. If this were the case, it would necessarily follow that the necessary existence through itself must be differentiated from what is other than it by a differentia. If this were the case, this differentia would limit the reality of the genus, and the necessarily existent would be combined of a genus and a differentia. All this is impossible. Therefore, the initial assumption is impossible, namely that existence is a genus. It follows, therefore, that [existence] is a non-constitutive concomitant (lāziman ǧayr muqawwim). [§648] Furthermore, because existence is predicated of what is below it by analogy (bi-t-taškīk), it follows necessarily that every being must be differentiated from another being by its essence (bi-ḏātihī), as blackness is [differentiated] from extension. Such two [concepts] do not share a constitutive common [notion] (ʿāmm muqawwim), but may share a nonconstitutive concomitant (lāzim ǧayr muqawwim). As for the case when one of them is differentiated from another by a quality, if this quality is essential then it is a differentia, and what shares this [quality] is undoubtedly a genus; if [by contrast] this quality is not essential, it can be either a property (ẖāṣṣa) and a concomitant accident (ʿaraḍ lāzim) or a common accident (ʿaraḍ ʿāmm).58 Hence, the accidentality of existence can be described as a sort of nonconstitutive accidental, since, according to Avicenna, existence is beyond, outside of, and not included within the quidditative constitution of a thing’s essence or true-nature. 8.2.3 The Accidentality of Existence as Through Another Thus far our analysis of the accidentality of existence has focused on the resources available in Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notions being and thing. The distinct intensions of being and thing illuminate the way in which existence is a nonconstitutive accidental that is analogically common to all quiddities. But there are other features of Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of

58

Avicenna, Discussions (Mubāḥaṭāt), §§647–8, pp. 218–9 (trans., Treiger, Transcendental Modulation, 362). For the background of this later work of Avicenna, see Gutas, aat, 159– 160 [141]; Reisman, The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Mubāḥaṭāt (The Discussions).

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existence that do not seem to be covered by his account of the primary notions of being and thing. The doctrine of the accidentality of existence is not completely explained by saying existence is a nonconstitutive accidental, for we also need to capture in a more exact fashion the priority, inseparability, concomitance, and extrinsic character of the accidental connection existence has to quiddity. A nonconstitutive accident as such is a classificatory taxon that can include all of these additional designations but it also includes their contraries. For instance, unlike predicable properties, existence is not specific to one quiddity, but it is like properties insofar as it is an inseparable concomitant of a quiddity. And like predicable accidents, it is common to more than one species, for existence is common to all existent quiddities. But unlike both predicable properties and predicable species—and so most nonconstitutive accidents—existence is prior to the subject or quiddity it existentializes. It is not intrinsically derived from the quiddity of the subject, but is acquired extrinsically or through another. Avicenna identifies many of these additional features of his doctrine of the accidentality of existence in his Book of Categories in the Logic of the Healing. [a] Even if [existence] were univocal, it would not be a genus, since it does not signify a notion intrinsic to the quiddities of things, but an inseparable concomitant (lāzim) of them. [b] Therefore, when you conceptualize the notion of triangle, and relate it to shape-ness (šaklīya) and existence, you find that shape-ness is intrinsic to the notion of triangle, so that it is impossible to comprehend that triangle is triangle without [thinking] beforehand [that] it is necessarily a shape. When you conceptualize the notion of triangle, therefore, you cannot avoid conceptualizing that it is a shape first of all; on the contrary, it is not necessary that you conceptualize, at the same time, that it is a being. In order to conceptualize the quiddity of triangle, you do not need to conceptualize that it is a being, as you need to conceptualize that it is a shape. The shape belongs to triangle insofar as it is a triangle, and enters into its constitution. Triangle, therefore, is constituted by it [also] externally, in the soul, and in every other condition. As to existence, it is an item by which the quiddity of triangle is not constituted. Hence you can comprehend the quiddity of triangle, while being uncertain about its existence, until you get the demonstration that it is a being, or a possible existence, in the first figure of Euclid’s book. You cannot do the same with shape-ness. What is like shape-ness is one of the notions that constitute the quiddity, whereas what is like the existence does not constitute the quiddity.

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[c] Even if existence did not separate itself from triangle in your mind either, it would nonetheless be an item consequent (lāḥiq) on the triangle externally. [d] Therefore, it is impossible to seek what is the thing that makes triangle a triangle or a shape, whereas it is not impossible to seek the thing that makes triangle a being in the mind or externally. What is essential to something does not belong to it in virtue of a cause external to its essence. What occurs in virtue of an external cause is neither constitutive [of the quiddity] nor essential (although also an accidental [item] sometimes takes place not in virtue of a cause external to the quiddity, but is necessitated and entailed by the quiddity). What is not necessitated by the quiddity, and can occur on account of something external providing it, is not constitutive of the essence. [e] The genus is among the notions that resemble the form, insofar as, by means of it, the notion [of something] becomes a notion, and the quiddity [of something becomes] a quiddity. Existence, on the contrary, is an item that is consequent (yalḥaqu) upon the quiddity, sometimes in the concrete objects, sometimes in the mind.59 Existence is not merely nonconstitutive with respect to the quiddity of a thing, but it also an inseparable concomitant of quiddity that is caused by something other which is extrinsic to the quiddity. This brings us to the kind of accidents called (5) “per aliud accidents,” which occur or attach to a subject through something else that is extrinsic to the subject. Avicenna frequently describes the relation of necessary existence through another to possible existence in itself, that is, the relation of existence to essence, respectively, in terms of per aliud accidents. Furthermore, per aliud accidents explicitly capture the extrinsic characteristic through another that is not specifically indicated by the term (1) “nonconstitutive accident.” It is noteworthy that we cannot account for this extrinsic characteristic of a being having its existence through another as a kind of per aliud accident simply through an analysis of the primary notions being and thing. For the intensions of being characterize existence according to an intrinsic construal of existence as that which is established and realized, but not as that which is caused through another that is extrinsic to both the quiddity and existence of an entity. To describe Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence as a per aliud accident requires appealing to the primary notion necessary and its

59

Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, ii.1 [61:2–62:4] (trans., Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 285–286). Cf. Benevich, Fire and Heat, 264–266.

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extrinsic construal of existence. And as we have seen, the necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence is worked out clearly in Avicenna’s primary hypotheses concerning the causal properties of all possible existents that have their necessary existence through another caused by an extrinsic efficient cause of existence. It is important to recognize, moreover, that per aliud accidents alone cannot precisely capture the way existence is non-quidditative and beyond the essence, as is denoted by nonconstitutive accidents. We need both meanings of accident taken together in order to capture the way the accidentality of existence is a nonconstitutive accident that occurs to the quiddity extrinsically and through another. 8.2.4 The Accidentality of Existence as Concomitance These two kinds of accidents taken together, that is, (1) “nonconstitutive accidents” and (5) “per aliud accidents,” provide us with a substantially more accurate and complete description of the accidentality of existence. Never the less, they still lack the requisite precision needed to capture all the characteristics of this doctrine. This is because neither one of them accounts for the priority and inseparable concomitance of existence with respect to quiddity. In the case of inseparable concomitant “essential constitutives” (such as differences) and “nonconstitutive accidentals” (such as predicable properties), it is the quiddity that grounds these inseparable concomitants.60 But the quiddity of a thing is precisely what cannot be the cause of its own existence. As Avicenna’s primary hypotheses make clear, this is because the quiddity of a possible existent is in itself existentially insufficient and presupposes its existence, without which it is nothing.61 What accounts for existence being inseparable (ǧayr al-mufāraq) and a concomitant (lāzim) of quiddity if it is not derived from the quiddity of a thing? We must first take note of the metaphysical significance of Avicenna’s use of the term concomitant (lāzim) outside the framework of the five predicables. Acknowledging this wider sense of concomitance helps illuminate Avicenna’s account of the concomitance found between being and thing, and so existence and essence. With “thing” (šayʾ) therefore, this notion is meant. The concomitance (luzūm) of the meaning “being” (mawjūd) does not separate itself (lā yufāriqu) from it [i.e., from the notion of “thing”] at all (al-battata). On

60 61

Cf. Healing. Logic. Book of Categories, ii.1 [61–62]. Cf. Chapter 7.1.2.

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the contrary, the notion of “being” always (dāʾiman) accompanies it inseparably (yalzamu), since it [i.e., “thing”] is either a “being” in concrete objects, or a “being” in the estimative faculty and the intellect. Were it not so, it would not be a “thing.”62 Bertolacci points out the importance of Avicenna’s use of the term concomitance here. The infinitive luzūm and the verb lazima in {Ilāhiyyāt i.5.11 [32]} attest that Avicenna regards “existent” {i.e., being} as a lāzim of “thing”, namely, a notion that, albeit not being part of the essence of something is also not a bare accident, but something approaching the status of a property. In {Ilāhiyyāt i.5.11 [32]} Avicenna strongly emphasizes the stability of the connection of “thing” and “existent.” He says that this connection is not interrupted under any circumstance (“at all”), and that it is permanent (“always” …). He also contends that, if a “thing” didn’t exist, it wouldn’t be a “thing” …. This suggests that existence (i.e., the fact of being an “existent”) is a very peculiar inseparable concomitant of essence (i.e., the fundamental ingredient of a “thing”) and approaches the status of a constituted element.63 Bertolacci provides one of the most perspicuous and accurate presentations of Avicenna’s doctrine of the connection between existence and essence. He defends the interpretation that being or the existent (mawjūd) and thing (šayʾ) are inextricably connected; indeed, that they accompany each other inseparably (mutalāzimani), for existence is a “very peculiar inseparable concomitant of essence.” Nevertheless, despite the clarity and rigor of Bertolacci’s careful analysis of Avicenna’s doctrine of being and thing, he does not consider the relevance of the one and necessary to the distinction and composition of existence and essence. Similarly, he does not sufficiently address the variety of ways Avicenna employs the terms constitutives, concomitants, accidents, and properties. Consequently, his interpretation does not break free from past interpretations that attempt to place Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence within the framework of the predicables or categories. For instance, it is imprecise to suggest, as Bertolacci does, that existence as an inseparable concomitant of quiddity means it is “approaching the status of

62 63

Ilāhiyyāt i.5.11 [32] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 267). Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 270–271.

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a property.” This is a metaphor, and like all metaphors it is approaching an accurate delineation of the connection between existence and essence, but is also still too far away from a precise formulation of Avicenna’ doctrine. As we have seen, strictly speaking, “properties” follow after the quiddity of a thing is constituted, and so presuppose that the essence or quiddity is already realized by its existence. If existence were a property of essence, then Avicenna’s metaphysics would entail that essences can be prior to their existence; a thesis Avicenna rejects. Another difficulty is found in Bertolacci’s other description of the relationship between existence and essence, namely, that existence “approaches the status of a constituted element” of an essence. This is problematic for a number of reasons. The first difficulty is that Bertolacci also characterizes existence as “approaching the status of a property,” and Avicenna sharply distinguishes properties from constitutives of an essence. But more importantly, Avicenna explicitly says existence is not a constitutive of the essence. So what does Avicenna mean when he says that existence is a concomitant of essence? In our treatment of his matrix of logical distinctions we saw that the basic meaning of concomitance for Avicenna does not include subordination, but merely means that some item accompanies another. So even though Avicenna prefers to identify the term “concomitant” with the non-constitutive predicable called a “property,” he often observes that it can also be applied to constitutives, even non-quidditative constitutives of an entitative whole, like existence and unity.64 In his Isagoge of the Healing, Avicenna describes existence as concomitant, not because it is a predicable property, but because it is an inseparable entitative principle of any entitative whole. As under a species specialissima (nawʿal-anwāʿ) there are universal subjects although they are not species, like “secretary”, “sailor”, “Turk” under “man”, likewise it is not impossible that, above a summum genus (jins alajnās) there are predicates that are not genera, but notions that are inseparable concomitants (maʿānin lāzima) shared by some of the summa genera, like existence and unity, and like some entities that are predicated

64

“As for the non-constitutive concomitant {i.e., the property}, properly designated by the name ‘the concomitant,’ even though the constitutive is also a concomitant, it {i.e., the non-constitutive concomitant} is that which accompanies the quiddity without being a part of it. An example of this is the triangle having its angles equal to two right angles.” Pointers. Logic, m. 1, c. 11 [158–59] (Inati, 56).

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of a certain number of highest genera (ajnās ʿāliya), as you will understand later.65 Every feature that is intrinsic to a genus is an inseparable concomitant of its species. No species of the genus animal can fail to be a sentient and living being, because these generic features of animals are inseparable concomitants of all animal species. But this does not mean that sentience and living are subordinate to the species horse or are predicable properties of horses. Similarly, Avicenna holds that even though existence (wujūd) and unity (waḥda) are not quidditative constitutives of any essence, they are nevertheless among the most common entitative features that are required for any existent quiddity that falls under the ten categories or highest genera. Consequently, existence and unity are both called inseparable concomitants even though they are not subordinated to quiddities and are not predicable properties of the quiddities that fall in the categories. This wider use of concomitance is corroborated in a remark from the Logic of the Salvation where Avicenna warns against the mistake of substituting these more universal, that is, transcategorical inseparable concomitants— such as existence and unity—in place of a genus in definitions. He states that an error occurs, “when the concomitants [of a thing] are posited in place of the genera, such as ‘one’ and ‘being.’”66 In short, Avicenna indisputably uses the term “concomitant” in various analogous senses that go beyond the more restricted divisions specified by the five predicables; its basic meaning does not imply subordination, it merely indicates that something accompanies another. Consequently, when Avicenna says that existence is an inseparable concomitant of quiddity, he does not mean that it is subordinated to quiddity; rather, he means that existence “does not separate itself” (lā yufāriqu) from quiddity “at all” (al-battata), but it “always” (dāʾiman) accompanies quiddity. But why is existence necessarily an inseparable concomitant that is prior to the quiddity?

65

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Avicenna, Healing. Logic. Isagoge, i.11 [64] (trans., Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 272, n. 20). Bertolacci notes, “The reference at the end (‘as you will understand later’) is to the reworking of the Categories (Maqūlāt ii, 4), where Avicenna discusses the status of motion as an entity external to the categories and common to three of them (quality, quantity, and space).” Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 272, n. 20. Cf. Healing. Physics, ii.1–3. Salvation. Logic, 149.viii [D, 173:2–4] (Ahmed, 138). This is the error that Avicenna addresses in his reformulation of the description of the Aristotelian category of substance, which mistakenly includes being in its formulation, see Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.17–19 [348–349]. Cf. Chapter 8.1.3; Gilson, “Quasi Definitio Substantiae.”

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8.2.5 The Accidentality of Existence as Inseparable Bertolacci rightly emphasizes that existence is an inseparable concomitant of essence, but he does not explain why Avicenna maintains the mutual concomitance and inseparability of existence and essence.67 I would suggest this is at least partially explained by the fact that Bertolacci’s analysis of existence and essence concentrates entirely on being and thing without considering the primary notions one and necessary. But the intensions of being and thing are insufficient for addressing the question of the inseparability of existence and essence. This is because Avicenna’s claim that existence is inseparable from essence does not merely mean that an essence is nothing without its existence. This is of course true, but a deeper explanation can be found by considering the intensions of the primary notions one and necessary.68 To be one is to be indivisible, and a composite entitative whole can only be one insofar as its fundamental entitative principles of existence and essence are united. The one indicates that any entitative whole’s entitative principles of existence and essence are actually indivisible and inseparable insofar as the entity exists. A still deeper reason is found in Avicenna’s doctrine of the necessary as the invariance of existence, and in the hypotheses concerning the causal properties of possible existents. A possible existence in itself is rendered necessary existence through another by an extrinsic efficient cause that necessarily existentializes its quiddity into existence; without this extrinsic efficient cause of existence, possible existents would be nothing.69 Because the existence of all possible existents is necessary existence through another, their entitative principle of existence is also characterized as necessary, albeit, through another. And it is the necessary’s construal of the extrinsic cause of a being’s existence that reveals the fundamental reason why the invariance of a possible being’s existence is inseparable from its quiddity. Without the causal explanation added by the necessary, Avicenna’s account of the accidentality of existence as being an inseparable concomitant of quiddity would remain an unmotivated contention that is not adequately explained by the primary notions being, thing, and one. Because the primary notion necessary signifies the necessity of existence through another for all possible existents, it thereby also reveals why the accidentality of 67 68

69

For a detailed study of Avicenna’s account of inseparability, see Strobino, Per se, Inseparability, 235–255. It is noteworthy that the first time Avicenna addresses this initial condition—namely, that without existence a quiddity would be nothing—is in his account of the primary hypotheses concerning possible existents, which are derived from his doctrine of the necessary. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.4–6 [38–39]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.1; vi.1–3; Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna.”

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existence is aptly characterized in terms of being an inseparable concomitant of quiddity. 8.2.6 The Accidentality of Existence as Prior Finally, the necessary also makes it especially clear why existence as a necessary inseparable concomitant must be prior to the quiddity of a thing. As we have seen, Avicenna holds that existence is ontologically prior to nonexistence, all existence is necessary existence either in itself or through another, and necessary existence is prior to possible existence. Indeed, the possible existent is known through necessary existence, and without the causal role of the latter, the former loses its very existence. And since a quiddity in itself is only a possible existence in itself, without its necessary existence through another, a quiddity is nothing. Consequently, the possible existent’s necessary existence through another, namely, its necessary existence due to an extrinsic efficient cause, must be prior in order for the possible existent to be at all.70 8.2.7 Concluding Remarks on the Accidentality of Existence In this section we have investigated eight distinct senses of accident in Avicenna in order to establish which senses of accident most aptly describe his doctrine of the accidentality of existence. We first eliminated the kinds of accidents that do not accurately delineate the way existence is an accident of quiddity. Existence is not accidental to quiddity in the sense of a categorical accident, predicable accident, per se accident, quasi-accident, generic or specific per aliud accident, or being per accidens. It was then shown that in order to capture accurately all the characteristics that belong to his doctrine of the accidentality of existence, we must combine the features signified by nonconstitutive accidents and per aliud accidents with the signification of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. Accordingly, we have established that the doctrine of the accidentality of existence means that existence (wujūd), considered as an entitative part or principle, in all possible beings, is a nonconstitutive accident of quiddity, because it is beyond the quidditative constitution 70

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6; iv.1; vi.1–3; viii.3–4; ix.1; ix.4. This account of Avicenna’s doctrine of the priority of existence over essence in Ilāhiyyāt is also confirmed by a passage found in the metaphysical part of his later work Pointers. “It is permissible that the quiddity of a thing is a cause of one of the attributes of that thing and that one of the attributes of that thing is a cause of another attribute, as the specific difference [is a cause of] property. However, it is not permissible that existence, which is an attribute of a thing, be truly caused by that thing’s quiddity, which is not existence, or by another attribute. This is because the cause is prior to existence, and nothing is prior in being to existence.” Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 17 [30–34] (mod. trans., Inati, 125).

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of the true-nature in itself. But existence is also related to quiddity as a per aliud accident, since it only existentializes a quiddity through an extrinsic efficient cause of existence. This extrinsic efficient cause necessarily causes the quiddity of a possible being to have its existence invariantly and necessarily, even though its necessary existence is through another. Finally, it was shown that even though existence is a nonconstitutive and per aliud accident of its quiddity, we cannot overlook the fact that, by being accidental to quiddity, existence is also a prior inseparable concomitant of quiddity. With respect to the primary notions, our analysis has also revealed that a complete account of Avicenna’s doctrine of the composition and distinction of existence and essence cannot merely explicate the accidentality of existence in terms of the primary notions being and thing, but must also appeal to the primary notions one and necessary. Avicenna’s doctrine of the distinction and composition of existence and essence can be captured up to a point by the primary notions being and thing, as Ilāhiyyāt i.5 reveals. These two notions, however, only signify the accidentality of existence with respect to quiddity as a nonconstitutive accident. But being and thing do not explain why the accidentality of existence is also a prior inseparable concomitant to quiddity that is extrinsically caused through another. The primary notions one and necessary are therefore required for providing a more complete depiction of Avicenna’s doctrine of being, the real distinction and composition of existence and essence, and what he means by the accidentality of existence. In particular, when the necessary is left out, the characterization of existence as a prior inseparable concomitant to quiddity becomes a mere ad hoc stipulation for the intension of existence. For the intrinsic construal of existence signified by the primary notion being is incapable of accounting for these features of the accidentality of existence, which are precisely the characteristics of existence that are signified by the necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence. The significance of the priority and inseparable concomitance of existence in relation to essence in Avicenna’s doctrine of being is measured by the attention these two facets of existence receive in the ontological, aitiological, and theological parts of the Ilāhiyyāt. In Chapters 9–10 we shall examine Avicenna’s various approaches to the question of the priority and inseparable concomitance of existence to quiddity in the Ilāhiyyāt. By following this line of enquiry we shall also determine which of the primary notions—being, thing, one, and necessary—are the most basic primary notions and which of them is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt. Finally, we must briefly take note of the way our conclusions about the accidentality of existence apply mutatis mutandis to the primary notion one (wāḥid) and Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of unity. As we have seen,

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Avicenna holds that the primary notion of the one, “like being, is said of each one of the categories. But the meaning of the two differs, as you have known. They agree in that neither of them designates the essence (jawhar) of any one thing.”71 Both primary notions are applied to the categories analogically, according to priority and posteriority. Furthermore, “everything that is said to be a being from one consideration is, from a certain consideration, correctly said to be one.”72 Indeed, “every thing has one existence.”73 But being and one do not have the same intension, “Rather, the two are one in subject—that is, whatever is described by the one is described by the other.”74 Their intensional descriptions are distinct, even though they both apply coextensionally to the same entity. In short, the intension of one notionally amplifies being, since, prior to any notional constrictions, being means that which exists and one signifies the actual indivisibility of that which is. Like existence, unity occurs to the quiddity of a thing; indeed, unity occurs to a quiddity through its mode of existence.75 This is also why, like existence, comprehensive unity or unity absolutely speaking is described as being an accident or a common concomitant (lāzim ʿāmm). But what kind of accident most accurately captures Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of unity? Based on the foregoing analysis of the accidentality of existence, we can also expeditiously eliminate the senses of accident that do not pertain to the primary notion of one. First, the one is not a (3) “categorical accident,” for Avicenna describes the one as applying analogically to all of the categories, indeed “unity is not included in the definition of a substance or an accident but is a relation belonging to a common necessary concomitant.”76 The one is also neither a (2) “predicable accident” nor a (8) “quasi-accident,” nor a (6) “per se accident,” for even though unity does presuppose quiddity and existence, it is both common (like a predicable accident and quasi-accident) and an inseparable concomitant (like a predicable property and per se accident) to all existent quiddities. Nevertheless, unity occurs extrinsically to existent quiddities, and not in virtue of any quidditative determination, but by an existential determination. Hence, unity is neither a predicable property or predicable accident, nor any of their derivative versions as (6) “per se accidents” or (8) “quasi-accidents.” Similarly, the one is not a (7) “generic or specific per 71 72 73 74 75 76

Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.20 [103] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.1 [97]; iii.3.15 [109]; v.8. [243]; vii.1.1 [303]. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303]. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303]. Ilāhiyyāt vii.1.1 [303]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.1 [373]. Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.17 [109–110].

