Modality in Language Acquisition / Modalité et acquisition des langues [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110856996, 9783110123784

Citation preview

Modality in Language Acquisition Modalite et acquisition des langues

Soziolinguistik und Sprachkontakt Sociolinguistics and Language Contact

Herausgegeben von / Edited by Norbert Dittmar

Band 6 / Volume 6

w DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1993

Modality in Language Acquisition Modalite et acquisition des langues Edited by / Edite par Norbert Dittmar · Astrid Reich

w DE

G Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 1993

® Gedruckt auf säurefreiem Papier, das die US-ANSI-Norm über Haltbarkeit erfüllt. Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek — CIP-Einheitsauf nähme

Modality in language acquisition = Modalite et acquisition des langues / ed. by Norbert Dittmar ; Astrid Reich. — Berlin ; New York : de Gruyter, 1993 (Soziolinguistik und Sprachkontakt ; Bd. 6) ISBN 3-11-012378-9 NE: Dittmar, Norbert [Hrsg.]; PT; GT

© Copyright 1993 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany Druck: Werner Hildebrand, Berlin Buchbinderische Verarbeitung: Lüderitz & Bauer-GmbH, Berlin

Contents - Table de matieres

Introduction

IX

I Modal Structures in Languages and Language Varieties Structures Modales: Langues et Varietes

l

CHRIJmANE VON STUTTERHEIM Modality: Function and Form in Discourse

3

EDDY ROULET Des formes et des emplois des modalisateurs de proposition dans l'interaction verbale

27

ANDRZEJ KATNY Lexical and Grammatical Exponents of Modality in Polish and German

41

BENJI WALD On the Evolution of Would and Other Modals in the English Spoken in East Los Angeles

59

ANNA DUTKA Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

97

OSWALD DUCROT A quoi sert le concept de modalite?

Ill

VI

Contents - Table de matieres II Modality in First Language Acquisition Modalite et acquisition d'une langue maternelle

131

URSULA STEPHANY Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

133

MAGDALENA SMOCZYNSKA The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

145

SUSAN SHEPERD The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

171

CHRISTIAN CHAMPAUD, DOMINIQUE BASSANO & MAYA fflCKMANN Modalite 6pistemique et discours rapporte chez 1'enfant francais

185

III Modality in Second Language Acquisition Modalite et acquisition d'une langue seconde

211

NORBERT DITTMAR Proto-Semantics and Emergent Grammars

213

HEINER TERBORG Elaboration of the Modal Lexicon in German as a Second Language

235

ROMUALD SKffiA Modal Verbs and Their Syntactic Characteristics in Elementary Learner Varieties

247

BERT-OLAF RIECK Conditionals in Learner Varieties of German

261

HENRIETTE STOFFEL & DANIEL VERONIQUE Acquisition de modalites en francais et proces de modalisation chez des adultes arabophones marocains

277

MIREILLE PRODEAU Donner des instructions en langue otrangere: acquisition des mo yens de la function prescriptive et rapports de face

297

Contents - Table de matieres

VII

FRANCOISE HICKEL Modalito et argumentation: profits stratogiques et developpement linguistique

325

Bibliography - Bibliographie

351

Index

371

Contributors - Contributeurs

381

Errata

p. XIII, 1. 16: refering] referring p. XIII, L 28: protasis (antecendent) and an apososis] a protasis (antecedent) and an apodosis p. 115,1. 15: trois] quelques p. 123,1. 1:3.] 2.4 p. 127,1. 17: 4.] 3.

Introduction

ι The concept of modality is a genuine 'topos' of recent reasoning in linguistics. Theoretical outlines have been drawn and new insights in intonation, sentence typology, modal particles, speech acts and the expression of attitudes and beliefs have been gained by introspection. Empirical research on concepts and verification of hypotheses have however been widely neglected. The present volume aims to overcome this obvious lack in linguistic research on modality. Psycholinguists and sociolinguists in close contact to more generally interested researchers have examined the ways of expressing modality in first and second language acquisition as well as in different languages and speech communities. When we started to prepare the conference on 'Modality in Language Acquisition1 held at 'The Free University', Berlin, in May 1989 we proceeded from the following question: 'What essential contribution can empirical work offer towards the construction of a theory of modality?' Of course Palmer (1986) presented a crosslinguistic study on modality by looking at some 25 different languages and their ways to express modal meanings. However he either used informants who explained to him the organization of modality in their language or he looked at grammatical descriptions of the languages (more or less a priori grammars). The idea of the conference and the resulting book was to proceed from the opposite viewpoint in order to deal with modality i.e. to examine whether real language occurrence helps us to evaluate theoretical options. Let us regard an example; the so-called Irrealis receives a lot of attention in a priori grammars, but in everyday argumentation and in first and second language acquisition this concept does not play an outstanding role. This is not to say that irrealis should not be described at all, but the empirical facts urge us to consider its real role and weight in everyday communication.

X

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

Of course we are still quite far from the realization of this goal but if this volume initiates the revision of our categorical thinking on modality and succeeds in illustrating the variability of expressions which fulfill different semantic functions within the domain of modality, it may be a complementary addition to our current knowledge. The various contributions of widespread interests reflect some of the different ways to think of, and to analyze modality and modalization. In dealing with actual language use the articles presented here also involve questions like the following which partly explain the existing heterogeneity: -

What is the range of phenomena to be included in the field of modality and modalization? Does a modal 'neutrality' exist, or do we have to conceive of every utterance as having to be modalized in some way?

Depending on the linguistic tradition to which the authors subscribe and on whether they work with language use documented in real data or from a more theoretical perspective, the answers to these questions turn out to be quite distinct. What they have in common nevertheless, is the importance they ascribe to pragmatic interpretations in the study of modal phenomena. The most common languages at the Berlin Colloquium were English and French - German was excluded as it was not a language suitable with which a bridge between the Romance and the Anglophone world could be formed. There may be different ways of dealing with both languages in the introduction to such a bilingual volume; we opted for a rarely practised bilingual 'modality': English articles will be presented in English and French contributions in French.

This volume contains three articles exploring theoretical aspects of modality. In her contribution, CHRISTIANE VON STUTTERHEIM looks at the function of modal expressions in discourse. Using a textual frame the author analyzes the distribution of different kinds of information in narratives and instructions. These text types are structurally organized in response to an underlying "quaestio" of the text (Klein & von Stutterheim, 1987; von Stutterheim & Klein, 1989). In narratives, e.g., references to time, to space, to persons/objects and to 'predicates' (actions, properties, etc.) have to be

Introduction

XI

organized in a coherent way. Moreover, there is also modal information which must be coded in the utterances. Von Stutterheim presents a frame of analysis with which one can describe the organization of modal reference. With respect to the "validity" of a proposition she distinguishes between three basic categories: "factual", "counterfactual" and "open". Once utterances have been classified according to this -level other facultative components of modal meaning can be looked for. The use of modal verbs leads to modalized propositions which may be characterized by an abstract modality-relation (BCategory) of necessity or possibility. On the C-level the relation type i.e. different types of neccessity and possibility will be subspecified. Sources play a role here as do all kinds of background information ("Redehintergrund", cf. Kratzer, 1978). A last notion regarding the degree of certainty enters the model of analysis as category D. hi a detailed description of a sample of authentic narratives and instructions von Stutterheim demonstrates how these A-, B-, C- and D-categories are verbally realized in discourse. She pays particular attention to the semantic differences between können and müssen. It seems that these modal verbs are both deontic but serve different stylistic functions. With respect to modality, she concludes that "there is more to language competence in this domain than just the knowledge of word meanings and construction types" (von Stutterheim, this volume: 22). In contrast to the expression of temporality, which must be indicated anew in every utterance, it seems that modal functions can be marked once when setting up a frame for a specific discourse. We have to learn that modality is much more 'implicit1 in utterances, than for example temporal relations.

Face au nombre impressionnant d'etudes portant sur la modalite, OSWALD DUCROT developpe une position theorique qui, au contraire, met en question 1'utilite meme du concept de modalite. A 1'aide d'une esquisse historique, il introduit la position moderne du traitement theorique de la modalite d'une categorisation fondamentale qui, se trouvant dejä chez Descartes et les grammairiens de Port-Royal, a etc transmise sous des etiquettes differentes jusqu'ä nos jours. Ducrot affirme que la conception du modal implique egalement l'existence du non-modal et que cette repartition rappelle la distinction traditionnelle de notre pensee occidentale entre le subjectif et 1'objectif. II montre que cette position de stricte repartition empeche de saisir

XII

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

maints phenomenes Ii6s ä la somantique modale: Or, le survol historique amene Ducrot ä l'abandon de la notion gonerale de modalite, parce que cette notion s'avere trop etroite pour la gamme des prises de position qui marquent le discours du locuteur et qui sont verbalis£es par un grand ensemble d'expressions. "Ce qu'on appelle idee, dictum, contenu propositionnel n'est constitue par rien d'autre ... que par une ou plusieurs prises de position. Dire que le fruit est delicieux, que le sermon est monotone, ... cela consiste seulement ä exprimer certaines attitudes vis-ä-vis des objets dont on parle. Ces attitudes, je ne voudrais pas les appeler modalites, car, ce faisant, on donnerait ä entendre qu'elles s'appliquent ä des representations. Pour moi, au contraire, elles constituent ä elles la vision du monde vehiculee par nos enonces" (Ducrot, ce volume: 128). En decouvrant les valeurs subjectives et argumentatives dans l'emploi des mots, en les attachant aux intentions des locuteurs, on arrive ä saisir les prises de position. La signification subjective constitue un champ de valeurs modales qui est beaucoup plus vaste que la liste restrainte des expressions modales qu'on analyse au sein de la grammaire traditionnelle. Heureusement le refus de Ducrot ä utiliser la notion de modalite ne mene pas ä un vide ä ce propos. N'est-ce pas lui-meme qui admet: "Mon but ici n'est pas de critiquer les recherches faites ä propos des modalites. Beaucoup de ces recherches me semblent en effet parmi les plus importantes de la linguistique recente." (ibid.: 112)? Le fait que ses reflections theoriques ne soient pas sans consequences directes ou indirectes, c'est ce que montrent les contributions de Stoffel & Veronique, de Prodeau, Roulet, de Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann ainsi que de Hickel et Dutka. Ces dernieres, l'une travaillant sur les connecteurs argumentatifs en Polonais (Dutka), l'autre sur l'argumentation en L2 (Hickel), prennent en consideration l'ensemble des traits linguistiques qui servent ä l'argumentation. Du point de vue de la semantique traditionnelle, seuls les modaux entreraient dans la responsabilite du champ de la modalite et non pas l'argumentation en general. C'est ä Ducrot que revient le merite d'avoir indique que l'argumentation entiere concerne les modalisations pour lesquelles le concept traditionnel de la modalite s'avere plutöt comme un lit de Procruste. EDDY ROULET, l'autre linguiste francophone qui aborde plutöt le cöte theorique de la modalite, suit Ducrot lorsqu'il souligne que le chevauchement entre semantique et pragmatique doit etre considere dans l'analyse de la modalite. II etudie les modalisateurs de proposition qui sont definis "comme une marque de point de vue de l'enonciateur portant sur l'ensemble de la proposition" et qui se situent "au niveau de l'acte de langage considere

Introduction

XIII

iso!6ment" (Roulet, ce volume: 38). Roulet classe les modalisateurs en francais selon les axes 'extrait' (modalisateur externe ä la proposition tel que dans // est probable que Paul va venir) - 'integre' (Paul va probablement venir) ainsi que 'explicite' (Je pense qu'il fera beau) - 'implicite' (// me semble qu'il fera beau). II faut cependant distinguer les emplois modaux et non-modaux des modalisateurs qui, en fait, fonctionnent comme lexemes potentiellement - sous certaines conditions d'emploi - modaux. Des extraits de conversations authentiques servent ä illustrer trois types d'emploi importants des modalisateurs dans l'interaction verbale: l) l'expression du point de vue de 1'enonciateur, 2) 1'indication implicite de la function illocutoire, et, 3) l'attenuation de l'acte illocutoire. On voit les relations etroites entre modalisation et illocution qui seront de nouveau focalisees dans les contributions de Hickel, Prodeau, Stoffel & Veronique reprenant en cela Ducrot et Roulet. Outre les trois contributions d'interet theorique, cette premiere partie du volume rassemble trois autres contributions qui traitent divers moyens d'exprimer des valeurs modales dans differentes langues et varietes. Avant d'aborder les domaines de l'acquisition (de langue matemelle ou seconde), ces trois contributions constituent une sorte de 'test1 pour les concepts theoriques. Dans le cadre de la theorie de l'argumentation developpee par Ducrot et Anscombre (cf. supra et Anscombre & Ducrot, 1976, 1981, 1983), ANNA DUTKA explore les valeurs argumentatives des connecteurs polonais ale, a et / qui recouvrent grosso modo le champ de mais et et en francais. Elle montre 1'apport possible que pourrait dormer cette theorie ä la description de ces elements en tant que connecteurs du polonais. Jusqu'ä maintenant ils n'ont connu que des analyses qui integrem incompletement le cöte semantique et pragmatique. Dutka, par contre, maintient avec les theoriciens de l'argumentation que "pour decrire le Systeme linguistique, il faut envisager la fa9on dont ces elements orientent le discours" (Dutka, ce volume: 104). Or, il faut prendre en consideration que les connecteurs, done ale, a et /, different quant ä la possibilite 1) de relier des propositions, 2) d'articuler des P et Q implicites, 3) d'introduire certaines exclamations et reponses, et, 4) de fonctionner comme interjection redoublee. On voit ä quel degre le niveau de l'argumentation sert ä distinguer, par une specification de fonction, des elements qui modalisent le discours.

XIV

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

One of the other 'test cases' constitutes the comparison of modal expressions in German and Polish by ANDRZEJ KATNY. From a contrastive point of view he is mainly concerned with the question of how to translate modal expressions and values from German into Polish. Therefore the exact analysis of meaning variants in the two languages is essential. In distinguishing between forms and types of modality, Katny establishes some kind of bridge between grammatical and speech act analysis (without focusing directly on functions in discourse). He concentrates on those modal expressions which pose particular translation problems: 1) affix types of modal meaning linked with word formation and morphology of adjectives and adverbs which are generally ignored by other linguists, 2) constructions with 'sein/haben + zu + infinitive' [to be/have to + infinitive] which express necessity, obligation and possibility, 3) modal verbs in their deontic and epistemic readings and finally, 4) modal values inherent to certain uses of the infinitive. Katny also emphasizes that for a real understanding of modality and modalization the view has to be broadened to include adjacent grammatical-semantic fields as well as text and discourse level. BENJI WALD's contribution points at an obvious lack in the studies on modals which generally tend to describe an 'ideal' stable system: very little is known about the variation of modals in oral language use both within a given speech community and across dialects of a language as widespread as English. Wald collected data at different points in time from different age and proficiency groups in the bilingual but nonetheless English dominant community of East Los Angeles (ELA) where variation can be studied on different levels. The author is concerned with the question of the varied basic factors (language internal or external) which determine the specific use of modal verbs in ELA English and which may be of general interest: "They include general linguistic tendencies, specific tendencies within English dialects, transfer from Spanish and retention of other interlanguage strategies." (Wald, this volume: 88). Wald describes the use of modals in the English spoken in ELA in general and compares it with other existing and historical dialects. He concentrates on the modal WOULD which is particularly salient in its uses slightly different from other varieties (e.g. mood concord), thus indicating some of the factors which may determine the actual use of modals in English.

Introduction

XV

Once the idea of varieties and variation has been admitted, a necessary step has been made towards first and second language acquisition research in dealing with data from language use. Up to now we can count far more studies on the acquisition of modals in first than in second languages. Modality and modalization seems to be a particularly promising field of investigation because the interrelations between cognitive and language development can be quite clearly observed. The studies presented here possibly contribute to a cross-linguistic comparision of the initial stages in the appropriation of modal expressions (cf. Stephany). They all agree on deontic means preceding epistemic ones, hence emphasizing the special interest in the acquisition of deontics (Smoczynska; Sheperd). All the more, there is a need to consider the epistemic part as well (Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann). URSULA STEPHANY gives a detailed review of studies on modality in child language acquisition. She reports on theoretical and methodological problems connected with the empirical study of modality in first language acquisition and states that "the study of modality has recently shifted from a syntactic to a pragmatic approach ... because acquisition of modality is not just the acquisition of grammatical rules but also of rules of adequate usage in a given communicative context" (Stephany, this volume: pp. 133). Her crosslinguistic survey reveals some variation between the languages taken into account (including Slavonic, Germanic, Romance languages, Greek, Turkish and Korean). She therefore appeals for more "detailed knowledge of the emergence and eventual acquisition of the different formal means different languages provide for the expression of this semantic category [i.e. "modality", the editors], as well as of the meanings and conversational functions ... these have for children until they finally master the adult system." (ibid.: 144). Stephany's review starts with the ontogenesis of deontic and epistemic modality in the prelinguistic stage with the development of declarative and imperative acts. Continuing from the preinflectional to the inflectional stage she reports on the acquisition of modal verbs used mainly at first for deontic purposes. Epistemic modal means generally appear later on as well as conditionals (//(ihen)-constructions) and Stephany discusses the reasons put forward for these findings (cognitive, pragmatic and/or linguistic factors). These factors may also account for the fact that the whole semantic system of modality is still not isomorphic with the adult one at the age of twelve, at least when considering the childrens' productive skills.

XVI

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

The tendencies reported in Stephany (1986, and this volume) are confirmed by MAGDALENA SMOCZYNSKA in her study on the early acquisition (up to age 3;0) of modals by four Polish children. Polish makes use of a rich modal system, thus sharing characteristics as mood morphology with languages like Greek but it also uses a substantial variety of modal verbs comparable to English. It is quite surprising to note that these two modal systems have little impact on each other. Both of them begin to develop quite early even if the range of semantic and pragmatic functions appear to be relatively limited at first. The acquisition of modal means prevails in the deontic domain starting with the volitive chce [want] which gradually decreases in frequency with the subsequent appeareance of 'real' modal verbs. All initial uses are performative and bound to a specific activity in an actual situation. Only later decontextualization takes place in the use of modals. Once again significant variation is to be observed; it seems that in Smoczynska's data environmental (i.e. input) factors play a substantial role: "The range of modal verb functions seems to mirror that used by the child's family." (Smoczynska, this volume: 169). On the basis of her observations Smoczynska proposes to look more closely at speech styles and social context in general because they apparently influence the individual process and course of acquisition. The social context turns up again as an important factor in the data analyzed by SUSAN SHEPERD. By comparing children who belong to distinct speech communities she is able to attribute differences in first language acquisition to the specific conceptions of society with which the children are confronted. Due to her data Sheperd is concerned (as is Wald, this volume) with varieties and language development. She mainly describes modals in Antiguan Creole (AC) and their acquisition by children learning this language as their native as compared to Standard English (SE) use and acquisition. The interesting characteristic of modals in Antiguan Creole is their apparent similarity with SE modals in the fields of phonetics and semantics. As there are only few analyses that deal with Creole modals it is generally assumed that they function in the same way as the corresponding SE modal expressions. Sheperd however, analyzes in detail the particularities relating to their semantic functioning and syntactic use and focuses on the difficulties children encounter in learning them. She states that for children "modality is an ideal area for experimentation because it involves meanings related to ... features such as self and other, and compulsion and volition ..., and because even in adult language the forms are flexible - they are ranged along a continuum, without clearcut boundaries between forms, and are often used to serve more than one function." (Sheperd, this volume: 184).

Introduction

XVII

Les contributions de Stephany, Smoczynska et Sheperd soulignent chacune la predominance du deontique sur I'epistemique chez les tres jeunes enfants dans les premiers stades de l'acquisition. L'etude de CHRISTIAN CHAMPAUD, DOMINIQUE BASSANO & MAYA HICKMANN est la seule ä s'interesser justement au domaine epistemique auquel les enfants de la tranche d'äge de 4 ä 8 ans deviennent graduellement sensibles. En se referant ä Alleton (1984) et Lyons (1977), les auteurs franfais definissent les modalites epistemiques en constatant qu'elles concernent "la connaissance que nous avons des choses", qu1 "elles ont ä voir avec l'attitude du locuteur envers le contenu propositionnel de l'enonce ... qu'elles qualifient le contenu eu egard ä sä validite, sä verite, sä factualite" (Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, ce volume: pp. 186). Us discutent les divers raisons mises en avant pour expliquer l'acquisition tardive des epistemiques. Ainsi sont presentes les facteurs fonctionnels, pragmatiques et cognitifs susceptibles d'influencer le developpement relatif au domaine de la comprehension et de l'expression de ce dont est sur, pas sur et de ce que croit. Trois facteurs variables sont introduits dans la situation experimentale qui sert ä reunir des donnees rassemblees aupres de 60 enfants repartis en 3 groupes d'äges de 4, 6 et 8 ans. Quant ä l'aspect epistemique analyse, les resultats de l'etude revelent une "claire progression cognitive et linguistique retentissant sur les conceptions et representations que se font les enfants de notions comme la certitude et l'incertitude, ainsi que des emplois des marques qui peuvent leur servir d'expression." (ibid.: 208). Comme Smoczynska (ce volume) et d'autres le constatent pour les deontiques, les auteurs trouvent "la capacite de plus en plus grande de generaliser" (208), capacite de "transcontextualisation" (209), c'est-ä-dire d'application des moyens epistemiques ä des nouveaux contextes. Puisque, surtout dans le domaine de l'epistemique, nous sommes encore au debut d'analyses ä la fois empiriques et detaillees, la recherche doit etre avancee afin de pouvoir comparer les resultats obtenus pour le fran^ais avec ceux provenant d'autres langues.

La derniere partie du volume rassemble des contributions qui focalisent l'acquisition d'une langue seconde, respectivement I'allemand ou le francais, par des migrants de divers langues d'origine. Toutes les analyses empiriques se

XVIII

Norbert Dietmar & Astrid Reich

basant sur des donnees longitudinales, elles tächent d'isoler et de decrire en detail les sequences acquisitionnelles dans le domaine des modaux. En general, elles touchent plus aux varietes elementaires (et mesolectales) qu'ä l'approximation de la variete standard, ä l'exception pres de Rieck (cf., pour une vue complementaire, Wald, ce volume). Les textes fran9ais par Stoffel & Veronique, Prodeau et Hickel appartiennent aux recherches entreprises dans le cadre du projet ESF (cf. e.g., Perdue, 1982; Becker, Carroll & Kelly, 1988; Bhardwaj, Dietrich & Noyau, 1988; Broeder et al., 1988; Klein & Perdue, 1988). Avec leurs informateurs arabophones (Stoffel & Veronique) ou hispanophones (Prodeau; Hickel), ils observent les toutes premieres etapes de l'acquisition oü non seulement la production mais egalement la comprehension des modaux est en danger, oü l'implicite et le pragmatique predominent, oü le succes de la communication depend entierement du contexte pragmatique et oü la langue matemelle joue un role important. Les contributions en anglais, par contre, concernent l'acquisition de l'allemand par des Espagnols (Rieck, reprenant la base de donnees du projet de Heidelberg, cf. HPD, 1975), ainsi que par des Polonais (Dittmar, Skiba et Terborg, chacun travaillant dans le cadre du projet P-MoLL; cf. Dittmar et al., 1990). Ces trois derniers auteurs, ayant affaire ä des apprenants quelque peu plus avances que ceux des Fran9ais, dessinent le cours de l'acquisition ä partir du moment oü les premiers moyens modaux explicites, soit les protomodaux, apparaissent. Une vue d'ensemble de ces trois contributions nous permet d'evaluer les conditions syntaxiques, semantiques et pragmatiques qui influencent les premieres etapes dans l'acquisition des modaux. Est-ce qu'il y a des points communs entre l'acquisition des langues maternelle et seconde, est-ce qu'il y a convergence entre les sequences acquisitionnelles observees aupres des adultes migrants et celles trouvees pour les enfants, si oui, ä quel degre convergent-elles? Le cas de l'acquisition tardive des epistemiques s'impose. Quelles en sont les raisons quant aux adultes et quant aux enfants? La comparaison des donnees empiriques est prometteuse parce que les deux types d'apprentissage connaissent - au moins en partie - des facteurs differents qui exercent une influence. De maniere generate le migrant adulte n'a pas ä surmonter des barrieres cognitives majeures lorsqu'il se met ä apprendre la langue d'une communaute d'accueil. Ces facteurs sont-ils alors d'ordre structurel (interne ä la langue), social, psycholinguistique (ayant trait au procedural) ou contrastif (ce qui est du ä la langue source)? La comparaison des donnees provenant de differentes langues sources et cibles nous permettra de mieux saisir ce qui est essentiel ä l'acquisition des modaux.

Introduction

XIX

8

HENRIETTE STOFFEL & DANIEL VERONIQUE tracent l'itineraire de developpement dans les deux domaines de la modalisation, notion plus generate, et des modalites: "La modalisation en tant que proces devaluation et de prise de distance produit un ensemble d'effets pragmatiques: 1'enonciation montre ä 1'autre qu'il se desinvestit partiellement ou totalement du propos ou du mouvement (Roulet et al., 1985). II induit chez son interlocuteur un calcul sur la verite, la possibilite, la probabilite, etc. de ce qu'il dit, de la fafon de le dire ... Le materiau [langagier, les editeurs] qui se trouve ä la disposition de l'apprenant est constitue de formes modales explicites ... - ce sont nos modalites - et de moyens indirects, peu ou pas grammaticalises" (Stoffel & Veronique, ce volume: 279). Les auteurs soulignent l'importance du cöte pragmatique: "Un double mouvement doit done etre etudie: I'origine pragmatique et interactionelle des formes modales et le declenchement de proces de modalisation ä travers l'interaction" (ibid.: 281). Leurs considerations theoriques et methodologiques refletent le fait que les auteurs fran9ais analysent des donnees empiriques qui proviennent de conversations peu guidees avec des apprenants de niveau elementaire; ces donnees dictent, en quelque sorte, 1) la stricte distinction entre comprehension et production en ce qui concerne les competences des informateurs non natifs, 2) la prise en compte des täches conversationnelles specifiques pour lesquelles les donnees ont etc rassemblees, 3) la retention des seuls types de modalites qui jouent de röle substantiel dans la langue parlee (epistemique, deontique, volitive et commissive), 4) la segmentation en unites conversationnelles (tours de parole) au lieu de reconstruire des unites propositionnelles et, enfin, 5) la dissociation de forme et fonction afin de pouvoir bien saisir leurs interrelations qui accelerent le proces de l'acquisition. Stoffel & Veronique nous montrent comment, au tout debut de l'apprentissage, la dependance sur le pragmatique et la reconstruction des intentions modales par inference prevalent et comment, graduellement pendant la periode d'observation, le nombre de marques linguistiques explicites (i.e. les modalites) augmente considerablement. Si Stoffel & Veronique examinent de maniere plus globale l'inventaire modal de leurs informateurs arabophones, incluant ainsi des donnees issues de maintes täches verbales pour trois cycles d'observation, MIREILLE PRODEAU presente une analyse detaillee d'un seul type de täche conversationnelle. Ses deux apprenants d'origine hispanophone executent cette täche, i.e. dormer des instructions, egalement ä trois reprises ce qui permet ä Prodeau de considerer les precedes utilises pour verbaliser la fonction prescriptive dans une

XX

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

perspective developpementale. La function prescriptive est "celle par laquelle un locuteur invite ou incite son interlocuteur ä faire quelque chose: le locuteur doit se faire entendre, i.e. indiquer ses intentions, effet illocutoire de la langue, et son but, effet perlocutoire de la langue." (Prodeau, ce volume: 298) paraphrasant ainsi Confais & Shannen (1989). Comment les apprenants arrivent-ils ä realiser, malgre leurs moyens tres reduits, cette function fondamentale de l'usage langagier? En adoptant une perspective pragmatique, Prodeau decrit l'itineraire de developpement ä l'aide de l'analyse de situations verbales authentiques. Elle distingue le niveau de l'enonce oü se trouvent decrits les moyens qui servent ä exprimer les concepts modaux (les verbes et adverbes modaux, le mode, etc.) et le niveau du discours. Ce dernier s'avere egalement necessaire ä l'analyse complete de la fonction prescriptive; il seit ä expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles la transmission des intentions instructives reussit malgre les moyens linguistiques en nombre relativement restreint, peu varies, et la modalite souvent laissee implicite. Comme von Stutterheim (ce volume), eile constate que le cadre modal, donne a priori, reste evident, ce qui assure, en accord avec la stricte sequentialite du discours, un succes relatif. Prodeau compare ses propres donnees avec des formes et fonctions modales exprimees par une apprenante polonaise de l'allemand (projet P-MoLL). Les differences dans 1'expression qu'elle rencontre sont difficiles ä interpreter: sont-elles d'ordre "personnel, culturel, sociologique? Quel est le rapport avec les langues cibles et sources?" (ibid.: 321). A partir de donnees prelevees lors d'un jeu de röle avec deux hispanophones apprenant le fran^ais, FRANCOISE HICKEL examine les rapports entre interaction et acquisition. En s'appuyant surtout sur Ducrot et Anscombre (theorie de l'argumentation) et Roulet, eile s'interesse aux strategies argumentatives employees par les deux informatrices et, liee ä cela, leur faculte de modaliser le discours. Puisque le jeu de role analyse est de caractere conflictuel, Hickel focalise plus particulierement le domaine de la fonction contrastive (cf. "fonction prescriptive", Prodeau, ce volume), celle-ci etant "realisee lorsqu'il y a mise en opposition d'objets dans le discours entre deux interlocuteurs ou ä l'interieur du discours d'un seul locuteur." (Hickel, ce volume: 331). Puisque la fonction contrastive s'inscrit dans I'argumentation, Hickel cherche "ä savoir comment des apprenants interpretent la valeur argumentative des enonces de leur interlocuteur et par quels moyens ils opposent l'orientation de leurs propres enonces." (ibid.: 330). Dans une teile perspective, modalisation et modalites sont subordonnees - nous rappellons les positions de Ducrot et Dutka (les deux dans ce volume) - ä I'argumentation qui integre justement la pragmatique ä "l'etude de la semantique et de la syntaxe."

Introduction

XXI

(329). Grace ä la notion de 'profil strategique', Hickel decrit en detail et differencie les realisations langagieres de la competence argumentative (i.e. modalisation du discours et emploi des modalites) que font les deux apprenantes de niveau tres elementaire: face ä la meme situation conflictuelle, il est frappant de voir comment une locutrice opte pour un profil 'a risque' tandis que 1'autre se contente d'un repli sur un profil 'prudent'.

Dittmar, Skiba, and Terborg, all working within the framework of the Berlin P-MoLL project (Modality in a longitudinal study of learner varieties) each with their own arguments, give a picture of the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic conditions in the early expression of modal concepts. NORBERT DITTMAR is concerned with discourse and semantic properties of elementary learner varieties. He deals with the "question of how the adult learner manages to use proto-semantic and pragmatic methods in constructing a discourse with a minimal lexical repertoire in German." (Dittmar, this volume: 214). Within this larger field of investigation Dittmar predominantly focuses on the domain of "proto-modality" which for him, forms part of the pragmatic mode (Givon, 1984) with which learners with elementary varieties are communicating. Preceding the grammaticalization of modal means (cf. Dittmar & Terborg, 1991) the pragmatic mode still depends greatly on implicit meanings which have to be inferred. Dittmar proceeds from the empirical observation that modalization starts well before "the first use of expressions that are known as modal expressions" and that "there are apparently other devices which compensate for modal meanings of words." (Dittmar, this volume: pp. 222). He describes the unanalyzed prefabricated chunks of quasi-modals which function as proto-semantic expressions. The "proto-modals" tragödie/fantasie [tragedy/fantasy], bitte [please], guck mal [look], komm [come] and gut [good], a sort of 'situational label' can be characterized by their pragmatic polyfunctionality as documented in requests, evaluations, subjective comment and hypothetical and deontic contexts. These expressions are performative in the beginning. Intonation also plays an important role; it is shown that intonational patterns are an integrated part of the proto-semantic meaning of modality in the first stages of second language acquisition.

XXII

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

If Dittmar (this volume) is mainly concerned with the proto-modal stage in second language acquisition then HEINER TERBORG focuses on the appearance of the first 'true1 modal means. He gives a general account on the development of the modal lexicon based on data elicited from two Polish learners of German. To a certain extent acquisition sequences seem to correspond to those found in children learning their native language (cf. Stephany, this volume). Can we conclude from these results that similarities are more important than differences between first and second language acquisition? Terborg considers methodological problems when he reflects on those modal categories which can be identified with the respective gradations in the learners' utterances. Inspired by empirical observations he develops an analytical model consisting of four basic semantic categories, each of which have several degrees of gradation: 1) the probability of an utterance's content to be considered true, 2) the capability of action, 3) desire and intention and 4) the necessity of actions and states. To a large extent these categories correspond to traditional classifications (deontic and epistemic modality, volition and ability). On the basis of this empirical model and in the light of certain data, Terborg is able to develop empirical questions that could guide future research on modality in (second) language acquisition; the question as to "how different discourse types and situations influence modal expression and how the semantics and pragmatics of the modal means of necessity (possibility) are influenced by epistemic means." (Terborg, this volume: 239). Terborg too, observes that deontic expressions precede epistemic ones. He interprets these findings as being due to the fact that deontic modality has to be marked explicitly by the speaker "if he wants to express it" (ibid.: 245) whereas factivity may be left implicit. Within the deontic category necessity is expressed before im(possibility) and thus, müssen [must] precedes können [can] in its deontic reading (ability and epistemic means appear even later on). In contrast to the results from the Heidelberg project (Dittmar, 1979) modal adverbials seem to follow modal verbs which may be due to crosslinguistic differences between the source languages (Polish vs. Romance). While all the contributors working in a second language acquisition perspective mention the existence of linguistic devices which precede 'classical1 modal means in the target language, ROMUALD SKIBA shows exemplarily how one of these devices, bitte [please], functions and develops in learner varieties. The author describes in detail that bitte can be conceived in early learner varieties as a pragmatically motivated syntactic frame which offers a format for restructuring, relexification (through modal verbs) and eventually grammaticalization. Skiba is convinced that in second language research "the

Introduction

XXIII

phenomenon of modality cannot be described with only one method. A variety of approaches must complement each other in the description" (Skiba, this volume: 259). He therefore uses distributional analysis (regarding types of constituents, constituent combinations and orders), first occurrences as well as frequencies of occurrences and finally, functional aspects (relating syntax to semantics and pragmatics; cf. Dik, 1978) in order to illustrate the whole complex development from bitte to deontic modal verbs, such as müssen [must] and können, [can]. This includes an increase in syntactic complexity, phases of generalization, competition between different devices and the subsequent semantic and pragmatic differentiation towards the target variety. More surprisingly, the polish learner under observation also tries to employ bine as a precursor of volitional möchte [would like to] and will [want]. Describing in detail these attempts Skiba discusses structural and pragmatic reasons responsible for the fact that this unprofitable path is not pursued in the course of acquisition. Refering to Lyons (1977) and Palmer (1986) BERT-OLAF RIECK (this volume: 263) states: "Since conditionals are by implication non-factual (hypothetical/counter-factual), they have been subsumed under the grammatical category of modality." While working with a longitudinal section of the data from the Heidelberg project (cf. Klein & Dittmar, 1979) the author explains why verbal means of expressing conditional meanings are quite difficult to acquire; the target language disposes of a typical functor wenn...dann [if/when...then] which is not easy to distinguish from temporal wann [when] just as conditional sentences are generally very close to temporal ones. Other problems related to the conditional are as follows: from a semantic point of view conditionals are arranged along an irrealis contiuum and syntactically, conditional constructions have a synthetic character because they always involve the realization of protasis (antecedent) and an apososis (consequent) in a compound sentence. Data analysis allows us to detect several stages in the development of conditional constructions: in the earliest phase no explicit means are employed so that "the analyst can only suppose that a sequence of sentences may be intended as a conditional by a learner." (Rieck, this volume: pp. 266). At best there are indications in the learner's native language. The explicit marking of conditional meaning begins with Type I which is characterized by a strict parallel structure with clauses related by negation, specific intonational patterns and the use of a 'sentential adverb'; Type II-utterances, on the contrary already use a functor similar to the target language whereas Type III comes quite close to the German standard with functor wenn, verb morphology and target language word order.

