Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848 9789048536214

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Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848

Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848

Dean Kostantaras

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: Gustaf Wappers’s Episode of the September Days 1830, on the Grand Place of Brussels, painted in 1835. Royal Museums of Fine Arts of Belgium, Brussels. Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6298 518 6 e-isbn 978 90 4853 621 4 doi 10.5117/9789462985186 nur 685 © D. Kostantaras / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2020 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

To Carmen and Yianni, with love, on the beginning of their journeys.



Table of Contents

1. Introduction

9

2. Enlightenment Era Representations of the Nation

23

3. The Enlightenment Nation as a Site of Practice

51

4. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Inheritance

79

5. The Greek Revolution of 1821

107

6. Revolutions of 1830

137

7. Revolutions of 1848

173

8. Epilogue

203

Bibliography

209

About the Author

259

Index

261

1. Introduction Abstract The present chapter introduces readers to the major themes and lines of enquiry. Reference is also made to authors and works of both recent and earlier vintage which deal with similar questions and the manner in which their views cohere or conflict with the positions taken here. Keywords: Enlightenment, historiography, composite revolution

None of the trends which the peoples of Europe are following in our day is as difficult to interpret aright as the one which manifests itself in national aspirations.1

The words above are taken from a work by the Hungarian statesman Jozsef Eötvös (1813-1871) published in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions. Eötvös alludes to the novelty of the national ‘aspirations’ declared in the course of these and earlier upheavals, their diverse forms, and his difficulty in satisfactorily explaining the cause or causes of their relatively sudden appearance. Many of his contemporaries, including those with strong national convictions of their own, were similarly perplexed. As Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) wrote when trying to account for the rise of Greek national sentiment in his lifetime, ‘We see such a succession of cause and effect, such a concourse of varying circumstances, and yet all conspiring toward the same end, that it is quite impossible for me to assign to each its proper place in the sequence of events.’2 The difficulties of these earlier figures may provide some consolation for modern researchers when struggling themselves to reconstruct how, and again in a rather short space of time, the nation became an object of major importance in questions of collective identity and power. So 1 Eötvös, The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century, I, p. 109. 2 Korais, Mémoire, p. 15.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch01

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great in fact have been the changes rendered to the political geography of Europe in the intervening years that its modern history may simply be told, according to some, as the ‘history of nationalism.’3 Still, analytical problems, not unlike those articulated by the figures mentioned above, continue to resonate in contemporary debates. These same dilemmas press heavily on the present work, which represents yet another attempt to lend some coherence to the story while avoiding the teleological lapses or faulty ‘methodological’ dispositions cited in connection with previous efforts. 4 In terms of starting points, the year 1763 is proposed as a useful place to begin. Although the selection comes with some important caveats (see below), this year, which marks the end of the Seven Years’ War, is important for dating the constitutional struggle in France, into which debates concerning the condition of the nation, its constituents, and who was best positioned to lead it, were increasingly inducted. The centralizing policies instituted by Habsburg authorities in the aftermath of the same war served meanwhile to provoke controversies elsewhere in Europe where the rights of the nation, or even the right to a ‘national existence,’ also obtained a prominent hearing. In short, the power struggles of these years, culminating in France with the overthrow of the monarchy, afford a compelling view of how principles such as ‘national sovereignty’ were widely debated and put into practice. But before entering the political sphere, the nation had, in the words of David Bell, experienced an ‘efflorescence’ of usage ‘across a wide cultural front’ and even came, by century’s end, to ‘possess a talismanic power.’5 Accordingly, the investigation of this phenomenon, critical for our understanding 3 Caplan and Feffer, Europe’s New Nationalism, p. 3. 4 This tendency was especially pronounced in earlier nationalism studies, John Breuilly once wrote, which often portrayed the rise of such sentiment in the manner of ‘some gradually unfolding development to which virtually everything is relevant.’ Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 443. As Roger Chartier once wrote similarly on the origins of the French Revolution: ‘Under what conditions is it legitimate to set up a collection of scattered and disparate facts or ideas as “causes” or “origins” of an event?’ Such a method provides a retrospective ‘unity,’ Chartier continued, ‘to thoughts and actions supposed to be “origins” but foreign to one another, heterogeneous by their nature and discontinuous in their realization.’ Chartier, Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, p. 4. These points relate finally to the still more recent critique of what has been called ‘methodological nationalism,’ or a tendency on the part of scholars from a range of fields to treat the nation-state in a way that obscures all the ‘doubts and uncertainties’ surrounding its emergence. In the words of Chernilo, ‘methodological nationalism presupposes that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity and that the nation-state becomes the organising principle around which the whole project of modernity cohered.’ Chernilo, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Its Critique,’ p. 129. 5 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 7, 25; Bell, ‘Le Caractère national,’ p. 869.

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of the rhetoric surrounding the upheavals of 1789, leads us farther back into the century. The results obtained from this research, which complements also the work of scholars such as Berger, Leerssen, Hirschi, and Slimani, to name a few, reveals significant weaknesses in previous accounts of both the prevalence and representation of ‘the nation’ in European culture in the decades preceding the French Revolution.6 Eric Hobsbawm’s and Ernest Gellner’s famous works are typical of these faults. Both in fact characterize Enlightenment thought on the subject as sporadic in nature with little bearing on what came later. There is, consequently, no indication of the large volume of literature, across a range of genres, engaged with questions (which became fixtures of later political debates) concerning ‘the nation’ and its standing as a ‘moral being’ with the capacity both for perfection and degeneration.7 In defense of these earlier works, their attention was more heavily trained on the nineteenth century and developments such as those in the socio-economic sphere which necessitated the institutionalization of the ‘high cultures’ Gellner deemed essential to nation-state formation, or ‘interventions’ from above of an identity-shaping order intended to bolster the ‘foundations’ of threatened dynasties, elites, and traditional modes of rule.8 These and other aspects of Hobsbawm’s and Gellner’s thought certainly remain relevant for our understanding of the later nationalization of European life, but provide an inadequate view of how the condition and regeneration of the nation

6 Text refers to works such as Berger, The Past as History; Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism; Leerssen, National Thought in Europe; and Slimani, La Modernité du concept. As indicated in Chapter 4, Hroch, a major influence on earlier scholars such as Hobsbawm, has also reconsidered his views of late and expressed greater appreciation for the importance of developments in the cultural sphere. 7 A similar critique could be made of Elie Kedourie’s influential Nationalism. Again, one may ask how an entity which led such a shadowy existence in pre-revolutionary culture, to judge at least from this work (which refers sporadically to the Encyclopédie, Montesquieu, and conventions regarding the organization of student bodies at medieval universities), could become the major concern of later actors. Kedourie, Nationalism, pp. 5-7. The result is a highly attenuated portrait and one which promotes conceptions of a stark ‘dichotomy’ (see below) between Western and Eastern European modes of development. Kedourie’s remarks on the place of language in national discourse relies heavily, for example, on German sources (and mainly of later vintage). The reader thus gains little sense of how commonplace the ideas attributed to these thinkers were and especially the degree to which they were present in French and British texts. Ibid., pp. 60-64. 8 Text refers to Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, and Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism. Gellner’s thesis is, for example, reconsidered below in connection with the historiography of the Czech and Flemish movements (Chapters 6 and 7).

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gained such high standing in pre-revolutionary era political culture.9 In the case finally of Anderson’s Imagined Communities, to cite another centerpiece of the theoretical canon, the idea of ‘nationality’ is posed as suddenly springing upon the scene ‘towards the end of the 18th century’; a ‘cultural artifact’ created from a ‘spontaneous distillation’ of ‘discrete historical forces’ and concurrent advances in print capitalism.10 However, Anderson rarely discusses the cultural understandings and uses of the terms in question, and thus gives little indication as to why the ‘imagined linguistic community’ created by such forces should be construed as a ‘nation’ or have ‘national’ significance for people at the time.11 This is not intended to dismiss Anderson’s claims regarding the importance of certain developments that may have abetted changes in consciousness or identity; however, the semantic conventions brought to light here, in which nation and language were closely associated, may rather be conceived as providing the missing deductive step for theories of this kind. In supplying greater detail to the picture of Enlightenment era understandings and representations of the nation, the present work aims therefore to depict how developments in the sphere of ideas influenced the terms of political debate in France and elsewhere, as witnessed in the diverse pronouncements concerning the cause of the nation’s characteristic ‘lightness’ and other defects impeding its quest for ‘regeneration.’12 This is not to suggest that ideas concerning the nation, or ideas more generally, caused the revolution; but one may at least gain from these sections an understanding of the retinue of ideas, conjectures, and claims from which contemporary actors drew when responding to the crises of their times.13 It follows that the reader can expect a substantial dose of intellectual history in Chapters 2 and 3, with particular importance given to the widespread use and perceived serviceability of the ‘nation’ as a means to examine the causes of the manifest diversity in human manners as well as the ‘rules 9 See, for example, Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 7. 10 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 4. 11 When writing similarly of the ‘conceptual assumptions that make nationalism look too modern in modernist theories,’ Hirschi refers to Anderson’s claim that the ability to ‘think the nation,’ was dependent upon modern circumstances. He goes on to illuminate semantic conventions from earlier periods explicitly linking nation, language, character, and even sovereignty in ways that are customarily thought to be of much more recent vintage, and thus independent of the rise of secularization, print capitalism, or other attributes of modern times said to be crucial in this connection. Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism, p. 30. 12 See, for example, Bell, ‘The Unbearable Lightness.’ 13 See, for example, Breuilly, ‘Changes in the Political Uses of the Nation,’ p. 93; Baker, ‘Enlightenment Idioms.’

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of social evolution.’14 As proclaimed by Voltaire in his sprawling Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations, ‘What is most interesting for us is the noticeable difference among the espéces of men who populate the four known parts of our world.’15 The ventures conducted in this vein included many studies directed toward questions surrounding the formation of ‘national characters,’ as well as numerous works of history (ranging in form from universal to philosophical) into which nations and their manners were inducted as the principal units of comparison and analysis. The lessons gained from the examination of national characters were believed to have implications also for linguistic studies, and of course theories of governance. As Rousseau observed, much knowledge was yet wanted ‘on the real features which distinguish nations’ if contemporary thinkers were to have a full picture of their world and the challenges of fashioning lasting political bonds.16 It is important to add that Enlightenment thinkers were not in this case inventing entirely new modes of analysis or genres of enquiry, the idea of national characters having long-ago appeared on the conceptual landscape. Questions nevertheless persist over the cause of the contemporary enthusiasm for anthropological endeavors of this kind, with speculations on the role of print culture, secularization, Jansenism, and the proliferation of travel literatures continuing to provoke debate. These problems notwithstanding, the explosion of studies directed toward charting and accounting for the differences cited above raised the nation’s entry in contemporary letters to a high rate of incidence. Greater knowledge of the cultural context also helps to dispel, as Maria Todorova and other scholars observe, a still pervasive, yet false understanding of a dichotomy between an original Western-Enlightened-civic national ideal, and an Eastern-Romantic-ethno-linguistic successor.17 The ensuing pages demonstrate in fact the considerable volume of literature produced in France and Britain which not only explored the interdependence between language, manners, and nation, but placed them in a state of coterminous perfectibility. As Diderot observed in his entry for ‘Encyclopédie’ in the work of the same name, the educated observer may ‘solely on the comparison of the vocabulary of a nation in different times […] form an idea of its progress.’18 There even appears to have been something of a linguistic arms race in 14 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, pp. 38. 15 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 4. 16 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 159. 17 See, for example, Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 331. Text refers to Todorova, ‘Is There Weak Nationalism?’ Additional critiques of this kind are discussed in Chapter 2. 18 Encyclopédie (1755), V, p. 637.

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progress during the period, perhaps triggered by the publication of the French Academy’s Dictionnaire (1694). The stakes, according at least to Samuel Johnson, were great: Should the ‘academicians’ succeed, he warned, in colonizing the language of arts and sciences, the English would soon find themselves (the signs were already unmistakable) ‘babbling a dialect of French.’19 In addition to indicating what readers can expect to find in the volume, it may also be appropriate to note some omissions. On one hand, space limitations necessitate that many parts of Europe and the European colonial world receive, unfortunately, minimal attention. Similarly, no attempt is made to narrate in great detail the events of the era. Suffice to say, one could hardly expect to capture here the complexity of a crisis such as 1848 which touched nearly the whole of continental Europe, or do justice, for that matter, to the mass of quality scholarship, in many languages, expended upon that upheaval or those which came before. Narrative interludes are thus intended only to introduce certain historiographical problems concerning the study of European nationalism raised by the events under review. Finally, the ensuing discussion and analysis does not delve greatly into the primordial-modern debate on the supposed vintage of nations, one outcome of which has been an extended dialogue over the nature of various entities, from ancient Armenia to Second Temple Judea, deemed to give testimony (according to the definition held by one author or another) of the perennial quality of nation-formation.20 Instances of collective sentiment and action that might be retrieved from the past are certainly not without interest for historians; however, the enumeration of such episodes obscures the significance of subsequent events and mentalities, and above all, the novelty of claims such as those articulated by a Slovak patriot in 1834 that ‘it would be the worthiest and most appropriate if states were formed in such a way as to cover the territory of a single nation.’21 In short, the problem addressed here is primarily a modern one.22 Some readers may also impute a modernist or constructivist 19 Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, II, pp. 37, 52, 64. 20 See, for example, Grosby, ‘The Primordial, Kinship and Nationality’, pp. 52-78. 21 Šuhajda, ‘Magyarism in Hungary,’ p. 352. 22 This distinction was also recognized by figures, such as John Armstrong, who are commonly associated with the ‘perennialist’ camp. ‘Like most scholars,’ as Anthony Smith once wrote of the latter, ‘Armstrong regards nationalism, the ideological movement, as modern,’ even if ‘he is a good deal less sure about nations.’ Smith refers here to Armstrong’s well-known Nations before Nationalism. Smith, ‘Nations before Nationalism?,’ pp. 169-170. Smith’s own views didn’t fall far from this mark. See, for example, Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, p. 192, among many other characteristic works.

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disposition to the work from the emphasis placed on the importance of elite culture in shaping the terms of popular discourse. This is not intended to diminish the importance of mass sentiment, the quantification of which remains one of the holy grails of nationalism research. Still, to whatever extent such sentiment prevailed among the people at large, the initiative for the various endeavors associated with the rise of the national idea – and on this point there is a broad consensus – does not appear to have come from below. The aim of ‘regenerating’ the nation expressed in sources from the French Revolution was often paired with the momentous claim (also heard in preceding years) that all sovereignty resided in the nation. Chapter 4 examines the diverse ways in which such an idea was received, put into practice, and contested across the European continent over the course of the ensuing Napoleonic Wars. Here again, the reader confronts problems of meaning that surface throughout the volume, as the groups of people that might be held to comprise a nation and thus advance a claim to sovereignty was subject to interpretation, with ethnic and civic elements often mingled from one iteration or evocation of the concept to the next. Some placed still greater stress on matters of consciousness: Did, for example, a nation’s existence and thus its entitlement to sovereignty depend upon some convincing display of self-awareness? As a German writer later declared, it would indeed be inappropriate to consider ‘every group of men that has such things as descent, language, and customs’ a nation. Such a group ‘only becomes a nation when as opposed to other men they feel and recognize themselves as an entity and a self-contained totality.’23 Differences in definition aside, the principles articulated in these texts continue to inform the rhetoric employed in political struggles to the present day, with demands for autonomy being frequently grounded on the assertion that the people in question constituted a nation (slumbering or not) and had on that basis a natural title to independence – a claim illustrated, to cite one notable example, in the language used by contemporary advocates of Catalan independence whose banners often simply declare ‘Catalunya es una nació’ (Catalonia is a nation) and ‘Som una nació’ (We are a nation).24 23 Cited in Vick, Defining Germany, p. 40; italics added. 24 The response of the Spanish state, as captured, for example, in the Christmas 2015 address of the king, offers in turn a restatement of the civic ideal. Felipe evokes here the idea of the Spanish nation as a moral community in which ‘all of the different forms of being and feeling Spanish fit.’ Political plurality and differences of vision aside, all Spaniards were bound together by a transcending sense of identity derived above all from a ‘common history.’ ‘Mensaje de Navidad del rey Felipe VI.’

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In writing therefore that the modern ideology of nationalism can be ‘precisely’ traced to the period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Stuart Woolf restates a familiar and uncontroversial view of the problem.25 But how much of a force was nationalism in the years immediately following these events? The second part of the book is accordingly concerned with exploring the difficulties posed to historians when attempting to assess the state of national sentiment throughout the continent and its capacity to inspire significant, extra-legal challenges to the Restoration status quo. In doing so, there is the danger, to some degree unavoidable in works of this kind, that by charting the presence or circulation of such ideas and aspirations one tends to inflate their standing or ‘overdetermine’ the outcome.26 Historians must also contend with the problem that all of the revolutions of the era could be considered composite in nature; a factor pointed out previously in famous works by Hobsbawm, Labrousse, and other prominent scholars discussed throughout the text.27 The challenge of determining or delineating the relative strength of these diverse sources of discontent – the constitutional, national, and social – is further complicated by terminological and conceptual traditions which facilitated, at least from a rhetorical standpoint, a considerable amount of overlap in the articulation of ends. Thus, internal conflicts over the distribution of power – such as those which broke out in Spain in 1820, and France in 1830 and 1848 – were commonly portrayed, drawing upon ideas and language reminiscent of earlier political discourse, as ‘national’ struggles.28 These problems notwithstanding, most accounts of the revolutions which occurred in parts of the Italian peninsula and German Bund during the 25 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 10. Indeed, for better or worse, observed Renan in a lecture from 1882, ‘the principle of nationhood is ours.’ Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?,’ p. 51. 26 These hazards cogently described by Etienne Balibar in ‘The Nation Form.’ Similar points made also by the editors of a recent work on the question of ‘nationhood from below’ when writing critically of the ‘linear sequential narrative present in many theoretical and monographic studies of nationalism.’ The editors refer here to Hroch’s famous ‘ABC model’ which they call, alluding to the comments of another contributor (Laurence Cole) ‘an implicitly developmental process through which societies eventually nationalize.’ Van Ginderachter and Beyen, Nationhood from Below, pp. 15-16. 27 This factor is indeed often cited as a cause of the rapid collapse of the same or their failure, most famously in the case of 1848, to achieve concrete results. Note also that ‘revolutionism’ was not always a guage of national sentiment, as indicated in the discussion of the Czech case in Chapter 7. 28 The constitutional conflict was simultaneously a national one in the sense that the people (e.g., nation) was endeavoring to recover its sovereignty. See, for example, the discussion of the Spanish Revolution in Chapter 5, as well as the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 (Chapters 6 and 7).

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1820s and 1830s lay stress on the primacy of constitutional grievances over national. The constitutional conflict was also severe in the case of Belgium, discussed at length in Chapter 6, although debate continues over questions surrounding the strength of a Belgian national identity (the present difficulties of that state aside) and its effects. When considered in tandem with the social grievances also associated with the outbreak of the crisis, the Belgian Revolution of 1830 serves indeed to display the qualities of composite revolution to an uncommon degree. The Greek and Polish Revolutions of 1821 and 1830, respectively, hold the distinction meanwhile of having been planned (this alone was rare) and set in motion by groups of conspirators with the explicit intent of launching bids for national independence. 29 However, here too, a closer investigation of the events in question indicates the multiplicity of actors involved, the motivations of which have been subject to diverse interpretations. One might anticipate from the vantage point of the 1830s that new troubles lay in store for Europe in the future; but certainly, the scale of what transpired in 1848, as witnessed especially in the strength of the national demands that came to the fore in Germany and Italy, is startling. Rather than a gradual rise in the spread and assertiveness of such sentiment, historians tend therefore to present a highly punctuated picture of change, with the 1840s – and indeed the later years of that decade – often portrayed as the site of a sudden escalation in political mobilization and cross-border collaboration among oppositional movements within Habsburg Europe, the Bund, and parts of the Italian peninsula. Contemporary Italian historians speak, for example, of a ‘transformation of the social base of Italian nationalism from a minority political sect into a mass movement’ which ‘took place between 1846 and 1848.’30 Here again, the apparent growth in the popularity of the national idea during these years has often been linked to a contemporaneous rise in the level, to cite James Sheehan, of ‘liberal political action’ bred in turn from the ‘growing sense’ of an impending social crisis.31 The ensuing chapters explore the ideological and practical sources of this national-liberal linkage, as well as the transnational character of the phenomenon. The historians cited above refer also to the ‘social basis’ of national movements during the period, and specifically, the problem, also addressed often below, of determining which segments of the societies in question tended 29 As indicated below, the Kraków Revolution, orchestrated by the Polish Democratic Society in February of 1846, may also be placed in this category. 30 Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 399. 31 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 12.

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to display more interest in such causes. Thought on this subject includes of course the earlier traditions of analysis associated with the works of Kautsky, Proudhon, Marx, and Engels, with their corresponding stress on the political and material appetites of ‘the modern bourgeoisie’ (and the congruence of the same with a liberal-national agenda).32 In a somewhat similar manner, the ‘middle classes,’ or more generally, ‘middle strata’ of local ‘economic and status hierarchies,’ are frequently portrayed as the leading component, where they emerged, of the movements considered here.33 That said, historians such as Alberto Banti, in a well known series of interventions in the field of Risorgimento history, have suggested other sources (beyond material interests) of political mobilization.34 It is also important to note, 32 The ‘nationalism’ of the middle classes was thus ‘a false representation of the real,’ which, upon closer examination could be exposed as a bourgeois quest for political power set in the popular terms of the day. See, for example, Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival, p. 133; Thompson and Fevre, ‘The National Question,’ p. 302; Avineri, ‘Marxism and Nationalism,’ p. 640. As declared in one momentous passage of the Manifesto: ‘The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. […] Independent, or but loosely connected provinces […] became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs-tariff.’ Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 339. This depiction of capitalism as simultaneously the breaker and fabricator of nations was evoked still earlier in the work of Proudhon. As Noiriel writes, ‘Proudhon is undoubtedly the first author to explicitly accuse capitalism of destroying nationalities. On several occasions he refers to “nationalities sacrificed on the altar of privilege”; he denounces the “mercantile influences [which] are death to the nationalities of which they leave only the skeleton.”‘ Noiriel, ‘Socio-histoire d’un concept,’ p. 13. The author refers here to Proudhon’s Système des contradictions économiques (1846). It should nevertheless be added that not all Marxists viewed nations as largely artificial constructs or even incompatible with the eventual triumph of socialism. Some indeed, notably Otto Bauer of the Austro-Marxist school, made quite elaborate claims regarding the historicity, formation, and future relevance of nations. Any ‘systematic approach to the question of the nation’ must in fact begin, wrote Bauer, recalling ideas surveyed in the early chapters of this work, ‘with a conception of national character.’ Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, p. 20. 33 Sheehan objects for example to the use of terms ‘middle class’ and ‘bourgeoisie’ when writing of the Vormärz. Such terms, he argues, suggest ‘a common set of economic interests arising from a similar relationship to the means of production’ which simply did not exist. The ‘middle ranks’ of German society were occupied instead by a diverse collection of people and (mainly urban) occupations. Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 24. 34 Banti places emphasis instead on the ability of national advocates to attach their ideas to ‘deep images,’ such as ‘kinship’ and ‘sacrif ice’ that were ‘located in a previous discursive continuum.’ Where successful, and, as discussed in Chapter 7, Banti argues that the upheavals of 1848 give notice of this fact, nationalism derived its strength not from the manifest power of the idea itself or still less abstract principles and claims, but from achieving ‘intertextual links […] with other preexisting and traditional discursive formations.’ Banti, ‘Reply,’ pp. 449-450. ‘In

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as Hobsbawm (among others) has shown, that nationalism was not the exclusive preserve of the middle classes or liberals.35 To be sure, in some of the cases studied below – notably Greece, Poland, and Hungary – the role of an urban ‘middle strata’ was limited or overshadowed by other groups of elites. Although there is even some evidence in these later examples of involvement from the peasantry, most work on the subject tends to support the view that the rural populace was largely unmoved by national appeals – a problem that was indeed frankly acknowledged at times by the leaders of erstwhile national movements.36 Finally, the chapters on Restoration Europe provide readers with a view of the continuing evolution in cultural representations of the nation and the fascination with the study of national characters and histories that was so prominent feature of pre-Restoration culture. Emphasis is also placed on the end,’ comments another, ‘such procedures made it possible to formulate a political statement which, though radically innovatory in many respects, was at the same time built up out of already highly familiar and deeply prestigious components.’ Brice, ‘Alberto M. Banti,’ p. 435. See also Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 399, and Isabella, ‘Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,’ p. 256. Text refers to works such as Banti’s La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santita` e onore alle origini dell’Italia unita. 35 ‘Identif ication with a “people” or “nation,” wrote Hobsbawm of the adoption of such attitudes on the part of traditional elites, ‘was a convenient and fashionable way’ of combating the legitimacy challenges of the day. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 83-85. Similar forces were at play behind the proliferation of national traditions. Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-Producing Traditions,’ p. 267. Sources from the Restoration era provide signif icant evidence, in sum, of the willingness of dominant classes to adapt themselves to the rhetoric of the day; much like the notables of old regime France described in Chapter 4. ‘A moment’s glance at the historical record,’ David Miller similarly attests, ‘shows that nationalist ideas have as often been associated with liberal and socialist programmes as with programmes of the right […] the flexible content of national identity allows parties of different colours to present their programmes as the true continuation of the national tradition and the true ref lection of national character.’ Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, pp. 32-33. See also Breuilly Nationalism and the State, p. 51, Mann, ‘A political theory of nationalism,’ p. 53, and Godsey, Nobles and Nation, p. 242. 36 See, for example, Porciani, ‘On the Uses and Abuses of Nationalism from Below,’ p. 81. In some cases too, the involvement of the masses in the national struggle was not avidly or consistently sought. Chapters 4 and 6 describe for example the conflicted attitude of some Polish gentry toward drawing ‘the people’ into their movement – a support, or so it was claimed, that could only be obtained through some form of political compensation. As Maurycy Mochnacki (1803-1834), a partisan of the ‘maximalist’ faction of Polish nationalism, bitterly wrote of his ‘minimalist’ foes: ‘Here in the centre of Europe is a great nation that collapses […] because with us not the majority but the minority has always been the nation.’ Mochnacki, ‘To Be or Not to Be,’ p. 93. Like other Polish liberals, Mochnacki advocated a simultaneous course of social and national revolution; conservatives were more likely to place their hopes in diplomacy and the aid of friendly powers.

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the impact of larger trends and fashions in contemporary thought. Indeed, for Mazzini it was only self-professed ‘romantics’ such as he who were able to recognize the spirit of the age and embrace the mission that history had conferred upon them: ‘No one in Italy had said that romanticism stood for liberty against oppression,’ he boldly declared of his movement, ‘that it battled against every construct or norm that we had not chosen freely through individual inspiration or the deep, collective aspirations of the country. We were the ones who said it.’37 As the century progressed, the idea that nations were necessary elements of the human habitat and that each had a right to an independent and unfettered existence became in fact the subject of ever more extravagant and grandiose theories, frequently situating the flowering of nations into a larger story of material and moral progress. Recast in the intellectual fashions of the day, and these theories borrowed heavily from the glossaries of French utopian and German idealist schools of thought, the cause of one nation or another was not simply a matter of subjective interest but part of the greater ‘becoming’ and glorification of creation; all were intended to give testimony, as with nature, of the infinite productive capacity of god. ‘Where it is allowed to develop on its own,’ wrote the very Hegelian-sounding Slovak patriot Ľudovít Štúr in 1846, ‘there will always be found in a nation a flowering and unfolding spiritual life which resembles a budding and healthy tree. […] [O]ur goal is to realize the capability hidden in its roots.’38 Each nation had indeed its own part to play in the ‘common work of civilization’ Renan observed in a famous lecture from 1882, its ‘one note’ to add ‘to the great concert of humanity,’ discordant now and shrill for the grievances of its many discontented and dispossessed peoples.39 Traumatic though they may be, the struggles of the national age were therefore the necessary prelude to a peaceful postnational one; for the people of Europe could not be dragged as captives into any future union. The point of these later chapters and the epilogue which closes the volume is not of course to infer that the national idea had by 1848 completely won over the hearts and minds of the European body politic, masses and elites alike. 40 The events described here were nevertheless milestones of a kind in further validating the principle of nationality, or perhaps fostering an 37 Cited in Sarti, Mazzini, p. 33. 38 Štúr, ‘The Slovak Dialect,’ p. 152. 39 Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?,’ p. 59. 40 A similar point is made by Wimmer and Feinstein in another recent work. ‘Our own historical institutionalist approach,’ write the latter, ‘assumes that nationalists create nation-states, whether or not nations have already been built.’ Wimmer, and Feinstein, ‘The Rise of the Nation-state across the World,’ p. 767.

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impression of its ubiquity and strength. As indicated in later chapters, it was, additionally, the fear of future disturbances, or in the words of Perry Anderson, ‘the imaginative proximity of social revolution,’ that gave further encouragement to the imposition of a program of nationalism ‘from above’ capable of attracting conservatives and liberals (especially those of the ‘moderate’ variety) alike.41 Contemporary thinkers could of course be found, like Eötvös, who might reflect more philosophically on the subject. To be sure, ‘the great word “nationality,”’ observed the latter in the same mid-century work cited earlier, ‘blares out at us from every direction, but everybody wants to understand it differently. Every nation demands its rights; not one is clear in its own mind what these are.’42 Perhaps more provocative still were the thoughts again of Renan, for whom the nation was ‘not something eternal,’ but only the latest of many ‘abstractions’ to enter the annals of European history: ‘They began,’ he wrote, ‘so they will come to an end. A European confederation will probably replace them.’ Like all ‘truths of this order,’ the nation too would inevitably cease to inspire faith. ‘Such, however,’ he was quick to add, ‘is not the law of the century we are living in.’43

41 Anderson, ‘Modernity and Revolution,’ p. 104. 42 Eötvös, The Dominant Ideas of the Nineteenth Century, I, p. 110. 43 Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?,’ p. 59.

2.

Enlightenment Era Representations of the Nation Abstract The present chapter describes the various meanings attached to the term ‘nation’ during the eighteenth century and the manner in which they reflected larger Enlightenment era tendencies of thought. Insights are sought from formal works of lexicography as well as a range of contemporary studies on history, natural laws, governance, and the origin of language. Particular attention is given to the diverse ways in which contemporary authors engaged with the concept of national character. Keywords: national character, Enlightenment, philosophical history, lexicography

Speech distinguishes man from the animals. Language distinguishes nations from each other.1 The duty of a nation is […] to labor after its own perfection.2

In his account of how ‘the nation’ was represented in eighteenth-century thought, Eric Hobsbawm wrote that ‘the primary meaning’ of the term ‘and the one most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political.’3 This conception was notably bereft, he continued, of those attributes of nation-ness ‘so hotly debated by the nineteenth-century theorists, such as ethnicity, common language, religion, territory and common historical memories.’4 Hobsbawm’s conception of the Enlightenment nation – with its corollary projection of a 1 Rousseau, Essai sur l’origine des langues, p. 215. 2 Vattel, Droit des gens, I, pp. 11-12. 3 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 18-19. 4 Ibid., p. 20.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch02

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Western, civic original, and an Eastern, ethno-linguistic, successor – persists, though not without its critics. Many, such as Maria Todorova, have challenged the ‘dichotomy’ posed in such accounts; a product, she and others argue, of a surfeit of theoretical works over more detailed accounts of contemporary understandings and context.5 As these authors suggest, there remains a surprising shortage of empirical works documenting how ‘the nation’ was actually portrayed in eighteenth-century culture and thought. In addition therefore to examining the political connotations of the term highlighted by Hobsbawm, the following pages reveal how the nation was also commonly employed to distinguish bodies of people on the basis of descent, culture and language: The language of a given nation was to be sure not only used to determine its ‘racial’ ancestry but was further held to convey certain truths about its ‘character’ and state of ‘progress.’ Although the intended meanings of the ‘progress’ (or alternately, perfection, improvement, and refinement) cited in these texts was seldom rendered with precision, allusions were typically made to factors such as an increase in vocabulary and especially the formation of an ever more sophisticated conceptual repertoire; these attributes being viewed as the outcome of the nation’s advance from one stage of socio-economic complexity and integration to the next.6 As Diderot observed in his entry for ‘Encyclopédie’ in the work of the same name, the educated observer may ‘solely on the comparison of the vocabulary of a nation in different times […] form an idea of its progress.’7 This association is essential to explaining why the advocates of ‘national regeneration’ discussed in the following chapter often focused on linguistic endeavors: If indeed a connection between linguistic and ‘national’ progress existed, perhaps it could be instrumentalized as a means to improve a given nation’s prospects in the ‘race for Enlightenment.’8 The first pictures of the nation presented here introduce therefore the range of ideas connected with the concept; it being portrayed variously as 5 Todorova, ‘Is There Weak Nationalism and Is It a Useful Category?’ According to these typologies, she adds, ‘the American and the French belong to a noble, civic and moderate variety,’ and East Europeans to ‘the bloody subspecies of the unsavory and organic […] ethnic nationalism.’ Ibid., p. 682. See also Benner, ‘Nationalism,’ p. 37; Baycroft and Hewitson, What Is a Nation?, pp. 3-4, 7-8, 28-34; Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism, pp. xi, 18. Previous critiques of this ‘dichotomy’ include those by Kuzio, ‘The Myth of the Civic State,’ and Brubaker, ‘The Manichean Myth.’ 6 Some main lines of enquiry associated with the idea of ‘progress’ are described in Heffernan, ‘Historical Geographies of the Future,’ pp. 125-164, and Outram, The Enlightenment. 7 Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc. (1755), V, pp. 637. 8 Morrissey, ‘The Encyclopédie,’ p. 156.

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a ‘political body,’ a group of people ‘governed under the same laws,’ and an ‘organic structure’ with pronounced, in modern parlance, ‘ethno-linguistic’ characteristics.9 In either guise, the nation was also frequently depicted as having the properties of a ‘moral being’; that is to say a people with the same customs, language, laws and even will, who were furthermore not only capable of progress and perfection, but decline and ‘degeneration.’10 These latter ideas formed the basis of many of the political and cultural calls to action discussed in the following chapters. The concepts cited above are first documented through an analysis of works of lexicography followed by a survey of how they were conveyed in sources surrounding contemporary events, as well as writings on history, language, governance and manners. Far from suddenly springing upon the scene, as Benedict Anderson wrote, ‘towards the end of the eighteenth century,’ the nation was in fact entangled within an older, cross-cultural discourse on matters ranging from the operation of natural laws and the origins of language, to the fashioning of viable political units.11 Particular emphasis is placed here on the genre of works concerned with the problem of ‘national character,’ which as Berger, Bell and a number of other scholars have shown, increased greatly in number during the Enlightenment.12 Although the reasons for this interest in, to quote Voltaire, ‘the noticeable difference among the espéces of men which populate the four known parts of our world,’ continues to provoke debate, the presence of the nation in contemporary letters was greatly abetted by the increasing incidence of such endeavors and their perceived relevance for the investigation of many present day concerns.13

The Nation as Political Body and ‘Bearer of Culture’ Prominent works of lexicography from the period that can be mined for contemporary understandings of the nation include the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694), Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopædia (1728), Diderot 9 Slimani, La Modernité du concept, p. 57 10 From Dubos, Histoire critique de l’établissement de la monarchie françoise dans les Gaules (1742), cited in Slimani, La Modernité du concept, p. 42. 11 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 4. See, for example, Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, p. 38. 12 As Bell wrote, ‘In the eighteenth century, the literature on national differences and national character grew to massive and unprecedented dimensions.’ Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 143-144. See also Romani, National Character and Public Spirit. 13 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 4.

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and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie (1751-1765), and Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language (1755). Of these, the Dictionnaire merits special notice not only for the early timing of its appearance, but also its statement of aims; the latter being adopted by the creators of similar works throughout the continent.14 Specifically, the authors of the Dictionnaire sought to ‘perfect and polish’ the French language and render it capable of conveying the latest advances in the Arts and Sciences. The linkage between linguistic refinement, literary honors, and national prestige was indeed alluded to in a glowing dedication to Colbert, a key advocate for the Dictionnaire, and one whose commitment to the project was said to have been inspired by a belief that ‘that which serves to form the Eloquence contributes immensely to the glory of a Nation.’15 In pursuing such ends, the ‘academicians,’ as they were somewhat pejoratively referred to by Samuel Johnson, established a standard of quality that was followed by advocates of linguistic reform (and the creators of dictionaries of their own) throughout the continent – each relating ‘cultural refinement,’ to ‘the ability of the national tongues to serve as a vehicle of scholarly communication.’16 As the multiplying works of lexicography attest, the goals of national and linguistic refinement were indeed entangled within a continental-wide discourse on improvement frequently animated by pronouncements regarding which nation’s language was fairest of them all; a feature of the times perhaps alluded to by Herder when declaring, with characteristic hyperbole, in a work from 1781 that ‘the people of Europe […] are now in a contest of, not physical, but mental and artistic forces with each other.’17 Turning to the definition for ‘Nation,’ in the Dictionnaire the entry reads: ‘Terme collectif. Tous les habitants d’un mesme Etat, d’un mesme pays, qui vivent sous mesme lois, et usent le mesme langage [Term collective. All the inhabitants of the same state, the same country, who live under the same laws and use the same language].’ In addition to touching upon attributes such as language and common governance reprised often in later texts, this 14 Important precursors included the Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca (1612) and Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel (1690). 15 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (Paris, 1694), I, pp. iv, vii. 16 Török, ‘Patriotic Scholarship,’ p. 679. Johnson pilloried, for example, their faith in mankind’s ability to ‘perfect’ a language. ‘Preface to the English Dictionary,’ in Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, II, p. 65. Note that some contemporary thinkers, associated linguistic refinement and perfection with a loss of perspicuity. See, for example, Rosenfeld, A Revolution in Language. These issues also noted in passing by Voltaire in Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 35, and Dunbar, Essays on the History of Mankind, p. 124 17 Quote from Herder’s Idea for the First Patriotic Institute for the Common Spirit of Germany (1781) cited in Benner, ‘Nationalism,’ p. 43.

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entry also includes a list of phrases, indicating forms of usage, that allude to the frequently cited concept of national temperaments and mœurs: ‘Each nation has its customs,’ add, for example, the editors, ‘its virtues and its vices.’ One may speak equally, the passage continued, of the ‘mood, the spirit, and the genie of the nation.’18 A notable modification was made to the entry in the 1718 republication of the text, with the editors drawing a distinction between national and political boundaries: ‘It [nation] could also be said,’ they note, ‘of the inhabitants of the same country, even though they do not live under the same laws: As although Italy is divided among diverse states and governments one does not stop to speak of the Italian nation.’19 Succeeding editions of the Dictionnaire coincided with the publication of Johnson’s work, as well as several other English dictionaries.20 These latter endeavors largely adopted Johnson’s definition of ‘nation’ as ‘a people distinguished from another people; generally by their language, original, or government,’ although John Ash made a modification in keeping with contemporary fashions (‘the people of any particular country, generally distinguished from others by their language, customs and manners’). 21 In the case of another English work, Chambers’s Cyclopædia, the entry begins plainly enough by referring to ‘a quantity of people who inhabit a certain extent of country, contained in certain limits who obey the same government.’ However, Chambers proceeded to supplement the definition with an alliteration that cites as ‘nations’ groups of people (such as ‘Germans’ and ‘Italians’) who clearly did not all ‘obey the same government’ but were bound together on the basis of ‘character,’ e.g.: ‘Each nation has a particular 18 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694), II, p. 110. These examples reappeared in the 1740 and 1762 editions of the Dictionnaire. Also, the more fashionable ‘mœurs’ supplanted ‘virtues and vices’ in the 1762 edition. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1762), II, p. 197. The idea conveyed here – that the members of various nations possessed distinguishing ‘temperaments’ – has a long history, as indicated in one instance by an often-cited passage from the writings of Erasmus. See, for example, Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 143; Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism, p. 39; Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, pp. 20-22. 19 Nouveau dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1718), II, p. 121. The French, Spanish, German and English nations are also mentioned; this passage was retained in the 1740 (II, p. 177), 1762 (II, p. 197) and 1798 (II, p. 148) editions (which reverted to the original title, e.g., Dictionnaire de l’Académie française). See also Godechot, ‘Nation, patrie, nationalisme’; Le Guern, ‘Le Mot nation,’ pp. 162-164. 20 See, for example, Kenrick, A New Dictionary of the English Language (1773); Barclay, A Complete and Universal English Dictionary on a New Plan (1774); Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1775). 21 Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, II, p. 34; Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language, II, p. 3.

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character, and it is a kind of proverb to say, light as a Frenchman, jealous as an Italian, serious as a Spaniard, deceitful as a Greek.’22 Chamber’s definition of nation as well as his accompanying illustration of national characters was adopted finally by the Encyclopédie.23 As indicated below, the idea of French ‘lightness’ expressed in these passages recalls an important stream of French political discourse that was especially well represented in the republican critique of despotism.24 Language and nation were also connected in the Encyclopédie, and perhaps most definitively in an entry on ‘Langue’ in the ninth volume (1765), the author (Nicholas Beauzée) waxing at length on the interdependence between climate, national character and the genie of a given language in a manner highly reminiscent of D’Espiard, Rousseau, Condillac, Herder and others discussed below.25 Beauzée also weighed in upon the distinction between ‘national’ languages and dialects, as well as the differences in meaning between langue and langage.26 He noted, for example, that nations may retain the same langue over time but ‘the same nation […] may, in different times, have different languages, if it has changed manners, views, interests.’27 The formal entry for ‘nation’ in the Encyclopédie represents but one instance of the many references to the concept throughout the work, as indicated in Diderot’s claims (noted above in his entry for ‘Encyclopédie’) concerning the status of a nation’s ‘vocabulary’ as an index of its ‘progress.’28 Being concurrently a dictionary of the French language, the Encyclopédie promised to further this progress by enriching that language with the latest conceptual advances from the arts and sciences, embellishing in turn the reasoning powers of its speakers and thus positioning the nation to leap still farther ahead of its peers 22 Chambers, Cyclopædia, II, p. 616. 23 Encyclopédie (1765), XI, p. 36. See also ‘caractere des nations’ in Encyclopédie (1752), II, p. 666. For examples of further dispersion, see the Diccionario castellano of Estebean Terreros y Pando where ‘nacion’ is defined as ‘nombre colectivo que significa algun Pueblo grande, Reino, estado, &c. sujeto a un mismo Principe, o Gobierno.’ The entry then repeats some phrases from the earlier Diccionario de la lengua castellana, before recalling the list of characters noted above. Terreros, Diccionario castellano, II, p. 645. Note also the influence of the Dictionnaire and Encyclopédie on the definition of narod (nation) in Franciszek Jezierski’s Polish dictionary (1791). Jezierski, ‘Some Words, Alphabetically Ordered,’ pp. 132-36. 24 See Bell, ‘Le Caractère national,’ pp. 873-874; Bell, ‘The Unbearable Lightness.’ See also Romani, ‘All Montesquieu’s Sons.’ Some English authors feared that their national manners were also trending in this direction. These issues discussed more fully in Chapters 3 and 4. 25 Encyclopédie (1765), IX, pp. 249-262. 26 Ibid., p. 256. 27 Ibid., p. 249. 28 For correlation with ideas in Condillac’s Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines (1746), see Lifschitz, ‘The Arbitrariness of the Linguistic Sign,’ p. 550.

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in the ‘race for Enlightenment.’29 As Diderot declared: ‘What a prodigious superiority one nation gains over another, above all in the abstract sciences and the Beaux-Arts,’ by cultivating its language in this fashion.30 The lexicographic works reviewed above offer in summary an introduction to the range of meanings associated with the ‘nation’ during the eighteenth century. This diversity was replicated in the sources surrounding contemporary events, such as those connected, to cite one important case, with the confrontation between the British crown and its American colonies. Allusions to the nation in its guise as the mass of the governed are visible, for example, in the tendency of colonial authors to pin their grievances on the British ‘state,’ while holding ‘the nation’ blameless or even as a potential co-belligerent.31 In his reflections on the breakdown in metropole-colonial affairs following the Townshend Acts (1767), Dickinson thus wrote that ‘We have a generous, sensible, and humane nation, to whom we may apply. They may be deceived […] by artful men […] but I cannot yet believe they will be cruel or unjust.’32 What Hobsbawm referred to as the ‘centralizing and unitary implications’ of the term, which might also be gathered from the definitions found in Chambers (e.g., ‘a considerable quantity of people who inhabit a certain extent of country, contained in certain limits who obey the same government’), may similarly explain the absence of any 29 Morrissey, ‘The Encyclopédie,’ p. 156. 30 Encyclopédie (1755), V, p. 638. 31 The usage appears to conform with the meaning found in Chambers, whose entry for ‘state’ reads: ‘the Policy or Form of Government of a Nation. Hence, Ministers of State; Reasons of State, &c.’ Chambers adds that ‘Politicians make several Forms of State, viz. the Monarchic, as that of England; see MONARCHY: The Democratic, as that of Rome and Athens; see DEMOCRACY: The Oligarchic, as that of Venice; see OLIGARCHY: And the Aristocratic, as that of Sparta; see ARISTOCRACY, &c’ (Chambers, Cyclopædia, II, p. 124). Johnson’s entry for ‘state’ in the Dictionary of the English Language (1755) touched variously upon ‘the community; the publick; the commonwealth […] civil power, not ecclesiastical […] a republick; a government not monarchical […] the principal persons in the government.’ Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, II, n.p.n. 32 Dickinson, Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, p. 34. A similar use of the term was made by Richard Henry Lee in the course of the later crisis. As he advised the bearers of a 1774 petition to the king: ‘we wish it may be made public thro’ the press […] as we hope for great assistance from the spirit, virtue, and justice of the nation.’ Lee, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, p. 125. In doing so, both reprised a metropolitan tradition of political dissidence reminiscent of works such as Cato’s Letters (1737), a text that in fact exerted a considerable influence on colonial leaders; here, too, ‘the nation’ appears as a politically unified body of people, unerring in its judgment (if sometimes misled by its ‘governors’). Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, pp. 82, 125, 128, 153, 179, 215, 238, 258). See also Reid, ‘“Widely Read by American Patriots.”‘ The authors of the Declaration had similarly charged the king with acts unworthy of ‘the Head of a civilized Nation.’ Jefferson, Writings, p. 21.

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references to an ‘American nation’ from intercolonial engagements and official documents issuing from the same, including the Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation, where matters of sovereignty and the distribution of power came into play.33 In some cases too, texts connected with the event contain allusions to the idea or perhaps ideal that nations were not merely bodies of people joined together under the same laws, but moral communities imbued with a sense of collective identity and consciousness. A notable example of such a usage occurs in Paine’s Common Sense (1775), wherein the author depicts the colonists as inhabiting the ‘non-age of a nation,’ and bids them to let go their particular attachments and form ‘the Continent into one government.’34 A group of people thus ‘becomes’ a nation through some act of self-recognition or affirmation of collective identity. Similar meanings are conveyed in the writings of Buffon who, as discussed below, judged the native peoples of the Americas as mere ‘haphazard collections of men’ (as opposed to ‘nations’) on this basis, as well as, still more famously, the various works of French Revolution era vintage discussed in Chapter 4. If, in sum, colonial authors referred often to ‘nations’ in their writings, allusions to an ‘American nation’ (save when speaking of native American groups) were extremely rare. This phenomenon was linked above to the 33 ‘Early political discourse in the USA,’ wrote Hobsbawm, was distinguished by a tendency ‘to speak of “the people,” “the union,” “the confederation” […] in order to avoid the centralizing and unitary implications of the term “nation” against the rights of the federated states.’ Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 18. This point was made earlier by scholars such as Merrill Jensen, who once argued that the terminological choices of the American founders exemplified the ‘clear distinction made by eighteenth century political leaders between the terms “federal” and “national” as applied to central governments.’ They believed, he continued, ‘that a federal government was one created by equal and independent states […] who remained superior to it in every way,’ while a ‘national government was a central organization with coercive authority over both the states and their citizens.’ Jensen, ‘The Idea of a National Government,’ p. 357. Hobsbawm drew especially upon the American historian, Andrew Johnston (1849-1889), who observed that ‘the word “nation” and its derivatives were by no means favorites in our early political history.’ Johnston, ‘Nation,’ p. 932. Such sensitivities were illuminated with particular clarity by Benjamin Rush, a determined advocate of colonial unity, when denouncing the federal initiatives urged by several of his peers at the Continental Congress (1776). Rush’s views were recorded by John Adams, who appeared to refer to the sentiments of several others at the proceedings when observing that ‘the colonies [were] as yet perfectly independent of each other’ and thus better suited for a ‘confederation.’ Adams, The Works of John Adams, II, pp. 496, 499, 501. See also Haw, Founding Brothers, pp. 92-95; Jefferson, Writings, pp. 14, 30. 34 Paine, Collected Writings, p. 42. Similar remarks on the nature of nation-formation were articulated during the postwar constitutional debates. See, for example, Tansill, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union, pp. 174, 182, 188. For additional context, see Kostantaras, ‘Early American and Contemporary European Conceptions.’

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clash between ‘the centralizing and unitary implications of the term’ and the interests of various state leaders. However, the contemporaneous readings of the nation as a ‘bearer of culture’ (also featured in the lexicographical works reviewed above) which lay stress on factors such as common language, manners and descent, may also have posed a general barrier to the conceptualization of an ‘American nation’ in local self-understandings and representations, as indicated in an early work of Franklin’s on ‘The Increase of Mankind’ (1751).35 Jefferson’s writings, including those produced in the midst of the crisis, would indeed give readers the impression that the colonists all descended from the same ‘Saxon ancestors,’ a conception that persists in the Declaration’s references to colonists’ ‘British brethren,’ ‘common kindred,’ and ties of ‘consanguinity.’36 Several recent works on metropolitan and colonial identities further suggest that not only were colonial self-conceptions greatly influenced by the fact ‘that most of the colonists in British North America’ saw themselves ‘as Britons, or even part of the English nation,’ but that these perceptions persisted ‘right until the eve of independence.’37 For John Breuilly, these factors precluded the American Revolution from his celebrated analysis 35 The colonists are unambiguously described here as belonging to the English nation, with references to attributes such as language and manners being pronounced throughout, e.g., ‘why should the Palatine Boors be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion.’ Franklin, Writings, pp. 371-374; see also the author’s reflections on ‘Indian nations,’ ibid., p. 546. The term ‘bearer of culture’ is borrowed from McBride, ‘The Nation in the Age of Revolution.’ 36 Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, pp. 7, 35; idem, Writings, pp. 22-23. 37 Conway, ‘From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners,’ p. 65. See also Zuckerman, ‘Identity in British America,’ p. 156; Breen, ‘Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution,’ pp. 19-29. These attitudes may have been abetted by works of European and English origin which suggested that the unfavorable climactic conditions in the Americas could have a degenerative effect on émigrés to such zones. ‘Even the children of Europeans,’ wrote Falconer, ‘born in the Indies, lose the courage peculiar to their own climate.’ Falconer, Remarks on the Influence of Climate, pp. 9-10. Still more severe claims of this kind were put forward in De Pauw, Recherches philosophiques. For additional context, see Chinard, ‘Eighteenth Century Theories on America as a Human Habitat’; Kupperman, ‘Fear of Hot Climates in the Anglo-American Colonial Experience.’ Such ideas were vehemently opposed by authors throughout the Americas but may have had a role in encouraging the claims of an undiminished English national character that emerge in colonial works. Brading, Classical Republicanism and Creole Patriotism; Jefferson, Writings, pp. 182-192, 800-801. A similar reaction is alluded to by Zuckerman when suggesting that the colonists turned to an ‘idealized identity as Englishmen’ (and sought to comport themselves accordingly) as a means to counteract the fear that they had been barbarized by their exposure to ‘the extremities of frontier life.’ Zuckerman, ‘Identity in British America,’ p. 143.

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of the first national movements of the modern era. Here again, Breuilly placed stress on the fact that the colonists never ‘make the idea of a peculiar [American] nation explicit’ or the ‘foundation’ of their ‘political claims.’ This may be attributed in turn, he continued, to the absence of a sense of cultural coherence or uniqueness on the part of the people in question.38 This perspective on the ‘national’ identity of the colonists was evidently shared by many on the other side of the Atlantic and indeed, in the words of Conway, ‘for many Britons, perhaps for most Britons,’ Americans ‘were still part of the same nation.’39 As one British observer accordingly declared at the height of the crisis, enumerating properties cited often in the literature on ‘national characters’ that pervaded the century, colonists and metropolitans were ‘of the same language, the same religion, the same manners and customs, sprung from the same nation, intermixed by relation and consanguinity.’40 ‘We are one nation,’ wrote another, ‘with the same language, the same manners, and the same religion.’41 As these claims indicate, Anglo-American texts from the period frequently depicted the colonists as composing one part of a transatlantic British (or alternately ‘English’) nation; a view which may have served the political ends of both parties.42 Rhetorical considerations aside, the strength of these perceptions of common descent and shared nationhood were real enough for Paine, who believed them partly responsible for the colonists’ reluctance to declare their independence. 43 38 As he writes: ‘The leaders of that independence movement made little reference to a distinct cultural identity to justify their claims. They demanded equality and, failing that, independence, and justified these demands by appealing to universal human rights. Parts of North America were simply the areas in which these rights were being asserted.’ Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, pp. 3, 5. See also Armitage, The Declaration of Independence, pp. 19-20. 39 Conway, ‘From Fellow-Nationals to Foreigners,’ p. 85. See also similar points in idem, ‘War and National Identity in the Mid-Eighteenth-Century British Isles,’ pp. 864, 890, 892. 40 Wahrman, ‘The English Problem of Identity,’ p. 1240. 41 Ibid., pp. 1240-1243. See also Savelle, ‘Nationalism and Other Loyalties in the American Revolution,’ p. 912. 42 For example, the frequent reference to our ‘British brethren’ and ‘Saxon ancestors’ by colonial dissidents bolstered their claims to the rights enjoyed by those of similar heritage on the other side of the Atlantic. See, for example, the writings of Richard Bland (e.g., ‘An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies,’ 1766) and other colonial sources collected in Jensen, Tracts of the American Revolution, pp. 24, 122-25, and idem, The Founding of a Nation, p. 87. Alternately, representations of a shared nation-ness, which, as Merrett suggests, rose sharply in the British press in the years immediately preceding the war, may have been viewed as a means to temper colonial resistance. Merritt, Symbols of American Community, p. 119. 43 But ‘Europe, and not England is the parent country of America,’ he objected, adding that ‘not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province [Massachusetts], are of English descent.’

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The Origin and Implications of National Character Colonial attitudes toward their English national patrimony may have obtained further prompting from the vogue for anthropologically minded investigations characteristic of the period. Particular attention is given here to works in which the nation was used as a principal means for comparing the visible differences in manners (also character, mœurs, spirit, genie, etc.) distinguishing the diverse groups of people inhabiting the earth. It is important to note from the start that this use of the nation for such enquiries was based on semantic relationships and heuristic conventions of considerable vintage. 44 To compare the characters of different peoples was, according to such traditions, inevitably to compare their ‘national’ characters, as the nation signified that stage of group formation (beyond the larger category of ‘race,’ or smaller one of tribe) in which such peculiarities became sufficiently developed and manifest. No single literary milestone looms as an obvious starting point for an investigation of this genre of eighteenth-century thought, although scholars might agree on the particular importance of works from the 1740s and onward by Montesquieu, D’Espiard, Hume and Voltaire. In addition to treatises dedicated to the subject, speculation on the form and origin of national differences had implications for a range of concerns and indeed was not always the terminus of a line of enquiry, but a step in the fulfillment of others. 45 These included debates over the ideal forms of governance, the Paine, Collected Writings, pp. 23, 42. The conspicuous vehemence of Paine’s denial of a shared English nationhood is perhaps reflected in the reaction of critics who dismissed the anonymously written piece as obviously the work of ‘a stranger.’ Larkin, Thomas Paine and the Literature of Revolution, pp. 58-59. 44 These concepts dealt with, for example, in the works of Johann Boemus, Omnium Gentium Mores, Leges et Ritus [Manners, laws and customs of all nations] (Augsburg, 1520) and Jean Bodin, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem [Method for the easy comprehension of history] (Paris, 1566), among other, even earlier, sources. According to one scholar, the Boemus work went through 43 editions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. John Barclay had comparable success with his Icon animorum [The mirror of minds] (London, 1612). The author makes a valuable point finally when adding that ‘The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced countless writings on the national character, mainly dwelling on its explanation, while the older books had been more descriptive.’ Hertz, ‘National Spirit and National Peculiarity,’ p. 361. For additional context, see Grafton, What Was History?, pp. 64, 191; Bell, ‘Le Caractère national,’ p. 869. 45 Pujol, ‘Histoire et philosophie,’ p. 193. Some also found occasion to revisit topics that had earlier aroused their curiosity, as in the case of Hume, for whom the questions surrounding the moral and material bases of national character afforded new opportunity for rumination on more elemental problems of causality and perception. Ainslie, ‘The Problem of the National Self,’ p. 296.

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origins of language, the unfolding ‘story of the human mind,’ or even the study of mœurs themselves, as witnessed by the endeavors of Charles Duclos, an important contributor to the Encyclopédie and works on language who also authored the Considérations sur les mœurs de ce siècle and Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire des mœurs du XVIII. siècle (1751). 46 Duclos even attempted to bring some clarity to the subject by explaining how the mœurs of a nation form its character, while further observing that ‘it would be very interesting to study the different characters of nations.’ He himself withdrew from doing so on account of the enormity of the task and the fear that he might not prove immune to the hazards of partiality. 47 The causes in turn for this preoccupation with comparison and ‘the Other,’ as Stéphane Pujols writes, that ‘characterized the century,’ remain open to debate, with the role of print culture, secularization, Jansenism, and the proliferation of travel literatures given various stress. 48 With respect to the latter, the growing knowledge of the native peoples of the Americas appears to have played a particularly important role in stimulating interests and comparisons of this kind, to judge at least from studies of D’Espiard, Rousseau, Robertson, Herder, Buffon, and Goldsmith, to name a few. 49 By joining the ‘Relations of Travelers,’ wrote, for example, D’Espiard, with ideas from ‘the different Parts of universal History,’ contemporary thinkers could obtain a more empirically informed view of the conditions affecting the formation of nations and mœurs over time.50 For Ferguson and Robertson, the discovery of the Americas had indeed presented modern thinkers with an opportunity – unknown to Greco-Roman writers who were only exposed to peoples of their own rank or higher – to observe ‘the sentiments and actions of human beings in the infancy of social life’ and thus acquire a closer 46 Important predecessors included Jean de La Bruyére, Les Caractères de Théophraste. For additional context, see Dornier, ‘Entre moralisme et réformisme.’ 47 Duclos, Considérations sur les mœurs de ce siècle, pp. 6-7, 12-13. See also Bell, ‘Le Caractère national,’ p. 871n. 48 Pujol, ‘Histoire et philosophie,’ p. 182; Bell, The Cult of the Nation; Berger, The Past as History, p. 57; Carhart, The Science of Culture. 49 Early works of this nature – among many that could be cited – that also took into account the Americas and its native inhabitants include Muret, Ceremonies funebres de toutes les nations; De Gaya, Ceremonies nuptiales de toutes les nations; Crouch, The Strange and Prodigious Religions, Customs, and Manners, of Sundry Nations; Manesson-Mallet, Description de l’univers […] et les mœurs, religions, gouvernemens et divers habillemens de chaque nation; Hennepin et al., A New Discovery of a Vast Country in America; Oldmixon, The British Empire in America. 50 D’Espiard, L’Esprit des nations, I, p. iv. See also Fulford and Kitson, Travels, Explorations and Empires, and Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, for additional context and examples.

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view of the laws of progress.51 Still other scholars see in this development a continuation and extension of enquiries concerning the existence and implications of natural laws.52 From the point of view at least of Montesquieu, ‘Man, as a physical being, is, like other such bodies, governed by invariable laws.’53 If so, the existence of such laws had to be squared with the empirical diversity of human culture. Montesquieu provided an important model for the type of comparative investigation inferred by this problem in his De l’esprit des loix (1748), a work that did not include the nation in its title but relied heavily upon it as an organizing and heuristic device.54 Nations accordingly appear in the work as bodies of people who have arrived at a point of unity and development where they display an identifiable set of customs and spirit. As in the lexicographical works noted above, nations were also to be distinguished in part by their temperaments, e.g., cheerfulness, imprudence, courage, frankness, vivacity, politeness, gayety, gravity, silence, sagacity, vanity, laziness,’ etc.55 The process of differentiation need not apparently have progressed very far, as Montesquieu spoke frequently of ‘barbaric nations’ or those in their ‘infancy.’ However, the existence of such attributes, even on a rudimentary level, provided sufficient basis for national comparison and analysis; a definition that held true for many contemporary authors such as Robertson and Ferguson (see below). A still more purposeful investigation of national characters was performed by Francois-Ignace d’Espiard de la Borde in his Essais sur les génie et le caractère des nations (1743), a work that influenced many authors on both sides of the English Channel.56 In the case of the nations placed under 51 Robertson, History of America, I, p. 282. See also Wolff, ‘Discovering Cultural Perspective,’ and Hargraves, ‘Beyond the Savage Character.’ 52 As Varela writes, ‘most of the illustrados, in effect, conceived the nation and the bond of patriotism in strictly Newtonian terms.’ Varela, ‘Nación, patria y patrotismo,’ p. 347. See also Zammito et al., ‘Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited,’ p. 662. Note Herder’s famous support of his claim that ‘every nation has its centre of happiness within itself’ by the proof ‘just as every ball has its center of gravity.’ Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, p. 194; Herder, Another Philosophy of History, p. 29. 53 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, I, p. 5. As Montesquieu wrote in the second volume: ‘Les nations, qui sont a l’egard de tout l’univers ce que les particuliers sont dans en etat, se gouvernant comme eux par le droit naturelle & par les loix qu’elles se sont faites.’ Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, II, p. 349. 54 Note, for example, the title of Book 19: ‘Des loix, dans le rapport qu’elles ont avec les principes qui forment l’esprit general les mœurs & les manieres d’un nation.’ Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, II, p. 209. 55 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, II, pp. 209-252. 56 The connection between Montesquieu’s and D’Espiard’s works, as well as the popularity of Montesquieu’s choices on the linguistic front, is reflected in the re-issue of D’Espiard’s Essais

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investigation, D’Espiard ranged over a wide array of examples, seeming to refer at one point or another to virtually every collection of people that had left some impression of its existence upon history. There are additionally numerous occasions of conceptual overlap. The separate states of Italy (and their inhabitants) are thus often included in discussions on the formation of ‘national’ character, as are ‘Italians’.57 As noted elsewhere by other scholars, D’Espiard was not unique in this regard.58 Montesquieu’s ‘nations’ were similarly a diverse lot, with facets of political and cultural historicity both entering into account. When writing, for example, of the relation between laws and the ‘general spirit, morals, and customs of a nation,’ he made reference to Germans (while elsewhere in the work he spoke of the ‘different nations of Germany’), Romans, Parthians, Venetians, Chinese, ancient Athenians and Spartans, Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Muscovites.59 Although Montesquieu reflected frequently in the Esprit on the effects of variations in climate, religion, and governance, he did not deal with the subject of language or include it by name within the suite of differences that separated one nation from another.60 In contrast, language is identified explicitly as a marker of national difference by D’Espiard, as indicated by the title of an early chapter on ‘Of other bodily qualities, peculiar to Nations of different climates, the voices, the pronunciation of languages.’61 D’Espiard as L’Esprit des nations in 1752. This work appeared in English translation the following year. Bell describes D’Espiard’s work as a ‘turning point’ and ‘perhaps the first book to make nations the subject of extended scholarly enquiry.’ Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 10, n224. D’Espiard’s influence on Montesquieu qualified in Romani, ‘All Montesquieu’s Sons,’ pp. 192-193. 57 Note in this context John Andrews, A Review of the Characters of the Principal Nations in Europe (1770). Andrews’s ‘nations’ are the English, French, Italian, Spanish, German and Dutch. See also from the same author A Comparative View of the French and English Nations, in Their Manners, Politics and Literature (1785), and An Account of the Character and Manners of the French, with Occasional Observations on the English (1770). This latter work was translated into French as Essai sur le caractère et les mœurs des françois comparées à celles des anglois (1776). For additional context, see Hayman, ‘Notions of National Characters,’ pp. 14-15. 58 Varela notes similar cases of ‘terminological confusion’ and overlap in contemporary Spanish texts which deal with the same subjects. Varela, ‘‘Nación, patria y patrotismo,’’ p. 33. 59 See Montesquieu, De l’esprit des loix, II, Book 19. 60 However, Montesquieu also offers no evidence for assuming that the myriad nations which populate his work were anything but monoglot constructs; ‘empires’ do not appear to qualify and indeed are depicted as ruling ‘over nations.’ Ibid., I, pp. 258-260. 61 D’Espiard, L’Esprit des nations (1753), I, p. 39. This chapter heading reprised in Jean-Louis Castilhon’s Considérations sur les causes physiques et morales de la diversité du génie, des mœurs, et du gouvernment des nations (1769), a work also notable for its insistence on French cultural, especially linguistic, supremacy. D’Espiard’s views on language and climate are echoed in the Encyclopédie (see above) and many other works, such as John Richardson’s A Dissertation on the Languages, Literature and Manners of Eastern Nations (1778).

