My God, My God Why Have You Abandoned Me: The Experience of God's Withdrawal in Late Antique Exegesis, Christology and Ascetic Literature 9782503593609, 2503593607

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STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE ExpLORATIONS IN EARLy AND MEDIEvAL THEOLOGy Theology continually engages with its past: the people, experience, Scriptures, liturgy, learning and customs of Christians. The past is preserved, rejected, modified; but the legacy steadily evolves as Christians are never indifferent to history. Even when engaging the future, theology looks backwards: the next generation’s training includes inheriting a canon of Scripture, doctrine, and controversy; while adapting the past is central in every confrontation with a modernity. This is the dynamic realm of tradition, and this series’ focus. Whether examining people, texts, or periods, its volumes are concerned with how the past evolved in the past, and the interplay of theology, culture, and tradition.

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STUDIA TRADITIONIS THEOLOGIAE ExpLORATIONS IN EARLy AND MEDIEvAL THEOLOGy

43 Series Editor: Thomas O’Loughlin, Professor of Historical Theology in the University of Nottingham EDITORIAL BOARD Director Prof. Thomas O’Loughlin Board Members Dr Andreas Andreopoulos, Dr Nicholas Baker-Brian, Dr Augustine Casiday, Dr Mary B. Cunningham, Dr Juliette Day, Prof. Johannes Hoff, Prof. Paul Middleton, Prof. Simon Oliver, Prof. Andrew Prescott, Dr Patricia Rumsey, Prof. Jonathan Wooding, Dr Holger Zellentin

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‘My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?’ The Experience of God’s Withdrawal in Late Antique Exegesis, Christology and Ascetic Literature

Evaggelos Bartzis

F

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Cover illustration: Tabula Peutingeriana © ÖNB Vienna Cod. 324, Segm. VIII + IX © 2021, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2021/0095/74 ISBN 978-2-503-59360-9 eISBN 978-2-503-59361-6 DOI 10.1484/M.STT-EB.5.122672 ISSN 2294–3617 eISSN 2566–0160 Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

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Dedicated to the memory of my mother Athena (1950–2002) Αἰωνία ἡ μνήμη

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Θα πενθώ πάντα – μ´ ακους – για σένα, Μόνος, στον Παράδεισο. Για σένα μόνο δέχτηκε ο Θεός να μου οδηγεί το χέρι Πιο δω, πιο κει, προσεχτικά σ’όλο το γύρο Του γιαλού του προσώπου, τους κόλπους, τα μαλλιά Στο λόφο κυμματίζοντας αριστερά Το σώμα σου στη στάση του πεύκου του μοναχικού Μάτια της υπερηφάνιας και του διάφανου Βυθού, μέσα στο σπίτι με το σκρίνιο το παλιό Τις κίτρινες ντατέλες και το κυπαρισσόξυλο Μόνος να περιμένω που θα πρωτοφανείς. (Odysseas Elytes, The Monogram)

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

11

Abbreviations i) Primary Sources ii) Modern Works

13 13 14

Introduction Setting the Objective Why Does Abandonment Matter? Literature Review Clarifications on Methodology

17 17 19 20 24

The Abandonment of the Bride The Biblical Background: Divine Abandonment in Religious Literature and the Song of Songs Christian Exegesis and the Song of Songs in Late Antiquity Origen: Perfection and Trials Gregory of Nyssa: Abandoning All Concepts Theodoret of Cyrrhus: Combining Exegesis and Asceticism Nilus of Ancyra: An Evagrian Ascetic Milieu

29

Jesus Abandoned on the Cross The Loud Cry in Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) The Primary Sources and their Context The Abandonment of Jesus in Late Antiquity Origen: Patristic Foundations Athanasius of Alexandria: Against the Arians Gregory Nazianzen: An Allegorist? Gregory of Nyssa: Realism or Typology? Basil of Cæsarea: The Ascetic Didymus the Blind: A Technical Vocabulary Epiphanius of Salamis: The Abandonment of the Body Cyril of Alexandria: Against Nestorius Theodoret of Cyrrhus: A Unique Synthesis John Damascene: Revisiting the Tradition

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37 42 51 61 70 75 77 83 83 87 93 96 100 101 105 107 112 115

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The Abandonment of the Ascetics Origenist Ascetic Themes Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony Divine Abandonment in Ascetic Sources after Antony Causes and Kinds of Divine Abandonment Perfection and Sin

125

Conclusion

189

Bibliography Primary Sources Secondary Bibliography

195 195 198

Index Index of Ancient Authors Index of Modern Authors General Index

213 213 214 215

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136 148 148 170

Acknowledgements

This book has been many years in preparation and its greatest part is based on my doctoral research that I completed at the University of Durham, UK. Several years have passed since I submitted my thesis, but I have applied some changes, mostly in terms of style, to reflect the way that I see the subject of the book right now. I am still much indebted to the Institute of National Grants (I.K.Y), Athens, whose generous funding provided me with the financial means to undertake my research, and also to Professor Emeritus Dionysius Dakouras who had been appointed my academic adviser in Greece. Despite the distance between the completion of my doctoral studies and the publication of this book, I still feel the need to thank several individuals, because without them my research would not have been possible in the first place, and some others who have helped me maintain much of my original enthusiasm for the subject. I am sure that I will never find adequate words to express my gratitude, admiration and appreciation to Professor Emeritus Andrew Louth, who privileged me with his inspirational supervision and remains even to-day a ‘spiritual father’ to me. In my research I have profited from discussions with the following academics whom I would like to thank, since their comments and insights shaped my research in many ways: Prof. Mary Cunningham and Prof. Martin Laird, Prof. Carol Harrison, Dr Augustine Casiday, Dr Demetrios Bathrellos, Dr Mika Törönen, Dr Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev, Prof. Ruth Gregory and Prof. Nikolaos Loudovikos. I would like to thank Dr David Wagschal and Dr Jonathan Zecher for their support and friendship: they must have thought that God had abandoned them several times, when they had to put up with endless late night discussions about God’s turning away his face, Origen and Evagrius. Dr Dionysios Skliris must be unaware that a small comment he made during a coffee break at a conference in Oxford opened up an unexpected perspective for my work. The family of Dr Michael Watts and Mrs Lourdes Watts, and also Dr Constantinos Boyopoulos will always hold a special place in my heart for lifting up my spirits when I mostly needed it. In the past few years, several individuals have provided the necessary encouragement for me to keep going. Dr Lambros Psomas has become a real co-traveller with me as the road seems to “go ever on and on”, and I would like to express my appreciation for his support and his friendship. My colleagues Konstantinos Bartzis and Dimitrios Papageorgiou, and also the Rev. David Broad have my gratitude for helping me lately to see that the glass is actually half-full. The many sacrifices that my father Michael Bartzis has had to endure so that I could reach my dreams might never find adequate rewards, but I hope that this book might be a small token of my love to him. I am not sure yet whether Dr Andreas Andreopoulos is my academic Gandalf or angel

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of providence, but he appears when he is mostly needed and he managed to infuse new life to this book with his positive attitude, discretion and also valuable insights. I am indebted to him. Finally, my wife Mais Al-Hannat and my son Michael-Liam have always made sure that the ‘winter’ of dejection passes, along with those days without inspiration, and that the ‘season of singing has come’. I am humbled by their support and love. This book would have been impossible without their presence in my life.

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Abbreviations

i) Primary Sources Apophth. (AC) Apophth. (AnC) Apophth (SysC) Antony, Letts. Apollinarius. FrPs. Athanasius, Arian. Ps. Trin. Vita Cyril, ComLk ComJn Nest Chr. Thes. Damascene. ExpF Nest. Volunt. Diadochus, Keph Didymus, Eccl. Trin. FrPs. Epiphanius, Pan. Evagrius, AdMon. De Octo Eccl. Gnost. KephGn. Orat. Prakt. Prov. Gregory, Apol. Beat. Hom. Moses Macarius. Hom.

Apophthegmata Patrum: The Alphabetical Collection —, The Anonymous Collection —, The Systematic Collection Letters 1–6 Fragmenta in Psalmos Athanasius of Alexandria, Orationes tres contra Arianos Expositiones in Psalmos De Sancte Trinitate Vita Antonii Commentarii in Lucam (in catenis) —, Commentarii in Johannem Libri V contra Nestorium Quod unus sit Christus Thesaurus de Sancta Consubstanstantiali Trinitate Expositio Fidei Contra Nestorianos De duabus in Christo Voluntatibus Gnostic Century Commentarii in Ecclesiasten De Trinitate Fragmenta in Psalmos Panarion Ad Monachos De Octo Spiritibus Malitiae Scolia in Ecclesiasten Gnostikos Kephalaia Gnostica De Oratione Praktikos Scholia in Proverbia Salomonis Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium De Beatitudinibus Homiliae xv in Canticum Canticorum De Vita Mosis Homiliæ Spirituales 50 [in PTS]

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a bb r ev i at io ns

Serm. Typs. Maximus, Charit. Lib. Opusc. QnD. Thal. Nazianzene, Fil. Nilus, Com Nemesius, Natur. Origen, Com. Hom. Martyr. 27Nm. Princ. Palladius, Laus. Theodoret, EpP. Expl. Psalm.

Homiliæ Spirituales [in TLG] Homiliæ Spirituales [in TU] Capita de Caritatæ 1–4 Liber Asceticus Opuscula Quæstiones et Dubia Quæstiones ad Thalassium De Filio (Orat. 30) Commentary on the Song of Songs De Natura Hominis Commentarii in Canticum Canticorum Homiliæ in Canticum Canticorum Exhortatio ad Martyrium Homily xvii on Numbers De Principiis Historia Lausiaca Interpretatio in xiv Epistulas Sancti Pauli Explanatio in Canticum Canticorum Interpretatio in Psalmos

ii) Modern Works ACO ACO2 ACW CPG CCSG CS CSCO CthBQ CUP DOP EsChQ EsChR DSp FOTC

Edward Schwartz (ed.), Acta Conciliorum Œcumenicorum, vol. 1–4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1914–1974) Rudolf Riedinger (ed.), Acta Conciliorum Œcumenicorum, Series Secunda, vol. 1–2 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1984–1995) Johannes Quasten et al. (eds), Ancient Christian Writers: The Work of the Fathers in Translation (New York NY, Mahwah NJ: Newman and Paulist, 1946–) M. Geerard (ed.), Clavis Patrum Graecorum, vol. 1–5, CCSG (Turnhout: Brepols, 1974–2018) Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca (Leuven: 1977–) Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo MI: Cistercian) Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium (Louvain: Peeters, 1903–) Catholic Biblical Quarterly Cambridge University Press Dumbarton Oaks Papers Eastern Churches Quarterly Eastern Churches Review M. Viller (ed.), Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique: Doctrine et histoire (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932–1995) Thomas P. Halton et al (eds), The Fathers of the Church (Washington D.C: Catholic University of America, 1947–)

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abb re v i ati o ns

GCS GNO HThR JR JThS LCL OThM OUP PG PTA PTS RSR RSPhTh SC SH SP SVS TLG TU VgCh

Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1897–) W. Jaeger et al. (eds), Gregorii Nysseni Opera (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952–) Harvard Theological Review Journal of Religion Journal of Theological Studies Loeb Classical Library (London: W. Heineman; Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1911–) Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Oxford University Press J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Graeca, vol. 1–161 (Paris: 1857–1866) Patrologische Texte und Abhandlungen (Bonn: Rudolph Habelt Verlag) Patristische Texte und Studien (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964–) Recherche des sciences religieuse Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques J. Danielou and H. de Lubac (eds), Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1941–) Scripta Hierosolymitana Studia Patristica (Leuven: Peeters) [some titles under TU] St Vladimir’s Seminary Press Thesaurus Linguæ Græcæ Workplace, Silver Mountain Software, vers. 8, 2000. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1882–) Vigiliae Christianae: Revue of Early Christian Life and Language (Leiden: Brill, 1947–)

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Introduction

I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him not Song 3:1 My God, my God why have you abandoned me? Mk. 15:34 Where were you? Why did you not appear at the beginning? Athanasius, Vita Antonii, 10

Setting the Objective The content and objective of this book could be summarized in the three quotations in the subtitle of this chapter: the first quotation is from the Song of Songs, when the bride is abandoned by her beloved and she expresses her distress. The second quotation is Jesus’ loud cry on the cross; an incident that has baffled theologians since late antiquity. And the last question belongs to an Egyptian monk, Antony the Great, who is amongst the earliest and most prominent ascetics in late antiquity. All three quotations express the feeling that, at some level that remains to be clarified, the person speaking feels abandoned; the bride by the groom and Antony by the Christian God. It is not easy to say who has abandoned Jesus as it will discussed in the second part of this book. Given the fact that all three quotes signify abandonment, the quotes have been chosen in order to represent a different part of Christian theology: biblical exegesis, Christology and ascetic discourse. The first term refers to the way late antique authors read and interpreted Scripture, the second to the theological formulas that were developed in late antiquity about the identity of Jesus, and the third to works that were composed (or compiled) by men and women who renounced mundane affairs, dedicated themselves to a life of prayer and usually inhabited a desert. Hence, the objective of the book becomes clearer. It is an examination of the way that biblical exegesis, doctrinal works about the identity of Jesus (Christology) and early ascetics understood the notion of divine abandonment. How did late antique exegetes explain the fact that the biblical bride is suddenly left alone by her beloved; that in his dying moments Jesus cries out seemingly in dereliction and that in the desert of Egypt Antony feels that God has abandoned him? However, rather than assuming the existence of clear-cut lines in biblical exegesis, Christology, and ascetic discourse in late antiquity, through the examination of the aforementioned

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points, it is my intention to put into question the presence or absence of such compartmentalization and thus argue the degree of interconnectedness between the three fields of Christian thought, given the fact that, as biblical scholars remind us, the Christian biblical canon had not acquired a definite form in late antiquity.1 The primary objective might be to examine how late antique authors dealt with a mystery that – I borrow from St Ignatius – is shrouded by “[God’s] silence”,2 but this objective is only served to the degree that it also establishes the extent of interconnectedness across theological fields. Therefore, every part of the book sets several questions, but at another level it examines the degree of this interconnectedness. As a result, there are three points that summarise the gist of this book: – The extent to which parallel lines were drawn in late antique theology between the experience of the biblical bride, the loud cry of Jesus on the cross and the early ascetics. – The normativeness of divine abandonment in early Christian thought and its association to sinfulness. – The possibility that late antique theology had introduced a Jesus-like ‘kind’ of abandonment. As it concerns the first point, my intention is to examine whether Christian exegetes interpreted the abandonment of the bride from her beloved in the Song by employing the image of Jesus crying out in Mk 15:34 or the technical language that Christian ascetics developed after the fourth century ce. It goes without saying, then, that this book also explores the alternative possibilities: did theologians of Christology in late antiquity resort to the biblical witness or ascetic ideals to illuminate the loud cry of Jesus on the cross? Did the ascetics invoke Scripture to elucidate their experience of a sudden withdrawal by God? It should have become apparent by now that this point pertains to the way that late antique exegetes, theologians and ascetics read Scripture and appropriated its content. Yet, according to Kaplan, when dealing with biblical texts one ought to distinguish between allusions and echoes: the former are citations interpreting and elucidating a verse within a given context, whereas echoes have no visible connection between a verse and its immediate context.3 This book is looking for allusions and echoes of abandonment in the image of the bride, the dying Jesus and the ascetics. The second point addresses the normativeness of the experience. This is not a matter of how frequently the motif of divine abandonment occurs in written sources, but whether such an experience could be anticipated as occurring normally within

1 For the purposes of this book, I have taken into account Ehrman’s observation that behind adaptations of Scriptural texts in the transmission of manuscripts, and, in fact, behind the notion per se of a canon of sacred texts, hides the struggle between groups of Christians that held conflicting views concerning the identity of Jesus and his Church. Ehrman (2011). For the compilation of the Canon see McDonald (2002). 2 Ignatius, Letter to the Ephesians, 19. St Ignatius refers to Mary’s child-bearing, her virgin birth and the death of Jesus. 3 Kaplan (2010).

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a process. It needs to be noted, in advance, that it is the presence of sinfulness that complicates things, since in all three cases that I have presented (the bride, Jesus and Antony) divine abandonment occurs at a stage of perfection. Such an observation is contrasted with the sense that sin is the only ethical/existential factor that leads to God’s turning away his face. Therefore, the role that sinfulness plays in a state of perfection should be discussed in order to shed light to the normativeness of divine abandonment as it is legitimate to ask: does ethical perfection safeguard man from divine abandonment? The last question arose while I was researching my material and I came across an examination of Maximus the Confessor by Sakharov. In his concise, yet invaluable contribution, Sakharov has perused late antique sources to find the degree of normativeness that the experience of divine abandonment had enjoyed, and notes that, [i]n Maximus, we find a fairly schematised classification of the various categories of abandonment, which recapitulates the preceding patristic ideas: there is abandonment as a test, as a purification, as the edificatory punishment, and Christ-like abandonment.4 The last ‘kind’ of divine abandonment caught my eye as it has a dubious meaning and it either signifies the feeling of divine abandonment as it was experienced only by Jesus on the cross, or it suggests the existence of a ‘Jesus-like’ kind of abandonment on which the experience of Christian ascetics could have been modelled. Given the fact that a Jesus-like kind of abandonment, perceived in terms of the second possibility, lies at the heart of experiences that have been related by several theologians after the Middle Ages, it felt legitimate to ask whether late antique theology had actually introduced such a ‘Jesus-like’ kind of abandonment that would have shed light on the experience of divine abandonment by early desert ascetics.

Why Does Abandonment Matter? It has been pointed that modern theology has turned its attention to the loud cry of Jesus as a result both of the horrors that the world experienced during WWII and an excessive reading of theology that has been called kenotic.5 As White has observed “[m]odern theology has focused upon the last words of Christ in Mk 15:34 – ‘My God, My God, why have you abandoned me?’–as a key locus of Christological dispute and interpretation”.6 The objective of modern theology is to ascertain the loud cry as an authentic disruption between Jesus and the Father, even if it seemingly diminishes the divine nature of Jesus, and provide an explanation to human suffering. This trend has been witnessed in unexpected places with no apparent connection to the historical

4 Sakharov (2002), 254. 5 Clarke (2002). For a thorough presentation of the main points, strengths and weaknesses of kenotic theology see Evans (2006). 6 White (2007), 555.

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development of the Christian doctrine, such as Caputo’s intellectual interlocution with the post-structuralism of Derrida: “it is because God is but a weak force that Auschwitz was possible, all the Auschwitzes, all the ethnic cleansings that have stained human history… that does not intervene upon the heartbreak of a perfectly innocent child… that Christ was nailed to the cross for he was not a king in any archical sense. My God, my God why have you forgotten me?”;7 or Žižek’s unorthodox philosophical explorations of the religious event, where the loud cry signifies that God has manifested his irrelevance.8 Jesus’ loud cry appears as unexpectedly in Perelandra, where C. S. Lewis echoes this modern exigency to find meaning in world history by turning one’s gaze to Jesus’ abandonment on the cross: “[t]hey all think He’s going to help them – till they come to their senses screaming recantations too late in concentration camps, writhing under jaws, jabbering in mad-houses, or nail on the crosses. Could he help Himself… ‘Eloi, eloi, lama sabachtani’”.9 The hellish history of the twentieth century has urged theologians to explore in depth the notion of Jesus’ emptying-out (kenosis) as he makes his progressive descent from heaven to hell.10

Literature Review As it concerns previous scholarship much has been available with regard to the Song of Songs, even though the majority of works is limited to the history behind the inclusion of the book in the Jewish and Christian biblical canons and also its appropriation from Christian exegetes. On the other hand, the theme of God’s presence and absence (including the notion of abandonment) in the Old Testament and the religions of the Near East has been thoroughly researched vis-à-vis the book of Psalms and Ezekiel. I have made use of such material in order to establish the regularity of the theme in the Song of Songs. Yet, it needs to be noted that even in Balentine, The Hidden God which is an exhaustive survey of the motifs of presence and hiddenness in the Old Testament, no reference has been made to the theme of abandonment in the Song of Songs. Balentine offers an in-depth analysis of grammar and semantics that pertain to “hiddenness” and assesses inter-biblical as well as extra-biblical witness. Even so, the sole quotation from the Song of Songs occurs in a context other than divine hiddenness. This might be due to Balentine’s preoccupation with matters of worship or “the cultic of language prayer”, as he dubs it.11 Another type of scholarly research

7 Caputo (2006), 94. 8 Caputo (2006), 43. Žižek (2003), 123 and (2009), 57. 9 Lewis (2013), 280 and 670–71, where the main character has been forced to perform a sacrilegious act by stepping on the icon of the Crucifix which only reinforces the feeling of defencelessness of both Jesus and Lewis’ protagonist. It has also been claimed (cf. Williams (2012), 57–58) that the interchange between God’s immanence and transcendence appears in the Chronicles of Narnia but without a direct reference to the image of the suffering Jesus this time. 10 Kenosis as a progressive movement of the Logos from Heaven to Hell has been masterly presented by Balthasar (1990), 89–147. For a more poetic approach see Balthasar (1979). 11 Balentine (1983), vi.

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that lies closer to the scope of this book deals with the notion of divine immanence – proximity – and transcendence – aloofness – in writers that have commented on the Song of Songs, such as Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. As it will be shown, the classic theme of divine transcendence might play an important role in late antique exegesis as part of an epistemological discussion concerning the possibility to grasp God by man’s higher mental functions, but my intention is more ethically oriented, due to the question concerning sin and the image of the dying Jesus as an ethical model. Finally, Christology and the Song of Songs in the Early Church 381–451 by Elliott implements a similar methodology as he peruses an extensive list of Christian exegetical works on the Song of Songs with the explicit intention, though, to establish the relation between Christian exegesis on the Song of Songs and Christology.12 An important textual issue arises in the gospel accounts of Jesus’ passion is that his cry in Mk 15:34 appears to be Ps 22:2: “My God my God why have you abandoned me?” with the obscure additional detail that bystanders mistook the meaning of his utterance. At this point I have intentionally referred to the loud cry but not a cry in abandonment, because it remains to be seen whether Mark intended his readers to conceive Jesus as abandoned by God. The academic works that have dealt with the textual issues in Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) and its relation to Ps 22, fall into three categories: textual, historical and systematic works.13 Rossé, The Cry of Jesus on the Cross and Clarke’s A Cry in the Darkness are two excellent examples of how the three categories do not stand apart but could be combined so that an examination of the text in Mk 15:34 (textual approach) could generate theological thought (systematic approach) in different directions.14 However, the scope of the two books is different; Rossé puts more weight on the textual and historical processes, whereas Clarke to the development of a system of theological thought. Thus, they might share the same point of departure, i.e. a textual examination of Mk 15:34 vis-à-vis Ps 22, but Rossé presents a historical overview of theological exegesis and deliberation from late antiquity to modern times, whilst Clarke does not refer to early theologians but to the theological deliberations of Moltmann, Sölle, Jüngel and von Balthasar. Though this point will be revisited later, here it suffices to mention that Clarke’s presentation of late antique theology is brief without the necessary distinction between biblical exegesis, Christology and ascetic works. Another concise summary of late antique theology that deals with his sources as a homogeneous matter without distinguishing between the various theological genres (exegesis, Christology, asceticism) appears only in passing in Carey, Jesus’ Cry from the Cross, which is otherwise a thorough presentation of textual criticism: Carey peruses intra-textual as well as sociocultural witnesses in order to establish the place and function of the loud cry of Jesus in the greater narrative in the Markan (as well as Matthew’s) gospel.15 12 Elliott (2000). 13 Though the account of Jesus’ loud cry in forsakenness occurs in Mk 15:34 as well as Mt 27:46, I have chosen to cite Mk 15:34 as it is considered the oldest version. It should be noted, though, that the incident plays a different role in the evangelists. 14 Rossé (1987). Clarke (2002). 15 Carey (2009).

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In terms of the textual approach, a significant part of scholarship has been dedicated to an analysis of the textual issues that arise in Mk 15:34 (Ps 22:2), including the alleged misunderstanding by the bystanders, and the textual relation between Mk 15:34 and the three other gospels. Carey reminds his reader that the intra-textual elements were meant to convey a meaning to Mark’s early readership and much scholarly work has been dedicated to the analysis of this meaning, but attempts to view Matthew, Luke and, to a lesser extent John, as part of Mark’s early readership.16 Thus, Carey believes that Mark included Ps 22:2 as part of his passion and resurrection narrative because he had intended his readers to identify Jesus as a Righteous Sufferer, i.e. a faithful person who suffers but remains just and faithful in God; or, as Rossé indicates, a person who suffers because he is just (martyrdom genre). On the other hand, Menn has indicated a historical shift from reading Ps 22 as part of (community) rites to a psalm that refers to the history of a specific individual, i.e. Jesus.17 However, such issues lie beyond the scope of this book and only inform part of my discussion to the degree that they occupy, if they do, the thought of late antiquity exegetes, theologians and ascetics. It should be noted, however, that modern scholarship has identified two possible ways that early readers, including late antique exegetes and theologians, would have read Mk 15:34: either they would read the loud cry with the entirety of Ps 22 in mind (contextual reading) or they would understand Ps 22:2 as it stands, i.e. a desperate utterance in abandonment (atomistic reading). Scholars have thrown their weight behind both modes of reading, even though, as Carey suggests, the two approaches should not be contrasted. The historical approach has looked at early Christian exegesis vis-à-vis its Jewish counterpart; and also traces the various trends that developed while Christian exegesis was growing in depth and width. As it concerns Jewish exegesis, Brown Tkacz and Berkovitz, for instance, have raised the matter of the extent that the appropriation of Ps 22 by Christians affected or was affected by contemporary Jewish exegesis.18 They point to the rise of an exegetical trend in Judaism that progressively read Ps 22 with reference to Esther, the biblical heroine, as part of a “counter-narrative” to the Christian passion narratives that also feature Ps 22. Alongside, there appeared a messianic reading of Ps 22 that perhaps was meant to counter the Christian appropriation of the Ps 22. As it concerns Christian exegesis, Koltun-Fromm has located the earliest appropriations of Ps 22 by Christians in Justin, Tertullian and Aphrahat, even though it is surprising that Ps 22:2 plays no role in their exegesis.19 Koltun-Fromm’s approach belongs to the textual approach as she reads those textual allusions that enabled Christian exegetes to defend the Christological content of the Psalm against the Jewish claims concerning David, Esther or the Messiah. 16 For instance, Clarke argues (cf. Gundry (1993), 1024) that abandonment is an important motif from the outset but at the same time notes Gundry’s observation concerning the presence of a “glory theology” that informs the Markan narrative. Clarke (2002) 24. 17 Menn (2000), 301–41. 18 Tkacz (2008), 709–28. Berkovitz (2019), 222–39. 19 Koltun-Fromm (1998), 37–58.

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Concerning the historical approach, it addresses the historical development of a Christian interpretation of Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46). Jouassard, L’Abandon du Christ par son Père durant sa passion d’ après la tradition patristique et les docteurs du XIIIe siècle is a seminal work that is cited by scholars as the single authority on the subject. However, any assessment of Jouassard’s research hits upon the fact that it is an unpublished thesis, not available via interlibrary tools, and any assessment of his research depends entirely on his articles. The french scholar examined the Greek-speaking theologians in late antiquity and how they engaged with the loud cry of Jesus on the cross and distinguished two threads of thought: a symbolic one in which Jesus speaks on behalf of humanity, and a realistic one where Jesus speaks in abandonment but only according to his humanity.20 The scope of my enquiry is wider than Jouassard’s since it encompasses a variety of theological attitudes that were expressed through different media (i.e. biblical commentaries, polemical discourses, sermons and works of spirituality) and also seeks to establish the relation between the various approaches. As a result, Jouassard’s conclusions have informed part of my discussion but only as far as exegesis on the gospel narratives goes. When it comes to the historical development of ascetic discourses, attention has been drawn to the theme of divine abandonment only in the case of Evagrius of Pontus thanks to Driscoll, ‘Evagrius and Paphnutius on the Causes for Abandonment by God’ and subsequently to Dysinger, Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus.21 Both works depend on previous scholarship on Evagrius, where a handful of scholars had discussed divine abandonment in Evagrius but only as part of an overall examination of the preservation and transmission of the Syriac texts of Evagrius. Thus, Driscoll provides an in-depth analysis of divine abandonment in the Evagrian system of asceticism and the broader genre of desert literature, whereas Dysinger focuses more on the witness in Evagrius’ works. Finally, Sakharov has perused the ascetic witness in late antiquity with no reference to either exegesis or the development of Christology.22 Finally, systematic works of our times turn the tables as they attempt to find meaning to the desperate cries of humanity by taking for granted – to a greater or lesser extent – the reality of Jesus’ abandonment on the cross and the implied ontological connection between Jesus’ loud cry during his passion and that of those suffering and being afflicted; two points that late antique theology developed neither explicitly nor unanimously. The task of contemporary systematic theology is to argue the precise way that world history could still find signification in Jesus’ abandonment on the cross after unthinkable atrocities inflicted by humans on other humans. The sources perused in this book asked different questions: how could Jesus have cried out in seeming dereliction given the fact that he is God? Why did ascetics feel that God withdrew his protection from them? As Clarke has written,

20 As it concerns the Latin-speaking world, Jouassard published an article exclusively on Augustine in Jouassard (1924), 310–26. 21 Driscoll (1997), 262–70. Dysinger (2005). 22 Sakharov (2002), 187–97.

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for modern theology “[it] is no longer justifiable simply to accept our present sufferings – an attitude which locates God too much in the future; we need also to talk about God and suffering together in the here and now. Therefore, many modern theologians have insisted that God must suffer with us”.23 I have already referred to certain examples of this modern approach, such as in Caputo’s employment of the loud cry of Jesus in abandonment to argue his notion of “weak theology”. Here, rather than enumerating these individuals that have placed the cry in abandonment on the cross at the heart of their theological reflections, I will only mention again and recommend the academic works by Clarke and Rossé, where one could trace the various threads that have developed in the systematic investigation of the abandonment of Jesus on the cross.24

Clarifications on Methodology This book engages directly with late antique sources that fall in three main categories: exegetical works – comprising commentaries, scholia or sermons, polemical treatises that were written to fend off heretical ideas and ascetic discourses, also known as desert literature. Extensive commentaries and scholia were among the first Christian works to be produced and those on Genesis, Exodus, the book of Psalms, the Gospels and Paul’s letters comprised the majority of exegetical production, whereas other books, such as the Song of Songs, drew scarce attention. This disparity could be explained on liturgical and catechetical grounds, since some books of the biblical canon were used extensively in Church prayers and the process of instructing those in preparation for the Christian baptism (catechesis), whereas some other books were only read in private, if read at all. The Song of Songs belongs to this latter category since there is no indication that it was ever in liturgical use, whereas the book of Psalms of which Ps 22 is part, was in frequent liturgical use and even provided the material that ascetics used in their daily prayers. Besides, together with the Gospel reading of Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) they have been part of the Easter liturgical celebration.25 Polemical works were produced during the great Christological controversies that broke out between the fourth and seventh century ce, when Christian theology took on the task to draw the line between right faith and heresy. Therefore, a question arises concerning the degree to which exegetical works that were produced during the Christological

23 Clarke (2002), 5. 24 See Clarke (2002). Rossé (1987). As it concerns the Eastern Orthodox tradition, apart from Sakharov (2002), 171–97 there has not been a systematic survey of divine abandonment in modern thinkers. However, I would recommend Florovsky (1976), 100; Bulgakov (2004) and (2008), and Stăniloae, (2001). Sakharov (2002) where one could find elements albeit scattered in his works. 25 For the role of Scripture in the shaping of Christian worship in urban as well as ascetic settings see Taft (1986). See also McKinnon (1994), 505–21 who has indicated that the fourth century ce witnessed an unprecedented enthusiasm for the use of Psalms in Christian worship. Burton-Christie (1993), 107–29 has presented the various ways in which ascetics were exposed to Scripture and noted ascetic attitudes towards the written and oral transmission of Scripture.

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debates reflect this struggle against heresy and vice versa: how much did theology articulate its doctrine based on the biblical witness? On the other hand, it has been noted that ascetic discourses, which in general remained unaffected by doctrinal struggles, depended on Scripture.26 Yet, the same principle that has been outlined above concerning Christian exegesis, also applies in the case of the ascetics: they did not draw equally from all the books of the biblical canon. I have deliberately overlooked the book of Job despite the fact that, as it will be discussed, several ascetics included Job’s experience among several types of abandonment. It is true that Job articulates a question addressed to God, “why do you hide your face and consider me your enemy?”, which shares linguistic elements with the Psalms.27 Even Žižek, an unexpected modern witness, might be right in his observation that to understand Jesus’ abandonment on the cross “the key to Christ is provided by the figure of Job”.28 However, historically speaking, Origen was the first that systematically interpreted Job, a book which was has been in use in liturgical life. The reason for Origen’s choice has been sought on the grounds that he lived at a time of persecution and in this book he found the theological arguments to reinforce the faith of his contemporaries that were on the way to their martyrdom. In a similar fashion, two commentaries on Job of Arian origin reflect the legal predicaments of their authors in the fourth century ce.29 Thus, the reason why I decided not to include the book of Job is related to the way late antiquity exegetes deal with this book. It was common knowledge in the ancient world that human prosperity is fleeting and so much has been aptly summarised in Sophocles, The Women of Trachis: The gleaming splendour of the night will not remain with men, nor yet will grief, nor wealth: all pass away at once, and soon another man encounters joy and sorrow.30 The figure of Job might be a perennial witness to the flimsiness of human joy and the fact that bad things happen to good people, but what implicitly keeps apart the Song of Songs from Job in the minds of late antique exegetes is love and the fact that the soul sets off in a process that begins with a “wound of love” and leads to 26 This is the main argument of Burton-Christie (1993) in his excellent analysis of the use of Scripture in desert literature. 27 Job 13:24. 28 Zizek (2003), 124. 29 This is an assessment by Simonetti (2006), xvii. It is important to note that the Arian commentary introduces a clear connection between the ordeal of Jesus and Job, but without ever setting an exegetical example nor finding any imitators. 30 Sophocles, The Women of Trachis, 131: “μένει γὰρ οὔτ᾽ αἰόλα νὺξ βροτοῖσιν οὔτε κῆρες οὔτε πλοῦτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἄφαρ βέβακε, τῷ δ᾽ ἐπέρχεται χαίρειν τε καὶ στέρεσθαι”.

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the soul’s ascension.31 It should suffice at this point to mention Gregory of Nyssa’s progression from a lower to a higher knowledge of the divine mysteries and Evagrius’ of Pontus progressive transition from praktikos to gnostikos.32 In the process much is revealed about God’s being as well as man’s being. It is the lack of this element in Job that has tipped the scales, in my mind, to favour the Song of Songs, a book that was never used in liturgy and became a popular reading in the West for Christian mystics during the Middle Ages. As it concerns the structure of this book, it is divided in three parts. The first part examines the notion of divine abandonment in exegetical works on the Song of Songs during the patristic era. It sets off with an historical account concerning the character of this book and discusses why, despite its debatable presence in the Jewish and Christian biblical canons and its de facto exclusion from the Christian liturgical life, it still attracted the attention of patristic exegetes. This part lays the theoretical foundations: it presents the development of the notion of divine abandonment in the Bible and the religion of the Near East. Then, it engages the exegetical work of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Nilus of Ancyra, and therefore demonstrates the clear shift in Christian exegesis from a Platonic understanding of divine abandonment to a more discernible Christian anthropology. Such a shift should be attributed to the development of a clear system of ascetic ideals and also a distinct ascetic anthropology that was shaped mostly in the desert of Egypt. The second part deals with patristic interpretations on Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46). First, some introductory matters are addressed concerning the way that late antique readers would have approached the loud cry of Jesus, on the one hand, and also the nature of the theological works that included an exegesis of the loud cry. Then follows an author-by-author analysis of late antique sources that have dealt with the loud cry of Jesus in light of Jouassard’s claim that, after Origen, Christian theology faced the danger of explaining away Jesus’ abandonment as a pretentious or superficial act that did not affect him personally. This part of the book asks to establish the theological connections between biblical exegesis and Christology that might have been available to Christian thinkers given the unique identity of Jesus. The final part deals with the degree that ascetics viewed divine abandonment as a norm even at the stage of perfection. It sets off with some further insights into Origen’s ethical thought and thus highlights the origins of Christian ascetic ideas. It also introduces Athanasius, Vita Antonii and Antony’s Letters, in which two different theological threads, Christocentrism and ascetic realism, are discernible concerning divine abandonment. The rest of this part is dedicated to the ascetic

31 For an introduction to the development of Christian spirituality see William (1990). 32 This strong allusion to the soul’s journey is exemplified in a manuscript (fourteenth century ce) that contains Arabic translations of Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Song of Songs, a philosophical discourse attributed to Hermes the Sage, A Letter to the Soul and a letter on ascesis and the monastic life by Isaac of Nineveh. https://www.wdl.org/en/item/4168/ (last accessed August 2019). Perhaps this cathartic process that transforms the soul is the most accurate definition of what constitutes Christian mysticism. Concerning the problem of defining Christian mysticism see Louth (2007), 200–14.

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sources that coincide or antecedent the introduction of the more refined ascetic system by Evagrius of Pontus. The introduction of some lists in late antiquity that refer to either ‘causes’ or ‘kinds’ of abandonment are discussed thoroughly in order to present the dependence or independence of authors such as Palladius, Evagrius, Macarius the Great, Diadochus of Photice and Maximus the Confessor and then the discussion turns to the association between ethical perfection and the experience of God’s turning away his face. To sum up, this book is looking at the exegetical, Christological and ascetic tradition in late antiquity and is examining the way that Christian theologians treated the notion of divine abandonment. Though modern approaches have raised the question concerning world history signification in light of Jesus’ abandonment on the cross, this book asks three different questions: how much did exegetes, theologians and ascetics turn to Scripture, Christology or the wisdom of desert ascetics in order to gain insights into the experience that God has turned away his face? To what extent did they argue for or against the normativeness or, alternatively, the extraordinariness of the experience? Finally, how likely is it that theology in late antiquity could have put forward a Jesus-like kind of abandonment? Some authors, such as Balthasar, Rossé and Sakharov have argued that it was not until late in the middle ages that the notion of a Jesus-like abandonment was introduced. It is true that early theology developed the notion of divine abandonment with regard to two theological presuppositions: a distinction between theology and economy, i.e. Jesus as one of the Trinity and Jesus in his incarnate state, that Origen introduced and Athanasius the Great established. The distinction bore significant implications as it discouraged a real comparison (ontological connection) between Jesus’ life and that of the Christians. It is also true that the development of a system of ascetic anthropology highlighted the role of sin to such a degree that also discouraged an explicit connection between Jesus’ experience and that of the Christian ascetics. However, the purpose of this book is to argue that, despite the aforementioned points, there existed several elements in late antique exegesis, Christology and asceticism that implied, as it was never expressed straightforwardly, an ontological connection between the abandonment of Jesus and that of Christians. However, in the course of time these elements developed further and eventually made possible an explicit and rigorous theological position that views the experience of abandonment of Christians and, in fact, of all people, as finding signification and meaning in Jesus’ abandonment on the cross.

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The Abandonment of the Bride The Biblical Background: Divine Abandonment in Religious Literature and the Song of Songs

Jewish and Christians read the Song of Songs in late antiquity; that much is clear even though the matter concerning the frequency that it was read before the third century remains open to interpretation. The fact is that the Song appears in almost every list of authoritative texts that was compiled until the fifth century ce, including the Septuagint. Despite this fact, it is not uncommon among those who study the history of Jewish and Christian exegesis to raise the matter of its canonicity and thus sketch an adventurous journey that the Song of Songs went through until it made it to the safe harbor of the hallowed canon; and this was possible once Jewish rabbis had affirmed its spiritual value in the Council of Jamnia (late first century ce) by devising an allegorical reading. Hence, the way was paved securely for its unequivocal and final pronouncement in the third-fourth century ce as canonical, a fact that instigated Christian exegetes to appreciate the theological potential of the Song of Songs.1 According to this story, an authority as grave as rabbi Akiba had to put his weight behind the religious appreciation of the Song and thus defend its place in the Jewish biblical canon by proclaiming that “the whole world is not worthy the day that the Song of Songs was given to Israel”.2 However, such a picture has been revised: the concept of canonicity per se has been questioned, serious doubts have been expressed about the historical validity behind the – hypothetical – Council of Jamnia, whereas the argument concerning the allegorical device has been turned to its head; an allegorical interpretation was likely to be applied only for books that already enjoyed an “authoritative” status in the Jewish religious community.3 According to Cohen, the real problem is the reason that anyone should have thought of treating the work as an allegory in the first place. There must have been works aplenty that were excluded from the canon and that were not interpreted. One must, therefore, ask why the scales were tipped in favour of this particular poem that was a priori so religiously questionable.4 1 For an introduction about matters of authorship, date of composition, geographical setting and subsequent interpretation in Judaism and Christianity see Hess (2005), 17–22. For its status among the Hebrew and Christian biblical canon see McDonald (2007). Leiman (1976). Ellis (1991). Cohen and Gilbert uphold the hypothesis about the Council of Jamnia (c. 90 ce) See Cohen (1974), 262. Gilbert (1978), 4–5. 2 Gilbert (1978), 13. 3 Barton (2005), 1–7. McDonald (2007), 173. Lewis (2002), 146–92. Kaplan (2010), 43–66 has suggested that allusions to the Song of Songs could be securely traced in Jewish literature from as early as the first century ce. 4 Cohen (1974), 264.

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For Burton the answer is straightforward: the Song had already enjoyed a canonical status, it was read in Judaism, and, as a result interpretative devices were applied in order to bring to the fore its theological message. The hypothesis that supports the supposed uneasiness that late antique exegetes felt when dealing with the Song does so on the grounds of its content and language: the Song is a love song, or a wedding feast song, or a collation of many songs that perhaps were not of Jewish provenance, and its unparalleled erotic language with explicit descriptions, for instance, of the female body should have been a stumbling block that prevented its religious appreciation and appropriation.5 Accordingly, the history of the interpretation of the Song is closely related to those alleged rabbinic disputes about its value, whereas the cultural and religious interaction between rabbis and Christians and Hellenism has been tipped as a factor that gradually removed all reservations from the Jewish and Christian camps for its theological appropriation through the application of various exegetical methods.6 Cohen has provided his insights by indicating that the content of the Song was felt to fill a theological gap that “no other work in the Bible could fill”7 on the ground of: i) its conformity with the Pentateuch; ii) its content as a love song; and iii) the cultural interaction between Judaism and Hellenism. As it concerns the first two points, the conformity and the theme of love, the relation between husband and spouse had already been a common simile that signifies the relation between God and Israel in the Pentateuch and the prophets. However, what was felt to be unique in the Song was the fact that love stands at the core of the narrative, and such love has taken a dialectic form;8 in the biblical canon, it is either God that addresses Israel or Israel that speaks to God. Yet, the Song is written in the form of a drama in which God and Israel are engaged profoundly in a dialogue, addressing to each other at the same time.9 [W]hereas the other books of the Bible do proclaim the bond of love between Israel and the Lord, only the Song of Songs is a dialogue of love, a conversation between man and God that gives religious faith a kind of intensity no other form of expression can.10

5 For a summary of modern attitudes in textual and structural analysis see Phipps (1974), 82–100 where he states that “[i]t is one of the pranks of history that a poem so obviously about hungry passion has caused so much perplexity and has provoked such a plethora of bizarre interpretations. Even some contemporary scholars appear baffled by the Song of Songs”. Bakon (1994), 216 believes that such approaches steam from a dismissal of the sacred character of the book that originated in the eighteenth century. 6 For the various exegetical tools in the rabbinic and early Christian era see Fawzi (1994), 6–36. Gilbert (1978), 1–20. Tanner (1997), 23–46. 7 Cohen (1974), 265. 8 For the centrality of the theme of love in the Song and rabbinic exegesis see Zlotowitz (1979), l–lvii. White (1978). Cohen (1974) has pointed to the dialectical interaction between religious fidelity to God and infidelity as expressed through images of loyalty to the husband and physical adultery. See also Gilbert (1978), 3. Fawzi (1994), 8–9. 9 For Rabbi Simon the title of the book [Shir Hashirim] is an indication that it is about mutual love in the form of a dialogue: “[b]eing composed of two strands – Israel’s praise to God and God’s praise to Israel”. See The Midrash (1951), 19 [footnote no. 4]. 10 Cohen (1974), 275.

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As it concerns the third point, the cultural interaction between Hellenism and Judaism, Cohen has noted that “wherever the Greek literature and philosophy went, the problems of Beauty and Love went with them”.11 Consequently, an interpretation of a biblical book that emphasized love as the element that unites human and divine was turned into an intellectual response to the search for eros in classical philosophy and the Song played the role of the Old Testament interlocutor to Plato’s Phaedrus and the Symposium. Yet, with its insistence on the unconsummated character of the union between bride and groom (God and Israel), the Song maintained intact a unique theological point in Judaism, according to which the characters of the two lovers remain distinct and unconfused.12 Separation and abandonment play a pivotal role in the unfolding of the drama in the Song suggesting that bride and bridegroom do not enjoy an undisturbed and blissful relationship. In fact, in the course of eight chapters, the bridegroom abandons his bride twice leaving the bride at a state of bafflement as to the reasons behind his sudden departure (Song 3:1–4 and 5:6–8). The second instance of being abandoned (Song 5:6–8) is traumatic for her as she is physically wounded by those who guard the city when she inquires about the whereabouts of her beloved. However, despite the presence of such strong images of abandonment and despair, the question concerning the conformity between abandonment in the Song and the rest of the biblical canon has not been raised. The question of the Song’s conformity has been restrained to the simile of the union between bride and bridegroom, and the biblical witness has been employed in search of echoes and allusions to such similes, or with regard to individual images and expressions (such as the dove in Song 2:14) in the rest of the biblical canon. The most indicative example of a survey that explores the notion of the hiddenness of God in the Old Testament is Balentine, The Hidden God. It provides valuable insights to the role of divine abandonment in the Old Testament and consequently provides the necessary biblical background behind the way that late antique exegetes developed their theological deliberations concerning divine abandonment. Nevertheless, Balentine has not commented on the presence of abandonment in the Song, and even though he states that the theme of God’s “turning away his face”, the most common expression of divine hiddenness in the Psalms, has been his point of departure as his intent has been to examine the “general motif of God’s hiddenness”,13 this intent has not been served satisfactorily by the list that features exclusively the occurrence of the phrase “hide the face” in the Old Testament. Perhaps, Balentine has overlooked the Song on the grounds that either lacks the catch phrase “hide the face” or does not make it explicit that it is God who abandons the bride. It is true that the assumption that the Song does refer to divine abandonment is only possible if one applies an allegorical reading and then compares the Song to the Psalms or the

11 Cohen (1974), 277. 12 Cohen (1974), 279. Compare this point to Plato’s famous formula in Theætetus, 176b: “to escape is to become like God so far as this is possible”. 13 Balentine (1983), v.

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prophets. Yet, this is a problem only if one focuses on the subject of the action (i.e. the bridegroom) or insists on the linguistic formulation whilst dismissing altogether the action itself and the semantics behind it: the bride experiences her psychological despair due to the sudden withdrawal of her beloved. Besides, Balentine points to the fact that the causes of divine abandonment remain hidden in the Psalms, whereas in all other instances, i.e. the prophets, it is Israel’s sin that has brought about the sudden withdrawal of God.14 Yet, as it was mentioned, the episode of being left abandoned in the Song leaves the bride at a state of bafflement, because the bridegroom’s decision to depart seems inexplicable given the fact that bride and bridegroom have just expressed their mutual love. Though the theme of divine abandonment features in the Old Testament, its origins could be traced in the religious cult in the Near East. Balentine and Block have pointed to the presence of divine abandonment in the Sumerian-Akkadian religious literature.15 According to Block, it is evident that the theme played an integral part in the early religious literature of the Middle East, as it was an integral part of those myths whose function was to explain disasters and misfortunes that suddenly fell upon the Assyrian and the Babylonian nation. The myths connect divine absence and distressful conditions, and suggest that such causes for distraught occurred because the local deity has abandoned its place of cultic worship thus leaving the people vulnerable to natural and political disasters. What were the cause of divine abandonment? The answer is not always clear, though the myths refer to human sin but only in several instances. It is indicative that from fifteen instances in ancient Near East literature that Block has discussed and in which the devotee inquires about the causes of abandonment, straightforward human accountability is indicated eight times due to human misdeeds that have offended the local deity. As a result, the nation is left unprotected to suffer natural disasters (such as flood) and also military defeat.16 In those instances that the causes remain hidden, the myths intend to stress the consequences of divine aloofness. Such developments in the expression of religious experience did no leave Israel unaffected and a historical continuity is traceable between the Sumerian-Akkadian religious literature and the religious experience of ancient Israel in which God threatens to lift his protection from his people who face the prospect of death or God’s departure from the place of worship in Jerusalem.17 As Balentines writes, 14 Balentine (1983), 65–75. 15 Block (2000), 16–17. The development of the theme of divine abandonment in Ezekiel was influenced by the religious and political interaction of Israel with nations that had already developed a notion of divine desolation in their religious literature. Block highlights the fact that Ezekiel adapted the theme appropriating it according to the monotheistic character of the Israelite religion. Before Block, Balentine had already discussed the presence of the theme in the Near East of antiquity indicating that the motif of divine abandonment had addressed the relation between God and the community as much as God and the individual. See Balentine (1983), 22–44. Also Kutsko (2000). 16 Block provides a list with regard to the motif including among other issues: i) the genre in which the theme has appeared; ii) the cause (human provocation); iii) the motive (divine anger); iv) the effect (disaster); and v) a change in the deity’s disposition. For the list see Block (2000), 32–33. 17 Balentine (1983), 68.

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[i]n view of the parallel laments about the deity’s aloofness which can be found in Sumero-Akkadian psalms, it can no longer be assumed that this was a problem which Israel confronted for the first time in the sixth century bc. Instead it is best to see Israel’s laments as having taken up a motif that was probably quite common in the lament Gattungen of the Near East.18 What Balentines hints at is the sixth century bce as being of paramount significance, since it witnessed the Babylonian invasion and the consequent exile. The author of Ezekiel appropriated the Sumero-Akkadian notion of divine absence in order to interpret the Babylonian captivity and indicate that, for the first time, God has made good on his threat to abandon his people due to the sin of Israel which is non other than idolatry, i.e. a misrepresentation of God in the worship of idols and divine images. According to Kutsko, Ezekiel devised the paradoxical scheme of God’s presence in absence/proximity in aloofness so as to reassert his fellow Israelites that God remains at hand even after the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, an event that left Israel deprived of any divine representation when the gods of the nation that conquered them were represented in idols and images.19 Yet, for Balentine, even before this time, Israel had developed a notion of divine abandonment that referred collectively to Israel but also to each individual. According to Block, [i]n tracing the history of the motif we may recognise five specific dimensions of Yahweh’s abandonment contemplated in the Old Testament: (1) Yahweh’s absence from an individual, devotee or otherwise; (2) Yahweh’s absence from his people, the nation of Israel; (3) Yahweh’s absence from the land of Israel; (4) Yahweh’s absence from Jerusalem/Zion; (5) Yahweh’s absence from his sanctuary.20 As it was stated, the most common phrase that signifies divine abandonment is that God “hides the face”, there are instances, such as Ps 22, where the explicit phrase “to abandon” occurs.21 Through the simile of the facial expression and the direct indiction of abandonment, Jewish religious literature gives implicit and explicit expression to the

18 Balentine (1983), 170 states that the sixth century bce is of particular significance since it corresponds to the Babylonian invasion and exile. Ezekiel appropriated the notion of divine absence in order to interpret Israel’s exile to Babylon. As Kutsko (2000) has put it, the author of Ezekiel devised the paradox of God’s presence in absence in order to reassert God’s presence in the wake of the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple that left Israel without any divine representation at a time when other gods were represented in idols and images. 19 This is the main argument of Kutsko (2000). 20 Block (2000), 16–17 did not intend to discuss the first dimension of divine abandonment (individual/ devotee), since he focused on the prophetic understanding of it (Ezekiel). However, certain assessments could be used in order to help us understand the place that the theme had held in Middle East religions. 21 Balentine (1983), 24 traces this position already in the Sumerian and Akkadian literature. He discussed the morphological combination of the words ‫( םינפ‬to hide) and ‫( רתס‬face) as indications of God’s hiding his face. The latter term became synonymous to divine abandonment. However, Balentine did not engage in an examination of the verb ‫( בזע‬to abandon) in the Old Testament. It was Block that has researched the various cognates. His examination, nevertheless, only addresses the motif in Ezekiel. See Block (2000), 16–17 [footnotes nos 6–7].

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fact that the relationship between God and his devotee does not remain undisturbed in perpetuity; nor is ever God bound unconditionally to his promise to stand by the side of his devotee. Psalms abides in such instances that the devotee prays that God should not hide his face or inquires about the reasons that made God do so. Among the psalms that contain the phrase, it is possible to trace some common motifs: a period of unexpected distress usually in the hands of one’s enemies is followed by God’s deliverance. Besides, it is not infrequent in the Psalms for the suppliant to question God as to the reasons “why?” behind this sudden withdrawal,22 or as to the duration “how long?” of the experience.23 Taking for granted the likelihood of suddenly being abandoned by God, some psalms are proleptic supplications to God that he should not hide his face from devotee: “abandon me not/hide not your face”).24 The causes of divine abandonment are not always clear to the psalmist, who protests about his seeming innocence in several instances. As a literary device, such a protest is meant to demonstrate the inexplicable character of the experience, but also points to the fact that human sin might not be the only reason behind divine abandonment. Though it has been suggested that any reference to concrete sin would have limited the use of the Psalms as models of prayer for the community to specific occasions, Balentine argues that there are several indications that show the irrelevance of sin: despite the fact that the supplicant has not sinned, God has withdrawn his presence.25 The two motifs of sin and divine abandonment are almost inseparable in the prophetic books, where sin is the primary cause of divine abandonment.26 However, the occasions of divine abandonment in the prophetic literature are dominated by the notion of communal sin, since the idolatry of the people leads to divine abandonment.27 The causes of divine abandonment are only an aspect of the experience, the other being its consequences. The religious experience in the Near East had highlighted vulnerability in the face of natural phenomena and political disaster as the consequences of the local deity abandoning his people. In the Psalms that the devotee expresses the feeling that he has been abandoned by God, more often than not it is implied that the direness of the suppliant’s condition serves as the solid indication that he has been abandoned by God. Even in those occasions that the causes of divine abandonment remain hidden, the psalmist might be vocal about the distress he has been experiencing. Balentine has classified the consequences of divine abandonment into three categories: i) separation between God and man; ii) separation between God and his place of cultic worship; and iii) the confinement of the suppliant to Sheol.28 As it concerns the first point, divine abandonment has cut

22 23 24 25 26

Ps 22:2; 44:24; 88:14. Ps 13:2. Both forms of inquiry were of Sumerian origin according to Balentine (1983), 26. Ps 10:1; 38:21; 27:9; 69:17. Balentine (1983), 50–51. Balentine (1983), 50–56. See Mic 3:4, Is 59:2 and Jer 33:5 and also Dt 31:18. However, it needs to be noted that in several instances, such as Mic 3:4, God only threatens to hide his face, but there is no evidence that ever he does so. 27 See Kutso (1980). 28 Balentine (1983), 56–57.

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off the communication between God and man. The Psalms invoke the verbs “not to hear”, “not to see” and “not to answer” to include all modes of divine activity from which the supplicant has been deprived. Despite the fervent supplications, God has not harkened to the prayers of the psalmist, who has been left prey to his enemies and has experienced severe distress. Ps 22 begins with an inquiry as to the cause of the abandonment: “My God, my God why have you abandoned me?” (v.2) and then proceeds to a detailed and grim description of the consequences: Many bulls encompass me, strong bulls of Bashan surround me; (v.13) they open wide their mouths at me, like a ravening and roaring lion (v.14) I am poured out like water, and all my bones are out of joint; my heart is like wax it is melted within my breast; (v.15) my strength is dried up like a potsherd, and my tongue cleaves to my jaws. (v.16) This point makes it evident that the Psalms share the notion of vulnerability with the religious literature in the Near East, only this time the line between the individual and the community has been blurred as there is no indication about the identity of the enemies of that surround the psalmist. There is no doubt that the psalmist presents a harrowing experience, but the lowest point brings him close to death: “you have brought me into the dust of death”.29 It is not uncommon in the Psalms to use the simile of being confined to a pit or grave, which is a metonymy of Sheol, “the land of forgetfulness” when presenting the consequences of divine abandonment:30 For my soul is full of troubles: and my life draws into the grave. I am counted with them that go down into Sheol: I am as a man that has no strength,31 [when] you are silent to me, I become like them that go down into the pit.32 According to the religious experience that finds expression in the Psalms, God is the source of life, of goodness and strength33 when he looks upon his creation.34 But this means that when he hides his face and withdraws his strength, his creation is dismayed and everything dies and returns to their dust.35 Thus, the gravest consequence of divine abandonment is that human life is exposed to the danger of death.

29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Ps 22:16. For Sheol as the land of forgetfulness see Pedersen (2002). Ps 88:3–4. Ps 28:1. Ps 18:1; 24.1; 61:1–4. Ps 104:28. Ps 104:29.

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It is important to note Block’s observation that God might warn of hiding his face from the sinner, but outside the prophetic books there is no indication or confirmation that God has ever actually turned his face from his supplicant.36 Rather, it is the individual that is distraught and as a result assumes that God has hidden his face. Yet, there is no such confirmation or even denial from God. It is the prophetic books that God communicates through his prophet the confirmation that he has abandoned Israel; a shifting point in religious literature. However, as it has been noted, such shift needs to read in light of Ezekiel’s appropriation of the language of divine abandonment to serve a specific historical role: from a political perspective, the prophet should explain military defeat and from a religious point of view he should reassert the strength of a God that has been deprived of any representation after the destruction of his place of cultic worship in Jerusalem. Thus, Ezekiel points to the communal sin of idolatry, or false representation of the divine, that has brought about the hiding of God’s face and has resulted in consequent military defeat, where his people has been left vulnerable to the attacks of their enemies. Ezekiel appropriates notions that had been introduced originally in the religious literature of the Near East, but he has revised the notion of abandonment so that, like Ps 22, the pessimistic picture of a people abandoned by his God could be complemented with the promise of God’s return: With the end of the period of captivity, the prophets speak of an end to the period of God’s hiding and of the promise of future deliverance. Thus, the ultimate consequence of God’s hiding is not separation, which is the implication in the psalms of lament, but restoration.37 It could be concluded that, apart from individual images and the notion of love, the conformity of the Song with the religious experience of Judaism might be found in the occurrence of episodes of abandonment and separation that one also finds in the Psalms and some parts of the prophetic books. At first sight, the Song might be lacking the linguistic formula “to hide the face” or “to abandon”. It is also true that there is neither inquiry as to the reasons behind the bridegroom’s action nor petition not to depart from the bride. The bride might be asking the watchmen, “Have you seen him whom my soul loves”, but her inquiry does not conform to the typical question “why” or “how long” that one encounters in Jewish religious literature. Nevertheless, the Song gives expression to the fact that the relationship between God and his people does not remain undisturbed: God abandons his people. In fact, when reading the Song in parallel with the Psalms, it is the explicit expressions of passionate affection that lacks conformity with the rest of the canon, but not the notion of abandonment or separation.38 Besides, that points that the Psalms and the Song share are the lack of 36 Block (2000), 17. 37 Balentine (1983), 76. 38 Theodoret of Cyrrhus would have had serious reservations against this observation, since in his defence of the spiritual value of the Song, he presented a list of biblical quotations that contain quite explicit images, including one of sexual intercourse in Ezekiel. See Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Commentary, 49–258.

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any explanation as to the reasons that led to the sudden departure of the bridegroom and the idea of vulnerability: the reasons of abandonment are hidden from the psalmist and the bride, whereas both have been left unprotected and have suffered physical wounds.39 It might be surmised that in the instance of sudden separation between bride and bridegroom in the Song, the bridegroom has departed because of his lover’s failure to open the door promptly.40 Yet, neither the bridegroom nor the bride confirm this assumption. On the other hand, an important consequence of the inexplicable departure is the lifting of the protection that the bride had enjoyed so that in Song 5:7 the bride has suffered physical wounds by the watchmen of the city. Thus, when reading the Song one comes across the same obscurity as to the reasons that God hides his face with the Psalms and also the lifting of his protection.

Christian Exegesis and the Song of Songs in Late Antiquity There is no witness to any objections about Christians reading the Song in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, even though they recommend caution when reading such a book that it is intended only for spiritually mature readers. It might be true that Melito of Sardis (second century ce) was the first Christian to include the Song of Songs in his list of books accepted as authoritative, and that Hippolytus of Rome (third century ce) was the first to approach it from an exegetical perspective, but that does not necessarily mean that Christians did not read the Song before the third century ce.41 On the other hand, it is meaningless to ask questions concerning the canonicity and authority of a book prior to the fifth century ce, when the two concepts as such were still in the making. The reasons why early Christians were interested in the Song are not clear, but several factors seem to have been at work, such as the translation of the Song in Greek as part of the Septuagint, the appearance of Solomon’s name in the title, contemporary Jewish deliberations on the spiritual value of the Song, the appropriation of allegory by Christians and, for later generations, the influence of Origen as an exegete.42 As it concerns Origen, it is indicative of the reception of his exegesis by subsequent theologians that Gregory of Nyssa and Theodoret of Cyrrhus refer to him by name in acknowledgement of his exegetical labors. On the other hand, with regard to allegory, the same observation that was

39 Song 3:1. 40 Song 5:3: “I have put off my coat; how shall I put it on? I have washed my feet, how shall I defile them”? 41 Hippolytus’ work has survived only in fragments that do not cover the entirety of the book. Hess (2005), 22. For a list of the earliest Christian lists of canonical books see McDonald (2007), 439–42. For a list of commentaries on the Song of Songs and their editions, see the monumental work of CCSG, vol. 3 (1979), 125–26 and also Elliott (2000). For the available commentaries in the Latinspeaking world see Matter (1990), 203–10. 42 See Sauve (2012), 81–88 who has argued that, in fact, Irenæus of Lyon had set the theological foundations for the Christian appropriation of the Song by exploiting systematically the nuptial analogy as an expression of soteriology and ecclesiology.

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made about the application of the allegorical method in rabbinic Judaism might be valid here: Christians were encouraged to read the Song as an allegory due to the fact that it enjoyed an authoritative status: i.e. a tradition had been handed down to later generations that included reading the Song.43 That much has been argued by King who has indicated that Origen took into consideration several factors that urged him to provide theological insights on the Song by applying an allegorical method of interpretation: the theological significance of the Song as concluding the “spirit of scriptures” at a time of persecution and also the wider context of the intellectual dialogue between Christianity, Judaism and Greek philosophy.44 It should be noted that it is Theodoret of Cyrrhus who indicates that some Christians read it in a literal way as a love song, and thus rejected the spiritual value of the Song. Theodoret appeals to the authority of the Fathers by arguing that, if it bore no theological significance, the Holy Fathers would not have considered it as part of Scripture.45 After Origen (third century ce) several commentators engaged with the content of the Song in an attempt to bring to light its theological meaning. However, due to the fact that many works have survived in fragments, here I present four extensive commentaries composed by Origen,46 Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Nilus of Ancyra. With the single exception of Theodore of Mopsuestia that interpreted the Song as a poem of human love with no real spiritual value, Christian exegetes shared with their Jewish counterparts an immense appreciation for the spiritual insights of the Song as it is an allegory that depicts God’s love for human kind. However, the subject that manifests his love and the object of such affection is a theological point that, alongside the liturgical use of the Song in Judaism, manifests the parting of the ways between Christian theology and the Jewish tradition in late antiquity: rabbinic Judaism interpreted the Song as the ultimate expression of love between the God that was revealed in Sinai, and Israel, and consequently traced the historical journey of Israel from Egypt to the promised land via the desert of Sinai behind the episodes of the poetic drama.47 The culmination of the mounting exegetical appreciation of the Song in Judaism and also the notion that the Song represents the ultimate song

43 Parente (1944), 143 believes that it was due to the spiritual and allegorical interpretation that a book that lacks the divine name or supernatural ideas was included in the Jewish and Christian canons. King (2005) has challenged this view and indicated that Origen’s interest stems from his ideas of Scripture as a mystical body as well as his preoccupation with the notion of martyrdom. Yet, Sauve (2012), 82–83 argues that King has overlooked the extent to which Origen depended on previous theological traditions of the first and second century. 44 According to King (2005), 8 as early as the Severan persecution Origen had developed “a nuptial understanding of martyrdom” and as a result in his thought he gave prominence to the martyr’s ‘bridal’ status before the Bridegroom, Jesus. For the use of allegory in Origen see Edwards (2002), 123–63 who has examined several assumptions about Origen’s theology and as a result has put under question the general belief that Origen infused the Christian faith with unmistakable (middle) platonic doctrines. 45 See Theodoret’s Introduction in his Commentary, 13. 46 Origen’s Commentary and Homilies are preserved in the latin translation by Jerome. Several fragments from his previous exegetical endeavour have been transmitted in exegetical catenas. 47 Gilbert (1978), 3. Elliott (2000), 4.