XXIV

Norbert Dittmar & Astrid Reich

Acknowledgements We are obliged to all those who have contributed to the completion of this volume despite the difficulties we had to face. Many thanks to the contributors who were willing to revise their oral presentations in the light of the lively discussions that took place at the Berlin Colloquium and who had to be patient with the final publication. We have benefited from financial help from the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the FNK (Kommission für Forschung und Nachwuchs der FU Berlin). Romuald Skiba, Matthias Butt and Hans Rumpel (ZEDAT - Zentraleinrichtung für Datenverarbeitung der FU Berlin) gave valuable support with computer problems we encountered. Without the corrections made by Mireille Prodeau, Martin Davey and particularly Clement Zürn and Sophie Hill we wouldn't have been able to publish this volume in English and French. Above all, we are most grateful to Karin Goihl, and especially to Christine Dimroth who worked many many hours in order to prepare the manuscripts. Of course we take final responsibility.

Norbert Dittmar and Astrid Reich, Berlin, July 1993

Modal Structures in Languages and Language Varieties Structures Modales: Langues et Varietes

Christiane von Stutterheim1

Modality: Function and Form in Discourse2

On compte peu d'otudes, jusqu'ä ce jour, qui s'intoressent ä l'emploi d'expressions modales dans diffeients textes en langue standard. Le cadre de la präsente analyse a restreint, e"tant donno les vastes dimensions de la question. A I'aide de deux types de texte, narration et instruction, l'6tude montre quel peut etre l'apport de la contextualisation dans l'interprotation des expressions modales. Le principal intoret roside dans l'influence des marques globales, spöcifiques ä difforents types de texte, sur le domaine de la modalito. Pour finir, ä partir d'un exemple (l'emploi de können [pouvoir, savoir] et de müssen [devoir] dans des instructions) les consequences qui r£sultent de l'analyse du texte seront envisagies en ce qui concerne en §6n6ral la proble"matique s6mantique.

0.

Introduction

Research in the field of modality has mainly been concerned with questions of the following kind: What is understood by modality, and what are the general notions underlying this conceptual domain? What is the meaning of modal expressions in a given language? What role do modalized utterances play in communication? What is the illocutionary force associated with to modalized sentences?

SFB 245 'Sprechen und Sprachverstehen im sozialen Kontext', Universität Heidelberg The research reported on in this article has been funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. I want to thank Mary Carroll and Rainer Dietrich for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

4

Christiane von Stutterheim

One major problem with evaluating the studies lies in the different definitions of the concept of modality. The range of phenomena understood as components of this conceptual domain varies immensely. Bally (1942: 3) on the one hand represents a very broad definition of modality: "la forme linguistique d'un jugement intellectuel, d'un jugement affectif ou d'une volonte qu'un sujet pensant enonce ä propos d'une perception ou d'une representation de son esprit." (cf. also Heger, 1977; Hermeren, 1978; Palmer, 1986; Sandhöfer-Sixel, 1988). Lyons (1977) on the other hand, limits the concept modality to the notions necessity/possibility, following the lines set by modal logic (cf. Calbert, 1975; Kratzer, 1978). It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these different approaches nor to try to develop new lines in the field of modal semantics. We will draw upon previous theoretical work in setting up a categorial frame for the analysis. The question, however, pursued in this paper approaches the problem of modality from a perspective which is rarely considered with respect to this semantic domain. We will look at how modal categories function in different types of discourse.3 An example will help to clarify this perspective. Consider the following two questions, which elicit different text types: (a) (b)

What happened to you yesterday at the party? How do you get to the Red Square?

These questions suggest very different modalities for the expected answertexts. With (a) a modal frame is established which locates the reported events in the real world. They will be assigned the status factual. Any change in modal value will be understood as a break in the plotline: it constitutes background material. The second question calls for a text which belongs to a different modal category. It asks for the specification of non-factual, hypothetical events. In this text type, a route-direction, it is therefore quite normal to have changes in the modal value, such as: First you go right, then you have to turn left, then you will see a red building [...].

So far, text based analyses have only been carried out in the field of first and second language acquisition research, cf. the contributions in this volume by Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, Dittmar, Skiba and Terborg.

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

5

It is obvious that the two texts will show different patterns with respect to the modal status of the information given. In this paper, we will take a look, first of all, at the modal structure of two different text types, narratives and instructions, and, secondly, at how modal structure varies within a specific text from foreground to background. In conclusion we will discuss possible implications of the results for the analysis of modal expressions.

1.

Brief sketch of the analytic frame4

The general analytic frame underlying the study at hand has been developed within the context of the project "Bedeutungsorganisation im Diskurs" [Meaning organization in discourse], which started in 1986. We will briefly outline the central concepts of the approach in order to provide the background for the analysis of modal categories below. In this framework, texts - that is larger pieces of coherent speech - are regarded as complex answers to a leading text-question (which need not be made explicit), the quaestio of a text. Given a specific text-question, e.g. how did the accident happen?, the speaker's task consists in providing information in different domains: s/he has to specify information about the people involved, about temporal relations and places, relevant for the events, about actions which have taken place, and so on. In order to be understood, the speaker has to organize these pieces of information in a way which results in an organized unfolding of a referential net. To achieve this goal, the pieces of information have to be structured at two levels. They have to be put together at utterance level (referential selection, e.g. the combination of reference to time, space, person, and action), and they have to be systematically connected as the text develops from utterance to utterance (referential movement, e.g. shift in time, maintenance of spatial reference and reference to person, etc.). The entire information may belong to different semantic domains, five of which will be distinguished here: -

reference to time (it) reference to space (rl) reference to person/object (φ)

For a more comprehensive outline of the approach see Klein & v. Stutterheim (1987) and v. Stutterheim & Klein (1989).

6

-

Christiane von Stutterheim

reference to 'predicates' (actions, properties, etc.) (ra/e) modal values (rm)5

The assumption is, now, that a specific text-question establishes constraints of different kinds on the referential structure of the answer text: The question constrains the possible types of referential selection and referential movement presented in the answer text - in different ways for the different domains. A question introducing a narrative such as how did you loose your purse?, defines a specific spatio/temporal/modal frame as topic elements for the whole text and asks for the specification of events in chronological order. If we have a question, such as what does your new dress look like?, the conditions for the answer text look quite different: an object is introduced as topic element for the whole of the text, time reference will be an unspecified intervall maintained throughout the text and the new information asked for will involve specifications of properties. The referential patterns thus set by the text-question concerns not only the information selection, but also structural properties of the text, such as the linearisation strategy (cf. Levelt, 1981), the topic-focus distinction, the role of referential domains for creating coherence, etc. -

A second important implication derivable from the notion of text-question is the organization of a text in foreground and background material.^ Foreground utterances are those which comply with the given constraints, they answer the question, so to speak; background utterances violate one or more of the constraints. Note, that this definition is not linked to the notion of communicative importance.

On the basis of these considerations one can assume that there are text-type specific patterns of referential structure. It is the goal of the project "Bedeutungsorganisation im Diskurs" to uncover principles which govern Clearly, these five domains cannot be seen as contributing on equal terms to the information given in an utterance. Rather they relate hierarchically in the composition of an utterance. The core is formed by specifications in the domains rp and ra/e, the referent and the predicate in the traditional sense. This core can then be anchored by means of temporal and spatial references. The relation established between the different meaning components will then be given a validity status, the modal value. Cf. Labov & Waletzky (1967), Hopper (1979). In these studies the categories background/foreground ("narrative" and "non-narrative clauses", in Labov's terminology) have been developed for and applied in narratives. We take this distinction to be a general feature of any text type.

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

7

these structures and their respective linguistic representations for a selected number of text types. With this general frame as theoretical background, the following analysis will be limited to the contribution of modal categories to the structured unfolding of information in a text.

2.

Modality in texts

2.1

Modal categories

In the following we will briefly outline the distinctions used for the description of modality in discourse. The goal under which this schema was developed was pragmatic in nature. It has to be regarded as a tool and not as concise theory of modality7. Therefore we will essentially keep to notional distinctions made by several authors without discussing particular views. As components of the modal concept we usually find mentioned: /actuality, possibility/necessity, relation types like deonticlepistemic, subjectivity (cf. Palmer, 1986: pp. 14). (Mood as another main category will be excluded in our study). We basically follow these categories and will now briefly discuss them in turn. (A) A central category has been described as validity status of a proposition. Notions related to it are realis/irrealis,factual/counterfactual. For our study we distinguish three subcategories:/ac/wa/, counterfactual, and open.

Whereas the first two notions follow a traditional distinction (cf. Lyons, 1977), the third has to be defined. A proposition is open with respect to its validity status if it is neither factual nor counterfactual, but unspecified with respect to its status in the world (cf. the notions "unassertedness" and "nonfactives", Palmer, 1986: 18). This is the case if a proposition is embedded into a higher proposition. Complex constructions of this type are, for example, embedded infinitive clauses, 7

For a detailed study on modality as a conceptual category and its function in discourse, cf. Dietrich (1990).

8

Christiane von Stutterheim

Er verließ die Stadt, um sich endlich zu erholen [He left the city for finally getting some rest], factual open or complex predicates with a modal verb: Peter mußte gestern die Prüfling machen [Peter had to take the exam yesterday]. In this sentence we distinguish two propositions, the core proposition p ('Peter gestern Prüfung machen'), which is open in its validity status, and the modal proposition mod ('es war notwendig, daß'), which belongs to the category factual. We will come back to the particularities of open propositions in the course of the data analysis. Category (A), the validity status, has a special status in the system of modal categories in that it forms part of the meaning of every utterance. Every proposition underlying an utterance can be attributed a factivity status, resulting from an interpretation of all meaning components represented in it, supplemented by contextual information.

(B) Sentences like Peter mußte gestern Examen machen [Peter had to take the exam yesterday] lead us to the second main component of modality. In this case we do not talk about the factivity of the proposition p 'Peter yesterday take the exam'; this proposition is open with respect to its validity status. Rather, what is said in this sentence is that certain conditions exist from which p follows as a necessary consequence. The same holds for a sentence like Peter konnte das Examen gestern machen [Peter was able to take the exam yesterday], only that p has to be regarded as a possible consequence. In these cases we speak of modalized propositions (modp). A modalized p therefore contains the following elements:

-

the proposition p presupposed propositions q, which do not have to be specified the component mod, which refers to an abstract relation between q and p

The modality-relation can be qualified as necessary (nee) and possible (pos), with a number of degrees between absolute necessity and very weak possibility (cf. Dittmar & Terborg, 1991).

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

9

(C) The relation mod has to be further specified with respect to different types of necessity and possibility. The 'reason' for making a claim about, let us say, a nee-relation between p and q can be drawn from different sources. Here again we follow the traditional distinction in deontic, dispositional, and epistemic types of modality. Note that these categories are not part of the core meaning of the modal verb, they have to be specified by context, be it by verbal context or by some implication (cf. the notion "Redehintergrund" in Kratzer, 1978). We shall leave open the number of subcategories which have to be distinguished for the description of modality in discourse (cf. Dietrich, 1990, for further subcategorization). That we do need at least the distinction between deontic and epistemic modality becomes clear if we look at the possibilities of ellipsis in this domain. In the following example, an elliptic maintenance of modality is impossible, because the relation type changes from epistemic to deontic modality:

* Die Stämme mußten von Norden in das Tal gekommen sein und 0 sich dort den Lebensunterhalt schwer erarbeiten. [The tribes must have come from the north into the valley, and (had to) work hard for their support.] (D) The last component - related to the notion of subjectivity - is problematic, because it can, to some extent, be regarded as a subcategory of the relation type epistemic^. This component concerns the assessment of the factivity conditions of p by the speaker. We will call this the degree of certainty. Here, we have to know who the speaker is in order to be able to interpret a modality utterance of this type appropriately. In the example Peter hat vielleicht angerufen, [Peter has perhaps called] the modal adverb has to be anchored in the sense that we have to relate it to one particular source of knowledge, and this will be the speaker - if not explicitly stated otherwise.

The problem with this category lies in its close semantic relationship to epistemic modality (cf. discussion in Palmer, 1986, and Dietrich, 1990). Epistemic modality expresses just as well the assessment of the factivity status of a proposition, and, a further parallel, in the unmarked case it will be 'subjectively' anchored.

For a discussion of the notion subjectivity, c.f. Palmer (1986: pp. 51)

10

Christiane von Stutterheim

Das Haus muß geräumt worden sein. [The house must have been left.] The epistemic modality in this example will be interpreted as reflecting the speaker's point of view. A further argument for treating modalizations by means of adverbs and particles as one subcategory of epistemic modality comes from the incompatibility of epistemic modality with this group of expressions: ^Vielleicht/wahrscheinlich muß das Haus geräumt worden sein. [perhaps/probably] There are, however, arguments against grouping these two types of modality together. One argument could come from the formal distinctions involved. In the one case, we are dealing with modal verbs, in the other with lexical particles. However, under a functional perspective on language, this should not count as a major argument. It has been shown that in many areas different devices can be used for expressing the same function. Another argument has to be taken more seriously. It regards the systematic relation between the main categories outlined above. As we know, subjective modality expressing the degree of certainty can operate on deontic modality, Peter mußte die Prüfung vielleicht machen [Perhaps Peter had to take the exam.], and on epistemic modality only, if the epistemic modality is explicitly not speaker-anchored. Nach ihrem Glauben mußten sie vielleicht Götter sein. [According to their belief they must perhaps have been gods.] If we now argue that the expression of the degree of certainty with respect to a given proposition is part of epistemic modality, we end up with the undesirable result of a partial hierarchical order within category (C), the relation types. From one perspective deontic and epistemic modality appear to operate at the same level. From another perspective, a subcategory of epistemic modality operates on deontic modality, and they therefore have to be regarded as hierarchically ordered. We have to leave this problem unsolved and will in the following speak of the group of epistemic/subjective modality. The last point has already led us to the question of how the different components are interrelated. Again, we will relate to what has already been

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

11

said about this topic in the literature. Category (A), the validity status, is the 'topmost' category in the sense that every utterance can be classified as either factual, counterfactual or open. The other components are facultative. If a proposition is modalized, then the utterance can be classified with respect to the categories (B), the modality relation, and (C), the relation type. These two go together logically. (C) constitutes a part of category (B). Category (D), the degree of certainty, operates on unmodalized propositions and on modalized propositions of the deontic type.

2.2

Modality on text-level

On the basis of the general approach outlined above (cf. section 2), we will now look at the function of modal categories at discourse level. The central function of modality can be seen in its role as one of the frame parameters in a text. In a coherent piece of text, produced to answer a particular question, all utterances conveying information 'to the point' will belong to the same modal category.9 Modality is therefore a domain in which coherence is created on text level. Its value remains constant throughout the foregrounded utterances of a text. This has implications for the expression of modality. Once the frame value is established (by a question or a setting), it does not have to be explicitly maintained in the following utterances. This is especially interesting in languages which do not have a grammatical device for marking validity status, such as early learner language. Here, it suffices to introduce the modal frame at the beginning of a text, it is then assumed that the hearer maintains the frame until marked otherwise (cf. the articles by Dittmar and Terborg, this volume). We find this strategy also in languages such as German. It occurs, for instance, in cases where a hypothetical frame is introduced by an expression like zum Beispiel [for example]. You can continue with utterances in which we do not get an explicit mention of the modality value, e.g. du gehst zum Chef, sagst ihm... [you go to the boss, tell him...], the validity status hypothetical remains unchanged.

This is not true for all text types. Argumentations, for example, do not obey this rule. For all texts, however, which can be analyzed as a complex answer to One' question, and which therefore talk about one, decomposed situation, the claim holds.

12

Christiane von Stutterheim

Obviously, this cannot mean that changes in the domain of modality do not occur within a text. Utterances violating the modal constraint at whatever level are thus marked as external to the foreground of the text. This will not be treated in detail at this point as it is one of the main questions addressed in the data analysis. On the basis of narrative and instructive discourse it will be shown how the function of modal categories is determined by discourse type, and how the interpretation of modal expressions is dependent on other references given in the domains person, time, and space.

3.

Data analysis

3.1

Database

The data underlying this study are taken from a larger corpus, collected within the framework of the project mentioned. It consists of spontaneous speech and of quasi-experimental data (both types consisting of narratives, descriptions, instructions), where subjects were asked to fulfil a particular communicative task. Subjects were adult speakers of German. For the study of modality in discourse we limited the data basis to spontaneous narratives (10 texts) and quasi-experimental instructions (19 texts). The analyses have the character of case studies, quantitative evaluations are not possible.

3.2

Modality in narratives

The frame parameters of a narrative about personal experiences (e.g. How did the accident happen? or How did you find your job?) can be characterized in the following way: specific time reference, anchored on the time axis; specific spatial reference, though it might not be specified in detail; reference to a specific person (in our case the speaker); the modal component has the value factual. The narrative task consists of specifying events in chronological order. These parameters define the foreground of the text. From this follows that all kinds of modalized utterances form part of the background (cf. Hopper, 1979). The narratives analysed show violations of the modal constraint of different types. The main group belongs to the category B (nec/poss) with the relation types dispositional and deontic, e.g.

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

(1)

13

text E2 (see appendix) da kann man also nicht mehr lenken [then one cannot steer anymore]

(2)

text El jetzt mußt aufs Arbeitsamt [now you have to go to the employment office]

The typical function of these utterances are explanations of events forming the main story line (example 1) and motivations for events (2). There seems to be a preference as regards the contexts in which these modalizations occur. The explanative function very often goes along with generic references in other domains. As in the example given, reference to person is shifted to the generic man [one], time reference leaves the temporal frame and becomes unspecific. These components contribute to the reading of the modp utterance in which p is open with respect to its validity status. A typical context is the frame of direct or mental speech. This corresponds to the function of providing motivations for reported events. The quotation frame allows for the introduction of perspectives other than the perspective of the speaker. The presentation of conditions for events can thus be linked to the respective subject whose reflections are the source of the modalization. The cooccurence of modp and quoted speech, or thought, supports what has been said about the subjectivity of modality.10 It shows that the speaker wants to 'anchor' modp utterances by assigning them to a specific subject. There are a few cases which do not seem to share the features of background utterances. (3)

text E2

1

ich bin also rechts gefahren [I drove on the right side]

2

und der stoppt [and he stops] Cf. Lyons (1977: 308) who regards modality as "the large variety of ways in which 'the attitude' of the speaker is grammatically marked", also Calbert (1975: 58), Palmer (1986: pp. 16). A study of the use of modp in discourse, however, shows that the subjective character of certain modp cannot be generalized. There are contexts in which the modalization is explicitly 'de-subjectivized', for instance in generic statements.

14

Christiane von Stutterheim

3

und ich muß eben bremsen [and I have to brake (= had to brake)]

4

und es hat frisch angefangen zu regnen [...] [it had just begun to rain]

5

ich bin gerutscht wie auf Schmierseife [I slipped like on a piece of soap]

Here utterance 3 does not leave the story line, rather it will be interpreted as an event following the event in 2. This is achieved by means of implication. Given the context, the hearer will assume that the act of braking actually took place. It would sound superfluous, if somebody said then I had to brake and I actually did or something similar. Moreover, one would expect the speaker to use the counterfactual form if the act of braking had not taken place Ich hätte bremsen müssen [I should have braked], since he as the experiencer must know whether the event actually took place or not. This implication of factivity is certainly not a general rule. It is due to the type of event and its embedding in the flow of reported events. The crucial referential domain to be considered is time. The time interval referred to in the modalized utterance is bounded, with the time reference of the preceding event (reported in utterance 2) providing the left boundary. It therefore obeys the major constraint of a narrative text: the presentation of events in chronological order. This is supported further by the use of the present tense and the conjunction und [and], both indicating a foregrounded event. This can be illustrated by contrasting this type of modalized utterance with a different type in which the event is not part of the chronologically ordered story line, e.g. Ich mußte an diesem Tag dringend im Büro erscheinen [I had to be in the office on time that day]. Here, the use of the present tense in German and the connector und are very unlikely, hi this example, no inference can be drawn with respect to the validity status of p, it belongs to the category open. In conclusion we can say that contextual embedding of modp might yield a result in which the validity of p is no longer open. The utterance 3 in the example text gives - integrated as it is - two pieces of information in one. It states explicitly the necessity of an event, and by implication, the factuality of the event. This possibility of presenting 'two in one' does not exist in the case of epistemic modality. Since in this type of modp it is usually the speaker who

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

15

relativizes the validity status of the proposition s/he cannot at the same time make the hearer assume that this relativization is unwarranted. This shows that processes of inferencing function differently for the different modal subcategories.11 Coming now to the expressive devices used for modal categories in narratives we can be very brief. Modal categories with deontic reading are in all cases expressed by modal verbs. There is no single case of periphrastic forms of the type it is necessary/possible, nor of adverbials, e.g. notwendigerweise [necessarily]. As a second category of modality we find subjective modalizations in the texts. According to our definition above this category includes modalizations based on the knowledge of the speaker. The texts contain relatively few instances of this modality type. This is obvious since speakers are talking about personal experiences which are part of their positive knowledge. In the narratives, subjective modality occurs at two points: In cases, where the speaker comments on possible causes or preconditions for reported events, e.g.: (4)

es ist nämlich der gleiche Mantel gewesen [it was the same coat] der hat nicht geguckt [he didn't look] 's war das gleiche Gewicht sehr wahrscheinlich [...] [it was probably the same weight]

Subjective modality is also found in passages where the speaker speculates about the possible flow of events where she has for some reason a knowledge gap, e.g.: (5)

text E3 (appendix) und ich nehm an [and I assume] daß sie's irgendwo liegen hat lassen [that she left it somewhere] This is particularly important in L2-comrnunication, cf. the contributions of Dittmar, Skiba and Terborg (this volume).

16

Christiane von Stutterheim

oder hat's verloren [or lost it] und des hat jemand gefunden [and somebody found it] und hat das Geld raus [and took the money out] und hat's dann in des Körbchen geschmissen [and then threw it into the little basket] einfach irgendwo abgelegt [simply dropped somewhere] also anders kann ich mir des nicht vorstellen [I can't imagine it being otherwise] In all the utterances in the example the validity status of p is open. Utterances of this type have therefore to be regarded as leaving the foreground of the narrative. Looking at the expressive devices for subjective modality it is interesting to note that - quite in contrast to deontic modality - there is only one instance in which a modal verb is used. In all other occurrences the shift of the modal value is expressed either by an adverb (wahrscheinlich, vielleicht [probably, perhaps]) or by verbs of belief. The distribution of the two devices corresponds to the intended range of the modality. Where the speaker modalizes just one proposition he prefers the adverb. The modalization of a sequence of propositions is indicated by a verb of belief, thus establishing a new modal frame. The events within the frame are then presented in an unmodalized form. As in the example given above, the speaker often concludes such a passage by repeating the modalization - as if to ensure that the hearer has not forgotten the validity status of the reported events.12 Completing the description of modality in the narrative data, we have to mention counter)'actuals as the last category. There are only three cases to be

it is interesting to see that the same strategy of 'bracketing1 can also be found in L2 texts. Learners use it not only for establishing a modal frame but also for temporal frames (c.f. v. Stutterheim, 1986).

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

17

found in the data, and they occur where the speakers speculate about alternatives to the reported events: (6)

text E3

ich nehm an [I assume] daß derjenige überrascht worden ist, [that this person was taken by surprise] sonst wären vielleicht die Schecks auch weggewesen [otherwise the cheques would have perhaps also been lost] In a narrative text, modalized utterances of this type can only function as background material because they violate the central constraint for the modal domain: p belongs to the category non-factual. Let us briefly summarize what has been said about the function of modality in narratives. In most cases, modalized utterances contribute background material to the story with the variety of functions that have been described in several studies on narrative structures (c.f. Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Hopper, 1979; Quasthoff, 1980): comments, evaluations, explanations, speculations. This list of functions supports the claim that modalizations are subjective in nature in that they are expressions of the speaker's (or some 'secondary1 speaker's) opinion. However, we also found that modalized utterances can be part of the story line if they are referentially tied - in time, space, and person - to the narrative frame. Here, the modalized utterance implies the affirmative statement, thereby loosing its implications for the validity status of the proposition as a whole. It is theoretically interesting that epistemic modalization does not allow for contextual suspension of the feature p-open. It wouldn't make sense to talk about the same event as factual and as probably factual. The different behaviour of deontic and epistemic I subjective modality in discourse confirms the treatment of these categories as differently structured conceptually (cf. Palmer, 1986). This is one example of how the analysis of modal categories in discourse can provide results relevant for a general theory of modality.

18

3.3

Christiane von Stutterheim

Modality in Directives

We have chosen directives as the second text type, mainly because they contrast with narratives in the domain of modality, but also because they have been little studied. The data on which the following analysis is based consists of 19 texts, elicited in a quasi-experimental setting. Subjects had put together part of a Lego-type unit following a picture-based set of instructions. They were then asked to instruct someone else verbally to put the same unit together. The introductory question for all the subjects was Können Sie bitte jemanden, der keine bildliche Information hat, anweisen, wie man diese Teile zusammensetzen muß [Can you please instruct someone who does not have a set of instructions as to how one puts these pieces together]. This question establishes frame parameters of the following kind: unspecific time reference (reflected in the choice of the present tense form as the 'neutral' tense), unspecific reference to person (reflected in the variety of forms used for reference to person: /, you, one and also elliptic constructions without any reference to person), and for modality a modalized value of the deontic type, implying that all ps have to be open with respect to their validity status. From this follows that changes in the modal value to factual or counterfactual and also to epistemic/subjective modality will make utterances part of the background of this text type. Given the text question above, the speakers have different choices as to how to refer to the modal frame. -

They can either mark deontic modality step by step in every utterance. None of the speakers chose this strategy.

-

They can remain within the given syntactic frame by presenting all the steps in elliptic, infinitive constructions such as:

(7)

dann die roten Teile befestigen, [then to fix the red pieces] dann das graue Teil an der schwarzen Kurbel befestigen [...] [then to fix the grey piece onto the black handle] In this construction type, deontic modal categories run implicitly through the whole text by leaving a syntactic 'trace' in the utterances as elliptic finite verb forms in second position: dann (mußt du) die roten Teile befestigen [then (you have) to fix the red pieces]. Two speakers, in fact,

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

19

chose this strategy, and there is no single explicit mention of modal categories throughout these texts. -

The third strategy is the one chosen by the majority of speakers (17). They expect that the given modal frame will be maintained by the hearer and present the instructions as a description of a series of ongoing events (cf. appendix). Some of them pick up the deontic modality in the first utterance, but all the following steps are formulated as if they were factual (cf. Terborg, this volume,).

On this basis, it is now interesting to see what the functions of modal expressions are which occur in a number of texts. (Only five texts do not contain any explicit marking of modal categories.) Some of the utterances containing a modal expression provide background material in the function of comments or reflections, e.g.: (8)

also das würde ich nie verstehen [this I would never understand] or

das ist eher ästhetisch wahrscheinlich gedacht [this is probably meant to be decorative] Utterances of this type (counter)"actual, subjective modality) leave the modal frame and violate, in most cases, the constraint for temporal reference and reference to person as well (for example, in Dl: utterances 12, 18/19). As in the case of the narratives, the more interesting cases are those where modalization occurs in utterances which have to be considered as part of the foreground of the text. In the instructions, speakers selectively express necessity (müssen) and possibility (können). A first analysis showed that the speakers who used the modal verbs did this more or less at the same points in the course of the reported events. The question then was, why did the speakers at some points explicitly refer to modal categories On top of the implicitly maintained frame. A detailed analysis of the overall text structure suggests the following answer. In these cases, modality operates at a different level. The mod-relations are motivated by the inherent structural properties of the subject matter. They belong to the source category dispositional given by the disposition of the

20

Christiane von Stutterheim

object in question. Necessity is expressed in connection with steps in the instructions which have to be carried out in a particular way, because later steps are based on them. We call this a cataphoric use of müssen [must]. Here a necessity relation is established between p and a condition q which is, in fact, the goal behind p (for examples see appendix). Exactly the opposite is the case with the use of können [can]. This modal verb is used to emphasize a relation between already established facts and the p of the utterance. It signals that the step has been somehow prepared by proceeding steps. This can be called an anaphoric use of können. An example of the directionality of müssen/sollen [must/have to] and können in this context is: (9)

und das soll dann so draufgesteckl werden, [and this has to be put on top in such a way] daß das dann nach unten zeigt [that this then points downwards] und daß man dann den grauen Bügel einhängen kann [...] [and that one then can insert the grey piece]

On the basis of these observations we can formulate the following hypothesis: Given the general strategy of implicit maintenance of the modal value hypothetical, deontic modalization, the modal verbs are in a way 'free' to take on additional modal functions within the text. They are used to mark particular structural relations within the overall information structure between two sometimes in the course of the text quite distant - steps of the instruction. This, of course, has to be confirmed by further material. Given this use of modal verbs in instructions, we can say that the characterisation of modal verbs, as expressing the subjective assessment of the speaker, covers only parts of their meaning. We saw that the analysis of modal expressions in narratives suggested a 'subjective' interpretation. For directives, however, one would rather want to speak of an Objective' reading of the modal verbs. They are used for expressing certain causal relations between propositions. This points to a problem which is related to semantic analysis based on isolated sentences. One is constrained with respect to the possibilities of usage and function of particular forms. We therefore believe that the study of modal expressions in all kinds of discourse is relevant for answering general questions concerning this semantic domain.

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

4.

21

Implications for the semantic analysis of modal verbs

Let us, in conclusion, briefly look at how text analysis could be made fruitful for the semantic analysis of modal verbs. The use of the modals müssen/sollen and können in the instructions has been described above as cataphoric (goal oriented) and anaphoric (precondition oriented), respectively. This points to an asymmetry between the concepts necessity and possibility. The two modalities are usually described as two types of, in the basic components congruent, logical relations (cf. the parallel treatment of "obligation" and "possibility" in Calbert, 1975, or the parallel treatment by two operators, Mp and Lp, in Karttunen, 1972). The components involved are the proposition p, a number of other propositions q functioning as conditions ("Redehintergrund", Kratzer, 1978; "source", Calbert, 1975; "Voraussetzungssachverhalte", Dietrich, 1990), and a relation between p and q. nee

The observation in the instructions suggests that a parallel treatment of nee and pos is not possible. Let us look at two examples. (a)

das mußt du draufschieben [this you have to slide on] um den Hebel zu bauen [in order to construct the handle]

(b)

das kannst du draufschieben [this you can slide on] um den Hebel zu bauen [in order to construct the handle]

In example (a) the source q for the nee-relation is to be seen in the proposition represented in the second part of the sentence. The goal of the whole activity provides the reason for the nee-relation. In example (b), the second part is not involved in the interpretation of the modal verb. The source for the pos-

22

Christiane von Stutterheim

relation cannot be given by a following event. In this example q remains implicit and will be inferred as some precondition which has prepared the ground for p. Hence, the directive behaviour of nec-p and pos-p is different. Whereas the nee-relation is bi-directional - q can be given a precondition or a consequence of p - the pos-relation is uni-directional - q can only be a precondition of p. nec-p:

type I

q (precondition)

type Π pos-p:

> p ρ
ρ

The difference results from the different logical implications of nec-p and posp.13 For the nee-relation, q and ρ stand in a relation of reciprocal dependency. There are thus no constraints on the direction of the relation. In the case of possibility, the relation between q and ρ is open in the sense that ρ is but one among a set of alternatives following from q. This relation has to be directional - following either chronological or causal order -, because it does not make sense to talk about alternative preconditions under the perspective of a definite consequence - unless we speculate about alternative conditions. Then, however, we get a change in the type of possibility from a deontic or dispositional to an epistemic reading.

5.

Final remark

Broadening the perspective again, the results obtained in studies on modality in discourse can be seen as relevant also for studies in first and second language acquisition. A careful analysis of the principles of language use provides necessary knowledge for the study of how children acquire language competence in the domain of modality. As the study has shown, there is more to language competence in this domain than just the knowledge of word meanings and construction types. Children have to learn how to use these formal devices appropriately in different discourse contexts, and it is an interesting question, Cf. Kratzer's definition of the nee - and pos-relation: nee q -> p; pos qnp. (1978: pp. 115) This provides the logical basis for differences in the 'textual' behaviour of the two modal verbs k nnen and m ssen.

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse

23

whether, and if so, how the acquisition of the linguistic devices is connected to specific types of usage. Is it the case that specific functions of modal expressions occurring in particular discourse types play a trigger-role in acquisition? How does competence spread across the variety of discourse functions (cf. Stephany, this volume)? Any answer to these and related questions presupposes a thorough understanding of how modality functions in adult language. Similar consequences hold for studies in L2-acquisition. Here we are also confronted with the problem that we know so little about how standard speakers actually express particular conceptual categories in texts. This knowledge is necessary not only because we need a model of what has to be considered the goal, the end-state of the acquisition process, but also because we need to know more about principles which govern the transformation of conceptual structures into linguistic form in texts. Principles of the type discussed in this article can be assumed to be also at work in a learner's text production.

