Myanmar: Life After Nargis 9789812309679

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MYANMAR

Life After Nargis

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967. The Member States of the Association are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The ASEAN Secretariat is based in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).

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Pavin ChaChavalPongPun & Moe Thuzar

ASEAN Secretariat Jakarta, Indonesia

Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2009 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2009 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or their supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Myanmar : life after Nargis / Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Moe Thuzar. 1. Cyclones—Burma. 2. Disaster relief—Burma. 3. Cyclone Nargis, 2008. I. Moe Thuzar. HV555 B9P33 2009 ISBN 978-981-230-966-6 (hard cover) ISBN 978-981-230-967-9 (PDF) Cover photo: Aerial view of a community in Labutta Township on the road to recovery one year after Cyclone Nargis. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd, Singapore Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd

Contents

Message from ASEAN Secretary-General Message from ISEAS Director Acknowledgements

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INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1 The Nargis Impacts 11 CHAPTER 2 In the Cyclone’s Wake 47

CHAPTER 3 The Human Stories 69 CHAPTER 4 Continuing the Post-Nargis Journey 89

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Message from ASEAN Secretary-General Forty-one years after its establishment, in May 2008, ASEAN was “baptised” — not by fire, but by a cyclone that wreaked terrible havoc on Myanmar. This prompted ASEAN to take a lead role and assist the affected Government and the international community to work together in helping the cyclone victims. The impact of Cyclone Nargis was comparable to the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Nargis struck the Ayeyawaddy Delta and southern Yangon Division on 2 and 3 May 2008. It was the worst natural disaster in the country’s recorded history, leaving in its wake death, destruction and despair. ASEAN has since been at the forefront of the humanitarian assistance effort in Myanmar, proving its relevance and effectiveness in the face of a humanitarian crisis. The highlight of ASEAN’s contribution was the successful implementation of the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA), which assessed the needs for post-cyclone relief as well as requirements for recovery. Comprising a

mix of interagency, intercountry groups of professionals and volunteers, PONJA was a landmark effort to integrate relief and recovery efforts in a policy-coherent manner. As it brings together national and international humanitarian actors under the aegis of an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism, PONJA as a mechanism is unprecedented. I felt it imperative to document PONJA’s dynamic efforts as they evolved on the ground, to aid understanding of how and why certain situations require particular responses, whom to involve in which phase of such responses; and to develop recommendations to improve our responses in future events. I sought the assistance of the ASEAN Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) for this documentation. This book is the result. Rather than analyse the disaster, the book focuses on capturing the conduct of the PONJA to ensure that its findings are used as a catalyst to enhance ongoing humanitarian operations, and to provide examples of good practices

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which could be incorporated into subsequent reviews for recovery planning and programming. The book serves as a good reminder for partnerships and working relations that shall continue in Myanmar throughout the recovery phase and beyond. The suggestions put forward by the authors can be an impetus for improvement at a time when it can still make a difference. Most importantly, we are all reminded of the continued needs of the

Myanmar people in rebuilding their lives after Nargis. I thank ISEAS and the ASEAN Studies Centre for their assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat in this initiative. I look forward to future collaboration with them in promoting ASEAN’s purposes through pragmatic solutions.

Surin Pitsuwan Secretary-General of ASEAN

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Message from ISEAS Director

The ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS started operations in March 2008. One of the major tasks it took up in the first few months of its work — indeed, even before its formal launch — was the documentation of the ASEAN initiative in assisting Myanmar respond to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. I take this opportunity to commend the work of the ASEAN Secretariat as the implementer of the ASEAN initiative in post-Nargis Myanmar. ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan personally took the lead in bringing together groups with different interests for the common goal of addressing important needs for post-cyclone relief as well as for the recovery and rehabilitation of those affected. I would like to thank Dr Surin for giving the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS the opportunity to document the Post-Joint Assessment. Recognising the real-time importance of documenting the situation while the experience of PONJA was still fresh in the minds of those involved, the ASEAN

Studies Centre team immediately started work in consultation with ASEAN Secretariat officers in Yangon, to capture PONJA and other experiences from key actors involved in post-Nargis relief work. I am pleased to present this book, which looks at life in Myanmar after Nargis, and focusses on the ASEAN initiative of working together to make a difference for the people of Myanmar. It traces the path of events that led to new mechanisms of collaboration among different interest groups. The ASEAN approach allowed for more openness in dealing with different governments and entities, greater acceptance of international NGOs in the country, and a higher level of trust towards the international community. We are left to ponder the suggested windows of opportunity where ASEAN’s catalytic role can continue to support the momentum of ongoing humanitarian operations in Myanmar. I would like to thank Dr Surin and the ASEAN Secretariat officers in

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Yangon, headed by Dr Surin’s then special envoy, Dr Anish Roy, who provided assistance and support in facilitating interviews and visits for the ASEAN Studies Centre team. Finally, I commend the Head of the ASEAN Studies Centre, Mr Rod Severino, and the researchers for their sincerity and diligence in carrying out this task with an understanding of the important issues facing ASEAN cooperation and Myanmar.

A special note of thanks is due to Mrs Triena Ong and her staff at the ISEAS Publications Unit for their hard work in producing this publication on time for the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

K. Kesavapany Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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Acknowledgements

This book is the result of an initiative by the ASEAN Secretariat to document the role of ASEAN, working closely together with the United Nations (UN) and the Government of Myanmar, to facilitate the distribution of assistance from the international community and to expedite the deployment of relief and recovery teams in the areas affected by Cyclone Nargis. The authors would like to express profound thanks and gratitude to Dr Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General of ASEAN, who initiated the project and shared a whole afternoon of invaluable insights. Without his vision and commitment, this book would not have materialized, and we thank him personally for that. Our sincere gratitude also to H.E. U Kyaw Thu, Chair of the TCG (then Deputy Foreign Minister), concurrently serving as the Chairman of Myanmar’s Civil Service Selection and Training Board. We were invited to accompany U Kyaw Thu to visit the village of Pyinsalu, one of the areas hardest hit by the cyclone.

Our deep appreciation for the support and guidance provided by Dr Anish Kumar Roy, then Director of the ASEAN Secretariat’s Bureau for Resources Development (now restructured as a directorate under the purview of the Deputy SecretaryGeneral for the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community), Ms Adelina Kamal, Head of the ASEAN Secretariat’s Disaster Management Unit (now restructured as the Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division), and Dr Puji Pujiono, regional disaster response adviser for the United Nations (UN) seconded to ASEAN for postNargis work, particularly the in-depth insights shared with us on the ASEAN Yangon field office’s coordinating work. Without their contributions, we could not have captured the multifaceted processes to share with wider audiences in ASEAN. Our special thanks to ISEAS Director Ambassador, K. Kesavapany, and ASEAN Studies Centre Head Mr Rodolfo C. Severino, who both provided valuable advice and

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comments for the report, with Mr Severino also providing significant writing and editing assistance. We also acknowledge and thank the contribution of the following, all of whom carved time and attention out of their busy schedules to share their respective experiences, views, and thoughts on the unique journey in responding to the impact of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar: U Tun Myat, former UN Assistant Secretary-General; Prof Dr Aung Tun Thet, Principal Officer of the UN System Staff College in Turin; U Myint, Former Chief of the Least Developed Countries Section, Development Research and Policy Analysis Division in UN-ESCAP; H.E. Robert H.K. Chua, Ambassador of Singapore to Myanmar, and H.E. Bansarn Bunnag, Ambassador of Thailand to Myanmar; Sawanit Kongsiri, Assistant Secretary-General of the Thai Red Cross Society; Vanessa Chan, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Singapore Embassy in Yangon; Somjai Tapaothong of the Royal Thai Embassy, Yangon; Daniel Baker, acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator and Head of the UNFPA office in Yangon; Bishow Parajuli, UN Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Yangon; Ramesh Shrestha, UNICEF representative in Myanmar; Thierry Delbreuve, Head of OCHA-Myanmar; Elliane Kuppens of OCHA; Bernard Delpuech, Head of the EU Field Office in Yangon; Rurik Marsden, Head of the DFID office in Yangon; Raja Rehan Arshad, the World Bank’s Lead Operation

Officer for Sustainable Development, heading the DaLA assessment efforts in Myanmar; Michiko Umezaki, JICA resident representative in Yangon and her team members Junichi Hirano and Hiroyuki Okuda; U Aung Tun Khaing, Deputy Director-General, and U Myo Set Aung, Deputy Director, of Myanmar’s Ministry of Social Welfare; the dedicated officials from the Ministries of National Planning and Development, Transport, Health, Post and Telecommunications, Information, Education, Home Affairs, and Forestry; and to Yohannah ‘Yoyo’ Wegerdt, who was involved in the VTA exercise and is now Programme Manager, TCG Periodic Review. Personal thanks go to Richard Blewitt of HelpAge International, William Henry, Delwar Hussein, Dr Aye Aye Naing (UNAIDS) and Ko Lwin (MMRD Research Services), who patiently walked Moe through the VTA experience, and allowed a glimpse into the highs and lows of the experiences of all the volunteers who worked tirelessly during the VTA, at the PONJA welcome back ceremony. Aung Pyi Tan Oo, Saw Thet Soe and Pyi Tan Phyoe also shared their VTA experience with Moe. Khun Thanapon Songput and his team of ASEAN volunteers made the Seik Gyi story real for us. May Myat Mon Win of Chatrium Hotel shared both photos and stories of the Chatrium staff ’s hands-on experience of local initiatives to provide relief the cyclone survivors. With May’s assistance, the authors were also afforded the

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opportunity to meet Zaw Win Htut, Myanmar’s leading rock artiste, who also shared additional insights into citizen initiatives. Not least, a note of special

thanks to U Aye Lwin, former ASEANMyanmar Director-General, for his thoughtful input, and advice on ‘Saetanar’ volunteerism.

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1 Introduction

Official warnings of a cyclone gathering force in the Bay of Bengal and making its way towards Myanmar were first broadcast on 30 April and 1 May 2008.1 These warnings came out on what seemed to be a normal monsoon day in the lives of many people in Myanmar’s delta districts — villages and towns in the Ayeyawaddy and Yangon Divisions, including the commercial hub of Yangon itself. The rains had arrived. Farmers had planted their second crops in the paddy fields. Fishermen sailed the waters seeking their daily catch. City folk went about their business in the windy, wet weather that the monsoon season regularly brings to peninsular Southeast Asia.

Villagers living along the coastline, whose communities had been attuned to the whims of nature for centuries, could smell a storm brewing. Only a few paused to ponder over the instinctive difference they felt in their bones about this particular storm, but could not put this into words. Urbanites with access to satellite television noticed that the international news channels and the local weather department’s warnings about the approaching storm differed in the sense of urgency that they conveyed. However, having been shielded from the worst of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that had caused untold suffering in neighbouring countries, and as far as

Facing page: Paddy fields flooded with salt water. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 1

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Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the majority discounted the importance of the weather warnings broadcast over radio and television. In fact, the most visible activities immediately before the storm struck were those related to the nationwide referendum on the draft constitution scheduled for 10 May. Cyclone Nargis hit the southwest shores of Myanmar on the afternoon of 2 May 2008, sweeping through the lower delta regions of the Ayeyawaddy and Yangon Divisions, continuing on through

3 May. Urban and rural areas alike were not spared, although the villages in Labutta, Pyapon, and Bogalay districts bore the brunt of the storm’s force. Mountains of water assaulted these areas throughout the night. For many it was a nightmare from which they never awoke. Many others who did live to see daybreak wished they had not survived. The thin light of morning dawned on a landscape of utter devastation, and on the survivors scarred by lacerations on both skin and soul. Entire villages were reduced to quagmires of mud and debris.

Flooded paddy fields in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 2

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Scenes of devastation in the delta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Thousands were left dead, injured, or suffering. Urban dwellers also woke to the effects of this disaster. Trees had fallen on roofs and roads. Water and electricity were cut off. Phone lines were down. Although this damage was nowhere near the level of devastation experienced in the towns and villages closer to the coastline, life in Yangon came to a standstill. The impact of Cyclone Nargis still haunts people — the destruction of homes and livelihoods, the loss or contamination of water sources, not to

mention the psychological cost to the affected persons. The devastation of the delta areas, Myanmar’s rice bowl and the heart of its fishing industry, is a problem that runs deeper than current rehabilitation efforts. It has been acknowledged that Cyclone Nargis was the worst natural disaster in Myanmar’s history, and the most devastating cyclone to strike Asia since 1991.2 Its death toll stands at 77,738 dead, with 55,917 missing.3 The total amount of damage (physical assets) and losses (reduction in economic 3

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Skin “burned” away by the combined effects of wind and rain. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

The combined force of wind and rain left both physical and psychological scars. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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activity) caused by the cyclone in the affected areas of Myanmar is estimated at about 4,500 billion kyats (approximately US$4,057 million).4 The Government of Myanmar (and several humanitarian missions under the aegis of the UN and ASEAN) conducted preliminary assessments in specific sectors in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. These early assessments, although useful, were in no way sufficient to gauge

the true scale of the disaster, and of the requirements for immediate relief, and early (and full) recovery. The momentum of relief and recovery efforts was hampered by a breakdown in infrastructure and communications networks that resulted in poor access and transportation. A National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee was formed on 3 May 2008, headed by Myanmar’s

Temporary shelters set up at the cyclone-hit areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 5

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Drinking water dirtied and salinated by the storm. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

A once vibrant pond full of debris and dirt from the storm. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Prime Minister, General Thein Sein. Cabinet ministers were assigned responsibilities to assess damages and loss, and to coordinate relief assistance in the affected districts. The sum of 5 billion kyats was allocated as a relief fund. Myanmar’s Foreign Minister publicly acknowledged to the world that the country was in need of assistance to respond to the disaster. Camps for the affected victims and relief distribution coordinated by the government were set up on 17 May. Concerned citizens had been travelling to the affected areas since 4 and 5 May, braving the fragile roads and bridges to get emergency relief supplies to the affected villages. Members of the clergy rallied the survivors, by helping to clear the debris, offering refuge in the monasteries, feeding people out of monastic and church supplies, appealing through clerical networks for support and assistance, and serving, in the true sense of the word, as focal coordinators for any relief support that came their way. The major characteristic of these sincere but disjointed responses was unpreparedness, on the part of the government, as well as the people. The dimensions of the damage inflicted by the disaster were just too much of a challenge for the government to answer the urgent call to action fully. Spontaneous reactions by citizens, however well meant, could not be systematic and efficient. The government as the sole entity that could contribute any sense of order to the process was

simply not prepared to shoulder the enormous burden of responsibility. Instead, its resources were wholly occupied with the national referendum process. Indeed, the referendum went ahead countrywide only days after Nargis struck, with the exception of those districts that had been severely affected by the cyclone. The delays in dealing with the outside world and in meaningfully responding to the urgent needs of the victims caused confusion and clamour, criticism and censure, both within and outside the country. Amidst the confusion and delays, UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies, and emergency missions from fellow ASEAN members had all reached the affected areas, some as early as the second week of May. The ASEAN Emergency Response Assessment Team (ASEANERAT), organized by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) under the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), was deployed for the first time. The team was made up of members from Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Even before the ASEAN-ERAT deployment, representatives of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams from Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore were in the field. They also served as resource persons for the ASEAN-ERAT mission.5

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From 9–18 May, the ASEAN-ERAT mission undertook consultations with senior government officials and field assessors, coming up with recommendations on how best to facilitate the coordination of relief and early recovery assessment coordination, including the offers of assistance from ASEAN and the international community. Its report formed the basis of discussion for the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, hosted and chaired by Singapore on 19 May. It was not until this meeting that ASEAN’s efforts finally provided the framework for coordination and cooperation with the United Nations, and regional and international agencies to respond to the disaster in a systematic, efficient and responsible manner. The ASEAN-led mechanism brought together the Government of Myanmar, ASEAN, the UN, and international NGOs in a unique working mechanism for coordinating and facilitating assistance and responses to the cyclone’s impact. This mechanism is now known as the Tripartite Core Group (TCG). It was formed on 25 May at the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference. The TCG agreed on 31 May to conduct a Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) to address the Pledging Conference’s call for a credible, multi-sectoral assessment, “to determine the full scale of the impact of the cyclone and requirements for both immediate humanitarian assistance needs and medium to longer-term recovery”. Undertaken from 10–19 June, the PONJA brought together policy

coordinators and humanitarian and development actors in an unprecedented collaboration to bring relief and recovery to the cyclone victims and affected areas. The exercise also brought together two mutually supportive assessment methodologies that had never before been carried out at the same time: (a) a village tract assessment (VTA) to determine the needs for relief and early recovery, and (b) a damage and loss assessment (DaLA) to examine longerterm, macroeconomic implications. The PONJA Report was launched and welcomed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 21 July. Before that, the PONJA findings had been used for the UN revised appeal launched on 10 July. PONJA serves as a unique example of genuine cooperation for one common objective: to help the cyclone victims. It has shown that there is opportunity in diversity. PONJA, especially its VTA component, helped to further illuminate the different roles and strengths of each group involved in the whole exercise and the equal importance of each strength. The exercise also brought to light the importance of sustaining efficient networks for longer-term recovery and of engendering consultative mechanisms that build on the success of the PONJA spirit. Much has been written on the response to the cyclone, but this is not this book’s intention. With this book, we seek to document the human interactions, leadership strengths, beneficial partnerships, and best practices that arose from the PONJA exercise and that made PONJA a success.

