Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era) [1 ed.] 0275992675, 9780275992675, 9780313086359
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MODERN WARFARE: A French View of Counterinsurgency
Roger Trinquier
Praeger Security International
ModernWarfare
PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice DavidGalula CommunistRevolutionaryWarfare:FromtheVietminhtotheVietCong GeorgeK.Tanham ModernWarfare:AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency RogerTrinquier Counter-GuerrillaOperations:ThePhilippineExperience NapoleanD.ValerianoandCharlesT.R.Bohannan
MODERNWARFARE AFrenchViewofCounterinsurgency
RogerTrinquier TranslatedfromtheFrenchbyDanielLee WithanIntroductionbyBernardB.Fall ForewordbyEliotA.Cohen
PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra
PraegerSecurityInternational Westport,Connecticut•London
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Trinquier,Roger. Modernwarfare:aFrenchviewofcounterinsurgency/RogerTrinquier;Translated fromtheFrenchbyDanielLee;WithanintroductionbyBernardB.Fall;Forewordby EliotA.Cohen. p.cm.—(PSIClassicsoftheCounterinsurgencyEra) Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0–275–99267–5(alk.paper)–ISBN0–275–99268–3(pbk:alk.paper) 1.Tactics2.Guerrillawarfare3.Subversiveactivities4.France—DefensesI.Title II.Series UA700.T7131964 355 64013363 BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable. Copyright©1964,2006byPraegerSecurityInternational Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher. LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:64013363 ISBN:0–275–99267–5 0–275–99268–3(pbk.) FirstpublishedinFrancein1961underthetitleLaGuerreModerne byEditionsdelaTableRonde PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881 AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc. www.praeger.com PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Foreword byEliotA.Cohen
vii
Introduction:APortraitofthe“Centurion”byBernardB.Fall
xi
PARTONE.PREPARATIONFORWAR
1
1. TheNeedtoAdaptOurMilitaryApparatusto ModernWarfare
3
2. ModernWarfareDefined
5
3. AnExampleofaClandestineWarfareOrganization
9
4. Terrorism—ThePrincipalWeaponofModernWarfare
15
5. IdentifyingtheAdversary
23
6. DefenseoftheTerritory
27
PARTTWO.THEPOLITICALANDMILITARYCONDUCT OFTHEWAR
35
7. DirectActiononthePopulationsofCities
37
8. ErrorsinFightingtheGuerrilla
45
9. TheProblemofResources
51
10. ConductingCounterguerrillaOperations
57
vi
CONTENTS
PARTTHREE.CARRYINGTHEWARTOTHEENEMY
75
11. TheInadequaciesofTraditionalWarfare
77
12. ModernWarfareinEnemyTerritory
83
Conclusion
89
Index
91
FOREWORD
World War II divided the French military and the experience of bitter conflictsinIndochinaandAlgeriadidsoagain—culminatinginonesuccessful and one unsuccessful revolt by the military against the government.RogerTrinquierwasnoGaullist:anofficerinthecolonialinfantry, hespentthewarfirstdefendingtheFrenchconcessioninShanghaiand theninIndochinaundertheJapaneseoccupation.Yetalthoughhemissed fighting with the Free French in North Africa and Europe or with the maquis,hesawplentyofactionduringtherestofhiscareer.Followinghis internmentbytheJapanesein1945,hecontinuedtoserveinIndochina andtheninAlgeria. HeledcounterguerrillaunitsagainsttheVietMinh,includingthousands ofmontagnardtribesmenintheclimacticbattleofDienBienPhu;narrowly escapingbeingpurgedasaVichysympathizer,herotatedbetweentraining assignmentsinFranceanddutyasaparatrooperinAlgeria,includingwith the10thParachuteDivisionunderGeneralJacquesMassuduringtheBattle ofAlgiersin1957.HecommandedaregimentontheTunisianborderand afterthat,luckilyforhim,wasinGreecedrawingupplansforoperationsin theCongowhenhisfriendsandformersuperiorslaunchedanabortivecoup against President Charles de Gaulle in 1961. But his days of soldiering wereover,andamoderatelysuccessfulyearsasawriterbegan. ModernWarfareisthebookwhichmadehismarkamongEnglishspeakingreaders,anddeservedlyso.Itistheproductofagreatdealofexperiencewithcounterinsurgencyoperations.Indeed,itisworthnotingthatin overathirty-yearcareerinthearmyhespentallofitengagedinirregular
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warfare.Promotionwasnotrapid:sixteenyearsafterreceivinghiscommissionhewasadeputybattalioncommanderinIndochina;andatitsend he was only a regimental commander. But like many of his peers, he acquiredararedepthofexperienceandperhapssomethingmore:theperspectivethatcomestothosewhohavewagedwarintwodistinctpolitical eras.Muchoftheinterestinthisbookcomesfromhisrealizationthatthe pettywaragainstbanditsandrebelsofthepre-1939periodhadchanged foreverasaresultofWorldWarII. ForTrinquier,theenemy—herereferringprimarilytotheAlgerianinsurgents—meansanationalisttotalitariantype,utterlydifferentfromindigenousenemiesofearlieryears.Whatthenewinsurgentbringstowarisnot merely ideological zeal or deep felt resentment, but technique and discipline.Trinquiermakesdissectionofthattechniquehispointofdeparture. Hisaccountofbomb-makingcells,compartmentalizedhierarchies,andhow theuseterrorremainasvalidastheywerehalfacenturyago.Indeed,in somerespectstheAlgerianinsurgents,andearliertheirVietnamesecounterparts,weremoresophisticatedthansomeofthegroupsactivetoday. TheFrenchtheoristsofrevolutionarywar,Trinquieramongthem,saw thesestrugglesasacontestforthepoliticalmobilizationofanormallyinert populace.FamiliarwiththeworkofcommunistmovementsinEurope,they understoodtheroleoffrontorganizations,andassignedimportancetotrade unionsandteachers,amongothers,aswellastheestablishmentofsocial institutions that would gradually erode legitimacy and efficacy from the government.Aparallelinsurgentleadershipthatwouldundobynightwhat theauthoritiescoulddidindaylight.Thebattlefieldswerewebsofsocial life,andnotjustalongjungletrailsordriedriverbeds. ForthisenemyTrinquierhasthecoldrespectofaprofessionalwarrior.He describesanenemywhoisdeeplycommittedtohiscause,andingeniousin itspursuit.Oneknows,withoutbeingawareofTrinquier’scombatrecord, thathewouldprobablygivelittlequartertoanenemywhomhecouldnot turnorexploitinsomeotherway.Butthereisnoculturalcondescensionhere, noranythingbutrespectforthecourageofthoseheiscommittedtofight. WhatofTrinquier’stechnique?Thebookhasgainedsomenotorietyfor thepassageinwhichhediscusses,obliquelybutclearlyenough,theuseof torture.Theterrorist“claimsthesamehonors[asthesoldier]whilerejectingthesameobligations.”Buttheforcesoforder,Trinquierinsists,cannot treat the captured terrorist as a criminal (who acts not out of personal motivesorgreed)norasasoldier.Hemustbequicklyinterrogatedand,in severalchillinglines,theauthordescribeswhatensues: No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not,
FOREWORD
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specialistsmustforcehissecretfromhim.Then,asasoldier,hemustfacethe suffering,andperhapsthedeath,hehasheretoforemanagedtoavoid.Theterroristmustacceptthisasaconditioninherentinhistradeandinthemethodsof warfarethat,withfullknowledge,hissuperiorsandhehimselfhavechosen.
Unsurprisingly,thisandsimilarpassageshavegivenTrinquierareputation for justifying the use of torture. There is much to criticize: he doesnotreflectonwhatusingsuchmethodsdotothosewhoinflictas wellasthosewhoundergotorturenorconsiderthedoubtfulvalidityof informationextractedunderphysicalduress.Heassumestorturecanbe appliedclinicallyandwithrestraint,andheseemsoblivioustothepoliticaldamagedonebywidespreaduseofthesemeans.Perhapsthebest thatwhatcansaidisthatheconsiders—albeitnotthoroughly—ahorribleissue. Ontheotherhand,Trinquierisquicktoaddthatafterinterrogationterrorists should be treated like normal prisoners of war, and he compares moderninsurgentstomembersoftheFrenchresistanceacceptingtherisks offightingtheGermansoutsidethelawsofwar,tacitlycedingconsiderablemoralstaturetoinsurgents.Herepeatedlyinsistsontheimportanceof treatingthepopulationwhoconstitutethebattlegroundofirregularwarfarewithconsiderationandrespect.Andperhapsmostimportantlyofall, physicalcoercionisquiteclearlyonlyapartofwhathethinkscounterinsurgencyisallabout. Indeed,Trinquier’sjustificationoftorturehascausedmuchofwhatis valuableoratleastinterestingaboutthisbooktobeignored—inparticular hisdiscussionoftheneedforwhattodayiscalledclear-and-holdoperations,forcountermobilizationofthelocalpopulationtoconductespionage as well as resistance, for the comparison of counterinsurgency in urban andruralenvironments.Onallthesepointsheisinstructive,andonecan onlywishthat,forexample,AmericancommandersgoingtoIraqwould haveunderstoodashedidtheimportanceofsuchmeasuresastheuseof nationalidentitycardsor,conversely,thefutilityofsuchmeasuresaslargescalesweepsthroughinsurgentareas,inaccurateaerialbombing,orhunkering down in fortified bases separated from the population they are seekingtoprotect. Modern Warfare is not a detached treatise—or rather only in part. It boldly challenged complacent senior military leaders who the author believeddidnotfullyunderstandthethreat.Trinquier’sindictmentofthe Frencharmyissevere:hebelievesthatconventionalsoldiersareuninterestedanduninformedaboutaformofwarfareinwhichtacticalproblems arelimited,inwhichforceisasmallproportionofeffectiveaction,andin whichlocalpoliticalconsiderationsplaythedominantrole.Heandother
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French officers with similar experience knew how costly such attitudes couldprove. The U.S. military, both wrongly and unprofessionally, expressed contempttowardtheirFrenchcounterpartsinthe1950sand1960s.TheythemselvesstumblednolessbadlyonmanyofthesamebattlefieldsinSoutheast Asia.Americansturnedasidefromthinkingaboutthiskindofconflictafter Vietnam,preparingforthewartheypreferred—massive,violent,andutterly conventional. For them, and not only for his own comrades,Trinquier’s finalwarningbearsreflection:“Thenationdoesnotaskthearmytodefine problems,buttowinthewaritisengagedin.”Hispaththroughthecounterinsurgencyeramaynotbeours,butthisconcentratedreflectiononhis travelsandthoseofhiscomradesarewellworthreading. EliotA.Cohen May2006
EliotA. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies in the Paul H.NitzeSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudiesattheJohnsHopkinsUniversityandtheauthorofSupremeCommand:Soldiers,Statesmen,andLeadershipin Wartime.
INTRODUCTION:APORTRAIT OFTHE“CENTURION”
InabookthatbecameoneofFrance’sgreatestbestsellerssinceWorld WarII,JeanLartéguygavethenameof“centurion”tothehard-bitten French regular who had survived the Indochina war, had learned his MaoTse-tungthehardway,andlaterhadsoughttoapplyhislessons inAlgeriaoreveninmainlandFrance.1 Ofthatcenturion—asthereadernodoubtknows,thiswasthetitleof the company commanders who formed the backbone of the Roman Legions—Lartéguysays:“Ishallalwaysfeelattachedtothosemen,even if I should ever disagree with the course they choose to follow, [and] dedicatethisbooktothememoryofallthecenturionswhoperishedso thatRomemightsurvive.” Rome,ofcourse,didnotsurviveinitsancientsplendorinspiteofthe incrediblesacrificesofthecenturions,nordidFrancesurviveasaworldwideempire.ButinthecaseofFrance,thecenturionexistsasalivehuman being;rightatthismoment,heiseitheremergingfromcolonelcytogeneral’s rank, or being placed on the compulsory retirement list—or, perhaps,beingsentencedtothejailsoftheFrenchRepublicforSecretArmy activities.Foratleastanotherdecade,heandhiskindarelikelytoexerta stronginfluenceuponFrenchmilitarythinkingandplanningand,therefore,upontheWesternallianceasawhole. The French Army officer, to a far greater extent than his BritishAmericancounterpart,hasspentthelastquarterofacenturyfightingdesperaterear-guardactionsagainsthighlypoliticizedirregulars.Inaddition, thelackofcoherentpoliticalleadershipfromParisinthechaoticyears
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of theFourthRepubliclefttheFrenchmilitarywithaheavyburdenof makingpoliticaldecisionsateverylevel.Localcommanders,forexample,hadtomakethedecisionwhetherornottoarmlocalleviesandifso, of what political or religious persuasion. In Indochina, such officers— often of captain’s rank or lower—raised Catholic, Buddhist, Cao-Dai, Hoa-Hao, or mountain tribal militia forces whenever they did not use outrightriverpiratesordesertersfromtheCommunists.Inreturnforsuch militaryassistancebythenatives,thoseofficersundertookpoliticalcommitments of a far-reaching nature:They swore solemn oaths to protect eitheragivengroupfromCommunistreprisalsoragiventerritorywhose populationhadcommitteditselftothem.Fromapurelytacticalinvolvement,thewar(bothinIndochinaandAlgeria,butevenmoreinthelatter) becameahighlypersonalinvolvement.Anofficerwhowould,undernormalcircumstances,haveabandonedagivenpositionfortacticalreasons feltcompelledtoholditbecausehehimselfhad“promised”toholdit—and promisednothisownsuperiors,butthepeopleamongwhomhefought. To withdraw became not only proof of military failure, but—and this aboveall—ablemishonone’spersonalhonorasan“officerandagentleman.” To the Anglo-American mind, which sees its officers as Colonel BlimpsandGeneralJubilationT.Cornpones(ortheirreal-lifecounterparts oftheretiredextremeright-wingvariety),thisviewofwarseemsinconceivable.And it is, of course, inconceivable in conventional war, where it is perfectlypermissibletoloseorwinaterrainfeaturewithoutlosingone’s militaryhonor.The“Ishallreturn”ofGeneralMacArthuramplyredeemed thesurrenderofCorregidor;theInchonlanding,thebloodyretreattoPusan beachhead.Butinsuchconventionalwars(Trinquiercallsthem“traditional,” toemphasizetheirobsoleteness),militaryoperationsgoonwithoutregard forthehaplesscivilianpopulation.Nooneasksittotakesidesinthestruggle—atanyrate,notatfirst,whilethebattlerages. Inrevolutionarywar(or,asTrinquiercallsitthroughoutthebook,italicizing thetermforemphasis,“modernwarfare”),theallegianceofthecivilianpopulationbecomesoneofthemostvitalobjectivesofthewholestruggle.Thisis indeedthekeymessagethatTrinquierseekstoimpressuponhisreader:Militarytacticsandhardwareareallwellandgood,buttheyarereallyquiteuseless ifonehaslosttheconfidenceofthepopulationamongwhomoneisfighting. AndRogerTrinquierisextremelywellqualifiedtowriteonthissubject, for his own background makes him the perfect example of the scholarly warriorofpeasantstockthatisavanishingbreedintheotherWesternarmies. (Inalllikelihood,CommunistChina’sarmiesstillhaveafewintheirranks, not the least of whom is Mao Tse-tung.) Trinquier was born in 1908 in La Beaume, a small mountain village in the FrenchAlps where he still ownsahomeandspendshisvacations.Untiltheageofthirteen,hewent
INTRODUCTION
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totheone-roomvillageschool.Becausehewasabrightstudent,hisparentsdirectedhimtowardwhatwasthenthemostobviouspathtosocial bettermentforthesonofapoorfarmer—schoolteaching.Hesuccessfully passedtheentranceexaminationstotheNormalSchoolofAix-en-Provence andgraduatedattheageoftwenty,readyforalifetimeofteachinginthe backcountryofsoutheasternFrance. ButlikeallotherFrenchmenhisage,hefirsthadtoputinhistwoyearsof compulsorymilitaryservice.SinceitisstillaFrenchsayingthattheschoolteachersmakeupthebackboneoftheFrenchArmy’sreserveofficers’corps, itwasnotsurprisingthatTrinquierwassenttoReserveOfficers’School. Although most schoolteachers consider their military career a necessary evil, Trinquier thought it a revelation of a vaster, more active world. He requestedatransfertotheOfficers’SchoolofSaint-Maixent,thengraduated,in1931,intotheFrenchMarineInfantry;andsincetheFrenchMarines (theywereknownas“Colonials”from1870until1961,buthavenowtaken on their old name again) were specifically trained for overseas duty, the younglieutenantsoonfoundhimselfonatriptotheFarEast. His first assignment, as was the rule then, was probably his toughest: HefoundhimselfincommandofanoutpostatChi-Ma,inthewildestand most isolated part of the Sino-Tonkinese border region, aptly called the “OneHundredThousandMountains,”fightingChinesepiratesandopium smugglers.Tostayalivethere,onehadtorelyonnativehelp,andTrinquier quicklylearnedhowtofindit.Healsolearnedsomeofthemountaineer dialects.UponhisreturntoFrancein1937,hewaspickedforanotherdelicate assignment, as a member of the French Marine force guarding the InternationalConcessioninShanghai,whereJapan’saggressionhadjust unleashedWorldWarII.Trinquierwasthenreassignedtothecommandof oneofthetwoMarinecompaniesguardingtheFrenchEmbassyinPeking. Othermajorpowers—theUnitedStates,Britain,Italy,andJapan—alsohad units in the diplomatic enclave.Trinquier became very friendly with the Americancommander,ColonelMarstone,andhealsolearnedChinese. WhenWorldWarIIofficiallybrokeoutinEurope,inSeptember,1939, TrinquierwastransferredbacktoShanghaiasdeputytotheFrenchbattalioncommanderthere.PearlHarboranditsaftermathcreatedananomalous situation:AlthoughtheBritishandAmericanunitsinShanghaiweredisarmedandinternedbytheJapanese,theFrench—becausetheywereunder thenominalcontroloftheVichyGovernmentinGerman-occupiedFrance— wereleftunmolestedandfullyarmed.TheJapanese,however,didnottrust theVichyforcesindefinitely;havingoverwhelmedtheminIndochina,on March9,1945,theydidlikewiseinShanghaionthefollowingday,whereuponTrinquiergotatasteofJapaneseimprisonment.(Theexistenceofthe FrenchunitsinChinawastolead,inatleastoneinstance,toarathercomi-
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INTRODUCTION
calsituationafterV-JDay:WhenAmericanMarinesinfullbattlegearwent ashore nearTientsin, they were greeted by a French Marine detachment thatpresentedarmstothem.ItwaspartofthenearbyPekinggarrisonthat hadpickedupitsweaponsagainaftertheJapanesesurrender.) Promoted to the rank of captain in 1942 by the Vichy Government, Trinquier, like most of his comrades in neighboring Indochina, neither broke with Vichy nor sought to join General de Gaulle’s Free French Forces—afactthatwaslatertoaffecthiscareerdecisively.Hispromotions weretocomeslowly,andthemutualdistrust(moreoften,dislike)between theFreeFrenchofficersandthosewho,thoughsympathetictotheAllied cause, had remained faithful to their soldier’s oath—or so they were to rationalizeit—neverquitedisappeared.ItexplainsTrinquier’sstronganimosity toward de Gaulle, which he does not bother to hide and which comesthroughquiteclearlyinhispoliticalstatements. LiberatedfromtheJapaneseafterV-JDay,Trinquier,likemanyofhis comrades,soughtanassignmentinIndochina—perhapsasademonstration thathiswartimeallegiancewasdictatedbymotivesotherthanfearofbattle. ArrivinginSaigononJanuary3,1946,hebecameaplatooncommanderin thecommandogroupofMajorPonchardier,whichhadbeengiventhedifficulttaskofclearingVietminhelementsoutoftheswampsandricepaddiessurroundingthecity.Uponhisreturnto France, however,Trinquier learnedthat,likeotherofficerswhohadremainedfaithfultoVichy,hewas tobedismissedfromtheservice.Butsinceaseniorofficerwhohadknown himwhenhewasayoungsecondlieutenantatChi-Maintervenedinhis behalf,CaptainTrinquierwasassigned,onFebruary1,1947,toTarbesand Pau,wheretheFrenchairbornetrainingcenterhadbeencreated.(TheofficerwhohadsavedTrinquier’scareerwashimselfanold“Indochinahand,” GeneralRaoulSalan,latercommander-inchiefinIndochinaandAlgeria.In 1961hewastoleadtherevoltagainstGeneraldeGaulle’sAlgerianpolicies;caughtandconvictedofattemptingtooverthrowtheFrenchRepublic, SalanisnowservingalifesentenceinaFrenchmilitaryprison.) On November 14, 1947, Trinquier again landed in Indochina as second-in-commandoftheIstColonialParachuteBattalion,whosecommandhewastoassumeinSeptember,1948,afteritscommanderhadbeen killedinaction.Promotedtotherankofmajor,Trinquierandhisunitparticipated in the grim inch-by-inch clearing operations on the Plain of Reeds—hewastoparachuteintoitfourtimes—andinsouthernCentral Vietnam.Those are exactly the same areas in whichVietnamese troops andtheirAmericanadvisersareheavilyinvolvedtoday. AfteranothertourofdutyinFranceascommanderoftheCommando TrainingCenterinFréjusandoftheColonialParatroopSchool,Trinquier returnedtoIndochinainDecember,1951,totakeoverabrand-newservice just created by Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, France’s best
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commander-in-chiefintheFarEast.(Regrettably,hewastodieofcancer withinayear.)DeLattrehaddecidedtoturntheVietminh’sskillinfightingbehindthelinesagainsttheVietminhitselfbyimplantinganti-Communistguerrillasdeepinsidetheenemy’sterritory,Inviewofhisknowledge ofthenorthernhillareasandtribalgroups,Trinquierwasselectedasthe leaderforthenorthernoperations;hisfirsteffortsweresooncrownedwith success,forcontactteamaftercontactteamwasdroppedintoenemyterritory,and,contrarytoexpectations,mostmanagedtosurviveandfight. When Trinquier’s methods became known to the American military advisersinSaigon,hewasinvitedtovisitAmericanantiguerrilla-training centersinKoreaandJapan.TwoyoungAmericanofficersalsoreturned withhimtoIndochinatolearnfromhisoperations,andAmericanequipmentforhisguerrillaunitsbecamereadilyavailable.Bymid-1951,Major Trinquier received command of all behind-the-lines operations in Indochina,andhisunitsbecameofficiallyknownasGCMA,orGroupements de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (Composite Airborne Commando Groups),anamethatwaschanged,inDecember,1953,toGMI(Groupement Mixted’lntervention,orCompositeInterventionGroup),whentheirmissionwasextendedbeyondairbornecommandooperations. Bylate1953,almost20,000menwereunderhiscommand—probably thelargestunitevercommandedbyanarmymajor—andengagedinoperationscoveringseveralthousandsquaremilesofenemyterritory.Native tribesmenwereflockingtohismaquisingreaternumbersthancouldbe armedandtrained;butbeforehecouldmakefulluseofthem,whatTrinquier—in a masterly understatement—calls “the regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident” ended the Indochina war. What followed was a horrible debacle:Thousandsofpartisanshadtobeabandonedtotheenemy,since thestipulationsoftheGenevacease-fireof1954didnotpermittheFrench tocontinuetosupplythem. Trinquier asserts that he had asked the United States, which had not signedthecease-fireagreement,tocontinuetosupplytheguerrillas,but thathisrequesthadbeenturneddown.Althoughthepartisansandtheir Frenchcadresfoughtonlongbeyondthecease-fire,theywereeventually wiped out one by one.2 In his final operations report (which I found in someforgottenarchivesinParis),Trinquiercouldnothelpbutshowsome ofhisdeepfeelingsabouthisabandonedmen: Thetotalsuppressionoflogisticalsupport...willbringinitswaketheprogressiveliquidationofour[infiltrated]elements.Thereislittlehopeofseeing theleadersofourmaquisescapethe“clemency”ofPresidentHoChiMinh. As ofAugust 15, 1954, fifteen enemy regular battalions, fifteen regional battalionsandseventeenregionalcompaniesarenowcommittedagainstthem. Ceasingoperationsasperordersattheverymomentwhentheywereaboutto
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INTRODUCTION
triumph,ourmaquis,undefeatedonthefieldofbattle,havebeenofferedup forsacrifice. Whilethe[GCMA]commandhas,withdiscipline,acceptedthesacrificeof themaquis,itnolongerfeelsmorallyauthorizedtoaskitspartisanstoremain atourdisposal. Inthisbloodthirstyadventure,theironlyconsolationremainstheprideof having won the last successes of that campaign, and of having created a veritablepopularuprisingagainsttheVietminh.
