Military rule in Burma since 1962: A kaleidoscope of views [1 ed.] 962220211X, 9789622202115

Citation preview

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962 A Kaleidoscope of Views

Edited by F. K. Lehman

Issued under the auspices of ihe Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

MARUZEN ASIA

©1981 Maruzcn Ipvestmenl (Hong Kong) Ltd.

All rights reserved. No part of this publleaiion may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

ISBN 962-220-211-X

Distributed by MARUZEN ASIA PTE. LTD. P^sir Panjang P.O. Box 67 Singapore 9111

Printed in the Republic of Singapore by Koon Wah Printing Pte. Ltd.

€30,H

CONTENTS

Preface — F.K. Lehman........................................................................ 1

n

Foreign Policy of Burma since 1962: Negative Neutralism for Group Survival — Maung Maung Gyi . . ........................

1

9

Burmese Economics: The Conflict of Ideology and Pragmatism — David J. Sieinberg.................................................... 29

III

Minority Problems.in Burma since 1962 — Josef Silverstein .............................................. ;.................................. 51

IV

Tradition in the Service of Revolution: The Political Symbolism of Taw-hlan-ye-khit —- Jon Wiant ................................... 59

V

Comments on the Recent Situation in Burma — Edwin W. Martin ..................................................................................... 13

VI

Some Reflections on Contemporary Burma — Charles F. Keyes ........................................... Contributors

............................................................................................ ■

79 82

PREFACE

The job of an editor is to edit and not to comment upon thfe papers, especially when these include two that are themselves discussions of the individual topical papers. However, happily or not, the editor also has the duty of composing a PREFACE, and it is here that he can, where he feels it utterly necessary, make his own remarks. In the presentcase, I have felt it necessary to set straight certain points brought up in the papers on which I happen to have some specialized information that has, / as far as I know, not appeared i{i the literature on Burma’s recent history. I shall do this in the form of very brief remarks addressed to the several papers in the order of their original presentation. About this, let me explain. The papers collected together in the present volume were first written for pre­ sentation ajid discussion at a panel session of the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, held in Washington, D.C., in March 1980. The panel was entitled, as is the present book, “Military Rule in Burma since 1962’’ and was organized by David I. Steinberg and the present editor at the insti­ gation of the former. It was intended to pull togfether a number of currents of thought upon the recent Burma situation, something that we felt needed doing at this time; besides, the Association had not had a general session on Burma as such in its annual meetings for several years. The present volume contains the papers and discussion from that panel, but pretty thoroughly edited and revised on the basis both of the discussions following the formal oral presentations and of corre­ spondence between the authors and the editor. All of the remarks that I might have wished to make from the vantage point of a Burnta scholar I have made in this correspondence, and the effect appears in the papers as revised for this publi­ cation. So, it is only my knowledge as an anthropologist specializing in ethnic minorities in Burma that appears in the followingBrief remarks. With regard to Professor Silverstein’s paper, I think it is necessary to point out that there were all sorts of ambiguities connected with the Federalist Seminar of early 1962, which, in some sense was not entirely clear to me. It came.at least close to collapse some few days prior to the military coup that officially brought it to an end. As it happened, I had been working through much of 1961, in the Kayah State, with the sponsorship of the then parliamentary secretary of the Kayah State, U Sein, and I had also worked previously at the end of 1960 and the start of 1961 and briefly,, in February 1962, in various parts of the then Chin Special Division (now Chin State). One of the fidnsequences of my semiofficial associa­ tion with the Kayah State was that U 3cin' had arranged that my family and I

2

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

should stop in the Kayah Stale Guest House when we were staying in Rangoon. This explains why, when the Federalist Seminars were going on, we were living at the headquarters and residence of much of the steering committee of the Feder^ist Seminar. As a matter of fact, the Kayah Guest House was one of the very first places seized by the military forces of Ne Win in the earliest hours of the morning of the coup itself, and I myself had to join the other residents in being interrogated under gunpoint. About six of these, mainly Shan, were taken away in their night­ clothes immediately thereafter. Indeed, when at dawn, a few hours later, some of us tried by telephone to find out what had transpired, we were unable to get any clear idea, and it was only some time after nine o’clock in the morning that an official announcement was made that explained what I had been witness to. It is on the basis of this unique experience that the following is written. The views of the participants in the Federalist Seminar were not at all uniform as to what Federalism might mean and how they felt about it. First, take the Shan, who, I suppose, in many respects had initiated the idea of Federalism a possible solution to the problem of the minorities in the Union of Burma. It is easy to say that one of the issues was proposed right of secession for the Shan and Kayah, a right embedded in the old Constitution anyhow. But exactly what secession might mean is not easy to answer. It is often said by the Shan, and echoed by analysts, that the Shan saw real possibilities in seceding from Burma and joining Thailand, because, after all, the Shan a^e very close linguistic relatives of the Thai. Indeed (cf. JCeyes 1970), in the past, for example, in the nineteenth century, scions of some Shan princely houses were sent to be raised or trained at the Siamese Court at Bangkok, and it is clear that this was done with the aim of signalling to the Burmese throne some sort of possibility of secession even then. However, during 1967-68, when I worked amongst the Shan in the villages and towns of northwestern Thailand, I found that the pQssibility of the Sto becoming part of Thailand was a very equivocal issue. Since this is not intended to be an analytical scholarly discussion on my part, I can state the matter succinctly. Shan ethnic-cum-political identity seems to depend historically upon, among other things, the Shan claims to have succeeded to the rulership of the first Burman* kingdom of Pagan (A.D. 1287). It is this connection with the historical Burmese throne that in large measure gives ideological and symbolical legitimacy to'the Shan system of principalities and subordinate Buddhist thrones, and it is this political system that underlies much of the Shan sense of ethnic identity. Inti­ mately interwoven with these considerations is the fact that much of Shan Theravada Buddhism is in the Burmese rather than the Thai style, and that the peculiarities of the Shan language, which make it so opaque to a Thai speaker, come to a great extent from the massive influence of the Burmese language upon

•

The term Burman, as used in this article, refers to a native speaker of the Burmae lan^age, who is a member of the dominant national majority group in Burma. Burma m^s die terntory of the Union of Burma. Burmese, where it is used for persons, refers to all ethnic and hnguistic groups residing jn the Union of Burma.