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Chapter 1 describes the impact of Cyclone Nargis on the people of Myanmar. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, lead researcher on political and security affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS, examines the impact, and looks at the implications for ASEAN and the international community. Sanchita Basu Das, the ASEAN Studies Centre lead researcher on economic affairs, discusses the economic impact. Chapter 2 explores ASEAN initiatives as recipes for synergy. Moe Thuzar, lead researcher for social and cultural affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, traces the path of key events that led to new mechanisms of working together, and discusses both their shortcomings and successes. ASEAN’s role in bringing together divergent interests is the common thread that runs through the experience of working together. Through interviews, and frank, open discussions with key actors involved in the PONJA process, as well as with independent actors, this chapter undertakes a qualitative narrative analysis of the turning points in the trajectory of ASEAN’s coordination and good offices in assisting Myanmar in the response to Cyclone Nargis. Chapter 3 highlights the strength and resilience of Myanmar’s people in responding to the crisis on their hands. Pavin Chachavalpongpun recounts the human stories of weathering the storm and its aftermath. The voices of policymakers, technocrats, volunteers, humanitarian workers, citizens rallying

to lend a helping hand, and, most importantly, the victims themselves, are the source and inspiration for this chapter. The contributions of ASEAN governments and peoples, the international community, and international and Myanmar NGOs are also discussed. The book’s concluding chapter focuses on the continuing journey. This chapter looks at what has been set into motion for longer-term recovery and reconstruction. Drawing from the experience of working together for PONJA, some policy recommendations are provided for Myanmar’s road to recovery after the storm, and ASEAN’s continued role as an honest broker for such relief efforts. Notes 1. From statement by Myanmar’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva, at the 61st World Health Assembly on 19 May 2008, “For two days national radio and television continuously warned the people”. 2. Post-Nargis Joint Assessment full report, released on 21 July 2008. 3. Ibid. The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment carried out forty days after the cyclone set the final official count at 84,537, with 53,836 missing. 4. From statement by Myanmar’s Prime Minister, General Thein Sein, at the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008. 5. ASEAN-ERAT Report to the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, 19 May 2008.

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1 The Nargis Impacts

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May 2008, with wind speeds peaking at 200 kilometres per hour. It inflicted enormous devastation, particularly in the low-lying Ayeyawaddy Delta in the south of the country. The cyclone destroyed buildings, infrastructure, and farmland in the area, and caused a terrible number of deaths and casualties, especially in 37 townships. Continued heavy rains, flooding, and storms after the cyclone exacerbated the situation. In the Ayeyawaddy Delta, in particular, more than 23,500 square kilometres were directly hit by the cyclone. Cyclone Nargis can most certainly be said to be the worst natural disaster the

country has encountered in the course of its history. This conclusion can be reached on the basis of the sheer number of deaths alone. At the time this book was written, the official death toll released by the Government of Myanmar stood at 84,537, with 53,836 people missing (and now presumably dead) and 19,359 injured. Some 2.4 million out of the 7.35 million people living in the affected townships were severely affected by Nargis. More women than men died, thus distorting the social structure. Child deaths are also believed to have been substantial.1 Other international organizations and media outlets have offered somewhat different estimates of

Facing page: Damage and loss. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 11

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the number of deaths. But the fact remains that Nargis violently ripped through the country, killing a large number of people who were unprepared for, and unequipped to cope with, the furious cyclone, both prior to its attack and in its aftermath. U Kyaw Thu, Myanmar’s Deputy Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) which comprised the Myanmar Government, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United

Nations (UN), informed the ASEAN Roundtable on Post-Nargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery and Reconstruction, held in Yangon on 24 June 2008 that his government had immediately deployed national assets in the relief effort. To date, according to the Deputy Foreign Minister, some 27 billion kyats have been spent on this effort.2 Measuring the Impact The Myanmar Government had, at the initial stage and within its own capacity,

Rebuilding from scratch. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 12

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Nowhere to play. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

When the sky becomes your roof: villagers in Bogalay area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Life amidst debris in Pantanaw area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Tents huddled under toddy palms. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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A destroyed monastery. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

attended to the needs of the cyclone victims, by setting up the “National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee”, chaired by Prime Minister Thien Sein and designed to coordinate the response to Cyclone Nargis. However, the extent of the damage was too great; international assistance was therefore urgently required, in order to save the lives of those who survived the disaster. On 19 May 2008, Singapore, as ASEAN Chair, hosted a special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers to find ways to open up channels of communication between the Myanmar Government and the international aid donors, with

ASEAN taking the role of “broker”. The ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference was subsequently organized in Yangon on 25 May 2007. The ASEAN-led mechanism to coordinate the disaster relief and rehabilitation work with the Myanmar Government was founded. The ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) was established under the Chairmanship of ASEAN SecretaryGeneral Dr Surin Pitsuwan. Soon after, the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) was also established. The primary task of the TCG was to conduct a credible assessment and, at a later stage, formulate a recovery plan, 15

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thus giving birth to the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA). The relief and recovery component of such a joint assessment was administered through the Village Tract Assessment (VTA). The macro and long-term recovery component was carried out through the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA). The total number of personnel deployed for this exercise, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu, was 228: 6

government officials and 42 UN/NGO personnel based at the hub, and 180 mobile enumerators, made up of 21 government officials and 159 UN/NGO personnel. The data collection phase of PONJA was concluded two months after Cyclone Nargis hit. The full report of PONJA was finally released on 21 July 2008 on the occasion of the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore. What is

Dr Surin (right) discussing VTA and DaLA at the AHTF Yangon office. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 16

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Dr Surin (right) meeting TCG members. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Dr Surin (left) with Myanmar’s Minister for Social Welfare. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Dr Surin in an early meeting with TCG members. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Temporary office in Yangon. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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clear in the report is that aside from the strikingly high number of deaths and casualties, the physical destruction left behind by the cyclone was highly visible. The assessment covered all humanitarian clusters and all sectors, both micro/ humanitarian and macro/long-term recovery, extending to all corners of the Ayeyawaddy Delta. Some 280 villages were covered, 2,800 households interviewed, 560 community discussions held, and 1,700 key informants, such as teachers and monks, interviewed. Secondary data were also looked at. Presenting the PONJA Interim Report at the ASEAN Roundtable Meeting in Yangon on 24 June 2008, Dr Puji Pujiono, ASEAN member of the TCG, emphasized that, in the assessment process, cross-references and the sharing of results by both the DaLA and VTA were imperative, in order to avoid overlaps and duplication. The combination of household questionnaires, focus groups, key informants, and secondary data produced a strong assessment, which stood up to international standards. Thirty-two VTA teams visited a total of 300 villages throughout southern Yangon and the Delta, approximately 5 per cent of all villages in the affected area. Six DaLA teams criss-crossed the area, assessing the scale and intensity of the damage. Some 3,000 households were interviewed. A total of 900 community discussions were organized, and 2,100 key informants were interviewed. About 350 people, including those in the humanitarian community, government

personnel, and ASEAN officials were involved in the assessment. Early analysis revealed that social ties remained strong, and that people had coped with the aftermath of the cyclone rather well. The VTA teams completed the assessment in various sectors, including those on food, health, water and sanitation, shelter and agriculture. The DaLA in the meantime provided findings on housing, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industries, health, education and transport, as well as water and electricity supplies. Impact on Basic Needs Food Stocks and Malnutrition Crisis More than 40 per cent of all food stocks were completely destroyed, 11 per cent partially so. It was assessed that, considering the food situation at the time, 8.86 per cent of the existing stocks of food would last for more than 30 days, 17.02 per cent for 7–30 days, 25.65 per cent for 2–7 days, and 18.37 per cent for only one day. As a result, 56 per cent of households obtained their food from the markets, and 45 per cent from humanitarian distribution. This left many people in a situation of food insecurity. However, by the end of June 2008, almost 700,000 people had been able to acquire food commodities. In coping with the inadequacy of food, the victims of Nargis shifted their diet to a less varied one. Although this might prevent a critical state of starvation in the short term, malnutrition could pose a longterm health risk if the affected people did not receive sufficient and nutritionally

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Watching over food supplies in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Measuring out rice for distribution in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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adequate food. Speaking from an optimistic viewpoint, Umezaki Michiko, Resident Representative in Yangon of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), confirmed in 2008 that, despite the shortage of food and the potential breakout of infectious diseases, there had so far been no report of people suffering or dying from them.3 Physical and Mental Health Equally influential in the way the country came to perceive the impact of Nargis is the psychological shock amongst the Myanmar people. The physical reconstruction might take a long time, but it could be achieved within a specific timeframe. On the other hand, the psychological healing of the cyclone victims, their recovery from their nightmares, seemed to require an indefinite period of time. A more patient approach for putting people’s lives back on track was called for. Village leaders agreed that common health problems resulting from Nargis included, from the most to the least severe, colds and coughs, diarrhoea, fever, physical injuries, skin infections, skin rashes, and jaundice. Furthermore, 22 per cent of households were reported to be suffering from psychological stress, due to the loss of some or all family members, the trauma of the country’s most violent cyclone, and having to stay alive, even when left with nothing. It is noted that unemployment, other than in agriculture and fishing, doubled in this difficult period. This added to the victims’ anxiety over how to survive in the months to come.

The deterioration of physical and mental health, and the need for medical care require adequate health facilities, including station hospitals, and rural health centres and sub-centres. The number of medical facilities in the precyclone period stood at 1,217 units, including 100-bed, 50-bed, and 16-bed hospitals, regional/sub-regional health centres, and medical training schools. However, Nargis fully or partially destroyed between 50–60 per cent of those facilities. Mobile medical units were quickly deployed in four townships — Labutta, Bogalay, Maw Kun and Phya Pon, from 19 May to 30 June 2008. A Myanmar official said that 45,950 victims of Nargis underwent medical check-ups at these mobile medical services.4 One major undertaking by the Yangon office of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was to return displaced children to their families. According to Ramesh Shrestha, Representative of UNICEF, by 10 July 2008 more than 400 children had been successfully reunited with their families after days of being separated by Nargis.5 In sum, losses to the health sector are estimated at about 19 billion kyats. Some two-thirds of the losses were incurred by the public sector, and one-third by the private sector. Interruption in Education Before Cyclone Nargis, public schools in the affected areas, ranging from primary, middle, and high schools, numbered 7,257. Between 43–48 per cent of those schools, according to

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administrative data, were wiped out by the cyclone. The damage to the schools’ latrines, staff residences, school furniture, and early childhood centres (preschools) was extensive, and in most cases, beyond repair. The total damage to education is estimated at about 116 billion kyats, including 25 billion kyats’

worth of damage to educational materials. In order to resume education quickly, schools were operated in alternative buildings. Education for orphans also continued, even when their former classrooms had been entirely devastated. The assessment team concluded that

Continuing studies in Bogalay township. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 22

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At recess — makeshift school in Pantanaw (the schoolkit is donated by UNICEF). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

All classes congregate under one roof at a temporary school in Pantanaw. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Smiling schoolchildren in the Pyapon-Wakema area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

An alternative learning place by the side of a go-down. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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School life continues (Pyapon-Wakema area). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Learning amidst rubble of the old destroyed school (PyaponWakema area). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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some of the most serious losses facing the people in the affected areas were those of school infrastructure, teaching and learning materials, and human resources. Because of the resulting deficiency in school facilities, student enrolment decreased and the dropout rate went up. There were two reasons for this — the soaring demand for child labour for reconstruction, and the rise in opportunity costs for education. The DaLA team indicated that, in the reconstruction period, better standards for quality buildings and technical know-how were much needed, as were regular civil works and the maintenance of existing buildings. It was important to maintain in stock textbooks and teaching and learning materials for emergencies, and ensure a timely transportation to the affected areas. In the long run, disaster preparedness and counselling should be incorporated into the curriculum. Information management systems should also be strengthened. The government must improve communication networks for rapid response, particularly to the educational needs at temporary shelters. Impact on Economic Livelihoods Agriculture The agricultural sector, which includes crops, plantations, livestock, and fisheries, produced almost 45 per cent of Myanmar’s GDP in 2007, and about a third of the regional GDP of the Ayeyawaddy and Yangon Divisions. Paddy

is the major crop in this region. Other important crops are pulses, sesame, jute, and groundnuts. The southern end of the Ayeyawaddy Delta was more severely affected than the northern part, because the southern area is closer to the sea. An early assessment suggested that over 750,000 hectares of land had been flooded, particularly in the areas considered to be the country’s “rice bowl”. The damaged fields in which summer paddy and sesame were usually cultivated accounted for about 29,137 hectares and 2,428 hectares, respectively. Unfortunately, certain areas of summer rice and sesame had not been harvested at the time of the cyclone, resulting in vast losses to farmers. Damage to paddy stored by farmers, rice millers, and traders is estimated at 1.01 million tonnes. Paddy I and Paddy II polder projects financed by the World Bank in the 1980s were all demolished by the disaster. Overall, the losses estimated for the agricultural sector range from 570,000–700,000 million kyats. Heavy rains were a major cause of damage to stored paddy because roofs of small warehouses and paddy barns had been blown off. Upper layers of paddy were spoiled by heavy rains, while the lower layers were damaged by the rising water level. Although the spoiled paddy could still be sold to the public, the low milled quality of the rice and its yellowish colour brought down prices in the market. In fact, the price of spoiled paddy was 50 per cent lower than that of good quality rice. Apart from paddy and sesame,

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Paddy seeds destroyed by salt water. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

A roofless barn with destroyed harvest in Bogalay area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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other crops like coconut, betel nut, cashew nut, nipa palm, mango, and rubber were also devastated by Cyclone Nargis.6 Most farmers were eager to plant their monsoon paddy in time for the planting season. In the survey conducted by the VTA, 60 per cent of village leaders suggested that there were not enough seeds for the next planting season. They needed seeds, farm machinery and implements, fertilizers, and working capital. The problem here was not that the fields were damaged, since 47 per cent of arable land escaped the floods, and even part of the flooded land could still be used for planting. The critical hurdle was that, from planting to harvesting, farmers needed to obtain food for their family’s consumption. Repairing the natural landscape was also an important part of the reconstruction efforts. Embankments were in need of restoration, and their height should be raised for long-term protection against floods. Polders also had to be urgently repaired. Livestock The PONJA report mentions that approximately 50 per cent of the buffalo and 25 per cent of the cattle died in the worst hit townships. The high mortality of small livestock, including pigs, sheep, goats, chickens, and ducks affected many small and marginal farmers and landless agricultural workers. The total number of dead draught animals is more than 200,000. The damage and losses to livestock total about 75 billion kyats.