DuringthosedecisiveyearsinIndochina,Trinquierbegantostudyin depththeprinciplesof“modernwarfare,”ofwhichthepagesthatfollow will give a detailed account, but the years of combat inAlgeria thatweretofollowprobablyaddedapoliticaldimensionthatwasheretoforelackinginhim.Assignedasalieutenant-coloneltothe10thParachute Division of General Massu (another old Indochina hand), he narrowly missed the Suez invasion of 1956—another perfect illustration,fromhispointofview,ofthefrustrationbypoliticsofwhatseemed tobea“sound”militaryoperation—andfoundhimselfassigned,with all the other units of the 10th, to clearing the town ofAlgiers of all terrorists.Bomb-andgrenade-throwinginAlgiershad,in1957,become an everyday occurrence, against which the regular police was all but powerless. Massu, Trinquier, and the camouflage-clad paratroopers of the 10th “waded” into the situation with a cold ferocity that made headlines throughout the world and provided Lartéguy’s The Centurions with its choicestpassages.ItalsoprovidedTrinquierwithaCartesianrationale fortheuseoftortureinrevolutionarywar;tortureistheparticularbaneof theterrorist,justasantiaircraftartilleryisthatoftheairmanormachinegun fire that of the foot soldier. Trinquier’s methods won the day in Algiers;butthedyingFourthRepublicfeltthatitcouldnotaffordtolet him remain much longer in the public eye, and Trinquier temporarily wenttocommandtheFrenchAirborneCenteratPau. But his old protector, General Salan, soon recalled him toAlgeria to becomethecommanderofthe3dColonialAirborneRegiment.Thatunit tookontheoneroustaskofsealingofftheTunisianbordersouthofthe “Morice Line”—the electronic 300-kilometer-long fence constructed by theFrenchArmyfromtheMediterraneantothedesert—alongitsSaharan fringe.AsTrinquierwastodescribeindetailinanotherbook,3hefound himselfbyaccidentratherthandesignintheAlgiersareawhentheMay13, 1958,putschinAlgiersledtothereturnofGeneraldeGaulletopower,but heneverthelesstookanimportantpartinestablishingthefamousPublic SafetyCommitteeofAlgiers. SoonindisagreementwithdeGaulle’spolicies,hereturnedtothecommandofhisregimenttoparticipateinthemop-upoperationsofthe“Challe
INTRODUCTION
xvii
Plan,”namedafterthenewcommander-in-chief,AirForceGeneralChalle. BetweenJuly,1959,andMarch,1960,the3dAirborne,inaseriesofrelentlesspursuits,broketheAlgeriannationalists’holdononeofthemostdifficultareasinAlgeria,ElMilia.Militarily,theendseemedinsight,but, internationally,pressureshadbeguntobuildupagainstFrance.TheAlgerian warwasexpensive,allthenewlyindependentnationswereturningagainst France, and even her own allies no longer voted with her in the United Nations.Inahistory-making“touroftheofficers’messes”(“latournéedes popotes”)inMarch,1960,deGaulleexplainedtohisofficersinAlgeria that,inevitably,thecountrywouldachieveindependence. To the new generation of technicians of revolutionary warfare, that politicalsolutionwasabhorrent.Notswayedbytheinternationalimplicationsofthesituation,theybelievedthattoabandonAlgeriawhenmilitary victoryseemedsonearforthefirsttimewouldbenotonlyanotherrank betrayalofapersonalcommitmentbutalsoadirectcondemnationoftheir methodsofcombat.Thereactionthatsetinwastoleadmanyofthemout ofthearmyandintoprison—andafewtothefiringsquad. Trinquierhimselfwas,beyondadoubt,savedbycircumstances.While theAlgerianstormwasbrewing,hehadbeenrecalledfromhiscommand tohelpPresidentMoiseTshombeofKatangaProvinceorganizehiswhitecadredforces.HehadarrivedinElisabethvilleonJanuary25,1961;he wasexpelledfromKatangaonMarch9,underBelgianandU.N.pressure. HewasinAthenswritinguphisrecommendationsforKatangawhenmost ofhisformerassociatesbecameinvolved,onApril21,1961,intheabortive“generals’mutiny”inAlgiers.Hisarmycareer,atbest,wasfinished, andhisrequesttobeputontheretiredlistmetwithnoopposition. ButTrinquierseemstohavefoundanewavocationinpoliticalwriting andlecturing,whichmayindicatethathehascertainpoliticalambitions forthefuture.ItwouldbedifficulttoclassifyhimbyAmericanstandards as radically “right wing,” for his acquaintance with Mao leads him to accepttheneedforsocialreformsasaninstrumentindefeatingCommunism. Inhisrecentwritings,however,hehasattackedwhatheconsiderstobethe high-handedmethodsoftheFifthRepublicinthefieldofcivilliberties; yethisownwritingsclearlyshowthathewouldnotshrinkfromusingthe samemethods,ifnecessary,himself. Tobesure,theinformedreaderwillfindinthefollowingpagesmuchthat willshockhimorthatwillstrikehimasincredible.Inmanycases,Trinquier,likeanyotherpersonwhoiscertainheholdsthekeytoabsolute truth,underplaysthedifficultiessomeofhiscounterinsurgencymeasures arelikelytoraiseandencounterorneglectstoexplainallthefailuressatisfactorily. For example, although it is true that the GCMA’s tied down a VietminhforcethreetimestheirownsizeduringthebattleofDienBien Phu,theyneversucceededinseriouslyhamperingCommunistsupplylines
xviii
INTRODUCTION
tothebesiegedfortress.Likewise,therehasneverbeensolidevidenceto provethatarealeffortwasmade—asTrinquieradvocateshere—toinfiltrate counterguerrillamaquisintoTunisiatoattackAlgerianbases;orthatsuch maquis,iftheyeverexisted,weresuccessful. Butontheotherhand,Americanreaders—particularlythosewhoareconcernedwithtoday’soperationsinSouthVietnam—willfindtotheirsurprise thattheirvariousseemingly“new”counterinsurgencygambits,fromstrategichamletstolarge-scalepacification,aremererehashesofoldtacticsto which helicopters, weed killers, and rapid-firing rifles merely add a new dimensionofspeedandbloodinesswithoutbasicallychangingthecharacter ofthestruggle—noritsoutcome,ifthesamepoliticalerrorsthattheFrench havemadearerepeated.AndthecareersofTrinquierandofhisnumerous comradesstillintheFrenchArmyprovethatFrancehasanamplereserveof counterinsurgencyspecialistswhosequalificationsaresecondtonone. Itis,onceagain,Lartéguywhobringsintosharpfocusthattypeofsoldier, when one of his key characters, just such a revolutionary-warfare colonel, jokingly states that France should have two armies—one with “lovelyguns”and“distinguishedanddodderinggenerals,”andtheother “composedentirelyofyoungenthusiastsincamouflagedbattledress,who wouldnotbeputondisplay,butfromwhomimpossibleeffortswouldbe demanded....” To which another character answers with a warning: “You’reheadingforalotoftrouble.” But the trouble into which a regular army must inevitably—perhaps fatally—runwhenitiscommittedtoalongstringofrevolutionarywarsis onlydimlyperceivedinAmericasofar.ColonelTrinquier’sbookshould domuchtoserveasatimelywarning. BernardB.Fall Alexandria,Virginia October,1963 NOTES 1. Jean Lartéguy, The Centurions (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1961; NewYork:AvonBookCorp.,1962[paperback]). 2. For a more detailed description of GCMA operations, see Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: Indochina at War, 1946-1963 (3d rev. ed.; Harrisburg: Stackpole,1963). 3. RogerTrinquier,Lecoupd’etatdu13mai(Paris:Editionsl’EspritNouveau, 1963).
PartOne
PREPARATIONFORWAR
Chapter1
THENEEDTOADAPTOUR MILITARYAPPARATUS TOMODERNWARFARE
Thedefenseofnationalterritoryistheraisond’êtreofanarmy;itshould alwaysbecapableofaccomplishingthisobjective. SincetheliberationofFrancein1945,however,theFrenchArmyhas notbeenabletohaltthecollapseofourEmpire.Andyet,theeffortthe countryhasmadeforthearmyisunprecedented.NoFrenchmilitaryman oughttorestuntilwehavecreatedanarmyatlastcapableofassuringthe defenseofournationalterritory. Westillpersistinstudyingatypeofwarfarethatnolongerexistsand thatweshallneverfightagain,whilewepayonlypassingattentiontothe warwelostinIndochinaandtheoneweareabouttoloseinAlgeria.Yet theabandonmentofIndochinaorofAlgeriaisjustasimportantforFrance aswouldbethelossofametropolitanprovince. Theresultofthisshortcomingisthatthearmyisnotpreparedtoconfront anadversaryemployingarmsandmethodsthearmyitselfignores.Ithas, therefore,nochanceofwinning. ItisafactthatinIndochina,despiteamarkedsuperiorityinmateriel andintroops,wewerebeaten.Fromonecampaigntoanother,ourcommanderstriedtodrivetheVietminhintoaclassicpitchedbattle,theonly kindweknewhowtofight,inhopethatoursuperiorityinmaterielwould allow an easy victory. The Vietminh always knew how to elude such maneuvers.Whentheyfinallyacceptedtheconventionalbattlesovainly soughtforseveralyears,itwasonlybecausetheyhadassembledonthe battlefieldresourcessuperiortoourown.ThatwasatDienBienPhuin May,1954.
4
MODERNWARFARE
Despite the record, our army is employing, with few exceptions, the identicalcombatproceduresinNorthAfrica.Wearetryinginthecourse ofrepeatedcomplexoperationstoseizeanadversarywhoeludesus.The resultsobtainedbearnorelationtotheresourcesandeffortsexpended.In fact,weareonlydispersing,ratherthandestroying,theattackedbands. Ourmilitarymachineremindsoneofapiledriverattemptingtocrusha fly,indefatigablypersistinginrepeatingitsefforts. Theinabilityofthearmytoadaptitselftochangedcircurnstanceshas heavyconsequences.Itgivescredencetothebeliefthatouradversaries, whorepresentonlyweakforces,areinvincibleandthat,soonerorlater,we shallhavetoaccepttheirconditionsforpeace.Itencouragesthediffusion of dangerously erroneous ideas, which eventually become generally accepted. France is accused of having conducted rigged elections in Algeria,andoneisledtobelievethatthosecarriedoutundertheaegisof the (Algerian) National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) would be genuine.At thesametime,itiswellknownthatanythreatthatwouldsubsequently confrontthevoterswouldbeeffectiveinquiteadifferentwayfromthe former,merelyadministrative,pressures. Allthisisnonethelesswhatalargepartofourownpresstriestotellthe public. Weknowthatitisnotatallnecessarytohavethesympathyofamajority of the people in order to rule them.The right organization can turn the trick. ThisiswhatouradversariesareaccomplishinginAlgeria.Thankstoa specially adapted organization and to appropriate methods of warfare, theyhavebeensuccessfulinimposingthemselvesuponentirepopulations andinusingthem,despitetheirowndesiresinthematter,againstus.Our enemiesaresubmittingustoakindofhatefulextortion,towhichweshall have to accede in the end if we cannot destroy the warfare system that confrontsus.Wewouldbegravelyremissinourdutyifweshouldpermit ourselves to be thus deluded and to abandon the struggle before final victory.Wewouldbesacrificingdefenselesspopulationstounscrupulous enemies.
Chapter2
MODERNWARFAREDEFINED
Since the end of World War II, a new form of warfare has been born. Calledattimeseithersubversivewarfareorrevolutionarywarfare,itdiffers fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected fromtheclashoftwoarmiesonafieldofbattle.Thisconfrontation,which intimespastsawtheannihilationofanenemyarmyinoneormorebattles, nolongeroccurs. Warfareisnowaninterlockingsystemofactions—political,economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authorityinacountryanditsreplacementbyanotherregime.Toachieve thisend,theaggressortriestoexploittheinternaltensionsofthecountry attacked—ideological,social,religious,economic—anyconflictliableto haveaprofoundinfluenceonthepopulationtobeconquered.Moreover,in viewofthepresent-dayinterdependenceofnations,anyresidualgrievance withinapopulation,nomatterhowlocalizedandlackinginscope,will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world conflict. From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalizedconflict. On so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy theiraccustomeddecisiverole.Victorynolongerdependsononebattle over a given terrain. Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed forces, are of only limited importance and are neverthetotalconflict.
6
MODERNWARFARE
Thisisdoubtlessthereasonwhythearmy,traditionallyattractedbythe purely military aspect of a conflict, has never seriously approached the studyofaproblemitconsidersaninferiorelementintheartofwar. Amodernarmyisfirstofallonethatiscapableofwinningtheconflict inwhichitscountryisengaged.Andwearecertainlyatwar,becausewe runtheriskofbeingfinallydefeatedontheground(asatDienBienPhuin May,1954)andbecause,incaseofsuchadefeat,weshallhavetocede vastterritoriestoouropponents. Thestrugglewehavebeencarryingonforfifteenyears,inIndochinaas wellasinAlgeria,istrulyawar.Butwhatweareinvolvedinismodern warfare. If we want to win, it is in this light that we must consider it from nowon. Studieshavebeenmadeinmanycountriesofwhatiscalledsubversive warfare.Buttheyrarelygobeyondthestageofguerrillawarfare,which comesclosesttothetraditionalform. MindfuloftheAlliedvictoryinWorldWarII,andperhapsbecauseit ismoreappealingtostudysuccessfulcombatmethodsthantodwellupon thereasonsforadefeat,onlytheoffensiveuseoftheguerrillahasbeen considered.Butthestudyofeffectivecountermeasureshasbeenneglected. Someauthorshavestressedtheinadequacyofthemeansemployedagainst theguerrilla;othershavesimplycounseledreactingagainsttheguerrilla— confrontinghimwiththecounterguerrillatobeathimathisowngame. This is to wish to resolve a problem quickly without having duly weighedit. The subtlest aspects of modern warfare, such as the manipulation of populations,havebeenthesubjectofrecentstudies.Butonlysomeofthe methodsemployedbyanenemytoconsolidatehisholdoverconquered populationsinpeacetimehavebeeninvestigated,inparticulartheworking ofpsychologicalactiononthemasses. But the rallying of opposition and the study of effective means of protectionhavebeenneglected.Moreexactly,whentheenemy’smethods and their application have been recognized, propaganda and pressures havealwaysbeenpowerfulenoughtoinfluenceapoorlyinformedpublic andtoleaditsystematicallytorefusetostudyorusethesamemethods. We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditionalsupportofapopulation.AccordingtoMaoTse-tung,itisas essentialtothecombatantaswatertothefish.Suchsupportmaybespontaneous,althoughthatisquiterareandprobablyatemporarycondition.Ifit doesn’texist,itmustbesecuredbyeverypossiblemeans,themosteffectiveofwhichisterrorism.
MODERNWARFAREDEFINED
7
Inmodernwarfare,wearenotactuallygrapplingwithanarmyorganized alongtraditionallines,butwithafewarmedelementsactingclandestinely withinapopulationmanipulatedbyaspecialorganization. OurarmyinAlgeriaisinexcessof300,000mensuppliedwiththemost modernequipment;itsadversarynumberssome30,000,ingeneralpoorly equippedwithonlylightweapons. Ifweweretohaveanopportunitytomeetthisenemyonthetraditional fieldofbattle,adreamvainlypursuedforyearsbymanymilitarycommanders,victorywouldbeassuredinamatterofhours. The war has lasted more than six years, however, and victory is still uncertain.Theproblemismorecomplex. Inseekingasolution,itisessentialtorealizethatinmodernwarfarewe arenotupagainstjustafewarmedbandsspreadacrossagiventerritory, butratheragainstanarmedclandestineorganizationwhoseessentialrole istoimposeitswilluponthepopulation.Victorywillbeobtainedonly throughthecompletedestructionofthatorganization.Thisisthemaster conceptthatmustguideusinourstudyofmodernwarfare.
Chapter3
ANEXAMPLEOFACLANDESTINE WARFAREORGANIZATION
Oneexampleofaclandestinewarfareorganizationisthatoperatinginthe cityofAlgiersduring1956–57.Itwasconstitutedasanautonomouszone by the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), but was related to the F.L.N. setupthroughoutAlgeria. TheAutonomousZoneofAlgiers(Z.A.A.)operatedunderacounciloffour members:apolitical-militaryleader,apoliticalassistant,amilitaryassistant, andanassistantforexternalliaisonandintelligence.Decisionsweremadein common,butthevoteofthepolitical-militaryleadercountedheaviest. The city and its suburbs were divided into three regions—Central Algiers,AlgiersWest,andAlgiersEast—whichoperatedunderregional councilsidenticaltothezonalcouncil.Eachregionwasdividedintosectors, which, in turn, were subdivided into districts. In all, the Z.A.A.’s threeregionscomprisedtensectors,orthirty-fourdistricts. The organization of the Z.A.A. contained two distinct elements: the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), or political arm, and the National LiberationArmy(A.L.N.),ormilitaryarm.Bothwereintegratedintothe samegeographicalbreakdown,butwerehighlycompartmentedandwere unitedonlyattheregionalandzonallevels. UnitsoftheA.L.N.andF.L.N.workedsidebysideineachdistrict,but theregionalcouncilwasresponsibleforcoordinationoftheiraction. The political organization (F.L.N.) of each district—based on the demi-cellofthreemen,thenthecell,thedemi-group,thegroup,andthe sub-district—wasunderthecommandofadistrictleader,whocontrolled 127men(seethetablebelow).
10
MODERNWARFARE
Themilitaryorganization(A.L.N.)ofthedistrictconsistedof35armed men. The district commander and his deputy were at the head of three armedgroups,eachheadedbyaleaderanddeputyandcomposedofthree cellsofthreemeneach. (Thepoliticalorganizationhadatitsdisposalsomearmedshockgroups ofitsownthatwerenotpartoftheA.L.N.;theyconstitutedtheF.L.N.’s “police”andwerechargedwiththeexecutionofsentencespronouncedby theirjudiciary.) Thezonalcouncilassistantforexternalliaisonandintelligencehadat hisdisposalacertainnumberofcommitteesinwhichweregroupedthe F.L.N.’s intellectuals.The following were the principal committees and theirduties. Demi- Cell
Cell
Demi- Group
Group
Sub- District
District
1Demi- Cell
2Demi-Cells plusaCell Leader
2Cells plusa Demi- Group Leader
2Demi- Groupsplus aGroup Leader
2Groups plusa Sub-District Leader
2Sub- Districts plusa District Leader
3men
7men
15men 31men
63men
127men
ANEXAMPLEOFACLANDESTINEWARFAREORGANIZATION
11
• LiaisonCommittee—maintainedcontactwiththewilayas,ormajormilitarydistricts(AlgeriawasdividedbytheF.L.N.intosixwilayas);withthe CommitteeforExternalCoordination(C.C.E.),forerunnerofthepresent ProvisionalGovernmentoftheAlgerianRepublic(G.P.R.A.);andwith theExterior:Tunisia,Morocco,France. • InformationCommittee—atthattimetheembryoofthespecialservices. • Editorial Committee—maintained United Nations dossiers, “reprisal” dossiers, relations with the intellectuals, documentation for the French andotherforeignpress,etc. • JusticeCommittee—generalsurveillanceofFrenchcitizensofMoslem origin(F.M.A.);judgedcasesbetweenMoslemsincivilandcriminallaw, imposedvariousfines,etc. • FinancialCommittee—gatheredfundsfromthepopulationatlarge,using unitsoftheF.L.N.,and,inlargeramounts,directlyfrombigcompanies, banks,leadingmerchants,etc. • HealthCommittee—embryonicinAlgiers.Thesickandwoundedwere mostlycaredforinsecretinthehospitalsofthecity. • Trade Union Committee—maintained permanent contact with various syndicalorganizations,suchastheGeneralUnionofAlgerianWorkers (U.G.T.A.)andtheGeneralUnionofAlgerianMerchants(U.G.C.A.).
A final important element of the whole Z.A.A. organization was the bomb-throwingnetworkdirectlyresponsibletothezonalcouncil.Carefully keptapartfromotherelementsoftheorganization,thenetworkwasbroken downintoanumberofquitedistinctandcompartmentedbranches,incommunicationonlywiththenetworkchiefthroughasystemofletterboxes. A chart of the organization of the bomb-throwing network is shown below. InthecityofAlgiersalone,theclandestinewarfareorganizationcomprised approximately 1,200 armed men (A.L.N.), and 4,500 persons unarmedorsemiarmed(F.L.N.).Atthattime,therewerescarcelyathousandpolice,equippedonlytofightcommoncriminalsintimeofpeace. Taken by surprise by an adversary of which it was totally ignorant, the policehadnochanceofcomingoutontop.Thearmy’sinterventionwas thereforeunavoidable. Aclandestineorganizationofsuchsizeandcomplexityrequiresforits creationbothtimeandaprecisetechnique. Thehighercadres,uptoregionallevel,hadallreceivedamoreorless thoroughMarxisttraining;theyhadenteredtheorganizationvoluntarily. Thelowercadresandtherank-and-filewereatfirstrecruitedfromthe seamierelementsofthecity,delinquentsorhabitualcriminals.Bythevery
12
MODERNWARFARE
factoftheirpasts,theywerealreadyquitewelladaptedtothemissions theyweregoingtobeassigned. Lateron,theorganizationreceivedaconstantinfluxofnewmembers whichkeptuporaugmenteditsforces.Themannerinwhichtheywere recruitedhasbeenrevealedtousthroughnumerousinterrogations.Tothe question “How did you enter the A.L.N.?”—which was often put to them—mostoftheyoungterroristsreplied: “Iwasagoodworkerandwasearninganhonestliving,Oneday,Iwas stoppedbyafellowwhoinsistedIpayacertainsumtotheF.L.N.Atfirst Irefused,andwasbeatenupbythethreemenhehadwithhim.Ipaid.The nextmonththesamesumwasasked.Ipaid it without argument. Some timelater,Ibecameacollectormyself.Ireceivedalistofpersonswho weretocontributeandasmallarmedteamtoprotectmeduringthecollection.Then,asIwasathleticandingoodhealth,Iwasaskedtoenterinto the armed organization—theA.L.N.—theArmy of National Liberation. Iwantedtorefuse,butafewpointedthreatsmademeaccept.Fromthat timeonIwaslost,becausetobeadmittedtotheA.L.N.,onefirsthadto provehisworth;thatis,tocarryoutanarmedattackinthecity.Theconditionsunderwhichthiswastobeaccomplishedwereexplainedtome.One evening,atafixedtimeandanappointedplace,anindividualunknownto mewastogivemealoadedweaponwiththemissiontokillthefirstperson Icameacross.Iwasthentoflee,droppingtheweaponintoatrashcanthat
ANEXAMPLEOFACLANDESTINEWARFAREORGANIZATION
13
theunknownpersonhadpointedouttome.Ididwhatwasrequiredofme and,threedayslater,IenteredasamemberintoacelloftheA.L.N.” ItwasinthismannerinthemonthofJanuary,1957,thatDoctorXof Algierswasassassinatedbyayoungmanwhodidnotevenknowthename ofhisvictim. Themeansofputtingpressureonthecitizenrywerequitevaried.The followingisanexampleofoneusedbythemembersofthezonalcouncil toassuretheirownsecurity: Whenoneorseveralmembersofthecouncilwantedtoinstallthemselves inahouseintheCasbah,theyfirstsentateamofmasonstoconstructahidingplacethere.Themasonsimmediatelygatheredtogetherthepeopleinthe buildingandtoldthem,insubstance:“Youaresoontoreceiveimportant personages.Youwillberesponsiblefortheirsecuritywithyourlives.”And sometimes, to indicate that this was no idle threat, a burst of gunfire cut downonthespottheresidentswhoseemedtothemmostsuspect.Fromthen on, the movements of the residents were strictly controlled; never could morethanhalfofthembeoutsideatatime.Thesecretwaswellkept. Yassef Saadi, political-military commissar of the Z.A.A. was able to installhimselfwithin200yardsoftheofficeofthearmycommandantof theAlgierssectorandremaintherewithoutbeingfoundforseveralmonths beforehisarrest.
Chapter4
TERRORISM—THEPRINCIPAL WEAPONOFMODERNWARFARE
ThewarinIndochinaandtheoneinAlgeriahavedemonstratedthebasic weaponthatpermitsourenemiestofighteffectivelywithfewresources andeventodefeatatraditionalarmy. Thisweaponisterrorism. Terrorismintheserviceofaclandestineorganizationdevotedtomanipulatingthepopulationisarecentdevelopment.AfterbeingusedinMorocco in1954,itreacheditsfulldevelopmentinAlgiersinDecember,1956,and January, 1957. The resultant surprise gave our adversaries an essential advantage,whichmayhavebeendecisive.Ineffect,ahundredorganized terroristswereallthatwasnecessarytocauseustogiveupthegamequickly totheMoroccans. Terrorism,then,isaweaponofwarfare,whichcanneitherbeignored norminimized.Itisasaweaponofwarfarethatweshouldstudyit. Thegoalofmodernwarfareiscontrolofthepopulace,andterrorismisa particularlyappropriateweapon,sinceitaimsdirectlyattheinhabitant.In thestreet,atwork,athome,thecitizenlivescontinuallyunderthethreatof violentdeath.Inthepresenceofthispermanentdangersurroundinghim,he hasthedepressingfeelingofbeinganisolatedanddefenselesstarget.The factthatpublicauthorityandthepolicearenolongercapableofensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherentmissionitistoguaranteehissafety.Heismoreandmoredrawnto thesideoftheterrorists,whoaloneareabletoprotecthim. Theintendedobjective,whichistocausethepopulationtovacillateis thusattained.