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aliud accident” for it is neither more common nor less common than quiddity or existence. We are left with the one being either a (1) “nonconstitutive accidental,” a (5) “per aliud accidental,” or being (4) “one per accidens.” But as with (4) “being per accidens,” the (4) “one per accidens” is not precise enough to capture Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of unity. Consequently, because Avicenna does take one (wāḥid) to be a nonconstitutive inseparable concomitant of quiddity that occurs to quiddity through another, namely, through the occurrence of existence, it is reasonable to maintain that unity, like existence, is best described as a kind of (1) “nonconstitutive” (5) “per aliud accidental.” Accordingly, this means that existence and unity both add intensions to a quiddity but do so in different ways. Existence adds the intensional aspect of existing to the quiddity of a thing; the intension of existence posits a really distinct entitative principle from the quiddity, and without this existential determination the quiddity would not exist at all. Unity follows on the existential determination of the quiddity and thereby negates its actual divisibility, for the composite is indivisible in actuality. But even though existence and unity are both extrinsic to the quidditative constitution of a thing—insofar as every quiddity is a possible existence in itself—quiddity has its necessity of existence through another, and so existence and unity must thereby be necessary and inseparable concomitants of quiddity. This is why the entitative constitution of any whole entity includes existence and unity with quiddity among its intrinsic entitative features, even if existence and unity are both extrinsic to the quidditative constitution of a thing. Concluding Remarks This chapter has treated Avicenna’s account of being per se in connection with his doctrine of the analogy of being and the accidentality of existence. We have also addressed his account of the accidentality of unity, which follows upon the existential determination of a thing’s quiddity. Over the course of the last few chapters we have addressed the form and material content of Avicenna’s integration of the four senses of being with his scientific first principles and their application to the quasi-species of being. Thus far our investigation has established that a complete account of Avicenna’s doctrine of existence and essence must integrate the intensions of all four of the primary notions: being, thing, one, and necessary. By examining each of the primary notions, this chapter has attempted to present an accurate and precise account of Avicenna’s doctrine of existence.

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To summarize, existence (wujūd) is among the most common analogical entitative principles of any entitative whole. It is composed with the quiddity of all existent things, but it is accidental to the quiddity insofar as it is both a nonconstitutive accident and a per aliud accident of the quidditative entitative principle of any entity. Insofar as we consider existence and essence with respect to the primary notions being and thing, we can characterize existence as a nonconstitutive accident of quiddity. But we must also look to the primary notions one and necessary, for they explain why Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence also characterizes existence as being a prior inseparable concomitant of quiddity. We shall make use of the preceding chapters’ extensive investigations into the scientific first principles and four senses of being in the final chapters’ investigation into the question: what are the most basic and fundamental primary notions in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing?

Part 4 Basic and Fundamental Principles in the Metaphysics of the Healing

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The Basic Primary Notions in Avicenna’s Metaphysics In this chapter we must address which primary notions are the most basic in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. The series of investigations addressed so far have laid the foundation required for confronting this problem. Chapters 1–2 sketched an outline of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science and delineated the two noetic acts it is based upon, namely, primary knowledge by conceptualization and assent. Chapters 3–4 examined the way Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science provided the epistemological profile for his account of metaphysics as a demonstrative science which consists in a subject, scientific principles, and various ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry. Chapter 3 established that Avicenna identifies the subject of metaphysics with being qua being and takes its ultimate goal to consist in an aitiological–cum–theological study of the ultimate divine cause. Chapter 4 presented Avicenna’s doctrine of the scientific principles as primary notions, primary hypotheses, and axioms, that is, the primary metaphysical knowledge by conceptualization and assent. Chapters 5–8 addressed the formal and material aspects of Avicenna’s integration of the scientific principles with his own doctrine of the four senses of being, and their application to the categories. Chapter 5 explicated the formal dimensions of this integration. Chapter 6 concentrated on the material content of the primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary, i.e., the scientific principles of conceptualization. Chapter 7 focused on the material aspects of the primary hypotheses concerning existence as necessary and possible, i.e., scientific proper principles of assent. Chapter 8 attended to the analogy and accidentality of existence in the Ilāhiyyāt. Drawing on the doctrines established thus far, this chapter endeavors to prove that being and necessary are the most basic primary notions in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt for they both point to existence (wujūd), which will be shown to be prior to quiddity and indivisibility, which are denoted by the primary notions thing and one, respectively. The ontological objects of enquiry are treated in Ilāhiyyāt ii–vii and set up the aitiological and theological investigations in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. Because Avicenna’s ontology is only concerned

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with possible beings this chapter’s investigation into the basic primary notions will concentrate on possible beings. By establishing that being and necessary are the most basic primary notions applied within Avicenna’s ontology, we also thereby establish, as the next chapter will make clear, that they are the most basic primary notions for the aitiology and theology as well. This is because the conclusions of the ontology—which are based on these first principles— govern what is established in the aitiology and theology. In the next and final chapter we shall establish that between these two basic primary notions of being and necessary the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt is necessary, for the necessity of existence is intensionally prior to the established existence denoted by being. Our distinction between basic and fundamental primary notions requires a few points of qualification. First, Avicenna does not make any explicit terminological distinctions that concern the ordering among the primary notions; consequently, he does not label his primary notions as being either basic or fundamental. I have introduced this terminology to enrich our exegesis of the way Avicenna does employ these primary notions within the Ilāhiyyāt, a deployment that clearly reveals a definite hierarchy among these four primary notions. In short, my stipulated terminological distinction between basic and fundamental primary notions illuminates the interrelated functions Avicenna ascribes to the primary notions in the central and subsidiary arguments of his Ilāhiyyāt. Second, it is noteworthy that many exegetical debates about the priority of being, thing, and one in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt have presupposed some conception of basic or fundamental primary notions. My distinction between basic and fundamental primary notions makes explicit what has largely remained implicit in Avicenna’s application of the primary notions and in various rival exegetical interpretations of Avicenna’s deployment of his primary notions. This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section we shall recapitulate the doctrine of the primary notions and reiterate the priority of the primary notions over their opposites. In the second section we shall address the way being and necessary can be demarcated as more basic primary notions in virtue of their intensional priority. Said otherwise, we shall present the criteria by virtue of which we can assess whether there is any intensional hierarchy or subordination among the primary notions. In the third section we shall argue that one is intensionally subordinate to the primary notions being, necessary, and thing. In the fourth section we shall argue thing is intensionally subordinate to the primary notions being and necessary. We can therefore conclude that being and necessary are the most basic primary notions in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt.

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The Primary Notions as Prior to their Opposites

Before we address whether there is any hierarchy among the primary notions we should first recapitulate what has been put forth thus far with respect to the primary notions and their opposites. Thus far we have established that the primary notions of metaphysics are the common notions that are first known, the most known in themselves, are the scientific first principles of conceptualization through which all other notions are known (including the opposites of the primary notions), and are the most universal notions. Along with absolute being Avicenna identifies thing, one, and necessary as the primary notions of his metaphysics. These primary notions are the same in extension but distinct in intension, and so, like absolute being, all the primary notions have intensions that are antecedent to any notional constriction by the quasi-species of being (that is, the categories) or by the common notions as quasi–accidents of being (such as prior and posterior, act and potency, perfect and imperfect, universal and particular, caused being and cause of being). As for the distinct intensions of the primary notions, being points to the existence of an entity, thing points to the quiddity or essence of an entity, one denotes the entity’s indivisibility, and necessary points to the invariance of existence of that entity. In short, thing, one, and necessary, as primary notions, introduce notional amplifications to the intension of being without constricting its absolutely universal extension. In the last chapter it was shown that unity and the established existence or the necessity of existence are nonconstitutive and per aliud accidents that are inseparable concomitants of the quiddity of a composite thing. In other words, existence and unity are extrinsic to the quidditative constitution of a thing, even though, along with quiddity, they are all intrinsic to the entitative constitution of a composite entity. Accordingly, being, necessary and thing all point out positive entitative principles or metaphysical parts of an entity; existence is indicated by being and necessary, quiddity is denoted by thing. The one points to a negative characteristic of an entity, namely, its actual indivisibility, which for an entity composed of existence and essence, means the actual indivision of an entity’s existence and quiddity. Consequently, the intensions of being, thing, and necessary point out the real entitative principles or component parts of an entity. The meaning of the one, however, denotes the confluence and actual indivisible relationship between the existence and essence of that composite entity. In Chapter 6.1.4 we established that the primary notions are prior to their opposite notions; this is because primary notions have a greater extension

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and more basic intensions than their opposites. First, the absolutely universal transcategorical extension of the primary notions reveals the subordination of nonbeing, nothing, many, and possible or impossible, to being, thing, one, and necessary, respectively. For Avicenna, every entity is a being, a thing, one, and necessary, but not all entities are nonbeings, nothing, many, and possible or impossible. Second, the intensions existence, quiddity, indivisibility, and invariance of existence—that is, the intensions denoted by the primary notions—are also prior to the intensions of the opposite notions. For nonexistence, nothing, multiplicity, and possibility and impossibility are all intellectually understood in virtue of the intensions of the primary notions. Hence, the primary notions are prior to their opposite notions. This brings us to the question, is there any priority among the primary notions themselves? 9.2

Primary Notions: Subordination by Intensional Priority

We turn now to the principal question of this chapter: which primary notions are the most basic primary notions in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt? To answer this we must first establish that there is a hierarchy among the primary notions. Since the primary notions are all coextensional with each other, their shared universal extensionality cannot provide the distinguishing factor required to determine which primary notions are more basic. Accordingly, we must turn to what distinguishes each of the primary notions, namely, their diverse meanings, in order to determine if there is any intensional priority or posteriority among the primary notions. Each of the primary notions points out a distinct intension, and these distinct intensions identify distinct entitative principles or relationships among the entitative principles of the same entitative whole. By establishing a priority or posteriority among these distinct entitative features captured by the intensions of the primary notions, we thereby establish an intensional priority and posteriority among the primary notions. The entitative principles or characteristics that are prior to the other entitative principles or characteristics are thereby the most basic, and so also reveal which intensions and primary notions are the most basic. To be clear: each of these distinct intensions signified by the primary notions indicate real inseparable concomitant entitative features of the same entity. To establish that some of these entitative characterizations of these entitative principles are intensionally subordinated to others does not imply that any of these entitative features can exist on their own as whole entities in themselves; it does not mean that these entitative features do not depend in

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any reciprocal way on the other entitative features; and, it does not imply that these diverse intensions are mere conceptual or logical distinctions that do not target real features that belong to composite entities. Each of these distinct intensions identifies a real feature of an entity, and by setting in relief the intensional priority and posteriority or subordination among these distinct intensions means that there is a real ontological dependency with respect to the existence, essence, and actual indivisibility of an entity that is intrinsic to its entitative constitution. In short, by identifying the way unity and indivisibility are grounded in the entitative composition of existence and essence—as we shall do in the next section—we also establish the intensional subordination of indivisibility to existence and quiddity, and so the priority of the primary notions being, necessary, and thing over one. 9.3

The Intensional Subordination of One (wāḥid)

The primary notion one (wāḥid) is subordinated to the other primary notions in Avicenna’s ontology. This does not diminish its relevance and universality within his metaphysics; it is a primary notion, but it is also clear that Avicenna’s ontological concern with being, thing, and necessary takes precedence over the henological investigations of the Ilāhiyyāt. The one as a primary notion signifies that which is actually indivisible. “The one is said ‘analogically’ (bi-l-taškīk) of items sharing the fact of {having} no divisibility in actuality insofar as each of them is what it is.”1 Unity and existence are nonconstitutive inseparable concomitants of the quiddities that fall under the categories of substance and accident. The one “does not enter into the realization of the quiddity of any substance, but is an inseparable concomitant of substance.”2 Its concomitance to quiddity, however, does not imply that unity is extensionally or intensionally subordinate to quiddity in the way predicable properties are subordinate to the essence of the species. Indeed, as we have seen, to be a concomitant (lāzim) of another does not necessarily entail being subordinated to that other. For Avicenna concomitance can simply mean accompanying or being together. And because all the primary notions are coextensional, each of their intensions must thereby be inseparable concomitants of each other, that is, they are inextricable conjuncts. This is what Avicenna means when he states

1 Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.1 [97]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.1–3 [104–105]; iii.3.13 [108]; iii.3.15 [109]. 2 Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.10 [106] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.2.20 [103]; iii.3.15 [109]; v.1.18–19 [201].

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that, “unity is not included in the definition of a substance or an accident but is a relation belonging to a common inseparable concomitant.”3 Given the coextensionality of the primary notions the concomitance of unity and existence to quiddity, and vice–versa, is insufficient to indicate any intensional subordination among the primary notions. We must look elsewhere for the distinguishing factor that indicates which primary notions are intensionally subordinated to others.4 Let us consider in more detail the way existence and unity occur to quiddity. With respect to a thing’s quiddity considered in itself, such as horseness, in itself, it is neither one nor many and exists neither in concrete things nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in act, such that [these] are included in “horseness.” Rather, in terms of itself, it is only “horseness.” Rather, oneness is an attribute (ṣifa) that conjoins (taqtarinu) with “horseness,” whereby “horseness” with this attribute becomes one. Similarly, in addition to this attribute, “horseness” has many other attributes that enter it.5 The entitative constitution of a thing requires that it be one or many, but, like existence, unity and multiplicity are extrinsic to the quidditative constitution of a thing. “For, it does not follow that, if a human is one or white, the essence of humanity (huwiyyat al-insāniyya) is identical with the essence (huwiyya) of

3 Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.17 [109–110] (mod. trans.). 4 Hence, I reject the suggestion of Jan Aertsen that Avicenna’s use of concomitance implies being and one are subordinate to thing. “Avicenna’s account of the primary notions left a question open, which turns out to be of importance for the history of its reception. He distinguishes a plurality of first notions, states their difference and identity, but does not discuss their order. Does the notion of res precede that of ens? Avicenna does not give an explicit answer; it is, however, significant that he uses the term concomitans to express the relation of ‘being’ (and also, as we shall see, of ‘one’) to ‘thing’. The term suggests a conceptual priority of res, insofar as notions that ‘accompany’ ‘thing’ are later than that which is ‘accompanied.’” Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions, 29. Aertsen understands his own view to conflict directly with that of Druart, he notes: “Contra T.-A. Druart (n. 21), in particular the claim on p. 130 that Avicenna ‘always gives precedence to ‘being’ over ‘thing”” Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions, 29, n. 27 (citing Druart, Shayʾ or Res). In the next section we shall prove that Druart is certainly correct that being is always prior to thing in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. It is Aertsen and others who are mistaken about the priority of being and thing in Avicenna, and this is in part due to their mistaken assumption that Avicenna always uses of the term concomitance to imply subordination. 5 Ilāhiyyāt v.1.4 [196]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.1.6–9 [197–198].

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unity or whiteness, or that the essence of humanity (huwiyyat al-insāniyya) is the essence (huwiyya) of the one and the white.”6 The quiddity of humanity taken in itself is neither one nor many, “because inasmuch as it is the essence of humanity (huwiyyat al-insāniyya), it is something other than either {i.e., one or many}, there existing in the definition of that thing nothing but humanity.”7 But this does not mean that quiddities in themselves can be on their own independently of existence or unity. Avicenna’s primary hypotheses state unequivocally that quiddities in themselves are possible existences in themselves that do not exist without their necessity of existence through another.8 Again, even though Avicenna’s thought-experiment asks us to conceptualize quiddities in themselves independent from their extramental or mental existence and unity, this does not imply that such quiddities have any kind of being of their own, akin to Ibn ʿAdī’s account of essences with divine or metaphysical existence.9 And just as all quiddities must have existence, Avicenna also maintains that all existent quiddities must be one or many. As for whether it is one or many insofar as this is a description that attaches to it {i.e., quiddity} from the outside, it is inevitable that it should be described as such. But it would not be that [thing] which is described, inasmuch as it is only humanity [for example]. Hence, it would not be many inasmuch as it is humanity; rather, it would be as though {unity or multiplicity} is a thing that attaches to it from the outside.10 This is because, It necessarily adheres to [animal or man] that it should be either one or many, since no existent thing is devoid of this, except that these necessarily adhere to it extrinsically. [Now,] this animal with this condition, even 6 7

8 9 10

Ilāhiyyāt v.1.6 [197] (mod. trans.). On the proper translation of huwiyya as essence in this context, see Bertolacci, Some Texts, 46. Ilāhiyyāt v.1.7 [198] (mod. trans.) Cf. “This is akin to “white,” which in itself has an ‘intelligible content’ (maʿqūl) that does not require with it the conception that it is a garment or that it is wood. If [one of these] is conceived with it, then [66.15] something to which white attaches has been conceived. Similarly, ‘one’ in itself has an ‘intelligible content.’ That it is a man or a tree, however, is something extrinsic to {the} ‘intelligible content’ it has (maʿqūluhu), [something] that attaches [later] to its being one.” Healing. Logic. Isagoge i.12 [66] (mod. trans., Marmura, Universals in the Isagoge, in Probing, 50). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.4–6 [38–39]. See Chapter 6.2.1; Owens, Common Nature. Ilāhiyyāt v.1.8 [198].

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though {it is} a being (mawjūd) in every individual [instance], is not [rendered] by this condition a certain animal–[this] even though it becomes necessary for it to become a certain animal because, through this consideration, it is, in its true-nature and quiddity, a certain animal.”11 The one, for Avicenna, is an analogical transcategorical primary notion that denotes the actual indivisibility of a being. Unity cannot subsist in itself separate from the substance or accident it belongs to. This is because there cannot be an actual indivisible that is simply an indivisible as such, for indivisibility is a negative characterization that presupposes some positive entitative characteristic; there must be an entity that is indivisible.12 Based on Avicenna’s metaphysical hypotheses, we know that such indivisible entities are either an indivisible being that is absolutely simple necessary existence in itself, or are indivisible composite entities that are possible existences in themselves and have their necessary existence through another. In other words, the one signifies either indivisible necessary existence in itself or the indivisible necessary existence through another that occurs to real and mind dependent quiddities that exist as substances and accidents. In either case, the one signifies “indivisible to be” (wujūd lā yanqasim) that is either the indivisibility of a simple existence or the indivisibility of a composite of existence and essence. The latter kind of indivisibility pertains to the possible beings investigated in Avicenna’s ontology. We shall return to simple self-subsisting indivisible existence in our treatment of Avicenna’s theology in Chapter 10.3. Let us concentrate on his ontological account of the indivisible existence of possible beings. All possible beings are entities composed of the entitative principles of existence and quiddity, and it is this composition of entitative principles that is characterized by the one as actually indivisible. Consequently, because indivisibility is not an entitative principle, but presupposes the confluence of the two entitative principles it characterizes, the entitative feature of indivisibility is intensionally subordinated to the entitative principles of existence and quiddity. To be clear, indivisibility and unity are not said to be intensionally subordinate to quiddity and existence because unity is an inseparable concomitant of quiddity; rather, unity is intensionally subordinated to the entitative principles of existence and quiddity, because indivisibility is a negative intension that presupposes the that which is, which is what is indivisible. Hence, because the unity or indivisibility signified by the one is subordinated to the entitative

11 12

Ilāhiyyāt v.1.8 [198] (mod. trans.). Cf. Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna, 87.

