Nationalism and localism : the origins of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia

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Nationalism and Localism: The Origins of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia

Christopher Atwood

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BLGOr/i'^CrON Submitted to die faculty o f die Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree Master of Arts in the Department o f Uralic and Altaic Studies, Indiana University December, 1990 A W j v_ D ig itiz e d by

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Accepted by the Graduate Faculty o f Indiana University in partial fulfillment o f the requirements o f the Degree Master o f Arts.

Prof. György Kara

Prof. Larry Moses

Prof. Elliot Sperli:

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I would like to acknowledge the kind assistance extended to me by Professor Gydrgy Kara, who read many drafts of this work and in the process supplied many valuable corrections and citations, as well as inducing me to think more deeply about the issues of nationalism in Inner Mongolia. His prompt and thorough attention to this work as it developed has resulted in a far finer end product. I

would also like to thank Professors Elliot Sperling and Larry Moses who spared the

time to give my draft a thorough reading. Jagchid Sechin also generously responded to my questions about the names and activities of some of his Kharacin compatriots. But of course the final responsibility for the remaining errors of fact, interpretation and typography is mine alone. Finally I would like note my gratitude to those Mongols of Inner Mongolia who, while nowhere mentioned in the pages that follow, supplied me essential materials without which this work would have been much poorer. In so doing, they laid upon me no charge but to someday write the real story of Inner Mongolia, a task in which I hope this thesis may be a worthy first installment.

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Contents

Conventions

iii

Introduction

1

I. The Growth of the Nationalist Party in East Mongolia

13

II. The Youth Party and the National Revival Club

34

III. Mongolia-Canton Ties and the Foundation of the Nationalist Party of Inner Mongolia

46

IV. The TQmed Communists

56

V. The Duguilang Faction

64

VI. Radicalization in Mongolia and the Inner Mongols

77

VII. The Break Between Conservative and Radical Mongols and the Coalescing of the PRPIM

85

VIII. Soviet Support and PRPIM Policy

99

IX In Place of a Conclusion: The First Congress and the Future of the PRPIM

103«.

Appendix I: Major Documents

135

Appendix II: Mongols Attending the Chinese Parliament, 1920-1921

154

Appendix III: Delegates to the First Congress of the PRPIM

157

Appendix IV: Table of Names

158

Bibliography

160

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Conventions of Transcription and Usage All Mongolian personal names, terms, and titles, along with toponyms in Inner Mongolia are given in a transcription of the vertical, or Uygur script. The orthography of Inner Mongolian names and toponyms follows the post-classical orthography now current in Inner Mongolia; that of names of Khalkha Mongols and of concepts and organizations follows usage at the time. The ethnonyms ‘ Buryat* and Kalmyk’ have been left in their Russian forms now usual in English. In the body of the text, the usual philological transcription has been simplified both to accord with the modern pronunciation, and to avoid diacriticals and non-Latin letters, according to the following table: Philological system

System used in Monggol Kitad toffl

System used herein

ayi eyi oyi uyi

ai ei oi ui h h

ai ei oi ui kh kh

9 g

9 I

X

sh shi c

q k Y silent, intervocalic g, s* si **

y

Ï* c*

xi q

J' ts dz

i

c z

j*

In the reference matter, however, the philological transcription has in general been retained. Due to typographical considerations, though, the letters marked by * have been transcribed according to the system used elsewhere in this work. Toponyms currently in use in the Mongolian People's Republic are given in a transcription of Cyrillic script Mongolian. The common element in personal names, originally spelled wacir, has come to be written in modern Inner Mongolian orthography as weir, with the w - playing the role of the "o' found in pronounciation. I have thus transcribed this name-element as ‘ocir.* Chinese personal names, terms, and titles are given in the Pinyin system now current in the People's Republic of China. Multi-syllabic units are combined without hyphens, and where ambiguity might result, an apostrophe separates the two syllables, e.g. Xian'an Palace. When the er syllable is used as a transcription for a syllable—final liquid in a non-Chinese word it is written together, e.g. Harbin, or Zhunger. The names ‘Sun Yat-sen" and "Chiang Kai-shek’ have been left in their Cantonese forms now usual in English. Toponyms in the People's Republic of China are generally given according to the *Map of the People's Republic of China/Zhonghua

1Nei Menggu Daxue Menggu Yuwen Yanjiu Shi, Mongyol Kitad toll/Meng Han ddlan (Khökhekhota: Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House, 1976).

