Mobility instead of exodus: Migration and Flight in and from Africa 9783658400835, 9783658400842

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Thomas Faist · Tobias Gehring Susanne U. Schultz

Mobility instead of exodus Migration and Flight in and from Africa

Mobility instead of exodus

Thomas Faist • Tobias Gehring Susanne U. Schultz

Mobility instead of exodus Migration and Flight in and from Africa

Thomas Faist Fakultät für Soziologie Universität Bielefeld Bielefeld, Germany

Tobias Gehring Bertelsmann Foundation Gütersloh, Germany

Susanne U. Schultz Fakultät für Soziologie Universität Bielefeld Bielefeld, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-40083-5    ISBN 978-3-658-40084-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This book is a translation of the original German edition „Mobilität statt Exodus“ by Faist, Thomas, published by Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH in 2021. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Contents

1 Introduction: A Continent on the Move��������������������������������������������������� 1 2 Migration: Drivers and Dynamics of Cross-Border Mobility ��������������� 9 3 Flight in Africa�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������21 4 Internal Migration and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa �����������29 5 Integration in Africa�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������35 6 Migration and Refugee Policy in Africa���������������������������������������������������45 7 Diaspora as Mediator Between Africa and Europe���������������������������������51 8 European  Interventions: On the Externalization of Migration Control���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������65 9 What to Do? To Promote Mobility�����������������������������������������������������������79 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������87

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Abbreviations

AfDB AU BAMF BMZ CIGEM COMCAD ECOWAS EPA EU GAMM IDP ILO IOM PRS SEZ SRS UEMOA UNHCR

Afrikanische Entwicklungsbank/African Development Bank African Union Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Center for Migration Management and Information/Centre d’information et Gestion des Migration Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development Economic Community of West African States Economic Partnership Agreements European Union Global Approach to Migration and Mobility Internally Displaced Persons International Labour Organization/International Labour Organization International Organization for Migration Protracted Refugee Situation Special Enterprise Zones Self Reliance Strategy Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Global migration movements. (Source: Withol de Wenden 2018)���������� 3 Fig. 1.2 Migration movements into and out of sub-Saharan Africa. (Source: Mercandalli 2017, p. 23)���������������������������������������������������������5 Fig. 1.3 Early human migration. (Source: https://www.crystalinks.com/ migrationhuman.html)���������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Fig. 2.1 Inverted U pattern of migration. (Source: Clemens 2014, p. 155) �������� 13 Fig. 2.2 Migration movements in West Africa. (Source: Boyer 2017, p. 31) ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 Fig. 3.1 Global distribution of refugees, end 2017. (Source: UNHCR 2018, p. 10) �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 Fig. 3.2 Main destination countries for refugees, end 2017. (Source: UNHCR 2018, p. 15)���������������������������������������������������������������������������23 Fig. 8.1 Migration routes through North Africa. (Source: de Haas 2007, p. 17) ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������72 Fig. 8.2 Border installations in Ceuta and Melilla �������������������������������������������75

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1

Introduction: A Continent on the Move

Generally, Africa is regarded as a “continent on the move” (Tetzlaff 2019) in academic observation and in mass media reports – movement primarily in the direction of Europe. In this context, the public discussion is characterized by two misconceptions. The first of these is that high population growth in Africa would quasi-automatically trigger higher international migration to the neighbouring European continent. There is even talk of a “rush to Europe” (Smith 2018). The second frequently encountered misconception assumes that migration and flight in and from Africa is predominantly a result of poverty, violent conflict and environmental degradation (but see Braunsdorf 2016; Crawley et  al. 2018). Neither of these can be reconciled with the facts at hand.

Population Growth and Migration With regard to the first assertion, population forecasts usually assume that the population on the African continent will grow from the current level of about 1.2 billion people to 2.5 billion by 2050. It will then double its share of the world’s population to about 20%. The African Development Bank (AfDB) expects around 295 million young people to enter the labour markets of African countries by 2030. This would represent a 40% growth in the working-age population. However, according to the AfDB, Africa is currently creating only 12 million new jobs per year. As a result, up to 100 million young people could be unemployed in 2030. The unemployment rate in Africa is already 28% (AfDB 2019, 2020). Nevertheless, a directly derived and imminent mass rush to Europe is bad news that is not shared

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_1

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1  Introduction: A Continent on the Move

by serious population science (Héran 2018). Already now, migration shares lag behind population shares: while Africa has 16% of the world’s population, the continent produces only 14% of migrants. Indeed, the absolute number of international migrants has increased from about 16.3 million in 2000 to about 23.9 million in 2015. However, the share in the total population remained stable. At about 2.5% from 2000 to 2015, it was even lower than the 3.2% in 1990 – and lower than the share of all migrants in the world population, which was about 3.3% in 2015 (Carbone 2017). It is therefore important to observe that a high migration potential does not automatically result in a high actual migration volume (Faist 2000a). In this context, Africa is spoken of in very general terms. The problem is not only that the diversity of this continent is forgotten (Flahaux and de Haas 2016, p. 2). What is quickly lost sight of is that the available data point to a much more exciting narrative: Migration is predominantly intra-African. Mobility in and out of Africa is part of global migration movements (Fig. 1.1). More than half of the world’s 36.6 million migrants from Africa lived in another African country in 2017 (SVR 2020, pp. 9, 15–18). And nearly 90% of migrants come from neighbouring countries; that is, much of the migration stays within the region. In West Africa, this is a good two-thirds of all nine million migrants (ibid., p. 20). South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire are the two most popular countries of immigration in Africa, followed by Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia. It is therefore not surprising that about 80% of sub-Saharan African migrants in Libya have no intention of migrating on to Europe. They are predominantly people who migrate circularly and seek work in North Africa (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017). Only since about the 1980s do we observe increased emigration to Europe, North America, the Gulf States and selected Asian countries such as China. About onesixth, or 8.9 million, of the migrants living in the European Union (EU) are from Africa (Antil et al. 2016). It is important to note, then, that migration between African countries exceeds intercontinental migration (Table 1.1); not to mention the even much higher internal migration within African countries. This statement still holds true today, although migration from Africa to the rest of the world increased between 1960 and 2000. Nor should it be forgotten that Africa also functions as a continent of immigration, formerly by the colonial powers, and today, for instance, by skilled workers from the Indian subcontinent1 in East, West and Southern Africa, but also immigration from China, for instance under the Belt and Roads Initiative (Giese and  In the nineteenth century, labour migrated from India for railway construction in the British colonies of East Africa (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uganda/_Railway#Workers) 1

Fig. 1.1  Global migration movements. (Source: Withol de Wenden 2018)

Population Growth and Migration 3

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1  Introduction: A Continent on the Move

Table 1.1  Migrants (stock) from, to and within Africa From Africa to the rest of the world 1960 1,830,776 1980 5,418,096 2000 8,734,478

From the rest of the world to Africa 2,811,930 1,872,502 1,532,746

Within Africa 6,176,385 7,966,359 10,500,00

Source: Global Bilateral Migration Base, https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-­ bilateral-­migration-­database; for further data see, inter alia, https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/ sites/default/files/2020-­05/2019-­forum-­report_0.pdf

Marfaing 2016; Mohan and Lampert 2014; Chatzky and McBride 2020). Moreover, given the high number of returnees both from outside Africa to African c­ ountries and from one African country to another, reintegration plays an important role.

Poverty: Not a Direct Driver of Migration As for the second assertion, namely that poverty is the main cause of international migration, it cannot be substantiated either. On the contrary, poverty tends to reduce migration because migration over longer distances requires considerable financial resources. Rather, the drivers of migration must be seen in socio-economic development and social transformation. This means that in order to understand (cross-border) mobility, it is important to analyse more closely the increased opportunities and aspirations of individuals as a result of social transformation. Finally, the trend is unmistakable: about half of the 20 fastest growing economies are located in Africa (ze.tt 2017; cf. AfDB 2020). All these observations speak against the often expressed thesis that Africa is characterized by an exodus (Collier 2014). This is because migration within Africa is quantitatively higher than intercontinental migration out of Africa (see also Fig. 1.2); apart from the fact that there is much short-term and seasonal mobility across borders, which, according to the UN definition, is not categorized as migration in official statistics. For migration in and out of West Africa – already historically known as one of the most mobile regions in Africa (Adepoju 2005) – it is true, for example, that with the exception of Cape Verde, only a very small proportion of the population of West African states migrate to Europe and other OECD countries (Boyer 2017, p.  31). For West Africans now migrating to Europe, Germany has been an important destination for receiving and distributing refugees for over a decade, along with Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal (de Haas 2007, p.  33). These migrants are mainly from Nigeria, while

Fig. 1.2  Migration movements into and out of sub-Saharan Africa. (Source: Mercandalli 2017, p. 23)

Poverty: Not a Direct Driver of Migration 5

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1  Introduction: A Continent on the Move

East Africans are particularly from Somalia and Eritrea (BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) 2020). The directions of migration from Africa are diverse: intercontinental migration out of Africa goes not only to Europe, but also to the Gulf States, increasingly to China (Gordon 2015) and to South and North America.

Historical Context of Migration The current migratory movements into, out of and towards Africa must be seen against the background of a long history of migration that goes back not just thousands but millions of years. As early as six million years ago, the ancestors of today’s homo sapiens left the tropical rainforest in Africa for the savannahs. They took advantage of a new habitat and developed the upright gait. However, this was a slow process. They did not leave Africa until two million years ago (Schrenk 2016). There were four possible routes out of Africa. The first was via Gibraltar with raft-like companions across the strait to the Iberian Peninsula. The second went via islands into what is now southern Italy, where 1.4 million year old tools are found. The third route was across present-day Israel and the Levant, and the fourth across the Arabian Peninsula into the Caucasus and toward Southeast Asia (Fig. 1.3). In the wider history, the Bantu dispersal in Africa about 3000 years ago is worth mentioning. In modern times, slavery, including overseas movements from the seventeenth century onwards, contributed to major population movements; as did forced resettlements by the European colonial powers of Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Germany. This involved, among other things, labour for plantations in Côte d’Ivoire or mining in South Africa and infrastructure projects, e.g. the construction of the railway from Uganda to Tanzania.

Structure of the Book The following chapters provide an overview of the most important aspects of migration and flight in and from Africa. The second chapter deals fundamentally with the causes and drivers of cross-border and internal migration and mobility. It is important to note that, in addition to clear cases of forced migration, the relationship between opportunities for spatial mobility on the one hand and social aspirations on the other is crucial. The third chapter provides an overview of refugee movements in Africa and differentiates, among other things, according to regional

Structure of the Book

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Fig. 1.3  Early human migration. (Source: https://www.crystalinks.com/migrationhuman. html)

aspects. It is important to note that the vast majority of all refugees remain in the region, even if this involves cross-border flight. The fourth chapter deals with an often neglected dimension of spatial mobility and refugee migration, namely internal migrants and internally displaced persons. The guiding principle is the recognition that mobility, rather than sedentariness, is the central starting point for understanding these processes. In the fifth chapter, attention rests on processes of migrant integration in African countries. Here, the focus is on the case of South Africa as one of the most important destination countries in Africa. This issue requires special attention, as central concepts of integration research have usually been developed for North America and Europe and cannot be applied to African conditions without difficulty. The sixth chapter describes the current policies of African governments with regard to migration and flight. The seventh chapter takes up two key developments in migration control, externalisation from Europe into Africa and securitisation of migration. Both are also global trends. An important unintended effect of externalisation is that it makes migration illegal. This means that the interventions create, or at least reinforce, the phenomenon that policy declarations are

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1  Introduction: A Continent on the Move

designed to address. The concluding eighth chapter addresses policy solutions to the unanswered questions of managing migration. In particular, this chapter addresses migration as an instrument of development and refugee migration using the example of two policy proposals from the social sciences, an economically oriented resource approach and a rights approach aiming at the political autonomy of refugees.

2

Migration: Drivers and Dynamics of Cross-Border Mobility

If poverty is not the main cause of migration, what are the drivers? Empirical research has demonstrated that it is not the poorest of the poor who cross borders towards Europe (Ahmed 1997; de Haas 2007). This is also simply related to the requirement that, in addition to information about routes and destinations, considerable financial resources amounting to several thousand euros are usually necessary.

Migration Motives The motives for migration can be grouped into four main categories, which are not mutually exclusive and usually interact. First, migration can serve to optimise material resources such as income. This thesis is advanced in particular by economic, especially neo-classical theory (e.g. Todaro 1970). It is based on the assumption that reliable information on income differences, for example, is available and that people try to optimise their income by migrating to regions with higher income. Second, migration can serve to manage risks, for example for rural farming families, in order to compensate for lost income from crop failures. This has been pointed out in particular by the “New Economics of Labor Migration” (Stark 1991). The constellations in which this motive occurs are characterised by the fact that there is no formal insurance for most risks in agriculture in the countries of the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_2

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Global South.1 Seasonal migration to neighbouring regions and states in particular, whether in mines or again in agriculture, therefore serves as a kind of informal insurance. Third, migration can aim to maintain social ties. This approach builds on social capital theory, which sees resources mobilized through social ties as crucial preconditions for social order; including at the level of families. Social capital is not intrinsically mobile and therefore not easily transferable across borders, but it can become mobile through migration networks and institutions (Faist 2000a, pp. 102–123). Family reunification is also one of the most important legal categories in migration from Africa to Europe, along with labour migration and flight or asylum (Grote 2017). Fourth, migration can result from the avoidance of danger. This is often forced migration,2 which is mainly caused by physical violence, as in civil wars, or structural violence, as in economic crises (Zolberg et al. 1989). It should not be forgotten that other types of migration are also rarely entirely voluntary; even labour migration is often based on coercion and hardship. It is useful to distinguish between causes and drivers of migration. The causes include the unequal distribution of life chances in many parts of the world, but also in the regions of emigration themselves, environmental degradation or political regimes that oppress the respective populations (Faist 2019). These thus form the causal background. Drivers, in contrast, are acute political and economic crises, regime changes, or droughts or floods that directly contribute to mobilizing people to migrate. Drivers also include recruitment through agencies (Gammeltoft-­Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen 2013) and migration networks, which often reduce the financial, social and psychological costs of migration (Massey et al. 1993).  It would be premature and unproductive to understand the terms “Global South” and “Global North” in purely geographical terms. For example, there is currently also a global South in Europe, such as economically peripheral regions in Bulgaria or Romania. The pair of terms refers to the power imbalances – economic, political and cultural – between and within world regions. As a rule, these terms must be accompanied by differentiations indicating which aspect is to be illuminated, e.g. emigration regions with low levels of socio-economic development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). This makes it possible to avoid the premature homogenisations that underlie all dichotomous categorisations: global South/global North, developed/less developed states, etc. 2  “‘Forced migration’ refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (displaced by conflict) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.” (Forced Migration Review, https://www.fmreview.org) Forced migration could be seen as an umbrella term underlying multiple forms of structural and physical violence, and refugee migration in the sense of the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951) and its Protocol (1967) as a specific case in which people migrate because of persecution for belonging to social categories such as religion, “race”, nationality and group membership. 1

Socio-economic Transformation

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The causes and drivers can therefore be manifold, and as a rule various factors interact in every migration decision (Aksakal 2020). For example, environmental changes such as sea-level rise in coastal regions often are not the only causes and drivers of emigration. Lacking prospects for decent livelihood may also play a role. Similarly, migrants in other parts of the world, such as individuals who emigrated to New Zealand from the doom-threatened island of Tuvalu in the Pacific, tend to emphasize better economic opportunities in the country of immigration rather than environmental threats as a migration motive (Shen and Gemenne 2011). Nevertheless, it is important to consider ecological factors. For example, in the West African Sahelian countries of Mali and Senegal, since the severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, rural populations have depended on seasonal and increasingly prolonged regional as well as international migrations for food security. Despite today’s strongly fluctuating climatic conditions, it is mainly growing incomes, increasing education, long-established social networks and multilocal households, and rising aspirations that set migration in motion, perpetuate it, and also intensify it (e.g. Hummel 2014, pp. 54–57).

Socio-economic Transformation Much more than scarcity – which can certainly be seen as a driver in the case of disasters and violent displacement – it is socio-economic change leading to higher life chances that systematically enables and structures mobility and immobility. It can be observed, for example, that international migration is particularly evident from countries undergoing a socio-economic and political transformation of living conditions. Examples include Turkey, Mexico and the Philippines from the 1960s to the beginning of the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, countries such as Nigeria and Kenya also fall into this category. However, these general conditions must always be placed in their specific historical and regional context. European overseas migration in the second half of the nineteenth century could be channelled to settler colonies such as the USA, Canada, South Africa or Australia  – the “population surplus” in Europe could thus be exported overseas on a large scale, as it were. This is not even approximately possible in the states that are nowadays undergoing a demographic transition (Zelinsky 1971). Such a demographic transition means an increase in life expectancy with simultaneously increasing or at least not decreasing birth rates and decreasing infant mortality  – until eventually birth rates also decrease and the population grows less rapidly or stops growing at all or even declines. In Africa, countries undergoing such a demographic transition include Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya. The fact that it is impossible for many coun-

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tries to cushion the demographic transition through emigration is partly due to the increased ability of immigration states in the Global North to limit and control ­migration.

Dynamics of Migration Transnational migration processes show their own dynamic (endogenous) course. As a starting point, it can be stated: While the poor also migrate, they migrate less frequently and over shorter distances. In contrast, those considered “highly qualified” and thus members of better-off social classes are overrepresented in cross-­ border migration. Once transnational migration processes are underway, the necessary financial capital can be partially replaced by social capital, i.e. social ties and their inherent resources such as reciprocity and solidarity. Networks among migrants in kinship groups can act as a source of social capital, for example, by helping pioneer migrants to finance migration and by supporting resources to obtain housing or a job in the early stages in the country of immigration. In acceleration phases of migration, holders of low financial capital may also migrate – ideally to the point of flattening out when all those willing to migrate have been able to realise their intention (Faist 2000a, pp. 143–194). Macro-structural effects can be described in the context of social transformation, which go hand in hand with economic development. For example, the highest emigration rates are generally observed in countries that are experiencing rapid economic growth, while emigration rates are in turn lower in the phase before and the phase after. This pattern of correlation between economic development and emigration is currently observed in Africa in the case of Nigeria and Kenya, for example. In contrast, far fewer people migrate to Europe from economically poorer countries such as Chad and Niger. A typical pattern of an inverted U is emerging (Fig. 2.1 for global developments): Emigration rises first as per capita income rises, before falling again as average income rises relatively. The emigration rate is currently highest at incomes of around US$ 5000. To date, a simple pattern can be observed for the relationship between economic development, emigration and immigration, namely the parallel linear increase in economic development and immigration, while emigration in turn decreases over time.

