Muslim Women and Islamic Resurgence: Religion, Education, and Identity Politics in Bahrain 9780755611614, 9781848858244

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This book is dedicated to Mourad and Samiya Shehadeh and Sachin Pandya, my children. Mourad and Samiya came with me to Bahrain and helped me make contacts through their friends, but more importantly, they kept me company. Sachin was only a dream at that point, but he came true.

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ACK NOWLEDGMENTS

This project has left me indebted to many people. Drs. Juan Campo, Dwight Reynolds and Nancy Gallagher have provided much guidance. This study would not have been possible without their help, dedication, enthusiasm and unflagging support. Dr. Mimi Hotchkiss made helpful editorial suggestions during the revision from dissertation to book, for which I am grateful. The Pandya family has been of assistance in every way. I am grateful to Punit and Anuradha Pandya, my father-in-law and mother-in-law, for the many hours they spent providing childcare so that I could work and for all their help and encouragement. Shilpa Pandya, my sister-inlaw, offered her editorial expertise on several occasions. Shefali Vatsa, another sister-in-law, lent moral support. I would also like to thank the women who are represented in this study for sharing their thoughts and lives with me. I am grateful to the Fulbright Program which financially enabled my research. The University of Bahrain, my academic sponsor, was most generous and hospitable. Innumerable people in Bahrain kindheartedly helped me. I owe much gratitude to Aleta Wenger for her assistance, as well as to Shaha El Kenderi, Sharon Nagy and Dana Jawahery. I deeply appreciate the assistance of Izzuddin El-Byanooni with Arabic texts. My copyeditor Diane Belle James went above and beyond her job description to make this a better book, and I admire her professional dedication and generosity. Many thanks to Rasna Dhillon, Maria Marsh, and

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Nadine El-Hadi, my wonderful editors at I.B.Tauris, for their encouragement along the way. Many colleagues offered their support, especially Ahmad Atassi, Aysha Hidayatullah and Michelle Zimney. I am grateful to those organizing the Scholarly Writing Institute at California State University at Long Beach. I thank all of my colleagues in the Department of Religious Studies at CSULB, as well as our department coordinators, Richard Rodriguez, Lynda Stassi and Ben Blanchard, and our wonderful CSULB librarian, Greg Armento. I also extend my gratitude to the CSULB’s College of Liberal Arts, and in particular to Dean Gerry Riposa for his support of this project. My thanks to Katie Banh Coombs for her friendship. I am eternally and immensely grateful to Colleen Adelle Nava Gala for surviving our ill-fated encounter with a drunk driver. An earlier version of chapter 3 was published as “Women’s Shi’i Ma’atim in Bahrain” in the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 6/2 (Spring 2010). Parts of chapter 4 were published under my previous name, Sophia Shehadeh, in “Women’s Religious Practices in Bahrain: Umm al-Darda’” in MIT’s Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (Spring 2004). While I appreciate the assistance that many have provided, any mistakes or imperfections in this work are my responsibility alone. Finally, there are no words to say how much the ongoing support of my husband, Manish P. Pandya, in all of my endeavors, has meant to me. I also credit him here for creating the index of this book. May our journey together continue forever.

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1 BAHR AIN AND BEYOND ITS SHOR ES

Introduction The Kingdom of Bahrain provides a fascinating example of a Gulf country that has undergone social, political and economic change at a dizzying speed. The year 2002 proved to be pivotal in many ways. The first democratic elections ever held were in May and October of that year (for municipal and legislative offices, respectively), and women were allowed, for the first time in Bahrain’s history, not only to vote but also to run for office. Issues of gender were ardently debated on television, in the newspapers, and in the many women’s clubs and organizations that exist in Bahrain. At one women’s gathering I attended, Bahraini Muslim women from many sectors were present: a parliamentary candidate, two newspaper journalists, the president of the charitable Bahraini Women’s Association, and others. The talk was animated and passionate, and centered on how to get more women into positions of power. Some might find it ironic that, at the same time, Bahrain was host to active movements of Islamic resurgence among both the Sunni and the Shi‘i communities, movements that many might dismiss as conservative and thus detrimental to women. Yet women who supported Islamic revival movements were in attendance at this gathering, and they took part in the discussion regarding empowering women.

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In fact, the “gender question” is debated by both men and women within Islamic movements as ferociously as it is outside them.1 Many scholars have argued that the Islamic resurgence is linked to the subjugation of women.2 While Islamism has produced neopatriarchal movements, this study focuses on alternative understandings of the resurgence. Specifically, I argue that the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain is shaped by the rise of modern education in the country, and that ultimately it offers a potential space for women’s self-determination. More broadly, this study looks at the many different ways in which modernization, religion, the state, and gender intersect in Bahrain.

At First Glance The presence of the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain was clearly apparent to an observer walking around in public in 2002: the overwhelming majority of Bahraini women were wearing the black abaya and covering their hair, whereas this was not the case in the early 1970s.3 Many women of my acquaintance, completely clad in black, showed me old photos of themselves and their mothers wearing scanty mini-skirts and T-shirts out shopping in the market place. They tended to tell me that back in the seventies, things were really liberal and that at that time they themselves were naive and not religious; they had not yet become serious, contributing adults who understand politics, Islam, their duties as Muslims, and their role in the world. Bahraini men, by the way, also wear their own versions of Islamic dress. They tend to wear a white or black robe and cover their hair with a red, black or white scarf, or for Shi‘i men, sometimes a turban. Though at first glance this new phenomenon did create the appearance of a religiously heightened atmosphere in Bahrain, the clothing story is more complex than it appears. These black and white robes are often very expensive, and they are status symbols and ways of expressing Bahraini communal identity as much as they are symbols of religious adherence or piety, or indeed of any allegiance to Islamism. At a traditional festival at the school my teenage daughter attended while in Bahrain, all the girls were to wear abayas instead of their school uniforms that day. We went on a shopping expedition

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and found out that an abaya can easily cost 100 US dollars. In a country with such a large non-citizen population, it is quite easy to distinguish a Bahraini from a non-Bahraini simply by the clothes they wear. Bahrainis, often dressed in clean, pressed, gleaming, expensive, austere and flowing black or white robes, appear quite elegant compared to the expatriate community, although of course even among Bahrainis their clothing reflects class distinctions. Passing through the mall, one can see individual differences in abayas based on personal choice, position and class: girls in skin-tight abayas that were obviously chosen for their fashionable and sexy design; professional women wearing elegant and highly tailored abayas; the very religious wearing heavy, voluminous abayas with face coverings and black gloves as well; and poorer women wearing plain, undecorated abayas. On my first trip to a mall in Bahrain I was amused to see a teenager, dressed in a fashionably embroidered and sequined abaya, step onto a scale outside a pharmacy; when she saw that I noticed her she grinned widely. Dress is not mandated in Bahrain as it is in Saudi Arabia, and most expatriates and even some female Bahrainis reject the abaya. An enormous variety of apparel is apparent in the mall or the marketplace, including mini-skirts, South Asian shalwar qameez, designer dresses, suits, and of course the ubiquitous jeans, adding to the cosmopolitan atmosphere. The diversity noted in the black or white robes worn by many Bahrainis reflects a range of attitudes toward the Islamic resurgence. The presence of women and men wearing non-Islamic apparel, including Western-style shorts and sleeveless shirts (which would be forbidden in nearby Iran and Saudi Arabia), manifests Bahraini tolerance of other cultural practices.

First Impressions Arriving with my two children in the middle of the night in Bahrain, a tiny country near Saudi Arabia in the Arabian Gulf,4 allowed for a groggy introduction to the country in which I had planned to live for a year as a university graduate student researching Muslim women’s religious practices. During the trip from the airport to the apartment

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which the University of Bahrain had kindly reserved for our stay, we all tried to take in the country and get our first impressions despite the late hour. After crossing the bridge from the island of Muharraq, where the airport is located, to the main island of Bahrain, what I noticed was how modern, glittery, and indeed upscale everything appeared. Tall high-rise buildings in the capital city of Manama gleamed in the dark, the highways appeared wide, clean, smooth and well lit, and the roadside landscaping was elegant: evenly spaced palm trees and other green foliage; the urban landscape reflected Bahrain’s access to global capital and technology. When we arrived at the apartment, it looked like a graceful Spanish-style villa and, to my surprise, the refrigerator was stocked with soda, ice cream, cookies, hot dogs, potato chips and a lot of other food that an American researcher with two children might be grateful to find. “So this is the Gulf,” I thought, and I was struck by how starkly different it was from other Middle Eastern countries I had been in, such as Yemen. Both the evidence of wealth, as reflected in the highly developed landscape I was able to see as I arrived, and the availability of a variety of Western foodstuffs in my apartment, caught me by surprise. The name “Bahrain” means “two seas.” It might derive from the assumption that there were sweetwater springs issuing from the seabed surrounding Bahrain, and thus a second source of water or a “sea under the sea.”5 Bahrain is an archipelago composed of 33 islands, only five of which are inhabited, and its capital is located on the main island, also called Bahrain. The name “Manama” means “sleeping place,” and it probably comes from the fact that in pre-Islamic times Manama was used as a burial ground by residents of the other islands. Bahrain looks quite different than Yemen. Many Western-style franchises, including McDonalds, Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Starbucks, lend the island a Westernized feel despite the presence of some traditional architecture. Yemen, while beautiful, is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and as such certainly does not look as wealthy, modern, or developed as Bahrain (McDonalds has not yet arrived in Yemen). However, this glossy initial introduction to Bahrain proved to be somewhat deceptive. Some of the Shi‘i villages

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outside the capital, with their rickety houses and pot-holed streets, offer a picture of quite a different socioeconomic situation. Viewing this contrast, I wondered in what ways the rapid urban development of Bahrain had impacted religious practices, if it had at all: development does not necessarily lead to major social transformation. Initially I had planned to carry out my research year abroad in Yemen in 2001, but these plans were cancelled with the tragic events of 11 September 2001, as my granting agency, the Fulbright Program, asked me to select another country. I chose Bahrain upon the recommendation of a faculty advisor, Juan E. Campo, who had been there and recommended it as a worthy alternative site for research. The change of plans caused me to adapt what I had planned to study in Yemen – Sufism and women – to Bahrain. While “folk Islam” and activities broadly associated with Sufism used to be widely practiced in Bahrain,6 as I read about religion and society in the country in preparation for my field research, I found that this was no longer the case, although Sufism is still practiced by a very small number of people on the island.7 I was curious as to why Sufism was on the wane, and the process of thinking about my project brought up many new questions as well. My broader concerns had to do with women’s agency, religion, and change, and how women work toward their own interests from within religious movements. My questions, now applied to Bahrain, included three significant areas of inquiry: how have women’s religious practices changed in the last half-century or so; why have these changes taken place; and what are the implications of these changes? I found that the replacement of traditional Islamic education and older concepts of literacy by modern, Western-inspired, twentieth-century education for women in the Gulf, combined with economic and political developments and the effects of globalization, has led to significant changes in women’s religious practices in Bahrain. One example of change is that many women now reject popular forms of what revivalists consider “non-orthodox” Islam, such as many practices associated with Sufism.8 Instead, there is a new emphasis on textual forms of Islam. Of particular interest to me were women’s religious institutions. I found that Bahraini Muslim women, both Sunni and Shi‘i, use their communal religious venues to create safe spaces in which they can

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reinterpret religious texts, practice religious leadership, and work in a variety of ways toward self-improvement and the improvement of their communities. A common perception in much of the Western world regarding Muslim women is that they are uniformly oppressed not only by Muslim men but also by Islam, which is seen as codifying and sanctioning misogynistic practices. Certainly, neopatriarchal religious movements arising in the last few decades in many regions of the world, including the Middle East, have limited women’s rights and choices in a variety of ways in those regions.9 This is true in Bahrain as well. Nonetheless, my research finds that it is precisely through religion that many Bahraini Sunni and Shi‘i Muslim women of differing social status actively participate in shaping their world, whether at the personal, the local, or the global level. Religion is not the only channel through which Bahraini women seek self-improvement or the improvement of their communities, but for many, it is a principal one. Some might expect a country as developed and as modern-looking as Bahrain to be Westernized in a broad sense, and in some ways, it is: one can watch American television programs, eat at American and European restaurants, and buy a variety of Western products. However, it would be more accurate to say that in international Bahrain, Bollywood movies are quite popular, Indian, Chinese and Persian restaurants are easy to find, and markets offer a wide range of international products. Nonetheless, a Westerner might at first assume that since Bahrain looks “modern,” it “naturally” follows that Bahraini society also embraces secularism and is “liberal” regarding women’s roles.10 Such assumptions are problematized by the fact that in contemporary, technologically developed Bahrain, many educated women participate in Islamic revivalism and choose religion as a venue for the communal activities through which they seek modes of change. This movement, or these movements, cannot be considered “traditional,” but represent forms of modernity existing in “a continual development of multiple modernities.”11 Joel Beinin and Joe Stork note that “Islamists do not uncritically reject modernity; they are trying to reformulate it and regulate it, using the discursive terms of the Islamic heritage.”12

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Terminology It is relevant to bring up terminology at this point. John Obert Voll refers to “movements of Muslim revival” and the “Islamic resurgence,” whose appearance he places in 1979–80.13 Najib Ghadbian makes use of a variety of terms including “Islamist,” “Islamic movements” and the “Islamic resurgence.”14 I find these terms to be analytically useful, flexible, and more accurate than certain other terms often used by other scholars such as “Wahhabism,” “extremism,” “radicalism,” “fundamentalism,” and so forth. Voll writes, “Part of the visible Muslim resurgence is putting modern sentiments into Islamic garb, but the Islamic resurgence also involves the creation of new and effective forms for the continuing vitality of the Islamic message.”15 By my choice of terms, however, I do not mean to imply that Islam was “weak” or “lifeless” before its resurgence or revival. Selecting terms that appear to reflect the ideals of those to whom they refer reflects the attempt to understand, and thus, for the purposes of this study, I often refer to the modern Muslim religious movements in Bahrain as an expression of Islamic resurgence or revival, promoting the vitality of Islam and the relevance of Islam to the modern context. While I also occasionally employ the widely accepted terms “Islamist” and “Islamism,” I do so with a measure of discomfort. The term “Islamist” is commonly used to refer to a Muslim who promotes a form of government based on sharia (shari‘a, Islamic law), although some use it more broadly (and loosely) to refer to Muslim religious groups that are working toward any political or social change.16 One Bahraini to whom the term would likely apply complained that it seems to imply that an “Islamist” is somehow more Muslim than a “non-Islamist,” which I (and he) would not like to suggest. The term also appears to suggest that only those involved in the “Islamist” movement are unhappy with the status quo, and that secularists and “non-Islamist” Muslims support encroaching Westernization and the prevailing policies and systems of the government, which in reality may or may not be the case. Many who are labeled “Islamists” because of the degree of their religious adherence do not actually hold uniform political views; some might not be interested in the political side of

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things at all. More importantly, while one has to acknowledge that the social arena in Bahrain has been largely Islamized, and while some of the Bahraini women with whom I spoke were in fact involved with religious groups associated with political Islamism, nonetheless many would not define themselves as Islamists. This is not only because they might simply have preferred the term “Muslim,” which was often the case, but because many saw their participation as being inspired by piety, not politics. In short, the term “Islamist” carries a political meaning that I often found problematic when applied to real people, and given the Western hostility to “political Islam” as an ideology, I am concerned with the dehumanizing effect of its use. However, I accept, with reservations, Ghadbian’s nuanced definition of an Islamist as someone who has a “conscious activist agenda” and who calls “for the implementation of Islam in the public as well as the private realms,” and it is in this sense that I use the term.17 When the term is broadly applied to include Muslim groups involved in any form of social activism, however, its use places individuals with widely disparate goals in a single category, which is unfortunate. “Wahhabism” is another problematic term and one that I reject. Sunni Muslims involved in the Islamic resurgence with whom I spoke in Bahrain found the term to be offensive because it emphasizes the role of the founder of the movement, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, rather than the message of Islam, and at times it incorrectly implies Saudi connections. “Wahhabism” has also come to mean “religious extremism,” which in the post–9/11 era carries highly charged connotations and may have serious implications. I have observed Muslims who found themselves the object of the “Wahhabist” label – whether because of their strict religious adherence, dress, Salafi views, or Saudi nationality – correct the labeler. Finally, the terms “Islamist” and “Wahhabist” are used in opposition to the term “secularist” which often implies someone who promotes Western ideals and models of government such as individual liberty and secular democracy.18 It must be pointed out that the form of government in Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy, and that most Bahrainis, whether involved in the resurgence or not, would appreciate greater opportunities for democratic political participation. Those

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Bahrainis who are not part of the Islamic resurgence have myriad reasons for abstaining, including but not limited to their adherence to alternative ideologies or worldviews such as socialism, Pan-Arabism, Sufism, Western liberalism, etc. Reality is more complex than the terms used to describe it.

Methodology Within a few days of my arrival, I started making contacts with women’s religious groups. During a meeting with the very serious-looking directors of Discover Islam, a prominent Sunni Muslim proselytizing organization in Manama for both men and women, I was offered an introduction to an all-women madrasa (school for Qur’anic learning) called Umm al-Darda’. In this school I was able to observe classes and carry out interviews, which provided the basis for chapter 4 of this book. In fact, I attended classes at Umm al-Darda’ for a period of three months. Besides taking my children back and forth to school from ‘Aali, where we lived, to Manama, the location of their school and the madrasa, those classes structured a lot of my time in Bahrain. I met other women, both Shi‘i and Sunni, through my children’s school, at Umm al-Darda’, in my neighborhood, at public events such as the Annual Conference for Religious Tolerance, at the University of Bahrain, and through social events hosted by the US Embassy. My fieldwork was primarily ethnographic in nature. I carried out interviews and spoke informally with countless others about women’s communal religious practices. I also took notes at social or religious events, and otherwise participated in life in Bahrain during my stay; for example, I took notes after attending Qur’anic classes, weddings, literary events, parties and other social events. I was able to formally interview 25 Sunnis and 11 Shi‘a of various socioeconomic backgrounds, most of whom were women between the ages of 20 and 60. Most of the women I spoke with were educated and of middle- to upper-middleclass standing, although I also spoke with a few very wealthy women. A few of the Shi‘i women I interviewed (but not all) were of a lower socioeconomic standing, as were some of the expatriates I interviewed. This study is based chiefly on these interviews, conversations, notes,

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and also on my experiences in Bahrain. More specifically, it focuses on the perceptions of Bahraini Muslim women, as well as expatriate Muslim women living in Bahrain (see chapter 6), of the changes that have taken place in their communities and religious structures and in how they interpret Islam. I have changed the names of almost all of the women whose voices appear in this study (although none requested that I do so) in order to preserve their privacy.19 In many cases, statements made by the interviewees represented in this study were originally made in English, which is widely and fluently spoken in Bahrain, especially among educated Bahrainis; only some women of the older, less educated generations do not speak English. At times, however, people broke into Arabic here and there, which I can speak and understand (although not at a native level), having studied Modern Standard Arabic for approximately seven years. Previous trips to Yemen and Palestine/Israel allowed me to develop skills in colloquial Arabic as well. I recorded my informants’ comments either in handwritten notes or on audiotape, or both. Interested in intergenerational change, I asked my informants to give me some background information regarding their education, family, and sect of Islam, and then I typically asked how their religious practices differed from those of their mothers and grandmothers. I also questioned them regarding the ways in which women’s religious practices differed from those of men in their religious community. The women whose stories informed my chapters on Sunni and Shi‘i communal religious institutions (chapters 3 and 4) were asked about the role these organizations played in their lives. Finally, I asked how the educational system affected culture and religion in Bahrain, from their perspective. I tried to craft questions that were as open-ended as possible, and thus these interviews often took a different path than I had originally planned, as conversations often do.

The Demographics of Bahrain: Sunnis, Shi‘a and Others Rather than a single ethnic group, my informants represent a range of ethnicities. Bahrain is a diverse country: at the time of my field research in 2002–3, its population of nearly 700,000 was approximately 63 percent

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Bahraini nationals, with the rest being South and Southeast Asians, Arabs from other countries, Iranians, Europeans and Americans.20 Approximately 60–70 percent of the native Bahraini population is Twelver Shi‘i, although the ruling Al Khalifa family is Sunni.21 A simple description of Islam in Bahrain would note that Bahraini Muslims comprise two major religious groups, the Sunnis and the Shi‘a. Yet there is a further division among the Shi‘i community in Bahrain: the Baharna, or Arab Shi‘a native to Bahrain, and the ‘Ajam, or Shi‘a of Iranian descent. Among the Sunnis there are three major divisions: the tribes who originally migrated to Bahrain starting in the eighteenth century and who are associated with the ruling Al Khalifa family; the Najdi who originated from the Najd in central Arabia; and the Hawala, Arab Sunnis who migrated from Bahrain to Iran decades ago and then returned, and who possess both Arab and Persian identities.22 Among all these groups there exists, as there does everywhere, great variety in actual religious adherence, with many preferring to identify themselves primarily as secularists, intellectuals, feminists, or political activists, without being particularly religious at all. Expatriates in Bahrain represent a variety of religions including Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. The difference between Sunni Islam and Shi‘i Islam chiefly has to do with authority. The Sunnis believe that upon the Prophet Muhammad’s death, political authority in the Muslim community passed to a succession of caliphs who were chosen by the community. The Shi‘a, on the other hand, believe that after the Prophet’s death, religious authority was passed on to his cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali. Twelver Shi‘a hold that this authority then passed through a chain of twelve Imams until ultimately coming to rest in the person of the final, Twelfth Imam, a messianic figure known as al-Mahdi who is believed to be in ghayba (occultation) in a supernatural realm. According to Shi‘i tradition, the Twelfth Imam was born in Samarra in 868 CE and went into occultation in 874 CE after his father, the eleventh Imam, was killed.23 The Sunnis wanted no part of this, considering it not only nepotism but also the great sin of shirk, or the association of other people or things with the Divine. They believed that the Prophet never intended for his authority to come down to a matter of lineage.

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The majority of the women whom I interviewed belong to three distinct population groups. The first group is composed of Shi‘a of Iranian and Bahraini descent who attended women’s ma’atim (pl. of ma’tam, Shi‘i communal centers). The second group is comprised chiefly of the Sunni women who attended Umm al-Darda’. The third consists of women in Bahrain (whether Bahraini or not), both Sunni and Shi‘i, who did not attend any religious organization regularly. This study should not be understood as a comprehensive analysis of women throughout the country.

The 2011 Protests in Bahrain Having discussed Bahrain’s unique demographics, a brief discussion of the current political situation is in order. The grassroots protest movements that spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 and toppled the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and eventually Libya took the world by surprise. This wave of political activity spread to Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain as well.24 While these movements have much in common – e.g. the demand by protesters that a dictator or a monarch step down to allow for a democratic form of government and greater political participation – it is a mistake to conflate them into one giant “Arab Spring” without noting the different political, social, economic and religious contexts of each. The recent protests in Bahrain, for example, are distinctive not only because of its Shi‘i majority, but also due to its position in the Gulf, near to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its accommodation of a US naval base. Demonstrations in Bahrain centered on the Pearl Roundabout where tens of thousands of Bahrainis camped at night and demonstrated during the day, chanting slogans such as “We are all Bahrainis – not Sunnis, not Shiite!”25 These protests were violently crushed by the Sunni Al Khalifa government with the help of Saudi Arabia. As Anthony Shadid powerfully observed in the New York Times, The crackdown here has won a tactical and perhaps ephemeral victory through torture, arrests, job dismissals and the blunt tool of already institutionalized discrimination against the island’s Shiite Muslim majority. In its wake, sectarian tension

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has exploded, economic woes have deepened, American willingness to look the other way has cast Washington as hypocritical and a society that prides itself on its cosmopolitanism is colliding with its most primordial instincts.26 Indeed, while the USA supported the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, it remains deeply ambivalent about supporting political change in the strategically invaluable Gulf region.

Significance of Bahrain There are several reasons why Bahrain makes a valuable case study. Despite its small population – in this respect it is rather like a citystate – Bahrain is more significant in terms of geopolitics than its size would suggest. Its interconnectedness with other countries has in many ways made Bahrain a microcosm of the Gulf region. For example, many residents of other Gulf states frequently travel to Bahrain, either for business or for pleasure, as it is both a tourist site and a commercial center. Since November 1986, Bahrain has been connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway that one scholar describes as a “sign of incorporation into the Saudi sphere of influence.”27 Saudis are now easily able to enter Bahrain, and indeed they often cross in order to vacation; in contrast to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain offers the legal consumption of alcohol and minimal social restrictions. The influence of religious ideologies emanating from Saudi Arabia is present in Bahraini Sunni religious spheres, just as the proximity to Iran and Iranian religious discourses impacts the Bahraini Shi‘i community. Bahrain’s global visibility is also due to its earlier status as a British protectorate and its current role as host to the US Naval Forces Central Command and headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet.28 Because of these links, what happens in Bahrain resonates far beyond its shores.

Bahrain in 2002–3: The Political Environment To a certain degree, my experiences in Bahrain were shaped by political circumstances. We arrived in 2002, a year after the 9/11 tragedy and

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seven months or so before the start of the war in Iraq. The United States was carrying out its “War on Terror,” and many Bahrainis with whom I spoke were, on the one hand, eager to dispel the image of Arabs as terrorists, and on the other hand, indignant that such an association would be made in the first place. Many were concerned and uncomfortable with the prominent presence of the US military in Bahrain, and sympathetic with the Iraqi people; most Bahrainis were against the upcoming war. When communicating with Bahrainis in this highly charged atmosphere, I was always aware that my American nationality was playing some role in the nature of our contacts. In many initial conversations I listened to many critiques of US foreign policy before I could ask any questions of my own related to my research. Before being accepted as a student at Umm al-Darda’, I was asked for proof that I was actually a scholar, in the form of either my Master’s thesis or a letter from a professor. I provided the requisite proof (my Master’s thesis) and the administrator told me that Arab culture has always been unconditionally generous and open toward foreigners, resulting in betrayal in some cases, and that she was cautious because she was no longer willing to have others take advantage in this way. There was quite a lot of anxiety in the air, since there was still uncertainty and anxiety regarding what Saddam Hussein might do in retaliation against a US strike. During the Gulf War of 1990, two Scud missiles hit Bahrain, albeit in an unpopulated desert region. As host to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Bahrain was considered to be a possible target again. People everywhere spoke about gas masks and duct tape, and a general feeling of nervousness took over the island as the war approached. In some ways, it was an interesting time to be there because I was able to see how people were reacting to the tension. But it was upsetting at times to be held somewhat responsible for the foreign policies of my government and sometimes to be seen as a suspect outsider, when in order to carry out research I needed to be able to make a lot of contacts. The great majority of people I encountered did not seem to hold my status as an American against me, but on occasion I did encounter suspicion and resentment. Most people made pained efforts to tell me that while they certainly did not approve of President Bush’s

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foreign policy, they did not think Americans as a group should be held responsible for it. I am grateful that under these tense circumstances most people were still kind enough to talk to me. Besides this situational difficulty, I found Bahraini society different from Yemeni society. Speaking from my own experience and from conversations I had with Bahrainis and expatriates in Bahrain, native Bahrainis generally tend to maintain a sharp distinction between those with whom they socialize in their domestic lives and those with whom they socialize in their public lives. Whereas outside the home the various ethnic and religious groups mix, when they go back inside they generally hunker down with their own extended family members or, in the case of the non-natives (who might not have family in Bahrain), with their ethnic communities. It is not as commonplace in Bahrain as it is in Yemen to be invited home for dinner or to share a holiday, although I was fortunate that in my case exceptions did occur. There are a several possible reasons for this: first of all, like other areas in the Gulf, Bahrain has a large foreign population. I was told by several Bahrainis that the country’s history of British domination and then the American military presence has led to a desire on the part of Bahrainis to keep the home a relatively separate space where Bahraini traditions and culture are maintained. There is an economic reason as well: Bahrainis wield a certain amount of power and influence over their guest workers, expatriate investors, and all non-Bahrainis in the country. Ahn Longva, writing about a parallel situation in Kuwait, argues that a heightened sense of power imbalance, combined in many cases with actual financial inequality, has led to a degree of awkwardness between the native population and the expatriate community, as the non-native group is called.29 Within the expatriate community there is a greater level of mixing between the various ethnicities and nationalities, but only to a point. The result is something that Gulf scholar Sharon Nagy has termed “social bubbles.”30 One can see through the transparent walls separating the groups and feel close and at times almost part of them, but in fact each bubble remains distinct. The educational system in Bahrain manifests and supports this phenomenon. Many children attend a school correlated to their ethnicity. Among these institutions are the Indian School, the Asian School, the

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British School of Bahrain, the Bangladesh School, the Pakistan Urdu School, the Alliance Française, etc., and of course the public schools which for the most part are for native Arabic-speaking Bahrainis.31 Nonetheless, many Bahrainis I spoke with described their culture as tolerant of diversity, and many expatriates echoed that sentiment and felt comfortable practicing their religion and traditions in Bahrain. Again, outwardly Bahrain manifests openness and tolerance, but within the domestic sphere the communities appear to be much less permeable. Not surprisingly, it was easier for me to make close friends with Muslim women from the expatriate community, although I met many wonderful Bahraini women, some of whom invited me with great hospitality to various events held outside the home such as weddings, Ramadan tents, or literary events. Occasionally I was invited inside a home, which I considered to be a great honor. Besides the invaluable friendship that these native and expatriate women offered me, they also gave me their insights into life in Bahrain, as well as into my specific area of study. I formed three particularly close friendships through my children’s school, which testifies to the convenience of the availability of that venue. Throughout the six months I spent in Bahrain, I made a total of 40 apple pies to share with the many Bahraini and expatriate women I met, in the hope of spreading crosscultural goodwill, and performing a little anthropological reciprocity through the sharing of food. In late February 2003 the US Embassy issued a warning regarding travel in Bahrain and neighboring countries, ostensibly because of the impending military action. Because I was there with children, I decided it was a good time to leave, four months earlier than planned. However, other American researchers stayed without incurring any problems: as it turned out, there was no violence in Bahrain. There were major anti-war demonstrations, as in the rest of the world, and these were peaceful and well organized.

Islamic Revival Movements Nonetheless, since the 1980s, Bahrain, along with other countries in the Middle East, has witnessed a profound change in religious behavior,

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specifically, the advent of the Islamic resurgence, which is evident in both the Sunni and the Shi‘i communities. Briefly defined, the resurgence is a trend to re-emphasize and make relevant Islamic values and the Islamic way of life, as opposed to what has come to be seen as decadent Western values and lifestyle. Despite the presence of religious diversity and the varying degrees of any type of religiosity, the atmosphere in Bahrain clearly reflects the presence of the resurgence. Islamic revival movements have sprung up at different times and places in the Middle East, and there is no single reason for their appearance. Centers of Islamic revivalism formed in the eighteenth century in cities such as Mecca, Medina, Cairo and Damascus. The ideology of the famed Saudi Arabian reformer, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), who condemned Sufism as a form of polytheism and religious innovation, has had a lasting impact on the religious environment, especially in Saudi Arabia, but also in the greater Gulf region and beyond.32 From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Muslim reformers in the greater Middle East, disturbed by encroaching Western colonialism, called for resistance to imperialism and for political and intellectual reform through a return to Islam.33 This heralded the beginning of the Sunni reformist salafiyya (Salafi) movement which demands that Muslims return to “pure Islam” by following the precepts of the Qur’an and the Hadith instead of the religious scholars of the four Sunni schools of law. In the postcolonial era of the midtwentieth century, some newly independent Middle Eastern nations (such as Egypt) pursued secular systems of government and education based on Western models. In the 1950s and 60s, Nasserism in Egypt and Ba‘thist movements in Syria and Iraq developed state ideologies based on Arab nationalism while paying lip service to Islam.34 Religion was used as a tool to legitimize and justify government agendas. In contrast were religious non-governmental movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–49).35 The Muslim Brotherhood opposed Western secularization and called for a complete return to Muslim values and way of life rooted in written Islamic sources, i.e. the Qur’an and the Hadith, and for the formation of an Islamic state. Other similar movements were inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood but their scope was limited.

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In the late 1970s, a much larger Islamic movement began which spread through Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. While these movements came about due to differing historical circumstances, it is still possible to note the similar goals they share. Islamists, such as those involved in the Muslim Brotherhood, advocate a return to Islamic morality and the conscientious observance of the five pillars of Islam. Some also call for the implementation of Islamic law and the creation of Islamic forms of government. Earlier I referred to written Islamic sources. Islamists emphasize these sources to the exclusion of orally transmitted folk traditions, which many consider innovations and thus incorrect and heretical ways of practicing Islam. John Esposito cites governmental corruption, the lack of possibilities for political participation, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, and dependency on the superpowers as causes for the widespread popularity of the Islamic resurgence. He writes, “The climate of despair and disillusionment throughout the Muslim world during the late 1960s is amply documented in secular as well as religious literature issuing from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.”36 Islam was considered by many to be the best solution to these problems. The resurgence gained momentum in Bahrain in the late 1970s, especially during the Iranian Revolution. The sizable Shi‘i population, which includes many people with Persian ancestry, was influenced by the passion and success of the revolution, as well as by other revival movements abroad. The Sunnis, impacted by events in Iran, were also influenced by the two-week seizure of Mecca’s Grand Mosque in 1979 by a Saudi Arabian Sunni religious reformer, Juhayman ibn Muhammad ibn Sayf al-‘Utaybi.37 Significant numbers of Bahrainis who studied abroad during the 1970s came into contact with Islamic groups and returned to Bahrain newly politicized and committed to Islamist ideologies.38

Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework in which this study is situated has to do with the intersection of discourses on postcolonial theory, gender,

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and agency. It has to do with the politics of writing about power and women and with the nature of power itself. In Writing a Woman’s Life, Carolyn Heilbrun posits that female autobiography has tended to “find beauty even in pain,” often transforming negative experiences into positive ones and perpetuating gender inequalities by not addressing them.39 There is a raging debate among feminist scholars who study gender and development regarding whether most women in the Middle East and the developing world should by and large be understood as oppressed victims of male dominance, of the changing agendas of nation-states, of global capitalism, and/or of recent waves of religious conservatism,40 or as subjective “agents” who wield degrees of self-determination regardless of the external power structure in which they live.41 Delia Aguilar would likely agree with Heilbrun; she argues that a postmodernist approach that highlights agency despite overwhelming oppression obscures the true situation and thus contributes to women’s victimization. She writes, “Feminist emphasis on empowerment and resistance, then, might be construed as a deceptive device that gives the illusion of an emancipatory agenda where there is none.”42 Valentine Moghadam, who writes about transnational women’s organizations and their responses to “neoliberal capitalism and patriarchal fundamentalism,” defines her own approach as “Marxist feminist” or “feminist political economy.” In her view, the links between capital, class, and gender shape the ways in which women (and men) are affected by globalization and determine the degree to which they are able to play cultural, economic, and political roles. Like Aguilar, Moghadam criticizes the postmodern approach, arguing that it rejects “the importance of the state, the global economy, and global feminism.”43 Deniz Kandiyoti contends that the ways in which Middle Eastern women are represented, the roles they are allowed to play in society, and “the nature of the social movements through which they are able to articulate their gendered interests” are closely connected to “state-building processes,”44 and I analyze some of these processes with respect to Bahrain in the following chapter. Haideh Moghissi specifically criticizes those scholars of women in the Middle East in the postmodern era who, she thinks, have fallen into the trap of cultural and moral

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relativity and enthusiastically bend over backwards to avoid being Orientalists.45 She argues that there is an unfortunate tendency to describe Muslim women as empowered when, in her words, “women are systematically brutalized and caught in a deadly crossfire between the secular and fundamentalist forces.”46 While the above-mentioned scholars speak to women’s limits and the forces that shape and restrict their lives, their approaches are nevertheless valuable. We need to recognize and assess those limits and forces. However, my concern is that this analysis marginalizes women’s subjectivity. There is a reductive and dismissive quality to drawing inferences regarding women’s lives without listening to their own perceptions of reality and acknowledging their status as actors and agents no matter how “oppressive” their circumstances. Other scholars do emphasize Muslim women’s role as actors.47 The following remark by Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo illustrates this trend toward recognizing the agentic status of women in the Middle East: Often Middle Eastern women have been portrayed by Westerners as either silent shadows, or as helpless victims of suppressive customs and traditions unable to organize and form groups on their own and for themselves. The last decade, however, has seen an explosion of research and publications fully acknowledging women as persons in their own right, as political and economic actors who fend and struggle and reflect on their lives and the future of their societies.48 Saba Mahmood and Chandra Talpade Mohanty have written about the ethics involved when Western non-Muslim feminists interpret Muslim women’s lives. Mahmood, in her study of Islamist women’s participation in the revival movement in Egypt, asks her readers to question their own preconceived notions regarding ethics and gender: [M]y suggestion is that we leave open the possibility that our political and analytical certainties might be transformed in the process of exploring non-liberal movements of the kind I

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studied, that the lives of the women with whom I worked might have something to teach us beyond what we can learn from the circumscribed social-scientific exercise of “understanding and translation.”49 Mahmood brings up an important point: judging other women as moving toward “liberation” or away from “liberation” can blind a scholar to the fact that the concept of liberation itself is relative. I also agree with Chandra Talpade Mohanty who argues that many Western feminists are guilty of constructing a flat image of the “third world woman” as poor, illiterate, oppressed, and unchanged by time, an image that reduces complex situations to dichotomies and ultimately reinforces a larger Western agenda of cultural dominance.50 The act of ignoring the subjective dimension of people’s lives can be a form of paternalistic violence; it is akin to saying about a given group of people, “I know more about their lives than they do.” Cultural understanding has no chance if scholars prejudge the lived realities of others. I believe it is important to acknowledge both subjectivity and position in external economic, social, and political power structures. It would be misleading to paint too rosy a picture of gender relations in Bahrain, a patriarchal society whose laws and customs still favor men in most cases. However, to describe Bahraini society as “oppressive to women” ignores the fact that many women do not experience daily reality in that way. In fact, some women expressed to me that they felt more brutalized by Western conceptualizations of Muslims than by their own societal constraints, although certainly some also criticized Bahraini society. While the “emancipatory” agendas of nation-states serve to reposition women as new subjects of power, that is not the only way in which to understand the significance of women’s lives. My study focuses both on the ways in which women see their own worlds, and on the ways in which they are actors. Bahraini women are indeed relatively marginalized from political and judicial power. They are nonetheless active in Bahraini political life, they wield degrees of influence, and they are in no way passive. There is room to say that much change in Bahrain seems to be positive, such as suffrage and the rise in female literacy. My interest lies in how women negotiate within

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their externally imposed limits, and the roles that religion and modern education have played in that process, and not so much in the limits themselves.

Chapter Topics This first chapter has introduced Bahrain as a place, the context in which my research was carried out, and my methodology and approach. The second chapter offers a history of Bahrain with a focus on gender and education, and describes the country’s political, economic and religious connections to the larger Gulf region and the West. The third chapter is about Shi‘i women and the recent educationally focused ways in which the ma’tam plays a part in their lives. Chapter 4 deals with Umm al-Darda’, a Sunni women’s Qur’anic center, and changing women’s religious practices as reflected in the organization. Chapter 5 does not focus, as did chapters 3 and 4, on women’s organizations. Instead, I discuss Bahraini women who do not fit neatly into any category but whose stories add depth to the picture of women and religion in Bahrain. For example, one section treats the changing idioms that Bahraini women have used to express their gendered and political identities. Chapter 6 continues along the lines of the previous chapter to examine individual stories; however, here I focus on the expatriate experience in Bahrain and the role religion plays in integration. Finally, in chapter 7, I conclude by offering some thoughts on the implications of this research.

Conclusion Modern education in Bahrain has given women new skills with which to engage the world, and their use of these skills can be seen in the religious arena. Women are reinterpreting religious texts and the significance of religious figures in ways that have social and political ramifications. They are creating spaces for themselves and other women to grow in their religious identities. Some choose religious community with other women, others get religious instruction from the Internet, and still others promote the home as the source of instruction. What

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many Muslim women in Bahrain have in common is that they are negotiating modernity with religion. In order to shed light on that process, the next chapter offers a history of modern Bahrain, focusing on economics and politics, education, the changing roles of Bahraini women, and religion.

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2 A BR IEF HISTORY OF BAHR AIN SINCE 1932

The single greatest influence on twentieth-century Bahrain – indeed on all of the Gulf Arab states – was the discovery of oil on the Arabian side of the Gulf. Bahrain was the first: oil was discovered there in 1932. Combined with Bahrain’s pre-oil transregional character due to its strategic location as a trade and shipping center and its social system shaped by the pearling industry, as well as sociopolitical influences in the larger Muslim world, the discovery of oil allowed for enormous economic, political and social development. Specifically, the new economic situation led to the rise of a modern educational system with the establishment of public schools for both boys and girls. For the first time, large numbers of male and female Bahrainis became literate beyond a rudimentary knowledge of the Qur’an. This, coupled with new political and religious developments such as Arab nationalism and the Islamic resurgence, led to new forms of religious practices and activities among men and women. The impact of education manifested primarily in two ways. First, education was the principal force behind the growing social consciousness and politicization of men and women in Bahrain, which in contemporary times has increasingly been expressed in terms of an Islamic ideology. Secondly, and linked to the first, education allowed for a new focus on literate, textual Islam as opposed to oral, folk Islam. For women, the effects of this new focus have been manifold and complex, leading both to new forms of

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patriarchy and to new venues for women’s greater social, political and religious participation. This chapter will examine the history of modern Bahrain, focusing chiefly but not solely on the period from the discovery of oil in 1932 to 2003. For the purpose of clarity, I have separated this analysis into five historical periods: (1) before the discovery of oil, (2) post-oil, 1932–70, (3) post-independence, 1971–9, (4) the Islamic resurgence, 1979–90, and (5) the recent past, 1990–2003. Within each period, I will discuss four separate themes: the political economic situation, developments in education, the changing roles of women and women’s issues, and finally, religious currents and the development of religious institutions in both the Sunni and the Shi‘i communities. Of course, there are many points of convergence between these themes. The intent of this historical examination is to provide context for the issue of women, religious change and the impact of modern education in Bahrain.

Before the Discovery of Oil Politics and Economics The history of Bahrain is said to go back 5,000 years to a time when Bahrain was part of the land of Dilmun, a fertile and prosperous area known for its legendary role in the epic of Gilgamesh. It has been speculated that Dilmun was the site of the Garden of Eden and the landing place of Noah’s ark. Its trade and migration routes connected the earliest civilizations, and indeed Bahrain and the Gulf region have long been known for their strategic location and connections to other regions. For many centuries Bahrain has held a precarious position vis-àvis its neighbors which have frequently acted in a predatory fashion toward this desirable group of islands. Not only have nearby states such as Oman and Iran tried to seize Bahrain, but also, before its independence from Britain in 1971, Bahrain suffered 500 years of foreign domination, chiefly by European powers. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, Portugal, Holland, France and Britain each ruled or dominated Bahrain at various times.

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Iran has claimed Bahrain as its own several times. In 1602 the Safavid ruler Shah ‘Abbas captured Bahrain from the Portuguese who had sought control of the Gulf because of its strategic trade-route position. Bahrain was under Persian rule for most of the period from 1602 to 1782, although at times Arab governors were appointed to supervise the island.1 The Ya‘ariba tribe of Oman fought off the Portuguese in 1660 and retook Oman, and then in 1717 claimed Bahrain too, only to lose it to the Persian ruler Nadir Shah in 1753. The Al Khalifa family, which has its roots in an area that is now part of northeastern Saudi Arabia and Iraq, settled at Zubara across from Bahrain on the Qatar Peninsula in 1776. After a successful defense from a Persian attack on Zubara, Sheikh Ahmad Al Khalifa invaded Bahrain in 1782/3 and expelled the Persians,2 but this did not put an end to Persian claims. An unsuccessful claim was made again in 1844, and in more recent times both Reza Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini tried to assert Iran’s right to the islands.3 The period from 1602 until the Al Khalifa takeover of Bahrain in 1782/3 saw the establishment and development of Twelver Shi‘i institutions on the island.4 Indeed, Iran remains influential in Bahraini affairs today, as many Bahraini Shi‘a are of Iranian descent and look to Iran for religious guidance. During the nineteenth century, Bahrain under Al Khalifa rule was compelled to enter into a series of agreements with Britain in order to gain protection from aggression by other states and tribes. Initially, Britain was interested in protecting its trade route to and from India and, in the pursuit of that goal, was also interested in the “economic and commercial stability” of the Gulf region.5 Europe’s industrial revolution created a new demand for raw materials and cheap labor, both of which India and other Asian countries supplied. Britain’s control of sea traffic and its eventual role as “policeman of the Gulf”6 were the means of furthering its imperialistic goals. This series of agreements heralded the onset of British domination of Bahrain and also shaped the borders of the future Gulf states. In 1821, the Bahraini Sheikh, swayed by superior British sea power, signed an initial treaty with the British government called the General Treaty of Peace. The implications of this treaty were notable: the Gulf sheikhdoms were for the first time recognized as distinct political entities, each with

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an independent ruler. However, the exact delineation of the borders of each state (except Bahrain) would not be decided until around the time when oil was discovered in the Gulf Arab territories. After the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman and Sharjah signed the so-called Perpetual Maritime Truce with Britain in 1853, their lands became known as the Trucial States (they would join together to form a Trucial Council in 1952, a Trucial States Council in 1967, and the United Arab Emirates in 1971). Bahrain considered joining but eventually decided to remain independent; nevertheless, in 1861 it pledged to refrain from sea attacks in return for Britain’s promise to protect it at sea.7 These various treaties, and British diplomacy during the nineteenth century in the Gulf in general, while undertaken to stabilize the region to further British interests, had the effect of buttressing the authority of local rulers, including Bahrain’s Al Khalifa family. The most significant treaties signed were the Exclusive Agreements of 1892 which solidified British influence over the Gulf. Firstly, it prevented others who were attempting to extend their authority into the region, such as France or Germany, from dealing directly with the Arab Gulf rulers.8 The Bahraini ruler had already agreed in 1880 to abstain from negotiations with any power other than Britain, unless Britain agreed. In the treaties of 1892, Bahrain and the Trucial States agreed not to sell or lease lands without British consent. These treaties cemented Britain’s relationship of domination in the Gulf, which would soon extend to the oil market. In fact, between 1913 and 1922, the Gulf rulers agreed to limit oil concessions to companies chosen by the British government which was anticipating the discovery of oil on the Arabian side of the Gulf.9 As Emile Nakhleh notes, Bahrain has long been an “object of policy in some other state’s long term plans” for the region.10 This was true initially because of Bahrain’s strategic location and thriving economy based on pearling and trade, and later because of the prospect of oil. Britain’s agreements, not only with the rulers of Bahrain but with other Gulf rulers as well, increasingly brought the area under its influence. While Britain had long maintained a Political Resident at Bushire on the Persian coast, with Political Agents stationed in different Gulf countries including Bahrain, the Residency itself was transferred to

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Bahrain in 1946 and remained there until Bahrain achieved independence in 1971. Although the British for the most part supported the ruling Gulf families, isolating the region to a large degree from social and political development, they did meddle in Bahraini politics, especially in the 1920s. The local Political Agent, Major C. K. Daly, deposed Sheikh ‘Isa bin ‘Ali Al Khalifa in 1923 and replaced him with his son, Sheikh Hamad ibn ‘Isa Al Khalifa.11 He also installed Charles Belgrave as British Adviser to the new ruler. Both actions were taken to increase British influence, but also to check Sunni power in response to growing Shi‘i discontent. The sizable Shi‘i population was upset by a series of offenses the government and members of the Sunni community had committed against them in 1923 and the immediately preceding years. The British government wanted to be seen as capable of protecting the Shi‘a. The Resident introduced a system of reforms that were met with resentment on the part of many Sunnis. These included the reorganization of the Customs Department, which was the main source of governmental revenue. Customs would now fall under the charge of a British director who was to rid the system of corrupt practices and ultimately make it possible to improve collections and facilities. Another reform was the institution of a civil list that budgeted stipends for the royal family and allowed for the allocation of some monies to public services. A measure was also enacted to reform the justice system which had long been blatantly biased against the Shi‘a. A group of Sunni Bahrainis formed the Bahraini National Congress in order to resist and oppose reforms that benefited the Shi‘a more than the Sunnis and that demonstrated British control over Bahrain, but all of its members were arrested and deported.12 Struggles between Sunni, Shi‘i, governmental and Western factions would continue, at times under the umbrella of Arab nationalism, and later under the umbrella of religion. As for the economy during the centuries before the discovery of oil, the chief industry in Bahrain, as in other Gulf sheikhdoms, was pearling which had a long history in the region, possibly dating back 4,000 years. From the seventeenth century until the early twentieth century, pearling gave Bahrain an economy that was prosperous if not equally

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shared by all.13 In the eighteenth century, the demand for pearls was so great that many Arab tribes came to the Gulf to trade, shaping the current social demographics. The pearling industry created markets for trading and shipbuilding. Agriculture – primarily date farming – was another activity that engaged many in Bahrain and the Gulf. The British Adviser to the Sheikh estimated in 1934 that 6,000 acres, or one-twentieth of the total area of Bahrain, was cultivated.14 Before the collapse of pearling in 1929 due to the worldwide depression and the growing popularity of Japanese cultured pearls, almost half of the adult males in Bahrain were employed in the pearl industry.15 Education in the Pre-Oil Period Before describing the state of education in Bahrain prior to the discovery of oil, it is worthwhile to take a brief look at education in the Islamic world in general before the advent of modern education. Next, the focus will turn to the development of Bahrain’s modern school system. While modern education is often assumed to have emanated from the West, the Islamic tradition has always placed great emphasis on learning. At times this emphasis has manifested as the practice of critical inquiry, at other times as the practice of rote memorization. The Qur’anic requirement that Muslims study and learn led to the great florescence of education from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries in the Muslim world. Science, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and medicine were among the subjects of research and study. The mosque, as the earliest center of learning, was the first Islamic “school.” The Prophet Muhammad met with his companions who sat around him while he offered them religious instruction. In the earliest phase of Islam, scholars met in mosques to study and discuss religious texts, and later, to teach religious sciences. With the expansion of Islam came the establishment of mosques in new Muslim territories. These served the dual purpose of providing venues for worship and religious instruction and unifying newly conquered populations under a single ideology, thereby fostering social order.16 Some of these mosques housed libraries and were famed as centers of scholarship.