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Renmin Gongheguo Ditu."2 Where this map supplies alternate Latin script forms, as in ‘Canton* and "Yellow River,’ I have used them, and where main or alternate Latin script form on this map is based on a non-Chinese language, e.g. Mongolian, I have likewise given the form based on that language, although the transcription form followed here may differ from that of the map. Russian personal names, terms, titles, and toponyms, as well as the names of Buryats of Russian or Soviet citizenship, are given according to the transcription system used In the New York Times Atlas of the World. Surnames of Western origin, e.g. Joffe or Blucher, are given in their proper Latin script forms as is usual. Where toponyms of human habitation changed over the course of time, e.g. Neislel Khuriye to Ulaanbaatar, Beijing to Beiping, etc. I have strived to used the form contemporary to the period being discussed and to avoid anachronism. Names of physical features, however, are given only in one form, that current today, as is found in the New York Times Atlas (for the USSR), the map ‘ BOgd Nairamdakh Mongol Ard Uls*3 (for the Mongolian People's Republic) and the ’ Map of the People's Republic of China/Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ditu,’ (for China, with the qualifications noted above). . Most of the Mongols of Inner Mongolia at this time had at least two names, one Mongolian and one Chinese. In general I have used the Mongolian form except where that form is unknown or doubtful. I have tried to use revolutionary aliases, e.g. Serengdongrub for Buyantai, Ula’ankhQO for Yun Ze, only for the time when they seem to have became the usual name for the person, and not project them back anachronistically. Some dates are given in the sources according to the Mongolian calender. I have converted these dates into those of the Gregorian calender according to the tables in Dieter Schuh's monumental work on the Tibetan calendrical system.4 The Mongolian calender is closest to the 'Phags-pa system which seems to never vary from the Mongolian by more than three days. Since however a divergence of a few days is still possible, though, such dates have always been preceded by the term ‘around* or ‘approximately,* and the Mongolian calender date given in a footnote. The usage of ‘ Mongol* and ‘ Mongolian* is now rather confused in English; here *Mongol* is used as a noun and ‘ Mongolian* as an adjective. Although the usage of ‘ Inner* and “Outer* Mongolia, dating from the Qing dynasty has been rightly criticized as Sino-centric, it is clear that such usage for Inner Mongolia is now the accepted English translation even for the Mongols themselves. As for “Outer Mongolia,’ I have used that term for the period up until November 1924, when the present day name, the Mongolian People's Republic, was adopted, as it was still commonly used by Mongols themselves. The areas of the former Jirim, Josotu, and Juu Uda Leagues, I have termed East Mongolia, following the usage of the people there themselves. ‘Chinese’ here refers both to the country and to the ethnic group. Where the latter meaning needs to be specified I have used ‘ethnic Chinese,’ not ’Han.’ Although ’ Han’ is now widely used in China, it remains true that in English, the word ‘Chinese’ generally refers to the Chinese as an ethnic group, so that ‘Chinese language,’ ’ Chinese literature,’ or ‘ Chinese

^Beijing; Cartographic Publishing House, 1984. 3Ulaanbaatar: State Geodesic and Cartographic Institute, 1984. 4 Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der tibetischen Kalenderrechnung, Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementary Vol. 16 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973). Explanations of the tables are on pp. 133-137. ■