It was suggested by initial assessments carried out by UN-ASEAN that the restocking of working animals, especially cattle and buffalo, should begin in earnest. The farmers asked that feeds be provided for those animals, without delay, as well as essential medication, such as vaccines and drugs, to prevent any contagious diseases from infecting the animals. Badrul Shah Mohammad Idris, a disaster expert from Malaysia’s National Security Council, and a member of one of the teams sent into the Delta by ASEAN, said that he remembered seeing buffalo trucked in to replace those that had died. This enabled farmers to start ploughing what remained of their paddy fields for the next planting season. Badrul Shah noted, “That was most useful, because most of the buffalo and cows had been killed by the cyclone.”7 Fishery Over 2,000 large fishing vessels, small boats, nets, and other fishing equipment were destroyed and 55–60 per cent of aquaculture facilities were severely damaged. The economic value of the losses is estimated at 12,099 million kyats, equivalent to US$10.52 million. A total of 732 hectares of fishponds in the Ayeyawaddy Division and 218 areas in the Yangon Division were destroyed. In the Ayeyawaddy region alone, shrimp and soft-shell crab farms were seriously damaged by the cyclone, accounting for 14,639 hectares and 208 acres, respectively. The total value of the

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damage to fish and prawn culture was approximately 7,400 million kyats, or about US$6.43 million. The overall losses of the fishery’s industry stood at 30 billion kyats. Because of the cyclone’s impact, the supply of freshwater fish, sea fish, and prawns have declined, which has led to prices rising in Yangon markets. Prices have also risen because of the insufficient supply of ice and reduced transport facilities. To recover from the present situation, the assessment team concluded that small-scale fishermen were in immediate need of small fishing boats, with or without engines, and that fishing gear had to be supplied in badly hit areas. The assessment team called for the urgent repair of fishing vessels and landing sites, which would require at least 6–12 months to complete. In this process, loans must be proffered to the individual owners of the fishing vessels. This financial assistance would be used not only for the repair of damaged vessels, but also for the purchase of fuel, wood, engines, and necessary fishing equipment.

factories in industrial parks in the affected areas and almost all of the dried fish and prawns and fish paste industries were demolished. Around 75–85 per cent of the 30,660 acres of salt mines was severely affected by the disaster; 50–55 per cent of the 1,907 small rice mills and 60–65 per cent of the 215 medium to large rice mills suffered huge damage. On top of this, over 90 per cent of the retail markets in the Ayeyawaddy Division and 20 per cent of those in Yangon were put out of business. The total damage and losses in the industrial sector accounted for almost 2,000 billion kyats, of which economic losses amounted to 1,484 billion kyats and damage slightly above 500 billion kyats. Signs of recovery were seen not long after Cyclone Nargis took place. “Everywhere, there is activity. The cyclone-damaged shops are open for business; fruit hawkers line the roads and workmen busy themselves repairing smashed houses”, an ASEAN field team reported after surveying areas that were badly hit by the cyclone.8

Industry and Commerce Industry, ranging from manufacturing and mining to the generation of power, accounted for about 20 per cent of the national GDP in 2007. The main components of the industrial sector in the Ayeyawaddy and Yangon Divisions were salt farms, dried fish and shrimps, and fish paste production, rice mills, and factories located in industrial parks. Almost 75–80 per cent of the 5,380

Impact on Infrastructure Housing Situation The VTA and DaLA findings on the damage to housing immediately after the cyclone indicated that 57 per cent of the houses in the affected areas had been totally destroyed. They pointed out that those partially damaged houses accounted for 25 per cent, and slightly damaged for 16 per cent. Only 2 per cent of the

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Aerial view of temporary camp in Kadon Kani, Pyapon. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Aerial view of temporary camp in Kadon Kani, Pyapon. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Temporary camps in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Temporary camps in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Temporary camps in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Temporary camps in Pyapon and Wakema areas. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Temporary camp residents in Hlaing Pone, Labutta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Temporary camp residents in Hlaing Pone, Labutta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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A muddy tent in Set San, Bogalay. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Tents in Kadon Kani, Pyapon. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Waiting … boy in tent at a temporary camp in Hlaing Pone, Labutta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

A mother and her child in their tent at Kadon Kani, Pyapon. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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houses escaped the physical impact of Cyclone Nargis. The disaster in total affected approximately 800,000 housing units, with around 450,000 of these being totally destroyed and 350,000 slightly damaged. The total damage and losses are estimated at around 686 billion kyats. The findings show that, before the disaster, there were 330,184 houses in existence for the population of 1,742,857 in the Ayeyawaddy Delta. After Nargis, there were only 21,143 undamaged houses, and 72,484 houses with repairable damage. A total 236,557 new houses have since been built to replace the severely damaged ones. The size of the population decreased to 1,611,984. The housing situation in Yangon is no different. Before Nargis hit the old capital, there were 761,005 houses for the population of 5,374,131. The disaster reduced the total population of Yangon to 5,372,269, leaving 276,007 houses without damage, and 268,056 with repairable damage. In total, 216,922 replacement houses would be needed in the reconstruction phase.9 The DaLA team observed that the Myanmar Government responded to the housing needs of the victims of Cyclone Nargis by setting up camps and temporary shelters, and reconstructing schools and health facilities. In this process, partial resettlement has been carried out, so that the victims have been able to return to their places of origin. Nevertheless, the next steps in housing reconstruction may prove critical, including the work of identifying hazardous zones, verifying the current

whereabouts of all former inhabitants, assessing the benefits and shortcomings of recycling materials, and formulating policy on the ownership of lands that belonged to those who perished or went missing, and of lands in hazardous zones, or those that have been washed away. In any case, the success in rebuilding houses is most evident in the fact that an estimated 80 per cent have been completely constructed or repaired. The massive recycling of a large amount of construction materials, particularly wood and fasteners, such as nails and straps, has been encouraged. This progress has enabled many families to return to the original locations of their livelihood. However, certain obstacles have been found in the housing reconstruction efforts, such as the lack of technical assistance in the reconstruction itself, sufficient guidance on construction technology, grant assistance to poor or needy families to support their own efforts, and village planning to avoid settlement in toxic zones. In retrospect, one of the factors contributing to the massive destruction wrought by Cyclone Nargis was the poor quality of housing construction, which also points to the insufficient measures for safety and the lack of regular maintenance. In building new houses, therefore, a more systematic use of simple and sound engineering and construction technology is needed, alongside good village planning and disaster risk management and maintenance. At the time of writing this chapter, preparations for new settlements at

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Labutta and Bogalay have begun, with assistance offered by a number of NGOs. To complete this task, as the DaLA findings suggest, there is an urgent need of government assistance for the most vulnerable groups of people. The government in the meantime needs to work out a plan for community-based reconstruction and retrofitting, and also to formulate a package of mitigation measures. Electricity and Water Supply It is reported that the electricity breakdown affected about 48,000 people in the Ayeyawaddy Delta, and about 781,200 in Yangon. As part of national and international relief efforts, emergency power was provided from 8–11 May 2008. All township centres had power by 30 June 2008, leaving only three townships, home to 6,400 consumers, not yet connected to the electrical grid but supplied with emergency generators. Although there was only minor damage to power generation facilities in general, significant damage had been inflicted on transmission lines and substations throughout the affected areas. It can also be said that damage to electricity in the Ayeyawaddy was rather slight when compared with the situation in the old capital of Yangon. This is because the electrical consumption in the delta amounted to less than 1 per cent of the national total, whereas Yangon used up to 40 per cent of the electricity consumed by the whole country. As a consequence, electrical sales in May 2008 dropped to 72 per cent of April’s sales. The

assessment team estimated that full service would take up to three months to return to pre-disaster levels. Initially, the damage to water supply and sanitation systems was not so easy to evaluate because of the absence of a centralized inventory of water supply at the village level. It can only be said that, regarding the state of sanitation, open defecation more than doubled in the post-Nargis period. On the water issue, township centres were generally provided with some centralized water supply, which, however, was not potable, and this service only covered about 2–15 per cent of the total population. The price of the centralized supply of water is at a fixed monthly rate. Those townships that did not rely on a centralized water supply secured their potable water from rain-fed village ponds, wells and roof water harvesting. However, many water supply ponds close to the sea were seriously polluted as a result of the cyclone. At this moment, it is still uncertain when those ponds will be successfully and adequately purified for drinking purposes. The assessment team hoped that this might be done within four months (from June 2008). In Yangon, the assessors disclosed that no major damage was done to the water supply facilities, despite the fact that the water supply service was not in operation for four days after the raging cyclone. Transport and Communications The DaLA team explored nine townships in the Ayeyawaddy Delta to assess the level of damage and losses incurred by

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the transport and communication systems. These townships included Maubin, Wakema, Pathein, Ngaputaw, Labutta, Myaungmya, Dedaye, Pyapon, Bogalay, and Kawmhu. The survey team focused mainly on the damage to roads, bridges, inland water transport, post, and telecommunications. Their findings showed that 15–20 per cent of the 314 kilometres of roads was damaged; most of these were secondary roads that were already in poor condition before Cyclone Nargis. The damage was

estimated to be above 120 billion kyats, and the total losses at close to 65 billion kyats. Further road damage was caused mainly by heavy trucks that brought relief goods to the affected areas. In total, approximately 15 per cent of the network length suffered damage, which is estimated at about 13 billion kyats. There were only a few engineered roads and bridges in the heavily cyclone-affected rural areas. Major bridges were, however, untouched by the disaster. In one moving account told by a Thai volunteer who

Fishing and passenger vessels that succumbed to the storm. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 38

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Salvaging what they can. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

travelled through one village, the survivors of the cyclone, while waiting for the state assistance, took the initiative and restored the damaged roads on their own. Without any proper tools, they repaved the roads, using whatever materials were on hand.10 In terms of inland water transport, in Labutta and Bogalay in particular, major damage was clearly visible on jetties, boats, and buildings, with 20–30 per cent of private and public transport fleets, and 60–65 per cent of public jetties ravaged. Yangon’s ports suffered the heaviest damage, estimated at 100 billion kyats. Additionally, 45–55 per cent of household ponds had turned saline, and the local rainwater collection systems, including hand-dug wells, were

abandoned, thus posing potential health risks to the people. 60 per cent of the victims interviewed by the VTA group considered their access to clean water to be inadequate. More people had turned from ponds to rain water because of salinization and contamination, but it was the interruption in transportation services that generated the real and tangible impact, particularly on the economic front, since many of the transport facilities had not yet been properly restored. Service interruption was also the cause of substantial revenue losses on account of a shortage of vessels and boats. To make the situation worse, the private sector freight tariffs and passenger fares increased. The PONJA report stated that 39

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this situation would continue for some time to come, as a year would normally be required to build a medium- to largesized vessel, and at least two months for a small boat. The total losses were estimated to be slightly more than 30 billion kyats.11 The severe damage to inland water transport, especially that owned by the private sector, will have a substantial impact on the local economy. The earlier DaLA report concluded that the full recovery of water and road transport would be a long and arduous process. The postal and telecommunications systems suffered major devastation. Fixed line telephone systems, both poles and overhead cables, and microwave towers and buildings were severely damaged. The mobile phone system was, however, largely unaffected. The total damage was estimated at about 7 billion kyats. Summary of Macroeconomic Impact12 According to the PONJA report, the total economic losses would amount to about 2.7 per cent of the projected 2008 GDP of Myanmar. As for the hub for agriculture and fisheries, the Ayeyawaddy Delta region produces 65 per cent of the country’s rice, and has about 50 per cent of all its irrigated areas. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the country was projected to have produced 30.02 million tonnes of rice in 2007, down 2 per cent from 30.6 million tonnes produced in 2006. The occurrence of the cyclone will lower this

estimate. In addition, given the relatively poor storage facilities in the country, the impact of the cyclone on rice supplies already harvested might have been serious. This may result in short-term food shortages in Myanmar and may also impair the country’s ability to export rice. Therefore, the country may need to import some rice from neighbouring countries, primarily Thailand and Vietnam. Myanmar could shift from being a net rice exporter to an importer, which would add to the pressure on the country’s already strained balance of payments. The other important sector, the fishing industry, has been similarly affected. Fisheries in the affected areas produce more than half of the country’s fish supply, while coastal aquaculture, including shrimp, crab and grouper farms, accounts for nearly 20 per cent of produce. Both the agricultural and fishery sectors generate significant export earnings for the country, and have been important sources of growth in recent years. However, with such large-scale of damage, the crippling of the fishing industry could make a serious dent in the country’s export trade. The cyclone also caused major structural damage and destruction, ranging from infrastructure to transport and telecommunications. This means that the immediate cost of reconstruction will be high, and put significant pressure on government coffers. Nevertheless, spending on the reconstruction of damaged facilities could also benefit

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other sectors of the economy (like construction), thus mitigating some of the negative effects. Besides the domestic economy, the impact of the cyclone will also be felt globally. Rice production in the worst hit Ayeyawaddy region will be severely reduced, further tightening the supplies on the world rice market. This is also going to be a missed opportunity for Myanmar, given the high international demand for rice. Regionally, Myanmar’s economy is one of Asia’s worst performers, and the cyclone disaster will add to its economic woes. The economic impact of the cyclone disaster will thus be harsh and long-term, given the fact that Myanmar’s economy has already been under considerable strain. Despite substantial external aid, the cyclone will also affect the 2008 government budget. While the import of basic foodstuffs such as rice will increase, exports from the fishery industry will suffer, placing a heavy burden on the country’s balance-of-payment position and foreign currency reserves. While energy exports are largely unaffected by the disaster, the revenues will be swallowed up by the cost of the rehabilitation programme. All this will worsen inflationary pressures, raising the economic risk for Myanmar in the months to come. Impact on Environment Cruelty to Nature Based on satellite photography, the survey of the damage to natural forests caused

by Cyclone Nargis was carried out in three townships — Labutta, Bogalay and Mawlamyinegyun. The outcome was daunting. In Labutta, 4,037 hectares of forest area were damaged, and the financial loss was at 1,497 million kyats. In Bogalay, the forest area was worst hit by the cyclone, leading to the devastation of its 9,892 hectares, costing some 3,666 million kyats. In Mawlamyinegyun, the damaged forest area amounted to 63 hectares, which translates into a financial loss of 20 million kyats. According to the survey, the destroyed forest area in the Ayeyawaddy Division encompassed 20,141 hectares, out of the total planted area of 29,297 hectares. The estimated value of the loss stood at 840 million kyats. In the Yangon Division, the planted area was only slightly hit, with 741 out of 33,181 hectares suffering from the impact of Cyclone Nargis. The economic damage in this region was estimated at 41 million kyats. The estimated cost of damage and losses to the mangrove forests accounted for about 14 billion kyats. The loss of the environmental benefits of the natural mangrove forests was valued at about 46 billion kyats. The assessment team admitted that it had been difficult to quantify the real monetary value of the damage caused to the environment. Moreover, new tasks have yet to be accomplished, such as the evaluation of coastal and riverbank erosion and the loss of forest products, such as poles, fuel and medicines, and other environmental services, including biodiversity, nutrient uptake, fishery

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A tall tree almost submerged by the flood and tides. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

nurseries, the carbon sink, buffers for salt water intrusion, and soil stabilization. Implications for ASEAN and the International Community The real impact of Cyclone Nargis was not only about the loss of human lives and the worsening economy, but also about the extent to which the Myanmar Government was obliged to open its doors to foreign aid, both from ASEAN and the international community. Wary of the politics of aid carried out by certain Western governments, Myanmar’s leaders chose initially to deal with the task of disaster relief in isolation. Only subsequently did they accept limited help from neighbouring countries. Chapter 2 discusses in detail the

timeline of Myanmar’s acceptance of aid, from the first arrival of aid flights in Yangon, to when agreement was obtained to allow aid workers into the country. ASEAN was criticized for being too slow to respond to the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin Pitsuwan admitted that such criticism was to some extent valid. He said, “I do not have any defence for that. But I think the international community also realises we have a lot of sensitivities to work around, to the point where all international agencies have come to accept the fact that if it has to be an ASEAN-led vehicle or structure or architecture. They would be happy and willing to work with us and rally behind us.”13

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Initially, some ASEAN members provided financial assistance and relief goods to Myanmar on an individual basis without reference to the organization. A collective ASEAN effort was visible to the international community only on 19 May 2008, when ASEAN convened an emergency foreign ministers’ meeting that produced a package of initiatives. But this approach also had its own merits. Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General and currently the head of ASEAN Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, perceived that uncoordinated assistance from certain ASEAN members had been delivered relatively smoothly to Myanmar, not only because Myanmar was a member of the organization, but also because the assistance came without a political agenda or threats.14 The role of ASEAN here is critical. It has successfully acted as a broker and a bridge to fill the gap between Myanmar and the outside world. The fact that Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win agreed to allow ASEAN to lead an international aid effort through the establishment of a mechanism that would facilitate aid from all over the world to flow into the country is testimony to the organization’s success. The key is that ASEAN has consistently made sure that it focuses solely on humanitarian assistance. Surin has said, “The choice is to complicate the issues and be denied the opportunity of accessibility and help deliver and clear bottlenecks, or concentrate on the humanitarian challenge. We have to make sure the