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Qur’anic schools for children date to the seventh century.17 By the end of the Umayyad dynasty, an elementary school system was established in many parts of the Muslim world. This network of Qur’anic schools is sometimes known as the kuttab system. Despite being widespread, kuttab schools typically shared similar curricular goals, chief among which was the rote memorization of the Qur’an. For those seeking knowledge beyond the elementary level, lectures were offered at mosques during this early stage. Study circles, which began with the Prophet’s time and continued to function through the ninth century as Islam spread, met to discuss the Qur’an and legal issues. The ‘Abbasid era (750–1258) witnessed the proliferation of bookshops and literary salons, in part because of the great achievements in the translation of Greek philosophical works into Arabic. Bookshops and salons were especially widespread in major cities such as Baghdad and Cairo. Literary circles formed in which male intellectual elites met to discuss a variety of topics.18 In addition to these informal centers of learning, research centers and various types of colleges, both Sunni and Shi‘i, were established.19 One type of college, the madrasa, may have been founded as early as the eighth or the ninth century by Shi‘a in eastern Persia.20 There are accounts of madrasas dating to the tenth century in the city of Iranshahr in southeastern Persia.21 Whereas Qur’anic schools were widespread and were even to be found in rural areas, madrasas were usually located only in cities. The Nizamiyya, a notable Sunni madrasa in Baghdad that inspired the growth of the organized madrasa system throughout the Middle East, was founded in 1057 CE.22 This marked a pivotal moment in the history of the madrasa. While previously madrasas had been privately owned and independent, now they became public institutions connected to the state.23 A primary reason the madrasa system was founded was to promote Sunni Islam and to combat Shi‘i Islam which had gained power as manifested in the North African Fatimid dynasty and the Persian Buyids. The madrasas were supported by the Seljuq Turks who took over Baghdad in 1055 and who strongly opposed the Shi‘a. It should be noted that the organization of Sufism into institutions such as the khanqah (Persian: hostel), tariqa (Arabic: method, path) and ta’ifa (Arabic: order) also provided early Muslim

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centers of learning.24 Medieval Iranian madrasas taught philosophy, math and astronomy. In the Arab world, however, the non-religious sciences and philosophy in particular were increasingly considered suspect, especially during the later medieval period.25 Religious sciences and law were the primary topics taught in the madrasas. While formal education in the premodern era often excluded females – one scholar recalls the saying, “A woman who is taught to write is like a serpent who is given poison to drink” – some families, especially wealthier or scholarly families, found various alternative methods for educating their daughters.26 Perhaps a father would teach his daughter himself, or hire a tutor. Husbands also taught their wives. Leila Ahmed writes, regarding the history of women’s education in the Middle East, that “even in the most misogynistic periods women have been able to participate to some degree in the world of thought and learning.”27 During the Mamluk period (1250–1517), some women endowed madrasas and performed administrative roles in these institutions as well.28 Yet, while women occasionally attended men’s lectures, and there is evidence of female scholars educated by relatives, tutors or other scholars, there is no mention of women attending a madrasa during the medieval period of Islam. Only in the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century does evidence point to girls’ attendance at kuttab schools. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a movement toward public secular education grew in Europe and then spread to the Middle East. Europeans began to reform education to make it more relevant to the needs of the industrial economy. As most of the Middle East fell under colonial control, the area was introduced to European concepts of education. After Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, there was a tremendous increase in the numbers of Europeans living in the region.29 With this influx came European influence. As governor of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali opened the first modern school there in 1816. Wishing to strengthen the country, he believed that it was crucial to modernize, and with that aim in mind he sent students abroad to study in Europe and established a network of modern educational institutions in Egypt. But it was not until 1873 that the government opened the first primary school for girls. A secondary

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school followed in 1874.30 The need for secular professional education was also recognized in the Middle East. Qur’anic schools found themselves in competition with modern government-sponsored schools, and by the mid-twentieth century, students educated in the latter were more likely to be employed by the government than those who had received a traditional education. Nonetheless, various forms of madrasa education including Qur’anic schools still exist today in almost all parts of the Middle East, but no longer as the sole type of educational venue. At the turn of the twentieth century, secular modern education had not yet arrived in Bahrain. There was very little formal schooling past childhood, unlike in Egypt and Iran. Instead, both boys and girls received some education in kuttab schools that existed in every village. Some kuttabs were co-educational. Sometimes male mullas provided instruction; women might also work as kuttab teachers. The curriculum focused on Arabic, mathematics and rote memorization of the Qur’an. Students generally attended until around ten years of age. In 1914, there were approximately 800 boys and 400 girls studying in the kuttab system in Bahrain.31 The opening of the American Mission School for girls in 1892 heralded the beginning of modern Western-style education in Bahrain. It was run by the Arabian Mission, an independent American Protestant group, and was adopted by the Reformed Church of America in 1934. Among other subjects, the curriculum included English and Bible study, reflecting the sponsors’ evangelistic goals.32 The institution was received with tension: parents did not want their daughters converting to Christianity as a result of missionary education. Sheikha al-Misnad, a prominent Qatari scholar of education in the Gulf region, notes that education for females in general was then considered suspect by many. People were afraid that it was not Islamic for girls to be educated in any context other than their religion. They also worried that educated females might be tempted to use their new skills to illicitly communicate with men. According to al-Misnad, “Apart from Kuttab education, which they received in childhood, the education of women was considered not only unnecessary but also detrimental and a threat to traditional society.”33 Male religious leaders used the

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mosque to campaign against women’s education which they feared would threaten the foundation of the family itself. Needless to say, the missionary school was not well attended. Bahrain was the first among the Arab Gulf states to introduce a modern system of education, perhaps because of its prosperous economy and its exposure to other cultures and ideologies. While the Arabian Mission also opened a school for boys in Bahrain as early as 1905,34 the first government-sponsored school, Al-Hidaya School for Boys, opened in 1921 on Muharraq, one of Bahrain’s smaller islands. A committee composed of Sunni notables supervised the school which later produced a number of offshoots. These developments led the Shi‘i community to organize their own educational committee and open schools for their children in 1927–8.35 The government opened a school for girls on Muharraq in 1928, but female education still faced opposition on cultural and religious grounds.36 In Charles Belgrave’s memoir of his years in Bahrain as Adviser to the ruling Sheikh, he relates an interesting story about the founding of the girls school: apparently the catalyst was a conversation between his wife Marjorie and the Sheikh’s wife in which the Sheikha promised her support if Marjorie would organize the school. Belgrave remarks, “A public petition was organized by some of the leading Arabs and presented to the Shaikh, protesting against such a dangerous innovation.”37 In 1930, the Bahraini government took control over the burgeoning school system, overriding initial opposition from the committees involved.38 Tension regarding modern education manifested throughout the Middle East in various ways, as secular education was sometimes associated with colonialism and encroaching Westernization. Fazlur Rahman argues that “Islamic civilization confronted modern Western sciences at multiple disadvantages – psychological as well as intellectual – because of the political domination, economic aggression, and intellectual hegemony of the West.”39 He writes that Middle Eastern communities who felt threatened by colonialism tended to react by defending their traditional madrasa-type educational systems. Marnia Lazreg writes that Algerian girls had to contend with “class and gender bias” in the French colonial education system.40 Bahrain, a protectorate

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rather than a colony per se, suffered foreign domination for quite some time, but Bahrainis overcame their initial unwillingness to educate females and welcomed modern education. Rahman points out that the growing Muslim interest in modernism and modern education led to a parallel re-emphasis on tradition, nationalism and religious identification.41 This trend would later manifest in Bahrain. Women in the Pre-Oil Period In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, Bahrainis witnessed not only the transformation of their educational system but also a cultural renaissance. In 1892, the American Mission opened Bahrain’s first bookstore which brought printed books and newspapers to the country, linking local intellectuals to the Arab world. This development and the discourse it engendered gave Bahrainis greater access to thinkers and movements in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Europe and India. Cultural clubs, where educated Bahraini men could meet and discuss the new literary, political and religious trends they were now able to read about, formed in the early 1900s and became quite popular.42 These clubs were sites of emerging Bahraini nationalism and resistance to British colonialism. Formally organized clubs and societies for women were not yet established during this period. Scholar Sakina Muhammad al-Qahtani describes Bahraini women’s lives in the pre-oil period as being structured by busy visitation schedules in which they would move from home to home, socializing with their female neighbors, often sharing dates and coffee. She adds that women typically gossiped about who had recently gotten married or divorced, who had returned from pilgrimage to Mecca, which hostess offered generous refreshments and which one was stingy. Sometimes they took along palm fronds to craft items for their homes while on their visiting rounds.43 Other than socializing, many Bahraini women were already exercising agency at home and sometimes in the public sphere as well, due to the particular way in which the pearling industry had shaped gender roles. Although pearling itself was chiefly a male activity, the very fact that men were away at sea for long stretches of time allowed their

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wives a degree of independence. They functioned as head of the household, making decisions, raising the children and receiving guests, and sometimes they worked as servants or seamstresses while their husband was gone. Some even participated in activities such as fishing or diving.44 If a woman’s husband died – an all-too-common occurrence – her responsibilities increased even more. There is a body of Bahraini songs and traditions regarding the sea and its great power over the lives of women who often lost their fathers, brothers or sons at sea. In one tradition that I observed, Bahraini mothers purchase baskets of grass or other plants known as “hiyya-biyya baskets” for their children, who throw the grass into the sea while singing a song, symbolically reenacting the sacrifices that many Bahrainis have made while pearling. This maritime-related practice typically occurs right before ‘Eid al-Adha which is the Muslim celebration of Ibrahim’s (Abraham’s) willingness to sacrifice his son for God. Although the female members of pearling and fishing families sometimes worked outside the home, other women whose families were not engaged in those activities – notably women from upperclass families – were often secluded. Belgrave noted in 1960 that “the purdah system is still de rigueur in Bahrain.” He described women’s clothing in the pre-oil period as a “heavy black cloak covering her from head to foot, and very often a black mask made of stiff dyed calico, giving the wearer a black, bird-like appearance.”45 By the end of the pearling era, the industry had created a society that was highly cohesive due to its system of credit and debt. Pearl divers typically lived on credit borrowed from boat owners, and in many cases they were never able to fully repay these loans. Debts were passed on from father to son, thus ensuring the continuity of relationships and binding those in the industry together for generations. Boat owners in turn took care of their divers, offering them credit when needed, especially since the diving season only lasted from June to September. The profit each boat made was shared with all who worked on the boat, which encouraged teamwork. Sami Hanna notes that pearl diving created an atmosphere that was accepting of hierarchy and dependence on kin, which in turn supported and maintained the stratified tribal class system.46

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Religion in the Pre-Oil Period Turning now to examine the religious environment of the pre-oil period, Bahraini Sunni practices during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries reflected a lack of orthodoxy or focus on textual Islam and contained many elements associated with popular Sufism such as saint worship, the visiting of tombs, and mawlids (celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday). The zar ritual was commonly practiced throughout the Gulf region, and in Bahrain participants came from all classes and ethnic groups. This ritual was performed to appease an evil spirit that had entered the body of a woman, causing illness and sometimes the appearance of hysteria. An afflicted woman could make all kinds of requests of her husband who was obliged to comply in order to appease the spirit. Typically, her family would organize a feast and hire a zar specialist to appease the spirit. It has been argued that the zar is a way in which women can satirize their own subordination, and that it serves a therapeutic function.47 The lack of modern medicines and medical facilities before the twentieth century also shaped Bahraini practices to a great degree. Healing was often sought by hiring a man to carry out a Qur’anic recitation; after reciting, the practitioner would spit into a bowl from which the patient would drink. Amulets were commonly worn for protection against the evil eye that could cause illness or harm.48 Charles Belgrave relates an incident that occurred when his son (born in Bahrain in 1929) fell ill. Sheikh Hamad told him that, were it his own son, he would have him branded with a hot iron as a “cure.”49 These and similar practices were also found among the Shi‘a. Shi‘i religious customs were quite distinct and they remain central to Shi‘i identity. Most are related to Ashura rituals, including the annual processions through the streets of Bahrain (and of other countries with large numbers of Shi‘a such as Iraq and Iran), lamenting the martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn (d. 680). These processions take place on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram. The first nine days of Muharram are devoted to commemorative readings regarding Husayn’s death, which take place in the men’s and women’s

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funeral houses (ma’atim) that serve as Shi‘i communal religious centers. Men and women also meet in their respective ma’atim all throughout the year to carry out readings and socialize. Ma’atim have become public sites of religious and communal identity for most Shi‘a, including both native Bahraini and Persian immigrant Shi‘i communities. They are also visible sites of Shi‘i political resistance against the dominant Sunni minority. According to the late Lebanese anthropologist Fuad Khuri, “The Shi‘a use the funeral house as a platform to assert their grievances, mobilize their converts for action, and implicitly attack ‘mundane’ (government) authority and rule.”50 Before 1890, these sites were located in private houses, but during the 1890s, community members built many freestanding ma’atim unattached to domestic structures. According to Nelida Fuccaro, this gave them “new social and political visibility.”51 Shi‘i women continued to meet in private homes even after separate ma’atim were built for men. One important venue for socioreligious change was the opening of bookstores which became centers of intellectual exchange, as mentioned earlier. In 1913, several educated Bahraini men opened their own store, calling it Maktaba Iqbal Awal (Iqbal Awal’s Bookshop), which they later changed to Nadi Awal al-Layli (Awal’s Night Club) because its activities took place only in the evening.52 The club hosted lectures on political and religious topics inspired by Islamic reformers from the greater Muslim community who were known as proponents of the salafiyya (Salafi) movement, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rid‘a (1865–1935). Associated with Islamic modernism, these reformers were known for their emphasis on the importance of education and their attempts to reconcile concepts such as reason, science, and other Enlightenment principles with Islam. They advocated purging Islam of what they considered to be innovations, such as Sufism. Despite the influence of such reformers, however, Bahrainis who participated in the activities at Awal’s Club were not clearly “religious” but were “secular” and “liberal,” according to Hanna, unlike those who were later active in the Islamic Club, founded in 1928, which I discuss below in the context of religion in the post-oil period.

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The Post-Oil Period, 1932–70 Politics and Economics In 1932, Bahrain became the first Gulf Arab state where commercially promising crude oil was discovered. This was fortuitous, given the recent collapse of its pearl industry. More significant discoveries soon followed in other Gulf Arab states. Given its limited oil reserves, Bahrain would never become as wealthy as states such as Kuwait or Dubai. Nevertheless, the prosperity that followed led to rapid social and political development. The price tag for this boon, as it was in all the oil-producing Gulf states, was the enormous ramping up of Western interest. Bahrain and the other Gulf Arab states now found themselves at the center of Western – specifically British and American – foreign policy interests. Britain established a naval base at Juffair (Al-Jufayr) near Manama in 1935 and, as mentioned earlier, transferred the office of its regional Political Resident from Bushire to Manama in 1946.53 Here it is worth taking a slight detour to relate the events that led to the discovery of oil in Bahrain and to put a human face on a discovery that would change the geopolitics of the globe. I take this alternative route, in part, to retell a good story, but my intention is also to illustrate the effects of British and American economic influence in the region. Frank Holmes, a mining engineer from New Zealand, had the opportunity to travel extensively in the Gulf region during World War I. He became convinced that oil would be found there, and after the war he spent many hours scrutinizing geological maps. Risking his own capital, he formed a small exploration company in 1920 named the Eastern and General Syndicate. Initially discouraged from exploring in Bahrain due to its exclusive agreements with Britain, Holmes went to Saudi Arabia in 1922, which was not limited by the same type of agreements. He was granted a Saudi concession but he did not have sufficient capital to actually sink a well and demonstrate the presence of oil to skeptical producers. Holmes returned to Bahrain in 1925 and made a special agreement with Sheikh Hamad who permitted him to drill but, initially, only for fresh underground water. If he found water he would take no

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commission or profit on it, and the Sheikh – grateful for the water – would then seriously consider granting him an oil concession. Holmes found water and then he was allowed to explore for oil. Now his problem was to convince a major producer to buy his concession. Shell Oil, Anglo-Persian Oil and Standard Oil of California all declined. The first two did not believe there was significant oil in Bahrain, the third was wary of exclusive British-Bahraini treaties.54 Holmes finally sold his Bahrain concession to Gulf Oil in 1927, and Gulf sent its people to island but they were never allowed to drill. The following year, Gulf Oil and several other oil companies, in exchange for other interests, signed the so-called “Red Line” Agreement which prevented any one of them from pursuing oil rights in the Arabian Kingdom, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen and Iraq without consent of the others.55 One drawback was that the agreement did not prevent non-signatories from pursuing concessions in these areas. Gulf Oil offered its Bahrain concession to Standard Oil which was not party to the 1928 agreement. And what of Britain’s claim to exclusive rights over Bahrain’s oil reserves? Standard Oil came to an arrangement with Britain whereby the American company would register a subsidiary in Canada which was then still a dominion of the British Empire. Thus the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) was formed, and in 1930 it was assigned the Bahrain concession. BAPCO’s chief representative in the field was Frank Holmes.56 His first attempts to strike oil in the foothills of Jebel Dukhan near the center of the island were not altogether promising. A strike in the spring of 1932 produced only a limited amount, but Belgrave, Sheikh Hamad’s adviser, dubbed Holmes Abu Naft (Father of Oil). Then on Christmas Day, Belgrave received an urgent message from Holmes asking him to come out to the oilfield. There he saw oil and gas spouting from the rig, “great ponds of black oil and black rivulets flowing down the wadis” and men “dripping with oil.”57 Holmes had finally proven to all that there was indeed oil in Bahrain. The discovery of oil signaled the beginning of US influence in the country, and the continuation of Bahraini resistance to US and British authority. One example of Western meddling in Bahrain’s internal affairs took place in the late 1930s when a widespread uprising was

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quelled with British and BAPCO assistance. By 1937, the Al Khalifa family had grown quite wealthy from oil royalties while the rest of the country was experiencing an economic depression. Bahraini grievances mounted, and in 1938, BAPCO workers threatened to strike. Organizations formed in opposition to BAPCO, Britain’s political agent, and Sheikh Hamad’s adviser (Belgrave). Political dissent was expressed in clubs and ma’atim, but the uprising was soon squelched by the government, BAPCO, and the British.58 Nevertheless, to varying degrees it became a new tradition among the lower and middle classes, especially among the Shi‘a, to challenge the regime as represented by the Al Khalifa family and foreign agents. The acceptance of hierarchy – a tribal tradition from the days of pearling – was beginning to crumble, as Bahraini workers attempted to mobilize and political activity increased in the club milieu. The oil industry changed labor patterns in many ways. It created a great demand for foreign manpower as it expanded after World War II. Both workers and professionals from abroad were needed to run the new industry, and they came from India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Britain, the United States, and other countries as well. Today up to one-fourth of the residents of Bahrain are from India, having been drawn by the lure of good wages or high returns on investment.59 Although Bahrainis are not a minority in their own country, estimates of the number of non-Bahrainis range from 37 to 50 percent of the total population.60 Work patterns also changed as Bahrainis transitioned from pearling and agriculture to the new industries. One reflection of these changes was that date palm cultivation, once the primary agricultural activity, became less popular. In 1959, agricultural workers made up 6.7 percent of the total labor force; by 1971, their number had dropped to 2.9 percent.61 Bahrain began to develop a second key industry in 1969 when the cornerstone was laid for the first aluminum smelter on the island. As in other industrially developing nations, these changes brought an increase in the urban population as villagers who formerly worked in pearling or agriculture moved to Manama and took salaried jobs. The class distinction between Sunnis and Shi‘a sharpened, causing political rifts. The Sunnis were generally wealthier than the Shi‘a, and

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this discrepancy was exacerbated by developments in the labor market.62 Educated, urban Sunnis dominated fields that would give them access to government-related positions, reflecting the status of the ruling Sunni elite, while educated Shi‘a tended to take jobs in technically oriented fields.63 The oppression that Shi‘a felt at the hands of the ruling Sunni minority led to sectarian violence and riots in 1953–4. There was rising hostility toward the government and the British, and Bahrain’s depressed economic situation did not help matters. The fact that many new jobs were contracted and salaried enabled those who felt disenfranchised to feel secure enough to organize for collective bargaining. Also, those who were dissatisfied with the government for whatever reason found groups and clubs in which they were able to discuss their complaints. There were many labor-related protests in the late 1940s and 50s. The government, supported by the British – who did not want instability threatening their interests in the region – responded by repressing all political activity. The Palestinian problem of the late 1940s caused further tension with the government. Sheikh Salman ibn Hamad Al Khalifa (r. 1942–61) did not want Bahrain to get involved in the issue, and this stance antagonized those who sympathized with the Palestinians. By the 1950s and 60s, the rise of Arab nationalism in the greater Arab world had spread to Bahrain where it was translated into a wave of challenges to the authority of the regime.64 Writing about developing countries in the Middle East, Najib Ghadbian says that “modernization, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, did not necessarily seem to result in increased democratization.”65 Clubs and Shi‘i ma’atim served as venues for political organization against the government. In fact, the activities that took place at these sites were so threatening to the ruling establishment that in 1959 an ordinance was promulgated to regulate clubs and place them under governmental control. A club had to have an apolitical agenda in order to be able to exist, and members’ names would be sent to the appropriate authorities. Ironically, the ordinance resulted in the creation of even more clubs reflecting all segments of Bahraini society: Shi‘i, Sunni, Persian, Indian, etc. Despite governmental regulation, politics predictably continued to play a great role in these associations.

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Two events in 1968 shook the government’s sense of security. First, due in part to rising anti-British sentiment in Bahrain, and indeed across the Arab world, Britain announced that it would withdraw its bases from the Gulf, which would leave Bahrain without protection from any foreign threat.66 Second, the Shah of Iran issued a claim to Bahrain that worried the latter so much that it considered joining the recently formed Trucial States Council for security purposes. In 1970, however, the Shah agreed to relinquish his claim, and so Bahrain chose instead to be fully independent.67 Bahrain’s status as a British protectorate was terminated in 1971, Bahrain declared independence, and Britain officially left the Gulf. Education in the Post-Oil Period, 1932–70 Because of its oil revenues, the Bahraini government was able to develop education and other social services at a rapid pace during this period. Apparently, there had been a growing “awareness and demand for education” in the Gulf states even before this period. The Bahraini government built new schools, hired teachers from abroad, and offered financial assistance to students in the form of free textbooks and transportation. Between 1947 and 1970, it spent 26.1 percent of its total oil revenues on social services.68 Sheikha al-Misnad points out that, without the wealth that underwrote free education, girls in the Gulf would not have been able to go to school in great numbers: Provision of free education has always played a significant role in the promotion of literacy among people in general and in particular of the girls in many societies. It is well known that when people have to contribute towards the cost of education, preference is normally given to the education of male children, and girls tend to be neglected.69 For the first time ever, it now became possible for many Bahrainis to continue in school beyond the age of ten and to study subjects other than religion and basic math. Secondary schools opened for boys in 1939 and for girls in 1951. Nevertheless, illiteracy persisted, especially in the poorer rural areas and among females.

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Enrollment figures illustrate the rapidly increasing accessibility of government-sponsored education. Six hundred Bahrainis were enrolled in public school in 1932, when, obviously, very few men and even fewer women were literate.70 Yet only eight years later, enrollments had tripled.71 Enrollments gradually increased in the 1940s and 50s, and then a dramatic increase was recorded in 1961/2, when 23,090 students were enrolled in some type of school, including elementary, intermediate, secondary, technical, commercial and religious schools. The number of students more than doubled by 1970/1, when 50,011 were enrolled.72 Thus, this period began with 600 students and in only 40 years the number leapt to more than 50,000, which was truly a monumental change for Bahraini society. According to Emile Nakhleh, educational planners in Bahrain were concerned with both the “political socialization” of students in the school system, and producing “technicians in different skills to man the country’s industrializing economy.”73 Yet, despite these gains, female literacy rates lagged behind male literacy rates. By 1971, girls between the ages of eight and sixteen were three to four times less likely to attend school.74 Because education for girls was still controversial, and because school was not compulsory, many girls were still kept home. This is in contrast to other Middle Eastern countries: in Turkey, school was decreed compulsory for both boys and girls in 1924; likewise in Egypt (at least officially) in 1925.75 In Iran, education was made compulsory for both sexes in 1974; the same occurred in Iraq in 1976, and in Syria in 1981.76 Bahraini girls who did attend school received a different education than their male counterparts, focusing on domestic sciences, needlework, religion and art instead of science and math. Because schools were located in the larger towns and cities, illiteracy rates were higher in rural areas. While the national mean rate of illiteracy for all ages in 1971 was 50.3 percent, the rate jumped to 70.6 percent in rural areas; in the same year, however, only about 25 percent of school-age children were illiterate.77 There were many obstacles to the education of females in the Gulf. It was hard to overcome opposition on the grounds that if women were educated, they would somehow use their newfound skills to flirt with men, or that they simply did not need an

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education. However, the socioeconomic changes that took place after the 1930s began to pave the way for change in societal attitudes. In this initial period of educational development, Bahrain did not yet have a college-educated population as it does today. Between 1950 and 1972, only 426 Bahrainis managed to obtain a college degree, and 75 percent of them were men.78 This would change in the 1970s, further altering the social landscape. Women in the Post-Oil Period, 1932–70 The status of women in Bahrain has changed greatly since pre-oil times. Despite women leading relatively active lives due to the way in which the pearling economy had shaped Bahraini society, there was still a Gulf tradition, or at least an ideal, of women being confined to their homes. By way of illustration, al-Misnad writes that, “One of the most flattering things that could be said of a dead woman was that she had crossed the doorstep of her home only twice in her life: when she entered on her marriage and when she left on her death.”79 Such absolute domestic confinement was likely a reality only for women of the upper classes, but the effect of this ideal could be seen in the workplace. Bahraini women constituted only 4 percent of the labor force in 1965, and approximately 5 percent in 1971.80 Notwithstanding traditional barriers to women taking a role in the workplace, it is also true that in many cases Bahraini women did not work because they did not have to, although this obviously depended upon their economic status. Bahrain’s relative wealth after the discovery of oil allowed many women to stay home. According to al-Misnad, It must be acknowledged that there are few incentives for a woman to work in non-home-based employment unless she is internally motivated, as her economic support and well-being [are] assured within the kinship structure and she gains little if any personal freedom from outside employment.81 Yet, whether or not women wanted to work, attitudes toward their participation began to change. For example, developments in newspaper

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publishing during the first few decades of the twentieth century brought about new possibilities for women’s involvement. The first Bahraini newspaper, Al-Bahrain, was founded in 1939, and the editor, Abdullah al-Zayed, allowed women to write for the paper. According to Sami Hanna, “Al-Zayed’s horizon expanded more and more when he began to open the door for Bahraini women to write in his newspaper, a step which [laid] the cornerstone in the first women’s movement in Bahrain.”82 As a result of the rise of education and these other advances, women had much less time than before to devote to their daily visitation circles.83 However, they now began to take part in clubs like their male counterparts. The Bahrain Young Ladies’ Society, which was founded in 1955, was the first women’s club not only in Bahrain, but in the entire Gulf region. The goals of the club, which still meets today, have included promoting women’s social and educational status and helping the poor. In furthering these goals, the organization has sponsored lectures, plays, dances and other cultural events. Another organization, the Jam‘iya ‘Awal al-Nisa’iya (Awal Women’s Society), was founded in 1967. This club encouraged Bahraini women to contribute to and serve their community. According to a history of the club, “Those young women were really motivated to do something for other females, for their country, and for the Arab world.”84 Limiting the potential of women’s organizations in Bahrain was the fact that their activities had to be sanctioned by governmental authorities, and the Bahraini government was apparently suspicious of the ultimate agenda of the Awal Women’s Society. The women involved wanted to go beyond charity and improve women’s rights, which at the time was a revolutionary goal. The authorities responded by limiting the club’s functions to the charitable realm.85 Women’s organizations in the Gulf to a great degree involved the wealthier classes, and while such organizations have been successful in raising female participation, they have been criticized for catering to the elite upper classes while failing to address or include the concerns of rural and lower-class women.86 Haya al-Mughni, writing about Kuwait, argues that women’s organizations did not appear in a political void but were in fact supported by the state: “The emergence

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of feminist groups was initially encouraged to promote modernism. These were later replaced by conservative groups to reinforce the patriarchal structure of society.”87 The formation of these groups was controlled by the state which had the same interests as the elite women who tended to join women’s organizations. Similar to the situation in Iran under the Shah, the Bahraini state had a vision of modernization in which women would dress and act like women in other developed countries.88 Poorer, rural, and mainly Shi‘i women had less reason to align themselves with the Sunni power elite and indeed they were not reached to any great extent by women’s organizations. Whereas Shi‘i women were most likely to be interested in organizing to promote women’s employment, wealthier women were interested in organizing for the purpose of volunteering their time and services to poor families. Alongside the emergence of women’s associations, transformations in the family structure also helped to change gender roles in Bahrain. Oil wealth and economic development led to the emergence of the nuclear family, as couples for the first time had enough money to live on their own and did not always have to rely on their parents and extended families. During the pearling era, the patriarch of a given extended family was considered responsible for all family members and made all major decisions. After the economic development of Bahrain and the subsequent emergence of the nuclear family, however, many married couples who lived separately from their parents became jointly responsible for family matters.89 Writing about the larger Gulf region, al-Misnad observes that “the role of a woman as a wife in the nuclear family is not subservient as in the case of the extended family, because she plays an equal role in running family affairs and bringing up the children.”90 Women also began to take an interest in politics and to express themselves politically outside the home. Charles Belgrave observed the effects of women’s and girls’ new access to education: Inevitably education gives them an interest in politics. During political disturbances in Bahrain the girls from one of the schools went on strike and a young woman, who had lately left

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school, took part in a demonstration and led a procession round the town.91 Newly literate women were gaining the same access to foreign books and newspapers that men enjoyed and which provided them with new political ideas that they discussed in their clubs and societies. Religion in the Post-Oil Period, 1932–70 Religious traditions were not yet undergoing profound change, although new ideas regarding religious reform continued to circulate through access to Islamic discourse in the form of books and magazines from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries, as mentioned earlier. Clubs that focused almost exclusively on religious issues, such as the (Salafi) Islamic Club formed in 1928, continued to bring the religious thinking of al-Afghani, ‘Abduh and Rid‘a into Bahrain, creating a bridge to the rest of the Arab Muslim world. The Islamic Club’s charter states that members seek to elevate their “religious, literary and moral standards,” and while the club focused on religion as the primary topic of discourse, it soon became popular with poets and writers. “In addition to its ‘Islamic’ tone,” writes Sami Hanna, it also acquired “a nationalistic character as well as an intellectual image.”92 Religious discourse from all over the Muslim world, including the ideas of Salafi reformers, began to circulate in newly formed Bahraini clubs and were soon to have quite an effect on the religious environment.

The Post-Independence Period, 1971–9 Politics and Economics Aside from the achievement of independence in 1971, the most important political event during this period was the announcement in 1972 by Sheikh ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (r. 1961–99) that a Constitutional Assembly would be held to discuss the drafting of Bahrain’s first constitution. The elements that had given the government legitimacy had changed: whereas the right to rule had been a function of tradition and main force prior to the reforms of the 1920s and the transformations

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of the post-oil period, popular representation now emerged as a legitimizing force. In light of the British withdrawal, it is likely that the government considered this political opening a strategic move. Yet optimism about the potential political participation of both the Shi‘i and the Sunni (male) population was short-lived. The constitution, adopted in 1973, called for the creation of a National Assembly comprised of elected representatives.93 But the Assembly held only two sessions (1973/4 and 1974/5) before it was dissolved by Sheikh ‘Isa because of its conflicts with his regime. Specifically, blocs of religious pro-Shi‘i and leftist pro-Marxist representatives engaged in a power struggle with the regime, which the Sheikh would not tolerate. Having seen its hopes for political participation dashed, Bahrain now entered another period of political repression. After the conflicts in the National Assembly, there were few serious struggles between the government and the Shi‘a until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iran, which had posed an external threat, continued to pose an internal one as Iranian supporters of the revolution managed to stir political opposition to Bahrain’s Sunni government by reaching out to the Shi‘i population, some of whom are ethnically Persian. Radio broadcasts from Tehran were aimed to incite Bahraini Shi‘a to overthrow the Al Khalifa regime. Economically, however, Bahrain was doing marvelously. The boom in profits after the 1973 oil embargo left the oil-producing nations feeling powerful. Bahrain made 6 million Bahraini Dinars in 1965, 111 million in 1975, and 320 million in 1980.94 But not all Bahrainis benefited from the economic surge, and the gap widened between the rich, predominantly Sunni elite and the poor, chiefly Shi‘i community. This set the stage for growing tensions between the two groups. Another consequence of the oil boom, and a setback for the Shi‘i population in particular, was the large number of foreign workers being hired. Foreigners comprised 17 percent of the total population in 1971, and by 1981 they accounted for 30 percent.95 Foreign workers competed with Shi‘a for unskilled as well as skilled jobs. However, poorer Shi‘a to some extent gained middle-class standing by obtaining positions in the burgeoning technical fields, and in fact the middle class grew during this period.

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Education in the Post-Independence Period, 1971–9 Flush with oil money, Bahrain continued to develop its educational system as it built secondary schools, teacher training colleges, and eventually a university. Emile Nakhleh cites a 1972 report by the Ministry of Education, according to which “the educational policy of the state was to campaign against illiteracy in order to aid the country in its development programs.”96 Teachers were recruited from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to allay the shortage of qualified Bahraini teachers. Girls began to do particularly well. In the academic year 1965/6, girls accounted for only 28 percent of total enrollments in secondary school, but by 1979/80, they reached 51 percent of the total. In fact, girls outperformed boys by 10–15 percentage points on pass rates in both elementary and secondary school. These successful young women began to demand the opportunity to pursue university degrees, which “caused considerable headaches for the authorities.”97 How could the authorities deny these young women when they were doing better in school than young men? Yet, given that there was no university in Bahrain until 1978,98 young women would have to go abroad for a university degree. This was a remarkable change from the days when the best thing one could say about a woman was that she had only left her house twice. Young men and women seeking a university education went to countries such as Egypt, Iraq and India. The oil boom of 1973 allowed for a large increase in the number of students studying abroad, and more than half of them were female. Social and economic obstacles still stood in the way of full female literacy. In 1980, 10 percent of boys and 20 percent of girls were still not enrolled in school.99 Even at the time of my field research in 2002–3, there was still no law mandating compulsory education. The illiterate, as before, tended to be the residents of rural, predominantly Shi‘i villages which the benefits of the new economy had not fully reached. Women in the Post-Independence Period, 1971–9 This rise in the level of female education translated into a sharp improvement in the rate of female employment. In 1981, after the end of this

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focal period, women constituted almost 8.3 percent of the labor force, and they tended to be better educated than the men.100 Yet, predictably, they did not get promoted as fast as men, nor were they given administrative positions. Despite their successes, and despite the crumbling of traditional forms of patriarchy such as that found in the extended family during the pearling era, new forms of patriarchy were alive and well in Bahrain. Valentine Moghadam refers to “neopatriarchy” as “the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the context of dependent capitalism; it is modernized patriarchy.”101 Nonetheless, women were quite visible in almost every realm during the 1970s. Those who had been educated during the previous decades became politically, socially and vocationally active. They formed politically oriented organizations (such as the Awal Women’s Society) whose members petitioned the government for the right to vote in 1972.102 Testing boundaries, women in great numbers eschewed traditional dress in favor of Western-style garb. As mentioned in chapter 1, many Bahraini women, now dressed in full black abaya, showed me photos of themselves wearing mini-skirts, short-sleeved shirts and high heels in the 1970s. Of course, not all women dressed in this fashion; like anywhere else, there was a range of styles and dress. For example, there were women whose families who had left Iran during the 1930s when Reza Shah banned the veil in public places, and had moved to Bahrain where they had the freedom to veil; some of these women reportedly continued to veil even during the 1970s. Yet it is significant that many women and girls who would later don the abaya preferred in the 1970s to dress like young people did in Europe. As Bahrainis became more aware of women’s movements in Egypt and Europe, they increasingly challenged traditional patriarchy. The movement to unveil took place in Bahrain much later than in other Middle Eastern countries. In Egypt, for example, women first began to appear unveiled between 1910 and 1919. In Iran, veiling in public was forbidden in 1936, a proscription that remained in force until 1941. Up until the Iranian Revolution, women were actively discouraged from veiling in schools, universities, and other public venues such as hotels and restaurants.103 Unlike the feminist movement that engendered resistance to the veil in Egypt, the Iranian policy was an

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instrument of Reza Shah’s desire to present a modern, Westernized face to the world. After 1941 and until the revolution, veiling in Iran was considered a sign of backwardness by many and was in fact an obstruction to social and professional advancement. Religion in the Post-Independence Period, 1971–9 During the first half of the 1970s, the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain had yet to begin. Instead, women and men were going through a “liberal” phase as many who had reached a relatively high standard of living and level of education wished to throw off the vestiges of their pre-wealth, pre-literate past. For a time, many adopted the dress and lifestyles of foreign pace-setters. Jeans and T-shirts were the ubiquitous uniform and a symbol of modernity among elite youth around the globe. Yet, even as Bahraini women were throwing off their abayas, many Egyptian women were beginning to veil again as a sign of their involvement with the Islamic revival movement. The stage was being set for a religious transformation in Bahrain. Women and men were traveling abroad in great numbers and they were exchanging ideas with their Muslim counterparts in other countries. After Nasser was succeeded by Sadat in 1970, resurgent Islamic movements in Egypt had more freedom to mobilize under the latter’s relatively lenient government. Islamic discourse was becoming less parochial and more international as young people made connections abroad with the greater Islamic world. Anti-colonial resistance movements, such as the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), Yemen’s struggle for independence from the British (1963–7), the Six Day War (1967), and Oman’s Dhofar Revolution (1971) influenced political and religious opinion in Bahrain.104

The Islamic Resurgence, 1979–90 Politics and Economics Two events shaped the political, economic and religious landscape in Bahrain during this period: the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the downward spiral of Bahrain’s economy during the 1980s as the oil

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trade declined due to oil depletion. It was at this time that the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain really began. At the onset of the 1980s, the lower and middle classes had hopes of upward mobility as a result of their newly acquired educational qualifications, but they were generally disappointed to find that their situations failed to improve; in fact, many Shi‘a fell out of the middle class during this period. Yet, at the same time, upper-class families and especially those connected to the ruling Al Khalifa family were flourishing. Among the less fortunate, this disparity created enormous frustration and feelings of alienation from the ruling elite. Education had politicized the middle class, and their political discourse was increasingly couched in religious terms. The rise in unemployment and increasing government repression led to growing identification with Islamic movements, especially among the educated lower and middle classes who found in the Islamic resurgence an ideology that gave them a sense of solidarity against the Bahraini elite and against Western imperialism more broadly. The Shi‘a in particular took great inspiration from the Iranian Revolution which to them represented a triumphant battle against government corruption and Western imperialism. Their backing for the revolution was quite visible. For example, in August 1979, 1,500 Bahraini Shi‘a demonstrated in the streets in support of the revolution. Iran, this time under Khomeini, revived its claim to Bahrain and sponsored a coup attempt in 1981, but this was suppressed. Anthony Cordesman summarizes the growing politicization of the Shi‘a during the 1980s and the government’s corresponding response: A new and relatively well organized opposition movement called the Islamic Front began to form cells in the Shi‘i villages in 1986, and had organized some cells to conduct guerilla and sabotage operations in 1987. This led to 60–100 arrests in 1988. Similar annual levels of arrests took place throughout the 1980s. Many Shi‘a were arrested and detained under a 1974 State Security Measure, while others were exiled or were not given passports.105

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Clearly, some in the Shi‘i community had become organized to such an extent that the Sunni elite considered them a serious threat. Security concerns were high, and given that Britain was no longer protecting Bahrain, the government turned to Saudi Arabia and the two states signed a Bilateral Mutual Security Pact in December 1981.106 Earlier in the same year, at a conference held in Riyadh, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed for the purpose of supporting the internal and external security of the member nations, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi influence in Bahrain began to rise, and in 1986 a causeway was opened between the two countries. John Bulloch, the author of many books on Middle East history and politics, observed in 1984 that Bahrain’s “English atmosphere” was becoming increasingly “Saudi-ized.”107 This is only somewhat true today; while many Saudis converge on Bahrain every weekend, and while Bahrainis have to a great extent begun to dress like Saudis, there are so many foreigners and Western businesses that it would be more accurate to say that Bahrain’s atmosphere is quite international. The downturn of the economy not only politicized Bahrainis, but it was a new impetus for women to join the workforce, not only out of economic necessity, but also because of concern over Bahrain’s reliance on foreign workers. The Ministry of Labor promoted a policy of “Bahrainization” to lessen dependence on expatriate workers by replacing them with previously unemployed Bahraini nationals, including women, and while the policy is supported by Bahrainis, it has never been fully implemented, but it still retains political currency. Efforts to diversify helped stem the downward spiral of Bahrain’s economy. In the early 1980s the country began to rely less on oil and more on its new status as an international banking center. Two other industries also emerged to replace oil: aluminum smelting and shipbuilding. Education in the Islamic Resurgence Period, 1979–90 This period was characterized by the further development of higher education in Bahrain. The Gulf Technical College, established in 1968, and the University College of Arts, Science, and Education, established

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in 1978, merged in 1986 to become the University of Bahrain, a national institution offering Bachelor’s degrees in a variety of fields in the arts and sciences. Literacy rates for both men and women soared during this focal period, and by 1990 reached 87 percent for men and 82 percent for women.108 Women and Religion in the Islamic Resurgence Period, 1979–90 Religion became a channel for political discourse and action during the 1980s, especially for the middle and lower classes, as Islamist movements in Iran, Egypt and other countries influenced Bahrainis, and as Bahrainis who had joined Islamic groups while studying abroad returned home and became active in Bahrain. For both Sunnis and Shi‘a involved in the resurgence, the emphasis was on an educated, rational, correct approach to religion. The Islamic movement reflects the rise in the level of education. In a study of the impact of statesponsored education on religion in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt, Gregory Starrett notes that the state’s goal in sponsoring education was to mold productive, rational, secular, happy and stable citizens whom it could more easily control. However, with the development of mass education in Egypt, which included state-approved religious instruction, some schools became “centers of revolt,” and eventually centers of Islamization, despite the government’s attempts to counteract the Islamists through education.109 The same is true of Bahrain, where the government-established university has been a site of both secular political activity and Islamization. Educated Bahrainis generally became less willing to accept traditional practices that they now deemed either unscientific or irrational and without basis in textual Islamic orthodoxy. They saw moving away from these practices not only as a purification of their religious beliefs – a rejection of what they began to perceive as misinformed, superstitious, uneducated customs associated with folk Islam and Sufism – but also as a move toward social progress, education and modernity. Carl Ernst writes, Through the experience of colonialism and European-style education, Muslim modernists have been highly critical of Sufism,

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not on the grounds that it is foreign to Islam but because they see it as a medieval superstition and a barrier to modernity.110 Starrett likewise notes that in Egypt, modern schools were seen as “weapons” against “harmful” unorthodox religious practices.111 While the term Sufism generally refers to the mystical dimension of Islam, it has also been loosely used to refer to the many diverse folk traditions practiced in various Muslim communities. There are many reasons why education would alter religious practices. Some earlier activities associated with folk Islam did demonstrate a lack of scientific knowledge. Traditional religious healing remedies such as spells, charms and exorcisms, or procedures such as branding the patient with hot irons, or administering water infused with the ink of a Qur’anic sura, had limited efficacy. Some practices were actually harmful if not lethal. The Islamic resurgence in Bahrain advocated a return to religion for the answers to modern problems and concerns. The “return,” however, was not to the traditional indigenous understanding of religion, but to textual Islam as interpreted by educated religious scholars, many of whom were nationals of countries other than Bahrain. Certainly, the Islamic resurgence manifested differently among the Sunnis and the Shi‘a. Nevertheless, they share a common ground and thus a discursive space within which the generalities of the movement can be described. It emphasized adherence to Islamic precepts including values, behavior, law and dress as found in the Qur’an and the Hadith, as well as the rejection of some forms of religious innovation. May Seikaly writes about the new emphasis on Islamic texts as a source of inspiration for veiling among both Sunni and Shi‘i female Islamic activists: Islamism, in their view, does not change their identity but clearly channels it in a more conscious, knowledgeable fashion. To this younger generation, the reconfirmed faith is due to an awareness, an understanding, and an educated comprehension of the written word commanding veiling; the veil has been ordained and prescribes what a proper woman’s attire should be.112

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The reappearance in the 1980s of the black abaya – today the ubiquitous marker of Islamic and Gulf identity for women – was not only a political statement or a manifestation of communal identity, but also a reflection of the influence of mass education, and in particular, of the new emphasis on textual Islam. Women’s newly literate status allowed them access to religious texts and enabled them to decide how to practice Islam in ways that reflected that access. Paradoxically, the women most emphatically calling for strict observance were often those who had received their college education in the West. Indeed, the female founders of the Umm al-Darda’ Qur’anic school, which is the focus of chapter 4, were educated in the West and attribute the early formation of their ideology to the connections they made with other Muslim women while studying abroad.