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offered a further note on what he considered to be the still larger categories of difference to which finer divisions of humanity such as the nation belonged, with language serving again as a critical variable and one of the best means for tracing the nation’s lineage.62 The relationship between race and nation evoked by D’Espiard was reprised in many contemporary texts as witnessed by the writings of Oliver Goldsmith, a popular author on whom he wielded a considerable influence. In addition to works of history incorporating this theme, Goldsmith also published ‘A Comparative View of Races and Nations’ (1760), in which he sought to project before his readers an ‘intellectual map’ of the world on the basis of those categories.63 Following D’Espiard, Linnaeus and Buffon, Goldsmith conceived the nation as a ‘subdivision’ of race and means ‘to denote,’ within that larger stratum, ‘differences in political systems, languages and temperaments.’64 The same linkage between language, mœurs and climate was raised by Duclos when proposing in his Remarques sur la grammaire, générale et raisonnée (1754) that one of his peers shoulder the task of examining ‘how the character, mœurs and interests of a people influence their language’ – a challenge met by Rousseau in the posthumously published Essai sur l’origine des langues (1781).65 ‘Speech distinguishes man from the animals. Language distinguishes nations from each other,’ observed Rousseau at the outset of this work before entering upon a series of speculations on the role of climate in shaping the character of a particular language.66 As indicated above, this line of thought was also pursued across the English Channel by authors such as John Richardson and James Dunbar, the latter observing in his Essays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages (1780), that ‘the connexion of language and manners is an obvious connexion.’ Citing still earlier ventures in this direction by Joseph Addison, Dunbar added that ‘serious criticism, on the structure of the European languages, leads to more important distinctions, founded on the diversity of national character.’67 Similar ideas were carried into the quarrel over the ‘ancients 62 ‘We divide humankind into four essential branches […] distinguished by language, color, customs, shape, tastes, Religion, and separated after such a great number of centuries that it is impossible to determine the epoch when this occurred.’ D’Espiard, L’Esprit des nations, I, p. 4. 63 Goldsmith, ‘A Comparative View,’ p. 80. 64 Griffin, Enlightenment in Ruins, pp. 44, 46; Goldsmith, ‘A Comparative View,’ pp. 75-77. 65 Duclos, Œuvres complètes de Duclos, IX, p. 9 66 Rousseau, Œuvres complètes de J.J. Rousseau, XIX, p. 215. 67 Dunbar, Essays on the History of Mankind, pp. 96-97, 109, 112-113, 132. In a Spectator article from 1710 Addison suggested that the ‘genius and national temper of the English’ was incorporated in their language. One might furthermore ‘carry the same thought into other languages and deduce a great part of what is peculiar to them from the genius of the people who speak them.’

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and moderns,’ the combatants disputing the degree to which the language of each was more ‘perfect’ than the other or described the manners of the ‘nations’ that spoke them. Present day European languages were duly subjected to similar comparison, as witnessed by the writings of Charpentier and Leibniz, with each articulating associations between language, national manners and prestige typical of the Dictionnaire and later works.68 In the words of Charpentier, for whom the (imputed) small lexicon of the French language was also a matter of great concern, ‘if we can judge Nations by their Languages,’ the Romans were surely ‘very depraved’ and the French ‘incomparably more civil.’69 As a starting point of language diversity, D’Espiard’s scheme bears resemblance, finally, to those elaborated in other contemporary works, notably Herder’s ‘Treatise on the Origin of Language’ (1772), in which ‘national’ languages were said to evolve from larger ‘racial’ linguistic complexes. Herder attributed this outcome to the imperatives of what he called the ‘Third Natural Law,’ which he went on to state as: ‘Just as the whole human species could not possibly remain a single herd, likewise it could not retain a single language either. So there arises a formation of different national languages.’70 For Herder, climate’s effect on language was manifested first on the level of ‘race.’ Each race, accordingly, ‘brings into its language the sound belonging to its house and family.’71 However, this racial unity did not hold; familial conflicts led to countless dissensions and separations in the course of which the antagonists altered their customs and most of all their language as a means to register their apartness from the members of their former ‘herd.’72 These dynamics, which recall what Freud described later as the ‘narcissism of minor differences,’ helped to explain why one might find a multiplicity of nations and languages in parts of the world where a single climate regime prevailed.73 Addison, The Works of the Right Honourable Joseph Addison, III, p. 321. Muralt alluded to similar correlations in his Lettres sur les Anglois et les François (1725): ‘Moreover, the Genius of the Nation,’ he wrote of the English, ‘is for the Serious; their language is strong and succinct, such as is necessary to express the Passions.’ De Muralt, Lettres sur les Anglois et les François, p. 57. 68 Lauzon, Signs of Light, pp. 115-118, 136-137. 69 From Charpentier, De l’excellence de la langue françoise (1683), cited in Lauzon, Signs of Light, pp. 151-152. 70 Herder, ‘Treatise on the Origin of Language,’ p. 147. 71 Ibid., p. 148. 72 Ibid., pp. 152-154 73 Ibid p. 154. The question was taken up elsewhere in the German-speaking world by thinkers such as Adelung, who, if focused on theoretical concerns of a different order, professed that ‘language was the most important symbol of a nation’s uniqueness’ and ‘the nation that loses

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Herder’s plan of language diversity marks a departure from previous explanations that placed greater stress on migration, as well as what he appeared to judge as an overly simplistic concept of regional specificity advanced by Voltaire in his Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations (first published in 1756 and re-issued with an expanded introduction in 1769).74 An influential contribution to the literature on national differences and contemporary historiography, Voltaire’s Essai offers furthermore another vista on the manner in which language was often identified with national divisions, albeit with a measure of the conceptual overlap typical of the period. The work begins, for example, with a summary exposition of the different ‘races of man,’ although some of these ‘races’ were also referred to elsewhere as ‘nations.’75 Still, in subsequent parts of the work, such as the brief section on the ‘Antiquity of Nations’ which immediately followed, Voltaire appeared to distinguish race and nation, with the latter representing an advance in socio-cultural differentiation.76 Although Voltaire offered no def initive account in the ‘Antiquity of Nations’ of the attributes that constituted a nation, he suggested that they were not easily brought into being, and that considerable time and favorable circumstances were indeed necessary to unite a given collection of people under the same laws and language.77 The correlation between language and nationhood was rendered still more explicit a few pages later where Voltaire observed that ‘before coming to form a large society, a people, a nation, there must be a language.’78 Voltaire added a further detail to his account of nation formation when intimating that the transition to nationhood was often incomplete, imperfect, or an indefinite work in progress. This was especially owing to the difficulty again of fashioning and disseminating a common language. Indeed, it was more difficult to spread the ‘rudiments’ of even ‘an imperfect and barbarous language than establish a society.’79 And its language also loses its identity.’ Carhart, The Science of Culture, pp. 102-103, 184. For Freud, see Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, pp. 40-45. 74 Herder, ‘Treatise on the Origin of Language,’ p. 150. The new edition of the Essai included Voltaire’s Philosophie de histoire as a ‘preliminary discourse.’ 75 Note, for example, references to ‘Albinos.’ Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 5. 76 For additional context, see Hudson, ‘From “Nation” to “Race.”‘ 77 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 9. 78 Ibid., I, p. 33. 79 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, p. 10. Note that opinions varied over the extent to which language was a precursor or byproduct of political union. For Hume: ‘Where a Number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defense, commerce, and government, that, along with the same speech or language, they must contract a resemblance in their manners and have a common or national character, as well as

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yet, should this first step be accomplished, another challenge immediately loomed of bringing that language to a still higher state of perfection. Many nations in fact never wholly succeeded in ‘forming a regular language and distinct pronunciation’ and staggered on indefinitely in the near-mute state of the infamous Troglydites.80 The close identification between language and nation in these passages and, specifically, the correlation between linguistic and national improvement helps to inform the emphasis placed on language as a site of ‘national’ improvement by reformers and apologists in other parts of the continent; the principle emerging that by polishing the language one simultaneously brought the nation to a higher state of perfection. National character was also implicated finally in thoughts on the design and effects of various schemes of governance: In some cases, the manners of a nation were deemed to follow from the way in which it was governed; in others, they ideally served as the starting point for any future system of governance. ‘The different genie of peoples,’ wrote, for example, Contant d’Orville, voicing ideas typical of Montesquieu, proceeded ‘from the climate that nations inhabit, the education which they receive and the form of their government.’81 Vattel’s influential Droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués a la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (1758) offers meanwhile an illustration of how manners and governance were to be joined together in a work of national ‘perfection.’ In a manner reminiscent of Vico, Ferguson and Herder, Vattel depicted ‘nations’ as springing from nature, and just as nature obliged each man to labor after his own perfection, the duty of a nation ‘towards itself is to labor after its own perfection.’ The steps taken in such a work of perfection were in turn to be judged suitable or not according to the given nation’s ‘character’ and the form of civil society toward which it inclined.82 This mode of approach entered also into the thought of Rousseau, who observed in his famous treatise on a personal one, peculiar to each individual.’ Hume, ‘Of National Characters,’ p. 284. See also Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, pp. 96-97; Encyclopédie (1765), IX, p. 252. As noted nevertheless below, many, including Hume, agreed that language was a principal means of establishing the lineage of ‘nations.’ 80 Ibid., I, p. 10. 81 D’Orville, Dictionnaire universel, historique et critique des mœurs, loix, usages et coutumes civiles, militaires et politiques (1772), II, p. 389. 82 Emmerich de Vattel, Droit des gens, I, pp. 4, 11-14, 43-49. Vattel defines ‘a nation, or state as political bodies, societies of men united together.’ These nations began life as assemblages of free people living in the state of nature. Ibid., I, pp. 1-2. This perfection, finally, was not to be measured by the satisfaction of each nation’s material wants alone, but by its accomplishments in the realm of learning. Such ideas were visible still earlier in the writings of Vico, who professed

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inequality that much knowledge was yet wanted ‘on the real features which distinguish nations’ if contemporary thinkers were to have a full picture of their world and the challenges of fashioning lasting political bonds.83 Speculation on the nature of the symbiosis between law, national manners and governmentality surfaced also in Rousseau’s Confessions and Social Contract but reached its highest form of expression in Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (1772), a work in which he argued that the survival of Poland ultimately rested on the ability of its leaders to instill a sense of collective identity among all its peoples. If designed properly, ‘national institutions,’ and most of all a substantial system of national education, offered the best means to intensify any society’s ‘form’ and ‘peculiarity,’ and thus its governmentality.84 But, for the Poles, facing partition, this could have the still more profound importance of securing the nation’s very survival. As he conceded to his sponsors, the measures proposed in the Considérations might not prevent the encroaching powers ‘from swallowing you’; however, they might yet insure that ‘they cannot digest you.’85

History as Chronicle of National Refinement From the standpoint of methodology, a notable feature of works on national character was their heavy reliance on historical comparisons and change over time: As D’Espiard explained, physical circumstances were of vital importance in shaping the character and spirit of a nation; but these were also affected by its passage through successive ‘stages’ of improvement and the conditions and effects belonging to each had to be taken into account if one was to arrive at a satisfactory ‘system of man.’86 This idea was famously explored again by Voltaire in his Essai, the author embarking on a global account of nations and their mœurs as part of a larger bid to decipher the ‘story of the human mind.’87 Knowledge of the New World was deemed especially that ‘the nation’ reached its ‘perfect state’ when the ‘sciences, disciplines, arts, religion and laws’ were directed toward the same ends. Vico, The First New Science, p. 211. 83 Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, p. 159 84 This was the necessary precondition, he had written in other works, for the formation of a true general will, and in turn the resolution of the contradiction between absolute freedom and law that had eluded his philosophical predecessors. See, for example, Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal, pp. 27-49. 85 Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, pp. 16-21, 30-38, 130. 86 D’Espiard, L’Esprit des nations, I, p. iii. 87 Voltaire quote cited in Force, ‘Voltaire and the Necessity of Modern History,’ p. 475. Voltaire’s Essai first published in 1756; re-issued in 1769 with the earlier published Philosophie de histoire

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valuable for such an endeavor as it was held to supply an unprecedented view of nations at an embryonic stage of their development.88 These concerns ranked high in the contemporary fashion for histoire philosophique, or an examination of the past as a means for deciphering the ‘rules of social evolution.’89 Voltaire’s Essai thus amounted to a global account of nations and their mœurs in the service of an improved universal history. However, works of ‘national’ history were also a staple of the era, if critics could be found of the unscientific manner in which the authors in question often dealt with the inevitable blank pages in their nation’s past. Indeed, ‘each nation,’ wrote Robertson, ‘with a vanity inseparable from human nature, hath filled that void with events calculated to display its own antiquity, and lustre.’90 His own Scots suffered acutely from this fault, although they might be excused on account of the harm done by English authors intent on obliterating ‘our’ history.91 The desire to repair such damage and deficits was shared by many apologists throughout the continent who felt a similar duty to rescue their nation’s history from the malice of foreign writers.92 inserted at the beginning as a ‘preliminary discourse.’ Voltaire’s Essai may also be held to represent another renovation of older episteme, with specific regard to the ‘universal history’ of Bossuet: Although ‘nations’ and their ‘genie, esprit, mœurs, caractèr,’ etc. appeared periodically in this earlier work, they did not serve as a central organizing device as they do for Voltaire. Bossuet, Discours sur l’histoire universelle, pp. 11, 210, 368, 411, 412, 416, 437, 448, 491; Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs, I, p. 4. For Voltaire’s relationship to Bossuet and contemporary genres of history, see Force, ‘Voltaire and the Necessity of Modern History,’ pp. 459, 477; Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, II, pp. 72-162; Burke, ‘European Views of World History’; O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment; Méricam-Bourdet, Voltaire et l’écriture de l’histoire; Berger, The Past as History. 88 This vista was unknown to Greco-Roman writers who were only exposed to societies equal or more advanced than their own. Robertson, History of America, I, pp. 280-282; D’Espiard, L’Esprit des nations, I, p. iv. For the influence of travel writing on Herder’s sense of national and linguistic diversity, see Paxman, Voyage into Language, pp. 221-226. For additional works on eighteenth-century travel writing, see Bauer, The Cultural Geography of Colonial American Literature; Chard and Langdon, Transports: Travel, Pleasure, and Imaginative Geography; Fulford and Kitson, Travels, Explorations, and Empires; Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind. 89 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, pp. 11-59. In mounting, for example, their own ‘aplicación retrospectiva de las normas de racionalidad,’ Spanish historians sought not merely to record dates and events, but explain the ‘origin and evolution of the legislation, customs and politics of Spain in history.’ Varela, ‘Nación, patria y patrotismo,’ p. 38. 90 Robertson, History of Scotland, I, p. 2. 91 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 92 As Sanchez Albornoz observed, ‘el siglo XVIII hispano was the century of History.’ Quoted in Fusi, España: la evolucion de la identidad nacional, p. 147. The efforts of Spanish historians, such as Ponz (El viaje de España, 1772-1794), Forner (Oración apologética por la España y su mérito literario, 1786), and the Real Academia Española were further motivated by the representations of Spain in foreign sources. Note, for example, the uproar over the article ‘Espagne’ in the 1782 edition of the Encyclopédie methodique. Fusi, España: la evolucion de la identidad nacional,

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The works of Robertson further help to show that contemporary historians might cross from the particular to the universal over the course of their careers, if always with an eye toward the world-historical framework. Robertson’s History of America (1777) situated, for example, the discovery of the New World in a narrative of scientific and commercial progress that reached back to the earliest times.93 This work is also notable for Robertson’s pronounced use of ‘the nation’ as a means to organize his description of the indigenous inhabitants and he indeed suggested that the concept offered more value for this purpose than previously recognized. As he explained in one telling passage: ‘In America, the word nation is not of the same import as in other parts of the globe. It is applied to small societies, not exceeding, perhaps, two or three hundred persons, but occupying provinces larger than some kingdoms of Europe.’94 Robertson’s comments appear to have been prompted by several observations of Buffon in his Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (1749-1767), a work that also dwelled considerably on America and, in doing so, made a welcome overture toward clarity on matters of definition.95 Although Buffon acknowledged the value of the nation as a means to chart divisions in humanity beyond race, he expressed reservations about its applicability to the Americas, where group relations were in such a primitive state. Few if any conclusions could be drawn from such pretendues or ‘would-be’ nations, judged Buffon, given the fact, again, that the manners of barbarous peoples were everywhere the same.96 These points were illustrated by allusion to the importance of a verifiable group consciousness and distinct language as markers of national difference. The later linkage appeared fundamental to Buffon and he equated the refinement of a group’s language, and its subsequent distinctiveness from others, with nationhood. The assemblages of people in the Americas were, accordingly, less nations than ‘haphazard’ collections ‘of barbarous and independent men.’97 But what if some were pp. 124, 148, 151-53. See also Boixareu and Lefere, La Historia de España en la literatura francesca, pp. 301-363. For similar complaints elsewhere, see Kontler ‘William Robertson’s History of Manners,’ p. 136n; Kostantaras, ‘Byzantine Turns.’ 93 Similar approach taken in Raynal’s Histoire philosophique et politique. 94 Robertson, History of America, I, p. 337. 95 See, for example, Ibid., p. 287. Robertson’s perspective shared by Roubaud in Nouveaux synonymes françois, III, p. 239. 96 Buffon, Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, III, p. 492. Although Robertson accepted the conventional wisdom that barbarous nations were nearly indistinguishable from one another, the modicum of unity and identifiable manners exhibited by the groups in question sufficed to qualify them for nationhood. 97 Ibid., p. 491.

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found to recognize the bond between them, ‘speak the same language and unite themselves when they must under a chief […]?’ Such a group could be held to constitute a nation, Buffon affirmed, provided that its customs ‘were consistent and its language is not so simple that it is common to all others.’98 And indeed, he added ‘it must be easier for a savage to understand and speak all the languages of other savages, then it is for a man from a polished nation to understand the language of another nation equally polished.’99 Robertson was not silent on matters of language (see below), but his test of nationhood in the American volumes laid stress, in a fashion reminiscent of Adam Ferguson in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) on common governance. Ferguson, who also dwelled considerably on America, applied the term to the most embryonic of group formations and depicted such ‘nations’ as springing into existence with the very first peopling of the planet. That said, Ferguson appears to assume the existence of a common language in the formation of the early bonds cited above. If we were in fact to imagine the world in its original state, wrote Ferguson, we should see it ‘planted’ with little ‘colonies’ of people, each herded together with ‘language[s] of their own,’ and embarking from this point forward on their careers as nations.100 The most polished of modern day European nations began life in such rude form and indeed the encounter with the natives of America afforded modern day Europeans with nothing less remarkable than the experience of beholding ‘as in a mirror, the features of our own progenitors.’101 As for the connection between language and nationhood in Robertson’s America, the assumptions of the author on this front appear sporadically throughout the work but hew closely to the ideas and heuristic value associated with the concept in the works cited previously. His digressions, for example, on the peculiarities of the ‘Mexican language’ cohere with a general inclination to judge the language of a nation and specifically its conceptual repertoire as an index of its progress from rudeness to refinement. This principle helped to explain, for example, the absence of words for ‘universal,’ ‘abstract,’ and ‘of reflection’ in the vocabularies of the ‘nations’ populating his History of America (1777). ‘Solicitude’ about future and past was indeed emblematic, he observed in the course of these reflections, of changes in 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid., p. 493. This thesis also became commonplace. See, for example, Turgot, ‘Remarques critiques,’ p. 105. 100 Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society, p. 6. 101 Ibid., p. 121.

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consciousness corresponding to the complexity of life in polished nations.102 Robertson applied this same principle to his reconstructions of European history, equating the ‘unpolished’ state of European languages during the early Middle Ages with the rude condition of its contemporary ‘nations.’ Indeed, ‘All the languages in Europe,’ during this time, ‘were barbarous, destitute of elegance, of force, and even perspicuity. No attempt had been hitherto made to improve or to polish them.’103 The growing refinement of these languages corresponded, in turn, with changes in the sixteenth century that led to the introduction of ‘more regular government and more polished manners into the various nations of Europe.’104 The importance in summary placed by Herder, D’Espiard and D’Orville on manners and language as a means for tracing the lineage of nations was reprised in more formal historical works. As Hume wrote in his History of England (1778), if the ‘curiosity of enquiring into the exploits and adventures of their ancestors’ was an impulse shared ‘by all civilized nations, the only certain means by which nations can indulge their curiosity in researches concerning their remote origin, is to consider the language, manners, and customs of their ancestors, and to compare them with those of neighboring nations.’105 Additional adherents of this view from the English-speaking world included Jefferson, Pinkerton, and the still earlier Buchanan. When tracing, for example, the racial ancestry of the Scots in The History of Scotland (first published in Latin 1582, with English translations in 1690, 1722, 1733), Buchanan counted manners and religion as critical; but the test of proof rested above all on language.106

Conclusions The preceding investigation reveals the diverse meanings attached to the nation in eighteenth-century culture. In addition to its standing as a political 102 Robertson, History of America, I, pp. 25, 265, 312; II: 273, 278, 470, 477, 481. 103 Robertson, History of the Reign of Charles V, I, p. 75 104 Ibid., I, p. 83. 105 Hume, History of England, I, pp. 3-4. 106 Buchanan, History of Scotland, II, pp. 50-88. See also Pinkerton, Dissertation of the Origin and Progress of the Scythians and Goths (1787). For additional context, see O’Brien and Manning, ‘Historiography, Biography and Identity,’ p. 146; Kidd, ‘Gaelic Antiquity and National Identity,’ and idem, Subverting Scotland’s Past. Note that Thomas Jefferson drew upon the same heuristic tradition when commenting upon the ancestry of various European and native American ‘nations.’ Language was, in his words, ‘the best proof of the affinity of nations which can ever be referred to.’ See Notes on the State of Virginia (1781) in Jefferson, Writings, pp. 226-227.

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unit, ‘bearer of sovereignty,’ and a body of people governed under the same laws, contemporary works also demonstrate the value attached to the nation as a means to organize enquiries involving differences in the way people looked, thought, and spoke, or even the ‘rules of social evolution.’107 These works project the assumption that the unique or defining characteristics of a group of people only become distinct when they comprised a nation, e.g., had arrived at a certain stage of socio-economic complexity and integration. A study of character was thus, inevitably, a study of national character. Although the explanation for this heightened awareness of difference remains in question, the choice of concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘national manners’ as a means to articulate and wrestle with such problems appears to reflect older heuristic traditions, in use since the Renaissance, that promoted their serviceability for pursuits of this kind. Enlightenment thinkers were not in this case inventing new modes of practice, however, the growth of studies directed toward explaining the nature and cause of difference helped to raise the nation’s entry in contemporary letters to a high rate of incidence. The literature discussed above also demonstrates the manner in which the nation was increasingly rendered as a moral body and site of improvement. As Bell and Slimani have noted in earlier works, much of the previous European literature involving the nation treated it as an organic but also rather inert entity. However, those discussed above introduce the idea that it need not remain in such a state indefinitely or furthermore that its progress from one stage to the next be left to chance. The nation could be improved and indeed had a duty to know and perfect itself, in a manner reminiscent of the moral improvement obtained by an individual through a well-designed course of upbringing and education. These ideas resonate in the pronouncements of later Jacobin nation-builders and other actors such as Korais, the latter speaking of the Greek nation’s quest to lift itself from barbarism as offering the remarkable sight of ‘a man trying to perfect himself.’108 The qualities associated with the perfection, refinement, improvement, etc. of the nation were again more often a matter of conjecture than explicit enumeration, with authors such as Robertson, Buffon and Ferguson alluding to an increased state of social integration and complexity (accomplished with a major assist from the introduction of private property and commerce), that created new wants and needs, the demands for satisfying which ‘called forth,’ in turn, an increase in reasoning powers and dexterity. The results of 107 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, p. 38. 108 Korais, Memoire sur l’etat actuel, p. 3.

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these developments were visible in the quality of civil society, achievement in the arts and sciences, a stronger sense of collective consciousness, and finally, the conceptual repertoire of the nation’s language. Language was thus a fixture of the theoretical literature on this theme and duly appeared as both a characteristic attribute of nations and a means to assess their manners and standing in the ranks of civilization – a complementarity that could be treated in a more instrumentalist fashion in the ‘race for Enlightenment.’109 As indicated by Diderot, if the conceptual repertoire of a language reflected a given nation’s state of refinement, direct intervention in this area might serve to hasten progress toward that end. This point is developed in the next chapter which charts the various ways in which linguistic renovation – pursued through the publication of dictionaries and related endeavors – was treated as a powerful lever of improvement upon which the nation’s stewards might lay hands to affect an acceleration in the operation of the laws of progress. The nexus of language and nation was thus, contra the traditional notion of ‘dichotomies’ alluded to earlier, part of a cross-cultural, continental-wide discourse and emphatically not the exclusive preserve of a particular Western or Eastern European disposition. The composition of the Dictionnaire alone attests to the fact that the condition of a nation’s language was a primary field of concern for French cultural elites and indeed the catalyst for similar ventures across the English Channel. Samuel Johnson, to cite one notable example, agreed with the ‘academicians’ that ‘the glory of a nation’ rested greatly upon its letters and described his own efforts on behalf of the Dictionary of the English Language as having been expended in the hope ‘that we may no longer yield the palm of philology, without a contest, to the nations of the continent.’110 The failure of the English to ‘make some struggle’ for their language, he further warned, was to court still greater, existential dangers: For should the architects of the Dictionnaire succeed, with the aid of irresponsible translators, in colonizing the language of arts and sciences, he and his countrymen would soon be left to ‘babble a dialect of France.’111 If D’Alembert’s reconstruction of events 109 Morrissey, ‘The Encyclopédie,’ p. 156. 110 Johnson, ‘Plan of an English Dictionary,’ and ‘Preface to the English Dictionary,’ in The Works of Samuel Johnson, II, pp. 23, 65. The academicians had previously declared that ‘that which serves to form the Eloquence contributes immensely to the glory of a Nation.’ Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694), I, pp. iv, vii. 111 Johnson, ‘Plan of an English Dictionary,’ p. 64. Johnson was particularly concerned by the tendency of ‘Gallick’ elements to supplant the ‘Teutonick.’ ‘Preface to the English Dictionary,’ p. 52. Similar warnings in Brown, Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times. These

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in the ‘Discours preliminaire’ from the Encyclopédie is to be trusted, this may not, in fact, have been far from the Dictionnaire’s original intent: ‘Our language being widespread throughout Europe,’ wrote D’Alembert, ‘we believed that the time had come to substitute it for Latin.’ Unfortunately, ‘the scholars of other nations to whom we had given the example, believed with reason that they could write better in their own language than in ours.’112 Johnson’s response to this challenge, typical of reformers discussed in the next chapter, was to expand and purify English by supplanting words of foreign origin with those of native provenance fallen out of use: If, for example, ‘the terms of natural knowledge [be extracted] from Bacon […] few ideas would be lost to mankind, for want of English words, in which they might be expressed.’113 The heavy emphasis on language and culture in the pages above raises the question of whether the national idea projected in many works from the period was not only a linguistic, but an ethno-linguistic one, although a problem immediately arises here concerning the concept of ethnicity – a term that was not used in the period and whose meaning has since been subject to diverse readings. However, if ethnicity may be said to allude to features such as a shared language, culture, history and ‘myth of descent,’ then many evocations of nationhood viewed above have an ethno-linguistic quality.114 In the case nevertheless of national ‘character,’ this was often portrayed as accruing from particular combinations of climate, economic organization and the given nation’s stage of development, rather than as a manifestation of inner essences.115 Furthermore, if the nation was a bearer of culture and site of improvement, sovereignty was not deemed as a necessary precondition for accomplishing such ends. Although the ‘nation’ was often used to refer to a sovereign political unit in works of philosophical history and jurisprudence, the cultural and linguistic revival campaigns discussed in the following chapter were largely absent of any overt political sentiments were expressed elsewhere in Europe, as witnessed by a famous outburst of Herder’s from 1774 in which he declared that ‘All the rulers of Europe are speaking French already, and soon we will all be doing so.’ Herder, Another Philosophy of History, pp. 64-65. 112 Encyclopédie (1751), I, p. xxx. 113 Johnson, ‘Preface to the English Dictionary,’ p. 53. Many similar contemporary examples of this discourse are cited in Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism. 114 See, for example, Smith, ‘Structure and Persistence of ethnie,’ and Eriksen, ‘Ethnicity, Race and Nation.’ 115 Glimpses of what some might call an essentialist sentiment do nevertheless occasionally appear. See, for example, Obradović, ‘Letter to Haralampije,’ p. 222. For additional examples and context, see Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 104; Carhart, The Science of Culture, p. 4; Richards, ‘The Axiomatization of National Differences.’

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aims or demands, if exceptions may be observed in the Polish or Magyar cases where a pre-existing measure of sovereignty was under threat. The foregoing leaves out the question of whether the nation, as conceived in its rendering as the ‘people at large’ or ‘mass of the governed,’ was also itself the source of sovereignty. This problem too entered into the intellectual affairs of the period but is addressed in Chapter 4, which discusses political and discursive developments, especially in France, in the years immediately preceding and after 1789.

3.

The Enlightenment Nation as a Site of Practice Abstract The present chapter moves across eighteenth-century Europe and offers many illustrations of how people engaged with the ideas described in the previous chapter and sought to put them into practice, often with the aim of freeing their particular nations from the scourge of backwardness and attaining parity with those deemed to have reached a higher state of ‘refinement’ or ‘perfection.’ Particular stress is placed on educational initiatives and the production of dictionaries and grammars, works which, by making the nation’s language an effective medium for modern scholarship, echoed the aims of earlier French and English lexicographical ventures. Keywords: cultural nationalism, national regeneration, Seven Years’ War, Enlightened Absolutism

‘But what will result from this?’ someone may ask. It will come to pass that men destined for the priesthood may with no further delay […] be given such books as may make them more learned when they read them, that they may be capable of teaching themselves and their own nation, leading their nation in the paths of righteousness and enlightenment: such are the things that in the name of God will result from this.1

The words of the Serbian monk and educator Dimitrije Obradović (1743?-1811) echo the sentiments of other scholars and churchmen from Southeastern Europe whose appeals for new schools and books in the ‘popular language’ were at least partly inspired by the goal of preserving the integrity of Orthodox practice. Looming throughout and mingling with the otherwise 1 Obradović, The Life and Adventures, pp. 283-284.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch03

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hopeful messages found in these texts are darker references to the sad plight of peoples condemned to lives of poverty and superstition or left indefinitely to wander, in the words of a contemporary Greek cleric, in the ‘labyrinth of illiteracy and barbarism.’2 Such documents help further to illustrate the variety of ways in which Enlightenment era actors portrayed the instrumentality of their educational initiatives and still larger quests for ‘national regeneration’; a cause which, as Obradović infers, was not free of controversy but often capable of arousing intense conflicts and ‘culture wars’ among various factions of patriots who each believed themselves best-placed to judge of the nation’s true needs and interests. The present chapter moves across eighteenth-century Europe, although with emphasis on the central and eastern parts of the continent, and offers many additional illustrations of how people engaged with the ideas described in the previous chapter and sought to put them into practice, often with the aim of freeing their particular nations from the scourge of backwardness and attaining parity with those deemed to have reached a higher state of ‘refinement’ or ‘perfection.’ Many of these projects evoke the concept of the nation as a linguistic community that was well represented in the previously cited literature and were accordingly centered on the problem of rehabilitating or cultivating the ‘national’ idiom. Particular stress was placed on educational initiatives and the production of dictionaries and grammars, works which, by making the nation’s language an effective medium for modern scholarship, echoed the aims of earlier French and English lexicographical ventures. If in fact East European advocates of linguistic renovation are often portrayed as engaged in projects akin to ‘nationalizing progress,’ or fitting an originally Western, cosmopolitan vision of perfectibility to their own particular ends, the intense concern shown toward the status and preservation of the ‘national language’ by French and English authors, to say nothing of the mass of rhetoric expended on the state of the nation’s moral condition, attest to the fact that the Enlightenment had already been ‘nationalized’ in the West, and the nation – and its language – become a principal object toward which true patriots directed their improving zeal.3 Although such endeavors are commonly associated with the practice of ‘cultural nationalism,’ the following pages note too how the nation was also implicated in contemporary political conflicts and debates, as notably in France in the years surrounding the Seven Years’ War, where its 2 3

Psalidas and Thesprotos, Geographia Alvanias kai Ipeirou, p. 77. See, for example, Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, pp. 3-9.

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moral condition and indeed, ‘regeneration,’ were the subject of considerable thought. 4 The diverse speculations and pronouncements on this head were sometimes accompanied by allusions to the deleterious effect of absolutism on the character of the nation and even the far-reaching claim, discussed in the following chapter, that France’s ills were the result of an incomplete state of national self-consciousness and unity. Elsewhere, the endeavors of language enthusiasts gained further impetus, provisioning, and even a level of militancy from political disputes connected with the practice of Enlightened Absolutism. In the case of central Europe, this encouragement sometimes arrived in the form of material support from local nobilities who turned to Czech or Magyar as a means to buttress their claims of ‘historic rights’ against the centralizing initiatives of Habsburg rulers. The events and ideas explored in this chapter provide, in sum, another revealing illustration of the manner in which Europe functioned, in the words of Joep Leerssen, ‘as a zone of traffic and exchange.’5 The circulation of national discourse throughout the continent (and beyond), which this author has likened to the movement of ‘a weather system or an epidemic,’ was accomplished through both conscious acts of borrowing as well as innumerable forms of incidental transfer, all of which help to explain how ‘the nation’ became a feature of public discourse amid a range of societies (the Low Countries, France, Central Europe, the Balkans, to name a few) that differed so greatly in social and political circumstances.6 The perspective from this supra-national height can in fact be revelatory in the sense of dispelling the image of cultural ‘autarchy’ that was so marked a feature of early national historiographies.7

Escaping the Ranks of the ‘Troglydite Nations’ In terms of ends, many of the initiatives launched on behalf of various nations throughout Europe over the eighteenth century were directed toward 4 See, for example, Woods, ‘Cultural Nationalism.’ 5 Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, p. 19. 6 Nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe, writes Leerssen elsewhere, was ‘not generated wholly from within the bosom of a pre-existing ethnic group or from within the infrastructures of their states or societies of origin,’ but spread instead ‘by way of the communication of ideas, not only within the ethnic group, state or society, but between and across them as well.’ Leerssen, ‘Viral Nationalism,’ pp. 257, 267. 7 Trencsényi and Zászkaliczky, Whose Love of Which Country?, p. 3. See also Hroch Social Preconditions, p. xvii; Breuilly, ‘Reflections on Nationalism,’ p. 138.

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improving the ability of each to acquit itself, recalling principles articulated by Vattel, in the realm of arts and sciences. This quest was consistent with the ideas discussed previously concerning the stages of refinement through which nations were held to pass in their journeys from rudeness to refinement, and indeed the more general conception, as Morrissey writes, of the nation as ‘a vehicle for the universal institution of Enlightenment values.’8 The condition of a nation’s language, and specifically its serviceability as a medium for modern scientific and scholarly pursuits, was thus conceived as a means for tracking its progress in this journey. Many of the national cultural revival movements of the eighteenth century could thus be described as appeals for collective action toward peoples thought to be in a depressed and even degenerate condition; an endeavor typically expressed in the terms of a biting self-critique deemed to have an instrumental value in motivating action. When dealing with ideas such as national degeneration and regeneration there is probably an inclination to think first of rhetorical traditions connected with figures from the ‘other Europe.’ To be sure, students of East European and Balkan nationalisms are accustomed to encounter such terms, their ubiquity typically attributed to the heuristic value the concepts appeared to hold for revivalist-minded intellectuals seeking to close the distance between their homelands and the more advanced societies to the west. The quest for regeneration served to express the notion, dearly held at least by the enlightened stewards of the nations in question, that they were the descendants of once proud and accomplished peoples – a notion captured in Korais’s Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilization dans la Gréce (1803) which begins with the words: ‘If one could observe with profit the state of a nation it is principally in the period when this nation degenerates from the virtue of its ancestors, as well as the period of its regeneration.’9 And yet, however well such concepts appear to express the sentiments of reformers from the ‘other Europe,’ terms such as national degeneration and regeneration were originally employed in the West, as is evident from a survey of contemporary literary and political developments in France, where one additionally finds a robust culture of social criticism equally available for appropriation. 8 Morrissey, ‘The Encyclopédie,’ p. 159. 9 Korais, Mémoire, p. 1. According to an Italian thinker writing in the very same year (1803), the task of ‘regenerating a nation’ was not only the ‘most sublime plan a great man could envisage,’ but one that was ‘even more difficult than creating a nation.’ Cited in Patriarca, Italian Vices, p. 22.

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As discussed in several works by Antoine de Baecque, and more recently those of Bell and Quinlan, ‘degeneration’ and ‘regeneration’ appeared in mid-eighteenth-century medical and religious texts and subsequently crossed into French politics, from which time they ‘besieged the sphere of government.’10 This re-purposing of the terms did not in fact escape the notice of contemporary thinkers, one of whom classified ‘regeneration’ among ‘the words already in common use but now employed in a new and wider meaning.’11 Sean Quinlan writes similarly of an ‘obsession’ with degeneracy and decline that broke out in the 1750s, at which time ‘doctors abruptly entered the political culture of pre-revolutionary France.’12 Certainly, few usages of the term were as memorable as Diderot’s in a later edition of the Histoire des deux Indies, wherein he remarked that ‘un nation ne se régénéré que dans un bain de sang [a nation regenerates itself only in bloodshed].’13 The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), and France’s defeats in the same, appeared to further promote the use and elaboration of such ideas, as well as their induction into the political domain.14 These developments fostered in some quarters, writes Bell, a ‘radical critique of the national character’ in which traits such as légèreté, once treated as a benign condition or at least one subject to diverse assessments, now took on a grave form.15 For certain critics of the regime, the nation’s degeneration, as witnessed in its ‘lightness’ of character and moral failures, could be traced to the advance of despotism – a charge which also informed claims for a restoration of the nation’s ‘sovereignty’ discussed in the following chapter.16 Finally, the nation was increasingly employed in these years, in ways comparable to 10 These terms even found their way into Louis XVI’s speech on the convocation of the EstatesGeneral in 1788, the latter declaring at one point that the ‘regeneration of the kingdom’ was at hand. Cited in De Baecque, The Body Politic, pp. 133-135. See also from the same author, ‘L’Homme nouveau est arrivé,’ pp. 193-208; Bell, The Cult of the Nation; Sepinwall, The Abbé Grégoire, as well as entry for ‘Régénération’ in Furet and Ozouf, Dictionnaire critique. 11 De Baecque, The Body Politic, pp. 133-135. 12 Quinlan, The Great Nation in Decline, p. 20. 13 These thoughts, from the third (1780) edition of the work were prefaced by a discussion of why it is that ‘great men’ may ‘form and cultivate [murir] a nascent nation,’ but cannot ‘rejuvenate an aged and fallen one.’ In short, ‘the condition of a restorer of a corrupt nation’ may be likened to that of ‘an architect who proposes to build upon an area covered in ruins,’ or ‘a doctor trying to heal a gangrenous corpse.’ Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, III, p. 102. 14 The effects of the war on French public opinion are discussed at length in Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme français. The author gives particular attention to the government’s role in shaping and elevating the level of patriotic discourse. 15 Bell, ‘The Unbearable Lightness,’ pp. 1230-1231. 16 Ibid.

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traditional uses of the patrie (which remained in style), as a locus of one’s affection and loyalty.17 In the English case too, argues Gerald Newman, the middle of the century witnessed ‘an intensifying’ and ‘obsessive’ concern ‘with national decline’ and even the need ‘for thorough moral regeneration.’18 These sentiments were expressed in the writings of people such as James Burgh, John Brown and John Shebbeare, among many others, who traced the malaise to unfettered materialism and excessive contact with other peoples.19 Although Krishan Kumar objects that many of the works discussed by Newman do not often qualify as instances of ‘nationalism,’ they do nevertheless offer testimony of how copiously the nation and matters of identity entered into the political and cultural concerns of metropolitan and continental authors.20 To be sure, the circle of ‘nations’ clamoring for regeneration expanded outward in all directions as the eighteenth century came to a close, as indicated in contemporary writings from Spanish America.21 The imperative therefore of improvement and even ‘regeneration’ was a fixture of discourse of the ‘Enlightenments’ in many parts of Europe and the European colonial world, if focused on national ills particular to local circumstances or traditions of discourse. Friedrich Klopstock’s works have, 17 The patrie’s fitness for such usages is illustrated in the Encyclopédie entry, which begins by informing the reader that more than simply a reference to the place of one’s birth (note: The 1762 Dictionnaire entry reads: ‘The country or state where one was born.’ Dictionnaire de l’Académie françoise [1762], II, p. 325.), the term was derived from the Latin pater and thus signified the attachments to ‘a family, a society, and a free state in which we are members and whose laws assure our liberty and happiness.’ Unlike nation, there are no self-evident or perhaps ‘natural’ examples, in the sense that a patrie was not identifiable by some physical or sensible form of difference, but by the display of sentiment shown by a given populace toward a particular place (the entry alluding only to ancient Greece and Rome and what their famous patriots had to say about them as a means to illustrate the concept). Encyclopédie (1765) XII: pp. 178-180. See also Slimani, La Modernité du concept, pp. 45-46; Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme, pp. 340, 364; Bell, ‘Revolutionary France,’ and Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 11-14; Godechot, ‘Nation, patrie, nationalisme,’ p. 495; Jourdan, ‘France, Patrie, Nation.’ 18 Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism, pp. 60, 190-193. One by-product of this turn of thought was the contemporary fascination, shared by Jefferson and other colonial authors, with Saxon ancestors. See also Bailyn, The Ideological Origins; Colley, Britons. 19 See, for example, Harris, Politics and the Nation. Text alludes to works such as Brown’s Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (1757). 20 Kumar, The Making of English National Identity. 21 ‘The first concern of legislators working to regenerate a country [que traban en la regeneración de un pais],’ proclaimed, for example, the anonymous Venezuelan translator of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) in 1797, ‘must therefore be that of not exposing the People to the furors [ furores] of […] intestinal dissensions.’ Grases, Pensamiento Politico, p. 20. See also Brading, Los Orígenes, pp. 55-57.

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for example, been cited as evidence of a long-standing cultural self-critique in the German-speaking world dwelling on the themes of lethargy and mimicry.22 As Leibniz claimed in a still earlier work, these tendencies were reflective of an endemic inferiority complex, the effects of which were visible in the reluctance of German scholars to esteem and cultivate their native language.23 Similar sentiments come to the fore amid the streams of enervated prose that fill the pages of the young Herder’s journals, the author brooding over the timorous mores of ‘my Germans, who think a great deal, yet think of nothing original.’24 Remarks such as these have even led scholars such as John Zammito to speak of a ‘campaign’ among contemporary German elites to attain ‘cultural parity with Western Europe.’25 This was partly to be achieved, or so at least Leibnitz urged, through the establishment of the German language as an artistic and scholarly idiom of the first rank. If so, this goal was arguably attained, as the German Enlightenment could boast of such luminaries as Lessing, Kant, Goethe, and Herder himself – seminal figures who found many admirers in the West and fueled the hopes of Slavic and Magyar reformers for what their own nations might one day accomplish if they too cultivated their language and, in turn, the intellectual capacities of its speakers.26 Rumination on the scourge of ‘backwardness’ was also a feature of contemporary Italian letters, as reflected in the diverse reflections, writes Stuart Woolf, on how what was once ‘the richest and intellectually most advanced’ part of Europe had fallen well behind its northern neighbors ‘in both respects.’27 As in many other regions of Europe discussed in this volume, 22 Zammito, Kant, Herder; Blanning, The Culture of Power, pp. 232-265; Herder, J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, p. 112. 23 Tatlock, Seventeenth Century German Prose, pp. 14-28. Text refers to Leibniz’s Exhortation to the Germans to Better Use their Mind and Language (1679). See also Hirschi, The Origins of Nationalism, pp. 115-116. 24 Herder, J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, p. 112. ‘We woke up,’ observed the same in a later work, ‘because it was midday everywhere and in some nations the sun was already beginning to set. In short, we came too late. And because we came so late, we imitated; for we found many excellent things to imitate.’ Cited in Bishop, ‘Nationalism and Europeanism,’ p. 97. 25 Zammito, Kant, Herder, p. 309. 26 See, for example, De Staël, Politics, Literature, and National Character. For influence of German Enlightenment on Slavic and Magyar reformers, see Ives, Enlightenment and National Revival, p. 16; Štaif, ‘The Image of the Other’; Macura, ‘Problems and Paradoxes,’ p. 190. For influence, specif ically, of Gottingen School thinkers on linguistic ventures of Dobner, Dobrovský and Thám, see Agnew, The Origins of the Czech National Renascence, pp. 49-52, 83-85, 112-113. 27 Woolf, A History of Italy, p. 75; Robertson, ‘Enlightenment and Revolution,’ p. 28; Patriarca, ‘Indolence and Regeneration,’ and idem, Italian Vices; Venturi, ‘Church and Reform,’ p. 215; Reinert, ‘Lessons on the Rise and Fall.’

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the ‘Italy’ of Enlightenment-era vintage alluded to in the passage above is a difficult object to satisfactorily define or reconstruct. Contemporary historians are indeed generally averse to the idea, perhaps more characteristic of earlier times, of treating the Risorgimento as unambiguously ‘beginning’ in the eighteenth century and progressing in the manner of ‘a forward march of national consolidation.’28 With these cautions in mind, it is nevertheless possible to conceive, as Riall, Cerruti, and other scholars have suggested, that a shared ‘sense of cultural italianità’ or Italian-ness existed among social elites throughout the peninsula, who, if divided among its various states, were joined together in an ‘associational life’ of scientific, literary and artistic interests.29 The ideas exchanged in this Italian republic of letters were highly influenced by innovations in thought imported from abroad and for some Italian intellectuals, even those as great as the legal philosopher Cesare Beccaria, Italy’s thinkers were merely the ‘disciples’ of the ‘Parisian encyclopédistes’ – a sentiment typical of many Eastern European intellectuals who modeled their activities on the examples of their philosophe-idols in the West and often assumed the role of precocious upstarts.30 The ‘backwardness’ of Italian life, if given to various modalities of expression, was indeed a fixture of contemporary Italian discourse and the source of ironic reflections on how what was once ‘the richest and intellectually most advanced’ part of Europe, had fallen ‘well behind the northern European nations in both respects.’31 These sentiments lent some force to the generation of a reform movement that brought the intelligentsia of the Italian peninsula into collaboration with its princes. In fact, several of the most influential figures of the day, Beccaria among them, enjoyed substantial careers in public service; a phenomenon that helps to explain the ‘practicality,’ as Stuart Woolf, Silvana Patriarca, and other scholars have observed, of the Italian Enlightenment as a body of thought when compared to developments elsewhere.32 This dialogue on reform was carried out on a peninsular level through scientific congresses and in the pages of literary 28 See editor’s note to Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 484. 29 Riall, Garibaldi, p. 23; See also Cerruti, ‘Dante’s Bones.’ 30 Cited in Venturi, ‘Church and Reform,’ p. 215. Note, for example, the comment of a Greek scholar in 1801 to Barbie du Bocage regarding the former’s desire to lead a reform project back in the Balkans: ‘I know well that the venture belongs to a scholarly society presided over by a Condillac, or Kant, but I can only do what my powers allow.’ Koumarianou, Gazis-BocagePhillipidis, p. 35. 31 Woolf, A History of Italy, p. 75. 32 Ibid., pp. 85-86, 93. See also Chadwick, ‘The Italian Enlightenment.’ As Patriarca writes, ‘reform projects filled the literature of the Italian Enlightenment.’ Patriarca, Italian Vices, p. 22.

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journals such as the famous Il Caffe published by the venerable Milanese intellectual Pietro Verri. Although these developments might be taken to represent the stirrings of a ‘literary Risorgimento’ they describe the activities, sporadic and perhaps indifferently received, of a limited number of people. The glorification of foreign ways could also breed resistance and dissension, writes Adrian Lyttelton, and even a prideful reaction among some local intellectuals against, in his words, ‘ideological imperialism.’33 Examples of this sentiment surface in the later writings of the dramatist Vittorio Alfieri, who, much like the contemporary Greek scholars surveyed elsewhere in this volume, sought inspiration for his endeavors in the past and even spent whole days in ‘melancholy meditation’ at the tombs of Dante, Tasso and Ariosto.34 These romantic pilgrimages were the outcome, he recounted in his memoirs, of a slow process of self-discovery in which he found at last his own true voice – contra the French imposed on him as a youth – in the speech of Petrarch.35 Alfieri’s choice of literary models indicates too how the Renaissance loomed large in the imagination of many contemporary thinkers when similarly reflecting on the greatness of what Italy was and perhaps again could be; a preference which nevertheless posed a ‘language problem’ for Italian revivalists not unlike those confronted by others cited below: Although calls for linguistic unification had been heard throughout the peninsula as far back as Dante, not much had changed in the intervening centuries to bring this prospect closer to fruition.36 Nor could complete agreement be reached among reformers on the iteration of Italian best suited to serve as a platform for the nation’s regeneration: the actual language of The Divine Comedy or its Tuscan successor?37 33 Lyttelton, ‘Creating a National Past,’ p. 43. Gian Rinaldo Carli’s (1720-1795) essay ‘Of the Italian Fatherland,’ which appeared in Il Caffe in 1765, offers one particularly striking example of the reaction cited in the text. 34 Alfieri’s ‘internalization’ of Italy’s status, wrote Salvatorelli, was abetted by his exposure to the attitudes of foreigners, in whose presence this son of Piedmont nobility often found himself as a youth. Salvatorelli, The Risorgimento, p. 42. A trip to Tuscany in the company of English travelers thus became the setting of a prolonged tutorial on the barbarous mores of Italian life. ‘I was ashamed of being an Italian,’ Alfieri later recalled of the experience, ‘and did not wish to possess anything in common with this nation.’ Alfieri, Memoirs, pp. 65, 216-217. 35 Alf ieri, Memoirs, p. 62. The dramatist’s transformation culminated f inally in a pledge to ‘un-Frenchify’ himself and ‘speak, hear, think and dream Tuscan and only Tuscan forever afterwards.’ Ibid., p. 164. 36 Bouchard, Risorgimento in Modern Italian Culture, p. 9; Ciccarelli, ‘Dante and the Culture of Risorgimento.’ Text refers to Dante’s De Vulgari Eloquentia (c. 1303-05). 37 Laven, ‘Italy,’ pp. 262-265.

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For all the expressions of cultural inferiority that emerge in German and Italian sources, their authors nevertheless made many original contributions to the Enlightenment, something which could not unfortunately be said for their Greek, Magyar or Slavic contemporaries, the efforts of whom were almost completely absorbed in the translation and retransmission of foreign texts.38 If Herder might therefore grumble at the shortcomings of his countrymen, scholars such as Joachim Whaley detect signs of growing confidence among German thinkers ‘in the worth and world-historical potential’ of their arts and letters as the eighteenth century progressed.39 These factors may help to explain the more intensive form of the cultural rehabilitation projects undertaken by contemporary intelligentsias in other parts of central Europe. Certainly lacking, at least in the German case, was the catalytic effect of Joseph’s language reforms, an innovation not unflattering to German letters and prestige. Elsewhere in Europe, movements for cultural rehabilitation drew heavily upon the contributions of diaspora students and scholars such as those discussed above, their interests in such endeavors appearing to stem from an experience which supplied to each a new and often unpleasant perspective on their nation’s perceived rank in the world. 40 To be sure, the self-critique expressed in French letters over the evils of degeneration does not suggest that the philosophes judged the civilization of their ‘poor relations’ to the east as equal to their own. 41 The Western gaze could indeed be severe as indicated in the words of Hume from his previously cited work on ‘national characters’: ‘The ingenuity, industry, and activity of the ancient GREEKS,’ he observed in the course of a disquisition on the primacy of social conditioning, ‘have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present inhabitants of those regions.’42 Sensitivity to such criticism frequently surfaces in the works of non-Western writers from the period, including Korais, whose publications and correspondence are replete with denunciations of the ‘slanders’ suffered by the Greeks at the hands of such authors, as well 38 In the words of a Polish scholar, the Enlightenment was only the latest chapter ‘in the stately procession of advanced ideas from the west to the eastern parts of the continent.’ Grochulska, ‘The Place of the Enlightenment,’ p. 244. 39 Whaley, ‘The Transformation of the Aufklärung,’ pp. 175-176. See also Blanning, The Culture of Power. 40 Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, pp. 3-9. 41 Augustinos, ‘Philhellenic Promises.’ 42 The modern Italians fared little better: ‘Candour, bravery, and love of liberty formed the character of the ancient Romans,’ wrote Hume, ‘as subtilty, cowardice, and a slavish disposition do that of the modern.’ Hume, ‘Of National Characters,’ p. 250.

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as periodic attempts to fashion an effective counter-narrative. 43 Occasions can also be cited of Eastern intellectual émigrés who rejected the notions of advanced and backward that such judgments were raised upon. 44 Still, as László Kontler writes, ‘if the (Western) Enlightenment “invented Eastern Europe” as a constitutive other in its rudeness, “Easterners,” although too late to be contenders for the patent rights, did not always contradict.’45 Indeed, ‘who can say that we do not need Europe?,’ asked Korais’s contemporary, Iosipos Moisiodax, ‘because while Greece lacks everything, Europe has everything, and in abundance.’46 True patriots had in fact no choice but to recognize the gulf separating their nations from the advanced societies to the west, concurred another (Dimitrios Darvaris), and do what was necessary to close the distance. The key to the prosperity of the ‘enlightened races’ was, above all, the interest they showed in public education. 47 ‘And yet we fail to imitate them,’ lamented Darvaris, ‘and do what is necessary to enlighten our race and not be so much held in contempt by the others as ignorant and barbaric.’48 If works of this genre often display a hopeful attitude toward the prospects of success, expressions of pessimism surface too over the immensity of the task, as indicated, for example, in an early diary entry of the Hungarian reformer István Széchenyi. ‘The only difference between the afterlife of a nation and a human being,’ the latter waxed darkly, ‘is that the corpse of a 43 Korais was famously incensed over the remarks of Corneille de Pauw in his Recherches philosophiques sur les Grecs (1787-1788), a work which the former singled out for rebuttal in his Mémoire. For additional context, see Kostantaras, ‘Byzantine Turns,’ pp. 178-181, and idem, ‘Idealisations of Self and Nation’; Augustinos, ‘Philhellenic Promises.’ 44 See, for example, Bracewell and Drace-Francis, Under Eastern Eyes. 45 Kontler, ‘The Enlightenment in Central Europe?,’ p. 36. Kontler refers here to Larry Wolff’s well known, Inventing Eastern Europe. 46 Moisiodax, Prologue to Ithiki Philosophia, republished in Kitromilides, Iosiphos Moisiodax, p. 331. 47 These appeals actually met with a reasonable amount of success, with the financial contributions of diaspora merchants being critical to the translation and re-transmission efforts of Greek and other Balkan intellectuals (very many of whom were Orthodox churchmen). As one historian writes, ‘the pathways of Greek commerce’ were also ‘the transportation routes of the Greek book.’ Iliou, Istories tou Ellinikou Vivliou, p. 72. The active efforts of Greek scholars to engage the merchant community are described in Kostantaras, ‘Commerce, Culture, and Civilization.’ Supporting roles were also played by Phanariots and the occasional Metropolitan or Bishop, several of whom contributed significantly to the publication of journals, the construction of schools, and the funding of scholarships for those wishing to pursue higher studies in Europe. The most important sites of Greek publishing activity were also in the diaspora. Iliou, Istories tou Ellinikou Vivliou, p. 72. See also Koumarianou, O Ellinikos Proepanastatikos Typos; Patiniotis, ‘Textbooks at the Crossroads.’ 48 Cited in Kostantaras, Infamy and Revolt, p. 98.

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human being is eaten by worms and completely ceases to exist, whereas the dead body of a nation may vegetate for many years.’49 Even the indefatigable Obradović saw a long road ahead: ‘We must take courage […] and begin to think as people will think a hundred years later than ourselves unless we are content to remain forever in our original simplicity and childishness.’ But if a journey of a hundred years might test the spirit of even the most dedicated patriot, ‘the example of other nations gives me courage,’ he was quick to add, citing among other things the benefits to be gained from the spread of public education and literacy. Indeed it was a ‘shame,’ he continued, ‘that the Serbian people should be deprived of books in its own language at a time when close to us learning shines like the sun in heaven.’50 One of the greatest lessons, Obradović implied, that other peoples might learn from the ‘shining’ societies to the west was the linkage they implicitly recognized between the cultivation of the common language and the general progress of the nation.51 Ignacy Krasicki, perhaps the leading Polish poet of the age, said much the same in a journal article from 1765: ‘The honor and glory of the nation which rises to perfection always depends on education and the expansion of the native tongue.’52 As the passages above attest, and indeed many similar expressions of this kind could be cited, these principles were heard in many parts of Europe where the fortunes of nation and language were similarly spoken of as entangled and, furthermore, that any work of improvement directed toward the latter would accrue to the improvement of the former. In addition finally to the practical benefits of language reform and vernacularization, the rehabilitation of such idioms also functioned on a symbolic level. This is to say that the refinement of the spoken language into one capable of serving as a medium for communicating the latest advances in the arts and sciences was viewed as a necessary qualification for admittance into the ranks of civilization.53 49 Cited in Cornis-Pope and Neubauer, History of the Literary Cultures of East-Central Europe, I, p. 18. For ‘pessimism’ in Italian context, see Patriarca, Italian Vices, p. 22. 50 Obradović, The Life and Adventures, p. 147. 51 This principle was shared by one of his Greek peers from Bucharest, who similarly declared that ‘we must follow in the footsteps’ of others and most of all in the teaching of philosophy, ‘which as we see in the examples and excellent results of the learned nations, wishes to speak to us in our mother language.’ Ermis o logios, 1811, I, p. 8. 52 Cited in Kostkiewiczowa, ‘Reflections on Patriotism,’ p. 699. ‘Everyone knows,’ agreed Moisiodax, ‘that all the nations [ethni] of Europe currently write, each in its own simple dialect, as much as in the sciences as in every other matter of study.’ Moisiodax, Theoria tis Geographias, p. 10. 53 To recall again the observation of Borbála Török cited in the previous chapter, ‘cultural refinement was related to the ability of the national tongues to serve as a vehicle of scholarly

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Although a full accounting of the endeavors conducted in this vein is not possible here, Thám’s Apology for the Czech Language (1783), in which an appeal for linguistic revival was premised on the maxim that ‘no nation is so dim or mad as not to love the language of its fathers sufficiently to protect it carefully and try to cultivate it with all its aspirations and zeal,’ strikes many of the notes found in other texts.54 This conception of language as an index of national improvement was repeated with remarkable consistency throughout the continent, with each partisan declaring their nation’s idiom, even in its neglected state, as superior to all others.55 The task of linguistic renovation was indeed to be accomplished in part through such works of apologia, with each author seeking to make the state of the language a source of public concern, as well as the production of the all-important dictionaries and grammars. The cultivation of the vernacular and its fashioning into a language capable of communicating the latest advances in the arts and sciences would in fact appear to be an initiative much in keeping with the rationalist aesthetic of the times, to say nothing of expediency. And yet, such campaigns were a site of controversy in many parts of Europe where opinions clashed over the choice of idiom to be used, as indicated in the Italian case, or the manner in which the popular languages, which were too poor in their present states to serve as mediums for education or the re-transmission of Western philosophical and scientific works, should be reformed. This issue gave rise to the famous ‘language question’ in the Greek-speaking world, a contest which provoked in turn, as glimpsed in Patriarch Grigorios V’s famous encyclical of later years (1819), fierce debate over matters of identity and tradition.56 communication.’ Török, ‘Patriotic Scholarship,’ p. 679. Note, for example, the choice of words used by a Transylvanian scholar when waxing upon the importance of language reform for any nation that sought to ‘rise to perfection.’ Ibid., p. 699. Note finally the claim that ‘As long as a nation neglects and despises its natural language, it neglects and despises its humanity,’ was a fixture of contemporary polemic. See, for example, Konstantas and Philippidis, Geographia Neoteriki, p. 146. 54 Thám ‘Apology,’ p. 209. 55 For notes on M. Lomonosov’s Russian Grammar (1754), another important entry in this genre of literature, see Wachtel, ‘Translation, Imperialism, and National Self-Definition,’ p. 55; Vacheva, ‘Identité nationale,’ p. 113. See also Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, p. 172; Thám ‘Apology,’ p. 209; Verlooy, ‘Treatise on the Neglect of the Mother-Tongue,’ pp. 49-50. 56 The Patriarch condemned the late custom of naming children after ancient Hellenes, yet nevertheless defended the use of the antique idiom in schools. ‘This Greek language is admired and applauded by all learned Europeans,’ he wrote, ‘and is the only valuable treasure left to us […] the only characteristic relic of ancestral nobility.’ ‘They (the vernacularists) put it about,’ he continued, ‘that the language of [our] ancestors, that Greek voice, is both difficult

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A revealing view of these local engagements with matters of linguistic and national refinement is offered by the writings of Dimitrios Katartzis (1720-1807), a leading force within the Phanariot-led, Greek-speaking high culture of Ottoman Bucharest and a close reader of developments in Western thought.57 For one of his modern interpreters Katartzis even evokes the figure of ‘le grec philosophe,’ a counterpart and fellow traveler of the Lumières, who, in addition to embarking on at least two attempts to produce a modern Greek translation of the Dictionnaire was an avid reader of the Encyclopédie methodique.58 The encounter with Western episteme was indeed constitutive in shaping Katartzis’s thought, as reflected in his attempts to locate the particular ‘national’ community to which he belonged within the conceptual frameworks articulated in contemporary European works.59 In some cases, this required a measure of linguistic innovation, as displayed by Katartzis’s use of the term ‘ethnos,’ a word retrieved from antiquity that appears to have been his choice for rendering the concept of ‘nation’ into modern Greek.60 Katartzis’s reclamation of the ethnos and other terms was consistent with a general policy of Greek language reformers, including Korais, to upgrade the vernacular with words from the classical lexicon, and is even reminiscent of Johnson’s approach to enriching the English language.61 That said, Katartzis took a nuanced position on the still larger question of the connection between the ancient ‘Hellenes’ and modern Greeks or ‘Romaioi.’62 The ancients, he reasoned, were indeed ‘our ancestors,’ and yet so different from the Romaioi in ‘political circumstances, religion, in comprehension and use and is in a way superfluous to the Nation today and intrude some grotesque innovations and new rules.’ ‘Patriarchal Encyclical of 1819,’ in Clogg, The Movement for Greek Independence, pp. 87-88. 57 For life and works of Katartzis, see Ta Evriskomena; Dokimia; Dimaras, La Grèce au temps des Lumières, pp. 26-36; Tabaki, ‘Historiographie et identité nationale’; Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution, pp. 142-156; Mackridge, Language and National Identity, pp. 92-101; Chatzispirou, ‘Les Essais de Dimitrios Katartzis’; Trencsényi and Kopeček, Discourses of Collective Identity, I, pp. 210-217. 58 Katartzis, Dokimia, p. xliii; Ta Evriskomena, pp. 36-37. 59 These interests were balanced by an impulse to identify those ideas suitable for appropriation. Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, pp. 46, 104, 177, 201. This critical stance toward foreign letters was shared by contemporaries such as Dobrovský. See, for example, Teich, ‘Bohemia,’ p. 161. 60 Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, pp. 44-46. Katartzis’s choice of ethnos as a native rendering of ‘nation,’ possibly based on its usage in the works of Aristotle. For additional lexicographical background, see Kitromilides, ‘“Imagined Communities”‘; Mackridge, Language and National Identity, pp. 92-101; Ward, ‘Ethnos in the Politics.’ 61 For an introduction to the life and works of Korais, see especially Kitromilides, Korais and the European Enlightenment. 62 Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, pp. 171-172.

