Morphopragmatics: Diminutives and Intensifiers in Italian, German, and Other Languages 9783110877052, 9783110140415

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Morphopragmatics

W DE G

Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 76

Editor

Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Morphopragmatics Diminutives and Intensifies in Italian, German, and Other Languages

by Wolfgang U. Dressier Lavinia Merlini Barbaresi

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1994

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

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Cataloging-in-Publication-Data

Dressier, Wolfgang U., 1939— Morphopragmatics : diminutives and intensifies in Italian, German, and other languages / Wolfgang U. Dressier, Lavinia Merlini Barbaresi. p. cm. - (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 76) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 3-11-014041-1 ; 1. Grammar, Comparative and general - Morphology. 2. Pragmatics. 3. Languages, Modern - Diminutives. 4. Languages, Modern - Intensification. I. Merlini Barbaresi, Lavinia. II. Title. III. Series. P241.D73 1994 306.4'4-dc20 94-28594 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek —

Cataloging-in-Publication-Data

Dressier, Wolfgang U.: Morphopragmatics : diminutives and intensifiers in Italian, German, and other languages / Wolfgang U. Dressier ; Lavinia Merlini Barbaresi. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1994 (Trends in linguistics : Studies and monographs ; 76) ISBN 3-11-014041-1 NE: Merlini Barbaresi, Lavinia:; Trends in linguistics / Studies and monographs

© Copyright 1994 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Typesetting and printing: Arthur Collignon GmbH, Berlin. Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Preface With this book we intend to fill in a lacuna in the theories of both pragmatics and morphology and to show that investigations in the theory of grammar and in pragmatic or discourse theory can be unified with mutual benefit. In fact we propose to integrate morphology and pragmatics in the area of their natural intersection. In addition to this theoretical aim, we intend to apply new theoretical insights to more principled and systematic descriptions of so-far marginalized facts and hope to dig up novel facts. Such theory-guided description will chiefly refer to our native languages, Italian and German. After independent and common work on the subject (cf. 1.10.1), we started to work on this book in July 1990 in Santa Teresa di Gallura, while our respective families were enjoying the beautiful beaches of Sardinia. The work progressed in parallel at our home universities (through correspondence by letters, phone, E-mail and fax) and during reciprocal visits to Vienna, Litzlberg, Milan, Pisa, and Viareggio. Parts of earlier versions of this book were tried out in Wolfgang Dressler's courses at the Universität Wien, at the Scuola Normale di Pisa, at the Universitä di Roma, and at the Universite de Montreal and in Lavinia Merlini Barbaresi's courses at the Universitä di Pisa. Moreover, general ideas, specific claims and concrete examples of our book were submitted to the attention of colleagues at several conferences and in many European universities as well as in North American, Japanese and Egyptian ones. These receptive audiences we thank warmly. For many helpful comments and suggestions as well as useful information, we owe gratitude to many colleagues and friends, particularly to Michael Agar, Hans Basboll, Pier Marco Bertinetto, Manfred Bierwisch, Monika Cigler, Eugenio Coseriu, Maurizio Dardano, Katarzyna Dziubalska, Konrad Ehlich, Robert Fiehler, Bruce Fräser, Horst Geckeier, Claudio Giovanardi, Helmut Gruber, Michael Halliday, Sachiko Ide, Jose Luis Iturrioz, Ferenc Kiefer, Marianne Kilani-Schoch, Eva Lavric, Elisabeth Leinfellner, Michele Loporcaro, Liliana Madelska, Ardith Meier, Igor Mel'cuk, Sylvia Moosmüller, Miren Onederra, Franz Rainer, Jochen Rehbein, Zdenka Rusinovä, Sonia Sanchez, Barbara Sandig, Marina Sbisä, Klaus Scherer, Masayoshi Shibatani, Rajendra Singh, Ioana Stefanescu, Tamäs Terestyeni, Giovanna Turrini, Ruth Wodak, Igor Zagar.

vi

Preface

Also those of Wolfgang Dressler's students, who have developed special aspects of morphopragmatics in published or unpublished papers and theses deserve our gratitude for providing stimulating feed-back, particularly Danielle Belanger, Anastasia Christofidou, Grazia CroccoGaleas, Ursula Doleschal, Lihua Guo, Ilse Haslinger, Marianne Hilscher, Roswitha Irran, Sergios Katsikas, Richard Kerschhofer, M. A. Khabir, Anna de Marco, Brigitta Müller, Wilfried Öller, Eduard Silhavy. Generalized thanks also go to all native speakers of Italian, German, English, Polish, Spanish, Japanese, Greek, Danish, French, Hungarian, Czech, and other languages who acted as our informants, and we apologize to them for not being able to include all the valuable data they graciously supplied. For the English translations of many of our Italian examples, we are indebted to Tony Cafazzo, Lois Clegg, Edward Farrants, Susan Garton, Susan George, and Domenico Pacitti. Very special thanks are due to Carol Taylor Torsello for her careful reading of the whole manuscript and for her insightful observations. For computer help we warmly thank Martin Prinzhorn. We dedicate this book to our patient families as a sign of our gratitude for their help as informants and their constant encouragement and understanding throughout the time of our endeavors. Milan, Autumn 1992

Contents

Preface

ν

1. Introduction 1.1. Prelude: Cosifan tutte 1.2. Pragmatics in general 1.3. Text and discourse 1.4. Semiotic basis 1.5. Action theory 1.6. Functional explanation 1.7. Relevant areas of pragmatics 1.8. Emotion 1.9. Morphology and Natural Morphology 1.10. Morphopragmatics: History of research 1.11. Morphopragmatics and grammaticalization 1.12. Outlook and final definitions

1 1 4 6 8 11 15 18 29 36 49 51 55

2. Morphopragmatics in inflection 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Here and There 2.3. Personal pronouns 2.4. On the morphopragmatics of Japanese addressee honorifics 2.5. A Huichol prefix 2.6. Conclusions

58 58 59 60 72 80 82

3. Diminutives 3.1. Aims 3.2. History of research 3.3. Diminutives in Italian, German, and English 3.4. Semantics and pragmatics of diminutives 3.5. Data and their interpretation 3.6. Linguistic conclusions 3.7. Sociocultural conclusions

84 84 85 91 116 170 394 409

4. The morphopragmatics of Italian intensification 4.1. Intensification in general

415 415

viii

Contents

4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5.

Augmentatives in -one Elatives in -issimo Italian word reduplication Conclusions on Italian morphological intensification . . . .

428 491 510 524

5. Italian (and German) interfixes 5.1. History of research 5.2. Structural properties of antesuffixal interfixes 5.3. Semantics of Italian antesuffixal interfixes 5.4. Pragmatics of Italian antesuffixal interfixes 5.5. Textual functions of Italian antesuffixal interfixes 5.6. German interradical interfixes 5.7. Conclusions

529 529 529 540 542 548 553 557

6. The 6.1. 6.2. 6.3.

558 558 559

German excessive Morphotactics and history of research Morphosemantics of German excessives Morphopragmatics and textual functions of German excessives 6.4. Conclusions

562 573

7. Conclusions

574

Notes

583

References

615

Language Index

658

Subject Index

661

1.

Introduction

1.1. Prelude: Cosi fan tutte This book is devoted to affixes and other morphological devices whose meaning appears to be primarily located in pragmatics. These devices exhibit no stable semantic value and their meaning seems to be often elusive. Due to this elusiveness, morphologists have tended to give very vague and impressionistic descriptions of such meanings. Pragmaticists, on their part, have largely disregarded the autonomous pragmatic value of productive morphological operations. In both fields, very little effort has been made to account systematically for their dependence on, and contribution to, the speech situations in which they typically occur. Our aim is to investigate how pragmatics and morphology meet and become mutually relevant. This is tantamount to an attempt at developing a new, integrated subdiscipline, morphopragmatics, to be placed alongside of the well-established subdisciplines of morphotactics and morphosemantics. Such a task entails a systematic investigation of the dependence of morphopragmatics on speech situations, speech acts, attitudes of the interactants, etc., that is, areas which go well beyond morphosemantics, intended as the study of the denotative or connotative meaning of morphological operations. For a first illustration of some of the issues that we are going to tackle in this book, let us analyze a scene from Mozart's Cosi fan tutte 11.18 (libretto by Lorenzo da Ponte):

Ferrando:

A voi s'inchina Bella damina II cavaliere Dell' Albania.

Guglielmo: II ritrattino Pel coricino Ecco, io le rendo Signora mia.

Our literal translation: 'To you is bowing, beautiful little lady, the cavalier from Albania. The little portrait for the little heart, here, I return it to you, my lady.'

2

Introduction

For comparison, a German version of the opera is given:1 Ferrando:

Euch, edle Dame, Stolz von Ferrara, Grüßt voll Verehrung ein Fürst aus Zara.

Guglielmo: Hier dieses Bildnis geb ich dir wieder, Gib, Liebste mir mein Herzchen zurück.

'Ye, noble lady, pride of Ferrara, salutes in adoration a prince from Zara. Here this portrait I give you back, Give me, dearest, back my little heart.'

And, now, two English versions, one British, the other American: 2 Ferrando:

Maiden so charming, Quickly disarming A cavalier from The wilds of Albania

Guglielmo: See here a treasure Guarded with pleasure, Yours in return, love, Render to me.

You are my goddess! I kneel before you! I am your hero who wants to adore you! Here is a portrait I know you treasure. Give me my heart now, measure for measure.

Earlier in the opera, the two characters Ferrando and Guglielmo had set a trap for their fiancees in order to test their faithfulness. Disguised as rich Muslim Albanians, they had engaged in close courtship, pleading their suits to the young ladies (each to the other's fiancee), with exaggerated expressions of love. The ladies had fallen easy prey to them and had gone as far as signing a marriage contract with the two "Albanians". In this final scene, the two lovers, back to their true selves, are ready to unveil their imbroglio ('trick'). The strategy they choose is that of recalling parts of their courtship scenes by way of parody. 3 Parody is verbally obtained through an overuse of diminutives: 4 damina 'Madam!' (diminutive of dama) replaces madama (or plural madame) and donne 'women', which have occurred in earlier scenes. Ritratt-ino 'portrait' (diminutive of ritratto) of Ferrando had been called ritrattino and ritratto before. And cor-ic-ino (from core 'heart') had appeared only once in comparably emotional environments (emotion not pretended!), otherwise core had been used. 5 This brief sequence highlights a few among the various questions that we intend to raise in this book. The productive rule of diminutive forma-

Prelude: Cosi fan tutte

3

tion is strategically used to obtain irony and parody and emphasizes a state of simulation. At the same time it brings forth the ludic character of the lovers' action. The rhyme increases the effect obtained by diminutives. The meaning of diminutives is not limited to a denotation of smallness but contains indication of contextual and communicative conditions. 6 The goal of the speech event - that is, the expression of pretended love - is pursued through an exaggerated use of this verbal device, paralleled by an equally exaggerated use of gestural devices. Another important aspect of these diminutives is their macrostructural relevance in the pragmatic design of the opera. In their capacity of being received as a parody of preceding scenes, they play a major macro-anaphoric role (cf. 1.4). The British version tries to render the difference between It. damina and dama with a lexical choice, that is, by substituting maiden for lady (as if damina here implied younger age or different social status), but otherwise it entrusts the parodistic effect of the excessive use of Italian diminutives to non-verbal gestures and to Mozart's art of musical parody. The American version makes no attempt whatsoever to render the Italian diminutives. This is not so much a question of undertranslation, but rather it reflects a void in English morphology. As we will see, English lacks most of the morphopragmatic categories that Italian has. German, on its part, has a larger number of morphopragmatic categories than English, but certainly not as large as Italian. Moreover, compared with Italian, it certainly makes less use of such categories. Thus, in our passage, there is just one German diminutive: Herz-chen 'heartlet'. Bild-chen might have been used instead of the simplex Bild 'image, picture, portrait' or its more specific quasisynonym Bildnis, but a diminutive *Bild-nis-chen would be ungrammatical, and dim. Däm-chen instead of Dame would be pragmatically inappropriate because it has a stable (that is, semantic) pejorative connotation and can hardly be used for the language of love. Of course, one might argue that the German and English versions are by no means literal translations, but rather very free adaptations having operatic purposes. Yet, both the speech acts of the two lovers and the speech situation are well rendered in those aspects which are relevant for the macrostructure of the opera. But some of the effects obtained by diminutives in the Italian original, in English are pursued by different means, and this is also predominantly the case in German.

4

Introduction

1.2. Pragmatics in general 1.2.1. "Today, pragmatics is a large, loose and disorganized collection of research efforts" (Verschueren 1987 b: 4; 1987 a: 15 n. 2). This description may still be valid in 1992. Therefore, with no pretense to an original contribution to pragmatic theory in general, it is necessary for us to take a position and state our preferences within this vast array of different approaches to pragmatics. In line with our semiotic perspective (cf. 1.4), we favor a pragmaticist view (Morris 1938; Leech 1983) and include semantics within pragmatics, that is, as meaning in context. 7 But since we do not want to investigate areas of morphological meaning that can be dealt with successfully by morphosemantics alone, we are, actually, close to Leech's complementarism (1983: 6 - 7 ) , that is, we believe that - despite the pragmatic basis of semantics and the impossibility of drawing sharp boundaries - pragmatics and semantics can be treated as separate disciplines which complement and enrich each other (cf. also Levinson 1979: 217—218).8 In the practice of our analysis, semantics is what remains of meaning if all pragmatic variables (classified in 1.2.3) are ignored, that is, kept fixed in the analyst's idealisation. And in this restricted view, pragmatics is the area that deals with all the aspects of meaning determined by the introduction of such variables. Thus, at least in practice, we do not depart much from the conception whereby pragmatic meaning - the object of our morphopragmatic investigation - is global meaning (meaning as use) minus semantic meaning. 1.2.2. Taking up a distinction made by Eco (1987: 704), we do not subscribe to a pragmatics of signification, but rather to a pragmatics of communication, which investigates "how to analyze pragmatic phenomena that take place in the course of a communicative process". Of course, morphopragmatics may also study pragmatic phenomena that take place in the course of a cognitive process, during silent but already verbally conceptualized thinking, but in order to investigate thoughts we would have to rely on our own intuitions or on reports of others, and such sources are quite unreliable (cf. Ringen 1975). Therefore, in this book we limit our treatment to morphopragmatic phenomena within communicative processes. Communicative processes must not be equated with performance (e. g., in a Chomskyan sense), that is, with language use conceived of as merely "language structures in motion" (as caricatured by Clark 1987: 9).

Pragmatics

in general

5

We can metaphorically think of the pragmatics of communication in terms of a theatrical representation, 9 where we analytically distinguish a static and a dynamic dimension. A) The static dimension is made up of the setting, the stage, and the dramatis personae (cast). B) The dynamic dimension is made up of the actions planned and performed by the actors. Let us identify the static dimension with the speech situation and the dynamic dimension with the speech event (cf. Verschueren 1987 a: 80—82) — in contrast to models which conflate the two into one (into speech situation in, e.g., Leech 1983: 13—15; into speech event in Levinson 1983: 279).10 1.2.3. By speech situation - (A) - we understand the entire communicative situation consisting of: 1) participant roles with their properties and interrelations; 2) place, time, and general setting of communication; and 3) the conventional verbal and non-verbal means of communication available to the participants. The social structure binds these three (analytically distinguished) groups of elements of the speech situation together.11 Interlocutors refer indexically to elements of the speech situation (social deixis, as defined by Levinson 1979). Thus they can link aspects of linguistic form to aspects of context directly, that is, pragmatically, with no mediation of semantics (Levinson 1979: 216). We reserve the term speech event - (B) - to indicate the verbal and non-verbal actions and interactions 12 of participants as governed by social norms (cf. 1.5), which are defined by the social structure. We ignore all non-communicative actions. Participants of the speech situation ( A l ) include speaker (text producer), addressee (direct destinee, recipient), side-participants (audience considered by speaker), and (marginally) bystanders (Brown—Levinson 1987: 180-181; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980: 23). Participants have relevant static properties, such as presuppositions and cognitive properties (as defined by Nuyts-Verschueren 1987), attitudes (psychological dimension), interrelations (social dimension, including discernment, cf. Ide 1989). Wodak et al. (1990: 213-214) differentiate objective factors, like biography, experiences, previous knowledge, status, and position roles from latent factors, like motives, preconceptions, attitudes, emotions, sympathy vs. antipathy. Social structure may be understood in terms of macrosociological domains (cf. Breitborde 1983). Conventional means of communication also include conversational maxims and conventional implicatures. Here social deixis belongs, which we restrict "to those aspects of language structure that are anchored to the social identities of partici-

6

Introduction

pants (including bystanders) in the speech event, or to relations between them, or to relations between them and other referents" (Levinson 1979). Major features of a speech event (B) are dynamic elements like volition, intentions, goals and super-goals, plans, pragmatic strategies, topics, (non-conventional) conversational implicatures, and also speech acts. 13 1.2.4. So far our analytical assumption seems to imply that speech situation (A) and speech event (B) are strictly separate and that (A) is given before the occurrence of (B). In reality, there is an important interface between dimensions (A) and (B), in the sense that many elements of the speech situation have to be negotiated or, at least, can be renegotiated by the participants. 14 Thus it is another analytic idealization that we follow here in assuming with Littman—Mey (1991: 139) that "situations are the contexts in which agents act." This idealization is a useful analytic tool to account for the predominance of static vs. dynamic dimensions in various morphopragmatic areas (e.g., Japanese honorifics in Chapter 2 vs. diminutives in Chapter 3). But before illustrating and justifying our approach to specific areas of pragmatics relevant for our book (1.7) we will, in succession, look into units of communication (text and discourse level, 1.3), then integrate communication into semiosis (1.4), then investigate action and interaction in general (1.5) and finally argue why functional explanation is the best suited explanatory model for morphopragmatics (1.6).

1.3. Text and discourse The unit of communication is the text, that is, verbal communication occurs in the format of texts. Texts are defined as communicative occurrences (Beaugrande-Dressier 1981: 3) or as communicative events. A discourse is definable, instead, as a set of mutually related texts. The size of a text is not a criterion for definition, that is, it may range from a oneword (= holophrastic) exclamation to a whole book or from a lengthy utterance to a short turn in conversation, etc. A conversation must be classified as discourse because it consists of two or more mutually related texts (scil. turns). Texts are interpretable and therefore they are also semiotic units (cf. 1.4). Since they are interpretable, they are normally meaningful (at least

Text and discourse

7

to some interpreters). In agreement with the pragmaticist view of meaning (1.2.1), the primary textual meaning is pragmatic meaning. In other words, the fundamental textual perspective is that of text or discourse pragmatics. 15 The basic standard of textuality, viz., coherence, is pragmatic in nature, in the sense that coherence is based on inferences drawn by interpreters. 16 The connexity of the surface text, called cohesion (Beaugrande Dressler 1981: 48-83), is a less important standard of textuality than coherence. A text may be lacking in cohesion but cannot lack coherence. Coherence may be established, via inferencing, even in the case of scarce cohesion. The relation of grammar to cohesion may be compared to the relation of semantics to pragmatics (1.2), that is, grammar is an idealization abstracted out of cohesion. So, also grammar is "discourse-driven", to use Thompson's (1991) felicitous term (cf. Fasold 1990: 75-86). Coherence and cohesion apply to both the macro-structure (or global structure) of a text and its micro-structure, that is, the connexity between clauses, sentences, or tone-units. Typical micro-structural units above the sentence level are adjacency pairs produced in different speakers' turns or coherent pairs of sentences or tone-units produced by the same speaker/writer (for speech-act sequences, see 1.7.2.2). We have restricted the agenda of this book to morphopragmatic phenomena, whose scope in the text is, in general, micro-structural. 17 So, many of the cases examined in our analysis can be discussed with no recourse to text linguistics. Therefore we can dispense with most of the text-linguistic apparatus and simply refer to Beaugrande-Dressier (1981). Only what is needed in later chapters and sub-chapters and what is not discussed in the sub-chapters on semiotics (1.4), action theory (1.5), pragmatics (1.7), is introduced here. Only two other standards of textuality will be explicitly used later on: intentionality, that is, the text producer's intention to use textual coherence and cohesion for attaining a goal, and its mirror image, acceptability, the text receiver's attitude towards the text (cf. Beaugrande-Dressier 1981: 1.13-14). In addition to the seven standards of textuality (representing constitutive principles), Beaugrande-Dressier (1981: 11) also introduced three regulative principles: efficiency, effectiveness, and appropriateness. The efficiency of a text is accounted for in terms of the processing ease of text producer and/or receiver. "The effectiveness of the text depends on its intensity of impact on text receivers, promoting processing depth, and upon its contribution towards the producer's goal, constituting the rele-

8

Introduction

vance of texts materials to steps in a plan" (Beaugrande 1980: 21; cf. 4.1.5.1). The appropriateness of a text regulates the relations among standards and between the other two regulative principles of textuality. In the sections on style (notably 3.5.16, 4.1.5.4, 4.2.5.2), we will refer to text types, understood as classes of texts whose typical constellations of properties and strategies are appropriate for specific purposes (cf. Beaugrande—Dressier 1981: 182—188). In addition, we will need the following two polar oppositions (cf. Rehbein 1988: 1187—1188 with references): 1) written vs. oral texts; 2) institutional or institution-specific vs. homileic (or homiletical) texts. Homileic discourse has the social goal of entertaining and making people socialize and thus is a more specific concept than B. Malinowski's "phatic communion". It typically occurs in spontaneous, casual conversation, such as small talk in all circumstances (cf. Ehlich-Rehbein 1980: 343). Homileic discourse is often characterized by fictive, aesthetic and/or ludic aspects. 18 Another text-linguistic concept is re-elaboration. In the sections concerned (notably 3.5.15, 4.1.5.3, 4.2.5.1), we will deal with this specific text-constitutive action of reformulation, that is, reformulation of an antecedent formulation by the same or a different speaker (cf. GülichKotschi 1987). Re-elaboration entails pragmatic reloading.

1.4. Semiotic basis A communicative process can be seen as a semiosis, while its basic unit, the text (1.3), and, more specifically, any morphopragmatically relevant rule within the text can be seen as a sign. We embrace this view and base our approach on Peircean semiotics (cf. Peirce 1965; Hookway 1985). Our choice rests on the following arguments: first, linguistics deals with language as a system of verbal signs, semiotics with signs in general. That is to say, semiotics is an appropriate meta-level for linguistic theory. Second, we use Peircean semiotics instead of other semiotic models (e. g., Saussurean semiology), because it seems to be especially appropriate for use in a discourse-based approach (cf. Dressier 1986 a, 1989; Merlini Barbaresi 1988). In contrast with Saussure, Peirce does not reduce the sign to a static dyadic relationship between signans and signatum (cf. Apel 1989). He emphasizes the role of the interpreter in the dynamics of semiosis. So, his

Semiotic basis

9

words: "nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign" 19 do not indicate the potentiality of the signans-signatum relationship but refer to the actual signification of any instance of (cognitive or communicative) semiosis. Peirce's view allows conceiving of semiosis as taking place on the level of pragmatics (cf. 1.2). The basic notion relevant for pragmatics is Peirce's interpretant, that is, the effect created in the interpreter's mind (cf. Peirce 1965: 1.339, III.228). Peirce differentiates various types of interpretants, for example, the immediate interpretant (the immediate communicative effect on the text receiver) and the final interpretant (the result the receiver arrives at after complex steps of interpretation). This differentiation corresponds to different degrees of processing depth in inferencing (cf. Beaugrande— Dressier 1981: III.9), cf. Eco (1984: 2): "a sign is an χ standing for a y which is absent, and the process which leads the interpreter from χ to y is of an inferential nature." The depth of inferencing may vary according to individual interpreters and specific speech situations. In semiotic terms, hearers do not achieve the same level of interpretant. Therefore it is not surprising that interpreters do not agree in interpreting the contribution of a morphopragmatic category to the overall meaning of an utterance. There are other semiotic concepts relevant to our book. Some of these are drawn from Peirce's well-known first triad of signs. Within this triad, consisting of icons, indices, and (conventional) symbols, icons are the most natural signs (cf. Peirce 1965: 11.276), or more precisely: all linguistic signs are, at least minimally, conventional/symbolic, but they may, at the same time, contain iconic and/or indexical aspects. The more iconic a sign is, the more natural/more preferred/less marked it is. This establishes the universal parameter of iconicity, where iconicity means similarity between signans and signatum in the mind of the interpreter. On the text level, the best known aspect of iconicity is the universal preference for ordo naturalis (cf. Dressier 1989b: 15-18; 1989c: 88-89). For morphology, see 1.9.5.2. An index or, more precisely, an indexical signans is defined by Peirce (1965: 11.369) as that "which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular object intended (= indexical signatum) without describing it." Indexicality may point either to an element within the context of situation (exophoric deixis) or to a cotextual element, that is, within the same text (endophoric deixis) and thus either backwards (anaphora) or forwards (cataphora), as in textual ana/cataphora. Anaphora is preferred over cataphora (cf. Dressier 1989 b: 2 4 -

10

Introduction

26: 1989c: 89-90; Merlini Barbaresi 1988: 109-110), as we will see in 1.9.5.2 and 5.5. Endophora is, ceteris paribus, the more reliable, the closer the distance between indexical signatum (e. g., an antecedent) and its indexical signans (e.g., a coreferring pronoun, cf. Dressier 1989b: 27-30; 1989c: 90-91; Merlini 1988: 113-114). This is especially relevant in textual micro-structure, but macro-anaphoric indexicality is not excluded, for example, allusions to distant previous parts of the same discourse, as we have seen in 1.1. Indexicality plays a role also in morphology (cf. 1.9.5.2). Exophoric indexicality is important in pragmatics, for example in social deixis (cf. 1.7.1 — 1.7.2). Pragmatic operations or devices (e.g., pronouns or morphological rules) may index the pragmatics of speech acts and speech situations. In this case, the preference for close distance holds as well. For example, pronominal reference is more direct, when the referent (the indexical signatum) is the speaker or addressee rather than another participant or an absent referent. Distance may mean either physical or social or psychological distance. Also the degree of saliency of an indexical signatum may regulate morphopragmatic indexicality (cf. Silverstein 1987: 32 and 3.5.9.6 on landing-sites of diminutive suffixes). Another semiotic principle is that of transparency, generally preferred over its opposite pole opacity (cf. Dressier 1989 b: 37-46; for morphology cf. 1.9.5.2). According to Koj (1979: 377) "Transparency to meaning ... appears precisely when we completely cease to perceive the material shape of a sign ... and are conscious only of its semantic sign", that is, when cognitive or pragmatic or semantic meanings are directly reflected on the surface of the text and there is no need for further inferencing or reconstructive processing. Of course, full transparency can obtain only in an idealized state of affairs. Still, transparency requires minimal inferencing (cf. 1.3, 1.7.11) and thus favors efficiency in interpretation. Among implicatures (1.7.6), conventional implicatures are more transparent than conversational. Direct speech acts are more transparent than indirect speech acts (cf. 1.7.12.5), that is, the degree of directness of a speech act is correlated with its illocutionary transparency. Direct speech acts are universally unmarked insofar as they are easier to understand, earlier learnt by children, better preserved in aphasia. However their predicted frequency of use is highly restricted by language- and culture-specific conventions, particulary by norms of politeness, although indirectness does not always increase politeness (cf. Held 1989, 1990). Finally, we will use the semiotic concept of figure and ground. This concept of a more important, more precise, more dynamic figure (or

Action theory

11

foreground) set against a less important, more pallid, more static ground (or background) has been taken from gestalt psychology and transferred into semiotics (cf. Holenstein 1976; Β. Scherer 1984: 156-166; Dressler 1989b: 47-51; 1989c: 91-92). This parameter seems to be adequate for capturing hierarchies within the rhythmic structuring of sequential linearization of a text. All texts must have hierarchical structuring. This rhythmic structuring follows iconically from underlying cognitive, pragmatic, and semantic differences in saliency. The stronger the contrast between figure and ground, the better the figure is perceived, that is, the "percept ... obtrudes itself on my gaze" (Peirce 1965: VII.619). Intensification (cf. 4.1.5.1) is a means for foregrounding. Although it would be possible to embed many more concepts and arguments used throughout this book into a semiotic metatheory, we will generally refrain from doing so, because this might divert many readers from the main goals of this book. The semiotic grounding of morphopragmatics is planned for future research. But we will have to mention some more semiotic concepts in 1.9.5.2.

1.5. Action theory 1.5.1. In our view, an action theory is a necessary background to pragmatics. It is compatible with Peircean semiotics (1.4), whereby signs can be understood either in terms of relations or of actions of semiosis (cf. Parret 1983: 30). In fact, language can be seen as part of social action in the sense of Max Weber (1947), that is, as an action whose meaning is decided by its actor(s), and which has an orientation towards the behavior of other persons and whose performance is regulated in accordance with such behavior. Since language is produced by human beings who organize their social life by means of language (both via communication 20 and cognition, the two basic functions of language), language is best described and understood as a system of goal-directed actions within its social frame. For example, speech acts are actions, and, in general, "language use is a class of human activities in which language is but one ingredient" (H. Clark 1987: 9), and "the broadest interpretation of pragmatics is that it is the study of understanding human action" (Green 1989: 3).

12

Introduction

Therefore many authors agree that a model of pragmatics (and particularly of speech acts) must be inserted into a theory of action and/or interaction. 21 Since available action theories 22 do not so far cover all the pragmatic aspects relevant to morphopragmatics, we can use it, for our purposes, only as a basic point of reference but not as an explanatory model. Notice also that Nuyts—Verschueren (1987, I: 52) derive all subfields of pragmatics from the basic concept of "action" but do no try to qualify the subtleties of linguistic pragmatics within a theory of action. In our explanatory approach, action theory does have a place, as we want to account for the role that morphology plays in the pragmatics of language conceived of as human activity. From this perspective, we can avoid constraining our study to morphology as linguistic structure, that is, in terms of Humboldt's ergon, and can opt instead for an approach in terms of Humboldt's energeia. 1.5.2. Schütz (1967) correctly distinguishes performed action from projected action (or action scheme), that is, the anticipation of future real action according to a devised plan; not everything which is performed was intended at the level of projected action, because any plan may have empty slots. In other words, a distinction between competence and performance or (a weaker claim) between type and token, also pertains to the level of action. 23 What we, like many linguists, are more interested in is how actual, empirically investigable performance of acts of speaking, writing, evaluating, and receptively processing language reflects patterns of devised plans. For example, conversation — the primary locus of language use — consists of patterns of moves, long studied by conversational analysts, where "the listening behavior of the listeners and the speaking behavior of the speakers, co-occurring synchronously, complete each other's actions and thus mutually influence each other" (Erickson 1982: 45). 1.5.3. In our schematic sketch, we start with social interaction within a social world. 24 Interaction includes negotiation of goals and actions for obtaining these goals. 25 Interaction may be either cooperative or noncooperative (that is, antagonistic, cf. Kiefer 1979: 59—60). Only intentional antagonism is relevant here, 26 not unintentional rudeness, such as ignorance of, or failure in, politeness strategies, or "interincomprehension" and misunderstandings. 27 Cooperativeness, in its many senses, is particularly important for morphopragmatics. At this point we are primarily interested in the first of the following interpretations of cooperativeness:

Action theory

13

1) Global or local cooperativeness as opposed to antagonism in social interaction. 28 Of course, we must differentiate hierarchies of interaction, in terms, for example, of Castelfranchi—Parisi's (1980) distinction between goals and supergoals (cf. below 1.5.5), insofar as local antagonism may be embedded into global cooperativeness, and vice versa local cooperativeness may be embedded into global antagonism. The opposition global/local relative to cooperativeness must not be confused with the opposition deep/surface, which, for example, becomes pertinent in case of lying, pretending, cheating, etc. Cultures may differ greatly in their desire for (local or global) surface cooperativeness, e.g., (social) "harmony" as underlined by Wierzbicka (1991: 68-69, 113-115). In 1.1, we have an instance of local antagonism (a conflictual, mocking attitude by the male partners) embedded into global cooperativeness (as induced by mutual love).29 The polar contrast between human benevolence and malevolence refers to this interpretation of cooperativeness. 2) Cooperativeness in terms of social interaction is more crucial when common goals are to be achieved by joint action of speaker and hearer as, for example, in many transactional speech events. 30 Common goals may even be felt as such by the speaker only and thus give rise to misunderstandings (as in some of the cases discussed by Sarangi-Slembrouck 1992). Related but different are the following interpretations of cooperativeness: 3) Cooperativeness towards felicity of speech event at both local and global levels (that is, micro- and macro-speech acts and sequences) falls into the domain of Grice's Cooperative Principle (cf. 1.7.6). Even in case of antagonistic (inter)action, e.g., of threats, sarcasm, insults, etc., the speaker generally wants the addressee to correctly identify and understand his hostile speech act, and in this very elementary sense, the antagonistic speech act is "cooperative" in the Gricean sense (cf. Castelfranchi Poggi 1987: 244; Souza Filho 1984: 93). Much of the criticism levelled against Grice's Cooperative Principle (cf. 1.7.6) has arisen from confusing various senses of cooperativeness (the most recent example being Sarangi-Slembrouck 1992). 4) A very specific instance of cooperativeness is convergent speech behavior, as illustrated within the Speech Accommodation Theory (cf. Thakerar-Giles-Cheshire 1982). 5) Related to cooperativeness is also comity, which "consists in the alignment and adjustment of each interlocutor's schemata so that they are

14

Introduction

brought into sufficient correspondence for interlocutors to feel satisfied they have reached agreement (mutual acceptance)" (Aston 1988 a: 77). 1.5.4. Within interactions, we can identify complex actions, which can be subdivided into the following stages:31 orientation or appreciation of the situation by the actor, motivation for acting, fixing of goals, formulation of a plan (which may contain a morphopragmatic element), performing of the planned act, outcome and consequences of the performance (sc. perlocutionary effects). Various types of actions combine to form action patterns (cf. Ehlich 1987). Fixing of goals and formulation of plans rest on intentionality, a basic element of human action, which engenders responsibility for action (cf. Sbisä 1989: 45; Wunderlich 1976: 38). Intentions differ from motives (cf. Canagarajah 1987: 24) insofar as motives are "because-of-reasons", intentions "in-order-to-reasons" (Tedeschi-Norman 1985: 315). Moreover, the same motive may give rise to different intentions (cf. Meier 1992). Intentionality distinguishes actions from behavior (cf. Ehlich 1987: 21; Harras 1983: 18, 131). Within "in-order-to-reasons" we must distinguish intentions proper, which stimulate and accompany actions, from goals, which are their purpose (cf. Austin 1970: 272). Rehbein (1977: 12-57; cf. 1988: 1183, 1190), furthermore, distinguishes the following extra elements: Handlungsraum (action space, similar to speech situation), Handlungsfeld (action field) or decision space as the set of actions available to the actor at a given moment as background for understanding what aims and effects a given action has (e. g., the use of a particular morphological rule), control field (that is, the actor's reach of action), and mechanisms of evaluation, belief, and motivation. 1.5.5. Communicative action is goal-intended (except in very circumscribed degenerate cases). A complex action typically has a hierarchy of goals, that is, the goal of an action may have a supergoal, and further actions with their own subgoals may be subordinated to it. For example, the utterance Can you open the window? at face value, has the goal of eliciting an answer to a request for information, but, conventionally, is intended and received as having the supergoal of obtaining compliance to a request for action. And actually the response may reflect satisfaction of both goal and supergoal, for example, if a Yes, of course accompanies the performance of the requested action. And if this request is preceded by a presequence of the type Excuse me, whose specific goal is to attract attention, then this goal is still at a lower rank in the goal hierarchy.32

Functional explanation

15

By the same token, all the goals of micro-speech acts are, directly or indirectly, subordinated to the supergoal of a macro-speech act. Parallel to the goal hierarchy, there is a hierarchy of actions reaching down to basic (and often incomplete) acts or procedures. 33 Morphopragmatic elements may reflect such subordinated or embedded procedures. But we do not assume a direct expression of actions via morphological means, because this would be reductionist, that is, this would reduce pragmatics to action theory. Instead we follow the common view that pragmatics is based on action theory. We may illustrate our view metaphorically by seeing pragmatics of verbal communication as dealing with the visible part of an iceberg and action theory as the account of the invisible part of it. And these two levels are better kept apart. 34 In social interaction, interlocutors may share many goals and supergoals according to the degree and type of cooperativeness, as discussed in 1.5.3. Interlocutors may also adopt or impose or resist one another's goals. The position of morphology in general, and of morphopragmatics in particular, within this perspective of Humboldtian energeia can be explained only by having recourse to a functionalist model of explanation (1.6).

1.6. Functional explanation Speaking of acts/actions entails speaking of goals (cf. 1.5.4-1.5.5; Ehlich 1987: 21). This requires a science theory which includes purposeful acts/ actions in its model of explanation. An appropriate model of explanation that combines acts/actions with their goals and goals with operations that may serve to attain them is functionalism (see Woodfield 1976; Wright 1976). Under this label we do not mean to include models of linguistic functionalism (such as A. Martinet's or S. Dik's), but a science-theoretical model of explanation (cf. Dressier 1985 c: 262; 1990 a), that is, one which works as a theoretical framework for explanation and description and as a heuristic means for discovering facts through theory-guided questions. 35 There are two types of functional or more precisely, teleonomic, explanation (cf. Woodfield 1976; Wright 1976), which are both valid in pragmatics in general, and in morphopragmatics in particular. One is valid

16

Introduction

for goal-intended behavior in purposive, conscious actions; the analyst has to relate actions to the goals of their actors by following the accepted social norms for those action patterns (cf. Rehbein 1977: 91-101; Harras 1983: 74; cf. 1.5.5). Here one has to reckon with language- and culturespecific divergences in patterns. We will use this type of explanation in discourse analysis and particularly when interpreting the actual linguistic actions under observation. 36 The other type of explanation holds for teleology (or rather teleonomy) of function, where one makes abstraction of the speaker's intentions, as, for example, when analyzing the morphopragmatic devices of a language system. Thus a morphological rule X can be attributed a function F within a system S if X has a property A (or does an activity A) which "characteristically and normally contributes to F" and if "F is good for S (in normal circumstances), either intrinsically or because it characteristically contributes to some further good" (Woodfield 1976: 208).37 For example, if Thompson (1991) is correct in characterizing grammar as discourse-driven, then the grammatical means that serve discourse are in need of a functionalist explanation. Leech (1983: 48-56) tries to reduce this type of functional explanation to causal explanation. This approach may be due to the illusion that deductive-nomological explanation is more respectable. But in pragmatics, one can achieve, at best, a deductive-probabilistic derivation of expectations concerning the ways speakers might behave in a given constellation of factors and conditions. As we have seen in our analyses and interviews, however, the speaker always has considerable freedom whether to perform or not perform the expected action (cf. Kendall 1981: 237, 249). Therefore, in order to achieve explanatory power, we must take the following four steps: 1) "Specification of the conventional use of the expression ... and ... relevant ... context ... all of the information that speaker and hearer can presuppose about one another's intentions, ... background knowledge, about the physical setting, and so on." 2) "A demonstration, usually in the form of a description of a set of inferences, that the use in question is the best way available to the speaker of accomplishing a particular conversational purpose ... in that situation" (Nunberg 1981: 203). This amounts to predicting in which circumstances the speaker may be induced to choose a certain action to the exclusion of other conceivable ones. The range of choices (available for prediction) is more limited for the morphological (and, in general, grammaticalized) part of morphopragmatics than for its pragmatic part (in the strict sense).

Functional explanation

17

3) Next we must try to establish the relative weight of favorable and disfavorable factors and the (very approximate) probabilities of alternative actions among which the speaker may choose. 4) Finally we can interpret, post factum, the motives that may have induced a speaker to choose a given action (hermeneutic and functional analysis). Let us take the example of an Italian request mitigated via a diminutive: (1)

Potrei

aver - ne

una

fett-ina?

Could I have of it a slice-DIM? 'Could I have a little piece of it, please?' We will claim (3.5.10) that, within the system of Italian requests (S) and in a given set of speech situations, the application of diminutive formation (X) which involves the morphopragmatic feature [non-serious] (A) has the primary and secondary functions (F) of mitigating the request, of making the request more palatable by decreasing the obligations of the addressee, and thus getting it more easily accepted by the addressee, and/or decreasing the risk of losing face if the addressee should refuse the request. Of course having a function does not equal achieving the goal of the request or action (Wright 1976: 73-78). Functional explanation may become complex and intricate due to the following two problems: First, goal conflicts may arise. For example, in planning and performing an action, the speaker must balance expected desirable effects of a speech act with its possible undesirable side-effects. By uttering a request a speaker may obtain satisfaction of his needs, but may sound arrogant or obtrusive. Now, by mitigating the request via a diminutive, the speaker may take care of the negative side-effects, and still obtain his goal, although there is the risk that the addressee of (1) may misunderstand the politeness strategy and take (1) as the speaker's intention of having only a small slice. This is an instance of trade-off and possible compromise among conflicting demands and goals (cf. Pinker-Bloom 1990: 717). Of course, the speaker himself may have contradictory intentions (Canagarajah 1987: 64). Second, one function may be served by several operations (multiple strategies), and one operation may serve several functions simultaneously (multi/plurifunctionality). Thus in (1) the speaker uses a diminutive, a conditional, and a question to mitigate the request, presumably thinking

18

Introduction

that one of these alternatives alone would not suffice (cf. 3.5.10). On the other hand, both the diminutive and the question may move from different meaning intentions, viz., the diminutive may be intended to denote smallness and the question format may stand for a true request for information. In actual circumstances, however, the risk of misunderstanding is likely to be decreased by the conventions assumed in the specific speech situation. 38

1.7. Relevant areas of pragmatics We will now turn to more specific areas of pragmatics, which become especially outstanding elements within our semiotic and theatrical representation of static and dynamic aspects of pragmatics (1.2), notably presuppositions (1.7.5), implicatures (1.7.6), speech situation (1.7.1), speech acts (1.7.12), politeness strategies (1.7.13). 1.7.1. The static dimension is covered by the concept of speech situation, "represented as an unordered set of attributes ... locations, agents, objects, facts which are true about the situation" (Littman-Mey 1991: 139).39 Speech situations are often relevant contexts for rules of speaking (cf. Fasold 1990: 42). Speech situation and communication become mutually relevant, first of all, via social deixis, understood by Levinson (1979: 206) as "those aspects of language structure that are anchored to the social identities of participants (including bystanders) in the speech event, or to relations between them, or to relations between them and other referents". Interlocutors may use morphopragmatic devices, for example, as indexical signantia to refer to relevant elements in the speech situation as indexical signata. Which among the potentially relevant elements of a speech situation are actually relevant for the use of morphopragmatic devices is to be learned specifically and is often learned only in late stages of the learner's socialization. 1.7.2. The most important constituent of the speech situation is represented by its participants, its cast or dramatis personae, so to say. In a first step of pragmatic modelling, the actual dramatis personae are assigned participant roles. Within units of interaction (cf. 1.5.4—1.5.5) and textual macro-structure (1.3), a participant may have the role of agent,

Relevant areas of pragmatics

19

beneficiary, victim, etc. Morphopragmatic elements may be used to specifically refer to such macrostructural roles, for example honorifics (cf. 2.3—2.4) or diminutives in child-/pet-/lover-centered speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4) or augmentatives, such as It. princip-one (cf. 4.2.0.2). As regards microstructural units, such as utterances or single speech acts, participant roles may be covered by speaker (text producer), addressee (direct destinee), side-participants (audience considered by speaker), and (marginally) bystanders. 40 For semiotic reasons (indexical proximity, cf. 1.4), the general hierarchy of participant roles has speaker and addressee at the top and bystander at the bottom, cf. 3.5.2.1. Interrelations between participants are also important for morphopragmatics (cf. Verschueren 1987 a: 68—69): for example, social role relationships as determined by social structure, including role conflicts and the notion of social power definable as the extent to which a participant can impose his/her wants on another participant. 41 Static interrelations will be important in our analysis of Japanese honorific -masu (2.4) or of diminutives and augmentatives in child/pet/lover-centered speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4 and 4.2.4.6—4.2.4.8). Differentiating participant roles brings about a distinction of referent vs. addressee vs. bystander honorifics (Levinson 1979: 207). Personal relationships may also be morphopragmatically relevant, as shown, for example, in the use of the Italian augmentatives princip-one, zi-one, discussed in 4.2.5.2. The social dimension of interrelations may be modelled within role theory (cf. Leodolter 1975: 79-136), for example by differentiating various status and position roles. In studying Japanese honorifics (2.4), we will make reference to Ide's (1989) concept of discernment and to Goffman's 1971 concepts of deference and demeanor. In various case analyses, distinguishing between insiders (ingroup) and outsiders (outgroup, cf. Golopentia 1988: 90-109) will be useful. Familiarity, informality, and intimacy are given as regulatory features of participant interrelations (cf. 2.3-2.4, 3.5.8, 4.2.4.11). 1.7.3. The most important properties of participants as individuals are their cognitive properties, as defined by Nuyts-Verschueren (1987; cf. Verschueren 1987 a: 60, 65-66, 68, 70-72), particularly those that derive from objectively-definable factors (such as biography, experiences, previous knowledge, etc.). Their beliefs (including stereotypes) are also essential, though less objectifiable. Other properties of participants are, on the psychological dimension, their attitudes (cf. Bartsch 1987: 181; Potter-Wetherell 1987), motives, preconceptions, emotions, sympathy vs. antipathy. Their relevance will

20

Introduction

be discussed with regard to diminutives and augmentatives in 3.5.6—3.5.7 and 4.2.4.9—4.2.4.10. Psychological and social distance between interlocutors (cf. Wolfson 1988) also belong here. 1.7.4. Elements of the "stage", such as place, time, and general setting of communication (cf. Verschueren 1987 a: 60—62; Bartsch 1987: 139), are less important than the above-mentioned indexical signata of social deixis (cf. Levinson 1979; Bartsch 1987: 139) and will be rarely referred to in this book. 1.7.5. Much more important "static" factors are the conventional verbal and non-verbal means of communication available to participants, including global knowledge patterns such as frames and scripts (cf. Beaugrande-Dressier 1981: V.16 and above 1.3). These conventional means include presuppositions, which are definitely outside social deixis (cf. Levinson 1979: 212-213). We will need the notion of semantic presupposition for the unmarked status of intensification (4.1.3) and for the excessive (6.2), and in both cases mainly for presuppositional properties of adjectives (cf. Kiefer 1978). For the purpose, we can limit ourselves to the simplistic definition of semantic presuppositions by Green (1989: 71): "propositions whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic expression, propositions without which the utterance cannot be evaluated". If we turn from semantic to pragmatic presuppositions, this definition has to be enriched. The utterance or discourse level, instead of the sentence level, is the pertinent level for presuppositions. 42 In other words, semantic presuppositions hold between sentences, whereas pragmatic presuppositions hold between utterances and the speaker (cf. Kiefer 1977: 255) and other elements of the speech situation. Therefore, pragmatic presuppositions must be "consistent with the context" (Gazdar 1979: 107; cf. Dascal 1983: 139). The notion of semantic presupposition is abstracted out of pragmatic presupposition, an idealization which is adequate for our purposes in 4.1.3 and 6.2.2. 1.7.6. Conventional means of communication also include the Gricean notions of cooperative principle, conversational maxims, and (at least, conventional) implicatures. 43 According to Grice (1989: 369-370), the Cooperative Principle as he states it, "Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged", is the "supreme Conversational

Relevant areas of pragmatics

21

Principle" and applies to rational, concerted talk-exchange, considered to be the prototype of communication. 44 Grice's well-known conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner (which all go back to Kant's corresponding categories) all evolve from the Cooperative Principle and, "in paradigmatic cases, their observance promotes and their violation dispromotes conversational rationality" (Grice 1989: 370). These maxims are (Grice 1989: 2 6 27): "Make your contribution as informative as is required" (quantity); "Try to make your contribution one that is true" (quality); "Be perspicuous/orderly/brief' (manner); "Be relevant" (relation). For our agenda, violation of maxims is more important than the maxims themselves, because, provided the assumption of cooperativeness is maintained, violation gives rise to implicatures (cf. Green 1989: 87). For, as Grice (1989: 370) himself states, "an implicatum ... is the content of that psychological state or attitude which needs to be attributed to a speaker in order to secure" that (a) his violation of a conversational maxim "is in the circumstances justified, at least in his eyes", or that (b) it is "only a seeming, not a real, violation", in the sense that "the spirit, though perhaps not the letter, of the maxim is respected" (Grice 1989: 370). Grice characterized (but did not properly define) three subtypes of implicatures. Conventional implicatures are "pragmatic implications which are derived directly from the meaning of words, rather than via conversational principles" (Leech 1983: 11; cf. Levinson 1983: 127). Unlike conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are independent of the Cooperative Principle. Conventional and automatic pragmatic effects of morphosemantic meanings may fall into this category. Among conversational implicatures, Grice distinguishes generalized vs. particularized conversational implicatures. The former are default implicatures, the latter are to be derived from context via subsequent extra inferences. 45 We will find many cases of context-dependent inferences relevant for morphopragmatic analysis, whereas default inferences are not easy to identify, for example, in connection with diminutives and augmentatives. At the present state of research, the theory of (tripartitioned) implicatures is rarely useful for the identification and differentiation of pragmatic effects as necessary for our discussion of morphopragmatics. For example, we claim that augmentatives have a pragmatic feature [Active] (3.4.9, 4.2.4.2). The presence of this feature may give rise, with the interpreter, to implicatures. But none of the implicatures specified in the tri-

22

Introduction

partition would help predict or explain the type of pragmatic effects obtained. That is to say, a model of implicatures, at least at the moment, rarely appears pertinent to our analyses, in the sense that the morphopragmatic means under observation remain grossly underdetermined by the application of the theory. For these reasons, a theory of implicatures cannot serve as a major model guiding our research. 46 1.7.7. Social structure (of the "social world", Verschueren 1987 a: 62-64, 69—70) binds together the analytically distinguished elements of the speech situation. Different positions of the interactants in the social structure may lead to antagonistic interaction, as particularly highlighted in Marxist accounts and in "critical sociolinguistics" (cf. Wodak—Schulz 1986, Wodak et al. 1990, for example). An important aspect of social structure is represented by macrosociological domains (cf. Breitborde 1983). Each domain, for example, family or school, may have its specific norms, defined by Bartsch (1987: xii, 75) as "the social reality of correctness notions" (cf. pp. 76, 166). Norms are basic to the interactants' "expectation of a regularity" (cf. Bartsch 1987: 167 and, on conventions in general, Souza Filho 1984: 87). Therefore pragmatics must be embedded in sociopragmatics and sociolinguistics (cf. Mey 1985). 1.7.8. As to the pragmatics of speech events, we have already dealt with action and interaction theory in 1.5, including intentions, goals and super-goals, plans, etc. (for Ide's notion of volition, cf. 2.4.4. B), and so we are not going to add anything here. 1.7.9. Pragmatic strategies (cf. Parret 1980: 151) are means for serving pragmatic principles and functions (cf. 1.6). In contrast to rules, they are flexible and adaptive discourse operations, adopted and negotiated by speaker and hearer. 47 Functionally relevant steps of a strategy are called moves (van Dijk 1984: 116). Morphopragmatically relevant morphological rules may be strategically used. Such a use is a central explanandum of our account. 1.7.10. Choosing a topic of communication (a pragmatic and sociolinguistic concept), 48 may entail choosing a certain pragmatic strategy, for example, euphemism or understatement (3.5.13). The ways topics are introduced and handled may both hinge on pragmatic and sociolinguistic variables and affect them (cf. Fasold 1990: 110, 300-303). 1.7.11. Presuppositions (1.7.5) and implicatures (1.7.6) induce processes of inferencing in receivers (addressees, side-participants, etc., 1.7.2). But

Relevant areas of pragmatics

23

much more inferencing is needed to bridge discontinuities and fill gaps in discourse (cf. Beaugrande-Dressier 1981). The text producer accurately calculates the intended receivers' power for performing inferences. Among the various types of inferences (e.g., as distinguished by van de Velde 1984), pragmatic and/or action-oriented inferences are the most important ones for our purposes. In the course of this book, we will find cases where the hearer is confronted with a literal semantic meaning contradicted by contextual evidence, that is, pragmatics does not allow the hearer to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation, unless he draws, via implicature, a certain set of inferences. This typically applies to cases of irony (cf. 3.5.14, 4.1.4, 4.2.20). Inferencing via implicature also occurs with inadequate pragmatic default meanings. For example, the default addressee of an expressive speech act of the following type is a child. (2)

Ti sei sbucciato il ginocchi-etto, pover-ino? To you you were hurt the knee-DIM, poor-DIM? 'Did you hurt your nice little knee, poor darling?'

If this utterance is directed at an adult, the hearer(s) must infer, via implicature and on the basis of other information, an ironic or sarcastic or sympathetic or loving or jocular, etc., intention on the part of the speaker (but note the problems discussed in 3.4.6.9). On the other hand, no implicature is involved in the reconstruction of the speaker's supergoals, as pursued, for example, in cajoling strategies (cf. 1.5.5, 3.5.10.4.3.2, 3.5.10.4.4.1). In this case, inferencing means engaging in additional, deeper interpretation (leading to a Peircean final interpretant, cf. 1.4). In many other cases, semantic meaning can only account for a part of the actual meaning, for example, of a diminutive or augmentative. In this case no maxim related to literal meaning is actually flouted, and therefore the hearer cannot draw inferences via implicature. In these cases, the hearer must infer the actual meaning on the basis of extra information (cf. 3.4.6.9). Another flaw of the implicature analysis has been identified by Ervin-Tripp (1987: 51 — 52): "inferences do not start from literal meaning, but from situation". And we assume exactly this when we say that the speech situations with their relevant regulative factors are of paramount importance for the interpretation of diminutives (cf. 3.5.2-3.5.8) and augmentatives (cf. 4.2.4.6-4.2.4.11). For a systematics of contextual clues see Dascal—Weizman (1987).

24

Introduction

In Sperber-Wilson's relevance theory (1986), the role of inferencing becomes even greater (cf. Moeschler 1990: 89), excessive in our view (cf. Levinson's 1987 arguments against inferential explosion). 1.7.12. One of the basic units of our pragmatic analysis is the speech act, justly called the minimal communicative unit. 1.7.12.1. An appropriate speech-act theory has existed since Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), but basic insights go back to the Stoics (as cited by Wierzbicka 1991: 197, 457-458). Among the forerunners of speech-act theory in our century, besides Ludwig Wittgenstein and other often-cited authors (cf. Harras 1983: 96; Wierzbicka 1991: 196), the legal philosopher Armin Reinach deserves special mention for his elaborate typology of actions (see Burkhardt 1986). 1.7.12.2. This is a specifically pertinent approach, as a theory of speech acts is to be embedded in a theory of action (cf. 1.5), that is, a speech act reaches its full significance only within a social action or interaction and against a background of social institutions and conventions. 49 From the point of view of text/discourse pragmatics (cf. 1.3), only whole texts or at least coherent text chunks can be seen as relatively autonomous units of communication (cf. Burkhardt 1986: 396; Canagarajah 1987) and can thus be identified as macro-speech acts, that is, as "a speech act performed by a sequence of speech acts" (van Dijk 1977: 238). Note also the concept of text illocution referring to the global, macrostructural illocutionary force of a text (cf. Rehbein 1988: 1185). Morphopragmatic operations have no direct relevance to macrospeech acts, they rather interest smaller units. A pertinent intermediate level is represented by paired speech-act sequences such as question answer, request - promise, offer - acceptance/refusal, greeting — greeting, etc. 50 Both initiative and reactive speech acts imply a whole speechact sequence. Nevertheless, morphopragmatic operations generally refer to single speech acts, although, of course, the speech act has to be analyzed within its respective speech-act sequence. This justifies our choice of speech acts as basic units for analysis. 1.7.12.3. Current work in speech-act theory takes either Austin's (1962) or Searle's work as its basic point of reference. We will refer to Austin and to later refinements of Austin's model 51 wherever we find it illuminating, but we will generally stick to Searle's approach, 52 the most elaborate and useful for our purposes. Particularly important is Searle's notion of illocutionary force.

Relevant areas of pragmatics

25

According to Searle-Vanderveken (1985: 12) an illocutionary force 53 is defined by its seven components: 1) Illocutionary point, that is, "that purpose which is essential to an illocutionary act to its being an act of that type" (p. 13), for example, a request, a statement, a promise, etc. 2) Degree of strength of the illocutionary point, e. g., pleading and ordering are stronger than requesting, and requesting stronger than suggesting. 3) Mode of achievement, that is, the "special set of conditions under which (the) illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of the speech act" (p. 15). For example, in ordering (but not in requesting), the speaker invokes his authority in issuing the utterance. 4) Propositional content conditions, that is, what can (or cannot) be the propositional content of a speech act. In a promise, for example, this is the speaker's future action(s). 5) Preparatory conditions, that is, the "conditions which are necessary for successful and nondefective performance of an illocutionary act" (p. 17). 6) Sincerity conditions, that is, conditions for expressing a psychological state in agreement with the specific propositional content. 7) Degree of strength of its sincerity conditions, insofar as "the same psychological state can be expressed with different degrees of strength. The speaker who makes a request expresses the desire that the hearer do the act requested; but if he begs, beseeches, or implores, he expresses a stronger desire than if he merely requests" (p. 19). Searle has been criticized for the anglocentricity of many of his descriptions of particular speech acts (see Wierzbicka 1991: 25, 69, 85, 151). Criticism has also been moved against the monologic character of speech acts, their reliance on single sentences (cf. Potter—Wetherell 1987: 29), their excessive speaker perspective (cf. Burkhardt 1986: 99; Harras 1983: 96). Problems have arisen with the empirical identification of speech acts (cf. Reiss 1985), still Searle-Vanderveken's (1985) framework is the bestsuited for our specific purposes. 54 Therefore we concur with van Rees' (1992) contention that speech-act analysis is feasible, empirically valid and explanatory — provided that it is inserted into action theory and discourse theory (cf. 1.7.12.2). As we will see, speech-act theory is useful for the analysis of morphopragmatic devices and it is equally applicable to Italian and German in a consistent way, due to the comparability of the two languages and cultures in terms of basic speech-act structuring. Wierzbicka's (1991: 132, 150, 153, 199, 248) proposal for solving the problem of speech-act identification consists in a) carrying out a lan-

26

Introduction

guage-specific folk-taxonomy of speech acts (often indistinguishable from language-specific performative verbs, cf. 1.7.12.4); b) using simple formulae describing the speaker's intention; c) linking these descriptions to cultural values and customs of the respective speech communities. But many questions remain unanswered even with this approach: Wierzbicka's formulae in "plain English", move the vagueness and ambiguity of linguistic terminology that she criticizes to the ambiguity and vagueness of plain natural language. No method is provided for checking the adequacy of the proposed semantic descriptions (on p. 218, Wierzbicka even characterizes her procedure as one, "essentially, by trial and error"), nor for testing the equivalence of sentences described with the same formula. 55 Her formulae mix the level of preconditions (or presuppositions) with the level of illocution (cf. Meier 1992). 1.7.12.4. Searle's classification of speech acts, although much disputed (see below), still provides an insightful frame of reference, on which we will especially rely in characterizing the modification of speech acts via diminutives (3.5.10-3.5.12). Searle-Vanderveken's (1985: 13) classification is based on differences in illocutionary point, the most important component of illocutionary force. The authors differentiate five illocutionary points (p. 13): 1) "The assertive point is to say how things are" (e. g., in statements). 2) "The commissive point is to commit the speaker to doing something" (e. g., in promises). 3) "The directive point is to try to get other people to do things" (e.g., in requests). 4) "The declarative point is to change the world by saying so" (e. g., in naming or appointing somebody). 5) "The expressive point is to express feelings and attitudes" (e.g., in thanking). For perlocutionary effects of speech acts, see 1.7.15 below. Searle has been criticized for insufficiently distinguishing between the classification of performative verbs (e. g., I thank you for having done ρ) and the classification of speech acts themselves. Speech acts may stand without the explicit use of performative verbs (e. g., in Very kind of you to have done pi used for thanking, cf. Burkhardt 1986: 7 - 8 ) . Further criticism concerned his insufficient criteria for speech-act classifications. 56 Due to space limitations, our morphopragmatic analysis will be restricted to a few representative speech acts, and only with diminutives will we go into some detailed exemplification (cf. 3.5.10—3.5.14). Therefore proliferation of speech acts is a minor problem for us. It can be handled

Relevant areas of pragmatics

27

either via assuming a combination of speech acts (cf. 3.5.12.8.4) or via adding further regulative criteria (cf. 3.5.12.8.5-3.5.12.8.11). Aiming at representativity, we will take examples from each of Searle's five major types. But we will not reduce these major types further, for example to Leech's (1983) four illocutive functions or Ervin-Tripp's overarching category of control acts (cf. Ervin-Tripp-Guo-Lampert 1990). 1.7.12.5. Particularly popular (and controversial at the same time) is Searle's distinction between direct and indirect (that is, implicit) speech acts. Very often speakers are considered to "perform one illocutionary act implicitly by way of performing another illocutionary act explicitly" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 10), e. g., by giving an order in the format of a question. 57 But as a matter of fact, directness and indirectness cannot be discerned on a universal basis (cf. Wierzbicka 1991: 88). The notion of indirect speech act can also be described in very different terms, for example as a metaphor or metonym of a direct speech act (cf. Tasmowski-de Ryk 1980) or as a sentence whose local goal is subordinated to a supergoal (cf. Castelfranchi-Poggi 1987 and 1.5.5). Due to the above caveat, we will make little and cautious use of the notion of indirect speech act. 1.7.13. All morphopragmatic means are usable for either politeness or rudeness strategies or, in certain contexts, even for both. The nature of social interaction (cooperative vs. antagonistic, cf. 1.5.3) determines whether a speaker intends to be polite or rude. 58 The patterning of such intentions and of their various possible implementations is the subject of politeness theories, many of which go back to Goffman's (1967: 11) conception of face-work, where face is defined as "image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (Goffman 1967: 5).59 In accordance with viewing speech acts as specific verbal emanations of larger social actions, we see speech-act theory as a suitable framework for dealing with politeness phenomena, in particular the "dynamic" aspects of "volitional politeness" (cf. Ide 1989, Kasper 1990: 196), that is, of strategic politeness (such as in Brown -Levinson's 1987 model). The complementary "static" aspects of politeness concerning social indexing or "discernment" (cf. Ide 1989, Kasper 1990: 196) are better linked to the notion of speech situation (cf. 1.2, 1.7.1-1.7.2). These second "static" aspects are more important for inflectional morphopragmatics as treated in chapter 2, while the first, "dynamic" aspects are more important in dealing with diminutives (3), interfixes (5), intensification (4, 6).

28

Introduction

We subordinate the dimension of politeness to the dimensions of speech acts and speech situations, because we want to cover the subject matters of morphopragmatics in the amplest and most systematic way. Our methodology is in this sense a much more rewarding means. For the same reason, we cannot align with those who are trying to replace speechact theory with a model of implicatures (cf. the discussion in Verschueren 1987 a: 31-33), at least not at the present state of the art (cf. 3.4.6.9). Positive politeness is involved in interactional, as opposed to transactional, discourse. Its goal is to negotiate rapport and to maintain interpersonal social relationships, cf Leech's (1983: 100) and Aston's (1988) notion of comity. This distinction we will use in 3.5.8.5 (more in KilaniSchoch-Dressier 1992). 1.7.14. We agree with Verschueren's (1987 a) theory of linguistic adaptation in the following respects: 1) Pragmatics is a perspective — indeed, as proponents of Natural Morphology (cf. 1.9.5), we assume that all components of the language system have their own semantic and pragmatic perspectives. 60 2) Pragmatics regulates the choice among alternative "formulations" on all levels. For example, in the case of morphopragmatics, the choice is between a simplex and its derived diminutives, augmentatives, excessives, honorifics (and among them). 3) Adaptation serves interaction goals (cf. 1.5.3), including the goals of specific discourse events, as is the case of intensification and/or re-elaboration in discourse (cf. 4.1.5). 1.7.15. Within pragmatics, we must distinguish what is more narrowly linguistic from the sociocultural aspects of pragmatics. 61 For example, illocutionary force belongs to the first area, intended perlocutionary effects and perlocutions 62 (in the sense of actual perlocutionary sequels) rather to the second. As linguists we feel more competent to deal with the first area, because we think that research in the sociocultural aspects of morphopragmatics 63 needs a truly interdisciplinary effort. That does not mean that we want to exclude perlocutionary effects from pragmatics (cf. Verschueren 1987a: 33-35) but only that, in general, we lack adequate tools for investigating the sociocultural aspects of morphopragmatics (cf. 3.7 for diminutives). 1.7.16. Within pragmatics, there exist several powerful explanatory models, originally devised for different objects. Their gradual elaboration has had the consequence that many objects of pragmatic study can be investigated within more than one of those models, for example, within speech-

Emotion

29

act theory, politeness theory, and the theory of Gricean implicatures. But none of these models can easily replace or completely subsume all the others. As a result, it would be reductive to use just one of these models. On the other hand, using all of them simultaneously would generate excessive explanatory power. In trying to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, we have adopted and adapted two complementary (that is, hardly overlapping) models, viz., of speech situations and of speech acts. And, wherever necessary, we have taken the liberty of supplementing them with arguments drawn from other models. And sometimes, in due respect for those who may not share our choice, we have tried to translate our account of a fact into the format provided by another model.

1.8. Emotion 1.8.1. Much of what we are going to discuss in chapters 3 - 4 is often dealt with under the labels of emotion, affect, sentiments, passion. 64 Thus the pertinent entry in the subject index of Beard—Szymanek's (1988) bibliography is "affective morphology". Volek (1987, summarized in Volek 1990) is the best representative of this approach (see also the survey of the literature there). Moreover, her collection of Russian "emotive" suffixes (her chapters 2—6) covers semantic areas comparable to those covered by the morphological rules that we are going to treat in our chapters 3 — 5, for example, diminutives. 1.8.2. Volek's (1987) approach is nearly exclusively morphosemantic, whereas our major interest is morphopragmatics. In this sense, our respective studies are complementary rather than mutually contradictory: Volek is mainly interested in the (monosemic or polysemous) structural meaning of morphemes (that is, in morphosemantics), we want to show how interpreters systematically and strategically create pragmatic meaning within types of cotexts and within the context of prototypical speech situations (see above 1.7). Volek identifies part of the meaning of relevant morphemes as emotive, e.g., "The category of diminutivity and even more the category of augmentativity are modificational categories with pronounced emotive semantics" (Volek 1987: 46); "We have suffixes that exclusively express

30

Introduction

an emotive component" (Volek 1987: 48). However, this morphosemantic approach does not provide enough ground for solving the fundamental problem arising from the fact that, for example, diminutives may express contradictory emotions. Thus, in her framework, her remarks on "the vagueness of emotive components ... that is, the same emotive component can appear as both positive and negative depending on the context" are paradoxical. In fact, such opposed values are nothing else but symptoms of their pragmatic character. Moreover, without adequately defining emotion itself, 65 she gives semiotic definitions of emotive (as opposed to notional/evaluative) signs such as: "The central phenomena of emotivity are those linguistic devices that serve for the direct expression of the actual emotive attitude of the speaker" (p. 12); "emotive components of meaning ... have the character of actual experience" (p. 35); "The emotive sign ... normally has the character of a symbolic index" (p. 32); "it automatically refers to the speaker as a subject of emotive attitude" (p. 31); "the emotion itself is 'expressed' (directly indicated) rather than represented" (p. 32). Such definitions, however, are too abstract to allow empirical testing, and her identification of degrees and types of emotion is largely intuitively based (cotextual clues having a very marginal status). Empirical identification would be made possible only by recourse to psychological tests. Buch such tests would find application only with difficulty in literary texts, the main source of Volek's data. And, in general, psychological testing of emotions, when applied to verbal material (cf. Fiehler 1990), is marred by basic problems and test artifacts. Finally, we must take into account that "grammar is a notoriously poor medium for conveying subtle patterns of emotions" (Pinker-Bloom 1990: 7151 with references, cf. Fries 1991b: 36-37) and, inversely, that non-verbal communication is much better suited for it (cf. Pinker-Bloom 1990: 7301 on animals being "highly competent at communicating ... emotions"). 1.8.3. Therefore we follow Fiehler's (1990) approach in leaving aside the (often very divergent) individual aspects of emotion in favor of those having interactional status. These aspects can be investigated via pragmatic, sociolinguistic, and textual methodologies. In his exhaustive treatment, Fiehler correctly stresses the interdisciplinary nature of the problem, as apparent, for example, in the following citation from SchwartzTrabasso (1984: 410): "To understand an emotion is to know the situations in which it occurs, to know the states, events, and actions that relate to it, to know how it operates physiologically and how it functions,

Emotion

31

motivationally, to know what actions and expressions follow as consequences from it, to know what states, state changes, events, and actions cause it, and to what uses emotions can be put." 6 6 Gestures, voice quality, and various physiological manifestations (underdifferentiated for type of emotion, see Birnbaumer 1983) are difficult to control for a linguist. All other above-cited aspects of emotions, however, are embedded in domains which go beyond the immediate experience of an emotion and, thus, make it necessary to check the cotext and context of an emotion, be it expressed by a word or a morpheme. This is even more so since having emotions means at the same time taking an evaluative position (Fiehler 1990: 37). Only events or stimuli deemed important for the organism may arouse emotions that go beyond mere sensations or attitudes (cf. Scherer 1990: 6—7). In contrast to Volek (1987: 27, passim, but not Alonso 1961: 6) who opposes emotion to evaluation, Fiehler subsumes emotions under evaluations, 67 communication being concerned with both information and evaluation (Fiehler 1990: 36). Here, emotion clearly belongs to the evaluative component. We cannot report here the whole of Fiehler's complex definitional apparatus; it will suffice to present his four types of emotion rules (Fiehler 1990: 76-87, cf. Asendorpf 1983), because they will be of relevance for us later: 1) "feeling rules" conventionalizing feelings for appropriate types of speech situations; 2) "display rules" determining which emotions are appropriate in which fashion and in which situations; 3) "correspondence rules" inducing emotional reciprocity (mood-sharing or mood-joining between interlocutors, e. g., if A is very sad, interlocutor Β is not supposed to show signs of great pleasure, but must manifest empathy); 4) "coding rules" determining which behavior is an appropriate manifestation of a certain emotion. 1.8.4. When we analyzed our oral and written data, for example, our corpus of diminutives, according to Fiehler's (1990) criteria, we found much less emotivity than admitted by Volek (1987) for her written sources. In most instances we found no or only negligible and/or dubious signals of emotivity. Since we do not want to rely on the analyst's intuitions concerning the presence/absence, the type, and degree of emotion in verbal expressions under investigation, we must look in the context (e. g., in non-verbal gestures) or in the cotext for signals guaranteeing the presence of emotion. For instance, in our examples of diminutives taken from Italian television, actors nearly never made emotional gestures, nor was there any other contextual or cotextual evidence for emotions.

32

Introduction

By contrast, in our example taken from the last scene of Cosi fan tutte (cf. 1.1), the actors playing Ferrando and Guglielmo, in our experience in the Wiener Staatsoper and in the Teatro alia Scala (Milan), always made clearly emotional gestures, and this in line with Da Ponte's stage directions, agogically supported by Mozart's music (particularly in tempo variations) intended for parodistic effects. Moreover (in stark contrast to our television examples), both the micro- and macro-cotext contain clear signs of Ferrando's and Guglielmo's pretending great love. This scene exemplifies feeling rules, display rules, and coding rules of love (and earlier the beloved Dorabella and Fiordiligi had followed correspondence rules). 1.8.5. Clearly, all social interaction (particularly if opposed to transaction, cf. Aston 1988) is emotionally colored. But, most of the time, presence and differentiation of emotions is hardly identifiable through the mere linguistic means. 68 Therefore, if one defines (cf. Volek 1987), for example, diminutives and augmentatives as means for expressing emotivity, then one would expect to find them all over the place, that is, only very "sober" transactional speech acts would be devoid of them. On the other hand, if only some of the interactional speech acts are accompanied by such word-formation rules, then we would have to suppose that these diminutives or augmentatives signal high degrees and/or specific types of emotivity. Such degrees and types would have to be identified by the analyst in a falsifiable (or, if one believes optimists, verifiable) manner — a task that Volek (1987) has not achieved in any intersubjective way. If, however, diminutives and/or augmentatives neither occur in all cases nor in some identifiable specific cases of emotivity, then emotivity cannot be identified as a main meaning of diminutives or augmentatives. Emotive meaning can be attributed only where it is clearly discernible. And this is our approach, and it is in line with a functional model of language (cf. 1.6). For example, Nuyts (1990: 234) identifies emotion as "a subfunction of communication with orientation at the frame of reference of an utterance" and "as an indirect functional factor" (p. 237). The importance of emotions for pragmatics is limited, since "only the [scil. rather rare] direct expression of emotion is part of the functional usage of an utterance" (Nuyts 1990: 239). 1.8.6. If we take a functionalist view (1.8.5), we must discuss frequent claims about the expressive function or nature of diminutives, augmentatives, and other "expressive signs" (the best representative is, presumably, Grabias 1981). Many authors simply equate expressivity with emotion or

Emotion

33

the "expressive" with the "emotive function", for example Stankiewicz (1989: 74), who refers to an "age-old philosophical tradition which drew a fundamental dichotomy between emotion and reason". This equation may be either explicit or implicit (examples in Grabias 1981: 19—37; Schneider 1991 b). We have already criticized this approach (1.8.1-1.8.5, cf. also 3.5.6 and 4.2.4.9). Of course, emotion is not the same as speaker's involvement (attitudinal attachment or detachment), which Hübler (1983: 373) and Caffi (1990: 174) identify as a fundamental element of expressiveness. What we want to discuss here instead is whether and, in case, how far Bühler's "expressive function" can account for our morphopragmatic devices. The expressive function is one of three functions within his Organonmodell of signs, or in Bühler's (1934: 28) own words: "Das komplexe Sprachzeichen ... ist ... Symptom (Anzeichen, Indicium) kraft seiner Abhängigkeit vom Sender, dessen Innerlichkeit es ausdrückt" ['The complex linguistic sign ... is a symptom by dint of its dependence on the speaker, whose inner states it expresses'].69 Its aim is to characterize the speaker and to "faire sortir quelque chose de soi" ['to let emerge something of one's own']; "se delivrer d'une pression interieure" ['to liberate oneself of an interior pression'] (in contrast to "communiquer": Martinet 1991: 3), to express the speaker's inner states or his whole personality and psychic activity (Grabias 1981: 19), it is the outer representation of the speaker's personality (Grabias 1981: 22). But among the followers of Bühler, expressiveness has very often been narrowed down (completely or prototypically) to the expression of emotions, for example in Martinet (1991: 4): "les reactions subjectives et affectives du locuteur ä l'experience qu'il est en train de communiquer" ['the speaker's subjective and affective reactions to an experience which he is about to communicate'] or in P. Guiraud's dichotomies of expressive signs being emotional and subjective rather than rational and objective (as discussed by Grabias 1981: 29; cf. Vigara Tauste 1992: 45, 49). Even Grabias (1981), who is careful in pointing to non-emotional components of expressiveness, is not very helpful. For, either he provides no specification or illustration of such components (e.g., pp. 38 — 39), or, when he does, his specifications deviate from what is commonly characterized as expressive. His first specification of non-emotive expressiveness is the "modal" subfunction (p. 46, pp. 50—51), which seems to correspond to our "evaluative" character of diminutives and augmentatives (cf. 3.4.6).70 His second, non-emotive subfunction is "metalinguistic" (p. 46), that is, indicating that an expressive sign belongs either to the

34

Introduction

standard or to the colloquial language or to dialects or to bookish styles, etc. But this refers to social deixis in general (cf. 1.7.1) and is not specific to expressive signs. But even if, within Bühler's tripartition, we classify diminutives, augmentatives, etc., in Grabias' terms as expressive signs, not much is gained, because diminutives, augmentatives, etc., clearly also serve Bühler's two other functions. His "appellative Funktion" (Ε. appeal, Fr. appel, declenchement) is, for example, served in hearer-oriented persuasive strategies (cf. e. g., 3.5.10 and 4.2.4.13), and his Darstellungsfunktion ['representational function'] is served in the denotative meanings of diminutives and augmentatives. 71 This critical survey of expressiveness casts doubts on the very notion of "expressive morphology" (to be discussed in 1.9.1-1.9.2) and on its potential usefulness for morphopragmatics. 1.8.7. Clearly we do not want to exclude emotions from our pragmatic analysis of morphological rules and patterns, but we treat them as something which the analyst can separate from the other pragmatic factors involved, and we claim that no morphopragmatic phenomenon can be exhaustively described in terms of emotions. Now, where do we locate emotions in our pragmatic model? First we can place them among the speaker's evaluation (cf. 1.8.6, 3.4.6) of the speech situation (1.7.1) and the topic (1.7.10). A classification of emotional evaluations (cf. Fries 1991 a: 2, 10) is given by Sandhöfer-Sixel (1990) in the following terms: The first type of evaluation consists of only one continuum, that of interest — disinterest, the second type consists of the continua pleasure - displeasure, attachment - disattachment, degree of surprise, approval - disapproval. All of them (except the last one) are also classified as affective. But, as far as morphopragmatics is concerned, no morphological rule seems to have a pragmatic meaning referring only to one of the above continua. Even pejoratives present connotations that refer to the negative poles of all continua. In our analyses we will see whether this regards morphosemantic connotations or emotional overtones of morphopragmatic meanings. Second, emotions have a place in speech acts (cf. Ochs-Schieffelin 1989; Sbisä 1990). Ochs-Schieffelin (1989) distinguish two principal types of affect markers: 1) affective specifiers specifying the particular affective orientations of utterances; 2) affective intensifiers modulating the affective intensity of utterances. Let us start with affect specification. Sbisä (1990: 284) claims that there are illocutionary acts "whose felicity

Emotion

35

conditions require that [the speaker] should have a certain affective state" and that "this affective state is selected as the one that has been expressed by the speech act". Her first example (p. 284) is the illocutionary act of criticizing, whose sincerity conditions imply the speaker's disapproval. Now, disapproval is an evaluative attitude which does not necessarily include affect (cf. above Sandhöfer-Sixel 1990), and even if it is present, there is no guarantee that it is verbally expressed in the locutionary form of the speech act. Moreover there seem to be no morphological rules whose meaning indicates just one illocutionary (or other part of a speech) act or a definite group of closely related acts. Next, Sbisä (1990: 287) deals with affect specification where "the object to which the affective state is directed" is specified. Clearly, if one addresses a child with the exclamation: (3)

G. Du Schweind-erl! = It. Maial-inolal 'You pig-let!'

then the speaker is in an affective state (presumably a mixture of several different affects) which is directed towards the addressee, and the diminutive suffix (in addition to prosody and to the emphatic Du) is the carrier of this affective state. But such an assignment becomes more difficult if the locutionary form of the speech act is more extended, such as in (cf. 3.4): (4)

G. Du ißt ja It. Mangi You eat 'You eat

wie come like like a

ein Schweind-erl! un maial-ino! a pig-DIM! piglet!'