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that humanity chants in her encounter with God led to the liturgical use of the Song.48 As it concerns the Christian Church and despite the fact that the Song was never used in the liturgical life of the Church, it invited Christian exegetes to read it and interpret it, albeit not with the same frequency as Genesis, the Psalms, the prophets, the gospels or Paul’s letters. However, when reading it, Christian exegetes highlighted the presence of the Logos incarnate and deliberated on the salvation that was brought about by the incarnation. Christians “found it easy to extend the Jewish allegory beyond the Old Testament Israel” and include in their deliberations the work of Jesus as it has been expressed in the New Testament.49 Thus, as early as the time of Hippolytus of Rome, the Song was read in light of the incarnation with Hippolytus stressing the image of Jesus, God incarnate, as the one who stands between the old synagogue and the Church.50 The image of bridegroom and bride is invoked by Paul in the New Testament to explicate the consequences of the incarnation and the passion of Jesus, and subsequent Christian commentators utilized this analogy in light of the incarnation and applied it to the dramatis personae of the Song.51 Whereas rabbinic Judaism had viewed Israel in her encounter with God as the object of the groom’s affection, Christians exegetes did not distinguish between the Church (or Mary)52 and the individual soul as the object of God’s affection; the Church and the soul are used indistinguishably based on the premise that “the Church… is the whole assembly of the saints”.53 Even in the case that a single term is used, the other should be implied on the ground of the same principle expressed by Origen: the Church might be the congregation of individual souls, but at the same time these souls have achieved spiritual perfection only in the Church, where they have met the Logos. However, this intertwined affair between the Church and

48 The Song of Songs is read during the holiday of Pesach, on Shabbat Chol HaMoed. In rabbinic Judaism, a song is the ultimate expression of worshipping God. Due to its mystical character, the Song is the ultimate song that Israel sings when encountering God. The superlative of the title (Song of Songs) bespeaks of its supreme value and also distinct character as the song of all songs. In fact, there is a spiritual ladder of ten songs dispersed in the biblical canon that lead to higher levels of God’s worship and also manifest the history of the Israelites on earth. The Song is the ninth step of this ladder, since the last song, the tenth, remains to be with the restoration of Israel by the Messiah. Zlotowitz (1979), xxii–xxxiii. The Midrash (1951), 19. Origen demonstrates his familiarity with the above rabbinic tradition in the introduction of his Commentary. 49 Gilbert (1978), 6. 50 DeSimone (2000), 30–31. For the identity of Jesus and how this affected the appreciation of the Song by Christian theologians see Elliott (2000), though I believe that he overemphasizes the theological exigency to provide images that would explicate the mystery of the identity of Jesus in late antiquity. For instance, as Louth has put it, Origen’s concern was not to explicate the mystery of the identity of Jesus, but to read Scripture as a “repository of all wisdom and all truth” that lies at the core of his mystical theology. Louth (1981), 54. See also Behr (2001). For the role of Scripture in the formation of a Christian identity see Young (1997), De Lubac (1998–2000) and Blowers (2007), 619. 51 Eph 5:22; 2 Cor 11:2. 52 Elliott (2000), 120. Elliott also includes Jesus’ soul as signified in the allegory of the bride. But, apart from Nilus of Ancyra, no other exegete suggested something similar. 53 Origen, Com. 1.1.59 [all translations by Lawson (1957)]. For the interwinding between individual and collective in Gregory of Nyssa, see Balthasar (1995), 134.

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the soul has significant implications concerning the spiritual state of the bride. For the reason that divine abandonment due to the presence of sin does not present such a theological challenge as the hiding of God’s face in a state of spiritual perfection, it is important to shed some light to this point in order to set properly the theological frame within which Christian exegetes have examined the notion of divine abandonment. The Song presents an interplay between imperfection and perfection, a fact that has been commented by Origen: “[the] soul that has indeed been set in the path of progress, but she has not yet attained the summit of perfection. She is called beautiful because she is advancing”.54 The Song invokes the bride’s perfection before the groom abandons her, but before that the bride has not concealed her former imperfections and at the same time, she has declared genuine affection for the bridegroom.55 From his part, the bridegroom has accepted her previous imperfections and has offered his love to her. To understand this interplay between the imperfection and perfection of the object of the bridegroom’s affection, one should take into consideration that Christian exegetes view the Song as an allegory of the historical continuity and theological discontinuity between the synagogue and the Church that has been brought about by the incarnation and that progresses from an imperfect knowledge of God to perfection.56 As a result, Christian exegetes appropriate the events of Israel’s history as found in the Old Testament, but at the same time they stress the new reality which is the Church. In order to accentuate this point, they introduce the notion of baptism which divides history in two moments: the imperfection of Israel before the advent of Jesus and the perfection that the Logos incarnate has bestowed to his Church. Origen has given expression to this deeper interplay between history and theology, by arguing that the bride has been beautiful and neighbour (πλησίον) due to her proximity to the bridegroom. When she had not approached the bridegroom, she was blackened and tanned by the sun.57 As Louth has noted, for the Alexandrian theologian “[the] ascent of the soul to God begins with her ‘coming out of Egypt and crossing the Red Sea’, that is her conversion and baptism. The mystical ascent for Origen begins in baptism and is a deepening and bringing to fruition of baptismal grace”.58 As a result, the history of divine revelation in Israel has been interwoven with Origen’s theological deliberation on the consequences of the incarnation: perfection is a consequence of the bride’s baptism that has been possible due to the incarnation. Yet, it needs to be reminded that the reader is not presented with an

54 Origen, Com. 2.5.136. 55 Song 1:6 and 3:6 compared to Song 5:2 and 6:9. 56 There is a consensus among Christian exegetes about the role of the incarnation. It is the means by which Jesus has cleansed the imperfection of the bride. Philo of Carpasus, Enarratio in Canticum Canticorum, PG 40, 9 and 11. Nilus, Com. 7.13.23 and 77.1.192 [numbers refer to chapter, paragraph and page in PTS 57]. 57 Origen, Hom. 2.4.289. An appellation that is a combination of the words beautiful and neighbour appears six times in the Song (Song 1:15; 2:10; 2:13; 4:1; 4:7; 6:4). 58 Louth (1981), 56. See also Daniélou (1955), 297. For an exposition on the divine image according to Origen see Crouzel, (1956).

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individualistic mystical journey, but with the historical journey of the Church and also all Christians at the same time.59 A further feature that points to the perfect state that the bride enjoys is the restoration of the divine image, which is a consequence of the baptism. As Procopius of Gaza has interpreted the Song, I introduce you to the intellect (νοῦς), which is the house of the mother who, as it were, has given birth to me through baptism, the grace of the all-Holy Spirit, which is receptive of this grace because of the likeness (διὰ τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν); it is also the inner chamber of grace, because the hidden treasures of grace are laid down in it because of the “image” (διὰ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα); this grace has conceived me through faith.60 Nilus of Ancyra, who produced a commentary that invites an individualistic reading, indicates that the soul has received divine grace in baptism, as she has put off her previous sinful life, and as a result she has recovered the divine image within, which had been tarnished by sin. Gregory of Nyssa argues in similar fashion, but without distinguishing between the Church and soul: the bride bears the image of the bridegroom, “by approaching the archetypical beauty (ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος) you became fair, since like a mirror you have obtained my character (τῷ ἐμῷ χαρακτήρι ἐμμορφωθεῖσα)”.61 Therefore, there exists a kinship between bridegroom and bride and we could surmise that perfection is part of it.62 As Gregory of Nyssa point, “[the soul became fair] when she approached the good and obtained the image (ἐνεμορφώθη) of the divine beauty”.63 To demonstrate further the fact that the bride has acquired the properties of the bridegroom Gregory indicates that Logos who is the Father’s dart, has wounded the soul with his affection. Consequently, the soul acquires this property and becomes the dart of the Logos that wounds with desire those who are uninitiated in the divine mysteries.64 Thus, one is led to think that the bride is fair and good because her bridegroom has been fair and good. As Procopius points, it is due to the divine imprint that the bride bears and reflects, that the uninitiated souls could contemplate the divine bridegroom on her.65 The state of perfection is also implied in the fact that the bride has become the teacher of those uninitiated in the divine mysteries. For Gregory, a profound bond exists between the perfect bride and the uninitiated maidens, which takes the form of the relationship between

59 Origen, Com. 3.13.231. Louth (1981), 53 who compares Origen’s notion of search to Plato and Plotinus according to whom the soul is after the ultimate truth either in the company of like-minded souls or as ‘the alone to the Alone’. See Plotinus, Enneads. 6.9.11. For an exploration of the same concept in Gregory of Nyssa see Corrigan (1997), 151–57. 60 Procopius of Gaza, Catena in Canticum Canticorum, PG 87, 1709C. 61 Gregory, Hom. 4, 103. For an exposition of Gregory’s thought on the notion of divine image see Balthasar (1995), 111–19. 62 See Balthasar (1995), 89–90 and 113. 63 Gregory, Hom. 5, 150. 64 Gregory, Hom. 4, 129. 65 Procopius of Gaza, Catena in Cantica Canticorum, PG 87, 1760A.

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tutor and disciples.66 The latter are instructed to the divine mysteries by observing the life and spiritual advancement of the bride, but this is possible only when we assume the perfection of the bride.67 Procopius of Gaza designates the soul as teacher (διδάσκαλος) and the uninitiated maidens as disciples (μαθητευόμεναι). The bride has become their teacher and instructor and they constitute her students, since as the drama develops, it transpires that the bride has been guiding them to desire and find the bridegroom.68 However, it is only due to her own perfect affection for the bridegroom that the bride has been able to stir up their desire for him and thus urge them to join her in her spiritual endeavors.69 To conclude, Christian commentators in late antiquity treated the bride of the Song as an image of spiritual perfection, since she has advanced from her idolatrous past into desiring the Logos incarnate. This has been possible due to the incarnation of the Logos and the reception of baptism by the bride, who stands as an allegory of the Church as she advances from the old covenant and engages into the new covenant of the Logos. However, as Origen points and despite the perfect state of the bride, [The] Bridegroom, however, is to be understood as a husband who is not always in house, nor is He in perpetual attendance on the Bride, who stays in the house. Rather, He frequently goes out, and she, yearning for His love, seeks Him when He is absent; yet He Himself returns to her from time to time. It seems, therefore, that all through this little book we must expect to find the Bridegroom sometimes being sought as one who is away, and sometimes speaking to the Bride as being present with her.70 Having set the theological historical and theological context, it is time to investigate the way that Christian exegetes interpreted those episodes in the Song that the bridegroom has abandoned the bride. Origen: Perfection and Trials

Origen views the Song as a book that unfolds in the form of a drama and from the outset he notes that in some parts the bridegroom is present, whereas in other parts he is absent. [The] Bridegroom, however, is to be understood as a husband who is not always in house, nor is He in perpetual attendance on the Bride, who stays in the house. Rather, He frequently goes out, and she, yearning for His love, seeks Him when 66 Origen, Com. 2.3.117. Gregory strikes an analogy between Paul and the bride: Paul exhorts the faithful to imitate him as he has imitated Jesus. Therefore, the bride instructs the maidens by addressing Paul’s command to them. Gregory, Hom. 2, 46. In De Vita Moses the teaching function serves Gregory’s purpose to indicate that the soul is never mentally or spiritually detached from the community. Gregory, Moses, 1.56 [edition in CS 1]. See also Nilus, Com. 69.1.172. 67 Nilus, Com. 5.3.16. Origen, Com. 1.5.84. Procopius of Gaza, Catena, PG 87, 1756A. 68 Procopius of Gaza, Catena, PG 87, 1757D and 1772B. 69 Procopius of Gaza, Catena, PG 87, 1760A. Theodoret, Expl. 2.93A and 4.197A. 70 Origen, Com. 3.13.230.

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He is absent; yet He Himself returns to her from time to time. It seems, therefore, that all through this little book we must expect to find the Bridegroom sometimes being sought as one who is away, and sometimes speaking to the Bride as being present with her.71 Therefore, Origen notes that there exists in the Song a dialectic between presence and separation, which is not limited in Song 3:1 and 5:6: the theme of presence and absence seems to be one of the main themes of the Song alongside love and permeated the whole narrative. Therefore, Origen has commented on the theme of the bridegroom’s absence, despite the fact that the fragments from his Commentary and Homilies that would have interpreted Song 3:1 and 5:6, have not survived. Origen follows the biblical narrative as it unfolds: the drama opens with the bride’s plea in anticipation of the coming of the bridegroom. Origen remarks that the Song begins with the soul (or the Church) praying to God the Father to send his Logos. However, Origen indicates that one should not miss the paradox behind this prayer: whereas the soul expects the coming of the bridegroom, the latter is already present with her: [While she is thus praying] the Bridegroom was present and standing by her as she prayed… The Bride having seen that He, for whose coming she was praying, was already present, and that even when she spoke He offered her the things she asked.72 Therefore, the opening scene introduces the dialectic between presence and absence, but Origen still refers to the history of divine revelation and therefore his interpretation in anchored on Scripture: the bride, a representation of the soul and also the Church, longs for the coming of the Logos but she has already received his gifts through the reception of the Law. For Origen, the Law and the Prophets manifest God’s presence in history, but even so, this presence has not diminished the bride’s desire for the direct presence of the Logos.73 The wound of love that the soul has received from the bridegroom also reveals the divine presence in the soul. I have already mentioned that Origen developed an articulate notion of the divine image that the soul has recovered, an image that bespeaks of the close intimacy between bride and bridegroom and attests to the proximity of the bridegroom. Yet, the paradox remains: the bride anticipates the coming of the bridegroom despite the fact that he is already present. The facts that the bride feels the bridegroom leaping off the mountains and bounding over the hills, and even hears his voice signify his proximity,74 but, on the other hand, the bridegroom hides behind the walls and communicates with his bride only through enigmas, hence signifying his hiddenness. It seems that Origen revises in a Christian context several themes that had been introduced in the rabbinic interpretation of the Song or were part of the Greek

71 Origen, Com. 3.13.230. 72 Origen, Com. 1.2.63 and Com. 3.11.210: “the Bridegroom is thus sometimes present and teaching, and sometimes He is said to be absent; and then He is desired”. 73 Origen, Com. 1.1.58–59. 74 Song 2:8.

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philosophical heritage. The Talmudic tradition has introduced the notion of divine presence and absence, but in light of the history of Israel: the Song is an exposition of the historical route of Israel from the slavery of Egypt to the eschatological restoration. In Mount Sinai, God revealed his presence through the Law and thus it is considered to be the time of intimacy between God and Israel, when God communicated his “innermost secrets” to Israel.75 However, Israel was abandoned by God in the desert and, most significantly, during the Babylonian captivity. Therefore, the night which is the time according to Song 3:1 that the bridegroom abandons the Song is interpreted as the time when God did not speak to Moses: it is the time of God’s silence: Rashi explains night as referring to the torment of Israel’s darkness when they were under the ‘Ban’ [incurred because of the sins of the Spies who turned the people against the land. During this period, the Midrash (2:11) explains, God did not speak with Moses]… According to Alschich, the verse refers to the dark ‘nights’ of the Egyptian and Babylonian exiles when Israel sought out their God to redeem them and resume His love for them. [The imagery is poignant. It depicts the anguish of a tormented, insomniac Israel – bereft of its former open, uninhibited relationship with God – figuratively twisting and turning sleeplessly during its period of most pronounced separation, longing after Him, and a resumption of His love].76 The Targum on the Song interprets Song 5:6 as the prayer of the soul to God, when God remains silent and thus forsakes her: “I called Him but He did not answer me, i.e. I prayed but He did not respond”.77 It is a prayer in despair, since God revealed his intimacy, but he ceases his communication with Israel. This interpretation is based on the notion of divine abandonment as it was viewed in the prophetic circles: it is the communal sin of Israel that has become the cause for God’s abandonment and it follows that the tension between God’s presence and absence depends entirely on ethical purification of Israel: the actions of Israel urge God to react.78 The Greek philosophical tradition had developed a notion of union and separation (hiddenness) which was never articulated in definite terms before Philo and Plotinus. As Louth remarks, Origen employed the notion of a sudden appearance of the divine which is found in Plato.79 Nevertheless, unlike Plato, Origen explicitly introduces an equally unexpected separation between God and the soul. McGinn believes that the idea of a sudden apparition of the divine in Plato puts under question the notion that Greek philosophy believed to an impersonal-salvation that was achieved

75 76 77 78 79

Zlotowitz (1979), 69–70. Zlotowitz (1979), 116. Zlotowitz (1979), 150. See Block (2000). Orig. Hom. 1.7.280. For the notion of an unexpected revelation of the divine in Greek philosophy see Plato, Epistula 7, 341d; Respublica, 515c; Symposium, 210e. See also, Plotinus, Enneads, 5.3.17, 5.5.7 and 6.7.34. Philo, Quod Deus est Immutabilis, 93.1; De Praemiis et Poenis, 37–51. For a discussion on the Platonic motif of union with the divine and its reception in Christian theology see Louth (1981), 1–17 and McGinn (1991) 30 and 53.

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by the individual, and that the sudden nature of the divine manifestation should be viewed as a kind of interference from the divine that results in the awakening of the soul.80 However, though one would assume that the divine also withdraws so as to manifest itself at a later point, Plato only implied this idea, but never articulated it as clearly as Origen did. Not surprisingly, then, Plato did not discuss the causes of the withdrawal of the divine, but there is no indication that ethical sin was the factor that brought about the departure of the divine. Plotinus, who was Origen’s contemporary, revisited this Platonic position and elaborated it further by introducing the notion of a sudden apparition and also an equally sudden falling from the vision of the divine.81 For McGinn, it seems that Plotinus deals with this dialectic between presence and absence in light of the notion of educating the soul: paideia. In his work, Plotinus discerns three stages in which spiritual life progresses: preparation, union and return. At the stage of preparation, the subject and object (i.e. the soul and the Intellect) of contemplation are distinct. This distinction is removed at the stage of union, when the soul and the Intellect are indistinguishable. However, this union is not everlasting, because in the last stage, a disruption takes place between the soul and the Intellect, as they are separated.82 The stages form a circle of endless repetitions and they complement each other. At the stage of separation, the soul fall from the vision of the Intellect and returns to discursive reason and as a result the distinction between soul and Intellect is re-introduced. Even so, the reason why the soul falls from this vision is neither sin nor her incompetence. McGinn thinks that the three stages might occur in this life but, despite the fact that Greek philosophy never developed an eschatology, Plotinus postpones the journey of the soul to the divine after she leaves the body.83 That means that the soul could not achieve full union with the divine Intellect in this life, but she lives in anticipation of the removal of this ontological distinction between the subject and object of contemplation at a future point.84 Therefore, it could be claimed that Plotinus has introduced an eschatological perspective in his thought. Philo appropriated the Platonic notion of a sudden apparition, hence anticipating Origen’s own teaching that would anchor this idea more firmly to the biblical witness. The theme has acquired a clear dialectical form, since times of divine presence are interchanged with times of absence. According to Philo, the Logos who is the part of God that operates in the world, illuminates the human intellect in its philosophical pursuits to such an extent that the philosopher experiences an ecstasy that Philo relates in classic terms: a sudden possession of the intellect by the divine that leaves Philo unaware of his own activities and detaches him from all spatial-temporal reality.85 At other times, it is impossible for Philo to pursuit his philosophical endeavors with 80 81 82 83 84 85

For the notion of contemplation in Plato see Festugière (1936). Plotinus, Enneads, 6.9.11. McGinn (1991), 44. An underdeveloped eschatology has been detected in Plato. See Melling (1987), 64–74. O’Meara (1974), 238–44. See Louth (1981), 17–34 for a presentation of the Logos in Philo and the way Philo has anticipated the notion that the Logos reveals himself in Scripture.

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the same vigor, since he finds his intellect emptied out of all ideas to such an extent that Philo ceases his philosophical activity. In a lengthy passage, Philo relates his personal experience which is meant to stress the regularity of the experience and also contrast the two states: I feel no shame in recording my own experience, a thing I know from its happening to me a thousand times. On some occasions, after making up my mind to follow the usual course of writing on philosophical tenets, and knowing definitely the substance of what I was to set down, I have found my understanding incapable of giving birth to a single idea, and have given it up without accomplishing anything, reviling my understanding for its self-conceit, and filled with amazement at the might of Him that is to Whom is due the opening and closing of the soul-wombs. On the other occasions, I have approached my work empty and suddenly become full, the ideas falling in a shower from above and being sown invisibly, so that under the influence of the Divine possession I have been filled with corybantic frenzy and been unconscious of anything, place, persons present, myself, words spoken, lines written.86 Philo claims to have experienced the apparition and withdrawal of the Logos who is Wisdom, a thousand times, which is an indication of the regularity of the experience, and an attestation to the normativeness of the interchange between the two phases. His account might not refer explicitly to the withdrawal of Wisdom, but rather to Wisdom’s withholding his illuminating power and refuses to open the womb of the intellect. Nevertheless, the account highlights the contrast between the presence of Wisdom and the time that Wisdom is not as active as before. Therefore, it is in indirect terms that Philo presents a kind of divine abandonment, since Wisdom interferes and withholds its illuminating power. There is no indication concerning the cause of this sudden withdrawal, though it is evident that the Jewish philosopher has not committed any sin. Origen introduces the notion of divine abandonment in similar terms with Philo and it is remarkable that Origen relates his personal experience when commenting on the Song in a passage that bears an unmistakable semblance to Philo’s account: God is my witness that I have often perceived the Bridegroom drawing near me and being most intensely present with me; then suddenly he has withdrawn and I could not find him, though I sought to do so. Then when he has appeared and I lay hold of him, he slips away once more. And when he has so slipped away my search for him begins anew.87 Origen stresses the regularity of the experience by referring twice to the interchange between presence and absence, which he presents in more concrete terms than Philo: the Logos draws near and withdraws unexpectedly. Like Philo, Origen relates the presence of the Logos to perception of divine mysteries, even though it is not

86 Philo, De Migratione Abrahamis, 34 [trans. Colson and Whitaker]. 87 Origen, Hom. 1.7.280.

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clear whether his reader should interpret this passage either in mystical terms, i.e. an unspeakable union that takes place between the soul and God, or in terms of the impenetrability of the meaning of Scripture.88 It seems most likely that Origen intended both readings simultaneously, since it is difficult to distinguish between a mystical experience and the interpretation of a written text in Origen. Plotinus had presented the flight of the soul to the divine, but for Origen such a flight could not be dissociated from the manifestation of the Logos in Scripture, which is the place that the Logos reveals himself. In other words, Plotinus had exposed the preparation that the soul undertakes in order to complete her spiritual journey that begins with introspection and finishes with the final union between the subject and object of contemplation; whereas Origen sketches the illumination of the soul through the direct guidance of the Logos, who manifests himself in Scripture. Whereas Plotinus and Philo stress the fact that the union is sudden so as to indicate that this union lies beyond the understanding of the soul,89 Origen emphasizes the presence of the divine Logos at the very heart of the union. At the same time, he introduces the notion of separation, which differs from Philo. If Philo describes the way that Logos withholds his illuminating power, Origen stresses the fact that the Logos actually withdraws from the soul, thus providing the passage with a more dramatic overtone. It could be argued that this is due to the fact that Origen introduces the presence of the Logos as an acting agent in more concrete terms than Philo, since the Logos arouses the desire of the soul, but suddenly withdraws from her.90 When she [the soul] is trying to understand something and desiring to know some obscure and secret matters, as long as she cannot find what she is looking for, the Word of God is surely absent from her. But when the thing she sought comes up to meet her, and appears to her, who doubts but that the Word of God is present, illuminating her mind and offering to her the light of knowledge? And again we perceive He is withdrawn from us and comes again, in every matter that is either opened or closed to our understanding.91 Another indication that the reader should not overemphasize the intellectual aspect that relates to perception or the mystical aspect is the fact that Origen relates divine presence and absence to trials and tribulations. Origen does not mention sin as a contributing factor to the withdrawal of the Logos, but he indicates that trying events are part of the spiritual journey of the soul: “[the] fact that emerges is that he appears to his bride all through the winter – that is to say, in the time of tribulations and trials”.92 In a language reminiscent of Ezekiel, Origen argues

88 Louth (1981), 70–71. The same point is argued by King (2005), 16 (cf. Origen, Hom. 1.7.279–80). 89 Louth (1981), 14. Plato, Timaeus, 28c. Plotinus, Enneads, 5.5.6 and 6.9.6. According to Meredith, Plato had introduced divine incomprehensibility and Plotinus had touched upon the theme of divine infinity. See Meredith (1999), 13–14. 90 King (2005), 15. 91 Origen, Com. 3.11.210–11. Philo, De Migratione Abrahamis, 38 and Cyril of Alexandria, Fragmenta in Cantica Canticorum, PG 69, 1284. 92 Origen, Com. 3.11.212.

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that the Logos is present when the bride faces tribulations and trials, which form an inseparable part of the soul’s spiritual journey (or the Church’s historical path). Origen writes about the coming of winter (cf. Song 2:11), when the bride experiences hardships, a time when the Logos manifests his presence in an indirect way, since only his voice is heard by the bride, but he remains hidden. That is to say that the Logos appears, but only in a hidden way. Origen might be following the narrative of the Song, but he also stays consistent with the dialects of divine presence and absence: the voice of the bridegroom is an indication of his presence, but it is equally an indication of his absence. He offers his reader no indication concerning the nature of trials and tribulations: misfortunes might happen, but the Logos always remains at hand. It is not easy to argue for a certain position concerning the nature of the trials, given the fact that Origen never clarifies if he refers to the spiritual journey of the soul or the historical route of the Church.93 However, if we take into consideration the impact that the persecutions against the Church and the presence of the martyrs had on Origen’s psyche and the way that they shaped the production of his exegesis on the Song, then we might be able to put forward a reasonable hypothesis which shows that Origen’s notion of the Logos’ withdrawal radically differs from the intellectual experience of Philo that relates to perception.94 Origen introduced the same analogy between winter and tribulations in Exhortatio ad Martyrium, a work that intended to reinforce the faith (and morale) of Christians at times of persecutions. In his exegesis on the Song, Origen alludes to the winter when tribulations occur, and Exhortatio ad Martyrium cites Mt 24:20–21, the eschatological prophecy of Jesus that is a forewarning that the winter of tribulations is coming for the faithful.95 That visitation, however, whereby she is visited for a while and then left, in order that she may be tested, and then sought again, so that her head may be upheld and she be wholly embraced, lest she either waver in faith or be weighed down in body by the load of her trials, is different.96 The divine Logos visits the bride, a fact that implies the temporary nature of the Logos’ presence, who might depart at a later stage. However, the purpose of his visit is to strengthen the faith of the soul, and after his departure the faith of the soul is put to the test.97 When exhorting his Christians flock not to shrink before the prospect of martyrdom, Origen cites the words of Jesus about the winter of tribulations in order

93 See King (2005), 8 who argues (cf. Bright (1988), 182) that Origen did not distinguish between martyrdom and the nuptial union and that his concept of martyrdom was anchored on the Gospel paradox of losing one’s soul so as to save it (Mk 8:35). 94 Kind (2005), 8 relates the details from Origen’s life that demonstrate his relation to the martyrs: he visited them in prison, attended their trials and even greeted them with a kiss at their execution. At a young age, he longed for martyrdom, but he was prevented from his mother. 95 Origen, Exhortatio ad Martyrium, 11. Cyril of Alexandria, Fragmenta in Cantica, PG 69, 1284. 96 Origen, Com. 3.11.212. 97 Origen, Com. 3.11.21. Origen distinguished between visitations during the soul’s trials and visitations to impart spiritual insights. The one reinforced the soul morale, whereas the other leads her upwards.

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to forewarn Christians that their faith could be tested.98 And his biblical commentary also reminds his readers that their faith might be put to the test during persecution but it also points to the nuptial union with the bridegroom that lies ahead. Therefore, we could make the reasonable assumption that the tribulations and trials that Origen mentioned reflect the historical reality that the Church faced in the third century ce: religious persecution. However, there is an immediate connection between trials and withdrawal, even if Origen does not elaborate on the matter: when the Logos hides from the bride, her faith is tested. The implication is that God consents to the soul’s trials and even though Origen does not articulate this position, it could be surmised from the wording. Origen’s position bears an unmistakable resemblance to the paradoxical language of Ezekiel who had argued that God is at hand even when he has seemingly withdrawn. It is also likely that Origen has set here the theological precedent that the ascetic literature after the fourth century would develop in terms of God’s consent. De Principiis includes the same paradox of divine presence in seeming absence as part of Origen’s overall discourse on divine providence. According to his exegetic work, wickedness belongs to the past of the bride (cf. Song 1:5–6), since she has received the Logos.99 Therefore, even though the perfection of the bride is undeniable, the bridegroom departs from the bride. De Principiis puts forward the supposition that God is responsible for the hardening of one’s heart (cf. Ex 9:12) and argues that people harden their own hearts out of their free will through disobedience and wickedness. The purpose of the passage is to provide an explanation for the existence of wickedness despite God’s own goodness. As part of the argument, Origen distinguishes between two kinds of divine abandonment that could account for the fact that wickedness exists: on the one hand, God withdraws his presence so that one’s wickedness could be revealed (or resurface), and on the other hand, he does so in order to maintain one’s vigilance lest he backslides to his previous sinful habits.100 When dealing with Origen’s work there is a constant temptation to view his theology in light of the controversy that broke out in the late fourth century ce and revolved around the speculative aspects of Origen’s theology and anthropology that were informed allegedly by his platonic background.101 However, Origen demonstrates his pastoral concerns with more consistency than a modern reader might be willing to admit and the passage concerning divine abandonment should be read in light of Origen’s instructions to those converts that have been newly admitted in the Church. The wickedness that Origen mentions is not the Platonic satiety that the souls might experience while contemplating the divine world, but the fake signification of God,

98 Origen, Exhortatio ad Martyrium, 1. 99 Origen, Com. 2.1. 100 Origen, Princ. 3.1.12–13. Lilla, (1971) who has highlighted the accommodation of the classical ideal of instruction (paideia) in Clement. Ethical perfection was a combination of i) human natural tendency to virtue (ἔθος-φύσις); and, ii) [divine] instruction (παιδεία-ἄσκησις-μάθησις). The Talmud had also introduced divine forsakenness in order to exercise the people of God, i.e. Israel. See Zlotowitz (1979), 154. 101 For a summary of Origen’s speculative theology see Edwards (2002).

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i.e. idolatry. Thus, he warns against a potential backsliding to idolatry which is the sinful past of the converts when they venerated fake gods. Therefore, there exists a remarkable consistency between Origen’s exegetical commentary in which he has noted the previous idolatry of the bride, and the part in De Principiis that Origen introduces the kinds of divine abandonment in that they both address newly converts: the Logos visits the bride to strengthen her faith, but withdraws his presence so that those elements from her previous wickedness could resurface.102 If her conversion has been wholehearted and her faith is genuine then, she will be strengthened, otherwise her faith will falter and diminish. Origen does not deny the possibility that those who have turned from ignorance to faith, might return readily to their previous ignorance, but at the same time he ascertains that the Logos remains at hand, even when wickedness resurfaces. However, Origen employs different ways to illustrate the dialectic between presence and absence, since in his exegesis he exploits the biblical narrative, whereas De Principiis implies that God’s consent demonstrates God’s presence in what seems like absence. Otis notes that there exists an innate weakness in the soul in Origen’s thought to which De Principiis and the commentary on the Song refer with the term slothfulness.103 The unexpected withdrawal of God maintains the soul’s vigilance lest she experiences slothfulness, which Origen presents as a likely possibility throughout the soul’s journey. However, due to the historical and theological circumstances that surround the production of the commentary on the Song and have already been presented, it seems that Origen understood this lapse as a return to idolatry.104 Even though Origen believes that the soul faces the prospect of divine abandonment even at the stage of perfection due to this innate weakness, his thought should not be construed in pessimistic terms, since Origen directs his reader to the final union between God and the soul.105 Cheek has argued that what lays behind Origen’s exegesis on the Song is the motion of history towards an eschatological consummation of the union between the bride and her beloved; an idea that Cheek sums in the word Heilsgeschichte.106 In this context, the dialectic between divine presence and absence should be viewed as God’s leading human history to a finale or an eschaton. Human history is the history of the progressive revelation of Jesus that the Song illustrates with the analogy of the kisses of the bridegroom and his leaping over the mountains, and the progressive revelation of the fragrance, the sweetness and the final taste of the wine. In order to illustrate the fact that the time of the union remains unknown to the bride, Origen employs a clearly eucharistic language: the union between the

102 Origen, Com. 2.5.138. Origen appropriates the classic motto ‘know thyself ’ to indicate that the soul has turned from ignorance to knowledge (faith). See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 1.40. Clemens, Stromata, 1.14.60.3. Origen, Com. 2.5.128. 103 Origen, Princ. 1.6.2. Otis (1958), 102. 104 Origen, Com. 2.3.117. 105 Louth (1981), 71–72. 106 Cheek (1962) has illustrated the Jewish foundation of the theme. Thus, Origen did not develop only themes of classic Greek philosophy, but as an exegete he formed his thought within a distinct tradition that was anchored on the Old Testament.

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bridegroom and the bride will be consummated “on the festal day in the heavenly places, when the great feast is set”.107 As in the rabbinic interpretation so in Origen the desire of the bride remains unfulfilled, despite the progressive initiation of the bride to the mysteries of the bridegroom. Therefore, divine abandonment illustrates the progressive presence of God within history, who speaks through enigmas theophanies and revelations. Despite the fact that the incarnation of the Logos has brought a new level of divine revelation after which the soul conceives that she had been viewing God through mere types of his presence, for Origen the incarnation is not the final union between God and the soul. As Cheek has noted, [t]he redemptive work of God has been fulfilled in the incarnation and man is already redeemed. But the plan waits to be consummated in the future at the end of time; man does not yet fully participate in the blessings of redemption. The redemptive blessings, however, can be participated in by anticipation through the relationship which the believer establishes with the Incarnate Word; through his sharing in the gifts of the Spirit; through his participation in the community of the Church.108 To sum, in his exegesis Origen has introduced the dialectic between divine presence and withdrawal. His exegesis seems to be anchored on the biblical narrative, even though he revises several positions from Greek philosophy and Philo, such as the sudden character of the disruption and the possibility of an intellectual interpretation of divine withdrawal, where perception finds that some meaning is impenetrable. However, due to the fact that Origen’s thought was affected by the presence of the martyrs in the Church, he introduces the possibility of two kinds of divine withdrawal at the stage of perfection so that God could strengthen the faith of the soul in his providential care for his bride. Origen did not rule out a potential relapse of the soul to her previous wickedness that he presents in terms of returning to idolatry. Yet, that God consents to trials and tribulations is a theological device that enables Origen to argue God’s presence even in seeming absence. Finally, divine abandonment bears an eschatological undertone, since God directs the bride to a final union, a position that implies that God reveals his presence only partially as he remains hidden from his bride. Gregory of Nyssa: Abandoning All Concepts

In his exegesis, Gregory of Nyssa acknowledged his indebtedness to Origen which means that Gregory took into consideration the Alexandrian’s suggestions about the theological value of the Song and the identification of the characters that take part in 107 Origen, Com. 2.11.167. Origen distinguished between various levels of revelation with regard to the Logos’ presence; the Logos’ fragrance and his presence. Origen referred to the latter (i.e. presence) in the future tense, thus indicating its anticipation by the soul. See also Origen, Com. 1.4.78. Origen gave an eschatological twist to his argument as he referred to the union between the soul and Jesus. According to Origen, the Logos has taken over the soul’s physical and spiritual functions. 108 Cheek (1962), 120.

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the drama.109 Besides, Gregory exploits the Origenist notion that God progressively reveals himself in the Old Testament, a fact that reached its climax with the incarnation.110 He maintains Origen’s idea that the Song is an allegory that reveals the progressive initiation of the soul (or the Church) to the divine mysteries. However, whereas Origen only implies the corporeal manifestation of the Logos, since the encounter with him takes place through the medium of Scripture, Gregory explicitly teaches the direct and real presence of the Logos within the soul, a reality that goes beyond the manifestation of the Logos in Scriptures. His exegesis deals with the mystical encounter between the soul and God, where the soul longs after the knowledge of God’s nature, but that does not mean that Gregory holds an intellectualist notion of this union according to which the divine mysteries elevate cognition or discursive thought: the virtuous life holds a central place in his interpretation, since the soul ascends to divine knowledge and simultaneously progresses in the acquisition of the virtues. Daniélou and Meredith have argued that Gregory’s moral teaching and notion of divine knowledge are equally important.111 As Meredith comments, we find in the works of Gregory’s exegetical maturity that the moral, the contemplative and the ascetic life are deeply related to each other. In his earlier writings he seems to have thought of the relation as only one-way, that is, of virtue as the gateway to gnōsis; but in his more mature writings the movement is two way.112 Gregory thinks that the more the soul advances morally, the more she is introduced to the divine mysteries, which is the means by which the soul discovers the imprint of the divine bridegroom that she bears within.113 In fact, Gregory follows two threads of thought that seem intertwined according to which the ability of the soul to participate in the virtues is due to her participation in the divine image, and the virtuous life enables the soul to recover the divine image within.114 The two positions are equally balanced in his exegesis. Gregory interprets the episodes in the Song that the bridegroom abandons his bride in terms of divine transcendence. The two works of Gregory’s spiritual and exegetical maturity, i.e. De Vita Moisis and In Canticum, provide sufficient evidence

109 Gregory, Hom. Prologus, 13. For various aspects concerning the details of the composition see Cahill (1981), 447–60. Also, Munitiz, (1971), 385–95. Daniélou (1966), 159–69. Canévet (1971), 144–68. Meredith, (2000), 78–89. 110 Gregory, Hom. 5, 140. 111 Meredith (2000), 59–62. 112 According to Meredith, before the composition of his Commentary, Gregory had shaped the opinion that the summit of Christian excellence is not a mystical union but an ethical perfection in the life of the virtues. 113 Balás (1966), 152–57 has presented the close relationship between Gregory’s anthropology, ethical thought and mystical theology according to which the soul is meant to participate in divine attributes – virtue is an attribute of God – and as a result the virtuous life consists in the soul’s participation in God. 114 For a discussion on the notion of participation see Balás (1966). Also, Keenan (1950), 167–207 and Ladner (1958), 59–94.

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that Gregory progressively developed an apophatic language predominated by negative statements and predicates. On the way to spiritual perfection knowledge is imparted to the soul about the divine being. But, as Balthasar put it, such knowledge only conceives the fact that the divine being (ὅντως ὄν) exists (εἶναι), but it does not disclose the divine nature as such.115 De Vita Moisis presents the progressive ascension of Moses from light (φῶς)116 to darkness (γνόφος)117 and then to unknowability.118 In Canticum depicts the sudden departure of the bridegroom.119 It seems that Gregory adjusts his theological positions to fit into the narrative of the biblical text that he interprets and this is the reason why Moses ascends and enters into the cloud that covers Mount Sinai, whereas the bride finds and then suddenly loses.120 However, the notion of ascension and abandonment seem to signify the mystery of God’s incomprehensibility, the realization of the impossibility to fully grasp the divine being in its nature.121 It lies beyond the scope of this thesis to present the sources of Gregory’s theology on divine incomprehensibility or discuss the technical language that Gregory developed.122 In a summary, Gregory seems to have been the first Christian thinker who perceived incomprehensibility as an expression of divine infinity: nothing could circumscribe God, because the divine is simple in its essence. From this ontological observation Gregory was led to the conclusion that the knowledge of God is infinite and that spiritual life is the unceasing quest of a knowledge that could never be exhausted. As it concerns divine abandonment in Gregory’s thought, there are three points that should be noted: i) whether the image of being abandoned by God and the fact that God leads Moses into the dark cloud, signify the same reality; ii) the prospect of divine abandonment at the state of perfection; and iii) the notion of trials and sin in the state of divine abandonment. i) As it concerns the first point, In Canticum introduces the language of a sudden departure which signifies the unexpected withdrawal of God. This image is peculiar in this work and De Vita does not allude to it, but describes the journey of Moses in terms of a progressive ascent to Mount Horeb. Evidently, Gregory modifies his exegesis according to the text that he reads and therefore differentiates his language in order to fit into the biblical narrative. De Vita presents God as communicating with Moses and at the same time denying access to his divine nature: the narrative is permeated with the imagery of a progressive ascension, communication and darkness. 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

Balthasar (1995), 27–108. Gregory, Moses, 2.19 (cf. Ex 3:2). Gregory, Moses, 2.162 (cf. Ex 20:21). Gregory, Moses, 2.233 (cf. Ex 33:18–23). Gregory, Hom. 6, 181 (cf. Song 3:1–4). Compare Ex 33:18–23 to Song 3:4. Gregory, Moses, 2.236; Hom. 12, 370. Divine incomprehensibility in Gregory of Nyssa is the main subject in various scholarly works. Laird (2004); (2001), 126–32; (1999), 592–616 has examined the role of the Logos in order to argue against an interpretation of divine incomprehensibility as mere intellectualism. Daniélou in DSp, 175–307 and his introduction in Grégoire de Nysse, Vie de Moise, J. Daniélou (ed.), SC1 (Paris: Cerf, 1955), xiv. Geljon (2005), 152–77. Meredith (2000), 62. Ware (1975), 125–36. Lossky (1969), 460–71.

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The Song illustrates the sudden departure of the bridegroom and contains images of communication, union, separation (darkness) and re-union. Both works introduce Gregory’s position that God’s essence lies beyond the intellectual (discursive) and intelligible comprehension of the soul, even though there is evidence that Gregory significantly revised his position about the progress of the soul when commenting on the Song. According to the biblical narrative in Exodus, Moses desires to reach the summit of divine knowledge and therefore ascends Mount Horeb but only to discover that his desire has remained unquenched as God’s abode remains utterly surrounded by darkness,123 an image that signifies the utterly incomprehensible nature of God. In his interpretation of the ascent of Moses, the encounter between God and Moses takes place within the dark cloud. However, Gregory makes no allusion to the image of the bridegroom that departs from the bride and features in the Song, but he does employ the image of Moses when he discusses the experience of the bride in his In Canticum.124 It might be true that the introduction of the theme of a progressive ascent from light to darkness was devised by Gregory in order to expose his position that the divine nature is incomprehensible. But the In Canticum presses on the position of God’s incomprehensibility through the image of God’s abandoning the soul. Laird indicated a shift in Gregory’s exegesis in his In Canticum: according to Laird, the In Canticum illustrates a more optimistic position in Gregory with regard to the summit of spiritual life. If, in his De Vita, Gregory had argued in terms of darkness and incomprehensibility, in the In Canticum, Gregory shifted to the language of union and light.125 It is true that the motif of abandonment was part of the narrative. Yet, the theme of abandonment needs to be seen in connection to the notion of union. Rather than dealing with utter separation of ‘discursive’ and ‘intelligent’ thought (διάνοια-νοῦς) from the divine reality, Gregory highlighted the notion of separation and re-union. Any overemphasis to the exegetical similarities between the De Vita and In Canticum would do an injustice to the fact that the motif of love – being the main element of the Song – communicated the notion of union 123 Gregory, Moses, 2.162–64 (cf. 2 Sm. 22:10). 124 Gregory, Hom. 6. 181. Meredith (2000), 84 believes that the two accounts of the De Vita and In Canticum might share common themes with regard to spiritual progress, but it is important to note their different elements. Gregory presents γνόφος (cf. Ex 20:21) as the summit of spiritual ascent in the Song, whereas in De Vita it is darkness (σκότος) (cf. Ex 33:20–23). As a result, Meredith concludes that the Song introduces divine incomprehensibility, whereas the Vita refers to divine infinity. However, the two terms are intertwined and Gregory does not differentiate sharply between them: the cloud (γνόφος) is the darkness where God dwells. 125 See Laird (1999) who acknowledges Meredith for highlighting the balance between light and darkness in Gregory and at the same time downplays the significance of Puech and Daniélou who had argued Gregory as the mystic of darkness par excellence. According to Laird, In Canticum demonstrates the elegant balance between “darkness mysticism” and “light” spirituality in Gregory. See Meredith (2000), 52–101 who thinks that the notion of darkness was never integrated into Gregory’s Commentary. Daniélou (1944), 190–99; DSp 2.2, 1872–1886. Puech (1978), 119–41. Crouzel (1989), 121 had already expressed his objections to a sharp contrast between Origen as a mystic of light and Gregory of Nyssa as a mystic of darkness arguing that there could be no certainty that the two experiences actually stand apart in either writer. For a thorough analysis of the imagery of union in In Canticum see Laird (2004), 131–53.

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between God and the soul. Thus, the theme of abandonment needs to direct us to the motif of re-union between bride and bridegroom. ii) Despite the fact that Plotinus and Philo had both touched upon the idea of divine infinity,126 it is only Gregory who argued the notion of divine abandonment as the summit of knowledge about God. It needs to be noticed that Origen, in his Commentary on John, had also addressed the theme of separation with regard to the soul’s perception of the divine. However, it is acknowledged that Origen never supported divine infinity.127 What Origen indicated is the fact that the Logos remained with the intellect for as long as the latter was capable of holding him;128 but, he would soon depart. Origenist exegesis depended on Jn 2:11 and 4:40 and lacked the Gregorian overtones of the soul’s seeking of and ascending to “knowing God in unknowing”, since Origen denied divine infinity.129 However, it is in another point that Origen and Gregory came close in their exegesis. Origen and Gregory envisaged separation from the divine as an experience that took place at a spiritually mature level. For Origen, at the summit of spiritual development, the soul had experienced trials that Origen associated with divine separation. Origen’s argument held more ethical overtones than that of Gregory of Nyssa. In his turn, the Cappadocian exegete maintained a more sophisticated argument than Origen’s: he did not refer to trials, but to divine incomprehensibility.130 Yet, for both authors, we need to notice that the theme of abandonment was introduced after the soul’s initial ascension. It is the biblical narrative that urged the two exegetes to introduce the theme of separation and re-union. However, they both established their thought on theological and anthropological suppositions. For Origen and Gregory, the Song of Songs drew its theological value from the fact that its content was of one accord with divine revelation. Thus, the motif was incorporated in their exegeses as a theme introduced in the biblical narrative. Origen indicated that divine paideia found its ultimate expression at the summit of spiritual life where the soul remained subjected to trials. Origen argued the above position in his other works, such as De Oratione, Exhortatio ad Martyrium and Homiliæ in Numeros. Gregory

126 Geljon (2005) objects to the idea that Gregory was the first thinker to introduce the theme of divine infintity (cf. Mühlenberg (1966)) and agrees that the origin of the notion should be sought in Philo (cf. Guyot, (1906)). 127 Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium Joannis, 13.52.347 [p. 224 in SC 222]. It seems that Origen follows the Platonic notion that whatever is un-circumscribed is not defined and thus it is a non-being, i.e. whatever lacks form or definition. See Meredith (1999), 13 and 66. Gregory changes the terms of the argument so that what defines or circumscribes something, is the presence of an opposite quality (e.g. light and darkness). Since there are no opposite qualities in God (e.g. good-evil), it follows that the divine knows no definition and is un-circumscribed. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1.168 [edition in GNO 1]. See Otis (1958). 128 Gregory reads this in the allegory of the Canaanites and the Samaritans of the Gospel. 129 Though Gregory and Origen think that the soul could not fully grasp God, their positions were grounded on different anthropological and theological presuppositions: Origen attributes this limitation to human weakness after the fall, whereas Gregory believes that it is the divine that is incomprehensible per se. See Laird (1999), 593 [footnote no. 3]. 130 See the overall presentation in Gregory, Hom. 6, 173–99 and 12, 340–70.

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dismissed this Origenist line of interpretation in his De Vita and In Canticum. Yet, he maintained the notion of divine paideia. Only this time, paideia did not instruct the soul about her fall (Origen), but about the true nature of the divine. Thus, the fact remains that both exegetes attested that the soul experienced abandonment – in different levels – in her pursuit for the divine bridegroom. It is apparent that Origen and Gregory referred to different kinds of experiences connected to the theme of abandonment. For Origen, it was an experience in ethical terms where the soul was subjected to trials. Yet we need to remember that Origen also associated the experience with the hiding of the bridegroom from the intellect. For Origen, the soul remained puzzled about the meaning of the scriptures. For Gregory, the experience revealed the incomprehensibility of the divine nature. We could not overlook this fundamental difference between the two exegetes. Yet, we need not exaggerate their exegetical divergence. Like Origen, Gregory also presented the experience of abandonment as a distressful condition. Balthasar might have highlighted the importance of the soul’s frustration and despair, but Laird has smoothed over any Origenist overtones by indicating that, according to Gregory, the soul did not really reach despair, since she was not deprived of the divine presence altogether: even though she did not fully grasp the divine, her desire was fulfilled through the presence of the divine within her (divine image).131 We could not agree more with Laird’s observation. Yet, the fact remains that both Origen and Gregory attested that, at the stage of spiritual maturity, an experience has taken place that took the soul by surprise and momentarily caused distress to her. Both exegetes derived this position from the imagery presented in the Song. The imagery of separation is followed after the simile of union. Mosshammer has researched on Gregory’s intellectual development from his De Beatitudinibus to his In Canticum.132 His article is an excellent presentation of the way that Gregory’s thought developed throughout the years. However, Mosshammer did not discuss the fact that Gregory advanced his thought further in distinction to the Origenist tradition. This fact becomes more apparent when we take into consideration Gregory’s exegesis on the third beatitude (Mt 5:5),133 and compare it to his interpretation on Song 3:1. In both cases Gregory presented the idea of distress that has taken place at the soul’s spiritual ascension.134 For Gregory, the beatitudes were a spiritual ladder of ascensions. The beatitudes were addressed to spiritually mature

131 Gregory, Hom. 12, 369. Balthasar (1995), 104 construes Gregory’s thought in light of the latter’s thoughts on the structure of time and being (cf. Gregory, Hom. 12, 369). Laird (2004), 88–89 and 96 [footnote no. 179] disagrees with Balthasar about the possibility of a psychological reading that would have sadness lead the soul to complete ignorance about God, since the pursuit itself turns to the soul’s spiritual satisfaction. For Laird, the issue is not whether soul experiences a sort of frustration, but whether she is presented with a ‘consolation prize’. Williams (1993), 242 has reached the same conclusion with Laird but he argues from a more ascetic point of view. Balás (1966), 158. Rombs (2001), 288–93. 132 Mosshammer (2000), 359–87. 133 Gregory, Beat. 3.98.24 [reference to number of homily, and page in GNO 7.2]. 134 For a discussion of Gregorian exegesis on Mt 5:4 see Vinel (2000), 139–47.

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souls that were advancing in spiritual life. Gregory commented on the fact that, in the beatitudes, mourning was part of the third beatitude: mourning was close to the peak of spiritual ascension.135 According to Gregory, in an Origenist fashion, at the summit of spiritual life, the soul meditated on her nature, her previous condition (i.e. before the fall) and the fact that she had rediscovered a treasure that she possessed but lost due to her fall.136 Gregory defined sorrow as “the loss of something the heart was set upon”, i.e. a deprivation.137 His exegesis echoed the Origenist Homilies on the Song: the soul needed to meditate on her nature, in order to advance to further spiritual hights. Most significantly, Gregory seems to have accommodated the classical image of the Platonic cave in the Republic:138 the soul that had looked upon light descended to the shadowy world.139 Origen had explicitly engaged the role of trials as paideia in this instance; a fact that Gregory continued to overlook. Gregory focused on the contrast between the soul’s previous status and her current condition. Grief was the product of the soul’s spiritual progress. The more she realised her loss of divine heights, the more she grieved about this loss. Gregory emphasised the fact that the soul possessed this Good before the fall.140 In the In Canticum, grief appears in connection with divine incomprehensibility. Gregory had presented the idea of divine transcendence in his earlier work De Beatitudinibus. He also related transcendence to grief in this instance.141 It was not divine incomprehensibility that caused the soul’s grief, but the idea that she had fallen from her previous blessed status. Thus, Gregory employed a semi-Origenist line of reasoning. However, in his In Canticum, Gregory refined his thought by highlighting the close relation between grief and divine transcendence. From a sort of anthropologically-connected perception of grief which bears more psychological overtones, Gregory moved to a theological conception that emphasised grief as intimately connected to divine knowledge.142 What we need to conclude is that, despite this shifting in his exegetical position, Gregory maintained the idea of an “event” within spiritual life that, in its own terms, saddened the soul without involving the notion of sin or trials. In his De Beatitudinibus, Gregory illustrated a clear distinction between past, present and future: The one who has been able to look upon the truly Good and thereafter considered the poverty of human nature, will surely hold his soul to be unfortunate, regarding it as a sorrow that his present life is deprived of that Good. Therefore the saying

135 Gregory follows the Gospel narrative (Mt 5:1) according to which Jesus addresses the beatitudes from a mountain. Gregory, Beat. 2.89.31 and also 3.98.24. 136 Gregory, Beat. 3.104.1. 137 Gregory, Beat. 3.102.16. 138 Plato, Respublica, 516e. For the use of Plato’s myth of the cave in Gregory see Meredith (1993), 49–61. 139 Gregory, Beat. 3.103.17. 140 Gregory, Beat. 3.105.10. 141 Gregory, Beat. 3.105.5. 142 De Beatitudinibus feature more homiletical elements that intend to move Gregory’s audience. In Canticum is a demonstration of Gregory’s theological maturity as he deals with divine infinity in his refutation of the Arianism of Eunomius and the peculiar Christology of Apollinarius.

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does not seem to me to bless the pain, but rather the knowledge of the good, since what is being sought is not present in life.143 iii) Finally, the lack of any reference to sin as cause of abandonment remained among the main features of Gregorian exegeses on the Song. Origen had only implied the presence of sin in his work and only with regard to her paideia. Thus, the soul was not chastised by the experience. She was instructed to look at her origin and realise her immanent weakness. Thus, even if Origen had referred to trials – in connection to divine abandonment – it was not sin that had caused the presence of trials. Gregory maintained this distinction between the experience of divine abandonment and the presence of sin: it was not the latter that had caused divine abandonment. It is more likely that Gregory refrained from associating the two events because of the biblical narrative. As it was observed, it is the narrative that provides no explicit hints of misdeeds that had caused the departure of the bridegroom. Unlike Origen, Gregory overlooked the presence of sin altogether: the soul ascended to the divine unhindered. We agree with Otis that it was due to diverging anthropologies that Origen and Gregory presented different approaches to sin. As Otis observed, Origen was occupied with the idea of the soul’s potential lapsing, and her “return” to the divine.144 To this position, Otis juxtaposed Gregory’s optimism: Gregory highlighted the soul’s “pursuit” of divine knowledge instead.145 This might be so. However, the reason why Gregory overlooked the presence of sin is not merely because he refined Origenism. As Meredith and Keenan have shown, Gregory illustrated the theological tension of Patristic literature to argue spiritual life in terms of the efficacy of the redemptive work of Jesus.146 Thus, that the soul ascended unhindered was not due to her knowledge of her own weakness, as Origen might have put it.147 It was due to the incarnation and the passion.148 Thus, Gregory viewed sin and human weakness as utterly overcome by means of the incarnation.

143 Gregory, Beat. 3.104.1. 144 Otis (1958), 101 argues that Origen holds the Platonic position that mutability is a negative attribute of the soul: changeability brings moral mutability and leads the soul away from good. On the other hand, Gregory has changed the terms through the introduction of epektasis, i.e. an unceasing quest for the divine. Thus, changeability is the ability of the soul to pursue after her object of unceasing desire: God. 145 Gregory, Hom. 12, 366. 146 Gregory might be alluding to Athanasius here. Meredith (2000), 69 and 87. On the centrality of Christ in Gregory’s thought see Keenan (1950), 167–207. In Vita Antonii, Athanasius presents ascetic life in light of the incarnation, since Athanasius’ Antony is victorious over passions due to Jesus’ victory over sin. For Meredith, the centrality of Christ in Gregory’s ethics generated from the latter’s reaction to the human minimalism of Apollinarius. See Meredith (1993), 49–61. 147 Gregory, Hom. 6, 174 (cf. Phil 3:12). The term epektasis was treated as a technical term signifying the ceaseless pursuit of the soul after the divine due to divine infinity only after Daniélou published his monumental work on Gregory of Nyssa. See J. Daniélou (1944), 291–307; (1979), 56–71. Canévet (1972), 443–54. 148 Gregory, Hom. 2, 51. For Gregory, Jesus’ redemptive work is realized in the efficacy of baptism. The soul had lost her divine image through the fall, but baptism has restored this divine image within the soul.

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But this is not to say that Gregory believed that the soul was assaulted by trials any more. He illustrated such trials in terms of hindrance: [The soul] should look into herself and walk on the divine way with every safety, leaping across and overcoming all the hindrances that appear on her way from temptations.149 We ought to note that in this excerpt Gregory maintains several points of Origenist thought:150 the soul had meditated on her nature, and thus, she overcame what might obstruct her way to the divine. It is important to highlight the fact that Gregory referred to temptations that seem to continue afflicting the soul. Indeed, Gregory did not deny that the soul remained subjected to assaults from evil spirits and pride: So, if someone establishes his soul to have tranquility in waveless silence, [the soul] shall not be disturbed by the evil spirits, or arrogant in pride, or foamy from the waves of anger, or shaken by any other passion and wandering in the winds that stir up the various waves of passions.151 What Gregory implied is that, at the summit of the spiritual life, the soul was not unassaulted by trials and temptations: the soul reached the stage of apatheia. The term indicates that the soul remained undisturbed from temptations assaulting her. As Daniélou has observed, temptations are coterminous with this present life.152 As long as the soul had remained in this life, she remained subjected to trials and temptations. Comparing Origen with Gregory of Nyssa, Otis ably observed that “Gregory, of course, refers to temptation en route, but for him this is never a temptation to relapse once the final ‘shadow’ has been entered”.153 We need to view Otis’ observation in terms of Gregory’s eschatological direction. The soul remained afflicted by temptations. However, the grace brought by the incarnation “secured” the soul from lapsing. The soul continued to labour ethically until the time of her rest to come.154 149 Gregory, Hom. 3, 80. Gregory, Beat. 1.85.1. In both instances, Gregory uses similar expressions that the soul that has looked into herself could not be assailed by pride. He explains that “looking into herself ” means meditating on her humble origin. However, the overall homiletical overtones of the De Beatitudinibus suggest that Gregory is carried away while addressing his audience, and there is no indication that he delves into matters of Christian mysticism. In the latter work, pride seems not to spring from the soul’s spiritual achievements, but from earthly-possessions. 150 Gregory, Hom. 2, 58–59 where Gregory relates pride to the soul’s sinful past. 151 Gregory, Hom. 3, 81. 152 For the theme of temptations in Gregory see Daniélou (1944), 87–92. 153 Otis (1958), 116 [footnote no. 52]. 154 Modern research discusses Gregory’s eschatology in relation to his universalism or in light of the idea of epektasis. Mosshammer (1993), 70–93. Ludlow (2000). As a result, it is often overlooked that an aspect of Gregory’s eschatology is the fact that the soul expects her liberation from trials. If the idea of epektasis and unknowing knowledge seem to diminish the importance of eschatology for Gregory, the fact that in both De Beatutidinibus and In Canticum Gregory introduces a clear distinction between “here” and “there”, or “now” and “then”, makes evidence that Gregory includes a genuine Christian anticipation of the eschaton as the point in history that brings something novel to the soul. Alexandre (2000), 257–91.

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To this end, Gregory introduced the notion of interchanging periods between rest and trials, which he seems to have developed independently of Origen. In fact, Gregory followed the language of the Song that introduces the interaction between “winter” and “spring”. Whereas the latter connoted spiritual rest – the time that virtues had shone forth – the former period was synonymous with trials and temptations: “this present time lies between the two seasons of the winter dejection and of the summer communion of the fruits”. Gregory presented the soul’s current condition as balancing between the cultivation of virtues and the expectation of trials. He made the distinction between “early figs” (ὄλυνθοι) and “mature figs” (γλυκέος καὶ τελείου καρποῦ). That is to say that, Gregory distinguished between the initial fruits of virtue and the mature works of virtue. This distinction was meant to introduce the position that this life is conducted with the interaction of the winter of trials and the spring of virtue. Thus, Gregory maintained the Origenist tension between resting and labouring. Regardless of the soul’s spiritual ascension to the divine, the present life was expected to be conducted in labour and rest. Gregory alluded to Mt 13:39 to bring forth the scriptural foundation of his argument: For this reason, on the one hand, it expressly announces the provision of evils, and on the other hand, it does not present perfectly the fruits of virtue. But, she [i.e. the soul] will deposit them in proper time, when the summer shall come. You know about the meaning of the summer from the voice of the Lord which says that: “the harvest is the consummation of the age”.155 Gregory presented this life as conducted in tension between labouring (winter) and resting (spring), until the Second Coming that signaled the soul’s harvesting the fruits of her virtue (summer). Thus, Gregory maintained a clear eschatological perspective. In arguing thus, Gregory showed the need for moral and ethical struggle. Gregory exhorted to ethical vigilance and also presented us with the idea that spiritual life is not an intellectual exercise. Moral life was standing at the same level with the soul’s grasping God through faith. Finally, we need to look more closely at the expression μεθόριος. Gregory did not find refuge in the notion of abandonment in order to argue that this life was balanced between two conditions. Unlike his contemporaries Macarius and Evagrius, Gregory developed a spirituality that derived from his distinct anthropology. This life is μεθόριος (being a boundary); for the human being is a μεθόριος being a boundary between heaven and earth, the intelligible and tangible, anticipation and fulfilment.156 In Ladner’s word, [the] temporal rhythm is one of life and death, of wakefulness and sleep, of tension and relaxation, of continuous renewal until time be consumed and consummated

155 Gregory, Hom. 5, 155. 156 Gregory, Hom. 11, 334. For the notion of man standing between two realities see Gregory, De Opificio Hominis, PG 44, 125–256. For the central role of Christ in such a cosmic plan see Balthasar (1995), 146–47. Thunberg (1985), 295–97. Corsini (1972), 455–62. Something similar has been introduced by Nemesius of Emessa, De Natura Hominis, 1, 45.