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manners, language, behavior, clothing,’ etc., as to constitute a separate nation.63 He similarly opposed the use of ancient Greek in primary schools on the grounds that it failed to represent the present nation’s customs and character.64 ‘Hellenic’ is something we study, he wrote, ‘like any other foreign language and we do not become Hellenes by doing so, or simply take it on (the Hellenic) as a national name (onoma ethniko) in the same sense that one who studies a foreign language is not altered in the process.’ The ancient idiom might thus be mined as a source of vocabulary, but only ‘to cultivate and enrich our language, the romaic, in order to have a language of our own, and intertwine (nantistrefi) the name of the ethnos with its language.’65 Greek Enlightenment scholars displayed, in summary, an agenda not lacking in ‘nation-building’ spirit nor the aspiration to assume control over the nation’s past characteristic of the endeavors of authors, as discussed in later chapters, in the years following independence. There was indeed a great deal at stake in the eyes of these earlier figures, who, enjoying a modicum of freedom in the literary sphere, behaved very much like the ‘cultural custodians’ of sovereign states – if this nominal freedom of maneuver opened the way in turn for clashes of opinion over a range of issues concerning language, identity and power.66 The diverse inhabitants of the Ottoman Balkans were even free to build communal schools, should they have the resources, without incurring the opposition of the state; and indeed, the rapid growth in the number of the same occasionally drew surprise from foreign observers.67 The writings of Katartzis, and for that matter Alfieri and Herder, recall in sum that Enlightenment and progress were contested ideals which, when it came to practice, provoked sharp reactions throughout the continent over 63 Ibid., pp. 14, 104-105. Future Greek historians should ‘dwell especially on the history of the pious Romans, treating it as our own history.’ There was also a glaring absence of works on the period since 1453. Ibid., p. 149. From these, the Romaioi would learn what distinguished them as a nation both from earlier peoples as well as neighboring others; even other communities of Orthodox faithful, such as ‘the Serbs, Bulgarians and Bosnians.’ Ibid., p. 201. 64 Katartzis, Dokimia, p. xliii; Ta Evriskomena, pp. 36-37. 65 Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, pp. 50, 149, 171. 66 The concept of ‘cultural custodian’ is adopted from Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German. 67 William Leake, for one, declared himself quite startled by the ‘liberty of opinions’ and proliferation of schools he found during his travels over the years 1804-1810: ‘The Turkish government is no obstacle to such a proceeding (the spread of schools),’ he surmised, ‘being too blind or too careless of distant consequences to oppose the education of its Christian subjects, and rather pleased perhaps to see them engaged in such peaceful pursuits, though in the end they may be the most formidable of any to the Ottoman power.’ Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, IV, p. 388.

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the threats they allegedly posed to the integrity of ‘national’ culture.68 The push and push back between competing groups, each claiming to speak on behalf of the larger public, added thus a force of its own to the emergence, writes Laurence Cole, of a ‘language of nationality.’69 Lucy Riall has even used the term ‘culture war’ to describe the struggles that grew out of these tensions.70 These points could be applied directly again to multiple cases including Poland where conservative nobles condemned the ideas of their enlightened peers as an assault on native ways, precipitating a heated debate over what constituted a ‘true Pole.’71 ‘The notion of nationality,’ in the words of Jedlicki, ‘came to be viewed as a counterbalance to everything that was new and alien […] it broke free of the Enlightenment-liberal order of values and increasingly came to be associated with the ideas of the characteristic features of the Slavic race which were confirmed by historical tradition.’ Polish enlighteners confronted in this case the same challenge faced by reform-minded intellectuals elsewhere in Central and Southeastern Europe of persuading their critics that progress could be achieved by adopting Western models in ‘a Polish, rather than in a French guise.’72 As indicated by the work of these and other historians, the contest over Enlightenment was the source of some of the most vehement ‘nationalist’ rhetoric of the time period, if such could also contain a large measure of dissimulation or, in the words of Lyttelton, a ‘masking of political opposition by cultural debate.’73 This is to say that liberal ideas which threatened the political status of certain groups might be rejected on the more discrete charge that they were not ‘Polish, Hellenic, English,’ etc. If of questionable veracity, the effects of such claims were nevertheless real enough and helped fuel the rise of a vitriolic form of identity politics in Europe as the eighteenth century progressed. 68 If the sections above have emphasized therefore the tendency of nationalist awakeners to be ‘enlighteners,’ a category of thinkers who embraced progress as a means to regeneration, these points help to illuminate another important source of nationalist rhetoric in the contemporary host of claims made by the so-called ‘counter-Enlightenment.’ Although the use of this term is strenuously contested by some. A range of views on the subject can be found in Norton, ‘The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment’; Cole, ‘Nation, Anti-Enlightenment, and Religious Revival,’; Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 7. Burson provides a valuable survey of recent historiography in ‘Towards a New Comparative History.’ 69 Cole, ‘Nation, Anti-Enlightenment, and Religious Revival,’ pp. 476, 497. As Jay Smith points out, ‘Many recent studies have shown the ways in which magistrates, lawyers, administrators, and writers invoked the nation, the constitution, and the public for their own frequently conflicting purposes in political debates and literary texts.’ Smith, ‘Social Categories,’ p. 345. 70 Riall, ‘Martyr Cults,’ p. 260. 71 Walicki, The Enlightenment, p. 2. 72 Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, pp. 6, 20. 73 Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 72.

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Language and Power in the Age of Enlightened Absolutism If the refinement of the spoken language and its use as a platform for the nation’s educational pursuits and moral revival could be considered an innovation in keeping with the best traditions of Enlightenment rationalism and practice, it may have had the additional effect in some parts of Europe of not only legitimating the value of native languages but forcing a reassessment of intercommunal relations and attitudes in general – especially in those cases where one language (and its speakers) was plainly overshadowed by another. This response is visible in the writings of Jan Baptist Verlooy, a prominent lawyer and public figure in Brussels whose works are held to express characteristic elements of the ‘Flemish Enlightenment’ (see also Chapter 6). Like contemporary thinkers elsewhere, Verlooy associated the use of the vernacular with the larger end of public improvement and had harsh words for those among his countrymen who, in abandoning their native language for French, had contributed to the impoverishment of Flemish popular culture.74 Similar sentiments were expressed in Habsburg Bohemia where, according to scholars such as Nancy Wingfield, the exclusion of Czech from public affairs had long symbolized the ‘civilizational’ standings of Slavic and Germanic culture.75 With the tacit encouragement now of their age, Bohemian-Czech intellectuals celebrated the rehabilitation of their language with the enthusiasm of those putting paid, argues Vladimir Macura, to an imposing edifice of unflattering assumptions. This was only the starting point for a general reassessment of native culture that found further expression in philology and historical scholarship.76 Public theatres, literary journals, museums – all were common features in the institutional sphere (as elsewhere) of a transnational cultural response to the challenge of ‘improvement’ and the kindling of the ‘moral revolution’ upon which the native intelligentsias placed their hopes for their peoples’ renewal and progress.77 As with many of the movements discussed above, the Czech revival had rather benign beginnings, f irst surfacing in the second half of the 74 ‘The love of things foreign,’ he fumed in the Treatise on the Neglect of the Mother Tongue in the Low Countries (1788), could only ‘arouse in the people nothing but contempt for everything native.’ Verlooy, ‘Treatise on the Neglect of the Mother-Tongue,’ in Hermans, The Flemish Movement, pp. 49-50. See also Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 43. 75 Wingfield, Creating the Other. See also Evans, ‘Language and State Building,’ p. 12. 76 Macura, ‘Problems and Paradoxes,’ p. 190. See also Štaif, ‘The Image of the Other.’ 77 Note again, for example, Korais, Mémoire, p. 52. This ‘moral revolution’ could also have disturbing consequences. In the words at least of Korais, ‘for the first time the nation contemplates the hideous spectacle of its ignorance.’ Ibid., p. 60.

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eighteenth century as part of a larger effort at ‘popular enlightenment.’ Drawing liberally from the same revivalist repertoire observed elsewhere, the movement also took a decidedly linguistic turn, as greater use of the vernacular was deemed instrumental, along with love of fatherland (properly understood), to attaining the goal of public improvement.78 These aims notwithstanding, efforts of the Czech linguistic advocates within Bohemia did not escape the notice of German speakers who looked on with dismay at the many good works expended on behalf of a culture long regarded as much inferior to their own or even marked for extinction. Such prejudices, which were not unknown to Czech Bohemians, have indeed often been emphasized by historians when seeking to account for the energy aroused on the part of scholars over the cause of cultural rejuvenation. The ‘struggle for equality of languages,’ according to Miroslav Hroch, reflected, for example, the more fundamental ‘need for prestige and acknowledgement’ felt by Czech-speaking intellectuals.79 More readily visible at least were the sensitivities of Czech reformers to the criticisms their activities elicited from local elites of both German and Czech descent. Indeed, ‘It must surely be clear now,’ declared Thám in his Apology, after enumerating the many virtues of the Czech language, ‘that the denunciations by non-Czechs are unfounded and utterly nonsensical.’80 Thám was particularly aggrieved by the attitudes of his fellow Czechs, and especially those who had freely abandoned their ancestral tongue; the latter countering that the ‘enthusiasts’ were ‘swimming against the current’ and must ultimately come around to accept their inevitable ‘assimilation into the higher civilization’. 81 As for German Bohemians, writes Evans, the activities of Thám and like-minded thinkers served only to further intensify a tendency ‘to dismiss Czech as upstart and derivative.’82 78 Evans, ‘Language and State Building,’ p. 12. Historians find in these activities a variety of impulses and agendas, including the interests, argues Rita Kreuger, of a local aristocracy eager to display its cultural credentials and enlightened social outlook to European peers. Krueger, Czech, German and Noble, p. 8. 79 Hroch, ‘From Ethnic Group toward the Modern Nation,’ p. 105. Some have even gone so far as to argue that the Enlightenment had in diverse ways sanctioned the impulse to strike back against longstanding traditions of bigotry and belittlement, or even to suggest that the ‘revivalist translation’ and appropriation of foreign texts ‘was often connected with a specific philosophy of revenge.’ Macura, ‘Problems and Paradoxes,’ p. 190. 80 Thám, ‘Apology,’ p. 208. 81 Evans, ‘Language and State Building,’ p. 12. 82 Ibid. See also Agnew, ‘Czechs, Germans, Bohemians?,’ pp. 58-59; Macura, ‘Problems and Paradoxes,’ p. 189.

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Czech reformers were of course keen to make the case that theirs was not an ‘upstart’ culture but one seeking to recover its former luster.83 It is noteworthy in this connection that some of the earliest scholarly societies founded in Bohemia such as the Societas Incognitorum Litteratorum (1747) were devoted to historical enquiry. The latter undertaking was also supported by the local nobility, introducing a pattern of convergence, writes Hugh Agnew, between ‘the historical and political interests’ of the Bohemian aristocracy ‘with the scholarly concerns of the non-noble intelligentsia’ that would continue into the future. Historical research could, for example, ‘provide the Czech nobility with proof of the ancient rights and privileges of the kingdom of Bohemia, and thus strengthen their position vis-à-vis a centralizing court in Vienna.’84 A proper knowledge of one’s ancestors and their accomplishments could also advance the pace of moral regeneration, a goal deemed vital to social progress. Indeed, ‘the worth and happiness of nations,’ declared the first president of the Bohemian National Museum, ‘rests on the basis of their intelligence and morality.’85 And yet it sometimes happened that ‘the improving zeal of enlightened reformers’ led to breaches of scholarly propriety, as witnessed in the controversy surrounding the ‘discovery’ of several Czech literary artifacts which ultimately proved to be forged.86 These transgressions were perhaps extreme responses to the pressure felt by certain apologists, writes Agnew, to create a ‘complete’ cultural life in Czech (without which their arguments would be ‘exposed as hollow’).87 But of course the case was also made that the Czechs were the ones more often victimized by foul play. Indeed the absence of sufficient cultural ‘monuments,’ many patriots claimed, was the result of ‘conspiracies’ hatched by those ‘desiring the demise of our language.’88 Czech scholars had therefore a special responsibility, as Gelasius Dobner declared in 1761, to ‘wipe away everything that was invented by later ages, and thus rescue [their] nation from the ridicule of foreigners.’89 This corrected version of Czech history tended to trace the decline of the nation to the 83 These claims, as Robin Okey for one has written, are not wholly without basis. ‘For nations which had once possessed their own states and social elites,’ the latter has observed, ‘nationalist claims of rebirth and revival were not empty of content.’ Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 110. 84 Agnew, The Origins of the Czech National Renascence, p. 26. 85 Cited in Krueger, Czech, German and Noble, pp. 163-164. 86 Ibid., pp. 8-15. See also Štaif, ‘The Image of the Other,’ p. 85. 87 Agnew, ‘The Emergence of Czech National Consciousness,’ p. 182. 88 Thám, ‘Apology,’ p. 206. 89 Cited in Agnew, The Origins of the Czech National Renascence, p. 29.

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defeat of the Bohemian Estates at the Battle of White Mountain (1620).90 Habsburg authority over Bohemia was certainly greatly strengthened in the aftermath of this battle and the German language raised to an equal footing with Czech. The ‘Germanizing process’ spread rapidly from this point forward, with middle and upper-class Czechs adapting themselves to the emerging lingua franca of the Habsburg world; the Czech language was, in turn, increasingly ‘confined to the peasantry and the urban poor.’91 The enthusiasm of scholars like Thám notwithstanding, the prospects for a Czech revival would therefore appear to have been rather dim. Histories of the Czech ‘national awakening’ place substantial emphasis in fact on aid obtained from another quarter and, specifically, the interest taken in such endeavors by local elites in response to Habsburg experiments in enlightened despotism. This is to say that the rationalizing tendencies of the age found a new field of deployment in the actions of European courts then locked in an increasingly costly struggle for power and prestige. Those states which proved best at ‘extracting’ resources from the lands within their borders would surely be more successful in emerging from conflicts such as the Seven Years’ War intact.92 This centralizing agenda, likened by Balázs as a program of ‘radical modernization,’ was arguably pursued most boldly in Vienna.’93 Beginning with the reign of Maria Theresa in 1740, laws were introduced intended among other things to advance the economic prospects of the empire and achieve a greater degree of administrative rationalization. These initiatives were carried still farther by Joseph, from whose perspective ‘a modern centralized state could not have separate and distinct loci of power.’94 Education, finally, was made compulsory for all children between the ages of seven and thirteen with German language instruction mandatory. More controversial still was Joseph’s attempt in 1784 to institute German as the language of government and secondary 90 Works written in this spirit by Josef Dobrovský (1753-1829) and František Martin Pelcl (1734-1801) projected a view of events such as the White Mountain or the execution of Jan Hus (1372-1415) that tended to minimize, write Petráň and Petráňová, their ‘confessional aspects.’ Petráň and Petráňová, ‘The White Mountain.’ As with the disasters of Constantinople and Mohacs in Greek and Magyar discourse, respectively, the White Mountain became the defining catastrophe which precipitated the Czech nation’s descent into ‘darkness’..’ 91 Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, p. 77. See also Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 10-11; Klíma, ‘The Czechs,’ p. 232. this move recognized in some respects the dominant position German speakers had already achieved in the town life of Bohemia 92 This perspective famously developed in Tilly, The Formation of National States. 93 Balázs, Hungary and the Habsburgs, p. 167. 94 Krueger, Czech, German and Noble, p. 72. See also Beales, Enlightenment and Reform, and Szabo, ‘Changing Perceptions,’ for additional introductions to the subject.

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education, a step taken on the grounds that its widespread dispersion made it most suitable as a medium of popular enlightenment.95 Radical as these measures appear, Joseph’s policies drew some praise at first from the Czech revivalists whose aims they served in some ways to validate.96 Thám’s previously cited ‘Apology’ featured, for example, a special appeal for support to the emperor in recognition of his public spirit and educational concerns.97 Joseph’s subsequent language decrees dealt a blow to such hopes; but they also raised the prospect of an alliance between the intelligentsia and the Czech ‘noble nation,’ the latter then engaged in a war of words with Habsburg authorities over the new scheme of administrative centralization. These local power holders increasingly supported, in turn, the activities of the revivalists and vernacularists whose writings and research programs could be used toconfirm the existence of their ‘ancient rights’ and perhaps mobilize popular resistance.98 The tempests raised by Joseph’s policies were thus enormously beneficial to the moral and material provisioning, writes Agnew, of the Czech ‘renascence.’99 Joseph’s reforms met with similar resistance in Hungary where local nobles responded with an impressive and perhaps surprising defense of Magyar – a language that had been rejected by the emperor as a substitute for the kingdom’s official Latin on the grounds that only a minority of Hungarians could speak it. Although support for the still widely spoken Latin was duly offered, the Hungarian gentry soon turned to the promotion of Magyar as perhaps a more effective means of expressing their sentiments and claims (again) of historic rights.100 Allies were found among a cohort of ‘progressive’ noblemen and vernacularists who had earlier embraced the cause of national improvement and sought to establish Magyar ‘as a modern European idiom on the analogue of the German achievement.’101 As in the case of Bohemia and the Austrian Netherlands, resistance to Joseph’s language law served therefore to unite progressive and conservative elements of Hungarian ‘national’ sentiment. This show of defiance helped force the 95 Evans, ‘The Politics of Language,’ p. 210. 96 Agnew, ‘The Emergence of Czech National Consciousness,’ p. 180. 97 ‘O, most powerful Josef,’ declared Thám, ‘solace and hope of the lamenting Czechs, you who have exhibited an exceptional love of their language (traveling through all the districts of those excellent Slavonic parts and casting your merciful gaze on them), look to the honor that is being done to the language, and defend it!’ Thám, ‘Apology,’ p. 209. 98 Agnew, ‘The Emergence of Czech National Consciousness,’ p. 178. 99 Ibid., p. 180. 100 Evans, ‘The Politics of Language,’ pp. 204, 209-211. 101 Király, ‘The Political and Social Legacy,’ pp. 5-6; Ives, Enlightenment and National Revival, pp. 15-16.

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revocation of the offending policies, but not before the Hungarian Diet had taken steps in the direction of establishing Magyar as an official language of public affairs, this being equated by patriots like Jozsef Kármán with ‘the refinement of the nation.’102 However, the cycle of action and reaction did not end here, as legislation directed toward the promotion of Magyar stimulated even greater efforts from Slavic and other groups within Hungary then undergoing linguistic and cultural revivals of their own.103 Joseph died in 1790, by which time many of his initiatives had been rescinded. However, the contentious reform program had generated considerable opposition throughout the sprawling Habsburg domains. As an author from the Austrian Netherlands noted at the time: ‘One of the Emperor’s gravest mistakes of late, has been to try and govern the Belgians like he governs his Germans, his Bohemians and his Hungarians; the monotony which he has introduced throughout all his states has been the main cause of discontent, which, little by little, has led to the insurrection of these Peoples.’104 In retrospect, some might argue, Joseph’s attempt to rationalize the empire violated the logic that kept such a diverse, tradition-bound construct together, presenting in the process the ideal of the unitary, mono-linguistic state to be imitated in miniature by the nations which came after. Here was an inheritance of the Hapsburg experience, writes at least Solomon Wank, that would live on in the policies of its successor states, all of which ‘did to their minorities what had been done to them’ and in the process furthered the perception that in the age of the ‘scientific state,’ control of the governing apparatus was the only guaranteed means of cultural self-preservation.105 The controversies surrounding the practice of Enlightened Absolutism provide additional context finally for approaching the work of Herder and in particular the hostility frequently expressed by the same toward what he regarded as the homogenizing aims of contemporary statecraft.106 These sentiments were congruent with a philosophy of history and human arts that laid stress upon subjectivity and exceptionality, the particular over the universal, for ‘each thing,’ he insisted, ‘resembles only itself.’ Human communities were similarly unique creations of Geist (spirit) and climate. 102 Kármán, ‘The Refinement of the Nation,’ pp. 231-236. 103 See, for example, Brock, The Slovak National Awakening; Wank, ‘Some Reflections.’ 104 Cited in Roegiers, ‘Belgian Liberties and Loyalty,’ p. 30. 105 See, for example, Wank, ‘Some Reflections’; Mayall and Simpson, ‘Ethnicity Is Not Enough,’ p. 8; Smith, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 231-239. 106 Herder, Another Philosophy of History, pp. xxxviii, 60-62, 89-91; Herder, Philosophical Writings, pp. 316, 318, 354-355.

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Indeed, ‘nature makes nations, not states.’107 Each was a product too ‘of history,’ a ‘non-recurring, unique whole, an organic unity or individual, whose values, beliefs, institutions, traditions and language are all inseparable from one another.’108 Such principals clashed with the centralizing designs of present day rulers, each intent, in his mind, on ‘dissolving’ these very same and age-old communal bonds in the interests of greater power and efficiency; a calamity which gave rise to a further evil in the ‘excessive, unhealthy expansion of cities, those abysses for the vitality of mankind.’109 Readers of Herder would find in summary (among much else) a vehement defense of native traditions against the ‘regimentation of our age.’110 His ‘historicism’ looked dimly on any normative reading of human affairs all of which tended, on closer inspection, to associate the West with the end of history.111 In this he was the dissolving agent, eagerly exposing the presumptions that lay hidden (if barely) behind the cosmopolitan façade: More precisely, an enlightened, modern world was to bear the impress of Parisian civilization.112 Such conceit elicited streams of vitriol from Herder, for ‘every nation,’ he declared in a major early work, ‘has its center of happiness within itself,’ before being carried off further in a fit of sarcasm: How wretched [the time] when there were still nations and national characters. […] Native ways of thinking, a narrow circle of ideas, eternal barbarism! Thank God that all our national characters have been erased! […] We may not have a fatherland, none who are dear to us and for whom we live; but we are friends to all men and citizens of the world. All the rulers of Europe are speaking French already, and soon we will all be doing so. And then – state of bliss! – the golden age shall be upon us again “when all the world will have one tongue and language and there shall be one flock and one shepherd.” National characters, where have you gone?113 107 Berlin, Three Critics of Enlightenment, p. 188. 108 Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, p. 5. 109 Herder, Another Philosophy of History, p. 41. Indeed none of this spelled true civilization, as he attempted to make clear in his attacks on Western imperialism and the slave trade. Ibid., 63-64. 110 Ibid., p. 40. 111 ‘All the books by our Voltaires and Humes, Robertsons and Iselins are full of this, and there emerges so beautiful a picture of the enlightenment and improvement of the world from its murky past.’ Ibid. 112 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 143; Hampson, The Enlightenment, p. 247. 113 Herder, Another Philosophy of History, pp. 64-65. Such relativism, and Herder is sometimes regarded as a founder of cultural anthropology, precluded him, as he indicated in one of his later works, from a belief in the existence of a favoritvolk appointed by God to lead mankind. Herder, Philosophical Writings, p. 394. See also Zammito, Kant, Herder.

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If such outbursts recall again that Enlightenment was a contested ideal capable of provoking debate over the threats allegedly posed to the integrity of ‘national’ character and language, these threats were more palpable still in the case of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The partitioning of that state (1772, 1793, and 1795), provided the occasion for Rousseau’s Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (1772), a work that famously laid stress on the cultivation of national character as the best means for securing the nation’s survival.114 The dissolution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was in fact a subject of great contemporary debate and according to the historian Lord Acton had even the decisive role of awakening ‘the theory of nationality in Europe, converting a dormant right into an aspiration, and a sentiment into a political claim.’115 These upheavals left their marks as well on Polish thought and are even considered by some to have fostered a turn to more culturally weighted appreciations of nationhood. If, for example, writes Andrej Walicki, ‘the Enlightenment concept of the nation was generally political rather than ethno-linguistic,’ these latter elements became more prominent following the partitions.116 Stripped of its political wrapping, one may infer from such remarks, some new means of demonstrating the unity of the peoples formerly contained within the Commonwealth would now have to be found if Polish nationalists were to make a case for recovering the very same lands they had lost. Polish thinkers of the late eighteenth century did at least place increasing emphasis on language as an ‘instrument of unity,’ as indicated by the influential scholar Hugo Kołłątaj’s advocacy for the complete polonization of public affairs in the wake of the second partition; an initiative which he supported with the Herderian-sounding claim that ‘only that country can truly be called a nation which understands one language.’117 These sentiments agreed in some measure with older notions of Polish cultural supremacy (that is, over other Slavic peoples) which, far from suffering a diminution of strength as a result of the partitions, appeared to attain an even more extravagant guise in ‘the sui generis moral imperialism of a defeated nation’ – a concept articulated with remarkable clarity by Prince Adam Czartoryski when essaying on the need for institutions of higher learning: ‘Because our nation must concede to other peoples in terms of power,’ wrote the latter, ‘it can only seek primacy in cultural virtues and excel through its natural qualities and scholarship.’118 114 Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, pp. 16-21, 30-38, 130. 115 Dalberg-Acton, ‘Nationality,’ p. 413. 116 Walicki, The Enlightenment, p. 1 117 Ibid., p. 73. See also Walicki, The Enlightenment, pp. 73, 76-77; Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, pp. 104, 107; Walicki, ‘Intellectual Elites’; Jedlicki, ‘Holy Ideals,’ pp. 16, 21. 118 Cited in Zawadzki, A Man of Honor, p. 278. See also Brock, ‘Polish Nationalism,’ p. 314.

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Conclusions In the decades preceding the French Revolution various programs for perfecting the nation, often sited on education and the perceived nexus of linguistic and national refinement, were put in practice in many parts of Europe, and even became implicated in local political and cultural controversies. The sources discussed above, which give particular attention to the role of intellectuals as the awakeners of their decadent nations indicate finally how, in the absence of a reliable ‘peasant narrative,’ the rise of nationalism in Europe tends to be told in the form of intellectual history. There is therefore a strong constructivist orientation to many modern works on the subject given the critical role they all assign to elite culture in shaping the terms of popular discourse. This is not of course to diminish the importance of mass sentiment, a subject which continues to invite research. Still, to whatever extent such sentiment prevailed among the people at large, the initiative for the various endeavors associated with the rise of the national idea – and on this point there is considerable consensus among a range of scholars – does not appear to have come from below. As the following chapters show, the advocates of the nation themselves recognized that a measure of vulgarization was necessary to facilitate the spread of ideas which were more easily consumed if boiled down to their fundamental elements or refocused on matters of faith, community and kin, as indicated by the frequent gendering of the nation in Greek sources as a helpless maiden or mother.119 In terms of the intellectuals themselves, considerable attention has been given to figures from Central and Eastern Europe, many of whom had spent time in the West or were close followers of intellectual developments from that quarter. Through their subsequent translation and other publishing ventures, such figures are in fact commonly understood to have played a significant role in the transfer, modification and exchange of ideas across the continent. A remarkable number of these scholars, especially from the Balkans, were also churchmen, and indeed to a large extent the Greek or Serbian Enlightenments were the work of Orthodox clerics.120 The goal 119 As Korais wrote in a work from 1801, ‘Imagine if you can our mother, Greece […] with black and shredded clothes, wounded in all parts of her body […] her hair untied and tangled.’ Korais, ‘Salpisma Polemistirion,’ in Daskalakis, Keimena-Pegai, p. 33. See also discussion of Banti in Chapter 7. Later figures such as Mazzini sought further to direct or name the sentiments and grievances stirred up in the people by great events of the day, as indicated in his remark to a fellow Italian patriot regarding the aim ‘to insinuate something National into the demonstrations’ surrounding the election of Pope Pius IX. Cited in Riall, ‘The Politics of Italian Romanticism,’ p. 182. 120 See, for example, Kostantaras, ‘Commerce, Culture, and Civilization.’

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of national regeneration, as manifested in language reform, the spread of literacy, school-building, and other ventures, could encompass therefore a range of secular and spiritual aims.121 For the same reasons, each instance of ‘borrowing’ or retransmission was far from indiscriminate.122 That said, demands for national unification and independence were extremely rare, if Aikaterina Koumarianou’s remark that ‘educational reform and more generally the enrichment of cultural life was in itself a political act,’ is worth bearing in mind.123 The Polish case represents of course an important exception to this rule and there were additionally occasions of intercommunal strife, such as occurred in the course of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, where, with considerable Russian prompting, a revolt broke out against Ottoman rule in the Peloponnese (e.g., the Orlov Revolt, discussed briefly in Chapter 5). Although the aims of the Orlov Revolt have been subject to diverse readings, it did give rise to a number of polemical works and appeals for collective action reminiscent of later eras.124 121 To be sure, their appeals for vernacularization were often grounded on the principle of preserving the integrity of Orthodox practice. As Obradović wrote in 1788 on the need for books in the Serbian language: ‘It will come to pass that men destined for the priesthood may with no further delay […] be given such books as may make them more learned when they read them, that they may be capable of teaching themselves and their own nation, leading their nation in the paths of righteousness and enlightenment.’ Obradović, The Life and Adventures, pp. 147, 283-284. See also Psalidas and Thesprotos, Geographia Alvanias, p. 37; Kostantaras, Infamy and Revolt, pp. 101-105. 122 When deciding, for example, to translate a work of ethics Moisiodax was keen to select one ‘most appropriate for Greece in its present condition.’ Some consequently ‘seemed too short to me, some detailed, some controversial and others […] obscure.’ He decided f inally on Muratori’s Filosofia morale, which had the merits of being ‘simple, measured, and easy to understand by all, or nearly all.’ Moisiodax’s prologue to the Ithiki Philosophia (1761) reproduced in the appendix of Kitromilides, Iosiphos Moisiodax, p. 332. This critical stance toward foreign letters was shared by Dobrovsky. See, for example, Teich, ‘Bohemia,’ p. 161. Similarly, although Katartzis reflected often on Montesquieu, he deemed Gaspard de Réal de Curban’s decidedly less secular La Science du gouvernement (1762) more appropriate for translation. See, for example, De Curban. La Science du gouvernement, I, p. 52. For Katartzis’s prologue to his translation, see Ta Evriskomena, pp. 311-329. 123 Koumarianos, ‘The Contribution of the Intelligentsia,’ p. 77. The odd work can also be cited where an author made reference to the political condition of the nation. ‘I confess,’ wrote, for example, Katartzis in one well-known passage, ‘that at this time, we are not a nation [ethnos] that forms its own state, but that we are subject to a more dominant one; for this and taking the definition of citizen [politis] given by Aristotle, some Franks belittle as not having a patrie; however, this is not the case.’ Katartzis, Ta Evriskomena, p. 44. The offending statements appear to have come from entries in the Encyclopédie méthodique, of which he was nevertheless a great admirer. Katartzis goes on to say that Aristotle was referring to imprisoned peoples, such as the helots of Sparta, a condition, he believed, which did not apply to that of the modern Greeks. 124 Perhaps the most famous of these was Evgenios Voulgaris’s, Stochasmoi eis tous parondas krisimos kairous tou Kratous Othomanikou, a text which called for the creation of an independent

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Mention of the Russo-Ottoman War and its effects recalls too how Great Power conflicts and the stresses on statecraft obtaining from the same had the potential to foster thought and sentiment on matters of collective identity or politicize to some extent the ideas discussed previously. This tendency was highlighted above in connection with a discussion of events in Habsburg Europe, where attempts to raise awareness about the national language on the part of enthusiasts in Bohemia and Hungary were promoted by the rationalization policies of central authorities (themselves bent on bolstering the state’s fitness for acquitting itself in future conflicts); or again in France, where defeat in global conflicts such as the Seven Years’ War engendered a fresh outpouring of discourse on the moral condition of the nation. Thoughts on the state of the national language and even linguistic rationalization also contemporaneously surfaced in France, where, in addition to the lexicographical ventures studied previously, one may cite works such as Abbé Grégoire’s Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs (1788) in which it was argued that the people in question should be compelled to learn French, if retaining their traditional language for use in religious rites.125 Grégoire’s position on linguistic uniformity in this piece may nevertheless appear tolerant when compared with the one he adopted during the Revolution – his insistence in these later years on linguistic homogenization as a means to ‘melt’ the people of France ‘into the national mass’ being perhaps emblematic of the intensification of discourse that might occur amid the stresses of war and internal strife.126 One hastens to recall again cautions expressed earlier regarding the tendency of a discussion sited principally on instances of national discourse to impart a magnified sense of the stature of the subject or ‘overdetermine’ the results. It should also be noted that if the ideas described here aroused the interest of intellectuals throughout the continent, they could also pose the vexing question of to which ‘nation’ a particular individual or group Greek state from parts of the Ottoman Empire. The extent of the work’s circulation remains diff icult to assess; however, it was apparently translated into French and Russian. See, for example, Makridis, ‘I Galliki Metaphrasi.’ 125 Although Grégoire took a far less accommodating stance on the matter during the revolution, he felt at the time that a modicum of internal linguistic diversity was excusable given that many others in France did not know the ‘langue nationale’ and in fact ‘in Europe, and no part of the globe that I know, is a national language universally used by the nation.’ Grégoire, Essai sur la régénération, p. 134. A similar point was expressed in the lengthy Encyclopédie article on langue, the author of which appeared to take a dim view nevertheless of the patois. Encyclopédie (1765), IX, pp. 249. See also Sepinwall, The Abbé Grégoire; Bell, ‘Lingua Populi,’ p. 1412. 126 Text refers to Grégoire’s Rapport sur la nécessité & les moyens d’anéantir le patois, et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française (1794), cited in Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 15.

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principally belonged; a subject explored in recent works by authors such as Isabella, Zanou and Reill.127 The works cited above are therefore treated principally as a means to highlight some important vectors of Enlightenment era thought and practice and, in turn, inform our understanding of the raw materials used in the ‘improvisations’ of later actors when responding to the political crises of the Old Regime state.128

127 Isabella and Zanou, Mediterranean Diasporas; Reill, Nationalists Who Feared the Nation. 128 This emphasis on ‘improvisation’ advocated also in Baker, ‘Enlightenment Idioms,’ and Chartier, The Cultural Origins. ‘There is in the concept of revolution,’ wrote Furet in similar fashion, ‘something which belongs only to its history as it was lived and which does not conform to the logical sequence of cause and effect.’ Furet, ‘The French Revolution Revisited,’ pp. 60-61. John Breuilly took up a similar position when reflecting recently on the question of ‘how far modern nationalism builds upon earlier ideas of the nation.’ Breuilly observed in this connection that ‘just as building materials limit the range of possible buildings but do not determine (or make it possible to predict) just what building will be constructed, so do historical legacies relate to political ideologies.’ Breuilly, ‘Changes in the Political Uses of the Nation,’ p. 93.

4. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Inheritance Abstract The present chapter describes the diverse ways in which claims concerning the nation, its condition, and the means necessary for its ‘regeneration’ entered into the debates and controversies in the years prior to and following the French Revolution. Further attention is given to historiographical problems concerning the degree to which the conflicts and diplomatic affairs of these years served to politicize the cultural revival movements discussed previously or may otherwise be credited as decisive in shaping the national consciousness of the European body politic. Keywords: French Revolution, Napoleon, Congress of Vienna, Carlsbad Decrees

O my nation! To what degree of debasement you have fallen! Your name, once so respected in Europe […] has fallen into scorn. […] Your glory has disappeared, your laurels have faded. But an invisible hand has stopped you at the edge of the precipice. Eighteenth century! Return to France all its energy; return to it all its virtues.1

This pamphlet from 1789 depicts how Enlightenment era ideas and tropes connected with the nation found their way into French political culture and were later articulated in the highly charged atmosphere of the Revolution. As tracts such as the above indicate, the ideas and meanings circulating in contemporary scholarly and lexicographical works were well represented in the intense constitutional debates of the day, the nation being rendered at some points as a linguistic entity and ‘moral’ being, capable of both debasement and regeneration, and at others in its less esoteric guise as 1

From ‘Les Lunettes du citoyen zèlé,’ cited in De Baecque, ‘L’Homme nouveau,’ p. 195.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch04

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a body of people governed by the same laws. Some extended this later point to further assert, following ideas present again in writings of earlier vintage, that the nation was not only a body of people subject to the same laws – it was the very source of the power to make laws and the arbiter of their rectitude. By declaring therefore in his famous manifesto that the ‘third estate’ or commoners were ‘the nation,’ Abbé Sieyès was making a still larger statement on the nature of sovereignty. The employment of the nation in debates over matters of governance and sovereignty was one feature of a virtually century long series of confrontations – increasing in intensity from the 1750s on – between the French monarchy and parlements. As scholars such as Kenneth Margerison and Johnson Kent Wright have discussed in the past, one striking aspect of the literature surrounding these conflicts was its pronounced historical character; this is to say, as Wright explains, that each party to the debate sought ‘to use historical argument for the legitimation of political programs […] based on the assumption that historical study revealed an immemorial and thus legitimate “constitution.”‘2 One accordingly finds a thèse royale, in which French history was said to reveal how the ‘feudal nobility “usurped” royal authority,’ and a competing thèse nobiliare, which strove to demonstrate the primacy of representative institutions.3 Wright also identifies an important change in the opposition literature, becoming increasingly apparent after 1751, involving a ‘transformation of the thèse nobiliare into a thèse parlementaire, in which the defense of the rights of the nobility gave way to those of the more nebulous “nation.”’4 Supporters of the monarchy responded in kind with claims of their own regarding the king’s status as both founder and embodiment of the nation.5 Bell, like Margerison, 2 Wright, A Classical Republican, p. 127. See also Margerison, ‘History, Representative Institutions, and Political Rights.’ 3 Wright, A Classical Republican, p. 128. See also Gruder, The Notables, p. 33. As the latter writes, the nation was viewed by the old regime noble elite as a valuable means to ‘engage in battle and make their gains’ in the contest over the future power structure of the French state. ‘The deliberate use of the nation by the parlements as a vehicle for their own political ambitions,’ argues another scholar, ‘had the unintended effect of opening the door for other self-styled national spokespeople to override even the parlements’ claims,’ a development that further abetted the ‘entrenchment of the nation in French political rhetoric.’ Keitner, Paradoxes of Nationalism, pp. 45, 47. 4 Wright, A Classical Republican, p. 130. 5 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 59. See also additional forms and uses of this discourse in examples cited by Hardman, Overture to Revolution. Conservative critics would in fact later claim that by ‘abolishing privileges and executing Louis XVI,’ the French Revolution had ‘destroyed the essence of the national character.’ Noiriel, ‘Socio-histoire d’un concept,’ p. 10.

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also notes how these terminological shifts were preceded and perhaps influenced by earlier innovations on this front contained in works such as L’Etat de la France (1727) by Henri de Boulainvilliers, who, ‘simply by using the word nation,’ writes Bell, ‘rather than asserting the rights of an ancient corporate institution like the Estates General, gave it political salience it had previously lacked.’6 The debate over power became in sum a debate over the historical origins, composition and rights of the nation, the progress of which, he continues, ‘succeeded, by the 1760s, in making the concept of the nation central to French political culture.’7 The competing views described above concerning the original condition of the nation and the division of powers accruing from the same, deal principally with the claims of social elites and in turn convey a very different understanding of national or popular sovereignty than found in The Social Contract, or for that matter Mably’s contemporaneous and polemical Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen, in which appear declarations such as: ‘The people, in whom sovereign power originally resides; the people, as sole author of political government and distributor of the power entrusted as a whole or in different parts to its magistrates, is thus eternally endowed with the right to interpret its contract, or rather its gifts, to modify the clauses, annul them, and establish a new order of things.’ 8 Such language may make ‘historians familiar with the political discourse of the Pre-Revolution’ feel somewhat ‘uneasy,’ writes Keith Baker, having ‘accustomed ourselves not to expect such language thirty years before the event.’9 And yet, he continues, echoing points cited by other scholars above, these turns in thought were ‘exemplary’ of a ‘transformation of French political culture that occurred in the course of the constitutional conflicts of the 1750s.’10 Additional examples of how the ideas and claims expressed in Mably’s Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen entered into the political debates of these years include the well-known pamphlets of the Jansenist ‘patriots’ Guillaume-Joseph Saige, Jean-Claude Martin de Mariveaux, and Augustin Rouillé d’Orfeuil. These texts, representing a mixture, writes Slimani, of 6 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 57-58. See also Margerison, ‘History, Representative Institutions, and Political Rights,’ p. 69. 7 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 59. As Slimani observes, ‘Thus, the problem that arises is to know why this or that part of society considers itself in the eighteenth century as the nation or as its illustrious representatives?’ Slimani, La Modernité du concept, p. 245. 8 Mably, Des droits et des devoirs, p. 80. This work is generally believed to have been written in 1758. 9 Baker, ‘A Script,’ p. 238 10 Ibid., p. 263.

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‘Rousseauist influences and natural law,’ first appeared in the 1770s, but were re-published and circulated again in the years immediately preceding the revolution.11 Saiges’ Catéchisme du citoyen (1775, 1787) is deemed particularly significant and, as Baker writes, develops ‘the argument for national sovereignty in brief, unambiguous terms’.12 ‘The sovereign power, Saige characteristically declared, ‘is inalienably attached to the body of the nation because it is in the sole will of that body that this necessary tendency towards the public interest exists.’13 He proceeded to quote a passage from James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), in which the author claimed that ‘the interest of the people is in the whole body of the people.’14 Additional passages of note, among many that could be cited in this connection, include the following from a later section of the Catéchisme in which Saige asserted that ‘l’essence de la souveraineté reside toujours dans la nation assemblée ou non assemblée [the essence of sovereignty always resides in the nation whether assembled or not].’15 The resemblance of this passage with the famous opening lines of the later Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) is indeed striking: ‘Le principe de toute souverainté reside essentiellement dans la Nation [The principal of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation].’ Similar ideas come to the fore in the writings of the Physiocrat journalist Pierre Joseph André Roubaud, whose works included a two volume Histoire générale de l’Asie, de l’Afrique et de l’Amérique (1770-1775), considered to have influenced similar ventures by Diderot, and a four volume Nouveaux synonymes françois (1785-1786), in which he sought at one point to accurately render the contemporary meanings of ‘nation’ and ‘people.’16 ‘The nation is one, by unity of will, of power, of Law, of interest, of political existence,’ wrote Roubaud, who added: ‘we consider especially in the nation, the power, the rights of the citizens, the civil & political relations. We consider in the people subjection, the over-all need of protection.’ He went on to say that ‘A King is the head of a nation, & the father of the people. […] [T]he nation is, in various respects, governess & governed; the people are only governed, if the particular order of the people does not govern by magistrates of its choice. The choice is made by the representatives of the nation in its name; 11 Slimani, La Modernité du concept, p. 310. 12 Baker, ‘French Political Thought,’ p. 282 13 Saige, Catéchisme du citoyen, pp. 161-162. 14 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 15 Ibid., p. 184. 16 See, for example, Thomson, ‘Diderot, Roubaud et l’esclavage.’

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it is made by the representatives of the people only in democracy.’17 Taken in sum, observes Baker, such works ‘clearly suggest the problems which French political thinkers faced on the accession of Louis XVI, the range of language in which such thinkers attempted to resolve those problems, and the tensions that language often displayed. They also suggest how close French political thought was in the early 1770s to the formulations that became so compelling in 1789.’18 The references made above to the struggles between monarchy and parlement provide a glimpse of how the nation, national sovereignty, and related concepts were inducted into the political conflicts of the day. These developments recall in turn the thesis, criticized by David Bell and others, that ‘French nationalism has solely political origins.’19 Although the aforementioned disputes clearly had a role in elevating the place of the nation in public discourse, ‘any interpretation,’ Bell nevertheless argues ‘that reduces nationalism to a political strategy and to a series of claims about political sovereignty is fundamentally mistaken.’20 This error stems he believes from a failure, typical of any politically centric form of approach, to appreciate the importance of developments in the cultural sphere. His reasoning here is worthy of fuller account: To be sure, in the eighteenth century the idea of sovereignty embodied in the whole nation challenged and ultimately prevailed over the idea of sovereignty embodied in a single man. […] But simply tracking this shift and the strategic deployment of the concept does not explain why the French developed the ability to imagine the nation as a sovereign entity. Earlier opponents of the monarchy had not challenged the king in the name of the nation. What made the eighteenth century different? To answer this question, we must first recognize, as the advocates of the political approach do not, that the concept of the nation was used in many discursive arenas in the eighteenth century, not just that of constitutional 17 Roubaud, Nouveaux synonymes françois, III, pp. 238-243. 18 Baker, ‘French Political Thought,’ pp. 285-286. Dale Van Kley adds further that ‘prerevolutionary pamphleteering and remonstrating did little more than recapitulate the ground traversed from 1750 to 1775 until the wholly unprecedented institutional developments of late August and September 1788 forced it into ideological terrae incognitae where no version of French history pointed the way.’ Van Kley, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins,’ p. 461. 19 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 18. Bell refers especially here to arguments made in works such as Liah Greenfeld’s Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, in which the author advanced a theory of nationalism based upon the concept of ‘status inconsistency.’ 20 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, p. 18.

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politics. Moreover, the changes in its usage occurred across these different arenas, making it difficult to attribute them to political strategy alone.21

Bell succinctly captures here the important insights to be gained from cultural approaches to the subject. Mirsolav Hroch, to cite another wellknown scholar, has taken a similar stance of late and even described one of his recent works as an act of ‘atonement’ for his previous ‘disregard’ of developments in the cultural sphere.22 The foregoing discussion of the contesting claims regarding the founding of the nation, its composition, who was best placed to act on its behalf, etc., provides important context finally for considering the works of Sieyès, in which one finds a severe treatment of the historical depictions and corresponding claims (including those involving the idea of Frankish descent), contained in the thèse nobiliare. Such claims were of course vehemently rejected by Sieyès and like-minded thinkers, who famously portrayed the ‘privileged orders’ as in fact ‘a scourge for the nation that endures them […] a hideous malady to be more precise that devours living flesh.’23 Long habituated to such abuse and lacking any sense of collective consciousness, the people of France were nothing more than one of those ‘pretendue’ or ‘would-be’ nations, to recall the language used in an earlier work by Buffon, a mere ‘haphazard collection of men.’24 And yet, the people were awakening at last to a consciousness of their plight and powers. Indeed, ‘the patriotic and enlightened citizens,’ Sieyès declared, ‘who for so long have looked with sadness and indignation upon all these millions of men heaped together without order and without design […] finally see the moment arrive for us to become a nation’ (italics added).25 Sieyès viewed his own role in this process, much like the national awakeners encountered in Central and Southeastern Europe, as ‘guiding the nation in its task of self-identification.’26 21 Ibid. 22 Text refers to Hroch, ‘Why Did They Begin?.’ 23 Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état? pp. 14, 123, 167. 24 See Chapter 2. 25 Sieyès, Vues sur les moyens d’exécution, p. 4. 26 Forsyth, Reason and Revolution, p. 70. For additional context, see also Sewell, A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution; Hont, ‘The Permanent Crisis’; and Guilhaumou, ‘La langue politique.’ For Noiriel, Sieyès’s terminological choices also provide an important illustration of ‘the polysemic character again of the concept of the “nation”‘ at the time of the Revolution. He adds ‘According to the authors (and sometimes to the same author, depending on the chapter), the term refers to the nation-state, the ethnic group, the race, and even the social class. Sieyès himself stated for example at one point that “each order is a distinct nation.”‘ Noiriel refers here to Sieyès, Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?, p. 80. Noiriel, ‘Socio-histoire d’un concept,’ p. 9.

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Sieyès’s momentous claim that ‘the Third Estate was the nation’ took concrete form on 17 June 1789 when delegates from that order, with allies from the other two estates, reconstituted themselves as the ‘National Assembly.’ Decrees quickly issued from that body which dissolved the whole system of estates, culminating in August with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. This ‘liberal’ or ‘French Republican nationalism’ aimed not only at the political emancipation of the people at large (or at least the adult males), but their full transformation into Frenchmen; as exemplified by a greater awareness of their shared identity, values, history, and destiny.27 This nationalism is also frequently held to be of a civic character in the sense that membership in the nation was not determined, in principle, by ethnicity or cultural distinctions (elements notably bereft, for example, from Sieyès’s writings), but by one’s identification with the ideals expressed in the developing revolutionary canon; there were thus no ‘primordial’ barriers to becoming French.28 If the ‘liberal’ qualities of French nationalism are therefore well represented in the initiatives described above, ethno-linguistic elements also rose occasionally to the fore.29 As Bell writes, ‘the problem of linguistic diversity’ was, in fact, taken up by the ‘the first revolutionary government’.30 This ‘problem’ attained still larger proportions with the onset of internal crises and above all, the Vendee, which as Marie-Clémence Perrot writes, ‘encouraged the opposition between Paris and the provinces, between the language of liberty and the regional languages.’31 ‘By 1794,’ Bell concludes, thanks above all to the influence of Grégoire, ‘the pendulum had swung toward forcing the entire population to adopt standard French, not merely as the language of public exchange, but as the language of the home.’32 As proclaimed, for example, in Bertrand Barere’s Discours sur l’état de la langue française (1793), ‘Citoyens, la langue d’un peuple libre doit être une et la même pour tous [Citizens, the language of a free people must be one and the same for all].’33 27 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 12; Bell, ‘Revolutionary France,’ p. 70, and idem, ‘The Unbearable Lightness,’ pp. 1216-1217. 28 The terms ‘inclusivist’ and ‘voluntarist’ are also frequently used in this fashion. 29 See also Baycroft for notes on how the ‘civic’ character of French revolutionary discourse gained precedence in subsequent accounts (thus obscuring the presence of the ethnic elements). Baycroft, ‘France,’ pp. 28-34. 30 Bell, ‘Revolutionary France,’ p. 73. 31 Perrot, ‘La Politique linguistique pendant la Révolution,’ p. 162. 32 Bell, ‘Revolutionary France,’ p. 73. 33 Cited in Scherer, ‘La Queue de Robespierre,’ p. 31.

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The problem of internal diversity was also to be ameliorated through the institution of an ambitious program of public education, another course of action that was not completely novel.34 These tendencies were brought to a high pitch of expression in the crucible of revolution, the friction between ideals and reality revealing to the caretakers of the new Republic that the French, in fact, ‘were not a nation.’ ‘Staring into the political void,’ as Bell writes, the order of the past cast aside, the fledgling Jacobin nation-builders fell back on such principles with an astonishing alacrity, exhibiting an almost pathological faith in the power of ‘national education’ to forge a new generation of patriots and ‘melt’ the people of France ‘into the national mass.’ Popular sovereignty might someday function without so intrusive a project of social conditioning; but for the moment, ‘France’s tremendous diversity’ appeared as nothing less than ‘a towering barrier to the nation.’35 The elimination of such barriers became ever more critical with the outbreak of warfare between France and the Coalition powers. In addition to mobilizing the populace against the external threat, the National Convention (successor to the National Assembly) issued on 19 November 1792 the famous Déclaration pour accorder fraternité et secours a tout les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur liberté to potential allies in the world at large. Acting in ‘the name of the French nation,’ the Convention extended through this instrument its friendship and aid to all peoples who sought to recover their liberty, further charging the executive power to ‘give the generals the orders necessary to help these peoples, and to defend the citizens who were offended, or who may be offended for the cause of freedom.’36 Such proclamations were consistent with the sentiments expressed in still earlier outbursts from revolutionary leaders, such as Jacques-Pierre Brissot, who had since 1791, in the words of Jonathan Israel, ‘publicly urged an ideological war of peoples against princes.’37 The following pages indicate the ways in which the various calls to arms presented in the documents surveyed above were interpreted and, in some cases, put into practice throughout the continent over the period 1789-1815. In addition, for example, to stimulating demands for the liberalization of political rights in a manner consistent with the claim that all power emanated from the nation (e.g., the people at large), the right to ‘recover 34 According to Sieyès, ‘nothing is more appropriate for perfecting the human race in both the moral and physical spheres […] than a good system of public education.’ Cited in Israel, Revolutionary Ideas, p. 112. 35 Bell, The Cult of the Nation, pp. 12-15. 36 Collection générale des décrets rendus par l’assemblée nationale, V, p. 104. 37 Israel, Revolutionary Ideas, p. 233.

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their liberty’ was also conceived in some contexts to apply to the plight of those ‘nations’ (historic, ethno-linguistic entities) bound up within the great empires of the day. As indicated by the examples of various figures cited below, such declarations could and did have a politicizing effect on the imagination of some who were active in the cultural ‘regeneration’ ventures already in progress.38 Movement in this direction was further abetted at times by the attempts of Napoleon and his adversaries to attract allies to their respective sides – the combatants making open promises of support to any subject peoples or ‘nations’ who sought to assert or recover their freedom. In cases like Poland and Italy, Napoleon even endeavored to bring, in a manner of course consistent with his interests, some semblance of ‘national’ states into (or back into) existence. As witnessed elsewhere in this work, no attempt is made below to narrate in detail the events of 1789-1815. Suffice to say, one could hardly expect to capture in such limited space the course and complexity of a crisis which touched nearly the whole of Europe. Narrative interludes are intended only to introduce certain historiographical problems raised by the events under review and specifically those which relate to questions concerning how the power struggles connected with the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars affected the politicization and spread of nationalist doctrines and sentiment throughout the continent. In general, the assessment given here coheres with the observations rendered by scholars such as Michael Rowe, Stefan Berger and Jonathon Sperber.39 As Rowe has, for example, recently argued, the impact of the revolution and wars was especially pronounced in the sphere ‘of ideas and rhetoric,’ which was, he writes, the site of a mobilization in the service of ‘nationalism’ that was ‘without precedent in terms of its scope.’40 38 This development was sometimes cited in contemporary texts, as, for example, in the case of Korais’s Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilization dans la Gréce (1803), wherein he claimed that the moral awakening and recovery of the Greeks gained its final ‘rhythm and vitality’ from the French Revolution, an upheaval which brought before the nation’s eyes a clear picture of its own submerged aspirations. Korais, Mémoire, pp. 43-44. This politicization of discourse was in keeping with a strain of contemporary critical literature in France, discussed previously, that attributed the moral failings of the nation to the despotism of its governors. ‘What can you say about the enlightenment of a people who are under the yoke?’ asked in similar fashion the authors of a contemporary Greek work. To be sure, ‘prosperity requires f irst of all good government.’ Unfortunately, ‘the despotic, arbitrary rule of the sultan is an example to be followed by all those below him until finally everyone in Tourkia becomes fretful over their lives and property.’ Konstantas and Philippidis, Geographia Neoterike, pp. 47-50. For additional context, see Kitromilides, Enlightenment and Revolution. 39 See, for example, Berger, Germany; Rowe, ‘The French Revolution’; Sperber, ‘Echoes of the French Revolution.’ 40 Rowe, ‘The French Revolution,’ p. 143.

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If questions therefore persist over the extent to which these events were decisive in shaping the national consciousness of ‘the masses,’ it is clear, argues Rowe, that they profoundly affected and would subsequently inform the terms of political discourse – and especially the language of dissent – in Europe from this time forward. 41 If, for example, nationalistic rhetoric and appeals were ‘initially sponsored’ by governments to ‘aid mobilization,’ they were later ‘taken over […] to further very different agendas: the protection of particular local, confessional, social, or provincial interests, against attempts by government to centralize, conscript, and tax.’42

The Napoleonic Interlude Given what has been said above, it is probably not surprising that Napoleon looms large in the reconstructions of national awakening found in many historiographical traditions of Europe. As Andreas Fahrmeir writes, for example, of Germany, it was typical for earlier authors to follow the maxim that ‘in the beginning was Napoleon.’43 Similar tendencies are visible in the Italian case. ‘The idea of Italian unity took on a definite shape,’ wrote, for example, Luigi Salvatorelli, ‘precisely as a reaction against the double and contemporaneous experience derived from foreign domination.’44 Works of this kind may place stress on the importance of political innovations, such as the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy or Duchy of Warsaw, or the mobilization of sentiment in response to foreign incursion, as exemplified by the wars of ‘national independence’ associated with the Napoleonic occupations of Spain and Germany. If contemporary scholars acknowledge the importance of the events alluded to above, they have nevertheless tended to be more cautious than their predecessors in assessing the extent to which these affected the consciousness of the people writ large. This caution is less apparent again in scholarly evaluations of developments in the ideological sphere and their perceived contribution to the prevailing sense of what constitutes the modern nationalist ‘canon.’ In the case, for example, of the German-speaking world, the literary response to the events in question ranged from a (short-lived) enthusiasm 41 Ibid. See also Broers, Europe under Napoleon, p. 269. 42 Rowe, ‘The French Revolution,’ pp. 128-143. 43 Fahrmeir, ‘National Colours,’ p. 199. This view especially associated with the work of Thomas Nipperdey. See, for example, Nipperdey, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck. 44 Salvatorelli, The Risorgimento, p. 59.

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for the Napoleonic new deal, to impassioned if inchoate appeals for ‘national unification.’45 The latter sentiments reached perhaps their highest form of expression in the writings of Ernst Moritz Arndt, who called on the German people to recognize in their hour of weakness the voice of destiny stirring within them: ‘To be a nation,’ or so he declared, ‘to have one feeling for one cause, to come together with the bloody sword of revenge is the religion of our times.’46 Still more famous to posterity are Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation, a work which secured its author’s place, according to John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, among many others, as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of modern nationalist ideology. 47 Fichte’s fourteen Reden or lectures, delivered over the winter of 1807 and 1808 in French-occupied Berlin, may have drawn less attention at the time than the tirades of Arndt or Kleist, however, they contain many of the tropes and ideas, such as the by now familiar emphasis on the importance of preserving and cultivating a people’s national character, found in the work of contemporary thinkers and those who came after. Reproaching, for example, his fellow Germans, in the manner of the Enlightenment era figures cited previously, for their ruinous tendency to admire foreign works over their own, Fichte claimed that they too were a nation of great vintage and genius, if one that had yet to fully realize its potential. This state of affairs might be corrected, continued Fichte, through the production of a new ‘soul-stirring’ work of German history, an instrument whose power to shape and unify the populace he likened to the Bible. Indeed patriotism, truly lived, was nothing less than a ‘devouring flame.’ If written properly this new history would show its German readers that models of strength and unity could be found in their own past. Ranking high in the writer’s imagination was the glittering ‘burgher’ civilization that flourished, if all too briefly, in the medieval cities of the Rhineland: ‘That age was the nation’s youthful dream,’ Fichte waxed upon the subject, ‘within a narrow sphere, of its future deeds and conflicts and victories, and the prophecy of what it would be once it had perfected its strength.’48 And strength would 45 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 89. 46 Cited in Sheehan, German History, p. 381. 47 Hutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, p. 4. The authors also include Rousseau, Herder, Korais and Mazzini in this company. 48 Fichte, Addresses, p. 91. Here again the patriotic message appears to be especially crafted for the consumption of an urban, middle class audience. ‘The history of Germany,’ Fichte continued, ‘of German might, German enterprise and inventions, of German monuments and the German spirit – the history of all these things during that period is nothing but the history of those cities. […] In what spirit did this German Burgher class bring forth and enjoy this period of bloom?

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indeed be needed for the severe tests to come, contemporary fantasies of international cooperation or a ‘confederation of peoples’ notwithstanding.49 Germany’s survival was all the more critical finally for the reason that it had a special mission to perform. Indeed, Fichte’s nationalism contained the messianic elements found in so many others of the time period. ‘Next to the unity of the Germans among themselves,’ he declared, ‘their internal autonomy and commercial independence’ forming the means for their own ‘salvation’ and that in turn of Europe.50 Similar pronouncements appear in contemporary Polish and Italian letters, a body of literature, moreover, that provides glimpses of internal divisions on matters of power sharing and centralization characteristic of later nationalist discourse.51 Italian thought on unity was actually promoted by French occupation officials during the ‘Triennio’ (1796-1799), an initiative which the latter deemed useful, at least at the time, as a means to drive a wedge between the people of Italy and their rulers.52 The resulting dialogue, which took on a public form via the organization of essay contests on the subject of Italy’s ills and the means for remedying them, revealed a range of political stances on the merits of liberalization, as well the appropriate pace (gradual or immediate) and form (federal or unitary) of unification.53 These debates notwithstanding, the northern parts of the peninsula were subsequently reconstituted as the Kingdom of Italy (1805) where, while In the spirit of piety, of honor, of modesty, and of the sense of community. For themselves they needed little; for public enterprises they set no limits to their expenditure.’ Ibid. 49 ‘That is easy to say,’ Fichte scoffed at such ideas in a later work, ‘but how do we get to this point? It is a task for the divine order which is not yet accomplished. Until then, however, the rule applies: every state protects itself to the last drop of blood.’ Cited in Perkins, ‘Introduction,’ p. 13. 50 Fichte, Addresses, p. 196. 51 For Matteo Galdi, ‘the creation of a free and united Italy was a necessary step in the process of universal “regeneration” set in motion by the revolution.’ Cited in Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 64. 52 For additional context, see Rao, ‘Introduction.’ 53 According to Lyttelton, these ‘Italian Jacobins’ (as they were labeled by opponents) were ‘the first to pose the creation of a united Italy as a concrete political project.’ Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 63. For De Francesco, who concurs, ‘It is time to appreciate the impact of Italian Jacobinism on the birth of the political culture of the Risorgimento.’ De Francesco, ‘Aux origines du mouvement démocratique’ p. 348. Like their successors, those attracted to such ideas were nevertheless divided over the form unification should take – unitary or federal – and how it should be achieved – gradually or all at once. Robertson, ‘Enlightenment and Revolution’; Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 69; Gregory, Napoleon’s Italy, pp. 119-120, 178; As Broers writes, the collaboration of figures like Melzi was often motivated by the fear of disorder, Broers, Europe under Napoleon.

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contending with discontent over conscription, taxation, and the many hardships that accrued from a seemingly interminable state of war, several nation-building tactics characteristic of later eras (notably, the creation of a national army) were enacted.54 Under these circumstances, the ability of the kingdom to raise a force of nearly 80,000 men by 1812 was an impressive feat.55 Many of these recruits were subsequently deployed in the Spanish War of Independence (1808-1812), a conflict that loomed large in the imagination of Mazzini and Greek nationalists as a model ‘people’s war.’56 According to Michael Broers, Poland represents the exceptional case of ‘a truly nationalist patriotism, almost unique in Europe at this time.’57 If so, Polish opinion was nevertheless divided over the best means to achieve unity and independence – those of the ‘maximalist’ disposition advocating a program of reform intended to fully invest the masses in the cause of the nation; and those of the ‘minimalist’ view who, if equally desirous of independence, opposed any revision of the internal power structure or social hierarchy.58 These positions surfaced in debates surrounding the creation of the Constitution of 3 May 1791, the cause of which was subsequently taken up by Kościuszko, who sought to arouse popular support for his struggle 54 See, for example, by Grab, ‘The Napoleonic Kingdom,’ and idem, ‘Army, State, and Society.’ See also Rao, ‘Napoleonic Italy,’ p. 89. 55 In addition to works cited above by Grab, see also Broers, ‘The Imperial Departments,’ p. 222. 56 An additional 27,000 Italian soldiers were sent to Russia in 1812, of which only 1,000 are believed to have survived. A similar fate befell the great army of the ‘Duchy of Warsaw’. For Mickiewicz, fourteen years old in 1812 when the columns passed through Wilno, it was a memorable sight, and one which he reprised in Pan Tadeusz. Della Peruta, ‘War and Society,’ pp. 41-48; See also Clark, The Italian Risorgimento, p. 40; Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 84; Thomson, ‘Mazzini and Spain.’ Ypsilantis (see Chapter 5) also made reference to the Spanish conflict in this fashion. See Ypsilantis, ‘Fight for Faith and Motherland!,’ p. 401. 57 Broers, Europe under Napoleon, p. 128. 58 As Kościuszko declared in one famous tract, the social disunity bred by these arrangements was being exploited by Poland’s enemies: ‘I must inform the nation,’ he claimed, ‘that the Muscovites are seeking means to enrage the country folk against us, citing the arbitrariness of the lords, their former misery, and, finally, the prospect of a more prosperous future with Muscovite help. Speaking thus, they encourage and collaborate with the country folk in the joint plunder of the manors.’ Kościuszko, ‘Polaniec Manifesto,’ p. 289. The decrees issued from his headquarters to attain these ends were nevertheless modest, a reflection of both his limited powers as well as his need to maintain the support of the szlachta. Skurnowicz, ‘Polish Szlachta Democracy,’ p. 82. Partition rulers sought meanwhile to preclude the possibility of new ventures along these lines by introducing land and labor reforms of their own. As William W. Hagen writes: ‘since Kościuszko’s rising against Russia and Prussia in 1794, radically minded Polish political leaders, as they sought means of restoring the Polish state, concluded that the Polish peasantry must be induced to take up arms in the national cause by the promise of receiving full ownership of the land they tilled as serfs.’ Hagen, ‘National Solidarity,’ p. 40.

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against the partitioning powers through new initiatives in the direction of land reform and liberalization.59 Still other members of the Polish elite looked to restore the nation without resorting to measures of this kind. Czartoryski, to cite one well-known figure, declared, for example, at the time that ‘Poland’s future could not be divorced from that of Russia’ as a state fashioned on principles redolent of French design could never hope to enjoy peaceful relations with its autocratic neighbors.60 All depended therefore on a moral revolution within Russia, with the Poles playing the role (as they had done in the past) of enlighteners.61 Although this position was abandoned in the aftermath of the 1830 revolution, minimalists continued to reject the need for social and political reform and placed their hopes instead on the intervention of friendly powers – a means to liberation which, by requiring no change to the power structure or the need for mass mobilization, might be deemed more congenial to the interests of the ‘gentry nation.’ 59 Specif ically, the framers of the constitution sought to bring the power structure of the ailing state in closer conformity to the principle that ‘all authority in human society takes its origin in the will of the people.’ Voting rights were accordingly to be determined by property ownership rather than order; an act which enfranchised at a stroke many wealthy commoners, but simultaneously disenfranchised thousands of noble (szlachta) electors. In other measures, peasants were granted freedom from their lords and the monarchy converted into a hereditary institution. For additional context, see Biskupski and Pula, Polish Democratic Thought, pp. 170-173. 60 Zawadzki, A Man of Honor, p. 305. To be sure, the latter’s remark that ‘we live at a time when the most terrible and astonishing prophecies seem immediately to turn into commonplace truths,’ expressed some of his own dismay and opposition toward the political innovations of the day. Cited in Zawadzki, A Man of Honor, p. 185. Czartoryski’s plan was based especially upon his estimation of tsar Alexander, whom he served at the Congress of Vienna, and whose support was essential to the creation of a semi-autonomous Polish ‘Congress Kingdom.’ Ibid., p. 236. The story of the relationship between these two figures is indeed a remarkable one, initiated by an impromptu conversation among the gardens of the Tauris Palace in which Alexander startled the young Czartoryski by his bold critique of Russian foreign policy (Czartoryski was at that time being held in Russia on account of his family’s support of Kościuszko’s revolt). ‘I am sorry I did not take note of the exact date,’ Czartoryski later remarked, ‘for that day had a decisive influence on a great part of my life and on the destinies of my country.’ Czartoryski, Memoirs, p. 110. 61 Czartoryski’s brand of Pan-Slavism was not dissimilar in this case from those cited above which tended to present the Poles as ‘the chosen people of Slavdom.’ Zawadzki, A Man of Honor, p. 305. See also Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate, p. 22. The pronouncements of someone like Stanisław Staszic display a rather different view of how this same sense of the historical significance of the Poles could serve to fashion an enlightened new world order. For Staszic the creation of the Duchy and its corresponding French-Polish condominium marked the restoration of a political order essential to European progress: As the eastern ‘bulwark’ of western civilization, Poland had always protected Europe from the incursions of barbarous peoples while spreading, with the help of France, ‘the light of civilization’ across the Slavic world. Staszic, ‘On the Statistics of Poland,’ pp. 94-95.