And, in fact, we will argue in 3.4 and 3.5.9 that the pragmatic meaning of diminutives belongs to the whole speech act and that factors of structure and focus determine where the diminutive suffix is to be attached (its "landing-site"). Finally, emotion may come in when a modifier of the illocutionary strength of a speech act (e. g., a diminutive) applies to the expression of inner states. The expression of inner states may be emotionally colored, and it will be our task to identify signals vouching such emotionality (cf. 3.5.10.4.2, 3.5.12.8.5).

36

Introduction

1.9. Morphology and Natural Morphology 1.9.1. The limits of morphology I: extragrammatical vs. grammatical morphology Morphology relates to the formal composition and decomposition of words in relation to meaning. This initial characterization, however, comprises many very heterogeneous phenomena. But the main objects of the morphological enterprise traditionally lie in a domain which has been given various names, e. g., morphology as a part (or component or module, etc.) of grammar, micromorphology, plain morphology. First we have to isolate this domain (1.9.1-1.9.2). 1.9.1.1. Sobkowiak (1991) has attempted to distinguish phonology from "metaphonology", which comprises deliberate phonological operations, as in puns, in linguistic games (e.g., Pig Latin), etc. In a similar way a term "metamorphology" might (at least partially) replace Zwicky—Pullum's (1987) term "expressive morphology". In differentiating "plain morphology" and "expressive morphology", Zwicky—Pullum (1987) collapse the following four dimensions: a) the dimension of expressivity, which is close to emotionality (cf. 1.8.6). Not all of Zwicky-Pullum's examples are, however, clearly emotionally colored: for example, cafeteria (and other accepted neologisms of this type) clearly lack emotional coloring, whereas not yet accepted formations such as honeyteria have at least the appearance of emotional coloring due to their transitional sociolinguistic status. Also linguistic games can be played with no emotion, and ideophones can be produced with little emotions. b) The dimension of center vs. periphery (in the Praguian sense). In the same way as interjections have a phonological makeup that often differs from "normal phonology", ideophones cited by Zwicky-Pullum (1987: 334-335) may have morphological properties of their own. Of course, peripheral may also be certain properties of reduplicative morphology (cf. 4.4), and even of diminutives, which may show properties absent in other categories (see 3.3, e.g., Italian recursive diminutives in -ino-inoino). But to determine how central or peripheral a phenomenon is in a given language, remains an empirical issue. Many criteria cited by Ζwickly—Pullum (1987) either refer clearly to "metamorphology" or are rare in morphology proper. In a theory of Generative Morphology this might be captured by a term such as core morphology, in Natural Mor-

Morphology and Natural Morphology

37

phology we may speak of (particularly: universal) preferences and of prototypical morphology (if several preferences are combined), cf. 1.9.2.2. c) The "meta"-dimension in metamorphology (similar to Sobkowiak's 1991 metaphonology) may refer at least to the two following aspects: 1) Conscious reflection about morphology (similar to a frequent use of "metalinguistic"), as occurring in scientific and popular etymology (paretymology), conscious learning of morphology, laboratory experiments, punning. 2) The application of a competence based on, but not identical with, morphological competence, as in linguistic games and in certain audacious poetic nonce-formations, with the consequences of possible imperfect control, more alternative outputs, more interspeaker variation (Zwicky-Pullum's criteria 4.4-4.6, 1987: 337). Both aspects may be responsible for Zwicky-Pullum's criterion 4.2 (p. 336) of "promiscuity with regard to input category", that is, the fact that there are by far fewer restrictions on the category of the base than in "plain morphology". Indeed, there is a big difference between a linguistic game (such as Pig Latin), which may apply to any word of the language, and Italian diminutives, where some of the suffixes can be attached to more than one of the categories noun, verb, adjective, and adverb (see 3.3, for reduplication cf. 4.4).72 d) The pragmatic dimension: the "pragmatic effect" cited by Zwicky— Pullum (1987: 335-336 criterion 4.1) and Sobkowiak (1991: 20) is no special dimension of metamorphology, expressive morphology, or peripheral morphology, because pragmatic effects may be obtained in any subpart of language. 73 1.9.1.2. There may be some common metalinguistic intuition among linguists to the effect that something like "plain morphology" is conceived of. All that remains outside "plain morphology", however, does not form a homogeneous set. Therefore we propose the following two distinctions: a) The meta-dimension of "meta-morphology" must be distinguished from morphological phenomena themselves, like meta-levels everywhere else in science (cf. 1.—9.1.1.c). b) Morphology as a component of grammar only accounts for a part of morphology at large. For example, echo words such as E. zigzag = G. Zickzack are morphological phenomena, but we cannot and must not account for them within the morphological grammar of English, German, etc. The domain of morphological grammar approximately corresponds to the morphological part of "microlanguage" as proposed by Trager (1955)

38

Introduction

and redefined by Wescott (1976/1977: 2—4); the complement of "microlanguage" has been called "allolanguage", a term which allows for great internal heterogeneity. 74 Wescott's "allolanguage" is divided into 1) metalanguage (see above); 2) "prelanguage"; and 3) "paralanguage". The child's first analogical word manipulations and morphological decompositions might be assigned to "prelanguage". Most other instances of Zwicky-Pullum's (1987) "expressive morphology" would fall into the realm of "paralanguage" and might be called "paramorphology". But there are yet other, heterogeneous morphological phenomena which do not belong to morphological grammar. Therefore rather than characterizing "paramorphology" or "expressive morphology", it is more sensible to define morphological grammar and thereby exclude all the "para-" or "allomorphological" phenomena. This approach is mandatory in this book where we set out to establish morphopragmatics as a proper subdiscipline, because the core of morphopragmatics must be the pragmatics of morphological grammar (see 1.12).

1.9.2. Morphological grammar The following descriptive definitions of morphology must be seen against the background of Natural Morphology (see 1.9.5), but we hope that with the necessary modifications - it may be appropriate also within other approaches to morphology. Due to the specific purpose of this book, this definitional part must remain brief and incomplete (more in Dressler et al. 1987). We are using the notion prototype, although we will explain it only in 1.9.4—1.9.5.75 1.9.2.1. If a theory assumes a concept of grammatical competence (or an equivalent), then - by definition - morphological grammar belongs to grammatical competence. Other morphological operations belong to other competences. They may even violate principles of grammatical competence (cf. Wescott's term "dysmorphy" 1976: 506), although their use may relate to morphological structures governed by grammatical morphological competence. This is the case of language games (or secret languages), for example, which manipulate morphological structures. Accordingly, Zwicky-Pullum (1987) exclude from "plain morphology" all those morphological operations that are used only conscientiously. Those sophisticated coinages that deviate from any criterion of grammatical morphology (e.g., certain nonce forms) and all linguistic games

Morphology and Natural Morphology

39

are thus excluded. Also deprecative constructions of the type variables shmariables76 are sophisticated coinages. Conscientious blends (see 1.9.2.3) should be excluded for the same reasons. 1.9.2.2. Whereas the lexicon consists of stored material, morphological grammar — just as other parts of grammar like syntax and phonology — consists of categories, rules (or processes) expressing or manipulating them, and principles governing rules. Morphological rules are essential elements of morphology, at least in a processual approach such as ours. This approach excludes suppletive phenomena from morphological grammar, unless suppletion represents a morphological expression of a grammatical category. According to this line, / and we belong to grammatical suppletion because they represent the morphological categories singular and plural. Similarly / and me represent the syntactic categories subject and object. This criterion also holds for the relations between one and first due to the exact morphosemantic parallelism with the morphological rule of forming ordinal numbers like tenth from ten. In this sense, then, grammatical suppletion belongs to morphological grammar, although secondarily and marginally. Next, the relation between a submorpheme and the word containing it (e.g., the submorpheme gl- in gleam, glow, cf. Dressier 1990b) does not belong to morphological grammar because no rule is involved. For the same reason, all purely analogical formations lie outside morphological grammar, for example, an Austrian small boy's formation papapia referring to his father (modeled on the Italian exclamation mamma mia), cf. MacWhinney's (1978) distinction between analogy and (rulegoverned) combination. 1.9.2.3. Morphological rules manipulate meaning and form in a regular, that is, predictable, way.77 Allomorphic rules manipulate form alone, but they must be preceded by a morphological rule which manipulates meaning, and those theorists (like R. Beard) who assume a class of morphosemantic rules dealing with meaning alone, must have them followed obligatorily by morphotactic rules manipulating form. In this sense, morphological rules change both meaning and form (including conversion/zero affixation); this applies even to the most transparent types of compounding where meaning and form are compositional, that is, combination counts as change (of meaning and form). The operations forming blends (e.g., sm/oke plus flog > sm/og) are less regular than morphological rules forming compounds. This induces

40

Introduction

most morphologists to exclude blends from morphological grammar (cf. Bauer 1983: 234-237, cf. 1.9.2.1). Thus hypocoristics such as Lisa, Liz, Bet from Elisabeth are excluded from grammar, because they are not formed by a rule in any predictable way. Lizz-y, Bett-y are included, because they are formed by rule from Liz and Bet. The operations forming abbreviations such as acronyms (Grand Old Party > GOP) or clippings (e. g., microphone > mike) are also excluded, not so much because they are often irregular, but rather because they do not change meaning, that is, they do not form new words from the point of view of meaning (at least when they are coined). 1.9.2.4. A morphological rule applies to a distinct class of bases. Rules of inflection and derivation have one base, compounding two (or, marginally, more). Bases are lexical and morphological items, such as (preferably) words or stems, roots, (lexicalised) phrases. This criterion excludes echo-words (cf. Mayerthaler 1977) like zigzag formed by the morphological operation of total reduplication with vowel modification, because the English lexicon does not contain either an item /zig/ nor an item /zag/. The German equivalent Zickzack can be related to the root of Zack-e 'peak, spike', whereas ticktack 'tick-tock' can be related to the verb tick-en 'to tick'. Thus, in contrast to grammatical reduplications, the operation of echo-word formation can not be restricted to a rule based on either the first or the second part, that is, both ways are possible (depending on the vowel). Onomatopoetic ideophones, e.g., dingdong (cf. Wescott 1977), usually, have no bases anyway. 1.9.2.5. The meaning change involved in rule operations is additional (including compounding) - unless one assumes a purely replacive meaning change in those derivational rules that change one category into another (e. g., conversion Ν —• V). This criterion excludes back-formations (back-derivations) such as editor > to edit (cf. Bauer 1983: 230-232), where a verb base was reconstructed from a human agent noun. Now, there seems to exist a productive subtype that "back-derives" verbs from phrasal compound instruments such as dish-washer > to dish-wash. In order to be a rule, it would have to be represented as [PATIENT V INSTRUMENT],^ — [[PAT V INSTR] n ] v . 1.9.2.6. Morphological rules of word formation produce new words, distinct from their bases, while morphological rules of inflection produce

Morphology and Natural Morphology

41

word forms which are necessary for syntactic constructions and which express grammatical meanings. Morphological operations that produce outputs not classifiable as either distinct words or inflectional word forms are not part of morphological grammar. This criterion excludes the abbreviatory devices of 1.9.2 and "expletive infixations" of the type absolutely —«• abso-blooming-lutely (Zwicky—Pullum 1987: 330-331), because neither new words nor inflectional word forms are formed. 1.9.2.7. Wescott (1976) cites many other differences between "microlinguistics" (of which our "morphological grammar" forms a proper part) and "allolinguistics" (cf. 1.9.1.2 b), but these criteria distinguish the two areas only very approximately, if at all. Thus they seem to be rather elusive, to cite Wescott's (1976: 505, 508) own characterization of allolinguistic phenomena. 1.9.3. The limits of morphology II: Morphology vs. other components As we have already asserted, morphology (even beyond morphological grammar) relates to the composition and decomposition of words (and inflectional word forms) in both meaning and form. Morphology also includes operations such as conversion or zero affixation, and subtraction where only meaning is compositional. Due to the preference for diagrammaticity (cf. 1.4, 1.9.5.2), prototypical morphology is concatenative. Natural Morphology assumes, as many other approaches do, a distinction between morphology, lexicon, syntax, and phonology. In the following, we will briefly delineate boundaries and transitions among these components in order to prepare definitions and characterizations of morphopragmatics (1.10—1.12) and in order to justify why, in the chapters to follow, we are avoiding discussion of phenomena which lie outside morphology.' 1.9.3.1. The lexicon stores at least all accepted words of a language as well as all idiomatic phrases (e. g., to kick the bucket) and idiomatic inflectional word forms (e. g., brethren with its special meaning). If we separate morphology from the lexicon and follow a processual model of grammar, then grammatical morphology has to account for all grammatically correct (actual or potential) words and inflectional word forms of a language. As a consequence, all correct actual words and some inflectional word forms are both stored in the lexicon and derived by a morphological rule. Whether a totally unproductive rule represents still a rule in terms

42

Introduction

of morphological grammar or rather expresses suppletive or other lexical relations, is open to debate. 1.9.3.2. Whereas morphology relates to the internal structure of words, syntax relates to words in syntactic constructions. But at least the following transitional phenomena exist originating in the diachronic process of univerbation by which two words fuse into a single word, e.g., Lat. facili mente 'with easy mind' > adverb Fr. facile-ment 'easi-ly'. At the beginning there is a phrase consisting of two words, a clear object of syntax. At the end there is a single word, and if it is still complex and rule-derived then it is a clear object of morphology (cf. 1.11). A transitional case between a syntactic phrase and a single, morphologically complex word is represented by juxtapositions (cf. 4.4), that is, a combination of words that are especially closely knit in form and meaning, but still carry two word accents and are separately inflected. For example, Sp. hidalgo 'noble man'; pi. hidalgo-s (with a unitary accent) has had a now obsolete plural variant hijo-s-dalgo (with two accents and separate inflection of the first part) lit. 'sons of something'. And such inbetween stages can be assumed in the above-mentioned diachronic development Lat. facili mente > Fr. facilement. Also the deprecative construction variables shmariables (cf. 1.9.2.1) belongs here. Other instances are Hungarian and German separable prefixes of the type G. weg-geh-en 'to go away' vs. sie geh-t weg 'she goe-s away'. More clearly on the syntactic side are periphrastic tenses formed with unaccented auxiliary verbs, such as she will come, she has come when compared with the cliticized forms she'll come, she's come. This leads us to the much debated class (or family of classes) of clitics (e. g., Fr., Sp., It. se). According to some scholars, they belong to phrasal morphology, whereas others assign them to one or more intermediate components between syntax and inflectional morphology (cf. Zwicky 1990: 232-234; Spencer 1991: 350-394). 1.9.3.3. Only in very abstract models of phonology may allomorphic morphological rules such as umlaut in foot - feet (if it is a rule at all) be mistaken for phonological processes. More delicate is the case of morphonology (cf. Dressier 1985a), e.g., the morphonological rule of German umlaut in bar-fuß = bar-füß-ig 'bare-foot', which has morphological, lexical, and phonological conditions. Due to its marginal connection with meaning, we can almost completely disregard morphonology in this book.

Morphology and. Natural Morphology

43

1.9.4. Parts of morphology On the basis of the above delimitations of morphology (in the sense of morphological grammar) und using concepts of Natural Morphology (1.9.5) we can characterize the following parts of morphology. 1.9.4.1. First we have to characterize inflection vs. derivation (as part of word formation). Both inflection and word formation have the function of motivating complex meanings and forms via morphological rules and their bases. Word formation produces new words (function of lexical enrichment) or relates existing words (cf. Aronoff's 1976 notion of redundancy rules) and thus has a lexical function. Inflection produces or relates inflectional word forms for signalling syntactic features and thus has a syntactic function. Other criteria can only distinguish prototypical inflection from prototypical derivation (see Dressier 1989 a) on a universal scale. In individual grammars, many non-prototypical phenomena fail to occur, and this fact facilitates separation of inflection and derivation. Prototypical representatives of inflectional categories are, for example, case and (whenever they are a morphological category of a given language) definiteness and possessive in noun inflection, and person, number, gender, tense, voice, mood in verb inflection, sc. these categories do not show any properties prototypically attributable to derivational morphology. Non-prototypical representatives of inflection are, for example, number in noun inflection, gradation (positive, comparative, superlative, excessive, etc.) in adjective inflection, infinitive, participle, gerund in verb inflection. Prototypical representatives of derivational morphology are, for example, denominal adjective formation (e.g., sand-y); deadjectival noun formation (e. g., readi-ness)\ or verb formation (e. g., to dark-en). Nonprototypical representatives are, for example, deverbal agent formation (e. g., destroy-er) and action-noun formation (e. g., destruction)·, -able adjective formation; diminutive and augmentative formation. Inflectional forms of the same word represent a paradigm, identical (or at least very similar) paradigms represent an inflectional class.78 Paradigms have a much smaller role in word formation than in inflection (cf. van Marie 1985; Pounder 1987; Crocco Galeas 1991; below 3.3.2-3.3.3, 4.5.1). 1.9.4.2. Within word formation, derivation is distinguished from compounding according to whether the morphological rule applies to only

44

Introduction

one base (e.g., derivation of sand-y) or more than one base (e.g., compounding of sand-bag). But also here there are transitional phenomena, 79 that is, semi-suffixes such as, in German, the prefixoid hoch- as intensifier in hoch-fein 'super-fine' and the suffixoid -tum in König-tum 'king-dom'. Again, it may be easier to decide where a specific morphological rule has to be assigned in an individual language than it is on a universal scale. 1.9.4.3. An important, albeit controversial, morphological concept that we are going to need several times for morphopragmatics, is the notion of "head". 80 There is much agreement about not assigning head status to inflectional affixes. Thus headhood is a property of (prototypical!) word formation. In most languages to be considered in this book, prototypical derivational suffixation and compounding assigns the head to the suffix and to the right-hand compound member, respectively. For example, in eas-y, easiness, easy-chair, social-ism the rightmost morpheme is the head in the following respects: it assigns to the whole word the morpho-syntactic subcategorization as adjective or noun and the respective lexical category membership. This includes features such as [common, countable, abstract, animate, human]. The rightmost morphemes are also the locus for inflectional suffixation (that is, eas-ier, easy-chair-s). And if a part may substitute the whole, it is the rightmost morpheme, e. g., a chair, an ism. In order to give an example of headhood in non-prototypical derivational morphology, let us cite Italian diminutives (cf. Scalise 1988: 2 3 3 237) and augmentatives (see 3.3, 4.2) such as il libro 'the book' —• il librino 'the book-let', il libr-one 'the thick(ish) book'. The suffixes are the loci for inflectional suffixation (pi. i librin-illibron-i), but the derivatives (seem to) retain all the subcategorization, category, and other class features (including nouniness and gender), to the exception of the semantic and/or pragmatic meaning of the diminutive or augmentative. Finally, the simplex may substitute the diminutive/augmentative in the same syntactic construction. Diminutives, augmentatives, pejoratives (e. g., It. -astro), E. -ish suffixation in grey-ish and much of prefixation are rather typical examples for the derivational type of alteration (called "Modifikation" in E. Coseriu's model of word formation). 81 In contrast to alteration, denominal noun formation as in garden —» garden-er, man —• man-hood only retains the syntactic category as noun, while all other features may change. Alteratives are part of, but not identical with, what Volek (1987: e.g., 177) calls "modificational derivatives". Alteratives do not include Volek's

Morphology and Natural Morphology

45

(1987: 196) "mutative derivatives" where "the derivational process changes the categorical meaning of the original word (e.g., a name of a substance, action, or quality is transformed into a name of a person characterized by a certain relationship to the given substance, action, or quality)". But she wrongly includes (pp. 193-194) "suffixes specifying gender", e.g., the (mostly pejorative) feminine suffix R. -ixa; (pp. 194— 195) "suffixes designating offspring", e. g., R. -onok', (pp. 195-196); "suffixes building collectives", e.g., R. xuligan —>• xuligan'e 'band of hooligans'. 1.9.5. Natural Morphology 1.9.5.1. The approach of Natural Morphology can be characterized in the following way: 82 a) In respect to explanation and to science theory in general, Natural Morphology is not conventionalist, but functionalist (cf. 1.6). b) Natural Morphology does not assume an autonomous module of grammar, but attempts to find cognitive and other extralinguistic bases (including semiotics, cf. 1.4) of morphological principles and preferences, c) In addition to traditional internal evidence (from given or elicited standard data corpora), Natural Morphology accepts external (or substantive) evidence (e.g., from language acquisition and disturbances, diachrony, language contact, etc.). d) Instead of discrete and/or binary distinctions, Natural Morphology often assumes continua and/or prototypical differences. This holds even for the predicate "natural" (roughly equivalent with "unmarked"), which means "relatively more natural than" (or less marked than) or "relatively very natural", e) Morphological naturalness may interact with phonological or syntactic or textual naturalness either in a cooperative or in a conflicting way. Naturalness conflicts are an important source of relative unnaturalness in each of these components. As a consequence, Natural Morphology, in principle, has to deal with all aspects of morphology, not just with grammatical morphology (as delineated in 1.9.2), although grammatical morphology remains the main object of investigation also within Natural Morphology. The theory of Natural Morphology, albeit in many aspects still very sketchy, is divided into three parts: a universal markedness theory (1.9.5.2), a theory of typological adequacy (1.9.5.3), and one of system adequacy (1.9.5.4). 1.9.5.2. The most important part of the universal markedness theory deals with universal preferences. These are either directly expressed on

46

Introduction

universal, semiotically based parameters or follow from them. The most relevant ones for morphopragmatics are (cf. 1.4): 1) The parameter of iconicity, comprising several subparameters. One is the subparameter of constructional diagrammaticity, on which operations of concatenative morphology (composition, affixation, and other additive operations) are preferred over operations of modification (e. g., ablaut, umlaut), of zero morphology, and of subtraction. In (very natural) affixation, addition of intensional meaning is diagrammatically reflected by addition of form, whereas in (antidiagrammatic, thus very unnatural) subtraction, addition of meaning is contradicted by subtraction of form. Thus German plural formation, Sg. Hund —• PI. Hund-e illustrates constructional diagrammaticity (affixation), dialectal Sg. hond —• PI. hon illustrates subtraction of form contradicting the addition of plural meaning. As a consequence, it is predictable that, crosslinguistically, concatenative morphology will be most frequent, productive and stable, while subtractive morphology will be very rare and, where it exists, rather unproductive and unstable. The child should first acquire rules of concatenative morphology. All these predictions have been borne out spectacularly so far. Other diagrammatic relations (i.e., analogies) between meaning and form will be mentioned later. 2) On the parameter of indexicality, a minimal distance between an indexical signans (e.g., a demonstrative or relative pronoun or an affix) and its indexical signatum (e. g., the antecedent or postcedent of the indexical pronoun) is preferred. Therefore affixation, preferably, applies directly to the base to which it indexically refers, and therefore, within affixation, interfixation, as an insertion rule, is disfavored (cf. 5.2). Indexicality towards an antecedent is more Reliable than towards a postcedent, with the effect that a coreferent paratactic sequence John ... he is preferred over he ... John (which in most languages is severely restricted, if not totally prohibited). This is one of the sources of the preference for suffixation over prefixation. Since derivational affixes index the stem, whereas inflectional affixes also index syntactic categories (e. g., in concord/agreement), derivational affixes are preferentially less peripheral than inflectional affixes. 3) Biuniqueness is preferred over uniqueness and, particularly, ambiguity. If there is a biunique relationship between the input and the output of

Morphology and Natural Morphology

47

a rule, then this rule is productive. Therefore, morphological rules are preferentially productive. 4) Morphosemantic (and, as we will see, also morphopragmatic) transparency is preferred over opacity. This provides another reason for interfixes to be dispreferred (cf. 5.3.2): they are semantically empty and thus morphosemantically completely opaque. Let us anticipate here, that morphosemantically transparent rather then opaque word formation is relevant for morphopragmatics. 5) Morphotactic transparency is preferred over opacity. For example, it is easier to decompose morphotactically transparent government into govern and -ment than less transparent conclusion into conclude and -ion. Therefore the application of morphonological rules, an element of opacity, is dispreferred. Due to the preference for diagrammaticity, morphosemantically transparent rules tend to be morphotactically transparent as well and vice versa, similarly opaque rules tend to be so on both parameters. Continuous signantia are morphotactically more transparent than discontinuous ones. Therefore prefixes and suffixes are preferred over discontinuous circumfixes and over infixes which render their bases discontinuous (e.g., the «-infix in Lat. tang-o Ί touch' from the root tag-). Words are more transparent bases of morphological rules than stems (or even roots) or phrases (or even sentences, cf. below). Since words are the primary units of lexical storage, they are the most transparent bases for motivating morphologically complex words. The prosodically most transparent morphological elements either coincide with feet or syllables (or with binding domains of beats), the units of prosodic parsing. Morphological parsing is easier if its units are identical with the units of prosodic parsing. The optimal size of a word coincides with a prosodic foot rather than with that of a syllable. 6) Words (including complex words) are stored as such. In early stages of morphology acquisition also inflectional word forms are stored, and later on at least idiomatic and frequently occurring inflectional word forms are stored. In order to avoid multiple storage, the internal structure of complex words and word forms tends to have a fixed morpheme order, a preference that is reenforced by iconic and indexical factors. 7) Binary relations are preferred. Thus binary compounds are preferred over n-ary ones, at least those with binary branching structures such as [[[four][star]][general\] vs. ternary Fr. [[blanc][bleu][rouge]] (the colours of

48

Introduction

the tricolor). For the same reason a head, preferentially, dominates just one non-head. Prototypes (cf. Craig 1986) can be characterized as bundles of preferences. Thus prototypical grammatical morphology is concatenative and transparent, and in addition, for example, prototypical inflectional morphological rules are represented by suffixation that applies directly 4o words. Therefore plurals of the type boy-s represent prototypical morphology as opposed to childr-en, feet or the sentence-based Hungarian occasionalism a ha-erdekli-vigyis-elolvassa-vers+ek 'the if-interest-him anyway-will-read-verse+s = the verses which will be read anyway, if they interest one'. 1.9.5.3. Since morphological naturalness may come into conflict with phonological and syntactic naturalness (cf. 1.9.5.1 .e), and since parameters of morphological naturalness may conflict with one another, no language can attain the most natural options on all parameters. Consistent choices of options on several parameters may be called morphological types, and such consistency typological adequacy. Of course, such types are ideal constructs (in the sense of Skalicka 1979), and actual languages approach more or less closely one or more of these types. Not only do typological choices of the various morphological parameters favor or disfavor each other, but also morphological and syntactic factors (dis)favor each other. Thus syntactic and morphological constituent orders are interrelated, and the presence of syntactic agreement (concord) is favored by typological factors of morphology. Since we are going to deal very little with the incorporating and the introflecting type, we limit ourselves here to a very brief characterization of the three following types (more in Dressler et al. 1987: 118-121): 1.9.5.3.1. In the agglutinating type (rather well represented by Turkish, less so by Hungarian or Japanese), morphological naturalness is highly favored on the parameters of constructional diagrammaticity, biuniqueness, morphosemantic and morphotactic transparency. Morphological rules tend to be word-based, but, as a consequence, unnatural phenomena arise on other parameters like a tendency for inflectional word forms to be much longer than a binary foot, admission of alternative morpheme orders, little morphological redundancy (including lack of concord), etc. 1.9.5.3.2. In the inflecting type (better represented by Latin than, in descending order, by Polish, German, and Italian), much more ambiguity and opacity is admitted, there is less constructional diagrammaticity,

Morphopragmatics:

History of research

49

morphological rules tend to be stem-based, but the length of word forms approaches the optimum of one foot, affix order is always fixed, there is more redundancy (including concord), etc. 1.9.5.3.3. The isolating type (as represented by Modern Vietnamese), ideally, has no grammatical morphology, but may have many reduplicative ideophones or onomatopoetics (that is, extragrammatical morphology). Words are often monosyllabic. Pidgin languages and, partially, English and (less so) French inflection approach this type. 1.9.5.4. System adequacy, as first established by Wurzel (1984), is much more important for inflection than for derivation or even compounding. Typical properties are language-specific preferences in the structure of paradigms (cf. 1.9.4.1).

1.10. Morphopragmatics: History of research 1.10.1. After independent work on discourse strategic creation of nominalizations and compounds in Dressier (1981, 1982, 1985 a) and Merlini Barbaresi (1983) and on feminism in morphology in Dressier (1987), we presented our first common papers on morphopragmatic issues (specifically on interfixes) at the 1986 Veszprem morphology conference (Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1986) and at the 1986 Bologna congress of the Societä di Linguistica Italiana (Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi 1989 a). We dealt with morphopragmatics in general at the 1987 International Pragmatic Conference in Antwerp (Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi 1987). Follow-up papers were produced in 1988 (Dressler—Kiefer 1990), in 1989 (Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1989 b), in 1990 (Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1992). Also Kilani-Schoch-Dressler's (1992) study on French formations in -o (type intellectuel —• intell-o) and Kerge's (1991) sketch of morphopragmatic problems of Estonian belong here. There are morphopragmatic sections in the following theses (directed by Dressier at the Universität Wien): MA thesis by Doleschal on motion in German (1992, cf. Doleschal 1990; cf. also her article 1989); Crocco's 1991 Ph.D. thesis on Italian ethnics (published as Crocco 1991, cf. also Crocco 1992); Christofidou's 1991 Ph.D. thesis on occasionalisms in Greek poetry (cf. also Christofidou 1990); Hilscher's MA thesis on word-formation tests with

50

Introduction

aphasics (pragmatic aspects being focussed upon in Hilscher- Dressier 1990). 1.10.2. Clearly there have been and there are other people working on issues to be dealt with in morphopragmatics, but with no actual focussing on it. Among all those who studied diminutives in the past, Alonso (1961) published (first in 1933) the finest pragmatic observations, and this long before the establishment of pragmatics as a discipline (see 3.2). Even certain proposals by Leo Spitzer could be reinterpreted in a morphopragmatic way (cf. 3.2.2). Mühlhäusler (1983) pleads for studying non-referential aspects of morphology and mentions pragmatic dimensions but without going into pragmatic theory. Volek's (1987) fifth chapter on the "pragmatic analysis of diminutives" in Russian deals with lexical and connotational elements of the microcontext and distinguishes types of emotive stimuli and "emotive attitude towards a phenomenon expressed in the diminutive base" (p. 174) "and towards the addressee". With these hints, she goes beyond the otherwise purely morphosemantic character of her chapters. Wierzbicka's studies (1984, 1985, 1986, 1991, in print) on various, nonsynonymous Polish diminutives and Russian hypocoristics, and Italian intensifiers (particularly reduplication) are important investigations on the illocutionary meanings of morphological devices in discourse, but she reduces pragmatics to a semantic metalanguage (more in 1.7.12.3, 3.2, 3.7, 4.5.2). And when one scrutinizes relevant or potentially relevant pragmatic studies, one finds, at best, morphological devices enumerated among many other devices, such as in Ochs—Schieffelin's (1989) survey on emotional phenomena and in Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa's study (1990, 1991) of modifications of illocutionary force (more in 3.5.10.3 f.). The combination of morphology with pragmatics has been scarcely investigated in a systematic way, as proven by the absence of relevant references in the bibliographies of Volek, Wierzbicka, Beard -Szymanek (1988) and Mey (1989). Mey proposes to discuss the pragmatic valency of morphological categories, and also how they affect language users. Then he briefly surveys a few morphological means for expressing power and solidarity but does not differentiate between syntactic and morphological pragmatics or between the pragmatics of word formation rules and that of complex lexical words (cf. 1.12). 1.10.3. Of course, there are many studies on specific morphological categories where pragmatics plays a role, but here the approach is either not

Morphopragmatics

and grammaticalization

51

pragmatic or is a mixture of morphological and syntactic or lexical analysis. Among these, there are sociolinguistic and/or sociopragmatic studies on "pronouns of power and solidarity" (Brown - G i l m a n 1960) like Fr. vous vs. toiltu, where morphology and syntax are involved, and studies on honorifics (cf. here chapter 2). Grabias (1981: 46) investigates pragmatic functions of diminutives, augmentatives, pejoratives, etc., but we cannot accept his methodology (see discussion in 1.8.6, 3.2.3). Or, we can recall some sociolinguistic work on sexism in language, which also investigates the pragmatic consequences of male-female inequality in gender agreement (also syntactic, cf. Christofidou-DoleschalDressler 1992), in agentive formation and motion (e.g., Hellinger 1985 and, from a morphological point of view, Malkiel 1978: 149-150, cf. 1.10.1). The role of morphological constructions, particularly of occasionalisms and neologisms has been studied (and not only for lexicological and lexicographic aspects) by many authors, but in a text/discourse perspective rather than in a pragmatic perspective. 83 Another pertinent field of study is the interplay of grammar and pragmatics in "exotic" languages, as in Heath (1991), cf. 2.5. 1.10.4. Several studies claim to deal with the pragmatics of word formation (e.g. Anwar 1984; Aronoff 1980; Bauer 1979; Beard 1978; Brekle 1986: 44; Cetnarowska 1992; Clark-Clark 1979; Fleischer 1979; Levi 1983; Meys 1980; Romaine 1983; Wilss 1986: 85-89). For example, Coseriu's (1970) often cited contrast between G. Eis#Verkäufer 'ice (cream) seller' and Straßen^ Verkäufer 'street seller, pedlar' shows idiosyncratic lexical fixations in the norm of Standard German. Given the conceivable appropriate pragmatic conditions, however, an Eisverkäufer could sell something to ice skaters while himself skating on ice, and a Straßenverkäufer might sell roads to Saudi-Arabia, etc. The normal interpretation of Eisverkäufer, for example, is determined by general knowledge of the world or by specific knowledge of the current speech situation, that is, our knowledge identifies the actual reference of the lexical meaning of the specific complex word as a whole. But this is matter for lexical pragmatics, not for morphopragmatics (cf. 1.12.1).

1.11. Morphopragmatics and grammaticalization 1.11.1. After our sketchy outline of the history of research that prepared the ground to the establishment of a proper sub-field of morphopragmat-

52

Introduction

ics (1.10), we want to put forward and discuss the claim that morphopragmatics is a certain type of grammaticalized pragmatics. This proposal may sound paradoxical. For, on the one hand, pragmatics is usually seen as an antithesis to grammar, each one representing, for example, a separate module in generative theory (cf. Leech 1983: 4 - 5 , and here 1.2). On the other hand, our proposal is incompatible with the definition of pragmatics in Levinson (1983: 9 (8)): "Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalised, or encoded in the structure of a language." For, if pragmatics were grammaticalized as a whole, then morphopragmatics could not be defined as grammaticalized pragmatics. Therefore we have to look first into the notion of grammaticalization (1.11.2), and only after this can we propose a more specific definition of morphopragmatics (1.11.3). 1.11.2. Grammaticalization (cf. Lehmann 1986, 1987, 1989 a) is normally understood as a diachronic process of growing desemanticization and synthetization or as a "transfer of a sign from the lexicon into the grammar" (Lehmann 1987). A well-known example is the diachronic transformation of the syntactic construction Lat. cantare habeo Ί have to sing' (where habeo is a lexical item) into the synthetic inflectional category of the future in Romance languages such as Fr. chanterai; Sp. cantari; It. canterd, etc. (cf. Harris-Ramat 1987). Often, grammaticalization is distinguished from univerbation (cf. Heine-Reh 1984: 32), another diachronic notion that refers to the change of phrases, through juxtapositions, into compounds and derivations, as in the case of the English suffixes -ship, -dom and their German equivalents -schaft, -turn. If we assume a gradual (diachronic and synchronic) continuum between inflection and derivation with prototypical differences and many common properties (cf. 1.9.4), then it is justified to expand the notion of grammaticalization from inflection to derivation and to include univerbation. 84 The notion "grammaticalized" in the sense of "being or becoming more grammatical than" may also apply to synchronic variation, if we follow Lehmann's (1987) definition: "A language sign S; is more grammatical than another one Sj, if S; is more part of the grammar than Sj", a definition which presupposes a conception of morphology and other parts of grammar as continua (cf. 1.9.3-1.9.4). In this sense then, we can say that the derived word dogg-ie, a diminutive, is more grammaticalized than the noun phrase small dog, and that maybe little dog (with the weak, phonologically reduced form of little) is slightly more grammaticalized than small dog (more in 3.3.5).

Morphopragmatics

and grammaticalization

53

Thus we conceive of the notion of grammaticalization as a typological and panchronic variable - beyond diachrony - and use it to study the degree of grammaticalization of a semantic or pragmatic category. Let us illustrate it with the semantic category of verbal aspect. If we start with the German multilexical paraphrase Ich war gerade dabei ein Buch zu lesen, then we find no grammaticalization, 85 in contrast to the English equivalent I was reading a book, an analytic syntactic construction which counts as a grammatical expression of verbal aspect. Grammaticalization is still stronger with a synthetic morphological category as the imperfect F. Je lisais un livre\ It. Leggevo un libro, whereas an Italian construction such as Stavo leggendo un libro has a degree of grammaticalization ranging between the English progressive/expanded form and its German paraphrase. 86 In modifying Lehmann's (1986, 1987, 1989 a) classifications we propose the following criteria for assessing the relative degree of grammaticalization: 1) Desemanticization intended as decrease of the number of semantic features and as reduction of semantic autonomy and concreteness along the continua a) from autosemantic to synsemantic signs; b) from lexical to grammatical meaning; and c) from more concrete to more abstract meanings (cf. Heine-Reh 1984: 36). This criterion is well illustrated in our aspect example with the abstract synsemantic meaning "imperfective aspect" of the Romance imperfects as opposed to the English and, particularly, German correspondences. For the purpose of morphopragmatics, we will deal with relative degrees of pragmatic autonomy and concreteness (see 3.6.2.4). 2) Syntagmatic extension in numbers of phonemes, syllables, morphemes, syntactic constituents. Although counting is model-specific, there is, in our aspect example, no question about the drastic difference between G. Ich war gerade dabei X zu Y-en and It. Y-(e)vo in all dimensions. 3) Degree of bondedness or coalescence (vs. autonomy) and ensuing degree of syntagmatic variability vs. fixation. Whereas coalescence is so great in It. -(e)vo as to render segmentation and establishment of meaning-form relations difficult, the German correspondent consists of four free words, one clitic and one suffix. As a consequence, several permutations of word order are possible in the German sentence, no morphotactic permutation in It. leggevo. 4) Paradigmaticity, that is, membership of a more or less loosely organized paradigm. Thus It. leggevo represents one tense within the tightly

54

Introduction

integrated paradigm of tenses, in binary oppositions to the present, past, and perfect tenses. In other words, the Italian imperfetto is a grammatical category within a closely-knit set of categories. The German construction, by contrast, is not part of any paradigm and is only loosely related to other syntactic expressions. 5) Automaticity, that is, systematically constrained choice and use as automatic consequence of a higher-order choice vs. "free choice of items according to communicative intentions" (Lehmann 1985: 44). The use of an Italian imperfect such as leggevo is a largely obligatory consequence of textual and syntactic choices (with clear-cut intervening variables). The German expression, in contrast, is an optional choice (among many) towards clarifying an intention which, in languages that have this grammatical category, is rendered by the imperfective verbal aspect. 1.11.3. In morphopragmatics we are clearly most interested in the endpoint or extreme pole of diachronic and synchronic grammaticalization, that is, in the final stage, when the pragmatic category enters morphology. And this final stage is nothing else than morphologization of syntactic constructions and of lexical collocations, comparable to morphologization of phonological rules (cf. Dressier 1985 c). Defining morphopragmatics as morphologized pragmatics is thus more precise than defining it as grammaticalized pragmatics, and this allows us to avoid the misunderstandings mentioned in 1.11.1. Both terms, grammaticalization and morphologization, also imply the regularity of the operations involved. Univerbation often ends up by producing irregular, idiomatic complex words or in obliterating the identity of affixes. In this case, the complex word or word form ceases to be a morphological construction or at least becomes less pertinent for morphological study and rather qualifies as a lexical idiosyncrasy. In line with grammaticalization rather than with univerbation, morphopragmatics must deal primarily with the regular pragmatic effects of regular morphological operations. And this brings us back to the definition of morphopragmatics as the area of the general pragmatic meanings of morphological rules. This sets morphopragmatics apart from the pragmatics of textual, syntactic, and lexical phenomena (cf. the specifications in 1.12). 1.11.4. Interestingly, the morphological categories that we are going to study in this book, namely plural formation; Japanese honorifics; the Huichol prefix /til (2); diminutives (3); Italian augmentatives, elatives, and reduplicative juxtapositions (4); Italian interfixes (5); German exces-

Outlook and final definitions

55

sive formation (6), are all non-prototypical representatives (cf. 1.9.4) of either inflection or derivation (reduplicative juxtapositions are, in fact, non-prototypical representatives of morphology as a whole).

1.12. Outlook and final definitions As a result of our characterization of morphopragmatics as morphologized pragmatics (1.11), we are now able to provide more precise definitions of the field of morphopragmatics. 87 1.12.1. Morphopragmatics can be defined as the area of the general pragmatic meanings of morphological rules, that is, of the regular pragmatic effects produced when moving from the input to the output of a morphological rule. As happens in morphology in general, morphologically irregular patterns are not central to morphopragmatics, for example, suppletive personal pronouns, morphotactically opaque patterns, and, particularly, extragrammatical operations (cf. 1.9) are marginal. A morphological rule is relevant for morphopragmatics if it contains a pragmatic variable which cannot be suppressed in the description of its meaning. Our definition includes within morphopragmatics the (morphologically relevant) "pragmatic conditions on linguistic rules" that Levinson (1979: 217-218) considers as part or pragmatics. But the scope of morphopragmatics is much wider. According to our definition, morphopragmatics is to be strictly distinguished from a) morphosemantics; b) lexical semantics of morphology; c) lexical pragmatics of morphology; d) pragmatics of syntactic constructions: a) Morphosemantics deals with the semantic meanings of morphological rules, that is, with regular denotational or connotational semantic change between inputs and outputs or morphological rules of word formation or inflection. When studying morphosemantics, one can dispense with the pragmatics of speech situations, speech acts, speaker and hearer strategies. That is, all pragmatic variables can be suppressed when describing the semantic meaning of a morphological rule. b) Lexical semantics of morphology deals with the denotational and connotational semantics of morphologically complex words, particularly of the semantic idiosyncrasies of each individual output of a morphological

56

Introduction

rule. That is, it treats word meaning (G. Wortbedeutung), whereas wordformation meaning (G. Wortbildungsbedeutung) is treated by morphosemantics. c) Lexical pragmatics of morphology deals with idiosyncratic pragmatic meanings/effects of individual, morphologically complex words. All the self-proclaimed pragmatic studies of word formation we are aware of belong here (cf. 1.10.4). d) It makes little sense to speak of the morphopragmatics of inflectional rules unless this can be clearly distinguished from the pragmatics of syntactic constructions (which trigger the application of these inflectional rules). Since the main function of inflectional morphology is to signal syntactic categories, morphopragmatics of inflection is rather marginal. 1.12.2. The study of a morphopragmatic phenomenon can be approached in the following standard way. The first step (cf. 1.9) is ascertaining whether one deals with (a) a productive morphological rule; or (b) an extragrammatical morphological operation; or (c) a phenomenon like suppletion, only marginally belonging to morphological grammar. Only in the first case (a), do we have a chance of dealing with prototypical morphopragmatics. As groundwork for the third and fourth steps of pragmatic investigation, structural restrictions on the application of rule (a) or operation (b) or on the distribution of phenomenon (c) have to be studied. Moreover, one needs to establish whether the rule is a prototypical rule or not (inflection, derivation, or compounding), and if not, in what way it is not prototypical. The second step consists of a semantic analysis of the morphological rule (operation, phenomenon) in question, in order to see what generalizations on meaning can be made without recourse to pragmatic factors. This analysis must also cover semantic restrictions (including lexical restrictions, when not yet studied in step one). The third step consists of the pragmatic analysis. In order to qualify as morphopragmatic, generalizations must concern the morphological rule, operation, or paradigm itself, not just individual lexical items (lexical pragmatics, cf. 1.12.1c) nor the whole syntactic construction (cf. 1.12.1 d). Clearly the findings must be couched in terms of a pragmatic model or, at least, of pragmatic concepts, such as those delineated in 1.7 above. One difficulty inherent in this analysis is to establish whether there are autonomous pragmatic meanings, effects, or conditions that are specific to the rule, operation, or paradigm studied, or whether pragmatic properties can be simply explained as pragmatic exploitation of semantic

Outlook and final definitions

57

properties of the object of study. In the latter case, pragmatic exploitation is merely a predictable instance of general pragmatic operations working in exactly the same way in all linguistic components. A final step is the most complex and difficult to pursue. It is the description and explanation of the relations between pragmatic and semantic or structural facts. For example, if the morphological rule in question is non-prototypical, are these peculiarities (be they structural or semantic) related to one of the pragmatic properties of the rule? And are such relations founded in diachronic developments, in language acquisition or in phylogenetic evolution (in the sense of cognitive linguistics)? Due to the novelty of the field of morphopragmatics, results in this fourth step of analysis will be very defective in this study, if at all possible. For the purposes of an analysis of the above type, data collection can rely neither on native-speaker intuition nor on informal observation of naturalistic data. Data elicitation via open interviews (and, a fortiori, closed interviews or questionnaires) often has to cope with many variables, pertinent to each item in question and exceeding in number and combinability the imagination of the interviewee. Moreover, informants' awareness and conscious evaluation of non-referential meanings is reduced. 88 As a result, informant work is scarcely suited for generating examples but is useful for checking and interpreting naturalistic data. In this case, specific questions are posed by the interviewer. Informal observation of naturalistic data, with no possibility of questioning the text producer or applying discourse analysis, is often unavoidable (e. g., when listening to the radio or watching TV), but the observer has to supplement it with situation recall and report. More on data collection and interpretation in 3.5.1 (cf. Wolfson 1983).89

2.

Morphopragmatics in inflection

2.1. Introduction 2.1.1. As we have argued in 1.9.4.1 (more in Dressier 1989 a), the main function of inflection is to serve syntax, that is, to provide inflectional word forms for their role in syntactic constructions. Since syntactic constructions may also have regular pragmatic meanings, inflectional morphological rules may contribute to, or may be involved in, the pragmatic meaning of syntactic constructions. Moreover, the contribution of inflectional morphological rules to meaning is usually morphosemantically transparent, and this holds for pragmatic meanings as well. As a consequence, the pragmatics of inflectional morphological rules is usually derivable from the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. In other words, the morphopragmatics of inflection is usually overshadowed by the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. Therefore it has little sense to duplicate, within morphopragmatics, studies on the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. So we have to look for areas where morphopragmatics may be rather autonomous from the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. 2.1.2. A first candidate is the area of morphological opacity. For example, Bolinger (1989: 21) mentions differences between the full modal forms could, must and their reduced variants c'd, m'st. These reduced forms, in a first phase, represented casual speech forms derived by phonological processes, but later on they have become grammaticalized and lexicalised, that is, the phonological reduction process has become irregular, thus producing irregular morphotactic opacity; then, due to the iconic tendency of pairing morphotactic opacity with opacity of compositional meaning (cf. 1.9.5.2), the reduced forms have obtained their own meanings, unpredictable from the meanings of the full forms. For example, Bolinger claims that full forms tend to have an epistemic meaning, reduced forms a root meaning, as in his examples: (5)

I c'd kill him! (I feel like it.)

(6)

I could kill him. (That would be one solution.)

Here and There

59

Since the morphology of the two forms is different (though not determined by general morphological rules), and since the pragmatic variables of the speech situations in which they are used, are also different, there is at least a marginal area left over for morphopragmatics. But this is clearly no paradigm case of an autonomous area of morphopragmatics, and therefore we will not study such cases in this book. 2.1.3. A second candidate is the area of transition between inflection and derivation (cf. 1.9.4.1). If derivational morphology is the favorite domain of morphopragmatics, then any non-prototypical inflectional morphological rule which comes close to the domain of derivational morphology, has a higher chance of being relevant to morphopragmatics than a prototypically inflectional category. We will discuss an example of this transitional type from Huichol in 2.5. 2.1.4. A third class of candidates has the following characteristics. If some pragmatic meaning can be expressed by several syntactic constructions A, B, C, etc., and if construction A is uniquely expressed by one and only one inflectional morphological rule (or,in other words, has one and only one exponent), whereas constructions B, C, etc. have multiple exponency, that is, are expressed by a variety of syntactic, morphological, and lexical means, then the inflectional morphological rule of A is the best candidate for a morphopragmatic study. In other words, it is predictably rewarding to analyze the pragmatic meaning of construction A in terms of morphopragmatics. Japanese examples will be given in 2.4. 2.1.5. But we will start with another area of inflection where morphopragmatics is relevant. An inflectional category or paradigm may have a clear pragmatic basis explaining asymmetries of its inventory and/or its semantics. This is most evident with certain deictic elements, for example, those discussed in 2.2 and 2.3.

2.2. Here and There Universal pragmatics (in the sense of Habermas 1985) and the notion of the prototypical speaker (see Mayerthaler 1981) provide the cognitive basis for many morphological markedness relations. Let us start with the deictics of here and there (cf. Weissenborn-Klein 1982).

60

Morphopragmatics

in inflection

It is often said that "here" is semantically less marked than "there" because "here" is applied to the speaker (cf. Parret 1983: 124), not only in the hie et nunc of the speech situation, but also in thinking (where language serves its cognitive function). Thus in case of neutralisation, that is, loss of distinction between two opposite terms, the less marked term should remain, in our case "here". However, in English, it is there that we find as the unmarked case in the construction: (7)

There is a conference in Kiel.

Yet the corresponding construction: (8)

Hire is a conference.

is clearly marked (also as provided by obligatory initial contrastive stress). In some German dialects only da 'there' remains of the pair here — da, and in modern French lä and voilä have expanded to the detriment of ici, -ci, and void. According to Mayerthaler (1981: 88) the relative unmarkedness of "there" is understandable when one considers that the prototypical speaker's visual perception is dominant over all other kinds of perception, and that the prototypical speaker normally does not look at himself or herself, that is, "here", but rather looks outside, that is, "there". Thus universal pragmatics explains the preference for morphemes denoting "there". 9 0 The relation between "here" and "there" is usually either of a lexical nature or suppletive, and therefore concerns a marginal domain of morphology and thus also of morphopragmatics. For this reason we will not go into any more detail here.

2.3. Personal pronouns Number is a much more central phenomenon in morphology, although it does not present a prototypical inflectional category in nouns and pronouns. Let us consider number relations in personal pronouns. Here we want to distinguish aspects of universal pragmatics (to be treated especially in 2.3.1) from culture-specific ones (see 2.3.2-2.3.5).

Personal pronouns

61

2.3.1. Universal pragmatics (in the sense of Habermas 1971, 1985) provides the general foundation of exophoric deixis of first- and secondperson pronouns and thus of their indexical semantics. 91 And pragmatics also explains asymmetric distributions of morphotactic transparency and opacity (cf. 1.9.5.2) in the inventories of personal pronouns in the languages of the world. The sets of inventories 92 have two polar types. I) The first type displays strong suppletion (cf. 1.9.2.2—1.9.2.3) between singular and plural for both persons, as in most European languages. (9)

Lat. 1. ego — PI. nos, 2. tu - PI. vos.

This type, characterized by total morphotactic opacity, is very frequent throughout the world. II) The opposed pole is represented by a type that displays morphotactically totally transparent plurals in both first and second person, as in Chinese: (10)

1 .wo — PI. wo-men, 2. ni - ni-men,

Compare this to plural formation for human referents, e. g., haizi 'child' —• PI. haizi-men. Transparent plurals are frequent in Creole languages. For example, in Cape York Creole (McGregor 1989: 445), in addition to the English personal pronouns ai, wi, yu, yu, there are the forms Sg. mi, yu, PI. inclusive mi-pela, exclusive mi-tu-pela (exclusive dual mi-tu), yu-pela. Besides the polar ones, there are mixed types. If we consider only nominatives and languages that have just four (nominative) forms, one for each person and each number, then we can assume the existence of two ideal types which mix morphotactic transparency and strong suppletion: III) One type has strong suppletion between singular and plural in the first person, morphotactic transparency in the second person, as in: (11)

Modern Greek 1. egö — PI. emis, 2. esi — PI. esi-s.

IV) The other type has the opposite: morphotactic transparency in the first person, strong suppletion in the second person, such as: (12)

Buryat 1. bi - PI. bi-de, 2. si - PI. ta.

62

Morphopragmatics

in inflection

Which universal predictions can we make about the relative frequency of these four types, that is, about their crosslinguistic distribution? As we will see, universal pragmatics combined with the semiotically based preference for iconic relationships between meaning and form, allows the following two predictions (A and B): A) Plurals of nouns are usually morphosemantically transparent in relation to their singulars, such that the meaning of, e.g., hill-s is entirely predictable from that of hill, in that hills really means nothing else than a plurality of hill. On the other hand, whereas Fr. moi generally refers to the speaker and toi to the addressee of the speech situation, the respective plurals do not necessarily refer to the set of all and only those who speak or are addressed in the speech situation. Therefore the meaning of plurality in personal pronouns (first and second person) is typically more opaque than the meaning of plurality in nouns or in third-person pronouns. This holds for pragmatics in the first place, but always seems to be extended to semantics as well (via iconicity). Since there is an iconic tendency to express morphosemantic transparency with corresponding morphotactic transparency, and morphosemantic opacity with morphotactic opacity (cf. 1.9.5.2), we can predict that crosslinguistically there should be less morphotactic transparency in the expression of plurality in first- and second-person pronouns than in nouns and third-person pronouns. 93 This prediction is amply confirmed, first by languages which have strong suppletion in singular - plural relations of the first and second person, but form third-person plurals, like most noun plurals, in a transparent way. One such case is Russian: (13)

1 .ja — PI. my, 2. ty — PI. v^, 3. m. on, f. on-a, n. on-o - PI. m., f., η. on-i.

Second, the prediction is confirmed by the apparent non-existence of languages that form a transparent pronominal plural in first and second person but have strong suppletion for the third person, and by the nonexistence of languages having strong suppletion to a higher extent in nominal than in pronominal plural formation (first and second person). Seeming exceptions have some extra motivation. Take the Tok Pisin personal pronouns 1 .mi - mi-pela, 2. yu — yu-pela, 3. em — ol. Suppletion in the third person - in contrast with maximal transparency in the other persons - derives from the general use of ol as plural marker (e. g., ol house 'house-s').

Personal pronouns

63

Β) The second prediction is based on the observation that the universal pragmatics of plurality is still less transparent with the first person 94 than with the second person. In fact, the only speech situations where we is a pragmatically transparent plural of / are those in which the speakers utter or sing something in chorus. In this case, we refers to all and only the speakers. 95 And even then they might choose to use I, as frequently in Ancient Greek tragedies (e.g., Euripides, Medea 796-797, 811-812), where all the members of the chorus when chanting simultaneously refer to themselves with ego. Another situation may be one in which recruits must swear oaths of allegiance. Here, some languages (e.g., Italian) prescribe "I" instead of "we", because the obligations are to be undertaken by the individual, and thus the oath is more binding if expressed in the first singular than in the first plural. On the other hand, there are many more speech situations where the speaker refers to all and only the addressees with, e. g., G. ihr, It. voi, Fr. vous, Russ. vy, etc. Again, in accordance with the iconic tendency expounded in A), we can predict that within the set of languages with mixed type systems (III and IV), type III (morphotactic transparency in the second person plural, suppletion in the first) will be more frequent than the opposite type IV. This prediction is spectacularly borne out, insofar as there are lots of cases of type III, while the only example of type IV we have found is that of Buryat cited above (8). Prediction B) is confirmed even in cases of different degrees of morphotactic opacity in first- and second-person plurals. In particular, we predict type V to be more frequent than type VI: V) This type has strong suppletion (that is, total morphotactic opacity) in the first person, weak suppletion (that is, some morphotactic transparency) in the second person. One example among many is Hungarian: (14)

1 .en - PI. mi, 2. te - PI. ti.

VI) For the other type, weak suppletion in the first person and strong suppletion in the second person, we have found no examples so far. 2.3.2. Iconicity relations become more complicated as the inventory of personal pronouns becomes richer. One complicating element is the distinction between inclusive and exclusive plural. Such enlarged inventories mostly occur in languages with rich morphology. This is the case with the data collected in Forchheimer (1953), Head (1978), Ingram (1978),

64

Morphopragmatics

in inflection

and by Dressier (for the 1985 a publication). But exclusive vs. inclusive also occurs in some Creole languages as noted above and, marginally, in It. noialtri 'we with the exclusion of you' (cf. Sp. nosotros, Fr. nous autres frangais, cf. Wandruszka 1991: 45—46). (For problems with inclusive plurals cf. McGregor 1989.) It seems to be quite difficult to predict which types of languages and/ or cultures differentiate between inclusive and exclusive plurals. Relative morphological richness seems to be just one favoring variable. Anyway, languages having such a morphological distinction have a grammatical means for signalling the social functions of integration (and also of solidarity) vs. separation. Languages that have no such grammatical distinction, can signal these functions only by having recourse to textual and lexical pragmatics (cf. Varenne 1984). As to transparency of plurals, universal pragmatics makes it evident that the indexical (deictic) referents of an inclusive plural can only be identical with the speakers, if the speakers address each other on chorus, a rather exceptional situation, or if no other addressees are present, for example, when a group is singing for themselves. Only then is an inclusive plural a true plural of ego. On the other hand, the exclusive plural expresses true plurality of ego, when a group is praying to God or is swearing an oath of allegiance to somebody, or when a chorus is singing to an audience. Only an ethnographic analysis can decide which of the two types of speech situations is more basic and/or more frequent for a linguistic community, and what other culture-specific factors may intervene. But if we may venture a speculation, we would expect inclusive speech situations to be relatively more typical for a Gemeinschaft, exclusive speech situations relatively more typical for a Gesellschaft.96 Only after ascertaining the language-specific pragmatic basis can we try to predict whether, in conformity with the iconicity principle, inclusive or exclusive plural forms should also be morphotactically more transparent. This issue is relevant for languages which have more than four (nominative) forms for first- and second-person pronouns. Languages that have fewer than four forms, such as Ε. I, you, we, do not seem to be overall rich in morphology. Such languages have no morphopragmatic means (of the type of Fr. tu/toi vs. vous) of expressing pragmatic attitudes related to the well-known sociolinguistic concepts of "power and solidarity" (Brown—Gilman 1960) and thus, often, must have recourse to discourse and lexical pragmatics (cf. Braun-Kohz— Schubert 1986, Braun 1988).

Personal pronouns

65

In accordance with Searle's expressibility principle ("whatever can be meant can be said"), the absence of a morphological distinction as that between you and thou in Modern English does not preclude the possibility of expressing the corresponding social meanings with some other device:97 for example, those Portuguese varieties where the second plural pronoun voce has ousted the singular tu, have not lost social meanings present in other varieties where either this innovation has not taken place or where, in a subsequent innovation, voce has been assigned singular position after the emergence of a new, morphotactically transparent plural voce-s (cf. Braun 1988: 77-83). Therefore Wierzbicka's (1985: 164; 1991: 4748) interpretation of the English neutralization as some sort of "distance-building device" is in need of further support. 2.3.3. Now let us turn to issues which are still more language and culture specific. In regard to iconicity relations as discussed in 2.3.1, the honorific and impersonal use of pronouns complicates the calculation of the relative morphosemantic transparency of we and you, but the preference for more morphological suppletion in the first plural and for more morphotactic transparency in the second plural still remains. Let us start with Kitagawa—Lehrer's (1990) differentiation between vague and impersonal uses of personal pronouns. We conclude from their study: 1) that vague we and you include speaker and addressee respectively, impersonal plural pronouns only implicitly, at best; 2) that regular impersonal use of plural pronouns renders these pronouns morphosemantically more opaque; 3) that languages with extended honorific pronoun systems (such as Japanese, that is, those which "lack a closed set of personal pronouns") do not have a regular impersonal use of plural pronouns; 4) that honorific use of plural pronouns to refer to a single person (such as Fr. vous, G. Sie) also opacifies the morphosemantics of plural pronouns, and therefore, honorifics may play a double role for the morphosemantic transparency/opacity of plural pronouns. When it is the case that the honorific system precludes regular impersonal use of personal pronouns, morphosemantic transparency is enhanced provided that plural pronouns can only refer to more than one referent. If, instead, honorific plural pronouns can also refer to a single referent and do not preclude regular impersonal use, then they enhance morphosemantic opacity of plural pronouns. If they do preclude such use, then they achieve an intermediate degree of opacity, that is, there is a sort of tradeoff. 2.3.4. Japanese personal pronouns of the first and second person have a variety of forms according to their degree of formality: 98

66

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1. Sg.: boku, ata(ku)si, wata(ku)si, ore 1. PI.: same, plus suffixes -tati or -ra (rough, restricted to the more informal variants or to lower social classes) or -domo (humble, restricted to the most formal variants, cf. 2.4.5.2). 2. Sg.: anta, anata, kisama, omae, kimi 2. PI.: same, plus -tati or -ra (substituted by respectful -gata after respectful anata and, optionally, after anta). So far everything is morphotactically transparent, provided that one allows for preferences and restrictions in cooccurrence of formal/informal bases and more or less respectful suffixes. There is, however, an additional, suppletive first plural wareware 'we', often used ethnocentrically (Hinds 1986: 251). The reduplication (of now obsolete or only dialectal ware T ) is atypical for pronouns. A case of suppletion in the second person is syokun suppleting kimi-tati 'you and others'. Then, we have two cases of number neutralization: uchi 'house, home' may be used for expressing "I" and "we" (Hinds 1986: 252-253), and, similarly, taku 'house, home' can refer to both numbers of the second person. Therefore, there is about the same (small!) degree of opacity in the singular/plural distinction in both persons. The explanation for this distribution lies in in the language-specific, social variable of the importance of the honorific system, which levels the universal paradigmatic assumption for Japanese. Thus Japanese belongs to the type II languages of 2.3.1 (like Chinese), that is, languages with very transparent plurals in pronouns. Other facts show the greater overall transparency of Japanese pronominal plurals when compared with the majority of languages. Japanese personal pronouns do not have regular impersonal use, and plural honorifics do not refer to a single person. In the same line, Japanese does not have a pluralis maiestatis (cf. 2.3.5). For example, emperors have never used the plural for "I"; Hirohito, up to the end of World War II, used the special singular form tin, and Akihito uses the most formal forms wata(ku)si. However, two metaphorical, opacifying types of plural do exist in Japanese as well: the author plural and the plural of modesty (more on this in 2.3.5). Thus the sociopragmatics of Japanese is responsible for the introduction of honorific expressions into the system of personal pronouns and,

Personal pronouns

67

indirectly, for the relatively high morphosemantic transparency of the pronominal plural. In addition, we find a second pragmatic foundation of the inventories of Japanese personal pronouns: Japanese upper and middle class women are expected to speak much more politely than m e n , " and these norms hold for the standard language as a whole. The effects of these sociopragmatic norms are not only that women prefer more formal/respectful variants where men prefer more informal variants, but also that even the inventories used by men and women are different, for example, in the singular (cf. Ide 1990: 73-74). In the first person, the very formal watakusi and the rather informal watasi are used by both sexes, but atakusi and atasi only by women, the informal boku and the rather rough variant ore only by men. In the second singular, both sexes use anata and anta, but only men use the informal variant kimi and the rather rough variants omae, kisama. Thus only the most polite/respectful forms are identical for both sexes.100 (On the use of third-person pronouns see Hinds 1986: 257-258). But changes seem to be possible if sex-specific social roles change (cf. Hori 1986; Reynolds 1990). Thus young girls may be heard using boku, ore, kimi (cf. Reynolds 1990: 140-141). In other words, the sex-specific restrictions of inventories do not refer to the structural level of competence, but to the institutional level of sociopragmatic norms. Japanese personal pronouns clearly show how deeply the morphopragmatic foundation may motivate patterns of pronominal inflection. 2.3.5. There is much less to say on the morphopragmatics of other uses of plural personal/possessive pronouns crosslinguistically. As to pluralis maiestatis, for example, in Italian, it is used by popes, cardinals, bishops, university rectors (and formerly by Italian kings, Austrian emperors in their Italian territories, etc.). It is generally densely used at the beginning of a text, but later in the text it can be omitted like any other personal pronoun. Of course, emphatic or contrastive purposes may autonomously induce its use. Thus again, the pluralis maiestatis is a characteristic of a syntactic construction, that is, of arguments referring to specific speakers. Historically, the pluralis maiestatis goes back to Late Latin when a bishop or an emperor (particularly since Gordianus III, AD 238-244) spoke/wrote also in the name of fellow-ecclesiastics and co-emperors respectively. But later the pluralis maiestatis became a metaphorical device for underlining the importance and venerability of the speaker.

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Pluralization may also be a defocusing device (cf. Shibatani 1990: 364; 1991) used to avoid or weaken direct reference to speaker or addressee. Weakening of directness by using the plural has two bases: a) the single speaker or addressee "is lost" within the group or frame indicated by plurality; b) since plurality is more transparent with the second person, we expect that "you" is a better defocusing device for "thou" than "we" is for "I", and as far as politeness is concerned, in effect, crosslinguistically "you" is much more used as a respectful replacement of "thou" than "we" is used as a humbling device for "I" (pluralis modestiae). This argument, however, loses some of its force because a second universal pragmatic preference converges. Elevating the addressee by using forms of respect is a more direct pragmatic device than playing down oneself by using a humbling device. For example, in Japanese there is a clear preponderance of (direct or indirect) addressee-elevating devices over speaker-humbling devices (see 2.4). Another metaphorical plural that occurs in Italian, Latin, Japanese, and in many other languages is author plural. Here the pragmatic basis is different from the pluralis maiestatis/modestiae: as the traditional term "sociative plural" indicates, the author wants to associate, that is, to involve his/her readers. And, again, this is not a question of pronoun inflection alone, but regards the reference to the author in any syntactic construction - of course, one might argue that there is always an underlying personal pronoun of the first person with which the verb agrees (e.g., pro-drop hypothesis). Thus the exact boundary between morphopragmatics and the pragmatics of syntactic constructions is theory-specific. In any case, note that the plural of the author is excluded if the author (such as Xenophon, Julius Caesar, Charles de Gaulle) chooses the detachment strategy (cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1980: 64-65, 71) of referring to himself in the third person. This objectivizing (and defocusing) strategy seems to be incompatible with the associative base of the author-plural strategy. 2.3.6. Honorific neutralizations of personal pronouns (such as Fr. vous 2nd pi. = polite address form towards a single person) are hardly a matter of morphopragmatics alone, because usually syntactic constructions, far beyond morphology, are involved. Let us briefly illustrate this with German and Italian. In both languages, the third person is used for polite address (metaphorically indicating social distance). 2.3.6.1. In German, polite Sie (homophonous with 3rd pi. sie) cannot be dropped and plural agreement is necessary in the verb as in:

Personal pronouns

(15)

69

Geh-en Sie weg? go PI. They away? 'Are you going away?'

As in French such sentences are ambiguous as to whether one or more persons are addressed. But there is an older, now largely obsolete system of polite address with the third person singular towards a single person, plural towards more than one person. This is still used by waiters and sales-persons in certain shops: (16)

Geh-t der Herr! die Dame weg? Geh-en die HerrschaftGo -es the Sir/ the Lady away? Go PI. the lordship en weg? PI. away? 'Is the Sir/Lady going away? Are your Lordships going away?'

(17)

Ist der Herr schon bedient? Is the Sir already served? 'Is your Lordship already being served?' 101

Earlier it was also possible to use the third singular pronoun as in: (18)

Ist Er schon bedient? Is He already served? 'Are you already being served?'

This ended up being disregarded as rather unrespectful so that: (19)

Geh-t Er schon weg? Go -es He already away? 'Are you already going away?'

was rather appropriate for sarcastic threats ("Get off or ...!"). Also a mixed system (with the verb in the third plural) arose which still can be heard in: (20)

Sind der Herr schon bedient? Are the Sir already served? 'Is the gentleman already being served?' 102

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in inflection

This might be interpreted as showing an independence of subject and predicate in syntactic agreement and indicating an autonomous pragmatic value of politeness in person (third vs. second) and number (plural vs. singular when directed towards a single person). However, the singular subject der Herr cannot (and, probably, never could) be replaced by the singular pronoun Er, if the predicate is in the plural: (21)

* Sind Er schon bedient? *'Are (PI.) He already served?'

not even if linguistic material intervenes between subject and plural (which might be thought of allowing a constructio ad sensum): (22)

* Sind, was ich annehmen darf und hoffen möchte, *Are, what I assume dare and hope may, Er schon bedient? He already served? *'Are you being already served, what I dare to assume and would like to hope?'

This shows that the pragmatics of polite personal pronouns in German is not just a question of morphology, but refers to syntax as well, another instantiation of our claim that syntactic pragmatics overshadows pragmatics of inflectional morphology. 2.3.6.2. In a pro-drop language like Italian, the third person (singular and plural) is used for politeness, 103 e.g., "You go away?" is: (23)

(Lei/Ella) va via? vs. (Loro) vanno via? (She) goes away? (They) go. PL away? 'Are you (Sg. vs. PI.) going away?'

Some regional dialects use voi instead of Lei and Loro, identical to Fr. vous, and Mussolini tried to generalize and impose this norm during his dictatorship. Now, what is left of this usage is restricted to those regions where the form was used before. It is clear at any rate than in otherwise identical speech situations formal Lei replaces informal Sg. tu much more easily than formal Loro replaces PI. voi. Characteristically, confusions often arise between (Loro) vanno 'you (polite plural) go' and (loro) vanno 'they go', but much less between (Lei) va 'you (polite singular) go' and (lei) va 'she goes'.

Personal pronouns

71

In the language of commerce, voi (and/or an agreeing second-person plural verb) 104 is used to address a business or an office, that is, a collective. This holds for both business letters and oral communication, for example, in the question by a customer to a sales-person: (24)

Avete uova? Have 2. PI. eggs? 'Do you have eggs?'

There is no morphopragmatic uniformity between polite singular and polite plural. The plural and the third person in itself both defocus from the personal, familiar relationship towards the addressee (cf. 2.3.4, Shibatani 1991). Moving from either singular to plural or from the second to the third plural is a morphological way of distancing that reflects, iconically, social distance between speaker and referent-addressee in social space, which honorifics indicate. Moreover, this iconic indexicality is metaphorically (that is, iconically) related to norm-governed physical distance between speaker and addressee according to their social role relationships (cf. also Shibatani 1991). Heath (1991: 86) concludes that such pragmatic strategies "obscure the "objective" relationship between speaker and addressee". 2.3.6.3. There is another reason why in a study of French, German, Italian, etc., polite personal pronouns can only be marginal for morphopragmatics. The relations between plain second person pronouns and their polite counterparts is suppletive, and suppletion is not central to morphology. We have defined (1.11) morphopragmatics as the pragmatics of morphological rules, and this renders suppletion marginal. 2.3.7. So let us now briefly look at two languages having regular plural formation. 2.3.7.1. Hungarian uses either Ön 'self (more formal) or Maga 'self, alone, reflexive' (less formal) towards a single addressee and the respective plural forms Ön-ök and Mag-uk towards more than one person. There is normal number agreement and the pronoun can be omitted, unless there is contrast or emphasis: (25)

(On!Maga) olvas?vs. (Ön — ök/Mag-uk) olvas-nak? (Self) read? (Self PL) read PI. 'Do you (Sg. vs. PI.) read?'

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in inflection

Thus there is nothing specifically morphopragmatic about this plural formation (more details on Hungarian in Guskova 1978). 2.3.7.2. This is also the case in Turkish, which uses the suppletive plural siz 'vous' as polite counterpart of sen 'toi', both omissible like in Hungarian. If more than one person is addressed, the nominal plural suffix -ler may be attached: siz(-ler). The verb has optional plural agreement, at least in some varieties. In order to be more polite the imperative plural suffix -in may be extended to -in-iz, e. g., gid-in-iz! 'go!' (more in Kuglin 1977). 2.3.8. Finally, two more arguments can be provided to show that terms of address are not central for morphopragmatic treatment. First of all, many lexical and onomastic devices are involved (cf. Braun 1988; Braun-Kohz-Schubert 1986). Second, Braun (1988: 18, confirmed by Marello 1990) has correctly underlined that the great variability in the use of terms of address calls for a sociolinguistic rather than a pragmatic study. 105 Obviously this also effects the proper delimitation of the domain of morphopragmatics.

2.4. On the morphopragmatics of Japanese addressee honorifics 2.4.1. Japanese seems to have one of the most complex and most grammaticalized honorifics systems that has been described so far. In order to give an idea of the great variety we display the repertoire from the most informal to the most formal variants of the question "When do (you) go?' 106 (26) a. b. c. d. e. f. g· h. i.

Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu

iku? iku no? irassyaru. iki-masu? iku η desu ka. iki-masu ka. ik-are-ru η desu ka. ik-are-masu ka. irassyaru no?

Japanese addressee honorifics

j. k. 1. m. n. o.

Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu Itu

73

irassyaru η desu ka. irassyai-masu ka? o-ide-ni-nari-masu ka? o-dekake-ni-nari-masu ka. o-dekake-ni-nar-are-masu ka. o-dekake de irassyai-masu ka.107

The formal means used are (cf. Harada 1976, Coulmas 1987) changes of syntactic construction, addition, elimination, or substitution of particles (e.g., n(o), ka, de), suppletion of verbs (cf. Kuno 1973: 127), various prefixations and suffixations. All types of means are employed in the subject (also called referent) honorific system where respect towards the referent of the grammatical subject ist expressed. This grammaticalized system of pragmatics goes far beyond morphology. The same holds for the object (referent) honorific system where the speaker chooses to be the grammatical subject and humbles him/herself in relation to a respected referent of the grammatical object. The only system restricted to morphopragmatics is the partner-centered addressee honorific (or politeness) system expressed by inflectional -masu suffixation (as in the fourth line of the above repertoire) followed by morphonological change of -u to -i in iku 'go'. 108 2.4.2. It is worthwhile to devote some attention to the sociopragmatic content indexed by the honorific systems, before proceeding to describe the partner-centered system (2.4.4). Also some brief supplements on beautification (2.4.5.1) and humbling prefixations (2.4.5.2) will be added. In contrast to certain Western societies which, with some justification, may be called egalitarian, Japanese society is rather hierarchically stratified. 109 Individuals are positioned in "frames/locations" (Jap. ba, cf. Matsumoto 1989: 217-218) such as companies they work in, families they belong to, place of origin, etc. Solidarity with the group of the same "frame" (as in-group) is more important than familiarity/intimacy (cf. Shibatani 1990: 379) and even than individual territory. In the classification of interlocutors, there are soft boundaries between the "ego" class and the "in-group" class, but strong boundaries between the out-group class (soto) and the in-group class (uti) on the one hand and between the out-group class and indifferent people on the other hand. Therefore perfect strangers, if the speaker is not prepared to include them within the (ratified) out-group class, can be totally neglected as social nobodies, cf. below (29).

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This is what Ide 110 (1989: 227) sees as the basis of wakimae 'discernment', that is, social behavior according to status and roles and as almost automatic and obligatory compliance with the respective social rules. These social rules prescribe111 to be polite - verbally and non-verbally, e.g., in the extent of bowing - in a formal setting, towards a person of a higher social position or of more power in the communicative situation or simply older, so that "politeness is recognized as perceived distance between interactants" (Ide et al. 1986: 26). Honorifics are verbal means - often accompanied by non-verbal ones - of social actions and reactions to social expectations and evaluations. Wrong use of honorifics may provoke social sanctions and even physical aggression (an extreme case is reported by Coulmas 1987). 2.4.3. Direct consequences on the sociolinguistic norms of the honorific systems are: 1) There is no absolutely neutral form (Matsumoto 1989: 208, 213), because each level of verbal honorifics must be adequate to the appropriate speech situations. In modern stylistics, this fits in with the demise of the concept "neutral, generally unmarked style". Thus there is no way of contrasting pragmatically marked forms with "apragmatic" ones. 2) There is a surprising homogeneity in evaluations of speakers when questioned to what type of interlocutors they should address certain types of honorifics (cf. Hill et al. 1986: 357; Ide 1989: 234-235: as opposed to much less homogeneous results with American interviewees, Hill et al. 1986: 358; Ide 1985: 236-237). 3) Very often several honorific systems are used simultaneously, that is, in mutual agreement or harmonious interaction (cf. Harada 1976: 554; Ide 1989: 227; Shibatani 1990: 377; Kindaiti-Hayase-Sibata 1988: 624). 4) Honorifics prove to be reliable pragmatic indices of the speech situation and of the roles of interlocutors. Thus a) they are partial substitutes for frequently missing signals, indicating whether speaker or addressee are the referents of an argument/thematic role of the predicate; b) the absence of signals referring to person, number, and sex/gender in the verb is partially compensated by pragmatic indication (honorifics) of the social relation between speaker and addressee (cf. Coulmas 1987: 50, 59). Or, extending Yamanashi's (1974: 763) description, one may say that honorifics indicate whether the addressee has authority over the speaker or vice versa and how great this asymmetry is. For discourse functions, cf. Maynard (1991). 5) It takes much time to acquire the sociopragmatic rules of honorifics. Frequently it is not completed until the tertiary Socialization in one's

Japanese addressee honorifics

75

professional activity, well after school. 112 And surveys have shown that young people (particularly males) are in favor of simplifying politeness styles. But, in fact, -masu forms seem to be spreading. 2.4.4. Whereas the very complex referent (or propositional) honorific systems represent a pragmatic area of syntactic constructions (with their morphological consequences) and of lexical choices, the addressee-controlled, partner-centered (or performative) honorific system (teineigo) is a matter of morphopragmatics, in the sense that it is biuniquely expressed by the inflectional suffix -masu (or -masita with the past tense marker following it). Only the copula da is suppletively changed into desu (instead of /da+masu/), whereas -masu reappears in the super-polite suppletive form gozai-masu (which also functions as a suppletive of the existential verb aru). Therefore we are going to concentrate on the pragmatics of polite sentences of type (b) as opposed to plain (a), but not as opposed to superpolite (c), such as in Harada's (1976: 553—554) triplet of "here is a book": (27) a. Koko ni hon ga aru. b. Koko ni hon ga ari-masu. c. Koko ni hon ga gozai-masu. The relevant elements of the speech-situation are: (A) speaker, (B) addressee, (C) participant, (D) occasion (place and time), (E) topic. (A) As to the speaker, female speakers use teineigo (polite -masu forms), in general, more often than male speakers, 113 for example, in telling somebody about having seen Mount Fuji. (28) a. Huzi-san ga mie — masi- ta Fuji HON PART visible HON PRT Ί saw Mount Fuji' b. Huzi-san ga mie-ta. Ide (1990: 67) gives the following reasons for this tendency: a) "women's lower assessment of politeness level of linguistic forms"; b) their "higher assessment of appropriate politeness level toward the addressee"; c) politer "kinds of interactional patterns" (cf. D below). Also higher age, higher education and more prestigious profession of the speaker may play a role in preferring (a) over (b) (cf. Ide 1982: 377;

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in inflection

Loveday 1986: 6), cf. also D. Therefore use of -masu may be non-reciprocal, 114 although consideration of the other elements of the speech situation may lead to reciprocality and thus override the speaker factor. Speech act intensifying or weakening strategies (cf. BazzanellaCaffi-Sbisa 1990, here chapter 3.5.10.3-3.5.10.4) are rather expressed by the other honorific systems. B) As far as the addressee is concerned, the polite -masu is always used towards members of an out-group, that is, to addressees more distant than the in-group, but only to persons defined as interactants, that is, not necessarily to indifferent strangers. Therefore plain, "impolite" forms can be used both to the in-group and to strangers not considered as interactants (cf. Ide 1982: 373—374). For example the plain variant (a) of the answer "I don't know him/her/it/them" (29) a. Sir — an vs. Know not

b. Siri- mas- en Know HON not

may be directed at either a close friend (in-group) or a stranger (not defined as out-group interactant, if the speaker is not or does not want to get involved with him/her). In line with B, television115 and radio speakers, oral (including taped) announcements in train and subway stations, and in elevators, etc., use teineigo (cf. Matsumoto 1989: 214; Ide 1982: 372), because the addressees are considered to be interactants (ratified out-group), for example, in the announcement: (30) a. Ame ga huri-masu Rain PART fall HON 'Rain is falling' In contrast, the synonymous plain variant (b) never seems to be used in weather reports (TV, radio, newspapers): (30) b. Ame ga huru. Books and newspaper columns (except weather reports), however, do not use teineigo, unless their authors want to involve their prospective readers by personalizing them as interactants (and, of course, as out-group). Of course there are other means of personalizing written texts as described by Makino (1990) and Maynard (1991). Women seem to use -masu forms

Japanese addressee honorifics

77

more often than men, as seen with sex differences of writers in Makino's illustrative texts. Naturally, historical traditions of the written language also play a role (cf. Shibatani 1990: 357; Matsumoto 1989: 209, 214; Maynard 1991: 554). In contrast with laws and instructions, written announcements, for example, public requests in train/subway stations, may use -masu suffixation,.insofar as they intend to involve the addressees. For example, compare the prohibitions: (31) a.