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in eternity. What Gregory says about reformation and time, resurrection and eternity, stands on the border line between the philosophical-physiological and the mystical-ascetical aspects of his anthropology.157 Gregory developed an anthropology in which he implanted the notion of mediation at the centre: in all his aspects, man is a medium between two conditions. This position shows that Gregory provided a uniform understanding of man: before the fall – mediating between intelligible and tangible; in this present life – mediating between labour and rest; and in the future life – mediating between anticipation and fulfilment. What Gregory achieved was a theological synthesis that maintained more positive elements about humanity than Origenist thought. Gregory gave his spiritual teaching a remarkable balance in arguing divine presence and absence without referring to sin, even as a potential foe. And again, the notion of absence due to divine incomprehensibility introduced the notion that man was meant to exist in a state of mediating between extreme conditions uniting them and illustrating their dialectical form. Theodoret of Cyrrhus: Combining Exegesis and Asceticism

Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Nilus of Ancyra composed their exegetical works on the Song in a theological milieu that appreciated the exegetical feats of the previous generations, in which the two great men, Origen and Gregory, belonged. Theodoret mentions them by name.158 Despite the fact that Nilus of Ancyra does not acknowledge any exegete prior to his age, the critical text introduced by Rosenbaum and the textual analysis by Guérard have provided sufficient evidence to establish the exegetical indebtedness of Nilus to Origen and Gregory.159 It is important to stress the likelihood that Nilus would have been familiar with the work of either exegete in order to demonstrate the points of continuity or discontinuity between his though and that of Origen and Gregory. Alongside the previous exegetical tradition, one should take into consideration that Theodoret and Nilus composed their works at a time when organized monastic establishments had appeared across the Eastern Roman Empire, and when Evagrius of Pontus had introduced a sophisticated ascetic system of thought. In what follows, I will try to present the exegetical positions of Theodoret and Nilus in light of both the previous tradition and this sophisticated system of asceticism in order to explore the extent to which their exegetical approach has been affected by either factor. In doing so, I will suggest that the two exegetes of late antiquity progressively departed from the theological agenda that Origenist and Gregorian exegesis had established, and enriched their reading of Scripture with ascetic ideals. Origen lived in the age of the Christian martyrs, when asceticism was primitive in its structures. Though Gregory of Nyssa was a personal acquaintance of Evagrius 157 Ladner (1958), 59–94 [citation on p. 86]. 158 Theodoret, Expl. Præfatio, 32B. 159 See the introduction by Guérard (1994), 23.

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of Pontus, there is no evidence that Gregory was familiar with the distinct ascetic system that has been associated with Evagrius and became widespread in Egypt and Syria.160 In fact, it seems that Gregory preserves elements of a pre-Evagrian ascetic spirituality which, as Keenan has observed, it had been shaped by two of Gregory’s siblings: Basil and Makrina.161 On the contrary, Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Nilus of Ancyra lived after Evagrius’ time, when the evagrian ascetic synthesis had already established its presence in Syria. By the time Theodoret became bishop of Cyrrhus in Syria, asceticism had been thriving in the region and Evagrianism had found fertile soil in which it thrived.162 His Historia Religiosa is a historical witness to the strong personal affiliation between the bishop of Cyrrhus and the ascetic communities in Syria. However, Urbainczyk has supported that Theodoret composed his biographical work as part of his church-politics and in the context of a theological and ecclesiastical struggle for dominion between Antiochean theology and Alexandrian thought.163 However, such an overemphasis on church politics turns a blind eye to the fact that Theodoret’s life had been marked profoundly by the presence of Christian anchorites since his childhood,164 dismisses altogether Theodoret’s expressed admiration for Syrian ascetics – he was a monk at Nicerte near Apameia – and overlooks the fact that Theodoret, a prolific writer, composed his work at a time when ascetic biographies were an established genre (as witnessed by Athanasius and Palladius’ biographies).165 Rice observes that, even as a bishop, Theodoret embraced monastic ideals and for a short period he was presented with the chance to return to his monastery (449 ce).166 That is not to say that church-politics did not play any role in the thought of a bishop who participated actively in the ecclesiastical fallout between Alexandria and Antioch that was the aftermath of the struggle for power between Constantinople and Alexandria during the Nestorian controversy.167 Even so, the deeper affection that the bishop of Cyrrhus

160 For an examination of Gregory’s influence on Evagrius see Jaeger (1954), 208. Basil, the older brother of Gregory, appointed Evagrius as lector and Bousset has suggested that Evagrius might have received the monastic habit from Basil, even though Bamberger doubts it. Gregory of Nazianzus, the personal friend of Basil, ordained Evagrius as a deacon shortly after Basil’s death in 379 ce and Gregory of Nyssa dedicated a letter to Evagrius on the occasion of the latter’s ordination. Evagrius participated in the Council of Constantinople (381 ce) in which Gregory of Nyssa opened the proceedings. Gregory of Nyssa, De Deitate adversus Evagrium, GNO 9 (1967), 331–41. See Bamberger (1981), xxxvi–xxxvii [footnote no. 55]. 161 Keenan (1950), 169–72. 162 For the history and character of monasticism in Syria see Vööbus (1958–1960). Escolan (1999). 163 Urbainczyk (2002). 164 For Urbainczyk, Theodoret deliberately sketches his close bonds with the ascetics in order to strengthen his administrative authority in the local Church. Theodoret relates the story that he was the fruit of prayers from a monk, Macedonius, because his mother could not conceive. See Theodoret of Cyrrhus, A History of the Monks of Syria. For the personal affiliation of Theodoret with the Syrian ascetics at an early age see the introduction in CS 88, pp. xi–xiii. 165 Theodoret, A History, xii; Epistulae 80 and 81 [in SC 98, pp. 188–98]. 166 Theodoret, A History, xiii; Epistula 119 [in SC 111, pp. 76–82]. 167 See Pásztori-Kupán (2006), 18 who thinks that In Canticum and Historia Religiosa were written at the same stage of Theodoret’s theological career.

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had developed for Syrian asceticism oughts to be equally acknowledged and inform our judgements.168 According to Canivet, Theodoret exposes ascetic ideals in his Historia Religiosa,169 even though, when Theodoret composed his biographies, his primary intention had not been to systematize or codify ascetic teachings: unlike the Apophthegmata Patrum or the Historia Lausiaca, Theodoret longed to commit to written memory the extraordinary feats of Syriac ascetics. However, it is paramount to raise the question with regard to the extent that his affiliation with Syrian ascetics informed his exegesis in his Explanatio in Canticum Canticorum. In the Præfatio, Theodoret provides the details of the circumstances under which he undertook the composition of his exegesis on the Song:170 his addressee who is identified as the Reverend bishop John,171 had taken the initiative to request for such a commentary. Theodoret indicates that, in composing his work, his main concern was to address contemporary objections about the spiritual value of the work.172 His addressee was not a monastic himself and Theodoret provides no hints that the work would be read by monastics. Therefore, the immediate circumstances did not encourage Gregory to treat his exegesis as a means to communicate his ascetic ideals. Even so, Theodoret presented a unique synthesis in his exegesis. It was observed that Origen and Gregory stood for two differing traditions: Origen dealt with the notion of divine abandonment in the Song of Songs as representation of ethical trials in the life of the Church and all Christians. Gregory had promoted an intellectual understanding of the episodes in the Song, according to which the soul has been introduced to the notion of God’s incomprehensibility. It was in the work of Theodoret that the two threads of thought, the ethical and the intellectual, converged. Theodoret related the incident of the abandonment of the bride to the tradition of the lamentation psalms: he indicated that the episode in Song 3:1 echoed Ps 12:2 that features the theme of God’s “turning away his face”.173 In discerning the inter-biblical connection between the Song and the lamentation Psalms, Theodoret highlighted the biblical foundation of the experience of the bride and the conformity of Song 3:1 with the biblical imagery in the Psalms. That is to say that Theodoret dealt with Song 3:1 as another episode that had already occurred in other places in the biblical canon. By implying this position, Theodoret suggested that his exegesis was anchored on scriptural evidence and, in fact, indicated that it was Scripture itself that had provided evidence about the exegetical position that he had to follow. Gregory had introduced 168 No monograph has addressed Theodoret’s ascetic teachings in the commentary on the Song. Canivet (1977), 44–51. 169 For an exposition of Syrian monastic ideals see Canivet (1977). According to Vööbus the translation of the Evagrian corpus into Syrian might have taken place as early as the middle of the fifth century ce. See, A. Vööbus (1988), 142–50. 170 According to Quasten, the commentary on the Song was the earliest exegetical attempt of Theodoret. Quasten (1960), 540. 171 Quasten believes that the bishop is John of Germanicia. Quasten (1960), 540. 172 Theodoret, Expl. Præfatio, 29A. For the historical details and several opinions with regard to the exact circumstances of the production of the commentary see Elliott (2000), 35. 173 Theodoret alludes to other instances in Scripture where God hides his face, such as 2 Cor 12:7–9 and 1 Kgs 19:4.

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divine infinity in his early works. Yet, it was only when he composed exegesis on the Song and Exodus that he fully exploited the motif of divine abandonment, even though the motif of abandonment is a theological device to intertwine Christian anthropology and epistemology. Like Gregory, the motif of abandonment played no further role in Theodoret’s overall theological thought, but appeared only with the context of his biblical exegesis. However, there is no indication that Theodoret had viewed the notion of divine abandonment within a broader anthropological context – as opposed to his seniors Macarius and Evagrius. Theodoret’s initial silence about the cause of the experience – at least in his opening lines – is an indication of his dependence on the biblical narrative: Many times while exercising the souls of the faithful, the God of all permits them to encounter manifold trials, sometimes giving the petitioners relief, sometimes delaying this gift, devising benefit from all quarters for his followers.174 Despite the fact that Theodoret introduced the motif of divine paideia (γυμνάζωνπαιδεύων), he did not discern a specific cause that could refer directly to the soul: the bridegroom has departed to exercise his beloved, but Theodoret does not provide an analysis of that which needs to be exercised within the soul. If we are to take into account Pásztori-Kupán’s observation that all Theodoret’s exegetical works belong to the same period between Ephesus (431 ce) and Chalcedon (451 ce), then it seems that, in his In Canticum, Theodoret departed from his own exegetical line of reasoning. In his Quæstiones ad Octateuchum, Theodoret had indicated that God permitted trials to occur in order to exercise the soul’s self-determination (αὐτεξούσιον), a line of reasoning that Theodoret had presented in various places in his exegetical works but did not bring into play in his In Canticum:175 it is self-determination that is the subject of God’s paideia. i) Theodoret viewed Song 3:1 in terms of separation. In Gregory of Nyssa, the bride’s abandonment had taken the form of divine hiddenness, as opposed to separation-forsakenness. Gregory identified divine presence with the soul’s desire, i.e. the wound of God within the soul that remains ever present, a fact that enabled Gregory to promote the dialectic between presence and hiddenness: God is hiding, yet he is present within the soul through her desire. Theodoret followed another exegetical route: God truly abandoned the soul: “abandoning him [i.e. Elijah] for a while… he appears to him”.176 Reflecting on the same episode, Gregory had used the verb καταλείπω but denied that this is a matter of divine abandonment: “My beloved has departed, not abandoning

174 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113A. 175 Theodoret, Quæstiones in Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]; Psal. PG 80, 1716.41; Interpretatio in Ezechielis Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 1013B]. 176 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C (cf. 1 Kgs 19:4). Theodoret was aware of the Platonic motif of a “sudden” appearance. However, the context in which he uses it is different, since he views the term in a cleary Christological and soteriological context: due to the incarnation, the soul has been cleansed suddenly from idolatry. Thus, whereas in Plato, Philo – and Origen to some extent – the adverb signifies the encounter between the divine and the intellect, for Theodoret it refers to the sudden advent of the Logos in his flesh. See Theodoret, Expl. 1.69C.

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the soul that follows him, but attracting her to him”. Theodoret moved to affirm the separation between God and the soul: “abandoning him for a while to be exercised”.177 ii) This is not to say that God has forsaken the soul. Following Origenist exegesis, Theodoret related divine abandonment to the presence of trials: the soul comes to realise that she has been abandoned by God when trials occur. However, Theodoret has developed further this Origenist notion: divine abandonment does not mean that God forsakes entirely the soul, but that he postpones his intervention during trials.178 Theodoret constantly reminded his reader of this position in his exegetical works. Despite the fact that God could have prevented trials, he gave his permission for them to afflict the soul. This assertion played a single role in his work: to refute the Gnostic position that God was the author of evil deeds or misfortunes. In relating trials to divine permission, Theodoret distinguished between giving consent to and causing trials. God did not cause trials, even though he provided his consent: “the God of all permits them to encounter manifold trials”.179 Theodoret had composed a work on divine providence (De Providentia) arguing that God was the author of good deeds only.180 In his exegesis, the term “συγχωρεῖν” was Theodoret’s device to distinguish between divine providence and misfortunes. Thus, he affirmed that a divine plan had always been at work,181 and that the individual was meant to profit from the experience: “devising benefit from all quarters for his followers”.182 iii) Theodoret had developed the motif of God’s consent within a Christological context. The fact that – unlike the Apophthegmata Patrum and the Lausiac History – Theodoret did not mention this motif in his Historia Religiosa, indicates that the latter work was not composed as a “handbook” of Christian asceticism.183 In his Christological works, like Cyril, Theodoret had highlighted the fact that Jesus’ divinity permitted his humanity to experience natural human passions.184 That is, it is only through a divine act that Jesus was subjected – or not subjected – to natural human passions, such as thirst or hunger. The date of his exegetical work on the Song remains debatable, and as a result it is not clear whether Theodoret had introduced the notion of God’s consent in an anthropological context which he later applied to his Christology, or if the opposite is true. Origen had already introduced the notion of God’s consent with regard to trials.185 In the Lausiac History and the Spiritual Homilies of Macarius,186 we encounter an already chrystalised notion of God’s Compare Gregory, Hom. 12, 353 to Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C. Theodoret, Epistulae, 93 [in SC 98, p. 244]. Theodoret, Expl. 2.113A; Historia Religiosa, 31.17. See Procopius of Gaza, Catena, PG 87, 1773D. Theodoret, De Providentia, PG 83, 556–773. Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C. Theodoret, Expl. 2.113A; EpP. PG 82, 449 (cf. 2 Cor 12:7). In Historia Religiosa paideia does not connote afflictions due to trials nor the capacity of selfdetermination, but signifies one’s being instructed from Scripture. 184 Theodoret, De Incarnatione Domini, PG 75, 1457C. See also Cyril, De Sancta Trinitate, PG 75, 1033B-C. 185 Origen, Fragmenta in Lucam (in catenis), 192 [number of fragments in GCS 49]. 186 Palladius, Laus., Vita 47. Theodoret would have come into contact with the same ascetic tradition that shaped the teaching of Macarius. It is only in recent years that scholars have established the Syriac milieu of the Macarian spiritual corpus. For a review of the literature see Plested (2004).

177 178 179 180 181 182 183

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consent with regard to trials (παραχώρησις-συγχώρησις). It seems then that, from an original anthropological context, the notion was accommodated and inserted in the Christological debates of late antiquity.187 The next step that Theodoret took was to introduce the scriptural images of Paul and Elijah.188 Theodoret did not seem to distinguish between the two scriptural figures and the respective causes of their abandonment: both figures undergo abandonment, but God does not intervene to deliver them from their afflictions. Paul had prayed to be spared from his experience, but God did not remove the “thorn in the flesh”; “Paul pleads, but he is not granted”. And Elijah “is looking for the defender”, but “he [i.e. God] abandons him for a while to be exercised through fear”. Theodoret did not see any reason why to differentiate between Ps 12:2, 2 Cor 12:7–9 and 1 Kgs 19:4; at least not explicitly. However, one could discern a difference if one takes into account the aftermath of the experience as discussed by Theodoret. Paul was granted understanding concerning the nature of divine grace: “for [Paul], having being taught what he did not know, he accepts with pleasure not to be granted what he had asked for”. The ascetic literature had already related the figure of Paul to a precautionary kind of abandonment: God prevented the presence of pride in Paul.189 Theodoret had introduced such an understanding of Paul’s experience in his exegetical work on Paul’s letters.190 However, in his In Canticum he shifted from his position: Paul was taught about the role of weakness. It is through weakness – in terms of trials – that God reinforced the soul. The Pauline passage implies a precautionary action on God’s behalf, but Theodoret did not elaborate any further on this matter. Yet, in citing 2 Cor 12:7, Theodoret implies this point, that is that Paul was taught about the ways of God’s pedagogy as God acts in a precautionary (or proactive) way and sheds light to the presence of human weakness in Paul. As it was mentioned, Theodoret does not point out that he departs from his line of reasoning and brings into play Elijah’s case: [God] appears to him and as though ignorant asks the reason for the flight, not to mock him but to bring out the plan behind the flight, and to teach him, as one with a human nature and the victim of its passions, to make allowances.191 187 Historia Religiosa does not feature a particular set of technical ascetic terms, such as temptations, pride or listlessness. This is odd if we bear in mind that Vööbus has supported that Syrian asceticism was of a particular and distinct character from the outset, as it is evident in the ascetic corpus of Macarius the Great. The editors of the English translation of Historia Religiosa and also Cavinet refer to the ascetic ideals that Theodoret exposes in his work, but provide no explanation about this lack of an ascetic vocabulary, or about the fact that the lives of the Syrian ascetics bespeak of an uncharacteristic asceticism that is not distinct from asceticism in Egypt. Therefore, it is possible that either Theodoret composed his work at an early stage of his life, before he developed an elaborate ascetic vocabulary, or that he intended to paint a romantic and idealized image of the Syrian ascetics to such an extent that he diminished the true characteristics of this ascetic system. This latter position has been supported by Urbainczyk (2002). 188 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113B. 189 Palladius, Laus., Vita 47. 190 Theodoret, EpP. PG 82, 449. 191 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C.

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Theodoret emphasised that God did not chastise Elijah and it is easy to discern in the last sentence the idea of a knowledge that arises from the experience, gnosis with regard to human nature, just like in Paul’s case: “ὡς ἀγνοῶν πυνθάνεται, διδάσκων, παιδεύων”. But what was the content of such an instruction? [God] appears to him and as though ignorant asks the reason for the flight, not to mock him but to bring out the plan behind the flight, and to teach him, as one with a human nature and the victim of its passions, to make allowances.192 When comparing between his exegetical work In Canticum, and his Quaestiones in Libros Regnorum with regard to 1 Kgs 19:5, it becomes evident that Theodoret knew of an anthropological position that could have brought his exegesis closer to the ascetic argument.193 What stands at the core of his exegesis is the notion of knowing and acknowledging human weakness. In the latter work, the experience of Elijah and Paul are identical: In order not to be puffed up by arrogance due to the wonder-working, grace granted that cowardice would be introduced to his nature, so that he might know his own weakness.194 Theodoret introduced an experience at the level of precaution in which the soul had felt divine paideia. What is of interest is the last sentence: “he might know his own weakness”. Origen had already argued that, through the experience, the soul gained knowledge of her origin. Theodoret indicated that it was human weakness that was the content of such gnosis. It is important to mention, in advance, Hausherr’s observation that, for Evagrius, gnosis of human weakness remained at the summit of spiritual life and it is the highest fruit of divine abandonment. Macarius had made the same point. It is certain that Theodoret did not mean his reader to discern such technical observations in his In Canticum.195 Theodoret was still addressing natural passions such as “cowardice”. What needs to be concluded at this point is the fact that, apparently, Theodoret introduced the notion of divine abandonment as a precaution, that he related to the scriptural image of Paul. He only implied the presence of pride within the soul. There is no evidence that Theodoret was aware of Paphnutius’ discourse in the Lausiac History, a work that had drew a clear connection between pride and God’s turning away his face. In advance, we will note that: i) Theodoret did not include a 192 It needs to be noted that similar cognates appeared in Theodoret’s Christological works. The expressions referred to Jesus who put on humanity and as a result his humanity has been consubstantial with ours. Cf. Theodoret, Expl. 3.141A. Theodoret did not explicitly see Elijah as prefiguring Jesus, but it could not be entirely coincidental that this is the only instance that Theodoret appropriates the expression “he puts on human nature” outside an explicit Christological context. Cf. Theodoret, Eranistes, 90 [p. 60 in FOTC 106] and 205 [p. 196]. 193 Theodoret, EpP. PG 82, 449. 194 Theodoret, Quaestiones in Libros iii Regnorum, 59 [PG 80, 733A]. 195 Theodoret is following the biblical narrative (cf. 1 Kgs 19:5–8) according to which God presented Elijah with food in the desert to curb his hunger. Therefore, the term natural passions is an allusion to 1 Kgs 19:5–6 and these passions do not signify the inner motions of the soul, as it is the case in Evagrius and Macarius.

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clear distinction between events that occur due to God’s (passive) consent and God’s (active) will; and, ii) he did not refer to pride explicitly. These are the two points that an early monk, Paphnutius, had argued in a story preserved in the Lausiac History. Theodoret did not associate divine abandonment with chastisement of sin and even though in this matter he seems to follow Origen and Gregory, it is more likely that Theodoret has been following closely the biblical narrative, as opposed to the presence of a firm anthropological theory, which is true about Gregory. The fact remains that, at the summit of spiritual perfection, Theodoret discerned a distressful condition that caught the soul by surprise. Theodoret provided an alternative explanation about God’s abandonment and therefore introduced another theological reading that lies loser to the interpretation of Gregory. The experience of abandonment might be related to trials, yet its aftermath has been felt at an intellectual level: the soul is initiated in the mystery of God’s incomprehensibility. Theodoret, like Gregory, introduced the distinction between an uncreated God and his creation (either intelligible or material).196 The soul has left behind all material and intelligible reality in order to conceive that God is incomprehensible. Unlike Gregory, however, Theodoret did not introduce or elaborate on the notion of divine infinity. Notwithstanding the fact that God is beyond comprehension, Theodoret indicated that it is within the life of the Church that the soul has been trully united to God. Therefore, Theodoret did not resort to the description of the soul’s ceaseless quest for the divine, but exploited the Gregorian notion of the incarnation and also the presence of the divine image within the soul to argue – in more vigorous terms than Gregory – that the soul is truly united to God. In Song 5:2–3 the bride claims that her heart has been vigilant, but she does not hurry to open the door for her groom when he knocks on the door.197 Analyzing this episode, Theodoret does not seem concerned with the paradox that the soul is vigilant and at the same time she has fallen into slothfulness (ὄκνος).198 Apparently, he has let the narrative to carry him away and the paradox goes unnoticed. Unlike Gregory, who had treated both episodes (Song 3:1 and Song 5:3) in a uniformed and coherent way, Theodoret seems to have departed from the notion of God’s consent and introduced the theme of desire and eros.199 But, most importantly, he also referred to slothfulness (ὄκνος) (cf. Heb 12:1). The theme of slothfulness appeared at the opening and closing lines of his exegesis.200 Despite his assertion that the soul has been vigilant, Theodoret indicated that the soul fell into slothfulness. It follows then, that through the experience of abandonment, God corrected this negative

Theodoret, Expl. 2.116A–D. Theodoret, Expl. 3.149B. Theodoret, Expl. 3.149B and 3.152B. Theodoret, Expl. 3.152B–3.153A. The presence of eros and desire (πόθος) are indications that Theodoret depends on the previous tradition of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. However, the fact that Theodoret connects divine abandonment to a desire for God indicates that Theodoret’s dependence on Gregory is more significant. 200 Theodoret, Expl. 3.153C. 196 197 198 199

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disposition in the soul. This time, the cause of abandonment seems to be clear: the soul lacks proper zeal. However, Theodoret was cautious not to introduce a reading that would have suggested that God has chastised the soul. Having noted the centrality of desire, Theodoret commented that, through abandonment, the groom had intended to stir up the soul’s desire. Thus, Theodoret shifted his focus from the negative disposition of the soul to the positive act of God: God has been working at many levels to attract the soul. The introduction of slothfulness was an exegetical device rather than anything else (when compared to the Evagrian acedia): Theodoret did not introduce the term in a coherent ascetic anthropology where slothfulness is a foe to spiritual perfection. The latter position was part of the argument in the ascetic literature. For instance, Macarius and Evagrius had defined slothfulness as a sort of spiritual laxity.201 Evagrius had favoured the term acedia that denoted spiritual laxity at the summit of spiritual progress. Through trials, God exercised the soul, urging her to take up spiritual warfare. Most importantly, Evagrius had connected acedia to the presence of sinister spirits (demons). In Macarius and Evagrius, acedia was introduced within a certain anthropological context that defined spiritual life as the warfare between laxity and spiritual effort. Theodoret did not reflect on such a position. He was aware of the term acedia, but only as part of the biblical narrative (cf. Is 61:3. Ps 60:3 and 101:1) and it is indicative that he did not use it in his Historia Religiosa.202 Theodoret did not integrate the notion of spiritual laxity in his spirituality and the only instance where the term clearly appeared in an anthropological context was in his Eranistes: he indicated that ὄκνος refers to the natural bond between the soul and the present life that God has planted into the soul.203 All the above evidence suffices to suggest that the presence of the term slothfulness was accidental in his work and therefore should not be treated as part of a concrete or coherent anthropological system in Theodoret’s thought. It appeared due to Theodoret’s lowalty to the biblical narrative, in which the bride fails to respond promptly to the presence of the bridegroom who has been calling her. It is the narrative that leads Theodoret. It should be pointed, though, as a summary, that, even though Theodoret had introduced the term slothfulness (ὄκνος), the experience of abandonment remained unlinked to sin or chastisement, and Theodoret invites his reader to focus on the notion of stirring up one’s desire for God, rather than the possibility of an natural weakness in humanity.

201 For Macarius, ὄκνος is a cause of ethical lapsing from perfection. Macarius, Hom. 15.16 Evagrius believes that there is a connection between ὄκνος and acedia. Evagrius, De Vitiis quae Opposita sunt Virtutibus, 4 [PG 79, 1144]. For an examination of acedia in Evagrius see Bunge (1991). 202 The theme of acedia features in his other works, but Theodoret uses it in its classical form: it signifies “hesitation” or “postponing a task”, and also being “slothful”. “Slothfulness” is a natural passion, not the work of the demon of “acedia” or the “mid-day demon” as Evagrius held. Whenever the motif means that one is slothful, it is so because Theodoret follows closely the biblical narrative. Theodoret, EpP. PG 82, 189 (cf. Ro 12:11); Theodoret, Intepretatio in Psalmos, PG 80, 1325; 1676 and also 1829. 203 Cf. Theodoret, Eranistes, 245 [p. 243 in FOTC 106]. Theodoret alludes to the prayer of Jesus at Gethsemane and the shrinking of his soul before death.

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Nilus of Ancyra: An Evagrian Ascetic Milieu

It seems that Nilus of Ancyra was an ascetic.204 On the grounds of internal and external evidence Guérard has suggested that Nilus should be considered as the author of a Commentary on the Song of Songs as well as other ascetic writings, such as an Ascetic Discourse. If so, then it is imperative to ask the reasons that led Nilus, an ascetic, to compose a commentary on the Song of Songs, his single exegetical work, given the fact that the Song was not a favorable reading in the desert: it was never part of the readings from the Old Testament used in the liturgical life throughout the year. Guérard has explored the possibility that Evagrius had been the inspiration for Nilus,205 on the grounds that the textual analysis attests that Nilus had knowledge of the Evagrian ascetic system.206 For instance, Nilus follows Evagrius when he refers to the correspondence between the wisdom literature (Ecclesiastes, Proverbs and Song of Songs) and the Origenist division of philosophy into practical, natural and enoptic. The very fact that Nilus composed a work on the Song raises the question about the degree to which Nilus envisaged his work as complementary to Evagrius, who composed commentaries on two of the books of wisdom literature: Ecclesiastes and Proverbs but not the Song of Songs.207 However, her position overlooks the influence that Didymus the Blind equally exercised on Nilus.208 Origen’s trinity of wisdom literature had also appeared in the exegesis of the Alexandrian scholar, but unlike Evagrius, Didymus had interpreted the three books of wisdom literature, including the Song of Songs.209 It is certain that Nilus was influenced by a broader Origenist appreciation of the wisdom literature that was common in Didymus and Evagrius. Therefore, it is difficult to know for certain if Nilus completed the Evagrian trilogy on the wisdom literature or if he merely followed a widespread tradition that was common at the time. However, if we turn to internal evidence in his In Canticum, then it becomes apparent that Nilus did 204 For matters concerning the identity, the theological influences on Nilus and the list of his writings see Guérard (1994). 205 Guérard (1994), 43. 206 Guérard (1994), 42. 207 Guérard (1994), 43. Evagrius followed the Origenist position about a threefold ladder in wisdom literature that leads the soul from practical to natural and divine contemplation. Evagrius, Prov. 22.20 (247). See the introduction by Origen, Com. 3.41. Evagrius composed commentaries on Ecclesiastes and Proverbs though it seems that death stopped him from composing a work on the Song of Songs. Macarius also appreciated the content of the Song in an ascetic milieu, since he alluded to the Song with regard to spiritual perfection. See Macarius, Typs. 3.2 [edition in TU 72] where he cites Song 2:5–6, 2:10, 3.3 and 7.5. The fact that Macarius was the only ascetic in late antiquity to make extensive use of the Song of Songs needs to be viewed in connection to Vööbus’ observation that the image of Jesus as “bridegroom” was common in Syrian theology from the outset. Of course, his observation presupposes a Syriac ambience for the composition of the Macarian corpus. See Vööbus (1988), 55 and (1972). 208 Vööbus (1988), 41–42. According to Guérard, Nilus was familiar and made extensive use of the Christology and the biblical exegesis of Didymus the Blind. 209 Didymus was the only known author after Origen that completed a commentary on each book of the wisdom literature. For a fragment in his Commentary on the Song see Meursius (1617).

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incorporate an Evagrian anthropology and spirituality in his work. Hence, whatever his inspiration might have been, in his commentary, among other traditions, Nilus does seem to embrace Evagrian ascetic positions with regard to Christian spirituality and asceticism.210 Nilus of Ancyra displayed remarkable coherency when interpreting Song 3:1 and Song 5:2 which was due to his anthropological perspective: both times he departed from the biblical narrative. Part of his coherency is the fact that he discerned the motif of slothfulness (ραθυμία) behind the biblical episodes and, as it will be illustrated, unlike the biblical text and his exegetical predecessors (Origen, Gregory and Theodoret), Nilus located the cause of divine abandonment within the soul. Commenting on Song 3:2–3, Nilus indicated that the episode occurred while the soul was on her way to perfection, following after the bridegroom.211 What lies behind his exegesis is an Evagrian anthropology that, unlike Gregory and Theodoret, had stressed the soul’s role in spiritual life. It is remarkable that, in the two latter exegetes, the soul was advancing in spiritual life without any hindrance. Even Theodoret’s pride was only a potential foe that was prevented by the exercise of God’s paideia. Nilus held a different opinion: the soul was never secure in her spiritual journey to God and there is a discernible connection between divine abandonment and spiritual laxity: When you seek, it is not possible to find the desired-one in comfort (for ascesis for goods fights listlessness)… [the soul:] I thought it was light and easy to acquire virtue and be similar to wisdom, and I was looking for it without effort, carelessly and lightly, resting on the bodily (matters) like a bed.212 Spiritual perfection required the soul’s active participation. We need to view this exegetical line of thought within the context of arguing the need for spiritual efforts in the ascetic tradition. Characteristically, Nilus did not refer to praxis but, ascesis, a stronger indication of the soul’s efforts which connotes the need for ethical purification.213 As Guérard noted, Nilus accommodated the Evagrian notion of praxis as the means by which the soul cleansed her concupiscence (ἐπιθυμία) and purified the passionate part of hers. Ascesis was the only way to virtue. Nilus envisaged virtues as the basis on which the soul was established in order to advance spiritually. The above observations would suffice to indicate that Nilus introduced divine abandonment as means of reinforcing virtues within the soul, rathen than correcting a negative property within the soul. However, Nilus position is not that optimistic, as he brought into play the notion of the soul’s satiety (κόρος). In her spiritual journey, the soul was never secure from natural weakness and vice. This was due to the possibility of being fed up and as a result overlooking spiritual efforts. This position seems to place Nilus within an Origenist anthropological context, 210 Nilus incorporates elements from the liturgical tradition of the early Church (Cyril of Jerusalem and John Chrysostom), the Christological and exegetical positions of Athanasius and Didymus the Blind, and the pagan philosophy and culture of late antiquity. See Guérard (1994), 38–47. 211 Nilus, Com. 32.1.100. 212 Nilus, Com. 32.3.100. 213 Nilus, Com. 48.6.140. Messana (1989), 235–41.

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but there is no evidence that Nilus thought of satiety as a cosmological principle that caused the soul’s original fall from divine contemplation, as Origen seems to have held. Nilus dismissed such a speculative position and only maintained the anthropological implications that accompany it.214 Nilus noted the possibility of κόρος in the acquisition of virtues: Many, when they reach their pursuit, either because of becoming fed up with it after some time or, because of turning away their disposition to something else, they stand aloof and, becoming neglectful after a little while, they fall from the perfect state.215 Despite the fact that Nilus did not attribute satiety directly to the biblical bride, nevertheless, his position that the soul became neglectful needs to be viewed in close connection to the presence of satiety.216 The soul fell into laxity; she was idle. Therefore, the objective of divine abandonment is twofold: to heal laxity and stir up the soul’s desire for the divine. Nilus was the first commentator to connect divine abandonment with a negative attribute within the soul. Theodoret had introduced abandonment as a precautionary action from the part of God, but Nilus is explicit that divine abandonment chastises the soul, i.e. heals the soul from innate negative properties. This latter position becomes more apparent from what follows as the narrative unfolds. Even though the soul felt the urgency to correct her perception of spiritual effort (laxity-ascesis) and heal her slothfulness, and despite the fact that she was working on the virtues, even so the bridegroom remained hidden. Nilus shared a common pessimism with Macarius and Evagrius that a parasite lies within the acquisition of virtue, i.e. pride: Having left the bed to conduct my pursuit through deeds, but even this did not lead me to find it. Though it is proper to hide the toil when working on the virtues, I [the soul] was manifesting it [ascesis] making it public in the squares and the market places seeking for the praise of men.217 Nilus attributed the soul’s desire to manifest her spiritual toil to her pride, a state of being puffed up due to one’s own achievements. Pride had sprung from within the virtues. The word pride occurred several times in his work either in the form of κενοδοξία or

214 The designation “Evagrian thought” should not be understood narrowly as denoting only the work of Evagrius, but refers to a wider tradition in late antiquity, wider than Evagrius’ own thought. It predicates an anthropology that views spiritual life from down, i.e. from the soul’s point of view, and affirms the possibility of backsliding at any stage of one’s spiritual life. For instance, Macarius and also the Desert Fathers held a similar position that the soul might possibly relapse even though she has reached spiritual perfection. Therefore, the predicate “Evagrian” is only meant to bring such a thread of thought into contrast with the notion of an unhindered spiritual ascension that is found, for instance, in Athanasius and the Cappadocians. 215 Nilus, Com. 32.16.102. 216 Nilus, Com. 32.2–3.100. 217 Nilus, Com. 32.6.100–01.

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φιλοδοξία.218 The parallel between Nilus’ In Canticum and Evagrius’ De Octo Spiritibus Malitiae is striking and unmissible.219 Evagrius had indicated that the proud soul asked for human praise at public places (πλατείαι).220 Nilus applied this image to the biblical bride.221 Nilus seems to be following the biblical narrative here, but he was the only commentator that related the bride’s appearance at public places to pride, and this is a strong indication that he might have had Evagrius’ passage in his mind. In his Narratio, Nilus had defined pride as “counting on one’s self ”. Like Macarius and Evagrius, Nilus had emphasised that the soul dismisses the need for divine assistance, since she thinks that spiritual progress has been her own achievement.222 In In Canticum, Nilus indicated that pride had sprung from the soul’s spiritual advancement: as soon as the soul realised the presence of virtues within her, she became puffed up.223 Nilus discerned a deeper reason why the soul was afflicted by pride. He implied that the soul’s original disposition was corrupted, because she longed to acquire the virtues, but not because she desired God. She was looking for human appraisal. Nilus’ position was reminiscent of Paphnutius’ discourse in the Historia Lausiaca. As will be discussed later, Paphnutius had distinguished between disposition (πρόθεσις) and praxis (πράξις). A virtuous action might take place, but the disposition, i.e. the original purpose that leads to this action, might be corrupted. Nilus agrees with Paphnutius that the bride (i.e. the soul) had been working on the virtues, but the object of her desire was misplaced as she was after public praise. Nilus’ thought on divine abandonment shared common themes with Evagrian thought: divine abandonment was part of divine paideia devised to chastise the soul from the negative property of pride and laxity. The term “abandonment” as such might not have appeared in his commentary, but even so he has communicated the ascetic message for spiritual effort and vigilance against pride and laxity. Nilus’ exegesis on Song 5:4 followed the same line of reasoning. Divine abandonment was introduced as a means to chastise the soul from her negative qualities. The only difference is that, here, Nilus was even more explicit about the connection between abandonment and chastisement:224 [The soul] suffers because she did not obey to the word zealously, to be shown that the one who is most precious to God, being after comforts and resting, is

218 Nilus, Com. 12.18.36; 12.20.36; 29.4.90; 32.7.101; 38.4120. 219 Guérard (1994), 25. Evagrius, De Octo, 15 [PG 79, 1160D]. See Rosenbaum (2004), 36–37 who cites Evagrius in the critical apparatus of the edition of Nilus’ commentary. The Greek manuscript tradition had attributed De Octo Spiritibus to Nilus of Ancyra which is a direct indication of the uniformity between the thought of the two men. Vööbus (1988), 146. 220 Evagrius, De Octo, 16 [PG 79, 1161A]: “ἐν πλατείαις προσεύχεσθαι συμβουλεύει κενοδοξία” (pride instructs us to pray in public places) [cf. Mt 6:5]. Evagrius paraphrases the passage in Matthew and Nilus follows Evagrius, since he relates the presence of the bride in “public places” to a public display of virtue and pride. 221 Nilus, Com. 32.6.100–01. 222 Nilus of Ancyra, Narratio, 3.15. 223 Nilus, Com. 29.4.90. 224 Nilus, Com. 81.3–4.198–99.

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despised and receives the experience of punishment. For, ‘he [i.e. God] has sent’, it is said, ‘the hand that chastises the disobedient’.225 To sum, it seems that Nilus had meant his commentary to be read by ascetics, as we discern a clear anthropological context that had been shaped within ascetic circles. Nilus found himself at pains to exhort ascetics to spiritual vigilance and to highlight the importance of unceasing ethical labour. In his exegesis, the bride was never secure in her ascension to God, but she is a representation of the ascetics who conduct spiritual warfare, but at the same time they have already been acquainted with the bridegroom. Nilus made his way through the commentary by introducing elements of ethical edification wherever he felt it more appropriate.

225 Nilus, Com. 57.1–2.158. In the critical apparatus Rozenbaum suggests a potential reference to Apponius, in whose commentary the “hand that chastises” is an allegory that the soul has been chastised by God by “losing her goods, through the famine, through the abandonment to the enemies (uastitatem hostilem), through the privation of his [God’s] proximity, through the imprisonment due to slander, through the torments of various maladies (uariorum infirmitatum tormenta)”. See Apponius, Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, 8.15.

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Jesus Abandoned on the Cross The Loud Cry in Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46)

A modern reader would assume that Christians in late antiquity who read Scripture would have been aware of the paradox that, although Jesus was proclaimed as a divine being in vigorous terms, in fact a being co-substantial with the Father as the Council of Nicæa pronounced in 325 ce, the same Jesus cries out on the cross in Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46): “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?”, an utterance that Christians must have identified as the opening verse of Ps 22. In order to discern the theological significance of the loud cry of Jesus, a modern reader would first engage in the textual analysis of Mk 15:34 and therefore raise the question of the historical authenticity of the loud cry, and then would examine the likelihood that the utterance might be an intentional interpolation. However, such matters would not have concerned late antique readers, who had no reason to doubt that Jesus cried out these exact words in his dying moments, even though they would still face the challenge of interpreting the loud cry. Carey has argued that, since it is accepted that the gospels of Matthew and Luke were composed after Mark, and despite their individual morphological editions and modifications, they should be considered as the earliest examples in Christian literature of how Christians read and understood the loud cry of Jesus in Mk 15:34. According to Carey, Matthew and Luke edited their material that surrounds the moments after the crucifixion in order to direct their readers to view the loud cry in light of the entirety of Ps 22.1 The next historical occurrences of an early engagement with the loud cry on the cross (or Ps 22:2) took place within two distinct contexts: on the one hand, Justin the Martyr cited Ps 22:2 in his attempt to convince his Jewish interlocutor that the entire Ps 22 is a prefigurement of the passion of Jesus.2 Nevertheless, Justin did not comment on the meaning of the loud cry in v.2 or whether it signifies real abandonment. The same is true about Tertyllian and Aphrahat who also cited Ps 22 but did not elaborate on the historicity or theological significance of v.2 since their purpose was to show that Jesus was the subject “I” of the Psalm.3 The other theological context concerns the various modifications applied to Mk 15:34 by several Christians that had deviated from the main reception of the Christian faith, i.e. Gnostic groups. The way Gnostics edited their material is a witness to the uneasiness that they felt with regard to the suggestion that Jesus trully cried out in abandonment. Therefore, the Gospel of Philip maintained the original citation “My God, my God why O Lord

1 Carey (2009), 176–88. 2 Justin the Martyr, Dialogue to Trypho, 97.3.1–99.1.5. 3 See Koltun-Fromm (1998), 37–58.

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have you forsaken me?” but clarified that Jesus laments the departure of the divine Christ from a human element.4 On the other hand, the Gospel of Peter modified the entire verse so that it read “My power, O power, you have left me”. Therefore, the editor of the text brings the verse in alignment with the distinct Christology of some Gnostic groups according to which, as a lower aeon (or divine emanation) in the gnostic hierarchy of beings, Wisdom was truly abandoned on the cross by the Pleroma or Light.5 The testimony of Irenæus of Lyon (c. 130–200 ce) is an early corraboration that Gnostic groups significantly diverged from the main interpretation of the loud cry by applying such textual modifications. However, Irenæus sketches the general frame of the Gnostic myth within which the Gnostics interpreted the loud voice on the cross, but does not clarify what constitutes an “orthodox” explanation that himself could have endorsed.6 Even so, Irenæus’ witness should be viewed as an early indication of the historical origins of diverging traditions that provided conflicting views about the loud cry on the cross.7 It has been argued that, at least immediately after the time of the passion of Jesus, someone who read Mk 15:34 would have been confronted with two possible ways in which Ps 22 is part of the passion narrative: Mk 15:34 could be read in light of the entirety of Ps 22 (a contextual reading), or only with regard to v.2 (an atomistic reading). Scholars have thrown their weight behind either option, even though, as Carey suggests, the two approaches should not be contrasted. The socio-cultural milieu of the first century ce has been examined in order to clarify the way that early readers would approach written texts.8 It has been pointed that in Judaism a collection of biblical texts had formed a distinct sub-division that referred to the image of the Suffering Servant: a person elected by God who suffers in the hands of his enemies. It has been argued also that a number of psalms were grouped together as Psalms of Lamentations on the grounds that they share the notion of suffering and final deliverance by God. Therefore, it is assumed that in Mk 15:34 a first-century ce reader must have read Ps 22:2 and thus interpreted the loud cry in light of the tradition of the Psalms of Lamentation. Yet, due to its strong anticipation of deliverance by God, such an approach has been criticised for a happy-ending attitude that diminishes in effect the reality and intensity of the passion that the loud cry is meant to convey to the reader. On the other hand, an atomistic reading of Mk 15:34 that is restrained to v.2 is thought to reinforce the passion of Jesus as a painful experience, even though this is so at the expense of the message of final deliverance that also forms an indispensable part of the passion narrative in the Gospels. It might lie outside the scope of this

4 Ehrman (2011), 168–71. Epiphanius of Salamis has preserved this verse from the Gospel of Philip in Epiphanius, Pan. 1.423.17. 5 Évangile de Pierre, M. G Mara (ed.), SC 201 (Paris: Cerf, 1973), 19.1. 6 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 1.1.7.11 and 1.1.16.22. 7 Ehrman has noted that in the process of textual transmission, several codices incorporated an alternative reading for Mk 15:34, “My God, my God, why have you reviled me”, which he believes it is an indication that several scribes were aware of the gnostic misuse of the verb “abandon” and thus opted for an alternative reading that echoes Mk 15:32. Ehrman (2011), 169–71. 8 Carey (2009), 94–137.

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book to analyse the validity of such academic approaches, but for our purposes we should note in both cases the strong identification of Mk 15:34 with Ps 22 and also the possibility that opens up to interpret Ps 22:2 in two different ways: a contextual or an atomistic reading. Before we examine how Christians in late antiquity tried to resolve the aforementioned paradox of Jesus who cries out in abandonment, it is important to make some observations with regard to the nature of the primary sources and the general historical context in which they discuss the abandonment of Jesus.

The Primary Sources and their Context There are two points I would like to note straightforwardly: first, with the single exception of Theodore of Mopsuestia,9 late antique theologians identified unanimously Jesus as the subject “I” that cries out in Ps 22:2.10 Second, as it became evident in the first part of this book, Christian commentaries on the Song of Songs that were composed in late antiquity did not view the abandonment of the biblical bride in light of the loud cry of Jesus on the cross.11 Theodoret of Cyrrhus who provided most scriptural cross-references in his commentary, did not attempt an exegetical connection between the passion narrative and the Song of Songs. It is reasonable, then, to inquire whether commentators invoked the image of the biblical bride in their polemical works or theological treatises that involved, to any extent, the loud cry on the cross. One would be excused to assume that Christian exegetes who composed biblical commentaries and were actively involved in the theological controversies concerning the identity of Jesus that broke out after the fourth century ce, would have grasped the opportunity in their exegetical works to comment on theologically contentious positions that occupied the minds of their contemporaries. For instance, Gregory of Nyssa had engaged in the refutation of the position that the humanity of Jesus lacked a nous, a position associated with Appolinarius of Laodicea, and also rebuked the demotion of Jesus to the order of created beings by the Eunomians. Therefore, the Homilies on the Song of Songs formed part of Gregory’s defence of the Nicene faith against the Eunomians, and his Antirrheticus set out to demonstrate the inconsistencies of Apollinarius’ Christology by referring, among other things, to the loud cry on the cross. Nevertheless, there is no indication that Gregory ever viewed

9 According to Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Theodore of Mopsuestia dismissed the Christological value of Ps 22:2 which he found inappropriate to be rendered to Jesus due to the centrality of sin in Ps 22. See Theodoret, Psalm. PG 80, 1009. 10 Late antique exegetes usually cited Matthew which was the most widely read and cited gospel in late antiquity. See Augustine of Hippo, De Consensu Evangelistarum 1.2 who suggests that Mark copied and edited from Matthew. However, in order to be consistent with contemporary recognition that Mark might be the oldest gospel, I have cited Mark and added Matthew in brackets. 11 For Rossé and Balthasar, this position never really changed before the presence of the Rhineland mystics in the West, since they were the first that employed the image of the biblical bride as a link between the ascetic experience of abandonment and the suffering Jesus on the cross. Rossé (1987), 73 and 97 [see footnote 12] and Balthasar (1990), 75. See also Delumeau (1990), 73.

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the experience of the bride in light of the abandonment of Jesus, and vice versa: to put it differently, Gregory did not treat Jesus as bridegroom and bride at the same time. Perhaps, such a position would have diminished the divine nature of Jesus and would have provided a theological argument that would have played against him at the hands of his Eunomean and Apollinarian opponents. One could assume, then, that in Gregory of Nyssa’s thought Jesus is the bridegroom that abandons the soul and that the nature of his own abandonment is entirely different. As it concerns Theodoret of Cyrrhus, he was actively engaged in the theological turmoil in the fifth centrury ce that is known as the Nestorian controversy and concerned the number of natures in Christ and also the exact relation between his natures. It has been argued that several elements in Theodoret’s exegesis on the Song suggest that it was composed during the years when the Nestorian controversy was at its most intense point. However, the lack of any controversial or contentious elements in the way that Theodoret presents Jesus in his biblical commentary has been accounted for in differing ways: Guinot and Pásztori-Cupán have supported the rectitude of Theodoret’s Christology throughout his theological career, whereas Richard and Bardy have discerned the theological adventures of a radical Antiochene in the 420s ce that was tamed in the years close to Chalcedon (451 ce).12 In any case, the fact remains that Theodoret did not draw a common line between the abandonment of Jesus and the bride; nor did he comment on the experience of the bride in his Christological works. One way to account for the lack of a distinctive Christology in the Commentary is to review Theodoret’s theology anew and also establish a more definite date of composition for the Commentary. However, there is an alternative explanation about the lack of any connection between Christology and exegesis in most Christian exegetes, and which might also help us understand the reason why Athanasius of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind, Theophilus and Cyril of Alexandria had identified Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) with Ps 22:2 when they commented on the Psalms, but overlooked this fact in their polemical discourses. Theodoret of Cyrrhus might not have intended his Commentary as means to expose his more refined theological positions and that much is evident in the introduction of his work where Theodoret follows the theological agenda that Origen had already set: Theodoret defines his objective as a defence of the validity of reading the Song as an allegory. Theodoret’s silence concerning the abandonment of Jesus on the cross might be an implicit indication that he, like Gregory of Nyssa, had no intention to sidetrack from the fact that in the Song of Songs Jesus is the bridegroom that leads the soul: the bride faces trials but not the bridegroom. In fact, it might be argued that Gregory of Nyssa presented in more rigorous terms the central role that Christ plays in the spiritual journey of the bride, a role that Oriden seems to have downplayed or 12 For Guinot (1985) the Commentary predates the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy. The overall impression in Pásztori-Kupán (2006), 18 is that Theodoret maintained a balanced Christology throughout his theological career but was often misunderstood by others. Therefore, he attributes the commentary on the Song during the “cold war” years between Ephesus (431 ce) and Chalcedon (451 ce). The opposite view has been held by Bardy (1946) and Richard (1935). For Theodoret’s reception at the Council of Chalcedon see ACO 2.1/69.

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even undermined.13 Overall, it seems that Christian exegetes treated the Song on its own terms, but not as means to express the Christological concerns of their times.14 Cyril of Alexandria might have been an exception when he interpreted Song 3:1 from a Christological point of view, but he only went as far as to introduce a typology of the death of Jesus: the night when the bride reclines on the bed is the time that Jesus is laying in the tomb while the myrrh-bearing women are approaching the tomb. However, even here, there is no explicit relation between the abandonment of the soul and the experience of Jesus. Perhaps Elliott has exaggerated the degree to which Christian exegetes were preoccupied with the identity of Jesus prior to the Council of Chalcedon (451 ce), but I agree with him that, after Chalcedon, Christian theology sought exact theological formulas to the detriment of biblical exegesis, and not just only on the Song of Songs.15 Therefore, the fact that the Song did not arouse any interest as a source of theological inspiration after the fifth century ce should be viewed in light of the overall diminishing interest in Christian exegesis. Before the above facts lead us to any final pronouncements as to the compartmentalization of the various fields of theology, where biblical exegesis stands apart from Christology, one should also take into account the observation of Rossé that, in fact, “the cry of Jesus on the cross did not enjoy any particular attention during the patristic era”.16 That is to say that theology in late antiquity appears less preoccupied with the loud cry on the cross than modern readers would have anticipated and this might be the reason why exegetes and theologians did not see the experience of the bride and that of Jesus in light of each other. This fact diminishes the gravity of any assumption that the silence of the written witness with regard to the relation between the abandonment of Jesus and the bride should be interpreted in terms of a real difference between the two experiences. Rossé does not discuss any particular reasons why this incident from Jesus’ life did not enjoy any particular treatment in late antiquity, but the answer might be sought in the nature of the primary sources dealing with the loud cry that fall into two categories: exegetical works and polemical ones. Exegetical works are mostly lengthy commentaries on the gospels, even though some short comments appear in exegesis on other books, such as Isaiah or Paul’s letters (e.g. Hebrews). The overall implication behind this observation is that in such a literary context, Christian exegetes viewed the loud cry as a mere snapshot in the overall narrative of the gospels and therefore they tried to fit it into their overall theological agendas that most often than not were concerned with specific pastoral duties. This might be the reason, then, why a prolific

13 Andreopoulos (2011). 14 Cyril of Alexandria, Fragmenta in Cantica Canticorum, PG, 69, 1285C. The Cyrilian fragments on the Song show that Cyril diverged from the Origenist and Gregorian tradition by discussing the Song from a more historical point of view and always in light of the incarnation. A close associate of Epiphanius of Salamis, Philo of Carpasus, was the first to interpret the Song of Songs from a more coherently christological point. See: Philo of Carpasus, Enarratio in Canticum Canticorum, PG 40, 28–153. His purpose was to demonstrate the ascension of the Christian church and the diminishing of the Jewish synagogue. 15 Elliott (2000). 16 Rossé (1987), 73.

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commentator of the stature of John Chrysostom, who wrote an extensive interpretation of the Passion Narrative in Matthew, spends more than fifty lines to discuss the solar eclipse in Mt 27:45, but only twelve lines on Mt 27:46.17 We come across the same limited scope in the small number of homiletic works that introduce the loud cry, but only as part of a general subject that is usually dictated by the content of major ecclesiastical feasts (e.g. Holy Saturday) or the readings from New Testament that are part of the eucharistic rite. It should be noted that not even a single homiletical work deals exclusively with the loud cry on the cross. Polemical works were composed in refutation of theological views that diverged from the “orthodox” tenets of faith. I have already mentioned Justin Martyr and also Irenæus of Lyon as the earliest writers that introduced the loud cry on the cross within a polemical context. Origen was the next theologian that commented on the loud cry in the third century ce in his Contra Celsus, where he addresses his interlocutor’s objections that Jesus could have been divine.18 However, Origen does provide a proper interpretation of the loud voice, but he merely makes the episode fit into his general argument against Celsus. When the divine state of Jesus was put under question in the fourth century ce by Arius who, allegedly, demoted Jesus to the order of created beings, there is no evidence in the surviving fragments – preserved by his detractors – that the loud cry formed part of his argument.19 It seems, then, that some adherents of Arius cited the loud cry in order to argue that the subject that was abandoned on the cross could not have existed co-eternally with the Father, since the incident on the cross reveals a separation between God and the suffering subject.20 However, the main biblical citation employed by the Arians was not Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) but Prov 8:22. As McGuckin has put it, Prov 8:22 “was elevated as his [Arius’] supreme proof text”.21 As it concerns Appolinarius of Laodicea, he might have

17 John Chrysostom, In Matthæum, PG 57, 776. Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarii in Matthæum (in catenis), PG 72, 312. In two contemporary commentaries on Matthew and Mark that are compilations from early antique sources, Simonetti (on Matthew) provides four entries (by Hilary of Poitiers, Origen, Jerome, and Chrysostom) for the divine abandonment of Jesus, while he cites nineteen patristic witnesses for the prayer in the Mount of Olives; and Oden and Hall (on Mark) cite three entries for the incident of the cross, but nineteen for the prayer in agony. Simonetti (2002), 253–59 and 292–95. Oden and Hall (1998), 208–14 and 232–34. 18 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3.32. 19 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 380. Hanson has questioned the degree to which Arius’ detractors actually cite Arius himself. It seems that Athanasius cited Arian positions rather than Arius. See Hanson (1988), 6–18. However, Kopecek, Stead and Williams have criticised this position and argued in support of the authenticity of such passages in Athanasius’ work. For the literature on this matter, see Hanson (1988), 11 (footnotes no. 33 and 34). For Arius’ theology see Behr (2004), 130–49 and Gavrilyuk (2004), 101–34. 20 Epiph. Pan. 69.19.5 [GCS 3/168]:“[allegedly quoting from Arius] καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ σταυρῷ φησίν ἔλεγεν· Ἠλι Ἠλι, λημᾶ σαβαχθανί, τουτέστι, Θεέ μου Θεέ μου ἵνα τί με ἐγκατέλιπες; και ὁρᾷς, φησίν, ὡς ἐπιδέεται βοηθείας;” (and again on the cross, he says that he [Christ] said: my God, my God why have you abandoned me? and do you see, he says, how he is in need of assistance). 21 McGuckin (2004), 29. For the role of Prov 8:22 in the Arian controversy see Ernest (1993), 341–62. Bromiley (1978), 85 also introduces Mk 10:18, 13:32, Jn 17:3; 5:19 and 14:28. For Gregg and Groh (1981) it is Phil 5:11 that features as the most constant and consistent point of refutation in Athanasius,

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developed his system of thought in support of the Nicene faith that officially rebuked the Arian positions in 325 ce, but there is no evidence that he alluded to the loud cry as part of his minimalistic anthropology that deprived the humanity of Jesus from a nous. In those instances that Apollinarius did introduce the loud cry, he adheres to the theological line of thought that Athanasius of Alexandria had laid out.22 Gregory of Nyssa, who was the theological adversary of Appolinarius, seems to have been dragged into an argument that was dominated by the theological presuppositions set by Apollinarius. As a result, he refers to the loud cry on the cross, but only in response to the Apollinarian idea that Jesus is a “heavenly man”.23 Even in this case, though, Mk 15:34 is not the main proof text of either Apollinarius or Gregory. In the fifth century ce, Nestorius interpreted the faith of Nicæa in extreme ways and therefore introduced two acting subjects in Christ: Jesus the Son of Mary that suffered on the cross, and the divine Logos that performed miracles.24 Cyril of Alexandria, one of the main protagonists that were embroiled in a controversy with political extensions, informed his readers that the loud cry of Jesus was cited by Nestorius in defence of his position that there existed two distinct centers in Christ: God and man.25 In his Nestoriana, Loofs has collected three instances in which Nestorius had examined Jesus’ loud cry on the cross, and Abramowski and Goodman provide two further loci.26 It seems that Cyril of Alexandria had only reacted to Nestorius interpretation of Mk 15:34, because prior to the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy, Cyril had treated the loud cry only as part of the Passion Narrative.27 After the Council of Ephesus

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Contra Arianos. For a thorough discussion of Arianism with respect to its biblical anchoring see Hanson (1988) and Williams (2001). Apart from Gregory of Nyssa, who quotes Appolinarius without providing any context, Theodoret of Cyrrhus provides some information about Apollinarius’ theological positions in Historia Ecclesiastica, 5.9.12 [in GCS 19/292]. For Appolinarius’ theological system see Mühlenberg (1975), 28 [Ps 37:22] and 53 [Ps 42:2]. Lietzmann (1970). Bathrellos (2004), 10–16. Gregory, Apol. 3.1/168. For Harnack (1898), 149–63, Grillmeier (1975), 330–33, and Olson (1999), 188–90 Apollinarius was merely misunderstood by his contemporaries. The opposite view has been held by Behr (2004), 451–58 who thinks that Apollinarius was less careful in his Christology than the above scholars have admitted. See also Gavrilyuk (2004), 101–34. See ACO 1.1.2/49. For a concise introduction to the system of thought of Nestorius see Gavrilyuk (2004), 141–44. Bathrellos (2004), 16–24. Wessel (2004) has analysed Nestorius style as an exegete and orator. In ACO 1.1.2/49 Nestorius appears to have introduced humanity as a concrete acting agent alongside the divine Logos. Cyril accused the Nestorian party of dividing Jesus into two distinct and independent acting subjects, as Paul of Samosata had done, even though Nestorius never admitted that he endorsed such a sharp distinction. See ACO, 1.1.1/101, 110, and 1.1.4/36. For Nestorius’ defence see The Bazaar of Heraclides, 1.1. Loofs (1914) and Bethune-Baker (1908) have tried to reconsider Nestorius’ Christology in a more favourable light, but, as McGuckin (1994) and Bathrelos (2004), 16–24 have argued, the evidence does not suffice to fully restore Nestorius as a theologian deeply misunderstood by his contemporaries. Loofs (1905), 219; 260 and 360. In fact, the loud cry features three times, but one is a translation of Loof ’s own German text. Abramowski and Goodman (1972), 43; 68 and 118 [the latter had also appeared in Loofs (1905), 219]. McGuckin (2004) has questioned the real purpose behind any modern attempt to restore Nestorius to the detriment of Cyril’s own image, since he is depicted as a monolithic and totalitarian bishop that could tolarate no dissent. Wessel (2004) has contributed much to the restoration of the image of Cyril of Alexandrian as a trained orator and exegete. See also Grillmeier (1975), 559–68.

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(431 ce) and the controversial council of Chalcedon (451 ce), the theological stage was dominated by further controversies that threatened the ecclesiastical and also imperial unity, and the consequent attempts to reach a compromise between the embattled parties through imperial decrees and theological formulas.28 Even so, in the years that led to the Council of Second Constantinople (680 ce) the loud cry on the cross did not fair any better and theological instances in which it features are rare, since exegetes and theologians opted for other biblical witnesses, such as the prayer of Jesus at Gethsemane (Mk 14:32, Mt 26:36 and Lk 22:39).29 Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) is part of the scriptural witness that forms the extensive florilegia that were compiled methodically during the theological debates in the seventh century ce. The florilegia presented at the Council of Laterano (649 ce) were collected under the theological influence of Maximus the Confessor, one of the most outstanding orthodox thinkers in late antiquity. Their objective was to refute that Jesus lacked proper human will or activity, and though they introduce the prayer at Gethsemane, they pay insignificant attention to the loud cry on the cross. The florilegium that was compiled as part of the proceedings in the Council of Third Constantinople (680–81 ce) by the theological adversaries of Maximus did not include any patristic uses (χρήσεις) on the loud cry on the cross, and the one put together by Maximus’ supporters comprises some patristic uses concerning the loud cry, but even in this case the citations of the prayer at Gethsemane significantly outnumber the citations of the loud cry.30 In his own polemical works, Maximus the Confessor cites the prayer of Jesus at Gethsemane but does not mention the loud cry of Jesus.31 In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that the reason for the evident lack of any direct connection in late antique sources between the loud cry of Jesus in abandonment and the experience of abandonment by the bride should be sought in the overall lack of theological interest in the loud cry. The instances that Christian thinkers of the patristic era dealt with the loud cry on the cross were rare and were triggered as a reaction to arguments that had been put forward first by theological adversaries. Even this latter group did not address the loud cry with consistency or any frequency. Benoit’s observation, then, that “from the beginning, Christian exegetes have given a great deal of attention to these words [Mk 15:34] and several suggestions have been put forward to explain this desertion by God” could only be viewed as an exaggeration of the real role and place of the loud cry of Jesus in late antique theology.32 28 For the years between Ephesus (431 ce) to Chalcedon (451 ce) see Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400 to 700, Translated Texts for Historians, Contexts (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009). Meyendorff (1989). 29 For the homiletical works and available commentaries on the prayer see Geerard, CPG 5/130. 30 In ACO2, 1/84–90, 258–336 and 2.1/288–368 (florilegia of Maximus’ supporters) and 2.1/370–90 (florilegium of Maximus’ adversaries). 31 For the place of the prayer at Gethsemane in Maximus’ thought see Léthel (1979) and (1996) and also Heinzer and Schönborn (1982). Bathrellos (2004) has also examined the place of the prayer at Gesthemane in theology prior to the controversy of the seventh century ce, and thus indicates that “it seems that the Gethsemane prayer first came to the fore of doctrinal disputes in the fourth century” (p. 141). 32 Benoît (1969), 194.