Appendix

El 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

unä dann hob ich Maler gelernt [...] ich hob gradl neulich hob ich da gesagt des einzige Problem war dann's Arbeitsamt es war alles abgesprochen ich kann bei ihm lernen und dann hat er zu mir gesagt "jetzt mußt aufs Arbeitsamt und mußt dir eine sogenannte Zuweisungskarte hole" dann bin ich da hinaus spaziert und *** naja dann wollt er Zeugnisse sehe [...] und wollt mich dann berate da hob ich zu ihm gesagt [...] "ich werde Maler"

E2 1 2

also das war so wir sind auf die Autobahn gefahren

24 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Christiane von Stutterheim da in der Bergheimerstraße die verlängerte das war früher/ erst war das äh Kopfsteinpflaster gewese die Zufahrt und so (—) vor drei Jahre oder vor zwei Jahre is es geändert worde [...] und da is/ vor mir is en Auto *** angehalte worde [...] und * ich bin also rechts gefahren und der ** stoppt [...] und *** ich muß ehe bremse und es hat frisch angefange zu regne [...] ich bin gerutscht wie auf Schmierseife ne *** da kann ma also net mehr lenke ne

E3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

also bei ***/ die letzt Woche is was meiner Kollegin passiert die war beim W. drin {...] einkaufe und hat ihr Fahrrad mit'm Körbchen nebe hingstellt * und wie se rauskommt liegt ein Portemonnaie im Körbchen drin ** und des hat einer Studentin gehört und die hat dann bei uns * angerufen und hat se gesagt * äh also der Mann war dran ne hat er gesagt ne da weiß er nix. davon daß äh seine Frau des Portemonnaie verlöre hat die hat'abgegebe dort in der Rohrbacherstraße in dem Polizeipräsidium [...] aber Geld war überhaupt keins meht drin und ich nehm an [...] bei m W. oder oder hat's verlorn M/I * des/ es hat jemand gefunden und hat das Geld raus und hat's dann in des Körbche geschmisse [...] also anders kann ich mir des net vorstelle

Dl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

können Sie bitte jemanden der keine bildliche information hat genau anweisen wie man diese teile zusammen setzen muß mhm also ich habe * ahm eins zwei neun Bauteile und ein großes Teil auf die ich diese Bauteile setze nehme ich zuerst ein * kleines rotes Bauteil was zusammengesetzt is aus einer waagrechten Platte und zwei kleinen Quadern

Modality: Form and Function in Discourse 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

25

und diese Quader die haben/ also diese zwei Quader die haben einen kleinen Höcker * auf der Vorderseite und diesen Höcker *5* jetzt braucht man nochmal die Instruktionen also diesen Höcker den schiebe ich in die * Vertiefung der zwei grauen Quadern auf der Bauplatte ** an der Vorderseite jetzt hob ich noch vergessen daß diese Platte ein Stückchen überstehen muß nach vorne * f...] mh *3* jetzt setze ich die kleinen * roten Teile *2* ahm *2* äh so daß sie * äh unter dieser Platte * zu stehen kommen *2* also das würde ich kaum verstehen wenn ich wenn ich des mir jetzt anhören würde [...] und zwar so daß sie auch an den kleinen grauen Quadern angebracht sind * äh ** die auf der Bauplatte * festgebracht sind [...] jetzt nehme ich dieses Teil mit den roten Aufsätzen es is ein länglicher Quader auch und den setze ich auf den grauen Stab der sich auf der Bauplatte befindet *2 * und zwar stecke ich den durch den ** durch das mittlere Loch durch das mittlere rote Loch * * dieses Bausteins l...] ahm * den kleinen grauen Stab den ich also in einem vorhergehenden Schritt durch den schwarzen Stab gesteckt habe ** kann ich jetzt mit dem Baustein den ich gerade eben aufgesteckt habe * verbinden

D2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

könnten Sie bitte jemanden der keine bildliche information hat genau anweisen wie man diese teile zusammen setzen muß [...] ... und steckst des dann auf den *** schwarzen * Stiel der sich etwa in der Mitte der Platte befindet [...] das graue Stück soll schräg über die Platte hinausragen und zwar *** auf die Breitseite wo vorher das Teil lag legst du jetzt den kleinen roten Ring und steckst den dann auf den gleichen schwarzen stiel *1* also über das ** graue längliche Stück * drüber dann nimmst du das größte Stück das noch übrig ist das grau* rote und legst es an die andere Schmalseite ** der platte *6*

26 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Christiane von Stutterheim du steckst es dann auf auf den grauen Stiel *1* der * aus der Platte herausragt und zwar so daß der Knips der da dran is nach unten reicht und in * das Loch von dem grauen länglichen Stück * hineingesteckt werden kann

Eddy Roulet1

Des formes et des emplois des modalisateurs de proposition dans l'interaction verbale

The paper presents a taxonomy of different types of proposition modalizers in French, distinguishing between implicit and explicit, as well as between extracted and integrated modalizers. It then describes different uses of these forms in verbal interaction as markers of subjectivity, implicit markers of illocutionary forces and hedges.

1.

Introduction: les modalisateurs de proposition

Les modalisateurs de proposition se caracterisent, dans la plupart des langues, par une grande diversite de formes, de sens et d'emplois et par l'absence de relations univoques entre ces trois dimensions, ce qui complique serieusement la täche de l'analyste et, sans doute, de l'apprenant. C'est ainsi que la probabilite, ä differents degres, peut etre exprimee en franfais par des formes aussi differentes que il esl probable qu'il a manque son train, il semble qu'il a manque son train, il semble avoir manque son train, il doit avoir manque son train, il a du manquer son train, il aura manque son train, il a probablement manq^ son train, je pense qu'il a manque son train, ou que des formes comme Universite" de Geneve

28

et

Eddy Roulet

// ne doit pas manquer d'argent, /'/ doit ne pas manquer d'argent,

ou

et

je pense qu'il ne viendra pas, je ne pense pas qu'il viendra,

sont per9ues comme synonymes. Par ailleurs, une forme comme il ne doit pas sortir est doublement ambigue; en effet, eile peut etre interpretee, soil comme une modalisation epistemique (probabilite), soil comme une modalisation deontique (obligation) et, dans ce dernier cas, eile peut signifier soit 'il lui est interdit de sortir', soit 'il n'est pas oblige de sortir'; en outre, la forme // doit rentrer a 8 heures peut exprimer la probabilite, la necessite ou 1'imposition d'une obligation et etre utilisee ainsi pour realiser trois actes illocutoires differents: {'assertion, I'information et Vordre; enfin, une forme comme pouvez-vous attraper le pot qui est sur I'etagere? qui n'est pas semantiquement ambigue, peut neanmoins etre utilisee pour executer deux actes illocutoires differents: une question ou une requete. 2.

Formes et functions des lexemes modaux

Je ne tenterai pas ici d'approfondir la semantique des modalisateurs de proposition, dejä abordee pour le fran9ais dans un papier anterieur (Roulet, 1979) et par ailleurs abondamment traitee par des logiciens et des linguistes, pour examiner plutöt les deux autres aspects, moins etudies quoique sans doute directement pertinents dans 1'acquisition: les formes et les functions de ces lexemes modaux dans l'interaction verbale. Comme je ne travaille pas dans une perspective d'acquisition de la langue, matemelle et seconde, je me contenterai de formuler, ä partir de mes observations sur l'emploi des lexemes modaux, en particulier des verbes et des adverbes modaux, dans une langue comme le

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

29

fran9ais, des hypotheses et des questions sur l'acquisition des modalisateurs de proposition. Reprenant les suggestions de Roulet (1979), je definirai le modalisateur de proposition comme une marque du point de vue de 1'enonciateur portant sur I'ensemble d'une proposition, ce qui exclut du champ des modalisateurs de proposition le vocabulaire axiologique lorsqu'il a une portee locale, interne ä la proposition; voir la difference entre et

// viendra certainement (il est certain qu'il viendra) // viendra rapidement (portee limitee au verbe),

et

// est heureux que Paul vienne Paul est heureux (portee limitee au sujet).

De plus, et ä la difference de Bally (1942), j'exclus des modalisateurs de proposition les expressions de l'activite verbale de l'enonciateur; il me parait en effet utile de distinguer les verbes performatifs, qui sont des predicate d'action, des verbes modaux, qui n'en sont point. Dans cette etude, je m'en tiendrai ä l'etude des modalisateurs lexicaux, les plus accessibles ä 1'observation, ce qui exclut les marques grammaticales (comme le futur anterieur epistemique: il aura manque son train) et les contours prosodiques; ces derniers, du fait qu'ils sont non discrets, permettent sans doute une modalisation beaucoup plus fine de l'enonce que les marques lexicales ou grammaticales. Je commencerai par rappeler certaines distinctions formelles, dans la manifestation de la modalite, qui ne peuvent manquer d'influencer l'acquisition. C'est ainsi que je distinguerai d'une part, apres Bally (1942), les modalisateurs explicites, qui portent une trace explicite de l'enonciateur, comme dans je crois (je pense, il me semble) qu'il fera beau, des modalisateurs implicates, depourvus de teile trace: // doit faire beau, il semble qu'il fera beau, peut-etre qu'il fera beau2·. On prendra garde de ne pas voir dans je dois m'etre trompa d'adresse un modalisateur explicite. La modalit6 6pist£mique est indopendante de la presence du je (qui est en fait le

30

Eddy Roulet

D'autre part, je distinguerai les modalisateurs extraits, nettement distinctes du dictum, comme dans il me semble que le temps s'ameliore, il est probable que Paul va venir des modalisateurs integres dans le dictum: le temps me semble s'ameliorer, Paul va probablement venir. On obtient ainsi le classement croise suivant, illustre par quelques exemples: Table 1 MODALISATEUR

EXPLICITE

IMPLICITE

EXTRAIT

je pense que... je veux que... il me semble que... je suis heureux que...

il semble que... ilfaut que... il est probable que... il est heureux que... peut-etre que... heureusement que...

il me semble dormir je crois rever

il semble dormir il doit etre rentra il a probablement dormi il est heureusement id je dois me tromper

INTEGRE

Generalement, les formes extraites et integrees sont synonymes, meme pour les couples adjectifs (forme extraite)/adverbe (forme integree); voir // semble que la situation se gate, La situation semble se gäter, ou

// est probable qu'il a reussi, II a probablement reussi, mais on observe une difference semantique importante entre les adjectifs et les adverbes dits souvent evaluatifs; voir la difference entre

sujet du verbe se tromper), comme 1'atteste le fait qu'elle est conservoe si on remplace je par il: il doit s 'etre trompu d'adresse (alors qu'elle disparait avec le je dans je pense que je me suis trompf).

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

et

31

// est malheureux qu'il ait echoue // a malheureusement echoue,

1'echec etant presuppose dans le premier cas alors qu'il est pose dans le second. Bien que cette dimension ne semble pas avoir etc prise en compte jusqu'ici, il serait tres surprenant que l'ordre des acquisitions ne soit pas determine en partie par le type de modalisateur, mais il parait tres difficile de faire des hypotheses ä partir de la seule description linguistique, tant sont heterogenes les facteurs qui peuvent interferer: est-ce la simplicite de la morphologic qui est determinante, ce qui favoriserait l'apprentissage des adverbes et des adjectifs?, ou le caractere explicite de l'expression de la modalite, ce qui favoriserait l'acquisition de verbes modaux comme penser, croire, vouloirl est-ce la construction analytique de 1'enonce, ce qui favoriserait l'acquisition des formes extraites? ou encore la frequence d'emploi en francais contemporain, ce qui favoriserait l'apprentissage des formes integrees, plus courantes, comme nous le verrons dans nos corpus? Peut-etre d'ailleurs convient-il de distinguer l'acquisition au plan de la comprehension, peu etudiee jusqu'ici, qui est sans doute plus aisee pour les formes explicites et extraites, de l'acquisition au plan de la production, qui serait plus aisee pour certaines formes implicites et integrees tres courantes? Avant d'aborder le probleme des emplois des modalisateurs de proposition dans l'interaction verbale, il convient encore de rappeler, pour eviter une confusion frequente dans les etudes quantitatives, que les lexemes modaux, comme les performatifs, le sont potentiellement, ä savoir seulement sous certaines conditions d'emplois. En particulier, les verbes exprimant une modalite explicite ne le font qu'avec un pronom sujet (ou objet indirect pour les impersonnels) et un temps renvoyant ä l'enonciateur actuel. Voir la difference entre et ou

je pense que c'est unfilm interessant [emploi modal] il pense que c'est unfilm interessant [emploi non modal] a l'epoque, je pensais que c'etait unfilm interessant [id.]

et ou

je veux que tu sortes [emploi modal] vous voulez que nous sortions [emploi non modal] j'ai longtemps espere rencontrer cet auteur [id.]

Par ailleurs, des verbes comme devoir et pouvoir, dans leurs emplois dits d6ontiques, ne sont effectivement employos modalement que si 1'obligation ou

32

Eddy Roulet

la permission est creee par la parole meme de l'enonciateur (c'est-a-dire dans des actes illocutoires de requete ou de permission). Us ne sont pas modaux lorsque l'enonciateur constate simplement 1'existence d'une obligation ou d'une permission dont son acte denunciation n'est pas la source. Voir I'ambigufte de 1'enonce Les enfants doivent rentrer ce soir a dix heures. II en va de meme pour les emplois epistemiques que Lyons (1977: 797) appelle "objectifs" et qui correspondent au simple constat d'une possibilite sans prise de position de la part de l'enonciateur. Voir l'ambiguite de // peut y avoir de la neige a Päques qui peut signifier soit: n'est pas exclu que ..., je ne prends pas position', soit 'je pense que c'est possible que...1. II est important de bien distinguer les emplois modaux et non modaux de lexemes potentiellement modaux; on ne peut, pour evaluer le degre de modalisation d'un texte, se contenter d'additionner les occurrences de devoir et de pouvoir, comme l'ont fait, par exemple, Cotteret et al. (1976) pour les interventions de Giscard d'Estaing et de Mitterrand dans le debat televise de 1974; par ailleurs, dans la perspective qui nous interesse ici, on peut faire l'hypothese que le moment et le degre de l'acquisition d'un modalisateur different pour les emplois modaux et non modaux.

3.

Les modalisations de proposition dans 1'interaction

Examinons maintenant les emplois des modalisateurs de proposition dans 1'interaction verbale. Us servent tout d'abord, conformement ä la definition que j'en ai donnee, ä exprimer le point de vue de l'enonciateur par rapport ä un certain contenu propositionnel; ils contribuent done ä l'expression de la subjectivite, comme dans 1'exemple ci-dessous, extrait d'une reponse de Michelle Maurois ä Jacques Chancel, ä propos de son pere Andre Maurois (emission RADIOSCOPIE du 11.1.80): (1)

Par moments, certainement, il a ete heurewc j'crois qu'il a ete heureux dans sa vie litteraire.

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

33

Par ailleurs, les modalisateurs de proposition contribuent aussi ä l'expression et ä la modulation des relations intersubjectives, en particulier des functions illocutoires, cornme dans les extraits de dialogues suivants, tires du corpus de conversations telephoniques de Schmale-Buton & Schmale (1984): (2)

-

est-ce que le docteur pourrait me faire une ordonnance? oh ben oui... vous pourriez euh passer il n'a pas de consultations la aujourd'hui mais ilfaudra.it euh passer tout a fait au debut de I'apres-midi

ou

j'peux regarder sur le livre oui, , j'veux bien Monsieur Dans ces exemples, l'emploi du verbe modal ne vise pas ä exprimer le point de vue de 1'enonciateur par rapport ä un certain fait, ä moduler simplement le contenu d'une question ou d'une assertion, mais il indique par convention la function illocutoire de l'acte execute: requete, proposition et conseil dans le premier dialogue, offre et acceptation dans le second. Des lors, la function du lexeme modal deborde la signification de 1'enonce isole pour toucher la fonction illocutoire de l'acte de langage dans l'interaction verbale. Pour expliquer ces emplois, on admet generalement, avec Brown & Levinson (1987), que tous les actes de langage sont potentiellement menafant pour les faces des interlocuteurs, et que cela a conduit, dans chaque langue, au developpement progressif de processus de figuration, qui visent precisement ä attenuer cette menace potentielle, en indiquant la fonction illocutoire de l'acte de maniere plus implicite, et done moins contraignante pour les interlocuteurs (voir Roulet, 1980a, b et c). Les formes implicites les plus courantes font generalement allusion ä une des conditions de realisation de l'acte vise, comme 1'a montre Searle (1975). C'est ainsi que la realisation sincere d'une offre presuppose au moins les trois conditions suivantes: -

1'offre conceme un acte futur du locuteur; le locuteur se juge capable d'exocuter cet acte; il pense que 1'interlocuteur desire qu'il accomplisse cet acte (voir Roulet, 1977).

34

Eddy Roulet

Pour eviter la forme par trop contraignante du performatif explicite: je vous offre ..., le locuteur peut executer implicitement un acte d1 off re en assertant une des conditions qui le concerne (assertion completee eventuellement par une hypothetique portant sur la condition qui concerne I'interlocuteur) ou en interrogeant la condition qui concerne I'interlocuteur: je peux regarder sur le livre [, si vous voulez] je regarderai sur le livre [...] voulez-vous que je regarde sur le livre? ä quoi I'interlocuteur peut repondre, comme dans le dialogue ci-dessus, en evitant le verbe performatif, de maniere implicite, par l'assertion de la condition qui le concerne. On peut emettre, avec Morgan (1978), 1'hypothese que 1'emploi repete, au travers des siecles, d'expressions indirectes r6fe"rant aux conditions de realisations des actes en a fait des formules conventionnelles pour realiser de maniere ä la fois implicite (sur le mode de l'implicite conversationnel generalise de Grice) et claire les actes de langage correspondants. Comme les possibilites, desirs et obligations des interlocuteurs occupent une place preponderate dans ces conditions, certaines formes des verbes modaux epistemiques et deontiques, et en particulier en fran9ais pouvoir, devoir et vouloir, sont devenues des marques conventionnelles de certains actes illocutoires. On peut penser que ce Statut tres particulier de formes quasi figees et tres courantes a une influence determinante sur leur acquisition, avec, en langue seconde, le probleme supplemental que la selection des formes conventionnelles peut etre tres differente d'une langue ä l'autre (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987; House & Kasper, 1981). Enfin, les modalisateurs de proposition peuvent etre utilises, en comple"ment des marques performatives ou modales de function illocutoire mentionnees cidessus, pour attenuer la menace potentielle que tout acte de langage presente pour les faces des interlocuteurs. Voir l'exemple suivant, extrait d'un debat des DOSSffiRS DE L'ECRAN (7.4.81): (3) Je voudrais vous demander ce que vous pensez de l'homme qui a ecrit U y a quelques annees

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

35

oü le verbe performatif est modalis6 par le verbe vouloir, ou celui-ci, extrait de la conversation telephonique du corpus de Schmale-Buton & Schmale (1984) reproduite en annexe (page 230 de leurs transcriptions, lignes 5-7): (4)

ban mais ecoutez euh la aujourd'hui je ne travaille pas mais enfln euh exceptionnellement si vous voulez je pourrais peut-etre vous voir quand meme la

oü le je peux marquant 1'acte illocutoire d'offre, dont nous avons vu precedemment un exemple, est surmodalise par le conditionnel, 1'emploi hypothetique de vouloir et l'adverbe epistemique. Ces emplois des modalisateurs comme attenuateurs ("hedges", selon la terminologie de Lakoff, 1972) sont sans doute moins importants que les deux emplois precedents quant au contenu et ä la visee de l'enonce; par ailleurs, ils font intervenir des formes moins figees, avec de nombreuses possibilites de combinaisons pouvant aboutir ä des structures assez longues et complexes, comme dans le dernier exemple ci-dessus; on serait done tente d'emettre 1'hypothese que leur maitrise est plus tardive. En revanche, le role determinant que ces attenuateurs jouent dans le bon deroulement de l'interaction en face ä face ainsi que leur frequence dans les echanges de la vie quotidienne conduiraient plutöt ä 1'hypothese d'une acquisition assez precoce. En resume, on peut distinguer au moins trois types d'emplois des modalisateurs de propositions dans l'interaction verbale: -

l'expression du point de vue de l'enonciateur, l'indication implicite de la function illocutoire, l'attenuation de l'acte illocutoire.

Meme si des formes identiques peuvent apparaitre dans ces trois emplois, par exemple: je dois m'etre trompe d'adresse, tu dois rentrer avant dix heures, je dois vous avouer que je me suis trompe, il parait important de distinguer clairement ceux-ci dans les etudes sur l'acquisition des lexemes modaux, car chaque emploi est caracterise, outre sa fonction specifique dans la communication, par certaines proprietes (construction plus ou moins figee, plus ou moins frequente, plus ou moins

36

Eddy Roulet

complexe, etc.), qui ne peuvent manquer de determiner dans une certaine mesure 1'ordre d'acquisition des modalisateurs. Pour ma part, je me contenterai d'observer comment ces formes et ces emplois se manifestent dans des dialogues authentiques entre autochtones. J'examinerai deux exemples, qui relevent de modes d'interactions diff6rents: un entretien radiophonique entre un animateur et un ecrivain et une conversation telephonique entre un client et la secretaire d'un medecin. J'ai retenu tout d'abord un fragment d'entretien entre Jacques Chancel (JC) et Michele Maurois (MM), extrait de 1'emission RADIOSCOPIE du 11.1.1980, qui est particulierement interessant car le theme traite: 'une faute, voire une eventuelle infidelite de l'ecrivain Andre Maurois', surtout devant un vaste public d'auditeurs, ne peut manquer d'etre potentiellement mena9ant pour les faces tant positive (atteinte ä l'image de la famille) que negative (intrusion sur le territoire personnel) de la fille de l'ecrivain et, par ricochet, pour la face positive de J. Chancel, qui risque d'essuyer une rebuffade si son intervention est jugee deplacee. D'oü la necessite, pour les deux interlocuteurs, de recourir ä des implicites et de multiplier les attenuateurs dans les questions, dans la denegation et dans 1'aveu: (5)

JC

[...] C'est vrai qu'on peut s'demander s'il s'est passe quelque chose dans sa vie, parce qu'il a ete e ban enfant, ban eleve e... bon ecrivain, ban academicien euh ban man, bon pere, enfin hein? MM Oui, oui, avec e, avec tout... JC On souhaiterait presque e... la chose qu'on n'sait pas, c'est-dire la faute qu'il a pu commettre un jour, non? MM De veritable... JC Vous cherchez pas dans. ..dans... [rires] MM De veritable faute je n'pense pas qu'il ait pu commettre parce que ce n'etait pas dans... ce n'etait pas possible [ . . . ] . [denegation suivie, apres une nouvelle relance de JC, de 1'aveu:] Je ne suis pas sure qu'il ait ete un ... un mari parfait, a je... je ne pense pas.

JC tente de neutraliser son intrusion sur le territoire de MM en gommant toute reference ä l'enonciateur (voir l'emploi systematique de on ä la place de je), en evitant l'emploi de verbes performatifs, remplaces par des verbes modaux (se

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

37

demander, souhaiter) et en accumulant les attenuateurs, dont plusieurs sont d'origine modale: peut, c'est vrai, a pu. De son cote, MM modalise fortement sa denegation, peut-etre parce qu'elle ne peut etre sure de fails concernant une autre personne, celle-ci füt-elle son pere, mais surtout pour eviter une eventuelle objection decisive de JC, et eile formule son aveu de maniere tres attenuee ä l'aide d'un adjectif et d'un verbe modaux, utilises ä la forme explicite. Mais ce qui est frappant surtout, dans ce passage, c'est l'emploi de formes dont la structure de surface est tres differente de la structure semantique; ainsi:

-

qu'il a pu commettre pour 'qu'il est possible qu'il ait commise', avec deplacement de la marque temporelle du verbe plein sur le verbe modal; je ne pense pas qu'il ait pu commettre pour 'je pense qu'il n'est pas possible qu'il ait commis', avec deplacement de la negation de pouvoir sur penser et deplacement de la marque temporelle du verbe plein sur pouvoir.

Quel que soit le traitement syntactico-semantique qu'on retienne pour decrire ces constructions, le choix dans le discours de la construction modale la moins transparente n'est pas innocent et constitue sans doute, comme 1'ont releve certains (cf. Prince, 1976), un moyen de renforcer 1'attenuation introduite par le modalisateur. Si nous revenons maintenant ä une perspective d'acquisition des modalisateurs, ces formes ne peuvent manquer de poser un probleme particulier, qui n'est pas sans rappeler, ä un autre niveau, le probleme souleve par l'acquisition des formes modales dans les emplois conventionnalises de marqueurs implicites d'actes illocutoires; en effet, d'une part, le peu de transparence et la complexite syntactico-semantique de ces formes combinant un modalisateur, une negation et un auxiliaire devraient en rendre l'acquisition tres difficile et tres tardive; mais, d'autre part, comme ces formes supplantent nettement les formes plus analytiques dans I'interaction quotidienne, pour les raisons que j'äi evoquees, leur frequence d'emploi devrait en faciliter et en accelerer 1'acquisition. J'examinerai enfin une conversation telephonique extraite du corpus de Schmale-Buton & Schmale (1984) et reproduite en annexe, qui presente un mode d'interaction plus proche de la vie quotidienne et qui, outre la forte recurrence de formes modales, presente l'interet de faire intervenir des problemes de places. En effet, il s'agit de deux dialogues successifs d'un patient, le premier avec la receptionniste, qui est aussi la femme du medecin, la seconde avec le medecin lui-meme. Dans ce type d'interaction, il importe de

38

Eddy Roulet

justifier son intrusion sur le territoire de 1'autre, surtout si on demande un rendez-vous urgent, d'oü la multiplication d'activites justificatrices de la part du client; en outre, pour decrire ses troubles de sante, le patient occupe une place defavorisee, celle du beotien, par rapport aux specialistes (receptionniste ou medecin), d'oü la necessite pour lui de tenir un discours tres modalis6, du point de vue epistemique, pour eviter de se disqualifier. On observe ainsi, apres le je voudrais savoir si je peux avoir (229, 2-3), qui marque une function illocutoire de requete (229, 3), et qu'il est interessant de comparer, dans la meme fonction, au je voudrais savoir si vous pourriez faire (229, 27-28), la recurrence des modalisateurs epistemiques: j'ai p't'etre,je pense avoir (avec la rectification interessante d'une modalite implicite en une explicite), j'ai du faire , c'est peut-etre, j'ai p't'etre. On notera aussi dans la meme perspective le j'suis pas sür vraiment que ce soil mais j'ai tous les symptomes en annexe si vous voulez.

4.

Conclusion: Operateurs modaux et connecteurs pragmatiques

On aura peut-etre observe aussi, dans ce dialogue, la frequence et l'importance de connecteurs pragmatiques tels que mais, parce que, quand meme, enfin, de toutes fagons. Cela me conduit ä aborder un dernier probleme, souleve" par 1'introduction dans le projet berlinois du concept de modalisateur discursif ("discourse modalizer", cf. Dittmar & Terborg, 1991), pour decrire la fonction d'un connecteur comme aber [mais]. Dans le modele d'analyse du discours genevois presente en particulier dans Roulet et al. (1985) et, en allemand, dans Drescher & Kotschi (1988), nous distinguons les fonctions illocutoires initiative et reactive, qui relient les interventions constitutives d'echanges (question, information/reponse, remerciement, par exemple) des fonctions interactives (de types rituel, comme la preparation, argumentatif, comme 1'emploi d'un argument ou le rejet d'un contre-argument, ou reformulatif) qui relient les Constituante de Intervention: actes, interventions et echanges. Le modalisateur, defini comme une marque du point de vue de l'enonciateur portant sur l'ensemble de la proposition, se situe au niveau de l'acte de langage considere isolement et reste interne ä celui-ci (c'est pourquoi nous parlons le plus souvent d'operateurs modaux). La fonction d'un connecteur pragmatique comme mais (parce que, enfin ou de toutes / ons) est differente et se situe ä un autre niveau, puisqu'il fournit des instructions (pour reprendre le concept de Ducrot et al., 1980) sur

Formes et emplois des modalisateurs de proposition

39

l'articulation et l'interpretation des Constituante de l'intervention (voir pour les connecteurs argumentatifs, contre-argumentatifs et consecutifs, les descriptions, qui s'inspirent tres largement des travaux de Ducrot et Anscombre, proposees dans Roulet et al., 1985, chap. 2, et, pour les connecteurs reformulatifs, Roulet, 1987). ne fait aucun doute que l'acquisition de ces connecteurs, dont la maitrise est capitale dans l'interaction verbale, doit faire l'objet d'etudes systematiques et approfondies, en langue maternelle comme en langue seconde, d'autant qu'ils fonctionnent de maniere souvent tres differente d'une langue ä lautre (cf. Rossari, 1989), mais on peut se demander quelle est l'utilite de ranger ceux-ci sous l'etiquette de modalisateur, füt-il discursif. Meme si certains connecteurs expriment bien, d'une certaine maniere, le point de vue de l'enonciateur, il n'est pas certain qu'on puisse degager des generalisations interessantes en les rangeant sous la categoric de la modalisation. En effet, l'etude de la fonction des connecteurs pragmatiques me paratt devoir necessairement (que de modalisateurs dans cette proposition!) se situer dans la perspective d'un modele de la construction et de l'interpretation du discours.

40

Eddy Roulet

Annexe

X

Φ

4-* g

Ό >

411

1_ 4-*

If I HAD (also ELA: WD/WAS.TO HAVE) money, I WD buy a new car] This example is accepted without correction by all the Mexican speakers I have interviewed, indicating that the use of the past subjunctive in the main clause is not inferior in Mexican normative status to use of the conditional. The correspondence between the past subjunctive and WD mood concord is immediately evident in the following codeswitch: (29) Si lo HUBIE-RA-MOS dejado he WDV ykjust taken onto any kinda drug or anything like that. [if we HAD/WDV left him alone...] (PV53mG2B) where HUBIE-RA-MOS [have-PAST.SJN-Ip] corresponds to English WDV in general, but to the past auxiliary HAD in a standard English version of the IFclause. As noted in section 5.1 above, mood concord also occurs in various dialects of English, most relevantly in the LA dialects areally adjacent to ELA. Trudgill & Hannah (1982: 47) informally identify the use of W D in an //-"-clause or object complement clause to wish as American, not British English. It has nonfactual condition, but Southern dialects use the same hypothetical mood as in the main clause.

90

Benji Wald

never been a feature of the New York City dialect which I grew up speaking, although I have heard it recently among New Yorkers, so that my dialect may now be conservative. In any case, the occurrence of the mood concord among LA dialects, coupled with general use in relevant dialects of Spanish, allows that the principles of normative assimilation and shortest path have operated in the extreme use of mood concord in ELA English. With regard to the shortest path principle, it is interesting to note that mood concord has relatively old roots in British English, although Trudgill & Hanna's (1982) observations indicate that it is no longer general among current British dialects. Thus, although it is not particularly well documented in earlier varieties of British English, the long documented use of H ADDA [< HADE'VE] for WDA [< WOULD'VE] suggests earlier currency of mood concord in some British dialects, cf. Caxton (15th century): (30) "HAD [WD via Ό] Tybert the cat HAVE been there, he SHOULD [WD] also somewhat have suffered." (Jespersen, 1965: 322) According to Jespersen, this variation arose from reinterpretation of 'D as a contracted form of HAD rather than WD. If so, it must be noted that W D could not have contracted when inverted, as in the example. It follows that it must have contracted in /F-clauses and then the uncontracted re-analysis as HAD spread to inverted conditions. HADDA remains current in /^-clauses, currently considered nonstandard. An example from an Anglo LA dialect is: (31) Now if you HADDA asked me (before) I probably CDV came up with a few old (stories)... but right now, no. (FR50m,WLA) Significantly, HADDA does not occur in ELA English. Its non-occurrence is consistent with the principle of shortest path, by which ELA English rejects seemingly superfluous variation occurring in source English dialects. WDV is the expected choice as the variant more generally corresponding to the Spanish past subjunctive and/or imperfect. While the HADDA variant of WDV indicates the early emergence of mood concord in English, there is no parallel variant for WD. The importance of this observation is highlighted by the failure of WDV to interact with stative verbs in the same way as WD. Thus, mood concord dialects which reject /// WD be/have/know use and accept // / WDV been/had/known. Thus, there is further complexity and subtlety to the W D /Stative interaction. A full explanation of the conditioning will not be attempted here, but it is evident

On the Evolution of Would and Other Modals in ELA English

91

why the interaction is a difficult one for second language learners to acquire. This in turn suggests why it has survived into the ELA English dialect despite its violation of the principle of normative assimilation. There are limits to the principle according to the complexity of the conditions to be acquired. The degree to which a population is assimilated into a host population determines the degree to which it will have the opportunity to conform to the principle of normative assimilation. The ELA community has remained partially isolated from the larger LA community by geographical and racial boundaries, where 'race1 in American society simplifies a more complex system of ethnic diversity by emphasising distinctions in aggregate physical characteristics (real or stereotyped). The WD/stative interaction can be traced back to the early Germanic lexical class of preterite-present verbs, from which the primary modals in English and other Germanic languages descend. Originally based on an aspectual distinction, which remains in Spanish and other Romance languages, the system was reinterpreted as a tense distinction, so that the old past perfective became simply the past tense in Germanic. Hence the continuing use of the past in both perfective and imperfective contexts. The preterite-present verbs remained distinct. Their past perfectives were interpreted as non-past statives, but their non-past forms never shifted from the original perfective inflection. Thus, there is no can/??cans parallel to take/takes etc. They did, however, receive the newer Germanic (weak) past inflection, so that CAN/CD and WILL/WD emerged, indicating the non-past reinterpretation of the original perfective. Their stativity is still evident in some contexts. Thus, for example, Palmer (1980: 92) observes that in a non-iterative context "yesterday I ran fast and COULD catch the bus" does not readily invite the inference that I did in fact catch it, while "... and WAS ABLE to catch the bus" does. In the context of the example, CD appears to be stative, awkwardly expressing a state of potentiality. Palmer further observes that this awkwardness does not occur in iterative contexts, cf. "I USED TO run fast and COULD always catch the bus". In brief, the WD/stative interaction is motivated by its historical evolution. The interaction in both iterative and hypothetical contexts derives from the same historical source in Germanic re-analysis of an older lexical class of verbs as stative rather than perfective. Viewing the source of the violation of the WD /stative interaction in ELA English as a remnant of second language acquisition, it can be first noted that learners of Spanish language background, like all other learners, begin simply with a naked verb, without making tense, aspectual or modal distinctions.