2.4 million people survive. Our choices are limited, and we do not have the luxury of picking up too many issues to complicate the immediate responsibility before us, which is to deliver aid to the best of our ability.” He has also emphasized that the credibility of and confidence in ASEAN has risen since the engagement in Myanmar, and that the challenge is to maintain these vital signs of trust.15 The other crucial implication for ASEAN is that Cyclone Nargis highlights ASEAN’s efforts to address issues that require special engagement with its sovereign members, such as human rights cases and natural disasters. It is also a reminder to ASEAN members that they should immediately implement or ratify a number of agreements, including the 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response and the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.16 Indeed, Dr Surin has urged ASEAN members to recognize the importance of ratifying these documents, which would oblige them to assist one another in times of natural disasters, and provide for the protection of people from the impacts of a catastrophe. ASEAN has always been perceived as playing second fiddle to Myanmar. But perhaps, as its success in the Nargis episode demonstrates, ASEAN has finally come of age in rallying support from fellow members to come up with an integrated stance on how to assist Myanmar in dealing with the disaster, as well as to strengthen a sense of trust, so

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that the government in Naypyidaw could be comfortable to work with ASEAN. What will be the next challenge for ASEAN? Dr Surin, together with Noeleen Heyzer, the UN UndersecretaryGeneral and executive secretary of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), wrote in a recent commentary: “On the ground, we saw that while the relief phase is far from over and unmet humanitarian needs remain significant, particularly in the food, water, sanitary, and shelter sectors, much has been accomplished to bring assistance to most

The authors and the rock star, Zaw Win Htut (centre). Photo courtesy of Pavin Chachavalpongpun.

villages in the delta and some level of normalcy was starting to take shape.”17 This statement signifies that, although the trail of death and destruction left by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar has remained evident, the signs of recovery and reconstruction taking place in the affected areas have also been visible. While the focus has been mainly on the reconstruction and relief efforts by the Myanmar Government and the many regional and international organizations, little attention has been paid to efforts made at the people’s level. Preliminary analysis shows that social ties were strong, and helped people to cope well with the aftermath of the cyclone. The rifts and misunderstandings between the government and certain international organizations do not appear to have affected social cohesion at the village level. The authors had the privilege to talk to Myanmar’s most celebrated rock star, Zaw Win Htut, who threw himself into the forefront of relief work. His main concern was for the small villages in the more remote areas, which were not on the formal list of humanitarian recipients. Many villages like these had not yet received any assistance.18 Nargis survivors in such small villages had no choice but to help one another out in their current difficult situation. The key to their continued existence is their own tolerance, resilience and the spirit of “getting on with life”. That seems to be the true quality of the Myanmar people. Indeed, the resilience of the people of Myanmar, picking up the pieces of

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their lives with a quiet determination, remains a source of inspiration for the numerous efforts and initiatives undertaken in their name. Chapter 2 tells the story of how the international community, with ASEAN countries at the forefront, came together to offer assistance to the people of Myanmar, and help them on the road to recovery. Notes 1. Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, June 2008, p. 1. 2. Speech on “Post Nargis Current State of Response and Recovery in Myanmar”, delivered by U Kyaw Thu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Tripartite Core Group, for the ASEAN Roundtable on PostNargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery and Reconstruction,Yangon, Myanmar, 24 June 2008. 3. Interview with Umezaki Michiko, Resident Representative, JICA,Yangon, Myanmar, 9 July 2008. 4. Interview with an official from Myanmar’s Ministry of Health, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 5. Interview with Ramesh M. Shrestha, Representative, UNICEF, Yangon, Myanmar, 10 July 2008. 6. It is reported by the DaLA that more than 30,000 hectares of plantation crops were damaged by Cyclone Nargis.

7. Quoted in Leslie Koh, “Myanmar 8 Weeks On”, Sunday Times, 29 June 2008, p. 18. 8. Quoted in Leslie Koh, “Signs of Recovery in Myanmar’s Cyclone-Hit Delta”, Straits Times, 25 June 2008, p. 14. 9. Source: Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA). 10. Interview with Thanapon Songput of the Disaster Risk Reduction Programme, The Mirror Foundation, Thailand, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 11. Post-Nargis Joint Assessment, June 2008, p. 18. 12. The author would like to thank Sanchita Basu Das, Lead Researcher on Economic Affairs at the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS, for her contribution of this “Impacts on Economy” section. 13. “We were too Slow, Admitted ASEAN Chief ”, in New Zealand Herald, 21 May 2008. 14. Rodolfo Severino, “Lessons in Offering Neighbourly Aid”, Straits Times, 15 May 2008. 15. Nirmal Ghosh, “Cyclone Survivors Need Aid for Six More Months: UN”, Straits Times, 26 July 2008. 16. Achara Ashayagachat, “ASEAN Struggles to Help Burma”, Bangkok Post, 21 May 2008. 17. Surin Pitsuwan and Noeleen Heyzer, “Myanmar’s People Need World’s Help”, Straits Times, 11 July 2008, p. 25. 18. Interview with Zaw Win Htut, Yangon, Myanmar, 10 July 2008.

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2 In the Cyclone’s Wake

Chapter 1 traced the trail of death and destruction that Cyclone Nargis left in its wake, and the implications for ASEAN and the international community. This chapter attempts an insight into the response by the ASEAN governments, and the initiative taken by the ASEAN Secretary-General to bring together a “coalition of mercy” for the victims of the cyclone. It also highlights the efforts of UN agencies, the World Bank, and international and local NGOs and voluntary networks in first getting relief to those most in need, and then assessing the extent of damage and loss,

so as to put into motion steps for sustained recovery and rehabilitation. While Cyclone Nargis provided ASEAN with the challenge (and opportunity) to exercise a leading role in brokering and consolidating initiatives to bring relief and assistance to the disaster-affected areas, the dedication demonstrated by the United Nations and the humanitarian assistance community during the emergency through to the assessment stage also played a strong part in the tapestry of goodwill. Their role in the whole exercise has been significant, especially

Facing page: All those involved in the PONJA Village Tract Assessment. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 47

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with the UN serving as an umbrella for the international non-governmental organizations to play their part. The following sections follow the path taken by ASEAN in breaking down barriers and building bridges of goodwill through the ASEAN-led Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) exercise. One Week After Nargis Cyclone Nargis left a double challenge of bringing emergency relief and succour to the survivors and assessing the amount of damage and loss for recovery efforts. Even as Myanmar immediately established a high-level central coordinating committee on 3 May to respond to the cyclone’s aftermath, the scale of damage was too much of a challenge for the national capability. The government was simply unprepared to answer this urgent call to action. Poor access, transportation and communications hindered the momentum of relief and recovery efforts. In the week immediately following Nargis, the overriding concern for the international community in readying itself to provide assistance to Myanmar was access to the affected areas, and indeed to the country itself. The situation was aggravated further by the Myanmar Foreign Ministry’s statement on 9 May, which welcomed cash and emergency aid, but stressed that Myanmar was “not ready to receive search and rescue teams as well as media teams from foreign countries”.1 Even so, as early as the weekend of 4–5 May, Singapore and the Philippines

had sent their experts to join the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team that was assembling in Bangkok.2 The ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, and Thailand, and the neighbouring countries, China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, offered food, medicine, emergency aid, and humanitarian and financial assistance, which were all accepted. In fact, the first aid flights from ASEAN and neighbouring countries, carrying relief goods, medical supplies, food, and water, began arriving in Yangon as early as 6 May, the day that Myanmar’s Foreign Minister appealed for help. The assistance, including cash contributions made through the International Red Cross, was accepted with “little trouble”. A Thai military transport plane carrying nine tonnes of food and medical supplies flew to cyclone-hit Myanmar on 6 May 2008, the first outside aid to leave for Myanmar. On the same day, the Government of Singapore announced that it would provide US$200,000 in humanitarian aid to Myanmar, including medical supplies, drinking water, water purifying tablets, tents, groundsheets, blankets, sleeping bags, and emergency food. On 7 May 2008, India launched Operation Sahayata under which two Indian Navy ships transported more than one hundred tonnes of relief material, and two Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft carried eight tonnes of relief supplies to Myanmar. Japanese emergency relief goods were also delivered to Yangon on 7 May. Indonesian relief aid arrived in Yangon on 9 May 2008, with a letter

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from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the Myanmar Government, conveying his condolences and solidarity. Chapter 1 described former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino’s analysis of the ASEAN response as a lesson in offering neighbourly aid.3 Myanmar’s acceptance of aid through ASEAN’s coordination points to an awareness by the government of its position — as an integral part of Southeast Asia (as stated in 1996 by the country’s then foreign minister on Myanmar’s bid to join ASEAN), and as a member of the group. It certainly helped that assistance from ASEAN came with no strings attached. Myanmar also accepted assistance from governments critical of Myanmar’s military regime — Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Commission. These offers were accepted despite the continued ambivalence and even reluctance over accepting foreign aid or relief workers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of 8 May clarifying this condition sheds light on the multiple layers of the ambivalence that led to the turning away of a chartered plane from Qatar with emergency provisions, and search and rescue and media teams on board. The provisions were accepted, but not the teams that accompanied them. Media coverage picked this up and added to the consternation over Myanmar’s reluctance. It probably did not help that on 7 May, France had suggested

invoking the UN responsibility of the “right to protect” clause, and delivering aid without waiting for approval. Yet on the same day, entry visas were granted to the UNDAC team. The first UN aid flight conveying supplies as well as personnel was also approved on that day. What ensued in the media was inevitably confusing, and amidst this confusion, relief supplies continued to arrive. The United Nations promised to release US$10 million from its Central Emergency Relief Fund and to raise even more.4 The Red Cross and World Vision delivered the donations through local networks and volunteers. UNICEFMyanmar staffers were in the field as early as 4 May. Indeed, national staffs of international agencies on the ground in Myanmar rose to the challenge, and ensured that a lifeline of supplies and assistance continued through the days when foreign relief workers and specialists were waiting for their entry visas. The World Food Programme (WFP) responded to the logistical challenge of providing assistance to people in the worst hit areas, accessible only by boat. WFP formed a helicopter team to fly to the delta area for emergency relief, but there were tense moments waiting for approval from the Myanmar Government.5 Approval was given on 16 May, but the fleet of ten helicopters was allowed into the country in phases: first one (May 22), then five, and the final four by 10 June. Still more voluntary and nongovernmental organizations from around

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the world responded with compassion to the plight of the cyclone victims, working through local networks and civic entities in the country. The earliest emergency relief and assistance were mobilized by Myanmar citizens and expatriates, some under the aegis of religious leaders and organizations, some on their own initiative, none seeking recognition and all with one overriding desire — to get immediate help to those whose reason for living had been swept away into a dark abyss by the cyclone’s winds and waves. On 5 May, ASEAN SecretaryGeneral Dr Surin Pitsuwan called on ASEAN member countries to provide urgent relief assistance to victims of Cyclone Nargis. Speaking on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting, Surin stressed the need for ASEAN to intensify efforts in disaster management, “on its own as well as in collaboration with its friends and partners”.6 An emergency humanitarian relief fund for Myanmar was established at the Secretariat on 8 May. Surin’s personal diplomacy was in constant use to persuade the Government of Myanmar to open up venues for relief workers and specialists to assist the cyclone victims, in the spirit of the 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER),7 and to manage the mounting concern and frustration reported in the international media. At the same time, the ASEAN Secretariat was serving as the Interim ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian

Assistance, and putting together the necessary arrangements to deploy an ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) to the disasteraffected areas. Two Weeks After Nargis ASEAN senior officials met informally on 9 May in Singapore, to discuss how ASEAN could assist Myanmar in responding effectively to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. This was in preparation for a special meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, which Singapore, as ASEAN Chair, had offered to host. Myanmar accepted the offer, and the ASEAN-ERAT’s deployment to Myanmar took on the added responsibility of assessing the magnitude of the necessary response in terms of relief efforts. From 9–18 May, the ASEAN-ERAT experts complemented the work undertaken by the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination teams and the Government of Myanmar, in assessing the critical needs of the cyclone victims and the affected areas. Their findings and recommendations were reported to the special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on 19 May. It was, as declared by many of the ASEAN foreign ministers throughout the meeting’s intense discussions, ASEAN’s defining moment. For the first time, an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism had come into being, “to facilitate the effective distribution and utilisation of assistance from the international community, including the expeditious and effective

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deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel”. For this ASEAN-led mechanism to fulfil its mandate, it was critical that international assistance provided through ASEAN should not be politicized. It was on this basis that Myanmar’s Prime Minister agreed to accept ASEAN-led international assistance and expertise. And so, Myanmar moved from a stance of accepting aid but not workers, to one of accepting all international assistance including relief workers through an ASEAN-led coordination system. This was reaffirmed on 23 May, when Myanmar’s reclusive Senior General agreed to allow all aid/relief

workers into the country “regardless of nationality”. This promise has been kept. Hundreds of UN workers and those from the international humanitarian assistance community continue to operate in Myanmar today (see Figure 2.1). Work now began in earnest to reach the people in the stricken areas. It started with the immediate dispatch of medical teams from all ASEAN member countries. At the same time, an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) was formed, as called for by the ASEAN’s foreign ministers, to ensure the credibility and transparency of the ASEAN-led mechanism, which brought together the different ASEAN member countries, the

Figure 2.1 A Timeline Towards Accepting Aid ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference Nargis strikes Delta Myanmar appeals for aid

2nd stage of UN Chief meets ASEAN ERAT Senior General Special AMM “Myanmar will accept aid through ASEAN” “Aid workers allowed regardless of nationality

First steps of relief work “critical time”

2–3 May

5 May

4–9 May

Decision to conduct PONJA

12 May

19 May

23 May

- Senior General Than Shwe - ASEAN and neighbours, visits delta for 1st time since int’l and local organizations donate aid and relief supplies Nargis (18 May) - First visa approvals (7 May) - “R2P suggested (7 May) - “Myanmar welcomes aid, not workers” (9 May) - ASEAN ERAT starts operations (9 May)

25 May

31 May Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to act and decide on ground ASEAN+UN +GoM

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Myanmar Government, and the UN with its international NGOs, to coordinate relief, assistance, and a rapid assessment of the country. Meanwhile, on 15 May, Surin had conferred with World Bank President Robert Zoellick on how ASEAN-World Bank collaboration could be brought to bear. Zoellick offered the World Bank’s expertise in assessing the damage and loss and in planning for recovery.8 The United Nations9 The United Nations’ role in the response was manifested in the initiative taken by the resident UN agencies in Myanmar in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, and in its partnership with ASEAN to bring about a constructive solution to the humanitarian crisis. This also contributed to the eventual emergence and acceptance of the ASEAN-led coordination. Many see the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference, held in Yangon on 25 May, as the first occasion for ASEAN, the UN, and the Myanmar Government to start working together in the collaborative partnership that characterizes post-Nargis relief and recovery work today. The UN’s role throughout May, which laid the initial groundwork for the ASEANcoordinated approach, deserves some mention. Like the government and people of Myanmar, and also many in the ASEAN and international community, the UN community in Yangon was caught unawares by the fury of Cyclone Nargis. The cyclone struck at a time when the

new UN Resident Coordinator had just arrived in Myanmar to assume his duties. The interim coordinator, who had admirably risen to the challenge of resident coordinatorship in a situation fraught with tension, was out of the country on a mission in early May. It fell to the WFP representative in Yangon to coordinate UN efforts on the ground, and get the initial humanitarian response going, including early assessments and relief work. ASEAN also owes its initial exploration of the situation in Myanmar to the information and advice provided by the UN officers in Yangon. Throughout May, informal consultations between ASEAN and the UN helped provide an assessment of how partnerships could possibly be brokered, and how delicately ASEAN needed to tread in bringing about a solution to answering the urgent needs of the cyclone survivors. The initial operations of the ASEAN-ERAT team were housed in the UNFPA office in Yangon. Paving the way for UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki Moon’s visit to Myanmar’s cyclone-hit areas and his meeting with the country’s top leadership, the UN UndersecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes, met with Myanmar’s Prime Minister. ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference The pledging conference is seen as another turning point for ASEAN. Building on the working relationship between ASEAN and the UN, co-

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sponsored by both, and co-chaired by their secretaries-general, the conference was attended by fifty-one countries, all with a high level of representation. Ban Ki-Moon, present in Myanmar for the conference, as well as for talks with Myanmar’s leadership, led the appeal. It is noteworthy that the countries and governments that had criticized Myanmar most strongly were all present at the pledging conference, where all agreed to set aside political differences in the common quest to help the people of

Myanmar, especially those in the disasterdevastated areas, “to overcome this dreadful tragedy and resume their normal lives as quickly as possible”. On the sidelines of the pledging conference, the ASEAN Secretariat was hammering out the scope for a Yangonbased Tripartite Core Group (TCG) (see Box 2.1) with equal representation of the ASEAN Secretariat, the UN and the Myanmar Government, as a smaller, more agile entity to carry out the AHTF’s mandate on the ground in Myanmar, and

Box 2.1: The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) Chaired by Myanmar’s Deputy Foreign Minister, the TCG is a tripartite consultative mechanism amongst ASEAN, the Myanmar Government and the UN (which also brings together the international humanitarian assistance community), to discuss and respond to situations or challenges that arise from coordinating relief work. Each has three representatives participating in the TCG. The TCG is an interesting case study in establishing partnerships that work. The open and frank nature of the discussions on many issues and challenges that seemed insurmountable in the TCG’s early months is not to be glossed over. Visa issues remain on the agenda, despite much more streamlined approval procedures. Interestingly, initial terse discussions over visas for aid workers and international volunteers led to the decision to shorten the lengthy practice of approval and referral, and place the streamlined procedure under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The honesty of the TCG exchanges was underpinned by the knowledge that the TCG members shared the same goal — to save and rebuild the lives of the survivors. This and several other factors helped to clear the inevitable bottlenecks in stabilizing the relief phase and making progress towards early recovery. The TCG Chair took a deliberate stance of not standing on ceremony. The TCG members representing the Myanmar Government showed their willingness to engage in collaborative partnerships. There was also a certain comfort level amongst the TCG members, who knew one another, and were familiar with one another’s working style. The existing cordial working relationship between the UN and ASEAN, and ASEAN’s tradition of working together also facilitated decision making.