16
MODERNWARFARE
Whatcharacterizesmodernterrorism,andmakesforitsbasicstrength, is the slaughter of generally defenseless persons. The terrorist operates withinafamiliarlegalframework,whileavoidingtheordinaryriskstaken bythecommoncriminal,letalonebysoldiersonthefieldofbattle,oreven bypartisansfacingregulartroops. Theordinarycriminalkillsacertainindividual,usuallyonlyone,fora specificpurpose.Havingachievedit,hemaynolongerconstituteadanger tosociety.Hiscrimeisbasedonaneasilydiscerniblemotive—robbery, vengeance, etc.To succeed, he quite often has to run risks sufficient to causehisarrest.Hiscrimeisthuscarriedoutwithinaknownframework. Well-definedpoliceprocedurecaneasilybeapplied,whichtakeswhatever timeisnecessarytoobtainjustice,whilerespectingtherightsofboththe individualandsociety. Thesoldiermeetshisadversaryonthefieldofbattleandinuniform. Hefightswithinaframeworkoftraditionalrulesthatbothsidesrespect. Aware of the dangers that confront him, the soldier has always had a highregardforhisopponent,becausebothrunthesamerisks.Whenthe battleisover,thedeadandthewoundedofthetwocampsaretreated withthesamehumanity;prisonersarewithdrawnasquicklyaspossible fromthebattlefieldandaresimplykeptfromfightingagainuntiltheend ofthewar. Forthepartisanandtheirregularwhoopposearegulararmy,thevery fact that they violate the rules of warfare in fighting without a uniform (avoidingtherisksinvolved)deprivesthemoftheprotectionofthesesame rules.Iftakenprisonerwhilearmed,theymaybeshotonthespot. Butthecaseoftheterroristisquiteotherwise.Notonlydoeshecarryon warfare without uniform, but he attacks, far from a field of battle, only unarmedcivilianswhoareincapableofdefendingthemselvesandwhoare normallyprotectedundertherulesofwarfare.Surroundedbyavastorganization,whichprepareshistaskandassistshiminitsexecution,which assureshiswithdrawalandhisprotection,herunspracticallynorisks— neitherthatofretaliationbyhisvictimsnorthatofhavingtoappearbefore a court of justice. When it has been decided to kill someone sometime somewhere,withthesolepurposeofterrorizingthepopulaceandstrewing acertainnumberofbodiesalongthestreetsofacityoroncountryroads, itisquiteeasyunderexistinglawstoescapethepolice. InAlgiers,during1956,theF.L.N.setuptheclandestinewarfareorganizationalreadydescribed,anditwasimpossibleforthepoliceforcestoarresta singleterrorist.Inthefaceoftheeverincreasingnumberofattacks,thepolice oughttohaveacknowledgedtheirimpotenceandappealedtothearmy. Withoutthemassiveinterventionofthearmy(inparticularoftheTenth ParachuteDivision)atthebeginningof1957,theentirecitywouldhave
TERRORISM—THEPRINCIPALWEAPON
17
fallenintothehandsoftheF.L.N.,thelosscarryingwithittheimmediate abandonmentofallAlgeria. Inalargecity,policeforcescanpartlyrestricttheactionoftheterrorists anddelaytheircompletecontrolofthepopulace.Obligedtoactsecretly, theorganization’sfunctioningwillbeslowanddifficult.Massiveanddrasticactionbythearmymayevenbeabletostopitentirely,asinAlgiers in1957. Butintheunprotectedregionsthatcomprisethemajorportionofthe nationalterritory,particularlythevastareaofinhabitedcountrysidewhere policeforcesaresmallornonexistent,terroristactionencountersnooppositionatthebeginningofaconflictandismosteffective. Isolatedraidsfirstrevealtheexistenceofapartiallyorganizedmovement.These attract attention and promote caution among the populace. Then,selectiveterrorismbeginstoeliminatelesserpersonsofinfluence, pettybureaucratsandvariouspoliceofficialswhodidnotunderstandthe firstwarningsorwereslowinreactingtothem.Administrativecadresare restrained or eliminated. The silence and collusion of the unprotected inhabitantshavebeenwon.Agentsoftheenemyhaveafreehandtoorganizeandtomanipulatethepopulationatwill. Fromthenon,withinthemidstofthesepeopletakenoverbyterrorism, thesmallarmedbandswhosetaskitistowageguerrillawarfareareable toinstallthemselves,inthephraseofMaoTse-tung,likefishinwater.Fed, informed,protected,theyareabletostrikewithoutdifficultyagainstthe forcesoforder. Modern warfare requires the unconditional support of the populace. Thissupportmustbemaintainedatanyprice.Hereagain,terrorismplays itsrole. Anunceasingwatchisexercisedoveralltheinhabitants.Anysuspicion or indication of lack of submission is punishable by death, quite often precededbyhorribletorture. TheatrocitiescommittedbytheF.L.N.inAlgeriatomaintainitshold overthepopulaceareinnumerable.Iwillcitebutoneexampletodemonstratethedegreetowhichtheywerecarriedincertainareas. InthemonthofSeptember,1958,theforcesofordertookpossessionof thefilesofamilitarytribunalofoneoftheregionsoftheF.L.N.Inthe cantonofMicheletalone,inthearrondissement(district)ofFort-National in Kabylie, more than 2,000 inhabitants were condemned to death and executedbetweenNovember1,1954,andApril17,1957. Quiteclearly,terrorismisaweaponofwarfare,anditisimportantto stressit. Althoughquiteold,untilrecentlyithasbeenutilizedonlybyisolated revolutionaries for spectacular attacks, principally against high political
18
MODERNWARFARE
personalities,suchassovereigns,chiefsofstate,andministers.Evenin Indochina,whereguerrillasachievedsucharemarkabledegreeofdevelopmentthatitpermittedtheVietminhfinallytowin,terrorismhasnever beensystematicallyemployed.Forexample,theplasticbombattacksoutsidethemunicipaltheaterinSaigon,whichcausedthegreatestnumberof victims,werenotcarriedoutbytheVietminh(seeGrahamGreene’sbook TheQuietAmerican). Theterroristshouldnotbeconsideredanordinarycriminal.Actually,he fightswithintheframeworkofhisorganization,withoutpersonalinterest, foracauseheconsidersnobleandforarespectableideal,thesameasthe soldiersinthearmiesconfrontinghim.Onthecommandofhissuperiors, hekillswithouthatredindividualsunknowntohim,withthesameindifferenceasthesoldieronthebattlefield.Hisvictimsareoftenwomenand children,almostalwaysdefenselessindividualstakenbysurprise.Butduringaperiodofhistorywhenthebombingofopencitiesispermitted,and whentwoJapanesecitieswererazedtohastentheendofthewarinthe Pacific,onecannotwithgoodcausereproachhim.1 Theterroristhasbecomeasoldier,liketheaviatorortheinfantryman. Buttheaviatorflyingoveracityknowsthatantiaircraftshellscankillor maimhim.Theinfantrymanwoundedonthebattlefieldacceptsphysical suffering,oftenforlonghours,whenhefallsbetweenthelinesanditis impossibletorescuehim.Itneveroccurstohimtocomplainandtoask,for example,thathisenemyrenouncetheuseoftherifle,theshell,orthebomb. Ifhecan,hegoesbacktoahospitalknowingthistobehislot.Thesoldier, therefore,admitsthepossibilityofphysicalsufferingaspartofthejob.The risksherunsonthebattlefieldandthesufferingheenduresarethepriceof thegloryhereceives. Theterroristclaimsthesamehonorswhilerejectingthesameobligations.Hiskindoforganizationpermitshimtoescapefromthepolice,his victimscannotdefendthemselves,andthearmycannotusethepowerof itsweaponsagainsthimbecausehehideshimselfpermanentlywithinthe midstofapopulationgoingaboutitspeacefulpursuits. Buthemustbemadetorealizethat,whenheiscaptured,hecannotbe treatedasanordinarycriminal,norlikeaprisonertakenonthebattlefield. Whattheforcesoforderwhohavearrestedhimareseekingisnottopunishacrime,forwhichheisotherwisenotpersonallyresponsible,but,asin anywar,thedestructionoftheenemyarmyoritssurrender.Thereforehe isnotaskeddetailsabouthimselforaboutattacksthathemayormaynot havecommittedandthatarenotofimmediateinterest,butratherforprecise information about his organization. In particular, each man has a superiorwhomheknows;hewillfirsthavetogivethenameofthisperson, alongwithhisaddress,sothatitwillbepossibletoproceedwiththearrest withoutdelay.
TERRORISM—THEPRINCIPALWEAPON
19
Nolawyerispresentforsuchaninterrogation.Iftheprisonergivesthe informationrequested,theexaminationisquicklyterminated;ifnot,specialistsmustforcehissecretfromhim.Then,asasoldier,hemustface thesuffering,andperhapsthedeath,hehasheretoforemanagedtoavoid. Theterroristmustacceptthisasaconditioninherentinhistradeandin the methods of warfare that, with full knowledge, his superiors and he himselfhavechosen.2Oncetheinterrogationisfinished,however,theterroristcantakehisplaceamongsoldiers.Fromthenon,heisaprisonerof war like any other, kept from resuming hostilities until the end of the conflict. Itwouldbeasuselessandunjusttochargehimwiththeattackshe wasabletocarryout,astoholdresponsibletheinfantrymanortheairman for the deaths caused by the weapons they use. According to Clausewitz: War...is an act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our will....Self-imposedrestrictions,almostimperceptibleandhardlyworthmentioning,termedusagesofInternationalLaw,accompanyitwithoutimpairingits power.Violence...isthereforethemeans;thecompulsorysubmissionofthe enemytoourwillistheultimateobject....Insuchdangerousthingsaswar,the errorswhichproceedfromaspiritofbenevolencearetheworst.Astheuseof physicalpowertotheutmostextentbynomeansexcludesthecooperationof theintelligence,itfollowsthathewhousesforceunsparingly,withoutreference tothebloodshedinvolved,mustobtainasuperiorityifhisadversaryusesless vigorinitsapplication.... Tointroduceintothephilosophyofwaritselfaprincipleofmoderationwould beanabsurdity.3
Thesebasicprinciplesoftraditionalwarfareretainalloftheirvalidityin modernwarfare. Althoughviolenceisanunavoidablenecessityinwarfare,certainunnecessaryviolenceoughttoberigorouslybanned.Interrogationsinmodern warfareshouldbeconductedbyspecialistsperfectlyversedinthetechniquestobeemployed. Thefirstconditionforaquickandeffectiveinterrogationistohaveinterrogatorswhoknowwhattheycanasktheterroristunderquestioning.Forthis,it isfirstofallessentialtoplacehimpreciselywithinthediagramoftheorganization to which he belongs.A profound knowledge of the organization is required. It is useless to ask a funds collector about caches of weapons or bombs. Every clandestine organization is strictly compartmented, and he wouldknownothingaboutthem.Toaskhimwouldbeauselesswasteoftime. Ontheotherhand,hedoesknowtowhomheremitsthefundsandunderwhat conditions.Thisistheonlysubjectaboutwhichheshouldbequestioned.
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MODERNWARFARE
It is known that the ordinary terrorist operates as part of a three-man team;thereforeheknowshiscomradeandhisdemi-cellsuperior.Thisis theonlyinformationhewillbeabletofurnish,buthemustgiveitquickly; otherwise,theindividualssoughtwillhavethetimetodisappear,thethread willbebroken,andalengthysearchwillquiteoftencometonaught. Theinterrogatorsmustalwaysstrivenottoinjurethephysicalandmoral integrityofindividuals.Sciencecaneasilyplaceatthearmy’sdisposition themeansforobtainingwhatissought. Butwemustnottriflewithourresponsibilities.Itisdeceitfultopermit artilleryoraviationtobombvillagesandslaughterwomenandchildren, whiletherealenemyusuallyescapes,andtorefuseinterrogationspecialiststherighttoseizethetrulyguiltyterroristandsparetheinnocent. Terrorism in the hands of our adversaries has become a formidable weaponofwarthatwecannolongerpermitourselvestoignore.Triedout inIndochinaandbroughttoperfectioninAlgeria,itcanleadtoanyboldness,evenadirectattackonmetropolitanFrance.ThankstotheCommunist Party,whichisalreadyonthesceneandisfamiliarwithundergroundoperations,itwouldencounternogreatdifficulty. Evenabandofgangsters,lackinganypoliticalideologyatall,butwithoutscruplesanddeterminedtoemploythesamemethods,couldconstitute agravedanger. Inthelightofpresentevents,wecanimagineinitsbroadoutlinesthe unfoldingoffutureaggression: Afeworganizedandwell-trainedmenofactionwillcarryoutareignof terrorinthebigcities.Ifthegoalpursuedisonlytostrewthestreetsnightly withacertainnumberofanonymouscorpsestoterrorizetheinhabitants,a specializedorganizationwouldhavenodifficulty,withintheframeworkof existinglaws,inescapingthepursuitofthepolice.Thenumerousattacks beingcommittednightlyinourlargecities,whicharenothingotherthana prelude to facilitating the creation and training of an important warfare organization,demonstrateinatangiblewaytheinadequacyofatraditional policeforceagainstmodernterrorists.Wheneverabroadattackisunfolded, thepoliceruntheriskofbeingquicklyoverwhelmed. Inthecountryside,andparticularlyinthehillyregionssuchastheMassif Central,theAlps,orBrittany,thepopulationhasnopermanentprotection. Smallbandscouldeasilyblocktrafficthroughdifficultpassesbykillingthe passengersofthefirsttwoorthreeautomobiles.Afewbrutalities,suchas savagelyexecutedpreventiveassassinationsinthesurroundingvillages,will cowtheinhabitantsintoprovidingforthemaintenanceofthebandsandwill discouragethemfromgivingusefulinformationtotheauthorities.
TERRORISM—THEPRINCIPALWEAPON
21
Occasionalpoliceoperationstimidlycarriedoutwithinadequateforces will fail pitifully. These failures will encourage a goodly number of adventurerstoteamupwiththeoriginaloutlaws,whowillrapidlydevelop intorebels. In this fashion, immense zones will be practically abandoned to our adversariesandwillbelosttoourcontrol.Thewaywillbeopentothe guerrilla.Withterrorisminthecitiesandguerrillasinthecountryside,the war will have begun. This is the simple mechanism, now well known, whichcanatanyinstantbeunleashedagainstus. NOTES 1. YassefSaadi,chiefoftheAutonomousZoneofAlgiers(Z.A.A.),saidafter hisarrest:“IhadmybombsplantedinthecitybecauseIdidn’thavetheaircraftto transportthem.Buttheycausedfewervictimsthantheartilleryandairbombardmentsofourmountainvillages.I’minawar,youcannotblameme.” 2. InFranceduringtheNazioccupation,membersoftheResistanceviolated therulesofwarfare.Theyknewtheycouldnothidebehindthem,andtheywere perfectlyawareoftheriskstowhichtheywereexposingthemselves.Theirglory istohavecalmlyfacedthoseriskswithfullknowledgeoftheconsequences. 3. KarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,trans.Col.J.J.Graham(NewYork:E.P. DuttonandCo.),1,2–3.
Chapter5
IDENTIFYINGTHEADVERSARY
Tocarryoutawareffectively,towinit,itisindispensabletoidentifythe adversaryexactly.Thisconditionmustbefulfilledsothatourshotswill strikehome. Formerly,thiswasasimpletask.Accordingtotheperiodofourhistory, hewastobefoundontheothersideoftheRhineortheothersideofthe Channel.Hehadhiswaraims,simpleandprecise,aswehadours.Itwould have been useless to attempt to convert him to our cause or to hope to causehimtogiveupthefightwithouthavingdefeatedhim. Togainavictory,thenationanditsarmyputtoworkallmaterialand moralresources.Anypersonwhodealtwiththeenemy,orwhofavoredhis objectivesinanyway,wasconsideredatraitorandwastreatedassuch. Inmodernwarfare,theenemyisfarmoredifficulttoidentify.Nophysical frontier separates the two camps.The line of demarcation between friend and foe passes through the very heart of the nation, through the samevillage,andsometimesdividesthesamefamily.Itisanon-physical, oftenideologicalboundary,whichmusthoweverbeexpresslydelineated ifwewanttoreachtheadversaryandtodefeathim. Sincethemilitaryartissimplyandcompletelyoneofaction,itisonly whenwehaveidentifiedtheenemythattheapparentlycomplexproblems posedtothearmybymodernwarfarecanbereducedtorealisticproportionsandeasilyresolved.Thecriteriaforarrivingatsuchapointwillbe difficult to establish; however, a study of the causes of the war and the aimspursuedbytheadversarywillpermitustodiscoverthem.
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MODERNWARFARE
Theperiodofpreparationbeforetheopeningofhostilitiesgenerally takes place under cover of a legally established political party; our opponents can thus get themselves within our frontiers and under the protectionofourlaws.Coveredbylegality,theywillstrivetocreatea climatefavorabletotheircausewithinthecountryandabroadandto establish on our own territory the essential elements of their warfare organization. Thefactthatmodernwarfareisnotofficiallydeclared,thatastateof warisnotgenerallyproclaimed,permitstheadversarytocontinuetotake advantage of peacetime legislation, to pursue his activities both openly andsecretly.Hewillstrivebyeverymeanstopreservethefictionofpeace, whichissoessentialtothepursuitofhisdesign. Therefore,thesurestmeansofunveilingtheadversaryistodeclarea stateofwarattheearliestmoment,attheverylatestwhenthefirstsymptoms of the struggle are revealed in political assassinations, terrorism, guerrillaactivities,etc. Atthisstagethepreparationoftheopponentwillbequitewelladvanced andthedangerverygreat;tominimizethiswouldbeadisastrousmistake. Henceforth,anypartythathassupportedorcontinuestosupporttheenemy shallbeconsideredapartyoftheenemy. Thenationattackedmustfallinbehindthegovernmentanditsarmy.An armycanthrowitselfintoacampaignonlywhenithasthemoralsupport ofthenation;itisthenation’sfaithfulreflectionbecauseitiscomposedof thenation’syouthandbecauseitcarrieswithinitthehopesofthenation. Itsunquestionedactionsshouldbepraisedbythenationtomaintainthe nobility of the just cause it has been charged to make triumphant. The army,whoseresponsibilityitistodobattle,mustreceivetheunreserved, affectionate,anddevotedsupportofthenation.Anypropagandatending toundermineitsmorale,causingittodoubtthenecessityofitssacrifices, shouldbeunmercifullyrepressed. Thearmywillthenknowwheretostrike.Anyindividualwho,inany fashionwhatsoever,favorstheobjectivesoftheenemywillbeconsidered atraitorandtreatedassuch. In totalitarian countries, ideological boundaries are extended to the country’sgeographiclimits,sothattheremaybenodoubtastotheenemy tobestruck.Allenemiesoftheestablishedpowerareeliminatedordriven outofthenationalterritory. Althoughweshouldavoidtheseextrememeasures,whichareunquestionablyincompatiblewiththeidealsoflibertydeartousandtothecivilizationwearedefending,wecannot,obviously,defeatanenemywehave notclearlyidentified.
IDENTIFYINGTHEADVERSARY
25
Weknowthattheenemyconsistsnotofafewarmedbandsfightingon theground,butofanorganizationthatfeedshim,informshim,andsustains his morale. This is a state of affairs that democracy tolerates within an attackednation,butitenablestheenemytoactsecretlyoropenlyinsucha waythatmeasureswhichmightdealhimadecisiveblowareeithernever takenorareindefinitelydelayed.
Chapter6
DEFENSEOFTHETERRITORY
Sincethestakeinmodernwarfareisthecontrolofthepopulace,thefirst objectiveistoassurethepeopletheirprotectionbygivingthemthemeans ofdefendingthemselves,especiallyagainstterrorism. Wethenhavetocreateandtrainorganizationscapableofdetectingthe elementsourenemieswillstrivetointroduceintoourterritorypreparatory totheopenstruggle. Finally,ifhostilitiesbreakout,ifterrorismandguerrillaactivityhave establishedthemselvesoveralargeportionofourterritory,wemustcombatthemwiththeappropriatemethods,whichwillbefarmoreeffective thanthosewhichwouldhavebeenconsideredandusedinpeacetime. THEINHABITANTS’ORGANIZATION Militaryschoolsteachingclassicdoctrinesofwarfarerelyuponanumber ofdecisionfactors—themission,theenemy,theterrain,andtheresources. But one factor that is essential to the conduct of modern warfare is omitted—theinhabitant. Thebattlefieldtodayisnolongerrestricted.Itislimitless;itcanencompassentirenations.Theinhabitantinhishomeisthecenteroftheconflict. Amidstthecontinuingmovementofmilitaryactions,heisthestablestelement.Likeitornot,thetwocampsarecompelledtomakehimparticipatein thecombat;inacertainsense,hehasbecomeacombatantalso.Therefore, itisessentialtopreparehimfortherolehewillhavetoplayandtoenable himtofulfilliteffectivelyonourside.
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MODERNWARFARE
Fortheinhabitanttoeludethethreatsoftheenemy,toceasetobeanisolatedtargetthatnopoliceforcecanprotect,wemusthavehimparticipatein hisowndefense.Tothisend,wehavehimenterintoastructuredorganizationencompassingtheentirepopulation.Nooneshallbeabletoavoidthis service,andeachpersonatanymomentwillbesubjecttotheordersofhis civilormilitarysuperiorstoparticipateinprotectivemeasures. Controlofthemassesthroughatightorganization,oftenthroughseveral parallelorganizations,isthemasterweaponofmodernwarfare.Thisis whatpermitstheenemytouncoverquicklyanyhostileelementwithina subjugatedpopulation.Onlywhenwehavecreatedasimilarorganization willwebeabletodiscover,andasquicklyeliminate,thoseindividualsthe enemytriestointroduceamongus. Thecreationofsuchanorganizationmayrunintoseriousdifficulties, buttheyarenotinsurmountableifwefirmlydesiretosucceed.Therewill benolackofgoodwill;dangerwillcreateit.Theexperienceofthebattle ofAlgiersprovidesuswithasoundbasisforthisassumption. First, we designate an energetic and intelligent man in each city who will,withoneormorereliableassistants,buildtheprojectedorganization withaminimumofhelpfromtheauthorities. Theprincipleisverysimple.Thedesignatedleaderdividesthecityinto districts,attheheadofeachofwhichheplacesachiefandtwoorthree assistants.These,inturn,dividethedistrictintosub-districtsanddesignate achiefandseveralassistantsforeachofthem.Finally,eachbuildingor groupofhousesreceivesachiefandtwoorthreeassistantswhowillbein directcontactwiththepopulace. Carefulinvestigationisnecessarybeforedesignatingmembersofthe organizationandtopreventfailures.Nevertheless,makingeachmemberresponsibleforthedesignationandcontrolofhisimmediatesubordinates will permit rapid creation of the organization on a sound foundation. Inouroverseasterritoriesorduringaperiodofcrisisathome,whenfor a variety of reasons we may not be sure of the loyalty of the people— particularly if the enemy organization previously created is sufficiently strong to oblige the population to walk carefully—the problem will be more complex, since the inhabitants will reject any responsibility that mightsubjectthemtotheadversary’sretaliation. Inthiscase,thepyramidofourorganizationiscreatedfromthebottom upbythepoliceforceschargedwithmaintainingorder.Mobilegendarmeriesquadrons,withtheiraccustomedpolicecontactswiththepeople, willbeespeciallyqualifiedtoperformthisdelicatetask. First,theyconductacarefulcensusoftheentirepopulation.Thebasic leaderoftheorganizationalstructurewillbetheheadofthefamily.Heis
DEFENSEOFTHETERRITORY
29
made responsible for all inhabitants of his apartment or house, and for keepinguptodatethelistestablishedatthetimeofthecensus. During the taking of the census, we designate at the next echelon a chiefofagroupofhouses(orofabuilding,orafloorofabuilding),who willberesponsibleforacertainnumberofheadsoffamily,fourorfive atmost. Finally, when the census is completed and a close relationship established with the population, chiefs of sub-districts will be designated. Accordingtothewayinwhichthecityisdividedup,itwillbepossiblefor asub-districtleadertobemaderesponsibleforsometenchiefsofhouse groups.Sincethisindividualwillplayakeyrole,thedistrictcommander shouldappointhimandthenonlyaftercarefulinvestigation.Theessential qualityofapotentialsub-districtleaderisthathehavefirmattachmentsin thesub-district(abusinessorshop,affluence,alargefamily).Thatis,he shouldhaveastandardoflivingorfamilytiesthatitwouldbedifficultfor himtoabandon. There will be no structural echelon above the sub-district leader. His roleistooimportantforhimtobeeasilycommanded,andhewillbetoo vulnerableatargetfortheenemy.Theorganizationwillactuallybeapyramidofwhichthesub-districtleaderwillconstitutetheapex. Incaseofwar,aspecialcivilandmilitaryorganismissetupforanentire medium-sizedcityorfordistrictsinthelargercities.Itsessentialroleisto transmitorderstothesub-districtleaders,toseetotheirexecution,andto gatherinformationthesub-districtleaderswillprovide.Havingpermanent contactwiththesub-districtleaders,thisspecialorganismwillensurecontinuingandcorrectexecutionofinstructionsissuedtothevariousechelons oftheorganization. Thepopulationcensuswillpermiteachinhabitanttobegivenacensus card, one or two copies of which will remain in the possession of the forcesoforder. Thecardwillincludeaphotographoftheindividual,aswellas,say,his house-groupnumber(e.g.,3),theletterofthesub-district(B),thenumber ofthedistrict(2),andtheletterdesignatingthecity(A).Theresultwill constitutewhatamountstoacatalognumber(A.2.B.3.),whichwill,inthe courseoffrequentchecks,enableustokeeptabsoneachindividualandon theabilityoftheleadersuponwhomhedepends. Thisorganizationwillpermitthecommandtoenlisttheparticipationof thepopulaceinitsownprotection.Toacertainextent,itwillbeableto participateinthetasksoftheforcesoforderandcarryoutsimplepolice missions.Detection,surveillance,andoccasionallythearrestofdangerous individuals will be managed without difficulty, and the transmission of instructionwillalwaysbeeasyandquick.Theorganizationwillrapidly
30
MODERNWARFARE