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The Abandonment of Jesus in Late Antiquity Origen: Patristic Foundations

In his pioneering doctoral thesis that influenced subsequent scholarly works, Jouassard (1923)33 set about to examine theological interpretations during the patristic era of Jesus’ loud cry on the cross. He drew the conclusion that late antique theologians introduced two approaches in their deliberations: a realistic reading and a typological/ metaphorical one, “realism on the one hand, metaphorical system on the other”.34 A great number of scholars have maintained this exegetical polarisation in their own works.35 The person that introduced this twofold distinction, according to Jouassard, was Origen, who was also the first Christian author that provided a thorough interpretation of the loud cry on the cross, even though the theologian from Alexandria never defined the two approaches in such clear terms. It seems that in his assessment Jouassard reflects the theological currents that had dominated academic research on patristic exegesis in the first half of the twentieth century and eventually found masterful expression in the seminal work of Daniélou (1955). Daniélou discerned three exegetical threads in Origen’s exegesis: literalism, typology and allegory – albeit reservations have been expressed in current Origenist and patristic scholarship about the usefulness of maintaining such labels in patristics.36 What is at stake in each approach is the degree to which it might be claimed that Jesus actually experienced abandonment. In other words, whereas realism affirms that some form of separation or disruption between Jesus and God took place on the cross, typology and allegory make less extreme the effect of the experience. If some fragmentary comments on Psalms that have survived under Origen’s name are authentic, then Origen did read Ps 22:2 as a typology, since he identifies Ps 22:2 as the loud cry of Jesus in Mt 27:46 and offers an interpretation: [citing Ps 22:2] this is the voice of Christ our Lord when he was hanging on the cross, and in another way it is a type of our own passion. For, we were abandoned and forsaken before… he appropriated our folly and malediction.37 Origen affirms that the loud cry belongs to Jesus, who appears to cite the opening verse of Ps 22. However, it is not certain whether Jesus experienced true abandonment

33 His thesis was submitted at the Catholic Institute in Lyon but has never been published. Jouassard produced several articles based on his thesis which have been available to researchers. Despite my many efforts, it has been impossible to obtain a copy of his thesis and even the Bibliothèque Nationale de France was unable to provide any help in this matter. Therefore and with due caution, I depend on Jouassard (1925a) and (1925b). 34 Jouassard (1925a), 609. 35 See Rossé (1987), 73 who argues that “[Origen] finds himself at the beginning of two currents of interpretation that persist until the Middle Ages”. The same idea echoes in Carra de Vaux Saint Cyr (1965), 305–06 and Balthasar (1990), 125 [footnote no. 70]. 36 For literature review on this subject see Martens (2008). 37 Origen, Selecta in Psalmos, PG 12, 1253A [Ps 22].

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because Origen suggests (“and in another way”) that Ps 22 actually gives expression to the experience of divine abandonment by humanity collectively. Therefore, the loud cry signifies the passion of Jesus but at the same time it is spoken on behalf of people. But there is no indication whether Jesus merely becomes the voice of humanity or if he trully experiences abandonment on the cross. Origen introduces the obscure term “appropriation” of human sufferings by Jesus, but provides no explanation as to the exact meaning or extent of this appropriation. Since this work is an exegesis on Psalms, it seems reasonable to assume that Origen’s intention had been to merely point to the identification of the loud cry on the cross with Ps 22.2, like Justin and Irenæus of Lyon had done before Origen. Due to the presence of the word “type”, Rossé has questioned the degree to which Origen believed in the personal involvement of Jesus in the passion: “Christ as the representative of humanity expresses a reality that does not regard him directly but concerns his body, of which he is the head”.38 Rossé endorses Jouassard’s position that, for Origen, Jesus gives expression to the weakness of his body, i.e. humanity as a collective noun, but otherwise he passion does not belong to him, since he has appropriated (οἰκειούμενος) our folly (πλημμελές). In which case, it would be proper to claim that the object of abandonment by God is humanity, not Jesus. To the above position, Jouassard juxtaposed an alternative approach that features in Origen’s Commentary on Matthew. Here, Jesus is personally involved in his suffering and he is the subject “I” that experiences abandonment. Certain people, in an outward display of piety for Jesus, because they are unable to explain how Christ could be forsaken by God, believe that this saying from the cross is true only as an expression of his humility. We, however, who know that he who was “in the form of God” descended from the greatness of his stature and emptied himself, “taking the form of a servant” according to the will of the one who sent him, understand that he was indeed forsaken by the Father inasmuch as he who was the form of the invisible God and the image of the Father “took the form of a servant”. He was forsaken for people so that he might shoulder so great a work and come “even to death” and “the death of the cross”, a work which seems most shameful to most people. It was the height of his abandonment when they crucified him with thieves and when “those who passed by blasphemed and wagged their heads”. The chief priests and scribes said, “He saved others but cannot save himself ”. At that time “even the thieves reviled him” on the cross. Clearly then you will be able to understand the saying “Why have you forsaken me”? when you compare the glory Christ had in the presence of the Father with the contempt he sustained on the cross, for his throne was “like the sun in the presence of God and like the moon established forever; and he was his faithful witness in heaven”. Afterwards, he also added with regard to those reasons for which he said “why have you forsaken me”.39

38 Rossé (1987), 73. 39 Origen, Commentarii in Matthæum, 135 [edition in Simonetti (2002), 294].

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The reality of the experience is unquestionable: Jesus experiences abandonment on the cross. Origen unfolds his interpretation with an attack against a pious attitude that would deny the reality of Jesus’ abandonment by thinkink of it as a mere expression of humility. Origen does not elaborate further on the reasons behind such a pious approach, but only indicates that those who held it were unable to admit that Jesus could have been abandoned by God. We might assume that this party acknowledged the existence of divinity in Jesus and therefore faced with discomfort the paradox that God might have abandoned Jesus. But, this is the point that Origen wishes to bring home: Jesus has been abandoned by the Father, so that the Father is the acting agent and Jesus the object that experiences abandonment. In order to dissolve the paradox, Origen points at another paradox: the kenosis or self-emptying of Christ. The loud cry belongs to Christ as long as one might accept that Christ who was “in the form of God took the form of a servant” and even suffered “the death of the cross”. At the core of Origen’s argument lies the Pauline hymn in Phil 2:5 that Origen cites, and the notion that Christ left the majesty of the Fatherly bosom to be subjected to mockery, contempt and even death.40 Origen does not provide a full explanation of the inner – i.e. phsychological – mechanism that might have enabled Jesus to experience abandonment, but instead resorts to a common exegetical device in which Scripture is invoked in order to clarify Scripture: Origen understands Mt 27:46 by reading it in light of Phil 2:5, so that anyone who denied the reality of the loud cry would also have to reject the reality of Christ’s existence “in the form of a servant”. On the other hand, it should be noted that Origen does not clarify whether he thought that Jesus cited Ps 22:2 in a contextual way, that is expecting deliverance from God, and in fact he seems to have implied an atomistic reading, since he does not cite Ps 22 in its entirety. Therefore, the first exegetical work has put forward a typological reading according to which the loud cry merely signifies the appropriation (οἰκείωσις) of human weakness by Jesus, albeit in uncertain terms, whereas In Matthæum introduces exegetical realism, according to which it is appropriate to view the loud cry as an expression of a real separation between Jesus and the Father that took place on the cross. However, such a sharp juxtaposition of realism and typology in Origen is problematic. First, the authorship of the exegetical work in Ps 22 remains debatable and as a result it is

40 From Origen to Athanasius of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria and the Rhineland mystics in the West, and from the German kenotists of the nineteenth century (Gottfried Thomasius) to S. Bulgakov in the East and von Balthasar in the West, Phil 2:5 has become the locus classicus that proclaims the self-emptying of Christ or kenosis, and therefore has been elevated to an invaluable proof text that exemplifies the mystery of the incarnation. See Davis (2002), Richard (1997), Strimple (1978), 247–68 and Feinberg, (1980). I have singled out Bulgakov (2008), 215 because of his position that Phil 2:5 “talks about not only an earthly event occurring within the limits of human life but also a heavenly event occurring in the depths of Divinity itself ” and von Balthasar (1979), 110 for his excessive and at the same time poetic appropriation of kenotic theology: “‘Father, I am your Son, your beloved Son, born from you before time began!’ But the Father no longer knows you. You have been eaten up by the leprosy of all creation: how should he recognise your face?”.

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numbered amongst the spurious works of Origen. In this case, Jouassard seems to have based his theory of two threads of thought in Origen on uncertain grounds. Second, the notion of appropriation questions the real involvement of Jesus in the passion and is therefore a vague formula that does not signify anything certain: if Jesus is not abandoned, he must be pretending. How could it be claimed, then, that Jesus makes the abandonment of people his own, if he does not truly suffer? Origen has expressly reproached those who would deny the reality of the experience of abandonment by Jesus and at the same time he defines abandonment as a real separation between Jesus and his Father. In some other fragments that survive under Origen’s name, the author, whom I call Origen for convenience, indicates that, “[I] (i.e. Jesus) am asking for your help; as if he is without assistance by the Father, but he is not really without assistance even if he says; My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?”41 The presence of the condition “as if ” could justify modern concerns about the degree to which Origen would have acknowledged the experience of abandonment as authentic, a point that is accentuated by the fact that here Origen denies a separation between Christ and his Father (“but he is not really without assistance”). Even though Origen does not explicitly hold an ontological separation between Jesus and his Father, he indicates that the experience is real enough since, it is Jesus’ soul that has become the bearer of human transgressions: “Christ says, my soul is filled with troubles, for he bears our sins in his soul and, he is filled with troubles… For, if he carries our sins and suffers for us, he properly says that he is filled with troubles”.42 The author cites Ps 87:4 and pushes the identification of Jesus with human suffering to its extremes: the appropriation of human suffering is real since Christ’s soul has become the bearer of many troubles in an authentic way. Therefore, it is proper to refer to Jesus’ sufferings as his own on the grounds of the existence of a soul in Christ. In the past, Grillmeier had read too much on the existence of soul in Christ, which he elevated to an indispensable theological and anthropological factor (an acting subject).43 However, even though modern scholarship has distanced itself from such immoderate assessments, that does not mean that we should not pay attention to the role of the soul in this instance, as it might be the case that Origen speaks about Jesus’ soul, and even refers to the obscure idea of appropriation, so that he could affirm the reality of Jesus’ experience and at the same time maintain the ethical purity of Jesus and his divine relationship with his Father. The idea, then, that Origen did not believe that Jesus was immediately involved in the passion seems ungrounded, if we take into account another passage from this dubious exegetical work on the Psalms: commenting on Ps 68:14, Origen actually cites Heb 5:7 and interprets it as referring to the prayer in Gethsemane (Mk 14:32) in order to bring home the 41 Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150, Ps 87.5 [edition in Pitra (1966)]. 42 Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150, Ps 87.3. 43 Grillmeier (1975). Given the speculative aspects of Origen’s Christology, his treatment of Christ’s soul could not be entirely unproblematic. However, even in this case we depend mostly on the assumption that the fragments, translations and excerpts of his works that have survived reflect his actual positions. See McGuckin (2006) under the entries “soul” and “Christology”.

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immediate involvement of Jesus in the passion and thus remove any reservations that his prayer might have been an act of pretence: “[Christ prays] not in pretence in order to lure Satan, not accommodating the will of the world, but in his own person, Christ economically voluntarily prays with a cry”.44 Therefore, unlike what Jouassard has suggested, Origen seems to have interpreted the loud cry only in realistic terms, arguing for the authenticity of the experience and the immediate involvement of Jesus in the passion. The idea that Origen has introduced a typological reading seems to be unjustified. However, it should be noted that though Origen referred to divine abandonment in terms of a separation between Jesus and his Father, he did not elaborate on the way that Jesus could have been abandoned given his divine state, and the fact that Origen cited Phil 2:5 as cross-reference only served his purpose to reinforce the notion that Christ was trully incarnated and that the passion was his own.45 Athanasius of Alexandria: Against the Arians

In the third century ce, the adherents of Arius rose the question that Origen had not answered: if Christ is divine, then how could he have been abandoned by his Father? As Jouassard has remarked, “the Arians sought to profit from the scene of the anguish to deny that a being so overwhelmed by the suffering could be really the power of God”.46 However, it should be reminded that Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46) was not the proof text that triggered their theological inquiries, but seems to have played an insignificant part in their endeavours to anchore their theological positions on Scripture. On the other hand, our understanding of the way the Arians interpreted the loud cry on the cross depends on the material preserved mostly by Athanasius of Alexandria, the most prominent theological critic of the Arians. Athanasius of Alexandria did not refute the interpretation of the Arians in a systematic way and, like his adversaries, the loud voice did not even play second fiddle to the use of certain scriptural passages in his overall attempt to ground his own theological argument on Scripture.47 Nevertheless, it is possible to discern the inner logic of his thought. It should be noted in advance that the bishop of Alexandria affirms that Jesus experiences on the cross some form of disruption in his relation with the Father, even though Athanasius never demonstrated the inner (psychological) mechanism which resulted to the experience of abandonment by Jesus. This is due to the fact that Athanasius reacts to the theological opinions of his opponents who diminish the divine state of Christ. As a result, the objective of his argument is to shed light to the logical absurdities or inconsistencies of the 44 Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150, Ps 68.14. Weinandy (2000) and (2001) has even argued that Origen introduced love as a divine capacity that goes beyond divine impassibility and actually enables God to become a co-sufferer with all people in an authentic way. 45 Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, 3.32.10. 46 Jouassard (1925a), 610. 47 Jouassard, (1925a), 612.

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Arian positions and also to show that their exegesis was not anchored on theological tradition.48 That much is evident in the following passage in which Athanasius quotes his opponents who think that it is absurd to say that Jesus is God: How is it possible that the Logos is essential (ἴδιος εἶναι) to the Father, without whom the Father was never, through whom he makes all things, as you believe, he who said on the cross, ‘my God, my God why have you abandoned me?’… If he existed according to your belief eternally the Son to God, he would not ignore about the day, but he would know as Logos, nor would be abandoned he that co-exists.49 To provide some context, the overall strategy of the Arian party was to locate those biblical passages that predicate weakness, ignorance or limited powers to Jesus. As it concerns Mt 27:46 and supposing that Athanasius’ witness is reliable, his adversaries construed the loud cry as a true separation between the Father and the Logos, and therefore argued that the one who has been separated from the Father could not have coexisted as an essential part of the Father, since he suffers temporal separation from him. There is no evidence whether the Arians read Ps 22 behind Mt 27:46, but even if they did so it should be assumed that they applied an atomistic reading for v.2: Jesus trully cries out in abandonment on the cross. Their theological interpretation reflects the way that the Arian party perceives the immutability of God: an essentially and truly divine being could not have suffered any temporal change in its nature brought about by the passion, least it ceased to be divine.50 Gavrilyuk has presented a thorough analysis of the thought of the Arian party with regard to divine immutability and impassibility and the way that the two ideals informed the way that the adherents of Arius constructed their theological system: they felt the need to provide a theological compromise between the classic philosophical ideal that the divine should be impassible and immutable, on the one hand, and the soteriological achievement of Jesus, i.e. some sort of “divine” involvement in human sufferings. Therefore, the Arians introduced the position that Jesus is a suffering subject that is not a “mere man” (a soteriological statement), but nor is he truly divine (a philosophical premise). For Gavrilyuk, divine impassibility and immutability is the main theological substratum on which the Arian argument is anchored and finds reasonable coherence.51 Like the adherents of Arius, there is no indication that Athanasius departed from the atomistic reading of v.2, since his concern was not to demonstrate the role of the entire Ps 22 in the passion narrative. Athanasius merely reacts to the arguments of his

48 The majority of instances that Athanasius deals with the loud cry on the cross occurs in Contra Arianos, and especially in the third oration, where he extensively refutes the way that the party of Arius interprets the biblical witness. 49 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 380. 50 Dragas (1980), 51 explains that “Arius’ starting point is theo-monistic and results in a tension between the transcendent absolute being of God and the transient and contingent being of the creatures, which are seen as opposites”. For an introduction to Athanasian thought see Weinandy (2007). 51 Gavrilyuk (2004), 101–34.

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opponents and refutes them by introducing his own biblical witness that reinforces the divinity of the Logos, denies that the Father abandoned Jesus, and affirms that weakness and limitations properly belong to human nature; or, according to Athanasius’ vocabulary, they belong to the “flesh” of Christ. His strategy is simple: for any biblical passage that seems to endorse the view of his opponents, Athanasius provides an appropriate passage that refutes such a view. His intention is to demonstrate that, since it is unreasonable to predicate contradictory qualities to Jesus, one should not depend on Scripture alone, but should try to interpret the passage along the lines of an already established theological tradition. Therefore, to the image of Jesus shrinking back before death at Gethsemane and on the cross (citing Mt 27:46), Athanasius juxtaposes those instances that Jesus encourages his disciples (Mt 10:28), and assures them that he heads to his own passion voluntarily ( Jn 10:18).52 However, even Athanasius had to work out a way to solve the tension between such contradictory claims and he does so while upholding the notion that Jesus is fully and properly divine. To achieve this, he introduces a line of thought that seemingly diverges from Origen, since it does not interpret the loud voice in terms of a separation between the Father and Christ: Behold when he utters ‘why have you abandoned me?’ the Father showed that he was in him and then as always. The earth, knowing her talking master, immediately trembled, and the veil was torn apart, and the sun hid, and the stones cracked, and the graves, as I said, opened, and the dead that were in them rose.53 Athanasius does not doubt the authenticity of the narrative and he accepts that Jesus cried out on the cross, but he opts for a different interpretation than the Arian one: he follows the narrative in Mt 27:51 that describes the natural and supernatural phenomena that occurred after Jesus had given up his spirit and interprets the narrative as a manifestation of the divine power of Jesus. Only if Jesus has maintained his unbreakable relationship with the Father on the cross does Mt 27:51 make any theological sense. To clarify that it is not the Father that works those wonders and in order to proclaim the divine nature of Christ, Athanasius interjects an expression that does not occur in Mt 27:51, “the earth, knowing her Lord (Δεσπότη) talking…”, and therefore draws the following conclusion that stresses the unity between the Father and Christ ( Jn 10:30): “so, it is not possible to be abandoned by the Father, the Lord he who is in him always, before he speaks and after he left this cry”.54 This thread of thought does not fit into Jouassard’s scheme of either realism or typology, and Jouassard acknowledges this by indicating that Athanasius neither affirms the reality of the loud cry (realism) nor implies that Jesus gives expression to the sufferings of all people (typology). Athanasius seems to agree with his theological interlocutors that, if Jesus had experienced a separation from the Father, then he could not have been divine, but he chooses to tone down the effect of the loud cry

52 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 436–37. 53 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 441. 54 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 440.

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with regard to the relation between Jesus and the Father: Mt 27:46 does not signify a kind of discontinuity in the relationship between the two parts.55 However, such an interpretation could have left Athanasius exposed to the accusation that he viewed the loud cry as an act of pretence, and even though Athanasius has not preserved any indication that his opponents actually decided to bring up this matter, it is still clear that Athanasius has led himself into a dead-end. His overall argument makes it evident that Athanasius was apparently aware of the unsoundness of any interpretation that does not attribute some sort of weakness or limitations to Jesus, since the menace of a docetic reading that would deny the reality of any human experience in Christ, was looming over late antique theology.56 Whereas his opponents had applied a realistic interpretation according to which Jesus experiences weakness and limitations to the detriment of his divine status, Athanasius had to work out an alternative position that would read the loud cry on the cross as a disruption and still maintain the divine state of the subject. Therefore, Athanasius stirred the discussion towards the subject “I” that manifests weakness. His answer is twofold and comprises a positive and a negative clause: the one who cried out on the cross “was the Logos crying out what belongs (what is essential) to the soul”,57 yet “it was not the Logos in so far as he is Logos, the one who cries and is troubled, but this belongs (it is essential) to the flesh”.58 The two clauses do not contradict each other since they both indicate that the Logos, i.e. the divinity, has not suffered, and at the same time they affirm the reality of the experience. According to the first clause, the subject that suffers abandonment is the Logos, but according to his soul. This position brings Athanasius close to Origen, since it does not deny the realism of the experience, but contains the important clarification that the true subject of abandonment is the soul of Jesus.59 The second clause introduces the obscure clarification that the experience of abandonment does not belong properly to the Logos as such, but it is an essential part of his flesh. The two terms, soul and flesh, do not signify different entities, since in the system of thought of Athanasius they were synonymous to human nature.60 It follows, then, that the subject of aban-

55 Jouassard (1925a), 611. 56 Athanasius directs a disguised accusation of docetism against the party of Arius: “in vain now do they pretend to take offence, and they think little about the Logos those who support Arius, if it is written that he was troubled and cried. They think he had no human sensation, ignoring the nature of men and what is essential to them”. Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 444. 57 Athanasius, Trin. PG 28, 1264A. 58 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 440. 59 McGuckin (2006), 77–78 makes the necessary clarification that though Athanasius had employed the notion of a divine incarnation “in the soul”, like Origen, he progressively shifted his position to emphasise more rigorously the reality of the incarnation and therefore promoted the idea of an incarnation “in the flesh”. See McGuckin (2006), 77–78. 60 Grillmeier (1975), 308 had tried to establish whether Athanasius viewed the soul as a physical entity that is subjected to suffering or as an anthropological factor that unites the material (body) to the divine (Logos). However, Dragas (1985), 289–399 [especially pp. 344–56] and Anatolios (1998) have demonstrated the weaknesses of Grillmeier’s position that emulates the kantian image of the ghost in the machine: the Logos animates his body as a mere instrument.

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donment is the humanity of Christ. Whereas Origen had introduced the distinction between Christ in the “form of the servant” and Christ in “the form of God”, with the appearance of Jesus on earth standing between the two moments, the patriarch of Alexandria progressively developed a vocabulary that distinguished between two moments in the life of Christ: theology (θεολογία), i.e. God in his essence, and economy (οἰκονομία), i.e. God as he appeared on earth.61 According to this scheme, soul and flesh belong naturally to the second moment in the life of Christ. It appears, then, that Athanasius promoted a realistic reading of the loud cry on the cross, since Christ maintains his divinity on the cross intact, hence the (super) natural phenomena, even though his flesh experiences real abandonment. Jouassard has pointed that, if Origen had introduced the term οικονομία and the obscure term “soul”, he did so in order to moderate the personal involvement of Jesus in the passion. Instead, Athanasius introduced the term “flesh” to remove any reservations about the reality of the passion: Christ that has made flesh his own, experiences a reality that properly and naturally belongs to humanity.62 However, this is not a typological reading, since Jesus does not merely voice the maledictions of humanity, but, somehow, he experiences those maledictions in his own flesh. He has accommodated, then, human nature that has been able to experience the same (natural) passions with the rest of humanity that manifest when Jesus ignores something, shrinks back on the face of death and cries out on the cross: “through this he made known that, though he is God impassible, he assumed passible flesh; with his works he shows himself to be the Logos of God and later he becomes man”.63 This led Athanasius to work out a fine, but not entirely unproblematic, distinction between natural operations that are essential to Christ as Logos the God, and those actions or passions that are essential to the “economy of the union” (ἑνώσεως οἰκονομία) between Logos and flesh:64 “for these [passions] do not belong from nature to the Logos as far as he is Logos; the Logos was in the flesh that suffered those [passions]… and these were not spoken before the incarnation; but when the Logos became flesh, and became man”.65 Athanasius stands first in a line of patristic commentators that would take pains to demonstrate with as much clarity as possible that no contradiction occurs when Christian theology affirms the presence of human natural passions in Jesus and at the same time proclaims him as God. To address this paradox, Athanasius introduced the idea that the incarnation is the crucial moment that defines the existence of Christ before and after it. However, because such an argument could have played at the hands of his adversaries, Athanasius presses the matter on soteriological grounds to demonstrate how Christ assumed human passions in order to deliver

61 For Grillmeier, this fine distinction applied by Athanasius was meant to safeguard the divinity from any personal involvement in the passion: the humanity acts like a shield for the divinity. However, Dragas (1985) 346 [quoting Grillmeier] and most recently Gavrilyuk (2004), 101 have criticised such a reading not only of Athanasius’ system of thought but also the Nicene faith in general. 62 Jouassard (1925a), 612. 63 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 437. 64 Jouassard (1925a), 610. 65 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 437.

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people from them: “in the same way that he crushed death with his death, and in a human way (ἀνθρωπίνως) all that is human (ἀνθρώπινα), in this way he removed with what is thought as cowardice our cowardice, and he made so that no longer do people fear death”.66 Christ has saved humanity by assuming human limitations and such a claim turns the tables in favour of Athanasius and against the Arians who taught that if the saviour had been involved in human suffering, this would have endangered his divine impassibility. Athanasius modifies the argument so that only if Christ was fully and trully God could he have brought salvation to humanity, and he adds: “just as he, having come (γενόμενος) in our body, he imitated (ἐμιμήσατο) what is ours, in the same way we, having received (δεξάμενοι) him, partake (μεταλαμβάνομεν) in immortality from him”.67 The symmetry of the Greek text is unmistakable as each clause couples a participle and a verb: Christ has come into flesh and therefore has imitated our condition so the effect that humanity has received him and therefore has partook in immortality. Therefore, Christ is a co-sufferer with people and humanity collectively partakes in the divine property of immortality. In the next section, I will discuss how Athanasius exemplified even further the result of the incarnation in his Life of Antony by propagating a certain image for Antony, an Egyptian ascetic. It should be noted that, despite his pains to turn the argument of the Arians to its head, Athanasius does not truly engage in a discussion about the psychological mechanism that is involved in the experience of feeling abandoned, which means that he does not clarify who abandoned whom on the cross: if the humanity of Jesus was abandoned on the cross, then Athanasius does not indicate who abandoned it, the Logos or the Father? This question has troubled scholarly research of Athanasius’ thought for the reason that it is closely related to the question of Jesus’ death on the cross: if abandonment is defined as separation, then did Athanasius support a separation between humanity and divinity in death? Given the fact that, having invoked Ps 16:10, Athanasius taught that corruption belongs properly to humanity, any separation between the Logos and the human element in Jesus would have left the latter susceptible to bodily corruption. On the other hand, for as long as the matter remained unaddressed, the role of the Father in the passion remained obscured. By casting doubt to the role of Christ’s soul as a proper anthropological element in Athanasius’ system of thought and by reading between the lines, Grillmeier thinks that Athanasius supported a separation between body and soul, in which case, the Father played no role in Jesus abandonment. An alternative possibility is that of a separation between Christ and his humanity that took place on the cross. However, since Athanasius did not provide a clear answer, the question remained unaddressed and became, among other reasons, the backdoor for the appearance of the theology of the Nestorian party. According to Dragas, we should view the silence of Athanasius in light of the fact that he never saw himself involved in questions concerning the actual ontological mechanism that caused the passion and death of Jesus. Athanasius was

66 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 444. 67 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 444.

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primarily concerned with the soteriological ramifications of diminishing the divinity of Jesus. As a result, he constrained himself to the refutation of such arguments. In summary, the Arian party had set the theological agenda and provided proof texts that suggested that Christ could not be an essential part of the Christian Godhead. As a result, they restrained the exegetical space available to Athanasius, since he could not have interpreted Scripture as introducing a separation of Jesus from the Father, because this would have played nicely in the hands of his adversaries. Athanasius managed to maintain the reality of the loud cry on the cross, like Origen, but he obscured the exact nature of the abandonment of Jesus, since he did not clarify the exact inner mechanism that brought about the feeling of abandonment. Though he viewed abandonment in terms of a disruption, and in order to safeguard the divine nature of Christ, Athanasius introduced a theological scheme that distinguished between scriptural events that happen at the level of the economy (οἰκονομία) or at the level of theology (θεολογία). According to the first, Christ assumed the consequences of man’s fall, including weakness, ignorance, cowardice and death, but that did not change his relation to the Father, since the divinity remained united with the Father. Consequently, Athanasius departed from Origen’s thought by stressing further the reality of the incarnation: God assumed flesh and this flesh, i.e. human nature, experienced what is essential to it.68 The fact that Athanasius referred to “the flesh” of Christ and the sharp distinction that he introduced between qualities predicated to the humanity and those predicated to the divinity left theology wide open to further controversies concerning the proper way of interpreting such statements.69 However, the most significant achievement of Athanasius was the fact that he directed the argument to the level of soteriology by teaching that Christ appropriated, howsoever he understood the term, human weakness in a real way because only God could save humanity. Gregory Nazianzen: An Allegorist?

According to Jouassard, the theological synthesis that Athanasius had introduced between Origen’s realism and, what he calls, typology was not followed with con-

68 Jouassard (1925a), 612 provides an excerpt in which Athanasius cites Phil 2:5 and applies a typological reading on Mt 27:46 according to which the loud cry of Jesus gives voice to the weakness of humanity. However, even though the work is considered spurious, the author is aligned with Athanasius’ system of though and therefore distinguishes between Jesus’ sayings that pertain to his divinity and those that refer to his humanity. Athanasius, De Incarnatione Dei Verbi et Contra Arianos, PG 28, 983 and 988. 69 Athanasius might have introduced another theological line according to which the exhibition of human weakenss by Jesus is a mere “fish-hook” and his ignorance and cowardice only serve to lure Satan. This position had been known since Origen’s time, even though Origen seems to have dismissed such an idea. Nevertheless, it gained popularity in the two Gregories from Cappadocia and never fell out of theological favour. A variation appeared in the West by Augustine who introduced the image of the “mouse-trap”. However, Athanasius, Homilia de Passione et Cruce Domini, PG 28, 228 is now considered a spurious work. See Rivière (1928), 257–70. Winslow (1979), 107. It should be noted that the idea features in a homily that would have been attended by normal church-goers and served to highlight the fact that every single event in the life of Jesus contributed to the defeat of death and the devil.

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sistency in consequent years, and Jouassard points to Gregory the Theologian (or Nazianzen) as the first representative of this discontinuity. According to Jouassard, Gregory put forward an allegorical interpretation whose pedigree could be traced in Origen, and which, at the hands of Gregory, profoundly underestimated the personal involvement of Jesus in abandonment.70 It is not clear whether Jouassard discerned any difference between metaphor and allegory, because he indicates the proximity of Gregory’s thought to Origen, he supports that Gregory articulated with unprecedented vigour a position that Origen had already introduced, but Jouassard employs the term “metaphor” for Origen and “allegory” for Gregory. The one instance that Gregory directly interprets Ps 22 occurs in his polemical work De Filio (Orat. 30), which constitutes Gregory’s own refutation of the Eunomians, that is extreme sympathisers of Arius that denied that Son was “co-substantial” (or of one nature) with the Father as the Council of Nicaea (325 ce) had proclaimed. Like Athanasius, Gregory reacts to the theological positions of his adversaries and the initiative seems to belong to them. It has been suggested – but has not been endorsed fully – that Gregory actually commented on an Arian catena, i.e. a row of exegetical excerpts that also include comments on Ps 22, and therefore provides a line-to-line refutation of an extreme Arian exegesis.71 There is no indication whether Gregory applies an atomistic or contextual reading on Ps 22. With regard to the subject that experiences abandonment Gregory argues that it is Jesus, but then presents the necessary clarification that the loud cry gives voice to the suffering of people, since Jesus experiences natural weakness and limitations “as the head of the whole body”.72 He was not abandoned either by the Father or by his own Godhead, as some think, as if it [the Godhead] were afraid of the passion, and therefore departed from him who suffers. Who forced him to be born on earth in the first place or go up on the cross? In himself, as I said, he becomes a type (τυποῖ) of our own (τὸ ἡμέτερον). For we were the abandoned and disregarded ones before; and now we have been received (προσειλημμένοι) and saved through the passion of the impassible.73 It is true that the language of Gregory is problematic, since he does not stress the reality of the experience, but merely uses the cryptic expression “he has become a type of our own”. However, this is far from Jouassard’s position that this constitutes an allegorical reading, because this would suggest that Gregory reads something that

70 Jouassard (1925a), 612–13. 71 Kopecek (1979), 502. Norris (1991), 55 and 159 might agree with Kopecek on this basic premise, and yet he believes that Gregory did not follow the exact order of the excerpts, but he rather quoted them in the order that he found most fitting: “[t]he ordering is probably his [Gregory], the substance their [Eunomians]”. 72 Nazianzene, Fil. 5.7. McGuckin (2001), 299: “[Gregory] argues that they [i.e. Jesus’ words on the cross] do not indicate anything of the mind of Christ considered either as God or as the manGod. They speak out, at the great moment of his act of salvation for the world, the entire plight of the human race alienated from the divinity”. 73 Nazianzene, Fil. 5.15.

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is not there in the first place. To put things into context, one should focus on the opening lines, where the theologian from Cappadocia infers that abandonment would have introduced disruption and therefore denies that the Father or the Godhead ever departed from him who suffered on the cross. The main preoccupation of Gregory has been the refutation of the theological line of the Eunomeans, and therefore it is his intention to stress the reality of Christ as God. However, like Athanasius, Gregory could find little place to manoeuvre: he could not have implied by any means a discontinuity between Christ and the Father, since this would have been exploited by his adversaries, and therefore he follows Athanasius who had reinforced the uninterrupted relationship between the Father and Jesus during the passion. One might think, then, that Gregory stresses the reality of Christ’s divinity to the expense of the authenticity of the experience. However, like Origen (soul) and Athanasius (flesh), Gregory moderated the rigidity of his position by adding that Christ cried out as “a type of our own”. Norris has observed that Gregory introduced a unitive Christology that highlights the singleness of the suffering/acting subject in the wake of the theological controversies in which he found himself involved.74 I might be reading too much into the passage by Gregory, but Norris’ position seems to be justified given the fact that Gregory introduces an active verb, “he becomes a type” (τυποῖ), with Christ as its subject, and subsequently adds passive participles “received” (προσειλημμένοι) and “saved” (σεσωσμένοι) that predicate humanity. Gregory and Athanasius use the same verb, to receive (λαμβάνω), but Athanasius stresses the reality of the incarnation (we have received [Christ]), whereas Gregory focuses on the subject that brought about our salvation (we have been received). Therefore, Jouassard might be right when he observes the problematic language of Gregory, but then proceeds to a hasty presentation of his thought and underestimates the role of the word type (τύπος) in Gregory. The Cappadocian bishop explains in no uncertain terms the fact that Christ has trully assumed our weakness: “he bears (φέρων) on himself me with all that is mine (μετά τῶν ἐμῶν)”.75 In fact, Gregory affirms the notion that Jesus is truly God and he equally affirms the idea that, through the incarnation, Jesus has gained experience and even tasted our natural weakness: For this reason he honours obedience with deeds and he experiences (πειρᾶται) it from his passion. For the disposition is not enough, as it is not in our case, unless we move forward to the deeds… It is not worse perhaps also to suppose this, that he tastes our obedience and measures everything through his passion due to the art of loving mankind.76 The passage rephrases H 5:8, according to which Jesus tastes obedience through the passion that includes a loud cry (μετὰ κραυγῆς ἰσχυρᾶς). As Norris has noted,

74 Norris (1991), 50 and 163. However, Winslow (1979), 94 holds an alternative view that does not deny the existence of a unitive Christology in Gregory, but argues that such a stance was adopted with consistency only after Gregory had been confronted with the Apollinarian positions. 75 Nazianzene, Fil. 6.8. 76 Nazianzene, Fil. 6.10.

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in Gregory’s system of thought, the humanity of Jesus does not function as a shield between the passion and his divinity.77 What Jouassard, then, views as an allegorical reading might have been Gregory’s way to work out a full proclamation of Christ’s divinity and, at the same time, an affirmation concerning the salvific participation of the divinity in human weakness. Gregory does not elaborate on the psychological mechanism that is involved in Jesus’ abandonment on the cross and, most importantly, he does not indicate the object that has been abandoned on the cross. His unitive Christology that stresses Christ as the acting subject could not have served such a purpose effectively. Gregory defended the natural divinity of the Logos in light of his soteriological concerns and presuppositions, like Athanasius, but the precedent of promoting a unitive Christology paved the way for the Christological controversies in the fifth century ce.78 Gregory of Nyssa: Realism or Typology?

Gregory of Nyssa did not set a novel precedent in his treatment of the motif of Jesus’ loud cry on the cross, but seems to have worked on themes that had already appeared on the theological stage. And like his predecessors, he only directed his attention to this moment in Scripture when he was confronted with the exegesis of the Appolinarean party that took a minimalist approach in Christology. The only evidence that the loud cry on the cross formed part of Apollinarian exegesis survives in fragments found in exegetical catenas in the Psalms; but even in this case, the passage in which Apollinarius would have interpreted Ps 22 has not survived and as a result we rely on short quotations that survive in other places.79 For Behr, modern scholarship has re-appreciated Apollinarian Christology at a positive light on the grounds of Apollinarius’ defence of the Nicene faith and his rejection of a divisive Christology that would introduce a loose union between the divinity and humanity in Christ (see Diodore of Tarsus).80

77 Norris (1991), 50: “Humanity is not inserted into the equation so that divinity will be kept from full involvement”. 78 For Gregory’s Christology see Grillmeier (1975), 368–70. Norris (1991), 47–59. Winslow (1979), 73–119. Ottis (1958), Meredith (1979) and Berh (2004), 325–408 provide a thorough background of Gregory’s thought and put it into the appropriate historical and theological context. 79 See the edition of Appolinarian fragments in Mühlenberg (1975). 80 Olson (1999), 207–08. Apollinarius rebuked the divisive Christology introduced by Diodore of Tarsus. See Behr (2004), 392. Gregory, Apol. 185 [1200] provides the following witness: [quoting Apollinarius] “but we say that we speak of two persons, the God and the man that was assumed by God”. Apollinarius understood person in broader terms than some of his contemporaries, as the life-giving principle and also the point of union between human and divine in Christ. Therefore, any theological formulas that suggested the existence of two natures or two persons inferred two life acting subjects and two life-giving sources. Harnack and Grillmeier have pointed at the Stoic nature of Apollinarius’ thought with regard to the soul as the main principle of life and motion. Due to his strong allegiance to Nicaea, Apollinarius thought that there could be only one life-giving principle in Christ, the divine Logos, lest the union between God and flesh be perceived as a loose union.

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Apollinarius seems to have followed the main patristic line of his time, as he denies that Christ, whom he identifies with the divine Logos, could have been abandoned on the cross.81 His exegesis resembles that of Athanasius of Alexandria, the champion of the Nicene faith, and therefore Appolinarius stirs clear from an interpretation of the loud voice on the cross that would infer a separation of Jesus from the Father, as it could cast doubt on his divine nature. Also, he too refers to the natural phenomena in Mt 27:51 in order to affirm the total union between the Father and Jesus on the cross.82 The surviving fragments indicate that Appolinarius held a unitive Christology, like Gregory the Nazianzen, that stressed the identification of the acting subject as Christ and at the same time he endorsed the view that Christ had suffered in his humanity: “This [divine glory] is said to have changed into humility, when he came to the passion suffering what was for the sake of men and being abandoned by them for whom he was suffering”.83 However, due to the limited witness that has been available, we could not classify his exegesis as either typological or realistic, even though the last sentence would suggest that Appolinarius introduced an alternative exegesis according to which the loud cry gives expression to the fact that his disciples have abandoned, even denied, Jesus, whereas the bystanders attend the event of the crucifixion in mockery and derision (Mk 14:50, 66 and 15:29). In what survives, Apollinarius does not incorporate the Athanasian distinctions between voices attributed to Jesus as God and those attributed to Jesus as man, and there is little evidence of his peculiarly minimalistic Christology that his adversaries accused him of.84 It is true that Gregory of Nyssa examined the Apollinarian exegesis on a negative light and thought it to be less innocent than it appears (at least in the fragments). Gregory’s Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium is a systematic refutation by the Cappadocian bishop of Appolinarius’ theology.85 Reading between the lines, Gregory discerns the fact that Apollinarius teaches the existence of a “middle-being” – the designation belongs to Grillmeier – who suffered on the cross but is neither God

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Corcerning the way that Apollinarius interpreted the poorly-defined terms nature (φύσις) and person (πρόσωπον) see Grillmeier (1975), 333–40. For the classical anthropology behind Apollinarius’ thought see Harnack (1898), 149–63 and Wolfson (1958), 5–28, even though it should not be exaggerated as Appolinarius’ only drive in doing theology. Apollinarius, FrPs. 28 [Ps 37:22–23]. Apollinarius, FrPs. 28: “For I am not alone, he says, because my Father is with me”; and FrPs. 53 [Ps 42:2]: “It is not said for the Lord the ‘why have you abandoned me’, when what is according to him is not rendered to be worthy of abandonment; therefore, it is immediate the manifestation of the heavenly assistance for him who suffered through this body for us”. Apollinarius, FrPs. 148 [Ps 87:16b]. The theological controversy between Apollinarius and Diodore of Tarsus should be taken into consideration when assessing the former’s Christology, since he shaped his theological positions in response to the theology of Diodore, even though his contemporaries suspected that he diminished the concreteness of the humanity of Jesus by exaggerating how the Logos is called the life-giving principle in Christ. For a thorough discussion of Gregory’s objections towards Apollinarian Christology see Berh (2004), 451–58.

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incarnate nor an exalted man.86 However, several times it serves Gregory’s purposes to present Appolinarius as holding a unitive Christology that overemphasised Christ’s divinity and saw Logos the God as the object of divine abandonment. In order to bring home this point, Gregory decides to press the question of the subject and object of abandonment with the intention to pave the way to introduce the role of Christ’s humanity: “Who cried out that he had been abandoned by God, if the divinity between Father and Son is one? And from whom does abandonment happen as he cried out on the cross?”87 Gregory defines the loud cry as a separation and therefore raises the question concerning the subject and object of abandonment: “the one abandons, the other is abandoned”.88 An overemphasis on the divine nature of Christ would lead to the absurd thought that God has suffered on the cross, or that God has been separated from God: If that which suffers is the divinity, the faithful claim that the Son is of one essence with the Father, – says he who suffers, my God my God why have you abandoned me? [Mt 27:46] – how is the divinity that is one, separated during the passion and the one abandons, and the other is abandoned?89 In what follows Gregory plays at Appolinarius’ sensitivities: though Appolinarius had followed the exegetical line of Athanasius and the Nicene party, and despite the fact that he refers to the passion of Christ in his body and at the same time dismisses an interpretation that might imply discontinuity between the Father and Son, Gregory decides to press the matter concerning the role that Appolinarius attributes to the Godhead in the passion to such an extent that he urges Appolinarius either to come out as an Arian, if he claims that a separation did occur on the cross,90 or to acknowledge his belief in a myth, i.e. a hybrid being.91 Gregory’s reaction was instigated by Apollinarius’ obscure position about the object that was abandoned on the cross: the heavenly man, even though such exegetical unclarity was not unprecedented. Besides, Appolinarius hesitated to acknowledge in no uncertain terms the existence and proper role of Christ’s humanity during the passion. Therefore, Gregory rejected what he thought to be an inflexible unitive Christology and believed that the only way out was for his opponent to acknowledge that the passion belongs to the incarnate state

86 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.133.1. Grillmeier (1975), 332. According to modern scholarship, Apollinarius held that the body of Christ was the subject of the passion, in which case Christ’s humanity is the “passive part” in Christ. Therefore, the passion belongs to Christ’s humanity but only to the extent that there exists some sort of human quality in the “commingling” between divinity and humanity --what Grillmeier called the “compositum Christ”. Gregory did accuse Apollinarius of introducing another substance after the union in Christ that is neither God nor man, and presented this “hybrid” being as the result of a mingling that took place between the divinity and the lower functions of humanity. See Grillmeier (1975), 329 who comments that Harnack had intended to present Apollinarian Christological in a more favourable light. Harnack (1898), 149–63. Behr (2004), 379–401. 87 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.168.3. 88 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.168.9. 89 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.168.5. 90 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.137. 91 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.168.13.

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of Christ and to introduce the existence of humanity as a concrete (i.e. real) entity. It should be noted, then, that in his refutation of Appolinarianism and despite the fact that Gregory’s intention was not to elevate humanity as an independent centre in Jesus, he had anticipated, in a sense, the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy in the fifth century ce.92 Concerning the “heavenly man”, the subject that speaks and acts in the New Testament and that Appolinarius had introduced in the theological stage, it does not feature as such in the exegetical fragments that have survived and I have cited above.93 Appolinarius employed it as means to work his way out of the impasse concerning the acting subject: as a staunch supporter of the Nicene faith, he could not claim that Logos the God suffered on the cross, but neither could he diminish the authenticity of the passion. Therefore, he introduced the notion of the “heavenly man” as the subject of the passion. Unlike Grillemeier’s observation, it is certain that Gregory was fully aware that the term signified the union between divinity and humanity and that it provided a way forward so that one could confess the divinity of Christ and at the same time proclaim the reality of the passion. Even so, Gregory pressed on, interpreted the notion in extreme ways and as a fierce and trained orator decided to ridicule Apollinarius for his position in order to bring him to his knees.94 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Gregory’s own position is not clear as to the proper interpretation of the loud cry on the cross. Though he refutes the arguments put forward by Appolinarius and points at the absurdities that might rise from his opponents’ interpretations, Gregory falls short of providing a clear answer as to the subject and object of divine abandonment, not to mention the psychological mechanism involved in the experience. His overall argument emulates the exegetical position of Athanasius of Alexandria and Gregory Nazianzen. In order to provide some clarification, he cites Phil 2:5 and distinguishes, like Athanasius, between the “form of God” in Jesus and the “form of the servant”, two moments that signify the assumption of humanity from Christ. Besides, he follows Gregory Nazianzen in pointing out that one should confess unreservedly on soteriological grounds the assumption of human weakness from Jesus so that he could heal human weakness.

92 Historically, the question about the extent to which Christ’s humanity should be viewed in concrete terms did not arise in Christian theology properly until the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy. It should be noted, nevertheless, that even after that and, in fact, beyond the time of Chalcedon or the neo-Chalcedonian synthesis in the sixth century ce, the matter remained unsolved: how could Christian theology proclaim that Christ assumed proper and real humanity without introducing a second acting subject alongside the Godhead? Bathrellos (2004) provides a thorough historical survey of the matter and reviews scholarly works. The contribution of Grillmeier (2002), 143–63 remains monumental. See also Torrance (1988). Chesnut (1976). Gray (1985), 151–54. Madden (1993), 175–97. Daley (1993), 239–65. 93 About the “heavenly man” see Daley (2002), 469–88. 94 Gregory, Apol. 3,1.148–50. Gregory intentionally presents the heavenly man as possessing a heavenly body and then asks about the nourishment that such a body would have required before all ages. He also introduces the preposterous paradox, which he knows that no Christian could confess, that if Christ’s body pre-existed, then his mother Mary, who gave birth to this body, should also have existed before Abraham and even Adam.

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The last position is remarkably close in essence but not in wording to the famous formula “what has not been assumed, has not been healed” that had been put forward by Gregory Nazianzen.95 As it concerns the loud cry on the cross, it plays no significant role in the Cappadocian’s thought and has been employed as one further example of the theological dead-end that Appoliarius had been heading to. It seems, then, that Gregory merely draws the boundaries of a framework within which one should approach the loud cry on the cross, but did not attempt a proper interpretation himself. In fact, as if he intended to reinforce the feeling of perplexity that his modern reader might feel, Gregory even suggests that the answer as to what happened on the cross should not be sought in the separation of Christ’s divinity from his body, since the divinity remained united to Christ’s body.96 In summary, it is only a matter of guess whether Gregory of Nyssa viewed the loud cry on the cross from a realistic perspective or not. Basil of Cæsarea: The Ascetic

Basil of Cæsarea is even more laconic than his younger sibling, Gregory of Nyssa, about the loud cry, but his own contribution should be fully acknowledged since he engaged with the loud cry on the cross in an unprecedented context: Christian asceticism. Regulae Morales is Basil’s grand opus in which he lays out the general premises for Christian asceticism.97 There are eighty principles overall and the sixty-fifth reads: “that we need to pray for what is suitable even at the time of death”.98 Among the witness from Scripture that Basil collected to elucidate this principle, he includes Mt 27:46 as well as Lk 23:46 (Christ’s death on the cross) and also Act 7:58 (Stephen’s death). Basil did not provide a commentary on the loud cry, but the overall scheme is a strong indication that Basil interpreted the loud cry on the cross as a faithful prayer. Lk 23:46 presents Jesus’ death as he commits his spirit to his Father in a final loud cry, and Act 7:58 describes Stephen’s prayer and consequent loud cry as he dies. Given the context, then, it is safe to think that Basil viewed the loud voice of Jesus as setting an example, that is a type of faithful prayer, that Christians should emulate. It seems that Basil treated Mt 27:46 in what Dailey has named a contextual approach, according to which the overall tone of Ps 22 is that of faith in final deliverance by God. Basil has presented an alternative explanation, one that avoids the question

95 Gregory, Epistulae Theologicae 101 [PG 37, 181]. 96 Gregory, Apol. 3.1.153. It should be noted that On Soul and the Resurrurection suggests that any soul remains connected with the material elements from which the body is composed, even when the body is decomposed. However, in the case of Christ, Gregory modified his position and argued that the incorruption of Christ’s body was due to the (uninterrupted) presence of the Logos in the body. For a discussion over Gregory’s anthropology with respect to the connection between body and soul see Williams (1993), 227–47. According to Stead, (1981), 170–91 Gregory held that a personal element survives death and it guarantees the union between soul and body at the resurrection. 97 According to Fedwick (1981), 3–19 the work belongs to the period 363–78 ce when Basil also composed most of his Homilies. 98 Basil of Cæsarea, Regulae Morales, 65 [PG 31, 804C].

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of the subject and object of abandonment, since Ps 22 is treated as a faithful prayer. This is a theological line that would be followed by other exegetes, such as John Damascene, who in the eight century ce employed the idea that the loud cry set an example/type (ὑπογραμμός) of Christian prayer.99 Didymus the Blind: A Technical Vocabulary

It should be clear by now that the incident of the loud cry on the cross did not stand out in Christian thought of late antiquity, but it belonged to a group of events in which Jesus manifests cowardice, ignorance, thirst and strong emotions, and which I have collectively called natural human weakness. When reading the scriptural witness, patristic theology was left with three options to interpret such incidents: to diminish the divine nature of Christ (Arianism), to dismiss the literal interpretation of the incidents (docetism) or to negotiate a way out. Didymus the Blind was the first in a long process of patristic theologians that worked out an appropriate technical framework in which such limitations (“passions” in his vocabulary) are viewed as natural and indispensable attributes of humanity. After the seventh century ce the technical term “blameless passions” appeared in order to define collectively natural attributes and, at the same time, imply the existence of trully blameful or sinful natural capacities. Didymus introduced two lines of thought that significantly diverge from previous exegesis and therefore baffled Jouassard who classified one of them as allegorical.100 In any case, like Basil, Didymus was in full control of his theological argument, since he did not respond, at least not immediately, to the interpretation of an intellectual adversary. When commenting on Ps 22, Didymus defined abandonment straightforwardly as a distance (ἀποστῆναι) that opens up between two parts, and therefore he indicates that some times the term might be used in a non literal way, as in the case of the Christian martyrs who were subjected to torments but were not forsaken by God.101 Like Basil, Didymus read Ps 22 as a faithful prayer, lest Christians see their purposefulness diminish at times of hardships. Then, he reflects on the possibility that one might be abandoned by God even though appearances suggest the opposite. In this case, there is a clear connection between cause and effect: vice (κακία) is the only reason why God has forsaken his people. Though Didymus is commendable for introducing the connection between abandonment and sinfulness in his exegesis,

99 The origin of the term is scriptural, 1 Pet 2:21. Origen developed the motif in an ethical context in which Christians should follow the example that Jesus has set in his life. Origen, Excerpta in Psalmos, PG 17, 109 [Ps 16:4]. Layton (2000), 269 observes that “Origen turns Jesus’ agony into both a didactic opportunity and an indication of Jesus’ full participation in human nature”. Interestingly, John Chrysostom, though he did not belong to the Alexandrian school of interpretation, appropriated this motif in his own exegesis. See Athanasius, De Virginitate, 3.20 [if it is authentic]. Didymus, In Psalmos 29–34, 160.8 [Ps 31:2 in PTA 8]. Cyril, ComJn, PG 74, 92C. See also Maximus, Thal. 65 [PG 90, 770] and Damascene, ExpF. 68. 100 Jouassard (1025a), 612. 101 Didymus, Commentarii in Psalmos 20–21, 25, 2.

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it should be noted that he thinks of vice exclusively as man’s turning away from the Christian God. This line of reasoning informs Didymus’ argument in the second part of his exegesis, in which he turns his attention to the loud cry on the cross.102 Since he has defined abandonment as a disruption between subject and object, and given Didymus’ allegiance to the Nicene faith, it is not surprising that he denies that Jesus was abandoned on the cross. The only option, then, that remains available is to view Ps 22 as a faithful prayer, a point that Didymus stresses by citing directly Ps 22 as the loud cry of Jesus rather than Mk 15:34 (Mt 27:46).103 However, where he truly parts from previous and subsequent theology and therefore introduces his novel exegesis is his suggestion that the cry of Jesus was meant to inform the bystanders that the true object of abandonment were the Jews: while hanging on the cross, Jesus speaks Ps 22 to make it known that the Jews had abandoned God and therefore God has abandoned them. In such an exegesis, Didymus provides novel ways forward and avoids the exegetical deadlocks that his predecessors had faced, since he does not deny the disruption that occurs in abandonment, he confirms that Jesus cried out on the cross, he provides a clear indication of the subject and object of abandonment and even names vice (κακία) as the reason of abandonment.104 On the other hand, he has opted for a position which weakens the reality of the experience: even though Jesus recited Ps 22, it does not mean that Jesus was affected in any way from the experience. However, this is not the only possible interpretation according to Didymus. In another place, he provides a different account that follows more closely the gospel narrative and presents the loud cry as a genuine cry that belongs to Jesus.105 First, he maintains the identification between the loud cry and Ps 22 and notes that throughout Ps 22 there is only one acting subject, Christ, David’s offspring “that was born according to the flesh”. Then, he comments on the textual discrepancy between the Septuagint (Ps 22) and Mt 27:46 indicating that it is habitual for Scripture to interchange between the nominative and the vocative. Didymus stays consistent with his previous exegesis that in his loud cry Christ inquires about the reason of his abandonment so the bystanders might know it. However, this time the object of abandonment is Jesus, not the Jews, since he has been abandoned for the sake of those who watched the event. Jouassard discerns the application of an allegorical reading by Didymus, but there is no reason why we should assume that the Alexandrian teacher did not think that Jesus was truly abandoned on the cross. In fact, Didymus remarks that Jesus “was abandoned” (ἐγκατελείφθη) “for the sake of those who watched” him. The expression “for the sake of those who watched”, which seems to have intrigued Jouassard, might be understood in two possible ways: I should point to the fact that the expression is reminiscent of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed that confesses 102 Didymus, Commentarii in Psalmos 20–21, 25, 14. 103 Mk 15:34 is almost identical with the Septuagint (Ps 22), whereas Mt 27:46 seems to provide a translation of the cry directly from Aramaic. 104 In many ways, Didymus anticipated the way that Christian ascetics would deal with the experience of abandonment in their discourses. 105 Didymus, Fragmenta in Psalmos, 175.

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Christ who was crucified “for our sake”. In other words, Jesus suffers in order to bring salvation to humanity. Another option is that Jesus suffers “for the sake of ” the bystanders who have rejected him. However, this option is less improbable because Didymus adds that all people should praise Jesus who “was abandoned for them”. In any case, there is no doubt that Jesus has been abandoned on the cross, but we should note that Didymus has resorted to the exegetical obscurity of his theological predecessors and stirs clear from the actual question concering the subject and object of abandonment: he does not clarify who abandoned Jesus on the cross, nor does he explain how this experience possibly occurred. When Didymus comments on Ps 22:3 he makes two points that are closely interwoven and show that he was aware of the fact that the above exegesis could be susceptible to an Arian interpretation – he who suffers could not be God – and therefore proceeds to show that it is possible to hold the divine nature of Jesus, as it had been proclaimed in the Nicene faith, and at the same time affirm the reality of the experience. Didymus achieves this by introducing several elegant distinctions. First, Didymus presents the abandonment of Jesus as an experience that did not occur due to sin, since “he [ Jesus] did not know sin” (οὐκ ᾔδει γὰρ ἁμαρτίαν). However, since such a position could have weakened the intensity of the experience to the ears of his audience, he examines v.3 in such a way that could affirm the authenticity of the experience. He introduces a fine distinction between “logoi of transgressions” (λόγοι παραπτωμάτων), and actual “transgressions” (παραπτώματα).106 For Didymus, the feeling of abandonment should be viewed as a natural human experience, otherwise Jesus would not have been subjected to such a passion. The multifaceted term “logoi” signifies the reason behind the feeling of being abandoned and Didymus finds himself at pains to establish a fine distance between a sinless reason for abandonment and a sinful one. The implication, therefore, is that Jesus did suffer abandonment but in a sinless way, since he assumed, or made his own, those blameless reasons that make people feel abandoned. The list of the Christian martyrs, Job and Jesus that Didymus subsequently provides is meant to reinforce his argument that not all experiences of abandonment are due to sinfulness (κακία). Therefore, Didymus draws from Scripture and the history of the Church in order to disassociate between abandonment and sinfulness.107 However, this argument requires an authentic experience of abandonment which has been expressed through the loud cry on the cross. To bring home the idea that Jesus manifested human weakness and limitations such as hunger, thirst, cowardice and ignorance in a genuine way, Didymus introduces an elaborate psychological scheme that discerns between the natural capacity to experience a human passion and its actual manifestation: i.e. the distance from pre-passion to passion (προπάθεια-πάθος).108 This scheme should be viewed in the overall approach 106 Didymus, Fragmenta in Psalmos, 176. 107 In this sense, Didymus set an exegetical precedence that we shall come across in Nemesius of Emesa and the Christian ascetics, though we should assume the existence of a wider tradition, from which several independent threads of thought emanated. 108 Layton (2000), 273 has observed that in Didymus, “propatheia is a proof of nature, not a quality which produces moral defect or virtue”.

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of Didymus that confirms a genuine assumption of human weakness by Jesus through which he has become a co-sufferer with humanity.109 Such an argument is anchored on soteriological grounds and seems to have been directed against any attempt to read theology in a minimalist way, in which case one would be reluctant to attribute human weakness to Christ.110 As Didymus puts it, [Christ] having condescended in everything, and becoming poor (πτωχεύων) in the form of the servant, and having refashioning according to the word himself without change into what is common and keeping the whole accordance (ἀκολουθία) of the incarnation, and not destroying the truth of the character… he became similar to us.111 How would we know that, according to what is written, he lifted our weaknesses on the holy cross, so that through it he offered a better condition to men, if before that, in the way that he knows, he did not assume them [i.e. natural passions] on him and dislay them?112 The contribution of Didymus, therefore, is indispensable since he provides two exegetical alternatives: Ps 22 is either a faithful prayer or a genuine cry in abandonment. When abandonment is associated with vice, then God responds to human vice, in which case Jesus pronounces God’s condemnation of those who have abandoned him. On the other hand, it is possible to disassociate abandonment from sinfulness, but it still remains a very human experience as it is exemplified by Job and the Christian martyrs. Didymus seems to lean towards a realistic approach, but in order to do so he introduces an elaborate psychological scheme that paved the way for subsequent theologians to distinguish between blameless natural properties and also sinful passions in human nature. On the other hand, when Didymus approaches the loud cry on the cross as a disruption, he did so to the expense of clarity, since he does not discuss the psychological

109 Irenaeus was the first to deal with the presence of natural passions in his defence of the reality of the incarnation and against the Gnostics. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 3.33.8. Didymus employed the medical terminology of his time, mostly Stoic in origin, to point at the various gradations of human passions (πάθος-προπάθεια, passio-propassio). Therefore, he introduced a technical vocabulary that could defend the assumption of natural human passions by Jesus without raising ethical concerns about his sinlessness. Didymus, Commentarii in Psalmos 35–39, 282.5; Commentarii in Psalmos 40–44, 293.10; Commentarii in Ecclesiasten (11–12), 337.24. See also Brakke (2006), 54 and Grillmeier (1975), 363. Maximus the Confessor appropriated the Aristotelian approach that Nemesius of Emesa had introduced concerning the existence of natural passions in humanity by adopting the latter’s distinction between actions that are “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) and those that “are not up to us” (οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). Nemesius was familiar with the stoic gradation of natural passions, i.e. the various degrees of fear or cowardice. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, 3.1109b–1119b. Nemesius, Natur. 19 [p. 80 in Morati’s edition], 21 [p. 20], 29–34 [pp. 93–104] and 39–40 [pp. 112–17]. Maximus, QnD. 66 [PG 90, 837]; Thal. 42 [PG 90, 405]. Damascene, ExpF. 38–42 [pp. 94–99], 64 [pp. 162–63] and 67 [pp. 165–66]. For an examination of natural human passions in classical philosophy see Hardie (1980), 152–81. 110 Didymus, Trin. PG 39, 901B. 111 Didymus, Trin. PG 39, 901B. For a review of the Christology of Didymus see Grillmeier (1975), 361–67, Gesché (1962), 71–90, Bouteneff (2001), 389–95 and Lebon (1935), 307–29. 112 Didymus, Trin. PG 39, 904A.

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mechanism behind Jesus’ abandonment; nor does he clarify the subject and object of abandonment. Was it the Father? If so, whom did he abandon? The Alexandrian exegete exploited the Athanasian definition of experiencing abandonment qua human experience, but he did not proceed beyond this point. However, if one thing is clear is that Didymus adapts his position concerning the loud cry on the cross according to the text that he has been reading and the pastoral points that he wishes to stress. Epiphanius of Salamis: The Abandonment of the Body

On the mediterranean island of Cyprus, Epiphanius of Salamis, a contemporary of Didymus, tried to provide his own insights concerning the object that experienced abandonment on the cross within the general context of his theological polemics against the Arians and Apollinarians. In his refutation of the Arian positions, Epiphanius follows Athanasius and therefore defends the Nicene faith.113 As a result, Epiphanius’ exegesis requires an understanding of abandonment as an experience that severs the relation between two parties, but at the same time he unequivocally dismisses any disruption in the relation of the Father with Christ: When was a son abandoned by the father, when was not the Son in the Father and the Father in the Son? The Son was on earth, and the Logos, the God, was walking, but he was touching upon the heavens… he was inside Mary and became man, and he was filling the cosmos with his power. How is it possible that he and such a one was desperately saying according to his divinity “Eli Eli”?114 The Nicene faith had fully and unreservedly proclaimed the natural (essential) unity between the Father and the Son and this informs Epiphanius’ argument: this unity has been preserved on the cross. In order to find a compromise between proclaiming the unity of Father and Son and preserving the reality of the experience, Epiphanius recalls the Athanasian scheme of distinguishing between theology and economy, according to which the object that experiences abandonment is the human element in Christ. The passion might belong to the incarnate state of Christ, but at the level of theology, the relation between the Father and the Son remained ever undisturbed. However, Epiphanius has been careful lest his audience understands that Christ’s humanity experienced corruption during the passion. He reads Ps 15:10 according to which the soul of the righteous (i.e. Jesus) was not abandoned in Hades. For Epiphanius, Ps 15:10 testifies to the unity between Christ’s soul and his divinity that remained unbroken even in death.115 And it is the resurrection that shows the fulfilment of Ps 15:10, since the soul of Jesus rises from the dead due to the unity with the divinity.116 113 114 115 116

Epiphanius, Pan. 69.19.5 [GCS 3/168] and 69.63.1 [GCS 3/211–12]. Epiphanius, Pan. 69.63.6 [GCS 3/212]. Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.4–5 [GCS 3/213]. Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.4–5 [GCS 3/213]. Even Epiphanius employs the image of the fish-hook: the soul serves as bait for death. Death approaches the soul, but suddenly encounters Christ’s divinity that has been hiding behind the soul.