Tatiiri kinsi Entrance forbidden b. Haitte wa ik- e - mas -en Enter PART go MOD HON N E G 'You should not enter!'

Unlike the nominal sentence (a), a verb, as in (b), takes -masu. On the other hand, letters are more polite than comparable oral communication (Shibatani 1990: 360; 1991), a phenomenon which holds for other languages as well (cf. 1.3). Clearly addressees are more salient when directly addressed (direct speech). This saliency decreases in embedded sentences, and Harada (1976: 503, 544, 556) goes into great length in trying to explain why certain embedded sentences can take -masu whereas others cannot. His basic approach is supported by the observation that otherwise appropriate -masu may be omitted in parentheses qualifying as main clauses (that is, grammatically not embedded clauses). The saliency of the addressee decreases when a sentence is backgrounded (in whatever way). Another important factor is the authority relation between speaker and addressee (relative social status, power, age) as mentioned above (2.2.4.2). Generally speaking, if addressees have authority over the speakers, they must use -masu. For example -masu may be used in a request directed at an addressee with whom the speaker normally does not use teineigo. Here, of course, rhetorical effects may come in, that is, what Ide (1989 and in Hill et al. 1986: 348) calls "volition". For example, a speaker may drop -masu in order to express "feelings of closeness such as intimacy, empathy, sympathy, love, etc." (Ide 1982: 376; cf. Loveday 1986: 5 — 6). But such strategies of volition seem to be much more restricted in Japanese than in European languages (cf. Hill et al. 1986: 362). Thus when the speaker asks a sales-person whether Marlborough cigarettes are

78

Morphopragmatics

in inflection

available, either plain (a) or polite speech (b) is used, depending on whether there is familiarity with the sales-person or not: (32) a.

Marlborough aru? vs. Marlborough be there? b. Marlborough ari -masu ka? Marlborough be there HON INTERROG 'Are there any Marlborough?'

Whereas in Italian or German, a diminutive of the word cigarette may be used for purposes of interactional discourse (cf. 3.5.8.5), the introduction of a corresponding interactional element into the transaction of the business encounter (b) does not induce the Japanese customer to drop -masu. Increase in familiarity may by itself leave teineigo intact and only discourage the use of other types of honorification (a good example is (270) in Ide 1982: 373).116 C) If a participant in the speech situation - even if other than the addressee - is in an out-group or authority relation to the speaker, the speaker must use teineigo - except when talking to him/herself (Matsumoto 1989: 209; cf. Ide 1982: 370), that is, when excluding a bystander from participation in the speech situation (not assigning him/her participant status, cf. 1.7.2). In this respect, of course, it becomes a tricky sociopragmatic question to distinguish participants from bystanders (that is, non-participants within earshot), and to what degree speakers must include bystanders familiar to them. Obviously physical distance, presence or absence of immediately preceding verbal or non-verbal interaction (e. g., greeting), social distance or degree of authority over the speaker, degree of acquaintance, etc., may play a role. D) The occasion of interaction influences the formality of the speechsituation, considered by Ide (1982: 371-372, 374-375; cf. Shibatani 1991) as the overriding factor. For example, funerals, weddings, commencement ceremonies, epistolary style demand the use of -masu. For example, when congratulating a close friend at his wedding -masu must be used. The factors of speaker type and formality of occasion interact in the speakers' identification of their own "demeanor" (see Ide 1990: 72-73). E) It is not always easy to distinguish topic from occasion (D), but a clear example for the importance of the factor "topic" is provided by the reported cases of businessmen switching to the use of -masu when their

Japanese addressee honorifics

79

topic switches from personal items to business, the other elements of the speech situation (addressee, participants, place and time of interaction) remaining equal (cf. Ide 1982: 375). In such instances, however, it may rather be a question of a more general switch from interactional to transactional communication (cf. 1.7.13), well beyond the topic itself. 2.4.5.1. A much less important morphopragmatic rule introduces the derivational beautification prefix o-. It may be attached to nouns such as in o-biiru 'beer' and is referable to the speaker's beer where honorification is otherwise impossible. Occasionally it may be attached to adjectives as well, e. g., in o-kirei 'pretty' in: (33)

Ο — kirei na (o-) kimono desu ne? HON pretty PART (HON) kimono be INTERROG 'The kimono is pretty, isn't it?'

Before Sino-Japanese words o- is substituted by go-, as in go-hon 'book'. This prefix is considered to make speech "softer" and politer (cf. Shibatani 1990: 374; 1991; Harada 1976: 504). Again female speakers use this morphopragmatic device more often than men (Ide 1981: 23-24; 1982: 379-380; 1990: 74-75; Shibatani 1990, 1991). Thus an offer becomes "softer", as in the quadruplet: 117 (34) a. Biiru ikaga? Beer how? 'How about a beer?' b. Ο biiru ikaga? HON beer how? 'Would you like some beer?' c. Ο biiru ikaga desu ka? HON beer how be INTERROG d. Ο biiru wa ikaga de gozai -masu HON beer PART how PART be.HON H O N ka? INTERROG The beautification prefix olgo- coincides with the honorification prefix olgo- in case of referent honorifics. Apparently certain lexical pragmatic restrictions hold for both of them: for example, o- may be prefixed to mizu when it means 'drinking water', but not when it means 'water in the ocean/a river/a lake'.

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2.4.5.2. Finally we have to mention two humbling devices in epistolary style (cf. Ide 1982: 365-366; Shibatani 1991) with which the speaker may refer to him/herself or to his/her belongings (including one's wife118 or children!): a) Inflectional plural suffix -domo attachable to watakusi Τ —1• watakusidomo 'we'. b) The derivational prefixes (originally compounding devices) gu- lit. 'stupid', syoo- lit. 'small', setu- lit. 'bad' attachable to Sino-Japanese nouns (which often are bound suppletive forms), e. g., bun 'sentence' —» setubun 'my (lit. bad) sentence(s)'; tuma 'wife' —• gu-sai 'my (lit. stupid) wife'. The pragmatics of such humbling devices may be compared with other techniques of "self-depression" (cf. Tokunaga 1988; Wierzbicka 1991: 72-88). 2.4.6. Japanese honorifics index the relative social and psychological distance between speaker and addressee/referent in contrast to Korean and other languages where the absolute position of participants is indexed (Shibatani 1990: 380; Kindaiti-Hayasi-Sibata 1988: 645; cf. 6.3.9 on the German and Danish excessive). Whereas there may be ways of describing absolute honorification systems in terms of semantic categories, relative honorification systems, like the Japanese system, do not allow this solution, but necessitate a pragmatic description. The above morphopragmatic analyses of Japanese are based only on descriptions written in European languages and on information elicited from a rather restricted number of native speakers. With a more thorough pragmatic analysis, much more complex results might be obtained. We hope that our approach may provide opportunities for further productive investigation.

2.5. A Huichol prefix In polysynthetic incorporating languages where the role of morphology is increased at the expense of syntax, morphopragmatics may also play an important role, and then even operations of inflectional morphology may have a direct link to pragmatics. As an example we may report the semantics and pragmatics of the verb prefix /ti/ (with its variants ti, r-, te~) in the Mexican language Hu-

A Huichol prefix

81

ichol (according to Iturrioz 1991 and pers. comm., cf. Iturrioz 1986— 1987). (a) One main role of this polysemous prefix is to generalize (deindividualize) the sentence meaning and thus it obligatorily cooccurs with at least one generic argument, e. g., in: (35)

tsiiki -ri tätsiu -rixi me — te — kwaä — ti dog PL rabbit PL 3. PL - GENER eat SUBJ 'Dogs eat rabbits.'

This is a morphosemantic (inflectional) meaning. (b) Morphosemantic is also its role of scaling and/or intensifying the meaning of a verb (also adjectives are verbs), as in the following example. (36)

Tiki tsi — ti — tsuye — ti wall little SCALE being thick SUBJ 'a rather thin wall'

(If the word meaning is not scalar in itself, then /ti/ is a necessary prerequisite for quantification of any sort). (c) The same prefix may also stand for a question, as in: (37)

Me — te — mitsü — ri 3. PL INTERROG cat PL 'Are they cats?'

When combined with the assertive prefix /pi/, a positive answer is expected, as in: (38)

Me — pi — te — mitsü — ri 3. PL ASS INTERROG cat PL 'They are cats, aren't they?'

(d) In an answer, however, /ti/ intensifies not only the verb, but the whole assertion (expressed by /p-i/), as in: (39)

Kami ne — pi — ti -wixärika Naturally l . S G ASS INTENS Huichol 'Naturally I am a. Huichol.'

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in inflection

Here /ti/ has a pragmatic role in speech acts of confirming. Clearly there is a connection between morphopragmatics (confirmation) and morphosemantics (intensification). In 4.3 we will study an Italian parallel, the elative suffix -issimo which intensifies adjectives, scales and intensifies nouns, and contributes to the pragmatics of confirmation in answers. So far we have characterized the prefix /ti/ as inflectional and our examples have come from the domain of inflectional meaning. But according to Iturrioz (1991) the prefix /ti/ is situated at the turning-point from inflection to derivation. This is evidenced by its linear position among modal prefixes and by the fact that meaning (a) is also used for derivational purposes, that is, in word formation, including lexicalized complex words. The semantic counterpart of the pragmatic meaning (d), however, is clearly not (a). But of course the meaning relations of such polysemous affixes need closer scrutiny.

2.6. Conclusions The morphopragmatics of inflection is usually overshadowed by the pragmatics of syntactic constructions, so we have avoided duplicating studies on the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. We have preferred to look for areas where morphopragmatics seems to be rather autonomous from the pragmatics of syntactic constructions. This has led us to concentrate on two areas of inflectional morphology. First, we have discussed the universal as well as culture-specific pragmatic bases of plural expression in personal pronoun systems and have, we hope, succeeded in explaining distributional asymmetries of inventories in terms of markedness effects which reflect, in an iconic way, the pragmatics of pronominal deixis (2.2-2.3). But the preponderance of suppletive relations in many cases assigns this area a rather marginal status in inflectional morphology. Second, we have looked at Japanese honorific meanings, each of which is uniquely expressed by one morphological rule (2.4). The great range of social and pragmatic variables was a basis for predicting the inadequacy of a purely morphosemantic study. On the other hand, even simpler honorific systems in other languages appear to be promising areas for morphopragmatic inquiry. The relation between morphosemantics and morphopragmatics is quite different in the two areas. As regards personal pronouns, pragmat-

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ics provides the basis for morphosemantics, and, at the same time, it is superimposed over semantics. As to Japanese -masu, its meaning appears to be exclusively of a pragmatic nature. This seems to point to a complementary distribution between morphopragmatics and morphosemantics. In a diachronic perspective, pragmatic change may lead either to an increase in pragmatic meanings to the detriment of morphosemantics or, vice versa, to a loss of pragmatic meanings and consequent increase in morphosemantic transparency. Both types of changes can be identified with the politeness properties of pronouns that we have mentioned. In a semiotic perspective, we can claim the following: If there is a morphotactic addition (as in the case of affixation), - due to constructional diagrammaticity (1.9.5.2) - an addition in meaning should also be expected. If no or little morphosemantic meaning can be identified in the morphological operation, then either the meaning is of a morphopragmatic nature (as in the case of Japanese honorifics) or the morphological rule is rather unnatural (cf. chapter 5). Finally, we briefly looked at an area of transition between inflection and derivation (2.5), whose partially derivational character allows some autonomy. We assume that not just Huichol, but also other incorporating languages should be amenable to morphopragmatic analysis. In all cases — with the exception of instances where pragmatics functions only as the basis of semantics — we have found an important difference between morphopragmatics and morphosemantics. Whereas morphosemantic meaning may refer exclusively to the word that has undergone the morphological rule and only secondarily may percolate into the meaning of the phrase or sentence it belongs to, pragmatic meaning primarily signals a pragmatic perspective which regards the whole sentence or clause, that is, it refers to the sentence/clause as such. For example, the choice of F. vous instead of toiltu or of Jap. -masu affects (in terms of politeness) the whole speech act and the sentence that expresses it, that is, when -masu is attached to a verb, it does not confer politeness to just this verb; there are lexical means in Japanese for replacing a neutral verb by a polite alternative. The same seems to hold for the Huichol case. And even the use of Fr. vous, voire does not refer to the addressee alone, but depends on many other factors of the speech situation which are indexed by this choice. This difference between morphosemantic and morphopragmatic meanings comes as no surprise, since it is the reference to variables of speech situation and speech act which makes the meaning description of a morphological rule morphopragmatically relevant.

3.

Diminutives Es ist eine ganz bekannte Sache, daß die Viertel-Stündchen größer sind als die Viertelstunden. 'It is a well-known fact that the little (DIM) quarter hours are longer than the quarter hours.' G. C. Lichtenberg, Sudelbücher

3.1. Aims This paradoxical, but truthful aphorism by the famous enlightenment writer testifies to the difference between morphosemantic and morphopragmatic meanings of diminutives. In this chapter we want to minimize discussion of morphosemantic denotation ("smallness") and connotation ("endearment, affectiveness" or whatever) of diminutives in favor of a systematic treatment of the regular uses of diminutives as strategic means to pragmatic effects. We do not attempt a truly cross-linguistic study (such as Nieuwenhuis 1985), but concentrate on the pragmatic analysis of one diminutive-rich language, viz., Italian. Within the morphological paradigm of evaluative alteration formed by augmentatives and other intensifiers (see chapter 4) and pejoratives in addition to diminutives, Italian diminutives show a great variety of predictable, strategic uses in speech acts and speech situations. We will try to describe and explain such uses in both oral and written text and analyze their pragmatic functions in the micro-cotext or micro-context as well as in the macro-cotext. Mainly for contrastive reasons, we will also analyze German (particularly Viennese) diminutives (which have no paradigmatic augmentative or pejorative counterparts, and which are used in a much more restricted way than the Italian ones) and English correspondences, which are very rarely diminutives, but much more often rendered by lexical and syntactic devices. Like Volek (1987), we will exclude hypocoristics as in It. Giovanni Gianni, Giannino, Nino; G. Johann, Hans —• Häns-chen, Häns-lein, Hansl, Hans-i; E. John —• Johnn-y, although they have much in common with diminutives and have even wider cross-linguistic distribution. 119 Also diminutive formation via compounding (cf. Babiniotis 1969) is outside the

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scope of our study. We will also largely disregard the sociolinguistic questions of which social groups or classes and age brackets make more or less use of diminutives (cf. Fontanella 1962; Ettinger 1974 a: 51-52; Nieuwenhuis 1985: 78-79), as well as questions of sexism (cf. Schneider 1991a).

3.2. History of research Among all morphopragmatic devices within derivational morphology, diminutives represent the category which has the widest distribution across languages and has stimulated the greatest number of studies. The existence of surveys' 20 and in-depth studies with large bibliographies 121 may dispense with the problem of providing a history of research on diminutives in general. However, we must at least mention the very few studies which have dealt with diminutives in a pragmatic way. 3.2.1. Studies on morphopragmatic aspects of diminutives date as far back as the ancient Greek and Roman grammarians (cf. Friedrich 1916: 3; Babiniotis 1969: 20, 23-24). Let us start with Priscian (III 609-610 = Keil, Gramm. Lat. II: 101-101): "Diminutivum est, quod diminutionem primitive sui absolute demonstrat Solent autem diminutiva necessariae significationis causa proferri ... vel urbanitatis causa proferri ... vel adulationis, et maxime puerorum, ut ... 'Patriciolus', 'Sergiolus' ..." ['It is a diminutive that shows the diminution of its base' (sc. in contrast with the relative diminution via a comparative) ... But diminutives are generally used for their necessary meaning ... or for fine manners ... or for adulation/cajolery, and particularly with boys, as with Patricius-DIM, Sergius-DIM.'] Reference is made first to denotative meaning, then to pragmatics, that is, apparently to politeness and/or homileic discourse (urbanitas), then to hearer-directed effects (adulatio), and finally to hypocoristics. Several grammarians also noted diagrammaticity of meaning and form in cumulative diminutives, as in mons 'mountain' —» mont-iculus —• mont-icellus —* mont-icellulus. Such accumulation of the meaning of diminution is commented upon by Cledonius 429 (Keil, Gramm. Lat. V 143-144): "Quando sensus minuitur, crescit saepe numerus syllabarum". ['When the sense is reduced, the number of syllables often grows.'] Early grammarians often noted pragmatic conditions for the use of diminutive suffixes, particularly when they were of dialectal origin. For

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example German grammarians of the seventeenth century (cf. Öhmann 1972: 559—560) reported that certain suffixes were used in the standard only "aus scherz oder aus hönischeit" ['for joking or mocking'] or "wenn man verkleinern, liebkosen und schertzen will" ['if one wants to diminish, caress or joke']. 3.2.2. A good example of the traditional historical analyses of pragmatic effects in our century is the study by Sieberer (1950) who argues that the essence of diminutive meanings is not denotational diminution but emotionality (Gefühlsbetontheit) and calls the category of diminutives a word form for compassion and sympathy (Wortform der Anteilnahme) and for subjectivization. Despite many interesting and insightful observations (that we will cite later on) the description of purportedly "subjective" phenomena has itself remained rather subjective. Hasselrot (1957, particularly his chapter 9 "Vue-perspective de la formation diminutive dans le monde", p. 283), on the other hand, is an excellent example of a positivistic diachronic-philological and crosslinguistic analysis with a sound scepticism against psychologising interpretations. However, within the diachronic linguistics of the last two centuries, two authors can be singled out as the most important precursors of a morphopragmatic study of diminutives: Leo Spitzer and Amado Alonso. Both concentrated on diminutives in Romance languages. Therefore they are of particular importance for our analysis. Spitzer's most important contributions are best summarized in his own words (1921: 201—202): "Der Spieltrieb ist eine Stimmung im Sprecher, die die Grundierung des Satzes, die 'key', abgibt: die spielerisch angefügten Suffixe entsprechen ursprünglich keinem logischen Ausdrucksbedürfnis, sie haften nicht am einzelnen Wort, daher ich sie ... 'Satzdiminutiva' genannt habe und heute vielleicht, weniger grammatisch, 'impressionistische Diminutiva' ... nennen möchte." ['The ludic instinct is a mood of the speaker's which creates the ground of the sentence, the key: the playfully attached suffixes originally do not correspond to any logical expressive need, they do not stick to that specific single word, and this is why I called them sentence diminutives and today I would like, perhaps, to call them in a less grammatical way, impressionistic diminutives.'] And, in a note, he expands on tonality: "Die Suffixe wirken wie Vorzeichen in der Musik, sie bestimmen die 'Tonart' der menschlichen Rede." ['Suffixes (sc. diminutive) work like key signatures in music, determining the "key" of human speech.']

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This characterization refers to 1) the ludic character of many diminutives, which makes them particularly fit for homileic discourse (cf. 1.3, 3.5.5); 2) their global, non-semantic modification of expressions (instead of a local modification of the respective base, cf. 3.4.4.2 and 3.5.9). 3) Are we allowed to reinterpret Spitzer's "impressionistic" as referring to fictive evaluation (cf. 3.4.6)? Otherwise, Spitzer often spoke of feelings, for example, of joy (1921: 188; 1918: 107-110). Alonso ([1961] first published 1933) contributed the most pragmatically oriented study, the importance of which goes far beyond Spanish diminutives. 122 He downgraded the denotative meaning of smallness in favor of various emotional values whose exact meanings and effects depend on the context, the attitudes of the participants (pp. 167, 169) and on the speech act itself (pp. 170-171, 175-176); he even speaks of a strategic use of diminutives (p. 175), e. g., for the sake of captatio benevolentiae (pp. 174, 187). And, following Leo Spitzer, he characterizes them as sentence diminutives (pp. 168, 170; cf. also Sieberer 1950: 88) having the effect of focalizing the word to which they are attached (pp. 163, 168, 185—186). If we concentrate on these illuminating observations by Alonso and downgrade the emotive ingredient, then we come rather close to our own position (3.4). Already in an earlier study of 1930 (which we know only through Spitzer's review of 1933), Alonso had introduced the concept of the strategic use of diminutives. Spitzer (1930) welcomed this innovative concept, which he considered to be based on affective expressiveness. Whereas we consider Alonso (1935) as a pioneer in the pragmatic analysis (avant la lettre) of diminutives, others refer to him for his classification of emotions expressed by diminutives. A recent example is Rudolph (1990) on Portuguese diminutives, cf. Klimaszewska (1983: 8 - 9 ) , for a survey of authors who considered diminutives as primarily emotive. Other recent "emotionalists" are Holthus-Pfister (1985); Stankiewicz (1989), Schneider (1991 b), and particularly Volek (1987 see 3.2.4). A more pragmatically oriented follower of Alonso is Gaarder (1966), whose study of Mexican diminutives and augmentatives abounds in insightful observations concerning such factors as familiarity, modesty, irony, playful extravagance, strategic meiosis, attenuation, and euphemistic mitigation. But he is less theory-oriented than Alonso and indulges in an unfortunate emotionalist opposition between emotional modifications (mostly with diminutives, which he does not distinguish from hypocoristics) and intellectual, evaluative modifications (mostly reserved to augmentatives).

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3.2.3. As to research in the 70s and 80s, Haas's (1972) brief cross-linguistic survey does not go beyond a few remarks on connotations, which, however, allow a pragmatic reinterpretation. Ettinger's (1974 a) study of diminutives (and augmentatives), although devoted to form rather than meaning, contains some elements pertinent to our purposes: For example, following Coseriu's model (1973 cf. 1.9.4.3), he assigns (pp.24, 28-29, 59, 74, 76) to all diminutives the meaning of reduction in semantic content on the level of the linguistic system, whereas, on the level of norms, diminutives may range from signifying this denotational diminution to conveying (various) connotations (which are often restricted to specific lexical groups). Alonso's (see above) differentations of speech acts and discourse strategies, however, would belong to the level of parole/performance only (pp. 26-27, cf. p. 57), whereas we definitely assign their basic invariants to the language-specific system of pragmatics, and their recurrent variants to sociolinguistic and pragmatic norms. But such morphopragmatic problems are not investigated by Ettinger (1974 a), in contrast to the ample space he devotes to semantic base restrictions of diminutive formation (pp. 366—399) and to item-specific lexicalizations (pp. 178—182), that is, to questions of denotational lexical semantics, called Fixierung der Bezeichnung ('fixation of designation'). Grabias (1981) bases his monograph on Polish diminutives and augmentatives on expressiveness (cf. 1.8.6) and wants to include pragmatics. But in this, he limits his attention to very general and vague notions of speaker's evaluation and to the expression of emotions. In her contrastive analysis of Dutch, German, and Polish diminutives, Klimaszewska (1983) presents what she intends to be a pragmatically oriented investigation (p. 2), but she equates pragmatic meaning with connotation (p. 3). She assigns to pragmatics (and sociolinguistics) the task of establishing stylistic values (pp. 6, 27, 30) and considers all expressive connotations as stylistic means. Moreover she seems to equate pragmatics with a study of performance (pp. 7, 27), but appears largely to follow an emotionalist interpretation of diminutives. Daltas (1985) studies the regulative factors of familiarity and formality for diminutives and augmentatives in spontaneous Greek conversation (particularly p. 82), but erroneously calls them infixes and fails to distinguish well between diachronic and synchronic aspects, diminutives and hypocoristics. Nieuwenhuis (1985 unpublished thesis) sets out to look for universale of diminutive formation, and achieves this goal in lexical and morphotac-

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tic domains, but he devotes much less attention to pragmatic or even morphopragmatic issues. These he makes fall into a "subjective" or emotional domain (in contrast to "objective" denotation). Nieuwenhuis (pp. 41-42) correctly points out that there is often complementarity between "subjective" synthetic (that is, morphological) and "objective" analytic (that is, lexical) diminutives. His work is also valuable for its judicious history of research and for a huge appendix that contains lexical and morphotactic information about many languages. 3.2.4. In her "pragmatic analysis o f ' Russian "diminutives", Volek (1987: 149-175) first establishes the following dichotomy (which can be found anticipated in Alonso [1961]: 171, 174, 187-188): 1)The expression of an "emotive attitude ... toward the phenomenon named in the base of the diminutive derivative", e. g.: (40) a.

Oj, kakoj sup-cik vkusnyj Oh what a soup-DIM delicious O h , what a nice delicious soup!'

An exact equivalent is possible in Italian and Viennese German: (40) b. Oh, che minestr-ina deliziosa! Ah, was für ein köstliches Supp-erl! 2) The expression of an "emotive attitude ... towards phenomena not named in it", particularly the addressee, as in: (41) a. Nu vypij vod-icki Now drink water-DIM 'Now drink some nice water!' The Italian and Viennese equivalents: (41) b. Allora, bevi un po' di acqu-etta! Na trink doch ein Wasser-l! are confined to baby talk (or metaphoric usage of it, cf. 3.5.2). Quite apart from the question whether emotivity is present (cf. 1.8), our pragmatic perspective leads us to ascribe the pragmatic value of a diminutive formation rule to the whole speech act and speech situation

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(as a basic act within a complex act or activity, cf. 1.5). In our view then, it is a question of focalization and other constraints, which determine where the diminutive suffix is to be attached (its landing-site, so to say, see 3.5.9). We will later expand on other pragmatically relevant observations by Volek (1987), such as the use of diminutives in adult-child speech (p. 168), in requests (pp. 164-165), in irony (p. 166), in jocular speech in a familiar atmosphere (pp. 167, 169—170). However, in our view, such qualifications are not simply features of the speech situation to be classified descriptively, but they rather constitute the speech situation and represent a strategy of the speech act towards a certain pragmatic effect. 3.2.5. Both Russian (cf. Bratus 1969; Volek 1987; Wierzbicka in press) and Polish (Wierzbicka 1984, in press) have a series of quasi-synonymous diminutives with diversified denotations and connotations. As far as pragmatics is concerned, Wierzbicka's main aim is to reduce emotional and attitudinal meaning features to performative hypersentences of speakers such as "I think of you/it as someone/something small"; "I want to speak to you the way people speak to people they know well (and to children)"; "I feel something (good) towards you/it (as one does towards someone/something small)"; "I feel something good thinking of it"; "I want you to do something small"; "I think of you as of someone who is like a baby animal"; "I feel good feelings towards you as one does towards a baby animal"; "I assume you understand that these things are good." Wierzbicka's specifications of pragmatic meaning are too reductive; they cannot account for the diversity of meanings and conditions of use that we are going to present in this chapter. Secondly, they account only for speakers' feelings and attitudes towards addressees and objects (similar to Volek 1987: 12) while neglecting other relevant factors of the speech situation. Particularly she does not include in her formulae those pragmatic goals of speech acts which the speaker wants to achieve by strategically using diminutives (although in 1987: 166, she acknowledges that the interaction between "expressive derivation" and speech acts "deserves a separate study"). We are also sceptical about her apparent view that the emotional attitude towards small beings/objects is always/generally/prototypically positive, that is, that one may generalize from attitudes to small children. Finally, we will discuss to what extent and in what sense all uses of diminutives can be derived from the semantic feature [small] and from "expressive meaning", as Wierzbicka seems to imply. In her study on the use of Greek and English diminutives (and hypocoristics which she does not distinguish) for expressing politeness, Sifianou

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91

(1992: 158) ascribes to diminutives the primary "pragmatic function" of being addressed to children and then enumerates effects of endearing, softening, mitigating, expressing modesty, affection and solidarity, and serving as an in-group marker. The theoretical discussion is limited to classifying all these effects as positive politeness (in the sense of B r o w n Levinson 1987). 3.2.6. Several monographs on diminutives do exist for such languages as Russian, 123 Spanish, 124 or Latvian (Rü^e-Dravipa 1959), but there is none for German. The best treatment of German diminutives is in Klimaszewska's contrastive study (1983), cf. also Brandstetter (1963) on meanings of German diminutives and Schneider (1991 a) on sexism. Our morphopragmatic studies started with Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi (1989b), Dressler-Kiefer (1990). For Italian, there exists no real monographic treatment: Sigg's work (1955) is a short dialect study. There is an abundant data repertory (Alberti et al. 1991) without any description or explanation, whereas Pellegrini's contrastive thesis (1977) on Italian and German diminutives concentrates on translation equivalence. Trenta Lucaroni (1983) provides examples and statistics but hardly any interpretation. The chapter on Italian in Hasselrot (1957) is mainly diachronic. The article by Rainer (1990 a) deals only with semantics (mainly semantic restrictions). A preliminary morphopragmatic study is Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi (1989b). As regards English diminutives, Charleston (1960: 120—126) goes beyond synchronic and diachronic morphotactics and morphosemantics when she acknowledges (p. 124) the strategic potential of diminutives "when trying to persuade, coax, or wheedle a person into complying with a request, or when urging a person to undertake some action", but she does not specify or illustrate this remark and she bases these effects on the emotional appeal of diminutives. Mühlhäusler (1983) makes a strong plea for diminutives representing a basically non-referential category, and he refers to typical speech situations of use, identical to our child- and lover-centered speech situations (cf. 3.5.2-3.5.3).

3.3. Diminutives in Italian, German, and English In this section we are going to describe those structural properties of diminutives in Italian (3.3.2), German (3.3.3) and English (3.3.5) that

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may be suited to explain at least some of the semantic and pragmatic peculiarities of diminutives. General questions will be treated in 3.3.1, 3.3.4, and 3.6. 3.3.1. General comments All the diminutives that we are going to discuss here (and the augmentatives and elatives of 4.2—4.3) share the following properties: First, they are derivational and not inflectional or compositional (or juxtapositional like reduplication, discussed in 4.4). As we are going to see, there is insufficient justification for setting evaluative suffixes apart as a distinct third class (as postulated for Italian evaluative suffixes by Scalise 1984: 131-133; 1988), alongside the two well-known classes of inflection and derivation. Earlier on, some Russian linguists (e.g., V. V. Vinogradov, cf. the summary in Polterauer 1981: 10—11) assigned them an intermediary status between inflection and derivation. But in contrast to diminutives in Bantu languages and in Lamut, 125 diminutives in European languages share no essential properties with inflection. On the other hand they are not prototypical representatives of derivational morphology either (cf. Dressier 1989). Second, all diminutives are alterative (1.9.4.3, in the sense of the Italian alterativo, cf. Dardano 1978: 95) in that the respective word formation rules change neither subcategorization nor selectional restrictions, and, as for the change of denotative meaning, this is restricted to a scale of quantity (or also corresponding quality): e. g., augmentatives involve an increase in quantity, diminutives a decrease. All this holds at least for prototypical diminutives. Third, if there is a basic connotative change, this seems to be tendentially positive for diminutives, 126 and negative for augmentatives. The reason for this is that evaluation is typically positive in the case of diminutives, and typically negative in the case of augmentatives (see more in 3.4.6.6-3.4.6.9, 4.2.4.5). Alteratives share the evaluative pragmatic perspective which is at the basis of this third criterion with evaluative lexical categories such as evaluative adjectives, which, however, escape classification as either morphological or alterative elements. Of course, we must exclude pejoratives, which have a stable negative connotation. Fourth, some diminutives violate Aronoff's (1976) "Unitary Base Hypothesis", that is, many rules of diminutive formation do not have a unique categorial base, for example, if they can derive diminutives both from nouns and adjectives. Thus they differ from derivational morpho-

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logical rules according to Scalise (1988: 234—235), and even more so from inflectional morphological rules. Z w i c k y - P u l l u m (1987: 336) take such "promiscuity with regard to input category" even as a symptom of "expressive morphology" (cf. 1.9.1 — 1.9.2). There do exist, however, other non-prototypical representatives of derivational (and inflectional) morphology which have the same property: in many languages a g e n t - n o u n formation (preferentially) applies to verbs, (less) to nouns and (least) to adjectives, comparative and superlative formation (preferentially) to adjectives, adverbs and (less frequently) to nouns (cf. Dressier 1986). Nieuwenhuis (1985: 64, 216) proposes, as an inductive generalization, the following hierarchy of diminutivizable categories: nouns > adjectives > verbs > numerals > interjections > pronouns > prepositions > demonstratives, 1 2 7 but he provides no explanation. For our explanation see 3.4.1.5. Fifth, diminutives prefer an iconic expression via morphological rules that involve palatal vowels or palatalisation, that is, fronting and/or raising of vowels and constants, 1 2 8 or high pitch in tone languages (cf. Auer 1988: 13 η. 19). There are divergent explanations of the sound-iconism of [i]. For example, Ohala (1984) provides an ethological explanation: small vocal tracts, which produce high-pitched sounds, are typically possessed by smaller, weaker, less threatening beings, such as babies, pets, and small animals; and, of course, female voices are higher-pitched than men's. Fischer-Jorgensen (1967: 87), on the other hand, provides a perceptual explanation. 1 2 9 3.3.2. Italian diminutives 3.3.2.1. Italian diminutives are part of a rich paradigm 1 3 0 (in the sense of van Marie 1985) which also includes augmentatives in -one (see 4.2), pejoratives in -accio, -ucolo, -astro, attenuatives of adjectives in -iloccio (cf. D a r d a n o 1978: 9 5 - 1 0 7 ) , and elatives in -issimo (see 4.3); marginally annexed to this paradigm is juxtapositional reduplication (see 4.4). This is the derivational paradigm of evaluative alteratives. 131 From this paradigm, we must also exclude pejorative suffixes in -aglia and -ame because they both form denominal collectives. We include the elative in -issimo on the ground that it is derivational and evaluative and that it does not change selectional restrictions or denotation (other than dimensional). Italian reduplication of the type bello bello (4.4) is related but can be included only in an extended paradigm, because it diverges by being not derivational but juxtapositional. In respect to restrictions

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on, and preferences for, bases of the rules concerned, the paradigm is not homogeneous but rather evokes Wittgensteinian family resemblances. The richest subclass of the paradigm is represented by diminutives, cf. Hasselrot (1957: 235—239) for descriptions and evaluations by Italian grammarians, from the Renaissance up to our century. 3.3.2.2. Italian shares the universal preference for diminutives having nominal bases. Not only do nouns occur as bases (of diminutives) much more frequently than adjectives, adverbs, and verbs, but they also allow much larger choice of diminutive formation and much greater freedom of use. The productive suffixes are -ino, -etto, -ello, -(u)olo, -uccioiuzzo, -otto, and, less so, -onzolo.132 Competition between the synonymous diminutive formation rules often allows variant outputs (at least as potential words, for regional preferences cf. Rainer 1990 a: 207—208; Sigg 1953). More on morphotactic and morphosemantic constraints and preferences can be found in Rainer (1990 a) cf. here 3.4.1.2. An allomorphic rule inserts the affricate /c/ before the diminutive suffixes -ino, -ello, if the basis ends in -one/a (of whatever origin), e. g., leone 'lion' —»• leon-c-ino; porta 'door' —• augmentative port-one —* porton-cino; verbal noun distrazione 'distraction' —• distrazion-c-ina; persona —• person-c-ina; padrone/a 'master/mistress' —• padron-c-ino/a vs. patrono/a 'patron(ess)' —• patron-ino/a,133 This allomorphic rule does not contribute to meaning, whereas insertion of the interfix -ic- (see chapter 5) may bring a connotational and/or pragmatic contribution. 3.3.2.3. As already mentioned in 3.3.1, Italian diminutive formation rules, in general, operate no change in either subcategorization or selectional restrictions, and, as to denotation, they just decrease quantity. Thus, all other denotative lexical meaning and morphosyntactic features such as gender, [abstract, countable, common, animate, human] generally remain intact. If the base is a derivative, then the same head properties of suffixes are maintained as with simplex bases. For these reasons Scalise (1988: 233—235) claims that they are not heads. 134 They do, however, have two head properties. First, they may change the inflectional class: All masculine bases (also of adjectives) go into the most stable class among the classes of masculine nouns, that is, those in sg. -o, pi. -i: e. g., il duca 'the duke' —» il duch-ino; il cinema 'the cinema' —1• il cinem-ino; il verme 'the worm' —• il verm-etto; il film, pi. ifilm —• il film-ino, ifilm-ini; lo gnu, pi. gli gnu —* lo gnu-ino, gli gnu-ini. All feminine bases (also of adjectives) go into the most stable class of feminine nouns,

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that is, those in sg. -a, pi. -e: e. g., la tribii, pi. le tribu —1• la tribu-ina, le tribu-ine; la pelle 'the skin', pi. le pelli —*• la pell-ic-ina, le pell-ic-ine. Thus diminutive formation is morphosemantically transparent to the category of gender, but not necessarily morphotactically transparent to the morphological expression of gender. This is further proved by the derivations of la mano 'the hand', which is feminine but - as an isolated exception - ends in the thematic vowel -o of the only stable masculine class. Now, as expected, diminutive derivations end in -a (Dardano 1978: 100): la man-ina, la man-uccia, and even lexicalized sg. la man-etta 'handle', pi. le man-ette 'hand-cuffs'. Second, as we have already seen in the above examples, plural inflection follows the diminutive suffix and is governed by the class of the diminutive suffix. Therefore, if gender changes in the plural basis, the plural of the diminutive still follows the gender of the singular diminutive, e. g., masc. sg. il ginocchio —• fem. pi. le ginocchia, dim. il ginocch-ino, i ginocch-ini. This regularity is partially violated by the variant le ginocchine, which is feminine like the base form. But, at any rate, a form *le ginocch-ina with the (originally, collective) ending -a of the plural of the base form is strictly excluded, that is, the first property (above) of diminutive suffixes is still present. Many diminutives change gender, nearly always from a feminine (marked) base to a masculine (unmarked) derivative (cf. Luciani 1943: 22; Savoia 1984: 114). Counterexamples to this general direction of change are carro 'cart' —*• carr-elta; sigaro 'cigar' —• lexicalized sigar-etta 'cigarette' (Pellegrini 1977: 28). Not all diminutives that change gender necessarily change other head features as well. Many, but not all, are lexicalized, that is, idiomatic in meaning. In other words, opacity with regard to the semantics of the base is not always connected with opacity with regard to properties of headhood. For example la finestra 'the window' has a transparent diminutive la finestr-ina, but an opaque diminutive il finestr-ino 'the window of a car/train, on a screen', thus no longer a prototypical window (sc. window of a building): this represents a change of a lexical, denotative feature only. The same holds for la porta 'the door' —» transparent la port-ic-ina, opaque il port-ello. On the other hand there are perfect synonyms with gender variation such as la faccina = il facc-ino prepositions > demonstratives" and adds the comment: "The further down the hierarchy a diminutive form occurs, the less the actual change in meaning and the greater the importance of subjective diminutive force." According to our material, the hierarchy is partially correct, insofar as we have found few examples of denotational diminution with interjections and very few with (possessive or personal) pronouns, demonstratives, and prepositions. Our data relative to adverbs and numerals are too limited for calculating any percentages. But note the isolated Italian diminutive of the numeral "6" un se-ino = se-uccio designating a scarcely positive mark at school (where "five" is still a failure, "six" the first pass mark). As far as diminutive verbs are concerned, they are mostly used for denotation, but their denotative meaning is, as we have seen, different from the denotative meanings of the other parts of speech. And as regards adjectival diminutives, we do not find, in Italian, any evidence of adjectives being used proportionally less for denotative diminution than nouns. Finally, Nieuwenhuis does not provide any explanation for his hierarchy. What we can offer is the following suggestion: Gradable dimensions are a typical property of adjectives and nouns, while other dimensions

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are more important for verbs (e. g., verbal aspect and aktionsarten other than intensification/deintensification). Interjections, pronouns, and prepositions are hardly gradable. And the more unlikely a decrease in quantity or quality, the more probable a connotational or pragmatic meaning. Further explanations must be looked for in terms of possible landingsites of diminutive affixes (cf. 3.4.4.2, 3.5.9). 3.4.2. As we will see, there are difficulties with the identification of stable morphosemantic connotations of diminutives and with their categorization into invariant connotation(s). 181 3.4.2.1. One option that many authors have taken, 182 is identifying an emotive or affective invariant connotation (a semantic feature which is clearly pragmatically based, since it refers to a real or pretended emotive attitude of the speaker or is within the author's perspective). The cotext and situational context would then specify the type of emotion (cf. 1.8). Then, only those uses of diminutives which are neither denotational nor emotional would be of a morphopragmatic nature. A first difficulty here is that emotivity is much more rarely present than analysts such as Volek (1987) would assume (see 1.8, cf. Dardano 1978: 96-103). And if all nonemotional uses were taken to be morphopragmatic, then the domain of morphopragmatics would be enlarged to an excessive extent. 3.4.2.2. An alternative option is recognizing, as a morphosemantic connotation of diminutives, a semantic feature such as [agreeable, gracious, pleasant] (again clearly also a pragmatically based feature); 183 this corresponds, presumably, to Volek's (1987: 61) notion of diminutives expressing positive emotions (sc. by default). Ettinger (1974 a: 34) gives, for a German dialect, the schema: positive connotation [lieb, nett] 'dear, nice', negative connotation [verächtlich] 'disdainful', but this diversity of connotations is considered (p. 27) to be contextual, that is, to belong to the level of performance/parole. 184 Emotivity, in fact, cannot be excluded, but remains a supplementary, optional connotational feature. For example, when someone says: (85)

Vai come una lumach-ina. You walk like a snail-DIM 'You are as slow as a baby snail.'

a semantic feature of graciousness would be added to the snail's negative connotation focussed upon in the metaphor, and this semantic feature

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would then be pragmatically exploited to attenuate the negative remark (see below 3.5.11). The same applies to remarks of the type: (86)

Mangi come un maial-ino (porcell-ino). Du ißt wie ein Schweind-erl. you eat like a pig-DIM (piglet-DIM) 'You eat like a little piggy.'

The meaning of the non-diminutivized Viennese and of the second Italian (porcello) version refers to lack of gracefulness — which the diminutive mitigates. Also the more negative reference of It. maiale is mitigated by the diminutive, but this effect is less attributable to a feature [graceful]. Graciousness would also be added, when the base is in itself neutral/ positive as in: (87)

Sei proprio una formich-ina. («— formica) you are really an ant-DIM 'You're such an eager little beaver (lit. ant).'

Another example where such a connotation appears, is Vienn. Flug-erl 'flight-DIM' for a nice, not very serious flirtation (Wehle 1980: 123, cf. It. scappat-ella 'escapade-DIM'). Note that the base Flug 'flight' does not have such a meaning. But couldn't this semantic feature of graciousness be vice-versa derived from the pragmatic attitude generally associated with such speech situations involving the use of diminutives? And are not both of these hypothetical connotations pragmatically-based? (Cf. 3.4.6.9 and 3.5.8 for notions of sympathy and empathy.) However, in order to avoid the danger of overinflating the domain of morphopragmatics, let us assume, for the moment, that there is an invariant morphosemantic connotation of diminutives. 3.4.2.3. The actual existence of either of these hypothetical connotations would explain Rainer's (1990 a) base-constraint whereby no diminutives can be formed from Italian nouns which belong to burocratese or to abstract or scientific or other high-brow lexical domains, e.g., alunno+ *DIM = discepolo+*DIM vs. more colloquial scolar-ino/etto 'disciple'. 185 Exceptions to this constraint, however, do not occur only in ludic use or with diminutiva puerilia (3.5.2, 3.5.5), but also elsewhere in numerous cases such as una flrm-etta, ricevut-ina, recession-c-ina, polmonit-ina,

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bronchit-ella, sospett-ino, sorpres-ina, paur-etta, riserv-ine from 'signature, receipt, recession, pneumonia, bronchitis, suspicion, surprise, fear, reserves (that one has)', cf. Latin spe-cula 'hope-DIM'. Other examples in Alberti et al. (1991) are manovr-ina fiscale, acclamazion-c-ella, aggressionc-ella, digression-c-ina/ella, anticipazion-c-ella, cognizion-c-ella, dubitazion-c-ella, dichiarazion-c-ella, catast-ina, comitat-ino, cris-etta from 'fiscal manoeuvre, acclamation, a/digression, anticipation, cognition, dubitation, declaration, cataster, committee, crisis.' Such stylistic constraints are not absolute, but rather represent disfavorable factors. This can be further illustrated by what a professor (University of Pisa), in a committee for reforming syllabuses, said with some disdain, about a proposed diminution of language and literature programs: (88)

Allora, queste lingu-ine e queste letteratur-ine... thus these languages-DIM and these literatures-DIM 'And so, these poor language and literature courses ...'

These diminutives struck the other committee members as rather surprising instances of diminutive formation. There are, however, many other, clearly non-ludic violations of this putative base-constraint, as in fisichetta, chimich-etta, logich-etta from 'physics, chemistry, logics' (rather pejorative) and in a paper headline {La Repubblica (Cronaca di Firenze)): (89) a.

"Ripres-ina" targata Cee recovery-DIM labeled EC '"signs of a recovery" made in the EC'

and in the first sentence of the body of the report: (89) b. Ε una ripres-ina e il merito e tutto del is a recovery-DIM and the merit is entire of the prodotto tipico di Prato. product typical of Prato 'There are slight gains, all thanks to Prato's traditional wares.' Later on we find only another occurrence of la "ripresina" and the paraphrase una sensibile ripresa 'an appreciable recovery' (in one sector); la lieve ripresa 'the weak recovery'; il positivo andamento 'the positive

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course'. A well-known case from political discourse is pejorative Italietta 'Italy-DIM'. Or in an international symposium, we heard a Roman psycholinguist producing (without any ludic intention): (90)

una specie di lessic-uccio nella testa a sort of lexicon-DIM in the head 'a sort of mini-dictionary stored in one's head'

with its anaphoric coreferents un list-ino 'a list-DIM' and un sistem-ino 'a system-DIM'. For German cf., for example, Revolutiön-chen 'revolutionDIM' (Wellmann 1975: 124). Such examples relativize Rainer's base constraint. Interestingly, both constraint and violation of it have a pragmatic basis: formal speech situations disfavor the use of diminutives (cf. 3.5.7, cf. Sifianou 1992: 168), but formality is negotiable. 3.4.2.4. Before proceeding in our difficult attempt at separating morphopragmatics from morphosemantics (3.4.3.1), let us survey some other important morphosemantic aspects of diminutives. First of all we must differentiate morphosemantically transparent and opaque (that is, lexicalized) diminutives. As we have argued in 1.9.5.2, morphopragmatic generalizations can only be based on morphosemantically transparent word formations. For contrastive purposes we provide a certain number of the many lexicalized diminutives in a) and b), with lexicalization affecting denotations (a) and connotations (b) respectively: a) Denotatively lexicalized diminutives such as finestr-ino 'window-DIM (of a car)', libr-etto 'book-DIM' in the sense of an opera libretto or a savings-account booklet. 186 If nouns referring to objects whose size/dimension is invariably small are diminutivized, then these diminutive nouns often seem to be subject to lexicalization, e. g., G. Atom-teil-chen 'particle' (lit. 'atom-part-DIM'), cf. Klimaszewska (1983: 81-82) for Polish.187 There are more (denotatively) lexicalized diminutives in Italian than in Spanish, according to Carrera Diaz (1988: 502), who cites, for example, radio —» radi-ol-ina 'transistor', cf. recent telefon-ino 'cellular telephone'. Often the etymological meaning of smallness is still translucent, as in Triestine un birr-ino 'a certain (small) quantity of beer' (cf. Vienn. ein Seid-llKrüg-erl Bier). Among Viennese diminutives, /-diminutives are very often lexicalized, e. g., Mäd-(e)l 'girl' = Mäd-chen, whereas Mäd-erl, Mäd-i are still heard as diminutives, cf. Back#hend-l (for Back#huhn 'roast chicken') vs. true

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diminutive Back#hend-erl. Examples of lexicalized -erl diminutives are, e.g., ein Alz-erl 'a bit'; Buss-erl (vs. dim. Buss-i in child language and language of love) 'kiss'; Flank-erl 'flake'; Nock-erl 'dumpling' (dim. Nocki in child language); Pock-erl 'turkey; fir-cone'. There are no * Alz, Buss, Pock, whereas Flanke and Nocke have very different meanings, 'flank' and 'cam; stupid thing', respectively.188 Other diminutives are lexicalized because they are fixed components in idiomatic phrases such as fare cap-ol-ino 'to lurk' (lit. 'to make headDIM'); fare pied-ino 'to touch intentionally somebody's foot under the table' (lit. 'to make foot-DIM'). A German example is the idiom ins Fett#näpf-chen steigen!treten 'to make a big gaffe' (lit. 'to step into a bowl-DIM filled with fat'), cf. Vienn. ins Narren#kast-l schauen 'to fix one's look into nowhere', lit. 'to look into the fool's cupboard-DIM' (more in Ettinger 1974 a: 37-38). In principle, all denotatively lexicalized nouns are devoid of any semantic or pragmatic connotation typical of diminutive formation. If there is still some such connotation identifiable, then it is either lexically marked or contextually or prosodically conditioned (e. g., in the context of transparent, non-lexicalized diminutives). For example, there is little chance of connotational coloring in G. Atomteil-chen 'particle', b) Connotationally lexicalized diminutives: for example, formich-ina ' a n t + D I M ' (cf. 3.4.2.2) may be used only with positive connotations, as in (Corriere della Sera, article on Mantova reported to be the most prosperous Italian city): (91)

Formich-ine laboriose, dunque i prototipi nazionali ants-DIM diligent thus the prototypes national del benessere of the wealth 'diligent little ants, thus, the national prototypes of wealth'

Similarly gatt-ina 'kitty' (fem.), un donn-ino (masc.) 'a gracious, attractive little woman (donna)' always have positive connotation (except, of course, in ironic context), in contrast to una donn-ina (fem.) which may be used also negatively, e. g., una donn-ina allegra 'a merry woman+DIM', a euphemism for a prostitute. G. Pap-i (from Papa) 'daddy' is currently said only of one's own father, thus dein Pap-i 'your dad' is more unlikely than deine Mam-i 'your mum', where this preference does not hold (the same seems to be true with It. ilpap-inolbabb-ino vs. la mamm-ina).

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137

Even a whole lexical field, that is, that of drinks, may obtain almost only positive connotations with its diminutives, note caffe-(t!r)-ino = Vienn. Kaffee-tscherl 'coffee-DIM'; birr-etta - Bier-chen — V. Biertscherl 'bier-DIM'; Wein-chen = V. Weind-erl 'wine-DIM' (but not It. vinello which may also have negative connotations); V. Schnaps-erl 'brandyDIM'; whisk-ino, cognach-ino, liquor-ino 'whisky/cognac/liqueur-DIM'. 1 8 9 Examples for pejoratively lexicalized diminutives (representing negative stereotypes in the sense of Quasthoff 1987) are Vienn. Heft-(e)l-n (e.g., Mickey-Mouse-Ηeftin, unless uttered by children; Roman#heftln) said of unbound booklets, similarly Geschicht-erl-n 'stories-DIM': (s)ein Sprüch-erl aufsagen 'to recite a/one's rehearsed account'; Arm-utschk-erl (with the Czech suffix -ucka added to the adj. arm 'poor') = pover-accio 'poor-PEJ'; Wehwehchen 'ailments' (Vienn. Wehwehtscherl). Vienn. Ganserl#wein for 'water' (lit. 'goose-DIM-wine') is still more sarcastic than G. Gänse#wein) in its contrast to true wine; cf. Nerv-erl 'very nervous person' (lit. 'nerve-DIM'); Null-erl 'a nobody' (lit. 'zero-DIM', both metaphorically used); G'scheit-erl 'somebody who thinks he's very clever, but is not'. We may add some among Klimaszewska's (1983: 57—58) examples of pejorative connotation only: Dichter-lein 'poet-DIM' ( = It. poetucolo)\ (metaphorical) Friicht-chen 'fruit-DIM' = 'ill-bred youth' (Vienn. Frücht-erl), cf. Klimaszewska (1983: 88) for Polish diminutivized terms for professions. Cf. It. student-ello, medich-etto 'student-/doctor-DIM'. On the other hand, Vienn. Gfries 'face', has a negative connotation, D I M Gfries-erl has a positive default connotation, c) All lexicalizations are fixed on the level of norms (cf. Ettinger 1974 a: 179—183), that is, of lexical norms, but in word games, e.g., in puns or in jocular advertisements, their morphosemantically transparent meanings may reappear, for example, when the Italian politician Craxi characterized a political scandal as: (92)

Ε un cas-ino, cioe un caso piccolo! is a case-DIM/brothel that is a case small 'It's a big mess, of no importance that is.'

By this Craxi intended to play with the lexicalized meaning ('brothel' as a metaphor for 'big mess', derived from casa 'house') which he meant to retain together with the potentially transparent denotative meaning of a non-important case (caso) that he wanted to attribute to the scandal. 3.4.2.5. Another morphosemantic phenomenon is recursive diminution. Double (or even triple) diminutives, 190 if stem-based, can express further

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denotative diminution and/or connotative intensification, e.g., in casa 'house' —» cas-etta 'smaller house' — referent" (3.5.2.1). This would then explain Klimaszewska's (1983: 92) observation that animal diminutives in Polish occur with particular frequency as vocatives. She makes the same observation, however, about people, personified objects, children, and lovers. Could this mean that direct reference to the addressee is privileged in Polish? In any event, we see that diminutives are more widely used in child-centered than in petcentered speech situations. However, Arabic and Chinese informants have claimed that in their languages diminutives can be used at least as much with pets as with small children. In Basque, diminutive palatalisation is used when addressing pets (including parrots, M. Onederra pers. comm.), in English, little (Haas 1972: 149) or -yl-ie diminutives. Diminutives, and particularly Vienn. -/-suffixes, tend to be minimized by women when they seem to model their relationship to pets according to a female-male cliche. According to Ide (pers. comm.), Japanese -masu honorifics (2.4.4) are never used in pet-centered speech situations (cf. 3.5.2.1). 3.5.4. Lover-centered speech situations This is another specific speech situation which also seems to have a metaphorical relation with the child world (cf. Ferguson 1977: 231; RükeDravipa 1959: 35-37). The special Viennese German rule of -/-suffixation, whose primary locus is child language and baby talk (cf. 3.3.3, 3.5.2.1), can also be used in the language of love, albeit with more restrictions. If we return to the nursery rhyme (123) Kommt ein Maus-i aus dem Haus-i, both Maus-i and Haus-i can be used when addressing pets, but only Maus-i would seem appropriate for the language of love. Or Katz-i 'cat-DIM' may be used in the language of love, whereas Hund-erl,

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Fleisch-erl, Papp-erl, Tschap-erl must be substituted for the respective idiminutives of 3.5.2-3.5.3. 233 Further evidence for the metaphorical derivation of this domain from child language are diminutive verbs. Viennese diminutive verbs, which have a specific role in child-centered speech situations (cf. 3.4.2.1), can be, at least partially, transferred to the language of love. An example is finger-l-n («— finger-n) 'to touch lightly with the finger-tips', which has an effect of tenderness and intimacy, here specifically acquiring an erotic connotation ('petting', cf. Wehle 1980: 119, cf. p. 122), cf. schmieg-i 3rd plural human > 3rd singular human > 3rd non-human (cf. Tuttle 1986: 278, for Italian auxiliaries). Ease of diminutivisation seems to be a good diagnostic criterion for further subclassification of the humanness hierarchy. But this must be left for a separate study, which also should include other factors governing individual psychological distance. 246 3.5.7.8. Summing up, we may say that the notions of sympathy (3.5.7.1) and empathy (3.5.7.2) are regulative factors which generally favor the use of diminutives (except in irony, sarcasm, euphemism and similar, cf. 3.5.13-3.5.14), but that, in regard to empathy, Kuno's (1987) notion must be combined with the more traditional notion of Einfühlung (3.5.7.2 e). In 3.5.16.8 we will discuss a special case of empathy, the (literary) authors' empathy towards the dramatis personae of their work. 3.5.8. Formality, familiarity, and intimacy 3.5.8.1. Other factors which generally favor diminutive use come under the names of familiarity, informality, intimacy, closeness, and the like (cf.

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Wierzbicka 1991: 105, Daltas 1985: 63, and here 3.5.7.1). Here we will use the following terms: Intimacy is a dyadic relationship for which we take over Wierzbicka's (1991: 105) definition as "readiness to reveal to some particular persons some aspects of one's personality and of one's inner world that one conceals from other people; a readiness based on personal trust and on personal 'good feelings'." This presupposes psychological proximity, a readiness to sym/empathize (cf. 3.5.7) and an insider relationship between speaker and hearer or referent. Both psychological and social distance (cf. Wolfson 1988) oppose intimacy. Familiarity is also a dyadic relationship in the sense of acquaintance based on customary interaction between the speaker and the other relevant component(s) of the speech situation. In the case of cooperative interactions, familiarity may reduce psychological distance and lead to an insider relationship and often even to intimacy, cf. the findings of Kreckel (1981) on conceptual convergence between communicants in families and resultant changes in verbal interaction. Let us take the speaker—addressee relationship. Clearly the more often A meets B, the greater the likelihood that both the psychological distance between A and Β is lowered, and that A and Β interact as insiders. But still there is a difference in familiarity between insiders who interact frequently with one another and those who do not (cf. Milroy 1980 for sociolinguistic network theory). Informality we define in more neutral ways than Wierzbicka (1991: 111), namely as (relative) lack of formality either a) of the speech situation, or b) in (especially verbal) behavior, as signaled by choice of a specific, usually informal register (e.g., in casual speech). Informal verbal behavior (b) is a typical effect of familiarity and/or intimacy and of the informality of the speech situation (a). 247 Homileic discourse is usually more informal than comparable institutional discourse. Familiarity and intimacy are regulative factors which generally favor diminutive use (except for 3.5.8.6), although the presence of these factors is more needed (and to a higher degree) in German than in Italian. Formality of the speech situation increases psychological distance and thus disfavors the use of diminutives, and even more so in German than in Italian. Informal verbal behavior (b) and diminutive use are only indirectly correlated, insofar as they are regulated by an identical intersection of factors. 3.5.8.2. Familiarity, intimacy, and informality are always present in the language of love (3.5.4), but obviously not in outsiders' ironic use of

Data and their interpretation

— Familiarity

215

amich-etta, Lieb-chen, etc., which are lexicalized uses outside lover-centered speech situations. In pet language (3.5.3), familiarity favors diminutive use but is not a necessary condition for it. In child-centered speech situations, familiarity, intimacy, and informality of the speech situation are favorable factors for, and usually present in, the use of the diminutivum puerile, but again not a necessary precondition (cf. 3.5.2.4, cf. Blum-Kulka 1990: 284). This is the case when the child is the speaker, or when the child is addressed by an unknown but empathetic person as in (136) in 3.5.2.4. There, outsider status and lack of familiarity is counterbalanced by empathy. In other words, a low degree of psychological distance seems to be a necessary precondition for the use of the diminutivum puerile. 3.5.8.3. Familiarity (even without intimacy) favors diminutive use in other speech situations as well. As already discussed in Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi (1989 b: 241, cf. below 3.5.10.4.3.1), the Italian and German utterances: (176)

Ma si, mi porti una birr-etta! but yes me bring a beer-DIM Bitte bringen Sie mir doch ein Bier-chen! please bring you me PART a beer-DIM 'Go on, then, bring me my (e. g., usual) beer!'

can be uttered only if a component of the speech situation is familiar to the speaker: either the waiter addressed or a side-participant (e. g., a good friend) or even the place, e.g., if the speaker is a client there. Friendly irony is another case in point (cf. 3.5.14.3.4 and 3.5.14.3.7). Familiarity is a more important constraint in German than in Italian, for example, for the use of the diminutivum modestum (cf. Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi 1989 b: 245; below 3.5.13), as in (177) uttered by a (female) linguist in the discussion period of a large conference. (177)

Avrei anch' io una mia teori-etta in proposito. I'd have also I a my theory-DIM ä propos 'I'd have a little theory myself on this point.'

Such a situation would be much too formal for allowing a diminutive in German. Theorie-chen, Theori-erl, Theorie-tscherl 'theory-DIM', if possible at all, would be only conceivable in a small, closed seminar of lin-

216

Diminutives

guists who would know each other very well and be on very friendly terms. According to our informants, Spanish and Slovene are rather like Italian in this case, Basque and Czech like German. 3.5.8.4. Informality of speech situation is one default criterion for distinguishing oral and written language or, more precisely, orally and graphically composed discourse. And, as expected, diminutives occur more in oral than in written discourse (cf. Klimaszewska 1983). First of all, this is due to the fact that many types of discourse used in child/pet/lovercentered speech situations are rarely reproduced or recreated in writing. Secondly, and more importantly, if we consider comparable speech situations, diminutives may occur much more freely in oral than in written discourse. Thus, when chemists talk to each other, they may replace (178 b) with (178 a): (178) a. una concentrazione un po' alt-ina di una sostanza a concentration a bit high-DIM of a substance chimica chemical 'a somewhat high-ish concentration of a chemical substance' b. una concentrazione aha di ... But informants have declared that they would not use such a diminutive in writing - except in a personal letter to a close friend or colleague (conceivably the highly tentative character of an assertion might be an alternative, cf. 3.5.11.2.3.3). Also (177) with teori-etta is rather excluded in writing, except in a personal letter or if somebody else's theory is opposed and ridiculed in a very sarcastic way. Use of diminutives is in fact viewed as signaling the greater degree of informality to be expected in spoken discourse as compared with written discourse. 3.5.8.5. A low degree of psychological distance (as a component of sym/ empathy, familiarity and intimacy) may also be used as a feature which distinguishes interactional discourse from transactional discourse according to the definition of Kasper (1990: 205; cf. also Aston 1988 b): "Transactional discourse types focus on the optimally efficient transmission of information .... Interactional discourse, by contrast, has as its primary goal the establishment and maintenance of social relationship." We have already seen (1.7.13, 2.4.4.E) the importance of this distinction for pragmatics. Here we just want to illustrate the relevance of interactional discourse for diminutive use. For the purpose, we can cite a case where a

Data and their interpretation

— Familiarity

217

lady (A) entering a shoe shop approaches the owner in a non-conventional way thus immediately establishing a non-purely transactional context. The (male) owner (B) takes up this personalized relation and uses a diminutive: (179) A: Lei e una persona paziente? Ε disposto ad you are a person patient are willing to avere α che fare con piedi problematici? have to what do with feet problematic A: 'Are you a patient person? Are you willing to put up with problem feet?' B: Vediamo questi pied-ini! let's see these feet-DIM B: 'Let's have a look at these little feet of yours!' The diminutive used is a symptom of reduced psychological distance and of a ludic character. 3.5.8.6. So far familiarity, intimacy and informality in speech situations have been favoring (or even necessary) factors for diminutive use. There are, however, a few contexts where these factors actually make the use of diminutives unnecessary. The most evident case is euphemism in formal speech situations (cf. 3.5.13; Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1989 b: 244), as in: (180)

No signora, mi dia una taglia piugrande, no madam me give a size larger questi [sc. pantaloni\ sono cosi stretti che si vede tutto il these [sc. trousers] are so tight that one sees all the segno delle mutand-ine (said to an unknown sales-woman), mark of the panties-DIM 'No madam, could I have a larger size, these are so tight you can see my panty-line.'

If the two ladies had been familiar to each other, the use of the diminutive with the tabu word mutande would not have been felt as necessary. Another case is the diminutivum sarcasticum (3.5.14), whose use presupposes antagonistic interaction and, therefore, is likely to be avoided in case of psychological proximity. 3.5.8.7. Ettinger (1974a: 366-367) hypothesizes that diminutives can be formed more easily from frequent words than from very infrequent ones.

218

Diminutives

If accurate statistic analysis should confirm this hypothesis, an explanation might be the preference for familiarity in diminutive use: if the speaker's familiarity with elements of the speech situation increases the chance of his using a diminutive, then the property of familiarity must not be restricted to the relationship between speaker and hearer, but should also be applied to the relationship between speakers and the words they use (cf. Dressier 1985 c: 88). In a truely pragmatic perspective, however, familiarity of words would have to be ascertained within types of speech situations. Thus, in 3.5.2.4, we assumed that acqu-etta in example (133) could be a frequent form in child-centered speech situations (in adult-child interaction). Therefore, establishing frequency ranks of dictionary entries would not produce a sufficient criterion for identifying degree of familiarity. We would rather have to count tokens of words in those speech situations in which they are typically used. 248 3.5.8.8. Finally, let us resume and again test the alternative hypotheses advanced for explaining the pragmatics of diminutives that we have argued against in 3.4.2 and 3.4.5. We will now compare our model and these alternative hypotheses in explaining the relevance of familiarity and related notions for diminutive use. As far as we can see, there is no way to derive the relevance of familiarity and informality either from a feature [gracious, pleasant] or from emotionality. Nor is there any pragmatic principle by which we can derive the relevance of sym/empathy, familiarity, intimacy, informality from the notion of smallness. On the other hand, the feature [non-serious] attached to the speech situation can be easily expected to diminish the formality of the speech situation, and this reduces psychological distance. Reduced psychological distance is a component of sym/empathy, familiarity and intimacy. In this way these regulative factors can be linked to the abstract feature [nonserious]. Of course, neither this abstract feature nor psychological distance are strictly inherent in a type of speech situation, it is the interlocutors who define a speech situation in these respects. The same holds for the preference for using diminutives with insiders rather than with outsiders, for it is the interlocutors who define themselves and each other as insiders. 3.5.9. Landing-site After having studied three easily identifiable types of speech situations (3.5.2—3.5.4) and the intersecting factors of playfulness (3.5.5), emotion

Data and their interpretation

~ Landing-site

219

(3.5.6), sympathy/empathy (3.5.7) and formality/familiarity/intimacy (3.5.8), we are ready to tackle the problem of the landing-site of diminutive suffixation, as anticipated in 3.4.4.2.249 Once this is accomplished we will have more tools for approaching a still more detailed study of speech situations, speech acts and pragmatic strategies (3.5.10-3.5.16). 3.5.9.1. The landing-site of diminutive suffixes is a much more intricate question for Italian than it is for German, because in German there are many more morphological (see 3.3.3) and lexical (e.g., semantic) constraints (cf. 3.4.1-3.4.2) limiting the choice of landing-sites. The only principled exception is verbs from which German but not Italian can derive a diminutivum puerile (3.5.2.1). On the other hand, Italian sentences typically contain many more bases permitting diminutive suffixes than German ones. Therefore, accounting for the choice of landing-sites is more crucial for Italian than it is for German. For the moment at least we will ignore all the bases that do not admit diminutive suffixes normally, that is, that do so only under very specific circumstances (cf. 3.5.2.1-3.5.2.2, 3.5.5.5). 3.5.9.2. Next, we have already seen (3.4.4.2 and examples in 3.5.2.8) that - except for the diminutiva puerilia, e.g., examples (111), (117), (118), (122), (125)—(128) in 3.5.2 - diminutive suffixes are rarely attached to all the morphologically or lexically adequate bases within the sentence, clause or phrase expressing the speech act, 250 that is, normally a single landing-site is chosen per speech act. A case where the three options of having two landing-sites or just one (on one or the other of the conceivable bases) are equally possible (albeit with slight pragmatic differences), will be discussed below in 3.5.9.7. Co-occurrence of two or more diminutives is found rather often in rhymes and produces a ludic effect (cf. 3.5.5.5), as in: (181)

(X) ha guadagnato un soggiorn-ino in un convent-ino. has won a stay-DIM in a convent-DIM '(X) won himself a stay in a nice little convent.'

Or take the sarcastic remark by a drunk person in a posh restaurant: (182)

Un elegante post-ic-ino pieno di gente an elegant place-INTERF-DIM full of people per-ben-ino! well-to-do-DIM Ά fancy little place full of comely people.'

220

Diminutives

For Spanish cf. (Gooch 1967: 192): (183)

Chiv-it-os chiqu-it-os arriba y chiv-ot-es goat-kids-DIM small-DIM above and goats-kids-AUGM grand-ot-es abajo. big-AUGM below 'Up with little baby-goats, down with great big goats!'

Non-playful pragmatic uses may be illustrated with the following descriptive text chunk from the newspaper II Giornale, which displays just one diminutive in each complex noun or prepositional phrase: (184)

a) api che ronz-ettano, b) un insospettato bord-ino bees that hum-DIM an unsuspected rim-DIM d' acqua c) dopo bussi, url-etti, ... d) un om-ino of water after blows shouts-DIM a man-DIM che si infila riluttante la camicia, e) ti rifila who himself puts on reluctant the shirt you hands uno smilzo libr-ett-ino a slim book-DIM-DIM 'a) buzzing bees, b) an unexpected little water-edge, c) after knocking, a shout or two, etc., d) a little man reluctantly putting on his shirt, e) he palms off a meager little book on you.'

For example, there is, in (184d), a diminutive suffix on the noun but not in the relative clause, while, in (184 a) it is in the relative clause (on the verb) but not on the governing noun "bees", etc. This may look like stylistic economy, but as we are going to see, there is more than just style behind it. 251 3.5.9.3. First of all, certain lexical items are unsuitable as bases for diminutive formation (cf. 3.3.2, 3.4.1.1—3.4.1.2, 3.4.2.3). For example, un paio 'a pair of' cannot be diminutivized. Therefore, there is no alternative to diminutivization in the threat: (185)

Le dirö un paio di cos-ette! to you I'll say a pair of things-DIM 'I'll tell you one thing or two!'

Or let us take the diminutivum sarcasticum in Figaro's aria (cavatina in Mozart's Le nozze di Figaro I, 3):

Data and their interpretation — Landing-site

(186)

221

Se vuol ballare signor cont-ino? if wants dance lordship count-DIM 'Would his lordship, that dumb count, care to dance with me?'

Here the noun conte is the only possible landing-site, because prefixed titles signore, signora, professore, etc., cannot be diminutivized. In the German translation there is an additional lexical constraint: Herr Graf '(His) lordship (the) count' cannot be diminutivized. 252 Therefore the translator attached the German suffix -chen to the only noun that admits it: (186')

Will der Herr Graf ein Tänz-chen nun wagen? wants the Lordship count a dance-DIM PART dare 'Does His lordship the count dare to dance a little with me?'

Finally let us briefly review invocations. Since It. Dio, Iddio 'God' cannot be diminutivized, there is no alternative to: (187)

Dio buonol —• Dio b(u)on-ino! 'Good Lord!' — Lord good-DIM

Santo 'saint' cannot be diminutivized either (unless in lexicalized un santino = un' immagin-etta sacra 'a picture-DIM of a saint'). Therefore Dio santo! 'Holy God' cannot be diminutivized, and there is no counterpart to: (188)

Madonna santa! —*• Madonn-ina santa! 'Oh holy Virgin!' — Virgin-DIM holy

In (at least certain varieties of) Spanish, 'God' and 'Virgin' can be diminutivized: Dios-ito, Virgen-c-ita. 3.5.9.4. As to syntactic factors, we could not find any simple principle or tendency comparable to that of Jap. tyotto, which "as a speech act qualification tends to occur at sentence initial position rather than immediately before a qualifiable lexical item" (Matsumoto 1985: 152). Similar principles hold for other languages as well. For example, Hasselrot (1957: 311) cites Khalkha Mongolian where diminutive suffixes are attached to attributive adjectives, while their diminutive meaning refers to the nouns governing them, and (p. 311) a Dakota dialect where the diminutive suffix

222

Diminutives

tends to be attached to the last word of a sentence. No comparable principle (or even tendency) holds for Italian. Nor does stress play a role. Relevant syntactic factors we have identified so far, are: Pragmatic diminutivization is limited to nouns, adjectives and adverbs, that is, it is, in general, avoided with verbs (but cf. above 3.5.9.2 and Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1989b: 246, example 22). Among adverbs modifying adjectives, constructions of the type un po' troppo spess-ino 'a bit too often-DIM' do not have the alternative *troppino spesso, whereas un po' tropp-ino 'a bit too much-DIM' occurs. The construction un tant-in(-ell)o + adjective has no counterpart un tanto + adjective. Therefore un tant-ino freddo 'somewhat cold' cannot be replaced by *un tanto fredd-ino. On the other hand, the near-synonymous construction exemplified by un po' (poco) fredd-ino 'a bit cold-DIM' seems to be more usual than the alternative un poch-ino freddo. Again in terms of position, a preposed attributive adjective cannot be diminutivised. Thus the examples (with denotative synonymy between diminutives and analytic constructions): (189) a. due belle chiacchier-ine, un ponte piccol-ino tun piccolo two nice chats-DIM a bridge small-DIM /a small pont-inol-ic-ello, una notizia trist-ar-ella bridge-DIM/-INTERF-DIM a notice sad-INTERF-DIM tuna triste notizi-ola /a sad notice-DIM b. e bello piccol-ino, e bei cald-uccio is nice small-DIM is nice warm-DIM 'It is nice and rather small, it is nice and warm' cannot be replaced by *bell-ine chiacchere, piccol-ino ponte, trist-ar-ella notizia, bell-ino piccolo, bell-ino caldo. In a noun-phrase, consisting of a governing and a governed noun and referring to a unique concept, only the governing noun, that is, the head can be diminutivized. Thus, fondo di ricerca 'research fund' cannot be diminutivized to "fondo di ricerch-ina (although the understatement una mia ricerch-ina 'a research-DIM of mine' is possible). Rather the head, the more salient entity, is diminutivized, as in: (190)

Devi attingere al tuo fond-ino di ricerca you must draw on your fund-DIM of research 'You will have to draw upon your dear research fund.'

Data and their interpretation

— Landing-site

223

Similarly a 'glass of liqueur' can only be diminutivized as in: (191)

Forse vorrebbe un bicchier-ino di liquore. maybe would like a glass-DIM of liquor 'Perhaps you'd like a little shot of liquor.'

The same holds for limiti di velocitä 'speed limits' —• limit-ini di velocitä; colpo di telefono 'phone call' —• colp-ett-ino di telefono; un giro di opinioni 'a survey of opinions' —• un gir-etto di opinioni, etc. The nominal head is also the only possible landing-site if a nounphrase consisting of a noun and an attributive (modifying) adjective refers to a unique concept. For example, settimana bianca 'white week' (vacation reserved for skiing) can be diminutivized to una settiman-ina bianca, but not to *una settimana bianch-ina, although a jocular, ironic diminutivization of the adjective is conceivable in predicative position, as in: (192)

La settimana non e proprio bianch-ina. the week not is really white-DIM 'This week is not exactly snow-white.'

(e. g., as a response, in case there is no or very little snow). In most German compounds the rightmost member is the morphological head. This is the only landing-site for diminutive suffixes. Diminutive suffixes in non-head position already belong to the respective basis of the compound. For example, a Häus-el#bauer is somebody who builds a small house (Häus-el); a Bröt-chen#geber is the employer who gives Brötchen 'bread-DIM'. Similarly, the Viennese inns Brück-l#wirt, Gartl#wirt, Gans-1# wir t are called after the 'bridge-DIM' (Briick-l), the 'garden-DIM' (Gart-l) and the 'goose-DIM' (Gans-l) where the first innkeeper {Wirt) established the inn. And the child who complained about his Kopf-i#weh 'head-DIM-ache' (3.5.2.6 example (140)) would have used Kopf-i for his head. 3.5.9.5. The landing-site for diminutive suffixes may be textually constrained. Where more than one is possible, the one which better suits what is thematic, is preferentially chosen. If the hypertheme of a text chunk is to be hedged, then it is the noun referring to it that is diminutivized. The utterance containing the above-cited sentence (191) is introduced by the sentence announcing the hypertheme:

224

(193)

Diminutives

Pensi che ha fatto un liquor-ino con le sue mani. think that has made a liqueur-DIM with the her hands 'Just think, she's made this little brew with her own hands.'

The variant un liquore con le sue man-ine would be pragmatically less adequate in this context. A similar case can be identified in the initiating sentence: (194)

Un paio di mesi fa lei stava raccontando un a couple of months ago she was telling a fatt-er-ello un po' spinto. fact-INTERF-DIM a bit juicy Ά couple of months ago she was describing a rather juicy little incident.'

whereas un fatto un po' spint-ar-ello might be conceivable elsewhere. 3.5.9.6. Purely pragmatic motives (linked to semiotic indexicality in 1.4) affect the choice of the landing-site in many instances of the diminutivum puerile, especially with the child as addressee. Since the speaker's attention is focussed on the child, diminutive suffixes are preferentially attached to nouns referring to the child, its body parts, or even objects specifically belonging to the child. Thus the following three (a) sentences are pragmatically more adequate than the respective (b) sentences: (195) a. Su, metti anche le man-ine nell' acqua!253 on put also the hands-DIM in the water 'Come on, put your little hands in the water too!' b. Su, metti anche le mani nell' acqu-etta! (196) a. Adesso metti le scarp-ine nella valigia! now put the shoes-DIM in the suitcase 'Now put your booties into the suitcase!' b. Adesso metti le scarpe nella valig-ina! (197) a. Ε caduto e s ' e preso una botta alia is fallen and REFL is got a bump on the test-ol-ina. head-INTERF-DIM '(The boy) fell and got a bump on his noggin.' b. Ε caduto e s' e preso una bott-ar-ella alia testa. 'He fell and got a beautiful bump on his head.'