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Events in the Ottoman Balkans may serve, finally, to illustrate how the French Revolution and subsequent wars could stimulate nationalist aspirations in parts of Europe not directly affected by the fighting or subject to an intervening period of Napoleonic rule. Among the incidents that may be cited in this context is the plot of Rigas Velestinlis, whose vision of converting the multiethnic and multiconfessional Ottoman Empire into a unitary nation-state – its internal diversity intact – further attests to the many ways in which French revolutionary doctrines were adapted to local settings.62 Born in Thessaly of apparently mixed ethnic heritage, Rigas later entered the service of Phanariot elites in Constantinople, Bucharest and Vienna. Here his literary talents blossomed, and he embarked on a publishing program of original and translated works intended to help resurrect the ‘fallen Greek race.’ His thought acquired a much more radical quality after the outbreak of the French Revolution, as happened also with Korais.63 Napoleon’s occupation of Italy and still later the Ionian Islands (1797) pushed Rigas finally to action and he resolved to appear before the generalissimo, political manuscripts in hand, and recruit him in a plan to replace the Ottoman Empire with a new state governed under a constitution modeled on the French original of 1793.64 Such a meeting never took place as Napoleon shortly came to terms with Metternich over a partition of Italy (via the Treaty of Campo Formio, 1797) and returned to France. This division of the peninsula, which included the transfer of Venice to the Habsburgs, became incidentally the centerpiece for the tale of thwarted nationalism told in Ugo Foscolo’s Last Letters of Jacopo Ortiz (1802), a work idolized by Mazzini and other patriots of his generation.65 Rigas attempted meanwhile to press on with his plot but he had long since been discovered by Austrian officials who arrested him on his way to the Peloponnese – his trunks stuffed with copies of his patriotic writings and proclamations – and turned him over to Ottoman authorities. 62 English readers may find a compelling account of Rigas’s thought and actions in, Woodhouse, Rhigas Velestinlis. 63 A sampling of Korais’s vitriolic writings from the period, imploring the Greeks to join forces with the French, can be found in Dimaras, O Korais. As discussed in the following chapter, he remained committed to the goal of Greek independence, but came later to the view that considerable time was still needed to prepare the nation for the many challenges bound up within such an enterprise. 64 A thought-provoking analysis of Rigas’s terminological choices when rendering the document into Greek is presented in Sfini, ‘Langages de la révolution.’ 65 ‘We wrote of Foscolo,’ Mazzini recounted of his early literary endeavors, ‘to whom, apart from all his other merits, the Italians owe eternal reverence, from the fact of his having been the first, both in word and deed, to restore literature to its true patriotic mission in the person of the writer.’ Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 10.

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As indicated above, Rigas aimed to replace the Ottoman Empire with a unitary republic based upon the political ideas of revolutionary France. The vastly more complex ethnic and confessional composition of this future state posed no barrier in his mind to unity as all the inhabitants of the republic would be protected under the aegis of laws blind to such distinctions. ‘The Greek Republic,’ he declared of his future state in one surviving text, ‘is one, for all that it contains within it different races and religions. It does not look on differences in worship with a hostile eye.’ The ‘sovereign people’ he continued, comprised all of its inhabitants, e.g., ‘Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Wallachians, Armenians, Turks and every other kind of race.’ All were in turn assured ‘equality, freedom, security, the control of the landed property of each, the freedom of all religions, a common upbringing, the unhampered freedom of the press, the right of each to petition and to complain, the right to gather in public companies and, lastly, the enjoyment of all the Rights of Man.’66 Here, in retrospect, was a remarkable vision of civic nationhood that departs sharply from the tendency toward ethnic separatism more closely associated with Balkan history. Rigas’s new ‘Hellenic Republic’ was not, however, an entirely culturally neutral construct. In the question of language, a matter essential to social intercourse and the expression of the all-important general will, some choices had to be made. Greek was in this case to be the official language. If such gestures reflected an ‘over-appreciation’ in his mind of the role Hellenism might play as a unifying force in the region, it is worth noting that Rigas came of age in the Danubian Principalities amid a multiethnic intelligentsia that had been united in just such a fashion.67. Although the details of Rigas’s death are a mystery, his fate and aspirations were a subject of much contemporary debate and it was not long before

66 Vranousis, Rigas, pp. 110-112; English translations of several documents can be found in Clogg, The Movement for Greek Independence. 67 See, for example, Kitromilides, ‘An Enlightenment Perspective.’ There was nostalgia too for a past in Rigas’s ideal state that appeared as well in the reflections of the Phanariot elites against whose arrogance he sometimes chafed. See, for example, Mango, ‘The Phanariots’. The form emerges in such imaginings of a reconstructed Byzantium with an antique gloss. Vranousis, Rigas, pp. 110-112. Rigas’s writings present finally an all-encompassing geographical response to the question ‘What was Greece?’ that was rather characteristic of his time. Campbell and Sherrard, Modern Greece, p. 60. One finds a similar vision in Konstantas and Philippidis’s Geographia Neoteriki of 1791, the authors posing the figure of an ideal ‘Greece’ whose dimensions far exceeded those typically depicted by European authors; an error which they attributed to the sorry condition of the lands once encompassed within the boundaries of Hellenic civilization. Konstantas and Philippidis, Geographia Neoteriki, p. 38.

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enthusiastic tributes to him surfaced in the radical literature of the day.68 It is interesting to note, however, that this discourse was largely silent on the pan-Balkan character of his plot; presenting him instead as a martyr for the cause of Greek liberty.69 Rigas’s hopes for a positive reception from Napoleon bring finally to mind the propaganda campaigns of the warring parties, all of which expended a measure of rhetoric toward those dwelling within or near the zones of conflict. These too, like the French before 1789, were depicted as so many slumbering or captive peoples awaiting the hour of their redemption. ‘The nations’ thus obtained a certain pride of place in the pronouncements of the Great Powers, each presenting their campaigns as struggles not only against revolution or reaction but as liberating crusades.70 Napoleon’s appeal, for example, to ‘the Italian nation’ to unite with France, recalling to its people ‘the past glories of Italy and the decay into which it had fallen,’ was reprised by his enemies.71 As indicated in the following chapter, a number of overtures were also made to potential allies in the Peloponnese. Similar pledges of support (and even troops) were directed toward Ireland where a major rebellion against British rule broke out in May of 1798.72 The eastward march of French forces was accompanied by new overtures of this kind, with the competing powers extending promises of aid or even autonomy to rally the masses and especially local elites to their side.73 As Brian Vick writes, key figures such as Castlereagh, ‘not only deemed the conflict a national one but pressured the Austrians to make it yet more so.’74 This was to be accomplished by inciting ‘national uprisings in Tyrol and Italy to 68 Perhaps the only first-hand account, albeit brief, of Rigas and his acts is to be found in the memoirs of Christophoros Perraivos. This figure was later to play a major role in the establishment of the Philiki Etaireia. Perraivos, Apomnimonevmata, I, pp. 16-22. 69 Note again the previously cited Elliniki Nomarchia of 1806 which was dedicated to Rigas, ‘that great and unforgettable Greek.’ Anonymou tou Ellinos, Elliniki Nomarchia. See also Xanthos, ‘Apomnimonevmata,’ p. 140. 70 As David Bell has recently written, ‘thanks to the wars of “national” independence waged against imperial France, the concepts become explicitly contradictory. The rise of nationalism calls into question the legitimacy of empires – at least, that of European empires (colonial empires are something else). The allies exploited nationalism to defeat Napoleon, but nationalism became a double-edged sword for them.’ Bell, ‘Nations et empires,’ pp. 27-28. 71 ‘Warriors of Italy!’ British military commanders declared, ‘Only call and we will hasten to your relief, and then Italy by our united efforts will become what she was in her most prosperous periods, and what Spain now is.’ Cited in Gregory, Napoleon’s Italy, pp. 181-182. 72 Yet another was planned at the time of the Battle of Waterloo. Broers, Europe under Napoleon, p. 259. 73 The French and Allied overtures to Greek elites are described in the following chapter. 74 Vick, The Congress of Vienna, p. 269.

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match those in Spain’ and thus divert the enemy’s forces and attention. ‘It is become a contest of nations to all intents and purposes and not a game of statesmen,’ wrote the latter, and all might yet be lost, ‘if the whole is not sustained by a national sentiment and by that impulse, which is alone to be communicated by calling the mass of the people into action.’75 For Ioannis Kapodistrias, a native of the Ionian Islands who rose to a senior position in the Russian Foreign Service, these developments on the rhetorical front had far-reaching implications. Specifically, by rallying the people to arms ‘in the name of the fatherland and not in the name of the sovereign,’ the desperate powers had established a precedent that would have to be figured into their postwar calculations and above all modes of governance.76 Unfortunately, many failed to do so, he at least believed, and ruled ‘as if the events of the past twenty-five years had not transpired.’77 Britain’s Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston similarly fretted over the many restless and ‘discontented spirits’ that crowded the continent waiting for the signal to revolt.78 However, it was by no means clear that the conciliatory gesture or two toward liberal opinion advised by Kapodistrias would appease and not further embolden those desirous of change. As Vick observed of the dilemmas posed to the statesmen gathered in Vienna: ‘Too liberal a constitution, they thought, might provoke further revolution, but so too might reactionary measures. And preventing renewed revolution and concomitant warfare, moderates and conservatives agreed, formed the primary task after Napoleon’s defeat.’79 These anxieties and conflicts of opinion came especially to the fore in the course of the tense negotiations surrounding the creation of the Polish ‘Congress Kingdom’.80 Still, even conservatives such as 75 Ibid. 76 Cited in Woodhouse, Capodistrias, p. 235. 77 Ibid. The Piedmont nobleman Massimo D’Azeglio (1798-1866) complained similarly of the ‘stupid, blind, retrograde absolutism of the restoration,’ to which he attributed the spread and mischief of secret societies. D’Azeglio, Things I Remember, p. 131. 78 Cited in Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, p. 107. 79 Vick, The Congress of Vienna, p. 240. Viewed from the perspective of people at the time (and especially those intent on upholding the new order of things), revolutions might seem liable to happen anywhere; a suspicion perhaps reinforced in the first postwar decade by revolts in settings as disparate as Russia, and most seriously, Spain and the Ottoman Balkans. The sudden onset in 1830 of the Belgian crisis, preceded by the upheaval in France, and followed by another in Poland, seemed to furnish additional evidence of this fact. To be sure, if revolution could occur in Belgium, or so some feared, it could occur anywhere. In the words of Guizot: ‘The Belgians! We call them a people! That is, they play the people!’ Cited in Stengers, ‘Sentiment national,’ pp. 66-67. 80 The state in question, reconstituted from the lands of the former Duchy, was deemed necessary by Alexander I as a means of resolving the ‘Polish problem.’ In the case of its constitutional arrangements, the kingdom was headed by the tsar although the Poles possessed a measure

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Talleyrand and Metternich, he continues, ‘recognized that many populations (at least the political classes among them) desired relatively liberal rule, and that above all for those who had lived under constitutional regimes for ten or twenty years, attempting to go back would be difficult or dangerous.’81 The anxieties cited above appear therefore to express a sense of foreboding among many statesmen of the era that the upheavals of the preceding quarter century had fostered, to cite Hobsbawm, a culture of ‘revolutionism.’82 This concept, if difficult to substantiate, does at least surface in the pronouncements of figures such as Mazzini who later professed that for many who lived through the events of these years or were born soon after, the idea of another continental-wide spasm on the lines of 1789 was never far from sight. ‘My Italianism,’ he explained, ‘consists not so much in working for Italian emancipation as in working so that the Italian revolution, like the French of 1789, becomes a European revolution.’83 Such enthusiasms were likely to be felt most strongly, Azeglio appeared to concur, among those who had ‘the seeds of the new era’ sown in their hearts: ‘We all felt a need for action,’ the latter recalled of his youth, ‘we all felt driven to try to distinguish ourselves in some way or other, owing to that powerful far-reaching electric shock, imparted to his age by the tireless activity of Napoleon.’84 Although they clashed violently on virtually every question relating to Italy’s future, Azeglio appeared nevertheless to share Mazzini’s view that ‘only those born and raised in the climate of revolution were mentally and emotionally equipped to carry out the renewal of society.’85 Carlyle’s thoughts on the of self-rule in the form of their own Diet. Eligibility to vote and stand for election to the lower house of this body was reserved for property owners (a feature of the defunct 3 May Constitution) while a smaller senate was composed of members appointed by the king. The king’s interests were also maintained by both a ‘special representative’ and a viceroy (many hoped, to their later disappointment, that he would be a Pole) who exercised executive authority with the assistance of an Administrative Council. The kingdom’s army was placed, finally, under the command of the tsar’s brother Constantine. Unfortunately, writes Zawadzki, these terms (especially the territorial arrangements) comprised ‘a very modest proportion of what most politically articulate Poles believed was theirs by right.’ He sums up the feelings of contemporary opponents of the plan when writing that ‘while it placated, for a time, many war-weary Polish notables, the Polish settlement of 1815 was a compromise that contained the seeds of future discontent.’ Zawadzki, ‘Russia and the Re-opening of the Polish Question,’ pp. 43-44. 81 Vick, The Congress of Vienna, p. 240. 82 As Eric Hobsbawm once wrote of the years 1789-1848, ‘Never in European history and rarely anywhere else has revolutionism been so endemic, so general, so likely to spread by spontaneous contagion as well as by deliberate propaganda.’ Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 138. 83 Cited in Sarti, ‘Giuseppe Mazzini,’ p. 296. 84 D’Azeglio, Things I Remember, p. 135. 85 Sarti, Mazzini, p. 53.

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nature of ‘modern revolutionism,’ articulated in the course of his reflections on the upheavals of 1830, express a similar view of the times: ‘The Three Days (of July 1830) told all mortals that the old French Revolution,’ he bid his readers to remember, ‘mad as it might look, was not a transitory ebullition of Bedlam, but a genuine product of this Earth where we all live; that it was verily a Fact, and that the world in general would do well everywhere to regard it as such.’86

Toward Restoration The cases discussed above indicate some of the events that typically appear in accounts regarding the role of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars in further disseminating the national idea or encouraging political action in its name. Some historical problems concerning the actual effect of these developments on the consciousness of the European populace at large are discussed below and still more so in subsequent chapters. As indicated previously, less controversial, historiographically speaking, is the significance the era is deemed to have had in the ideological and cultural spheres. It is in fact ‘precisely to Revolutionary France,’ Stuart Woolf writes, stating a view shared by many, that ‘the constitutive elements of the ideology of modern nationalism’ can be traced.87 The fundamental parts of this ‘ideology’ are rendered below by Smith and Hutchinson in a form that would also likely meet with wide approval: Nationalism was, first of all, a doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty. The people must be liberated – that is, free from any external constraint; they must determine their own destiny and […] control their own resources; they must obey only their own ‘inner’ voice. But that entailed fraternity. The people must be united […] they must be gathered 86 As he wrote in 1840: ‘A common theory among considerable parties of men in England and elsewhere used to be, that the French Nation had, in those days, as it were gone mad; that the French Revolution was a general act of insanity, a temporary conversion of France and large sections of the world into a kind of Bedlam. The Event had risen and raged; but was a madness and nonentity – gone now happily into the region of Dreams and the Picturesque! – To such comfortable philosophers, the Three Days of July, 1830, must have been a surprising phenomenon. Here is the French Nation risen again, in musketry and death-struggle, out shooting and being shot, to make that same mad French Revolution good! The sons and grandsons of those men, it would seem, persist in the enterprise: they do not disown it; they will have it made good; will have themselves shot, if it be not made good.’ Carlyle, ‘The Hero as King,’ p. 421. 87 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 11

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together in a single historic territory, a homeland; and they must have legal equality and share a single public culture.88

The revolution may be credited in sum with establishing a repertoire of ideas and claims frequently reprised in power struggles – especially those involving disputes over sovereignty – of later years; with demands for autonomy being often grounded on the claim that the people in question were a nation (whether as a civic, ethno-linguistic body, or both) and had on that basis a right to a free and unfettered existence.89 The resort to national rhetoric was equally pronounced in the constitutional struggles which followed, as indicated in the next chapter on the subject of the Spanish Revolution of 1820. The crises of 1789-1815 did nothing furthermore to diminish the enthusiasm for cultural initiatives directed toward the improvement of the nation, or those in which the nation served as a primary focus of enquiry, as witnessed, to cite one prominent example, in the evolution of historical scholarship.90 These endeavors continued apace in the aftermath of the wars (if sometimes subject to greater surveillance) and indeed acquired, thanks especially to ideas of romantic and idealist provenance, ever more grandiose theoretical trappings.91 The passages above allude to the formation of ideas that became fixtures of the modern ideological landscape, but did they constitute, in the immediate aftermath of the wars, a major source of popular dissidence? Were in fact the concerns expressed by some at the time, and especially those connected with the interests of the old regime, regarding the effects of these events and their capacity to arouse concerted action credible? Finally, did the hostility toward such sentiments commonly associated with the deliberations and decisions taken at the Congress of Vienna predetermine new troubles of a 88 Hutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, p. 4. 89 This principle is immediately recognizable again in the pronouncements of modern-day advocates of Catalan independence, to cite one well-known case, whose banners often simply declare: ‘Catalunya es una nació’ (Catalonia is a nation), and ‘Som una nació’ (We are a nation). 90 Particular emphasis was placed on the medieval era, as epitomized in works such as the Monumenta Germania Historica, a project launched by the Society for the Study of Older German History (established in Frankfurt in 1819). For additional context, see Crane, Collecting and Historical Consciousness. 91 The nation, to judge from the works in question, was ultimately something felt not thought; a truth experienced through those organs of sense and intuition cultivated especially by painters, poets and pietists. In the words of Weiland, the dream of a common fatherland could indeed only be realized if Germans listened ‘to their poets and not their princes.’ Cited in Sheehan, German History, p. 373. For many additional examples, see Leerssen, The Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism.

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nationalist character? These questions are explored again in subsequent chapters, although a few points may be made in advance. Above all, it is worth recalling previous concerns over matters of narrative emphasis that necessarily come into play in works of this kind. Specifically, by focusing on the generation of nationalist ideas and their reception on the part of figures such as Rigas one tends to obscure the diffidence or even hostility also expressed toward the same in many parts of Europe, where ‘national’ aspirations were often trumped by concerns for the preservation of tradition, order, or prevailing power structures.92 Contrary, for example, to the wishes of someone like Rigas, a Patriarchal printing press was established in Constantinople toward the end of the eighteenth century which became a principal battery for combating foreign ideas and doctrines deemed harmful to the spiritual wellbeing of the Orthodox faithful. All were merely the latest abominations of the heretical ‘Franks,’ it was claimed in one famous tract written in the aftermath of the French Revolution, against whom God had ‘raised out of nothing this powerful empire of the Ottomans so as to be to the people of the West a bridle, to us the people of the East a means of salvation.’93 The problem of loyalties figures especially large in the historiography surrounding the Spanish La Guerra de la Independencia, to cite another well-known example, as witnessed in debates concerning the nature of the attachments – to sovereign, faith or ‘nation’? – most responsible for mobilizing resistance to the French invasion.94 If much work, similarly, on German history suggests that the upheavals of the era promoted new thought on matters of national ‘self-identification,’ 92 As Broers observes, the attitude of local elites toward the French ‘could never be divorced from how their presence altered the previous political order.’ Broers, Europe under Napoleon, p. 131. One notes here the hostile reaction toward Napoleon on the part of many Magyar nobles, their previous opposition to Habsburg centralization initiatives notwithstanding. This hostility was especially pronounced after the ‘Jacobin Conspiracy’ of 1793-1795. Magyar nobles subsequently contributed substantial amounts of capital and manpower to the Habsburg war effort against Napoleon and even took the f ield themselves. Despite these strong appearances of support, Habsburg rulers suspended the Hungarian Diet in 1811 and embarked on a period of ‘absolutist’ rule that would persist until 1825. See, for example, works by Bödy, ‘The Hungarian Jacobin Conspiracy’; Barany, ‘Hoping against Hope,’ and idem, ‘From Fidelity to the Habsburgs’; and Wangermann, From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials. 93 English translations of the Grigorios and Anthimos texts can be found in Clogg, The Movement for Greek Independence. For additional context, see also Clogg, ‘The “Dhidhaskalia Patriki.”‘ 94 As indicated in the text, this subject continues to inspire considerable interest and debate. José Álvarez Junco’s ‘La invención de la Guerra de la Independencia’ has been especially provocative. For valuable discussions of the historiography surrounding the claims made in this and opposing works, see Aparicio, ‘Modernidad e identidad nacional’; Alonso, ‘La Guerra de la Independencia’; and Luis, ‘Déconstruction et ouverture.’

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scholars also stress the continuing importance of regional and dynastic loyalties.95 Certain prominent f igures from the Bismarck era, such as Heinrich von Treitschke, were indeed so bold as to openly proclaim that ‘the masses of the people outside Prussia had little sense of the heroic fury of this war.’96 Martin Schennach writes furthermore of the dilemmas posed to Austrian leaders regarding prospective attempts to evoke a ‘German patriotism,’ this being viewed as interfering with or indeed undermining the aim of promoting a ‘supra-territorial, Austrian patriotism’ encompassing ‘all of the Habsburg subject populations.’97 Although Schennach cites some initial overtures made in the former direction over the years 1813-1814, he concludes that ‘calls to German patriotism played no role in the Austrian lands and were not used for mobilizing public opinion.’98 The eradication of these internal divisions ranked high nevertheless among the goals pursued in the immediate postwar era by the Burschenschaften, or associations of patriotically minded university students and veterans spread across the Bund. These latter made their national sentiment and wishes known through a series of public festivals, the most famous of which took place at Wartburg in 1817.99 It was in fact the murder of August von Kotzebue, a prolific playwright occasionally given to ridicule the ‘Germanomaniacs,’ by a young Burschenschaftler that precipitated the Carlsbad 95 Sheehan writes, for example, that the ‘long struggle against revolutionary France,’ had a ‘transformative’ effect on ‘both the theory and practice of German nationalism.’ Sheehan, German History, p. 372. Brian Vick similarly attests that if ‘problems of German self-definition […] had existed before the late eighteenth century,’ they were not expressed in those ‘modern constructions of nationhood that arose in the wake of the French Revolution.’ Vick, Defining Germany, p. 15. The new attitudes coexisted nevertheless, most agree, with older traditions of thought and attachments. These ambiguities discussed also in, Hageman, ‘Of “Manly Valor,”‘ and Godsey, Nobles and Nation. 96 According to Von Trietschke in a famous work first published in 1879, ‘just as had formerly happened in the beginning of modern German state-building, so now the re-establishment of the national independence proceeded from the north alone. The new political and moral ideals of the awakened youth bore the stamp of North German culture. The old German God, to whom they prayed, was the God of the Protestants.’ To be sure, ‘in its first and more difficult half, the German War of Liberation was a war of Prussia against the three-fourths of the German nation that were ruled by France.’ Von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, I, p. 511. 97 Schennach, ‘“We Are Constituted as a Nation,”‘ pp. 245-246. 98 Ibid., 246. 99 The organizers sought to commemorate both the Battle of Leipzig and the launching of the Protestant Reformation, an event which evoked of course far more ambivalent sentiments in Catholic Germany. The festival offers thus a glimpse of the sectional issues that would complicate German ‘nation-building’ in the years ahead. For additional context, see Hagemann, ‘Celebration, Contestation and Commemoration.’

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Decrees (1819).100 These measures generated some opposition throughout the Bund, as was later demonstrated in the events of 1830. However, the ‘national’ dimension of these disturbances, at least from the perspective of the prominent scholars cited in Chapters 6 and 7, was limited. Historians find instead a sudden surge of political activity and assertiveness in the late 1840s, the causes of which are discussed below. A similar pattern is visible in the Italian case. Here too one can point to episodes and conditions conducive in principle to the formation of collective sentiment and dissidence. Most would additionally agree that the political and social upheavals of the preceding years had undermined to some extent the foundations and legitimacy of the prewar status quo; a problem faced by returning rulers in other parts of the continent.101 Also as elsewhere, the ‘restored’ Italy which emerged from the Vienna accords was by no means a facsimile of the old regime original. Most conspicuous were those alterations which dramatically raised the profile of Austria and its rulers in peninsular affairs.102 If these changes were undertaken with the aim of strengthening the empire, they also had the potential to imbue socio-political frictions throughout the peninsula with an anti-Austrian coloring.103 According to the Lombard philosopher Carlo Cattaneo, ‘hatred, which previously had been divided among individual tyrants, now found itself naturally concentrated on the one power that afforded those tyrants protection […] so the people of Italy did not achieve their fraternal love until after they had first been united in fraternal hatred.’104 As Cattaneo suggested in the same passage, discontent was equally directed toward the non-Austrian ‘reactionist’ regimes in the peninsula, the most ‘determined’ examples of which were Piedmont, the Papal States and Modena.105 In each case, Napoleonic legal codes were modified or dissolved, education returned to the church, and 100 These events described in Williamson, ‘What Killed August von Kotzebue?’ 101 See, for example, Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, p. 11. 102 Venice and Lombardy were directly annexed by the empire, while the duchies of Tuscany, Modena and Parma were governed by members of the Habsburg royal family; the Papal States and the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily were all bound to Austria through military alliances. 103 As Stuart Woolf writes: ‘local exponents of progress’ found the way ahead ‘increasingly impossible without political independence from the foreigner (Italy) or from territorial fragmentation (Germany).’ Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 12. Others have similarly written that by ‘uniting’ the various states of Italy ‘in subservience to Austria,’ Metternich’s postwar policy succeeded in giving ‘Italian nationalism its history and target.’ Beales and Biagnini, The Risorgimento, p. 33. 104 Cattaneo, Civilization and Democracy, pp. 200-201. 105 Meanwhile in Naples, the balance of power had swung back again to the side of the Bourbons, who summarily abolished the constitution which the Sicilians had been granted under British rule. Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, pp. 18-20.

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government posts reorganized in a fashion that displaced the bourgeois officialdom of the intervening years.106 The ideas and frictions described above are also considered to have had a role in abetting the growth of secret societies. Of these, the Carbonari, who may have formed in Naples as early as 1807, gained the largest following.107 Although often portrayed as a union of patriots bent on national emancipation, the Carbonaros had nevertheless no fixed agenda on this front and it is probably the case that many of those who joined – and in large numbers – from the south, were ‘more interested in achieving a democratic constitution in Naples than in the national question.’108 Contrary to the popular understanding, Brian Vick has recently argued, the Vienna delegates were not unaware of the dangers corresponding to any attempt at completely negating the constitutional innovations of the preceding years or dismissing out of hand any consideration of ‘national’ interests. ‘Belief in the existence and rights of nations and peoples,’ he indeed goes on to claim, ‘shaped the politics of the Vienna Congress more than has often been recognized.’109 These considerations entered into Metternich’s stance on the Italian question. Specifically, Vick continues, Metternich pursued a policy of ‘parcelization’ intended to reinforce ‘local identities as a means to damp the growth of national sentiment.’ Thus, ‘Metternich and Franz […] hoped to appeal to “the Lombard spirit” to counteract “the so-called Italian spirit”‘110 These aims notwithstanding, it might be expected that Restoration regimes would err on the side of order, especially when 106 The centralizing designs of restored rulers – another Napoleonic inheritance – could also earn for them the opposition of old regime elites, as indicated by Meriggi, ‘State and Society,’ pp. 52, 58. 107 Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, p. 178. 108 Lyttelton ‘The National Question,’ p. 78. 109 Vick, The Congress of Vienna, p. 234. He adds that ‘the desire to give Germany a federal constitution also partly resulted from belief in the prevalence of German national sentiment and of a German national movement that would not be satisfied with less.’ Ibid., p. 270. 110 Ibid., p. 275. He adds: ‘Moreover, while Metternich opposed Italian political nationalism, he was not averse to a certain degree of Italian patriotism or even cultivation of Italian cultural nationalism.’ Ibid., p. 275. As Haas shows, these and related policies were fiercely debated in Vienna. See, for example, Haas, Metternich, Reorganization and Nationality, pp. 35-45. At some points too he expressed a dim view of the strength of dissidence from this quarter or its prospects for growth. Metternich informed, for example, Emperor Francis in 1817 that if ‘several secret fraternities’ were known to be operating in Italy they lacked ‘leaders of name and character, central guidance and all other means of organizing revolutionary action.’ They were furthermore divided among themselves in ‘design and principle […] change every day and on the morrow may be ready to fight against one another.’ ‘Metternich to Emperor Francis, November 3, 1817,’ in Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 31.

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faced with the prospect of unrest. Mazzini’s hopes for waging a ‘people’s war’ largely depended in fact on the mobilizing effect of state-sponsored oppression, the exercise of which he repeatedly tried to provoke.111 According to this brute logic, unrest – by leading to executions, arrests and other hardships – could be instrumental in widening the social base of his movement. However, such endeavors and accompanying rhetorical campaigns do not appear to have translated into mass action or sustained appeals for political unification. The actual incidents of unrest and dissidence in the Italian peninsula during the 1820s offer at least a rather modest indication of the spread and power of such sentiment. The most important of these, following closely upon the Spanish Revolution of January 1820, took place in Naples and Piedmont, the revolt led by reform-minded army officers espousing a range of both constitutional and national aims including the liberation of Lombardy and Venice from Habsburg rule.112 Mazzini’s own first awareness of his calling was famously portrayed in the pages of his memoirs where he claimed to have been deeply moved by the sight of the indigent survivors of the Piedmont revolution on the streets of his native Genoa. ‘A confused idea presented itself to my mind,’ he wrote of the experience, ‘I will not say of country or liberty – but an idea that we Italians could and therefore ought to struggle for the liberty of our country’ – remarkable thoughts, if true, for a youth of twelve.113 However, the revolts in question drew little support from other parts of the peninsula or the general populace. As in the German case, this situation suddenly changed in the 1840s, which were in Italy, as elsewhere on the continent, the site of a rather sudden surge in liberal political activity and mobilization, as well as urban social unrest, with a concurrent rise in nationalist appeals. In a recent historiographical review, Maurizio Isabella, for example, observes that if the French Revolution is still deemed ‘central to the origins of the Risorgimento,’ the ‘center of 111 For one biographer, Mazzini’s willingness ‘to try again and again’ at making revolution disclosed a ‘conviction that the death of martyrs would advance the cause by disseminating a consciousness of italianità and forcing governments into unpopular repression.’ Smith, Mazzini, p. 10. 112 Defeated by Austrian forces at Novara, a number of these latter insurgents followed their leader Santarosa on to Greece, buoyed perhaps by the faith that ‘in fighting for the freedom of others […] they were fighting also for their own.’ Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 78. For a view of Santarosa’s principles and thoughts on Italy, see ‘De la révolution piémontaise’ in Smith, The Making of Italy, pp. 40-41. 113 Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 2. These sentiments may have been encouraged in him by his parents’ republicanism, a cause which he pursued with particular zeal in college. It was also at this time that he began his custom of dressing in black, out of ‘mourning for his country,’ and became absorbed in the writings of Foscolo.

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gravity […] has shifted away from the French period and earlier decades of the Restoration towards 1848-9 and the biennium of 1859-60.’114 In sum, the 1820s were the site of disturbances and protests against the Restoration settlement in Spain, parts of Italy, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe; however, the ‘national’ properties of these incidents, at least as expressed in the form of demands for unification and independence from foreign rule, as well as instances of cross border collaboration within the Bund and Italian peninsula toward the same, were limited.115 There was, however, one notable example of a significant revolution during the immediate postwar era with arguably more pronounced ‘national’ traits that was furthermore directly linked, genealogically speaking, to the preceding Napoleonic interlude. Reference is made here to the Greek Revolution of 1821, an enterprise that was set in motion by a secret society formed in 1814. The motivations and aims of those involved, among other problems surrounding the history of this event, are discussed in the following chapter.

114 Isabella, ‘Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,’ pp. 256. 115 Note that the following chapter describes the manner in which other elements and traditions of national discourse (especially those relating to the concept of popular or national sovereignty) were expressed in the course of the Spanish crisis.

5.

The Greek Revolution of 1821 Abstract The present chapter describes the outbreak and outcomes of the Greek Revolution of 1821. Attention is given to questions surrounding how this event – especially from the standpoint of its imputed causes and the social composition of those who played a leading part – may be compared with other notable upheavals of the Restoration era. The chapter closes with a discussion of the European political and cultural response to the event. Keywords: Greek Revolution, Ottoman Empire, national identity, irredentism

Perhaps many Christians by converting to Islam aided the growth of the Ottoman army and population. However, in those who preserved their religion and language the Ottoman elements exerted no influence at all. […] The nation of 1821 was the very same one of 1453; morally, intellectually and numerically it had undergone many changes, but ethnologically none at all.1

The historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891) is best known for his multivolume History of the Hellenic Nation from Ancient Times to the Present (1860-1874). As the title of this work and the excerpt above suggest, the author sought to portray the Greek nation as a community of descent whose genetic continuity had remained largely unbroken over time. Although Paparrigopoulos did not deny that some mixing of ‘races’ had taken place throughout the eastern Mediterranean since antiquity, it was clear to him that in those areas where the Greek language prevailed, the Hellenes had absorbed rather than been absorbed by the others.2 The arguments 1 Paparrigopoulos, Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vivlio Dekato Pempto, p. 45. 2 As Paparrigopoulos wrote in one of his first works, the Slavic races were ‘absorbed’ into the Hellenic and lost in the process all their former character, much like what happens to a river ‘upon shortly entering the vast waters of the sea.’ Paparrigopoulos, Peri tis Epoikiseos

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch05

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of the Austrian philologist Jakob Fallmerayer (1790-1861) notwithstanding, the modern Greeks were exactly who they claimed themselves to be: the descendants of that storied race whose wisdom and works remained among the most sacred possessions of European civilization.3 If such a connection appeared doubtful, even ridiculous, given the state of material and moral destitution that long reigned over the lands once home to such a people, Paparrigopoulos would bid his readers to think again. Indeed, the regeneration of Greece proved, as Korais declared in his Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce (1803), ‘that if unhappy circumstances can devastate the most fertile soil […] they cannot deprive it of its natural fecundity; a light rain and a little cultivation will suffice for all the riches which once covered it to germinate anew.’4 For Korais, the regeneration of Greece was nevertheless incomplete at the time of the revolution of 1821, an event which arrived at least 30 years too soon, he lamented in a later work, and ‘gave rise to the flowing of so much innocent blood.’5 Like its Balkan-Serbian predecessor, the Greek Revolution was indeed notable for the protracted nature of the struggle, to say nothing of the human cost, as well as its culmination in the establishment of a nominally independent state. This outcome may have raised the hopes of dissidents elsewhere, however, the Greek success, also like the Serbian, was contingent upon the intercession of outside powers. In some cases, such as Belgium, the geographical and diplomatic setting proved favorable to aid from this quarter; in others, such as Hungary or Poland, it did not. Still, by consenting to the creation of an independent Greece, the European Great Powers appeared to confer a measure of legitimacy on the insurgents’ claims. Slavikon, p. ii. See also Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, p. 157. For additional background on Paparrigopoulos and his work, see Koubourlis, Oi Istoriographikes Opheiles; Kostantaras, ‘Byzantine Turns.’ 3 In a series of works dating from the 1830s, the Austrian classicist Jacob Phillip Fallmerayer asserted that the modern Greeks were in fact the Hellenized descendants of Slavs and Albanians who had migrated into the region in the seventh century. The debate over Fallmerayer’s ideas in German letters (Zinkeisen and Kopitar leading the opposition) was actually productive in furnishing counterarguments to Greek intellectuals. These placed emphasis on the continuity of language and religion, facts which demonstrated that the native population had survived the incursions. However, for Fallmerayer, these facts only served to indicate how forcefully Byzantine rulers had striven to Hellenize the newcomers. See, for example, Veloudis, Ο Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, p. 39. 4 Korais, Mémoire, p. 64. As the anonymous author of the Elliniki Nomarchia (1806) similarly wrote, the Greeks had a ‘natural disposition […] to invention’ and would need only a few years of liberty and peace to regain their former virtues. Anonymou tou Ellinos, Elliniki Nomarchia, pp. 178-179. 5 Korais, Vios Adamantiou Korai, p. 27.

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This particular outcome of the Greek Revolution has, many have argued, great significance for our understanding of how the ‘national problem’ became further established on the European cultural and political scene in the years following the 1815 Vienna settlement. For Joep Leerssen, the creation of the Hellenic Kingdom served not only to validate the principle of national sovereignty, it abetted too the onset of a developing romantic form of nationalism which retained in his words ‘the “vertical” notion of freedom as the assertion of popular rights, but adds to this a “horizontal” aspect, namely the separateness of the nation amidst its neighbours.’6 Although this idea was not entirely new, it had now obtained another footing in reality. The importance of the revolution for the historiography of the ‘national problem’ in Europe is also a function of the remarkable European public reaction to the event. This response, which fell heavily on the side of the insurgents, was of such scale that it may even qualify as a genre of cultural production in its own right. These important effects aside, historians continue to struggle with problems concerning the nature and causes of the revolution, not all of which can be adequately pursued here. Two especially prevalent lines of thought may nevertheless be taken under review: On one hand, the revolution is often represented as another example of the sometimes-violent liberal challenges to the Vienna settlement that broke out elsewhere in Europe during the Restoration era. For others, it has a more local explanation and may be attributed in particular to the centralizing policies enacted by Ottoman authorities (and the opposition they inspired among various elites) in response to a series of disastrous wars. Both positions have their merits and are not mutually exclusive, however, they do lay stress on different factors: For example, adherents of the former view place emphasis on the fact that the Greek Revolution occurred at roughly the same time as others in Spain, Naples, and Russia. Do they all belong therefore to the same revolutionary ‘wave’ or reflect a shared set of conditions and motivating factors? For Richard Stites, who made this point in a highly regarded posthumous work, differences loomed from case to case, but all gave notice of the strength of ‘post-Napoleonic liberalism,’ especially when paired with the decision of certain ‘restored’ sovereigns to conduct their business without due regard for recent events or the expectations they had engendered among the populace – the great example being Ferdinand VII’s repudiation of the Constitution of Cádiz.7 6 Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, p. 133 7 Text refers to Stites, The Four Horsemen. Kolokotronis had his own way of putting things: ‘The French Revolution and Napoleon, in my opinion, opened the eyes of the world. Previously

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It might be pointed out here that the parts of the Ottoman Empire affected by the Greek Revolution were never incorporated within the Napoleonic world nor subject, accordingly, to the rule of restored sovereigns bent on re-establishing their authority.8 If therefore the revolution was another example of a thwarted or crusading liberalism, it was not strictly speaking provoked by the reactionary attitudes of ‘the European Restoration’ – as practiced on the part of reinstated regimes or, in the Russian case, those within the European Concert who had come through the crisis intact.9 Still, for other historians, the difference is negligible. As Nassia Yakovaki writes, those who led the revolution ‘were indeed organizing themselves against a Restoration power – part of the European equilibrium: the Ottoman status quo.’10 In some cases too, Greek documents from the period give the impression that certain protagonists viewed their cause in those terms. This may even hold true for Alexandros Ypsilantis, the leader of the secret society (Philiki Etaireia or ‘Friendly Society’), founded in 1814, which initiated the revolution. In an 1820 encyclical addressed to all the leaders of ‘the nation,’ Ypsilantis declared that ‘in the present critical circumstances, when all the nations of Europe are struggling to acquire their national rights and limit the power of tyrants’ the time had finally arrived for the Greeks too to act.11 In addition therefore to articulating a sense of the ‘revolutionism’ that Stites (like Hobsbawm before him) described as permeating the era, Ypsilantis appeared also to place the Greek Revolution in the company of the other liberal revolutions of the period.12 It is important nevertheless to note that Ypsilantis, and the Etaireia more generally, had no explicit political program. the nations [ethni] were not recognized, they thought of their kings as gods of the earth, and whatever they did, they said of it: well done. For this reason, it is difficult now to govern the people [laon].’ Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 49. 8 The Russian case also does not f it this scheme perfectly, however, as Stites shows, the Decembrists displayed an exceptional interest in the Spanish Revolution and proclaimed a political aim that was explicitly constitutional. Stites also cited the Russian participation in the Holy Alliance as cause for the empire’s placement within the company of post-1815 reactionary regimes. As he finally notes: ‘Distant Spain ignited the most frequent and passionate feelings of the Decembrists and presented some of them with what looked like a model and a precedent.’ Stites, The Four Horsemen, p. 282. 9 For one aggrieved Decembrist, Tsar Alexander went from being ‘The savior of Europe, restorer of Poland, liberator of the Baltic Serfs, sponsor of Enlightenment’ to ‘heeding the slanders of Metternich.’ Cited in Stites, The Four Horsemen, p. 274. 10 Yakovaki, ‘The Philiki Etaireia,’ p. 187. 11 Archeio Emmanouil Xanthou, II, p. 181. 12 As one Decembrist declared at his trial, the events of the previous years had ‘familiarized the minds’ of his comrades ‘with revolutions, with the possibilities and means of making them.’ Cited in Stites, The Four Horsemen, 275.

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This is to say that a review of the organization’s surviving documents reveals a surprising absence of any mention of political aims beyond independence.13 Induction into the society was not dependent in this sense on any profession of political orientation or affiliation – a remarkable fact, but one that may help to explain the Etaireia’s ability to attract a diverse body of members.14 Liberal principles or sympathies may be imputed in various passages of text, such as those cited above, and some Etaireia members, including one of its founders, Emmanuil Xanthos, were involved with other European secret societies such as the Freemasons, with leanings of this kind (Xanthos actually modeled some Etaireia rituals on Masonic originals).15 That said, it remains that the Etaireia never articulated a future plan of governance. If Etaireia sources don’t give a clear sense of ultimate political aims, one thing that does stand out is the emphasis on freeing ‘the nation’ from foreign oppressors, as expressed in documents such as the ‘Great Oath.’16 For Stites, like Leerssen above, this remains the distinctive feature of the Greek Revolution when considered alongside its 1820s’ contemporaries. In his words: ‘the Greeks, unlike the others, lived under alien rule, that is by people of different language, origins, and faith.’17 There is some truth to this, but as Koliopoulos and Veremis, among other scholars caution, the question of who exactly was a Greek was not always clearly stated in documents from the period. As they noted, the ‘true meaning of the term ethnos in insurgent Greece is elusive. […] [R]eligion and residence, as well as language and “descent,” were used in various combinations to define the identity of members of the insurgent nation.’18 The linkages between the diverse and 13 As Frangos wrote, Etaireia documents display ‘an apparent absence of any developed political position. […] [They] did not once clearly propose the political form a Modern Greek state might adopt.’ Frangos, ‘The Philike Etairia,’ p. 79. 14 See, for example, Mandylara and Nikolaou, ‘To ephikto kai to anephikto tis istorias kai tis istoriographias,’ p. 23. 15 Xanthos also expressed some admiration for Rigas, whose Jacobin-colored dream of a future Hellenic republic was discussed in the previous chapter. Xanthos, ‘Apomnimonevmata,’ p. 140. 16 ‘I swear to you, O holy and afflicted Motherland! I swear by your long years of suffering. I swear by the bitter tears, which for so many centuries your wretched children have shed and continue to shed! By my own tears, which flow at this minute! And to the future freedom of the race I dedicate all myself to you! In the future you will be the cause and object of my thoughts, your name the guide of my actions and your happiness the reward of my efforts!’ Protopsaltis, I Philiki Etaireia, p. 29. Note: there are at least three versions of the Oath available in manuscript, however, the differences between them are negligible. See Kostantaras, Infamy and Revolt, p. 148n. 17 Stites, The Four Horsemen, p. 9. 18 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, p. 227.

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far flung parts of ‘Greece’ is also a matter of debate and was even touched upon in the later recollections of those who took part in the event.19 These problems aside, here was an iteration of the ‘national problem,’ or so it was perceived and presented by many at the time and after, in its guise as a bid for separatism on the part of a people long joined together by the bonds of shared history and culture.20 One hastens in passing to add that if the other revolutions of the 1820s had different aims, declarations involving ‘the nation’ and even its liberation were not absent from their pronouncements; on the contrary, they appear often, if in another manner reminiscent of French revolutionary practice. These factors help in fact to explain the ubiquity of the nation in Restoration political discourse, the malleability of the concept being such that it could be implicated in virtually any political controversy. ‘Spain is living at the mercy of an arbitrary and absolute power,’ declared, for example, the leader of the Spanish revolt, Rafael Riego, ‘exercised without the slightest respect for the fundamental laws of the Nation.’ ‘The king is a citizen like everyone else,’ proclaimed another, ‘who receives his authority from the nation.’21 Here again, the rebels presented themselves as fighting for the emancipation of ‘the nation’ and the recovery of its (plundered) sovereignty. As indicated above, historians have also proposed interpretations of the Greek Revolution that lay less stress, and sometimes none at all, on the concept of thwarted liberalism. Approaches of this kind have often dealt especially with analyses of the social backgrounds of those who joined the plot and played crucial roles in the revolution itself. The interpretations under this head are diverse, although most refer to a disjuncture between the ideals expressed by the founders of the Etaireia regarding the 19 ‘The society of men was small,’ wrote, for example, the rebel leader Theodoros Kolokotronis (1770-1843) of his pre-1821 world. ‘It was our revolution that brought all the Greeks together. You would find people who didn’t know about a village one hour away from their own. They thought of Zakynthos as we think now of the most far-away place on earth. America seems to us now as Zakynthos appeared to them; they thought it was in France.’ Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 49. 20 See, for example, Pouqueville’s widely read Histoire de la régénération de la Gréce (1824). ‘Following in the footsteps of the father of history (Herodotus),’ he begins, ‘I will show how the Greeks, fallen from their splendor, subdued by the Romans, whom they softened, degraded under the scepter of their theologian Caesars, conquered by the Turks, whom they could not civilize, silently cast off their chains […] and ascended to the rank of nations.’ Ibid., I, p. 2. 21 Riego continued, ‘The king, who owes his throne to the multitudes who struggled in the independence war, has nevertheless not sworn to the Constitution; the Constitution – a pact between monarch and people – is the foundation and embodiment of every modern Nation.’ Cited in Stites, The Four Horsemen, pp. 30, 84.

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reconstitution of a vaguely imagined Greece, the geographical parameters of which were never specified, and the more prosaic aims of its members. In keeping, for example, with the thesis elaborated by Marx and Engels in the 1848 Manifesto, one important strand of Greek Marxist historiography has characterized the revolution as essentially the work of an ascendant bourgeoisie; an interpretation that lays stress on the merchant backgrounds of many, especially early, Etaireia members.22 However, for Kostas Kostis, to cite a prominent contemporary Greek historian, attention should be more properly directed toward the circumstances and aims of those Etaireia members who composed the ‘military’ and ‘political’ classes of the Peloponnese (the leaders of Christian militia and bandit bands and large landholders, respectively) and played a major role in mobilizing the manpower needed to conduct and sustain the revolution.23 These latter represent for Kostis a ‘marginalized elite’ who turned to revolution as a means to either recover their former powers or prevent a further erosion of status.24 Kostis advances a position here that bears some relation to arguments made elsewhere by Frederick Anscombe regarding the nature of the ‘Balkan revolutionary age.’ According to Anscombe, Peloponnesian notables and bandit chiefs joined the Etaireia and took part in the revolution out of fear for the designs of a newly assertive Ottoman state; one that, like the powers to the west, appeared to have embarked on an ambitious (and potentially violent) centralization project as a means to bolster its capacity to meet the financial and military challenges of the day.25 The Greek Revolution, like the Serbian one which came before, may best be understood therefore as a reflection of an Ottoman crisis that also provoked insurrections from displaced or threatened elites in Bulgaria and Bosnia. All ‘were launched,’ argues Anscombe, ‘in self-defense […] against the central government, which 22 Kordatos, I Koinoniki Symasia. As Mandylara and Nikolaou note, it remains common to present the original merchant element as comprising the radical and revolutionary ‘wing’ of the society, the powers of which were subsequently curbed by the induction of the notables. Mandylara and Nikolaou, ‘To ephikto kai to anephikto tis istorias kai tis istoriographias,’ p. 27. 23 As Hobsbawm wrote in The Age of Revolution, ‘only one of the 1820-2 revolutions maintained itself, thanks partly to its success in launching a genuine people’s insurrection and partly to a favourable diplomatic situation: the Greek rising of 1821.’ ‘In Greece alone,’ he continued, his prose acquiring an almost romantic hue, ‘did an entire people rise against the oppressor,’ and in doing so present to the world ‘that unique and awe-inspiring thing, the mass rising of an armed people.’ Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, pp. 116, 140, 142. 24 Kostis, Ta Kakomathimena Paidia, p. 177. 25 ‘Of all the foreign wars the Ottoman Empire fought in this period (1768-1774, 1787-1792, 1798-1801, 1806-1812, 1821-1823, 1828-1829), only two did not end in decisive and costly defeat.’ Anscombe, ‘The Balkan Revolutionary Age,’ p. 577.

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seemed intent on rebuilding its power not through reforming itself but by crushing anyone whose loyalty was judged suspect.’26 Conspicuously absent from Anscombe’s account is any mention of Spain, Italy, or Decembrists. The perspectives surveyed above do not exhaust the possibilities for interpreting the causes and nature of an event as complex as the Greek Revolution, however, they do represent some prominent vectors of enquiry and dwell upon developments, such as the formation and plans of the Etaireia, that are described in further depth below. The present analysis serves further to show the slight resemblance the Greek Revolution bears in form to the ‘composite revolutions’ of the 1830s and 1840s; these latter drawing particular strength from a far more identifiable and formally organized liberal element and urban social duress (this factor being entirely absent from the Greek case). It is also notable that if the historians cited above disagree on certain points of emphasis, all nevertheless express interest in examining the motives of those who took a leading part in the event and often display a critical attitude toward claims regarding the role of national sentiment as a guide to action. This skepticism may be warranted, and yet, the nation – at least in the general understanding of the event during the period – triumphed. This is to say that if the attitudes of the Christian notables of the Peloponnese (to name one cohort) toward the ideas exalted by the Etaireia may not be so readily charted, their participation in the revolution was crucial to the success of a venture that became closely associated with the national problem in Europe.

Composition and Aims of the Philiki Etaireia As indicated previously, the Greek Revolution stands out as one of the rare cases from the period (the Polish revolts of 1830 and 1846 represent additional examples) in which a national revolution was planned and set in motion by a group of conspirators. Credit for this outcome belongs chiefly to the Philiki Etaireia, the beginnings of which were mentioned above and the previous chapter. Briefly, the organization was established in 1814 by three merchants in the city of Odessa. The merchant background of the founders of the Etaireia and many of its members is in fact conspicuous: One celebrated analysis of the surviving sources found that nearly 54 percent of (known) members fell into this category.27 This fact looms large, again, 26 Ibid., p. 574. 27 Frangos, ‘The Philike Etairia,’ p. 87

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in one branch of Marxist historiography which presented the revolution as the work of an ascendant bourgeoisie determined on eliminating all barriers to its further accumulation of economic and political power. Further research has nevertheless revealed that many of the merchants who joined the society were men of minor means and occasionally destitute, a condition that was occasionally cited by new members themselves in the surviving ‘devotional’ letters.28 Contemporary observers were in fact often profuse in their expressions of distaste for those first drawn to the society’s ranks. Far from the ‘all-conquering’ heroes of commerce exalted in the patriotic literature of the day, the first ‘friends’ wrote George Finlay, ‘were bankrupt merchants and intriguing adventurers, possessed of some cunning and great enthusiasm.’29 The low station of the original conspirators was indeed an impediment to their early proselytizing activities; a fact that was brought home to one of the founders, Nikolaos Skouphas, in the form of a sharp rebuke to his advances from the greater-merchants (megalemboroi) of Moscow.30 As Kostis shows, the Etaireia’s early recruitment efforts met with little success and by 1816 the organization may have enlisted as few as 30 members.31 However, a subsequent decision to move the society’s base of operations to Constantinople appears, for all its hazards, to have paid off. Although the final tally of members is unknown – the surviving sources identity 1,093 ‘friends’ – the total sum, Kostis adds, may conceivably have been two or three times that number (a figure which he also found negligible).32 The range of people brought into the society was nevertheless notable and in some cases of great consequence. These included as indicated above a 28 These latter were part of an initiation ritual in which each new member was asked to make a financial contribution to the society, disguised as an act of national philanthropy. Examples of surviving documents can be found in Philimon, Dokimon Istorikon peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos and Protopsaltis, I Philiki Etaireia. 29 Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution, p. 121. The text also refers to a famous article by Traian Stoianovich which described the success of Balkan merchants in exploiting the economic opportunities of the age. See Stoianovich, ‘The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant.’ The response of merchants (regardless of their accomplishments) to the Etaireia is noteworthy and raises questions regarding a possible connection to the effects of the Greek Enlightenment. As a number of recent works attest, merchants were the object of numerous appeals from Greek scholars who sought to recruit them into their cultural rehabilitation endeavors. One notes in contrast the conspicuous absence of other elites, such as the primates, in journal editorials, the dedicatory pages of new books, or the lists of subscribers often published with the same. See, for example, Iliou, Dia tou Genous; Kostantaras, ‘Commerce, Culture, and Civilization.’ Note also the heavy emphasis placed on the activities of merchants in Korais’s previously cited Mémoire. 30 Archeio Emmanouil Xanthou, I; Xanthos, ‘Apomnimonevmata.’ 31 Kostis, Ta Kakomathemena Paidia, p. 122. 32 Ibid.

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large number of lower merchants; however, the society succeeded too in enlisting at least one greater-merchant, Panayiotis Sekeris, upon whom they depended enormously for financial aid.33 The society also had success in recruiting several Phanariots, a group of elites so-named for their settlement in the Phanar or lighthouse district of Constantinople, who had also obtained high positions in the Ottoman state – as indicated in one important measure by their appointment as princes or hospodars of the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia).34 In addition to the Ypsilantis brothers (Alexandros and Dimitris), the Etaireia also gained the support of Phanariots Nikolaos Soutsos, the reigning prince of Moldavia, and Alexandros Mavrokordatos, a key figure in the revolution and subsequent history of the Greek kingdom.35 Etaireia records also show that the society had success in recruiting a number of Orthodox clerics, some notable logioi or men of letters (many of whom were also clerics), and even individuals from other nationalities, such as the Serbian leader Karageorge and the Romanian Tudor Vladimirescu (1780-1821). These latter endeavors were representative of an effort to bring about a pan-Balkan assault on Ottoman rule somewhat reminiscent of Rigas’s earlier vision. However, the assassination of Karageorge dealt these plans a major blow.36 Etaireia agents were also unsuccessful in gaining the support of his successor, Obrenović, despite their repeated efforts to impress upon him the ‘sacred’ nature of the struggle (which they posed in surviving correspondence as a war for ‘religion and patrida’ against a ‘common enemy’), to say nothing of Ypsilantis’s false representation of himself as acting under 33 Meletopoulou, I Philiki Etaireia, p. 6. 34 The Phanariots succeeded as early as 1669 in becoming the chief diplomatic advisors to the sultans in 1669, and ‘hospodars’ (princes) of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1711 (being deemed more reliable than the local boyars). Once established in these domains, the Phanariots subsequently embarked on ambitious Hellenization projects exemplified by the foundation of academies in Bucharest and Jassy which drew into their orbit the leading luminaries of the Balkan Enlightenment. See, for example, Kitromilides, Neoellinikos Diaphotismos, p. 219. However, their treatment of the local populace was later cited often as a chief cause for the failure of the Etaireia to rally support for their cause in the Principalities. See, for example, the harsh depiction of Phanariot rule in sources such as Bălescu, ‘The Course of Revolution in the History of the Romanians,’ pp. 463-472. 35 This latter figure, who played a significant political role in the revolution and the subsequent Greek Kingdom, has nevertheless been held to represent another example of a marginalized elite who saw the creation of an independent Greek state, consciously or not, as a route to political relevance – the Mavrokordatos family being one of those recently barred from becoming hospodars by Ottoman authorities. This argument made notably by Georgios Theodoridis in Alexandros Mavrokordatos. 36 See, for example, Papadopoulos, ‘To “Schedion Genikon.”‘

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the orders of the Tsar.37 As indicated below, Vladimirescu did actually take part in the revolution, but his role in the struggle, and with it the Etaireia’s hope for a general uprising in the Principalities, was short-lived. Beginning in 1817, Etaireia agents were nevertheless successful in enlisting the support of the armed men (oplarxygoi) of the Peloponnese. This ‘military class,’ to cite a term used in period documents, was composed of both bandits (klephts) and members of the militias (armotolos) raised among the Christian populations to police them. Here indeed, in the figure of people like Kolokotronis, who, like many of his peers spent time as both klepht and armotolo, was a group that would play a critical role in mobilizing and commanding the revolutionary forces.38 The motivations which may in turn have led these men to join the Etaireia have been subject to diverse interpretations. Kostis, for example, lays stress on the recent hardships suffered by the klephts as a result of Ottoman attempts to rid the Peloponnese of banditry; an effort in keeping with the New Order reform initiatives described by Anscombe, Yaycioglu and Stathis.39 The klephts were exposed to an especially violent campaign in 1806 which forced many, including Kolokotronis, to take refuge in the Ionian Islands. From here, a considerable number were recruited (perhaps exceeding 6,000, writes Stathis) by various powers for service in the Napoleonic Wars. When these came to an end, so goes the argument, many of these now idle fighters saw the Etaireia and its aims as a means to end their exile and resume their former ways of life. 40 37 These entreaties included fantastic claims regarding Ypsilantis’s ability to secure Obrenović’s hold on power in Serbia and prevent any future challenges from the surviving members of the Karageorge family. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 38 Sources from the period tend incidentally to show that these vocational identities were far from static and it was not uncommon for klephts and their captains to trade the life of banditry for steadier pay as armotolos in the service of local primates or pashas. See Alexander, Brigandage and Public Order; Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause. Note that these factors did not hinder the klephts’s reputation as freedom fighters in later nationalist literatures. See, for example, the more sympathetic account in Vlachogiannis, Klephtes tou Moria. 39 Text refers to Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire; Stathis, ‘From Klephts and Armatoloi.’ See also Alexander, Brigandage and Public Order, pp. 89-90. For general background on social and economic challenges to the Ottoman order during the period and responses to the same, see Goffman, The Ottoman Empire; Barkey, Empire of Difference; Nagata, Studies on the Social and Economic History; Faroqhi, The Cambridge History of Turkey, III; Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, II. 40 Stathis, ‘From Klephts and Armatoloi, p. 174. Note that this account of the onslaught against the klephts does not depart significantly from Kolokotronis’s own retelling of the story. According to the latter, the enlistment of the klephts into foreign – especially Russian – service greatly disturbed the Ottomans, who feared that they might in the future turn against the sultan. Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 16. Stathis also attempts to explain the entry into the plot

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Stathis closes his essay by stressing that ‘the overwhelming majority of the klephts and armotoloi did not seek changes in the social structure through their participation in the revolution.’41 He appears to argue here against an interpretation of events that places too much emphasis on ideology or imputes to the actions of the klephts an attachment to the ideals and aims commonly attributed to the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment. The same argument is often made in the case of a final cohort of Etaireia members, namely, the Christian notables (also referred to as primates, kodjabashis, proestoi, prokritoi, etc.) of the Peloponnese. Reference is made here to a group of elites with a high degree of corporate sentiment, that is to say a consciousness of their rank as members of a standing ‘political class’ and corresponding role as ‘custodians’ over local affairs (much in the manner of the nobilities found elsewhere in Europe with a similarly elevated view of their ‘historic rights’ and as constituting a ‘political nation’); all participated in the functioning of ‘a system’ and had numerous dealings with fellow notables with whom they competed (sometimes violently) for offices, or served alongside in provincial bodies. 42 As J.C. Alexander observed, these systems were present throughout the Ottoman Balkans, however, ‘the Moreot kodjabashis […] to a greater extent than their brethren elsewhere on the Greek mainland, were powerful and aggressive partners in the Ottoman power structure of their province.’43 These same notables had shown a willingness to contemplate secession in the past, as indicated by the disastrous Orlov Revolt of 1770 – the memories of which appeared to bear heavily on the actions of those caught in the upheaval of 1821.44 More recently, the Napoleonic Wars brought new opportunities for conspiracy and overtures from the belligerent powers, notably the French, who following their conquest of Italy and occupation of the Ionian Islands, of those military men who had returned to the mainland as armotolos in the employ of Ali Pasha of Ioannina. As he argues, the sultan’s decision to move against Ali in 1820 put them at risk, too. Stathis, ‘From Klephts and Armatoloi.’ 41 Stathis, ‘From Klephts and Armatoloi,’ p. 178. 42 The corporate sentiments accruing from membership in this ‘political class,’ as the leading notables identified themselves, were further bolstered by the notion of a distinct Peloponnesian constitution and political history, represented by events such as the Venetian conquest of the province in 1684, the Turkish re-conquest in 1715, and the Orlov Revolt of 1770. For a fuller picture of the Peloponnesian administrative ‘system,’ see Gritsopoulos, Ta Orlofika, pp. 7-11; Sakellariou, I Peloponnisos kata tin devteran tourkokratian; Kyrkini-Koutoula, I Othomaniki dioikisi; Sarris, Proepanastatika Ellada. 43 Alexander, ‘Some Aspects of the Strife among the Moreot Christian Notables,’ p. 474. 44 Catherine the Great, with the help of court favorite Alexei Orlov, sought to raise a rebellion in the Peloponnese intended to coincide with a new Russian assault on Ottoman territory.

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entertained the possibility of further advances east. 45 In 1808, a leading group of notables went so far as to form a plot to detach the Peloponnese from the Ottoman Empire and convert it into a semi-autonomous French protectorate, its internal affairs to be administered by local elites. 46 This latter initiative had the further distinction of representing a secessionist bid that involved both the Christian and Muslim primates of the province. 47 The instances of primate-led conspiracy cited above were mainly focused on the fate of the Peloponnese and the preservation of the former’s powers – points which naturally raise questions about their subsequent enlistment in the Etaireia. Some see in these later actions a genuine acceptance on the part of the primates of the ideals professed by the Etaireia and specifically the desirability of creating a Greek nation-state.48 Others support the more skeptical views indicated above concerning their fears of an impending

45 The importance of the Peloponnese was recognized by many of the belligerents. ‘The conquest of Greece depends on the taking of the Morea,’ wrote, for example, an advisor to Napoleon in 1797. Savant, ‘Napoléon et la libération de la Grèce,’ IV, p. 324. French efforts included the dispatch of the Stephanopoulos brothers, Greeks from Corsica, to the Peloponnese in 1797. Their experiences were published in Stephanopoli, Voyage de Dimo et Nicolo Stephanopoli. These activities, along with British countermeasures, are discussed in Alexander, Brigandage and Public Order, pp. 60-67 46 The immediate catalyst for this venture was the appointment of Veli Pasha as Mora Valisi in 1807, a decision which proved controversial to many Christian and Muslim notables who believed that the new governor shared the centralizing designs of his father (Ali Pasha). For additional context, see Kyrkini-Koutoula, I Othomaniki dioikisi, pp. 107-114; Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte; Pylia, ‘Les Notables moréotes,’ pp. 351-352, and idem, ‘Conflits politiques,’ pp. 138-139. 47 Portrayals of the event found in: Deliyiannis, Apomnimonevmata, I, pp. 47-51, 64; Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 38; Kontakis, Apomnimonevmata, p. 23; Chrysanthopoulos, Apomnimonevmata, p. 41; Papatsonis, Apomnimonevmata, p. 40. Earlier Greek histories that cite the event include: Philimon, Dokimion Istorikon peri tis Philikis Etairias, pp. 110-112; Paparrigopoulos, Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, V, pp. 687-688. Paparrigopoulos repeats Kolokotronis’s account word for word adding that it was uncertain how many French and Turkish were sincerely committed to the scheme. Kolokotronis himself claimed that it was his ‘secret aim’ to later evict the Turkish inhabitants from the liberated areas when the opportunity presented itself. Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 38. Later Greek and French works that discuss the event include Pylia, ‘Les Notables moréotes,’ pp. 54, 352, and idem, ‘Conflits politiques,’ pp. 139-140; Kyrkini-Koutoula, I Othomaniki dioikisi, pp. 117-118; Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, p. 226; Savant, ‘Napoléon et la libération de la Grèce,’ IV, pp. 475-478. According to Savant, French officials were more cautious about the project than they may have let on and concerned about the confederates’ ability to survive an early test of strength with Ali Pasha. 48 Tzakis, ‘I Ephoria tis Philikis Etaireias,’ p. 99. In other cases the recollections of former members indicate a certain consciousness of larger events and the sense that by joining the society they were associating themselves with a new world of ideas. See, for example, the remarks of the Peloponnesian magnate Anagnostis Kontakis (1782-1854) on the circumstances surrounding his enlistment into the society. Kontakis, Apomnimonevmata, p. 28.