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composition of existence and essence—the distinct intensions indicated by being, necessary, and thing—the primary notion one is subordinated to the primary notions being, necessary, and thing, in Avicenna’s ontology. This is why Avicenna holds, contrary to Neoplatonism, that henology is subordinated to ontology. This is illustrated in the way the basic questions if and what are formulated. The question what concerns the quiddity of a thing and is known by conceptualization. The question if pertains to the existence indicated by being and necessary and is known by an assent. Insofar as we investigate what unity or multiplicity mean, we are enquiring into the intension or truenature of one or many, and such questions pertain first and foremost to the essence or quiddity of a thing, that is, prior to the unity or multiplicity that occurs to the quiddities of things. So even though we can ask what is the meaning of one or many, the question what as such does not pertain to unity or multiplicity as such, but first to quiddity and thing, and only subsequently to unity and one. Consequently, with respect to the question what, one and unity are intensionally subordinated to thing and quiddity. Similarly, to enquire into if a being or a thing is one or many, presupposes that it exists. Indeed, the henological question concerning the unity of a thing’s quiddity always takes the form of the composite–if query, “is it one or many?” Any answer to this henological question if assumes that the quiddity exists either as independent or as dependent on the mind.13 Hence, the one and unity are also intensionally subordinated to existence with respect to the question if, which first and foremost concerns existence and the primary notions being and necessary. Given the intensional subordination of the one to being, necessary, and thing, let us conclude our treatment of the intensional subordination of the one to the other primary notions by addressing the question: does unity pertain more to quiddity or existence? Avicenna clearly maintains that the one is a nonconstitutive inseparable concomitant of the quidditative determination of a thing, but it is not a concomitant like a predicable property. This is because the one belongs to the existential determination of a thing; it is an extrinsic nonconstitutive accident and inseparable concomitant of quiddity that occurs alongside the mode of existence that attaches to a thing’s quiddity.14 The indivisibility of the quiddity of a thing that is one—that is, the oneness of a possible being composed of existence and essence—does not get any quidditative traction without existential traction. Unity occurs to a thing’s quiddity in virtue of the existence that belongs to the quiddity, whether it exists in reality or in the mind. The primary 13 14

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.1–2; esp. Ilāhiyyāt v.1.4–14 [197–200]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.7–17 [106–110].

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notion one that belongs to possible beings—whether they are corporeal or separate immaterial substances—pertains to possible beings, “through a unity which is an existential determination (maʿna wujūdī) that attaches itself to an essence or essences.”15 Possible beings are one insofar as they have unity, which, as an intrinsic feature of the entitative constitution of a being, belongs to a whole entity through the existential determination that brings into existence the essence it occurs to. It is in virtue of this existential establishment or realized subsistence of the quiddity that the existing quiddity is also one actually indivisible whole entity composed of existence and essence. In short, for Avicenna, unity adheres to quiddity through existence, for it is not a quidditative determination, but occurs along with the existential determination of an entity. Because unity exhibits this existential polarity, unity pertains more to existence. Hence, the intensional subordination of the one to the other primary notions is due to the subordination of indivisibility to existence and quiddity, and in particular, because unity only occurs to a quiddity in virtue of unity being grounded in the existential determination of a thing’s quiddity.16 9.4

The Intensional Subordination of Thing (šayʾ) to Being (mawjūd)

We have just established the thesis that the primary notion one is intensionally subordinated to the primary notions being, thing, and necessary in the ontology of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. This is hardly surprising considering that Avicenna always treats henological matters in subordination to ontological issues in the Ilāhiyyāt. For instance, the one is the only primary notion he does not investigate in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, and he does not investigate the one at length until Ilāhiyyāt iii. Given this intensional subordination of the one, we must now address a considerably more difficult issue concerning the intensional priority and posteriority among being, thing, and necessary. While no interpreter of Avicenna, so far as I know, contends that the one is the most basic or fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt, there is disagreement concerning the priority among being, thing, and necessary. The scholarly debate centers around the question: is being subordinate to thing or thing is subordinate to being? I have not encountered any scholar that explicitly puts forth the claim of this study that necessary is the most fundamental primary notion. In this chapter I shall only mention the necessary in 15 16

Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.1 [373] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iii.3.13 [108]; iii.3.15 [109]; vii.1.1 [303]. Cf. Houser, Transcendental Unity, 171–176.

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passing, and will instead focus on being and thing; I will compare being and the necessary in the next chapter. Since being and the necessary both signify that which exists—even though they signify that which exists according to two distinct construals, being intrinsically, necessary extrinsically—their intensional priority with respect to thing stands or falls with existence’s priority to quiddity. In other words, if being is shown to be prior to thing, due to its connection with existence, then it thereby follows that the necessary—which also signifies existence—is prior to thing as well. I shall argue that because existence is intensionally prior to quiddity, that is, because the entitative principle of existence is prior to essence, the primary notion thing is intensionally subordinated to being. Let us begin with a brief survey of the different positions taken by scholars concerning the priority of being or thing in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, some of which were already mentioned in previous chapters. Given that Avicenna explicitly states in many passages throughout the Ilāhiyyāt that being and thing are mutual concomitants, a number of scholars contend that being and thing are coextensional primary notions, but because existence is prior to essence, being is intensionally prior to thing.17 Other scholars argue to the contrary that thing is prior to being; two prominent reasons are often given for this interpretation.18 The first concerns Avicenna’s frequent statements that existence is a concomitant of quiddity, which they interpret to mean that existence follows after quiddity and so is posterior and subordinate to quiddity. The second concerns Avicenna’s doctrine of the possibles and his apparent attribution of a specific to be or, as they translate it, a proper existence (wujūd ẖāṣṣ) to essences independent from and prior to their existence in reality or in the mind. Scholars who put forth this second reason for why being is intensionally subordinated to thing, often maintain as well that being and thing cannot be coextensional insofar as there is a realm of quidditative things that are independent from their existential being. Consequently, they contend that Avicenna is either inconsistent or he changed his mind about the coextensionality of being and thing.19 17 18 19

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.5.19 [34]; Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 272–273; Druart, Shayʾ or Res. Cf. Wisnovsky, Thingness; idem, amc; idem, Avicennian Tradition; idem, Islamic East on Essence and Existence; Menn, Averroes Against Avicenna; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions; Owens, Common Nature. These complex issues cannot be succinctly addressed here; however, let us take note of the following difficulties with the second interpretation which mistakenly holds that thing is subordinated to being in the Ilāhiyyāt. First, many of the scholars who hold that being is not coextensional with thing concede that their interpretation is inconsistent with Avicenna’s clear statements in Ilāhiyyāt i.5 that being and thing are mutual

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This second line of interpretation, which takes thing to be prior to being has been discussed at length and cogently refuted in recent studies by Amos Bertolacci and Olga Lizzini.20 Lizzini’s study concentrates on refuting the view that the possibles somehow exist on their own independent from their existence. Bertolacci establishes being and thing are mutually coextensional concomitants in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt, and that being or the existent is in fact intensionally prior to thing insofar as existence is prior to essence. He concludes that Avicenna’s “tendency to underscore the priority of ‘existent’ with respect to ‘thing’ appears to be part of a general strategy that aims at showing that ‘existent’ is the first and most universal among the primary conceptions, and that hence it solely deserves to be the subject-matter of the first and most

20

concomitants. Wisnovsky, for instance, contends that the later parts of the Ilāhiyyāt are inconsistent with Ilāhiyyāt i.5 (Cf. Wisnovksy, Thingness, 196–200). Second, and as Bertolacci has pointed out as well (cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence), such interpretations fail to understand the way later parts of the Ilāhiyyāt—such as Ilāhiyyāt v’s treatment of universals—are related to Ilāhiyyāt i.5, insofar as they attempt to read i.5 in light of v.1–2 or vii.1. But as we have shown, since i.5 provides the scientific principles of the Ilāhiyyāt, we cannot read the objects of enquiry from v or vii as contradicting the very scientific principles it presupposes from i.5. Once we read v and vii in light of the principles from i.5—as Avicenna’s scientific order requires—then no inconsistencies emerge with the doctrine that being and thing are mutual concomitants. Third, not only does this mistaken line of interpretation—which ascribes to quiddities in themselves a kind of existence—fail to follow Avicenna’s scientific order that moves from scientific principles to objects of enquiry, but it also overlooks his account of the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions when interpreting Avicenna’s “thought-experiment” that distinguishes quiddities considered in themselves, in reality, and in the mind. All three of these modes of consideration are kinds of conceptualization addressing the quidditative-what question, and so presuppose that the simple-if question has been answered, and that such quiddities do in fact exist in reality or the mind, but not in themselves. Fourth, as we have repeatedly pointed out, this line of interpretation fails to grasp that in this context, Avicenna’s use of the term “concomitance” does not mean being is subordinate to thing, but simply that being always accompanies thing. Fifth, this line of interpretation also overlooks that, for Avicenna, wujūd is said in many ways, and does not always mean existence, such as the way he describes a sense of wujūd, namely, wujūd ẖāṣṣ, that simply means quiddity. Sixth, the interpretation that takes Avicenna to hold that essences can be on their own apart from existence does not reconcile its interpretation with Avicenna’s unequivocal rejection of Platonic exemplars in Ilāhiyyāt vii.2. Seventh, and finally, this line of interpretation does not adequately address Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence, which reveals that existence is not related to quiddity in the way categorical and predicable accidents are posterior and subordinated to some subject, but that existence is simply accidental to the quiddity in the sense that it is beyond or nonconstitutive of the quiddity and accrues to the quiddity through another, namely, a prior extrinsic efficient cause of existence. For an extended treatment of these issues, see Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Lizzini, Order of Possibles; Druart, Shayʾ or Res. Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Lizzini, Order of Possibles.

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universal science.”21 The present study has addressed a number of issues in Avicenna’s metaphysics that corroborate the accounts of Bertolacci and Lizzini that undermine the two reasons put forward to support the view that being is subordinated to thing. With respect to the first reason concerning the concomitance of existence to essence, the previous chapter’s extensive treatment of Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence, established that, for Avicenna, the term “concomitance” does not necessarily imply any kind of posteriority or subordination. In short, this first reason simply assumes that concomitance means subordination, when Avicenna explicitly holds that it merely means that which accompanies another. The second reason for holding thing is prior to being concerns Avicenna’s term wujūd ẖāṣṣ. In Chapter 6 we established that Avicenna’s introduction of this term cannot be taken to mean that quiddities have their own proper existence; rather, Avicenna is simply pointing out that wujūd is said in many ways, one of which is the specific quidditative to be that belongs to the essence or true-nature of any thing. Finally, throughout this study we have examined numerous passages from the Ilāhiyyāt that make it unequivocally clear that thing is counted among the primary notions as scientific principles of metaphysics, because it is first known, a principle of conceptualization, is most common, and so it is coextensional with being, one, and necessary. Consequently, given that Avicenna explicitly states that being and thing are coextensional, and that the reasons supporting the view that thing is prior to being in extension or intension have been cogently refuted and undermined by the recent studies of Bertolacci and Lizzini, as well as by the arguments of the present study, we conclude that being and thing are coextensional primary notions in the Ilāhiyyāt.22 Let us turn now to the aim of this chapter, which is to establish the priority of being over thing by drawing on the analyses of being and thing, existence and essence provided by this study, especially, in the previous chapter’s treatment of Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence. The intensional priority of being over thing can be established by examining the way the quiddity of a thing depends ontologically on its existence. Avicenna holds that the quidditative part of the whole is dependent upon the existential principle, for the simple reason that without existence, the quiddity is nothing. This ontological dependency among entitative principles reveals a real intrinsic priority of existence over essence and signals the intensional priority of being over thing. Avicenna’s doctrine of the priority of existence over essence underlies 21 22

Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 288. Cf. Chapter 6–7; Bertolacci, Essence and Existence; Lizzini, Order of Possibles.

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many of the arguments presented throughout his Ilāhiyyāt. Let us consider a few of the clearest and most explicit presentations of this doctrine, beginning with his account of the efficient cause of existence of the form and matter in all hylomorphic composites. Avicenna distinguishes two ways in which the form of a thing is related to its quiddity or essence. In hylomorphic substances, the quiddity of the thing is constituted from its form and matter, whereas in separate substances the immaterial simple form of the thing is its quiddity.23 We shall return to the priority of existence over form in separate substances. In Ilāhiyyāt ii.2–4 Avicenna provides a detailed examination of the way form and matter are composed in all hylomorphic substances.24 He first shows that the quiddities of composite substances cannot be without matter or form, because matter and form are inseparable from each other in such composite substances. After establishing that form and matter are inextricable parts or principles of a quiddity, Avicenna then investigates whether form or matter is more basic. To be more precise he asks: is form or matter the cause of the existence of the other? Avicenna begins with why matter cannot be the cause of form. Since causes of form must be in actuality, and matter of its nature is in potency to form and can only be in actuality through its form, it is impossible for matter to be the cause of the existence of formal actuality. Consequently, Avicenna holds that

23

24

Cf. “The quiddity of every [thing that is] simple is the same as itself because there is nothing receptive of its quiddity … Nor are composites [the things] they are through form alone. For the definition belonging to composites does not consist of form alone; rather, the definition of a thing indicates all the things that render it subsistent. Thus, it also, in some respect, includes matter. It is through this that the difference between quiddity and form in composite things is known. Form is always part of the quiddity in composite things, while the form of every simple [thing] is also identical with it because there is no composition in it. In the case of composites, however, neither their forms nor their quiddities are identical with themselves. As for form, it is obvious that it is part of it. As for the quiddity, it is that by which it is what it is; and it is what it is only by virtue of the form being connected with matter, which is something additional to the meaning of form. The composite is also not this meaning but is the assemblage of form and matter. For this is what the composite is, and the quiddity is this composition. Form is thus one of the things to which composition is added. The quiddity is this very composition that combines form and matter. The unity that comes about through both is due to this one [composition].” Ilāhiyyāt v.8.5 [245]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt v.8.1 [243]. Cf. Lizzini, “The Relation between Form and Matter: Some Brief Observations on the ‘Homology Argument’ (Ilāhīyāt, ii.4) and the Deduction of Fluxus,” (Henceforth Form and Matter); Bertolacci, “The Doctrine of Material and Formal Causality in the Ilāhiyyāt of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ,” (Henceforth: Material and Formal Causality); McGinnis, Avicenna, 53–59.

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matter can neither be prior to form nor be its cause;25 “form, therefore, is prior to matter; and it is not permissible to say that form in itself always exists in potentiality, becoming actual only through matter. For actuality is the essence (jawhar) of form.”26 Next, Avicenna addresses whether the form alone is the cause of the existence of matter. Actuality is proper to the nature of form, and so form is prior to matter insofar as it is the cause of the actuality of matter in the composite substance; however, this does not mean form alone is the cause of the existence of matter. Indeed, for any composite substance that is able to generate and corrupt the union of its form and matter can potentially dissolve. Hence, “as regards the form that separates from matter, [with that] matter continuing to exist with another form,” it “is not possible” for the form alone to bring the matter into actual existence. Avicenna holds that matter only exists through the combined efforts of form and that other thing that is extrinsic to form, namely, the emanation of existence by an efficient cause.27 By efficient cause, Avicenna means, “the cause which bestows an existence that is other than itself…. Metaphysical philosophers do not mean by “agent” only the principle of motion, as the naturalists mean, but the principle and giver of existence, as in the case of God with respect to the world.”28 The existence of a form due to an efficient cause renders the form to exist in such a way that it actualizes the matter. In this way the form is a mediator that communicates existence to matter from the efficient cause, while also communicating its own formal actuality to the matter.29 To be clear, the efficient cause cannot actualize the matter without the form, and the form cannot

25 26 27 28 29

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.6 [83]. Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.20 [88]. Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.10–11 [85–86]. Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.2 [257]. “[In the case of] forms that separate from matter to be succeeded [by other forms], that which places [the successive form] in [matter] perpetuates it by rendering that form the successor. In one respect, then, form becomes the intermediary between [this] retained matter and that which perpetuates it, and [in another respect it becomes] the intermediary in substantiation. For its essence is first rendered subsistent, then another is rendered subsistent by it in an essentially prior manner—[the latter] being the cause that is proximate to the thing retained in existence. If the [first form] is rendered subsistent by the cause that perpetuates matter through [the form’s] mediation, then subsistence, deriving from the [celestial] first principles, belongs to [the form] first, then to matter. If form is not subsistent through that cause but [is subsistent] in itself matter becoming subsistent through it thereafter—then [form’s priority to matter] becomes more evident.” Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.18 [87–88].

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actualize the matter without the efficient cause of existence; both the efficient cause and the form are required.30 Avicenna explicates the primary notions of natural philosophy—form and matter—in terms of act and potency. Form is actuality and matter is in itself potentiality, though it can be actualized through another, namely, another form. Form exists in matter, but matter is neither the cause of form’s existence nor of form’s existence in matter; this is caused by the efficient cause. In other words, matter is a potentiality that is subordinate to the actuality of form and the efficient cause of existence.31 But form is itself subordinate to the efficient causality of existence; form does not subsist of itself but by its efficient cause. Existence is thereby communicated to the composite quiddity via the form to the matter.32 Hence, all quiddities composed of form and matter are subordinate to their existence, which is efficiently caused, and makes the quiddity of the thing exist, for the “cause is not rendered subsistent by effect.”33 The subordination of quiddity to existence is made especially clear by Avicenna’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causes, where the former are dependent upon the latter. He identifies the formal and material causes as intrinsic causes that constitute the quiddity of a thing, in contrast to the agent or efficient and final causes as causes of existence that are extrinsic.34 In other words, Avicenna distinguishes the existential determinations that belong to 30 31

32

33 34

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.12 [86]. Cf. “Thus, it is matter that is properly said to exist in itself in potentiality and in actuality through form. And even though form does not separate from matter, it does not become subsistent through matter but through the cause that bestows matter upon it…. {E}very form that exists in corporeal matter exists through some cause.” Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.21–23 [88– 89] (mod. trans.). Cf. “If the form is a cause for matter which it renders subsistent, [this] is not in the manner in which form is a cause for the composite, even if both agree from the perspective that each is a cause of something whose essence does not separate from [such a cause]. For, even if both agree in this, in the case of one of the two perspectives the cause of the other does not bestow on it its existence; rather, something else bestows existence, but in it. [In the case of] the second, the cause would be the proximate principle for bestowing on the effect its existence in act—not alone, however, but with a partner and a cause that brings into existence the cause (I mean the form). It would then render the other [that is, matter] subsistent through it. Thus, it would be an intermediary with a partner in bestowing on that [matter] its existence in actuality. Form would be as though [it were] an efficient principle for matter, if the existence [of matter] in act comes about through the [form] alone. It seems that form would be a part of the efficient cause, as in the case of one of the two movers of a ship…. Form [however] is only a formal cause for the thing composed of it and matter. Form, hence, is only a form for matter, not a formal cause of matter.” Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.5 [259]. Cf. Bertolacci, Material and Formal Causality, 135–136. Ilāhiyyāt ii.4.21. [89]. Cf. Lizzini, Form and Matter ii.4. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.1.3 [258].

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the order of extrinsic causes, from the quidditative determinations that pertain to intrinsic causes.35 As intrinsic causes of a thing, formal and material causality jointly cause the quidditative constitution of a thing, whereas efficient and final causes are the extrinsic causes of a being’s existence. Among these four causes, the final cause is the cause of causes and is ultimately prior to the other causes. This is because matter is only a being in potency, which depends upon formal actuality, but form does not exist without its efficient cause of existence. The efficient cause, however, only acts for the sake of its end, that is, its final cause. In short, “what belongs essentially to the final cause inasmuch as it is a final cause is that it is the cause of the rest of the causes.”36 Hence, according to Avicenna’s division of the four causes into intrinsic and extrinsic causes, the aforementioned ordered hierarchy among the four causes—from material to formal, to efficient, and then to final causality—also reveals that the intrinsic causes of a thing’s quiddity are subordinated to the extrinsic causes of existence. As Olga Lizzini notes, the intrinsic quidditative “constitution of the thing is caused by the causes of its existence (i.e., the final and efficient causes), and, from this point of view as well, one should assert that no essence can exist before its own existence.”37 Furthermore, and as we shall see in Avicenna’s aitiology and theology, this hierarchical order of causal dependency is not only true of the way the intrinsic causes of one creature’s quiddity are dependent upon the extrinsic efficient and final causes found in another creature; it in fact applies to the way the whole created emanative order is a caused effect that depends upon God as the uncaused first efficient and final cause of existence. 35

36 37

“For the agent causes are the causes of existence without being causes of quiddity, whereas the parts of the definition—be they genera, true (ḥaqīqiyya) differentiae or the parts of some differentiae—those are the causes of quiddity. As for the causes of existence, they need not be the causes of quiddity. And therefore the causes of existence—that is the agent and final causes—are not included in the definitions….” Healing. Logic. Book of Demonstration, iv.1 [A, 265]. (mod. trans., Strobino). Cf. “A thing may be caused in relation to its quiddity or true-nature, and it may be caused in its existence. You can consider this in the triangle, for example. The reality of the triangle depends on the surface and on the line which is its side. Both the surface and the line constitute the triangle inasmuch as it is a triangle and has a true-nature of triangularity, as if they are its two causes: the material and the formal. But inasmuch as a triangle exists, it may also depend on a cause other than these [two], which is not a cause that constitutes its triangularity and is not a part of its definition. This is the efficient cause or the final cause that is an efficient cause of the causality of the efficient cause.” Pointers. Metaphysics, cl. 4, c. 5 [13–14] (Inati, 121). Ilāhiyyāt vi.5.31 [294]. Lizzini, Order of Possibles, 261; Cf. Wisnovsky, “Towards a History of Avicenna’s Distinction between Immanent and Transcendent Causes.”