Data and their interpretation — Landing-site

225

In all cases, the noun which is more closely connected with the child, preferentially attracts the diminutive suffix. 3.5.9.7. Now we turn to various speech acts in different situations and limit our discussion to noun phrases as landing-sites. We hypothesize that diminutive suffixes are preferentially attracted by the noun-phrase which receives the greatest focus in the speech act. A clear example of euphemistic focus referring to just one noun phrase is mutande 'pants' —• mutand-ine in example (180) of 3.5.8.6 (cf. 3.5.13.3). Or take the headline from the newspaper La Repubblica: (198)

Quando Γ Italia penso di fare la furb-etta when the Italy thought to make the clever-DIM 'When Italy tried to be a smart Aleck'

where sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14.5) is focussed on the petty dealings of the state and not on the state itself, that is, on the predication, not on the topic of predication. For requests (cf. 3.5.10), we may quote Sieberer (1950: 96): "gerade das ist deminuiert, worauf sich ein Wunsch konzentriert" ['precisely the word which receives the focus of the wish is diminutivized']. The first example is a request addressed by a woman to her husband, where the alternative (199') would not attenuate the request: (199)

(199')

Tesoro, scrivimi due fras-ette nella letter a a treasure write me two sentences-DIM in the letter to Piero! Pete 'Darling, add a line or two to my letter to Pete!' Tesoro, scrivimi due frasi nella letter-ina a Piero!

In a similar vein, we can explain an apparent counter-example to examples (195)—(197), a mother's directive, uttered on the beach: (200)

Su, vieni che la mamma ti toglie tutto il sal-ino on come that the mum you remove all the salt-DIM dalle gambe! from the legs 'Come on here so Mummy can clean all the little salt off your legs!'

226

Diminutives

First of all, the diminutive is embedded in a secondary clause depending on the directive, because there is no potential landing-site in the main clause. Second, "salt" is [non-countable] and not even individualized, whereas "legs" are [countable] (although this constraint is easily violated by diminutiva puerilia, cf. 3.5.2.2). Third, salt is definitely less closely related to the child than his legs. Fourth, the diminutive sal-ino is homophonous with the adjective sal-ino 'salty' (which may be substantivized). Nevertheless "salt" and not "legs" is the landing-site. We interpret this choice of the landing-site in this way: By using the diminutive, the mother wanted to mitigate the somewhat unpleasant action of rubbing off the salt, and here the salt is more central than the legs. Nevertheless the variant: (200')

... tutto il sale dalle gamb-ine!

is conceivable and even sounds better (more child-centered). Now let us move to speech acts of recommending (cf. 3.5.12.3.6). In a restaurant in Pisa, the waiter recommended in a sequence: (201)

a) trigli-ette con pomodoro, b) seppi-ol-ine con mullets-DIM with tomato cuttle-fish-INTERF-DIM with bietole, c) stoccafisso con pomodor-ino beet stockfish with tomato-DIM a) 'some nice mullet with tomato-sauce, b) some nice cuttle-fish with Swiss chard, c) some nice stockfish with tomato-sauce.'

The diminutive suffixes were always attached to the main ingredient of the dish, except in the case of stoccafisso, which hardly admits diminutivization. As a consequence the diminutive suffix was moved to the secondary ingredient. At the same time this is an example of the higher saliency of the syntactic head (cf. 3.5.9.4). Only if the suffix cannot be attached to the more salient head of the complex noun phrase, is it affixed to the non-head. In the same restaurant, the menu offered: (202)

penne al granchio 'penne (type of pasta similar to maccaroni) with crab sauce'

but the same waiter recommended 254 it as (a), rather than the conceivable alternative (b):

Data and their interpretation

(202)

— Landing-site

227

(a) penn-ett-ine al granchio penne-DIM-DIM to the crab (b) penne al granch-ino

Finally, let us mention attenuated assertions referring to unpleasant things (cf. 3.5.11.2.2). In a faculty meeting, a professor made statement (203), which he repeated, soon afterwards as (203'): (203)

Ε un problema un po' spinos-etto. is a problem a bit thorny-DIM 'It is a rather thornyish problem.'

(203')

Ε un problem-ino. 'It's a delicate problem.'

The speaker wanted to attenuate the unpleasant aspects of the problem in case. Since spinoso greatly intensifies the degree of complexity of a problem, attenuation is much more effective on spinoso than on problema. Therefore he avoided the otherwise correct variant: (203")

Ε un problem-ino spinoso. 'It's a thorny little problem.'

3.5.9.8. In order to see the pragmatic meaning differences in the choice of landing-sites, let us discuss the Italian equivalents of Alonso's (1961: 165) Spanish expression of pleasure: (204) a. Me gusta la sopa calent-ita. me pleases the soup hot-DIM Ί like nice hot soup.' First of all, the literal rendering: (204) b. Mi piace la minestra cald-ina. Ί like my soup rather hot.' has no denotative diminutive meaning, because this would be rendered by: (204) c. Mi piace la minestra tiepida /non troppo calda. me pleases the soup tepid not too hot Ί like my soup tepid/not too hot.'

228

Diminutives

Second, (204 b) can be uttered as a protest against being served a rather cold soup. In this case, the illocutionary force of the protest in reference to the temperature is attenuated, thus the landing-site is obvious. Third, (204 b) can occur as an alternative to: (204) d. Mi piace una minestr-ina calda (la sera). me pleases a soup-DIM warm the evening Ί just love a nice hot soup (e. g., for supper).' (said with pleasure while having it, and putting the main stress on the verb). The Viennese equivalent is: (204) e. Ich liebe ein warmes Supp-erl (zum Abendessen). I love a warm soup-DIM for supper In this case, the diminutive clearly refers to the whole speech act of expressing pleasure. The landing-site is fixed in German but variable in Italian. The speech act can be, ludically or ironically, intensified to: (204) f. Mi piace

una bella minestr-ina cald-ina.

me pleases a

nice soup-DIM warm-DIM

where both slots for possible landing-sites are filled. 3.5.10. Requests There is much discussion on the definition, identification, classification, and characterization of speech acts as the minimal units of communication (cf., e.g., Grewendorf 1979; Sbisä 1989; cf. above 1.7.12). Important as these disputes may be, they rarely touch the one aspect of speech acts which is most important for the morphopragmatics of diminutives: the relative strength of the illocutionary force of a speech act. This will be the main concern of our analysis. We are going to start with the classical battle-horse of speech-act analysis: requests. As a way of approaching the prototypical characteristics of the speech act of request, we take its classical definitions and characterizations as a point of departure. Requests belong to Austin's (1962) and Sbisä's (1989: 116) class of exercitives (because they exercise "powers, rights, or influence"), to Searle's (1969) directives, to McCawley's (1977) imperatives, etc. 3.5.10.1. In his classical study on speech acts, Searle (1969: 66) defines the speech act "request" in the following way:255

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

229

a) The propositional content is a future act A of the hearer H. 256 b) The preparatory conditions are: 1. Η is able to do A, and the speaker S believes Η to be able to do A. This evidently excludes requests which ask for the impossible (and are thus bound to be non-felicitous speech acts). 2. "It is not obvious to both S and Η that Η will do A in the normal course of events of his own accord." To these preparatory conditions we want to add two more conditions which hold for all our requests studied so far: 3. Doing A is in the interest or to the advantage of S or of somebody/something in the sphere/territory of S. 4. A request may only be felicitous if S is entitled to ask Η to do A. c) The sincerity condition is "S wants Η to do A", (cf. Haverkate 1990: 87, 101). d) The essential condition is: The request "counts as an attempt to get Η to do A". By following Searle's (1976) classification of illocutionary acts and the later systematic exposition of illocutionary logic, as in Searle-Vanderveken (1985), we can characterize a request in respect to its illocutionary force as a directive illocutionary act. The illocutionary force of a request is best defined by characterizing its seven components (p. 12-20): 1) Its illocutionary point (as "that purpose which is essential to an illocutionary act to its being an act of that type") "is to try to get other people to do things" (p. 37). 2) The degree of strength of (achieving) the illocutionary point in requesting is stronger than that of recommending and weaker than those of pleading and ordering. "The greater strength of pleading derives from the intensity of the desire expressed, while the greater strength of ordering derives from the fact that the speaker uses a position of power or authority that he has over the hearer" (p. 15).257 3) Its mode of achievement (as a "special set of conditions under which their illocutionary point has to be achieved in the performance of the speech act"): "the speaker must ... be in a position of authority" for uttering the request, but in contrast to an order, he does not use or invoke his authority in issuing the utterance (p. 15-16), and he "allows for the possibility of refusal" (p. 199). On the other hand, begging "is to request very politely or humbly" (p. 70). 4) Propositional content conditions are as in Searle (1969: 1 a above). 5) Preparatory conditions (as the "conditions which are necessary for successful and nondefective performance of an illocutionary act") are also as in 1 b) above. 6) Sincerity conditions are as in 1 c) above, but made more precise, insofar as directives "have the general sincerity condition that the speaker

230

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wants or desires the hearer to do what he attempts to get him to do" and "create reasons for the hearer to do the action that he is directed to do" (p. 55-56). But a request is a special type of directive in that it "allows for the possibility of refusal" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 199). 7) Its degree of strength of the sincerity conditions can be characterized in the following ways: "The speaker who makes a request expresses the desire that the hearer do the act requested; but if he begs, beseeches, or implores, he expresses a stronger desire than if he merely requests" (p. 19). For these speech acts "the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions and the degree of strength of the illocutionary point vary directly. ... But an order, for example, has a greater degree of strength of (achieving) its illocutionary point than a request, even though it need not have a greater degree of strength of its expressed psychological state" (p. 20), that is, of its want/desire. In other words, an order is stronger than a request in its mode of achieving the illocutionary point. This mode of achievement comprises the degree of "strength derived from the position of the speaker" (or "authority mode", p. 101): In respect to the speaker's authority (or entitlement), a request is intermediate between the higher degree of strength of orders and commands on the one hand, and the weaker degree of suggestions, advice, and recommendations on the other hand (cf. also Leech 1983: 175). Clearly, this account may hold for Standard American English requests, but not necessarily for requests in other languages and cultures, as Wierzbicka (1991: 32) rightly points out. For our purposes, though, we can still use this account as a background, because German and Italian do not substantially deviate from English (but cf. below 3.5.10.2.2, 3.5.10.4.2, 3.5.10.4.3.1-3.5.10.4.3.2). In general, though, "English is fond of understatement and of hedges" (Wierzbicka 1991: 44, contrasting Polish) much more than Italian or German are. Requests belong to impositive directives characterized by Haverkate (1990: 94) as those that "are performed by the speaker to influence the intentional behavior of the hearer in order to get the latter to perform, primarily for the benefit of the speaker, the action directly specified or indirectly suggested by the proposition" (cf. also Bach-Harnish 1979: 180). 3.5.10.2.1. Modifications of the illocutionary force of directives in general, and of requests in particular, are envisaged by Searle—Vanderveken (1985: 71—73) in a very simple way: the strength of the illocutionary point and of the sincerity conditions may come in different degrees, and

Data and their interpretation

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231

an in/decrease by one point generates a new illocutionary force, as in the English illocutionary verbs to order - to request — to beg which express illocutionary forces whose strength differs by one point. In/decrease refers to either strength of sincerity conditions or of illocutionary point or both. 258 Noteworthy is Hübler's (1983: 14) elaboration of decrease of illocutionary strength in terms of "the extent to which the speaker, confident in his expectation of receiving ratification of his formulation from the hearer, is prepared to expose the sentence to the risk of non-ratification." 3.5.10.2.2. Fraser (1980 and elsewhere, cf. Caffi 1990: 182-183) has concentrated on decrease of illocutionary force in the form of mitigation, defined as a strategy for softening or reducing the strength of a speech act whose effects are unwelcome to the hearer. This he differentiates from hedging and politeness. He motivates mitigation as being either self-serving (egoistic) as often in requests (cf. our notion of interest in 3.5.10.1, 1 b) above) or altruistic (which, obviously, is marginal in requests). Among the mitigation devices he considers, we may mention indirect speech acts (instead of direct ones), "immediacy" — which corresponds rather closely to empathy (cf. 3.4.4.9, 3.5.7) - disclaimers (e. g., prefacing "If I'm not wrong"), hedging adverbs. But the specific English means of indirectness must not be generalized to other languages (cf. Wierzbicka 1991: 33). 3.5.10.2.3. Based on Searle (1976), Holmes (1984) integrates mitigation into a wider repertoire of pragmatic strategies serving weakening (attenuating) or strengthening of illocutionary force, independent of whether the speech act has a negative or positive evaluation. 259 Although she does not mention any morphological device among her "downtoners" (devices for decreasing illocutionary force), one of her English examples (p. 347) can be rendered by diminutives in diminutive-rich languages like Italian (201'b): (205) a. You are pretty —» b. You are kind of pretty in a way. (205') a. Sei bella. —1> Sei bell-ina. you are pretty you are pretty-DIM For collection of downgrading and mitigation devices cf. Venier (1991) and Blum-Kulka-House-Kasper (1989), who distinguish (p. 283) understates, hedges, downtoners, and cajolers, again without mentioning diminutives.

232

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3.5.10.2.4. Next we must check whether and how the politeness theory has contributed to the pragmatics of diminutives. As an example we take the most fully articulated model (according to Fraser 1990: 235) — and the most often used one, viz. the "face-saving" model of Brown-Levinson (1987). A "kernel idea" of Brown—LeVinson's politeness theory (1987: 24) is "that some acts are intrinsically threatening to face and thus require 'softening'". Their paradigmatic example is requests (p. 25). 260 In their sub-chapter on negative politeness (p. 129), Brown-Levinson (1987) discuss several means for minimizing conceivable face-threatening acts. Especially interesting for our argument is hedging via "weakeners". A hedge is an element "that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set" (p. 145). Weakeners are hedges "that soften or tentativize what they modify ... in one way or another they all indicate something about the speaker's commitment toward what he is saying, and in so doing modify the illocutionary force" (p. 147). In this connection, Brown-Levinson (1987: 335) also mention diminutives, but in fact they only discuss hypocoristics (see below) or adverbs (or adjectives) such as Tzeltal 9ala 'a little, a bit, sort of, a mere', which, they maintain, has hedging functions related to modifications of performative force (p. 157). An example presented by the authors is a request for permission by a daughter who wants to take a course (?ala kurso) in San Cristobal. In languages such as Spanish, Italian or German, the same weakening effect could be aptly entrusted to a diminutive suffix (e. g., It. cors-ino). Also what the authors call (p. 166) "Quantity hedges" (in reference to Grice's maxim), such as "roughly, more or less, approximately, to some extent, somewhat, so-so", may be used to achieve effects obtained via diminutives in other languages. Brown-Levinson (1987) also mention other ways of "negative-face redress", that is, strategies that have the effect of non-coercing the hearer's response (p. 172). One strategy is being pessimistic about the hearer's likelihood to perform the action requested (p. 173). Also diminutives may serve this strategy, as in the indirect request made in a fruit-shop late on a Saturday afternoon: (206)

Ha qualche cilieg-ina rimasta? Have you any cherry-DIM left 'Have you by any chance got any cherries left?'

where the diminutive may contribute to expressing the speaker's pessimism about obtaining the desired fruit. What is weakened here, is obvi-

Data and their interpretation

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233

ously not the fruit but the request (the cherries being the only possible landing-site), and this in correspondence to the very low expectations signaled by the speaker. Such "pessimism" may be other than redressive politeness, in the sense that it may express an actual pessimistic view quite bluntly notified. In this case, it results in impoliteness. Diminutives are ruled out with this type of pessimism. Another strategy of negative politeness is to minimize the imposition on the addressee (p. 177) by using expressions of this type (p. 177, n. 258): (207)

Just a sec(ond) = Solo un secondotsecond-ino! (Italian) only a second(-DIM)

All the examples of Tzeltal ?ala given (p. 177) can be rendered by diminutives in Italian and many in German (more in 3.10.4.3.2). Diminutives are also applicable to positive politeness. According to Brown-Levinson (1987: 100), "the appreciation of alter's wants in general or ... the expression of similarity between ego's and alter's wants" should be intended by this. The success of this overt politeness strategy is based on the assumption that sharing wants with the speaker is actually also the hearer's desire, which is often not the case. Brown-Levinson's only mention of "diminutives" is actually restricted to hypocoristics as address forms used as "in-group identity markers" (p. 107). Diminutives, however, may at large be seen as in-group identity markers that fall into the sphere of our notions of familiarity, intimacy, and decreased psychological distance (see 3.5.8). Besides being indices of social closeness, diminutives may also function as "accelerators" of intimacy among strangers (cf. Brown-Levinson 1987: 103 and our sections 3.5.2.6, 3.5.8.8). Other positive politeness strategies for claiming common ground between speaker and hearer also served by diminutives are strategies for seeking agreement or avoiding disagreement (p. 112, cf. below 3.5.11.2.1.1 — 3.5.11.2.1.2, 3.5.11.2.4.1) and joking (p. 124, cf. our section 3.5.5). Next we have to mention Brown-Levinson's (1987: 125) techniques for conveying the idea that speaker and hearer are cooperators. Here we can refer to our discussion of cooperativeness in 1.5.3. For example, cooperativeness, in terms of achieving common goals by joint action of speaker and hearer, tends to involve positive politeness strategies. These may be used, for both real and fictive common goals, as in Brown— Levinson (1987: 125), to smooth the way towards cooperation. Diminutives can be a smoothing element, for example, in the strategic attempt

234

Diminutives

at including both speaker and hearer in the activity. A Viennese example is: (208)

Komm, setzen wir uns zu einem kleinem come let set we us for a little Tratsch-erl! Plausch-erl! chat-DIM 'Come, let's sit down for a nice little chat!'

The final positive politeness strategy mentioned by Brown-Levinson (1987: 129) is to "give gifts to Η (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)". Diminutives may again contribute to this strategy, as in: (209)

Vieni dalla tua zi-etta che ti dä un bac-ino! come to the your aunt-DIM that ye give a kiss-DIM 'Come on over to your auntie so she can give you a kiss!'

This is a "gift" the child addressed may not be interested in. Even more important to our argument is Brown-Levinson's (1987: 211) classification included in their sub-chapter on communicative acts done "off record", that is, "done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute one clear communicative intention to the act". Off-record actions are intrinsically face-saving for both speaker and hearer because the degree of pragmatic opacity which allows the speaker to escape responsibility for the face-threatening act, gives the hearer an option not to respond. So, technically, off-record actions do not require redress. They are produced as (covertly) mitigated face-threatening acts. Their also being felicitous acts depends on the speaker's ability to invest correctly in politeness, that is, to trade off between costs to himself and hearer's benefits in that specific context. But it also depends on the hearer's capacity and willingness to make the correct inferences and get the "politeness message" (cf. Grice's implicatures, as discussed in 1.7.6). Although Brown-Levinson never specifically refer to diminutives or semantically related elements, they provide a frame for uncommittal acts to which the diminutive may aptly contribute via its feature [non-serious]. Brown-Levinson classify off-record strategies according to violations of specific Gricean maxims and consequent implicatures (cf. 1.7.6, 3.4.6.9). Diminutives do not seem to be especially involved in violations of the Relevance Maxim (e.g., when giving only hints instead of fullyfledged semantic or pragmatic meanings). They are, however, pertinent

Data and their interpretation

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235

in case of violations of the Quantity Maxim ("Say as much as and no more than is required!"), as in the case with understatements (Brown Levinson 1987: 217, see below 3.5.13). Diminutives are also involved in violations of the Quality Maxim ("Be sincere!"), as with irony (p. 221, see below 3.5.14). Finally, diminutives are involved in violating the Manner Maxim (p. 225), insofar as they may contribute to vagueness (p. 226) by decreasing the degree of precision (see below 3.5.10.4.1.1). In Brown and Levinson's (1987) account (as in Leech's 1983), politeness responds to a personal need shared by all individuals - face-saving and maintenance of good social relationships — whose pursuit constitutes sufficient motivation for deviating from Grice's conversational maxims, face-saving being more important than efficient conversation. 261 In conclusion we may say, first of all, that Brown-Levinson's (1987) politeness theory may be extended to cover many uses of diminutives, but only if a model of diminutive meanings is provided which renders the two theories compatible and complementary. Our model of diminutives is eligible for that, since it provides the denotative meaning of [smallness] relevant for the use of diminutives as weakeners, the pragmatic meaning of [non-seriousness] relevant for off-record uses, and other pertinent conditions such as those referring to familiarity. Second we must justify our cautious use of Brown—Levinson's (1987) model in our analyses to follow. This is due to the fact that this model is basically anglocentric. This bias has been criticized and discussed by many authors (cf. Kasper 1990: 194), most forcefully by Wierzbicka (1991: 67). For example, avoidance of imposition via negative politeness strategies is much less important for Italian and German than for English speech acts, even directives. 262 3.5.10.2.5. Other politeness theories 263 seem to be less respondent to our purposes, and none appears to have been applied to diminutives. Moreover, their categories can be easily translated into the categories we use in this book. For example, Leech's (1983) sympathy maxim is covered by our categories of sympathy and empathy (cf. 3.5.7); his tact maxim is covered by the notion of imposition of obligations (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2); for his modesty maxim, see 3.5.13. Whether politeness strategies (negative politeness) are implicated as redressive actions, as in Brown-Levinson (1987), or anticipated as a set of conversational principles as in Leech (1983), or contextually negotiated as in Fraser (1990 and earlier), they are generally seen as relating to a general modality of minimization (Held 1989: 168; cf. also Held's

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Diminutives

constrasting notion of maximization). Minimization naturally links with illocutionary-force downgrading techniques such as hedging, mitigation, and meiosis. But it is not to be equated with them (cf. Fraser 1990) nor is it necessarily enacted by the same linguistic means. For example, mitigation may also be motivated by other goals (e.g., saving the hearer unduly strong emotion). And politeness, on the other hand, may be arrived at via different routes (e. g., explicit apologies). This is why the use of downgraders — and of diminutives among them — may or may not be related to politeness. Although, of course, they show a strong bias towards it. We may use the same argument against a downright equation of certain positive politeness strategies of maximization (e. g., in effusive compliments or expression of gratitude) with the use of upgraders - again including diminutives, and of course augmentatives and intensifiers (cf. chapter 4) - suited as these may appear for such a job. In relation to maximizing techniques for politeness, caution is due because many crosscultural differences are attested, as demonstrated by the literature on compliments (see Kasper 1990: 199). There seems to be more likelihood of a generalized use of maximizing techniques - and thus for politeness based on maximization - in Italian than in British English (cf. Hübler 1983), for example, where emphasis contrasts with the opposite tendency of this ethnicity towards restraining affect of any kind. The same difference holds between Polish and English, according to Wierzbicka (1991: 44). On Greek diminutives marking "the interaction as positively polite", that is, by "showing solidarity" or "affectionate concern", see Sifianou (1992: 159). 3.5.10.2.6. The morphopragmatics of Italian and German diminutives finds some parallel in the use of the Japanese particle tyotto 'a little, a bit', as described by Matsumoto (1985, 1990). She regards tyotto as a lexical hedge which qualifies speech acts in terms of mitigation, such as in: (210)

Ano tyotto o-sio kudasai. um a little HON-salt give 'Um, give me a little salt, please.'

This may correspond to Italian: (210')

Potrei avere un poch-ino di sale, perfavore? could I have a bit-DIM of salt please 'Could I have a pinch of salt, please?'

Data and their interpretation

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237

A less formal, that is, more familiar version (which may sound jocular, ironic, or childish) would be: (210")

Potrei avere un po' di sal-ino, perfavore? could I have a bit of salt-DIM please 'Could I have a teensy pinch of salt, please?'

Pragmatic notions referred to by Matsumoto (1985, 1990) in relation to the use of tyotto are: weakening of the force of the speech act, lightening of the addressee's obligation, minimizing of the significance of the speech act, lowering of the speaker's status, and finally indirectness and hesitancy. The notion of non-seriousness is conveyed by paraphrases such as the performative expressions: "I'm asking you just a small question, so that you don't have to take this too seriously. This is not important, but I'll tell you anyway, since you may want to know it." As we are going to see in 3.5.10.4, these are all categories involved in speech act modifications via diminutives. But in Italian, non-seriousness is associated with jocularity or irony, which seems to be avoided with Jap. tyotto. 3.5.10.3. Merlini Barbaresi (1983: 53-54, 71-72) dealt with modification of speaker's epistemic commitment and consequent modification of assertive force. But we prefer to refer to the most complete and systematic study so-far, that is, Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä (1990) elaborating on how illocutionary force of speech acts can be modified, in terms of upgrading and downgrading of strength. 264 Devices for downgrading are called downgraders, and diminutives are subsumed under these downgraders. According to their definition, "a device will be classified as a downgrader ... on the basis of a comparison, in the given context, between the speech act actually performed by the aid of the device under examination and an hypothetical speech act not containing that device." 265 According to the minimalist understanding of morphopragmatics (cf. 3.4.5), a) diminutives have the denotational meaning [small]; b) this meaning can be applied to the speech act as a downgrader of the illocutionary strength; c) diminutives should, automatically, downgrade all dimensions of an illocutionary force that can be downgraded; d) this downgrading should be identical in all languages that have a productive rule of diminutive formation, except that 1) lexical-base restrictions might distinguish diminutive use in different languages; 2) competi-

238

Diminutives

tion between diminutive formation and other downgraders might differ, 3) the frequency of use might differ as well. According to our maximalist understanding of morphopragmatics, the general strategies of downgrading cannot be automatically applied to the use of diminutives in order to predict or explain the way diminutives modify the illocutionary force of speech acts. On the contrary, there should be diminutive uses that are systematically different from other morphological or non-morphological downgrading devices. Moreover, it is the morphopragmatic feature [non-serious] which is applied to the speech act. Finally, languages may differ systematically in the morphopragmatics of diminutives. 3.5.10.4. Let us now compare these two alternative approaches in regard to the speech act of request (as defined in 3.5.10.1-3.5.10.2), with Italian, Viennese German, and Argentinian Spanish 266 examples. For the dimensions of downgrading, we will use Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa's (1990) numbering. 3.5.10.4.1.1. According to Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä (1990), "indeterminacy of propositional content weakens the performed illocutionary act." Diminutives as downgraders are expected to increase indeterminacy (or decrease precision) of propositional content. This prediction is fulfilled for the use of diminutives with measures, as in 3.4.1.2 (70): (211)

Facciaun chil-etto! Make a kilo-DIM 'Give me about/roughly a kilo!'

Compare this with: (212)

Aspettami Wart' auf mich wait for me 'I'll be an hour

un' or-etta vs. un' oral ein Stünd-chen vs. eine Stunde! an hour-DIM vs. an hour or so vs. an hour!'

(212')

Espera un minut-ito vs. un minutol (Spanish) wait a minute-DIM 'Wait a minute!'

(please see Lichtenberg's aphorism, the motto of chapter 3). A constraint on lexical allosemy will restrict this effect, among nouns, to lexical bases denoting measures (cf. 3.4.1.2). For adjectives, see 3.4.1.1.

Data and their interpretation

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239

Also It. un bei poch-ino 'a nice little-DIM' increases imprecision of un beipo' 'a good bit', as in: (213)

Ne vorrei un bei poch-ino, questa volta. of it I'd like a nice bit-DIM this time 'I'd like a fair bit this time.'

The feature [non-serious], however, would do the same job as the feature [small] by making the standards fuzzy (cf. 3.4.6). And this fuzziness becomes directly relevant for measures in terms of decrease of precision (cf. 3.4.2). In addition, there is a pragmatic effect which is not accounted for by any of Bazzanella-Caffi—Sbisä's dimensions: the diminutive may introduce into the transactional type of discourse (requests in service encounters) an element of interactional discourse (cf. 3.5.6.4). According to Algerian and Moroccan informants, this is true as well for Magreb Arabic diminutives used in business transactions in bazars and in many shops. There, these transactions of buying and selling, conventionally, contain elements of interactional discourse, accompanying offers of socializing. All this is appropriate environment for diminutives. Moreover, the diminutive may be involved even in another phase of the art of buying and selling, namely negotiation of the final price. Here diminutivization of the object involved in the buyer's request of the type "Show me/Give me X!" is to be expected as a strategic means for downgrading the value of the merchandise wanted (cf. 3.5.4.1.2) and so make a price reduction plausible. In Western societies, however, such speech situations generally lack the ingredient of interactional discourse and also the possibility of price reductions. And where sizeable price reductions are possible, as in banking, these transactions are defined as too serious for allowing the use of diminutives. This is another instance of culturespecific constraints in morphopragmatics. For Latvian diminutives cf. Rüke-Dravina (1959: 139). Again, Italian has ampler possibilities than German for using diminutives even here, especially if there is some familiarity between bank manager and customer. Thus the following request format is perfectly conceivable: (214)

Ε allora, non sarebbe possibile un prestito di un and now not would be possible a loan of one milion-c-ino di dollari? milion-DIM of dollars 'Well then, wouldn't there be any chance of a million dollar loan?'

240

(215)

Diminutives

Ε allora, non sarebbe il caso di farmi una and now not would be the case of make-me a riduzion-c-ina almeno sulle spese? reduction-DIM at least on the expenses 'Well, then, wouldn't it be reasonable to give me some sort of reduction, at least on the expenses?'

Due to the non-serious (ludic) character attached to the diminutive, both requests sound slightly nonchalant, and would be used to downgrade the embarrassment of a request (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3). And indeterminacy as derived from fictiveness (inherent in the feature [non-serious]) may be compared with Austin's (1970: 271) specification of "pretending" as involved in "not exactly doing things". In an alternative account, all the main effects discussed above are also derivable from pragmatic opacity induced by off-record strategies (cf. 3.5.10.2.4). 3.5.10.4.1.2. Another dimension from Bazzanella-Caffi—Sbisä is diminution of propositional content. This is a trivial application to speech acts of the most common morphosemantic denotation of diminutives, [smallness], and should be handled in analogy to 3.5.10.4.1.1. 267 Here, the local character of diminution becomes most evident, that is, diminution just refers to the base, and can be replaced by the analytic construction 'small X'. 2 6 8 3.5.10.4.2. The next relevant notion is expressed inner states. "The expression of inner states is downgraded if linguistic ... devices hinder the foregrounding of the speaker's inner states where the context and/or the discourse topic would make it appropriate to expect its occurrence" (Bazzan e l l a - C a f f i - S b i s ä 1990). An example has been discussed in 3.4.5.3 (96) interpretation 3). One way of downgrading is to use off-record strategies (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1). Diminutives never exert this downgrading effect on "affectively coloured inner states" (as Bazzanella—Caffi-Sbisä 1990 call emotions). In fact, diminutives may highlight emotions (cf. 3.5.6), as BazzanellaC a f f i - S b i s ä themselves recognize. Diminutives also highlight another type of inner state, viz. empathy (cf. 3.5.7), cf. also 3.5.10.4.3.1. Wierzbicka (1991: 52) correctly insists that Polish requests are much more likely to be accompanied by expression of emotions than English ones. German and, even more so, Italian here align with Polish rather than with English. The same holds for culture-specific inhibitions from expressing emotions in general (cf. Wierzbicka 1991: 121).

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

241

3.5.10.4.3.1. "Power (authority, capacity ...) that entitles the speaker to perform the illocutionary act." "The downgrading of this dimension consists in a lowering of the speaker's power" (Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä 1990).269 This downgrading of the speaker's entitlement for requesting is quite obvious in (216 b) as opposed to (216 a): (216) a. Pud venire un momento? b. un moment-ino? can come a moment a moment-DIM 'Can you come over for (b. just) a moment?' (216a) is likely to be said by a superior to a subordinate (e.g., employee), 270 whereas (216 b) is more suited among equals (cf. also KunstGnamus 1991: 52). In French, where no diminutives are available for this purpose, the adjective petit 'small' produces the same effect as the diminutive in (216 b): (216')

Voulez-vous venir pour un (petit) instant? want you come for a (little) moment

Example (216 a) may count as an indirect speech act of ordering, whereas (216 b) hardly would. Does this mean that a diminutive is able to transcategorize a speech act, that is, to downgrade its illocutionary strength to such a degree as to change an illocutionary force of strength η into a different, weaker one, whose strength is n-ΙΊ (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 99). This does not actually appear to be the case. For example, if the order (216 a") is transformed into (216 b") the speech act in (216 b") remains an order, even if a mitigated one. (216") a. Venga come b. Venga come

un a un a

momento! moment moment-ino! moment-DIM

On the other hand, (216 a) is, in formal situations, a formula to express an order, albeit indirect, whereas (212 b), due to the addition of the diminutive, can hardly be used as a formula and recovers its default interpretability as an indirect request. More normal in Italian is the unmodalised question format:

242

Diminutives

(216) c. Viene un momento? Do you [polite] come a moment

d. moment-ino? moment-DIM

where the diminutive is performing the same downgrading on the request as seen above. A similar downgrading effect (although in a situation of greater familiarity between the interlocutors) is required for Viennese (217 a) vs. (217 b): (217)

Könntest Du could you Moment-erl moment-DIM

bitte (a) einen Moment (b) ein please a moment a kommen? come

Here, diminutives are secondary means for modalizing the request, whereas syntactic and lexical means are primary. 271 The downgrading effect of diminutives occurs independently of primary means of modalizing, for example, even if we substitute an imperative in (216), (217), or an indicative in (217), or if we exchange the modal verbs in (216), (217), or if we add hedges such as "I wonder if, If it's not too much trouble, If you don't mind" etc., cf. Fraser (1980); Bazzanella-CafTi-Sbisa (1990); Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi (1989 b: 242). If a subordinate addresses a superior with the request in (216), he must choose a more indirect way, as in: (216) e. Potrei chieder-Le di venire un momento (moment-ino)? could I ask-you to come a moment(-DIM)? where the speaker has introduced a performative verb and has changed modal verb and mood. The indirect way used here signals the low degree of entitlement of the speaker to make a request. The diminutive adds to that by further downgrading such entitlement. Like the primary means of modalizing, diminutives may also affect the degree of politeness (cf. 3.5.10.2 above). An example of a ludicly exaggerated polite request is in Johann Nestroy's comedy Lumpazivagabundus I, 10 (painter to rich client):

Data and their interpretation — Requests

(218)

243

Wenn es gefälligst wäre, mir noch gütigst if it pleasant-SUPERL were me still kindly-SUPERL auf ein Viertelstünd-chen die Ansicht Ihrer for a quarter hour-DIM the view of your höchst interessanten Physiognomie zu verstatten? highly-SUPERL interesting physiognomy to grant 'Would your Lordship be pleased to be so kind as to grant my having a view of your most interesting physiognomy for a tiny quarter hour?'

The politeness effects of the indirect question, of the three superlative forms of adverbs referring to the addressee, and of the lexical choice are further increased by the diminutive of time measure. There are, however, formal situations where politeness requirements do actually block the use of a diminutive. One factor that politeness must take into account is familiarity vs. non-familiarity. Whenever the use of the diminutive is linked to the presence of familiarity and intimacy, then the absence of familiarity/intimacy automatically blocks its use in very formal speech situations. The following (b) and (c) variants illustrate the presence vs. absence of familiarity and intimacy: (219)

(220)

Posso avere un (a) caffä (b) caffe-t-ino (c) un can I have a (a) coffee (b) coffee -DIM (c) a caffe? coffee 'May I have a coffee/a little/a teensy little coffee?' Posso chieder-Le (a) un piacere? (b) piacer-ino? can I ask you (a) a favor? (b) favor-DIM? piacere? favor? 'May I ask you a favor?/a small/a little favor?'

po' di bit of

(c) piccolo (c) small

The (a) variants suit any speech situation. But if the speaker wants to downgrade his request in terms of low degree of authority, he will use the (b) forms in relatively informal situations (e. g., to a friend). In a very formal situation, only recourse to the (c) variants is conceivable. A radical type of downgrading of the speaker's power is the beggars' diminutive, 272 as in:

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(221) a. Ha qualche spicciol-ino? you have some change-DIM 'Have you got any coppers?' b. Mi dia dei sold-ini! vs. c. dei soldi! me give a few coins-DIM 'Give me some (b: loose) cash!' The simplex soldi in (221 c) might sound rather arrogant — or even threatening (provided the intonation changes accordingly), which would not be the case with a simplex spicciololi in (221 a) because the semantic denotation of the lexical item already refers to an excessively small amount of money (that is, the beggar would not be satisfied, if he just received "some change"). Like (221c), simplicia would be unacceptable in Argentine Spanish (222): (222) a. Derne un pedaz-ito de pan! give me a piece-DIM of bread 'Give me a little piece of bread!' b. Derne una moned-ita! give me a coin-DIM 'Give me some loose money!' In German, however, diminutives are excluded because of lack of intimacy between beggars and passers-by (cf. 3.5.8.3). Other languages even allow beggars to make direct ("bold") requests (cf. Brown-Levinson 1987: 96). (221c) is ambiguous in isolation. It may count (with appropriate changes of prosody and in the appropriate situation) either as an order (e.g., when uttered by a menacing robber) or as a request (e.g., in a transaction) or, with a pleading intonation, as begging. Such transformations of illocutionary force (shifting of one speech act to another) cannot be obtained by the mere adding of a diminutive suffix. In fact, the diminutivized version (221 b) may just make the expression of begging more appropriate or may count as a jocular request in transactions (clash between familiar diminutive and formal third person form). With an order, the diminutive in (221 b) is incompatible, unless with a sarcastic intention. In all these cases, our feature [non-serious] obviously functions at least as efficiently as the feature [small] that a minimalist understanding of morphopragmatics would have to assume. But there is a problem for the

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minimalist hypothesis. The various downgraders do not work in exactly the same way, e. g., diminutives, question instead of imperative (or subjunctive with imperative value), conditional instead of indicative, etc. For example, when changing the subjunctive-imperative construction in (221 c) into an indicative interrogative as in: (221) d. Mi da dei soldi? me give a few coins 'Give me some money?' the entitlement of the speaker would be less downgraded than by replacing (221 c) with (221 b). And (221 b) would fit a pleading intonation better than (221 d). Now let us contrast downgrading of (221 d) through conditional (221 e) vs. diminutive (221 f): (221) e. Mi darebbe dei soldi? f. Mi da dei sold-ini? me would give a few coins me give a few coins-DIM 'Would you give some (f: loose) money?' Again, (221 e) downgrades entitlement less than (221 f). Moreover, whereas (221 f) perfectly suits a beggar's pleading attitude, (221 e) fits a more detached attitude, for example, of a drug addict. The detached attitude of (221 e) implies greater psychological distance between the interlocutors than (221), cf. 3.5.7-3.5.8. We can perhaps go as far as saying that non-compliance would be less face-threatening for the requester in (221 e) than in (221 f)· Finally, let us contrast downgrading of (221 d) through the diminutive in (221 f) with downgrading through adverbial un po' 'a bit, a few': (221) g. Mi da un po' di soldi? me give a bit of money Again, there is less downgrading in (221 g) than in (221 f) and greater psychological distance. So, we may conclude that the other downgraders considered do not work in the same way as diminutives. Entitlement to the request seems to be downgraded the most via diminutives. This might derive from the fact that diminutives are most adequate for the beggar's attempt to reduce psychological distance and so move the requestee to pity. Because of this appeal to the requestee's feelings, the force of the request rests

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even less on the entitlement of the requester. The beggar's pleading behavior is supported by the fact that the diminutive upgrades the expression of inner states (cf. 3.5.10.4.2), which the alternative forms considered do not do. In trying to apply Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa's (1990) descriptive model, we have realized that other criteria have been neglected, which we believe are relevant. One concerns the twofold nature of the speaker's power/ entitlement. The speaker's power falls into 1) social power and 2) contextual entitlement. Further complexity (3) is added when 1) or 2) is artificially modified. 1) Social power (in the sense of S's position of power or authority over H, as in Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 15), again, may mean different things: 1 a) Social power deriving from a predetermined higher (or lower) status role. As we have seen in our examples (216 a) vs. (216 d), (218), (221), (222), the subordinate but not the superior role may induce the use of the diminutive (with intervening regulative factors discussed above). 1 b) Social power deriving from a position role. For example, in service encounters in Italy, where, in general, the client is considered to be the master of the situation, 273 the client is not expected to use the diminutive (but see below c). Conversely, in the case of the wife adopting the cliche role of the "weak" female requesting something from the "strong" male, her subordinate position role may favor the use of diminutives. 1 c) Social power deriving from having a strong (dominant) personality, if confronted with a "weak" personality, that is, relative to the personalities involved in the specific encounter. Again, a position of superior strength disfavors the use of diminutives and vice-versa. 2) Contextual entitlement of the speaker is his contextual justification (other than social power) for performing the specific speech act. 2 a) The speaker may feel a stronger right to request if it is evident to both speaker and hearer that all the preparatory conditions are clearly met. Expectedly, this disfavors the use of diminutives. But if, for example, it is not so evident that the addressee can perform the requested action, then the diminutive may be used to signal downgraded entitlement, cf. our discussion of speaker's pessimism in 3.5.10.2.4 (with example (206)). Similarly, if it is rather obvious that the addressee will do the action on his own accord but the speaker, in violation of the second preparatory condition (3.5.10.1.b.2), puts the request, he may use the diminutive to signal downgraded entitlement. In other words, speaker's entitlement is downgraded (via diminutives) when a preparatory condition is deficiently met. So, less contextual entitlement, like less social power (1 above), favors diminutive use.

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2 b) The non-obviousness of the action to be performed (the second preparatory condition above), however, may obtain quite the opposite effect on the speaker's entitlement. If the addressee appears unlikely to perform the action (in the sense that it is out of the normal course of events on that occasion), the speaker may feel less entitled to put the request and may signal his lower entitlement with a diminutive. We will discuss such cases under the heading "obligations" (3.5.10.4.3.2). 3) The picture becomes still more complex when we consider artificial modification of social power or contextual entitlement. The speaker may pretend to have a lower social status role (1 a above), for example as a strategy towards positive politeness, and use a diminutive for this, as in example (216b). Lowering of position roles (1 b above) via diminutives seems more difficult to obtain. If a shop client uses a diminutive in his request, surely he does not mean to lower his position role (unless he is such a weak personality as to be unable to assume a dominant role, cf. 1 c above). Rather, he may want to introduce interactional discourse, as in (176), (179) in 3.5.8, cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3 (231). A dominant personality ( l c above) may also want to disguise his strength for strategic reasons. For example, in the TV serial centered on the extremely efficient police detective commissario Colombo, Colombo often disguises his superior intelligence and determination by lowering both his commitment and his entitlement through the production of indirect requests or presequences to requests of the type: (223) a. Ah, c' e anche uri altra piccola cos-etta che devo oh there's also one other little thing-DIM that I must chiederle. ask you O h , there's one other little query I have to ask you.' b. Avrei ancora un problem-ino. I'd have still a problem-DIM 'I'd still have a little problem.' In the specific sequences mentioned, the respective addressees of (223 a, b) later described the detective as quel buffo om-etto 'that funny little man', which proves that the downgrading had been obtained. As to strategic manipulation of contextual entitlement (2 above), the speaker may pretend that a preparatory condition is not adequately met (2 a above). A case in point is strategic pessimism, where diminutives may be used under certain circumstances (see 3.5.10.2.4, 3.5.8.5 example (179)). Another case is when the speaker pretends to share the addressee's

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belief that the action cannot be performed. For example, elderly persons often claim inabilities and are induced to action by their care-takers who first pretend to acknowledge such inabilities and then tentatively (and with low entitlement) request action, as in: (224)

Non vuoi fare due pass-etti anche tu, ο sei not like you make two steps-DIM also you or you're troppo stanca? too tired 'Don't you want to go for a little walk too, or are you too tired?'

As we will see in 3.5.10.4.4.1, actual and pretended downgrading have quite different effects on the achievement of the perlocutionary goal. In general, we may conclude that, in order to give an explanatory account of the pragmatic effects of diminutives, we had to have recourse to a finer descriptive grid than that provided by Bazzanella—Caffi-Sbisä (1990). 3.5.10.4.3.2. "Obligations assigned to the addressee". The downgrading of such obligations is essential to politeness requirements (cf. Held 1989 on vagueness strategies). Take, for example, the following request by a wife to her husband:

(225)

Copiami una (a) pagina (b) pagin-etta del testo sul put me a page page-DIM of the text on the computer, per favor el computer please 'Put a page (b: this little page) of text into the computer for me, please!' G. Schreib mir bitte ein Stück(-chen) Text! write me please a piece(-DIM) text (e. g., on the PC). (226) Dame (a) un pucho! / (b) un puch-ito! (Spanish) give me a cigarette a cigarette-DIM a. 'Give me a cigarette!' b. 'Can you spare a cigarette?' Compare Kurt Tucholsky's often cited request (Klimaszewska 1983: 59): (227)

Gib mir mal 'η Zigarett-chen! give me PART a cigarette-DIM 'Can you spare a cigarette?'

where the modal particle mal is another downgrades

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249

Obligation imposed on the addressee 274 has at least the following two interpretations: A) the general obligation to perform the requested act according to the modal role the requestee is assigned by the requester, which is independent of the social relations between them. The degree of importance of this obligation depends both on the propositional content of the request and on the strength of its illocutionary force; 275 B) the politeness obligation to avoid non-compliance, which varies with the relationship between speaker and addressee. This includes social roles, psychological distance, degree of cooperativeness/antagonism, type of speech situation, general, culture-specific social norms. If obligation (B) is downgraded, non-compliance becomes easier for the addressee. The same effect obtains, if the speaker downgrades obligation (A) by reducing the strength of his request (case A 1). But if the speaker downgrades obligation (A) by reducing the burden of the task requested (propositional content), compliance with the task is naturally eased (case A 2). The reducing of the burden may actually be only pretended and used by the speaker as a strategy for cajoling the addressee into acceptance. Whether both obligations are downgraded in parallel or not, depends on the scenarios and the types of request made. In (225 b), the diminutive would normally reduce the burden of the task requested (effect A 2), that is, the task is presented as being a comparatively easy one. This leaves less room for not complying than would be the case with a more difficult task (consequence of A 2). On the other hand, the feature [non-serious] attached to the request via the diminutive acts towards lessening the social sanction of a refusal (effects A 1 and B). This conflict between the conjoined effect of ( A l ) and (B) on the one hand and the consequence of effect (A 2) on the other may be resolved in favor of (A 1 and B), because the non-seriousness feature of the request may be taken up by the addressee, applied to obligations (A 1 and B) and exploited to say no in a ludic, non-sanctionable way. If we resume our examples (221 d) and (221 f), however, we see that in a different speech situation, downgrading of obligations may work in a different direction. As to effect (A 2) and its consequence relative to compliance, things are similar. But the difficulty to say no to a request is reinforced by the moral obligation imposed on the requestee by the personal relationship established by the beggar (less psychological distance) plus the social obligation imposed by the requestee's better economic position (both factors belonging to B). In contrast to (225)-(226), the beggar's speech act is certainly not ludic, that is, the feature [non-serious]

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does not work towards a ludic character of the speech-act but rather towards intimacy, although pretended. Presumably, intimacy is not easily accepted by the requestee, who, therefore, cannot exploit the [non-serious] feature for refusing in a non-sanctionable way. Moreover the addressee will rather not interpret the diminutive as reducing the strength of the beggar's request (A 1). And again, the other modalizing devices do not work in the same way as diminutives. Let us just compare conditional and diminutive, first in (225). (225) c. Mi copieresti una pagina del testo sul computer, me would you put a page of the text on the PC per favore? please 'Would you put a page of the text into the PC for me, please?' Würdest Du mir bitte eine Seite... schreiben? (German) would you me please a page write If we replace (225 a) with (225 c) the burden (in terms of task) put on the requestee (effect A 2 as above) is not reduced. The very polite way of putting the request, however, increases the social obligation of complying (effect B). A refusal would be possible but with the same degree of politeness, e. g., via prefacing apologies, explanations, etc. All this is very different from the picture we had with diminutives. Now, if we compare (221 e) and (221 f), again the conditional in (221 e), unlike the diminutive in (221 f), does not reduce the burden imposed (effect A 2). As to the obligation of effect (B), a non-compliance with (221 e) would be very easy indeed. This is mainly determined by the inappropriateness of such a request. The conditional works towards politeness but not towards reducing psychological distance. The social roles of the interlocutors in (221 e), therefore, remain insufficiently defined, and this leaves room for the requestee to find such a request for money totally unjustified and thus pragmatically inappropriate. Varying degrees of politeness in formulating requests affect the politeness obligation of compliance in a bell-shaped form. If the request is impolite (e. g., by lack of downgrading devices), it is easy to refuse compliance, as in: (225) d. Copiami una pagina del testo nel computer, däil put me a page of the text in the PC give 'Put a page of the text into the PC for me, come on!'

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

251

On the opposed pole, excessively polite, that is, pragmatically inappropriate formulations (such as 221 e) may also be refused compliance very easily. In between, there are, for the various speech situations, specific, most appropriate degrees of politeness, which render non-compliance difficult. The conditional is inappropriate in (221 e), but it is appropriate in (225 c). If, however, we add further politeness devices transforming (225 c) into: (225) e. Ti dispiacerebbe, per favore, magari, copiarmi una ye would displease please perhaps put me a pagina...? page 'Would you mind, please, perhaps putting a page...?' the requestee could easily say no, on the basis of the ironic and ludic character that the formulation would acquire in the specific speech situation. As to the effects of diminutives in relation to politeness, diminutives, again, function quite differently from other modalizing devices. Let us start with a diminutive variant of (225 d): (225) d'. Copiami una pagin-etta ..., däil Whereas (225 a, c) result in being more polite than (225 d) via the adoption of downgrading devices other than diminutives, the addition of the diminutive in (225 d') does not make it more polite than (225 d). What the diminutive does — besides downgrading the burden (effect A 2) - is adding a ludic element which makes impoliteness irrelevant. Therefore non-compliance based on impoliteness of request is no longer justified. If we add the diminutive to (225 c): (225) c'. Mi copieresti una pagin-etta ..., per favore? 'Would you copy a short/little page ... please?' the diminutive, again, does not render (225 c') more polite than (225 c), but has the same effects as the diminutive in (225 b) when added to (225 a). If we add the diminutive to (225 e), the main effect would be increased ludic character.

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These systematic comparisons between diminutives and other downgraders may suffice to show that they often operate along different parameters and have different pragmatic effects. This, once more, falsifies the minimalist view (cf. 3.4.5). In all cases the downgrading of the imposition stems from the non-seriousness feature attached to the speech act, cf. Brown-Levinson's (1987: 176) point on minimizing impositions: "One way of defusing the FTA [= face-threatening act] is to indicate that Rx [= rating of imposition], the intrinsic seriousness of the imposition, is not in itself great." Looking at what we have illustrated so far, we may say that, in general, diminutives contribute towards mitigating the imposition on the addressee (in terms of all obligations discussed). Viewed from a politeness perspective, this mitigation coincides with the negative part of Leech's (1983: 107, 119) "Tact Maxim", viz. minimizing addressee's costs. 276 Discussion of costs and benefits means stepping out of Bazzanella— Caffi-Sbisa's (1990) scheme, yet this subject must be taken up and is best dealt with in connection with obligations imposed on the addressee, because, as we have seen, these obligations clearly involve primary costs for the addressee. But we must also consider secondary benefits for the addressee and primary benefits and secondary costs for the speaker. 1) In uttering a request, the speaker calculates his own primary benefits against the (secondary) costs that may derive to him from the addressee's reactions (which we will consider under the heading of negative perlocutionary sequels in 3.5.10.4.4.2). By using the diminutive as in: (228)

Mi fai un piacer-ino? me do you a favor-DIM '(Can) you do me a little favor?'

the speaker downgrades his own benefits (he may actually want to disguise them), cf. below. 2) In hearing and processing a request, the addressee considers his primary costs (obligation A above) against the secondary social benefits he may derive from complying with the request (effects of fulfilling obligation Β above). He may analyze the diminutive as a signal of downgraded costs for himself, but also of downgraded potential benefits for himself. If we took the two calculations above to be the only ones relevant, we would reduce the notion of interaction to the primitive communication model which consists of sender, channel and receiver. In fact, there is a

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strong interdependence between the calculations of speaker and addressee. 3) The speaker in fact also calculates the addressee's costs and benefits, and the use of diminutives is strongly affected by the results of this calculation. For example, pagin-etta in (225 b) may be meant to minimize the evaluated costs to the addressee (also interpretable as a strategy of negative politeness, cf. 3.5.10.2.2 and 3.5.10.2.4 example (207)). Moment-ino in (216 b), when directed by a superior at a subordinate, may be meant to reduce the psychological distance between speaker and addressee and thus to offer the addressee the occasion for obtaining social benefits with comparatively little cost (cf. also Sifianou 1992: 161). The speaker may use this diminutive even as an accelerator of solidarity and intimacy, which in turn may work as a strategy in favor of the speaker's own benefits. As a last example let us take birr-etta (example (176) in 3.5.8.3). This diminutive may be meant to induce an empathetic response on the part of the waiter. This reducing of psychological distance works in favor of both speaker's and addressee's benefits. The latter are likely to be, for example, granting of intimacy and better chances that the customer will become a client. 277 4) But also the addressee calculates the speaker's benefits. For he is unlikely to comply with a whimsical/capricious request which does not imply adequate benefits to the requester, but which does imply costs to the requestee. Since diminutives are not minimizers (in the sense of 3.4.1.5), they will not be interpreted by the addressee as cancelling benefits to the speaker and they do not risk being understood as signals of a whimsical request. 5) The speaker calculates the addressee's calculating of the speaker's and his own benefits, while the addressee will vice-versa calculate the speaker's, and so on. In other words, speaker and addressee are conscious of each other's calculations, and this is the basis for a well-aimed, strategic use of diminutives. Our preceding discussion shows how difficult it is to carry out a separate analysis of the oppositions costs/benefits and speaker's entitlement (3.5.10.4.3.l)/addressee's obligations, because these concepts are clearly interdependent. More generally, we have to say that rights and duties are closely intertwined and this in distinct, culture-specific ways (cf. Kasper 1990: 204). Our discussion has also shown that often the speech act is too small a unit to be a frame for an explanatory account of diminutives (cf. 1.7.12.2). For this purpose, it is often necessary to look beyond into enac-

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tion sequences (in the sense of Ballmer-Brennenstuhl 1981: 24), into discourse as a whole, and into social interaction in general. But as a starting point, Bazzanella—Caffi-Sbisa (1990) offer a useful descriptive framework. 3.5.10.4.3.3. "Speaker's commitment: Commitment is considered here as the obligation ... that the speaker assumes through the performance of an illocutionary act. The upgrading/downgrading of commitment can affect either the strictness of the speaker's obligations or the size and importance of their content" (Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa 1990). This is applicable to requests insofar as speakers might be more or less committed to the sincerity condition (of wanting the addressee to do the respective act) or to the preparatory condition that the requested act is in the speaker's interest. Downgrading is obtained in such multiply hedged requests as: (229) a. Quasi quasi ti chiederei di comprarmi qualche almost almost ye I'd ask to buy me some mel-ina. apple-DIM 'I'm tempted to ask you to buy me an apple or two.' b. Ε se ti chiedessi di comprarmi qualche mel-ina? and if ye I asked to buy me some apple-DIM 'What if I asked you to buy me an apple or two?' c. Eigentlich wollte ich Dich um ein Apf-erl bitten. actually wanted I ye for an apple-DIM ask 'Actually I just wanted to ask you for an apple.' (German) Here the diminutive with its feature [small] or [non-serious] contributes to the downgrading of the illocutionary force, although to a lesser extent than the hedges. 278 Another example is 3.4.5.3 (96) interpretation 1). Clearly, off-record strategies (cf. 3.5.10.2.4) also downgrade the speaker's commitment. Diminutives can also achieve primary upgrading, but this is limited to the expression of inner states (cf. 3.5.10.4.2) and only secondarily has consequences for other scales, as (with a scolding or pleading intonation) in: (230)

Oh, ma devi comprarmi le mie (a) mele oh but you must buy me the my apples / (b) mel-ine! apples-DIM 'Oh, but you (b: really) must buy me my apples!'

Data and their interpretation

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Here the expression of the strong desire for the object is upgraded by the diminutive. Since a stronger wish has as a logical consequence a stronger commitment to the request for satisfaction, the expression of the first is also interpreted as the expression of the second. Therefore the hearer may interpret the diminutive in (230 b) as a sign of the speaker's upgraded commitment. Speaker's obligations, however, must be seen in a larger sense. First there is an interdependence of speaker's and addressee's obligations (as discussed in 3.5.10.4.3.2). Second the primary obligation undertaken by the speaker may entail a consequent obligation. Let us take a client asking for an object, as in (cf. 3.5.8.3 (176)): (231)

Ah, mi dia una (a)birra / (b) birr-etta! oh me give a beer beer-DIM O h , I'll have a (b: nice) beer!'

By requesting a beer, the client, by default, assumes the further obligation to accept and drink it, when the waiter brings it. Since the diminutive in (231 b) implies a more positive attitude than the simplex (231 a) does, the client upgrades this obligation via the diminutive. As a result he is less justified if he rejects it or drinks only part of it than he would be in case he had used just the simplex birra. A similar effect is obtained by uttering (232 b) rather than (232 a) in a department store: (232)

Vorrei un (a) vestito / (b) vestit-ino proprio originale. I'd like a dress dress-DIM really original 'I'd like a (b: nice) really unusual dress.'

This, again, is a case where the pragmatic effects of diminutives reach beyond the speech act into the whole enaction sequence (cf. BallmerBrennenstuhl 1981: 24). 3.5.10.4.4.1. "Strength of the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary object (goal) 279 ... This dimension is upgraded when the speaker emphasizes the perlocutionary object or uses some strategy in order to get the addressee to align her/himself with it; downgrading occurs when the speaker shows a lower-than-expected interest in the actual achievement of the perlocutionary object" (Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa 1990). Although this wording also seems to allow two alternative interpretations (A, B) of downgrading: A) The speaker S is really less inter-

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ested (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3); B) S pretends to be less interested; we suppose that the authors rather intend C): S makes the request with less strength, and this involves the choice of weaker strategies to obtain the perlocutionary goal, that is, to optimize the perlocutionary effect (cf. also Holly 1979; Hübler 1983: 23, 75). Now, if we look at a request for a favor, like: (233)

Fammi un (a) piacere / (b) piacer-ino! do me a favor favor-DIM 'Do me a (b: little) favor!'

then we immediately see that formulation (233 b) is weaker than formulation (233 a). The feature [non-serious] attached to the speech act via the diminutive has precisely this effect. On the other hand, (233 b) does not imply at all that (interpretation A) the speaker is less interested than in (233 a) in the actual achievement of the perlocutionary goal. In fact, (233 b) may be strategic and work as a cajoling device, perhaps even more effectively than (233 a). So, paradoxically, a weaker formulation of the request may turn out to be more strategic and thus more likely to obtain the perlocutionary goal. As in 3.5.10.4.3.3, the hearer will interpret the diminutive as signaling a greater attachment to the object (and consequently greater commitment to the request). Only someone really unfamiliar with mitigation of requests may interpret the weaker formulation of the request in (233 b) as a transparent expression of the speaker's lower interest (interpretation B). See also the discussion in 3.4.5.3 (96) interpretation 2). Of course, (233 b), as do all requests (at least to some extent), downgrades the obligation imposed on the addressee. 3.5.10.4.4.2. "Avoiding/intensifying conflictual perlocutionary sequels: ... such as offending the addressee or getting her/him angry with the speaker. ... Speakers generally attempt to downgrade these features of their illocutionary acts" (Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa 1990) or even to optimize social effects (as opposed to more material effects in 3.5.10.4.4.1). This downgrading of social risks is, of course, called forth if the speaker wants the interaction to be a cooperative one or, at least, less antagonistic. Diminutives may be a device for this type of downgrading, as in (234 b) vs. (234 a): (234) a. Posso chiederti un ultimo piacere? may I ask you a last favor 'May I ask you a last favor?'

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

257

b. Potrei chiederti un ultim-issimo piacer-ino? Might I ask you a last-ELAT favor-DIM 'Could I ask you a very last little favor?' where S fears that Η may get angry over the repetition of identical requests. To avoid this effect, one has recourse to diminutives in the final request of a sequence (cf. Blum-Kulka-House-Kasper 1989: 17-19), as in (235 a - c ) : (235) a. Dammi una mela! give me an apple 'Give me an apple!' b. Dammi un' altra mela! give me another apple 'Give me another apple!' c. Ancora una melina! still an apple-DIM 'Another apple again!' c'. Noch ein Apf-erl bitte! German still an apple please 'Another apple please!' b". Dame otro pucho! Spanish give me another cigarette 'Give me another cigarette!' c". Un puch-ito mäs! a cigarette-DIM more 'Another nice little cigarette!' Again, both features of diminutives, [small] and [non-serious] can operate the downgrading. If Hübler (1983: 21) is right in seeing indeterminacy as the basis for the hearer not feeling harmed by the formulation, then the feature [non-serious] is to be preferred. The diminutive may, however, upgrade antagonism, when it contributes to the expression of sarcasm, as in: (236)

Non sarebbe il caso che tu almeno mettessi via i not would be the case that you at least put away the tuoi piatt-ini, le tue posat-ine? your dishes-DIM the your cutlery-DIM 'Don't you think you should at least clear away your own dishes and cutlery?'

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(said by a father to a grown-up daughter). The diminutives increase the likelihood of an angry answer and thus intensify conflictual perlocutionary sequels. Of course the indirect way of requesting is more important for obtaining a sarcastic effect. The preparatory condition (3.5.10.1 .b.2), whereby it is not obvious to the requester that the addressee, in the normal course of events, will perform the action (desired by the requester) of his own accord, may be violated in case of insistence, and this implies a risk of a negative perlocutionary sequel. The diminutive may be used to mitigate this risk. A case is the repeated request by an elderly woman to her daughter (who is precisely going to perform the requested action): (237)

Quando esci, ricordati le mie mel-ine! when you go out remember the my apples-DIM 'When you go out, see that you remember my apples!'

3.5.10.5. In section 3.5.10.4, we have applied Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) model of illocutionary strength downgrading to the speech act of request. We hope we have been able to interpret the model correctly and to test the effect of diminutive formation in full respect of their rationale. The extension of this - so far most detailed and consistent - descriptive model of downgrading to a systematic study of diminutives has allowed us to test the minimalist interpretation of morphopragmatics, that is, the assumption that, jointly, the denotative meaning of [small] used for downgrading and the mechanisms of illocutionary force were enough to predict the pragmatic effects of diminutives on illocutionary force. We have seen that this attempt fails in several instances. And if we make an explicit comparison (cf. Rose 1992) of diminutives with the other downgraders that Fraser (1980), Hübler (1983), Holmes (1984) and Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä (1990) enumerate (e.g., 3.5.10.4.3.1-3.5.10.4.3.2), then it becomes all too obvious that there is no strict parallelism between the effects of diminutives and those of the other downgrading devices. Worst of all, in certain constellations (especially 3.5.10.4.2), where other co-occurring downgrading devices, as expected, all downgrade, diminutives may upgrade. In particular, downgrading of illocutionary strength via diminutives does not equal strategies of indirectness. 280 Thus our findings are in line with those summarized in Kasper (1990: 200) "that internal and external modification [sc. in regard to the speech act] operate independently", but even sentence-internal modification is very heterogeneous.

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

259

Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä ([1991]: 66) correctly point out that modification of expressed inner states (3.5.10.4.2) and of modal roles of participants (3.5.10.4.3) are internal to the illocutionary act, whereas modification of propositional content (3.5.10.4.1) and of perlocutionary goals (3.5.10.4.4) is external. And even modification internal to both the sentence or clause expressing the speech act and to the illocutionary act itself is not homogeneous. In fact, we have found many examples where not all dimensions of internal modification are modified in parallel (that is, parallel downgrading in all dimensions). Finally, a comparison between requests and other speech acts (cf. the conclusions in 3.5.12.8) shows that there is no exact parallelism in the effects of diminutives across speech acts. These results falsify the minimalist position, but fit the maximalist position which assumes that diminutives have their own pragmatics, which sets them apart from other morphological, lexical, syntactic, prosodic, and textual downgraders. Moreover, we have been able, at least partially, to explain differences in pragmatic effects between diminutives and other downgraders and this by having recourse to arguments discussed in 3.4.4 and 3.5.5-3.5.9 (that is, non-seriousness, ludic character, empathy, emotion, psychological distance). Finally, we want to draw attention to the co-occurrence of diminutives with other downgraders that we have found in many examples. If their effects worked in the same direction, their combination should be replaceable with recursive or repetitive diminutive formation. Thus (229 a) should have a similar effect to (229 a'). (229 a)

Quasi quasi ti chiederei di comprarmi qualche mel-ina 'I'm tempted to ask you to buy me an apple or two.'

(229 a') Ti chiedo di comprarmi qualche mel-ett-(in-)ina. Ye I ask to buy me some apple-DIM-(DIM-)DIM Ί ask you to buy me some tiny, tiny little apples.' This reductio ad absurdum illuminates the raison d'etre of such combinations of downgraders: Each downgrader contributes different ingredients to their combined pragmatic effect. We may conclude that Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) descriptive model can be used as a useful tool in pragmatic analysis and may be expanded, adapted and made use of within a global morphopragmatic account of diminutives and, as we will see in 4.2.4, of augmentatives.

260

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3.5.10.6.1. Since diminutives are "diminishers", but not minimizers (cf. 3.4.1.5), they never annul a speech act or its obligations (in the sense of Franck 1979). But, as we can infer from sections 3.5.10.2 and 3.5.10.4, they can modify the illocutionary strength of speech acts, although not up to the point of changing one speech act into another (even within the same class of speech acts, cf. (216), (221), (222)). For they cannot lower the strength of illocutionary force by one point (in Searle-Vanderveken's 1985 terms). In cases of ambiguity, what they can do, is make a weaker interpretation clearer by the addition of extra elements towards it. With requests, the effect of diminutives consists just in the mitigation of a request with no change of the request into a weaker speech act (unless we want to multiply the number of speech acts in assuming that there is a sizeable number of different speech acts of request). Let us look at what diminutives may do to orders as described by Sbisä (1989: 132 (1)). She reports an order given by an elementary school teacher to her class: (238)

Perfavore dovete rispondermi con le parole — non please you must answer me with the words — not con gesti! with gestures 'Please, you must answer me with words — not gestures!'

What would be the effect of replacing (238) parole with parol-ine (excluding denotative meanings)? We envisage five different conceivable effects (a-e): a) It may be a diminutivum puerile, which changes the adequate speech situation into a child-centered one (cf. 3.5.2), appropriate for a kindergarten. b) The diminutive highlights the speaker's impatience as an emotion (note per favore, which sounds impatient or insisting), cf. 3.5.10.4.2 above. c) The diminutive may diminish the addressees' obligations (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2), but would not change the order into a request (also because of the modal verb "must"). d) If the diminutive is ironic/sarcastic, it would rather increase the obligation, if one allows for an increase in illocutionary strength within an order. e) The diminutive might express less speaker's power (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1), for example in case the speaker should be repeatedly complaining, but the strength of the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal (cf.

Data and their interpretation

— Requests

261

3.5.10.4.4.1) would not be reduced, nor would the speaker's commitment (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3. The teacher would be more disappointed, should the children not comply). In any event the speech act would remain an order. Thus, from the very first example that Sbisä (1989: 132) describes, we can see the complexity of the effects that diminutives have on speech acts and speech situations. 3.5.10.6.2. A decrease in illocutionary strength on the paradigmatic axis may be exploited on the syntagmatic axis (cf. 6.3.1 for German excessives). This may be the case in re-elaborations (cf. 3.5.15), particularly in corrections where the illocutionary strength is corrected. An example is the sequence: (235) b'. Gib mir noch einen Apfel! Give me still an apple 'Give me another apple!' c'. Noch ein Apf-erl bitte! yet an apple-DIM please! 'Yet another little apple please!' wherfe the speaker utters a request in (235 b'), but may seem to transform it - together with an appropriate change of intonation - into pleading in (235 c'); this represents a correction which works along various possible dimensions. The speaker may a) recognize the inappropriateness of a request, e. g., by noticing a negative mimical reaction in the addressee, and thus decide to avoid conflictual perlocutionary sequels (cf. 3.5.10.4.4.2); or (b) the speaker S may begin to lose hope of getting the apple (that is, hope in the success of the speech act) and thus may decide to reduce the strength of his attempt to achieve the perlocutionary object (cf. 3.5.10.4.4.1). Accordingly, (c) S will, at this point, reduce his commitment to the speech act (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3) and (d) will reduce the obligations assigned to the addressee (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2) so that the addressee can more easily say no. This in turn will result in relieving the threat to the cooperative nature of the interaction (cf. again 3.5.10.4.4.2). Or (e) S diminishes the propositional content (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.2), hoping that the addressee would give him another apple more easily if it is a small rather than a large size. 3.5.10.7. Appendix: Non-impositive directives (advice) So far, we have concentrated on request as a prototypical directive. Requests fall under the heading of impositive directives (cf. 3.5.10.1). For

262

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the sake of representativeness, let us briefly mention non-impositive directives, like advice (cf. Fries 1991 a: 20), warning, instruction, counseling, proposal, recommendation, suggestion. Such directive speech acts are performed primarily for the addressee's benefit (such, at least, in the speaker's judgement). 281 They correspond to McCawley's (1977) speech act type of advisories (cf. Bach-Harnish 1979: 48). Advice may thus be taken as prototypical of its class, and therefore we are going to limit our discussion to this speech act. 282 When applying Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) framework, we find that diminutives downgrade the illocutionary strength of advice in nearly all dimensions, more or less the same as they do with request. For example, determinacy of propositional content (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1) is analogously reduced in the act of advice or suggestion below: (239)

Perche magari non aspetti uri why maybe not you wait an chiamarlo? call him Warum wartest du nicht lieber why wait you not rather ihn anrufst? him call 'Why don't you maybe give it an

or-etta prima di hour-DIM before

ein Stünd-chen, bevor du an hour-DIM before you

hour before phoning him?'

The same is true with diminution in propositional content (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.2). As to expression of inner states (cf. 3.5.10.4.2), there is a difference insofar as, typically, the speaker's inner states are likely to be more alerted with action beneficial to himself than to the addressee. As a result, in general, diminutives hardly affect the expression of inner states in advice (cf. also 3.5.11.2.4.1). Downgrading of speaker's entitlement (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1), via diminutive, is less recognizable in advice and suggestion than in request, e. g., in (240), presumably because the speaker is likely to exert authority or power when the results of the action are to his own benefit and to the addressee's cost. (240)

Perche non fai una telefonat-ina? why not you make a phone call-DIM 'Why don't you try phoning?'

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

263

As to the obligation assigned to the addressee (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2), the politeness obligation of compliance is lower (because less face-threatening) in advice than in request, therefore diminutives have a more limited modifying effect. The obligation towards the action may not be downgraded at all, as is the case in our examples. Speaker's commitment (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3) is also lower in advice than in request, diminutives do not interfere substantially. The same holds for the speaker's attempt to avoid conflictual perlocutionary sequels (cf. 3.5.10.4.4.2), unless the speaker is not entitled to give advice. In terms of strength of attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal (cf. 3.5.4.4.1), diminutives obtain the same downgrading effect as in requests. 283 3.5.11. Assessments Among the various types of assertive speech acts, the most interesting for the characterization of diminutives are speech acts of assessment or, more general, evaluation, because of the evaluative character of diminutives (3.4.6). This connection includes axiological (that is, qualitative) evaluation: speakers usually evaluate a state of affairs as being either positive or negative, and this holds both for diminutives as evaluatives and for speech acts of assessment in general. Assessments, as expressions of opinions (Sbisä 1987: 1), belong to Haverkate's (1990: 90) evaluative (as opposed to descriptive) assertions and to Austin's (1962) and Sbisä's (1989: 123) class of verdictives.284 They represent those speech acts that "consist in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value" (as opposed to those "as to fact"). 285 Assessments are usually hearer-directed. 3.5.11.1. Among the various classificatory criteria of assertions in Searle (1969, 1976) and Searle-Vanderveken (1985), the most relevant for our argument are: a) The sincerity condition: the speaker S believes something to be the case (proposition ρ). This belief is also the psychological state to be expressed. The expression of a belief implies that there is or may be some difficulty in establishing the true state of affairs (Sbisä 1989: 160) about which the speaker informs the addressee. In assessments, this belief includes reference to a system of values. b) The essential condition: The assertion "counts as an undertaking to the effect that ρ represents an actual state of affairs" (Searle 1969: 66). The illocutionary point is "to say how things are", that is, to present "a proposition as representing an actual state of affairs in the world of

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Diminutives

utterance" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 37). In assessments, the speaker rather wants the hearer to know about his view on the propositional content (Zillig 1982: 34, 304). c) The expressed psychological state is the belief that p. d) The strength by which the illocutionary point of an assessment is pursued ranges from weaker to stronger according to the performative verb used or underlying the assessment. 286 "Hypothesize/guess/suggest" signal less strength than "claim/admit/hold/rate", which in turn signal less strength than "swear/insist/testify" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 99). The degree of commitment to the belief that p, co-varies with the degree of strength of the illocutionary point. 287 e) Among assertives, some, such as "to notify, testify, confess", when performed with a special mode of achievement, may represent official acts whose formality (entailed by some preparatory condition) is normally incompatible with the non-seriousness character of diminutives (cf. 3.5.8). f) The sincerity condition — having the belief that ρ — is at stake in case of understatement (see 3.5.13) and irony (see 3.5.14) in the sense that there is a clash between the propositional content of the illocutionary act and the expressed psychological state. This clash is a consequence of applying the feature [non-serious] to the speech act. Diminutives are often used towards this effect. 3.5.11.2. For general characteristics of modification of strength, we refer to 3.5.10.2 and 3.5.10.3 (for evaluations cf. also Sandig 1991, particularly p. 239-240; Zillig 1982: 145). Here we are immediately going to apply Bazzanella-Caffi—Sbisä's (1990) model. 288 3.5.11.2.1.1. Downgrading the determinacy of the propositional content via diminutives is more relevant for assessments than it is for requests (3.5.10.4.1.1), because it directly affects the speaker's evaluation (cf. adverbial modifications in Brown-Levinson 1987: 117; Zillig 1982: 177). Lower precision makes the assertion more tentative. Let us take the two examples (241), (242): (241)

Io facevo un ragionamento un po' divers-ino. I was making a reasoning a bit different-DIM Ί was approaching the matter slightly differently.'

said by a student to her professor as a way of dissenting from her. By rendering the degree of diversity less precise, the student becomes less sanctionable and leaves room for negotiation.

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

265

And in the following: (242) A: Ma sono molti? but are they many 'But are there many of them?' B: Eh, sono parecch-ini. Mm they are some-DIM 'Mm quite a few.' Β is talking to colleague A of the necessity of having extra help to satisfy an increase in students' demand for a certain service. The question put by A contains an element of doubt. In the answer, the meaning of the base {parecchi 'quite a number') allows Β to go on with his argument. Again, lack of precision in propositional content as indicated by the diminutive will save his face in case actual counting of students should disprove him. This effect is directly derivable from the opacity produced by the off-record strategy (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1). 3.5.11.2.1.2. In contrast to requests, diminution of propositional content in assessments may exceed the local character and may affect the whole speech act. Let us observe such a shift in (243) and (243'): (243)

Ε un tant-ino troppo presto. It's a little-DIM too early 'It's a shade too early.'

Here the diminutive mitigates a somewhat reproachful assertion by merely diminishing the degree by which the addressee is transgressing the expected (or agreed) time. Here the feature [small] would be operative in modifying the illocutionary strength. Other landing-sites would be possible: (243')

Ε un po' (troppo) prest-ino. Ε un poch-ino troppo presto. 'It's still a bit (too) early. It's just a bit too early.'

This would obtain the same pragmatic effect, but would be restricted to a more familiar speech situation. For, in this case, rather the feature [nonserious] would be operative, since a denotative, dimensional reduction is much more perceivable with the quantifier tanto than with the semantically more loaded presto. Prest-ino would make the assertion sound more

266

Diminutives

tentative, that is, the mitigation would be based on a lower commitment by the speaker (to the whole of the assertion) rather than on his evaluation of the low degree of transgression as in (243). Diminution of propositional content is linked to a mitigating effect on negative evaluations, as in (Italian and Viennese German): (244) a. Eh, c'e una bella salit-ina. hm there's a nice climb-DIM 'Hm, there's a good bit of climbing there.' b. Hm, dagibt's ein ganz schönes Berg-erl. hm there's a quite nice mountain-DIM 'Hm, there's quite a nice little mountain.' Here the evaluative character of the diminutive, together with the intensifying adjective bello = schön (lit. 'beautiful'), is constitutive of the assessment embedded in the statement c'e una salita. The diminutive, with its features [small] and [non-serious] is pragmatically exploited to mitigate the negative connotation which might accompany the matrix sentence 'there is a good climb (244 a)/mountain (244 b)', that is, the implied physical toil connected with climbing a sizeable mountain, cf. the following paraphrases: (244) c. Ε una bella camminat-ina. It's a nice walk-DIM. 'It's a fair bit of a walk.' d. C'e un bei poch-ino di strada there's a nice bit-DIM of road 'There's a fair bit of road.' Not only nouns, adjectives and adverbs may be diminished in propositional content, as in the above examples, but also verbs, as in the case of an actress interviewed on TV: (245)

Ho cominciato a cantare, a cant-icchi-are, poi ho I've begun to sing to sing-DIM then I've fatto uno spettacolo, uno spettacol-ino. made a performance a performance-DIM Ί began to sing, to do a bit of singing, then I did a performance, a bit of performing.'

Here there is a strict parallelism in the diminution of noun and verb.

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

267

3.5.11.2.2. In assessments, paradoxically, diminutives may both downgrade and upgrade the expression of inner states. But the conditions for the two types of modification are different. Let us start with downgrading: (246)

Ε un problema un po' (a) spinos-etto / (b) spinoso. is a problem a bit thorny-DIM thorny 'It's a rather thorny (b: thornyish) problem.'

uttered by a rather elusive speaker, who later referred back to it as un problem-ino 'a problem-DIM' (cf. 3.5.9.7 for the landing-site). Here the diminutive contributes, together with un po' 'somewhat' and the base 'thorny', to the evaluative assertion. The diminutive feature [small] is pragmatically used as a downgrader to limit the illocutionary strength of the assertion. This assertive reluctance in (246 a), in contrast to (246 b) may signal both low involvement or reluctance to disclose one's actual feelings about it. By this downgraded assessment (that is, downgraded speaker's commitment), the speaker actually dismissed the problem and no longer took part in the discussion. If he had uttered (246 b), his interlocutors would have expected him to elaborate on the problem. Note that no emotional colouring of (246 a) was perceivable during its uttering. In general, the presence of emotion tends to upgrade the expression of inner states. In the absence of it, only downgrading of the various scales of strength is possible. Emotions may often play a role in assessments (cf. Sandig 1979: 142; Fries 1991 b: 24, 35). For example, emotion was clearly displayed in: (247)

Che bella (a) musich-ina / (b) musica allegra! what nice music-DIM music cheerful VG. Was für ein schönes, fröhliches Musik-stück(-erl)! what for a lovely cheerful music-piece(-DIM) 'What a lovely, cheerful piece of music!'

uttered by an elderly lady with clear manifestation of enjoyment. The disclosing of emotion in (247 a) works towards upgrading the assertion, in the sense of increasing the speaker's commitment to the belief expressed. At the same time, the attributive adjectives and the (co-determined) diminutive conveys a positive attitude towards the object, that is, pleasure and enjoyment. Moreover, the diminutive adds a ludic element and indicates informality of the speech situation (cf. Klimaszewska 1983:

268

Diminutives

55): the music was a Mozart symphony, and such an evaluative assertion, containing the feature [non-serious], would definitely not suit a formal speech situation (cf. appendix 3.5.11.6 on exclamations). There may be problems in identifying the direction of modification of strength (downgrading vs. upgrading), when propositional content and expressed inner state overlap (typical in combinations of assertives and expressives, cf. Sbisä 1989: 161). An example may be: (248) A: Ma gli vuoi bene? but him want you well 'But do you love him?'