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Ottoman repudiation of their ‘system.’49 Charges and counter-charges regarding the national spirit of the primates came in fact to the fore in the very first decades of independence. Although there is no room here to revisit the question at length, these laid stress on the fact that the primates joined the conspiracy relatively late (1818-1820) and en masse; a phenomenon which appeared to suggest a measure of concerted action.50 For some observers, the previous enlistment of the klephts was the deciding factor: this placed pressure, in turn, on the primates who may have feared for the consequences of the former’s scheming and perhaps viewed membership in the society as a means to maintain control over an unruly body of men with whom they had often clashed in the past.51 Such charges were indeed bitterly acknowledged by the primate Kanellos Deliyiannis (1780-1862) in his memoirs, the latter waxing at length against the ‘blasphemies’ he and his peers were made to endure from those who claimed that the revolution came from the people and that ‘the primates only joined the plot when they recognized they could not stop it and consequently obtained a premier place in the Etaireia.’ ‘However, every wise Hellene knows,’ he continued, ‘that the people, the mob, is not preoccupied with or thinks of freedom, nor does it have any sense of patriotism. In all ages and epochs it is always the more distinguished and learned, those having property, wealth and other advantages, who have influence and move the people, and these always follow.’52 Once part of the conspiracy, the primates moved quickly to establish their supremacy over local affairs. In doing so, they displayed again the diplomatic acumen, and above all their preoccupation with the Peloponnese and determination to preserve their ‘system,’ characteristic of previous endeavors. Of particular importance is a June 1820 letter to this effect delivered to the (then) unknown supreme leader of the conspiracy in Russia.53 In this piece, the product of deliberations between the leading families of 49 These diverse interpretations are cogently described in Bacharas, ‘Symmachies, antimachies kai tropoi entaxis ton peloponnision prokriton sti Philiki Etaireia.’ 50 Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, p. 260. 51 See, for example, Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece, and Bacharas, ‘Symmachies, antimachies kai tropoi entaxis ton peloponnision prokriton sti Philiki Etaireia.’ 52 The primates joined the plot, Deliyiannis continued, in order to persuade men of second- and third-class wealth to become members. Deliyiannis, Apomnimonevmata, I, pp. 97, 99. Deliyiannis appears to be responding here to Nikolaos Spiliadis (1785-1867) whose own memoirs were published in 1851. See Spiliadis, Apomnimonevmata, I, pp. 10-11. A valuable review of the memoir literature which appeared after the revolution and its uses for addressing the problems cited above can be found in Nikolaou, ‘I Philiki Etaireia sta apomnimonevmata ton agoniston tou ‘21.’ 53 Philimon, Dokimion Istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias, I, p. 336

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the region, the primates asked that several of their number be designated as ‘directors’ (ephors) of the province, and their positions officially confirmed. The authors also asked that the leadership order all Etaireia members in the Peloponnese give their complete obedience to the named directors who, furthermore, would have the power to discipline any intransigence. The ‘Peloponnesians’ further requested that all funds contributed to the society from members in the region remain in the province.54 The notables received an answer in the fall of 1820 via a letter from Ypsilantis, who, in addition to identifying himself as the leader of the society, consented to the request for the appointment of local directors and the retention of funds, further decreeing that every member of the society in the Peloponnese must give the aforementioned directors respect and obedience.55 A similar dialogue took place slightly earlier between the notables of the Mani and the Etaireia, the results of which are captured in a remarkable document from 1819 which indicates, if in sometimes ambiguous prose, the relationship that would henceforth prevail among the chieftains of this region as well as their duties in the coming struggle with respect to Sparta, the society, and ‘tis genikis imon patridos Ellados [our general patrie Greece].’56 The document provides, in fact, a revealing view of the manner in which this group of Peloponnesian elites and their suitors drew upon and manipulated an older tradition of discourse to reach a common understanding of aims. The text begins: ‘We three families, as stronger and more capable than the others of our patrie Sparta, promise with this fearful oath, that from now on there will reign in our bodies one soul, one harmony, one will, and that no cause whether of internal or external origin will be able to break or weaken this holy bond.’57 With 54 Ibid., pp. 336-337 55 He was nevertheless keen to add that the primates must themselves obey the orders of the General Director and not put in motion any action on the part of the society without obtaining ‘our opinion.’ The foregoing dialogue gives notice in sum of tensions over the delineation of power that became a major source of friction between the primates and Ypsilantis’s successor Ibid., p. 340. For Photopoulos, Ypsilantis had thus ‘recognized the superiority of the primate element in the political affairs of the Peloponnese, […] however, as if fearing the undertaking of initiatives that might escape his oversight, [the letter] specified that [the society leadership] would have the last word on every initiative.’ Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, p. 278. 56 Philimon, Dokimion Istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias, I, p. 160. Note: The Mani refers to a peninsula in the southern Peloponnese that was treated as a separate administrative unit by the Ottoman state. 57 Ibid., p. 158. The desire of the chieftains to maintain the peace and balance of power between their families and disavow any bid to unilaterally profit from the venture is expressed amid several other passages in the agreement, such as where the parties declare that: ‘Whatever order the Kingdom [an apparent reference to the Russian court] or our Race presents to us, which aims

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these important issues resolved, the document turns at last to one more pressing matter: ‘Just as it wishes only upon us,’ the signatories declare near the end of the text, ‘to have the entire burden of our patrie’s good government placed, similarly every other command our Race makes of us we accept and will put into effect as an indispensable duty without any hesitation and resistance’ (emphasis added).58 Documents such as these indicate the openness of the Peloponnesian notables to the possibility of political change, but also the type of political change that they envisioned. In the words of an earlier scholar, ‘A bargain had been struck: The Maniotes would acknowledge and come to the aid of the ‘general fatherland’ in return for recognition of their traditional social and political position in the ‘particular fatherland.’59 As indicated at several points above, the Etaireia’s success in building its membership owed in some measure to the claim of having the Tsar’s support. This was patently false, however, the intervention of Russia appears to have been earnestly desired by many within the organization – an indication perhaps of growing doubts over the prospect of achieving independence without foreign aid.60 The top two candidates in the search to find a commander in chief were in fact men with close connections to the Russian court, an aim which also fit well with the desire to recruit a leader whose pedigree would further promote the society’s appeal to Greek elites. These hopes first lit on the figure of Yiannis Kapodistrias (1776-1831), a native of the Ionian Islands and enthusiastic supporter of Greek educational reform efforts who was also one of the chief diplomatic advisors to Alexander I. However, Kapodistrias did not believe that the conditions within Greece (or without) were propitious for revolution and even attempted to dissuade others from embarking on such a course.61 ‘It does not rest with men,’ he counseled the Maniote chief Petrobey, ‘to create nations through words, or official acts, or to regenerate those which have lost their ancient brilliance. Such great for the benefit of the common patrie, will be viewed and acted upon eagerly and energetically by us, provided, however, we do not dishonor any of the esteemed of our patrie, in other words the aforementioned captains, but toward the honor and virtue of all we will proceed, without any self-interest,’ Ibid., p. 159 58 Ibid. 59 Frangos, ‘The Philike Etairia,’ p. 98. 60 As Hatzopoulos argues, Etaireia strategists also sought to exploit oracular traditions which spoke of liberation via the intervention of a ‘blond race coming from the north’ – or what was widely construed as Russia. Hatzopoulos, ‘Oracular Prophecy,’ pp. 110-111. 61 Kapodistrias quit the tsar’s service after the outbreak of the revolution and was later named the insurgent nation’s first president. His tenure was cut short by assassination at the hands of the Mavromichalis family in 1831.

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events as these depend on the will of God.’62 In the event, the Phanariot Alexander Ypsilantis (1792-1828) looked to be an excellent alternative. If lacking Kapodistrias’s international reputation, he was from a distinguished family and personally knew the tsar, having served as an officer in the Napoleonic Wars and attained the rank of major-general in the Russian army. On becoming Grand Commissioner of the Etaireia in the spring of 1820, Ypsilantis and his fellow conspirators immediately began work on a strategy for revolt; their haste driven partly by the fear that the Etaireia’s growth increased the likelihood of discovery.63 The original plan called for beginning the revolution in the Peloponnese. As Thomas Gallant explains, the region’s ‘remoteness from the centre of the empire, the very high ratio of Christians to Muslim inhabitants, the number of powerful kocabasis there, and the considerable number of armed bands elevated the chances of the rebellion being there successful. It could then provide the rump of a Greek-Christian state.’64 This plan also took account of the decision of Sultan Mahmud II in the summer of 1820 to bring down Ali Pasha (1740?-1822), the ruler over a territory, centered on Ioannina, ‘that covered almost the entirety of what today is mainland Greece.’65 The Ottoman forces in the Peloponnese would thus be away on campaign to the west, presumably, when the revolution broke out. For Anscombe, the move against Ali represents a premier instance of the post New Order centralization campaign in practice, and the decisive event that turned the primates toward revolution – their thoughts being that the destruction of Ali was but the first step of a thorough revision (at their expense) of the regional power structure.66 There is nevertheless a timing issue here, as the primates joined the Etaireia before the move against Ali had materialized. Still, the Ottoman assault against Ali did bring a new governor (Hursid Pasa) on the scene with orders from Constantinople, according to Etaireia informants, to violently disabuse the local primates of any revolutionary ideas.67 With the Porte then engaged in a military struggle against Ali Pasha and suspicious of how the crisis might be exploited by other parties, many primates had indeed arrived at the conclusion that some 62 Kapodistrias was responding to an enquiry from Petrobey regarding the Tsar’s support of the plot. Zisios, Oi Mavromichaloi, p. 52. 63 Etaireia anxieties were especially elevated by the arrest of the society’s emissary to Obrenović. Papadopoulos, ‘To “Schedio Genikon,”‘ p. 52 64 Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 67. 65 Fleming, The Muslim Bonaparte, p. 7. 66 Anscombe, ‘The Balkan Revolutionary Age,’ p. 592. 67 Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 97; Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, pp. 278-279.

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form of pre-emptive violence on the part of the Ottoman state was likely.68 Tensions were further elevated in February 1821 by Hursid Pasa’s ultimatum to the major primates and clerics ordering them to Tripoli to ‘vouchsafe their good conduct,’ with those failing to report declared outlaws.69 This greatly raised the pressure on the Etaireia leadership in the region, especially the primates, who had only shortly before counseled delay, claiming that preparations for war were incomplete and that not enough was known about the dispositions of the Tsar.70 By this time, the Etaireia grand plan had also changed. Ypsilantis had now decided on an opening thrust in the Principalities as well as additional actions in Constantinople itself.71 By launching the revolution in the north he apparently hoped to take advantage of a change in hospodars beneficial to Etaireia aims, stir up the other Balkan peoples, and draw Russia into the conflict.72 The entry of Ottoman forces into the provinces, so this line of reasoning went, would violate treaty provisions between the two empires and force a Russian declaration of war. Ypsilantis was then to march off and link up with Greek forces in the south, where the revolution was to be led by his brothers. Accordingly, Ypsilantis crossed into Moldavia (from Bessarabia) on 6 March 1821 and immediately set about organizing the forces recruited in advance by Etaireia agents. He also had with him a proclamation penned for the occasion in which was reprised once more the illusion of Russian support while portraying the coming struggle as the latest chapter in an ancient contest between the forces of East and West, Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam, civilization and barbarism.73 It soon became apparent, however, that Ypsilantis’s claims to have Serbian and Russian support were false. And although Vladimirescu had gathered together a sizeable force of Romanian peasants, these appeared mainly interested in 68 Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, p. 279. 69 Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 72. Germanos recounts the ways in which some avoided doing so without drawing the suspicions of Ottoman authorities. Germanos, Apomnimonevmata, p. 23 70 Text refers to the Vostitsa meeting at the end of January 1821. Here it was also decided that more information would be sought about preparations in other parts of Greece. Trikoupis, Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos, I, p. 31; Germanos, Apomnimonevmata, p. 24. Photopoulos, Oi Kotzambasides, pp. 289-291; Nikolaou, ‘I Philiki Etaireia sta apomnimonevmata ton agoniston tou ‘21,’ pp. 291-292. 71 Tappe, ‘The 1821 Revolution,’ p. 135; Ypsilanti, Correspondance inédite, pp. 31, 71-72. 72 Text refers to the death of Alexandros Soutsos, the hospodar of Wallachia. This freed the hand of Michaiel Soutsos, the hospodar of Moldavia and a member of the Etaireia. See, for example, Kostis, Ta Kakomathimena Paidia, p. 127. 73 Ypsilantis, ‘Fight for Faith and Motherland!,’ pp. 396-402.

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obtaining concessions from their boyar and Phanariot landlords. By the time Ypsilantis reached Bucharest in April the two men found that their aims were largely incompatible, a rift driven wider by the now obvious fact that the tsar had no intention of intervening. When Vladimirescu, his forces disintegrating, was later found to be in correspondence with Ottoman officials, Ypsilantis issued orders for his execution.74 As it was, Ypsilantis did not have much more of a part to play himself in the drama. Trapped in the Principalities, he was finally compelled to meet the Ottoman army at Dragashani on 19 June 1821, where he lost most of his remaining forces.75 The revolution was therefore quickly defeated in the north, however, Etaireia hopes for a successful rising in the Peloponnese were borne out by events. As indicated above, the fighting between Ali Pasha and the Ottoman forces considerably raised the pressure on Etaireia leaders in the region, as had the new pasha’s order for the primates to report to Tripoli. Unfortunately, what happened next remains unclear. Questions persist, for example, regarding whether or not a precise date (e.g., 25 March) had been set for the revolt, and if so, how well it had been communicated to the dispersed members of the society.76 Other accounts lay stress on the significance of several seemingly random episodes of violence perpetrated by klephts against Ottoman officials and interests.77 These served in turn to provoke a defensive response from the Muslim population and a series of skirmishes between armed men from each side, the escalation of which according to Germanos, the Metropolitan of Patras – a particular site of unrest – left the leaders with no choice but to act or face divided and unprepared the inevitable Ottoman reprisals.78 To be sure, the specter of violence sharply elevated the sense of insecurity and suspicions of people already burdened with the residue of what had been a sometimes troubled coexistence. Figuring especially large were memories of the great blood-letting that had marked the outbreak and aftermath of the Orlov Revolt.79 The rapid escalation of these anxieties and corresponding 74 Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, pp. 23-26; Georgescu and Călinescu, The Romanians, pp. 102-104. 75 He himself escaped to Austria where he died (1828), though not before issuing a scathing address to his surviving troops. Archeio Emmanouil Xanthou, p. 263. 76 The 25th of March is celebrated as Independence Day in Greece in commemoration of actions attributed to Bishop Germanos, who is said to have first raised the standard of revolt. See, for example, Stavrianos, The Balkans, p. 283. For the dissenting view, see Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 72. Germanos himself makes no mention of the event in his memoirs. 77 Trikoupis, Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos, I, p. 59; Germanos, Apomnimonevmata, p. 29. 78 Trikoupis, Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos, I, p. 59. 79 ‘This war will be the most atrocious ever seen,’ wrote an Italian observer on the arrival in early 1770 of Orlov’s flotilla in the Eastern Mediterranean, ‘because the Turks will slaughter any Greeks

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‘security dilemmas,’ to borrow a phrase from a work on more recent episodes of intercommunal violence,80 was vividly portrayed by Dennis Skiotis: The people of the Peloponnese – Greeks and Turks alike – had been following the unfolding drama in Epiros with passionate interest. The feeling grew that revolution was inevitable. Toward the end of March, despite the hesitation of the primates and high clergy, tension became pronounced. All it took was the killing of a few Turks to convince them to shut themselves in their fortresses and towers. Emboldened, the mass of the Greek population rose in arms. By the beginning of April, insurrection was general in the peninsula and fast spreading to other parts of Greece.81

In the months which immediately followed, most of the Turkish strongholds in the Peloponnese were captured by rebel forces. Ottoman commanders subsequently faced the challenge of re-conquering these territories, even as the war against Ali Pasha continued. Their task was further complicated by the onset of a violent internal struggle between the sultan and the janissaries (the latter finally crushed in 1826), as well as the inadequacy of the empire’s naval forces. This latter factor meant that Ottoman commanders would have to send their armies on long marches over terrain custom made for the talents of the bandit and militia leaders who opposed them. Despite therefore the rebels’ early gains, the conflict shortly settled into a war of attrition. As such, the advantage swung increasingly to the side of the empire, with Greek hopes coming more and more to rest on the intervention of friendly powers.82

The European Cultural and Political Response In many cases, the outbreak of fighting was accompanied by the massacre of civilians, with the onslaught against the Muslim inhabitants of the Principalities and Peloponnese being matched by the slaughter of Greeks in Constantinople (the Orthodox Patriarch Grigorios V numbering among they capture, and no quarter will be given by Greeks or Muscovites to Turks or Jews.’ Such fears proved to be well founded. Cited in Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, p. 41. For the influence of these events on the thought of subsequent actors, see Makriyiannis, Apomnimonevmata, p. 23; Trikoupis, Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos, I, p. 54. 80 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds. 81 Skiotis, ‘The Greek Revolution,’ p. 99. The rapid escalation in tensions is described also in Germanos, Apomnimonevmata, pp. 88-91. 82 A concise military history of the war can be found in Dakin, The Greek Struggle.

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the victims), Chios and Thessaloniki.83 This violence, as one historian has noted, significantly altered the cultural geography of the region, with Greeks being ‘uprooted from provinces where insurgency was crushed and Turks uprooted where it succeeded.’84 The war was thus to have the dubious distinction of initiating ‘a process of ethnic disentangling which continued intermittently but inexorably in the Balkans and Near East over a century.’85 Although the slaughter of civilian populations, Christian and Muslim alike, aroused outrage from outside observers, European and American sympathies fell heavily on the side of the rebel cause.86 As an expression of affection for things Greek, older notions of ‘Philhellenism’ surely had a role in this outcome, although these sentiments were not always synonymous with sympathy for the present-day inhabitants of Athens or Sparta. The extravagant praise of ancient Greece served in fact to bring into sharper relief the rude state of modern Greek life, an impression greatly reinforced by direct contact with the lands that had inspired so many dreamy idylls.87 Greece’s plight was indeed a vivid demonstration of the power of those regressive forces that threatened the life of all civilizations – a concept that looms in the thought of Montesquieu and the French Ideologues as well as the productions of many Western artists who replayed in work after work the absorbing spectacle of peasants milling aloofly among the decaying yet still stupendous relics of antiquity.88 Still, for some, such a sight inspired a desire to see the Greeks rehabilitated, if only to bolster their own beliefs, so passionately held, of what Greece was or should be.89 Such thoughts regarding the rehabilitation of Greece were typically directed toward cultural ends, however, they could sometimes have political connotations.90 Despite, for example, its ruinous consequences, the Orlov 83 Mazower, Salonica, pp. 125-132. Among many contemporary accounts, see Finlay, A History of Greece, VI, pp. 119-121, 161-165, 180-181. 84 Petropulos, Hellenism, p. 32. 85 Ibid. 86 Various scholars have indeed represented the conflict as milestone in the history of humanitarian intervention. See, for example, Bass, Freedom’s Battle; Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention; Heraclides and Dialla. Humanitarian Intervention; Rodogno, Against Massacre; Weitz, ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System.’ 87 Indeed, ‘Is this the renowned Athens?’ one Western traveler characteristically shrugged after a long and perilous journey. Charlemont, The Travels of Lord Charlemont, p. 134. 88 See, for example, Kostantaras, Infamy and Revolt, pp. 16-17 89 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, pp. 78, 94; Yakovaki, Evropi meso Elladas. 90 As Locke, to cite one example, declared in the Second Treatise, ‘who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have a chance to do it?’ Locke, Second

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Revolt appears to have had an especially important effect of this kind on Western opinion, as reflected in one measure by Voltaire’s pleas to the tsarina as the peace negotiations unfolded (e.g., ‘If you make peace I’m sure it will be very glorious. […] But what will become of my poor Greeks?’).91 One scholar has even called the Orlov Revolt ‘the crystallizing event in the emergence of philhellenism as a significant literary movement.’92 Figures like the aforementioned Petrobey also clearly recognized the value of evoking the concept of ‘Mother Hellas’ in their representations of the subsequent revolution to the outside world, as illustrated in his address ‘To the European courts.’ The ‘Ottoman tyranny,’ Petrobey declared, had left ‘the unfortunate Peloponnesian Graikous’ with nothing but a voice to express their groans. With this they asked ‘for the aid of all the refined European races. […] To speak most directly, our mother Hellas, from whom you too were enlightened, demands your philanthropic assistance, and funds, and arms, and counsels.’93 Petrobey’s hopes were answered in the form of a steady flow of volunteers to the theater of combat, if not all were driven by the same motives. As Woodhouse, for example, observed, this latest iteration of philhellenism was an ‘international movement of protest in which nationalism, religion, radicalism and commercial greed all played a part, as well as romantic sentiment and pure heroism.’94 Some number of these sentiments were present in arguably the most famous philhellene of them all, Lord Byron, who traveled to Missolonghi, in western Greece, in January 1824 intent on leading the Greeks to victory.95 And yet for all of Byron’s glowing public rhetoric on behalf of the insurgents and their cause, his unpublished writings struck a jarringly different tone: ‘I know this nation by long and attentive experience,’ he reported to a friend, ‘while in Europe they judge it by inspiration. The Greeks are perhaps the most depraved and degraded people under the sun, uniting to their original vices both those of their oppressors, and those inherent in slaves.’96 The challenge of reconciling the public expressions Treatise, p. 98. The circulation of this work amongst Greek readers is discussed in Kitromilides, ‘John Locke and the Greek Intellectual Tradition.’ 91 Voltaire, Correspondance, LXXVI, pp. 46-47. 92 Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow, p. 16. 93 Zisios, Oi Mavromichaloi, pp. 64-65. 94 Woodhouse, The Philhellenes, p. 9. There is no space here to discuss for the vast number of primary and secondary works, in several languages, dealing with the subject of philhellenism during the Greek War of Independence. Useful bibliographies of the subject may be found in Augustinos, French Odysseys; Barau, La cause des Grecs; Mazurel, Vertiges de la guerre; Tolias, ‘The Resilience of Philhellenism.’ 95 For additional background, see Beaton, Byron’s War. 96 Cited in Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow, p. 74.

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of the poet with the ‘searching criticism’ found in his letters perhaps turns on the larger meaning which Byron and other frustrated Restoration-era liberals attached to the Greek cause: For all his misgivings about the degraded Greeks, their revolution provided a singular opportunity to ‘strike a blow’ against tyranny in all its guises.97 If the enthusiasm shown for the Greek Revolution by Europe’s artists and poets was not matched by its statesmen, it was nevertheless clear to rebel leaders that their hopes rested increasingly on making progress toward this end. Success in gaining the recognition of foreign powers depended in turn on the ability to form a functioning government. This goal was never fully attained. Leadership over the revolt was first assumed by the primates, who established regional ‘senates’ in southern, western and eastern Greece. However, the primates came into conflict with Dimitrios Ypsilantis who arrived upon the scene in June with the claim of being the Etaireia chief and thus the supreme leader of the enterprise.98 Primate hostility toward Ypsilantis was acute, however, he found strong allies among the klephts, who nevertheless became divided themselves along regional lines (Rumely and the Peloponnese). These frictions generated two rounds of civil war over the years 1824-1825.99 Despite these serious internal conflicts, the revolution was not as severely impeded at the start by the kind of socio-political divisions that inhibited in Hobsbawm’s words ‘a genuine people’s insurrection’ elsewhere and even appears to have attained the properties of a mass movement.100 One of the most striking differences, for example, between the Greek and Polish cases was the willingness of Greek landowners to lead the peasantry into revolt; a phenomenon that might be attributed to the ‘political immaturity’ of the latter.101 Documents from the time period in fact indicate the confidence felt by 97 Ibid. Examples of how the Greek cause was implicated in internal French political debates can be found in works such as, Fraser, ‘Uncivil Alliances.’ 98 This was followed by the convening of the Epidavros Constitutional Assembly of December 1821-January 1822, which was proposed by Ypsilantis ‘in order to obtain national recognition of a unitary state with a supreme leader.’ The primates came nevertheless to acquire a dominant position in the proceedings. Petropulos, Politics and Statecraft, p. 20 99 The story of the diverse power struggles of these years is succinctly and ably told by Koliopoulos and Veremis in Greece, pp. 13-43. 100 Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, pp. 116. See also Lekas, ‘The Greek War of Independence.’ 101 Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 126. Note that Hobsbawm uses the term in a somewhat different way: He refers, for example, to the absence of the peasantry from such struggles, which he marks in turn as a reflection of their immunity to the ideas and claims of the nationalists (as well as the reluctance on the part of elites to make the concessions necessary to motivate them).

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the Greek primates and captains in their power to both mobilize and maintain control over the masses.102 The Polish ‘noble nation’ was wary in contrast of involving the lower classes in such ventures for fear of the political concessions that would have to be extended in return (see Chapter 6). This politicization of gentry and non-noble relations and the development of a strong corporate mentality among the Polish szlachta, who believed themselves to comprise a distinct ‘nation,’ owed partly to the existence of a Polish state in which interests of this kind could develop and obtain a formal hearing, as illustrated most famously in the debates over the Constitution of 3 May 1791. There was furthermore little evidence of a Jacobin element in Greece or the existence of a sharp division between town and country; factors that appeared to hinder the development of a united movement in Italy.103 The position of the Catholic Church also stands out as an obstacle in the Italian case, or at least the source of some controversy (see Chapters 6 and 7). However, if Orthodox officials in Constantinople condemned the Greek revolt, an entirely different reaction occurred at the local level, where large numbers of clerics participated directly in the struggle.104 The fact that the combatants were also starkly separated along Christian-Muslim lines was also notable in the Greek case and served to reinforce (or at least was often wielded in this manner) the social and political antipathies of the belligerents; something which could not be said again of the Italian national movement whose enemies, whether local or foreign, were nevertheless all Christian and indeed mainly Catholic. One hastens, however, to add that a shared creed was by no means a barrier to future conflict within the Balkans, as demonstrated later in the struggle between Orthodox Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Romanians over the future of Macedonia. Finally, 102 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, pp. 15-17. This assumed embodiment of the popular will in the figure of the territorial elite is conveyed in Deliyiannis’s ridicule of the leadership capacities and qualifications of Dimitrios Ypsilantis: ‘Not having a patrida,’ wrote Deliyiannis of his rival, ‘he had thus not a single soldier to follow him into war.’ Deliyiannis, Apomnimonevmata, II, p. 13. Gallant further suggests that the severe hardships suffered by the peasantry, especially on account of steep rises in taxation, may have been critical factor in inducing them to participate in the revolution. Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 65. 103 Greek leaders strove at least to ensure that the revolution could not be characterized on these grounds. See, for example, Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, p. 23. Kolokotronis’s address to a band of bellicose soldiers (the latter intent on murdering a gathering of primates for their treatment of Dimitrios Ypsilantis) is especially notable: The Europeans have taken notice of our struggle, declared Kolokotronis, because they heard that it was a rising of the ‘Greeks against the Turks’ in the cause of liberty, ‘but if we kill the primates the kings will say that we did not rise up for freedom and that we are bad men and carbonari and they’ll help the Turks and we’ll wear the yoke more heavily than ever before.’ Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 75. 104 See, for example, Gallant, Experiencing Dominion, pp. 187-189.

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such comparisons must also take into account the degree to which the ‘mass’ action of 1821 was motivated by self-preservation as the past tended to teach that revolution, even if perpetrated by a few, had consequences for all. Unlike the Polish revolts against Russian authority described below, the present struggle was in many respects an intra-communal one in which few had the luxury of remaining neutral.105 Indeed, ‘danger was the driving force, the leader, and salvation,’ wrote one memoirist, ‘for the people had no other object but how to save themselves.’106 The critical test for the revolution came finally from the forces of the sultan’s Egyptian vassal, Mohammed Ali, who had been promised Crete and the Peloponnese if successful in bringing the war to a close. Under the capable leadership of Ali’s son, Ibrahim, a base of operations was established in February 1825 at the bay of Navarino (western Peloponnese) from which Ottoman forces marched inland. Concern by this time over how their rivals might ultimately seek to profit from the crisis had stirred the Great Powers into talks. These led to the Treaty of London of July 1827 in which the allied powers (Britain, Russia, Prussia, France and Austria) called for an immediate end to the fighting, further stipulating that Greece would become a tribute-paying province of the Ottoman Empire. In order to enforce the treaty, an allied fleet gathered outside Navarino in the autumn of 1827. This having failed to illicit the desired response from Ibrahim, the allied admirals eventually sailed into the bay itself and anchored their ships directly across from the Ottoman force; a battle shortly ensued which resulted in the complete destruction of the Egyptian fleet. The sultan’s position was made worse in April of 1828 when war broke out with Russia over the presence of Ottoman troops in the Principalities. This conflict was concluded in September of 1829 with the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople in which the sultan recognized the provisions of the earlier Treaty of London. The allies had meanwhile given more thought to the future of Greece and now believed that it would best be governed as an independent kingdom under the rule of a foreign prince with no connection to the internal factions.107 105 Kolokotronis, for one, declared that he would indeed ‘bring fire to any village that failed to heed the voice of the patrida.’ Kolokotronis, Diigisis Symvanton, p. 55. 106 Kontakis, Apomnimonevmata, p. 33. These fears did appear to quell thoughts of rebellion in some parts of the region as indicated in the accounts of emissaries from the Peloponnese who found the population in the Aegean Islands traumatized by what had happened to the inhabitants of Chios. See Metaxas, Apomnimonevmata, pp. 50-51. 107 The new arrangement also reduced British fears concerning the potential increase of Russian influence over Greece (were it to remain a province of the Ottoman Empire). Jelavich, History of the Balkans, I, p. 228.

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Outcomes By all accounts, the conflict’s effect on the lands encompassed within the newly created Greek Kingdom was catastrophic, with some 662 villages, two-thirds of olive trees and mills, and 90 percent of pre-war livestock destroyed.108 In addition to wreaking havoc upon towns, flocks and fields, ten years of war and civil war had left the new state engorged with refugees. The person selected to tackle these problems was the seventeen-year-old prince Otto of Bavaria (r. 1833-1862); a choice partly owing to the stipulation that the king not come from one of the ‘protecting powers.’109 Because of his age, Otto was accompanied to Greece by a trio of Bavarian regents in whose hands virtually all power was entrusted. Frictions between ruler and ruled soon emerged concerning the level of native influence in matters of governance as well as the military, where the old captains chafed under the command of Bavarian officers. There was also the issue of the king’s Catholicism: Although Otto agreed to baptize his son and successor in the Orthodox faith, he and his wife were childless, raising the prospect of one of the king’s devoutly Catholic brothers inheriting the throne. These factors played a significant role in the (second) coup which removed Otto from power in 1862. It is also often said that the kingdom contained only a third of the ‘Greek’ inhabitants of the eastern Mediterranean, although such remarks, as modern scholars point out, make claims on the identities of people which are far from certifiable.110 What was one to make furthermore of the Karamanlides, a group of people from northeastern Anatolia who were Greek Orthodox in religion (and thus subject in 1923 to removal) but Turkish in speech – a language nevertheless which they rendered in Greek script?111 The fate of these communities became the object nevertheless of the Megali Idea or ‘Great Idea,’ a term which signified a bid to expand the kingdom’s frontiers until all the members of the nation had been freed from alien rule.112 Great demands and hardships followed from endeavors of this kind. And yet, for all its risks, irredentism proved the one policy of Otto’s (and his successors) 108 Gallant, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, p. 117. See also McGrew, Land and Revolution. 109 The title was actually extended f irst to Prince Leopold of Saxony, who, after an initial acceptance, rejected the offer. Another was soon forthcoming in the form of the crown of the newly created Kingdom of Belgium (see Chapter 6). 110 See, for example, Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, p. 227. 111 See Clogg, ‘A Millet within a Millet,’ for additional context. 112 This term is especially associated with the f igure of Ioannis Kolettis (1773-1847). For an English translation of his remarks on the subject, see Kolettis, ‘On This Great Idea,’ pp. 244-248.

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that met with broad popular support – provided, of course, that the regime in power succeeded in delivering on its claims. The remarkable fact is that for all the rhetoric expended on liberating ‘the nation’ in insurgent Greece, no clear picture emerged of its geographical disposition. In this, the sources of the Etaireia did not depart in any significant way from the kind of vague rumination on the territorial outlines of the Greek world found earlier in the texts of the Diaphotismos.113 The inconclusive or ambiguous nature of such thought was perhaps a reflection of the dispersion of Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians throughout the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean; a factor which may have inhibited the imagining of a perfectly homogeneous nation-state. This mingling of ethnic and confessional communities was indeed documented by Balkan authors themselves, as indicated in a Greek work on the geography of Albania from the first decade of the nineteenth century. In the course of their travels the authors thus found that some villages contain ‘Albanians, the majority of whom are Turks, and a few Christians’; others are divided among ‘Turkish Albano-Bulgarians’ and ‘Christian Bulgarians’; and still others are composed of ‘Christian Albano-Vlachs.’ Ioannina meanwhile contained ‘nearly 3000 houses; 1700 Romaika, 1000 Turkish, and 300 Jewish.’ In a neighboring province ‘all the higher villages are composed of Greek (Graikous) Christians, except two, and speak Greek (Graikika) […] the others speak the Albanian dialect, and the Albanians are both Turk and Christian.’114 This mingling of confessional and linguistic communities extended even to the lands contained within the narrow confines of the original kingdom; an issue that surfaced in both revolutionary and independence-era constitutional debates over matters of citizenship.115 Greece was not unique in this regard: The same problem presented itself in varying degrees to all the aspiring nations and nation-builders of the Balkans. Not only were their peoples similarly dispersed, but the most 113 These representations of an ideal Greece could often take grandiose form. Note, for example, the sprawling entity portrayed by Konstantas and Philippidis in Geographia Neoteriki, p. 38. 114 These divisions notwithstanding, the text also notes occasions of cultural interaction and syncretism, as indicated in the description of a monastery near Moschopolis (now the Albanian city of Voskopojë) that was ‘held in esteem by both Turks and Christians; here go the weak of both ethnie for health.’ Psalidas and Thesprotos, Geographia Alvanias, pp. 24-30, 53, 65. 115 These extended full citizenship to Orthodox Christians, but professed toleration for Jews, Muslims and Catholics. See, for example, Svolos, Ta Ellinika Syntagmata. Korais’s comments on these endeavors and proposals for a gradual extension of citizenship to non-Orthodox inhabitants are discussed in Korais, Semeioseis Eis to Prosorinon Politevma. For debates and developments in this vein during the independence era, see Doxiadis, ‘A Place in the Nation.’

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highly valued territorial prizes – the few urban districts of the region – were the most ethnically diverse. These, after all, contained the vital wealth generating forces so essential to an ambitious yet economically fragile young state; one otherwise encumbered, as they all were, with masses of peasants engaged in subsistence agriculture. The challenge to Ottoman power in the Balkans presaged therefore a prolonged contest among the awakening nations over the territorial spoils, one result of which, in the words of Lord Curzon, was a momentous ‘unmixing of peoples’ – a process carried forward by a relentless cycle of war and revisionism of which the experience of Bulgaria, whose borders expanded and contracted eight times from 1878 to 1945, is illustrative.116 The struggle was particularly acute in the sprawling Ottoman province of Macedonia, its ethnically diverse inhabitants subject to the incursions of rival Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian bands, each seeking to persuade the population of its connection to one nation or the other.117 In summary, most Balkan nationalisms embraced territorial objectives that if achieved would have resulted in the creation of ethnically heterogeneous states.118 Initially at least, but perhaps not permanently: for behind the guerilla bands and armies would come the churchmen, gendarmes and schoolmasters; years would pass, new generations would replace the old, and in time all the souls once lost to Hellenism, but still Hellenes (or Bulgarians or Serbs), would be fully joined to the nation once more. One gains a foreshadowing of the assumptions that lay behind such policies in an earlier letter of the Serb Obrenović: ‘Law and religion can change,’ he wrote in 1783, ‘but kinship or language can never change. A Bosnian or a Herzegovinian Turk is a Turk by law, but as far as language and kinship are concerned, whatever his great grandfathers were, so will the last of his descendants be: Bosnians and Herzegovinians until God decrees the end of the world.’ ‘They are called Turks while the Turks rule that land,’ he continued, but ‘when the real Turks return to their homeland where they came from, the Bosnians will remain Bosnians, and will be like their ancestors were.’119

116 Text refers to famous statement attributed to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon (1859-1925) in response to events accompanying the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. 117 This ‘national’ proselytizing was often attempted on religious grounds. That is to say that the contending parties claimed that they were striving to save Orthodoxy from the heresies of their national adversaries. See, for example, Livanios, ‘“Conquering the Souls.”’ 118 Se for example, Garašanin, ‘The Draft,’ p. 238. 119 Obradović, ‘Letter to Haralampije,’ p. 222.

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In terms finally of its larger implications and influence on European history, the Greek Revolution is often counted as a milestone in the intensification of the diplomatic struggle over the ‘Eastern Question.’120 Also of great significance was its influence on notions of sovereignty, and in ways that were congruent with the claims of many contemporary nationalists. As Weitz notes of the London Protocol of 1830: ‘By establishing the territorial and political contours of independent Greece, it marked the first time that the powers clearly linked a specific population and sovereignty – that is, the Greek state considered as representative of the Greek people.’121 Perhaps less tangible but equally portentous responses to the conflict were visible in the intellectual and cultural sphere. To judge from the works of Delacroix, the brutality of the struggle, which, if occasionally sensationalized was by no means a fiction, loomed especially large in the European mind. The war was in fact fought on terms that were shocking to foreign observers, eliciting images of a merciless, primordial world where one people supplanted another in a perpetual cycle of violence and conquest. For some, these images furnished modern observers with a looking glass into Europe’s own barbaric past; for others, they appeared to stimulate reassessments of still more recent historical phenomena. These latter sentiments found notable expression in the writings of Augustin Thierry (1795-1856), the eminent French historian who was moved by the struggle to dramatically revise the positions he had taken on certain great events in earlier works.122 Writing now ‘under the influence of the Greek war of independence,’ Thierry believed that a racial or national element lay behind every social conflict; indeed, those composing the ‘superior and inferior classes’ of the present day were in reality the descendants of ‘the conquering and enslaved peoples from an earlier era.’123 The primary force in French history, including the great cataclysm of 1789, was thus an enduring ‘racial antagonism’ between Franks and Gauls. He carried this view into his study of England, whose history he now reimagined as ‘a racial struggle between Anglo-Saxons and Normans […] between conquerors and conquered.’124 And yet, the Greek Revolution showed that not all ‘vanquished nations’ were damned to extinction, for ‘a great people’ cannot be held 120 For an introduction to the role of the Greek Revolution in the onset of the Eastern Question, see Frary and Kozelsky, Russian-Ottoman Borderlands. 121 Weitz, ‘From the Vienna to the Paris System,’ p. 1317. 122 Note: The terms race and nation are used synonymously in Thierry’s works. See Seliger, ‘Race-Thinking during the Restoration,’ p. 281. 123 Thierry, Histoire de la conquête, I, p. 6. 124 Tollebeek, ‘Historical Representation,’ p. 343.

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eternally by the ‘law of force.’125 To be sure, ‘the resurrection of the Greek nation proves,’ he continued, in language typical of nationalist discourse from both that era and after, ‘that we are strangely mistaken in taking the history of kings or even conquering peoples for that of the whole country over which they dominate. Patriotic regret still lives in the depths of hearts long after there is no longer any hope of raising the ancient patrie.’126

125 Thierry, Histoire de la conquête, I, p. 11. 126 Ibid.

6. Revolutions of 1830 Abstract The present chapter turns to the revolutions of 1830. Although events in France, Germany, and Italy are taken into account, the Belgian and Polish cases are treated with greatest depth. In doing so, the chapter explores the diverse sources of discontent – national, constitutional, and urban social distress – evoked in the concept of composite revolution. The chapter also describes significant developments in the evolution of nationalist thought during the period. Special attention is given to the productions of Polish authors who, in the aftermath of the 1830 revolutions, made particularly striking contributions to the elaboration of such doctrines. Keywords: Belgian Revolution, Polish Revolution, The Social Question, Flemings, Walloons

It is not Belgium which I understand to be battling here, it is Revolution, which, from closer and closer, and quicker than anyone would believe, threatens even us, if we are seen trembling before it.1

The present chapter examines the revolutions that broke out in the second decade of the Restoration. As indicated by the comments of Tsar Nicholas I above, the major sites of conflict in this latest wave of unrest included Belgium, France, Switzerland, parts of Italy and Germany, and finally Poland. As might be expected, such an array of cases, virtually all of which have been portrayed as having a ‘composite nature,’ presents problems of typology and interpretation not unlike those encountered in the previous chapter.2 On one hand, the liberal dimension of these revolutions was prominent, in the sense that many were preceded by clashes of interest in which demands for 1 2

Remarks of Tsar Nicholas I cited in Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, p. 61. Baranska, ‘Pologne: une insurrection sans révolution?,’ p. 151.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch06

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civil liberties and representation were well-sounded and employed later as the rallying point for popular mobilization. Historiographical perspectives also place emphasis on the role of social grievances connected with the advance of the industrial revolution – a factor of still greater importance in appraisals of 1848.3 Finally, the revolutions of these years provide many new examples of how by-now familiar doctrines regarding the status and rights of nations figured into contemporary power struggles. As in the case of the revolutions of 1820, the elasticity of a concept like national sovereignty was of such an order that it could be implicated in a wide range of conflicts – from those of an internal constitutional nature, as in the case of France (and previously Spain) – to others, as in Belgium and Poland, that are more commonly associated with bids for secession and autonomy. Given the many cases cited above, the question arises concerning which to treat in greater depth in the space available. In keeping with the general aim of the volume, emphasis is accordingly placed on the Belgian and Polish Revolutions given their importance in illuminating and arguably elevating the status of the continental-wide dialogue on the nature of the ‘national problem.’ The Belgian case, which serves as an excellent vehicle for considering the historiographical problems posed by the subject matter, holds additional interest as it has arguably attracted less attention than other revolutions of the period. Sources from the event provide nevertheless a valuable demonstration of how local demands for constitutional change and later independence were frequently made on the grounds that the people in question constituted a nation and were deserving of all rights accruing from that fact. In doing so, these works allude to the significance of nation-ness as a basis of sovereignty or at least as a factor that had some bearing on the attitudes of outside parties. ‘The Belgians have a nationality,’ wrote, for example, an editor of the Courrier des Pays-Bas in the days before the outbreak of the revolution, ‘which one can only claim to be unaware of if one denies the long testimony of their history and one does not take into account the numerous distinctions of character that they still display today.’ Although it was true, the author conceded that the Belgians were often ruled by outside powers, ‘this is not a reason to deny their nationality, but rather to proclaim it even more strongly and more vivaciously, since the foreign protector never managed to absorb it and make it lose itself in this foreign nationality.’4 3 For Hobsbawm, 1830 ‘marks […] the emergence of the working class as an independent and self-conscious force in politics.’ Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 111. 4 Cited in Harsin, Essai sur l’opinion publique en Belgique, p. 72. This piece originally appeared in the Courrier des Pays-Bas, 10 August 1830.

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The Belgian cause found some support for such claims abroad, as indicated by the remarks of the Irish MP and ‘Liberator’ Daniel O’Connell, who was quick to characterize the conflict as no mere ‘civil war’ but ‘a war between nations.’5 However, the sentiments expressed in the Courrier des Pays-Bas article, among many other sources, display too the sensitivity of Belgian patriots to the many skeptical pronouncements of foreign observers, especially those in positions of power, who felt otherwise. For Talleyrand, to cite one prominent example, the events of 1830 had indeed done little to alter his previous view of the national pedigree of the people in question or, specifically, the extent to which they could be categorized as anything other than ‘Flemings and Walloons.’6 ‘The Belgians will not last!’ he famously declared in 1832. ‘Look, it’s not a nation, two hundred protocols will never make a nation. This Belgium will never be a country; it cannot hold.’7 In the event, independence did not relieve the Belgians of the burden of justifying their claims to nationhood, and thus, in the words of Jo Tollebeek, their ‘right to exist.’8 This challenge was addressed in part through the production of national histories, works which provide an important illustration in turn of ideas and sentiments expressed often by intellectuals in other parts of Europe, such as Greece, who also sought to establish and defend their ‘national’ credentials before a doubting world. However, it was not only in newly independent or aspiring nations that these historiographical impulses were present. Greek, Belgian, and Polish scholars, among many others, were to be sure modeling their efforts on the famous, multivolume histories of Western authors. Guizot and Thierry’s works on France were particularly influential in this regard as prototypes for the young Paparrigopoulos, much 5 Cited in Lane, ‘Daniel O’Connell and the Belgian Question,’ p. 274. 6 ‘There are no Belgians; there are Walloons and Flemings,’ Talleyrand had declared still earlier in 1815. Cited in De Lannoy, ‘L’Idée favorite de Talleyrand,’ p. 441. 7 ‘Your Belgians are weak and false,’ he scoffed at one point in the proceedings. A fellow diplomat concurred, ‘Belgium has never been an independent nation. […] Moreover, the Belgians have aroused little interest in their cause: they are certainly ungrateful provocateurs and fight badly.’ Cited in De Lannoy, ‘L’Idée favorite de Talleyrand,’ pp. 444, 452-453. For additional background, see also Lacour-Gayet, Talleyrand. ‘Between France and the Rhine,’ wrote finally Stengers, foreign observers tended only to see, ‘following the phrase of Devaux, “a territory without nationality, a sort of wasteland without a proper denomination, without fixed ownership, belonging to whoever can take it, passing by for centuries from one conqueror to another.” “The Belgians!” exclaims Guizot, “we call them a people! that is, they play the people! [c’est-à-dire qu’ils jouent au people].” Stengers, ‘Sentiment national,’ pp. 66-67. 8 Tollebeek, ‘Historical Representation,’ p. 334. Tollebeek refers to works of Gerlache (see below), and his contemporaries Henri Moke and Theodore Juste. As the authors of one recent work similarly attest, ‘The image of a particularly “artificial” nation […] haunted Belgians for many years.’ Degn et al., ‘The Construction and Deconstruction of Nation and Identity,’ p. 134.

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as they were for his Belgian contemporary Jean-Baptiste Nothomb.9 The production of national histories by native authors was thus symbolic of the quest (observed previously in the lexicographical sphere) to attain cultural parity with the advanced nations of the continent. But they also served, according to some, as a veritable demonstration of national consciousness; the possession of such histories being deemed critical to distinguish the nation in question from those many dormant, still slumbering or prétendue nations, to recall a phrase of Buffon’s, whose histories had to be written for them. ‘They tell us that we are not a nation,’ declared, for example, Paparrigopoulos to his readers: Very well, ‘let’s show them with history in our hand, that for all time we have existed as a nation, strong, vital, unbowed […] and that we know very well who we are, where we came from and where we are going.’10 These points highlight another major aim of the volume, which is to track significant developments in the evolution of nationalist thought over the period. In addition, therefore, to the Belgian, French and Greek works cited above, attention is given to the writings of Polish authors who, in the aftermath of the 1830 revolutions, made particularly striking contributions to the extension of such doctrines. To be sure, one finds a continuity of themes and imagery from earlier times. The Italian dissident Silvio Pellico’s enumeration, for example, of the elements which comprised a nation would have been familiar to readers of eighteenth-century dictionaries and encyclopedias.11 Similarly, Louis de Potter’s declaration on the eve of the Belgian Revolution that ‘We must live as free men […] before the Supreme Power, which is the Nation, before its Will, which is the Law!,’ echoes those of an earlier generation of political dissidents and reformers.12 Benjamin Disraeli reprised finally a host of other by now familiar themes in the course of (one of many) denunciations of the Whigs. ‘A people is a species,’ wrote 9 Guizot’s pronouncements concerning the benefits to be gained by a people who ‘knew their own history’ were brandished on the title page of Paparrigopoulos’s multivolume Istoria. Text refers especially to Guizot, Histoire de la civilisation en France. 10 Cited in Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, p. 151. 11 Arrested for being a Carbonaro in 1820, Pellico went on to publish My Prisons (1832) and The Duties of Men (1834). In the latter, he shared his vision for ‘a liberal patriotism’ in which love for one’s nation and the world were not mutually exclusive. A ‘patrie’ is to be distinguished meanwhile from a ‘nation’ (as Switzerland is to be distinguished from Italy), as he goes on to explain: ‘Each nation is that aggregation of men of the same religion, the same laws, the same manners, the same language, the same origin, the same glory, the same complaints and the same hopes, all these elements finally, or only most of these elements, united by a special sympathy.’ Pellico, Mes prisons, pp. 389-390. 12 Cited in Kohn, ‘Nationalism in the Low Countries,’ p. 165.

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the latter, while ‘a civilized community is a nation,’ an entity which he went on to further describe as follows: Now a nation is a work of art and a work of time. A nation is gradually created by a variety of influences – the influence of original organisation, of climate, soil, religion, laws, customs, manners, extraordinary accidents and incidents in its history, and the individual character of its illustrious citizens. These influences create the nation – these form the national mind, and produce in the course of centuries a high degree of civilisation. If you destroy the political institutions which these influences have called into being […] you destroy the nation.13

Alongside conventional expressions of this kind there nevertheless appeared others that displayed a generous admixture of romantic and idealist themes, as well as a growing stress on matters of national essence, mission and purpose. As Jean-Claude Caron and Michel Vernus observed, ‘Germans, French, Italians, all imagined a Europe in which their nation would have an enlightening mission, a superior role, a predestination to command. All based their national identity on the concept of an “elected nation” or a chosen nation.’14 These themes were especially prevalent in works of Polish authors, who displayed a marked taste as well for images of national death and salvation.15

Anatomy of a Failed State: The United Kingdom of the Netherlands The unification of Belgium and Holland, known officially in the diplomatic proceedings as an ‘amalgam,’ was arranged by the European powers at 13 ‘The nation in a state of anarchy and dissolution,’ he continued, ‘then becomes a people; and after experiencing all the consequent misery, like a company of bees spoiled of their queen and rifled of their hive, they set to again and establish themselves into a society.’ Disraeli, Whigs and Whiggism, p. 343. This work was first published in 1836. 14 Caron and Vernus, L’Europe au 19e siècle, p. 11. Such themes expressed, for example, in the works of Guizot and Michelet’s, the latter depicting France in his Histoire de la Révolution française as ‘the common child of nations. In her all feel united, all associate themselves with her future destiny. […] There is not one between them, who see her without crying. How Italy was crying! Poland! and Ireland! (Ah! sisters, remember this day!) […] Every oppressed nation forgetting its slavery at the spectacle of this young freedom, said to him: “I am free in you!”’ Michelet, Histoire de la Révolution française, II, p. 181. 15 As indicated in Chapter 7, similar images also found favor with Hungarian authors.

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Vienna in 1815. In doing so, they appeared to lay primary stress on the need to ‘form stronger protective barriers around France.’16 There were also the interests of the Dutch to consider, the British having confiscated several of that country’s colonies during the Napoleonic Wars (Holland being allied for a time to France). Belgium, or, more precisely the Austrian Netherlands, might be awarded in this case to the Dutch as compensation for these losses, creating in the process a state large enough to play a role in containing France.17 Whatever speculation was given to Belgium’s standing as a nation or the challenges this posed to a successful unification were outweighed on such grounds, although interventions of this kind were attempted by leaders from the former provincial estates and the press.18 These latter included the editor of the leading Catholic journal, Le Spectateur belge, who, basing his argument on the authority of ideas associated with Montesquieu, claimed that the government of each nation must reflect ‘the differences demanded by its mind, habits, principles, mores, and religion.’ Any union of the Northern and Southern Netherlands thus appeared dubious, since ‘the Belgian “soul, manners, spirit, customs” were entirely different from ‘“those of Holland.”‘19 Claims of this nature were often accompanied by references to events that were held to demonstrate the existence and considerable vintage of Belgian national character and consciousness. Of particular importance in this connection was the so-called Brabant Revolution (1787) which broke out in the wake of Emperor Joseph II’s attempts to curb the powers of the Estates (regional administrative bodies led by representatives of the clergy, nobility and guilds) and more closely regulate ecclesiastical affairs.20 These reforms infringed principally on the interests of traditional elites; however, 16 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p. 40. 17 As the representatives of the Great Powers at the subsequent London Conference of 1830 reported, the Amalgam had been fashioned ‘with the sole intention of making the Belgian provinces contribute to the establishment of a just balance of power in Europe, and to the maintenance of a general peace. It was this intention that guided their ulterior stipulations, and united Belgium to Holland.’ Papers Relative to the Affairs of Belgium, A, p. 318. Austrian leaders had meanwhile renounced their claims to the province at war’s end in exchange for territorial gains in Italy. 18 Marteel, ‘Constitutional Thought,’ p. 87. These included demands that the estates be returned to their former positions of power – a claim, Marteel adds, that was advanced on the grounds that this was an expression of the national will and traditions of the people, as witnessed in recent events such as the Brabant Revolution (see below). 19 Ibid., pp. 89-91. Text refers to arguments found in De Foere’s, ’Questions politiques’ of 1815. 20 R.R. Palmer likened the province to a ‘museum of late-medieval corporate liberties’ that had ‘since the sixteenth century been immunized against change.’ Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1, pp. 341-342.

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the arbitrary manner in which they were imposed served to turn liberals against the emperor as well and created the basis for a broader movement.21 The rapid escalation of the crisis was accompanied by a flurry of pamphlets, petitions and editorial missives broadcasting claims regarding the existence of the Belgian nation, its manners, character, ‘constitution’ and historic rights.22 Armed conflict ensued, and, following the expulsion of the imperial garrison in October 1789, local revolutionary committees declared their independence from Habsburg rule and the foundation of the United Belgian States (États Belgiques Unis). Historians have since debated the signif icance of what transpired, with some, notably Pirenne, going so far as to declare that ‘with this, the Austrian Netherlands became Belgium.’23 For others, like Peter Geyl, such pronouncements make far too ambitious claims on the sentiments of the people involved and are more revealing of the patriotic and teleological leanings of an author who ‘always saw Belgium coming.’24 More recently, scholars such as Judge, Vos, Polasky, Marteel and Stengers suggest that – Pirenne’s flights of enthusiasm aside – the revolution did show signs of a patriotism ‘that surpassed more local provincial attachment.’25 If so, this triumph was short-lived, as imperial forces returned and easily terminated the existence of the faction-riddled Belgian Republic the following year.26 21 Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, pp. 54-55; Wils, ‘The Two Belgian Revolutions,’ p. 34; Dubois, L’Invention de la Belgique. 22 Janet Polasky describes, for example, the language found in various manifestos surrounding the event as follows: ‘After pages detailing every violated agreement between the emperor and the Belgian people, the “Manifeste” concluded: “It is not possible to report all the injustices, atrocities, & horrors committed against the citizens & the entire nation.”‘ Cited in Polasky, ‘The Brabant Revolution,’ p. 445. See also Van den Bossche, ‘Historians as Advisers to Revolution?’; Stengers, Les Racines de la Belgique, pp. 122-151. 23 Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, V, p. xi. 24 Geyl, Debates with Historians. 25 Judge, ‘Nation and State in the Belgian Revolution,’ p. 155. ‘Although Belgium as a nation-state did not come into existence until 1830,’ writes, for example, Vos, ‘its establishment was not the beginning but rather the culmination of a process of nation-building.’ The national consciousness of the Belgian people, which this historian characterized as a ‘Southern Netherlandic identity,’ had already developed into ‘modern nationalism’ by the Brabant Revolution. Vos, ‘Nationalism, Democracy and the Belgian State,’ p. 89; see also Polasky, ‘The Brabant Revolution,’ p. 450. According to Marteel, ‘In the Southern Netherlands public opinion did not express any desire to become an independent nation. This, however, should not obfuscate the fact that there existed a strong conviction in the Southern Netherlands of constituting a ‘nation,’ i.e., a historical territory with its own political identity.’ Marteel, ‘Constitutional Thought,’ pp. 87, 89. 26 Recollection of these events had some role in shaping the Belgian Kingdom’s constitution, and, specifically, the framers’ insistence on the need to create a unitary state. This was based on the belief, writes Deseure, citing earlier works by Defoort and Polasky, that the republic ‘had

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The province was subsequently fought over by Habsburg and French forces until its annexation by the latter in 1795. Debates nevertheless continued within Belgium over questions surrounding the character of ‘the nation’ and its appropriate mode of governance.27 These revealed, according to Polasky, sharp divisions between ‘traditionalists’ and ‘democrats,’ if all sides nevertheless agreed on the existence of a Belgian national character which could not be served by simply adopting French, English or American political models.28 Similar questions were taken up during the Restoration by the Académie royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles, which held public essay competitions in 1819, 1820, 1823, and 1824 on the subject of whether the Belgians had maintained a ‘dominant character’ despite the many ‘catastrophes politiques’ they had endured over time, or furthermore, if there had been conserved ‘in the different provinces a common character’ independent of ‘des intérêts domestiques.’29 King William’s government had of course the very different problem of promoting sentiments and interests that would serve to bind the new Belgian provinces more tightly to the original lands of the realm. As indicated below, the regime’s attempts to address its (in contemporary parlance) ‘nationbuilding’ problem, give in fact notice of its consciousness of the challenges which lay ahead.30 The large Flemish population of the Belgian provinces, long consigned to a secondary status in social and cultural affairs, may nevertheless have represented a source of potential political capital for Dutch rulers. If, in other words, the sharp Catholic-Protestant divide separating Dutch speakers of Belgium and Holland – and the Flemish districts of Belgian were the most zealous in Catholic sentiment – presented difficulties to the formation of a collective identity, the moral and material advantages partly failed due to its excessively regionalist inner structure.’ Deseure, ‘National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831,’ p. 97. 27 These endeavors were permitted by occupation authorities, who were nevertheless committed to a policy, according to Stengers, of ‘Francisation.’ Stengers, Les Racines de la Belgique, pp. 153-160. 28 Polasky, Revolution in Brussels, p. 269. 29 The results were inconclusive: Catholicism was a popular choice for many but did not express in unambiguous fashion the unique properties of a Belgian national ‘essence.’ Further dissension occurred over the attempts by various authors to identify one principality or another as the ‘cornerstone of the Belgian fatherland.’ Tollebeek, ‘Historical Representation,’ pp. 339-340; see also Stengers, Les Racines de la Belgique, p. 19. 30 This term came into popular use by scholars in the postwar era (e.g., Karl Deutsch, Lucian Pye, David Apter, etc.) in connection with attempts to describe the challenges faced in those parts of the world experiencing de-colonization. See, for example, Deutsch and Foltz, Nation Building, and Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. For additional context, see Latham, Modernization as Ideology.

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accruing from a rehabilitation of the Dutch language might help to mediate this cleavage and win converts to the kingdom’s side. Some of these hopes were realized in the emergence of figures such as Jans Frans Willems, a civil servant of both Flemish and Walloon descent.31 Inspired by the works of Herder and Verlooy, Willems denounced in his many writings the contempt with which Belgians had habitually treated their ‘national heritage.’ This neglect had serious consequences, he pointed out, for as French gained ascendancy the ‘native language’ of Flanders was pushed ‘down the social ladder,’ leaving Flemish speakers politically and economically debased by conventions that became increasingly institutionalized over time.32 Prospects for unification were further enhanced by the potential for economic synergy, and specifically, the advantages that might accrue from joining Belgian industry – which had begun to develop in the preceding decades – to Dutch trading and mercantile expertise. After some early fits and starts the royal policy of incentives and high protective tariffs led to sharp growth for Belgian manufacturers, who also exploited the opportunity to compete for business in the Dutch colonial empire. The subsequent commercial revival of Antwerp, if it aroused some disquiet in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, raised William’s hopes that his ‘system’ was working: the amalgam was uniting the unique economic forces of north and south and perhaps of equal importance eliminating the divisions between the kingdom’s people. Viewed in this way, the economic policies of the United Kingdom recall the nation-building ideas associated with later ‘modernization’ theorists.33 William’s taxation and industrial development policies, ranging from the creation of trading companies to the generous use of government credits to spur capital investment, were, 31 He would later write that after 1830 ‘the Flemings had two nationalities […] they were Belgians in terms of their “political nationality,” but Nederlanders in terms of their “nationality of origin.”‘ See Van der Horst, ‘Jan Frans Willems,’ p. 92. 32 Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 44. This theme figures prominently in Willem’s Ode to the Belgians of 1818 in which he condemned those who had abandoned their native tongue while offering a message of hope to aspiring Flemings, burdened, perhaps like he, with similar feelings of inferiority or exclusion. All should take heart now, he advised, to be living in times when ‘A worthy Fleming who no French can understand, No longer on those grounds from office will be banned.’ Willems, ‘Ode to the Belgians,’ p. 65. 33 As argued by figures such as Deutsch and W.W. Rostow, economic development accelerated the process of identity formation so crucial to the task of ‘nation-building’ in new states. See, for example, Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. Cultural assimilation in this case was anticipated as the fortuitous byproduct of a process of social ‘mobilization’ in which ‘major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.’ Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development,’ p. 494.

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in sum, instrumental in entangling the commercial lives and destinies of the inhabitants of the kingdom; creating in the process an economic interdependence that would inhibit any thought of separation and foster a gradual reorientation of identity – points that recur in Friedrich List’s claims regarding the contemporaneously established Zollverein, as well as those of Cavour on the prospect of an Italian railroad network.34 But what of the future nation that would emerge from this process? Which language would it use, and which religion would it practice? These questions were perhaps too important to be left to the impersonal calculus of economic change; and possibly even more so given the fact that the population of the new southern provinces was much larger than that of the original northern domains (e.g., 3.4 million to 2 million ). The constitutional arrangements and cultural policies of the new state indicate that William and his advisers appear to have given some thought to these issues and, according to Kossmann, ‘consciously’ designed ‘nation-forming policies’ intended to influence their resolution.35 Dutch officials had a relatively free hand in such matters as the negotiations in Vienna did not dwell greatly on matters concerning the handling of internal affairs. The powers simply stated that the Belgians were to suffer no fear of religious bigotry and be ‘reasonably represented’ in the States General – a legislative body akin to the House of Commons.36 However, in practice, the seats in this house were not distributed on the basis of the population figures cited above but divided equally between Dutch and Belgian representatives.37 Proceeding on the plane of culture, William’s unifying initiatives are sometimes given the name of the ‘Great Netherlands Movement.’ Cultural divisions were to be mediated in this case through the elevation of a common identity as ‘Netherlanders.’ An ‘official historiographer’ was duly appointed and charged with the task of re-conceptualizing the history of the lands 34 Economic rationalization had been conceived still earlier by thinkers such as Genovesi (1712-1769) as instrumental to the peninsula’s material and moral regeneration. Balbo and Cavour were also strong proponents of economic integration and spoke enthusiastically of the benef its that might be gleaned from the creation of a railroad network and Italian customs union – ideas that were encouraged by the contemporary example of the German Zollverein. Smith, The Making of Italy, pp. 84-110 35 Kossmann, The Low Countries, p. 118. 36 Ibid., p. 111. 37 To have given the Belgians a governmental presence commensurate with their size would indeed have consigned the Dutch to a second-tier position in the power structure of the new state. Finally, the First Chamber of the realm, or upper house, was to be filled out by notables appointed by the king – appointments dominated by individuals from the northern provinces, as was also true in the case of higher civil and military postings. McRae, Conflict and Compromise, p. 21.