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food’ unambigously refers to the language, literature, or food of the ethnic Chinese, not that of the more than fifty nationalities of modern day China. Hence the use of ’Han Chinese’ is otiose. Moreover in Chinese documents of the time, zhongguoren (’Chinese’) is often used in an ethnic, not a national, sense, so that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia may be exhorted to cooperate with the zhongguoren (’Chinese’—see Appendix I, document 4). The following abbreviations are used in the body of the text and in the bibliography: CPC C(P)PCC IMCHM KMT KUTV MPR MPRP PRPIM

Communist Party of China Chinese (People's) Political Consultative Council Inner Mongolia Cultural and Historical Materials5 Guomindang or Nationalist Party of China Communist University of the Toilers of the East (Kommunisticheskiy Universität Trudyashchikhsya Vostoka) Mongolian People's Republic Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia

^Published in Kh&khekhota by the Committee for Cultural and Historical Research of the Inner Mongolia Committee of the CPPCC.

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Introduction

Few concepts in Mongolian history have so honored a place as the concept of nationalism.

Historians confidently assert it to be the main factor motivating Mongolian

political activity, and indeed view its presence as the distinguishing mark between those whose activity is directed for the public good and those whose activity is purely selfish.

The role of

‘ nationalism* as a concept is all the greater in the historiography of Inner Mongolia.

There, in

response to a situation of alien, i.e. Chinese rule, essentially all meaningful social activity is seen as being motivated by nationalism in a particularly pure and unadulterated form. Historians assert that Mongolian politicians were concerned with increasing the autonomy of Mongolian organizations vis & vis Chinese ones, but did not concern themselves with the structure of such organizations, nor with determining what Mongolian political or social structure might best resist such pressure, nor did they have any deep concern for intra-Mongolian issues that did not affect the balance of power between the Mongols and the Chinese,

in other words Mongolian political activity is seen as purely other-directed.

Moreover, Chinese pressure is said to be uniform in all regions—it consisted of Chinese merchants and landlords buying Mongolian land and lending money—so that the response of the Mongols, too, was uniform, over all of Inner Mongolia at least.1 In this view, then, Mongolian nationalism was almost purely reactive; it was incapable of being influenced in any positive way by the neighboring societies. Such diversity as existed in the Mongolian responses is explained as variations on a continuum of selfish vs. nationalist thinking. This continuum

tin his Mongols of Manchuria, (New York: John Day Co., 1934— reprint, New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), Owen Lattimore surveyed the East Mongols and the peoples of Kh&l5n Buir in a fairly detailed fashion, but apart from his brief discussion of the different sorts of Chinese colonization in Josotu League and that in Juu Uda and Jirim Leagues (see pp. 241, 247-249), differences between areas are cast in quantitative terms, (i.e. how many Chinese have been there for how long), not qualitative ones.

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corresponded roughly with the political hierarchy; princes and dukes were likely to be more morally defective and sinicized, while the masses were more nationalistic.

Finally since

nationalism was the mark of the public spirited man, and the opposite of selfishness, all nationalists are held to have had essentially the same ideas. Historians may disagree as to who is a nationalist and who is not, but that one nationalist may differ fundamentally from another on points of principle is impossible. Variations along the axis of moderate vs. radical (or slow vs. quick) may exist, but what exactly is involved in these distinctions is left rather fuzzy. For these writers, then, nationalism is essentially a single quality, which may differ only in quantity. Paul Hyer, for example, states that: Demchugdungrub remained aloof from the radical movement of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, led by Pai-yun-ti [Serengdongrub] . . . Oe Wang had a vision of restoring Mongolian greatness but he was far from being an opportunist concerned with personal political power, a characteristic all too common among those of his generation.2 Thus the actual differences in ideology between Serengdongrub, who was an avowed anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolutionary, and no friend of Buddhism, and Demcugdongrub, who at this time was a monarchist, a believer in reform, not abolition, of the old banner system with its hereditary nobility, and a devout Buddhist, are glossed over and reduced to a distinction merely of selfish Serengdongrub vs. heroic Demcugdongrub. Given such a paradigm of nationalism as a force varying only in quantity not quality, it is not surprising that little detailed analysis of the actual documents available in Mongolian history has been attempted. A given leader's nationalism having been proven by his actions, his world view (or at least the part of it significant for a historian) must be essentially identical to that of any other nationalist leader.