B: Un poch-ino tanto. a bit-DIM so much 'Quite a bit.'

Here, the emotion of love both represents the propositional content and the inner state expressed. If B's response is emotionally colored, then the diminutive in poch-ino (vs. po') contributes to expressing the inner state. On the other hand, the diminutive downgrades the propositional content. This example is also illustrative of the regulative mechanism of understatement (cf. 3.5.13). Speaker Β downgrades the expression (signans) of propositional content without weakening the content itself (signatum). This clash between speaker's meaning and form becomes apparent in the microcotext because both un po' and un poch-ino contrast with tanto 'so much', the diminutive increases the contrast. If Β had answered: Un tantino 'Somewhat', the clash would have become apparent, if at all, either via B's non-verbal signals or previous (or contextual) knowledge about the state of affairs (cf. 3.5.13). 3.5.11.2.3.1. When downgrading affects the speaker's power (or authority/entitlement), the assessment becomes more tentative as in several examples discussed above (cf. also 3.5.10.4.3.1). In assertions there is the preparatory condition whereby the asserter is supposed to have available evidence for the knowledge (that is, to be competent, Sbisä 1989: 154, 156) that he intends to impart to the addressee (contextual entitlement, as we have called it in 3.5.10.4.3.1). Relative to the specific point of information, the addressee is supposed to be less competent than the asserter. In (241), where a student is the asserter and her professor the addressee, the asymmetry in assertion competence (contextual entitlement) clashes with an opposite asymmetry in social roles (social power), that is, the prototypical role configuration whereby'the professor rather than the student is assigned the task of imparting knowledge (cf. Sbisä 1989: 124). The two hedges in un po' divers-ino 'a bit different-DIM' are strategic towards reducing this clash.

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

269

In (243) it is again awareness of his lower social power that induces the subordinate to downgrade a reproachful assessment directed at his superior, although he has solid evidence for his assessment (cf. also Zillig 1982: 120). Example (242), on the other hand, is a dialogue between speakers of equal social power. Here it is the actual lack of solid evidence which decreases the speaker's (contextual) entitlement to his assertion and which justifies his downgrading. In other words, the (at least) partial lack of a preparatory condition for his assertion (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 54) accounts for the use of the diminutive. Upgrading of speaker's authority via using a diminutive can be obtained through the regulative mechanism of sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14). Several examples of diminutives serving sarcasm can be drawn from II Gattopardo where diminutives are often used to qualify the emerging lower bourgeois class in contrast with the declining Sicilian high aristocracy. Such social distance is exemplified by the main character, the Prince of Salina, for example in (Lampedusa 1958: 149), through the image of the aristocratic Austrian generals 289 defeated by the plebeian Napoleon: (249)

ma il vittorioso e Γ om-ici-attolo in cappott-ino but the winner is the man-INTERF-DIM in coat-DIM grigio grey 'but it is the squat little man in the grey top-coat who is the victor' (Colquhoun 1963: 102) aber Sieger ist der kleine Mann im grauen Mantel but winner is the little man in the grey coat (Birnbaum 1959: 87)

Immediately afterwards, the Prince's bourgeois opponent (Napoleon's counterpart, so to say) is assigned the diminutives: (250)

piccol-ino ... sarebbe davvero sembrato uno small-DIM would have really seemed a sciacall-etto ... i suoi occhi-etti jackal-DIM the his eyes-DIM 'very small ... would have looked like a jackal ... eyes' (Colquhoun 1963: 102) sehr klein ... er hätte wirklich das Aussehen eines very little he would have really the looks of a Schakals gehabt... Äug-lein (Birnbaum 1959: 87) jackal had eyes-DIM

270

Diminutives

Both in (249) and (250) the Prince directs the [non-serious] feature of the diminutive at his referent to emphasize the social and psychological distance between himself and this little, somewhat ridiculous man. Such increased distance is perceived by the reader as downgrading of the referent's image and upgrading of the speaker'a authority (social power). 290 3.5.11.2.3.2. Assessments also impose obligations on the addressee which can be up- or downgraded. If the speaker intends his assessment to be a serious contribution (sincerity condition), the addressee is supposed to take it seriously, that is, as non-fictive, not absurd, etc., and thus to acknowledge, at least, that information is being passed on to him about a certain state of affairs and about values, and that he will have to take a stand. The addressee will either be convinced by the speaker, that is, share his beliefs (cf. Reiss 1985) or engage in rebuttal, unless opting out of the argument altogether. Diminutives, via the feature [non-serious], may downgrade the addressee's obligation to take the speaker's assertion as fitting an actual state of affairs (within the world of discourse). For example, in (241) the student left room for the professor to take the objection not too seriously and as less threatening to her positive face. Thus the professor might have chosen to dismiss the student's dissent without losing face. If the student, however, had advanced her objection in the following format: (241')

II mio ragionamento e totalmente diverso the my reasoning is totally different 'My course of reasoning is totally different.'

the professor would have had to take it up and discuss it. Similarly, in (242) the speaker mitigated the force of his assertion, with the result of weakening the addressee's entitlement to object. Somewhat different is the case of the exclamation in (247). Although the diminutive in (247 a) upgrades the expression of the speaker's inner state, the interlocutors took it less seriously (than they would have taken 247 b) because of the more informal character of musich-ina as compared with musica. B's understatement in (248), however, imposes a bifurcated obligation on the addressee A. On the one hand, A is supposed to take B's confession of love (signatum) seriously. On the other, Β leaves A some room for joking about the form (signans) of her expression, for example with friendly irony as in: (248')

Aaah, solo un poch-ino, eh? O h , only a little bit, what?'

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

271

Obligations imposed on the addressee may acquire a more specific character in case the assessment contains a reproach (an act which is liable to threaten the addressee's positive face). A reproach imposes on the addressee either the obligation to feel guilty (with a need for apology to restore one's face) or the obligation to prove one's innocence. The diminutive downgrades the obligation, as can be seen in (243) and in: (251)

Beh, forse la somma che gli offri e un po' well maybe the sum that him you offer is a bit bass-ina. low-DIM 'Well, maybe the amount you're offering him is a bit lowish.'

(offered as an explanation for the negative reaction of a third party to the action referred to, previously performed by the addressee). Again, the addressee has less obligation to take it seriously and to react to this downgraded criticism than he would have with the non-diminutivized variant (that is, bassa 'low'). In case of sarcasm obtained via diminutive (cf. 3.5.14), the intensity of the obligation imposed is upgraded. Take the reproachful assertion in: (252)

Che (a) rispost-ine / (b) risposte che däi what answers-DIM answers that you give ( complimenti)! congratulations 'What poor answers you give (well done)!' c. Che belle risposte che däi! what nice answers that you give

uttered by a father to a grown-up daughter. The intonation of (252 b) is typically angry, compatible even with shouting, while the intonation of (252 a) and (252 c) is low-keyed, definitely not suited for shouting. In (252 c), sarcasm is obtained through the adjective bello which clashes with the intended meaning, that is: (252) d. Che brutte risposte che däi! what nasty answers that you give The mutual substitutability of the adjective bello and the diminutive seems to indicate that the clash operated is similar, that is, a clash be-

272

Diminutives

tween negative meaning and positive formulation. This, in turn, may suggest association of the diminutive with positive connotations (cf. 3.3.1, 3.3.4.6.6-3.3.4.6.8). This hypothesis is confirmed by the possibility to expand (252 a) into (252 e) thus intensifying sarcasm: (252) e. Che belle rispost-ine che däi! 'What nice little answers you give!' Sarcasm would be lost, however, if (252 a) were expanded into: (252) f. 'What Che brutte che däi! nastyrispost-ine little answers you give!' where the diminutive would have quite the opposite effect, of mitigating the reproach. 3.5.11.2.3.3. Downgrading via diminutive also affects the speaker's commitment to his assertion as we have seen in (241) and, explicitly or implicitly, in all other examples (cf. also Gaarder 1966: 588). If the assessment is critical as in (243), the diminutive reduces the amount of negative evaluation and this means lower commitment. Neither remark is sarcastic, the respective speakers aiming at co-operativeness. Another example of downgraded commitment is: (253)

Magari e un antefatto, una premess-ina. perhaps is a summary a preamble-DIM 'Perhaps it's a piece of background information, or some sort of preamble.'

uttered by a comic character, always frustrated in his actions and opinions, and thus, typically, displaying a low, only tentative, commitment to his beliefs. The following example, on the other hand, is a critical assessment of a colleague by a very authoritative and self-confident scholar: (254)

Ε un (a) cretin-etto / (b) cretino. is a imbecile-DIM imbecile 'He's a perfect little cretin/an imbecile.'

The diminutive in (254 a), as opposed to (254 b), downgrades the commitment to the negative assessment. The Viennese equivalent of (254 a):

Data and their interpretation

(254')

— Assessments

273

Er ist ein (a) Idiot-erl / (b) Idiot. he is an idiot-DIM idiot

is only possible in a very familiar speech situation. If reported to the person referred to, (254 b) might represent a serious offense, whereas a speaker of (254 a) could always withdraw to a face-saving position, by claiming he was joking, as one does with intimate friends. However, if (254 a) is pronounced with appropriate sarcastic intonation and accompanying gestures indicating despise, then the expression of inner states is upgraded. And whereas the speaker might excuse (254 b) as an inadvertent, uncontrolled slip of little importance, (254 a) would be too elaborate for such a minimization of accountability. Therefore, insofar as (254 b) may involve less conscious planning, it may display a lower commitment to the negative evaluation than does sarcastic (254 a). Again, we may conclude that, in case of face-threatening acts, the nature of the social interaction (cooperative vs. antagonistic, and, in the latter case, the degree of antagonism) into which a speech act is embedded, determines whether a diminutive functions as a downgrader or an upgrader. As a means of an off-record strategy, however, the diminutive contributes to opacity, independent of whether the speaker's belief is strong or weak. Diminution of commitment also occurs in the headline quoted in 3.5.9.7: (198)

Quando Γ Italia penso di fare la furb-etta. 'When Italy tried to be smart/to pull a clever move.'

Although the commitment is apparently reduced, the sarcastic diminutives in (254, 198) sound more despising than their respective simplicia cretino, furba would. The critical attitude of the speaker is well served by diminutives underlining the little importance of the criticized objects (a person in (254), a political strategy in (198)). 3.5.11.2.4. Perlocutionary goals of assessments are a) to change the addressee's state of knowledge; b) to convince the addressee of the truth of one's proposition (Searle 1969: 66), especially if there is an element of arguing, a) is the minimal goal which is entailed in b). 3.5.11.2.4.1. The strength of the attempt to achieve both perlocutionary goals (a) and (b) is downgraded via diminutives in many of the examples

274

Diminutives

discussed above (241)-(244), (251), (253). In contrast, see the following example: (255)

La soia e buonissima, da un gust-ino. the soya is good-ELAT gives a taste-DIM 'Soya's great - it adds a really nice taste.'

uttered with manifested enjoyment. The expression of (affective) inner state via diminutive, again, has the effect of upgrading the strength of the assessment, and thus the chances of persuading the addressee. The same is true of: (256)

Un bei bicchier-otto di vino ti farä bene! a good glass-DIM of wine ye will do well VG. Ein gutes Glas-erl Wein wird dir gut tun! a good glass-DIM wine will ye good do Ά nice good glass of wine will do you good!'

Here, rather than emotion, it is the speaker's positive attitude (sympathy) towards, and familiarity with, both the object of assessment and the addressee, which obtain the secondary effect of upgrading the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goals. For, the specific attitude and reduced psychological distance between the interlocutors make the speaker more trustworthy to the hearer. But, clearly, this speech act is not just an assessment, it is a sympathetic advice at the same time, in the sense that the speaker indicates that the addressee ought to take a glass (cf. Brown-Levinson 1987: 66). Depending on the context, (256) may be taken as either ambiguous (assessment or advice, thus "off record" according to Brown-Levinson 1987: 69) or as indirect advice couched in the form of an assessment. 291 3.5.11.2.4.2. In several of our examples, speakers use diminutives in order to avoid conflictual perlocutionary sequels or, at least, to mitigate them (e. g., the amount of disagreement), that is, in (241), (243), (251), (253).292 A clear example is also the answer in: (257) A: Mi sta bene? me is well 'Does it suit me?'

Data and their interpretation

Β: Ε un po' cort-ίηα, ma comunque is a bit short-DIM but anyway 'It's a bit on the short side, but anyway

— Assessments

275

'

where the diminutive downgrades the second speaker's negative evaluation and the chance of threatening the first speaker's positive face. As a consequence, Β has a better chance not to offend A and to avoid disrupting their cooperative interaction. A reproachful assessment (cf. Zillig 1982: 87, 179), in the presence of the referent (an adolescent) is mitigated, via diminutive, in: (258)

Questo sciagurat-ello ha perso il portafoglio. this rascal-DIM has lost the wallet 'This poor rascal has lost his wallet.'

The speaker attempts to downgrade conflictual perlocutionary sequels not with the addressee, but with a side-participant. An assessment by a doctor (surgeon in (259) and dentist in (260)) implies future actions by the speaker linked (via the doctor's diagnosiscum-therapy frame) to a directive speech act in the two following examples: (259)

Ho paura che dovremo fare un tagli-etto, signora. I've fear that we'll have to make a cut-DIM Madam 'I'm afraid we're going to have to make a little cut, Madam.'

(said to an elderly lady, more examples in Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi (1989 b: 242 (9)), and, from a spontaneous report about a medical visit: (260)

und sie sagt, da haben Sie noch ein Lück-erl... and she says here have you still a hole-DIM 'and she (the dentist) says, here you've got still a little hole.'

In both assessments (259), (260), the diminutive seems to display empathy with the patient, both with her health and her fears about pain and inconveniences which may result from a medical treatment. Although such patient's fears are not direct perlocutionary sequels of the doctor's assessment, they are easily and habitually inferrable. Therefore the doctor is able to calculate them and tries to mitigate them, with the diminutive, as he would do with any direct conflictual perlocutionary sequels. Depend-

276

Diminutives

ing on the context, the diminutive may also contribute towards downgrading speaker's commitment — then it would be a case of understatement (cf. 3.5.13). In a sarcastic reproach like (252), however, the diminutive is likely to upgrade the chance of a conflictual perlocutionary sequel. 3.5.11.3. In respect to conflictual perlocutionary sequels (3.5.11.2.4.2), Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) model can accommodate diminutives only when diminutives downgrade. Let us look, for example, at conceivable Italian correspondences of Tannen's (1984: 108) description of an American friend's individual downgrading strategy: "Chad's running together a list of alternatives in a monotonous tone, ending with something hedgy and mumbled like 'or what', is his way of belittling what he is talking about, of showing that the ideas he is reporting are repugnant, and he wishes to dissociate himself from them." Here, in Italian, a final: (261)

...esimili cos-ette. and similar things-DIM 'and other things of the like

'

would be perfectly adequate. The downgrading diminutive would be a means for avoiding negative perlocutionary sequels, that is, a negative reaction of the hearer at the idea that the speaker might take the reported repugnant ideas seriously. When, however, diminutives upgrade, Bazzanella—CafFi-Sbisä's (1990) model must be supplemented with an intervening variable such as sarcasm. But their model does not provide any element which could be linked to a mechanism whereby diminutives would create (not only modify!) conflictual perlocutionary sequels. Let us start with an example (taken from a TV series, from a dialogue between friends, A male, Β female): (262) A: AUora, quella tua rivist-ina, sembra proprio avere well that your magazine-DIM seems really have sfondato. succeeded 'Well, that little magazine of yours seems to be quite a hit.' B: Quella mia rivist-ina [ironic] sembra proprio avere sfondato. that my magazine-DIM seems really have succeeded 'That little magazine of mine does seem to be quite a hit.'

Data and their interpretation — Assessments

277

Compare with Viennese German: (262') A: Also dein letztes Büch-erl hat eingeschlagen. well your last book-DIM has hit in (said of a magazine (262) or book (262') of ordinary size and importance). As B's ironic answer in (262) shows (with strict parallelism underlining conflict, cf. Merlini 1989), A's assessment of B's magazine as rivist-ina clearly has displeased her. In contrast, the same remark with the simplex rivista would have pleased her. The diminutive in itself is capable of introducing two types of evaluation (cf. 3.4.6), both identifiable in (262 A). First, the diminutive refers locally to the nominal basis rivista and attaches to it the evaluation [small] with its alloseme [unimportant]. This is an embedded evaluation, that is, an evaluation embedded into the meaning of a noun. Second, the speaker attaches the evaluation [non-serious] to the speech act, the only possible landing-site being rivista. Third, and this is specific to evaluative speech acts such as assessments, evaluation via the diminutive interacts with the evaluation inherent in the speech act of assessment. Since interaction is usually stronger between similar linguistic elements than between dissimilar ones (cf. 3.5.12.8.3), we hypothesize that the evaluative force of the diminutive may have a stronger influence on assessments than on non-evaluative speech acts. 3.5.11.4. If we compare the strength-modifying effects of diminutives in assertions/assessments with those in requests (3.5.10), then we find great similarities as regards the downgrading of the modal roles of participants (except with sarcasm), as regards avoiding conflictual perlocutionary sequels (except with sarcasm), and as regards the double direction of modification in the expression of inner states. But as to the modification of propositional content, diminutives act more globally in assessments than in requests. And the strategies served by diminutives in achieving the respective perlocutionary goals also seem to be quite different for the two classes of speech acts. 3.5.11.5. With requests (3.5.10.5), we have explicitly illustrated differences between diminutives and other downgrading devices to their modifying effects. Here we avoid reporting the results of our comparisons concerning assessments, because they did not lend appreciable differences from what we found in 3.5.10.5. Thus our general conclusions about the usefulness and limits of applying Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) model to speech acts is essentially identical for requests and assessments.

278

Diminutives

3.5.11.6. Appendix: exclamations 3.5.11.6.1. Here we would like to account for the pragmatic effects of diminutives when applied to exclamations in a more systematic way than anticipated in examples (247), (252). The assignment of exclamations to a specific class of speech acts is difficult. They tend to appear as conflations of different illocutionary forces, for example of assessment and expressive, as in (247). The expressive part (cf. 3.5.12.8.4) is always present, whereas the other component may vary. 293 The diminutive may be involved in any of them or in both. Many languages have specific exclamatory sentence types, like the Albanian admirative, for example (cf. Sadock-Zwicky 1985: 163). In Italian, German and English, exclamations may take up the form of declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences. Exclamations are prosodically marked, particularly when emotionally colored. In addition, they may appear in a reduced form lacking the finite verb. 294 3.5.11.6.2. Let us start with the most reduced formats, typical of formulaic holophrastic exclamations like:295 (263) a. Caspita! Gosh

b.

Caspit-(er-)ina!296 Gosh-(INTERF)-DIM

The illocutionary force of these exclamations is merely expressive, and the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive in (263 b) attenuates the speaker's commitment to, and the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal of the expressive force. The illocutionary force is the expression of a reactive feeling of surprise (or of its negative variant disappointment). This is true for all exclamations, 297 which are precisely "used for expressing the extent to which the speaker is impressed by something" (Quirk et al. 1985: 804). This entails that exclamations are more speaker-oriented than other expressives (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 88), as proved by the fact that they can easily be produced in the absence of any hearer. Orientation can change and become hearer-oriented, if other illocutionary forces intervene. Another general property of exclamations (among expressives) is that they, prototypically, display feelings and attitudes (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 38) with emphasis and often also with emotion. 298 Due to the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive, (263 b) is not suitable as a presequence of an expression of compassion or condoling. Nor would it fit a situation where the expressive in itself might be in order

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

279

but the speaker would not utter it because of intimacy or familiarity with the interlocutor, and because they share feelings and attitudes. In this case, the speaker would rather entrust the expression of his strong reactive feelings to non-verbal or paralinguistic signals and utter only the exclamation (263 a). The diminutive in (263 b) would give evidence of the speaker's non-serious involvement. Thus the use of the diminutive would be risky, that is, it might cause a negative reaction on the part of the interlocutor. Hence, the diminutive is not a device for avoiding or downgrading conceivable negative perlocutionary sequels. Nor is (263 b) appropriate when the speaker expresses strong emotions (cf. 3.4.5.1, 3.5.6.6). Similar exclamations are (264) and the irregular, suppletive forms (265): (264) a. Per Bacco! b. Per-bacc-ol-inola! 'By Jove!' by Baccus-INTERF-DIM (265) a. PerdincilPerdinalPerdiana! b. Perdindirind-ina!299 Here, (264 b), (265 b) may have a jocular effect, in the second case reinforced by the extragrammatical reduplication. All three forms (263 b), (264 b), (265 b) may be used in restrained complaints, where the diminutive acts as a downgrader of the expression of inner states. Caspit-(er-)ina may also be used in mild commiserations. Also North German Ach Gott-chen! 'Oh, God-DIM!' may replace Ach Gott! (cf. 3.5.12.2.4) in restrained complaints and mild commiserations. There, the [non-serious] feature of the diminutive may be extended to the situation and be exploited as a device for soothing the addressee. In Dio buon-ino/30° for Dio buono! 'Good Lord!', the diminutive is a downgrader, typically used for restraining one's impatience, indignation, annoyance, etc. An upgrading effect, however, viz. in the expression of inner states, can be assigned to the diminutive of: (266) a. Madonna santa! 'Holy Lady!'

b. Madonn-ina santa! Lady-DIM holy

This upgrading may be due to the fact that (b) (as well as (a)) can also represent an invocation where Madonn-ina functions as a hypocoristic rather than a diminutive, and hypocoristics typically function as general upgraders of illocutionary strength (cf. Alonso 1961: 174, 186). Moreover,

280

Diminutives

such invocations are used for pleading, when, typically, the expression of inner states is normally upgraded (cf. 3.5.10.4.2, 3.5.10.4.3.1). The diverse modifications brought about by diminutives in the above reduced exclamatory formulae cannot be predicted from properties of the expressive speech acts themselves, but only a close scrutiny of the speech situations and speech act sequences where these exclamations are anchored may allow apperception and interpretation of their differences. 3.5.11.6.3. Let us pass now to exclamations combining expressive force with other illocutionary forces. The following one-word exclamation also counts as an (albeit very reduced) assessment: (267) a. Pover-ettolPover-ino/301 poor-DIM(masc.) Pobr-ec-ito! Spanish

b. Povero! poor

The simplex (267 b) is very rarely used in Italian. As Ettinger (1974 b: 175) has correctly pointed out, the German equivalent of (267) is the superlative: (267')

DulSie (b) Ärmster! / (a) Armer! thou/you poor-est poor

The pragmatic equivalence between (267 b') and (267 b) indicates comparability also in the upgrading effect, namely degree of emotion and expressive strength in general. This is clear evidence of the upgrading via diminutives in (267 b). As is the case in (267), exclamations, typically, appear to contain an evaluative and an expressive part (for their conflation cf. Sbisä 1989: 161). Positive assessment (assertive speech act) is combined with surprise and admiration (both expressive speech acts) in the German exclamations (cf. Klimaszewska 1983: 55): (268) a. Was für ein Wein-chenfWG. Weind-erl! what for a wine-DIM 'What a nice wine!' b. Was für ein hübsches Sümm-chen! what for a pretty sum-DIM 'What a pretty nice sum!'

Data and their interpretation — Assessments

281

c. Das ist ein Wein-chenNG. Weind-erl! this is a wine-DIM 'This is a nice wine!' d. Dies ist ein hübsches Sümm-chen! this is a pretty sum-DIM 'This is a pretty nice sum!' where the replacement by the declarative sentence format downplays surprise in favor of admiration, although in the presence of exclamatory prosody. Other examples of a similar type (expressing surprise and admiration) 302 are: (269)

Che macchin-ina! = VG. Was für ein Aut-erUWag-erl! what car-DIM what for a car-DIM 'What a great little car!'

These utterances, typically, are produced with empathy with the addressee if this is the owner of the objects, and/or with emotion, thus in both cases with an upgraded expression of inner states. Some relevant aspects or dimensions of the referent are of a quality which, to the judgement of the speaker, is comparatively high. The relevant quality may be value, elegance, size, performing ability, etc. The positive assessment concerning such a high quality is conveyed by appropriate prosody. The diminutive, whose denotative meaning of [smallness] clashes with the positive assessment, may represent a classical strategy for understatement. The pragmatic meaning [non-serious] conveyed by the diminutive also contributes to understatement. This understatement procedure is in conflict with exclamatory emphasis (see above 3.5.11.6.2, cf. Brown-Levinson 1987: 219). Downgrading, via diminutive, applies to the expressive part of the speech act, that is, it does not interfere with the assessment part. The effect is thus restrained emphasis. With the same examples and with a similar clash, irony or sarcasm can be produced instead, given the appropriate prosody. Of course, the speaker may just intend to be polite and thus just pretend a positive judgement. It should be noted, however, that the use of the diminutive with its feature [non-serious] prevents the speaker from referring to an extremely large or valuable item of the respective category (e.g., a Rolls Royce in (269) or a real fortune in (268 b, d)), except for irony. In other words, the understatement can only apply to a limited range of thresholds on the dimensional scales relevant for the referent.

282

Diminutives

On the other hand, if the car is actually small, then the exclamation may want to convey despise instead. In this case, the diminutive does not downgrade the propositional content of despise. Of course, prosody changes whether despise or admiration is conveyed. The same effects are obtained in: (270)

Che test-ol-ina che ha! what head-INTERF-DIM that (s/he) has! 'What a smart mind s/he has!'

(usually with the interfix -ol- vs. test-ina). The declarative sentence format is more likely in German (also cited by Klimaszewska 1983: 58): (270')

SielEr hat aber ein Köpf-chen/303 she/he has but a head-DIM 'But s/he's quite intelligent!'

The expressive part is predominant in the following exclamation: (271)

Wie gern ich jetzt ein Wein-d-erl hätte! how lovingly I now a wine+DIM would have 'How much I'd like a nice little wine now!'

(cf. Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1989 a: 241 (4)), which is unlikely to be uttered by an alcoholic in serious want of alcohol or by somebody lost in a desert and dying from thirst. This shows the relevance of the feature [non-serious]. In (271), the expressive force is made predominant, whereas the assessment is merely presupposed. Accordingly, only the illocutionary strength of the expressive is modified by the diminutive. Also the following exclamation is predominantly expressive (joy): (272)

Sapere che c'e un nuovo esser-ino che sta to know that there's a new being-DIM that is crescendo dentro di me! growing within me 'To think that there's a tiny new being growing inside of me!'

In addition to denoting smallness, the diminutive upgrades the emotional expression of inner states and thus supports the upgrading effect of the exclamatory emphasis.

Data and their interpretation

— Assessments

283

Similarly, diverse effects are obtained when adjectives rather than nouns are diminutivised in exclamations. For example in Che cald-ino! 'What warm/hot-DIM = Pretty hot!', the speaker's surprise can alternatively be (a) a pleasant one by default; (b) an unpleasant one in case of irony (where the diminutive contrasts with the implied notion of coldness); (c) understatement (restrained emphasis). In (a), the diminutive is an upgrader of inner states, in accordance with the presence of emotion (joy), which is expected to accompany exclamations. The corresponding declarative sentence format Ε cald-ino! is, accordingly, less likely to be uttered with emotional involvement. The propositional content is downgraded. In the (b, c) cases, the diminutive is a downgrader, as is usually the case when no emotion is present. Returning to nouns, let us take the insulting exclamation addressed to a friend: (273)

Sei una (a) bestial (b) besti-ol-ina! you are a beast beast-INTERF-DIM (a) 'You're an ignoramus!' (b) 'You're a fine one!'

where (b) is strongly attenuated in comparison with (a). Due to the expectation of (at least global) cooperativeness among friends, the diminutive in (273 b) will be interpreted as mitigation of the negative assessment. As a consequence, an interpretation of (273 b) as an insult is most unlikely. 3.5.11.6.4. Finally, let us briefly look at exclamations where the expressive combines with an illocutionary force other than assessment. When we transform (317) into the expressive speech act of either an insult or a protest: (273') a. Bestial

b. Besti-ol-ina!

the diminutive is still a downgrader. In accordance, (273 b) can be directed only at an addressee with whom there is a globally cooperative interaction, antagonism being only local. Our next case combines the exclamation with the expressive speech act of regret (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 842): (274)

Oh, se non avessi fatto tutta questa serie di oh if not I had done all this series of sciocchezz-uole! blunders-DIM 'Oh if only I hadn't done all these stupid little things!'

284

Diminutives

Here the expressive force of regret is downgraded relative to speaker's commitment and to propositional content, and this is partly due to the somewhat jocular character of the diminutivised noun. When replacing it with the non-jocular error-ini 'errors-DIM', there is still downgrading, but to a more limited degree. A speaker producing a directive exclamation intended as a warning would normally avoid diminutivisation (with its feature of [non-seriousness], for fear of nullifying the perlocutionary goal of warning). Thus the diminutive (a) variants of the formulaic (b) variants in: (275)

(275')

Attenti al (a) cagn-ettol cagn-ol-ino! vs. attentive(PL) of the dog-DIM/ dog-INTERF-DIM (b) cane! dog Achtung (a) bissiges Hünd-chen! (b) bissiger Hund! attention biting dog-DIM biting dog 'Beware of the doggie!/dog!'

would result in a jocular parody, devoid of any actual force of warning. If the dog is actually very big, irony is added. If the dog is very small and hardly harmful, jocularity rests on the violation of the preparatory condition for warnings, that is, that there is a danger which the addressee is to be warned of. 304 Mention of imprecatives is in order here, because they are similar to exclamations (Sadock-Zwicky 1985: 163) and sometimes included in the same class. They also are emphatic, generally emotional, and represent strong reactions, but, in fact, they lack the element of surprise and are predominantly hearer-oriented. When imprecatives appear as curses, they are classified as declaratives (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 209). In the following curse: (276)

Che ti venga un (a) accidente! (b) accident-ino! that ye come an accident accident-DIM (a) 'Damn you!' (b) Ί hope you have rotten luck!'

the main effects obtained by the diminutive in (276 b) are downgrading of speaker's commitment, of propositional content and of risk of negative perlocutionary sequels. Jocularity and familiarity are usually involved (cf. 3.5.12.1).

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

285

3.5.12. Other speech acts This sub-chapter is devoted to speech acts other than directives (3.5.10) and assertives/evaluatives (3.5.11). In order to avoid repetitiveness, the analysis will not be as systematic as in the previous sub-chapters, but will only touch upon specific aspects which are not strictly analogous to those analyzed previously. Nor will the survey be a complete one, since such an endeavor would require a separate book. Our framework of analysis is Searle's classifications (1969, 1976, Searle-Vanderveken 1985). In addition, we will consider finer sub-classifications (such as in Wunderlich 1976), but not models with more general classes (such as in Sbisä 1989). 3.5.12.1. Declaratives Declaratives 305 are those acts whose illocutionary point is to bring about a state of affairs by the mere utterance of the propositional content (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 37, 39). "In general declarations require an extralinguistic institution and a special position of the speaker" (1985: 205). The formality of such situations generally blocks the use of diminutives, with few exceptions in Italian and probably none in German. It holds for all speech acts that their expression is more formulaic (and therefore more formal) when a performative verb is used. Thus we may expect an inverse correlation between the frequency of use of performatives and that of diminutives. Now, the declarative act, prototypically, requires the use of a performative verb and is thus particularly unlikely to exhibit diminutives. Now we come to still another reason for not expecting diminutives in declarative speech acts. In contrast to the speech acts so far discussed, declaratives do not accommodate the expression of inner states. And therefore they are not expected to display emotions. The speaker may be emotionally involved in the declarative act, but his emotions do not find expression in the formulaic language of declaratives. If they do, they give shape to a simultaneous expressive speech act. 306 The fact that declaratives are incompatible with the expression of emotions, blocks the use of diminutives as upgraders of emotional inner states (in contrast to other speech acts, cf. 3.5.10.4.2, 3.5.11.2.2). Nevertheless diminutives are conceivable in some special types of speech acts which may still count as declarations, although they lack explicit performative verbs. Our corpus of spontaneous language does not include any specimen. But the following fabricated examples were easily accepted by native speakers. Our first is:

286

(277)

Diminutives

Da questo momento tu sei il suo (a) padron-c-ino from this moment you are the his master-DIM / (b) padrone e devi curartene. (referring to a dog) master and you must take care of 'From now on, you'll be his own little master and will have to take care of him.'

(277 a) is perfectly conceivable when directed at a child by an adult. If directed at an adult, extra conditions are necessary, for example: it must be jocular or ironic, e.g., recreating a child-centered speech situation. Under the same conditions, it may also appear in a lover-centered speech situation. It should also be noted that (277) simultaneously refers to a pet-centered speech situation, and that the utterance would be less likely if referred to the ownership of, for example, a boat or a car. Thus a combination of favorable conditions seems to be necessary for making the diminutive in (277 a) appropriate: speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4) and/ or jocularity (3.5.5) and/or irony (3.5.14). The German translation: (277')

Und von diesem Augenblick an bist du sein Herr-l and from this moment on are you his master IFrau-erl... /mistress

also contains a diminutive, but it is lexicalized, and so (277') is the translation of both (277 a) and (277 b), no jocularity or irony or special speech situation being needed. 307 That is to say, (277') is no exception to the exclusion of diminutive formation rules from German declarative speech acts. In fact, the only exception we can think of might occur in some satirical imitation of child speech made, for example, by adult actors engaged in political satire. The specific sarcasm would be obtained by exaggerating the diminutivum puerile or overextending its use. Now let us discuss endorsements and nominations. We have already pointed out that diminutives are excluded from formal declarative acts expressed with declarative performative verbs, as in: (278)

Io dichiaro di appoggiare la candidatura di X per questo I declare to endorse the nomination of X for this posto. position. Ί declare that I endorse X's nomination for this position.'

Data and their interpretation — Other speech acts

(278')

287

Io presento la candidatura di X per il posto di I present the nomination of X for the post of presidente. president Ί present X's nomination for the post of president.'

Diminutive forms, such as *post-ic-ino30S ( - G. **Pöst-chen!-leintPosterl) and **president-ino ( = G. **Präsident-erllchenlleiri) 'humble president' would sound ridiculous. Yet, at least in Italian (but cf. 3.5.11.6.4 (275)), such diminutive uses would be conceivable if restricted to an in-group, where all people are well acquainted and possibly friends, and especially where a jocular tone is allowed even for serious matters, as in: (279)

Per il post-ic-ino di presidente (*president-ino) For the p o s t - I N T E R F - D I M of president (*-DIM) presento/propongo la candidatura di... I present propose the nomination o f . . . 'For the humble position of president I present/propose as cand i d a t e . . . .'

The conditions of familiarity (3.5.8) and jocularity (3.5.5), and possibly additional friendly irony (3.5.14) are presupposed. The strength of the declaration is downgraded (cf. 3.5.11.4, 3.5.12.2) in terms of determinacy/ precision of propositional content, authority/entitlement of the speaker, and obligations assigned to the addressee. As to speaker's commitment, strength of the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal, and attempt to avoid conflictual perlocutionary sequels, we have to take into account that (279) combines the declarative speech act with a request, and it would be under the heading of request (cf. 3.5.11.4) that downgrading operates. In other words, the diminutive in (279) would be used as a strategy for convincing a reluctant candidate, but in a jocular atmosphere and with a jocular tone, although with serious intent. The following variant would sound even more jocular: (279')

Ε se chiedessimo a X di essere il nostro president-ino? and if we asked X to be the our president-DIM 'And what about asking X to be our dear president?'

addressed to such an assembly of people, in the presence of X (it counts as an indirect request to X). But of course, it is unlikely that all the necessary factors for such utterances cooccur.

288

Diminutives

Another example of a somewhat ludic performance of a declaration is: (280)

Ε con questo estinguo il mio debit-ino. and by this I cancel the my debt-DIM 'And hereby I cancel my outstanding little debt.'

(accompanied by the actual action of handing over the money). 3.5.12.2. Expressives Next, let us discuss some relevant aspects of expressive speech acts (called behabitives by Austin and McCawley and acknowledgments by B a c h Harnish 1979: 41, 51). "The expressive point is to express feelings and attitudes ... the speaker expresses some psychological attitude about the state of affairs represented by the propositional content" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 38).309 3.5.12.2.1. In the case of apologies, that is, of redressive acts (repair work) costly to the speaker, 310 the point is "to express sorrow or. regret for some state of affairs that the speaker is responsible for", a preparatory condition is that the state of affairs "is bad for the hearer" (SearleVanderveken 1985: 211). Our examples are: (281)

Scusami se sono arrivato un po' tard-ino.311 excuse me if I am arrived a bit late-DIM 'Sorry for being a bit on the late side.'

(282)

Send, scusami per quelle sciocchezz-ine che ti ho listen excuse me for those silly things-DIM that ye I've detto, non le pensavo. said not them I was thinking 'Listen, do excuse me for those rather silly things I said to you I didn't mean them.'

In both examples, we identify diminution of propositional content (cf. 3.5.10.4.2.2), downgrading of speaker's commitment (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.3), understatement (cf. 3.5.10.4.4.1). The speaker's attempt at avoiding conflictual perlocutionary sequels (cf. 3.5.10.4.4.2) may turn out to be the wrong strategy. There may actually be conflictual reactions such as:

Data and their interpretation — Other speech acts

(28 Γ)

(282')

289

Chiamalo tard-ino! Sono tre ore che ti aspetto. call it late-DIM are 3 hours that ye await 'Call it a bit late! That's three hours I've been waiting for you.' Chiamale sciocchezz-ine, mi hai veramente offeso! call them silly things-DIM me you've really offended 'Call them rather silly things - you really offended me!'

The negative reaction is precisely triggered by the first speaker's downgraded commitment and by the risk of being understood as failing to make a serious attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal (cf. Meier 1992 on risks in repair work). The same might occur with the German and casual Viennese parallels to (282): (282")

(282"')

Entschuldige bitte, das war nur ein Späß-chen! excuse please that was just a joke-DIM 'Sorry, that was just a little joke.' 'tschuldige meine Spass-ett-eln! excuse my jokes-(DIM)-DIM!

with a lexicalised form consisting of the Italian diminutivised noun spassetto followed by the suffix -el. In German, much more than in Italian, diminutivized excuses are limited to familiar or even intimate speech situations. In Meier's (1992) data, elicited in test situations, no transparent diminutives occur, whereas other mitigators do, e.g., ein kleines Malheur 'a small mischief'. 3.5.12.2.2. A second type of expressive are thanks, that is, expression of gratitude for benefits received. 312 The example we have is (in Italian and Viennese German): (283)

Grazie per il Danke für das thanks for the 'Thanks for the

delizioso regal-ino! reizende Geschenk-erl! lovely gift-DIM lovely little gift!'

The diminutive, here, downgrades neither propositional content nor speaker's commitment. It is rather used to upgrade the expression of inner state (cf. 3.5.10.4.2), through an emotional attitude (e.g., endearment) towards the present and/or the giver. Alternatively, with different prosody and mimics, (283) might be a choice towards understatement

290

Diminutives

(cf. 3.5.10.4.4.1), e.g., uttered by a reserved person who refrains from expressing strong emotions. Understatement would also apply in case of an indirect way of thanking, 313 such as: (283) a. Io ho ricevuto un delizioso regal-ino! I have received a lovely gift-DIM Ich hab' ein reizendes Geschenk-erl erhalten! I have a lovely gift-DIM received 'I've just received a really lovely little gift!' directed at the person who sent the present. The speaker jokingly pretends the giver is not the addressee. In this way, the speaker downgrades the obligation imposed on the addressee (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2), who is not seriously obliged to acknowledge the speaker's gratitude. An actual lower degree of speaker's commitment, instead, would have to be expressed in a different way, such as in the rather dismissive-sounding variant: (283) b. Ah, Oh, oh, Oh,

a proposito, übrigens, by the way, by the way,

grazie danke thanks thanks

del für das for the for the

regal-ino. Geschenk-erl. gift-DIM little gift.'

In trying to account for the difference between (283 b) and (283 a), we have to refer to the social norm whereby gratitude should be sincere and deeply felt for whatever amount of benefit provided, and should be expressed accordingly. Therefore a diminutivized thanks, by implicature, will not be interpreted as downgraded propositional content or speaker's commitment, but rather as in (283 a). If such downgrading is actually intended, it must be made clear through co(n)textual cues or overt expression, such as the phrase by the way in (283 b) or a flat, matter-of-fact intonation in: (283) c. Grazie per il regal-ino. Danke für das Geschenk-erl especially with avoidance of an intensifying modifier (such as delizioso in (283)).

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

291

Downgrading of propositional content and speaker's commitment could be also obtained through modification of the performative expression grazie. In utterances (283 c), the only possible landing-site for the diminutive is regalo, since neither delizioso nor grazie admit diminutivization. But the feature [non-serious] could be expressed by adding piccolo 'small' to grazie, as in: (283) d. Un piccolo grazie per il (delizioso) regalo. 'Just a word of thanks for the (lovely) gift.' Here the above-mentioned implicature for a sincere-gratitude interpretation is less clearly invited than in (283). Irony would be applicable to (283), with the appropriate prosody. For example, (283) could be used to thank someone for a gift which was expected, but not given. 3.5.12.2.3. Diminutives can also be used to modify congratulations (cf. 3.5.11.3):314 (284) a. Congratulazioni per la tua rivist-ina. congratulations for the your magazine-DIM 'Congratulations on your neat magazine.' If (284 a) is uttered with intended downgrading of propositional content and speaker's commitment, the addressee's obligation to thank is also downgraded, even to the point of provoking a conflictual reaction. If, however, the speaker's attitude is transparently one of empathy towards the addressee, such as in the variant: (284) b. Congratulazioni per la tua amata rivist-ina! congratulations for the your beloved magazine-DIM the interpretation is not one of downgraded speaker's commitment. The imposed obligation to thank may even be upgraded, especially if speaker's emotion is displayed. In this case, also the expression of inner state and strength of attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal are upgraded. Friendly irony may be applied especially to the object of empathy. An example we have is: (285)

Ah, bene, e arrivato finalmente il tuo amato oh well is arrived finally the your beloved marit-inol husband-DIM 'Oh, good, your dear husband has finally arrived!'

292

Diminutives

where the speaker is affectionately teasing the addressee for her excessive tenderness for her husband. 3.5.12.2.4. The conditions of the speech act of condoling, the opposite of congratulating, are too serious to allow diminutivisation of any sort (except, possibly, for the loss of a child). In case of complaining or lamenting, diminutives normally refer to the assertion associated with, or embedded in, the expressive speech act, as in: (286) a. Guarda che pasticc-etti che ha fatto il cane, qui! look what mess-DIM that has made the dog here 'Look what a fine little mess the dog's made here!' where downgrading affects propositional content, speaker's commitment, and possibly obligation imposed on the addressee (of consoling, commiserating, of expressing surprise). The expression of an emotional inner state may be upgraded. There is no exact parallel in German. But if we take the denotatively similar Viennese pair (cf. 3.5.3): (286)

Schau (b) das Hauf-erl/i (c) den Haufen an, daslden der look the heap-DIM the heap at that the Hund hier gemacht hat! dog here made has

then the difference between (286 b) and (286 c) is predominantly denotative (referring to a normal size in (286 b) and a big one in (286 c)). Northern German has, in addition to the exclamation Ach Gott! 'Oh God!', a diminutive variant Ach Gott-chen!, often used for commiseration, e. g., as a reaction to somebody complaining about a sad or negative event, that is, this exclamation downplays the importance of that event, cf. 3.5.11.6.2. Commiseration and compassion are also expressed in the German examples (287) and (288) cited by Klimaszewska (1983: 59, 55-56): (287)

Das arme Ent-lein hatte es wirklich nicht gut the poor duck-DIM had it really not good 'The poor little duck really didn't have a good time.'

(288)

Der Kranke muß rechtzeitig sein Süpp-chen essen the sick must in time his soup-DIM eat 'The sick person must eat his little soup in time.'

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

293

Empathy with somebody in need results in upgrading of the expression of inner states via diminutive. Example (287) occurs in a book for children and (288) is especially favored when talking about sick, elderly people. Thus these are speech situations apt for a diminutivum puerile and senile, respectively.315 3.5.12.2.5. The speech act of wishing expresses a desire for a future event which is seen as desirable for either speaker or addressee (or both). 316 An example is, with and without performative verb: (289) a. Allora, ti auguro di passare una bella serat-ina. well ye I wish to spend a nice evening-DIM 'Well, I hope you have a nice enjoyable evening.' b. Allora, passa una bella serat-ina! well spend a nice evening-DIM 'Well, have a nice enjoyable evening!' The diminutive obtains empathy and often displays emotion (except when ironic), therefore the expression of inner states (and also of speaker's commitment) is upgraded. In German wishes, diminutives appear much less likely than in Italian. 3.5.12.2.6. Next, let us consider the speech act of welcoming, as in: (290) a. Benvenuto nella mia cas-etta! welcome in the my house-DIM 'Welcome to my humble abode/little house!' If accompanied with expressed joyful emotion, the diminutive upgrades the expression of inner state, speaker's commitment seems to be upgraded, also the obligation imposed on the addressee of thanking and sharing the speaker's emotions. Denotative diminution of 'house' (actual or due to understatement) is a possible interpretation, but, more likely, the diminutive is interpretable as an expression of endearment or good feeling towards the house. Emotion and intimacy are more clearly expressed in: (290) b. Che gioia averti qui nella mia cas-etta! what joy have you here in the my house-DIM 'How wonderful to have you here in my dear little house!'

294

Diminutives

with no performative verb and with the naming of the emotion felt. The German translation of (290 a): (290) c. Willkommen in meinem Häus-chen!Häus-erll*Haus-ί! welcome in my house-DIM rather refers to denotative diminution of 'house' (again actual or by understatement). Once more, German diminutives, show their less important pragmatic role than Italian ones (cf. also (286 b) vs. (286 c)). 3.5.12.2.7. Finally, let us mention greetings (cf. Bach-Harnish 1979: 51). Their function is predominately phatic but may also be emotive (cf. Stankiewicz 1989: 76). Italian, but not German, letters or postcards 317 may be closed with: (291)

bac-ini, *Küß-chen,3Xg salut-ini, *Grüß-chen kisses-DIM greetings-DIM

An Italian girl used to write salut-ini to members of her family, the interfixed (and thus pragmatically intensified) variant salut-ar-elli to close friends. The diminutives in (291) may upgrade the expression of emotional inner state and of the writer's commitment and also impose, on the addressee, an extra obligation to keep up the warm relationship (including intimacy) presupposed by the use of these diminutives. Diminutives also contribute to accomplishing this goal through their effect of de-automatising the formulaic base form saluti. Emotional upgrading of inner states or jocularity are obtained with diminutivized greetings, such as Northern G. Tag-chen; Viennese juvenile Hallo-tscherl; Swiss G. Tschau-li; Hung, szioka (cf. Terestyeni 1992), etc. All of them presuppose familiarity (see also 3.3.3.5). In Italian, there is only (Buon) giorn-ino '(Good) day-DIM', usable when addressing small children or pets. In other words, diminutive formation is restricted to the most general greeting formula and to child/pet-centered speech situations. Diachronically, most greeting formulae have their origin in speech acts of wishing, of the type Ί wish/God give you a good day'. Therefore the pragmatics of diminutives in such greetings may be thought of as deriving diachronically from empathetic or emotional upgrading of the expression of inner states in wishes via diminutives (if we may generalize from the synchronic state of affairs discussed in 3.5.12.2.5). If our diachronic hy-

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

295

pothesis is correct, the importance of emotional upgrading in current diminutivised greetings may be identified as a trace of the pragmatics of earlier diminutivised wishes. 3.5.12.3. Commissives In commissive speech acts, "the speaker commits himself to carrying out the course of action represented by the propositional content" (SearleVanderveken 1985: 37; cf. Bach-Harnish 1979: 49). The importance of speaker's commitment makes it a primary target for modification via diminutives. 3.5.12.3.1. In the speech act of promising, the strength of commitment co-varies with the obligation undertaken by the speaker in the act of promising. In: (292) a. Ti prometto un aiut-ino, ma per domani ye I promise a help-DIM but for tomorrow Ί promise to help you out, but tomorrow though.' (not for now, as you seem to expect) the commitment is downgraded through diminution of propositional content and deferring of time, the speaker displays reluctance to undertake an obligation. This in turn downgrades the obligations imposed on the addressee of being pleased and thankful. The variant: (292) b. Ti prometto un aiut-ino per domani, non preoccuparti ye I promise a help-DIM for tomorrow not worry Ί promise to help you out tomorrow, don't worry.' however, may obtain an upgrading of emotional inner state, 319 through the display of emotion and the supplement. In this way, diminution of propositional content is made less evident and downgrading of speaker's commitment is nullified. Next, we have a promise with no performative verb: (293)

Magari, uno di questi giorni vi diamo un colp-ett-ino perhaps one of these days ye we give a call-DIM-DIM di telefono... e forse ci sta anche un of phone and maybe there stays also a ristorant-ino e un pranz-etto restaurant-DIM and a lunch-DIM 'One of these days we might just give you a ring ... and maybe we could even arrange to go out to a nice restaurant for a quick lunch together.'

296

Diminutives

(uttered by two policemen in a film and addressed to two girls). The main goal of these diminutives is to test the girls' willingness to accept a possible invitation, that is, to downgrade commitment and determinacy (precision) of propositional content and thus save face in case of the addressees' lack of interest. The same holds for the offer associated with the promise. Promises such as in (292) and (293) cannot be diminutivized in German, mainly because the respective nominal bases do not admit diminutives. But example (294 a) is appropriate, (294 b) somewhat less so due to the presence of the performative verb (cf. 3.5.12.1): (294) a. Ich I b. Ich I 'I'll

schreib' dir ein Brief-erI. write you a letter-DIM versprech' dir ein Brief-erl zu schreiben. promise ye a letter-DIM to write (b: I promise to) write you a little letter.'

These diminutives are interpretable as diminishing propositional content (size or importance of the letter) or downgrading speaker's commitment, but other interpretations are not excluded. Various effects are identifiable in Sbisä's (1989: 144 (9)) example, a promise by a cook in a TV serial: (295)

Tutti quanti avranno il loro piatt-ino di dolce. all so many will have the their plate-DIM of dessert 'Everyone will be sure to get their plate of dessert.'

Interpretation of denotative smallness is improbable, in this case a more appropriate wording would be un piattino 'a plate-DIM'. The presence of the possessive loro privileges a pragmatic interpretation. As in previous cases (cf. 3.5.7.2), the possessive may be an indicator of empathy. With this promise, the speaker undertakes an obligation to benefit the referents (tutti) and has the purpose of reassuring the beneficiaries and the hearers. The lower speaker's commitment that may be indicated by the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive may arouse some worry in the hearers, since they may suspect a reduction in the obligation undertaken by the promiser. And this might even provoke a reaction by the addressee (a TV moderator, for example) of the type: (295) b. Ma, sul serio, eh, mi raccomando. but on the serious OK me I recommend 'Be sure and do it seriously though.'

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

297

The more evident the ludic character of the speaker's promise, the less satisfied may the addressee be with the promise. Still another interpretation of (295) would presuppose a different speech act sequence, where (295) would be a concession to somebody complaining rather than a spontaneous promise. 320 In this case, the diminutive would indicate empathy focussed on the addressee, the complainer, rather than on the generic referents (tutti). We return to the motto of our chapter, Lichtenberg's aphorism, with the following promise: (296)

Verro fra uri or-etta I'll come within an hour-DIM Ich komm' in einem Stünd-chen (German) I come in an/one hour-DIM 'I'll be there in about an hour/in an hour or so.'

Here the diminutive mainly downgrades precision of propositional content and speaker's commitment. 321 Promises never initiate a dialogue, and they often occur as answers to questions, even maximally reduced to mere yes or no answers. A more elaborate promise is B's rhymed Viennese answer to A's question (cf. Wehle 1980: 210): (297) A: What do I get for it? Β: Α goldenes Nix-erl in an silbernem a golden nothing-DIM in a silver Bix-erl (— Büchs-erl) IKist-erl box-DIM /chest-DIM Ά little golden nothing in a little silver box/chest.' mitigating the negative answer, where the effect of the diminutive is supported by strategies of elaboration (e.g., connotationally positive adjective, rhyme). 3.5.12.3.2. Speech acts of threatening 322 may share with promises the same surface expression (cf. Wunderlich 1976: 280), in the sense that a) without a performative verb disambiguating words or phrases, their expression is identical; b) the performative verb promise = G. versprechen may be used for threats in English and German (but, in general, not in Italian, see below). The underlying reason for this overt similarity is that

298

Diminutives

both speech acts count as the speaker's undertaking of a future action directed at the addressee, beneficial in the case of promises, detrimental in the case of threats. Let us start with an ambiguous expression exemplifying type a) above: (298)

Domani, ti faccio una (a) visit-ina / (b) visita. tomorrow ye I make a visit-DIM visit 'Tomorrow I'll pay you a little visit.'

This may be either a prediction (an assertive speech act) or a promise or even a threat, depending on the context of interpretation. In case of a promise-interpretation of (298 a), the diminutive would appear to downgrade propositional content, speaker's commitment, obligations imposed. As to the expression of inner states, the diminutive may upgrade them if accompanied by displayed emotion. In case of a threat-interpretation, the diminutive does not downgrade anything, and seems to upgrade the expression of inner state (menacing attitude) even in the absence of emotion. Moreover, it may intensify the conflictual perlocutionary sequel. We account for this divergence between promises and threats in the following way. Threats and insults are the most face-threatening social acts, insofar as they not only neglect the addressee's negative face-wants, but they also directly impede the addressee's agenda of intended actions, and they diminish his image (unless he reacts, in turn, with similar acts). Moreover, as we have seen, threats announce detriment for the addressee. The diminutive, with its feature [non-serious] attached to the speech act of threatening, may further diminish the addressee's face, provided that he is a "competent adult" (in the sense of Brown-Levinson 1987: 62) and not a child, and that the situation is neither jocular nor embedded in a cooperative interaction. More precisely, the feature [non-serious] negatively acts on the addressee's image, insofar as the addressee is not even granted the dignity of being taken as a serious opponent. This face-threatening force of the diminutive becomes most transparent, if its landing-site is an expression referring to the person threatened, as in: (299)

Warte nur Kerl-chen, jetzt werd' ich dir's zeigen! wait just chap-DIM now will I ye it show 'Just wait, little chap, now I'll show you!'

uttered with despisal. An Italian example for this (with a predicative adjective concording with the pro-drop subject referring to the addressee) can be found in the following threatening order:

Data and their interpretation

(300)

— Other speech acts

299

Stai tranquill-ino, hai capito? keep quiet-DIM have you understood 'Just keep nice and quiet, do you understand?'

uttered, in a film, by a robber holding a gun. Here the speaker's threatened action is not made explicit, but is recoverable from context and prosody, and in any case from the robbery frame. If the threat represents a momentary conflict embedded in an otherwise cooperative social interaction, and if this global cooperativeness is more important than the local antagonism, the feature [non-serious] inherent in the diminutive may act towards downgrading speaker's commitment and obligations imposed, as well as confiictual perlocutions. This holds both for (300) and: (301)

Guarda, signorin-ella, che ti do due sberle! beware young lady-DIM that ye I give two slaps 'Watch out, my dear girl, or I'll give you a couple of slaps.'

uttered by a mother to her grown-up daughter (also possible between other similar non-equal roles). We find similar downgrading in a combination of threatening, assessment and, perhaps, also an expressive speech act (female professor to male dean, raising a finger in a threatening gesture): (302)

Ti meriteresti un (a) calc-etto / (b) calcio nello ye you'd deserve a kick-DIM kick in the stinco! shin-bone 'You'd deserve a (a: little) kick in the shin!'

This is a very mitigated threat, first, because its primary illocutionary force is assertive and only secondarily a threat, and, second, because the diminutive downgrades the overall seriousness of the threat. Contributing to the somewhat jocular utterance is also the wording chosen, more suited to a boy's playground than to a supposedly formal speech situation. Of course, a feature [non-serious] can be used for understatement. In (302 a), to a beholder, the seriousness of the speaker's negative assessment did not appear downgraded, and accordingly the utterance was received as serious in content, although as an understatement in form.

300

Diminutives

Threats are often conditioned (cf. Wunderlich 1976: 289 on conditioned speech acts), where the threat occupies the apodosis. Diminutives may modify either the protasis (concerning the addressee's action to be sanctioned) or the apodosis (concerning the speaker's threatened action). Let us start with a modified apodosis: (303)

Se non stai zitto, ti do uno (a) sberl-otto if not you stay quiet ye I give a slap-DIM / (b) sberl-ott-ino! slap-DIM-DIM 'If you don't keep quiet, I'll give you a quick slap!'

Here the diminutive primarily affects propositional content (a small slap) and this operates a general downgrading. The double diminutive in (303 b) downgrades even more. Diminutives in the protasis, as in: (303) c. Se non stai zitt-ino, ti do una sberla! if not you stay quiet-DIM ye I give a slap 'If you don't keep nice and quiet, I'll give you a slap!' do not downgrade the threat, because the feature [non-serious] is not attached to the speech act of threatening itself (conveyed in the apodosis). Rather, due to its precise landing-site in the protasis, the addressee's face is threatened (cf. above (298-299)) and the overall seriousness of the speech act is intensified. The same holds, if the expression of the threat is, as often is the case, entrusted to the protasis only: (304)

Se non stai (a) zitt-ino ...! f (b) zitto ...! 'If you don't keep (a: nice and) quiet, (then ...)!'

Clearly the threat is by no means less serious in (304 a) than in (304 b), unless, again, there are nullifying conditions such as with (301), (302) above and, in general, in case the threat is embedded in a cooperative macrostructure. Returning to case (b) at the beginning of our discussion of promises, we must point out that Italian does not use the performative verb 'promise' for threats, unless included in sequences of the type:

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

301

(305) A: Mi prometti un bacio, se finisco in tempo? me promise you a kiss if I finish in time 'Do you promise me a kiss, if I finish in time?' B: 77 prometto (a) uno sberl-otto / (b) una sberla, se non ye I promise a slap-DIM a slap, if not finis ci! you finish Ί promise you a (a: good) slap, if you don't!' where (305 a, b) become appropriate when in strict parallelism with the preceding sentence. In turning the expected promise into a threat, speaker Β mitigates the negative implication for A via the diminutive in (305 a). Unlike in promises, in threats the commitment that the speaker undertakes to perform a future action (the action threatened) is not liable to put the speaker's face at risk, if in the end he does not actually fulfil it. 3.5.12.3.3. Speech acts of swearing are similar to promises or threats, but they need the presence of the performative verb 'swear'. Unlike other speech acts, where the performative verb is generally a choice towards formality, in swearing this does not apply, because the performative verb is a necessity in all cases (an instance of surface neutralization of formal and informal character). The diminutive then may easily cooccur with the performative verb and has the same effects as in promises (example (306), (307)) and threats (308): (306)

77 giuro che arrivo prest-ino prest-ino. ye I swear that I arrive soon-DIM soon-DIM Ί swear I'll arrive really early.'

(307)

77 giuro che ne mangerö soltanto un piatt-ino. ye I swear that of it I'll eat only a plate-DIM Ί swear that I'll eat no more than just a plate.'

(308)

Ti giuro che ti do uno sberl-otto ye I swear that ye I give a slap-DIM Ί swear I'll give you a good slap.'

Since swearing commits the speaker maximally (more than promising or threatening), one might expect it to be hardly compatible with downgrading via diminutives. The fact that it actually is compatible indicates that

302

Diminutives

diminutives may operate as downgraders at any threshold of the illocutionary strength. 3.5.12.3.4. Similar to swearing, the speech act of betting requires the use of the performative verb and implies a strong commitment by the speaker. Bets, in their strict sense, 323 require an official mode of achievement involving reciprocity by the addressee. In this case, they highly disfavor the pragmatic effects of diminutives. Yet, betting may be used also figuratively as strong assertives, that is, its preparatory condition is that the speaker has such strong grounds (at least to his judgement) for what he asserts (assertive entitlement) that he formally vouches for the truth of his belief (assertive sincerity condition) and undertakes the obligation (the commissive part) to pay if his belief turns out to be incorrect. This results in a strong commitment on the part of the speaker. Now, all three crucial elements, that is, entitlement, assertive and commissive commitment, may be downgraded by diminutives, as in: (309)

Scommetto un milion-c-ino che lui lo farä I bet a million-DIM that he it will do 'I'll even bet a million that he'll do it.'

The assertive part becomes predominant, if the indicative in the performative in (309) is replaced by the conditional (which is impossible with bets in the strict sense): Scommetterei.... 'I'd b e t . . . . ' Assertive bets of this latter type are also much more frequent than those of type (309). The same holds in German: (309')

Ich würde! möchtet könnte ein hübsches Sümm-chen wetten, V dt might/ could a nice sum-DIM bet daß.... that 'I('d/might/could) bet a nice little sum that

3.5.12.3.5. The speech act of bidding, 324 when used in very formal speech situations (such as auctions and tenders) is too serious a type of offer for admitting diminutives, whereas informal bids and, in general, other types of offers may admit them. Bids and, with reservations (see below), offers are commissives and as such they commit the speaker to some future action, the performing of which is conditional on the addressee's previous acceptance. 325

Data and their interpretation — Other speech acts

303

See the following informal (Italian and Viennese) bid: (310)

Ti compro io la tua macchin-ina, se mi ye buy I the your car-DIM if me buon prezzo. good price Ich kauf' dir dein Wag-erl ab, wenn du I buy ye your car-DIM off if you Preis machst. price make 'I'll buy your car from you all right, if your

fai un you make a

mir einen guten me a good

price is right.'

Here no downgrading is apparent, but there is either empathy with the seller's positive attitude towards his car and familiarity between the interlocutors or, marginally, irony, if there is a clash between the referent (e. g., a luxury car) and the denotation of the diminutive. Downgrading via the diminutive is not excluded, but this would need some extra coding, such as in: (310')

Ah, ti compro io la tua macchin-ina, non preoccuparti. VG. Ah, ich kauf' dein Wag-erl ab, mach dir keine Sorgen. 'Oh, I'll buy your car from you all right, don't worry.'

(uttered with the appropriate prosody). Here at least speaker's commitment is downgraded. 3.5.12.3.6. A proper commissive offer (other than a bid) is: (311)

Ti offro tutti i miei sold-ini, va bene? ye I offer all the my money-DIM goes well 'I'll offer you all the cash I've got, O.K.?'

with emotional upgrading of the expression of inner states. In absence of the performative verb 'offer' (It. offrire, G. anbieten), often commissive offers 326 are difficult to distinguish from directive speech acts. In such cases, we must differentiate ambiguity (cf. ErvinT r i p p - G u o — Lampert 1990: 308) from combination. Let us start with mixture of a (commissive) offer with a directive speech act (such as advice, recommendation, invitation, suggestion). The following indirect offer includes advice, that is, in this case, a suggestion to accept help for the benefit of the addressee:

304

(312)

Diminutives

Cosa ne diresti di un aiut-ino da parte mia? what of it would you say to a help-DIM on part my Sono brav a, sai. I'm good you know 'What would you say to a bit of help on my part? I'm good at it, you know.'

Here the diminutive mainly indicates, for both the commissive and the directive part, lower speaker's entitlement/power, not necessarily less commitment, but perhaps understatement or modesty. Again, there may be an upgrading of inner states through displayed emotion (with appropriate intonation). Next, let us take speech situations in restaurants. A written menu can be analyzed as an offer which commits the restaurant to providing any dish chosen from the menu. Sometimes, the offer can be mixed with a recommendation or suggestion, namely when the menu is used as an advertisement at the same time. 327 The speech act of recommendation becomes predominant in a waiter's utterance: 328 (313)

Ich könnt' Ihnen da ein Wein-d-erl empfehlen! I could ye PART a wine-DIM recommend 'Now, I could recommend you a nice wine!'

with the performative verb G. empfehlen (= It. raccomandare 'to recommend'). The commissive (the offer) part, that is, the waiter's commitment to provide the recommended wine if chosen by the client seems to be changed into a presupposed obligation which stands as an extra preparatory condition. Prototypical recommendations have the preparatory condition that the thing recommended is available (at least to the belief of the speaker). When a recommendation is enriched with an offer, as here, the extra preparatory condition is that the speaker (the waiter) is himself presupposed to be able to provide the thing recommended. One important difference between commitment and presupposed obligation (as a preparatory condition) is that the commitment can be modified in the course of the speech act, whereas the presupposed obligation (preparatory condition) cannot. For example, in a recommendation, the diminutive may modify the speaker's commitment to the recommendability of the object, and, in an offer proper such as (311), it may modify the commitment to provide the object of the offer. Therefore, in our enriched recommendation (313), the diminutive may modify the speaker's commit-

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

305

ment to the recommendability of the wine in question, but not the presupposed obligation to provide it. Of course, in order to downgrade the presupposed obligation, the waiter might always reach back to this presupposition and refer to it by uttering an afterthought of the type: (313')

Let's hope it's still available!there is still some left.

The diminutivized utterance in (313) can be uttered by a waiter to a client, only if they know each other. In other words, an element of familiarity in the speech situation is a constraint (cf. 3.5.8.3). The main effect of the diminutive in (313) is to stimulate, in the client, empathy with the waiter's positive attitude towards this type of wine. This attitude can be further seen as an extra ingredient deriving from a third speech act, the expressive speech act of praise, as underlined by Wierzbicka (1984: 128; cf. 1985: 166, 1991: 51): "In Polish, the person who serves food (a waiter, a housewife, a hostess etc.) frequently adds dim. suffixes to the nouns referring to the food which is being served By doing so, the person serving the food, who feels responsible for the quality of the food and for the customer's satisfaction, expresses both discreet and indirect praise of the food and a solicitous attitude towards the addressee." One default condition has to be added: the diminutivized nouns preferably refer to small (or even medium) quantities, for example in the offers/recommendations by a Viennese friend: (314)

Darf ich Dir ein Schnaps-erl geben? Noch ein may I ye a brandy-DIM give still a Paradeis-erl? tomato-DIM 'May I give you a shot of brandy? Another little tomato?'

The diminutives in both utterances are excluded in case of large portions of Schnaps offered or of enormous tomatoes in display, unless ironically, of course (the same holds for Italian), cf. cognach-ino vs. cognac. In addition, the second diminutive goes easier with Austrian Paradeis (being usable for solidarity between interlocutors) than with its more standard synonym Tomate, that is, empathy is being pursued. Many authors (e. g., Klimaszewska 1983) have a subcategory of diminutives corresponding to Staverman's diminutiva culinaria indicating that favorite dishes tend to be diminutivized. On the one hand, many of these terms are lexicalised diminutives, such as carciof-ini 'small pickled ar-

306

Diminutives

tichokes'; pis-elli 'peas'; spagh-etti; VG. Schwamm-erl 'mushroom'; Nockerln 'dumplings'; Brös-eln 'breadcrumbs'. On the other hand, diminutiva culinaria are privileged in speech acts of offers/recommendations. As a consequence, diminutives such as VG. Kartoff-erlnlErdapf-erln = It. patat-ine 'potatoes-DIM' are used by cooks, waiters and the like rather than by farmers or gardeners. The predominance of the directive over the commissive part in enriched/complex recommendations by waiters in restaurants becomes evident in the behavior of a waiter in a restaurant in Pisa, several times observed by both authors. When asked what was on the menu, he enumerated dishes he considered recommendable and, in this oral recommendation/offer, he transformed the names of all dishes written on the menu into diminutives: (315)

grigliata, totani, saraghi, gamberi—• grigliat-ina, totan-ini, saragh-ini, grilled fish-DIM cuttlefish-DIM prawns-DIM gamber-on-c-ini shrimps-AUGM-DIM

But when asked to describe the dishes, he returned to the non-diminutivized names on the menu (other examples from the same source, with an analysis of the landing-sites, in 3.5.9.7 (201), (202)). The waiter's recommendations differed from the written menu in the following relevant dimensions: l)They were oral. But this diminutive-favoring factor (cf. 3.5.8.4) cannot be decisive, because also the waiter's non-diminutivized descriptions were oral. 2) The waiter wanted to stimulate empathy which presupposes a reduced psychological distance (this a written menu cannot do). In fact, the waiter treated customers (and even their friends) in a rather familiar way. But why should his empathy disappear during the oral description of dishes? 3) The recommendation is the predominant part only in the waiter's actual suggestions, but not in his oral descriptions or in the written menu. The difference pointed out in number 3 is the decisive one and explains the waiter's systematic and exclusive use of diminutives only in his recommendations. Having discussed combinations of commissive and directive speech acts, we turn our attention to ambiguity. In the case of ambiguity, an utterance, if considered in isolation, may be interpreted either as a commissive offer or as a directive.329 This ambiguity is achieved, e.g., when reducing (312) to:

Data and their interpretation — Other speech acts

(312')

307

Che ne diresti di un aiut-ino? 'What would you say to a bit of help?'

where the speaker may either be committing himself to giving such a help (commissive) and indirectly advising the addressee to accept his help (mixture of commissive and directive, as in (312)). Or (312') may be interpreted as mere advice to resort to somebody's help. In the second interpretation, the diminutive may downgrade propositional content and speaker's entitlement, and also speaker's commitment, especially in the case that the addressee is known to be reluctant to accept help. In this case, the choice of (312') may represent a cajoling strategy (cf. 3.5.10). Understatement is not excluded. Some pragmatic effects obtained by the diminutive in (312) are identical with those in (312'), some are different. This shows the dependence of the pragmatics of diminutives on the speech act type. Also the utterances discussed in 3.5.8.3 (176) and in Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi (1989 b: 241) are ambiguous in isolation, as they may be either invitations, recommendations, or invitations mixed with offers. 3.5.12.3.7. Closely related to offers are those proposals where the speaker commits himself to take part in the future action he recommends/suggests to the addressee (thus again a combination of commissive and directive, cf. Houtkoop-Steenstra 1990), as in: (316)

Cosa ne direste di un cinem-ino stasera? what of it would you say to a cinema-DIM this evening 'What would you say to a nice film tonight?'

Here the diminutive serves the attempt at stimulating in the addressee the same pleasant feeling towards the object that the speaker has. This counts as an attempt to create mutual empathy. This can be only partially covered in terms of Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) "upgrading the expression of inner states". The simplex form cinema would sound much more detached, that is, there is greater psychological distance from the object and among speakers. Empathy signaled by the diminutive may, again, upgrade speaker's commitment, imposed obligations and strength of speaker's attempt to achieve his perlocutionary goals. Let us resume an example discussed in 3.5.5.5 (159): (317)

Ε se chiedessimo un passaggi-uccio? 'What if we asked if there was any chance of a lift?'

308

Diminutives

This jocular, non-serious proposal is characterized by downgrading of entitlement, since the speaker is well aware that her proposal is most unlikely to have success. The last proposal we want to look at was uttered in a supermarket in front of a fish display: (318)

Ε se ne prendessimo un poch-inovs. and if of it we took a bit-DIM 'And if we took a little bit?'

un po'? a bit

Here all dimensions of illocutionary strength are downgraded by the diminutive, namely propositional content, speaker's entitlement and commitment, imposed obligation on the addressee (of accepting), speaker's attempt to achieve perlocutionary goals and to avoid conflict. Only expression of inner states seems to escape downgrading. 3.5.12.3.8. The last commissive speech act we want to discuss is commissive acceptance of an offer or proposal. As a reactive speech act its aim is to fulfill interaction conditions already previously established. Therefore Wunderlich (1976: 145) calls such speech acts satisfactive types. Clearly, a systematic analysis of acceptances (or refusals, and in general, responses and other reactive speech acts, cf. Wunderlich 1976) is possible only by studying coherent speech act sequences (as done, for example, by Houtkoop-Steenstra 1990, with references). Although space prevents us from doing this here, we want, at least, to take adjacency pairs into account, such as offer—acceptance. Non-denotational diminutives have special effects in acceptances, when they occur in repetitions within the adjacency pair sequence, as in: (319) A: Non vuoi due carot-ine al burro che sono cosi not you want two carrots-DIM buttered which are so buone e ti fanno bene? good and ye do well Β: Ε dammi 'ste carot-ine! and give me these carrots-DIM A: 'Won't you take a few nice buttered carrots? They're so tasty and good for you.' Β: Ό Κ , give me these nice carrots of yours!' where Β gives in to A's offer. The diminutive expresses downgraded inner states (that is, desire) of accepting, and commitment to accept, the offer.

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

309

B's resignation is conveyed by the initial conjunction e 'and' as well as by 'ste, the reduced form of queste 'these'. Repetition of the diminutive in (319 B) emphasizes B's resignation, that is, he even accepts A's attitude towards the carrots (as expressed by the diminutive), cf. Merlini Barbaresi (1989). In a different speech situation (e.g., in a restaurant) and with strict parallelism (and the appropriate prosody) within the adjacency pair, irony is conceivable on the part of B, if another participant is present to share the irony with: (319') A: Vuole due carot-ine al burro? Sono molto buone. B: Vogliamo due carot-ine al burro che sono molto buone. 'Would you like some nice buttered carrots? They're very tasty.' 'We'll have some of your very tasty nice buttered carrots.' where A's diminutive is meant as a cajoling device. Β yields to A's persuasive efforts, but ironises (in a rather jocular way) on such efforts by repeating both the diminutive (which clearly suits A's argument, but not B's) and an extensive stretch of A's argument. Repetitions of diminutives within the adjacency pair may still have other effects, as in (Italian and Viennese): (320) A: Oppure vuoi una mel-ina? or like you an apple-DIM B: Si, voglio una mel-ina. yes I want an apple-DIM A: Oder möchtest du ein Apf-erl? or would want you an apple-DIM B: Ja, ich möcht' ein Apf-erl. yes I 'd like an apple-DIM 'Or would you like a nice apple?' 'Yes, I'll have a nice apple.' where the adjacency pairs clearly follow previous offering. Here repetition with strict parallelism indicates that Β wholeheartedly accepts A's offer in both substance and way of putting it, including the attitude towards the referent of the diminutivised noun (also with the same or even greater jocularity). Clearly A is showing, via the diminutive among other things, empathy towards B, and is also trying to anticipate B's empathy towards the apple. Thus Β displays sharing of attitudes in inter-

310

Diminutives

actional speech (cf. Aston 1988 b: 82). Here repetition iconically stands for sharing of attitudes, whereas in (319) there is a clash between identity of the signans and non-identity of the signatum, that is, "Repetition (is) a suitable instrument for serving equally well such opposed pragmatic functions as agreement and disagreement" (cf. Merlini Barbaresi 1989: 449). The element of jocularity present in (320 A) would be cancelled in B's response, if the diminutive were cancelled as in: (320' B) Si, voglio una mela. = Ja, ich möcht' einen Apfel. yes I want an apple yes I 'd like an apple The link of jocularity to the diminutive rather than to repetition in general is proved by the following reduced variants of B's response: (320") (320"')

Si, una mel-ina. = Ja, ein Apf-erl. Ε una per-ina. = Und ein Birn-d-erl. And a pear-DIM

where the mere presence of the diminutive guarantees jocularity. Of course, repetition is not necessary for a diminutive to occur in an acceptance, it may come autonomous, as in: (320"") A: Vuoi una mela? B: Siii, una mel-ina! want you an apple yees an apple-DIM 'Do you want an apple?' 'Yees, that would be lovely!' where B's diminutive upgrades the expression of his emotional inner state (joy) and thus the strength of illocutionary force of his acceptance. It follows that the element of jocularity remains confined to B's response. Unlike such jocular cases, acceptances in legal contracts and similar institutional acts are too formal to allow non-denotational diminutives (cf. 3.5.12.1, 3.5.12.2.4). By way of concluding, let us see another adjacency pair, this time with a commissive in second position, viz. lament-offer of help (in the form of a bid, as in (310')): (321) A: Se appena potessi vendere la macchina, avrei qualche If only I could sell the car I'd have some soldo subito! money at once

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

311

B: D'accordo, d'accordo, ti compro io la tua macchin-ina O.K. O.K. ye buy I the your car-DIM 'If only I could sell my little car, I'd have some money right now!' O K , OK, I will buy your little car.' where, by using the diminutive, Β wants to soothe A's worries. In Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa's (1990) model, the diminutive downgrades the propositional content of the act of buying, that is, depicts it as relatively unproblematic. In terms of politeness theory, this downgrading lowers A's indebtedness (cf. Brown—Levinson 1987: 210). In addition, A's diminutive signals empathy with B's worries. 3.5.12.4. Other types of speech acts 330 Wunderlich (1976: 75) proposes a more fine-graded classification of "illocutive" types. On the one hand, he distinguishes types that we have already dealt with, namely directives (cf. 3.5.10); commissives (cf. 3.5.12.3); declaratives (cf. 3.5.12.1); representatives (= assertives, cf. 3.5.12.11); satisfactives (such as excuses, thanks, responses, justifications, congratulations, which Wunderlich considers as being always reactive speech acts and thus excluded from initial position in a speech act sequence, cf. 3.5.12.2). On the other hand, he identifies three further speech acts, which we are going to discuss briefly in the following paragraphs, viz. erotetic, retractive, and vocative speech acts. 3.5.12.5. Erotetics Wunderlich (1976: 75) separates questions (as erotetics) from directives, on the ground that a request for information (= erotetic) is too different from a directive request. 331 Let us see whether the behavior of diminutives mirrors any such difference. Of course, we must exclude questions working as indirect speech acts for reproach, proposal, request, etc. Predictably, there is no difference as to pragmatic effects linked to empathy, 332 emotion, familiarity, child-centered, etc. speech situation. But let us test downgrading effects relative to Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) dimensions of illocutionary strength, e.g., in (322) uttered by an aunt to a teen-ager niece. (322)

Ε i sold-ini che ti ho regalato, come li and the money-DIM that ye I've given how them hai spesi? have you spent 'And the cash I gave you, how did you spend it?'