PREFACE

J I j

’

I

3

Shan, not least the fact that the form of the considerable body of Pali loanwords in Shan (Pali being the Indian language of the Theravada Buddhist scriptures) comes through the phonetic filter of the (Tibeto-Burman) Burmese language. The Shan in Thailand recognize this, not least that fairly large number of Shan who have come over from Burma during the period of Shan insurgency dating chiefly from the start of the Ne Win era. In Thailand, the Shan are at home in one sense, but not necessarily as Shan, because there they tend to be thought of simply as speakers of an odd dialect of Thai and not as a politically distinctive ethnic group. Concomitant with this is the fact that in Thailand, with its cen­ tralized educational system and a political constitution granting even lower recog­ nition to cultural minorities than is found in Burma, the younger generation show a strong tendency to lose their Shan identity •— losing first the Shan language. Moreover, in Thailand, the Shan are required by law to make their Buddhism and,their monks conform to the centralized Thai system of monastic organization. Thus, the Shan recognize that they are in a dilemma: if to secede from Burma means to join Thailand, then the very means adopted to preserve Shan autonomy may lead quite rapidly to the absorption and disappearance of the Shan as a people. This seems also to have been the attitude towards apparent threats of some Shan princes to put themselves under Thai rule in the nineteenth century. This threat always seems to involve something a good deal less than a firm princi­

r i'*

I '

; i

1 'I !1 t ■

ple, even for those who enunciate it. The Kayah situation was; and still is, even more ambiguous. On the one hand, the Kayah view of Federalism was coloured by the fact that, under the Constitution, the Kayah Slate, like the Shan States, was given the possibility of secession from the Union, and this in turn has to do with the fact that the Kayah political system of “statelets” was modeled upon and politically allied to that of the Shan States (see Lehman 1979). In that guise, the Kayah have fended since independence to dissociate themselves from the Karen in general, insisting upon the designation Kayah instead of the old Red Karen (Burmese, Karenni), even though the name Kayah is nothing but their particular form of the Karen word meaning Karen or “man”, whilst their language tl^y in fact call kayah-Ungo, the Red Karen Language. On the other hand, for other,than political purposes, every Kayah is perfectly aware that the Kayah are a kind of Karen; aqd, whatever in detail it may be, the Karen view of Federalism or of the nature of the minority problem in Burma and its possible solutions is quite a different matter. Kayah had, since Independence, been in and out of the Karen insurgency, as a matter of fact, and it appears that the Kayah State involvement in the Federalist Seminar was rhainly on the part of those leaders taking the former view of Kayah identity. In this connection it may be worth pointing out also that a related ambiguity pervaded the way various minorities looked upon their traditional leaders with regard to the problem of maintaining their autonomy within the Union of Burma. On the one hand, these traditional leaders, the Shan Sawbwas or princes, and those of the Kayah, the Chin and Kachin hereditary chiefs, and so on, the traditional political systems of which these people were a major element, were

‘4

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

important symbols of the very identity and distinctiveness of these respective minorities. On the other hand, in the increasingly relevant context of modern political rhetoric and'thought, these traditional leaders were often seen by their own people as barriers to economic and social progress and even as reactionary oppressors. The Shan and Kayah villagers I worked amongst were often led to ask what these traditional leaders had ever done for ordinary villagers. Occasional Chin rhetoric about ‘independence’ has never been accompanied by any equivalent of the Shan possibility, however equivocal, of joining with Thailand. The Chin view (Lehman 1963) of themselves is summed up in the general word they have for themselves, which is zo, meaning uncultivated, relative to Burma (yai/kawl) specifically. For these people, as all their oral “history” shows,- Burma is the particular foil against which they identify themselves. It is therefore instructive to take note of the fact that the most insistent political advo­ cacy of Chin separation from Burma has appeared in connection with the relatively restricted Chin insurgency, and that this has in considerable measure been inti­ mately tied up with the much larger} anti-Indian insurgency of the Mizo National Front (MNF), across the India-Burma border. The Mizo (formerly Lushai) are close kinsmen of the Chin, but for thepi vai (the correlative word to zo) is not identified with Burma, but rather with something vaguely Indian, more parti­ cularly Assam-Manipur-Tripura. Indeed, I would go so far-as to suggest that organized Chin insurgency, in the contempora,ry era in Burma, is a satellite of Mizo insurgency;' it has limit^ independent context in which to flourish. Finally, there is one bit of information concerning the fragility of the Feder­ alist movement that I feel obliged to report. On this point, because the issue was sensitive and I am an anthropologist and linguist and not a political student, I took no explicit notes, so I am unable to reconstruct exact dates and exact details. How­ ever, a few days before the Ne Win coup, whilst my wife and I were stopping at the Kayah Guest House, we came home in the afternoon and found the door to our room blocked by several persons involved in the Federalist Seminar arguing furi­ ously. One of these was the Sama Duwa Sinwa Naung, the Kachin leader and hereditaria chief who was then slated to become the next President of the Union of Burma. This argument went on for quite a few minytes whilst my wife and I stood by not three feet off, and at the end, the Sama Duwa stalked off angrily down the ^eat stairway, out to the driveway and into his car, telling the driver to get him out of there and making clear to the other participants in the argument that he was through with the Federalist Seminar and movement. Nobody, for some reason, made any effort to keep me from overhearing all this, nor did my having done so ever come up afterwards. I mention this incident because it provides striking evidence that the Federalist movement was far from being a homogeneous thing. Moreover, it may help to

1

My Lushai correspondents between 1963 and 1965 certainly fell that the Chin had been co-opted into insurgency for the benefit of MNF.