92

Benji Wald

When auxiliaries are first acquired they are not consistently used, and this variation may persist, cf. (32) IflDIDN't [HADn't/WDn't have] move(d), they [WDV] hit me all over my face ... (HU16ml2S) Semantic distinctions among auxiliaries and modals are, of course, appreciated early, since similar distinctions occur in Spanish. Thus, strategies for English can include transfer of strategies from Spanish once the lexical resources are acquired. As Kellerman (1984: 121) put it in his study of mood concord in second language acquisition: "Advanced learners are affected by cross-linguistic influence in different ways from beginners, but simply because they know more and this knowledge opens up new susceptible areas." In this vein, WD:USETA confusion occurs with some learners, because both correspond to the undifferentiated Spanish imperfect. Since the Spanish imperfect is also used non standardly instead of the preterite subjunctive in Mexican and other dialects of Spanish, USETA sometimes occurs in unEnglish hypothetical uses, e.g., (33) If this WAS mine I USETO [WD] wak - take this bed. (CR12m9S)

waf-offnput

meaning: 'if this trailer were mine, I WD take out this table and put a bed in its place (so that I could live in it)'. The strategy used here transparently associates USETA with the Spanish imperfect in a hypothetical use. This non standard use is of long standing in Spanish (cf. Bourciez, 1956: 476), and is specifically noted in ELA Spanish (e.g., Phillips, 1967: pp. 551; SilvaCorvalän, 1987). Silva-Corvalän suggests that later generations in ELA are accelerating tendencies which already exist in relevant monolingual Spanish dialects to replace the past subjunctive with the imperfect under the condition of removal from the influence of normative pressures to maintain traditional Spanish norms. An example from my own data: (34) S/ el esta-BA aqui te ayuda-BA. [if he be-IMPF here you help-IMPF => if he WERE (or ELA: WD BE) here, he WD help you] (LV32fG3E)

On the Evolution of Would and Other Modals in ELA English

93

Since learners recognise the global influence of English on ELA Spanish, it is reasonable to infer that the exaggerated use of the imperfect for the past subjunctive among ELA Spanish speakers encourages learners to adapt the same strategy to English. If so, most learners seem to relatively rapidly learn that WD is the more appropriate general equivalent to the Spanish past subjunctive/imperfect, not USET A. They come to recognise that WD is used where there is variation in Spanish, i.e., in hypothetical contexts, USETA only where there is no variation, just use of the imperfect in Spanish. The result is that WD becomes the favoured modal in all contexts, cf. Spanish: (35) Se junta-BA-n conmigo y si no i-BA una, no i-BA-mos ninguna. [they USETA/WD hang out with me, and if one of us WDn't (or DIDn't) go, none (of us) WD go (or WENT)] (SL16H6S) In the example -BA marks the imperfect. Substitution of the subjunctive would be inappropriate because it would imply that the propositions are nonfactual. In context the propositions are intended to be factual. This interpretation of the utterance is, of course, an inference from the larger discourse context, not only because Spanish allows the imperfect to substitute for the subjunctive, but because in the larger sense discussed in section 1 above, absence of modality marking is neutral to factuality, and does not insist that a proposition is true. Naturally, the specifically iterative effect of WD is not recognised by learners as readily as its correspondence to the Spanish imperfect, so that inappropriate uses as durative with Stative verbs persist long after USETA is withdrawn from hypothetical contexts, as exemplified earlier. Eventually, however, learners recognise the distinction between WD and USETA. The fact that there are two distinct forms undoubtedly helps. Beyond this, they have useful distinctive functions in organising English discourse by separating orientation from event sequencing, as discussed in section 5.1 above. Neither of these motivations for further acquisition apply to the hypothetical WD/stative interaction. In hypothetical contexts, WD varies with 0, where φ has already occurred as an early stage of English acquisition. Similarly, there is no tangible discourse organising function to the WD/stative interaction to compensate for its conflict with the principle of shortest path, where Spanish favours marking of the hypothetical in each clause, either with the subjunctive or imperfect.8 Finally and most crucially, as previously noted, it is simply Someone might want to argue that the WD/stative interaction in hypothetical contexts does serve a discourse purpose, since it distinguishes root from concord uses of WD, cf. if you WD BE quiet, I WD be able to concentrate. Here WD in the i/-clause is not the result of

94

Benji Wald

hard to notice because of the complexity of its conditions. Thus, it is just as interesting that WD/stative interaction in hypothetical contexts has become variable in ELA English as the fact that the variation violates the principle of normative assimilation. Possibly the occurrence of the more useful and transparent WD/stative interaction in imperfect (habitual) contexts has aided recognition of the interaction in hypothetical contexts. At this point evidence is not sufficient to recognise if there is an evolutionary direction to the variation, so that ELA English will eventually eliminate this difference from adjacent Anglo dialects. For that matter, evidence is not sufficient to determine whether the WD/stative interaction will remain characteristic of Anglo dialects, so that ELA English may anticipate the generalisation of WD to stative /F-clauses in other mood concord dialects.

6.

Conclusions

For the most part, ELA English has the same lexical resources and uses the same grammatical and discourse strategies for expressing modality as do relevant source dialects of English. The principle of normative assimilation is largely supported by modality in ELA English. However, preference among strategies is mitigated by the principle of shortest path, particularly in the adoption of mood concord to the virtual exclusion of the simple past, where source English dialects allow variation between the two. Even more interesting and revealing is ELA English generalization of mood concord to contexts in which adjacent dialects of English do not allow it, according to the WD/stative interaction, an interaction of ancient Germanic origin. Here shortest path conflicts with normative assimilation, so that the latter principle is violated. The WD/stative interaction tests the limits of the principle of normative assimilation under the sociolinguistic condition of the geographic segregation mood concord, but derives more directly from the root meaning of WILLIWD as 'be willing', involving volition. Root uses of WD in (/"-clauses (and some other contexts) indeed allow a semantic differentiation between WD and 0. How useful or influential this possible semantic distinction is to maintenance of the WD/stative interaction is problematic. It has not been sufficient to prevent the distinction from being obscured with nonstative verbs in English mood concord dialects, even though the distinction has no direct bearing on whether or not an affected verb is stative, cf. if somebody WD come and challenge us today, we WD play them. There are also considerations of interaction with tense-like distinctions in some contrasts between WD and 0, cf. "I wish the clock worked/WD work" parallel to "I hope the clock works/WILL work" (Leech, 1971: 115). Similarly, see Close (1980) for a discussion of WILL in //-clauses. This semantic distinction is clearly relevant to the semantics of WD in many varieties of English, but cannot be pursued further here.

On the Evolution of Would and Other Modals in ELA English

95

of a population of a single language background (Spanish) from communities speaking the source English dialects. Accordingly, it seems that the noncategorical status of the violation reflects the continuation of the principle of normative assimilation in a direction toward conformity with other accessible dialects of English. The variation most likely manifests an interplay between social forces promoting separate development of the community and contrasting social forces promoting identification with and further assimilation toward Anglo communities. It is important to realise that this does not mean that the variation is symptomatic of social strife, though it might be, but more neutrally of the manner in which social groups everywhere are integrated into a larger looser community without losing all trace of their historic identity. Language difference is, of course, not necessary to the maintenance of distinctive ethnic identity. Therefore, it would be simplistic and naive to insist that violations of the principle of normative assimilation have a necessarily separatistic motivation. For that matter, the principle of shortest path may reflect an eagerness to become linguistically non-distinct from other communities, in addition to its more obvious cognitive function of facilitating the transition between using one language and using another. Constrained by the principle of normative assimilation, the principle of shortest path does not distinguish the grammar of ELA English from those of source English dialects, only the use of that grammar in producing discourse. Among minor trends in ELA English the substitution of WERE/WAS.TO for W D in hypothetical contexts establishes an optional contrast between hypothetical (modal) and iterative (aspectual) contexts parallel to the Spanish option of using either the past subjunctive or imperfect in equivalent contexts, but only the imperfect in iterative (imperfective) contexts, as discussed in the context of example (20) above. The parallelism goes beyond a mere semantic distinction to the stylistic dimension of language use. The use of WERE/WAS.TO in ELA English is more 'elegant1 than WD, similar to the way that the past subjunctive is prescriptively more acceptable than the imperfect in Spanish //"-clauses. It is true that ELA use of W AS.TO ignores the at least standard English semantic difference from WD in assertiveness, as discussed in the context of examples like (20) above. While this fact supports the parallelism of WAS.TO to the Spanish subjunctive, its difference from other dialects of English is hardly perceivable when it does not violate the principle of normative assimilation. In sum, within the constraints of the principle of normative assimilation, the principle of shortest path has led ELA English, more than its source English dialects, to reverse the old Germanic re-analysis of the former past perfective

96

Benji Wald

aspect as the simple (aspectually and modally neutral) past, so that in conformity with Spanish, the simple past is preferentially restricted to perfective contexts, e.g., in marking the main line of narrative. In other words, the shortest path analysis is 'English simple past = Spanish perfective past' (usually called preterite). This analysis is encouraged by the fact that in all English dialects, only the simple past is appropriate where the context is indeed perfective. However, the analysis ignores other contexts in which the simple past can be used without violating the principle of normative assimilation. Thus, parallel to the Spanish obligation, ELA English prefers to explicitly mark deviations from the perfective context, usually by means of WD. This preference is most salient in its use in subordinate clauses, where all English dialects allow, and many prefer, the suspension of such marking (cf. discussion of example (16) above). To the extent that the effect of the ELA English preference is to produce mood concord, it exemplifies the more general strategy of decontextualisation. Decontextualisation encodes information into the clause which might otherwise be expressed only in a larger discourse context. It increases discourse redundancy. As a general process, decontextualisation can evolve independently in different languages. Undoubtedly, mood concord has developed independently in various English and Spanish dialects. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that Spanish has assisted this process in forming the use of WD in ELA English.

Anna Dutka1

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

From the point of view of discourse, the description of some morphemes in Polish as connectives considerably innovates the previous approaches, traditionally influenced by logic and syntax. The present article is inspired by the argumentation theory, developed by Anscombre and Ducrot. According to this theory, the utterances operate as arguments or conclusions. The possibility of realisation of utterance sequences in discourse is determined at the level of linguistic structure particulary in the choice of signs. Among these are those which link utterances directed towards opposite conclusions (counter-orientation connectives, [e.g. mais}) or towards the same conclusion (co-orientation connectives [e.g. et]). The argumentative description of mais and et allows the specification of the semantic and pragmatic particularities of the Polish connectives ale, alez and lecz, and the confrontation of those of ale, a and /.

1.

Introduction

Nous nous proposons de situer les morphemes que la theorie de I'argumentation dans la langue de Jean-Claude Anscombre et Oswald Ducrot considere comme des connecteurs^ dans le cadre general de la modalite adopte par les linguistes polonais. Ces morphemes sont repartis en conjunctions, particules et adverbes.

Universito de Varsovie Les connecteurs sont des morphemes qui servent ä mettre en rapport deux actes de parole accomplis ä travers les propositions qu'ils relient (Ducrot, 1983b: 166). La distinction oporateur/connecteur dans l'&ude de certaines conjunctions causales en polonais dans 1'approche polyphonique est pre"sent£e par Dutka (sous presse a).

98

Anna Dutka

Nous confronterons diverses descriptions de ale (un correspondant de mais) avec sa description argumentative. Nous presenterons certaines hypotheses sur ia description argumentative des morphemes a et i. (les correspondants de et).

2.

Une presentation sommaire de la modalite en linguistique polonaise3

Definie par le dictionnaire des termes linguistiques comme "une attitude subjective determinee du locuteur par rapport ä ce qui est le contenu de son enonce" (Golab, Heinz & Polanski, 1968), la modalite est concue comme un ensemble de relations entre le locuteur, l'enonce et la realite objective (Mirowicz, 1956; Jodlowski, 1971; Bellert, 1971; Wierzbicka, 1971). Souvent eile est consideree comme un element constitutif de la predication (Mirowicz, 1956; Boguslawski, 1971). La concept de modalite a etc beaucoup influence par les approches logiques et syntaxiques. Meme si certains linguistes postulent de distinguer la modalite logique et linguistique, dans de nombreuses recherches plus recentes, on note que les definitions linguistiques portent une empreinte logique. Wierzbicka (1969, 1971), en construisant un Systeme semantique universel de la pensee humaine, postule de decrire la structure d'une phrase en langue naturelle par le schema 'M, que S est'. S est un signe de l'objet reel dont parle le locuteur, P est un predicat, M est un signe de l'attitude du locuteur vis-ä-vis d'un etat de choses oü l'objet S possede la propriete P. M, le cadre modal, peut etre realise par quatre elements: sadze. [je pense], chce. [je veux], nie chc% [je ne veux pas]4 et czuje. [je sens]. Pour certaines conjunctions et particules Wierzbicka propose des paraphrases semantiques en metalangue, p.ex. nawet on przyszedl [meme lui, il est venu = sache qu'il est venu; je pense que tu sais que d'autres sont venus; je pense que tu comprends qu'on pouvait penser que quant ä lui, ce serait autre chose]. Le Systeme de paraphrase a etc generalement adopte dans la description des morphemes qui nous Interessent (Grzegorczykowa, 1975; Grochowski, 1986). Les paraphrases servent ä decrire przeciez [bien], p.ex. dans przeciez ci mowilam, ze jest pozno [je t'ai bien dit qu'il etait tard]. En se referant ä Bakhtine, cette explication (Mayenowa, 1983) traite przeciez comme un exemple du dialogue interne et l'interprete comme un signal d'un message elliptique, decrit par la formule: 'tu 3

4

Pour une prosentation plus detailloe voir Boniecka (1976). nie ehe [je ne veux pas] est consid6r6 comme un pr6dicat autonome et non pas la nögation dec/zee [jeveux].

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

99

penses/tu pourrais penser que x, il n'en est pas ainsi, tu ne peux pas ne pas savoir que non x'. Boguslawski (1971) propose de traiter toutes les expressions modales les plus typiques (les modes, les mots et les particules comme prawdopodobnie [probablement]) comme des expressions predicatives, en se fondant sur une analyse fonctionnelle de la phrase en objet spatio-temporel et en complexe predicatif. Ainsi on chyba przyjechat [il doit etre arrive] = przypuszczam, ze on przyjechai (je suppose qu'il est arrive]. Pour Bellert (1971) interpretation semantique d'un enonce consiste en un ensemble de conclusions qui en decoulent, conformement aux regies de grammaire employees et aux informations placees ä cöte des entrees lexicales utilisees dans 1'enonce. Les unes et les autres doivent etre decrites du point de vue logico-semantique. A chaque enonce on peut assigner une attitude modale qu'on peut expliciter par Temetteur affirme que..., 1'emetteur veut savoir si...', etc. Le point de vue discursif est envisage par Antas & Fajfer (1985) dans 1'analyse des unites appelees modulateurs [modulanty] ou Operateurs pragmatiques. Ces unites se situent au niveau du texte. Du point de vue stylistique elles marquent un dialogue cache entre les interlocuteurs, et du point de vue syntaxique elles donnent le cadre du texte: etant donne qu'elles marquent l'expression du sujet, dans la structure profonde on peut toujours les expliquer au niveau du sens de 1'enonce entier, p.ex. tylko ojciec mi pomogi [seulement mon pere m'a aide] est explique par zaluje, ale nikt inny mi nie pomogi [je regrette, mais personne d'autre ne m'a aide]. Ainsi les modulateurs sont traites comme des elements dont la valeur informative est 'semantiquement ouverte': leur sens est chaque fois determine par la valeur modale qui justifie leur emploi. Les auteurs ont examine le fonctionnement des modulateurs dans les emissions de la television dans les annees '70, ä l'epoque dite de la propagande du succes, qui servait la politique du Parti Ouvrier Unifie Polonais dirige par E. Gierek. La plupart des linguistes postulent de distinguer la modalite des elements expressifs de l'enonce (Mirowicz, 1948, 1956; Rieger, 1957). Les particules peuvent trouver leur place dans la description semantique en tant que cadre de l'enonce (Jodlowski, 1976) ou en tant que commentaire que le locuteur fait de

100

AnnaDutka

son enonce (Mirowicz, 1949). Les interjections sont ecartes5. Les marques de 1'expressivite seront eventuellement envisagees quand elles accompagnent un contenu objectif (Jodlowski, 1971). L'expressivite est envisagee par Wierzbicka (1969, 1971) qui lui reserve le predicat 'czuje' [je sens] et par Antas & Fajfer (1985) pour qui les modulateurs sont en meme temps des signes de l'expression et de l'impression. Quant aux moyens linguistiques de l'expression de la modalite, les particules ont etc decrites surtout par Grochowski (1986) dans le cadre de la semantique lexicale, de la structure theme-rheme et du Systeme des paraphrases de Wierzbicka. Au terme de sä recherche 1'auteur pose le probleme de l'equivalence et de l'hyperonymie entre les particules. Pour rendre compte de leur fonctionnement pragmatique, Grochowski voudrait construire un Systeme de relations base sur les conceptions de Boguslawski. Dans son analyse des adverbes, Grzegorczykowa (1975) se propose d'en determiner la structure semantique profonde en s'inspirant de la methode de Wierzbicka. Peu de conjonctions ont ete decrites du point de vue semantique (Wajszczuk, 1986). Leur liste complete n'existe pas et seulement quinze morphemes sont appeles "conjonctions" par dix grammaires, dictionnaires et monographies contemporaines les plus importantes (Lojasiewicz, 1982). Une grande partie de recherches a ete consacree aux predicate modaux (p.ex. Bralczyk, 1978; Rytel, 1982; Jedrzejko, 1987). Une liste de moyens modaux qui relevent du discours dans la langue polonaise reste ä faire. Comme un point de depart nous considerons l'inventaire de Antas & Fajfer (1985: 117). Parmi les modulateurs les auteurs classent les adverbes, certains pronoms (p.ex sam [lui-meme], sobie [soi-meme]), certaines expressions intentionelles (p.ex. nawet [meme], wprawdzie [certes]) et idiomatiques (p.ex. w kazdym razie [en tout cas], tak czy inaczej [quoi qu'il en soit], na dobra sprawe [ä vrai dire]). Les auteurs ont montre comment le choix des modulateurs devient ä la television une convention, comment les modulateurs effacent la distinction entre la description des phenomenes et leur evaluation (p.ex. ils imposent une hierarchic des phenomenes, amplifient leur importance, masquent la pauvrete informative du message, affaiblissent l'assertion, etc.). Le mot-cle de la Cette exclusion se fait meme si on tient compte des idoes de Bally sur la modalitö explicite et implicite et meme si on peut trouver l'idoe que l'interjection est 'un substitut - un embryon - de la phrase' (Mirowicz, 1948).

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

101

propagande du succes estyi/z [dejä]. On a montre comment, dans un certain type de dialogue televise, les questions servent ä en assurer le deroulement preetabli tout en gardant les apparences d'un dialogue authentique: les questions permettant d'exclure les expressions non-liees au theme, comme p.ex. proszg sie streszczac [dites-le en resume], byioby lepiej, gdyby pan unikai takich sformulowan [il serait mieux si vous evitiez de telles formulations], etc.

3.

ale [mais] - un morpheme frequemment decrit

3.1

ale conj onction

En tant que conjunction, ale a re9u beaucoup de descriptions. Leur breve presentation permettra d'evaluer l'apport de l'approche argumentative. Wojtasiewicz (1972) a analyse la relation semantique entre p et q dans la structure 'p ale q', qui est necessaire pour que l'emploi de ale soit correct. II affirme que la conjunction de deux membres est lie avec la negation du second membre, comme dans X walczyl ale przegra} [X a lutte mais il a perdu]. - X tächait (r) de ne pas perdre (-q) = p; il a perdu (q), ou avec la negation d'un contenu implicite consideree comme un foncteur, comme dans X jest bardzo pracowity, ale mafo uzdolniony [X est tres assidu, mais peu doue]. - II est bon pour X (r) d'etre assidu (p); il n'est pas bon (-r) d'etre peu doue (q). (r) marque un element semantique interpole, absent en surface, pour expliquer 1'opposition. Wierzbicka (1969) propose pour ale une formule universelle 'nie wnioskuj' ['n'en conclus pas'], p.ex. Ona jest maia, ale silna [eile est petite, mais forte]. Sache qu'elle est petite; n'en conclus pas qu'elle soit faible; sache qu'elle est forte. En cherchant une substitution explicative de ale dans le texte, Wajszczuk (1986) s'inspire de Wierzcicka en rempla9ant 'nie wnioskuj' ['n'en conclus pas'] par 'zaprzecze' ['je nierai'], la phrase nice etant indiquee par un pronom: 'p, ale q' - ['p (qui predique quelque chose de quelque chose']; en pensant ä ce ä quoi on peut maintenant penser, je le nierai: q (qui predique quelque chose de quelque chose). Le pronom traduit le souci de ne pas verbaliser dans 1'interpretation ce qui ne Test pas dans 1'enonce. La conjunction est consideree

102

AnnaDutka

comme une instruction-description, qui est une annonce et en meme temps un engagement du locuteur ä entreprendre un certain type d'activite langagiere. Parmi les descriptions syntaxiques nous signalons seulement celle de Pisarkowa (1974, qui a analyse ale avec 17 autres morphemes qui marquent 1'adversativite ou la concession6. L'auteur a releve en particulier les cas decrits comme l'incorporation de la parataxe dans 1'hypotaxe ou vice versa. Du point de vue semantique les phrases adversatives sont interpretees comme un resultat d'une comparaison de contraste ou de degres d'une meme propriete. Le contexte peut lever ces contraintes, ce qui confere ä 1'adversativite une etendue semantique illimitee. En partant du cadre syntaxique, Labocha (1987) met en oeuvre la theorie argumentative de Ducrot (1980a) en ce qui concerne mais, en se servant de la notion d'illocutoire. L'opposition entre p et q peut etre explicite ou indirecte. Elle est explicite quand les marques de l'opposition se trouvent dans p et q; eile est indirecte lorsque, pour interpreter la structure 'p ale q', il faut introduire un element r ou des elements r et s, qui sont une certaine conclusion ou consequence de p ou de q. L'opposition existe entre p et r, q et r ou r et s. La valeur illocutoire, traduite par une formule performative, n'apparait que dans certains cas. Le fonctionnement de ale dans la langue parlee est Signale d'une fa?on generate et est qualifie d'enchainement.

3.2

ale dans 1'approche argumentative

Cette approche releve de la pragmatique integree (Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983). Un de ses postulats methodologiques de base est de ne pas fonder la description semantique sur une distinction entre l'aspect objectif et subjectif de la langue (Ducrot, dans ce volume). II est important de noter que la description vise la semantique du discours ideal, c'est-ä-dire s'interesse au monde cree par l'enonciation et aux enchainements discursifs que tel enonce pretend ouvrir, et n'envisage pas les contraintes qu'impose la conversation (Moeschler, 1985; Roulet et al, 1987). Le point de vue argumentatif a permis d'elargir l'analyse de ale que nous avons decrit (Dutka, sous presse b) ä partir des hypotheses suivantes:

Les morphemes analys6s sont: a, ale, lecz, atoli, tylko ze, jednak ze, przeciz natomiasl, tymczasem, za to, zaSjedynie, tylko, raczej, mlmo to, owszem, wprawdzie, wszak.

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

103

a) nous avons admis la distinction etablie par Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) entre un ma/s-operateur (dit rectificatif, note par maissw, p.ex. dans // n'est pas fache, mats fatigue, qui correspond ä sondern en allemand ou ä sino en espagnol) et un /na/s-connectuer (dit concessif, note maisp\, p.ex. dans Jean a ete pris, mais il m'a aide, qui correspond ä aber en allemand ou apero en espagnol); b) nous avons admis la description de WO/SPA en termes destructions: dans une situation donnee, le locuteur de 'P maisp\ Q', oü P et Q sont des contenus, presente P comme un argument pour une conclusion r, il presente Q comme un argument pour la conclusion inverse non-r; Q est un argument plus fort pour non-r que ne Test P pour r, et pour cette raison la suite T maispA Q' est orientee argumentativement vers non-r. Dans notre dernier exemple, P: correspond au manque de temps de Jean, Q: ä l'aide apporte par Jean au locuteur, et r: p.ex. ä l'impossibilite d'aider le locuteur. La conclusion peut etre interpretee comme une proposition, comme un acte illocutoire ou d'enonciation explicitee dans d'autres enonces du meme discours, comme un acte illocutoire qu'on pourrait expliciter ou comme une attitude (Ducrot, 1983a). A partir de la structure 'P maisp\ Q' ou P et Q sont donnes par des segments materiels, nous avons envisage les cas oü P ou bien P et Q sont implicites (Bruxelles et al., 1980). Cela a permis de decrire ale sans distinguer la conjonction de la particule et de l'interjection.

3.3

Une description argumentative de ale, lecz, tylko et alez

Nous avons fait 1'hypothese que Yapproche argumentative permettrait de rendre compte des differences entre trois morphemes consideres comme proches: ale, lecz (qualifie d'equivalent litteraire de /e-conjonction) et tylko, pour lequel on postulait une analyse contrastive (Grochowski, 1986: 89). Nous avons envisage aussi tylko ze, qui dans les dictionnaires suit tylko apres un signe de subdivision et figure dans des exemples ou il lui est substituable. Etant donne que nous tenons compte de l'implication des contenus, nous avons analyse alez, classe comme une particule. La recherche (Dutka, ä paraitre) nous a permis de constater que ale, lecz et tylko sont Operateurs (ont des proprietes de WÖ/SSN). tandis que alez, ale et lecz sont connecteurs (ont des proprietes de maisp\). Pour tylko et tylko ze

104

AnnaDutka

nous avons propose le Statut de marqueurs de derivation d'un acte de refutation ä partir d'une assertion restrictive, comparables ä sauf que. Les connecteurs ale, alez et lecz different quant ä la possibilite de servir dans les enchainements, ce qui confirme l'hypothese fondamentale de la theorie de 1'argumentation: pour decrire le Systeme linguistique, il faut envisager la fafon dont ses elements orientent le discours. Les connecteurs different quant ä la possibilite: a) b) c) d) f)

de relier les segments materiels; d'articuler P et Q implicites; d'introduire les exclamations du type 'Beau Cnct beau!'; d'introduire une reponse du type 'Cnct + ouilnon, Cnct + proposition'; de fonctionner comme une interjection redoublee (nous la traitons comme un marqueur de l'introduction par le locuteur d'un discours nouveau qu'il presente comme etant en passe d'etre oublie).

Nous avons donne une explication semantique aux effets stylistiques souvent reconnus ä lecz (l'impossibilite de refuser la pretention ä la legitimite d'un acte de langage) et attribues ä son caractere 'litteraire'7. C'est le connecteur ale qui peut etre envisage comme une expression relevant de la "proto-modalite". La presentation des types du discours de l'informatrice Janka examines (Dittmar, dans ce volume) nous fait exclure alezqui est marque pour des emplois exclamatifs (on aurait pu le prendre en consideration au debut d'une replique), ainsi que lecz, qui releve du registre soigne. L'approche argumentative, qui est une sorte de 'structuralisme discursif et qui decrit 1'enonce par ses prolongements pretendus au niveau du discours, ne se prononce pas sur de nombreux aspects du fonctionnement de ale dans des echanges authentiques8, il serait done difficile de confrenter nos resultats avec ceux de Dittmar pour aber et de Hickel pour mais (les deux dans ce volume).

II serait intoressant de trailer ces effets en termes de transformation, dans le discours litteiaire, de certaines formes de parier sanctionndes socialement et de poser la question des relations entre la podtique et la sociolinguistique (Gtowinski, 1982). Ce probleme a 6tudi6 pour mais (Cadiot et al., 1979).

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

4.

Les connecteurs ale, a et /: une Hypothese sur leur description argumentative

4.1

L'insuffisance des descriptions formelles

105

Decrire le fonctionnement de ale dans le discours amene d'une fafon inevitable ä le confronter avec a et / (correspondant ä et en frangais). Le polonais, comme la plupart des langues slaves, dispose de deux morphemes: concurrence par /', qui etait posterieur et purement copulatif, a s'est specialise dans la function adversative9. Leur description en polonais contemporain pose des problemes. L'approche formelle, qui donne la priorite aux contenus articules et charge la conjunction d'une simple explicitation de leur relation, amene ä assigner aussi bien ä a qu'ä presque toutes les relations parataxiques et hypotaxiques (Wajszczuk, 1986). Dans une optique formelle, la possibilite de substituer les conjunctions, p.ex. ale, a et /, permet d'envisager une 'superposition' de diverses relations dans le cas de la juxtaposition. Meme lorsque les propositions sont articulees par des conjunctions adversatives ou concessives, on remarque que l'adversativite et la concession peuvent se superposer (Pisarkowa, 1974; Jodlowski, 1976). Cela porte ä chercher une autre explication de la distribution des morphemes en question.

4.2

L'etude de l'aspect argumentatif des enchamements avec ale, a et i

Nous voudrions verifier si la description de conjunctions en termes destructions argumentatives (pour le moment nous envisageons les connecteurs qui relient des segments materiels) et la prise en compte des intentions discursives du locuteur peuvent expliquer les valeurs attribuees aux morphemes dans les enchainements. Nous avons suppose une echelle binaire de valeurs subjectives (valeur positive +, valeur negative -) et avons examine:

a remplit les deux fonctions seulement en tcheque, en slovaque et dans certains dialectes (Bednarczuk, 1963).

106

Anna Dutka

a) la possibilite de coordonner les arguments ayant les valeurs +/+, -/-, +/- et b) la correlation entre l'emploi de tel connecteur et le fait de fonder la conclusion sur le premier/deuxieme argument; c) l'aptitude des connecteurs ä servir dans une refutation.

4.2.1

L'etude des probtemes (a) et (b)

Nous avons teste environ trente personnes en leur presentant des coordinations et en leur demandant: (a) si teile coordination etait acceptable; (b) si oui, quelle conclusion eile pouvait servir. II s'agissait d'etre pret ä acheter vs. ä renoncer ä l'achat d'un manteau laid Cnct eher, laid Cnct bon marche, eher Cnct joli, etc.; d'etre pret ä accepter vs. ä refuser une invitation de la part d'une personne dont on entend dire qu'elle est gentille Cnct avare, mechanic Cnct avare, etc.; d'accepter vs. de refuser d'epouser une fille riche Cnct belle, belle Cnctpauvre, etc.10. Voici nos observations: 4.2.1.1

Le connecteur ale

II est rejete quand les valeurs sont +/+ ou -/-· II est toujours accepte pour des valeurs +/- et -/+, souvent on le prefere ä a. Les coordinations avec ale sont jugees plus objectives qu'avec a. Certaines personnes ont remarque que meme si dans un premier temps tel enchainement paraissait inacceptable ou bizarre, on pouvait trouver une situation ou il irait sans probleme. 4.2.1.2

Le connecteur /

II est accepte sans probleme quand il articule les arguments avec des valeurs +/+ et -/-· Quand les valeurs sont -/+ ou +/-, soil on le rejette (la plupart des cas), soil les conclusions se fondent sur le premier ou le deuxieme argument. Cela indiquerait que la deuxieme place n'est pas priviligiee. 4.2.1.3

Le connecteur

II est dans la plupart des cas rejete pour des valeurs +/+ ou -/-. S'il etait accepte, on expliquait qu'un tel enchainement signifiait qu'on s'attendait plutot L'id6e du test et le dernier exemple sont emprun^s ä Ibrahim (1978).

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

107

ä la propriete inverse ä celle donnoe par le second terme. Voici quelques commentaires de la part des personnes testees: ladny a tani [joli et bon marche] (ä propos d'un manteau): il devrait etre eher; joli et en plus bon marche. zdolny a pracowity [doue et assidu]: il pourrait etre paresseux. bogata a ladna [riche et belle (ä propos d'une fille): on s'attendrait ä ce qu'elle soit laide, mais tiens! eile est belle. Souvent on suggerait une formule plus expressive, p.ex. pour brzydki a drogi [laid et eher]: Co$ takiego! Taki brzydki, a taki drogif [incroyable! tellement laid et tellement eher!]. On remarquait souvent, lorsque les valeurs etaient +/- ou -/+, que la coordination vehiculait une nuance affective (regret, etonnement, sarcasme). L'aspect argumentatif des coordinations se voit nettement dans I'interpretation de la coordination des enonces byi milionerem [il etait millionaire], sprzedai majqtek [il a vendu ses biens]: -

pour ale: il a su se priver; il est pauvre; il n'est pas millionaire. On a propose d'enchainer par / rozdat go ubogim [et il les a distribues aux pauvres]; - pour /: une relation; une constatation de faits; rien de particulier; - pour a: ce n'est pas dans les habitudes des millionaires; il a su se montrer large; qu'a-t-il fait, imbecile!

4.2.2

L'etude du probleme (c)

Nous avons demande aux personnes testees de defendre X que quelqu'un jugait mal du fait que X etait millionaire (en vertu d'un stereotype qui associe la richesse ä l'avarice et ä l'egoisme). Peut-on defendre X en repliquant: Owszem, byi milionerem, alelali sprezedal majqtek [d'accord, il etait millionaire Cnct il a vendu ses biens]? La refutation a ete jugee satisfaisante avec ale, faible avec a et impossible avec /. Pour que la defense de X soit evidente on a propose: (a) d'ajouter ä a et ä le morpheme jednak [pourtant]. Cela renforcerait la refutation par a et rendait possible celle par /'; (b) de modifier le deuxieme enonce, p.ex. ali potrafil si% zdobyc sprzedanie majqtku [Cnct quand meme il a su vendre ses biens]11. Peu nombreuses etaitent les personnes qui ont remarque que tant qu'on ne savait

11

La traduction frai^aise est tres approximative.

108

AnnaDutka

pas ce qu'il avail fait avec 1'argent, on ne savait pas s'il a cesse d'etre millionaire.12

4.2.3

Les observations nous amenent aux hypotheses suivantes

4.2.3.1 Hypothese I marque la co-orientation des arguments; ale et a marquent la contre-orientation des arguments. Deux cas sont ä distinguer du point de vue des intentions du locuteur: a) le locuteur ne vise aucun r particulier (Ducrot, 1989c), ale et a articulent les arguments dont aucun n'est presente comme plus fort, il s'agit juste d'un contraste, p.ex. Dotad sp^dzaiem wakacje nad morzem, ale/a w tym roku pojade w gory [jusqu'ä maintenant je passsais les vacances ä la mer, mais cette annee j'irai ä la montagne]; b) le locuteur vise un r particulier. Dans le cas de ale r se fonde sur le deuxieme argument, dans le cas de a - sur l'heterogeneite des arguments.

4.2.3.2 Hypothesen -

ale et a different quant ä la possibilite de servir dans une refutation

ale - la refutation se fait au moyen du deuxieme argument, ale entre dans des structures ou il n'est pas substituable par a, p.ex. wprawdzie... ale [certes ... mais]: Wprawdzie jest pozno, ale przyjdg [certes il fait tard, mais je viendrai]; l'opposition de degre: Jest to opis zartobliwy, ale nie do konca [cette description est une plaisanterie, mais pas tout ä fait], a - la refutation est derivee. Le locuteur peut toujours dire d'avoir voulu faire juste noter tel autre aspect du probleme.

Une recherche plus approfondie devrait donner des interpolations plus nuancdes ä ces observations preliminaires.

Les connecteurs argumentatifs en polonais

109

4.2.3.3 Hypothesen! Si i peut etre souvent substitue ä a, c'est parce que, nous semble-t-il, dans une situation donnee le locuteur peut presenter des contenus en contraste comme une accumulation de divers aspects de la situation en question. II faut noter cependant que l'univers de discours qu'il constant n'est pas le meme: a introduit fondamentalement une opposition binaire et detache 1'element qu'il precede de celui (de ceux) qu'il suit.