Migration as Relative Deprivation

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Fig. 2.1  Inverted U pattern of migration. (Source: Clemens 2014, p. 155)

Migration as Relative Deprivation From a macro perspective, however, migration processes are not purely economically determined, but are also shaped by political framework conditions such as emigration controls and recruitment by immigration countries. It is by no means only the opportunities and restrictions for cross-border migration that play a role. Rather, it is the interplay between these opportunities and the hopes and ­expectations of potential migrants (aspirations) that is a fundamental element of migration dynamics. It is the interplay of immigration and emigration policies of immigration, transit and emigration countries, and the aspirations of potential migrants to realise notions of the good life, that are crucial to much of cross-border mobility. For example, recruitment policies of immigration states create expectations in potential and current countries of origin. A process of relative deprivation is often set in motion, also known as the Tocqueville effect (Faist 2007). This effect states that expectations viz. aspirations of individuals generally rise faster than the opportunity to take up opportunities such as migration. This mechanism implies that successful migration often feeds back to the regions of origin in such a way that the regular or official opportunities for migration rise less rapidly than the expectations to participate in them. Once such processes are underway, often accelerated by migration networks that reduce the financial costs of migration, expectations rise faster than in situations where few or no opportunities were or are available.

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2  Migration: Drivers and Dynamics of Cross-Border Mobility

Thinking further, relative deprivation in migration also means that, in these constellations, illegal migration can be a consequence of processes that are triggered by legal opportunities to migrate in the first place. What is referred to as illegal and sometimes irregular migration – namely crossing the border without valid official documents or exceeding the time limits granted by another country for residence – is thus not only an effect of increasingly restrictive control and immigration policies, but is also rooted in the inherent dynamics of migration processes. All these considerations refer to the internal or endogenous dynamics of migration movements. But what happens when external factors have a decisive influence on migration? Economic factors often play a role here, but also political developments such as revolutions, regime changes and persecution of certain groups (Zolberg et al. 1989). An example of the importance of economic and political factors and a migration regime determined by them can be found in West Africa. Through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regional migration has grown steadily since the 1970s (Fig. 2.2). Treaty-wise, or in theory, there is freedom of travel between ECOWAS states, although in practice this is only implemented to a limited extent, such as for travel between directly neighbouring states (Fresia 2014). Moreover, residence and work permits are increasingly closely controlled by the state as part of the securitization of cross-border mobility (see Chap. 6). The highest migration rates are between Senegal and Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Sahel. Since the 1990s, there has been an increase in rural-rural migration – precisely not only to the cities. A typical example of this from another part of Africa is also Zambia, where circular migration has increased (Girard and Chapoto 2017, p.  34). This type of temporary migration, often limited to a few months, is characterized by periodic return to the place of origin. Circular migration is based on, among other things, strong rural-urban networks, migration history in terms of work in mines, for example, and better physical and virtual infrastructure. The poorest households in rural areas in particular resort to this form of mobility to secure their livelihoods. In this context, typical problematic situations are emerging (Boyer 2017, p. 30). Demographic pressure and the destruction of land through monocultures and land grabbing, among other things, mean that access to local resources and food security is experiencing dramatic declines. Alternative options such as mobility to cities exist in West Africa, for example (Ballo 2009). Migration also takes place to rural areas that are sparsely populated; for example, to southeastern Liberia and eastern Guinea. Migration and its diverse dynamics are often linked to expectations of improved living conditions – at the family, village or even national level. These expectations have in turn found their way into the policies of states and international organiza-

Fig. 2.2  Migration movements in West Africa. (Source: Boyer 2017, p. 31)

Migration as Relative Deprivation 15

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2  Migration: Drivers and Dynamics of Cross-Border Mobility

tions. This has been especially true since the World Bank focused part of its activities in the early 2000s on emphasizing financial remittances as an instrument of socio-economic development. More correctly, it should read re-emphasized, as remittances have made their periodic return since the 1960s as part of the focus on migration and development (Faist 2019, pp. 188–195). In this latest round, institutions such as the World Bank pointed out that the amount of remittances has far exceeded payments of publicly funded development money for years, currently by about three times.

Refugee Migration Forced migration in general and refugee migration in particular are subject to somewhat modified dynamics. There is often very rapid growth in migration due to external conditions that threaten life and limb. The number of migrants within a country, or migrations across borders, increases rapidly. One need only think of the consequences of the genocide and civil war in Rwanda and the flight movements to neighbouring countries such as the DR Congo and Tanzania, or currently the civil war in South Sudan, which has led to extensive flight movements almost exclusively within Africa. If we expand the ideal-typical migration models, the question of the categorisation of migration immediately arises. The politically and legally most important guiding distinction is found in the juxtaposition of refugee migration and labour migration, which is reflected in a variety of other distinctions, such as political vs. economic migration or involuntary vs. voluntary migration. From a social science perspective, such dichotomies are questionable (cf. Schmidt 2020). First, there are often multiple motives or causes (see above). In addition, migration for reasons of persecution may lead to labour migration, for example in the case of people who have sought safety from physical violence in a neighbouring country and then move on for reasons of better socio-economic opportunities. Second, the above-­ mentioned comparisons are not able to capture the structural violence (Galtung 1969) that prevails, for example, in countries whose political regimes pursue the economic exclusion of large parts of the population through rent-seeking3 of raw  “Rent seeking (emphasis in the original) is the behavior of market actors which aims at influencing state power by using resources (including money) in such a way that the market actor generates additional income. The resources spent on this are wasted from an economic point of view, since the total of consumer and producer surplus does not increase, but only the producer’s surplus grows at the expense of the consumer.” (https://www.vimentis.ch/d/ lexikon/81/Rent+Seeking.html) 3

Refugee Migration

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materials and thus deprive them of important life opportunities. Consider, for example, the mining or even plundering of raw materials such as uranium in Niger, where French corporations and their political partners profit but local residents are forced to leave their surroundings due to radioactive contamination.4 Such ­situations can also force migration. So it is not only physical persecution that creates predicaments. As an alternative, various modifications of the dichotomy of flight and migration have been proposed. Some observers speak of a continuum from reactive to proactive migration, i.e. a wide range of possibilities not only to react – as in the case of many refugees fleeing civil war – but also to act in anticipation (Richmond 1993). The latter can also occur in situations of incipient persecution, as indicated, for example, by the term “anticipatory refugees”: it refers to refugees who choose the option of migration at the very beginning of persecution situations or in anticipation of them. If we thus apply a broader understanding of violence in migration processes, as in forced migration, the problem immediately arises of how to ensure protection for all those who are persecuted but do not fall under the protection of the Geneva Refugee Convention.5 Especially in the case of war refugees, these persons fall under the broader refugee definition from the African Union (AU) Refugee Convention. Often, in contrast to the Geneva Refugee Convention, for example, no individual persecution has to be proven here, but refugees are collectively recognised as such. This is due to the fact that not only people who flee because of individual persecution, but also those who had to leave their country because of wars, occupation or “events seriously disturbing public order” are recognised as refugees. It is even possible that so-called climate refugees, who flee from droughts or natural disasters, fall under the refugee definition of the African Union (Okello 2014, pp. 72–73).

 https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/uranium-in-africa.aspx 5  The Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees incorporates the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (entered into force 22 April 1954) and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967 (entered into force 4 October 1967). Article 1 provides that the designation applies to any person “who, owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (…)”. 4

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2  Migration: Drivers and Dynamics of Cross-Border Mobility

 elected Migration Drivers: Conflicts, Environmental S Degradation, Climate Change Thus, while the causes of migration – and in some cases: forced non-migration or involuntary immobility of so-called trapped populations – are to be sought in broader socio-economic processes of societal transformation, migration drivers ­denote the immediate causes. The drivers of migration certainly include economic crises or corrupt regimes that are not characterized by “good governance”. Furthermore, disputed statehood is often associated with conflicts that end in civil wars and the associated persecution of various groups (Iqbal and Zorn 2009). A whole range of phenomena are part of state conflicts in which flight movements arise. For example, in rentier states – states in which income is generated through scarcities of commodities such as oil or rare earths and distributed from “top” to “bottom” – the issue can be which group gets access to the profits from mineral resources. This includes some of the wars in the DR Congo in recent decades. Conflicts among elites are also encountered. In Somalia, violent clashes erupted between factions demanding democratic reforms and the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre, leading to the civil war that de facto divided the country and continues in southern Somalia to this day, now as a struggle against the Islamist movement al Shabaab. Direct interventions are also relevant, for example from Rwanda to the east of the DR Congo.6 Equally, the drivers include the destruction of human habitat through land grabbing and subsequent displacement due to the search for and extraction of raw materials, which are often driven by international corporations and foreign interests (see Sassen 2014 and Faist 2018a for a fundamental discussion). Examples of this include the aforementioned mining of uranium by French corporations in Niger and the extraction of oil and gas in Chad. Despite various attempts, “climate refugees” are not recognised as refugees in the sense of the Geneva Convention (Mohamoud et al. 2014, pp. 11–12), even if there are starting points such as the AU Convention mentioned above. One reason for this may also be found in the complex interplay of multiple causes and drivers. Climate change in particular, together with economic and political factors, can contribute to migration in several ways: through sudden natural disasters, through gradual changes in the environment, and also indirectly by causing conflicts (e.g. over water or land), which in turn lead to migration. It is not always easy to draw a  More generally on the relationship between state order, conflict and flight, see Maley (2016). 6

Selected Migration Drivers: Conflicts, Environmental Degradation, Climate…

19

line between forced and voluntary migration. A political argument often voiced in this context is that the inclusion of climate refugees in the Geneva Convention or similar international conventions would further reduce the willingness of host states to cooperate and further reduce the UNCHR’s ability to protect refugees. Another example of the link between environmental degradation, conflict and forced migration is oil production in the Niger Delta and the resistance of local people to their displacement (Okwechime 2013). The region has been affected by severe environmental degradation due to oil production, which has long led to protests at local, national and also transnational levels against the government and oil companies. In 1995, for example, the execution of the civil rights activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and other activists involved in the “Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People”, who had publicly criticized the oil company Shell, caused an international sensation (see pp. 19–22). One example of environmental damage caused by oil production is the result of leaks in poorly maintained pipelines, from which large quantities of crude oil can escape. This can lead to the destruction of fishing grounds and agricultural land and to the contamination of drinking water and the pollution of the air with toxins, and is accompanied by various violations of the economic and social human rights of the inhabitants of the affected areas (Amnesty International 2013, pp. 12–13). Other known migration drivers are important economic factors such as international trade barriers that the EU maintains to the detriment of weaker trading partners: For example, African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana produce much of the world’s cocoa. But chocolate, as one of the end products, comes mainly from European production. When discussing these drivers, it should be noted that they do not usually act in isolation. This insight is illustrated, for example, by the example of climate degradation (McLeman et al. 2016). It is often linked to an already existing monoculture (as in the case of cocoa), i.e. overexploitation of the land. Climatic change is also already contributing to internal migration through desertification and increased natural disasters, for example in Niger where lack of rain leads to migration from rural to urban areas, and in countries such as Mauritania and Zambia where agricultural productivity is declining. There is also increased conflict between pastoralists and arable farmers in countries such as Sudan, for example in Darfur – not to mention increased spread of diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. Conflicts between pastoralists and arable farmers are also widespread in Mali and Burkina Faso. These are predominantly sub-Saharan African developments, which cannot be observed on this scale in other regions of the global South (Barrios et al. 2006).

3

Flight in Africa

When taking a closer look at the situation in Africa, the first thing to notice is that refugee migration or conflict-related forced migration to Europe is not the primary form of migration on the continent. In 2015, according to UNHCR, there were 5.27 million Africans fleeing outside their country of origin. About 85% of these refugees found refuge in another African country. Only about 7.5% fled to Europe, mostly to EU member states (Prediger and Zanker 2016). The majority of African refugees therefore do not come to Europe, but remain in Africa (see Fig. 3.1). Even during the “refugee crisis” of 2015/2016, refugees from Africa did not form the majority in Europe. They came mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Nigeria, Eritrea and Somalia were among the ten countries from which most refugees came to Europe (Eurostat 2017). The fact that two of the three countries mentioned are in East Africa is no coincidence, but reflects current patterns of African refugee migration. Eritrea and Somalia in particular can be understood as an indication that a regional focus is necessary to better understand causes of flight. Refugee migration is concentrated in certain regions of the continent, where it is currently occurring in large numbers due to political and other circumstances that need to be specified in detail.

Flight in Eastern and Central Africa Eastern and Central Africa can be considered the regions with the most refugees today. This is also where the majority of the continent’s armed conflicts are fought. An intracontinental comparison is instructive: in East Africa we find more refugees, 4.3 million people, than in the whole of Europe (excluding Turkey), where © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_3

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3  Flight in Africa

Fig. 3.1  Global distribution of refugees, end 2017. (Source: UNHCR 2018, p. 10)

there are about 2.6 million (UNHCR 2018, p. 14). The high concentration in East and Central Africa is notw surprising, as neighbouring states of countries afflicted by conflicts usually host the most refugees; and precisely not intercontinental destinations. Outside of East Africa, in other parts of the continent, far fewer people are currently fleeing (UNHCR 2018, p.  14). This large intra-African variance is particularly noteworthy because it runs counter to sweeping statements about Africa as a continent of (refugee) crises: Refugee migration is obviously not a ubiquitous part of life in Africa. Accordingly, among the ten most important destination countries for refugees worldwide, three are African  countries (Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia), but with Germany only one is European, if one disregards the special case of Turkey with regard to neighbouring Syria (cf. Fig. 3.2; cf. Paul 2020). The main causes of flight in East and Central Africa, the region with the highest number of refugees in Africa, currently include (inter alia, Kibreab 2014, pp. 573–578): • the civil war in Somalia, which has been going on since 1991 and has led to the de facto tripartition of the state and the complete disintegration of state order in southern Somalia; • the civil war in South Sudan – an ethnicized power struggle between President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and his opponent and two-time Vice President Riek Machar

Flight in Eastern and Central Africa

23

Fig. 3.2  Main destination countries for refugees, end 2017. (Source: UNHCR 2018, p. 15)

(Nuer), who had already led opposing wings of the South Sudan People’s Liberation Army during the South Sudanese secession war; • conflicts in eastern DRC that periodically flare up as the aftermath of the Congo wars of 1996/1997, 1998–2003, and 2006–2009 (most recently, in particular, during the M23 rebellion (French: Mouvement du 23-Mars) of 2012/2013) and are largely driven by revenues from the export of resources, control of which is also a key source of conflict; • conflicts in Sudan, particularly in the Darfur region, which, combined with poverty, forced displacement in connection with development projects, and droughts and famines, have led to protracted internal displacement and cross-border refugee migration that has outlived its original triggers1; • the civil war in the Central African Republic, which is primarily fought over control of resources and grazing land, although tensions between Christians and Muslims also play a role2

 https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/307811/binnenvertreibung-imsudan 2  https://www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/innerstaatliche-konflikte/185581/zentralafrikanische-republik 1

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3  Flight in Africa

• the authoritarian governance in Eritrea under President Isayas Afewerki, which manifests itself, for example, in the compulsory military service of large parts of the population for up to 20 years. Other conflicts that had led to massive and often protracted refugee migration in the past have now been successfully overcome, such as the former Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), which led to the secession of South Sudan, or the genocide in Rwanda, which was accompanied by a civil war. Nevertheless, after a brief decline around 2010, the number of refugees in the Great Lakes region is currently at its highest level in the past 20 years. This is largely due to the South Sudanese civil war, which has led to a serious increase in refugee numbers in Uganda, South Sudan’s southern neighbour. Large numbers of people have also fled to Sudan and Ethiopia as a result of the civil war, in addition to almost 2 million internally displaced persons (as of September 20183).

Flight in Southern, Western and Northern Africa In Southern Africa, refugee migration reached peaks of up to 1.8 million refugees around 1990, but has since declined significantly (Crush and Chikanda 2014, p.  554). Meanwhile, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) still counts just under 200,000 refugees in the region (UNHCR 2018, p. 14). Independence and civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, in which foreign states also intervened (especially the South African apartheid state), were among the main causes of flight in the past (Crush and Chikanda 2014, pp.  556–559). Currently, Southern Africa, particularly South Africa and Zambia, is a destination region for refugees from other parts of Africa. In addition, there are many asylum seekers from Zimbabwe in South Africa, but most of them are not recognised as refugees (ibid., pp. 560–563). In West Africa, there were not quite 300,000 refugees at the end of 2017 – about one and a half times as many as in Southern Africa, but less than a tenth of the number of refugees in Eastern and Central Africa (UNHCR 2018, p.  14). More recently, the civil wars in Liberia (1989–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002) were among the key causes of flight. Another example is the civil war in Guinea-Bissau (1998–1999), which continues to have devastating consequences today and has found expression in political unrest and several coup attempts, most recently in

 https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-bulletin-issue-9-30-september-2018 3

Dynamics of Migration and Flight

25

2012. The desolate economy in Guinea-Bissau is dominated primarily by the cocaine trade (Vigh 2015). Also to be taken into account is the conflict over the Casamance region in southern Senegal, which has been striving for independence since the 1980s, or the conflict in northern Mali since 2012, in which Tuareg separatism (Fresia 2014, pp. 544–555) and by now complex entanglements with (international) Islamism, smuggling routes and international counter-terrorism operations play a role (Wiedemann 2018). In North Africa, Egypt and Algeria are the main destination countries for many of these refugees, with refugees from East Africa migrating north via Egypt, whereas Algeria is the destination country for refugees from its western neighbour Morocco, who are fleeing to Algeria because of the Western Sahara conflict and have often been living there for a very long time (Hanifa 2014, pp. 588–590). At the end of 2017, UNHCR counted 233,000 refugees in Egypt and 94,000 refugees in Algeria. The other Maghreb states, especially Tunisia, host extremely few refugees (UNHCR 2017a, p. Annex, Table 1).