PREFACE

5

explain why the Sama Duwa, President designate under the old Constitution and earlier participant in the Seminar (who upon leaving the Guest House headquarters had proceeded to go up-country to the Kachin State), was allowed to come down to Rangoon again shortly after the coup without being arrested as so many of the Federalist leaders had been the night of the coup itself.-Several of the Chin partici­ pants, some of them retired Burma army officers, were likewise allowed to leave Rangoon after the coup and were not arrested that night at the Kayah Guest House. To Dr. Maung Maung Gyi’s. paper; I would also, like to add a couple of remarks. The first is that there is ond motivation of the stance of “negative neu­ tralism” that must not be lost sight of. Burma lives in,the immediate neighbour­ hood of China, and China is seen as potentially more than just a more-thanoccasional supporter of the Burmese communist insurgents. As one of my ac­ quaintances then on the General Staff put it, if the Chinese sent just their million^ of women and children armed with sticks and stones against the entire Burma army, Burma would probably get swallowed up. Ifithat attitude had any currency in higher Army circles, we can perhaps better understand the“negative” aspects of Ne Win’s neutralism: it has been a way of not antagonizing powerful neigh­ bours at least cost to independence and autonomy. The Chin in particular throw light upon the relationship between minority efforts to advance the cause of autonomy within the Union of Burma and the con­ nection of the minorities with countries and peoples outside Burma. Rather like the Karen, the Chin have had a close association with Christianity and mission­ aries since the end of the nineteenth century. The actual number of converts was not perhaps great: at most 25% of the Chin population at the beginning of the 1960s. But the political leadership and the educated Chin in general were almost all Christians, chiefly but not exclusively American Baptist Mission communi­ cants. Moreover, the syipbolical importance of Christianity politically was obvious even for nonconverts. Political identification with Christianity, with a Church, gave the Chin a basis for treating with the Burmans on a more or less equal footing. The Chin are traditionally animists, and as such particularly looked down upon by traditional Burmans. To appear to the Burmans as people’v^th a literate and sophisticated cultural tradition, the Chin had, so to speak, two choices: to become Buddhists in the Burman mould, or to adhere to some other world religion. The first course was unacceptable to most Chin, because it would have amounted to giving in to the Burmans; so the Chin took the sedond course, although this is obviously a vast oversimplification. Not a few Chins in the less Christianized Southern Chin Hill^ were wont to speak of the possibility of conversion as “joining the Christian Party”. We should draw the conclusion th^t it is false to suggest that, the mino­ rities have been simply manipulated by outside countries for the interests of the latter, or that their only reason for seeking a connection with oqtside countries has been merely pragmatic and material — seeking military and political assistance. As a matter of fact, at the time of John F. Kennedy’s first presidential election

6

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

campaign in the United States, some missionaries preached actively against Kennedy on the grounds that Kennedy was a Roman Catholic. Many Chin reacted by strongly rejecting this more than merely irnplicit claim to identify Baptist Christianity with American culture or the American political system. This leads me to make a remark that is largely relevant to Professor Keyes’s comments. The Chin connection with foreign institutions is different from that of many of the minorities. It is, as I have just suggested, in large measure symbolical. Concomitantly, the Chin are almost not at all involved in the shadow foreign trade economy. Consequently, with the exception mentioned earlier on,‘the Chin foreign connection has resulted in very little organized insurgency. Finally, having regard to Jon Wiant’s paper, it ought to be pointed out that -the real or potential factional split in the Army between those in power in govern­ ment and those who are officers in the fields is by no means a novel phenomenon. At least it was often said in Burma in 1961-62 tha't one of the reasons that the first Ne Win (Caretaker) Government gave power back to the civilian politicians w^ that in its brief life it had already come to experience this same factionalism, which threatened the very unity of the Army-if allowed to continue. Furthermore, still setting straight the record, the Caretaker regime did not, as is often said (once at least in this volume), come into being virtually without fore­ thought‘when the split between the ClpAn and Stable-factions of the Antifascist People'’s Freedom League (ApPFL) threatened to bring down the government altogether. It is commonly alleged that either U Nu called in Ne Win and urged him to prevent this by taking over the Country, or that Ne Win persuaded U Nu to do this, immediately before it actually happened. However, to my direct know­ ledge, the troop movements in and about Rangoon that made possible such a bloodless coup were under way a couple of months at Ipast before the coup itself. I got wind of this quite accidentally, when I met some Chin soliders whose units I had thought were stationed far from Rangoon. They told me that they were there to replace troops in such essential support units as the central Arniy motor pool, and that it Seemed from what they had been told that this had been done, and was still being done then, in anticipation of some move by the Army that required the absolute reliability and loyalty of troops in the area of the capital. Subsequently, I mentioned this to a General Staff officer’I was acquainted with, who had up to then stoutly maintamed (he official thesis that the Caretaker coup was a spur-ofthe moment thing, and he more Or less admitted that these troop movements had been in anticipation of at least the possibility of such a coup. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that the final and definite decision on the coup was taken before the actual event..What it shows clearly, once again, is that even the possi­ bility of government by the military in Burma has always been constrained by limitations upon internal unity within the military itself. I have published?the papers in an order that seems to me to'make sense: Dr. Maung Maung Gyi’s paper more or less sets the stage,nelling us about the general framework of the Burma Government from the tinje of the coup in 1962 and about the history of this era, albeit from the angle of foreign policy.

PREFACE

7

David Steinberg’s paper is equally broad, but it takes off from the early 1970s, giving us the economics of the. general changes in the country and in the framework of government during this era. Professor Silverstein’s paper is more specialized, and it lets us see in some detail the relationship between Burmese politics ih the Ne Win era and the inherited problems attendant upon Burma’s being a country composed of many different peoples. Finally, Jon Wiant’s paper attempts a cultural analysis of the politics of the Ne Win era, and there; follow ■comments, respectively, by Professor Martin, looking from the inside as a former American Ambassador to Burma, and by Professor Keyes, looking in from the wider point of view of a Southeast Asian scholar, thoroughly familiar with Burma but primarily orientated to Thailand.