5.

Conclusion

Une etude systematique des connecteurs argumentatifs - et ensuite d'autres marques ä fonction argumentative - permettrait de decrire un domaine peu explore de la langue polonaise. A notre connaissance, ce serait la premiere application de la theorie de l'argumentation ä une langue slave. Les recherches psycholinguistiques concernant le fonctionnement et l'acquisition des valeurs argumentatives en polonais, p.ex. dans le cadre propose par Bassano, Champaud & Kail (1988), constitueraient un apport important ä la psycholinguistique developpementale et permettrait d'approfondir les recherches de Kielar-Turska (1989) sur la narration et la conversation des enfants ä Tage prescolaire. L'aspect argumentatif de la langue n'est qu'un facteur ä envisager dans 1'etude des echanges verbaux reels, en particulier dans celle qui releve de la pragmatique psychosociale (Dittmar & Wildgen, 1980).

Oswald Ducrot1

A quoi sert le concept de modalite?

In linguistic semantics, is it useful to build a general concept of modality! In referring to Descartes, the Port-Royal grammar, Charles Bally and the Speech Acts philosophy, an attempt is made to have this concept coincide with the concept of subjectivity. The opposition between modal and non-modal, inside the people, operates as the opposition of the subjective to the objective. A general concept of modality cannot be accepted without the presupposition that there is a certain number of purely objective elements in meaning. The question is: is it necessary?

1.

Modalite et subjectivite

Une foule d'elements linguistiques ont etc, un jour ou 1'autre, qualifies de modalites. Le nom a bien sür etc donne d'abord aux expressions qui renvoient, plus ou moins approximativement, ä 1'opposition etablie par la logique ancienne entre les concepts de possible, de reel et de necessaire (dans cette perspective, ce sont d'abord les concepts de possible et de necessaire que voit comme des modalites, et 1'on a tendance ä tenir le reel comme une sorte de modalite zero: Pierre est venu apparait moins modal que // est possible (necessaire) que Pierre soil venu). Au fil du temps se sont ajoutees les modalites deontiques et epistemiques - et, lä encore, la simple affirmation d'un fait (Pierre viendra) est sentie comme moins modale que l'affirmation d'une obligation (Pierre doit venir) ou d'une croyance (Je pense que Pierre viendra). Et puis les interjections, les structures exclamatives, les marqueurs de force illocutoire, quelquefois meme certains connecteurs comme mais (par opposition ä et) ont ete entasses dans la categoric. 1

E.H.E.S.S., Paris

112

Oswald Ducrot

Aliens plus loin. Pourquoi ne pas y inclure aussi les expressions une foule de et entasses que j'ai employees il y a quelques instants, alors que j'aurais pu dire plus sobrement un grand nombre et introduitesl Mon choix suggere dejä que j'ai une certaine repulsion devant l'entassement de cette foule. D'oü la necessite d'accroitre encore la foule en y pla9ant tous les 61ements lexicaux possedant des connotations, tout ce qui releve de la stylistique - au sens que Bally donne ä ce terme. Supposons maintenant que j'aie dit un grand nombre ä la place de foule, aurais-je ete, au fond, moins modal? Car ce nombre n'est grand que pour mon impatience. Pour echapper ä la modalite, j'aurais peut-etre du dire un certain nombre. Mais ma phrase (devenue alors Un certain nombre d'elements linguistiques ont ete, un jour ou I'autre, qualifies de modalites) n'aurait plus possede la moindre raison d'etre, et je pouvais aussi bien commencer mon expose par la suivante. Mon but ici n'est pas de critiquer les recherches faites ä propos des modalites. Beaucoup de ces recherches me semblent en effet parmi les plus importantes de la linguistique recente. Si quelque chose est retenu de notre travail, ce sera sans doute notre interet pour les modalites. La question que je voudrais poser concerne la constitution meme de cette categoric generate. A quoi sert-elle? Tous, nous l'employons, et nous aurions bien du mal ä nous en passer. Mais quelle est au juste sa fonction dans notre comprehension des fails linguistiques? Comme tout concept, le concept de modalite est oppositif. S'il y a du modal, il doit y avoir aussi du non-modal. A quoi renvoie done cette opposition? J'essaierai de montrer qu'elle renvoie ä l'opposition, traditionnelle dans la pensee occidentale, entre l'objectif et le subjectif, entre la description des choses et la prise de position vis ä vis de ces choses (ou vis ä vis de la description qu'on en a donnee - car on a tendance ä penser que la description, si eile est correcte, est conforme aux choses qu'elle decrit, que les choses sont ce qu'on dit d'elles: des qu'on a accepte de decrire un homme comme mechant, on le voit comme etant un mechant, et l'hostilite ä la personne ne se distingue plus de l'hostilite ä sa mechancete). Si admet cette opposition, les aspects modaux d'un discours seraient done relatifs aux prises de position, aux attitudes, morales, intellectuelles, affectives, exprimees tout au long de ce discours (Exprimees par qui? C'est une question que, pour l'instant, je laisse en suspens)2. L'aspect non-modal releverait, lui, de la description des choses, de rinformation Objective', des renseignements ä propos d'elles. On notera d'ailleurs que les modalitos alothiques, telles que les d&rivent les logiciens, entrant mal dans cette caract6risation, et qu'elles devraient plutot etre logoes dans le contenu

A quoi seit le concept de modalito?

113

On voit tout de suite que la notion de modalite, teile que je la comprends, presuppose que Γόη puisse separer, au moins en theorie, l'objectif et le subjectif. Notamment eile exige qu'il y ait une part isolable de la signification qui soit pure description de la realite. C'est d'ailleurs ce que Γόη admet implicitement, dans les journaux, lorsque Γόη distingue le commentaire et rinformation, et c'est peut-etre aussi ce que les sujets parlants tendent generalement admettre ou faire admettre. En disant Je lui reproche d'etre venu, on a souvent l'impression de signaler d'une part un fait objectif 'il est venu', et d'autre part de porter une appreciation personnelle, ici defavorable, sur ce fait (la separation serait sans doute moins facile soutenir pour Je lui reproche d'avoir assassine la liberte: il est moins facile d'admettre, dans ce cas, qu'un fait a etc decrit, meme s'il est s r qu'on a fait allusion un certain fait). Si Γόη veut admettre une categoric generate de la modalite, on doit done soutenir qu'il est possible de decrire sans prendre position, et que meme la ou ces deux fonctions sont etroitement imbriquees, on peut, par abstraction, degager de la parole un contenu purement descriptif. C'est la la question que je voudrais poser. Est-ce que toute description n'est pas en elle-meme, intrinsequement, une prise de position? Afin d'eviter un malentendu, je voudrais d'abord distinguer cette question d'une autre, apparemment semblable, mais qui ne releve plus de la linguistique, et pourrait etre renvoyee la psychologie ou la sociologie. Cette seconde question concerne les intentions ou les motivations des sujets parlants. II s'agit alors de savoir si Γόη peut concevoir une parole dont la seule fonction serait de decrire des objets ou des situations (ou, dans la version sociologique de cette question, si la societe peut accorder la parole quelqu'un pour en faire un simple donneur d'informations). Ce n'est pas la le prob lerne dont je m'occupe, et je ne pense pas qu'il s'agisse directement d'un probleme linguistique. Pour ma part, je voudrais me placer sur un terrain proprement semantique, et me demander si cela a un sens de chercher, dans un discours, des elements intrinsequement descriptifs. Pour montrer que ces deux questions sont, sinon independantes, du moins distinctes, je signalerai qu'on peut repondre oui la question linguistique, tout en repondant non la question socio-psychologique, et inversement. Supposons d'abord qu'on soutienne, en tant que linguiste, qu'il y a, dans le sens, des elements proprement descriptifs, ou meme que certains enonces, dans leur propositionnel (comme l'a noto Hans-Heinrich Lieb, dans une intervention faite lors du colloque). Mais on peut se demander si les langues expriment de telles modalite's.

114

Oswald Ducrot

totalite, sont purement constatifs (comme le pensait Austin dans ses premiers articles), et n'ont d'autre sens que de dire ce que les choses sont. Cela n'empecherait pas d'affirmer, d'un point de vue, cette fois, psychologique, que la communication de teile ou teile de ces descriptions repond toujours ä une intention ou ä une motivation d'un autre ordre. On dira par exemple que 1'enonce Pierre est venu a pour sens d'indiquer un certain fait, mais que la decision de transmettre cette information implique toujours chez le locuteur 1'intention, plus ou moins consciente, d'influencer son destinataire ou ses auditeurs de teile ou teile fafon, decision qui releverait du perlocutoire. Inversement, on peut, et c'est mon cas, dire qu'un enonce comme Pierre est intelligent possede en lui-meme une valeur argumentative, dans la mesure ou la notion meme d'intelligence comporte intrinsequement une prise de position axiologique, et cependant admettre que cet enonce peut servir ä accomplir une simple description, qu'il peut etre utilise pour repondre, de facon tout ä fait 'desinteressee', ä la question Comment est Pierre?. Une theorie "polyphonique" du sens (Ducrot, 1984: chapitre 8) permet en effet de rendre compte de cette situation. En utilisant ma terminologie, il suffira de dire que le locuteur met en scene un enonciateur, i.e. presente un point de vue, fait entendre une voix soutenant une position axiologique et argumentative, mais qu'il n'assigne pas pour but ä sa presente enunciation de manifester une teile position. Le sens de 1'enonce n'est rien d'autre que la mention d'une argumentation possible en faveur de Pierre, mais le locuteur, en tant que tel, n'accomplit pas 1'acte d'argumenter: il donne une image de Pierre, fondee sur la possibilite de cette argumentation. Si, comme je viens de le dire, et comme j'essaierai de le montrer, le concept de modalite doit se comprendre par rapport ä l'opposition subjectif-objectif, qui commande une bonne part de la pensee occidentale, il reste un probleme historique, que je peux seulement poser. Chaque fois qu'on rencontre un couple conceptuel de cette nature (passion-raison, folie-sagesse, faute-justice), on peut se demander si Tun des termes est valorise par rapport ä l'autre (ce qui n'est pas evident dans le cas de l'opposition modalite-contenu descriptif). Lorsqu'il y a cette dissymetrie, le couple permet de rendre compte d'une contradiction constatee entre le fait et le droit. Pourquoi les homines ne sontils pas en fait sages et raisonnables comme ils devraient 1'etre? C'est, dira-t-on, parce que la folie et la passion s'y opposent, mais cela ne retire rien pour autant ä la Suprematie naturelle de la sagesse et de la raison. En est-il de meme pour le couple subjectif-objectif en linguistique? Je suis, bien sür, incapable de donner une reponse argumentee ä la question, meme si,

A quoi seit le concept de modalito?

115

dans l'histoire de la linguistique moderne, la modalite me semble souvent utilisee comme une sorte d'explication au caractere non-veritatif d'un langage qui, en droit, devrait pouvoir etre juge en termes de vrai et de faux. En parlant de modalite, on fait, pour ainsi dire, la 'part du feu', et Γόη sauvegarde, pur et dur, un noyau non-modal de la signification, ou est cense s'exprimer ce qui est le plus rationnel dans le langage, savoir la possibilite qu'il nous donne de representer les choses telles qu'elles sont. Mais je ne peux que signaler le probleme, en le livrant aux historiens de la linguistique. Je voudrais seulement montrer ici, sans prendre parti sur sa function ideologique, que 1'opposition modal - non-modal est souvent liee l'opposition du subjectif et de l'objectif, et ceci en me limitant quelques exemples pris dans la linguistique occidentale de ces trois derniers siecles (je ne parlerai pas, notamment, des grammairiens modistes du moyen- ge, et du rapport entre leurs modes et ce que nous appelons actuellement modalite s).

2.

La conception de la modalite dans la linguistique occidentale: trois exemples

2.1

La position de Port-Royal

La theorie de la modalite que Γόη rencontre dans la Grammaire de Port-Royal (Arnauld & Lancelot, reimpression de 1969), meme si eile ne s'appuie pas explicitement sur Descartes, me semble renvoyer la conception cartesienne de 1'esprit. On sail que, pour Descartes, "toutes les fa9ons de penser que nous rencontrons en nous peuvent etre rapportees deux generates, dont 1'une consiste apercevoir par 1'entendement, et l'autre se determiner par la volonte" (reimpression de 1899: §32). Lorsque nous pensons, nous mettons simultanement en oeuvre ces deux aspects de la pensee. Lorsque Γόη juge, par exemple, d'une part on se represente des objets par 1'entendement, et d'autre part on acquiesce ces representations par une decision libre de la volonte. Lorsque Γόη doute, c'est encore une decision de la volonte qui retient d'acquiescer aux representations offertes par 1'entendement. Meme les passions sont elles aussi des attitudes prises par la volonte devant certaines representations, mais la volonte, dans ce cas, est influencee (sans etre contrainte) par les mouvements du corps. Pour les grammairiens de Port Royal, chaque phrase est 1'image d'une pensee, et si eile peut etre utilisee pour faire connaitre aux autres cette pensee, c'est seulement dans la mesure o eile en est une image (en d'autres termes la

116

Oswald Ducrot

communication est seconde par rapport l'expression). Les articulations de la phrase sont done necessairement celles de la pensee qu'elle reflete. Aussi 1'analyse grammaticale doit-elle etre conduite d'apres une analyse prealable de la pensee - celle-la meme que Γόη trouve dans Descartes. Des le debut de leur ouvrage, Arnauld & Lancelot posent que "la plus grande distinction de ce qui se passe dans notre esprit est de dire que Γόη peut y considerer l'objet de notre pensee et la forme ou la maniere de notre pensee, dont la principale est le jugement. Mais on doit encore y rapporter [O.D. "y" = 'a la forme de la pensee1] les conjonctions, disjunctions et autres semblables operations de notre esprit, et tous les autres mouvements de notre arne, comme les desirs, le commandement, 1'interrogation [...]." (1969: chapitre l de la 2eme partie).3 Tout cela ne fait qu'expliciter Descartes. L'originalite de Port-Royal est d'en tirer les consequences linguistiques, et de donner comme "plus generate distinction des mots" le fait que "les uns signifient les objets de nos pensees, et les autres, la forme ou la maniere de nos pensees" (Arnauld & Lancelot, 1969: chapitre l de la 2eme partie). Les noms, adjectifs et pronoms relevent de la premiere categoric, car ils servent designer les objets de nos pensees. Les conjonctions et interjections relevent au contraire de la seconde. Quant aux verbes, tous - sauf un - amalgament des elements des deux categories. C'est ce qu'exprime la fameuse analyse des phrases du type Les hommes mentent comme Les hommes sont menteurs. Dans cette analyse, le mot menteur represente une idee, objet de la pensee, et le verbe etre marque une 'maniere de la pensee', savoir 1'operation par laquelle 1'esprit unit les deux idees 'homme' et 'menteur1. On aura compris que le seul verbe entierement modal est etre: II exprime 1'acte d'affirmation par lequel la volonte relie deux concepts donnes separement par 1'entendement. J'aimerais insister sur la difference entre cette conception de l'enonce declaratif et la conception moderne de l'affirmation, que Γόη trouve par exemple chez Frege et chez la plupart des philosophies du langage. Pour ces derniers, l'element objectif (le contenu) de l'enonce affirmatif est une J'ai parle" tout l'heure de cet 'entassement' qui fait ressembler la categoric de la modalitd la cabine de bateau d'Une Nuit a I'Opara. On aura remarquo qu'Arnauld & Lancelot avaient dej commenc6 bien remplir la cabine, en y poussant pele-mele les actes intellectuels (le jugement ainsi que les connexions entre jugements), plusieurs attitudes affectives et certaines prises de position que Γόη appellerait de nos jours actes illocutoires 1'assimilation entre l'affectif et l'illocutoire 6tant d'ailleurs inevitable vu que Port-Royal, je 1'ai dit, ne donne pas un role fundamental la notion de communication, notion n6cessaire pour distinguer l'expression des sentiments et l'action sur autrui.

A quoi sert le concept de modaliti?

117

proposition logique, par exemple la proposition 'Les hommes sont menteurs', susceptible done d'etre vraie ou fausse. Et l'element subjectif est un acte concernant cette proposition. Port-Royal accorde beaucoup moins ä 1'entendement: le lien entre les deux concepts 'homme' et 'menteur1 n'existe pas avant 1'acte d'affirmation: c'est ce dernier, done la volonte, qui relie les idees. Aussi ne faut-il pas, si on veut etre fidele ä Port-Royal et ä Descartes, dire que affirme (acte) que les hommes sont menteurs (contenu), mais dire que 1'acte volontaire d'affirmation attribue ä un premier terme (le sujet) un second terme (le predicat). J'ai insiste sur ce point pour suggerer que 1'analyse modus-dictum, si eile constitue une constante de la pensee linguistique occidentale, repose plus sur un parti-pris culturel que sur un donne empirique. Ni les 'faits', ni le 'sens commun', ne revelent avec evidence la frontiere entre ces deux elements, comme ce serait le cas, me semble-t-il, si leur opposition tenait ä une heterogeneite intrinseque. Tout se passe comme si la decision d'etablir une frontiere etait anterieure ä l'observation des faits. On sait seulement qu'il faut en tracer une, mais, une fois le trace choisi, on le voit comme 'naturel' - et il n'est, d'ailleurs, ni plus ni moins naturel que les frontieres entre etats. On remarqera d'ailleurs, comme l'a montre Pariente (1985), qu'Arnauld & Nicole (cf. Arnauld & Lancelot, 1969), suivant d'ailleurs en cela Descartes, sont conscients de la difficulte qu'il y a ä separer les "termes" (objets de l'entendement) de 1'acte d'affirmation qui, dans le jugement, les unifie. Si, par exemple, le sujet de l'enonce est un nom modifie par un adjectif ou par une proposition relative, il faut dire que le terme lui-meme (p.ex. hommes justes dans Les hommes justes sont pitoyables) est le produit d'un jugement prealable qui s'y est, pour ainsi dire, cristallise: la representation 'homme juste' est le residu d'un ancien jugement ou la justice a etc attribuee ä certains hommes. La liaison, qui ne peut etre qu'une 'maniere' de la pensee, en vient ainsi ä constituer un nouvel objet.

2.2

La perspective de Descartes

Pariente (1985) montre que cette idee d'un passage entre 1'acte de la volonte et le monde de 1'entendement est ä attribuer ä Descartes lui-meme. D'une part Descartes fournit I'instrument theorique necessaire pour conceptualiser le passage. Pour lui en effet, puisque la pensee est par definition consciente d'elle-meme, il y a, parmi les idees de l'entendement, les representations de tout ce qui se passe et s'est passe en eile, et notamment des actes dont la volonte

118

Oswald Ducrot

a ete la source. De sorte qu'un jugement, une fois effectue, donne naissance ä une image consciente de lui-meme, qui va prendre place parmi les autres idees. Ce qui permet ä Descartes de parier, dans les Meditations, d'idees "materiellement fausses", bien que, pour lui, seul un jugement, ä parier rigoureusement, puisse etre dit faux: s'il n'est pas absurde de dire aussi qu'une idee est fausse, c'est .'.ans la mesure ou lui est associee la trace inveteree d'un jugement dont eile a ete l'occasion habituelle. Descartes ne se contente d'ailleurs pas de fournir l'instrument conceptuel permettant de penser le passage de la volonte ä l'entendement: il en donne un exemple lui-meme dans ses Reponses aux objections d'Arnauld contre la 4eme Meditation. Nos idees sensibles (celle de la couleur bleue p.ex.), bien qu'elles ne soient pas fausses en elles-memes, c'est ä dire en tant qu'idees de l'entendement, ont ete si souvent, dans l'enfance, associees ä de faux jugements, ou nous les declarions ressemblantes aux objets physiques exterieurs, qu'elles se sont incorporees ä elles-memes une sorte de faussete: elles nous incitent presque spontanement ä les prendre pour des caracteres inherents ä la realite physique. Descartes prevoit ainsi une transmutation possible du modus subjectif (le faux jugement par lequel les enfants attribuent au ciel la couleur bleue) en representation objective (en representation du bleu comme le bleu du ciel). Cette possibilite, nous le verrons, est au coeur des debats recents entre ascriptivistes et descriptivistes. Le parti pris central de l'attitude cartesienne consiste ä maintenir, coute que coüte, une frontiere entre ce qui est objectif et ce qui est subjectif dans la pensee. Lorsque certaines idees (l'idee du bleu, p.ex., qui, de droit, appartient ä l'entendement) semblent indissociables de certaines decisions de la volonte (la decision de voir le ciel comme intrinsequement bleu), on decrit cette situation comme une sorte d'invasion de l'entendement de l'adulte par la volonte de l'enfant: l'idee 'fausse' de l'adulte est le reste d'un jugement faux de l'enfant, mais, dans ce jugement original, la part de l'activite volontaire et de la passivite representative restent clairement separables.

2.3

L'approche de Charles Bally

Le mode de pensee que je viens de faire apparaitre dans la Grammaire de Port-Royal se retrouve, presque etape par etape, chez differents linguistes modernes, et notamment, au debut du 20eme siecle, chez un eleve de Saussure, Charles Bally. Comme Port-Royal appuyait son analyse linguistique sur 1'analyse cartesienne de la pensee, Bally, ayant decide que "la phrase est la forme la plus simple possible de la communication d'une pensee" (Bally,

A quoi seit le concept de modalite"?

119

5

1965: lere partie, chapitre 1), en conclut immediatement que la structure de la "phrase explicite" doit en bonne "logique" reflechir celle de la pensee, sans meme signaler ce qu'il y a d'antisaussurien dans le fait d'appuyer 1'analyse linguistique sur une reflexion non linguistique. En ce qui concerne l'analyse de la pensee, Bally reprend 1'opposition cartesienne, habillee selon la psychologic de l'epoque. "Penser, c'est reagir ä une representation en la constatant, en 1'appreciant ou en la desirant" (ibid.). La constatation, positive ou negative, constitue un "jugement de fait, qui releve d'une operation de l'entendement" ("c'est celui-ci qui croit, ne croit pas ou doute"). L'appreciation ("se rejouir, estimer desirable, ou regretter, estimer indesirable") constitue un jugement de valeur, qui releve du "sentiment". Quant au desir ("souhaiter ou ne pas souhaiter"), il "constitue une volition et releve de la volonte" (ibid.). On remarquera certes que la terminologie utilisee n'est pas exactement celle des cartesiens, puisque les mots "entendement" et "volonte" designent tous les deux, pour Bally, des operations exigeant la "participation active d'un sujet pensant" - alors que, pour Descartes, l'entendement est du cote de la passivite. D'autre part, l'activite spirituelle, que Descartes unifie sous le concept de volonte, est divisee par Bally, conformement ä la psychologic enseignee ä l'epoque dans les manuels de philosophic, en trois facultes distinctes (entendement, volonte, sentiment) ou il faut d'ailleurs peut-etre retrouver les trois fonctions fundamentales de la vision indo-europeenne du monde selon Dumezil (1958). (A travers cette analogic, plus qu'audacieuse, je cherche seulement ä suggerer que les pretendus concepts que a voulu importer de la psychologie en linguistique ont peut-etre une origine plus lointaine et moins scientifique qu'on ne le pense d'habitude. Je ne sache pas d'ailleurs que leurs utilisateurs aient meme songe ä les justifier: il s'agit le plus souvent pour eux, et notamment pour Bally, d'une "evidence" - ce qui me semble la marque meme de leur caractere arbitraire.) Mais, malgre cette difference entre l'analyse pseudo-psychologique ä laquelle Bally se refere et la theorie cartesienne sur laquelle se fonde Port-Royal, une ressemblance me parait frappante. Dans les deux cas on part d'une opposition fundamentale entre le cote actif et le cote passif de la pensee, entre ce dont la pensee est source et ce qu'elle subit. C'est cette opposition que Bally va exploiter du point de vue linguistique. La "phrase explicite", dit-il, "comprend deux parties: 1'une est le correlatif du proces qui constitue la representation (p.ex. la pluie, une guerison): nous 1'appeHerons, ä l'exemple des logiciens, le

120

Oswald Ducrot

dictum. L'autre contient la piece maitresse de la phrase, celle sans laquelle il n'y a pas de phrase, ä savoir l'expression de la modalite, correlative ä l'operation du sujet pensant" (Bally, 1965: chapitre 1). Bally precise un peu plus loin que "l'expression logique" de la modalite (expression qu'il appelle modus) contient un verbe modal, marquant l'attitude du sujet pensant, et un sujet modal, designant ce sujet pensant. Du cöte de ce qui est exprime, on a done, pour resumer: 'modalite + proces'. Et du cöte de l'expression, on a: 'modus (= sujet modal + verbe modal) + dictum'. J'illustrerai ces distinctions par quelques exemples que Bally lui-meme analyse: MODUS SUJET MODAL Je Man marl Galilee Je

DICTUM

VERBE MODAL crois a decide croit veux

que tu mens que je le trompe que la terre tourne boire du the

Dans ces exemples, le sujet modal est clairement designe dans la morphologic de la phrase, mais ce n'est pas necessairement le cas, notamment lorsqu'il s'agit des modalites au sens logique du terme. Cependant on peut toujours le retablir, ce qui permet en meme temps de decrire ces modalites logiques selon le schema general donne par Bally, c'est-ä-dire comme des reactions d'un sujet pensant ä une representation. Dans le cas d'un enonce deontique comme // est interdit defumer, on dira que le sujet modal est, p.ex., I'administration, ce qui autorise ä prendre comme verbe modal l'expression d'une attitude psychologique, teile que Vouloir', et comme dictum On ne fume pas'. Plus surprenante encore est 1'analyse proposee pour les emplois de type alethique des verbes pouvoir etfalloir, si surprenante que Bally n'ose la donner que dans une note de bas de page. Je le cite: "("il fait trop chaud,) il faut que je retire mon veston" = (la chaleur) m'oblige, veut que [...] Inversement ("il fait moins chaud") je peux remettre mon veston" = (la temperature) me permet [...]" (Bally, 1965: 37). Pour etre coherent avec lui-meme, Bally est ainsi oblige de personnifier le temps qu'il fait en le considerant comme un sujet pensant (Noter, ce qui peut etre interessant du point de vue de ce que j'appelle argumentation, que Bally a etc oblige de le personnifier sous deux noms differents, chaleur et temperature. On aura remarque d'autre part que, pour falloir, Bally a pu trouver un verbe psychologique, peut, pour exprimer le

A quoi seit le concept de modalitö?

121

modus, mais qu'il y renonce pour pouvoir, et qu'il doit se contenter d'un verbe de communication, permet.) Apres avoir donne ces exemples, je me contenterai, pour commenter la theorie de Bally, de signaler quelques points directement lies au probleme de la modalite4. Une premiere caracteristique me semble importante, et eile apparait nettement dans les analyses que j'ai citees, c'est que le sujet pensant, source de la modalite et designe par le sujet modal de la phrase explicite, n'est pas necessairement, pour Bally, identifiable ä la personne qui a prononce la phrase. Quand Mme. X declare que son mari a decide qu'elle le trompait, le sujet pensant est M. X, dont le correlat linguistique est le sujet modal man mari. La structure linguistique des phrases a done, selon Bally, une propriete tout ä fait paradoxale par rapport aux conceptions habituelles de la langue, tout ä fait contraire au common sense (ce qui est loin, pour moi, d'etre une critique, car la linguistique a peut-etre autre chose ä faire que d'expliciter les pretendues 'intuitions' du sens commun): eile permet de presenter des points de vue qui ne sont pas necessairement ceux du locuteur. Admettre cela, c'est dejä inscrire dans la langue elle-meme la possibilite du style indirect libre, c'est attribuer au langage conversationnel une capacite reservee, selon Hamburger (1986), au langage de la litterature fictionnelle. Je voudrais d'autre part montrer les consequences que comporte le fait de definir le modus ä partir de l'opposition representation-reaction, et non ä partir d'un decoupage morphologique5, consequences devant lesquelles Bally ne recule pas. II arrive bien souvent qu'un adjectif ou un verbe contiennent en eux une appreciation, et qu'ils expriment done ce que nous avons appele une modalite. On est alors amene ä dire, quelle que soit leur fonction syntaxique, qu'ils font partie, au moins partiellement, du modus - bien que la phrase ou ils sont employes, ä la difference des phrases explicites du tableau precedent, ne se laisse pas materiellement segmenter en un constituant modus et un constituant dictum. Bally va dire ainsi que 1'enonce Ce fruit est delicieux comporte un modus implicite 'J'ai du plaisir', applique ä la representation 'Je mange ce fruit' (On aura note la difficulte qu'il y a, dans ces cas, ä distinguer le modus qui, tout en etant implicite, releve de l'expression - et la modalite, qui appartient ä la pensee exprimee). Autre exemple analyse par Bally, 1'enonce Ce sermon est monotone. On y trouve deux modus, appliques ä deux dictum 4

5

On trouvera une &ude plus complete de la thoorie de l'önonciation de Bally dans Ducrot (1989a). C'est seulement dans la phrase dite explicite que le decoupage s£mantique et le decoupage morpho-syntaxique sont conformes Tun ä l'autre.

122

Oswald Ducrot

differents: le modus 'je trouve que', relatif au dictum 'ce sermon est uniforme', et le modus 'je m'ennuie', applique au dictum 'j'ecoute ce sermon1. La frontiere entre modus et dictum passe done non seulement a l'intorieur des mots, mais eile peut dedoubler la structure syntaxique de la phrase (J'ai I'impression que cette part modale que Bally releve dans le contenu lexical des mots a quelque rapport avec les "protomodalites" dont nous parle Dittmar (dans ce volume).) Mes demiers exemples montrent enfin que Bally introduit dans le modus beaucoup d'elements que qualifie actuellement de connotatifs. Je voudrais maintenant montrer la difference entre modus et connotation, car cette difference permet de mieux preciser la function epistemologique du concept de modalite. Generalement, contenu connotatif et contenu denotatif sont consideres comme deux Constituante independants et superposes du sens. Au contraire le modus et le dictum appartiennent, pour Bally, ä une structure semantique unique, et n'ont pas d'existence possible separes Tun de l'autre, ce qui l'amene ä dire que "le modus est le theme, et le dictum, le propos de 1'enonciation explicite" (Bally, 1965: chapitre 1) (II me semble que Bally utilise ici les notions de theme et de propos d'une contraire ä leur usage habituel, mais la seule chose qui m'importe pour ma demonstration, c'est que theme et propos font necessairement allusion l'un ä l'autre: il ne peut pas y avoir un theme sans propos, ni 1'inverse). Ainsi le modus de Bally, defini comme reaction, exige une representation ä laquelle il s'applique. Alors que la theorie de la connotation attribue ä 1'enonce deux functions separees, decrire et apprecier, Bally lui donne done une fonction unique: il s'agit seulement d'exprimer les attitudes des sujets modaux. Lorsqu'il y a deux modus, comme dans l'exemple du sermon monotone, il y a deux attitudes, mais chacune d'elle est dejä un mixte d'objectivite et de subjectivite. Cela ne signifie pas bien sur que Bally renonce ä l'analyse de 1'enonce selon la dichotomic objectif-subjectif (cette dichotomic est, je l'ai dit, le noyau meme de la notion de modalite). Mais cela montre que cette analyse n'est pas presentee comme une dissociation reelle en deux elements susceptibles de subsister independemment Tun de l'autre. C'est justement une des functions de cette notion que d'insister sur l'imbrication de l'objectif et du subjectif au moment meme ou on les declare theOriquement separables6. Pour la critiquer, il faudrait se demander si cette separation theorique est elle-meme tenable.

Je rattacherai ä la meme attitude thoorique une proposition faite par Harald Weydt ä la suite de mon exposo au colloque de Berlin. Weydt, tout en admettant que modus et dictum ne

A quoi sen le concept de modalito?

3.

123

Modalite et la theorie des actes de parole

La theorie des actes illocutoires me semble s'inscrire directement dans la conception generate de la modalite que j'ai illustree jusqu'ici ä partir de la linguistique cartesienne et de la theorie de Bally. Pour le montrer, il faut la comparer avec la premiere philosophic d'Austin (1965), celle qui distingue les enonces constatifs, destines ä dire ce que les choses sont, et les enonces performatifs, destines ä accomplir des actes. Bien sur, cette philosophic manifeste, comme les theories de la modalite, l'opposition fundamentale du subjectif et de l'objectif, mais eile la manifeste en supposant que ces deux aspects sont separables en fait Tun de l'autre: en produisant un enonce, on choisit, soit de se placer dans l'ordre de la constatation, soit d'accomplir une action visant ä transformer ce qui est. En disant cela, Austin ne faisait que moderniser une opposition etablie par Aristote (et reprise par les rhetoriciens arabes du Moyen-äge, par exemple Assakkaki 7 ) entre les enonces qui demandent ä etre juges selon le vrai et le faux, et ceux pour qui une appreciation d'ordre logique n'est pas pertinente. Opposition qui avait egalement re?u une application linguistique dans I'Hermes de James Harris (1751). Celui-ci appuyait sur la distinction de deux facultes, la perception et la volonte, une dichotomic entre deux types de phrases, les affirmatives et les autres (imperatives, optatives, interrogatives). La position de Harris etait done bien differente de celle de Port-Royal, qui reperait ä l'interieur de chaque phrase l'entremelement de l'entendement passif et de la volonte active. Par la suite, avec la theorie des actes illocutoires, Austin se situe au contraire dans la ligne de Port-Royal et de Bally; la dualite de l'objectif et du subjectif est installee au coeur meme de la phrase, que celle-ci soit de l'ordre du constatif ou du performatif. Bien plus, cette dualite n'est pas vue contrairement ä ce que fait la theorie de la connotation - comme la superposition de deux elements susceptibles de faire sens independemment l'un de l'autre, mais comme une application du subjectif ä l'objectif. Cette attitude est particulierement claire si se refere ä la schematisation proposee par Searle (1969), dans Speech Acts, pour la deuxieme theorie austinienne. Le sens d'un enonce, selon Searle, consiste, on le sail, dans l'application d'une "force

sont goniralement pas siparables en fait, maintenait qu'elles peuvent etre distinguees, en droit, dans une analyse thiorique. Mon probleme concerne precisement ce point de droh. II oppose les ononciations ä valeur vöritative (habar) ä toutes les autres (talab) (c.f. Ouazzani, 1989).