The Recent Past, 1990–2003 Politics and Economics The contemporary period is distinguished by growing and at times violent calls for democracy in Bahrain. Education raised the political consciousness of both male and female Bahrainis and created a desire for political representation and an awareness of the possibility of change. All sectors of the population sounded the call for democracy, but it was most forcefully voiced by the Shi‘a. The violence that wracked Bahrain during this period included bomb explosions in 1996 outside of hotels, restaurants and a bank in which eight people were killed, and at least 22 people were killed in connection with political unrest between 1994 and 1996.113 By 2002, the year I arrived in Bahrain, the dream of democracy had become a reality, if perhaps bittersweet, as elections were held for the first time and even women were allowed to vote and run for office. It was bittersweet because some leaders in the Shi‘i community called for a boycott of the elections which they considered a meaningless exercise in view of the powers the retitled King would retain regardless of the results. (In February 2002, Sheikh Hamad ibn ‘Isa Al Khalifa, who had succeeded his father as Emir in 1999, officially changed the name

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of the country from the Emirate to the Kingdom of Bahrain and took the title of Malik or King.) Also of significance was the growing US presence in Bahrain due to the American naval base at Juffair and to the Gulf wars, the first, 1990–1, and the second which began in 2003 and has apparently come to an end as of this writing. According to Amnesty International, men, women and even children who were involved in political activity in support of the implementation of democracy and the restoration of Parliament and the Constitution were increasingly the victims of violent governmental repression. Activists came primarily though not solely from the Shi‘i community, but networks sprang up connecting various factions across sectarian lines. In response to demonstrations in 1994–5, there were many human rights violations including arrests, torture, forcible exiles, expulsions and killings.114 The government was reacting not only to the Shi‘i demand for political representation, but also to the recurring Iranian threat: this time it came in the form of a Bahraini wing of Hezbollah founded in Qom which plotted from 1993 to 1996 to establish a pro-Iran government. The plot was uncovered and many arrests were made.115 According to an official at the US Embassy in Manama, Hezbollah was still active in Bahrain in 2002.116 Despite the violence of the previous decade, the continuing tension between the government and the Shi‘a had eased to a considerable degree when I was there in 2002–3. This was due to governmental reforms aimed at placating the Shi‘a, and to the greater possibility of political participation now that the democratic process had begun, despite the shortcomings of its present form. Clearly, the government’s excessive use of force against protesters during Bahrain’s manifestation of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 has exacerbated this tension.117 One problem with the move toward democratization in 2002 is that some feel that it did not go far enough in allowing representation. The King sanctioned the formation of two parliamentary councils with 40 members each, one appointed and one elected, thus ensuring his control of half of the Parliament. Any new law would require 41 votes to pass. Many Shi‘a were infuriated by this arrangement which fell far short of full representation, instead leaving the bulk of power with the Sunni Al Khalifa family. The Shi‘i cleric Sheikh ‘Ali Salman, who

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was involved in the movement to boycott the elections, said, “This is really a step back from the dream of democracy. The new constitution has many points that have reduced the power of the elected people. Unfortunately, we don’t agree with this.”118 Despite the call to boycott, many Shi‘a voted anyway. During this period the USA expanded its influence in Bahrain, essentially ensuring the country’s security in return for military basing rights. Because of the oil reserves in the wider region and its interest in extending and reinforcing its regional influence, the USA has long considered Bahrain a strategic location for a naval base. Bahrain cooperated with the USA during the 1990 Gulf War and in 1991 signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (renewed in 2001) allowing a significant increase in the US military presence. When the US Naval Forces Central Command and its Fifth Fleet established their headquarters at Juffair in 1995, the relationship between the USA and Bahrain was firmly established.119 The conspicuous presence of the Fifth Fleet, which is comprised of approximately 25,000 people serving afloat and 3,000 ashore, demonstrates US influence in the Gulf region.120 Bahrain today has a love/hate relationship with this military presence: grateful for the security and the economic support it brings, yet to a great degree dissatisfied with US foreign policy in the Middle East, including US support for Israel and, at least until very recently, the war with Iraq. The Palestinian cause is frequently discussed in the media. During my stay I often saw front-page photos of dead Palestinian children, the victims of Israeli aggression, accompanied by sympathetic articles, which is evidence of Bahraini sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians. The war with Iraq was also unpopular, and many peace demonstrations were held in protest, reflecting the conflicted feelings of Bahrainis toward the US presence. Education in the Recent Past, 1990–2003 Education in Bahrain today is, on the one hand, quite developed. From an American point of view, on the other hand, it is still somewhat formal and traditional. Literacy rates for adults (age 15 and over) are

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high: 91.9 percent for males and 89.4 percent for females,121 reflecting the great emphasis now placed on education by both the government and the Bahraini public. Bahrain is host to many different types of schools, public and private. The private schools often cater to the expatriate communities, but some Bahrainis send their children to schools that offer American or British curriculums so that they can become fluent in English which is widely spoken in Bahrain. Additional institutes offer extracurricular activities for children where they can learn music, art or sports. The fact that most expatriate children attend private schools correlating with their nationalities has created a society in which the various groups do not often mix. Furthermore, schools – patterned after the British system – seem to be more concerned with test scores than with creativity, and I noticed a level of formality not found in American schools. For instance, many schools require uniforms, assign heavy loads of homework and emphasize frequent examtaking even at the elementary level. The late Bahraini journalist, writer and activist ‘Aziza al-Bassam observed in 1998 that despite gains in women’s education at the university level, discrimination against women continued, with university authorities making it easier for men than for women to attain a degree. The typical rationale the authorities offered for this discrepancy was that since male students would eventually be responsible for supporting their families, they needed a degree more than female students did.122 The university also continues to serve a major role in mobilizing youth to join the Islamic resurgence. As May Seikaly put it, “Education remains the major inducer for young people, both Sunni and Shii [sic], to join the ranks of the Islamists, and it is both in the schools and at the university where conversion and commitment to the Islamic cause takes place.”123 Not everyone has applauded the ways in which modern education has manifested in Bahrain. Among religious conservatives I heard complaints that not enough time was given to religious instruction in elementary schools. Some Shi‘a would prefer that religious education in the public schools reflect the Shi‘i Islam of the majority. Education in Bahrain and elsewhere remains a battleground for competing value systems.

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Women in the Recent Past, 1990–2003 By 1991, a large number of women remained unemployed in Bahrain, yet at the same time, 55 percent of women in the workforce were female expatriates, most of whom served in domestic positions. According to data provided by ‘Aziza al-Bassam, those native Bahraini women who did work typically held positions in governmental departments, representing 65.7 percent of all Bahraini working women in 1991. The environment in private companies was not friendly to female workers in general, due to the lack of time off for childbirth and the long hours of work. Al-Bassam argued that tradition alone could not be blamed for the low percentage of women in the workforce; rather, the real problem was that the Bahraini government was doing little to ensure that there were enough jobs for those women and men seeking employment.124 Yet the government continued to allow business to import foreign labor, fueling resentment against the expatriate community. Bahraini feminists, such as the scholar Munira Fakhro, continued to advocate that Bahrainization would allow more Bahraini women to get jobs.125 During the 1990s, the growing unrest among the Shi‘a as they struggled for democracy and human rights drew a heavy-handed response on the part of the government. Bahraini women, especially Shi‘i women, became exceptionally active in the political realm. They circulated petitions and led demonstrations demanding democratic participation and the release of husbands, fathers and brothers who had been arrested for their involvement in demonstrations against the ruling establishment. Amnesty International’s 1996 report notes that, “For many women, this was the first time they had engaged in an active and vocal participation in public protests, a shift from their traditional role away from the public arena.” The title of the report, “Bahrain: Women and children subject to increasing abuse,” characterizes the government’s response to this political activity. Women and children were arrested, tortured and exiled, and some died. Many Shi‘i women were arbitrarily detained or held in detention to punish their male relatives. The report further notes that “Amnesty International knows of no cases in which women have been charged with involvement in violent acts.” Two Bahraini scholars whose work has informed

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this study, ‘Aziza al-Bassam and Munira Fakhro, were among 20 professional women who sponsored a petition to the Emir in 1995 asking for an end to the violence and the opening of a dialogue. As a result, al-Bassam and Fakhro were both dismissed from their jobs.126 As a consequence of the brutality against the Shi‘a during the 1990s, with the loss, imprisonment and exile of husbands and sons, many Shi‘i women were forced to become breadwinners. In 2001, 23.5 percent of the national workforce was comprised of women, reflecting not only the effects of Shi‘i unrest and the need for women’s salaries, but also the growing acceptability of Bahraini women’s participation in the workforce.127 In 1996, when Dr. Ribhi Mustafa ‘Ilian published a bibliography of all the women in Bahrain who had ever published research or other manuscripts, he listed 399 individuals, documenting the extent to which Bahraini women have been successful in reaping the fruits of their education.128 Religion in the Recent Past, 1990–2003 The Islamic movement that began in the late 1970s and the 1980s and gained strength in the 1990s is, of course, still active today. The growing adoption of Islamic dress reflects political and religious affiliations as well as social pressures. For women, Islamic dress is the black abaya and veil covering the hair. By the late 1990s, nearly 95 percent of university women veiled themselves, and Seikaly noted that, “Those who do not are under a constant and persistent pressure to do so.”129 Paradoxically, despite the Western perception of the abaya as a sign of women’s marginality, for many in Bahrain it is a banner of ideology and belonging. In and of itself, however, it is not an accurate barometer of a given woman’s religiosity: despite the growing willingness to identify in dress with the Islamic resurgence for political and cultural reasons, not all who do so are enthusiastic practitioners.

Conclusion As oil income rapidly flooded a largely illiterate Bahrain, the political, social and religious landscape underwent tremendous change.

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An economy based primarily on pearling and date farming quickly found itself possessed of riches and standing in the spotlight of the oil-hungry West. A tribal political system in which a single family dominated has now begun, at the urging of a newly politicized population, to bend to democratic pressures, albeit to a limited extent. An educational system that was chiefly concerned with giving students rudimentary skills in reading and memorizing the Qur’an was transformed with the founding of a new modern system in which both boys and girls are able to gain high levels of secular education. Women, for the first time in significant numbers, became literate and active in every realm. The role of patriarchy in Bahrain has likewise undergone change.130 During the pearling era, women’s position in the traditional extended family varied. Certainly, during times when male kin were either away at sea or no longer living, Bahraini wives of divers worked outside the home and made important family-related decisions. However, most women’s lives fell under the authority of the family patriarch, and women from wealthy families lived secluded lives with few opportunities to leave the home. After the rise of the nuclear family, however, the “traditional” patriarchy of the extended family began to crumble. Women began to be able to make more major household decisions, although clearly a woman’s husband was (and is) still considered by most Bahraini Muslims to be the head of the family, with the final say in domestic matters. As women became educated and began to work in a variety of fields, they nonetheless faced discrimination in the workplace where they were subjected to new forms of patriarchy or “neopatriarchy.” And they often found themselves at a disadvantage in the religious courts when dealing with matters of divorce, custody or inheritance, as these courts frequently favor males.131 Until 2009, there was no codified personal status law regulating issues pertaining to the family, and the new family law approved by the government in that year excludes the Shi‘a because they have their own sectarian courts. According to Suad Hamada, a prominent journalist based in Manama who covers women’s issues, “Shariah law court judges are notoriously pejorative of women litigants in divorce, child custody, inheritance and marriage disputes.”132 Some Bahraini women

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complained to me of having experienced biased and humiliating treatment at the hands of these judges. Thus, while Bahraini women’s lives have changed to a great degree – most are now able to become educated, to live apart from their in-laws, to work if they so choose – they are still limited by patriarchal or neopatriarchal institutions and understandings of Islam. Islam in general was transformed as well, from being suffused with local folk traditions to being inspired by international movements of Islamic resurgence, as newly literate Bahraini men and women traveled abroad and otherwise became involved in these movements. As education brought about political awareness and a concern with national and religious identity, political ideology came to be defined in religious terms. The Islamic resurgence, however, can also be understood as a new concern with practicing Islam in an educated, literate manner. Given the remarkable changes that have occurred in Bahrain since the discovery of oil, and the significant increase in literacy among Bahraini women, I now turn to examine Shi‘i women and their changing religious practices.

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3 THE SHI‘I M A’TA M “We Used to Cry But Now We Don’t”

Introduction Often, while spending evenings with my children in our apartment in the Shi‘i village of ‘Aali, we heard what sounded like plaintive chanting or singing, broadcast loudly from a speaker at the local ma’tam (pl. ma’atim), or Shi‘i religious center. On nights when an event was being held, the streets near the ma’tam and the ma’tam itself shone with green-colored lights, people milled about outside greeting each other, and the overwhelming, poignant sound of religious recitations could be heard at quite a distance. Inside the ma’tam, people sometimes sat on cushions on the floor, drinking tea. A ma’tam is not the same thing as a mosque, it is rather primarily a place for Shi‘a to eulogize the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, who was the second son of the first Shi‘i Imam, ‘Ali, and the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. A mosque, in contrast, is the site of communal Muslim ritual prayer. A ma’tam is also a community center for the Shi‘a, who have suffered from economic disadvantages and political repression. In Sunni-ruled Bahrain, Shi‘a comprise the majority – up to 70 percent – of the national population, and they tend to be much less wealthy than Sunnis. Religious demographics in Bahrain are controversial, and precise figures are not available.

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The role of the ma’tam has changed in Bahraini society, especially in the case of women’s ma’atim. While men’s ma’atim have always been sites of political relevance, it is only in the past few decades, according to the women I interviewed, that women have used their ma’atim for purposes other than religious and social. The ways in which Bahraini women use their religious structures reflect their newly educated status. Having offered a history of Bahrain from a variety of angles in the previous chapter, I now turn to the Shi‘a and to Shi‘i Islam in Bahrain. I discuss the history and the evolving functions of the ma’tam through the lens of the impact that education has had on Shi‘i Islam. I describe some of the new activities taking place in the ma’atim, especially the women’s ma’atim (I analyze a Sunni women’s Qur’anic center in the following chapter). Next, the focus shifts to an analysis of the factors behind these new changes. The chapter closes with a glimpse of some of the future plans of the Shi‘i women I interviewed, and of the ways in which they are thinking “outside the ma’tam.”

The Shi‘a in Bahrain and Bahraini Shi‘ism While almost all the Shi‘a in Bahrain belong to the Twelver Shi‘i sect of Islam, they are a diverse group.1 The Baharna are Shi‘i Arabs indigenous to Bahrain, and they are generally the most economically disadvantaged community among the Bahrainis. They comprise approximately half of the total Shi‘i population. The ‘Ajam are Bahraini Shi‘a of Persian descent, and they represent up to 22 percent of the total.2 They tend to be the wealthiest among the Shi‘a, and many speak Persian as their primary language. Rigid categories of identification tend to be problematic. A person identified as Shi‘i might not be religious at all, yet still identify with the Shi‘a because of his or her family connections, political ideology or cultural and ethnic ties. On the other hand, a person might dismiss the latter connections yet hold deeply religious convictions. This study focuses on all Bahraini Shi‘a, whether Baharna or ‘Ajam, and more specifically on female Shi‘a involved in some way in activities at a ma’tam. Contrasting Shi‘i and Sunni ideology and practices sheds light on the differences and the commonalities between the two communities.

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The religious distinctions between the Shi‘a and the Sunnis are many, and these are manifested in both private devotion and public presentation. The Shi‘a have developed their own ways of practicing Islam while still sharing many similarities with their Sunni counterparts. For example, while practicing Shi‘a perform five prayers a day, they combine the five prayers into three prayer sessions, instead of the five sessions that Sunnis observe. The Shi‘a keep the same holidays as the Sunnis do, but there are small differences in the way they do so. For instance, many observant Shi‘a break their Ramadan fast a few minutes later than Sunnis do, although in actuality the degree to which Shi‘a and Sunnis adhere to their religious doctrines varies. The Shi‘a also observe days having to do with the martyrdom of Shi‘i religious figures, and while some Sunnis in the larger Muslim community have participated in these commemorative rituals, most Sunnis in Bahrain do not. Kamran Scot Aghaie notes that many Sunnis in Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and South Asia participated in Shi‘i commemorative rituals in the past, but that in recent times Sunni and Shi‘i practices have grown more distinct from each other.3 Bahraini Shi‘i communal attendance at ma’atim is unparalleled in the Sunni community; the Sunnis do not have a site that functions like a ma’tam. The most dramatic religious event carried out annually in the public realm by the Shi‘i community in Bahrain is the Ashura procession through the streets on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram. In this procession, participating Shi‘i men flagellate themselves until bloody to commemorate the brutal slaying of the Prophet’s grandson, Imam Husayn, at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE.4 While there are myriad ways in which Shi‘i Islam is actually interpreted and practiced, it is nonetheless possible to describe common aspects of Shi‘i culture. In general, the Shi‘i worldview is different from that of the Sunnis. Typically, in the Shi‘i ethos, their communal history is viewed with great mourning and grief for their past oppression and their slain religious leaders, considered martyrs, who led their communities under oppressive conditions and died tragic deaths. Functions that commemorate this history have been understood as providing cohesion and meaning for the community. They allow the Shi‘a to relive their communal past and perform collective ethics, such

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as the importance of standing up to tyranny and demonstrating compassion for the suffering of all, especially that of the Prophet’s family. It is not possible to comprehend the significance of martyrdom and suffering in the Shi‘i context without some knowledge of Shi‘i sacred history. The most prominent of the holy figures are ‘Ali, Hasan and Husayn who are considered the first three Shi‘i imams. ‘Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law and the father of Hasan and Husayn, was wounded by one of the Khawarij while he was praying and subsequently died in 661 CE.5 Hasan succeeded to the imamate and carried it out under horrific conditions, being persecuted, along with other Shi‘a, by the Umayyad Caliph Mu‘awiya. He was ultimately poisoned circa 669, according to Shi‘i accounts, by an agent of Mu‘awiya. Husayn succeeded Hasan and he too served his imamate under repressive conditions. In the Battle of Karbala in 680, Husayn was cruelly slain, along with his children and a small group of followers, by the army of Yazid, son of Mu‘awiya, who had succeeded his father as caliph. The collective sorrow the Shi‘a feel, not only for these deaths, but for the tragic ways in which they occurred, is combined with hope for a future filled with justice. The tone and mood of religious functions in part emanate from this shared sorrow and hope. Just as Bahraini Shi‘i Islam is imbued with memories of a sacred past – the struggles against tyranny and oppression waged by Imam Husayn and the others – it also carries with it the struggles that contemporary Shi‘a are waging against their political and economic situation. Shi‘i Islam has a long tradition of valuing dissent. It goes back to the days after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and the ensuing contest for authority. While many in the Shi‘i community were quietist, some Twelver Shi‘a in the late twentieth century were responsible (as were some Sunnis) for political activism and uprisings. One strategy that Shi‘a have historically used to avoid persecution is known as taqiyya (prudential dissimulation), in which they disguise their religious beliefs from potentially hostile Sunnis, outwardly behaving as though they were Sunni while inwardly remaining Shi‘i.6 The most important example of contemporary Shi‘i activism in places other than Bahrain is that of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Iranian intellectual ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933–77) was tremendously

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influential during the period preceding the revolution. His ideas regarding religious reform, such as his conceptualization of Shi‘i Islam as a revolutionary ideology for modern times, helped to inspire the revolution. Other examples of contemporary Shi‘i activism include the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait in 1983, and the hijacking of a Kuwait Airways flight by Lebanese Shi‘a in 1984. Emerging in the early 1980s, Hezbollah in Lebanon carried out operations such as the destruction of Israel’s military headquarters in the southern Lebanese town of Tyre in 1982, in which some 90 Israeli personnel and their Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners were killed.7 The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), led by Massoud Rajavi, is another Shi‘i political movement known for violent tactics. Formed in 1965, MEK has claimed to promote democracy and women’s rights in Iran. Its armed struggle has included suicide bombings targeting the Iranian government. Juan Cole, a prominent scholar of Shi‘i Islam, argues that, given the Shi‘a’ status as minorities, or functional minorities, other than in Shi‘aruled Iran, recent Shi‘i activism should be understood as an attempt to obtain political representation.8 Despite Shi‘i regard for dissent and protest, and despite the recent waves of Shi‘i opposition, activism and violence, Twelver Shi‘a in the past were not particularly known for terrorism or the pursuit of martyrdom. In fact, for many centuries Shi‘a practiced taqiyya in order to avoid martyrdom.9 This contradicts the idea that Shi‘i Islam is somehow inherently violent, or that all Shi‘a are willing to die for their political cause. Current activism, instead, has been inspired by specific political circumstances and historical contexts. Recent Shi‘i activism in Bahrain has economic and political roots. The Gulf and the surrounding oil-producing regions constitute the homeland of the Shi‘a. Shi‘i communities are found in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran; outside the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf they are found in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and elsewhere. The Shi‘a have a marginalized status in all of the Gulf states except Iran and post-Saddam Iraq.10 They have not benefited from oil and other resources to the same degree as the Sunnis have. After the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, as nation-states were

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forming, Shi‘a found it difficult to integrate into states whose binding ethos was Arab nationalism.11 Modernization and urban development benefited urban Sunnis much more than they did Shi‘i villagers. In Bahrain under Sunni Al Khalifa rule since 1783, the majority Shi‘a have remained at the bottom of the economic ladder. In 2000, one scholar estimated unemployment among Bahraini males at 16–30 percent, with most of the unemployed being of Shi‘i descent.12 Activism among Bahraini Shi‘a since the late twentieth century is a result of Shi‘i dissatisfaction with their lower socioeconomic status, the lack of any democratic participation, and governmental discrimination and oppression. The 1990s in particular were a time of intense political repression, as the Bahraini Shi‘i community actively and at times violently struggled to achieve political representation. Shi‘i violence included several bombings in Manama’s business district in 1996. The government responded by severely cracking down on Shi‘i activists: thousands were arrested, including women and children, and at least 22 Shi‘a were killed.13 In 1996, Amnesty International documented cases of torture and other abuses of both male and female Bahraini Shi‘a by the authorities. In 1994, many in the Shi‘i community, together with secular Sunni liberals who spearheaded the move, signed a petition calling for the restoration of Parliament; of the 23,000 people who signed, the majority were Shi‘i.14 Over the next decade, the government did a number of things to appease the Shi‘a, such as granting amnesty for political prisoners and allowing exiles to re-enter Bahrain.15 In my interactions with Sunni and Shi‘i Bahrainis in 2002–3, I noticed that they tended to present themselves as mutually tolerant, at least in the public realm. Invited to a women’s party held in a tent during Ramadan, I was begged by one woman not to write a book on problems between the Sunnis and the Shi‘a, as many others had. She said, Look, the tension you read about doesn’t really exist. I’m Sunni and [pointing to another woman] my friend and relative over here is Shi‘i. There are Sunnis and Shi‘a right here at this party and we don’t have any problem with each other.

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While there, I wondered if in fact these women’s tent parties – which can be quite grand affairs complete with servants, lavish menus and festive decorations – also serve to cement ties between the two groups, thus creating and maintaining a degree of sectarian harmony. Complicating the notion of Sunni-Shi‘i strife is the fact that not only do the two groups socialize – though mainly outside the home – but intermarriage is increasing. The line dividing the Sunnis and the Shi‘a is not as rigid as is often imagined. Aversion to strife also came up concerning a television program broadcast in Bahrain. Titled Al-Mustaqilla (The Independent), it presents debates between Sunni and Shi‘i religious scholars that are characterized by a lot of arguing and mutual recrimination. Everyone I asked about this program thought it was terrible; they said it provoked sectarian hatred. One person suggested to me that an “outside hand” might be fomenting problems between the two groups. Despite Al-Mustaqilla’s agenda, she added, once the extremists on both sides are taken out of the picture, it is easy to see what the two groups have in common. I often heard the specter of a “sinister outside hand” evoked as the hidden cause of ethnic strife, which accords with the commonly held notion that intolerance is foreign to Bahrain. Clearly, sectarian strife has a long history in the country. Yet both Sunnis and Shi‘a vehemently insisted to me that the conflict is overblown. While no one denied the sometimes violent Shi‘i activism of the 1990s or the government’s heavy-handed response, Bahrainis seemed to want to present a harmonious face to the world. There are several possible reasons for this presentation. Firstly, in the post–9/11 environment, during the war on terror and immediately preceding the war in Iraq that began in 2003, many Bahrainis spoke of feeling besieged by US foreign policy and needing to put forward a unified Muslim front. Secondly, I noticed an inclination to promote positive images of Bahrain, the Gulf and Muslims in general, countering the plethora of negative images of Muslims and Arabs. Thirdly, in Gulf culture, a high value is placed on reserve, refraining from gossip and backbiting, and otherwise displaying impeccable manners. Saying pleasant things about others, including other ethnic and religious groups, is one way of displaying one’s own good upbringing. Finally, Bahrain having

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long been a center of international trade, Bahrainis have cultivated a self-image characterized by tolerance which has probably served their objective of conducting business with others very well. Clearly, the social atmosphere will be altered by the anti-government protests that started in 2011. To what degree is yet to be known.

The History and Functions of the Bahraini Ma’tam Some context will shed light on the roles the ma’tam has recently begun to play. It is important to note that the institution is not unique to Bahrain. Elsewhere, Shi‘i communal meeting halls are known by different terms: husayniyya is the principal term used in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon; it is heard less often in Bahrain.16 The term refers to Imam Husayn, the martyr of Karbala. In Bahrain as in Iran, the husayniyya or ma’tam is a site devoted to carrying on Imam Husayn’s struggle for justice and against oppression, apart from the formal and ritualistic activities carried out at the mosque. History Before the late nineteenth century, ma’atim in Bahrain were situated within private homes. Each extended family had its own ma’tam, and strangers were not encouraged to enter. Later, the community began to build ma’atim as communal structures independent of private estates, and they became visible manifestations of the presence and prosperity of the Shi‘i population.17 The ma’atim in which men met were the first to become public structures. Women continued to gather in homes until separate public communal ma’atim were also built for them.18 Women’s activities in the ma’tam centered on reciting Qur’anic passages, religious stories and special prayers drawn from the sayings of Shi‘i imams, chanting verses lamenting Shi‘i martyrs (especially Husayn), grieving and socializing with others.19 Functions of the Ma’tam: Religious Education How is the ma’tam being used in Bahrain today? Aside from its traditional function as a religious communal meeting place, it is being

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used for religious education. One issue the Shi‘a have had to contend with since the founding of governmental schools is that the religious component of the system-wide curriculum did not and does not teach the Shi‘i version of Islam. Prior to the availability of modern public education, both Shi‘i and Sunni communities gave their children religious instruction, but when only the Sunni form of Islam was offered in the public school system, there was a need to heighten the emphasis on the private religious education of Shi‘i youth. Islamic education is presented in general terms in Bahraini public schools, with sensitivity to the Shi‘i population. If parents wish to provide learning in Shi‘i Islam, they turn to the ma’tam for more specific religious guidance. In 2002, however, they were given another alternative when a public school opened in Juffair, offering primary- and secondary-level curriculum in the Ja‘fari Shi‘i school of Islamic thought. Fatima, a young, earnest and outgoing Baharna Shi‘i who was studying English literature at the University of Bahrain, expressed her dissatisfaction with the religious education she had received in public school: I went to a government school, but I never, ever depended upon what they gave us for religion. They gave us the Sunni stuff. We learned it – just memorized it for the exam – then we went home and learned our religion at the ma’tam. It’s not fair. Remedying the imbalance of the public school religious curriculum, the ma’tam serves to maintain Shi‘i religious identity. Fatima’s friend Dana, likewise a university student and a Baharna Shi‘i, articulated the urgency of this need: “We feel that this is all we have. The government is not on our side. We feel we have to keep up: we have to know our religion.” I met Fatima and Dana, both from lower-middle-class families, in the American Studies Center at the University of Bahrain where I had been invited to give a talk. Both aged 21, they sat assertively in the front row of the lecture hall, wearing unassuming abayas and headscarves, and asked several questions during the discussion, smiling at me with friendliness. Afterwards they came up to me and introduced

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themselves, offering their cellphone numbers in case I needed any help with my research, which I deeply appreciated. They were young and optimistic, and in later conversations with them it struck me that while they were not naive, they did not seem to have much of the cynicism regarding “the state of the world” or “hope for the future” that I often encountered when I interviewed middle-aged Bahrainis. They also seemed to be more poised and mature than typical college students their age in the USA. I found out later that Fatima, who has eight brothers and sisters, was soon to be married – it is common for women in the Middle East to marry relatively young (in their late teens or early twenties) – which might have contributed to her appearance as a person with responsibilities.20 Functions of the Ma’tam: A Refuge While Fatima and Dana emphasized the educational function of the ma’tam, it is also a site of refuge for the Shi‘i community. It is a liminal space between the public and the private realms, into which Sunnis and other outsiders rarely venture uninvited, and where Shi‘a can develop and strengthen their communal identity and position in society. Hajar, a Baharna Shi‘i and a strongly outspoken political activist in her forties, noted that the ma’tam serves as a safe gathering place for political discourse during periods of government persecution of the Shi‘a. She said, “During the uprising [of the 1990s], no one could speak about politics except in the ma’tam. This was the only place we could speak the truth.” Hajar was from a middle-class family, married with two children, and her husband was also quite active in politics. She had been educated in Saudi Arabia. While her parents were not religious, she said that she had become more political and more devout after her marriage. In fact, I found her quite knowledgeable about the history and oppression of the Shi‘a. For Hajar, Islam was not just about piety, but rather “a political religion that governs all actions and lays down foundations for all of your life.” I visited Hajar and her husband Jalal in their spacious, elegant home one evening – their two small children were running around in pajamas – and what impressed me

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about her the most was her intensity. She spoke quickly and with a force that was almost intimidating. It was only after I attempted to visit one of the ma’atim that I truly realized they are places of communal privacy. I had thought it would be a fairly simple matter: I would ask a Shi‘i acquaintance to accompany me and we would go. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case. I asked some ten different individuals and each one said that of course he or she would take me, only to cancel the visit later. Bemused and feeling rather shunned, I wondered why. I was finally told by a friend that taking an American into a ma’tam during the build-up to the war with Iraq, when US popularity was at an all-time low, would be viewed poorly and with suspicion by the community. Later, when I discussed the experience with other Shi‘a, they seemed surprised at the difficulty I had had gaining access to a ma’tam. I was told that under less tense circumstances, I would have had no problem whatsoever. Fatima was quite helpful regarding this particular debacle. She had previously invited me to an event put on by her ma’tam which highlighted the plight of the Palestinian people, and she was deeply disappointed when I fell ill and was unable to come. She sent me a long text message saying that she was upset because she had wanted me to see how organized and well put-together the program was, and indeed I felt guilty for not having attended the event of which she was obviously so proud, and frustrated to have missed the opportunity. I got the impression that in her own way Fatima wanted to build bridges between the Bahraini and the American communities. She admitted in an interview with me that her friends and family had been worried about her talking to me, but said she had insisted to them that it was important that dialogue remain open between groups. In a separate interview, Dana also spoke of having learned tolerance for others and credited her university education for this newly embraced value. She admitted that she used to regard Sunnis as alien, but after taking classes with Sunnis she could no longer hold onto her prejudices. The benefit of living in a pluralistic society, she said, was that after mixing with the Sunni community, she became interested in the American community too, which led her to focus on the American Studies Program at the University of Bahrain. She explained:

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I really changed after studying at the university. I was really strict, but then after seeing a variety of people there I asked myself why I thought I was better. I thought, everyone hates Americans, and yet we all eat their fast food. What is America? I became interested in knowing their history and background. I was touched that Fatima asked me to attend her wedding party. The event was lovely yet modest – the refreshments provided were limited to small sandwiches and bottles of water served in boxes – and it was held in a beautiful ma’tam in ‘Aali, a Shi‘i village on the outskirts of Manama that was famous for its pottery and where I lived. When I entered the hall, it was full of black-robed women sitting on cushions against the wall and children playing and milling about. The men, including the groom, were in another section of the building. My two children and I were the only non-Shi‘a there. Obviously, we stuck out in the crowd, but soon my eight-year-old son began running around with the other children. Nonetheless, Fatima’s friends (Dana was there too) made a point of pulling me over to chat with them at the front of the room where the bride was traditionally seated. I could hardly recognize Fatima, resplendent in her white wedding gown, with elaborate makeup and her hair uncovered, after I had seen her so often in her modest black Islamic garments. Before her wedding I had asked Fatima about gender roles, married life, and whether or not she wanted to pursue a career after marriage. She told me that she hoped to organize her time after she got married so that she could take care of her husband and children and continue her studies. She even wanted to travel to the UK to get a Master’s degree. She freely and humorously admitted to having contradictory opinions on marriage and gender roles. On the one hand, she thought that it would be great if men focused more on domestic life. She said that her fiancé had cooked for her a few times, and that her father used to help her mother too. Then she laughed at her own double standard on the matter. When her brother started helping out his wife by bathing the children, she was annoyed with her sister-in-law, thinking that she had manipulated him into doing it, that it was not proper for her brother to perform domestic chores. “In the Eastern view of a man,”

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she said, “he is a king. If we see a man helping his wife, we think he is weak.” She admitted that she did want her husband to help her but, on the other hand, she did not want her brother to be “made weak” by his wife! Her remarks illustrate the tensions and the ambivalence that some Bahraini women might feel regarding women’s changing roles. Returning to the ma’tam, why is there a need for a refuge? Firstly, doctrinal and sectarian differences underline the existing political and economic rift. Sunnis in Bahrain have a range of attitudes toward Shi‘i Islam and Shi‘a. Some Sunnis insisted to me that they live quite peacefully with their Shi‘i counterparts who are their coworkers, friends, and sometimes relatives through marriage. Regarding the truth value of Shi‘i Islam, I heard statements such as, “Only God knows.” On the other hand, while the Shi‘a are tolerated, they are also often misunderstood by the dominant Sunnis, and some Sunnis go so far as to consider the Shi‘a kafirs (apostates). Although the Shi‘a comprise the majority in Bahrain (as in Iraq, Iran and Azerbaijan), everywhere else they are a minority. The dominance of Sunni Islam in the Arab world, combined with Sunni political dominance in Bahrain, creates a Sunni-normative environment. In this setting, some Bahraini Shi‘a feel defensive despite their majority status, because they perceive that they have been constructed as “the other.” I witnessed a long debate between two women regarding the issue of prayer sessions. The Sunni was trying to understand how her Shi‘i friend could possibly consider it correct to pray fewer times daily than she herself did; this struck her as simply lazy. Needless to say, her friend became quite defensive, sighed deeply, and wearily launched into an explanation of this particular Shi‘i practice. While Sunnis pray five times a day, Shi‘a combine the second and third daily prayers, and then the fourth and fifth. Within these three sessions (including the morning prayer), Shi‘a perform the same number of units of ritual prayer as the Sunnis do.21 Despite the fact that the Shi‘a are the majority in Bahrain, I got the sense that few in the Sunni community had more than a superficial understanding of Shi‘i religious practices. This incident sheds light on the types of misunderstanding that some Sunnis have of these practices, and on the defensive yet resigned responses of the Shi‘a.

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Many Shi‘a told me stories illustrating the condescension they had suffered at the hands of Sunnis whom they perceived to be overly righteous. Most annoying were those whom they referred to as Wahhabis – a term used, often pejoratively, for Sunnis who adhere to a resurgent purist form of Islam inspired by the Saudi Arabian reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) – and whom they often also referred to as Salafis. Hajar’s husband Jalal related the following story with a deep sense of exasperation: I was in Mecca praying. A Wahhabi came and told me, “Repeat your prayers. A lady has passed in front of you.” I said, “What is wrong with that?” He replied, “Three things cannot pass in front of you: a donkey, a black dog and a woman.” Jalal’s story not only depicts the way some Shi‘a feel they are treated by Sunnis – condescended to, as though they were constantly in need of correction – but it also illustrates the perceived ideological differences between Salafi Sunnis on the one hand and Shi‘a on the other. Shi‘a tend to describe themselves as being more liberal about women’s issues and generally less dogmatic than Salafis. There is no essential Shi‘i concept of gender roles and thus no definitive answer to the question of comparative women’s rights under Sunni Islam versus Shi‘ism. There is nonetheless the perception among many Bahraini Shi‘a that Shi‘i Islam is more “open” or more “liberal” regarding women. Whether or not this is true, there is evidence suggesting that, at least in some ways, Shi‘i women have enjoyed greater rights than their Sunni counterparts. Inheritance rights are more generous to women under Shi‘ism than under Sunni Islam. Certain educated Twelver Shi‘i women in Iran have historically been able to practice ijtihad (independent judgment) on legal questions, and in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Iranian women were relatively active in the political realm. For example, they participated in Iran’s Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. They were also quite active in some of the movements that led up to the 1979 revolution.22 Since that revolution, many Iranian women have continued to negotiate religion and gender roles, some through

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their participation in the publication of women’s journals such as Zan-e Ruz and Zanan.23 Hajar’s husband Jalal was also irritated by the hypocrisy that he felt Saudi Arabian “Wahhabis” (his term) demonstrate by making a show of religiosity when in fact, he said, their piety is feigned. He described what he considered to be a typical scenario: “You can see the Saudis – a man and a wife – the wife walks 20 feet behind him. Then they both sit down, the wife lifts her niqab (face veil) and drinks a beer.” Many Shi‘a I spoke with also expressed their resentment of Saudi wealth and the Saudis’ ability to propagate their version of Salafi Islam to poorer countries, building mosques and schools for this purpose. It was rumored that Saudi Arabia was also sending Salafi proselytizing materials to Bahrain, specifically to centers such as Discover Islam, the Salafi organization in Manama. Many Shi‘a found this threatening, believing Salafi Islam to be intolerant in general and intolerant of the Shi‘a in particular. Zahra, a tall, upper-middle-class ‘Ajami (of Persian descent), was in her late forties when I met her. She had children, and she was the founder of a prominent women’s society. Serious, dedicated, articulate, calm, poised and efficient, she had all the qualities that enabled her to be a leader in her community. I consider myself fortunate to have known her, and I still remember some of her comments that I felt reflected a great deal of wisdom, such as one in which she said that in order to create change in the world, people have to begin on a much smaller scale and work on changing themselves. I met her at a party where she told me about the activities of her organization. She wanted to meet with me once a week at a mall to practice her already advanced English. When we met, I would usually ask her to explain some aspect of Bahraini society to me, and she would patiently do so. Zahra’s patience did not extend to Salafis. Like Jalal, she complained about their “righteousness,” charging that they had done great damage to the image of Islam with their rigid and shallow ideology, as she characterized it. She said, The Salafis focus on the external aspects of Islam. Worship shouldn’t be used as a weapon against other people, but should be between you and God. The religious police in Saudi Arabia

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beat you to make you close your store and go pray. Will that cause people to pray? Zahra also complained that the Bahraini government’s priorities were skewed toward promoting Westernization at the expense of other issues that she deemed more important: The Bahraini government encourages people to make Bahrain the Singapore of the Gulf, having freedoms, being “civilized,” instead of paying attention to what is important, such as science, et cetera. They run to McDonalds but they pay no attention to women’s rights, children’s rights or humanitarian issues. Everyone is shopping, everyone has Western fever. Is it government policy to keep people too busy to think about democracy and human rights? Clearly, Zahra felt that this shopping-oriented “Western fever,” which she suggested the government supported, was diverting people from crucial social and political awareness. The Iranian intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–69) coined the term Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness) for this phenomenon. “This Gharbzadegi has two heads,” he wrote. “One is the West, the other is ourselves who are Weststruck.”24 Many in the Shi‘i community feel they have derived little benefit from the rapid pace of government-sanctioned economic development that they associate with the West. Thus “Western fever” is not only a diversion, it is one that most Shi‘a cannot fully enjoy, which results in feelings of alienation. The ma’tam, then, is a refuge from the intolerance and prejudice of some in the wider society, from governmental oppression, and from feelings of alienation toward what some consider the materialistic ambitions of the ruling Al Khalifa family. The reasons for needing a sanctuary are varied, and no one single reason could be claimed by all Bahraini Shi‘a. Functions of the Ma’tam: A Center for Religious Change Besides its functions as a center for religious education and as a communal refuge of sorts, the ma’tam is at the heart of the discourse

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regarding changes in religious practice and belief that have taken place in the last few decades. According to those I interviewed, one of these changes is the reinterpretation of Shi‘i religious figures and rituals, for example, the increasing rejection of Shi‘i victimhood, especially by the younger, educated and more politically active generations. These new interpretations serve to redefine the Shi‘i community, often shedding images of passivity, victimhood and blind adherence to traditional ritual practice. Instead, sacred figures are being interpreted as strong and responsive. The new emphasis is on an educated understanding of Shi‘i religious figures and practices, along with an insistence on their relevance to today’s concerns, political and otherwise. Ma’tam functions that re-enact sacred events from the Shi‘i historical past are traditionally accompanied by expressions of profound grief and crying by both men and women. I was told that women wept not only for the travesties the Shi‘a had endured in their communal past, but for their current situation as well, thus linking the past to the present. Yet women stated again and again that in the past they had spent most of their time at the ma’tam weeping, and that now – except for the older women – they no longer do. Zahra described the older generation and their religious expression of sorrow at the ma’tam: Older women read sad poems and tap their chests. This is not so bad – I won’t do it – but it’s not a big deal. They want to feel as though they are empathizing, as though they are connected to Imam Husayn. What makes them feel connected is that most of the people in jail now are Shi‘a. Women feel relief when they cry, they release their emotions. They link Imam Husayn with all Shi‘a. Thus they connect the suffering and the loss of Imam Husayn, who was martyred in the Battle of Karbala, with the suffering they themselves are experiencing, which reinforces a sense of Shi‘i identity. What is different now is suggested in Zahra’s comment that she herself did not participate in that type of lamentation. Zahra did not cry and tap her chest in the ma’tam because she found these gestures to be inappropriate. In the past, she argued, Imam Husayn had traditionally been understood as a powerless

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victim in need of help. Zahra considered this notion to be incorrect and dangerous; she felt that it fed into the Shi‘i culture of victimhood, a representation she saw as passive, destructive, unproductive, and ultimately serving as a negative force on the community. “It’s not true,” she objected. “Imam Husayn was a great hero. No one else did what he did. He had dignity. He would have rejected that representation. He wanted us to draw inspiration from his life.” Likewise Jihan, a Baharna Shi‘i and a wealthy, polished professional in her early thirties who worked in the diplomatic quarter in Manama, explained that it was no longer considered acceptable among “modern” Shi‘a to react to the story of Imam Husayn solely by crying: I get very emotional when I go to the ma’tam and hear the whole story of Imam Husayn. He died and he was killed for reasons beyond that, beyond us just going to the ma’tam and crying. He died because he wanted us to think, to better ourselves, to improve our Shi‘ism and our way of thinking. Jihan spoke passionately about the role of newly interpreted Shi‘i Islam in her life and the ways in which she felt it empowered her. Dressed quite elegantly in a variety of muted colors and a silk headscarf, she presented an image that was strikingly different from that of Fatima and Dana, the black-robed university students. A new mother, she smiled with tension and told me how much she missed her baby boy and how hard it was to leave him every day and go to work. Contemporary Bahraini women have also reconceptualized the significance of another figure in Shi‘i sacred history, Zaynab, the daughter of ‘Ali and the sister of Hasan and Husayn. Zaynab accompanied Imam Husayn to Karbala where he and others were massacred, and after his martyrdom she was forced to cross the desert to Damascus. Later, while captive in Yazid’s palace, she held the first lamentation assembly for her brother. Zahra, the ‘Ajami who was active in a prominent Bahraini women’s organization, argued that while in the past Zaynab had been understood as a symbol of grieving womanhood, today this would be considered an incomplete understanding of her significance. Zaynab should also be remembered for her strength and resilience.

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A better way to view her, Zahra held, was to remember that Imam Husayn relied upon Zaynab to continue his revolution. Zaynab was a model of patience; she was able to bear all tragedies. Nowadays women see Zaynab as a positive role model, inspiring them to be patient and strong, and not just to grieve. Lara Deeb describes a similar reinterpretation of Zaynab’s significance among Shi‘i women in Lebanon: while traditional portrayals of Zaynab cast her as “buried in grief,” in recent years she is depicted with “courage, strength, and resilience.”25 Jihan, the Baharna professional and new mother, also spoke of Zaynab’s function as a modern role model: Zaynab has become a symbol for all Shi‘i women because of her strength, her strong faith and her crisis management skills. You know, it occurs to me that they didn’t use to have these terms, but now we do. Shi‘i women use Zaynab as a symbol. Even highly educated women try to emulate her skills and ability as a guide and an example for their lives, and they implement this in a way that can serve their office work and their interpersonal relations. In Jihan’s view, Zaynab now serves as a career role model for women and as someone to turn to for help with “crisis management” as well as other professional and personal matters. Clearly, she found a way to connect the significance of the figure of Zaynab to her own professional life. Jihan also emphasized the fact that before the advent of female literacy, women had neither a profound nor an informed understanding of Zaynab: Of course, you know, for illiterate women who only think of Zaynab as a superwoman, they don’t know why. I’m telling you this because I know why. I’ve read about it, I’ve thought about it, I’ve discussed this with several people. The first reason, the second reason, the third reason: the new generations know why. Her emphasis on knowing why implies that to understand the relevance of these religious historical individuals – to know why they are

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important to one’s life – one has to undertake careful research and not just rely on popular or commonly held notions. In other words, a literate and self-educating approach to religion is the key to genuine understanding. Young Shi‘i women who look to Zaynab as a role model are now able to draw from a new set of qualities. In the past, the Zaynab whom Shi‘i women revered and perhaps sometimes emulated was a grieving, hair-pulling victim. Today, the figure of Zaynab takes positive action; she is brave, patient and strong. Indeed, she is imbued with characteristics that Shi‘i women can draw on to help support them as active working women. As they are now participating more actively in the public workplace, Zaynab’s significance in their lives has taken on new directions that reflect their current concerns. Women are also rejecting ritual practices that invoke themes of Shi‘i victimization. Zahra discussed the self-flagellation that Shi‘i men perform during Ashura processions,26 a practice that she believes is unproductive: “These flagellations are wrong. Why should we hurt ourselves and shed our own blood? Instead, we can donate blood for the Palestinians. In fact, we are already donating blood instead. What is the point of flagellating?” Although women in the Shi‘i community rarely participate in ritual self-flagellation, they do give blood. And rituals such as wailing and self-injury, while still commonplace, are increasingly being rejected by the more educated in favor of gestures they perceive to be more productive, such as donating blood to those in need.27 The newly literate and educated generation of Shi‘i men and women have reassessed other customs as well, rejecting those they consider to be irrelevant or un-Islamic. In Dana’s very conservative family, for example, the women not only wore long cloaks and headscarves, they also covered their faces. When I visited her apartment-sized home, her brother remained with us as her chaperone during the entire interview. She told me somewhat proudly that no one in Bahrain was raised more strictly than she was. Her grandfather had been a religious man who was not open to new ideas. In fact, he forbade television, radio, and anything else that would bring the outside world into the house. The family’s tribal values forbade marriage outside the extended family. By the time Dana came of age, some of those rules were less stringently

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enforced or had disappeared altogether. She herself broke with the family tradition of endogamy by marrying a man from another tribe. Before she went to the university where she began to read about Islam, Dana had believed that covering one’s face was Islamic. She said, People always mix culture with religion. I didn’t used to know what was what, and I don’t want that to happen to my kids. For example, covering the face – I thought it was a religious thing. It is merely a tradition. Now, with the support of her husband, she no longer wore the niqab. To a Westerner this may not seem particularly revolutionary, given that Dana still wore the abaya and covered her hair, but for her and her husband, it was. Whether or not her decision was truly based on any particular religious source is irrelevant; what matters is that she thought she was making an educated choice, and thus one more likely to be the “correct” choice. Dana’s decisions reflect textual religious learning that was inaccessible to earlier generations of Bahrainis and certainly to most Bahraini women. Shi‘i attitudes toward grieving and victimhood, the significance of religious personages, and even dress have changed as a result of this new emphasis.