F. K. Lehman ^Department of Anthropology University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois

REFERENCES Keyes, Charles'F. 1970. “New Evidence on Northern Thai Frontier History.” Pp. 221-249 in Tej Bunnag and Michael Smithies, eds., Jn Memoriam PhyaAnumdn Rajadhon. Bangkok: The Siam Society. . . Lehman, F. K. 1963. The Structure of Chin Society. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Lehman F K 1979. “Who Are the Karen, and If So, Why?” Pp. 215-253 in Charles F. Keyes, ed., EthnicAdaptationandfdenlity:TheKarenontheThaiFrontier^ithBurma.Phi\s.-W“tern stance cover the entire period. But until the year 1966 the tone of anti-Amencanism was unmistakable. A more charitable view would be to sa^y that it was not so much a case of anti-Americanism as of oro^tiontoWstei^re^owev^, institutions and programmes, BahTthTiargest in the country, felt the axe more poignantly than others when the Revolutionary Council made the decision early i April 1962 to terminate the activities of the foreign private agencies such as Asia Foundation. Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Museum projret. The U.S Infonpation Library, the British Council, and the ^mencan Consulate at Mandalay were also ordered to be closed. These institutions were seen centres of k cultural neocolonialism, disseminating the evil influence of the d^^nt 1 To the overzealous neopurist military head, the conduit pipe of imltural hmperialism” had to be shut off before it conoded the whole society. Viewing themselves as born-again ultrapatriots, the members of the Idetermined to save Burma not only from disintegration in the face of cemnfug feudalist forces but also from cultural pollution and segmentation fomented by these foreign institutions. The barmmg of horseracing ^and b^u^ 'tontests came ni.t nf.th&sam&«ioulli.of_thought.‘' At one point, an official request ■-^^^SXZtha11fe;S?pfo»e of the British Broatohng Corporation (BBC) beamed lo the teenage population. Some Amencan insUtutions were also seen as agents of the Central IntelUgence Agency (CIA).

3 4 5

Studies, Ohio University, 1974) p. 32.

NEGATIVE NEUTRALISM FOR GROUP SURVIVAL

75

Apart from the preconceived anti-Western bias, much of the regime^ foreign policy stance was dictated by the vagaries of domestic policies and nolitics. As the regime rah into dp^f^llibU fronnhe Students, the political parties, the business circle, and some religious quarters, the fear of possible foreign help to these groups ceased to be imaginary. Inadvertent reference to’ the United States as a possible source of help by some irresponsible leaders put that country in a very awkward position. The Revolutionary Government did allow a subtle mass media campaign against the “capitalist-imperialist” powers without actually identifying any particular foreign power, but the allusion to the United States was obvious. Some columnists would even use the label nga-pwa-gee (Mr. Bloated) to mean Uncle Sam. Anti-American feeling may partly be traced to Ne Win’s antipathy towards America arising out of the commonplace treatment he received on his earlier visit to the United States in I960,® and his feeling that the United States was not sincere enough in bringing about the end of the Kuomintang troops’ presence in the Shan States.’ Also in March 1963, a rumour was afloat about possible “outside” interference and the sighting of a foreign submarine believed to be from the West in the waters near Mergui.® “AU these imagined fears and hurt feelings made Ne Win nervous about his relationship with the United States.”’ At the outset, the Revolutionary Council’s desire to remain positively neutral and evenhanded towards all foreign countries may be seen as genuine, although the leftist members of the junta had axes to grind .against both the United States and Communist China, the former for its cultural intrusion and the latter for its abetment of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) through its counterpart within China.'® Its immediate concern, however, was to set the house of Burma in order, and to get rid of the vestiges of the colonial days, a task it viewed as left undone by the previous Parliamentary Government and the Caretaker Government headed by General Ne Win, the same head of the Armed Forces but guided by a different philosophy and surrounded by a group of Western-oriented senior officers at the time. This time the leftist-oriented Revolutionary Council members felt they needed to stay in power for a longer period. A rationale for the seizure of political power from the civilian-U Nu Government was not enough. A theoretical basis for its continuance in'power was imperative. A logical st^, therefore, was the for­ mulation of a new political programme called “the Burmese Way to Socialism”, which was duly announced by the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council on 30, April 1962 at the conference of the Commanding Officers. Armed with this state ideolngv of the ‘ ‘RiiKmeseJyaylQ Socialism”, Ne Win A was determined tn rpvnh^£ianigAthftant;r1itlcaLflnd.eennorTiic system, Parlia- \ mentary democracy had to be ended for good as it was highly divisive, weak, and

6 7 8 9 10

Ibid., p. 32. Ibid, p. 35.

The Guardian, 3 April 1963. The Future of Burma, p. 35. Ibid., p. 37.

14

»

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

/-inefficient, and it only served the interests of the feudal elements, exploiti^ land\ lords; national and foreign capitalists, and economic opportunists The two Chambers of the National Assembly had already been disbanded on the second ( day of the coup, the Election Commission on.8, March 1962, and the Supreme