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within the kingdom’s borders in a manner consistent with the goals of the regime.38 More controversial were the steps taken on the language front. These appear to have been first aimed at strengthening the use of Dutch in the northern, predominantly Flemish sections of Belgium. An initiative was duly launched in 1819 with the announcement that, following a period of transition, Dutch would become the official language in these districts. Included, however, in this area was the city of Brussels, where French had traditionally served as the language of government and the courts.39 There followed a protracted struggle that resulted, by 1830, in the establishment of French as an ‘optional language’ for all public affairs in Flanders. 40 Other edicts had meanwhile prepared the ground for a collaboration between the government’s Walloon and Flemish critics: If William’s language policies and conservative political views aroused opposition in this case from the former, his policies in the sphere of religion and education provoked a clash with the Flemish clergy. 41 These grievances led to the fashioning of a Union des Oppositions (Catholics and Liberals), which took definite form by 1828. 42 William had to contend finally with the discontent of Belgian workers in cities hit hard by a sudden rise in unemployment. 43 This unrest which was felt throughout Europe at the time, presented another instance of what contemporary observers referred to as the ‘Social Question,’ a term, writes Francois Jarrige, which first came into use in France in the 1830s as a means to describe the conditions arising from ‘des transformations industrielles.’44 38 Tollebeek, ‘History Writing in the Low Countries,’ p. 283. Stress was placed on the preHabsburg Burgundian period, at which time the Belgians and Dutch had been politically united. It could thus serve as a ‘prototype of the new community’ which William and his officials were working to create. See also Kossmann, The Low Countries, pp. 118-119. 39 Critics of the policy imputed an aim to displace the many Francophone lawyers and administrators of the region, if not the onset of a still more ambitious Dutch campaign to culturally colonize the south. Geyl, Debates with Historians, p. 212. 40 McRae, Conflict and Compromise, p. 20. 41 The king’s education policy included the introduction of the state-run Dutch system intended to ‘narrow the distance between the two halves of the kingdom by introducing a common system of elementary education and giving equal opportunities to profit from it.’ Protests nevertheless arose from the Flemish clergy over the curriculum and specifically its neutral stance on religious matters. Schama, ‘The Rights of Ignorance,’ pp. 84-86. The kingdom’s education policy signaled, perhaps more fundamentally, or so its critics claimed, a heavy-handed revision of church-state relations. See also Kossmann, The Low Countries, p. 128 42 A contemporary view of the union from the standpoint of one of its more influential liberal constituents can be found in De Potter, Union des catholiques et des libéraux. 43 For additional economic background, see Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, pp. 18-20. 44 Jarrige, ‘Le Travail et la question sociale,’ p. 272. See also Castel, Les Metamorphoses de la question sociale.

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Concern over the threat of disorder from this quarter was not of course completely new. As Reinhard Bendix once wrote, ‘The lower classes were considered a threat to the established order of Europe, and hence a principal social problem, long before economic development had created conditions under which a working class proper could arise.’45 However, governments had now to face the possibility that the revolution underway in production was dramatically increasing both the incidence and severity of episodes of social distress. 46 Were the old systems of relief sufficient to maintain equilibrium in times of hardship, or were modern conditions of such a kind as to require a radical reorientation of attitudes and measures? To some, such as Tocqueville, worse was to come: As the momentum of industrialism quickened, people would continue to migrate to the cities, cutting themselves off from sources of support that helped to mediate the effects of economic instability and duress. 47 If Belgium’s economic development was in summary, beneficial to the larger cause of unification, it was also a potent source of social unrest.

From the ‘July Days’ to the Fall of Warsaw Most accounts of the Belgian Revolution of 1830 lay stress on the role of events in France, where, in July, the conflict between the restored Bourbon king (Charles X) and Chamber of Deputies, a body created by the 1814 Charter, reached a critical phase. 48 This dispute was formally of a constitutional nature but illustrates again important features of the political culture of the day and, specifically, the extent to which the principles of nationhood and national sovereignty were presented as matters of supreme importance. According, for example, to Robert Alexander, the 1814 Charter was viewed as a ‘contract between the monarch and the nation.’ The subsequent conflict was thus a struggle between the ‘advocates of royal or national sovereignty’– a characterization that recalls the rhetoric surrounding the Spanish 45 Bendix, ‘The Lower Classes,’ p. 92. 46 Ibid. 47 De Tocqueville, Tocqueville and Beaumont, p. 9. 48 A valuable review of historiography can be found in Caron, ‘Débats autour d’une révolution libérale.’ As Caron argues, the event has drawn more interest from Anglo-American than French scholars (e.g., Pinkney, Merrimen, Pilbeam, Newman, Price). A selection of the latter can be found in Merrimen, 1830 in France. Important new works have nevertheless appeared from Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, Jean-Louis Bory and Caron himself (e.g., Trois jours qui ébranlèrent la monarchie).

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Revolution of 1820.49 The opposition’s success in drawing the masses into the confrontation is reflected in part by the public demonstrations and street fighting that shortly followed Charles’s decision on 26 July 1830 to dissolve the Chamber and reduce the franchise. For Louis Blanc, who formulated, writes Pinkney, a ‘Marxist before Marx’ socio-political interpretation of the crisis still prominent in accounts of this and other revolutions of the decade, ‘La bourgeoisie raised up the people [souleve le people].’50 In the face of such resistance, the king quickly conceded defeat and by 2 August 1830 had abdicated in favor of Louis-Phillipe. In addition to emphasizing the precipitating role of Charles’s sudden fall from power, most accounts of the Belgian Revolution dwell also on the outbreak of rioting that occurred during a performance of the opera La Muette de Portici in Brussels on the night of 25 August.51 This peculiar starting point was later the cause of some inconvenience for Belgian patriots who had to defend the revolution from the charge that it was merely ‘an imitation,’ and even, ‘a bad parody of the Revolution of July.’52 The victims of the evening’s violence included the office of the government journal National, along with the homes of the police chief and the Minister of Justice, whose mansion according to one historian, the crowd proceeded to ‘methodically’ demolish.53 The unrest soon spread to outlying areas of the city where workers exacted revenge on the factories and machines they deemed responsible for their hardships, a phenomenon cited also in reports of the unrest that occurred contemporaneously throughout the Bund.54 In the days that followed, a modicum of order was restored in Brussels and other cities by local militias formed from the urban middle classes. Delegates were also sent to Amsterdam to initiate talks on reform. As these negotiations carried on into September, the situation in Brussels deteriorated, a development that was seized upon by the king, who saw the strife between local moderates and radicals as an opportunity to return to Brussels in strength and even be welcomed by the populace as the restorer 49 Alexander, Re-Writing the French Revolutionary Tradition, p. 1. 50 Blanc, Histoire de dix ans, I, p. 185. This work f irst published in 1842. See also Pinkney, Decisive Years in France, p. 97. Blanc’s ‘thesis,’ in the words of Maurice Agulhon, of ‘a bourgeois revolution behind the facade of freedom,’ places him at the forefront of a still vital critical tradition. Agulhon, ‘1830 dans l’histoire du XIXème siècle,’ p. 20. 51 The plot involves a seventeenth century revolt in Naples against Spanish rule. For additional context, see Witte, La Construction de la Belgique, pp. 50-51. 52 Van der Weyer, A Letter on the Belgic Revolution, p. 23. 53 Demoulin, La Révolution de 1830, p. 14. 54 Witte, La Construction de la Belgique, p. 52; Sheehan, German History, p. 605.

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of law and order. The entrance of the Dutch army into the city was the occasion instead of fierce street battles.55 This bloodshed proved decisive in reshaping the aims of the revolutionaries, who formed a provisional government and declared Belgium independent.56 These events also set in motion the diplomatic maneuvers that resulted in the calling of the London Conference, where Anglo-French opposition to outside military intervention along with the Polish Revolution of November 1830 (see below) proved decisive in enabling Belgium to obtain its independence. In agreeing to the creation of an independent Belgium, the Great Powers appeared also to confer another measure of legitimacy upon the principle of nationality as a basis for political sovereignty, if documents from the proceedings indicate the qualified nature of this concession (to say nothing of the fierce disputes among the parties involved over the wisdom of such a decision).57 Although the events of 1830 suggest that the revolt attained in time the properties of a mass movement, historians have been divided since over how the revolution should be properly interpreted. Had history truly imbued Flemings and Walloons, as De Potter claimed, with a def inite sense of collective identity and interest, or does he merely express the sentiments of a disaffected member of the Francophone elite?58 Some remain skeptical, even questioning the heuristic value of events such as the petitions of 1829 and 1830 in which thousands of Flemings, driven on by local clergymen, affirmed ‘their desire to free the Press which they could not read, the schools which they did not attend, and a language which they did not understand.’59 For Geyl, the revolution was, similarly, a Wallonian affair; if the Flemish population ultimately participated, it did so because the Dutch regime made both Flemings and Walloons the object of its aggression.60 These views are challenged meanwhile by others who argue that 1830 was ‘in essence a national revolution’ which reflected a fundamental sense of shared history 55 Church, Europe in 1830, p. 89. 56 Stengers, Les Racines de la Belgique, pp. 200-201; See also by the same author, ‘Sentiment national.’ 57 Speaking on behalf of ‘Europe,’ the Great Powers strove nevertheless to make clear the contingent basis of such action: ‘The union of Belgium with Holland was broken. […] It did not belong to the Powers to judge of the causes which severed the ties which they had formed. But […] to secure, by means of new combinations, that tranquility of Europe, of which the union of Belgium with Holland had constituted one of the bases. […] Each nation has its particular rights; but Europe has also her rights; it is social order that has given them to her.’ Papers Relative to the Affairs of Belgium, p. 318. 58 This historiographical position discussed in Witte, ‘Belgique, débats et controverses,’ p. 139. 59 Kossmann, The Low Countries, p. 149. 60 Geyl, History of the Low Countries, p. 197. See also Kossmann, The Low Countries, p. 152.

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among Flemings and Walloons.61 Although the participation of Flanders lagged in the early stages of the crisis, this was no reflection, they counter, of an absence of national sentiment, but of the more pronounced Dutch military presence in these regions.62 As in the case finally of other upheavals from the period, the Belgian Revolution has also been subject to a considerable number of social analyses and interpretations. These range from overtures on this front by Pirenne, who, if insisting upon the national pedigree of the revolution, was, according to Witte, the ‘first to give necessary attention to the tensions between the bourgeoisie and workers,’ to Maurice Bologne’s provocative L’Insurrection prolétarienne de 1830 en Belgique (1929), in which he depicted the revolution as an uprising of workers displaced by the introduction of mechanized production (the bourgeoisie later conducting a ‘coup d’état’ to take control of the enterprise once its success was assured).63 In other instances, the middle classes are assigned a more fundamental role, although once again, à la Blanc, their ability to exploit the discontent of the people is typically deemed critical to the revolution’s ultimate success.64 Marx held a similar view.65 According to such readings, the heavy rhetorical emphasis on ‘the nation’ in the revolutionary literature was in turn simply a reflection of the tendency of the bourgeoisie to identify its interests with those of society at large.66 Their ‘nationalism’ was thus ‘a false representation of the real’ which, upon closer examination signified a quest for political power cast in the popular terms and rhetoric of the day.67 As Witte has recently observed, these differences of opinion over the social and national character of the revolution remain as vital as ever.68 61 De Schryver, ‘The Belgian Revolution,’ p. 24. See also Demoulin, La Révolution de 1830; Stengers, ‘Belgian National Sentiments’; Vos, ‘Shifting Nationalism.’ 62 Demoulin, Le Journées de septembre. 63 Witte, ‘1830 en Belgique,’ pp. 113, 128. 64 Note that some have attempted to identify and measure different levels of revolutionary sentiment among the several ranks of the bourgeoisie. For additional context, see Demoulin, Le Journées de septembre; Clark, ‘Nobility, Bourgeoisie and the Industrial Revolution’; Polasky, ‘Women in Revolutionary Belgium’; Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 20. For another scholar, the Belgians of 1830 formed more accurately a ‘political community’ rather than a ‘nationality,’ led by an elite class which exploited popular grievances to effect a political change consistent with its interests. Zolberg, ‘The Making of Flemings and Walloons,’ p. 186. 65 See, for example, Marx and Engels, Collected Works, I, p. 143. 66 For additional background, see Dubois, L’Invention de la Belgique. 67 Thompson and Fevre, ‘The National Question,’ p. 302; Delanty and O’Mahoney, Nationalism and Social Theory, p. 702; Avineri, ‘Marxism and Nationalism.’ 68 Witte, ‘1830 en Belgique,’ pp. 128-129.

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Unrest stemming from the French crisis of 1830 also spread eastward into the Bund, affecting in turn nearly the whole of the federation albeit with varying results. Austrian and Prussian politics were, for example, largely unaffected by the crisis, despite major disturbances in Vienna and Berlin.69 The rulers of several states in northern and central Germany were nevertheless pushed into granting constitutions, while attempts for further liberalization in those states to the south and west, which already possessed such instruments, were ultimately thwarted.70 Given these results, it is perhaps not surprising that the significance of the events in question has been subject to diverse readings. Some historians have, for example, gone so far as to characterize 1830 as the ‘decisive beginning of an opposition movement in Germany,’ with Charles’s fall appearing to confirm the beliefs of liberals throughout the Confederation (and perhaps those who feared them) that they were on the right side of history.71 Other historians, such as David Blackbourn and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann convey a dimmer view of the outcomes.72 69 ‘The storm centres of revolt,’ as David Blackbourn writes, ‘were the most rigid and arbitrary Restoration regimes in Braunschweig, Saxony, and Hesse­Darmstadt.’ There was also ‘serious unrest,’ he continues, in Hanover, the major cities of Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Vienna, and the Upper and Middle Rhine. Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 126. 70 Michael Rowe offers a mixed appraisal (typical of the larger historiography) of events in the Rhineland and their effects, e.g., ‘The failure of full-blown revolution to break out in 1830/32 suggested the continued triumph’ of conservative forces. However, he adds, ‘in the Rhineland at least, that quintessentially liberal French institution, the jury, blunted the conservative counter-offensive that followed those years.’ Rowe, From Reich to State, p. 285. 71 Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, p. 23. Taking a similarly long-term view, Wolfram Siemann observed that if reactionary forces were strong, changes were enacted in parts of the Bund and by 1841, 25 of the federal states had constitutions of one kind or another along with legislative bodies where ‘all of the central demands made by the March revolutionaries’ (of 1848) were later heard. Siemann, The German Revolution of 1848-49, pp. 21-23. In one work, Sheehan too called the revolutions ‘a significant turning-point in the evolution of German political life’ (German History, p. 604); a view somewhat at odds with an earlier study in which he had depicted the 1830s as a time of ‘scattered’ liberal political activity. Sheehan, German Liberalism, pp. 11-15. 72 For Blackbourn, ‘The revolutionary successes of 1830-1832 proved short-lived.’ Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 127. He further notes that the crisis generated another round of ‘political and literary emigration,’ while ‘at home, political freedom retreated into parliaments, where they existed. From his Parisian exile, Ludwig Börne wrote bitterly about “prisons of freedom”: “To prevent liberty running freely around in the land, it is locked up in parliament.”‘ Ibid., p. 128. Sperber meanwhile claims that the opposition was effectively muzzled until 1840. Sperber, ‘Echoes of the French Revolution.’ Finally, for Paul Schroeder, ‘The conservative victory was a convincing one. The Bund by its decrees and actions infringed further on the rights and sovereignty of individual states, and established the very principle the middle states had once vigorously opposed, that federal law overruled state law (Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht). Smaller German governments, including Bavaria, now accepted this principle and the renewed

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Although the German Revolutions of 1830 remain relatively understudied compared to those of 1848, historiographical perspectives tend furthermore to dwell, as indicated above, on the constitutional and social (rather than national) dimensions of the discontent.73 However, the July Days did provide a short-lived opening for the first exhibition of ‘organized nationalism’ in the Bund since the Carlsbad Decrees (1819).74 This took place in the form of the Hambach Festival of May 1832, an event attended by upward of 30,000 people. Inspired by August Wirth, whose writings allude to the kind of hopes for a mass awakening of the people reminiscent of Polish ‘romantic nationalism’ (discussed below), the gathering had the character writes Sheehan, of a Konstitutionsfest in which diverse opinions on the matter of national unification came also to the fore.75 The more radical pronouncements of participants on both counts soon provoked in fact the intervention of authorities.76 In the aftermath of these events, public expressions of sympathy for the cause of unification were restricted again to participation in associations of a ‘crypto-political character,’ such as gymnastic and choral societies.77 The leaders of the various Lander continued meanwhile to pursue means for directing the ‘nationalism’ of their subjects toward the local vaterlands.78

Austro­P russian condominium in Germany for the sake of protection against revolution.’ Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 703 73 See, for example, Schmidt-Funke, ‘Allemagne,’ and Green, Fatherlands, p. 40. Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann similarly observes that the actions of dissidents ‘had not been coordinated and national demands were not strong.’ Von Strandmann, ‘The German Revolutions of 1848-1850,’ p. 104. Cases of worker unrest, including the destruction of industrial property and (even the homes of proprietors) redolent of (and perhaps influenced by) contemporary events in Belgium, were, for example, reported throughout the Rhineland. Rowe, From Reich to State, p. 277. Sheehan notes that these grievances made possible occasional ‘accidental alliances’ between ‘local liberal leaders’ and the disaffected workers, if these were ‘always attenuated by deep distrust.’ Sheehan, German History, p. 606. 74 Jansen, ‘The Formation of German Nationalism,’ p. 248. 75 Sheehan, German History, pp. 610-611. 76 Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism, p. 62. In the aftermath, Austrian and Prussian authorities succeeded in steering the passage of the ‘Six Acts’ (June 1832) and ‘Ten Articles’ (July 1832) through the Federal Diet. In addition to curbing free speech, these were intended to prevent state diets from blocking federal anti-revolution laws. 77 Jansen, ‘The Formation of German Nationalism,’ p. 248. According to Blackbourn, ‘Through the 1830s political opposition was still often forced to express itself obliquely. “Public life stormed and raged in the theatre and concert hall because there was nowhere else it was allowed to storm and rage,” as Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl rather tartly observed.’ Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 128. 78 Green, ‘Political Institutions and Nationhood in Germany,’ p. 320.

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News of the July events in Paris also precipitated new disturbances in Italy, and most seriously in Bologna, Parma and Modena.79 As in the case of 1821, these were put down with the help of Habsburg forces followed by the imposition of harsh security measures.80 However, if the sight of young men hanged or driven into exile was typically, in the words of Azeglio, the final act in ‘tragic-comedies of this kind,’ these same ‘citizen martyrs,’ became part of the ‘arsenal of words and images amassed by nationalists in their struggle to make convincing the idea of Italian independence and unity.’81 Mazzini, who claims to have channeled his disappointment over the failures of 1830 into the founding of Young Italy, seems especially to have incorporated these lessons into his mode of operation – which to a significant extent entailed fomenting revolutions that had little hope of success.82 If nevertheless the people ‘had to be formed’ and enlightened of the ‘truth,’ there was no better way of doing so than by hastening a ‘clash of opposing ideologies and interests.’83 The Italians would, in the repressive aftermath, be made to feel the reality of their subjugation. Although frequently charged with indifference to the lives lost in his name, such sacrifices, observed his contemporary Bakunin, were not in vain: ‘All his [Mazzini’s] insurrections failed,’ wrote the latter, yet ‘their results as an educative force on Italian youth have been incalculable.’84 This ‘educative force’ was intended to work upon world opinion as well: In the words of Mack Smith, ‘Mazzini’s aim in the years after 1838 was to keep the rulers of Italy in constant fear of 79 As Laven shows, some parts of Italy, notably Venetia, remained calm, much to the frustration of patriots such as Pellico. Laven, ‘Law and Order in Habsburg Venetia.’ 80 Such upheavals were indeed sufficient, according to John Davis, to bring about an ‘apocalyptic climate of repression.’ Davis, ‘Italy 1796-1870,’ p. 187. For diplomatic context, see Reinerman, ‘Metternich, the Powers, and the 1831 Italian Crisis.’ 81 Riall, ‘Martyr Cults,’ p. 256; D’Azeglio, Things I Remember, p. 174. Once attacked, Cavour similarly observed, the Restoration governments ‘sought only how to defend themselves. Putting aside all notions of Italian progress and emancipation, they concentrated on averting the dangers which menaced them and which were perfidiously magnified by the reactionary party.’ Cavour in Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 106. See also Davis, ‘Italy 1796-1870,’ p. 186; Beales and Biagnini, The Risorgimento, p. 60. 82 The latter had joined the Carbonari in 1829. His subsequent arrest and exile, after being betrayed by a fellow Carbonaro, no doubt contributed to the dim estimation of his former comrades expressed in later writings. Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, pp. 21-33 83 Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 82. 84 Cited in Smith, Mazzini, p. 201. The execution of the Bandiera brothers in 1844 was particularly controversial and although Mazzini claimed to have no part in the affair, he struck a typically defiant pose: ‘The faith for which men seek death as eagerly as the lover seeks his betrothed, is neither the frenzy of culpable agitators, nor the dream of deluded men, it is the germ of a religion, a providential decree.’ Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 264.

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revolt, so driving them into acts of persecution that would help the cause of patriotism and win sympathy in London.’85 As in the case of Germany, historians continue to debate the extent to which these developments aroused the masses or otherwise advanced the ‘Italian cause.’86 Unif ication was nevertheless a subject that in the 1830s and 1840s clearly attracted some thought among people who would figure notably in later events, if their perspectives on the prospect did not cohere: ‘Mazzinians,’ for example, desired a unitary, democratic republic; monarchy was a spent force and federalism conflicted with the goal of unity, without which there was no strength and Italy, surrounded by hostile powers had ‘need of strength before all things.’87 Alongside what might be called Mazzini’s ‘maximalist’ position emerged various ‘moderate’ alternatives – moderate because they made room for regional autonomy or proffered a more restrained brand of liberalism. Believing, for example, that the ‘unitarist’ position was a prescription for ‘bloodshed, tumults, and revolutions,’ Gioberti (On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians, 1843) proposed a federal union led by the pope.88 Another popular version of the federal position came from Cesare Balbo, who rejected the idea of papal supremacy and advocated instead a scheme of unification under the leadership of Piedmont.89 These and other ideas were given a public hearing in the journal Il Risorgimento founded by Cavour and Balbo in 1847; they became in fact much more marketable to liberals throughout the peninsula in the wake of the constitutional reforms enacted in Piedmont during the 1840s. The Polish Congress Kingdom is commonly regarded as the site of the second great ‘national’ revolution of the 1830s, although, as Anna Baranska 85 Smith, Mazzini, p. 33. Mazzini’s enthusiasm for conspiracy was responsible nevertheless for ruptures with fellow patriots such as Daniel Manin who judged his ‘violent republican strategy’ and ‘theories of the dagger’ as harmful to the Italian movement both at home and abroad. Roberts, Prophet in Exile, p. 65. His ‘mode of working’ was similarly distasteful to John Stuart Mill, although the latter’s criticism was tempered by the belief that ‘to him [Mazzini] is mainly owing the unity and freedom of Italy.’ Cited in Smith, Mazzini, p. 189. 86 Proponents of this view included again scholars such as Banti and Luca Mannori. For Banti, the battle between the troops of Zucchi and the Austrians was a ‘baptism of fire’ which ‘legitimized the struggle for the Italian cause.’ Cited in Arisi-Rota, ‘Italie: conspirationnisme, fraternité et génération,’ p. 166. See also Pécout, Naissance de l’Italie contemporaine, p. 98. 87 Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, pp. 46, 65-67. Similar assumptions found in the works of German authors such as Arndt and Fichte. See, for example, Vick, Defining Germany, p. 75. 88 Gioberti in Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 84. 89 A more liberal iteration of the same was put forward finally by the young Cavour. Woolf, ‘Nation, Nations and Power in Italy,’ p. 296.

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shows, a closer investigation of the historiography surrounding the event produces a far more variegated picture.90 The traditional ‘national reading’ of the event, which has to be sure its merits and contemporary advocates, must contend in this case with many recent interventions which tend to dwell on the ‘hybrid’ nature of the revolution.91 These differences aside, all nevertheless agree that the crises in the West played a vital role in accelerating plans (however perfunctory) for an uprising.92 The success of the plot appears in fact to have rested less on preparation and planning than the hope that an initial provocation or two would incite a general uprising from the people at large.93 Once set in motion, leadership of the revolt would then be turned over to the men with ‘historic surnames.’94 As in the case of the Greek Philiki Etaireia, the absence of a clear political agenda may have played to the rebels’ advantage: ‘It was only because the conspiracy’s aims were so modest,’ argues, for example, Jerzy Skowronek, ‘that the vast majority of the upper and middle classes joined the insurrection.’95 Although the opening acts did not go as planned, the reactions of local Russian authorities, who abruptly withdrew their forces from Warsaw, was instrumental in prolonging the life of the revolt. Polish statesmen such as Czartoryski and Drucki-Lubecki promptly attempted to engage the tsar in talks, with the hope of peacefully resolving the crisis while achieving some progress in the direction of greater autonomy.96 However, with Nicholas refusing to compromise and the threat of Russian invasion growing by the 90 Baranska, ‘Pologne: une insurrection sans révolution?’ 91 Ibid. 92 Connection to events in the West discussed in Zajewski, ‘Le Rôle de la révolution de juillet 1830.’ 93 The rebels’ faith in the prospects of a mass uprising mark the plot, according to Skowronek, as a ‘classic example of Romanticism as a political ideology.’ Skowronek, ‘The Direction of Political Change,’ p. 271. Hopes for success rested on the belief that the revolution could exploit widespread hostility to the Vienna settlement. Relations were also tested by the discovery that the Decembrists had been in contact with patriotic societies in Poland. Those implicated by tsarist authorities in subversive activities included Lelewel, who was dismissed from his post at the University of Vilno, and Mickiewicz, who was exiled for several years to Russia. Tensions were raised further by the trial of another group of conspirators in 1828, at the close of which the Sejm refused to comply with the tsar’s wish to have the defendants condemned. Leslie, Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830, pp. 113-114. 94 Zawadzki, A Man of Honor, p. 300; Skowronek, ‘The Direction of Political Change,’ p. 271. See also Skowronek, ‘L’Insurrection polonaise de 1830.’ 95 Skowronek, ‘The Direction of Political Change,’ p. 272. 96 For Davies, it was an ‘odd situation,’ e.g.: ‘The loyalist leaders of a mutinous rebellion were hoping to exact constitutional concessions from the Autocrat in return for bringing the Rebellion to a close.’ Davies, God’s Playground, II, p. 319.

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day the revolution soon showed signs of succumbing to internal divisions. Debate was particularly fierce over the peasant problem, with liberals and radicals advocating land reform, and conservatives warning of the effects that ‘republicanism’ and ‘social revolution’ would have on ‘the Polish cause abroad.’97 In either case, the Great Powers were not moved and by September 1831, Russian forces had retaken Warsaw. In the wake of the defeat, thousands of Poles found themselves subject to reprisals or sought refuge in the West. Moreover, under the Organic Statute of 1831, virtually all power over local affairs was transferred to Russia, the universities of Wilno and Warsaw permanently closed, and Polish eliminated as the language of state. The divisions of opinion on the question of social reform that had animated Polish politics since the late eighteenth century were well represented in subsequent debates on the causes of the defeat and the way forward. For Czartoryski (now situated in Paris) and like-minded figures, the failure of the revolution was chiefly the result of Poland’s isolation. The Poles must therefore build closer relationships with the West, leveraging as much as possible the ‘moral debt’ which these societies incurred to the former for drawing upon themselves the full force of the counter-revolutionary onslaught.98 In the words, for example, of Lafayette, the suppression of the Polish Revolution was the price paid for the survival of the French and Belgian ones.99 For those on the left, or ‘maximalists,’ the failure of the revolt derived instead from the ‘class egoism of the landowners.’100 Once in control of the government, so this line of argument went, their refusal to pass reforms that would have brought the peasantry into the struggle sealed the revolution’s fate.101 Contrary to the appeals, moreover, of the ‘new right’ that political and social reform should be temporarily put aside (a plea captured in the slogan ‘first to exist – then how to exist’), 97 Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 112; Skurnowicz, Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism, p. 69. 98 Walicki, The Enlightenment, p. 32; Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 120. 99 Kramer, ‘The Rights of Man.’ Public sympathy for the Polish cause conflicted, however, with the wishes of French government officials who hoped to restore relations with the Eastern powers. This friction was most severely felt by outspoken figures such as Lelewel, who were ultimately forced to find refuge elsewhere. See, for example, Stanley, ‘Joachim Lelewel,’ p. 64; Baár, Historians and Nationalism. 100 Although the dissolution of the kingdom’s army led some conservatives to a greater appreciation for the value of ‘mass insurrection,’ the political and social ideals of each faction remained far apart. Leslie, ‘Politics and Economics in Congress Poland,’ p. 46. 101 The notion of assistance from the West was discredited by the left and all thought of compromise with the partitioning powers rejected. Skowronek, ‘The Direction of Political Change,’ p. 273.

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the left advocated a program of ever bolder agrarian reform.102 These ideas, expressed earlier by ‘radical’ partisans of the Polish Enlightenment like Jezierski, found a new voice in figures such as Edward Dembowski.103 For others, Poland’s emancipation depended not only on social revolution at home, but perhaps more importantly, a still more general one abroad that would radically transform the European political order. ‘The future lot of Poland rests neither in diplomacy nor the support of foreign cabinets,’ wrote, for example, Lelewel, ‘but in the uprising of the peoples and their emancipation.’104 Marx put it still more cogently: ‘Poland must be liberated not in Poland but in England.’105

Epilogue: Post-1830 Nation-Building Challenges in Belgium and Poland The following sections describe subsequent developments in thought which highlight the dispersion, mingling and refraction of nationalist ideas across the continent during the period under review; evoking in turn the perspectives on cultural change alluded to by Paul Ther and Lawrence Cole when speaking of the ‘Europeanization of European society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’106 Emphasis is placed again on the Belgian and Polish cases, which, despite their very different political circumstances, indicate the challenges posed by heterogeneity, especially in the linguistic sphere, to the forging and maintaining of national unity. In the Belgian case, and this may hold true as well for Poland, the challenge of heterogeneity cited above does not appear to have been, at first, immediately apparent. More pressing, to judge at least from the cultural production of the early national period, was the demand to rebuke the critiques of certain foreign observers who called into question the very legitimacy of the Belgian nation. These sentiments were expressed in part through a flurry of historiographical endeavors which strove to depict the revolution of 1830 as the ‘terminus’ of all the nation’s previous struggles.107 102 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 103 In the words of Jezierski: ‘If only one house in the nation enjoys the privileges that elevate its descendants above other people this nation will never endure.’ Jezierski, ‘Some Words, Alphabetically Ordered,’ p. 135. 104 Lelewel, ‘The Regeneration of Poland,’ p. 106. 105 Cited in Cummins, Marx, Engels and National Movements, p. 35. 106 Cole and Ther, ‘Introduction,’ p. 589. 107 Tollebeek, ‘Historical Representation,’ p. 348.

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‘If our revolution really had the character that its detractors would like to attribute to it,’ declared, for example, Jean-Baptiste Nothomb, ‘it would be […] a very strange social phenomenon.’ How indeed could an ‘accident grow to the point of becoming a political event?’108 In retrospect, the failure of the amalgamation gave definitive proof of the existence of a Belgian identity, as it demonstrated the impossibility of ‘metamorphosing’ what were plainly two distinct nations.109 Nothomb’s contemporary, Etienne-Constantin de Gerlache, made similar claims, if also arguing that the developments of the years from 1815 to 1830 had greatly advanced the nation’s consciousness of its rights and aspirations. In previous times, for example, the ‘lien commune’ did not exist other than in the person of the sovereign. ‘But in 1815, we had a constitution, a press, a tribune libre and a prince who could be Belgian if he wished.’110 ‘C’est 1815,’ he declared, warming to his task, ‘which made us nation; it was 1815 which brought 1830, which gave us a purely Belgian King: 1815 and 1830, voilà the two great events of our contemporary history!’111 These differences in perspective aside, Nothomb and Gerlache nevertheless agreed that if independence was late in coming, this was no reflection of an absence of national sentiment, but the many ‘foreign usurpations’ the Belgians had endured in the past.112 Would in fact the previous intrusions have not sufficed to ‘carry off its nationality,’ Nothomb asked, ‘if nationality was not its destiny?’113 These truths had been obscured by the fact that ‘our history,’ wrote Jean Stecher, echoing points made earlier by many previous (e.g., Robertson) and contemporary authors, ‘is first written only by our conquerors, and it is at the bottom of these hostile assessments that we must seek the first testimonies of our national idea.’114 Similar remarks 108 Nothomb, Essai historique et politique, p. 43. 109 As he continued, ‘Il était impossible de métamorphoser les deux nations, en imaginant un type nouveau [It was impossible to transform the two nations, imagining a new type].’ Ibid., p. 47. 110 De Gerlache, Histoire du Royaume des Pays-Bas despuis, 1, p. 275. 111 Ibid. 112 Nothomb cites here ‘Les Recherches des Guizot, des Thierry, des Sismondi.’ Nothomb, Essai historique et politique, p. 30. 113 In the words of Nothomb, ‘Should we deny the Belgian people their personality, because in their country the social march was slower and more painful? Should we punish them for having lost in the sixteenth century this dynastic principle which could have saved them from political vicissitudes, and for having been reduced to going through three great crises which would have carried their nationality away, if nationality were not in their destiny?’ Nothomb, Essai historique et politique, p. 30. Nothomb’s allusion to providence recalls a widespread feature of contemporary national historiography. See, for example, Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, p. 157; Paparrigopoulos, Peri tis Epoikiseos Slavikon, p. i. 114 Stecher, Flamands et Wallons. See also Tollebeek, ‘The Hyphen of National Culture.’ For Nothomb, ‘Belgium has therefore been the victim three times of an attack against its nationality.’

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can be gleaned again from the works of Balkan historians who tended also to present themselves as endeavoring to free ‘our past’ from the whims of ‘foreign scholarship.’115 The existence of a native historiographical tradition was thus essential for correcting these errors while further demonstrating the nation’s passage from inert object to fully emancipated, autonomous and striving subject.116 Could, in fact, any people remain ‘indifferent spectators’ to the distortion of their history, wrote Paparrigopoulos, ‘without being justifiably scorned as lacking honor or resembling those barbarous nations for whom others undertake to write their history because they are unable to fulfill this holiest of obligations themselves?’117 These efforts to historicize and redeem the Belgian nation proceeded alongside more prosaic tasks of statecraft. Here, concrete decisions had to be made on matters such as an official language for the new kingdom, French being duly selected for the role.118 This choice, which was defended on the grounds of expedience (the variety of German and Flemish dialects being simply too profuse to allow for an official publication of the laws in those languages), appears nevertheless to reflect the preferences of Francophone liberal elites in Flanders and Wallonia who had played a leading part in the independence movement and were the principal authors of the kingdom’s first constitution.119 This outcome was not necessarily fatal to the prospects of unity. As one historian notes, citing the passive response to these laws on the part of the Flemish populace, the first years of the country’s existence ‘held few clues that Belgium would later be dominated by the divisive Dutch-French language issue.’120 The Flemish masses had reacted in a similar Nothomb, Essai historique et politique, p. 30. The history of this trope discussed in Stengers, ‘Le Mythe des dominations étrangères.’ 115 Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, p. 38; Zambelios, Asmata dimotika, p. 7. This same sentiment was expressed in an article of 1850 in which he reflected on Fallmerayer and the larger challenges at hand; republished in French in Le Spectateur de l’Orient in 1855 as ‘L’Opinion grecque sur le système de Fallmerayer.’ Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, pp. 144-145. 116 As Turda shows, this too was another ‘axiom’ of contemporary historiography. Turda, ‘Historical Writing in the Balkans,’ p. 349. 117 Cited in Dimaras, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, p. 151. 118 These decisions taken amid much more intense debate over constitutional matters. See, for example, De Dijn, ‘A Pragmatic Conservatism.’ 119 Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 43; Witte, La Construction de la Belgique, p. 167; Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement, pp. 49, 52. Provisions were made for the use of local languages in civil affairs, however, French soon became the language of the courts and public administration throughout Flanders. Hermans et al., The Flemish Movement, p. 7. 120 Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 43. See also Stengers, ‘La Déconstruction de l’État-nation.’

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fashion after all to the policies of French occupation officials.121 If therefore voices of protest against these measures had been raised in the past, their failure to gain a strong following suggested that Flemish speakers had long since become inured to the dominance of French, or even that the matter of an official language was not an issue of great importance. Nor was it inevitable that it should become one, or so it might be gathered from the works of certain prominent theorists. Weber, for example, famously claimed that national unity and consciousness depended most of all on shared ‘political destinies.’ In this way, ‘otherwise heterogeneous peoples’ might be ‘melted together.’122. The Belgian case nevertheless indicates some of the challenges posed in practice to any such ‘melting together,’ if specialists offer different interpretations of when and why the alienation between the two parties became acute. Some, like Stengers, date the rupture to conditions and claims arising from the experience of the First World War.123 Others, place emphasis on earlier events and, specifically, circumstances stemming from the advance of the industrial revolution and democratization. For still others, the origins of the problem must be traced farther back to the political reversals of the pre-1830 years, and especially those commencing with the French occupation (1794). According to McRae and De Shryver, ‘the reactive impact of successive changes in language policy produced an escalating dialectic of linguistic hostility.’124 In a remarkably compressed period of time, argue the latter, the people of Belgium found themselves exposed to a succession of centralizing programs, one upon the other that made conquest of the state the ‘chief prize’ in a struggle not only over economic spoils, but the power to determine laws and language. The effects of this ‘dialectic’ may be visible in the early opposition shown by some Flemish-speaking intellectuals to the kingdom’s language policy. 121 Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement, p. 25. See also Stengers, Les Racines de la Belgique. 122 Weber, ‘The Nation,’ p. 25. Renan’s famous characterization of the nation as ‘an everyday plebiscite’ placed a similar emphasis on political bonds, the efficacy of which, he added, rested on the ‘voluntary’ nature of the compact. Peoples justified their existence as nations by ‘presupposing’ a past while renewing themselves in the present through actions that demonstrated their desire for a ‘common life.’ Renan in Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 58. These ideas are well represented in the works of Pirenne: ‘The community of memories,’ the latter reflected on the First World War, ‘of needs and of liberties has made natural the collective conscience which the war has revealed so profoundly. And this consciousness […] depends neither on geographical nor linguistic unity. Belgium – and this is the originality and the beauty of its history – is the product of the will of its inhabitants.’ Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, V, pp. xiii-xiv. 123 Stengers’s perspective on the subject depicted in ‘La Déconstruction de l’État-nation.’ 124 McRae, Conflict and Compromise, p. 327; De Schryver, ‘The Belgian Revolution,’ p. 20.

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As indicated by the figure of Willems, Flemish had been the beneficiary of a modest literary revival in Flanders stimulated by William’s initiatives; however, this progress was now imperiled, or so it appeared to some, by the change of regime.125 The opposition of those in question drew heavily in turn upon ideas that were circulating throughout the continent, as illustrated in a work of Philip Blommaert (1809-1871) from 1832 in which the author declared that a language ‘certifies a people’s existence.’126 Blommaert attributed the Flemish peoples’ apathy toward the marginalization of their native language to a number of causes including the rule of ‘foreign despots,’ the most recent of which was ‘the twenty-year domination by the French, who did everything in their power to impose their language on us.’127 The clock could not be turned completely back, as Blommaert and his comrades freely acknowledged; but change was necessary to ensure social equality and inclusion. The Flamingants aimed in this case not to bar French from Flanders, but have it placed on an equal footing with Dutch.128 These aims were expressed in a famous petition drive in 1840 launched by a group of ‘Flemish Belgians,’ who sought to make their case for the creation of a bilingual – but no less united – Belgian nation: ‘There are different languages,’ after all, they argued, ‘in Denmark and Switzerland just as there are in Belgium; the inhabitants of these countries are nevertheless governed each according to their own regional tongue and this does not detract from their national character.’129 The 1840 petition which succeeded in gaining a modest number of signatures was in some measure a victory for the cause of bilingualism.130 It appeared to indicate furthermore that in addition to intellectuals, another source of support had begun to emerge in the form of the lower bourgeoisie of cities such as Antwerp. Having managed to attain a higher social rank, this group nevertheless found itself excluded from the commanding heights of the Belgian economy, these being largely the preserve of Francophone elites.131 As Clough among others have noted: ‘Big 125 As Stengers nevertheless cautions, efforts to expand the use of Dutch were perceived by some in Flanders as a threat to the local dialect. Stengers, ‘La Déconstruction de l’État-nation,’ p. 38. 126 Blommaert, ‘Observations on the Neglect of the Dutch Language,’ p. 80. 127 Ibid., p. 81. ‘People learned French,’ his fellow flamingant Conscience wrote in 1838, ‘not simply to gain knowledge of a foreign language, but in order to gain a prestige which the Flemish language could no longer give them.’ Conscience, ‘“Foreword,”‘ pp. 88-89. 128 ‘We are not denying,’ wrote Blommaert, ‘that the French language is widely used, and therefore indispensable for merchants and various other classes of society,’ Blommaert ‘Observations on the Neglect of the Dutch Language,’ p. 81. 129 ‘Petition to the House of Representatives,’ pp. 93. 130 Witte, La Construction de la Belgique, p. 169. 131 Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, pp. 56, 70; Strikwerda, ‘The Low Countries,’ pp. 95-96.

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business in Belgium grew up in the hands of French speaking persons; […] the branches which they founded in Flemish cities were usually directed by Walloons; the technical language of the machine age spread from Wallonia to Flanders and was French.’132 Although the cause of bilingualism had yet to gain a following in 1840 among the Flemish masses, here too the industrial expansion of Belgium in the decades following independence may have been consequential in altering the situation. For example, population growth combined with industrialization led ever larger numbers of Flemish peasants to emigrate from the countryside to the cities.133 Class and linguistic division became in the process more visibly aligned. The hardships of Flemish workers, exacerbated by the growing sense of Flanders’ underdevelopment in relation to the country as a whole, was in turn stressed by the leaders of the rising labor movements who included ‘the hold of the French language’ over Flanders in their diagnoses of the people’s ills.134 As Herman van Goethem writes, ‘at the end of the century’ there was ‘a broad consensus within Flanders that the language question was also a social question and a question of economic power.’135 These developments were meanwhile taking place at a time when the Belgian political system was undergoing a process of liberalization, one byproduct of which was a contest between the Flemish Catholic and Liberal parties for the loyalties of the proletariat. Both accordingly made great efforts to present themselves as the true supporters of Flemish interests, with obvious consequences for the further politicization of the language question.136 In summary, the confluence of these two trends – ‘underdevelopment’ in the Flemish regions at a time when Belgium was moving ‘toward the age of mass political participation’ – was arguably decisive for the prospects of the language question.137 Taking these developments into account, the growth of the Flemish national movement offers a potentially instructive 132 Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement, p. 55. 133 Van Goethem, Belgium and the Monarchy, p. 76. See also Kittell, ‘The Revolutionary Period.’ 134 Zolberg, ‘The Making of Flemings and Walloons,’ p. 197; Strikwerda, ‘The Low Countries,’ p. 95. Hroch has similarly argued elsewhere that the strength of a national movement greatly depended on the extent to which those holding such ideas succeeded in ‘translating’ a local ‘conflict of interests into the language of nationalist conflict.’ Hroch, ‘National Romanticism,’ pp. 14-15. 135 Van Goethem, Belgium and the Monarchy, p. 74. For the author’s position on the importance of the First World War, see pp. 92-149. For additional context, see De Wever, ‘The Flemish Movement.’ 136 Witte et al., Political History of Belgium, p. 70; Kossmann, The Low Countries, p. 255. 137 Zolberg, ‘The Making of Flemings and Walloons,’ pp. 197-199.

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case of Ernest Gellner’s thesis that nationalism is what happens when ‘a nation,’ construed here as an ethnic group, ‘becomes a class.’138 A similar interpretation was in fact put forward as early as 1869 by a deputy from Ghent, who boldly asserted that ‘the Flemish movement is a social movement […] carried on by the Flemish speaking lower classes against the French speaking bourgeoisie of Flanders.’139

The Polish Problem Reflecting on the events of 1830 from his refuge in newly independent Belgium, the historian Lelewel implored his readers to ‘remember the past’ and ‘repeat the song of your fathers.’ For Poland will not die, he wrote, citing the famous Dabrowski March (1797), ‘so long as you are alive.’140 These themes were prevalent in many European nationalisms of the period, however, the preoccupation with notions of national life and death, rebirth and redemption arguably reached its apogee in the works of post-1830 Polish authors.141 From these came the striking image of Poland as the suffering Christ of nations, betrayed and crucified that it might initiate, upon resurrection, a new age of universal justice and salvation.142 ‘For the Polish nation did not 138 Only under such conditions, he claimed, do nations become ‘conscious and activist.’ Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 121. Contra Marx, Gellner believed that the social ‘chasms’ and frictions generated by industrialization could also be mediated by the same. However, the corrective mechanisms failed in instances where the boundaries separating rich and poor aligned with ‘cultural’ divisions. In such cases, the rupture was much more difficult to mend. 139 Cited in Clough, A History of the Flemish Movement, pp. 93-94. As indicated nevertheless above, the conceptualization of this cleavage was elevated by the exigencies of an intra-Flemish, political contest, as well as conditions, others argue, stemming from the First World War. The effects of a ‘counter-mobilization’ among Walloons, some historians have been keen to argue of late, must also be considered. See, for example, Van Ginderachter and Leerssen, ‘Denied Ethnicism.’ 140 Dabrowski March composed by Józef Wybicki in 1797 on the formation of the first Napoleonicera Polish Legions. For full text, see Wybicki, ‘Dabrowski Mazurka.’ 141 These anthropomorphizing tendencies of Polish thought are visible still earlier in the writings of Jezierski. See, for example, again Jezierski, ‘Some Words, Alphabetically Ordered,’ pp. 132-36. To take away a nation’s independence for Czartoryski was similarly akin to subjecting a fellow ‘moral being’ to bondage. ‘It is to commit a moral murder, inflicting upon the victim the torment of an agony unending.’ Cited in Maslowski, ‘L’Éthique du politique,’ p. 10. Originally published in Czartoryski, Essai sur la diplomatie. 142 Weber once described these latter preoccupations as characteristic of peoples whose ‘sense of honor’ rested on a ‘promise for the future’ and the assignment of some special ‘function.’ Weber, Economy and Society, I, p. 491. That said, works such as Guizot’s Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe make clear that allusion to the existence of national genies and missions

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die,’ declared the poet Adam Mickiewicz: ‘Its body lieth in the grave. […] But on the third day the soul shall return to the body, and the Nation shall arise and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery.’143 The Polish romantic nation, triumphing in the realm of letters if not in politics, was certainly a more elaborate, richly imagined object than its predecessors. To be sure, according to Henryk Kamieński (1813-1866), the loss of a national political existence demanded even more the cultivation of a spiritual one. For if a nation might be deprived of the former, it was only truly ‘dead,’ he wrote in 1844, if it succumbed to spiritual conquest.144 The task of preventing such a fate fell mainly to the thinkers and poets of the emigration, ‘a specific intelligentsia group,’ as one historian has described them, ‘bent upon the elaboration of new ideologies that would promote the success of the national cause.’145 In doing so, these writers played a major role in shaping a popular language of nationalism heavily informed by concepts associated with idealist and romantic modes of thought. This change is visible in the evolving attitude of Polish thinkers toward the Enlightenment, which some now saw as ‘anti-national’ in spirit; disputing in particular its tendency to chart the progress of civilizations in terms of ‘stages’ (which suggested that all peoples were engaged in a process of development toward some common end) as opposed to ‘types.’146 To judge furthermore from the responses of certain French intellectuals who was a feature of contemporary discourse that was not restricted to authors from dispossessed nations. For Guizot, European civilization – past, present and future – owed much to the fecundity of French national genius. Guizot, Cours d’histoire moderne, pp. 4-5. For similar themes in German thought, see Lehmann, ‘The Germans as a Chosen People.’ 143 Mickiewicz, ‘The Books of the Polish Nation,’ p. 143. Another example of the employment of such language, among many that could be cited, appears in a later tract from Karol Ruprecht (1821-1875), the member of a group of patriots (dubbed Millenaries by their opponents) who sought to forestall any new revolutionary ventures: ‘We feel that the moment of resurrection has not yet come, that Poland would arise today only as an undead […]; so we should, with the strong hand of the cemetery caretaker, restrain this inconsiderate act.’ Cited in Janowski, Polish Liberal Thought before 1918, p. 118. 144 ‘Spiritual conquest is the only force which can lead nations to unite into a larger whole,’ he continued. ‘And this force is our weapon, precisely our weapon, just as military force is the exclusive weapon or our enemies, for we represent the spiritual power while they represent the material one.’ Kamieński, ‘Vital Truths of the Polish Nation,’ p. 426. ‘You merely tickle aristocratic nerves,’ Mickiewicz complained to the young Chopin in the course of one memorable outburst over the manner in which he wasted his gift when the times called for Polish artists to celebrate their national culture and thus bolster the spirits of those in danger of succumbing to the pressure of assimilation. Cited in Pekacz, ‘Deconstructing a “National Composer,”‘ p. 171. 145 Kieniewicz, ‘The Polish Intelligentsia,’ p. 125. 146 Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, pp. 16, 21.

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attended Mickiewicz’s lectures on Slavic literature at the Collège de France or engaged him in correspondence, this was not solely a tendency of East European discourse. For George Sand, to cite one example, Mickiewicz exuded a ‘savage energy’ in his appearances which she attributed to ‘the instincts and tendencies of the Slavic race.’ ‘Your Orient illumines my Occident with unexpected flashes,’ exclaimed in similar fashion Michelet, ‘and I will be more fruitful because of it.’ Among the ‘fruits’ of this experience was the elevation in Michelet’s mind of ‘the moral characteristics of each nationality.’147 Nations were no mere byproducts, according to such readings, of varying socio-economic conditions; nor was their independence to be striven for as an end alone. This was a far too underconceptualized reading of history for a ‘philosophical age.’148 The new sense of national becoming alluded to above by Andrzej Walicki – in which the distinctive cultural attributes of nations materialized as the gradual unfolding of a particular spirit – bears particular resemblance to concepts from the idealist canon, as glimpsed in the thought of Hegel, who had earlier written of history as ‘the exhibition of the spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially,’ or again, just ‘as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree […] so do the first traces of spirit virtually contain the whole of that history.’149 Similar analogies inform the national discourse of the period, the authors affecting in the process a transposition of ends from the world historical to the national, or attempting to fit the rise of nations into a greater, universally beneficent design. In the words of Droysen, ‘Only by collectively regarding history as the development of humanity can individual formations – nations, cultures, states, individuals – acquire their true significance.’150 Indeed, ‘the suffering of nations, the loss of freedom, the struggle of the patriots must have some higher meaning,’ one historian has written of these theories: ‘History cannot be a chaos of random events nor the triumph of brute force over liberty.’151 Such trials had instead as their end a ‘harmonious 147 Cited in Kramer, Threshold of a New World, pp. 192-195. For additional sources of this kind, see Mitosek, Adam Mickiewicz au yeux des Français. 148 Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 91. 149 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, pp. 17-18. The historian’s task, wrote Droysen, was to explain ‘the workings of providence in the historical world.’ For the relationship between Droysen and Hegel, see Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition, pp. 294, 318. 150 Each nation gave testimony, declared Mazzini, of the ‘heavenly Law of infinite progress for all.’ ‘All sovereignty is in God, in the moral Law, in the providential design – which rules the world […] in the aim we have to reach, in the Mission we have to fulfill.’ Mazzini, The Duties of Man, p. 144. Droysen cited in Southard, Droysen and the Prussian School of History, pp. 37-38. 151 Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe, p. 46.

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symphony of universal human culture’ to be achieved through the perfection of the many voices from which it was composed.152 Each nation’s right to existence was thus grounded in the essential contribution it was destined to make toward the glorification of creation. To struggle for the independence and interests of one’s nation was therefore no mere egoism; it advanced the course of history toward its appointed end.153 In the Polish and Italian cases, these thoughts were arguably shaped in some measure too by necessity: To gain support from abroad the Poles had, for example, to present their cause as serving the common interest of Europe, if not all humanity. As the philosopher Bronisław Trentowski succinctly explained, ‘to be restored as a state, Poland has to prove that her independence is necessary for mankind.’154 Problems nevertheless arose over attempts to satisfactorily characterize the Polish national essence. Unlike other nationalisms from the era that were inclined to take their cues in this connection from the ‘empirical’ properties of ethnicity, Poles (like the Belgians) were presented with a more complicated task given the multiethnic and multilinguistic nature of the peoples involved.155 Some found a way out of these difficulties – which, as indicated below, had important political implications – by describing the Polish nation as ‘a spirit or an ideal’ which ‘had no clear ethnographic content.’156 ‘Our individual and collective existence depended upon our relationship to a common history,’ wrote, for example, Gołuchowski.157 Lelewel made similar claims, instructing his countrymen ‘not to differentiate the sons of Poland, whether they speak the Ruthenian, Polish, or Lithuanian language.’ In doing so, writes Porter, he attempted to locate the ‘true’ Polish national essence ‘within a realm in which ethnic identity was of secondary importance.’ The ‘exclusionary’ properties of this vision fell ‘only on those who were identified with the forces of evil, oppression, and tyranny.’158 Although the people therefore of ‘Old Poland’ might be classified as ‘Lithuanian, Cracovian, Ruthenian, Mazur, Samogitian, Ukrainian, Great Polander,’ wrote Lelewel, ‘all are Poles.’159 If the contemporary quarrels of the 152 Weintraub, ‘The Noble as a Hero,’ p. 55. 153 ‘It is a general rule of the development of history,’ observed a Polish author in 1845, ‘that every nation, which has risen high above others, had to fulfil a certain great mission for the good of all humanity.’ Cited in Janowski, Polish Liberal Thought before 1918, p. 94. 154 Cited in Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 169. 155 See, for example, Tollebeek, ‘Historical Representation.’ 156 Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate, p. 16. 157 Cited in ibid., p. 19. 158 Ibid., p. 20. 159 Cited in Stanley, ‘Joachim Lelewel,’ p. 67.

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nations belonged to an age when mankind was still ‘tainted with idolatry,’ Mickiewicz declared similarly in the Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrims (1832), the Commonwealth offered a moral lesson comparable to the one Christ delivered to the Pharisees.160 The expressions of equanimity described above had nevertheless to contend with customs of thought which seemed to elevate the status of the ‘Poles’ of Poland or award them pride of place in narratives of the defunct Commonwealth’s formation and history. It was indeed Poland’s ‘spiritual force,’ according to Kamieński, which led Lithuania to ‘cast itself into our brotherly arms.’161 Similar thoughts emerge in Lelewel’s pedagogical texts and Mickiewicz’s Books of the Polish Nation, in which the founding of the Commonwealth was partly credited to the virtue and magnanimity of Polish kings who offered neighboring peoples ‘the gift of faith and freedom.’162 And for this ‘God rewarded them,’ Mickiewicz continued, ‘for a great nation, Lithuania, united itself with Poland, as husband and wife, two souls in one body. And there was never before such a union of nations.’163 Civic readings of the Polish nation circulated furthermore alongside others of an ethno-linguistic stamp. Despite his professions, for example, to the contrary, Polishness represented for Mochnacki something ‘more profound than a mere sociological category.’ Its ‘essence’ was expressed in a host of ‘concepts and feelings regarding religion, political institutions, legislation, customs’ which had ‘a tight bond with geographical location, climate and other factors of empirical existence.’164 Culture was indeed nothing less than the ‘objectification’ of the 160 Desist, he counseled his readers, from making ‘distinctions among yourselves, saying I am […] a Lithuanian and thou a Masovian. The Lithuanian and the Masovian are brothers: do brothers quarrel because one hath for a name Władysław, another Witwowt? Their last name is the same, the name of Poles.’ Mickiewicz, ‘The Books of the Polish Nation,’ p. 161. Ruthenians and Lithuanians were, similarly, declared Czartoryski, ‘our brothers and common nationality.’ Cited in Bilenky, Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 111. 161 Kamieński, ‘Vital Truths of the Polish Nation,’ p. 426. 162 Mickiewicz, ‘The Books of the Polish Nation,’ pp. 140-141. See also Skurnowicz, Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism, p. 107. See also by Lelewel, Histoire de la Lithuanie et de la Ruthénie; Histoire de Pologne; and Légitimité de la nation polonaise. 163 Mickiewicz, ‘The Books of the Polish Nation,’ pp. 140-141. Mickiewicz’s increasingly vehement calls for action have been portrayed as expressions of the poet’s ‘self-reproach’ over his failure to take part in the revolution of 1830. Bugelski, Mickiewicz and the West, p. 22; Koropeckyj, Adam Mickiewicz, pp. 156-158. His thought also became encumbered with the teachings of the spiritualist Towiański and a cultish devotion to the memory of Napoleon. These latter reveries, delivered on public occasions amid a coterie of inspired acolytes, became the stuff of parody for erstwhile fellow travelers such as Alexander Herzen. See, for example, the scene described by Herzen in My Past and Thoughts, pp. 342-346. 164 Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate, pp. 20-21.

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nation’s ‘inner essence’ wrote Mochnacki, recalling romantic tendencies of thought which sought for the vital forces of human creativity, individuality, and imagination in the inner recesses of being and consciousness.165 These ‘empirical’ qualities of Polish nationality were still less equivocally stated by Karl Libelt who spoke of the Polish nation as an ethnic ‘corporality.’166 Of particular importance for the future was the place in this literature, again, of language, which was increasingly regarded as an object of veneration in its own right.167 In general, the writers of the emigration were largely of a lower-gentry background, and mainly Polish speakers, who assumed that theirs would be the ‘national’ language of a resurrected Commonwealth.168 Looking ahead, this was an attitude that was likely to complicate the aims of unity.169 Linguistic centralization also appeared to clash with the goal of democratization embraced by liberal nationalists: To impose Polish on all the inhabitants of the former Commonwealth, even if done in the gradualist manner pursued by the ‘organic work’ advocates, appeared, for example, to conflict with ‘the idea of democratic equality of rights, including the right to speak one’s native language.’170 Similar attitudes nevertheless prevailed among those Hungarian reformers (see below) who hoped to simultaneously liberalize and Magyarize their own multiethnic kingdom: Both viewed the ‘national problem’ as ‘basically a social problem to be treated through labor and land reform.’171 Were the ‘inner dialectics’ of such an agenda, as Walicki argues, ‘selfdestructive’? The challenges would at least be especially great in those lands ‘where non-Polish (especially Ukrainian) peasants had good reason to identify “Polishness” with nobility.’172 Indeed the Polish national movement had increasingly to contend with a Ukrainian national awakening, which, although waxing 165 The ‘practical task of philosophy,’ wrote Józef Gołuchowski, was to enable people to ‘overcome painful social atomization [and] rediscover their rootedness in mysterious primeval forces.’ An ‘awakening’ of the ‘common national spirit’ would thus solve a host of psychic problems associated with modern life while strengthening the cohesion of society. Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, pp. 104-107. 166 Ibid., pp. 20, 25. 167 Walicki, The Enlightenment, pp. 76-77. 168 Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 177; Kieniewicz, ‘The Polish Intelligentsia,’ p. 124. 169 These future clashes described, for example, in Janowski, Polish Liberal Thought before 1918, p. 101. 170 Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 71. 171 If emancipated from their lords and gradually introduced to the off icial language, the peasants ‘could be fused without trouble,’ it was assumed, into the national mass. Brock, ‘Polish Nationalism,’ p. 323. 172 Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism, p. 73.

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and waning in strength from the later decades of the eighteenth century began to produce charismatic leaders such as Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), himself a former serf, who took pains to remind his fellow Ukrainians of the burdens they once shouldered under the yoke of ‘Polish magnates.’173 School building and literary endeavors which raised the status of the Ukrainian language were meanwhile supported by Austrian authorities eager to weaken the influence of Polish elites in the lands under their control.174

Conclusions Considered together, perspectives on the revolutions of the 1830s, especially many of those of recent vintage, often evoke the concept of hybridité. This tendency is naturally most pronounced, as Anna Baranska writes, in social approaches to the subject which investigate the events in question from the standpoint of the ‘plurality of actors’ involved and their diverse, sometimes distinct, grievances and aims. But certainly any account of an event as complex as the Polish Revolution must consider, she continues, the range of sentiments animating all those who had a role great or small in the uprising.175 Is it likely that the participants shared a common goal, or as Sheehan suggested of events in parts of German-speaking Europe, did occasions of common action represent no more than ‘accidental alliances’ of the moment, ‘attenuated by deep distrust’?176 This emphasis furthermore on the composite nature of the revolutions in the historiography of the period, projects a picture of European life, which from the perspective of the 1830s, was beset by a host of critical issues: By all accounts, Europe had a social problem, a national problem, and a constitutional problem. The potential for further unrest on any of these fronts was elevated too by the existence of a dissident culture imbued with a character, to recall again the words of Hobsbawm and Carlyle, of ‘revolutionism.’ Which of these ‘problems’ was nevertheless most capable of initiating another round of revolutionary unrest? Where would the national problem stand in such a hierarchy of grievances? Did it possess the capacity to arouse mass action commensurable with the other social and political issues of the day, and if so, which parts of Europe were most likely to experience 173 Shevchenko, ‘Preface to an Unpublished Edition of Kobzar,’ p. 103. 174 See, for example, Magocsi, ‘The Ukrainian National Revival.’ 175 Baranska, ‘Pologne: une insurrection sans révolution?,’ pp. 151-152. 176 Sheehan, German History, p. 606.

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such troubles? If looking ahead again from the vantage point of the 1830s, a contemporary observer might be expected to foresee further problems of this kind in Poland; and, in fact, another revolution occurred in the lands of the Austrian Partition (specifically Galicia) in advance of those which broke out in 1848.177 That said, one would probably not predict, from the point of view again of the 1830s, that the national unification of Germany or Italy was in any way imminent. As Sheehan observed, although liberal constitutional challenges appeared to be waxing in strength during this time throughout the Bund, ‘almost no liberals imagined a popular nationalism that would wipe away the existing structure of states.’178 ‘If,’ he observes again in another work, ‘the events of 1830 showed that there were important reservoirs of discontent in Germany, they did not signal the emergence of sustained political movements.’179 And yet, the constitutional crisis that broke out in France in 1848 was soon followed by scenes of unrest and demands for change in Germany and other parts of Europe – wherein national aspirations and conflicts also came prominently to the fore – which greatly exceeded in intensity and scale anything from 1830. The events included under this head range from the calling of the Frankfurt National Congress and the establishment of Mazzini’s Roman Republic, to the fierce intra-communal struggles in Hungary. As indicated in the following chapter, this remarkable turn of events was immediately preceded by a deterioration of urban living conditions and a sudden, sharp increase in the size, organization, and assertiveness of dissident political movements across central Europe and the Italian peninsula. Explanations for what followed, especially in regard to the conflicts within Habsburg Europe, also lay stress on the frictions and security dilemmas stemming from a rapid series of group (and counter-group) mobilizations.

177 Dembowski’s ‘maximalist’ revolt of February 1846 described in Skowronek, ‘The Direction of Political Change,’ p. 278. The military presence of the occupying powers was deemed less formidable in these lands; however, Austrian authorities thwarted such designs by spreading fears among the peasantry of a gentry plot to roll back the Habsburg land reforms. The subsequent jacquerie in western Galicia left thousands dead and 90 percent of the manors destroyed. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 135. 178 Sheehan, German History, p. 600. 179 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 11.

7.

Revolutions of 1848 Abstract The present chapter explores the historiographical problems surrounding the role and relative strength of national sentiment in the revolutions of 1848. Here again the national problem is considered in relation to other contemporary sources of political and social discontent. In each of the cases under review, from Germany to Habsburg Europe to Italy, historians portray a sharp and even abrupt rise in the strength and assertiveness of, in the words of James Sheehan, ‘liberal political action’ in the years immediately preceding the 1848 revolutions, with a corresponding elevation in the perceived stature of national sentiment and demands. Keywords: 1848 revolutions, Risorgimento, German unification, Habsburg Empire, The Social Question

Les révolutions se font malgré les révolutionnaires.1

In a well-known paper delivered at a conference commemorating the one-hundred-year anniversary of the 1848 revolutions, Ernest Labrousse argued that if the tempests of the period beginning in 1789 had ‘distant origins,’ each was immediately preceded by the sudden onset of ‘economic tensions.’2 This was furthermore the ‘only force powerful enough’ for revolutions of the type 1789, 1830 and 1848, which he clarified as spontaneous, mass uprisings stemming from social grievances of an ‘endogenous’ nature.3 All were thus the product to a considerable degree of ‘hazard’ or chance, and ‘appeared to their contemporaries comme des révolutionssurprises.’4 Labrousse’s paper elicited a lively response from his listeners, 1 2 3 4

Labrousse, ‘1848-1830-1789,’ p. 1. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 1.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch07

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some of whom pointed out that the hardships cited by the author were present elsewhere, and yet, did not have the same ‘explosive’ consequences. Labrousse’s ruminations on the role and primacy of chance seemed in this case to be at odds with the conspicuous frequency of revolution in France, leading another to ask whether these results might be traced more precisely to ‘psychological’ factors (e.g., that the French people had come to regard revolution as a ‘phénomène normal’).5 Although Labrousse did not address this question directly in his essay, he believed that France’s susceptibility to revolution in 1789, 1830 and 1848 accrued instead from the fact that certain economic and social imbalances persisted over the period and were even augmented by the emergence of new insecurities linked to the spread of industrialization.6 These provocative reflections on the fundamental challenges that ‘fortune’ posed to the conduct of history as a scientific enterprise appeared to deflect attention from Labrousse’s less speculative observations concerning the events at hand.7 He went on, for example, to explain that the revolutions in question would not have amounted to much if they were merely ‘jacqueries d’affames’ born of temporary economic distress.8 The momentous nature of what transpired should be attributed instead to the fact that ‘the political crisis coincided with an economic one.’9 There was also a ‘national’ dimension to the unrest. From 1789 forward, Labrousse wrote, each revolution became indeed the occasion for mass recitals of national feeling, the byproduct in part of a political culture in which most claims or calls to action were grounded on their (imputed) congruence with the will of the nation or the ideals expressed in the great events of its past. In the words of Labrousse: ‘Finally, there is the national fact, fait passionnel par excellence. What a thrill, in 1830, at the sight of the tricolor flags. What hatreds against Guizot and against the regime of July, accomplices by action or abstention of the treaties of 1815.’10 Similar professions of national agency and independence came to the fore in 1848, as captured, for example, in 5 Fawtier, Actes du congrés historique, p. 22. 6 Labrousse, ‘1848-1830-1789,’ pp. 4-8. 7 Note, for example, Labrousse’s response to the remarks of M. Van Kalken. Fawtier, Actes du congrés historique, pp. 26-27. 8 Labrousse, ‘1848-1830-1789,’ p. 11 9 According to Labrousse: ‘In 1848, an industrial proletariat was born: a united proletariat, in which was born, to a higher degree than before, a class consciousness.’ Ibid., pp. 17, 19. For Pierre Leveque, the crisis in France might thus be characterized as le printemps des ouvriers. Leveque ‘Ébranlement et restauration de l’ordre social,’ p. 84. 10 Labrousse went on to add, ‘But the “frisson tricolore” is also a frisson social: that of the progressive bourgeoisie.’ Labrousse, ‘1848-1830-1789,’ p. 15.