Dynamics of Migration and Flight This overview shows that there are specific dynamics that characterize forced migration. Especially migration that takes place in the context of physical violence is characterized by a step-wise migration pattern. Due to the rather restrictive control policies that manifest not only at the borders of European countries but have also already shifted into Africa (see below) and the dominance of intra-African migration, this observation applies to many forms of migration in Africa. In short, it is not simply a matter of emigration and immigration, but of gradual processes that do not necessarily end in immigration. Instead, it is precisely out of sub-Saharan African states that we observe long and dangerous migrations, mostly through neighbouring and transit states to North Africa, especially Morocco and Libya, which has become one of the main routes north, especially since the fall of Gaddafi. These journeys are repeatedly interrupted and marked by long waiting times or even unexpected turnarounds, which makes them appear as “fragmented journeys” (Collyer 2007). These trajectories are usually gender-specific. Women refugees from Somalia who had fled to Malta via Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya described the journey to Europe as unpredictable in its course and length, citing financial and social resources as well as gender as factors that significantly influenced how long the journey took and what happened during it (Gerard and Pickering 2014). Often the journeys were marked by experiences of direct or structural, and in extreme cases

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3  Flight in Africa

lethal, violence. These included, for example, rape and extortion for money or sexual assault during the journey across the Sahara, threatened and actual arrests in Libya and subsequent inhumane detention conditions, exploitation of migrant women who worked in Libya to earn money to continue their journey to Europe, and finally the perilous journey across the Mediterranean. In addition to the natural dangers of the sea, there was also the risk of being turned back to Libya in violation of human rights or of other ships failing to provide assistance (Mannik 2016). Moreover, women were often treated worse than men by the crews of the refugee boats. Another case study of migrant mothers, in this case in Rabat, Morocco, provides evidence: When children are born out of wedlock and/or classified as “mixed-­ race”, this can contribute to migrant women who cannot continue to Europe not returning home anyway, fearing stigmatisation there. One response to this is to create a new social position for themselves in Morocco (Stock 2012, pp.  1590– 1592). Thus, it is indeed often “turbulent trajectories” (Schapendonk 2012) that migrants follow. Even under these conditions, common group identities emerge among migrants from different countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is often national groups in which migrants organise themselves, as expressed, for example, in the expression “Nigerian ghetto” (e.g. Lecadet 2013).4 It also needs to be taken into account that motives and goals change during the migration process. For example, the case of migrants in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset shows that migrants sometimes decide to stay in Tamanrasset once they have found work, rather than moving on. They then integrate into the local society and into networks with other migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, which develop into translocal or transnational networks if contact is maintained with people who move on. At the same time, the internet in particular is also used to maintain contact with family members. In this way, “Tamanrasset is not only connected to the sub-Saharan region, but especially to border regions and localities, as well as to cities in Europe” (Hathat and Wehrhahn 2017, p. 73). Some of these migrants and translocal or transnational networks that support (irregular) migration or flight processes of others, often from their own region, thus become part of smuggling networks or even build them themselves (see, for example, Richter 2016 in the case of Mali-Algeria-Morocco and Ayalew Mengiste 2018 on Eritrea-Ethiopia-Sudan-­ Libya).  In an analysis of turbulent journeys punctuated by repeated “stuckness” and partial deportations in transit spaces, Clara Lecadet (2013) examines the organization of collective groups in “ghettos” by citizenship, which is a symbolically effective form of opposition in the face of a policy of rejection by foreign states. Citizenship serves as a positive anchor. 4

Migration Processes: Turbulent and Fragmented

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Migration as Initiation An important role in all these processes is played by the motif of the adventurer who takes his fate into his own hands and decides for himself where to stay. This is a self-designation of African migrants, especially from West and Central Africa, which thus also describes a certain phase of life, especially as a man. It is about coming of age and becoming a man (Bredeloup 2013, 2017), which in turn goes back to ancient concepts of initiation in the wilderness (Dougnon 2013). Given fragmented mobility and turbulent and uncertain migratory pathways, high risk in terms of life and dignity is an important part of this process in today’s world. However, migrant adventures often do not end as successfully as expected, for example, by the associated family members. Possibly pushed back, supposedly “failed adventurers” are thrown back on restoring their dignity (Schultz 2019). From this collective identity, foundations for political mobilization for migrants’ rights sometimes develop (Berriane 2018, pp. 93–96).

Migration Processes: Turbulent and Fragmented However, migration processes cannot necessarily be considered to have ended with arrival in Europe and integration there. For example, secondary migration can be observed within Europe from Spain, Italy and Portugal to Germany and Sweden (Schapendonk 2018). A case study looking at migrants who later also took the reverse route – from Europe back to Africa, in this case from London to Kampala, Uganda – notes: “solidarities forged through the experiences of racialisation and racism in Britain fail to translate into more inclusive everyday practices of belonging on return to Uganda” (Binaisa 2018, p. 204). This is largely related to the fact that in Uganda, “race” as an identity category loses relevance to ethnicity and socio-­economic status. Migration to Britain, on the other hand, first led to experiences of racialization: “For many of my participants, coming to Britain was their first experience of the totalizing application of their race, of ‘black’ as primary identity, rendering all other identities and trajectories of difference, particularly ethnic group, insignificant or irrelevant, outside the company of fellow members of the Ugandan diaspora” (ibid., p. 213). Migrants deal with these experiences with varying degrees of agency. However, their identity as Ugandans or Africans (almost) always plays an important role, behind which ethnic distinctions (there are dozens of different ethnicities in Uganda) recede, so that transethnic communities emerge. After returning to Uganda, many therefore want to transcend ethnic bound-

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aries there as well, but then find that this is only possible there to a limited extent (this., pp. 215–221). The reverse case, remaining in Europe, often occurs despite a desire to return, partly when migration does not bring the desired success (Hernandez-­Carretero 2017). Especially in the North African states that serve as stepping stones to Europe, we find stranded migrants with different statuses: as recognised refugees in ­UNHCR camps or as stranded persons who have no such status, i.e. are staying irregularly and cannot return for social reasons. In some cases, they have already been deported on their way back or have made several attempts (Thorsen 2017). In both categories, we often find ‘active waiting’ (e.g. Lucht 2017) for a possible onward journey to other continents. This waiting is characterized by different notions of time and speed. Migrants often arrive in transit states with high optimism. However, this then diminishes as they become familiar with the realities. Ideas about mobility are linked to the fact that migration is not an individual undertaking, but is embedded in many ways in family and collective contexts. Families support migrants on the one hand, but also formulate expectations of them on the other. Some migrants also participate in “voluntary return” programmes run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However, these are mainly isolated cases. Much more widespread are IOM programmes aimed at entire groups, e.g. from Yemen to Ethiopia or from Libya to Mali. However, those affected rarely speak of voluntariness here (Koser and Kuschminder 2015). Others return forcibly as deportees from North African countries and have no way to leave again or alternatively come into money, and sometimes face the disappointed expectations of families as they cannot provide the income they need or expect (Schultz 2019; Kleist 2017). Social networks may well play different roles in migration: Both the embedding in a network and the absence of one can enable migrants to continue their planned route, but also lead to a change of route. Importantly, networks sometimes include not only people in countries of origin and destination, but also people in additional countries that one knows before migration or meets during migration. Changes in the network structure, e.g. through new acquaintances or the loss of old contacts, as well as other critical events, can lead to changes of course during the migration process from A to B, which is therefore not straightforward (Wissink et al. 2017, pp. 2–5).

4

Internal Migration and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is home to large-scale migratory movements that, unlike North African migration, mostly begin and end within the region (Mercandalli et  al. 2017, p. 14). In this respect, relevant research points out that mobility and not sedentariness should be the starting point for an analysis of migration in and out of Africa (De Bruijn et  al. 2001, among others). Yet data on internal migration in particular are limited. All in all, however, the share of migrants in the population of sub-Saharan Africa seems to have remained constant in recent decades, while their numbers have increased significantly due to population growth (see above). Sub-­ Saharan Africa (SSA) is characterized by strong population growth and urbanization largely without industrialization: “In this unique context, migration and rural migration in SSA cannot develop along the same lines as the historical pattern observed in other regions of the world, where a definitive rural-urban migration directly fed the transformation process. In today’s globalized world, massive overseas migration will not play the same historical role than [sic] in Europe” (Mercandalli et al. 2017, p. 15).

Demographic Change and Urbanisation The population of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and also the rural population, will have grown strongly by the middle of the twenty-first century (Mercandalli et al. 2017). This short- to medium-term development line applies in particular to West and Central Africa, even though birth rates here are stagnating or already

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_4

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4  Internal Migration and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

declining.1 This will increase both the number and the proportion of the population that is of working age. This can have positive effects on economic development, but only if it is possible to create sufficient numbers of jobs and career prospects. This would also give people in these countries the opportunity to develop themselves further. In rural areas, moreover, the increase in population density associated with population growth will also be a problem that needs to be addressed. Internal migrants are primarily people from rural Africa who move to cities. In addition, other forms of internal migration – between cities or between villages – also play an important role, with the latter generally predominating. Africa is therefore not only the continent of huge metropolises such as Cairo in Egypt with 16 million inhabitants, Lagos in Nigeria with 13 million, Kinshasa in the DR Congo with 12 million or Johannesburg in South Africa with 9 million, but also and much more a continent of villages. The majority of Africans live in rural areas, such as 88% of people in Burundi (continental high, second in the world behind Trinidad and Tobago), 80% of Ethiopians, 74% of Kenyans, or 62% of Guineans; the latter corresponds to the average for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Three African states (Burundi (88%), Uganda (84%), Malawi (84%)) are among the 10 states with the highest proportions of rural population in the world. In all African states except Gabon (13%), Libya (21%) and Djibouti (23%), the proportion of rural population is higher – often very significantly – than in the EU (25%) (World Bank 2016). As early as the end of the nineteenth century, large movements of labour forces took place within and between colonies for plantation work (e.g. cotton, cocoa, coffee and peanuts in West Africa), but also to the port cities in West Africa that were growing as a result, e.g. to Dakar, Abidjan, Accra or Lomé, in order to facilitate trade to Europe and the USA. In West Africa, this was predominantly a north-­ south migration. This trend continued after the end of the colonial period, e.g. with migrations from Mali and Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire. Overall, however, the proportion of the rural population in Africa has declined significantly since the end of the colonial period (Manshard 1986). Already during colonization, rural-urban migrations, agricultural colonization, and the conversion of forests into plantations led to a comprehensive transformation of the West

 In Mali, for example, population growth is currently just under 3%. Since 1950, the population has risen from 4.3 million to about 20.4 million (2020; https://worldpopulationreview. com/countries/mali-population). This means that the country’s population is extremely young. In connection with an average low level of education among women and high birth rates, the population is expected to more than double within the next four decades (see also Hummel et al. 2012). 1

Rural-Urban and Rural-Rural Migration

31

African coastal states. In 1960, the so-called Year of Africa, when 18 countries gained independence, Burundi, Rwanda, Botswana, Swaziland, Malawi, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and Tanzania each still had at least 95% of their populations living in rural areas; the average for sub-Saharan Africa at the time was 85%. Only two countries – Djibouti (50%), South Africa (53%) – had a balanced ratio of urban to rural population in 1960, none a majority of urban dwellers (World Bank 2016). A central cause of the decline in rural population is migration from rural to urban areas.

Rural-Urban and Rural-Rural Migration In South Africa, it is primarily rural-urban migration that dominates. Since the end of apartheid, permanent internal migration has played an increasing role in South Africa alongside temporary labour migration (Dindabo et al. 2017, p. 36). Unlike many other African countries, only a minority of the population in South Africa lives in rural areas; this rural population is on average significantly poorer and less formally educated. High unemployment in rural areas is a factor that strongly contributes to migration to cities, especially of young adults. Positive effects of rural-urban, but also rural-rural internal migration can also be observed: Migration contributes to the diversification of household income and increases access to employment opportunities, albeit usually only temporarily. Migration thus supports the viability of small and medium-sized cities (Mercandalli 2017, p. 22). Households with a migrated member are somewhat wealthier or less poor than households without one, precisely because of remittances from migrants. However, the extent of remittances is limited. Nevertheless, remittances in the context of internal migration contribute to poverty reduction. Overall, better economic prospects for oneself and one’s family represent a major, but not the only, reason for migration. Other important motives are education and family reunification (Dindabo et al. 2017, p. 24). In terms of gender, a clear trend towards the feminisation of migration can be discerned, particularly in West Africa (e.g. Hummel et al. 2012; Ballo 2009). The motives to migrate also differ according to gender. For example, in Mali, men focus on earning a living and supporting their families. Female (labour) migration is often associated with learning and is less highly regarded. However, women are increasingly migrating to larger cities and neighbouring countries as household workers or in petty trade, although international migration remains male-­dominated (Lesclingand and Hertrich 2017; Hertrich and Lesclingand 2013, among others). Taking into consideration only the financial aspect, we see that while most migra-

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tion from sub-Saharan Africa is internal migration or migration to other countries in the region, most remittances come from migrants on other continents. These facts powerfully underscore how profitable migration out of African can be (even when taking up low-skilled work). Indeed, remittances to Africa grew from $44.3 billion (2007) to $60.5 billion (2016) (Ponsot et al. 2017, p. 10). However, all of sub-Saharan Africa received less than half as much money in remittances as India in 2015 (Nshimbi 2017, p. 26).

Internally Displaced Persons in Africa According to the common definition from the Geneva Refugee Convention, one is only a refugee when one has fled to another country (UNHCR 2015, p.  6, see above). The African Union Refugee Convention, which expands the concept of refugee compared to the Geneva Convention with regard to causes of flight, also adheres to the criterion of flight to another country (OAU 1969, Art. 1). This means that these conventions do not apply to internal refugees. However, not least in the often very large states of Africa, many people are also fleeing as internally displaced persons. If these are taken into account, the global focus of forced migration shifts even more strongly to the global South and Africa, since there are practically no internally displaced persons in the global North, with the exception of Ukraine. Promoted by the increasingly restrictive policy towards refugees in Africa, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is higher than that of those living abroad. Internally displaced persons “frequently live in a more desparate situation than refugees” (Crisp 2006, p. 18; cf. Kälin 2014). It is not surprising that among the 10 states with the largest populations of IDPs in the world at the end of 2017 were four African ones  – DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan (cf. UNHCR 2018, p.  35). The situations in conflict zones such as Darfur in South Sudan and northern Nigeria, where large numbers of people are also internally displaced, can be considered as other examples of the situation of IDPs. In Sudan, the Darfur conflict, which has been ongoing since 2003, is primarily responsible for the high number of internally displaced persons. Similar to South Sudan’s war of secession, the Darfur conflict is rooted in Sudan’s colonial constitution, which as Africa’s formerly largest state encompassed a number of different peoples, and the dominance of peoples categorizing themselves as North African Arabs over peoples categorized as black in what is now South Sudan as well as Western Sudan (Darfur). The prospects for return and reintegration of IDPs are very limited and extremely precarious due to violence and the absence of the rule of law. An important conflict line out of which refugees result runs along land con-

Improving the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons

33

flicts between nomadic and sedentary population groups. The dispute over land rights leads to tension and conflict between communities. Although the whole population in Darfur suffers from the crisis, it is mainly the IDPs who were previously farmers who struggle for livelihood due to their social marginalization (UNHCR and AU 2017, pp. 26–27). In Nigeria, the current high number of internally displaced persons is due to the Boko Haram rebellion, as well as other conflicts and floods. Boko Haram is an Islamist terrorist militia operating in the northeast, which attracted international attention in particular for the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in 2014. The conflict, which has been simmering for years, has led to mass flight within the country and abroad. It is estimated that more than 8.5 million people have been affected, particularly in the states of the northeast, i.e. Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. This is where over 90% of the over 1.75 million IDPs in Nigeria are concentrated (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2017). According to Amnesty International, about 20% of Nigeria’s IDPs live in camps, while the remaining 80% live in other places in Nigeria. The situation of the people in the camps is described as extremely problematic. There is a lack of food, clean water, sanitary infrastructure and medical care. Many people are not allowed to leave the camps, and women are sexually exploited (Amnesty International 2017c). In summary, IDPs are often deliberately uprooted by their governments because of their ethnic, religious or political affiliation; sometimes also in the context of campaigns against insurgents. In civil wars along the aforementioned social divides, they are often perceived as enemies. Often, they are associated with insurgent or opposition groups that are considered dangerous or inferior. In yet other cases, the uprooted are pawns of warring sides. Competition over scarce resources such as land or water typically intensifies such conflicts. In cases where states end up in anarchic conditions, such as in parts of Somalia, some of the worst abuses have been committed against IDPs. As a result, socioeconomic structures and communities often collapse, preventing reconstruction and development for decades (Crisp 2006, p. 19).

Improving the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons The first steps towards improving the situation of internally displaced persons were taken at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the form of the adoption of the UN’s (legally non-binding) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and a cluster approach designed to improve cooperation between organisations such as UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO in assisting internally displaced persons in the wake

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of Darfur (ibid., pp. 20–24). In 2009, the African Union’s legally binding African Convention on the Protection and Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) was adopted. In the Great Lakes region, the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (Kälin 2014, p. 163), adopted by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, has also been in place since 2006. Through these conventions, Africa has moved from soft law to hard law. Through the Kampala Convention, states are obliged “to enact appropriate legislation, create an institutional framework for the coordination of IDP-related activities, and allocate the necessary funds to ensure implementation” (ibid., p. 171). Despite this progress, however, there is still often room for improvement both at the level of national legislation and in the practical implementation of assistance to IDPs.

5

Integration in Africa

In the case of settlement, migration is followed by the successful or unsuccessful integration of migrants in the destination countries. Various sociological theories exist on this topic, but they have been developed with a view to countries in the Global North, especially the USA. It is important to emphasise this, as assumptions that are often taken for granted when developing theories about societies in the Global North may not necessarily apply elsewhere. Overall, conceptual distinctions such as emigration, transit migration, immigration, return and integration may only fit the African continent to a limited extent, because different forms of mobility are part of everyday life.