Vourt and the High Court on 30 March 1962. k was perfectly clear that the new military regime was leftist-oriented, and that^t would restructure the politica system to suit its political, social, and economic needs and goals; yet itwas not clear how the junta would proceed in reorganizing the national economy.. There were connicting signals from within the Revolutionary Council. Brigadier Aung Gyi, Ne Win’s seoond-ih-command, was for moderate economic reforms, and said so in his press interview a week after the take-over Even foreign investors would be allowed to invest in industries which were beyond the resources of the local investors.'^ Moreover, the.Burmese Way to Socialism programme - / guaranteed a positive role for private businessmen who were Burmese citizens and > who would work in cooperation with the programme. Aung Gyi repeated his V VJ X liberal views on Burma’s need for economic modernization at his press interview in Tokyo while serving as Head of the Burmese Reparations Mission to Japan. Meanwhile, General Ne Win had been converted to the radical views of Brigadier Tin Pe, who in turn was influenced by the “red” Socialists and crypto-Communists They were for complete state control of the entire national economy. A week after his arrival from J^pan, Aun^ Gyi was given the sack by Ne Wip. He lost aU his positions - the Vice-Chief of Staff, Minister for Trade Development. Chairman of the newly constituted Board of Dnectors of the state-owned Burma Oil Company, and membership of the Revolutionary Council.” t The Revolutionary Council’s swing towards the extrerne left was confimed , , by the publication of the philosophy of the Burma Socialist Programme Party I (BSPP) called TTie System of.Correlation of Man and His Environment. It is in essence a rehash of nineteenth century Mafxism with a dash of Buddhist philos­ ophy, a strange mixture of the concept of ‘ ‘ three worlds’ ’, class antagonism, and the law of impermanence. It did not spell out per se the direction and course the foreign policy should take but it laid down the fundamental principles of a new economic and political system which would provide guidelines for both domestic and foreign policies. Centrally guided democracy and centrally planned economy were envisaged^’ ‘Without centralism society will tend towards anarchism, says “the System-wanted4o be in the best political form possible. The shadow of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia was beginning to be cast widely, an'd Ne Win wanted to assure his pankphaw friends in the North that Burma would not align itself with Russia. Ne Win’s main obsession was the entrenched position of the BCP in the Northeastern corner of Burma which he found very difficult to dislodge because of China’s support. He did pay a state visit earlier in 1975 but nothing substantial was achieved on that score. He tried again in 1977 but with no appreciable improvement in the border situation. At present, Ne Win is completely at the mercy of his paukphaw government which must of necessity play a power game to prevent Russia’s “hegemonic” designs in Southeast Asia. For the survival of his “group”, Ne Win will have to play an extremely delicate balancing act between Russia and China. A move'closer to Russia could bring in China under the guise of a strong BCP force. Ne Win fully realizes this point. Perhaps he is also well aware of the words of wisdom in the two well-known Burmese proverbs, namely, (1) “because one is afraid of a tiger one seeks the help of a nat (literally, spirit), but alas, the nat is far worse than the tiger”, and (2) “a nearer sword is more dangerous than a distant one”. Hence he is trying his best to strike a friendly and peaceful posture in his dealings with a powerful neighbour. Why not? It has worked out sojvej.1 so far, and incidentally ifl has saved the country from third power involvement. In his relations with Beijing] Ne Win has followed a policy of appeasement, “the BurmeseAVav”. It is nol wonder that his Foreign Minister at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana (1979) played the Chinese card. On the grounds that the Non-Aligned Movement has deviated from the basic principles, the Burmese delegation notified the Con­ ference that it “will withdraw from the conference and Burma will end her partici­ pation in the movement.”^® 56 57 58

FEER, 11 May 1979. FEER, 7 October 1977, and 23 December 1977. Working People's Daily, 30 September 1979, pp. 1,4. Also see the Report of the Council of State concerning Burma’s action at the Sixth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, presented to the fourth session of the Second Pyithu-Hluttaw in Working People’s Daily, 9 October 1979.

28

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

Writing on Ne Win’s dilemma in his relationship with China, one correspon­ dent quotes the remarks of apolitical commentator as follows, “By wanting to be everybody’s friend, or more exactly nobody’s foe, he has ended up pretty well [nobody’s anything.’’ The quote seems like a smart q^, but Ne Win does not svant to be “everybody’s friend’’ or “nobody’s foe’’.^ll he wants is to be left

alone so that he may promote his “Burmese Socialism” without outside inter­ ference, and to protect his “group” interests at the same time. His policy of iso­ lation, noninvolvement in regional matters (such as his refusal to join ASEAN), bilateral summit approach to resolve outstanding issues with neighbouring’states, and selective acceptance of foreign loans and aid are all directed at kepping him­ self and his “group” in power so that he can mould the nation in the way he likes best. So far, he has succeeded in keeping his “group” in power although the same cannot be said of his “Burmese Socialism”. From his and his group’s viewpoint, foreign policy since 1962 is unquestioningly “positive’ ’, but from t^viewpoint of the masses and the country, it cannot be anything but “negative’^

II

BURMESE ECONOMICS: The Conflict of Ideology and Pragmatism David I. Steinberg

’ Between 28 June and 11 July 1971, the First Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP or Lanzin Party) was held. It was the inaugural meeting of the Lanzin Party as.a mass organization. It had been a cadre party since its con­ stitution was published in ,1962. During that meeting, the Congress considered a, paper that was to pinpoint important changes in Burmese economic policy. It was formally adopted as policy at the fourth meeting'of the BSPP Central Committee on 22-27 September 1972. This seminar paper. The Long-Term and Short-Term Economic Policies of the Burma Socialist Programme Party,' was to have a profound effect on the Burmese economy. It articulated a major shift in developmental priorities and operational procedures. These changes were justified in broad ideological terms, but they reflected a pragmatism in approach to socialist planning, a pragmatism that had also been evident in the civilian period of Burmese independence. The causes of this shift in policy, its effects, and whether the changes that were mandated will prove to be evanescent or permanent are the questions this paper will address. The hypothesis of this paper is that the degree to which these changes are implemented, the effectiveness of their translation into action, and the efficacy of foreign donor support of them will in part determine the prospects for the Burmese economy and the improvement in,the well-being of its citizens.

ROOTS OF IDEOLOGY The origins of socialism in Burma are well known. They were a response to^ ^4he identification of capitalism with imperialism afichforeign domination of the a economy of pre-World War 11 Burma, infusion of socialist thinking through the education of the intelligentsia in England, and an association of socialism with | Elements of Buddhist nationalism.2 Although the effects of these socialist in--^

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Agency for International Development or the Department qf State. Burma Socialist Programme Party, Long-Term and Short-Term Policies of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (Rangoon: Planning Department, Ministry of Planning and Finance, December 1973). For example, see E. Sarkisyanz, Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965); Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); and David I. Steinberg, Burma: The Road Toward Development. Growth and Ideology under Military Rule (Westview Press, forth­ coming).