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Lamartine’s Manifeste à l’Europe. ‘France is a Republic,’ declared the latter in this famous tract, further adding that ‘the French Republic does not need to be recognized in order to exist. It is a matter of natural right; it is a matter of national right. It is the will of a great people which only demands its title from itself.’11 Although some parts of Labrousse’s thesis have fared better than others over the years, the view one gains from his work of the ‘composite’ nature of the revolutions in question remains a staple of scholarly approaches to the subject, as noted in the previous chapter.12 The revolutions of 1848 bear witness in this sense to the several problems or sources of dissonance challenging the repose of Europe and the international order at the time of the crisis. In the words of Hobsbawm, ‘the world was out of balance. The forces of economic, technical and social change released in the past half-century were unprecedented […] their institutional consequences, on the other hand, were yet modest.’13 The previous chapter closed by asking which of these changes and the corresponding or perceived deficiencies in the institutional or geopolitical sphere – the constitutional, social, or national – was the most severe or capable of initiating a new round of continental unrest. On one hand, it might be doubted whether any general conclusions are possible on this point given the different conditions prevailing in the many parts of Europe affected by the crisis. For others, the question, which is premised on the assumption that certain problems possessed greater mass appeal or mobilizing potential than others, might also seem flawed in the sense that the concept of composite revolution implies that the upheavals sprung from an interdependence of grievances and their cumulative force.14 Additionally, certain grievances and aims were entangled in such a way as to pose severe challenges to any scholar who would wish to delineate the relative power of each. This entangling of ends is particularly evident in the case of the close association, well-marked by historians, between ‘liberalism,’ a movement that encompassed a range of opinions on the appropriate scale and pace 11 Lamartine, Manifeste à l’Europe, pp. 3-4. 12 For a history of the reception of Labrousse’s thesis, see Démier, ‘“Comment naissent les révolutions.”‘ 13 Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 303. 14 As Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann writes, ‘Political reformers had as much need for social protests to further their cause as those backing social protests depended upon the reformers to articulate their demands.’ Von Strandmann, ‘The German Revolutions of 1848-1850,’ p. 103. Similarly for Sheehan, ‘Although the details varied greatly, everywhere a similar pattern emerged: reports from France produced widespread expressions of discontent, usually led by Vormärz opposition but quickly joined by more radical groups and reinforced by collective action among urban working people and peasants.’ Sheehan, German History, p. 661.

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of reform, and nationalism.15 If liberalism, as is commonly argued, grew in popularity and strength during the period was this a reflection therefore of the constitutional or national substance of its aims? These problems aside, in each of the cases reviewed here, from Germany to Habsburg Europe to Italy, historians portray a sharp and even abrupt rise in the strength and assertiveness of, in the words of Sheehan, ‘liberal political action’ in the years immediately preceding the 1848 revolutions, with a corresponding elevation in the perceived stature of national sentiment and demands.16 Contemporary Italian historians speak, for example, of a ‘transformation of the social base of Italian nationalism from a minority political sect into a mass movement’ which ‘took place between 1846 and 1848.’17 Similar depictions are found in the works of Czech, Hungarian and German historians. This remarkable change in the political landscape, if prone to diverse explanations, helps to account for the swift manner in which the liberal opposition in these same regions was able to organize a response to the crisis. There was clearly too a strong transnational element to this development in the sense that the increase in activism occurred across a range of political and cultural frontiers in near simultaneous fashion. R.J.W. Evans, for example, writes that the liberal political forces in Hungary, which, ‘by the mid-1840s’ had attained a powerful position in the kingdom’s diet, ‘drew particularly on the German example.’18 Historians also appear to have less difficulty in accounting for the failure of the revolutions, with most tending to cite the problem of reconciling the substantial divisions within the ranks of the opposition forces. In the words of Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, 1848 may thus be regarded ‘as a historical moment in which the “complexity” of the problems raised made it difficult for any political action to be taken.’19 15 Otto Urban writes, for example, that ‘it would be more proper to talk of “liberalisms”’ in the sense that one cannot point to a ‘complete system of ideas with a well-defined and determinate content.’ Urban, ‘Czech Liberalism, 1848-1918,’ p. 273. Where necessary, distinctions are made below (as elsewhere in the volume) between ‘liberals’ and ‘democrats.’ For a review of how these and related terms (e.g., ‘republicans’) were used during the period, see Philp and Posada-Carbó, ‘Liberalism and Democracy.’ 16 To recall again the words of Von Strandmann, the actions of dissidents in 1830 ‘had not been coordinated and national demands were not strong.’ Von Strandmann, ‘The German Revolutions of 1848-1850,’ p. 104. 17 Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 399. 18 Evans, ‘1848-1849 in the Habsburg Monarchy,’ p. 184. 19 Haupt, ‘1848 en Allemagne,’ p. 466. Haupt attributes this consensus to a cooling of the conflict between German historians of varying ideological dispositions. See also Mattheisen, ‘History as Current Events.’

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The clashes of opinion alluded to above, which were visible in the pre1848 divisions among moderates and ‘democrats,’ were greatly heightened by the ensuing disorder. ‘While many different elements combined to make the revolution possible,’ Blackbourn writes, for example, of the situation in Germany, ‘its outbreak released forces of still greater diversity. The collapse of authority produced an intoxicated sense of new possibilities that spurred some Germans to further actions but f illed others with fear.’20 In the case of Habsburg Europe, the ensuing power vacuum and struggle, combined with the surge in calls for collective action on the part of one group or another, gave rise to a series of mobilizations and counter-mobilizations (euphemisms such as the ‘springtime of the peoples’ notwithstanding) that occasionally took lethal turns.21 If, for example, ‘the threat of German unification,’ writes Bernard Michel, ‘radicalized Czech nationalism,’ the actions of Magyar nationalists had a similar effect on the sentiments of Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, and Serbs. 22 These events serve to mark 1848, he continues, expressing a view shared by several others cited here, as ‘an essential break’ in the history and relations of ‘the nations of the empire.’23

Rise and Fall of the Frankfurt National Assembly As indicated above, the historiography surrounding the revolutions of 1848 contains many references to a sharp increase in the strength of the ‘protest party’ in the second half of the 1840s. Sheehan describes, for example, a sudden ‘impulse to political involvement,’ manifested, most conspicuously, in the rise (if difficult to quantify) of ‘liberal political action.’24 Given the stress placed on the need for unification in the platforms of most liberal parties (whether moderate or radical), this was to have in turn great implications for the public stature of the national question.25 And to be sure, ‘nationalism’ is 20 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, pp. 143-144. 21 For a genealogy of the history and use of the term, see Caron, ‘“Printemps des peoples.”‘ 22 Michel, ‘La Revolution de 1848,’ p. 481. 23 Ibid., p. 477. Similar points in Reill, Nationalists Who Feared the Nation. 24 Sheehan writes in this connection that ‘every indicator of public interest in political life showed a sharp increase: newspaper circulation, book publishing, the formation of political organizations, parliamentary debates, and popular demonstrations.’ Sheehan, German Liberalism, pp. 12, 290. 25 Links between politically active Germans across state lines were meanwhile promoted by developments such as rising newspaper production and expanding ‘transport networks.’ Siemann, The German Revolution of 1848-49, p. 142.

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often said to have risen precipitously in the Bund during this period.26 The rapid establishment of the Frankfurt National Assembly, which was virtually in place by the end of March 1848, followed in fact, according to Brian Vick, from the ability of its founders to ‘draw on the institutional network of the “organized nationalist movement” that had become increasingly dense and popular in the course of the 1840s.’27 In the case of the factors that may help to explain the ‘vitality’ of German liberalism in these years, Sheehan lays stress on ‘a growing sense of crisis’ stemming from ‘economic discontent’ and a corresponding fear of ‘social unrest.’28 The ‘economic dislocations’ alluded to by Sheehan would seem to have been most severely felt by those outside of the Mittelstand ranks of German society, from which the liberal movements were largely composed, although it is possible that a condition of underemployment in these sectors served to politicize some number of this cohort as well.29 Sheehan refers more directly to the possibility that such involvement was stirred by the belief that major reform was needed to avert an impending social upheaval.30 These anxieties were felt as well by German conservatives who also increasingly turned to nationalistic appeals as a means to quell the gathering threat. As Doron Avraham points out: ‘The combination of social crisis, which from the 1820s on became the ‘Social Question’ (die Soziale Frage), and political unrest from the 1830s onwards created a background 26 ‘The undoubted centrality of the national question in 1848 was as much effect as cause of the revolution,’ David Blackbourn observes; however, ‘it was nevertheless a measure of how much German nationalist sentiment had grown in the 1840s that moderates and radicals alike thought immediately of establishing a national assembly.’ Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 164. In the words of Hagen Schulze, ‘it was the idea of nation as a prevailing standard of legitimacy which served to bind together the other, in part contradictory, factions making up the party of protest.’ Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism, p. 68. 27 Vick, Defining Germany, p. 79. 28 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 12. Living conditions in cities such as Berlin, whose population increased by 30 percent between 1840 and 1847, were further imperiled throughout the ‘hungry forties’ by a series of agricultural failures and economic downturns. See, for example, Von Strandmann, ‘The German Revolutions of 1848-1850,’ p. 106. 29 Sheehan refers here to ‘the judicial and administrative bureaucracy,’ physicians, pastors, teachers, and other ‘members of the educated elite.’ Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 19. 30 Ibid., pp. 30-34. Among the groups hardest hit by this distress were the urban craftsmen and artisans: Economic liberalization had substantially increased their numbers but led as well to a condition of chronic underemployment increasingly made worse by the introduction of mechanized production. Seriously endangered in this case by the ‘threat of social demotion,’ urban craftsmen were among the most restive social elements in Europe during the period, a fact grimly attested to by their overrepresentation on the lists of those killed in the street battles of 1848. See, for example, Siemann, The German Revolution of 1848-49, pp. 27-28; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 157.

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in which conservatives started contemplating the meaning and importance of collective identity and nationalism.’31 The sources responsible for the growing strength of liberal activism aside, any movement in this direction served to further raise the level of public discourse on the need for national unification – a principle which was, again, a fixture of most liberal programs. This correlation has been well marked, however, the ‘nature of the association’ as Stuart Woolf suggests, has been subject to diverse readings.32 In attempting himself to explain the sources of such a linkage, Hobsbawm noted that part of the difficulty arose from the fact that there was a ‘surprising degree of intellectual vagueness’ surrounding the importance of the nation in ‘nineteenth-century liberal discourse.’33 Hobsbawm nevertheless believed that this was due to the assumption ‘that it did not require to be spelled out, since it was already obvious.’34 He goes on to argue that the connection accrues in part from a conception of the ‘nation as progress,’ and its corresponding appeal, like liberalism, to those who regarded themselves the bearers of such values or forces of change.35 It might be objected that this cannot be said to represent a ‘natural’ affinity, as Hobsbawm refers, from the start, to a particular rendering of the nation consistent with liberal tastes (it is perhaps akin to saying that liberals were attracted to a liberal conception of the nation). Hobsbawm touches more directly on these subjective elements of contemporary political culture when he later writes that ‘it [e.g., the ‘modern nation’] was linked to the remainder of the great liberal slogans by long association rather than by logical necessity: as liberty and equality are to fraternity.’36 Conversely, ‘because the nation itself was historically novel, it was opposed by conservatives and traditionalists, and therefore attracted their opponents.’37 Woolf 31 Avraham, ‘The Social and Religious Meaning of Nationalism,’ p. 527. Avraham refers to f igures such as Friedrich Julius Stahl, Adam Müller, and Ernest Ludwig von Gerlach who proposed systems of unification in which the princes would operate under the leadership of a strengthened central monarchy. The same would appear to hold for Italian conservatives (e.g., the ‘Anti-Risorgimento’), who might espouse the merits of independence without an insistence on unification, or alternatively, a loose, federal approach to the same. See, for example, Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 86. 32 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 12. 33 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 24. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., pp. 38-39. Note: Scholars tend to trace the first political usage of the term ‘liberal’ to the 1820s. See, for example, Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 11; Philp and Posada-Carbó, ‘Liberalism and Democracy,’ p. 180. 36 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 40 37 Ibid.

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alludes similarly to the logic of a political contest in which each side took up ideological stances based in part upon the oppositions of the other.38 As indicated below, however, conservatives too could fashion a rendering of the nation compatible with their interests. This problem notwithstanding, both Hobsbawm and Woolf refer to a (liberal) concept of the nation, hewing to French Revolutionary-era precedents, in which popular sovereignty and other ideals later associated with liberal movements, were equated with the awakening and emancipation of the ‘nation.’ It could be argued from this perspective that liberalism is implicitly a form of nationalism in the sense that it represents the acquisition on the part of the people at large – the Third Estate or ‘nation,’ for Sieyès – of political powers formerly reserved for other parties.39 However, the nation could only exercise its sovereignty effectively, according to the same tradition, if all its members shared a common consciousness, will or character; an idea that is reprised, in a manner flattering to French national pride, in Lamartine’s Manifesto of 1848. 40 Liberalism necessarily proceeded in tandem therefore with, in contemporary parlance, a nation-building endeavor. These ideas are alluded to by Brian Vick when attempting himself to account for the stress on nationalism in German liberal ideology at the time of the Frankfurt Assembly. Vick observes in this connection a ‘mutually reinforcing and interlocking quality’ of the nationalism and liberalism espoused by the figures in question. Specifically, these deemed the cultivation of national consciousness and the ‘fusion’ of ‘individual or group opinions into a general, or national, will’ as essential to the functioning of ‘self-governing institutions.’41 One may nevertheless ask how deeply these ideas permeated the rank and f ile of German liberals. Secondly, the correlations made here, which deal mainly with classical notions of popular sovereignty, 38 ‘Liberalism and nationalism were necessarily associated,’ he writes, ‘because the anti-liberal states were also anti-national.’ Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 12. 39 See Chapter 4. 40 The various forms of government then in operation, wrote Lamartine in the Manifeste, reflected ‘the diversity of character, geographical location and intellectual, moral and material development among peoples.’ Nations were thus ‘like individuals of different ages’ and ‘the principles that govern them have successive phases.’ The forms – monarchiques, aristocratiques, constitutionnels, républicains – corresponded to the ‘different degrees of maturity of the genie of peoples.’ ‘They demand more freedom as they feel able to bear more,’ he continued, ‘they demand more equality and democracy as they are inspired by more justice and love for the people. It is a matter of timing. A people loses itself by anticipating the hour of this maturity, just as it dishonors itself by letting it escape without grasping it.’ Lamartine, Manifeste à l’Europe, pp. 6-7. 41 Vick, Defining Germany, p. 41.

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don’t account alone for the stress on unification. According, for example, to what has been said above, the people of Saxony, Baden, or any other state of the Bund could be construed as ‘nations,’ complete with their own peculiarities and national consciousness, and their liberal aspirations accordingly satisfied through a more equitable distribution of political power. However, this was obviously not the position of German liberal nationalists. The insistence on unity suggests that they were especially attracted from the start to a more encompassing understanding of the nation, dwelling on matters of culture or history, not wholly accounted for in the theoretical observations made above. 42 Still other works which address the linkage between liberalism and national unification in Germany offer more prosaic explanations. John Breuilly, for example, suggests that the insistence upon national unification in German liberalism was a matter of self-preservation: Simply put, the triumph of such reforms in any state of the Bund would most likely be short-lived if its neighbors remained in the enemy camp – a premise which appears to be applicable as well to the Italian context. As Breuilly explains, ‘opponents of state governments found that behind those governments stood the Bund. That made national reform a necessary condition of state reform. Gradually political opponents of individual states took up connections with one another.’43 This notion of self-preservation had also an international dimension, at least as expressed in German rhetoric upon the subject: As Vick shows, the speeches and writings of the Frankfurt delegates were highly charged with warnings about the ambitions of external powers and the threats they posed to the people of Germany, especially in their divided condition (a point also expressed in Italian discourse). 44 There are finally economic motives to consider. Specifically, the members of liberal movements, who tended to represent the commercial interests of society and waxed often, according to Sheehan, on ‘the blessings of economic growth and development,’ were more likely to appreciate the benefits of the closer economic union which was bound to follow from the political one.45 These 42 Note that Vick refers to the diverse forms and expressions of German national consciousness elsewhere in the work. 43 Breuilly, The Formation of the First German Nation-State, p. 32. Liberal politics were thus implicitly national in orientation, another historian has observed ‘since the creation of a liberal political order at [the] national level was seen as a precondition of the desired domestic changes.’ Green, Fatherlands, p. 13. 44 Vick, Defining Germany, pp. 74-78. 45 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 28. Similar points made in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 20-33.

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benefits were already visible in the early returns from the Zollverein, or so at least it was claimed by figures such as List. 46 It might be said that the material and tactical explanations given above for the liberal attachment to the goal of national unification fail to account for the emotional quality of the discourse on the subject; an issue noted often in Anthony Smith’s critiques of ‘structural’ approaches. 47 The qualities alluded to by Smith came especially to the fore again in works dealing with the specter of an impending recurrence of continental warfare.48 The Rhine Crisis of 1840 is often cited as the catalyst for a widespread surge in sentiment and rhetoric of this kind. 49 In a recent article on the subject, James Brophy cites, for example, the works of an impressive array of modern German historians – Wehler, Schulze, Echtenkamp, Alter, Simms, Winkler – all of whom have ‘canonized the view that the crisis was a decisive moment when liberals abandoned the hope of reforming the political framework of the Confederation, moving toward a program of national unity.’50 Brophy is inclined to agree with this position although he is keen to point out the plurality of responses to the crisis. On one hand, he writes, ‘evidence abounds to record the anti-Jacobinic, anti-Bonapartist, anti-western strains of German political thought, which encouraged not only war but also the belief that France was a force hostile to Germany’s political development.’ On the other hand, he continues, ‘an equally impressive range of print matter can be adduced to show a restrained, measured assessment of the political crisis.’51 Also 46 ‘From day to day it is necessary that the governments and peoples of Germany be more convinced,’ he wrote in 1841, ‘that national unity is the rock on which the edifice of their welfare, their honor, their power, their present security and existence, and their future greatness must be founded.’ Likening the reluctance of some small states to join the venture to an ‘apostasy’ and a ‘national scandal,’ he was confident that in reconsidering the matter ‘intelligently’ all would find that ‘the material advantages of joining the Union are much greater for those states, than the sacrifice which it requires.’ List, ‘The National System of Economy,’ pp. 132-133. 47 This problem pursued throughout works such as Smith, Nationalism and Modernism. 48 According to Iggers, a ‘xenophobia’ with ‘anti-French, anti-Slav, and anti-Semitic components […] had occupied a crucial place in the ideology of pre-1848 nationalism.’ He adds that ‘In 1848 liberals and particularly democrats […] were more outspoken opponents of Slav stirrings for autonomy than were conservatives, and were willing to risk a general European war.’ Iggers, ‘Nationalism and Historiography,’ p. 17. 49 See, for example, Leerssen, ‘The Never-Ending Stream,’ pp. 224-261. Similar spirits were aroused in 1848 over relations with Denmark. See, for example, Hewitson, Nationalism in Germany, pp. 50-52. 50 Brophy, ‘The Rhine Crisis of 1840,’ p. 3. For Schulze, the Rhine crisis was ‘the breaking point’ which established nationalism as ‘a mass phenomenon.’ Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism, pp. 64, 66. 51 Brophy, ‘The Rhine Crisis of 1840,’ p. 20.

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significant are Brophy’s conclusions regarding the crisis’ role in encouraging a reduction of censorship restrictions throughout the Bund; a measure that was conducive to the further dissemination of liberal doctrines.52 In sum, attempts to explain the remarkable developments in the Germanspeaking world over the course of 1848 point to a sharp intensification of political activity in the immediately preceding years and one which accrued especially to the benefit of liberal and nationalist programs. The Assembly served as an official medium for the continuation of a dialogue on issues of this kind, while dealing of course too with the nation’s economic maladies.53 Defining the borders of the German nation was consequently a matter of first importance but also one of great contention. These vehement debates, in which ‘Tacitean references to ancient tribal habitations mingled with voluntarist Rousseauian echoes of the general will,’ offer a remarkable view of the diversity in both ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity on the part of those attending as well as the division of opinion over the merits of federal and unitary state designs.54 As Levinger writes, a central problem ‘for the revolutionaries of 1848, as for subsequent generations of German political leaders, was the proper distribution of sovereign authority between the nation and the territorial states.’55 If in fact, he adds, ‘the leading revolutionaries concurred that Germany should be unified, many believed that significant authority should remain vested within the individual territorial states.’56 Compromise was perhaps further hindered by what Sheehan describes as a political culture in which each faction tended to depict the 52 According to the author: ‘Because state officials saw utility in the nationalist hue and cry, censors permitted nationalist musings, thus opening a door.’ Ibid. 53 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, p. 149. 54 Vick, Defining Germany, p. 142. Although the question of sovereignty was never definitively settled, most members of the assembly were probably in favor of retaining the Lander (states); the future Bund would perhaps bear a closer resemblance in this case to the federal Germany much spoken of by patriots such as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) during the Napoleonic Wars than the federation of German states which later emerged at the Congress of Vienna. As indicated in the words of Schleiermacher in 1813: ‘My greatest wish after liberation is for one true German Empire, powerfully representing the entire German folk and territory to the outside world, while internally allowing the various Lander and their princes a great deal of freedom to develop and rule according to their own particular needs.’ Cited in Sheehan, German History, p. 379. Even in 1848, another has observed, ‘the memory of the old Reich’ continued to foster ‘federative rather than unitary’ visions of a future Germany. Green, Fatherlands, p. 322. 55 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, p. 225. 56 ‘Indeed,’ he continues, ‘many Germans would continue to use the word “nation” to describe Germany’s constituent states, such as Bavaria and Wurttemberg, through the decade of the 1860s. Even Prussia had its own “national assembly” in 1848-1849. In Prussia, however, this usage of the word “nation” seems to have been an anomaly of the 1848 Revolution. The term “Prussian

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contests at hand as a ‘struggle between good and evil.’57 Given these many ‘controversies’ writes Levinger regarding the constitution, boundaries and social composition of the nation, ‘the revolutionary movement failed to crystallize around a single central project’ and ‘ultimately proved no match for the conservative forces, which were determined to reassert monarchical authority in the German states.’ Indeed, ‘the failure of the 1848 Revolution,’ he concludes, ‘stemmed in part from the intensely contested character of the concept “nation.”’58

National Mobilization and Counter-Mobilization in Habsburg Europe The sharp rise depicted above in the strength of liberal movements and internal political contention in Germany over the course of the 1840s is typical too of accounts of contemporaraneous events in Habsburg Europe. As Otto Urban writes, for example, of the situation in Bohemia, the emergence of a ‘new, liberal generation’ of Czech patriots and ‘ideologists’ precipitated an intense power ‘struggle’ in which the latter sought a ‘comprehensive revision’ of the ‘original premises of the national program.’59 These developments entailed, Urban continues, a politicization of the Czech national movement, with ‘purely national (linguistic and literary) demands’ being joined to ‘new, liberal postulates, including claims for radical changes in the basic social, political and governmental structures.’60 In Hungary, too, the 1840s are commonly described as a time of intense internal debate, with the political balance of power increasingly favoring the liberals.61 As again in Germany, the strength and initiative of liberal movements in both these parts of Habsburg Europe was reflected in their ability to quickly form an organized response to the subsequent crisis and advance their agendas for reform. Moreover, the connection observed in Germany between liberalism and nationalism holds as well in the Czech and Hungarian cases, although nation” had appeared quite rarely in public discourse since the Napoleonic era, and it virtually disappeared after 1850.’ Ibid. 57 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 18. 58 Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, p. 225. 59 Urban, ‘Czech Liberalism, 1848-1918,’ p. 280. 60 Ibid., pp. 280-281. 61 In the words of Eötvös in a text from the time, Hungary found itself in the 1840s ‘at a crossroads.’ Cited in Vermes, Hungarian Culture and Politics, p. 304. See also Dénes, ‘Political Vocabularies of the Hungarian Liberals and Conservatives.’

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few could have predicted what followed.62 To be sure, the early stages of the crisis featured episodes of intracommunal cooperation, notably in Bohemia. However, these were succeeded by an escalation of tensions, increasingly inflammatory rhetoric (replete with dystopian visions of national annihilation), and ultimately, in the case of the Hungarian Kingdom, full-blown ethnic conflict. This violence reached such a scale again that the period has often been characterized as representing a ‘turning point’ in the history of the ‘nations of the empire.’63 Attempts to reconstruct how this came about usually take account of the fact that some conflicts of interest were previously present among the groups in question, although one hastens to add that this did not imply an unavoidable slide toward open warfare. Nor did the leaders of the national movements within the region always espouse radical or overtly threatening aims, as indicated again in the Czech case, where many advocated strongly against full sovereignty and the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. This position was famously presented in the course of Palacký’s rejection of an invitation to join the deliberations in Frankfurt; the implication being that Bohemia, which had been part of the Holy Roman Empire as well as the Bund, belonged in a future united Germany. But ‘when I direct my gaze beyond the frontiers of Bohemia,’ countered Palacký in his well-known ‘letter’ of 11 April 1848, ‘natural and historical considerations constrain me to turn not to Frankfurt but to Vienna, to seek there the centre which is fitted and predestined to ensure and defend the peace, the liberty, and the rights of my nation.’64 The initiatives in Frankfurt promised only to elevate ‘German national consciousness,’ he continued, and ‘expand the power and strength of the German Empire.’65 The dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire would strengthen in turn, the hand of Russia, warned Havlíček, an acquisitive power driven by the ambition to ‘control all Slav lands.’66 Any hope for the cultivation of a Czech national life, and surely all of the small nations composing the Habsburg Empire grasped this point, depended therefore upon the preservation of the empire – provided of course that it recognized the error of its ways and adopted a more enlightened nationality policy.67 62 According, for example, to Urban, ‘all forms of Czech liberalism were “nationalistic” to some degree.’ ‘Czech Liberalism, 1848-1918,’ p. 274 63 Michel, ‘La Révolution de 1848,’ p. 481. 64 Palacký, ‘Letter to Frankfurt,’ p. 327. 65 Ibid., p. 324. 66 Havlíček, ‘The Slav and the Czech,’ p. 253. 67 For only a system built upon ‘the principles of equality,’ advised Palacký, could produce the unity necessary for the empire’s survival. Palacký, ‘Letter to Frankfurt,’ p. 327.

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As historians have nevertheless pointed out, the prospects for compromise not only between the empire and its constituent nations, but among the latter themselves, were sometimes undermined by overlapping territorial claims and notions of ‘historic rights.’68 ‘The example set by the Magyars,’ as Peter Brock has written, ‘stimulated the Slovaks and other peoples of the kingdom to emulate their cultural achievements and even to resist them when they attempted to deny to others what they demanded for themselves.’69 The Ukrainian movement elicited hostility in turn from Polish nationalists who saw it as a threat to their dream of a fully restored Commonwealth.70 The Czechs had meanwhile to contend with the appearance of similarly ‘upstart’ Moravian and Slovak nationalisms. Of these, the latter proved more controversial and this despite the fact that its first representatives, Ján Kollár and Josef Šafařík, advocated a form of Pan-Slavism that took some account of Czech sensibilities.71 The ‘unitary’ position on the language question advocated by the latter was subsequently rejected by younger Slovaks such as Ľudovít Štúr who published several ‘apologies’ of their own intended to demonstrate the substantial differences between the ‘national’ idioms of both peoples.72 Although the writings of Štúr produced angry denunciations in Prague, historians suggest that the attention of Czech scholars and polemicists tended to fix more upon what was perceived to be the historical confrontation between German and Slav; a perspective on full display in Palacký’s 68 For an earlier scholar, ‘the question of nationalities was raised and appeared in all its complexity. […] Each nation seeking to resolve the issue to the best of its interests, it was inevitable that rivalries would arise: pursuing its national unity, it could not fail to come into conflict with another nationality living in the same territory.’ Markovitch, ‘La Révolution Serbe de 1848,’ p. 194. 69 Brock, The Slovak National Awakening, p. 39. 70 As Janowski writes, ‘Soon, however, it became apparent that the conflict between the despotic authority and the liberal opposition was blended with the conflict between rivaling nations. Weaker nationalities considered the threat from Vienna less dangerous than the threat from the stronger neighbors. So, the Czechs were afraid of the Germans, the Ukrainians of the Poles, and the weaker nations of the Hungarian crown of the Hungarians. In effect all of them gave support to the Viennese court in the hope that the reformed Austria will assure them the best conditions for development. In this way, in 1848 the Poles in the Austrian Partition had to face the modern nationality question for the first time in their history. Besides the Polish national movement there appeared a quickly maturing and even more self-conscious Ukrainian movement. Polish thought was totally unprepared for such a development, repeating dogmas of the return to the boundaries of 1772.’ Janowski, Polish Liberal Thought before 1918, p. 98. 71 For Kollár and Šafařik, former students at the University of Jena where they had come into contact with both the Burschenschaftler and the works of Herder, Czechs and Slovaks formed a single nationality. See, for example, Orton, The Prague Slav Congress of 1848, p. 9. 72 Ibid. For additional historiographical context, see Maxwell, ‘Effacing Panslavism.’

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multivolume History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia (1848-1867).73 ‘Continuous contact and conflict between the Slav, Roman and German characters,’ wrote Palacký, ‘was the basic feature of all Bohemian-Moravian history.’74 But given the fact that the Roman character did not touch the Czechs directly it might simply be said that Czech history is ‘based mainly on conflict with Germandom, in other words, on the Czechs acceptance or rejection of German manners and regimen.’75 Although Palacký used much stronger language in this Czech version of his history than the earlier work of the same title published in German, such ideas, circulating widely in the later years of the Vormärz, offer some context for the rhetoric that burst out amid the stresses of 1848, with German and Slavic writers each accusing the other of fantastic plots to absorb and assimilate their peoples.76 As scholars such as Hugh Agnew nevertheless contend, many people, Czech and German alike, retained a ‘flexible’ sense of ‘Bohemian’ identity well into the nineteenth century.77 Some even sought to give it a surer foundation, as glimpsed in the writings of the Charles University professor Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) whose appeal for a renewed commitment to bilingualism and the cultivation of a ‘Bohemian’ identity recalls the hopeful remarks of Belgian patriots discussed in previous chapters.78 The social cleavage between German and Slav abhorred by Bolzano was nevertheless reinforced, writes Urban, recalling points made again in the Belgian case, by a pattern of industrialization in Bohemia in which the ‘means of production’ largely found their way into the hands of German speakers.79 These and other socio-economic developments have also been cited by scholars such as Hroch as conducive to fostering a ‘coincidence 73 See, for example, Štaif, ‘The Image of the Other.’ According to Urban, ‘from the late eighteenth century, Czech modernization was a matter of building up the Czech nation, saving it from the influence of Germanization.’ Urban, ‘Czech Liberalism, 1848-1918,’ p. 274. 74 Palacký, ‘A History of the Czech Nation,’ p. 55. 75 Ibid. 76 Orton, The Prague Slav Congress of 1848, pp. 42-43. 77 Agnew, ‘Czechs, Germans, Bohemians?’ 78 Text refers to works such as Bolzano, ‘Concerning the Relations between the Two Peoples of Bohemia,’ pp. 239-245. For additional context, see Hroch, ‘From Ethnic Group toward the Modern Nation.’ 79 As one scholar has explained, ‘Initially, industrialization occurred in German-speaking regions with their older tradition of crafts, and due to this and other reasons a stereotype grew up around the middle of the nineteenth century: the German as craftsman, industrialist, entrepreneur, workman; the Czech as peasant, farmer or workman.’ Progressing in this fashion, industrialization privileged (or reinforced the privileges) of one group over another and placed Czech workmen in the position of having to learn German in order to improve their status. Urban, ‘Czech Society, 1848-1918,’ pp. 199-202. Gellner alludes to the case in Gellner, Nations and

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of national demands and social (political, cultural) interests’ which may have abetted the growth of the Czech movement. 80 Sharp increases, for example, in the size of the rural population of Bohemia, combined with peasant emancipation and a rise of commercial activity in the towns, led to a steady exodus of people from the countryside. These largely Czech-speaking newcomers to town life accordingly found themselves in circumstances which were propitious for the elevation of collective sentiment: Unlike the German peasant, argues Hroch, the Czech ‘entered a society whose official language he was unable to understand. The difference in possibility of social advancement – and also in the search for a new identity – became apparent.’81 These sources of friction notwithstanding, the demands included in the 11 March 1848 Prague Citizens Petition, which called for the unification and federal autonomy of the ancient ‘crown lands’ of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the elevation of Czech to equal status with German as the language of public affairs, and a set of reforms concerning the extension of political rights and civic freedoms, was initially drafted with the support of liberal German Bohemians.82 Unfortunately, the final version of the petition and its provisional acceptance by the hard-pressed Habsburg authorities was greeted with less enthusiasm by a Bohemian German community stirred up by the progress of events in Frankfurt. In the rapidly intensifying contest over loyalties it became clear, writes Agnew, that the majority of the latter had been converted to the großdeutsch or Greater Germany program.83 The pronouncements of Havlicek demanding succession of Bohemia from the German Confederation and finally Palacký’s widely circulated response to the Frankfurt Assembly (cited above), further widened the breach.84 Both lent their support in turn to the forming of the Prague Slav Congress, seeing this as a means for rallying Slavic opinion in defense of maintaining the physical integrity of the Habsburg Empire. For Jeremy King, the inhabitants of Bohemia thus found themselves suddenly faced with ‘a fundamental question […] did they want to belong to a German state, to a Habsburg one, or to a Czech or Bohemian one within the monarchy?’85 The advocates of each side proceeded to publicize their Nationalism, pp. 108-109n. See also the observations of Hroch, ‘National Romanticism,’ p. 14, and idem, ‘From Ethnic Group toward the Modern Nation,’ p. 106. 80 Hroch, ‘From Ethnic Group toward the Modern Nation,’ p. 95. 81 Ibid., p. 99. See also Klíma, ‘The Czechs,’. 82 Havránek, ‘Bohemian Spring 1848,’ p. 125. 83 Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, p. 118. 84 Havránek, ‘Bohemian Spring 1848,’ p. 125. 85 King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans, p. 30.

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positions with competing slogans demanding ‘Czechia for the Czechs! And ‘Bohemia for the [German] Bohemians!’86 These frictions, however severe, between Czech and German speakers of Bohemia did not escalate into armed conflict. Unfortunately, this was not true in the case of Hungary, where intra-communal relations took a violent turn. In the case of pre-1848 Hungarian affairs, here again, historians point to a heightening of nationalist discourse, as well as the ill feelings inspired in minority groups by the Magyarization campaigns, expressed in the form of language ordinances, issuing from the kingdom’s Diet.87 This latter institution, which had been recalled to service by Habsburg authorities in 1825, became the site of considerable debate and acrimony over the question of how best not only to improve the nation but preserve it from extinction.88 For all the violent clashes of opinion which came to the fore, these proceedings helped nevertheless to shape the Diet into an institution which had by 1848, in the view of Kořalka, ‘far outdistanced all other corporate representative bodies in the Habsburg Monarchy in terms of political experience, definition of aims and determination.’89 Contention within the Diet entered a critical phase in the 1840s following the rise of a new generation of liberal statesmen, led above all by Kossuth, and a corresponding attempt to accelerate the pace of reform.90 In addition to fierce debate on issues such as peasant emancipation, freedom of the press, and measures to increase commerce, opinions also diverged over a renewed push to make Magyar ‘the vehicle of Hungary’s cultural life’ – a project that aroused opposition from other groups within the kingdom.91 The language laws of the 1830s which made knowledge of Hungarian mandatory for all engaged in public affairs were particularly divisive.92 Demands for a federalization of the Habsburg Empire further elevated these tensions by raising the prospect (should they succeed) of even greater exposure to Magyar control – as the federal program envisioned by Hungarian leaders for the 86 Ibid., p. 24. 87 The recall of the Hungarian Diet in 1825 is typically identified as the starting point of the so-called ‘reform era’ in the kingdom’s history. Barany, ‘The Age of Royal Absolutism,’ p. 188. 88 Vermes, Hungarian Culture and Politics, p. 319. 89 Kořalka, ‘Revolutions in the Habsburg Monarchy,’ p. 149. 90 See especially the description of the 1843-1844 diet in Vermes, Hungarian Culture and Politics, pp. 308-313. 91 Barany, ‘The Age of Royal Absolutism,’ p. 190. 92 ‘We are yet a Hungarian people [genus Hungaricum] and a single people,’ objected, for example, the Croatian poet Juraj Rehoni in 1832, ‘so long as the communal Latin tongue remains.’ Cited in Evans, ‘Language and State Building,’ p. 9. For additional background, see Péter, Hungary’s Long Nineteenth Century, pp. 187-189.

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empire did not extend to the lands enclosed within the Hungarian Kingdom itself. Attempts by some prominent figures such as István Széchenyi to exert a restraining influence on these trends were nevertheless defeated by more forceful and charismatic proponents of change.93 The mobilizations of other language groups within the kingdom meanwhile grew apace. To meet this challenge, Hungarian reformers reprised a democratized version of the old culturally neutral concept of the ‘political nation.’ National feeling would be grounded, according to this view, in common political, social and legal rights, the access to which was now to be enjoyed by all the inhabitants of the kingdom (not merely the nobility). Hungarian liberals, much like those discussed earlier in Poland, hoped therefore to thwart demands for greater autonomy among the minority groups through a program of expanded individual freedoms, or, in so many words, ‘to offer constitutionalism in return for assimilation.’94 But this enlarged ‘political nation’ still required a common language to function, or so at least it was claimed by Magyar legislators, who made their preferences for the choice of such an idiom clear. The prospective benefits of membership in the ‘Hungarian political nation’ proved therefore inadequate in halting the politicization of groups such as the Slovaks whose efforts toward cultural rehabilitation and enrichment evolved into appeals for a separate crown land – a constitutional measure now deemed necessary to prevent ‘denationalization.’95 As witnessed previously in the cases of Germany and Bohemia, Hungarian liberals responded swiftly to the disorders of 1848 and sought at once to mobilize popular support for their cause.96 Legislation was duly passed abolishing the robot, extending suffrage – the old ‘noble nation’ was finally put to rest – and establishing freedom of the press. These reforms were institutionalized in the ‘April laws’ which additionally proclaimed Hungary’s new autonomous status within the empire and its reunification with Transylvania. Jubilation surrounding these achievements was soon tempered, however, by reports of growing restiveness among the kingdom’s national minorities, the insecurities of which were heightened now by the prospect of life in Hungary without the mediating influence of Vienna. These anxieties surfaced in the earlier cited Prague Slav Congress 93 See, for example, Vermes, Hungarian Culture and Politics, pp. 303-308. 94 Trencsényi, editorial introduction to Lajos Mocsary ‘Nationality,’ in Trencsényi and Kopeček, Discourses of Collective Identity, II, p. 356. 95 Brock, The Slovak National Awakening, p. 52. 96 See Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary.

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of June 1848 but took a darker turn with the actual outbreak of fighting between Serbs and Magyars in the Banat, the former drawing volunteers from the semi-independent Serbian state across the Habsburg border.97 The conflict quickly escalated into a fierce and wasteful struggle of a year’s duration, since characterized by some historians as the ‘region’s first ethnic and race war.’98 Warfare also broke out between Magyars and Romanians in eastern Hungary and Transylvania. An additional challenge to Magyar hegemony came finally from Croatia, which possessed an army of its own led by the newly installed Ban, Josip Jellačić. Although defeated in his first clashes with Hungarian forces in September of 1848, Jellačić later helped to put down the second Viennese revolution of that year, a victory which appeared to mark a turning point in the fortunes of the beleaguered empire. The fall of Prague shortly followed. By January 1849, with order restored in the capital and a new emperor at its head, the monarchy was poised to reckon with Hungary. An offer of military assistance from the Tsar in May settled the issue. And yet at this late hour the now fully independent state of Hungary, its leaders having refused to recognize the succession of Franz Joseph to the Habsburg crown, made a sweeping gesture of peace to the peoples over whom it still claimed suzerainty, guaranteeing ‘a national life’ to all in exchange for political unity.99 It was nevertheless a show of beneficence, indifferently received, on the part of a government which, in less than a month’s time, would cease to exist.

1848 and the ‘New Risorgimento Historiography’ In a recent review article, Mauricio Isabella observed that ‘the centre of gravity’ of Risorgimento scholarship, ‘has shifted away from the French period and the earlier decades of the Restoration towards 1848-9 and the biennium of 1859.’100 Although Isabella detects no opposition on the part of the scholars in question to the view that ‘the French Revolution was central to the origins of the Risorgimento,’ the representatives of this new school, and Isabella refers specifically to figures such as Banti, Ginsborg, Isvenghi and Cecchinato, see 1848 as exemplifying and in rather abrupt fashion 97 For additional background, see Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, I, pp. 239-250. 98 Deák, ‘The Historiography of Hungary,’ p. 1046. See also Ćirković, The Serbs, p. 203. 99 Text refers to the Nationalities Act of 28 July 1849. 100 Isabella, ‘Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,’ p. 256.

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‘the birth of a new popular political culture.’101 This view breaks also with postwar traditions of historiography, linked especially with the thought of Gramsci, in displaying a greater appreciation for the mass involvement of the public in events like 1848, which these later scholars attribute in turn to a sharp increase in the strength and spread of national sentiment.102 In The Risorgimento Revisited, Lucy Riall and Silvana Patriarca write similarly of 1848-1849 as having acquired the significance of a ‘turning point in Italian history,’ while referring also to the increasing importance of ‘nationalism’ as a ‘causal variable’ over ‘the primacy of class struggle and the fight for political hegemony.’103 This change is credited in part to historiographical trends corresponding to the intervening linguistic turn as illustrated especially again in the work of Banti, who has striven to show 101 Ibid. Note also again remarks of Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 399. This view may be distinguished from ones found in prewar histories, often ‘hagiographical’ and teleological in nature, which give the impression of a gradually unfolding process, beginning in the eighteenth century, and characterized by a steady, incremental growth in popular mobilization. ‘Everyone knows,’ wrote the historian Gioacchino Volpe in 1932, ‘that to understand the ‘Risorgimento’ it is not enough to go back to 1815 or even to 1796. […] The ‘Risorgimento,’ as the renewal of Italian life, as the formation of a new bourgeoisie, as a growing consciousness of national problems […] has to be traced back to well before the Revolution.’ Cited in Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 233. Gramsci refers to Volpe’s L’Italia in cammino: l’ultimo cinquantennio (1927). 102 Isabella refers, for example, to the work of Anna Maria Isastia, who has argued that the military conflicts of 1848 and 1849 involved ‘over a hundred thousand individuals organized in more than 350 groups of volunteers.’ Isabella, ‘Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,’ p. 253. This shift can even be seen in the works of important present-day scholars, who, in their studies from the 1990s tended ‘to look primarily at the interaction between social classes and institutions in the Restoration regimes, at the expense of revolutions, ideology and politics, thus neglecting nationalism and even the Risorgimento itself as putative causes accounting the creation of the Italian state.’ Ibid., p. 250. Riall, for example, once wrote of Risorgimento as an outcome of the failure of Italian states (other than Piedmont) ‘to negotiate Italy’s ‘difficult modernization’ successfully.’ Riall, The Italian Risorgimento. Unification occurred, John Davis wrote similarly in a more recent piece, ‘because six Italian states collapsed,’ crushed under a weight of accumulated discontent stemming from ‘a series of crises’ beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing into the nineteenth. Davis, ‘Rethinking the Risorgimento?,’ p. 45. 103 Patriarca and Riall, The Risorgimento Revisited, pp. 2, 12. See also Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 397. This to be distinguished from Gramsci, whose interpretation of the ‘nationalism’ of the Moderates ran as follows: ‘The Moderates, then, were an expression of the “trepidation” of the aristocracy and affluent people, who feared “excesses,” and of the diplomatic corps. In what way could this be an expression of anything “national”? As for the fear of “excesses”: was it not fear of the classes that would mobilize to assert their progressive demands? And the “fearful”: were they not the reactionary protectors of an antinational status quo…? […] Grand Duchy or a unified Italy: what does it matter as long as things stay the same?’ Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 245. Note that Gramsci’s interpretation continues to find a place in Risorgimento historiography, as witnessed in the work of Franco Della Peruta. See, for example, again, Isabella, ‘Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,’ p. 249.

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how the national aspirations conveyed in writings of various patriot-literati could obtain a mass following.104 Far from advancing their claims through appeals to abstract concepts or principles, the texts cited by Banti dwell upon matters of faith, kinship, heroism and honor; connecting the ideals and aims in question (consciously or not) to ‘deep images’ which had the capacity to arouse emotional responses and motivate action. Banti thus conducts an analysis of Risorgimento discourse that responds, many feel effectively, to the kinds of cautions expressed by Lyttelton when writing earlier of how too great a reliance on ‘disembodied ideas’ may inhibit an understanding of the ‘social forces’ which actually made the Risorgimento.105 In summary, although the turn in scholarship cited above continues to provoke debate, it seems uncontroversial at present to rank national sentiment high among the factors responsible for the massive unrest across the Italian peninsula over the years 1848-1849. This raises in turn by-now familiar questions regarding how to best account for the sharp rise in such sentiments considering again the nature of the disturbances in 1830, which if significant, failed to acquire – and by a large margin – such dimensions. What had happened in the intervening years to dramatically alter the fortunes of the national movement in Italy? In addition to the claims of authors such as Banti and Ginsborg regarding developments on the cultural front and their effects, speculation on this question turns also to trends in the political sphere.106 Here again, scholars tend to link the rise of nationalism in Italy during this period to an increase in the strength of liberalism, variously defined. For Roberto Romani it was in fact more precisely the emergence and popularity of a particular branch of Italian liberalism, namely ‘moderatism,’ that warrants attention.107 This moderate ‘movement’ had 104 For Körner and Riall, Banti ‘laid down the major challenge to previous ways of thinking’ in his landmark book, published in 2000, La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santita` e onore alle origini dell’Italia unita [Risorgimento nation: Kinship, sanctity and honor at the origins of a united Italy]. Körner and Riall, ‘Introduction,’ p. 399. Note again that some historians, such as David Laven, continue to express reservations toward this school of thought. See, for example, Laven, ‘Why Patriots Wrote and What Reactionaries Read,’ pp. 419-426. ‘When popular insurrections broke out in 1848,’ he countered earlier, ‘those on the barricades were not prompted by reading Foscolo or looking at the canvases of Hayez. […] Revolution came about because of the failure of the Restoration regimes to address practical problems faced by ordinary Italians.’ Laven, ‘Italy,’ p. 257. 105 Lyttelton, ‘The Middle Classes in Liberal Italy,’ p. 218. 106 See, for example, Ginsborg, ‘European Romanticism and the Italian Risorgimento.’ 107 ‘Moderates,’ write Philp and Posada-Carbó, ‘saw themselves as a “party,” as distinct from a faction, and sought a dialogue with their governments. They were committed to order and the decentralization of state institutions, and aspired to a constitutionally protected dialogue between the governing classes and the sovereign. They emphasized the importance of a public sphere for political deliberation and as the basis for mixed government. They wanted

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its ‘inception,’ writes Romani, in 1843 with Gioberti’s previously cited Del primate morale, a work which inspired a host of comparable publications promoting the ‘neo-Guelph’ position, the great advantage of which, from a popularization standpoint, lay in its complimentary attitude toward the Church.108 In short order, ‘a moderate network encompassing the whole peninsula was quickly set up,’ the power of which was expressed not only in intellectual and journalistic endeavors but in the realm of practice, as witnessed by the reforms undertaken in the Papal States and Piedmont on the eve of the revolutions. Despite the differences in doctrine separating the various branches of Italian liberalism, the connection cited elsewhere appears again to hold: where liberalism grew in strength, so too did nationalism. That said, familiar questions come to the fore regarding which end of the linkage merits precedence – were people drawn, for example, to such movements on the basis of their constitutional or national ideals? – or were indeed the two joined in such a way as to render such queries irrelevant (or insoluble)? In addition to the ideological and cultural factors noted above, practical explanations for such a linkage are also prominent and analogous to the German situation. As in the case of the relationships in Germany between the individual federal units and the Bund, the success of liberalism in one state of the Italian peninsula was arguably contingent upon its triumph elsewhere; as any isolated attempt at regime change would otherwise be exposed to a reactionary onslaught – with of course the support of Austria – from its neighbors. These factors could accordingly serve to profoundly entangle national independence, unification and anti-Austrian sentiment in the mind of Italian liberals. Another practical source of calls for unification, relevant also to German liberalism, may be found in the material sphere and namely in the form of its projected economic advantages. The question of a peninsula-wide railway network was a particularly popular subject; however, this could not be completed without the cooperation of Austria, which declined to link its Italian territories by rail with those of Piedmont – a policy, writes Lyttelton, which ‘helped to fuse economic and nationalist grievances.’109 independence from foreign intervention and advocated a politics rooted in their own history and culture.’ Philp and Posada-Carbó, ‘Liberalism and Democracy,’ p. 193. For contemporary developments in democratic ideology, see Fruci, ‘Democracy in Italy.’ 108 According to Romani, ‘moderatism worked for it resonated with deep-rooted opinions and feelings associated with Catholicism.’ Romani, Sensibilities of the Risorgimento, p. 97. 109 Lyttelton writes, for example, of a major effort in the 1840s on the part of journalists and intellectuals to ‘popularize’ a ‘programme for economic unification.’ Ibid., p. 88.

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If in sum, scholars have recently tended to depict a sharp increase in popular support for national independence and unification throughout the peninsula in the second half of the 1840s, why did the revolution in Italy fail to make any progress in achieving such aims? Reasons given for this outcome include factors cited elsewhere, such as the existence of a plurality of interests and agendas among the opposition forces, as well as the actions and deficiencies of certain key figures, chief among them King Charles Albert of Piedmont. Some scholars also refer to the failure of the nationalist parties to draw the rural populace into the fold.110 Accounts of the revolutions in 1848-1849 give compelling evidence, for example, of mass uprisings involving the urban strata of Italian life.111 However, the participation of the rural peasantry in such events and their attitude more generally toward issues of ‘national’ import remains difficult to assess.112 That said, many scholars no doubt share Ilaria Porciani’s view that the rural populace ‘had no interest in the cause of independence, let alone unification […] most of all, it was the urban dwellers (including lower-class people) who participated in 1848.’113 She further argues that sources such as 110 Although he spoke often of the goal to create a genuine mass movement, Mazzini himself looked first to the ‘the youth of the educated classes,’ as a recruiting ground for Young Italy. His reasons for doing so appeared to rest not on material interests but the belief that his movement was built upon conceptions of duty and mission that required a modicum of leisure time, education, and independence of mind to grasp. Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 107. It was similarly the urban middle classes, representing more generally a retinue of merchants, professionals and bureaucrats (the latter of whom had been enlarged in number by the reforms of the Napoleonic era), who are thought to have been the primary consumers of the canone risorgimentale and the greatest advocates for reform and Italian unif ication. Many of these found their career prospects inhibited by the Restoration, a situation which was further complicated in Venice and Lombardy by the tendency to fill government positions with appointees from Vienna. Lyttelton, ‘The Middle Classes in Liberal Italy,’ pp. 219-221. 111 See, for example, the remarks of Carlo Cattaneo in L’Insurrection de Milan en 1848. For additional background on Cattaneo’s thought and actions, see Thom, ‘Unity and Confederation in the Italian Risorgimento.’ As Adrian Lyttelton recently wrote, ‘in 1848 the mobilization of the masses was far more general than in 1859-1860, and even if it was prevalently an urban phenomenon, there were moments when the rural population was also involved.’ Lyttelton, ‘Comment.’ 112 As John Davis and Paul Ginsborg write in another work, the popular spirits and enthusiasms aroused by the great events of the day might just as rapidly be extinguished or diverted, e.g., ‘We do not want the Republic,’ declared the villagers from one province of the Neapolitan Kingdom over the course of the Napoleonic struggle, ‘if we must pay the same taxes as before.’ Cited in Davis and Ginsborg, Society and Politics in the Age of the Risorgimento, p. 21. A figure such as Garibaldi was thus of immense value because of his ability to inspire mass interest. Riall, Garibaldi, pp. 226-247. 113 Porciani, ‘On the Uses and Abuses of Nationalism from Below,’ p. 81.

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Cattaneo’s L’Insurrection de Milan en 1848 which allude to the involvement of the peasantry were intended to counter the very different accounts of the event produced by Austrian authorities.114 Still other scholars note in this connection a marked disinterest toward ‘the people’ in Risorgimento discourse, or at least a tendency to show much less reverence toward the same than found in those nationalist traditions with a prominent volkish dimension.115 A similar situation it may be argued arose in Greece, where the peasant masses also appeared to interfere with the reveries of a social elite, fixated on a golden past.116 Italy and Greece stand out starkly in this case from contemporary Slavic and German nationalisms which expended so much ink and energy upon the glorification of folk culture, a phenomenon that appears to suggest the conditioning role of external perceptions and attitudes.117 If not included in the nationalist discourse the peasants were nevertheless a social force of immense potential, their lives having been adversely affected by the nexus of high population growth and the commercialization of agriculture.118 Some historians may take these factors to suggest again that the peasantry represented a missed opportunity for Italian nationalism, a social force that could otherwise have proven decisive. Mazzini, for one, who referred often to the examples of the Spanish and Greek wars of independence, appreciated this fact; however, he also seemed puzzled over the way forward.119 The task of building a truly mass movement had, 114 Ibid. 115 For Stuart Woolf, ‘wholly absent from Risorgimento national discourse is exaltation of the peasantry as the ‘carriers’ of the original purity and language of the nation.’ Woolf, ‘Nation, Nations and Power in Italy,’ p. 302. 116 These questions explored in works such as Augustinos, ‘Philhellenic Promises.’ 117 Greek and Italian intelligentsia tended to covet in so many words those things (and the honors attached to them) which they perceived to rank high in the minds of enlightened European opinion – even if such claims of heredity only served to highlight the distance separating themselves from their glorious ancestors. For additional context, see Kostantaras, ‘Idealisations of Self and Nation’; Todorova, Imagining the Balkans; and Leontis, ‘Ambivalent Greece,’ among many other sources. 118 As elsewhere, land reforms enacted in Italy during the Napoleonic era proved extremely injurious to the peasantry, generating conditions, in the words of John Davis, of ‘grinding poverty, tensions and conflicts that were a constant backdrop to the political struggles of the nineteenth century.’ Davis, ‘Italy 1796-1870,’ p. 179. 119 See, for example, the opening statutes of Young Italy, which include Mazzini’s reflections on waging a people’s war: ‘Insurrection – by means of guerrilla bands – is the true method of warfare for all nations desirous of emancipating themselves from a foreign yoke. […] It forms the military education of the people, and consecrates every foot of the native soil by the memory of some warlike deed.’ Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 71.

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in his defense, the qualities of a zero-sum game in which appeals to one class imperiled the ability to attract another; a dilemma felt by nationalists in Poland and elsewhere. If too radically pitched, a program of attaining national unification ‘from below’ would ‘terrify’ the middle classes and drive them to reaction.120 Other scholars have claimed that prospects for gaining the support of the peasantry were dimmed by the alienation of the church, an institution which played a critical role in the Spanish and Greek revolutions.121 However, this view has been qualified of late by scholars such as Isabella, Riall, Romani, and Borutta.122 It should finally be noted that if the rural populace in Italy participated less avidly in the movements and events described above, this was by no means exceptional, as Blackbourn notes of contemporaneous events in Germany.123 If therefore some explanations for the failure of the revolutions in Italy allude to the absence of the peasantry, this factor is overshadowed in most accounts by a stress on the plurality of interests among the opposition forces and the severe obstacle these divisions posed to concerted action. Although no attempt has been made to narrate events in detail, the picture one obtains from works of this kind is of a period of protracted uncertainty, the forces of various factions waxing and waning in strength, punctuated by occasional, albeit short-lived, gestures of compromise and collaboration.124 There is 120 As one scholar has explained, ‘there were severe problems about putting Mazzini’s conception of a ‘people’s war’ into effect. […] A guerilla war could not succeed without the support of the peasants. Mazzini saw this […] but he had no convincing practical programme for bringing it about. The Italian republicans were never successful in overcoming the cultural gap between town and country.’ Lyttelton, ‘The National Question,’ p. 84. Philosophically, therefore, and perhaps tactically, Mazzini eschewed radical ideologies such as those advanced by Filippo Buonarroti. There would be no attack in his Italy on private property; poverty and inequality would be eliminated instead through educational initiatives and worker-owned business ‘associations’ intended to promote wealth accumulation on a wider scale. No one would be threatened in the process. See, for example, Mazzini, The Duties of Man. 121 ‘Undoubtedly the great disappointment of 1848, which was to make the task of winning the support of the peasants for the new nation state immensely more difficult, if not impossible, was the irreparable breach between the national movement and the Church.’ Lyttelton, ‘Comment.’ 122 As Manuel Borutta, for example, writes ‘there was a powerful, liberal Catholic movement in the Italian Church’ and ‘many members of the clergy supported the project of national unification.’ Borutta, ‘Anti-Catholicism and the Culture War in Risorgimento Italy,’ p. 192. Similar points are made in Isabella, ‘Religion, Revolution, and Popular Mobilization,’ pp. 241-246. See also Cerruti, ‘Dante’s Bones,’ and Riall, ‘Martyr Cults.’ 123 According to Blackbourn, ‘the large-scale defection of the peasantry […] their demands for the abolition of feudal privileges met […] granted German princes the great boon of rural quiescence.’ Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, pp. 170-171. 124 English readers can find a concise recapitulation of events in works such as Coppa, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence.

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finally the figure of Charles Albert, who launched two ill-fated wars against Austria in the course of the crisis and subsequently abdicated the throne. In addition to his faulty military leadership, Charles failed, nor even seriously attempted, claim his critics, to exploit prospects for alliance with other Italian sovereigns, anti-Austrian partisans, or foreign powers. These deficiencies, according to his detractors, can be traced to still more fundamental issues of motive. For Cattaneo, who took every opportunity in his account of the revolution in Lombardy to excoriate the character of the (soon to be) fallen sovereign, Piedmont’s entrance into the fray amounted to no more than a pre-emptive strike against republicanism, or alternately, a bid for territorial aggrandizement waged in the guise of a crusade for Italian emancipation.125 The king’s famous rallying cry that ‘Italy will do it alone’ disclosed no great surfeit, accordingly, of patriotic spirit, but rather, his anti-French animus and desire to ensure that Piedmont would be the sole beneficiary of Austria’s expulsion from the peninsula.126 As indicated in a recent work by Catherine Brice, some scholars have nevertheless taken a more sympathetic attitude toward Charles Albert of late, and if acknowledging his penchant for acting in accordance with the dictates of realpolitik, believe that he did show some measure of support for constitutional reform.127

Conclusions One of the major lessons from the historiography of 1848 reviewed above concerns the remarkable extent to which the 1840s appear as a time of sharply rising political mobilization throughout Europe, a turn which reflected especially the increase in strength and assertiveness of liberal parties. The reasons for this remarkable change in the power and prospects of liberalism – a relaxation of censorship rules or a heightening fear of social problems and their consequences – are matters of debate. There were furthermore reciprocal qualities to this development in the sense that the growth of such activity in one part of Europe gave encouragement to similar movements elsewhere. This sudden increase in ‘liberal political action’ with its corresponding effect on the elevation of nationalist discourse helps on one hand to account for the remarkably swift manner in which the liberal 125 Text refers to Cattaneo, L’Insurrection de Milan en 1848. See also Pécout, Naissance de l’Italie contemporaine, pp. 113-114; Coppa, The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence, pp. 41-58. 126 Pécout, Naissance de l’Italie contemporaine, p. 113. 127 Brice, ‘Monarchie, Etat et nation,’ pp. 87-88.

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opposition in places such as Germany, Hungary, and Bohemia was able to organize a response to the disorders and press forward in its aims. The subsequent crises in Berlin and Austria, which, as David Blackbourn points out, were, in sharp contrast to 1830, ‘rocked by events,’ had the effect of encouraging still more widespread and ambitious challenges to the status quo.128 Further impetus was provided by the hope, albeit short-lived, of aid and support from abroad.129 The failure of the revolutions is generally attributed again to the plurality of aims and interests prevailing among the forces of change. That said, one encounters often the claim that 1848-1849 represents a ‘rupture’ and ‘turning point’ for the prospects of the national idea in those parts of Europe affected by the crisis. According to Lyttelton, ‘we cannot simply look on 1848 as a failure or simply as a prelude to 1859-1860. On the contrary, it was then that it became clear that Italy was not just a “geographical expression” and that political independence and even unification were probable in the long term.’130 Such sweeping arguments, which may raise teleological concerns for some, imply that despite the failures of the revolutions to achieve any concrete results, the crisis had served to politicize large numbers of people and thus passed in contemporary parlance a social ‘tipping point,’ the vagaries surrounding such a claim notwithstanding, in popular indoctrination. In some parts of Europe, notably Italy and Hungary, the insecurities and violence stemming from the revolutions may also be conceived as having reified matters of nation and national identity in ways that were far beyond the capacity of ideas and intellectuals; a phenomenon addressed recently 128 Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, 164. For Cattaneo, ‘the insurrection of Lombardy and the Veneto was truly popular and general; it broke out the same day in Milan and Venice, from the effect of the same news, arriving from Paris and Vienna.’ Cattaneo, L’Insurrection de Milan en 1848, p. 180. 129 These hopes aroused in the Italian case by remarks made in Lamartine’s Manifeste, the latter’s disavowal of any hostile intentions notwithstanding. Although claiming, for example, that ‘the proclamation of the French Republic is not an act of aggression against any form of government in the world,’ Lamartine did go on to say ‘that if the time of the reconstruction of various oppressed nationalities in Europe, or elsewhere, appears to us to have been sounded in the decrees of Providence,’ if the Swiss are menaced in their bid to democratize (a reference to the 1847 Sonderbund War won by Swiss liberals), and finally, ‘if the independent states of Italy are invaded; if limits or obstacles are imposed to their internal transformations; or if they were challenged by armed forces the right to join forces with one another to consolidate an Italian homeland, the French Republic would believe itself to have the right to arm itself to protect these legitimate movements of growth and nationality of peoples.’ Lamartine, Manifeste à l’Europe, p. 13. Cattaneo seems to have put (at least initially) some faith in such overtures, as did Manin. See, for example, Ginsborg, Daniele Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848-49, p. 87; Brovelli, ‘1848 à Venise,’ pp. 142-143. 130 Lyttelton, ‘Comment.’

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by John Breuilly in review of Risorgimento historiography.131 These same dynamics were alluded to previously in the case of the Greek and Belgian Revolutions. Other scholars suggest that the prospects for national unification in Germany and Italy in the aftermath of 1848 were facilitated by a substantial change in liberal outlook. Stuart Woolf, for example, writes that 1848 ‘led to painful self-questioning by both Italian and German liberals whether national independence might not be a necessary prerequisite for liberal reforms and the furtherance of progress.’132 The consequences in both cases were the ‘subordination of liberal reformism to political unity’ as witnessed, for example, in the foundation and political disposition of important organizations such as the National Society.133 If a perennial source of debate, support for this view may be found in the works of important scholars such as Sheehan, who, if acknowledging a range of liberal sentiments in the aftermath of the revolutions (from ‘relief’ to ‘despair’), notes a trend in thought beginning in ‘the early fifties when men like Rochau had begun to emphasize the centrality of state power in the achievement of unification.’ These developments were further encouraged by fears of the onset of an increasingly hostile international environment.134 Pecout too writes of a tendency among historians of Italy to portray a sense of ‘political resignation’ among Italian liberals which, combined with a few reforms from Albert’s successor, sufficed to secure ‘the triumph by default of the project unitairé piémontais.’135 131 As Breuilly has observed, ‘Emotional depth in group identity does not require historical depth.’ Breuilly, ‘Risorgimento Nationalism,’ p. 440. 132 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 13. 133 Ibid. 134 Sheehan refers here to the influential publicist August Ludwig von Rochau. He also writes that such tendencies in thought were ‘reaffirmed by the process of national unification in Italy, a process which German liberals watched carefully.’ Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 113 135 He himself believes that these interpretations do not place adequate emphasis on the ‘meaning of 1848 in the process of the politicization of Italian civil society.’ Pécout, Naissance de l’Italie contemporaine, p. 122. Mark Philip and Eduardo Posada-Carbó write in similar vein that ‘after the containment of the revolutions of 1848, erstwhile democrats passed into internal or external exile, and moderate and elitist strands of liberalism regained their dominant place, although they did so with a heightened suspicion of popular power, a sharper sense of the risks from their left, and an increased sense of the fragility of the progress they sought to defend.’ ‘Positioning themselves,’ the authors continue, ‘as the only viable alternative to absolutism and foreign domination, they [Piedmontese liberals] offered a nationalist agenda in place of a democratic one. […] “Ideas of nationality and independence” took centre stage, displacing concerns with popular government and entrenching conservative moderatism at the heart of the state-formation process.’ Philp and Posada-Carbó, ‘Liberalism and Democracy,’ pp. 181, 201.