Other Preconditions Discourses of integration in the global North often operate with a “spherical model” of self-contained, separate nations (Welsch 2010, pp. 40–42; Faist 2000b, pp. 9–47) stemming from the national or even nationalist discourse of modernity, which equates national, ethnic and cultural belonging. It is therefore often assumed that migrants immigrate to an ethnically and culturally homogeneous, e.g. monolingual, country, and that they are both ethnically and culturally distinct from the society of the country of immigration because of their origin in another nation. Often this ideal-typical model assumes that integration on the part of migrants means adaptation to a culturally homogeneous nation; where nation is understood to mean the dominant ethnicity in a state. The idea of a homogeneous nation is also often associated with a “container model” that reduces the social life of migrants to the country of immigration and neglects the diverse interconnections across national © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_5

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borders, for example through remittances to countries of origin or cross-border political activities (Faist 2000a, pp. 195–241; Faist et al. 2014). However, models that take into account the diversity of modern societies beyond ethnic, legal and cultural differences of groups under keywords such as diversity and plurality and include the transnational ties of migrants are becoming discursively more influential (Faist 2000b, pp. 339–392). The spherical or container model outlined above and the equation it contains can hardly claim any validity for the postcolonial states of Africa. African states did not emerge as manifestations of the political sovereignty of a national community with a common culture; rather, their borders were drawn by the colonial powers, usually without regard to existing cultural differences and ethnic distinctions. Even more than in Europe, one can therefore speak here of an “invention of the nation” (Anderson 2006) – and indeed an invention from outside – since subject categories such as “Nigerian”, “Congolese” or “South African” were brought into being out of historical nothingness.1 The fragility and lack of control and regulatory capacities of some African states made the formation of “own” national identities in the sense of “will nations” more difficult. In many African states, however, distinct national everyday cultures have meanwhile developed that differ from those of neighbouring countries (cf. Bierschenk 2003). The predominantly negative descriptions of African states, such as “fragile”, “failed”, “weak”, “criminal”, are based primarily on the fact that the African state is usually portrayed against the background of the idea of the state according to Max Weber, which is based on an understanding of the state as a hierarchically and bureaucratically organised political order that is widespread in the global North (Weber 1980, pp. 821–824).2 On the other hand, in recent years there have been attempts to overcome this deficit  In Africa, one can speak of an invention of the nation from outside in a double sense. It is well known that today’s state borders in Africa were mostly drawn by the colonial powers and thus the nations of today were created. In addition to the individual nations, however, the concept of the nation-state as such is also one that was brought to Africa by Europeans and then adapted by the anti-colonial liberation movements. Pre-colonial political communities in Africa, for example, were often characterized by fuzzy, fluid boundaries and were often organized around a center of power from which political authority radiated out into the surrounding countryside, diminishing with increasing distance (Speitkamp 2009, pp. 39–59). This forms a clear contrast to the ideal-typical nation-state, which exercises sovereignty to the same extent everywhere within a precisely demarcated territory. 2  It should be mentioned here, however, that there are African states that do not correspond to such descriptions, such as Botswana (stable democracy since independence) or Rwanda (fairly high degree of state control, successful reconstruction after the genocide). In the case of Rwanda, it must be added that this was partly bought by the plundering of eastern Congo and at the price of an authoritarian government under Kagame. 1

Postcolonial Demarcations

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perspective and to develop theoretical concepts that more accurately describe the local political realities in African states.3 In particular, the concept of “heterarchy”, originally from neuroscience, tries to overcome the focus on the state (Hüsken and Klute 2015, pp. 323–324). In contrast to hierarchy, it is concerned with a processual character of politics, with a differentiated distribution of foci of power by different actors (including non-state actors, but e.g. traditionally established ones), and with the fluid and changing relations within an entity whose components can split and reunite in ever new constellations. Today’s Libya and northern Mali are cited as the most impressive examples (ibid.).

Postcolonial Demarcations As a result of colonialism, members of the same ethnic group often live on both sides of state borders in Africa, as the colonial border was drawn right through their living area. For example, the Ogaden Province in eastern Ethiopia is inhabited by a majority of ethnic Somalis, and the border between Nigeria and Niger runs through the living territory of the Hausa. Another impressive example, besides the already mentioned Fulbe, is the group of Mande languages and ethnic groups, which are spread over 11 countries in West Africa, and the Tuareg, who do not form a state of their own. Moreover, post-colonial borders often enclose a multitude of different ethnic groups, so that African states are usually culturally highly heterogeneous multi-­ ethnic states. In extreme cases, such as the huge territorial states of Nigeria and Congo, this can mean that several hundred different languages are spoken among the native population of the same country, and in addition the language of the former colonial power as the nationwide lingua franca. However, that language is not equally mastered by all social classes. In Nigeria, the country is also divided along religious lines, into a Muslim north and a Christian south.4 But even smaller African states are mostly characterized by a degree of heterogeneity that condemns any  Concepts such as “governance in spaces of limited statehood” (Risse and Lehmkuhl), the “heterogeneous state” (Sousa Santos), the idea of a “polycephaly”, especially at the local level (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan), “oligopolies of violence” (Mehler) or “hybrid political orders” (Boege et al.), and most recently “heterarchy” (see summary in Hüsken and Klute 2015) are under discussion. 4  In addition to the major monotheistic religions, “traditional” religions, animism, shamanism or voodoo also coexist. Elements from the monotheistic and “traditional” religions are often combined in everyday life. Multiple conversions can also occur, e.g. from Christianity to Islam and back again. 3

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attempt to equate culture, ethnicity and nation to failure and makes upholding a fiction of the congruence of nation and state impossible from the outset. In Uganda, for example, people from more than 30 different ethnic groups live in an area the size of Great Britain, speaking diverse languages from two different language families. Integration in Africa can thus hardly be understood on the basis of models that assume an ethnically and culturally closed, homogeneous nation state. It seems far more appropriate to understand integration in Africa against the background of the approach of a transcultural society (Welsch 2010) or a (also ethnically) plural society (Furnivall 1948), since this does away with the only supposed unity of nation, culture and state. The point is to also take into account cases in which a national ‘we’ comprises such a heterogeneous population, as is usually the case in Africa (Gehring 2016).

 olerance and Xenophobia in the “Rainbow Nation” South T Africa The ethnic, cultural (e.g. linguistic) and “racial” heterogeneity of African states is particularly evident in South Africa. Since the end of apartheid, it has also been expressed in the self-image as the “rainbow nation” or in the multilingual national anthem. However, this symbolic appreciation of the equal coexistence of people from different population groups in a “colourful” society is hardly reflected in a particular openness and tolerance for migrants from other countries. While Achille Mbembe (2015), for example, sees Johannesburg as the centre of a cosmopolitan “Afropolitanism” or Bukasa (2018) names Pentecostal church congregations founded by migrants as places where communities emerge beyond national, ethnic and cultural demarcations, there are many other examples of indifference or open xenophobia. This is evident not only in descriptions of migrant life in Johannesburg that differ significantly from Mbembe’s assessments (Landau and Freemantle 2018; Makina 2010), but also in xenophobic violence against migrants, not least those from neighbouring Zimbabwe. This can manifest itself, for example, in fatal attacks on migrants or the destruction of migrant-run businesses. In addition, migrants also suffer psychologically from xenophobia. However, the goal of inducing migrants to return to their country of origin in this way is hardly achieved in practice, especially in the case of Zimbabweans: in view of the very difficult conditions in Zimbabwe, they nevertheless prefer to try to get along as well as possible in South Africa. This is made more difficult by what the migrants see as totally inad-

Migration Between Zimbabwe and South Africa and the South African…

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equate support from both the Zimbabwean and South African governments. The latter in particular mostly responds to xenophobic violence by denying xenophobia and dismissing the attacks as part of ordinary crime (Crush et al. 2017; Thela et al. 2017; Misago 2016). Quantitative surveys show that xenophobic attitudes are widespread in South Africa. However, their prevalence differs when comparing different population groups, for example depending on the level of education or the extent of contact with migrants. Some studies show that over time, social relations between South Africans and migrants have increased on the one hand, and xenophobic attitudes have decreased on the other, although they remain at high levels. This relationship is also known from other countries, e.g. Germany, and gives rise to hope that over time there might eventually be a noticeable decline in xenophobia (Gordon 2018; 2015; Crush et al. 2012).

 igration Between Zimbabwe and South Africa M and the South African Closed-Door Policy Given the prevalence of xenophobic attitudes towards migrants among the South African population, it is not surprising that the government’s migration policy towards Zimbabwe, which can be characterised as a policy of closure, enjoys backing (Crush and Chikanda 2014, pp. 560–564). Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is very diverse, as different causes of migration (e.g. economic or political reasons) dominate at different times or are intermingled in individual cases. Similarly, the socio-economic profile of migrants, for example in terms of gender and socio-economic status, is diverse and changes over time. And the intentions of migrants also differ, so that some only want to live in South Africa temporarily, while others want to live there long-term or permanently (Crush et al. 2012; Crush and Tevara 2010). This migration is contrasted with a policy that is primarily concerned with sealing off and controlling migration instead of integrating and respecting the rights of migrants. Only in recent years has the South African government tightened its refugee policy with the aim of making South Africa unattractive to refugees, for example by planning to house asylum seekers in camps (Crush et al. 2017). Asylum claims by Zimbabweans in South Africa are hardly recognised (ibid., p. 5; Crush and Chikanda 2014, p. 563). And even before the tightening of political regulations, migrants in South Africa were not always able to exercise in practice rights that they were entitled to on paper (Bloch 2010).

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The restrictive side of South Africa’s migration policy is particularly evident in deportations. Between 1988 and 2010, South Africa arrested and deported more than 2.5 million people. This is more than any other country in the world during this period. 5Most of these people were from bordering countries, with 80% of them from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho alone (Feltes et al. 2018, pp. 561, 569). Regional superiority makes it easier for South Africa to restrict mobility into the country, including cross-border trade. Not least, this is attributed to widespread xenophobic attitudes (ibid., pp. 568–569). South Africa is thus a case characterised by many contradictions in terms of integration.

Integration of Refugees? Camps vs. Local Integration The South African plan to house asylum seekers in camps is in line with a widespread preference for refugee camps in the Global South, for three reasons in particular: By concentrating them in specific locations, refugees are easier to control. This makes it easier to organise their care. This also appears advantageous from a security policy perspective. Moreover, the visibility of refugees in camps makes it easier to obtain international support for their care (Bakewell 2014, pp. 128, 134– 135). [E]ncampment refers to a policy which requires refugees to live in a designated area set aside for the exclusive use of refugees, unless they have gained specific permission to live elsewhere. The host state is obliged to ensure that the human rights of the refugees are upheld, including the rights to shelter, food, water, sanitation and healthcare, and education, but how these are delivered varies enormously. (Ibid.., p. 129)

Accordingly, refugee camps can also look very different – “we may be considering anything from areas enclosed by barbed wire, akin to prisons, to open villages” (ibid.., p. 127). The approach of housing refugees in village-like, agricultural settlements was tested in many African countries in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda (ibid., p. 130). Refugee camps are first of all part of a humanitarian approach that reacts to the arrival of larger groups of refugees. Because of this, the idea of integrating refugees

 Meanwhile, the U.S. has far exceeded those numbers (https://www.dhs.gov/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2015/table39) as has a previously unknown number of expulsions by Saudi Arabia: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/09/saudi-arabia-mass-expulsions-migrantworkers 5

Integration of Refugees? Camps vs. Local Integration

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at first does not play a role here and is also rejected by most African governments (ibid.., pp. 134–135): Integration is a function of social and economic interactions between refugees and host populations, and yet camp- and settlement-based refugees and asylum seekers lack freedom of movement and residence and therefore cannot interact with host populations. […] As such, the aim of ʻlocal settlementʼ is to provide refugees with a confined geographical space where they can maintain and perpetuate their ʻOthernessʼ without being able to intermingle with nationals. (Kibreab 2014, pp. 580–581)

A further problem arises from the fact that refugee camps, as part of a humanitarian policy, are rooted in an approach that is sometimes very exclusively aimed at short-­ term aid in acute emergency situations (Barnett 2014). The humanitarian operation in refugee camps in Goma, DR Congo, where more than a million people from Rwanda arrived in a very short time after the genocide and civil war in Rwanda, can be seen as paradigmatic of this. However, the vast and increasing majority of refugees in the world, including many refugees in Africa, live in a protracted refugee situation (PRS). Many of them are unable to return to their countries of origin for decades. In the meantime, children born in exile in the camps grow into adults for whom it is no longer meaningful to speak of a “return” to the “homeland” when the PRS finally ends (Milner 2014, pp. 152–153). Thus, questions of integration contain a very different virulence than if refugees were to live only temporarily in camps and return home within a few years. It should also be borne in mind that following a PRS, the reintegration into the country of origin is by no means unproblematic. Return to the country of origin is by no means to be equated with a simple return to life before the flight (if such a life existed at all  – see the second-generation refugees born and raised in exile mentioned above). In concrete terms, problems can arise in the context of reintegration if refugees are able to return to their country of origin but not to their place of origin, or if the return is associated with a noticeable change in living standards (Hammond 2014, p. 505 f.). A well-known example of people in a PRS are the Somalis in Kenya who have fled as a result of the civil war that has been going on since the early 1990s. Dadaab refugee camp, inhabited mostly by refugees from Somalia, was until recently the largest refugee camp in the world, with several hundred thousand residents, now including third-generation migrants. It was later replaced in this position by Uganda’s Bidi Bidi, home to over 200,000 South Sudanese (Watera et al. 2017, p. 2). Another refugee camp in Kenya comparable to a large city in terms of population is Kakuma. This is described by Jansen (2017) as a place that was never in-

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tended as such a long settlement, but in practice has developed into a locality where the coexistence of self-regulation and humanitarian management as well as “the existence of a category of people whose lives are shaped by mobility and uncertainty” has become a permanent routine (Jansen 2017). The camp is beneficial both for the refugees living there and for the Kenyans living nearby, as the existence of the camp favours the development of the entire region (ibid.). Kreibaum (2016, p. 2) comes to a completely different conclusion with regard to the Dadaab refugee camp: “The camp has an isolated location in the desert. Its residents are not permitted to leave or work; leaving them dependent on aid as a consequence.” In addition, positive portrayals of Kakuma and the opportunities and advantages (allegedly) offered to refugees there are also criticised, in some cases in a clear manner (Brankamp 2018). The verdict on the village-like refugee camps in Uganda, which are discussed in detail in Chap. 6, is also mixed. On the whole, however, studies on refugee camps in the global South come to a negative conclusion (Bakewell 2014, p. 127). Camps for refugees are often considered a bad option, but alternatives to them are hardly known or are not considered (ibid., p. 136).

 efugee Integration: Repatriation, Resettlement and Local R Integration Basically, three alternatives can be named, which are summarized under the concept of durable solutions, namely the return of refugees to their home country, their settlement in another country, and local integration into the society of the country where they (initially) live in a camp (Hovil 2014, p.  488). A distinction can be made between a de facto and a de jure dimension of local integration, which refer to the actual cohabitation with locals and the acquisition of citizenship, respectively (ibid., pp. 489–490). Both de facto and legal integration of refugees are usually rejected by governments. Accordingly, the former often takes place primarily when refugees settle outside camps in defiance of policy (ibid., pp. 488–490). In addition to camp policies and the associated restrictions on freedom of movement, which are essential for de facto integration, a widespread reluctance on the part of governments to grant citizenship to refugees also stands in the way of local integration (ibid., p. 492 f.). Nevertheless, self-settled refugees repeatedly succeed in integrating locally, although this is accompanied by a precarious situation of de facto statelessness if they lose their protection as refugees through self-settlement (ibid., p. 493 f.).

Refugee Integration: Repatriation, Resettlement and Local Integration

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Against these general trends, the case of the naturalisation of over 100,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania from 2008 stands out. It is the only recent example of an attempt to address the challenge through mass naturalisation (ibid., p. 494). The decision was linked to the Tanzanian government’s desire to dismantle the camps where refugees from Burundi had been living for decades, so that they were given the choice between returning to Burundi and naturalisation, combined with a move elsewhere in Tanzania. The latter was preferred by most refugees (Kuch 2016, pp. 471–472). This is because after decades in Tanzania (the majority had been born there after their parents fled), they had already achieved a high degree of de facto integration, but felt they also needed citizenship to be fully integrated (ibid., p. 476). Linked to this are the right to freedom of movement, which is linked to other rights such as freedom of choice of employment, rights to political participation and involvement in elections, and (perceived) security both in the sense of physical security and in the sense of planning security for the future (ibid., pp. 476– 481). Another reason why the majority of refugees chose to naturalise in Tanzania is that they now identified strongly with Tanzania, unlike in earlier decades (ibid, pp. 481–482). In addition to local integration, return and repatriation play a major role. In West Africa, for example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and finally in Côte d’Ivoire, which divided the country into two camps and quasi-partition (2002–2006), resulted in over 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons. This led to such complex situations that Liberian refugees hosted in camps in Côte d’Ivoire were hastily evacuated there by UNHCR to Guinea or Ghana when the crisis erupted there. To date, the majority of refugees and internally displaced persons have gradually returned to their places of origin, often with the support of UNHCR or IOM. West Africans who worked mainly in Côte d’Ivoire fled back to Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana and Guinea when the crisis broke out (Drumtra 2003). A renewed crisis and civil war in Côte d’Ivoire following the 2010/2011 presidential elections drove more than a million people to flee again in a short period of time. Many of the West Africans working there left the country again. Today, some 22,000 Ivorians remain in Liberia, Ghana, Guinea and Togo. 6 ADNcommonC.–.

 UNHCR, Operational Portal. Refugee Situations. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ivorianreturnee 6

6

Migration and Refugee Policy in Africa

Within Africa, as in Europe, there is a trend towards more restrictive asylum and refugee policies. And as in Europe, migration and refugee policy in Africa is variable on a spatial axis and differs between different regions and countries. North African refugee policy is shaped by the relevant conventions of the African Union (AU) on the one hand, and the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the other. In Algeria, refugees from Western Sahara have been living for decades in refugee camps established by the Polisario Front involved in the Western Sahara conflict and often described as ideal camps. This description of the situation, however, threatens to leave out existing problems and neglect the search for ways to improve the refugees’ situation (Hanifa 2014, pp. 538–542).