becomeoneoftheessentialelementsoftheterritorialcommandandwill assume an ever increasing importance.A special office, which we shall callthebureauoftheinhabitants’organizationandcontrol,willbenecessarytomonitortheorganization’sactivity. Incaseofemergency,thisorganismwouldbeinapositiontoestablish without delay very strict control over food supplies, animals, and all resources our adversaries could use against us. This organization will enablethepreciseidentificationoftheoutlaw:Anyindividualwhoisslow toestablishhimselfanddoesnotentertheorganizationwould,ineffect,be anoutlaw. Acarefulsearchofthepopulationisnecessarytofindmencapableof beingleadersoftheorganizationatitsvariousechelons.Thebulkofthe populationisbyhabitortraditionnormallydevotedtoestablishedauthorityandtheforcesoforder.Thepeoplewillbereadytohelpifweasktheir aid,ontheconditionthatwewillatalltimessupportandprotectthosewho are on our side. This protection is one of the essential missions of the inhabitants’organization. Goodwillisneverlackingeveninthemosttroubledoftimes.Indochina and,later,Algeriahaveamplyproventhis.Butweoughtnevertoforget that ambition has always been a powerful incentive for a young and dynamicelitethatwishestogetoutofitsrutandarrive.Itislargelytothis youththatwemustappeal.Wemustbindthemtousandcompensateservicesrenderedaccordingtotheirworth. Finally,ofcourse,wemayalwaysassureourselvesoftheirloyaltyby placing them within an organization it will be difficult to leave once admitted. Thisinhabitants’organizationcertainlyrunscountertoourtraditional spiritofindividualismandmaypromotedangerstoourlibertiesthatwe must not minimize. The analogy with certain totalitarian organizations willaffordouradversarieseasyopportunitiestoattackus. Butwecannotpermitourselvestobedeluded.Thereisafundamental difference.Ourorganizationisadefensiveone,thesoleaimofwhichisto ensuretheprotectionofthepopulace,particularlyagainstthedangerof terrorism.Noindividualenteringitneedabdicateaparticleofhisbasic liberties;butinthefaceofacommonenemy,eachwillgiveunderdisciplinehistotalandunreservedassistancetohisfellowsandhissuperiors. Oncethewariswonorthedangerhaspassed,ourorganizationwillhave noreasontoexist. Abusesarealwayspossible.Theorganizationwillhavetobeseriously controlled,sothatitremainssolelyameansofprotectionagainsttheexternalenemyanddoesnotbecomeavehicleforinternalpoliticalpressure. Thiscannothappenifitiscreatedinaspiritofjusticeandiftheburdensit
DEFENSEOFTHETERRITORY
31
necessitates are equitably shared among all the inhabitants of a given region,nomatterwhattheirsocialcircumstancesmaybe. Oneshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatthisisthesolemeanswehave toassuretheprotectionofpeacefulcitizensandtopreventterrorismfrom forcingthemintoaharshandinhumanservitude. Formerly,nationsspenthugesumsfortheconstructionoffortifications designed to protect themselves against invasion. Today, the inhabitants’ organization, the elite formation designed as a framework for protection and to give us information about the enemy’s clandestine penetration of ourterritory, constitutes the modern means of defense against modern warfare. Anycountrythatdoesnotcreatesuchanorganizationrunsapermanent dangerofbeinginvaded.Thefinancialoutlayscalledforcannotbecomparedwiththoseneededfortheconstructionofelaboratefortifications.We havenoexcuseifwedonotcreatesuchanorganization. COUNTRYWIDEINTELLIGENCE Withareliableintelligenceservice,wewouldbeabletodetectallinfiltrationattemptsagainstourterritoryandtodiscoverwhoarethoseindispensabletotheenemy’spreparationofhisprojectedoffensiveaction. The inhabitants will know them, since they suffer terribly from their activities,butwillnotdenouncetheseagentsunlesstheycandosowithout risk.Fearofreprisalwillalwayspreventthemfromcommunicatingtous informationtheypossess. The inhabitants’ organization, which in large measure assures their security, will therefore be an important organism for information. In its verycreation,itpassestheentirepopulationthroughasieveandlearnsthe circumstancesinwhicheachpersonlives.Contactsaremade,andacertain confidenceintheforcesoforderestablished. Then,frequentmeetingsofresponsibleleadersatvariousechelonswill permitregularandfrequentrelationsbetweentheauthoritiesandqualified representativesofthepeople.Muchinformationwillalsobegathered,the sourceofwhichouradversarieswillnotsucceedindiscovering.Wewill thushavecreatedaninitialelementofsecurityandunderstanding. Wecannothopetotransformalltheinhabitantsintoagents.Butsince modernwarfareassertsitspresenceonthetotalityofthepopulation,we havetobeeverywhereinformed.Therefore,wemusthaveavastintelligencenetwork,whichoughttobesetup,ifpossible,beforetheopeningof hostilities. Duringaperiodofcrisis,wecomplainofnotbeingbetterinformed.We accusethepeopleunjustlyofconcealingthetruthorofnotgivingusthe
32
MODERNWARFARE
informationtheypossess.Andveryoften,becausewehavenotprepared anything,wewillbetemptedtoobtainbyviolenceinformationthatawellorganizedservicewouldhavegivenuswithoutdifficulty. Selectiveterrorism,aswehaveseen,will,evenbeforetheopeningof hostilities,putanendtoourregularintelligenceagents.Leadersandsmall functionariesareitsfirstvictims.Thethreatoftheenemy’swarfareorganization quickly condemns the population to silence. When hostilities begin,weshallbecutoffprecipitouslyfromallsourcesofinformationif wehavemadenoprovisiontoguardagainstit. Evenbeforetheinhabitantshavebeenorganized,weoughttogiveaportionofthepopulacethechanceofinformingussecurely.Thetimeispast when a specialized service could recruit a few agents haphazardly and fromaquitespecialsectorofsociety. Wehavetohavenumerousandsecretlyestablishedcentersofaccelerated training, where we will be able to train quickly a great number of inhabitantsintheagentrolesweshallaskthemtoplay.Theirtrainingwill beessentiallypractical:Itwillbelimitedtoteachingthemafewelementaryproceduresfortransmittingsimpleinformation(telephone,letterbox, dead-drop,etc.),whichwillbesufficienttoensuretheirprotection. We then distribute them throughout all phases of human activity— factories,yards,administrativeoffices,thelargepublicservices—everywhere peoplegatherwewillbepresent,thankstothem.Weshallalmostalways beabletorecruitthemintheverycirclesofinteresttous;ifnot,weshall getthemjobsappropriatetotheirprofessionalorvocationalaptitudesthat willservethemascover. These“benevolent”agentscangiveusinformationontheirmilieuand informusoftheagentstheenemyattemptstoinfiltrateintothepopulation— thatis,suchbasicactivistsasfundcollectors,propagandists,strikeleaders, etc., who usually constitute the first echelon of the opponent’s organization.Workingamongthem,oftenintheirverymidst,ouragents candiscoverthemwithoutdifficulty. This intelligence network, despite its extent and the considerable number of agents it will put to work, can be created at little expense. Their employment itself will provide the agents with a steady income. Variouspremiumsforproductionwillusuallybesufficienttosustaintheir enthusiasm. Informationisnothinginitself,particularlyduringacrisis,ifitisnot quickly exploited. Therefore, we must create an intelligence-action servicecapableofexploitingitsowninformationintheshortestpossibletime. Certainindividualsofourbroadlybasedintelligencesystem,afterprovingtheirexceptionalqualities,willbeabletoentertheintelligence-action
DEFENSEOFTHETERRITORY
33
service.Theyoughttobecapableofdetecting,following,andsometimes evenarrestingtheenemyagentstheyuncover. Butourbestagentswillbefurnishedtousbytheenemyhimself.During thecourseofinterrogations,weshouldalwaysbearinmindthatthemajorityofindividualsarrested,ifwehaveenoughflexibility,canchangecamp. Many among them have passed over to the service of the enemy only throughduressandhavebeenkepttheresolelybyacontinuingthreatof blackmail.Ifwegenerouslyofferthemanotherpathwithourprotection, theywillbecomeourmostfaithfulcollaborators. Asforothers,itwillsufficetoleadthemtodenounceopenlymembers oftheorganizationwhomtheyknow,particularlytheirsuperiorsandtheir subordinates.Fromthenon,theyarenolongerabletobetrayusandwill collaboratewithusifonlytoassuretheirownprotection. Finally, experience has demonstrated that, although confessions and conversions may be difficult to obtain at lower echelons, they are, at a higherlevel,andespeciallyamongintellectuals,usuallyeasyandquick. Itisthusthatweshallrecruitthebasicagentsofourintelligence-action service.Welltrainedbyspecialistsoftheforcesoforder,theywillthemselvesbepreparedtoexploittheirowninformationinthedestructionof theopposingorganization. But,exceptforafewindividualscapableofplayingadouble-agentrole, profitableuseofthemisofshortduration.Weshallhavetorenewthem frequently,particularlyafteralltheirinformationhasbeenexploited. Thisserviceshouldcooperatewithalltheelementschargedwithexploitingleads,bepreparedtofollowcloselyallpoliceoperations,andbeau courant of all arrests so as to utilize to the maximum all recruitment possibilities. Awell-organizedintelligenceservicecanmakeusawareofthestructure of the warfare organization our opponents seek to implant upon our territory. Themosteffectivesolutionwouldnodoubtconsistofdestroyingthese opponents before they constitute a danger. However, if for various reasons—ingeneral,politicalones—wearenotauthorizedtodothis,we ought to observe their development closely so as to be in a position to arrestthemthemomenttheorderisgiven. Thebestwaytobewellinformedconsistsinintroducingourownagents intotheorganizationoftheenemyandincorruptinghisagents.Thisisa delicatetaskthatonlyafewprovenagentswillbeabletoaccomplish. Astheadversary’sorganizationbeginstoexpand,ouropponents,workinginanenemycountry,willfindthattheirfreedomofactionbecomes morelimited.Theyrunintoincreasingdifficultiesastheyrecruitmoreand morepersons;theyarenolongerabletoexercisetightcontroloveralltheir
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agents.Thenwewillhavetheopportunitiesofintroducingourownagents intotheirorganization,andweoughttoexploitthem. Here again, the best candidates will be furnished to us by the enemy himself.Thesecurityofaclandestineorganizationisassuredbyrigorous compartmentation.Personalcontactsare,forreasonsofsecurity,rareat higherechelons.Awell-trainedintelligence-actionserviceshouldbeable tomakefrequentarrestsofmembersoftheenemyorganizationinutmost secrecy.Weshouldtrytomakethempassquicklyintoourservice,permittingthemtoremainwithintheirownorganizationafterhavingestablished asuresystemofcommunications. Weshouldnotunderestimateouradversaries,norshouldweoverestimate themandattributetothempowerstheydonotpossess.They,too,willalways haveinnumerabledifficultiestoovercome.Thethingthatmakestheirtask easyistheabsenceofaspecialservicecreatedtocombatthem,andthepracticallytotalfreedomwepermittheminthefieldofclandestinity. Ifweprepareourselvesinpeacetimetofacemodernwarfare,ifweprovidethepeoplewithameansofdefendingthemselves,ifwetakeprecautionstobeinformedatalltimesofthepreparationsandtheintentionsofour adversaries,thenweshallhavenodifficultyinquicklytakingthenecessary actionwhenthetimecomestoreduceouradversariestoimpotence. Thiscapabilitywillnotgounnoticed;initself,itmaybesufficientto discourageanyattemptatatrialofforceandservetomaintainthepeace. If,however,ouradversariesshoulddecidetopassovertoopenwarfare,we would have at hand the means of crushing any enemy who attempts to carrythewarontoourterritory. Butifthemeasuresdecribedabovearenotadopted,ouradversarieswill beabletoundertakeanopenstruggletoattaintheirfinalobjective,which istooverthrowtheestablishedauthorityandtoreplaceitwiththeirown system. Sinceitisthepopulationthatisatstake,thestrugglewillassumetwo aspects: Political—direct action on the population; and military—the struggleagainstthearmedforcesoftheaggressor.Ouradversarieswillnot openhostilitiesuntilacertainnumberofpreliminaryconditionshavebeen realized.Bythattimetheirinfiltrationofourpositionwillbeprofoundand extensive.Itwillbepossibletoeradicateitonlybypowerfulmeans,afirm intentiontoprevail,andaconsiderableinvestmentintime.
PartTwo
THEPOLITICALANDMILITARY CONDUCTOFTHEWAR
I.THEPOLITICALASPECT
Chapter7
DIRECTACTIONONTHE POPULATIONSOFCITIES
Internalwarfarewithinapopulation,particularlyincities,generallyinvolves anextensivepoliceoperation.Thereisalsoanintensivepropagandaeffort, destined primarily to make the steps that are taken understood.A broad socialprogram follows,theobjectiveofwhich is to give the people the material and moral assistance necessary to permit them to resume their normalactivitiesquicklyafteroperationsareover. We have seen how action against the population is conducted by the enemy,andwestressedtheprimaryroleofterrorismsupportedbyawarfareorganization. Anyactionstakenincitiesagainstenemyorganizationswillbeessentially broadpoliceoperationsandwillbeperformedbytheregularpoliceforcesif theseareadequateandcapable.Ifnot,thearmymaytakeoverthetask. Themissionofthepoliceoperationisnotmerelytoseekafewindividualswhohavecarriedoutterroristattacks,buttoeliminatefromthemidst ofthepopulationtheentireenemyorganizationthathasinfiltrateditand ismanipulatingitatwill. Simultaneously,unitsofthearmywillspreadtheiractivitythroughout theentirecity,throwingoveritanimmensenettooverlaythepoliceforces alreadyinplace.Thepoliceorganizationwillnotbedisturbed,butwill continuetooperatewithinitsnormalframeworkwhilecooperatingcompletelywiththearmy. Withoutfearofreactionfromtheenemy,thearmywilloperateinlight detachments.Ahighlymobilereserveelement,thesizeofacompany,will usuallyallowthehandlingofanyunforeseeneventualityinevenalargecity.
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The police forces can take advantage of the army’s presence and the protectionandassistancethatitwillaffordtoundertakewithoutdelay(as described in the preceding chapter) the organization and control of the population,thecreationofabroadlybasedintelligenceservice,andthe establishmentofanintelligence-actionservice—allofwhichoughttostart functioningasquicklyaspossible. Inthisway,wecanopposetheenemywithourownorganization.Ifwe areserious,itwillquicklybeinplace.Workingopenlyinasystematicway andwithgreatresources,theforcesoforderwilloftenbeabletooutrun theenemy,who,obligedtooperateinsecret,hasonlylimitedresourcesat hisdisposal. Then,incollaborationwiththepoliceservices,weobtainasmuchinformation as possible on the organization to be destroyed and then reconstruct,ifpossible,itsorganizationalchart.Sinceitisadaptedtoeachcity accordingtothecity’simportanceandthelocalsituation,theorganization willrarelybeverydifferentinitsgeneralstructurefromthatofAlgiersin 1956–57,describedatthebeginningofthisstudy. Theforcesofordermustsimultaneouslyinitiatenormalpoliceoperations,whichfromtheoutsetwillrunintoseriousdifficulties.Weknowthat iftheenemyopenshostilitiesitisbecausecertainpreliminaryconditions havebeenmet:Principally,heiscapableofexercisingastrongholdover thepopulacehisattackshaveterrorized. Thepeopleknowcertainkeypersonsintheenemyorganization—fund collectors,activists,andterroristsofthearmedgroupswholiveinpermanentcontactwiththepopulation.Buttheywillnotdenouncethemunless theycandosoinsafety.Therefore,assuringthissafetyisoneofthefirst aimsoftheinhabitants’organizationandtheintelligenceservice.Wecannot wait, however, until an intelligence network has been set up before obtainingfromthepopulationtheinformationweneed.Operationsmust beginassoonasthearmyhastakenupitsposition. The inhabitants are first mustered entirely, by city district. They are quicklyinterrogated,individuallyandinsecret,inaseriesofpreviously arrangedsmallrooms.Anynoncommissionedofficeroftheunitcanask themsimplequestions,themostfrequentofwhichwillbe,“Whoinyour districtcollectstheorganization’sfunds?” Astimegoeson,weincreasethenumberofinterrogationteams.Certain inhabitants,assuredthattheiridentitieswillnotbedisclosed,willreadily givetheinformationrequested.Afterverifyingthisdata,weproceedtothe arrestoftheindividualswhohavebeensingledout.Inthismanner,wecan capturethefirst-echelonelementsoftheenemyorganization. Exceptforrarecasesofemergency,thearrestsshouldtakeplaceatnight, facilitatedbyacurfew.Theforcesofordercaneasilywatchallthestreets
DIRECTACTIONONTHEPOPULATIONSOFCITIES
39
ofacitywithaminimumoftroops.Anyonefoundawayfromhishomeat night is suspect, and will be arrested and interrogated. Numerous small patrolswillmoveaboutrapidlyandsecurelyapprehendmostoftheindividualssoughtintheirhomes.Theseareinterrogatedonthespotbyspecializedteams.Theymustgivequicklythenamesandaddressesoftheir superiors,sothatthelattermaybearrestedbeforetheliftingofthecurfew. Duringtheday,theywouldsurelybeforewarnedandwouldplacethemselvesbeyondourreach.Aseriesofnightraidswillcauseimportantelementsoftheenemyorganizationtofallintoourhandsandwilldisruptit. Thereareothereffectiveintelligenceandcontrolprocedures.Whenwe arrest important leaders, we carefully disguise them and line up before themallpersonspickedupinthecourseofpoliceraids.Theleaderswill beabletopointoutmembersoftheirorganizationtheyrecognize,whom wecanarrestonthespot.Atothertimes,wemayplacetheleadersinconcealed “observation posts,” set up at heavily trafficked points in a city, fromwhichtheywillindicate(byradioorothermeans)recognizedindividualstosurveillanceteamswhowillquicklyapprehendthem. Oneofourmosteffectivemethodsisthecensuscard(alreadydescribed) issuedtoeachindividual.Ofcourse,theimportantmembersoftheenemy organizationalwayshaveoneormorepseudonyms,butcertaininhabitants have met them at one time or other, although they may not know their name,function,orplaceofresidence.However,theycanreadilyrecognize themfromthephotographsonthecopiesofthecensuscardretainedbythe authorities.Atonetime,wecanobtainnotonlytheirexactaddress,but alsothenamesofthosewhoareresponsiblefortheirmovements(chiefsof house-groupsandchiefsofsub-districts). But the conduct of a police operation in the middle of a city raises numerousdifficulties.Weshouldnotethemainonessothatwemaybe abletoovercomethem. 1.Modernwarfareisanewexperienceforthemajorityofourfellow citizens.Evenamongourfriends,thesystematicconductofraidswillrun intoopposition,resultinggenerallyfromatotallackofunderstandingof theenemyandhismethodsofwarfare.Thiswilloftenbeverydifficultto overcome. Forexample,thefactthattheenemy’swarfareorganizationinasingle citymayconsistofseveralthousandmenwillcomeasasurpriseevento themajorityofhighadministrativefunctionaries,whothoughtsincerely thattheyweredealingwithonlyafewisolatedcriminals. Oneofthefirstproblemsencountered,thatoflodgingtheindividuals arrested,willgenerallynothavebeenanticipated.Prisons,designedessentiallytoaccommodateoffendersagainstcommonlaw,willrapidlybecome inadequateandwillnotmeetourneeds.Wewillbecompelledtointernthe
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prisonersunderimprovised,oftendeplorableconditions,whichwilllead tojustifiablecriticismouradversarieswillexploit.Fromthebeginningof hostilities,prisoncampsshouldbesetupaccordingtotheconditionslaid downbytheGenevaConvention.Theyshouldbesufficientlylargetotake careofallprisonersuntiltheendofthewar. 2.Byeverymeans—andthisisaquitelegitimatetactic—ouropponents willseektoslowdownand,ifpossible,putanendtoouroperations.The factthatastateofwarwillgenerallynothavebeendeclaredwillbe,aswe havealreadyindicated,oneoftheirmosteffectivemeansofachievingthis. Inparticular,theywillattempttohavearrestedterroriststreatedasordinarycriminalsandtohavemembersoftheirorganizationconsideredas minorpeacetimeoffenders. Onthissubject,thefilesoftheAlgiersterroristorganizationdivulged someparticularlyinterestingdocuments. “Wearenolongerprotectedbylegality,”wrotethechiefoftheAlgiers F.L.N.in1957,whenthearmyhadtakenoverthefunctionsofthepolice. “Weaskallourfriendstodotheimpossibletohavelegalityre-established; otherwisewearelost.” Actually,thepeacetimelawsgaveourenemiesmaximumopportunities forevadingpursuit;itwasvitaltothemthatlegalitybestrictlyapplied. Theappealwasnotlaunchedinvain.Shortlythereafter,aviolentpress campaign was unleashed, both in France and abroad, demanding that peacetimelawsbestrictlyadheredtointhecourseofpoliceoperations. 3.Warfareoperations,especiallythoseofapolicenatureinalargecity, take place in the very midst of the populace, almost in public, whereas formerlytheyoccurredonabattlefield,towhichonlyarmedforceshad access. Certainharshactionscaneasilypassforbrutalitiesintheeyesofasensitivepublic.Anditisafactalsothat,intheprocessofextirpatingtheterroristorganizationfromtheirmidst,thepeoplewillbemanhandled,lined up,interrogated,searched.Dayandnight,armedsoldierswillmakeunexpectedintrusionsintothehomesofpeacefulcitizenstocarryoutnecessary arrests.Fightingmayoccurinwhichtheinhabitantswillsuffer. People who know our adversaries will not protest in submitting to inconveniences they know to be necessary for the recovery of their liberty. But our enemies will not fail to exploit the situation for their propagandaneeds. Nevertheless, even if some brutality is inevitable, rigorous discipline mustalwaysbeenforcedtopreventwantonacts.Thearmyhasthemeans ofdemandingandmaintainingfirmdiscipline.Ithasatitsdisposalitsown systemofjustice,preciselycreatedtocheckquicklymisdeedsorcrimes committedbymilitarypersonnelintheexerciseoftheirduties.Thearmy mustapplythelawwithouthesitation.
DIRECTACTIONONTHEPOPULATIONSOFCITIES
41
Undernopretext,however,canagovernmentpermititselftobecome engagedinapolemicagainsttheforcesoforderinthisrespect,asituation thatcanbenefitonlyouradversaries. Police action will therefore be actual operational warfare. It will be methodicallypursueduntiltheenemyorganizationhasbeenentirelyannihilated.Itwillnotenduntilwehaveorganizedthepopulationandcreated anefficientintelligenceservicetoenableittodefenditself.Thisorganizationwillhavetobemaintaineduntiltheendofhostilitiestopreventany returnbytheenemytotheoffensive.AfterthebattleofAlgiersin1957, theFrenchGovernment,underpressurefromouradversaries,permitted thedismantlingofeverythingthearmyhadbuiltup.Threeyearslater,the enemy was able to re-establish his organization and once again to take control of the population (December, 1960). The victory of Algiers in 1957hadgonefornaught. Ourwaraimsmustbeclearlyknowntothepeople.Theywillhavetobe convincedthatifwecalluponthemtoflghtatoursidesitcanonlybein defenseofajustcause.Andweshouldnotdeceivethem.Thesurestmeans of gaining their confidence will be to crush those who want to oppress them.Whenwehaveplacedtheterroristsoutofharm’sway,theproblem ofpacificationwillbequicklyresolved. Aslongaswehavenotarrivedatsuchapoint,anypropaganda,any solution,howeverskillful,willbeineffectiveonapopulaceinfectedby clandestineorganismsthatpenetratelikeacancerintoitsmidstandterrorizeit.Itisonlywhenwehavedelivereditfromthisevilthatitwillfreely listen,think,andexpressitself.Ajustpeacewillthenbequitepossible. Duringtheperiodofactiveoperations,theroleofpropagandaactionof themasseswillhavelittleeffect.Itwillusuallybelimitedtomakingthe peopleunderstandthatthefrequentlyseveremeasurestakenhavenopurposeotherthantocausetherapiddestructionoftheenemy. With the gradual return to peace, however, propaganda will play an importantroleincausingthesometimesimpatientmassestounderstand thevarietyofproblemsthatmustberesolvedbeforeareturntonormal existenceispossible.Theinhabitants’organizationwillbethemosteffectiveinstrumentofpropagandacontactanddissemination. Thepeopleknowinstinctivelywhatiscorrect.Itisonlybysubstantive measuresthatwewillleadthemtojudgethevalidityofouraction. War has always been a calamity for the people. Formerly, only those inhabitantswhofoundthemselvesinthepathsofthearmieshadtosuffer the calamity. Today, modern warfare strikes the entire population of a country, the inhabitants of the large cities as well as those of the most remoteruraldistricts.
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Theenemy,infiltratedamongthepeople,willalwaystrytodeprivethe inhabitantsoftheirmeansofsubsistence.Itisamongthepeoplethatcombatoperationswilltakeplace,andtheiractivitieswillbelimitedinmany ways.Theywillhavetosuffertheexactingdemandstheenemyinvokesto compelobedience,aswellasthefrequentlyseveremeasurestheforcesof orderareledtotake. It will be the role of the social services to lessen the miseries war engenders. Butwemustnotlosesightofthefactthatanymaterialaidwegivewill only profit the enemy if the organization that permits his control and manipulationofthepeoplehasnotfirstbeendestroyed.Aidmustbeprudentlyadministereduntilthepoliceoperationhasbeencompleted;premature,uncontrolledassistancewouldbeofnousetotheinhabitants. Oncepeacehasbeenestablished,eveninasmallpartoftheterritory, extensiveandgeneroussocialassistancewillbeofprimeimportancein bringingtoourcausemanypeoplewhoareunhappyandoftendisoriented bythemilitaryoperationsandwhowillnothavealwaysunderstoodthe underlyingreasonsforthem. Theconductofmilitaryoperationsinalargecity,inthemidstofthe populace,withoutthebenefitofthepowerfulweaponsitpossesses,iscertainly one of the most delicate and complex problems ever to face anarmy. Tocarryouteffectivepolicework,conductoperationsamongthecitizenry,andcausetheinhabitantstoparticipateactivelyonitsside,areobviouslytasksforwhichthemilitarygenerallyhasnotbeenprepared.Some feelthattheseoperationsshouldbeentirelycarriedoutbythepolice,and thatthearmyshouldkeeptothenoblertask,betteradaptedtoitsspecialty, ofreducingarmedbandsinthefield. Thisisagraveerrorintowhichouradversarieswouldcertainlyliketo leadus.Thejobofthepoliceisonlytoensuretheprotectionofthepeople intimeofpeaceagainstordinaryoffendersorcriminals.Butthepolicedo nothavethemeansofconductingcombatoperationsagainstapowerful enemyorganizationwhoseaimisnottoattackindividualsprotectedbythe police,butrathertoconquerthenationandtooverthrowitsregime. Theprotectionofthenationalterritoryandregimeisquiteclearlythe essentialroleofthearmy.Byandlargeithasthemeansnecessaryforvictory;thereisonlythequestionofwillandmethod.