30

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

fluences on the mass otfeBgasantry at the villagekvel may have been minimal, the ideology, however vaguel^understood and poorly articulated it may have been, was pervasive among the elites. It was the hallmark of all Burmese govern­ ments since independence. It was less influenced by the international socialist. movement than by indigenous factors. Maw, the(doy^of prewar Burmesd^ / politicians, summed up Burmese intellectual attitudes best. Remarking on the 1962 publication of The Burmese iVay to Socialism, he said that because it was socialist it was good, but because it was Burmese it was better. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE BURMESE MILITARY TILL 1972

The military elites of the coup period were influenced by the same forces that affected the civUian polifirians^of the IQSfk fill if not the administrative establish­ ment that the military distrusted. This close identification, personal and ideologi­ cal, of military and civilian politicians has often been noted in the literature.^ Both were leaders in the independence struggle, a struggle that was more political than military. ’ Prior to the coup, the military had developed considerable experience in (economic affairs and in administration. During the period of the Caretaker ,Governmcnt (1958-60), the military had develoiTed botlTexperience^d com­ petence in running far-flung economic pnterprises. Starting-Moth the Defence Services Institute, a postexchange activity at its inception, it expanded into virtu­ ally all economic activities of the state, from international shipping to internal trade and production.-* The relative ease with which the military ameliorated the short-term economic problems facing the state may have given them confidence in ^dealing with the -longer term problems that faced the nation following the military coup. The army also had considerable experience in administering parts of the country since World War II when, for a period, the Burma Independence Army ran 80% of the major towns, and 90% of those'in Lower Burma.’ During -the civilian period, they in fact also administered major portions of the rural areas where the insurgencies were the greatest.threat. This confidence in economic and .administrative affairs turned out to be misplaced. Immediately following the coup, economic policy seemed to vacillate in spite of the rapidity with which the three major documents guidingjnilitary rule were

3

See, for example, Lucian Pye, Politics, Personglity, and Nation Building: Burma’s Search for Indentity (New Haven: Yale University Press, J962); and Moshe Lissake, Military Roles in Modernization, Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma (Beverly Hills: Sage Pubu-

cations, 1976).

4

Is Trust Vindicated? A Chronicle ofa Trust, Striving, and Triumph. Being an Account oj the Accomplishments of the Government of the Union of Burma. I November 1958-1 February 1960 (Director of Information, Rangoon: 1960).

5

Dorothy Guyot, “The Burma Independence Army: A Political Movement in Military Garb ’ in Josef Silverstein, ed,, Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays. Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series No. 7 (New Haven: Yale University. 1966).

BURMESE ECONOMICS: THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

3J

(produced (T/ie Burmese IFaj to Socialism, 30 April 1962; TheConstitutiorLnfthp

A Wur/nGSocwfo/PTOgram/nePffz-zy, 4 July 1962; and The System of Correlation of and His Environment, 17 January 1963). Initially there were indications that .the military would move slowly in the economic sphere, and that emph^is would he placed on agriculture.^ However, with the ouster in February 1963 of Brigadier Aung Gvi (generally regarded as a moderate) and the ascendancy shortly the^tec-of Rjigariler Tin Pe and 11 Ba Nyein as keV SPOkesmen-of the new policy,, f hP-pacfiU2^£-jtate_pnntrnl increased

Nationalization began with the Imperial Chemical Industries on 1 August 1962. It was followed by the Burma Oil Company on 1 January 1963. In February of that year, the Enterprise Nationalization Law, stipulating that all major industries were to be nationalized by 1 June 1963, was promulgated. All banks, foreign and domestic, were nationalized on 23 February. Ne Win announced on 15 February -''' that no new private industry would be allowed. Nationalization of consumer in­ dustries (department stores, warehouses, wholesale shops) was announced in August 1963 and the People’s Stores Corporation was established on 24 September 1963 to handle all import and distribution of foreign goods and the distribution of bcaLgoods. Nationalization,proceeded rigorously in 1964 and 1965.’ It was not until 28 Mprch J£6A-with promulgation of the Law to Protect I National Solidarity, that'all political parties, except the BSPP, were banned and ^11 their-property and assets confiscated. That same year the press was nationalized. The government at the same time embarked on a major programme of indus­ trialization. During the first decade of military rule, about one billion kyat were invested in this programme, 9O’?^o of it from Burmese sources. Foreign assistance was modest, the major donor continuing to be the Japanese. In spite of this effort, the effects were limited. By the time of the First Party Congress in 1971, the positive economic results of military rule were yet to be de­ monstrated. Income per capita in current prices had risen from K284 in 1961 /62* to K390 in 1971/72, but in constant prices it had only increased from K345 to K379. It was Still below 1938/39 levels; it had been K395.3 at that time, while by 1970/71 it was only K374.I (Table 2-1). The albin^rtant rice production eco­ nomy had not performed well. Acreage in paddy was. h ,359,000 acres in 1961/62; it had risen to 12,300,000 acres by 1971/72, and paddy production had also grown from 6.7 million tons to eight million tons-over the same period. Production increases barely kept pace with-the growth of population. Even worse for the overall economy, rice and rice exports as a percentage of production fell drama­ tically: from 42.2*7o in 1961/62 to 14.9% in 1971/72. Rice exports declined from yp ,676,000 tons in 1961/62 to 715,000 tons in 1971/72. The value of rice exports had also dijastically declined. It was US$134.5 million in 1964/65, but only $52.7

Interview with Brigadier Aung Gyi, New York Times, 7 March 1962. For a Chronology of events bn Burma 1962-79. see Appendix A, Steinberg, op. cit. pates separated by a stroke (e.g. 1961/62) indicate Burmese fiscal years. Dates like 1962-63 indicate calendar years”.

32

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962 TABLE 2-1 PER CAPITA ODP

(In Constant 1970/71 Prices)

Year

1938/39 1947/48 1948/49 1951/52 1956/57 1961/62 1966/67 1970/71 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76

Real GDP (Million Kyat)

Real GDP Per Capita (Kyat)

6,483 4,663 3,983 4,767 6,424 7,758 8,355 10,388 11,088 11,620 12,321

395.3 262.1 218.1 254.4 304.0 335.4 330.1 374.1 375.6 385.2 399.6

million in 1071/79 (Tah1pJ2-2). Agrieulture had pfferlivrly been de-emphasized. Public capital'expenditures on it-in 1964/65 had been 11.39Zo; by 1970/71 it 4.4*7o. Such expenditures in processing and manufacturing had risen from 13.4'vo

Xo 39.5'Vb over the same period (Table 2-3). The export trade had also decreased by about half during the same period. In 1961/62 it was K12,718 lakhs, but by 1971/72 it was only K6,860 lakhs* (Table 2-4). There were fewer consumer commodities. Imports of consumer goods had decreased'as a percentage of imports. It had been 38.IVo in ^964/65, butby 1971/72 it was 11% (Table 2-5). Domestic savings as a percentage of GNP had declined from 12.8

’ 92.9 122.3

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977*

100 133.04

123.53 159.8

156.85 200.96

206.38 267.00

252.59

249.67

' 1978 ^as 234.62, according to the Report to the Pyithu Hlutlaw 1979/80.