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TCG members in the control room. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

TCG in action in the “control room”. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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TCG Chair welcoming back the PONJA teams in a ceremony at the Traders Hotel, Yangon on 21 June 2008 (a very frank and open sharing session followed this ceremony). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Welcome Back PONJA ceremony. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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deal effectively with any obstacles or challenges in the course of its work. The pledging conference welcomed the TCG’s creation, “as a working mechanism for coordinating, facilitating, and monitoring the flow of international assistance into the country … to ensure full information exchange, close coordination of relief and recovery efforts, and problems”.10 Following the pledging conference, the ASEAN Secretariat — found itself pressed for time and space to establish its presence in Yangon. Up to that point, the Secretariat officers had been operating out of office space and with equipment provided by the UN. For the first time in the Secretariat’s operational history, its officers were now faced with the challenge of opening a field office, with limited resources. Dr Surin himself scouted for possible office space, and used his personal networks to negotiate favourable terms and obtain sufficient funds to tide over the initial operations of the ASEAN field office in Yangon.11 Work started immediately, with meetings of the AHTF and preparations for the second deployment of the ASEAN-ERAT by 28 May. The pledging conference’s recommendations were being followed through. PONJA is Born The pledging conference had called for a “comprehensive rapid joint assessment of recovery needs, and the development of a shared post-disaster recovery and reconstruction plan”. It fell upon the shoulders of the newly established TCG

and the ASEAN field office in Yangon to strike an intricate balance between the interests of the UN and the World Bank, which bodies offered their respective assessment methodologies for the joint exercise. ASEAN again assumed the mantle of honest broker that it had newly donned, to facilitate the entry of international aid into Myanmar. Daily coordination meetings and an on-theground version of shuttle diplomacy led to a compromise and principled settlement. This integrated the UN’s relief-oriented assessment and the World Bank’s trademark damage and loss assessment into a joint exercise that would draw on the strengths of both, and include the expertise of, and support from, ASEAN and other parties in the exercise. The comprehensive joint rapid assessment took on another quality — that of being credible. It was embodied as the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment and referred to by its initials, PONJA. Launching PONJA With agreement reached for the PONJA exercise at the end of May, and the urgent need for action requiring an almost immediate deployment of assessment teams, ASEAN again found itself hard-pressed for time and resources, both financial and human. PONJA would bring together two assessment methodologies: (a) the UN-led village tract assessment (VTA) to determine the needs for relief and early recovery, and (b) the World Bank’s damage and loss assessment to examine longer-term, macroeconomic implications. Mobilizing

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PONJA meant mobilizing more than 300 people, the majority of them local volunteers, and about one million U.S. dollars. The Myanmar Government accorded blanket approval to the ASEAN Secretary-General’s request for unrestricted access to the affected areas to carry out the exercise, and agreed to the integrated approach to the assessment proposed under PONJA. Time became a major constraint in recruiting and training volunteers within the space of three days, and in managing the logistics of payment. The ASEAN field office’s financial resources came nowhere near the amount necessary to provide payment for the government and local volunteers, until a solution came in the form of

interim assistance from the Thai embassy in Yangon. And so PONJA was launched as a two-week exercise undertaken in the delta areas affected by Cyclone Nargis, from 5–19 June, the teams’ every movement and requirement monitored and coordinated by TCG representatives in Yangon. ASEAN missions in Yangon all pitched in to provide sufficient human resources for the TCG to man the PONJA Control Room around the clock, seven days a week. The control room itself had been established by a group of three Thai volunteers with 2004 tsunami experience, and was operational within four hours, maintaining consistent links between the PONJA field personnel

Box 2.2: PONJA, VTA and DaLA PONJA involved some 350 persons, including international and national staffers of UN agencies, NGOs, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, ASEAN, and Myanmar civil servants and local civil society volunteers, in what now stands as the first ever systematic assessment of the impact of Cyclone Nargis since it struck on 2 and 3 May. The Myanmar Government assigned twenty officers from the eighteen line ministries involved in the relief effort to join the PONJA effort. PONJA consisted of two interrelated and complementary assessments: DaLA (damage and loss assessment) and VTA (village tract assessment). DaLA had six teams of twenty to thirty people, each from various sectors and organizations visiting seven townships in five days. The teams had a three-day training session before leaving for their work in the field. VTA differs from DaLA in being based on grassroots information, focusing on learning how cyclone survivors have been getting by since the storm. Information was obtained from interviews with a variety of people in the affected areas, mainly farmers, fishermen, nurses, social workers, and community elders. After three days of training and pilot test in a village in the Yangon Division, the VTA teams also spent ten days in the field, visiting at least two villages per village tract in 128 identified village tracts. There, they interviewed ten households per village.

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A VTA volunteer’s T-shirt. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

and the TCG, and acting proactively to meet all requests, including those asking for emergency relief supplies for several villages that assistance had not yet been able to reach. It is at once humbling and inspiring to learn of the dedication and determination of a group of amateurs in the field of humanitarian assistance, who managed and coordinated the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and government officers involved in the PONJA exercise, without a single loss of life.12

PONJA’s Recipe for Synergy The Village Tract Assessment (VTA) and its outcomes (see Box 2.3) best demonstrate PONJA’s effectiveness. The VTA experience, especially the lessons to be drawn from it, provides a basis for continued work on early recovery. As an integral part of the PONJA exercise, the VTA bears in mind the importance of addressing the needs of people in the affected areas. From the VTA exercise, consultative mechanisms for community

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rehabilitation emerged. The needs identified by the villagers are now being addressed through several community(or village)-based projects. The VTA was undertaken to assess the most seriously affected areas and identify any vulnerabilities and capacities in a joint, credible and comprehensive manner. The assessment exercise itself did help to provide immediate succour to areas not yet reached by assistance, and also identified pressing needs for recovery and the rebuilding of victims’ lives. It also helped gather much needed information for the second of its expected outputs — — the creation of a common information database shared between the clusters and the Myanmar Government. The success of the VTA mission is an illustration of the genuine cooperation of all concerned, in helping address the pressing needs of the cyclone victims within the supporting framework of PONJA. It showed that there is opportunity in adversity. Bound together by a common objective, the VTA helped to illuminate in a clearer light the different roles and strengths of each group involved in the exercise, and the importance of each strength. For example, the government’s role as facilitator and coordinator became evident to many, including the government officials themselves. Despite several limitations of the VTA, there are many positive gains that future work should build on. There is an overwhelming desire on the part of those involved in the VTA to continue the process of early recovery and monitoring,

to give renewed hope to the people in the affected areas. Lessons can be learned from the limitations, due mainly to the tight time constraints, experienced in the design of questionnaires, training, and the interpretation of responses. Many of the responses from the villages and wards in the thirty townships involved in the VTA indicate the aspiration of the villagers to emerge from the cyclone’s debris and move on with rebuilding their lives. Self-reliance characterizes the spirit in which villagers have started this process of rebuilding. Rather than rely on humanitarian assistance and distribution, many villagers have voiced the need for sufficient supplies of paddy seeds and farming equipment. Food sufficiency is an urgent objective, but not through the means of finite handouts. The villagers’ voice is an inspirational lesson in ensuring that the assessments address their specific needs. Follow-up proposals will need to facilitate systems that match these needs with assistance. For example, hand-held tillers should be accompanied by the necessary spare parts, technical support for maintenance and repair, and the all-important fuel to operate the tillers. Paddy seeds and fertilizer need to be of the type that responds well to the soil and weather conditions in the delta areas. The essence of consultative decision making should continue at the community level for people to manage their own needs in obtaining, distributing, and maintaining equipment and supplies, and in ensuring that they

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are put to best use. Indeed, the villagers’ traditional system of consultation provides the basis for them to make decisions on their lives and future livelihood. The government, ASEAN, the international donor community, and international and local NGOs can do no

better than to provide the facilitating support. What worked well: • Team members were all united in the same objective of helping the survivors. The team spirit that

Box 2.3: The Village Tract Assessment (VTA) and its Gains To get a realistic snapshot of conditions in the delta areas after Cyclone Nargis, 32 fivemember teams from various organizations fanned across the 30 worst affected townships, which were divided into 128 identical quadrants of village tracts. The teams spent ten days in the field, visiting at least two villages per village tract. They usually visited the village closest to the centre of every quadrant, and then surveyed at least two other villages nearby. In each village, the teams conducted ten questionnaire-based interviews with “key informants”, including community leaders and focus group discussions, to gather data that was in addition to their own observations of the situation. To reach these often remote and inaccessible locations, the surveyors travelled by helicopter, car, motorcycle, and boat. They also walked long distances to reach some villages that were accessible only by foot. Cyclone survivors were questioned about how much food they had in store, their post-cyclone livelihood situation, how they planned to meet their families’ daily needs, and whether they had access to medical care. Information gleaned from these interviews helped identify priority needs, and this was fed into the creation of a common information base shared among all sectors involved. It provided a common reference point not only for future monitoring and evaluation, but more importantly for discussion between the government and aid agencies on how best to help the survivors meet their needs. The composition of the VTA teams relied heavily on volunteers. Those with experience in data collection headed the teams. Government officers on the teams had the role of coordinating the teams’ travel and communications with the control room in Yangon. Despite differing backgrounds and affiliations, the team members worked well together and discovered each other’s strengths in facing and finding solutions to difficulties. Many young volunteers came forward after the PONJA exercise, offering their determination and enthusiasm to assist in similar undertakings and, indeed, in any activity or project that would bring some measure of relief and assistance to the survivors.

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VTA teams in the field, on land and on water. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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VTA teams in air. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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•

•

prevailed regardless of nationality, profession or affiliation led to collective solutions for difficulties and problems. Volunteers had the chance to learn and understand the tools used for assessment. This was an eye-opener to many young people, undertaking such an exercise for the first time. The villagers responded positively to the team visits, sharing their experiences and needs willingly enough (although some hesitated to share fully). The teams not only discussed the urgent needs of the survivors, but also found themselves helping the villagers in the catharsis of their emotions and helping to solve some of their difficulties.

What did not work so well: • Time was the major constraint in preparing the volunteers and other team members for the assessment. The aim of PONJA to be comprehensive and yet rapid led to some trade-offs between quality and depth. Some of the questions set for the key informants and focus group discussions were not so clear. • Team members were not well prepared for encountering the emotions of villagers when asking questions of a sensitive nature. Some felt awkward about taking their midday meals in full view of the villagers, many of whom had urgent food needs to last them over the next few days or weeks. In retrospect, the training of the VTA teams could have

•

provided for more time for the emotional preparation of the volunteers. The time constraints also led to hitches in logistics, such as the poor quality of equipment in the survival kits. Weather conditions in the delta areas during PONJA were not taken into account, leading to difficulties, including boats capsizing in rising tides, in travelling to and from villages and the conveyances amidst wind and rain during transportation.

Despite the constraints of time, transport, and logistics, teams were very positive about the joint assessment experience, describing it as “a great success and an exhilarating experience”. All shared the view that more young people should be trained and exposed to similar situations, and that it would have been ideal if the assessment could have been done one week after the cyclone. At a welcome-back event held in Yangon on 21 June, after all the teams had returned and rested from their PONJA activities, each team shared its individual experiences in the technical, emotional, and logistics elements of the PONJA exercise. All teams acknowledged that the process had been difficult and had exposed volunteers to many things and situations that were difficult to adjust to, and to reconcile their feelings with. PONJA’s successful mission was also largely due to the availability of the WFP helicopters. Deployed initially to supply emergency food supplies, the WFP

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The WFP chopper over Bogalay. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Bringing VTA teams to Pyapon-Wakema area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Bringing supplies to Pyapon-Wakema area. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Landing in Bogalay. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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helicopter flights delivered aid (including shelter materials, water purification units, and hygiene kits) for UNICEF, CARE, and Merlin (a British medical charity that provides medical and health care assistance to people in need). With access facilitated by the helicopters, medical teams supported by Merlin could operate emergency clinics in remote villages. The helicopters even assisted with two medical evacuations, a young child suffering from serious dengue fever, and a young mother with a newborn baby requiring urgent medical care. The helicopters facilitated the deployment of the PONJA teams of humanitarian workers across the delta. The helicopters became a welcome sight for many grateful villagers, especially in the eightyeight remote locations where no assistance had reached the inhabitants since the cyclone struck.13 Indeed, the helicopters are now synonymous with aid and assistance, supplies and support, spreading hope in many a villager’s heart that their plight has not been forgotten, and that the international community’s goodwill remains with the people of Myanmar. The next chapter takes us through the highs and lows of the emotions and aspirations experienced by all those involved in responding to the urgent needs of the people in the stricken areas. The human stories bring alive the processes that made what now stands as a unique working mechanism to coordinate and facilitate assistance for response and recovery in the wake of

devastating tragedies such as Cyclone Nargis. Notes 1. Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Light of Myanmar, 9 May 2008, p. 11. 2. ASEAN Secretariat press release, dated 5 May 2008, “ASEAN Members Urged to Support International Emergency Relief for Cyclone Victims in Myanmar” at . 3. Straits Times article by Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis: Lessons in Offering Neighbourly Aid”, 15 May 2008. 4. Myanmar Cyclone Relief, from MSNBC article, “Myanmar accepts aid, not aid workers”, 8 May 2008 at . 5. WFP spokesperson Paul Risley, in an interview with Bloomberg’s Paul Tighe on June 4, said that the Australian Government rented four from a private South African company, and Canada brought in four from Ukraine to form the WFP’s helicopter team. The WFP managed to fly only one helicopter into the country since 22 May. It reached the delta town of Labutta on 2 June. News article in full at: . 6. Myanmar is one of the eight countries that have ratified the AADMER. 7. Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman’s Statement, Singapore, 19 May 2008. 8. Joint ASEAN-World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Pledges Support for ASEAN”, Washington, 15 May 2008, at and

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. 9. This section is based on a very interesting and instructive interview with Dan Baker, Head of the UNFPA office in Yangon and interim Humanitarian Coordinator. 10. ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference on Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN and UN Chairmen’s Summary, Yangon, 25 May 2008. 11. Interviews with ASEAN Secretariat officers, and ASEAN Secretary-General, 4 July and 5 August 2008, respectively.

12. Interviews with H.E. Robert Chua, Singapore’s Ambassador to Myanmar; Richard Blewitt (HelpAge) and his team of VTA coordinators; VTA volunteers; Dr Puji Pujiono and Adelina Kamal. 13. “Cyclone Nargis: Two Months Later”, WFP article dated 3 July 2008, on UNOCHA’s ReliefWeb, at .