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This priority of causes to their effects is not a temporal priority but an ontological priority due to the per se order of dependence of the effect on its cause. Indeed, Avicenna holds that “true causes coexist with the effect.”38 This is because “the existence of the quiddity is connected with what is other inasmuch as it is an existence for that quiddity … {and} that existence in this respect is caused so long as it exists. Likewise, it is an effect connected with what is other. Thus, it becomes evident that the effect needs that which bestows existence on it per se … {Hence,} the effect needs that which bestows existence on it always, permanently, as long as [the effect] exists.”39 Not only is the existence of a quiddity a distinct entitative principle that is other than the quiddity, but the existence of the quiddity is itself an effect that has a permanent and per se dependency upon its cause, so long as it persists. The coexistence of effects with their per se causes, however, does not undermine the ontological priority of causes to their effects. This is because Avicenna maintains that the order of per se causes also demands, in the final analysis, that “the cause is more worthy of existence than the effect,”40 insofar as it is in virtue of the cause’s prior possession of existence that it is able to communicate existence to its effect. Consequently, the intrinsic causes of a thing’s quiddity are themselves effects with respect to the extrinsic causes of a being’s existence, for the intrinsic causes depend upon the extrinsic causes for their very existence. The extrinsic  causes of existence are therefore ontologically—though not necessarily temporally—prior to the intrinsic causes of the quidditative constitution of a thing. Finally, because the quidditative principle of the composite is clearly dependent upon the existential principle, it follows that existence is ontologically prior to quiddity, even though it is not separable from the quidditative principle. Thus far our analysis of Avicenna’s doctrine of the intrinsic and extrinsic orders of causality has revealed that existence is prior to the essence of a hylomorphic substance. But Avicenna also holds that existence is prior to essence in all possible beings, including created immaterial separate substances. Drawing upon his primary hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6, Avicenna maintains that it is impossible for essences to exist prior to their existence, for existent essences 38 39 40

Ilāhiyyāt vi.2.5 [265]. Ilāhiyyāt vi.1.17 [264] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.30 [278]. “…if one then returns to considering the state of existence, the active principle would not be equal to [the patient]. [This is] because [the active principle] exists by itself, whereas the patient’s existence with respect to the reception of that action is acquired from [the former].” Ilāhiyyāt iv.3.26 [267]. Cf. Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna;” idem, “Avicenna on Causal Priority;” idem, Proof from Contingency; Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 281–310.

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depend upon their prior existential causes for their very existence; hence, existence is prior to essence. He draws this conclusion explicitly in Ilāhiyyāt viii.4’s treatment of the distinction between quiddity (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd) or existential-thatness (anniyya) in all entities except God, who’s truenature is necessary existence in itself. Existential-thatness and existence both occur accidentally to quiddity (al-anniyya wa-l-wujūd ʿāriḍāni li-l-māhiyyati).41 Therefore, either they accompany it inseparably (yalzamuhā) on account of [the quiddity] itself, or on account of something extrinsic. But it is impossible that this happens on account of the quiddity itself, since what follows [something else] does not follow except {something that is} a being (mawjūd); in this case, therefore, quiddity would have an existence before its existence, which is impossible. We thus say: everything that has a quiddity other than {its} existential-thatness is caused. For you know that existential-thatness and existence, with regard to the quiddity that is extrinsic to {its} existential-thatness, do not have the status of a constitutive {quidditative principle}, but are among the inseparable concomitants (lawāzim).42 This passage consists in the convergence of the primary hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 with Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality of existence presented in the last chapter. Both doctrines are employed to help clarify his view that for every entity other than God, its existence is not constitutive of its truenature. For all composed entities, quiddity is distinct from existence, and since existence is not a quidditative constitutive in composite entities, existence or existential-thatness occurs accidentality (ʿāriḍāni) to quiddity as an inseparable concomitant. Now there are two kinds of inseparable concomitance (luzūm): there are quidditative concomitants that follow from the very quidditative constitution of a thing, such as predicable properties, but there are also concomitants that occur to a thing through an extrinsic cause and are not subordinate to its quiddity. Avicenna rejects the idea that the existence of a quiddity might follow upon and so be posterior to the quiddity. This is because what follows something else presupposes the very existence of the prior thing.

41 42

For Bertolacci’s emendations to this passage, see Reception, Appendix A, 534–535; idem, Essence and Existence, 282, n.42. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.10–12 [346–347] (mod. trans., Bertolacci, Existence and Essence, 282–283).

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But prior to receiving its existence, a quiddity in itself is nothing. Hence, it is impossible for an essence to exist prior to receiving its existence, for then: …the quiddity would be a being in itself prior to its existence—and this is contradictory. It remains that the existence it has is due to a cause. Hence, everything that has a quiddity is caused. The rest of the things, other than the Necessary Existence, have quiddities. And it is these quiddities that in themselves are possible in existence, existence occurring to them extrinsically.43 Because the quidditative principle of the composite cannot exist without the distinct existential principle of the whole, Avicenna explicitly denies that quiddity is prior to existence. On the contrary, the existence of the quiddity is an effect that depends on a prior extrinsic efficient cause of existence. So even though existence is a nonconstitutive inseparable concomitant of quiddity, it occurs accidentally to quiddity through a prior extrinsic efficient cause of existence. Consequently, existence is prior to essence in all composite entities. Here in Ilāhiyyāt viii.4, Avicenna concludes his account of the priority of existence to essence in creatures by elucidating the way it is connected to the denial of any composition of existence and essence in God, and by showing how it complements Ilāhiyyāt i.6’s presentation of the primary hypotheses concerning possible existence in itself and the necessary existence in itself. All quiddities that have existence as an inseparable concomitant are caused; hence, to have a quiddity is to be caused. Since God, the peerless necessary existence in itself is uncaused, all other things have and receive their existence from a prior extrinsic cause of existence and so are possible existences in themselves. In short, existence is prior to essence in the Ilāhiyyāt, and so, because being signifies that which has existence and thing means that which has essence, it follows that being is intensionally prior to thing. This section has established that being is intensionally prior to thing by examining a number of doctrines from Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt which reveal that the entitative principle of essence depends upon and is posterior to the entitative principle of existence. Our argument for this conclusion commenced with Avicenna’s account of the way the extrinsic efficient cause of existence is prior to and brings into existence the form that actuates the matter of a hylomorphic composite. Because the matter and form together constitute to the quiddity of the substance, and existence is prior to both the form and the matter, so also 43

Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.12 [347] (mod. trans.).

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existence is prior to the quiddity of the hylomorphic composite. We found additional support for the intensional priority of being over thing in Avicenna’s doctrine of the dependency of the intrinsic causes of the quidditative constitution of things on the extrinsic causes of existence. Finally, we looked to Avicenna’s treatment of the distinction between God and creatures in Ilāhiyyāt viii.4. Here he employs his primary hypotheses and doctrine of the accidentality of existence to argue that even though essence and existence are distinct in all composite entities, existence is nevertheless an inseparable concomitant of essence that is prior to essence insofar as it occurs accidentally to a thing’s quiddity through a prior extrinsic efficient cause of existence. Hence, because the entitative principle of existence is prior to the entitative principle of essence, the intension of essence that thing indicates is subordinated to the prior intension of existence that is indicated by being. Consequently, being is intensionally prior to thing. Concluding Remarks We have established that there is an intensional hierarchy among the coextensional primary notions being, thing, one, and necessary. The primary notions one and thing are intensionally subordinate to being and necessary insofar as the intensions denoted by one and thing, namely, indivisibility and quiddity, are subordinate to the intensions indicated by being and necessary, namely, existence and invariance of existence. The primary notion one (wāḥid) was shown to be the least basic of the primary notions, because the intension of one as indivisibility characterizes the entitative composition of the entitative principles of existence and essence as being actually indivisible. Indivisibility does not indicate any positive entitative feature of beings, but is rather a negative intension that presupposes and depends upon the entitative principles of existence and essence signified by being, necessary, and thing. And since the intension of the one is posterior to the intensions of the other primary notions, the primary notion one is intensionally subordinate to being, thing, and necessary. The primary notion thing (šayʾ) stands between the least and most basic primary notions insofar as it is intensionally prior to one but is intensionally posterior to being and necessary. Thing signifies the entitative principle of essence or quiddity that, in composite entities, is really distinct from the entitative principle of existence signified by being and necessary. It was shown that the essence of a thing is posterior to its existence, since the quiddity in itself is nothing without the prior extrinsic efficient cause of its existence. The

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entitative principle of existence bestowed upon a being by its prior extrinsic efficient cause is that which existentializes the quidditative principle of a thing into existence. In short, without existence essence is not, for the essence of a thing depends upon its existence as that which is posterior to that which is prior.44 Hence, because the entitative principle of existence (which is identified by the intensions of being and necessary) is prior to the entitative principle of quiddity (the intension indicated by thing), the primary notion thing is thereby intensionally subordinated to the primary notions being and necessary. Consequently, this means that the entitative principle of existence is the most basic entitative feature of any entitative composite in Avicenna’s ontology, for indivisibility and quiddity are both dependent on and subordinated to the existence of an entity. And because the intensions of being and necessary both indicate the entitative principle of existence, that is, the most basic entitative principle of any entitative composite, the primary notions being and necessary are correctly identified as the most basic primary notions in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. This brings us to the more penetrating question of the next chapter: between being and necessary, which of these two most basic primary notions is the most fundamental? 44

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.1.11 [167].

Chapter 10

The Fundamental Primary Notion in Avicenna’s Metaphysics Our task in this final chapter is to determine whether being or necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. Our investigation will proceed in three stages. (10.1) We shall first establish that necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s ontology. We will then show that necessary is also the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s (10.2) aitiology and (10.3) theology. Since the ontological, aitiological, and theological vectors exhaust the objects of enquiry addressed by Avicenna’s metaphysics, the conclusion of this chapter thereby also shows that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the whole of his Ilāhiyyāt. The previous chapter concluded that the primary notions being and necessary are the most basic primary notions insofar as they are intensionally prior to the primary notions one and thing. The intensional priority of these two basic primary notions was established on the basis of the ontological priority Avicenna ascribes to the distinct entitative features identified by the distinct intensions of the coextensional primary notions. Because the entitative characteristic of indivisibility indicated by the intension of one, and the quidditative entitative principle identified by thing’s intension are both entitative features that ontologically depend upon the existential entitative principle targeted by the intensions of being and necessary, we concluded that being and necessary were both intensionally prior to thing and one. Our aim in this chapter is to establish the intensional priority of necessary over being. The difficulty is that the criterion we employed to discover the basic primary notions is inadequate for determining which basic primary notion is the most fundamental. This is because the intensional priority of the basic primary notions was determined on the basis of the ontological priority of the entitative features identified by the distinct intensions of the distinct primary notions. But we cannot determine whether being or necessary is intensionally prior on the basis of the ontological priority of distinct entitative features, because the intensions of being and necessary both identify the same entitative principle, namely, existence. In short, if there is any intensional subordination between being and necessary, it cannot be established on the basis of the

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priority of existence to some other entitative principle, but must be demonstrated on the basis of the distinct ways in which each notion construes its respective intension of that which is or that which has existence. 10.1

The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Ontology

Our task in this section is to establish that the necessary is intensionally prior to being, and so therefore the necessary is also the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s ontology. Avicenna’s ontology concerns the objects of enquiry that pertain to being qua being as its quasi-species (Ilāhiyyāt ii–ii) and quasi-proper accidents (Ilāhiyyāt iv–vii). As we have seen, Avicenna’s application of the primary hypotheses concerning necessary existence and possible existence to these ontological objects of enquiry revealed that every being treated in Avicenna’s ontology is a possible existence that is necessary existence through another.1 In order to demonstrate that necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt we must first prove that the necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence is prior to being’s intrinsic construal of existence. In Chapter 6 we established that the primary notions being and necessary are more than just coextensional primary notions; indeed, their distinct intensions both denote the same entitative principle of existence, however, their respective intensions construe this existential entitative principle in two distinct ways. Whereas being’s intension of that which has its existence established provides an intrinsic construal of the entitative principle of existence, the necessary’s intension of that which has its existence invariantly characterizes the entitative principle of existence according to an extrinsic construal of existence. I shall argue that because the intrinsic construal of existence signified by being is ontologically dependent upon the extrinsic construal of existence signified by necessary, necessary is therefore intensionally prior to being and so is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s ontology. Let us begin by explicating the distinct ways in which being and necessary construe existence. The Intensional Subordination of Being (mawjūd) to Necessary (wājib) For Avicenna it is evident in relation to us that being means that which has existence, for the notion being is among the primary notions first impressed upon 10.1.1

1 Cf. Ilāhiyyāt ii.1.9 [60].

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our intellect. In contrast to the primary notion necessary, which also points to the entitative principle of existence, the intension of being provides an intrinsic construal of existence. Just as thing describes quiddity as an intrinsic entitative principle, and one captures the actual indivisibility of the intrinsic composition of two entitative principles, so also being characterizes existence as an intrinsic entitative principle. Being’s intrinsic construal of existence is elucidated further by the synonyms of being, such as established and realized, and its intensions characterize existence, such as existential-thatness, established existence, and realized subsistence. Accordingly, being denotes the existence or existential-thatness of an entity as a given achievement; it captures the way in which the quiddity of an existent composite entity has received its existence in itself. This intrinsic existential accomplishment consists in the realization of a quiddity into existence within a subsistent and stabilized entitative whole. In short, being’s intrinsic construal of existence characterizes the putative existence of an entity as it is manifested in relation to us, namely, as a given existent. As we have seen, this account of existence is incomplete, for the existence of an entity composed with its essence is the result of an extrinsic cause, which the very existence of the being depends upon permanently insofar as the entity continues to exist. It should not be surprising that our initial encounter with existence is simply, though incompletely, thematized as a given existent, for it is only after further reflection on the primordial givenness of existence that we realize such existent beings are dependent upon another for their very existence. Significantly, none of the synonyms or intensions of being indicate that the existence of an entity depends upon any existent other than itself. But this is precisely what is captured by the necessary’s extrinsic construal of the entitative principle of existence, for necessary signifies the way the existence of a composite entity is necessary existence through another. Necessary provides an extrinsic causal construal of existence insofar as the intension of the necessary—as that which has invariant existence—is ascribed to composite entities that are possible existences in themselves, which exist because the invariance or necessity of their existence is through another, namely, by an extrinsic efficient cause of their necessary existence through another. In sum, the entitative principle of existence can be intensionally construed according to two distinct polarities: the intrinsic and the extrinsic. The intrinsic construal of being (mawjūd) captures the way the union of existence with quiddity—that is the internal union of two entitative principles—realizes the existential achievement of an existent entitative composite. The extrinsic construal of necessary (wājib) reveals that entitative composites are not autonomous beings; for it looks beyond the intrinsic composition of existence and

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essence and draws attention to the way the existence of an entitative composite depends upon the extrinsic efficient cause of its existence. Said otherwise, being’s intension of that which has existence established invites us to consider the existence of a composite entity as an accomplished given; whereas necessary’s intension of that which has existence invariantly demands that we recognize that the same composite entity’s existence always depends upon an extrinsic efficient cause of existence. Which construal of existence is intensionally prior? Is it being’s intrinsic construal of existence, which characterizes the existence of an entity as an accomplished given? Or is it necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence which makes clear that the accomplished existence of the entity is completely ontologically dependent on an extrinsic efficient cause of existence so long as the entity continues to subsist? In the previous chapter we concluded that the established existence of a being is intensionally prior to its quiddity, since without existence a quiddity is nothing. Existence is prior to essence, because the entitative principle of essence ontologically depends upon the ontologically prior entitative principle of  existence. Similarly, just as essence is dependent upon existence, so also the very existence of a being considered intrinsically as a realized existential achievement in itself is ontologically dependent upon the prior extrinsic efficient cause of that very existence, which bestows upon the entity its necessary existence through another. This order of ontological dependency reveals that necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence is intensionally prior to being’s intrinsic construal of existence. Hence, the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. The significance of this radical conclusion is seen best in light of the crucial function the necessary plays in the major metaphysical doctrines of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt that we have already addressed, for it sheds new light on the fundamental function performed by the necessary in our earlier treatments of Avicenna’s doctrines of the analogy of existence, the accidentality of existence, the intensional priority of existence over essence, and the primary hypotheses of metaphysics. That which has existence (wujūd) is signified by being and necessary in distinct ways, but both primary notions signify an analogical notion of that which has existence. What is noteworthy with respect to the fundamentality of the necessary is the central role the necessary plays in determining variations in the analogical modes of existence. In Chapter 8’s explication of Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy of existence, it was shown that existence is employed analogically according to the absolute analogies of priority and posteriority and by way of worthiness or deservingness and appropriateness, but not by

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degrees of intensity or strength and weakness. Avicenna briefly analyzes the distinct analogical modes that belong to existence in Ilāhiyyāt vi.3. Existence inasmuch as it is existence does not vary in terms of strength and weakness and is not receptive of what is less and what is more deficient. It only varies in terms of a number of [modes], namely, priority and posteriority, absence of need and need, and necessity and possibility. «1» As for priority and posteriority, existence, as you have known, belongs first to the cause, secondly to the effect. «2» As for absence of need and need, you have known that in existence the cause does not need the effect but exists either by itself or by some other cause. This meaning is close to the first, even though it differs from it in the way it is considered. «3» As for necessity and possibility, we know that, if there is a cause which is a cause of everything that is an effect, then its existence is necessary in relation to the whole in terms of all the effects, and absolutely. If, [on the other hand], there is a cause of some effect, then its existence is necessary in relation to that effect, while that effect in itself, in whatever manner it occurs, is [something whose] existence is [only] possible.2 The analogy of existence weaves together priority and posteriority, need and absence of need, and possibility and necessity. Significantly, it is the transcategorical modal disjunctive of possibility and necessity of existence—which is derived from the primary notion necessary—that provides the determining factor for whether existence is prior or posterior, needed or not needed. What is possible existence is necessarily posterior to the prior efficient cause of its existence; similarly, the existence of a possible existence is an effect that needs its necessary existence through another. But what is necessary existence in itself is absolutely prior and does not need anything, for it has perfect aseity. Such variations in the analogical modes of existence cannot be captured adequately by the primary notion being; rather, they are worked out through the primary notion necessary. Similarly, in Chapter 8’s treatment of the accidentality of existence we discovered that, even though the primary notions being and thing can elucidate why Avicenna maintains existence is a nonconstitutive concomitant accident of essence, they cannot adequately explain why existence occurs accidentally to essence inseparably and through another that is prior to the essence. To explain why existence occurs to essence inseparably, through another, and is 2 Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.27 [276–277] (mod. trans.).

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prior to it, we turned to the primary notion necessary and the primary hypotheses derived from it. Avicenna’s doctrine of the necessary reveals that existence occurs necessarily to an essence by a prior extrinsic efficient cause, and all efficient causes, as causes, necessarily bestow existence on their effect. This last point was touched upon in the previous chapter’s argument for the priority of existence over essence, which appealed to Avicenna’s doctrine that even though the cause and effect coexist, the cause possesses its existence in a prior manner. Hence, with the existence of the cause, the existence of every effect is necessary; and the existence of its cause necessitates the existence of the effect. The two exist together in time, eternity, or whatever but are not together with respect to the attainment of existence. This is because the existence of [the former] did not come about from the existence of the [latter]. Thus, to the former belongs an attainment of existence not derived from the latter’s attainment of existence, while to [the latter] belongs an attainment of existence deriving from the [former’s] attainment of existence. As such, the former is prior with respect to the attainment of existence.3 The existence of a quiddity is an effect that is derived necessarily from its prior extrinsic efficient cause of existence; a cause, moreover, cannot derive its existence from its effect. This is why the cause of existence has existential priority over its effect, and since the quiddity only exists through the existence bestowed upon it by its cause of existence, existence is prior to essence. Finally, the necessity of the effect’s existence is a result of Avicenna’s account of the causal transitivity of existential necessity.4 Hence, even though being’s account of existence does provide valuable insights with respect to the priority of existence over essence, the strongest

3 Ilāhiyyāt iv.1.11 [167]. 4 Cf. “The effect in itself is such that existence is not necessary for it; otherwise, it would be necessary without its cause, if supposed to be necessary in itself and inasmuch as existence is not prevented from [being for] it. But, since it came to exist by a cause, its essence in itself—without the condition of there being a cause for it or there not being a cause for it—is possible of existence. It is inescapably the case that it is rendered necessary only by the cause. Moreover, as it has been shown, the cause cannot be necessitated by [the effect] but is either necessary in itself or necessary from another thing [so that] if necessity comes to it through [this thing], then the necessity of another would properly ensue from it.” Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.28–29 [277] (mod. trans.).

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arguments in favor of this doctrine appeal to these causal doctrines, which are uniquely rooted in Avicenna’s doctrine of necessity. The primary notion being does not provide any unique explanatory principles that support these causal doctrines. In short, Avicenna’s causal doctrines concerning the coexistence of cause and effect in per se causal orders, the priority of the cause’s existence over the derivative existence of the effect, and the transitivity of necessity in efficient causality—and so also the arguments for the priority of existence over essence that rely upon these causal doctrines—are all grounded in Avicenna’s doctrine of the fundamentality of the analogicity of necessary existence. Similarly, the extrinsic construal of existence in composite entities is rooted in Avicenna’s account of the way the necessary figures into scientific principles as the primary notions (Ilāhiyyāt i.5) and primary hypotheses of metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7). To exist is, for Avicenna, to be necessary, and an existent entity is either necessary existence in itself or necessary existence through another, where the latter identifies the domain of what is possible existence in itself. The primary hypotheses pertaining to possible existence in itself reveal that all possible beings are (1) composite entities, (2) that the quiddities of possible beings are existentially neutral and so insufficient to bring about their existence, and (3) that possible beings need and attain their necessary existence through another as an effect of an extrinsic efficient cause of existence. Consequently, since the invariance of existence for all possible beings is caused by an extrinsic efficient cause of existence, the necessary’s intension of the invariance of existence provides an extrinsic causal construal of existence for all composite or possible beings. Each of these major metaphysical doctrines presupposes and employs Avicenna’s primary hypotheses concerning the compositional and causal properties of necessary existence in itself and necessary existence through another, which is possible existence in itself.5 Even though these primary hypotheses are absolutely first scientific principles of assent proper to metaphysics, they are grounded in the still more primary conceptual scientific first principle, namely, the primary notion necessary. This is because the primary notion necessary and the intensions it denotes—such as the invariance of existence or the necessity of existence—provide the conceptual basis for the formulation of the self-evident primary hypotheses of assent. Thus far we have argued that the ontological dependency of being’s intrinsic construal of existence upon the necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence reveals that the necessary is intensionally prior to being, and so, the necessary 5 Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7; Chapter 7.