(Mass) Expulsions of Migrants and Isolation of Refugees In West Africa, there were cases of mass expulsions even before the change in African refugee policy, such as the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969 and Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983/1985 due to an oil and major economic crisis, among others. The latter affected about 1.5 million people who had been living and working in the country for some time. Most of the intra-African expulsions can probably be understood in the sense of an adjustment measure of the working population, some of which already took place during the colonial period (Lecadet 2018). Since the independence of African countries, nation-building processes and associated xenophobia have been added as justifications for deportations (Sylla and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_6

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Schultz 2019; Bredeloup 1995).1 As in European countries, it was and still is often domestic political reasons and, above all, an expression of state sovereignty for the sometimes extremely violent expulsions that ultimately determine who belongs and who does not. For example, historian Daouda Gary-Tounkara compares Nigeria’s current deportation practices in the “fight against Boko Haram terrorism” (2015, p. 26) to the massive expulsions of 1983 in the wake of Nigeria’s economic crisis. Another important case is the mass expulsions or repatriations from Côte d’Ivoire in the wake of the 2002 and 2010 crises. In 1989, in the context of another border conflict, Mauritanians were expelled from Senegal and Senegalese from Mauritania. Mauritania also took the opportunity to expel other nationals belonging to the same ethnic group as the expelled Senegalese (Bredeloup 1995, p. 119; Fresia 2014, p. 545). For about 20 years, West African refugees in particular have been expelled from North Africa, directly linked to European policies of closure. Through bilateral and multilateral migration control agreements, the EU and its member states also continue to exert influence on the migration policies of West African countries. Overall, however, with limited temporal and/or spatial exceptions, West Africa tends to be an exception to the trend of tightening refugee policies (Fresia 2014, pp. 544–552). In this region, we find longstanding economic ties and kinship bonds across national borders, fostered and reinforced by the ECOWAS framework. While in precolonial times there were large migrations in the region due to environmental conditions and tribal disputes, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, trade mobility as well as individual migration increased primarily for economic purposes (Feltes et al. 2018, p. 557). Apart from this, the Sahel, to some extent until today, was characterized by nomadism. In this sense, the ECOWAS has been a space of free mobility and circulation since the 1970s. This takes account above all of the cross-border ethnic groups and the long history of mobility and, in part, seasonal migration (Camara et al. 2011; see above, p. 19). On the other hand, these freedoms of movement are increasingly threatened by the latest wave of externalisation in migration and refugee policy. There is evidence of this in the form of massive border controls, especially in Niger and at the Nigerien borders, but also far beyond, e.g., to Mali or Burkina Faso (Brachet 2018).2 Deportations have also taken on a new dimension in this context. For ex Bredeloup (1995) presents a survey of intracontinental deportations of West Africans, already during the colonial period and especially since the African independents between 1951 and 1995. 2  See also the work and documentaries of the Alarme Phone Sahara, https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/, 2020 as well as the ZDF documentary “Türsteher Europas. How Africa should stop refugees.”, 16.08.2018, https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/tuersteher-europas-102. html. Cf. Jakob and Schlindwein (2017). 1

(Mass) Expulsions of Migrants and Isolation of Refugees

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ample, according to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and official Algerian statistics, Algeria alone deported 25,000 people from sub-Saharan Africa during 2018; between 2015 and the beginning of 2018, the figure was around 27,000 people from sub-Saharan countries.3 In West Africa, and Mali in particular, the Centre for Migration Management and Information (CIGEM) had been created in 2008, as the first EU migration centre on the African continent, which was intended to facilitate legal migration routes to Europe, but was ultimately almost exclusively responsible for the readmission of migrants (Dünnwald 2017; Feldman 2012: Chap. 7). In South Africa, as already mentioned, a restrictive policy towards refugees from Zimbabwe can currently be observed. As it is often not possible to distinguish clearly between refugees and economically motivated migrants, South Africa refuses to recognise almost all Zimbabwean asylum seekers. This is in line with strong xenophobic sentiments in South African society, which exist in similar form elsewhere in the region, and foreign policy interest in good relations with Zimbabwe.4 Botswana, too, is committed to sealing itself off from (refugee) migration from Zimbabwe. On the other hand, more progressive refugee laws have been formulated in various southern African countries since the 1980s, and refugees can become citizens in Lesotho, South Africa and Mozambique (Crush and Chikanda 2014, pp.  560–567). In these cases, closure also means, in very concrete terms, massive expulsions, up to and including the mass expulsions already mentioned (on the commonplace nature of the deportation of Zimbabweans from Botswana, see, for example, Galvin 2014). The transition from a generous to a restrictive refugee policy can also be observed in East and Central Africa. Mass deportations have already occurred in the past. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was brutal, with some 75,000 Eritreans arrested and deported from Ethiopia without legal process between mid-­ 1998 and early 1999, while Eritrea repatriated some 70,000 Ethiopians with the support of the International Red Cross (Human Rights Watch 2003, pp. 5–7). More recent restrictive policies, as mentioned earlier, are manifested in the increased emphasis by states in the region on placing refugees in camps and preventing self-­ settlement. The segregation of refugees is intended to specifically prevent their integration into the societies of the destination countries. In addition, refugees, who

 https://www.ecre.org/?s=Algerien+Deportations+25%2C000+Migrants+to+Niger  Of course, this still refers to the Zimbabwean government under Robert Mugabe; the effects of his fall remain to be seen. 3 4

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are increasingly seen as a security risk since the genocide in Rwanda, are to be more easily controlled in this way. The securitization of refugee migration and refugees, i.e. their portrayal and perception as a threat, is sometimes also used to justify deportations (Kibreab 2014, pp.  579–582). However, there are also ­sometimes significant differences between individual states in this regard. For example, while the Kenyan government is currently attempting to close the Dadaab refugee camp, which is home to more than a quarter of a million Somalis, and deport its residents (BBC 2017), the Ugandan village of Bidi Bidi has become the largest refugee camp in the world as a result of the South Sudanese civil war. Sub-Saharan African states such as Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea or Nigeria, which are only indirectly under the influence of EU externalisation practices (see Chap. 8), also contribute substantially to the massive deportations that have taken place in the last two decades since these countries gained independence. The high numbers of repatriations of West Africans from Côte d’Ivoire have already been reported here; as well as of the hundreds of thousands of repatriations of South Africa and partly of the bordering states, e.g., Botswana, especially since the 1990s. Another example is statistics from the General Delegation for Malians Abroad, which estimate, for example, that 91.8% of all deportations of Malians between 2002 and 2014 were from other African states, compared to 6.6% from Europe.5

Uganda as a Showcase? Especially recently, Uganda has often been praised as a shining example of good refugee policy (see, for example, Clayton 2018). Not only does Uganda’s high level of willingness to accept refugees play a role here (not least because of the civil war in South Sudan, Uganda is currently hosting more refugees than any other African state), but also the way it deals with refugees living in the country. For example, a new refugee law was passed at the turn of the millennium that is less restrictive than its predecessor and grants refugees more rights (Refugee Law Project 2006), and a development-oriented approach has been institutionalized and refined to provide refugees with pathways to economic self-sufficiency and to link refugee policy with support for local communities in rural Uganda. However, critics of Uganda’s refugee policy speak of a failure of the development-oriented policy, widespread poverty among refugees, and clear discrepancies between refugee  Document de Politique National de Migration (2015, p. 54). https://www.maliens-exterieur. gouv.ml/docs/Brochures_Politiques.pdf 5

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rights formulated on paper and the practical reality of life (Hovil 2018; Ahimbisibwe 2017; Ilcan et al. 2015). When analysing the actual living situation of refugees in Uganda – but also in other contexts of refugee migration in Africa  – it is important not to view “the ­refugees” as a homogeneous mass, but to address heterogeneities and inequalities. Not only the refugee policy of the country of refuge, but also the age, gender, etc. of refugees influence their lived realities (Gehring 2020, pp. 385–391). Different refugees thus each face different, specific challenges. For example, many female refugees, but also some male refugees, are affected by sexual and gender-based violence (Edström and Dolan 2018; Krause 2015a, b). Refugee children attend in principle the same schools as Ugandan children, but de facto often cannot attend school or are taught in overcrowded classes (Schalit 2018; Kupfer 2016). Homosexual refugees experience persecution, discrimination and exclusion due to widespread homophobia in Uganda (McQuaid 2017; Nyanzi 2013). Refugees who are physically or mentally ill have limited access to medical care or psychological support (OʼLaughlin et al. 2017, 2018; Adaku et al. 2016; Nagujja et al. 2015). And refugees who settle in the capital Kampala itself, for example, instead of living in camps or settlements designated for refugees, are generally excluded from access to humanitarian assistance (Addaney 2017). In view of all this, Uganda can hardly be described as a “paradise for refugees” (Unger 2019). Even if Uganda’s refugee policy may be progressive in its principles, in practice weighty challenges remain (Ahimbisibwe 2018, pp.  8–12): the high number of refugees, their often long stay in the country, ecological and security problems resulting from the presence of refugees, and the limitations of both own resources and foreign support. The latter must also be taken into account when measuring the design of Ugandan refugee policy, such as refugees’ access to schooling or medical care, against normative ideals such as the human right to education, which cannot be achieved without sufficient resources (cf. Pogge 2011, pp.  89–92). Civil society actors are accordingly calling for greater support for Uganda from abroad in order to provide the necessary resources for adequate care for refugees (Amnesty International 2017d).

Self-Organisation of Deportees In many (West) African societies, civil society protest has been stirring for years in the face of thousands of involuntary returnees. This is often carried out by self-­ organised deportees, for example in Mali, but also in Sierra Leone, Togo, Cameroon,

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Nigeria or Senegal.6 The Association Malienne des Expulsés (AME), for ­example, was founded in 1996 by deported Malians from Angola and France. Today, together with other migrant organisations, they play a central role in the national, political debate and have recently also increasingly organised themselves with regard to the many disappearances and deaths in the Mediterranean (cf. Sylla and Schultz 2020). With the Alarme Phone Sahara, a locally anchored and transnationally networked initiative has also emerged that provides emergency aid to stranded people in the Sahara and makes a political stand.7

 See on Mali https://www.expulsesmaliens.info/ and https://www.facebook.com/amapros/ (last accessed 15.05.2023); on Sierra Leone https://neas-sl.org/ (last accessed 15.05.2023) and on Nigeria https://cyid.org/crep/. The initiative Post Deportation Monitoring offers an overview of some civil society organisations in some destination countries of deportations as well as texts and resources on the topic: https://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/postdeportation-monitoring 7  https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/ 6

7

Diaspora as Mediator Between Africa and Europe

The role that diasporas play in social change and development in the country of emigration is the subject of controversial debate. Diasporas are understood here as communities of migrants who live abroad but have a link back to their country of origin, for example through financial remittances or political involvement. One thesis on their role is that diasporas are one of the key drivers of transnational migration and will thus shape its dynamics for decades to come (Collier 2014). Collier argues that three factors underlie transnational migration dynamics. First, there would be a substantial gap in income and life chances between poor and rich countries. Second, transnational migration alone would not narrow this gap. And third, “foreign communities would continue to grow for decades as migration continues” (Collier 2014, p. 57). In Collier’s perspective, then, diaspora communities facilitate migration from South to North, from Africa to Europe – without addressing the key drivers of migration. In an earlier publication Collier goes even further and sees diasporas mainly as a catalyst of violent conflicts in the countries of origin (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). From this perspective, diasporas act as (civil) war drivers by financially supporting rebel groups. However, this thesis has not gone unchallenged (see Hall 2015 for a review; cf. Zunzer 2004). It should be noted that there are examples that demonstrate the conflict-driving role of diasporas. One example would be the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was composed of Rwandan refugees in Uganda. This grouping led an invasion of Rwanda in 1990, which initiated a civil war and acted as a precursor to the genocide in 1994. However, there is also evidence that emigrant communities can be helpful in resolving conflicts and supporting democratization. For example, African diaspora groups may foster democratization in countries of residence (Gumedze 2019). Beyond the issue of violence, then, it is important to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_7

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note that diasporas can have both positive and negative consequences for social change in countries of origin. It depends on the conditions in each case. Diasporas can perform a wide variety of functions. Diaspora groups act as catalysts for political, economic and cultural change in the countries of origin, and sometimes also in the destination countries. These include dispute resolution in conflicts, contributions to participation in education and health care by supporting family members, post-conflict reconstruction and de facto integration in the countries of settlement. But of course, negative impacts should not be neglected: Diasporas can, for example, fuel and prolong conflicts between ethnic and religious groups. Examples include divisions between Hutu and Tutsi in the Burundian diaspora in Belgium (e.g. Turner 2007) or conflicts in the Eritrean diaspora (SVR 2020, p. 182).

Renaissance of the Concept of “Diaspora” Nowadays, diasporas are often understood in a very broad sense to include all (former) citizens living abroad and their descendants who maintain a connection to the country of origin, whether material or symbolic (e.g. Sheffer 2003). In this sense, diaspora can be understood as a form of transnational community. Transnational communities1 involve close and enduring ties characterized by high levels of familiarity, emotional depth, moral commitments, and social cohesion. Transnational communities can develop at different levels of aggregation. The simplest form consists of village communities in systems of interstate migration. Members of such communities who live abroad or have returned invest in part in public or private projects for the benefit of the community in question. The central form of transnational communities is formed by larger, transnational religious groups and churches. World religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism existed long before modern nation states came into being. Diasporas also belong to the category of transnational communities. In recent decades, the concept of diaspora has experienced a revival in the context of development and as a transnational actor. In the process, the term diaspora has gone through a very chequered history. Originally, it was used to describe the dispersion of the Jews after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. Later, the concept referred to minority situations of religious communities, until in the twentieth century the term was finally used predominantly for ethnic or ethno-­  More accurate, in terms of Max Weber’s distinction between “communitarization” and “socialization”, would be the term “communitarized social units” (Faist and Ulbricht 2017). 1

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religious and national minorities abroad. Generally, members of a diaspora share common memories of a lost homeland or visions of an imagined homeland to be created and a return there, while the destination country often denies the minority in question full recognition of its cultural distinctiveness. It is useful to think of diaspora not as a narrowly defined political and cultural community, but as a political aspiration (Brubaker 2005, p. 12). In this view, diaspora appears as a group of people in a destination country that refers to an imagined or real country of origin or homeland, sometimes even propagating a return option, and therefore tends to reject demands for social integration or assimilation in the country of current settlement. On the one hand, diaspora in a broad sense characterizes the emergence of communities of citizens outside the country of origin. In this case, diaspora functions as an extraterritorial part of a nation-state. On the other hand, diaspora is often involved in politics in the home country and sometimes acts as a competitor or threat to state- and nation-building and the consolidation of political power of the respective political regimes. Among other things, emigration functions as a safety valve for authoritarian regimes that fight political opposition; in other words, it promotes emigration (exit) instead of dissent (voice). At the same time, emigration is a precondition for effective opposition from within the diaspora. From the perspective of the target country, diasporas are then a kind of foreign country within the country. In relation to civil society processes, the term diaspora has experienced a particular upswing. Organizations in the diaspora are definitely influenced by global meta-norms and slogans and sometimes use them cleverly, for example in relation to demands for more democracy, greater respect for human rights and gender equality in the countries of origin; in other words, overall liberal-inspired membership policies. At the same time, there are many cases where diasporas promote nationalist projects. In this respect, diasporas can thus also be interpreted as a reflection not only of the rule of law, but also of nationalist and xenophobic currents in the destination countries (Baser 2015). The trauma of the transatlantic slave trade as a central point of reference for the African diaspora generally plays no role in the current political discussion in the European context. A historically contextualising perspective is completely absent from most studies oriented towards development and migration policy. Conversely, the literature on the African diaspora has dealt intensively with the historical dimension of transnational entanglements between Africa, Europe and America, such as the classic title The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness by Paul Gilroy (1992). However, currently relevant questions regarding socio-­ cultural, economic or political development processes in African societies are

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largely ignored.2 This shortcoming stands in stark contrast to the significant role played by representatives of the African diaspora in the independence movements and in the constitutional process of postcolonial nation states in Africa. It is important to recognise the consequences of diaspora claims as primarily civil society events, but also driven by states and confederations of states (e.g. AU). This addresses three key political areas of transnational membership: (1) political freedom and democratisation; (2) the use of emigration by states; and (3) the ties of emigrants to a collective or collectives, often the nation but also families, religious communities and ethnic groups.

Political Participation and Democratisation All immigrants are also emigrants; apart from that, further differentiations are needed, both in research and politics. In the 1980s and 1990s, research focused on the role that emigrants, and diaspora groups in particular, played in fomenting conflict in their countries of origin. More recent research and public policy debates, on the other hand, have focused on their roles as brokers in violent conflicts, as development entrepreneurs after conflicts have ended, and as agents of democratization. This new focus should be seen against the backdrop of a changed geopolitical landscape. Until the end of the Cold War, superpowers used actors from the diaspora to interfere in the internal affairs of emigrant countries. South-North constellations were for this reason an integral part of both the East-West conflict and the aftermath of decolonization, involving state- and nation-building projects in former European colonies precisely on the African continent. With the end of the Cold War, diaspora groups had to find new fields of activity. Development cooperation became one of them. Leading international donors and institutions understand the term development in the broadest sense primarily as economic development, which, however, should also be complemented by dimensions such as the institutionalisation of the rule of law and democracy (Bauböck and Faist 2010). One could speak here of an agenda that applies to the states of the Global South not only criteria of the economically competitive state, but also of the rule of law and democratization. Some observers speak in this regard of a postcolonial agenda in the  One exception is Pérouse de Montclos (2002), who addresses the difference between the “ethnic-national” African diasporas of the present and the “black diaspora” created by the slave trade. Pérouse de Montclos’ expertise is based on empirical research on violent conflicts in Africa (especially Nigeria), on African refugees and forced internal African migration. 2

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sense that these categories otherwise tend to describe migration policy in the Global North, whereas others argue that these are also criteria of the intra-African democratization movements advocated, for example, by Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in the 1990s. It can also be questioned to what extent migration policy in the Global North is aligned with criteria derived from democracy and the rule of law. Very different consequences of remittances can be observed: Under certain circumstances, transnational remittances are used at the family level to fight poverty. For example, school fees for children or health costs are paid. However, remittances also go in the opposite direction, from countries of origin to countries of destination (reverse remittances). In the destination countries, migrants use these remittances to be able to afford legal assistance in obtaining residence permits; this is the case, for example, with migrants from Ghana in Amsterdam (e.g. Mazzucato 2011). At the state level, there can also be negative effects. Sometimes remittances from destination countries even prevent important structural economic reforms from being undertaken by the governments of the countries of origin. Instead, a number of African states also use remittances as collateral for loans from abroad (Horst et al. 2014). Interestingly, the effect of remittances from abroad, especially from overseas, is different from financial transactions from internal migration within African countries. Remittances from internal migration have an equalizing effect on communities of origin, while those from international migration tend to exacerbate inequality in places of origin and between migrant and non-migrant families (Ellis 2007, p. 21) This difference can be attributed to the selectivity of migration. Transnational migration presents higher barriers in terms of cost of travel and for visas than internal migration. Therefore, transnational migration is more likely to be restricted to relatively more privileged sections of the respective urban and village populations. In this case, the Matthew Principle is at work, i.e. the preferential treatment of already better-off individuals and groups. These results point in a clear direction: in order to have a poverty-reducing effect, transnational migration should also be made possible for relatively poorer people (Faist 2016). In this context, the discussion on the role of diasporas as development agents not only considers monetary remittances, but increasingly also the role of migrants in terms of social remittances. Migrants are sometimes observed to certainly influence politics in their country of origin through “ideas of citizen rights and responsibilities and different histories of political practice” (Levitt 1997, p. 517) that they practice in countries of immigration. These social remittances – for example, ideas about democracy and gender equality – are thus transferred to the country of origin.