124

Oswald Ducrot

illocutoire" (assertion, promesse...etc.) ä un "contenu propositionnel" (j'utiliserai, dans ce qui suit, les abbreviations FI et CP). L'originalite essentielle du CP par rapport ä Tidee de l'entendement" dont parlent les cartesiens, tient ä ce que, pour ces demiers (j'ai eu l'occasion de le signaler), l'entendement ne contient que des termes, mais aucune liaison entre les termes. De sorte que le contenu representationnel de la phrase ne peut pas, selon Port-Royal, etre estime en termes de vrai et de faux - sauf lorsqu'un groupe nominal contient un adjectif ou une relative, situation que Port-Royal traite comme Descartes traitait les idees sensibles (qui comportent des jugements cristallises). En ce qui concerne Bally, la situation est mo ins nette: il est difficile de dire exactement en quoi consiste la representation exprimee par le dictum, car les notions de vrai ou de faux n'appartiennent pas aux outils conceptuels de 1'auteur, mais, dans la mesure ou Bally parle de "proces", on a Timpression qu'il introduit la liaison ä l'interieur du dictum. Les choses sont en revanche tout ä fait claires dans le cas de Searle, influence par la logique de Frege. Le CP est l'application d'un predicat ä un referent, application qui est condition necessaire et süffisante pour qu'un jugement veritatif soit possible. Par definition, le CP est un objet susceptible de verite ou de faussete. Que disc La terre est ronde, Est-ce que la terre est ronde?, Terre, sois ronde!, dans les trois cas il y a la meme liaison entre le referent terre et le predicat rond, liaison susceptible d'etre vraie ou fausse, et qui constitue une entite semantique sous-jacente quel que soit l'acte effectue ä propos d'elle. Si on a du mal ä concevoir une liaison sans activite de mise en relation, il faut, comme fait Searle, l'attribuer ä un "acte de predication" primordial, qui n'est pas 1'acte illocutoire d'assertion, mais qui rend possible ä la fois 1'assertion, la question, l'ordre...etc. Peut-on cependant, dans le cadre de la logique fregeenne, cadre qui est celui de Searle, concevoir un acte comme vrai ou faux? Pour eviter cette difficulte, Searle, si je le comprends bien, pose que l'acte de predication n'est pas situe ä l'interieur du sens de l'enonce (ä la difference des actes illocutoires). II appartient ä l'activite preparatoire prealable ä l'enonciation, activite qui produit le CP, mais n'en fait pas partie. On peut alors maintenir que la formule 'sens = FI + CP' exprime une analyse semantique conforme ä la dichotomic traditionnelle objectifsubjectif. La subjectivite de la FI s'applique bien ä une objectivite pure, celle du CP, mais cette objectivite a etc subjectivement construite. II me reste maintennant ä comparer la FI des philosophes du langage au modus de Bally. Deux differences au moins semblent evidentes. Le modus est une

A quoi sert le concept de modalite"?

125

reaction du sujet, reaction qui est exprimee par l'enonce, et, de ce fait, communiquee au destinataire, mais qui n'implique pas sä propre communication. Autre divergence: le sujet modal, selon Bally, n'est pas necessairement le sujet parlant. Je rappeile que la reaction exprimee dans l'enonce Man mari a decide que je le trompe est celle de l'epoux et non pas celle de l'epouse qui produit l'enonce. De meme, dans Pierre est content que tu partes, le sujet modal ne peut etre que Pierre, et c'est la satisfaction de Pierre qui est la reaction exprimee dans l'enonce. II est clair que Searle, au contraire, analyserait ces deux enonces en y placant une FI d'assertion mise en O2uvre par leurs locuteurs respectifs, et dont le CP serait, dans un cas, la hantise du mari, dans 1'autre la satisfaction de Pierre (solution qui est certes beaucoup plus proche du sens commun, mais qui implique d'attribuer des conditions de verite ä la hantise oü ä la satisfaction - et, sur ce point, sens commun et na'ivete se rapprochent peut-etre dangereu sement). J'examinerai d'abord la deuxieme divergence, et je me demanderai si la theorie de l'illocutoire peut maintenir l'attribution necessaire de la FI au sujet parlant (sauf dans les cas de discours ironique). La reponse me semble negative, au moins si adopte, pour l'etude des mots evaluatifs, la conception "ascriptiviste" suggeree par Austin et developpee par Hare (1970) (conception, on le sait, que Searle refuse en soutenant au contraire un descriptivisme pur et dur - ce qui est logiquement inevitable si on veut identifier automatiquement sujet illocutoire et locuteur). L'ascriptivisme consiste ä analyser des phrases comme Cet hotel est bon ä partir d'une FI de recommandation appliquee ä un CP du type 'frequentation de cet hotel'8. Leur forme declarative serait done un travestissement: dans la terminologie de Austin, il s'agirait de "mascaraders". Une objection vient cependant tout de suite ä l'esprit: on peut enchässer la structure sous-jacente ä cette phrase dans des phrases complexes oü aucun acte de recommandation n'est fait ä propos de l'hotel. C'est le cas dans Cet hotel est bon, mais je ne te le recommande pas ou dans Si cet hotel est bon, il doit etre eher. La reponse de Hare (1970) est que 1'acte illocutoire ne comporte pas seulement un CP (qu'il appelle element "phrastique") et une FI (qu'il appelle element "tropique", ou "mood"), mais en outre une decision du locuteur d'appliquer cette FI ä ce CP (acte de "subscription" - je traduis par 'adhesion' qui constitue 1'element 'neustique'). Dans l'enonce simple Cet hotel est bon le locuteur adhere effectivement au fait d'appliquer la recommandation ä la J'aimerais analyser de la meme fa5on la plupart des adjectifs ou verbes (et meme pas mal de substantifs), dans la mesure oü ils me semblent comporter une valeur ovaluative, pas toujours 6vidente.

126

Oswald Ducrot

frequentation de l'hötel: d'oü la räalisation d'un acte de recommandation. Mais, dans les enonces complexes, l'adhesion du locuteur ä la FI est absente, sans que pour autant cette FI disparaisse, car eile appartient, selon Hare, au sens meme de l'adjectif bon. Dans ces enonces, le locuteur envisage, sans 1'accomplir, un acte de recommandation. Si 1'on admet cette analyse, la FI n'est plus liee directement au sujet parlant, et eile se rapproche done sensiblement. de ce point de vue, du modus de Bally. Elle se rapproche aussi de ces jugements anciens, de ces "pre-juges" qui, selon les cartesiens, seraient cristallises dans certaines idees, par exemple dans les idees sensibles. Dans ce traitement, on assiste ä un double mouvement simultane. A la fois la subjectivite (volonte, modus, FI) se detache du sujet parlant, et en meme temps eile s'incorpore ä ce qu'on prend d'habitude pour un element objectif (ainsi sont analysees, par les cartesiens, l'idee de bleu, par Bally, la hantise du mari, par les ascriptivistes, la bonte de l'hötel). Je passe maintenant ä la deuxieme divergence entre le modus et la FI, qui tient ä ce qu'il s'agit d'une reaction psychologique dans un cas, d'un type d'acte de communication dans 1'autre. Pour faire apparaitre le probleme, il faut signaler que Bally a bien vu l'impossibilite de limiter l'element subjectif au simple modus, tel qu'il 1'a defini. Aussi introduit-il, dans un second temps, un nouvel element dans la description semantique de l'enonce. Celle-ci est completee selon le schema 'X communique que X pense que...', oü l'element modal ('X pense') est enchässe ä l'interieur d'un constituant superieur ('X communique'). La plupart des verbes que appellerait maintenant illocutoires amalgament, selon Bally, ces deux elements. Ainsi Pierre affirme que p equivaut ä 'Pierre communique qu'il croit que p', et Pierre ordonne que p recoit la description 'Pierre communique qu'il veut que p'. On aura remarque que Bally identifie ä la meme personne sujet modal et sujet communiquant (c'est pourquoi je les ai notes par la meme lettre X), tout en les distinguant Tun et l'autre du sujet parlant effectif. Apparait mieux alors ce qui distingue modus et FI. Le type d'acte qui constitue la FI selon Searle serait analyse par Bally en deux elements Tun et l'autre subjectifs, l'acte de communication et l'attitude psychologique communiquee (c'est cette derniere qui constitue le modus). Pour Searle au contraire, le type d'acte est une entite inanalysable, unique constituant subjectif du sens. Quant aux elements psychologiques de Bally, Searle les traiterait, je pense, ä deux niveaux. Certains, ceux qui sont impliques par la FI (comme la volonte est impliquee par l'ordre), releveraient des prealables ä l'accomplissement

A quoi seit le concept de modalite"?

127

honnete et serieux de 1'acte illocutoire: si 1'enonciation les fait connaitre au destinataire, c'est en vertu d'une sorte de raisonnement de celui-ci, dans lequel le destinataire suppose que le locuteur a etc honnete et serieux ('X a ordonne que p; or X est honnete et serieux; done X veut que p'). En ce qui concerne les autres eloments psychologiques, savoir les evaluations axiologiques et affectives liees des adjectifs comme bon, delicieux, monotone ou par des verbes comme aimer, esperer, Searle, nous 1'avons vu, les placerait dans le CP: son descriptivisme lui permet d'attribuer ces evaluations des valeurs de verite. De meme les modalitos logiques traditionnelles, possible, necessaire seraient, elles aussi, englobees dans le CP; mais pour cela il faut admettre le caractere veritatif, mon avis, bien suspect, d'une phrase comme // est possible que Pierre vienne. Et il en serait encore ainsi des modifieurs du type de peu, un peu, beaucoup: dans la mesure ou on arrive mal les decrire en termes de FI, il est inevitable de les incorporer au CP. On devrait done trouver des conditions de verite differentes, par exemple, pour Pierre a un peu mange et pour Pierre a peu mange.

4.

En guise de conclusion

En conclusion, je commencerai par rappeler les points communs toutes les theories dont j'ai parle. D'abord elles reposent sur une dissociation semantique du subjectif et de Tobjectif, permettant ainsi de maintenir qu'il y a l'interieur du sens un aspect purement descriptif, isolable en droit des prises de position subjectives. Si elles divergent, c'est sur la fa^on dont elles ΰοηςοίνβηί les deux elements separes. La subjectivite peut etre la decision volontaire des cartesiens, la reaction psychologique de Bally, 1'activite illocutoire de Searle. Et de meme 1'objectif peut etre soit 1'idee cartesienne, soit le proces de Bally, soit le CP de Searle. Certes, selon les definitions choisies, on obtiendra des repartitions differentes du subjectif et de 1'objectif, mais on ne remettra jamais en cause la legitimite meme de la repartition. Second point commun. Cette repartition est censee interieure au sens de chaque enonce: il ne s'agit pas, comme chez Harris ou dans la premiere philosophic d'Austin, de diviser les enonces en deux groupes, mais de construire un schema d'analyse valable pour tout enonce. Enfin 1'element subjectif et l'element objectif sont vus comme interdependants, en ce sens que le premier fait allusion au deuxieme, le conceme, le commente: la subjectivite modale est done bien differente de la connotation, et n'est pas confue comme une evaluation affective ou axiologique qui se superposerait la denotation.

128

Oswald Ducrot

Enfin j'indiquerai schematiquement pourquoi j'aimerais, sans en etre vraiment capable pour 1'instant, me passer de la notion generate de modalite: c'est que je crois les mots de la langue incapables, de par leur nature meme, de decrire une realite. Certes les enonces se referent toujours ä des situations, mais ce qu'ils disent ä propos de ces situations n'est pas de l'ordre de la description. II s'agit seulement de montrer des prises de position possibles vis ä vis d'elles. Ce qu'on appelle idee, dictum, contenu propositionnel n'est constitue par rien d'autre, selon moi, que par une ou plusieurs prises de position. Dire que le fruit est delicieux, que le sermon est monotone, que le restaurant est bon, que Pierre est intelligent, cela consiste seulement ä exprimer certaines attitudes vis ä vis des objets dont on parle. Ces attitudes, je ne voudrais pas les appeler modalites, car, ce faisant, on donnerait ä entendre qu'elles s'appliquent ä des representations. Pour moi, au contraire, elles constituent ä elles seules la vision du monde vehiculee par nos enonces. Que deviendraient, dans ce programme, les recherches concernant les differents phenomenes etiquetes d'habitude modalitest D'abord je rappelle ce que j'ai dit au debut: ces recherches me semblent parmi les plus importantes et les plus productives de la linguistique. Tout ce que j'ai discute, c'est leur insertion dans une categorie generate. Celle-ci oblige en effet, pour leur trouver un point commun, de dire qu'elles portent sur la subjectivite9 - ce qui implique le dualisme subjectif-objectif dont je voudrais justement faire 1'economie. Quant ä preciser la place ä dormer aux diverses modalites dans une semantique dont ce dualisme serait absent, je ne saurais le faire, ni ici, ni meme actuellement. Je rappellerai seulement que, pour moi, le sens d'un enonce consiste ä presenter un locuteur (le sujet communiquant de Bally) qui met en scene les points de vue de differents enonciateurs (les sujets modaux de Bally). Et ces points de vue consistent ä evoquer, ä propos de la situation dont on parle, des topo'i, ou principes argumentatifs, dont 1'application met les choses ou situations au service de divers interets argumentatifs, les caracterisant par rapport aux conclusions qu'on peut en tirer. Les modalites seraient alors ä situer ä plusieurs points de ce schema general. Certaines concernent directement la nature des topo'i, d'autres (cf. 1'opposition un peu-beaucoup), la force avec laquelle les topo'i sont convoques, d'autres enfin, 1'attitude pretee au locuteur vis ä vis des enonciateurs (refus, accord, identification). Tout cela Cette g6n£ralisation apparait de fa9on 6clatante dans l'ouvrage, essentiel, de KerbratOrecchioni (1985), L'Enonciation de la subjectivito dans le langage.

A quoi sert le concept de modalitö?

129

n'est qu'un programme, qui commence ä peine ä etre realise sur quelques points de detail. J'ai seulement voulu montrer dans ma contribution 1'intention qui le dirige: en refusant d'unifier les modalites, je voudrais echapper au dualisme du subjectif et de l'objectif, eviter de dire que certains elements de l'enonce decrivent les choses, et soutenir au contraire que tous servent ä prendre position vis ä vis d'elles.

π

Modality in First Language Acquisition Modalite et acquisition d'une langue matemelle

Ursula Stephany

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

Pour rendre compte des premiers stades du döveloppement de la catogorie de la modalite* dans le langage enfantin, il semble süffisant de distinguer entre modalitis deOntiques et ipistomiques, les premieres se re"f6rant plutot ä l'action et les demieres ä la connaissance d'ftats de choses. Les modalit6s doontiques ainsi confues comprennent non seulement 1'obligation (devoir faire) et la permission (pouvoir - faire) mais aussi la volition (vouloir - faire) et 1'aptitude. Bien que les racines des modalitos doontiques et 6pist£miques se situent dans les actes impiratifs et indicatifs se doveloppant des le stade prilinguistique, l'expression linguistique des modalitos 6pist£miques semble plus tardive par rapport aux modalitos deOntiques. Au stade flexionnel, les formes verbales se difKrencient en formes modales et non-modales avant la diff6renciation de ces dernieres en formes du präsent et du pass£ (ayant une valeur plutöt aspectuelle). Le doveloppement tardif des modalitis £piste"miques (excepto, peut-etre, en corden) est attribue" ä des facteurs cognitives, linguistiques et pragmatiques. En plus, le docalage entre la comprohension et la production d'expressions opistömiques semble considorable. Parmi les expressions modales prises en consideration sont les verbes modaux, les modes grammaticaux (rimperatif, le subjonctif, l'€videntiel) ainsi que les conditionnelles.

0.

Introduction

The difficulties in choosing a theoretical framework for studying the acquisition of modality are considerable. Despite of a number of important theoretical and empirical studies published in the present decade, the situation does not seem to have improved very much since 1983, when I was preparing a paper (Stephany, 1986) to which the present one is a follow-up. Just as the study of verbal aspect has evolved from a sentence-based to a text-based context, the study of modality has recently shifted from a syntactic to a

134

Ursula Stephany

pragmatic approach (cf. below and von Stutterheim, this volume). Such an approach seems especially promising for the study of language acquisition because acquisition of modality is not just the acquisition of grammatical rules but also of rules of adequate usage in a given communicative context.

1.

Theoretical considerations

Modality is one of the fundamental semantic concepts in the linguistic expression of situations: epistemically, it relates to the validity of utterances, and socially, to the permission or obligation of performing actions (deontic modality). The question of whether or not there are utterances for which the category of modality is lacking (cf. Katny, this volume) seems to be a terminological issue. In statements of fact such as it is raining, the speaker does not overtly qualify the validity of the expressed proposition. Such statements may therefore be considered as modally unmarked or non-modal (read non-modalized; cf. Lyons, 1977: 797; Stephany, 1985a: 60). Rather than being located outside the continuum of modal strength (Figure I) 1 , they seem to occupy the area between the turning point of this continuum and the pole of necessity or, as used in everyday speech, may even be reduced to this pole itself: Accepting the factuality of the proposition expressed by a statement and expecting the hearer to agree, the speaker sees no need to qualify the validity of his utterance. Note that what is important for the purposes of ordinary communication is the speaker's subjective interpretation of the situation rather than the objective truth of the proposition expressed by his utterance. Figure 1 The scale of necessity and possibility

turrune υοιιί Situating related linguistic categories on intersecting continua of contrary or contradictory terms is an important aspect of Seller's work on language universals and linguistic typology (Seiler, 1986: pp. 20).

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

135

In order to better cope with the different degrees of factuality, obligation, capability, etc., expressed by modal forms, it seems more appropriate to consider the semantic differences between these expressions as gradual rather than categorical. It is interesting to note that the continuum of epistemic modal strength allows considerable variability even with mature speakers. In a pilot study with adult subjects the purpose of which was to establish a continuum of modal strength for the epistemically used German auxiliaries ist > muß > wird > kann [is > must > will > may], Hofmann (1986) obtained definite results only for the relationship of kann to ist, muß, and wird, respectively, while the relative strength of muß and wird showed the highest variability. Contrary to what would be expected from logical studies of modal meanings, 40 to 60 per cent of two different groups of subjects (N = 15 and 13, respectively) found wird to express a higher degree of probability than muß. As far as the earlier stages of the development of modality are concerned, it seems sufficient to distinguish between deontic and epistemic modality. In this context the most important distinction between these categories seems to be that deontic modality refers to actions (doing) and epistemic modality to knowledge of states of affairs (being). Both of these types of modality can be described in terms of necessity and possibility, with deontic modality being necessity-based and epistemic modality possibility-based. The two additional modal concepts of volition and ability may be considered as expressing deontic necessity and deontic possibility, respectively, with the source of modality in both being subject-internal, as opposed to subject-external in expressions of obligation and permission (Stephany, 1986: 376 and the literature cited there).

2.

First steps towards modality

The roots of the ontogenesis of deontic and epistemic modality go back to the prelinguistic stage and the development of request!ve and indicative acts. While requestive or imperative acts represent instrumental behavior, indicative or declarative acts having "the social function of establishing joint attention" may be interpreted as precursors to the descriptive function of language (Stephany, 1983: pp. 7). Although the two basic linguistic functions related to the epistemic and the social dimension of human existence can be found in the earliest stages of the ontogenesis of language, it is the non-epistemic function which clearly predominates at first. This is one of the reasons why deontic modality develops prior to epistemic modality (Stephany, 1985a: 224).

136

Ursula Stephany

In the preinflectional one-word stage, utterances serving a descriptive function are not consistently distinguished from those of an instrumental character. Within the area of modality, wishes and commands can often not be distinguished since inflection has not yet emerged and utterances are limited to one word at a time. Several authors note that in the preinflectional stage the child already has a variety of linguistic devices at his disposal for expressing deontically modalized utterances, most of which do not involve a verb form at all (Stephany, 1983: pp. 8). Depending on the language acquired, the first verb forms to appear are most frequently based on adult imperatives (e.g., Bulgarian, Russian, Finnish, Turkish, Hebrew) or infinitives (e.g., English, German, Dutch, French, Portuguese), although in Italian the third person singular indicative forms were used early by two children, even with modal meaning (Stephany, 1983: 9). When children reach the inflectional stage, verbs are split into modal and nonmodal forms. As already observed in many languages (for Polish, cf. Smoczynska, this volume), this split precedes the differentiation of non-modal verb forms into present and past tense forms, which in the beginning express aspect more than tense (Stephany, 1983: 11; 1985a: §9).

3.

The acquisition of modal verbs

Modal verbs represent an important formal means for the expression of modal meanings in a number of languages. The emergence of English modals reported by Stephany (1986) can now be compared with more recent research on the acquisition of German modals (Adamzik, 1985; Stephany, 1985b; Ramge, 1987). In both English and German child language, modal verbs at first serve deontic and not epistemic functions and are used as main verbs rather than auxiliaries. In both languages, modal verbs with a subject-internal source of modality (will/can; wollen/können) expressing deontic (or dynamic, but in any case non-epistemic) necessity and possibility occur early and frequently. Modals with a subject-external source of modality such as shall/should and müssen/sollen appear later.2

Although two of her subjects used müssen very often in commenting on ongoing actions or announcing immediately following ones, Adamzik considers this modal as 'semantically reduced' "in that such expressions were largely equivalent to sentences in the present or

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

137

As with other complex linguistic phenomena, such as aspect and tense, appearance does not mean acquisition. Defining the order of emergence of modal verbs can thus only provide very rough clues for the ontogenesis of the modal verb system of a language. In order to trace the gradual acquisition of the complex meanings these verbs convey in the adult language, a detailed analysis of their use in both sentence and speech-act types, with different persons and in different tenses, is necessary. Ramge (1987) found that his son Peter at an early age predominantly used wollen [will] or können [can, may] in statements expressing his own will, but dürfen [may] and sollen [shall] when asking for permission or in questions of obligation. Later on, when all four of these modals occurred in statements, wollen was predominantly used in the first person singular, while sollen and dürfen were preferably used in the second and third persons. From a pragmatic point of view, the source of modality in all of these statements was the speaker. Studying the discourse purposes of will and gonna as used in quasi-naturalistic play settings by three dyads of children aged between 3;2 and 4;2, Gee (1985: 208) found that 94% of ^///-utterances occur in joint negotiation and are immediately executed in action, whereas joint negotiation tends to be lacking with gort/za-utterances, which "often refer to an imaginary realm and usually are not followed through with". She describes w/7/ and gonna used in the first or second person as expressing deontic and dynamic modality, respectively. (On the use of will and gonna with third person subjects, cf. below.) Both Adamzik (1985: 25) and Ramge (1987) note that most of the time children's use of modal verbs is semantically appropriate. The development of this area of language acquisition seems to involve a gradual differentiation of the meanings of these verbs (Adamzik, 1985: pp. 26).

future tense lacking a modal" (1985: 20). Why not admit that müssen functions to render some authority to verbalized actions, albeit by imitating the adult's way of addressing the child? A typical example is the sequence: ich muß mal tucken [-> gucken], ob der slouch [> schlauch] in Ordnung ist. ich tuck [-> guck] mal, ob der puler [-> spüler] in Ordnung ist (2; 11.28) [I have to look if the pipe is all right. I am going to look if the dishwasher is all right.].

138

4.

Ursula Stephany

Epistemic modality

It is widely believed that, in the ontogenesis of language, epistemic modal meanings cross-linguistically develop later than deontic ones (Stephany, 1985a, 1985b, 1986 and the references cited there; Ramge, 1987; Smoczynska, this volume). This view agrees with findings on the diachronic development of languages (cf. e.g. Fleischman, 1982). Empirically, it is mainly based on the study of the early meanings of modal verbs and the development of grammatical moods, as well as on the fact that epistemic adjectives, adverbs, or nouns, such as possible, possibly, or possibility, are almost completely lacking in early child language (Stephany, 1986: 375). In order to trace the ontogenesis of epistemic modality, a more comprehensive study of both linguistic and paralinguistic means of expression is necessary. Some of the paralinguistic phenomena which should be considered are hesitation (e.g. pauses), tone of presentation of statements (low or loud voice), etc., as well as reactions to the participant's statements, such as laughing or nodding (Stoffel & Veronique, this volume). Linguistic means of expression which must be included are prosodic phenomena such as intonation and contrastive accent as well as lexical categories besides modal verbs, especially the child's use of affirmative and negative particles for approving of or disagreeing with the statements made by the conversation partner. It will also be rewarding to study in detail the rarely found early examples of epistemic adverbs. In the age of computer-based data analysis, such a task has become less formidable. The appearance of adversative particles (not only conjunctions) and the functions of indirect speech (Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, this volume) are also relevant here. Recent results of more comprehensive studies along these lines of the development of epistemic modality will be discussed below. The reasons for the later appearance of the use of mood and modal verbs to convey epistemic meanings, as opposed to deontic ones, seem to be threefold: cognitive, linguistic, and pragmatic. Cognitive reasons may be sought in the egocentricity of the preoperational child (Perkins, 1983; Stephany, 1985b). Since the same modal verbs may usually convey both deontic and epistemic meanings, it would seem difficult to invoke any linguistic reasons for the later appearance of their epistemic use. Non-integrated modal constructions (Roulet, 1979: pp. 44 and this volume) in which modus and dictum occupy different clauses are syntactically more complex than integrated ones and therefore

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

139

appear later. But both types of construction apply to epistemic and deontic modality. Thus, both the integrated epistemic modal expression John may have left and the deontic expression John must leave may be paraphrased by nonintegrated constructions, namely: It is possible that John has left and It is necessary that John leaves. Why then do children first use sentences such as John may leave only in a deontic and not (yet) in an epistemic sense? The reason seems to be that while epistemic meanings represent a comment made by the speaker, deontic meanings "form part of the clause, expressing conditions on the process referred to" (Halliday, 1970: 338). From a pragmatic point of view, not only is the number of epistemically modalized utterances used in the speech with young children limited, but they are not even that common in ordinary non-scientific discourse (Lyons, 1977: 845). Furthermore, the young child's social status and physical condition are likely to favor both his concern with norms for actions and the possibilities of performing them as well as his interest in inducing desired states of affairs rather than worrying about their factuality. According to Shatz, Wellman & Silber (1983: 301) mental verbs such as think and know are first used "for conversational functions rather than for mental reference" (for French, cf. Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, this volume). The origin of the concept of possibility, "involving a distinction between reality and some other state of affairs based on certain conditions, [...] may be seen in the child's ability to pretend" (Stephany, 1986: 393; Piaget, 1946), "because such activity involves the creation of an "as if world by the child" (Aksu-Ko9, 1988: 198). In Turkish, the non-evidential past suffix -DI appears earlier than the evidential -mis, the latter occurring in symbolic play and story-telling towards the end of the third year (Aksu-Koc., 1988: 198). "Further differentiations within epistemic modality, related to commitment to the possibility, necessity or factuality of what is asserted [...] follow" (op.cit.: 199). In an ongoing study of the development of modality in Korean, Choi (1986) found that the first three sentence ending morphemes productive in children's speech "denote different kinds of epistemic modal meaning" (new/ unassimilated, old/assimilated information, degree of certainty). Already before 2;0 there is a more or less distinct opposition between the particles -ta and -e, with -ta mainly being used for the description of real (present) events, and only rarely for pretended ones, and vice versa for -e. (The latter particle also serves to describe past events and occurs in requests.) The particle -ci,

140

Ursula Stephany

which becomes productive in the first half of the third year, is used in utterances seeking the listener's confirmation, such as, for instance: hammunikke-ci [(It is) Grandma's, right?]. Both Gee (1985) and Stephany (1985a: 160; 1986: 397) consider predictions to be a kind of early epistemic expressions (cf. also Mawby et al., 1983). In Greek, these are rendered by the subjunctive mood and/or future tense and in English, by the modals will and gonna. According to Gee (1985: 219), will is used to make proximal predictions with third-person subjects "such that the outcome is conditional upon the joint activities of the participants", while the epistemic gonna is used for temporally more distant and more inevitable events. The temporal future reference of such expressions is considered "a consequence of the modal function" (op. cit.: 221). In a crosslinguistic, longitudinal study of the development of negation, Choi (1988) found deontic negation (prohibition, rejection) to precede what might be called epistemic negation (e.g., / don't know) in 11 children acquiring English, French, and Korean, respectively (cf. also Bassano, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c; Bassano & Champaud, 1983; Champaud & Bassano, 1984). While Choi's cross-linguistic studies of negation confirm the developmental priority of deontic as opposed to epistemic modality, her findings on the acquisition of the epistemic sentence-ending morphemes in Korean cast some doubt on this view. They might, however, simply be further evidence of the fact "that already in the preschool years, children show that they are sensitive to particular ways in which the mother tongue codifies experience" (Slobin & Bocaz, 1989: 2).

5.

Conditionals

In a study of the acquisition of conditionals in English, Polish, Italian, Turkish, and Finnish, Bowerman (1986) considers the question why if-(then)constructions only appear in the second half of the third year and thus later than other structurally similar complex sentences. This fact seems to contradict all expectations since evidence already exists for cognitive prerequisites of conditionals in the first half of the third year and, to a certain extent, even in the second year, when children "can appreciate contingencies of various sorts, entertain counterfactual, uncertain, and hypothetical situations and even sequences of two or three contingently linked hypothetical situations (although

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

141

probably not sequences of counterfactual situations), draw inferences, recognize generic events, and, at least in some cases, relations between such events" (op. cit.: 295). Bowerman therefore rules out cognitive reasons for the late emergence of conditionals. According to this author, pragmatic factors do not seem to be responsible either. Stephany (1985a: 195), however, found conditionals to be nearly absent from the speech of four Greek mothers addressed to their children in the second half of the second year, while other hypotactic clauses, especially purpose and complement clauses, occurred quite frequently.^ Cross-linguistically, children's early conditionals belong to a category which is "apparently central to conditional semantics in languages around the world: low-hypothetical future predictives" (Bowerman, 1986: 295). These findings are in agreement with Gee's (1985) and Stephany's (1985a, 1986) interpretation of early non-hypotactic predictive expressions (cf. section 4 above) as well as with the historical development of the expression of conditional relations from that of temporal ones (Heidolph, Flaming & Motsch, 1981: pp. 794). The acquisition of conditional sentences and the conditional mood by French children after age 4 has been the subject of a number of detailed studies by Boloh, Champaud, Roland, and others (Champaud & Boloh, 1987; Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, this volume, and the references cited there).

6.

Later stages in the acquisition of modality

Although age 5 "can be considered as a frontier age psycholinguistically", Karmiloff-Smith (1986: 455) argues that "fundamental changes take place in language development" after that age. It is therefore hardly surprising that the system of modality should continue to develop until at least age 11 or 12 (for English, Coates, 1988 and for French, the studies cited above and below). Most of the research on the later stages of the acquisition of modality concentrates on comprehension. However, care must be taken to avoid transferring the results of comprehension studies to production (cf. below).

Unlike first language acquisition, in second language acquisition the communicative importance of the conditional relation seems relatively important (Rieck, this volume).

142

Ursula Stephany

The most important result of Hirst & Weil's (1982) experimental study on the acquisition of the epistemic meaning of English modal verbs is that in accordance with Jakobson's principle of maximal contrast, children first distinguish modals from factuals before differentiating within the modal field, where the general rule seems to be: "the greater the difference in the strength of two types of modal propositions the earlier this difference will be appreciated" (Hirst & Weil, 1982: 665; cf. also Stephany, 1986: 399). Their findings were only partially confirmed in a replication of this study with 40 German children aged 3;0 to 6;0 by Hofmann (1986). In agreement with Hirst & Weil's results, Hofmann found that the difference in modal strength between the two verb forms at the poles of the epistemic continuum ist > muß sein > wird sein > kann sein [is > must be > will be > may be] was definitely established at 3;7. Although, within the field of modal verbs, Hirst & Weil's 50% criterion (i.e., occurrence with at least 50% of the children studied) was reached by the 3;0 to 3;6 age group for both the muß > kann and the muß > wird sections of the continuum, the criterion was definitely met only by age 5;1 and only for muß > kann. The answers of children between the age of 3;7 and 5;0, who were asked on two occasions to judge the relative degree of certainty expressed by muß as opposed to kann were for the most part contradictory. While from age 5;1 onwards 50% of the children correctly graded wird > kann, they either estimated the relative degree of certainty of muß and wird as wird > muß (rather than vice versa) or gave contradictory answers. Grading of the two modal verbs occupying the central part of the epistemic continuum thus seems to be especially troublesome (cf. section 1 above). As far as the left area of the continuum is concerned, the difference in meaning between ist and wird or muß was not yet understood by more than 80% of the children up to age 5;0. Only from 5;1 on, could 50% of the children differentiate between ist and muß (in addition to ist and kann), while ist and wird were distinguished only by half of the 5;7 to 6;0 year olds. Hofmann's results indicate that what determines sequence of acquisition is not the opposition factual/non-factual as such (ist vs. muß/wird/kann) but rather the relative difference of epistemic strength (ist > kann acquired prior to muß > kann, but ist > muß/wird acquired as late as muß > kann). The overall development in the comprehension of utterances with epistemically used modal verbs seems to occur somewhat later in German than in English. In a study using a card-sorting method, Coates tested the ability to distinguish between different modal meanings and found "that eight-year-old children have only a rudimentary system" of modal meaning, and even by the age of

Modality in First Language Acquisition: The State of the Art

143

twelve a child's system will not be isomorphic with the adult system (Coates, 1988: 425). While eight-year olds distinguish epistemic possibility from all other modal meanings (without further differentiating among the latter), twelve-year olds make the same rough distinctions in type and strength of modality as adults do, without however distinguishing "between items at a semantically more delicate level" (op. cit.: 432). As a kind of appendix to her study of the understanding of epistemic modal meanings, Hofmann (1986) switched roles with 27 of her subjects, asking them to pronounce two probability judgments as hints to the experimenter where to look for a piece of candy they had themselves hidden under an upside-down cup or box. Until 4;7 the subjects showed a general tendency to avoid modal verbs in this situation, some of them using the modal adverb vielleicht [maybe]. Only in the 5;7 to 6;0 age group did three of four subjects use sein [to be] to express a stronger degree of probability than any of the modals werden [will, shall], müssen [must], können [may], while none of them could yet differentiate between the latter. Up to 5;1, the children always used müssen instead of können. Comparing these production results to those of her comprehension test, Hofmann concludes that comprehension of the epistemic meanings of modal verbs must be fairly well established before they can be used productively. Perkins (1983) studied the spontaneous use of modal expressions (not just modal verbs) in child-child interaction by 96 English-speaking children aged 6 to 12 during the construction of buildings with Lego bricks. In spite of a low level of epistemic modals in general, might and may were always used epistemically (op. cit., 148).4 Acquisition of the modalities of opinion by French monolingual children from 4 to 11 has been extensively studied by Champaud, Bassano, and others, who concentrated on the understanding and use of the verbs croire [to believe] and savoir [to know] (Champaud, Bassano & Hickmann, this volume).

Perkins explains the overall development of modal expressions in a Piagetian framework of cognitive development in which egocentricity and subjective vs. objective modality play a major role.

144

7.