New Activities at the Ma’tam: Less Crying, More Learning Secular Education What then is replacing the time formerly spent grieving in the ma’tam? Surprisingly, a great deal of time is now given over to secular education of all kinds. Dana told me that, whereas in the past women at her ma’tam had spent all of their time there crying, nowadays most of them would only cry for ten minutes, and then listen to a lecture for 40 minutes. Lectures on legal matters, politics, health issues, and marital advice can be heard at both men’s and women’s ma’atim. Dana described the new subject matter being offered: I go to the ma’tam all the time. It is the source of education in all fields. In the past, the ma’tam was for religious practice only.

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Now it has become relevant for all fields. Doctors and lawyers give lectures there. During Ramadan we had a lawyer give a lecture about political changes in Bahrain. Later a doctor came to speak about diabetes. We meet there in groups and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the programs we have. Nowadays my group is thinking about bringing computers into the ma’tam. Jihan also commented on the topics of discussion at the ma’tam: In the past 7–8 years, ma’atim in Bahrain – women’s ma’atim – have remarkably advanced. . . . They have developed to where they are very active in society now. Not just to get people to come and weep and cry, but also to tackle issues and problems. Family problems, religious problems, social problems such as drugs, sexual relations, relations between the sexes, things like that are being tackled in the ma’tam. When my mother went, this wasn’t possible. Now our celebrations are more civilized, more informative. In other words, if a mother takes her kids to the ma’tam, she’s there not only to chit-chat, eat sweets and drink tea. She’s there to listen to how and what is the best way of raising her child, what is the best way of dealing with her husband, having a happy family life, things like that. In other words, things have changed. While women used to meet at the ma’tam to cry and drink tea, now they also have in-depth discussions on a variety of subjects. Self-improvement and the improvement of society are on the table now in a way that reflects modern education, modern forms of governance, and globalization. Without a doubt, education – which of course has always been highly valued in Islamic societies – is taking on a new importance and new religious significance in Shi‘i ma’atim. There is now a sense that education is crucial to bettering the entire struggling Bahraini Shi‘i community. Not only is secular education being offered in the ma’atim, but the way it is provided evokes the modern classroom, with those in attendance seated in rows of chairs and listening to speakers who use

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state-of-the-art equipment including overhead projectors for PowerPoint presentations. Keeping in mind that until recently women went to the ma’tam solely to meet with other women and perform lamentation rituals, all of these changes are startling. Politics A further break with tradition is taking place in women’s ma’atim, in that now they are becoming overtly politicized. The extent to which they may have been a locus of political discourse in the past is not clear; most likely, there has always been discussion of a range of issues. What is new is the organized nature of political functions at women’s ma’atim, something that was pointed out to me by Shi‘i women themselves. The role of the ma’tam in Shi‘i communal life was publicly highlighted during the run-up to the groundbreaking 2002 elections, which was the first time that women were allowed to vote and run for office. In their attempts to reach out to the Shi‘i community, candidates for office used the ma’tam as a campaign venue, with contenders giving speeches in women’s as well as in men’s ma’atim. According to Hajar, the outspoken political activist, “All the female candidates campaigned in the ma’atim [and] the interaction and the amount of discussion were astonishing.” Even King Hamad’s wife, Sheikha Sabika, visited a ma’tam to urge the Shi‘a to vote in the face of calls to boycott the elections. Jihan, the professional woman, remarked on how the campaigning had altered the role of the ma’atim: To be honest, the face of the ma’atim has changed because of the municipal council elections we had last spring. They started to take on a more political role, even the women’s ma’atim. OK, we’re not talking about the men’s ma’atim – they have always been political from the beginning. But now even women have started talking about politics in the ma’tam. Actually, they started campaigning for their candidates in the ma’tam, trying to get women’s votes. This is all because of changes that have occurred in the surrounding environment, whether political, social or educational. It all affects the ma’atim, their purpose and function in society.

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The campaigning that took place in women’s ma’atim in 2002 illustrates the increasing degree of Bahraini Shi‘i women’s political involvement. It also exemplifies the new ways in which they are using their religious institutions, as well as their new understanding of the role of religion in their lives.

Behind These Changes What is the cause of these changes? In the previous chapter I discussed the Islamic resurgence and how it is related to modern education. The inclusion of issues such as health, society and law in the forum of the ma’tam points to the Shi‘i community’s vital new interest in modern forms of education and governance. The extent to which this reflects a larger religious and political project will become clear as we consider the impact of the Iranian Revolution and of notable Shi‘i figures such as ‘Ali Shari‘ati of Iran and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr of Iraq. The Iranian Revolution One cannot overemphasize the influence of nearby Iran on the Bahraini Shi‘i community. The tremendous upheaval in religious and political thinking, and the flowering of innovative thought that took place before, during and after Iran’s 1979 Revolution had a great impact on the Shi‘a of Bahrain. Their marginalized status, their ethnic ties (in the case of the ‘Ajam), their proximity to Iran, and the history of economic and political interaction between the two countries predisposed them to this influence. As noted in the previous chapter, hundreds of Bahraini Shi‘a demonstrated in support of the revolution in 1979. Bahraini activists, some trained by Iran, organized in protest of the Sunni government. An Iranian-backed attempt to overthrow the ruling family was thwarted in 1981. The attempted coup resulted in the expulsion or imprisonment of many Shi‘i dissidents. Some Iranian clerics tried to influence the political scenario in Bahrain through radical preaching. It was Khomeini’s avowed goal to “perpetuate the revolution both at home and abroad,” as it was

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written into the new Iranian Constitution.28 Iranian radio broadcasts called on Gulf Shi‘a to overthrow their Sunni rulers, casting the latter as “un-Islamic,” in part because of their associations with the West.29 Ideology was exported from Iran by means of conferences, broadcasting, publishing and the funding of religious organizations. Many Shi‘a not only became politicized during this time but they embraced a Shi‘i form of resurgent Islam. In Hajar’s words, The Iranian Revolution had a great impact on the Bahraini Shi‘a. After the revolution, cassettes with religious messages were distributed in Bahrain, spreading the revolutionary ideology. . . . It was possible to get ideas from new modern sheikhs in Iran. These sheikhs, reformists from Qom, were able to see things from different points of view: they had studied Martin Luther King, secularism, science and philosophy. Hajar added that Shi‘i women became more interested in their religion at that time because, when Khomeini spoke about the revolution, he called on women to be involved. Zahra too spoke of taking religious inspiration from the Iranian Revolution. Wanting to find the “real Islam,” she read religious books about Islamic values and principles which led her to reevaluate her life and way of thinking. It was this search that led to her commitment to an Islamic way of life. Shi‘i unrest was not limited to Bahrain: there were parallel uprisings in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. An Iranian Shi‘i Religious Reformer: ‘Ali Shari‘ati One Iranian religious reformer who had a particularly relevant impact during the period leading up to the Islamic Revolution was ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933–77), mentioned earlier. His sermons were formative of the modern Shi‘i Islamic resurgence that spread to Bahrain and is still active. One of his contributions was to bridge the gap between religion and educated, alienated, middle-class Iranian youth with new approaches to thinking about Islam, and his ideas spread beyond Iran to the greater Shi‘i community.

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Many middle-class Iranian youth during the 1960s and 70s felt alienated both from their government and from their religious institutions. Iranians from various sectors were dissatisfied with their lack of political participation and fed-up with the Shah’s Westernization programs. Roy Mottahedeh sees the rise of political unrest as an unintended consequence of the Shah’s support for modern education, as students began demanding the democratic representation they had read about.30 As for religious alienation, the youth in particular had attained a level of secular, scientifically oriented education that made them less willing to follow their religious traditions unquestioningly. These modern, educated youth also wanted a presentation of their religion that was rational, not steeped in blind tradition, not contradicting and clashing with their new worldview. In a nutshell, they wanted Islam to make sense to them. Clerics were still using traditional methods of religious instruction, such as rote memorization, which made both them and their methods seem outdated. Instead, what was needed to reach these young people was an interpretation of Islam that would speak to their modern-day consciousness. Educated in France (1960–4), ‘Ali Shari‘ati was one among a few prominent religious reformers who was able to offer a vision of Islam which, he argued, was based on rational, systematic thinking, and was relevant to modern Iran’s social and political situation. He often spoke at husayniyyas as the venue for his revolutionary religious teachings, especially Husayniyya Irshad in Tehran, and thousands of cassette recordings of his talks were sold. According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, Shari‘ati believed that ijtihad (religious reinterpretation) was necessary in order to apply Islam to modern life, and he “overtly attacked the religious class [for] their mode of presenting Islam [and] their lack of Quranic comprehension.”31 He challenged unscientific thought in religion, which he believed led to ignorance, and he criticized those who promoted ideas unsupported by “independent rational, scientific analysis.”32 In his view, wisdom and knowledge – not ignorance – lead to a rational worldview and thus to the capacity to seek justice, which is a primary Shi‘i goal.33 In other words, he preached that an educated, informed, even scientific approach to Islam was essential to gaining a true understanding of religion and making real social progress.

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As for gender, Shari‘ati was known for his relatively liberal views regarding women’s role in society. He spoke of women’s public activities as having a religious precedent in the life of Fatima, a member of Ahl-e Bayt (the Holy Family), the daughter of the Prophet and the mother of Imams Hasan and Husayn.34 Shari‘ati believed that women should have access to education and should be free to better themselves and to model themselves after Fatima whom he described as possessing incredible strength and resilience.35 Shari‘ati also rejected the passivity inherent in the Shi‘i concept of waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam (the Mahdi), arguing instead that Shi‘ism should be active and positive. His popularity can be credited not only to his ability to reinterpret Islam in a way that was intelligible and meaningful to alienated Iranians, but also to the fact that he spoke of religious reform in ways that were still inherently Shi‘i, invoking Shi‘i motifs such as the recurring call for social justice. In fact, Shari‘ati called for a re-emphasis on Shi‘i Islam’s early revolutionary message and he criticized the ulema (religious leaders) for their alliance with the state.36 He believed that religion should not simply consist of a system of personal ethics, but rather should be a revolutionary ideology that emancipates people from oppression and tyranny. His recorded lectures and his writings, which circulated throughout Iran, provided Iranians with a new way of thinking about religion. His revolutionary messages did not go unnoticed by the Shah’s regime: Husayniyya Irshad, where Shari‘ati delivered most of his lectures, was shut down in 1973 and he was jailed. He died mysteriously in exile in 1977. One can see evidence of Shari‘ati’s influence on Bahraini Shi‘ism even today in the ways in which the women interviewed for this chapter spoke of new interpretations of Shi‘i ritual practices and traditions. Like Shari‘ati, they spoke of moving away from “traditional” practices toward new practices informed by an educated approach that they deemed more “progressive.” Like Shari‘ati who insisted on applying reason to religion, Jihan insisted on knowing why in her approach to understanding the significance of the figure of Zaynab. Zahra reinterpreted Imam Husayn and Zaynab to focus on their positive actions and their qualities of strength, resilience and patience, rather than

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their passivity or victimhood. Dana discarded the face veil after she did some research and decided that it was merely a cultural tradition and not based on Islam. The new emphasis on political activity in women’s ma’atim, reflective of women’s educational development and their participation in the greater Bahraini Shi‘i resistance movement, can also be understood as a legacy of Shari‘ati’s particular interpretation of Shi‘i Islam as a revolutionary message. In his interpretation, believers should struggle against ignorance and oppression – and thus be politically active – just as the early imams and their families actively struggled against oppression. Many educated Iranian women, applying Shari‘ati’s principles, did become politically active during the Iranian Revolution,37 perhaps offering inspiration to their Bahraini counterparts. A famous slogan of Shari‘ati’s reads, “Every day is Ashura; every place is Karbala!”38 One blogger in Bahrain recently quoted Shari‘ati’s exhortation to “Remember Ashura, [in order] to humiliate the ruling group. . . . It will help you to decide on the best agenda for the struggle against the rule of tyranny.”39 Shari‘ati’s revolutionary teachings were used in this case to draw attention to the political nature of Ashura processions which, the blogger argued, are a performance of Shi‘i solidarity against the ruling Sunni elite in the Bahraini context. Shari‘ati’s politicized interpretation of Shi‘ism is easily applied to the more recent political struggles of the Bahraini Shi‘a. An Iraqi Shi‘i Religious Reformer: Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr Movements of Islamic resurgence arose in the Arab Shi‘i world as well. For example, the situation in Iraq in the late 1950s and the 1960s was somewhat comparable to that in Iran, in that the rise of secular ideologies such as Arab nationalism and communism had weakened the hold of religion and reduced its relevance and appeal. Seeking to avert “foreign influences” and restore the masses to Islam, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1931–80) and other reformist ulema founded the Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (Party of the Call to Islam) in 1958. His strategy was to reach out to educated young Muslims, and he “revolutionized thinking in Najaf by the respect he showed for the ability of educated

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laypeople to understand religious law and by his acceptance of nonseminarians in his classes.”40 The political situation in Iraq was not unlike that in Bahrain, in that the Shi‘a comprised the majority of the population of Iraq and yet their rulers were Sunnis, i.e. the Arab nationalist Ba‘th Party which by 1979 was run by Saddam Hussein.41 Iraqi Shi‘a tended to be rural and poorer than the Sunnis, while the Sunni ruling class lived in the cities, as in Bahrain. Baqir al-Sadr and his followers actively opposed the Ba‘th Party, and their opposition led to the arrest, torture and execution of many clerics. Baqir al-Sadr himself was hanged in 1980.42 Educated in Najaf, the site of many Shi‘i theological schools, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, like ‘Ali Shari‘ati, thought that a reinterpretation of Islam was necessary in order to reconcile faith with scientific knowledge and rationalism, and he advocated actively working to change society rather than patiently waiting for divine intervention.43 This emphasis on positive action versus grief-ridden patience can be seen in the Bahraini rejection of victimhood. As described earlier, my interviewee Zahra chose to emphasize the positive lessons of Shi‘i religious history and to emulate the strength and resilience of sacred figures instead of crying and tapping her chest, and she approved of the new trend of donating blood to the Palestinian cause rather than self-flagellating. Baqir al-Sadr was relatively progressive regarding the role of women. Seeking to improve their position, he supported women’s education and rejected certain traditional practices.44 As could be seen in Bahrain some two decades on, Shi‘i women got more involved in every sphere, as evidenced by their landmark participation in the elections of 2002 and their innovative uses of the ma’tam. Increased access to education is chief among numerous factors behind their changing role. The precise extent to which Shi‘i religious reformers such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr or ‘Ali Shari‘ati impacted Bahraini society is impossible to gauge. It should be noted that both were part of a larger Islamic reform movement that rejected what they considered stagnant forms of traditional thinking and practice and that sought to incorporate rational scientific thinking into religion. These reformers called for the laity’s

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right to interpret Islamic texts. Early representatives of the movement include Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905).45 Al-Afghani is associated with Islamic modernism and is known for his commitment to reason. ‘Abduh was greatly influenced by the Enlightenment; he emphasized the importance of education and tried to reconcile Enlightenment thought with Islam.46 While Shi‘a in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain no doubt influenced one another through the sharing knowledge of ideologies and the movements that elaborated and propagated them, each movement manifested in a distinct way that reflected specific local social, cultural and political circumstances. Those who took part in the efforts that led to the revolution in Iran wanted to topple the Western-oriented shah. The struggle in Iraq involved active resistance to the secular Arab nationalist government. The Shi‘i Islamic resurgence in Bahrain arose in response to political and economic discrimination against the Shi‘a. Other than the isolated thwarted coup attempt, the thrust of the Shi‘i political struggle in Bahrain has been to achieve democratic participation and to end discrimination.

A Bahraini Movement Nevertheless, the Shi‘i Islamic resurgence in Bahrain is in many ways a Bahraini movement. While Sunnis may caution against the “Iranian threat,” and Shi‘a may warn of the “Saudi threat,” in fact this type of fear-mongering is used excessively by both sides. The Islamic resurgence in Bahrain (whether Sunni or Shi‘i) manifests in unique ways that are shaped by Bahraini culture. The cultural value placed on social and religious tolerance – a value embraced by both Shi‘a and Sunnis – is evident in the ways in which Bahraini Shi‘a talk about their religious resurgence. For example, one woman begged me not to write a book about Sunni-Shi‘i strife because “getting along” is a priority for both groups. Many Shi‘a emphasized to me that their problems were not specific to the Shi‘a, and that many Sunnis were also fighting for democracy and justice. Although some Shi‘a boycotted the 2002 elections, others spoke of their willingness to compromise in order to move ahead and promote social harmony. After all, Bahrain is a

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tiny island, and it seems almost as if everyone knows everyone else. Not only do they attend each other’s parties, but sometimes they even attend each other’s religious events and institutions, as in the case of the Shi‘i woman who went to Umm al-Darda’, the Sunni women’s school, for instruction in Qur’anic recitation. Sunnis and Shi‘a are both aware of Bahrain’s political fragility, surrounded as it is by larger, more powerful neighbors, and of the need to prioritize Bahraini nationalism over ethnic and religious sectarianism if the nation is to survive. Another unique characteristic of the Islamic revival movement in Bahrain is that it reflects the relatively liberal nature of Bahraini society as compared to that of Iran or Saudi Arabia, both of which strictly enforce laws regulating public dress and behavior.47 In Bahrain, on the other hand, it is common to see a wide range of dress, and it is not illegal for a woman to appear in public unveiled. Nor is it illegal to drink alcohol, as it is in Iran and Saudi Arabia.48 Self-identification through dress or behavior as a member of the Islamic resurgence movement is an individual choice in Bahrain; such expression is not regulated by the state. In fact, some female university students who considered it appropriate to wear black abayas and head scarves while on campus would later change into jeans and T-shirts before they went to the mall. The very ability to afford a range of apparel reflects the class status of those individuals, and in fact it is often the wealthier Shi‘a who are not as strictly adherent to Islamic traditions of dress.

Conclusion: Thinking Outside the Ma’tam Many Shi‘i women whom I interviewed spoke optimistically of their plans for the future. Fatima and Hajar both discussed the importance of thinking beyond the ma’tam and reaching out to others. Fatima was proud of the various activities that she had helped organize at the ma’tam and now she wanted to find ways to publicize them. She believed they could have a greater influence in Bahraini society but, as she complained to me, We have a problem, a serious problem. No one knows what we do in the ma’tam. We don’t own the media. They have a lot of

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power and we don’t. It’s expensive. Everyone who deals with the ma’tam is a volunteer. And the government has the media. Here Fatima was saying, with some resentment, that the media, seen as a government tool, were difficult to access, again underlining the power struggle between Bahrain’s Shi‘a and their Sunni government. Nonetheless, it was still Fatima’s goal to find ways to spotlight ma’tam events. Similarly Hajar, the political activist, wanted to expand upon the progress already made, arguing that the next step for the Shi‘a was to think outside the ma’tam. Instead of seeking publicity for local Shi‘i events, she supported the notion that the Shi‘a should create and nurture community leaders, especially women. These leaders would be able to speak out about Shi‘i issues and concerns, not only in Bahrain’s public sphere, but at the international level as well. She said, As Shi‘i women, we need more leaders to go out in public. They could go to seminars at hotels and reach foreigners worldwide. . . . Then we could defend our point of view. We need to mix [with other groups] in order to show how Muslim women can be strong. We lack leaders. In sha’allah (God willing), things will change. In other words, neither Fatima nor Hajar considered community selfeducation sufficient; rather, they aspired to inform and involve the greater Bahraini community and even the global community. For women whose mothers sat in the ma’tam grieving, socializing, and drinking tea, this was heady and ambitious thinking. After tracing the history of education in the Gulf in the previous chapter, I posed the question of what women would do with their newly acquired religious literacy. Bahraini Shi‘i women are using it to reinterpret their religious practices and sacred figures in ways that reflect their desire for a rational and educated approach to religion. Clearly, as illustrated by their use of the ma’tam as a venue for community education and self-betterment, women are using their literacy to empower themselves and their community. Education raised the level

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of political consciousness of both male and female Bahrainis and created a desire for political representation and an awareness of the possibility of change, as reflected in the politicization of women’s ma’atim. The expansion of literacy in Bahrain, the Shi‘i Islamic resurgence movements in Bahrain, Iran and Iraq, and the Bahraini struggle for democratic political participation all informed and shaped the ways in which the Shi‘a of Bahrain are making use of their religious structures. Some of the women I spoke with were optimistic about the impact these changes might have in the future, in terms of strengthening the role of women and uplifting the Shi‘i community and Muslims in general. As Zahra put it, The new generation is changing. They want religious life to be more informative and educational. In traditional ma’atim, you read, you cry and you go home. In new ones, you can give speeches about Bahrain and the world. This chapter has revealed some of the changing ways in which Shi‘i women negotiate communal identity and self-determination through religion, with a focus on their communal religious institution, the ma’tam. In the next chapter, I turn to Umm al-Darda’, a Sunni Qur’anic school for women in Manama, in order to shed light on how women’s activities at that venue reflect change within the Bahraini Sunni community.

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4 A QUR’ANIC SCHOOL FOR SUNNI WOMEN A Body, Not a Wing

Introduction: The Center Umm al-Darda’, a small women’s center for Qur’anic learning (madrasa), occupies a modest building, with two floors and a few classrooms, situated in the trendy, café-dotted ‘Adiliyya quarter of Manama. Inside it feels rather cozy: in the downstairs hallway there are almost always thermoses of ginger tea and cardamom coffee as well as piles of cookies or other treats set out as refreshment for the students between classes. Incense is regularly burnt, creating a soothing environment for the women who come in for classes at different times of the morning and the afternoon, arriving laden with Qur’ans, notebooks, pencils and various study guides. Stacked on a table one can also find special items for sale such as handicrafts, beauty products and Yemeni honey. Umm al-Darda’ was founded in 1993 and is managed solely by women. Almost all of the classes are taught by women, although a male expert is occasionally brought in when needed to teach certain classes for which there is no qualified female instructor. The center’s purpose is to further Muslim women’s proficiency in tajwid (Qur’anic recitation), hifz (Qur’anic memorization), tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), fiqh (Islamic

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jurisprudence) and other related subjects. Adjacent to the center is a thrift shop run by the women. The shop, as well as functions held by the center, help raise money to sustain Umm al-Darda’ and support charitable causes. In the early stages of my research I met with the organizers of Discover Islam, a well-known Salafi Sunni Muslim proselytizing institution in Bahrain that offers Qur’anic studies in many languages to both men and women, many of whom are non-Arab converts to Islam. Many Bahrainis insisted to me that the organization is supported by Saudis and heavily influenced by the Saudi Arabian Salafi resurgence, although I was not able to verify to what degree that might be true. After I explained to my interlocutors at Discover Islam that I was researching Bahraini women’s changing religious practices, they recommended that I meet with the founders of Umm al-Darda’, with whom they are tenuously associated. There are other women’s centers for Qur’anic learning in Bahrain, but Umm al-Darda’ is exceptional in that it is not directly affiliated with a male-led organization. Participating Muslim Bahraini women actively work together at Umm al-Darda’ to shape society through teaching or gaining skills and self-improvement in the process of “perfecting their religion,” or through the articulation of a variety of religious, social, political or cultural goals and concerns, such as the desire to supplement the available forms of secular education with religious education, and to strengthen Islamic identity in a rapidly changing Bahrain. Illustrating the inadequacy of binary terms such as “public” and “domestic” in describing social settings, it would be inaccurate to describe the activities that occur at Umm al-Darda’ as taking place in the “public realm.” While the school is inaccessible to the general public and the media (and men are excluded except when they are needed to teach), the activities that take place there are not in any way “domestic.” They are carried out communally in a realm that is not fully public, private, sacred or profane. While there is a site for prayer, most of the space is used for religious instruction and not for formal religious practice per se. The activities at Umm al-Darda’ reflect the rise of female literacy as well as the current socioreligious and political context in Bahrain.

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The previous chapter treated Shi‘i women in Bahrain and the changing ways in which they make use of the ma’tam (communal religious center). Building upon that, this chapter focuses on a Sunni institution for women, the Qur’anic school Umm al-Darda’. After offering descriptions of the students at the school and a few details regarding my research experience there, I will look at the role of Umm al-Darda’ in Bahrain and in the lives of the women who attend the school and teach there. I will also present historical context for the center and note how women’s activities at Umm al-Darda’ reflect the development that has taken place in Bahrain in the past few decades. Next, I will examine participants’ attitudes toward women’s roles and their changing religious practices. Finally, I will look at the ways in which the Islamic movement manifests in Bahrain, as reflected in the role that Umm al-Darda’ plays. The Students Most of the students at Umm al-Darda’ are Bahraini nationals, but there are also several Arabic-speaking non-Bahraini Arab and African women. The majority are Sunni Muslims, although a few Shi‘a sometimes attend as well, since many skills taught at the center, such as Qur’anic recitation, are also valued by the Shi‘i community. Usually the women come without their children in order to better focus on the lesson and to avoid disturbing others. The fact that they have free time and access to childcare suggests at least middle-class status, although mothers of lower-class status might afford the inexpensive daycare provided by foreign domestic servants, or have family members who are available to watch their children. It is likely that the non-Bahraini Arab and African women are not as well off as their Bahraini counterparts. Regardless, life in Bahrain is generally costly and even the price of travel might be prohibitive for some. Most women wear the abaya and cover their hair, even inside the center. Some cover their face with the niqab, but this last article of modesty is usually taken off within the safe all-female space of the center. A few women, especially those from Egypt and other Muslim countries outside the Gulf region, also dress modestly, but they wear colors other than black, and a few individuals prefer not to cover their

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hair at all. During my visits, the few African women present, wearing garments printed with vibrant reds, yellows and oranges, especially stood out in the classroom of primarily black-robed students. However, as the only Westerner and dressed in modest Western clothing, I felt rather conspicuous myself. My Impressions and Problems “Fitting In” One of my impressions of Umm al-Darda’, which was formed as I attended and observed classes and socialized over refreshments, was that all the women with whom I came into contact seemed content to be there. I myself enjoyed the peaceful, sanctuary-like environment. Perhaps the women enjoyed their studies, or the social aspect of the gathering, or maybe they were simply happy to get out of the house and away from domestic chores. Describing the various functions of Umm al-Darda’, one of the founders smiled and acknowledged that the women come not only because they are trying to improve their religion, but also because it is a social center where they can chat together and drink tea during breaks. However, many of the women seemed to take their classes very seriously and had studied at Umm al-Darda’ for years, graduating to higher and higher levels of Qur’anic expertise. I sat in on some of the advanced tajwid classes and was struck not only by the beauty of their recitations, but also by the intensity with which some women worked to perfect their skills. Listening to the high, lilting voices of a group of women reciting the Qur’an with remarkable expertise and pious devotion is quite an otherworldly experience. Being able to speak and understand Arabic (although not at a native level) facilitated my research, in that I was able to understand the instruction and the lectures, and persuade the management to allow me to carry out interviews. After initially allowing me to observe classes for a few days, the founders made it clear that if I were to continue spending time there, I would have to participate in a class suitable for my level. Thus I began to attend elementary-level classes in Qur’anic recitation three times a week. My classmates were mainly Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Egyptian and African housewives. Although I had hoped that I could simply blend

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in, it soon became apparent that my presence was an anomaly. There were no other Westerners there; most Westerners interested in Islam would probably take classes at Discover Islam which was designed for the needs of converts. The pending war with Iraq initially added to my tension because I was uncertain as to how the students and teachers would react to my American nationality. My admission to teachers and students that my purpose in taking classes there was to carry out research on women and religion in Bahrain made some people concerned about what I might write about them. Perhaps they were afraid that I would misrepresent their activities. In light of the contemporaneous political events, the negative portrayals of Muslims and Arabs in Western media, and the history of Orientalist scholarship, I did not blame them. Adding to my nervousness, I had little experience with Qur’anic recitation. When it was my turn to recite a passage, I would typically take a deep breath, feel my body go rigid, my face become red and sweaty, and then finally I would begin to recite, stumbling and faltering. Thankfully, many other students were supportive – some held their breath while I recited because they could tell that it was quite difficult for me – and on occasion a few even spontaneously applauded my efforts. After some time, it seemed that, while I was not going to blend in, at least I felt that a degree of my “strangeness” was dissipating. One student even joked about my nationality, asking me if Muslims in America serve their children chicken nuggets for the evening meal during Ramadan (I am sure that some do). This awkward period of observation and participation helped me to find students and teachers who were willing to be interviewed, not only because everyone knew who I was, but perhaps also because they felt sympathetic regarding my tremulous efforts.

The Center’s Role in the Larger Context of Bahrain Promoting a Sunni Islamic Identity While Umm al-Darda’ is essentially an educational and religious institution whose objective is to teach the Qur’an to women, the center also

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reflects a larger religious, social and political context. It plays a role in the broad resurgent movement to Islamize Bahraini society, and in particular to promote Sunni Islam of the Salafi variety. While some Bahrainis might benefit from and appreciate the wealth that has come in part from Bahrain’s ties to the USA, many also resent the encroachment of Western culture. On the face of things, Bahrain appears “Westernized.” Marwan Kraidy’s term, “cultural hybridity,” is perhaps a more appropriate expression for Bahrain’s international atmosphere and mixture of cultural structures, although he warns against using the term to legitimize “corporate profitability” at the expense of “human agency” by uncritically idealizing the unequal realities of globalization.1 Ien Ang writes about the importation of “foreign” cultural forms via television, arguing that these forms are “subject to change and modification as a result of the domestication of imported cultural goods.”2 Bahrain’s adoption of Western goods and media does not necessarily equate with the adoption of Western cultural values. As Ang notes, new forms, as understood through local lenses, are changed and become “domestic.” Yet foreign business and media interests are associated with other symbols of transnational presence and Western dominance in Bahrain. Some Christian churches have been active since the late nineteenth century when they were established in Bahrain to carry out missionary purposes.3 Since Bahrain was a British protectorate for over a century, from 1869 to 1971, it is still home to many British citizens as well as Americans. Recent US foreign policy has not done much to mitigate Bahraini resentment of the West. It is clear that most Bahrainis disapprove of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq and its stance on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The US did not actively support those involved in the “Arab Spring” protests against the Al Khalifa government which broke out in Bahrain in 2011, and this too engendered resentment. In the face of these political views held by many Bahrainis, the presence of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet on the island creates further tension. One woman at Umm al-Darda’ mentioned that even the country’s educational system has become Westernized: English is increasingly prioritized over Arabic, and the study of Islam, according to her, is being marginalized.

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Umm al-Darda’ provides some relief for those frustrated by these issues: the center has responded by offering religious classes in Arabic for children and by trying to strengthen Islamic identity among women. Those who attend find a place where they can reaffirm and reinforce their Arab Muslim identities in a Bahrain that has become not only quite cosmopolitan, but also, in the eyes of some, dominated to an uncomfortable degree by the Western cultural and political presence. Another way to understand the center is that it offers the type of education that was to a large degree replaced with the advent of secular schools in Bahrain, that is, it fills the gap left by the decline in kuttab-style education. A New Form of Kuttab School It is true that much of the curriculum at Umm al-Darda’ is traditional; memorization and recitation of the Qur’an have long been the central focus of kuttab schools. However, while Umm al-Darda’ can certainly be understood as a sort of modern-day kuttab, or really a madrasa (since it is a formal organization), it symbolizes more than a reversion to the traditional past. Instead, while offering traditional subjects in its curriculum, the center nonetheless also reflects the effects of modern education and social change in Bahrain. Indeed, Qur’anic schools, which exist today in many parts of the world, can be “agents of preservation and change,” as Helen Boyle puts it.4 One way in which Umm al-Darda’ reflects modernity is found in its very emphasis on the education of adult women. Before the growth of modern education in Bahrain, females were at least marginalized, if not completely excluded, from textual learning. Some girls did attend kuttab schools, although they were ordinarily not allowed to continue after the age of 11. By 1914, there were only some 400 girls attending kuttab schools, as compared to 800 boys, and thus the education of females, although existent, was hardly widespread.5 Those females who did study rarely gained the same level of access to formal Islamic learning as males did. Women’s religious practices were often based on oral traditions passed down from mother to daughter. There was no real equivalent to Umm al-Darda’ in the past. Some kuttab schools

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had only female students, taught by a female teacher, paralleling the single-sex nature of education at Umm al-Darda’. Yet these earlier kuttab schools were only for girls, not women, and they were held informally in the teacher’s home. Umm al-Darda’, by contrast, is a formally organized Qur’anic school for adult women. The center supplements existing governmental educational institutions in Bahrain; it is not the sole source of education for its students as the kuttab schools were for theirs. Indeed, adult students at Umm al-Darda’ are already literate and have been educated to varying degrees in modern secular institutions. The center is a site for educated women to gain religious skills – which in the past were chiefly the purview of males – such as Qur’anic recitation and memorization, whereas in the past very few girls went to school at all. While school is not compulsory today, most boys and girls do attend school, and as of 2008, the literacy rate for adult females was 89.4 percent.6 At Umm al-Darda’, women can also hear lectures from prominent Islamic scholars, discuss Qur’anic interpretation, and take part in a wide range of activities – not only Qur’anic memorization and recitation – that were not previously accessible to them. With the rise in the level of women’s literacy, specialized religious knowledge has only now become available to them. Additionally, Umm al-Darda’ has taken on the appearance of a modern secular educational institution. The classroom environment also reflects the influence of modern education. The layout consists of rows of chairs for the students, a desk and a podium for the teacher, and equipment such as overhead projectors and audio-cassette players. (In traditional kuttab schools of the past, students typically sat on the floor in a semi-circle around their teacher.) Textbooks and study aids are available for purchase, and Umm al-Darda’ publishes some of its own materials including cassettes. In other words, the way in which religion is taught here parallels the way in which academic subjects are taught in modern secular schools. The Founders of Umm al-Darda’ Umm al-Darda’ was founded by a small group of women, many of whom had traveled abroad during the 1970s. Bahrain, people

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vehemently explain, was quite different then. The oil boom of the 1970s caused rapid development and modernization on the island. This, coupled with increasing Western influence in the region (due to globalization and the politics of oil), led to a radical social transformation characterized by a new trend toward a liberal lifestyle. Feminism was being debated in new and different ways, as were other political ideologies, in part because female literacy, largely neglected before the 1950s, had risen significantly. By 1980, 80 percent of young girls were enrolled in elementary schools, and girls represented 51 percent of the total enrollment in high schools.7 Women began to receive an education, work outside the home, discard their abayas, and become active in the public realm.8 For the first time in Bahrain’s history, women were graduating from secondary schools and, like men, receiving grants for travel abroad to study at foreign universities. Sawsan and Leila, administrators of Umm al-Darda’, were recipients of such grants.9 Sawsan, a Bahraini Sunni with some Turkish and Iraqi ancestry on her mother’s side, was one of the original founders of the center. Leila, of Persian descent, joined at a later date. The Influence of Education Abroad Interestingly, Sawsan and Leila and many other women only began to seriously practice Islam during their university studies abroad in the 1980s – which coincided with the rise of Islamism in many parts of the Middle East – and then brought their newly found Islamic identities back to Bahrain when they returned with their degrees. Both from educated, upper-middle-class families, neither Sawsan nor Leila was very religious before going to McGill University in Montreal, where they were roommates. In fact, Leila, who has a Bachelor’s degree in biology, was the first in her family to cover her hair, which initially upset her mother who did not cover at that time. Leila told me that while she herself is now Sunni, her parents, both Shi‘a, are very flexible and open-minded. Sawsan, serious, bespectacled, and the mother of five children, still finds time to attend conferences and attend to her managerial duties. Despite having an executive role at the center, she seemed a little sad

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about her own missed opportunities. She was also tense about the political situation in Bahrain, and we spoke for a while about the worsening misconceptions that Middle Easterners and Americans had of each other following 9/11 and the subsequent US response. Wistfully, she told me that she had once dreamed of becoming a doctor, but that her father had refused to send her to Saudi Arabia to go to medical school. She still hoped to get a Master’s degree in educational administration, and hoped to be able to complete most of it in Bahrain, stating, “Now, with globalization, everything that happens in America happens here.” In the 1980s, Sawsan explained, it was very easy to get a scholarship for study abroad, regardless of one’s gender. She and Leila enjoyed their time in Canada, and there they and the other Bahraini women with whom they associated made connections with the larger Muslim student community. They all spent time together, initially due to their cultural similarities more than their religious beliefs. The contact with other Muslims, as well as the exposure to Western culture, values and secular educational system, had a profound effect on the two young women, as well as on many other Bahrainis who traveled abroad at that time. This exposure, in part, shaped the form of Islam they brought back to Bahrain. Sawsan fondly recalled her years abroad: When we started practicing, it was just between us, the girls. One or two of them were practicing much more than we were. They started advising us. When you are there [in the West], you see the value of your own religion much more. You see the way people are living and the way they are wasting their lives. Especially at our age, you see which things they take care of. You really value your religion much more. We felt, among ourselves, that we must take care of our religion much more, that we should start practicing. We had some gatherings every week and one of those ladies would talk and teach us. Those girls inspired us. Then we had some Gulf mates who would also teach us and tell us. At first it was just among ourselves, then we started going to their functions. We started helping them. We never knew they were there before. After we started practicing our religion in a correct way there, I started to wear the hijab [headscarf]. We had

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very nice societies there; we felt that the people were very active. They did very nice functions, the Muslims. I think that any place where there is a minority, they try to cling together. . . . We used to go to Islamic conferences. We really, really missed that when we came back to Bahrain, because at that time, even politically, you couldn’t say what you wanted, you couldn’t write in the press, you couldn’t do anything that you wished. We found that it was very different, what we could do in Canada and what we could do here. Other Muslims I interviewed who had also studied in the West during the late 1970s and the 1980s offered similar accounts of their religious awakening. They met practicing Muslims from other countries who inspired them to begin practicing themselves and get involved with communal activities such as Muslim student groups. May Seikaly has noted this initial Bahraini involvement in the Islamic resurgence; writing about the character of Bahraini female students who traveled abroad, she refers to their adoption of Islamic garb, including the hijab, i.e. headscarf: Such suggestions [to cover fully] mainly came from women who had been educated in the West and who were completely immersed in the Islamic movement. It was noticeable that these women showed great self-confidence and expressed leadership traits of being assertive, emphatic, and proselytizing. It is clear that to them the veil was the strongest symbol forging their revitalized identity and they went to great pains in asserting its distinctiveness and authenticity.10 Culture shock brought on by interaction with university culture in the West, combined with an admiration for other young Arabs who seemed to be focused in a new and positive way on an idealistic, unifying Islam, provided them with an alternative to the Western lifestyle. Donning the hijab was not only a sign of piety but also of this new identity and participation in a greater movement which, ironically, was shaped in part by contact with the West.

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Returning to Bahrain Ambitious young people returned to Bahrain full of enthusiasm about getting involved in social, political or religious movements like those in which they had been involved during their time studying abroad. The relative freedom they experienced in the West gave them a heady feeling of confidence in their own potential to return and shape society in a number of ways. Yet some came back only to be disillusioned. Bahrain in the 1980s was characterized by governmental oppression. Political parties were prohibited, the Constitution had been suspended in 1975 by the Emir, Sheikh ‘Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, and according to a 1996 Amnesty International report, “The Government of Bahrain has engaged in a consistent pattern of human rights violations since the early 1980s.”11 The tension students encountered upon their return was not unprecedented – Sheikha al-Misnad writes that Bahraini students who went abroad in the early twentieth century “strongly criticized the authorities for their administration of the country’s affairs.”12 In Sawsan’s case, she brought back her new commitment to Islam but had no overt political ambitions of any kind. She did not immediately make any plans to start a center. Instead, she tried to find work in scientific research. However, she was not able to realize that dream either. After two months of teaching at the elementary level, she was bored; she felt that teaching was very “routine.” She wanted to do something creative, something involving research, something involving the study of medicine. She discussed the enthusiasm for life she had in Canada and how the disappointment she faced upon her return to Bahrain dimmed her optimism: There [in Canada], I felt that people were really up to something. Here [in Bahrain in the 1980s], you got really disappointed. I wanted to do something but things weren’t easy then. I had so much enthusiasm, I wanted to do something. My father is an educated man. My mother is not. They always looked up to educated people. They always said, “We want you to be something.” I wanted to be something then. I didn’t get any chance. I don’t know how to say it; something that was lit inside me went out.

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I enrolled in classes, in children’s education, in flower arrangement, but something inside me wasn’t satisfied. It was in that context that Sawsan and eight to ten other women began the formal study of tajwid with an Afghan sheikh.13 She said, “I couldn’t just spend my life raising children and staying at home.” This pursuit greatly interested her, and she and the other women, with the sheikh’s encouragement, began to formulate a plan for a center in which they would teach other women Islamic skills. At that time no such center existed in Bahrain, and women had not yet begun to learn traditional, textually based Qur’anic skills; it was a field that had previously been monopolized by men. A Body, Not a Wing Sawsan and Leila insisted that one reason why Umm al-Darda’ was created was that they wanted to study Islamic subjects without being influenced by male thinking. They also did not want to associate themselves with any other Muslim group in Bahrain, and they were adamant that the center was not a branch of any male Islamic organization. However, it does maintain an affiliation with the religious authorities at Al-Fateh Mosque (which was then the largest structure in Bahrain and can accommodate 7,000 worshippers.) Islamic groups often have a “women’s wing,” which supports the stereotype that women’s religious role is marginalized. Umm al-Darda’ is unique in that it is not a wing but rather a body that functions independently. Clearly, establishing a center separately from men was a way to avoid gendered hierarchy. In Umm al-Darda’, women provided themselves with a space in which they could interpret the Qur’an, discuss their own role as they understood it to be given by Islam, and indeed enter into other communal discourses. This is not to say, however, that they rejected male religious expertise; they did not. Male Qur’anic experts are brought into the center occasionally as needed; the female teachers refer almost exclusively to male Islamic scholars; and in no sense whatsoever does Umm al-Darda’ represent a “radical feminist movement” such as that term might be understood in the West.