II.THEMILITARYASPECT
Chapter8
ERRORSINFIGHTINGTHE GUERRILLA
Thebasicweaponofmodernwarfare,particularlyinthecities,isterrorism, supported by a special organization. In the countryside, there is an old methodofcombatthathasproveditselfinthepastandhasbeentakenover andadaptedtoconditionsofmodernwarfare:Itisguerrillawarfare,which isrootedinterrorism. The guerrilla and terrorism are only one stage of modern warfare, designedtocreateasituationfavorabletothebuild-upofaregulararmy forthepurposeofeventuallyconfrontinganenemyarmyonthebattlefield anddefeatinghim. Thegoaloftheguerrilla,duringwhatcanbealongperiodoftime,isnot somuchtoobtainlocalsuccessesasitistocreateaclimateofinsecurity, to compel the forces of order to retire into their most easily defensible areas.Thisresultsintheabandonmentofcertainportionsofterritorythat theguerrillasarethenabletocontrol.Atthebeginningofhostilities,the guerrillasshowthemselvesonlyinminorbutviolentactions,whichthey carryoutbysurprisebutwithcaretoavoidlosses. Dispersionisanecessarypartoftheirdefense.Theirsubsequentregroupingandtransformationintolarge,regularlyorganizedunitsisnotpossible untiltheyhaveacquiredabsolutecontrolofavastareainwhichtheyare abletosecurethesubstantialmaterialaidnecessaryfortheestablishment, training,andenlistmentofaregulararmy. Theappearanceofregularunitsincertainregionsdoesnotmeantheend oftheguerrilla.Hewillcontinueactivelywherevertheestablishmentof regularunitshasnotbeencarriedout.Regularunitsandguerrillabands
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MODERNWARFARE
will cooperate closely to try to bring about a situation favorable to the engagementoftheenemyarmyinadecisivefighttoannihilateit. Modernwarfare,likeclassicalwarsofthepast,willdefinitelyendonly withthecrushingofoneofthetwoarmiesonthebattlefield,orbycapitulationofonesidetothewaraimsoftheopponent. Theorigin,evolution,andefficacyoftheguerrillaarewellknown.Many authorshavestudiedhim,particularlyinthevarioustheatersofoperation ofWorldWarII.HewasunquestionablyasuccessinRussia,France,and Yugoslavia.InChinaandIndochina,itwaspossibletoleadhimtoafinal victoryoverwell-equippedregularmodernarmies.InAlgeria,despitehis meager resources of personnel and materiel, he has for years fought a Frencharmythathasnotsucceededineliminatinghim. Therearethosewhothinkthat,todefeattheguerrilla,itissufficientto fighthimwithhisownweapons;thatis,toopposetheguerrillawiththe counterguerrilla.Inaway,thisiswhatwetriedtodoinIndochinaandthen inAlgeria. But the guerrilla’s weapons and those of a regular army are quitedifferent,evenopposed,inanumberofrespects. Toattempttoemployguerrillatacticsthatweourselvesdonothaveor cannotputtouseistocondemnourselvestoneglectthosethatwedopossessandthatcanhaveadefinite,usefulapplication. I believe that the errors committed and the failures sustained flow in largepartfromconfusionbetweentheguerrilla’spotentialandthatofa regulararmy.ForbriefintervalsinIndochina,wewereabletoplaythepart ofthecounterguerrillaagainsttheVietminh,andeventhatoftheguerrilla. This experience illustrated the difference between the potential of the guerrillaandoftheregulararmysoldier. At the time that the FrenchArmy occupied Than-Uyen on the right bankoftheRedRiver,tothenorthofNghia-LoinThaicountry,thetown anditsairfieldweredefendedbyafortifiedpostatoparockypeak,held by one regular company reinforced by some partisans. But its security wasratherchancy,evenaroundtheimmediateapproachesofthetown, andonnumerousoccasionstheVietminhwereabletoopenfireonthe planesparkedontheairfield. After the fall of Nghia-Lo, the town of Than-Uyen, which had been evacuatedbyair-lift,wasoccupiedbytheVietminh. Then,inOctober,1953,nativemaquisardsfromtherightbankofthe RedRiver,recruitedfromamongpeoplewhohadremainedloyaltous, wereablewiththeirownresourcestoreoccupythePhong-Thoregionand itsairfield,tolaunchasuccessfulraidonLao-Kay,and,finally,toseize Than-Uyenandholditforsevenmonths,deepbehindenemylines.When observerscamebacktothetown,theywerestruckbythefactthatthefortified post had not been reoccupied and the airfield was never guarded.
ERRORSINFIGHTINGTHEGUERRILLA
47
Nonetheless, security was tighter than the previous year when French troopsheldtheposition. The regular troops had observed the airfield and its immediate approaches from the fortified post. Outside of a quite limited circle of vision, they were blind, particularly at night when they missed everything. The Vietminh, who knew the limits of this circle, were able to harassuseasily. Our maquisards, recruited from among and living in the midst of the localpopulation,watchednottheairfield,butrathertheVietminhthemselves.Theyplacedtheiragentseverywhere—inunitsoftheVietminh,in everyvillage,ineveryhouse,andonallthetrailsofthearea.Theentire population was responsible for watching the enemy, and nothing could escapeitsobservation.Whenthemaquisardssignaledusthattheareawas free,ourplaneswereabletolandwithoutriskontheairfield,towhichit wasunnecessarytogivecloseprotection. Thesupportofthepopulationisessentialtotheguerrilla.Inparticular, itpreventshimfrombeingtakenbysurprise,avitalfactorforsuccessin combat.As long as this support is not withdrawn from him, we cannot surprisehim,unlesshecommitssomeblunder,whichisunlikelyifheis welltrainedandbattle-hardened. Thisisthereasonwhymethodscurrentlyemployedagainstguerrillas— such as military outposts, autonomous commando groups or patrols detachedfromsuchposts,isolatedambushes,andwide-rangingsweeps— onlyrarelyachievethehoped-forresults,andthenusuallybyaccident. Militaryoutposts,installedatgreatexpenseinareastobepacified,are ingeneralnotsuccessful.Oftenthevillagestheysurroundareaswellcontrolledbyourenemiesasvillagesquitedistant. Outpostsareusuallyplacedatcommunicationsjunctionsthatmustbe held to secure heavy equipment. They cause the guerrillas no trouble becausethereisnoneedtotakethem.Armedbandscanfreelycirculatein the large areas between the outposts, and can organize and control the populationwithoutinterference.Afewcleverlyplannedterroristattacks cansufficetosubjecttheinhabitantstotheirwill. Inaddition,thedispositionoftheoutpostsisanopenbooktoourenemies,whoobservethemattheirleisure.Theymissnothing. Theonlyusefulnessoftheoutpostsistheobligationtheycreateforus. Tomaintainthemforcesustoopenandkeepuproads,toprotectsupply convoysduringthecourseoflonghauls,andingeneraltocarryonmilitary activityinwhichwewouldnotindulgeifitwerenotfortheoutposts. Tobreakthefeelingofisolation,whichisnotlongincoming,themore active or experienced outposts send out patrols rarely exceeding about sixty men (two platoons) in strength. Certain sectors even make use of specially trained commandos of company strength. Their mission is to
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patroldayandnightapredeterminedsectorbyavarietyofroutes,withthe objectiveofcreatingasenseofinsecurityintheguerrillassurroundingthe postandofreassuringthepeoplebytheirpresence. Thepopulaceseesthecommandosorpatrolspassingthrough,andoften views them sympathetically. But the patrols always pass too quickly to destroytheorganizationtherebelshavesetupineachvillagetoterrorize theinhabitantsandtobendthemtotheirwill—thefundcollectors,organizationleaders,lookouts,etc.Aslongasthisstructureisnotdemolished, thepopulation’sfearwillremainthesameandthetaskofpacificationcan makenoheadway. Awayfromtheiroutpostsorbases,thecommandosorpatrolsareunable to subsist for long—a few days at best, just time enough to use up the rationstheycancarry.Theycannotliveofftheland,becausetheydonot haveattheirdisposaltheresourcestheguerrillasuse.Theguerrillabands haveinhabitantstoguidethem,anorganizationthatpreparestheirbivouac eachday,seestotheirprovisioning,andassurestheirsecurity. The commandos move about blindly, guided only by the reconnaissance elements they send ahead.At night, even with sentinels nearby, their security is precarious at best. Physical and mental wear and tear comerapidly. Inaddition,theyareunabletovarytheiritineraryasmuchastheywould like,particularlyonthetripbackandiftheterrainisdifficult.Theycannot escapetheobservationoftheinhabitantsandthelookouts,whoareableto analyze their habits quickly.They will shortly realize that a patrol on a certainpathwillnotleaveit—sometimesbyforceofhabit,oftenbecauseit hasnowayofgettingout.Nothingwillhappenaslongasourenemiesare unabletobringtogethersufficientforcesforanattack.Butwhenthistime comes,theywillmakethebestofit. Patrolaction,unwearyinglyattemptedbymilitarymenwhostillbelieve itpossibletobeattheenemyonhisownground,isoftenrewardedbyseriousfailures;atbest,itneverproducesconvincingresults. Thatiswhyoutposts,whenfirstestablished,attempttocarryoutsome externalactivity,butthenpullintheirhornsandnevertryagain. Forthesamereasons,isolatedambushesdonotaccomplishanything. Usuallytheyarebetrayedbeforetheytakeplaceandcometonothing;at othertimes,theyactuallydousharm. Pursuitcommandosorisolatedambushesarecombatoperationsthe guerrillacanemploywiththebackingofthepopulationandwhenhe has a support organization on the spot.As long as we are unable to resort to the same methods, we will achieve only mediocre results, which are disproportionate to the risks run and the efforts demanded fromthesoldiers.
ERRORSINFIGHTINGTHEGUERRILLA
49
Large-unit sweeps, conducted with conventional resources within aframework similar to that of conventional warfare, and invariably limitedintime,1temporarilydisperseguerrillabandsratherthandestroy them. Anormaloperationofthistypeusuallyconsistsintheattemptedsurprise encirclementofawell-definedzoneinwhichguerrillasarethoughttobe located,whilemobileelementsconductamopping-upoperation.Despite theingenuity,evenmastery,whichsomecommandershavedemonstrated inmovingtheirunitsabout,theseoperationsarealwaysthesame. Surprise,thatessentialfactorofsuccess,ispracticallyneverrealized.As wehaveseen,thepeopleamongwhomourtroopsliveandmovehaveas theirmissiontheinformingoftheguerrillas,andnomovementoftroopscan escapethem.Thenooseisnevercompletelytightened.Thetroopscharged withthemop-upoperationsarealwaystoofewinnumbertosearchavast anddifficultterraininwhichthedispersedbandsareabletodisappearduringthebriefoperation. Traditionallyattractedbythepurelymilitaryaspectofwarfare—thatis, bythepursuitanddestructionincombatofguerrillabandsontheground— operationalcommandersinvariablyhopetosucceedinmaneuveringthem likeregularunitsandtogainarapidandspectacularsuccess.Theyhave littleinterestinthelessnobletask,howeveressential,ofsubtleworkwith the population and the destruction of the clandestine organization that enablesguerrillabandstosurvivedespitelocaldefeatstheforcesoforder periodicallyinflict. Only a long occupation of the countryside, which will permit police operationsamongthepeopleanalogoustothosecarriedoutinthecities, cansucceed. The certainty of never running the risk of a clear defeat, such as an equallyarmedopponentcouldinflictuponus,enablesanymilitarycommandertoconductsomesortofoperation.Evenifguerrillabandsarenot destroyed, at least geographical objectives are secured within the prescribedtime,andafewdeadrebelswillalwaysbalancetheaccount.If, moreover,afewarmsarerecovered,theoperation,whichhasbeencarried outlikeanormalpeacetimemaneuver,thenassumesanairofbattleand victorysufficienttosatisfyacommanderwhoisnottooexacting. Butthatwhichisessential—thedestructionoftheenemy’spotentialfor warfare—isneveraccomplished,principallybecauseitisneverseriously contemplated. Ifitisstillnecessarytoremoveanyillusionregardingthepossibilityof conducting a surprise envelopment against guerrillas, under conditions wherethepopulationhasnotyetbeenbroughtundercontrolbytheforces oforder,anaccountbyaformerofficerinIndochinafollows:
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In1948,inacertainsector,IwasabletoestablishrelationswithaVietminh captaininchargeofacommand(aBoDoi)thatwasindependentoftheenemy regimentstationedintheregion.HehimselfwasnotaCommunist,although the entire cadre of the regiment was. Still, he was unwilling to rally to the Frenchcause,andheexplainedhisreasonsasfollows:“Someday,sooneror later,weshallhavepeacewithFrance.Mypersonalsituationatthattimewill be what I have made it. If I should go over to your side today, you would alwaysconsidermeaturncoat,andyouwouldgivemeatbestrathermenial employment.IhavechosentheVietminhbecauseitisherethatIhavethebest chancesforadvancement.Iftheregimentonmyflank,therefore,shouldsuffer aseriousdefeat,myownsectorwillincreaseinimportance,andmyfuturewill beenhanced.Iaminapositiontogiveyouinformationthatwillbeusefulto youinthisrespect.” Asamatteroffact,heprovidedmewithapreciselydetailedplanoftheregimentalcommandpostanditscamouflagedforestinstallations,whichhadpreviouslyevadedourobservation.Inexchange,Igenerouslypromisedtowarnhim inadvanceoftheprojectedoperation.“That’squiteunnecessary,”hesaidironically. “I’m always aware of your operations at least twenty-four hours in advance.Therewillbeplentyoftimeformetowithdrawtoanothersector.” IhadalwaysbeenconvincedthatIwaspreparingmyoperationsintheutmost secrecy,butnothingcouldescapethenumerousagentsamongthepopulation surroundingus,whospieduponusunceasingly.
NOTE 1. Frequently,infact,itisdecidedapriorithatagivenoperationnotlastmore thanashort,predeterminedtime—severaldays,forexample.
Chapter9
THEPROBLEMOFRESOURCES
Thetraditionalarmy,havingatitsdisposallargenumbersoftrainedtroops andanabundanceofmodernmateriel,inthefinalanalysisiscompletely incapableofovercomingapracticallydestituteenemywhoseleadersand menhavereceivedonlyrudimentarymilitarytraining.Incredibleasthis seems,itisnonethelessabitterreality. A slave to its training and traditions, our army has not succeeded in adaptingitselftoaformofwarfarethemilitaryschoolsdonotyetteach. Itsvaliantefforts,sufferings,andsacrificesservetoobstructtheenemy,to slowdowntheexecutionofhisplan,buttheyhavebeenincapableofstoppingtheenemyfromattaininghisobjective. Thearmyusuallystrikesintoavacuum,andfruitlesslyexpendsconsiderablemateriel.Norwouldasignificantincreaseinmaterielbringasolutionanycloser.Itishowweexploitourresourcesthatwemustcompletely revise. Ifwewanttomeettheguerrillasuccessfullyandtodefeathimwithina reasonable period of time, we must study his methods, study our own methodsandtheirpotential,anddrawfromthisstudysomegeneralprinciplesthatwillpermitustodetecttheguerrilla’sweakpointsandconcentrateourmaineffortsonthem. The following table compares simply the guerrilla’s basic resources withthoseofthetraditionalarmy:
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Traditionalarmy 1.Haslargenumbersofwell- armedtroops,readysupplies offoodandammunition. 2.Canmovequickly overfavorableterrain (aviation,motorvehicles, boats,etc.). 3.Hasawell-organizedcom- municationsnetwork,which givesitgreatcontrol advantages.
3.Haslittlelong-distance communicationsequipment (atleastattheoutset),which leadstodifficultiesin coordinatingoperations.
BUT 1.Experiencesgreatdifficultyin movingaboutguerrillacountry; usuallyhasimperfect knowledgeoftheterrain. 2.Haspracticallynosupport fromthepopulation,evenif itisnothostile. 3.Hasgreatdifficultyingetting informationonthemove- mentsandintentionsofthe guerrilla.
BUT 1.Choosesownterrain,is welladaptedtoit,canmove quickly,andquiteoften disappearsintoit. 2.Hasthesupportofthe population(eitherspontan- eousorthroughterror),to whichitiscloselytied. 3.Getsinformationonall ourmovementsfromthe populaceandsometimes (throughagentsinfiltrated intoourmidst)onour intentionsaswell.
Guerrillaband 1.Hassmallnumbersofpoorly armedtroops(atleastatthe beginningofhostilities),difficultyinobtainingsupplies offoodandammunition. 2.Canmoveonlyonfoot.
By studyingthistable,wecanseethatthe guerrilla’s greatest advantagesarehisperfectknowledgeofanarea(whichhehimselfhaschosen) anditspotential,andthesupportgivenhimbytheinhabitants. Theadvantagesofthetraditionalarmyareimposingsuperiorityinnumbers and in materiel, practically unlimited sources of supply, and the advantagesofcommandandextendedmaneuvergrantedbymodernmethodsofcommunicationandtransport. Whatcantheguerrilladowiththemeanshehasathisdisposal? Hechoosestheterrainandimposesituponus.Itisusuallyinaccessible toheavyandquick-movingequipment,andthusdeprivesusofthebenefit
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ofourmodernarms.Weareforcedtofightonfoot,underconditionsidenticaltothoseoftheguerrilla. On his terrain, which he knows perfectly, he is able to trap us easily in ambushesor,incaseofdanger,todisappear.Ontheotherhand,ifheisan incomparablefighteronhisowngrounds,orinanareatowhichhehasadapted himself,theguerrillalosesagreatdealofhisvalueinneworunknownterrain.Healsoisinclinednottoleavehisarea,butclingstoitexceptincaseof absolute necessity, because he knows that away from his own terrain and deprivedofhismeansofsupportheisonlyamediocrefighter. Wehavealreadyseenhowindispensablethesupportofthepopulationis totheguerrilla.Itispossibleforhimtoexistonlywherethepeoplegive himtheirunqualifiedsupport.Hecannotliveamongapopulacehehasnot previouslyorganizedandsubjectedtohiswill,becauseitisfromitthathe mustdrawhissustenanceandprotection. Itistheinhabitantwhosuppliestheguerrillawithhisfoodrequirements onanalmostdailybasis,therebyenablinghimtoavoidsettingupcumbersomesupplypoints—soeasilyidentifiableanddifficulttore-establish.It is the inhabitant also who occasionally supplies him with ammunition. Theinhabitantcontributestohisprotectionbykeepinghiminformed.Our restandsupplybasesarelocatedinthemidstofapopulacewhoseessentialmissionistokeepaneyeonthem.Notroopmovementcanescapethe inhabitant.Anythreattotheguerrillaiscommunicatedtohiminplentyof time,andtheguerrillacantakecoverortrapusinprofitableambushes. Sometimestheinhabitant’shomeistheguerrilla’srefuge,wherehecan disappearincaseofdanger. Butthistotaldependenceuponterrainandpopulationisalsotheguerrilla’sweakpoint.Weshouldbeable,withourmorepowerfulpotential,to makehimsubmitortodestroyhimbyactinguponhisterrainanduponhis support—thepopulation. Knowing that the guerrilla sticks to the area of his choice, we ought resolutely to engage him there. Once we have occupied the terrain, we oughttohavethewillandthepatiencetotrackhimdownuntilwehave annihilatedhim.Thisrequirestime,andouroperationswillbelong. Weknowalsothatheislessofafighterawayfromhome.Weshould thereforedevoteourselvestomakinghimforgothebenefitofhisterrainby causinghimtoleaveit.Wheneverpossible,weshouldinterrupthisfood supplies,muchmoreimportantthanhissuppliesofammunition.Actionof thiskindoftenimpliespoliticaloreconomicmeasuresthatdonotalways fallwithinthepurviewofmilitaryleaders,buttheyshouldbeusedwheneverpossible. Aboveall,wemustloosetheguerrilla’sholdonthepopulationbysystematicallydestroyinghiscombatorganization.Finally,wemustpermit
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thepeopletoparticipateintheirowndefenseandtoprotectthemselves againstanyoffensivereturnoftheenemy,byhavingthementerintothe structuredorganizationwehavealreadydescribed.Suchanorganization mustbeestablishedwithoutdelayinareaswecontrolthatcouldbethe refugeofarmedbands. To recapitulate our rapid analysis, we have three simple principles to applyinfightingtheguerrilla—tocuttheguerrillaofffromthepopulation thatsustainshim;torenderguerrillazonesuntenable;andtocoordinate theseactionsoverawideareaandforlongenough,sothatthesestepswill yieldthedesiredresults. Thefightagainsttheguerrillamustbeorganizedmethodicallyandconductedwithunremittingpatienceandresolution.Exceptfortherareexception, it will never achieve spectacular results, so dear to laurel-seeking militaryleaders.Itisonlybymeansofasumtotalofperfectlycoordinated, complexmeasures—whichwearegoingtomakeanefforttostudy—that thestrugglewill,slowlybutsurely,pushtheguerrillatothewall. Beforedrawingsomepracticalconclusionsabouttheconductofoperationsagainsttheguerrilla,weshouldexaminethosetheU.S.ArmyconductedwithcompletesuccessinKorea.Thankstoaseriesofmethodically conductedoperations,thearmywasable,inarelativelyshortperiodof time,toeliminatecompletelytheguerrillaswhohadinstalledthemselves behindtheAmericanlinesin1950. Inanarticleentitled“BeatingtheGuerrilla,”(MilitaryReview,December,1955),LieutenantColonelJohnE.Beebe,ofthefacultyoftheU.S. ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,drawsprofitablelessonsfrom theseoperations. Military operations alone he says, are not sufficient. Counterguerrilla operations have two objectives—the destruction of the guerrilla forces, andtheeradicationoftheirinfluenceonthepopulation. Thecounterguerrillaplantopreventtheformationofguerrillaunitsor todestroythemiftheyhavebeenformed,sinceitwillcomprisemeasures that are political, economic, psychological, administrative, and military, mustbepreparedataveryhighcommandechelon. For the conduct of operations against the guerrilla, he recommends thatthecommandpostofthecounterguerrillaforcesbeestablishednear theguerrillazoneandthattroopspenetratethezoneoftheguerrillaand install bases of operations there, taking the necessary security precautions.Thenaplanofcombatandambushagainsttheguerrillascanbe prepared, with the idea in mind of constantly maintaining pressure to deprivethemofanychanceofrestingorofreorganizingandpreparing newoperations.
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Thisoperationwillendonlywhentherearenolongeranyguerrillasin the area. Counterguerrilla operations involve large numbers of soldiers andlastmanymonths.InKorea,thereweretwoexamples. Operation Ratkiller, in the mountainous region of southwest Korea, was conducted by three divisions—two Korean and oneAmerican—to whichwasaddedapolicebattalion.Itlastedthreeandahalfmonths,from December 1, 1951, until March 16, 1952, during the course of which 11,000guerrillaswerekilledand10,000takenprisoner. Operation Trample, against guerrilla elements still remaining in the southofKorea,wasconductedbytwodivisionsfromDecember,1953, untilJune,1954—justaboutsixmonths.Itwasthelastoftheoperations againsttheguerrilla,andthefirstduringthecourseofwhichthepopulationgaveitstotalsupporttothetroopsresponsibleforthemaintenanceof order. Theselessonsdonotdifferfromthosethatmaybedrawnfromseveral successfulcounterguerrillaoperationsinSouthVietnam,atthebeginning oftheIndochinacampaign,andeveninAlgeria.
Chapter10
CONDUCTING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
THEENEMYORGANIZATION Inanymilitaryoperation,wemustfirstlocatetheenemybeforewecan concentrateourblowsagainsthim. Weknowthatinmodernwarfarewearenotclashingwithjustafew armed bands, but rather with an organization installed within the population—an organization that constitutes the combat machine of the enemy,ofwhichthebandsarebutoneelement. Towin,wehavetodestroythisentireorganization. Wehaveseentheimportancetheorganizationcanassumeinasingle citylikeAlgiers.AndbecauseofourexperienceinAlgeria,weknowwhat awarorganizationcoveringawholecountryislike. Algeriaisdividedinto6wilayas(majormilitarydistricts);eachwilaya isdividedinto4or5zones;eachzoneinto4or5regions;eachregioninto 4or5sectors;and,finally,eachsectorisdividedintoacertainnumberof communes. Justasinthecities,ateachgeographicallevelfulfillingthesamefunctionswefindthesameleaders—apolitico-militaryleader,apoliticalassistant, a military assistant, and an assistant responsible for liaison and intelligence. There are also departments, unnecessary in the cities, that have been createdforthebroaderorganization—adirectorresponsibleforlogistical problems,especiallyforfoodsupplies;andapersonresponsibleforthe health service, for organizing hospitals when possible, and for looking afterthepopulaceinthisrespect.
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The councils at all levels make their decisions in common, but the politico-militaryleaderhasthedecidingvoice. (Thegeographicbreakdown,madesolelywiththeconductofthewarin mind,isneverpatternedonthelinesofpeacetimeadministration.Nevertheless,theapproximateequivalentsareasfollows:Awilayacomprises the same area as an igamie,1 a zone that of a French department, and a regionthatofanarrondissement.) Thebasicunitoforganizationistheregion.Itisthelowestechelonat whichacompletestaff,suchaswehavejustdescribed,isfound.Atlower levels—thesectorandthecommune—thestaffismerelyembryonic.In thecommunesinparticular,itisreducedtothe“committeeoffive,”the mostimportantofwhomisthemanchargedwithproblemsofsupply. Aregionisdividedintoacertainnumberofsectors,fourorfivedepending upon the extent of the area and the characteristics of the terrain. (See the adjoiningsketch.)