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With regard to processes of democratisation, the existing data material provides an ambivalent picture (cf. Pedraza 2013). By leaving the country, migrants often form a new constituency that rulers in the countries of emigration have to reckon with. Nevertheless, there are clear limits to what migrants’ transnational political activities contribute to the spread of democratic practices. While there are few empirical studies on the influence of diasporas on democratization processes with regard to Africa (cf. Melchers et al. 2003), evidence on other world regions is certainly available. In El Salvador, for example, hometown associations contributed to the development of participatory institutions and the dynamics of local political participation (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Migrants, in this case, became a new and difficult-to-predict power grouping. Thus, it would be premature to see migrants primarily in the role of agents for deep political and social change. After all, in quite a few cases, migrants themselves are part of local elites, even though diaspora groups may radically challenge existing political regimes. Similarly, it should not be overlooked that migrants’ interests are usually relatively more focused on participation in the politics of the country of immigration. But in other cases there is evidence that diasporas do play a role as “actors of democratisation”, not only in the post-communist world of Eastern and South-­ Eastern Europe (Koinova 2010), but also in South Africa (SVR 2020, pp.  185– 186). This observation holds true for those cases where the diaspora has not been exclusively committed to a national or nationalist agenda, but above all to democratisation. After the Cold War, the diasporas just mentioned were not necessarily the most obvious actors of democratization in many parts of the world, but they made a visible contribution to it. Compared to emigration countries, there is a striking lack of studies on the impact of migrants on democracy in the immigration countries of the Global North. There, one finds predominantly normative statements that immigrants pose a threat to the alleged cultural homogeneity of Western democracies (e.g. Huntington 2003). As a rule, no empirical evidence is provided for this view. The discourse consists mainly of an account of fears towards people of, say, Muslim groups in Europe (Faist 2019, pp. 204–237). These debates often contribute to a further culturalisation and securitisation of migration policy. This also leads to the question of how effective diaspora policies and the extension of citizenship rights across nation-states actually are and what contribution they may make to the ongoing transformation of citizenship (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). One of the important questions for countries of immigration is whether engagement in the country of emigration is compatible with the political integration of migrants. In short, the question is whether ‘between two places’ means living ‘neither here nor there’ or ‘here and there’. Previous research indicates that migrant

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organizations play a key role in political participation in countries of immigration (Rex et al. 1987). However, few studies have systematically analysed the role of migrant organizations in facilitating the two-pronged process of supporting political activity both ‘here and there’ simultaneously, simultaneity being one of the key features of transnationality. Results from a study of migrant associations in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia, for example, conclude that the majority of organizations of migrants from North and West African countries were transnationally active (Morales and Jorba 2010). The transnational link actually seems to promote the political participation of migrants in Spain as a whole. In sum, the two orientations – migrants’ integration into the countries of immigration and their activity in the regions of emigration – are not a zero-sum game, but can actually reinforce each other (cf. Pries and Sezgin 2012).

States Use Diasporas: Rights and Obligations of Emigrants Occasionally, nation-states align themselves with the interests of emigrants in order to exploit them for their own ends. The transnational state or “emigration state” (Gamlen 2008) is therefore an integral part of the social constitution of extraterritorial groups and a global nation through various mechanisms. The aim of the countries of origin, or in this case also of the African Union (AU), is to (re)integrate the emigrants through various state measures in the country of origin. Since its foundation in 2002, the AU has been trying to integrate diasporas into the continent’s development goals. Crucially, such policies are anchored institutionally; for example, in a well-developed network of government agencies and consular services. Thus, states such as Algeria, Morocco, Mali and Kenya created their own ministries for diaspora affairs; other states such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger and Nigeria created special departments in existing ministries. Some states complement such measures by supporting national cultural activities abroad through the broadcasting or transmission of national television channels and state-­ sponsored web portals. Sometimes states establish migrant associations specifically, such as the Amicales in the case of Morocco or Diaspora Knowledge Networks in the case of South Africa (Meyer 2011). One aim of these policies is to control a loyal diaspora or to exploit its economic potential. The reinforcement of basic civil, political, social and cultural rights reflects efforts by states to maintain loyalty but also to emphasise the obligations of those who have left. A mix of economic incentives, patriotic exhortations, and marketing programs, such as “roots tourism” in Ghana (Benton and Shabazz 2009), is particularly popular. Specifically, the following aspects can be distinguished:

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• Financial resources: Some states, such as Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Egypt and the Gambia, offer special financial and, above all, tax incentives for emigrants. In this way, states of origin take advantage of the special resources available through emigrants. Such policies include simplified investment and tax regimes. Senegal, for example, is trying to implement co-development projects in cooperation with the French government and diaspora groups, usually migrant organizations. In this case, the focus is on financing infrastructure projects, such as schools, health facilities and water supply. A particularly targeted group for project financing are returnees. There are also examples of taxation attempts. Eritrea, for example, attempted to levy a “healing tax” on (former) citizens living abroad, a kind of tax intended to compensate for the emigrants’ departure and to promote the further development of the country. Eritrean migrants abroad are in a quandary. On the one hand, they emigrated due to coercive measures at home (e.g. labour service); on the other hand, they are dependent on the confirmation and extension of their passports by Eritrean consulates and embassies for the issuing of documents such as residence permits in countries such as Germany (cf. Koser 2007). • Human knowledge and experience: Desired in emigration countries are not only capital but also the knowledge and skills of qualified professionals. These emigrants should either be lured back to their country of origin through the diaspora knowledge networks already mentioned, or at least remain linked to the country of emigration. Countries such as South Africa, and now Nigeria, have created programmes to promote knowledge transfer of their expatriate citizens back to their country of origin (see Faist 2008). TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals) is a program launched in 1977 by the United Nations Development Programme in Turkey and active in dozens of countries. In Mali, for example, it was introduced in 1998. Highly educated migrants living in Europe, North America and Japan are invited and sponsored to teach temporarily in public universities or even to help with reconstruction, as in Liberia since 2006.3 In the case of Nigeria, it is mainly experts in the natural sciences, IT and economics who are targeted. Programs for the short-term deployment of citizens living abroad to train local experts are widespread (SVR 2020, pp. 183–185). • Political representation of interests: Governments also regard their emigrants as representatives of foreign policy interests in the respective immigration countries. There are examples of political instrumentalisation of diaspora organiza https://www.unescwa.org/transfer-knowledge-through-expatriate-nationals; gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/155, last accessed 29 Dec 2020. 3

https://www.

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tions by governments of the countries of origin (e.g. SVR 2020, p. 191). To be distinguished from this are more symbolic measures to integrate (former) citizens into the political community of the country of origin. A step in this d­ irection are, for example, initiatives by states such as Morocco, which has created foundations for communication with emigrants, or Mali, which established a Diaspora Council with representatives of the government and NGOs. Symbolically significant is also the increasing tolerance of dual citizenship and the willingness of the majority of African governments to grant voting rights to citizens living abroad – at least in principle (cf. Lafleur 2013). State efforts to mobilize “their” diaspora abroad are also taking place in the context of academic and political debates about the “brain drain”. The term has been increasingly used since the late 1960s (see first Adams 1968). The dependency and world-systems theories that emerged at the same time did not see migration as a contribution to development, but on the contrary, a process of “underdevelopment” in the countries of origin. To date, the discussion has proceeded in three phases. In the first phase, brain drain was defined as the consequence of imposing the costs of education on the countries of origin without compensating them for the brain drain. For the destination countries, immigration represents a mechanism to avoid the costs of education by having access to well-educated professionals (Meillassoux 1981). In a second phase, in the early 1990s, the concepts of brain gain and brain circulation emerged, pointing out that it was precisely the success of the emigrants that would encourage the next generation in the emigration countries to follow in their footsteps and study medicine, for example. In this case, the medical faculties would have an incentive to increase their training quotas (Stark 2004; with references to the situation in Africa). What this argument forgets, however, is that many countries simply lack the resources to expand costly university courses in this way. In a third phase, which goes hand in hand with the new optimism about the contribution of migration to socio-economic development since the 2000s, but also highlights its limitations, it has been pointed out that in countries that have elevated brain export to a national labour market policy – notably the Philippines – there is a glaring shortage of trained professionals in the health system of that country of origin. Evidence from empirical research suggests that exporting skilled workers beyond a certain threshold has markedly negative effects on domestic health care. Malawi is one such case: over two-thirds of all doctors and nurses trained there work in the UK4 (cf. Commander et al. 2004 on other world regions).  https://www.africaportal.org/features/tackling-malawis-medical-brain-drain/ for a position that differs from this, see Record and Mohiddin (2006). 4

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Another interpretation of brain drain refers to the political dimension. The emigration of low-skilled workers can serve as a safety valve for authoritarian political regimes. In the case of the emigration of the so-called highly qualified, there is an additional aspect. For it is precisely this group that usually constitutes the bulk of political activists, who are often critical of the respective political regime (Faist 2019, pp. 238–268). Overall, it is noticeable that governments generally resort to a mixture of programmes that are intended to strengthen loyalty or the sense of belonging to a state as a global nation, as well as to offer incentives for investment, remigration or circulation. Loyalty is thus the third element, alongside emigration (exit) and dissent (voice), in understanding diaspora policy. In this way, governments in emigration states seek to promote what they see as desirable forms of transnationality. Often, however, the state of origin is unable to keep the voice of the emigrants strictly under control through measures such as surveillance or even threats. This challenge is evident not only in the existence of separatist and irredentist diasporas, but also in the activities of political opposition groups.

Belonging, Nationalism and State-Building Understanding practices associated with diaspora requires looking not only at the interactions between states and diaspora organizations, or states and their (former) members, but also at the interactions between migrants and the relatively immobile. Therefore, it is necessary to start by looking at the migrated citizens. Here, the focus is particularly on the socio-moral resources of citizenship, such as reciprocity, solidarity and trust among citizens. Since the end of the Cold War, diaspora groups often claim responsibility for social remittances, such as an improved situation with regard to democratisation, gender equality and human rights. Diaspora organizations also occasionally claim the right to national self-determination. These claims, mostly by ethno-national groups, are particularly contentious. There are two types of transnational groups in particular that pose a challenge in this respect for the country of emigration, and to some extent also for the countries of immigration concerned: refugees and stateless diasporas. The role of all three categories goes far beyond the flow of financial capital – for example, to fund rebel armies – and provides insight into the politics of transnationally active political organizations and communities. States are not only based on organizational infrastructure and various mechanisms of legitimate legislation and law enforcement. They are equally dependent on ascriptions of meaning that constitute nations as political communities in the first place.

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Membership in such imagined communities is based not only on formal ties between states on the one hand and citizens on the other, but also on trust among citizens. This trust between members of political communities cannot simply be imposed from the top down in states. It is these socio-moral resources that diasporas also try to mobilise for themselves. Refugees or political exiles, emigrants and members of stateless diaspora groups often see themselves as the vanguard of a new nation-state or a nation-state in urgent need of reform. At first glance, they appear to be competitors of existing (emigrant) states. The transfer of political-cultural resources takes many forms, ranging from the activities of displaced persons whose aim is to improve human rights in their country of origin to long-distance nationalism aimed at creating a new nation-state. The stated intention of “stateless” diaspora groups is to establish a new nation-state, or at least a high degree of autonomy in their declared homeland. These groups are represented by organizations or, depending on one’s point of view, liberation movements or terrorist groups, which are involved in an armed conflict with the former home country. An example of this are refugees from Western Sahara living in camps in Algeria. These are maintained by the Frente Polisario, which wants Western Sahara to secede from Morocco. And yet refugees often have a major impact on peaceful political development by mediating between competing groups or providing resources for reconciliation and reconstruction. Well-known examples include the role of the South African diaspora in the anti-apartheid movement and the engagement of the Ugandan and Nigerian diasporas. In Burundi, Somalia and Sudan, diaspora groups contributed to peace negotiations in collaboration with NGOs in these countries. However, there are also cases in the African context where diaspora organizations supported nationalist forces in the country of origin and thus exacerbated conflicts (Nordien 2017, p. 6). The peacebuilding function of organizations can be seen in thematic networks. These are links between individuals and organizations that exchange information and services in order to achieve a common goal. Such connections can coalesce into advocacy groups (e.g., for human rights), business networks, or scientific networks (e.g., Bilecen and Faist 2015; Jöns 2009). Often there is a shared discourse on an issue such as human rights, or there is mobilization around professions, and at times such networks are even considered the core of a “global civil society” (Keane 2003). Unlike organizations, access to these networks is not limited to formal members. Issue-based networks have a long tradition in the field of human rights and are also gaining importance in the field of environmental degradation and protection. They are also emerging among migrants who have migrated to the

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European Union (EU) from third countries, including countries in Africa.5 In terms of business networks, people from emigration countries living abroad represent an important source of financial transfers and investments, both in their role as entrepreneurs in the destination countries where they have settled and with reference to their countries of origin (e.g. Agunias and Newland 2012), where they also act as returnees. In the political field, returnees make up a significant proportion of political personnel in some (post-)conflict states; such as one-third in Somalia (Vanore 2018). In the business world, networks mitigate the problems associated with the enforcement of contracts (transaction costs; cf. Walther 2014).

Beyond the Diaspora: Transnational Families It should not be forgotten that diasporic communities and organizations form only one, albeit important, area of the practices of cross-border interactions of non-state actors. Alongside these are small groups such as families and kinship networks. Highly formalized cross-border relationships within small groups such as households and families are typical of many migrants. Families may live in different places because one or more members are abroad. Families are often characterized by a high degree of attachment to the common place of origin. A classic example of such relationships are transnational families, which see themselves as an economic-­solidarity alliance and maintain a shadow household in another country in addition to their primary residence. Transnational families make use of the social ties of inherent resources such as reciprocity and also resources associated with symbolic ties such as solidarity. Remittances are mostly transferred from abroad to those who continue to take care of the household in the place of origin. Conversely, reverse remittances can also be observed, for example to help migrants obtain work and residence permits (see above) or to finance the tuition fees of children studying at universities in the Global North in Paris, London, the US, and increasingly China.

 Examples include activities in the Ghanaian and Gambian diaspora in Germany: https:// www.cimonline.de/static/media/giz2016-de-diasporastudie-ghana.pdf and https://www. cimonline.de/static/media/giz_diaspora_gambia_online.pdf. Furthermore, Europe-wide associations are also visible, such as Afrique-Europe-Interact. It consists of diaspora representatives from various countries, especially North, West and Central African countries, European and African representatives on the ground: topics include land grabbing, climate change, migration, flight, deportations and political conflicts: https://afrique-europe-interact. net/ 5

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The transfer of financial and social resources builds on elements of social orders in families and other groups that, under certain circumstances, confirm patriarchal orders and prevent social change. One social mechanism for generating a ­continuous flow of remittances is represented by spatial gender segregation. For example, in the context of migration in the Senegalese-French transnational social space, extended family groups selected marriage partners for male migrants. The women and children were encouraged to remain in Senegal. Family reunification was deliberately discouraged in the context of origin in order to maintain the flow of remittances and increase the likelihood of the return of the fathers of the families. Importantly, Senegalese migrant organizations also helped to sustain this form of social order (Mezger and Beauchemin 2014).

 iaspora and Transnational Actors: Bridge-Builders or D Conflict Drivers? From all this it can be concluded that transnational activities revolving around national interests can support, compete with or even challenge the congruence of a people, a state territory and a state authority. Overall, it is clear that the one-sided narrative that diasporas are primarily conduits for further migration from Africa to Europe has little to do with observable processes. Rather, diaspora activities reveal the diverse interests and norms represented by countries of origin and destination and intervening civil society organizations. Diaspora thus forms a central link between the two continents. The answer to the question of whether diasporas and other transnational social structures function more as bridge-builders between countries of origin and destination or as conflict drivers in the countries of origin and/or destination is therefore differentiated: It depends on the circumstances. In general, rule of law and democratic procedures, predictable economic policies, the absence of physical violence and discrimination in countries of origin and destination all contribute to migrants’ ability to build stable relationships with their reference states in African-European contexts. These linkages are particularly evident in the role of diasporas in conflict exacerbation and post-conflict transformation. However, it is unclear whether, in addition to the destination countries, the countries of origin can also derive positive benefits, at least economically, from the contributions of migrants from abroad.

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The immigration policies of most destination countries in Europe are too restrictive and the migration quotas too low. The situation is even less clear with regard to processes of democratisation. It is evident, however, that in the African context, too, the families of transnational migrants in particular benefit from remittances, especially in the fields of education and health.