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is the fundamental primary notion in the ontology of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. We have shown that a number of major metaphysical doctrines from the Ilāhiyyāt are grounded in the necessary as the invariance of existence, including the existential accomplishment of being. The fundamentality of the necessary with respect to being and the other primary notions is demonstrated by the order of ontological dependency among the intensions of the primary notions. A possible being is necessary because it is necessary existence through another, but without its extrinsic efficient cause of necessary existence, the entity could not have its necessary existence from another, and without its necessary existence from another it would not only not be necessary (wājib), it would not exist. And if the entity did not receive its existence, then it could not be a being (mawjūd), and if its essence did not exist, its essence would be nothing, and so it would not be a thing (šayʾ). Finally, without existence and essence there are no positive entitative principles to be indivisible, and so the nonexistent entity would not be one (wāḥid). In short, this ontological cascade of the orders of dependency among the primary notions and their intensions sets in sharp relief why the necessary is the most fundamental of the primary notions. In sum, the central element found in all of the aforementioned doctrines is the primary notion necessary, for in each case it provides the fundamental ground for the derivative elements. The primary notion necessary is the conceptual principle for the primary hypotheses on necessary and possible existence, it provides the principal explanatory factor for Avicenna’s doctrine of the accidentality and analogy of existence, it elucidates why existence is prior to quiddity, and finally, it even accounts for why the accomplished existence of a being is an established existence. For the achievement of existence signified by being’s intrinsic construal of existence is dependent upon the continuous necessary causation of an extrinsic efficient cause of existence which sustains the entity’s invariance of existence through another, all of which is captured by the necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence. Taken together, these diverse doctrines grounded in the primary notion necessary provide substantial and probative reasons for concluding that the necessary is intensionally prior to being. 10.1.2 The Subject of Metaphysics: Being or Necessary? Our conclusion that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt might surprise some of Avicenna’s readers. Indeed, if the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt, why does Avicenna expend so much effort in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 to establish that being (mawjūd), not necessary (wājib), is the subject of metaphysics? In other words, why does Avicenna unquestionably hold that being qua being, and not

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necessary qua necessary is the subject of metaphysics? This is an important objection.6 Our response to this objection turns on the way we know the distinction between existence taken intrinsically and extrinsically. As primary notions, being and necessary are both first known, known in themselves, and are the first principles of conceptualization for all other notions. Nevertheless, these primary notions can be assigned distinct kinds of intensional priority according to two different orders: either (1) as known in relation to us, or (2) as they are in relation to themselves. The most fundamental primary notion must be intensionally prior with respect to things taken in relation to themselves. In relation to us, it is more obvious that being means that which is/has its existence established, but, for Avicenna, it is more obvious in itself that necessary means that which is/has its existence invariantly. Metaphysics commences with being qua being as its subject because being is more evident in in relation to us, and it is in virtue of conceptualizing being as denoting existence that we notionally amplify being by also conceptualizing the necessary as denoting the invariance of existence. But it is on the basis of the notional amplification of being by the necessary that we come to conceptualize existence by the notional constrictions of caused existence and cause of existence, since the former means necessary existence through another, and the latter must ultimately be the necessary existence in itself. Finally, as for necessary existence, the necessary existence through another of all possible beings is more known to us, than the divine necessary existence in itself, which is more known in relation to itself.7 6 It is noteworthy that a similar question is raised with respect to the primary notion thing in Aertsen’s treatment of various scholastic receptions of Avicenna’s metaphysics. Aertsen argues that a few scholastic thinkers took thing (šayʾ, res) in Avicenna to be in some respects prior to being (mawjūd, ens); but if this is so, then why is the subject of metaphysics being qua being and not thing qua thing? Cf. Aertsen, Doctrine of Primary Notions, 290. Bertolacci takes up this question and offers a brief response. He first refutes the suggestion that thing is extensionally and intensionally prior to being in Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. He then argues that being has a wider extension than thing in the Ilāhiyyāt insofar as being applies to God, for Avicenna seems to studiously avoid calling God a thing, insofar as to be a thing means to have a quiddity, and God does not have a quiddity. Cf. Bertolacci, Reception, 123–124, n. 33; idem, Essence and Existence, 287–288. These arguments, however, cannot be employed to show the priority of being over the primary notion necessary, since necessary and being are unquestionably coextensional, and because, for Avicenna, the primary philosophical name for God is necessary existence in itself. 7 It is noteworthy that the priority of being over necessary with respect to what is more known to us, and, conversely, the priority of necessary over being with respect to what is more known in relation to itself, corresponds to the similar distinctions that apply to the subject and goal of first philosophy. The subject of metaphysics concerns the first epistemological principle that is more known in relation to us, and this is why being qua being is the subject

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There is another important reason why the necessary cannot be the subject of metaphysics that is connected to Avicenna’s clear rejection of the views that the subject of metaphysics is either the ultimate causes or God. For Avicenna, such aitiological and theological objects of enquiry consist in the ultimate goal of metaphysics.8 The difficulty with identifying the necessary with the subject of metaphysics is that this would reduce metaphysics to either an aitiology or a theology. This is because necessary existence either means necessary existence in itself, which turns out to be God, or it means necessary existence through another, which construes existence in an overtly causal fashion. Hence, if the necessary existence in itself were the subject of first philosophy, it would make the subject of metaphysics a theology, and if the inherently causal notion of necessary existence through another were the subject of metaphysics, then it would make first philosophy into an aitiology. Both proposals, even if taken together, are too limited for the universal scope of enquiry proper to the science of metaphysics, which is why Avicenna clearly rejects both the aitiological and theological accounts of the subject of first philosophy. Hence, the necessary cannot be the subject of metaphysics. In short, even though the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion, it is not the subject of first philosophy, because if it were it would render the subject of metaphysics into an aitiology or a theology, both of which are clearly rejected by Avicenna. Furthermore, if the necessary were the subject of metaphysics, it would divert the study of first philosophy from studying being qua being to the study of one aspect of being, namely, the causality of necessary existence or absolutely simple necessary existence, and it would thereby exclude from first philosophy the study of substance, essences, unity, universals, and the host of other related topics that fall under being qua being. Consequently, being is not taken to be the subject of first philosophy because it is the most fundamental primary notion in metaphysics, but because it is the most evident notion among the four most common primary notions. The fundamentality ascribed to the necessary is due to its intensional priority with respect to the order of entities in themselves. Hence, being is the subject of metaphysics because it is more known to us and necessary is the most fundamental primary notion because it is more known in itself.

of first philosophy. The ultimate goal of metaphysics, however, consists in the demonstrated philosophical knowledge of God as the divine necessary existence in itself that is the first causal principle, which is first in itself, but is last with respect to our knowledge. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.2.18 [15]; i.3.12–13 [21–22]; vi.3.30 [278]. 8 Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2.

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In sum, we have shown that being construes existence intrinsically as an existential achievement of being in itself and that this achievement is the result of an extrinsic efficient cause. This is why existence in composites is an effect and this effect depends upon its cause. The necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence directs our attention to this extrinsic dependency, and this dependency reveals the intensional priority of the primary notion necessary. The distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic considerations of existence by being and necessary also supplies a reason for why being is the subject of metaphysics and why the necessary initiates the ontological investigation of caused beings, which eventually sparks the aitiological investigation into the ultimate causes of all caused possible beings. In this section we have established that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s ontology. But the fundamentality of necessary existence in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt also directs our attention to the existential causal dependence of all entities in Avicenna’s ontology. The entities treated in his metaphysical ontology are all entitative composites or possible beings that are necessary existence through another. Hence, all composite beings treated among the ontological objects of enquiry are caused beings or effects, and effects necessarily demand their causes. Accordingly, the ultimate conclusion of Avicenna’s ontology prompts us to ask aitiological questions concerning whether there is some ultimate cause of the entire ontological order of caused possible beings. 10.2

The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Aitiology

Thus far we have established that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s ontology. The fundamentality of the necessary also sets in relief the ultimate conclusion of Avicenna’s metaphysical ontology, namely, that all the entities studied in ontology are necessary, and yet they are necessary existence through another because they are causally dependent on some extrinsic efficient cause. Accordingly, the conclusion of his ontology also focuses our attention on the existential causal dependency of all entities in Avicenna’s ontology and provokes a series of aitiological questions. If all the entities studied in his ontology are possible beings that are only deemed necessary because they are necessary existence through another, and so are causally dependent on some extrinsic efficient cause, then are there any ultimate efficient causes of existence that do not themselves depend upon another for their existence? Are there any entities that are not possible beings that are necessary existence through another? Simply put: why, if all composite beings

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are possible existences in themselves, is there something instead of nothing? What ultimately explains the existence of these ontological possible beings? These questions are addressed in Avicenna’s aitiological investigations into the ultimate causes in Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3. Our interests in the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt are not in the detailed arguments Avicenna presents within his aitiological investigations, but concern whether the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s aitiology. In order to determine the fundamentality of the necessary with respect to Avicenna’s aitiology, we must first outline the aims of his aitiology and situate them within the overall central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. The aitiology of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt consists in his own novel appropriation of Aristotle’s treatment of first causes in Metaphysics α 2.9 Following upon his extensive treatment of the four causes in Ilāhiyyāt v.1–5, and his refutation of the Platonists’ and Pythagoreans’ pseudo-aitiological doctrines and false proposals for the ultimate causes of reality in Ilāhiyyāt vii.1–3, Avicenna turns to the question of the existence of the true ultimate causes in Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3, namely, is there a first cause within each of the four orders of causality that is the terminus of a finite causal order? Avicenna’s aitiological investigations in Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3 arrive at the conclusion that there are first causes in each of the four orders of causality, because it is impossible to proceed via an infinite regress of caused causes in the orders of efficient, material, final, and formal causality. There must exist some first uncaused efficient, material, final, and formal causes within each of these respective orders of causality.10 This conclusion, however, is not the ultimate conclusion of Avicenna’s aitiology, for he immediately turns to the question: is there, among these ultimate first causes, one that is the most fundamental or absolute first uncaused cause? Avicenna contends that there is. If we say that something is a first efficient principle—rather, a first absolute principle—then it must necessarily be one. If, however, we say it is a first elemental {or material} principle and a first formal principle and the like, such a principle would not have the same necessity of being one as the necessity of this in the necessary existence. This is because none of these causes would be a first absolute cause because the necessary 9 10

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.2.1 [333]; Bertolacci, Reception, 312–316; 321–327; Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 281–310. Cf. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, 336–377; Marmura, Proof from Contingency; Bertolacci, Subject–Matter of Metaphysics; Houser, Two Aristotelians on God; De Haan, Why the Five Ways; idem, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?;” Janssens, “Metaphysics of God.”

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existence is one and has the status of the efficient principle. Hence the one, the necessary existence, would also be a cause of these first causes.11 Avicenna’s important though enthymematic argument here in Ilāhiyyāt viii.3 must be seen in light of the primary hypotheses that it presupposes from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, which concern the unity and simplicity of the necessary existence in itself. He contends that unlike the other first causes, such as the first material cause and first formal cause, only the first efficient cause of existence is necessarily one absolutely first causal principle. This is because, as the primary hypotheses show, the only existent being that is not a caused possible being is that which is necessary existence in itself, and this necessary existence in itself must be absolutely one, peerless, unique, and completely uncaused. Even the first material and first formal causes are intrinsic causes of a thing’s quiddity and so are possible beings with respect to their efficient cause of existence. Furthermore, since the first final causes of possible beings are themselves caused beings, they receive their necessity of existence from another.12 The first efficient cause of existence, however, is itself necessarily uncaused in its existence; otherwise it would not be the first cause of existence in the order of efficient causes of existence. But to be the first efficient cause of existence that is necessarily uncaused in its existence is the same as being necessary existence in itself. In other words, to demonstrate that there exists an uncaused first efficient cause of existence, is also to demonstrate that the one necessary existence in itself—which was merely considered, but not proved to exist, in Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s account of primary hypotheses—actually exists. Finally, “if there is a cause which is a cause of everything that is an effect, then,” as Avicenna points out, “its existence is necessary in relation to the whole in terms of all the effects, and absolutely.”13 And since the first material, formal, and final causes are themselves caused possible beings, they are all effects with respect to the first efficient cause of existence, which is necessary existence in itself.14

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Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.5 [342] (mod. trans.). To be clear, later in Ilāhiyyāt viii Avicenna will identify the necessary existence in itself, that is, the absolutely first uncaused efficient cause of existence, with the final cause of creation through efficient causality. Nevertheless, he does not attempt to argue that God is the absolutely first final cause of existence here in the aitiological investigations of Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt vi.5.30 [293]; Ilāhiyyāt viii.6–7. Ilāhiyyāt vi.3.27 [277]. See Avicenna’s heading for Ilāhiyyāt viii.3. “On showing the finitude of the final and formal causes; on proving [the existence of] the first principle in an absolute manner; on making decisive the statement on the first cause absolutely and on the first cause

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In short, Avicenna’s aitiology does not argue for a unique absolutely first uncaused cause in the orders of material, final, and formal causality, but only for the necessity of there being one uncaused first efficient cause which is also the cause of the existence of the other first material, final, and formal causes. And this conclusion—that the first uncaused efficient cause of existence simply is identical to the necessary existence in itself from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7—is at once the ultimate conclusion of Avicenna’s aitiology and the point of departure for his philosophical theology. Before turning to Avicenna’s philosophical theology, we must first determine whether the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s aitiology. The fundamentality of the necessary in the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt can be shown in two ways. First, by explicating the way the fundamentality of the necessary in Avicenna’s ontological treatment of causality is integral to the main argument of his aitiology. Second, by showing how the ultimate conclusion of his aitiology does not even attempt to employ the other primary notions in its argument for the absolutely first uncaused cause, but instead relies solely on the fundamentality of the necessary and the primary hypotheses derived from it. Let us start with the first reason. In Ilāhiyyāt i.1, Avicenna argued that aitiology is not the subject of metaphysics, because it belongs to the goal of metaphysics. And so far we have seen that the fundamentality of the necessary in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt brings to a close the many ontological enquiries of the Ilāhiyyāt and compels the Ilāhiyyāt to address certain unresolved aitiological questions. In other words, the necessary plays a crucial function in the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt’s transition from the ontological objects of enquiry that follow on the subject of metaphysics to the aitiological goal of the science of metaphysics. But the aitiological argument of Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3 presupposes a number of key causal doctrines that were worked out in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. Highlighting these key causal doctrines from the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt will reveal the fundamentality of the necessary for Avicenna’s aitiology, as well illuminate the fundamental function played by the necessary within the ontological and aitiological “integral parts” of the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. Let us present a cursory and selective outline of the Ilāhiyyāt that focuses on the integration of various causal doctrines into the arc of its central argument. The central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt is, of course, initiated in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–2 where Avicenna distinguishes the subject of metaphysics—as an enquiry into being qua being and what follows upon it— from its ultimate aitiological and restrictedly, showing that what is absolutely a first cause is a cause for the rest of the causes.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.3 [340:11–13].

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theological goal. In Ilāhiyyāt i.5 the primary notion being (mawjūd) is notionally amplified by the primary notion necessary (wājib), which adds to the intension of existence (wujūd) indicated by being, the intension the invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd). In Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7’s presentation of the primary hypotheses of metaphysics exhaustively divides necessary into two modes of existence: necessary existence and possible existence. Avicenna then proceeds to identify the self-evident causal properties that belong to necessary existence and possible existence. He establishes that necessary existence in itself is absolutely uncaused, but that all possible beings are caused, because they are also necessary existence through an extrinsic efficient cause of their existence. These primary hypotheses are applied throughout the rest of the Ilāhiyyāt’s ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry. Significantly, the primary hypotheses concerning the causal properties of possible beings reveal that all composite entities treated in the Ilāhiyyāt’s ontology are possible beings that necessarily require an extrinsic efficient cause of their existence. Following his investigation of the categories of substance and accidents in Ilāhiyyāt ii–iii, Avicenna addresses a number of important causal doctrines in Ilāhiyyāt iv.1–2 and vi.1–3. In particular, he treats the existential priority of causes and the existential posteriority of effects, that causes as causes necessarily cause their effects. He also establishes that all effects necessarily coexist with their causes in all essential or per se causal orders, that the efficient cause of existence is what bestows necessary existence through another on all possible beings,15 and he distinguishes between absolute creation (ibdāʿ) and temporal creation or origination (ḥudūṯ).16 As was shown in the last section, the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion operative in Avicenna’s arguments to establish these causal doctrines. These causal doctrines from the scientific principles and ontological objects of enquiry of the Ilāhiyyāt are integral to Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3’s aitiological demonstration that it is impossible for there to be an infinite series of caused

15

16

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.1–2; vi.1–3. For an examination of the overall connection between these distinct causal doctrines from the Ilāhiyyāt, see Marmura, Proof from Contingency; idem, “Avicenna on Causal Priority;” idem, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna;” Richardson, “Avicenna’s Conception of the Efficient Cause.” Cf. Ilāhiyyāt iv.2.24 [181]; vi.2.9–13 [266–266]; Janssens, “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sīnā;” Acar, “Creation: Avicenna’s Metaphysical Account;” idem, Talking about Creation, 131–230; Houser, “Avicenna, Aliqui, and Thomas Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation;” McGinnis, “Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility and Potential in Avicenna and Aquinas;” Taylor, “Primary and Secondary Causality;” Janssens, “Metaphysics of God.”

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causes, that each order of causality is finite and has a first cause, and finally, that the whole of reality cannot consist simply of caused possible beings without any cause of their existence, and so there must exist some absolutely uncaused first cause of existence.17 Consequently, the necessary is also the most fundamental primary notion in the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt insofar as the major conclusions of his aitiology presuppose key causal doctrines from the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt that rely upon the fundamentality of the primary notion necessary. The fundamentality of the necessary in Avicenna’s aitiology is revealed in another way that complements the first. As we have seen, with respect to the four causal orders treated in his aitiology, the efficient causality of existence plays the most important role. It is by efficient causality alone that Avicenna demonstrates the existence of the necessary existence in itself, which is the ultimate conclusion of his aitiology and the start of his metaphysical theology. And given the connection of efficient causality of existence with necessary existence through another—which is the kind of necessity ascribed to all possible beings by the primary notion necessary—it follows that because the necessary is the most important primary notion for explicating the nature of efficient causality and demonstrating the existence of the first efficient cause, the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s aitiology. The centrality of efficient causality and necessity in Avicenna’s aitiology is seen even more clearly in light of what his aitiology does not endeavor to do. First, and by way of contrast with Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ, Avicenna’s aitiology 17

It is noteworthy that Michael Marmura has argued in a similar way that the premises for the overall causal proof stretches across the Ilāhiyyāt. “A proof from contingency for the existence of God is certainly found in the Metaphysics. The problem, however, is locating it, more accurately, locating its parts and assembling them. For the proof in the Metaphysics is spread among various and often widely separated chapters of this intricately argued and structurally complex work. Its components are found mainly in Book 1, chapters 5 and 6, Book 4, chapter 1, Book 6, chapter 2 and Book 8, chapter 1.” Marmura, Proof from Contingency, in Probing, 131. My interpretation, however, is significantly different from Marmura’s. Whereas Marmura takes these distinct but related causal doctrines strewn throughout the Ilāhiyyāt to be parts of an extended argument for God’s existence, I contend the argument for God’s existence from efficient causality is only found in Ilāhiyyāt viii. What Marmura mistakenly identifies as parts of a proof for God’s existence, are in fact causal doctrines that are key junctures in the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. These causal doctrines from the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt are presupposed in the demonstration of God’s existence in Ilāhiyyāt viii, but they are no less relevant to the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt, and Avicenna’s later treatment of the divine attributes of the necessary existence in itself and God’s necessary creation of the whole emanative order of creations in Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix. Cf. De Haan, “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?”

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does not develop an argument from Aristotle’s transcategorical distinction between act and potency. Second, with respect to the one, Avicenna does not attempt any heonological argument from the potential divisibility of created beings to the absolute actual indivisible unity of the first cause that is the absolute One. Furthermore, his aitiology does not argue for the existence of an uncaused ultimate cause on the basis of the material, formal, and final causes that explain his doctrine that the quiddity of all created beings is distinct from their existence, which is rooted in the distinction between being and thing. Rather, Avicenna bases the entire argument for the ultimate conclusion of his aitiology on the efficient causality of necessary existence. Hence, because his doctrine of the efficient causality of existence is uniquely grounded in the primary notion the necessary and its derivative primary hypotheses concerning the causal and compositional properties of possible beings, it follows that the necessary also functions as the most fundamental primary notion for the aitiology of the Ilāhiyyāt. Thus far we have established that the necessary is the fundamental primary notion in the ontology and aitiology of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. It is through the fundamental function played by the necessary that the main argument of the Ilāhiyyāt transitions from the subject of metaphysics as being to its ultimate ontological conclusion (namely, that all possible beings are necessarily caused by another), to its ultimate aitiological conclusion (namely, that there exists an absolute first uncaused efficient cause of existence for all caused possible beings) to the first stage of Avicenna’s philosophical theology (namely, that the divine necessary existence in itself does in fact exist, for it is identical with the absolute first uncaused cause). Let now turn to the function of the necessary in the philosophical theology of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. 10.3

The Necessary as the Fundamental Primary Notion in Theology

Avicenna’s philosophical theology concerns three major doctrines: God’s existence, the divine attributes of God’s true-nature, and God’s creation.18 The first commences with the ultimate conclusion of his aitiology, and consists in the demonstration of the existence of the uncaused first efficient cause of existence, which is identified with the divine necessary existence in itself. The second stage pertains to Avicenna’s ascription of divine attributes to God on the basis of God’s true-nature as the necessary existence in itself that is necessary existence in every respect. The third and final stage addresses God’s necessary 18

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.5–7; viii.4–7; ix.