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Theurbansectorissmallinareabutencompassesthelargestpopulation concentration of the region, quite often the chief town of the arrondissement. Here there is located a military unit the size of a platoon,welltrainedandwellarmed,especiallyentrustedwiththetaskof carryingoutassassinationsandofcontinuallypresentingathreattothe inhabitantsofthetown.Thentherearethreeorfoursectorsofsimilar characteristics.Intheurbansector,theenemypermanentlyassignssome ofhisownpeopletoserveinthetown’spoliticaladministration.Eachis inchargeofanareaoftheinhabitedflatlandthatextendsfromthetown tothehillycountry.Itisherethatthe“base”ofthearmedbandislocated, usuallyacompanypersector.Therefugeareaisintheroughestpartof the adjoining mountains, to which the band may withdraw in case of danger. Except for operational missions ordered by the region, or in case of gravedanger,thebanddoesnotleaveitssector,whereithasitsrootsand theelementsthathelpittosubsist.Awayfromitssector,itwouldenjoyno supportandwouldusuallymoveaboutinunknownterrain.Insuchcases, itwouldbequitevulnerable. Withinagivensector,thevariouselementsoftheenemyorganization aredividedgeographicallyintothreegroups: Thetownsorpopulationcenterseachunderthecommandofapoliticoadministrativeleaderresponsiblefororganizingurbanterrorism,collectionoffunds,propaganda,andanintelligenceservice,whosemaintaskis toreportonthemovementsofarmytroopsstationedinthetown. Theinhabitedruralarea,underthecommandofapolitico-militaryleader responsible for maintaining a firm hold on the population; distributing or arrangingdeliveryofsuppliescomingfromthetowns,shelteringandfeeding thebandnormallystationedthereorthosepassingthrough;andprovidingthe bandswithinformationand,thankstoitsarmedpartisans,closeprotection.Insuchanarea,whichisundersomesortofcontrolbytheforcesof orderatleastsporadically,thepolitico-militaryorganizationplaysavery importantrole. The refuge area, under the command of a politico-military leader, responsibleforseeingtotheguerrillas’securityandsupply,andassuring thatthedepotsandbivouacareasareguardedwhenthebandsaremoving about.Therefugeareaissituatedinterrainto which access is difficult, isolatedbythecuttingofroads,sabotageofbridges,etc.;andsoorganized topermitthebandstobestationedthere. Thearmedguerrillaband,becauseofthepermanentthreatitposesto thepopulationandthefearitinspiresamongunitsoftheforcesoforder, istheguaranteeoftheentireorganization.Itnormallyinhabitstherefuge area,butmakesfrequentvisitstotheintermediateareabetweentherefuge
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areaandthetown,especiallyinwinterwhenitlivestherepracticallyall thetime. Themembersofthesectororganizationthusliveunderoneoftwodifferentkindsofsituation—eitherinthetownandtheintermediatearea;or intheintermediateorrefugearea.Butthereisnodirectconnectionbetween thetownsandtherefugearea. Whensuchanorganizationhasbeenabletoestablishitselfinacountry, military operations directed against the armed bands never quite reach them.Eveniftheydidreachthem,theessentialpartoftheorganization wouldremaininplaceand,evenwithoutthebands,wouldstaysufficiently powerfultoretainitsholdoverthepopulation. Victorythereforecanbeattainedonlythroughthecompletedestruction oftheentireorganization. COUNTERGUERRILLASTRATEGY Themostvulnerablepartoftheenemyorganizationisinthetowns. Itisalwayswithinthecontrolofthearmytroopsthatoccupyit,anda police operation conducted along the lines already described can destroyit. Butthemostdesirableobjectiveisthedestructionofthepolitico-military organizationintheintermediatearea.Thisweshouldundertakeassoonas wehavethenecessarymeansatourdisposal.Suchanoperationwillleadus backtothetownorganizationandalsoprovideuswiththechannelessential toreachingthebandsintherefugeareas.Wecanthusdestroytheentireorganizationsupportingthebands.Cutofffromtheirsourcesofsupplyandinformation,theywillbemorevulnerable. A broad envelopment, therefore, ought logically to begin with a policeoperationintheintermediatearea.Theoccupationoftheintermediate area and the destruction of the organization supporting the bandsisourfirstobjective.Inthiswaywecan,inaninitialphase,compel the bands to withdraw into the refuge area. Deprived of supplies andinformation,theywillnolongerbeabletoleavewithoutriskand will find it difficult to defend themselves when we finally decide to attackthem. COUNTERGUERRILLATACTICS TheOrganizationofDefense:“Gridding” The enemy’s first acts of war—terrorist attacks, localized guerrilla action—generallytakethepeacetimeforcesoforder—police,gendarmerie,
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army—bysurprise.Toowidelydispersedandtoovulnerable,theseforces quickly fall back upon the built-up areas, which offer them the best chanceofresistingtheaggressor. Someelementsarepushedbacktopositionsthatmustbeheld.Traffic betweentheseheldpositionsismaintainedorre-establishedbymeansof armedconvoys,butthemajorityofsecondaryroadsareabandoned. Theaggressoralsoobligesustotakeupanareadefensetoprotectvital positions and to prevent complete strangulation of the territory. This defense,moreorlessindepth,isestablishedaftertakingintoconsiderationimmediateneedsandavailableresources—vulnerablepoints,populationdensity,attitudeoftheinhabitants,thenecessityofkeepingopen roadsandwaysessentialtothelifeofthecountry. Eventually there is established a so-called defensive grid system, in whichthemilitaryorganizationfollowsthelinesoftheciviladministrationtomakemaximumuseofallcommandpossibilitiesandtopermit normal administration to function insofar as possible—the department becomes a zone, the arrondissement becomes a sector, the canton becomesaquartier. Theretreatoftheforcesoforderrapidlydeliversalargepartofthe territory to the enemy. Surprise has been to his advantage. From this pointonhewillattempttoconsolidateandcompletehiscombatorganization, to defend the territory he has conquered against the forces of order,tocrushonebyonethelargestnumberpossibleofthesquaresof thegridinordertoincreasetheareaunderhiscontrol. Offense—SectorLevel Howcanwe,withtheforcesatourimmediatedisposal,plusthereinforcementsweshallreceive,setaboutthedestructionoftheenemy’scombatorganizationandtheliberationoftheoccupiedterritory? Firstofall,wehavethetroopsthatmakeuptheinitialgrid,calledsector troops.Iftheregionisthebasisoftheenemy’sorganization,thesector (arrondissement)isthebasisofoursystem. Thewithdrawalofourelementshasledtothecreationofmilitaryposts inthemostimportantvillagesandinthetowns,particularlyintheprincipaltownofthesector. Wehaveobservedhowineffectiveoutpostsare.Sincethecontrolofthe populationistheaimofmodernwarfare,anyelementnotindirectandpermanent contact with the population is useless. Furthermore, if we try to makestrongholdsofoutposts,wewouldbesurroundingthemwithwalls builttosupportasiegetheenemyhasneithertheintentionnorthepossibility ofundertaking.
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Inthevillages,however,weoftenfindoneortwoemptyhouses,where thebandsusuallystaywhileintransit,whichwecanoccupy.Otherhouses forthelodgingofthemencanberentedfromtheinhabitantsorconstructed ifnecessary. Wethenorganizenotjustthedefenseofasolemilitarypost,butthatof theentirevillageanditsinhabitants,makingitastrategichamlet.Atight, impassableperimeteriscreated(ofbarbed-wire,underbrush,variousother materials),protectedbyafewarmedblockhouses,mannedwithautomatic weaponsandcapableofcoveringthewholeperimeter. A police operation is undertaken immediately within the village thus protected. Simultaneously, we organize the population according to the principleswestudiedpreviously. Inhabitantsofthenearestvillagesorisolatedindividualsareprogressively brought within the security perimeter. Most of the others will come there themselves.Theinhabitantsareallowedtoleavethevillageonlybythegates, andallexitswillbecontrolled.Theyarepermittedtotakeneithermoneynor supplieswiththem.Noonewillbeabletoleaveorenterthevillagebynight. In effect, we are re-establishing the old system of medieval fortified villages,designedtoprotecttheinhabitantsagainstmaraudingbands. Thefirstpoliceoperationwillbecarriedoutintheprincipaltownofthe sector(arrondissement).Anofficeforthecontrolandorganizationofthe inhabitantsisinstalledassoonaspossibleatthesectormilitarystaff.The townitselfwillbesurroundedbyatightandprotectedperimeter,andall itsentrancesandexitswillbecontrolled. Inhabitantsoftheprincipaltownandvillageswill,aswesaidearlier, receiveacensuscard,acopyofwhichwillbesenttothecommandpostof thesectoranddistrict.Eachcardwillbearaphotographoftheindividual, hishouse-groupnumber(4),theletterofthesub-district(B),thenumber ofthedistrict(2),andtheletterofthetownorstrategichamlet(C). Thefirstpart(C2)letsusknowwherehecomesfrom;thesecondpart (B4)tellsustheleadersresponsiblefortheindividual—thehouse-group leaderandthesub-districtleader.Thecensuscardwillalsoenableusto controlindividualrationcards. Acensusisalsotakenofallanimals—draftanimals(horses,donkeys, andmules)andbovines(calves,cows,andbulls)willbebrandedwiththe cardnumberoftheirowner.Weknowhowimportantsuppliesaretothe guerrilla.Henceforth,nosuppliesarepermittedtoleavethetownsorstrategichamlets.Eventheanimalswillbestrictlycontrolled.Ifweprohibit uncontrolledtrafficoffoodonthemainroads,wecancutofftheenemy’s mainsourcesofsupplyinaveryshorttime. Thus,evenwithmuchreducedforces,wecanagainregaincontrolofthe majorportionofthecountry’spopulation—from80to90percent,ifone
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considersthetotalnumberofinhabitantsofthelargetownsdowntovillages havinggendarmeunitstocontrolthem.Inthisway,wehaveinourhandsan importantmassofpeopleadequatelyprotectedandcontrolled,andableto beusedtoblocktheenemyoffensiveonallsides. Theintervalsbetweenthegridsquares,however,stillremainemptyof troops; their defenseless inhabitants are at the mercy of enemy action. Broad-scaleoperationsorcommandoraidsmaycauseouropponentspassingconcern,buttheyareusuallytoobriefandsuperficialtodestroytheir combatorganization. Theorganizationandcontroloftheinhabitantsofthetownsandstrategic hamletspermitamajorityofthemtotakepartintheirowndefense.Acertainnumberoftroopscaninthiswaybefreedtoreinforcethereserveelementofthesectorcommand.Beingunengagedandmobile,theywillform thesector’sintervaltroopsandactcontinuouslybetweentheoutposts. Thisforceshouldbelargeenoughtooutclassanarmedbandwhosesize and quality will vary according to the guerrilla’s position and circumstances.Butifwereactquicklyenough,beforethesituationcandeteriorate,theenemywillnotbeabletocreatebandslargerthanapproximately a company.This is the normal unit that will permit him to move about securelyoverlongdistancesandtoliveoffthecountryandtheinhabitant, usuallyhissolesourcesofsupply. Therefore, a four-company battalion of infantry will be our standard intervalunit.Itmustbeessentiallymobile,movingusuallybyfoot,butalso equippedwithvehiclestomovequicklyoverlongdistances.Itsbasicmissionwillbetodestroythepolitico-militaryorganizationintheintermediate area;todestroythearmedbandsthatattempttoopposethisaction,tobring inpeopletothestrategichamletsand,ifpossible,tocreatenewhamletsfor regroupingandcontrolofeveryinhabitantoftheintermediatearea. Ifthesector’sintervaltroopsdonotamounttoatleastafour-company battalion,theywillcertainlybeunabletohandleatonetimetheintermediateareasofanenemyregion,whichcorrespondsapproximatelytoaFrench sector(arrondissement). Weknowthat,withintheregion,eachenemysectorhasanintermediate areaofitsown,whereitputsupandsupportsanarmedband. Atveryleast,wemustattacktheintermediateareaofanenemysector. Itsboundariesareeasilydefinable.Ourpoliceoperationsinthetownsand strategichamletswillhaveyieldedsufficientinformationforustoestablishthemwithoutdifficulty.Theintervaltroopscannothopetosurprisethe enemyinthisareabystealthypenetration,adesirewehaveseenisillusory,buttheycansurprisehimbytheirmethods. Troops penetrate the intermediate area at the ready to avoid being surprisedandtobeinapositiontomaneuverintheeventofachanceencounter
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withaband.Ifthebandsucceedsinescapingorfindsitselfinitsrefuge area,thepoliceoperationcommencesimmediately.Thepolitico-military organizationdoesnotfollowtheband,asitwouldonlybeexcessbaggage. Itstaysinplaceorintheimmediatevicinity.Itisthereforealwayswithin rangeoftheintervaltroopunits,ifthereissufficienttimetolookforitand destroyit. Keepingoneelementinreserve,thetroopsspreadoveralargeareain order to occupy, if possible, the entire intermediate area of the sector, especially the maximum number of villages and the most frequented paths. Then,whilepartofthecadresetsoutonanintensivesearchoftheterrain, tolocateanycachesordepositsandtostudyalayoutforthenight’sambushes, theunits’specialistsundertakethepolicework. Theentirepopulationofeachvillage,menandwomen,iscalledtogether andprohibitedfromleavingforthedurationoftheoperation.Everyinhabitantisindividuallyandprivatelyinterrogated,withoutanyresorttoviolence.Afewsimplebutprecisequestionswillbeaskedofeach.Forthe firstinterrogation,twoingeneralwillsuffice—Whichindividualscollect fundsinyourvillage?Whoaretheyoungpeoplewhoarearmedandcarry onthesurveillanceofthevillage? If this first interrogation is well handled, several people will readily make the desired replies. Quite often, since guilty individuals hope to escapedetection,theonesweseekwillbeamongthoseassembled.We willthereforehavenodifficultyinarrestingthem.Thosewhohavesucceededinleavingthevillagewillnothavegottenveryfar.Deprivedofany contact with the population, they may very likely fall into our night ambusheswhentheyattempttofindoutwhatisgoingonortrytoescape. Thefirstechelonoftheenemypolitico-militaryorganizationwillalso fallintoourhands.Morestringentinterrogationwillenableustodiscover quicklywhoallthemembersare—frontleaders,membersofcommittees of five, supply people, lookouts, etc.—as well as the location of food depositsandarmscaches. Atleastaweekisneededforthespecializedteamstodestroyavillage politico-militaryorganization.Thisislikewisetheminimumforapolice operationintheinhabitedruralareaofanenemysector. Paralleltotheworkofdestruction,welaythefoundationofourown systembyselectingintelligenceagentsandorganizingthepopulace. Tosucceed,wemustneverlosesightofthefactthatwewillreceive informationonlyfrompeoplewhocangiveusinformationwithoutriskto themselves.Wemustassureouragentsofthisindispensablesecurity. Wewillchoosetheminthevillageitself.Theywillusuallybepeoplewho provedbestinformedduringthefirstinterrogation.Havingmarkedthem,we
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contactthemonlyinthecourseofthenextpoliceoperationandunderthe samecircumstances.Theywillthenpointouttousthosementheenemy hasinstalledtoreplacehisdisruptedorganization.Later,whenthesituation hasimproved,wecanfindoutwhoarecapableofhandlingthesecretcommunicationofsimpleinformation. Weproceedimmediatelytotheorganizationandcontrolofthepopulationoftheintermediatearea. Thefirstresortisthetraditionaldivisionoftheareaintodistricts,subdistricts and house-groups—with the usual numbering. We conduct an exactcensusofalltheinhabitants,theirmeansofsubsistence,andinparticulartheirlivestock.Thenweenrolltheminthestructuredorganization ofwhichwehavealreadyspoken. Inthebeginning,wewillnotmakemanydemandsonthecadreswe havechosen.Butthisinitialactivitywillgreatlyfacilitatethecontrolof thepopulationinthecourseofsubsequentpoliceoperations,whichmust befrequentifwewanttopreventthedestroyedorganizationfromreconstitutingitself.Individualswillbeconsideredsuspectwhoappearinthe censusbutwhocannotbefound.Theirleadersandtheirfamilieswillbe heldresponsibleforthem.Ontheotherhand,anyindividualsofwhom no record has been made will be registered only after a very detailed interrogation. Inhabitantsfromtheruralareaswhowishtojointhestrategichamlets willbepermittedtodoso.Withourassistance,theywillcarrywiththem alltheirmeansofsubsistence.Inthismanner,wecancontinuetoaddto the number of persons controlled and protected.The difference in their manneroflife,especiallywithrespecttothedegreeofsecurityaccorded totheinhabitantsintheprotectedperimeters,willconstituteapowerful attractionthroughouttheintermediatearea.Wheneverandwhereverwe haveenoughtroopsandthenecessarymeans,wemustcreatenewstrategic hamlets. Onlyifweapproachtheproblemmethodicallycanwecontinuetoestablishastrictcontroloverallthepopulationanditsmeansofsubsistence. Thesupplyingofthebandswillbecomemoreandmoredifficultinthe intermediateareaasweproceedtodrainofftheirmeansofsupport.Ifthey canescapethefrequentpoliceoperationsoftheintervaltroops,theywill havetomaintainthemselvesintheirrefugeareaunderdifficultconditions. Armedwithconsiderableinformationabouttheenemy(bivouacs,caches, depots,etc.),thesectorcommanderwillbeable,withadditionalhelpona temporary basis, to follow him into his refuge with good chances of destroyinghim. Methodicalandpatientconductofoperationswill,intheeasiersectors and those of medium difficulty, lead to the destruction of the enemy’s
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combatapparatusandtherestorationofpeacewithinareasonablelength oftime. Offense—ZoneLevel Iftheactionofthesectorcommandersisdecisivelycarriedout,thegeneralcommandingthezone(department)canmoveaheadwiththeessential roleofachievingthemethodicdestructionoftheenemyorganizationover abroaderarea. Foreachsector,hewillinitiallydesignatethepointstobeoccupiedin theexecutionofanover-allplantoavoidthestrangulationofthedepartment.Hewillespeciallydeterminethethoroughfarestobekeptopento traffic. Havingdealttheadversaryhisinitialsetback,thecommandinggeneral takestheoffensive.Firstheattackstheenemyorganizationintheimportant townsofthedepartment,especiallyintheprincipaltown,toputanendto thespectacularterroristattackswhichbuildtheenemy’sprestige. Hegivesdetailedordersfortheconductofpoliceoperations.Heseesto itthattheorganizationandcontroloftheentirepopulationissecuredwithoutdelay.Heassuresthatthemethodsandproceduresusedarethesame throughouttheareaofthezonetomaintainauniformityofaction.Hewill atalltimeshaveathisdispositionasignificantreserveelementtobring pressuretobearonthosepointswhich,intheirturn,appearmostlikelyto hastentheexecutionofthepacificationplanhehasdrawnup. Aswehaveseen,unitsoftheenemyorganizationrarelycoincidewiththe peacetimeadministrativeboundariesourmilitaryorganizationmustadopt. Thesectorcommandersoughtnottostopanyactionattheirownsector limits,butshouldratherfollowupmethodicallyandrelentlesslythroughoutthewholeterritoryoftheenemyorganizationattacked—sectororregion. Hence,thereisanecessityforcoordinatingoperationsatthezonelevel, andforstrictplanningofmethodsandprocedures. Refugeareasareusuallyinirregularterraintowhichaccessisdifficult, countryoftencutthroughwithadministrativeboundaries.Insuchacase, theattackontherefugeareaswillbelaunchedbythegeneralcommanding thezoneandatsuchtimeastheperipheralpoliceoperationsofthesector commandershavebeenconcluded. While he leaves a broad area of initiative to his subordinates, the commanding general assures through frequent inspections that his orders are beingstrictlyfollowed.Hemakessurethathisplanofpacificationisfollowedinallareas,especiallywithrespecttopracticalprojectsthatcallfor considerableexpendituresandinwhichnowasteshouldoccur.Suchprojects includeconstructionofnewroads,ortherepairofthosethathavebeen
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sabotaged;constructionofnewstrategichamletstoreceivepeoplefalling back from the danger areas; school construction, and economic development of the department to give displaced persons means of subsistence. A well-conceived plan, executed with determination, courage, and foresight,willsavefromneedlessdistressapopulationthatwillhavehad morethanitsshareofsuffering. Inareasofdifficultaccess,wheretheguerrillahasbeenabletoestablish well-equipped bases for his bands and where he has numbers of seasoned fighters, the sector troops will generally not have sufficient resourcestoattackanddestroythem.Theywillthereforehavetoappeal totheinterventiontroops. The intervention troops of the zone will, in principle, consist of the zonecommander’sreserveelements,whichcanbereinforcedbylevies onthegeneralreserveofthetheatercommanderifnecessary.Itisthrough thejudicioususeofinterventiontroops—injectingthematthedesired moment at specific points—that the commanding general of the zone willbeabletoacceleratetheprocessofpacification. Theirnormalmissionwillbethedestructionofthearmedbandswhen theintervaltroopsofthesectorshaveforcedthemtowithdrawintothe refuge area.An operation against the bands will not differ essentially from operations conducted by interval troops in the intermediate area. Itwillbetheirlogicalextension. Thenumberoftroopstobeemployedwilldependontheimportance ofthearmedbandstobesubduedandtheextentoftherefugearea.In general,twoorthreeinterventionregiments,workingcloselywithintervalunitsoftheinterestedsectors,willsuffice.Theymaybecommanded byeitherthezonegeneralorhisdeputyor,onoccasion,bythesector commandermostdirectlyinterestedintheoperation. Atanearlystage,thetargetareaissealedoffbyintervaltroopsofthe sectors involved, who will establish themselves in the inhabited rural zones. If the police operation has been properly executed, contact betweentheguerrillasandthepopulacewillhavebeenbroken;theinhabitantswillalreadyberegroupedandorganizedandanintelligenceservicecreated. Thetroopsresponsiblefortheisolationoftherefugeareawillbecome thoroughlyfamiliarwiththeterrainoverwhichtheyrepeatedlytravel. Thissealing-off,orencircling,willnotbelinear,butwillextendovera deepandperfectlywell-knownzoneinwhichanyelementoftheband willbeimmediatelydetectedandattacked. Afterthenethasbeenputinplace,thezoneinterventiontroopswill invest—by helicopter, air-drop, or on foot—the entire refuge area,
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simultaneouslyifpossible.Ifabandisencountered,thetroopsmustatall timesbepreparedtoengageit,tomaneuver,andtodestroyit. Thecommanderoftheoperationdividesthezoneupamonghisunits, whichwillinturnsetuplightbasesmaintainedbyareserveelement.Duringthecourseofthefirstday,theunitswillprudentlyandsecurelyfanout asfarfromtheirbaseastheypossiblycan,toreconnoiterasmanyaspossibleofthepathsandtrackswhere,atnightfall,ambusheswillbeset. Areservetobemovedbyhelicopterisheldinreadinessfordispositionby thezonecommander,topermithimtoexploitandpursuetoafinishany engagementatanypointintheoperationalarea.Helicoptersandlightobservationaircraftarepreciousinstrumentsofreconnaissanceandprotection. All inhabitants encountered are immediately assembled. The police operation,initiatedwithoutdelay,willpermitthecompletionofinformationondepots,bivouacs,caches,hospitals,etc. Theinformationobtainedisexploitedonthespot,butcarefullyandwith sufficient troops to avoid surprise by an adversary who is well armed, hardened,anddeterminedtodefendhimself. Individuals recognized as part of the enemy organization are arrested andkeptwithintheunitsforexploitationduringtheoperation. Thepopulation,usuallynotverynumerous,isevacuatedentirelytoa regroupmentcenterpreviouslysetupforthispurpose. Fromtheverybeginning,therefore,thebandswillbecutofffromany contact with the population, and thrown back solely on their own resources. Alltroopsengagedintheoperationhavetheireveningmealbeforethe endofthehoursofdaylight.Afternightfall,nofiresarelit.Atappropriate pointsselectedduringtheday,theambushesgointoeffect.Duringthefirst days after the commencement of the operation, an ambush may take a platoon.Butinthedaysthatfollow,takingadvantageofthedisarrayofthe adversary and our improved knowledge of the terrain, the number of ambushpointswillincreaseandthestrengthofeachwilldiminishtowhere itdoesnotexceedfourorfivemen. All paths, in particular those where it is impossible to establish ambushes, are booby-trapped in a simple manner—with grenades or plasticexplosives—andretrievedinthemorningbythesamemenwho puttheminplace,toobviateblunders. Atnight,theinterventiontroopsandsectortroopsspreadoutavastnet; guerrillas who want to move about by night, leave the danger zone, or regroup,willrunintoit. Ingeneral,itisrecommendedtofirewithoutwarningonanyindividual whowanderswithincloserangeofanambush,saywithintenyards.Itis
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difficult to fire accurately at a greater distance at night, and guerrillas willneverappearinfrontofanambushinacompactgroup. Thenetiskeptineffectfortwohoursafterdaybreak,becausequite often it is in the morning that guerrillas who want to escape will take theirchances. Aroundtheareaandinasgreatdepthaspossible,alloutpostsshould keep on the alert, in a position to control all suspicious persons.Any individualnotcarryinghiscensuscardwillbeconsideredsuspectand arrested. Insidethezoneduringtheday,patrolssearchthebrushunceasingly and with minute care. They collect the dead for identification, the wounded for interrogation. Prisoners are subjected to quick interrogationsandtheirstatementscheckedonthespot. Thisactionwillcompeltheguerrillas,cutofffromthepopulationand with no knowledge of the situation, to leave their comfortable hiding places—whereotherwisetheymightbediscovered—toobtainwateror food or to attempt to flee. Their wounded will become an impossible burden. Appropriatepsychologicalaction,usingloudspeakersorleaflets,will quite likely secure the surrender of weak individuals whom circumstanceshaveplacedbeyondthereachandauthorityoftheirchiefs.Many oftheguerrillaswhohaveescapedtheambusheswillgivethemselves up,demoralized.Theentireoperationmustlastaslongasisnecessaryto destroytheguerrillabandcompletely. Anything that would facilitate the existence of the guerrillas in any way, or which could conceivably be used by them—depots, shelters, caches,food,crops,houses,etc.—mustbesystematicallydestroyedor broughtin.Thiswillactuallypermitthemethodicalrecoveryofmateriel andfood,whichcanbedistributedtotheregroupedcivilians.Allinhabitantsandlivestockmustbeevacuatedfromtherefugearea. When they leave, the intervention troops must not only have completelydestroyedthebands,butmustleavebehindthemanareaempty ofallresourcesandabsolutelyuninhabitable. Theoperationagainstthearmedbandsinarefugearea,supportedby interventiontroops,shouldspelltheendofthebattleagainsttheguerrilla inasector.Tobesuccessful,itmustbepreparedinthegreatestdetailatthe echelon of the general commanding the zone. It should get under way when the operations of the interval troops in the sectors have created a favorablesituationandthezonecommanderhasassembledallthenecessarymenandmateriel.Then,carefullypreparedandenergeticallycarried out,itcannotfail.
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Once successful, the sector commander will be able to regroup and controlalloftheinhabitantsofhissector—theultimateaimofmodern warfareoperations. However,organizationandcontrolofthepopulation,andsupplementarycontrolsoverfood,circulationofpersonsandgoods,animals,etc.,as wellasaflawlessintelligenceservice,mustremaininforceuntilpeacehas beenrestoredtotheentirenationalterritory.Anylackofvigilanceorprematuredismantlingofthecontrolsystemwillcertainlypermittheenemy torecouplostgroundandjeopardizethepeaceofthesector. Offense—TheaterLevel Thecommander-in-chiefoftheentiretheaterofoperationsshouldmaintainaconsiderablegeneralreserve.Thiswillpermithimtostrikeatthe precisetimeandplacehejudgesopportuneintheconductoftheater-level operations.Byjudiciousemploymentofreserves,aswehaveseen,hewill beabletoaccelerateandbringaboutthepacificationofdifficultareas. Forreasonsoftroopeconomy,certainareasmaybeabandonedorheld byonlyverysmallforces.Here,theenemywillbeabletoorganizeand maintainsignificantforces.Whenthetheatercommanderdecidesontheir pacification,thenormalresourcesofthesectorandzonemaybeinadequate.Suchoperationswillthereforefalltounitsofthegeneralreserve. Atthebeginningofanyconflict,theenemynormallywillnotbeableto launchhostilitiessimultaneouslythroughouttheentireterritory.Hefirst setshimselfupinareasfavorabletoguerrillawarfareandattemptstokeep theseunderhiscontrol. Atthispoint,forcefulaction,quicklybegunandvigorouslycarriedout accordingtotheprinciplesdiscussed,oughttoannihilatetheguerrillaand preventextensionoftheconflict,Thesuccessofsuchanoperationisofthe utmostimportance,becauseitcanre-establishthepeaceinshortorder. In any case, the operational area must be clearly defined and isolated. Initially,thisistheroleofthezonesandsectorsnearesttheenemy.Atthe firstaggressiveacts,elementsoftheforcesoforderalreadyinplace—the army,gendarmerie,police,variouspeacetimeintelligenceservices—attempt todetermineasaccuratelyaspossiblethelimitsoftheareaundertheenemy’s control. After quickly establishing the limits of this area, the measures previously studied—control and organization of the populace, creation of an efficient intelligence service—can contain the enemy’s sphere of action even further. The extent of this final restriction of enemy activity will delimittheareaofattack.