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In Europe, the discussion focuses on illegal migration from African countries. This is an extremely truncated idea, because firstly, the majority of South-North migration in Africa does not have Europe as its destination. Secondly, to date, the majority of African migrants have entered Europe with valid documents (visas). Illegal migration, such as crossing the Mediterranean on unseaworthy boats, has been less prevalent until recently (Alscher 2012). The number of unauthorised border crossings at the EU’s external borders has decreased significantly again since 2015/2016.1 In this context, the political treatment of migration is characterised by a dual approach of control or increasing restrictions on the one hand and development cooperation on the other. If the EU Member States have their way, the latter should be provided in exchange for the cooperation of African countries with regard to restrictive migration control. This means that, with the help of the EU Member States, an infrastructure for domestic controls and border controls in the countries of origin and transit will be built up. The EU countries will then grant further funds for development cooperation projects.

 https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysis-for2019-Dh6Wkf. On restrictive developments such as increased deportations from Algeria to Niger in 2020, see, among others, the Human Rights Watch report: https://www.hrw.org/ news/2020/10/09/algeria-migrants-asylum-seekers-forced-out 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_8

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Externalisation: Attempt at Remote Control Nevertheless, it is clear that until now the restrictions and export of migration control to Africa – the externalisation from Europe to Africa – has clearly dominated over development cooperation (Frelick et al. 2016). Externalisation, in the context of migration policy, refers to the transfer of border control and management to third countries and the reinterpretation of the EU’s territorial area. The latter means that migration management takes place far outside the national borders of destination countries (Faist 2018b). Externalisation is thus the attempt to prevent migrants from reaching the territories of destination countries or to classify them, from a legal perspective, as illegal migrants and thus not eligible for admission (Casas-­ Cortes et al. 2016). This may also involve indirect measures, i.e., recourse to control measures by third countries and private actors such as airlines. Externalisation involves financially lucrative ‘deals’ for countries of origin: for example, Cape Verde received a total of €27 million from the Spanish government between 2007 and 2009 as compensation for greater cooperation to combat illegal migration. One example of the linkage between migration control or restrictions and means of cooperation is deportation agreements. Overall, since the beginning of the 2000s, deportations in North and increasingly Sub-Saharan Africa have been a fundamental element of the externalisation of migration and border controls by the EU and its member states. Third countries are thereby asked to identify people suspected of wanting to migrate to Europe and, if necessary, send them back to their countries of origin or transit. For the African continent, this has meant a sharp increase in intra-African deportations from the transit countries of the Maghreb, especially Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania (see above). These mostly take place within the framework of a bilateral or multilateral agreement with the EU and/or its member states.2 In simple terms, these agreements link the payment of development funds to the condition that the signatory states prevent illegal migration towards Europe, inter alia by readmitting unwanted migrants and refugees of their own nationality; under certain conditions also third-country nationals and stateless persons. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU has had the legal competence to conclude migration and readmission agreements with third countries. From the outset, migration management has been linked to trade and development aid, and  Deportations from the EU to Maghreb countries have also increased significantly in recent years, not least due to the fact that Germany, for example, has declared these states to be safe countries of origin; see https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/abschiebungen-innenpolitikmarokko-tunesien-algerien-1.4340966 2

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migration and return policies have increasingly become an integral part of the EU’s external relations. Since 2005, the flagship policy project “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)”3 has placed a geographical focus on Africa and the Mediterranean in order to better manage migration from these regions. In the framework of the Rabat and Carthum processes, (non-binding) “mobility partnerships” and “Memoranda of Understanding” were signed, which were intended to implement a restrictive agenda of legal entry on the one hand and the return and readmission of so-called illegal migrants on the other. Since May 2015, the “European Agenda on Migration”,4 developed in the face of the “refugee crisis”, has linked EU internal migration policy with foreign policy to an even greater extent. Internal migration policy here means the area of asylum policy, which is to be further harmonised within the EU, as well as the development of a new immigration and labour migration policy, e.g., through the recognition of professional qualifications acquired in third countries. In concrete terms, this agenda mainly means cooperation in border management, the fight against human trafficking and smuggling, and, in the context of the return and readmission of migrants, increased cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa5 complements the European Agenda on Migration with measures for employment, education as well as humanitarian protection for migrants and measures for border management and the return and reintegration of migrants in the country of origin. More than before, the European Agenda is also linked to a comprehensive external European Investment Plan with the aim of “addressing root causes of flight”.6 However, similar investment measures have so far achieved little positive impact in migrants’ countries of origin and transit (Schultz 2018). The new proposal for an EU asylum and migration pact clearly continues this trend: the focus is on migration control, fighting the causes of flight and an even stronger focus on return, strongly dominated by EU needs. It also includes approaches of partnership cooperation and legal migration, or is to be developed in this framework in the future (Angenendt et al. 2020).

 See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/globalapproach-to-migration_en 4  See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en 5  See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en 6  See https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_migration_partnership_framework_update13_12_2016.pdf 3

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“Marshall Plan with Africa” Beyond the previous agreements, there are also more comprehensive plans to address the root causes of flight and migration. The “Marshall Plan with Africa”, an initiative of the German Minister for Economic Cooperation, is essentially based on achieving a leap forward for African countries through increased resource allocation (BMZ 2017). In this context, “combating the causes of flight” is also named as a priority objective. However, it is doubtful whether massive cash transfers, as also envisaged by the new Marshall Plan, would make much difference to the overall situation. A comparison with the historic Marshall Plan is appropriate, within which about US$ 14.3 billion in aid flowed between 1948 and 1952; equivalent to about US$ 130 billion in 2017. However, sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have already received about US$ 600 billion in aid since the 1960s. Therefore, the assumption that successful development aid or even direct investments by European companies can stem migration from Africa to Europe is also problematic, at least in its simplistic form. It is worth recalling very fundamentally the aforementioned inverted U-curve, which states that cross-border migration takes place particularly from middle-income countries (Chap. 2). Socio-economic development increases precisely the number of emigration countries in this category; in the medium term, therefore, it tends to lead to an increase in migration potential. Apart from this, in the view of its critics, the Marshall Plan with Africa is currently turning out to be a “sham” on closer inspection, as it has not yet been endowed with any financial resources, but is rather a concept without a concrete plan for implementation, which is also in conflict with German trade interests in Africa (Jung 2018, p. 200). Even if many questions remain unanswered with regard to “combating the causes of flight”, it is worth taking a look at the geographical situation and the political context. A glance at the map quickly reveals that none of the sub-Saharan African states is located in the immediate vicinity of Europe. Therefore, before refugees reach Europe, they first have to go through a longer phase of migration through North Africa  – or, in the case of refugees from Somalia and other East African countries, sometimes also through Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen (Research and Evidence Facility 2017). The main routes are via West Africa to the Canary Islands, via Morocco to Spain, via Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta, and via Turkey to Greece. Other routes may be particularly important at different times (Schapendonk 2012, pp. 29–30). Politically, the central reason for the decision to focus on cooperation between the G20 and African states is likely to be the expected development of migration, i.e., the forecast population growth in Africa and the associated increase in migra-

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tion and flight. The overriding political catchword is therefore: combating the causes of flight. What is meant by this is above all the fight against wars and the lack of economic growth on the African continent. It is ignored that the realisation of this goal, according to today’s state of knowledge and the structural constitution of the real world of states, in Africa as well as in Europe, might not be organisable in the short to medium term. For example, more stable political and economic conditions in some African countries would require not only a fair trade policy but also less intervention by European powers in the internal affairs of the states concerned. In addition, political-economic elites that govern, for example, rentier states (i.e., states in which income is generated through scarcities of raw materials such as oil or rare earths and distributed from “top” to “bottom”; see Chap. 2) would have to be replaced quite fundamentally by those with less onesided distribution strategies. In contrast, previous attempts at externalisation have only created superficial cooperation between African and EU countries. But precisely because these policies cement their status as destination countries, North African and, in some cases, West African countries in particular are resisting these deals. These countries belong to the category that benefits from emigration and associated remittances. This is also the reason why time and again bilateral and multilateral agreements on the readmission of third-country nationals fail. An instructive example is Mali. Here, a readmission agreement with France was not signed in 2009 and, moreover, a migration and readmission agreement with the EU failed to materialise in 2016/2017. In each case, there were massive civil society protests against this (Chap. 6; see also Soukouna 2012; Traoré 2016). As a result, the EU and its member states are increasingly adopting a flexible approach of different framework agreements and memoranda of understanding with regard to readmission agreements. These require less bindingness from cooperation partners and thus do more justice to multifaceted interests; also with regard to contradictions between the sovereign rights of the EU as well as individual member states. Where appropriate, they are easier to implement than formal agreements (Cassarino and Guffre 2017). Apart from that, readmission agreements are often about bargaining chips in broader agreements, for example on energy security, counter-terrorism, border or police cooperation (Schultz 2018). According to the proposal for a new EU Asylum and Migration Pact, this approach should be pursued even more strongly in the future. This preliminary assessment does not mean, however, that small-scale projects cannot improve people’s life chances. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has so far provided additional bilateral support to six reform partner countries – Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia – totalling over EUR 2bn since 2017. The objectives are to

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expand renewable energy, improve energy efficiency and develop the financial and banking sectors. In return, the countries committed themselves to reforms.7 This ultimately takes place within the framework of the above-mentioned Marshall Plan, which has thus taken shape and implements the Compact with Africa, an initiative of the German Federal Ministry of Finance as part of Germany’s Year of Africa 2017 with Germany’s G20 presidency. This support is accompanied, for example, by the BMZ special initiative for “Training and Employment”. This is intended to create up to 100,000 jobs and 30,000 training places in the coming years. On paper at least, the Marshall Plan is thus pursuing the goal of economic and social transformation in order to create sustainable jobs; unlike the Compact with Africa, which is primarily concerned with improving infrastructure and financial investment. All of this, in turn, ultimately falls within the programme of combating the causes of flight (cf., Schultz 2020). Migration restrictions and externalisation measures on the one hand and the semantics of the causes of flight on the other show clearly identifiable consequences for migrants and refugees and the countries of origin, transit and arrival. The policy of restriction is accompanied by a rhetoric of stereotypes that often equates smugglers and traffickers and clearly contrasts them as perpetrators with migrants as victims. In fact, most migrants travel on their own initiative and only use the services of smugglers – often local actors such as nomads or fishermen – at certain points in order to evade, for example, police and soldiers, who pose the far greater danger to many migrants. Sometimes migrants themselves become smugglers or parts of smuggling networks that already continue from their place of origin to the country of arrival (Richter 2016; Ayalew Mengiste 2018). Even in the case of trafficking of Nigerian women in the context of forced prostitution, the women concerned are not exclusively passive victims: “Therefore, smuggling should certainly not be seen as the cause of irregular migration, which is however the rational underlying policies to ‘combat illegal migration’. On the contrary, the growing importance of smuggling is rather a response to increasing migration restrictions and repression” (de Haas 2007, p.  26). Somewhat exaggeratedly, one could say that the rhetoric of criminal smugglers (which do exist) and above all the restrictions create the problems that one is trying to combat.

 https://www.bmz.de/de/presse/aktuelleMeldungen/2017/juni/170612_pm_072_Entwicklungsministerium-vereinbart-Reformpartnerschaften-mit-drei-afrikanischen-Laendern/index.jsp as well as Drucksache 19/18486, Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion der FDP – Drucksache 19/17490 – Aktueller Stand zum “Marshallplan mit Afrika”, Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode: https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/184/1918486.pdf 7

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Unintended Side Effects of Externalisation It is at least the unintended consequences of this policy that create a vicious circle. Militarized borders between African countries are financed by the EU or its member states and partly implemented in cooperation with local authorities. They create higher risks for migrants, who in turn not only have to invest more money to overcome these hurdles. For as a consequence of stronger migration controls in Africa itself, a professionalisation of smuggling networks is taking place, which, due to the need to circumvent controls and remain undetected, also encourages the activity of human traffickers. Thus, a spiral of armament is taking place, as trust in the smugglers is replaced by money and by an economic bartering with partly criminal gangs. An empirical illustration of this spiral is the city of Agadez in Niger, which, like Tamanrasset, acts as a kind of crosshairs for mobility from sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa – from where various routes from sub-Saharan Africa meet and split again: towards West Africa and the Canary Islands, Morocco and Spain, Libya, Tunisia and Italy, Malta (Fig. 8.1). Thus, arguably, more sub-Saharan African migrants live in North Africa than in Europe, and many cities in North Africa-both on and beyond the migration routes between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe now have notable sub-Saharan African populations. Economic factors, the social climate, and the migration policies of North African countries all play a role in determining whether migrants continue to travel or settle. To give an example of the unintended consequences of externalisation: As recently as the early 2000s, former rebels in particular were still running the business of transporting migrants through Niger to Libya or Morocco. They used the regular tracks through the desert for this purpose, which corresponds to the old caravan route.8 The risk of dying of thirst in the desert seemed manageable. However, as more EU-funded controls were installed along the routes around Agadez in the course of the 2000s, smugglers switched to secondary routes, but these were also more dangerous to life and limb (Brachet 2018). As this business attracted new operators due to the high risks, the rebel group acting as smugglers was displaced by criminal networks. Over time, due to tighter controls, the shift to less safe routes and the commercialisation of the business, the Sahara developed as a ‘mass grave’ or a ‘graveyard’, analogous to the Mediterranean (ibid.). The criminalisation of smuggling thus made transit more dangerous and the business more lucrative. In the securitisation of migration and its negative consequences for migrants, it should  In the past, it was the Touareg who travelled these routes and also took over the smuggling; today, it is primarily the Teda group that is criminalised (Musch 2017). 8

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Fig. 8.1  Migration routes through North Africa. (Source: de Haas 2007, p. 17)

also be borne in mind that in parts of the region there are strong UN military deployments and above all the French mission “Barkhane” and the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad), which also combat migration under the name of combating terrorism.9 Thus, an increased militarization of migration control is taking place (Müller 2018). The control policies, which were supposed to reduce the danger according to public statements, developed into drivers of the very process they claim to fight. It is a classic case of unintended side-effects.

 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/niger/2017-08-31/europes-migrant-hunters

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Trade-Off Between Development and Migration Control The externalisation of migration control through militarisation and remote control is being carried out with the new European Agenda for Migration 2016, mainly through so-called “migration partnerships” with individual states such as Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Ethiopia. Simply put, this is an (unequal) bartering of funds for development and migration control in exchange for the readmission of refugees. This is also one of the primary objectives of the so-called Khartoum Process, which the EU maintains with Eritrea, Libya and Sudan, among others. Here, the limits of legitimate state migration control are also being explored: All three of the aforementioned states are otherwise criticized, sometimes harshly, for their violations of human rights. One thinks, for example, of Eritrea’s compulsory service for young adults and the associated exit ban.10 However, these violations of human rights no longer seem to play a decisive role in the field of migration control (Landau et al. 2018, Kipp and Koch 2018, p. 12). These countries “assume the role of Europe’s watchdogs despite the fact that Eritrea is the main country of origin of African refugees in Europe and the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for former Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes before the International Criminal Court.” (Amnesty International 2017b, p. 4) Germany’s role is viewed critically in the cited report, in part because of the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’s (GIZ) Better Migration Management border protection program in East Africa (ibid., pp. 6–8). In fact, the instrument of migration partnerships has so far proved to be less than successful, as can be seen above all from the refusal of individual states (especially Mali and Ethiopia) to cooperate on the issue of deportations, which often run counter to the interests of some African states and their citizens, e.g., through the loss of remittances. This is arguably due in no small part to the asymmetric architecture of the agreements (Schultz 2020; Zanker et al. 2019). At this point, it is also worth noting more generally that migration policy is not a priority, particularly for some states in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in West Africa, socio-economic aspects such as country development, employment, education and health, sanitation and infrastructure have a much higher priority than migration policy (Adam et al. 2019). Tunisia may serve as another example among many: The country has been linked to the EU since 1998 and 2004 through an association agreement and within  Accordingly, international migration in Eritrea is officially prohibited for people between the ages of 18 and 41, as they are obliged to perform indefinite and unpaid national military service (cf. Ayalew Mengiste 2018, p. 60). 10

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the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As a result, Tunisia also participates in the externalized border protection of the EU. In this context, Pro Asyl, Bread for the World and Medico International criticize, among other things, the immediate repatriation to Tunisia of migrants and refugees who arrived in Lampedusa, the EU’s hesitant participation in resettlement programs for people who fled the Libyan civil war into Tunisian refugee camps, and the tendency expressed therein to externalize refugee protection as well, despite the often very poor living conditions in such camps (Kopp and Dünnwald 2013). The spiral of creating insecurity and increased dangers, resulting in an increase in migration as illegal or irregular, is reinforced by further measures. These include not only the end of humanitarian rescue missions in the Mediterranean after the Italian push Mare Nostrum or the personnel and infrastructural strengthening of the EU border protection agency FRONTEX. This also includes deportation camps for stranded people such as “Guantanamito” in Mauritania (Dünnwald 2013), in which case migrants and refugees apprehended in the port city of Nouadibhou were interned and subsequently deported to Senegal or Mali. The aforementioned deportations of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans from Algeria can also be assumed to have taken place since 2015 (e.g., ECRE 2018).11

 onsequences of Externalisation for Control C and Remittances Among the consequences of externalisation in West and Central Africa are the effects of the EU’s blocking of the central Mediterranean route at its hub in Agadez, Niger. Since then, many migrants from sub-Saharan countries have sought new routes, switching to the Western route via Algeria and Morocco. Around 40,000 sub-Saharan refugees were thus said to be stranded in Morocco at the beginning of 2018, awaiting their passage (Misereor 2018). This change of routes is particularly noticeable at the EU’s outposts on the African continent, namely the enclaves on the Moroccan coast belonging to Spain, Ceuta and Melilla. In this case, the Moroccan state takes over for the EU the task of keeping migrants away from its

 In mid-2018, the IOM published counts for the first time, according to which 13,000 people from sub-Saharan Africa alone had been deported by the Algerian police to the border with Niger and abandoned in the desert since May 2017. From there, they had to continue on foot until they were cared for and taken in by the International Red Cross, IOM and other organizations. The numbers of those who died are not known. https://apnews.com/9ca55922 17aa4acd836b9ee091ebfc20, last accessed February 20, 2019. 11

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gates. In the area around Melilla, about 5000 refugees from West Africa and the Middle East were living in the worst conditions at the beginning of 2018. Those attempting to cross into Spain must negotiate three six-meter-high fences and patrolled trenches that include cameras and sensors (Fig. 8.2). Moroccan army posts and, on the Spanish side, Guardia Civil patrols cooperate in this, including in the MIGRATION ATLAS: p. 32 closed 98.4 x 98.8

The border device of Ceuta and Melilla

Watchtower

Indoor fence with lights and radars

Exterior fence with tear gas diffusers

Deterrent barrier

r

LA ND

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roa

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e iph

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The deterrent barrier is a labyrinth of 6 to 12 mm thick cables braided between posts of 1 to 3 meters high. A mobile system prohibits the use of ladders. This device makes crossing attempts slow and difficult to allow the security forces to intervene before the migrants reach the outer wall.