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Epiphanius seems to be heading to the same dead-end that we noticed elsewhere: if abandonment signifies a separation, what was the object of abandonment if not Jesus (humanity) or his soul? The only option available to Epiphanius is the temporary separation between body and soul at a human level: The incarnation of his… seeing that the divinity together with the soul were moving to abandon the holy body, from the person of him, the dominical man, that is his incarnation, does he speak.117 The description of Epiphanius is vivid and for the first time we are presented with the psychological mechanism that was involved in abandonment: death is imminent and together the Godhead and the soul depart from the body of Jesus, since they could not suffer death. Therefore, the body shrinks at the view of the departing Godhead. Epiphanius implies the classical definition of the soul as a spiritual entity that relates to higher intellectual functions and that of the body as the tangible element that is associated to lower natural functions. “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me”? But this word is shown [to be] from the person of his incarnation in a human way suffering (ἀνθρωποπαθῶς)… so the body was that in the tomb, and the soul departed with the divine Logos.118 Epiphanius carefully stresses the unity between the Godhead and the soul of Jesus in death. And though he does take pains to maintain the unity between the Godhead and the body of Jesus, his interpretation holds contradictory claims: the Godhead departs together with the soul, hence the loud cry on the cross. Yet, the former remains united with the body, hence the resurrection of Jesus. If we were to label Epiphanius’ Christology at this instance, we would call it unitive, since he uses several expressions to highlight unity in Jesus, including the indication that the “dominical man” is the “I” that cries out on the cross. At the same time, he claims that the body is always part of the incarnation, and it could not lay in the tomb alone: “neither was the incarnate presence abandoned during the passion”.119 The contradiction is never explained and Epiphanius seems to have intentionally obscured his position since it serves his defence of the Nicene faith. His intention to reaffirm the existence of an integral humanity (body and soul) in Jesus, apparently against Arians and Appolinarians, has been fully served when he claims that Jesus assumed natural human passions,120 and that his soul has departed from the body in death, as Christians in late antiquity would

117 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.2 [GCS 3/213]. The expression “dominical man” became an important theological device during the Arian controversies, since it promoted a unitive Christology and affirmed the reality of the incarnation. The contribution of Grillmeier (1975), 287 has been irreplaceable as he set out to examine the origins of the term in Marcellus and the way that the Nicene party appropriated it to refer to the glorified state of Christ’s humanity, without introducing an independent acting subject alongside the Godhead. 118 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.66.1 [GCS 3/214], 69.63.4 [GCS 3/212] and 69.66.3–4 [GCS 3/214]. 119 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.42.4 [GCS 3/190]. According to Rossé (1987), 76 Epiphanius thought that the Godhead abandoned Christ’s humanity on the cross. 120 Epiphanius, Anchoratus, 33.4 [GCS 1/42]; Pan. 2.3.2 [GCS 1/230].

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have claimed that happens when any person dies. Therefore, Epiphanius does not feel the need to provide further insights on how one could solve the contradiction. Cyril of Alexandria: Against Nestorius

I have already pointed at several exegetical lines of thought that, in their vigorous and uncompromising refutation of Arian or Appolinarean teachings, proclaimed the existence of human capacities in Jesus in such concrete terms that they implied an actual human centre next to Logos the God. Some of the theologians that defended and promoted the Nicene faith had viewed the loud cry on the cross as a manifestation of the integrity of the humanity of Jesus, though their respective vocabularies varied: the soul of Jesus, his flesh and body, the incarnation of Jesus or the dominical man were all expressions that signified the reality of Jesus’ humanity in concrete terms. The promotion of natural human capacities in Jesus served to remove any doubt that the passion essentially belongs to the human nature, and to dismiss any suggestion that either the divine nature suffers on the cross (theopaschism) or that the passion is not genuine (docetism). Nevertheless, the inference that Christ assumed integral humanity, combined with theological obscurity and even silence concerning the subject and object of the experience of abandonment or the inner/ psychological mechanism that actually led to the passion of Jesus, had left theology susceptible to a potential interpretation that would actually see the human element in Jesus as an independent acting subject.121 Nestorius of Constantinople took this decisive step to proclaim the concreteness of Jesus’ human nature in no uncertain terms, and despite the fact that Nestorius never conceded that he actually believed in two distinct acting subjects, it is true, as Bathrellos has put it, that the vigorous application of the uncertain “predicates of hypostasis and person” by Nestorius was highly problematic.122 For any assessment of Nestorius’ exegetical interpretation of the loud cry on the cross we rely on fragments edited by Abramovski as well as short excerpts included in the acts of Ephesus (431 ce), which are cited out of their original context by Nestorius’ detractors. However, it has been noted that two drives informed Nestorius in his theological approach: he denounced the diminishing of human capacities in Jesus by the Appolinarians and at the same time he felt the need to proclaim the impassibility of Christ’s divine nature that the Nicene faith had defended.123

121 Meyendorff (1969), 3–16. 122 Bathrellos (2004), 18. 123 In ACO 1.1.6/11: “listen also that in death, if God ever laid [at the tomb], so we will introduce that God is passible. Though we were enemies, it says, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son. He did not say through the death of God the Logos”. McGuckin (2006), 130. Gavrilyuk (2004), 91–100; 141. Grillmeier (1975), 451. In late antiquity, the question of divine impassibility arose from early concerns that some threads of thought, eg. Noetius, suggested that God the Father was the subject of the passion (patripassianism). Gavriluyk has criticised Harnack’s position that early theology did not bother with such concerns, and during the Arian controversy, patripassianism was renounced in the person and teachings of Sabellius. It was thought that

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On the one hand, it should be noted in advance that, according to the existing evidence, the loud cry did not take centre stage in Nestorius’ thought and whenever he referred to it, he did so as part of the established tradition of citing Scripture in support of one’s argument. On the other hand, when Nestorius did address the loud cry of Jesus, he applied a realistic interpretation which presupposes the standard definition of abandonment as severing the relation between two subjects: the loud cry takes place in distress and therefore should not be properly attributed to the divine nature. When he asks, “if he was crucified due to weakness, who was weak, oh you heretic? Logos the God?”,124 Nestorius merely reproduces the previous patristic thought and expresses his disapproval of attributing any weakness to the divine nature. However, he significantly departs from the established theological framework that Origen and Athanasius had set, when he addresses the object of the experience of abandonment in concrete anthropological terms: the loud cry belongs to the son of Mary, it is the voice of a human individual. It seems, therefore, that Nestorius viewed abandonment as a disturbance of the relation between two parties; but the novelty of his interpretation lies to the fact that he departs from the previous theological obscurity and indicates with certainty that he who suffers on the cross is the man with whom the Logos has been united: the man who has become a collaborator with the Godhead (θείας αὐθεντίας συνεργός) and has been left alone on the cross.125 This man, the son of Mary, has formed a union (συνάφεια) with Logos the God and he is naturally susceptible to weakness, natural passions, and even abandonment on the cross.126 After the outbreak of the theological controversy, the Nestorian party tried to turn the argument of their critics to its head by accusing the party of Cyril of Alexandria that, by allegedly not acknowledging the existence of a concrete human centre that suffered on the cross, they mingled the two natures and were suspicious of attributing passibility to the divine nature.127

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any unitive Christology or Trinitarian theology that suggested the involvement of Logos the God in the passion, to any extent, was thought to endorse the participation of the Father in the passion. This fact resounds in the Arian diminution of the ontological status of the Logos so that the Logos, a created being, suffers on the cross, but the Father’s Godhead is not affected. If the opposite is true, then the diminution of the involvement of the Logos in the passion questions the way that salvation has been granted to the world by God: if Logos the God participates in relative terms only, it is unclear how humanity has been transformed. That mush has been argued by Gregory Nazianzen who provided an insightful discussion on the matter in his letter Ad Cledonium, and also Gregory of Nyssa in Contra Apollinarium. Gavrilyuk has examined the way that the argument developed from the Arian controversies until the outbreak of the Nestorian debate. It should be noted that, during the Arian controversy, one party accused the other of accepting patripassianism or holding the faith of Paul of Samosata who had introduced two acting subjects in Christ. ACO 1,1.6/12. Nestorius provided a chain of syllogisms to show that Cyril of Alexandria thought of weakness and death as essential qualities of Logos the God, even though he knew that Cyril held the Nicene faith and could not have endorsed such an idea. ACO 1.1.2/49. ACO 1,1.6.12. Nestorian Collection, no, 43, 68, 84 and 118 [number of fragments]. Also, ACO 1,1.6.12.

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Cyril of Alexandria dealt with the loud cry on the cross only as part of his overall defence – or attack – against Nestorius.128 There is no reason to believe that he developed a genuine interest in the loud cry at the early stages of his exegetical career, i.e. prior to 428 ce, and that much could be surmised by examining his extensive commentary In Matthæum: a commentary that lacks any reference to the loud cry, even though Cyril has been thorough about the sudden darkness that fell on earth during the crucifixion, and also the final words of Jesus on the cross. The loud cry became part of Cyril’s argument in his polemical works, most probably in reaction to Nestorius’ own exegetical approach, and was intended to expose in full strength the weakness of a divisive Christology that he thought Nestorius held.129 Due to its unremitting and non-negotiable allegiance to the Nicene faith, the previous tradition had been left with limited options how to interpret the loud cry: when late antique theology opted for a realistic approach, then it was felt that the loud cry somehow affected the relationship between the Godhead and humanity in Christ, but then obscure interpretations were invoked that affirmed that the passion on the cross is genuine and that the passion belongs properly to Jesus for the sake of redemption, but did not explain the subject and object that take part in the abandonment on the cross. In order to assess the true significance of Cyril’s contribution we should point that his exegesis was informed by three ideas: the image of the Logos of God that empties out himself (kenosis), the idea of fear before death as a natural human passion and also the classical definition of abandonment as separation. Working within the framework of the previous theological tradition, Cyril expresses his grievances that Nestorius addresses Jesus’ humanity in such concrete terms – the son of Mary – that he severs the union between Godhead and humanity in Christ and therefore relativises the fullness of the union. The position of Cyril stands at the opposite end of the Christological spectrum as he promotes a unitive Christology: the subject of the passion is the Logos in his incarnate state, in his impoverished condition when he assumed true humanity,130 i.e. the Logos in his 128 In his third correspondence with Nestorius, Cyril attached twelve anathemas against the bishop of Constantinople, a controversial move that became a stumbling block for any attempt to reconcile between the two parties. See Cyril’s works Apologia xii Capitulorum contra Orientales, PG 76, 316–85 where he addresses Andrew’s of Samosata refutation of the anathemas; Apologia xii Anathematismorum contra Theodoretum, PG 76, 385–452 in which he rebukes Theodoret’s of Cyrrhus refutation; and Explanatio xii Capitulorum, PG 76, 293–312. Only after the publication of the Formulary of Reunion (433 ce), which was drafted by Theodoret of Cyrrhus, did the significance of Cyril’s anathemas diminish. See Fr. Young (1983), 220–29 and Grillmeier (1975), 491. 129 In ACO 1.1.6/47: “[Nestorius] claims this that it is not possible to think of him [i.e. Christ] as mere man, but God and man, and he attributed the thorny glow and the rest of the passions exclusively to the man, in one part, and he confesses to worship him together with the Godhead”. 130 Cyril had little to say about kenosis that Origen and Athanasius had not already mentioned. He utilises the term to express the utterly inexpressible nature of the mystery of the incarnation from the point of a unitive Christology: God has become man. Modern thought has moved to the opposite direction: kenotic theology has become the basic theological tool that sheds light on the incarnation. Though originally kenosis addressed the question of the self-consciousness of Jesus, now it is thought that the self-emptying or self-poverty of the Logos opens up the possibility to view something from the life of the Trinity: the Christian Godhead is capable of poverty and alienation from its own nature qua

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humanity.131 Cyril embraces fully the exegetical line of thought of Athanasius and the distinction between theology and economy, and at the same time he elevates the kenotic hymn in Phil 2:5 as the proof text par excellence against which he could measure the theological deviations and shortcomings of his adversaries.132 For Cyril, the subject of the passion is the Logos of God in his incarnation. And even when the Logos incarnate suffers on the cross, one should not question the integrity of the Godhead, which manifests itself through the (super)natural phenomena and the final committing of the spirit to his Father. Cyril modifies his approach so that he could stir clear from the Scylla of questioning the reality of the experience on the cross or the Charybdis of diminishing the integrity of the humanity of Jesus.133 The reality of the passion should be defended for soteriological reasons, because the Logos of God has been involved in the passion and has assumed integral humanity to this end: to deliver people from weakness.134 Had he [Christ] not been afraid, the [human] nature would not have been freed from fear; had he not been sorrowful, it would have never been set free from sorrow; had he not been distressed, it would have never been freed from these. And you can apply this reason to each of the human events, you will find in Christ the passions of the flesh stirring not to take control, as in us, but so that having been stirred, they cease through the power of the Logos indwelling the flesh.135

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Godhead. Hence, the term has been employed even at the level of the intra-trinitarian life (θεολογία) and not just the economy (οἰκονομία). For instance, in Eastern theology, Bulgakov interprets the loud voice as an expression of the estrangement between the second and third hypostases in the Holy Trinity, the Logos and the Spirit, an estrangement founded on their eternal generation and procession from the Father respectively. on Balthasar, a Roman-catholic thinker, has explored the same line of thought, even though he corrects Bulgakov’s ideas in order to maintain an apophatic element in kenosis and the incarnation: the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are defined in terms of the kenosis of the Father, a sense of “estrangement” or “space” that opens up between the Father and the other two persons. It is true that patristic thought introduced the notion of otherness in God, but this was only in terms of the incarnation, not the life of the Trinity. By stressing this “space” for the existence of otherness in the Godhead, modern theology has articulated with more precision the fact that God has descended to the utter otherness of human sin, but this is so to the expense of the mystery of the incarnation, a mystery that late antique theology approached as shrouded in awe. The incarnation has become an extra-Trinitarian “extension”, if this is the proper word, of a “natural” process within the Godhead. See Bulgakov (2004), 219; (2008), 213 For kenotic theology in Russian thinkers see Gorodetzky (1938), 127–74. For a critique on such extreme readings of kenotic theology see Gavrilyuk (2005), 251–69 and Sakharov (1999), 119–26. For an example of modern kenotic theology see Richard (1997) and the individual contributions in Evans (2006). For Balthasar’s presentation of how late antique theology perceived kenosis, and also his constructive criticism of modern German kenotic theology or Bulgakov see Balthasar (1994), 319; (1970), 23–36 and also Evans (2006), 281–45 and Blankenhorn (2003), 245–68. Cyril, Quod unus sit Christus, 754.9; Nest. PG 76, 96. Coakley has presented a concise presentation of the kenotic theology of Cyril in Evans (2006), 250–53, where she indicates the drawbacks of Cyril’s theology, even though I think she exaggerates the way that late antique theology grasped the notion of the communion of idioms (communicatio idiomatum) between Christ’s divinity and humanity. Cyril, Ad Reginas, 1.1.5/34. Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 1328B and also in ACO 1.1.4/14. Cyril, Thes. 24 [PG 75, 397C]. Cf. Athanasius, Nunc anima mea turbata est, PG 26, 1241D.

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To strengthen the position that the loud cry belongs properly to human nature, Cyril groups together the loud cry and also the prayer in Gethsemane, and the vocabulary that he employs stresses the real effect of the anguish that Jesus experiences before death: tears, sorrow and fear. This is indicative of the way that Cyril appropriated the previous tradition, since he affirms the display of natural fear by Jesus due to the imminence of death, and implies that the same fear triggered the loud cry on the cross.136 Therefore, it could be assumed that he provides some insights into the psychological mechanism that led to the loud cry. However, it seems that Cyril understood that several problems could rise from the classical definition of abandonment as separation or disruption, and therefore adopted an exegetical line that only Didymus the Blind had presented, though it seems reasonable to assume that Cyril did so independently and on scriptural grounds (Heb 5:7 and 1 Pet 2:20). Though Cyril reiterates his belief in the reality of the passion, a passion that he attributes to the human element in Christ, and also proclaims that the Logos has assumed integral humanity (“the Logos of God is not naked”),137 he adds that when Jesus cries out on the cross, no separation takes place: the loud cry is a prayer to God, which means that Cyril supports the identification of the loud cry with Ps 22.138 Jesus prays in the name of fallen humanity (ὑποτύπωσις)139 and in doing so he provides an example (ὑπογραμμός) that all Christians should follow.140 This line of thought is waterproof when compared to previous attempts to shed light to the loud cry, since, from a technical point of view, it dismisses the importance of the question concerning the subject and object of abandonment, and at the same time it affirms the reality of an ordeal (i.e. fear before death) that belongs properly to the human element in Christ. Even so, I agree with Jouassard’s assessment that Cyril has approached the loud cry from a typological perspective, according to which Jesus gives expression to what belongs naturally to humanity and therefore provides a type or example for all people: one should pray when facing hardships.141 It seems, according to Jouassard, that Cyril reduced the loud cry to an act of pretence that did not affect Jesus psychologically.142 However, Jouassard did not examine closer the notion of natural fear; an idea that seems to imply that Cyril touched upon the psychological mechanism that affected Jesus at a personal level. Nestorius seems to have introduced two concrete acting subjects in Christ and though he affirmed the presence of genuine human qualities in Christ, he did so to the expense of the unity of the one Christ. Therefore, Cyril took the opposite stance and stressed a union in Christ that is grounded ontologically on the person of the Logos incarnate. Cyril has shaped his position in reaction to Nestorius. Consequently,

136 Cyril, Thes. 24 [PG 75, 389]. 137 Cyril, Quod unus sit Christus, 754.40. 138 Cyril uses several forms to elucidate that the loud cry is a prayer: “εὐχόμενος” ACO 1.1.4/14; “ἐκδυσωποῦντος” 1.1.5/35; “καλοῦντος” 1.1.5/35; “ἐκ παῤῥησίας ἀνεβόα” Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 1325C. 139 Cyril, Quod unus sit Christus, 754.34; Ad Reginas, 1.1.5/34. 140 Cyril, Quod unus sit Christus, 754.39; Chr. PG 75, 1321C; ComLk. PG 72, 921C; ComJn. PG 74, 92C. 141 Cyril, Quod unus sit Christus, 754.20. 142 Jouassard (1925a), 609 and 617.

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Cyril viewed the loud cry as a faithful prayer so as to avoid the exegetical dead-end of defining with precision the object that has been abandoned on the cross, a dead-end that Nestorius had led himself to. That is to say that Cyril could not have viewed the loud cry as an expression of a temporary separation between the Logos and his humanity, let alone between Father and Son. As a result, he applied a different exegetical approach that did not reduce the intensity of the passion, because Cyril insisted on the fear that naturally ensues from an approaching death; it is this fear that triggers the prayer of Jesus on the cross.143 But, the loud cry should not be read literally as giving expression to any separation between two parties. Therefore, Cyril directed his reader to think that the loud cry on the cross does manifest anguish, but it does not involve any separation. In a sense, this line of thought would be developed even further, as we shall see, in Maximus the Confessor who suggested that the Godhead consents so that Christ’s humanity might experience cowardice that is natural in the face of death. Theodoret of Cyrrhus: A Unique Synthesis

Theodoret of Cyrrhus, the bishop of a diocese in Syria, did not develop a genuine exegetical interest in the loud cry. His comments about the loud cry appear in an exegetical work that concerns the book of Isaiah (Is 49:8–9),144 and in his refutation of the Twelve Anathemas that Cyril of Alexandria had attached to his third letter to Nestorius.145 It is not surprising, then, that the loud cry plays an insignificant role in his work. Like other exegetes, Theodoret was directed in his exegesis by the biblical narrative and as a result he brought into play passages from the Old and New Testaments that he thought they could shed light on a specific passage: he views Is 49:1–9 in light of the loud cry on the cross. He believes that the passage in Isaiah proclaims Christ to be the fulfilment of God’s promise to Abraham, which means that Theodoret applies a typological reading to it and suggests that the passage prefigures Christ.146 To bring home this point, Theodoret indicates the historical inconsistencies that would arise if one thought king Zerubbabel as the agent of God that has been elected from the “womb of his mother” to glorify God and bring salvation to Israel.147 Since the passage contains a messianic proclamation, Theodoret opted to view the loud voice on the cross as a faithful prayer: Christ is the polished arrow of the Father – an unmissable reference to Song 5:8 – that has been elected before all ages to glorify God and God has glorified him despite his suffering.148 In order to strengthen this typological interpretation and messianic approach, Theodoret asserted two positions: Christ has suffered as a man, and at the same time Christ has maintained an unbreakable union with God. After Nicæa, Athanasius of Alexandria had introduced the distinction between sayings and 143 Athanasius, Fragmenta Varia, PG 26, 1241C: “he carries the trembling of the flesh when it accepts death”. 144 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.188. 145 Cyril, Apologia contra Theodoretum, PG 76, 409B. 146 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.194. 147 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.335. 148 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.347.

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deeds that are attributed to Christ’s human nature and the ones proper to the divine nature. Theodoret seems to be working within this Nicene framework and only once does he refer to Christ’s humanity in concrete terms, “the man” (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). But other than that, his expressions do not bespeak of any Nestorian sympathies: Christ suffers “in a human way” (ἀνθρωπίνως) and the passion belongs to the “economy” (οἰκονομία).149 As it concerns the interpretation of Is 49:8, Theodoret introduced two pairs of passages drawn from the New Testament that, at first sight, contradict each other: Mt 27:46 and Lk 23:46 on the one hand, and Mt 26:39 and Jn 17:1 on the other hand.150 One part of the pair includes a passage that presents Jesus praying in distress, and the other part depicts Jesus praying in confidence. Theodoret solves the exegetical tension by pointing to the outcome of Jesus’ prayer since God harkens to his prayer. Therefore, it is implied that Mt 27:46 does not signify a disruption in the relation between two parts, but it is a faithful prayer to which God responds by demonstrating the unbreakable nature of the union between him and Jesus even at the time of the passion. It only seems fitting to assume that, given the exegetical context, Theodoret was aware that he would have weakened his exegetical position concerning the messianic identity of Christ had he chosen to view the loud cry as severing the union between Jesus and the Father. Therefore, even Theodoret was living in the aftershock of the Arian controversy and showed his distaste of any position that might have diminished the absolute character of the redemptive triumph of Christ, as presented in the gospels. Any such position would have unlocked the backdoor from which an Arian or Appolinarian approach could have crept back into Christian theology. In another place, Theodoret provides another explanation, one that puts forward a more sophisticated exegesis. Commenting on Psalms, Theodoret indicates that “Christ” is the single subject that cries out on the cross. This is an intentional choice of words that serves a specific purpose: the Antiochean school of Christology favoured Christ as the acting subject, most likely in reaction to the “Logos” theology of the Alexandrian school of thought. Grillmeier thinks that the Alexandrians might not have objected in principle to the idea of teaching that Christ is the acting subject, but they did suspect that the Christ of the Nestorians was not the Christ of the Alexandrian tradition. For Cyril of Alexandria, Christ is primarily Logos the God and one should proclaim so without any reservations, qualifications or conditions; but Nestorius taught that Christ is the end-result of the union that occurs between two independent centers, Logos and man. It seems, then, that Theodoret has decided to stress the unity of the acting subject, but this time he does not resort to the Athanasian distinction between actions that belong to the theology and those that pertain to the economy, most likely because he did not want to jeopardise the singleness of the acting subject: He says that he is abandoned, without any sins being committed by him, but death holds onto him, since he has been given power over the sinful. So, he calls

149 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.360, Psalm. 80.1269. 150 Theodoret, ComIs. 15.347–61.

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abandonment not the separation from the united divinity, as some have claimed, but the occurring consent to the passion.151 Here, we are presented with a novel interpretation, a fact that strengthens my argument that Christian exegetes were directed by Scripture and therefore modified their opinion according to the text that they were presented with. Here, Theodoret defines abandonment as the consent that God gives so that the passion on the cross might occur. In other words, Theodoret does not define abandonment as severing the relation between two parties, and therefore, once more, he avoids the thorny question of the subject and object that were involved in abandonment. Though Theodoret refutes the position of some group that the loud cry signifies separation, he does not help us to identify the group, even though there are some possible candidates: the Arians, the Apollinarians, exegetes of the Nicene faith that had presented an obscure position, or even the Nestorians. It is safe to assume that he did not mean Cyril of Alexandria, since there is no indication that Cyril held such a position, at least in the works that have reached us. Theodoret puts forward his own exegetical suggestion: that Christ experiences abandonment is an indication that God has granted his consent (συγχώρησις) so that the passion might take place. There is unmistakable proximity betwee such a theological position and the biblical theme introduced by Ezekiel that God manifests his presence through the actual event of the passion, i.e. that God seems to be absent but this absence signifies God’s presence: “the divinity was present even when the form of the servant suffered, and it allowed it to suffer”.152 Therefore, rather than indicating who abandons whom on the cross, Theodoret opts for another exegetical line of reasoning: God gives constent and the passion, i.e. death, approaches. For Rossé, the sense that Theodoret gives to the abandonment of Christ comes close to the sense that philological analysis attributes to the verb itself (in Hebrew and in Greek), a sense that P. Foresi summarizes in these terms: ‘to leave someone entirely in a precarious situation’. The Father abstains from intervening in a situation of suffering provoked by men.153 Theodoret’s position is not entirely unproblematic. Rossé presumes that the Father gives his consent to the passion, but there is no indication that Theodoret thought so. The acting agent is the divinity but Theodoret did not elaborate how it is possible that Christ could actually suffer given the presence of a concrete divine element in him; nor does he name the Father as the subject that gives consent. Even so, the reader should be finding himself in familiar territory since Explanatio in Canticum had already introduced the idea that Christians suffer abandonment because God has given his consent to ethical trials. It is likely, therefore, that in order to avoid a theological impasse, Theodoret employs in his Christology a notion that he had formed in his exegesis. If this is so, it is the first time that we come across an indication that there was common ground and theological consistency across Christian literary genres. 151 Theodoret, Psal. PG 80, 1009. 152 Theodoret, Psal. PG 80, 1009. 153 Rossé (1987), 77.

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For Theodoret, the idea that God gives his consent forms a substratum on which he builds his Christology and also his exegesis on the Song. Therefore, he seems to be the first exegete to have touched upon the continuity between the experience of abandonment on the cross and the feeling of abandonment by Christians. Is it possible that Theodoret relied on a specific source? On the one hand, it has been noted that the book of Psalms presents God not intervening on behalf of the faithful but giving space to adversary powers so that they could attack. And the fact that Theodoret has been interpreting the book of Psalms might have invited such an exegetical position. On the other hand, we should not dismiss the possibility that Theodoret has incorporated in his exegesis elements that had been developing in desert asceticism, given his close personal affiliation with ascetics in Syria. The Spiritual Homilies by Macarius the Great, for instance, that seem to preserve the Syrian version of Christian asceticism, and also the Lausiac History of Palladius predate the work of Theodoret and both presuppose the grand ascetic synthesis of Evagrius of Pontus, as it will be discussed in the third part of this book. Besides, a contemporary of Theodoret, Diadochus of Photice, had presented his own ascetic theory that, in many ways, corrected several elements in Evagrius and Macarius and also gave prominence to God’s consent. All these authors introduce the notion that divine abandonment should be viewed as an experience in which God gives his consent so that ethical trials might happen. It is lileky, then, that Theodoret lets resound in his exegesis and Christology ascetic themes that had already gained predominance in Christian spirituality. To sum up, Theodoret did not endorse the idea that the loud cry signifies a separation between two parties but rather expresses the fact that God has given consent so that the passion might happen. When reading Theodoret’s exegesis on the Song of Songs and the loud cry side by side, one could not fail to notice this common approach: Christ and the Christian soul have been subjected to ethical trials, because God has granted his permission. Therefore, God has manifested his presence in what seems to be absence, i.e. his decision not to intervene on behalf of his faithful. In both cases Theodoret does not see sinfulness as the reason of abandonment, and it seems that he echoes the Origenist notion that ethical trials do not punish the soul because of a specific sin, an idea successfully argued by Layton.154 It seems that Jesus, then, experiences trials, i.e. the passion and death, and through the loud voice he expresses his solidarity with the faithful who are also tried so that their faith should be tested. Even though Theodoret might imply the continuity between the experience of Jesus and Christians, it is also true that he does not specify the true subject and object of the experience in his attempt to avoid introducing any sort of separation in Christ.155 John Damascene: Revisiting the Tradition

The era when Christian exegetes dealt with the loud cry on the cross came to an end with John Damascene. He tackled the loud cry in several theological contexts:

154 Layton (2000). 155 Nazianzene, Fil. 5–6, PG 36, 108–12. cf. Didymus, Trin. PG 39, 913–16.

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in his theological epitome known as Expositio Fidei,156 his work against heresies De duabus voluntatibus157 and Contra Nestorianos158 and his purely exegetical In Epistulas Pauli.159 What is common in all his approaches is the fact that his interest in the loud cry has been accidental. To put his thought into context, in the years between Chalcedon (451 ce) and Second Constantinople (680–81 ce) the theological agenda moved from a debate concerning the number of natures in Jesus and the exact manner of the union to the natural integrity of the natures and the way that the human element could trully exist alongside the Logos; questions that seem to have stemmed naturally from the legacy of Chalcedon. Civil interests of the Eastern Roman Empire meant that the ecclesiastical unity that had come under threat by the ongoing theological debates, had to be safeguarded and attempts to find a compromise between the battling parts were conducted in many cases after the initiative or even under the direct auspices of the Emperors of the Empire.160 The proceedings of the Second Constantinople (680–81 ce) were dominated by the theological legacy of Maximus the Confessor, one of the most preeminent sources of John Damascene, who had argued against a minimalistic understanding of natural human capacities in Christ. Maximus had revised the problematic Athanasian distinction between actions that are naturally attributed to Christ’s divinity and those attributed to his humanity, and therefore introduced the distinction between scriptural accounts that manifest the reality of Jesus’ humanity qua humanity, and those that manifest Jesus’ humanity qua deified humanity. By applying this modification, Maximus avoided a sharp distinction that could imply the presence of two acting centres in Jesus and at the same time he safeguarded the ontological reality and integrity of Jesus’ humanity: humanity has maintained its natural accordance, its distinct ontological character but at the same time it has been enriched and transformed due to the incarnation. Louth has noted that John Damascene formulated his thought in a totally different political and theological ambience than the Christian authors that had preceded him. John lived in Damascus and also Palestine when they were part of the muslim caliphate, and therefore defended, or better defined, the orthodox faith against non-Christians (i.e. Muslims) as well as Christian heretics, but without having the ability to invoke the imperial authority of the Eastern Roman Empire that had undertaken the task to promote Christian “orthodoxy” by means of political persuasion. Therefore, John addressed different theological needs than his predecessors. John found himself embroiled in theological debate during the iconoclast controversy (c. 730), a civil and also religious movement that questioned the tradition of making and venerating icons, and which has been viewed partially as the aftermath of the defeats of the Romans by the Arabs. Even so, though John Damascene was a subject of the Caliph, he was 156 157 158 159 160

Damascene, ExpF. 68 [in PTS 12]. Damascene, Volunt. 28.57 [in PTS 22]. Damascene, Nest. 26.1 [in PTS 22]. Damascene, Commentarii in Epistulas Pauli, PG 95, 824. For a concise sketch of the historical background from the years leading to Chalcedon (451 ce) to Second Constantinople (680–81 ce) see Louth (1996), 6–19.

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firmly anchored onto the theological and ideological milieu of the Eastern Roman Empire and drew heavily from the theological tradition of the past. Concerning the loud cry on the cross, one could easily work out the theological position of John Damascene by merely reading the Damascene’s Expositio Fidei and the group of titles that precede the chapter that features the loud cry in Mt 27:46. The titles sum up the main issues that had preoccupied Christian thought after Nicæa and, most importantly, Chalcedon: John deals in quick succession with the incarnation of Jesus, the number of his natures, the manner of the union between the natures, and also the integrity of his natural capacities.161 The next group of titles seems to be a natural follow-up, since John turns his attention from the natural capacities of Jesus to the blameless passions that are attributed to human nature. Then, he provides specific examples when such blameless passions manifest in Jesus’ life: ignorance and servitude, growth, fear and also prayer. For each passion, John introduces corresponding scriptural accounts. The next title, “Concerning accommodation”, serves to round up the whole argument and indicates that Jesus has accommodated such natural capacities. It is evident, then, at a glance that John defines the loud cry on the cross as a prayer, since he includes the loud cry under the title “Concerning the Lord’s prayer”: Jesus has assumed the natural capacity that humanity possesses to turn to God in prayer at times of trials. First, John employs a definition that Evagrius of Pontus had introduced according to which prayer is a conversation of the intellect (νοῦς) with the Godhead.162 The definition serves to refute the idea that Jesus did not assume all the faculties of a human soul, including an intellect (νοῦς). This is a disguised rebuke against a minimalist approach that would deny any higher intellectual faculty in Jesus (semi-Arians or Apollinarians).163 Then, John cites two stories from Scripture in which Jesus is engaged in prayer164 and brings this brief chapter to a conclusion by citing the loud cry on the cross in Mt 27:46. The overall argument is constructed in such a way so as to imply an identification of the loud cry with Ps 22 and at the same time to shed some limited light to the “psychological” mechanism that led to the experience on the cross – even though this is not John’s primary objection: the human intellect of Jesus turns to prayer when he faces the prospect of death. Therefore, when Jesus prays he does so to provide an ethical example so that Christians might know that they should follow it (ὑπογραμμός). The fact that the loud cry on the cross is presented as another instance that Jesus prays, leads the reader to assume that the loud cry is a prayer from the book of Psalms. This approach

161 Between Chalcedon and Constantinople II a theological thread of thought emerged and also a political line of action that sought to read Chalcedon in light of the theology of Cyril of Alexandria, the authority de facto that all battling sides accepted. This theological approach has been called Neochalcedonian theology, or more appropriately Cyrilline Chalcedonianism. For an overall review and assessment of this theology, see Daley (1993), 239–65 and for a critical approach see Ferrara (1997), 311–27. 162 Damascene, ExpF. 68. Evagrius, Orat. 35 A very similar definition has been provided by Gregory of Nyssa, De Oratione Dominica, PG. 44, 1124. Louth (2002), 176. 163 Damascene, ExpF. 68. 164 Jn 11:41 and Mt 26:39.

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made Jouassard express his doubt whether John believed in the genuineness of the experience; and the French academic might be justified in his assessment given the vocabulary that John did introduce: Jesus becomes a type (τυπῶν) of human nature and therefore teaches us (διδάσκων) to pray faithfully when facing trials. However, when John examines the loud cry as such, he seems not to have underestimated the authenticity of the experience: Further, these words, My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?, he said as making our personality his own [οἰκειούμενος]. For neither would God be regarded with us as his Father, unless one were to discriminate with subtle imaginings of the mind between that which is seen and that which is thought, nor was he ever forsaken by his divinity: nay, it was we who were forsaken and disregarded. So that it was as accommodating [my italics] our personality [οἰκειούμενος] that He offered these prayers.165 The transition between what has followed and the interpretation of the loud cry is quite loose (“Further”). Therefore, there is no certainty about how the loud cry fits within the general context that John has already sketched, given the fact that the chapter has introduced the position that Jesus has provided an example for Christians. John has also pointed to the fact that Jesus has assumed two natural wills that do not oppose each other. And, even though John has chosen to cite Mt 27:46 that bears the closest similarity to Ps 22, it is intriguing that he did not mention the connection between the loud cry and the opening verse of Ps 22, a point that would have reinforced his argument concerning a faithful prayer. It seems, then, that John has presented his reader with another kind of prayer, alongside the faithful prayer, and therefore he used the incident on the cross as a bridge that would lead his discussion to the next chapter, “Concerning accommodation”. It is not accidental that he opened and closed the paragraph concerning the loud cry with the indication that Jesus has accommodated (οἰκειούμενος) our natural condition. In the passage cited above, the experience of abandonment is naturally attributed to humanity, “it was we who were forsaken”, and therefore the idea that the experience could be naturally attributed to the Godhead is dismissed: the Father has not abandoned his Son. It is equally unfitting to suggest that the humanity of Jesus has been separated from his divinity, “nor was He ever forsaken by His divinity”, a position that might be refuting a Nestorian interpretation. Therefore, John seems to have led himself to the same dead-end that we have come across several times. But it is equally true that he does so because he maintains the definition of abandonment as a severance of the bond between two parties. It should be assumed that John dismissed both options on the grounds that they severe the unity between God and Son or between his humanity and divinity. In the preceding chapters, John had already pressed the notion of a single acting subject, and therefore he had implied that

165 Damascene, ExpF. 68. Translation in Shauff (1995), 535 though I have preferred the verb “accommodated” than “appropriated” since the former signifies that one provides sufficient space for something.

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a notion of separation might be possible but only if one acknowledges (εἰ μή γε) that Jesus has taken human weakness on his being: people have been forsaken, i.e. cut off from God, and Jesus accommodates this reality on his own person. However, John understands that such a position could jeopardise the reality of a single acting subject and therefore tones down the notion of separation. In the case of Jesus, discerning two parties is possible only at a conceptual level through the “subtle imaginings of the mind” (φαντασίαις τοῦ νοῦ): a distinction between human (what is seen) and divine (what is thought).166 The introduction of this activity of the mind serves as a warning against teaching a sharp and real distinction between human and divine in Christ after the incarnation. Therefore, John safeguards the ontological unity of Jesus as a single acting subject, and at the same time he carefully introduces a subtle notion of a separation between a subject and an object that took place on the cross, even though he does not identify the subject and object with more precision. John teaches that abandonment is an experience that belongs to humanity, presumably because of sin, and that it is said to have been experienced by Jesus but only as long as he chose to accommodate human experiences and to be counted among people.167 This last point seems to tone down the severe effects of the experience and pave the way to the chapter that follows, “Concerning Accommodation”, where John clarifies the manner that human weakness is said to belong to Jesus. To sum up, John teaches that Jesus has trully experienced human weakness that has not been associated to sinfulness, he has shown that prayer is a perfectly human activity, and seems to dismiss the idea that the loud cry should be viewed as a mere prayer, even though it features under the title “Concerning the Lord’s prayer”. Besides, John presupposes that abandonment is a form of separation, but though he supports that a separation took part on the cross, he does so in a subtle way and hastens to apply some qualifications which he elucidates under the next title. The loud cry, then, is a link between two successive titles, “Concerning the Lord’s prayer” and “Concerning Accommodation”, because it features in both. The latter chapter opens with a passage that draws heavily from Maximus the Confessor, and introduces two kinds of accommodation:168 a natural (φυσικὴ) and a relative

166 Behind this idea lies the classical distinction between that which is real and that which is only conceptually real. Origen had applied this classical distinction on his trinitarian and Christological theology by introducing the term concepts or epinoiai (ἐπίνοιαι). See Ramelli (2012), 303 and also the article “Epinoiai” by R. H. Heine in McGuckin (2006), 93–95. It should be noted that, given the fact that the chapter “Concerning accommodation” in John’s work revises ideas that had featured in Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula 21, it seems probable that John follows Maximus when he introduces the notion of subtle imaginings in order to discourage an absolute distinction between human and divine in Jesus. 167 Schaffs translation misses this point, since he introduces God as the subject of the verb (τάσσοιτο μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν), whereas I think that Jesus should be the subject for both verbs (τάσσοιτο and κατελείφθη). However, it should be noted that John has not clarified who the subject is even in the previous paragraphs. 168 Damascene, Exp.F. 69. For the Stoic origins of the term accommodation or oikeiosis (οἰκείωσις) see Engberg-Pedersen (1990). In the philosophy of the Stoa, the term signifies self-awareness of an individual concering those elements that properly belong to one’s nature. The accommodation of

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(σχετικὴ) one.169 However, John revises the pair so that it reads “natural and essential” accommodation on the one hand, and “prosopic and relative” on the other hand, a correction that fits into his theological agenda of upholding the singleness of the acting subject. The first kind of accommodation involves those properties without which human nature could not be perceived as human at all, and therefore should be thought as essential to its constitution; e.g. the feeling of hunger and thirst.170 Maximus the Confessor, the source of John’s argument, had elucidated how Jesus could not have confirmed that he was trully human, had he not exhibited such properties: otherwise he would have been perceived as a ghostly apparition. Maximus also taught that Jesus naturally assumed (οὐσιωδῶς κατεδέξατο) such human capacities, which he designates λόγοι επιτιμίας; an expression that means either that one enjoys certain dignity or that one has been punished. It seems that Maximus implies the first reading, since he juxtaposes this to another group of natural passions (λόγοι ἀτιμίας or logoi of dishonour) that distort human nature and which Maximus teaches that Jesus accommodated (ᾡκοιώσατο) voluntarily (οἰκονομικῶς).171 The fact that Maximus has used two different verbs, to assume and to accommodate, for each group of natural passions respectively, is not accidental and serves to highlight the voluntary action through which Jesus made his own those passions that do not constitute human nature but have become part of human every-day experience. The

one’s nature is a cognitive process through which the individual progressively becomes self-aware of his being, engages in actions that are only proper to one’s being and stirs clear from those that could harm one’s being. In Cicero, De Finibus 3, 20–23, oikeiosis does not present nature as an impersonal agent that has set absurd objectives, but rather it is the self that perceives one’s objectives as nature. Clement of Alexandria was the first to appropriate the term in Christian ethics and defines it either as the presence of passions in human nature due to ethical corruption, or as the ascent of the soul to the ideal of apatheia. Therefore, the result of oikeiosis is either an estrangement from one’s nature or a return to it. Clement, Paedagogus, 2.10.110; Stromata, 4.23.148. But Clement also uses the terms as a synonym to the “likeness to God”, in which case Clement seems to read oikeiosis in its literal meaning, i.e. to make one person a kinsman or a friend (οἰκείος). Clement, Stromata, 5.4.23. See also Sharples (1999). Athanasius appropriated the word in a Christological context: the verb (οἰκέω-ῶ) means that one makes space or arranges things in his home. For Athanasius, in his οἰκείωσις the Logos literally finds some space so that human properties could co-exist alongside him. Athanasius, Fragmenta Varia, PG 26, 1245A and 1325A. However, it was Didymus the Blind who developed a more elaborate understanding. Oἰκείωσις is a process through which the Logos empties out himself (kenosis), which means that the Logos assumes natural human capacities and limitations. Therefore, it was Didymus the Blind who set the foundations to understand the incarnation as a process in which the Logos finds some space in him to the extent that that which is not God by nature, i.e. humanity, could exist. Didymus, FrPs. 716 [Ps 68:17–19]. Cf. Cyril, Epistulæ Pascalæs, PG 77, 868, 53. It could be said that when late antique theologians argue that it is perfectly natural – and therefore it is blameless – for individuals to avoid anything that might cause harm to their being, such as death, unknowingly they might be appropriating the Stoic theory of oikeiosis. Maximus, Opusc. 1, PG 91, 12C; 3, PG 91, 48A; 7, PG 91, 77C; Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297A. Bathrellos (2004), 123–24. Also, John Chrysostom, In illud Pater si possibile est transeat, PG 51, 38. Theophilus of Alexandria, Sermo in fluxu sanguinis laborantem, in ACO2 1.288. 169 Maximus, Opusc. 19, PG 91, 220C. Coakley (2002), 143–63. 170 Maximus, Opusc. 19, PG 91, 221B. 171 Maximus, Opusc. 20, PG 91, 237A.

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objective behind the subtle and refined distinctions and definitions is to strengthen the authenticity of the experience of Jesus, and at the same time to dismiss the idea that Jesus has suffered because of sinfulness. Therefore, Maximus seems to have worked out some technical refinements that featured in the theological tradition of Cyril of Alexandria and Didymus the Blind.172 It suffices to remind here that Didymus distinguishes between the logoi of transgressions (λόγοι παραπτωμάτων), i.e. those natural and blameless passions, and actual transgressions, i.e. committing sin actively and voluntarily.173 John Damascene appropriates the above Maximian distinctions and therefore introduces two kinds of accommodation: an “essential or natural” (φυσική καὶ οὐσιώδης) and a “proposic and relative” (προσωπική καὶ σχετική); whereas the former involves natural properties that constitute humanity, such as the feeling of ignorance, toil, thirst and hunger, the latter one connotes the voluntary assumption by Jesus of non-essential properties, such as the experience of abandonment and the fact that “he was made curse for our sake”. I have left the word prosopic untranslated intentionally, because in Maximus’ thought, the word signifies several natural capacities that have been assumed voluntarily by Jesus.174 It should be noted that Maximus the Confessor dealt with the prayer in agony as part of the voluntary accommodation of passions by Jesus, but it is more likely that he referred to the prayer in Gesthemane, not the loud cry on the cross that played no role in his theological synthesis. John Damascene, then, is explicit that the experience of abandonment is a natural human weakness that Jesus assumed as part of his relative, i.e. voluntary, accommodation. Therefore, John thinks that, in the case of Jesus, abandonment is not the result of sinfulness, but it is due to a free acceptance of human experiences by Jesus who would still be trully human even without experiencing abandonment on the cross. In this chapter, one finds further evidence that Jouassard’s reservations concerning John’s belief in the authenticity of the experience might not be unfounded. This is due to the fact that John juxtaposes an essential accommodation to a relative one and at the same time he employs the verb “ὑποδύομαι” to define the meaning of

172 For instance, Maximus deals with ignorance as a blameless property of human nature in the same fashion that he talks about one’s will (βούληση) as a natural motion of the soul without which one could not be said to be fully human. Maximus, Opusc. 19, PG 91, 217–24. Maximus takes great pains to establish the distinction between what naturally belongs to humanity and what Jesus accommodates on soteriological grounds. And he does so in support of the existence of a proper and integral human nature in Jesus, i.e. a nature that possesses all its properties. Therefore, he addresses his opponents who intended to question the actual reality of such natural properties. For an overall presentation of the Maximian theological synthesis see Bathrellos (2004). Louth (1999). Törönen, (2007). 173 In his ascetic writings, Maximus distinguishes between passions, i.e. motions of the soul, that work from within human nature and those that have an external cause. It follows, then, that it is fitting to teach that Jesus has fully accommodated the first, but participates in a relative only manner in the latter, since Jesus is subjected to the results of the external passions voluntarily and without admitting their cause, i.e. sinfulness. Cf. Maximus, Thal. 51 PG 90, 484; LibAs, 35, PG 90, 940–41. 174 Gal. 3:13. See Maximus, Opusc. 9, PG 91, 120A: “οὐκ ἔκτισις ἦν, ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ κένωσις ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Λόγου τὸ πάθος” (the passion was not a punishment, as it is for us, but it was the kenosis of the Logos incarnate for our sake).

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relative accommodation. It is a verb that signifies the act of putting on an actor’s mask in the theatre and thereofe assuming a persona, in which case it connotes an act of pretence. Maximus the Confessor had defined relative accommodation as an activity in which “we accommodate naturally what belongs to each other, neither suffering nor effecting any of these ourselves”.175 John adds that one does so in only relative terms out of affection (ἀγάπη) or pity (οἶκτος).176 Therefore, John draws the conclusion that the incident of abandonment on the cross occurs in the process of such relative accommodation: “it was in this way that our Lord appropriated both our curse and our desertion, and such other things as are not natural: not that He Himself was or became such, but that He took upon Himself our personality and ranked Himself as one of us”.177 One might argue that John’s discussion should be assessed and appreciated within the general context of his theological synthesis that summarises theological developments after Chalcedon and that moves within the frame of a Cyriline Christology that upholds the divine Logos as the only acting subject. One might also point to the fact that Jouassard seems to underestimate John’s position that Jesus has shown to be one of us (μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τασσόμενος) because he has voluntarily experienced abandonment. Nevertheless, it is true that John includes many elements in his discussion that inevitably make it doubtful whether he intended to maintain the authenticity of the experience. In another work, John promotes the paradigmatic aspect of the passion of Jesus and at the same time he denies that the soul of Jesus might have experienced “cowardice” (μικροψυχία) that led to despair on the cross.178 The loud cry, he says, reveals the obedience of the Son to the Father and therefore provides an example to all people: “He suffered in our nature to strengthen it against the passions and teach us to look at God during temptations and call upon him for assistance”.179 There is no indication, this time, that the experience introduced a disruption in the relation between a subject and an object, and it is implied that no anguish took place on the cross. John seems to put forward an interpretation that raises no questions concerning the inner mechanism that might have led to the experience of abandonment, but he does so at the cost of the authenticity of the experience. However, it should be noted that the overall treatment becomes more perplexing if one considers the fact that, unlike his theological predecessors, John does not refer to Ps 22 even though an immediate connection between Mt 27:46 and Ps 22 might have helped his reader to grasp the religious and devotional character of the loud cry. Therefore, John Damascene who stands at the end of a line of great theologians in late antiquity that dealt with the loud cry on the cross, seems to summarise certain lines of thought that had been pursued before him: one author could pursue several ways how to interpret the loud cry, according to the text that he had been reading and the pastoral or theological

175 176 177 178 179

Maximus, Opusc. PG 91, 304A. Damascene, Exp.F. 69. Damascene, Exp.F. 69. Damascene, Nest. 26.1 [p. 272]. Cf. Maximus, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297D. Damascene, Nest. 26.1.

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needs to which he had been responding. Any discussion that viewed abandonment as a disruption (a realistic approach) led to a dead-end since it imposed an impossible question: who abandons whom on the cross? Given the red lines that the Nicene faith and also Chalcedon had set, any suggestion concerning the subject and object of the separation could play at the hands of several intellectual adversaries. At the same time, the thread that avoided such a deadlock and therefore viewed the loud cry as a faithful prayer (a typological approach) endangered the genuine character of the experience and even inferred an act of pretence, given the fact that those who promoted this line of thought suggested that Jesus speaks on behalf of humanity collectively and that the loud cry belongs to humanity. In this case, Jesus provides an example that people should pray to God when facing distressful conditions. The strict limits from a doctrinal point of view within which late antique theologians were able to find place to manoeuvre should account for the obscurity concerning the proper interpretation of the loud cry on the cross, and the fact that the loud cry of Jesus did not take centre stage in Christian exegesis or Christology. It follows, then, that it would have been nearly impossible in late antiquity to read side by side the loud cry of Jesus on the cross and the experience of abandonment of the bride in the Song of Songs.

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The Abandonment of the Ascetics Origenist Ascetic Themes

It is not easy to characterise Origen’s theology as “mystical”, since the word has taken disparate meanings in a range of theological contexts.1 For instance, there is little evidence that Origen believed in a supernatural and direct appearance of the divine to the soul that has not been mediated through Scripture or the sacraments. And yet, there could be no doubt that in his Commentary on the Song of Songs, he laid the foundations for a Christian understanding of the union between human and divine, even though it is not clear at what level this takes place (physical, cognitive or meta-cognitive) and given the fact that one should not differentiate sharply between the individual soul and the Church as a collective object.2 What is evident, then, is the fact that Origen is an exegete of the Logos, i.e. an outstanding thinker that emphasises the presence and role of the Logos in a process of God’s progressive revelation in world history that has been initiated by God and has been brought to fulfilment in Scripture and the sacramental life of the Church. However, even through the mediation of the Logos, the union between human and divine is not a fiat. That much could be surmised by the fact that Origen maintains that in her spiritual journey and as the soul approaches God’s presence in Scripture, the incarnation and the sacraments, she remains susceptible to ethical trials. In fact, ethical trials seem to be a spiritual norm. In his Exhortatio and De Oratione, Origen provides further scriptural witness ( Job 7:1, Is 28:10 and Rom 5:3–5) concerning the experience of trials,3 which he identifies with the whole of our present life: “[T]hat the whole of human life upon earth is a time of temptations we learn from Job in the following words: Is not the life of men

1 For a fresh look to the difficulty of describing any Christian author in late antiquity as “mystic” in light of the modern approach to religious mysticism, see the ‘Afterword’ in the second edition of Louth (2007), 200–14. 2 Origen produced an exegetical work On Prayer that deals with the dominical prayer (Mt 6:9–13) and falls within the framework that has been described above. It is the work De Oratione by Evagrius of Pontus that could be credited with a discernible shifting from scriptural exegesis on the Lord’s prayer to a more anthropological and psychological discourse that deals with prayer within the context of human purification, ethical warfare and passions. For instance, compare Origen, De Oratione, P. Koetschau (ed.), GCS 3 (1899), 297–403, Gregory of Nyssa, De Oratione Dominica, GNO 7.2 (1992), 5–74 and even Maximus, Expositio Orationis Dominicæ, PG 90, 872–909 with Evagrius, De Oratione, PG 79, 1165–1200. Though scholarship tends to endorse the claim that Evagrius read in Origen an emphasis to psychological pathology, Casiday has cast some doubt on such an assessment and has indicated that much research remains to be done to establish how much Evagrius would have been familiar with Origen’s work and thought. See Casiday (2021). 3 Origen, Martyr. 1 [all references indicate chapter divisions in the edition of Greer (1979)].

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upon earth a time of temptations”?4 For Origen, temptations are evidence of the warfare that has been waging between the soul and sinful passions or desires. In a lengthy passage Origen writes: For whether the wrestling is against the flesh that lusts and wars against the spirit5 or against the life of all flesh6 (which is synonymous with the body which the intelligence, otherwise called the heart, inhabits) and such is the wrestling of those who are tempted with temptations which are “common to man”; or whether, as with athletes who have made progress and are more perfect, no longer wrestling against flesh and blood or tested by temptations that are common to man, which they have now trodden under foot, our struggling is against principalities, and against the powers, and against the rulers of the darkness of this world, and against spiritual wickedness,7 in either case we are not released from temptation.8 According to the passage, temptations should be expected regardless one’s spiritual advancement. Even though Origen discerns between people who are taking their first steps in spiritual warfare and those who have already advanced, both groups suffer assaults from temptations whose nature changes according to one’s spiritual level: one should anticipate fleshly passions at the beginning and then assaults by demonic powers at a more advanced stage. Origen reads Mt 7:14 literally and explains the difficulties one should anticipate when taking the “hard path”.9 Yet, for Origen, this path has been “hard” due to the “body of death” which is another word for sin.10 It is sin, then, that makes spiritual advancement difficult and therefore hardships are expected if one wishes to take off this “body of death”. Hardness might be a predicate of the path, but the path is not hard as such. To bring this home, Origen emphasises that the gospel calls the path “τεθλιμμένη”, but not “θλίβουσα”.11 What Origen implies is the fact that sin makes the path hard, even though the path as such is not so. Therefore, Origen emphasises that sin is a spiritual factor that affects spiritual growth:12 the path to perfection is hard as long as the soul fails to put off sinfulness. Such a position seems to be a disguised attack against the Gnostic position that evil is generated by a sinister or inadequate creator. For Origen, evils are caused by sin that people fail to put off. Origen, Orat. 29.2. Cf. Jn 7:1. Eph 6:12. Gal 5:17. Lev 17:11. Eph 6:12. Origen, Orat. 29.2. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 4.22.138. Origen, In Jeremiam, 20.7.20 [in SC 238, p. 280]. Origen reads Mt 7:14 and 11:30 side by side: the narrow gate and hard path, on the one hand, and the light yoke of Christ on the other hand. Though the path is hard, it is also light when compared to life in sinfulness. Besides, the hard way becomes a light yoke when the faithful takes into consideration the prize with which he will be rewarded. Origen, Martyr. 31–32. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.20.126. 12 Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium Joannis, 6.19.105 [in SC 157, p. 208].

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As it concerns the nature of such trials or temptations, Origen introduces the appearance of thoughts within one’s heart and also the activity of demons. However, the actual role that demons play in ethical life and how their activity is associated to thoughts and also sin is not clear, since Origen did not compose any lengthy treatise concerning the matter. And though he has sketched some general ideas in his exegesis On the Song of Songs, it should be noted that the bride is not vulnerable to the activity of demons. In his exegesis, then, one comes across in a rudimentary form the most significant motifs that were developed in later ascetic literature: demons are associated to base thoughts which they insinuate to the heart so that passions might stir within the soul and make her abandon virtue.13 Normally, scholarship depends on De Principiis and views the matter of demons within the framework that this work sketches. Even so, it should be noted that Origen does not present consistency in the way he depicts demons and their activity, nor does he present them uniformly as personified sinister spirits that are responsible for human passions. In fact, he argues that passions result from the excessive and immoderate functions of the body14 and on the other hand he claims that sinning is unthinkable or even impossible without the activity of demons, and that their presence reveals a kind of “darkness” that lurks within the soul.15 Besides, Origen also indicates that each individual sin corresponds to a demon or a wicked thought.16 Origen has laid the foundations to view sin in light of the activity of demons, or as a consequence of the presence of wickedness within one’s heart. Even so, the line between interior mental activity and exterior activity due to demonic presence is not as clear and pronounced in his thought as subsequent ascetic literature in which demons are depicted as entities of such concrete existence that monastics could freely converse with them and even experience their physical assaults.17 In any case, academic scholarship is still in need of a more thorough examination of Origen’s thought not through the prism of De Principiis in order to elucidate the role of demons in ethical life and their association to passions, something that goes beyond the merit of this study, but it should suffice here to suggest

13 Origen, Com. 3.15.255. In a fragment that has been preserved by Procopius of Gaza, Origen allegedly relates the activity of the Bride to the battle against evil thoughts and demons but it seems that this describes the time that the soul received her initial spiritual instructions after she had been converted from paganism. See the footnote in Origen, Com. 2.3.113 (cf. Song 1:6b). 14 Origen, Princ. 3.2.2. One might find a similar argument in the platonic tradition, for instance in Phaedo. 15 Origen, 27Nm. 8. 16 Stewart (2005), 12 has noted a theological precedent in Origen that found more precise articulation in the notion of eight vices, or better evil logismoi, in Evagrius of Pontus, was further standardised and promoted to the West by Evagrius’ disciple John Cassian and would eventually become widely known as the seven deadly sins. For the semantics behind the evil logismoi and also a discussion concerning the provenance of the notion of evil logismos see Casiday (2021). 17 Burton-Christie has demonstrated the close association in early christian spirituality between an inherent weakness in human nature and the actual presence of demons as an exterior factor. He agrees with Brown’s approach to read the desert literature from a modern psychopathological perspective that views the demonic “as an extension of the self ”. See Burton-Christie (1993), 193 who cites Brown (1978), 90.

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another prism: the explicit association between sin, idolatry and ignorance of God’s activity.18 Demons are not always human passions personified, but spiritual entities that wish to lead people to idolatry and therefore hinder the worship of the one and true God. Idolatry is the final outcome of ignorance, since one dismisses or turns away from the knowledge of the Christian God as he has revealed himself in many forms. Therefore, when Origen interprets the biblical account of Israel’s journey in the desert, he teaches that God withdraws from Israel because Israel has forgotten or ignored the one God, which is a clear indication that that ignorance is the aetiology of divine abandonment, because ignorance inevitably leads Israel to idolatry, the gravest sin of them all. It could be concluded, then, that Origen does not deny the role that demons play in spiritual life, but it seems that he thinks of them as agents that bring deception in order to derail people from their course to God’s knowledge and lead to ignorance and idolatry.19 In other words, for Origen the existence of demons is another expression for the actual presence of idols of pagan deities.20 In his exegesis on the Song of Songs Origen did not view sin as the only factor that brings about God’s turning away his face: God departs from the soul as part of his divine pedagogy that fits within the general scheme of divine providence according to which God actively instructs and directs the soul to divine knowledge. In his ethical works, Origen presents a cause-and-effect approach, an aetiology of divine abandonment that sketches a closer association between sin and God’s departure: God has appointed an angel to minister each individual and God withdraws this angelic power from any person who falls “backwards to more material things”.21 A similar idea has appeared in his exegesis on the Song of Songs, but Origen’s claim does not pertain to the Bride, but her companions and, on the other hand, the ministering angel has been sent by God to strengthen the soul against the suggestions of evil thoughts that the soul experiences.22 The absence of the ministering angel is exploited by adversary powers, i.e. sinister spirits, to attack the soul: “[The worse power] having found an opportunity to attack by reason of his indifference, will be at hand to prompt him to such and such sin, seeing that he has offered himself in readiness for sin”.23 On the one hand, what is discernible is a description of divine abandonment that resembles the experience in the Psalms: God withdraws his assistance and therefore the soul has been left vulnerable to her enemies. On the other hand, man is susceptible to an attack by a “worse power” as a result of one’s indifference and therefore man is

18 Origen lived at a time when it was thought that the space between the Good and the material or else between Gods and men was occupied by both benign and malign entities. See Dodds (1970). For an introduction to Origen’s angelology and also demonology see Danielou (1955) though it should be noted that he views the subject through the prism of the cosmology preserved in De Principiis. For a concise presentation of Origen’s thought concerning the way that demonic activity affects the soul through thoughts of wickedness see Stewart (2005). 19 Origen, 27Nm. 8. 20 Origen, 27Nm. 3. 21 Origen, Orat. 6.4. 22 Origen, Com. 3.15.255. 23 Origen, Orat. 6.4.

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responsible for God’s response to withdraw his assistance. However, the actual place of the “worse power” that attacks the soul might be disputable, whether it is an exterior sinister factor or an inherent human weakness, given the fact that Origen does not elaborate any further. There is no doubt that the “ministering angel” signifies divine closeness of which someone has been deprived suddenly, and therefore it could be surmised that the “worse power” infers the proximity of sin. In the passage concerning the “worse power” Jay discerns an allusion to Lk 11:24–26 where Jesus describes the “personal” itinerary of an exterior factor, an evil spirit that departs from a man and then decides to return. For Jay, there is no doubt that the expression “worse power” employed by Origen signifies demonic presence, even though the boundaries between interior mental activity and exterior factor remain blurred, because as Jay remarks, for Origen wickedness lies within someone and this demonic presence “incites and urges us, striving to extend sin over a larger field”.24 What is useful for our discussion is the fact that a dialectic emerges between the presence and absence of God, the activity of wickedness being depended on God’s withdrawal: when God is in proximity, the soul feels spiritual rest, whereas when God withdraws his assistance the soul experiences immediately the activity of wickedness. Origen, therefore, seems to have anticipated a position that was further promoted by an ascetic figure who was revered as one of the great masters of Christian desert spirituality, Macarius the Great, according to which there could be no mingling between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of sin in the soul: [W]e must understand this about the kingdom of God, that, just as there is no fellowship between righteous and unrighteous, nor communion of light and darkness, nor concord of Christ with Belial,25 so the kingdom of sin cannot co-exist with the kingdom of God. If, then, we wish God to reign in us, let not sin in any way reign in our mortal body.26 Origen depends his thought on Paul who had dismissed the possibility that grace and sin could co-exist in the soul, and Origen reiterates this impossibility that faith in the Christian God and idolatry could exist simultaneously in the soul. Therefore, one should not read through the prism of the ascetic tradition as it developed after Origen, and perceived spiritual combat as a battle between the presence of divine grace and the demonic activity. Unlike what the Bride experiences in the Song of Songs, for Origen one should never think at any stage of spiritual life that ethical trials belong to the past. Origen several times returns to the possibility of an ethical backsliding that might affect even the most spiritually advanced person.27 Has anyone ever thought that men were outside the scope of temptations whose tale he knows, having himself completed it? And what occasion is 24 25 26 27

Jay (1954), 58–59. Cf. 2 Cor 6:14–15. Origen, Orat. 25.3. Origen, Martyr. 18. Cf. Is 14:12.

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there upon which a man is confident as not having to struggle that he may not commit sin?28 The picture that Origen draws differs significantly from the image of the joyful soul that ever presses on in the Commentary on the Song of Songs. There, Origen had been intent to stir up the spiritual desire of his reader so that he might ignite his longing for union with God: it should be reminded that eros is the main motif of this exegetical work. On the other hand, De Oratione strikes a different note because the circumstances of its composition are different: Origen instructs several Christians who have been imprisoned during the outbreak of a new persecution against the Church, to labour spiritually and he does so by putting forward the spiritual profits that Christians who would maintain their fidelity could reap from praying and remaining vigilant. This time, it is the dominical prayer (Mt 6:9) that has inspired Origen who presents it as the model par excellence of prayer. The motif of temptations features in the dominical prayer and Origen was obliged to follow the Gospel passage. Therefore, one traces two different images in Origen’s thought with regard to ethical progress that feature in different exegetical settings: the joyful soul on the one hand, and the faithful Christian who should anticipate temptations at all stages of his spiritual life. Though the images have been employed in different theological frameworks, and despite the fact that they present us with two contradictory ideas, it should be noted that the overarching theme between both images is the fact that spiritual fulfilment is a promise that is yet to be realised: the conjugal union in the Song of Songs remains unconsummated and the faithful in the De Oratione is presented with the prize that should get at a future time. Another exegetical work, In Numeros, makes it even more evident that it is actually the image of the ever-battling soul that should be viewed as normative in Christian life. Origen presents the reader with the recurring and inter-changing image of perfection on the one hand and spiritual warfare on the other hand, or else ethical rest and joy and also spiritual combat and trials. The dialectical character of the terms is self-evident and the same should be said about God’s proximity and hiddenness.29 Origen follows the narrative of the account in Exodus, a book that he reads as an allegory of the progress of the soul towards union with God. Origen explains the various “stations” (σταθμοί)30 that Israel comes across in his journey through the desert and suggests that those are reflections of the stages in the spiritual journey of the soul.31 Israel travels from places that offer rest to areas where hardships await him, and this 28 Origen, Orat. 29.5. Compare the above extract to Origen’s claim in his Commentary on the Song of Songs: “For those whom they have begotten through the Gospel they tear away from the chains of sin and the snares of the devil, that they will be no longer held enchained to his will…no, they will always forget the things that are behind, and press on towards those that are before”. Origen, Com. 3.12.224 (cf. Song 2:9a). 29 Daniélou (1955), 296. 30 According to Origen’s reckoning Israel visited forty-two resting places while wandering in the desert, but the number is allegorical since forty-two are also the generations between the time of Abraham and the birth of Jesus. Cf. Num 33:1. Mt 1:17. 31 Origen, 27Nm. 4.