Ursula Stephany

Conclusions and outlook

How can one appraise the study of modality in first language acquisition? This question will be answered differently by proponents of different theories of modality. (The difficulties encountered when trying to understand the category of modality as expressed in language does not, by the way, seem limited to children learning their mother tongue!) As linguists and developmental psycholinguists, we somehow have to live with the plurality of existing theoretical approaches, which themselves are the unavoidable consequence of the extraordinary complexity of our subject matter. In view of this, it seems hopeless to wait for theoretical linguists or even philosophers to bless us with a theory readily applicable to languageacquisition data. This would even be undesirable since developmental psycholinguistics should be the discipline making important contributions to such a theory. What is needed then is interdisciplinary collaboration and not just the application of linguistic or logical theories to language acquisition data. In view of the complexity of the category of modality we are in need of more detailed knowledge of the emergence and eventual acquisition of the different formal means different languages provide for the expression of this semantic category, as well as of the meanings and conversational functions (in different text types, cf. von Stutterheim, this volume) these have for children until they finally master the adult system. In order to understand the ontogenesis of modality as a linguistic category, form should not be divorced from function or function from form.

Magdalena Smoczynska

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs1

La langue polonaise se rovele particulierement interessante pour ceux qui otudient l'acquisition de la langue maternelle: Elle possede et des marques morphologiques modales, et un Systeme riche de verbes modaux ainsi qu'une quantiti d'autres verbes ä composantes modales. Les analyses pr6sent£es traitent l'acquisition des verbes modaux jusqu'ä Tage 3;0 ä l'aide de maintes donnoes extraites du corpus de Stefan Szuman constituo entre 1950 et 1960. Des differences, d'ordre quantitatif et qualitatif, sont observdes entre les quarre enfants consid6r6s. Elles renvoient, tres probablement, ä l'influence de l'input et, vraisemblablement, aux personnalit6s individuelles. Les analyses de dotail concernent les moyens exprimant en polonais la n6cessit€ et 1'obligation (musieo, trzeba, ma, powinien et la negation respective), l'interdiction et la permission (nie wolno, nie mozna et nie trzeba ainsi que leurs correpondants positifs) et la capaciteTincapacite" (maze, (nie) da si , (nie) umie). II apparait que les enfants de"couvrent et emploient, pas ä pas, les difforentes fonctions somantiques des modaux analyses. De maniere tres gonirale, 1'emploi est d'abord directement ä la situation et l'activite" immediates et, au cours du döveloppement, se dicontextualise de plus en plus. Finalement, 1'expression opistomique ne joue pas encore de role pour 1'age otudie".

0.

Introduction

The present paper gives an account of the acquisition of modal verbs by Polish children. The research is based on naturalistic data of 4 children aged from 1 ;6 1

The research reported in this paper was done during the author's stay at the Institute of Linguistics of the University of Cologne and at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen as a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, whose support as well as that of the two host Institutes is gratefully acknowledged.

146

Magdalena Smoczynska

(or 2;0) to 3;0. Quantitative analyses are presented as well as qualitative evaluation of the occurrences of modal expressions with focus on their semantic and pragmatic properties.

1.

The Polish modal system2

Polish has three moods: the indicative, the imperative and the conditional. The conditional mood can be split into the subjunctive (involving the clauses with zeöy-nonfactive [that/so that]) and the conditional proper. Both refer to nonfactive events, but it is only the latter that is used with reference to hypothetical events. Polish modal verbs differ in many respects from their English equivalents.3 Let us briefly examine the two most basic verbs: moze (infinitive moc) [can, may] and musi (infinitive musiec) [must]. Their grammatical status is more like that of full Stative verbs than of auxiliaries. Morphologically, they are not defective. In fact, they belong to the imperfectiva tantum (as do some stative verbs), but they have all tense forms (present, past and future), as well as conditional forms (but no imperative), and the person/number/tense/mood endings they take are regular. Syntactically, they do not differ from other verbs that take infinitival clauses as complements, and can be combined with each other. There are also significant semantic and pragmatic differences between Polish and English modals. In principle, Polish maze and musi can be used both deontically and epistemically, but in fact deontic uses are much more common. The most basic and neutral expressions of epistemic modality are modal particles, such as mozeprt [perhaps, maybe], chyba [probably = I guess so], pewnie [probably = I suppose so], na pewno [certainly, surely], rather than modal verbs.4

The following description is limited to modal expressions which occur in the colloquial, spoken version of Polish. Katny (this volume) gives a more complete account of Polish modal expressions. Many of his examples, however, concern the written form of the Polish language. See Jedrzejko (1987) for a semantic description of Polish deontic verbs. An account of differences between Polish and English modals is given in Lipinska-Grzegorek (1978). Bralczyk (1974) points to the fact that the verbal form of expressing uncertainty such as mozeverb is marked as compared to the modal particle mozeprt, since it contains a component of inferring about a possibility of a state from some cues.

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

147

Semantically, musi shows a relatively close correspondence to the English must and have to, as expressing obligation and compulsion, except for the negated form, where nie musi expresses the lack of compulsion and not prohibition, as the English must not does. Pragmatically, musze. in first person is used very frequently to refer to planned actions which the agent has decided to perform but is by no means forced to perform. Polish moze cumulates the meanings of English can, may and be able to, that is, possibility, permission and ability, with the exception of abilities involving some kind of knowledge or training, where the nonmodal verb umiec [know how] is used.5 Another difference between Polish and English involves the existence in Polish of a number of impersonal verbs or quasi-verbs, which serve in principle to formulate general statements about desirable/undesirable, possible/impossible, permitted/prohibited states of affairs. In fact they are often used as indirect requests rather than as general statements. They have specialized meanings and specialized pragmatic uses. The interaction of their meaning with negation is irregular too. These are: mozna [one can, one may]: permission or general possibility nie mozna: prohibition or general impossibility wolno [it is allowed]: permission only nie wolno: prohibition (strong) trzeba [there is need]: desirable states, impersonal obligation nie trzeba: lack of obligation, lack of necessity or weak prohibition da 5ΐς: possibility viewed from the object perspective (feasibility) nie da si ς: impossibility of performing an action due to the object characteristics.^ To the list of modal verbs powinien [should] needs to be added, which refers to obligation or duty, when used deontically, or to probability, when used epistemically. For instance, On powinien przyjsc [He should come] means 'It is his duty to come' or 'He is expected to come (= To my knowledge he will come)'. Almost synonymous is the construction with miec [have], e.g. On ma

Cf. Nie umiem tego otworzyC [I do not know (how) to open it], which points to the lack of information about how to proceed and Nie m ge tego otworzyi [I can't open it], which refers to the lack of physical ability (strength). Cf. Nie m ge tego otworzyi, which is focused on the agent's inability to perform the action, vs. Nie da sie tego otworzyt [It can't be opened], where the impossibility of the action is due to the characteristics of the object and not to those of the agent.

148

Magdalena Smoczynska

przyj&c [He is to come]. Constructions with miec can express compulsion7: the utterance Masz przyjic [You should come] is stronger than PowinnieneS przyjSc [You should come]. Other verbs that need to be mentioned here are: chce [want], the basic verb of volition, which appears first in child language and is most frequently used throughout the third year of life. Therefore it can be considered as the prototypical verb for expressing modality, both semantically and structurally. Finally, verbs which are not modal themselves but contain a modal constituent in their semantic structure are those referring to human actions of deontic modalizing such as pozwolic [permit, allow, let], zabronic [forbid] for permission/prohibition and kazac [order] or powiedziec + zeby-clause (in subjunctive) [tell somebody to do something].

2.

Data base

In the present paper an account is given of all utterances containing modal verbs (and quasi verbs) which occurred in the data of four Polish children from the beginning of data collection until age three. The records, known as the Szuman diary data, were collected by mothers of the children in 1950-1960 within a project directed by Stefan Szuman (see papers in Szuman, 1968). The daily samples of the child's speech (including the verbal and nonverbal context) cover a period starting from the onset of speech up to age six or seven. Unlike the classical diaries, the data are non-selective. They are now being coded in the CHAT format within the Child Language Data Exchange System CHILDES (MacWhinney & Snow, 1985). For the present paper the corpora of four children were analyzed: two girls, Kasia and Inka and two boys, Jas and Michal. Kasia and Michal were siblings. The data collection for three children started well before the emergence of any modal expressions: for Inka at 1;0, for Kasia and Jas at 1;3. In the case of Michal the sampling started later, at age two, when his linguistic development was considerably advanced and his utterances were already highly modalized. So far I have excerpted and analyzed the data up to age three, using CLAN programs of the CHILDES system (MacWhinney & Snow, 1985). Further

The most basic and neutral form of expressing compulsion is however that in the imperative mood. Similarly, the strongest expression of a statement is the straight indicative sentence and no modality of certainty can contribute to strengthen it

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

149

development of the children studied (except for Kasia, whose data end at 3;1) can be followed.

3.

General sketch of the development of modality in Polish

As the present paper focuses on the use of Polish modal verbs by children, let me sketch briefly the general picture of the acquisition of mood and modality in Polish. The analysis is based on the same data and the results partly reported in Smoczynska (1985). The distinction between the indicative and imperative is one of the first morphological contrasts to emerge (cf. Zarebina, 1965), with the opposition of 3rd person singular of the present tense and 2nd person singular of the imperative. The emergence of this contrast takes place in the very early phases of the acquisition of syntax, i.e. at the beginning of the two-word stage. By the time the verb chce [want] comes into use, the imperative is employed without difficulty. For most children chce is the first verb taking infinitival complements and expressing modality of volition. Utterances with chce take typically the first person subject and serve to express requests, in parallel with imperatives. Chce is, at least at the beginning, the most frequently used verb among those classified as modal, and with its syntactic pattern seems to serve as prototype for further modal constructions. The constructions containing modal verbs, both personal and impersonal, start to emerge before age two, and during the third year of life are used more and more frequently. They express deontic modality almost exclusively. A detailed account of their acquisition is given in this paper. During the second year two other phenomena occur. One is the emergence of modal particles expressing epistemic modality. They are not very frequent, but they appear relatively early in the data of all the children studied and are used adequately. Examples: Moze to od dzin-dzinia? [Maybe this comes from the ding-dong (=the bell)?]

150

Magdalena Smoczynska

(2) KASIA 2;0 Czyja to jest butelka? Mamy chyba. [Whose is this bottle? Probably Mommy's.] (3) KASIA 2;4 Uciekl tramwaj, chyba przyjedzie. [The tram is gone, (it) will probably come.] (4) KASIA 2;4 (Kasia's mother tells her to look for hair pins) Mother: Szukaj, coreczko, szukaj. Kasia: Pewnie (w) pudle sg. [Mother: Look for them, daughter, look. Kasia: (They) are probably in the box.] (5) KASIA 2;8 Jutro sobie ροζ\νοΙς naprawic zgbka, na pewno. [Tomorrow I will let (the doctor) treat (my) tooth, for sure.] The other phenomenon is the emergence of the conditional/subjunctive mood, which takes place typically about 2;3 - 2;6, after the acquisition of all tenses of the indicative. The conditional is most frequently used in its entangled form as the subjunctive of subordinate clauses. These are: adverbial purpose clauses, e.g. (6)JA$2;3 (Granny is leaving, Jas wants her to stay with him. She explains to Jas she feels more comfortable at home.) Jas: Dam ci poduszke, zeby ci byio wygodnie. [I will give you a pillow, so that you will be comfortable.] (7) MICHAL 2;9 Japluje. na indyki, zeby si ξ obrazify. [I spit on turkeys so that they get offended.] and nonfactive complement clauses, e.g. (8) JAS" 2;7 Mowiiem ci, zebys zawiazata, a tys nie zawiazaia. [I told you that you tie (it) up, and you didn't tie (it) up -> I told you to tie it up and you didn't.]

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

151

Less frequently, but still common to all children, genuine hypothetical conditional sentences appear. This phenomenon takes place about the age of 2;6, which is much earlier than in many other languages.8 Examples: (9) KASIA 2;6 Ja mam dwa kieszonki. A jak by byia jedna, to by brakowafo. [I have two pockets. And if there was one, (something) would be missing.] (10)JA$2;10 (After having been scolded for locking a neighbour in the bathroom, he explains that no harm was done.) Jakby pani zamykaia sie sama, to by sie tezboila. [If she locked her up herself, she would also be frightened]. The free form of the conditional appears also in adverbial causal clauses, e.g. (11)JAS2;5 Nie urwiem mu gtöwke., bo by ptaszek piakat i Jasiu zaptaszkiem by piakat. [I won't tear its head off, because the bird would cry and Jas would cry for the bird.]

4.

Modal verbs in the children's speech

In the quantitative data presented in Table 1 two groups of modal forms are distinguished: the category of modal verbs proper constituted by musi, trzeba, ma/powinien, wolno, mozna, mote, da sie, which express the notions of obligation/possibility and prohibition/permission and the category of other related and frequently used verbs which include the volitional chce verb, whose status is different from that of the modals proper, both linguistically and developmentally, and two verbs that are only semantically related to the modals proper: pozwolio [permit, allow, let] and umiec [can, know how]. The latter will be discussed only in relation to the verbs of the first group which are the main object of the study.

See Smoczynska (1985: 649-653) for an exhaustive list of examples.

152 Table 1

Magdalena Smoczynska

The occurrences of modal verbs in the entire data JAS

%

INKA

%

KASIA

%

MICHAL %

MODAL musi

34

23.5

12

12.0

112

30.0

57

35.5

tneba

25

17.0

7

7.0

95

25.0

22

13.5

4

3.0

1

1.0

15

4.0

6

3.5

wolno

26

18.0

47

47.0

20

5.5

7

4.5

mozna

9

6.0

6

6.0

61

16.0

17

10.5

maze

39

27.0

27

27.0

65

17.0

41

25.5

da si ς

8

5.5

0

9

2.0

11

7.0

145

100.0

100

377

100.0

161

100.0

malpowinien

TOTAL

100.0

OTHER umie pozwala chce

18

42

106

46

7

29

23

23

164

327

353

87

The data presented in Table 1 show that with Jas, Kasia and Michal the most frequent modal verbs were the basic musi and maze. For Kasia also the impersonal forms trzeba and mozna were very frequent. With Inka the pattern seems to be quite different, almost 50% of her modalized utterances contain the impersonal wolno. It appears in negated form and expresses prohibition. As far as the category Other' is concerned, it should be noted that chce [want] for all children except Michal was more frequent than all the verbs classified as 'modal proper' taken together, for Inka chce occurred three times more frequently than modals. All children used the verb umie [know how]. Pozwala [allow, permit, let] is the only verb referring to modal acts that is used by all the children studied.

153

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

Table 2 shows the growth of modal verb use in the consecutive three month periods. The use of chce, commonly preceeding that of modals proper and quantitatively prevailing at onset, loses importance with age for all the children except for Inka. With Kasia an important increase of modalized utterances is noticeable in the last quarter of the third year. Table 2

The occurrences of modal verbs and of chce in the consecutive quarters from 1;6 to 2;11.

AGE INKA

JAS

KASIA

NUCHAL

1;6-1;8

1;9-1;11 2;0-2;2

2;3-2;5

2;6-2;8

2;9-2;ll TOTAL

modal

0

10

17

21

25

27

100

chce

9

30

70

104

65

149

327

modal

0

15

10

25

34

61

145

chce

4

1

12

39

51

57

164

modal

41

73

39

no data

67

156

376

chce

72

75

29

no data

62

115

353

modal

no data

no data

55

56

no data

50

161

chce

no data

no data

36

31

no data

20

87

The relative frequency of modalized utterances could be calculated only for Inka and Jas, because it is only for those children that the total number of utterances recorded was calculated9. With Inka utterances including modals proper amount to 2.5%, and those including chce 8% of all her utterances recorded, whereas for Jas the figures are 2.5% and 3%, respectively. Let us examine the uses of modal verbs occurring in the data in more detail.

4.1

Necessity and obligation

Szuman (1963), who analyzed the meanings of the verb musiec as used by Inka and her parents during the whole period of data collection (1;0-6;0), found Przetacznikowa (1968: Table 2, 430-431) gives the following figures: 3662 utterances noted for Inka from 2;0 to 3;0 and 5773 for Jas over the same period.

154

Magdalena Smoczynska

that the earliest and most frequent use of musz^ [I must, I have to] consists in expressing an impulsive desire to do something rather than of referring to an external obligation or duty. These latter meanings appear relatively later. This finding, confirmed in the data of other children, means that musiec, at least at the beginning, is a volitional verb. Often it is the case that the verb chce is used when the child needs some help, collaboration or at least permission to fulfill his wish, whereas muszg just expresses the child's strong intention to do something without suggesting any kind of discussion or negotiation of the matter (Ί want to do it and I will do it'), e.g. (12)KASIA1;9 Nie ma Kasia czasu. Musi Kasia jesc obiadek. Musi obiadekjesc. Myc naczynie Kasia musi. [Kasia has no time. Kasia must have lunch. Must have lunch. Kasia must wash dishes.] (13)JA$2;4 Musim wszystko naprawiac, co si ς zepsulo. [I must fix everything that got broken.] (14)JA$2;11 Μ^ζς wyglgdac, czy mamusia jedzie z Huty. [I must watch if Mommy is coming from Huta.] (15) MICHAL 2;0

Μ^ζς gonic ρΐ&ξ. [I must run after the ball.] (16) INKA 2;6 Ja muszg posprzatac, wiesz? [I must tidy up, you know?] This kind of meaning is prevalent when both muszg and the modalized verb are introduced simultaneously as new information. However, if the action itself was previously mentioned by the child or by his interlocutors and musz^ appears in subsequent turns, the meaning is slightly different: this time the obligation or necessity of doing such and such is stressed. Very often the context is when the child insists on realizing his plans against the will of others.

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

155

(17) MICHAL 2;0 (putting the light on) Pstrykam. Mother: Nie rob tego. P o co to robisz? Przeciezjestjasno. Michal: Bo musz^ pstrykac. [Michal: I am pushing (it). Mother: Don't do that. What are you doing that for? There is enough light. Michai: Because I have to push (it).] (18) INKA 1;10 Mamusiu, daj Inusi ksiazke., ksiazke. duza. (Mother shakes her head negatively. Inka gets angry:) Inusia musi ksigzke., musi. [Mommy, give Inusia10 the book, the big book. Inka must book, (she) must.] (19)KASIA2;1 Β ςας plakac. Musze. plakac. [I will cry. I must cry.] (20) KASIA 2;2 Mother: Nie me.cz Michaia. Kasia: Musze go meczyc. [Mother: Don't tease Michal. Kasia: I have to tease him.] (21) KASIA 2; 10 Jachce. do tatusia. Ja musze.. Koniecznie musze.. [I want (to go) to Daddy. I must. I must absolutely.] Second person forms, much less frequent, usually impose the child's will on his interlocutors, e.g.

(22) JAS" 2;4 Broniu musisz Jasiowidacpieluszke,, bo zrobilsisi. [Bronia, you have to give las' a diaper, because he made wee-wee.] (23) MICHAL 2; 1 Hala lala nie chce isc do wadze, nie chce ϊέό do wagi, awanturuje sie.. Mowi 'nie chce. ist', a ja mowie. 'musisz'. [Hala-Lala (the doll) does not want to go to the scales, she is making a scene. She says Ί don't want to go (there)' and I say 'You must1.]

Inusia is an affectionate form of the name Inka.

156

Magdalena Smoczynska

In the third person the form musi refers to states that the child claims to be necessary according to his will or some norm. It corresponds semantically to ma bye [it is to be so], which appears late and infrequently in the data. (24) MICHAL 2;9 (building a train) Jeszcze duzo koimusi miec, bo be_dziejechac. [It has to have lots more wheels because it is going to travel.] (25) INKA 2;8 Babciu, czemu tu potozaias obrazek. Wujek Zbyszek powieszat go, nie wolno ruszac, wiesz? Musi tu bye. [Granny, why did you put the picture here? Uncle Zbyszek hung it up, it is not allowed to touch it. It must be here.] (26)KASIA2;10 (dressing herself up) Tata powie 'ach!' Tak musi powiedziec. [Daddy will say 'Ah!' He must say so.] (27)KASIA2;11 (putting clothes on her doll Pyzia) Taka Pyzia musi bye ubrana. [Pyzia has to be dressed this way.] Forms expressing some more general kind of necessity appear only exceptionally at the end of the period under study, e.g. (28) MICHAL 2; 10 Jak laleczka prawdziwa, to musi isc. [If it's a real doll, it has to walk.] Negative forms of musi appear only marginally, usually in the sense of rejecting an imposed obligation: (29) INKA 2;0 Granny: Musisz Inusiu zjesc wszystko. Inka: Nie chce zupki, nie musi Inusia. [Granny: Inusia, you have to eat it all up. Inka: I don't want soup, Inusia does not have to (eat it).] The impersonal form of obligation is trzeba. It is less imperative than musi. It simply states that something should or needs to be done. It appears rather less frequently than musi in the data of the children studied. The typical situation of early use is that of mentioning a state which is negatively valued and a

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

157

suggestion of an action that will alter it. Let me illustrate it with some examples from Kasia's data, whose irzeöa-utterances constitute 25% of all her modal utterances. (30) KASIA 1;7 Brudny kamyk. Trzeba umyc. [Dirty stone. One-should wash (it).] (31)KASIA1;8 On zimno. Trzeba przykryc. [He (is) cold. One-should cover (him).] (32) KASIA 1; 10 Be Michat, paskudny. Trzeba Michaika bic. [Bad Michal, awful. One-should beat Michal.] (33) KASIA 2;6 Zapigte jest. Trzeba rozepnac. [It is buttoned. One-should unbutton (it).] (34) KASIA 1;8 (having found a needle) Igia. Trzeba szyc. [Needle. One-should sew.]11 It is worth noting that these frzeba-utterances, indirect in form, were usually directed to the child herself: most frequently she was the intended agent of the suggested action. Sometimes acknowledgement of some external obligation appears, probably through a quotation of the adult's indirect request: (35) KASIA 1;7 Kasia nie chce lezet. Trzeba lezec, trzeba, mamu. [Kasia does not want to lie down. One-should lie down, one-should, Mommy.] Still another use of trzeba is to impose the child's will:

In this utterance there is no negative state to be altered. The object itself, the needle, provides the stimulus for the trzeba utterance.

158

Magdalena Smoczynska

(36)KASIA1;10 Trzeba pic misiu herbatke. [One-should drink the tea, Teddybear. -> You should drink it.]

(37) KASIA 2;2 (putting the doll into the bed) Trzeba lezeo przyzwoicie, zeby bylo ciepio. [One-should lie properly, so that it will be warm.] Most of the frzeoa-utterances refer to immediate actions. Only at the end of the third year more general statements appear: (38) KASIA 2; 10 Trzeba bye cichutko jak kto$ paciorek mom. [One-should be quiet when somebody says (his) prayers.] (39) KASIA 2; 11 A oset to bardzo khije i trzeba uwazac, zeby nie depngc osta. [And the thistle is very prickly and one-should pay attention not to step on a thistle.] The negated form nie trzeba usually is as a gentle form of prohibition, e.g. (40) KASIA 2; 10 Nie trzeba pisac na ksigzce. Nie mozna. [One-should not write on a book. One mustn't.] and only one example was found of nie trzeba meaning 'there is no need to' instead of 'there is need not to': (41) KASIA 2; 11 (after she has learned how to ride a tricycle) Nie trzeba Kasi juz wiezc, bo Kasia juz umie. [There is no need to make Kasia ride (it) anymore, because Kasia already knows how (to do it).] With Michal and las' the most frequent use of trzeba is that of suggesting an action to alter a state12 .

If the child wants to make the agent explicit, the verb musi is employed in this context, e.g. MICHAL 2;1 Rozsypalam. Musz^ wszystko powkiadaa. [I spilled it out. I have to put it all back in.]

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

159

(42) MICHAL 2;6 Ο biedne zwierzaczki, trzeba je wyleczyc. [Oh, poor animals, one-should cure them.] (43) JAS 2;4 Zepsuio si ξ, trzeba zawiazac sznureczkiem. [It got broken, one-should fix it with a string.]

With Inka /rze&a-utterances are very infrequent and are mostly directive. (44) INKA 2;6 Nie wolno misiu do pieluszki sisiac, do nocniczka trzeba, wiesz? [Teddybear, it-is-not-allowed to do wee-wee in one's diaper, oneshould (do it) into the pot, you know?] The last modal form to appear and the most marginal is ma [is to]. For all the children except Kasia it is recorded in the second half of the third year. One of its uses is synonymous with musi bye mentioned earlier, e.g. (45) KASIA 2; 1 Tak ma bye. [It has to be this way.] (46) MICHAL 2;8 Ο tak to miato bye. [Oh, that's the way it should have been. -> It was supposed to be so.] Another use is the transformation of an imperative into the indicative mood: (47) JAS 2; 10 Masz lezec. Lez! [You are to lie down. Lie down!]

(48) INKA 2; 11 Osma godzina tatusiu, na Akademie, masz i$c, no wstawaj! [Eight o'clock, Daddy, you are to go to the Academy, get up!] (49) KASIA 2; 11 A co mam robic? [What am I to do?] The only two occurrences of the related form powinien [should], recorded with Kasia, are given below. Utterances of this kind are highly unusual with

160

Magdalena Smoczynska

young children, especially the first one, involving the epistemic modality and some very general considerations (although based on false premises: 'Small children are not supposed to go to the kindergarten'). (50) KASIA 2;9 (watching some small children marching down the street:) Gdzie one idq? Mother: Do przedszkola. Kasia: Chyba do szkofy. Chyba nie powinny chodzic do przedszkola, bo sg. mate. [Kasia: Where are they going? Mother: To the kindergarten. Kasia: I-rather-think to school. I-rather-think they oughtn't to go to the kindergarten, because they are small.] (51) KASIA 2; 10 Mother: Nasze dzieci poszfy do ogrodu. Kasia: Powinny juz wrocic. [Mother: Our children went to the garden. Kasia: They ought to be back by now.]

4.2

Prohibition and permission

Three impersonal verbs can be used to express a prohibition. They are ordered with decreasing strength: nie wolno > nie mozna > nie irzeba. The form nie wolno/wolno is specialized: it refers exclusively to prohibition and permission, whereas nie mozna/mozna in principle expresses impossibility/possibility (although pragmatically it is mainly used in the restricted prohibition/ permission meaning), and nie trzebaltrzeba serves primarily to express lack of need/need (see above) and is used only secondarily for attenuated prohibition. Among the children studied Inka used utterances with nie wolno in 47% of all her modalized statements. The form of prohibition is not diversified. Other children, especially Kasia, use all the three forms: (52) KASIA 1;9 &pi kaczorek. Nie trzeba budzic. [The duck is sleeping. One-should not wake it.] (53) KASIA 1; 11 Nie mozna ruszao. [One-should not touch (it).]

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

161

(54) KASIA 2;6 Mnie sie nie bije. Kasi nie wolno bit. [One does not spank me. It is not allowed to spank Kasia.] In the example above a non modal form of prohibition Mnie sie nie bije [One does not spank me] is used as well. This variety of forms used by Kasia seems to reflect the rich and diversified input she gets. This is also true of Michal, Kasia's older brother, whose speech development is based on the same kind of input. In contrast, Inka's family tends to use nie wolno as the unique signal of prohibition. Other forms appear rarely and this is reflected in her speech. Jas uses mostly nie wolno but in general he does not speak often about prohibition. The development taking place during the time span under study is decontextualization of the nie wolno utterances. At the beginning they are always used ad hoc, bound to the ongoing situation and frequently addressed to a particular person, whereas later the child formulates general statements about what is forbidden. Examples: (55) INKA 2; 1 (to her father who is lying on her bed:) Mietek, czemu spisz mo je iozko, nie wolno. [Mietek why are you sleeping (on) my bed, it is not allowed.] (56) INKA 2; 10 Nie wolno tapac zajgczka, nie wolno jesc. Bo by piakai. [It is not allowed to catch a hare, it is not allowed to eat it. Because it would cry.] Of the forms discussed above, the positive counterparts wolno and mozna are used to refer to permission. Pragmatic contexts for such reference are: asking for permission, contradicting an act of prohibition performed by a parent or reporting about an act of permission. In the first mentioned function, the personal verb moze is also used. (57) KASIA 1;8 Kasia: Co to jest? Mother: Sliwka. Kasia: Mozna jest? Mozna jesc [Kasia: What is this? Mother: A plum. Kasia: One-can eat? One-can eat a plum?]

162

Magdalena Smoczynska

(58)JA$1;10 Mozna fyzeczkg pic herbatke.? [One-may drink tea with a spoon?] (59) JAS 2;3 (has hit a playmate) Granny: Nie wolno bit Jurka. Jas: Wolno. Jurek niegrzeczny. [Granny: It is not allowed to hit Jurek. Jas: It is allowed. Jurek (is) naughty.]

(60) INKA 2;4 Mamusiu, möge, tic na ulice.? [Mommy, may I go on the street?] (61) MICHAL 2;5 Mamo, czy möge wziac podusie.? [Mommy, may I take the pillow?] (62) MICHAL 2;9 (playing with his tools) Möge, je ruszac, bo to moje. [I may touch them, because they (are) mine.] The last related form is the verb pozwolic [to allow, permit, let] which designates the speech act of permission (or prohibition if it is negated13). Its semantic structure therefore contains a modal constituent of permission. The verb appeared in the speech of all the children in situations when they reported to someone about an act of permission or prohibition performed by a third person. For some children it was also used to ask for permission, they formulated their request as a question or as an imperative. The following early example from Inka shows the original lack of understanding of the relation between pozwolic and the relevant modal verb moze: (63) INKA 2;2 (wants to go to a birthday party) Father: Mamusia ci nie pozwoli i£c. Inka: Pozwoli. Father: Idz sie. zapytaj mamusi, czy ci pozwala i$t. (Inka runs to her mother:) Pozwolisz mamuniu? Mother: Jak tie, tatui wezmie, to mozesz iuc. Inka: Pozwoliias mamuniu? The specific verbs of prohibition zabronii, zakazai [to prohibit, ban] were never used by the children.

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

163

mamuniu? Mother: Pozwalam. (Inka runs back to her father:) Mamunia pozwolila do Huty na imieniny. [Father: Mommy won't let you go. Inka: She will let (it). Father: Go and ask Mommy if she will let you go. Inka: Will you let (me), Mommy? Mother: If Daddy takes you, you may go. Inka: Did you let (me), Mommy? Mother: I let (you). Inka: Mommy let (me go) to Huta for the birthday party.] A somewhat later example shows that she has acquired the knowledge: (64) INKA 2;2 (playing in the sandbox, she brings a spoon) Mother: Skad masz ίς lyzeczke? Inka: Chlopczyk daltyzeczke. Mother: Na pewno pozwolilci chlopczyk bawic sie iyzeczkg? Inka: On dal Iyzeczkg, pozwolii. (She runs to the boy:) Pozwoliles? Boy: Mozesz sie. nig bawic. (She runs back to her mother;) Pozwolii chlopczyk, tak. [Mother: Where did you get this spoon from? Inka: A boy gave (me) the spoon. Mother: For sure did the boy let you play with the spoon? Inka: He gave (me) the spoon, (he) let (me). (To the boy:) Did you let (me)? Boy: You may play with it. Inka: The boy let (me), yes.] These and other early uses show the original close relation between the use of the verb and the pragmatic context, e.g.

(65) JAS 2;6 (picking strawberries with Kasia) Kasia: Nie wolno paluszkami. Jas: Babunia pozwolila. [Kasia: It is not allowed (to do it) with fingers. Jas: Granny allowed (it).] (66) MICHAL 2;3 (goes to his father after his mother did not allow him to take a pillow;) Michal: Prosze. mi pozwolic. Father: Ale co? Michal: Wzigc. Father: Ale co? Michal: Poduch%. Father: Mama ci nie pozwolila. Michal: No to ja wezme.. [Michal: Let me, please. Father: But what? Michal: Take (it). Father: But what? Michal: The pillow. Father: Mommy didn't let you (take it). Michal: Then I will take (it).]

164

Magdalena Smoczynska

(67) MICHAL 2;5 (having found a tool) To by mi sie przydaio. Pozwolisz mi to wzigo do ogrodu? Granny: Pozwole.. Michai: Mamo, babcia mipozwolifa. [Michai: This would be useful to me. Will you let me take it into the garden? Granny: I will let (you). Michai: Mommy, Granny let me.] Only later the verb is used with no connection with the immediate activity context, and that only with the most advanced children, Kasia and Michai: (68)KASIA2;11 Taka Anula milutka dla Kasi, ze jej ροζ\νοΙζ moj beret. Jaka Kasia miia! Wszystko pozwoli Anuli do spaceru, a sama bedzie chodzic w czapce z ogonkami. [Anula is so nice to Kasia that I'll let her (wear) my beret. How nice Kasia is! She'll let Anula (take) everything for the walk and she herself will wear her hat with tails.] (69) MICHAL 2; 11 Babciu, czy pozwolisz mnie i Anulce sie ozenic? [Granny, will you let Anula and me get married?]

4.3

Ability and inability

One of the earliest uses of the modal verb moze is that of expressing inability, especially when referring to the child's own physical inability to do something, stated in the context of asking for help, e.g.

(70) JAS 1;9 (trying to open a bottle) Nie m ge flaszeczki! [I can't (open) the bottle!] (71) JAS 1;11 (trying to reach a book) Nie m ge dostac ksiazki. Talus' MieciuS, do gory! [I can't reach the book. Daddy Miecius, up! (=lift me!)] (72) MICHAL 2; 1 Konikjest wysoko, nie m ge go dosiegnac. [The horsie is high, I can't reach it.]

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

165

(73) INKA 2;4 (trying to close a box)Nie möge., mamusiu. Zamknijpudteko. [I can't, Mommy. Shut the box.] (74)KASIA 1;8 (trying to put the shoes on to the doll) Wiozyc butku. Nie moze Kasia.

[To put shoes on. Kasia can't.] Other forms which occur in similar pragmatic contexts are nie da sie. and nie umie. The former is used when lack of success is not so much a matter of the agent's inability but rather a result of features of the object itself, thus it means: 'it can't be done'. The latter is used if the ability in question involves some kind of knowledge (know-how) or trainable skill.

(75) JAS" 2;6 (trying to button his pullover) Nie da sie, zapiac. Nie da sie. zapigc. No,juzdasie.. [It can't be buttoned. It can't be buttoned. Here, now it can.] (76) KASIA 1; 10 (brings a broken doll) Naprawic lale.. Nie umie Kasia. [To fix the doll. Kasia doesn't know how.] (77) KASIA 1; 11 Zapnie Kasia. (She tries to do it without success, finally gives up;) Nie umie Kasia. [Kasia will button (it). Kasia doesn't know how.] Szuman (1965) analyzed all Inka's utterances containing umiec [to know how] recorded from 1;0 to 7;0. He noted that the expression of inability preceded that of ability. It is only at the end of the third year that the child started to comment more and more about her newly acquired skills and knowledge and the positive form umie prevailed. At this stage she formulated general statements about skills and knowledge. Szuman's findings can now be confirmed for other children and for other verbs expressing inability/ability. (78) KASIA 2; 11 Ja umiem juz gwizdac. [I already can whistle.]