312

Diminutives

Here the diminutive operates downgrading of speaker's entitlement to ask and of addressee's obligation to answer. The diminutive might also count as an attempt to avoid or mitigate conflictual perlocutionary sequels, for example, if the aunt thinks that the addressee will feel embarrassed to answer. Diminution of propositional content is possible (also by understatement) as in consequent downgrading of speaker's commitment, that is, lower determination to have the addressee's answer. This also affects the strength of the attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal (speaker's lower determination to find out). Question (322), like all others in our data, shows the whole gamut of possible effects of diminutives to be found in directives (3.5.10). Other questions are mixed with speech acts of assertives and share their possibilities of modifications via diminutive, as in: (323)

Ε lui /' avrebbe chiamata e offerto tutti quei and him her he'd have called and offered all that sold-ini? money-DIM 'So he really called her and offered her all that cash?'

The speaker has just received this piece of information and somewhat finds it hard to believe. If the erotetic force is felt to be predominating (want of confirmation), a suitable answer would be (323 a). If it is rather the assertive force to be received as predominant, the reaction might be (323 b), where the second speaker, via a rhetorical question, aligns with the first speaker to assess the incredibility of the event: (323) a. Si, pensa! b. Non e incredibile? yes think not is unbelievable 'Yes, you won't believe it! Isn't it unbelievable?' 3.5.12.6. Retractives Wunderlich (1976: 84) exemplifies such speech acts with retracting a promise or prohibition, correcting an assertion, and similar. For our purposes, these speech acts can be treated like any other declarative. For, in both presence and absence of performative verbs, such as It. ritirare 'to retract (a promise)'; ritrattare 'to retract (an assertion)'; correggersi 'to correct oneself', diminutives modify the speech acts in the same way as they do with other declaratives (cf. 3.5.12.1). The only difference is the smaller degree of formality of retractives, therefore we expect their

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

313

modificability via diminutives also without jocularity. And this is the case. Our example (245) (discussed in 3.5.11.2.1.2) contains two self-corrections where a performative verb could be easily inserted, without changing the pragmatic effects obtained by diminutives: (245)

Ho cominciato a cantare, (sc. mi correggo), a I've begun to sing me I correct to cant-icchi-are, poi ho fatto uno spettacolo, (sc. mi sing-DIM then I've made a performance me correggo), uno spettacol-ino. I correct a performance-DIM Ί began to sing, (or rather) to make an attempt at singing, then I gave a performance, (or rather) a performance of sorts.'

Here retractions are embedded into reports and their illocutionary force is entrusted to the mere diminutive suffixes. More in subchapter 3.5.15 on re-elaboration. 3.5.12.7. Vocatives Wunderlich (1976: 78) classifies summons, calls, addresses as vocatives. 333 Their point is to attract or keep the addressee's attention, that is, to govern the attention of interlocutors during the whole course of interaction. Vocative speech acts proper are very reduced speech acts, and therefore they do not offer much opportunity for modification via diminutives. Many examples can be found in J. Nestroy's comedy Lumpazivagabundus, where L., the so-called demon of slovenliness, addresses his followers with: (324)

meine fidelsten / echten Brüder-l-n my merriest / true brother-DIM-s

Brüder-1-n is also used by other characters in addressing comrades. The effects of the diminutives are to express intimacy or to introduce something jocular or joyful. By contrast, when a serious matter is prefaced by the vocative, this is given in the simplex form Bruder 'brother' (scenes 3.10, 3.11). All this, once again, derives from the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive. With the appropriate intonation, vocatives may be loaded with extra illocutionary force, for example reproach, as in:

314

(325)

Diminutives

Ehi, ragazz-ina/signorin-ella! hey girl-DIM Miss-DIM 'Come on now, my dear girl!'

(mother to teen-age daughter in a reproachful tone), where the diminutive obtains a reduction in face-threatening. It is a sort of call to duty, but the reproach is very mild, because the diminutive downgrades speaker's commitment and attempt to achieve perlocutionary goal as well as to avoid negative sequels. The illocutionary force of the call for attention is, however, not downgraded. Very similar is: Papa-r-ino! 'dad-DIM!' (wife to husband with a calling intonation, again a call to duty), where the presence of their child as side-participant determines the choice of the lexical item and favors the use of the diminutive (cf. 3.5.2.3). 3.5.12.8. Conclusion on modification of speech acts via diminutives Our analyses in chapters 3.5.10-3.5.12 have already indicated some regularities and tendencies in the capability of diminutives to modify certain aspects of speech acts. These induce us to attempt some general conclusions. Some further elaborations will be given in subchapters 3.5.13 — 3.5.14, specifically concerning understatement and irony/sarcasm. 3.5.12.8.1. A major point we can make is that diminutives are not capable of transforming one illocutionary force into another. 334 For example, within the category of assertives, the mere addition of a diminutive could not change (that is, weaken) a statement into a suggestion or hypothesis, or within directives, an order into a request. In our analyses, we have witnessed many patterns of illocutionary strength downgrading via diminutives, that is, a diminutive attached to a speech act, e. g., a statement, does operate a downgrading of its strength, but not to the point of changing the statement into a speech act of suggesting. We have, in fact, to postulate two major categories of differences in degree of strength. The first category covers those differences in strength that are responsible for a change in illocutionary force. For example, according to Searle-Vanderveken (1985: 99—101), the speech act of insisting differs from that of stating, and the latter from the speech act of suggesting by one degree of strength. Insisting and stating also differ by the mode of achievement of their illocutionary points, but stating and (assertive) suggesting have different illocutionary forces only on account of this (one-degree) difference in strength (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 187). Diminutives are irrelevant to this category.

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

315

The downgrading (and upgrading) effects of diminutives belong to a second category. The shift caused by the addition of diminutives does not seem to reach a one-degree value. Strength is modified but within the same illocutionary force. For example, I sincerely promise is stronger than I promise, but it is, of course, still a speech act of promising (SearleVanderveken 1985: 99), presumably with a specific discourse function. Or I tentatively state is weaker than I state, but is still a statement. Similarly, sono parecch-ini 'they are quite many-DIM' is a weaker assessment than sono parecchi (cf. 3.5.11.2.1.1 example (242)) but it is still an assessment. This means that the modifying force of diminutives seems to be comparable to that of adverbial expressions 335 of the type of tentatively. If, for example, tentatively is adjoined to a sentence such as I state that p, then the meaning of tentatively modifies the strength of the speech act of stating. We assume that diminutives may be used to obtain a similar effect. By affixing a diminutive suffix to an appropriate landing-site (cf. 3.5.9), and provided that all the necessary conditions and enough favoring factors are met (cf. also 3.6), a meaning [non-serious] is attached to the speech act, and the result is modified illocutionary strength. Zagar (pers. comm.) suggests that we have here a quite economical division of labour. Lexical elements, particularly verbs, determine the illocutionary force, particles, adverbs and morphological elements modify force. 3.5.12.8.2. In general, all dimensions of illocutionary strength as specified in Bazzanella et al. (1990) can be downgraded via diminutives (with the possible exception of the expression of inner states). Actually, those authors mention diminutives only in connection with diminution of propositional content and upgrading of expressed inner states. But it is important for any explanatory account of the pragmatics of diminutives to emphasize that diminutives are capable of downgrading all dimensions in an apparently parallel way, thus allowing more general conclusions. Two objections are conceivable against our hypothesis of an overall parallel downgrading. More precisely, our hypothesis may appear not sufficiently justified. The first objection may concern our data in sub-chapters 3.5.103.5.12. In the examples reviewed in 3.5.10-3.5.11, we generally discussed the downgrading effect according to one dimension for each example, this in view of illustrating the dimensions themselves. Of course, for each example, we picked out the most pertinent for the case. In 3.5.12, however, our perspective was rather on the speech act itself, and so, for each

316

Diminutives

example, we described various dimensions of strength downgrading. Only for a few examples did we explicitly review downgrading on all dimensions. Our procedure, in fact, reflects a well-attested phenomenon. Usually, in each example of modification via diminutives, the downgrading effect becomes clearly visible only on some dimensions, whereas on others it may be scarcely visible, and on still others even opaque. This does not mean, of course, that downgrading is erratic and that it must be learned by the child for each word and for each speech act separately. What we assume is that on the "emic" level, that is, on the level of the morphopragmatic system of a language, diminutives are appropriate downgraders for all dimensions. On the "etic" level, however, that is, in actual speech situations, the effects of other modifications within the same speech act (e.g., adjectival or adverbial modifiers, prosody, mood and modality in general, etc.), of lexical connotations and of other cotextual and contextual factors are such that the contribution of diminutives towards downgrading becomes transparent only on some specifically pertinent dimensions. Our analysis has proven that, in changing these co(n)textual factors, we can accordingly foreground some dimensions of pertinence for diminutives and background others. In other words, downgrading via diminutives always obtains for all dimensions, but often only latently. These latent pragmatic effects of diminutives may be rendered transparent by manipulating the co(n)text of the respective speech act. The second objection concerns the dimension "expressed inner states" (Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa 1990: point 2). In practice, it proved very difficult to systematically distinguish this dimension from that of speaker's commitment, unless emotion or sympathy/empathy were involved. We were unable to ascertain clear examples of autonomous downgrading of expressed inner states via diminutives (compare, for example, 3.5.11.2.2 (247)). This, we think, is due to the difficulty of discerning between unemotional or "impersonal" inner states (beliefs, intentions, etc.) and the speaker's commitment to them. In fact, downgrading of such inner states co-varies with downgrading of commitments to such a point that, to the eye of the analyst, they coincide. An important warrant for this conclusion is the following: as we never found upgrading of unemotional and/or "impersonal" expressed inner states via diminutives (cf. also 3.5.12.8.5), similarly, we did not find any upgrading of speaker's commitment via diminutives, unless there was a clear upgrading of expressed inner states via emotion or empathy. 336 3.5.12.8.3. The classification of speech acts into homogeneous categories and subcategories is one of the most debated issues in speech act theory

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

317

(cf. 1.7.12.4, 3.5.10, 3.5.12.4-3.5.12.7). Modificability by diminutives may be one diagnostic criterion. For our purposes, Searle's (1969, 1976, cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985) classification into five great types proved sufficient — only one subcategory deserved a special treatment, that is, assessments, among assertions, showed a special inclination towards modification via diminutives (cf. 3.5.11). As to Wunderlich's (1976) additional types, we found that erotetics behaved like directives (cf. 3.5.12.5) and retractives like declaratives (cf. 3.5.12.6). His vocatives (3.5.12.7) represent a very reduced speech act and, in accordance, their modificability by diminutives appears also very limited. Declaratives seem to admit modification via diminutives only when jocular and this only in Italian but not in German (one of the frequent differences between the two languages is the threshold of familiarity needed to admit diminutives, cf. 3.5.8 and below 3.5.12.8.6). Retractives are less formal declaratives, therefore modification via diminutives is easier. For the other types, we make the following deductive argumentation: a) the illocutionary point is the most important component of the illocutionary force (cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 13); b) the more mutually relevant (or similar) two elements are, the more likely an interaction between them; 337 c) diminutives modify the illocutionary strength on the dimensions identified in 3.5.10-3.5.12. From these premisses we draw the conclusion: d) diminutives are most likely to modify those dimensions of strength that are most similar/relevant to the illocutionary point of the specific speech act category concerned. This prediction seems to hold so far. For example, the illocutionary point of (particularly impositive) directives is to try to get other people to do things. This places focus on the obligation imposed on the addressee. In case the addressee should be unwilling to undertake such obligations, the speaker will have to calculate negative perlocutionary sequels. Predictably, the dimensions of the addressee's obligations are those to be most visibly affected by diminutives, along with the dimension of the speaker's attempt to avoid or mitigate negative reactions by the addressee. These expectations were amply confirmed by our analysis. The same type of prediction holds for erotetics (3.5.12.5). The assertive point is to tell people how (the speaker thinks) things are. The degree of strength of this illocutionary point co-varies with the strength of the speaker's commitment to the belief that things are as he asserts. Therefore we expect the strength of the speaker's commitment to

318

Diminutives

be most visibly modified by diminutives. This prediction is supported by our data. As to the assertive subcategory of assessments, their evaluative character is similar to the evaluative character of diminutives, to the point that the assessment may in fact be based on a diminutive. Modificatory use of diminutives is thus more expectable with assessments than with other assertives (cf. 3.4.6, 3.5.11.3). This prediction is supported by our data as well. The illocutionary point of commissives is to commit the speaker to future actions. Therefore it is the strength of the speaker's commitment that should be modified most visibly via diminutives. This is borne out by our examples — with the exception of the speech act of threatening (3.5.12.3.2). This is a motivated exception, however, (which even supports our hypothesis) as we know that the speaker's commitment (and his own obligation) plays a much smaller role in threats than in other commissive speech acts (cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 193). The illocutionary point of expressives is to express feelings and attitudes. Accordingly, the expression of inner states and attitudes should be most visibly modified via diminutives. True enough, we found more visible emotional upgrading of inner states and a greater importance of sym/ empathy (an attitude) with expressive than with other illocutionary types. Moreover, the expression of inner states co-varies with the speaker's commitment (cf. 3.5.12.8.2). This fits in well with the frequent modification of speaker's commitment we have found in expressives. 3.5.12.8.4. In several cases among our data, we identified speech acts that were classifiable as a combination of speech acts, rather than as single types, that is, speech acts having different illocutionary points but combining in the same expression. Most relevant were, for example, expressives combining with assertives, as in many exclamations (cf. 3.5.11.6), or assertives combining with directives, etc. In some cases, more than two types were involved at a time. 338 But, to make matters simpler, let us concentrate on cases where only two speech acts combine. We distinguish the following patterns of combination: 1) the contribution of each speech act is approximately equal; 2) one of them clearly predominates; 3) the second speech act is left only as a trace among the preparatory conditions of the first; 4) if an utterance has the prototypical form of a speech act X, but serves as an indirect speech act Y, only the indirect speech act Y can be modified via diminutives.

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

319

Relative to 1): if the ingredients of each speech act have an approximately equal importance for the combined speech act, then the two contributing speech acts can be equally downgraded, as we have seen in the cases of a commissive/assertive (3.5.12.3.2 (302) with understatement), a commissive/directive offer (3.5.12.3.5 (310)), an assertive/expressive (3.5.11.2.2.2 (248 B)), etc. As predicted by our hypothesis in 3.5.12.8.3, differences in downgrading depend on the nature of the illocutionary point of each of the speech acts involved. In 3.5.12.3.4, we have identified a parallel downgrading of three speech acts combining in (figuratively used) bets. Relative to 2): if a combined speech act includes a declarative (3.5.12.1) or a vocative (3.5.12.7), it is the non-declarative and non-vocative speech act that seems to be modified, irrespective of which speech act appears to be otherwise predominant. The reason may be that both declaratives and vocatives, although on different grounds, allow little room for modification via diminutives. Thus, if another speech act (with no constraint of this type) combines with one of them, it immediately qualifies as the one to be modified via diminutives. In other patterns of combination (that is, excluding a declarative or a vocative), it is generally the speech act predominating over the other(s) that seems to get modified more easily by the addition of a diminutive. Relative to 3): in some combinations, one of the illocutionary forces involved may be reduced to a mere preparatory condition for the other speech act. In this case, the speech act it represents is presupposed rather than expressed, and cannot be modified via a diminutive, which aligns with the similar phenomenon whereby presuppositions are not negatable (cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 90). This we illustrated with presupposed commissives left at the stage of preparatory conditions for recommendations (3.5.12.3.6 (313), (315)) and with assessments as preparatory conditions of expressives (3.5.11.6.3 (271)). Relative to 4): in case an indirect speech act of category X is in a format which is the prototypical direct expression of a speech act of category Y, the diminutive only modifies the indirect speech act X, as we have seen in example (256) of 3.5.11.2.4.1, where a speech act of advice gets modified instead of the assessment in which it is couched. Of course, there may be ambiguity of interpretation by hearers, but a choice in favor of the indirect interpretation of the speech act entails perceiving the diminutive as modifying the indirect speech act, and vice-versa. 339 3.5.12.8.5. The often exaggerated criterion of emotion has already been dealt with in 3.5.6. As to specific influences on speech acts, we have found

320

Diminutives

that, whenever a diminutive is uttered with emotion, the expression of inner states is upgraded. This may, in turn, trigger upgrading of illocutionary strength on other dimensions as well (cf. 3.5.10.4.2, 3.5.11.2.2, 3.5.12.2.2, 3.5.12.2.6-3.5.12.2.7, 3.5.12.3.1, etc.), especially of speaker's commitment, but also of obligations imposed and - less frequently - of speaker's contextual entitlement and attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal. Only in threats and sarcasm have we found a further emotional upgrading of negative perlocutionary sequels. The speaker's social authority, propositional content and its determinacy is never upgraded via diminutives, irrespective of the presence or absence of emotional colouring. It is important to emphasize, here, that diminutives combined with emotion produce peculiar effects, that is, upgrading of illocutionary strength instead of the downgrading generally obtained by diminutives. This is an argument against assuming that non-denotational diminutives are always affective (cf. 3.5.6). As we have seen, most examples in our data contain diminutives that do not produce an upgrading of strength and still cannot be merely classified as denotational. In the majority of cases, in fact, they produce an overall downgrading of the illocutionary strength of their respective speech acts, which is not the case, as seen above, when emotion is added. The presence of emotion seems to be a pragmatic accident rather than a semantic component of non-denotational diminutives. We do not deny that some emotions may favor the use of diminutives, as seen, for example, in the case of child/lover-centered speech situations (3.5.6), but they may not even be foregrounded at the level of expression, irrespective of the presence of diminutives. Emotions are to be seen, if not as mere correlates, at most as relevant variables for the degree of strength in the expression of inner states, and thus as constraints on the modificatory project entertained when choosing diminutives. But they should not be seen as necessary components of the meaning of diminutives. And indeed, in Searle—Vanderveken's (1985) model, the involvement of emotion finds its place in the second component of the illocutionary force, that is, it is a source for the different degrees of strength of the illocutionary point (p. 15). Another relevant concept is mentioned in Kasper (1990): "The overriding function of defensive and protective politeness is affect control" (p. 209 and further references there). As we have seen, there are many mitigating effects of diminutive use that belong to precisely this kind of politeness. We feel comforted in our interpretation, because surely at least

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

321

these (many!) strategies and instances of diminutive use cannot be said to serve the expression of emotions. 3.5.12.8.6. Empathy with the addressee as conveyed by the diminutive also upgrades the expression of inner states and may, in turn, trigger upgrading of illocutionary strength on other dimensions as well (cf. 3.5.11.2.2, 3.5.11.2.4.1, 3.5.12.2.3-3.5.12.2.5, 3.5.12.3.1, 3.5.12.3.63.5.12.3.7, etc.). Empathy, like emotion (3.5.12.8.6) is related to the degree of strength of the illocutionary point (Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 15). 3.5.12.8.7. Formality vs. familiarity or intimacy has been found (cf. 3.5.8, 3.5.12.8.3) to be an important constraint on the use of diminutives, that is, there is a clash between the seriousness of the formal speech situation and the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive. Another interesting case is the following: A speech act expressed with its performative verb is more formal than without. 340 Accordingly, the presence of a performative verb generally disfavors the use of non-denotative diminutives. Even more, a speech situation requiring the use of the performative verb may even totally exclude the use of such a diminutive, (more so in German than in Italian, though, cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1, 3.5.11.2.3.3, 3.5.12.1, 3.5.12.3.1); for Italian compare speech acts of bidding (3.5.12.3.5). But in some speech acts, such as swearing (3.5.12.3.3) and bets (3.5.12.3.4), however, the presence of the performative verb is a need and not just a choice. As a result, the difference between presence and absence of performative verbs becomes neutralized, while the distinction between more and less formal is based on other factors. In such cases, of course, diminutives occur independently of the presence of performatives. 3.5.12.8.8. Formality is often dealt with in connection with politeness and variably seen as either an important constraint or a strategic component of politeness (cf. Fraser 1990: 221). But the correlation between them is by no means a direct one, that is, it is not the case that more formal is always more polite, or vice-versa. By the same token, we can deny that a diminutivized expression is always less formal and thus less polite than the same expression without diminutive. This is, in fact, quite the opposite in many cases, as can be easily seen within the politeness framework of Brown-Levinson (1987); for example in directives, where diminutives are often involved in negative politeness strategies, that is, used to mitigate obligations imposed. In this case, the relation runs as follows: diminutivized is more polite.

322

Diminutives

Whether more polite is for the case also more formal (which, usually, it is not) must be independently proved. The same holds for other inherently face-threatening speech acts, such as, for example, threats (3.5.12.3.2) among commissives or reproachful assessments among assertives. Mitigated threats or reproaches, via downgraded speaker's commitment or propositional content or obligations imposed do sound more polite (or rather less impolite) and are more suited to a formal situation (e.g., 3.5.12.3.2 example (302)). But a downgrading effect may not be desirable in other cases. In promises, for example, downgraded speaker's commitment may mean lower or uncertain benefit for the addressee, and this may appear less polite and less suited to a formal situation (cf. 3.5.12.3.1). Thus politeness, again (cf. Held 1989, 1990), appears to be very context-specific. 3.5.12.8.9. Next we want briefly to anticipate the treatment of understatement, modesty and euphemism (in 3.5.13) in reference to examples previously discussed, such as (254) in 3.5.11.2.3.3, (283) in 3.5.12.2.2, (302) in 3.5.12.3.2. Let us just mention Brown—Levinson's (1987: 211) model of communicative acts done "off record", that is, "done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute one clear communicative intention to the act." Although they never specifically refer to diminutives or semantically related elements, they provide a frame for uncommittal acts to which the diminutive may aptly contribute via its feature [non-serious]. Brown and Levinson classify off-record strategies according to violations of specific Gricean maxims and consequent implicatures. Diminutives are pertinent in case of violations of the Quantity Maxim ("Say as much as and no more than is required!"), such as with understatements (Brown Levinson 1987: 217). Finally, diminutives are involved in violating the Manner Maxim (p. 225), insofar as they may contribute to vagueness (p. 226) by decreasing the degree of precision (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1, 3.5.11.2.1.1). 3.5.12.8.10. Similarly, in reference to irony (see 3.5.14), diminutives may be used in ironically violating the Quality Maxim "Be sincere!" (cf. Brown—Levinson 1987: 221), cf. example (285) in 3.5.12.2.3, etc. 3.5.12.8.11. In reference to sarcasm (see 3.5.14.5), diminutives may signal upgrading of all dimensions in case of overall antagonistic interaction, cf. 3.5.11.2.4.2, 3.5.11.3, 3.5.12.3.2. 3.5.12.8.12. Next let us contrast the explanatory power of the features [small] vs. [non-serious] (cf. 3.4.3.2, 3.4.5.3) in accounting for the prag-

Data and their interpretation

— Other speech acts

323

matic effects of diminutives in speech acts. The assumption is in both cases that the respective feature gets attached to the speech act and triggers the application of a rule of diminutive formation, provided all necessary conditions are fulfilled and enough factors favoring diminutive use present. 1) Clearly there is sufficient affinity between each of the two features and both downgrading of illocutionary strength (cf. 3.5.10.4, 3.5.11.2, 3.5.12) and minimizing of costs for the addressee in politeness strategies (cf. 3.5.10.2.4, 3.5.10.4.3.1-3.5.10.4.3.2, 3.5.12.8.8) for postulating that these features trigger such pragmatic effects. 2) Understatement and modesty (cf. 3.5.12.8.8, 3.5.13) may also be accounted for with both features. 3) The feature [non-serious], but not the feature [small], may account for limitation of many diminutive uses to familiarity, intimacy, informality, cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1, 3.5.11.2.4.1, 3.5.12.1, 3.5.12.2.4, 3.5.12.8.7, etc.) and, connected with it (cf. 3.5.8.5), to interactional discourse (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1). 4) The feature [non-serious], but not the feature [small], may account for limitation of many diminutive uses to situations with ludic or even jocular character (cf. 3.5.5, 3.5.10.4.3.2, 3.5.11.2.3, 3.5.12.1, etc.). 5) The feature [non-serious] can better account for irony than the feature [small] (see 3.5.14). 6) As we have seen in 3.5.12.3.3, diminutives may operate as downgraders at any threshold of illocutionary strength, that is, even at a maximal threshold. 341 This is in contrast with local diminution of the denotative feature [small] which may be excluded from operating on items which approach the maximum of the respective dimension. This suggests that the locally operating feature (sc. [small]) is not identical with the globally operating feature (the putative alternatives [small] vs. [non-serious]). 7) None of the two features can account for upgrading in case of emotions (cf. 3.5.12.8.5) and empathy (cf. 3.5.12.8.6). These two factors have to be assumed as separate variables. As we have seen (3.5.6—3.5.7), the diminutive-favoring character of both features can be accounted for when assuming the feature [non-serious]. 8) Sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14) must also be an independent variable. But it can be linked in a more direct way with the feature [non-serious] than with the feature [small] (cf. 3.5.12.3.2 for threats). These arguments justify our preference for the feature [non-serious] over the feature [small] as modifiers of speech acts. 3.5.12.8.13. The refutation of a presumed pragmatic feature [small] demolishes the minimalist hypothesis on the morphopragmatics of diminu-

324

Diminutives

tives (see 3.4.3.2, 3.4.5, 3.5.10.3 and 5), according to which the meaning [small] is applied to the speech act as a downgrader of illocutionary strength. In accordance, all downgraders should downgrade all dimensions of illocutionary force with all illocutionary forces in like manner, and in all languages having a productive rule of diminutive formation, apart from varying lexical restrictions, paradigms and quantitative differences. As a result of what has been discussed in 3.5.12.8.14, we have to see whether the minimalist hypothesis works with the feature [non-serious] instead, and how this modified minimalist hypothesis compares with our maximalist hypothesis. For this purpose, we must, first of all, scrutinize the following two comparanda, alternative (a) with a diminutive expressing [non-seriousness], alternatives ( b - d ) expressing the same in a different way. For example we may contrast the following: (326) a. Affermo che ρ [non-serious] (to be expressed by DIM) I state that ρ - " b. Affermo che ρ, ma non la penso cost. I state that p, but not it I mean so Ί state that p, but I don't mean it seriously.' c. Affermo che ρ (with jocular prosody) d. Affermo che ρ (with ironic prosody) Clearly (326 a) may have, in appropriate context, the same sense as (326 b) or (326 c) or (326 d), but its range of meanings is not identical with that of any of them. Nor could any other modifier of illocutionary force (as, for example, enumerated in Wierzbicka 1991: 235) be equivalent with the diminutive in (326 a). As far as the expression of emotion is concerned, this is generally inhibited by hedges and other downgraders (cf. 3.5.8.12.8.5), whereas diminutives upgrade the expression of emotions. In other words, general pragmatic strategies of downgrading cannot be seen as automatically applying to the meaning of a given speech act when we model the way diminutives modify the illocutionary force of speech acts. By contrast, the pragmatic meaning [non-serious] and the other pragmatic factors discussed above are unique to diminutives, as postulated by the maximalist hypothesis. Cf. the discussions in 3.5.10.4.3.1-3.5.10.4.3.2, 3.5.10.5-3.5.10.6, 3.5.11.4, etc. For the great number of different devices for expressing indirectness, cf. Wierzbicka (1991: 31).

Data and their interpretation — Other speech acts

325

3.5.12.8.14. Finally, let us examine the role of diminutives in affecting speech acts (3.5.10-3.5.12) vis-ä-vis the constraints exerted on this role by speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4). Our distinction is grounded in our theatrical representation of communication (see 1.2), where we analytically distinguish a static dimension of the speech situation from a dynamic dimension of the communicative event, which contains speech acts. Conditions pertaining to the static dimension which are relevant for the pragmatics of diminutives are especially the following: a) Speech situations which greatly favor the use of diminutives, particularly child-/pet-/ lover-centered speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4). This favoring factor is determined by the feature [non-serious], which is shared by these speech situations and by diminutives, b) Speech situations which are too formal for allowing the use of diminutives, e. g., certain institutional speech situations (cf. 3.5.12.8.7). Situational formality is characterized by the feature [-non-serious]. Apart from these speech situations, which are inherently either too formal (in the sense of b)) or non-serious (in the sense of a)), there are all the others where c) formality and d) familiarity are graded variables. For example, depending on the social relations between the interlocutors, the situation may be characterized by more or less formality, and their interaction as more or less unfamiliar. And these factors make the situation more or less favorable for the use of diminutives (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1). What these conditionings have in common is that speakers use diminutives in social indexing of the formality of speech situations. The possibility for interaction of static factors is minimal. For example, the case of interaction between a) and d) may be exemplified with an unfamiliar adult talking to a child in a child-centered speech situation (cf. example (136) in 3.5.2.4). This is liable to block the use of diminutives, unless another favoring factor intervenes. The case of interaction between b) and d) may be exemplified with the case of two close friends in a very formal speech situation. Here, several other favoring factors must intervene in order to allow the use of a diminutive. All the other relevant notions pertain to the dynamic dimension of speech events, now grouped under the following operational categories: A) The antagonistic vs. cooperative character of social interaction (1.5.3) is a fundamental constraint on the use of diminutives (cf. 3.5.10.2.4, 3.5.12.8.11). B) Diminutives can modify the illocutionary force of speech acts (variably, depending on the class of speech acts) by a) downgrading illocutionary strength (cf. 3.5.12.8.3 — 3.5.12.8.4), b) minimizing the addressee's costs (cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2).

326

Diminutives

C) Diminutive use is regulated by the following factors (regulative factors) operating on speech acts: a) playfulness (cf. 3.5.5), b) emotion (cf. 3.5.6), c) sym/empathy (cf. 3.5.7), d) irony and sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14). Not only B) refers to speech acts, but also the regulative factors of C) and the interactions of A), which dominate speech acts. We have linked all these elements with the diminutive features [small] and [non-serious]. These dynamic factors may interact. For example, in general, playfulness positively interacts with minimizing the addressee's costs (cf. example (225 d') in 3.5.10.4.3.2). The expression of emotion may interfere with general downgrading (B a) and trigger upgrading (notably of inner states, but also of other dimensions of illocutionary strength, cf. 3.5.12.8.5). In certain well-defined cases, antagonism operates in the same direction and has similar effects (e.g., in sarcasm, cf. 3.5.14.5). Dynamic factors may interact with static ones. Such interaction can be either synergetic or conflictual. A case of synergy is, for example, added playfulness in a child-centered speech situation. The result is, as predicted, increased likelihood of diminutive use. Conflictual interaction is of two kinds. First, favoring static factors may interact with disfavoring dynamic factors. For example, if a mother (that is, intimate) talks to her grownup child in an angry and antagonistic way, the use of diminutives is unlikely, unless for sarcasm. But if the same speech act is directed at her small child (that is, the favorable static factor of a child-centered speech situation being added), the use of a diminutive is more likely. Second, disfavoring static factors may interact with favoring dynamic factors. For example, when an Italian (but not a German) professor gives an official talk on the formal occasion of a congress, he can use diminutives for modesty (that is, for downgrading the strength of his assertive speech act (more in 3.5.13)). As in the first type of conflict, the number of interacting factors is crucial also in the second type of conflict. But in general, we may say that factors of the dynamic dimension win out over factors of the static dimension. This is in line with the notion of speech situations being negotiable (cf. 1.2.4, 1.7.14) and with Ide's (1989) claim whereby in Western societies volition (that is, the dynamic dimension) is more important than discernment (that is, the static dimension). The greater importance of the dynamic dimension also justifies the greater scope we have devoted to our systematic, although selective, survey of speech act modification via diminutives (3.5.10—3.5.12), compared with the relatively more restricted (albeit still systematic) treatment of

Data and their interpretation

— Euphemism and understatement

327

speech situations (3.5.2-3.5.4). Accordingly, we are now going to analyze additional regulative factors of the dynamic dimension (3.5.13 — 3.5.16). 3.5.13. Euphemism and understatement In this and the following sub-chapter (3.5.14), we are going to study further regulative factors in the use of diminutives (cf. 3.5.5-3.5.8), and precisely the role of diminutives in the figurative use of speech acts. 3.5.13.1. Diminutives, like any other linguistic element, can be involved in figurative use. In a certain sense, the feature [non-serious] is already a metaphor of the denotative feature [small] and thus in itself generates first-order figurative uses. In 3.5.13-3.5.14 we are going to discuss second-order figurative uses of [small] or [non-serious], depending on invited implicatures. Our discussion will cover euphemism (3.5.13.23.5.13.3), true and false modesty (3.5.13.4) and understatement (3.5.13.5), that is, Staverman's diminutivum modestum, then irony (3.5.14.13.5.14.4; Staverman's diminutivum ironicum) and sarcasm (3.5.14.5: Staverman's diminutivum acerbum). Diminutives can function as triggers for inviting implicatures, intended as "assumptions and conclusions ... supplied to preserve the application of the co-operative principle and maxims" (Sperber-Wilson 1986: 35). As a paradigmatic example illustrating our point let us take an author who calls his contribution il mio capitol-etto = G. mein Kapitel-chen 'my chapter-DIM', disregarding the fact that it is the most important chapter of the volume. If the addressee knows this contribution (contextual knowledge) or has deduced from previous speech that it is definitely not a small one (cotextual knowledge), he will reject "the face-value interpretation as inconsistent with the C(ooperative) P(rinciple)" (Leech-1983: 131, first stage of inferencing). For he will notice a clash between the meaning of the diminutive (either denotative or [non-serious]) and the importance and/or size of the referent. Instead of the expected noun designating the referent (capitolo), which might be accompanied by some modifier upgrading some pertinent property of this important chapter, he witnesses a downgrading. The default interpretation of capitol-etto a 'small, unimportant chapter' 3 4 2 will appear inconsistent with the assumption of cooperativeness, that is, that the speaker is being truthful (assuming that the speaker is not a notorious liar or otherwise uncooperative). At this point the addressee will proceed to the second stage of inferencing, that is, "search for a new interpretation consistent with the CP" (Leech 1983: 131). Knowledge of rhetorical conventions will suggest to

328

Diminutives

him to look for an interpretation in the realm of understatement, irony, or similar. In a third stage of inferencing, he may now decide to interpret the utterance as an understatement (in a broad sense). In the specific case, the addressee knows that the Italian linguist who uttered capitol-etto is neither a boasting nor an excessively formal speaker and is thus likely to use a diminutivum modestum. An interpretation of understatement is therefore a plausible implicature, which accommodates the apparent clash. Via the implicature, the addressee is capable of restoring consistency with the cooperative principle. While checking this consistency, the addressee will exclude the alternative interpretation of speaker's selfirony (cf. 3.5.14.3.3) for reasons of semantic and pragmatic coherence, and because he has no evidence for it (that is, prosody, cotextual clues, non-verbal behavior, notoriety of the speaker for privileging irony, etc.). Other clues are necessary to allow the exclusion of other pragmatic effects (as studied in 3.5.10-3.5.12), such as: absence of emotion will exclude emotional upgrading of the expression of inner states via the diminutive suffix in capitol-etto (cf. 3.5.13.5); occurrence in an assertive speech act will exclude effects typical of other classes of speech acts (cf. 3.5.12.8.8), etc. Such inferencing corresponds to what Brown-Levinson (1987: 213) provide for accommodating understatement, irony, euphemism, etc. in terms of inviting "conversational implicatures, via hints triggered by violation of Gricean Maxims". In this sub-chapter, we are going to discuss diminutives involved in meiosis, that is, in cases where the speaker's description is weaker than is warranted by the state of affairs described (Hübler's (1983) "understatement" in its broader sense). 3.5.13.2. Our first topic is euphemism. This is understood by Leech (1983: 147) in a rather broad sense as a strategy to "disguise unpleasant subjects by referring to them by means of apparently inoffensive expressions", and which may use minimizing adverbials of degree such as a bit, a little, for example in: (327)

The paint was a bit dirty

which may be literally transposed into Italian as (327' a) or, more idiomatically, as (327' b): (327')

La (a) pittura (b) parete era sporch-ina. the paint wall was dirty-DIM

Data and their interpretation

— Euphemism

and understatement

329

This fits in well with Klimaszewska's (1983: 56) characterization of diminutives as devices for embellishing states of affairs and for offering an external illusion of pleasantness and ease (G. Gemütlichkeit), that is, by portraying the current state of affairs as inoffensive (G. Verharmlosung) social acceptability may be increased. This derives from the mitigating effect of diminutives, in (327) more precisely from downgrading speaker's commitment and other dimensions of illocutionary strength of assessment (cf. 3.5.11). Leech (1983: 147) aptly derives euphemism from the "Polyanna Principle" "postulating that participants in a conversation will prefer pleasant topics of conversation to unpleasant ones". This principle may well be culture-specific, but it generally holds for the speech-communities studied in this book, with the notable exception of speech acts embedded in antagonistic interaction. 3.5.13.3. Many aspects of mitigation via euphemism (in this broad sense) have already been treated in 3.5.10-3.5.12. Here we will deal with euphemism only in a narrower and more traditional sense, that is, in terms of avoidance of obscene or tabu expressions or other socially sanctionable ways of putting things. The most common type of euphemism consists in "the substitution of an inoffensive term for one considered offensively explicit" (American Heritage Dictionary). An example can be found in a beauty contest on many Italian beaches (summer 1991) for selecting the Miss Cul-etto 'Miss bottom-DIM'. Here the diminutive is a euphemism for the simplex culo. Another euphemism is sedere 'seat, bottom', still more euphemistic sederino. These expressions seem to suggest that euphemism is reached by evoking the innocence of child-centered speech situations. Evidence of this procedure is lexical replacement of vulgar words with the corresponding words used with children, e. g. It. pipi = G. Pipi — E. pee, weewee. Euphemism as substitution of a sanctioned expression may be seen as representing an indirect speech act (in regard to propositional content), but clearly only as long as the euphemistic substitute has not become the only term used for the referent. For, in this case, the pragmatic effect of illocutionary opacity would disappear, and the hearer would no longer have to infer the true meaning. The hearer has to apply the inferences mentioned in 3.5.13.1 only if there is still a hidden meaning behind the conventional literal meaning of the euphemistic expression, that is, if the speech act is not a literal performance (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 25).

330

Diminutives

Diminutive formation clearly serves this euphemistic function in the anecdote from Santo Domingo reported by Alonso (1961: 175), where a witness (W) uses an obscene word and, when interrupted by the judge (J), replaces it with its diminutivized form: (328) W: ... singando W: '... f***' J: Silencio! Use un lenguaje mäs decent e. silence use a language more decent J: 'Shut up! Use a more decent language.' W: Bueno, pues singand-ito. good then f**-DIM W: 'Well, then "a little f **".' Here the speaker appears to consider the diminutive as a new word which does not carry the sanctioned connotation any more. According to Alonso's description (1961: 176: "desdibujar un poco la nitidez de perfiles de la expresion"), the precision and determinacy of propositional content is blurred. This would link up with Brown-Levinson's 1987: 226) politeness strategy of vagueness (off-record strategy 12 "Be vague!"), which violates Grice's maxim of manner. But one may also think of diminution of propositional content. In both cases the hearer is supposed to infer that the speaker has used a less offensive expression instead of a socially sanctioned one for reasons of politeness and in order to avoid negative perlocutionary sequels. Thus the speaker has downgraded the expression of inner states and his entitlement, but clearly not his commitment. Since all politeness strategies contain an element of insincerity, euphemism may make a speech act insincere. 344 Does a euphemistic diminutive, such as in (328), suffice for establishing insincerity? The answer is modeldependent, especially in regard to what diminutive feature one derives this pragmatic effect from: if one starts with the feature [small] which primarily signals a quantitative difference, then insincerity seems to be less obtainable than via the alternative feature [non-serious]. Unfortunately all cases of euphemism via diminutive seem to be equally amenable to an analysis with both features. Take, for example, the German 345 assessment: (329)

Er hat ein Gläs-chen über den Durst getrunken. he has a glass-DIM beyond the thirst drunk 'He drank one (little) glass too many (= he got drunk).'

Data and their interpretation

— Euphemism and understatement

331

Here the diminutive strengthens the euphemism for the socially sanctioned misdemeanour, and this contribution of the diminutive to the embellishment (cf. Gaarder 1966: 585) may hinge either on smallness of the referent's excess in drinking or on the suggested non-seriousness of the offense. Hearers may use both alternatives in their inferencing. Note that the evoking of a child-centered speech situation is excluded here. In contemporary "enlightened" Western speech-communities, politeness may be the most important reason for euphemism. As a result, lack of formal politeness in familiar, informal speech situations may lessen the need for euphemism, such as in example (180) in 3.5.8.6 (mutand-ine 346 for mutande). But since tabus and euphemisms "relate integrally to culture-specific beliefs and practices in religion or magic, decorum, and social control" (Saville-Troike 1989: 215), other cultures (including more traditional, e.g., earlier, European ones) may rank other tabus higher than those based on politeness, and therefore other euphemisms may be called for. Examples with diminutives are given by Sieberer (1950: 111), under the heading "Sprachtabu", in reference to things which have to be named with special caution because of their dangerous and fearful character. One example is, at least in its earlier interpretation, Swiss German Wetter-li 'thunderstorm-DIM' (and similar expressions enumerated in 3.5.2.5); for Latvian examples see Rüke-Dravina (1959: 88, 141). Nieuwenhuis (1985: 82) assigns to euphemism the task of "playing down a serious matter" and cites, as illustration, the expression by a British politician "a little temporary problem at the other side of town" (for a very serious miners' strike). But this example may not be a euphemism, but rather mere understatement, which leads us to our next topics. 3.5.13.4. A central area of meiosis is the expression of modesty, Staverman's (1953) diminutivum modestum,347 From the hearer's point of view, Grice's concept of implicature (cf. 1.7.6) is relevant here, since the hearer must reject the default interpretation of the utterance by recognizing an apparent flouting of the Gricean maxim of quantity and/or manner (more in 3.5.14.1). Let us start with an example of author modesty: the classic German author Friedrich Schiller wrote to his publishing houses Göschen and Cotta several times about his own Bänd-chen, Gedicht-chen, Werk-chen, Romän-chen, all diminutives of 'volume, poem, work, novel' (Ettinger 1974 b: 63). But of course, the publishers knew quite well that these works were neither small nor unimportant. Or on a train trip, an Italian writer said the following:

332

(330)

Diminutives

Ε stato durante quel viaggio che ho scritto la mia is been during that trip that I've written the my poesi-ola poem-DIM 'It was during that trip that I wrote my little poem.'

Diminutiva modesta occur also in many other types of speech situations and speech acts, such as (331), uttered by a woman referring to her career advances, where she did not want to appear boastful to her interlocutor. (331)

Ho fatto anch' io i miei pass-etti avanti. I've made also I the my steps-DIM forwards 'I've also made my own modest progress/little steps ahead.'

But are these examples of true or pretended modesty? Let us analyze the example: (332)

Avresti tempo would you have time / (b) occhiat-ina al mio look-DIM at my 'Would you have time over my article?'

di dare uri (a) occhiata to give a look articolo? article to have (a) a look at (b) a quick look

Here the speaker is being truly modest, if he actually reduces his desire to obtain inspection of his article by the interlocutor. The diminutive used in (332 b) is a transparent rendering of the downgraded strength of the speaker's attempt to obtain the perlocutionary goal, of his commitment, of propositional content, and a corresponding attempt to downgrade negative perlocutionary sequels. Moreover a typical constitutive element of true modesty is the speaker's downgrading of his authority, be it of his social power in general or his entitlement to the specific speech act in particular. In false modesty (cf. Gaarder 1966: 585) - similar to lying - there is a strategic clash between strength of desire and weakness of expression, that is, speaker's commitment and attempt to obtain the goal are not downgraded. In an assertion like (331), true modesty, as understatement in general, represents an attempt to avoid boasting, whereas, in false modesty, the speaker is boastful. How can the hearer know whether the speaker is truly modest or only pretends to be? First of all, there may be co(n)textual cues, such as in the following statement in the oral presentation of a psycholinguistic paper:

Data and their interpretation

(333)

— Euphemism and understatement

333

Abbiamo portato un bei grupp-etto. we've brought a nice group-DIM 'We've supplied a fair little group (of examples).'

The quantifier bello '(lit.) beautiful' and the fact that the authors have given more than 150 examples for the phenomenon in question, plus the visible pride in the speaker's face were more than enough to guide the hearer's interpretation away from true modesty. In fact, the speaker was boasting about his results, although the expression of pride and satisfaction was mitigated, as typical for an understatement. Although It. gruppetto has an exact and rather often used equivalent G. Grüpp-chen, it cannot be used in a translation of (333) for lack of familiarity in the speech situation (cf. a similar example in 3.5.8.3). Another typical occurrence of understatement may be illustrated with the following utterance in the discussion period of a congress: (334)

Anch' io avrei una domand-ina. also I 'd have a question-DIM 'I'd have a little question of my own.'

Downgrading via diminutive clearly had the super-goal of cajoling the chairman of the session into allowing this extra question. For, by inferring diminution of propositional content and of speaker's entitlement, he should believe in the brevity and relative unimportance of the question such that both the question and the answer stimulated by it should be calculated to be brief. But as congress-goers have learnt to know, such strategies for getting in another question sometimes may reflect false modesty, insofar as they may announce a lengthy and even preposterous question. On the other hand, a chair-person would be considered rather tough or even rude, if (s)he did not cooperate in the ritual of allowing an extra "little" question - because, after all, it might really be a small one. If, however, in the discussion the speaker's pretentiousness (in a case of false modesty) became apparent, this would counteract the speaker's perlocutionary goal of obtaining the floor. Thus, in this and many other cases false modesty must sound like true one. Diminutives are even used when the main load of downgrading is taken over by a modifier, as in: (335)

Ho anch' io una domand-ina velocissima have also I a question-DIM quick-ELAT 'I've also got a very quick point I'd like to make.'

334

Diminutives

And, in this case too, there is an exact and usual Viennese equivalent to It. domand-ina, viz. Frag-erl, but it cannot be used here, again for lack of familiarity. The most casual version conceivable might be: (335')

Da hätt' auch ich schnell noch eine kleine Frage. here would have also I rapidly still a small question

There is good chance of true modesty in B's reaction in the following dialogue (on TV): (336) A: Lei ha un conto in banca? you have an account in bank 'You do have a bank account?' B: Beh, si, un cont-ic-ino well yes an account-INTERF-DIM 'Well, yes, an account of sorts.' This "minimizing" may reflect a modest self-estimation, but only the wider context might show whether this interpretation is true (again no German diminutive would be adequate in this speech situation). Contextual knowledge is also necessary for the correct interpretation of the report on the parvenu mayor and notary (Lampedusa 1958: 101 = Birnbaum 1959: 58 = Colquhoun 1963: 70): (337)

II notaio parlava ...del vill-ino "fuori cittä". the notary was talking of the villa-DIM out of town 'The notary told ... of a little house he was having built "out of town".'

The lack of a diminutive in the German translation von der kleinen Villa 'about the small villa' fits, again, the rather formal situation of the dinner given by Prince Salina. A clear case of false modesty is the reply: (338)

Si, abbiamo anche noi una vill-etta 11 yes we have also we a villa-DIM there 'Yes, we have a little house there too.'

Here we know that it is a luxurious mansion the owner is very proud of.

Data and their interpretation — Euphemism and understatement

335

Although it may be important for the addressee to understand whether the speaker is truly modest or not, the speaker would hardly use different strategies as far as diminutives are concerned. Regular differences would be strategically self-defeating, since false modesty only works if interchangeable with true modesty. Therefore we are going to unite our further discussion of modesty conveyed by diminutives with that of understatement. Furthermore there is, in general, no direct way of determining the sincerity of modesty (as of any other speech act, cf. van Dijk 1984: 117). 3.5.13.5. Understatement is clearly envisaged in Leech's (1983: 132) maxim of modesty: (a) Minimize praise of self; (b) Maximize dispraise of self. Diminutives are an adequate means for serving this maxim, but the morphopragmatics of English diminutives is too limited to allow this. It may seem paradoxical that Italian, where this culture-specific maxim is of much less importance than in English (cf. Wierzbicka 1991: 41, 163), should possess many more means — in terms of diminutives for expressing understatement - and make a privileged use of them just to obtain this effect. German seems to be positioned between English and Italian in respect to both the preference for understatement strategies and the use of diminutives (more in 3.7.3). Both the global pragmatic strategy embodied in Leech's maxim of modesty and local strategies for obtaining specific goals via meiosis of expression count as understatement as we consider it here, whereas we disregard the use of "understatement" in the general sense of downgrading of any type (as done by Klimaszewska 1983: 38, 56, 97, 114, for example). Particularly, we want to oppose understatement to true modesty (3.5.13.4), where speaker's commitment is downgraded, whereas this is typically not the case in understatement. 348 In addition to the examples given in 3.5.11.2.2, 3.5.12.3.2, 3.5.13.4, we want to analyze Fellini's remark on TV about Mastroianni: (339)

Mi far ebbe piacere se si facesse ancora qualche me would make pleasure if one made still some pastrocchi-etto insieme. hotchpotch-DIM together Ί would enjoy doing a thing or two together again.'

The denotation "non-important" and/or the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive adds to the choice of the base, and thus the pragmatic effect

336

Diminutives

of understatement is increased as well. Alternative choices such as qualcos-ina 'a little something' or, further up in the dimension of importance, un film-ino 'a film-DIM' or uri oper-ina 'some work-DIM' would still render the understatement (or expression of false modesty), but with less sharp contrast to the reality of their masterpieces. However the choice of the simplex pastrocchio would be inappropriate, for its derogatory connotation would be too strong and definitely negative without the mitigating effect of the diminutive. G. Film-chen/lein/erl is too derogatory to be used in a German translation of (339) (cf. Klimaszewska 1983: 57). When, as in (339), the referent of a diminutivized noun clashes with the meaning of the diminutive suffix, there is an effect of strong understatement, provided that the diminutive refers to the sphere of the speaker. Another example is the assertive exclamation: (340)

Das ist mein Wag-erl! Viennese German that is my car-DIM Ecco la mia macchin-etta! Italian here the my car-DIM 'That's my little car!'

uttered in front of the speaker's splashy Mercedes. This clash occurs only if the referent has more than normal size, importance, value, etc., provided that the noun itself could refer to normal-sized/priced, etc., beings/ objects. In all these cases, the addition of meinlmio 'my' may be connected with an added emotional connotation of endearment. This implies that the expression of inner states is upgraded, which, as a result, may upgrade other dimensions of the speech act as well (cf. 3.5.12.8.5). This, then, deprives the understatement of its basis. In this sense, understatement via diminutive formation restrains the expression of emotions towards the referent of the diminutive. The expression of modesty, however, may be compatible with expressing emotions of fear. The use of diminutives in both modesty and understatement is characterized by the above-mentioned clash, which triggers the hearer's inferencing mechanism (cf. 3.5.13.1). As regards the speaker's point of view, we may refer to Brown-Levinson (1987: 217), who include, among their off-record strategies, the strategy of understatement, which generates "implicatures by saying less than is required". This holds for modesty as well. To the expressions they enumerate on p. 218 (some kind of, quite, somewhat, etc.) we can add diminutives. Thus in this area there seems to

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

337

be less difference between the maximalist and the minimalist conception of morphopragmatics than with other pragmatic properties of diminutives (cf. 3.5.12.8.13). As far as the speaker is concerned, there are important differences between (true) modesty and (strategic) understatement beyond those in speaker's commitment and emotions, which extend to the use of diminutives: a) Understatement does not weaken the degree of strength of the illocutionary point (cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 15), whereas modesty may; b) Sincerity conditions do not seem to be violated, but the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions (cf. Searle—Vanderveken 1985: 18) is downgraded in understatements, but not in true modesty; c) Understatement is not a literal performance (cf. Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 25), unless it is totally conventionalized (cf. 3.5.13.3 for euphemism), whereas the expression of true modesty is a literal performance. Does this mean that understatement (but not modesty) represents an indirect speech act, in the sense that the speaker pursues a supergoal hidden behind the expression downgraded through the diminutive? Understatement and modesty conveyed through diminutive formation may be accounted for with both features [small] and [non-serious] (cf. 3.5.12.8.12.2): [small] translates directly into downgrading, 349 [non-serious] eliminates the danger of being interpreted as boastful or conceited or dramatic and thus represents rather a function of being modest or understating. 3.5.14. Irony and Sarcasm Understatement (cf. 3.5.13) is centrally involved in many cases of irony. Irony is commonly understood as "the use of words to convey the opposite of their literal meaning", sarcasm as "a sharply mocking or contemptuous remark, typically utilizing statements or implications pointedly opposite or irrelevant to the underlying p u r p o r t . . . . Sarcastic and ironic both pertain to a form of expression in which meanings are conveyed obliquely. Sarcastic suggests open taunting and ridicule; ironic suggests a milder and subtler form of mockery" (American Heritage Dictionary). Although irony and sarcasm are related and may mingle in such a way that sometimes they are difficult to distinguish, they must and can be treated separately. We begin with irony (for sarcasm see 3.5.14.5). 350 3.5.14.1. Since Aristotle's poetics, the essence of irony is generally found to arise from a contradiction between what is said and what is in-

338

Diminutives

tended. 351 This definition is clearly too narrow and too broad at the same time, 352 but more recent models 353 also suffer from the same defect. Moreover, no model of irony has - as far as we know - explicitly included the specific effects of diminutive formation. 354 We will try to fill this gap and also to contribute to problems of irony in general. As for the literature on irony, we are unable to go into all the hypotheses, observations and explanations published on the subject; we simply refer to the two volumes by Groeben—Scheele (1984) and Groeben—Seemann Drinkmann (1985). Our focus on diminutives restricts our task to verbal irony, 355 that is, irony as a discourse strategy (cf. Myers Roy 1981). Thus we are interested in ironic situations (cf. Littmann-Mey 1991) or situational irony (Muecke 1970) only insofar as they are important for literary authors' styles (cf. 3.5.14.2.4, 3.5.16.6-3.5.16.8). We will largely neglect devices for conveying irony other than diminutives (e.g. grammatical, lexical, prosodic, co(n)textual, cf. Groeben-Scheele 1984: 58; Nekula 1991; Haverkate 1990: 79-80). 3.5.14.2. Our account of diminutives in irony starts with the simple characterisation - explicitly or implicitly shared by all authors on irony — that irony entails a contradiction or clash. 356 Now, our first task is to differentiate uses of diminutives which constitute (or, at least, contribute to the constitution of) the clash, and those which modify the clash. 3.5.14.2.1. Let us begin with adjectives, first with dimensional adjectives, that is, those whose antonyms refer to the same dimensional scale but differ in directionality on the same scale (cf. Bierwisch 1987: 109). It is possible to use diminutives of both the unmarked and marked dimensional adjective for the effect of ironic understatement. 357 For example, one may talk of a very tall person (or even of a skyscraper) and produce an ironic assessment in the form of a tag question: 358 (341)

Un po' (a)alt-ino / (b) bass-ino, eh? a bit tall-DIM short-DIM eh Ά bit (a) on the tall/(b) short side, eh?'

In (341 a) the irony effect is clearer and more efficient than in (341 b), because the diminutive constitutes the clash in size in (341 a), whereas in (341 b) the diminutive downgrades the irony obtained by the semantically clashing antonym basso. This is a sort of reversal in directionality, which

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

339

partly confounds the (lexical) strategy towards irony. Therefore the implicated correct interpretation is easier to infer in (341 a) than in (341 b). The overall clash obtained by the diminutive in (341 a) is lower than the lexical clash in (341 b), despite the downgrading effect of the diminutive. The larger than normal (standard/expected) size of the referent is contradicted in (341 a) by the diminutive (either by its denotative feature [small] or by its feature [non-serious]), in (341 b) by the (here marked) lexical antonym basso 'low, short'. The same holds for all the other prototypical dimensional adjective pairs. Another example is the following, where somebody is talking about a very old man marrying a very young girl (with a diminutivized adverb): (342)

Un tant-ino (a) anziano / (b) giovane per lei, eh? somewhat-DIM old young for her eh Ά shade old/young for her, eh?'

Or when talking about a very hot day (343) or a very big apple offered to a dieting person: (343)

Un po' (a) cald-ino / (b) fredd-ino, eh? a bit warm-DIM cold-DIM eh Ά bit warmish/coldish, eh?'

(344)

Un po' (a) gross-ina / (b) piccol-ina, eh? a bit big-DIM small-DIM, eh Ά bit biggish/smallish, eh?'

The picture is further complicated by a factor related to conventions in conversation and formulaic language. The conventionally obvious ironic comment on some abnormally tall object would actually make use of the antonyms 'low' or 'short': the addition of the diminutive suffix in (341 b) would sound a bit more elaborated and would thus mitigate conventionality. Also (342 b) may sound like a way of ironising on a conventional ironic comment frequently made in case of age-asymmetry between partners. In this case, the irony would be based especially on the use of such a conventional, prefabricated piece of language in pragmatically inappropriate circumstances. This is what Sperber-Wilson's (1981) mean when they conceive of irony as based on mentioning of another utterance. In all these cases, the unmarked pole of the scale is ironised upon by understatement/downgrading. If, however, the marked pole is the target

340

Diminutives

of ironic understatement, only diminutives of the marked adjective can be used. Thus, when talking about a very short person, (345 a) and (345 c) are adequate, but not (345 b): (345)

Un po' (a) bass-ino / (b)*alt-ino, eh? (c) Alto, eh? a bit short-DIM *tall-DIM eh Tall eh Ά bit on the shortAall side, eh?' 'Tall, eh?'

The reason for this asymmetry is obvious. It is easier for the hearer to infer the correct implicated ironic meaning if a marked adjective is inappropriately used for the appropriate unmarked adjective than would be if the reverse were used, namely the unmarked adjective, as in (345 c). And, as we have seen, the addition of the diminutive makes the correct inference still more difficult, too difficult apparently. This account is corroborated by the fact that not only (345 b) is situationally inadequate, but also: (345) d. Un po' alto, eh? A bit tall, eh?' Both downgraders, the diminutive suffix and the adverb un po', make the assessment inadequate. Bierwisch (1987: 109) sets up a second class, that of evaluative adjectives, that is, those whose antonyms refer either to a different scale or to a different section of the same scale. Here, as in the case of marked adjectives in (345), the antonym cannot be diminutivized to obtain irony via understatement. For example, if one wants to complain about excessively salty food, (346 a) and (346 c), but not (346 b), are adequate: (346)

Un po' (a) salat-ino / (b) *dolc-ino, eh? (c) Dolce, eh? a bit salty-DIM *sweet-DIM eh sweet eh Ά bit too salty/*sweety, eh?' 'Sweet, eh?'

The same holds, if, on the other hand, the expected salt is totally lacking: (347)

Un po' (a) dolc-ino I (b) *salat-ino, eh? (c) Salato, eh? a bit sweet-DIM *salty-DIM eh salty eh Ά bit too sweety/*salty, eh?' 'Salty, eh?'

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

341

Or when speaking on the beach about a deeply tanned person: (348)

Un po' (a) abbronzat-ino / (b) *bianch-ino, eh? a bit tanned-DIM *white-DIM eh (c) Bianco, eh? white eh Ά touch suntanned/*white side, eh?' 'White, eh?'

Inversely, about a person that, despite all efforts, has remained extremely pale: (349)

Un po' (a) bianch-ino / (b) * abbronzat-ino, eh? a bit white-DIM *tanned-DIM eh (c) Abbronzato, eh? tanned eh Ά bit on the white side/*a touch suntanned, eh?' 'Tanned, eh?'

We may generalize about Italian diminutives in ironical understatement/ downgrading: First, irony may be achieved by attenuating the proper adjectival description; this scalar downgrading can be reached more directly with the denotative feature [small] than with the pragmatic feature [non-serious]. Such diminutivization is sufficient to produce an ironic clash. Second, a diminutive suffix may be attached to the ironically used marked antonym of an unmarked dimensional adjective. In evaluative adjective pairs, the two antonyms are both marked, so that this possibility does not obtain. The deeper reason is that the diminutive attenuates on one scale. All marked adjectives have their specific scale, and attenuation functions ironically only on that scale, but not on the scale of its (equally marked) antonym. For dimensional adjectives, the scale of the unmarked antonym holds for the marked antonym as well. That is, bassino 'a bit short' is still on the scale of alto 'tall', it is attenuated on this general scale and directly clashes against the expected 'tall', that is, downgrading (e.g., via diminutive) can operate only on the same scale. This explains the asymmetry between marked and unmarked in this case. 359 Third, the mitigating effects of diminutive suffixes attached to adjective bases whose meaning clashes with the expected meaning of the lexical item, are of the same nature as in speech acts in general (cf. 3.5.10— 3.5.12). Thus, in the evaluative rhetorical questions (341b), (342 b), (343 b), (344 b), speaker's commitment and expressed inner state are

342

Diminutives

downgraded, as well as negative perlocutionary sequels (about perlocutionary goals, see below 3.5.14.4). Fourth, in all cases examined so far, irony is based on constrast between description and referent (cf. 5.1.3). There is a direct contrast both between basso 'short' and the tallness of the referent, and between alt-ino 'a bit tall' and the tallness of the referent (similar in bass-ino, salat-inol dolc-ino and the respective referents indicated by the base forms of the adjectives). Of course, there are disturbing variables that blur the picture, such as non-prototypical members of adjective classes, or avoidance of diminutive formation with certain adjectives, or ironical citation of diminutives frequently used in describing the opposite. We have also left out the complicating factor of negation (cf. Oomen 1983: 31). 3.5.14.2.2. Irony in diminutivised nouns follows the scale of the typical dimensional properties of the noun (cf. 3.4.1.2). Let us take a conceivable German translation of Haverkate's (1990: 82) English example (5): (350)

Your friend asked me to lend him the nice little sum of $ 100,000.

(350')

Dein Freund bat mich ihm das Sümm-chen von $ 100.000 your friend asked me him the sum-DIM of $ 100.000 zu leihen. to lend

The most important dimension of Summe 'sum' is quantity (for example of money). 100,000 dollars is a huge sum of money, thus there is a clash with the diminutive Sümm-chen in (350'), an overt contradiction in terms (Haverkate 1990: 82), similar to the lexical downgrading in (350). Less obvious is the tagged evaluative statement: (351)

La tua test-ol-ina non ha pace, vero? the your head-INTERF-DIM not has peace true 'That poor little head of yours has no peace, has it?'

The dimension referred to by "head" is thinking, and thinking is a serious matter. The use of the metonym "head" including a diminutive with its feature [non-serious] downgrades seriousness of thinking. Affectionate irony is the effect, due to the presence of positive emotions, but it could also be mild mocking. Now let us see two examples of expressions where normally the diminutive expresses an emotional upgrading of the speaker's inner states. As

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

343

we have seen in 3.5.12.8.5, such diminutives upgrade the illocutionary strength of the respective speech acts. Therefore, if such an expression is used ironically and if the lexical item which constitutes the ironic clash is diminutivized, then irony might be expected to be upgraded. This prediction comes true in pertinent Polish examples from Klimaszewska (1983: 100) like the following: (352)

To to talc, aniolku? that that so angel-DIM(VOC) 'Is that so, my dear angel?'

This is said to a person whom the speaker dislikes or whose behavior is on the occasion or in general very unlike that of an angel. (352) represents Haverkate's (1990: 91) case of propositional negation. A German correspondence would be: (352')

Ist das so, mein Engel-chen? is that so my angel-DIM

where the possessive mein 'my' underlines (and disambiguates) the connotation of the diminutive in the original usage of the noun-phrase. But this example lends itself more easily to a sarcastic rather than ironic interpretation (more in 3.5.14.5.9). Not all our German-speaking informants, however, agreed on recognizing upgrading of irony, due to the diminutive in such cases as (352'), nor did Italian informants with the equivalent angel-ucciolangiol-ottol-etto vs. angelo 'angel'. Subtle contextual factors seem to exist that we have not been able to identify in a generalizable way. For verbs, see our example (375) in 3.5.14.3.2. 3.5.14.2.3. A very different type of clash has been correctly recognized by Klimaszewska (1983: 100) in Polish examples where diminutive formation constitutes irony: "An ironic effect may also be obtained, if diminutive suffixes are attached to abstract concepts that, from the point of view of semantics, resist diminutivisation" (cf. also Wellmann 1975: 129). German examples are Kurt Tucholsky's Wissenschäft-chen 'science-DIM' (to be discussed in 3.5.15.4); Vorzugsstimmenaktion(d)-erl 'a preference vote action-DIM' (3.5.5.5); Guten Tag+DIM in (363) below; Italian ones lingu-ine, letteratur-ine 'languages-DIM, literatures-DIM' (cf. 3.4.2.3); ripres-ina 'slight economic recovery'; emendament-ino 'emendment-DIM'; decret-ino 'decree-DIM'; repubblich-ette 'republics-DIM'; rimpast-ino go-

344

Diminutives

vernativo 'government reshuffling-DIM'; all five diminutives often cited in Italian newspapers of 1991, cf. Parma, capital-ina di Maria Luigia 'Parma, capital-DIM of Maria Luise'. All our examples have an element of jocularity, which allows violation of constraints on diminutivization. Irony shares this capability of violating constraints on diminutivization with child-centered speech situations (3.5.2) and jocularity in general (cf. 3.5.5.5). Friendly irony and jocularity, both triggered by the feature [non-serious] may be very close or even mutually feeding. Which is predominant depends on the speech situation. Irony predominates in the case of such bureaucratic words as decret-ino, emendament-ino, govern-icchio (example (375)), etc., jocularity predominates in the examples of 3.5.5.5. In addition, we have a problem of cause and effect: such illegal neowords make readers smile when they see them for the first time. Do their creators anticipate and plan this effect, or do they coin them for other reasons, jocularity being just a side-effect? In any case, Goldstein (1990) is right when he claims that violation of rules and conventions very often produces humorous results. Not only certain lexical bases or classes of lexical bases but also idioms shun diminutives (cf. 3.4.1.2). If a lexical base within an idiom is diminutivized, there arises an ironic effect which, again, is conditioned by a lexical clash. This is because idioms are lexicalized phrases, whose parts are therefore inadmissible bases for derivational rules. Moreover, non-alterative rules cannot apply because the internal syntactic structure of a phrase (e.g., government relations) can hardly be changed. This additional reason does not hold for diminutive formation. But if it applies, this still violates the first constraint, and the ensuing strangeness, again, invites an ironic and/or jocular interpretation. Italian examples are: (353) a. tromba d' aria trumpet of air 'tornado'

b. tromb-etta d' aria. trumpet-DIM of air

(354) a. cominciare dalla gavetta to start from the mess-tin 'to come from the ranks' b. cominciare dalla gavett-ina (355)

ai nemici facciamo (a) ponti to the enemies we make bridges / (b) pont-ic-elli d' oro bridges-INTERF-DIM of gold 'to our enemies we offer advantageous terms'

Data and their interpretation

(356)

— Irony and Sarcasm

345

prendere un (a) granchio / (b) granchi-etto to take a crayfish 'to make a (b: bit of a) blunder'

(357) a. correre run b. quando when 'to run

rischi risks si corrono certi rischi-etti REFL run certain risks-DIM risks; when you run certain little risks'

Examples (354)-(357) are idiomatic verb phrases of the type that Mel'cuk (1982: 27) has called lexical functions. The landing-site (cf. 3.5.9) chosen in (353)—(357) is clear: it is the head in (353), (355) and the noun in those cases where the verb would not admit diminutivization (354)(357). But what happens if an idiom consists of two words that both admit diminutivization? Let us take the following idiom: (358)

cantare vittoria to sing victory 'to crow over one's victory prematurely'

Cantare has the well-attested diminutive cant-icchiare, vittoria the possible vittori-etta (as in una vittori-etta da poco 'a victory-DIM of little/no importance'). In this case both ironic diminutivizations (358'), (358") are possible, whereas double diminutivization in (358"') definitely seems to be too much: (358')

comincio

a cant-icchiare vittoria

'I'm beginning to crow a bit over my victory' (358")

comincio a cantare vittori-etta

(358"')

*comincio a cant-icchiare vittori-etta

Native speakers prefer (358') to (358"), but this may be simply due to the fact that cant-icchiare itself is well-attested, whereas vittori-etta is not. This, again, is matter for future ample and systematic studies. This specific strategy for producing irony (or jocularity) is not used in German, but of course, as in other languages, the wider strategy of breaking up formulaic language by some innovative or illegal device (cf. Tannen 1989) is current. And this, again, is a sub-case of the Russian formal-

346

Diminutives

ists' and Praguian concept of "de-automatization" (cf. Kloepfer 1975: 46; Garcia-Berrio 1992: 29). 3.5.14.2.4. The last type of verbal irony we want to mention is pretended empathy. Here the diminutives that normally signal speaker's empathy with the addressee (cf. 3.5.7) invite an ironic interpretation due to a cotextual or contextual clash. Usually ironic prosody is used, as typically in: (359)

La mogli-ett-ina ti ha fat to smettere? the wife-DIM-DIM ye has made stop 'Your better half has made you stop?'

(360)

Non vuol fare aspettare la fidanzat-ina not wants make wait the fiancee-DIM 'He doesn't want to keep his dear fiancee waiting.'

3.5.14.2.5. We move over to the area of situational irony (cf. 3.5.14.1) with the following question from a TV series: (361)

La magli-ett-ina ti ha fatto mettere? the vest-DIM-DIM ye he's made put on 'He got you to be a good boy and put the jumper on?'

Here the speaker is teasing the addressee like a child, that is, with the double diminutive, he ironically treats him like a prototypical child. Thus the diminutives indicate a clash in the speech situation between the real and the imagined addressee. Or let us take the following examples from G. Tomasi di Lampedusa (1958: 131) whose Gattopardo (The Leopard) is full of ironic contrasts (more in 3.5.16.8). One of the major ironic situations that the author creates is the plebiscite in the Sicilian village of Donnafugata concerning the union with Italy, where many diminutives are used. It starts with (p. 131): (362) a. II giorno del plebiscito... si erano visti the day of the plebiscite REFL were seen aggirarsi stanchi grupp-etti di giovan-otti go round-REFL tired groups-DIM of young-DIM-PL con un cartell-ino recante "si" with a card-DIM displaying yes 'The day of the Plebiscite ... tired groups of youth had been seen going through the streets of the town with bits of paper covered with "yes" ...' (Colquhoun 1963: 89).

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

347

Although giovan-otti is lexicalized and the other two diminutives may be mainly denotative (cf. G. müde Grüpp-chen junger Leute ... Zettel-chen ... 'tired groups-DIM of young people-DIM... cards-DIM': Birnbaum 1959: 75), there is also a contrast to the large-scale political manoeuvering in favor of the union. After an equally ironic melodi-etta 'tune-DIM' and a not very clearly ironic diminutive ciottol-ini 'loose stones' (Colquhoun 1963: 90), the Prince of Salina enters (p. 133): (362) b. una sal-etta del Municipio. a hall-DIM of the town hall 'a little room in the Town Hall' (Colquhoun 1963: 91) This is the equivalent of G. kleinen Saal 'little hall' (Birnbaum 1959: 76), again, with a denotative diminutive, but, again, the smallness of the mayor's study ironically contrasts with his great ambitions. The mayor then invites the Prince and the others present to: (362) c. "prendere un bicchier-ino" to take a glass-DIM 'for "a little glass'" (Colquhoun 1963: 91), an idiom with a lexicalized diminutive, such as in the German equivalent "ein Gläs-chen zu genehmigen" 'a glass-DIM to grant' (Birnbaum 1959: 77), but irony is signaled by the quotation marks (which correspond to ironic prosody in oral speech). In the next paragraph, there is a denotative reinterpretation of the diminutive with a still more ironic effect due to its cotext (p. 133): (362) d. Su un tavol-in-etto basso un piatto con biscotti on a table-DIM-DIM low a plate with biscuits anzian-issimi che defecazioni di mosche listavano a lutto, ancient-ELAT which defecations of flies blackened e dodici bicchier-ini tozzi colmi di rosolio and 12 glasses-DIM squat full of rosolio O n a small low table was a plate with some ancient biscuits blackened by fly droppings and a dozen little squat glasses brimming with rosolio wine' (four red, four green, four white, the last in the centre: an ingenious symbol of the new national flag) (Colquhoun 1963: 91).

348

Diminutives

(Also the German translation (p. 77) has two corresponding diminutives: Tisch-chen, Gläs-chen 'table-/glass-DIM'). The final irony co-signaled by diminutives comes on p. 134: (362) e. Prima del tramonto le tre ο quattro bagasc-ette di before the dusk the 3 or 4 whores-DIM of Donnafugata... col crine adorno di nastr-ini Donnafugata... with manes decorated of ribbons-DIM tricolori ...le pover-ine vennero beffeggiate... tricolour the poor-DIM were jeered at 'Before dusk the three or four easy girls of D. ... with tricolour ribbons in their manes ... the poor creatures were jeered at ...' (Colquhoun 1963: 92). Only the diminutive nastr-ini (G. diminutive Trikolorenbänd-chen) may be denotative, but their smallness clashes ironically with the patriotic character of the national colours. The other two diminutives show ironic compassion as does the futility of the women's patriotic demonstration. The ironic representation is completed in the hyperbolic newspaper report: (362) f. alcune gentili rappresentanti del bei sesso hanno voluto some gentle representatives of the fair sex have wanted manifestare la propria fede inconcussa nei nuovi fulgidi manifest the own faith untouched in the new brilliant destini della Patria amat-issima. fates of the fatherland beloved-ELAT 'Some gentle representatives of the fair sex wished to show their faith in the new and brilliant destinies of their beloved Country.' (Colquhoun 1963: 92) Here the hyperbolic elative, overlooked in the English translation, is wellrendered in the German translation (p. 77) by the excessive des allergeliebt-esten Vaterlands 'of the all-beloved-SUPERL fatherland' (cf. chapter 6). Golopentia's (1988: 196) definition of parody fits well here: "L'action de parodier consiste en la reduction ludique d'une action semiotique prestigieuse. Cette reduction peut etre operee par le biais de la representation deformee ... de Taction semiotique prise pour cible." And her para-

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

349

phrase of "reduire" as "diminuer l'importance" corresponds to a frequent meaning of diminutives (cf. 3.4.1.2, 3.4.6.6—3.4.6.7). These cases show that diminutivization is a sufficient device for creating an ironic effect. It operates enough downgrading for establishing a clash with common standards attributed to a referent. These characteristic features are not limited to situational irony created in literary written texts. They also hold for the following song broadcast within the Viennese satirical weekly radio magazine Guglhupf. After a scandal of corruption and waste of money within the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), SPÖ treasurers had a difficult time when they had to go around to collect the monthly membership contributions personally from SPÖ members. This was the background for the satirical Lied des Parteikassiers ('song of the party treasurer') which contained the verses: (363)

Sonst wünsch' i a Guats Tag-erl. Wo is denn otherwise wish I a Good Day-DIM Where is PART Ihr Beitrag-erl? your contribution-DIM Otherwise I wish a nice Good Morning. Where is your little contribution?'

Here we identify mitigating diminutives in speech acts of greeting and request. The author, however, is portraying this treasurer ironically (on the verbal level only via diminutives); the rhyming diminutives reinforce the irony. 3.5.14.3. We now need to fit our categories of ironic clashes operated by diminutives (3.5.14.2) into a pragmatic model of irony. We are going to concentrate on three models, Haverkate's (1990), Leech's (1983, below 3.5.14.3.6) and Groeben-Scheele's (1984) and Groeben-Seemann Drinkmann (1985) (below 3.5.14.3.7), and bring up phenomena not mentioned by Haverkate and Leech (3.5.14.3.2—3.5.14.3.5). For the goals or super-goals of irony, see 3.5.14.4. 3.5.14.3.1. According to Haverkate (1990: 104), "irony is the intentional expression of insincerity" (in Searle's sense),360 and, as far as diminutives are concerned, this occurs at the levels of the linguistic structure of the utterance and of the hearer's interpretation (p. 101). The speaker's intention to be insincere must be transparent to the addressee (p. 102)361 except for the case of misunderstanding, as with an error in performance by hearer or speaker. This transparent insincerity, the embedding of the

350

Diminutives

ironic utterance in its wider co(n)text, and the ironic prosody (if present) allow the hearer to infer the speaker's intended meaning. 362 Haverkate (1990: 89) gives a lucid analysis of the role of irony in Searle's classes of speech acts. His claim (p. 89) that "irony manifests itself predominantly in the performance of assertives", that they are normally depreciatory (p. 90), and that rhetorical questions and irony combine "to reinforce the perlocutionary effect of negative assessments, in particular of criticisms" (p. 93) is also supported by our material. Take the rhetorical question (said as a reaction to a cruel, racist injustice): (364)

Non siamo forse tutte creatur-ine di Dio? not are we perhaps all creatures-DIM of God 'Aren't we all in the end God's very own creatures?'

Ironic negation adds to the effects of the rhetorical question, of the adverb 'perhaps', and of the seemingly minimizing diminutive. Rhetorical questions are stronger upgraders than tag questions (3.5.14.2.1), because they render the addressee's disagreement more difficult. Haverkate's claim (1990: 93) that "declarative speech acts ... are incompatible with ironic interpretation" holds only for prototypical speech situations where declaratives occur, but not in the following case: (365)

77 nomino president-ino. ye I name president-DIM Ί name you our dear/humble/nice president.'

Here the diminutive inserted in the declarative formula (with an obligatory performative verb, cf. 3.5.12.1) contradicts the seriousness expected for situations in which such a formula is normally used. The implicature leads to two possible interpretations: either the speech act is non-serious, that is, the nomination is not valid (in this case the speaker would be insincere), or the speech act is serious (the speaker is sincere), but the special situation (e.g., a club of close friends) allows jocularity and irony even in serious matters (with perhaps a hint of understatement). In any case, (365) sounds like a modified (that is, ironically transformed) citation of): (365')

Ti nomino presidente.

which fits in well with Sperber-Wilson's (1981) model (cf. Clark-Gerrig 1990).

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

351

The examples of directive speech acts we have are of types not treated by Haverkate (1990: 94-97). The first comes from the Austrian weekly Profil, which reports about a protest by the chair-woman of the Austrian National Bank, Maria Schaumayr, against rumors that she would like to be nominated candidate to succeed Mr. Waldheim as president of the republic: (366)

Ich wäre Ihnen herzlich dankbar, wenn Sie dieses I' d be ye cordially thankful if you this Feuer-l austreten könnten — ohne mich dabei als fire-DIM out-trample could without me in this as Ganzes zu zertreten. whole to trample down 'I'd be extremely grateful to you, if you could quench this little fire — without quenching the whole of me.'

She dismisses and ridicules such rumors as non-important. More specifically, the irony lies in the clash between the sincerity of the wish (attempt at achieving the perlocutionary goal) and the non-seriousness of the diminutive (downgrading the expression of inner states), that is, in the metaphoric comparison with a non-serious fire. Also a ludic element is present (cf. the word play austreten — zertreten). The insincerity of an ironic directive may lie in the violation of the preparatory condition "that the hearer is able to do the act directed" (Searle-Vanderveken 1985: 18). This is the case in the following two (direct and indirect) requests which are impossible to comply with: (367)

Ecco, nonna, adesso fai una bella cors-ett-ina! Look granny now make a nice run-DIM-DIM 'Well, granny, now you can take a nice brisk little run!'