Thus although many documents of political significance

2Paul Hyer, ‘Demchugdungrub: Nationalist Leader in Inner Mongolia's Confrontation with China and Japan,* in Graciela de la Lama, ed., Proceedings of the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia S North Africa, vol. 1, Central Asia (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1976), p. 67. 2

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have been published in the Mongolian People's Republic or the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, not one document-based study of a modem Mongolian political or social figure's ideology or world view has yet appeared in a Western language.3 From the point of view of the currently prevailing historical paradigm, which sees Mongolian nationalism as like a vector pointing in the void, there is no reason to undertake such analysis. One consequence has been that historians of Inner Mongolia often make the most astounding errors in the evaluations of the political positions of various figures of the twenties and thirties. Kharanud thus states that as the Daur, Buyangerel, was ‘ honest and tolerant, and a firm revolutionary,* he also held a firm belief in the Three People's Principles, when in fact the man was always a pan-Mongolist, vehemently anti-Chinese, and from 1928 on, openly Marxist-Leninist in his orientation.4 Or again many writers from the late sixties on have associated Demcugdongrub with the Young Mongol movement of the twenties and thirties.5 Now at the time Demcugdongrub was indeed young, and he was a Mongol, but he was not in fact a Young Mongol, in the sense in which the phrase was used in that period. Derived primarily from the Revolutionary Youth League in the Mongolian People's Republic and the Youth Party in Kh5l6n Buir, the phrase ‘Young Mongol’ meant, at the very least, uncompromising republicanism, admiration for the MPR, and hostility to established religion, and often implied socialist and

3 Robert B. Valliant, in an article that otherwise makes fine use of English and Japanese documentation (‘ Inner Mongolia 1912: The Failure of Independence* Mongolian Studies: Journal of the Mongolia Society, vol. IV (1977), p. 86), even denies the existence of such sources in Mongolian: k propos the 1912 independence movement he opines that *The Mongols themselves left nothing in writing.’ 4Hamuote [Kharanud], “Qiantan Nei Menggu geming jun zongsiling Bai Yunti ji qi muliao renyuan," Menggu Wenhua Tongxun, vol. 6 (1985), p. 18. ¿Howard L. Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of Republican China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), vol. 1, s.v. Buyantai, and vol. 2, s.v. Demchukdonggrub; Edwin Pak-wah Leung, ‘ Regional Autonomy versus Central Authority: the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the Chinese Response, 1925-1947,* Journal of Oriental Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (1986), pp. 51, 53, 58; Hyer, "Demchugdungrub,* p. 67. 3

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Marxist beliefs. Clearly Demcugdongrub could find no place in such a movement, nor indeed would he want to find one there. .

As seen in the analyses of Ernest Gellner,6 modern nationalism arises in the process of

urbanization; the agrarian society, divided between an unlocalized horizontal stratum of the clerical and noble elite and the localized communities of agrarian producers, begins to break down as members of rural communities enter the cities.

In rural communities, those whose

identity goes beyond a local culture (almost always smaller than a modern nationality) belong largely to a relatively small elite whose privileges are justified by a long tradition that they defend by training and by interest. Thus we have a conservative low culture, or little tradition, bound to a particular locality, and an only marginally less conservative high culture, or great tradition, that claims to represent a whole nation.

In this political nation, though, full

citizenship is bestowed only on the fairly small minority who through birth, or through the not very widely available tutorial-style education, come to share in the traditional culture and values of the elite.