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Mothers and Daughters When I asked middle-aged women at Umm al-Darda’ about their daughters, their answers revealed much about how they viewed the changing nature of gender roles and about their religious views on gender. For the most part, women were happy to have their daughters take active, prominent roles in society and become involved with public religious activities. Sawsan, for example, said that she would let her daughters become whatever they wanted to be. Another student, Dana, said that she wanted her daughters to be married and happy, but that they could also be politicians if they wished. Iman just wanted her daughter to be honest, and thought it was best for women to restrict their public activities to the charitable sphere, or to teaching. But when asked if she would support her daughter’s choice to have a career that is typically associated with men, such as law or engineering, she replied, Yeah, yeah, I will. But I’ll still tell her the drawbacks. I’ll tell her my point of view. I’ll tell her my way, why I don’t like it. “Be a teacher,” I tell her, but she doesn’t like that. She wants to do something in marketing. She has the quality of leadership. She has her own character. Only one woman at Umm al-Darda’ told me that she thought women should just stay home. For the vast majority of those I interviewed, their religious beliefs did not translate into a desire to exclude women from the public realm, which is not really surprising, given the active role that women played during Bahrain’s pearling days and the presence of many resurgent women in the workforce in contemporary Bahrain. In fact, the center’s name reveals a lot about how the founders viewed women’s roles. As Sawsan explained to me, We chose the name Umm al-Darda’ because she was the wife of one of the very famous companions of the Prophet (may peace be upon him), Abu al-Darda’. She was a very knowledgeable scholar,

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especially in Qur’anic sciences, and she used to teach this even to men. And by naming the center after her, we aim to reveal that fact to the public and honor her memory.14 Their role model, then, is a female scholar who was so knowledgeable and educated that she was able to invert traditional gender roles and teach men. While others might consider the women involved in the Islamic resurgence as having rejected a strong public role, that is not how the founders of Umm al-Darda’ perceive themselves. A Diversity of Beliefs and Practices At Umm al-Darda’, attitudes among the students and teachers toward what constitutes correct Islamic practices continue to undergo change and reveal a range of opinions. A common image of Islamic movements as being comprised of a homogeneous group of people who follow a simplified, purified version of Islam is contradicted by the founders and students of Umm al-Darda’. While all consider themselves to be Muslims, they hold a range of beliefs. The Problem with Labels I had problems when I tried to categorize people. While the founders of Umm al-Darda’ are Sunni Muslims, they were unwilling to accept any label regarding their specific creed, or ‘aqida. They preferred to call themselves simply “Muslims.” Admitting at one point that they felt closest to the Salafi creed (which is how other groups in Bahrain tended to describe them because of their conservative dress, mannerisms and Sunni reformist ideology), they nonetheless found it counterproductive to attach any label to themselves. (Interlocutors who were hostile to the group attached the label “Wahhabi,” or even “Ninja” which refers to the face coverings some women had adopted.) A woman who taught at Umm al-Darda’, an expatriate from South Asia, was asked if she could categorize her creed or give it a name. She was irritated by the question and became impatient; she wanted me to know that she was “just a Muslim” and not a member of any other

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category. She seemed to find the idea that she could be categorized and labeled, repugnant. This was her vehement reply: No, I cannot. No. No, I can’t. Salafi just means those who follow the Salafiyeen. And the Salafiyeen are those who follow the Tabi‘een, who follow the Sahaba [companions of the Prophet]. And the Sahaba are those who follow the Prophet, peace be upon him. I follow the Qur’an and the Sunnah. If I say, “I am Salafi,” it’s a heavy label with quite strong connotations. I cannot say that. I believe in Allah, I try to follow Islam as much as I can. I feel that Allah gives to those who can carry it, and to those who cannot carry it. How can I be a Salafi and watch TV? Salafi means how you follow the tradition of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and the Qur’an, in all your dealings. My husband works for Coke. If I were really Salafi I would ask him for a divorce because he’s doing haram [a forbidden action]. It’s not a question of Coke. I cannot label myself. May Allah help me to be perfect. The term Salaf refers to the ancestors who lived at the time of the Prophet, and the Salafiyeen (pl. of Salafi) are those who try to follow them in spirit and in practice. This can be interpreted as the attempt to live as closely as possible to the way the Prophet Muhammad and his followers of that era did. For example, since it is believed that the Prophet advocated dying one’s hair with henna when it turned white, a Salafi today might use henna instead of a dye such as Clairol. Likewise, a Salafi might chew miswak (a small stick) because that was what the Prophet and the early Muslims used to clean their teeth. Essentially, it is the attempt to practice Islam as nearly as possible in the same way in which it is thought to have been originally practiced. The stringent observation of prayer times and the literal interpretation of the many regulations found in the Qur’an and the Hadith (the collection of the Prophet’s sayings and actions recorded by his followers) are also associated with the Salafi creed. John Voll writes about the Salaf: They are believed by Sunni Muslims to have had special insight into the requirements of the faith because of their close

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association with the Prophet Muhammad. As a result, fundamentalist reformers and other renewers frequently call for a return to the attitude or the ways of the salaf.15 Obviously, however, this teacher was uncomfortable with the Salafi label because it conveys notions of purity that she was unwilling to attach to herself. A true purist might object to her spouse working for the Coca-Cola Company on the grounds that the Prophet would never do so. I was not able to find out exactly why she felt that a true Salafi would not have a husband who worked for the company. However, some in the Muslim community have had concerns with Coca-Cola: they suspect that it might contain minute amounts of alcohol (it does not), and that the company intentionally designed the script of the label on Coke bottles to convey an anti-Islamic message when read backwards, which is extremely unlikely (although, reading a mirror image of the logo, one could conceivably make out a blurry “no Muhammad, no Mecca” in Arabic). The teacher’s comments may have been informed by a mistrust of Western corporate dominance as embodied by the Coca-Cola Company. Multilinear, Multidirectional Change I observed beliefs and practices changing in multilinear, multidirectional forms reflecting the complexities of a country that has recently undergone rapid development and the inherent diversity of its people. For example, one blond young woman at Umm al-Darda’ was a Shi‘i of Persian descent. When asked why she was studying at Umm alDarda’, a Sunni establishment, she said simply and directly, “We are all Muslims.” Her aim was to learn Qur’anic recitation which is a skill that, of course, both Sunnis and Shi‘a appreciate. Her direct and almost indignant answer conveyed a sentiment similar to that of the South Asian teacher mentioned above: she wanted to move away from categories and ultimately from sectarianism. Another student, a middle-aged woman, clearly did not identify with the external practices of most of the other students and refused to cover her hair, both outside and inside the center. In her view, the belief that God is one

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was sufficient, and wearing the hijab was no more than a superficial gesture. An additional anecdote illustrates the multilinear change and the fluidity of attitudes. Bahia, another one of the founders, who was around 50 years old at the time we met, discussed her tolerant attitude toward certain traditional practices. I particularly liked the sense of humor that came through in her teaching. She lectured in an animated and friendly way, often making jokes or yelling with great fondness at her students to be quiet. A teacher at the age of 16, she had taught English for nine years. Her family used to hold mawlids (religious parties or events celebrating the birth of the Prophet) and in fact they still do. Men and women traditionally attend mawlids separately, and they are held at different times for different reasons. One reason is to obtain blessings upon completion of the construction of a new house. Bahia said that she herself would not hold a mawlid because of her belief that it is an innovation (bid‘a), based on a hadith in which the Prophet warned his followers not to start worshipping him as the Christians worshipped Jesus. Yet, when asked if it was haram (religiously forbidden) to put on a mawlid or attend one, she said that the word haram was too strong. In fact, when asked if she would go so far as to attend a mawlid, she laughed and seemed to admit that she was flexible about attending since her mother still hosted them. “The old ladies don’t accept our new beliefs!” she laughed, pointing out the generation gap and implicitly placing herself in the “modern” category, even as she indicated the near impossibility of shunning her own mother’s activities. She told me that her father was quite religious and had tried to make her wear the abaya when she was a teenager, but that she would tear it off as soon as she was out of his sight. Of course, she wears the abaya now and, ironically, her tolerance did not prevent her from frequently and relentlessly scolding me regarding my Western garb. Similarly, a 40-year-old student with a Bachelor’s degree in computer sciences related that, while she herself thought music was haram, she did not prohibit her teenage daughter from listening to it. This woman loved music and had been a singer before she became religious, when she gave up music altogether. She laughed and admitted that sometimes when she overhears her daughter’s music she feels her

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body itching and yearning to move to the beat, but she stops herself! While she was strict with herself, she did not force her behavioral code on her daughter. These stories demonstrate the flexibility of religious practice that can be found among women involved in the Islamic resurgence, even within a Qur’anic institution. People do not exist in isolation; they are influenced by, and sometimes accommodate, the differing cultures, needs and opinions of the elder and the younger members of their family, as well as external society. Critics of Patriarchy Some women were willing to criticize aspects of the ways in which religion manifests in Bahrain, especially those aspects that caused them or their female relatives to suffer. For example, not everyone was satisfied with the prevalent patriarchal system, in particular concerning the implementation of family law, whereby it is difficult for women to obtain a divorce, and when they are granted a divorce, they rarely retain custody of their children. One older, divorced, lower-middleclass woman spoke of her experience with the Islamic legal system. (A native Bahraini, her facial features and coloring revealed African ancestry, indicating the diversity of the ethnic makeup of the population.) Trembling slightly, and with hennaed frizzy hair escaping from her headscarf, she spoke bitterly of her divorce and the insulting way in which she was treated by the Islamic judge: I was the one who didn’t want to stay with the man, so I went to the courthouse to talk to the qadi (Islamic judge). My husband didn’t want to divorce. He said, “Before I divorce you, I’ll beat you.” Wallah (by God), right from the start the judge was no help at all. He was impatient. He was old-fashioned and closed-minded. He believed the man should do whatever he likes. There was no chance for the woman to do anything, everything was in the man’s hand. He didn’t understand. He thought ladies couldn’t think. Other women at Umm al-Darda’ also complained about the distress that female relatives had experienced when they tried to obtain a

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divorce. One said that she knew someone who was unable to obtain a divorce, no matter how badly she was treated, until she bribed her husband with money to grant the divorce. For these women, despite their involvement in the resurgence, Islamic institutions were not above criticism and, like women everywhere, many expressed frustration with male domination. On the other hand, several also made sure to vehemently insist that their husbands were supportive in every way and left many choices up to them, such as their vocation or the level of their adherence to Islamic dress codes.

The Unique Bahraini Resurgence My argument that Umm al-Darda’ is a site of female agency contrasts with ideas held by some scholars who argue that the Islamic resurgence has led to women’s subjugation.16 Eleanor Doumato, a scholar of religious studies, notes that the Islamic revival movement in the Najd region of central Arabia led to women’s loss of ritual and communal space.17 Her argument pertains to a unique set of historical and political circumstances, i.e. the rise of what she calls “Wahhabi” Islam in Saudi Arabia in the late eighteenth century. This type of Islam calls for a rejection of religious innovation and advocates a return to the original practices of the Prophet’s era, as well as a strict and literal interpretation of the Qur’an. Salafi Islam is similar in a general way, although the term “Salafi” does not – as the term “Wahhabi” does – denote adherence to the specific ideology of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, the founder of the so-called Wahhabi movement.18 Doumato argues that Saudi women in the Najd, who were traditionally marginalized by religious orthodoxy and excluded from the center of communal religious practice, i.e. the mosque, turned to rituals and practices that affirmed women’s empowerment. These included the zar ritual, the veneration of saints, the visiting of tombs, and other activities now associated with Sufism. The rise of the Islamic movement led by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the Najd led to the demolition of Sufi structures and the suppression of women’s traditional rituals, thus depriving them of alternative religious and healing practices, which left them quite restricted in their religious options, marginalized and

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isolated. Doumato writes, “Wahhabism reconfigured women’s experience of community through ritual, placing their focus back on a single sacred center that in reality they were not invited to enter.”19 According to Doumato, this narrowing of ritual space reflected the narrowing of Najdi women’s social space and redefined female boundaries as being limited chiefly to the domestic sphere. Bahraini Women Excluded from the Ritual Center? Eleanor Doumato’s argument, which focuses on Saudi Arabia, does not apply to modern Bahrain, even though its ruling Al Khalifa family does have roots in the Najd region. Bahrain has witnessed its own Islamic resurgence, such as that represented in Umm al-Darda’, only in the last few decades, some two centuries after the resurgent movement that began in the Najd. The Islamic resurgence in Bahrain draws its inspiration from many sources, and since Islamic ideology truly has “gone global,” it is no longer possible to refer to sources solely in geographic terms, although Saudi Arabia and (for the Shi‘a) Iran remain quite influential. My purpose is not to equate the resurgent movements in the Najd and Bahrain – they began at different times and for different reasons – but to examine why women in Bahrain did not report experiencing a similar religious isolation. Do Sunni Bahraini women feel excluded from “a single sacred center” (the mosque)? Has the resurgence of Islam led them to feel that they are confined to the domestic sphere? The situation in Bahrain appears to be quite different from that of its much larger neighbor to the west. The Ritual Centrality of the Home Firstly, none of the Bahraini women I interviewed at Umm al-Darda’ expressed feelings of exclusion from the mosque. Religious involvement everywhere occurs in various types of spaces, with notions of centrality being relative. This is not to say that in Saudi Arabia women were not deprived of alternate centers of religious practice as a result of the reform movement, as Doumato argues, but rather that the mosque has never been the sole center of religious practice for women. The Muslim women whom I interviewed at Umm al-Darda’ assured me

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that they found the home to be their own sacred site for prayer, and considered it to be a far more appropriate space for themselves than the mosque. The Prophet Muhammad was reported to have said that while women should not be forbidden from praying in the mosque, the home was more suitable for that purpose.20 Many Bahraini mosques have sections reserved for women to pray, but those whom I interviewed found it an inconvenience to go; they did not consider it the optimal site for their prayers. One woman explained, “I don’t go to the mosque, not even for tarawih prayers.21 It [prayer] is much better in the house. God thinks it is better for me.” Juan Campo discusses the insufficient recognition of the sacred qualities of Muslim domestic space: “For many scholars of religion, houses appear to be outside the field of subjects defined by sacred texts, mysticism, and holy places. It is almost as if houses were too much within the mundane sphere of human existence.” He argues that houses in Islamic tradition are in fact sacred; they are not isolated spaces but rather “zones of social interaction.”22 The notion that women, whether in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, feel as though they are marginalized because they do not pray at the mosque, is not an accurate portrayal of the central religious and social importance given to the home. For many Muslim women, the ritual center may well be the home, not the mosque. Bahrain’s Social Atmosphere Secondly, while there is some danger in making generalizations, Bahraini society unmistakably possesses a different character from that of Saudi Arabia, despite the two countries’ proximity. Bahrainis spoke to me of their society as being more “open” and tolerant of diversity. It is true that many Saudis cross the 16-mile-long causeway from the mainland in order to take advantage of Bahrain’s less restrictive social environment. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, it is legal in Bahrain to drink alcohol, females are not mandated by law to cover their hair or face in public, and their being seen in public with an unrelated male is not grounds for arrest by the mutawwa‘ (religious police). Strategically located in the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain has long been a center of international trade, and a magnet for migrant labor; indeed,

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non-Bahrainis comprise approximately 37–50 percent of the total population.23 Bahrain is host to several churches and many non-Islamic ethnic and religious clubs, all of which lends credence to its reputation for tolerance. The region now known as Saudi Arabia has been traversed by trade and pilgrimage routes for centuries. It is host to diverse regional cultures as well as a large expatriate labor force that includes people of a variety of faiths. However, the government of Saudi Arabia has not yet allowed churches or other non-Muslim houses of worship to be built in the country, nor does it allow the celebration of non-Muslim holidays.24 In fact, Saudi religious police destroyed a Hindu temple in a Riyadh apartment and deported three worshippers in 2005.25 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa‘ud al-Faisal has stated, “We are very much sensitive to the social cohesion of the country.”26 However, it should be noted here that Saudi Arabian society is composed of diverse individuals, and it is unlikely that Saudi citizens uniformly support their government on each and every issue discussed above.

Secular Education In addition to Bahrain’s self-presentation of heterogeneity, the country was the first of the Gulf states to adopt modern education. This had profound implications for Bahraini society, leading to the shift from the extended to the nuclear family, and women’s refusal to be as subservient to men as their female ancestors had been.27 While Bahrain established its first public school for girls in 1928, Saudi Arabia did not do so until 1956.28 Bahrain’s elementary school curriculum can be distinguished from that of Saudi Arabia in that the former devotes much less instructional time to teaching religion than the latter does: 7.5 percent compared to 31 percent.29 The emphasis on religious studies in Saudi Arabia is a means of inculcating and reinforcing adherence to the state religious ideology. Bahrain’s lack of emphasis in this area and the greater portion of time allocated to mathematics and science suggest that the government has prioritized development over the promotion of a particular religious dogma. Interestingly, literacy rates for both men and women are consistently higher in Bahrain than in Saudi Arabia.30

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Bahraini Men’s and Women’s Clubs Furthermore, Bahrain has a history of open intellectualism as reflected in its tradition of cultural clubs. This phenomenon started in the early twentieth century when clubs were first formed in opposition to British colonialism. Later, clubs were formed to discuss literature, Arab nationalism, Islamic reform and other topics. Sami Hanna refers to this period as “Bahrain’s modern renaissance,” adding that ideas from major thinkers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Europe and India were discussed openly in these forums.31 Women’s organizations, such as the Bahrain Women’s Society, and other groups in which women participate are flourishing in Bahrain and they are part of this cultural legacy. Umm al-Darda’, while not a club but rather a religious educational institution, is nonetheless part of Bahrain’s strong tradition of communal discourse. Among the Sunni religious centers in the country, some are informal, based in private homes, and others possess the status of a formally recognized organization. Bahraini clubs, societies and organizations are required to register with the government.32 Bahraini Women at Work Oil production in Bahrain dropped in the early 1980s, and Bahrain is no longer as wealthy as it was during the peak of the oil boom in the 1970s. For that reason, and with the impetus to hire Bahrainis as part of the “Bahrainization” project, more Bahraini women have joined the labor force. An interviewee told me that in the old days, members of large extended families all lived together in one house, but that nowadays couples want to live in their own single-family home, and as a result, their expenses are so high that women have to work. She also added that a lot of money goes into women’s social life. This involves wedding parties, housewarming parties, dinners, gifts, flowers and more. A family like hers was obliged to give expensive presents on such occasions, presents that easily cost BD 100 (USD 265). A family’s disposable income, it seems, is channeled into these events which are for the most part orchestrated by women. My interviewee claimed that men spend their life working and paying. These days, however, men can no longer “do it all,” and many women have to secure employment

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in order to continue putting on this show. A lot of people are in debt, she complained. Writing about the change in Bahraini social life after the decline in oil reserves, Seikaly observes that for middle-class women, work became a “normal and needed support for the family.”33 The percentage of Bahraini women in the national workforce almost quintupled from 1971 to 2001, rising from 5 percent to 23.5 percent, and reached 34.3 percent in 2008.34 By contrast, in 2005 Saudi women only accounted for about 7 percent of the total workforce and 2 percent in private business.35 However, economic factors are not the only reason for women’s participation in the workforce. Many women work for reasons of personal fulfillment. This shift of women into the workplace likely bolstered society’s acceptance of women’s participation in other non-domestic forums such as religious organizations, making religion more of a public matter for women, and less of a domestic, tribal or ethnic affair. New Ways to Practice Indeed, Bahraini women have the right to drive, the right to choose from a range of careers, and now the right to vote. Saudi women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia, they have not been granted suffrage, and the range of careers they can pursue is limited by a strict policy of sex segregation, discrimination in education, and cultural norms.36 Yet, since the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain in the late twentieth century, most Bahraini women, like Saudi women, have ceased practicing many of the women-centered alternative rituals associated with folk Islam that Doumato argues came to an end with the rise of “Wahhabi-style” Islamic conservatism in Saudi Arabia. Why would that be so? This change was not imposed on Bahraini women by the state, although various forms of social pressure likely played some role. It was not the result of state-enacted restrictions of women’s religious activities as seen in Saudi Arabia. Rather, it was embraced by women themselves – to the extent that anyone is an “actor” and not merely a “pawn” of social forces – as a mature transition from what they believed to be outdated, superstitious folk practices, toward what they perceived

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to be rational, educated, modern ways of practicing their religion. New religiously oriented organizations have replaced the old ways of meeting, and these new forums reflect current concerns and issues, as well as the Bahraini tradition of open-mindedness and communal discourse. It should be noted as well that women in Saudi Arabia are reaching beyond their restriction and exclusion to create new modes of religious practice. Miriam Cooke observes that they attend lectures by female religious authorities, and even when they remain at home, supposedly isolated, they can and do network online.37

Conclusion It is true that, despite gains, Bahrain in many ways remains a patriarchal society in which men dominate government and control the courts. However, the example of Umm al-Darda’ problematizes the view that this is the only story worth reading about. It demonstrates that Bahraini women involved in the Islamic resurgence are not sitting at home, isolated from communal discourse and religious practice. Rather, they are actively grouping together, creating new religious organizations and centers that are woman-focused and reflect social, political and economic change, as well as the desire to rationalize and modernize religion. In conclusion, Umm al-Darda’ functions not only as a center for textual Islamic instruction, but also as an institution that provides women with a public forum in which they can join in communal discourse regarding religious, social, cultural and political matters. While Umm al-Darda’ is representative of a greater movement, the individuals involved in the center embody degrees of diversity and flexibility regarding religious beliefs and practices. The example of Umm al-Darda’ offers a different picture of Islamism than what has typically been portrayed. Sawsan noted that in Bahrain there were many male scholars – but a great dearth of highly educated Muslim women – in the field of Islam, with expertise in Qur’an, fiqh, and Hadith. “When there is a woman scholar,” she said, “it is different, she understands you.” The ways in which women will use their newfound access to textual Islam remain to be seen, but it is significant that resurgent

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Muslim women find value and solidarity in religious community with other women. Having explored Shi‘i and Sunni women’s participation in their communal religious organizations, in the next two chapters I focus on the stories of individual Bahraini and expatriate women in order to look at additional dimensions of religious practice in contemporary Bahrain.

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5 GULF WOMEN’S STOR IES ABOUT LIFE AND R ELIGION

In November 2002, a female diplomat threw a party, inviting elite, publicly prominent Bahraini women and, fortunately for me, a few visiting scholars as well. One by one, the room began to fill with women wearing beautiful, colorful Gulf Arab evening gowns. A friend of mine who was also in attendance later commented, “There was quite a bouquet of women!” Among the women were newspaper columnists, members of women’s organizations, parliamentary candidates in the recent elections, and women active in other fields. There was great optimism and excitement in the air as they spoke of women’s political achievements and plans for the future. They began discussing the elections in which eight women vied for seats in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house with 40 elected members) but none of them won. One guest, a candidate in the race, said that she had run knowing full well that she would lose, but wanted to participate nonetheless. She also felt that even though her maiden run did not lead to a “win,” it was groundbreaking and thus a positive experience.1 Another guest told me that she had recently traveled to Kuwait as a representative of her women’s group, and there she received a great compliment from a male official: he remarked that she and the other Bahraini women who had struggled for women’s rights (including suffrage) were frightening Kuwaiti men, who were unnerved by the suffragist wave rolling toward Kuwait.2

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At one point, the guests began listing the obstacles they had faced in getting a woman elected, among which was the absence of “real” women in the media – instead, they were always stereotypically portrayed as either villains or sex bombs. There was the dearth of media coverage of women’s issues, there was the lack of support, financial and otherwise, for female candidates, and there was the fact that Islamic groups backed devout male candidates. This last point prompted me to ask another guest if she thought religion had impacted the election in any other ways. She replied that religion decided the election: had the Shi‘a not boycotted, most likely a woman would have won.3 According to her, this was because Shi‘a were more likely to elect a woman – they were more liberal in that way. One of the former candidates elaborated: “Everyone who was willing to vote for me was either out of my district or boycotting the election.” This emotionally charged party gave me insight into the different ways in which individual women negotiate religion and gender in Bahrain, the focus of the next two chapters in which I look at women’s personal stories and the diverse, unconventional – and at times incongruous – roles that religion plays in their lives. This particular chapter focuses on religion, modernity and change as they play out in the lives of three Bahraini women: a Sunni candidate for Parliament, a middleaged Shi‘i feminist who writes for a prominent newspaper in Bahrain, and a homemaker who strongly emphasized the importance of the role of the mother.4 There is an enormous variety in religious practice among Muslim women in Bahrain. For example, one acquaintance, a very beautiful, wealthy, unmarried Ajami (Shi‘i of Persian descent), employed in a high-ranking position in Manama, often wore skin-tight mini-skirts and stiletto heels in public and frequently flew to Dubai to party. Nevertheless, she prayed five times a day without fail, fasted during Ramadan, and otherwise appeared to piously adhere to the five pillars of Islam. Another contact from my children’s school, a British convert to Shi‘i Islam who wore heavy black Islamic garb, practiced with the zeal of the new convert, appearing to outdo local Shi‘a in her devotion. Yet she also maintained her British identity by meeting with British friends once a week at Fuddruckers, an American burger joint

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in Manama, for a hearty British breakfast: tea, toast, eggs, beef bacon (halal, of course), and a chat.5 It would be an incomplete portrayal of both women and Islam in Bahraini society if no mention were made of the many women whose stories do not fit – for a variety of reasons – within the limited scope of Sunnis and Shi‘a and their religious institutions. Highlighting the voices and stories of a few women allows for a different perspective on religion in Bahrain. Human behavior can differ depending on factors such as the setting; behavior in an institutional setting may differ from that in the home or in public. A group member who is the subject of research, for example, might emphasize the expression of group solidarity over other expressions. In chapters 3 and 4, I examined communal religious expression as offered by those attending Shi‘i ma’atim or the Sunni Qur’anic school, Umm al-Darda’. Here, in contrast, I present individuals in order to shed light on other dimensions of religious behavior. However, I am not suggesting that in doing so I can extract some “essential quality” from the individual who is now “free” of her social constraints. I agree with Norman Denzin who writes, “There can never be a final, accurate representation of what was meant or said – only different textual representations of different experiences.”6 This chapter will provide another dimension to the issues examined in institutional contexts in earlier chapters, as will the following chapter in which I focus on expatriate women in Bahrain. The danger of the now outdated scholarly tradition of trying to portray the entirety of a given culture in a single work is that, in painting with too broad a brush, it becomes easy to overlook differences, complexities and nuances and thus the very thing that makes one group like any other, i.e. the fact that it is comprised of multifaceted individuals. The anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod points out that scholars are in a position of power vis-à-vis their “subjects” in that they are the ones holding the creative pen. In one study, Abu-Lughod chose to capture the stories of individuals without drawing any conclusions. Concerned with “the most problematic connotations of ‘culture’: homogeneity, coherence, and timelessness,” she sought to present her work in a way that would clash with stereotypical ideas regarding culture.7

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These “problematic connotations” include the idea that people within a culture are similar, that cultural phenomena can be neatly analyzed, and that an anthropologist can capture the “essence” of a culture that has always existed and will always exist in the same form. The late Edward Said argued that Western scholarship on the Middle East has been inextricably linked with the colonial enterprise.8 These days, any researcher who studies the region has to deal with a host of ethical issues regarding the intersections between power, politics and scholarship; to ignore this situation is either blindness or a purposeful intent to mislead. Chandra Talpade Mohanty further contends that Western feminist scholarship on non-Western women should be understood “in the context of the global hegemony of Western scholarship.” Arguing that scholarship that suppresses the heterogeneity of its subjects can be a form of colonization, Mohanty believes that Western feminists should consciously avoid representing women in ways that enable the colonial mindset.9 Such representations include a monolithic picture of the weaker and oppressed other, in contrast to the image of Western women as uniformly strong, rational and liberated – which reasserts and perpetuates hegemony. My findings did not support any such monolithic depiction of Bahraini women. It was the evidence, and not the argument, against this type of construction that shaped my work. And, given the history of Orientalist scholarship, I felt that it was important to include diversity and difference – which humanize – and to avoid discursive hegemony in the form of homogenizing the subject – which dehumanizes. There are a variety of reasons to focus on the individual: to shed light on individual versus group behavior, to be inclusive of difference, to avoid discursive colonization, and ultimately to recognize that there are many different ways to be religious. What the women covered in this chapter and the next do have in common, however, is that while they are not involved in formal religious institutions, they too are nonetheless contending with their Muslim identity and with the manifestations of modern life in contemporary Bahrain. Literate and educated, they are making their own choices – to the extent that they can – regarding how to negotiate these issues.

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Leila I spoke with Leila, one of the losing candidates in the October 2002 parliamentary elections, at a late-night Ramadan tent celebration attended by some 30 women. The tent was festively decorated with colorful hanging balls, lanterns and birds, and with a large semicircle of low, reddish cushions for the guests to sit on. After finding a place to sit, I was offered a choice of fresh juices: carrot, mango, lemonade or melon, served in elegant glasses. My generous (and wealthy) hosts immediately introduced me to the women sitting around me, and they began to ask me politely and attentively about my work. I began to chat with Leila, a wiry, serious, older, upper-class woman, then in her late fifties or early sixties, who spoke excellent English. Her hair was jet-black, cropped short in a severe bob, and contrasted with her lined and weathered face. Her eyes radiated intensity and intelligence. I noticed that her energy level was quite high; compared to the other, more subdued guests, she was electrifying. Strident and annoyed, she echoed complaints I had heard from women at the previous party held at the diplomat’s home, agreeing that religion had settled the election with respect to the female candidates. Leila blamed the Salafi camps for her own election defeat, confirming that they had supported male Salafi candidates, and she held the Shi‘i boycott responsible too. Voters were only allowed to vote for candidates residing in their own electoral district, and since Leila (though a Sunni) lived in a predominantly Shi‘i area, the boycott had cost her crucial votes. She also blamed the discrepancy between men’s and women’s campaign funding. Male candidates, she claimed, were not only better funded but some had been seen openly buying votes. Ironically, she argued that women themselves were the real reason for their dismal showing in the election results. She said that, to a certain extent, women did not vote for her because they still believed that men were more capable leaders. Women voted against themselves. She exclaimed vehemently that women must fight for their rights and not allow themselves to be brainwashed by their own societies into thinking that they are not capable. During her campaign, Leila had to address Bahrainis’ concerns about her candidacy, in particular their religious concerns regarding

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women in leadership roles. She brought up a hadith that is famously cited as religious grounds for not allowing women to serve in positions of public power: When news reached the Prophet (S.A.W.) that the Persians had appointed Chosroe’s daughter as their ruler, he said: “A nation which placed its affairs in the hands of a woman shall never prosper!”10 This has traditionally been understood to mean that the Prophet was against female leadership, although the matter has been debated for centuries.11 The argument that Leila used in response to this theological challenge was that the Prophet’s rebuke should really be understood in its specific context, and not as an all-encompassing statement expressing disapproval of female leadership. She offered an alternative interpretation that invalidated the traditional rationale. She did not make it up herself; there is quite a large body of contemporary literature (including on the Internet) arguing both for and against the liberal interpretation of this particular hadith. One has only to carry out an Internet search to get an idea of the volume of discourse regarding women’s leadership in Islam. Leila’s experience highlights the tension between those who support the maintenance of a patriarchal society in which women abstain from public decision-making roles, and those who promote women’s political participation in Bahrain. It also underscores the struggle between those who hold “traditional” understandings of religion which support male dominance, and those who hold more liberal and female-centric interpretations. While in theory Bahraini women are now able (literate, educated and socially aware) and allowed to run for political office, in actual practice they are still impeded by traditional patriarchal forces that have long wielded religion to sustain their authority. Although Leila sought legitimacy by addressing and debating religion, holding that there is no Islamic basis for withholding leadership roles from women, she lost the election nonetheless. On the one hand, she was able to access the previously male-dominated realms of religious scholarship, not to mention political candidacy; on the other hand, this access alone proved insufficient.

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Islamist movements today differ widely in their approach to women’s issues, but in general they call for greater social conservatism, which is consistent with the female candidates’ complaint that the Salafis ruined their chances to elect a woman MP. Indeed, Sunni and Shi‘i Islamic revivalist candidates together won 19 out of 37 open seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2002, creating a large and influential bloc of male religious conservative MPs.12 The rise of the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain has translated into greater social conservatism. Reacting to the dominance of the Western value system, Bahraini revivalists have promoted their version of Islamic social values. Unfortunately, the dominant interpretation of those values tends to support patriarchy and the limitation of women’s roles. This turn toward a deeper conservatism a decade ago arguably contributed to the crisis in 2011. Globally, women’s access to public office has often been restricted by cultural norms, unequal access to employment, insufficient campaign funds, single-member electoral district systems and other barriers.13 In the Middle East, as elsewhere, development and modernization do not always automatically guarantee gender equality, or for that matter democratic participation for either gender. In Bahrain, men as well as women have until recent times been prohibited from full democratic involvement. The greatest irony, of course, is underscored in Leila’s comment that, paradoxically, women as a group did not vote for female candidates. In one study of power in tribal culture, it was found that the weaker members, including women and youth, perform the values of their culture by supporting their male leaders.14 Bahraini women may likewise have felt it necessary and/or comforting in light of the disruptive pace of modernity to support traditional (male) leadership. Middle Eastern women might also vote in ways that reflect their larger interests, i.e. family and community, over self-interest.15 Elite women in particular have a history of supporting female subjugation in the interest of protecting their kinship advantages and class privileges.16 Cross-culturally, gender struggles have historically been subverted by identity politics. For example, women’s involvement in the Shi‘i boycott, which hurt female candidates’ chances of election, can be explained simply: those Shi‘i women who took part in the boycott, whose rights as women might have been advanced if women had

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been elected, placed their Shi‘i identity before their gender identity. Those women involved in the Salafi resurgence who voted for male Salafi candidates also prioritized their religious identity. Yet Leila’s frustration with many female voters for internalizing the dominant value structure – for being unwilling to trust a woman to make political decisions – underlines the notion that “misogynistic tendencies” on the part of both men and women have been an obstacle to women’s political participation.17 Alanoud Alsharekh cites a study mentioned in the Gulf Daily News in 2005 which found that “more than twothirds of Bahrainis do not consider the representation of women in parliamentary and municipal elections to be an essential part of the democratic process.”18 One response to these obstacles is illustrated by Leila’s rebuttal in the case of the hadith concerning women’s leadership, in which she argued that the hadith should be understood within the specific context in which it took place, and not as an across-the-board condemnation of female leadership. Feminist movements have sprung up from within the Islamic framework, where scriptural interpretation was previously a male domain and where women are now finding support for their agendas through reinterpreting sacred texts in order to find religious legitimacy. Leila responded to her critics by countering with an alternative interpretation of the hadith in question, in order to dismiss the claim that in Islam women cannot be leaders. She is in good company: there is a broad movement of Muslim women who have begun to examine the texts themselves in order to challenge traditional interpretations which in their view have served unjustly to oppress women. Examples include Iranian women’s writings published in the Islamic feminist magazine Zanan, founded in 1992, and the Lebanese writer Nazira Zayn al-Din (1908–76) who wrote prolifically and passionately in rebuttal to male scholarship promoting the veil as an Islamic requirement.19 The Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi’s study of The Veil and the Male Elite (1991) examines and questions the reliability of a number of hadith, in particular those referring to women. Amina Wadud, an American convert to Islam, has closely examined Qur’anic verses in order to reinterpret them without the male bias of earlier scholarship.20

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It is interesting to note that Leila did not simply respond that women intrinsically deserve every right that men have. Had she argued that women should be able to take a leadership role – that King Chosroe’s daughter had an inherent right to succeed her father – without drawing on the powerful and legitimating tool of religion, she would have run the risk of appearing to be influenced by Western-style feminism. The question of gender equity, frequently associated with “colonial feminism” and thus considered a Western import, is often put on the back burner in favor of other agendas, by men as well as by women. Typically, the response to external threats or to the reality of Western dominance has been to emphasize “tradition,” in particular what are thought to be traditional gender roles. There is tension in Bahrain regarding Western cultural and political dominance as represented by the overt presence of Western institutions such as the US Navy’s Central Command and Fifth Fleet as well as a plethora of American and British businesses. Given this tension, it was a strategic move on Leila’s part to place her argument within an indigenous framework. While those men and women who want to expand women’s roles have found ways to reinterpret religious texts in support of that goal, conservatives fighting to maintain patriarchal authority have also found plenty of material in the same texts to bolster their position.21 Although some Bahraini women such as Leila are fighting for political representation by using the same weapons that are used to restrict their involvement, religious conservatives still find ways to hinder their progress. Nevertheless, Leila’s example illustrates the progress Bahraini women have made, as well as how they are learning to use textual theological knowledge to their benefit. At the same time, it demonstrates the limits of these new gains. One solution to this stalemate was offered by Lateefa al-Ga‘oud (her real name) who, but for 300 votes, would have become the first female Member of Parliament in 2002. In an interview in the magazine Gulf Business, she suggested that seats be reserved for women in order to ensure female representation and ultimately familiarize Bahrainis with the idea of women in politics.22 That would most likely have required the consent of the dominant components of society, including the ruling Al Khalifa family. In any case, Lateefa al-Ga‘oud did become the

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first female MP in 2006, and she retained her seat in 2010. In byelections held in 2011 (after 18 MPs resigned in protest against the government’s response to pro-reform demonstrations), one female candidate won by default and two won the vote, for a total of four sitting female MPs as of this writing.23 To return to the Ramadan tent, after thanking Leila for her comments and my hosts for their elegant hospitality, I did not arrive home until after 2:00 in the morning, and I wondered how I and all the other guests with children were going to be able to get up and get them to school by 7:30 in the morning. It is common for Bahraini women to carry out frenzied social visiting schedules during Ramadan, and I asked myself how they were able to get any non-Ramadan–related tasks accomplished during this time. Clearly, class is an important factor. Middle-class and wealthy Bahraini women likely have the resources to hire domestic servants to assist them with their parental and household duties, such as waking up early with the children, preparing their breakfast and driving them to school. Utterly exhausted and bleary-eyed, I stumbled through these tasks myself the next morning, and I realized that negotiating social obligations in the elite circles of Bahrain would be very difficult without the help of domestic servants.

Nuha The scholar May Seikaly aptly describes the changing idiom that Bahraini women have used to express their gendered and political identities: “While in the 1960s and 1970s the idiom was one of national liberation, constitutional democratization, Western dress, and political radicalization, in the 1980s and 1990s the idiom of Islam is used.”24 This section discusses religion, politics and feminism, focusing on Nuha, a middle-aged Bahraini feminist and a prominent leftist journalist who still identifies with the idiom of the 1960s and 70s. Her story highlights the “generation gap” in the feminist community – of both idioms – in Bahrain. The first and most surprising fact that struck me about Nuha was that she was a Shi‘i married to a Sunni from the royal Al Khalifa

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family. A leftist, Ba‘thist, political columnist, she works as a prominent freelancer for a local newspaper, and in 2002 she also had other work in translation. Nuha had gone abroad to college in Beirut in the 1970s. In her early fifties when I met her, she was one of the many middle-aged women I interviewed who said that they remembered wearing mini-skirts in the marketplace in the 1970s. Perhaps this was their way of conveying to me that Bahraini society had really undergone a significant change since then, or that the women themselves had changed, or more likely, both. For the second half of my interview with Nuha, she invited me to her home. This was really a mansion, filled with large, exquisite Persian carpets and antique pieces of Arab art. She herself looked a little out of place in it, a diminutive woman dressed quite casually in jeans and a T-shirt, overpowered by the opulent setting. Nuha spoke to me of her love of religion but also her misgivings about the political ways in which it was being manifested. For example, she told me that one day her eight-year-old niece came to her and complained that her teacher had told her that if she did not wear the headscarf she would be hanged by her hair in hell. Furious, Nuha went and complained to the school. She was certain the teacher had received these extremist religious ideas in a political venue, not from her teacher’s training program or from the Ministry of Education. Irritated, she added that there is only one Islam, and if one raises children properly, that is Islam. She said, “These changes are political. They [Muslim revivalists] spend so much time on women, telling them what to do. It’s all a waste of time. . . . It’s all political.” Further developing her argument, she said that the new ways in which religion was being manifested in Bahrain had everything to do with both Iran and Saudi Arabia: Iran wanted more people in Bahrain to feel “extremely Shi‘i” in order to feed its own interests; Saudi Arabia wanted more people to feel “extremely Sunni” for the same reason. In contrast, she and her husband were raising their children without any emphasis on Sunni or Shi‘i sectarianism. Nuha is a practicing Muslim who prays and fasts, and we spoke for a while about Sufism, the mystical, esoteric wing of Islam for which she has an appreciation. She, like her eight-year-old niece, does not

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wear the hijab (headscarf), and she insisted the practice has no basis in the Qur’an. She was fed up with the “Wahhabis’” regulation of women’s outward appearance. She was particularly annoyed with the new leadership of women’s groups who were involved in the resurgence, and she indignantly exclaimed, They are leading women’s movements and covering [their body, their hair, and sometimes their face too] – this is a contradiction. We have traditional Arab costumes to cover against dust, sun and heat – you could display your identity with these – but to cover everything because of ‘ayb (shame) and haram (religiously forbidden), this too is just politics. Nuha talked about the women of her generation who had studied at Arab universities abroad and returned home to found the women’s movement in Bahrain. She compared it to the current movement which she considered to be less successful: Those groups that went abroad in the 60s, 70s and 80s came back with a different mentality. That is what I want to explain. It was a different era – I used to go to the suq (market place) in my mini-skirt. Almost all of the [female] leaders who went abroad then are the same ones taking part in the women’s movement today. This was not a group that went to Europe, but to Arab universities in Cairo, Baghdad and Beirut. But they failed to create a new generation of leaders. We [in the movement now] are the same ones who graduated then. There are a few reasons for this change. First, there is the selfishness of the ladies who want to hold on to their leadership roles. Secondly, the ways in which people see voluntary work has changed. Thirdly, we believe in many different ideas. A new [women’s] group has come on the scene with new religious ideas. The original leaders’ ideas are not compatible with the new religious ideas. “Unpacking” these comments requires some analysis of the groups Nuha mentioned. The initial group of women who still belong to

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what she referred to as “the women’s movement” are those women, now middle-aged, whom May Seikaly describes as liberal, political activists in Western dress. Nuha spoke of how they went abroad and returned with new political commitment, which did happen in many cases. Of course, in the late 1970s and the 1980s many also came back with a renewed commitment to Islam, but here Nuha was referring to those who returned to establish secular women’s associations or otherwise become involved in the women’s movement. The second group to whom she referred, the one with “new religious ideas,” are those Islamist women who are now presenting their agendas – gendered, political and otherwise – using the “idiom of Islam,” as Seikaly puts it. The rift between the first and the second group demonstrates the struggle for influence in Bahrain which, for the most part, has been won by those involved in Islamic revival movements. Nonetheless, a small group of Muslim-yet-secular activists, like Nuha, still play a prominent role in trying to shape Bahrain through their writing and other activities. It is important to note that when Nuha emphasized that she had not gone to a European university, but rather that she had become interested in feminism and other political issues at an Arab university, she was placing her ideology within an indigenous (Arab) framework. It struck me that she accomplished two goals by presenting her views in this way. First, she expressed (to her American interviewer) her ownership, as an Arab, of feminism. Western societies have historically been critical of the status of women in the Middle East, and the promotion of women’s rights has even served the West as a pretext for aggression when it was useful. One example is the way in which the ongoing war in Afghanistan was sold to the American public, who were told that by ousting the Taliban they would be heroically liberating oppressed Afghan women. In the West, the stereotypical image of a Middle Eastern woman is that of a burqa-clad, impoverished, oppressed female. She is presented either as wailing over the death of her terrorist husband or brother, or as casting a vote of thanks to the liberating Western forces in her country. It is not often that she is depicted with much agency gained on her own.25 Nuha claimed the opposite: she emphasized the Arab origins of her ideology. Moreover,

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her stance on this issue was perhaps intended to disarm any religious conservative who would associate feminism with the West. The women’s movement in the Middle East began to take root in the late nineteenth century. In Bahrain, it manifested in women’s clubs and associations. It was not until 1955 that the first women’s association, the Bahrain Young Ladies Society, was established. Emile Nakhleh noted that in order to be a member, one had to be “literate, non-political, of good character, and willing to participate in the activities of the society.” These activities included promoting women’s literacy, performing charitable acts and serving and promoting one’s country.26 Deniz Kandiyoti has argued that the extent to which Middle Eastern women have been allowed to play a variety of roles in society has depended on “state-building processes.”27 Indeed, each and every activity that took place in Bahrain’s state-licensed clubs required a permit, which suggests that the government allowed this public space for women to openly convene because it was consciously promoting certain activities carried out by women’s associations that it considered useful to the greater nation-building project. It was not until the early 1970s that many newly educated Bahraini women used this venue to push for social change, testing the boundaries set both by society and by the government.28 The 1970s were a time of social upheaval in Bahrain. One initial reaction to oil wealth and the modernizing education it afforded was to discard the abaya for jeans and mini-skirts, a symbolic move to cast away what suddenly seemed old-fashioned. Women began to be active in all areas of the public realm. As mentioned before, many men and women went abroad to study during the 1970s, and this had a transformative effect on the social landscape in Bahrain. New women’s organizations that formed in Bahrain and the wider Gulf region began to exert joint efforts to gain greater rights for women and to fight religious conservatives who resisted any change to sharia (shari‘a, Islamic law). Islamic family law allowed child marriage, polygamy and unilateral male divorce, and granted male custody of children at a certain age.29 Women’s groups were also involved in the 1972 Constitutional Assembly elections, and they presented a petition to the then Emir

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of Bahrain protesting their lack of voting rights. This petition ended with the following entreaty: In the name of the women of Bahrain, who have had a tradition of education for over 50 years, we present this petition, hoping it will produce positive results. Women’s humanity is inseparable from the whole of human kind, and we believe that on the day when injustice against women is eradicated, Bahrain will reassert its belief in freedom, democracy, and equality in human rights and responsibilities.30 This quotation illustrates the character of Nuha’s generation of Bahraini activists who made their demands in the name of secular concepts associated with principles of universal human rights such as gender equity, democracy and freedom. Unfortunately for Nuha’s group, several factors contributed to the weakening of their movement. In the late 1970s and the early 80s, the influence of Islamic groups combined with new restrictive government policies severely limited the role that women’s associations were able to play.31 Nuha also mentioned the failure of Bahraini feminists of her generation to pass the torch on to the next generation. She blamed their unwillingness to relinquish leadership roles, changes in charitable associations, and the rise of new ideologies (Islamic revivalism). Others have noted that upper-class Bahraini feminists have been unable or unwilling to reach the rural and lower classes of women such as Shi‘i villagers, a group that has been more successfully appealed to by those promoting the Islamic resurgence.32 Munira Fakhro, writing in 1990, observed that women’s associations are comprised of either wealthy women with the time, desire and resources to carry out charitable activities, or young working women who are not in a position to promote social change.33 It has been claimed that those who espouse feminism or some form of gender equity, and those who advocate a religiously based “return” to a patriarchal family structure, have become “implacable foes.”34 Broadly speaking, many Islamists have centralized the gender issue in their ideology, pushing for a return to sharia-based family law and a

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patriarchal family structure.35 One scholar writes of a global rise of neo patriarchal religious movements that can be understood as a “fundamentalist backlash against modernity that makes women its particular target.”36 In fact, Islamic revivalists have embraced many aspects of modernity, e.g. technology, Western university education and democracy, and have helped many to navigate between traditional culture and social change in the contemporary modernizing world.37 Other more plausible explanations of this trend include the male desire to assert collective masculinity in the face of a perceived threat to it, whether the threat is believed to arise from Western economic, political and cultural dominance, global capitalism, rapid social change, or other factors. Some revivalists have also accepted the theory that Western powers have conspired to weaken traditional Middle Eastern culture by seducing Middle Eastern women with ideas of feminism and sex appeal, creating “loose” women who are alienated from their religion and culture and “sick” with the disease of Westernization.38 Thus a common response has been to reinforce patriarchy in order to restore what is seen as the precolonial, natural and authentic social order. Yet this really falls short of being the full story. Muslim women, both those involved and those not involved in the Islamic resurgence, have begun to outline feminist agendas from within an Islamic framework.39 As Beinin and Stork note, “Women activists in Islamist movements respond and offer an alternative to an egalitarian model of gender relations perceived as specifically Western.”40 Seikaly suggests that Muslim women have found resurgent practices to be empowering in that they allow them to balance “tradition” with “modernity,” enabling them to access the public realm while still maintaining their cultural and religious identity.41 Indeed, the examples of women’s educational activity within the Shi‘i ma’tam, described in chapter 3 of this study, demonstrate the ways in which resurgent Bahraini women have sought to empower themselves through religion. This illustrates the complex relationship that Muslim women have with religion: on the one hand, it has been used against them to limit their behavior and potential; on the other hand, women have in turn appropriated religion to create spaces in which to promote their varied interests.

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A simplified understanding of Islamic movements as promoting patriarchy is an inadequate understanding of the multifaceted issue of gender and revivalist Islam. It was during the Islamic resurgence, in 2002, that women gained the right to vote in Bahrain. In many cases revivalist men have supported Islamic feminism as well, as does the famous Egyptian televangelist Amr Khaled who has written and preached extensively on this topic.42 Nonetheless, those who advocate women’s rights as part of universal human rights find it difficult to compromise on the issue. Iran and Saudi Arabia have supplied horrific examples of women’s repression at the hands of religious conservatives. Many Iranian feminists who initially supported Khomeini suffered violent repercussions.43 Most Bahraini women, even those active in the resurgence, would never wish to lose the right to vote or to drive, both of which are prohibited for their Saudi Arabian counterparts. Nuha’s dislike of Islamic groups is attributable not only to their promotion of patriarchy but also to what she sees as their ill-founded origins. She gave an account of the political foundation of the resurgence in Bahrain, painting it as a sinister movement that arose only because the Bahraini government allowed it to: After ’73, the government tried to hit all political parties.44 Bahrain was politically active, there were even three or four underground parties. They put those involved in jail for years. While scaring the activists or exiling them, the government also began to pacify them. They bought them off. All those parties disappeared. The streets were empty – no ideas, no movements. That was replaced with religious movements. If there are no organized parties, the opposite thing will come. They were supported by the government, they were allowed to go everywhere. How did they get permission? They got the green light and they got stronger and stronger, supported by the CIA. That’s because for a while these groups were anti-communist. Here Nuha describes Islamic groups as having appeared in the void created by government suppression of overt political activity, and

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as supported by the Bahraini ruling elite as well as the US Central Intelligence Agency in their joint effort against communism. In doing so, she clearly discredits them. To Nuha, the notion that one can be feminist and revivalist is absurd, hypocritical, and at best sadly mistaken. Yet Nuha is bound by location. She can express her opinions by writing impassioned editorials that help her impact the political situation in Bahrain, and vent as well, but she still has to cope on a daily basis with those involved in the resurgence. She is often confronted with those in Bahrain who also struggle with women’s issues, regardless of their ideological bent. Indeed, I first met her at the party hosted by the diplomat which I described at the beginning of this chapter, where a variety of women – veiled and non-veiled alike – were debating the issues of women’s rights and the elections. The dialogue on gender equity continues regardless of idiom. Those like Nuha will have to find a way to cultivate the common ground between themselves and resurgent women activists if they wish to bridge the rift.