(said with friendly irony to an elderly lady who hardly walks). Here the diminutive mitigates the insincerity, allows for a jocular (but always ironic) interpretation, and weakens the clash between propositional content and the impossibility of carrying out the request. In the indirect, fake request (said in front of a shop window displaying rings with huge, unaffordable diamonds): (368)

Cosa ne diresti di regalarmi quell' anell-ino? what of it would you say of presenting me that ring-DIM 'What would you say to buying me that little ring there?'

352

Diminutives

The diminutive reinforces irony, because it introduces a second clash, viz. between the true size or value of the ring and its downgrading via the diminutive (cf. 3.5.14.2.2). 3.5.14.3.2. There are other occurrences of ironic diminutives which have not been envisaged in Haverkate's (1990) model nor in those of others (except Groeben-Scheele 1984). A case in point is irony in repetition, where simple or especially multiple repetition establishes or greatly enhances irony, as in: (369) A: Manda avanti la sua bella figli(-)ol-ina. sends ahead the his nice daughter-DIM 'He puts his lovely darling daughter up front.' B: La sua bella figli(-)ol-ina picchia forte. the his nice daughter-DIM hits strongly 'His lovely darling daughter drives a hard bargain.' The diminutive in A's assertion expresses empathy which B's irony cancels. Irony derives from a) exact repetition of the noun-phrase (cf. Merlini Barbaresi 1989; Groeben-Scheele 1984: 39); b) clash between the diminutive's feature [small] or [non-serious] and the intensification (choice of verb, adverb forte) in the verb phrase. Irony was also signaled by ironic prosody. With no repetition (in the same utterance) there would be no irony in: (370) G. Köpfchen, Köpfchen! head-DIM head-DIM an idiomatic form for suggesting to the interlocutors that they should think harder (cf. Klimaszewska 1983: 59). A single Köpfchen would not obtain the effect. As we have seen in 3.5.9, clusters of diminutives are avoided outside child-centered speech situations and marked style. One instance of the latter is ironic clustering of diminutives in a detective story set in Frankfurt, a text chunk of which is reported by the German weekly Spiegel (March 1991): (371)

Dieser Edelkeller, wo der Yuppie-Pöbel Weißwein this super-cellar where the yuppie-plebs white wine schlürft.... Man ißt Häpp-chen auf Stühl-chen an sips one eats mouthfuls-DIM on chairs-DIM at

Data and their interpretation

Tisch-chen und trinkt tables-DIM and drinks zierliche Beine. delicate legs 'This super-wine-cellar, wine — One eats little tables and drinks from legs.'

— Irony and Sarcasm

353

aus Gläs-chen. Alles hat from glasses-DIM everything has

where the yuppie-plebs sip white things, sitting on little chairs at little little glasses. Everything has delicate

The situation is portrayed in an ironic way (cf. 3.5.14.2.4.9), and the cluster of (at least partially denotative) diminutives reinforces irony. Repetition and rhyming of diminutives is essential for producing irony in the following Italian examples, where rhyming is extended to include the second syllable of the stem: (372)

un soggiorn-ino in un convent-ino a stay-DIM in a convent-DIM 'a weekend in a wee convent'

(373)

mi tocca andare a fare il barbon-c-ello come un me touches go to make the beggar-DIM like a terron-c-ello terrone-DIM Ί have to act as a little beggar like a little "terrone".' 363

A rhyming diminutive, without repetition, is sufficient for reinforcing irony in: (374)

Che facc-ino, sei tanto carino! what face-DIM you're so much pretty 'What a cutey face for a cutey boy!'

In the following example, repetitive and rhyming clustering of diminutives is the most important producer of irony. Below a sequence of four cartoons which show the silhouette of the Italian prime minister Giulio Andreotti (Corriere della Sera 16.7.91, heading "Tali & Quali ... di Alfredo Chiappori"), each containing a cluster of diminutive verbs in the first person (Prime Minister Andreotti speaking): (375)

nicchio dorm-icchio toss-icchio son-icchio I hedge about sleep-DIM cough-DIM play-DIM camp-icchio. live-DIM

354

Diminutives

ros-icchio cant-icchio salt-icchio mors-icchio bev-icchio. nibble-DIM sing-DIM jump-DIM bite-DIM drink-DIM spend-icchio legg-icchio stud-icchio lavor-icchio puzz-icchio. spend-DIM read-DIM study-DIM work-DIM stink-DIM in breve ... govern-icchio! in short I govern-DIM Ί hedge about ( = shilly shally), sleep a bit, cough a bit, play a bit, get along a bit, do a bit of earning on the side (that is, illegally), a bit of singing, a bit of jumping, a bit of nibbling, a bit of drinking, I sort of spend, sort of read, sort of study, sort of work, sort of stink, in short, I sort of govern.' Of course, we have ad hoc formations {spend-icchio, puzz-icchio), some of which are unlikely because current synonyms exist (legg-icchio for leggiucchio), and it is unexpected that a prime minister confesses that he is governing only a bit, in a non-serious way, and that he is taking advantage of political power to earn money illegally {ros-icchio). For first-person present govern-icchio, no other interpretation than self-irony or (here) author's irony (creating situational irony, cf. 3.5.14.2.5) is possible. The main ironic effects are thus created by the rhyming clustering of diminutives and by the culminating irony of govern-icchio, the main point of the critical cartoon. 3.5.14.3.3. Self-irony, where the speaker makes himself the victim of irony (in monologues he is also the addressee, cf. Eggs 1979: 423) does not seem to have found systematic pragmatic treatment so far (except some relevant findings in Groeben-Scheele 1984: 8, 40). An expression of modesty or understatement, like: (376)

Ecco la mia macchin-ettalina! ( = 3.5.13.5 (340)) well the my car-DIM 'There's my modest car!'

may also be ironic, but then it has to be specifically signaled (e.g., by ironic prosody). The clash is the same as in modesty or in understatement (cf. 3.5.13), but the intention is different (see below, 3.5.14.4). Only irony is present in Klimaszewska's (1983: 39) Dutch example (with German translation): (377)

wij zijn een dom volk-je Wir sind ein dummes Völk-chen we are a silly people-DIM 'We're a sort of silly people.'

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

355

The self-depreciatory adjective "silly" clearly indicates an ironic interpretation, at least in West European and American societies (but not necessarily in China or Japan, where it may just represent a very polite understatement, cf. 2.4.5.2). The diminutive further plays down the speaker and his sphere (similar to threats, cf. 3.5.12.3.2). If the possessive "my" in the micro-cotext adds a connotation of endearment (cf. 3.5.7.5), the macro-cotext may still add a connotation of irony (signaled by prosody) as in the oral narrative (oral history) of a Jewish emigrant who was forced to leave Vienna in 1938: (378)

So hab' ich mein Koffer-l364 gepackt und bin weg. so have I my suitcase-DIM packed and am off 'Thus I packed my little suitcase and went off.'

Besides expressing denotative smallness (Jews were allowed to take only very little with them), the speaker played down himself a bit (there is no other landing-site for the diminutive suffix in this sentence), presumably in contrast with the fate that awaited Jews who remained (this would be the clash). All these examples of self-irony are of a dialogic nature. The following two examples, which in our data are dialogic, might also be interpreted as monologic self-irony, commenting on one's own silly behavior: (379)

Ho preso proprio un bei granchi-etto I've taken really a nice blunder-DIM Ί made a really fine blunder.'

Here, diminutivization within the idiom creates irony (see 3.5.14.2.3 example (356 b)). The adverb proprio and the adjective bello (lit. 'beautiful') function as upgraders and thus clash with the downgrading diminutive. In: (380)

Ho fatto qualche error-ino I've made some error-DIM Ί made a few little errors.'

the speaker was actually confronted with quite a lot of mistakes in his typing. The diminutive clashes with this high number of errors made. 3.5.14.3.4. The paradigmatic relationship between ironic speech acts addressed to an interlocutor and speaker's understatements about himself

356

Diminutives

is pertinent for diminutives in irony and does not seem to have been studied. Let us start with an example already given in Dressler—Merlini Barbaresi (1989 b: 245 (21)) and here in 3.5.13.4 (330), where an Italian poet mentions a poem of his own: (381)

Ε stato durante quel viaggio che ho scritto la mia poesi-ola. 'It was during that trip that I wrote my little poem.'

The understatement (expression of false modesty contained in the utterance) prompted the interlocutor to ask the poet how he would react, if she asked him: (38 Γ)

Ε stato durante quel viaggio che hai scritto la tua is been during that trip that you've written the your poesi-ola? poem-DIM 'Was it during that trip that you wrote your little poem?'

The poet's answer was "I'd give you a slap in your face!", that is, he interpreted (381') as offensive or satirical. Thus, both in (381) and (381'), the diminutive upgrades the expression of inner states. But if we return to (376) in its non-ironic interpretation, then we find a strict parallel: (382)

Ecco la tua macchin-ina! 'Ah, here's your little car!'

If (382) represents friendly irony (cf. below 3.5.14.3.7), then it corresponds to (376) uttered with true modesty, in the sense that in both cases the diminutive downgrades. Friendly irony always seems to be ludic or empathetic, a way of taking sides with the interlocutor. 365 If (382) is uttered with empathy and/or interlocutor-directed positive emotion, then it may be intended to correspond to (376) uttered with endearment, because in both cases the diminutive upgrades the expression of inner states. The deeper reason for these parallels is that the respective amount of cooperativeness between interlocutors has the same effects in understatements and in irony (more in 3.5.14.5.4). 3.5.14.3.5. Recursive diminutivization reinforces irony if the simple diminutive is constitutive of the clash. Take the case of self-irony (cf. 3.5.14.3.3), (said in front of an impressively huge yacht):

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

(383)

357

Ecco la mia (a) barch-etta/barch-ina! (b) barch-ett-ina! Here's the my boat-DIM boat-DIM-DIM 'Here's my (b: modest/humble) little boat!'

The same holds for our examples (359), (361), (362 d), (367). Wordbased recursion as in *barch-ina-ina-ina (cf. 3.3.2.9) is excluded, because it would be heard as insistence on denotative dimensional diminution (cf. 3.4.2.5), not relevant here. This proves that irony via diminutives clearly is a matter for the morphopragmatics and not for the morphosemantics of diminutives. 3.5.14.3.6. After our own analyses and descriptions of data we can now evaluate Leech's (1983) politeness model of irony. He posits a special "irony principle" (p. 82, with improvements in wording over earlier versions): "If you cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the P(oliteness) P(rinciple), but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of implicature." This he rightly considers (p. 142) "a 'second-order principle' which enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming to be polite". Another pertinent observation is (p. 143): "The ironic force of a remark is often signaled by ... understatement." This model, however, does not account for self-irony (either monologic or dialogic, cf. 3.5.14.3.3) nor for situational irony (cf. 3.5.14.2.5 and Littman—Mey 1991). Moreover, it is at least debatable whether friendly irony (cf. 3.5.14.3.4, 3.5.14.3.7, and 3.5.14.4) is to be viewed as impolite. Finally, reference to understatement needs further elaborations of the type we have tried to provide in 3.5.14.2.13.5.14.2.2. In these respects, Brown-Levinson's (1987) section on "Ironic composition and understatement" (p. 262-265) and their off-record strategy 8 "Be ironic!" (p. 221) have the same shortcoming: "By saying the opposite of what he means, again a violation of Quality, S [the speaker] can indirectly convey his intended meaning, if there are clues that his intended meaning is conveyed indirectly." 366 3.5.14.3.7. Groeben et al.'s (1984, 1985) two volumes develop a rich pragma- and psycholinguistic model of irony within a psychological model of cognitive constructionalism (I: 20) and test it experimentally. They define (I: 30, 53) verbal irony as an improper-contrastive speech act, which may be a direct or indirect speech act, that is, irony is contrastive (not just implying the opposite) in distinction to other improper

358

Diminutives

speech acts such as metaphoric or hyperbolic speech (I: 55). Our findings on diminutives fit this model. The authors differentiate four main types of irony (I: 157, 195, 230, 244, II: 10): a) protective, defensive irony, conceived of as the prototypical kind of irony, a typical indirect way used for criticizing by intellectually superior speakers who have not sufficient power to criticize directly; b) constructive-critical irony used by a sympathetic speaker to influence the addressee of his ironic utterance — this is a sub-type of our friendly irony (cf. 3.5.14.3.4); c) affectionate, always jocular irony, which does not criticize but expresses positive attitudes - another subtype of our friendly irony; d) arrogant, destructive irony. Unfortunately this categorization seems to have relatively little relevance for the use of diminutives, as we will see in the next sections. 3.5.14.4. Irony has more varied goals and super-goals than other regulative factors of diminutives. 3.5.14.4.1. Aristotle's concept of blame via apparent praise is still followed by those who see criticism as the main super-goal of irony. 367 This may hold even for monologic self-irony, whose main super-goal seems to be self-criticism. Dialogic self-irony may also belong here when it is meant to anticipate a criticism by the interlocutor (as in (376)) or when it represents fake self-criticism, which is, rather, indirect criticism of the interlocutor (cf. Groeben-Scheele 1984: 8, 40). Alternatively, the super-goal may be humour, 368 as in jocular facethreatening and/or teasing (Schütte 1987) or in jocular friendly irony (cf. 3.5.14.3.4) or in jocular ad hoc formations (cf. 3.5.14.2.3) or in the creation of situational irony (cf. 3.5.14.2.5 and (375)).369 According to Haverkate (1990: 77), irony creates interpersonal distance, obviously only when addressed to the interlocutor. But this is not the case with irony shared with the interlocutor, or with friendly irony and self-irony. Then there may be educational and still other purposes (cf. Littman — Mey 1991: 149), or a combination of goals like in the proclaimed purpose of Horace's satires (1.1,24) ridentem dicere verum 'smiling to tell the truth' or its antecedent in Cynic philosophy: spoudaio-geloios 'blending jest with earnest'. 3.5.14.4.2. But why is irony chosen for these super-goals? This leads us to the question on the specific goals of irony. First of all, an ironic formulation is (in general) unexpected and indirect and therefore textually more effective. 370

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

359

Irony may be humorous (cf. 3.5.14.2.3, 3.5.14.4.1). Humor may be either subordinated or superordinated to other goals, e.g., meant to express or build up group solidarity. 371 Humor, that is, may represent either a goal or a super-goal. And this hierarchy may not be easy to establish, as is the case in the proclaimed vs. true goals of Horace's satires (3.5.14.4.2) or in the caricature in (375). According to Leech (1983: 144), irony "keeps aggression away from the brink of conflict ... because irony pays lip-service to the P(oliteness) P(rinciple), it is less easy to break the PP in one's response to it." This may also be applied to self-irony. If dialogic self-irony anticipates the interlocutor's irony, then it represents a cooperative move. In monologic self-irony, the speaker mitigates criticism of self and its conceivable destructive effects. Finally, in friendly irony, aggressiveness is cancelled by jocularity. Situational irony of the type discussed in 3.5.14.2.4 is more difficult to reconcile with Leech's hypothesis. The irony of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa or Thomas Mann may still be seen to be non-aggressive (cf. 3.5.16). No representatives of social strata treated ironically by such authors have been reported to have protested against such parodies. This is a far cry from the massive protest against the aggressive sarcastic writings of such recent authors as Thomas Bernhard in Austria. The three goals of irony described here are not incompatible, but they are not mutually derivable either. Nor is there any fixed hierarchy of these goals. Which of the three goals is most or least important seems, rather, to depend on the speech situation and on the respective macrospeech act. 3.5.14.4.3. Thus, by way of a first conclusion on the relevance of diminutives for irony, we may state the following: for whatever goal and supergoal irony is chosen by a speaker of Italian and German (and of other languages with a similar morphopragmatics of diminutives), diminutive formation, by dint of its feature [non-serious], belongs to the arsenal of strategic means available. It may constitute a sufficient clash via its feature [small] or [non-serious] (3.5.14.2.1 -3.5.14.2.2) 372 or by applying to an illegal base (3.5.14.2.3) or by conveying pretended empathy (3.5.14.2.4) or by contributing to the creation of situational irony (3.5.14.2.5). Or it may upgrade irony with displayed emotion or empathy (3.5.14.2.2), repetition (3.5.14.3.2) or recursive application (3.5.14.3.5), or it may make irony more palatable by downgrading it via understatement (3.5.14.2.1). This holds, mutatis mutandis, also for self-irony (3.5.14.3.3).

360

Diminutives

Finally we want to cite Oomen's (1983: 25) observation that irony is always evaluative. This fits in well with the evaluative character of diminutives (and augmentatives, cf. 3.4.6, 4.2.4.2). 3.5.14.5. Now we will see that sarcastic diminutives (Staverman's diminutiva acerba) are quite different. 3.5.14.5.1. There is a common assumption (cf. 3.5.14) that sarcasm is like irony, only stronger. A first qualitative difference is, however, that "it is a way of using language with the intent of hurting a listener" (Littman— Mey 1991: 147) or a third party. Groeben-Scheele (1984: 55) classify sarcasm as direct attack on the victim of sarcasm. Within the framework of action theories, sarcasm belongs to antagonistic rather than to cooperative interaction (cf. 1.5.3). Like irony, understatement, euphemism, jocularity, empathy, and emotionality, sarcasm is a regulative mode of speech and not a speech act itself, as Littman-Mey (1991: 147) would have it. They categorize sarcasm together with other hostile speech acts, such as berating, fingerpointing, using invective, denigrating. Sarcasm is conflictual by intention, and not just by accident or because of inadequate planning or deficiencies in cooperativeness, etc. (cf. Schank-Schwitalla 1987 on communication disturbances). Therefore strategies for reducing conflict (cf. Schwitalla 1987) and elements of playfulness (cf. Schütte 1987) are either totally absent or much backgrounded. As a consequence, we would not expect diminutive formation to be used as a regular means of downgrading the illocutionary strength of sarcasm (e.g., according to the model of Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä 1990, cf. 3.5.10.3, 3.5.12.8.11). In fact, as we will see, diminutives are used for quite the opposite, that is, as tools of offensive strategies (cf. Schank 1987: 78).373 As a first illustration of the intensifying force of diminutives, we can cite the Viennese newspaper Standard reporting the words of an expert about the Austrian wines of 1990: (384)

Noch niemals zuvor seien so viele Spitzenweine aber auch yet never before were so many top wines but also "Wässer-chen" zu erwarten gewesen. waters-DIM to expected been 'Never before were so many fine wines but also lovely waters to be expected.'

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

361

Here bad wines are disqualified as "waters" (Wässer), in contrast to good wines. This sarcastic assessment is further upgraded via diminutive formation. Compare sarcastic threats (3.5.12.3.2, examples (299-301), that is, threats which add sarcasm by means of the diminutive. 3.5.14.5.2. In our view, it is the feature [non-serious] of the diminutive which is exploited to ridicule or debase the object or victim of sarcasm. The object to be attacked in these offensive acts may vary according to the speech act. In threats (3.5.12.2), this is usually the person threatened (rather than something or somebody from its sphere). In assessments like in (384), it is the negatively assessed entity. Nearly all examples of sarcasm we have belong to these two categories of speech acts. Similar to irony (cf. 3.5.14.3.2), sarcasm is clearly especially represented in assessments. In the two pertinent cases of sarcastic directives that we have, the object of sarcasm is expectedly linked to the illocutionary point, as can be seen in the following sarcastic advice, couched in a rhetorical question: (385)

perche non ti scavi una bella cavern-etta e non vai why not ye you dig a nice cavern-DIM and not go a fare /' eremit a? to make the hermit 'Why don't you dig yourself a nice little cavern and go and be a hermit?'

Unlike threats and assessments, advice may extend the object of sarcasm beyond the addressee or referent. It is the case in (385) where it is the action advised as a whole that gets ridiculed. Of course, this is still an offence directed at the addressee, but secondarily. This may also have made the choice of the landing-site easier: caverna admits dimensional diminution, so it is more likely than eremita to receive diminutivization, and to have it exploited morphopragmatically. 3.5.14.5.3. In terms of politeness theory, one might try to identify sarcasm with "ironic rudeness", but not in the sense of Leech (1983: 210): "irony can be seen as mitigated rudeness in that it wraps an aggressive act in a non-confrontational form", because sarcasm, in contrast to irony, is confrontational, as one can see from the reactions of victims of sarcasm, cf. 3.5.14.4.2. Thus, again in contrast to irony (3.5.14.4.2, Leech 1983: 144), sarcasm does not "keep aggression away from the brink of conflict". On the contrary, sarcasm - and, within sarcasm, dimiftutives -

362

Diminutives

usually represents "strategic rudeness" rather than ironic rudeness (cf. Kasper 1990: 210). 3.5.14.5.4. If we look for super-goals of sarcasm, then we can identify several. Some are the same as in irony, for example, educational ones or criticism (cf. 3.5.14.4.1). But, unlike critical irony, sarcastic criticism is rather caustic derision (or even cynicism, cf. Nekula 1990: 98), and the diminutive contributes to the debasement and ridicule of the victim of sarcasm, who/which is made to appear as someone/something not to be taken seriously. Let us take two sarcastic comments about political parties in Austria. The first, nearly a century old, comes from Anton Kuh's satiric text "Patej und Lokaj" [Political party and party meeting place], and is a sarcastic comment about an inn-keeper in whose inn the local branch of a political party regularly meets: (386)

hält er doch das Feuer der heiligen Vest-erl wach keeps he PART the fire of the holy Vesta-DIM awake 'for he kindles the fire of dear holy Vesta'

where the diminutive renders the unimportance of such meetings when compared with the context of the fire of Vesta symbolizing the sacred continuity of the whole state of ancient Rome. The maintenance of the feminine gender of the base (cf. 3.3.3) increases the sarcastic effect. A more recent example comes from an evaluative report in the Austrian weekly Profil (1990) on the dwindling and decaying Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ): (387)

...wurde er im Nomenklatur-erl der KPÖ was he in the nomenclature-DIM of the KPÖ zurückgestuft ranked back '...he was ranked back in the little nomenclature of the KPÖ.'

The features of denotational smallness and non-seriousness are applied to the tiny and definitely unimportant Austrian party and to its still tinier Nomenklatura, a term usually referred to the Soviet Union. Such a (only very little integrated) loan-word would not admit diminutive suffixation, were it not meant to achieve a sarcastic effect (or for irony, cf. 3.5.14.2.3 for clashes between diminutive formation and lexical bases). A further element of sarcasm is the cognitive dissonance between the serious conse-

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

363

quences of being excluded from the nomenklatura in the pre-perestrojka Soviet Union with the derisible consequences in the Austrian counterpart. Typical lexical clashes occur with titles which are frozen indices in addressing people or introducing names. Klimaszewska's (1983: 99) decontextualized examples can be replaced with a cartoon (la Repubblica 1991), which ridicules the proposal of introducing a laurea brevis (a reduced Master's degree) by depicting a visiting card of such a neo-laureate with the text Dottor-ino Mario Rossi 'Dr.-DIM Mario Rossi' (very common Christian and family names). 3.5.14.5.5. Unlike irony (cf. 3.5.14.4.1), sarcasm always creates distance, for example between speaker and addressee, as in a TV serial, staging two men, A and B. After B's complaint about A's bad language, A says: (388)

Ε allora perche non si chiude quelle sue and then why not REFL shut those your orecchi-ucce? ears-DIM 'So why don't you just cover those tender ears of yours?'

implying the inadequacy of Β whom he indirectly compares to a delicate maiden, that is, the diminutive sets up a distance between B's behavior and the appropriate behavior of a grown male. Compare the following, uttered by a rather radical female professor: (389)

Ah non aspettatevi che io sia una dam-ina tutta oh not expect that I am a lady-DIM all elegant-ina! elegant-DIM 'Oh don't expect me to be a proper little lady all nicely dressedup;

where the speaker was clearly distancing herself from other participants whom she thought were matching the description (with the strategic diminutive used twice). The German formal equivalent Däm-chen would be inadequate, because of its lexicalized negative connotation, but even a paraphrase with no diminutive, such as so eine feine Dame 'such an elegant lady', would convey similar sarcasm. A more complex situation is one in which the interlocutors converge in directing sarcasm against a third party - or where the speaker expects the addressee to agree - as in German:

364

(390)

Diminutives

Ein komisches Völk-chen! a funny people+DIM

an almost idiomatic exclamation of ironic surprise about habits of another country/region etc. Here the diminutive belittles the object of sarcasm and widens the gap between the speaker (or the interlocutors) and the victim, not to be taken seriously (modifier and diminutive). Here we can add the examples of derision (386), (387) in 3.5.14.5.4. Obviously, distancing is an expectable concomitant aspect of antagonistic action (vs. cooperative action). Similar to and closely related to derision is polemics, another frequent super-goal of sarcastic moves. In the Austrian weekly Profil, we found an example in the comment on the plan to build a museum for a Guggenheim collection within the Mönchsberg in Salzburg. The words of the minister of education, Hilde Hawlicek, are cited (in indirect speech): (391)

Man dürfe bei so einer Chance nicht "Grösch-erln one should at such a chance not pennies-DIM zählen" count O n e should not count lousy pennies on such an occasion.'

Here the diminutive intensifies sarcastic minimizing inherent in Groschen 'penny/ies'. For diminutives misunderstood as polemic, see below 3.5.14.5.10. As an effective means of sarcasm, an author may attribute a sarcastic utterance to the victim himself, as if it were self-sarcasm, something which, in contrast with self-irony (3.14.3.3), does not exist (cf. Groeben—Scheele 1984: 55). For example, the nineteenth century writer Friedrich August Kanne attacked the Austrian composer Anselm Hüttenbrenner for transforming Goethe's gruesome poem "Der Erlkönig" into a waltz: 374 (392)

Sage mir, lieblicher Kauz, was Du suchst in den tell me lovely eccentric, what you seek in the Werken von Goethe! Titel-chen stöb're ich mir auf. Erlkönig works of Goethe titles-DIM hunt I me up Erlkönig deutsche! ich fand' s! German I found it 'Tell me, oh my eccentric friend, what are you looking for in Goethe's works!' - 'I'm hunting up nice titles! Erlkönig German ones! I found it!'

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

365

3.5.14.5.6. Sarcasm may also convey speaker's resignation (combined with scorn), as in the sarcastic comment by Armin Feit (president of the German association of tax-payers) on the increase of the number of Staatssekretäre ('vice-ministers') from 27 to 33 (in Die Zeit): (393)

Es handelt sich hier ganz offensichtlich nur darum, neue it deals REFL here very evidently only about new Pöst-chen zu schaffen posts-DIM to create 'It is apparently only a question of creating new little jobs.'

where nur 'only' underlines sarcastic minimizing. Compare Anton Kuh's satirical text "Das tägliche Zwiegespräch" ('the daily dialogue') where a husband says to his wife with sarcastic resignation: (394)

Ich langweile dich... Ja, wenn ich ein Langstreckenläufer I bore you yes if l a stayer wäre, ein Tennisspieler, ein Sport-bub-erl! were a tennis player a sports boy-DIM 'I'm boring y o u . . . . Oh, if I just were a stayer, a tennis player, a little sports boy!'

where the speaker employs the diminutive to widen the gap between himself and a person that he thinks might thrill his wife. Also lexicalized diminutives can be used for these super-goals, as in the exclamation (Günter Grass, cited by Klimaszewska 1983: 56): Du mit deinen Wehwehchen! 'You with your ailments!' (cf. 3.4.2.4). Sarcastic self-resignation occurs in the Praguian joke about the difference between a real revolution and the Czecho-Slovak "velvet revolution" of 1989 and after. (395) stands for a real revolution, (395') for the velvet revolution (with diminutives): (395)

oko za oko, zub ζ a zub eye for eye, tooth for tooth

(395')

oc-icko za oc-icko, zoub-ek za zoub-ek eye-DIM for eye-DIM, tooth-DIM for tooth-DIM

In German and Austrian news, this was as: (395")

Aug um Aug, Zahn um Zahn — Äuglein um Äuglein, um Zähnchen

Zähnchen

366

Diminutives

Of course, the difference between polemics and resignation does not lie exclusively in the superordinate actions and super-goals, as we are presently going to see. 3.5.14.5.7. Both irony (cf. 3.5.14.4.2) and sarcasm are particularly effective means for obtaining their respective super-goals (e.g., derisive criticism or polemics). But their similarity does not go much farther. In fact, at the level of goals (cf. 3.5.14.4.2), their differences are even more perceivable. The afore-mentioned goals of irony, humor and avoidance of aggression and conflict, are definitely not shared by sarcasm. On the contrary, aggressiveness is a superordinate component in sarcastic derision and polemics (cf. 3.5.14.4.2), and its being apparently abandoned, as in the case of sarcastic resignation, is only strategic. The conflict inhering in the interaction is, in this case, entrusted to distancing rather than direct aggressiveness. Sarcasm also helps the speaker to get rid of his own aggressiveness.375 3.5.14.5.8. These differences in goals and super-goals between irony and sarcasm seem to render Littman-Mey's (1991: 148) statement paradoxical: "one of the most useful tools that a sarcastic speaker has at his or her disposal is irony". This presupposes that in such types of ironic sarcasm, there is a contradiction between what is said and what is intended (cf. 3.5.14.1). Such a contradiction can be identified in nearly all of our examples. In (384), water for wine, paradigmatic and syntagmatic contrast; in (386) sacred fire of a Roman goddess for the heating of an inn; in (391) pennies for millions of dollars, etc. Further examples can be added, e.g., the threat (cited by Klimaszewska 1983: 58): (396)

Du wirst nirgends hin entfliehen, mein liebes Freund-chen! You' 11 nowhere escape my dear friend-DIM 'You won't escape anywhere, my dear little friend!'

where the adjective 'dear' and the possessive 'my' underline (and disambiguate) the positive connotation of the diminutive in the literal performance of the vocative noun-phrase, which clashes with the threat, thus allowing the sarcastic reading, cf. also example (352) in 3.5.14.2.2. Comparable examples are those where a contradiction with denotational diminution constitutes irony (as in 3.5.14.2.1), as in (393) where 'posts-DIM' would be an appropriate designation for low-rank civil ser-

Data and their interpretation

— Irony and Sarcasm

367

vants, but not for vice-ministers. Another instance is the very sarcastic comment on a politician {Profil): (397)

entwickelte ein Vision-tscherl developed a visionary dream-DIM 'he developed a sort of visionary dream'

which the commentator considers not to be visionary at all. Examples also come from the regional Italian of Pisa which abounds in orders of the type (398 a), paraphrased by native speakers with Standard Italian (398 b): (398) a. Stai calm-ino! stay calm-DIM 'Calm down!'

b. Stai molto calmo! stay very calm 'Keep very calm!'

Another type of contradiction occurred in (388) where something appropriate for a non-adult was said to an adult. Likewise, Viennese verbal diminutives with -erl attached to the verb stem are appropriate to child language or motherese (cf. 3.5.2.1), but they can be transferred sarcastically to the adult world, e. g., when Arnold Schönberg derided some rival composers: (399)

Wer komm-erl-t denn da? who come-DIM-s PART here 'What cute boys are coming here?'

He treats them like small children and thus incompetent in the composition of modern music. A similar case of sarcastic situational contradiction occurred in an interview by a progressive politician of the conservative Austrian party ÖVP (in the journal Oberösterreichische Nachrichten): (400)

Der Zilk hat immer Hand-i halten gespielt mit dem the Zilk has always hands-DIM hold played with the Grο er Groer 'Zilk (the socialist mayor of Vienna) has always feigned holding hands with Groer (the arch-conservative catholic cardinal of Vienna).'

368

Diminutives

This is colloquial style (word order, definite article before names), and so is the diminutivum puerile Hand-i for Händ-chen, VG. Hand-erl. The idiom Hand-i halten is restricted to child-centered and lover-centered speech situations, but even for lovers Händ-chenlHand-erl halten is more usual. Using a verb phrase which is adequate for lovers or closely befriended children for the relation between two ideologically very different dignified leaders is a definitely ironic strategy. The same form can be used for sarcastic derision. A diminutivum puerile directed at an adult woman occurs in a sarcastic climax in the dialogue between a judge (J) and a female defendant (D) in the trial about a fatal car accident (reported by Leodolter 1975: 221): (401) J: Konnten Sie irgendwie auslenken? could you somehow steer away 'Were you able to steer away somehow?' D: Nein. no 'No.' J: Wissen Sie was das ist? know you what that is 'Do you know what it means?' D: Nein. no 'No.' J: (cynically) Jedes Fahrzeug hat ein Lenkrad, ja? every vehicle has a steering-wheel yes Wenn man daran dreht, so ändert sich if one on it turns then changes REFL die Richtung, ja? (impatient) Frau S. haben Sie the direction yes Mrs. S. have you gekurbelt mit dem Rad-erl? manipulated with the wheel-DIM '(cynically) Every vehicle has a steering-wheel, hasn't it? If you turn it, then the direction gets changes, doesn't it? (impatient) Mrs. S., did you manipulate the little wheel?' After several, ridiculously trivial rhetorical questions, the last question, with its derisive and humiliating diminutive, evokes the image of a child at play turning (aimlessly) around some small or unimportant wheel.

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

369

Contradiction in terms of adequacy to a given speech situation is referred to also in Nieuwenhuis' (1985: 81) observation that, in insults, diminutives are more insulting, particularly if they occur in formal speech, because diminutives challenge the formality of the speech situation. On the other hand, we have found a few instances of a sarcastic use of diminutives where the ironic clash is less apparent. For example, in (390), the diminutive belittles the victim of sarcasm. If Völk-chen refers to a large crowd, there is a clash with the denotation of the diminutive. But it could also have referred to a small group, also in the positive, empathetic assessment (exclamation): (390')

Ein munteres Völk-chen! A lively/cheerful people-DIM

Or, in (403), we will find only contradictions of a linguistic nature. But the effect is ironic (cf. 3.5.14.2.3), if jocularity is excluded by antagonistic interaction. Thus Littman—Mey (1991: 148) are quite right in saying that irony is one tool of sarcasm, whereas, we cannot agree with Haiman's (1990) definition of "sarcastic messages" as "those whose producer intends to mean the opposite of what his message would normally mean", since this is even less true with sarcasm than with irony. 3.5.14.5.9. Carrying on with our comparison between irony and sarcasm, we can identify another parallel in the use of repetitive and rhyming devices for intensifying sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14.3.2). Our example (389) was already a case in point. Another is the sarcastic comment by a drunk man in a fine restaurant: (402)

Un elegante post-ic-ino pieno di gente an elegant place-INTERF-DIM full of people per-ben-ino! classy-DIM 'An elegant little place full of classy little people!'

Here the speaker feels his own inadequacy to the place and puts the blame on the place itself, which he despises (and distances!) and pretends not to take seriously. The rhyme disambiguates the sarcastic interpretation intended. In addition, per bene is also a base which normally avoids diminutive formation.

370

Diminutives

A German example comes from the weekly Profil, from an article on the political reform of the Austrian conservative party (Ö)VP, quoting its general secretary Solonar, who criticizes the lack of consensus (403) and summarizes it in (403'): (403)

"Immer gibt es ein Hinund Rücksicht-l always there is a hither- and thither-consideration-DIM wegen irgendwelcher Gruppen, wegen ein, zwei Prozent", because whatsoever groups because 1 2 percent fordert auch VP-General Solonar ein Ende des demands also VP-general Solonar an end of the politischen "Eiertanzes" political "dance on eggs" "'There is always a back and forth consideration because of some groups, because of 1 or 2 percent" (saying this) VP-general secretary S. demands an end to the political contortions.'

(403')

Hinsicht l und Rücksicht I

with the following two anomalies: 1) both nouns are abstract lexical bases shunning diminutive suffixation, 2) only Rücksicht but not its rare quasisynonym Hinsicht 'consideration' is semantically appropriate in (403). Thus Hinsicht-l (gapped in (403)) is an ad-hoc echo-formation, intensifying sarcastic polemics. 3.5.14.5.10. Misunderstandings occur with both irony and sarcasm, but, in general, the direction of misunderstanding is opposite. Whereas, in irony, the literal meaning is often erroneously taken as being the correct interpretation, the opposite seems to be rare, that is, that something is erroneously interpreted as ironic, although the speaker didn't intend to be ironic. By contrast, innocuous (that is, cooperatively intended) utterances are often misinterpreted as sarcastic (that is, antagonistic), but rarely the other way round. We have two examples where mainly denotatively intended diminutives were misinterpreted by the addressees as sarcastic diminutives. Once, when a student came to an oral exam, the professor asked him and the student answered: (404)

Cosa porta all' esame? what bring you to the exam? 'Which book did you study for the exam?'

Data and their interpretation — Irony and Sarcasm

371

Quel libr-etto sull' episodio di Quartilla. that book-DIM on the episode of Quartilla 'That little book on the Quartilla episode.' The professor being the author of that rather small book misinterpreted the diminutive as sarcastic and examined the student accordingly. A similar case occurred at the end of the academic year when funds became scarce, but had to be spent before the financial year ended. In order to know exactly what was left over, a professor wrote to the competent accountant: (405)

Vorrei sapere quanti fondi restano nei vari I'd like know how many funds remain in the various capitoli e capitol-etti di spesa a me intestati chapters and chapters-DIM of expenses to me ascribed Ί would like to know what funds I have left in my various expense and small expense allowances.'

The addressee felt very offended by the diminutive. In both instances, the addressees erroneously inferred an antagonistic action, since in the speech situation were missing those elements of familiarity and empathy, which are to go with the pragmatic use of a cooperatively intended diminutive. The intention of the speakers, on the other hand, had been, primarily, that of referring to denotative smallness and, secondarily, of diminishing the importance of the speech act: in (404), the student, modestly, wanted to downgrade his amount of preparation; in (405), the professor wanted to downgrade the importance of what was left. 3.5.14.6. By way of concluding our comparison between irony and sarcasm, we can recall and summarize their similarities and differences. Similarities are: 1) both may have super-goals of criticism and education (3.5.14.5.4); 2) their use may share the goal of increasing effectiveness (3.5.14.5.7); 3) assessments are over-represented (3.5.14.5.2); 4) diminutive formation may violate lexical base constraints (3.5.14.2.3 and examples (397), (403)); 5) rhyme and repetition may intensify both irony and sarcasm (3.5.14.5.8); 6) contradiction is present in irony and sarcasm (3.5.14.5.8). Differences are: 1) irony is always, at least partially, cooperative, whereas sarcasm is essentially antagonistic (3.5.14.5.1); 2) as a consequence, there are differences in the positive vs. negative attitude towards

372

Diminutives

the partner's face (cf. Schank 1987: 69), and sarcasm is rather avoided in case of familiarity, even more in case of empathy; 3) therefore ironic rudeness is typical for irony, strategic rudeness for sarcasm (3.5.14.5.3); 4) the super-goals of derision (3.5.14.5.4), distancing and polemicising (3.5.14.5.5), of expressing resignation (3.5.14.5.6) are limited to sarcasm, the goals of humor and avoidance of aggression (3.5.14.5.7) to irony; 5) there is self-irony (3.5.14.3.3), but no self-sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14.5.5); 6) as to modification of illocutionary strength (cf. Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä 1990), diminutives are downgraders in irony, upgraders in sarcasm; 7) there are opposite directions of misunderstanding (3.5.14.5.10). So we see that there are more, and more important, differences between irony and sarcasm than similarities. At least some of the similarities may derive from irony being a tool for sarcasm (3.5.14.5.8). A final distributional difference, the frequent presence of jocularity in irony vs. its absence in sarcasm, brings us to a more fundamental difference in regard to the role of the diminutive feature [non-serious]: in irony, it functions as a warning to the interpreter against taking the ironic speech act as a literal performance (cf. 3.5.13.2); in sarcasm, it diminishes the face of the victim of sarcasm (as shown for threats in 3.5.12.3.2), cf. 3.14.5.2. 3.5.15. Re-elaboration 3.5.15.1. Under this heading we want briefly to discuss the use of diminutives in the reinterpretation or pragmatic reloading of previous utterances by same speakers or their interlocutors (cf. Dressler-Merlini Barbaresi 1992). With this topic, we intend to highlight textual aspects of diminutives that we have so far left unexplored. Re-elaborations are reactive, conditioned and discourse-organizing speech acts that have to be treated pragmatically (Wunderlich 1976: 146). Not all second speech acts in binary speech act sequences, such as greeting—greeting, insult-insult, question-answer, evaluation—(dis)agreement, etc. (Wunderlich 1976: 300) qualify as re-elaboration, because, for that, a pragmatic reloading is necessary, e. g., modifying or completing a previous speech act. Let us illustrate this point with German greetings. The second turn in A: Hallo! - B: Hallo! 'Hello — Hello' does not count as re-elaboration, unless a prosodical shift takes place, signaling, for example, the addition of irony. Also answering with a different greeting-form may represent a re-elaboration with a modified perlocutionary goal, especially if combined with a prosodic shift signaling, for example,

Data and their interpretation

— Re-elaboration

373

surprise, pleasure and a displayed intention of continuing the interaction. Alternatively, a change in the form of greeting might have the purpose of discouraging the interaction, e. g., if a very formal and prosodically neutral greeting is opposed to a friendly, informal one. The diminutives Hallo-chen, Hallo-tscherl, however, do not seem to be used for such a purpose. If A's Hallo is answered by B's diminutive, then it merely tells something about the person and/or social group, but not about the person's perlocutionary goals. Similarly, a mere sequence of a simplex and its diminutive, such as soli sol-etti 'alone-PL alone-DIM-PL', does not count as pragmatic reelaboration, but as mere semantic addition, as in R. Reggiani's "II treno del sole", when he describes the arrival of a numerous Sicilian family at the train station in Turin: (406)

Una volta finalmente tutti sul marciapiede, in un mare di once finally all on the platform in a sea of fagotti e fagott-elli parcels and parcels-DIM 'When, finally, everybody was on the platform, in a heap of big and small parcels.'

In such sequences, the exceptionless position of the unmarked simplex before the marked diminutive may have several reasons: 1) the simplex is cognitively more basic, 2) its signans is shorter, etc. (cf. Cooper-Ross 1975 and many later studies). This is not a matter of morphopragmatics or only very marginally so, and in any event, not a case of re-elaboration, because the simplex and the diminutive do not belong to different subsequent speech acts, but to one and the same token. Re-elaborations are second tokens of an identical type of speech act (according to any classical definition of speech acts ä la Austin or Searle, where we generally follow Searle -Vanderveken 1985). This second token is a reaction to a first token and is a partially autonomous contribution by same or other speaker. The propositional content may be identical, and in this case other elements of the speech act are modified, or the propositional content itself is modified. Modification via diminutives does not depart from the ways we have discussed in 3.5.10-3.5.12. In any event, the re-elaboration must represent a renewal which is not just a repetition, ratification or precalculated consequence of the first token, and it represents a fresh start in terms of discourse organisation or at least an autonomous contribution to its progression.

374

Diminutives

3.5.15.2. In line with their conceiving of texts as sequences of illocutionary actions, Gülich—Kotschi (1987) deal with reformulation as a textconstitutive action and propose the following categories and subcategories, most of which may also represent re-elaborations (according to our characterization above). Reformulation of an antecedent formulation (by the same or another speaker) may be a) a correction (pp. 218, 243, provided that it is the same type of speech act as the corrected one), b) evaluative (pp. 219, 243), e. g., by adding a connotation, changing the style or using a metaphor, or c) a paraphrase (pp. 218, 239). Paraphrases are of six types: expansion, reduction, specification (or making more precise), summary, explication (including definitions), denomination (labelling of the antecedent expression). Type a) and b) reformulations are also typically re-elaborations, but among paraphrases (c) - reductions, summaries, explications typically are not. For it is not enough to reformulate the shape (signans) of a (macro) speech act, its content (signatum) must also be modified. Of course, modified does not mean annulled, that is, negated or completely replaced (cf. Franck 1979); the redefinition of elements of the uttered or implied speech act must not represent a redefinition of the preceding speech act as a whole (e.g., of a request as a question). For example, if A requesting expects a promise by B, but Β replies with a threat (camouflaged as a promise, as in 3.5.12.3.2 example (305 a)), then this correction is a strong dissent but not a re-elaboration. Similarly, the reply (297) in 3.5.12.3.1 is disillusioning, but does not represent a re-elaboration. In contrast, B's reply is a re-elaboration in: (407) A : Ε

bella?

is beautiful(FEM) 'Is she beautiful?' B:

Bell-ina.

beautiful-DIM 'Rather, yes.' where diminutivization represents a modification, not only in form but also in meaning, of the assessment suggested by A, that is, Β agrees by means of a reactive assessment, but downgrades it (cf. 3.5.11.2.3, 3.5.11.4.2 and Wierzbicka 1991: 137, 140). Thus Β expresses a specification in terms of Gülich-Kotschi's (1987) classification of paraphrases. Now let us take a related speech-act sequence where A makes an assessment:

Data and their interpretation

— Re-elaboration

375

(407') A: £ bella! is beautiful 'She is beautiful!' B: Si, bell-ina. yes beautiful-DIM 'Yes, rather beautiful.' B's response is again a modified agreement, with an assessment expressing downgraded propositional content, but, in addition, this example illustrates more clearly the cooperative character re-elaboration may have. By using the mitigating diminutive, Β avoids a flat, uncooperative contradiction of the type: (407") Β: (No,) Brutta! '(No,) Ugly!' Here the diminutive functions pragmatically as in assessments (3.5.11.2.4.2) and in understatements (3.5.13.5), but it also takes up the discourse function of maintaining pragmatic coherence in the sense of allowing progress in cooperative discourse. In addition, in terms of politeness theory, the use of the diminutive may represent a negative politeness strategy of hedging. Similar effects occur with nouns, as in 3.5.11.2.1.1 (242) and in: (408) A: It. Vuoi una fetta di torta? G. Willst Du ein Stück Torte? want you a slice of cake 'Would you like a piece of cake?' B: Una fett-ina Ein Stück-chen = VG. Ein Stückerl. a piece-DIM Ά little piece.' Via diminutivization, Β re-elaborates upon the suggested course of action (acceptance). The reasons for this may be various: 1) Β is not hungry or is disinterested in the specific cake, but wants to accept for politeness; 2) Β is truly modest; 3) Β is eager to eat the cake, but chooses a polite way of accepting, that is, through modesty. More on re-elaborative answers in 4.1.5.3, 4.2.5.1, 4.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.5.

376

Diminutives

3.5.15.3. For other types of re-elaboration on an interlocutor's utterance see, e.g., ventic-ello (76) in 3.4.1.2 and the following dialogue in J. Nestroy's comedy Häuptling Abendwind [Chieftain eveningwind]: (409)

Biberhahn: Und der werte Name? and the valid name Atala: Atala. Atala Abend wind: Ja, das ist mein Atalal-erl. yes this is my Atala-DIM Biberhahn: 'And what's your name?' Atala: 'Atala.' Abendwind: 'Yes, this is my dear Atala.'

The father's re-elaboration shows his involvement in the discourse and constitutes his original, autonomous contribution to it (cf. Pomerantz 1984). This is here a clear case of emotional upgrading via the diminutive. 3.5.15.4. Re-elaboration, via diminutive, upon the speaker's own previous utterance can be illustrated by recalling the oral correction (245) in 3.5.12.6376 and with the following examples from written texts. The first comes from the satirical writer Kurt Tucholsky (cited by Klimaszewska 1983: 58): (410)

Jede Betätigung auf dieser Kugel hat sich eine each activity on this globe has REFL a Wissenschaft als Dach aufgebaut.... Und die Pfaffen all science as roof constructed and the parsons of all dieser Wissenschäft-chen sind munter am Werke. these sciences-DIM are eagerly on operation 'Every activity on this globe has provided itself with a science as r o o f . . . . And the prophets of all these petty sciences are eagerly operating.'

The ironic re-elaboration is signaled by the diminutive being attached to a prestigious word which generally shuns diminutives (cf. 3.5.14.2.3), the pejorative term P f a f f e 'parson' and the idiom munter am Werk sein. The next example is in a news report (Corriere della Sera) on taxes paid by balneary establishments with the title:

Data and their interpretation

(411)

— Re-elaboration

377

Solo le suore di Fregene si dichiarano in attivo. only the nuns of Fregene REFL declare in active Only the nuns in Fregene admit a profit.'

The sober first sentence of the report identifies them, again, as suore. In the second paragraph, they reappear as sor-elle di Santa Teresa 'sisters of Santa Teresa' (with a lexicalized synonym) who pay their taxes, whereas many much bigger establishments proclaim to be in the red. Then there comes the resignedly sarcastic statement (cf. 3.5.14.5.7): (411')

Viene addirittura il sospetto che dietro queste comes indeed the suspicion that behind these societä a responsibilitä limitata si nascondano veri companies of liability limited REFL hide true e propri benefattori dell' umanitä, capaci di fare and real benefactors of mankind capable of make concorrenza alle suor-ine di Santa Teresa. competition to the nuns-DIM of Santa Teresa 'There indeed arises the suspicion that behind these limited liability companies, there are real benefactors of mankind capable of competing with the little nuns of Santa Teresa.'

The contrast between the nuns and the big companies may also contain a denotational element, but the main purpose of the diminutive is to convey irony and show the journalist's empathy with the nuns rather than with the tax-cheating companies. Corrections via diminutives may follow their bases at close distance, as in Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks (cited by Wandruszka 1967: 172): (412)

Dann machen wir einen kleinen Bankerott, ein höchst then make we a little bankruptcy a most spaßhaftes Bankerött-chen, mein Lieber. facetious bankruptcy-DIM my dear 'Then we'll make a small-sized bankruptcy, a most facetious little bankruptcy, my dear.'

We see this also in Carlo Emilio Gadda's "L'Adalgisa" (cited by Cavallini 1977: 54):

378

(413)

Diminutives

Si trat ία non di una banale scodella, ο tazza, e REFL deals not of an ordinary bowl or cup and nemmeno di una tazz-ina, ma di una vera e propria not even of a cup-DIM but of a true and real "tazz-in-etta" cup-DIM-DIM 'It isn't just an ordinary bowl or cup, not even a smallish cup but one you would call a really nice and small cup.'

3.5.15.5. We have no good example of a re-elaborating paraphrase, the third type of reformulations in Gülich-Kotschi's (1987) model of reformulations (cf. 3.5.15.4). Closest comes the following example from G. T. di Lampedusa (1958: 73): (414)

L' aiutante di campo, un pivell-ino di diciannove anni, the aide-de-camp a recruit-DIM of 19 years era un conte milanese che affascino le ragazze.... II was a count Milanese who fascinated the girls the cont-ino milanese... count-DIM Milanese 'The aide-de-camp, a new recruit of nineteen, was a Milanese count who fascinated the girls.... The young Milanese c o u n t . . . . ' (Colquhoun 1963: 49)

Both diminutives (like G. Kerl-chen, Gräf-lein, Birnbaum 1959: 40) are denotative (referring to young age), but with some (slightly contrastive) irony. The reductive paraphrase at the beginning of the second sentence takes up the lexical element conte (re-elaboration in an anaphoric chain, cf. Viehweger 1978) and the diminutive suffix from pivell-ino. 3.5.15.6. Having studied how diminutives are used when re-elaborating on non-diminutives, we must briefly mention how diminutives themselves can be re-elaborated upon. Let us compare reduced variants of the ironic utterances (341 a) and (341 b) of 3.5.14.2.1, uttered in front of a very tall person or a huge skyscraper: (415) a. A: Alt-ino, eh? Ά bit tall, eh?'

b. A: Bass-ino, eh? Ά bit short, eh?'

A possible re-elaboration of (415 b) is B's reply Bass-issimo! 'short-ELAT = Extremely short!', where the clash between the lexical base and the

Data and their interpretation

— Re-elaboration

379

size of the referent is not mitigated by the diminutive any more, but increased by intensification, with consonant intensification of irony. This type of intensification is a preferred way for showing agreement (see 4.2.5.1, 4.3.5.4). Intensification is impossible with (415 a). An alternative way of agreeing, but with no intensification, is re-elaboration by means of paraphrases of the type: (415') B: (Ah si,) un po'! '(Oh yes,) a bit!' 3.5.15.7. We may conclude that the role of diminutives in re-elaborations derives from their general roles in speech acts. We propose - thus modifying Jefferson's (1987) and Gülich-Kotschi's views (1987: 251) - that re-elaboration as an action of reformulation is always embedded in a speech act (with its own goals and properties). Even if a reformulation, e.g., a correction, is "exposed", that is, becomes "interactional business in its own right", it cannot totally cancel the matrix speech act in which it is embedded. In other words, it becomes a question of whether the matrix speech act is more important or the reformulation. Re-elaboration is not a speech act in itself, although it hinges on a previous speech act. Therefore, Bazzanella—Caffi—Sbisä's (1990) notion of up/downgrading certainly does not apply directly to re-elaboration but to the matrix speech act. Re-elaboration exploits the application of the features [small] or [non-serious] to the propositional content or to the expression of inner states or to the modal roles of the participants or the perlocutionary objects of the matrix speech act, that is, to some component of the illocutionary force of the speech act. The function of using diminutives in re-elaborations clearly has nothing to do with the main functions that Giilich—Kotschi (1987) have found in their analysis of reformulations, viz. contributing to intercomprehension and to hierarchically ranking illocutions. The functions we have found are to convey irony and empathy in re-elaborations of the speaker's own previous formulation, and to do face-work by enhancing cooperativeness in re-elaborations of the interlocutor's previous utterance. In general, diminutives are much more used than intensifiers, but in re-elaborations we find the opposite (see 4.1.5.3, 4.2.5.1, 4.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.5). This asymmetry is part of the general asymmetry of intensification and deintensification in re-elaborations, as also implicitly observed by van

380

Diminutives

Dijk (1984: 124): "Emphasizing and its converse (mitigation) ... are corrections of a specific kind whereby often the same fact is referred to, but only in stronger terms (or weaker terms)." 3.5.16. Diminutives in literary styles

3.5.16.1. In contrast to many previous studies on diminutives which have concentrated on literary works (e.g. Spitzer 1961; Volek 1987), we have so far predominantly analysed non-literary data, that is, spontaneous or elicited spoken utterances, data from TV or radio, newspapers, magazines, advertisements, etc. Since poetic language or literary style, in general, is seen by many (e. g. Coseriu 1971) as the only complete usage of the means of language, our study on diminutives would be defective without considering the use of diminutives in literary style. Of course, we do not aim at any literary analysis. What we pursue is the most legitimate evidence for our linguistic argument. We are not so much interested in whether and how poets deviate from (whatever) norms in the use of diminutives — such an investigation of poetic license (cf. Dressier 1981) would demand a monographic study of its own — but in whether and how writers use diminutives as style markers (or stylistic devices) and whether and how such usage is linked to the pragmatics of diminutives as analyzed in our previous sub-chapters. And this demands the study and comparison of whole texts or, at least, coherent text chunks. We can present only limited results of this study, based on some selected texts in which diminutives came to our attention for their high density. 3.5.16.2. We start with brief theoretical clarifications. 377 We do not regard style as being merely additional or secondary to substance and content of a text (cf. Hickey 1989 b: 2) and thus diminutives as mere surface decoration of a text, because "the product grows with the instrument", as Sapir (1921: 15) aptly expressed, and because "literary messages have some form of additional 'symbolic' ... content" (van Dijk 1976b: 39; cf. Auer 1988). In other words, diminutives should be thought of as having their proper pragmatic effects, as in language use in general. And these pragmatic effects must be studied within the pragmatics of literary style. Here we disagree, on two points, with Hickey's (1989 b: 8) definition of "stylistics with a pragmatic component" as the "study of language-inuse which pays special attention to the choices made from among the various grammatically correct ways of expressing one and the same thing, which is semantically or truth-conditionally equivalent. It also describes how such choices relate to the overall situation in which the language is

Data and their interpretation

— Diminutives

in literary styles

381

used." First we refuse, as mentioned above, the notion of equivalence of stylistic "variants". 378 Second, the static dimension of speech situation must be supplemented by the dynamic dimension of the communicative event (cf. 1.2), notably that of the author's poetic acts, including macro speech acts. Literary texts (in the classical tradition of Western literature) have the property of fictionality, defined by Schmidt (1976: 175) as "the name for a special system of pragmatic rules which prescribe how readers have to treat the possible relations o f ' the text world to the "real world". Fictionality is thus, among other things, a specific (literary) elaboration of utterances on fictive speech situations and speech acts (cf. Garcia-Berrio 1992: 311). Hence, they share this element of fictiveness with the diminutive feature [non-serious] (cf. 3.4.6). This induces us to expect that literary authors may use the diminutive as an indicator of fictiveness, and that they may do it in more elaborated ways than ordinary speakers normally do, that is, in their special system of fictionality. 3.5.16.3. Diminutives as stylistic devices may be conceived of in a qualitative and in a quantitative way. As for the first conception, "often ... their purpose is to pin-point an image, to focus attention on a particular word" (Gooch 1967: 4), that is, they can be a de-automatizing device 379 or have Riffaterre's stylistic function of stressing particular stretches of text (cf. van Peer 1984: 292, 304; Hickey 1989 b: 4). For examples, see below 3.5.16.6-3.5.16.7. Or the author may show empathy towards a dramatis persona. 380 For examples of empathy, see below 3.5.16.8. 3.5.16.4. The quantitative conception appears in Enkvist's (1977: 176) definition: "A style marker is any linguistic feature whose density in the text is significantly different from its density in the contextually relevant norm." In this sense, the statistics of diminutive suffix distribution in different text types presented by Trenta Lucaroni (1983) provide data for stylistic interpretation. The quantitative conception fits to the view (expressed, for example, by Winter 1969: 3) that a single choice does not constitute style, but that the choice must be repeated and be systematic or characteristic of the text or class of texts being studied. Moreover, style markers acquire their status if they are interpreted as such within the given speech community (cf. Auer 1988: 4). Diminutives are interpreted as typical style markers of the genre style of Italian pastoral poetry. This genre style arose in fifteenth-century poetry and later expanded into melodrama up to Pietro Metastasio. 381 In

382

Diminutives

the seventeenth century, this genre style became conventionalized, with ludic erotism being one of its ingredients. The poetic world of the pastoral genre style is highly fictive, very much removed from the realities of contemporary society. Speech situations are often located in prat-elli delicat-issimi dove errano pastor-elle 'most delicate meadows-DIM, where shepherdesses-DIM wander around' (Corti 1969: 292). Let us look at a very late specimen, Wolfgang A. Mozart's La finta giardiniera [The false gardeneress], KV 196 (1775), text by Giuseppe Petrosellini. The main lovers, margravine Violante (the heroine with the gardener pseudonym Sandrina) and count Belfiore, call each other, and are called by others, marches-ina and cont-ino by default. These diminutives, undoubtedly, refer to their young age (young aristocrats are referred to with diminutives in Italian), but this is not the whole story. For, whenever their true identity is questioned (Arminda II. 11, Sandrina 1.11, Nardo 1.15), they are called marchesa and conte. Simplicia are used instead of diminutives also in certain speech acts, e.g., reproaches (Ramiro 1.15, Podestä II. 6, II. 10, Sandrina II. 11). Typically, diminutives occur in lover-centered speech situations. The likelihood of such occurrences has contributed to the convention of diminutive use in pastoral poetry, where love situations are constitutive, and this has led to a higher density of diminutives, which thus become style markers of pastoral poetry. Let us illustrate this use with the following three cases. The first is the little aria (II. 4) sung by Nardo con un vezzo all'italiana 'in the Italian way' to his beloved Serpetta (who does not reciprocate his love): (416)

Vi dird: "Che ye I'll say that core in petto heart in bosom 'I'm going to tell in the bosom

quel vis-etto / M' ha infiammato il that face-DIM me has inflamed the

you: "that this dear face has inflamed my heart "'

to which Serpetta reacts with a gesture showing her dislike for his affected way (ιaffettato). Nardo uses this conventional device to create a lovercentered speech situation. Serpetta refuses to define the situation as lovercentered and refuses the conventional format standing for it. One might object that the occurrence of the diminutive here is just for the sake of the rhyme. Rhymes are a preferred landing-site for diminutives, 382 both because they represent salient positions (higher effectiveness) and because they are more easily constructed thanks to recurring suffixes. This formal

Data and their interpretation

— Diminutives

in literary styles

383

preference, which is also conventional, would not explain, by itself, the higher density of diminutives in the conventionalized type of speech situation noted above. The second example shows a contrast between man-ina and mano 'hand', reflecting a shift from a lover-centered speech situation to one where love is defocussed, accompanied by a corresponding shift in speaker's attitude and perlocutionary goals. In scene II. 5, Count Belfiore uses only the diminutive man-ina in his love song to his beloved Violante/ Sandrina: (417)

Ma nel partir, car-ina IVorrei... /Baciar quella but in parting dear-DIM I'd like kiss that man-ina, / Per segno del mio amor. / Ah che hand-DIM for sign of the my love oh what man-ina tenera hand-DIM tender 'But in parting, darling, I'd like ... to kiss this little hand, as a sign of my love. Oh, what a tender little h a n d . . . . '

After her refusal, however, he says (that is, sings) to her rather coolly: (417')

Signora, si contenti, I Che in segno di rispetto / Le Milady REFL content that in sign of respect ye baci almen la mano. I kiss at least the hand 'Milady, be contented (with the formal, polite address form) that in sign of respect I kiss at least your hand.'

The third example is Serpetta's 383 aria (1.9), where she ironizes on men who fall in love with her: (418)

gridando, smaniando cost "Mirate che occhi-etti, che shouting craving thus look what eyes-DIM what sguardi d' amore I...I Bell-ina, car-ina, vi vo' glances of love beautiful-DIM dear-DIM ye I want sempre amar." always love 'shouting ecstatically like this: "Look, what little eyes, what glances of love.... Lovely little girl, dear little, I want to love you for ever.'"

384

Diminutives

When, in a typical cliche, weak and poor women are confronted with strong and arrogant men, diminutives are preferentially assigned to women, 384 as in (1.2) when Sandrina considers herself: (419)

Ρ overa villan-ella ... una don-z-ella onesta poor peasantess-DIM a woman-DIM honest 'Poor little peasantess ... an honest little woman'

(obviously also denotatively referring to her young age) and in her aria (1.4): (420)

Noi donne pover-ine ... Disgrazie da bambine / Strapazzi da we women poor-DIM bad luck as children toils as grand-ic-elle .... Ah donne pover-ine .... big-INTERF-DIM oh women poor-DIM 'We poor little women ... bad luck when we are children, toils when we are adolescents .... Oh poor-DIM women ....'

Similarly Arminda comments on credulous women (1.7): (421)

Ε la semplice zit-ella / Se lo crede, pover-ella.... and the simple maiden-DIM if it believes poor-DIM 'And the simple little maiden, if she believes it, the poor lass.'

Love is typically attributed a ludic character in pastoral poetry, and this fits in well with the non-serious character of diminutives. The highly fictive cliches of pastoral poetry go beyond pastoral erotism. For example, another ingredient of pastoral poetry is idealisation of nature as friendly and pleasant. Note, for example, the use of a diminutive when referring to birds, as in Ramiro's aria (I. 1), a verse which Mozart accompanies with violin staccato, apparently depicting small flying birds: (422)

Se Γ augell-in sen fugge when the bird-DIM REFL-ofit flees 'When the little bird flees'

We may compare this with Antonio Vivaldi's use of the violins at the beginning of La Primavera [The Spring] (the first movement of his Four Seasons), which as a programme has the Sonetto Dimostrativo starting with:

Data and their interpretation

(423)

— Diminutives

in literary styles

385

Giunt' e la Primavera e festos-etti / La Salutan gl' arrived is the spring and merry-DIM her greet the Augei con lieto canto, / Ε i fonti alio Spirar birds with joyful song and the sources at the blowing de' Zeffir-etti of the Zephyrs-DIM 'The spring has come and the birds merrily greet her (sc. spring) with joyful song, and, at the blowing of the lovely Zephyr-winds, the sources...'

where the adjective agreeing with 'birds' is diminutivized. The diminutives here are typical for those bucolic texts Vivaldi liked to put into music; cf. Folena (1983: 269) and his remark about Vivaldi's arias: "E i diminutivi non si contano" ('And the diminutives are innumerable'). Writers of contemporary parodies on pastoral poetry advise pastoral poets to use words such as farfall-etta, augell-etti, ruscell-etto, all diminutives of'butterfly, birds, creek' (Folena 1983: 269). It should be noted that diminutives are style markers of Italian (and derived) pastoral poetry, but not yet of its model, Vergil's Eclogae (Bucolica), which has few non-lexicalized diminutives (e.g., umbra-cula 'shadow-DIM', IX 42), nor of later Latin pastoral poetry. We may generalize from our discussion on Italian pastoral poetry and extend the argument on lover-centered speech situations. If the macro situation of a text is lover-centered and jocular, then we expect many diminutives (cf. Alonso 1961: 178 on Catullus' love poetry). A case in point is Lorenzo da Ponte's libretto of Wolfgang A. Mozart's Cosi Fan Tutte ossia la Scuola degli Amanti, dramma giocoso (cf. I. 1., lit. 'So all women do or the school of lovers, playful comedy'). This may be contrasted with da Ponte's Mozart libretto II dissoluto punito ossia Don Giovanni (lit. 'The punished lecher or Don Giovanni'), where love is equally central but only rarely viewed in a jocular way. Love is rather viewed in a dramatic way (in contrast with what happens in pastoral poetry). Accordingly, there are a lot fewer diminutives in Don Giovanni than in Cosi Fan Tutte. And in Mozart's Lucio Silla, due to its heroic style, no diminutives occur (cf. Babiniotis 1969: 23 on the absence of diminutives in Ancient Greek epics and tragedy). 3.5.16.5. For other genre styles where many diminutives occur, such as fairy-tales and folk-songs, we just refer to Klimaszewska (1983: 55) for the popular character of both text types (cf. also Gooch 1967: 14). A

386

Diminutives

primary audience of fairy-tales are small children, which brings us back to child-centered speech situations (3.5.2) and to child literature, where many diminutives appear (cf. Klimaszewska 1983: 110; Ruke-Dravina 1959: 32); cf. Pisarkowa's (1988) collection of Polish (and international) counting-out rhymes and Todorovic-Strähl's (1987) Italian rhymes with the sub-sections "uttered to children, for fondling, for consoling, for rocking, for teasing, for amusing and educating", etc. (cf. also S n o w Ferguson 1977: 231). Diminutives occur even in French child-literature, although the use of the adjective petit 'little' still outweighs the use of diminutives, as shown in an unpublished study by Danielle Belanger (Universite de Montreal). 3.5.16.6. Let us now look at a twentieth century German text, Kurt Tucholsky's short prose text Leere [Emptiness] exhibiting a density of diminutives not found in his other works. In this text, containing the author's reflections upon feelings of emptiness and sickness of life that everybody sometimes has, there is a pervading atmosphere of non-seriousness. Diminutives are appropriate stylistic devices for conveying this atmosphere. The first instance is: (424)

Das wäre ja wohl der Moment, in den Schoß von this might be PART PART the moment in the womb of Mütter-chen Kirche zu krabbeln. Nein, diesem Seelenarzt mother-DIM church to crawl no this soul doctor trauen wir nicht mehr recht trust we not more quite 'This might then be the moment to crawl back into the womb of little mother church. No, we don't really trust this doctor of the soul any more '

First, the diminutive and the verb krabbeln recall a child-centered speech situation (cf. (426)), second, it conveys irony about the church as an institution, which is often called Mutter Kirche 'mother church', but never Mütter-chen Kirche (cf. 3.5.14.2.3), third it downgrades the speech act of assessment immediately before the author's self-correction. The second instance is: (425)

Du siehst den kleinen Tier-chen nach, wie sie im you see the small animals-DIM after as they in the

Data and their interpretation

— Diminutives

in literary styles

387

Sande krauchen, Gottes Wunder! du blickst auf deine eignen sand creep Lord's wonder you look at your own Finger, jeder eine kleine Welt fingers each a small world 'You are gazing after the tiny little animals, as they are creeping in the sand, oh Lord's wonder! You are looking at your own fingers, each of them a small world.' where the diminutive is clearly denotative, but also, presumably, jocular like the verb krauchen (jocular for kriechen 'to creep') and the invocation of God (by the non-believer Tucholsky), and finally it represents a poetic macro-choice to write about "small worlds". The third instance recalls the first one, but partakes of the macrochoice of the second: (426)

Vergessen und zu Ingeborg kriechen wie ein Söhn-lein to forget and to Ingeborg creep like a son-DIM zurück in der Mutter Leib back in the mother's body 'to forget and creep back to Ingeborg like a little son into his mother's womb'

The fourth instance follows an exclamation: (427)

Wieviel tun wir, um diese Leere auszufüllen! Wer sie how much do we to this emptiness fill up who it ausfüllt und noch ein Meter-chen darüber hinausragt, der ist fills up and still a meter-DIM overtops he is ein großer Mann. a great man 'How much we do to fill up this emptiness! He who fills it up and makes it overflow by a mere meter, he is a great man.'

This diminutive cannot be denotative. It expresses lack of precision and non-seriousness, sc. "everything is relative". What we have here is a clear example of the polyvalence of diminutives, which renders a quantitative analysis (cf. 3.5.16.4) very superficial. At the same time, the diminutives contribute to the non-serious character of the writer's macro speech act.

388

Diminutives

3.5.16.7. Polyvalence of diminutives, intended as co-presence of semantic and pragmatic meanings, is also typical of the ironic style of Thomas Mann (cf. Baumgart 1964 and Muecke 1970, who, however, do not discuss diminutives). Thomas Mann does not use diminutives often, and when he does, they are always also denotative (if we may generalize from those parts of his works we have searched through for diminutives). But, in addition, particularly when grouped together, diminutives may have a text-pragmatic function, as we want to illustrate with two of his shorter narratives (Erzählungen). In the introductory part of his Der Weg zum Friedhof [The way to the cemetery], the author briefly describes a slowly moving carriage: (428) a Am äußersten Hinterteile aber saß ein gelbes on the most extreme back part but sat a yellow Hünd-chen, das... über sein spitzes Schnäuz-chen hinweg dog-DIM which over its pointed snoutie beyond mit unsäglich ernster und gesammelter Miene auf with enormously serious and concentrated expression at den Weg zurückblickte, den es gekommen war. the road back looked which it come was b. Es war ein unvergleichliches Hünd-chen, Goldes wert, fit was an incomparable dog-DIM gold worth tief erheiternd; deep amusing c. aber leider gehört es nicht zur Sache, weshalb wir but alas belongs it not to the thing for which we uns von ihm abkehren müssen. REFL from it turn away must 'a. But on the extreme back part, sat a yellow doggie, which ..., with an enormously serious and concentrated expression, looked beyond its pointed little snout at the road left behind, b. It was an incomparable doggie, worth its weight in gold, deeply amusing; c. but unfortunately it is besides our point, and therefore we must turn away from it.' Here the author plays with his reader (cf. Baumgart 1964: 39) and indulges in a ludic description of a completely non-serious marginality (without any relevance for the main action of the narrative). At the same time, he seems to underline his interest in this detail with the diminutive, as can be seen in the immediately following, much shorter sentences:

Data and their interpretation

— Diminutives

in literary styles

389

(429) a. Ein Trupp Soldaten zog vorüber. a troup soldiers passed by b. Sie kamen von der unfernen Kaserne, marschierten in they came from the nearby garrison marched in ihrem Dunst und sangen. its fumes and sang c. Ein zweiter Wagen schlich, von der Stadt kommend, a second carriage sneaked from the town coming gegen das nächste Dorf. towards the next village d. Der Fuhrmann schlief und ein Hünd-chen war nicht darauf, the wagoner slept and a dog-DIM was not on it weshalb dieses Fuhrwerk ganz ohne Interesse ist. for which this wagon totally without interest is 'a. A troup of soldiers was passing by. b. They were coming from the nearby garrison, marching amidst its fumes and singing, c. A second carriage was sneaking ahead, coming from the town, towards the next village, d. The wagoner was asleep, and no doggie was on it, and thus the wagon is definitely of no interest whatsoever.' The author's lack of interest is reflected in the absence of detailed description, and he playfully justifies this explicitly (429 d) by mentioning the absence of the (diminutivized!) ludic element of (428) which he anaphorically refers back to. Without the diminutive in (429 d), the ludic effect would be drastically reduced. In his Das Wunderkind [The infant prodigy], which is full of situational irony (cf., e.g., Baumgart 1964: 25), all the diminutives (with the exception of the ironic ein Stück-chen Melodie 'a bit-DIM of melody') are clustered at the beginning, when Thomas Mann describes how the boypianist enters the concert hall and sits down at the piano: (430) a. Es trägt ein weißseidenes Jäck-chen von phantastischem he wears a white-silken jacket-DIM of fantastic Schnitt.... cut b. Aber gegen die weißseidenen Hös-chen stechen but against the white-silken trousers-DIM contrast scharf die bloßen Bein-chen ab, die ganz braun sind; sharp the naked legs-DIM off which entirely brown are denn es ist ein Griechenknabe.... for he is a Greek boy

390

Diminutives

c. Er hat das harmloseste Kindergesicht-chen von der Welt, he has the most harmless child-face-DIM of the world ein unfertiges Näs-chen.... an immature nose-DIM d. Das Wunderkind setzt sich auf den Drehsessel und the prodigy sits R E F L on the music-stool and angelt mit seinen Bein-chen nach den Pedalen.... angles with his legs-DIM for the pedals e. und hebt die rechte Hand. and raises the right hand f. Es ist ein bräunlich naives Kinderhänd-chen.... it is a brownish pudgy child-hand-DIM 'a. He (sc. the prodigy) wears a white-silken little jacket of a fantastic cut b. But the white-silken little trousers contrast sharply with the naked little legs, which are entirely brown; for he is a Greek boy . . . . c. He has the most harmless childlike little face in the world, an immature little nose d. The prodigy sits down on the music-stool and strives, with his little legs, to reach the pedals e. and raises his right hand. f. It is a brownish, pudgy little child-hand....' Later on, the boy's body parts are always referred to with non-diminutives {Hände, Beine 'hands, legs', etc.). Evidently they haven't grown any bigger. What has changed is the author's perspective, as he now reports on the prodigy's astonishing skill and great success. This is already anticipated in (430 e), where the skilled and successful hand, which is about to start playing, is rendered with the simplex, which contrasts with the diminutives. The task of these diminutives is to underline, by way of antithesis, the contrast between the boy's appearance and his mature skill and success. The features [small] and [non-serious] invite the inference that such skill is not to be expected. 3.5.16.8. Our final specimen is Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's (1958) II Gattopardo (cf. Contini 1968: 887). An essential characteristic of its macro-structure is the ironic contrast between, on the one hand, the decaying world of the Borbonic kingdom of Naples and Sicily and its aristocracy (with its heroes, the Prince of Salina, the Gattopardo 'leopard' himself, and his family), and, on the other hand, the emerging petite bourgeoisie (with its prototype, Don Calogero), brought about by the Italian Risorgimento. Let us call this the macro contrast of the text. The

Data and their interpretation

— Diminutives

in literary styles

391

author displays irony towards both spheres, but his is friendly, sceptical irony, often veined with empathy and compassion. In general, the author - a high Sicilian aristocrat himself - seems to identify with the Gattopardo (but not with the Borbons), cf. Contini (1968: 28). We have already analyzed several examples of such macro contrast in 3.5.11.2.3.1 and 3.5.14.2.4. Another, shorter one is (p. 49): (431)

Questa gente, questi liberal-ucoli di campagna volevano these people these Liberals-DIM of country-side wanted soltanto avere il modo di approfittare piu facilmente. only have the way of profiting more easily 'All that these people, these petty local Liberals wanted, was to find ways of making more money themselves.' 385

This resigned, detached sarcasm continues in: (43 Γ)

Molte cose sarebbero avvenute, ma tutto sarebbe many things would have happened but all would be stato una commedia; una rumorosa, romantica commedia been a comedy a noisy romantic comedy con qualche macchi-ol-ina di sangue sulla veste with some spot-INTERF-DIM of blood on the dress buffonesca comic 'Much would happen, but all would be play-acting; a noisy, romantic play with a few spots of blood on the comic costumes' (Colquhoun 1963: 34). By contrast, the serious conversation (p. 135-140) between the Prince and Don Ciccio Tumeo, whose anger and frustration is taken very seriously also by the author (with no trace of irony or sarcasm) is devoid of diminutives. A clear example of empathy and compassion overlaying the ironic macro contrast appears in the episode where the Prince and Ciccio Tumeo are hunting rabbits (p. 125-128, the second translation of each diminutive by Colquhoun's (1963: 86-87)). The author empathizes with the Prince's commiseration for the rabbit they killed, and accordingly all diminutives are assigned to words referring to the rabbit and its sphere (never, for example, to the hounds): p. 125 cul-etto ('bottom-DIM = tiny ... backside', G. Hinterteil-chen); besti-ola ('animal-DIM = animal' without any effort to render the diminutive vs. G. Tier-chen); p. 126 zamp-ette

392

Diminutives

('paws-DIM = paws', G. kleinen Läufe 'small paws'); p. 127 gocci-ol-ine ('drops-INTERF-DIM = little drops', G. Blutströpf-chen); p. 128 coniglietto ('rabbit-DIM = little rabbit', G. kleine Kaninchen, base not diminutivizable). In the middle of this text chunk we find the following account of the Prince's attitude towards the rabbit: (432)

(432')

Mentre i polpastrelli pietosi accarezzavano il while the fingers sympathetic stroked the mus-etto misero, la besti-ola ebbe un ultimo fremito snout-DIM poor the animal-DIM had a last quiver e mori and died 'While sympathetic fingers were still stroking that poor snout [DIM not rendered], the animal [DIM not rendered] gave a last quiver and died.' (G. Schnäuz-chen, Tier-chen). aveva provato in aggiunta al piacere di uccidere anche had proven in addition to the pleasure of killing also quello rassicurante di compatire that reassuring of compassion '(the Prince) had had ... not only the pleasure of killing but also the comfort of compassion' (Colquhoun 1963: 86).