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The number of the troops (two to four divisions, if one accepts the Koreanexperience),thecivilianandmilitarymeanstobecommitted,the needforstrictcoordinationofcomplexactions—allmeansthatatheaterleveloperationoughtnottobelauncheduntildetailedstudypermitsthe drawingupofapreciseplanofactionwhenthenecessarymenandequipmenthavebeenassembled.Insufficientmeansorcarelessnessofpreparationandexecutionofoperationswillleadtocertainfailure;theareaofthe conflictwouldspread,andalongwarcouldnotbeavoided. Thecommanderoftheoperationshouldbethecommanderofthegeneralreserveunitstobeused.Hiswillbethecompleteresponsibilitynot merely to weaken the bands or disperse them, but rather to destroy the combat apparatus of the enemy and re-establish normal life within the affectedarea. Notimelimitfortheoperationshouldbesetaheadoftime.Itwillend when the enemy’s combat organization—guerrilla bands included—are completelydestroyed(thatis,whennotonemoreguerrillaremainsinthe region),andwhenacohesivesystemcapableofpreventinganyoffensive returnoftheadversaryhasbeenestablished. Attheappropriatetime,afterthegeneralreserveshavebeenwithdrawn, anassistantcanbechargedwithassuringarapidreturntopeacetimeconditions in the liberated territory with whatever means are available and withtheorganizationthathasbeencreated. Althoughatheater-leveloperationdiffersinsizefromthosepreviously considered,theprinciplestobeappliedarethesame. Ifthenumberoftroopsavailablecancoverthewholetargetarea,operations should begin simultaneously in both the intermediate and refuge areas. Valuable time may thus be saved. But we can only rarely bring togetherthetroopsnecessaryforanoperationofsuchsize. Therefore,theoperationusuallybeginsintheintermediatearea—which borders the refuge area—the importance of which we have already described,andwithwhosecharacterwearefamiliar. Avastpoliceoperationcoveringthiswholeareawillenableustodestroy theimportantpolitico-militaryorganismimplantedthere,andtocomplete ifnecessarythedestructionofthepolitico-administrativeorganizationof thetowns. Attimeswewillrunacrossguerrillabands,whichwewillattemptto destroy,butaboveallwemustputanendtotheirfreepassageandoblige themtowithdrawandliveintherefugeareas. Paralleltothepoliceoperation,thenowfamiliarorganizationiscreated tocontrolfood,animals,circulationofpersonsandconsumergoods,etc. Theinhabitantsareregroupedinstrategichamlets,whichwillbeequipped
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withthenecessarymeanstoensuretheircontrolandprotection.Villages, roads,andoutpostsaresetupandanormaladministrationcreated. Theinhabitedruralareawillinthiswaybecomeanimmenseworksite in which the populace, properly harnessed, can render precious and effectiveassistance. Itisonlywhentheruralareaoperationhasendedthattheater-leveloperationagainsttherefugeareascanbeundertaken. Ourintelligenceservices,thecivilianpopulation,andprisoners,aswell astheimpressionofstrengthemanatingfromavastoperationforcefully andmethodicallyconducted,willhaveenabledus,beforethelaunchingof theoperation,tobewell-informedaboutthebands—theirweapons,numbers,usualbivouacareas,shelters,caches,depots,normalroutesofmovement,meansofsubsistence,andsourcesofinformation. Wewillnotapproachtherefugeareasblindly,butwillfirsthavecompletelyandpreciselyblueprintedourobjectives. Althoughitisonamuchlargerscale,thetheater-leveloperationiscarriedoutjustlikethoseagainsttherefugeareasofthesectorandthezone. Afterfirstsettingupablockade,everymodernmethodoftransportation— helicopter, parachute, etc.—is employed simultaneously in the shortest possibletime,toclampdownontheentireenemyrefugearea.Theguerrillabandsareallowednoopportunitytoescape. Theentireoperationlastslongenoughforthemtobedestroyed.Itends onlywhentheareatheyhavechosenastheirhaveniswipedcleanofall meansofsubsistenceandrenderedcompletelyuselesstothem. Thus,weshallhaveachievedarealspecializationofthetroopsusedin modernwarfare. Thegridunitsarethefirsttroopsused,tostoptheadversary’soffensive effort.Responsibleforoccupyingtownsandsensitivepointsthroughout thecountryandforensuringthesecurityofthemainroads,theirapparentlystaticmissionshouldbethemostactive. Theirroleisquiteimportantbecausetheypartitionofftheenemyarea, stoptheextensionoftheterritoryhecontrols,and,thankstotheoutposts theyoccupyandthenetworkofroadstheykeepopen,provideexcellent basesofdeparturefortroopsspecializedinoffensiveoperations. Theirresponsibilityextendsnotonlytothesafetyofthecities,butalso tothesecurityoftheimmensemajorityofthepopulationlivinginmediumsizedandsmalltowns.Thissecuritydependsupontheabilityofthecheckerboardunitstodestroytheenemy’sorganizationinthetowns,tosetupan effectivecontrolsystemamongthepopulacetocontrolthemovementof personsandgoods,onwhichwilldependinlargepartthesuccessofoperationsconductedontheperipherybytheintervalunits.
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The grid troops must be trained in police operations. These they should carry out firmly, but with tact and discretion, not to alienate themselves unnecessarily from the people with whom they will be in permanentcontact. Theywillbereplacedlittlebylittlewithnormalpoliceforces,inparticularthegendarmerie,oncetheassistanceandcollaborationofthepeoplehas beenacquired.Thentheywillgotoreinforcetheintervalunitsandpermit themtoextendtheirfieldofactivity. Theintervalunitsshouldbecomposedofexcellent,well-trainedtroops. Theirbasicmissionistodestroytheenemy’spolitico-militaryorganizationintheintermediateareaoftheirsector,toregroupthedispersedpopulacetoensuretheirprotection,andtoorganizethemsothattheinhabitants participateintheirowndefense. Thesetroopswillbenomads,capableoflivingawayfromtheirbasefor longperiods,ofdispersingoveragreatareatocarryoutpoliceoperations indepth,andofquicklyregroupingintheeventofanengagementwiththe enemysothattheycanmaneuveranddestroytheguerrillabands. Theinterventionunitsareelitetroopswhowillseekoutthebandsin theirrefugeareasanddestroythem. Tofollowaresoluteadversaryindifficultterrain,tomovelongdistances onfootbydayandnighttoreachhim,tomanambushesallnightlongin smallteamsoffourorfivemenalongforestpaths—allthiscallsforexcellenttrainingandinsuperablemorale. Cadresofthehighestqualityareneededtoconductaneffectivepolice operation,tointerrogateinterestingprisonersquicklyattheverypointof theircapture,andtoexploitthesituationwithoutlosinganytime.Thisdifficultandcostlytrainingwillbeavailabletoonlyasmallnumberofunits. Theyshouldbeutilizedjudiciouslysothattheydonotsufferunnecessary wearandtear. IfoneacceptstheKoreanexperienceandthepresentneedsofthewarin Algeria, the commanding general of an important theater of operations oughttohaveatleastfourdivisionsathisdisposal. Consolidatedunderthecommandofadynamicleader,welluponthe combatproceduresofmodernwarfare,theywillbecapableofsuccessfully handling within a few months the most threatened and vulnerable areas. Tosumup,guerrillawarfare,becauseoftheadvantagesthataccrueto theguerrilla—forexample,theterrainhehaschosenandthepopulation thatsupportshim—canbeeffectivelyconductedbysmallbandsagainst amuchlargerarmy.Theguerrilla’sadversaryisalwaysatarm’slength; theguerrilla’snumerousagentscancontinuallyobservehim,andattheir
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leisurestudyhisvulnerablepoints.Theguerrillabandswillalwaysbeable tochoosethepropitiousmomenttoattackandharasstheiropponents. Tobeeffective,hisoperationsdonotcallforcoordinationofallhiselements,whicharetoowidelydispersedeventhoughtheyoperateonthe sameterritory.Audacity,initiative,courage—thesearethechiefqualities ofguerrillaleaders.Inthebeginning,atleast,guerrillawarfareisawarof lieutenantsandyoungcaptains. Weonthecontraryattackanenemywhoisinvisible,fluid,uncatchable. Inordertogettohim,wehavenoalternativebuttothrowanetoffine meshovertheentireareainwhichthebandsmove.Counterguerrillaoperationsthereforecannotsucceedunlesstheyareconductedonalargescale, unlesstheylastthenecessarylengthoftime,andunlesstheyareprepared anddirectedingreatestdetail. TothewordsofColonelBeebe,alreadycitedabove,“Acounterguerrilla operationendsonlywhentherearenomoreguerrillasinthearea,andnot whentheguerrillahasbeendisorganizedanddispersed,”letmeadd,“and whentheenemy’sentirewarfareorganizationhasbeendestroyedandours putinitsplace.” Thestruggleagainsttheguerrillaisnot,asonemightsuppose,awarof lieutenantsandcaptains.Thenumberoftroopsthatmustbeputinaction, thevastareasoverwhichtheywillbeledtodobattle,thenecessityofcoordinatingdiverseactionsoverthesevastareas,thepolitico-militarymeasures tobetakenregardingthepopulace,thenecessarilyclosecooperationwith variousbranchesoftheciviladministration—allthisrequiresthatoperations againsttheguerrillabeconductedaccordingtoaplan,establishedatavery highcommandlevel,2capableatanymomentofmakingquick,directintercessioneffectivelyfeltinthewideareasaffectedbymodernwarfare. Thecounterguerrillastruggleisdefinitelyaquestionofmethod.Amodernstatepossessesforcessufficientlylargetofighthim.Ourrepeatedfailuresresultsolelyfrompooremploymentofourresources. Manymilitaryleadersjudgetheseinsufficient.Weknowofnoexample inmilitaryhistoryofasoldierwhowentintobattlewithallthemeanshe thoughtheneeded.Thegreatmilitaryleaderistheonewhoknowshowto winwiththemeansathisdisposal. NOTES 1. Translator’s note: In French administrative parlance an igame is an inspecteur général d’administration en mission extraordinaire, e.g., an official outranking several departmental prefects and supervising them. The territory underhiscontrolisthenknownasanigamie. 2. Inprinciple,thatofthecommanderofthetheaterofoperations.
PartThree
CARRYINGTHEWARTOTHEENEMY
Chapter11
THEINADEQUACIES OFTRADITIONALWARFARE
We have just studied ways to react against an opponent employing the methodsofmodernwarfareonourownterritory.Butthemeansprescribed provide only for the destruction of forces the enemy has introduced or organizedwithinourfrontiers. The enemy, however, before moving to open warfare, will attempt to assurehimselfofthesupportofoneormorefriendly,nonbelligerentforeign nations.There,hewillsetupimportantbasesfortraininghistroopsandwill installreservesofwarmateriel.Thisterritorywillveryoftenserveasabase ofdepartureforattackslaunchedintoourterritory.Itistherethattheenemy will,attheopeningofhostilities,setuphiscommandstructure,andwill shapeitgraduallyintotheprovisionalgovernmenthehopestosetuponour territoryassoonasthereisalargeenoughareaconquered. Thefactthatthestatewhichsupportsouradversariesisanonbelligerent one seems to place these bases beyond our range and leave the enemy completelyfreetoreceivewithoutinterruptionthemenandmaterielthat willpermithimtosupplyhisbattleonourterritory. Aslongasthisconsiderablewarpotentialisnotdestroyedorneutralized,peace,evenifcompletelyrestoredwithinourownborders,willbe precariousandincontinualjeopardy. Theenemy’sfreedomofactionbeyondourfrontiersisoneofthefactors determiningthedurationoftheconflict.Materialsupportandtheassuranceofstrongandcontinuingaidfromabroadareessentialtomaintaining ahighmoraleamongthosefightinginourinterior.Withoutexternalaid andthehopeofanAlliedlanding,mostoftheFrenchmaquisunderthe
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occupationwouldnothavebeenabletoholdoutunderthepressureofthe Germanattacks.Andseveralmorerecentexamplesalsodemonstratethe importancethatthesupportofanonbelligerentstateinmodernwarfare canhaveontheoutcomeofaconflict. GreecewasunabletocrushtheCommunistattackuntilYugoslavia, havinglefttheSovietcamp,nolongerservedasasupportbasetothe armedbandsfightingonGreeksoil.TheprincipalerroroftheFrenchin Indochinawasnottohavemadeenoughofanefforttogainavictory beforethearrivalofChineseCommunistsattheTonkinfrontier.From then on, the Vietminh were able to make use of important bases in China, where they could freely provision themselves and where their largeunitscouldbeformedandtrained.Thecharacterofthewarimmediatelychanged.ItwaslostfortheFrench,whowerenolongercapable of supplying, so far from home, a theater of operations that had so increasedincomplexity. The destruction or neutralization of enemy bases on foreign territory is essentialifwearetohastentheendofhostilitiesandensureadurablepeace. Thesimplestsolutionistoobtaindiplomaticassurancesthatneighboringstateswillnotcontributeassistancetotheenemy.ButsincetheSpanishCivilWar,inparticular,differentideologieshavedividedthegreat worldpowersintoopposedcamps.Ourideologicalopponentswill,under variousguises,giveourenemiesgreaterorlesseraid,accordingtotheir capabilities and their geographic situation, but, in any case, they will supportthem. Moreover,bytheveryfactofthepresentinterdependenceofnations, anyrevolutionarymovementinanycountrywillbeexploitedbyothersfor theirownends.TheSovietbloc,inparticular,willdoeverythingpossible tofeedaconflictsusceptibleofweakeningtheopposingcamp.Theenemy willundoubtedlyseeksupportinacountrywherediplomaticactionwill havenochanceofsuccess. Whendiplomaticinterventionprovesineffective,attemptswillbemade toestablishalongthefrontiersoftheterritoryunderattackasystemcapableofdeprivingtheenemyofdeliveryofsupportfromwithout.Butthe boundariesofastatearelongandwaysofcrossingthemplentiful. Inadefensiveendeavorofthiskind,thetaskofthenavyistoguardthe seafrontiers.Guidedbyaneffectiveintelligenceservice,itisabletointerceptsuspectships,evenonthehighseas.Itsactioncanthusconsiderably interferewiththeenemy’ssupplies.Butthiswillnotsucceedincuttingoff contrabandinarmsandotherwarmaterielindispensabletohim.Tokeep a close watch on the ports and coasts is the responsibility of the civil authority. But this involves great problems because of the number of administrativeareasconcerned,andbecauseofthevolumeofthetrafficto
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be controlled, particularly in the large ports. Also, rigorous regulation delaysacountry’sownsuppliesandforthisreasonisnotpractical. Byday,theairforcecanensuretheeffectivesurveillanceoflandandsea frontiers,andcanevenattackenemysupplyconvoyswhentheycrossthe frontier.Atnight,however,itsroleismuchreduced.Itcannotstopparachutedropsofmaterieloragents,notevenincloselywatchedareas,which canescapeourcontrolforsufficientlylongperiods. Guardingthefrontiersonthegroundisevenmoredifficulttorealize. Weknowthatguerrillasuseessentiallylightwarmaterielanduseitsparingly.Evenifwesucceedincuttingofftheirmainpenetrationroutes,there arestillthelittlemountainpathsknownonlytoexperts.Wecanrarelycut themoffentirely. EventhefortifiedperimeteralongtheedgeoftheTonkindelta,establishedatgreatcostbyGeneraldeLattrein1950–51,didnotsucceedin impedingregularexchangesbetweentheVietminhunitsinfiltratedintothe delta. They continued to receive all their military provisions from the outside,andsawtoitthattheircomrades,installedaroundtheperimeteror intheUpperRegion,gottheirneededrationsofrice.Wewereneverable tostopthattraffic. InAlgeria, drawing on past experience, we have managed to set up a fragile,buttight,barrierofindisputableeffectiveness.Ifouropponentsare stalemated,iftheyhavenotbeensuccessfulincreatingguerrillaunitslarger thancompanysize,itisinlargepartbecausetheborderfencehasnotpermittedthemtoreceivethesuppliesvitaltothenormaldevelopmentoftheir activities.Theguerrillaoperatessporadically,intendingmoretomaintain hisholdovertheruralpopulationthantodisturbtheforcesoforder.Itis thereforemoretowardterrorisminthecitiesthattheyhavebenttheirefforts, principallybecausethistypeofactioncallsforaminimumofmateriel. ThisiswhyhostilitiesinAlgeriaarestalled.Theadversaryiscounting ontheproveninabilityofFrancetopursueacostlyandseeminglyinterminableconflict,permittinghimultimatelytoattainhiswaraims. Butthebarrierpossessestheseriousdefectofalldefensiveorganizations.Thereisnosecretaboutitslocation;theenemycanobserveitfunctioninganddetectitsweaknesses. Atirregularintervals,sporadicattacksinsmallforce,neverpressedto aculmination,areenoughtoimmobilizelargenumbersoftroops.Moreover,theeasewithwhichtheseforayscanberepulseddevelopsafalse sense of security, which can be very dangerous. We must never permit ourselvestobedecoyed.Theenemywillprofitfromtheserepeatedforays tomaintaintheoffensivespiritoftheirtroopsandtostudyourreactions. Onlywhentheyhaveassembledthenecessarymenandmaterieltoforce thebarrierwilltheyreallyattack.
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The lesson of Dien Bien Phu should not be forgotten. The camp’s entrenchedgarrisonbelieveditselfsecurebehinditsextensivebarbed-wire network, which in some places ran more than fifty yards in depth. The troopsreadilylookedforwardtoamassenemyattack,whichtheythought themselvescapableofeasilyrepulsing.Bythetimetheirattackwasfinally unleashed,theVietminhhadhadplentyoftimetoappreciatethetruevalue ofthedefensivesystem,andtheybroughttogetherthemeansnecessaryfor abreakthrough. No doubt the barrier has a certain value, but it has no effect on the combatpotentialtheenemycanrallytogetherwithimpunityalongthe frontiers. Formerly,particularlyduringthenineteenthcentury,whenarmedbands crossedthefrontierofFrenchoverseaspossessionstheywerefollowed.If necessary, the country giving them refuge was attacked and quite often broughttosubmission.Agreementsamongafewofthegreatpowerswere sufficienttolocalizeaconflict,usuallyasimpleincidentourarmyhadthe capabilityofquicklyconcluding.Today,becauseofthepowerofinternationalorganizationsandtheintricaciesofworldproblems,thiskindofinterventionwouldleadtoreactionsthroughouttheentireworld,andcertainlyto anunpredictableextensionoftheconflict. Butfollow-upactionremainsthenormalreflexofthetraditionalmilitaryman.Actually,ifenemybasesoutsideourterritoryareclosetothe frontiers, sometimes within range of our heavier weapons, they are a temptingtarget,certainlyeasytoreachanddestroy.Letusconsiderthe effectsofanairattackagainstthesebasesandatraditionalattackbyground forcessupportedbyaviationandartillery. Anairattackofferstheadvantageofsecretpreparationandrapidexecution.Itwill,however,havedecisiveresultsonlyifitismassive.Therefore, it requires considerable resources. There is an element of surprise only during the first bombardments; dispersion and then camouflage quickly makethemlessprofitable.Despitepreciseinformation,targetswillbeprogressively more difficult to define. They will often be located close to built-upareas,whichmustbearthebruntofthebombardments. Finally,aerialattacksdonotpermittherealizationofdesiredobjectives. They accord our enemies complete freedom to present the facts in the mannermostfavorabletothem—thenumberofcivilianvictimsareconsiderablyexaggeratedandthemilitaryresultsminimized.Abombingrun is transformed by unfavorable propaganda into a terrorist raid that the enemypresscanexploit.EvenalargepartoftheFrenchpressexploited theonlybombingattacktheFrenchArmyinAlgeriaevercarriedout—the oneinFebruary,1958,ontheF.L.N.baseofSakhietSidiYoussef,nearthe Tunisianfrontier.
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Aconventionalattackagainstenemybasesbygroundforcesalsopresentsdisadvantages.Thefactisthatthecrossingofthefrontierofastate byaregularlyconstitutedarmyisacasusbelli.Itisequivalenttoadeclarationofwar,andinternationalusagewoulddefinitelydesignateusasthe aggressor. Modernwarfarehasnotbeencodified.Innumerableattackscanbecommittedinacountrybyapowerfulenemycombatforce;armedbandsbased abroadcanregularlycrossafrontierandharassthearmyofaneighboring country in order to overthrow its regime—and none of these is a casus belli.Terroristsandarmedbandscanalwaysbedeceptivetotheeyesof observersuneducatedtotheconditionsofmodernwarfare,ortopersons whoaremerelyofbadfaith.Butthetraditionalarmywithitsgreatnumbersoftroops,itsheavymateriel,slowtomoveaboutandimpossibleto hide,canneverpassunobserved. Agroundattackinsufficientstrength,carriedoutwithdetermination, would most certainly produce initial good results. Most of the storage pointssituatednearourfrontierscouldbedestroyedorcaptured;asignificant portion of the enemy forces could be annihilated or captured, but neverallofthem.Adeptatguerrillawarfare,elementswecannotattackor whichhavesucceededinfleeing,benefitingfromthesupportofthepeople towhomweappearastheaggressor,wouldfindrefugeinareasinaccessibletoourheavyequipment. Withoutgaininganydecisiveadvantage,wewouldconsiderablywiden thedimensionsofabattlefieldwealreadyfinddifficulttomanage.But, aboveall,wewouldgivetheenemyunexpectedsupportontheinternationalplane,supportawaitingonlyafavorableoccasiontomanifestitself openlyagainstus. Ifitisindispensabletodestroythesebasesabroadthatareessentialtoour enemies,itiscertainlynotmethodsoftraditionalwarfareweshouldemploy. Attacked on our own territory with the methods of modern warfare, we mustcarrythewartotheenemywiththesamemethods.
Chapter12
MODERNWARFAREIN ENEMYTERRITORY
Traditionalwarfaremethodsinterferetoacertainextentwithouropponents’ supplies,butcannothaltthem. The conventional army, as we have seen, deploys its considerable resources on a field of battle devoid of the enemy. It cannot meet him exceptbychance,becausethetwonormallyoperateoncompletelydifferentplanes,andthearmy’sattacksfallmoreoftenthannotintoavoid. Itisacceptedthatthefinalstakeofmodernwarfareisthecontrolofthe populace. The army should therefore make its main effort in those areas wherethepopulationisdensest;thatis,inthecities.ButinAlgeria,aftera fewspectacularearlysuccesses(thebattleofAlgiersin1957),thelargecitieswereabandonedtoenemyterroristorganizations,whilethemaintroop unitschasedaftersmallandunimportantbandsinunpopulatedregions.1 (Itshouldbestressedthatthisrecurringerrorspringsfromthefactthat thearmybytraditionrejectstheuseofthemodernwarfaremethodsitlittle understands.Ontheotherhand,theviolenceofattacksthearmyhasundergoneincertainintellectualcircles,andthepoorbackingithasreceived fromthegovernment,havecertainlynotencouragedittoinvolveitselfin operationsforwhichitisinanycasepoorlyprepared.) Attackedonourownterritory,wemustfirstdefendourselves.Thenwe maycarrythewartotheenemyandgrantthemnorespiteuntiltheycapitulate.Wewillattackthemontheirterrainwithweaponsofmodernwarfare that will permit us to strike directly, in their territory, without exposing ourselvestotheinternationalcomplicationstheemploymentoftraditional armswouldsurelyevoke.
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Theconductofmodernwarfarerequiresclosecollaborationwiththepopulation.Wemustfirstassureourselvesofitssupport.Experiencehasdemonstratedthatitisbynomeansnecessarytoenjoythesympathyofthemajority ofthepeopletoobtaintheirbacking;mostareamorphous,indifferent.We willlimitourselvestoforminganactiveeliteandintroducingitasleaveninto themasstoproduceactionatthedesiredmoment. Weneedcadresfirst,andtheyareeasytofind.(IntheformerFrenchUnion, anumberofmenremaineddevoted;thiswasamplydemonstratedinIndochina, andlaterinAlgeria.)Theyaredoubtlessmoreattractedbythebenefitsthey expectthanbyourcountryitself,butthisattachmentcanbeunflaggingifwe areresolvedtoacceptitandarefirminourintentionsandobjectives.Weknow alsothat,introubledperiods,self-interestandambitionhavealwaysbeen powerfulincentivesfordynamicindividualswhowanttomoveoutoftheir rutandgetsomewhere.Self-interestandambitioncanbeconsistentwithan idealandwithhonorableintentions.Itisthisidealandtheseintentionsthat wemustdiscover.Ineachcountry,withineachrace,ineverysocialstratum, wemustfindareason,anidea,oftendifferentonesinneighboringareas,but capablenonethelessofconstitutingadequatemotivationfortheassumption ofnecessaryrisks.Thepresenttroubledperiod,withitssocialandideological struggles,providesabroadfieldforresearchthroughwhichwecanfindthe basicelementsappropriatetoourundertaking. Aseverystate,everypoliticalsystemhasitsopponentsandinternalenemies,sowilltheregimewewanttodestroy.Theirnumbersarealwayslarge inanationoccupiedbyforeigntroops,underadictatorialregime,andincertainoutlyingregionswherepopularoppositiontothecentralpowerhasnot disappeared. Itisamongthesethatwewillfindthecadresweneed. ESTABLISHMENTOFMAQUISZONES Theinstallationofadvanceelementsonenemyterritoryrequiresaprior studyindepthtodeterminetheareasintowhichweoughttodirectour efforts.Thestudyshouldgatherinformationonthephysical,economic, andhumangeography;thecurrentpsychologicalclimate,andthedispositionofmilitaryandpoliceforces.Thisstudywillpermitustodetermine whichareaswillbemoreresponsivetoouractionandwheretheconduct ofalargeoperationcanbemosteffective. Atfirst,ourresourceswillbeverylimited.Wemustthereforechoose the least protected areas—sparsely populated mountain regions, for example,wheresecrecycanbemaintainedforthetimeneededtoplant ourcontactteams.Ouractionbeginswiththeestablishmentofmaquis zonesonforeignterritory.