166

Magdalena Smoczynska

(79) MICHAL 2;8 (leaning out of the window) Ja umiem sie. wychylac, ale sie. nie be.de.. Bo to brzydko sie. wychylac. [I know how to lean out, but I won't. Because it's naughty to lean out.] In the later stages the expression of inability and ability evolves towards more general notions of impossibility and possibility. Earlier the child spoke about simple facts of physical inability, absence or presence of skill and knowledge. Now the child speaks about relations between events: some events are referred to as those which make other events possible or impossible. Since these more mature uses are especially interesting, an exhaustive list of examples is given. In Kasia's data these are quite numerous: (80)KASIA1;11 Nie möge, ci dac, bo Kasia spi, wiesz, bardzo jest chora. [I can't give (it) to you, because Kasia is sleeping, you know, she is very ill.] (81) KASIA 2;7 Nie pada deszczyk troszkg am wigcej. Mozna isc na spacer. [There is no rain either a little or more. One may go for a walk.] (82) KASIA 2;8 Jak jest deszcz, toparasola mozna wezlmic. [If there is rain, then one may take an umbrella.] (83) KASIA 2;9 Ona moze przyjsc sama, bo ona nie jest chora tak bardzo. [She can come by herself, because she is not so very ill.] (84) KASIA 2; 10 Nie mozemy jechac do Kasinki, bo teraz jest jesien. [We can't go to Kasinka, because it is autumn now.] (85) K ASIA 2; 11 Ona mi tak dokucza, ze nie möge, tego zapiac. [She is teasing me so, that I can't button it.] Michal has as well a few instances of these semantically advanced uses of moze:

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

(86) MICHAL 2;4 Jeszcze w dodatku potrzebne sitko do wozu, bo zebym mögt kre.cic. [A strainer is needed in addition to the carriage, because so that I could turn (it)14.] (87) MICHAL 2;5 Dalem mu takg, slomke, ktorq moznajesc. [I gave him a kind of straw that one-may eat. -> edible] (88) MICHAL 2;5 Juz zrobilo sie. cieplo i juz moglismy pojechac. [It got warm already and we could travel already.] (89) MICHAL 2;5 Zrobilo sie. juz cieplo i mozemy szczekac. [It got warm already and we can bark.] [!] (90) MICHAL 2;6 (covering his mother's feet with sand) Do nog tobie przysypie., zebys nie mogla^ poj&c na gor . [I will pour sand on your feet so that you can't go upstairs.] (91) MICHAL 2;10 (waving a feather) Zeby mo g l bye wiatr. [So that there could be wind.] With Jas these uses are less numerous and also less developed. (92) JAS" 2; 1 Bronia nie moze suszyc spodenki, majteczki. Nie majq we.gla, nie palq. [Bronia can't dry the trousers, the pants. There is no coal, they don't heat (the house).] (93) JAS" 2;8 Nie möge, pic, bo gorgca. [I can't drink (the tea), because (it is) hot.]

Note that moc appears in the conjunctive. Note the use of the subjunctive!

167

168

Magdalena Smoczynska

(94) JAS 2; 11 (after he changed his shoes for slippers) Teraz mozem juz kopac, to tig nie be.dzie bolalo. [Now I can kick (you) already, it won't hurt you.] With Inka one pattern is nie m ge., ηιιιζζξ [I can't do X, (because) I have to do Y]: (95) INKA 2;4 Granny: Ale nie spiesz sie tak Inusiu, mow wolno. Inka: Nie m ge, muszg ist do szpitala, pani tarn czeka na mnie. [Granny: But don't speak in such a hurry, Inusia, speak slowly. Inka: I can't, I have to go to the hospital, the lady is waiting for me there.] (96) INKA 2;7 Granny: Zjedz najpierw obiad. Inka: Nie m ge., muszg uczyc zadanie, ksiazki czytac wiesz babciu, ja do szkofy ide.. [Granny: Have your lunch first. Inka: I can't, I have to learn my homework, read books, you know Granny, I am going to school.] Other instances with Inka are: (97) INKA 2;7 Masz czyste raczki tatusiu, to mozesz ogladac ze mng. ksiazke.. [Your hands are clean, Daddy, so you can look at the book with me.] (98) INKA 2;9 Odmrozona byiam. Ale juz zagoifo sie., nie boli mnie juz, m ge isc na pole. [I was frozen. But it is healed now, it does not hurt anymore, I can go outside.] (99) ΓΝΚΑ 2; 10 (has asked her mother why the wind blows. The mother is giving her a long explanation:) ... wiatr wysuszy bloto i nie ma biota. Inka: Aha. I mozna iso na pole. [Mother: The wind dries the mud up and the mud is gone. Inka: Aha, and one can go outside.]

The Acquisition of Polish Modal Verbs

5.

169

Conclusions

The description of the acquisition of Polish modal verbs provides a strong confirmation of the findings reported by Stephany (1986), who analyzed Greek and English data on the acquisition of mood and modality. Polish shares the characteristics of both these languages: it has a well developed mood morphology like Greek and a variety of modal verbs like English. It seems that these two means of expressing modality do not greatly influence each other in development. In spite of the relatively early acquisition of the imperative and subjunctive/conditional morphology by Polish children, their acquisition of modal verbs is much like that of English speaking children (see Fletcher, 1986). Deontic modality prevails in all the children studied; the range of semantic/pragmatic functions performed by modal verbs is quite limited at the beginning; all the initial uses are performative. An interesting finding concerns environmental differences. The range of of modal verb functions seems to mirror that used by the child's family. A limited input, as with Inka, produced a very limited, strongly performative output, which was almost exclusively focused on prohibition/permission, whereas a rich and diversified input as in the case of Kasia and Michal brought about a correspondingly rich and diversified output. An interesting question would be to see if there is a relation between the style of speech and the individual development of modality. It seems that with Jas, a strongly object-oriented child, this development was relatively slow and limited, while with Kasia, strongly concentrated on interpersonal relations, a very precocious development took place, involving a large number of various quite advanced structures and meanings.

Susan C. Shepherd1

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

Le Statut des modaux en anglais est ambigu, parce que ceux-ci se situent entre grammaire et lexique et accusent une multifoncionnalito importante. Pour cette raison prdcise, les modaux constituent un objet intoressant dans le cadre deludes sur le doveloppement linguisüque et du point de vue de l'ontogenese et des changements diachroniques. La prosente 6tude se seit de plusieurs sortes de donnies afm de d&eler les caracte"ristiques de base des modaux: 1) des donnees authentiques du parier cr6ole de Hie d'Antigua (AC), ainsi que 2) des donn6es de l'acquisition de la langue maternelle, qu'elle soit l'anglais standard (SE) ou encore le creOle d'Antigua. Ces donnoes verbales sont mises en contraste avec l'emploi des modaux par les adultes parlant l'anglais standard. Puisque l'on n'a une notion que tres ge~n€rale des crdoles anglais, cette otude est ä la fois exploratrice et descriptive. Le creole d'Antigua dispose d'auxiliaires modaux qui ressemblent du point de vue phon6tique et, de maniere tres gondrale, se"mantiquement ä ceux de l'anglais Standard. Si l'on se met ä observer le sujet de plus pres, on docouvre, par centre, 1) que les modaux bounfu, hafu, mos, fi, mosa, kyan (kyaan) et go(n) difforencient les fonctions somantiques particulieres de maniere autre que le SE et 2) que ces modaux se distinguent de celui-ci par un emploi syntaxique difforent. Quant ä l'acquisition de la langue maternelle, on constate des paralleles entre les enfants apprenant le creOle et ceux qui apprennent le standard concernant 1) l'acquisition tardive des moyens opistomiques comparos au deontique (ce qui correspond, par ailleurs, ä la lignee du ddveloppement diachronique) et, 2) l'apparition de diffirenciations semantiques qui n'appartiennent pas ä la langue adulte.

Indiana University at Indianapolis

172

0.

Susan Sheperd

Introduction

The modals in English present an interesting area for study because of their ambiguous grammatical status. They are not clearly grammatical; neither are they clearly lexical. In addition: most of the modals serve multiple semanticpragmatic functions. They can be used epistemically to express varying degrees of possibility and probability, and deontically, to express notions such as obligation and permission. The syntactic and semantic characteristics of modals have been explored in some detail both in modern usage, and in terms of their historical development (see, for example, Lyons, 1977; Lightfoot, 1979; Palmer, 1979, 1986). The historical basis for their ambiguity and multifunctionality has been explored by Shepherd (1981, 1982), Traugott (1982, 1987), Sweetser (1984), and Bybee (1985), with evidence that the direction of development and change is unidirectional - proceeding from deontic to epistemic.

1.

The study

In this paper data from two types of language development other than historical change will be considered, namely, creolization and child language acquisition. There is no reason to assume that the use of modals in Creoles and child language will correspond identically to their use by adult native speakers of English. An examination of similarities and differences may provide us information as to what characteristics of modals are essential, and may also provide some clues as to the role of sociocultural and developmental factors in the assignment of meaning to modal forms. The data to be discussed here come from child and adult speakers of Antiguan Creole, an English-based Creole spoken in the West Indies, and child speakers of standard American English. The modal systems of other English-based Creoles, including those of Jamaica (Bailey, 1966), Guyana (Bickerton, 1975; Gibson, 1986), Hawaii (Bickerton, 1977, 1981), and Tok Pisin, spoken in Papua-New Guinea (Romaine, 1988), seem to be very similar to that of Antiguan Creole. Thus, many of the claims made here may be true of Creoles in general.

2.

Modals in Antiguan Creole (AC)

Antiguan Creole (AC) makes use of several modal forms, most of which are similar phonetically, and in a general sense, semantically, to English (SE)

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

173

modal auxiliaries and quasimodals (catenatives). These forms are bounfu, hafu, mosa, mos, kyan, and go(n); corresponding to bound to, have to, must, can, and going to. Another AC form,/«, is also used extensively. It is important to note that the use of these forms in AC does not correspond exactly to their use in SE. There are many differences between the two sets of forms. Other forms, wi, maita, wuda, kuda, and shuda, derived from English modals will, might, would, could, and should respectively, are also used in Antiguan Creole, but do not occur in the basilect and will not be discussed here. Few analyses of English-based Creoles have done more than make mention of Creole modal auxiliaries. Although linguists such as Bailey (1966) and Bickerton (1975) have discussed Creole modals to some extent, their descriptions in this area are incomplete and do not deal with the forms adequately. Bailey's groundbreaking analysis of Jamaican Creole involves only syntactic properties of the modals, which she considers preverbal particles. Bickerton implies that the use of Guyanese Creole modals is almost identical to SE in terms of both syntax and semantics. "Modals present the greatest area of similarity with standard English. It is unlikely that there is any speaker who lacks kyan 'can' or mos 'must'. It is true that both have variant forms: eebl, possibly more ancient than kyan, and mosi, derived presumably from 'must have' but not always used with a perfective sense. However, kyan and mos, when they do occur, are used in no ways that differ from their English uses (except that they follow rather than precede tense-aspect markers), and indeed they serve to introduce into GC the English verb-negation rule." (1975: 43) He makes similar assumptions in his discussions of Hawaiian English modals (Bickerton 1977: pp. 51, pp. 209). Bickerton (1981) discusses the ordering of modals in the verb phrase, but deals very little with their meanings. Elsewhere (Shepherd, 1981) I have demonstrated that although the forms themselves exhibit some similarity to SE forms, the functions of these forms and the ways they are used syntactically differ considerably from SE. The most significant differences will be summarized here. The AC modals can be combined (with certain restrictions) as double and sometimes triple modals. (1) An ya hafu kyan talk. [And you have to be able to talk (your way out of it).]

174

Susan Sheperd

(2) A mosa hafu Sally. [It absolutely has to be Sally.] (3) Ya gon hafu boun say subm. [You will certainly have to say something about it.] Some of the AC modals can occur as the only verb in a sentence - they are not always used in conjunction with a main verb. (4) Dem de kyan real. [Those can't be real.] (5) Mosa Jason lunchkit dat. [That must be Jason's lunchbox.] In SE the modals must precede all other auxiliaries. This is not true of AC modals. There are many syntactic differences between SE modals and quasimodals that are not used to differentiate the AC modals derived from these forms. The SE quasimodals are fairly clearly made up of separable parts (be + going + to, have + to), this is not true of the corresponding AC forms. Go(n), hafu, and bounfu each function as a single unit. Semantically the AC modals differ from the SE as well. Four forms, bounfu, hafu, mos, and/t, are used to express various sorts of obligation. The use of these forms is more clearly differentiated than that of their SE counterparts. Bounfu expresses extremely strong obligation, and is often used when the obligation is moral or religious. The source of authority is not necessarily mentioned, but is whatever the speaker perceives as a supreme being or God. The utterance often involves a reference to fate - to something which cannot be changed, or is out of the control of the speaker. This is the strongest type of obligation, and supreme authority is involved. Hafu expresses somewhat less strong obligation, and tends to be used when the source of authority is known and can be specified as a particular (human) individual. A speaker uttering / hafu... is likely to be referring to an obligation imposed by someone with more authority or power than the speaker. Mos conveys weaker obligation than bounfu and hafu. The source of authority is often unclear, and may be the speaker. Mos and// are more flexible than the other terms, and are used when the strength of the obligation is not clearly specified. Fi expresses the widest range of obligation. Most commonly it corresponds in meaning to the SE should, but it can also be used to convey fairly strong obligation. Mosa, possibly related to SE must have, expresses probability. Kyan is used to express both permission and ability. Unlike SE can/could, it rarely conveys

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

175

possibility. The negative form kyaan, however, occurs fairly regularly with the meaning of possibility. Go(n) expresses futurity, and sometimes certainty. Another form wi (related to SE will) is used so rarely, and only by acrolectal speakers, that it will not be included in this discussion. A major difference in AC and SE modals has to do with the expression of deontic modality (in which the constraint or obligation is recognized, endorsed, and possibly imposed by the speaker), dynamic modality (which reports the existence of some constraint) and epistemic modality (which involves the speaker's beliefs about the likelihood of the event under discussion). These distinctions are discussed in detail by Palmer (1979) and Gerhardt (n.d.). While individual SE modal auxiliaries are commonly used for all of these senses, such is not the case in the Creole. Mos and// are used only dynamically/deontically. They never occur with the epistemic meanings of probability and possibility. Mosa, on the other hand, is exclusively epistemic, expressing probability and possibility. Hafu and bounfu tend to be deontic. In my data, naturally occurring epistemic uses of these forms are extremely rare, but most speakers when questioned about their intuitions, feel that both forms can be used to express probability. This occurs when it is important to convey the degree of strength or probability, and the same strength hierarchy described above is used - bounfu expresses the highest degree of probability, followed by hafu, and then mosa. The following explanation, given by F during an interview, illustrates the relationships between these forms. (6)

F:

I: F:

If like you an Pat an my mother outside speakin an 1 turn from my sleep an I hear her -1 hear de three voices, but suppose de three voices soun de same. But I will say "a mosa Pat, naa, a mosa Pat." [Maybe it's Pat, you know, maybe it's Pat.] An den I'll turn over. Den muh say, "Tall - dot voice soun like Pat. A hafu Pat." [Not at all - that voice sounds like Pat. It must be Pat.] So you're sure? Yeah. An den ya come out. Υ a will say "oh", ya will say "I was right, man," kinda "a min bounfu Pat." Ya see? [It had to be Pat.]

Bounfu and hafu seem to be used epistemically only when the speaker feels it is necessary to distinguish between varying degrees of probability. Otherwise mosa is sufficient for a wide range of epistemic meanings.

176

Susan Sheperd

Source of authority and degree of control are important components of the deontic modals in AC. These distinctions are not expressed as clearly in the SE modals. Examples of modals in the speech of AC adults: - bounfu obligation: (7) Ya bounfu do who, dem say fu do. [You must do what they tell you to do.] (8) Ya bounfu eat plantain? [Do you have to eat plantains (just because you're from Dominica)?] probability: (9) He mosa tief um? i bounfu tief dem. [He probably stole them? He certainly stole them.] - hafu obligation: (10) Ya wan mefu deal wi? Ya hafu ha money laka peas. [You want to deal with me? You have to have lots of money. -> If you want to get involved with me, you have to have lots of money.] (11) Ya hafu do who you mama say. [You have to do what your mother says.] probability: (12) I hafu min wi Pat. [He must have been with Pat.] - mos obligation: (13) Me mos tap usin all dark color. [I have to/ought to stop using all dark colors (because they don't look good on me).] (14) Υa mos go tell she ya na vex wi she. [You have to go tell her you're not mad at her.]

-fi

obligation: (15) Mefibat. [I'm supposed to bat (while playing cricket).]

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

(16) A-you fi cook fish tonight. [You (pi.) are going to have to cook fish tonight (because someone just came in with a big catch for the day).] (17) Muh say yafi do urn. [I'm telling you that you have to do it (mother to daughter).] - mosa probability: (18) A mosa wet dey. [It must be wet there.] (19) Me ma link a so i go, but dem say a so i go. Mosa so. [I don't think that's what's going on, but they said that's what's happening. It must be true.] (20) A head skin he min senfii, bu he na get none. So she mosa sen de piece a pok. [He was sent to get head skin, but he didn't get any, so she must have sent a piece of pork instead.] - kyan (kyaan [can't]) permission: (21) One subm me can get dot keep out de heat an dem, a ten sumtingfor it. [One thing I can get that keeps away the heat rash - it costs ten something (dollars).] ability: (22) Me kyaan sing ya know. [I can't sing, you know.] possibility: (23) Pat, me kyaan sew ya dress now. [Pat, I can't sew your dress now (because I have to finish another one first).] (24) Ύa kyaan ge false gol jus so. [You can't get false gold (that looks so real).] - go(n) futurity: (25) He na go bang you man. He go ony put you pon ice. [He's not going to hit you, man. He's only going to kill you.]

177

178

Susan Sheperd

(26) He me gon cut i when muh na know how fu make it? [How am I going to cut it (a dress) out, if I don't know how you want me to make it?] certainty: (27) Dey na gon fit me good. [They're not going to fit me well.]

3.

Modals in AC child language

The AC child language data to be discussed here were collected at a daycare center. The sample, consisting of five children ages 3;2-5;0, is admittedly small, but the findings are consistent with data from ten other children, who will not be included in the analysis. My general impression is that AC children use modals less frequently than SE children. The youngest children rarely use modal forms, which is not to say that they do not express modal meanings. A preverbal particle, a, used as a marker of continuative aspect, as a copula, and as a topicalizer by adults, frequently serves a variety of functions in the speech of young children, including volition, futurity, obligation, and permission. Once they begin to use go(n), kyan, mos, hafu, and mosa, the patterns exhibited by AC children are similar to those found in children acquiring SE in many respects. Both groups of children express epistemic meanings quite late in comparison to deontic/dynamic meanings. In AC, mosa, which is used exclusively in epistemic contexts by adults, is the last modal form acquired. In my data, the first uses of mosa are often deontic, even though such uses do not occur in adult AC. Example (46) demonstrates the deontic use of mosa made by a child aged 4;6. Go(n) is the form most children use earliest, for volition and intention, followed by kyan, for ability and permisssion. Both are generally in use by 3;0, and hafu and mos are used for obligation by 3;5. Epistemic uses of mosa occur in my data only in the speech of children over the age of 5. Hafu seems to be used epistemically even later, and bounfu does not occur in my child data at all. Children also use modals to make distinctions not overtly present in the adult language, as will be discussed later in this paper. Examples of modals in the speech of AC children:

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

- go(n) (see also examples (47-60))

(28) L3;2 Me go put i in muh hair. [I'm going to put it in my hair.] (29) R3;3 Me go make urn run fas in muh car. [I'm going to make them go fast in my car.] (30) L3;2 Yestaday somebody say he gon mash up de school an burn i down. [Yesterday somebody said he was going to wreck the school and bum it down.] - kyan (kyaan [can't]) (31) L3;2 Me kyaan touch dem, you know. [I can't touch (reach) them, you know.] (32) L3;2 / kyan scale fish. [I can (know how to) scale fish.] (33) L3;2 ...me eat too much sweet as muh daddy tell me dot muh kyaan eat too much sweet. [I've been eating to much candy, and my daddy told me that I can't eat too much candy.] (34) K4;6 Sometime dey kyan go in people house ya know. [Sometimes they (ghosts, bogey men) can get into people's houses, you know.] (35) K4;6 / kyan write a alligator right here. [I can draw an alligator right here.] (36) C4;6 A-ya kyaan write a jumby. [You (pi.) can't draw a ghost.]

(37) C4;6 De boy kyaan catch it. [The boy can't catch it.]

179

180

Susan Sheperd

(38) K4;6 Υa kyaan wai? [Can't you wait.] (39) T5;0 / kyan see sumtin. [I can see something (out the window).] - mos

(40) C4;6 Ya mos say - ya mos say 'dem done gone a school', (giving directions in a game) [You have to say "They already went to school'.] (41) T5;0 Ya mos say 'Who bring ya here?' [You have to say, 'Who brought you here?'] - hafu

(42) C4;6 Wha ya bring de car up herefuh? A too much. A tory a-we hafu talk. [What did you bring the car up here for? That's too much. We have to tell stories.] (43) T5;0 Ya hafu fin de monkey. [You have to find the monkey.] (44) K4;6 Come muh show ya how i open... Ya hafu open - ow i open den? [Come on, I'll show you how to open it - How does it open?] (45) K4;6 Likl children kyaan talk on it co i hafu tune it firs. [Little children can't talk on it because he has to tune it first. (She is comparing her father's radio to the tape recorder used for the data collection.)] - mosa (deontic) (46) C4;6 A-ya play wi de sudn na. A-ya mosa gon play wi de sudn. [You play with that thing, okay? You (pi.) have to go and play with it.]

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

4.

181

Modals in child language development: Antiguan Creole and Standard English

As mentioned, the findings reported above are characteristic of the acquisition of SE, as well as AC. The same meanings that AC children express earliest with modals, are expressed earliest by SE children. Research on the acquisition of SE modals (Gerhardt, 1985, n.d.; Gee (Gerhardt) & Savasir, 1985; Stephany, 1986; Shepherd, 1981, 1983) supports the same progression from deontic and dynamic to epistemic that was found in AC. The most important point to be made is that deontic/dynamic meanings are expressed before epistemic ones. Volition, intention, ability, and permission come in early, followed shortly by obligation. Modals are used for epistemic possibility and probability comparatively late. Children's earliest uses of forms which can be deontic, dynamic, and epistemic in the adult language, are exclusively deontic or dynamic. Only later do they begin to use the forms for epistemic meanings as well. This pattern of development is also found in the historical development and grammaticalization of the English modal forms, and is sometimes seen as a move from concrete to abstract (Shepherd, 1981, 1982; Sweetser, 1984, 1987; Bybee, 1985; Bybee & Pagliuca, 1985; Traugott, 1982, 1987). The English modal auxiliaries were often main verbs before they became auxiliaries. As their grammatical status evolved, we find them used first deontically/dynamically, and only later epistemically. The first point, as well as the second, is paralleled in AC child language. For example, go as a verb of motion appears before it is used modally, and early uses are often ambiguous, as in examples (47) and (51).

(47) R3;3 Me go school wi me daddy. [(Tomorrow) I'm going to school with my daddy.] One characteristic of child language development is that children sometimes make innovations in their uses of particular forms. The meanings assigned by the child to a word (or structure) do not always correspond to those found in the adult language, (cf. Slobin, 1979, 1985a; Gee (Gerhardt) & Savasir, 1985; Shepherd, 1983, 1989; Deutsch & Budwig, 1983, for examples of this phenomenon). In order to clarify this point, findings reported in Shepherd (1989) will be briefly summarized here. In the speech of a 4;6 AC speaker, the forms go and go«, which seem to be used interchangeably by adults (no phonological, syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic conditioning factors have beeen found to date), are distinguished from one another on the basis of

182

Susan Sheperd

authority and control. Go is used to express willingness, intention, or prediction for those activities he performs or controls - for which he is, in a sense, the source of authority. Examples (48)-(54) illustrate his usage. Go is not simply used when the subject of the sentence is a first person singular pronoun (in ot^er words, when the agent is the child); it also occurs with second and third person subjects. He uses go after issuing a command to another child, in anticipation of that child's future compliance or other activity, as in (52) and (53). He also uses go as part of the verb phrase in utterances involving toys such as the soldier and tree in (54) - they are objects which he controls.

- go C 4;6 (48) / na go take de - take i back. [I'm not going to take the - take it back (referring to a toy he traded, and doesn't want to trade back).] (49) An I go wear it. [And I want to wear it.] (50) An me go put on dis. [And I'm going to put this on (my hand) (referring to a puppet).] (51) I go aks teacher. [I'm going to (go) ask the teacher.] (52) Ya go see I fin mine. [You'll see. I'm going to find it. (while looking for a picture in a book).] (53) De alligator - ya go write i. [You're going to draw an alligator, (command to another child).] (54) Ya see he ha a gun? Go shot dis tree and de tree go fall down. [You see he (a toy soldier) has a gun? He's going to shoot this tree, and the tree is going to fall down. (As C says this, he pretends the soldier is shooting, and then makes the tree fall over.] The form gon in the same child's speech is used for actions controlled and/or performed by others, as demonstrated by examples (55)-(60). The subject of gon can be a first person singular pronoun if the child is not the source of authority in the utterance. In (60) the child has just been told (by me) which book to look at. He is confirming that he has the right book. This could be compared with (48), in which he goes against a command given in the preceding utterance. He asserts that in this case he will not do what he has been told, and shifts the source of authority from other to self. (53)-(59) also make an interesting pair of examples. In (59) the child comments that another child

The Acquisition of Modality in Antiguan Creole

183

probably does not know how to draw an alligator, but since she controls her ability (or inability) to do so, he uses gon. In (53), when he commands the same child to draw an alligator, he uses go.

-gon (55) Co he gon comefuhya. [Because he's going to come for you.] (56) Dey gon take off dey other sock like dis. [They're going to take the other sock off (the clothesline) like this (referring to drawing in picture book).] (57) Ya gon lock de radio on again? [Are you going to turn on the tape recorder again?] (58) A na true. She na gon walkabout. [That's not true. She's not going to walk around.] (59) Me sho she na gon know how to write i. [I'm sure she's doesn't/won't know how to draw it.] (60) Me gon look at dis book? [Am I supposed to look at this book?] In the same study (Shepherd, 1989) a SE child was found to make a similar distinction in her use of will and gonna. Gee (Gerhardt) & Savasir (1985) have also analyzed the use of will and gonna in the speech of two three-year-old SE children. They found a distinction between the two forms based on activity type. Will is used in 'undertaking', and "concerns the speaker's willingness to undertake a commitment to carrying out a cooperative activity" (1985: 172). It is interactive and is usually used for concurrent and immediately subsequent events. Gonna is used in planning, which tends to be less interpersonal, and often involves reference to the distant future. Their findings differ from mine, in which go (AC) and gonna (SE) were found to be proximal, and gon (AC) and will (SE) more distal. I analyzed the forms in terms of self- and othercontrolled events, Gee & Savasir (1985), in terms of cooperative and planned activities. The studies are not totally contradictory, however. Different methods were used in data collection. The AC data from peer-peer conversations, as are Gee & Savasir's SE data. My SE data are mother-child, which may account for some of the differences. More importantly, the AC children come from a community in which sharing and cooperation are taken for granted. These concepts are not consciously 'taught'. What children are 'taught', however, is the importance of individual identity. The converse seems to me to be more true of middle-class SE speakers. The individual is recognized - that goes without saying - but children are 'taught' to share. If my

184

Susan Sheperd

analysis of the societies is correct, it might explain some of the differences in children's expression of modality. In order to distinguish forms not clearly distinct in the adult language, children in each society seem to draw on concepts they are being 'taught1, which they would logically see as important in their lives. In recent work, Gerhardt (n.d.: 68) suggests that SE children's use of the modal catenatives hafta, needta, and wanna, can be described in terms of type of force, involving "i) the nature of the force ('compulsion' vs. Volition') and ii) the source of the force ('external' vs. 'personal')". She characterizes the forms as follows: hafta = 'external/compulsion'; needta = 'personal/compulsion'; and wanna = 'personaI/volition'. This seems quite similar to what I have called control (compulsion/volition) and source of authority (personal/external). Gerhardt's analysis is revealing, showing how the two sets of meanings interact.

5.

Final remark

I do not find it disturbing that different children might employ different strategies in their use of modal forms. They incorporate aspects of their social situation as they perceive it and assign functions to forms or choose forms to express functions accordingly. I would expect to find many children using features such as self and other, and compulsion and volition in their construction of language. Modality is an ideal area for experimentation because it involves meanings related to these concepts, and because even in the adult language the forms are flexible - they are ranged along a continuum, without clearcut boundaries between forms, and are often used to serve more than one function.

Christian Champaud1, Dominique Bassano2, Maya Hickmann3

Modalite epistemique et discours rapporte chez 1'enfant

The present developmental study focuses on the process of reporting modal forms in discourse narrative productions. We examine 1) the mechanisms of restitution of modalities (reproduction, suppression, lexical substitution); 2) the effects of modalities on the form of reported speech (direct or indirect quotation, organisation of deictics); 3) the attribution of an epistemic state of certainty or uncertainty to the speaker. In our experiments 4-8 year old children were shown short movies. Immediately afterwards, they were asked to narrate the story and a subsequent interview took place. The story plots involved verbal interactions during which one of the protagonists produced a target utterance accusing another of having committed an unwarranted act (e.g. spilling a cup of something). Three variable factors were introduced: 1) presence vs. absence of the speaker during the act; 2) assertive form vs. modalised form of the utterance (je crois [I think/believe]); 3) true vs. false statement. The major results indicate 1) the reluctance of subjects to report exactly the believe-modality, according to developmental and pragmatic factors; 2) that functional constraints seem to be a determining factor in the use of the forms of quotations: indirect speech is not used to report the belief statement; 3) that there is a clear developmental increase in the attribution of uncertainty, along with a progression in children's conceptions of the relevant epistemic categories: young children have a realistic conception mainly determined by the truth/falsity of the utterance; for the older subjects the two other factors become the most important: linguistic markers such as modal devices are taken into account, and a metalinguistic and revised/relativised conception of epistemic categories emerges.

1 2 3

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France. Max-Plank Institut für Psycholinguistik, Nimegue, Pays-Bas

186

0.

Christian Champaud, Dominique Bassano & Maya Hickmann

Introduction

Les analyses presentees ici concernent le developpement des modalites epistemiques chez des enfants fran9ais: elles examinent comment ils rapportent des enonces comportant des modalites epistemiques, et comment ils commentent l'emploi de ces modalites. Plus precisement, nous presenterons quelques donnees developpementales obtenues partir de productions orales d'enfants qui Γόη a demande de raconter des films qu'ils venaient de voir en video (recit), puis de repondre une serie de questions portant sur certains passages des films posees l'enfant par un adulte suppose naif (entretien). On se propose d'examiner l'incidence de certaines conditions (systematiquement variees) sur la ίαςοη dont les enfants des ges etudies rapportent des actes de langage et les envisagent. En effet, un moment donne de chaque scenario, Tun des personnages produit un enonce (enonce-clef) qui relate une action precedemment effectuee par un autre personnage. Cet enonce est une phrase assertive avec ou sans le verbe modal croire (Je crois que c'est le chien qui a fait ςα/C'est le chien qui a fait ςα) et son caractere plus ou moins approprie varie d'un scenario l'autre selon plusieurs caracteristiques tenant aux locuteurs de ces enonces, aux evenements mentionnes et aux relations entre les deux. L'etude detaillee des recits fournis par les enfants s'est concentree sur les moyens employes pour (a) rapporter l'enonce-clef quand cela etait le cas. Les questions posees au sujet apres son recit visent obtenir des informations concernant s perception des enonces-clefs. Par exemple, on demande l'enfant (b) d'expliquer ces enonces (Pourquoi U a dit ζαΐ), (c) de proposer une alternative (Qu'est ce que tu aurais dit?), (d) d'attribuer au locuteur une attitude epistemique de certitude ou d'incertitude l'egard de l'evenement (Est ce qu'il est s rl), etc. Dans le texte qui suit, nous resumons certains aspects des donnees, en particulier celles qui concernent (a), (c) et (d). On trouvera des analyses plus detaillees et d'autres resultats dans Bassano, Champaud & Hickmann (1988) (a), (1989) (d), Bassano, Hickmann & Champaud ( paraitre) (d), Champaud, Hickmann & Bassano (en preparation) (a), Hickmann, Bassano & Champaud, (sous presse) (b).

1.

Les modalites epistemiques et leurs difficultes

On peut donner une definition generale et lapidaire de la categoric des modalites epistemiques en disant qu'elles s'interessent la connaissance que

Modalite" 6pist6mique et discours rapporto chez 1 'enfant

fran^ais

187

nous avons des choses (Alleton, 1984), des evenements, des actions, des etats, etc. Par lä-meme elles ont ä voir avec l'attitude du locuteur envers le contenu propositionnel de l'enonce; en effet on a pu soutenir qu'elles qualifient ce contenu eu egard ä sä validite, sa verite, sa factualite (Lyons, 1977). Les psycholinguistes developpementaux s'accordent generalement ä reconnaitre que, lors de 1'ontogenese, la production et la comprehension des formes exprimant ce type de modalites semblent plus tardives par rapport ä d'autres types (en particulier modalites deontiques, mais aussi modalites dynamiques et plus generalement les modalites de type agent-oriented). II faut toutefois noter que les travaux specifiques disponibles actuellement portent surtout sur des langues comme 1'anglais (Hirst & Weil, 1982), l'allemand (Hofmann, 1986), ainsi que sur le grec (Stephany, 1985a), le polonais, (Smoczynska, ce volume), et que les travaux sur le frangais ont souvent ete developpes dans des perspectives qui ne se fixaient pas pour but la comparaison entre modalites deontiques et epistemiques. On trouvera un etat de la question dans Stephany (1986, et ce volume). Nous soulignerons que cette apparente hierarchic dans la succession (deontique/epistemique) doit sans doute etre consideree dans un cadre plus large incluant d'autres proprietes des modalites, mais que les fails majoritairement rapportes dans l'ontogenese paraissent concorder avec ce que observe dans les changements diachroniques qui affectent les langues naturelles (Döhmann, 1960; Fleischmann, 1983; Goossens, 1981; Slobin, 1985c, par exemple). Pour ce qui est de l'acquisition de L2, on peut trouver des indications dans Dittmar (ce volume); il faut cependant tenir compte des remarques de Stoffel & Veronique (ce volume) sur la plurifonctionnalite des formes (par exemple le deontique #///