38

MILITARY rule IN BURMA SINCE 1962

REASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES There were a series of events in the late 1960s that were to have a profound effect on the economic policies of the Burmese Government. Some were economic, others political. It is impossible to determine which, if any, of these, among other possible factors, played a role leading to the First Congress of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and the economic decisions that it endorsed. These events may have been unrelated, but perhaps separately, in combination, or cumulatively, they may have prompted the moves that were to take place. The economy by 1967 was in serious trouble. There were shortages of rice and other essential foodstuffs which wete either not available or were illegally sold on the black market at exorbitant prices. Riots by workers broke out in August 19^. Brigadier Tin Pp, repntpH grchitPfTnf tbp dnrtrinaire socialist .policy

among the military, and iLBa Nyein, its civilian proponent, were losing influence. Ne Win could not hold all his political prisoners indefinitely, and by 1968 he had released most of them, including U Nu (who had been released earlier). In that year U Nu travelled around the country raising funds for Arakanese victims of a typhoon and tidal wave. It was a humanitarian and Buddhist gesture, and osten­ sibly apolitical. He was welcomed everywhere, but the political overtones were not lost on everyone. A few pyas donated for the Arakanese was a gesture of protest against the military. The anti-Chinese riots occurred in 1967 when the Cultural Revolution spilled over into Rangoon. In June the Burmese rioted against the Chinese because of economic motives as much as those of political nationalism. The Chinese had been accused of hoarding and thus raising prices in their shops during the rice crisis.'The army may not have been displeased to see an external focus for popular unrest^ In 1968 , the major irritant to security in Burma Proper was removed when, in September, Thak|nJ3iaiLluiiUeader of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) was

assassinated by members of his own group, and the BCP remnants from Centr^ ■^urma retreated into the wild and inaccessible reaches of the Wa state, across the Salween on the China border where, following the anti-Chinese riots, Peking gave the BCP support after denouncing the Ne Win Government as a “ fascist dictator­ ship”. Tension with the Chinese may have contributed to the perceived urgent need for military rule through an institutionalized mass moverhent. There were also growing rumours Of major offshore oil reserves that some felt might solve the economic problems that seemed intractable. This may have heightened the regime’s.optimism, as foreign oil companies began to express interest in exploring this potential. Ne Win had indicated in 1962 that the early period of the BSPP was a tran­ sitional one, and that thought should be given to its new stage as a mass party, when it would replace the Revolutionary Council. In what may have been'a second attempt at national reconciliation, the first having been the abortive negotiations with the insurgents in 1963, Ne Win formed in 1968 an Internal Unity Advisory

BURMESE ECONOMICS: THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

39

Body of thirty-three civilians who were,to report to him by 31 May 1969 with recommendations for the future structure of government. There was no unanimity of views in the final report. Eighteen members called for the restitution of the Constitution of 1947, while eleven advocated a national unity congress leading to a single party socialist state. U Nu issued a separate report, demanding his return to power as the last legitimate Prime Minister,, after which he would turn over power, as he had in 1958, to Ne Win legally under the old constitution. Ne Win rejected these alternatives, and U Nu was allowed to go on a supposed pilgrimage to India in April, even before the final report was in, after which he reached London and Washington where he tried to raise money to buy arms to overthrow the military. In 1969 Ne Win began to move concretely towards the formation of the Lanzin Party as a mass movement rather than continuing it as an elitist cadre organization composed of a handful of military officers. The stage had been set by the acceptance of “candidate” members of the party, a process that had gone on for some years. The resulting First Congress of the BSPP from 28 June to 11 July 1971 was momentous for Burma in several fields. It brought together for the first time over 1,200 delegates to the party meeting. In addition, the process of formulating a new constitution with the BSPP as the only legal political party began, and economic policy was reexamined.

LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC POLICIES OF BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAMME PARTY

This paper, 97 pages long in translation, was a remarkably candid document that both set forth the problems that the economy had faced over the previous decade of military rule and expounded new tactics that have been, "in their vicissitudes, the guiding economic principles of the Burmese economy since that date. It was the formal genesis of present long-term Burmese economic planning. This paper called for the drawing up of a Twenty-Year Plan to be divided into five four-year plans. It stated that since the “conditions are not favorable for adoption of a definitive long-term plan at the moment,” only general guidelines should be adopted for the Twenty-Year Plan. It called for implementation of The Burmese IVay to Socialism as the foundation of economic, social, and political objectives. It set forth broad areas that were permitted to the private sector and called for the diversification of the economy. The report listed the priorities for development: \ (a) (b)

(c)

The first priority is to expand production in agriculture, fishery, livestock and forestry sectors and to increase their exports. The second priority is to set up consumer goods industries to substitute (replace) imports by expansion of agriculture, fishery livestock and forestry sectors. The third priority is to raise mineral production to the highest possible level and to lay foundations for heavy industries based on such mineral production.

40

MILITARY RULE IN BURMA SINCE 1962

It noted that the BSPP Central'Committee was to determine in detail short-term economic policies that would be followed to attain the long-term goals set forth in the paper. The general economic policies of the BSPP were explicitly set forth: Policy Objectives {a)

[

(b)

(c)

(d) (e)

(f) (g) .(h) (i) (j) (k)

(1) (m) (n)

In laying (down) the general economic policies by the Burma Socialist Pro­ gramme Party, the following are the policy objectives: To lay the economic, social and political foundations of socialism in the Union of Burma Socialist Republic within the twenty-year period. To have consistency of the economic policies between the various economic sectors. To achieve success in the implementation of national economy by planning and to promote progress of the economic structure of the Union of Burma proportionately. To establish the economic system on a commercial basis. To guide and supervise systematically and to ensure that the managers take more and more of their respective responsibilities in the Economic activities. Workers should assume more responsibilities commensurate with getting more rights. To reduce damages and misappropriations of, properties owned by public and cooperatives. To form a financial supervision system that is in line with the economic enter­ prises. To reduce th^ cost of production and to raise productivity. To reduce prices of basic consumer goods and to promote welfare of the working people especially in regard to food, clothing and shelter. To utilize the means ofproduction of public and private sectors for the country’s optimal benefit. To eliminate unemployment and the black market. To establish the education system in line with the economic enterprises. To promote better economic relations with foreign countries.