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Of equal importance in this connection, or so at least it has been argued by some, were the effects of the revolutions on conservative thought and rhetoric. As Walter Schmidt has, for example, written, ‘in contrast to the prerevolutionary era it [the aristocratic and monarchical element] was no longer able to maintain a strictly anti-national stance. Discerning representatives of the reactionary powers, particularly of Prussia, abandoned their inflexible role as protectors of German particularism and themselves adopted national demands.’136 These thoughts certainly cohere with what Hobsbawm argued in the previously cited Invention of Tradition and other works regarding the attempt of the ‘dominant classes’ to appropriate the national idea in ways that were congenial to their interests.137 For similarly minded scholars the traumas of these years had a catalyzing effect on conservative opinion and one which contributed greatly in turn to the further nationalization of contemporary political discourse – a development which perhaps boded well for the prospects of the national idea in Europe, if not liberalism.138

136 Schmidt, ‘The Nation in German History,’ p. 160. See also Erdody, ‘Unity or Liberty?’ 137 Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-Producing Traditions,’ p. 267. 138 Perry Anderson, in a review of works by Berman, Mayer and Lukács, writes in somewhat similar vein of a post-1848 consciousness marked by ‘the imaginative proximity of social revolution.’ Anderson, ‘Modernity and Revolution,’ p. 104. As Levinger adds, liberals also ‘became terrified of the danger of an unchecked revolution.’ Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism, p. 222.

8. Epilogue Abstract The final chapter revisits and offers some final thoughts on the major themes and questions pursued throughout the volume. Keywords: Nation-building, Liberalism, national identity, Europe

Historical investigation, in fact, brings to light the acts of violence that have taken place at the origin of every political formation. […] Unity is always created through brutality.1

This book has had two principle tasks. The first was to account for the prominence of the nation in French Revolutionary-era discourse. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have accordingly sought to show how ‘the nation’ was entangled within an older, cross-cultural, and epistemic discourse on matters ranging from the operation of natural laws and the origins of language, to the ‘rules of social evolution’ and forms of governance – its fitness for such enquiries obtaining from semantic and heuristic conventions, such as those involving the formation of ‘national characters,’ of considerable vintage. Enlightenment thinkers were not in these cases wholly inventing new genres of episteme, heuristic strategies, or modes of practice; however, the explosion of interest in anthropological and related concerns raised ‘the nation’s’ entry in contemporary letters to a high rate of incidence. In supplying greater detail to the picture of Enlightenment engagement with ‘the nation,’ it is hoped that works of this kind offer an advance, in turn, to narrative coherence by suggesting how developments in the sphere of ideas influenced the terms of political debate in France and elsewhere; as witnessed in the diverse pronouncements concerning the cause of the nation’s characteristic ‘lightness’ and other moral defects impeding its quest for self-consciousness and 1

Renan, ‘What Is a Nation?,’ p. 50.

Kostantaras, D., Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020 doi 10.5117/9789462985186_ch08

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‘regeneration.’ The immense outpouring of national rhetoric in 1789 and after echoes in this sense principles that had obtained a prominent position in pre-revolutionary high culture and thus acquired some power to inform the improvisations of revolutionary-era actors.2 The second aim of this book has been to explore questions surrounding the status of these ideas in subsequent years and especially the extent to which they were capable of inspiring concerted, extra-legal challenges to the Restoration status quo. In doing so, there is the danger, to some degree unavoidable, that by focusing on national aspects of the rhetoric and outbursts of discontent expressed during the times one tends to inflate their standing and overdetermine the outcome. The preceding chapters tend nevertheless to indicate that if some parts of Europe were the site of significant disorders and nationalist agitation in the 1820s and 1830s, many areas, notably Germany and Italy, if not completely undisturbed by such forces, gave at least little notice of the upheavals to come. One obtains from this perspective a highly punctuated view of change that directs attention to developments, and specifically the remarkable escalation in the scale and assertiveness of ‘liberal political action,’ in the years immediately preceding the annus mirabilis of 1848. The surrounding historiography further reveals the composite nature of virtually every revolution from the period and the corresponding problem of satisfactorily delineating the relative power of national, constitutional, and social grievances. As indicated in previous chapters, this heterogeneity has been cited as the major contributing factor in the failure most notably of the 1848 revolutions to achieve very much in the way of concrete results. However, if the revolutions of 1848 were failures, it is often boldly claimed that they represent a ‘turning point’ for the prospects of the national idea in those parts of Europe affected by the crisis. This change has been attributed to a range of factors, all of which nevertheless remain the subject of perennial reassessment and debate. For some, the crisis served to politicize large numbers of people, and, in contemporary parlance, marks the crossing of a social ‘tipping point’ in popular indoctrination. Other scholars point to a change in outlook and even a sense of ‘resignation’ among liberals in several parts of Europe, one manifestation of which was a ‘subordination of liberal reformism to political unity.’3 This thesis, which cannot be elaborated in detail here, rests in part on the role the revolution is believed to have played in demonstrating the ‘inconstancy and unreliability of the masses’ (and 2 See, for example, Burrows, ‘Books, Philosophy, Enlightenment,’ p. 75. 3 Woolf, Nationalism in Europe, p. 13.

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fostering a corresponding dread of future social unrest), in conjunction with a growing appreciation for the importance of state power as ‘the essential instrument in the struggle for nationhood.’4 These considerations, writes Sheehan, rendered some number of German liberals less willing to ‘resist the state’ especially if it was favorably disposed to a policy of unification – a position which could be exploited by those in control as a means of quelling dissent.5 In the words of Sheehan: Once Prussian policy showed signs of success, an influential minority of liberals argued that it might be necessary to subordinate domestic to foreign policy goals. The root of this position is to be found in the early fifties when men like Rochau had begun to emphasize the centrality of state power in the achievement of unification. By 1863, members of the opposition such as Karl Twesten were prepared to acknowledge the priority of national issues: ‘If I had to decide whether the Bismarck ministry would last some time longer or if the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were to be lost forever, I would not hesitate for a moment in choosing the first alternative.’6

This development was congruent with and indeed abetted by trends in conservative thought which are also frequently linked to the experience and effects of the mid-century upheavals. Walter Schmidt has, for example, written that, ‘in contrast to the pre-revolutionary era it [the aristocratic and monarchical element] was no longer able to maintain a strictly anti-national stance. Discerning representatives of the reactionary powers, particularly of Prussia, abandoned their inflexible role as protectors of German particularism and themselves adopted national demands.’7 These later points cohere finally with the views put forward by Hobsbawm regarding the widespread efforts on the part of the ‘dominant classes’ in the second half of the century to appropriate the national idea and indeed institutionalize it in ways that were propitious for its mass consumption.8 For Hobsbawm, the proliferating ‘national’ traditions of the era should in fact be seen as a ‘rearguard action’ intended to acclimate the masses to a view of the nation and its values that 4 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 107. 5 Ibid. This was at least the contention of earlier thought on the concept of ‘social imperialism’ associated especially with the work of Hans-Ulrich Wehler. See Martin Fitzpatrick’s Liberal Imperialism in Germany, for one recent reassessment of this influential thesis. 6 Sheehan, German Liberalism, p. 113. 7 Schmidt, ‘The Nation in German History,’ p. 160. 8 Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-Producing Traditions,’ p. 267.

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was congenial to upper class interests.9 The effects of these and related endeavors have furthermore been counted critical by scholars such as John Meyer to the formation of ‘cultural and associational processes’ deemed integral to the success of the nation-state as a ‘world-wide institution.’10 These developments notwithstanding, nationalists from the period continued to express doubts concerning the popular reception of their ideas and claims. ‘Our people still have not acquired full nationhood; we still cannot speak openly to them,’ wrote, for example, the Slovak Ľudovít Štúr amid the tumults of 1848. ‘We have patriots, but if we expressed anti-Hungarian sentiments, thousands of them would oppose us.’11 For the Ukrainian scholar Mykola Kostomarov it was similarly useless ‘to consult […] the solid mass of the common people’ over matters of identity and nationality, ‘because they cannot answer, being ignorant concerning [such] questions.’12 For others, even vehement proponents of the national idea such as Mazzini, the efforts of these figures were very likely in vain for the still more fundamental reason that the peoples in question had no legitimate claim to nationhood – or so at least their omission from his calculations regarding the future national division of Europe suggests.13 However, despite the bravura projected in 9 Ibid. As he wrote in another influential work: ‘Identification with a “people” or “nation” […] was a convenient and fashionable way’ of combating the legitimacy challenges of the day. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 83-85. 10 As Meyer and his co-authors argued in one well known work, these dynamics help, for example, ‘to explain many puzzling features of contemporary national societies, such as structural isomorphism in the face of enormous differences in resources and traditions.’ Meyer, et al., ‘World Society and the Nation‐state,’ p. 145. Similar points are made in Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, p. 19. It is certainly arguable that nationhood, or modes of practice and governance associated with the concept, was ever more likely to be learned (or, for Anderson, ‘pirated’) from this time forward. 11 In the words of Štúr, the Slovaks were a ‘people’ who possessed their own history and language, but as he admitted in this memento from the Prague Slav Congress, they were not yet a ‘nation.’ They had still to reach that level of collective self-consciousness that would enable him to endorse the calls of Serb and Croat delegates who were pushing for secession from Hungary. Until this had been accomplished, awakeners such as he could not speak ‘openly’ of their larger (one presumes) political aims but advance patiently instead in the sphere of education and letters. A stronger sense of cultural identity would perhaps kindle the ‘moral revolution’ which Štúr and many other nationalist leaders of the time regarded as an essential precondition to the formation of a political consciousness. Cited in Orton, The Prague Slav Congress of 1848, p. 91. 12 Kostomarov, ‘A Letter to the Editor of Kolokol,’ pp. 135-136. 13 One such scheme ran as follows: ‘Spain and Portugal united – the Iberian peninsula. Sweden, Denmark and Norway united – the Scandinavian peninsula. England, Scotland and Ireland – idem. Italy, from the extreme Sicily to the Alps, including the Italian Tyrol, the Ticino, Corsica, etc. – one. Switzerland, with the addition of Savoy, the German Tyrol, Carinthia and Carniola, transformed into a “Confederation of the Alps.” Hellenia (Greece) having Epirus, Thessalia,

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many contemporary portraits, Mazzini suffered doubts too over the national prospects and sentiments of his very own countrymen.14 Dejected and adrift ‘in that moral desert’ of despair, he wrote of one such crisis, ‘doubt came upon me. Perhaps I was wrong and the world, right? Perhaps I had been led, not by an Idea, but by my idea; by the pride of my own conception […] an intellectual egotism, and the cold calculation of an ambitious spirit, drying up and withering the spontaneous and innocent impulses of my heart.’15 Moreover, could he justify the deaths of all those lost in the course of his schemes to ‘arouse the youth of Italy’ and ‘awaken in them the yearning for a common country!’ What indeed if the very object of such yearnings was no more than ‘an illusion?’16 These ruminations stand of course at odds with the ardent appeals to violence that surface elsewhere in Mazzini’s writings and indeed take on at times an apocalyptic hue. ‘Now, we need the masses,’ he declared at one such moment, ‘we need to find a word that may have the power to make armies of men decide to fight for a long time, desperately. Men that will be willing to bury themselves under the ruins of their own cities.’17 It could even be argued that this vision, intimated too in the words above of Renan, came to pass – Europe’s kaleidoscope surface of intricately configured nation-states obscuring a history of violence and social dislocation that took a staggering toll on its peoples. Many of the regions discussed here were indeed profoundly affected over the course of the succeeding century by conflicts which radically altered their ethnic geography. Blame for these tragedies cannot simply be laid at the feet of those described in the pages above, not all of whose claims for cultural or political recognition were without merit. But the challenge of reconciling the ideals of national unity espoused by Albania, Macedonia, Rumelia, reaching the Balkan mountains, including Constantinople. Constantinople to be the central town under Greek presidency of a confederation of the races (European and Christian) now constituting the “Turkish Empire” – that is, Eastern Austria, Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria […] Austria to disappear. A great Danubian confederation – Hungary, the Roumain race (Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, Herzegovina etc.), Bohemia, etc., Germany comprising Holland and a portion of Belgium. France comprising the French part of Belgium, Brussels, etc. Russia and Poland dividing the rest between themselves – two distinct associated nationalities.’ Mazzini to Jessie White in 1857; cited in Smith, Mazzini, p. 156. 14 According to Herzen, ‘Such men do not give in, do not yield. […] If today Mazzini loses friends and money and barely escapes from chains and the gallows, he takes his stand tomorrow more obstinately and resolutely than ever.’ ‘There is something of grandeur in this,’ he came around at last to reflect, ‘and, if you like, something of madness. Often it is just that grain of madness which is the essential condition of success.’ Cited in Smith, Mazzini, p. 91. 15 Mazzini, Joseph Mazzini, p. 194. 16 Ibid. 17 Cited in Levis Sullam, ‘The Moses of Italian Unity,’ p. 115.

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such figures with the reality of internal complexity and respect for group rights would remain a critical issue, and indeed the source of considerable conflict, far into the future. The same concerns may indeed be said to apply to the people of the ‘New Europe,’ for whom the challenges cited above have been further exacerbated of late by anxieties over the perceived threat to national culture raised by regional unification or immigration – sentiments which may be characteristic of responses to change that appear perennially in history, but are likely to obtain still wider expression in the context of a world order fundamentally informed by the principle of the nation.

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About the Author

Dean Kostantaras is Assistant Professor of History at Northwestern State University of Louisiana whose publications include Infamy and Revolt: The Rise of the National Problem in Early Modern Greek Thought, and numerous research articles in leading academic journals.

Index Académie royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles: 144 Acton (Lord): 74 Adams, John: 30 n.33 Addison, Joseph: 37, 37 n.67 Adelung, Johann Christoph: 38 n.73 Addresses to the German Nation (Fichte): 89, 89 n.48 Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829: 131 Agnew, Hugh: 69, 71, 187–88 Agulhon, Maurice: 149 n.50 Albania: 94, 108 n.3, 133, 207 n.13 Albert, Charles, king: 197–98 Alexander, J. C.: 118 Alexander, Robert: 148 Alexander I, tsar: 96 n.80, 122 Alfieri, Vittorio: 59, 59 n.34 Ali, Ibrahim: 131 Ali, Mohammed: 131 Ali Pasha: 123–26 the Amalgam see United Kingdom of the Netherlands American colonies: 29–33, 44 British views of: 31–32 American nation: 29–31, 30 n.33, 43 American Revolution: 31–32 the Americas: 31 n.37, 34, 43–44, 56 travel literature on: 34, 34 n.49, 42 n.88 Anatolia: 132 ancient Greeks: 60–61, 64–65 Ancients and Moderns (quarrel of): 37 Anderson, Benedict: 12, 12 n.11, 25 Anderson, Perry: 21 Anscombe, Frederick: 113–14, 123 “Antiquity of Nations” (Voltaire): 39 Apology for the Czech Language (Thám): 63, 68 April Laws, 1848: 190 Apter, David: 144 n.30 armotoloi: 118 Armstrong, John: 14 n.22 Arndt, Ernst Moritz: 89 Articles of Confederation, US: 29–30, 30 n.33 Ash, John: 27 Austria: 101–2, 170, 194, 196–99 see also Habsburg Empire Austrian Netherlands: 71–2, 142–43 see also Brabant Revolution of 1787 Austrian Partition: 170–71, 171 n.177 Austro-Marxists: 18 n.32 Avraham, Doron: 178–79, 179 n.31 Baecque, Antoine de: 55 Baker, Keith: 81, 83 Bakunin, Mikhail: 155

Balbo, Cesare: 146 n.34, 155 Balibar, Etienne: 16 n.26 Balkans: 53, 65, 75, 93, 96 n.79, 118, 127, 130, 133–34 Bandiera brothers: 154 n.84 Banti, Alberto: 18, 18 n.34, 19 n.34, 155 n.86, 191–93 Baranska, Anna: 155–56, 170 Barclay, John: 33 n.44 Barere, Bertrand: 85 Battle of Dragashani, 1821: 125 Battle of Novara,1849: 104 n.112 Battle of Navarino, 1827: 131 Battle of White Mountain, 1620: 69–70, 70 n.90 Bauer, Otto: 18 n.32 Bavaria: 132–33, 152 n.72 bearer of culture, nation as: 31–33 Beauzée, Nicholas: 28 Beccaria, Cesare: 58 Belgian Kingdom: 158–64 democratization and: 161, 63 industrialization and: 161–63 Flemish national movement and: 161–64 language policy: 160–61 Belgian national discourse: 138–40, 142, 144, 158–60 Belgian Republic: 143 see also United Belgian States/États Belgiques Unis Belgian Revolution of 1830: 17, 140, 148–51 bourgeoisie and: 149, 151, 151 n.64 Dutch response to: 149 European responses to: 137–39, 158 Great Power diplomacy and: 150, 150 n.57 historiographical perspectives on: 138, 149–51 Marx and: 151 workers and: 151 Belgium: 17, 138–51 Dutch and: 142, 144–45, 147, 150–51 Flanders: 147, 160, 162–63 Flemish in: 145, 147, 160–63 Flemish national movement in: 162–64 French language in: 147, 160–63 French occupation: 144, 160–61 Habsburgs and: 71–2, 143–44 Holland and: 141–42, 144–45 nation-building, post-1830: 158–64 national histories, production of: 139 unification with Holland: 141–48 see also United Kingdom of the Netherlands Bell, David A.: 10, 46, 55, 80–81, 83–86, 95 n.70 Bendix, Reinhard: 148

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Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848

Blackbourn, David: 152, 177, 178 n.26, 197, 199–200 Blanc, Louis: 149 Bland, Richard: 32 n.42 Blommaert, Philip: 162 Boemus, Johann: 33 n.44 Bohemia: 67–71, 185, 187–89 see also Revolutions of 1848 Bohemian National Museum: 69 Bologne, Maurice: 151 Bolzano, Bernard: 187 Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrims (Mickiewicz): 167–68 Börne, Ludwig: 152 n.72 Borutta, Manuel: 197 n.122 Bosnia: 133, 207 n.13 Bosnians, Herzegovinians and: 65 n.63, 134 Boulainvilliers, Henri de: 81 bourgeoisie: 18, 18 n.32, 33, 113, 115, 149, 151, 151 n.64, 162, 164, 174 n.10, 192 n.101 Brabant Revolution of 1787: 142–44 Habsburg Empire and: 142–43 historiographical perspectives on: 143, 143 n.25 Breuilly, John: 10 n.4, 31–32, 32 n.38, 78 n.128, 181, 199 Brissot, Jacques-Pierre: 86 Brock, Peter: 186 Broers, Michael: 91, 100 n.92 Brophy, James: 182–83 Brussels: 147, 149–50 Buchanan, George: 45 Buffon: 30, 34, 37, 43–44, 46, 84, 140 Bulgaria: 65 n.63, 94, 113, 130, 133–134, 207 n.13 the Bund: 16–17, 101–2, 152, 152 n.70, 152 n.72, 153 n.76, 171, 177–84 see also Congress of Vienna; German Confederation; Germany; Revolutions of 1830; Revolutions of 1848 Burschenschaften: 101–2 Byron (Lord): 128–29 Il Caffe: 58–59 canone risorgimentale: 59, 195 n.110 Carbonari: 103, 130 n.103, 140 n.11, 154 n.82 Carlsbad Decrees (1819): 101–2, 153 Carlyle, Thomas: 97–98 Caron, Jean-Claude: 141, 148 n.48, 177 n.21 Catalan independence: 15, 15 n.24 Catéchisme du citoyen (Saige): 82 Catholic Church and Risorgimento: 197, 197 n.122 Catholicism: 132, 144–45, 144 n.29 Catholics Belgian: 142, 144, 144 n.29, 147, 147 n.41, 150, 163 Italian: 194, 194 n.108, 197, 197 n.122 Cato’s Letters: 29 n.32

Cattaneo, Carlo: 102, 195–96, 198, 199 n.128 Chamber of Deputies, France: 148–49 Chambers, Ephraim: 25–30 Charles Albert, king of Piedmont: 195, 198 Charles X, king of France: 148–49 Charpentier, François: 38 Chartier, Roger: 10 n.4 Chernilo, Daniel, 10 n.4 Chopin: 165 n.144 civic variations on nationhood: 94 civilians, massacres of and Greek Revolution: 125–27, 135 climate language and: 37–38 nations and: 36–37, 40 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste: 26 Cole, Laurence: 66, 158 colonies, American: 29–33, 44 Common Sense (Paine): 30 The Commonwealth of Oceana (Harrington): 82 “A Comparative View of Races and Nations” (Goldsmith): 37 composite revolution: 16–17, 114, 137, 170, 175, 204 Congress of Vienna: 96–100 Belgium and: 141–42 Italy and: 97, 102–105, 109 Germany and: 100–102 historiographical perspectives on: 98–105 Ottoman Balkans and: 109 Spain and: 109 Conscience, Hendrik: 162 n.127 conservatives German: 178–79, 179 n.31, 200–1, 205 Italian: 179 n.31 nationalism and: 19 n.35, 21, 178–9, 179 n.31, 180, 200–1, 205 Polish: 19 n.36, 157 n.100 Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (Rousseau): 41 Constantinople: 100, 115–16, 124, 126–27 Constitution of 3 May 1791, Poland: 91–92, 92 n.59, 130 Constitution of Cadiz: 109 Courrier des Pays-Bas: 138–39 Croatia Hungary and: 177, 189 n.92, 191 Revolutions of 1848 and: 177, 191, 206 n.11 cultural autarchy: 53 cultural relativism: 73 n.113 cultural transfer: 26, 28, 52–54, 75–76, 76 n.122, 139–40, 158 culture, nation as bearer of: 31–33 culture war, Enlightenment and: 52, 66 Curzon (Lord): 134 Cyclopædia (Chambers): 25–27 Czartoryski, Adam, prince: 74, 92, 92 n.60, 156–57, 164 n.141

Index

Czech Enlightenment: 63, 67–70 Czech language: 63, 67–70 Czech national histories, production of: 186–87 Czech national movement: 184–89 see also Revolutions of 1848 Czech nobility: 53, 70–71 Czech reformers: 69 Czech revival: 67–68, 70–71 Dabrowski March: 164 D’Alembert: 25–26, 47–48 Dante: 59 Danubian Principalities:116–17, 124–25 Darvaris, Dimitrios: 61 D’Azeglio, Massimo: 96 n.77, 97, 154 Decembrists: 110, 110 nn.8–9, 110 n.12, 114, 156 n.93 Declaration of Independence, US: 29–30 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789): 82, 85 Déclaration pour accorder fraternité et secours a tout les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur liberté (1792): 86 degeneration, national: 54–55 De Lamartine, Alphonse: 174–75, 180, 180 n.40, 199 n.129 De l’esprit des loix (Montesquieu): 35–36 Deliyiannis, Kanellos: 119 Dembowski, Edward: 158 Democrats: 25, 90 n.53, 144, 155, 176 n.15, 177, 182 n.48, 194 n.107, 200 n.35 Denmark: 162, 182 n.49, 206 n.13 Des droits et des devoirs du citoyen (Mably): 81 d’Espiard de la Borde, Francois-Ignace: 35–38, 41 Deutsch, Karl: 144 n.30, 145 n.33 Diaphotismos: 133 see also Enlightenment, Greek diaspora students, intellectuals: 60, 61 n.47, 75 Diccionario castellano: 28 n.23 Diccionario de la lengua castellana: 28 n.23 Dickinson, John: 29, 29 n.32 Dictionary of the English Language (Johnson): 25–26, 47 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694): 13–14, 25–27, 47–48, 56 n.17 Dictionnaire universel: 26 n.14 Diderot Encyclopédie and: 13, 24–26, 28–29 Histoire des deux Indies and: 55 on nation: 28–29, 47, 55, 55 n.13 Discours sur l’état de la langue française (Barere): 85 Disraeli, Benjamin: 140–41 Dobner, Gelasius: 57 n.26, 69 Dobrovský, Josef: 57 n.26, 64 n.59, 70 n.90, 76 n.121

263 d’Orville, Contant: 40 Droit des gens, ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués a la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (Vattel): 40 Droysen, Johann Gustav: 166 Drucki-Lubecki, Franciszek Ksawery: 156 Duclos, Charles: 33–34, 37 Dunbar, James: 37 Dutch: 142, 144–45, 147, 150–51 the Eastern Question: 135 education Enlightenment and: 40–41, 46, 52, 61–63, 65 n.67, 67, 70–71, 75–76 French Revolution and: 46, 85–86 Joseph II and: 70–71 policy, of William: 147 n.41 Encyclopédie: 13, 24–26, 28–29 Engels, Friedrich: 18 n.32, 113 English language: 14, 27, 45, 47–48, 52, 64 English nation: 31–33 Enlightened Absolutism: 53, 67–74, 77 Enlightenment Czech: 63, 67–70 Flemish: 67 German: 56–57 Greek: 60–61, 61 n.47, 63–65, 75, 87 n.38, 118 see also Diaphotismos historiographical ventures: 41–45 Hungarian: 57, 71–72 in Italy: 57–59 lexicographical ventures: 25–29 nation, conceptions of: 23–78 nationalism and: 48, 56, 76 Polish: 62, 66, 158, 165 Serbian: 61–62, 75 vernacularization and 62–4, 67–68, 71, 76 n.121 Eötvös, Jozsef: 9, 21 Essais sur les génie et le caractère des nations (d’Espiard): 35–36 Essai sur la régénération physique, morale et politique des juifs (Grégoire): 77 Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations (Voltaire): 13, 39, 41–42 Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines (Condillac): 28 n.28 An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Ferguson): 44 Essays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages (Dunbar): 37 Estates General: 81 L’Etat de la France (Boulainvilliers): 81 ethnicity: 23, 48, 85, 163–64, 167, 169 ethnos: 64, 111 European Great Powers: 95, 108, 131, 142 n.17, 150, 150 n.57, 157 Evans, Robert J. W.: 68, 176

264 

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Fahrmeir, Andreas: 88 Fallmerayer, Jakob: 107–8, 108 n.3 Ferguson, Adam: 34–35, 44 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: 89–90, 89 n.48 Finlay, George: 115 First World War: 161, 164 n.139 Flamingants: 161–63 Flanders: 147, 160, 162–63 Flemings, Walloons and: 139, 145, 147, 150–51, 160 Flemish: 145, 147, 160–63 Flemish Enlightenment: 67 Flemish national movement: 162–64 Foscolo, Ugo: 93 France Chamber of Deputies: 148–49 constitutional crisis (pre-1789): 10, 55, 80–84 constitutional crisis of 1830: 148–49 constitutional crisis of 1848: 171 1814 Charter and: 148 ideologues of: 127 National Assembly: 85 National Convention: 86 national histories of: 139–40, 140 n.9, 165 n.142 Seven Years’ War and: 52–53, 55, 77 Frankfurt National Congress: 171, 177–84 Franz Joseph: 191 Franklin, Benjamin: 31 French Academy: 13–14 French language: 8, 26, 28–29, 38, 47–48, 52 in Belgium: 147, 160–63 and patois: 77, 85 French monarchy: 10, 80, 83 French national character: 12, 28, 36, 55, 203 French Revolution (1789): 10, 10 n.4, 15–16, 75, 77, 79–88 Coalition Wars and: 86 constitutional crisis and: 80–84 national regeneration and: 79 concept of civic nationalism and: 85 concept of national sovereignty and: 80–83 Jacobins and: 46, 86 policies toward regional languages and: 85 Sieyès and: 80, 84 French Revolution of 1830: 148–49 French Revolution of 1848: 173–75, 199 n.129 Freud, Sigmund: 38 Gallant, Thomas: 123 Gellner, Ernest: 11, 163–64, 164 n.138, 187 n.79 Genovesi, Antonio: 146 n.34 Gerlache, Etienne-Constantin de: 139 n.8, 159 German Confederation; 152, 182, 188 see also the Bund; Germany; Revolutions of 1830; Revolutions of 1848 German language: 57, 60, 70–71

German liberalism: 178, 180–81, 184–85, 194, 205 German nation: 89–90, 100–1, 183 Germanos of Patras: 125 German Revolutions of 1830: 152–53 German Revolutions of 1848: 177–84, 198–201 German unification: 181, 200, 205 Germany: 16–17, 152, 155, 171, 177 Bohemia and: 185, 187–89 Czech national movement and: 186–89 Napoleon and: 88–89 see also the Bund; Congress of Vienna; German Confederation; Revolutions of 1830; Revolutions of 1848 Geyl, Peter: 143, 150 Gioberti, Vincenzo: 155, 193–94 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: 57 Goldsmith, Oliver: 37 Gołuchowski, Józef: 167, 169 n.165 Gottingen School: 57 n.26. governance, national character and: 13, 25, 33–34, 40–41 Gramsci, Antonio: 192, 192 n.103 Great Netherlands Movement: 146 the Great Powers: 95, 108, 131, 142 n.17, 150, 150 n.57, 157 Greece language question in: 63–65 Rigas and: 93–95 see also Greek Enlightenment; Greek Kingdom; Greek Revolution of 1821 Greek Enlightenment: 60–61, 61 n.47, 63–65, 75, 87 n.38, 118 see also Diaphotismos Greek Kingdom: 116, 116 n.35 irredentism and: 132–135 Greek language: 63–64, 63 n.56, 87 n.38, 94, 107 Greek Marxist historiography: 113 Greek Orthodox: 75, 76 n.121, 130, 132–33 Greek Revolution of 1821: 17, 105, 107–136 Byron and: 128–29 Civilian massacres and: 125–127, 135 civil war and: 129 comparison with other revolutions of period: 109–14, 129–31 Danubian Principalities and: 116–17, 124–25 Eastern Question and: 135 European reactions to: 108–9, 112, 112 n.20, 126–29, 135–36 Freemasonry and: 111 Great Power diplomacy and: 108, 131, 135 historiographical perspectives on: 109–14 Hobsbawm on: 113 n.23 klephts and: 113, 117–18, 120, 129 merchants and: 113, 114, 116 Marxist views on: 113, 113 n.22, 115 Orthodox Church and: 111, 116, 125, 130–31

Index

Ottoman New Order and: 109, 113, 120, 123 Ottoman reactions to: 124–26, 131 Peloponnesian notables and: 113, 118–23, 129 Phanariots and: 116, 116 nn.34, 35 Philiki Etaireia and: 110–26 Restoration and: 109–110 rural populace and: 113 n.23, 129–30, 130 n.102, 131 Russia and: 109, 117, 120, 121 n.57, 122–24, 131 Greeks ancient: 60–61, 64–65 European views of: 60, 107–8, 108 n.3, 126–29 Greek scholars: 59–61, 61 n.47, 65 Grégoire, Abbé: 77, 77 n.125, 85 Grigorios V, patriarch: 63, 63 n.56, 126 Großdeutsch: 188 Gruder, Vivian: 80 n.3 Guizot, François: 96 n.79, 139–40, 141 n.14, 159 n.112, 164 n.142, 174 Habsburg Empire: 10, 17, 67, 77, 177 Belgium and: 143–44 Bohemia and: 53, 69–72, 184–85, 188 Congress of Vienna and: 96, 102–03, 102 n.110 Enlightened Absolutism and: 70–72 Hungary and: 71–72, 189–191 language ordinances and: 70–72 Napoleonic Wars and: 93, 95–97, 101 Revolutions of 1830 and: 152–53 Revolutions of 1848 and: 184–91, 194–201, 206 Seven Years War and: 10, 70 see also Austria; Austrian Netherlands Hambach Festival of May 1832: 153 Harrington, James: 82 Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard: 176 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm: 20, 166 Hellenic Kingdom: 109, 132–33 Hellenism: 134 Herder, J. G.: 38, 57, 57 n.24, 60, 72–74, 73 n.113 Herzegovina: 134, 207 n.13 Herzen, Alexander: 168 n.163, 207 n.14 Hirschi, Caspar: 11, 12 n.11 Histoire des deux Indies (Diderot): 55 Histoire générale de l’Asie, de l’Afrique et de l’Amérique (Roubaud): 82 Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (Buffon): 43 histoire philosophique: 42 historicism of Herder: 73 historiography: 138–39, 146–47, 155–56, 160 Enlightenment era: 41–45 Marxist: 113–15 Risorgimento: 191–201 see also national histories; nationalism; Revolutions of 1830; Revolutions of 1848

265 history, as chronicle of national refinement: 41–45 History of America (Robertson): 43–44 History of England (Hume): 45 The History of Scotland (Buchanan): 45 History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia (Palacký): 186–87 History of the Hellenic Nation from Ancient Times to the Present (Paparrigopoulos): 107 Hobsbawm, Eric: 11, 18–19, 19 n.35, 201 on Enlightenment nation: 23–24 on Greek Revolution: 113 n.23 on liberalism: 179–80 on nation: 29–30, 30 n.33, 205–6 on revolutionism: 97, 97 n.82 on revolutions of 1848: 175 Holland: 141–42, 144–45 see also United Kingdom of the Netherlands Hroch, Miroslav: 68, 84, 187–88 Hume, David: 39 n.79, 45, 60, 60 n.42 Hungarian Diet: 71–72, 100 n.92, 189 Hungarian Revolution of 1848: 189–91 Hungarian Political Nation: 190 Hungary: 171, 184–85 Diet of: 72, 100 n.92, 176, 189, 189 n.87 Enlightenment and: 57, 71–72 Habsburg Empire and: 71–72, 189, 191 internal conflicts: 189–90 Jacobin Conspiracy of: 100 n.92 Joseph II and: 71–72 language laws: 189–90 liberalism in: 184, 189–91 Magyar and: 71–72, 189–91 Napoleonic Wars and: 100 n.92 Reform Era: 189–90 Hutchinson, John: 89, 98–99 Idealism (philosophy of): 20, 166 ideological imperialism: 59 ideology, of modern nationalism: 15, 16, 89, 98–99 Il Caffe: 59, 59 n.33 Imagined Communities (Anderson, B.): 12 imagined linguistic community: 12 industrialization: 145, 147–48, 161, 163, 164 n.138, 174, 187, 187 n.79 L’Insurrection de Milan en 1848 (Cattaneo): 195–96 L’Insurrection prolétarienne de 1830 en Belgique (Bologne): 151 Ionian Islands: 93, 96, 118–19 Ireland: 95, 139, 141 n.14, 206 n.13 irredentism, Balkans and: 132–35 Isabella, Maurizio: 104–5, 191–92, 192 n.102 Isastia, Anna Maria: 192 n.102 Israel, Jonathan: 86 Italianità: 58, 104 n.111 Italian Jacobins: 90 n.53

266 

Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848

Italian liberalism: 103–105, 154–55, 193–94, 201 Italian Revolutions of 1820: 103–05, 154 Italian Revolutions of 1830: 154–55 Italian Revolutions of 1848: 191–201 Italy: 16–17, 20, 87, 171 Congress of Vienna and: 97, 102–105, 109 Enlightenment in: 57–59 Jacobins in: 90 n.53 Kingdom of Italy: 90–91 language problem and: 59 Mazzini on: 97, 104, 154–55, 207 Napoleon’s occupation of: 93, 95, 195 n.112 unification: 155, 200 Young Italy in: 154, 195 n.110, 196 n.119 see also Revolutions of 1830; Revolutions of 1848; Risorgimento, historiography of Jacobin Conspiracy of 1793-1795 (Hungary): 100 n.92 Jacobins: 46, 86, 90 n.53, 100 n.92, 111 n.15, 130 Janissaries: 126 Janowski, Maciej: 186 n.70 Jansenism: 13, 34 Jansenist patriots: 81–82 Jarrige, Francois: 147 Jefferson, Thomas: 31, 45, 45 n.106 Jellačić, Josip: 191 Jensen, Merrill: 30 n.33 Jezierski, Franciszek: 28 n.23, 158, 164 n.141 Johnson, Samuel: 14, 25–26, 26 n.16, 27, 47–48, 64 Joseph II, emperor: 70–72, 142 July Days: 153–54 Kamieński, Henryk: 165 Kapodistrias, Ioannis: 96, 122–23 Karageorge: 116 Karamanlides, 132 Kármán, Jozsef: 71–72 Kant, Immanuel: 57, 58 n.30 Katartzis, Dimitrios: 64–66, 76 n.123 Kautsky, Karl: 18 Kedourie, Elie: 11 n.7 King, Jeremy: 188 Kingdom of Italy: 90–91 klephts: 117–18, 117 n.40, 120, 125, 129 Klopstock, Friedrich: 56–57 Kolettis, Ioannis: 132 n.112 Koliopoulos, John: 111 Kollár, Ján: 186 Kołłątaj, Hugo: 74 Kolokotronis, Theodoros: 112 n.19, 119, 130 n.103 Konstantas, Grigorios: 63 n.53, 87 n.38, 94 n.67, 133 n.113 Kontler, László: 61 Kopitar, Jernej: 108 n.3 Korais, Adamantios: 9, 54, 60–61, 64, 75 n.119, 87 n.38, 108

Kordatos, Yanis: 113 Kościuszko, Tadeusz: 91–92, 91 n.58 Kossmann, Ernst: 146 Kostis, Kostas: 113, 115 Kostomarov, Mykola: 206 Koumarianou, Aikaterina: 76 Krasicki, Ignacy: 62 Kumar, Krishan: 56 Labrousse, Ernest: 16, 173–75 language climate and: 37–38 Czech: 53, 63, 67–70 Dutch: 144–45 English: 14, 27, 45, 47–48, 52, 64 European: 45 Flemish: 145, 161–62 formation of: 38–40 French: 26, 28–29, 47–48, 52, 147, 160–63 French regional: 85 German: 57, 60, 70–71 Greek: 63–64, 63 n.56, 87 n.38, 94, 107 Latin: 71 laws, of Joseph: 71 Magyar: 53, 57, 71–72, 169, 189–90 national character and: 28, 32, 36–40 national refinement and: 13–14, 24–25, 28, 38–39, 44–47, 62–65 perfectibility of: 26, 26 n.16 policies, of William, in Belgium: 147, 162 Polish: 28 n.23, 62, 74, 167, 169 power and, in age of Enlightened Absolutism: 67–74 race and: 38 revivalism: 63, 67–68 Rousseau on: 37 Russian: 63 n.55 Ukrainian: 170 vernacular: 63–64, 76 n.121 see also vernacularization, Enlightenment and Last Letters of Jacopo Ortiz (Foscolo): 93 Latin: 71 Leake, William: 65 n.67 Lee, Richard Henry: 29 n.32 Leerssen, Joep: 53, 53 n.6, 109, 111 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: 57 Lelewel, Joachim: 156 n.93, 158, 164, 167–68 Leopold of Saxony: 132 n.109 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim: 57 Levinger, Matthew Bernard: 183–84 lexicography: 26–29, 35, 52 Libelt, Karl: 169 liberal, French nationalism as: 85 liberal Catholic movement: 197 n.122 liberalism: 12, 137–38, 176 n.15 German: 178, 180–81, 184–85, 194, 205 Hobsbawm and Woolf on: 179–80 Italian: 103–5, 154–55, 193–94, 201

Index

nationalism and: 169, 175–76, 179–80, 184–85, 194 see also liberals liberalization: 91–92, 163, 178 n.30 liberal political action: 17, 176–77, 204 liberal reformism: 200 liberals Czech: 184, 188 Democrats: 25, 90 n.53, 144, 155, 176 n.15, 177, 182 n.48, 194 n.107, 200 n.35 Belgian: 144, 147, 149, 160, 163 German: 152–53, 152 nn.71, 72, 176–84, 180, 200, 200 n.134, 200–01, 205 Hungarian: 184, 189–90 Italian: 104, 154–55, 181, 192 n.103, 193–94, 200, 200 n.135 Moderates: 21, 96, 149, 177, 178 n.26, 192 n.193, 193 n.107, 194, 194 n.108 Polish: 157, 169 linguistic community, nation as: 52 Linnaeus: 37 L’Insurrection prolétarienne de 1830 en Belgique (Bologne): 151 List, Friedrich: 146, 181–82, 182 n.46 Lithuanians: 167, 168 n.160 Lithuanian language: 167 London Conference of 1830: 142 n.17, 150 London Protocol of 1830: 135 Louis XVI, king of France: 83 Lyttelton, Adrian: 59, 66, 90 n.53, 199 Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de: 81 Macedonia: 130, 134, 207 n.13 Macura, Vladimir: 67 Magyar: 71–72, 177, 189–91 Mahmud II, sultan: 123 the Mani: 121–23 Manifeste à l’Europe (De Lamartine): 174–75, 180, 199 n.129 Manin, Daniel: 155 n.85, 199 n.129 Margerison, Kenneth: 80–81 Maria Theresa: 70 Marx, Karl: 18, 18 n.32, 113, 149, 151, 158, 164 n.138 Marxism: 149 Marxist historiography: 113–15 Mavrokordatos, Alexandros: 116, 116 n.35 maximalist (faction of Polish nationalism): 19 n.36, 91, 157, 171 n.177 Mazzini, Giuseppe: 20, 93, 93 n.65, 154 n.84, 155 n.85 Italian nationalism and: 196 on Italy: 97, 104, 154–55, 207 on future of Europe: 206, 206 n.13, 207 on national idea: 75 n.119, 104, 154–55, 206–7 on “people’s war”: 91, 104, 196, 196 n.119, 197 n.120 on providence: 166 n.150

267 Roman Republic and: 171 Young Italy and: 154, 195 n.110, 195 n.110, 196 n.119 Mazzinians: 155 McRae, Kenneth: 161 Megali Idea: 132 Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilization dans la Gréce (Korais): 9, 54, 87 n.38, 108 Methodological Nationalism: 10 n.4 Metternich: 93, 96–97, 102 n.103, 103, 103 n.110 Meyer, John: 206 Michel, Bernard: 177 Michelet, Jules: 141 n.14, 166 Mickiewicz, Adam: 164–68, 168 nn.160 and 163 middle class: 18–19, 18 n.32, 178–79 see also bourgeoisie; Mittelstand Mill, John Stuart: 155 n.85 Millenaries (Polish): 165 n.143 Miller, David: 19 n.35 minimalist (faction of Polish nationalism): 19 n.36, 91–92 Mittelstand: 178 Mochnacki, Maurycy: 19 n.36, 168–69 moderates: 21, 96, 149, 177, 178 n.26, 192 n.193, 193 n.107, 194, 194 n.108 modernization theory: 145 mœurs: 26–27, 33–34, 37, 41 Moisiodax, Iosipos: 61, 62 n.52, 76 n.122 Montesquieu: 35–36, 40, 127, 142 Monumenta Germania Historica: 99 n.90 moral regeneration: 53, 56, 69, 146 n.34 La Muette de Portici: 149 Muslims (of Greece): 126–27, 130 Naples: 102 nn.102 and 105, 103–4, 109, 149 n.51 Napoleon: 87 defeat of: 96 Europe and: 88 Germany and: 88–89 Italy and: 88, 90–91, 93, 95 Metternich and: 93 Ottoman Balkans and: 93–95, 117–19 Poland and: 88, 91–92 Spain and: 88, 96 Napoleonic Wars: 15–16, 117–18 extension of: 95–96 historiography of nationalism and: 86–88, 98–105 nation Anglo-American renderings of: 29–33 as bearer of culture: 31–33 Diderot on: 28–29, 47, 55, 55 n.13 Disraeli on: 140–41 Enlightenment conceptions of: 23–78 Hobsbawm on: 29–30, 30 n.33 language and: 28, 32, 36–40, 38 n.73, 43–47, 54, 62 lexicography and: 26–29, 35

268 

Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848

Mazzini on: 206–7 mœurs and: 26–27, 33–34, 37, 41 Montesquieu on: 35–36 as moral being: 11, 25, 46, 79, 164 n.140 moral regeneration of: 54–56 patrie and: 55–56, 56 n.17, 140 n.11 people and: 15, 27, 30, 82, 140–41, 141 n.13, 161, 161 n.122, 206, 206 n.11 political understandings of: 24–33 race and: 24, 33, 37–39, 43, 84 n.26 racial ancestry and: 24 Renan on: 161 n.122 Roubaud on: 82–83 Rousseau on: 40–41 Sieyès on: 84–85 sovereignty of: 10, 15, 16 n.28, 29–30, 46, 48–49, 55, 80–83, 86, 98–99, 109, 112, 135, 138, 148, 150, 180, 183, 185 National Assembly, France: 85, 86 national character: climate and: 28, 31 n.37, 36–37, 40, 48, 72, 141, 168 Enlightenment understandings of: 26–28, 33–46 formation of: 34–41, 46, 48 governance and: 13, 25, 33–34, 40–41 language and: 28, 32, 36–40 pre-Enlightenment understandings of: 27 n.18, 33, 33 n.44 French: 27–28: language and: 32, 36–40 origin and implications of: 33–41 refinement of: 41–45 National Convention, France: 86 national degeneration: 54–55 national histories, production of: 99, 160 nn.115–116 Belgian: 139, 139 n.8, 158–60 Czech: 186–87 English: 45 Enlightenment era: 41–45 French: 139–40, 140 n.9, 165 n.142 German: 89, 99 n.90 Greek: 107–08, 139–40, 160 Polish: 139 Scottish: 42, 45 Spanish: 42 nn.89 and 92 National Society (Italy): 200 nationalism civic forms of: 24, 85, 85 n.28, 94, 99, 168 Congress of Vienna and: 96, 99–105 conservatives and: 19 n.35, 21, 178–9, 179 n.31, 180, 200–01, 205 Enlightenment and: 48, 56, 76 ethno-linguistic forms of: 24, 48, 85, 99, 168 East-West dichotomy, perceptions of: 13, 23–24, 24 n.5, 47, 52, 54 French Revolution and: 80–88, 98–100

liberalism and: 17–19, 85–87, 175–82, 184, 189–90, 193–95, 198, 200 Marxist perspectives on: 18, 18 n.32, 113, 115, 148, 151, 158 middle classes and 18–19, 18 nn.32 and 33, 178–79 see also bourgeoisie modern ideology of: 15, 84–5, 98–99 Napoleonic Wars and: 86–96, 99–101 Romanticism and: 109, 141, 153, 164–65 rural populace and: 19, 19 n.36, 75, 129–30, 195, 195 n.112, 196–97, 197 n.121 social forces and: 17–19, 112–116, 118, 120, 148–49, 151, 163, 178, 178 n.30, 181, 187–88, 192, 192 n.103, 193, 195, 197 n.120 theories of: 10 n.4, 11, 11 n.7, 12, 12 n.11, 14, 14 n.22, 16 n.27, 83, 83 n.19, 144, 144 n.30, 145, 145 n.33, 161, 164, 164 n.138, 187 n.79, 205–6, 206 n.10 The Social Question and: 147–48, 151, 153 n.73, 178 urban populace and: 17–19, 195, 195 n.110 Nationalism (Kedourie): 11 n.7 nationality: 12, 21, 66, 138, 159 national perfection: 52, 62 the national problem: 109 national refinement: 41–45, 52, 64 national regeneration: 11–12, 15, 24, 28, 59, 75–76, 79, 203–4 degeneration and: 54–55 England and: 56 France and: 55 Seven Years’ War and: 52–53, 55 national sovereignty: 10, 15, 16 n.28, 29–30, 46, 48–49, 55, 80–83, 86, 98–99, 109, 112, 135, 138, 148, 150, 180, 183, 185 national temperaments: 26–27 nation-building: 65, 145, 158–64 Nations and Nationalism (Gellner): 11 n.8, 164, 164 n.138, 187 n.79 Native Americans, European views of: 30, 34, 34 n.49, 42–44, 45 n.106 Neo-Guelphs: 155, 194 Netherlanders: 146 New Europe: 208 Newman, Gerald: 56 the New World: 41–43 see also the Americas Nicholas I, tsar: 137 noble nation, Polish; 66, 91–92, 91 n.58, 92 nn.59 and 60, 130 see also szlachta Nothomb, Jean-Baptiste: 140, 159, 159 n.113 Nouveaux synonymes françois (Roubaud): 82 Obradović, Dimitrije: 51–52, 62, 76 n.121 Obrenović, Miloš: 134 Odessa: 114 Organic Statute of 1831: 157

269

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Orlov Revolt: 76, 118, 125, 127–28 Orthodoxy Enlightenment and: 51–52, 61 n.47, 75, 76 n.121 Greek Revolution and: 51, 75, 76 n.121, 100, 130, 133 Ottoman Balkans: 93–94, 100, 134 Ottoman Empire: 64–65, 100, 109–20, 123–26, 131 Ottoman New Order: 109, 113, 120, 123 Otto of Bavaria: 132–33 Paine, Thomas: 30, 32, 32 n.43 Palacký, František: 186–88 Palmerston (Lord): 96 Pan-Slavism: 92 n.61, 186 Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos: 107, 139–40, 160 Parlements: 80, 80 n.3, 83 Pasa, Hursid: 124 Patriarca, Silvana: 58, 192 patrie, nation and: 55–56, 56 n.17, 140 n.11 “peasant narrative”: 75 peasants: 19, 70, 91 n.58, 92 n.59, 124, 127, 129, 129 n.101, 130 n.102, 134, 157, 163, 169, 169 n.171, 171 n.177, 175 n.14, 195–97, 197 nn.120 and 121, Pelcl, František Martin: 70 n.90 Pellico, Silvio: 140, 140 n.11 the Peloponnese: 95, 113, 117, 119 n.45, 125–26 Christian notables of: 118–24, 129–30 people, nation and: 15, 27, 30, 82, 140–41, 141 n.13, 161, 161 n.122, 206, 206 n.11 perfectibility, of nation: 13, 23, 40, 46, 52 see also progress perennialism: 14, 14 n.22 Perrot, Marie-Clémence: 85 Petrarch: 59 Petrobey: 122–23, 128 Phanariots: 116, 116 n.34, 123–25 Philhellenism: 127–28 Philiki Etaireia: 105, 110–26, 156 Philip, Mark: 176 n.15, 193 n.107, 200 n.135 Philippidis, Daniel: 63 n.53, 87 n.38, 94 n.67, 133 n.113 Piedmont: 59 n.34, 96 n.77, 102, 104, 155, 192 n.102, 194–95, 198, 200 n.135 Pinkney, David: 149 Poland: 66, 87 Alexander I on: 96 n.80 Constitution of 3 May 1791: 91–92, 92 n.59, 130 Czartoryski on: 92, 92 n.60 The Emigration: 157, 157 n.99, 165 Kościuszko Revolution: 91–92, 91 n.58 land reform and: 91–92, 157, 169, 171 n.177 Lelewel on: 164, 167–68 Marx on: 158 nation-building, post-1830: 158, 164–69 nobles: 66, 91–92, 91 n.58, 92 nn.59 and 60, 130

Organic Statute of 1831: 157 ‘organic work’ movement: 169 partition of: 41, 74 szlachta of: 91 n.58, 92, 92 n.59, 130 Polish Congress Kingdom: 92 n.60, 96–97, 96 n.80, 155–56 Polish Enlightenment: 62, 66, 158, 165 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: 74, 168 Polish national discourse civic variations of: 167–68 Enlightenment era: 62, 66, 158, 158 n.103, 165 Idealism and: 166–67 language and: 28 n.23, 62, 74, 167, 169 Lithuanians and: 167–68 maximalists and: 19 n.36, 91, 157, 171 n.177 Millenaries and: 165 n.143 minimalists and: 19 n.36, 91–92 post-1830: 157–58, 164–70 Ukranians and: 167, 169–70 Polishness: 169 the “Polish question”: 96 n.80 Polish Revolution of 1830: 17, 114, 138, 150, 155–57, 156 n.93, 170 Polish Revolution of 1846 (Kraków Revolution): 17 n.29, 114, 170, 171 n.177 Polish romantic nationalism: 153, 164–65 political body, nation as: 24–33 popular sovereignty: 81, 86, 180–81 see also national sovereignty Porciani, Ilaria: 19 n.36, 195–96 Porter, Brian: 167 Posada-Carbó, Eduardo: 176 n.15, 193 n.107, 200 n.135 Potter, Louis de: 140, 150 Pouqueville, François Charles Hugues Laurent: 112 n.20 Prague: 186, 188, 191 Prague Citizens Petition, 11 March 1848: 188 Prague Slav Congress: 190–91 primordialism: 14 print capitalism: 12, 12 n.11 progress Enlightenment understandings of: 24 of nation: 13, 24, 44, 46, 52, 179 Proudhon, Pierre: 18, 18 n.32 providence: 154 n.84, 159 n.113, 166 nn.149 and 150, 199 n.129 Prussia: 91 n.58, 101, 101 n.96, 131, 152, 153 nn.72 and 76, 183 n.56, 200–1, 205 Pujols, Stéphane: 34 Pye, Lucian: 144 n.30 Quinlan, Sean M.: 55 race: 107 language and: 38 nation and: 24, 33, 37–39, 43, 84 n.26 radicals: 149, 153, 157–58, 175 n.14, 177, 178 n.26, 197 n.120

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rationalism: 63, 67 refinement of language: 13–14, 24–25, 28, 38–39, 44–47, 62–65, 67 national: 41–45, 52, 64 regeneration: 53–56, 66, 87, 90 n.51, 108, 203–04 see also moral regeneration; national regeneration Remarques sur la grammaire, générale et raisonnée (Duclos): 37 Renan, Ernest: 20–21, 161 n.122 revivalism: 54, 63, 67–68, 70–71 revolutionism: 97–98, 97 n.82, 110, 170 Revolutions of 1830 Belgium and: 138–51 composite nature of: 137–40, 149, 153, 156, 170 France and: 148–49 in Germany: 152–54, 170 Great Power diplomacy and: 150 historiographical perspectives on: 150–53, 155 in Italy: 154–55 Marx and: 148, 151, 158 Mazzini and: 154–55 in Poland: 155–58 Russia and: 156–57 social forces and: 148–49, 151 The Social Question and: 147–48, 151, 153 n.73 Revolutions of 1848 Bohemia and: 184–89 Czechs and: 177, 184–89 Denmark and: 182 n.49 France and: 173–75, 199 n.129 Germany and: 176–84, 198–01 German Bohemians and: 186–89 historiographical perspectives on: 173–77, 191–93, 198–201 Hobsbawm on: 175 Habsburg Empire and: 176, 184–91 Hungary and: 184, 189–91 Italy and: 191–98 liberalism and: 176–82, 184, 189–90, 193–95, 198, 200 Risorgimento historiography and: 191–201 rural populace and: 195, 195 n.112, 196–97, 197 n.121 Serbs and: 177, 191 social forces and: 178, 178 n.30, 181, 187–88, 192, 192 n.103, 193, 195, 197 n.120 The Social Question and: 178 urban populace and: 195, 195 n.110 Rhine Crisis of 1840: 182 Riall, Lucy: 66, 192, 192 n.102 Richardson, John: 37 Riego, Rafael: 112 Rigas Velestinlis: 93–95, 100

Risorgimento, historiography of: 18, 18 n.34, 58–59, 88, 90 n.53, 101–02, 02 n.103, 104–5, 154, 155 n.86, 191–201 The Risorgimento Revisited (Riall and Patriarca): 192 Robertson, William: 34–35, 42–44 robot: 190 Romaioi: 64–65, 65 n.63 Romani, Roberto: 193–94 Romania: 116, 116 n.34, 124–25, 130, 177, 191 Roman Republic: 171 Romanticism: 169 romantic nationalism: 109, 141, 153, 164–65 romantics: 20 Rostow, Walt Whitman: 145 n.33 Roubaud, Pierre Joseph André: 82–83 Rousseau, Jean Jacques: 13 Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne by: 41 Discourse on Inequality by: 40–41 Essai sur l’origine des langues by: 37 French Revolution and: 81–82 The Social Contract by: 81 Rowe, Michael: 87 Ruprecht, Karol: 165 nn.143–44 Rush, Benjamin: 30 n.33 Russia: 185, 191, 207 n.13 Poland and: 91 n.58, 92, 92 n.60, 96 n.80, 156–57 Decembrists and: 96 n.79, 109–10, 110 n.8, 156 n.93 Enlightenment and: 63 n.55 Greek Revolution and: 96, 120, 121 n.57, 122, 122 n.60, 12324, 131, 131 n.107 Napoleonic Wars and: 91 n.56, 117 n.40 Orlov Revolt and: 76, 118 n.44 Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774: 76–77 Ruthenians: 167, 168 n.160 Šafařík, Josef: 186 Saige, Guillaume-Joseph: 81–82 Salvatorelli, Luigi: 88 Sand, George: 166 Santarosa, Santorre: 104 n.112 Schennach, Martin: 101 Schleiermacher, Friedrich: 183 n.54 Schmidt, Walter: 200, 205 Schroeder, Paul: 152 n.72 Scotland: 42, 45, 206 Sekeris, Panayiotis: 115–16 Serbian Revolution: 108, 113 Serbs: 51, 62, 65 n.63, 75, 76 n.121, 108, 113, 116, 124, 130, 134, 177, 190–91 Seven Years’ War: 10, 52–53, 55, 70, 77 Sheehan, James: 17, 18 n.33, 152 n.71, 153, 153 n.73, 170–71, 176, 178, 181–84, 200, 205 Shevchenko, Taras: 170 Sieyès, Abbé: 80, 84–85, 84 n.26 Six Acts, 1832: 153 n.76

271

Index

Skiotis, Dennis: 125–26 Skouphas, Nikolaos: 115 Skowronek, Jerzy: 156 Slavic race: 66, 107 n.2, 166 Slavic world: 92 n.61, 186–87 Slimani, Ahmed: 46, 81–82, 81 n.7 Slovaks: 14, 20, 177, 186, 186 n.71, 190, 206, 206 n.11 Smith, Anthony: 89, 98–99, 182 Smith, Jay: 66 n.69 Smith, Dennis Mack: 154–55 The Social Contract (Rousseau): 81 social imperialism: 205 n.5 the Social Question: 17, 147–48, 151, 170, 174–75, 178–79 Societas Incognitorum Litteratorum: 69 Soutsos, Nikolaos: 116, 116 n.72 sovereignty see national sovereignty; popular sovereignty; thèse nobiliare; thèse parlementaire; thèse royale Spain: 15–16, 15 n.24, 56, 88, 95–96, 100, 112 Spanish Revolution of 1820: 16, 99, 104, 110 n.8, 112, 148–49 Spanish War of Independence (1808-1812): 91, 100, 100 n.94, 196–97 Le Spectateur belge: 142 Staszic, Stanislaw: 92 n.61 Stathis, Panagiotis: 117–18, 117 n.40 Stecher, Jean: 159 Štúr, Ľudovít: 20, 186–87, 206, 206 n.11 Széchenyi, István: 61–62, 190 szlachta: 91 n.58, 92, 92 n.59, 130 see also noble nation, Polish Talleyrand, Charles-Maurice de: 96–97, 139, 139 n.7 temperaments, national: 26–27 Ten Articles, 1832: 153 n.76 Thám, Karel: 57 n.26, 63, 68, 71, 71 n.97 The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger): 19 n.35, 201 Ther, Paul: 158 thèse nobiliare: 80, 84 thèse parlementaire: 80 thèse royale: 80 Thierry, Augustin: 135, 139–40 third estate: 80, 85 Third Natural Law, of Herder: 38 Todorova, Maria: 13, 24, 24 n.5 Tollebeek, Jo: 139 Török, Borbála: 62 n.53 Towiański, Andrzej Tomasz: 168 n.163 Townshend Acts, 1767: 29 trading companies: 145–46 Transylvania: 190 “Treatise on the Origin of Language” (Herder): 38 Treaty of Adrianople, 1829: 131 Treaty of London, 1827: 131

Trentowski, Bronisław: 167 the Triennio initiative, 1796-1799: 90 Troglydites: 40, 53 Turks: 132–34 Ukrainian language: 170 Ukrainian national movement: 169–70, 186, 186 n.70, 206 Union des Oppositions, Belgium: 147 United Belgian States (États Belgiques Unis): 143 United Kingdom: 145 United Kingdom of the Netherlands: 141–48 constitution of: 146 creation of: 141–42, 144–45 economic policy: 145 Flemish and: 144, 147 language and: 145, 147 liberal opposition to: 147 nation-building and: 144–47, 147 n.38 religion and: 144, 147, 147 n.41 The Social Question and: 147–48 Walloons and: 145, 147 United States (US) American nation: 29–31, 30 n.33, 43 American Revolution: 31–32 Articles of Confederation: 29–30 colonies: 29–32, 44 Declaration of Independence: 29–30 Europe and: 32 n.43, 43–44 Urban, Otto: 176 n.15, 184 Van Kley, Dale: 83 n.18 Vattel, Emmerich de: 40, 40 n.82, 53–54 the Vendee: 85 Venice: 93, 102 n.102, 104, 118 n.42, 154 n.79, 195 n.110, 199 n.128 Verlooy, Jan Baptist: 67, 145 vernacularization, Enlightenment and: 62–4, 67–68, 71, 76 n.121 Vernus, Michel: 141 Verri, Pietro: 58–59 Vick, Brian: 95–96, 96 n.79, 101 n.95, 103, 103 nn.109–10, 178, 180–81 Vico, Giambattista: 40, 40 n.82 Vienna: 69–70, 96 Vladimirescu, Tudor: 116–17, 124–25 Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca: 26 n.14 Volpe, Gioacchino: 192 n.101 Voltaire: 13, 25, 39, 39 n.79, 41–42, 127–28 Von Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge: 152, 153 n.73 Von Treitschke, Heinrich: 101, 101 n.96 Vormärz: 18 n.33, 175 n.14, 187 Walicki, Andrej: 74, 166, 169 Walloons, Flemings and: 139, 145, 147, 150–51, 160 Wank, Solomon: 72

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Warsaw: 156–57 Weber, Max: 161, 164 n.142 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich: 182, 205 n.5 Weitz, Eric D.: 135 Whaley, Joachim: 60 Whigs: 140 Willems, Jans Frans: 145, 145 n.32, 162 William, king of Holland: 144–47, 147 n.41, 162 Wingfield, Nancy: 67 Wirth, August: 153 Witte, Els: 151 Woodhouse, Christopher M: 128 Woolf, Stuart: 16, 58, 98, 102 n.103, 179–80 Wright, Johnson Kent: 80

Xanthos, Emmanuil: 111 Yakovaki, Nassia: 110 Young Italy: 154, 195 n.110, 196 n.119 Ypsilantis, Alexandros: 110, 116–17, 121, 121 n.55, 123–25 Ypsilantis, Dimitrios: 129 Zammito, John: 57 Zawadzki, Waclaw H.: 92 n.60 Zinkeisen, Johann Wilhelm: 108 n.3 Zollverein: 146, 146 n.34, 182

Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848 addresses enduring historiographical problems concerning the appearance of the first national movements in Europe and their role in the crises associated with the Age of Revolution. Considerable detail is supplied to the picture of Enlightenment era intellectual and cultural pursuits in which the nation was featured as both an object of theoretical interest and site of practice. In doing so, the work provides a major corrective to depictions of the period characteristic of earlier ventures ‒ including those by authors as notable as Hobsbawm, Gellner, and Anderson ‒ while offering an advance in narrative coherence by portraying how developments in the sphere of ideas influenced the terms of political debate in France and elsewhere in the years preceding the upheavals of 1789-1815. Subsequent chapters explore the composite nature of the revolutions which followed and the challenges of determining the relative capacity of the three chief sources of contemporary unrest ‒ constitutional, national, and social ‒ to inspire extra-legal challenges to the Restoration status quo. Dean Kostantaras is Assistant Professor of History at Northwestern State University of Louisiana whose publications include Infamy and Revolt: The Rise of the National Problem in Early Modern Greek Thought, and numerous research articles in leading academic journals. Nationalism and Revolution in Europe, 1763-1848 offers a fresh perspective on the rise and spread of nationalism in Europe and its relation to revolutionary movements. Adopting an intellectual history approach, Kostantaras shows that the phenomenon was more variegated, polyvalent, and multicentric then previously appreciated. This book is a must-read for all students of nationalism and revolution. – Dr. Thomas W. Gallant, Professor of Modern Greek History & Archaeology, University of California, San Diego   Especially geared towards those with cultural and linguistic interests, Dean Kostantaras has produced a learned and sophisticated examination, drawn from examples  over nine decades of European history, about the origin of the concept of ‘the nation’. – James J. Sack, Professor Emeritus of History, University of Illinois at Chicago

ISBN: 978-94-6298-518-6

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