Samira A Polish friend from my Monday night literacy club, held at the home of a prominent Bahraini family, invited me one day in February to visit her friend, a middle- to upper-middle-class, older, Bahraini Sunni woman who lived in Riffa (al-Rifa‘), a large town south of ‘Aali in the Central Governorate. Umm Khalid came out to greet us dressed in a beautiful embroidered dress. She served us all kinds of fruits and nuts and manaqish, which resemble little pizzas. Trying to make me feel at home, she brought out pictures of her past travels in the USA and thrust a little stuffed moose wearing an American flag T-shirt that she had bought in Colorado into my arms. She said she loved Americans and missed them, but hated (US President) Bush and blamed him for the war in Iraq, a sentiment I frequently heard repeated in Bahrain. Umm Khalid’s daughter Samira, in her mid-thirties and with two children of her own, came to join us and we all started to chat. The discussion we had during that visit made me think about the binary of “tradition” and “modernity”: both terms carry positive and

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negative connotations in Bahrain as elsewhere. What is considered traditional, even when “tradition” has clearly been invented, can be thought of as authentic, original, and a source of the continuity of sacred values and beloved culture. On the other hand, the word can also evoke the sense of something backward or outdated. The word “modernity” can call to mind notions of progress, knowledge, and scientific and technological breakthroughs. To some, it evokes images of the Western world. Talal Asad argues that the modernizing project is something that “certain people in power seek to achieve,” and that it includes the implementation of human rights, democracy, capitalism, technological advances, medical advances, secularism, etc., as “exemplified by the ‘West’.” Yet, as such, it is also associated with the weakening of authentic culture and values, the encroachment of Westernization, and the overvaluation of unimportant or even dangerous knowledge. Asad refers to the “disenchantment” of society or the “stripping away of myth, magic, and the sacred” as part and parcel of this project, which underlines why Muslim revivalists have criticized modernization as secularization.45 Of course, that which is imagined to be “traditional” is, in fact, a modern construct. Shmuel Eisenstadt argues that there are contesting projects of modernity, and that contemporary revivalist groups should be considered as modern movements that engage in the reconstruction of tradition.46 The general focus of this study has been on the ways in which education has shaped Bahraini women’s religious practices, and how women are transitioning from “tradition” to “modernity” or, better put, how they negotiate contemporary life in a rapidly changing and, in many (but not all) ways, modernizing (in the senses that Talal Asad notes) Bahrain. However, this section looks at what many consider to be the core of tradition: the institution of motherhood. Previously, I addressed educated women’s growing role as religious leaders and their activities in a Qur’anic center and in Shi‘i ma’atim. But some women, as everywhere, choose to centralize their domestic roles. Muslim women have gained new textual access to religion, yet some prefer to educate their children religiously through their position as maternal role model, and not to any great extent through textual sources. Of course, some women may choose both or neither. Here, I highlight

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the importance of the home as a traditional site of learning, and of the mother as a traditional conveyer of culture and religion. Having heard that I was interested in the ways in which the rise of modern state-sponsored education has impacted religious practices in Bahrain, Samira noted that regardless of all that, the significance of the Muslim mother and of her conduct within the home cannot be underestimated. She argued, for example, that one can teach a schoolboy or girl Qur’anic verses about stealing, but if the mother does not discipline him or her at home, the child’s schooling will have no effect. Today as in the past, she maintained, the mother is a role model for children. She said that she offers her children a model of proper Islamic behavior by praying, fasting, and teaching them right from wrong. She insisted that home is still the basis for everything, despite any and all external influences; the four walls of the home provide the structure upon which everything is based. She spoke of her mother, Umm Khalid, saying, “She is the center. We all come to her to find out about the other members of the family. We are always all around her, returning to her and visiting her. Don’t discount the mother!” she sternly warned me. Despite her admonition, she then turned to the subject of religious change. She explained that people used to practice religion in a superstitious way, visiting saints’ tombs and other such activities.47 Umm Khalid broke in to say that people were more aware now that these practices were wrong and incorrect. She seemed to be proud that Bahrainis were no longer so superstitious and “behind the times.” Samira mentioned that her sister-in-law had studied religion in Mecca as a visiting student from Bahrain, and I responded that it seemed her sister-in-law was an example of the access that Bahraini women have these days to formal religious studies and texts. She grudgingly agreed, but kept steering the conversation back to the importance of the mother. Finally, I asked Samira which sources she would rely on when instructing her children in religion, and she replied that she herself would give them the basics at home, i.e. the five pillars of Islam. For guidance in other matters she would turn to religious experts like her brother, a part-time imam. The evening ended with Bahraini hospitality: tea, coffee, incense, a delicate application of heavy ‘ud (perfumed

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oil) and a liberal dousing of lighter Western perfumes, before my departure. What was Umm Khalid’s daughter cautioning me about when she told me not to discount the role of the mother? I had focused on Bahraini women’s new literate, educated status, and the ways in which they were involved in religious institutions outside the home. Samira was concerned that I would neglect to mention in my study that the mother and the domestic realm in which she dwells remain the first and primary agent and site of education for Bahraini boys and girls. Her comments regarding the centrality of the mother underscore the weighty value attributed to the maternal role in Bahrain and in the wider Middle East. In Islamic prophetic traditions, the role of the mother has been upheld as worthy of great respect, as the following hadith illustrates: Narrated Abu Huraira: A man came to Allah’s Apostle and said, “O Allah’s Apostle! Who is more entitled to be treated with the best companionship by me?” The Prophet said, “Your mother.” The man said, “Who is next?” The Prophet said, “Your mother.” The man further said, “Who is next?” The Prophet said, “Your mother.” The man asked for the fourth time, “Who is next?” The Prophet said, “Your father.”48 The renewed idealization of the role of mother and homemaker reflects the current political, social and economic situation. In many Middle Eastern countries where Islamic revivalism is predominant, both men and women emphasize the performance of gender roles that are considered, or imagined to be, “traditional.” It has been argued that one reason Islamic revivalism is so popular among women in Bahrain is that in the revivalist paradigm, women are portrayed as the active and crucial saviors of family, culture and religion.49 The mythical ideal of the home as a “woman-tended haven against a heartless world” is a widespread phenomenon that abounds especially during times of rapid social change, as Bahrain has experienced. Those who speak as advocates of a return to the “traditional” family tend to warn of its imminent demise through divorce or as women join the workforce

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and neglect the family.50 Bahrainis are concerned that the institution of motherhood, and ultimately Bahraini culture, are threatened by the reliance on foreign nannies, who are at hand in virtually every middle- and upper-class home in Bahrain. Yet, due to the economic decline and the call for “Bahrainization,” there is more pressure on women to work, and thus to employ childcare providers.51 These competing and contradictory ideals illustrate the societal tension concerning what women should be and do. For example, if women become educated and join the workforce, they can be seen as the salvation of the family and the nation, inasmuch as they earn money in time of need, take jobs that previously went to foreigners, and lend Bahrain a modern face.52 It is ironic that those Bahrainis who have nostalgia for “tradition” conceptualize it as a past in which women remained at home. As noted in chapter 2, Bahrain in fact has a long tradition of women working outside the home, due to the realities of the pearling industry in which men spent weeks at sea, sometimes never to return. Nevertheless, even during the days of pearling, the predominant societal conception of the ideal woman was one who stayed at home and took care of the family. Despite the essentializing tendency to think of the mother as the primary source and conveyer of tradition, culture and religion – an oasis of stability in a world of change – mothers (and everyone else) are influenced by life in the contemporary world, even while transmitting tradition, culture and religion, which are also not static. While the family unit is conceptualized by some as an oasis untouched by change, this idealized construction illustrates the “haven myth.” Umm Khalid’s pride in the “modern” way in which Islam is now practiced in Bahrain – here, by “modern,” I took her to mean reflective of a literate, educated access to religious texts, orthodoxy and orthopraxy – illustrates her own rejection of past practices or “tradition.” Despite her lack of access to formal education (she came of age before widespread public education), she was, of course, also affected by the changing social, economic, political and religious environment in present-day Bahrain. In this case, she was aware of the changing ways in which Islam is viewed in Bahraini society.

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Conversely, the impact of “modernity” on women does not always imply that they will reject what is considered “traditional.” Staying at home is a modern choice among other options for some, but for many it is not economically feasible. While it may be the case that maternity, “traditional” gender roles, and people’s conceptions of tradition are idealized in Bahrain, it is still important to underscore the significance of women’s domestic roles, whether or not they also work outside the home. And while Bahraini children now have access to higher education, it is true that their first teachers are found in the home. Samira described her mother as the embodiment of a family pilgrimage site, a place of return, a font of family knowledge and the living example of correct religious behavior. The mother’s domestic role, in Samira’s view, was more significant in the shaping of Bahraini children than any other single institution, as she suggested when she said that “home is still the basis for everything.” Upholding the pedagogical tools of modeling, discussion and discipline, Samira illustrated the importance she ascribed not only to the maternal role, but also to forms of education that are not necessarily based on literacy. She implied that she relied on her brother, the imam, for specialized questions – most likely questions related to religious texts – but that she was comfortable with all other aspects of instructing her own children. It was clear which of the two roles Samira held to be more important. Moreover, the example of her sister-in-law who had studied religion formally and textually in Saudi Arabia suggests that Samira was aware of alternative options and opportunities now available to women. One could argue that in choosing the domestic role and delegating the role of doctrinal expert to her educated brother, Samira was reinforcing patriarchy and thus ultimately curtailing her own options. In a discussion of the “rational choice” model and the tension between individual versus collective choices, Guity Nashat points out that those Middle Eastern women who have historically chosen to limit their roles to the domestic sphere made rational choices based on the desire to enhance their own well-being and that of their family and community. Despite the fact that this choice ultimately led to the weakening of women’s collective power and their subsequent exploitation,

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this model emphasizes individual agency and the rational basis of the choice.53 Saba Mahmood, in her study of conservative Islamist women’s movements in Cairo, reminds feminist scholars of the Middle East to “keep the meaning of agency open” instead of linking it to “the goals of progressive politics.”54 In Bahrain, as elsewhere, the expansion of women’s roles in the public sphere has not diminished the value placed on the role of homemaker. Currently this role appears to be idealized in Bahrain due to the Islamic resurgence, the greater number of Bahraini women in the workforce, the reliance on foreign nannies, and nostalgic perceptions of the way things used to be. While women have more career options than before, some, like Samira, prefer the domestic role. While they have access to religious texts, some are more comfortable with nontext–based methods of instruction. While they can become religious experts themselves, some prefer the traditional path of deferring to male religious authority.

Conclusion These three women Leila, Nuha and Samira, are grappling with a variety of different concerns. It is not possible to tie their lives together for the purpose of a neat conclusion, and indeed I chose their stories for the very purpose of shedding light on differences and complexity. Nevertheless, there are points of commonality even in such divergent lives. Other than their common gender and Muslim Bahraini identity, all three held strong opinions regarding what Islam is and should be, and spoke of their own potential to play a central role in shaping their society, whether as a Member of Parliament, a newspaper columnist and activist, or a mother. Yet, regardless of the negotiations all three made with religion, their solutions only solved part of a problem, and their stories speak of the limitations that women in Bahrain still face. Leila endeavored to reclaim women’s political participation as Islamically permissible, and yet, to her disappointment, she did not win a seat in the election. She expressed her anger and bitterness toward those who had not supported her or had outright opposed her. Nuha hated

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the idea that religion could be about endlessly regulating women’s lives for ultimately political motives, such as terrorizing young girls into wearing the hijab; she believed that instead religion should be about personal piety. Nevertheless, she continues to write columns and editorials that express her own views and values even as she finds like-minded people fewer and farther in between. However, she still has to deal with those whom she does not see eye to eye with. Samira fervently held that the home and the mother – and not, for example, modern public education – are the primary sources of religious understanding and the foundation of a cultured, religious society. As a mother herself and thus, in this paradigm, a key player in society, she argued that the traditional role of motherhood should be central to any study of women and religion. Yet she might find that her choice to support “tradition” could ultimately undermine her power to make other choices as she entrusts men with making decisions for her. These stories also brought up themes of alienation and marginalization. As a groundbreaking female candidate for national office, Leila attempted to convince voters that it was religiously permissible to vote for a woman, but encountered formidable opposition in competitors who were running on Islamic platforms, and she was not even fully supported by women in general. The liberal, middle-aged columnist Nuha found it hard to relate to those groups of younger women who rejected her brand of secular feminism in favor of a resurgent Islamic feminism. Indeed, her choice of a mixed marriage is itself an enduring public stand against orthodoxy. Unlike Leila or Nuha, Samira was not battling opposing ideologies; indeed, her embrace of motherhood as an institution is hardly controversial in Bahrain (or elsewhere). While not truly alienated, her ardent defense of the mother’s role might reflect some apprehension that the importance of motherhood, and of her own role as a mother, could be ignored or forgotten as Bahrain transforms and as more Bahraini women, mothers and otherwise, join the workforce. What is striking is that all three were able to make the choices they did. Bahrain’s self-presentation is that of a relatively tolerant society. In Saudi Arabia, for example, Leila would not be able to run for office or debate sacred texts in mixed company. Nuha, unveiled, liberal, critical

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and outspoken, would likely encounter greater opposition to her public views. Samira’s choice would hardly be an option at all; very few Saudi women work. These stories highlight a few individual ways in which women manage to maneuver between religion and religious identities and playing a role in modernizing Bahrain. They point out a few of the differences, complexities and unconventionalities in the ways in which women in Bahrain negotiate religion and modernity. Living on the same small island, these three women have very likely met one another socially, or at least walked past one another in the supermarket or the mall. Though each one is an individual, their lives also affect one another’s lives. Bound by location, their stories are woven into the very fabric of Bahrain. The next chapter will carry on with this theme of individual stories, analyzing religion and expatriate life through the stories of one Ethiopian and two Egyptian women residing in Bahrain.

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6 EXPATR IATE MUSLIM WOMEN’S STOR IES ABOUT LIFE AND R ELIGION

As I sat on a bench one day waiting for my children to get out of school, I met a Christian Ethiopian housemaid, Mahdere, who was waiting for her employers’ children as well. Many housemaids provide a myriad of domestic services including childcare. Mahdere lived with the Bahraini family for whom she worked. Thin, awkward, and in her early twenties, it seemed as though her enormous eyes conveyed despair, dimmed hopes of a life beyond housekeeping, and dull patience. She wore a small cross on a chain around her neck and was dressed in a plain skirt and blouse, her hair uncovered. I asked her about her life – she spoke some English but little Arabic – and she told me that in Ethiopia she had been a good student. She had come to Bahrain hoping to make a lot of money and then return to Ethiopia to finish her studies. Instead, she found herself stuck in a low-paying job with little time off and no easy way to get back to Ethiopia. She was also lonely. Female servants in the Gulf sometimes get no day off at all, but as far as I could tell, some are given one day off a week, rarely more. She had little access to other Ethiopians or to potential friends. Mahdere smiled shyly at me, revealing crooked teeth, and said that she missed Ethiopia. Then she abruptly stopped talking and turned back to stare at the ground while she waited. I will return to Mahdere’s story shortly.

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As in the previous chapter, here I focus on individual stories and snapshots of reality. These stories reflect the unique experiences and ideas of expatriate women in Bahrain and shed light on the transformation of religious identity in the greater expatriate community. They also form part of the larger narrative of religious change among women in contemporary Bahrain. The identities, religious and otherwise, of members of the various expatriate communities residing in Bahrain are shaped to varying degrees by their expatriate experience and by the dominant culture of the Bahraini Muslim community. I examine this process through the stories of three female expatriates residing in Bahrain: Mahdere, Hadia and Munira. Mahdere’s story looks at the reasons why a lower-class Ethiopian, Christian, domestic servant would convert to Islam during her employment in Bahrain. Hadia’s story is about navigating religious identity as a middle-class Egyptian Muslim expatriate in Bahrain, while having conflicted feelings toward the dominant Bahraini community and Islam in Bahrain. Munira is an elite, Egyptian, Muslim, Western-educated woman whose story is about finding ways to bypass local Islamic religious options from which she feels alienated, in order to impart Islam to her daughter. In a sense, all three of these stories are about negotiating religion in a new and at times alienating environment. While these three women come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, their embracing some aspect of the Islamic revival facilitated their integration into their adopted home, although the degree to which each found “success” was varied. First, however, I offer context for the various situations of expatriate workers in Bahrain. The discovery of oil, which led to social gains such as education and other forms of modern development, brought a radical increase in the number of immigrant workers, known as expatriates or “expats,” who, at the time of my field research in 2002–3, constituted more than one-third of the population residing in Bahrain.1 The majority of the expatriates are South Asians; also present are Southeast Asians, Arabs, and a small contingent of Europeans and Americans. Approximately half of the expatriate community are Muslims; other religious groups represented include Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is and Buddhists.

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Most expats come to take advantage of the economic opportunities available in Bahrain. Foreign merchants and entrepreneurs have been using the island as a base of operations for centuries, while the petroleum-rich countries of the Gulf have attracted labor since the 1930s, and even more so since the oil boom of the late 1970s which in the petroleum-consuming countries of the West was experienced as the oil crisis, and which led to a worldwide debt crisis. The imposition of structural adjustment programs on states in the developing world spurred an exodus of the unemployed poor, and in recent decades the number of unskilled foreign workers in the Gulf, especially from South Asia, has increased exponentially. Andrew Gardner, who carried out a study of Indian migrants in Bahrain, notes that, “‘Behind them,’ as the Indian transmigrants say, are spouses, children, parents, siblings and debt.”2 The same is true of most lower-class foreign workers in Bahrain. What migrant workers have in common is that when they enter Bahrain they enter into the kafala (sponsorship) system. Each expatriate worker has a Bahraini sponsor (kafeel) who is either a corporate entity or an individual. The kafeel creates the work contract and carries out other bureaucratic tasks involving the migrant’s legal status. The worker is then bound to a particular job and is not free to switch jobs unless allowed to do so by the kafeel.3 Expatriate workers are in a position of vulnerable subordination to their Bahraini hosts. Bahrainization policies further destabilize their job security. What female expatriate workers have in common is that they have to deal with the dual yoke of the kafala system and the patriarchal system. Expatriates can apply for citizenship but they will have to wait for many years, demonstrate facility in Arabic, and pay a large fee. Those who apply are rarely migrant workers; more typically they are professionals and business people who may have settled their families in Bahrain.4 One of my daughter’s teachers, an Indian immigrant, hosted a luncheon at her home in honor of a visiting guru. As we ate I took the opportunity to ask her how she felt about living in Bahrain as an Indian and the fact that immigrants to Bahrain must demonstrate 25 years’ residence (or 15 years for those of Arab descent) as a minimum requirement for naturalization. Her sincere response was that

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she appreciated the tolerant atmosphere in Bahrain and that she was able to practice Hinduism without discrimination. As for the long wait for citizenship, she said, “It is their country. It is understood that we are here to earn.” Expatriate experiences in Bahrain vary depending on factors such as class, race, vocation and the stability of the expat’s country of origin. Some people shared with me their feelings of good fortune in being able to work in Bahrain; I met others living in abject conditions with lives akin to slavery.

Mahdere Earlier I described Mahdere and how I met her. I saw Mahdere every school day and greeted her, but there was not a wealth of potentially upbeat subjects of conversation on which I could draw in getting to know her further. She always sat stiffly by herself; housemaids did not socialize as equals with Bahraini mothers likewise awaiting children, and I never saw another Ethiopian housemaid there with whom Mahdere might have chatted. I felt sad that she seemed so lonely and miserable. One Bahraini acquaintance told me that housemaids are not given time off because it is feared they will get into “trouble,” i.e. pregnant, if they are allowed to go out unescorted. Female foreign workers resent the presumption that they are sexually promiscuous: one Filipina who worked at Seattle’s Best Coffee in Manama angrily told me that when Bahrainis see her casually talking with a male coworker, they assume the two are lovers. One day Mahdere turned up wearing a beige hijab. Surprised, I asked her if she had converted to Islam, and she nodded silently. I wondered what had compelled her to do so, and at the risk of appearing nosy and impolite, I inquired further. She disclosed that her employers had encouraged her to convert, then pressed her lips together, looked uncomfortable and said no more. While I was at Umm al-Darda’, the center for Qur’anic learning examined in chapter 4, I observed a class of ten or more newly converted Filipina housemaids employed by members of the royal family practicing their recitations. Conversion itself is not uncommon in Bahrain; however, it is rumored that many housemaids in the Gulf convert in order to gain such benefits as higher

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pay and greater regard from their employers, though I assume that for some, their conversion to Islam is sincere. In fact, while most Bahrainis have housemaids who help with the children, many complain that there is a danger in allowing foreign women to raise Bahraini children.5 The fear is that foreign nannies will not be able to impart Bahraini culture and Islamic values. This way of thinking vilifies those non-Bahraini female domestic workers who are thought to be threatening the minds of Bahraini children, and idealizes Bahraini mothers as pious transmitters of culture and values. It also creates an atmosphere in which conversion to Islam on the part of a foreign, non-Muslim nanny boosts her status, at least a little, in the family for which she works. Although I do not know more about Mahdere’s particular situation, conditions for low-skilled foreign workers in Bahrain are dire, and the housemaid situation is rife with abuse. They sign contracts with recruitment agencies in their countries of origin, and upon arrival in Bahrain they are sometimes forced to sign new and less favorable contracts. Their passports are retained by the kafeel or the employer, and victims of mistreatment can expect no assistance from the government of Bahrain.6 Domestic servants have complained of sexual abuse at the hands of their employers, little or no free time, and exploitative working conditions.7 There are reports that they are forced to fast during the month of Ramadan even when they are not Muslim.8 While I have seen domestic servants in Bahrain living in relatively pleasant conditions, I have also seen situations where the housemaid slept in a closet or on the kitchen floor. One housemaid from Indonesia, whose bedroom was literally a closet under a staircase, decorated the walls of her little space with pictures torn from a magazine. She talked to me about missing home and the child she had left there. She could not bring her daughter with her to Bahrain – had she done so, she would not have been hired as a domestic worker – and if she had remained in Indonesia, she would have been unable to feed her child. When I asked her why she did not try to go back now, she looked at me blankly as if I were incapable of understanding her. Once, on a particularly hot day when I was with my children at the pool, I witnessed another young Indonesian housemaid staring with

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longing at the cool sparkling water, her face moist and beaded with sweat. Fully dressed, she suddenly grinned wildly and jumped in, only to be pulled out dripping, moments later, by her screaming, furious employer who slapped her in the face several times. Sometimes, when a domestic servant escapes, she finds that she is in debt to her employer, without a passport, and unable to leave the country. Some are forced or turn in desperation to prostitution. Bahrain is a destination and transit country for human trafficking, especially from countries such as Ethiopia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Russia and Ukraine.9 Up to 40 percent of the suicide cases handled by government hospitals are expatriate housemaids.10 Mahdere’s conversion to Islam, whether coerced, pressured, inspired by piety, or strategic move, is the product of an environment in which Islam is the religion of authority and prestige, practiced by those in control of her fate. It is likely that her conversion had much to do with unequal relations of power: isolated, lonely and vulnerable in every way, her actions may have created a link between herself and her employers. It is not clear what Mahdere and other expatriates who convert stand to gain from their conversion in the long term. I wondered if she would receive better treatment from her employers and from the greater Bahraini Muslim community, and how her family would accept her conversion if she were ever able to return to Ethiopia.

Hadia In her late thirties and professionally trained as an interior decorator, Hadia had lived in Bahrain with her husband and three children for 12 years. I met her too at my children’s school, and one day her daughter invited my daughter to visit. In order to make the arrangements, I went to meet Hadia who was sitting in her car. In this public locale, she was wearing jeans, a blouse, a headscarf and large sunglasses – and not an abaya – and I realized that she was not Bahraini but Egyptian. She vociferously insisted that I allow my daughter to stay the night, that her house was big enough for an extra person, and that she had everything needed for the sleepover. Afterwards, she told me that we were now good friends and that she would also visit me soon. We did visit each

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other often, and we even took an aerobics class together. If I did not telephone her frequently she would ask me why I forgot her so easily. Expatriates’ notions of religious identity are molded by their experiences living in Bahrain as transplanted minorities among the dominant group. I got the feeling that Hadia felt simultaneously resentful of and awed by the Bahrainis, analogous to minorities (or functional minorities) anywhere who must contend with their position vis-à-vis the dominant group. This love/hate relationship caused her to reassess and redefine her own religious values; yet from her statements it became clear that the contradictions in her attitude toward the native population reflected her conflicted feelings of religious identity. Hadia worked as an art teacher for a while, and when she quit she complained bitterly that Egyptians were treated like third-class citizens in Bahrain. She said that she and the other Egyptian teachers were paid far less than the American and Canadian teachers, even when they were doing the same job. This might have been due to the need for native-English–speaking staff, since the school in question was an American school offering Bahraini children an American curriculum. On the other hand, Bahraini society very much appears to be a tiered structure, with Bahrainis at the top, Westerners next, nonBahraini Arabs following, and non-Arab, non-Western foreigners at the bottom. I was told by acquaintances that the ethnicity of a housemaid determined her pay. Filipinas, for example, were paid at a higher rate than Ethiopians. Hadia was irritated by the blatant inequity of this structure, although that did not prevent her from overworking her own foreign housemaid. At the same time, Hadia was grateful to have the opportunity to live and work in Bahrain because, regardless of the inequity, the standard of living she enjoyed there was higher than what she would have had in Egypt. Obviously, she had mixed feelings about Bahrain, as did many others who came to the country for employment. In many cases, while benefiting materially in Bahrain, they found themselves, as foreigners, in a submissive position in relation to native Bahrainis. While, on the one hand, her husband was in the process of applying for Bahraini citizenship, on the other hand, she insisted that she would never give up her Egyptian citizenship. She often told me that it was

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a travesty that I had never been to Egypt, “Umm al-dunya” (Mother of the World), whose historical and cultural contributions to humanity, she argued, far outstripped anything the Gulf could offer. Yet, when I asked her about religion, what she said again reflected the tension in her sense of identity. She swung back and forth between expressions of praise and suspicion. She spoke of her admiration for the Bahrainis. She approved of the organized way in which Islam was taught in the schools and religious centers, and she commended the local culture in general, which she found to be more Islamic than that in Egypt. She said, I didn’t learn a lot about religion [in Egypt] at all – only at school. It isn’t a religious atmosphere. My parents prayed and fasted, nothing big. I changed a lot when I came here. I started taking care of religious things here because it’s a good atmosphere: no one lies, cheats or backbites. In Egypt, you’re a liar until proven otherwise; in Bahrain, you’re honest until proven otherwise. Maybe that’s because there are no problems here. They teach us how to practice correctly. The Bahrainis practice Islam more correctly than the Egyptians do. In Egypt, religious teaching is very weak. There’s a big Islamic base here. You know, I didn’t even get much religious education to give to my kids in Egypt. Here, I’m going to put them in centers to learn the Qur’an, to read it correctly, to learn how to pray and to learn the stories about the Prophets. They need the basics, which I missed. Although Hadia credits the Bahrainis with possessing a large “Islamic base” and organized methods of teaching Islam, she did not mention any of Egypt’s large and famous religious institutions, such as Al-Azhar University. However, she did admit that nowadays in Egypt many people, including most of her friends, were also becoming more focused on piety. She mentioned the popularity of the religious TV show featuring the televangelist and motivational speaker Amr Khaled.11 Regardless of Egypt’s changing religious scene, Hadia certainly seemed to be more impressed by the religious atmosphere in Bahrain. There are several reasons why Hadia might consider the Bahrainis to be more religious than the Egyptians. First, she seemed to have

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internalized Bahrain’s hierarchical structure. Living there as a guest, she was constantly faced with the contrast between the wealthier, dominant native Bahraini community and her own situation. There is some mixing between the native and the expatriate communities, but it is not commonplace. One study of Kuwaiti society described the natives as “closed and exclusive,” which could just as easily apply to Bahraini natives vis-à-vis the expatriate population.12 Bahrainis tend to socialize with other Bahrainis. There are reminders of the higher social status of Bahrainis everywhere. While most employees in administrative positions are Bahraini, workers in shops, restaurants, service and manual labor positions tend to be non-Bahraini. While many Bahrainis (especially Sunnis) live in large fancy homes, Hadia and many non-Western expatriates live in apartments. Even the distinctive appearance of Bahrainis in their flowing black or white robes signals status. After living in the Gulf for some time, Hadia was likely simultaneously annoyed by the discrimination she experienced and impressed by those in power and their material possessions. Her assumptions regarding the superiority of their religious practices might be informed by that fact that, as the dominant, more powerful group, they seem to be doing better than other groups in a multitude of ways. A second reason for which Hadia might consider the Bahrainis to be particularly pious has to do with clothing. The apparel worn by most Bahrainis conveys an Islamic identity; wearing jeans does not communicate piety in the same way that wearing an abaya does. Ahn Nga Longva notes that traditional Gulf attire signals differentiation and exclusivity as well as power, privilege and prestige. Clothing in the Gulf is a clear way of establishing ethnic identity, but it can also symbolize religious hierarchy, especially among women, and according to Longva, the abaya connotes a “monopoly on sexual morality.”13 The women of expatriate communities, Muslim and otherwise, do not typically don these outfits, although in some cases a female convert will adopt the abaya. Bahraini women in general are more secluded than their expatriate counterparts. Many expatriate women take on jobs that Bahraini women would be less likely to want, such as in restaurants, hotels, malls and airlines, and domestic service. This dichotomy creates the appearance on the part of the abaya-clad Bahraini female of

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greater adherence to a “traditional,” more pious, and ultimately more Islamic lifestyle, as Longva suggests. Finally, differences between Egyptian and Bahraini culture likely informed Hadia’s comments. An anthropologist who conducted research among women in both Egypt and Oman observed that Omanis, in comparison, seemed polite and reserved, while Egyptians were much less formal.14 While generalizations are of limited value, it does seem true that a calm, reserved and polite demeanor characterizes the outward appearance of social behavior in Bahrain, as in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula (where Oman is located). This public “face” of politeness and reserve is hard to miss in Bahrain. Gossiping (backbiting) is frowned upon, as Hadia noted when she said that “no one lies, cheats or backbites.” This is not to say that no Bahraini does such things, but rather that Bahraini culture places a high value on a certain style of interaction, especially in the public realm. This cultural makeup also likely added to Hadia’s overall impression that Bahrainis are more religious than are Egyptians. On the other hand, without acknowledging any incongruity, Hadia made seemingly contradictory statements that pointed to a degree of doubt regarding this outward appearance of Bahraini religiosity. After stating, “In Egypt, you’re a liar until proven otherwise; in Bahrain, you’re honest until proven otherwise,” she then added, “Maybe that’s because there are no problems here.” She seemed to be implying that the reason Bahrainis could be so honest was that they had certain advantages, the first and foremost being wealth. In her view, this quality of honesty could be attributed to the lack of “problems” and was not necessarily an intrinsic aspect of Bahraini character. Although she did not bring it up during this particular conversation, Bahrain does in fact have its share of problems such as those experienced by the Shi‘i community. Hadia also believed that rich people in general (whether in Egypt or in Bahrain) affect piety in order to parade their good values and stay in style: I think life’s problems make people feel like they have to pray. They feel hopeless now, it’s a very bad life [in Egypt]. Every woman tells her child to pray when there are problems. Maybe

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now it’s just the fashion to pray. Like displaying moral values. When even the rich pray, it’s for fashion, for show. It’s to have a “new look.” For a long time they wore dresses and tight things, and now they have changed their style. Stated differently, poor people pray because they have problems, while rich people pray only when it is in style. When Hadia spoke of prayer being in style, she was probably referring to the spread of Islamic revivalism over the past few decades in the Middle East, which was initially a lower- and middle-class phenomenon, but indeed later came to include some in the upper classes.15 Clearly, the social environment in Bahrain appears to be more pious than it did in the 1970s when many Bahraini women wore mini-skirts in the suq, which is a rarity today even among the wealthy, observant or not. In a sense, it is in style to be religious; there is social pressure to appear more indigenous and Islamic. While there are many factors behind this social pressure, such as the political climate, Hadia was nonetheless cynical regarding the authenticity of the piety of those who appeared to have “no problems.” By extension this applies to Bahrainis who, in contrast to expatriates, are generally of a higher socio economic status and to whom she referred as having “no problems.” This mixed bag of feelings regarding religious identity, which included admiration, resentment, suspicion and doubt, colored Hadia’s own approach to religion. On the one hand, she “started taking care of religious things here” and she wanted to enroll her children in Bahraini religious institutions. Being in Bahrain had made her more interested in religion. On the other hand, she had also become resentful and cynical. These feelings had caused her to be more aware of the ways in which she differs from the dominant group; however, placing her children in Bahraini religious institutions could be a way to begin to assimilate with the larger Bahraini community, given that her children were ineligible to attend Bahraini public schools. She defined her own religious approach, somewhat defensively, in contrast to Bahraini religious behavior: I pray. I feel my dress isn’t related to my inner religion. I respect myself. What if I wore an abaya and still did bad things? What

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if I went to a Qur’anic center and still did bad things? I like Islam because I like God, not so that I can make a big show [by wearing an abaya]. The Prophet said al-taqwa (piety) is in the heart. Some wear the abaya and then go out on dates with men. I’m true inside of me. Hadia’s contention that internal piety is more important than external display suggests her individualistic approach to religion, which might be a symptom of displacement, of feeling as though she did not quite fit into any one group and thus found little meaning in mimicking one. Living in Bahrain had isolated her somewhat from Egyptian religious life, although certainly not completely, given the presence of other Egyptian expatriates and the pervasiveness of Egyptian TV shows on Bahrain’s airwaves. Hadia likely consciously or subconsciously realized the limitations or the futility of fully adopting Bahraini behaviors: she would always be an Egyptian and thus occupy a relatively low position in the hierarchy, at least in the eyes of Bahrainis. In the sense that the Islamic resurgence in Bahrain is a national phenomenon, shaped by Bahraini culture, history and traditions, Hadia probably felt somewhat alienated from the symbols of its manifestation at the local level. (While it is true that there is some expatriate involvement in institutions linked to the Bahraini Islamic resurgence, this involvement is minimal.) Hadia’s comments were also a jab at those who feign their piety, those who “wear the abaya and still do bad things.” In rejecting the outward manifestations of religion which some Bahrainis have embraced, she was expressing her own values. Nonetheless, she expressed them in contradistinction to those of the dominant group. Hadia’s experiences constitute one individual’s response to the expatriate situation as regards religious identity. However, conflicting feelings concerning the dominant group are common among expatriates. I observed a variety of reactions to Bahraini dominance. I noticed that British and American expatriates tended to celebrate Christian and Western secular holidays with enormous enthusiasm; I have never been invited to as many Western holiday parties as I was in Bahrain. This emphasis on holiday ritual, or the performance of communal

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identity, is also a reaction to the dominant group. Performing one’s communal identity becomes more important when one is abroad than when one is at home; it is a means of defining and maintaining communal identity (and not losing it) while in a minority position surrounded by others. Hadia’s comments reveal her contradictory feelings regarding identity and religion. On the one hand, she admires the Bahrainis for their self-presentation; on the other hand, she implies that this presentation is only possible because Bahrainis are advantaged. Moreover, it might be all for show. Her statements highlight issues that arise in the shaping of religious identity among non-natives in Bahrain, such as the ambivalent attitude toward the dominant class. Hadia’s position as an expatriate in Bahrain compelled her to define and defend her religious approach, but this approach was also influenced by her experiences within the tiered structure of Bahraini society and the limitations, or the “glass ceiling,” inherent in this structure.

Munira The desire to participate in the global market has created a greater demand in Bahrain and the Gulf region, among those who can afford it, for private schools that offer a curriculum in English. The Saudi scholar Mai Yamani writes, “Proficiency in spoken and written English becomes a status symbol, a marker for the ability to obtain private education and to travel abroad, and a sign of a cosmopolitan lifestyle.”16 Clearly, private school education and the fluency in English associated with it both signal high-class status and internationalism. Along with preparing students for competition in the predominantly Englishlanguage business milieu, the inevitable process of acculturation that occurs within those schools takes a toll on any unified sense of Bahraini or Middle Eastern identity. The ensuing culture clash, created when privileged, Westernized, Middle Eastern youth leave school and join their broader communities, has caused social and religious alienation. Although the following story is about an expatriate, some of her experiences likely parallel those of “internationalized” Bahraini students who have attended private American and British schools. In 2004, out of

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Bahrain’s 230 elementary schools, 42 (more than 18 percent) were private and 188 were public.17 Among Bahrain’s private schools, several employed an American-style or a British-style curriculum. Other private schools cater to other non-Western expatriate communities such as Indian, Filipino, Pakistani, etc., but Bahrainis (and other Arabs) would be unlikely to place their children in these schools. I turn now to Munira, an expatriate schoolteacher in Bahrain. Truly international, of Libyan, Egyptian and Palestinian descent, she was born in Lebanon but had lived in London, Greece, Egypt, Dubai and finally Bahrain where she now lived with her Egyptian husband and their little girl. Slender, pretty, and in her late twenties when we met, Munira was unveiled. Wearing fashionable, casual Western clothes, she looked like an American graduate student. She wanted to talk to me about her dislike of religious conservatives and the difficult time she was having in the Bahraini environment finding appropriate ways to teach Islam to her young daughter. The ways in which she reconciled these feelings of religious alienation offer an example of the types of solutions devised by those who, like Munira, are dealing with the frustrations caused by being ethnically Arab yet culturally Westernized. Munira’s problems came to a head when she was 15 years old and her older sister died. At the time, she was attending a posh American (or British) school in Greece. In grief – her mother would not speak of the death for some time – and for financial reasons, her parents suddenly moved to Egypt, where her paternal grandmother lived, and placed Munira in an all-girls Egyptian public school. The school was inferior to her Greek private school, but the greater predicament she faced was that, because of her English-based private education, she had never learned to read and write in Arabic, despite being an Arab and residing in the Middle East. Before moving to Egypt, she had spoken Arabic at home with her parents but carried out all of her academic work in English. She remembered that in Egypt her Arabic teacher used to ask in astonishment, “Are you kidding? Why can’t you write in Arabic?” Eventually, Munira’s parents had to hire tutors and she began the process of trying to assimilate academically with her Egyptian peers.

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Not only was Munira unable to write in Arabic, and as a result stigmatized in her Egyptian school, but she had trouble fitting into Egyptian and later Bahraini society. From an intellectual upper-class family (before their financial crash) and educated up to the age of 15 in a Western-style private school, she felt at odds with the Islamic resurgence; its goals did not resonate with her. Those who, like Munira, are economically or culturally connected to the power elite have had less reason to organize against it. In Munira’s case, one could argue that, as an Arab expatriate in Bahrain, she (like Hadia) was excluded from the upper rungs of Bahraini society and was therefore not among the “elite.” In a sense, that is true. Like Hadia, she was paid less than American and British expatriates were paid for the same work. She socialized primarily with other expatriates in Bahrain. However, as part of the wider international intellectual and cosmopolitan elite, her status in some ways transcended the usual categorization. Nonetheless, her sense of identification with that elite group was likely the catalyst in the formation of her feelings of alienation from the Islamic resurgence. Her expatriate status, as in the case of Hadia, probably augmented these feelings of alienation. Yet even the elite have felt pressured to perform religious observance, despite the middle-class origins of the Islamic movement. In Munira’s case, her religious practices varied from time to time, and for a while in Egypt she had had a few boyfriends which had made her a victim of gossip. She said, “Other people were talking about me in a terrible way.” She described the religious “waves” she had gone through in Egypt where she had begun to practice Islam, initially because of her own interest, but ultimately in response to constant peer pressure. Though Muslim, she did not like what she considered to be the endless, pointless and hypocritical rules of dress and conduct that the newly conservative Islamists were promoting. On the other hand, she found it hard to “swim upstream,” dressing and behaving differently from the majority. She struggled with her religious identity: she wanted to practice Islam, but in her own way. Munira described a confrontation she had had one day as a teenager in Egypt which illustrated her feelings of alienation: on a sweltering day, she was wearing shorts, and she was admonished for her immodesty by an Egyptian male who was unknown to her.

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When it’s boiling hot, why the hell would you wear long pants? I was into shorts in June and July. One time when I was in Alexandria, a man said, “You think you’re in Holland, walla eh (or what)?” I got angry but my parents said, “It’s OK . . . .” That got on my nerves, but I started wearing long pants. I got more conservative because I can’t deal with that kind of thing. Society conformed me. The man’s accusation, “You think you’re in Holland,” illustrates the nature of the conflict which was rooted in deeply held differences regarding culture. Seeing an Arab girl dressed like a European seems to have infuriated the man, and he likely felt that her breach of propriety reflected a lack of allegiance to what he held dear. It was almost as if he had said, “Are you not Arab? Are you not Egyptian? Are you not Muslim?” To him, these identities were linked with a certain style of dress. As an Arab male, he probably also felt that he had the right and the duty to supervise her behavior. Munira, on the other hand, had grown accustomed to a degree of freedom in her dress because of her international background and private school experience. Wearing long pants in the sweltering heat simply seemed nonsensical. Unfortunately for her, the pressure created by this and other cultural struggles was effective in curtailing her behavior but left her feeling resentful. Similarly, while fondly reminiscing about her grandmother’s religious instruction, Munira recounted how her grandmother, her mother and she herself disliked wearing the veil: My grandmother taught me how to pray, make du‘a’ (personal prayers), salat (ritual prayers). I used to love my grandmother’s teachings, they were very, very nice. She got veiled late in life, in 1992. My grandfather pressured her. She called it “the monkey on my head.” I knew it was part of my religion, but I have problems with the heat and the physical discomfort of it. My mother is very academic, she’s into reason and she questions everything. She has issues with the veil, and with the four-wife thing. I have problems with those things too.

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All three generations had problems with the dictates of the Islamic revivalists. Even the grandmother’s religious devotion did not inspire her to adopt the dress of the resurgence, an indication of her own disaffection with it. While class, cultural and ideological distinctions do exist, they are neither completely isolating nor are they set in stone. Munira’s similarly educated brother, who was also living in Bahrain, became involved in the Islamic resurgence despite his family background. He married a strict adherent, which led to further incidents at the domestic level in which Munira was forced to cope with her discomfort regarding religious orthodoxy. Her exasperation was palpable: My brother became religious and married a Ninja. She’s wonderful, she’s beautiful, but look, I want to tell her, “You’re not that beautiful.” It annoys me. When I go to her house I have to go to the dungeon [i.e. a separate room for women]. We go into the bedroom to eat lunch. OK, I have a question: explain the niqab (face veil). When you go to hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) – the most holy center of Islam – you can’t wear it there. So what sense does that make [to wear it anywhere else]? Unmistakably, Munira’s confrontations with her sister-in-law left her feeling frustrated by resurgent practices regarding women’s dress and gender segregation. She referred to her as a “Ninja,” which is a derogatory term for a religiously observant woman who wears full Islamic garb including the face veil, a costume that some liken to that of a Ninja warrior. Angry that she was banished to the bedroom, where there were no table or chairs, to eat lunch with the other women in seclusion from the men, she referred to the bedroom as the “dungeon.” Munira also spoke of her discomfort with local Islamic educators. Once she had hired a teacher to give her religious instruction, but dismissed him after one class because he focused solely on memorization, whereas she wanted to spend more time discussing and analyzing religion. Even at the school where she taught, which offered the American curriculum in English, primarily to Bahraini children, she

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was confronted with what she considered inept methods of teaching Islam. She said, First of all, religious educators suck. They ignore important issues. Yesterday, [a male teacher] was blasting a tape and it was so painful. The tape was saying that jeans were haram (religiously forbidden), and your jeans will get squeezed through your nose if you’re not veiled. The kids came to me afterwards – they were so scared! Nor did she feel altogether comfortable visiting a mosque. She complained, Another thing that pisses me off: I can’t go to a mosque and ask a sheikh [about a religious question]. They make me feel uncomfortable. It’s considered “preferable” for women to pray at home. There should be easy access to knowledge, but there isn’t. Mosque visiting is primarily a male activity in Bahrain; women do attend, but in far fewer numbers. Despite feeling religiously alienated, Munira’s desire to teach her daughter about Islam compelled her to search for an alternative. Clearly, the local options were unacceptable to her. Instead, she found a technological solution in a software program called The Alim, advertised as “the world’s most useful Islamic software.” Designed for Microsoft Windows and produced in the USA, it offers both English and Arabic script. Here Munira was able to get the material she needed, in the language she read most fluently. Ironically, in Munira’s case, that of an elite Egyptian residing in Bahrain, modernity and education ultimately led her to use Islamic religious material – also a product of the larger Islamic revival – that was made in America and cast in English. She is not alone: there is a trend, supported by new technology, to bypass or supplement local religious authorities with new alternatives. The potential of technology to serve as an agent of religious transformation is exemplified by the role that audiocassettes played in the

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period leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when those disenchanted with the religious elite began to buy cassettes of taped sermons from alternative preachers, such as Khomeini, whose views were akin to theirs.18 These tapes made it possible for Iranians of differing socioeconomic backgrounds to obtain religious education and thus decreased their reliance on official religious authorities. New uses of technology have also reduced male monopolization of religious expertise. Cassette sermons by women preachers began to be distributed in the 1990s.19 Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the Internet will lead to an Islamic “sexual reformation.”20 The multitude of options now available also weakens dependency on regional institutions. Some have argued that the use of the Internet and new communications technology threatens the concept of nationalism and instead fosters transnational identities and internationalism. However, this does not necessarily imply a rejection of tradition or indigenous and regional structures, but rather a greater freedom to choose. Both those promoting the Islamic resurgence and those seeking alternatives to it use the Internet. Mazrui and Mazrui discuss the new possibilities that the use of the Internet offers for forging a “creative synthesis” of old and new value systems.21 People are no longer limited to local religious options. Anyone who has access to a computer can spend endless hours researching Islamic issues on the Internet. One can find the Qur’an and Hadith online, as well as websites where one can email a personal religious question to a sheikh and get a response. There are search engines that locate mosques in any country and list prayer times in every time zone. Innumerable articles discuss aspects of Islam, and chatrooms for Muslims offer opportunities to talk to other Muslims in almost every country. While browsing, it becomes readily apparent that the Internet has provided a new forum in which the struggle over what Islam should be is fiercely debated, and ultimately that anyone searching for support or information regarding their own vision of religion will most likely find it. Modern technology has allowed Munira and others like her to retain a sense of Islamic identity despite their feelings of alienation from the ways in which Islam is manifested at the local level. She can

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study Islam, be it via the Internet or other forms of technology, and make decisions on how to present it to her daughter without having to interact solely with those whose methods she finds nonsensical. On the other hand, she still lives in Bahrain among people involved in the Islamic resurgence, she still has to spend time with her brother and his wife, and most likely she still overhears sermons about things like jeans being squeezed through noses. Despite having access to instant international communications, she still physically resides in a single geographical location. Munira’s story exemplifies the ways in which new advances in technology have impacted religious practices; it also illustrates the types of practices and some of the factors that can create a market for these advances. The use of technology for Islamic instruction has become popular, and not only among those who, like Munira, seek alternatives to local options, but for a wide range of purposes. Technology has had a profound effect on religion. It has weakened dependence on religious experts and thus fostered egalitarianism in religious authority. It has strengthened international connections at the cost of regional authority. Finally, it has provided people with new religious options. Yet, while it solved Munira’s immediate problem concerning Islamic instruction for her daughter, there is no guarantee that it will resolve the greater problem of culture clash and alienation created by class differences and the variety of educational options in Bahrain and the Middle East.