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voluntary creation of the emanative order of possible beings, which all have God as the ultimate principle and end of their existence. As with Avicenna’s ontology and aitiology, our interest in his theology is not in his detailed arguments for each of these theological doctrines, but in the function the primary notion necessary plays in the overall argument of his theology. By briefly identifying the fundamental role of the necessary in each of these three theological stages, we will establish that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in his theology. Avicenna’s theology takes as its point of departure the final conclusion of his aitiology, namely, that there exists an uncaused first efficient cause of existence that is necessary existence in itself. In other words, Avicenna’s demonstration for the existence of God corresponds with his aitiological conclusion that the necessary existence in itself exists as the absolute first efficient cause of existence. Consequently, given the fundamentality of the necessary in this aitiological demonstration, it follows that the same doctrine taken as the starting point of his metaphysical theology is also grounded in the necessary as the most fundamental primary notion. Immediately following his identification of the necessary existence in itself with the first uncaused efficient cause, Avicenna turns to the divine attributes that belong to the essence (ḏāt) or true-nature (ḥaqīqa) of the divine necessary existence in itself.19 It has become evident from this and from what we have previously explained that the Necessary Existence (wājib al-wujūd) is one in number. It has [also] become evident that everything other than Him, if considered in itself, [is found to be] possible in its existence and hence caused, and it is seen that, [in the chain of things] being caused, [the caused beings] necessarily terminate with Him. Therefore, everything, with the exception of the One who in His essence is one (wāḥid) and the Being who in His essence is being (mawjūd), acquires existence from another, becoming through it a being (mawjūd), being in itself a nonexistent. This is the meaning of a thing’s being created—that is, attaining existence from another. It has absolute nonexistence which it deserves in terms of itself; it is deserving of nonexistence not only in terms of its form without its 19

Cf. Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God;” idem, “Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna’s Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle;” Acar, Talking about God; Houser, Language of Being; idem, Two Aristotelians on God; Judy, “Avicenna’s Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles;” McGinnis, “The Ultimate Why Question: Avicenna on Why God is Absolutely Necessary;” idem, Avicenna, 163–177; Rosheger, “A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes.”

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matter, or in terms of its matter without its form, but in its entirety. Hence, if its entirety is not connected with the necessitation of the being that brings about its existence, and it is reckoned as being dissociated from it, then in its entirety its nonexistence becomes necessary…. Hence, the whole, in relation to the first cause, is created. Its act of bringing into being that which comes to be from it would entirely rule out nonexistence in the substances of things. Rather, it is an act of bringing into existence that absolutely prevents nonexistence in things that bear perpetualness. This, then, is absolute creation.20 Avicenna proceeds rather quickly to the conclusions that the necessary existence in itself is one, being, absolutely uncaused, and the necessary cause of the necessary existence through another of all possible beings, which are now identified as creatures. This is because these theological conclusions are obviously entailed by the application of the primary hypotheses to the conclusions of his aitiology. As we shall see, while the primary hypotheses concerning the causal and compositional properties of possible existences played a dominant role in Avicenna’s ontology and aitiology, the corresponding primary hypotheses that pertain to the necessary existence in itself are central to philosophical theology’s many demonstrated conclusions. It is significant that Avicenna conceptually clarifies the divine necessary existence in itself by the primary notions one and being, and not vice-versa. He commences Ilāhiyyāt viii.4 with the heading, “On the primary attributes of the principle that is necessary in its existence,”21 and the opening statement asserts: “There has now been established for you something whose existence is necessary. It has [also] been established for you that the Necessary Existence is one. Hence, the Necessary Existence is one, nothing sharing with Him in His rank, and thus nothing other than Him is a necessary existence.”22 In other words, the divine is fundamentally conceptualized as the necessary existence in itself, which Avicenna then notionally amplifies by such divine attributes as unity, simplicity, uniqueness, creator, perfect, good, truth, intellect, will, and so on. Clearly, it is the necessary that is fundamental to Avicenna’s account of God’s true-nature, not being or one; for while God certainly is one and being, these primary notions, as well as all the other divine attributes, must be

20 21 22

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.3.6–7 [342]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.1 [343:9]. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.1 [343:10–12].

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conceptually understood in terms of the divine necessary existence in itself that is necessary existence in all respects.23 In Ilāhiyyāt viii.4–5 Avicenna reviews and reestablishes the divine attributes that belong to God in virtue of the primary hypotheses concerning the necessary existence in itself, such as divine unity, peerlessness, uniqueness,24 simplicity of the divine (whose true-nature (ḥaqīqa) is His very existential– thatness (anniyya)),25 and that God transcends the categories, including substance.26 This last point is significant, because it reveals that since the primary notions necessary, being, and one can all be ascribed to God, and God transcends the categories, these primary notions are absolutely transcategorical, that is, they apply intracategorically to all substances and accidents, but they are also extracategorical insofar as they apply analogically to God who completely transcends the categories.27 23 24

25 26 27

Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37]; viii.7.12 [368]; viii.4.8 [345]; viii.6.13 [358]; ix.1.2 [373]; ix.4.4 [403]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.1–2 [343–344]; viii.5.1–14 [349–354]. “He is pure existence with the condition of negating privation and all other description of Him.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.13 [347]. “It has become clear, then, that the First has no genus, no quiddity, no quality, no quantity, no ‘where,’ no ‘when,’ no equal, no partner, and no contrary—may He be exalted and magnified—[and] that He has no definition and [there is] no demonstration (burhān) for Him…. {If} you ascertain the truth about Him [you will find] that, after [the fact] of His existential-thatness, He is only described by means of negating all similarities of Him and affirming to Him all relations. For all things are from Him, and He shares nothing in common with what [proceeds] from Him. He is the principle of all things, and He is not any of the things that are posterior to Him.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.5.14 [354] (mod. trans.). Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.3–13 [344–347] Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.14–19 [347–349]. Avicenna appears to intentionally avoid referring to God as a thing (šayʾ) in the sense of the primary notion thing. Bertolacci suggests that this is because thing means that which has a quiddity, and that which possesses quiddity and is not identical with what it is, but receives its existence. Furthermore, Avicenna also explicitly states, “The First has no quiddity other than His existential-thatness.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.3 [344] (mod. trans.). There are a number of difficulties with Bertolacci’s suggestion. First, it contradicts Avicenna’s clear account of the coextensionality of thing with being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5. Second, because thing is a primary notion coextensional with being, one, and necessary, it is antecedent to the notional constriction that identifies being, thing, one, or necessary with caused being or cause of being and is even prior to such notional constrictions of the intensions existence and essence by in itself and through another. This is why Avicenna can apply the primary notions necessary, being, and one to God and to creatures. For just as being does not mean that which has existence, and necessary does not mean that which has its invariance of existence through another—except when they are applied to possible existences—so also thing need not mean that which has quiddity, essence, or true-nature, except when applied to possible existences. Finally, and as Bertolacci points out, in addition to the term quiddity (māhiyya), the primary notion thing is also given such meanings as

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As was shown in Chapter 7’s treatment of the primary hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7, Avicenna holds that the necessary existence in itself must be one, peerless, unique, and simple; if any of these properties are denied of the necessary existence in itself, then contradictions and absurdities ensue. Clearly each of these primary hypotheses are formulated in light of Avicenna’s primary notion necessary, but Avicenna also derives the other divine attributes such as perfection, goodness, truth, intellect, and will on the basis of his identification of God as the divine necessary existence in itself.28 A few examples will be instructive. First, divine necessary existence in itself is the perfection (kamāl) of existence. There are no perfections absent from God’s necessary existence, if there were, then there would be some perfections outside of God which God would not possess and would necessarily exist independently from God. But this is impossible, for “necessary existence is above perfection (fawqa l–tamām) because not only does He have the existence that belongs only to Him, but every [other] existence also is an overflow of His existence and belongs to Him and emanates from Him.”29 Similarly, “the necessary existence in itself is pure good (ẖayr maḥḍ),” and for two reasons. First, “the good in general is that which everything desires, and that which everything desires is existence or the perfection of existence in the domain of existence.” Now “that whose existence in itself is [only] possible is not a pure good, because existence for it itself is not necessary through itself. Its essence, hence, bears the possibility of nonexistence; and that which in some respect bears the possibility of nonexistence is not in all respects devoid of evil and deficiency. Hence, the pure good is only that whose existence is necessary in itself.”30 Second, “‘good’ is also said of that which bestows the perfections of things…. [Now] it has become evident that the Necessary Existence must in Himself be the furnisher of all existence and

28 29 30

true-nature (ḥaqīqa) and essence (ḏāt), which Avicenna does not hesitate to ascribe to God and identify with God’s existence, existential–thatness, and invariance of existence. In short, even though there does not seem to be any principled reason why Avicenna could not call God a thing (šayʾ), we must also acknowledge that he does not in fact appear to do so. It seems to me that Avicenna does not give us sufficient information to determine whether or not God can be called a thing (šayʾ). Cf. Bertolacci, Essence and Existence, 275–277; Macierowski, “Does God have a quiddity according to Avicenna?;” Acar, Talking about God, 81–83. Rosheger, “Is God a “What”? Avicenna, William of Auvergne, and Aquinas on the Divine Essence.” For an extended examination of Avicenna’s derivation of the divine attributes on the basis of God being necessary existence in itself, see Adamson, “From the Necessary Existent to God.” Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.1 [355]. Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.2–3 [355–356] (mod. trans.)

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every perfection of existence. Hence, in this respect also He is good, deficiency and evil being excluded from Him.”31 Avicenna also argues that “necessary existence is pure intellect because He is an essence dissociated from matter in every respect.”32 He maintains that whatever is completely separate from matter is intellect (ʿaql), intelligible (maʿqūl), intellector (ʿāqil). Hence, because the necessary existence in itself cannot in any respect be a possible being, and all material beings are caused possible beings that are in potency to formal actuality, the necessary existence is absolutely separate from matter. God’s “essence is, hence, [at once] intellect, intellectual apprehender, and intelligible (not that there are multiple things here).”33 God necessarily understands Himself, and “because He intellectually apprehends His essence, and that He is the principle of all things, He apprehends [by] His essence all things.”34 And this is the relation of the whole to the First Intellect, the Necessary Existence. For He intellectually apprehends His essence and what His essence necessitates. He knows from his essence the manner in which the good comes to be in all [things]. Thus, the form of beings follows the intelligible form He conceives in the intelligible order [which is conceived by] Him…. He knows the manner in which the order of the good [takes place] in existence and that it proceeds from Him; and He knows that existence emanates from this act of knowing, according to the ranking that He intellectually apprehends as good and as order.35 The necessary existence is also “a lover of His essence, which is the principle of all order and good inasmuch as [His essence] is such [a principle].” But unlike human wills, the divine will is identical to the necessary existence in itself, and so must be “devoid of [any] deficiency brought about by desire and [any] disturbance in the question of some objective.”36 Indeed, “the will of the Necessary

31 32 33 34 35 36

Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.4 [356]. For Avicenna’s identification of the necessary existence in itself with truth in itself, see Ilāhiyyāt i.8.1–2 [48]; vi.3.30 [278]; viii.6.4–5 [356]; De Haan, Metaphysics of Truth. Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.6 [356] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt viii.6.7 [357]. Cf. Acar, Talking About God, 93–101; Adamson, “Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna’s Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle;” McGinnis, Avicenna, 171–177. Ilāhiyyāt viii.7.1 [363]. Ilāhiyyāt viii.7.2 [363] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt viii.7.3 [363].

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Existence does not differ in essence from His knowledge, nor does it differ in meaning from His knowledge. For … the knowledge belonging to Him is identical with the will that belongs to Him.”37 Each of these divine attributes notionally amplifies our knowledge of the divine necessary existence in itself without ascribing any limitation, imperfection, or multiplicity to God’s true-nature, for each of these primary notions belongs to the divine in virtue of God being necessary existence in itself. Consequently, since “the necessary existence in itself is necessary existence in all His aspects,”38 we must also conceptualize each of these divine attributes in terms of the fundamentality of God’s existential necessity as the necessary existence in itself.39 This is no less true of the third and final doctrine in Avicenna’s theology, his doctrine of God’s necessary voluntary creation of the emanative order of possible beings. The fundamentality of the necessary with respect to Avicenna’s account of divine intellect and will are especially pertinent to his doctrine of emanative creation. Because God is necessary in every respect, not only is his knowledge and will necessary, but his creation is thereby absolutely necessary as well. For insofar as God knows himself as the cause and principle of creation, he is thereby necessarily its cause, since a “cause in [terms of] itself necessitates the effect, so that, if it is permanent, it necessitates the effect permanently.”40 And “Since nothing other than Him is a necessary existence, He is the principle of the necessitation of the existence of everything, necessitating [each thing] either in a primary manner or through an intermediary.”41 In other words, “the principle of the whole is an essence necessary in its 37 38 39

40 41

Ilāhiyyāt viii.7.12 [367]. Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.2 [373]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt i.6.2 [37]. Cf. “It has become manifest to us that there is, for the whole, a Principle whose existence is necessary, [that is] neither included in genus nor is subject to definition or demonstration; [that He] is free from quantity, quality, quiddity, place, time, and motion; [that He] has neither equal, companion, nor contrary; that He is one in all respects because He is not divisible—neither in terms of parts in actuality, [nor] in terms of parts by supposition and estimation (as with the continuous), nor in the mind in that His essence is composed of varied intellectual ideas from which an aggregate becomes united; [and] that He is one inasmuch as He does not share at all [with others] the existence that belongs to Him. He is thus, by this unity, single. He is one because He is perfect in existence; nothing in Him awaits completion, this being one of the aspects of the one. The one is only in Him in the negative manner. [This is] unlike the one belonging to bodies—by reason of connection or combination—or to some other thing among [things] where the one is in it through a unity which is an existential meaning that appends itself to an essence or essences.” Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.1 [373]. Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.2 [373]. Cf. Ilāhiyyāt viii.4.1 [343].

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existence, and what proceeds from the Necessary Existence is necessary. Otherwise, [the Necessary Existence] would have a state which did not [previously] exist and, hence, would not be necessary in all His aspects.”42 God does will creation into existence, but God wills creation necessarily. This is because if God’s willing creation were something extraneous to God’s necessity, it would then come into being within God’s essence, and “then His essence would have undergone change, when it has been shown that the Necessary Existence in his essence is necessary existence in all His aspects.”43 But this “coming to be of the whole from Him is not by way of nature in that the existence of the whole comes to be from Him with neither knowledge nor satisfaction on His part.”44 Because God creates knowingly and necessarily, Avicenna maintains that God’s creation follows from a genuine volition, since “there is in His essence neither an impediment for nor an aversion to the proceeding of the whole from Him. His essence knows that His perfection and loftiness are such that the good proceeds from Him and that this is one of the necessary concomitants of His majesty that in itself is the object of His love…. Hence, the First is satisfied with the emanation of the whole from Him.”45 Indeed, Avicenna is abundantly clear about the fundamentality of the necessary in his final words on the necessity of the creative emanation of intellects, souls, and bodies from God. His intellection is the cause of existence in accordance with what He intellectually apprehends. The existence of what comes to exist by Him is by way of a necessity of His existence and a necessary consequence of His existence—not [however] in [the sense] that His existence is for the sake of the existence of something other than Himself. He is the enactor of the whole in the sense that He is the being from whom all [other] existence emanates as an emanation that is distinct from His essence. [And He is the enactor of the whole] because the existence of what comes to be from the First is by way of necessity, since it has been [shown to be] true that the Necessary Existence in Himself is necessary of existence in all His aspects.46

42 43 44 45 46

Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.11 [376] (mod. trans.). Ilāhiyyāt ix.1.11 [376]. Ilāhiyyāt ix.4.3 [403]. Ilāhiyyāt ix.4.3 [403]. Ilāhiyyāt ix.4.4 [403].

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In short, Avicenna employs his doctrine of necessary existence in itself as the grounds for affirming that God exists, is not caused, is simple, peerless, one, without a quiddity, definition, or demonstration, is perfect, good, truth, immaterial, intellect, will, and voluntary creator of all emanations that necessarily flow from him as the divine first principle. Consequently, because his account of necessary existence in itself is rooted directly or indirectly in doctrines derived from the primary hypotheses from Ilāhiyyāt i.6–7 and these primary hypotheses are worked out on the basis of the primary notion necessary, it is clear that the necessary functions as the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s theology. Concluding Remarks The central aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing is the necessary (wājib). We tackled this issue in two stages. In the previous chapter we recapitulated Avicenna’s position that the primary notions being (mawjūd), thing (šayʾ), one (wāḥid), and necessary (wājib) are the first known, coextensional, and most universal transcategorical notions, and that they are prior to their opposite notions. We then argued that the primary notions being and necessary are the most basic primary notions in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt insofar as their intensions—existence and invariance of existence—are intensionally prior to the intensions of the primary notions thing and one—namely, quiddity and indivisibility. This chapter went one step further and argued that while being and necessary are the most basic primary notions, the necessary is itself the most fundamental primary notion in the whole of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. This thesis was established in three stages, namely, in the ontological, aitiological, and theological stages of the Ilāhiyyāt. We first argued for the fundamentality of the primary notion necessary in Avicenna’s ontology on the basis of its intensional priority over being. It was shown that because being’s intrinsic construal of existence is dependent upon and subordinated to necessary’s extrinsic construal of existence, the necessary is thereby intensionally prior to being and so is the most fundamental primary notion in the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. We then demonstrated that because Avicenna’s doctrine of efficient causality is uniquely dependent upon the primary hypotheses derived on the basis of the primary notion necessary, and since the doctrine of efficient causality is fundamental to the Ilāhiyyāt’s aitiological conclusion—namely, that there

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exists an absolute first uncaused efficient cause of existence for all possible existences—the necessary is thereby the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s aitiology. Finally, we established the fundamentality of the necessary in Avicenna’s theology by revealing that the necessary is uniquely integral to his demonstrations (1) of the existence of God as the necessary existence in itself, (2) that the divine attributes of unity, simplicity, uniqueness, perfection, goodness, truth, intellect, will, and so forth are all derived from God’s true-nature as necessary existence in itself, that is necessary existence in every respect, and (3) that the necessary voluntary creation of the emanative order of creatures from God is entailed by God’s true-nature as necessary existence in itself. In short, this chapter has demonstrated that because the ultimate conclusions of the ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry of the Ilāhiyyāt are all uniquely grounded in Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary notion necessary, the necessary is therefore the most fundamental primary notion in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing.