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motif appears several times as he makes his way across the desert.32 Origen applies this dialectic on the ethical life of the faithful soul and presents us with the paradox that Israel is pursued by Pharaoh, another word for sin, even though the Lord has already delivered him, i.e. through the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism.33 In order to solve the paradox, Origen introduces the idea that one should expect alternating periods of ethical combat and spiritual rest: after Israel has been rescued from the army of Pharaoh, a pattern emerges in the history of Israel seeing periods of rest and then distress. For the faithful Christian that means that he should anticipate some spiritual rest that should be followed by spiritual combat. This dialectic reveals the fact that divine providence is at work: God draws the soul closer to him through an initial experience of his proximity, but he withdraws suddenly from the soul and consequently she undergoes ethical trials and temptations. Though there is no indication that the soul has sins and that God withdraws to chastise the soul, but at the same time it is implied that the experience purifies the soul from whatever sin has been still stirring within. The motif of spiritual combat and rest fits within the great theme of divine pedagogy in which God actively instructs the soul and tests her faith in order to guide her to spiritual perfection. Therefore, Origen seems to be viewing God’s withdrawal in the same terms as Ezekiel: God’s abandonment does not mean that God is absent, but that he remains in proximity since he has given his consent so that the soul could be subjected to ethical trials and temptations. The point that even in seeming absence God remains in proximity seems to infuse Origen’s ethical theory and also his exegesis with a sense of uniformity. At the same time, another overarching idea should be taken into account that equally informs his theology: an eschatological orientation that still depends on the idea that God actively directs the soul in many ways. Origen reads in Paul the idea of a “promised heritage”, “hope” and “rewards” that have been postponed for the future.34 The life of men is the period of time that divine pedagogy is evidently at work. Ethical trials and temptations are part and parcel with this life and the soul should anticipate some periods of spiritual rest, even though the fullness of spiritual rest has been postponed for the time that the soul will be properly admitted to the kingdom of God. It is inferred, on the one hand, that the dialectics between spiritual joy and ethical labour do not result from sin, and on the other hand that even the more spiritually advanced Christians should anticipate spiritual combat.35 For Cheek, Origen has been reading in the New Testament the dialectics between the Kingdom of God as a fiat due to the redemptive passion of Jesus and at the same time as a promised that has been postponed, so “the plan [for perfect restoration] waits to be consummated in the future at the end of time”.36

32 In order to maintain some consistency about the above pattern Origen depends either on the etymology of the places in Hebrew or the actual events that took place according to the biblical accounts. 33 Origen, 27Nm. 4. 34 Origen, 27Nm. 5–6. Cf. Rom 5:3–5 and 8:18. 35 Cf. Origen, Orat. 11.2. Origen indicates that perfection is always predicated by a temporal conjunction, “then”, which suggests a strong eschatological orientation. 36 Cheek (1962), 119.

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Origen might be directing the attention of his reader to divine paideia and providence, i.e. the fact that God actively instructs and directs the soul, but it should be noted, in advance, that he does not differentiate between various expressions of God’s paideia. That means that behind several stories in Scripture that describe hardships Origen discerns the work of God’s providence and therefore he directs his reader to the final justification of those who have remained faithful to the end. Even so, he does not imply that there is any differentiation between the hardships experienced by Paul, Job, the Bride and even Jesus. All experiences fall within the same frame of God’s paideia: their faith has been tested by God and they all demonstrated their perfection during such hardships.37 Therefore, Paul and Job are ethical examples that have been praised, since they do not express dissatisfaction against God, nor do they rebel against God during hardships. In his commentary on the Song of Songs, Origen even includes the image of Jesus as an ethical model who has been tempted by the devil but has trampled and torn the evil snares,38 so that the Church might perceive that, “the way to Christ leads, not through idle ease and pleasure, but through many trials and temptations” and be emboldened herself to undergo temptations and come out victorious.39 In the case of Jesus, Origen might not explicitly refer to God’s paideia, but he views the experience within the context of God’s providence, for “it was needful that somebody should come who should be stronger than they [evil snares] and stand out above them and should destroy them”. In the same fashion, the Bride in the Song maintains her ethical purity and the martyrs that feature in Ad Martyrium remain utterly faithful to God, despite physical persecution and the prospect of death, to the extent that they hear from God the same words with which he has addressed the Bride in the Song (cf. Song 2:10).40 In Origen, divine abandonment does not take the form of spatial distance or a gap that opens up between God and man, but signifies that God withdraws his assistance from men, and even though he remains in proximity at the time of ethical trials, he observes one’s faith and sometimes intervenes to assist and provide some respiration from spiritual combats.41 Origen does not imply that God discriminates between righteous and unrighteous, and despite the fact that men have been estranged from God, God remains in proximity even to the “estranged” ones.42 As it concerns the

Origen, Orat. 29.5 and 30.1–2; Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150, 16.7; Homiliae in Job (in catenis), 26. Cf. Prov 1:17 and 6:5. Origen, Com. 3.13.237. Origen, Homiliae in Job (in catenis), 18 [PG 12, 1033]. Origen associates the biblical image of Job to that of Christian martyrs. 41 Origen, Orat. 20.2. 42 In an obscure passage, Origen teaches that those beings that do not participate in God’s being maintain a spark of divine effulgence. Jay and Greer provide two different translations. Jay promotes an ontological reading that sees Origen distinguishing between God’s nature and the nature of rational creatures that participate in God’s existence through the medium of divine effulgence. On the other hand, Greer applies an ethical reading according to which Origen merely refers to the condition of those beings that remain estranged from God. The original text might be ambiguous but Jay’s translation seems unfitting given the fact that the passage is part of an ethical discourse that depends heavily on Scripture and lacks any cosmological speculative overtones. 37 38 39 40

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martyrs, in particular, Origen proclaims the proximity of God and as soon as the martyrs manifest their love for God, they hear, “the Lord is here” (cf. Is 40:10 and 62:11).43 Thus, Origen associates God’s proximity to testing of one’s faith and implies that the moment that God reveals his presence depends on the individual, since the moment one presents his faith in God, God responds. Origen approaches God’s proximity and hiddenness in a different way in his commentary on the Gospel of John, and even though one discerns the main ideas that have already been presented, it seems that Origen introduces something more profound about the nature of God and men. He notes that Jesus does not extend his visit to Cana ( Jn 2:1) and Samaria ( Jn 4:4) beyond three or two days respectively, but at the same time he has been followed by his disciples all the time. From the historical narrative, Origen moves to provide an allegorical reading that sees the Samaritans and the Canaanites as allegories for the human “mind” (νοῦς). The visit of Jesus and also his departure are allegories for God’s proximity and hiddenness with regard to the human mind. The Logos descends to the mind, which is another way for Origen to say, among other things, that the mind is illuminated when reading the Scripture. Yet, there is something that seems to urge the Logos to depart and prevents him to extend his union to the mind for longer. Once more, the reason for God’s departure is not due to any sin that man has committed, but Origen has sought an explanation in the constitution of human nature and the fact that the inherent capacity of the human mind to grasp God intellectually is limited. At the same time, Origen implies that this natural limitation might be overcome, since the “disciples” of Jesus, whom he juxtaposes to the Samaritans and Canaanites, maintain their proximity to Jesus, which is another way to say that the Logos departs from the latter, but he remains united with the former.44 It seems that, even behind these images, Origen discerns the dialectics between God’s proximity and hiddenness, even though this time it takes place at another level, i.e. the proximity of the Logos to the human mind. The departure of Jesus serves as an instruction for the “Canaanites” and “Samaritans” to perceive their imperfection, since the Logos could not remain united to such limited intellects. In De Oratione, Origen exposes his reflections on an antinomy that is contained in Jesus’ proclamations: though Jesus says that the Kingdom of God is present in the human soul (Lk 17:21) he also teaches to implore God for the coming of the Kingdom, “thy Kingdom come” (Mt 6:10). For Origen, this antinomy reveals the various gradations of divine wisdom that the human nous might attain to. As the intellect is progressing into God’s mystery, it is discovering that the Kingdom of God lies within.45 This clarification might shed some more light on the distinction between the “disciples” and the “Canaanites”, since the latter are on their way to perfection and therefore only catch glimpses of the presence of the divine groom, unlike the disciples whose adobe is with the divine Groom. Even so, the Canaanites

43 Origen, Martyr. 42. Origen, Orat. 20.2. 44 Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium Joannis, 13.52.347 [in SC 222, p. 224]. 45 Origen, Orat. 25.2.

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are an image of the human intellect that longs for and anticipates the future union with the Groom. An important question that rises from Origen’s treatment of the experience of God’s proximity and hiddenness theory concerns the degree to which Origen views it as modelled on Jesus’ own experience. Origen’s insights depend on the way that he reads Scripture and at the same time the influence of Clement of Alexandria is evident on his thought in those parts that, like Clement, Origen presses the need for ethical purification. Therefore, there is another image that emerges as an ethical example in Origen, the martyr who is persecuted for his faith in God. The influence of the cult of the Christian martyrs is highlighted by the fact that Exhortatio ad Martyrium was composed to reinforce the faith of Christians whom Origen knew in person and were put to prison during a persecution in 235 ce.46 According to King, one discerns the undeniable impact of the cult of the martyrs even on Origen’s exegetical work on the Song. Origen’s life and times were saturated with the presence of the Christian martyrs: his own father, Leonides, died as a martyr,47 and Origen never hid his longing for martyrdom.48 Near the end of his life, he witnessed the persecution and martyrdom of the bishops of Rome, Palestine and Antioch under the orders of the Emperor Decius, and was tormented severely himself even though he did not die a martyr, but was counted amongst the confessors of faith.49 Clement of Alexandria, an intellectual predecessor to Origen, had already introduced the value of martyrdom in his Stromata50 and Origen seems to have followed in many aspects of his thought including the high esteem that both men held martyrdom. For Origen, the martyrs exemplify the notion of Christian devotion and fidelity, since they offer their lives to God. Origen highlights the faith and also perseverance that the martyrs show during their persecution and physical duress and views martyrdom within the context of love, since the martyrs manifest their love for God.51 Origen introduces several allusions to the Bride in the Song: the martyrs undergo the “winter” of trials, they follow the “hard path” through which their fidelity

46 It is the persecution of Maximin the Thracian that broke out in 235 ce. For the circumstances of the composition see McGuckin (2004), 39 and Crouzel (1989), 16–17. 47 During the persecution of Septimius Severus in 202 ce. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 6.1.1. Photius, Bibliotheca, 118.92b. Crouzel ruled out as fictitious the story preserved by Eusebius that Origen exhorted his father to martyrdom when he was probably only fourteen years old. 48 For Eusebius, Origen developed his desire (ἔρως) for martyrdom due to his father’s death. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 6.2.3. For a thorough sketch of Origen’s life and the way martyrdom eluded him see McGuckin (2004), 1–23. 49 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 6.39.1. 50 Cf. Clement, Stromata, 4.1.1.1. If we take into consideration parallel scriptural quotations between Origen and Clement (cf. Rom 5:3–5 and Mt 7:14), it seems likely that Origen was familiar with the work of Clement when he composed his exhortation. The two authors share the centrality of desire (πόθος) and good disposition (προαίρεσις), the confession of faith through martyrdom (ὁμολογία), the notion of ethical purification as part of martyrdom, hope (ἐλπίδα) as an ideal that transcends martyrdom, and also perseverance (ὑπομονή), a virtue exhibited by the martyrs. 51 Origen, Martyr. 2 and also 48. Cf. Mt 7:24–28.

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to God has been tested,52 and eventually God addresses them in the same way that he calls his Bride: “arise… the winter has passed”,53 the winter being those afflictions and wounds caused to the martyrs by the pagan persecutors. However, here Origen associates martyrdom to demonic activity, indicating that demons incite and feed the inhumane zeal of the human persecutors against the Christian martyrs.54 Therefore, it is discernible in Origen’s presentation of the martyrs, a close association between elements that Origen had introduced in his exegesis: namely, ethical trials, God’s proximity and providence and the activity of demons. Jesus, then, becomes an ethical example but only to the extent that the Christian martyrs have followed his own sacrifice and, in a sense, they have modelled their own sacrifice after his. The martyrs stand at the place of the priests in the Old Testament and offer their lives to God. Jesus is the High Priest who accepts the sacrifice of the martyrs and has been proclaimed the High Priest as he offers up his own life.55 Therefore, the martyrs follow the example of the true High Priest, they imitate Jesus and become priests and victims at the same time, as he does. As Jesus offered his life and now accepts the life of his martyrs, the martyrs are the subjects that do the offering and at the same time they are the objects of the sacrifice.56 As a result, they constitute an extension of Jesus’ own sacrifice throughout the ages and after the death of Jesus on the Cross, the martyrs have become the novel victims that renew his sacrifice through their martyrdom.57 Origen infuses his ethical theory with concepts and images drawn by the Eucharist and the offering of the body and blood of Christ in the Church. Therefore, by means of court trials and physical injuries, the martyrs become “mystical communicants” of Jesus’ passion, and they share in Jesus’ “cup” (Mt 20:22) which Origen takes as another word for the passion of Jesus. But also, they partake in the comfort that Jesus offered through the passion, since the bond between death and resurrection is unbreakable and unmissable: the martyrs take part in the passion of Jesus and it is only fitting that they also take part in his triumph, i.e. his resurrection. Origen proposes a “eucharistic” connection between

52 Origen brings into play the notion of gnosis. Through their trials, the martyrs demonstrate that they possess knowledge of the divine. In the next passage Origen turns to discuss idolatry and therefore strikes an interesting juxtaposition between the true knowledge that the martyrs exhibit and lapsing into idolatry which is characteristic of the unrighteous. Origen, Martyr. 31 and 32. 53 Song 2:10–11. 54 Origen, Martyr. 9 and 32. Origen sees the activity of persecutors in close association to the activity of demons that seek to deceit people to idolatry. The demons afflict the minds of the martyrs and suggest that the latter deny their faith. The persecutors are the puppets of demon. It should be noted that Origen sketches the spiritual itinerary of the Bride of the Song from idolatry and a distorted notion of the divine to the Christian faith. What seems to be at stake is the possibility of one lapsing back to idolatry. It needs to be noticed that idolatry, for Origen, referred to a distorted notion of the divine. Therefore, it is not clear whether Origen refers to demons as one’s internal thoughts of wickedness, or external factors that affect one’s mind. 55 Cf. Heb 7:27 and 10:12. 56 In fact, the martyrs are depicted by Origen as priests who stand in front of the sacrificial altar and offer their lives, an unmissible allusion to divine liturgy. 57 Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium Joannis, 6.54.280 [in SC 157, p. 342].

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Jesus and the martyrs, and he does not detail the way that Jesus and the martyrs might be sharing a common experience of God’s hiddenness. Such an idea could not have fitted within this distinctly eucharistic framework, in which Jesus fore-mostly stands as the High Priest that offers himself and at the same time receives the (eucharistic) sacrifice of the martyrs. Therefore, it could be argued that it is the image of the martyrs that emerged as the example that might shed light to one’s own experience of the “winter” of ethical trials, of following the “hard path” and of the comforts that should be received, even though a martyr’s triumph against those evil powers that seek to turn him against God has been possible because Jesus has already defeated such powers through his redemptive work. In his ethical discourses, Origen has introduced a rich vocabulary that highlights the virtues of “perseverance” (ὑπομονή), “confession” (ὁμολογία), and also “steadfastness” (προθυμία) that the martyrs whom he calls “athletes” (ἀθληταί), exhibit.58 They wage war against the “enemy of truth” (ἐχθρὸς τῆς ἀληθείας), a combat that as much a historical reference to the circumstances pertaining to the physical persecution of the Church in the third century ce, as it is a spiritual figure of speech that refers to the sinister spirits that seek to derail the martyrs from faith in God. Therefore, Origen has set forward several of the great currents of Christian spirituality.59 He presents two different accounts concerning spiritual progress: there is the unimpeded journey of the soul to the divine in the Commentary on the Song of Songs, but at the same time he introduces an interchange between moments of spiritual rest and periods of ethical combat that he sees as normative in Christian spirituality. However, rather than contrasting the two images, Origen presents them as complementary, since the former image emphasised the final union with God, whereas the latter describes the road that lies ahead until the eschatological fulfilment of the coming of the Kingdom of God. What unites the two theological moments is Origen’s consistency concerning the dialectics between divine proximity and withdrawal, the aetiology of divine withdrawal that does not necessarily involve the commitment of ethical sin, and the fact that God actively directs the Church to an eschatological spiritual fulfilment, since the final union between the soul and God is always “here but not yet”.60

Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony Two major developments took place in Church history not long after Origen’s death and, in many ways, the one could be viewed as sequential to the other: the era of the martyrs was followed by the pacification of the Church, a direct consequence of the shift in imperial policies towards a more favourable treatment of the Church

58 Origen, Martyr. 1. The martyrs undergo ethical trials and also physical temptations, they anticipate tribulations and maintain their hope that God will manifest “yet a little while”. Cf. Is 28:9 and Rom 5:3–5. 59 According to an expression by Hausherr (1937), 111–21 and 175–85. 60 Cheek (1979), 215 and Turner (1995).

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that was brought about when Constantine the Great remained the sole ruler of the Roman Empire. But the fourth century ce also saw a dramatic surge in the numbers of people who renounced life in the imperial cities and towns, and populated deserts and mountains in order to wage war against inner stirrings and external temptations. Amongst a number of reasons that have been suggested to explain the phenomenon of Christian monasticism in the fourth century ce is also “the desire of Christians for martyrdom when martyrdom, after Constantine’s final defeat of Licinius in 323 ce, had ceased to be a possibility”.61 Therefore, having presented how Origen viewed God’s proximity and hiddenness with regard to the Christian martyrs, it is only fitting to turn to the spiritual teachings of the new martyrs, as Christian ascetics in late antiquity came to view themselves from the outset of the monastic movement. Vita Antonii was composed by Athanasius of Alexandria and played an influential role on the emergence and development of Christian asceticism. Scholarship has questioned the Athanasian authorship of a work that relates the early years of Antony and the way that this man born in a village in Egypt interpreted Mt 19:21 literally and therefore decided to withdraw to the Egyptian desert where he fought against demons and having come out triumphant, he become a model ascetic whose example was followed by many. However, recent research has restored the biography of the Egyptian ascetic with some confidence among the genuine works of Athanasius.62 The question concerning the accuracy of the biographical details that feature in the work remains open and could never be settled given the fact that Athanasius depended on the literary genre of hellenistic biographies but also edited his material in such a way as to fit into his own theological and also political agenda.63 Therefore, Vita Antonii stands out as a landmark in Christian spirituality as it is the work that introduced a new literary genre, biography of a holy Christian person, that rose in popularity among early Christian ascetics in late antiquity, influenced the shaping of Christian ascetic discourses and, it should be noted, even shaded its pagan counterparts.64 However, the biography of Antony is not the only work that provides insights into the thought of one of the earliest and most influential Christian ascetics, since a collection of seven letters that have come to be known as the Letters of Antony allegedly do this. And though they have been subjected to scholarly scrutiny to establish their authorship and also authenticity, after exhaustive analysis by Rubenson there is 61 Louth (1981), 95. For the history of desert monasticism see Chitty (1966). Concerning the various reasons behind the origins of Christian monasticism see Burton-Christie (1993) though he mostly presents the way that monasticism was firmly anchored on Scripture. 62 See the introduction in the edition of the work by Bartelink (1994), 27ff and also Garitte (1942–1943) and (1956), 1–12. Louth (1988) examines elements of Athanasius’ theology in the text and Barnard (1974) exposes concisely external witnesses and also the various theories about the hellenistic precedents. Though there has been some debate about the exact date of the biography, the consensus is that it was composed at some time close when Athanasius penned Historia Arianorum. See Barnard (1974) and Brennan (1976). 63 For the political dimension of the work see Brakke (1995). 64 Fowden (1982) has directed academic research to the lives of the pagan men in late antiquity though he notes that they never “inspired the same reverence or fascinated horror” that early Christian ascetics did.

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little doubt that, on the grounds of internal and external evidence, all seven letters should be attributed to Antony.65 One point of contention that had cast considerable doubt on the authorship of the letters is the preponderance of themes that Origen had introduced and feature in the letters of a Coptic peasant whom Athanasius presents as illiterate. Rubenson addressed such concerns and established a firm relation between Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony based on common theological threads of thought, but also common elements concerning the personal character of Antony. For Rubenson, there is no doubt that the Origenist elements came from Antony and thinks that Athanasius’ claim that Antony was illiterate is over-simplistic and might be misleading. Athanasius illustrates Antony as a monk of no education who confronts pagan philosophers and adequately refutes his Arian interlocutors. However, even though Antony might have been illiterate, that does not mean that he had not come across some Origenist positions in the desert that he assimilated in his thought, given the fact that he was not the first to dwell in the Egyptian desert. Therefore, even though much has been done to establish a link between Origen’s thought and the early ascetic, the influence that Origen’s ethical theology had had on Athanasius remains mostly unaddressed and any reference has been limited to show the difference between a Platonic mysticism that presupposes a kinship between God and the soul, and the ontological gap between God and man that Athanasius has introduced in his theology.66 What I intend to do here is to discuss such Origenist elements in Athanasius’ Life of Antony and also the Letters of Antony in order to trace the continuity and discontinuity between Origen’s thought and the monastic ideals that emerged after the fourth century ce and always with reference to God’s proximity and withdrawal. Vita Antonii presents the way that Antony laid the foundations for desert asceticism. The ascetics become the new Christian martyrs that offer their lives to God and because Athanasius has been working on a classical vocabulary that also features in Paul, he shares in common with Origen the image of Antony as an “athlete” and “martyr” who manifests the veracity of his witness (μαρτυρία) by undergoing spiritual combat.67 Like the martyrs who fought against the evil powers of this-worldliness, i.e. those who impose imperial policies, Athanasius’ Antony faces fierce mental as well as physical attacks by sinister spirits and consequently shows that he possesses the virtues of steadfastness68 and perseverance.69 However, what lies at the heart of 65 Rubenson (1990), 35. After Rubenson it is accepted that Origenist ideas had been widely in circulation in the Egyptian deserts and that, after the letters of Antony, they proliferated amongst his followers. Casiday, for instance, has suggested that Evagrius of Pontus might have been taught several ascetic themes from monastics rather than the works of Origen. See Casiday (2021). 66 Louth (1981), 95–97 even though Louth indicates that the line between mystical and anti-mystical is not a clear one in later ascetic discourses but they develop side-by-side. 67 Gregg and Groh (1981), 133 think the way that Athanasius’ depiction of Antony emulates the “biblical presentations of the prophets, disciples, martyrs, and angels” but he also incorporates themes from the Greek-Roman era, like the image of Pythagoras from Apollonius of Tyana. Cf. Apollonius, Ἱστορίαι Θαυμάσιαι, 6.1. Quispel (1975), 98. 68 Athanasius, Vita, 5.1 [PG 26, 845] and 7.5 [PG 26, 852]. 69 Athanasius, Vita, 10.3 [PG 26, 860] and 51.2 [PG 26, 917].

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Athanasius’ account is Antony’s love for God, a love that makes Antony choose to face spiritual combat rather than enjoy the pleasures of life.70 Therefore, Vita Antonii pinpoints the transition from the era of the martyrs and confessors to that of the new martyrs, the Christian ascetics that populated the Egyptian desert. For Athanasius, Antony is the new martyr that pursues ethical purification. The setting where Antony conducts his spiritual warfare is not the imperial court, but the desert. Nor does Antony struggle to bring under control internal stirrings (passions), but he wages spiritual combat against the devil and demons who employ impure thoughts within Antony’s mind.71 Therefore, Athanasius presents an unsophisticated ethical discourse: the passions are not thought to be inner dispositions of the fractured soul, nor is the devil a concretised form, or an illusion, of one’s own psychopathology. The passions that Antony faces have been stirred from external stimuli and an external factor, i.e. demons, who are very much closely associated with the pagan gods.72 It is indicative that they only attack Antony when he intrudes their territory and decides to dwell in a tomb. Their intention, then, is to drag Antony away from the territory and to do this at first they affect his thoughts73 and then his body.74 When everything they have tried fails, they assume bodily forms and attack him physically therefore leaving him half-dead.75 This incident is followed by another event that divides Athanasius’ narrative into two parts: before and after. Having been wounded nearly to death by demons, Antony experiences God’s proximity in light.76 There are unmissable parallels between Athanasius’ account of a manifestation that signifies divine proximity and similar accounts in Philo, Plotinus and Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus which seem to revise the personal account of Plato in his Seventh Letter.77 The most important

70 Athanasius, Vita, 9.3 [PG 26, 856] and 14.6 [PG 26, 865]. 71 Stewart (2005) examines the demonology in Vita Antonii as standing somewhere in the middle between Origen and Evagrius and indicates the importance of how logismoi function in Athanasius’ work and also the Letters. Casiday (2021) commends him for this, even though he holds some reservations about the “shift in emphasis to a psychological pathology” that Stewart sees in Origen. 72 The Stoics had defined passions as wrong judgements of reason. For Clement, passions are excessive motions of the irrational part of the soul that are not subservient to the rational part and therefore are irrational and closely associated to the way the body and the senses function. Clement, Stromata, 2.13.59. For the Stoics and also Clement’s ethical theory see Lilla (1971), 60–117. In Athanasius, one gets a glimpse of associations that developed later in ascetic spirituality concerning demons and the irrational motions of the soul. Dodds (1971) has presented the philosophical background of the Christian ideas. And Brakke (2006) has provided an exhaustive account of how early ascetics perceived the demonic. Also, he includes a chapter dealing with the case of Antony whom he calls “The new martyr and holy man”. 73 Athanasius, Vita, 5.2 [PG 26. 848]. 74 Athanasius, Vita, 5.4 [PG 26. 848]. 75 Athanasius, Vita, 8.2 [PG 26. 856]. 76 Athanasius, Vita, 10.1–4 [PG 26, 860]. The literal analysis of the scene could indicate that the divine intervention echoes the device deus ex machina in Greek theatre of the classical era. For Anatolios, the importance of the scene has been highlighted by the fact that Athanasius informs the reader about Antony’s age at that time. Anatolios (1998), 184. 77 Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c.

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motifs that appear in all accounts are the unexpectedness of the manifestation and the presence of light. In Philo, the ascetic (ἀσκητής) is in pursuit of divine wisdom and the latter would suddenly appear to him after much pain and efforts78 in the form of (incorporeal?) light.79 Both Plotinus and Porphyry had provided similar accounts concerning a sudden illumination of their intellect.80 In Vita, Antony is attacked by demons, but in a dramatic turn of events, a ray of light suddenly descends upon the ascetic81 who immediately feels the alleviation of his bodily pain, whereas the demons are scared off and vanish. Antony “breathes again”, a sign of his revival and immediately identifies this light with God’s proximity as it becomes clear from the question that he addresses to the apparition “where were you” (ποῦ ἦς), a question that shows familiarity between the ascetic and the apparition. A closer look at the incident shows that some Origenist themes might be still at play. Though Antony suffers bodily afflictions, he has remained watchful (γρηγορῶν, νήφων). In response to demonic assaults who conduct their war at first through Antony’s thoughts and then his body, the ascetic is fasting,82 and notwithstanding all the afflictions that he has suffered, he remains deep in prayer. Exhortatio ad Martyrium contains Origen’s instructions to potential martyrs who are reminded to endure in their trials and points to the fact that comfort has been at hand. But commend yourselves ‘in every way as the ministers of God’: through great ‘endurance’, saying, ‘And now, what is my endurance? Is it not the Lord?’; in ‘afflictions’, persuaded that ‘many are the afflictions of the righteous’; in ‘necessities’, so that we may ask for the blessedness necessary for us; in ‘difficult straits’, so that by travelling steadily on the straitened and narrow path we may arrive at life. If it is necessary, let us commend ourselves also ‘in beatings, imprisonments, tumults, labours, watching, and fasting’. For behold, the Lord is here, and His reward is in His hand to give to each according to his works.83 Origen borrows his vocabulary from the Pauline exhortation to show endurance in trials and sufferings. For Origen, this is the way of the martyr: to suffer “beatings”, “tumults”, “efforts”, but also show “vigilance” and be “fasting”. For every affliction that befalls, Origen provides a corresponding scriptural quotation in order to strengthen the martyrs-to-be. Athanasius does something similar. The new martyr perseveres and does not succumb to demonic suggestions, despite the terrible trials that he has

78 Philo, Quod Deus est Immutabilis, 93. 79 Unquestionably, the influence of Plato on Philo might be evident, cf. Plato, Respublica, 515c4ff; Seventh Letter, 341c, Parmenides, 156d2 and Symposium, 210e1 but one should not overlook the increasing significance of light with respect to divine revelation in post-temple and apocryphal Judaism. McGinn (1991), 14 notes that the destruction of the Temple, in a sense the only tangible element of God’s proximity to Israel till then, is the reason why late Judaism introduced the idea of a direct and unmediated experience of the divine through personal visions and apparitions. 80 Porphyry, Vita Plotini, 13. Plotinus, Enneads, 5.3.17. 81 Cf. Ps 117:7. Athanasius, Vita, 6.4 [PG 26, 860]. 82 Athanasius, Vita, 9.8 [PG 26, 857]. 83 Origen, Martyr. 42 [my italics].

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to suffer. In order to maintain his steadfastness Antony fasts and remains vigilant, and even recites several biblical passages that acknowledge that God’s assistance is at hand. Each passage comes after another demonic attack.84 The biographical account provided by Athanasius shows further remarkable closeness to Origen’s exhortation to martyrdom: Antony experiences what Origen had promised to all potential martyrs of his time, that God will manifest eventually his proximity. God draws near to his martyr, calls at him and offers his reward: “Antony, I was here” (Ἀντώνιε, ὧδε ἤμην) an expression without any precedent in philosophy and the only possible allusion to Scripture could be Is 52:6 and this is only because of the presence of the verb ‘to be’ (εἰμί). However, both Origen and Athanasius present the outcome as dependent on the athlesis of the ascetic: God does not intervene before he has observed Antony’s perseverance and faith and, consequently, he offers Antony his reward. The account that introduces God’s proximity states that Antony has “felt the assistance”85 of God and at the same time deliverance has been brought upon him from his physical agony and also the demonic presence. The two points are interrelated and it is clear that the identity of the apparition has brought this deliverance and at the same time it is implied that the fact that he felt revived informed Antony about the identity of his interlocutor. Athanasius has masterly highlighted this point by noting that when the adversary powers attacked Antony, he had to inquire about their identity, “who are you that you talk to me like that? – I am the friend of fornication”.86 The experience of God’s proximity is immediate and does not depend on any intermediaries, hence the lack of a biblical greeting or even warning, such as “rejoice” or “do not be alarmed”.87 On the other hand, the alleviation of pain suggests that the experience has not taken place merely at an intellectual level in a Platonic fashion. The participle “αἰσθόμενος” which predicates “ἀντίληψις” could not be accidental, since it is a participle that refers to the senses and seems to serve Athanasius’ intention to argue the reality of the apparition. Origen had favoured the notion of spiritual sense (αἴσθησις)88 and Athanasius employs the participle αἰσθανόμενος to infer that God’s proximity has been felt at the level of Antony’s bodily senses and therefore oppose a strict intellectualism. Behind these lines, Athanasius might have been refuting a Platonic perception of the union between God and man, a point which is congruent with the overall theology of Athanasius: everything takes place at the level of the bodily senses and therefore it should be assumed that Antony saw the light with his

84 Ps 117:7. 1 Kgs 18:15. Phil 3:13. Once more, it should be noted that ethical combat takes place against an external factor and there is no indication that Antony has been fighting with his personal inner demons as modern psychology might have put it. 85 Athanasius, Vita, 10.2 [PG 26, 860]: “αἰσθόμενος τῆς ἀντιλήψεως”. 86 Athanasius, Vita, 6.2 [PG 26, 849]. 87 Lk 1:28 and Mk 16:6. 88 Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, 1.48.27 and 7.39.44; Fragmenta in Evangelium Joannis (in catenis), 20.1 [in GCS 10]; Fragmenta in Lucam (in catenis), 186.44 [in GCS 49, p. 306]. For Clement, faith begins at the level of the senses and is progressively transformed into divine knowledge. For Clement’s teaching on divine knowledge and the role of the senses see Hägg (2006).

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own eyes and felt bodily relief, on the same way that Christ assumed true humanity and experiences truly human weakness. The short dialogue between the ascetic and his interlocutor introduces the dialectic between God’s proximity and absence. It is Antony’s question that shows that the ascetic experienced divine abandonment and had been left on his own, but at the same time the apparition itself signifies God’s presence. Surprisingly, there is no allusion to Scripture and unlike Scripture, including Ps 22. At first, Antony does not inquire about the reason “why”, but wishes immediately to know “where” God’s presence had been.89 Then, he asks about the reasons and therefore the second part of his question resembles a number of lamentation psalms. Immediately, God indicates that his withdrawal does not signify his absence, since he has been present all along but he postponed his intervention. This motif appears in Origen and it was mentioned that it could be traced back to Ezekiel. Therefore, Athanasius has presented a unique scene in religious literature, but that does not mean that he has been inventing a new narrative, since there are several elements with whom his reader would have been familiar and attest to Athanasius’ theological pedigree. Athanasius infers that there has never been any spatial distance between God and the ascetic and therefore returns to the biblical notion of God’s assistance: Antony experienced God’s withdrawal, not absence, when God holds back and does not intervene to defend him. In the case of the martyrs Origen had alluded, very loosely, to Is 52:6 and 65:24, since he maintains the verb ‘to be’ (εἰμί) and also introduces the verb ‘behold’ (ἰδού): “Behold, here am I”.90 As it concerns the first half of the response by God, if Athanasius had in mind any biblical verse, then he alludes to it equally as freely. However, there is a strong similarity between the response in Origen and Athanasius: the answer is quick, it includes some form of the verb ‘to be’ and also the adverb of space, ‘here’. Antony has been called by his own name and this might be an indication that Athanasius implies a connection between Antony and those charismatic figures in the Old Testament whom God addresses by their own name (Ex 3:4 and 1 Kgs 3:4). Might it be the case that Athanasius paraphrases the response that he found in Origen? Though Athanasius cites from Scripture extensively in Vita Antonii,91 it would be bizarre to assume that at the climax of Antony’s temptations, when God’s withdrawal turns to God’s proximity at the pinnacle of his encounter with God, Athanasius could not think of a any passage from Scripture. Most likely, then, we

89 The only parallel text seems to be Job 38:4 but in this case the roles have changed and it is Antony who asks God where he has been. Rather than an inquiry or even glorification after the fashion of the Psalms, Antony’s address was that of a lover that is waiting for his beloved: “where have you been? Why did you not…”? Cf. Ps 9:22. 90 O’Meara suggests cross-references to Is 40:10 and 60:11 because both passages proclaim the presence of the Lord and the rewards that he brings to the soul. However, it is more likely that Origen had in mind Is 52:6 and 65:24 as Lawson suggests in Hom. 1.2.269. Cf. Origen, Orat. 10.1. The author of Selecta in Psalmos, PG 12, 1121 [Ps 3:2] cites from Isaiah. If it is truly a spurious work, then the author must have been familiar with Origen’s thought. 91 One look at the index of scriptural citations would suffice to demonstrate this point in the edition of Vita Antonii for Sources Chretiennes (SC 400).

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should either assume that the form of the answer by God, as it stands, advocates the authenticity of the voice that Antony heard and Athanasius recorded, or accept the fact that even if Athanasius actually has borrowed it from Origen, or any other source for that matter, he chose to disguise the original text. The second part of the response of God alludes in a loose way to Jesus’ final promise to his disciples about his everlasting presence (Mt 28:20) and also the promise of God to Abraham about the blessing of the latter’s name (Gen 12:2), an allusion that mostly depends on the meaning of the clauses and not their actual grammatical form. Another point that shows an affiliation between Origen and Athanasius is the aftermath of the manifestation of God’s proximity: after Antony saw the light that shone over him, he was never confronted by demons any more and he appears to be utterly victorious over his sinister adversaries. That means that the reader no longer reads about logismoi or passions that afflict him, and the fierce wrath of the devil ceases.92 Athanasius presents Antony as emerging from this experience instructed in God’s mysteries (μυσταγωγούμενος) and a God-bearing man (θεοφορούμενος),93 whose journey to God is unhindered from any demonic opposition. In this sense, Antony looks like the Bride of the Song and brings to mind the passage in which Origen praises the perfection of the martyrs who have conquered the adversary powers once and for all. However, this is not to say that Athanasius had been following subserviently ideas that circulated amongst the followers of Origen, since the reason why Antony could never again experience God’s withdrawal lies on the centrality of the incarnation in Athanasius’ thought, which is to say that Athanasius’ ethical theory has been firmly anchored on Christology and the redemptive work of Christ.94 And even if Origen had indicated that the martyrs destroy the snares that the adversary has laid down due to the incarnation, there will always be some uncertainty about the actual significance of such a statement due to the speculative elements in Origen’s Christology. It is Athanasius, then, who has been credited with the introduction of an undeniable association in the most vigorous terms between spirituality and the incarnation, since he has introduced an ontological gap between God and man that only God could have bridged. Athanasius stresses the fact that a synergy develops between God and man, a synergy that is discernible and at work as much in the incarnation as it is in Antony’s life:95 God’s power has taken a physical form in Jesus due to the incarnation

92 Even creatures that are considered to be harmful (such as reptiles) flee at the presence of Antony, Athanasius, Vita, 12.4 [PG 26, 861] and 13.1–2 [861–64] an image that might serve as an allusion to a previous attack by the demons in the form of reptiles in Vita, 9.5 [857]. 93 Athanasius, Vita, 14.2 [PG 26, 864]. 94 About the centrality of synergy in Athanasius’ system see Anatolios (1998), 177 and also Rubenson (1990). Anatolios addresses modern criticism about the meaning of synergy in Athanasius’ thought, and specifically in Vita Antonii. Anatolios supports that Athanasius viewed synergy depending equally on both parts: God bestow his grace, but the ascetic needs to respond. Therefore, the acquisition of divine grace is not only a matter of human volition, but requires an interaction between God and man. See also Gregg and Groh (1981), 133. 95 Anatolios (1998), 183.

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and has been passed to his disciples who become recipients of such grace. Antony, as a God-bearing man, also receives such a divine power, which is another word for God’s proximity and has been at work from within Antony (cf. 1 Cor 15:10), a direct result of the incarnation of Christ.96 In such a scheme of synergy it is only reasonable to picture Antony engaged in prayer and vigilant, therefore fulfilling his own part of the bargain. If Origen had viewed the incarnation in terms of the soul’s conversion from idolatry and the worship of false deities to faith in God, Athanasius has corrected this view by stressing the beneficial outcome of the incarnation in more concrete terms: the incarnation of Christ has transformed humanity. Therefore, if Origen had given a distinctly eschatological overtone to his thought and therefore maintained the tension between the Kingdom of God within and the Kingdom of God yet to come, for Athanasius who was striving against gnosticism and also Arianism, the outcome of the incarnation could be irrevocable: the recipients of divine grace have already defeated death and the adversary powers, a point that is signified by the fact that Antony merges from a tomb having not suffered bodily decay and having defeated his enemies.97 For Athanasius, Antony was a “receiver of God” (θεοδόχος),98 because Jesus had already trampled down death and the devil in his own flesh.99 Athanasius composed his work at a time when a platonic interpretation of the union between God and man was possible, and most likely widely accepted by many, an approach that diminished the importance of the incarnation and favoured a philosophical intellectualism: the union between God and man takes place at an intellectual level due to the kinship between the divine and human nous. Athanasius seems to refute such an approach by stressing the ethical importance of the incarnation and promoting a position that Irenæus had already introduced with regard to the participation of both body and mind in deification.100 Rather than a “bodiless” man who flies to the divine, Antony is a “God-bearing” man. As a result, Athanasius seems to lose sight of the eschatological dimension that Origen had established and therefore he overlooks altogether the dialectics between God’s proximity and withdrawal, since Antony has been already experiencing the transformation of humanity in this life, a direct outcome of Christ’s incarnation. When reading Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony in parallel one is struck by the different image that they draw of Antony and the different intellectual framework that they seem to presuppose.101 If Athanasius shares some common with Origen in his biography, this is so in implicit terms. On the other hand, the Letters openly presuppose a more sophisticated cosmology and anthropology that has been usually

96 Athanasius, Vita, 40.6 [PG 26, 901]. 97 Athanasius, Vita, 14.1 [PG 26, 864–65]. 98 For Gregg and Groh bears an anti-Arian undertone, since it discerns between the Logos and men and therefore refutes the Arian position that Christians could enjoy the same relation with the Father as the Son does. Gregg and Groh (1981), 147. 99 Athanasius, Vita, 5.7 [PG 26, 849]. 100 About the participation of the body in Christian theology of late antiquity see Otis (2004). 101 Rubenson has examined the place of the Letters in the genre of early desert spirituality and also Origenism. See the extensive introduction in Rubenson (1990).

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attributed to Origen. This is the reason why scholars had questioned the authenticity of the Letters and the likelihood that an illiterate Copt could have held such complex theological positions.102 But the world view of Antony as Athanasius sketches it, is not as simple as it might sound. There are long discourses in which Antony exposes complex ideas such as the origin of demons and also, according to the biographical account, he displayed sufficient knowledge to confront pagans and Arians alike.103 And even if Antony had not received encyclical education that does not mean that he had embraced certain ideas that must have circulated in Egypt, nor that he interacted with people that bore such ideas, Athanasius being one of them nor that might have dictated his letters to an educated disciple who acted like a scribe. Behind short stories and sayings that are attributed to Antony, Rubenson discerns some Origenist elements that suffice to put under question the extent of Antony’s illiteracy. However, it is also undeniable that the Antony of the Letters is not the victorious conqueror of passions, since Antony returns time and again to the likelihood that sin might cause an ethical fall. Here, it is pride that stirs the rational creatures and turns the mind away from contemplation of the divine. There are minds that have fallen and according to the extent of their fall, they have turned into angels, men and demons.104 Antony displays utter pessimism when he claims that the “great wound” of fallen humanity is incapable of healing, since sin leads one to forget that human nature is actually an “intellectual substance”.105 Therefore, it is only the advent of Jesus through which people could be redeemed. Overall, Antony seems to borrow images and a set of vocabulary that comes from the cosmology of Origen. Antony even employs an idea found in Origen that time is a temporal dimension that has become the stage on which God’s pedagogy is at work in order to return the world from sin. And as part of this pedagogy, God visits people in many forms, which Antony calls ‘visitations’; a term peculiar to Origen that implies that God, in a sense, meets up with humanity but only for a limited time: Truly, my beloved in the Lord, not at one time only did God visit His creatures; but from the foundations of the world, whenever any have come to the Creator of all by the law of His covenant implanted in them, God is present with each one of these in His bounty and grace by His spirit.106 God’s visitations signify his proximity to the world. Despite the fact that people have turned away from God, God manifests his proximity to the world in various ways: at first the presence of the immanent natural law, then the example of charismatic figures in the Old Testament such as Moses and the Prophets. That the natural law is a means of divine proximity had been argued by Clement of Alexandria who employed it in order to show how God could have enlightened even the Greek philosophers of old,

102 103 104 105 106

Athanasius, Vita, 1.1 [PG 26, 841]. Athanasius, Vita, 68.2 [941]. Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pp. 20 and 23]. Antony, Lettrs. 2 [pp. 6-7] and 3 [p. 9]. Antony, Lettrs. 2 [p. 6].

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and Antony uses it to stress that God has been at work at various levels (natural and supernatural). Most importantly, Antony retrieves the dialectics of God’s proximity and withdrawal, since God manifests his presence throughout the history of the world but he still remains withdrawn, as it is evident by the fact that Moses or the Prophets, who stand for God’s presence, had been incapable of healing the human wound.107 Therefore, God hides until the next time that he manifests himself through another medium. The reason for this dialectic is human sin: God withdraws when men turn away from him. The incarnation is the next medium through which God seeks to heal human sin, and Antony understands redemption in an origenist fashion, a return from ignorance to knowledge of God, but indicates that even after the incarnation perfection is a state postponed for the future: For as many as are set free by His dispensation, are called the servants of God. And this is not yet perfection, but in its own time it is righteousness and it leads to the adoption of sons.108 Therefore, not only does Antony restores the dialectics between God’s presence and withdrawal, but he supplements this with a strong eschatological orientation. The expression “not yet” indicates the temporal relativity of the experience of perfection, because even the advent of Jesus has not brought irrevocable perfection. The disciples of Jesus have moved to the state of being adopted, and even though they were servants now they have become sons. But this has been realised through the coming forth of the Holy Spirit. It could be concluded, then, that the incarnation plays an important but also limited role in Antony’s thought, since it stands as one more event in a line of events that manifest God’s proximity to people, even though righteousness and perfection will be granted “in its own time”. Therefore, Antony distinguishes between perfection in this present life and eschatological perfection.109 This strong eschatological orientation of the Letters is highlighted by the fact that Antony anticipates the likelihood that one might relapse from perfection to vice which only makes sense if Antony presupposes a cosmology similar to that of Origen.110 The soul has turned away from its original blessedness due to pride, “the beginning of their motion is the pride which came at the first”,111 and Antony defined pride as one’s estrangement from God and the virtues.112 Therefore, Antony exhorts his disciples:

107 Antony, Lettrs. 5 [pp. 14–15]. 108 Antony, Lettrs. 2 [p. 6]. 109 Antony teaches that the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is not perfection, but should be supplemented with man’s taking up spiritual warfare. Anton. Lettrs. 2 [p. 7]. 110 Origen, Princ. 3.1.12. The Letters present an escalation in ethical temptations that bear close resemblance to the scheme of Athanasius: first, the ascetic should anticipate natural motions of the body. In this case, the passions are regulated by the soul. Then, passions arise due to an abuse of natural needs, such as hunger and thirst. Finally, temptations are associated with the envy that demons have developed for all people. Cf. Antony, Lettrs. 1 [pp. 2–3]. 111 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [p. 23]. 112 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pp. 22–23].

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[I] want you to know that there are many who have pursued asceticism throughout their life, but lack of discernment killed them… if you neglect yourselves and do not discern your works, that you should fall into the hands of the devil, when you think you are near to God, and that in your expectation of the light, darkness should overtake you.113 Antony urges his disciples that they remain vigilant and work on discernment of thoughts, elements that feature in Origen as well as Athanasius. However, the centrality of pride, in a sense the generator of all evils, and also the fact that Antony warns that no-one is ever safe, ethically speaking, shows that the Letters are firmly anchored in a tradition that significantly departs from Athanasius’ thought and anticipates such discourses about pride and ethical backsliding that feature in the Lausiac History (cf. Paphnutius) and the Sayings of the Desert Fathers. On the other hand, it should be reminded that Origen had noted that combat against the adversary powers and ethical trials should be expected at any level of spiritual progress and Antony argues as much.114 Antony’s letters are simple in other ways, such as the lack of a full exposition of how God’s withdrawal affects the ascetics at a psychological level. However, Antony is addressing ascetics who would have come across spiritual afflictions at any turn of their spiritual journey and at the same time, they should have noted at likelihood that one takes steps backwards. Then, it does not seem unfitting or even unlikely that Antony would have adopted the image of an embodied soul in order to warn his fellow ascetics against spiritual laxity and to exhort them to stay vigilant. In order to instruct his fellow ascetics to maintain their vigilance, on the one hand Antony returns time and again to the notion of pride and, on the other hand, he postpones spiritual rest at an indefinite time in the future, like Origen who had referred to future hope. According to Antony, “[w]ho ever saw God, to rejoice with Him and retain Him with himself, so that God should not leave him, but help him while he dwells in this heavy body”?115 Antony dismisses the idea that God could remain united with anyone in this present life and therefore, once more, he infers this dialectic between God’s proximity and withdrawal, which he expresses through the image of initial visitations and subsequent separation. The ascetics should anticipate periods when God draws near and times when he withdraws. Therefore, one concludes that spiritual perfection as Athanasius would have described it has been reserved for the future. To sum up, in the work of Athanasius one might discern certain elements that could support that Athanasius composed his Vita within a milieu that had been influenced by Origen’s thought even when it did not acknowledge it. Athanasius intended to display Antony as the new martyr that has become a model of ethical integrity. In chapters 5.1–14.1 Athanasius describes the spiritual combat that Antony conducted and highlights his achievements and his sanctity, which he anchors on a specific theory concerning the incarnation and Christ’s redemptive work. Athanasius 113 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pp. 22–23]. 114 Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.1.12. 115 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [p. 20].

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describes the way that Antony rose to fame because of the way that he faced ethical afflictions and the fact that he emerged victorious. In this context, God has tried the faith and perseverance of the new martyr by withdrawing his protection, a protection that he fully restores once Antony manifests his faith. Therefore, Antony experiences God’s proximity and enjoys the fruits of his virtue.116 In his Letters, Antony addressed an entirely different audience than Athanasius, and in a totally different theological framework. Unlike the genre of biographies whose intention is to inspire, establish a role-model and also, given Athanasius’ doctrinal struggles, to argue the reality and efficacy of the incarnation, Antony’s Letter included instructions to ascetics that, it should be assumed, had been conducting spiritual combat in the desert. It is interesting that what keeps the two pieces of work apart also differentiates between Origen in the Commentary on the Song of Songs and Origen in the Exhortatio ad Martyrium: Antony instructs the ascetics to remain vigilant and therefore gives centre stage to the notion of sin and also the future hope or inheritance.117 Therefore, Antony teaches that divine assistance is at hand, but at the same time he warns against ethical laxity. On the other hand, Athanasius presents ethical life within a grand scheme of synergism, between God and man which has been the direct outcome of the incarnation. Whereas Antony directs the attention of the ascetics to an eschatological time, when they shall enjoy fully the fruits of their struggles, Athanasius loses sight of this orientation and focuses on the present. It is not accidental that the ascetics that we shall come across in the next chapters depart from Athanasius’ viewpoint and embrace the reality that Antony describes in his letters. Therefore, it is likely that the dialectics between God’s presence and withdrawal in the Antony of the Letters might be evidence to an indirect influence of Origen, or it might be due to an ‘ascetic realism’ as it was experienced in the Egyptian desert and affirmed the fact that ethical backsliding is possible.

Divine Abandonment in Ascetic Sources after Antony Causes and Kinds of Divine Abandonment

The Lausiac History is part of a body of literature that was composed within an ascetic milieu that had been inspired and, in many ways, shaped by the ideals that Origen, Athanasius and Antony had put forward, and contains the lives and opinions of ascetics that Palladius, the author of the Lausiac History, had met in person. In one episode, Palladius recounts how Evagrius, Albanius and himself visited a prominent ascetic, Abba Paphnutius, and, as it was customary, they put forward a question regarding spiritual combat and they expect Abba Paphnutius’ response, so that they could be instructed and profit from their visit to him.118 The three visitors relate to Abba

116 Cf. Origen, Homiliae in Job (in catenis), 19 [PG 12, 1032]. 117 Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.1.12. 118 Palladius, Laus. 47.

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Paphnutius the stories of five ascetics who have faced severe misfortunes, and then ask for Paphnutius’ opinion about the reason behind the spiritual hardships that the five ascetics have suffered. Within the course of his brief answer, Abba Paphnutius introduces the notion of God’s abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψις). Palladius mentions the names of the ascetics that have turned to sinfulness, but he does not provide at this point more details about their spiritual adventures. However, the accounts of the lives of Valens, Heron, Ptolemy, Stephen and Eucarpios have been preserved elsewhere in the Lausiac History and the episodes of their lives feature common elements: they conduct spiritual struggle, they are deceived by demons who proclaim to the ascetics that they have reached spiritual perfection, they are confronted with the ascetic community and they either repent or they perish in sinfulness. Driscoll who has presented an exhaustive examination of Paphnutius’ teaching as it has been preserved by Palladius, notes that Abba Paphutius has been presented with the ethical fall of “very accomplished” ascetics, and therefore the question of his visitors does not relate to the phenomenon of misfortunes in general, but it addresses the phenomenon that monks who have progressed spiritually might backslide.119 The core of the question of the three visitors and also the gist of the five stories that Palladius relates bear a remarkable similarity to several points in Antony’s Letters and also a story that has been preserved under the name of Antony in the collection of short sayings and acts of early ascetics in Egypt that bears the title Apophthegmata Patrum, although it should be noted that Antony does not refer to divine abandonment. In his Letters Antony had taught that it is very likely that an ascetic might have struggled all his life but a lack of discernment might lead him to perdition.120 In the Apophthegmata Patrum Antony laments the moral fall to sinfulness of an eminent monk, whom he does not name but dubs him a “great pillar of the Church”, a fall that followed a remarkable initial progress to spiritual life. The account implies that the moral failure of the monk had been foreseen by Antony, because the seasoned ascetic had anticipated that the progress that the monk had accomplished would become the reason for his fall.121 After hearing the story of the five monks, Abba Paphnutius presents a short discourse concerning the reasons why those who have advanced spiritually might experience a return to sinfulness. Driscoll comments on the suggestion of Guillaumont that the discourse of Abba Paphnutius could not have been authentic, but it has been devised by Palladius in order to introduce in his work a short digression concerning 119 Palladius, Laus. 47.5. 120 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [p. 23]. 121 Apophth. (SysC), 8.1. There is remarkable consistency between the story in the Apophthegmata Patrum and the instructions of Antony in the Letters concerning the possibility of sinfulness even at more ethically advanced levels. In his sixth letter Antony writes: “[I] want you to know that there are many who have pursued asceticism throughout their life, but lack of discernment killed them… if you neglect yourselves and do not discern your works, then you will fall into the hands of the devil, when you think you are near to God, and that in your expectation of the light, darkness will overtake you”. Antony, Lettrs. 6 [p. 23]. According to the story in Apophthegmata Patrum, Antony sends his disciples to the cell of the monk as he anticipates his moral fall, and they find the ascetic lamenting and imploring God to be granted ten more days to repent, but he dies after five days and the story does not indicate if his repentance has been accepted by God.

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the causes of divine abandonment that drew heavily on the work of Evagrius of Pontus, Gnostikos that features a chapter concerning reasons of ethical backsliding. However, the story that Antony relates about the “great pillar of the Church” and also his instructions in the Letters show that the desert ascetics might have been genuinely concerned about the phenomenon of spiritual backsliding even before Evagrius’ time and that they might have formed some opinions that had been circulating in monastic establishments in the desert. Antony’s story does not include a possible answer to the actual reason why monks could fall to sinfulness, but the fact that the story is part of one of the editions of the Apophthegmata Patrum called the Systematic Collection, featuring under the title of pride, is enough evidence that the compiler of the work had been concerned about the effect that pride could have on one’s spiritual life.122 In conclusion, it seems absurd to deny the authenticity of a dialogue that seems to pertain to genuine experiences of the desert fathers.123 Most importantly, it should be noted in advance that Driscoll and Guillaumont overlook the fact that, if the discourse of Paphnutius had been modelled after one’s work, more likely this should be Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, not Evagrius, Gnostikos. The fact that both academics depend the authenticity of the discourse exclusively on the extent that Evagrius had been an influence on Palladius has made them overlook the stunning parallels between Paphnutius and Nemesius.124 Abba Paphnutius provides an introduction concerning the causes (λόγος) behind all events. This part of Paphnutius’ answer bears significant similarities to Origen’s thought, since the ascetic discerns between those events that occur according to divine pleasure (εὐδοκία) and those that are due to God’s consent (συγχώρησις).125 Paphnutius omitted another group of events that occur according to divine will (κατὰ βούλησιν) and it seems this is so because the distinction between divine will and pleasure seems too obscure to conceive. Therefore, Paphnutius seems to have merged the two concepts into one, divine pleasure, and as a result he avoids the implication that divine pleasure could be different from divine will.

122 The story appears under the title: “That nothing should be accomplished to show off ”. Other stories that also feature in it share in common how vanity and pride might hinder spiritual progress, and in one of them, Abba Isaiah teaches that pride is the mother of all sin. Cf. Apophth. (SysC), 8.6. 123 Driscoll (1997), 259–86 has examined the doubts that Guillaumont (1989), 141–42 expressed about the genuineness of the dialogue, as Guillaumont thought it is most likely that Palladius put into the mouth of Paphnutius a discourse of Evagrian pedigree. Merely the fact that Guillaumont made cross-reference to Palladius in the edition of the Gnostikos is evidence of the association he supported between Evagrius and Palladius. As far as I am aware, Driscoll (1997) is the only extensive academic work on the subject, since he addresses the possible connection between Paphnutius’ discourse and Evagrian ethical theory and also provides an examination of Evagrius’ teaching about divine abandonment. 124 Nemesius, Natur. 42. 125 Origen, Fragmenta in Lucam (in catenis), 192.18 [in GCS 49, p. 309]. See also Suda, Lexicon, Γ.271 and Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pp. 100–03]. Driscoll (1997) and Guillaumont (1987) have not traced the twofold distinction back to Origen, because they focus on the Evagrian elements in Palladius and therefore they overlook any loans from other patristric sources, such as Origen, Nemesius and even Didymus the Blind.

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Everything that happens which is in accordance with virtue and the glory of God happens by His will. Now, on the other hand, things harmful and dangerous, accidents and falls, these occur with God’s consent.126 For the desert ascetic, any event whose outcome is the glorification of God should be viewed as occurring according to divine pleasure, and any event that results to perilous conditions, ethically speaking, should be attributed to God’s consent. In general, the term συγχώρησις signifies forgiveness, but in the desert tradition it also means ‘to give consent’ and therefore stresses the notion that ethical misfortunes and temptations should be viewed as part of divine pedagogy.127 In other words, everything that happens and pertains to virtue and the glory of God is due to God’s will, whereas things harmful and dangerous occur only because God has given his consent due to God’s pedagogy.128 Paphnutius, then, has stirred his speech from the causes of events to their actual outcomes, but the gist behind this distinction is that God is the primary agent that either acts or gives his consent. Either due to divine pleasure or consent, all events in human life originate from God’s agency, which is another word for God’s providence.129 Therefore, Abba Paphnutius turns a question concerning ethical life to a matter of cosmology and the way God acts upon the world.130 Clement of Alexandria had already presented God’s providence as the manifestation of God in creation, in giving the Law and in directing his creation.131 Scheffczyk remarks that, for Clement: “[t]he Logos who is the source of the world’s being also trains, instructs and redeems mankind; is the providence which leads us to our perfection”.132 In such a scheme, human history only makes sense in terms of God’s pedagogy and the way that he directs the world so us to redeem the fallen creation.133 From the cosmological concept of God as creator, Clement draws his conclusions about ethical life and the role of God as provider and redeemer of the world. It is safe to assume, then, that in the spiritual tradition of the desert, the term ‘consent’ does not stress the psychological effect of experiencing God’s withdrawal,

126 Palladius, Laus. 47.5. 127 Apophth. (AnC), 67.35 (the devil appears in physical form after God’s consent); Apophth. (SysC), 9.24 (a monk understands that God abandoned him after he had castigated another monk). For an overview of the use of the verb συγχωρῶ in patristic sources see Lampe (1961). 128 Palladius, Laus. 47.5. 129 For an earlier refutation of Epicureans, Stoics and Aristotelians by Clement of Alexandria with regard to divine providence, see Lilla (1971). Also, Origen, Princ. 2.11.5; Contra Celsum, 7.68: Origen distinguishes between actions according to divine providence and actions according to God’s consent. 130 Thinkers in late antiquity had been immensely concerned with the question of divine providence and it seems that Nemesius addresses some of these concerns. For an overview of the neoplatonic approach within context see Armstrong (1940), 102–05, Rist (1967), 38–52, Parma, (1977). 131 It might be apparent in Christian Scripture that God directs the world, but Clement employs the connections that Philo had drawn between the role of the Logos and divine providence as well as neo-Platonic concepts. 132 Scheffczyk (1970), 76 refers to the lost work of Clement On Providence, which survives only in fragments. 133 See Koch (1932) and Scheffczyk (1970), 77–80.

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but points to the fact that God remains in proximity, and therefore it also infers that the ascetics did not perceive abandonment as a spatial distance or a gap that suddenly opens up between God and man. It is in the work of a Christian author about whom we hardly know anything apart from the fact that he was a bishop in Emesa, Syria in the fourth century ce and that his name was Nemesius, that one finds an extensive discourse on God’s providence that also introduces the experience of God’s consent and divine abandonment.134 Nemesius introduces various reasons behind ethical trials, but his main focus is the idea that divine providence has been at work in diverse ways and argue about the existence of God’s providence from a Christian point. He presents five different views on God’s providence, beginning from Plato, and therefore tries to provide a Christian answer to such philosophical concepts as determinism, extreme fatalism (Stoics), indeterminism (Epicureans) and man’s free agency (αὐτεξούσιον). The last part of his discourse concerns whether divine providence extends to each and every individual and Nemesius argues that there is a reason (λόγος) behind every single event in one’s life, even though it might be impossible for man’s intellect to perceive all the reasons, given the impossible number of individual events that take place. In order to bring home this point, Nemesius deals with the various reasons behind misfortunes and argues that all of them happen on the grounds of God’s consent: Nemesius introduces the examples of Job, who suffers misfortunes so that his virtue might shine forth, Paul so that God prevents pride from taking over Paul’s heart, Jesus (he does not name him) who undergoes the passion on the cross for the salvation of humanity, Lazarus in Lk 16:19–31 who is abandoned to misfortunes so that others might be instructed and also the martyrs who have been subjected to martyrdom so that their desire for future rewards might be reinforced. As it concerns Jesus, there is no indication that Nemesius refers to the loud cry on the cross, but seems to refer to the passion in general. Two points that worth mentioning is the fact that all the above personages do not experience misfortunes due to their sinfulness, but they are all images of perfection. On the other hand, it should be assumed that Nemesius does not distinguish between consent and abandonment, but uses the two terms equally. The conclusion, then, that Nemesius draws is that God rules everything appropriately, because he is good and wise: he is good and therefore he provides for everyone, and he is wise so his providence should be wise. If Young’s suggestion is correct that Nemesius composed De Natura at the end of the fourth century (c. 395–400 ce), then there it is likely that this work served as Palladius’ source, given that we accept that the Lausiac History was composed at a later time, most probably in 419–20 ce.135 Alternatively, we should accept the mute presence of another, albeit unacknowledged, source that forms the substratum for

134 Nemesius, Natur. 42. Sharples (1983) has presented an excellent overview of the various theories that Nemesius refutes or corrects from a Christian point of view. 135 For the dates of Nemesius’ work see Young (1983), 222 and also the introduction in the edition of Palladius, Lausiac History in ACW 34.