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3 The Human Stories

When Cyclone Nargis made landfall at around midnight of 2 May 2008, its strong winds caught the residents of Ayeyawaddy Division sleeping. The relentless Nargis shattered many lives, injured countless victims, flattened houses, schools, and other infrastructure, and interrupted the economic livelihood of the people living in the affected areas. Without any kind of warning system, those who lived close to the mouth of the Ayeyawaddy River succumbed to the intensity of the cyclone, while those who resided in Yangon had little hint of the tragedy that was about to take place a few hours afterwards. One of the

managers of the Chatrium Hotel in Yangon admitted that she had not been prepared to cope with Cyclone Nargis. Even though the government had alerted the public to the scale of the cyclone much earlier, she believed that the country alone could not have dealt with such a large-scale natural disaster. She shared without reserve that without the intervention of ASEAN, what unfolded in the weeks following the cyclone would have been much worse. ASEAN, however, received both praise and censure for its response. Certain Western governments and some in the international media reproached

Facing page: Chatrium hotel staff donating food and basic supplies to cyclone survivors. Photo courtesy of May Myat Mon Win, Director of Sales and Marketing, Chatrium Hotel, Yangon. 69

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ASEAN for its slow intervention, and for giving in too easily to the Myanmar Government without any political bargaining. ASEAN, of course, perceived this issue differently. For ASEAN, the fact that the Myanmar Government allowed the organization to take part in the reconstruction and relief efforts was in itself an achievement. The post-Nargis reconstruction and relief process in which ASEAN had a leading role is worth documenting, not only for the organization’s own future reference, but also for the lessons that could be learned from the exercise, so that it could respond more effectively should a similar natural disaster strike the region in future. ASEAN organized a special meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers on 19 May 2008 in Singapore with the aim of assisting Myanmar respond to Cyclone Nargis. In that meeting, the foreign ministers recognized the outpouring of goodwill and the strong determination of the international community to help the victims of Nargis and decided to set up an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism.1 The ASEAN mechanism was considered the only viable channel that could be used for foreign assistance, both from the region and from elsewhere in the world. It was designed to facilitate the effective distribution and utilization of assistance from around the world, as well as the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers, especially health and medical personnel, and lessons were drawn from the Indonesian experience in response to the 2004 tsunami. Myanmar subsequently accepted ASEAN’s

intervention, since the foreign ministers pledged that the assistance would not be politicized. ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan later confirmed this view by stating, “Human rights concerns are also ours, but we are not there yet. We are not reconstructing, we are saving lives, and trying to cover those 2.4 million to make sure they are getting rapid delivery of relief.”2 An ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) headed by Surin was established to work closely with the UN and with a central coordinating body to be assigned by Myanmar as the ASEAN-led mechanism. The result was immediately evident when the Myanmar Government agreed to accept the urgent despatch of medical teams from all ASEAN countries. As an organization, ASEAN sent an Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) to Myanmar. Myanmar also permitted more international relief workers into the stricken areas. ASEAN cooperated with the UN to hold an ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference in Yangon on 25 May 2008. The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) was also established on this date. Bridging the Gap ASEAN stood firm in its determination to separate the humanitarian assistance from the political situation in Myanmar. The post-Nargis experience displayed the weaving of a tapestry of hope and goodwill, in which ASEAN, Myanmar and other international organizations were able to work together towards common objectives.

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ASEAN and UN SecretariesGeneral (far left and far right, respectively) flanking the ASEAN Chair (Singapore) (second from left) and Myanmar Prime Minister (second from right) at the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference. Photo courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore.

Singapore’s Ambassador to Myanmar Mr Robert Chua (right) delivering a statement at the pledging session of the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference. Photo courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore.

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ASEAN assigned itself as a “spinner” that weaves the hope and goodwill that had been pouring in from the region and around the world. Prior to the ASEAN special meeting on 19 May 2008, Surin had a private discussion with Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, in Washington D.C. on 15 May 2008. In the conversation that lasted forty-five minutes, the phrase “coalition of mercy” was first conceived and subsequently used repeatedly in the international media to describe the acts of compassion the world had to offer to the Myanmar people. Zoellick asked Surin, “What can we do to help?” In fact, the World Bank and ASEAN have in recent years been developing closer ties, particularly in order to “mainstream” social development into national development agendas in ASEAN countries. ASEAN welcomed the World Bank’s assistance in addressing emerging social development challenges, including the impact of climate change and the emergency response to natural disasters. Peter Stephens, Head of the World Bank office in Singapore, told Surin after the meeting that Zoellick himself had drafted the statement entitled, “The World Bank Pledges Support for ASEAN”, dated 15 May 2008, emphasizing his organization’s offer to ASEAN of expertise in assessing the devastation and planning for recovery in Myanmar.3 However, the World Bank has its own limitations in assisting Myanmar, limitations imposed by some member states. Nevertheless, the World Bank and ASEAN already have certain working

agreements in place, starting first in the area of social development and rural poverty reduction, and now expanding to include emerging priorities like climate change. Cyclone Nargis was in many ways a good case study for both organizations in how to work together to reach a higher level of cooperation. In carrying out its role, ASEAN simply revealed the bare truth to the world community — either let the victims perish or offer them a helping hand. In the words of Surin, “ASEAN has been baptised by Cyclone Nargis.”4 “Building back better”, a term borrowed from former U.S. President Bill Clinton, as he referred to the reconstruction effort in the wake of the 2004 tsunami,5 is also being applied to both Myanmar and ASEAN. Particularly for ASEAN, it has benefitted from the wreckage caused by Cyclone Nargis, as it enabled the organization to show to the world that it could deliver the necessary humanitarian support to the Myanmar people, thus remaining relevant in a time of regional crisis. Cyclone Nargis can be regarded as the first “true” engagement of ASEAN in the mission of relieving natural or manmade disasters. ASEAN as an organization had attempted to put a stamp on crisis management in its own region, but had somehow never been offered a chance. The closest ASEAN got to it took place in 1999, when killings and carnage erupted in East Timor, at the time of the referendum on national independence from Indonesia or autonomy within it. The crisis coincided with the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic

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Cooperation) Economic Leaders Meeting in Auckland in August 1999, but did not quite open up a space for ASEAN, as distinct from some of its individual members, to play a crucial role in preventing the further use of violence in East Timor. The role of ASEAN in the response to Cyclone Nargis has been assessed in a positive light by international organizations. A representative of the World Bank in Yangon said in an interview that, from a regional perspective, all parties could not have handled a “better institutional partnership”, which was open and forward-looking, without ASEAN’s leadership. ASEAN, to him, had done an outstanding job in bridging the gap between his organization and the Myanmar Government, and in bringing a high level of comfort to all key stakeholders in the way the assessment was undertaken.6 In responding to this view, Rurik Marsden from the Department for International Development, United Kingdom, the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar had been a “big gamble” for ASEAN, but it had paid off well for the grouping. The next big question was, how ASEAN could maintain this momentum.7 Tearing Down the Wall ASEAN was urged by many governments and organizations, including personal pleas from the Canadian Foreign Minister, the British Foreign Secretary, and the Ambassador of the EU in Bangkok, as well as from UN

Undersecretary-General John Holms directly to Surin, to break all the barriers, and persuade the Myanmar Government to receive international assistance without conditions. In fact, ASEAN had begun its mission of tearing down the wall immediately after Cyclone Nargis, by sending appeals to ASEAN governments, dialogue partners, the private sector, and civil society to generously assist the cyclone victims. It also activated the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP) for non-stop progress reporting, and established the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance within 24 hours. The foreign ministers of Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand engaged in shuttle diplomacy, reassured the world of ASEAN’s attempt to be the broker with Myanmar. ASEAN was initially afraid of Myanmar’s unpredictable behaviour, aware that “history could potentially repeat itself ”. Myanmar had gone along with ASEAN in inviting Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Special Envoy, to appear before the East Asian Summit in Singapore in November 2007, and there debrief the members on the political developments in Myanmar following the crackdown on street protests in September the same year, only to change its mind when Gambari was already on the plane to Singapore. With Cyclone Nargis, ASEAN simply could not fail again. To avoid a diplomatic embarrassment, the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 19 May 2008 in Singapore was initiated, to ensure that Myanmar would respond to

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ASEAN’s needs, and vice versa, at their respective comfort levels, and so as to ensure that the regional humanitarian assistance would succeed. In that meeting, ASEAN painted three possible scenarios for the Myanmar leadership. First, there would be a UNled mechanism for the reconstruction and relief effort in Myanmar. Second, an ASEAN-led mechanism could be established for the same purpose. And third, Myanmar had to bear “the responsibility to protect” its own citizens on its own. “These are clear and straightforward choices and Myanmar cannot wait any longer but to choose one of them”, said a group of senior officials from ASEAN. Just before lunchtime, Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win, picked the second choice: ASEAN’s taking lead in the relief efforts. That is how the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force came into existence, with the participation of representatives from Myanmar’s non-ASEAN neighbours, China, India, and Bangladesh. Within a week, on 25 May 2008, the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference took place in Yangon, paving the way for the founding of the historic Tripartite Core Group (TCG). It is noteworthy that for the tripartite partnership to have succeeded, a small-scale mechanism was preferred to a large, unwieldy one, and it had to guarantee accessibility to the Myanmar leadership at the highest level. If not, the mechanism would have proven incompetent, as obstacles on the ground were constantly anticipated. Myanmar gave consent to the idea, and even made

its own move by setting up the National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Thein Sein himself. To operate with full efficiency in Myanmar and to sustain its presence in the country, ASEAN decided that a coordinating office must be set up. The ASEAN Secretariat had never before opened up a field office in any of the member countries. New to this experience and forced to draw on its limited resources, ASEAN established its coordinating office within four hours. Surin had to exercise his personal influence to secure hotel space at a special rate, and the only person he thought might help at the time was the Thai ambassador to Myanmar Bansarn Bunnag. The Royal Thai Embassy in Yangon enjoys a close relationship with the Chatrium Hotel, which is owned by a group of Thai conglomerates. Not only did Surin personally request for a favour from the Thai ambassador to negotiate a special rate for ASEAN’s new office and accommodations for its staff, but also asked for the loan of an emergency budget, so that the office could begin its operation quickly and smoothly. Yet, the loan was not only for the setting up of an ASEAN office. ASEAN was also responsible for the payment of those who could not be paid by others, such as the allowances for government officials and ASEAN volunteers. The expected amount of US$33,000 for this purpose had to be available within eighteen hours, or the PONJA would not have taken off in time. Since the new ASEAN

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office in Yangon had no bank account and each incoming officer could only legally bring into the country the maximum amount of US$2,000, assistance from the Royal Thai Embassy was considered a boon. Surin consulted the Thai Ambassador in the early hours of the morning, while the paperwork was being prepared in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Yangon, a process necessary for the Thai Embassy to proceed with the extension of the loan to the ASEAN Secretariat. At dawn, the money came through and was withdrawn from the bank. ASEAN officials in Yangon returned to the Chatrium with a large suitcase of kyats. The obstacles did not derive purely from the unpredictability of the Myanmar Government, or the shortage of financial resources. The assessment process also posed another challenge in the work of the TCG. The objectivity of

the assessment report must be unquestionable, so that the report could be justified as a credible and valid document. Dr Puji Pujiono, ASEAN member of the TCG, lent his expertise in post-disaster assessment, his devotion and his wide experience. In fact, the term “PONJA” was said to have been coined by him. The survey teams conducted their fieldwork in almost all of the accessible affected areas in order to obtain the most accurate assessment. In this process, the teams sought assistance from the World Food Programme (WFP) for the use of its helicopters to send supplies into the disaster-hit areas. The foreign ministers of Australia and Canada also sent their helicopters, respectively from Canberra and South Africa (where the Canadian helicopters were based at the time), to meet the transport needs of the

ASEAN Coordination Office in Yangon. Photo courtesy of the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Thai Ambassador Bansarn Bunnag (in the middle) with TCG Chair U Kyaw Thu (right) and UN Resident Coordinator in Myanmar. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

assessment teams. But the generosity of the two foreign ministers landed them in “political and financial trouble” at home. Adelina Kamal, Head of the then Disaster Management Unit in the ASEAN Secretariat’s Bureau for Resources Development, who had been in Myanmar since the first mobilization of ASEAN-ERAT, shared with us some critical turning points that, to her, could have derailed the assessment mission. Together, Ms Kamal and Dr Puji told us that the process of forming the PONJA almost fell apart over initial disagreements amongst key stakeholders on the assessment approach. The UN agreed to embark on an integrated assessment under the auspices of the TCG, while the World Bank brought its own trademark

“turn-key” assessment methodology called, “Joint Damage, Losses and Needs Assessment”, and requested that the UN relief-oriented assessment be subsumed under this scheme. On the basis of past experience, the UN categorically refused to be “diluted” into the World Bank methodology, and was prepared to go on its own way if necessary. Here, ASEAN was caught in the middle. It tried extremely hard to convince the two sides to compromise and seek the best way to get the job done. As the rivalry faded, the final product was a first-rate assessment report, which took into account the importance of transparency and the full participation of parties involved. Difficulties have also been found in the recruitment process and the training

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Dr Puji contemplates the future during a field trip to the delta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Adelina Kamal surveying the extent of damage and losses to be recovered during a field visit to the delta. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon. 77

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of the volunteers, as was described in Chapter 2. As for capacity building at the ASEAN level, a World Bank official in Yangon shared his thoughts for ASEAN to firm up its capacity building, including the recruitment of technicians in the field of disaster management, which was perceived as “the weakest aspect” of ASEAN.8 Building Trust The ASEAN Roundtable on Post-Nargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery and Reconstruction held in Yangon on 24 June 2008 represented an essential milestone, not only in the humanitarian effort for the victims of Cyclone Nargis, but also in establishing a sense of trust amongst the three core players — ASEAN, the UN, and the Myanmar Government. The roundtable was an opportunity for the three parties to assure the international community of a level of confidence in the objectivity and validity of the report, and in the way it was assembled. In turn, the international community could make use of the roundtable to contribute to the assessment process. Furthermore, it had the purpose of documenting the process and assisting in capacity building, to make sure that ASEAN would have the experience and expertise in the event of future natural disasters. In short, ASEAN wished to listen to and learn from the experts in the field of natural disaster management. Rumours, however, were rife that the Myanmar authorities intentionally sent only a few of their officials to attend the roundtable, which was dominated by

personalities from ASEAN and international organizations. One theory was that Myanmar feared being “dictated” to do certain things by “foreigners”, and this, of course, reflected a lingering sense of mistrust and suspicion on the part of Myanmar’s officials. The other rumour was of the traditional rivalry between Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development. The two agencies had their own ways and approaches, which were sometimes contradictory, in dealing with ASEAN and international organizations. ASEAN let it be known that it needed to respond to tremendous pressure from around the world in persuading Myanmar to open up and adopt either the UN-led or ASEAN-led mechanism. Standing at the crossroads, ASEAN had been called upon by almost everyone, from near and far, to do something in order to save the lives of the survivors. Thus, the phrase, “a defining moment” could not have truer for ASEAN at this time. It was a big gamble for ASEAN: if it had not done anything to help the Myanmar victims, its credibility and relevancy would have evaporated. If it had taken the wrong course, it would have been similarly tarnished. As the reconstruction and relief effort progressed, the willingness of Myanmar to engage with ASEAN and its confidence in it became increasingly palpable. ASEAN stressed that it was willing to set aside other contentious

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issues in order to pursue its humanitarian tasks immediately. During the ASEANUN International Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, the issue of political reforms, or even the name of Aung San Suu Kyi was not mentioned. However, it is imperative to clarify here that in putting aside political agendas while taking up the humanitarian challenge, one should not automatically assume that ASEAN would from now on tone down or even abandon its request for a move towards serious democratization in Myanmar, as well as for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. The priority then was about saving lives and “to build Myanmar back better”. Of course, ASEAN’s sole focus on humanitarian assistance has until today remained a bone of contention with the many anti-Myanmar regime forces around the world. From the perspective of Myanmar, the fact that international organizations and NGOs were invited to participate in the meetings and conferences in May and June 2008 was testimony to a major breakthrough in its relationship with foreign agencies. They can now see each other “face to face” and hold meaningful dialogue, even when it is still limited to the humanitarian context. As the wall of suspicion begins to tumble, the next question is how to maintain the level of trust amongst all parties. Cyclone Nargis has indeed opened up many windows of opportunity for Myanmar and the world. At the end of the last Gambari mission, many hoped that one day, dialogue

between Myanmar and the world would be expanded beyond mere political and human rights issues to other issues of equal significance, such as economic development and poverty reduction as well as cooperation in the prevention of natural disasters. Nargis has done much more on these new issues than Gambari ever expected from Myanmar. When asked about the issue of trust, a group of Myanmar officials from different ministries agreed that the spirit within the TCG manifested itself in the success of the PONJA process. They proudly said, “We break each other’s fall. It is a spirit of helping each other as a group effect.” One official who sat in the corner finally broke his silence, “TCG put aside political differences, but rather concentrated on humanitarian relief. And because of this, more trust, hope, and help is being felt now between Myanmar and ASEAN.”9 Meanwhile, a Thai volunteer voiced the same opinion towards ASEAN. Thanapon Songput of the Disaster Risk Reduction Programme, the Mirror Foundation of Thailand, found that the work of ASEAN in Myanmar had so far been very successful, and that ASEAN had performed well under the constraints of its own limitations in experience and expertise in relief efforts. ASEAN took up the challenge of bridging any misunderstanding between Myanmar and the outside world. The most important point, to Thanapon, was that the reconstruction and relief efforts led by ASEAN would be likely to help change “certain cultures” in Myanmar in the

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next three years, the expected timeframe for the conclusion of such efforts. He reiterated, “ASEAN was never this realistic before when it came to Myanmar issue.”10 Look at what the Nargis operation has done to Myanmar today. There are now more UN agencies and international NGOs in Yangon than ever before. Myanmar has been issuing thousands of visas to those who work for international agencies. To stress this point, it is a never-before situation for those who are familiar with the country’s internal system. It is, therefore, apparent that there has been an increase in the level of trust and goodwill, including that of Myanmar towards outsiders.