Conclusion Whatever is necessary existence in itself is necessary existence in all its aspects. avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, i.6.2 [37]

The final question of this study is: How does Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt transition from the doctrine of being qua being to the demonstration of the necessary existence in itself as the ultimate divine first cause of being? In short, what is the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt that connects the subject of metaphysics with its ultimate goal? The contention of this monograph is that the “middle term” sought by this question is found in Avicenna’s scientific principles, and in particular, the most fundamental scientific first principle. In the last chapter we proved that the necessary (wājib) is the most fundamental scientific principle as primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt. Consequently, if the scientific first principles proper to metaphysics explain how the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt gets from the subject of metaphysics to its ultimate goal, then Avicenna’s doctrine of the necessary should play the most prominent role in the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. What is the function of the necessary in the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt? Before answering this question, we should first summarize the series of narrowing concentric circles that we have already worked through, starting with the outermost circle of enquiry that initiated our study. In Chapter 1 we surveyed a number of key doctrines from Avicenna’s logic and epistemology that presented the division of knowledge into primary and acquired conceptualizations and assents, and addressed the heuristic order of the basic “what” and “if” questions that correspond to these noetic acts. Chapter 2 elaborated the division of knowledge into conceptualization and assent by addressing the scientific perfection of knowledge acquired through definitions and demonstrations, which constitute the two fundamental pillars of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science. Chapters 3–4 moved inwards from these general epistemological and logical considerations of Avicenna’s theory of a demonstrative science to its application within the philosophical science of metaphysics. We examined at length the epistemological profile of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt, and in particular the division of Ilāhiyyāt i.1–8 into two tasks: presenting the subject and goal of first philosophy in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, and verifying the scientific principles of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8. The first task was explored in Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 initiated our extended investigation into the second task. By locating the scientific principles of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8, we thereby

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also established that the “middle term” of the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt stands between and connects the “minor term” of the Ilāhiyyāt, that is, the doctrine of being qua being in Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4, with the “major term” of the Ilāhiyyāt, that is, the myriad demonstrated conclusions accomplished throughout the course of the Ilāhiyyāt ii–ix’s various ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry ordered to the science’s ultimate goal. The next stage in our enquiry addressed what these scientific first principles are. This was accomplished in two parts. First, in Chapter 5 we examined the formal aspects of the scientific first principles, and established that Avicenna integrated his own version of the Aristotelian four senses of being into his account of the scientific first principles and their application to the investigation into the categories of being in Ilāhiyyāt i.5–ii.1. Second, in chapters 6–7 we explicated the material content of this integration of the four senses of being with the scientific principles. In particular, we focused on enucleating the primary notions and primary hypotheses of the science of metaphysics. Chapter 8 utilized the foregoing analysis of the integration of the four senses of being with the scientific principles to examine in detail Avicenna’s doctrine of the analogy and accidentality of existence (wujūd) and the application of these doctrines to the categories or quasi-species of being. In Chapter 9 we proved that being and necessary are the most basic primary notions in the Ilāhiyyāt. Finally, in Chapter 10 we showed that the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt by examining its fundamental role in his ontology, his aitiology, and especially its central role his theology arguments for the existence of God, for God’s essence as necessary existence in itself, and for his account of God’s necessary attributes, including the voluntary necessity of God’s creation by way of emanation. The investigations of the previous chapters have brought us to the final and innermost circle of our study. We can now address the question: why does the necessary bring us from the Ilāhiyyāt’s doctrine of being to the divine necessary existence, the ultimate aitiological and theological goal of the Ilāhiyyāt? In short, what function does the necessary—as the most fundamental scientific principle—perform in the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt? In brief, the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt is as follows: the scientific metaphysical enquiry of being qua being leads to demonstrative knowledge of the divine necessary existence in itself, because all beings are necessary. This argument is worked out through Avicenna’s application of the scientific principles to being qua being in the Ilāhiyyāt’s diverse ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry. Thus, substantial advances in the overall argument of the Ilāhiyyāt can be found throughout the Ilāhiyyāt, beginning with

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the presentation of the subject and goal of first philosophy (Ilāhiyyāt i.1–4) and Avicenna’s formulation of the scientific principles (Ilāhiyyāt i.5–8). It is upon this initial foundation that the central argument is developed in key doctrines that arise while treating such ontological topics as the quasi-species of being, that is, the categories of substance (Ilāhiyyāt ii) and accident (Ilāhiyyāt iii), and the quasi-proper accidents of being, such as prior and posterior (Ilāhiyyāt iv.1), act and potency (Ilāhiyyāt iv.2), perfect and imperfect (Ilāhiyyāt iv.3), universal and particular (Ilāhiyyāt v), cause and effect (Ilāhiyyāt vi), and the pseudo-ultimate causes of the Platonists and Pythagoreans (Ilāhiyyāt vii). This argument culminates in his account of the aitiological (Ilāhiyyāt viii.1–3) and theological goals (Ilāhiyyāt viii–ix) of the Ilāhiyyāt. The major stages of the central argument itself correspond to those doctrines from the Ilāhiyyāt that are integral to advancing from being qua being to the divine necessary existence; it is here that we find the necessary’s pivotal function in the overall arc of the Ilāhiyyāt. The function of the necessary, as the most fundamental scientific first principle in the whole of the Ilāhiyyāt, is to connect these major doctrines and so to link together the subject of metaphysics with the ultimate conclusions of its ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry that constitute the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt. The central argument is initiated by Avicenna’s identification of the subject of metaphysics with being qua being, but it is being’s coextensional primary notion necessary that directs and propels the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt forward to its ultimate theological goal. Following its introduction in Ilāhiyyāt i.5, the necessary is first applied to the task of verifying the primary hypotheses proper to metaphysics in i.6–7. Here, absolute being as necessary existence is divided into necessary existence in itself and possible existence in itself that is necessary existence through another. The extrinsic existential necessity of possible existents introduces causality into the Ilāhiyyāt, and has immediate implications for Avicenna’s ontology. The major conclusions of his ontology reveal that all quasi-proper accidents occur to the beings in the categories through their quiddity or existence; that all categorical accidents depend upon their substance; and all substances are caused possible existents that depend upon their extrinsic efficient cause of existence. Not only does the necessary ground the final conclusion of ontology—that all caused possible existents require some ultimate cause for their necessary existence through another—but it also directs the Ilāhiyyāt’s aitiological search for ultimate causes of possible existents that is initiated by the conclusion of the ontology of the Ilāhiyyāt. Furthermore, this aitiological enquiry into ultimate causes presupposes the Ilāhiyyāt’s ontological treatment of key

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causal doctrines that are established on the basis of the necessary and the primary hypotheses, such as the coexistence of cause and effect in per se causal orders, the necessity of a cause’s causation, the transitivity of necessity communicated by the cause to the effect, and the existential priority of a cause over its effect. These causal doctrines from the ontology are integral to the aitiology’s first major conclusion, that all per se causal orders are finite and that first causes exist for each of these finite per se causal orders. But the necessary is also employed in the ultimate aitiological conclusion that there exists a first efficient cause that is the absolute first cause of all the caused possible existents because it is the uncaused necessary existence in itself. Finally, the necessary plays the most prominent part in the theology of the Ilāhiyyāt’s conclusions that absolute uncaused first efficient cause of existence is the divine necessary existence in itself; that God is necessary existence in every respect; that all the divine attributes belong to God in virtue of being necessary existence in itself; and, that God’s creation of the emanative order of created possible existents is a necessarily voluntary creation because God is necessary existence in every respect. In short, the primary notion necessary grounds the primary hypotheses which ground the demonstrations, which ground the ultimate ontological, aitiological, and theological conclusions of the Ilāhiyyāt, and so, the necessary is the fundamental principle for our scientific knowledge of the ultimate divine cause, which is the ultimate goal of the science of being qua being. Hence, all of the demonstrated conclusions achieved in the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt’s many ontological, aitiological, and theological objects of enquiry ultimately depend upon the primary hypotheses or scientific principles of assent proper to metaphysics, and since all primary principles of assent are derived from the primary principles of conceptualization, and, finally, because the necessary is the most fundamental primary notion in the Ilāhiyyāt, the necessary is the most fundamental scientific principle employed in the central argument of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. What are we to make of the existential necessitarianism of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt? This is not the place to launch a defense or criticism of the Ilāhiyyāt, but we should conclude this study by drawing attention to some of the most important implications of our study’s conclusions. First, given that necessary existence fulfills the most fundamental function in the central argument of the Ilāhiyyāt and is the core of the Ilāhiyyāt, it is therefore appropriate to characterize the whole of the Ilāhiyyāt as putting forward an existential necessitarian metaphysical system. It is a metaphysical system, because it is a well ordered and executed metaphysical science that is clearly rooted in its first principles. For Avicenna’s metaphysical scientific first principles do in fact determine the

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contours and final conclusions of his metaphysical science. The ultimate conclusions of the Ilāhiyyāt’s ontology, aitiology, and theology were fixed the moment Avicenna’s conceptual gambit was made and the necessary was taken up into the primary notions of metaphysics and identified with the necessity of existence. Accordingly, it is imperative that exegetes reconcile their interpretations of his metaphysics with his existential necessitarianism. We have already shown the critical importance of reading the Ilāhiyyāt as a demonstrative philosophical science, especially in light of Avicenna’s logic, and that his doctrine of the composition and distinction of existence and essence cannot be adequately explicated independent from his doctrine of the necessary. The existential necessitarianism of the Ilāhiyyāt established in this monograph also has important consequences for a range of topics that we did not address in this study, such as how we interpret Avicenna’s account of divine providence and the problem of evil, and his treatment of natural and human agency. Looking beyond the Book of Healing, it will be of interest to compare this study’s account of Avicenna’s metaphysics with his own earlier and later works on metaphysics, as well as with the way his metaphysics was received and understood by later Arabic and Latin philosophers and theologians. Significantly, this study has touched upon controversial topics related to the doctrine of the transcendentals, the distinction and composition of existence and essence, the accidentality of existence to essence, the analogy of being, ontology, aitiology, theology, and the way the conclusions of metaphysics are related to the scientific principles of metaphysics. I hope the conclusions of this study will also help us to situate and to understand better Avicenna’s place among the doctrines of Aristotle, Aristotelians, Neoplatonists, the Mutakallimūn, AlKindī’s circle, the Baghdad Peripatetics, Al-Fārābī as well as the way he was received and interpreted by al-Ghazālī, Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and others. To conclude: this enquiry has demonstrated that because the necessary (wājib) is the most fundamental primary notion it is thereby the most fundamental scientific first principle in the Metaphysics of the Healing. Consequently, since it is the most fundamental scientific first principle, the necessary therefore functions as the core middle term of the central argument of the Metaphysics of the Healing that brings us from Avicenna’s doctrine of being to the divine necessary existence.

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Index Acar, Rahim 165, 375, 378, 381–382 abstraction 35, 38, 47, 115, 126–7, 253n, 298n, 300 accident 6–7, 19–20, 39–40, 42, 44, 46–49, 54–56, 76–81, 108, 115, 128, 132–133, 147, 186–187, 194, 198, 202–206, 214–217, 223, 226–227, 258, 269, 295–296, 301–303, 310–336, 380, 389 accidental / essential 6–7, 18, 38–53, 76, 80–81, 84, 135–137, 184–189, 192, 197–199, 215, 224, 243, 258, 281, 297, 299, 308, 314–336, 351, 357–359, 364–365, 375, 388, 391 See also being: quasi-accidents / properties; constitutive / nonconstitutive act and potency 5, 130, 135, 143–144, 175–176, 184–190, 193, 199–201, 203, 206–211, 215–219, 226, 263, 265, 270, 274–275, 282–283, 288–289, 323n56, 352–355, 376–377, 382–383 See also senses of being Adamson, Peter 237n50, 250n73-n74, 251n76, 252n79, 254n84, 272n6, 280n31, 378n19, 381n28 Aertsen, Jan 153n4, 225n11, 344n4, 369n6 Ahmed, Asad 35n4, 59n79 aitiology 7, 95, 98, 101–102, 106–124, 136, 138, 140–142, 148, 177–178, 184, 209, 218–219, 272, 310, 333, 339–340, 355, 370–379, 385–391 Alexander of Aphrodisias 99n11, 100, 111, 189n19, 271 analogy absolute analogies 300–305, 310 by priority / posteriority 194, 197–198, 202, 217, 235, 255–256, 291, 295–297, 301–314, 319, 321, 323n56, 334, 364–365 by worthiness / appropriateness 291– 292, 301–302, 305, 310–311, 364–365 by intensity 292, 301–305, 364–365 of being 109, 205, 216–217, 255, 292–293, 295–314, 319–320, 322, 335–336 of divine attributes 380 of existence 295–314, 324, 364–365, 368 of necessary 364–365, 367

of one 103, 254–256, 334, 343, 346 of truth 213, 290–292 pros hen equivocation 96, 206, 297 relational analogies 304–305, 310 resemblance 298–299, 305, 310 See also univocity; equivocity; transcategorical Aquinas, Thomas 189n19, 244n65, 265–266, 391 Aristotle 5, 14, 16, 22–24, 36, 54, 71–72, 74, 81–83, 86, 89, 91, 116, 143, 152, 158, 163, 178–179, 200–201, 208–211, 213–214, 237–238, 246, 248, 250–251, 264, 265, 268–269, 271–274, 289, 298, 312, 376–377 De Interpretatione 36 Metaphysics 96–107, 110–111, 117, 140n136, 143, 171n47, 183–190, 194, 196n46, 199–202, 205–206, 213–220, 234, 246n67, 250–252, 259, 268–269, 271–272, 290, 297, 311–312, 321, 372, 376–377, 388, 391 Outline of 96–97 Posterior Analytics 16, 23, 55, 74, 76n123, 81–82, 91, 106n33, 110–111, 151–152, 191, 193, 269 Prior Analytics 16, 71 Arnzen, Rüdiger 82n140 Asclepius 99n11, 111, 260, 271 Ašʿarites 235–237, 240 assent (taṣdīq) 3–4, 18–38, 56–58, 61–78, 81, 83–92, 112, 115–119, 125, 129, 131, 135, 150–179, 198, 221–223, 245, 251, 262, 269, 273, 275, 278, 285–286, 292, 339, 347, 367, 387, 390 See also demonstration; principles; syllogism Averroes (Ibn Rushd) 17n7, 82n140, 104n27, 189n19, 190–191, 195, 198n49, 199, 244n65, 319, 391 Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) Metaphysical education of 99, 104–107 Avicenna’s Healing (šifāʾ) 1, 16 Logic. Book of Categories 16, 54–56, 297–306, 325–327 Logic. Book of Demonstration 16, 23, 25, 27–30, 33–34, 38n14, 40–41, 64, 66, 74–76, 79–80, 85–87, 120n73,

Index 140–141n137, 143n147 & n149, 228n13, 290n51, 355n35 Logic. Book of Dialectic 16, 298n8 Logic. Book of Propositions 16, 34n2, 37n10, 57, 59, 60, 62, 232 Logic. Book of Syllogism 16, 37, 72 Logic. Isagoge 15–20, 36, 39n15, 40–42, 44n33, 46, 62, 115, 127, 329–330, 345n7 Metaphysics central argument of 2–3, 8, 13, 95, 372–374, 387–391 outlines of 108, 112 Physics 25, 56n71, 87n157, 91n168, 107n34, 134–135, 176, 243n63, 244, 274n8, 306–309 Psychology 54–55 Avicenna, works of Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī. Logic 68n104 Discussions 323–324 Pointers (Išarāt) Logic 15, 18, 24n27, 27–29, 34n2, 37, 42–48, 56, 66–71, 76n24, 79–80, 83n143, 84, 88, 91n169, 153, 160, 202, 317, 320, 329n64 Metaphysics 225, 305, 332n70, 335n35 Salvation (Najāt) Logic 15, 21, 24–30, 34–36, 38–44, 46–47, 50–54, 57, 59, 64–67, 72–74, 77–81, 83, 85–86, 90–91, 113, 153, 162n31, 175, 330 Physics 88 Avicennian 147n163, 263, 268, 295n1 axiom 4–6, 65–69, 81, 82n140, 83, 87–89, 96, 109, 111, 150–159, 163–179, 183, 201, 211–214, 217–220, 223, 269, 270, 290–293, 339 See also contradiction, principle of Bäck, Allan 260n98, 272n6 Baghdad Peripatetics 237n50, 391 being (mawjūd) 5, 36, 52, 103, 124–125, 128–140, 148–150, 157, 172, 191–199, 202–203, 206, 215–220, 221–238, 241–257, 267, 282, 289, 295–297, 311, 327–328, 348–360, 362–371, 375, 378, 385, 388–391 absolute being (mawjūd muṭlaq) 52, 79, 88, 102–103, 108–109, 136–137, 202–208, 217, 226–227, 258, 291, 297, 308, 322, 341, 389 being per se 5–6, 47n48, 158, 185–206, 212–222, 226–227, 235, 247, 253,

419 269–270, 293–297, 300–303, 310–314, 317, 321 being per accidens 6, 47n48, 158, 185–188, 194, 199–201, 212–220, 294, 310, 314, 317–323, 332, 335 quasi-species of 55, 106, 109, 132–133, 201–204, 214–221, 227, 258, 280–281, 287, 294, 318, 335, 362, 388–389 quasi-accidents / properties of 49, 110, 119n68, 132–133, 159, 318, 320, 322, 332–334, 341 senses of 5–6, 13, 40, 179, 183–222, 289, 294–295, 310, 321, 335–336, 388 See also analogy; common notions; existence; transcategorical Benevich, Fedor 39n18, 41n22, 45n36, 316n40, 322n55, 323n57, 326n59 Bertolacci, Amos 1n2, 58n77, 76n23, 79n131, 82n141, 87n158, 89n161, 96, 99–157, 164n33, 165n39, 167, 175, 200n52, 205n61, 208n65, 214n78, 222n2, 223–224, 230n21, 246n67, 251–252, 263, 288, 295n1, 314, 315n38, 328–331, 350–354, 369n6, 380–381n27 Black, Deborah 16n5, 18–19n13, 20, 35n5, 37, 53n64, 63, 66n100, 67, 70–74, 155n15, 246n67, 263 categories 16, 27, 39–50, 54–56, 92, 103, 109, 128–133, 138–139, 147, 152n1, 157–159, 168, 185–189, 193–206, 214–229, 247n68, 253–260, 267–269, 287, 294–322, 325, 328, 330, 332–334, 341–343, 350n19, 380, 388–389 See also being per se; senses of being; transcategorical cause and effect 1–4, 32, 42–43, 52–55, 78n129, 90–91, 96–99, 101–103, 106–111, 116–117, 120–125, 128, 131–143, 145–149, 158–160, 166, 169–179, 183–190, 203, 206, 209–213, 218, 226, 258–260, 265–267, 270–294, 304–305, 310, 313, 318, 321–323, 326–327, 331–334, 339, 341, 352–360, 380n27, 387–390 efficient cause of existence 6–8, 28–29, 42–43, 135, 209–211, 249–250, 265, 278–279, 282, 304–305, 310, 318, 327, 331–333, 350n19, 352–355, 358–360, 363–380, 383–390

420 four causes 29, 53, 96–97, 108–109, 121–123, 304, 310, 354–355, 372–374, 377 See also aitiology; principles: causal principles certainty (yaqīn) 61–75, 82n140, 83, 85–92, 109n37, 117–119, 122, 140–145, 151–152, 163, 177, 263–264 principles / propositions of certitude (yaqīniyyāt) 66, 85–92, 151, 163 cogitative power (quwwa mufakkira) 38n14, 64–65 See also estimative power; imagination conceptualization (taṣawwur) 3–5, 8, 17–57, 61, 68–69, 75–92, 112, 116, 119, 127, 151–171, 177–179, 195–196, 221–270, 278, 292–293, 298, 305, 311–312, 325–326, 339–351, 367–369, 387, 390–391 See also definition; notions; principles concomitant (lāzim) 6, 18, 39–48, 80, 205, 224–226, 236, 240, 244–245, 249, 253–254, 258–259, 281, 288, 308, 314–336, 341–359, 365–366, 384 subordination 7, 40–42, 225, 247, 250, 329–330, 344n4, 346–347, 349–360 See also predicables; separable / inseparable constitutive (muqawwim) / nonconstitutive (ġayr muqawwim) 7, 40–53, 80–81, 250, 308, 316–336, 341–350, 355–359, 365 See also accidental / essential contradiction, principle of 66, 69, 96, 156, 275 See also axioms, principles of demonstration creation 2, 8, 108, 110, 146n161, 235, 304, 373n12, 375–379, 383–386, 388, 390 D’Ancona, Cristina 99n11, 101n16, 250n73-n74 Davidson, Herbert 154nn6–7, 260n98, 263, 264n109, 272n6, 276n15, 280n31, 356n40, 372nn9–10 De Haan, Daniel 27n33, 63n92, 69n105, 109n36, 120n71, 129n103, 146n161, 154n6, 212n73, 214n78, 253n83, 274n10, 280n31, 285n43, 290n49, 295n1, 376n17 definition (ḥadd) 18, 21–22, 27, 30–31, 34–41, 48–56, 73–78, 81–92, 108, 116, 129, 131, 151–152, 155–170, 175, 196–198, 223–224,

Index 229–233, 243–244, 256, 261, 308, 330, 334, 352n23, 355n35, 380n24, 383n39, 385 principles of definition 15, 86, 89, 151, 155, 157, 162n31, 163–164, 166, 170, 223 See also conceptualization; predicables; principles demonstration (burhān) 1–4, 8, 13–18, 27–33, 37, 53, 55, 63–67, 70–92, 95, 106n33, 109, 113, 118–121, 125, 130–131, 134–136, 139, 141, 144–150, 154–156, 161, 163, 166, 171, 179, 183, 210, 212–213, 219, 275, 282, 285, 287, 291, 292n54, 325, 339, 375–380, 385–388, 390–391 principles of demonstration 6, 15, 70, 82n140, 86–89, 151, 154–156, 162n31, 163–164, 166, 171–174, 177, 213–214, 217, 220, 290–293 See also science; syllogism Di Vincenzo, Silvia 39n18, 41n22, 42n28, 45n36, 46n39, 316n40, 322n55 Druart, Thérèse-Anne 53n64, 56n72, 153n4, 190n21, 196n45, 225n10, 229n14, 235n43, 236n46, 243n60, 295n1, 316n39, 321n54, 344n4, 349n17, 350n19 Eichner, Heidrun 74n120, 76n124, 82n140, 86n152, 135n119, 153n2 emanation 1–2, 13, 35n5, 108, 110, 353, 384–385, 388 Endress, Gerhard 237n50, 250 enquiry, objects of 1, 4, 13, 21, 23, 77–79, 81, 84, 87, 89, 95, 106–124, 132, 137–139, 141–142, 145–148, 153, 160–163, 177–179, 203, 206, 217–219, 287, 339, 349–350n19, 361–362, 370–371, 374–375, 386, 388–390 basic questions 3, 22–35, 46–47, 53–57, 61, 77–78, 81–84, 91–92, 113–118, 131, 161, 167–171, 191–193, 223, 238, 245–246, 251, 278, 347, 387 heuristic order of basic scientific questions 3, 8, 31–32, 122, 350n19 See also epistemological profile entity (huwiyya) 230, 233–234, 250–252, 266, 284 entitative principle / part 6–7, 231–232, 241–245, 250–259, 262–267, 284, 289, 309, 318, 329, 331–332, 335–336, 341–342, 346, 349–351, 356–364, 368