The repVt stressed the deficiences of the Burmese economic situation, a situation that had been deteriorating rapidly in the late 1960s as rice procurement dropped and exports and foreign exchange earnings fell precipitously. The defects the Central Organizing Committee of the BSPP noted were as follows: (a) Although the Burma Socialist Programme Party was able to lay down the precise political programme, it was not able to lay down a precise economic programme and long-term economic policies. (b) In carrying out the tasks of the government organizations by laying down the most feasible economic policies, cooperation and coordination between them is weak and the economid policies for each of them are also inconsistent. (c) The national economy has lyt been imnlemenfed effectively by planning. (d) Managers of the governm^t dep^ments and public enterprises have been canying out the economic activities in quasi-administrative ways rather than in commercial style. (e) Owing to the weakness of the managers in taking the responsibilities at various stages, the systematic control and management of the workers is not possible, thereby leading to a slackness in discipline. (f) Although the workers are, getting more rights, they are not diitiful to their responsibilities to the same extent. (g) More damages*and misappropriations of public properties are found and yet the effective'action and punishment taken are very rare.

BURMESE ECONOMICS: THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

41

(h) Since the financial supervision system is not in line with the nature of some industries and establishments, the difficulties arose in the process of production and also hindered the increase in production. (i) The system of transferring the factory products to the trade organizations at factory cost led to the higher costs of production and the lower productivity. (j) Raising the priCes of some commodities due to the financial difficulties led to the higher commodity prices thereby affecting the cost of living of the working people. (k) Althou^ the public investment is increasing, the total investment of the country declined due to the private investment not being permitted in the economic acti­ vities permissable to the private sector under the socialist system. (l) Since the private investment is not permitted the economic activities on the one hand and public enterprises are not able to make employment on the other hand, unemployment and black marketing business are increasing. (m) Present education system is not exactly in line with the economic activities due to the inability to draw the systematic manpower planning. (n) High cost of administration and production weaknesses are due to the method of employment emphasis placed more in the administrative rather than the produc­ tive sector. (o) Weakness in economic relations with foreign countries.

The report discussed in detail the need to rectify the defects of each of the sectors of the economy, including Hnance and national planning, industrial and natural resource policies, agriculture and related fields, trade, construction, communi­ cation, etc. The policy implications for Burma were momentous. The industrialization strategy of the nation, the doctrinaire approach to a socialist state, was overthrown.Cinstead, those sectors in which BuflTlH "atiiral endowment were to be given priority^^e government admitted that Burma was an agricultural state and that this field should receive the highest priority in developmental planning? Together with the emphasis on forestry, livestock, and fisheries, stress wduld be placed on more traditional Burmese sectors of economic advantage. The develop­ ment of Burmese mining potential was deemed to be the third priority, again a recognition that Burma’s potential had not only been neglected, but that the mining sector had not performed at pre-war levels at any time since independence (Table 2-9). The sepond priority was to be given to the long^uffering Burmese consumer, by placing stress on the production of consumer products. The plight of the con­ sumer was emphasized throughout the report. The government also began public­ ly to recognize its own weaknesses, and to call for reform. The admission that there were serious, structural administrative problems facing the country, that responsibility was not taken and not delegated, and that bureau,cratic attitudes were widespread were all particularly important. Of great significance was the tacit recognition that altruism alone would not allow the Burmese economy to grow, and that material incentives had to be pro­ vided. The commercialization of state enterprises,- the payment of incentives to those organizations or individuals who performed well was a major shift in govern­ ment thinking and one which was to have a salutary effect over time on the growth of the economy.

TABLE 2-9 METAL PRODUCTION

Commodity (tons)

1938/39

1959/60

1963/64

1966/67

1969/70

276 (344) 496 (275) 31,600a

343 (378) 372 (398) 522 (580) 16,121 (16,525) 14,931 (14,152) 831 (800) 85 (1,062) — — 10,081 (9,600)

149 (181) 114 (126)

168 (195) 77 (83) 284

232

7,636 (7,518) 7,205 (6,968) 248 (409) 90 (197) 428 177 11,386

Copper matte

7,800

136

Nickel speiss

3,270

364

Antimonial lead

1,180

I0,453»

Refined lead

76,950

Zinc concentrate

61,700

4.275

Tin concentrate

5,441

1,306

Tungsten concentrate

—

Iron ore Antimony Coal

— —

1972/73

1951/52

792 6,677(’5I) 128

17,743 (18,283) 1,044 349

15,670 791

Sources: Report to the People

1971/72. Statistical Yearbook likSl. 1969 & 1976.

« Lead ores and concentrates, including galena, lead slag, and antimonial lead. *». Provisional. Note; Statistics in brackets are from Report to the People 1971/72.

11,510 (13,163) 8,332 (9,812) 444 (596) 95 (161) 4,442 — 16,068

1974/75

1976/77

197.7/78”

86

90

83

40 (78) 40

58

75

475

173

116

125

9,659

3,210

2,721

5,198

7,060

4,825

3,860

6,000

350

385

545

319

332

468

491 9,385

945 13,095

— — 18,398

— — 27,000

BURMESE ECONOMICS: THE CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

43

There was also the recognition that the government had been slighting the ^private sector, a sector that,*in spite of socialist goals, continued to have an important function in the society. The report indicated that the neglect of guide­ lines for the private sector had resulted in stagnation in employment there, while the government did not have the resources to provide either employment or goods. This resulted in a growth of the black market and unemployment, serious proj^ems which the BSPP had to face. v^inally, the report reversed the isolation of Burma in economic terms?\WhiIe Burma had carefully continued its traditional neutralist policy in foreign ^relations, foreign economic relations had deteriorated, and there was recognition I that if Burma wanted development, it could no longer rely on its own resources. ' Outside assistance was required.