Lessons and Mistakes Learned ASEAN seriously needs help from its partners in capacity building, especially in acquiring diverse experience from around the globe in the field of disaster management. ASEAN has to train more technicians in this particular field, so that it could be better equipped if similar natural disasters erupt in the region. Moreover, ASEAN must also produce, in the words of Robert Chua, Ambassador for Singapore to Myanmar and ASEAN Senior Member of the TCG, “a cohesive response to disaster”.11 From the tsunami to Nargis, there are many lessons to be learned, ranging from reconciling the assessment approaches and unlocking the inaccessibility issue, to understanding

Thanapon Songput, a Thai volunteer, sharing his experience with ASEAN media. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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cross-cultural sensitivity. One equally important message deriving from the Nargis experience is that ASEAN has stood strong, even in the midst of heavy criticism from many quarters over its slow intervention or its refusal to tie humanitarian aid to political reforms in Myanmar. ASEAN has made known its eagerness and curiosity to learn from those who have criticized or claimed to know better. Being humble is appropriate. But ASEAN must at the same time avoid being a “punching bag”, taking blows from a negative press. The Myanmar Government has also tolerated putting itself at the centre of a bad press. It might not be anything new for Myanmar to be criticized by the international media, but what the Myanmar leaders have done in the wake of Nargis, as has appeared in its own state-sponsored media, could be detrimental to their own administration. For example, the New Light of Myanmar has been reporting consistently on the generous donation of the leaders to the victims of the cyclone, but has failed to highlight the hard and genuine humanitarian work of Myanmar’s civil servants and volunteers, who went to the affected areas and spent many sleepless nights on their emergency assistance mission. Essentially, the government missed this crucial opportunity to represent itself appropriately in the eyes of the Myanmar people and the international community. The Myanmar Government missed another opportunity to shore up its legitimacy. In our conversations with the

victims of Nargis, they expressed their frustration, being unable to understand why the government had denied international assistance, even when the affected people were desperately in need of help. They strongly voiced their opinion that the government had mismanaged its relief efforts, which contributed to the worsening situation in the affected areas. We were told that even the doctors who volunteered to work in the cyclone-affected communities had to await the state’s order before they could begin their volunteer work. The victims were instructed to present their identity cards in order to be eligible to receive food and household supplies. There is a fine line between bad governance and the lack of post-disaster relief experience. Unfortunately, the Myanmar Government was unable to define this line, and instead put itself up for criticism and condemnation by the international media. In any event, the seeds of trust and confidence that have been sown from the PONJA experience must be maintained for the sake of future cooperation amongst parties involved when natural disasters revisit the region. Indeed, it would be inspiring as well as effective if such cooperation will not restrict itself to natural disasters, but be expanded to encompass other problems, too. The success of the reconstruction and relief effort in Myanmar could set a new precedent for closer cooperation amongst ASEAN, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the EU, and others, in the attempt to close the gap between old and

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new members of ASEAN in their political, economic, and social development. How can the lessons from Cyclone Nargis be used to promote further engagement between ASEAN and the rest of the world? More importantly, how can they be used to strengthen organizational engagement at a time of drastic change in the international environment? The focus here is not necessarily on Myanmar alone. But more assistance is also required to support various elements of development in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Strength Amidst Storms On 21 June 2008, a baby girl was born in Bogalay, one of the worst hit areas. U Thuzayta, head of the Zay Yar Ban Myint Monastery in the village, named the newborn baby, Thet Su Wai Hninn (the gift of multiple lives). She was smiling as though she understood the meaning of her name. The baby was exactly one month old. She was born a week after the disaster ripped through the Ayeyawaddy Delta, the birthplace of both of her parents and herself. “I am pleased that she was born after the disastrous cyclone. I couldn’t imagine what would have happened had she been born beforehand”, said Ma Thidar Hlaing, 35, mother of the baby, who works as community development facilitator for UNDP’s Bogalay office. She was on maternity leave at home in Ta Loat Chaung Village when Nargis made landfall on 2 May. Heavily pregnant Hlaing was forced to move for

shelter to a large boat that was stuck in a tree fork, together with other survivors, who numbered around one hundred people. They had no food to eat, and only coconut juice to drink. At dawn on 4 May, a rescue boat finally arrived, and took survivors to a government camp in Mawlamyinegyun, a nearby town. However, Hlaing refused to stay at the camp, but insisted on returning to her hometown, Bogalay. Hlaing reached Bogalay six hours later. “We cried because we were both happy and sad”, she said. “Happy because we were all safe, and sad because many lives and properties were lost.” Someone gave them clothes to wear. And on the fifth day in Bogalay, Hlaing gave birth to Hninn in the town hospital. With her daughter in her arms, she revealed, “I was so much luckier than people out there who faced the same fate.”12 This story is only one of many untold tales about the fear, bravery, strength, and resilience of the victims of Cyclone Nargis. It also tells us that the human stories emerging from the tragedy do not solely concern those who have come to the rescue of the affected people. But the stories of the victims themselves need to be told, highlighted and recorded, as a reminder of how the Myanmar people courageously coped with the furious cyclone, without putting the blame on their fate, destiny, or even the authorities. We travelled through one township in the Ayeyawaddy Delta, Pyinsalu, which was totally destroyed by the force of Cyclone Nargis. The survivors described

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the ordeal they had to endure when the storm hit the village. “Rain was pouring like steam coming out of a boiling hot water pot. Roofs were ripped off. Electric poles were uprooted. We locked ourselves in our houses and held on tightly to each other.” In Yangon, strong winds swept the city, and windowpanes of buildings cracked or shattered. Electricity was cut off. The residents were left in the dark for up to four days. No one was on the streets, not even the dogs. After the storm, streets were filled with debris and fallen trees. Yangon’s residents did everything they could to clear the streets without having to wait for help from the government. Some used their kitchen knives to cut up big logs that were obstructing the traffic lanes. A gentleman known only to us as Zaw wept as he told his own account. “We are farmers. Cyclone Nargis destroyed absolutely everything we had. I lost my house and my oldest son was killed. I cannot think of the next step in life. After the storm, we saw many dead bodies floating in the river and had to bury them by ourselves. Some corpses were left floating because of the sheer size of the river. We were scared to drink water from the river for hygiene reasons.”13 Cuts and bruises were the most common physical injuries suffered by Cyclone Nargis survivors. They were so extensive that it looked as if the survivors were wearing purple shirts. A resident of Labutta desperately clung onto a coconut tree, as the 120 mph winds raged and the floodwaters rose. He was left holding

onto the tree for many hours until the storm subsided. “I got cut with the pressure of the wind and water, which caused bruises all over me”, he lamented. But the survivors not only had to endure physical injury: emotional scarring was also evident in the erratic behaviour of some of the victims, who lurched from laughter to silence in the same breath.14 Three months later, many international organizations, foundations and charities went back to the cycloneravaged areas to hand out supplies and cash directly to the victims. The same story was told over and over: the survivors of Cyclone Nargis were calm, collected, and dignified, despite what they had been through. There was no grabbing or rushing when they came to receive food supplies and money. Former Nominated Member of Singapore’s Parliament Kanwaljit Soin, who travelled to the delta, said, “They didn’t even open the envelope to count the money. They just sat there, dignified.”15 Cyclone Nargis has come and now gone. What it left behind are not only traces of devastation or the many lessons to be learned by the government and other involved parties, but it has also brought out the best of human qualities, of people helping each other in a time of crisis. ASEAN cannot ignore the catastrophic impact of the cyclone and watch the victims die without intervention. On this basis, ASEAN recognized the urgency of rescuing the cyclone victims as fellow human beings, more than anything else. A round of applause should also be offered to the

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people of Myanmar themselves, who bore their misfortunes calmly, and were ready to move on a new chapter in their lives. This is exactly how Ramesh Shrestha, Representative of the United Nations Children’s Fund, described the people of Myanmar, as “resilient and patient”.16

Indeed, the resilience of the people of Myanmar, picking up the pieces of their lives with a quiet determination, remains a source of inspiration for the numerous efforts and initiatives undertaken in their name. The work that continues for the people of Myanmar has brought different groups

Villagers in Dedaye township waiting patiently for their names to be called out for relief supplies. Photo courtesy of Chatrium Hotel’s Director of Sales and Marketing, May Myat Mon Win.

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“Back to school with a smile”. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Secretariat.

“Back to school with a smile”. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Secretariat.

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and interests together with one single objective. Chapter 4 offers a glimpse of the tapestry of hope and goodwill being woven by all those who responded to the urgent need for assistance in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and are now paving the way towards recovery. Notes 1. Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Chairman’s Statement, Singapore, 19 May 2008, at . 2. Nirmal Ghosh, “Cyclone Survivors Need Aid for Six More Months: UN”, in Straits Times, 26 July 2008, p. 20. 3. “World Bank Pledges Support for ASEAN”, Washington, D.C., 15 May 2008, at . 4. Interview with Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General, Bangkok, Thailand, 5 July 2008. 5. “Clinton: Where We Stand One Year Later”, William Jefferson Clinton, in International Herald Tribune, 25 December 2005. 6. Interview with a representative of the World Bank, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 7. Interview with Rurik Marsden, Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, Yangon, Myanmar, 11 July 2008.

8. Interview with a representative of the World Bank, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 9. Interview with eight officials from Myanmar’s Ministry of Transport; National Planning and Economic Development; Information; Education; Forestry; Home Affairs; and Communication, Posts and Telegraph, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 10. Interview with Thanapon, Songput, Disaster Risk Reduction Programme, The Mirror Foundation of Thailand, Yangon, Myanmar, 8 July 2008. 11. Interview with Robert Chua, Singaporean Ambassador to Myanmar and ASEAN Senior Member of the TCG, Yangon, Myanmar, 9 July 2008. 12. “Friday Baby: UNDP Shelters New Life After Cyclone Nargis”, at . 13. Klairung Promsupha, “Achayakram Thang Manusayatham: Kkamhaikarn Khong Phuleephai Nargis” (Humanitarian Crime: Testimony of Nargis Refugees), unpublished article. 14. Source: . 15. Melissa Sim, “Face-to-Face With Victims of Myanmar Cyclone”, Straits Times, 29 July 2008. 16. Interview with Ramesh M. Shrestha, Representative of the United Nations Children’s Fund,Yangon, Myanmar, 10 July 2008.

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4 Continuing the Post-Nargis Journey

It is now more than a year since Nargis struck Myanmar’s shores. Relief work has given way to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The storm’s double impact in destroying both lives and livelihoods is still evident. Pockmarked paddy fields and scraggly roots of uprooted trees are seen side by side with the green shoots of paddy for a new harvest. Stumps of former structures in abandoned sites indicate where communities once thrived. Bent or broken spires of pagodas and churches are being rebuilt. Brand new dwellings with shiny tin roofs now house decimated families, but in areas void of vegetation. Migration to towns and cities continues. People are still struggling to

rebuild their homes, their communities and their lives. Despite the return of many villagers to their agricultural and fishing activities, the trauma of living through the storm, the loss of gainful employment, and dependence on donations and relief aid for food and other needs has led many others — not least the casual workers — to turn to drink, idleness and lethargy.1 Some progress has been made. UN Resident Coordinator in Yangon Bishow Parajuli speaks of children back in schools, farmers and fishermen back in action. The situation — according to him — cannot be compared with a year ago. While he views optimistically that things have “improved tremendously” he also

Facing page: The TCG Trademark. Photo courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar. 89

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admits that there remains much to be done in terms of healing the psychological scars.2 Nargis left many with a pervading sense of loss and vulnerability. While the world’s attention (and perhaps that of donors) may have moved on to other crises, the impact of the cyclone remains etched in the memory of survivors. The anniversary of Cyclone Nargis passed quietly. To mark the one-year remembrance the TCG visited villages in the delta where community-based rehabilitation work is being carried out, to emphasize that the recovery needs of the people in the delta should not be forgotten as the world turns its attention to new and emerging concerns. TCG Chair U Kyaw Thu stressed that no efforts are being spared “to ensure that relief and recovery assistance continues to be extended to the people in need”. ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Dr Soeung Rathchavy reminded that the needs of those who survived should not be forgotten, and that the tripartite effort of ASEAN, UN and the Myanmar Government should strengthen the TCG’s role to help people build back their lives. Thai Ambassador Bansarn Bunnag added that “resources and contribution must be forthcoming” to achieve this goal of building back better. UN’s Bishow Parajuli highlighted the urgent needs for the cyclone survivors in the Ayeyawaddy delta, citing the “enormous needs for sustainable shelter, education, health, livelihoods and agricultural support” among others.3

These echo the findings of the TCG’s first Periodic Review and the Social Impacts Monitoring report which were released in late 2008 and highlight the funding shortfall for relief and recovery work. Over the months since Nargis struck the UN and the TCG have consistently stressed that aid flow to Myanmar is not sufficient to meet existing needs. The TCG’s 19th press release issued at the one-year mark of Nargis states that “the UN Revised Appeal, covering the relief and recovery needs required for the first year, was met by US$315 million, or 66% of the US$477 million requested, according to OCHA’s Financial Tracking Services (FTS).” The TCG has also requested an additional US$691 million for medium-term recovery needs from 2009 to 2011 under the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) which was launched in January 2009. The funding shortfall for health alone is estimated at US$47 million, according to Merlin.4 The medium-term recovery plan and funding appeals are based on periodic reviews carried out under the TCG aegis to monitor multi-agency responses. The reviews build on the PONJA assessment carried out in June 2008. A Periodic Review to Monitor Recovery Needs5 PONJA brought home several truths for those coordinating the assessment, ASEAN included. In many countries that have experienced major natural disasters

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or are disaster-prone, overall analysis units have been established to monitor the post-disaster situation and needs. When the Village Tract Assessment (VTA) was carried out under PONJA, TCG was forewarned that the VTA would be the precursor for a community baseline assessment — independent of but complementing sectoral agency assessments — to support a monitoring system to review the situation across the delta over the next twelve months. TCG started discussions in August on the options and possibilities of establishing this monitoring system or a review of the areas affected by Nargis. The VTA results would be used as the baseline. The TCG and the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force endorsed the monitoring system as a “Periodic Review”. The Task Force — which has undertaken to secure funding for the review — also adopted Terms of Reference (TOR) for it in early September. The TOR places responsibility for the review on the ASEAN Secretariat, with the TCG monitoring progress. The Periodic Review was launched on 19 December 2008. The review’s aim is to provide a regular joint, comprehensive, credible and usable analysis of the relief and early recovery needs of the people living in areas affected by Cyclone Nargis. Two more reviews are planned. The first review gives an update on relief and recovery work carried out through May to December 2008. Its findings are a poignant reminder of the plight of the cyclone survivors. Many of

the cyclone-hit areas still require ongoing relief as well as recovery assistance. As the review states, the needs are diverse:6 •

•

High priority issues include the need for food aid, food security, improved sanitation and water sources, shelters, continued support for self-sufficiency and the repayment of debts. Several areas still need emergency assistance to meet daily needs, while there are also persistent needs even in areas that received substantial assistance (an issue of uneven depth and coverage of assistance). This requires continued targeted relief, as well as a greater coordination and integration of programming.