Index entitative whole 6, 224, 231, 244–245, 253–255, 266, 329–331, 336, 342, 363 essence (ḏāt) 5–7, 17, 25–31, 36–37, 42, 50–54, 153, 189–190, 232–254, 257, 262, 265, 268–269, 287–288, 312, 315–316, 323–324, 327–333, 336, 341, 344–360, 367–368, 378, 381–384, 388, 391 essence (huwiyya) 344–345, 252 See also whatness, true-nature essentialism 196n46, 202, 234, 237, 244–251, 262, 312 estimative power (wahm) 36, 65, 67, 245, 328 See also cogitative power, imagination equivocity 295–310 See analogy; univocity established (muṯbat) / established existence (wujūd iṯbātī) 203–204, 230–237, 241–253, 257–258, 263, 266–268, 278, 311–312, 326, 340–341, 362–364, 368–369 See also realized evil 303n15, 381–382, 391 excluded middle 4, 66n98, 96, 155n13, 164, 296 no middle between affirmation and negation 59, 66n, 69, 109, 163, 166, 171, 173–174, 212–213, 217, 275, 290–292 See also axioms; principles of demonstration existence (wujūd) 5–6, 39–40, 45, 57, 117n64, 125–129, 131–132, 137, 140, 151, 153, 157, 172, 192–199, 202–207, 215–216, 231–251, 257–269, 271–273, 284, 288, 297–315, 318–336, 339–360, 361–391 act of existence 265–266, 288–289 intrinsic / extrinsic construal of existence 7, 266–267, 288–289, 294, 326–327, 333, 362–368, 371, 385 mental / extramental existence 17, 26, 193, 196–198, 235–237, 240, 319n50, 344–345 specific to be (wujūd ẖāṣṣ, esse proprium) 153, 231–233, 244–250, 351 real distinction / composition of existence and essence 153, 258, 265, 278, 287, 315n39, 316, 328, 333, 343, 346–347, 358, 363, 391 See also constitutive; necessary; necessary existence; possible existence

421 existent (mawjūd) See being existential 39, 57, 62, 117n64, 122, 128, 131n108, 226, 240–244, 251, 253, 255, 262–263, 266–269, 272, 278, 319, 325, 331–333, 347–349, 351, 356–371, 375, 389–390 existential determination 7, 279, 334–335, 347–348, 354 existential necessity 264, 366, 383, 389–391 existentialism 234, 250–251, 262, 269, 272, 292, 312 existentially neutral 27, 37, 198–199n50, 226, 250, 367 existential-thatness (anniyya) 113n51, 117, 131, 137, 231n29, 233, 237, 251–253, 266, 278, 314, 315n38, 357, 380–381 extension / coextensional 5–7, 51–52, 96, 147, 172, 188, 203–205, 222–227, 231, 236, 242, 253–255, 258–259, 262–263, 267–269, 273, 291, 296–300, 312, 320, 322, 334, 341–344, 349–351, 359, 361, 369n6, 380n27, 385, 389 Al-Fārābī 17n7, 18, 22–23, 63n93, 74n120, 82n140, 99, 102–106, 111, 113, 133, 138, 183, 190–199, 202, 208, 219, 234–237, 246–247, 250, 260, 263, 268, 290, 391 fictional entities 53, 235n43, 240 form 53, 68, 73–74, 78n129, 87, 97, 126, 134–135, 189–190, 197, 238–239, 241, 244, 253n83, 265, 305, 311–313, 352–355, 358, 372–374, 378–379 Frank, Richard 235–236, 250n74 genus 39, 42, 44n33, 46–53, 78–79, 90, 97, 103, 109n37, 132–133, 197, 223, 280–282, 295–296, 312–313, 316–326, 329–330, 380n24, 383n39 Al-Ghazālī 391 Gilson, Étienne 153n4, 216n83, 247n69, 265n110, 312n31, 316n39, 330n66 God attributes 8, 379–386, 390 existence of 2–3, 8, 25, 29, 117–120, 146n161, 149, 154, 177, 285, 371–378, 386–391 first cause 2, 4, 29, 101, 110–111, 116–117, 121–123, 135–143, 210, 218, 310, 372–379, 387, 390

422 God (Cont.) goodness 8, 379–386 necessary voluntary creation 1–2, 13, 377–378, 383–388, 390 one 102, 377–385 thing 369n6, 380–381n27 true-nature is necessary existence in itself 357–358, 378–385, 387 truth 141, 290, 379, 382n31, 385–386 See also necessary; necessary existence good 8, 97, 109n37, 142, 222n2, 303n15 Gutas, Dimitri 1n1, 14n1, 15n3, 16n5, 55, 101n15, 104, 134n116, 190n21, 237n50, 250n74, 324n58 Hasse, Dag 35n, 155n15 henology 107n35, 108, 110n39, 147–148, 254, 268, 343, 347 Houser, R.E. 69n105, 77n125, 86n152, 96, 102n19, 106n33, 109n37, 110–111, 154n6 & n9, 157, 165n39, 167, 170n46, 177, 208n66, 214n78, 274n10, 277n18, 280n30, 291n52, 348n16, 378n19 hylomorphism 352, 356, 358–359 See also form; matter hypothesis 4–6, 81, 109, 111, 135, 152–157, 163–164, 172, 175–179, 201, 206–214, 217–220, 223, 269–293, 308, 313, 320, 327, 331, 345–346, 356–359, 362–364, 367–368, 373–381, 385, 389–390 causal / compositional properties 6, 166, 169–174, 211, 270, 274–283, 286, 292–293, 327, 331, 367, 375–377 See also assent; principles imagination 38, 44, 65, 74, 228n13, 256 See also cogitative power immaterial 52, 109–111, 226, 244, 283, 313, 348, 352, 356, 385 impossible (mumtaniʿ) 7, 59–62, 155, 168, 176, 229–231, 240, 259, 261–262, 272–273, 322, 342, 356–358 Inati, Shams 35n4, 49n53, 66–67n100, 70n109 in itself / through another 39n16, 167, 171–173, 174n50, 177, 290, 317–320, 324–327, 331–335, 369–371, 375, 380n27

Index intellect 18–19, 35–39, 42, 61–68, 115, 122, 145–146, 159–160, 162n31, 195–196, 222–223, 238–240, 256–257, 272, 298–299, 313, 328, 362–363, 381–386 intention / intension / meaning (maʿnā) 5– 6, 17–20, 25–26, 29–31, 37–56, 61, 65, 69, 84, 118, 125, 128–131, 137, 143, 152n1, 159, 164–165, 168, 170, 184, 187, 192–196, 203–205, 224–236, 241–268, 280–282, 295–305, 341–371, 380n27, 385 first and second intentions 17–18, 39, 41–42, 92, 126–128, 136–137, 193–198, 235, 247n68, 319 intensional priority / subordination 7, 222, 340–371, 385 intensional unity See analogy Janssens, Jules 54n68, 216n83, 229n14, 283n40, 372n10, 375n16 kalām 253 Al-Kindī 99–102, 104n27, 106, 117, 124, 191, 246n67, 250–252, 391 knowledge primary / acquired 21–22, 29–36, 48, 50, 56–56, 64–65, 71–75, 88–92, 131, 173–174, 387 See also assent; conceptualization; demonstration; science Lameer, Joep 19n15, 34n2, 35n4 Lammer, Andreas 19n15, 35n4, 65n96, 67n100, 81n137, 82nn140–141, 84n147, 85n149, 86n152, 243n63 Liber de Causis 111 Lizzini, Olga 142nn141–142, 146n161, 153n4, 154n5, 155n15, 196n45, 207n63, 209n70, 225n11, 229n14, 234nn40–41, 247n69, 250nn73–74, 283, 285n42, 315n39, 350–351, 352n24, 354n33, 355 logic 3–4, 8, 13–18, 27–28, 32, 35–37, 39n16, 55, 58–61, 70–76, 92, 105, 108, 115, 119, 126–128, 136–137, 160, 174, 178, 191, 228, 238–240, 260–262, 315n38, 343, 387, 391 matrix of logical distinctions 34–56, 92, 217, 224–225, 316–317, 329–330 subject of logic 16–17, 92, 126

Index Marmura, Michael 17, 75n122, 126n95, 155n15, 207, 230n21, 237n49, 242n59, 249n71, 263–264, 296n3, 315n39, 375n15, 376n17 mathematics 14, 86–88, 105, 108, 115–121, 126–127, 133, 136–138, 144–145, 156n16, 174–175, 226, 255 matter 16, 29, 52–53, 68, 87, 97–98, 109–110, 115–116, 120–121, 126–129, 134–137, 140–141, 144, 197, 226–227, 238–240, 244, 265, 273, 283–285, 304–305, 310–313, 352–355, 358, 372–374, 377–379, 382 neutrally nonmaterial / immaterial 109– 111, 126–130, 137, 203, 226–227, 297 Maurer, Armand 244n65 McGinnis, Jon 20n18, 25n29, 29n41, 35nn4–5, 53n62, 58, 61nn84–85, 75n122, 91n168, 102n19, 104n26, 123n83, 153n4, 154n7, 155n15, 209n70, 260n98, 264, 265n112, 272n6, 280n31, 283n40, 352n24, 375n16, 378n19, 382n33 Menn, Stephen 17n7, 165n39, 183–185, 189–201, 207–209, 225n11, 234n37-n38, 239n54, 247n68, 295n1 metaphysics after nature 88, 102, 144 divine science 78, 88, 98, 102, 106, 115–117, 120, 124–127, 139–143 goal / ultimate objects of enquiry 1–2, 4–8, 13, 102–106, 110–113, 117–120, 124–125, 132, 139, 141, 144–149, 218–221, 304, 339, 370, 374–375, 387–390 epistemological profile of 1, 3, 13–14, 33, 48–49, 75–76, 92, 95, 106–113, 118, 137, 147–149, 153–154, 178–179, 183, 190, 216–218, 221, 226, 387 subject of 1–6, 84n146, 95, 99, 106–141, 148–149, 160–161, 172–173, 203–206, 215–216, 219, 226–227, 255, 368–371, 374, 377, 387, 389 universal science 88, 96–98, 102–103, 112, 115, 121, 136, 142, 160, 177, 350–351 See also aitiology; enquiry; ontology; theology modus tollens 28, 170, 276–279, 285 Mullā Ṣadrā 391 Mutakallimūn 191n23, 235, 236n45, 240, 391 Muʿtazilite 191n23, 235–237, 240, 249

423 nature (ṭabīʿa) 232–233, 243–244 natural philosophy / philosophy of nature / science of nature 68, 75, 78, 87–88, 102, 105, 108, 115–116, 119, 121, 126–127, 134–136, 143–146, 175n51, 176, 209–211, 226, 231n29, 243–244, 265, 274, 289, 294, 305–306, 354 hypotheses of natural philosophy 176– 177, 209, 211 See also act and potency necessary (ḍarūrī) 5, 59–61, 157, 199, 206, 221–222, 229, 231–233, 259–261 necessary (wājib) 232–234, 259–267, 361–391 logical necessary (ḍarūrī) / ontological necessary (wājib) 59–61, 260–261 necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd) 164– 179, 206–214, 232–234, 259–293, 302, 305, 308, 313–314, 317, 332, 358, 361–391 invariance of existence (taʾakkud al-wujūd) 232–233, 251, 261–268, 272–273, 278, 287–289, 297, 331, 341–342, 359, 367–369, 375, 385 permanence of existence (dawām al-wujūd) 60, 232–233, 260–261, 264, 266, 273 necessary existence through another 6, 63, 263–265, 271–290, 292n56, 294, 305, 314, 317–318, 326–327, 331–332, 335, 345–346, 362–371, 375–376, 379, 389 See also possible existence necessitarian metaphysics 264, 390–391 oneness / simplicity of 279–290, 378–383 uncaused 275–279, 282–283, 370–379 demonstration of existence of 2–3, 8, 95, 110, 154, 219, 285, 288, 346, 370–378, 386–388, 390 Neoplatonism 101–102, 111, 147n163, 235, 347, 391 noetic acts 3, 30–32, 35, 65, 339, 387 ideogenesis 38 nonbeing / nonexistence (ʿadam) 7, 57–62, 103, 155–157, 164–165, 185, 189, 191n23, 194n37, 199, 205n60, 230–231, 234–236, 240, 248–249, 260–262, 276–277, 283, 292, 332, 342, 368, 378–381 privation 58, 187, 194, 303n15, 305, 380n24

424 notions 223–224, 228n13, 312 common notions 45, 96, 111, 121, 129–130, 133–138, 143, 149, 159, 172, 175, 177, 202–203, 222n2, 223, 231, 275, 285, 297, 341 primary notions 27, 35, 49, 54, 65, 68–69, 84, 89, 95, 109, 111–112, 134, 150–179, 183, 201–206, 214–269, 273, 275, 278, 284–287, 291–297, 301, 305–306, 311–313, 316, 318–326, 331–336 basic primary notions 2–3, 7, 13, 233, 340–362, 385, 388 fundamental primary notion 2–3, 7–9, 13, 233, 333, 336, 340, 348, 361–391 opposites 203, 340–343 notional transformation notional amplification 5–6, 51–52, 136, 172, 222, 226–227, 241–242, 258, 266–268, 291–292, 296–297, 300, 305, 322, 334, 341, 369, 375, 379, 383 notional constriction 6, 51–52, 133, 136–137, 172–173, 202–206, 214, 217, 222–227, 249, 258, 268, 273, 291, 297, 300, 305, 322, 334, 341, 369, 380n27 one (wāḥid) 5–7, 52, 102–103, 140, 147–148, 159, 167, 202–205, 222, 225, 227, 230–233, 254–259, 268–269, 279–287, 296–297, 306–308, 316, 322, 328, 330–336, 340–348, 359, 362–363, 368, 372–373, 377–381, 383n39, 385 indivisible 6–7, 52, 81–83, 232–233, 255–259, 262–263, 268, 284, 297, 331, 334–335, 339, 341–343, 346–348, 359–360, 363, 368, 377, 385 indivisible to be (wujūd lā yanqasim) 232–233, 257–258, 268, 331, 346 See also unity ontology 6–7, 13, 39, 46, 58–61, 95, 98–99, 102, 106–114, 124–125, 131–133, 140–141, 148–149, 154, 166, 177, 192, 196–198, 201, 209, 212–214, 218–220, 224, 235–236, 240, 260–267, 272, 277, 284, 287–292, 297, 310, 314, 322, 339–379, 385–391 Owens, Joseph 96n1, 98–99, 184n2, 185n8, 187n14, 196n46, 225n11, 251n75, 265n110, 315n39, 345n9, 349n18

Index perfection 266n113, 303n15, 309–310, 381–384 philosophical theology 102, 106, 109n37, 250, 374, 377, 379 See also theology Plato 237n50, 238–239 Platonists 97, 108, 246n67, 248, 283, 350n19, 372, 389 Plotinus 250, 252 Porphyry 16, 39–40, 45–46 Porro, Pasquale 116n60, 128n101 possible (mumkin) 5–8, 58–63, 121, 133–138, 322 proper possible / common possible 60–63, 261 possible existence (mumkin al-wujūd) 109, 151–159, 165–178, 194n37, 199–200, 206–214, 217–219, 229–231, 240, 249–250, 259–267, 270–294, 304–310, 313–314, 318–320, 325–327, 331–335, 339–342, 345–350, 356, 358, 362–386, 389–390 predicables 7, 34, 39–41, 44–49, 54, 225, 280, 315–334, 343, 347, 349–350n19, 357 principles 34, 64–67, 70–71, 77, 82–83, 87–89, 117n64, 151, 162, 223, 304 causal principles 103, 106–110, 133–140, 143, 146–149, 177–179, 206, 222, 226–227, 258, 297, 322, 369–370n7, 373 common principles 86–89, 127, 134–135, 151, 152n1, 156, 178, 306 proper principles 86–89, 109, 111, 151, 152n1, 156, 178 scientific principles 3, 7–8, 81, 86, 90, 95, 106–112, 135, 139–155, 162–167, 175–179, 201, 206, 214, 217–227, 270, 292–294, 306, 339, 349–350n19, 351, 367, 375, 387–391 Proclus 111, 239n54, 250 Pythagoreans 372, 389 question See enquiry quiddity See whatness Rashed, Marwan 237n50, 238n51 Al-Rāzī 391

Index realized (muḥaṣṣal) 203–204, 230–237, 241–244, 249, 253, 266–267, 311, 326, 363–364 realized subsistence (mutaḥaṣṣal qiwām) 231–233, 241–242, 253, 266, 311–312, 348, 363 reductio ad absurdum 155, 168–171, 174, 285 Reisman, David C. 102n19, 104n26, 324n58 science / scientific knowledge (ʿilm) 3–4, 8, 14–15, 32–35, 61–64, 70–92, 95–98, 102–149, 151, 156–157, 160, 163, 175n51, 178, 190, 198n50, 221, 226–227, 339, 387 division of 14, 64, 96, 115–116, 119, 121, 125–131, 136 See also demonstration; metaphysics: epistemological profile of Scotus, John Duns 391 Schöck, Cornelia 265n112 semantic triangle 36–37, 298 semiotic order 37 separable / inseparable See also logic: matrix of logical distinctions 18, 40–48, 224–226, 236, 244–245, 249, 253–259, 283, 288, 300, 307–308, 311, 314–336, 341–348, 356–359, 365–366 separate from matter 98, 109–111, 120, 127–129, 137, 140–141, 189n18, 190, 238–238, 313, 352–356, 382 species 39, 42, 46–55, 80, 103, 107n35, 196, 223, 245–246, 253, 310–312, 317, 320, 329–330, 343 quasi-species 8, 106–109, 132–139, 147–149, 178–179, 201–206, 214–222, 226–227, 258, 280–282, 287, 294, 314, 317–318, 323–325, 335, 341, 362, 388–389 Street, Tony 15, 16n4, 58, 74n119 Strobino, Riccardo 16, 19n13, 20n18, 22–30, 35–36, 40–42, 45n36, 49n53, 50, 60–61, 64–65, 73–77, 228n13, 316n40, 331n67 subsistence (qiwām) 116–117, 127–129, 132, 137, 203–204, 231–233, 241–242, 253, 266, 311–312, 363–364 See also realized subsistence

425 substance 39–44, 54–56, 80, 108–109, 126–128, 132–133, 144, 147, 157–158, 185–190, 194–195, 198, 201–206, 209, 214–217, 226–227, 244, 249, 255n88, 258, 287, 292n54, 294–323, 330n66, 334, 343–346, 352–359, 370, 375, 380, 389 See also categories; species: quasi-species syllogisms 16–22, 27–37, 55, 61–92, 155, 160–165, 171–172, 177, 307–308 See assent; demonstration synonyms 51, 66, 117n64, 165, 168, 170, 203–205, 222, 225–237, 241–254, 257–259, 266, 288, 311, 315, 363 Taylor, Richard 375n16 theology 8–9, 13, 95–125, 135–142, 148–149, 212–213, 218–219, 235–241, 271–271, 290, 310, 370, 375–386, 388–391 thing (šayʾ) 5, 196n45, 222, 229–237, 242–262, 266–269, 273, 277–287, 291–292, 296–299, 304–305, 308–320, 324–336, 339–363, 368, 369n6, 373, 377, 380n27, 385 thingness (šayʾiyya) 232–233, 236–237, 240, 243, 249, 253 transcategorical / transcendental 5, 109n37, 121, 128–130, 136–139, 143, 152n1, 153, 159, 172, 176, 205–211, 217–219, 224–227, 255, 263–269, 270, 273–274, 293, 312, 318–323, 342, 346, 365, 380, 385, 391 See also analogy transcategorical disjunctives 172, 176, 207–211, 217–219, 265, 270, 318, 322–323 Treiger, Alexander 295n1, 297–298n7 true / truth (ḥaqq) 5, 20, 24–28, 31, 57–58, 61–69, 84–85, 90–92, 96, 98n2, 101, 119, 141, 159, 163, 166–167, 171, 172n48, 190, 193–199, 211–214, 218–220, 235, 243, 247, 290–292 true propositions 17n7, 18–19n13, 20, 26, 56–57, 60–62, 65, 68–69, 72, 90, 97, 160, 166, 174, 177, 185, 188–190, 195–198, 213–217, 220, 222, 243, 290 See also senses of being true-nature / truthness (haqīqa) 1–2, 8, 26–27, 43n30, 51, 61–63, 117n64, 231, 243, 245–250, 253, 280, 378, 380–381n27, 383 Al-Ṭūsī 391

426 unity (waḥda) 7, 35n4, 54, 77, 97, 103, 140, 222n2, 225, 232–233, 241, 254–259, 282, 303n15, 306, 323n56, 329–330, 341–348, 352n23, 373 accidentality of unity 333–335 unity of necessary existence in itself 8, 373, 377–379, 383n39, 386 unity and multiplicity 172, 256–258, 347 See also one universals and particulars 37–42, 45–48, 52, 66, 82n140, 97, 108, 109n37, 110, 121, 133, 135, 138, 147, 202, 208, 239n54, 240, 244, 315n38, 317, 322, 323n56, 341, 350n19, 370, 389 problem of 153, 243n63 univocity 128, 133, 194–198, 235, 295–310, 319, 325 whatness / quiddity (māhiyya) 5–7, 17, 26, 29, 34, 36, 39–46, 50–53, 78–81, 84, 130–131, 192–199, 216, 225, 230–233, 236–259, 266–269, 277–279, 284, 295–299, 305–336, 341–360, 363, 366–369, 377, 380–381n27, 385 existentially insufficient quiddity 277–279, 308, 320, 327

Index quidditative determination 7, 242, 279, 334, 347–348, 355 quiddity in itself 26, 240, 277–278, 332, 358–359 See also essence; thing; true-nature whichness (ayyiyya) 113–116, 124, 132, 139, 149, 160, 226 whole and part 66, 147, 208 mereology 108, 253n83 whole is greater than (the sum of) its parts 35n4, 38n14, 65–66, 68, 156 See also axiom; entity: entitative whole; demonstration: principles of demonstration Wisnovsky, Robert 7, 39n16, 99n11, 196n45, 209n70, 225n11, 232n32, 235n42, 236n45, 237n50, 240n55, 246n67, 259–260, 264, 271–272, 296n4, 349n18, 349–350n19, 355n37 Wolfson, Harry Austryn 35n4, 86n152, 155n15, 295n1 Yaḥyá ibn ʿAdī 100, 104n27, 237–240, 246n67, 260, 345 three modes of existence 237–240, 345