MODERNWARFAREINENEMYTERRITORY
85
Experiencehasshownthatinanareasuitedtothesettingupofamaquis team,thereisnoroomfortwomasters—thelandbelongstothefirstoccupant. Accordingly,itisverydifficulttodislodgethepeoplealreadylivingthere.The ruggedlifeledbythemaquis,thefeartheymustinspireamongthesurrounding inhabitants in order to subsist, will oblige the natives to support them despitethemselves.Inthoseareaswhereweintendtobegin,wemustbecome theprimaryforce,topreventtheriseofanyauthorityotherthanourown. Fortakingoveraparticularmaquiszone,werecruitinitialcadresand,if possible,aleadertotakeovertheareacommandwhowillberepresentativeof theethnicandgeographicgrouppredominantinthatzone. Thecadresshouldbefromtheareainquestionandknowitperfectly,in ordertobeabletomakerecruitingcontactswithmenwhowillbeentrusted withcreatingtheassemblyareasoffuturemaquisteams.Theyshouldallbe localpeopleorpersonswhohavemaintainedfriendlyconnectionsorfamily relationships. TheContactTeams Thesefirstvolunteerswillbeassembledinaspecialcampfortraining contactteams.Followingaprocessofrigorousselection,theywillbeclassifiedintothreecategories—combatpersonnel(about50percentofthe volunteers), communications specialists (25 per cent), and political and intelligenceagents(25percent). Theirtrainingwillconsistofbasicgeneralinstruction(political,psychological, military, paratroop, counterintelligence) and specialized instruction (in particular, communications). This training will be conductedbyspecializedvolunteercadres,officers,andN.C.O.’s,whowill ultimatelyassumechargeofthemaquisbandswhentheyareactivated. At the end of the first training period, lasting two or three months dependingontheintellectualcapacityofthepupils,thefirstcontactmissionswillbeconstituted.Theywillgenerallybecomposedofateamleader andhisassistant(takenfromamongthosewhoreceivedthespecialized instruction for combat personnel), a communications specialist (voice), andtwopoliticalandintelligenceagents.Abouttensuchteamswillsuffice toprospectthemaquiszoneandtomakethecontactsnecessaryforcreatingbases.Theothervolunteerswillcontinuetheirtraining,especiallythe wirelessoperators,whoseinstructionmustbeespeciallythorough. Attherightmoment,thecontactteamswillbeassembledtogetherinthe maquiszone.Thiswillbeaccomplishedbynightparachutedrops,orby infiltration by land or water. Night drops of small teams by trained air crewsoffertheadvantageofgreatsecrecyandsparethemenbothalong difficulttrekandtherisksofinterception.
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MODERNWARFARE
Eachteamisindependentandoperatesinthevicinityofavillagethatis wellknowntoatleastoneoftheagentsandinwhichitwillbepossibleto renewfriendlyconnectionsandmakedesirablecontacts.Radiocommunicationwillenabletheworkoftheteamstobemonitored. When the contact mission is well under way, the team leader and an intelligenceagentreturntobase,usuallybyalandroute.2Bythistime, theyshouldbefamiliarenoughwiththeterrainnottorunanyrisk.They willtakealongwiththemafewpickedyoungpeople,alreadygivensome basictraining,toenrolltheminthemaquiscommando.Theassistantteam leader,thecommunicationsspecialist,andanintelligenceagentremainin theareasothatcontactsaremaintainedand,ifpossible,improved.This phaseoftakinguppositionsandmakingcontactsshouldlastfromoneto twomonths. Informationfurnishedbythecontactteams,coordinateduponthereturn oftheteamleaders,willenabletheofficercommandingthemaquistofollowtheevolutionofthesituation.Itenableshimtodirecttherecruitment and training of the necessary personnel, particularly that of the maquis command, which should consist of about 100 men. He can coordinate radiocontactwiththeteamsremaininginthefield.Hewillbeabletoset thepreciselimitsoffuturemaquiszones,designateandstudyparachute dropareas,andestablishquotasforweapons,radios,andothermateriel. When all the equipment has been mustered, when the training of the commando group, the team leaders, and the various specialists is completed,whentheorganizationofthezoneisfullycoordinated,aneffective maquisshouldbesettoworkassoonaspossible. Themaquisteamchiefsareparachutedfirst.Upontheirarrival,theywill organizetheirmaquisteamsforpersonalprotection.Maquisactionbegins immediatelywiththedismantlingofthelocaladministration.Themaquis leader follows his commando unit and radio equipment. He establishes himselfastheultimateauthorityinhisareaandputsanendtoanyaction ofthelocalpoliceorgendarmeriethatinterfereswithhisactivity.Afew well-calculatedactsofsabotageandterrorismwillthencompelanyreluctantcitizenstogivetherequiredcooperation.Harassmentofcommunicationlinescanbegin,whichwillleadtotheisolationofthemaquiszone.By meansofinternalsubversion,insecuritycanbesowedinthesurrounding villages. Oncethisimportantphaseiscomplete,thedevelopmentandextension of the maquis zone will depend on the leader and the reactions of the enemy.Effectiveweaponstrengthshouldrapidlyreach1,000rifles.Experiencehasshownthatamaquisteamof1,000armedmen,supportedby 2,000or3,000collaboratinginhabitants,ispracticallyinvulnerabletothe policeforces.
MODERNWARFAREINENEMYTERRITORY
87
Ifseveralmaquiseffortsarelaunchedatthesametime,theycancreate disturbancesofincalculablemagnitudeintheenemy’scountryofsupport. Otherquickerandmorebrutaltechniquescanbeemployed.Oneusedin Indochinaledtotheinstallationof20,000organizedandequippedpartisansintheUpperRegionofTonkingandinLaosinasingleyear.This figurewastobeincreasedto50,000intheautumnof1954,whichwould havepermittedthesoundlybasedreconquestofUpperTonking,thehaunt oflargeVietminhunits.Unfortunately,thisaction,undertakenontheinitiative of General de Lattre de Tassigny, came too late. The regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident brought the sudden cessation of hostilities and preventedusfromexploitingouropportunitiesindepth. TheactionofFrenchmaquisteamsdid,however,permittheevacuation withoutlossesofthefortifiedcampofNasan;thereconquestbyLaosofthe provincesofPhong-SalyandSam-Neuawithoutthehelpofregulartroops; thetotalinterdictionofthedirectroadfromLao-KaytoDienBienPhufor theentiredurationofthesiege,aswellastheimmobilizationofmorethan fourteen battalions of the Vietminh regular army on Route R.P. 41, the umbilicalcordofthebesiegers;therecoveryofhundredsofprisoners,etc. Andyet,theestablishmentofmaquisintheTonkineseUpperRegion, rightinthemiddleofanareaunderVietminhcontrol,seemedagamble whenitwasundertakenin1952.Thispotentialofthemaquiscommand, althoughscarcelynoticedatthetimeandalreadyforgotten,oughtnotbe lostsightof. Oncelargemaquisteamsareinstalled,weundertakeactioninthetowns. The maquis zones will serve as assembly areas and as refuge areas for forceschargedwithcreatingafeelingofinsecurityinthesmallsurrounding towns. Thelargetownsandcitiesinthemselvesconstitutemaquiszones.The extentoftheirsurfacearea,theirpopulationdensity,thedifficultyofestablishingthereastrictcontroloveralargeandconcentratedpopulation,will permitouragentstosetthemselvesup,toorganize,andtocreateareignof insecuritysufficienttocausetheauthoritiesconsiderabletrouble. ConcealingtheBuild-up Inordertosucceed,ouractioninenemyterritoryhastobecarriedout withdiscretion.Wemustrecruit,assemble,andtrainourmaquiselements in absolute secrecy.A camp capable of training 500 men, located in an isolatedareaofdifficultaccess,willserveourneeds. Themostpracticalmethod,theoneguaranteeingthebestresults,istoturn over a frontier sector command to whoever is designated to prepare and
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MODERNWARFARE
conductthenecessaryaction.Theregularsectorforceswouldcontinuetheir usualtasksduringthemaquistrainingperiodandwouldbeinapositionto supportthemwhenactionbegins. Innocasedoregulartroops,elementsofregulartroops,orisolatednationalscrossthefrontier.Ourinterventiontroopswillreceiveonlyenemyweaponsandequipment,capturedincombatorotherwiseprocured.Manyofour maquiswillberecruiteddirectlyfromamongtheenemy,especiallyfrom amongprisoners,andnativesoftheterritorywhereouractiontakesplace. Thus,wewillhavecarriedthewarontoforeignterritorywithoutusing regular troops. With respect to international opinion, the movement we launchmaybepresentedbyourselvesandourfriendsasaninternaluprising,fromwhichweareapparentlydivorcedbutwhichnonethelesshasour official sympathy. We will attempt to give the military action a clearly definedpoliticalcharacterand,ifpossible,asymbolicleadertorepresentit. We will give it any assistance that will contribute to its development, in anticipationofthemomentwhentheinternationalsituationpermitsusto giveaidofficially. Certainlyouropponentswon’tbedeceived;theywillknowfromwhere theblowsarecoming.Buttheirprotestswillcarrynomoreweightthanour own.Modernwarfare,nothavingbeencodified,remainsofficiallyignored. Anydiplomaticinterventionwouldlooklikemeddlingintheinternalaffairs ofasovereigncountryandwouldberejected. Peacemaythenbere-establishedonlyonourownterms;thatis,whenthe aidgiventoourenemieshasceased. NOTES 1. ThedisturbancesofDecember,1960,inthelargerAlgeriantownswerethe resultofsuchabandonment,whichtendedtoworsentheentireproblem. 2. Orbyhelicopter,aconsiderablesavingintime.
CONCLUSION
Inmodernwarfare,asinthetraditionalwarsofthepast,itisabsolutely essentialtomakeuseofalltheweaponstheenemyemploys.Nottodoso wouldbeabsurd. WelostthewarinIndochinalargelybecausewehesitatedtotakethe necessary measures or took them too late. For the same reason we are goingtolosethewarinAlgeria.Francewillseekacompromisepeaceit neverwouldhaveconsideredifthearmyhadgivenitthevictorythecountryhadrightlycometoexpectinviewofthesacrificesithadmade. Ifanarmyhasatomicweaponsandisfirmlyresolvedtousethemtodissuadeapotentialenemyfromattacking,weoughtequallytobefirmlydecided toemployeveryresourceofmodernwarfaretoensureourprotection. Suchresolution,clearlystated,maybeenoughtodeteraggression. Theformsofwarfareanditsweaponshaveevolvedgraduallyoverthe ages.Weareonceagainatanimportantjunctureofthatevolution. Scienceisallowingthemilitarytokillmoreandmoreoftheenemy atgreaterandgreaterdistances.Airmen,artillerymen,eveninfantrymen havekilledandbeenkilledwithouthavingseenasingleenemy.Thehard andpitilessrealitiesofwar—cruelandbrutalphysicalcontactwiththe enemy—arebeingsparedthemodernsoldier.Combatantsphilosophically acceptkillinganddying,butusuallyavoidtheruggedcontactofphysical sufferinganddeathindividuallygivenandreceived. Withtheadventoftheatomicweapon,thepowerofdestructionhas becomesuchthatitsusewouldprobablyinvolvethesimultaneousdisappearanceofbelligerentsofbothcamps.Itwillthereforenotbeused.
90
MODERNWARFARE
But war itself will not disappear. The increasing power of weaponry, whichplacesdistancebetweencombatants,isalsoabruptlybringingthem together.Onceagain,theywillconfrontoneanotheronaclearlydefined field, and will rediscover the physical contact lost these many centuries. Immensearmieswillnolongersimultaneouslyinvadeavastbattlefield.War willbeajuxtapositionofamultitudeofsmallactions.Intelligenceandruse, alliedtophysicalbrutality,willsucceedthepowerofblindarmament. Aproblemconfrontsus:Willweinmodernwarfaremakeuseofallnecessaryresourcestowin,aswehavealwaysdoneinthetraditionalwarsof thepastandasweatpresentenvisagedoingwhenweconstructnuclear weapons? Othersoldiershavebeenconfrontedwithproblemsofthisnatureinthe courseofhistory.AtthebattleofCrécyin1346,thearmyoftheFrench KingrefusedtousethebowandthearrowtheEnglishhandledsoeffectively.Forthem,truecombat,theonlyfairandpermissiblekind,remained man-to-man,body-to-body.Touseanarrow,tokillone’sadversaryfrom afar,wasakindofimpermissiblecowardlinessnotcompatiblewiththeir conceptsofhonorandchivalry. AtAgincourtin1415,thelessonofCrécywentunheeded.Onceagain onhorseback,withbreastplateandsword,Frenchknightsadvancedon Englisharchers,andonceagainwerecrushed. Theknights,atthattimetheprofessionalmilitarymenofthenation, refusedtousethenewarms,buttheKingofFrance,responsibleforthe destinyofthecountry,adoptedthemandarmedhisinfantrywiththebow. CharlesVII,infact,fromthattimeonobligedeveryparishtomaintainan archer,thefirststeptowardourpresentnationalarmy. Knights,havingbecomeanarchaicanduselessluxury,disappearedfrom thefieldofbattle.Forthem,apageofhistoryhasbeenturnedforalltime. Nonationdeprivesitsarmyofmaterialresourcesormoralsupport.It allowsititsownsystemofjustice,swiftandsevere,topassjudgmentin thecontextofwarfareonthosesoldiersfoundguiltyofoffensesorcrimes; doctorstocareforthewoundedonthefieldofbattle;chaplainstoensure spiritualpeacetothedying,andthepoweroflifeanddeathoveropponentswithintheframeworkoftherulesofwar.Usually,thearmylives isolatedfromthepeopleforthedurationofconflict. Thenationdoesnotaskthearmytodefineproblems,buttowinthewar it is engaged in and to ensure the population’s protection and security againstanythreateningdanger. If,liketheknightsofold,ourarmyrefusedtoemployalltheweaponsof modernwarfare,itcouldnolongerfulfillitsmission.Wewouldnolonger bedefended.Ournationalindependence,thecivilizationweholddear,our veryfreedomwouldprobablyperish.
INDEX
Agents:enemysupplyingof,33;recruitmentof,33;traininginhabitantsas,32 Aggressors,exploitationby,5 Airattack,advantagesof,80 Algeria:armyof,7;clandestinewarfare organizationof,9–13;effectivebarrierssetupin,79;France’sriggingof electionsin,4;FrenchArmybombing of,80;goodwillof,30;regionaldivisionsof,9;terrorismof,15;warbeing lostin,3 AlgerianNationalLiberationFront (N.L.F.),4,9,80;inAlgiers,16; atrocitiescommittedby,17;committeesof,10 Algiers:Battleof,41;F.L.N.clandestine warfareorganizationof,16;organizationalimportancein,57;wilayas/ zonesof,58 A.L.N.SeeArmyofNationalLiberation Ambushes:activationof,68;populace backingfor,48;asunsuccessful weaponagainstguerillas,47,48 Animals,censusof,62 ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege(U.S.),54 ArmyofNationalLiberation(A.L.N.), 9,10
Army(ies):advantagesof,52;defenseof nationalterritoryasraisond’êtreof, 3;guerillasresourcesv,resourcesof, 51–52;knightscomparedwith,90; lightdetachmentoperationsof,37–38; modernwarfaredistrustby,83;nonadaptationby,51;policecooperation with,38 Arrests,ofenemies,34,38–39 Atrocities,ofN.L.F.,17 Attacks:disadvantageofconventional, 81;goodpossibleresultsfromground, 81 Authority,established,overthrowingof, 34 AutonomousZoneofAlgiers(Z.A.A.): bomb-throwingnetworkof,11;committeesof,10,11;divisionsof,9; Saadi,Yassef,aschiefof,21 BattleofAlgiers(1957),41 BattleofCrécy(1346),90 Battlefield,nonrestrictednessof,27 Battles:BattleofAlgiers,41;Battleof Crécy,90;DienBienPhu,3,6 “BeatingtheMilitary”(Beebe),54 Beebe,JohnE.,54,74 Brutality,inevitabilityof,40–41
92
INDEX
Censuscard,62 ChineseCommunists,78 Clausewitz,Carlvon,19 Commandinggeneral:enemydestruction orchestratedby,66;generalreserve maintainedby,70;inhabitantsregroupedby,70;pacificationprojects orderedby,66–67;refugeareaattacks orderedby,66;zonedivisionby,68 Commandogroups(autonomous):day andnightpatrolsby,47–48;inhabitant’sobservationsof,48;populace sympathyfor,48;raidsby,63;as weaponagainstguerillas,47 Conduct,ofmodernwarfare,84 Contactteams,trainingof,85–87 Counterguerillaoperations:objectivesof, 54;timelimit’snonexistencein,71 Counterguerillas:Indochinaand,46;strategyof,60;tacticsof,60–74 DienBienPhu:battleat,3,6;lessonsof, 80,87 EditorialCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 Enemies:actionsagainstpopulaceby, 37;agentssuppliedby,33;corruptingagentsof,33;forcesoforderoppositionto,38;gainingknowledgeof preparationof,34;hostileelements uncoveredby,28;identificationof,23, 24;initialrestraintof,70;intermediate sectorareasof,63;methodsemployed by,6;militaryoperation’slocatingof, 57;militaryoutpostsobservedby,47; night-timearrestof,38–39;operation slow-downattemptsby,40;organizationsof,25;populacedividedby, 28–29;populationcensustakenby,29; secretarrestsof,34;stepsfordestructionof,61;supportsoughtby,77;systematicdestructionof,65,66;taking warto,1;vulnerabilityof,60 Enemyorganization:importanceof,57; wilayas/zones/regions/departments of,57 FinancialCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 F.L.N.SeeAlgerianNationalLiberation Front
Food,inhabitantsasguerilla’ssourceof, 53 France:dismantlingallowedby,41;Indochinaerrorof,78;liberation(1945) of,3;maquisteamsof,87;riggingof Algerianelectionsby,4 FrenchArmy:Algeriabombingby,80; Than-Uyenoccupiedby,46 General.SeeCommandinggeneral GenevaConvention,40 Greece,inabilitytocrushCommunists by,78 Greene,Graham,18 Gridunits:asfirsttroopsused,72;police operationtrainingof,73 Gridding,60–61 Guerillawarfare:secrecyrequirements for,87–88;smallbandeffectiveness of,73;terrorismrootsof,45;time limit’snonexistencein,71 Guerillas:armyresourcesv.resourcesof, 51–52;destroyingcombatorganization of,52;forceful/quickactionagainst, 70;goalof,45;greatestadvantageof, 52;inhabitantssupplyingfoodto,53; lossavoidanceby,45;militaryunits cooperationwith,45–46;morningescapeattemptsof,69;origin/evolution/ efficacyof,46;patiencerequiredin tracking,53;populacesupportof,47, 53;studyingmethodof,51;surprise envelopmentof,49–50;terrainchoices of,52–53;weaponsusedagainst,47; WorldWarIIinvolvementof,46 HealthCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 Indochina:counterguerillaactionin,46; Frencherrorin,78;goodwillof,30; terrorismof,15;warlostin,3 InformationCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 Inhabitants(citizens):agenttrainingof, 32;bureauofinhabitant’sorganization andcontrolofficeof,30;censuscard givento,62;censuscardsgivento,29; commandosobservedby,48;district bydistrictmusteringof,38;asessential toconductofmodernwarfare,27–28; guerilla’sfoodsuppliedby,53;indi-
INDEX
vidualnon-violentinterrogationof,64; infiltrationattemptsagainst,31;informingchancesgivento,32;intelligence networksetupamong,31–32;organizationof,27–31;refugeareasassemblage of,68;strategichamletjoiningby,65; troopmovementobservationsof,53 Intelligencenetworks:employmentprovidedby,32–33;settingupof,31–32 Interrogation:conditionsforeffective, 19–20;ofinhabitants,64;aspolice operation,73;ofpolitico-militaryorganization,64;ofterrorists,18–19 Interrogators,responsibilitiesof,19–20 Intervaltroops:nighttimeactivitiesof,68; politico-militaryorganizationdestructionby,63,64,73;ofsectors,63 Interventionunits,refugeareaconcentrationof,67,73 JusticeCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 Korea:drawingonexperiencein,71,73; U.S.Armycounterguerillaoperations in,54,55 LiaisonCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 MaoTse-tung,6 Maquiszones:contactteamsassembling in,86;establishmentof,84–85 Masses,controlof,28 Militaryoperations:enemylocationin, 57;influenceofscienceon,89;limited importanceof,5.SeealsoRegular militaryunits Militaryoutposts:enemyobservationof, 47;ineffectivenessof,61;asunsuccessfulweaponagainstguerillas,47 Modernwarfare:armedclandestine organizationsof,7;army’sdistrust of,83;ascitizen’snewexperience, 39–40;classicalwarcomparedwith, 46;conductof,84;controlofmasses asmasterweaponof,28;enemyidentificationdifficultyof,23;finalstake of,83;goalof,15,70;noncodification of,81,88;peacetimepreparationfor, 34;populacesupportrequirementof, 17,27;populationmanipulationsof,
93 6;sweepingconsequencesof,41–42; terrorismasweaponof,15,17,20,45; troopspecializationof,72;war’snondeclarationin,24;weaponsof,83,89
Nations,interdependenceof,5 Navy,defensivetaskof,78 NorthAfrica,4 OperationRatkiller(Korea),55 OperationTrample(Korea),55 Peacetime,warfarepreparationduring,34 Policeoperations,60;asactualwarfare, 41;armycooperationwith,38;city actionsagainstenemiesby,37;difficultiesof,39–40;gridunittraining aspartof,73;interrogationsas,73; limitationsof,42;againstpoliticomilitaryorganization,71;purposesof, 37;terroristspartialrestrictionby,17, 21;town/sectorfocusof,62,63 Politico-militaryorganization:interrogationsof,64;intervaltroop’sdestructionof,63,64,73;largescalepolice operationagainst,71 Populace:ambushesbackedby,48;brutality’sinfluenceon,40;commando groupssympathyfrom,48;controlof, 65;enemiesdivisionof,28–29;guerillassupportedby,47,53;inconveniencingof,40;insuringsafetyof,38;internalwarfareof,37;leadershipsearch among,30;modernwarfare’sneedfor supportfrom,17,27;policeoperations within,37;propaganda’sinfluenceon, 41;reignsofterroragainst,20;selfprotectionby,29–30;terrorismprotectionfor,30–31.Seealsoinhabitants (citizens) Popularsupport,assinequoanonofvictory,6 Prisoncamps,settingupof,40 Propaganda,influenceof,41 Psychologicalwarfare,usageof,69 TheQuietAmerican(Greene),18 Refugeareas:assemblageofinhabitants in,68;attackson,66;asdivisionof
94
INDEX
sectors,59;helicopter/air-drop/foot investmentof,67–68;intervention troopsneededin,67,73;isolationof, 67;resourcesdestroyedin,69 Region,57;asbasicenemyunit,58;sectordivisionsof,58–59 Regroupmentcenters,68 Regularmilitaryunits,guerillacooperationwith,45–46 Revolutionarywarfare,5 Ruralareas(inhabited),asdivisionofsectors,59
by,16;assoldiers,18;asthree-man team,20 Than-Uyen:FrenchArmyoccupationof, 46;Vietminh’soccupationof,46 Theater-leveloperations,70–74 Totalitarianism,24 Towns/populationcenters,asdivisionof sectors,59 TradeUnionCommittee(ofZ.A.A.),11 Traitors,creationof,24 Troopspecialization,inmodernwarfare, 72
Saadi,Yassef,21 Sectors:ofenemyorganization,58–59; geographicdivisionsof,59;interval troopsof,63;livingsituationof,60; policeoperationsfocuson,62 Security,compartmentationassurance of,34 Socialservices,wartimeinvolvementof, 42 Soldiers:qualitiesof,16;terroristsas,18 SpanishCivilWar,78 Strategy,ofcounterguerillas,60 Subversivewarfare,5 Sweeps:componentsof,49;asweapon againstguerillas,47
UnitedStates:ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,54;Koreancounterguerillaoperationssuccessof,54,55
Tactics,ofcounterguerillas,60–74 Terrain,guerilla’schoiceof,52–53 Terrorism:inbigcities,20;characteristics of,16;asfirstactofwarbyenemies, 60–61;asmeansofgainingsupport, 6;protectingpopulaceagainst,30–31; asweaponofmodernwarfare,15,17, 20,45 Terrorists:camouflagetacticsof,18;interrogationof,18–19;police’spartial restrictionof,17,21;qualitiesof,16, 18;slaughterofdefenselesspeople
Vietminh:elusivenessof,3;harassment by,47;Than-Uyen’soccupationby,46 Villages,asstrategicoutposts,62 Violence:warfare’sunavoidabilityof,19 Warfare:inadequaciesoftraditional,77– 81;asinterlockingsystemofactions, 5;militaryschool’steachingclassic doctrinesof,27;policeoperationsas, 41;preparationsfor,24;revolutionary, 5;socialservice’sinvolvementduring, 42;subversive,5;terrorismasweapon of,15,17,20;violenceinescapability in,19 Weapon(s):ofmodernwarfare,83;terrorismas,15;usedagainstguerillas,47 Wilayas(majormilitarydistricts),57 WorldWarII,5;Alliedvictoryin,6;guerillainvolvementin,46 Yugoslavia,Greeceaidedby,78 Z.A.A.SeeAutonomousZoneofAlgiers
AboutTheAuthor ROGERTRINQUIER (1908-1986) was born into a peasant family and wasgraduatedfromthemilitaryacademyatSaint-Maixent.Hewasposted intheFarEastformuchofhiscareer,servingfirstinIndochinaandthen in China. Following World War II, he campaigned in Vietnam before returning to organize and train a colonial parachute battalion in France. ThenhewasreassignedtoIndochinaasanexpertoncounterguerrillawarfare.ThistourwasfollowedbyhisactiveroleintherevoltofMay1958 bytheFrencharmyinAlgeria,forwhichhewaslabeled“apoliticalcolonel”.AfterwardColonelTrinquierledagroupoffellowofficers—recruited fromeliteunitsandofficiallyretired,butwiththeapprovaloftheMinistry ofDefense—toserveasmercenariesinKatangaProvince,Zaire,under the secessionist leader MoïseTshombe. He published La Guerre Moderne,whichwastranslatedintoEnglish,andanumberofotherbooksdealingwiththeIndochinawarandtheexploitsofFrenchairborneforces.