MOROCCO 100 km Source: www.elpais.com; Ceri and Atelier de cartoqraphie de Sciences Po, 2010.

Fig. 8.2  Border installations in Ceuta and Melilla

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“hot ­deportations”, which involve deportations from Spanish territory to Morocco in violation of human rights. As a result of externalisation, not only migration is prevented and human rights violated, which in part ends in a vicious circle of growing insecurity. Moreover, another, probably unintended effect can be observed. Less migration overseas also reduces the possibility of using financial remittances to promote human development (Nshimbi 2017; Krämer et al. 2013). This in turn contradicts the stated policy goal of strengthening development cooperation “from below”, i.e., the civil society side, in this case by the migrants themselves. This observation gains importance not least in view of the fact that the flows of resources exceed the funds of official development cooperation worldwide and also in Africa. In the meantime, the financial returns via migrants are three times as high as official development assistance (Stojanov and Strielkowski 2013); even if it must always be taken into account that there are also reverse flows, i.e., from the countries of origin to the destination countries, for example, via the outflow of knowledge and brains (brain drain) or via the investments that families make for migrating relatives so that they can gain a foothold in other countries (see also Chap. 7).

 epatriation in the Context of Externalization R and Militarization In addition to the externalisation of control of migrants and refugees in African countries, efforts to increase and change forms of internalisation of control must of course be taken into account. Internalisation and externalisation of control through militarisation and securitisation also partly result in problems for the integration of refugees. Via (voluntary) repatriation and deportation of refugees from Europe back to their countries of origin, integration in the destination countries and reintegration in the countries of origin are considerable challenges. An increasingly temporary status of refugees in Europe, e.g., with subsidiary status, means among other things that family members cannot live together in the short to medium term. The reintegration of deported refugees also remains unresolved at the political level, even though this is currently being virulently discussed politically and increasingly addressed in practice. Reintegration measures following voluntary and, even more so, involuntary or forced returns have so far mainly been individual measures or smaller programmes. From Germany, for example, programmes for repatriations to Kosovo, but also to Iraq and Ghana have been carried out in cooperation with the IOM.  There are hardly any systematic evaluations (Koser and Kuschminder 2015). In the course of

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the current wave of externalisation, these programmes are being developed, in some cases on a massive scale. For example, the BMZ has had a Department for Return, Reintegration and Development since 2017, which, among other things, is building information and reintegration centres in countries such as Morocco or Senegal through the “Perspektive Heimat” programme in cooperation with the GIZ, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the IOM, as well as countries of origin and transit of migrants. People are to receive counselling and training before and after their return.12 However, the financial support for individuals within the framework of “Start-up Plus” is limited. And here, too, it is again a matter of individual cases. Supported by the EU Emergency Trust Fund, broader migration management and reintegration programmes already exist in some African countries, especially in West and East Africa. Repatriations are increasingly taking place, especially from North Africa and Niger (see e.g. Bartels 2020). This involves thousands of “beneficiaries”; in Mali, for example, implemented by the Spanish Development Agency and the IOM. However, these individuals are differentiated in their care by whether they were on their way to Europe or not (cf. Sylla and Schultz 2019).13 Last but not least, it appears that African governments are more likely to cooperate with ‘voluntary’ return programmes, as it can facilitate a more dignified and humane return (Adam et al. 2019). However, given the concerns that have been raised about similar approaches, the extent to which these programmes can bear fruit is highly questionable. Overall, many African countries face the following problems in refugee policy (Crisp 2006, pp. 4–5). First, the global North acts as a role model for restrictive refugee policies. For example, many North African states also introduced visa requirements. Moreover, these states use migration as a bargaining chip and obstruct EU transit policies. One thinks, for example, of Gaddafi’s policy towards Italy and the EU. Their own financial needs served as a bargaining chip to soften EU pressure to curb migration. Libya under Gaddafi was the first country on the African continent with which a European state, namely Italy, entered into migration cooperation in the early 2000s. In 2008, the two countries concluded the “Italian-Libyan Friendship Pact”, which included the construction of a $5 billion coastal highway in Libya (Engler 2017). The pact was renewed in 2018. Second, African transit and destination countries experience a lack of support precisely with regard to ­refugees.  https://www.bmz.de/de/themen/Sonderinitiative-Fluchtursachen-bekaempfen-Fluechtlinge-reintegrieren/deutsche_politik/aktionsfeld_4/index.jsp 13  https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/mali/renforcement-de-lagestion-et-de-la-ouvernance-des-migrations-et-le_en 12

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On the contrary, through externalization and mobilization, many burdens of migration controls are shifted forward or backward. Third, related to this, not least in line with rigid control policies, increased xenophobia can be observed in Kenya and Tanzania (Milner 2009, pp. 92–107); similar to South Africa (Chap. 5).

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What to Do? To Promote Mobility

First of all, it should not be forgotten that neither African nor European states have an interest in the complete cessation of Africa-Europe migration flows. On the European side, there is still an interest in “cheap and willing” labour, which is amply confirmed by irregular employment, for example, in agriculture in southern European countries. And on the side of many African states, the oversupply of labour, i.e., the often-mentioned demographic surplus, is a decisive political driver (Chap. 2). The analysis so far shows that mobility in Africa, which does not result in an exodus to Europe, is prevented by externalisation and restrictive policy approaches. In addition, despite the German “Africa Year 2017”, bilateral and multilateral approaches with individual African states are still in the foreground on the European side, aiming at a short-term reduction of migrant numbers. Unfortunately, despite the mantra of an urgently needed “fight against the causes of flight”, the structural causes and drivers of migration tend to be disregarded in the measures taken from the European side. Similarly, the interests of the African side have so far been too quickly lost sight of. Legitimate interests include, for example, migrant remittances, which in many African countries far exceed the resources of bilateral and multilateral development cooperation. But they are an essential factor for economic and social development, especially in the education and health sectors, but also for small businesses.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 T. Faist et al., Mobility instead of exodus, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40084-2_9

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Partnership in Migration Policy? It is therefore necessary to partially overcome the Eurocentric view and thus not only focus on immigration countries. The cross-cutting issue of migration and flight is only one example among others, such as trade policy. It is well known that EU trade policy creates barriers for African exports; see the example of cocoa and chocolate already mentioned. But the significance goes beyond this: due to state subsidies, some European agricultural products are so cheap that they squeeze ­local products out of African markets. So there are obvious levers to be tightened here.1 However, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) recently concluded, e.g., with West African states of ECOWAS, continue to facilitate the import of European products on the African market and thus also lift protective tariffs imposed on French products in the course of decolonisation.2 Attention should instead be focused on support for and cooperation within the framework of the African Free Trade Area (Schmieg 2020). Closer to the migration issue, there are also opportunities that could be further exploited, to the benefit of both African and European states. Approaches can be found in current debates, most recently in the process on the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (A/CONF.231/3), to make migration policy more coherent. This means, among other things, that migration and development can only be effectively shaped in coordination with adjacent policy areas (Kipp 2018). In the debate here, partnership approaches between the EU, Germany and African states are also being discussed, which attempt to raise awareness of the existing asymmetries and Eurocentrism of cooperation and to overcome them. The interests at stake here differ in many cases. Whereas the EU is concerned with preventing and controlling unwanted, irregular migration, African states are confronted with the reality of pronounced internal migration and regional mobility. Apart from this, there is a need for cooperation on the African side on fundamental issues such as economic development, health, education and infrastructure. In this respect, asymmetries must be resolved into fair compromises, if cooperation is to be based on partnership. In this context, productive exchange must be entered into with actors on the ground and at all levels; in particular, the transnational social and economic relations of the diaspora must be harnessed (Schultz 2020).

 https://info.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/blog/kritik-eu-afrika-handelsabkommen-epas  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/migration_en_0.pdf

1 2

New Ways of Cooperation

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New Ways of Cooperation For all the attention that must be paid to the consequences of a policy of externalisation and securitisation and an instrumentalisation of development cooperation by the European side, it must not be forgotten that a policy that allows mobility but does not promote an exodus also requires comprehensive political, social and economic renewal in African countries themselves (Böckenförde and Braune 2018). In stronger partnership relations between Europe and Africa, more opportunities for regular migration should be explored. This would include prominent ­bilateral and multilateral agreements in selected sectors for temporary and permanent migration, e.g., in the construction, care and agriculture sectors. It would also be important for African emigration states to be financially compensated by EU states for the emigration of skilled workers and experts (brain drain). This would recognise the investments made by the countries of origin, particularly in the education and training of the highly qualified. In order to constructively address the existing dilemmas, the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) also presented a proposal for a visa on bail in 2020. This attempts to take into account the interests of migrants as well as those of their countries of destination and their countries of origin. Instead of paying large sums of money to trafficking networks, migrants should, under certain conditions, be given the opportunity to make a kind of “deposit” with a European state. In return, they can enter regularly and obtain a temporary residence permit for gainful employment. If they subsequently leave on time, the “deposit” is paid out again. In addition, re-entry can be made possible after a waiting period. According to the SVR, this would require a functioning readmission agreement with the countries of origin. The model could be limited in number and linked to further selection criteria. Employers and companies on the European side could also be involved in order to address their needs for skilled workers. Return migration in this model, which is also argued in the sense of a development of the country of origin, should initiate processes of circular migration and represent an offer for long-term and sustainable cooperation to African states (SVR 2020, pp. 104–108). Overall, in addition to a differentiated European policy, the rule of law and economic conditions in African countries must also change. Only then would there be a realistic chance of overcoming the one-sided sealing off of border areas, which is costly but not effective in terms of regulating migration. Under such auspices, mobility, also across borders, could be understood as a contribution to socio-economic and political development processes on both sides of the Mediterranean.

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Against this background, it is understandable that at the annual summit of the African Union (AU) in 2019, Africa was chosen as the “continent of migration” as a priority theme. This inaugurated the African “Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons”, which not only aims to give migration a positive connotation and increasingly place it within a development framework, but also targets long-term goals such as free mobility within Africa – similar to the EU.

Refugee Policy: Humanitarian Aid and Development For refugees in particular, three solutions are commonly discussed: Repatriation, resettlement and local integration in the host countries (Chap. 6). There are complex mixed forms, which should or could come into play in the so-called EU-­ Turkey deal, for example: rejection of refugees arriving in Greece from Turkey without valid papers, in return for the resettlement of refugees from Turkey in European countries. However, the 2015/2016 “refugee crisis” in the EU and also the EU-Turkey deal indicate that there are currently neither supranational nor international regulations for a burden-sharing of refugees that is perceived as fair by many sides. The EU-Turkey deal, for example, is too much a mere continuation of a European policy of restriction that attempts to establish a cordon sanitaire around the EU. In view of this situation, the UN Global Compact on Refugees3 could be a small step forward. It foresees regular international consultations on the issue and faster and easier access to financial assistance from international institutions such as the World Bank for the most affected host countries. Too many governments so far perceive refugees as a threat or use refugees as a means of dividing and dominating the electorate. Some of Africa’s authoritarian-ruled states are becoming veritable “migration profiteers” (Koch et al. 2018). In such a mixed situation, new approaches need to be adopted that are aimed not only at measures in Europe, but also in the regions of origin and transit. This is an urgent task, not least due to the fact that most refugees either remain as internally displaced persons in their own country or, at best, migrate to one of the neighbouring countries in the region (Chap. 3). Two examples of comprehensive policies resulting from academic research are the policy recommendation by Alexander Betts and Paul Collier entitled Refuge (2018) and the utopian proposal Refugia (2020) by Robin Cohen and Nicholas Van Hear.

 https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf

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Economic Autonomy of Refugees

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Economic Autonomy of Refugees Alexander Betts, a political scientist, and Paul Collier, a development economist, aim with their proposal to make refugees largely economically autonomous and, above all, to enable them to shape their own economic future (Betts and Collier 2018). They argue that refugees need more than humanitarian aid, which means more than food, blankets and tents. Betts and Collier even go so far as to argue that refugees can be an asset to host societies, if they are granted the right to work and education in the first place. In the long run, these refugees can contribute to the reconstruction of their country of origin, for example through financial remittances and the transfer of knowledge and skills. Betts and Collier thus foreground the increased agency of refugees through appropriate policies. A key element of government action should be Special Enterprise Zones (SEZs), which could be located at the borders of countries of origin. Factories located in such SEZs would be able to produce goods cheaply through cheap and, above all, willing labour. Betts and Collier are thinking primarily of countries that border Syria, such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. But such an idea could also be applied to corresponding African countries. Through their proposal, the authors thus try to appeal to the European countries, which try to prevent or contain further migration of refugees to Europe as much as possible. After all, it is well known that it is precisely the lack of humanitarian aid and future prospects in the countries bordering on Europe that often leads to secondary migration to Europe; this was the case, according to the authors, in the case of Syria in 2015. The two authors combine this consideration of restrictive tendencies with a market-liberal approach that relies on investments by companies in the countries bordering on conflict countries. Betts and Collier also assume that people – including migrants and refugees – are the most successful agents of socio-­ economic development. In their proposal, the differentiation of (voluntary) labour migrants and (involuntary) refugees does not play a major role. One could say that Betts and Collier are advocates of a particular manifestation of refugee management, shifting solutions from countries of arrival back to regions of origin. According to their idea, European states should then primarily regulate the situation in non-European regions. What is important in their proposal is to enable the countries of origin in the regions themselves and the refugees to help themselves. Uganda is one of the pioneers among the states striving for the economic independence of refugees (Chap. 5; Watera et al. 2017). Betts and Collier promote their solutions as an alternative to political decisions such as those of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who for a brief period in the summer

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of 2015 applied the rules of the Schengen area, which the authors call the policy of “headless hearts”. This would have started a brain drain from Syria and its bordering states – of brains that would have been desperately needed to rebuild the country. Ultimately, Betts and Collier’s proposal is a kind of developmental externalization of the refugee problem, with a focus on strengthening the economic resources of refugees, not their rights.

Political Rights for Refugees in Camps In contrast, Robin Cohen, a sociologist, and Nicholas Van Hear, a social anthropologist, advocate a rights-based approach to increasing refugee autonomy (Cohen and van Hear 2017). But instead of focusing on economic policies like Betts and Collier, they focus on political autonomy and empowerment. Cohen and Van Hear imagine a transnational polis for refugees, Refugia. All members of such a de-­ territorialized polis would receive a “Sesame” identity card or pass (“Open Sesame!”). Such a passport would not only be used for purposes of security and identification, but would also allow its bearers to move across borders between refugee camps in different countries. Centrally, it would also allow refugees access to credit and entitlements. In this respect, it has echoes of the League of Nations’ Nansen Passport in the period between the First and Second World Wars. Refugia would be spread across different states, so it would not be a territorial state. Rather, while some degree of self-government would be possible, the laws of each host state would be applicable. Nevertheless, self-government would also be a goal in democratic terms, which could be approached by constituting a global parliament. This is an element that already exists in well-known cases of diaspora such as the Tamil one. Certainly, this proposal, only very roughly sketched here, would be utopian. However, the times when most states find refugees an undue burden also call for new ways.

Forward-Looking Proposals Based on Historical Experience The two policy proposals are certainly among the more unconventional in the debate on flight and migration in Europe since 2015. Betts and Collier’s resource-­ based approach is based on market-liberal premises, namely that corporate profit and work itself – however regulated or not – increases the autonomy of actors. It is a rather technocratic perspective that adheres to social engineering and assumes

Forward-Looking Proposals Based on Historical Experience

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that social scientists and bureaucrats can make the right decisions for refugees. In contrast, Cohen and Van Hear’s policy proposal takes refugees seriously beyond the economic field. The two authors observe that states in both the Global South and the Global North have little interest in a long-term solution. They therefore propose, along the perspective of transnational migration studies, to create a transnational polis by migrants themselves, where they can make decisions for themselves. This proposal again falls back on mobility as a resource, also for refugees. A forward-looking aspect of both proposals is the realization, based on historical migration research, that it can make sense to view refugee situations not only as a humanitarian problem, but also as a task and opportunity for development processes. The current refugee regime, which has found expression in the Geneva Convention (1951) and its Protocol (1967) and institutionally in the UNHCR, aims primarily at humanitarian aid. In this, it contrasts with the post-World War I refugee regime, where the League of Nations entrusted the International Labour Organization in Geneva (ILO) with operational work (Long 2013). The ILO considered it its primary task to settle and resettle refugees in the wake of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, and to promote their economic base through employment or self-employment. In a sense, both Betts and Collier and Cohen and Van Hear harken back to the basic idea of the refugee regime in the interwar period of the twentieth century and thus extend the goals of the current regime, which aims to provide urgently needed, short-term humanitarian aid. Although the pairs of authors differ on what the foundations of longer-term aid are – material resources in the first case, and mobility and human rights in the second – they conceive of refugee movements as a task for longer-term development. Neither of the two policy proposals is (widely) discussed in the public sphere of the European states nor Africa. Nevertheless, there are opportunities to bring such considerations into the public sphere. After all, even the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, declared, “Today everything is migration” (2015, cited in de Genova 2017, p. 1). To have any chance of being heard, such proposals must certainly generate resonance, which can only succeed if they connect to existing concepts. This is not entirely impossible, as for instance the career of the term transnationalism indicates. This concept, applied to migration in the 1990s, is now well used by policy makers in Spain and France to generate development cooperation involving migrant organizations (Lacomba and Cloquell 2014). In this way, social scientists themselves bridge “structural holes” (Burt 1992), thus linking the spheres of politics, civil society and research, all three of which operate according to very different rationalities. In doing so, social scientists act as experts, but sometimes also as advocates, for example for the government or the refugees, or even as

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public intellectuals. The influence of such proposals tends to be indirect, in that thinking is steered in certain directions. Indirect effects, in turn, are those that do not, in the sense of social engineering, specify exactly what steps should be taken. But they do form a framework via concepts that can lend meaning and significance to real-world circumstances and provide the direction for proposed solutions.

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