Although the relief timeline was set till April 2009, recovery may take up to four years, according to the UNDP.7 True to form, Myanmar seems set to push on despite reluctance on the part of donors. The New Light of Myanmar’s 29 December 2008 edition ran large headlines on Senior General Than Shwe’s “inspection tour” of the Ayeyawaddy delta. This was the second visit by the SPDC’s reclusive chief since a first foray in May 2008, two weeks after the cyclone. The Senior General spoke of “the need to complete the construction of schools, hospitals, dispensaries, houses, cyclone shelters, and establishment of road networks in time for the open season” as well as rehabilitating “stormhit businesses … to return to normal” and encouraged “local people themselves to put more efforts into the

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[rehabilitation and reconstruction] tasks” in addition to what the government was carrying out. Similar messages were shared at each stop made by the Senior General over a three-day visit to the areas most affected by the cyclone.8 Will this “Do-Bamar” or “WeBurmans”9 mindset carry through recovery efforts without necessary funding? Work has begun on rebuilding infrastructure, but this needs to continue. Is Myanmar’s own blueprint for action adequate to give effect to the Senior General’s exhortations? This is where ASEAN can continue its coordinating role to assist those affected by the cyclone. In fact, ASEAN is already doing this in the form of catalysing community-based early recovery efforts in the delta. ASEAN Project on CommunityBased Early Recovery Recognizing that relief assistance and responses in the delta area are still inadequate to do justice to the areas most severely affected by the cyclone, the TCG has embarked on a Community-based Early Recovery Project to assist villages in the more remote and inner parts of the delta area rebuild their lives. The project was first proposed by what can be termed “ASEAN volunteers” — young people from Myanmar’s neighbouring country Thailand joining hands with young Myanmar citizens — who identified on their own initiative a focal village with surrounding smaller villages in Kungyangon Township (Yangon Division), where ASEAN’s focused

assistance could help set a model for helping the villagers recover from the impact of the disaster and get back their livelihood in tandem with other humanitarian needs identified during the PONJA exercise. The project — which was submitted to and approved by the TCG — was designed on the basis of the community’s wish for recovery and looks at helping the citizens of Seik Gyi village and its environs rebuild four key aspects of their community life. At the time of writing, the initiative started for Seik Gyi village has spread to other village communities in Kungyangon township in Yangon Division and in Bogale and Pyapon townships in Ayeyawaddy Division.10 ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan sees the story of Seik Gyi village as the saga of Myanmar’s cyclone survivors and their “determination to take on obstacles and challenges, to recover and live in dignity and security from this time onwards”. ASEAN’s assistance to Seik Gyi also sent a message of hope to all the people and communities in ASEAN extending compassion and assistance to the cyclone survivors. Young people around the region may be inspired by the spirit of volunteerism of their peers and lend their hands to future community rehabilitation projects across Myanmar’s delta region. An ASEAN volunteer corps may yet be born. The Road Ahead The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) in June 2008 signalled the start

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Welcome to Seik Gyi village. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Life in Seik Gyi village. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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A general store in Seik Gyi village. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

The village main road in Seik Gyi. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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TCG helped to get clean water for Seik Gyi village. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

The ASEAN project in Seik Gyi helped replant betel saplings. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Saying hello to grandma. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

New fishing boats with ASEAN’s help. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Amidst fishing nets — (from right to left) ASEAN Secretary-General Dr Surin, TCG Chair U Kyaw Thu, Mr Shuich Ono of Nippon Foundation, Thai Ambassador Barnsan Bunnag and UN Resident Coordinator Bishaw Parajuli. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Dr Surin (left) with the Seik Gyi Village Abbot and TCG Chair U Kyaw Thu (middle). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Admiring school bags (donated by UNICEF). Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Dr Surin arriving at Seik Gyi Primary. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Greeting the schoolchildren. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

Moe Thuzar (right) with Dr Anish Roy (second from left), the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral’s then representative in Myanmar, and 2 ASEAN volunteers. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Students of Seik Gyi Primary. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

of the long journey towards recovery. It helped determine the extent of damages and losses as well as recovery needs. In doing so it created a window of hope. It pushed ASEAN into the lead to coordinate responses. It demonstrated what worked best in the Nargis response and showed the way how future activities and partnerships should evolve. It led to a move towards rethinking aid relations

with Myanmar. The UN UndersecretaryGeneral for humanitarian assistance and emergency relief coordinator Sir John Holmes acknowledged that Nargis (and the response coordinated by ASEAN) showed a “new model of humanitarian partnership” that brought together the strengths and capabilities of both ASEAN and the UN in working with the Government of Myanmar.

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Box 4.1: Seik Gyi Village — A Model for Helping Myanmar’s Delta Recover Seik Gyi has a population of 1,318, with 325 families and 288 households. About onethird of the households were destroyed during the cyclone, as well as the main buildings in the village’s pagoda and monastery grounds — the main gathering area for villagers in times of sorrow or celebration. Seik Gyi’s economy relies mainly on its betel plantations (56 per cent) and fishing (26 per cent). By helping Seik Gyi villagers repair their community micro-infrastructure in accordance with their needs, ASEAN hopes to create a model that provides both information and inspiration for replication in other parts of the delta. Four Key Priorities 1. Betel plantation: This was one of the major market crops in Kungyangon Township before the cyclone struck. Through the project, 200 families in Seik Gyi village will be provided with approximately 200,000 betel saplings to help recover their income and livelihood. As of 6 September, 70 families had received some 70,000 saplings. While the betel saplings were being distributed, a local disease struck some betel gardens. The TCG facilitated the visit of officers from the Ministry of Agriculture to Seik Gyi and assist the villagers with sustainable solutions. 2. Fishing boats: Fishing is another common means of livelihood in the delta. The project is supporting the building of 32 boats for fishermen, together with fishing nets and other necessary equipment. The boats are built by the village craftsmen to suit local needs and the river current in the Seik Gyi area. 3. Drinking water: CARE Myanmar is managing the cleaning of wells contaminated by salt water in some 26 villages in the delta. Seik Gyi is one of these villages. ASEAN volunteers are working in partnership with CARE to help renovate the wells for sustainable long-term maintenance. The project will also support two new water reservoir tanks for drinking water. 4. Monastery as evacuation shelter: Nargis struck down the monastery, stupa halls, and the village stupa itself and damaged the monastery grounds extensively. As the monastery stands as the core of the villagers’ religious and social life, the renovation of the collapsed buildings and additional facilities in the monastery grounds will help strengthen the monastery’s position as a place of shelter in future times of need.

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Challenges — and concerns — remain as the post-Nargis journey continues at many levels. The first is continued financial support to sustain recovery efforts. Several offers of support made at the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference in May 2008 have yet to be realized. International agencies operating in Myanmar are concerned that pledges will be forgotten and the required funding not fully raised as the world’s attention turns to other topical events.11

Added to the shortage of funds is the exchange rate disparity in Myanmar, which resulted in a foreign exchange loss of about US$1.56 million over June to August 2008. Daniel Baker, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar, observed that this was a source of double concern, as the UN and the international humanitarian community do not get the full dollar value of their assistance and donors are “extremely worried and keen to see that this issue is resolved”. The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) — where

Bringing cheer to the children. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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Impromptu TCG discussion — (from left to right) TCG Chair U Kyaw Thu, Dr Heyzer and Dr Surin. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

ASEAN, UN and Government of Myanmar representatives get together to resolve issues — came up with a solution to reduce future losses. This might not have been possible in a situation where the TCG mechanism was non-existent. TCG now has to continue to build on trust established in the days of PONJA and evolve into a coordinating mechanism that can respond to the dynamics of relief and recovery work in the country. The solution reached on the exchange rate loss is a step in that direction. The Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development was invited to the TCG discussions to work out a solution. This resulted in the TCG Chair’s acknowledgement that future discussions on such matters could

involve the relevant ministries which had not been closely involved in the TCG’s work leading up to and during the PONJA exercise.12 Maintaining trust among stakeholders is another challenge. Trust is built with humility in accepting the inevitable and rising to the unenviable. ASEAN’s leadership was vital in building trust with the government and saving lives, notes Sir John Holmes.13 Confronted with the tragedy wrought by Nargis and the urgent need of the survivors for relief and emergency assistance, ASEAN could do no less. And with humility attendant to all its attempts to engage with, advise and assist the Myanmar Government in its response to Nargis, ASEAN devised a new way of 103

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working together for humanitarian assistance. Unceremonious though the baptism may have been, Nargis has been termed “ASEAN’s defining moment” for this reason. Expectations are high now for ASEAN to continue to perform and deliver results. Many more villages in similar or worse conditions than Seik Gyi and its surrounding villages in the Ayeyawaddy delta remain in need of recovery assistance. The journey is by no means over for survivors of Nargis, nor for the government, ASEAN or the UN and the international humanitarian assistance community. In implementing PONREPP, ASEAN can build on its experience of coordinating responses during PONJA. As coordinator, maintaining a flexibility and responsiveness to changing needs and priorities is important. Sir John Holmes has outlined four key lessons to learn from Nargis (see Box 4.2). Drawing from the lessons of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, staying the course and building capabilities in disaster preparedness and management are where the global humanitarian partnerships mentioned by Sir John can be most effective for recovery after Nargis. These are indeed daunting challenges. The scale and complexity of the task is compounded by the unique situation in Myanmar where confidence-building takes on a whole new meaning. Partnerships that worked during the PONJA phase will need to continue. Having come together for one

over-riding goal — to assist the Myanmar people in a crisis — recovery efforts should have a constant ear for the needs and aspirations of the Myanmar people. After all, it is their lives and communities that are being rebuilt. The people are key participants in the journey towards recovery. The PONJA exercise itself yielded several lessons for ASEAN in its newfound role in the humanitarian field. PONJA — by its very name — was about assessment. Relief and emergency assistance were incidental to the exercise although there were several instances when this was extended. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Social Welfare and Agriculture represented the Government of Myanmar in the TCG, and ensured coordination among relevant ministries. In fact, the TCG at times trod the fine line between exclusivity and efficiency. Following the assessment of recovery needs identified by the PONJA and the subsequent periodic reviews, ASEAN is serving as a common coordination point for different stakeholders. ASEAN’s mandate was extended to July 2010 by the 14th ASEAN Summit held in Hua Hin, Thailand in February 2009. The Chairman’s statement of the Summit “welcomed the success of the ASEANled mechanism” and pledged to continue supporting Myanmar in implementing PON-REPP. The ASEAN Secretary-General was entrusted “to serve as ASEAN’s humanitarian assistance coordinator” in the event of any future disaster affecting the region, including pandemics. This would still be

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Box 4.2: Lessons from Nargis First, no nation, rich or poor, can go it alone when confronted by a natural disaster of the magnitude of a Cyclone Nargis. It would have been much better, not least for the survivors, if the government of Myanmar had recognized the value of an international presence from the start. I encourage Myanmar’s leaders to continue down the path of cooperation, including in response to other humanitarian challenges, based on the universal principle of the impartial provision of aid. Second, we must stay focused on the goal: assisting people in crisis. From the first, the aid operation in Myanmar — as is true everywhere we work — had to be about helping vulnerable people in need, not about politics. In this post-Iraq age, I am concerned that humanitarians are often pressured to choose between the hammer of forced intervention and the anvil of perceived inaction. Was there a realistic alternative to the approach of persistent negotiation and dialogue that we pursued? I do not believe so. Nor have I met anyone engaged in the operations who believes that a different approach would have brought more aid to more people more quickly. This is not to say that there can never be a role for humanitarian intervention, even in natural disasters. But it must be the last resort, when all else has been tried and the only alternative is death and suffering on a mass scale. Third, Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government. This may prove the most important — and, I hope, enduring — lesson of the cyclone response, with implications for how we respond, anywhere, in the future. ASEAN’s leadership was vital in building trust with the government and saving lives. In recent years, ASEAN members have significantly stepped up participation in the humanitarian arena. Given that eight of the ten worst natural disasters last year occurred in Asia, this represents a lifesaving investment, where the United Nations is helping to build local capacity. Fourth, Nargis demonstrated once again the importance of disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Simple, low-cost measures — local evacuation plans, shelters, community early-warning systems — have saved tens of thousands of lives in neighbouring Bangladesh when it has been faced with similarly devastating cyclones. We need to help the people of Myanmar strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability. Building back better, to minimize future disaster risks, is a top priority. Excerpt from “Disaster Lessons” by Sir John Holmes, 6 August 2008.

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“at the request of the affected ASEAN Member State”.14 ASEAN will also have to maintain the collaborative spirit in balancing different interests. Many will look to ASEAN to mobilize funds for yet unmet relief and recovery needs. ASEAN members need to agree on a template for humanitarian relief and reconstruction to respond to such future disasters. Ultimately, ASEAN must also work towards building capacities for change. In many ways, Nargis was a “perfect storm”. It provided a dramatic stage for ASEAN’s coordinating role. The magnitude of the destruction caused by Nargis provided a backdrop for the circumstances characterized by Myanmar’s actions to be played out on

regional and international stages. It led to the unprecedented PONJA and TCG mechanisms. No crisis born of a natural disaster in history has had such mechanisms established. With these mechanisms, new partnerships and practices have come about after Cyclone Nargis. They are not perfect, but they do point to the possibility of a better future — for disaster management in the region, for humanitarian cooperation, for the maturing of ASEAN, and a new hope for the people of Myanmar. ASEAN’s emerging role in natural disaster preparedness, management and mitigation was catalysed by Nargis which hastened the setting up of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre (after four years of the idea being

Telling the schoolchildren about ASEAN and UN. Photo courtesy of ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force Office, Yangon.

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mooted).15 Through its cooperation mechanisms, ASEAN also helped Myanmar open up channels for impartial aid and assistance to reach the people. ASEAN can also help Myanmar and other member states to be better prepared for future natural disasters and to build better capacities at the national level for disaster risk reduction and community preparedness. Before Nargis Myanmar lacked early warning systems. Cyclone shelters were practically nonexistent in the delta. Ongoing recovery work shows a rebuilding of central village structures as future shelters from disasters. Existing ASEAN mechanisms should use Nargis as a case study in devising actions to minimise future risks for those most vulnerable. If ASEAN can build on the political will generated by collaborative partnerships in responding to Nargis, leave old grievances behind, and join forces for recovery and reconstruction, its legacy will surely live on as the catalyst for opening up and creating a brighter, more sustainable future for the people of Myanmar. Change — albeit small and incremental — did take place in Myanmar after Nargis. ASEAN’s biggest challenge now is to continue keeping the space for collaboration open. ASEAN’s work has just begun. Notes 1. Eyewitness account. 2. ABC Interview with Bishow Parajuli, ABC Online Correspondents Report “Cyclone Nargis One Year On” at

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

. 19th Press Release of the Tripartite Core Group, “One Year After Nargis: The Tripartite Core Group continues to support the affected people”, . Merlin is a British medical charity that provides medical and health assistance to people in need. It was one of the first NGOs to respond to Cyclone Nargis, as it had staff already on the ground in Labutta, one of the most affected areas. Article on funding shortfall for health at . The details of the Periodic Review were obtained from a conversation with Dr Yohannah Wegerdt who was closely involved in the PONJA exercise and conceptualized the Periodic Review. The concept and mechanisms described are Dr Yohannah’s work. Post-Nargis Periodic Review. IRIN humanitarian news and analysis, UN-OCHA, article on “Myanmar: Cyclone Recovery will take up to four years”, at . New Light of Myanmar (English) editions of 29–31 December 2008. Do Bamar Asi-Ayon or We Burmans Association was formed in the 1930s (formally organized in 1933) by a group of nationalist youth. Members of the association adopted the title “Thakin” (a Burmese meaning “master”, which became a title for Europeans by their subordinates during the colonial period) — to demonstrate they were the masters of Burma. Robert Taylor in his “State of

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Myanmar” (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009) notes that the man who was the inspiration behind the Do Bamar AsiAyon and who gave it its name was also the author of several tracts urging Burmese to have greater self respect and to avoid involvement with foreigners and the purchase of foreign made goods. While they used the language of Marxism, the association’s broad policy goals were focused on independence, self-determination and anti-imperialism. Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council echoed much of the Do Bamar Asi-Ayon’s prewar manifesto. 10. Fact sheet on “ASEAN’s Post-Nargis Humanitarian Assistance” at . 11. BBC News, Asia-Pacific, article on “Burmese Still Struggling After Cyclone” at . 12. 5th Press Release of the Tripartite Core

Group — Myanmar and the UN Find Solutions to Foreign Exchange Loss of Cyclone Nargis Humanitarian Aid, at . 13. Article by Sir John Holmes, UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Coordinator, article dated 6 August 2008, “Disaster Lessons”. 14. “ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples”, Chairman’s Statement of the 14 th ASEAN Summit, Cha-am, Thailand, 28 February–1 March 2009 (para. 11–12). 15. Following the road map of AHA Centre, the Interim AHA Centre was operationalized starting 20 October 2007 at BNPB Crisis Centre at 4th Floor of National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), Jalan Djuanda No. 36, Jakarta, Indonesia. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the ASEAN Secretariat performed the role of the Interim AHA Centre, providing daily situation reports on the disaster and coordinating the ASEAN-ERAT’s mobilization.

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