Thus a conservative form of aristocratic nationalism that often seems

inseparable from the defense of both tradition and of traditional privilege co-exists with a vigorous localism.

Thus in Inner Mongolia the Borjigid nobility, with their tradition of descent

from Cinggis Khan, along with the Buddhist clergy jointly embodied the traditional idea of the Mongolian nation, while the herdsmen and farmers saw their identity more (but not only) in terms of their province (aimag) or banner. The growing cities of an early modern country, however, replace this rural hierarchy with a pattern, tending towards universal, of literacy and competitive mobility.

Where new

urban immigrants enter a city or town that has already begun to develop an unspecialized, dynamic, mass high culture (as opposed to the conservative, elite, high culture of agrarian society) with cultural/linguistic differences from their own that cannot be bridged even in

6Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 4

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several generations, they must face the choice of either accepting a long lasting status of inferiority, or endeavoring to develop a mass high culture that is more congruent with the cultural traditions into which they were born. Thus the Mongols who began to move into Chinese county towns and larger cities in the late Qing could either accept that they and their chlidren would be seen as defective Chinese, or they could try to develop their own modem Mongolian culture. It is these alternate mass cultures (in our case Chinese and Mongolian) which marks national or ethnic identity in the modem sense, an identity that goes beyond the local one of the peasant, both in being larger and more inclusive, and also in having a far greater ability to survive the transition into modem society intact.

It is the culture of

standard speech, not local dialects, printed novels, not oral tales,7 and uniform schooling, not specialized apprenticeship. Yet to sustain this unstratified mass culture requires the creation of professional organs of culture, especially schools, but also newspapers, printing presses, clubs, and books, that propagate this particular version of new and modem universal high culture. But it is in the nature of modern culture to be universal, and to draw all within a given region into its grasp, just as it is in the nature of this mass culture to abolish ascribed status distinctions, and replace them with free competition. Thus the fledgling mass high culture comes in conflict with the well developed high culture of the environment in which it begins to develop, and naturally seeks to retreat to the bosom of the countryside, whence it came, to create in that countryside

Collecting and preserving folklore often does play a major role in the intellectual life of the nationalist intelligentsia, but to put oral literature in the form of written documents radically alters the social standing the text; the act of recording folklore is better described as appropriation rather than simple preservation. On the role of folklore collection in the formation of modem nationalism see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), especially pp. 1-100. It should be noted though that these examples, drawn from Scottish and Welsh history, represent a kind of limiting case of maximum discontinuity between the un-self-conscious culture of agrarian peoples and its new folkloric reincarnation among the intelligentsia. Elsewhere (as among the Mongols) where modern nationalism arises in a much earlier stage of acculturation, the folkloric revival involves more adaption and less outright invention. 5

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the conditions that can sustain the new high culture of universal literacy, generalized training, and competitive social mobility.

Yet this mass high culture inherently delegitimizes the

traditional elite by creating an alternate, non-hierarchical, mode of thinking, and at the same time, competes for resources with the already existing mass culture.

The representatives of

this budding high culture, that is, the emerging ethnic intelligentsia, cannot help but try to defend their culture by taking over the existing local organs of political power and putting them in service of the new mode of cultural existence. Thus a nationalist movement is bom; it is the struggle to make a government, whether local or independent, take as its task the furtherance of a modern culture and society that the agrarian population can enter without fear of discrimination, and its prime exponents are the ethnic intelligentsia.

It is the struggle of that

intelligentsia to create a space for a culture that will be both its own and modern. We can see thus that modem nationalism is inherently disruptive of the established order.