On p. 127, the men and hounds hunting rabbits are compared with the Garibaldian troups attacking the Neapolitan soldiers of the Borbonic king. Expectedly, it is the losers the author sympathizes with. Finally, on p. 141, there is a very brief recall of the hunting episode, where, again, a diminutive appears: i batuff-ol-ini di pelo ο di penne 'the flocks-DIM of skin or of feathers = the flying feathers, the shreds of skin' (Colquhoun 1963: 96). In this way diminutives contribute to constructing, often with great irony, this global, macrostructural contrast between the vanishing old world and the victorious new world. In addition, there are many local contrasts with at least slight irony to which diminutives contribute, as on p. 21: (433)

un aspetto cimiteriale accentuato dai an aspect cemetery-like accentuated by the mont-icci-uoli paralleli delimitanti i mountains-INTERF-DIM parallel bounding the

Data and their interpretation — Diminutives in literary styles

393

canal-etti d' irrigazione e che sembravano tumuli di canals-DIM of irrigation and which seemed graves of smilzi giganti thin giants 'the air of a cemetery, accentuated by the parallel little mounds bounding the irrigation canals and looking like the graves of very tall, very thin giants' 386 Of course, both diminutives are denotative, but the choice of contrasting them with giants fits in well with the author's predilection for ironic contrasts; cf. diminutives involved in contrasts such as p. 219 sciacall-etti 'little jackals' (Colquhoun 1963: 152, cf. G. kleinen Schakale: Birnbaum 1959: 131); p. 223 un paese picc(-)ino picc(-)ino ... ai piedi di qualche mur-icci-uolo, con tutte le sue storie-elle 'a tiny hamlet ... beneath some rustic wall [where the adjective renders DIM-DIM], with all those stories [DIM not rendered]' (Colquhoun 1963: 154, cf. G. einem winzigkleinen Dorf, Mäuer-chen, hübschen Geschichten: Birnbaum 1959: 132); p. 233 maestr-ucolo della scuola parrocchiale 'parish schoolmaster' [DIM not rendered] (Colquhoun 1963: 161, cf. G. unwissenden Lehrer der Kirchschulen); p. 253 spin-ucce 'little thorns' (Colquhoun 1963: 173, cf. G. häßlichen Dornen·. Birnbaum 1959: 150); p. 292 scherz-ucci malvag-etti 'spiteful little jokes' (Colquhoun 1963: 199, cf. G. dumme, ein wenig niederträchtige Possen: Birnbaum 1959: 174, etc.). Such contrasts, although very frequent, could easily be played down as relatively insignificant instances of the rhetorical and stylistic figure of antithesis, were it not for the text-constitutive macro contrast, which is a global (macrostructural) nature and thus goes far beyond local (microstructural) stylistic devices. There are many other strategic uses of diminutives, which could easily be interpreted along the lines of our pragmatic analyses of 3.5.2—3.5.15. 3.5.16.9. In conclusion, we may say that the pragmatics of diminutives in literary style is basically the same as in the general use of diminutives. But, in addition, literary style may accommodate diminutives into macrostructural strategies for constructing alternative literary worlds. Authors exploit general pragmatic effects of diminutives for the organisation of texts or at least of text chunks. This seems to be the case much more often in Italian than in German literature, due to the richer use of diminutives in Italian. Thus the use of diminutives in literary style is a widening and/or deepening of strategies and effects used in language as a whole. For example,

394

Diminutives

diminutives as style markers in child-literature and love-scenes are derived from the use of diminutives in child- and lover-centered speech situations (3.5.16.4—3.5.16.5). Showing empathy with a dramatis persona via diminutives derives from common use (cf. 3.5.7), for example, when performing a spontaneous oral narrative. The ironic contrasts in Thomas Mann (3.5.16.7) and Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa (1958, 3.5.16.8) highlighted by diminutives represent a judiciously planned intensification of contrastiveness, inherent in such ironic devices as diminutives (cf. 3.5.14). The polyvalence of diminutives in G. Tomasi di Lampedusa (1958), Kurt Tucholsky's Leere (3.5.16.6) and in Thomas Mann (3.5.16.7) represents a literary, intensified exploitation of the common polyvalence of diminutives (cf. 3.5.10-3.5.12 and cf. Ettinger 1974 b: 107 for the interpretation of one Spanish augmentative). The use of diminutives as style markers of pastoral poetry (3.5.16.4) is based on the playfulness often exhibited by diminutives (cf. 3.5.5).

3.6. Linguistic conclusions It is now time to try and draw conclusions from our comparisons of Italian, German and English morphopragmatics of diminutives. As we did in the course of our discussion, we will also deal with theoretical problems of morphotactics and morphosemantics of diminutives (more in 3.3 and 3.4), but our main concern is again pragmatics. 3.6.1. In accordance with the theoretical triple of 1.9.5.1 (universals, typology, language-specific system adequacy), we first deal with the universal level of morphopragmatics, that is, with generalizations that predictably apply to other languages besides Italian and German, then we are going to deal with typological aspects (3.6.2) and finally with languagespecific system adequacy (3.6.3) and prospects for the study of language acquisition (3.6.4). Our pragmatic model (cf. 1.7), with its distinction of static and dynamic aspects, constitutive and regulative factors, has proved capable of accommodating generalisations about diminutives in many languages (even beyond our three main languages). 3.6.1.1. We have moved from a conception of a feature [non-serious] (in a more specific sense than in Clark—Gerrig 1990, that is, as a combina-

Linguistic conclusions

395

tion of [fictive] and [non-important], cf. 3.4.4, 3.4.6). The application of this feature to the speech situation or to the speech act is constitutive, that is to say, it is a necessary precondition for triggering a productive rule of diminutive formation. Thus the scope of diminutives is, in principle, global, in the sense that they modify the whole speech act in the given speech situation. Thus the global modifying force of diminutives is comparable to that of sentence adverbials, like tentatively (cf. 3.5.12.8.1). Accordingly, we claim that an exclusively denotative use of the diminutive (which only locally modifies the meaning of its base noun/adjective/adverb) is largely restricted to lexicalized diminutives (3.4.2.4). Although this claim holds also for our examples of diminutivized verbs, they are not sufficient in number for testing our claim. Moreover, there is the (at least implicitly) well-known empirical problem of separating lexicalizations from semantically and(!) pragmatically transparent cases. What one usually finds in the literature, are theoretical fiats which beg the question. We have modeled speech-situations where the feature [non-serious] is constitutive, viz. child/pet/lover-centered speech situations (3.5.2 — 3.5.4). We have elaborated hierarchies of child-centrality and argued why diminutives are used more in child-centered than in pet- and lover-centered speech situations (and situations metaphorically derived from them). The application of the feature [non-serious] to speech acts (3.5.10— 3.5.12, also 3.5.13-3.5.15) showed that speech act and politeness theories (albeit with adjustments, cf. 3.5.10-3.5.15) are suitable frameworks within which the use of diminutives can be accounted for, an approach hardly explored in studies devoted to diminutives. In addition to the constitutive role of the feature [non-serious], we have highlighted and explicated the importance of (usually favoring) regulative factors such as ludic (jocular), sym/empathy, familiarity, informality and intimacy, meiosis, irony and sarcasm (3.5.5 — 3.5.8, 3.5.13 — 3.5.14). We have argued that emotive factors are not basic/primary, but only secondary and regulative (3.5.6, 3.5.12.8.5). Constitutive and regulative factors combine in determining the likelihood of diminutive use in a given speech act within a given speech situation. But the actual application of a productive rule of diminutive formation depends on whether the utterance contains an appropriate landingsite — a word, that is, that can be a suitable base for diminutive suffixation. If more than one such landing-site is available, then - unless in marked styles - just one landing-site is chosen according to an array of structural and pragmatic factors (cf. 3.5.9).

396

Diminutives

In 3.5.12.8.14 we have seen that the relevant factors of the static pragmatic dimension (sc. appertaining to the speech situation) are less important than those of the dynamic dimension (sc. appertaining to the speech acts). This conclusion has been confirmed by the results obtained in the succeeding sub-chapters (3.5.13 — 3.5.16), where understatement, irony, sarcasm, and re-elaboration are based on factors of the dynamic dimension. Euphemism (3.5.3) may be triggered by static factors (tabu), but is obtained by the dynamic factor of downgrading (similar to understatement). And in literary styles (3.5.16), static factors are relevant only for diminutives as style markers of certain genres like pastoral style and child literature, whereas dynamic factors are at work also elsewhere. 3.6.1.2. As to the meaning specification of diminutives, we have argued against the minimalist view whereby there is a unique meaning feature (either [small] or [non-serious]) and that general pragmatic strategies when applied to this feature automatically generate the pragmatic effects of diminutives (cf. 3.4.3.2, 3.5.12.8.13). Instead, we proposed the maximalist view whereby there are pragmatic regularities applying to diminutives only. In many places (cf. 3.4.4-3.4.5, 3.5.12.8.12) we have found that the feature [non-serious] is more appropriate than the feature [small] for explaining the pragmatics of diminutives. Whereas the feature [non-serious] can account for all factors, the feature [small] cannot account for familiarity (3.5.8.8) and playfulness (3.5.5). In many cases [non-serious] appears to be more adequate than [small], e.g., for pet-centered speech situations, insofar as diminutives are used not only for young and small dogs but for old and big ones as well. Emotionality (cf. 3.5.6, 3.5.12.8.5) is an independent factor. Since emotion is evaluative, it links easily with evaluative morphological rules (cf. 4.2.4.9). Thus it is not necessary to derive it from the feature [small], as, for example, Volek (1987: 89, 96, 224) tries to do when she claims that there is a relation of contiguity between smallness and emotivity. We see no good argument for this claim. A notion of contiguity is certainly not pertinent in the case of such an indirect link as between smallness and emotionality with metaphorical transfer of a child-centered speech situation to other speech situations (cf. 3.5.2-3.5.4). On pragmatic generalizations, see 3.5.12.8, 3.5.13.1, 3.5.14.6, 3.5.15.7, 3.5.16.9. 3.6.1.3. Now let us evaluate diminutives from the point of view of a semiotically-based theory of Natural Morphology (cf. 1.9.5).

Linguistic conclusions

397

Whereas hypocoristics, more often than not, belong to extragrammatical morphology (cf. 1.9.2), productive diminutive formation belongs to morphological grammar. For, diminutive formation is rule-governed, more precisely, governed by language-specific grammatical and pragmatic competence. Diminutive formation rules manipulate (semantic and pragmatic) meaning and morphological form in regular, that is, predictable ways. Such regularity of meaning and form provides evidence against models (e.g., Beard 1990) which strictly separate meaning rules from form rules (cf. Dressler-Kiefer 1990: 76). Accordingly, semantic and pragmatic meanings of diminutive formation rules are not to be strictly separated. This conclusion is hardly compatible with a strict modular separation of grammar and pragmatics. Like other word-formation rules, diminutivization appears to form new words distinct from their bases, for only the status of diminutives as new words may explain such phenomena as: 1) for certain pragmatic effects, speakers outdo simple diminutivization with recursive diminutivization (cf. 3.3.2.9, 3.4.1.1-3.4.1.2, 3.4.2.5); 2) the sharp reaction of purists against "inept", "childish" diminutives (cf. 3.5.2, 5.3.3) would seem to vouch for word status; 3) diminutives count as re-elaborations of their bases (cf. 3.5.15); 4) the speaker of Alonso's anecdote in 3.5.13.3 (example (328)) seemed to consider a euphemistic diminutive as a new word which does not carry the sanctioned connotation of the base word; 5) diminutives lexicalize as easily as other complex word forms (cf. 3.4.2.4, 3.6.2.3). This finding seems to present a paradox for our model of sentence diminutives, whereby the pragmatic meaning of the diminutive is attached to the meaning of the whole speech act. As a realisation of this pragmatic operation, a diminutive suffix is attached to a landing-site. This model presupposes that the lexical base of the diminutive is an autonomous word which may be chosen as an appropriate landing-site for purely textual, pragmatic or syntactic considerations which are other than considerations of lexical choice. Our paradox relates to the wellknown paradox of transparency in word formation: so-called transparent complex words (cf. 1.9.5.2) behave as semantically transparent and at the same time as semantically opaque (partially lexicalized) words. Now, our paradox refers to pragmatic transparency of productive morphopragmatic rules: first of all, the diminutive suffix is the carrier of the pragmatic meaning [non-serious] (with its meaning variants or "allopragms") ascribed to the meaning of the speech act or speech situation as such. These global meaning operations are largely predictible. The meaning of the diminutive suffix, however, interacts with the meaning of

398

Diminutives

its lexical base. This is a local meaning operation which may involve the local, denotative meaning [small]. This local meaning operation is liable to (partly) obscure the pragmatic transparency of the global meaning operation. The higher the frequency of attaching a diminutive suffix to the same lexical base, the higher the likelihood that the results of the local interaction between the meanings of the suffix and the base may become stable and start the process of lexicalization. This situation is typical for all morphopragmatically relevant word formation rules. In the languages we have looked at, diminutive formation belongs to word formation (cf. 3.3.1), but does not represent a prototypical derivational rule (cf. 1.9.4.1). The following properties are non-prototypical: diminutives are alteratives; diminutive suffixes are frequently non-heads (cf. 1.9.4.3, 3.3.2-3.3.3, cf. below); their position is sometimes more peripheral than that of non-prototypical inflectional suffixes (plural, comparative); diminutive suffixes may sometimes resemble autonomous words (cf. 3.3.2-3.3.3); they often violate the unitary base constraint (cf. 3.3.1); rules of diminutive formation are usually more productive than most other derivational rules; the change in semantic meaning they produce is small, if any. Thus the pragmatic meaning of non-lexicalized diminutives, more generally than not, outweighs their semantic meaning. The semiotic parameter of iconicity (1.9.5.2), is called into question with the well-known phenomenon whereby diminutive formation tends to involve sound-iconicity, that is, to employ a palatal high vowel or palatalisation for indicating smallness (cf. 3.3.1). Thus the semantics of diminutives seems to be more basic than their pragmatics although the pragmatics of diminutives can be recognized to be more important than their semantics. The best solution to this problem seems to lie in the complex dialectics of nature and nurture: 1) [non-serious] is a natural meaning extension of [small], thus sound-iconism may apply to this alloseme as well as to [small], 2) It seems to be a pragmatic generality, if not a universal, that adults do not treat small children as serious interlocutors and thus tend to define a child-centered speech situation as [non-serious]. 3) Children primarily acquire language in child-centered speech situations, with their overuse of diminutives, and only later learn to use diminutives to apply the feature [non-serious] to speech acts. 4) Thus the use of diminutives to apply the feature [non-serious] to speech acts is more conventional (symbolic) than their use in child-centered and related speech situations. Therefore we expect more crosslinguistic differences in the modification of speech acts via diminutives than in their indexing of child-centered and related speech situations. This seems to be empirically

Linguistic conclusions

399

true. Of course these hypotheses are in want of more empirical, psycholinguistic evidence from language acquisition. The universal tendency towards constructional diagrammaticity, a sub-parameter of iconicity, is generally complied with in diminutive formation. Nearly all rules represent the most diagrammatic reflection of meaning addition via affixing. Less diagrammatic methods such as ablaut in Arabic and consonant palatalisation in Basque are exceptional. Peripheral diminutive affixation is also more natural in terms of indexicality when it refers to the pragmatics of the speech act instead of referring to the lexical meaning of the lexical base. Thus it is predictable that infixing 387 is rare. Another type of diagrammaticity occurs in re-elaborations (3.5.15). The speaker can re-elaborate by using a diminutive for referring anaphorically to a simplex, but not the other way round (for interfixes, cf. 5.5.2), because the diminutive is the marked form and its base the unmarked. Metaphoric relations, as the weakest icons, have occurred in many places: for example, in the metaphorical recreation of child-centered speech situations (cf. 3.5.2-3.5.4) and in some strategic use of diminutives, e.g., as cajoling devices intended to portray elements of the speech situation or speech act in a way which is favorable to the speaker (cf. 3.5.10.4.4). As with metaphors in general, it is not clear to what extent metaphorical relations can be established between various meanings and pragmatic effects of diminutives. Very often such relations are implicitly assumed by those who derive all uses of diminutives from a basic meaning [small], but this has not been stated with sufficient explicitness nor have the numerous obstacles been tackled (cf. 3.6.1.2 for the minimalist view) and taken care of. Head relations (cf. 1.9.4.3) also tend to be diagrammatic (cf. Dressier 1987 c: 101). For example, a semantic head tends to be a syntactic and morphological head as well, and the same with semantic non-heads. This preference is often difficult for diminutives to take up. The problem starts with diminutive suffixes having a very weak status as semantic heads, in the sense that they either do not change semantic meaning at all or only very little. Therefore many languages, such as Italian, treat them basically as non-heads, although - due to the suffixing inflection - they must be morphotactic heads governing the subsequent inflectional heads. In their diagrammatic reflecting this mixed head- and non-head status, Italian diminutive suffixes display varying degrees of other head properties (cf. 3.3.2). Thus the often observed incoherence of head relations is to be expected.

400

Diminutives

The formulation of a theory of morphopragmatics obliges us to also take pragmatic headhood into consideration. In accordance with the notion of sentence diminutives, the pragmatic feature [non-serious] applies to the whole speech act or to elements of the speech situation, that is, it is a pragmatic index. Diagrammatically, the diminutive suffix as signans should index a diagrammatic formal correspondent of the speech act or of the respective elements of the speech situation. This is the semiotic basis for pragmatic conditions of selecting the landing-site of the diminutive suffix (cf. 3.5.9.6-3.5.9.7), insofar as the suffix tends to be attached to the lexical base whose referent is pragmatically focussed upon by the speaker. Now, also the fact that syntactic heads of noun phrases in preference to non-heads (cf. 3.5.9.4) tend to attract the diminutive suffix is an indexical-diagrammatic consequence of pragmatic headhood, since there is indeed more pragmatic focus on a syntactic head than on a syntactic non-head of a noun phrase. At this point, we can also explain why diminutive formation never seems to apply to conjunctions as bases (cf. 3.3.1, 3.3.4). Diminutive formation attaches the pragmatic feature [non-serious] to the speech act as a whole. Conjunctions typically link clauses or sentences or even speech acts but do not constitute parts of the speech act. Therefore conjunctions cannot be landing-sites for diminutive affixes. Due to the complex interplay of factors determining the landing-site (3.5.9), both morphosemantic and morphopragmatic transparency of diminutives is blurred. This opacity is the reason why there has been no satisfactory solution for the identification of both the meaning of diminutives and the conditions for choosing landing-sites, in spite of the large number of studies on diminutives. As far as morphotactic transparency is concerned, diminutive suffixation involves at least as much opacity as many other affixation rules. For example, German rules trigger allomorphic umlaut, Viennese German -erl suffixation triggers allomorphic -ßf-insertion and final devoicing (cf. 3.3.3). But the decline of umlaut in German dialect diminutives may be an instance of increased transparency (cf. Rowley 1992: 206). As for Italian, rules of diminutive formation trigger allomorphic -c-insertion (for interfixation see 5.3.3.2). 3.6.2. Next we pass over to the area of language typology. 3.6.2.1. Here we must restrict our summary to Italian, (Viennese) German and English with only occasional excursions into other languages, because the evidence we gathered from other languages is too fragmentary.

Linguistic conclusions

401

In contrasting the pragmatics of diminutives in different languages, we aim to find diversity and communalities, that is, equivalence (strict correspondence), similarities (that is, analogies or correspondences, whereby some intervening variables differ), differences (whereby one language has a category which another lacks). The quest for 100 percent equivalence is not our purpose. This we must relegate to translation theory (where this is a very disputed notion), for the following reasons: 1) At the present stage of pragmatics, there is no way to guarantee strict equivalence, across cultures, of the cultural background and cultural factors (co)determining pragmatic patterns nor is there equivalence among pragmatic systems themselves.388 Therefore a deductive way of establishing equivalences is overambitious at this point. 2) In addition to these difficulties on the "emic" level, there are as many on the "etic" level (cf. 3.5.12.8.2). Indeed, there are many more cotextual and contextual factors relevant for establishing the sense of a diminutivized utterance than we have been able to investigate. 3) The inductive way of establishing strict correspondences via translation equivalences is marred with difficulties (cf. G a r c i a - v a n P u t t e Tobin 1987) and only viable within a framework of translation theory and methodology not available to us (cf. also 3.6.2.3). Therefore our typological summary must be restricted to contrasting analogies and differences accounted for deductively, by considering the presence or absence of those categories, factors and other variables that we have been able to take into account. This implies neglecting many questions, which, however, we consider of minor importance. On the other hand, inductively, we use translation correspondences. Bilingual speakers or groups of heterolingual speakers have to decide on both "good" translations and applicability of such translation correspondences to corresponding speech situations having corresponding pragmatic effects. It was most important here to decide whether analogical substitutions and expansions of variables with analogical changes of pragmatic effects were possible in the languages studied. Thus correspondences were, on the one hand, defined according to the skeleton of hypothetical variables, and, on the other, vouched for by the communicative competence of bilinguals. Well aware of the pitfalls of our approach and of the modesty of our achievements when compared with what should be done in future research, we still think that our constrastive study on diminutives can offer much more, in terms of results and methodological precision, than any study on diminutives so far.

402

Diminutives

3.6.2.2. As expected, we have found that diminutives are less frequent, in type and token, in German than in Italian, and still much less frequent in English. In fact, diminutive formation fails to be fully productive in English (cf. 3.3.5), and is therefore only of marginal interest for morphopragmatics. Collocations with little are outside the realm of morphology and thus also of morphopragmatics. Frequency differences between Italian and German can be partially derived from different categorical constraints: adjectives and adverbs as bases for diminutive formation are normal in Italian, but only exceptional in German (cf. 3.3.2-3.3.3). In Italian, there is both strict recursivity and cumulative meaning addition (through addition of different diminutive suffixes); in German there is only meaning intensification, and even this rather exceptionally. In Italian there are also fewer semantic restrictions, e.g., in reference to young age and to countable nouns (3.4.1.2) and to toys (3.5.2.8). As to pragmatic conditions, there is a distinct diminutivum puerile in German (with the suffix -i, cf. 3.5.2-3.5.4), but not in Italian; familiarity is a favoring factor in Italian, but rather a precondition in German (cf. 3.5.8, 3.5.10.4.3.1, 3.5.11.2.3.3, 3.5.12.1, 3.5.12.2.1); cf. 3.5.2.4 for sym/ empathy. For the same reason, diminutives are excluded from transactions in German, but not in Italian (3.5.11.4.1.1). The speech act of wishing usually seems to be too serious for using diminutives in German, but not in Italian (3.5.12.2.5). As a result, diminutives are easier to use for stylistic effects in Italian than in German (cf. 3.5.15—3.5.16). See also 3.7. 3.6.2.3. If we apply the contrastive method of translation comparisons 389 and look at translations of diminutives between our three main languages, then we expect - as a consequence of the above differences translation to be much easier between Italian and German than between one of these languages and English. Moreover German diminutives should be nearly always translatable into Italian diminutives, even if not vice versa. These expectations are clearly fulfilled in the evidence at our disposal. Whereas it was nearly always easy to find an Italian diminutive equivalent for the German diminutives in our examples, and most of the time also in the other direction, only very rarely were we able to translate an Italian or German diminutive into an English one (most of the time only in child-centered speech situations), cf. Ettinger's (1974 b: 119) English translations of Romance diminutives.

Linguistic conclusions

403

The native speakers of English (and excellent speakers of Italian) we tested, rendered the Italian diminutives (or our examples) in English with a great variety of devices, as shown in 3.5.2 examples (113), (117), (123), (135) and in 3.5.3 example (151), among others. Here we are providing only a superficial, asystematic list of the devices encountered in these English translations: 390 diminutives and (extragrammatical) reduplications or abbreviations (rarely and only in child-/pet-/lover-centered speech situations), adjectival suffix -ish, little, a bit, a little, small!tiny, quick, humble, modest, teensy, wee, teeny-weenie, rather, so, such, just, any, some, about, really, sympathetic or empathetic adjectives (lovely, beloved, old, nice, beautiful, fine, fair, pretty, dear, darling, comfy, snug, cool, goodfor-you), pejorative adjectives (miserly, poor, mean), possessives (my, my own, your), other downgraders like or so, or thereabouts, more or less, an X or two = one or two X, of sorts, aspectual modifications (e. g., drink —• drink up), modal hedging (e.g., conditionals), persuasive elements like now, go on, come on, lexical modification (e.g., like —*• love; money —1• cash/change; often connotative), lexical metaphors and idioms, paraphrases, tag-questions. Our finding is consistent with the great variety of English translations of Russian diminutives in Bratus (1969, e.g., p. 3) and his frequent remarks on the difficulty of translating Russian diminutives into English, whereas Carrai's (1986) observations on difficulties of translating Russian diminutives into Italian only refer to single lexical idiosyncracies. Similarly, German diminutives are translated in asystematic ways into French, which uses diminutives much less than other Romance languages (see Fischer 1963; Ettinger 1974 a: 68). As for the literary translations of Lampedusa's (1958) "II Gattopardo", the English translation by Colquhoun (1963) almost never renders Italian diminutives with English ones, and little is just one of the very many ways used instead. The German translation by Birnbaum (1959) renders more than half of the Italian diminutives with German ones, otherwise klein 'small' is used for rendering nominal diminutives. Paradoxically diminutives are more often used in cases of predominantly denotative meanings and lexicalisations than for predominantly pragmatic meanings. A final observation to show the importance of pragmatics for the meaning of diminutives: when the first author worked with his Chinese student Ms. Guo on the rich Chinese paradigm of diminutives, she was unable to translate German diminutives into corresponding Chinese diminutives out of context, unless their meanings were clearly denotative.

404

Diminutives

This shows, again, that the pragmatic meanings of diminutives are not local. 3.6.2.4. So far we have avoided, on purpose, dealing with lexicalized diminutives, including those used in idioms (cf. 3.4.2.4, 3.5.14.2.3), as they do not represent a productive application of diminutive formation. Lexicalized diminutives and diminutive idioms may, however, give an indication of the productivity of diminutive formation in earlier stages of the language in question. For, if we assume a fairly constant rate of idiomatisation, then we can assume that the larger the number of idiomatic diminutives found, the more productive these were in earlier periods. For this purpose we compared Italian and German idiomatic diminutives, starting with Sedläkovä's (1986) unpublished MA thesis on Czech and German diminutives, which also deals with German translation equivalents of Czech idiomatic diminutives. Czech is richer in diminutives than German and, apparently, even than Italian. If we assume that there were no dramatic increases or decreases in the frequency of diminutives in the three languages, we may also expect a similar distribution in today's idiomatic diminutives. And this expectation became true when we translated the Czech and German idiomatic complex words into Italian. Clearly, German proved to have fewer lexicalized diminutives than Czech and Italian. Often Czech and Italian diminutives were replaced by German simplicia (more often compounds than derivations, cf. 3.6.2.5). This result is even more proving, if we consider the fact that there has been much more language contact between Czech and German than between Czech and Italian. This factor should tip the balance of diminutive translation equivalents to Czech in favor of German rather than in favor of Italian, as instead is the case. Here are some examples of Czech lexicalized diminutives which have an Italian, but not a German diminutive translation equivalent: Cz. zvon-ec-ek kobyl-ka lucni jazyc-ek kartäc-ek kolic-ek mlyn-ek ramin-ko zrcät-ko

It. campan-ella cavall-etta lanc-etta spazzol-ino moll-etta macin-ino om-etto specchi-etto

G. Glockenblume 'bluebell' Heuschrecke 'grasshopper' Zeiger 'hand' Zahnbürste (V. Zahnbürst-l\) 'toothbrush' Wäscheklammer '(clothes-)peg' Kaffeemühle 'coffee-mill' Kleiderbügel 'clothes-hanger' Rückspiegel 'driving mirror'

Linguistic

conclusions

405

In this material, we never found the reverse case of a Czech diminutive having a correspondent diminutive in German, but not in Italian. We had the same results with diminutives frozen in idioms: Cz. spät jako andil-eklandel-tc-ek — It. dormire come un angiol-etto chodit za nekym jako ocäs-ek seguire qualcuno come un cagnol-ino byt jemny jako pavucin-ka sembrare un ragn-etto 'to look like a spider-DIM' G. wie ein Engel schlafen jemandem wie ein Hund (also DIM) folgen dünn wie ein Spinnwebl Faden!Nadel sein

'to sleep like an angel(-DIM)'; 'to follow somebody like a doggie'; 'to look like a spider/thread/ needle'

3.6.2.5. Now we can turn to the degree of grammaticalization or, more precisely, morphologization (cf. 1.11) of diminutives and apply the criteria established in 1.11.2: 1)As for the criterion of desemantization, the polysemy (and thus the number of semantic features) and semantic concreteness of E. little, F. petit (and, of course, also It. piccolo, G. klein) contrasts with the abstract semantic and pragmatic meanings [small, non-serious] of the diminutives that we have studied. Therefore it is easier to find translation equivalences between Italian and German diminutives than between these and English noun phrases with little or scarcely usable diminutives (cf. 3.6.2.2). Little, generally, is just one among other semantically concrete, lexical renderings of diminutives from other languages. It is at least partially desemantisized in its weak form, and in this case it is closer to the pragmatic use of Italian and German diminutives than its full form. The meaning of little is predominantely denotative, while the meaning of diminutives is predominantely pragmatic. The possibility of their denotative use is further reduced by the constraints on landing-sites. This restricts the autonomy and concreteness of the pragmatic meaning of diminutives. 2) Syntagmatic extension in numbers of phonemes, syllables, morphemes, and syntactic constituents is, of course, different in little dog vs. dogg-ie, G. klein-er Hund vs. Hünd-chen, etc. Phonological shrinkage in the weak form of little decreases the number of phonemes and syllables by one. Similarly, the weak Quebecquois form ti [tsi] as in the hypocoristic ti-

406

Diminutives

Jean = dim. Jeann-ot is one phoneme shorter than the full form petit 'small'. 3) The degree of bondedness or coalescence of the above-mentioned weak forms little, ti is slightly greater than that of the respective full forms, but still much lower than that of diminutive suffixes. Italian recursive wordbased -ino-ino-ino is less tightly bound but is not part of m o r p h o p r a g m a t ics (see 3.3.3). When diminutives change the gender of the bases (see 3.3.3-3.3.4), they are more a u t o n o m o u s (that is, more likely to be lexicalized) than when they do not. The clear contrast between syntagmatic variability of little in general and fixation of diminutive suffixes is slightly blurred, first because, with the weak form of little, positional variability is much more restricted. In any case, syntagmatic variability of diminutive suffixes is very marginal. It occurs, and only rarely, in positional interchange with plural suffixes (cf. 3.3.4) and in extremely rare and even dubious alternations like It. tazz-in-etta = tazz-ett-ina (cf. 3.3.3). 4) Paradigmaticity, that is, membership in a more or less loosely organized paradigm sets E. little apart, because its only paradigmatic relations are of a lexical nature: little is a member of the word-field of dimensional adjectives, where the weak form little has no partners, that is, other similarly reduced adjectives. Also the G e r m a n diminutive is very isolated: in each regio- or sociolect there is just one basic form (e.g., -chen in the normative standard, -erl in colloquial Viennese), and there are only loose paradigmatic relations with other alterative devices (cf. 3.3.4). In Italian, as in other Romance languages (cf. Ettinger 1974 a, b), there are several diminutive suffixes with the same pragmatic potentials, and they contrast with an augmentative, with pejoratives, and elatives. In other languages (e. g., Slavic and Turkic languages), there are also caritative (or meliorative) suffixes. 5) Automaticity, that is, systematically constrained choice and use as automatic consequence of a higher-order choice, can be attributed to diminutives, as far as this is at all possible for word formation, whereas free choice of items according to communicative intentions is typical of aut o n o m o u s items such as little. As a result, occurrences of G e r m a n diminutives can be automatically translated into Italian ones (with rare exceptions), but less so the other way round (for reasons summarized in 3.6.2.2). In general, we have found a great and fairly uniform applicability of diminutives for pragmatic effects in both languages. In contrast, non-automaticity of English translations is symptomatic of the non-existence of a m o r p h o p r a g m a t i c category of sentence diminutives. Therefore,

Linguistic conclusions

407

in English, the most varied paraphrases are chosen for translating the pragmatic effects of diminutives. The above five criteria also show the more peripheral position of German diminutives as compared with Italian diminutives. This leads us to a typological problem. According to standard typological comparisons, Italian is a weaker inflecting/fusional language than German, and therefore its much richer paradigm and greater use of diminutives appears paradoxical. One may consider the lack of augmentatives in German to be partially compensated by compounding devices not available in Italian; this is similar to other cases where Italian derivation corresponds to German compounding (cf. Dardano 1983: 12). But such an explanation is possible only for lexicalized diminutives (cf. 3.6.2.4). Thus typological accounts in terms of different typological quality or quantity of morphological richness may partially explain the near-absence of diminutives in English, but such accounts appear futile when contrasting Italian and German. It seems that we must abandon such attempts in favor of pragmatic explanations (see 3.7), another indication of the (at least synchronic) priority of the morphopragmatics over the morphosemantics of diminutives. 3.6.3. Paradigms are the locus of system-adequacy (or system-congruity) in the sense of Wurzel (1984), at least in inflection, whereas the usefulness of the notion system-adequacy is more limited in derivation. For Italian diminutives, we can refer to our observations (see 3.3.2) that root-based diminutives are system-adequate (cf. Dressier—Thornton 1991), whereas word-based diminutives in -ino-ino-ino (that is, those which are irrelevant to morphopragmatics) are not. The unique augmentative suffix -one has its main counterpart (cf. 4.2.2, 4.2.4.2, 5.5.1), among the competing Italian diminutive suffixes, in the suffix -ino, which is not only the most iconic diminutive suffix (due to its vowel [i]), but also the only one with which it shares a consonant phoneme, that is, /n/. This phonological similarity may be seen as an iconic reflection of their closer meaning relation. Diminutive suffixes may share negativity of connotations with pejorative suffixes, but there is a paradigmatic difference: whereas these connotations are semantic with pejoratives, they are pragmatic (that is, pragmatically conditioned) with diminutives (unless there is a lexicalization, cf. 3.4.2.2). 3.6.4. Some of the characteristics of diminutives appear to be explainable by reference to first language acquisition. At least in many languages,

408

Diminutives

diminutive formation is the first morphological rule that small children acquire (cf. 3.5.2; Karpf 1990: 128, 133), that is, it is acquired at a time when there is no clear distinction yet between extragrammatical morphological operations (like extragrammatical reduplication or diminutive formation of the type wug —• wig, as uttered by children in psycholinguistic tests) and grammatical rules. Moreover, the distinction between inflection and derivation has not yet been developed, nor are the regularities of headedness and morpheme order yet acquired, and word classes are not yet clearly differentiated (the condition for the unitary base constraint). This may explain why small children's diminutive formation is not a prototypical rule of either derivation or inflection (cf. 3.6.1.3), and why it is more iconic than other morphological rules. The non-prototypical and iconic properties of adult diminutive formation may then be a reflection of the early stage of acquisition. The same argument may be put forth to stress the importance of pragmatics for the meaning of diminutives. Indeed, the acquisition of meaning starts with pragmatics rather than with semantics (cf. Trevarthen 1985). This (partial) explanation of typical properties of diminutives does, indeed, make little sense in a model which assumes that many principles and/or properties distinguishing morphology from non-morphology, extragrammatical from grammatical morphology, and inflection from derivation are innate linguistic properties. In such a model, early vs. later stimulation of inborn dispositions should make no real difference as to their prototypical or non-prototypical elaboration in language acquisition. But if we assume a model of self-organizing processes as in Karpf (1990, 1991), which implies that modules are not inborn but arise owing to specialization in language acquisition, then we may assume that the distinction of grammatical and extra-grammatical morphology, of inflection and derivation only arises after the acquisition of children's diminutive-formation rules. This explains much better why non-prototypical properties of diminutive formation arise and are (partially) preserved in adult morphology. This view clearly calls for more extensive functionalist and cognitive explanations of morphology and of its acquisition (e. g., in the spirit of Natural Morphology) and for more psycholinguistic observation and experimentation of morphology acquisition (cf. Karpf 1990, 1991; now an international project has started with this purpose). And this will also have repercussions for hypotheses on the (phylogenetic) evolution of diminutives and morphology in general (cf. Pinker—Bloom 1990: 738, 757, 763).

Sociocultural conclusions

409

3.7. Sociocultural conclusions As we have seen in 3.6.2.5, morphological typology may help to explain why diminutives play a more limited role in English than in German and Italian, but - at least in its present stage - cannot explain why they are more important in Italian than in German, and, we may add, more important in Viennese German than in many other varieties of German. Therefore we must look elsewhere for an explanation. 3.7.1. Popular cliches, stereotypes and prejudices come easily to mind. For example, the moderate use of diminutives in German would represent the aurea mediocritas of the German Gemüt ('soul, temper') between the "excessive" (cf. also Wandruszka 1987: 41) and the somewhat "childish" use of diminutives by Slavic, Baltic, Mediterranean, etc. people on the one hand, and the British "soberness" and "la clarte francaise" on the other. The greater role of diminutives in Viennese German would then be due to Italian, Slavic and Hungarian influence in Vienna. 391 But the greater role of diminutives in Dutch (cf. Klimaszewska 1983) cannot be accommodated in such simplistic East-West, N o r t h - S o u t h schemata. Dutch also falsifies the Czech writer Jaroslav Hasek's purported view that diminutives only occur with people inhabiting mountainous regions. Similar cliches can be found in literature as well. Take the Viennese emigree writer Schlamm (1938 [1987]: 150, translated): "The speech of the Viennese tended towards the diminutive. ... witty, ironic ... not pathetic"; p. 153 "full of scepticism ... not easy to be impressed"; p. 154: "They didn't take themselves too seriously." An earlier example of national cliches can be found in W. A. Mozart's La finta giardiniera (KV 196, 1775, text by Giuseppe Petrosellini) where (II. 4) Nardo sings love declarations to Serpetta in French, English and Italian (with a vezzo all'italiana) where he uses a diminutive, but Serpetta rejects this "affected" Italian way (Serpetta fa segno che non gli piace affettato 'S. makes him a sign that he displeases her in this affected way'), cf. 3.5.16.4. 3.7.2. Echoes of such ethnic cliches appear even in philological and linguistic studies on diminutives. For example, Sieberer (1950: 90) attributes the limited role of diminutives in English to national differences, like, for example, English reticence to show emotions, which he claims is weaker in Scotland, where the use of diminutives is more common. The danger of hastily relating language and mind, in a sort of naive Völkerpsychologie

410

Diminutives

is implicitly criticized by Ettinger (1974 b: 67) when he underlines the subjectivism expressed in a university dissertation on Swiss German diminutives. Hasselrot (1957: 316) explicitly ironizes on and criticizes preconceptions about diminutives (for example, the notion that they should be related to poverty or to sentimentality of whole nations, etc.). Nevertheless, national cliches have clearly exerted some influence on the use of diminutives, as is shown in the case of French, where the reaction against the influence of Italian has resulted in a condemnation of Italian-style diminutives and in a decline of the use of diminutives in standard French. 392 These national cliches are confirmed in actual diminutive use of bilingual writers. For example, Voltaire used very few diminutives in French, but exaggerated the use of diminutives when writing Italian (cf. Folena 1983: 406, 410, 421, 429). 3.7.3. The turn against Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism in pragmatics 393 and against assuming only minor "culture-specific variations" in pragmatic strategies (for example, as claimed by Brown—Levinson 1987: 13, 15 for politeness theory) has again raised the perspective of relating languagespecific use of diminutives to national sociocultural characteristics. Wierzbicka (especially 1985, rewritten in 1991 chapter 2) is a very outspoken critic of ethnocentrism in general and she is, certainly, an innovator in dealing with diminutives in particular. Wierzbicka (1991: 50) claims: "The central place of warmth, of affection, in Slavic as well as in Mediterranean cultures is reflected, among other things, in the rich systems of expressive derivation, and in particular in the highly developed systems of diminutives" (cf. p. 121 on Polish emotionality, cordiality and use of diminutives), and, in her sub-chapter on cordiality as a cultural value (p. 50), she contrasts the English tabu against showing emotions. And what she says (p. 53) about the high "amount of touching, kissing and hugging, which visibly takes place among the Russians" is found to be apt for Mediterranean nations as well (cf. Rudolph 1990: 258; Sifianou 1992: 157). But the implied direct link between greater emotionality and richer inventories of diminutives would only hold if the meaning description of diminutives (in the inventory) contained a feature [+emotional]. Against this option we have argued extensively in this chapter (cf. 3.5.6, 3.5.12.8.5, 3.6.1.2). Similarly, the opposition between solidarity- and deference-oriented societies (cf. Kasper 1990: 195) should not be linked directly to the use vs. non-use of diminutives, particularly if Scollon-Scollon's (1983: 176) claim is accepted as correct that the British have a deference politeness

Sociocultural

conclusions

411

society, while the Americans have a solidarity politeness society. For there is no evident difference in the use of diminutives between British and American English. Caution is also called for in using Brown-Levinson's (1987: 230) distinction between positive- and negative-politeness cultures. 3.7.4. A more promising way is therefore Wierzbicka's (1991: 51) method for studying the interaction between diminutives and culture-specific illocutionary strategies. 394 Emotionality would reappear here as greater readiness to display emotionality in certain speech acts and in certain speech situations. For example, if we make the plausible assumptions (a) that emotionality is more easily displayed by native speakers of Italian than of German, and (b) that personal letters and postcards represent a text type adequate for displaying emotions (cf. 3.5.6), then the fact that diminutives in greetings of postcards (cf. 3.5.12.2.7) are used in Italian, but not in German, might be linked to sociocultural differences. Also Italian augmentatives are used in greetings on postcards (see 4.2.4.17), but diminutives (e.g., bac-ini) sound more intimate than augmentatives (e. g., baci-oni). The easy inspectability of open postcards may prevent the use of intimate diminutives, and this may be one of the reasons why the use of German diminutives is very limited (e.g., V. viele Buss-i-s). This shows the danger of hasty conclusions in sociocultural explanations. Let us take another example. If empirical research should confirm and specify the common impression that native speakers of Italian are more prone to show intimacy to their interlocutors than native speakers of German, then this difference would be a good candidate for explaining our observations that, in many situations, more familiarity between interlocutors is needed in German than in Italian for using diminutives (cf. cross-references in 3.6.2.2). Similarly, should empirical research confirm and specify the common impression that native speakers of Italian are more likely to joke and take things less seriously than native speakers of German, then this difference could explain the fact that diminutives are excluded from transactions and wishes in German, but not in Italian (cf. crossreferences in 3.6.2.2). Compare also the specific sociocultural rationale lying behind the differences in the use of diminutives in requests (cf. 3.5.10.4.1.1) and behind the avoidance of the diminutivum senile in Arabic (cf. 3.5.2.9).395 More problematic is the question of understatement. Wierzbicka states several times (1991: 44, 68, 163, 276, 280) that, and tries to explain why, "English is fond of understatement and hedges", whereas Poles and Italians "tend to overstate". This is paradoxical insofar as Italians exten-

412

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sively use diminutives for understatement (cf. 3.5.13) and for hedging in a large number of speech acts (cf. 3.5.10-3.5.12). The danger of making sweeping generalisations becomes apparent when one compares diminutive use in several languages and finds out that the complex interplay of sociocultural and pragmatic factors varies across languages in seemingly unpredictable ways. A case in point is Wierzbicka's (1990: 52) utterance by a Polish host who, typically, insists that the guests must stay longer: (434)

Ale jeszcze trosz-ecz-ke! Ale koniecznie! but still while-DIM-DIM but necessarily 'But stay still a little while! But you must!'

Correspondences in Viennese German and Italian vary, for example, in: (435)

Aber bleib' doch noch (a) eine Weile! (b) ein Weil-chen! but stay PART still a while a while-DIM (c) einen Augenblick! = Moment! a moment (d) ein Augenblick-erl! = Moment-erl! a moment-DIM 'But do stay still a (a) while! (b) little while! (c) another moment! (d) another little moment!'

(436)

Ma perch0 non rimani (a) un po' / (b) un poch-ino? Ε but why not you stay a bit a bit-DIM is presto! (c) un momento? / (d) un moment-ino? Almeno il early a moment a moment-DIM at least the tempo di un bicchier-ino! time of a glass-DIM 'But why don't you stay (a) a bit/(b) a little bit? It is early! (c) a moment?/(d) a little moment. At least for a little glass!'

In German, the diminutives (435 b, d) require more familiarity than the respective simplicia, and (d) is somewhat jocular. Familiarity and/or jocularity may or may not be present in Italian with (436 b, d), and even with (436 c) because the request to stay for a moment only may be just a way of being modest and even respectful of the addressee's precious time. 396 Of course, in all three languages, examples (434)—(436) could be offers or invitations rather than requests, in a context where the guest is clearly keen to stay but is afraid that (s)he might bother his/her host. In this

Sociocultural

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413

case, the diminutive could be used to mitigate the guest's scruples. In addition, it can make the offer more agreeable (cf. the empathetic reference to bicchier-ino) and more easily acceptable. In this interpretation, there seems to be no significant cross-cultural difference between the three languages, whereas there would be differences with Arabic. 3.7.5. Of course, we must not neglect personal (cf. Hasselrot 1957: 320) and social (cf. 3.1) differences. Let us illustrate this with the differentiation that sociologists (cf. Terestyeni 1992) make between the following three types of characters, viz. 1) contact-oriented, 2) status-oriented, and 3) task-oriented people, a differentiation based on their preference for "the connection-creating" or "the power-representative style of knowledge". One type of distinctive features are the criteria according to which people make friends, that is, they choose friends according to their social status (2) or common (e.g. professional) interests (3) or common personal experiences (1). Now it seems intuitively plausible that contactoriented people use more diminutives than status- or task-oriented ones. This would fit the feature [non-serious] that we have assumed for diminutives (3.4.4) and the favoring regulative factors of empathy, jocularity, emotionality, familiarity, intimacy (3.5.5-3.5.8). And even personal styles vary according to speaker's communicative agenda and speech situations (cf. Tannen 1984: 109, 129, 140). And since, in many societies, women seem to be more contact-oriented than men, we may arrive at a partial explanation of the greater use of diminutives by women than by men. 397 Other reasons are the greater exposition of women to the use of the diminutivum puerile (3.5.2) in many societies (cf. Hasselrot 1957: 318) and the frequent phenomenon that communities socialize women more than men to express emotions (cf. Wodak-Schulz 1986). For example, in Portuguese (Ettinger 1974a: 52), certain diminutivized greeting formulae such as estä boa-zinha 'are you well' are used only by women or towards women. This opens the prospect for a fruitful cooperation of synchronic and diachronic morphopragmatics with both theoretical and empirical sociopsycholinguistic research. The morphopragmatic study of diminutives also opens sociological and sociolinguistic prospects. Both within single nations and beyond them, there are relevant sociological differences which separate groups within a nation and unite them with similar groups in other nations. Let us take the sociological distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. George (1990: 89) demonstrated that requests must be made and formulated differently in Naples and in Great Britain or North America

414

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and she argued convincingly that such differences follow from sociological differences between a Gemeinschaft (e.g., Naples) and a Gesellschaft (e.g., Anglo-American societies). As a consequence, we would expect speech communities with different languages and different cultures to show similarities in performing requests (e.g., in favoring or disfavoring the use of diminutives), 398 provided that their social structures fall into the class of a Gemeinschaft. On the other hand, we should expect pragmatic regional differences within Italian, for example when comparing Naples (predominantly a Gemeinschaft) with Milan or Turin (predominantly a Gesellschaft). 3.7.6. If we can hope to explain in the perspective of 3.7.4—3.7.5, why language (or regiolect) A uses diminutives more than language (or regiolect) B, then this does not yet explain why A should have a richer paradigm of diminutives than B. We can close the explanatory chain in assuming that language communities which often use diminutives for many pragmatic effects are also prone to use, for the same pragmatic effects, devices that are not diminutives but have pragmatic meanings which are related to them, either metonymically or metaphorically or by ambiguity of interpretation. Such devices may then come to be reanalyzed as diminutives if this is structurally possible. In fact, many diminutive suffixes have an evident non-diminutive origin, for example many Italian diminutive suffixes go back to non-diminutive Latin suffixes (cf. Rohlfs 1954 [1969]). These well-known diachronic changes should now be reanalyzed in a pragmatic perspective, first with ongoing change (as we have suggested for the weak form little in 3.3.4), then in a philological-pragmatic analysis of historical documents, and finally in analogical reconstructions of prehistoric or other non-documented changes. Such studies must include investigation of diachronic replacements of non-morphological pragmatic devices (e. g., of hedging) by diminutives, that is, a substitutive type of morphologisation of pragmatics (different from the type delineated in 3.6.2.5) and the change from extragrammatical to grammatical morphopragmatics. Thus the enrichment of diminutive paradigms can be seen as an instance of Leo Spitzer's (1961) dictum "Nihil est in grammatica quod non fuerit antea in stilo" ('There is nothing in grammar which was not before in style'), where, now, we can reinterpret stilus (in the sense of style de parole and, diachronically later, of style de langue) as pragmatic patterns. A pragmatic perspective should also be added to the classical studies of dialect mixture which look into what suffix of a standard goes back to which dialects.

4.

The morphopragmatics of Italian intensification

GOVERNO GOVERN I NO 60VERN0NE

GOVERNISSIMO

government g.-DIM g.-AUGM g.-ELAT 'government' 'li'l government 'big government' 'super government'

'These are all fancies. I am the only real one here.' (La Repubblica, September 1991, see here 4.3.5.9 (596)).

13

4.1. Intensification in general 4.1.1. Introduction Since the main purpose of this chapter is to study the pragmatic effects of intensification, we will investigate only those Italian intensifying expressions that involve morphological rules as operations for intensifying, that is, the rules of augmentative formation (-one suffixation, 4.2) and elative formation (-issimo suffixation, 4.3), and - with a more marginal status - juxtapositional word reduplication (4.4). These are also the rules which exhibit the greatest amount of pragmatic effects. For this very reason, we have excluded the pragmatically less interesting morphological rules of prefixation via the prefixes stra- 'over-', arci- 'arch-', super-, etc. (cf. Rainer 1983 a: 52; Lepschy-Lepschy 1981: 103).

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And we have excluded, as morphopragmatically still less pertinent, the extended paradigm 399 of morphological intensification, which includes juxtapositional intensification via preposed ben, bei, gran (cf. Rainer 1983 a: 18, 26) and loose compounds of the type stanco morto = G. todmüde 'dead tired' (cf. Rainer 1983 a: 70). 4.1.2. Semantics of intensification We define intensification as increase in quantity or quality ("very/extremely X"). Related to increase in quality is increase in precision or accuracy ("really/properly X"). 400 First of all, intensification of intensifiable expressions (cf. van Os 1989: 2) must be distinguished from gradation, the syntactic and often also inflectional operation of forming categories such as comparatives and superlatives from (preferentially) adjectival bases (cf. Dressier 1986). This is easy in Italian, which (except for suppletive forms such as buono 'good'; bene 'well', comparatives migliore, meglio) has only analytic, that is, syntactic, gradation (via piu 'more'). Second 401 we must deal with the semantics of intensification. Van Os (1989: 23-31) models intensification on scales representing evaluative rank orders. In an example such as: (437)

lt. X e molto sposato G. X ist sehr verheiratet 'X is very married'

X is considered to possess some typical property or properties of married men to a high degree. According to Warren (1984: 99) and van Os (1987: 36), most descriptive adjectives are intensifiable, but no adjectives in classificatory or identificatory use nor quantifications. Expectedly, relational adjectives of the type stradale 'street-', in their proper use, are excluded from intensification, cf. Bierwisch (1987), Rainer (1983 a: 5, 56). Properties, both of intension and extension, can be intensified. This also holds for nouns (van Os 1989: 77), that is, "degree nouns" (e.g., nouns with some adjectival dimension) and all nouns that may occur in predicative function. In terms of degrees of intensification we may distinguish (cf. van Os 1989: 95; Rainer 1983 a: 4) means of intensification proper (in the sense of "very"), which signify either a high or the highest degree, and absolute

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completion ("totally, absolutely") vs. approximate completion ("nearly complete, as good as"), provided that the dimension concerned has an upper limit. 402 Italian has various function words, adverbs, adverbial expressions and adjectives which function as intensifiers (cf. Rainer 1983a: 10), e.g., molto 'much, very' (cf. Rainer 1983 a: 30); assai 'much, very'; bel(lo) 'nice'; ben(e) 'well'; gran(de) 'big'; troppo 'too, very'; tutto 'all'; assolutamente 'absolutely', etc. The choice among them depends on the degree of intensification, the dimension they refer to, syntactic restrictions and specific lexical restrictions of collocation (cf. Rainer 1990 b on Spanish). Prototypical bases to which the Italian rules of elative formation and juxtapositional reduplication apply are adjectives (and, to a lesser degree, adverbs). The reason is that adjectives represent the category whose semantics lends itself best to gradation. For the same reason, adjectives are also the prototypical base for comparative and superlative (cf. Dressier 1986). Morphological intensification of nouns is not prototypical. This asymmetry is, however, reversed with augmentatives. Intensification of verbs can be excluded from our investigation, since Italian has no morphopragmatic means for it. So much for denotative intensification. Nouns not admitting denotative intensification may, however, be intensified in respect to connotations present in the base (van Os 1989: 78). Or, vice-versa, connotations may result from intensification of the base (see 4.2.4.5). 4.1.3. Unmarked intensification vs. marked deintensification If we compare intensification (upgrading) with deintensification (downgrading), then we find that, generally, intensification is unmarked, deintensification marked. This is related to the asymmetry of signs referring to evaluative dimensions, whereby the positive pole of a dimension is unmarked, the negative pole marked. A summary of such asymmetries in English polar adjectives (with psycholinguistic evidence) can be found in Clark (1970). Compare Seller's (1991: 45) criterion of negative affixation, whereby, among many German polar adjectives, "only the unmarked, that is, the positive term can be so negated", e. g., un-schön 'unbeautiful' vs. *un-häßlich 'un-ugly', un-gut 'un-good' vs. *un-schlecht 'unbad'. Similarly, the marked but not the unmarked adjectives induce presuppositions in comparatives and superlatives (cf. Kiefer 1978: 147), as in A is uglier than B. C is more beautiful than D, where A and Β are presupposed to be ugly, whereas C and D are not presupposed to be beautiful.

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Seiler (1991: 53) also points out that "spatial opposites are not equipollent. Thus upward direction and location seems to be more differentiated than downward direction and location. ... all languages have designations for 'up', 'above' but not for 'down', 'below'. From this we would conclude that reflexes of upwards LOCATORS are unmarked, while reflexes of downwards LOCATORS are marked." And he rightly compares this asymmetry of direction with morphological and syntactic gradation, whereby comparatives, superlatives (and excessives, cf. Chapter 6) refer to the upward, positive direction, whereas the downward, negative direction is usually conveyed by more complex paraphrases, as in less/least goodlbig vs. better/best and bigg-er, bigg-est. Since intensification refers to the upward direction and deintensification to the downward direction, we expect intensification to be unmarked and deintensification marked. Evidence for this prediction comes from the asymmetrical distribution of upgraders and downgraders: A large number of languages have a function word expressing excessive intensification (unmarked), but do not have any word for excessive deintensification (marked), e.g., E. too, It. troppo, F. trop, Sp./Port. demasiado, Lat. nimis, G. zu, Dan. (allt) for, Swed. (alt)for, Norw. altfor, Croat, previse, suvise, Slovene prevec, Slovak prilis, Cz. prills, Pol. zbyt za, R. sliskom, cerescur, Gk. parapoly, hyperägan, AGk. ägan, Halen, Bret. re, Welsh rhy, gor-, Hung, tül, Turk, fazla, etc. Many languages differentiate, in the unmarked positive direction, "very" and "much" (albeit with different distributions, cf. Rainer 1990 b) but have no such differentiation in the marked negative direction (e. g., of (a) little), e.g., G. sehr— viel vs. wenig, Dutch zeer—veel vs. weinig, F. tres—beaucoup vs. peu, Sp. muy—mucho vs. poco, etc. Many languages have a simple function word expressing "enough" but no such ready-made short word for "(in)sufficient(ly)", e. g., G. genug, Dutch genoeg, Norw. nok, AGk. hälis, Lat. satis, Pol. dosic, F. assez, It. abbastanza, Sp./Port. bastante, Hung, eleg, etc. Notice also the intensifying expressions Lat. satis superque 'enough and more than enough', G. genug und übergenug, with no negative counterpart. Analogously, the Italian expression basta e stra-basta 'it is enough and more than enough' has no negative counterpart manca e *stra-manca 'it is not enough and it is more than not enough'. Similarly, there are the well-attested sayings vince e stra-vince 's/he wins and over-wins' and abbiamo vinto e stra-vinto 'we have won and over-won', whereas the potential opposite perde e stra-perde 's/he loses and over-loses' seems much less likely. And the phrase si loda e stra-loda tutto il tempo 'he praises and over-praises himself all the time' has no negative counterpart at all.

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Another asymmetry in prefixation occurs in German, with the antonymic prefixes über- 'over' and unter- 'under' when they have no local meaning: there are many more types and tokens of über- than of unterprefixations. There seems to exist a much greater number of intensifying formulae than deintensifying ones (cf. Sandig 1991: 239). Symptomatically, in describing intensification and deintensification, many linguists have found it necessary to distinguish more grades of intensification than of deintensification (see Rainer 1983 a: 3). This descriptive choice reflects greater semantic differentiation in the unmarked positive direction (upgrading) than in the marked negative direction (downgrading). Finally, there is also a textual basis for the unmarked character of intensifiers when compared with deintensifiers, see below 4.1.5.1. In accordance with this general asymmetry, elatives and juxtapositional reduplication go in the unmarked positive direction and have no equivalent in the marked negative direction. This (asymmetric) markedness relation is reversed in the pair diminutives vs. augmentatives, and not without motivation, as we will argue in 4.1.4.1, 4.2.2.1, 4.2.4.1, 4.2.4.7 and 4.5.1. Note further that morphological intensification is dispreferred with nominal bases, an asymmetry which is reversed in augmentative formation. 4.1.4. Pragmatics of intensification 4.1.4.1. Some authors neglect or play down the pragmatic aspects of intensification (e. g., van Os 1989: 31). But Atlas (1984) in fact concentrates on them, and specifically on the pragmatics of degree words. Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisa (1990) have developed a descriptive model of intensification in regard to the strength of illocutionary force (cf. 3.5.10.4). 403 Among the various dimensions of their model, two serve as a link between semantic and pragmatic intensification: 1) upgrading, in regard to quantity or quality, of the propositional content expressed in the illocutionary act; 2) upgrading of the determinacy of the propositional content, that is, of the claim to its precision. The other dimensions of upgrading are of a pragmatic nature only, relating to illocutionary force (I) or perlocutionary force (II): I) upgrading of expression of speaker's inner states, of speaker's entitlement (authorization, power, etc., cf. 3.5.10.4.3.1), of speaker's commitment, of obligations (including costs, cf. 3.5.10.4.3.2) assigned to the addressee; II) upgrading of the strength

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of the speaker's attempt to achieve the perlocutionary goal and intensifying of the risk of conflictual (negative) perlocutionary sequels. In her related study on modification of illocutionary strength, Caff! (1990: 181) notes that, for social and anthropological reasons, mitigation is more frequent than intensification, because mitigated subjectivity is less sanctionable than more categorically expressed subjectivity (cf. 3.4.6). Blum-Kulka—House—Kasper (1989: 285-286) distinguish, for requests, various types of intensification devices, with definitions which, unfortunately, are not linked to any theory of intensification or homogeneous classificatory scheme. Their characterisations run as follows: "upgraders are elements whose function is to increase the impact of the request" (does this refer to perlocution only?); intensifiers are said to be "adverbial modifiers used ... to intensify certain elements of the proposition of the utterance", e. g., terrible, frightful, as distinguished from "commitment indicators" (apparently only for intensification) and "lexical uptoners", characterized as "a marked lexical choice whereby an element of the proposition is given negative connotation" (why only negative?), etc. Blum-Kulka-House-Kasper's (1989) terms and methods can actually be transferred from requests to other types of speech acts, but Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) model is much more systematic and theoryguided and also includes selected indications about which morphological means might express which type of upgrading. Moreover downgrading of strength of illocutionary force is included as well, and that makes their model particularly fruitful for our comparison of the pragmatics of diminutives and augmentatives (cf. 3.4.6, 3.5.10—3.5.12, 4.2.4). Another principled way of dealing with the pragmatics of intensification is offered by Brown-Levinson's (1987) model of politeness strategies. The following positive politeness strategies are certainly relevant for pragmatic intensification: the strategy of exaggerating interest in/approval of/sympathy with the H(earer) (strategy 2); the strategy of intensifying H's interest (in the form of the speech act) (strategy 3); the strategy of joking (strategy 8); the strategy of giving gifts (like goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) to Η (strategy 15). Held's (1989; 1990: 421) maximization strategies of hyperbole, of using intensifiers and repetitions in requests become relevant. Also Brown—Levinson's (1987) following off-record strategies are relevant: strategy 5, inviting conversational implicatures by overstating; strategy 8, inviting implicatures by being ironic; strategy 13, violating the Manner Maxim by over-generalizing. Pragmatic intensification, however, also occurs when politeness is either irrelevant or not affected by intensifi-

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cation, as for example, in newspaper reports, literary descriptions, etc. In other cases of intensification, the politeness effects are rather secondary. Therefore Bazzanella-Caffi—Sbisä's (1990) model is of a more general applicability in covering the pragmatics of intensification. 4.1.4.2. By choosing and adapting Bazzanella-Caffi-Sbisä's (1990) model for the purpose of accounting for the pragmatic effects of intensification we need additional regulative factors. The regulative factors that we have used in our chapter on diminutives are relevant for intensification as well. An intensifying operation may be more or less favored for expressing jocularity (cf. 3.3.5), emotions (cf. 3.5.6), empathy and/or sympathy (cf. 3.5.7). It may be constrained by the presence or absence of familiarity, intimacy among interlocutors or by the degree of formality of the speech situation (cf. 3.5.8). Overstatement may be involved (cf. 3.5.13 on understatement and modesty). Here we want to discuss just one of the types of the regulative factors of intensification, viz. irony or sarcasm (cf. 3.5.14). If intensification is the means, the resulting irony is based on a clash between the meaning implied by the intensifier(s) and the actual value the referent appears to have in the speech situation. If one says A fine day, isn't it?, when in fact it is pouring, the clash is anchored onto the positive/negative polarity (fine vs. bad etc.) of the evaluation (of a day according to the weather). If it pours, the day is classified as very bad in many cultures and in default circumstances, and therefore it locates at a big distance from the positive description of a day as fine. More precisely, a polarity dimension can be seen as a scale having various degrees between the two poles. The larger the distance between the perceived reality and its description on the scale, the greater the resulting irony. This distance can be enlarged in both directions. For example, saying fine day when it is pouring, sounds more ironic than saying the same when it is just drizzling. For our discussion, it is more interesting, though, if the distance is increased by moving up the descriptive element (applied to the same referent) along the scale. This moving up along a scale is commonly called intensification, and Leech (1983: 143) is quite right in remarking: "The ironic force of a remark is often signalled by exaggeration." Irony can be achieved by an upward moving along a word-semantic scale, as in the following speech situation, where A complains about a light breeze with Β reacting ironically:

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(438) A: Che vento! what wind 'What a wind!' B: Euh, addirittura un tornado! wow even a tornado 'Sure, it's a real tornado!' An alternative way may be lexical addition as in: (438) a. Bj: Euh, un vento spaventoso! 'Sure, a fearsome wind!' Adjectives such as "awful, terrible, gorgeous" qualify as highly evaluating words, according to Zal?cki (1990). Note that the use of lexical variants such as: (438) b. B2: Euh, molto vento! / un vento forte! wow, much wind a wind strong 'Sure, it's very windy! Sure, a strong wind!' would not render the irony adequately, because the distance between the pertinent descriptive element and the referent sounds insufficient. A morphopragmatic element added would instead do the trick, as in (438 c), where Β adds the pejorative suffix -accio to the noun, or in (438 d), with the additional elative suffix -issimo: (438) c. Euh, un vent-accio! wow a wind-PEJ 'Sure, a nasty wind!' ά. Euh, (un vento) fort-issimo! wow a wind strong-ELAT 'Sure, a very strong wind' A simple account of irony based on the criterion of distance would lead to the two following claims: a) There must be a sufficient distance between the meaning of the descriptive element and the referent. It seems impossible, though, to quantify it in a non-ad hoc way. For our purpose, it is sufficient to state that all the intensifying means we describe produce an adequate distance.

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b) The greater the distance, the stronger the irony. Or in Zalgcki's words (1990: 125): "the strength of irony is proportional to the degree of evaluation implied in those items" (= "highly evaluating words"). This is true for both a word-semantic scale as in tornado vs. gale when ironizing on a breeze, and for qualifying adjectives as in a gorgeous day vs. a fine day when ironizing on a rainy day. Extending this argumentation to morphological means, we can confirm that prefixation by stra- 'over-' intensifies sarcasm in examples (439 a, c), which have the sense of (439 b, d): (439) a. Dio ti bene-dica! 'God bless you!' b. Dio ti male-dica! 'God damn you!' c. Dio ti stra-bene-dica! God ye over-bless 'May God bless you!' d. Dio ti stra-male-dica! God ye over-damn 'May God damn you!' Analogously, the addition of, e. g., the elative suffix -issimo or the augmentative suffix -one or (intensifying) reduplication can increase irony, as in (440), said of a skinny girl: (440) A: Grassa, eh? fat(FEM) eh 'Fat, huh?' B: Euh, grass-issima! wow fat-ELAT 'Really fat!' B': Una grass-ona! a fat-AUGM Ά real dumpling!' B": Grassa grassa! fat-fat Ά proper fatty!' It is less clear whether claim b) holds when we compare diminutives with augmentatives or other intensifiers, as (in the same speech situation):

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(441) A: Grass-ina, eh? fat-DIM eh Ά bit on the plump side, isn't she?' B: Oh, si, grass-ona. oh yes fat-AUGM O h yes, decidedly chubby.' B': Si, grassa grassa. yes fat-fat 'Yes, really chubby.' B": Si, grass-issima. yes fat-ELAT 'Fat as a house.' Since diminutives are, by definition, less intense than augmentatives or intensifying reduplications, Β and B' should be more ironic than A. But this is doubtful. The fact is that subtle irony (such as obtainable with diminutives) may be even more effective than blatant irony. On the other hand, it is impossible to reverse the dialogue into: (442) A: Grass-ona, eh? fat-AUGM eh 'Really fat, huh?' B: Si, si, grass-ina! yes yes fat-DIM 'Oh yes, on the fat side!' In order to agree with A on the irony, Β has to re-elaborate on it (cf. 4.1.5.3), and cooperative re-elaboration demands intensification. Thus the unidirectionality of the re-elaboration from diminutives to augmentatives fits the distance model. The distance model, however, does not work on finer scales, that is, when applied to small distances. Thus it is unclear which among the three intensifying devices of elatives, augmentatives and reduplication gives the greatest irony; at least, there is no general difference in the degree of irony among them, that is, one which would be constant in all speech situations where they occur. Still, in such dialogues the easiest arrangement is definitely the one having the elative as the second, as in: (443) A: Che grass-ona! what fat-AUGM 'What a chunky lady!'

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A': Grassa grassa, eh? fat-fat eh 'Very nicely upholstered, huh?' B: Grass-issima! fat-ELAT 'There's plenty of her!' This points to the elative as being the most distant on the scale. Second, if we compare the polar diminutive suffix -ino with the less polar -etto (cf. 3.4.1.4), we cannot find a difference in irony, as in: (444) A: Grass-ina, eh? fat-DIM eh 'Plumpish, isn't she?' A': Grass-etta, eh? fat-DIM eh (said of the same skinny girl) although A' should be more distant from "skinny" than A. But, again, subtlety may be more effective. For other aspects of irony, cf. 3.5.14. 4.1.4.3. If we distinguish between semantics and pragmatics according to the arguments provided in 1.2, we can distinguish primary pragmatic effects that are independent of semantics, from secondary pragmatic effects depending on semantics. 404 This holds also for intensification. Let us start with irony. If the distance criterion of irony holds (cf. 4.1.4.2), that is, if a pragmatic effect of irony is based on distance between the semantics of the referent and the morphosemantics of elatives, augmentatives and reduplication, and if we assume that semantic intensification via elatives is stronger than via its competitors, then irony expressed via elatives should be stronger than irony expressed via its competitors. In other words, greater semantic distance should induce in the hearer an implicature of greater irony. If this were the whole story, intensification of irony would be nothing else than a secondary pragmatic effect of semantic intensification. 405 Therefore in comparing ironic effects of comparable morphological rules, we must ask: whether the same degree of semantic intensification has the same effect on intensity of irony; whether a higher degree of semantic intensification results in greater irony; whether any other morphosemantic property, specific to a given rule, affects the degree of irony, etc. If

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any general ironic effect (that is, any effect not depending on specific lexical bases or collocations or syntactic structures) cannot be explained in this way, then we must assume an autonomous pragmatic specification assigned to a morphological rule, which is to say that we enter the domain of morphopragmatics in the narrow sense. We may support analogous arguments for the regulative factor of emotion (cf. 3.5.6): if Volek (1987: 180) is correct in claiming that Russian augmentatives "base their emotive component, which they carry regularly, on a quantitative component", then we would simply have to assign alteratives a (semantic) emotive meaning and augmentatives an additional semantic meaning [big]. If, however, one of the three Italian rules studied in this chapter is in general better suited to the expression of emotions, and in a way which cannot be derived from a difference in semantic meaning, then we must assign this rule an appropriate pragmatic specification. The same type of argumentation is valid for the other regulative factors. Analogously, we have to ask whether a rule carries a constant semantic connotation or whether connotations deppnd on specific lexical bases or specific contexts (cf. 3.4.6.6-3.4.6.9). As we have seen with diminutives (3.5.2—3.5.4), specific speech situations may greatly favor or disfavor the use of a morphological rule, and this has to be explained through the typical constellation of pragmatic factors obtaining in these speech situations. Finally we have to investigate whether and how stylistic effects exploit semantic or pragmatic specifications of a rule (cf. 3.5.16), cf. also 4.1.5.3. 4.1.5. Textual functions of intensification Here we are going to discuss two topics, viz. the basic textual role of intensification (4.1.5.1) and the sequencing of intensifiers (4.1.5.24.1.5.4). 4.1.5.1. Two standards of textuality, viz. intentionality and informativity, the regulative principle of effectiveness (cf. 1.3), and the semiotic principle of figure and ground (cf. 1.4) refer to non-monotonous planning of discourse and explain why text producers foreground material which is more relevant to them and background material which is less relevant. Intensifiers are efficient means of foregrounding relevant concepts (cf. Zellermayer 1991 and Dorfmüller-Karpusa 1990 with references; van Dijk 1984: 52). Since the most efficient means of backgrounding is to simply omit or reduce material, we have a cognitive explanation for the

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reason why intensifiers are unmarked, deintensifiers marked (cf. 4.1.3). What is worth foregrounding is decided by the speaker's evaluation (cf. Sandig 1979: 147). And studies on evaluation have also shown that intensifiers are more frequent than deintensifiers, 406 and this supports the unmarked status of intensifiers. 4.1.5.2. Passing over to sequential order, we may say that augmentatives and elatives (and potentially reduplications), like diminutives (cf. 3.5.15.1), follow adjacent simplicia in sequences, cf. also ricchi e straricchi 'rich and super-rich people'. This ordering of a marked term after the corresponding unmarked one (cf. Gil 1989 on freezes) can be pragmatically exploited. This ordering constraint is only marginally of a textual nature. 4.1.5.3. But the same constraint applies as a default to re-elaborations as involved in reactive, conditional and discourse-organizing speech acts (cf. 3.5.15). This is a text-pragmatic function of intensification rules. A second aspect of their pragmatic relevance is the fact that they depend on relevant contextual factors of the pragmatics of the cotext. When we ascribe a meaning of intensification to an expression such as donna donna 'woman-woman' or giovan-issimo 'young-ELAT', we limit ourselves to the area of morphosemantics. We enter morphopragmatics when we can relate the elative formation to typical pragmatic functions present in the cotext. We particularly refer to re-elaborations in rebuttals, agreements or corrections. Such re-elaborations produce a reinterpretation or pragmatic reloading of previous utterances by same speakers or their interlocutors. Within Gülich-Kotschi's (1987) model of reformulation, we may refer to the following of their categories and subcategories: a) correction (maintaining the type of speech act); b) evaluative reformulation, e.g., by adding a connotation or by changing style or speaker's attitude, via emotional upgrading or empathetic reloading (cf. 3.5.15.3) or via ironic re-elaboration (see above 4.1.3 and cf. 3.5.15.4); c) expansion; d) specification. A third pragmatic aspect involved (either obligatorily or optionally) is interactional cooperativeness (cf. Pomerantz 1984; Merlini Barbaresi 1989), here meant as (a sharing of attitudes and) willingness to make autonomous contributions to the felicitous outcome of the discourse event. A fourth pragmatic aspect, which may be involved in re-elaborations, is the antagonism of "dueling" interlocutors (cf. 1.5.3). In such duels, "each participant turn should take the form of a novel utterance, yet one strictly patterned on the model of the previous discourse in the duel

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environment" (McDowell 1985: 204). In weakened form, this is a valid option for any dispute, quarrel or refusal. Here, intensification may help the speaker to outdo the antagonist. Because of this role of intensifiers, they are more often used in reelaborations than are diminutives (cf. 3.5.15.7). 4.1.5.4. Finally we come to stylistic exploitation of the semantics and pragmatics of intensification. Directly linked to our preceding topics of sequencing (4.1.5.1) and re-elaboration (4.1.5.2) is the rhetorical figure of climax (amplificatio), a type of overstatement (Norick 1982).407 An example of a mini-climax with the Italian intensifying prefix super- is, in a conversation about the coast of the Tyrrhenian Sea (analysed by Castelfranchi-Parisi 1980: 434): (445)

e una Riviera esposta a mezzogiorno, e protetta is a coast exposed to south and protected dalle colline che stanno alle spalle, no? ... che by the hills that stay at the shoulders no that proteggono dai vend settentrionali ... Poi, il Golf ο protect from the winds northern then the gulf di La Spezia, e ancora una situazione di questo tipo. ... Per of La Spezia is again a situation of this type for cui... e, e superprotetta. which is is superprotected 'a coast facing south, sheltered by the hills behind, isn't it? ... (hills) that shelter it from the north wind ... then the gulf of Spezia is another position of the same type ... and so ... it's doubly sheltered.'

Since "literary communication ... is marked mainly by devices of foregrounding" (van Peer 1984: 304), the use of the foregrounding device of intensification in literary styles offers scope for other interesting exploitations (cf. 3.5.16, 4.1.4.3, 4.2.5.2).

4.2. Augmentatives in -one 4.2.1. History of research The earlier history of research is well documented in Ettinger (1974 a, b). Nearly all the studies cited there only deal with the morphotactics or

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morphosemantics of augmentatives but hardly any with their morphopragmatics. A notable exception is Gaarder's (1966) analysis of Spanish augmentatives, in which, in addition to the denotative meaning of augmentation, connotative elements are taken into consideration, such as, for example, positive appreciation, speaker's feeling of superiority, euphemism, irony, endearment and devaluation, that is, concepts which may be viewed as pertaining to pragmatics. Ettinger himself assumes (1974 a: 76) that on the level of the language system (Saussure's langue) augmentatives only have the denotative meaning of enlargement, and he assigns their pragmatics to performance (parole) and considers it to be entirely derivable from their semantics ("enlargement"). 408 Among the studies that appeared after Ettinger's reviews (1974 a, b), Lang (1990) considers Spanish augmentatives to be primarily emotive, "with implications of large size, ugliness and impressiveness", cf. Faitelson-Weiser (1980: 88, 202). Vigara Tauste (1992: 170) deals with the intensifying function of Spanish augmentatives. Menäs (1978) concentrates on the morphotactics of Standard and dialectal Modern Greek augmentatives (and intensification in general). Klimaszewska (1983: 101 — 106) differentiates for Polish, on the level of langue, denotative enlargement of the -sko suffix and of back-formation (cf. 4.2.6) from expressivity of all other suffixes, although she considers all devices to be emotional and admits (p. 102) that the above distinctions do not actually clearly appear in performance; thus also the -sfcö-suffix, depending on context, may express pity, depreciation, contempt, love. Of all the augmentatives it is said that they are rather pejorative, but (p. 106) may be meliorative in certain special situations. Wierzbicka (1984: 125), in analogy with her studies on diminutives (cf. 3.2.5), describes the Polish augmentative and pejorative suffix -uch on a morphosemantic level and ascribes it the following meaning "I can say that I think of you as of someone big and that I feel bad feelings towards you as one does towards something big." Grabias (1981) decribes Polish augmentatives as expressive signs which have both semantic and pragmatic functions (= meanings, in our terminology), where pragmatics refers to emotionality, evaluation, and social indexicality (cf. 1.8.6, 1.10.3). In her analysis of emotive signs, Volek (1987: 180-185, 243) also considers Russian augmentatives, which are said (p. 180) to "base their emotive component, which they carry regularly, on a quantitative component as well. The only difference [sc. from diminutives] is that it is a compo-

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nent of large, rather than small, quantity." Although this seems to fit Ultan's (1978: 547) remark "Augmentatives ... may have pejorative, but never hypocoristic, connotations", one has to keep in mind that Ultan's generalisation is based on very few languages and that he himself cites a counterexample. 409 For a critique of the emotionalist approach, as applied to diminutives, see 1.8, 3.5.6, 3.5.12.5. In their dictionary of Italian alteratives (c. 3.2.6), Alberti et al. (1991), along with diminutives, also provide a useful collection of Italian augmentatives. 4.2.2. Structural properties of Italian augmentatives 4.2.2.1. Whereas there is a universal sound-iconic preference for the phonological features [high], [front] to index diminutive formation (cf. 3.3.1, 3.3.2.4), a preference for the contrasting features [low], [back] is much less evident in augmentative formation (cf. Ultan 1978: 555, pace Mayerthaler 1981: 102). Note the opposition in Basque, where diminutive formation via palatalization (a backgrounding or lenition process) corresponds to augmentative formation via affrication of sibilants (cf. Azkue 1969: 195), that is, via a phonological foregrounding or fortition process. The opposition between the Italian augmentative suffix -on- and the most important diminutive suffix -in- is concordant with universal preferences. It is a unanimous (explicit or implicit) assumption that augmentatives represent a marked category opposed to the unmarked category of diminutives. First of all, a crosslinguistic implication is assumed whereby the presence of augmentatives in the inventory of morphological rules of any language implies the presence of diminutives in the same language, but not vice versa. Haas (1972: 148) generalizes over many languages and states that "the presence of an augmentative implies the presence of a diminutive but not vice-versa" (cf. Schneider 1991 b: 239), and Greenberg (1966 b: 82) generalizes that diminutives are less marked than augmentatives (and simplicia least marked). Hasselrot (1957: 314) states more cautiously that universally there are more diminutives than augmentatives (cf. also Ultan 1978: 555). Furthermore, if a language has both augmentatives and diminutives, "augmentatives occur much more rarely than diminutives" (Volek 1987: 180, for Russian; cf. Klimaszewska 1983: 77, 102, for Polish). The documentation in Alberti et al. (1991) shows a much higher type frequency of diminutives, and, in accordance, our own corpus exhibits a much higher token frequency.

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All languages that have rules of diminutive and augmentative formation have more rules of diminutive formation, e. g., have more diminutive than augmentative suffixes (cf. Spitzer 1961: 1.93, for Romance languages). This threefold evidence for markedness of augmentatives as opposed to diminutives obliges us to assume markedness reversal in relation to the general unmarkedness of intensification vs. deintensification. The condition of markedness reversal is pragmatic (cf. 3.4.6; cf. Caffi 1990: 181). Productivity of augmentatives, however, is high, as shown by derivations from recent loans such as golf-one (