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both works. As it has already been noted, Guillaumont thinks that the source for Palladius is Evagrius of Pontus, but Guillaumont has overlooked the many similarities between Nemesius and Palladius on the one hand, and on the other hand, the points that Abba Paphnutius diverges from Evagrius. For once, Abba Paphnutius begins his talk by suggesting, like Nemesius, that all events happen for a reason (λόγος) and therefore he infers that his teaching is anchored on the notion of God’s providence. In Evagrius’ thought, as it has been transmitted to us in the Syrian version of Gnostikos, there is no discernible coherence between the chapters of the Gnostikos and therefore it is hard to place the passage that features divine abandonment in a wider context, such as God’s providence. And even though Evagrius claims that there are reasons why abandonment happens, he instructs in order to hearten (ὀρθῶσαι) those who have lost heart (ὀλιγοψύχους), but not in order to highlight God’s proximity even in the experience of abandonment. On the other hand, and this is a point to which I shall return, in Gnostikos, Evagrius omits the dual distinction between consent and abandonment that feature in Nemesius and Palladius, and only refers to abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψις).136 At first glance, the discourse of Abba Paphnutius seems to suffer from an inconsistency, because, at first, he claims that those who have truly progressed spiritually could not return to sinfulness and demonic deceit, but then he goes on to present several reasons why even they might experience abandonment. The logic behind his argument is that only those whose disposition has been corrupted have been abandoned by God so that they might repent, whereas in all other cases the reason behind the experience of abandonment is different. Therefore, the implication behind his position is that sinfulness is not the only factor that might result into being abandoned by God. Paphnutius uses the terms consent (συγχώρεσις) and abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψις) indiscriminately and as a result we could assume that he associates the two notions: when God gives his consent, the ascetic suffers God’s abandonment. It should be noted that Abba Paphnutius does not describe God’s proximity and withdrawal in an intellectual way, for instance enlightenment of one’s nous, but as a presence that provides and also withdraws his assistance and protection. This might be inferred by the fact that Abba Paphnutius employs the image of a guarding angel (ἄγγελος προνοίας) whom God withdraws so that the ascetic might be subjected to attacks from the adversary powers. To sum up, God provides his protection through a guarding angel, but once he has given his consent for his assistance to withdraw, the ascetic experiences God’s abandonment and he suffers spiritual attacks and misfortunes. However, it is clarified by Paphnuntius whether this process also applies to those who have reached spiritual perfection. Abba Paphnutius presents his visitors with a list that includes reasons why people might experience abandonment. Each reason is associated with a figure from Scripture, which might be the ascetic’s way to demonstrate that his discourse is anchored on

136 Evagrius, Gnost. 28. As far as I know, the only instance that the two verbs appear in Evagrius in the same sentence and are semantically connected is in Evagrius, Eccl. 4 [in SC 397] (cf. Qo 1:13).

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christian Scripture and also to present his visitors with examples that would have been familiar to them.137 The Egyptian monk draws the following associations: Causes of divine abandonment 1 To display virtue ( Job)138 2 To prevent pride (Paul)139 3. To heal sinfulness (the paralytic, Judas and Esau)140 Paphnutius introduces six different reasons of abandonment, but we could group them together into three categories.141 Abandonment takes place so that: i) hidden virtue might be displayed; ii) pride might be prevented; and iii) sinfulness might be healed. As it concerns the third case, Paphnutius presents three different figures, the paralytic in Jn 5:14, Judas Iscariot and also Esau, but if we take into account the initial discussion of Paphnutius that distinguished between ethical misfortunes that befall to those who have progressed spiritually and those who have not, then we could merge Job and Paul in one group and the rest in a second group based on the criterion of sinfulness, for it is implied that Job and Paul have not sinned. The new list could look like this: Causes of divine abandonment 1 Ethical perfection ( Job and Paul) 2 Ethical imperfection (the paralytic, Judas and Esau) We have already come across a similar list in Nemesius, even though his seems different, because Nemesius mentions Job, Paul, the blind man ( Jn 9:1), Jesus and also the martyrs. However, the main difference does not concern the names that feature in the list, but the fact that Nemesius has not included divine abandonment due to sinfulness, a point that could be explained on the grounds of Nemesius’ general discourse: he wishes to show that God’s providence should be maintained even in those cases that misfortunes are inexplicable and unjustifiable. On the other hand, the ascetic in Egypt has been presented with the stories of monks that have fallen to sinfulness and therefore he was expected to comment on their misfortunes. Abba Paphnutius seems to answer to the question that the three visitors put forward by including the second group in his talk: sinfulness causes abandonment by God and shows that, even though some experience God’s protection and others feel

137 All the examples come from passages that are part of the Sunday lectionary in Eastern Christianity. Burton-Christie has written an invaluable book on the use of scriptural images by early ascetics and therefore has supported that asceticism was views as the application of the word of Scripture in praxis. Burton-Christie (1993). 138 Job 40:8. 139 2 Cor 12:7. 140 Jn 5:14. Mt 27:5. Gen 25:29. 141 In the edition of Gnostikos, Guillaumont discerned only two causes in Abba Paphnutius: i) for the manifestation of hidden virtue; and ii) to prevent pride. Evagrius, Gnost. 28 [in SC 356, p. 137].

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God’s correction, the fact remains that God is at work even when the ascetics feel that he has withdrawn from them. Paphnutius seems to have revised Nemesius’ discourse and his list of reasons, or their common source, in such a way as it was appropriate for the setting of his talk. In fact, at closer scrutiny, he seems to have deliberately drawn his examples from Scripture, because they correspond quite closely to the spiritual adventures of certain monks: the ascetics Valens and Eucarpius resemble the paralytic, since they have been “redeemed” (ἀπεθεράπευσαν) from sinfulness.142 Heron’s life reminds us of Esau, because he lived between corruption and repentance,143 and finally, Stephen never repented, like Judas,144 but he was trapped in a burning house together with his concubine.145 As it concerns the case of the blind-man of the gospel that Nemesius had mentioned, in the gospel account Jesus indicates that his blindness is not due to sinfulness and therefore it must have seemed fitting to replace it with the story of the paralytic, whom Jesus exhorts to sin no more; a fitting instruction for ascetics who faced spiritual temptations as part of their daily regime. If we turn to the Apophthegmata Patrum the word ἐγκατάλειψις appears only occasionally,146 and the word παραχώρησις, a cognate of συγχώρησις used by a prominent ascetic, Macarius the Great, does not feature at all.147 Therefore, the main word that expresses the reality of God’s withdrawal is συγχώρησις and, only to a lesser extent ἐγκατάλειψις. Rarely do the sayings of the desert fathers refer to divine abandonment and when they do so usually in order to show how sinfulness has led God to withdraw his protection so that the ascetic might repent after he has been assaulted by temptations. Therefore, even in the Apophthegmata Patrum there is no evidence that the early ascetics were concerned with the psychological effect of the experience, i.e. the feeling that one has been left on his own, not to mention the

142 Palladius, Laus. 25.5. Though I believe that Palladius depended on Nemesius, there is no doubt that he quietly incorporated elements that Evagrius had been familiar with, such as the association between medical terms and the experience of divine abandonment. It was Evagrius that had treated divine abandonment in medical terms in Evagrius, Cogitat. 10 [PG 79, p. 1212]. More about the life of Eucarpius in Draguet (1978), 73. 143 Palladius, Laus. 26. 144 Cf. Origen, Commentarium Series in Evangelium Mattheum, 312 [in GCS 38.2, p. 245]. 145 See Draguet (1978), 72 about the life of Stephen. 146 Apophth. (AnC), 20; Apophth. (SysC), 7.50. 147 For Lampe, the earliest use in Patristic literature of παραχώρησις in an ethical context was that of Macarius the Great and Diadochus of Photice who seems to follow suit. Indeed, according to the Patristic Greek Lexicon, there is no indication that the verb had acquired the meaning of God’s consent before Macarius. Lampe cites only Macarius’ witness, but he does not include all the forms of the verb, and Hausherr appeals only to the witness of Diadochus. Hausherr (1931), 111. However, before Diadochus, Theodoret of Cyrrhus who was Diadocus’ senior had used the verb παραχωρέω-ῶ to signify God’s consent. Theodoret teaches that misfortunes that befall to people are due to God’s consent, an Macarius employs this meaning of the verb. It should be noted that Theodoret knew ascetics in person and Macarius was an ascetic himself. Theodoret, Quæstiones in Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]; Psalm, PG 80, 1716C [Ps 104:25]; Interpretatio in Ezechielis Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 1013B]. Theodoret, Incarnatione Domini, PG 79, 1457 had also employed the verb in a Christological context but so had Cyril, De Sancta Trinitate, 606.15.

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relation between Jesus’ loud cry on the cross and their own experience. However, the fact that they use the noun συγχώρησις puts their experience within a certain context, i.e. divine providence, and the fact that God remains in proximity while instructing and leading to repentance. That such a line of thought had been established as early as the fourth century ce is evident by the fact that Evagrius of Pontus, a monk that was nurtured, spiritually speaking, in the desert of Egypt, associates closely God’s providence and consent to divine abandonment in one pithy sentence: “God is not the cause of evils, as he is the fount of goodness, but he is said to give his consent according to the reason of abandonment”.148 I have already observed several times so far that the association between divine abandonment and sinfulness plays a secondary role in the thought of those ascetics I have already presented. However, two influential figures of late antiquity take a different stance and they focus on the effect that sinfulness might have on the progress of the ascetics: Macarius the Great and Diadochus of Photice. Due to the fact that Macarius preserved in his Spiritual Homilies, a popular reading amongst ascetics, a short version of Paphnutius’ discourse149 and also given the connection between Macarius and Diadochus that some modern scholars have suggested, I shall treat the two authors side-by-side in order to show the points that their thought lies close to each other and where they diverge.150 As it concerns Macarius, though the name belongs to an ascetic that lived in Egypt and was a contemporary of Antony, it is now accepted that the author actually lived closer to the end of the fourth century ce and that the corpus that has been transmitted under his name presupposes a Syrian milieu rather than an Egyptian one.151 Diadochus, a bishop in Old Epirus (Greece) in the fifth century ce, wrote a brief discussion on the causes of divine abandonment in his work Kephalaia Gnostica or Gnostic Century and though it is not clear whether Diadochus draws from a single source, it is possible that he revised in his own way certain theological positions that Macarius might had promoted.152 In any case, it is thought that Diadochus was familiar with the work of Evagrius and Macarius, either directly or indirectly, and presented his own synthesis between two authors who once

148 Evagrius, Eccl. 4 [in SC 376]. 149 Macarius, Serm. 54. 150 Though Diadochus had been treated as an unquestionable exponent of Evagrian thought, Plested has shown how modern scholarship has come to acknowledge the prominent effect of Macarius on Diadochus. See Plested (2004), 134, the introduction of Des Places (1955), Dörr (1966) and also Desprez and Canévet, DSp 10, 20–42. 151 For reasons of convenience, I refer to him as Macarius, even though it is not uncommon to call him Ps.-Macarius or even Macarius-Symeon. In the past the Macarian corpus had been designated as Messalian, and therefore it was thought to bear close relations with a certain monastic movement in Syria that, allegedly, exaggerated the efficacy of prayer and dismissed the need for an ascetic regime that orders the observance of anything other than prayer, and even the sacramental life of the Church. But after the academic research by Plested, the question of Macarius’ Messalianism has been seen through a different light, since Plested has pushed further the impossibility to define even vaguely what Messalianism actually stood for and instead he has argued that it is more promising to “examine the reception of the Macarian corpus within the wider Christian tradition”. Plested (2004), 16–27. 152 See also the introduction in Des Places (1955).

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had been thought to stand at two poles of the spectrum, with Evagrius standing for intellectualism and Macarius for ascetic realism.153 Macarius argues from the point of an ascetic that knows first hand the hardships and also failures of spiritual combat and this is the reason why his ascetic theory could be called ‘ascetic realism’. On the other hand, it should be noted that Macarius seems to react to the claims of some ascetics that they have reached complete impeccability (ἀπάθεια) in this life due to the efficacy of baptism, a claim that reduces asceticism only to vocal prayers and diminishes the significance of vigilance. It is within this context that Macarius parts ways with the tradition that we have come across in Origen’s exegesis, Athanasius and even Nemesius concerning the unhindered ascent of the ascetics to God, since he teaches that there is a certain co-existence between grace and sinfulness in the hearts of the ascetics. Diadochus might be correcting, if not directly attacking, such a position, but that does not mean that he refutes the idea that ascetics suffer ethical attacks as they conduct their spiritual warfare.154 Macarius prefers to use the expression God’s consent or παραχώρησις in order to argue for efficacy of baptism and at the same time account for the observed spiritual combat of the ascetics (realism).155 For Diadochus, there are two kinds of God’s consent (παραχώρησις) that results in ethical tribulations: Kinds of God’s consent 1 Due to God’s pedagogy 2 Due to God’s distaste of sinfulness At first, we should note that Diadochus does not refer to the reasons (λόγοι) anymore, but he mentions that there are kinds (εἴδη) of divine abandonment. This might be put down to the influence that Evagrius exercised to Diadochus, since the former had introduced the word εἴδη in his Gnostikos. However, that there are kinds of abandonment might imply that each one signifies an experience and a psychological effect on the ascetics that altogether differs from one another. Diadochus does not make such a bold claim. What Diadochus does say is that God withdraws his presence from the soul either to test the soul (παιδευτικὴ) or because he distastes sinfulness (ἀποστροφή), and therefore, it seems that, one more time, we come across the 153 Plested (2004), 134 and 256. 154 Diadochus, Keph. 76 and 80 (refutation of Macarius’ implicit dualism) and also 85 (the life of ascetics as continuous struggle). Whereas Macarius had taught that God’s grace and demonic powers co-exist within the soul, Diadochus corrects this view and teaches that before baptism the devil had dwelled within the soul and God’s grace had been acting from outside. However, after baptism the roles have been exchanged and it is God that now acts from within the heart, whereas the devil could only affect the ascetic from outside, i.e. the body and also thoughts. In a statement that approaches modern theories concerning the function of thoughts in cognitive behaviour, Diadochus suggests that evil does not dwell in the heart, but that it is inevitable that thoughts pop up in one’s mind. According to Polyzogogoulos (1984) Diadochus restored a biblical reading of the term ‘heart’ which he makes the centre of man’s being and therefore dismisses the use of the platonic term ‘soul’ or ‘intellect’ that Evagrius and Macarius had favoured. See also Plested (2004), 150. 155 Plested (2004), 134.

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‘reasons’ behind the experience.156 Therefore, at the level of style and form, Diadochus diverges from the discourse of Paphnutius, but in terms of semantics his argument lies close to the core of Paphnutius’ teachings.157 Diadochus might have favoured the Macarian παραχώρησις over the Paphnutian ἐγκατάλειψις, but this is only so in order to emphasise in even stronger terms the notion of God’s providence. Hausherr has observed that Diadochus interchanges between παραχώρησις and ἐγκατάλειψις indiscriminately and that the two nouns and their cognates should be viewed as synonymous,158 even though Hausherr has not noticed the Macarian origin of this position.159 Whereas Paphnutius distinguishes between ethical events according to divine pleasure and consent or συγχώρησις, Macarius maintains the first noun but substitutes the latter with consent or παραχώρησις, but the meaning that is signified by both terms (συγχώρησις/παραχώρησις) remains the same. Diadochus seems to depend on Macarius on this; therefore, it is not surprising that he uses the term παραχώρησις. Nevertheless, that does not mean that he does not approach his source in a critical way. In the Macarian corpus, παραχώρησις is always associated to testing (δοκιμασία) and paideia which does not imply necessarily the presence of sinfulness, but ἐγκατάλειψις always connotes God’s aversion to sinfulness. Therefore, Macarius teaches that there is a subtle difference between the two terms with respect to sinfulness: the former emphasises the pedagogical role of God (pedagogy), whereas the latter infers human responsibility. In a sense, God gives his consent so that a faithful ascetic is tested, but he abandons the sinner, even though Macarius never expresses this distinction in such sharp terms. Macarius stresses the presence of sinfulness in man’s soul and at the same time he argues that man’s free-will is responsible for this sinister presence within the soul. Pauline theology and Origen had already argued that there is a natural incompatibility between grace and sin, but ascetic pragmatism, as it is expressed in the Letters of Antony and the Apophthegmata Patrum, indicates that such a coexistence seems to be taking place. It seems, then, that Macarius employs the above distinction between God’s consent and abandonment to work out a compromise between the efficacy of God’s grace and also the observed assault by demonic powers. According to Macarius, on the one hand, God instructs and directs the ascetics but, on the other hand, individuals remain responsible for their sinfulness. At the end of the day, Macarius’ primary concern and responsibility is to call to ethical vigilance, because

156 Diadochus, Keph. 86–87 [references to chapters]. See Des Places (1955), 46–48 and Buckley (1993), 274–81 and two entries in DSp 3, 829 (concerning Diadochus) and 1253 (concerning discernment of spirits). 157 John Damascene maintains Diadochus’ distinction between two different kinds of abandonment, one according to God’s pedagogy and another according to God’s aversion to sinfulness. Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pp. 100–02]. Diadochus, Keph. 69 and 87. 158 Hausherr (1931), 111. Diadochus, Keph. 69 and 87. 159 According to Hausherr, consent gives emphasis to the idea that God takes the initiative to bring gnosis to the soul, this gnosis results from spiritual experience (πεῖρα). However, Hausherr overestimates Diadochus’ dependence on Evagrius and therefore overlooks the role of the Macarian corpus in the development of Diadochus’ ascetic theory. Hausherr, (1931), 111.

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in any case, God abandons the ascetics, either to test them or because of their sinfulness. However, Macarius distinguished between divine pedagogy and human accountability.160 Diadochus seems to exploit this elegant distinction, but he chooses to use only one term i.e. consent or παραχώρησις), because his concern seems to be the reinforcement of the notion of God’s pedagogy. Consequently, Diadochus seems to follow, in essence, Paphnutius’ discourse.161 Though Paphnutius had taught that events that take place according to God’s pleasure lead to God’s glorification, and those that occur due to God’s consent result in ethical peril (ἐκπτωτικά), Diadochus substitutes ἐκπτωτικά with ἀποστροφή (aversion), a favourite expression in the Macarian corpus that stresses human accountability.162 The terms are closer to the ethical jargon of the Old Testament and the Psalms that asks God not to turn away his phase (ἀποστρέφω) which connotes that God withdraws his assistance and as a result one’s enemies are free to approach and cause afflictions. Didymus the Blind had already taught that God’s turning away his face is part of his pedagogy in order to correct, but not really punish, the soul’s ethical corruption.163 In other words, the soul is tested in order to realise her ethical sinfulness and therefore repent. This is the way that Diadochus also uses the relation between pedagogy and consent as parts of divine pedagogy: “We should approach God by knowing the experience of both consents according to the proper manner of each condition”.164 Édouard des Places translates in a slightly different way, “We should know the experience of both conditions to approach God (‘pour aller à Dieu’) with the disposition that fits each of these”.165 His translation emphasises the need to experience divine withdrawal, but it is more likely that Diadochus focuses on the actual result of the experience, i.e. knowledge of God. For Diadochus, both experiences eventually lead to God, even though they differ in intensity. To sum up, Paphnutius, Macarius and Diadochus distinguish between various reasons of abandonment, and though they differ in their linguistic preference, they 160 Evagrius, Prov. 120 [in SC 340 (cf. Prov 10:18)]. 161 By placing human free agency at the centre of his ethical theory, Diadochus implies that the soul has been completely separated from God. See Diadochus, 86 where Diadochus obscures the subject that is responsible for the abandonment (“to hand to someone”) of the soul, because he wants to show that human free will (αὐτεξουσιότητα) is responsible for all afflictions. Therefore, the verb depends on the clause “consent according to aversion” (κατ’ ἀποστροφήν παραχώρησις). 162 Even though the notion of God’s aversion to sinfulness had been introduced quite early, cf. Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos, 76.1 and Didymus, In Psalmos 20–21, 20.6 [in PTA 7 (Ps 20:8)] and 49.7 [in PTA 7 (Ps 22:25)], it is more likely that Diadochus depends on Macarius. Macarius, Serm. 16.4.6. 163 Didymus, In Psalmos 29–34, 200.17 [in PTA 8 (Ps 33:17)]. Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.1.12. 164 Diadochus, Keph. 87. 165 “Il faut donc que nous connaissions l’expérience des deux désolations pour aller à Dieu avec les dispositions qui conviennent à chacune d’elles”. Compare the French translation in des Places (1955), 147 with the Greek original: “δεῖ οὖν ἡμᾶς είδότας τὴν πεῖραν τῶν ἀμφοτέρων παραχωρήσεων κατὰ τὸν ἑκάστης τρόπον προσιέναι τῷ θεῷ”. According to the rules of Greek syntax, the subject of the impersonal verb (δεῖ) is an infinitive (προσιέναι) and the subject of the infinitive is an accusative (ἡμᾶς). So, we could reconstruct the sentence as follows: ἡμᾶς προσιέναι δεῖ… (we should approach…). Whereas the Greek original suggests that the participle είδότας introduces a secondary clause of manner (by knowing…), the French translation turns the participle into an active verb (we should know…).

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all introduce the centrality of sinfulness. Whereas God’s pedagogy manifests itself in testing the faith of Job and preventing Paul from becoming prideful, sinfulness makes God turn away his face from the ascetics. Therefore, the true cause behind God’s withdrawal is man’s ethical responsibility. According to the bishop of Old Epirus, either because of sin or due to divine pedagogy, the soul was subject to divine abandonment. But, what permeates his discourse and makes it significantly different than Macarius is the notion of knowledge or gnosis, which is the final outcome of God’s pedagogy:166 in other words, spiritual life is about gaining knowledge (gnosis) of both the divine and the demonic, and this is so because this is the only way the soul could freely choose either God or the demonic in her capacity of possessing naturally free will. Therefore, Diadochus diminishes the ethical role of sinfulness and reinforces the notion of God’s pedagogy, since he maintains an element that might have been associated with Evagrius’ name, but in fact characterises a certain thread of thought that developed in late antique theology: the progress of the soul from praktike to gnosis. But that means that gnosis is not a mere intellectual achievement, but it is accomplished only through experience (πεῖρα).167 Therefore, Diadochus teaches that the reason why God consents to demonic assaults and the stirring of the passions is so that the soul might gain knowledge of the true nature of God and also sinfulness.168 Such a position might raise questions of an implicit dualism that has found its way into ascetic theory, but the centrality of divine pedagogy and also the idea that experience relates to the senses, in many ways disassociates ascetic theory from any gnostic inferences.169 That Diadochus refutes an intellectual understanding of spiritual combat is evident when one discerns the Evagrian position that true gnosis of sinfulness could only direct the soul to hatred against sin: “Those who combat should strive to hate all the irrational desires, so that they shall have as their habit hatred against them” [cf. Ps 139:22].170 Hatred of sinfulness is not an intellectual achievement, but results from an experience that Diadochus places at the level of the spiritual senses, since the soul tastes both God’s grace and the bitterness of sin. We might discern, once more, Evagrius’ thought at the background,

166 Compare the two clauses in Diadochus, Keph. 69: “φωτισμοῦ καὶ ἐγκαταλείψεως τὸ μέσον πεῖρα” (experience is the middle between illumination and abandonment) and Evagrius, Gnost. 28: “πεῖρα δὲ τῆς ἐγκαταλείψεως ἔγγονος” (experience is the progeny of abandonment). See also Hausherr (1955), 111. 167 Evagrius, Ad Eulogium, 23 [PG 79, 1124–1125]. Evagrius, Gnost. 28. See Macarius, Serm. 2.10.4 For gnosis in Macarius, see Plested (2004), 155. 168 Diadochus, Keph. 6 and 77. Ascetic literature developed the idea of discerning the spirits, which implies that the ascetics observed their thoughts to understand whether they would have a positive or harmful effect on them. Diadochus uses the term gnostikos that had appeared in Clement of Alexandria, but it became an inseparable part of Christian asceticism due to Evagrius of Pontus, to show that only the gnostikos could discern between the works of good and evil. See Des Places (1955), 42. Also Des Places (1995), 829 about the employment of gnostikos in Diadochus; Buckley (1993), 274–81 and Bardy (1995), 1247–1254 about ‘discernment’. For an early use of the term gnostikos in Clement of Alexandria see Lilla (1971), 118–226. The fact that Diadochus composed one hundred spiritual chapters about gnostiké is evidence of Evagrius influence. 169 Already Clement and Origen had associated gnostiké to God’s pedagogy. See Daniélou (1955), 278. 170 Diadochus, Keph. 43 and 71. cf. Evagrius, Cogitat. 10 [PG 70, 1212].

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because in Gnostikos Evagrius had associated God’s withdrawal with hatred against sinfulness. For Diadochus, then, the soul is expected to undergo alternating periods of experiencing God’s presence and his sudden withdrawal, because this is the only way to compare between God’s sweetness and the bitterness of sinfulness.171 The next person who picked up the idea of collecting a list with regard to divine abandonment was one of the most influential theologians in East and West and also an ascetic himself: Maximus the Confessor. And though Maximus did not address the question of God’s withdrawal in his doctrinal works, he did so in his ascetic ones. In general, Maximus maintains the basic structure of Paphnutius’ list, but it seems more likely that Maximus drew his material from Nemesius as well as Evagrius and also introduced his own modifications.172 Maximus refers to the following ‘kinds’ (εἴδη) of divine abandonment which he associates with certain figures from Scripture: 1 2 3 4

Kinds of divine abandonment The economy of salvation (Christ) Testing one’s virtue ( Job-Joseph) Prevention of pride (Paul) Aversion of sinfulness (the Jews)

First of all, the notion that there are ‘kinds’ of divine abandonment seems to indicate Maximus’ dependence on Evagrius, even though the idea of introducing one figure from Scripture might have come from Nemesius.173 The fact that Maximus refers to abandonment but not consent implies that Maximus might be addressing the psychological effect of the experience and at the same time dismiss the centrality that God’s pedagogy had enjoyed, but a closer examination shows that even Maximus treats the experience from the point of God’s providence. According to Maximus, divine abandonment might happen for reasons of salvation (Christ), to test one’s virtue ( Job and Joseph), to prevent pride (Paul) and because sinfulness has been detested from God (the Jews). Even this scheme might be reduced down to two reasons: God’s pedagogy and God’s aversion of sinfulness. That Maximus retained the notion of divine providence as his focal point becomes evident in the closing lines of the chapter when Maximus claims that the various forms of divine abandonment are all filled with God’s wisdom and goodness.174 Maximus uses the term abandonment, not consent, which might be due to the influence of Nemesius/Paphnutius and Evagrius.175 Besides, he seems to borrow the structure of his chapter from Nemesius and Evagrius and the presence of the latter is

171 172 173 174 175

Diadochus, Keph. 6 and 86; also 30 and 76. Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. cf. Evagrius, Gnost. 28 and Diadochus, Keph. 86–87. Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. For the elements of the Macarian corpus that Maximus maintained in his theological synthesis see Plested (2004), 213–54. According to Plested, Maximus was familiar with the work of Macarius and had borrowed several themes from Macarius either directly or through a medium, such as Mark the Monk and Diadochus of Photice.

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evident in the pithy way that he presents his position. Nemesius/Paphnutius might have been Maximus’ inspiration to anchor his position on Scripture – hence the images drawn from Scripture, even though he introduces his own changes – and to view the experience of divine abandonment in light of God’s providence. On the other hand, the enumeration of ‘kinds’ of abandonment might be traced to Evagrius, even though Maximus refers to four ‘kinds’, whereas Evagrius knew of five. The most interesting point of Maximus’ chapter is that it features Jesus’ abandonment on the cross. Nemesius had included Jesus in his list, but it is unlikely that he had the loud cry in mind, as Maximus did: it is only the loud cry on the cross that Maximus could have interpreted as an experience by Jesus of abandonment. For the reason that Nemesius intended to display the incarnation as part of God’s providence and how God directs the world to salvation in many ways, he did not address the loud cry on the cross, and therefore avoided the thorny issue of the subject and object of the experience of abandonment. Therefore, it is meaningless to ask whether Nemesius might have supported any similarity or dissimilarity between Jesus’ abandonment on the cross and the experience of abandonment by the ascetics. It is equally absurd to mention the possibility of a Jesus-like abandonment that occurs in the spiritual combat of the ascetics, since it is evident that the only common ground between Jesus and the ascetics, according to Nemesius, is God’s providence. The fact that Maximus refers to the loud cry on the cross might look more promising in order to establish any association between the experience of Jesus and his ascetics. However, this is no easy task and Maximus muddies the waters when he uses the predicate “δοκούσης” (seeming) for Jesus’ abandonment, in which case Maximus might diminish the genuineness of the experience and its intensity. As far as I am aware, this is only the second time in late antiquity that an author uses this predicate to describe Jesus’ loud cry and Maximus’ position is more surprising if we take into account the fact that he does not add that Jesus’ loud cry was a faithful prayer, as Didymus the Blind had done before him. In the second part of this book, I have already presented the reasons why theologians in late antiquity took such a stance with regard to the loud cry on the cross, even though it should be noted that the experience had not been described as seeming. For instance, Didymus the Blind had adopted a similar position in his exegesis on Ps 22: “for the Saviour has come to the cross, it seems (δοκεῖ) to men that to suffer such a death is abandonment… this nation (λαός) has been abandoned. And he says that it is his abandonment because he was their head”.176 On the one hand, Didymus presupposes the notion of God’s protection in the Old Testament and therefore he teaches that people thought that Jesus’ death was proof that he had been abandoned by God. He adds a typological reading, which had already been established in exegesis, and therefore treats Jesus as the head of the people. What Didymus implicitly does is to keep apart Jesus’ abandonment, which at some level is not real, and God’s turning away his face due to the sinfulness of Israel. It is probable, then, that Maximus implies something similar, but the frugality of his 176 Didymus, In Psalmos 20–21, 25.14–18 [Ps 22:2 in PTA 7].

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expression does not help us to draw any definite conclusions. To sum up, it seems that the sources of Maximus are Nemesius and Didymus:177 Nemesius provided a list that he associated with various figures from Scripture and that features the passion of Christ, and Didymus introduced an implicit distinction between seeming abandonment in Jesus’ case, and genuine abandonment in the case of Israel due to the latter’s sinfulness.178 I have postponed discussing the case of Evagrius for reasons which I am going to explain here. Evagrius presents his own list concerning divine abandonment in his Gnostikos, where we might be able to read between the lines the experience of Jesus, and has been thought to be the source for several authors, such as Palladius and Maximus.179 Unfortunately, the part of the Gnostikos in the original Greek that pertains to the experience of divine abandonment, has been lost with the single exception of a clause, but it has reached us in a translation from Syriac. Therefore, we rely on the Syriac text in order to gain insights into the way that Evagrius might have treated divine abandonment and understand whether he had established a connection between the loud cry of Jesus, on the one hand, and the experience of divine abandonment by early ascetics on the other hand. Yet, everything depends entirely on the way that different scholars have translated the Syriac text, a fact that casts doubt on the actual words in Evagrius’ text and shows how impossible it is to restore the original Greek text, a fact that has been reflected on Frankenberg’s attempt to provide a retro-version from Syriac.180 Frankenberg has suggested a possible restoration of the Greek original as follows: Μνημόνευε τα πέντε τῆς δοκιμασίας εἴδη, ἵνα ἔχῃς ὀρθῶσαι τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους καὶ τοὺς λύπῃ ἐκλυομένους. ἡ δὲ κρυπτὴ ἀρετὴ διὰ δοκιμασίας ἀποκαλύπτεται καὶ ἡ ἀμελουμένη διὰ καταδίκης μετανέρχεται καὶ γίγνεται αἰτία ζωῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ εἰ ἡ πρακτικὴ μετὰ τῆς γνώσεως συνυπάρχει, τοὺς αὐτὴν κεκτημένους διδάσκει ταπεινοφροσύνην. μισεῖ γὰρ τὴν κακίαν ὁ αὐτὴς πεῖραν λαβών, ἡ δὲ πεῖρα ἔκγονος ἐστι δοκιμασίας, ἡ δὲ δοκιμασία, θυγάτηρ τῆς ἀπαθείας.181

177 cf. Origen, Fragmenta in Psalmos 1–150, Ps 36:25. 178 Perhaps, John Damascene might have tried to elaborate on the meaning of the obscure reference by Maximus to the loud cry of Jesus and therefore he put forward the position that Jesus did not cry out in genuine abandonment, but he presented an example for all people. Damascene, ExpF. 68. 179 Driscoll (1997) has presented an excellent and extensive analysis of the twenty-eighth chapter of Gnostikos, where Evagrius deals with divine abandonment, and his examination places Evagrius’ teaching in context, since Driscoll takes into consideration Evagrius’ ascetic tradition and also the broader genre of desert ascetic literature. Therefore, he observes the difficulties that surround the Syriac text and its translations by stating that “it is not easy to know for sure exactly where in the text to place the numbers that divide what he [Evagrius] is speaking about”. In his English translation Driscoll follows the punctuation that Guillaumont (1989), 28 had worked out, so his statement should be directed towards Frankenberg and Hausherr who suggest different punctuation. 180 Ousley (1979), 31 thinks that the works that have survived only in Syriac should be treated with caution, since it is likely that they reflect both the teachings of Evagrius and also the Syriac ambience in which they were translated. 181 The text of Frankenberg is cited in Hausherr (1931), 110.

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Guillaumont translates from Syriac as follows: Souviens toi des cinq causes de la déréliction, pour que tu puisses relever les pusillanimes abattus par l’affliction. En effet la déréliction révèle la vertu qui est cachée. Quand celle-ci a été négligée, elle la rétablit par le châtiment. Et elle devient cause de salut pour d’autres. Et quand la vertu est devenue prééminente, elle enseigne l’humilité à ceux qui l’ont en partage. En effet, il hait le mal, celui qui a fait l’expérience; or l’expérience est un rejeton de la déréliction, et cette déréliction est fille de l’impassibilité.182 The indication that Evagrius’ instructions should be used to “hearten” (ὀρθῶσαι) those who have lost faith infers that Evagrius displays an ascetic pragmatism and, like Paphnutius, he endorses the view it is possible for ascetics to experience God’s withdrawal in their spiritual combat. However, it is not easy to indicate with precision a list, to state with confidence the exact subject of this list, or to argue whether Evagrius had included the abandonment of Jesus in his list. It is indicative of the complexity that surrounds the exact meaning of the chapter that Hausherr’s translation from the Syriac, in an otherwise remarkable work on the Syriac and Armenian manuscript tradition of the Gnostikos, does not clarify things. With regard to the main subject of the chapter, it is not possible to know whether Evagrius regards the ‘kinds’ or ‘causes’ of abandonment: if he had employed the first, then it would be possible to support that Evagrius believed that there are different levels and experiences of abandonment. According to Frankenberg, Evagrius knew of five different ‘kinds’ of divine abandonment, whereas Guillaumont suggests that he taught of five ‘causes’ of divine abandonment.183 Besides, according to the retro-version by Frankenberg, Evagrius did not use the noun ῾abandonment᾽and referred to ‘testing’ (δοκιμή); but an excerpt that survives in Greek and also Guillaumont’s translation from the Syriac include the latter noun.184 If the original text had read ‘testing’, as Frankenberg suggests, then Evagrius immediately places the whole chapter within the context of God’s providence and paideia, whereas the noun ‘abandonment’ stresses the psychological effect of experiencing God’s withdrawal. Even if we overlook this problem, still it is not easy to place Evagrius’

182 The French text in Guillaumont (1989), 28. For an English translation see Driscoll (1997), 277: “Remember the five causes of abandonment so that you can raise up again the weak souls brought down by this affliction. In fact, abandonment reveals hidden virtue. When virtue has been neglected, it re-establishes it through chastisement. And it becomes the cause of salvation for others. When virtue has reached a high degree, it teaches humility to those who have shared in it. Indeed, the one who has had an experience of evil, hates it; for, experience is a flower of abandonment, and such abandonment is the child of passionlessness”. 183 In his translation in English, Dysinger endorses Guillaumont’s suggestion. See http://www.ldysinger. com/Evagrius/02_Gno-Keph/00a_start.htm (last access 17/08/20). 184 Though the noun “testing” appears in the manuscript tradition, Guillaumont advocates the noun “abandonment”, because of its remarkable witness in both the Syriac and also the Greek manuscript tradition. See Guillaumont (1989), 135–36. In order to provide further support to his position, Guillaumont refers to the use of “abandonment” by Maximus and implies that Maximus depended directly from Evagrius. Hausherr (1931), 110–11.

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teaching in a certain context, other than his ascetic pragmatism, given the fact that Gnostikos consists of frugal expressions that display no visible coherence. As it concerns the exactness of the list, because Evagrius did not enumerate the ‘kinds’ or ‘causes’ nor did he associate each one with a biblical story, scholars depend on punctuation in order to come up with a list, given that number five limits their options. Whether Evagrius includes the experience of Jesus on the cross in his list is a matter of interpretation, since there is no clear association between a certain ‘kind’ or ‘reason’ and Jesus’ loud cry.185 According to Frankenberg’s text, Evagrius claims that divine abandonment is “cause to life” (αἰτία ζωῆς), but Hausherr and Guillaumont translate “cause to salvation” (cause de salut). Even if we accept that for reasons of convenience a “cause to life” and “cause to salvation” are practically synonymous, Frankenberg and Hausherr, on the one hand, and Guillaumont, on the other hand, do not agree about the syntactical dependence of the expression “cause to salvation”: according to the first two scholars, the clause depends on the clause concerning ethical chastisement, but for Guillaumont, it is an independent clause. Frankenberg and Hausherr introduced a clause that includes the ‘kind’ of chastisement and salvation: “καὶ ἡ ἀμελουμένη διὰ καταδίκης μετανέρχεται καὶ γίγνεται αἰτία ζωῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις” (Frankenberg);186 “la [vertu] bralante est restaurée grace à la condanmation [qui l’atteint], et devient cause de salut pour les autres” (Hausherr).187 The clause suggests that divine abandonment occurs due to one’s sinfulness, it restores virtue and therefore sets an example so that others could learn to avoid sinfulness. But, Guillaumont separates the two clauses: “quand celle-ci a été négligée, elle la rétablit par le châtiment. Et elle devient cause de salut pour d’autres”. That means that there are two different kinds of abandonment. One that restores virtue through chastisement and another that is salvific for the sake of others. If we follow Guillaumont’s punctuation, then it follows that Evagrius teaches the following ‘causes’ of divine abandonment:188 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

hidden virtue chastisement salvation humility hatred of sin

Divine Abandonment

185 In Scholia ad Psalmos (Ps 68:14–15) Evagrius presents a cross-reference to Heb 5:7 which he understands in a literal way and therefore defends the genuineness of the experience of Jesus’ prayer in anxiety and also refutes a typological interpretation or the idea that the prayer in agony of Jesus might have been an act of pretence. However, Evagrius refers to the prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane and says nothing about the loud cry on the cross. 186 Hausherr (1939), 110. 187 Hausherr (1939), 113 inserts semicolons to distinguish between the five causes and therefore the comma between the two clauses shows their syntactical dependence. 188 Guillaumont inserts five full-stops to indicate the length of each clause. See his footnote no. 28 in Guillaumont (1989), 135.

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However, Hausherr does not agree with this list and believes that the problem lies with the way that one understands the last clause which refers to the acquisition of “experience” (πεῖρα) and associates divine abandonment to “passionlessness” (ἀπάθεια). Whereas Guillaumont’s translation implies that the last clause serves as an epilogue that, in a sense, summarises the rationale behind divine abandonment, for Hausherr the last clause actually introduces another ‘kind’ for God’s withdrawal. [c]elui-là hait le mal qui en a fait l’expérience, or l’expérience est un fruit de la déréliction; et  une déréliction est fille de l’apatheia. For Hausherr, there is another kind of abandonment that is the daughter of impassibility. It follows then, that Hausherr seems to adopt the following list: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

hidden virtue chastisement prevention of pride hatred of sin passionlessness

Divine Abandonment

In order to maintain Evagrius’ indication of five ‘kinds’ of abandonment and at the same time to distinguish between abandonment that generates hatred of sin and abandonment that leads to passionlessness (or impassibility), Hausherr omits the notion that divine abandonment might lead others to salvation, since he joins two clauses that Guillaumont had separated.189 The reason why Hausherr has come up with this scheme depends entirely on his efforts to discern a distinction of spiritual life into three stages, praktiké, physiké and theologia and show Evagrius’ ethical teachings as a consistent system of thought.190 Hausherr’s argument depends on the hypothesis that Maximus reproduces Evagrius’ list and therefore he notes that Maximus names the four ‘causes’ of abandonment “salutary” (σωτήριοι)191 but he omits the cause of impassibility even though it featured in Evagrius. For Hausherr, the only explanation for this intentional omission by Maximus is the fact that, most probably, Maximus did not think that impassibility is salutary, because it seems to echo the Origenist notion of an eschatological restoration of beings (ἀποκατάστασις).192

189 Driscoll (1997) overlooks this discrepancy between the various translations with regard to the salvific character of divine abandonment, since his objective has been to read in parallel Evagrius and Paphnutius and therefore he acknowledged only the fact that the two early ascetics coincide in their teachings concerning God’s withdrawal as chastisement and also testing. 190 A platonic division that became an inseparable part of early ascetic teachings. See Louth (1981), 102. According to Hausherr (1960), 55 Evagrius introduced in Ad Monachos the association between one kind of temptation and the corresponding spiritual level. Driscoll (1991), 234 agrees with Hausherr and provides another reference in De Oratione. Evagrius, AdMon. 23; Orat. 37 [PG 79, 1176]. 191 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. 192 Hausherr (1939), 111–12.

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However, Hausherr has overestimated Maximus’ dependence on Evagrius and has overlooked the fact that Maximus might have drawn his material from Nemesius/ Paphnutius. According to Hausherr, the first two causes of abandonment that lead to a demonstration of hidden virtue and ethical chastisement are related to the initial stage of spiritual life in which virtue is established. The next two causes that prevent pride and generate hatred for sinfulness concern the fight of the ascetics against pride at an advanced spiritual stage. The last cause which is “the fruit of impassibility”, concerns divine knowledge at the stage of spiritual perfection. Hausherr refers to Maximus for further clarifications, because he reads in Maximus an association between the last reason of divine abandonment and knowledge of both human “weakness” (ἀσθένεια) and divine “power” (δύναμις).193 Though Hausherr has taken great pains to explain the discrepancies between the list of Evagrius and Maximus, it should be reminded that, firstly, he depends on the hypothesis of the event to which Evagrius had been Maximus’ source and, secondly, it overlooks the many meanings of impassibility in Evagrius. In Gnostikos the noun might implied the final restoration of the world at the level of perfection, but in De Oratione impassibility is clearly associated with the ethical struggles of the soul against temptations and therefore bears no eschatological connotations. In Evagrius, impassibility introduces both i) an ethical and also ii) an eschatological perspective. From the above discussion, it should have become clear that only Guillaumont’s translation supports that Evagrius discerned the “salvation of others” as a “cause” of divine abandonment, a point that might imply that Evagrius meant the experience of Jesus on the cross. In an extensive footnote in the edition of Gnostikos by Guillaumont, he provides some further insights to his position and shows that it is based on the hypothesis that John Damascene had used Evagrius as his source.194 John Damascene discusses divine abandonment in Expositio Fidei and some fragments that have survived in an exegetical catena on Matthew (Mt 27:5) and had been circulating under John’s name.195 The two works feature almost identical lists that include the experience of Jesus and stress the salvific character of his abandonment,196 together with Job, Paul, poor Lazarus,197 the blind man198 and the martyrs. The names of the biblical characters and also the phraseology show that John copies almost verbatim from Nemesius, not Evagrius, and even views the experience of divine abandonment 193 Evagrius, De Octo, 18 [PG 79, 1164] thinks that it is “great for a man to be assisted by God; he has been abandoned and he became aware of the weakness of nature”. A similar position resounds in Maximus, Charit. 2.67 [PG 90, 1005]. Though Hausherr supports that Maximus depended on Evagrius, he has overlooked the fact that Maximus could have found the idea that gnosis results from God’s withdrawal in Diadochus of Photice. See Louth (1997), 25. 194 Guillaumont (1989), 137. Guillaumont only implies that Evagrius might have served as the source of Maximus and as it was mentioned, Driscoll (1997) does not discuss the only ‘kind’ of abandonment that Guillaumont has not examined. 195 Damascene, Fragmenta in Matthaeum (in catena Nicetae), PG 96, 1412. 196 Damascene, ExpF. 43 [p. 101]. 197 Lk 16:19–31. 198 Jn 9:3.

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from the perspective of God’s providence, like Nemesius did, presenting the same line of thought. In conclusion, if John Damascene borrows his material from Nemesius and Maximus the Confessor from Nemesius and Paphnutius, then it is impossible to restore the meaning of Evagrius’ clause concerning “the salvation of others” since both Maximus and John refer to the experience of Jesus and John includes the blind-man and also poor Lazarus.199 Having said that, it should be noted that Maximus has preserved another list that, this time, clearly depends on Evagrius by omitting any reference to biblical stories or “salvation of others” as a reason for divine abandonment. Maximus maintains number five, only this time he does not treat the ‘kinds’ of divine abandonment (ἐγκατάλειψις), but the reasons of God’s “consent” (παραχώρησις). It is remarkable that here Maximus indicates that there are certain reasons why God gives his consent so that demons may attack the ascetics.200 Therefore, Maximus introduces the following list: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Reasons of God’s consent discernment between virtue and sin acquisition of virtue prevention of pride hatred of sinfulness acquisition of passionlessness

It is evident that Maximus used Evagrius’ list but he did not copy it verbatim as it is evident from the modifications that he has introduced.201 From a stylistic and also semantic point of view, the two lists of Maximus differ significantly. This list gives support to Hausherr’s suggestion with regard to Evagrius’ list, since it distinguishes between God’s consent that leads to hatred of sinfulness and God’s consent that generates impassibility. On the other hand, it omits the cause of the salvation of others, because either Maximus did not read this cause of abandonment in Evagrius’ text or he deliberately removed it from his own list. As it concerns the transition from ‘kinds’ of abandonment to ‘reasons’, it might suggest that the two words are not identical in Maximus’ thought and that here Maximus only presents the reasons that relate to man’s sinfulness. Therefore, Maximus gives emphasis to man’s accountability, and yet the fact that he refers to God’s consent is evidence enough that Maximus maintains the traditional approach that viewed ethical trials as part of God’s providence. Nevertheless, in such a context, where ethical trials are associated with man’s accountability and God’s consent, Maximus argues that due to man’s sinfulness God gives his permission so that demons might afflict the ascetics. Therefore, it would have been inappropriate to include the experience of Jesus on the cross, given the fact that late antique theology maintained the ethical purity of Jesus and Maximus implies recurring ethical trials and temptations. In the list that

199 Damascene, ExpF. 43 [p. 101]. 200 Maximus, Charit. 2.67 [PG 90, 1005]. 201 Hausherr (1939), 111. Guillaumont (1989), 136.

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depended on Paphnutius, Maximus did not refer to any other example concerning the salvation of others, but Jesus. Therefore, it seems that Maximus must have read the experience of Jesus under Evagrius’ expression “for the salvation of others”, but he left it out intentionally. It seems that in his deliberations concerning God’s withdrawal, Maximus used more than one sources, in particular Nemesius, Paphnutius and Evagrius, but he modified them as he saw fitting. For instance, he must have read the association between divine abandonment and God’s providence in Nemesius/Paphnutius but he must have equally appreciated the ascetic pragmatism of Evagrius’ list, even though the notion of God’s providence is discernible in the background, thanks to the use of the noun “consent” (παραχώρησις). Besides, he must have located similar elements of ascetic pragmatism in Paphnutius, since he introduces the notion that God withdraws due to man’s sinfulness, a fact that Nemesius had overlooked.202 It is also likely, then, that Maximus must have discerned an implicit reference to Jesus’ experience on the cross in Nemesius, which he exploited in his own writings and therefore explicitly wrote about the loud cry on the cross alongside the experience of others belongs. In general, in the ascetic literature after Antony some distinct lines of thought become discernible with regard to the loud cry of Jesus: a transition is introduced from ‘reasons’ of abandonment to ‘kinds’ with the implication that one experience differs from another, even though there is no elucidation whether this differentiation refers to the psychological effect of the experience or its intensity. On the other hand, the ascetics anchored their discourse on Scripture and therefore indicated that Scripture remained their most important authority that could provide insights into their spiritual combats. And yet, the ascetics did not think that their experience had been modelled on the experience of Jesus on the cross, and, in fact, the more emphasis a writer gives to sinfulness and man’s accountability, the less discernible the association is between Jesus’ experience on the cross and the early ascetics.203 On the other hand, even though Christian ascetics had introduced an exemplary kind of divine abandonment, they never associated it with the loud cry on the cross, and this is peculiar given the fact that Christian exegesis and theology had already viewed the loud cry as a faithful prayer that has set an example for all people. The only explanation might be that Nemesius who viewed the passion of Jesus as part of God’s providence emphasised the salvific work of Jesus, and he seems to have set a precedence that was followed after him. Abba Paphnutius, Diadochus of Photice and the Macarian corpus exhibit ascetic pragmatism in their instructions to fellow ascetics and therefore the predominance of sinfulness seems to have prevented them from suggesting that Jesus’ loud cry might share common elements with the experience 202 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. 203 John Damascene appropriated Nemesius’ discourse on divine abandonment, but the fact that he introduces two kinds of abandonment, namely pedagogical (παιδευτικὴ) and despairing (ἀπογνωστική) suggests that there should be little doubt about the fact that John was familiar with Diadochus’ ascetic theory. In his edition Kotter (1973) does not refer to Diadochus’ work in the critical apparatus.

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of God’s withdrawal by the ascetics. And though the question whether Evagrius of Pontus had introduced the loud cry on the cross in Gnostikos could not be settled satisfactorily due to the destruction of the original text, Maximus the Confessor clearly refers to the experience of divine abandonment by Jesus, apparently drawing from Nemesius, but then omits it when he turns his attention to man’s accountability and the effects of sinfulness. In any case, what is evident is the fact that it is God’s pedagogy that dominates any discourse concerning God’s withdrawal and there is absolutely no indication that early ascetics looked at the image of Jesus crying out on the cross in order to explain their own experience and find ethical encouragement and spiritual reinforcement. Perfection and Sin

Several stories in the Apophthegmata Patrum make it clear that early ascetics had reached the stage of spiritual perfection: for instance, Macarius speaks directly to demons while he remains unaffected by their presence204 and obedient monks even raise the dead.205 In fact, one comes across all sorts of miraculous incidents while the ascetics transform their “black-skinned” self into an angelic face.206 Such claims demonstrate the continuity between the way that Athanasius of Alexandria had presented Antony ripping the fruits of spiritual perfection and the description of early ascetics. There could be no doubt about the immense influence that Athanasius’ biography exercised upon the ascetics, and it seems that this observation extends not only to the particulars of Antony’s life, but also to the fact that Athanasius promoted an asceticism that was firmly anchored on a Christocentrism that stressed the redemptive work of Christ and argued the efficacy of the incarnation. It is in such a context that Amma Sarah is victorious over passions but only due to the fact that Jesus has already defeated those passions in his flesh.207 According to the life of Abba Pachon,208 the ascetic is redeemed from the spirit of fornication, which had afflicted him for more than twelve years, only through the intervention of Jesus who “was crucified for us”.209 This expression communicates the message that spiritual perfection results from the victory of Jesus over the passions in his incarnation.210 The image of demons fleeing at the presence of the ascetics in the Apophthegmata, since the ascetics dread them no more, echoes the victory of Antony in Vita Antonii: the

204 Apophth. (AC), Macarius 3 and Theodore of Ferme, 27. 205 Apophth. (AnC), 294. For the role of miracles in the literature of the desert ascetics see Ward (1980), 39–46. 206 Apophth. (AC), Paul the Simple.1. For an examination of the approaches with regard to one’s skin colour in light of ascetic anthropology and demonology see Brakke (2006), 157–81. 207 Apophth. (AC), Sarah, 2. A modern reading on the association between miracles and the ascetic self in Ramfos (2000), 237. 208 Apophth. (SysC), 5.54. 209 Apophth. (AC), Elias, 7 and Moses, 1; 18. Also Apophth. (SysC) 5.52. 210 Burton-Christie (1993), 245 thinks that the closing lines of the story are a short comment from Abba Elias and that they bespeak of the role of humility in ascetic spirituality.

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roles have been exchanged and now it is the ascetics that mock the demons.211 This victory over demons is the work of humility and the monk who has reached humility has been liberated from his passions and therefore he is feared by demons who do not dare to approach any longer.212 Therefore, behind the miraculous achievements of spiritual perfection, the desert ascetics discern the works of humility. To borrow from Keller, humility makes “Christ tangible” in the life of the ascetics and the acquisition of humility directly connects the ascetics to Jesus, since it is the humility of Jesus that actually shines forth in the deeds of the ascetics.213 The virtue of humility is the alpha and the omega in ethical life214 and according to Amma Theodora, it is the only way to salvation.215 Some ascetics, such as Abba Ammonas, Arsenius and Poemen are depicted at the stage of spiritual perfection,216 their humility has been well attested and tested217 and it is not uncommon in the Apophthegmata to conclude a short story with an even shorter ethical exhortation: “do this and you will be saved”.218 This short instruction implies that the elder who directs the others has already followed it and he has been saved.219 In the case of Antony, as it is related in the Apophthegmata, an angel instructs him to alternate between times of prayer and work to fight back acedia and according to the story, Antony follows the instructions and “doing thus he was saved”.220 However, this story presents half of the truth. Antony, who has come forth as a God-bearing man, grieves over the ethical fall of the “great pillar of the Church”,221 an ascetic whose name has been left out intentionally, but we have been informed that he “had performed a miracle on the road”. If the last sentence implies that the ascetic had reached some level of spiritual perfection, then the same sentence worried Antony and became the reason why Antony had anticipated the sinful end of the ascetic. In the same fashion, ascetics remind one another of man’s ethical frailty and they even dread the time of death. For instance, a concern about the judgement that follows

211 Apophth. (AC), Theodore of Ferme, 27. 212 Apophth. (AC), Antony, 7 and Theodora, 6. The same story is preserved under the name of Macarius, 11. See also Apophth. (AnC), 307. 213 Apophth. (AC), Daniel, 3 (humility as a commandment of Christ) and Arsenius, 33 (humility as the humble way of Christ). Apophth. (AnC), 373 (humility is the seal of Christ). About the centrality of humility in ascetic literature as an interpretation of Scripture see Burton-Christie (1993), 236–60. Also, Keller (2005), 131–55 and Ramfos (2000), 183–95 though the latter views the ascetic literature from the prism of modernity. 214 Ward (1981) has translated the stories of John of the Cells, 2 and Syncletica, 26. 215 Apophth. (AC), John Colobos, 22. 216 Apophth. (AC), Ammona, 11, Arsenius, 30, Bessarion, 4, Joseph, 7, Poemen, 144 and Silouan, 3. 217 Apophth. (AC), Peter the Pionite 3; Poemen, 4; The Roman Abba, 2 [Ward thinks that undoubtedly this Roman Abba is Abba Arsenius]. Apophth, (AnCol), 43. Ramfos (2000), 185 and Burton-Christie (1993), 241 contrast the works of humility to those of “false-humility” which is another deceitful demonic device according to the desert ascetics. 218 Apophth. (AC), Antony, 3, Arsenius, 1, Biare, 1, Joseph, 4 and Macarius, 41. Apophth. (SysC) 1.1 and 5.53. 219 Apophth. (AC), Agathon, 4, Cassian, 4 and Silouan, 6. 220 Apophth. (AC), Antony, 1. 221 Apophth. (AC), Antony, 14.

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death had sojourned with Abba Arsenius until his last breath,222 and it is remarkable that a seasoned ascetic of the statute of Abba Sisoes would implore to be granted more time to repent.223 Therefore, in the ascetic literature of late antiquity we discern two parallel lines of thought: one that praises the works of spiritual perfection and another that presents a potential backsliding to sinfulness. It is evident, then, that the desert literature preserves a theological tension between perfection and imperfection: whereas the ascetics have conquered their passions, they are afflicted by temptations and ethical struggles. This is the reason why Amma Theodora might be an accomplished ascetic who has defeated demons, and yet she teaches that temptations should be anticipated at all stages of one’s spiritual life until the last breath: [L]et us strive to enter the narrow gate. Just as the trees, if they have not stood before the winters and the storms, cannot bear fruit; so it is with us, this present age is a winter; and if we don’t [strive] through many trials and temptations, we cannot become heirs of the kingdom of heaven.224 This passage echoes the association that Origen had drawn between the winter of this life and the future rewards with regard to the life of the martyrs.225 According to Amma Theodora, this life is the winter of trials and temptations and there is no indication that one should expect them to abate. It should be concluded, then, that the distinction between this present life (“winter”) and the time to come (“kingdom of heavens”) gives to the teaching of Amma Theodora an eschatological flavour: spiritual perfection is a postponed condition. Another female ascetic, Amma Syncletica, alludes to the image of Paul and concludes that even at the stage of spiritual perfection, demons keep waging warfare against the ascetics.226 And Antony assures Abba Poemen that he should expect temptations to afflict him until his last breath, and even points out that it is impossible to enter to God’s kingdom without experiencing ethical trials: only through trials does God manifest his glory so that, “whoever has not experienced temptations cannot enter into the kingdom of heavens. [Antony] said, take away temptations and no-one is saved”.227 If pushed to its extreme, then this story could put under question the efficacy of the redemptive work of Jesus, since it is only through temptations that one could actually rip the rewards of his struggles. If read out of context, then the story stresses the importance of one’s own efforts and overlooks the redemptive work of God. However, the context within one should read such statements is that of God’s instructing his ascetic (paideia): spiritual warfare is the ideal way to ethical progress and perfection is a promise that remains

222 223 224 225 226 227

Apophth. (AC), Arsenius, 40. Apophth. (AC), Sisoes, 14. Apophth. (AC), Theodora, 2. Origen, Martyr. 31–32. Apophth. (AC), Syncletica, 7. Apophth. (AC), Antony, 4 and 5. The translation by Ward, “without temptations no-one can be saved”, expresses freely the meaning of Antony’s words. The closing sentence has been pronounced word by word by Evagrius in the same alphabetical collection. Apophth. (AC), Evagrius, 5.

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unfulfilled in this life. Therefore, unlike Athanasius, whose Antony was untroubled by temptations after God’s immediate intervention, Amma Syncletica presents a simple plan concerning spiritual progress: the higher the progress, the more intense the trial. It should be noted in advance that this scheme constitutes an integral part of the ascetic theory of both Macarius and Evagrius.228 Spiritual progress, then, could be measured according to the intensity of ethical trials. For example, Abba Pachon feels that God has turned his face away from him: “God has left me alone”229 and even describes his experience in terms of despair and even blasphemy. If we follow the distinction that Diadochus supported between God’s pedagogy and God’s aversion to sinfulness, then it should be assumed that Abba Pachon experiences divine abandonment because of his sinfulness. It should be reminded that Diadochus of Photice teaches that despair and blasphemy are associated with divine abandonment according to God’s distaste of sinfulness. Yet, God communicates to Abba Pachon that he has only tested him, which means that Abba Pachon has maintained his ethical integrity before the temptations occurred. According to this account, even at an advanced spiritual level, the experience that God has withdrawn from the ascetic is dreadful and only God’s intervention prevents Pachon from despairing. Therefore, there is no indication that the desert ascetics introduced the subtle distinctions that Diadochus had maintained, but rather view every experience of temptations as an indication that God has withdrawn from the ascetics as part of his pedagogy, and this applies to all levels of spiritual progress. So far, we have been presented with the idea that when God withdraws his presence, then temptations are given consent to afflict the ascetics. However, in the general context of God’s pedagogy one short story turns the argument to its head and associates God’s presence and ethical temptations: “[A]n elder was afflicted and sick continuously. It happened that for a year he was not tried and was grieving and crying saying: God has abandoned me and has not visited me”.230 Though one could have construed the first part of the story as an indication that the ascetic had reached the ideal of impassibility, the ascetic feels desolation which is caused by the absence of temptations. According to the ascetic, since he does not experience actively God’s pedagogy, God must have abandoned him. This thread of thought reinforces even more the message that Ezekiel had communicated in Scripture that God is present even in seeming absence, since the story describes God’s presence in terms of God’s not intervening to stop the afflictions of the ascetics: when God does not intervene, it is evident for the ascetics that he has given his consent so that afflictions might occur and therefore he manifests his pedagogy. For the desert ascetics, spiritual stillness might mean that one has been deprived of God’s pedagogy: Abba Poemen said of Abba John the Dwarf that he had prayed God to take his passions away from him so that he might become free from care. He went and told an old man this: ‘I find myself in peace, without an enemy’, he said. The old 228 Evagrius, Prakt. 59. 229 Apophth. (SysC), 5.54 (the verb is ἀπέστη). 230 Apophth. (AnC), 2.209.

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man said to him, ‘Go, beseech God to stir up warfare so that you may regain the afflictions and humility that you used to have, for it is by warfare that the soul makes progress’. So he besought God and when warfare came, he no longer prayed that it might be taken away, but said, ‘Lord, give me strength for the fight’.231 Although Abba John could claim the ideal of ethical “tranquillity” (ἀμεριμνία), an older ascetic suggests that spiritual warfare is an even greater ideal. It might be that the older ascetic discerned the work of pride behind Abba John’s words, but his instructions reveal the same truth that the anonymous ascetic presented in his own story: God’s presence manifests when one faces ethical trials. At the same time, it makes clear that, if the ascetics would have drawn a similar list with the ones in the previous chapter, that would have included God’s withdrawal due to one’s sinfulness and God’s withdrawal so that one could be tested. And it seems safe to speculate that, like Nemesius, they would have argued that God’s withdrawal is a manifestation of his providence. The fact that after following the advice of the older ascetic, Abba John returns becomes humble again, highlights the tension between spiritual progress and ethical laxity. Abba Orsisius illustrating this connection by employing a simile of the soul and a lit lamp:232 the Holy Spirit withdraws from the soul when negligence has taken over the soul; like a lamp that is extinguished when there is no oil. He explains that when the soul is stripped of God’s assistance (Holy Spirit), the demons attack her like mice that devour the wick and break the vessel sine there is no fire to scare them off. Abba Orsisius instruction is directed against spiritual laxity as he wishes to show how the soul that has been acquainted with God’s presence should remain vigilant, lest negligence leads to sinfulness. It should be noted that, Abba Orsisius presents negligence as an inherent human weakness that is not associated with the activity of demons, but rather leads to such activity. Negligence, then, springs up from within human nature and it results in demonic activity – as opposed to resulting from such activity. The compilers of the Systematic Collection of the Apophthegmata Patrum suggest that the young monk who caused Antony’s grief was attacked by pride. For the desert fathers, whose ethical theory Evagrius expresses, pride is the most subtle vice, and, in a sense, it is the beginning and the ultimate end of all vices. Every other vice might rise at the beginning of spiritual combat, and this is exemplified in the life of Antony, but pride springs from spiritual perfection, like a parasite of virtue. It is indicative that all the lists that refer to divine abandonment and despite their many differences, include pride and indicate that God withdraws his presence due to one’s pride. This is clearly the context in the Lausiac History where Paphnutius has been presented with the lives of some ascetics who have been affected by pride: they succumb to suggestions by demons that they reached perfection and even think that they have been worthy to encounter Christ. On the other hand, they turn a deaf 231 Apophth. (AC), John the Dwarf, 13; also Poemen, 13 and Syncletica, 7. Apophth. (SysC) 7.29 (that the making of a monk is displayed during temptations). 232 Apophth. (AC), Orsisius 2.