Where ethnic stratification corresponds with social stratification, then this disruption

can be easily justified as the struggle against alien exploiters. But even where the elite is not ethnically different from the rest of the society in question, the nationalist intelligentsia must end up in coflict with it, for the mass culture which it bears and which has become the talisman of its identity cannot subsist in a society of stagnant rural hierarchy. We can also see that the nationalists’ attitude towards the ethnic group against whose mass high culture they are forming their own mass culture cannot be simple. They always feel a force of both attraction and repulsion towards that group and its culture, attraction because it is the model on which they have created their own modem culture, and repulsion, because it is that group which has scorned them as rustic aliens, and which will continue to do so unless the nationalists can build their own house where they are the masters. This attraction and repulsion derives peculiar force from the context in which modern nationalism grows. The growing urbanization that sparks the rise of mass culture and the decline of the high culture-low culture pair found in agrarian society is only the local reflection

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of the world-wide process of development.

In this world-wide movement, traditional and

well-loved ethnic feuds that persisted for centuries suddenly acquire a new and frightening urgency. The race to develop, and the initially inevitable assimilation of members of the less developed groups generates a frantic fear, especially among the newly emerging intelligentsia, who are the ones most aware of the rapid development and the race for survival taking place elsewhere, that now the price of losing this ethnic feud is not a blow to one's pride, or even subjugation, but extinction as a people. The world-wide domination of the industrial West, with its attendant ideology of scientific enlightenment, creates a single measure against which all existing nationalities are judged, either as advanced or backward. In this sense, then, the picture changes from one of conflict to competition,1b and in this competition, those who are behind can only survive by learning all they can from those who have begun the race to modernity before them. Thus, the modern intelligentsia as the bearers of this modern competitive nationalism present a peculiar Janus-face both towards the other ethnic groups that threaten to outstrip them and to their own people; on the one hand, they oppose the other groups in the name of their own people, but on the other they see that their people can only survive if they adopt many of the features of the more developed people, features which the backward nationality has traditionally despised but now offer the key to success, indeed survival.

Thus their attitude

towards rival nations is one of fear and emulation, and towards their own people one of love

*O n the change from conflict to competition as the mark of modern society see the classic work of Georg Simmel, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, Conflict; The Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955— reprinted 1964). While Simmel dealt with how the change from conflict to competition both reflects and strengthens the growing unity and interrelation of elements in one society, we can also extend this analysis to how inter-national competition both reflects and strengthens a steadily more unified world system. 7

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and contempt.9 Hence we can see the perniciousness of the inattention to the complexities of the influence of other neighboring Asian peoples, especially China and Japan,10 on the Mongolian Intelligentsia and Mongolian intellectual history.

Essentially, in the prevailing paradigm of

monochrome nationalism in Inner Mongolian history, even the possibility of such influence is denied. It is seen as self evident that since China was the enemy, nationalist Mongols could not possibly have borrowed any political ideas from there.

Certainly influence there was, but it

must have been negative, concentrated among the selfish and morally defective princes, and unconnected to any positive, i.e. nationalist, movement in Mongolian society.11 But of course such a position shows a remarkable inattention to the dynamics of history elsewhere in the world. As we have seen above, modern nationalism grows in rivalry with, not simply in blind opposition to, neighboring peoples, and the nationalist intelligentsia's analysis of the reasons for the rival nations’ success will exert crucial influence on their views on how their own nation can be rescued from backwardness.12

»This dilemma of nationalist leaders, and the crucial role of the felt distinction between backward and advanced nationalities is developed with rich data and great psychological sensitivity in Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), especially pp. 95-288. As noted above, though, his theory could have been sharpened by a recognition of the analytical distinction between simple conflict and competitive conflict, and the role that the switch from the one to the other has played in the evolution of modern nationalism. 1°ln Buryatia, which aside from East Mongolia was the other great cradle of the Mongolian intelligentsia, the Russians played this same role. 11See e.g. C.R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (London: Kegan Paul International, 1989), pp. 172-173, 208, and George A. Cheney, The Pre-Revolutionary Culture of Outer Mongolia (Bloomington: Mongolia Society, 1968), pp. 21-22, 44-45. 12Nacinbatu, ‘Gungsangnorbu-yin suryan kumujil-un Ojel sanay-a-yin tuqai,"