Conclusion All three women discussed here were living as outsiders in Bahrain, although with vastly different experiences related to their outsider status. Nevertheless, they all had to deal with feelings of displacement and with other alienating aspects of life in Bahrain. They all devised coping strategies for these tensions and went through different sorts of religious transformation, shaped by their experiences as expatriates in Bahrain. Mahdere’s life and the lives of many other domestic servants in Bahrain are not far from bonded servitude, although for those fleeing

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poverty, famine or civil war in their homeland, this life might be preferable to life back home. Working under the kafala system, these women are “guests” in Bahrain. As someone once told me, a guest is the victim of his host. This is true in Bahrain, and while some expatriates willingly accept their subordinate status in order to get a chance of financial gain, for others like Mahdere, life, despite offering a small degree of self-determination, seems bleak. As far as I could peer into the window of Mahdere’s life, she was unable to have much of a social life or to recreate her national community on a smaller scale in Bahrain, as were other expatriates who had more free time. Lonely and isolated, she converted to the religion of her employers and of the dominant group in Bahrain, despite the fact that they gave her no time off, and despite missing her family in Ethiopia and wishing to return to her studies. Why? I can only surmise that, one way or another, she felt that converting to Islam would improve her present circumstances. Perhaps her employers would be happier with her, perhaps they would give her a day off now and then, perhaps she would feel part of the larger community. In any case, conversion appears to have been a coping strategy on Mahdere’s part, an aid to integration. Like Mahdere, Hadia found a glass ceiling in place that prevented her from ever achieving equal status with native Bahrainis. She was not paid the same as a Bahraini or even an American was for the same work at the same school. She too missed home, but she was able to make many Egyptian friends in Bahrain since she had a better job and more free time than Mahdere did. The fact that she both admired and looked askance at the dominant values of the indigenous population forced her to reshape her sense of self and her religious identity. Her strategy was to turn toward inner piety, perhaps because on some level she knew she would never be fully accepted into Bahraini society, no matter what she did. She also planned to place her children in Bahraini religious instructional centers which might help her family, or at least her children, come into contact with members of the dominant community. Yet, as long as I knew Hadia, she never fully resolved her mixed bag of feelings regarding religion and Bahraini society.

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Cosmopolitan Munira was not conflicted, like Hadia was, vis-à-vis conservatives; rather, she was in a state of perpetual irritation with them, aggravated by the fact that her new in-laws were conservatives. Like Mahdere and Hadia, she was displaced, but she seemed used to it, perhaps because she had already lived in so many different places. As she entered marriage and parenthood, she wanted to practice Islam and impart it to her daughter, yet she felt absolutely alienated from others who were practicing and teaching Islam in her environment. She managed to find a way to navigate around the local religious authorities by using technology. Despite finding these different ways to negotiate religion and identity in Bahrain, these three women nevertheless encountered limits to the success of their strategies. Mahdere remained a domestic servant, and conversion did not give her back any semblance of her life as a student in Ethiopia, at least during my stay. Hadia remained displaced and conflicted. Munira could not really escape being surrounded by religious conservatives in Bahrain. Yet the stories of these three women reflect degrees of agentic behavior, and they shed light on how religion plays a role in the lives of expatriate women in Bahrain, and how they navigate religion in order to assimilate. The dominant group uses religion – and religious symbols such as the abaya – to mark their own dominant status, and some expatriates internalize this hegemonic paradigm. However, religion is also a means by which the subordinate group can try to influence the dominant group. Through conversion or other outward displays of pious behavior, such as attendance at religious institutions, expatriates can hope to achieve a boost in status if not parity with Bahrainis. Along with the diversity already present among the indigenous Bahraini population, the global expatriate community, from different classes, ethnicities and educational systems, together create an environment in which Islam can serve as a force of both social division and social cohesion. Religion is a tool used by those Bahrainis in power to maintain power, and by those expatriates marginalized from power to gain power. In the previous chapter I examined the stories of three Bahraini women, and I concluded by noting that their lives, though different, were intertwined. Of course, this is true of all six women highlighted in both chapters, natives of

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Bahrain and expatriates, who all live on the same small island. The lives of the native population are also shaped by the foreigners working in their homes and institutions. In the next chapter, I offer a few thoughts in conclusion of this study of Islam and women in contemporary Bahrain.

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7 THINKING BIG

The first step is to believe in change. Myself, even though I am only one person, and even if no one listens to me, all my actions affect everything that I do. I believe that one should be calm, find inner peace, and then one can achieve great change. I started to think not just locally but rather globally. When someone cries in Nigeria I should feel responsible, not in a guilty way, but in a helpful way. We can achieve great changes, first in the family, then in the community, and finally at the international level. (Zahra, the leader of a prominent women’s group in Bahrain) Enthusiastic optimism about the future of Bahrain was a recurring theme in my discussions with women there, both during interviews and in conversations with friends and acquaintances. Perhaps that was because I arrived in Bahrain in the year of the groundbreaking elections and many women – voting for the first time – felt as though they were actively involved in shaping their country, be it politically, socially or religiously. Whether discussing the role of the ma’tam with Shi‘i women, or of Umm al-Darda’ with Sunni women, or simply the role of Islam in the lives of individual women, I found that many Bahraini women were actively participating in self-improvement and improving their external worlds through religious contexts. This was combined with underlying political tension: some in the Shi‘i community felt increasingly frustrated by their marginalized status despite

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the elections, while the pending war in nearby Iraq created a general environment of anger and anxiety. Those moods shaped and informed this study. Many in the West might look at a group of young abaya-clad Bahraini women and imagine them to be cloaked in oppressive monolithic tradition, moving backwards through time, ideologically homogeneous and perhaps even somewhat frightening. I found this picture to be far from accurate: while most Bahraini women wear the abaya, they do so for a multitude of reasons. Their varied religious beliefs and practices reflect the diverse and changing concerns of this newly educated generation. Many women spoke of becoming more knowledgeable about religion and religious texts than they or their mothers had ever been. Many also spoke of seeking to understand and practice religion in “modern,” “rational” ways that could be applied to every aspect of their lives. Other women might outwardly appear to be pious, but actually wear the abaya for political reasons, or perhaps just to fashionably fit in – abayas come in a range of changing styles.1 What might at first glance appear regressive to a Westerner should be understood as reflecting a synthesis of religion with modern education and subsequent political awareness, and a complex negotiation of modernity and globalization. Looking back to understand the choices that women in Bahrain have made, it is evident that the country has gone through a multitude of changes in the last century. In just a few decades it transitioned from an economy based on pearling and agriculture to one with much more income and cash flow stemming from the discovery of oil in 1932, and today it is a wealthy international banking and financial center. Bahrain transitioned from a tribal society to a constitutional monarchy. While the most powerful tribe still rules, the government has begun to allow a degree of political participation which might help satisfy its critics and appease the majority Shi‘i population. There is a large expatriate community which heightens the cosmopolitan atmosphere but also causes resentment among Bahraini natives, both men and women, who compete with foreigners for jobs. Enormous changes have also occurred in the educational realm. In the pre-oil period, kuttab schools (Quran’ic schools) were the primary

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educational venue, and they emphasized the rote memorization of religious texts. Girls were generally not permitted to attend these schools after the age of 11 or so, and many boys and girls received little if any schooling. Most women practiced forms of popular or folk Islam, having no access to texts and orthodoxy. When oil revenues gave Bahrain the opportunity to develop, schools were built for both boys and girls, and eventually, in 1978, a co-educational university was established. Outdoing their male counterparts on university exams, Bahraini women began to work in a variety of fields, though still suffering gender discrimination. Bahrain’s historically open intellectual atmosphere and its central location among several larger and very influential countries allowed for and facilitated a flow of ideas. When Islamic reform movements arose in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and all over the Middle East, many literate and politically aware Bahrainis of both genders, both Sunnis and Shi‘a, became involved in the resurgence which they felt embodied a modern, more rational approach to religion. For many, that meant discarding some of the practices of their elders, such as those associated with Sufism and popular or folk Islam. Those largely abandoned practices include the zar ritual and the visitation of saints’ tombs. These changes had a somewhat homogenizing effect, in which the Sunni form of Islam practiced in Bahrain began to look and sound more like Saudi Arabia–inspired Salafi Islam, and the Shi‘i form more like the Islam propagated through the Iranian Revolution. Certainly the vast majority of women, both Sunni and Shi‘i, began to wear the black abaya, a symbol of participation in the Islamic revival movements or the project of Islamization. The resurgence also offered a place for meaningful personal piety. Many considered it a solution to political problems, including Western economic and cultural imperialism. The achievement of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 made it clear, especially to the Bahraini Shi‘a, that religion can successfully play a central role in politics and that ordinary people can effectively fight oppression. In light of globalization and the momentous transformations cited above, it is no wonder that Bahraini women’s religious practices have changed. One example of their new approach to religion is found in the new ways in which Shi‘i women are using their communal meeting halls,

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or ma’atim, as described in chapter 3. While in the past, women met in ma’atim primarily to recite religious lamentations and grieve for the martyrdom of religious figures in their collective sacred past, and also to socialize, today these halls are used for quite different purposes. They have been serving as a venue for discourse about religious change in the Shi‘i community. Women and men have begun to reinterpret the meaning of sacred figures and religion itself in ways that reflect a new concern for their current relevance. For example, in the past, women understood the historical figure of Zaynab as a symbol of female grief. Now, some see her not as the epitome of the sacred victim, but rather as a role model for the successful career woman. In chapter 3, I discussed the woman who worked in the diplomatic field and who spoke to me of emulating Zaynab’s strength and “crisis management skills.” The ma’atim serve as venues for education and discourse of all types. They host lectures for women on a wide variety of topics, such as family law, health education and parenting skills. During the 2002 parliamentary elections, they hosted female candidates for office – a far cry from what Shi‘i women used to do in their ma’atim. This new use of religious space points to another consequence of education: as Bahraini men and women became more literate, they began to crave greater political freedom. For the Shi‘a, a deeper awareness of their own situation as a majority community ruled by a Sunni minority has served to heighten a collective sense of injustice and frustration, fueling their involvement in resistance movements – most recently in Bahrain’s unique “Arab Spring” beginning in 2011. Ma’atim activities also reflect Iran’s influence in Bahrain: ideological and political movements arising in Iran and in the greater Shi‘i community help shape the discourse and the activities that take place in communal halls, underscoring the fact that tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are played out in the Bahraini arena. While men’s ma’atim have always served as a site of political discourse and especially of resistance to the ruling Sunni minority, what is remarkable is that now women are using their ma’atim for political purposes too. Activities at Umm al-Darda’, the Sunni Qur’anic school discussed in chapter 4, also illustrate the intersections between modern education and Islam. While in the past, girls were not normally allowed to

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attend Qur’anic schools (kuttab) beyond their early childhood, Umm al-Darda’ was founded for the express purpose of offering religious education to adult women. Here women can study Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), both of which have long been the exclusive purview of male religious experts. Run by women for women, the center is a place to improve religious skills and to meet with like-minded women who also want to improve themselves in this way. It is a site for women to grow and forge their own religious identities; a site for the strengthening of a common Islamic identity in an era of Western cultural dominance. Yet the classrooms at Umm al-Darda’ mirror modern schoolrooms with rows of desks and instructional technology, and the learning environment is more like that of secular schools than of kuttab. Umm al-Darda’ reflects both the traditional past and the changing manifestation of modernity in Bahrain. Interviews with students and teachers shed light on the diversity within the Islamic resurgence, and the flexible, multidirectional ways in which religious change has taken place. While in the West, madrasa or kuttab-style education is associated with religious extremism and terrorism, in some rural and poorer regions of the Middle East, this is the only education available and the only means of becoming literate.2 While critics often contend that religious education fosters rigid “Wahhabi” mentalities, I found no such monolithic mentality at Umm al-Darda’; in fact, I spoke to a Shi‘i woman of Persian descent who felt comfortable attending this Sunni institution. Women at Umm al-Darda’ spoke of their own flexibility and fluidity in adhering to dogma. For example, Bahia, one of the founders of the school, disapproved of mawlids but remained open to attending them with her mother who still attended and hosted such events. As another example, a woman allowed her daughter to listen to music even though she herself believed it to be religiously forbidden. Several women criticized the religious courts for their favoritism toward the male party to a suit. In other words, the women at Umm al-Darda’ spoke of tolerance and accommodation regarding the divergent practices of their mothers and daughters and of society at large, and they did not uniformly share a single set of official views or orthodoxy.

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In relatively developed Bahrain, Umm al-Darda’ complements other educational venues for adult women. Specializing in teaching Qur’anic subjects, the center provides women with the opportunity to earn respect for their authoritative religious learning and to publicly perform piety, and it serves as a space to practice religious solidarity with other women. It also gives women a social outlet, a child-free haven for the most part, and a place to go on a small island with limited diversions. Like the Shi‘i ma’atim, Umm al-Darda’ is a place for women to negotiate religion with other women and a place to better themselves. As a Sunni institution, it enjoys a normative status in Bahrain and is known to and valued by the Sunni power elite – apparently the king’s wife, Sheikha Sabika, has sent her housemaids to the center for religious instruction – but it is not a “haven” or a site of political resistance in the same sense that Shi‘i ma’atim are. Nevertheless, Umm al-Darda’ does play a role in resisting the Westernization and the secularization of Bahrain, and in promoting a form of Islamic resurgence that is influenced by ideology emanating from Saudi Arabia. A focus on the individual stories of several women’s lives and their religious concerns, highlighted in chapters 5 and 6, made clear that not everyone fits neatly into any given category of Bahraini womanhood. Examining individuals outside of a group setting allows for an emphasis on difference, on the unique ways in which women approach religion and construct their religiosity. For example, the story of Leila, the unsuccessful parliamentary candidate, spoke to the intersections between gender, religion and politics, and shed light on women’s strategy of using religious argumentation to legitimize their political participation. The story of the journalist and activist Nuha and her exasperation with religious feminists illuminated the generation gap among feminists in Bahrain, and the changing ways in which issues of gender and religion are debated. The story of Samira, a mother and housewife, highlighted the importance of motherhood in the shaping of Bahraini religiosity. Not only did Samira argue that religious education begins at home, but she also spoke of the modern significance of choosing a traditional domestic role. Chapter 6 focused on particular experiences of the diverse expatriate community. Mahdere’s story focused on the plight of domestic

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servants in Bahrain, many of whom suffer discrimination and abuse. Her conversion to Islam suggested an attempt to improve her dismal working conditions. Hadia’s story shed light on her struggle to redefine her religious identity in light of her position in Bahrain’s hegemonic societal structure. Munira’s feelings of religious alienation from local religious authorities and educators shed light on the rift between the Westernized “secular” elite and those who identify with the Islamic resurgence. Her story also demonstrated the use of new technological solutions to religious alienation. While the focus of those two chapters was on difference, all of the stories in this study were informed by the struggle for religious identity and a meaningful role in a globalizing world. All of these women, Sunnis or Shi‘a, citizens or expatriates, are shaped by the distinctiveness of Bahrain, and also pulled apart by contesting geopolitical forces. Sharing a small geographical space, they cannot avoid one another nor can they avoid each other’s concerns. The feminist scholar and theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether points out that globalization, though often equated with progress, has in fact caused a “regression of women’s status” in many areas of the developing world due to neopatriarchal responses to globalization.3 Others hold that those who attribute progress in the area of gender equity to development or globalization ignore the fact that modernity does not necessarily entail equity. Rather, they argue that globalization has contributed to the systematic oppression of women in the modern Middle East by strengthening conservative patriarchal structures.4 The case could be made that despite women’s gains in literacy, their active participation in religious groups, and their access to forms of religious education previously denied to them, women’s education and their involvement in religious discourse ultimately serve to support patriarchy and kinship ties and do not further their gendered interests in Bahrain. The notion that educating females is universally positive is problematized by the matter of curriculum – does a given curriculum empower women in terms of gender parity, or does it instead reinforce their position in the patriarchal structure?5 It has been noted that the educational curriculum in Saudi Arabia supports gender segregation and reinforces the concept of “the inherent limits to women’s nondomestic potential.”6 Clearly, neither globalization nor the education

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of women is a “magic pill” that automatically and universally solves problems of gender inequity. Bahrain, though more liberal than Saudi Arabia in many ways, is still a patriarchal society in which Muslim family law upholds the gender-specific limitation of women’s rights. Nonetheless, there is evidence linking Middle Eastern women’s education to a number of positive developments (in terms of increasing their options), such as their growing involvement in the workforce. Women’s education is also related to a higher age at marriage and the use of contraceptives, both of which offer women potential health benefits and greater freedom of choice regarding how and when to undertake family responsibilities. Valentine Moghadam notes that those Middle Eastern Muslim women who have gained access to education have begun to challenge authority on all levels, including religious authority: “Economic development, universal schooling, mass communications, and legal reforms in Middle Eastern countries have produced a stratum of women whose very existence subverts the patriarchal order and accelerates the transition to modernity.”7 Despite the rise of religious conservatism with respect to women’s roles in nearby postrevolutionary Iran, educated women found channels through which they creatively sought agency, such as the flourishing feminist women’s journals.8 Even under restrictive circumstances, they found their literacy to be a vehicle through which they could express and promote their gendered interests. As in Iran, educated women in Bahrain together make up a formidable force, regardless of external circumstances. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they constitute a variety of forces, for, of course, there is no single “gendered agenda” corresponding to all Bahraini women; rather, they represent an assortment of interests depending on factors such as ethnicity, religion, class and personal opinion. Even in neighboring Saudi Arabia, considered to be one of the most restrictive countries in the world with respect to women’s issues, there is occasion to observe change. Miriam Cooke writes about the ways in which Saudi women have in fact been active in teaching each other religion through public lectures, private lessons and the Internet: “Global interconnection and cultural intertwinement are becoming the norm. Even in the most conservative, sex-segregated society, women are now able to communicate

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transnationally and to exchange new understandings of religious and social norms and values.”9 Many societal changes have taken place in Bahrain in recent decades. Highly educated Bahraini women are joining the workforce and they are represented in a variety of sectors. “Bahrainization,” the campaign to reduce dependence on foreign labor by employing more Bahrainis, is likely to further women’s engagement in the workplace, while unfortunately also destabilizing the lives of migrant workers. I hope that those native Bahraini women who support women’s rights and the implementation of a platform of universal human rights will also consider the plight of their foreign domestic servants. Bahraini women participated in elections for the first time in 2002, and by 2011 there were four female MPs in the lower house of Parliament. Many women’s organizations in Bahrain, religious and otherwise, serve as venues for collective solidarity. National governments and institutions of higher education in the greater Gulf region have begun to publicly promote women’s leadership through a series of conferences on this issue. Several Bahraini women attended the “Women as Global Leaders” conferences held in nearby Dubai and Abu Dhabi in 2005, 2006 and 2008, reflecting their desire to promote leadership roles for their countrywomen. My research sought to examine the ways in which modernity, education and globalization have impacted women’s religious practices in Bahrain. It also looked at the extent to which Islam serves as a vehicle for women’s empowerment. I argued that Bahraini women seek self-determination through religion in a variety of ways and that they are successful to varying degrees in doing so. In the introduction to this work, I referred to a debate in the discourse on women, religion and the Middle East as to whether scholars should focus on women’s perceptions of agency, or on what is deemed to be “objective” agency. While I took the occasion to state that my interest lies in the area of women’s perceptions of self-determination and their active negotiation of its limits, I do in any case also see “progress” in the status of Bahraini women, if one considers suffrage, literacy and greater public participation (in terms of employment in the formal labor sector) to be progress. Educating women, regardless of the curriculum, is powerful.

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Attempting to limit the potential of educated women is analogous to trying to hold a hundred corks under water using two hands – it is nigh on impossible, as the corks, or in this case the women, keep surfacing despite every effort to keep them submerged. Although religion is used for a multiplicity of purposes – including the limitation of women’s roles to the domestic realm – many Bahraini women are finding agency through their practice of Islam. Religion is often understood by believers to mean what they want or need it to mean. Consciously or unconsciously, people use religion to promote their values and interests, whether or not these are contradictory, whether they are grounded in class, ethnicity, gender, disability, individual experience or a combination thereof. Despite the pervasive Western understanding of Islam as a patriarchal religion, women in Bahrain and in the rest of the Middle East do not always understand it as such or practice it as such. They are using the very structures of religion, including institutions such as the Shi‘i ma’tam and the Sunni madrasa, as venues for empowerment. However, empowerment is relative; some use religion to try and win elected office while others study at Qur’anic schools to improve their recitation and other skills. Women should not be understood solely as “victims” of men’s understandings of Islam, but rather as complicit to varying degrees in their societies’ general understandings of Islamic ethics and mores. Insofar as they struggle to achieve their gendered interests, women also manipulate religion through reinterpretation, and sometimes through their newly accomplished religious authority, to mean what they need or want it to mean. Those whose lives were a focus of this study offer new ways to view Muslim women whom the Western media often depict as a uniformly silent and oppressed mass who seem to be still living in the Middle Ages. By contrast, Bahraini women are diverse, opinionated and engaged in the modern world. What might at first glance appear to be quite traditional is in many ways an expression of modernity, and of women’s agency. The mosaic of religious expression among women in Bahrain also belies the notion that there is a single way to describe the situation of women and Islam in the Gulf. In fact I have not attempted here to offer a comprehensive study of women in Bahrain – which I

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did not feel was possible – but rather a “series of snapshots” illustrating various facets of the intersection of religion and women’s lives on the island. It is fitting to conclude this study with the words of Zahra, the Shi‘i leader of a feminist women’s organization whose story was highlighted in chapter 3. One day, while we were sitting in the ‘Aali Mall in Manama, I asked her how she could appear so calm when a war was pending and the world seemed to be such a turbulent place. I wanted to understand why she seemed to emanate peacefulness and confidence in her efforts to help other women on a small scale when, to me, global problems sometimes seemed to be insurmountable. She talked about her own human potential and her religious goals, describing her belief that global change begins within, and her feeling that she could and should help others, not only locally but also globally. She spoke the words I placed at the beginning of this chapter, expressing her belief that change is possible and that it begins with the individual. She went on to say that, with calm inner peace, individuals can think beyond the local level to generate global change. Well aware of the daunting task of promoting women’s participation in the social project, Zahra also spoke of the recent (2002) parliamentary elections in which women were allowed to vote and to run for office, though none won a seat: “Women don’t trust other women. People don’t have enough confidence in women. It’s our social inheritance. It is very hard to change this concept. If there were better qualified women, it might have been better.” She described her role as a founder of the women’s society for which she works to improve women’s situation: “I want to build the inside of a woman, to make her confident enough to be efficient and effective and to believe that she can change society. We can change these customs in Bahrain.” What is striking about Zahra’s comments is that they reveal a great deal of self-confidence and social awareness and a sense of empowerment – qualities that were present in many other women I interviewed. Given that most adults in Bahrain told me that their grandmothers and sometimes even their mothers could not read, much less feel powerful enough to make an international impact, this is remarkable.

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Seeking ways to be traditionally Bahraini and Muslim and also engaged in the world, some women are finding community with others in order to join in religious discourse and a range of activities that sometimes, but not always, extend to the political realm. These women are not victims of a male construction of Islam, sitting isolated at home. Shattering stereotypes of Muslim women, they participate in the public sphere in a variety of ways. Whether reinterpreting the sacred past in ways they consider more rational, relevant and empowering, or creating female spaces in which they can nourish their identities as women and as Muslims, or finding ways to use religious arguments to battle those who use religion to limit them, Bahraini women and their religious practices reflect not only their education but their rising level of social and political awareness and the confidence to achieve a myriad of goals, whatever those might be.

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NOTES

1 Bahrain and Beyond Its Shores 1. See Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and the Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Mohammad Ali Syed, The Position of Women in Islam: A Progressive View (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); and Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 2. See Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis (London: Zed Books, 1999), 2; and Mervat Hatem, “Modernization, the state, and the family in Middle East women’s studies,” in A Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East, ed. Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 72–87. 3. May Seikaly notes that almost 95 percent of Bahraini female university students cover. “Women and religion in Bahrain: An emerging identity,” in Islam, Gender, and Social Change, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 182. 4. The name of the Gulf has long been controversial: Iran claims that its proper name is the Persian Gulf; the Arab countries on its western flank call it the Arabian Gulf. Since this research was carried out in Bahrain, I will either refer to it as the Arabian Gulf or avoid controversy altogether and call it simply the Gulf. 5. Keith Bradley, “Land of the two seas,” Saudi Aramco World 15/6 (November/ December 1964), 18–25. In pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, the name

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6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

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referred to the mainland of eastern Arabia; later it was limited to the archipelago known today as Bahrain. H. A. R Gibb et al., eds., Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960–), s.v. “al-Bahrayn.” See Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), especially chapter 3, “The healing power of words: Ink, spit, and holy speech,” and chapter 4, “Engaging spirits: Prophylaxis, witchcraft, exorcisms, trial by ordeal, and zar.” According to Sheikh Rashid al-Muraykhi, a Qadiriyya-Naqshbandiyya Sufi cleric in Bahrain, Sufism has a long history on the island but began to wane in the 1970s. See Daniel Munden, “Spreading the message of love,” Gulf Daily News, 12 July 2009, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails. aspx?storyid=255378 (accessed 11 December 2011). Marion Holmes Katz notes that practices associated with women and labeled as “folk religion” or “popular Islam” by one party can also be framed as “orthodox Islam” by another. Katz, “Women’s mawlid performances in Sanaa and the construction of ‘popular Islam’,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40/3 (2008), 467–8. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Integrating Ecofeminism, Globalization, and World Religions (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). For more on the concept of modernity in Islam, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), esp. 12–15. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Fundamentalist movements in the framework of multiple modernities,” in Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space, ed. Almut Höfert and Armando Salvatore (Brussels: P.I.E.–Peter Lang, 2000), 175. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, “On the modernity, historical specificity, and international context of political Islam,” in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, ed. idem (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 4. John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (2nd ed., Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 3, 289. Others who have also used these terms include John L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim politics,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. idem (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “The revivalist literature and the literature on revival: An introduction,” in The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, ed. idem, John Obert Voll and John L.

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NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28.

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Esposito (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, The Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995). Najib Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 4. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change (1994), 4. See, for example, Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), xi. Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge (1997), 7. For more on the construction of the term “secular” and the intersections between secularism and Islam, see Asad, Formations of the Secular (2003). In chapter 4, however, I do refer to one woman (Sawsan) by her first name, because it is public knowledge and because she has given me permission to do so. Muslims (Shi‘a and Sunnis) made up 81.2 percent of the whole, Christians 9 percent, and others 9.8 percent, according to the 2001 census cited in US Government, Central Intelligence Agency (USG/CIA), “Bahrain,” The World Factbook, 4 November 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html (accessed 11 November 2011). A July 2011 estimate puts the total population of Bahrain at 1,214,705. Ibid. Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, security, and U.S. policy,” Congressional Research Service, 29 December 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95– 1013.pdf (accessed 30 December 2011), 1. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 47. Moojan Momen, Introduction to Shi‘i Islam (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985), 71; Muhammad Husayn al-Tabataba’i, Shi‘ite Islam, trans. Seyyed Hossain Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 210. As of December 2011, Yemen’s Saleh had still not definitively relinquished his presidency, and Syria’s Assad remained in power, though facing international pressure to step down. Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, “We are all Bahrainis; not Sunnis, not Shiites!,” Qantara.de, 25 February 2011, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article. php/_c-476/_nr-1477/i.html (accessed 1 November 2011). Anthony Shadid, “Bahrain boils under the lid of repression,” New York Times, 15 September 2011. May Seikaly, “Women and religion in Bahrain” (1998), 177. Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “Bahrain’s base politics: The Arab Spring and America’s military bases,” Foreign Affairs, 5 April 2011, http://

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29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

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www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67700/alexander-cooley-and-daniel-hnexon/bahrains-base-politics (accessed 11 November 2011). Ahn Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). Dr. Sharon Nagy used this term in a conversation with me during my stay in Bahrain. However, some Bahrainis these days choose to send their children to schools that offer an English-language curriculum, such as the Bahrain School or the Modern Knowledge School, both of which are American schools, and in these schools one finds more of an ethnic mix. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change (1994), 30, 53–5. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim politics” (1983), 6. Among these reformers are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rid‘a. Ibid., 8–9. See also Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge (1997). According to Ghadbian (35), “Nasserism began as an enthusiasm for a charismatic figure and only later developed into an ideology. As an ideology, Nasserism contained the same bywords as Ba‘thism—’Unity, freedom, socialism’—but in a different order: ‘Freedom, socialism, unity,’ with freedom defined first and foremost as the freedom of the nation (watan).” While Nasser did make use of Islamic rhetoric, he also oppressed Islamists. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Muslim politics” (1983), 8–9. Ibid., 12. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 62, 130–1. Seikaly, “Women and religion in Bahrain” (1998), 175–6. Carolyn G. Heilbrun, Writing a Woman’s Life (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 12. Deniz Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” in Women, Islam, and the State, ed. idem (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Hatem, “Modernization, the state, and the family” (1999); Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (1999); Delia D. Aguilar, “Questionable claims: Colonial redux, feminist style,” in Women and Globalization, ed. Delia D. Aguilar and Anne E. Lacsama (New York: Humanity Books, 2004); Moghadam, Globalizing Women (2005); Ruether, Integrating Ecofeminism (2005). Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987); Marnia Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question (New York: Routledge, 1994); Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo, eds., Organizing Women: Formal and Informal Women’s Groups in the Middle East (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1997); Miriam Cooke, Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism through Literature (New York:

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42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

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Routledge, 2001); Connie Carøe Christiansen, “Women’s Islamic activism: Between self-practices and social reform efforts,” in Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe, ed. John L. Esposito and François Burgat (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2003); Mahmood, Politics of Piety (2005). Aguilar, “Questionable claims” (2004), 413. Moghadam, Globalizing Women (2005), 1, 17, 27. Kandiyoti, “Introduction” (1991), 2–3. The term “Orientalist” has come to refer to those who write about Middle Eastern people as the “exotic other,” objectifying them as part of a colonizing agenda. Edward Said wrote about this process in Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978). Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (1999), 2. See Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence (1994). See also Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xvi–xviii, and Christiansen, “Women’s Islamic activism” (2003). Dawn Chatty and Annika Rabo, “Formal and informal women’s groups in the Middle East,” in Organizing Women, ed. idem (1997), 1. Mahmood, Politics of Piety (2005), 39. Mohanty, Feminism without Borders (2003).

2 A Brief History of Bahrain since 1932 1. The Portuguese ruled Bahrain from 1521 to 1602. Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘ite Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2002), 4. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 4–5. Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), 28. 2. Emile A. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976), 8. Whereas Nakhleh cites 1782 as the beginning of Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain, Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 48, and Lawson, Bahrain: Modernization (1989), 29, both cite 1783. 3. John Bulloch, The Gulf: A Portrait of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE (London: Century Publishing, 1984), 51–2; Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 14. Bulloch (51) notes that Mohammad Reza Shah tried to claim Bahrain in the late 1960s, and that Khomeini did the same in September 1979. 4. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002), 56.

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5. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 12. Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 8. 6. Khuri uses this term in Tribe and State (1980), 22. 7. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 8, 9, 14, 18. Zahlan (7) notes that other Gulf sheikhs signed separate agreements, each known as the “General Treaty of Peace.” 8. Bulloch, The Gulf (1984), 57. 9. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 10–11. 10. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 1. 11. Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir, Bahrain, 1920–1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the Administration (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 5. 12. Ibid., 5, 33, 50, 52–3, 55. Al-Tajir (33) quotes a petition from the Shi‘i community to the British Resident (21 December 1921): “[T]he Shiah Community is in a state of great humiliation and subject to public massacre. They have no refuge, the evidence of none of them is accepted, their property is subject to plunder and themselves liable to mal-treatment every moment.” 13. Samar K. Datta and Jeffery B. Nugent, “Bahrain’s pearling industry: How it was, why it was that way and its implications,” in Bahrain and the Gulf: Past, Perspectives and Alternative Future, ed. Jeffery B. Nugent and Theodore H. Thomas (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 25. The French traveler Jean de Thevenot observed in 1665 that Bahrain’s pearling boats numbered 2–3,000 and that each boat paid a toll and a yearly tax to the Safavid government which used these monies to fund its Shi‘i religious institutions. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002), 46. 14. Al-Tajir, Bahrain, 1920–1945 (1987), 165. 15. Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 58. 16. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization in the Middle East (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973), 53–4. 17. Helen Boyle, Quranic Schools: Agents of Preservation and Change (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 1. 18. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 53–4, 59–61, 81. On the absence of women in public community life during the ‘Abbasid era, see Leila Ahmed, “Elaboration of the founding discourses,” in Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 19. George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 1–2, distinguishes between madhab, or “school of law,” and madrasa, or “college of law.” Madhab

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20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

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refers to the four surviving schools of Islamic jurisprudential thought, the eponymous Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali schools. It can also be understood as referring to the followers of the original jurisconsults, Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Malik (d. 795), Shafi‘i (d. 820) and Ibn Hanbal (d. 855). Madrasa, on the other hand, refers specifically to an institution of instruction. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 63. Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges (1981), 297–8, in his discussion of Max van Berchem’s theories, also mentions that the latter cited eastern Persia as the location of the first madrasa, but distinguished the early (eighth-century) madrasas as possessing a “private character,” versus their later (eleventh-century) role as “a state institution with political tendencies.” Gibb et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (1960–), s.v. “Madrasa.” Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 63–4. Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges (1981), 299–300. Spencer J. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8. See idem for more on the organization of Sufism. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 35–6. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 58. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992), 74. See also Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 58, and Jonathan Berkey, “Women and Islamic education in the Mamluk period,” in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 147. Berkey, “Women and Islamic education” (1991), 144–5. Five schools were founded by women in Egypt during the Mamluk period. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 97–8, 112. By 1863, there were 33,000 Europeans residing in Egypt. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992), 133, 137. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization (1973), 102–3. Sheikha al-Misnad, The Development of Modern Education in the Gulf (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), 30. While male teachers taught in variety of venues such as the home, the bazaar and shops, female teachers taught in their homes. Ibid., 31. Ibid., 2. Mohammed Monir Morsi, Education in the Arab Gulf States (Doha: University of Qatar, 1990), 24. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 32–3. Ibid., 22, 32–8. Charles Belgrave, Personal Column (Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1960), 94.

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38. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 33. 39. Rahman, Islam and Modernity (1982), 71. 40. See Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence (1994), 76–9, for information on Algerian women and colonial education. 41. Rahman, Islam and Modernity (1982), 53. 42. Sami A. Hanna, A Modern Cultural History of Bahrain: Contributors and Contributions ([Manama]: National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature, Ministry of Information, State of Bahrain, 1991), 33, 35. 43. Sakina Muhammad al-Qahtani, Min wahi al-ayyam (Inspiration from days past) (Bahrain: Tubi‘a bi-al-Matba‘a al-Hukumiya li-Wizara al-I‘lam, 1994), 99–101. 44. Fadwa El Guindi, “The status of women in Bahrain: Social and cultural considerations,” in Bahrain and the Gulf, ed. Nugent and Thomas (1985), 78. 45. Belgrave, Personal Column (1960), 62–3. 46. Hanna, A Modern Cultural History (1991), 20–1. 47. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 170–7. For more on the zar, see Janice Boddy, Wombs and Alien Sprits: Women, Men and the Zar Cult in Northern Sudan (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 48. Doumato, Getting God’s Ear (2000), 130–46. 49. Belgrave, Personal Column (1960), 71. 50. Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 173. 51. Nelida Fuccaro, “Islam and urban space: Ma’tams in Bahrain before oil,” ISIM Newsletter 3 (July 1999), 11. 52. Hanna, A Modern Cultural History (1991), 33. 53. Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 86. 54. Bulloch, The Gulf (1984), 73–7. The Eastern and General Syndicate’s Saudi concession lapsed in 1927. 55. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The 1828 Red Line Agreement,” http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921–1936/RedLine (accessed 19 December 1011). 56. Paul Lunde, “A king and a concession,” Saudi Aramco World 35/3 (May– June 1984), http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/198403/a.king. and.a. concession.htm (accessed 30 December 2011). 57. Belgrave, Personal Column (1960), 83. See also Bulloch, The Gulf (1984), 78. 58. Al-Tajir, Bahrain, 1920–1945 (1987), 173–7; Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 52–3. 59. See Andrew M. Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010).

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60. USG/CIA, “Bahrain” (2011); Cooley and Nexon, “Bahrain’s base politics” (2011). 61. Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 138. 62. Ibid., 145. Khuri notes that while income distribution for urban Sunnis was close to that of the USA, for the rural Shi‘a community it was closer to that of India. See also Khuri’s Figure 6, page 142. 63. Ibid., 52–3. 64. Egypt’s struggle for independence in the 1950s—headed by Nasser who called for Arab nationalism and the end of colonialism—had an impact in Bahrain as well as the rest of the Arab world. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 54–5; Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 5. 65. Ghadbian, Democratization and the Islamist Challenge (1997), 8. 66. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 58–9. Charles Belgrave had already resigned as Adviser to the Sheikh in 1957. 67. Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 41. 68. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 38–9. 69. Ibid., 41. 70. In 1971, 95.6 percent of women aged 45 and older were illiterate, which suggests that before the 1930s or so, less than 5 percent of girls were literate. Men aged 45 and older fared a little better in 1971, with 77.6 percent being illiterate, which suggests that before the 1930s, less than 23 percent of boys attended school. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 19. 71. Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 51. 72. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 24. 73. Ibid., 14. 74. Ibid., 21. 75. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992), 177. Nagat El-Sanabary, “Middle East and North Africa,” in Women’s Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits, and Policies, ed. Elizabeth M. King and M. Anne Hill (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 148. Ahmed cites 1925 as the year in which Egypt legislated compulsory education for girls, while El-Sanabary cites 1923. 76. Right to Education Project, ActionAid International (London), in re Iran: http://www.right-to-education.org/content/age/iran.html; in re Iraq: http:// www.right-to-education.org/content/age/iraq.html; and in re Syria: http:// www.right-to-education.org/content/age/syria.html (accessed 7 June 2006). 77. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 18–19. 78. Ibid., 22. 79. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 310.

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80. M. G. Rumaihi, Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War (London: Bowker, 1976), 157. 81. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 301. 82. Hanna, A Modern Cultural History (1991), 62–3. 83. Al-Qahtani, Min wahi al-ayyam (1994), 101–2. 84. Sakina Muhammad al-Najjar et al., Jam‘iya ‘Awal al-Nisa’iya: Al-Nash’a wa al-injazat; dirasa wa tha’iqiyya (Awal Women’s Society: Formation and accomplishments; documentary study (Bahrain: Al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiya, 1989), 15. Quote translated by Izzuddin El-Byanooni. 85. Al-Raida (Beirut), 20/100 (Winter 2003), 36n8, http://209.85.141.104/ search?q=cache:3FY7FaMW-HkJ:inhouse.lau.edu.lb/iwsaw/raida100/EN/ p036–039.pdf+aziza+hamad+al-bassam&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 1 August 2008). 86. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 312–13, points out, however, that had it not been for educated women, there might have been no women’s organizations at all. May Seikaly, “Women and social change in Bahrain,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26/3 (1994), 415–26, also observes that women’s movements in Bahrain reflected class hierarchies. 87. Haya al-Mughni, “From gender equality to female subjugation: The changing agendas of women’s groups in Kuwait,” in Organizing Women, ed. Chatty and Rabo (1997), 195. I assume that when al-Mughni mentions “conservative groups” that replaced these modernizing “feminist groups,” she is referring to religious organizations that flourished in the 1980s. 88. See Kandiyoti, “Introduction” (1991), 2–3, for her arguments regarding the link between “state-building processes” and Middle Eastern women’s changing societal roles. 89. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 20. 90. Ibid., 20. Obviously, it is unlikely that women were uniformly subservient even within the extended family during the pre-oil period; al-Misnad’s point is that the emergence of the nuclear family changed women’s roles. 91. Belgrave, Personal Column (1960), 63. 92. Hanna, A Modern Cultural History (1991), 92–5. 93. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1997), 51. 94. Ibid., 55. The Bahraini Dinar has remained stable at USD 2.65 for the past five years. Cf. http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (accessed 7 April 2006) and http://www.xe.com/ucc/ (accessed 1 November 2011). 95. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1997), 78. 96. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 15. 97. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 181, 104–12, 200.

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98. The Gulf Technical College was established in 1968 and the University College of Arts, Science, and Education was established in 1978. See University of Bahrain, “About the college” and “Brief history,” http://www. uob.edu.bh/english/pages.aspx?module=pages&id=1752&SID=144 and http://www.uob.edu.bh/english/pages.aspx?module=pages&id=1814&SID= 312 respectively (accessed 19 December 2011). 99. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 80, 204. 100. Munira A. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf: A Case Study of Bahrain (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 5, 303–4. 101. Valentine Moghadam, “Patriarchy in transition: Women and the changing family in the Middle East,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35/2 (Spring 2004), 148. 102. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 61–4. 103. Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1999), 174–5, 180. Iran’s anti-veiling policy remained until 1979, but after Reza Shah abdicated in 1941, it was no longer compulsory. 104. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 175–6. 105. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1997), 78. 106. R. K. Ramzani, “Shi‘ism and the Persian Gulf,” in Shi‘ism and Social Protest, ed. Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 50. 107. Bulloch, The Gulf (1984), 5. 108. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/indicators/i_pages/literacy%5Clit480asp?ano=1990 (accessed 7 June 2006). 109. Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 26, 57–8, 231–2. 110. Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambhala, 1997), 199. 111. Starrett, Putting Islam to Work (1998), 75. 112. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 182. 113. Amnesty International, “Bahrain: Women and children subject to increasing abuse,” 16 July 1996, Summary, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/3ae6a98624.html (accessed 4 November 2011). 114. Ibid. 115. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1997), 85–6. 116. Personal communication, 2002. 117. See Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Manama, 23 November 2011, http://bahrainrights. hopto.org/ (accessed 25 November 2011).

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118. Sheikh ‘Ali Salman interviewed by Ayman Dunseath in Gulf Business (December 2002). 119. Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, security, and U.S. policy” (2011), 9. 120. Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command, US Fifth Fleet, Combined Maritime Forces, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/command/command.html (accessed 13 November 2011). 121. US Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (USDOS/BNEA), “Background note: Bahrain,” 8 July 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/26414.htm (accessed 1 November 2011). 122. ‘Aziza al-Bassam, Al-Mar’a . . . al-as’ila al-gha’iba (Woman . . . the hidden questions) (Manama: Jam‘iya Nahda Fatat al-Bahrain, 1998), 67–8. 123. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 181. 124. Al-Bassam, Al-Mar’a (1998), 109–10, 105–37. 125. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990). 126. Amnesty International, “Bahrain” (1996), 2–4. 127. Rebecca Torr, “34.3 per cent of nation’s workforce now women,” Media Blog (Bahrain Labour Market Regulatory Authority), 1 December 2008, http:// blog.lmra.bh/en/archives/246 (accessed 6 November 2011). 128. Ribhi Mustafa ‘Ilian, Biblioghrafia al-mar’a fi dawla al-Bahrain: Rasd li’lintaj al-fikri li’l-mar’a al-Bahrainiya hatta nihaya am 1995 m (Bibliography of women in Bahrain: An account of the intellectual production of Bahraini women through 1995) (Bahrain, 1996). 129. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 182. 130. For more on changes in patriarchy in the Middle East, see Moghadam, “Patriarchy in transition” (2004). 131. For more details, see Bahrain Center for Human Rights, “Universal periodic review of the State of Bahrain—Human Rights Watch’s submission to the Human Rights Council,” 7 April 2008, http://www.bahrainrights.org/ en/node/2054 (accessed 1 November 2011). 132. Suad Hamada, “New family law for Sunni women in Bahrain not for Shiites,” IPS (Inter Press Service), 5 June 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/ news.asp?idnews=47106 (accessed 1 November 2011).

3

The Shi‘i Ma’tam

1. Approximately 150 million people, or 10–15 percent of the world’s Muslim population, are Twelvers. Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 170.

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2. Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 120. The authors note that they have also seen sources that suggest a lower percentage. 3. Kamran Scot Aghaie, “Introduction: Gendered aspects of the emergence and historical development of Shi‘i symbols and rituals,” in The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi‘i Islam, ed. idem (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 8. 4. These Muharram rites are found in other Middle Eastern Shi‘i communities as well. In Iran, they have been practiced in public since the sixteenth century. In Iraq, the commemoration was not carried out in public on a broad scale until the nineteenth century, due to the Mamluk prohibition, but under Ottoman control, the practice began to flourish in 1831. Muharram rites in Iraq reflected tribal Arab values. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘a of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 142– 4. Mahmoud Ayoub offers a history of the Muharram ritual in Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of ‘Ashura’ in Twelver Shi‘ism (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 148–58. 5. The Khawarij (plural of Khariji, Dissenter) were a group that opposed both ‘Ali and his rival, Mu‘awiya, the Umayyad governor of Syria. Initially part of the Shi‘i community, the Khawarij turned against the party of ‘Ali because he submitted to human arbitration with Mu‘awiya after the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 214–16. The Khawarij engaged in battles with the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids. Fazlur Rahman refers to them as both “extremely pious” and “fanatic rebels.” Islam (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 168. See also Muhammad Husayn al-Tabataba’i, Shi‘ite Islam, trans. and ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 192. 6. Nikki R. Keddie and Juan R. I. Cole, “Introduction,” in Shi‘ism and Social Protest, ed. Cole and Keddie (1986), 28–9. 7. Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 81–2. 8. During the reign of the two Pahlevi shahs (1925–79), the government of Iran was at least nominally Shi‘i despite the secular tone of its rulers. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002), 173. 9. Keddie and Cole, “Introduction” (1986), 28–9. 10. Countries with territory on the Gulf coast are known as the Gulf states, though the designation does not usually include Iraq. 11. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002), 174.

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12. Louay Bahry disputed the government’s 1998 claim of 1.87 percent unemployment among Bahrainis seeking work, noting that there were no reliable figures for any category of unemployed at the time. He estimated the number of unemployed Bahraini males at “anywhere from 16 to 30 percent. . . . Almost all of these are poor Shi‘ites, and the figure is higher among Shi‘ite women.” “The socioeconomic foundations of the Shiite opposition in Bahrain,” Mediterranean Quarterly 11/3 (Summer 2000), 137. See also Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1989), 47. 13. Amnesty International, “Bahrain” (1996), 1. 14. Fuller and Francke, The Arab Shi‘a (1999), 127. 15. Sheikh Hamad ibn ‘Isa Al Khalifa, on succeeding his father as Emir in 1999, promised municipal elections and greater press freedom. On seeking approval in 2001 for a constitutional monarchy with a restored and reconfigured Parliament, he carried out an amnesty for political prisoners and exiles. On declaring the monarchy in February 2002, he announced municipal and parliamentary lower house elections in May and October, respectively, of the same year. Bahry, “Socioeconomic foundations” (2000), 140. Infoplease, “Encyclopedia–Bahrain” (2007), http://www.infoplease.com/ ce6/world/A0856819.html (accessed 11 November 2011). USDOS/BNEA, “Background note: Bahrain” (2011). 16. I was told that in Bahrain the term husayniyya was used more commonly in the past and by the older generations, but I was unable to find out when ma’tam came into use in its current sense. According to David Pinault in his book on the Shi‘a of Hyderabad, India, the equivalent term there is matami guruh which he defines as a men’s “lamentation guild.” Pinault, The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 79. 17. Fuccaro, “Ma’tams in Bahrain” (1999), 11. 18. Doumato, Getting God’s Ear (2000), 116–17. 19. For a description of a women’s qraya (Shi‘i communal lamentation session involving the recitation of scriptures) in Iraq, see Robert A. Fernea and Elizabeth W. Fernea, “The variation in religious observance among Islamic women,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 391–3. For more on Shi‘i rituals, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Appendix III: Ritual practices in Shi‘ism,” in Muhammad Husayn al-Tabataba’i, Shi‘ite Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 233. 20. According to the Population Resource Center, “the average age at first marriage [in Bahrain] was 14.8 years from 1967–1975, but was 22.5 by 1987–1995.” Idem, “Executive summary: The Middle East” (Washington, DC, 2003), 3, http://www.prcdc.org/files/MidEast.pdf (accessed 6 November 2011).