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ear to any warnings from their fellow ascetics. In the desert ethical theory, pride is one’s tendency to count on one’s self, to dismiss any instructions from the ascetic community and to become isolated, it is an ethical temptation that originates from within the ascetic self.233 For Keller, pride means “ingratitude” against God:234 The demon of pride is the cause of the most damaging fall for the soul. For it induces the monk to deny that God is his helper and to consider that he himself is the cause of virtuous actions. Further, he gets a big head in regard to the brethren, considering them stupid because they do not all have the same opinion with him.235 Evagrius suggests that Christ submits the enemies of the ascetic and therefore the ascetic advances from praktiké to gnosis and the contemplative life.236 At the pinnacle of spiritual life we find impassibility, a condition at which the ascetic’s disposition is affected by neither temptations nor praise, as a story from Abba Poemen᾽s youth suggests. Presenting a list of virtues and arguing that one virtue stems from another, Evagrius places impassibility high at his list of virtues and calls her the progenitor of love.237 On the other hand, it has been mentioned earlier that, according to Hausherr and Driscoll, Evagrius introduces the motif of divine abandonment to make evident the interaction between praktiké and the contemplative life: the experience should be anticipated at all stages of ascetic life and to each stage corresponds a certain kind of God’s withdrawal.238 But, if Evagrius’ scheme is interpreted in the way that Hausherr and Driscoll have suggested, then a kind of divine abandonment corresponds even to this advanced stage of impassibility. Therefore, we should agree with O’Laughlin that the ascetic realism of Evagrius and the desert ascetics implies that one might contemplate the divine mysteries, but it does not mean that one no longer experiences afflictions or temptations. According to Driscoll pride “[is] an especially subtle temptation because it bases itself on what is of genuine good in the monk’s life”239 and this is so because Evagrius lists pride and vainglory as the most subtle and supreme vices that threaten the soul240 and at the same time he indicates that pride is closely associated with the state of impassibility.241 It could be claimed that, for Evagrius, the appearance of pride has been a sign that the ascetic has progressed spiritually. It is the

233 Ramfos (2000), 183–95 notes that humility requires ethical vigilance because once rising reputation in the desert, could eventually prove harmful. See Evagrius, Prakt. 5 where Evagrius argues that that those ascetics who leave alone have been tempted directly by demons, but the coenobites have been tempted by their fellow ascetics. 234 Keller (2005), 137. 235 Evagrius, Prakt. 14. 236 Evagrius, KephGn., 6.15 (cf. Ps 110:1). 237 See the introduction in Evagrius, Praktikos. 238 Hausherr (1939), 113. Evagrius, KephGn., 1.10. 239 Driscoll (1991), 228 and (1997), 274. 240 Evagrius, De Octo, 15–19 [PG 79, 1160–1165]. Evagrius, Prakt. 14. 241 Evagrius, Orat., 37 [PG 79, 1176]: “First of all pray to be purified from your passions. Secondly, pray to be delivered from ignorance. Thirdly, pray to be freed from all temptation and abandonment” [trans. Bamberger] but Driscoll, (1991) 234–35 cites Evagrius, Orat., 38 [sic]. Following Hausherr, Driscoll reads between the lines the division of ascetic life in three stages: the warfare against passions refers to

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last vice that he should face. But, this vice, unlike others, springs forth from virtues and, in a sense, it is intertwined with them. Successive chapters in Ad Monachos deal with the passing of the soul from praktiké to the contemplative life242 and they begin with the appearance of impassibility and the experience of contemplation (gnosis). Yet, “[w]hen the spirit begins to be free from all distractions as it makes its prayer then there commences an all-out battle day and night against the irascible part”.243 At this point, the ascetic should anticipate a relentless attack from prideful thoughts that even take the form of apparitions and visions that have been devised by demons.244 This description seems to sketch with precision the frame of the lives of the ascetics whose lives Abba Paphnutius has been presented with and implies that their ethical failure has been caused by pride. However, sinfulness is not the only factor that might cause God’s withdrawal. Abba Paphnutius is indebted to Nemesius of Emesa who had stressed the natural capacity of possessing free will. Therefore, rather than stressing the activity of demons or passions within the ascetics, the second part of Abba Paphnutius’ discourse concern man’s free agency. Abba Paphnutius contrasts the “right conduct of life” (ὀρθός βίος) and “demonic deception” (πλάνη δαιμόνων) and teaches that an ascetic could follow either but not both since the two terms are diametrically opposite. However, “demonic deception” is due to human accountability, since the ascetic has displayed a distorted disposition (πρόθεσις). Therefore, on the one hand, Paphnutius stresses God’s providence and pedagogy but, on the other hand, he also implicates the human factor. Origen had clearly suggested that disposition is ethically responsible for sinfulness, since no vice could be accomplished without the man’s consent, and the literature of the desert ascetics endorses this view.245 However, the images from Scripture that are part of the lists concerning divine abandonment and that signify perfection, and also the fact that Evagrius employed the notion of apatheia or impassibility might imply that God’s pedagogy has no reason to be exercised once the ascetic has progressed to this stage of spiritual perfection. Guillaumont has written an extensive analysis of the place of impassibility or apatheia

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an initial stage where the ascetics struggle in praktiké. The second stage sees a fight against ignorance and leads to knowledge, which is a passage from praktiké to the contemplative life. In the third stage pride is the enemy that the ascetic faces to achieve undisrupted contemplation. Hausherr (1960), 55. Evagrius, Prakt. 63–70. Evagrius, Prakt. 63. Evagrius, Prakt. 14. According to Driscoll (1997), 279 Evagrius based his ethical theory on the achievements and misfortunes of ascetics that he had met in person. Some ascetics must have been deceived by apparitions, as it is the case of some ascetics in Lausiac History. Therefore, his theory is anchored on ascetic realism. Driscoll (1997), 279, “[e]xperience with fallen monks is what probably gives him the details of his description”. Origen, Princ. 3.1.4 and more importantly 3.1.12. Didymus presented an elaborate description of the way that the mind gives consent so that thoughts might develop and the latter turn into sinful suggestions that lead to vices. Didymus, In Psalmos 29–34, 200.17 [Ps 33:17 in PTA 8]. Theodoret of Cyrrhus notices that God could have intervened to prevent ethical corruption, but even though he detests sinfulness, he allows it to happen because he respects man’s free will and does not wish to violate it. Therefore, Theodoret pinpoints human responsibility as the sole factor for sinfulness. See Theodoret, Quæstiones in Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]; Interpretatio in Ezechielis Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 1013B].

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in Clement of Alexandria and Evagrius.246 The Stoic origins of the term suggest that impassibility is a condition of emotional indifference, where the ascetics have left behind all emotions and dispositions. However, Guillaumont argues satisfactorily that impassibility in Evagrius bears no such Stoic connotations – it even diverges from Clement – concerning emotional indifference. Evagrius supplies the term with an ascetic content and therefore describes a stage at which the ascetic remains subjected to demonic attacks, since thoughts continue to pop up within one’s mind, but the ascetics do not succumb to such thoughts.247 As O’Laughlin observes, Evagrius might describe the passing from praktiké to the contemplative life, and yet he returns to “issues of πρακτική which remain constant once the desired level of impassibility is reached. Temptation and opposition continue to affect even accomplished monks”.248 In other words, Evagrius does not envisage asceticism as a strict succession of consecutive steps, but he outlines the interaction between ethical life and contemplative life. And the only way to understand how the ascetics have been affected by fresh afflictions and temptations is to return to the notion of God’s consent, when he withdraws his protection and assistance. Therefore, divine abandonment fits into Evagrius’ ethical theory as an experience that highlights the truth of the constant interaction between praktiké and contemplative life. Evagrius, then, has been instructing against ethical laxity and warns his fellow monks to remain vigilant. At the end of the day, Abba Paphnutius seems to have presented the gist of Evagrius’ ethical theory: even at an advanced level, the ascetics are afflicted by pride; they rely on their own power and forsake God’s assistance and therefore God abandons the ascetics so that they could conceive their weakness: Do not give your heart to pride and do not say before the face of God ‘Powerful am I’; lest the Lord abandon your soul and evil demons bring it low. For then the enemies will flutter around you through the air, and fearful nights will follow you.249 In this case, Evagrius of Pontus, Abba Paphnutius, Macarius the Great, Diadochus of Photice and the compilers of the lives of the desert ascetics display the same ascetic pragmatism and they all agree that God’s withdrawal restores humility to the ascetics and instructs them about their weakness. However, it is Evagrius who pressed even further the matter of how abandonment turns the ascetics against sinfulness and generates hatred for it, but even at this stage, where one abhors vice, Evagrius warns that the ascetics might fall to sinfulness: The hate we have for the demons helps our salvation a great deal, and it favours the practice of virtue. Yet we are not strong enough to nourish it in ourselves like a 246 247 248 249

Guillaumont (1996), 151–60 and the introduction of Guillaumont in SC 170 (1971), 98. Evagrius, Prakt. 6 and 74–75. Ousley (1979), 174. O’Laughlin (1987), 241. Evagrius, AdMon. 62. The translation is from Driscoll (1991), 56.

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good seed, for spirits that love pleasure destroy it and summon the soul back to its old love and habits. But, the doctor of souls cures this love, or rather this horrible gangrene, through abandonment. He permits that we suffer some terror caused by them, during the night and during the day, and so the soul comes again back to its original hate, having learned from David to say to the Lord, ‘With perfect hatred I have hated them; they have become my enemies to me (Ps 138:22)’. For this is the one who hates his enemies with a perfect hate, the one who sins never in act nor in thought. Such is proof of the first and the greatest passionlessness.250 If we combine the above passage with what Evagrius has written in Praktikos, we draw the conclusion that the ascetics experience abandonment at different levels and with different results: one that generates hatred for sinfulness and another one that maintains this hatred. Hausherr has remarked that the notion of hatred of sinfulness, knowledge of one’s weakness as well as apatheia are intimately related to the experience of divine abandonment and, once more, they stress the interaction between praktiké and contemplative life. The fact that pride remains a potential threat even after the ascetics have reached apatheia is the point where Evagrius diverges from the Stoics who maintain the emotional indifference of the soul ever after.251 But this is not the only point where Evagrius departs from the Stoics. The anticipation of an interchange between apatheia and God’s withdrawal at the advances stages of ascetic life suggests that Evagrius maintains an eschatological orientation in his work.252 Evagrius postpones the soul’s spiritual rest for the future, but this is a point that appears in Evagrius’ most speculative works, such as his Great Letter and Kephalaia Gnostica. Notwithstanding the speculative character of Kephalaia Gnostica, their history in the outbreak of the Origenist controversy in the sixth century ce253 and also the esoteric features of the Great Letter that has become a point of scholarly contention,254 both works expose Evagrius’ views on the notion of final perfection. In Kephalaia Gnostica the interchange between praktiké and contemplative life is maintained.255 Evagrius is influenced most probably by the Nicene Faith when he stresses that deification is possible due to the incarnation, but deification is a state that has been postponed for an indefinite time in the future.256 O’Laughlin notes that Evagrius envisages unity at the summit of spiritual life,257 since he refers characteristically to the “unity of the minds” in a final restoration of all created intellects – a position that has ignited long debates about the orthodoxy of Evagrius since late antiquity.258 In 250 Evagrius, Cogitat. 10 the translation is in Driscoll (1997), 280. 251 cf. Evagrius, KephGn. 1.10 (specific activities of demons correspond to each stage of spiritual combat, including the acquisition of God’s knowledge). See Ousley (1979), 172. 252 Driscoll (1997), 282–83. 253 For the history of the text see Guillaumont (1962) and Casiday (2006). 254 Casiday (2006), 28 has commented on the various scholarly approaches to Evagrius. 255 O’Laughlin (1987), 137–38. 256 O’Laughlin (1987), 119. 257 Evagrius, The Great Letter (or Ad Melaniam), 22. cf. Jn 17:22. 1 Cor 15:28. 258 Evagrius, KephGn. 1.6–8. Guillaumont (1962), 39.

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his Great Letter, Evagrius writes about the “minds/intellects” (νόες) who look like rivers that converge into the great sea, i.e. God,259 and therefore they are finally unified thus abolishing any distinction that is based on numbers, names or forms. However, such unification requires an eschatological orientation, since it could not be achieved in this life.260 This is Evagrius’ vision about the end of time: like Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius refers to ethical perfection in the present life but only in relative terms, since this present life provides only glimpses of the great sea, i.e. God. It follows, then, that apatheia, a state that ascetics achieve in this life, could only be considered perfection in only relative terms and the interchange between praktiké and the contemplative life stresses this reality together with the anticipation that God might withdraw his presence at any moment. But, like Origen, Evagrius does not wish to deprive altogether the ascetics from all spiritual consolation, since spiritual combat is followed by ethical peace and rest, but he displays what has been called ascetic realism by warning that the ascetics should remain vigilant because the pride works in subtle ways and as a result any spiritual rest could easily turn into ethical anxiety.261 This tension between ascetic realism and Christian eschatology has been maintained by many authors who were directly or indirectly influenced from his work, such as Macarius the Great, Diadochus of Photice and even Maximus the Confessor. As it concerns Macarius, the Syrian compiler of the Macarian corpus preserves both threads of ascetic theory. On the one hand, he highlights the efficacy and effectiveness of divine grace on the soul, but, on the other hand, he displays ethical realism, since the soul is never secure, ethically speaking, in her spiritual progress. At one point, Macarius seems to echo the same question that the ascetics who were visiting Abba Paphnutius had put forward: “how [do] those who are activated by the grace of God fall?”262 In a display of ascetic realism and despite the fact that Macarius had argued the real presence of God within the ascetics, he did not deny the possibility of ethical backsliding. In fact, rather than thinking that after the coming of God’s grace, sinfulness is impossible, Macarius takes the opposite extreme and teaches that ethical

259 Evagrius, The Great Letter, 27 and 66. 260 O’Laughlin (1987), 150. 261 We might want to take into account the possibility that behind the cryptic language concerning the transformation of the spiritual bodies and the existence of other worlds yet to come, Evagrius merely attempts to present eschatology as an open horizon that knows no temporal limits at one end (one’s death or the Second Coming). Origen and Gregory of Nyssa with the notion of epektasis had done something similar and it seems that Kephalaia Gnostica display Evagrius’ uneasiness to define the eschaton in terms of time. It is true that Evagrius has baffled modern scholars with his thought on the transformation of humanity to the state of the angels and the foundation of new worlds. Cf. Guillaumont (1962), 113 and O’Laughlin (1987), 130 but especially 150. Due to Evagrius’ personal acquaintance with Gregory of Nyssa we could not dismiss the possibility that has clothed Gregory’s theory with his unique language and imagery concerning bodily transformation and eternal creation. For instance, in modern theology the open-end of eschatology has been suggested by Loudovikos (2015) who uses linguistic style and form to invest his language with the possibility to maintain open to new interpretations, beyond the traditional imagery of final restoration and deification. 262 Macarius, Hom. 7.4.

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perfection could not be achieved without facing ethical trials.263 Macarius discerns an interchange between spiritual rest and ascetic struggles which means that the ascetics enjoy some rest from temptations and the attacks of vice but then they are afflicted anew by demonic thoughts and only someone that is spiritually naïve could think that God’s presence means the utter cessation of all passions and thoughts within the soul. One of the major points in the Macarian corpus is the co-existence of grace and sinfulness within the soul. That is not to say that the soul is at the same time acquainted with both grace and vice, but what Macarius means is that the soul should be viewed as a battlefield where opposite forces collide and the best way to integrate such a position in his thought is by appropriating the notion that God withdraws his presence: God’s grace diminishes when demonic powers make are presence and this is due to man’s free will. Notwithstanding God’s presence in the soul, sinfulness always remains in the soul and afflicts her. For Plested, in his ethical theory Macarius demonstrates his familiarity with the Platonic definition of evil as ‘non-being’, but Macarius does not construct an ontology, but rather takes great pains to explain why ethical laxity might endanger any spiritual progress that has been achieved. Therefore, he exaggerates the activity and effects of both grace and man’s frailty at the same time.264 Macarius must have shaped his ethical theory as part of his many interactions with his fellow-ascetics and this is the reason why his teachings display ascetic realism. Like Abba Paphnutius, Macarius addresses the reality of ethical backsliding to sinfulness that he must have witnessed in ascetic establishments. For Macarius, Christian ascesis is a spiritual warfare, a passing through “the narrow way” that the ascetics should walk if they desire to reach ethical perfection.265 If Macarius exaggerated the efficacy of God’s grace, he would have to diminish the significance of the ideal of ascesis as incessant vigilance. And yet, Macarius maintains the fact that God’s grace descends to his ascetics, but in order to compromise between God’s grace indwelling in the ascetics and his ascetic realism he employs the notion of God’s withdrawal: grace diminishes its presence and as a result spiritual attacks commence by the adversary power. The notion of God’s withdrawal is an inseparable part of his ascetic theory: The grace co-exists incessantly and it is rooted and leavened from a young age, and this that co-exists has become like natural and concrete with man like one nature. And in many ways and as it wishes it takes care (οἰκονομεῖ) of man for the sake of his profit. Sometimes the fire burns more and is ablaze, sometimes it is softer and milder; and this light sometimes it burns more and shines, and sometimes it diminishes and grows gloomier.266 Though Macarius does not pronounce it as clearly as Nemesius and Abba Paphnutius, this passage is centred on the notion of God’s pedagogy, since God’s grace “takes

263 264 265 266

Macarius, Hom. 17.5. Plested (2004), 36. Macarius, Serm. 55.2. Macarius, Hom. 8.2.

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care” of the ascetics and everything that happens is profitable for them. Macarius employs an analogy that would have been familiar enough to ascetics that depended on candles and lamps for some light after the sun had gone down. God’s grace is an essential part of man’s nature and Macarius does not seem too concerned to stress that, in a sense, God and man have become one nature. Like the lamp and the fire of that lamp, there are several degrees that God’s grace manifests itself, and sometimes this presence is strong but other times it diminishes.267 The effect that such an analogy would have had is obvious, since the ascetics could think of themselves being surrounded by darkness every time their lamp had gone out. The lesson, then, that the passage teaches is that God withdraws his presence and like the lamp, it shines no more within the soul. Macarius has invested the contrast between God’s presence and God’s withdrawal with language example from the daily life of the ascetics. Yet, it should be reminded that, in Macarius, there is no question of God’s absence, since God remains present through the exercise of his consent: God diminishes his grace and demonic attacks take place.268 Therefore, God’s withdrawal is a notion that stands in the middle between arguing the reality of God’s presence and its efficacy and also endorsing ascetic realism and the possibility that one might return to sinfulness.269 Macarius shares the same line of reasoning with Abba Paphnutius about the centrality of God’s pedagogy, according to which God safeguards the soul from an ethical backsliding to sinfulness. He even employs the image of Paul to argue that pride is a spiritual foe that remains present at all stages of spiritual combat.270 It comes as no surprise, then, that Macarius places pride at the centre of his ethical thought, since pride is an immanent characteristic of human nature. Macarius implies a speculative notion of pride, since he associates it to devil’s fall and the subsequent fall of Adam and Eve. According to Macarius, “pure” nature is inclined to pride271 and, in a sense, it is the presence of God’s grace that might bring about pride. When Macarius introduces the story of Paul, he strikes an analogy with those ascetics who have been deceived about their ethical perfection.272 Therefore, throughout the Macarian corpus the Syrian ascetic maintains the dialectics between God’s grace and ethical trials without resolving the tension

267 Macarius, Typs. 10.3. 268 Macarius, Typs. 9.1–2. 269 In order to refute dualism, Macarius teaches that it is only due to God’s consent that the soul has been attacked by demons. However, he underestimates his own argument since he uses strong images that suggest an ontological connection between demons and the soul (Macarius, Serm. 3.5.9) and might also lead one to think that are independent factors within the soul that do as they please. For the transformation of the demons from God’s agents to God’s adversaries see the classical articles under the title ‘Démon’, in D.Spir 3:141–219 [Lyonnet, 141–52 presents the Old and New Testament demonologies; Daniélou, 153–89 reviews classical theories up to Origen; and the Guillaumonts 190–219 peruse late antiquity]. It has been noted that Dodds (1971) has presented an irreplaceable examination of the demonic in pagans and early Christian, but equally unsurpassable is Brakke (2006) and his review of early ascetic demonologies. 270 Macarius, Hom. 7.4. 271 Macarius, Hom. 7.4 (it is in the nature of rational beings to be prideful). 272 Macarius, Hom. 17.5.

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between the two moments in spiritual life.273 In fact, like Evagrius, Macarius thinks that perfection is only relative since the ascetics should anticipate God’s grace and also God’s withdrawal when progressing in their ascetic labours, and there is no indication that they should expect to be redeemed from such polarity at least in their present lives. Macarius draws another image that would have been familiar to his fellow ascetics: richness and poverty: an instruction recurs several times that the ascetic that has been rich, spiritually speaking, should expect to be stricken by poverty, even though the ascetic should be equally aware that the initial richness shall be restored.274 The thought of Macarius is not as systematic as it is presented here, and though the notion of God’s presence and subsequent withdrawal plays an essential part in Macarius discourse, there is no one place that the ascetic has provided an exhaustive or systematic treatment of the experience. However, with regard to the normativeness of God’s withdrawal at the stage of spiritual perfection, one discerns four threads that Macarius follows, even though they all convey the same instruction: ascetics should anticipate God’s withdrawal and subsequent temptations at any stage of their ascetic life. Macarius presents the experience of God’s withdrawal with regard to the following axes: i) acquaintance of gnosis ii) ethical vigilance iii) community ministry iv) postponed eschatology i) As it concerns the first point, Macarius and Evagrius share the same notion that God’s withdrawal brings about gnosis, i.e. an experiential and profound level of knowledge, so that the ascetics could taste both good and evil.275 As Plested puts it, “the coexistence of sin and grace is permitted so as to educate and to form the soul”.276 It is only through the experience of God’s abandonment that the soul perceives that there exist two opposite natures in her: So by the experience of the two natures, tasting frequently both the bitterness of sin and the sweetness of grace the soul might become more perceptive and more vigilant, so as to flee evil entirely, and to attach itself wholly to the Lord.277 The allusion to the sense of tasting is not uncommon in the book of Psalms and Macarius returns time and again to this analogy between the sweetness of grace and the bitterness of sinfulness (cf. Ps 119:3). Through the experience of God’s withdrawal,

273 See Desprez (1980) 60–61. 274 Macarius, Hom. 10.1, 15.42 and 27.6. 275 In a passage Macarius introduces the triptych of trying (δοκιμάζειν), discerning (διακρίνειν) and trusting (ἐμπιστεύειν) and presents another simile that would have been familiar to ascetics who depended on some wine to gain some strength. Wine is first judged by sight, but then it should be tasted so that one could actually grasp the difference between good and sour wine. 276 Plested (2004), 37. 277 Macarius, Typs. 12.2 translation in Plested (2004), 37. Also, Macarius, Serm. 29.1.

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when he consents so that temptations might attack the ascetics, the ascetics perceive how entirely different good and evil are. At the same time, Macarius brings into play the man’s natural capacity to possess free will. Therefore, for Macarius it is not a given that the ascetics would choose the sweetness of God’s grace, but they constantly should be reminded of how bitter sinfulness tastes, so that they freely get to choose to pursue God’s grace. ii) Macarius indicates that the interchange between God’s grace and God’s withdrawal is frequent and several times comments that the ascetics need continuous training (γυμνασία και παιδεία), so that God’s grace should remain within them. His ethical theory is anchored on a literal reading concerning the “narrow gate” of the ascetic regime of life and, for Macarius, the passing through the narrow gate is a long process that coincides with one’s life upon earth.278 His argument could not be isolated from his thought regarding human weakness and the fact that, before the initial approach of God’s grace, the mind has been communicating with the adversary powers. In another passage, Macarius pushes his argument as far as to claim that Adam was the first to have been presented with the notion of spiritual warfare and Macarius makes a bold statement that oversteps the modern red-line of ontological determinism: demons have been introduced in creation so that Adam could find an ethical opponent and display his ascesis.279 Once more, it should be reminded that Macarius does not introduce a Christian cosmology and that his statements should be viewed within the context of his instructions to continuous spiritual vigilance.280 On the other hand, Macarius does not think that God’s withdrawal signifies God’s absence. In fact, in several parts his argument seems to be inspired by Origen’s presentation of the spiritual adventures of the bride in the Song of Songs: God has been present during temptations, but he remains hidden in order to observe the disposition of the ascetics and even assists in secret.281 Therefore, even though he associates closely God’s abandonment with ethical misfortunes and demonic assaults, Macarius instructs his fellow ascetics to discern God’s presence even during temptations. To solve this tension between God’s presence and God’s withdrawal, Macarius directs the attention of his reader to the notion of God’s testing the loving disposition of his ascetics. Because the experience of never-ending spiritual rest could lead the ascetics to ethical laxity, God manifests his presence to observe whether the ascetic is inclined to laxity, and withdraws his presence to test his ascetic’s endurance and spiritual vigilance: will the ascetic turn to God or against God during temptations?282 In conclusion, for Macarius even the feeling of spiritual pease should not be conceived as a reward, but it is another form of testing how vigilant the ascetics remain.283 iii) Plested has presented the way that modern scholarship has shifted its position and that now it endorses the suggestion that Gregory of Nyssa might have been 278 279 280 281 282 283

Macarius, Serm. 7.16.5 cf. Macarius, Serm. Macarius, Serm. 55.2.8. Macarius, Hom. 29.5, 32.10 and also Serm. 4.7.3 and 4.9.3. Macarius, Typs. 12.1.2 and 12.2.1. Macarius, Serm. 57.1.

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familiar with the Macarian corpus, even though Plested has limited his treatment only with regard to Gregory’s Great Letter.284 It is true that Macarius, like Gregory, introduces the notion that the soul ascends from glory to glory, and at the same time he indicates the fact that the soul failure to grasp God’s knowledge is not associated with the presence of sinfulness. However, there is one more point that Macarius and Gregory seem to hold similar positions: Macarius notes that God’s withdrawal is associated with ministry in the community.285 He acknowledges that, when caught up in divine inebriation, the ascetic soul might forsake all personal needs, since it is “fed” and “clothed” by God.286 Even so, the soul could stay in this stage for ever, since she needs to attend to the requirement of the Christian community for spiritual instructions. Therefore, God withdraws his presence so that the ascetic could experience natural needs and also interact with the Christian community. Like in Gregory’s De Vita Moisis and Homiliae, the ascetics remain always connected to the community and Macarius returns several times to the ministry of the Apostles.287 However, even this position should be seen in the overall approach of Macarius who refutes any position that views the ascetic’s duties exclusively in terms of vocal prayer. iv) Finally, the theme of God’s withdrawal plays an essential role in Macarius postponed eschatology that suggests the relative character of spiritual perfection in this life. For Macarius, God directs one’s life to a final union between God and man. Even though Macarius stresses the presence of God’s grace, it should be noted that he equally emphasises “the mystery of the cross”: “the faithful soul is ever ‘nailed to the Cross of Christ’. Such a soul shares in the Crucifixion, imitating Christ’s patient acceptance of his torments and crying loudly to the one who can deliver us from death [cf. Heb 5:7]”.288 There is no indication that Macarius ever solves the tension between the “mystery of the cross” and the unwavering presence of God’s grace in the soul. But, rather than contrasting them, Macarius presents their interchange as an essential part of ascetic struggles and teaches that the ascetics experience spiritual rest and temptations so they could distinguish between this present life and the final rest of the soul: This present time is for grief and tears, that age is of smiling and joy; this present time is of the cross and death, that time is of redemption and unspoken pleasure; this present time is of the narrow and hard way, that time is of rest and peace.289 284 Plested (2004), 46–58. 285 Macarius, Serm. 4.9.3 and Hom. 8.4 where Macarius designates God’s withdrawal is ὑποχώρησις in order to show that the ascetic that would have been inebriated with God’s presence would have forsaken his fellow ascetics. 286 An implication that God has fulfilled the soul’s very being with his presence. cf. Mk 9:3 and Num 6:15. 287 Macarius must have been aware of this fact due to his practical experience as he ministered the ascetic community as a spiritual director and among his disciples should have been people as intelligent as Evagrius. cf. Gregory, Life of Moses, 1.56. 288 Quotation and translation in Plested (2004), 38. Macarius, Serm. 3.5.9. 289 Macarius, Typs. 10.3 and also Serm. 2.4.1 cf. Mt 7:14. 2 Cor 6:2.

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Macarius puts side by side the image of the Spirit that now engages to offer “consolation” (παράκλησις) and the image of “perfect rest” and “rewarding” (τέλεια ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἀνταπόδοσις) that has been postponed for an indeterminate future.290 And though, as Plested has suggested, Macarius ascetic theory never loses hope from sight,291 the fact remains that the abundance of references to God’s withdrawal and the ensuing temptations provide no indication that the eschatological perspective in Macarius is secondary or even accidental. As Macarius puts it, this present life features grieving and pains, which is Macarius way to instruct his fellow ascetics to maintain their vigilance. The life to come will bring the final cessation of all temptations and misfortunes, which means that the present consolations that God provides should be interpreted in the same line with Origen’s “visitations”. What lies at the heart of Macarius ethical discourse is the presence of the cross that anticipates future redemption. Overall, Macarius seems to react to the notion which seems to have been in circulation at his time that after baptism there is no need for spiritual vigilance, since sinfulness has been uprooted from the soul. Therefore, Macarius takes the opposite stance and argues that God’s grace and demonic powers co-exist in the ascetic self, but rather than employing any language that might suggest that God is absent from the soul, he chooses to use the language of God’s consent in order to call to spiritual vigilance and implicitly view spiritual combat as part of God’s pedagogy. The above elements with regard to God’s withdrawal are dispersed in the vast volume of spiritual homilies that comprise the Macarian ascetic corpus and their interconnections are loose and latent. However, we find an attempt to provide a more systematic and coherent form of ascetic theory in Diadochus of Photice that has been facilitated by the use of a spiritual century. Diadochus was indebted to Macarius but he enriched the ascetic theory of the Macarian corpus and moderated several of Macarius’‘ exaggerations. Even though scholarship has treated the place of God’s pedagogy and aversion in the thought of Diadochus, it has not addressed the question concerning the experience of God’s withdrawal with regard to the state of perfection. Diadochus, like Macarius, stresses the fact that God’s assistance works within the soul, but this does not mean that the ascetic enjoys a state of perfection as Athanasius of Alexandria would have described it. God sends his assistance through consolations that pacify and encourage the ascetics but this does not deliver the ascetic from further spiritual warfare.292 The dialectic between God’s withdrawal and God’s presence has been maintained, but Diadochus refutes the Macarian position concerning the co-existence between God’s grace and demonic powers. Also, he diminishes the psychological gloominess that we come across in Macarius with regard to divine abandonment: God’s withdrawal lasts for little time and his consolations are frequent. Even so, that should not be lead to the conclusion that Diadochus ever loses sight of the normativeness of this interchange which should

290 2 Cor 1:22. 291 Macarius, Hom. 5.6. 292 Diadochus, Keph. 32 and 76: “μικραῖς παραχωρήσεσι καὶ πυκναῖς παρακλήσεσιν παρ’ αὐτῆς [τῆς χάριτος] γαλουχούμεθα” (we are fed by the grace through short small concessions and many consolations).

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be anticipated during one’s life.293 Therefore, Diadochus explicitly dismisses the idea that one could possess God’s grace unwaveringly: So it is possible here for those who progress to perfection to taste her (charity) continuously; but, no-one could possess her completely, until the mortal has been swallowed up by life.294 According to the above passage, ethical perfection in this life is only a foretaste but not the full measure of God’s grace. Diadochus introduces a subtle distinction between “tasting” of God’s grace and actually “possessing” it: he endorses the former but negates the latter. It follows, then, that the tension between the two images of the soul ascending unhindered and the ascetics facing temptations and ethical trials should not be solved, since the soul experiences both conditions. Diadochus follows Macarius when he distinguishes between “initiating joy” (εἰσαγωγὸς χαρά) and “perfecting joy” (τελειοποιὸς χαρά).295 What stands between the two conditions is the experience of God’s withdrawal, where God consents so that the ascetics are subjected to temptations. The ascetic tastes God’s grace so that his desire for God might be aroused, but then he suffers God’s withdrawal so that he could experience God’s presence anew. Diadochus does not deny the intensity of the experience and therefore maintains part of the psychological effect that the Macarian corpus would have caused to the reader: even when God abandons the ascetic due to pedagogy, the memory of God’s grace that has diminished, causes severe grief to the soul: “Thus, the soul feels more pain (ἀλγύνεται) at the memory of the spiritual love, since she cannot possess her [i.e. grace] sensorily due to the deprivation of the most perfect pains”.296 And yet, like Macarius, Diadochus dismisses the idea that God’s abandonment might cause despair to the soul. This suggestion finds expression in the idea of “moderate despair” (σύμμετρος ἀπελπισμός) that Diadochus has introduced in order to bring home the point that God remains hidden from the soul, but at the same time he has been strengthening her secretly. He introduces the dialectics between the verbs to hide (ἐγκρύπτειν) and to be present (παρεῖν) which serves as an indication that God’s withdrawal should not be interpreted as God’s absence, and then proceeds to claim that even in his hidden state, God’s grace “communicates part of his goods to the soul”.297 Therefore, the hidden presence of God prevents the soul from falling into despair. Even so, that does not mean, as it was mentioned, that Diadochus diminishes the psychological effect of the experience, since the soul experiences

293 Diadochus, Keph. 85 (ascetics should expect demonic assaults even at the pinnacle of virtue). 294 Diadochus, Keph. 90.4: “ὥστε οὖν γεύεσθαι μὲν αὐτῆς (ἀγάπης) ἐνταῦθα συνεχῶς οἱ εἰς τελειότητα προκόπτοντες δύνανται, τελείως δὲ αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς δύναται κτήσασθαι, εἰ μὴ ὅταν καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς”. 295 Diadochus, Keph. 60. 296 Diadochus, Keph. 90. 297 Diadochus uses the simile of the “lamp of gnosis” (λύχνος τῆς γνώσεως) that should remain lit, echoing Abba Orsisius, Paul and also Macarius. Diadochus, Keph. 28.9 (cf. 1 Thes 5:19). Apophth. (AC), Orsisius, 2. In Keph 77.1.

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great grief (λύπη πολλή): “the soul feels more pain”.298 Consequently, in Macarius and Diadochus we come across an attempt to describe even in a rudimentary way that psychological mechanism that is associated to God’s withdrawal and does not necessarily exhaust itself to the notion of demonic attacks and the stirring of passions. It might seem that the distinction between “initiating” joy and “completing” joy implies that perfection is possible in this life, since Diadochus sees “completing” joy as one more stage in the life of the ascetics. However, Diadochus returns several times to the idea that God’s withdrawal and temptations should be anticipated at all stages and therefore he seems to maintain the same ascetic realism that we have come across in Evagrius and Macarius. It is safe to assume therefore that the observation made by Ousley with regard to Evagrius holds true for Diadochus: God’s grace and spiritual struggles interchange in the life of the ascetics.299 It should be concluded that both the above points concerning the proximity of God even when the ascetic experiences God’s withdrawal and also the normativeness of tasting of joy and grief highlight the fact that God is the only factor that affects the ascetics as they struggle to approach ethical perfection. Besides, Diadochus relates spiritual combat to the acquisition of virtues. According to Diadochus, echoing an established tradition in Christianity, charity (αγάπη) is the highest virtue and he follows the tradition of the desert ascetics in claiming that charity is the virtue that connects the ascetic to his fellow-men,300 and that it is the virtue that stands at the summit of spiritual life.301 For Diadochus, divine withdrawal establishes charity in the soul, because through experience, the soul is instructed about the transcendental character of this virtue, which does not resemble any other virtue in this aspect.302 It should be assumed, then, that an experience of God’s withdrawal occurs when the ascetic has reached spiritual maturity, an experience that instructs him about the true nature of this virtue.303

298 Diadochus, Keph. 90. 299 Ousley, Theology of Prayer, 197. 300 Diadochus, Keph. 15 (charity directed to one’s neighbour) and also 34 and 74 (charity as a virtue). We might have good reasons to suspect that Origen and Gregory of Nyssa hold each to a greater or lesser degree a platonic approach that views spiritual life as the ascent of the intellect to God, and this is also true about Macarius who argues that the soul might be inebriated from God’s grace and forsake the community, but Diadochus completely departs from such statements and anchors his theory on the Gospel: the more one’s heart is filled by God, the more one opens up to his fellowmen. Such a position has been promoted in the ascetic theory of the desert ascetics. Apophth. (AC), John Colovos, 39; Antony, 9; Matoes, 7. 301 Diadochus, Keph. 34 and 89–90. Diadochus distinguishes between natural charity that the soul possesses as a natural property and spiritual charity that has been the gift of the Holy Spirit. The first charity enables the soul to progress to ethical life, but it is not sufficient to lead to spiritual perfection. Divine contemplation commences only with the acquisition of the second kind of charity that is related to the presence of the Holy Spirit within the soul. For an analysis of the position of Diadochus on charity see the introduction of des Places (1955), 48–49. 302 Diadochus, Keph. 90. 303 Des Places (1955), 47–48.

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But such a statement seems to relativise the notion of spiritual perfection and seems to connote a position similar to epektasis of Gregory of Nyssa. Divine abandonment, then, teaches the ascetic that spiritual perfection does not depend on human efforts: What is believed to be perfect by he who has been educated (παιδευόμενος) is still imperfect compared to God’s wealth in abundance of love; even if one manages to climb to the top of the ladder that was shown to Jacob due to the progress of his efforts.304 Diadochus appropriates the theme of desire that Origen and Gregory of Nyssa had introduced and he connects it to the acquisition of virtue in a scheme of postponed eschatology: God draws the ascetic close to him and provides a taste of his wealth so that the ascetic might get a glimpse or taste of God’s wealth and his desire might be stirred, but then God withdraws because the state of ethical perfection has been postponed to a later time.305

304 Diadochus, Keph. 85. 305 Diadochus, Keph. 90.

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Conclusion

This book has presented the place and role of the notion of divine abandonment in late antique theology and, in particular, in exegesis, Christology and the literature of early desert asceticism. The main questions that the book set to examine have been: i) the interrelation between the above three genres of theological production, ii) the normativeness of the experience of divine abandonment and its association to ethical perfection, and ii) the degree to which it is possible to argue that a Jesus-like ‘kind’ of abandonment had been introduced in late antiquity. As it concerns the first point, i.e. the interconnectedness of Christian exegesis, Christology and the literature of early desert asceticism, the evidence that I have discussed suggests the reality of a definite compartmentalisation between the three genres, and that any attempt to present a position that could apply across the genres occurs only individually. However, this statement refers only to the image of the bride who is looking for her beloved, Jesus who cries out on the cross and the desert ascetics who experience God’s withdrawal, because it is the three images that remain in rigid compartments and do not encourage theological or exegetical mobility. In other words, the desert ascetics turn neither to the image of Jesus crying out on the cross nor to the bride of the Song in order to throw light to their own feeling of God’s withdrawal. And the same is true about the exegetes who deal with the longing of the bride in the Song for her beloved who has been hiding, or the theologians of Christology who interpret the loud cry of Jesus on the cross. There is an explanation as to why these three images stand apart in the thought of the authors I presented: Origen had introduced the Song of Songs as an interlocutor to the Symposium and therefore had set a theological agenda and framework that was followed by his intellectual successors. As it concerns the fact that there are no allusions to the image of the bride in late antique exegesis on Mk. 15:34, the observation of Elliott concerning the inadequacy of such an imagery to express the mystery of the incarnation successfully summarises the limited degree of theological mobility in this case. And given the fact that, on the one hand, the Song was never a popular reading in the desert, unlike the book of Psalms that associates the image of God’s turning away his face with sinfulness, the only question that remains open is the reason why why a seasoned ascetic such as Nilus of Ancyra decided to interpret the Song. On the other hand, the question concerning the association between the loud cry of Jesus and the experience of the bride and the ascetics could be settled satisfactorily once we take into account the limited attention that the loud cry on the cross, per se, ever drew in late antiquity. On the one hand, there is no indication that late antique theology developed a genuine interest to grasp the psychological mechanism that could have made Jesus to cry out in abandonment. Such a position

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depends on our current sensitivities about the psychological self, but did not necessarily occupy the mind of late antique theologians in such terms. On the other hand, in those instances that the loud cry does appear then, unlike modern theology, it does not take centre stage but only features as part of a greater argument, as one more reference from Scripture among others. And even in this case, the uneasiness and uncertainty with which late antiquity dealt with the loud cry indicates that the uniqueness of the person of Jesus did not leave much space to use this image in any given context, since much had been at stake: an overstatement of his divinity could have suggested that his humanity had been a ghostly apparition, at best, and equally an understatement concerning his divinity would imply that a mere man brought about salvation. Theology in late antiquity had been treading on thin ice every time it was asked to elucidate the details of such moments as Jesus’ limited foreknowledge or his prayer in agony, and his loud cry on the cross was one such moment. The red lines in theology that had been described by the General Councils and the Church Fathers could not have been overstepped; and any interpretation that would have openly proclaimed a separation on the cross between a subject and an object during the experience was not vie unlike the ascetics and the bride that had been abandoned by God. Therefore, the existence of clear compartments between exegesis and ascetic literature in this case is anything but remarkable. Finally, the ascetics present their ethical theory in light of their fight against passions and innate weakness and progressively they did so in the context of ascetic realism: they preserve stories of fellow ascetics that have progressed spiritually but they face temptations and even experience an ethical fall to sinfulness. Earlier exegesis on the Song, as it had been shaped by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, had presented interpretations that featured several elements, despite all dissimilarities in style and content between the two authors, that encouraged a platonic reading of the intellect reaching towards God. In other words, the ascetic realism of the desert fathers meant that they faced different and, in many ways, more immediate challenges than the impossibility, for instance, to grasp the divine in its incomprehensibility (Gregory of Nyssa) or even the joyful and unhindered ascent of the bride that faces no challenges (Origen). As it concerns Jesus, in their experience of abandonment the ascetics could have had no recourse to Christian exegesis and Christology that produced more obscurity and uncertainty about what happened on the cross than the simple answer that Antony got from God: I had been here. And yet, despite the rigid compartments, one gets to see cracks opening up that enable the communication of certain ideas between the genres and even sees the common themes that unite them. But, to do so we should take into account the greater picture. On the other hand, Theodore of Cyrrhus who had been a bearer of rudimentary ascetic ideals due to his personal communication with monastics in Syria, presents the notion of God’s consent when he deals with the bride, but he has chosen not to follow suit when he discusses the loud cry on the Cross. Nilus of Ancyra clearly has moved the barriers between exegesis and ascetic theory by interpreting the Song in light of a developed ascetic anthropology, even if that means that to do so he had to dismiss the intellectualism of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa and exchange it for ascetic realism.

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Nilus synthesis brings me to next point that concerns the common themes that unite the genres and become more discernible. On the one hand, the notion that God’s withdrawal does not entail his absence permeates the three genres that we have been considering, and also the fact that God’s withdrawal should be viewed in terms of God’s decision not to intervene during ethical hardships. The dialectic between God’s presence and God’s withdrawal, a dialectic that the book of Ezekiel introduced, is exploited by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa and also the desert ascetics in the pains that they take to emphasise the fact that God is the sole agent that directs and instructs either Israel, his bride or his ascetics. Besides, one should take into account the fact that the loud cry on the cross features in the lists of ‘kinds’ or ‘reasons’ of divine abandonment, thanks to the genius of Nemesius, and that ascetic realism provides a substratum that made possible a unified exegesis concerning the experience of the bride and also the stories of desert ascetics. As it concerns Nemesius, the theme that seems to permeate all discussions is the notion of God’s pedagogy and paideia. This is the only discernible context in which the loud cry on the cross, the adventures of the bride and the feeling of God’s withdrawal during ascetic combat could coexist meaningfully. In this context, then, the three images represent different ‘kinds’ or ‘reasons’ of divine abandonment and that does not necessarily mean that the experience of one could help elucidate the experience of the rest. This seems to be the answer to another question that the book set to examine, i.e. the possibility of a Jesus-like ‘kind’ of abandonment. The answer is both positive and negative: yes, late antique ascetic literature introduced a ‘kind’ of abandonment that could be called Jesus-like; but no, it did not perceive it as a model that could have offered any insights into the experience of the desert ascetics. In other words, the ascetics in the desert did not think that they were undergoing the same experience with Jesus on the cross. For one thing, in those lists that I have presented and they include the image of Jesus, it is not always clear whether they refer to the passion altogether or the incident of the loud cry on the cross. On the other hand, even if we affirm the second option, then it should be considered as sui generis experience, because we should take into account the impossibility of drawing any parallel lines given the obscurity with which Christian theology dealt with the experience of Jesus. If one were to push the evidence to an extreme and argue that in such an assessment I have overlooked the fact that theology viewed the loud cry in light of the accommodation of human weakness by Christ and the many interpretative possibilities that this line of thought might open up so as to associate the two experiences, possibilities which I have dismissed, we still have to take into account the many subtle ramifications that theology applied to the notion of human weakness in order to do so, to the extent that the genuineness of the experience of Jesus is not always explicit or even guaranteed in our sources. For instance, we should think of the distinction between ‘passion’ and ‘pre-passion’ in Didymus the Blind, the suggestion that Christ assumed the results of sinfulness but not sinfulness as such and even the adjective “seeming” in Maximus the Confessor. At the same time, there is no indication that late antique authors would have applied the same psychological mechanism to both cases, given the uniqueness of the person of Jesus and the thin ice, theologically speaking, that had been stepping on. Such associations and options

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have been available to us, but I doubt they were possible in late antiquity given the red lines that seemed to overstep.1 However, the association between sinfulness and divine abandonment seems to have played a secondary role in keeping apart the experience of Jesus and the ascetics, given the fact that in the desert ascetic literature divine abandonment did not necessitate sinfulness as a cause, as it is evident in the distinction between abandonment due to God’s aversion to sinfulness and God’s pedagogy. In other words, our sources claim that divine abandonment might occur even at the stage of ethical perfection and it is indicative that the lists of ‘kinds’ or ‘reasons’ of abandonment feature alongside stories of sinfulness (e.g. Judas) and stories of perfection (e.g. Paul). This point is the answer to the question concerning the normativeness of divine abandonment. With the single exception of Athanasius of Alexandria in the Life of Antony for reasons that relate to his theological agenda, and regardless of the context, whether it is the intellectualism represented by Origen and Gregory of Nyssa or the ascetic realism of the desert tradition, there is general consensus that God’s withdrawal should be anticipated at all stages of one’s life. Our sources might disagree about the intensity, psychological effects and even the character of the experience (intellectual or bodily), but they agree on the normativeness of the experience. Some ascetics, such as Antony (Letters) and Macarius the Great, refer to the perennial possibility of sinfulness that seems to be innate to man’s nature; others indicate that such a possibility is more remote (Diadochus) while one is approaching God. And yet, in the greater scheme of God’s paideia the withdrawal of his presence and assistance is the means by which God instructs and directs the soul. Origen seems to be the example par excellence how the notion of God’s paideia might be shaped differently in different contexts: the bride experiences God’s withdrawal to stir her desire even more, but the martyrs undergo hardships so that their faith could be tested, and yet in both cases Origen’s discourse is saturated with the notion of God’s paideia. Again, Athanasius is the only author we have considered that proclaims the efficiency of God’s grace, whereas the general consensus amongst the sources I have presented concerning the content of God’s paideia is that it forms part of the greater scheme of God’s providence and that it signifies that God actively directs the bride and the ascetics towards a postponed eschatology that is ‘here, but not yet’, an eschatology that does not necessitate the engagement of sinfulness but is inconceivable without God’s paideia. In such a context, divine abandonment directs both the bride and also the ascetics to the final rewards and spiritual rest that they should enjoy. However, such an eschatological orientation could not have been applicable in the case of Jesus, and therefore it is not surprising that there is no connection in our sources between Jesus and the ascetics in such a context. 1 As Rossé (1987), 78 has indicated, only after the Middle Ages did Christian theology draw an explicit connection between the loud cry of Jesus the experience of monastics. The Rhineland mystics introduced the notion that they were “imitators of Christ” and this imitation encompassed all events and experiences of their life, including the feeling of being abandoned by God. [p. 97, footnote 12]. The experience of abandonment by the mystics is viewed as an extension of the effects of the incarnation on the ascetic self. See Balthasar (1990), 75.

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But that does not mean that late antique theology did not introduce a deeper connection to the experience of Jesus and that we do not discern in a rudimentary and latent way an ontological connection between ethical struggles and the person of Jesus. For instance, more scholarly research should be directed to the way that theologians of Christology and ascetics presented humility: whereas for Christ, it is a direct outcome of his kenosis, for the ascetics it is as much a positive disposition towards God’s pedagogy, as it is a virtue that the ascetics should strive to obtain. And in the case of Gregory of Nyssa, it is the only elements that displays a certain affinity between men and Christ.2 It is promising that ascetics describe humility in kenotic terms, as self-effacement of the ascetics, and therefore they introduce an argument that lies close to contemporary theological currents that exaggerate the notion of God’s self-emptying.3 On the other, we have noted the presence of Christocentrism that informs the stories and sayings of the desert ascetics. A definition preserved in the desert literature presents Christian life as the “imitation of Christ” and I think that more should be done concerning the ascetic ideal of “imitation of Christ” so as to explore the possibility that imitation signifies a profound ontological affliction between Christ and his ascetics.4 Macarius the Great follows such a thread of thought. An ontological connection might be traced in Origen who stresses the depth of the connection between Jesus and the bride by introducing a Christocentrism that Athanasius developed further: any victory against the adversary powers, regardless if these are idols, demons or passions, is possible due to the incarnation and the fact that Jesus has already trampled them down. There are elements of such an approach in many lives and stories in the literature of the desert ascetics. But Macarius the Great seems to have introduced the most articulate link between the cross of Jesus and the experience of God’s withdrawal in the ascetics: The soul that is following the word of the Lord ought to take up the cross of the Lord with joy as it is written, that is readily suffer for the Lord every coming temptation, whether secret or visible and to put her hope always in the Lord, for it is in his power to make sorrowful the soul when he gives consent and to redeem from every temptation and sorrow.5 What lies at the heart of Macarius’ ascetic theory is the notion that the ascetics imitate Christ and therefore they become co-sufferers with him in his passion. Therefore, it seems that the connections that both Christian exegesis and Christology were reluctant to introduce, were developed in the ascetic literature. Macarius teaches that

2 Gregory, Beat. 1.82.20 and 1.84.9 (alluding to 2 Cor 8:9 and Phil 2:5–7). 3 Keller (2005), 131–55 and Burton-Christie (1993), 236–60 have already examined the notion of humility as sharing in Christ’s suffering in the desert tradition and its association to the self-emptying (kenosis) of Christ. See also Ramfos (2000), 183–95. 4 Apophth. (SysC), 1.37. The notion of “imitation” might be of platonic provenance but it was appropriated in a distinctly Christian environment due to the exhortation by Paul (cf. 1 Cor 11:1). For a thorough analysis of the scriptural origins and also the development of the theme in the patristic era see the article ‘Imitation du Christ’ in DSp 7, 1536–1601. 5 Macarius, Typs., 9.1 and also 6.4.

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God’s “power” is associated with the experience of God’s withdrawal. At the same time, he notes that Jesus manifests himself both in “poverty” and “glory”, and this is so due to his passion and his resurrection, and that the ascetics should experience the poverty and glory of Jesus.6 In Burton-Christie’s words, Jesus Christ was the model of humility par excellence for the monks. The endurance of afflictions, insults, trials, and dishonor for the sake of Christ, one of the signs of blessedness in the Beatitudes (Mt 5:10–12), was an important ideal for those living in the desert, and an expression of humility. However, it is Christ’s own example of humility – his kenosis of self-emptying (Phil 2:5) – whose shadow falls most dramatically across the Sayings.7 And as Macarius writes, “You need to be co-crucified with the crucified, suffer with him who suffered, so in this way you might be glorified together with him who has been glorified. It is need that the bride suffer together with the groom and in this way become a participant and heir together with Christ. He does not admit someone to enter the city of saints without misfortunes or the narrow and hard way, and to reign together with the king to the ages of ages”.8

6 Macarius, Hom. 3.3. 7 Burton-Christie (1993), 240. Macarius, Serm. 55.4.3. 8 Macarius, Hom. 12.1.

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Index

Index of Ancient Authors Antony the Great 17, 19, 92, 136-148, 149, 156, 158, 169, 170-174, 190, 192 Aphrahat 22, 75 Apollinarius of Laodicea 77, 80-81, 96-99 Apophthegmata Patrum 63, 65, 149-150, 155, 158, 170-171, 174 Athanasius of Alexandria 26-27, 62, 78, 81, 87-99, 105, 108, 110, 112, 137-145, 147-148, 157, 170, 173, 185, 192-193 Basil of Cæsarea 62, 100-101 Clement of Alexandria 134, 145, 151, 177 Cyril of Alexandria 65, 78-79, 81, 108114, 121 Diadochus of Photice 27, 115, 155-161, 169, 173, 177, 179, 185-188, 192 Didymus the Blind 70, 78, 101, 102-105, 111, 121, 159, 162-163, 191 Diodore of Tarsus 96 Epiphanius of Salamis 105-107 Evagrius of Pontus 23, 26-27, 60-62, 64, 67, 69-70, 72-73, 115, 117, 148, 150, 153, 156-157, 160-170, 173-179, 182, 187 Gregory Nazianzen 94-97, 99-100 Gregory of Nyssa 21, 26, 37-38, 41, 51-64, 68, 71, 77-78, 81, 96-100, 179, 183184, 188, 190-193 Hippolytus of Rome 37, 39 Ignatius of Antioch 18 Irenæus of Lyon 76, 80, 84, 144

John Chrysostom 80 John Damascene 101, 115-123, 167-168 Justin the Martyr 22, 75, 80, 84 Macarius the Great 27, 60, 64-65, 67, 69, 72-73, 115, 129, 155-160, 170, 173, 177, 179-187, 192-194 Maximus the Confessor 19, 27, 82, 112, 116, 119-121, 161-163, 166-170, 179, 191 Melito of Sardis 33 Nemesius of Emessa 150, 152-155, 157, 161-163, 167-170, 174, 176, 180, 191 Nestorius of Constantinople 81, 107109, 111-113 Nilus of Ancyra 26, 38, 41, 61-62, 7074, 189-191 Origen 21, 25-27, 37-52, 55-61, 63, 64-65, 67-68, 70-72, 78, 80, 83-87, 89-91, 93-95, 108, 125-138, 140-148, 150, 157-158, 172, 176, 179, 183, 185, 188-193 Palladius 27, 62, 115, 148-150, 152, 153, 163 Philo 44-48, 51, 55, 139-140 Plato 31, 44-45, 139, 152, Plotinus 44-45, 47, 55, 139-140 Poprhyry 139-140 Procopius of Gaza 41-42 Sophocles 25 Tertullian 22 Theodore of Mopsuestia 38, 77 Theodoret of Cyrrhus 26, 37-38, 61-69, 71-72, 77-78, 112-115

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Index of Modern Authors Abramowski, L. 81, 107 Balentine, S. 20, 31-34 Balthasar, H. 21, 27, 53, 56 Bardy, G. 78 Barton-Christie, D. 194 Bathrellos, D. 107 Berkovitz 22 Block, D. 32-33, 36 Brown, R. 22 Canivet, P. 63 Caputo, J. 20, 24 Carey, H. 21-22, 75-76 Cheek, J. 51, 131 Clarke, A. 21, 23-24 Cohen, D. 29-31 Daniélou, J. 52, 59, 83 Derrida, J. 20 Dragas, G. 92 Driscoll, J. 23, 149-150, 175 Dysinger, L. 23 Elliott, M. 21, 79, 189 Frankenberg, W. 163-165 Gavrilyuk, P. 88 Goodman, A. 81 Grillmeier, A. 86, 92, 97, 113 Guérard, M. 61, 70-71 Guillaumont, A. 149-150, 153, 164-167, 176-177 Guinot, J. 78 Hausherr, I. 158, 164-168, 175, 178 Jay, E. 129 Jouassard, G. 23, 26, 83-84, 86-87, 89, 91, 93-96, 101-102, 111, 118, 121-122 Jüngel, E. 21

Kaplan, J. 18 Keenan, M. 58, 62 Keller, D. 171, 175 King, C. 38, 134 Koltun-Fromm, N. 22 Laird, M. 54, 56 Layton, R. 115 Lewis, C.S. 20 Loofs, F. 81 Louth, A. 40, 44, 116 McGinn, B. 45 McGuckin, J. 80 Menn, E. 22 Meredith, A. 52, 58 Moltmann, J. 21 Mosshammer, A. 56 O’Laughlin, M. 175, 177, 178 Otis, B. 50, 58-59 Pásztori-Kupán, I. 64, 78 Plested, M. 180, 182-185 Rice, R. 62 Richard, M. 78 Rosenbaum, H. 61 Rossé, G. 21-22, 24, 27, 79, 84, 114 Rubenson, S. 137-138, 145 Sakharov, N. 19, 23, 27 Scheffczyk, L. 151 Sölle, D. 21 Tkacz, C. 22 Urbainczyk, T. 62 White, J. 19 Young, F. 152 Žižek, S. 20

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General Index accommodation of human nature 87, 91, 117-122, 191 allegory 29, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 52, 78, 83, 94, 130 angel as sign of God’s proximity 128, 129, 153 in cosmology 145, 171 Apollinarians 78, 81, 96-97, 105, 114, 117 apophatic 53 Arians 25, 80-81, 87-89, 92-94, 98, 101, 103, 105-107, 113-114, 117, 138, 144-145 assistance by God 73, 86, 122, 128-129, 132, 141, 142, 148, 153, 159, 174, 177, 183, 185, 192 aversion of sin 158-159, 161, 173, 185, 192 Biblical canon 18, 20, 26, 29, 31, 36, 63 bride as Church 39, 41-42, 43, 48, 52, 63, 125 as Mary 39 Christology as genre 17, 18, 21, 23, 26- 27, 79, 123, 189-190, 193 Church liturgical life 24-26, 39, 70 consent by God 49-51, 65-66, 68, 115, 131, 150153, 156-161, 168-169, 173, 177, 181, 183, 185, 186, 190, 193 for the passion 112, 114, 115 consolation spiritual 179, 185 controversy theological 49, 93, 95, 113, 116, 178 Christological 24, 62, 77-78, 81, 82, 96, 99, 108 corruption of the body 92, 105, due to sin 73, 153, 155, 159

Council of Chalcedon 64, 78-79, 82, 116-117, 122-123 Council of Ephesus 64, 81, 107 Council of Jamnia 206 Council of Laterano 82 Council of Nicæa 75, 81, 94, 112, 117 Council of Second Constantinople 82, 116 cowardice 67, 92-93, 101, 103, 112, 122 darkness as unknowability 53-54 darkness of passions 126, 127, 129, 147, 181 darkness at Jesus’ death 109 darkness as separation 44, 54 demons sinister spirits/demonic 69, 126-129, 135, 137, 139, 140-141, 143, 145, 149, 153, 158, 160, 168, 170-172, 174-177, 180-181, 183, 185, 187, 193 despair 31-32, 44, 56, 122, 173, 186 dialectic between presence and absence 43, 45, 48, 50-51, 61, 64, 129-130, 133, 136, 142, 144, 146, 147-148, 185-186, 191 docetism 90, 101, 107 economy of God 91, 93, 105, 110, 113, 161 eros 31, 68, 130 Evagrius of Pontus ascetic system 23, 27, 61-62, 70, 71, 166 Ezekiel book of 20, 33, 36, 47, 49, 114, 131, 142, 173, 191 face God turns away/hides 25, 31, 33-37, 40, 63, 67, 128, 159, 160, 162, 173, 189 Gethsemane prayer of Jesus 82, 86, 89, 111, 121 gnosis 67, 160, 175-176, 182

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hatred of sin 160-161, 165-168, 177-178 hiddenness of God 20, 31, 43, 64, 130, 133-134, 136-137 humility 84-85, 97, 165, 171, 174, 177, 193-194 idolatry 36, 42, 50-51, 128-129, 144 imitation of Christ 135, 184, 193 impassibility of God 88, 92, 107 of man (passionlessness) 166-168, 173, 175- 177 incomprehensibility of God 53-57, 61, 63, 68, 190 infinity of God’s nature 53, 55, 64, 68 intellect as divine 45, 178-179 higher faculty 41, 46, 55-56, 117, 134, 140, 152, 190 Israel 29, 30-33, 36, 38-40, 44 Job abandoned by God 103-104, 132, 152, 154, 160, 161, 167 book of 25-26, 125 Judaism 22, 30, 31, 36, 38-39, 76 kenosis 20, 85, 109, 193, 194 laxity spiritual 69, 71-73, 147-148, 174, 177, 180, 183 loud cry of Jesus 17-24, 26, 75-77, 79-85, 87-91, 93-109, 111-119, 121-123, 152, 156, 162-163, 165, 169-170, 184, 189, 190, 191 martyrs 48, 51, 61, 101, 103, 104, 132-143, 147-148, 152, 154, 167, 172, 192 metaphor 83, 94 Moses 44, 53-54, 145-146 Mount Horeb ascent of Moses 53-54 Mount Sina revelation of God 38, 44, 53

mysticism ascent/journey 40-41, 52 mystical language/theology 47, 61, 125, 138 Nestorians 62, 78, 81, 92, 99, 108, 113114, 118 Nicene faith 77, 81, 96-97, 99, 102, 103, 105-107, 109, 114, 123, 178 night of abandonment 44, 79, 177 nous of Jesus 77, 81 as faculty 133, 144, 153 paideia 45, 55, 56-58, 64, 67, 71, 73, 132, 158, 164, 172, 191, 192 Paphnutius 23, 67-68, 73, 147-151, 153156, 158-159, 161-162, 164, 167-169, 174, 176-177, 179-181 passion narratives 22, 76-77, 80, 81, 88 ethical/ascetic theory 59, 126-128, 139, 143, 145, 160, 170-173, 176, 180, 187, 190, 193 of Jesus 21, 22, 23, 39, 58, 75-76, 84, 86-89, 91-92, 94-99, 105-107, 109-115, 122, 131, 135, 152, 163, 169, 191, 194 as human weakness 65-66, 101, 103, 104, 108, 117, 120-122 Paul abandoned by God 66, 67, 132, 152, 154, 160-161, 167, 172, 181 as image of perfection 192 Epistles 24, 39, 79, 85 pedagogy 66, 128, 131, 145, 151, 157-161, 170, 173, 176, 180, 181, 185-186, 191-193 prayer as loud cry 87, 100, 101-102, 104, 111, 112-113, 117, 118, 119, 123, 162, 169 pride 59, 66-68, 71-73, 145-147, 150, 152, 154, 161, 166-168, 174-179, 181 providence 49, 65, 128, 131-132, 135, 151-154, 156, 158, 161-162, 164, 168-169, 174, 176, 192 Psalms of Lamentation 36, 63, 76, 142

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Psalms book of 20, 24, 25, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 63, 78, 83, 84, 86, 96, 113, 115, 117, 128, 159, 182, 189 realism ascetic 26, 148, 157, 175, 179-181, 187, 190, 191-192 of loud cry 83, 85, 89-90, 93, 96 Scriptures (Septuagint) 17-18, 25, 27, 29, 37, 38, 43, 47, 52, 56, 61, 63, 75, 85, 87, 89, 93, 96, 100, 102-103, 108, 114, 117, 125, 132-134, 141-142, 153-155, 161-163, 169, 173, 176, 190 Sheol/Hades 34-35, 105 Mount Sina revelation of God 38, 44, 53 sinfulness ethical 126, 149, 150, 153, 155, 157, 161, 173, 179-185, 190-191 and abandonment 18, 19, 101, 103104, 115, 119, 121, 152, 154, 156, 158-163, 165, 167-170, 173-174, 176-178, 189, 192 slothfulness 50, 68-69, 71-72 soul of Jesus 86, 90-92-, 95, 105-107, 117, 122 suffering servant 76 theology

life of Trinity 91, 93, 105, 110 transcendence of God’s nature 21, 52, 57 typology 79, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 96-97, 111-112, 123, 162 union between bride and bridegroom 31, 49, 50, 54-55, 134 between soul and God 47, 50-52, 56, 125, 130, 133, 136, 141, 144, 184 of natures in Jesus 91, 96, 99, 108109, 111, 116-117 of God and Jesus 97, 112-113 vice 71, 101-102, 104, 146, 174-177, 180 vigilance 49-50, 60, 68, 73-74, 130, 140141, 144, 147-148, 157-158, 174, 177, 179, 180, 182-183, 185 virtue 52, 60, 71-73, 127, 136, 138, 146, 148, 151-152, 154, 161, 165-168, 171, 174177, 187-188, 193 warfare spiritual 69, 74, 126, 130, 139, 157, 172, 174, 180, 183, 185 will of Jesus 82, 118, free-agency 49, 151-152, 158, 160, 176, 180, 183

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