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21. Nasr, “Ritual practices in Shi‘ism” (1975), 231. 22. Nahid Yeganeh and Nikki R. Keddie, “Sexuality and Shi‘i social protest in Iran,” in Shi‘ism and Social Protest, ed. Cole and Keddie (1986), 114–20. 23. See Mehranguiz Kar, “Women’s strategies in Iran from the 1979 Revolution to 1999,” in Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts, ed. Jane H. Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 24. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi [Weststruckness], trans. John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh (Lexington, Kentucky: Mazda, 1982), 11. 25. Lara Z. Deeb, “From mourning to activism: Sayyedeh Zaynab, Lebanese Shi‘i women, and the transformation of Ashura,” in The Women of Karbala, ed. Aghaie (2005), 256. 26. For more information on the flagellation controversy, see Werner Ende, “The flagellations of Muharram and the Shi‘ite ‘ulama’,” Der Islam 55/1 (1978), 19–36. According to Ende (34–5), Shi‘i ulema in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries have actively discouraged extreme forms of flagellation. 27. Some Shi‘i communities abroad have also chosen to donate blood instead of self-flagellating on Ashura. In Istanbul, men and women lined up to donate blood to the Red Crescent Society. In Iraq, Shi‘a did likewise in response to the shortage of blood due to the war. Sa’ad Abdul Majid, “Marking Ashura, Turkish Shiites donate blood,” IslamOnline, 1 March 2006, http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2004–03/01/article08.shtml (accessed 5 January 2010). Emad al-Sharei, “Controversial Shia ritual under fire,” IWPR Online (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), 21 February 2005, http://iwpr. net/report-news/controversial-shia-ritual-under-fire (accessed 6 November 2011). 28. Quoted in John L. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam: Reformation or revolution?” in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. idem (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 664. 29. Ibid., 665. 30. Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 51. 31. Abdulaziz Sachedina, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution,” in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. Esposito (1983), 202–3, 207. 32. ‘Ali Shari‘ati, “Intizar, the religion of protest,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 298–9. 33. Sachedina, “Ali Shariati” (1983), 202–3. See also John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), s.v. “Shari‘ati, ‘Ali.”

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34. Margot Badran, “Islam, patriarchy, and feminism in the Middle East,” in Women Living Under Muslim Laws: Dossier 4 (August–September 1988), 17, http://www.wluml.org/node/249 (accessed 6 November 2011). 35. See [‘Ali Shari‘ati], Ali Shariati’s Fatima Is Fatima, trans. Laleh Bakhtiar (Tehran: Shariati Foundation, [1981]). 36. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam” (1999), 663. 37. Badran, “Islam, patriarchy, and feminism” (1988), 17. The same Iranian women who supported the revolution later witnessed a conservative reaction that curtailed their political activities. 38. As quoted in Hamid Algar, Preface to ‘Ali Shari‘ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley, California: Mizan Press, 1980), 9. 39. Chan’ad Bahraini (pseud.), “Political aspects of Ashura,” 7 March 2005, http://chanadbahraini.blogspot.com/2005/03/political-aspects-of-ashura. html (accessed 6 November 2011). The blogger was quoting Shari‘ati’s lecture on “Red Shi‘ism: The religion of martyrdom; Black Shi‘ism: The religion of mourning,” delivered at Husayniyya Irshad in 1972. See Ali Shariati (sic), Red Shi‘ism, trans. Habib Shirazi (Houston, Texas: Free Islamic Literatures, Inc., 1980), 9–10. 40. Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi‘as (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 31–2, 74–5. 41. According to Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (2002), 179, in the 1950s many members of the Ba‘th Party were Twelver Shi‘a, but by the late 1960s Sunnis were predominant in the party. 42. Wiley, Iraqi Shi‘as (1992), 53, 75–7. 43. Ibid., 131. 44. Ibid. 45. Esposito, “Contemporary Islam” (1999), 647–8. 46. Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof, “Introduction,” in Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought, ed. Moaddel and Talattof (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 13–14. See in particular “Part I: An overview of Islamic modernism: The contributors in context,” 7–16, for more on the movement of Islamic modernism. 47. I met with a range of responses to the liberal atmosphere in Bahrain, but most Bahraini women with whom I spoke, whether Sunni or Shi‘i, preferred it to the stricter, more conservative atmosphere in Iran or Saudi Arabia. 48. Nonetheless, the issue remains contentious in Bahrain. See Suad Hamada, “Debate on proposed alcohol ban far from over,” IPS (Inter Press Service), 24 March 2010, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50770 (accessed 11 December 2011).

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4

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1. Marwan Kraidy, Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 96. Kraidy uses the term “cultural hybridity” throughout the book; see in particular chapter 4, “Corporate transculturalism.” 2. Ien Ang, Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World (London: Routledge, 1996), 154–5. 3. According to the 2001 census, 9 percent of Bahrain’s population was Christian. USG/CIA, “Bahrain” (2011). Also see al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 31. 4. Helen Boyle, Quranic Schools (2004), 129. 5. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 30. 6. The literacy rate for adult males in 2008 was even higher, 91.9 percent. USDOS/BNEA, “Background note: Bahrain” (2011). 7. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 77–80, 105. 8. Seikaly, “Women and social change” (1994). Seikaly also argues that not all women followed this trajectory, however; rural and lower-class women were structurally excluded from taking this path because, even within the feminist movement, class hierarchies remained and the chasm between the educated elite and the poor was not bridged. 9. Throughout this chapter I have changed the names of the students and teachers, not at their request but to protect their privacy, with the exception of Sawsan, the main founder of Umm al-Darda’, who has allowed me to use her name. 10. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 182–3. 11. Amnesty International, “Bahrain” (1996), 2. 12. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 203. 13. According to Sawsan, this sheikh had been invited to Bahrain by the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. 14. There are at least two renowned historical female transmitters of Hadith (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet) known as Umm al-Darda’. The one Sawsan was referring to, Umm al-Darda’ (d. 650 CE), wife of the Prophet’s companion Abu al-Darda’, was famed for her piety and wisdom. The other one is Umm al-Darda’ al-Dimishqiyya (d. 700), also known as Umm al-Darda’ the Younger; she was an orphan who lived in the care of the same Abu al-Darda’. Iyas ibn Mu‘awiya considered Umm al-Darda’ al-Dimishqiyya to be the best Hadith transmitter of her time. See Aysha Bewley, Muslim Women: Biographical Dictionary (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 2004), 170. She is mentioned as a superior scholar of Hadith by Muhammad Zubayr Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: Its Origin, Development, Special Features and Criticism (Calcutta University, 1961),

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15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24.

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chapter 6, available online as “Women scholars of Hadith,” Islam for Today, http://www.islamfortoday.com/womenscholars.htm (accessed 6 November 2011). The medieval scholar al-Jahiz mentions an Umm al-Darda’ as a pious “female ascetic renunciant” from his community and includes her, along with the Sufi, Rabi‘a al-’Adawiyya (d. circa 801), in a list of pious ascetic women. It is not clear, however, whether he makes her a contemporary of Rabi‘a, in which case she would be a third Umm al-Darda’, or whether he is referring to Umm al-Darda’ al-Dimishqiyya and simply placing her in the same category of piety as Rabi‘a. ‘Amr b. Bahr al-Jahiz, Kitab al-Hayawan (The book of animals), vol. 5, ed. A. M. Harun (Cairo, 1938), 589. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change (1994), 410. See Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism (1999), 2; Hatem, “Modernization, the state, and the family” (1999), 82. Doumato, Getting God’s Ear (2000). Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, born in central Arabia (1703–92), founded what John Voll refers to as a “fundamentalist” movement of “socio-moral reconstruction.” Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change (1994), 53–4. The movement has been called “Wahhabism” or “Wahhabi Islam” but, as noted earlier, these terms carry pejorative connotations. Doumato, Getting God’s Ear (2000), 215. Juan E. Campo, The Other Sides of Paradise: Explorations into the Religious Meanings of Domestic Space in Islam (Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1991), 35. Tarawih prayers are the long prayers that Muslims carry out after they break their fast every evening during the month of Ramadan. Ibid., 1, 35–6. Current estimates of Bahrain’s population and its composition vary considerably. USG/CIA, “Bahrain” (2011), shows a total population of 1,214,705 (July 2011 est.), including 235,108 non-nationals which would be less than 20 percent, a figure that is perhaps not fully up to date. Cf. Cooley and Nexon, “Bahrain’s base politics” (2011), who estimate a total population of 1 million including 500,000 expatriates. See also data published by Bahrain’s Labour Market Regulatory Authority, http://portal.lmra.bh/english/portal (accessed 11 December 2011), which reported over 450,000 expatriate workers in the first quarter of 2011. Jeff Israely, “A church in Saudi Arabia?” Time Magazine, 19 March 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1723715,00.html (accessed 6 November 2011). In his report on the establishment of a Catholic chapel in Qatar, Israely noted that the Vatican had begun negotiating for permission to build a Catholic church in Saudi Arabia.

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25. AFP (Agence France Presse), “Religious police destroy temple,” Worldwide Religious News, 27 March 2005, http://wwrn.org/articles/16128/?&place=saudiarabia§ion=church-state (accessed 6 November 2011). 26. Prince Sa‘ud al-Faisal as quoted in Human Rights Watch, “Perpetual minors: Human rights abuses stemming from male guardianship and sex segregation in Saudi Arabia,” 19 April 2008, part 1, 5, http://www.hrw.org/ en/node/62251/section/5 (accessed 11 November 2011). 27. Al-Misnad, Development of Modern Education (1985), 299–300. 28. With the support of King Sa‘ud ibn ‘Abdel ‘Aziz (r. 1953–64), ‘Iffat al-Thunayan, wife of the future King Faisal (r. 1964–75), established the first girls school in 1956 in Jedda. She and Faisal went on to build the infrastructure for public education in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. King Faisal was well known for having supported the education of girls. Amani Hamdan, “Women and education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges and achievements,” International Education Journal 6/1 (2005), http://ehlt.flinders.edu.au/education/iej/articles/v6n1/hamdan/paper.pdf (accessed 11 December 2011) , 49–51). 29. Mohammed Monir Morsi, Education in the Arab Gulf States (Doha: University of Qatar, 1990), 101. 30. In Bahrain, literacy rates for adult males and females were 88.6 percent and 83.6 percent respectively (2001 census). USG/CIA, “Bahrain” (2011). In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, the respective rates were 84.7 percent and 70.8 percent (est. 2003). USG/CIA, “Saudi Arabia,” The World Factbook, 31 October 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/sa.html (accessed 6 November 2011). 31. Hanna, Modern Cultural History of Bahrain (1991), 54. 32. An ordinance regulating clubs and societies, and mandating their registration with the state, was promulgated in 1959. Khuri, Tribe and State (1980), 184, notes that by clearly laying out the registration process, the law contributed to the proliferation of clubs. 33. Seikaly, “Women and social change” (1994), 423. 34. Torr, “34.3 per cent of nation’s workforce” (2008). 35. Salwa al-Khateeb, “The oil boom and its impact on women and families in Saudi Arabia,” in The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernity, ed. Alanoush Alsharekh (London: Saqi, 2007), 86. 36. For more on the restricted rights of Saudi women, see Human Rights Watch, “Perpetual minor” (2008). According to a representative of the Public Affairs Office at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC, with whom I spoke by telephone in 2009, Saudi men and women would be permitted to vote in the 2010 municipal elections. That did not come to

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pass for women in 2010, but was recently promised for 2015. Martin Chulov, “Saudi women to be given right to vote and stand for election in four years,” The Guardian (London), 25 September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2011/sep/25/saudi-women-right-to-vote?intcmp=239 (accessed 4 November 2011). 37. Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xvi–xviii.

5

Gulf Women’s Stories about Life and Religion

1. Dunseath, Gulf Business (2002), 18–19. In addition to the eight women, 166 men competed for 37 open seats. 2. Kuwaiti women received the right to vote and run for office in 2005. 3. Many Shi‘a boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2002 because they were discontented by the degree of control the monarch would retain regardless of the outcome. Despite the boycott, 53.2 percent of 243,000 eligible voters went to the polls. Sami Kamal, “Bahrainis at the ballot-box,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 610 (31 October–6 November 2002), http://weekly.ahram. org.eg/2002/610/re11.htm (accessed 11 November 2011). 4. I have changed the names of the women highlighted in this chapter. All three spoke in beautiful English during their interviews. For the reader’s ease, nonetheless, in almost all cases I have had to smooth out a sentence here and there in order to convey the expression of the speakers’ body language and other nonverbal contextual clues. 5. Halal meats are those that are slaughtered in accordance with Islamic procedures. Eating pork is forbidden in Islam. 6. Norman K. Denzin, Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 21st Century (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997), 5. 7. Lila Abu-Lughod, Writing Women’s Worlds: Bedouin Stories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), xvii, 14. 8. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). 9. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses,” in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 196–7. Mohanty refers in particular to research carried out by Western feminist scholars on women in the developing world. 10. This hadith, as narrated by Abu Bakra, is found in Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani, Hady al-sari: Muqaddimat Fath al-bari (Introduction to the commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari), vol. 13 (Cairo: Al-Matba‘a al-Bahiya al-Misriya, 1928), 46. Hady al-sari includes Imam Bukhari’s sound (sahih) collection of hadith with commentary by al-’Asqalani. The translation quoted is taken from Sanusi Lamido

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11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19. 20.

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Sanusi, “Women and political leadership in Muslim thought,” October 2001, http://www.islamawareness.net/Women/leaders.html (accessed 11 November 2011). The Moroccan feminist Fatima Mernissi, who studied the historical context of this hadith, notes that the Persian King Khusraw (Chosroe) Parvis was assassinated in 628 CE. Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1991), 49. SAW (or SAWS) is an acronym for Salla Allahu ‘alayhi wa sallam (God bless him and grant him salvation), often rendered in English as “Peace be upon him” (PBUH), which Muslims say in respect after referring to the Prophet. See “Glossary of Islamic Terms,” Islamic Center of Raleigh, http://islam1.org/iar/about/archives/2004/09/20/ glossary_of_islamic_terms.php (accessed 11 November 2011). Mernissi, The Veil (1991), writes of being “[s]ilenced, defeated, and furious” upon hearing this hadith cited as grounds for barring women from leadership roles (2). The experience led her to learn more about the legitimacy of Hadith in general, and of this hadith in particular, to which she refers as “the sledgehammer argument used by those who want to exclude women from politics” (4). She challenges its legitimacy from within an Islamic framework, arguing that although it is considered sahih (sound or authentic) by most scholars, it should be discredited because the narrator, Abu Bakra, was convicted of false testimony and therefore cannot be considered a reliable source of Hadith (60–1). Kamal, “Bahrainis at the ballot-box” (2002). Joseph P. Zimmerman, “Equity in representation for women and minorities,” in Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, ed. Wilma Rule and Joseph P. Zimmerman (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994), 4. See Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments (1987). Nayereh Tohidi, “The issues at hand,” in Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity within Unity, ed. Herbert L. Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 282. Haya al-Mughni, Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender (London: Saqi, 2001), 14, 184. As‘ad Abu Khalil, “Women in Arab states,” in Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective, ed. Rule and Zimmerman (1994), 132. Abu Khalil refers to a 1970 study of Kuwaiti women. Alanoud Alsharekh, “Introduction,” in The Gulf Family, ed. Alsharekh (2007), 12. Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xiii–xv. Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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21. Abu Khalil, “Women in Arab states” (1994), 135. 22. Dunseath, Gulf Business (2002), 19. 23. Habib Toumi, “Bahrain women MPs set to make a difference as Parliament reconvenes,” Gulf News (Dubai), 8 October 2011, http://gulfnews.com/news/ gulf/bahrain/bahrain-women-mps-set-to-make-a-difference-as-parliamentreconvenes-1.887965 (accessed 11 November 2011). 24. Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 185. 25. See Ellen McLarney, “The burqa in Vogue: Fashioning Afghanistan,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 5/1 (Winter 2009), 1–23, and sources cited therein. 26. Nakhleh, Bahrain: Political Development (1976), 54. 27. Kandiyoti, “Introduction” (1991), 2. 28. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 61. 29. Ibid., 7, 44. Custody laws in Bahrain are different for Sunnis and Shi‘a. According to the journalist Lamia Radi, a divorced Shi‘i woman is allowed to retain custody of a daughter until she reaches nine years of age, and a son until he reaches seven. A divorced Sunni woman, on the other hand, may retain custody of a daughter until the latter is married, and a son until he reaches the age of majority (when he attains full legal rights). Lamia Radi, “Bahraini women long for fairer laws,” Daily Star (Beirut), 12 April 2006, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/Apr/12/Bahraini-womenlong-for-fairer-laws.ashx#axzz1dPQo5brU (accessed 11 November 2011) 30. Quoted in Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 63–4. 31. Ibid., 64. 32. Seikaly, “Women and social change” (1994), 415–26; al-Misnad, Modern Education in the Gulf (1985), 312–13. 33. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 65. 34. Moghadam, Modernizing Women (2003), 151. 35. The degree to which this has been emphasized differs according to the state, e.g. Saudi Arabian resurgent Islamic ideology differs greatly from the Turkish example which is less restrictive. 36. Ruether, Integrating Ecofeminism (2005), 29. 37. See John L. Esposito, “Introduction: Modernizing Islam and re-Islamization in global perspective,” in Modernizing Islam, ed. Esposito and Burgat (2003), 5. See also Eisenstadt, “Fundamentalist movements” (2000), 175. 38. Moghadam, Modernizing Women (2003), 158–9. 39. For more on Islamic feminism, see Heba Raouf Ezzat, “The silent Aysha: An Egyptian narrative,” in Globalization, Gender and Religion, ed. Bayes and Tohidi (2001), and Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001). Especially valuable are Cooke’s “Introduction” (vii–xxix) and chapter 3, “Reviewing beginnings”

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NOTES

40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46. 47.

48.

49. 50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

211

(53–82). See also Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Feminism in an Islamic Republic: ‘Years of Hardship, Years of Growth’,” in Islam, Gender and Social Change, ed. Haddad and Esposito (1998), 59–84. Beinin and Stork, “Context of Political Islam” (1997), 4. Seikaly, “Women and social change” (1994). See Amr Khaled’s website, amrkhaled.net. See also Amr Khaled, Women in Islam (Raleigh, North Carolina: International Islamic Publishing House, 2007). Moghadam, Modernizing Women (2003), 175. For more on the ways in which women were impacted by the Iranian Revolution, see Haleh Esfandiari, Reconstructed Lives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). The Bahraini government established the National Assembly in 1973, only to dissolve it two years later in response to parliamentary opposition. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 26–7. Asad, Formations of the Secular (2003), 13–15. Eisenstadt, “Fundamentalist movements” (2000), 175. I am aware that translating the Arabic term wali (pl. awliyat) as “saint” is problematic, since the latter carries Christian connotations. With some misgivings, I use the term for lack of a better word. A wali is a Sufi “friend of Allah,” a person, in the Sufi context, who has been recognized for his or her particularly close connection to God. Sahih Bukhari: Good Manners and Form, trans. M. Muhsin Khan, vol. 8, bk. 73, no. 2, http://www.Islamicity.com/mosque/sunnah/bukhari/073.sbt. html#008.073.002 (accessed 11 November 2011). Seikaly, “Women and religion” (1998), 180. Moghadam, Modernizing Women (2003), 114–17. Moghadam observes that despite the “haven myth” and the ensuing idealization of women’s domestic role, historically there never was a “golden age” of the family unit (114). “Bahrainization” is the process of replacing non-Bahraini with Bahraini employees. Munira Fakhro argued that encouraging female Bahrainis to join the labor force would decrease Bahrain’s dependence on expatriate workers. Idem, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 17. For more on the connection between Muslim women’s roles and the state’s agenda, see Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” and the localized studies collected in Women, Islam, and the State (1991). Guity Nashat, “Women in the Middle East: 8000 BCE–CE 1800,” in Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Restoring Women to History, by Guity Nashat and Judith E. Tucker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 9. Mahmood, Politics of Piety (2005), 34.

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6 Expatriate Muslim Women’s Stories about Life and Religion 1. As of the 2001 census, 37.6 percent of those living in Bahrain were nonnationals. USG/CIA, “Bahrain” (2011). 2. Andrew Gardner, “Strategic transnationalism: The Indian diasporic elite in contemporary Bahrain,” City and Society 20/1 (2008), 59–60. 3. Ibid., 71–3. According to the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (USDOS/BDHRL), “Country report: Bahrain,” 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ (accessed 15 November 2011), 26: “In August 2009 new rules went into effect to allow migrant foreign workers (excluding domestic workers) to change jobs without employers’ permission, subject to certain restrictions” (my emphasis). See also Bahrain Center for Human Rights, “Waiting for reform & recognition: Female migrant domestic workers in Bahrain,” 24 December 2010, http://www. bahrainrights.org/en/node/3692 (accessed 15 November 2011). 4. Gardner, City of Strangers (2010), 87. 5. Fakhro, Women at Work in the Gulf (1990), 66–8. 6. US Department of State, “Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 2000: Trafficking in persons report,” June 2002, http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/10815.pdf (accessed 11 December 2011), 26. 7. The Protection Project (Washington, DC), “A human rights report on trafficking of persons, especially women and children: Bahrain,” March 2002, http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/protection_project_2002_trafficking_bahrain.pdf (accessed 11 December 2011), 38. 8. Eunice del Rosario, “New laws urged to protect maids,” Gulf Daily News (Manama), 1 November 2005, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/ NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=125763 (accessed 11 December 2011). 9. Protection Project, “Bahrain” (2002), 38–9. 10. USDOS/BDHRL, “Country report: Bahrain” (2010), 26. 11. Amr Khaled is a popular Egyptian preacher known for his American-style “televangelism.” He espouses an Islam separate from “official Islam” and “political Islam,” and advocates the importance of hard work, personal success and good deeds. His approach has been dubbed “air-conditioned Islam” by the Muslim Brothers. Patrick Haenni and Husam Tammam, “Egypt’s air-conditioned Islam,” Le Monde diplomatique, September 2003, http://mondediplo.com/2003/09/03egyptislam, (accessed 15 November 2011). 12. Longva, Walls Built on Sand (1997), 47. 13. Ibid., 116–26.

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NOTES

213

14. Unni Wikan, Behind the Veil in Arabia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 15. Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xvi, notes that “the recent wave of Islamization seems to be having an impact on all classes.” 16. Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 58. 17. “Bahrain,” in Middle East Review 2003/2004: The Economic and Business Report (London: Kogan Page Ltd., 2004), 20. 18. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet (1985). 19. Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xv. 20. Ali A. Mazrui and Alamin M. Mazrui, “The challenge of cultural dependency: An African and Islamic perspective,” in Knowledge across Cultures: A Contribution to Dialogue among Civilizations, ed. Ruth Hayhoe and Julia Pan (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, 2001), 103. For more on technology and religious change, see Sophia Pandya, “Religious change among Yemeni women: The new popularity of ‘Amr Khaled,” in Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 5/1 (Winter 2009), 50–79. 21. Mazrui and Mazrui, “The challenge of cultural dependency” (2001), 99–101.

7

Thinking Big

1. See for example Noor al-Qasimi, “Immodest modesty: Accommodating dissent and the ‘abaya-as-fashion in the Arab Gulf states,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 6/1 (Winter 2010), 46–75. 2. Helen N. Boyle, “Memorization in Islamic schools,” in Islam and Education: Myths and Truths, ed. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 174. 3. Ruether, Integrating Ecofeminism (2005), 27. 4. See for example Hatem, “Modernization, the state, and the family” (1999), 72–87. 5. Writing about education, gender and power, Nelly P. Stromquist notes that in Mexico, Peru and the Dominican Republic, conservative factions of the Catholic Church fought against sex education in school and thereby denied females empowering education regarding their bodies and reproductive control. Idem, “Education as a means for empowering women,” in Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World, ed. Jane L. Parpart, Shirin Rai and Kathleen Staudt (London: Routledge, 2002). 6. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Education in Saudi Arabia: Gender, jobs, and the price of religion,” in Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East:

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Gender, Economy, and Society, ed. Eleanor Abdella Doumato and Marsha Pripstein Posusney (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 247–8. 7. Moghadam, Modernizing Women (2003), 135–9, 294. 8. Najmabadi, “Feminism in an Islamic Republic” (1998). 9. Cooke, Women Claim Islam (2001), xviii.

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SELECTED BIBLIOGR APHY

Abrahamian, Ervand. “‘Ali Shari‘ati: Ideologue of the Iranian revolution.” In Edmund Burke and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., Islam, Politics, and Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987. ——. Writing Women’s Worlds: Bedouin Stories. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Aghaie, Kamran Scot, ed. The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi‘i Islam. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005. Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Gharbzadegi [Weststruckness]. Trans. John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh. Lexington, Kentucky: Mazda, 1982. Algar, Hamid. Preface. In ‘Ali Shari‘ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique. Berkeley, California: Mizan Press, 1980. Alsharekh, Alanoud, ed. The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernity. London: Saqi, 2007. Amnesty International. “Bahrain: Women and children subject to increasing abuse.” 15 July 1996. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ MDE11/018/1996/en. Ang, Ien. Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World. London: Routledge, 1996. Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003. Al-‘Asqalani, Ibn Hajar. Hady al-sari: Muqaddimat Fath al-bari (Introduction to the commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari), vol. 13. Cairo: Al-Matba‘a al-Bahiya al-Misriya, 1928. Ayoub, Mahmoud. Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of ‘Ashura’ in Twelver Shi‘ism. The Hague: Mouton, 1978.

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Bahry, Louay. “The socioeconomic foundations of the Shiite opposition in Bahrain.” Mediterranean Quarterly 11/3 (Summer 2000), 129–43. Al-Bassam, ‘Aziza. Al-Mar’a . . . al-as’ila al-gha’iba (Woman . . . the hidden questions). Manama: Jam‘ia Nahda Fatat al-Bahrain, 1998. Boyle, Helen. Quranic Schools: Agents of Preservation and Change. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004. Bulloch, John. The Gulf: A Portrait of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. London: Century Publishing, 1984. Campo, Juan Eduardo. The Other Sides of Paradise: Explorations into the Religious Meanings of Domestic Space in Islam. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. Chatty, Dawn, and Annika Rabo, eds. Organizing Women: Formal and Informal Women’s Groups in the Middle East. Oxford, UK: Berg, 1997. Cole, Juan. Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘ite Islam. London: I.B.Tauris, 2002. Cole, Juan R. I., and Nikki R. Keddie, eds. Shi‘ism and Social Protest. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Cooke, Miriam. Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism through Literature. New York: Routledge, 2001. Cordesman, Anthony H. Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. Donohue, John J., and John L. Esposito, eds. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella, and Marsha Pripstein Posusney, eds. Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy, and Society. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. “Fundamentalist movements in the framework of multiple modernities.” In Almut Höfert and Armando Salvatore, eds., Between Europe and Islam: Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space. Brussels: P.I.E.– Peter Lang, 2000. Ernst, Carl W. The Shambhala Guide to Sufism. Boston: Shambhala, 1997. ——. Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Esposito, John L., ed. Voices of Resurgent Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. ——. “The Iranian revolution: A ten-year perspective.” In John L. Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990. ——. “Contemporary Islam: Reformation or revolution?” In John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford History of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Esposito, John L., and François Burgat, eds. Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003.

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Fakhro, Munira A. Women at Work in the Gulf: A Case Study of Bahrain. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990. Fischer, Michael M. J. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980. Fuccaro, Nelida. “Islam and urban space: Ma’tams in Bahrain before oil.” ISIM Newsletter 3 (July 1999), 11. Fuller, Graham E., and Rend Rahim Francke. The Arab Shi‘a: The Forgotten Muslims. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Gardner, Andrew. “Strategic transnationalism: The Indian diasporic elite in contemporary Bahrain.” City and Society 20/1 (2008), 54–78. ——. City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010. Ghadbian, Najib. Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. El Guindi, Fadwa. Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance. Oxford, UK: Berg, 1999. Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar, In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004. Hanna, Sami A. A Modern Cultural History of Bahrain: Contributors and Contributions. [Manama]: National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature, Ministry of Information, State of Bahrain, 1991. Hatem, Mervat. “Modernization, the state, and the family in Middle East women’s studies.” In Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker, eds., A Social History of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999. Heilbrun, Carolyn G. Writing a Woman’s Life. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988. Hodgson, Marshall G. S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. ‘Ilian, Ribhi Mustafa. Biblioghrafia al-mar’a fi dawla al-Bahrain: Rasd li’l-intaj al-fikri li’l-mar’a al-Bahrainiya hatta nihaya am 1995 m (Bibliography of women in Bahrain: An account of the intellectual production of Bahraini women through 1995). Bahrain, 1996. Jain, Jiya Lal. A Brief History of Education in Bahrain. Bahrain: Arabian Printing and Publishing House, 1986. Kandiyoti, Deniz, ed. Women, Islam, and the State. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. Kar, Mehranguiz. “Women’s strategies in Iran from the 1979 Revolution to 1999.” In Jane H. Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Al-Khateeb, Salwa. “The oil boom and its impact on women and families in Saudi Arabia.” In Alanoush Alsharekh, ed., The Gulf Family: Kinship Policies and Modernity. London: Saqi, 2007.

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Khuri, Fuad I. Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Kraidy, Marwan M. Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005. Kramer, Martin S., ed. Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987. Lawson, Fred H. Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. Longva, Ahn Nga. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. Mahmood, Saba. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005. Makdisi, George. The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981. Martin, Richard C., ed. Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. New York: MacMillan, 2003. Mazrui, Ali A., and Alamin M. Mazrui. “The challenge of cultural dependency: An African and Islamic perspective.” In Ruth Hayhoe and Julia Pan, eds., Knowledge across Cultures: A Contribution to Dialogue among Civilizations. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, 2001. Mernissi, Fatima. The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1991. Al-Misnad, Sheikha. The Development of Modern Education in the Gulf. London: Ithaca Press, 1985. Moaddel, Mansoor, and Kamran Talattof, eds. Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Moghadam, Valentine M. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003. ——. “Patriarchy in transition: Women and the changing family in the Middle East.” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35/2 (Spring 2004), 137–62. Moghissi, Haideh. Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis. London: Zed Books, 1999. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses.” In Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, eds., Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Morsi, Mohammed Monir. Education in the Arab Gulf States. Doha: University of Qatar, 1990. Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender. London: Saqi, 2001.

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Najmabadi, Afsaneh. “Feminism in an Islamic Republic: ‘Years of hardship, years of growth’.” In Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender, and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Al-Najjar, Sakina Muhammad, Latifa Muhammad al-Najjar, Fawzia Hussein Matar, and ‘A’isha Khalifa Matar. Jam‘iya ‘Awal al-Nisa’iya: Al-Nash’a wa alinjazat; dirasa wa tha’iqiyya (Awal Women’s Society: Formation and accomplishments; documentary study). Bahrain: Al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiya, 1989. Nakanishi, Hisae. “Power, ideology, and women’s consciousness in postrevolutionary Iran.” In Herbert L. Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Women in Muslim Societies. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Nakash, Yitzhak. The Shi‘a of Iraq. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. Nakhleh, Emile A. Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society. Lexingon, Massachusets: Lexington Books, 1976. Nashat, Guity. “Women in the Middle East: 8000 B.C.E.–C.E. 1800.” In Guity Nashat and Judith E. Tucker, Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Restoring Women to History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. Nugent, Jeffery B., and Theodore H. Thomas, eds. Bahrain and the Gulf: Past, Perspectives and Alternative Futures. London: Croom Helm, 1985. Pinault, David. The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Al-Qahtani, Sakina Muhammad. Min wahi al-ayyam (Inspiration from days past). Bahrain: Tubi‘a bi-al-Matba‘a al-Hukumiya li-Wizara al-I‘lam, 1994. Rahman, Fazlur. Islam. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1966. ——. Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Ruether, Rosemary Radford. Integrating Ecofeminism, Globalization, and World Religions. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Rumaihi, M. G. Bahrain: Social and Political Change since the First World War. London: Bowker, 1976. El-Sanabary, Nagat. “Middle East and North Africa.” In Elizabeth M. King and M. Anne Hill, eds., Women’s Education in Developing Countries: Barriers, Benefits, and Policies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993. Seikaly, May. “Women and social change in Bahrain.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26/3 (1994), 415–26. ——. “Women and religion in Bahrain: An emerging identity.” In Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito, eds., Islam, Gender, and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Shari‘ati, ‘Ali. Ali Shariati’s Fatima Is Fatima. Trans. Laleh Bakhtiar. Tehran: Shariati Foundation, [1981]. Singleton, A[nne]. Saddam’s Private Army: How Rajavi Changed Iran’s Mojahedin from Armed Revolutionaries to an Armed Cult. N.p.: Iran-Interlink UK, 2003. Starrett, Gregory. Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

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Stromquist, Nelly P. “Education as a means for empowering women.” In Jane L. Parpart, Shirin Rai, and Kathleen A. Staudt, eds., Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World. London: Routledge, 2002. Szyliowicz, Joseph S. Education and Modernization in the Middle East. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1973. Al-Tabataba’i, Muhammad Husayn. Shi‘ite Islam. Trans. and ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975. Al-Tajir, Mahdi Abdalla. Bahrain 1920–1945: Britain, the Shaikh and the Administration. London: Croom Helm, 1987. Tohidi, Nayereh. “The issues at hand.” In Herbert L. Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity within Unity. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Voll, John Obert. Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World. 2nd ed., Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994. Wiley, Joyce N. The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi‘as. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992. Yamani, Mai. Changed Identities: The Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Al Zeera, Zahra. “Paradigm shifts in the social sciences in the East and West.” In Ruth Hayhoe and Julia Pan, eds., Knowledge across Cultures: A Contribution to Dialogue among Civilizations. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 2001. Zimmerman, Joseph F. “Equity in representation for women and minorities.” In Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds., Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994.

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INDEX

A abaya, 2, 3, 51, 52, 57, 62, 73, 85, 95, 101, 107, 116, 140, 158, 161, 163, 164, 174, 178, 179 ‘Abbas, Shah, 27 ‘Abbasid era (and ‘Abbasids), 31, 194, 201 Abu-Lughod, Lila, 129 Aghaie, Kamran Scot, 67 Aguilar, Delia, 19 Ahmed, Leila, 32 Al-e-Ahmad, Jalal, 80, 203, 215 Algerian War of Independence, 52 Alsharekh, Alanoud, 134 American Mission School, 33 Amnesty International, 58, 61, 70, 110 Arab nationalism, 17, 25, 29, 42, 70, 92, 122 Arabian Gulf, 3, 120, 189 Arabian Mission, 33, 34 Asad, Talal, 145 Awal Women’s Society, 46, 51 Al-Azhar University, 160

B Baha’is, 154 Bahraini National Congress, 29

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Al-Bahrain newspaper, 46 Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), 40, 41 Bahraini Women’s Association, 1 Bahrain Young Ladies Society, 46, 140 al-Banna, Hassan, 17 al-Bassam, ‘Aziza, 60–62, Battle of Karbala (680 A.D.), 67, 68, 81 Beinin, Joel, 6, 142 Belgrave, Charles, 29, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 47 Bilateral Mutual Security Pact, 54 Britain (and British), 13, 15, 16, 26–30, 35, 39–43, 49, 52, 54, 60, 104, 122, 128, 129, 135, 164–167 Buddhists, 154 Bulloch, John, 54 Bush, George W., 14, 144

C Campo, Juan, 5, 120 capitalism, 19, 51, 142, 145 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 143 Chatty, Dawn, 20

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222

MUSLIM WOMEN

AND

Christianity, 11, 33 Christians, 116 Cole, Juan, 69 colonialism, 17, 34, 35, 55, 122 colonization, 130 Cooke, Miriam, 124, 184 Cordesman, Anthony, 53

D democracy, 8, 57–59, 61, 69, 80, 94, 141, 142, 145 Denzin, Norman, 129 Dhofar Revolution, 52 Discover Islam, 9, 79, 100, 103 al-Din, Jalal, 38, 94 Doumato, Eleanor, 118, 119, 123

E education, 2, 5, 10, 15, 17, 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–35, 38, 43–47, 50, 52–57, 59, 60, 62–64, 66, 72–75, 80, 85–88, 90–94, 96, 97, 100, 103–108, 111, 121–123, 137, 140–142, 145–149, 151, 154, 160, 165, 166, 170–172, 174, 178–185, 188 modern, 2, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32–35, 60, 86, 88, 90, 105, 106, 121, 178, 180 public, 73, 148 religious, 60, 72, 73, 80, 100, 122, 154, 160, 171, 181–183 Egypt, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 32, 33, 35, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 101, 102, 122, 159, 160, 162, 166, 167, 179 Elections, 1, 57, 59, 87, 93, 94, 127, 131, 134, 136, 140, 144, 177, 178, 180, 185, 187, 202, 208 Ernst, Carl, 55 Esposito, John, 18, 189–193

Pandya_Index_New.indd 222

ISLAMIC R ESURGENCE Ethiopia (and Ethiopians), 41, 152– 154, 156, 158, 159, 173, 174 Exclusive Agreements of 1892, 28

F Fakhro, Munira, 61, 62, 141, 211 feminism, 19, 107, 135, 136, 139–143, 151 France (and French), 26, 28, 90 Fuccaro, Nelida, 38 fundamentalism, 7, 19

G al-Ga’aoud, Lateefa, 135 Gardner, Andrew, 155 Germany, 28 gender, 1, 2, 18–22, 34, 35, 47, 76, 78, 91, 108, 111–113, 128, 133–136, 139, 141–144, 147, 149, 150, 169, 179, 182–184, 186, 213 gendered interests, 19, 183, 184, 186 Ghadbian, Najib, 7, 8, 42 globalization, 5, 19, 86, 104, 107, 108, 178, 179, 183, 185 Great Britain, see Britain (and British) Gulf Cooperation Council, 54 Gulf War, 14, 58, 59

H Hadith, 17, 56, 114, 116, 124, 132, 134, 147, 171, 205 - 206, 208, 209 Hamada, Suad, 63 Hanna, Sami, 36, 38, 46, 48, 122 Hasan and Husayn, 67, 82, 91 haven myth, 148 Headscarf, 82, 108, 109, 117, 137, 138, 158 Heilbrun, Carolyn, 19 Hezbollah, 58, 69 Hinduism, 11, 156

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INDEX Hindus, 154 hijab, 108,109, 116, 138, 151, 156 Holland, 26, 168 Holmes, Frank, 39, 40

I Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 8, 17, 78, 118 identity (and identities), Arab, 11, 105, 168 Bahraini, 2, 150 British, 128 communal, 2, 38, 57, 74, 97, 165 ethnic, 161 gender, 22, 134, 150 Gulf, 57 Islamic, 57, 100, 103, 105, 107, 161, 171, 181 middle-class, 156 Middle Eastern, 165 Muslim, 105, 130, 150, 168 Persian, 11 political, 136 religious, 22, 64, 142, 152, 156, 159, 163–165, 167, 173, 174, 181, 183 Shi’i, 37, 66, 73, 81, 134 transnational, 171 identity politics, 22, 133, 138 illiteracy, see literacy Imam Husayn, 65, 67, 68, 72, 81–83, 91 imperialism, 17, 53, 179 India (and Indians), 27, 35, 41, 42, 50, 69, 122, 155, 166 Iran (and Iranians), 3, 11–13, 18, 26, 27, 31–33, 37, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51–53, 55, 58, 67–69, 72, 77, 78, 80, 88–92, 94, 95, 97, 119, 134, 137, 143, 171, 179, 180, 184, 189, 199, 201, 204 Iranian Revolution, 18, 49, 51–53, 68, 88, 89, 92, 171, 179

Pandya_Index_New.indd 223

223

Islamic: movement(s), 2, 7, 18, 52, 53, 55, 62, 101, 109, 113, 118, 143, 167 resurgence, 1–3, 7–9, 17, 18, 25, 26, 52–56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 97, 109,113, 117–119, 123, 124, 133, 141–143, 150, 164, 167, 169, 171, 172, 181–183 Islamism, 2, 7, 8, 56, 107, 124 Israel, 10, 18, 59, 69

J Jews, 154 Jordan, 50.

K Kandiyoti, Deniz, 19, 140 Al Khalifa government (and family), 11, 27–29, 41, 42, 48, 49, 53, 57, 58, 70, 80, 104, 110, 119, 135, 136 Khaled, Amr, 143, 160, 212 Khomeini, 52, 88, 89, 143, 171 Khuri, Fuad, 38 Kuwait (and Kuwaitis), 15, 39, 46, 54, 69, 89, 102, 127, 161, 198, 208

L law, 21, 88 custody, 210 family, 63, 117, 140, 141, 180, 184 new, 58 religious, 32, 63, 93, 95, 112 regarding compulsory education, 50 regarding hair covering, 120 schools of, 17, 194–195 Islamic, 7, 18, 56, 63, 140, 141 Lebanon, 67, 69, 72, 83, 166 Liberalism, 9 Libya (and Libyans), 12, 13, 166.

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224

MUSLIM WOMEN

AND

Literacy, 5, 21, 25, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 83, 84, 96, 97, 100, 106, 107, 114, 118, 121, 122, 130, 140, 144, 147–149, 157, 179–181, 183–185, 197, 205, 207 Longva, Ahn Nga, 15, 161, 162

M Mahmood, Saba, 20, 150 Mamluk period, 32, 201 Ma’tam, 72, 74, 80, 81, 85, 95, 202 Mecca, 17, 18, 35, 78, 115, 146, 169 Mernissi, Fatima, 134, 209 Ministry of Education, 50, 137 Ministry of Labor, 54 al-Misnad, Sheika, 33, 43, 45, 47, 110, 198 modernity, 6, 23, 51, 52, 55, 56, 105, 128, 133, 142, 144, 145, 149, 152, 170, 178, 181. 183–186 modernization, 2, 42, 47, 70, 107, 133, 145 Moghadam, Valentine, 19, 51, 184 Moghissi, Heideh, 19 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 20, 21, 130, 208 Muharraq, 4, 34 Muslim Brotherhood, 17, 18 Mustafa, Ribhi, 62 mutawwa’; 120

N Nagy, Sharon, 15, 192 Nakhleh, Emile, 28, 44, 50, 140, 193 Nasser, Gamal Abdel-, 52, 192, 197 Nasserism, 17, 192 Nizamiyya, 31

O oil boom, 49, 50, 107, 122, 155

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ISLAMIC R ESURGENCE discovery of, 25–29, 39–41, 64, 154, 178 industry, 41 markets, 28 money, 50 reserves, 39, 40, 59, 123. revenue, 29, 43, 179. ‘wealth, 47, 140 Oman, 26, 27, 32, 40, 52, 54, 69, 162 Orientalism (and Orientalists), 20, 103, 130, 193 Ottoman Empire (and Ottomans), 69, 201

P Palestinian, 10, 42, 59, 69, 75, 84, 93, 104 Pakistan, 16, 18, 69, 166 patriarchy, 26, 51, 63, 117, 133, 142, 143, 149, 183 Perpetual Maritime Truce, 28 Philippines (and Filipinas, Filipinos), 41, 156, 158, 159, 166 Portugal, 26 post-9/11, 8, 13, 71, 108 post-oil period, 26, 38, 49 education in, 43–45 religion in, 48 women in, 45- 48 pre-oil period, 25, 26, 39–42, 178, 198 education in, 30–35 religion in, 37–38 women in, 35–36 Prophet Muhammad, 11, 30, 31, 37, 65, 67, 68, 91, 112, 114–116, 118, 120, 132, 147, 160, 164

Q al-Qahtani, Sakina Muhammad, 35 Qatar, 27, 33, 54, 69, 206

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INDEX

R Rabo, Annika, 20 radicalism, 7 Rahman, Fazlur, 34, 201 Ramadan, 16, 67, 70, 86, 103, 128, 131, 136, 157, 206 Reza Shah, Mohammad, 27, 51, 52, 193, 199 religious authorities, 124 behavior, 129 centers, 122, 124 clubs, 121 community, 125 dogma, 121 educational institutions, 122 expression, 129 ideology, 121 institutions, 129, 130 organizations, 123–125, practice, 124, 125, 128 police, 79, 120, 121 studies, 121

S Sadat, Anwar, 52 Saudi Arabia(n), 3, 12, 13, 17, 18, 27, 35, 39, 48, 54, 69, 72, 74, 78, 79, 89, 95, 100, 108, 118–124, 137, 143, 149, 151, 179, 180, 182–184, 204, 206, 207, 210 scholarship, 30, 130 feminist, 130 male bias in, 134 Orientalist, 103, 130 religious, 132 Western, 130 secularization, 17, 145, 182 segregation, 123, 169, 183 Seikaly, May, 56, 60, 62, 109, 123, 136, 139, 142, 189, 205,

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225

self-determination, 2, 19, 97, 173, 185 Shadid, Anthony, 12 Shah, Nadir, 27 shari’a, see Law, Islamic Shari’ati, ‘Ali, 68, 88–94 Shi’a, 1, 2, 4–6, 9–13, 17, 18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 49, 50, 53–62, 64–97, 101, 107, 115, 119, 125, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 141, 142, 145, 162, 177–183, 186, 187, 191, 194, 197, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210 Six Day War, 52 Starrett, Gregory, 55, 56 Stork, Joe, 6, 142 Sufism, 5, 9, 17, 31, 37, 38, 55, 56, 118, 137, 179, 190 Sunnis, 1, 5, 6, 8–13, 17, 18, 22, 26, 29, 31, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 49, 54–56, 58, 60, 65–71, 73–75, 77, 78, 88, 89, 92–97, 100, 101, 103, 107, 113–115, 119, 122, 125, 128, 129, 131, 133, 136, 137, 144, 161, 177, 179–182, 185, 186, 191, 197, 204, 210 Syria, 12, 17, 44. 50, 69, 191, 201

T tombs, visiting of, 37, 118, 146, 179 Trucial States Council, 28, 43 Tunisia, 12, 13 Turkey (and Turks), 31, 44, 69

U Umm al-Darda’, 9, 12, 14, 22, 57, 95, 97, 99–107, 111–113, 115, 117–119, 122, 124, 129, 156, 177, 180–182, 205–206 Ummayyad dynasty, 31 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 28, 54, 69

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226

MUSLIM WOMEN

AND

United States (US and USA), 74, 144, 170, 197 culture, 104 Department of State, 196, 200, 202, 205, 212 Embassy, 9, 16, 58, 69 foreign policy, 13, 14, 40, 59, 71, 104, 108 military presence, 14, 58, 59 Navy, 12, 13, 135, 200 Popularity of, 75 War on Terror, 14 workers from, 41 see also Bush, George and Central Intelligence Agency University of Bahrain, 4, 9, 55, 73, 75

V Voll, John Obert, 7, 114, 206

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ISLAMIC R ESURGENCE

W Wadud, Amina, 134 Wahhabi, 78, 79, 113, 118, 123, 138, 181, 206 Wahhabism, 7, 8, 119, 206 westernization, 7, 34, 80, 90, 142, 145, 182 World War II, 41

Y Yamani, Mai, 165 Yemen, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 40, 52, 69, 99, 191

Z Zayn al-Din, Nazira, 134

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